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COMMON SENSE:

IN A

LETTER

TO A

FRIEND.

By Henry Shears Esq.r, Co: Cork

In a FREE COUNTRY he, who holds Knowledge from the People, means to make their Ignorance an Inſtrument to inſlave them.

Proceeding of the Commons vindicated.

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Houses of the Oireachtas

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LETTER to a FRIEND.

Dear SIR,

YOU deſire my Sentiments on our political Occurrences, and ſhall have them with Honeſty and Conciſeneſs. I am conſcious I write to a Friend, and, therefore, little anxious about the Guiſe in which my Sentiments appear.

Simplicity of Argument and Stile is a neceſſary Attendant on the Cauſe of TRUTH; few *laboured* Performances on a plain Subject have any Foundation but *Deceit*. When great Pains are taken to *force* us into an Opinion, we may reſt aſſured it is ſuch a one as would never occur in the *ſtrait*, and *natural* Path of Reaſon.

I have but one Difficulty in my Way. To you I need not clear myſelf; but, ſhould you ſo far approve my Sentiments as to publiſh them, ſome Defence may perhaps be neceſſary to a Reader, for the Liberty I may take in my Cenſure of the Proceedings of certain Perſons, whoſe Rank and Authority ſeem to demand a large Degree of Reverence. To the Reader then do I ſolemnly declare, that I deteſt Scurrility, and mean to avoid every Expreſſion that tends that Way; if I ſhould cenſure, I aim ſolely at the *Action*, not the *Man*; it would be hard if *Miſconduct* ſhould, at all Events, gain Sanction from *Splendor* or *Power*, and that all Freedom of Opinion on bad Meaſures, ſhould be damp'd by the Appellations of licentious Libel, and perſonal Invective. But this is the ſtale Device of the Friends of miſguided Authority; *one* Point in which they muſt be ever ſuperior to their Adverſaries, and to which, when hard puſhed, they have had Recourſe in every Age. When driven from the Merits of the *Cauſe*, their only Refuge is to ſculk behind the *Perſon*.

Undeterred by this worn-out Art, and uninfluenced by Prejudice or Paſſion, I will venture to ſpeak my Thoughts as they occur; I hope I ſhall be thought rather to *ſoften* than *aggravate*; it

it is my Intention ſo to do, conſiſtently with *Truth*; but, if the Narrative of ſome Men's Conduct ſhould happen to carry in itſelf the ſevereſt Satire, to whom is it to be charged but themſelves?

That this poor Nation has been, and ſtill is, moſt violently agitated, its public Commerce, and its private ſocial Happineſs moſt ſeverely wounded, the Hearts of all can witneſs. What *all* are thus materially concerned in, what *all* are thus ſo ſorely hurt by, becomes the Buſineſs, and the Right, of *all* to inquire into, to know the Source, the Motives, and the Actors of the Scene, as far as *uncontroverted Facts*, explained by *unperverted Reaſon*, can afford a Means to know.

Theſe Confuſions, every one will, I preſume, allow, commenced with the preſent Ad———n here; whether the Proceedings have been ſuch as beſpeak the Authors well inclined to this Kingdom's Welfare, and actuated by a Deſire to promote it, or whether, on the contrary, theſe Proceedings have tended to the Prejudice of this Kingdom, and the Projectors have been actuated by a Deſire of elevating ſome Individuals, and gratifying others, both here and on the other Side of the Water, at the Expence of our national Felicity, is the grand Queſtion to be decided; nor is, I think, the Deciſion hard.

I ſhall argue only from the Attempts *actually* made; it is true that a Number of nicely-correſpondent Surmiſes, tranſpiring, through different Channels, from the Fountain Head, leave little Room to doubt that a more *ſuddenly-deciſive* Stroke was ultimately reſolved on, and ripe for Introduction. But theſe I ſhall wave; undoubted Facts afford an ample Field to form a Judgment on.

The firſt Step taken was the entire Rejection of that Set of Gentlemen who had long held the Favour of their Sovereign and a Succeſſion of Vice-Roys, as the fixed NATIONAL INTEREST in the *Iriſh* Parliament. In their Room was adopted a *Party*, a detached, reſtleſs, Combination, diſtinguiſhed only by their occaſional Turbulence in every Tranſaction ſet on Foot by their Adverſaries, however eſſential to the Dignity of the Crown, and conſiſtent with the Liberties and Intereſts of the People. I beg Pardon of theſe Gentlemen for this diminutive Deſcription of their parliamentary Conſequence; I aſſure them I mean it only as a *Deſcription*, and, I believe, they muſt themſelves allow it is as high a one as they were entitled to, until foſtered in the Sunſhine of Power.

The Price of this Acquiſition was naturally, the entire Enjoyment of Places, Penſions, and Employments; and the Conſequence, that they who had been ever loud againſt the *Court*, became inſtantly as ſanguine in the *miniſterial Plan*, and the whole Nation was let ſee, that there was no poſſible Road to Favour,

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but by renouncing thoſe whom the People had long conſidered as their Guardian Repreſentatives.

When the Scene had even thus far opened, it gave a diſguſting and an alarming View; every Perſon, who reflected at all, muſt have aſked himſelf, *What can this mean? This* uncommon Apparatus *muſt ariſe from ſome* uncommon *Deſign*; *ſomething* untoward *and* indirect *in its Nature, which cannot be accompliſhed in the* plain *and* uſual Path; *it cannot be* the King's *Buſineſs*; *the King's long-try'd and approved Friends are diſcarded: It can't be* the People's, *the Favourites of the People are rejected*; *it muſt then be* ſomething *diſtinct from* BOTH.

Sir *William Temple* beautifully and juſtly remarks that "One "of the principal Wheels on which alone the Chariot of the "State can drive with Eaſe and Safety is, the Governor's pur-"ſuing the true and common Intereſt of the Nation he governs, "without eſpouſing thoſe of any Party or Faction; or if theſe "are ſo formed in a State that they muſt incline to one or o-"ther, then *to chuſe and favour that which is the moſt popular,* "*or wherein the greateſt or ſtrongeſt Part of the People appear to be* "*engaged*; *for, as the End of Government ſeems to be* SALUS "POPULI, *ſo the Strength of the Government is the Conſent of* "THE PEOPLE."

In another Place, he ſays, "The Ground on which all Go-"vernment ſtands is the Conſent of the People, or the greateſt "or ſtrongeſt Part of them.—*That* Government which takes "in the Conſent of the greateſt Number of the People, and, "conſequently, their Deſires and Reſolutions to ſupport it, may "juſtly be ſaid to have the broadeſt Bottom, and to ſtand on "the largeſt Compaſs of Ground, and makes the Figure of the "firmeſt Sort of *Pyramid*."

"On the contrary, a Government which, by alienating the "Affections, loſing the Opinions, and croſſing the Intereſts of "the People, leaves out of its Compaſs the greateſt Part of their "Conſent, may juſtly be ſaid, in the ſame Degrees it thus loſes "Ground, to narrow its Bottom; and if this be done to *ſerve* "*the Ambition, humour the Paſſion,* ſatisfy the Appetites, or ad-"vance the Power and Intereſts not only of ONE MAN, but of "TWO, or MORE *that come to ſhare in the Government,* by this "Means the Stability of the Figure is always leſſened and im-"paired."

On this Topic he dwells a good good while, and illuſtrates it by a Variety of Inſtances; particularly the Diſtractions of *Athens* and *Rome*, when "*by the Sway of Men grown to* UNUSUAL "POWER AND RICHES, the Governments were engaged in "*Councils* and *Actions* contrary to the *general Intereſts of the* "*People*."

Theſe Sentiments are as ſtrikingly juſt, as the Writer's Authority is great; they neceſſarily reſult from the Nature and End of Government; and the natural Inference ſeems to be, that no Governor or Miniſter ever purſued an unpopular Method, who had either the Welfare of the People, or the true Dignity of the Crown at Heart. Such a one not only checks the Fluency of public Buſineſs at the Time, but runs a dreadful Hazard of propagating a Diſcontent, if not a Diſaffection, which for Ages may not be eradicated, but may become a perpetual Source of Calamity; he lays the Seeds of private Enmity as well as national Diviſion, and entails Diſtraction on Poſterity, at the ſame Time that he makes the preſent, once happy, Generation miſerable.

That the Caſe here ſtated was exactly ours, is undeniable; nay, it was much ſtronger; for, beſide their *Popularity*, the Gentlemen, thus diſcarded from the Smile of Power could plead a Courſe of *Merit* and *Deſert*, in a long and faithful Application to the promoting of the Dignity and Satisfaction of their Sovereign; this, one would imagine, ſhould have had ſome Weight in their Favour, even though they had committed ſome *Faux-pas*; that they *had*, was never pretended; their Crime muſt therefore have conſiſted, not in any thing *paſt*, but their Unfitneſs for what was *to come*.

A Revolution of this Nature is almoſt a *conſtitutional* one; it is a violent Strain from which a Nation with much Difficulty recovers, and ſhould therefore be never made uſe of but in a Caſe of the laſt Extremity; ſuch as to exterminate ſome dangerous Malady that threatens Deſtruction to the whole. But in our Caſe what was our Ailment, or where was the Neceſſity of ſuch a Procedure? The V——e R——y found us in Peace and Plenty, Harmony and Enjoyment; the Public not alarmed, nor private Families at miſerable Variance; *the Crown* honoured and complied with in all it deſired, and at the ſame Time, BECAUSE THE NATIONAL INTEREST HELD THE REINS, the Nation reſted ſecure in its Immunities, advancing to a Degree of Opulence and Improvement never attained by any other in an equal Time. — Ill-fated Opulence! — Thus circumſtanced, one would think a *Change* as needleſs as undeſirable. —— How ſoon the ſad Reverſe took Place I need not mention.

That this, and their other conſequent Proceedings, have been the Source of our Diſtractions is undeniable; if then no adequate Cauſe can be ſhewn that made theſe Proceedings *neceſſary*, I humbly apprehend on the Intrigues of thoſe in Power muſt be charged the whole Blame of theſe Diſtractions, and all their Conſequences both immediate and remote. We ſee, we feel, the Effects of what they have done; they are almoſt as grievous as a People *can* feel; ſhould there not be ſome great, ſome uncommonly

commonly great *Neceſſity* for ſuch uncommonly great and grievous Sufferings? And where, and what, was this *Neceſſity?* Can the greateſt Sagacity find it out? or muſt we be content to put *private Ambition* in its Place? a little Attention will quickly ſhew.

Sure I am, that ſhould a Phyſician force an Operation on me which puts me at the Time to Torture, and, in its Conſequence, emaciates my Conſtitution, I ſhould expect a very categorical Anſwer to a few plain Queſtions; Where was the *Neceſſity?* what was my *Diſorder?* I felt no Pain till *you* gave it; my Body was vigorous, my Spirits good, and every Part performed its Function in Eaſe and Harmony; what *Cure* have you performed? you leave me infinitely worſe than you found me; nothing but the abſolute Preſervation of my Life can compenſate *my* Sufferings, or juſtify *your* Proceedings; and unleſs you ſhew me to Demonſtration that my *Life* was in *Danger*, I ſhall neceſſarily conclude, that what I have endured was not intended for *my* Benefit, but ſome private Gratification of *your own*, and that my Health is broken, by him who ſhould have preſerved it.—— But how muſt my Suſpicions be confirmed, ſhould he turn on me, like another *Gregory*, with *Cabricius Arci Thuram Cathalimus*, &c.? Yet with many ſuch *Replies* as this, has the Preſs been of late employ'd.

So far neither the Service of King or Country ſeems to demand, nor, conſequently, authorize theſe Meaſures; private Deſigns muſt therefore have been the Groundwork of all; and, I fancy, if my Countrymen would be ſo juſt to themſelves as to aſſert the Dignity of Reaſon, and, rejecting all other Guidance, follow *that* alone in their Inquiry, it will ſhew them the whole Courſe of theſe Tranſactions as naturally connected as Branches from the ſame Root, and that Root to be no more than *a private Cabal, acting under the temporary Sanction of Authority.*

It is eaſy to ſee, that the Party thus adopted into Favour, and raiſed to a moſt unexpected Degree of Luſtre, were under a Neceſſity of fulfilling the Conditions of their Elevation; even though they were inclined to other Meaſures, yet they were under the Dilemma; they muſt either go through their *Buſineſs*, or forego all Hope of Power; this may, in ſome Sort, plead their Excuſe; the Hand that raiſed, and ſtill held them up, could, in the Twinkling of an Eye, let them ſink into their priſtine Situation. How reluctant they, or any of them, might have been, I can't take upon me to determine; it was ſaid there were ſome *Expoſtulations*; but certain it is there was no Heſitation in the Execution, ſo that all Scruples were, ſome Way or other removed.

At firſt View it appears not a little ſurpriſing, that any Men, who were aiming at an Aſcendency in a Nation, could bring themſelves

themſelves to ſet out with a Step ſo exceſſively unpopular as that which was ſo induſtriouſly laboured in the firſt Seſſion of this Ad——n; to ſupport a Perſon in an Embezlement of the public Money, an Embezlement ſo flagrant, that not a Man in the Kingdom had a Shadow of a Doubt about it; to apply all the Force and Influence which attend on Government, to the Protection of a Servant of the People, from *their* Inquiry firſt, and afterward from their Cenſure, ſeems to be a capital Overſight in Politics. For, what muſt the People think? "The firſt grand "Care of Government ſhould be to preſerve our Intereſts, our "Treaſure, and our Privileges; to lay the whole Weight of "the Authority committed to it, to the Support of parliamen-"tary Dignity, the Vindication of our Rights, and the Puniſh-"ment of public Abuſes, yet here is a Conteſt where the Body "of the People are on the one Side, and the G——t and the "Delinquent on the other; a public Vote of Credit enormouſly "abuſed, and the Abuſer moſt zealouſly ſheltered by the Arm "of Power; can the national Intereſts be the ultimate Aim of "thoſe who interpoſe all their Might to prevent Redreſs of a "national Injury? or can ſuch a Conduct tend to the Dignity "of our Sovereign, whoſe paternal Care for his Subjects has "been long exerted in the ſtricteſt Juſtice, and tendereſt Af-"fection? Here, indeed, we ſee the *Policy* of the Change of "Favourites."

Thus moſt Perſons argued at the Time, and it was natural they ſhould. Why then was Room left for ſuch obvious Inferences? It at firſt ſeems odd, but, on taking the whole of the Meaſures purſued into Conſideration, the Wonder will ceaſe; for we ſhall then ſee that Popularity was, from the Beginning, a good deal deſpaired of, and, conſequently, not made the Groundwork of the Plan; ſome warm and active Genius ſeems to have been the moving Spring; one, impatient of Delay, and too ardent for Fruition to brook a ſlow-paced Policy; and ſuch a one was really the fitteſt for ſo deſperate a Deſign; a precarious Ad——n was to be made uſe of in haſte, and, at ſuch a valuable Criſis, *Storm* was infinitely preferable to *Sap*; nothing, under a Miracle, could ſooth the People, or allay their Apprehenſions; what then availed it to be nice in the Merits of the Cauſe? Was it not more prudent to beſtow that Time and Aſſiduity, which may be waſted for Ages, in Purſuit of the national Favour, to the procuring of Auxiliaries, and putting their Staunchneſs and their Strength on *this* Trial, before a more important one was introduced? The firſt Point in View was *Succeſs*; *that* obtained, the Palate of the People might, in Time, be reconciled to what they muſt learn to bear. This Plan, we may obſerve, was purſued in every Step of this and the laſt Seſſion; *Diſguiſe* appears to have been entirely laid aſide; an avowed Enmity with

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with the national Intereſt could admit of none; and it ſeemed *unneceſſary* to thoſe whoſe ſanguine Hopes pointed out a Probability of ſubduing us by *Force*. In Conſequence of this we find Matters carried through the Whole with a very high Hand.

Mr. *N——l* was, therefore, moſt zealouſly eſpouſed, and to as little Purpoſe, for his Advocates were as yet too weak to make any conſiderable Oppoſition; he was convicted and cenſured; but how merciful was the Cenſure! how expreſſive of Moderation, and a Diſpoſition to Unanimity! I think it muſt ſtrike every Man who reflects on it for a Moment; a Set of Men, after a Series of Services, plunged ſuddenly, undeſervedly, from the Smile of Power into every *Diſgrace* which the Frown of ſuch an Ad——n *could* inflict; a Man ſupported, to their Faces, in an Abuſe of their Reſolutions, and an Embezlement of their Money; and hugged in the Boſom of Authority for no aſſignable Reaſon, but his being the Subject of *their* Animadverſion, for the Injury done to *them* and *the Nation*; this Man moſt ſolemnly convicted; his Miſdemeanor ſo flagrant as to juſtify the ſevereſt Cenſure they could paſs; in their Power, at their Mercy, and the moſt deſirable Opportunity that *Reſentment* could have deſired, for mortifying and expoſing *the Protectors*, by the natural and unſtrained Puniſhment of *the Minion*. — Yet all Puniſhment, nay, indeed, all Cenſure, except what was neceſſary to ſupport the Vote of Reſtitution, and *that* uncommonly ſoft in its Expreſſion, was omitted; ſurely every one who looks back at this Tranſaction, and conſiders the Particulars of it, will be ſurprized to find ſo wiſe and diſpaſſionate a Behaviour, among Men ſo circumſtanced as the Majority of that Time; I own it aſtoniſhes me; for Men will generally be *Men* in their public as well as private Character, and we find but few Inſtances on our Annals where a parliamentary Majority have ſhewed much Clemency to inveterate Oppoſers; ſuch an Occaſion has ever been a moſt tempting one, and *here*, which made it ſtill *more* tempting, Reſentment might have had its fulleſt Gratification without appearing to be concerned, or incurring the leaſt Degree of Cenſure. Yet certain it is, that, however it muſt have riſen againſt the Supporters, it had no Share in the Deciſion; not even this repetitional Stroke at public Welfare could provoke them to encreaſe the gathering Storm, even by a Step of the ſtricteſt Juſtice; Mr. *N——l*'s Conduct was conſidered, in his Sentence, not as a *Crime*, but an *Inadvertency*; the *Breach of Truſt* they forbore to puniſh, and ordered only a *Reſtitution*.

They have ſince been blamed for this; it is thought that, had they *then* cenſured him as they have *ſince* done, ſuch a ſpirited Proceeding would have ſtruck a Damp on the Hopes of certain Perſons, which have ſince gained Strength from ſuch Appearance

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of Moderation. How far this Opinion may be juſt I will not take upon me to determine; certain it is, they were ſometimes much miſtaken in their Manner of Dealing with their Adverſaries, and the Effects of their undeſigning and moderate Diſpoſition have been turned upon them in a more material Inſtance than this; but ſurely we, the People, muſt not only *excuſe*, but for ever *remember* and *applaud* a Conduct which aroſe purely from a View to *our* Advantage; had they conſulted only their own *private Gratification*, they would have given looſe to a Reſentment which nobody could have condemned, they would have indulged the Call of Juſtice in its utmoſt Severity, and have repelled a lawleſs and formidable Attack with *all the Force* which our Conſtitution allows to their important Station; but THE PUBLIC was in their *Hands*, and in their *Hearts*; the Kingdom, they ſaw, was *vitally* attempted, and any *violent* Effort to diſengage it, might have endangered the whole; the Power, which gave Life to this Attempt, was in its Nature but ſhort-lived; they hoped this might have been its laſt Opportunity, and the Project would die away of itſelf; they dreaded, (and *juſtly* it ſeems) a *Miſrepreſentation* of their own, and the People's Principles, in *a Place* where neither deſired or deſerved to be miſrepreſented. They, therefore, choſe to give the leaſt poſſible Colour for ſuch an Appearance, conſiſtent with Dignity to themſelves, and Juſtice to the Public.

They who think them faulty in this Forbearance, muſt alſo take into Conſideration, that they had the additional Motive of a ſolemn Promiſe from *thoſe* in Power, that the Nation ſhould have an Atonement; that *their* Reſolutions ſhould be laid before his Majeſty, and Mr. *N——l* ſhould, *in Conſequence* thereof, be puniſhed by *him*, as ſuch Reſolutions required; requeſting only that, as a public Servant, appointed *by the Crown*, he may ſuffer no Ignominy but from the royal Hand. This *Fact* has never yet, as I can find, been controverted. Here was ſtill a further Sacrifice to the injured People, yet takes not off a Particle from the Merit of the Parliament, who gladly caught at the Propoſal, as moſt agreeable to the Moderation they endeavoured to preſerve in the public Tranſactions, and the ſureſt Means to avoid the Evils that might ariſe from a more rigid Conduct. But how this *Promiſe* was performed, in the obtaining Leave for Mr. *N——l* to ſell his Employments with every uſual Mark of Honour, every Perſon is left to judge.

About this Time, the Linen Bill returned to us ſo mutilated, that, had it paſſed into a Law, it muſt have for ever ruined us; and if dropped (as it was) and the next Seſſion, by any Accident, ſuffered to ſlip without renewing it, our Fate muſt have been the ſame: Here was the daily Bread of thouſands, and the Source of our national Proſperity, brought upon the very Edge

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of Deſtruction! Perhaps by Accident; it was ſaid it was; a Clerk, it ſeems, in engroſſing the Bill, let fall ſome Sheets of the Draft, and conſequently omitted them in the engroſſed Copy: It was very remiſs in him to be ſo extremely inattentive to an ACT OF PARLIAMENT; and, what makes the Accident more odd, was, that the Sheets, which ſlided out of his Hand, happened to contain the moſt eſſential Paragraphs in the whole Bill, nay, theſe Paragraphs fell from him quite ſole and entire, without one Word more or leſs than what was abſolutely neceſſary to the Preſervation of our Linen Manufacture. It ſeems a little ſtrange, however, that this Omiſſion was not detected by the ſame Clerk, or ſome other, Time enough to be repaired; for an *Act of Parliament*, one would think, though an *Iriſh* one, was entitled to a Reviſal; be that as it may, this, we were told, was the Caſe; ſome People, notwithſtanding, cannot believe it, but affirm it was all a private Trick, calculated by aſpiring Perſons, like all the reſt of their Meaſures before and ſince, to *intimidate*; to ſhew that we were in their Power, and what we may expect if we proved reluctant in complying with their Meaſures; and they produce, to confirm this Opinion, ſeveral Paſſages in the ſame Bill, *altered* from their original State, in a Manner moſt detrimental to this Kingdom. But whether this, or the Miſtake of the Clerk, be the more probable Suppoſition, I leave the Reader to determine.

The Parliament taking upon them to enquire into Mr. *N—l*'s Conduct, without previous Conſent from his Patrons, gave them the higheſt Offence, and, by way of retaliation, it appears, that both the Repreſentatives and the People in general, were pictured at the other Side of the Water as ripe for *Rebellion*, and ready to ſhake off their Dependency on the Crown of *England*; this Repreſentation was built, I preſume, on that ancient Maxim, that all *Oppoſition* to a *Miniſter* is *Diſaffection* to the *Prince*. Certain it is, that ſuch an Opinion was induſtriouſly propagated, where it moſt could hurt us; happy for us that its Credit was but ſmall! our former conſtant Behaviour made the Improbability too groſs to gain any Ground; the Stroke however was artful though precarious; for, had it, in any ſort, ſucceeded, the united national Force of our parent Iſland, would naturally have exerted itſelf againſt us, to ſecure its own juſt Superiority, and thereby have, inadvertently, facilitated the Dominion over us which particular Perſons ſo ardently aſpired to. Who they could be that took this deſtructive Meaſure, that repreſented the moſt fond and faithful Subjects as Enemies to the beſt of Kings, and to that Nation under whoſe Protection alone they ſubſiſt, and how much they can, by the Rules of common Reaſon, be imagined to have the Welfare of this Kingdom at heart, is, I believe, a Matter that admits of ſmall Difficulty in the Deciſion.

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The Danger, however, was too great not to be oppoſed; and, accordingly the Commons, in an unuſual Addreſs to his Majeſty, at the End of the Seſſion, did all that Words could do to obviate the Miſrepreſentation; how juſt their Fears were, the Anſwer given to their parting Addreſs by the L— L— moſt undeniably demonſtrates; let ſuch of my Readers as have it by them, caſt their Eye on it for a Moment, and they will ſee in it the plaineſt *Promiſe* of painting them in diſaffected Colours at the Throne; its equivocal Expreſſion can bear no other Meaning, and farther than *that*, common Decency would forbid the keeneſt Rancour to go, in an Anſwer to one of the Eſtates of Parliament.

Thus ended the Seſſion; in a Manner that could be hoped for, only from the unparallelled Moderation of our truly injured Patriots, and the general inviolable Attachment of the People to their King. Shew me on Record a Houſe of Commons ſo circumſtanced, ſo attacked, ſo miſrepreſented, and, at the ſame time, ſo powerful, conducting with ſo much Temper, Wiſdom, and true parliamentary Dignity.

The Circumſtance of the Money-Bill I have omitted, as I intend to ſay a few Words immediately, in Relation to the Doctrine of *previous Conſent*, in which I ſhall include what was done with it this Seſſion. I ſhall only firſt obſerve, that, in this Interval between the Seſſions, occurred the ever memorable Tranſaction of the MEMORIAL; a Tranſaction for which the illuſtrious Author muſt be honoured and beloved, while any Senſe of Virtue, of Liberty, and Love of their COUNTRY holds Place in the Breaſts of *IRISHMEN*. It is hard to ſay whether the Nobleneſs of ſuch a Step, or the Pravity of the Conduct which had made it neceſſary, be the greater; the one is certainly the ſtrongeſt imaginable Contraſt to the other: To turn the Authority of G——t againſt the Repoſe of an innocent, deſerving People, to patronize the moſt deſtructive Combinations againſt their Intereſts, and moſt Groundleſly ſully their fair Fame, in the Eye of their Sovereign, on the one Hand; — on the other, to ſtand the Shock of Power in Defence of TRUTH and his COUNTRY, to break through the incircling Cabal to the Foot of the Throne, and diſpel the Miſt of Falſhood from the paternal Eye of our Prince, by pointing out, in one plain Narrative of *Facts*, the *real* Sources of our miraculouſly-ſudden *Diſaffection!*

This was a moſt mortifying Step; indeed they have met with a good many; as mortifying to their Pride as to their Deſigns, and the more, as being ſo very unexpected. It produced a Clamour of Rage, from every Member, and every Dependent, of the Aſſociation; but the moſt notable Production of all, was the Letter from the D—e of *D—t* to the L—d C——r *; every Man in

* For this, and ſeveral other curious Pieces, ſee the CABINET.

in the Kingdom ſhould keep it by him; there cannot be a better Guide, in our forming a Judgment of the Nature and Tendency of the Tranſactions of theſe Times; it throws, indeed, a Light upon them that needs no other Aſſiſtance, and from hence it is that it is ſo induſtriouſly ſlurred over by its Friends. One Indulgence, however, is certainly to be allowed it; *that* Indulgence which is due to *Paſſion*; in *Paſſion*, as well as Wine, there is *Truth*; and hence in theſe few Lines is contained, the very genuine Spirit of the *Dictator*; we find the *Event* to be ſtrictly *correſpondent*; ſome *important* Scheme was *premeditated* by the *antecedent* Menaces here uttered, and *what this* Scheme was, and how near their Hearts, appears from theſe Menaces being ſo *immediately* and ſo *exactly* put in Execution. — Surely there cannot be really on Earth, a Man whom ſuch ſtriking Evidence can fail to convince — On the whole, this magnificent Performance did no Harm; it added Vigilance to the public Apprehenſion, and, doubtleſs, gave a very pleaſing Vent to the Fullneſs of the Writer's Heart.

This naturally brings me to the Money-Bill: Shall I preſume to handle ſuch a Myſtery? I am neither Judge, nor Lawyer, Place-man, Penſioner, nor Expectant; will my Reader think me the worſe qualified? He may pleaſe himſelf among the Advocates for the Preamble. The Sentiments *my* Reaſon ſuggeſts to me, are not of the recommendatory Sort to the Smile of Power. My Plan is the Plan of *common Senſe*; if this Doctrine comes not within *its* Sphere, I have been miſtaken, and reſign it over to thoſe, whoſe Faculties are by various Means more quickened, and adapted to the Inveſtigation of all its Subtilties.

There is not in the Nature of Things, a Point that, when fairly and clearly ſtated, can admit of leſs Doubt or Delay in the Deciſion. It was this, its very Self-evidence, which made it neceſſary for the Eſpouſers of the weak Side, to be ſo induſtrious in raiſing a Miſt around it, with all the Powers of Sophiſtry and Art; but, when diveſted of this, it ſtrikes on the Mind, in all that irreſiſtible Splendor, which is peculiar to TRUTH.

One Circumſtance attends it which ſpeaks this ſtrongly, and is, indeed, *Truth*'s grand Characteriſtic; notwithſtanding all the laborious Efforts of the Friends of Power to diſguiſe it, notwithſtanding the moſt ſtudied Perplexity and Subtilty of Argument, and Plauſibility of Diction, the utmoſt they have effected is to *puzzle* and *confound*; to produce a kind of momentary Scepticiſm, or Irreſolution; nor have I ever met with one Perſon, within my Obſervation, who felt a Particle of *Conviction* from all thoſe Performances, though they, doubtleſs, gave no little Trouble to the Invention of the Compoſers.

My poor, poor Country! formidably attacked from *without*, betrayed from *within*, and, at the ſame Time, pregnant with

Swarms

Swarms who are eager to proſtitute, each his Share of Talents, to the Diſguiſe of the moſt *vital* TRUTHS, and Recommendation of the moſt fatal Meaſures! All for a Ray of temporary Sun-ſhine!

But why ſhould we wonder? Has it not ever been the Caſe with the moſt important Maxims both in Religion and Government? The moſt important are, in their own Nature, the moſt evident, yet this very *Importance* has made it neceſſary for deſigning Men to muffle their *Evidence* in order to lay a Footing for *private Gratification*; thus has the Goodneſs of GOD, which ſo connected Things as to place thoſe Truths within the Reach of *all*, on which the Happineſs of *all* eſſentially depends, thus has it been counteracted by the Selfiſhneſs and Perfidy of Man; and *that* Reaſon, which HE beſtowed for the Preſervation, has been ſinfully perverted to the Ruin of HIS Creatures.

Againſt the Subtilty of Falſhood he has given us *Reaſon* for an Antidote, and an irreſiſtible one if we *will* uſe it. From a Knowledge of our Species, if we reflect a little, we can eaſily ſee on *what* Topics it is *moſt likely* the Arguer deſigns to miſlead us, and this will put us on our Guard, and rouze us in the Inquiry; thus, an Argument, whoſe direct Tendency is the Advancement of POWER, ſhould call for the minuteſt Care in every Conceſſion, becauſe, from the Frailty of human Nature, it is plain that *Power* muſt have many, very many, Advocates, where plain *Truth* has not one; we know that *Power* can give every Thing that mortal *Paſſions* can deſire, and conſequently, that if any Sophiſtry *can* be deviſed, it *will* be where *Power* is a Party; where an endleſs Variety of Gratifications can be propoſed to thoſe *Paſſions*, which, alas! we all well know, have too ſtrong a Predominancy, in every Branch of human Conduct.

Thus cautioned, ſet Reaſon againſt Art, and we may be eaſy about the Event of the Conteſt; but, without this Circumſpection, we muſt ever run a Hazard of being impoſed on by *Words*; and Words we may rely on being attacked with, where Men's darling Purſuits are concerned, let the Badneſs or Abſurdity of the Cauſe be ever ſo flagrant.

We muſt not therefore be ſurprized at the Variety of Defences, with which the late rejected *Preamble* has been favoured; had it ſucceeded, there would have been little Pains taken in its Juſtification; but ſince its Fate has been unhappy, and the whole Scheme diſconcerted, it is but natural to attempt ſome Palliation, to take off the publick Odium from thoſe who have *ſhewn themſelves* to no Purpoſe, and the *public Gratitude* from the much envied Defenders of their Country. The leaſt the Loſers can have is leave to *ſpeak*.

In all ſuch Caſes we do not combat with the Difficulty of the Subject, but the Art of our Antagoniſt. Were *the Subject* adhered

hered to, a few Minutes would diſpatch it; but *he* muſt be followed through all his Labyrinth of Fallacy, and driven out of every Subterfuge, before he reſigns the Cauſe; every ſmooth-ſounding Sentence he can form, interſperſed with ſome occaſional Words relative to the Matter in Diſpute, is, with him, and his prejudiced Advocates, an *Argument*; and ſhould you grow tired of confuting Abſurdity, he applauds himſelf as Victor, and cloſes his Jargon in Triumph.

This ſeems the Caſe with *previous Conſent*; a Doctrine now almoſt as notorious as *Tranſubſtantiation*; vindicated by the ſame Species of *Reaſoning*, with as much Zeal, and pretty equal Succeſs. Words, indeed, have been neatly put together, for thoſe to *ſpeak with*, who before were devoted to miniſterial Meaſures; and I have heard an Orator of this Claſs, after getting the greateſt Part of the CONSIDERATIONS by Heart, exult in his Fluency over a very ſenſible Man, who had never dreamed of conſidering a plain Subject, in ſo refined and complicated a Light. This is all the beſt Covering for a bad Cauſe can poſſibly arrive at; and a Party, who never before even pretended to have any Thing *to ſay* for themſelves, may be glad of this Bettering of Condition. Whether the Voice of the Nation, ſpeaking in Addreſſes from every Quarter, and avowing a *Scheme of Conduct* upon future Elections, might not have contributed to force them out of their former Taciturnity, is pretty eaſy to ſee. This Point was full as unjuſtifiable, nay, much more ſo, than any other Step they had taken; but it was *neceſſary* to defend it becauſe it had failed, and the People were in a Flame; and it was thought *feaſible*, as the Nature of it gave a Colour for making it a parliamentary Myſtery, intelligible only to a few Adepts, and to be received implicitly by the Public, as by them taught and delivered.

But let not my Countrymen be impoſed on; there is not a Man among them, of a commonly-informed Underſtanding, but may fully comprehend the Queſtion, and, with a little Attention, ſee through the whole Chain of Fallacy, that has been made uſe of to miſlead their Judgments, in relation to this Tranſaction, and the Deſigns of its Promoters, and (according to the *Phraſe*, and the *Intention*, of the CONSIDERATIONS) to *quiet the Fears and Apprehenſions of the People*, until a more fortunate Occaſion preſents itſelf for finally effecting them.

The principal Art made uſe of for this Purpoſe, has been that which, in every Inſtance, has been the Refuge of Falſhood; the uſing of Words without determining their Meaning, from whence the Arguers take Liberty of uſing them in different Senſes, at different Times, and, by keeping the Word always *wide*, ſlip in every Idea that can poſſibly ſerve the Occaſion.

This

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This has been the principal Art; for I cannot give the Name of *Art* to that Species of Argument which fills the Bulk of the Performances in favour of the Preamble, I mean the laying down undeniable Premiſſes, and drawing the moſt foreign and abſurd Concluſion. A Cauſe is hard preſſed when thus defended.

In a Diſpute wherein we are *all preſumed* to be concerned, we have ſurely a Right to inſiſt on the Expulſion of *hard Words*, and the Subſtitution of ſuch as are, in their Import, quite clear and determinate to *all*. The *Aſtutia Politica* is built on *technical Phraſe*, and this Rule ſhould be therefore more carefully obſerved.

Let the honeſt and intelligent Reader take the following State of the Caſe in plain *Engliſh*; it will not long detain him, nor need he be deep-read to decide it; on the contrary, I will venture to anſwer, that he will not need one Argument to help him in his Determination: Nor will the hardieſt Court-Advocate ſay it is not exactly *juſt*; for there is not an Article of it but they have, in ſome Part of their Performances, confeſſed.

The King is at the Head of the State; put there *for the Benefit of the People*; *for the ſame Purpoſe* is he inveſted with the Office of *laying out* the public Money, which is raiſed out of the Pockets of *the People*, by the Means of their Repreſentatives; this is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe theſe Repreſentatives cannot, in the Nature of Things, be always aſſembled; but the King is always at the Helm, and therefore is the fitteſt to become *an Agent* for the People, and a Truſtee for the laying out the *public Wealth* for the *public Advantage*; as the Repreſentatives of the People, however, are juſtly ſuppoſed to be adequate Judges whether the Money they raiſed has been applied to its proper Purpoſes, and, at the ſame Time, to have the higheſt Right to *inquire*, the public Accounts are laid before them when they meet again, and *their* Approbation or Diſapprobation fixes the Propriety or Impropriety of the Application.

This will not be denied to be the general State of this Branch of our Conſtitution; the Author of the CONSIDERATIONS, indeed, denies that the Accounts are laid before the Parliament for their *Approbation*, and that the Commons have any *Right* to call for them in *that* Senſe; but as he has prudently thought fit to recant in his ſecond Pamphlet, this latter Part of his Doctrine, and graciouſly to indulge them in this *Right*, his other Aſſertion, though it were true, would make no manner of Difference in the Queſtion before us.

Now as to the particular Circumſtance which produced this Queſtion: The public Expences had ſo far exceeded the Produce of the Taxes, as to make it neceſſary for the Parliament, to borrow different Sums of Money, from private Perſons, at Intereſt, and to pledge the public Faith for the Payment. In ſome Time the Produce of the Taxes ſo ſwelled as to leave an Over-

plus

plus in the Treaſury after all the public Purpoſes, FOR WHICH theſe Taxes were granted, had been anſwered. The Treaſury, every one knows to be the PUBLIC COFFER, into which the Money, raiſed off the People, is brought, and to which the King, as the great public *Officer*, has recourſe, when he is to apply this Money *for the public Service.*

As a Redundancy of the People's Money was thus found, by their Repreſentatives, at their coming together, and the People were paying Intereſt for a conſiderable Sum, it was natural and equitable for the Repreſentatives to do for the People, as the People would have done for themſelves; to wit, to get rid of a heavy Intereſt, and pay their Debts when they were ſo well able to do it: The Redundancy in the Treaſury could not therefore be ſo well diſpoſed of, as in the Diſcharge of the public Debt.

The *Form* judged moſt adviſable for doing this was *an Act of Parliament*, to which, of Conſequence, the King becomes *a Party.*

Now to *him*, who never had a *Property* in this Money, who never *had* been or *could* be concerned in it, farther than, as the executive Power of the Conſtitution, to *receive* it, and *expend* what was *neceſſary*, and give up his Accounts to the Public, *whoſe* Money it was; to *him*, I ſay, one would imagine it a very ſufficient Share of Compliment and Juſtice, from the Nature of our Conſtitution, to make him *a Party* in the Diſpoſal of this Superfluity, and thereby to allow him a Negative on the whole Scheme, ſhould he pleaſe to exert it.

This, however, is not thought *ſufficient*; he muſt not only give his *Aſſent* to the Bill, he muſt not only be put on an *equal* Foot with the Repreſentatives of the People, *whoſe* Money this was, but he muſt be put on a *ſuperior* Foot; they muſt not preſume even to *bring in* a Bill for diſpoſing of *their own* Money, to the Diſcharge of their own Debt, until they had obtained *his previous Conſent* ſo to do, nor muſt any Act of Parliament paſs for this Purpoſe, without an Acknowledgment of ſuch *previous Conſent* being obtained.

This is the literal Fact, and, had the Fact been ſuffered to reſt on its own Merits, more than ſuch a plain Diſplay would never have been neceſſary. Reader, if you are not a blind Devotee of Party, lay your Hand on your Heart, and avow, as warmly as you muſt feel, the Force of TRUTH; the Caſe lies before you naked and plain, unembelliſhed and undiſguiſed; and ſurely it muſt ſtrike you in an Inſtant that ſuch *previous Conſent* from the Crown is (at leaſt) not neceſſary to the People's framing a Bill for the Diſpoſition of their own Money, which Bill, when framed, the Crown is at Liberty to refuſe, and, conſequently, to quaſh. Is it not enough that the King ſhould

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be made a *joint* Party with the other two Branches of the Legiſlature in a Matter entirely of *public Concern?* Is this not ſufficient to keep up the Dignity of the Crown? But muſt the Parliament be doomed to perpetual Silence, though they ſhould ſee the People labouring under a Grievance of Intereſt, and a large Sum of their Money, at the ſame Time, idle in the Treaſury, and not be at Liberty even to *offer* a Bill for their Relief, until they have obtained *Leave* for that Purpoſe? What Maxim is there in our Conſtitution that affords a *greater* Power to the King, over the public Money, than to the Repreſentatives of the People? or *what* Conſtitution muſt it be, in which *ſuch* Power is to be found? Yet, ſurely, here is a *greater* claimed; an *equal* one, in *this* Inſtance, is conceded; he may refuſe his Concurrence, and thereby as effectually overſet the Scheme as either of the other Parties can do: But why muſt his Conſent *before*, and his Aſſent *after*, be *both* neceſſary? Why ſhould he be inveſted with a *double Negative?* It is allowed he may *recommend*, *adviſe*, and *propoſe* to his People what, in *his* Opinion, is moſt for their Advantage, and why may not they be indulged in a Right to *propoſe* to him what is, in *their* Opinions, moſt for their own Advantage, (of which, ſurely, they may be ſuppoſed to be tolerably well qualified to judge) and of preſenting him a Bill, as the approved Method of carrying theſe their Sentiments into Execution? Surely, ſuch an infinite Diſparity in *ſuch* a Point, is not conſiſtent either with the Nature of our Government, or the Equilibrium of its reſpective Branches.

Whoever will conſider this Point ever ſo little a while, will find a Succeſſion of Arguments ſtarting up in his Mind, and vying with each other in the Confutation of ſuch Abſurdity.

If the King has no Intereſt in the public Money but that of a *Truſtee* or *Agent* for the *public Uſe*, and, of conſequence, is ſubject to be called (or, which is *tantamount*, *his* Officers and Miniſters) to an Account by the Repreſentatives of the People for the Application of this Money, ſurely he may, by *them*, be *antecedently* directed in the Application of it, more eſpecially when this *Direction* is no more than an humble Propoſal by Bill which he is left at Liberty to reject? Surely, by all the Rules of Nature and common Reaſon, any Perſon who has a Right to puniſh a Breach of Truſt when committed, muſt have a Right to *adviſe* before-hand how that Breach of Truſt may be avoided, and how that Truſt may be beſt uſed for the Service of himſelf the *Intruſter*. But mark the Abſurdity of this Doctrine: To-day, the King, the People's Truſtee, has ſuch a Kind of Dominion over their Money intruſted to his Care, that the Parliament ſhall not offer to him their Sentiments, in Form of a Bill, about the Diſpoſal of it, (which Bill he may, if he pleaſes, reject) until they have

have obtained his Leave for ſo doing; to-morrow, the ſame Parliament, or one Branch of it, ſhall, of *Right*, call for an Account of the Diſpoſal of this Money, examine it with the niceſt Severity, and puniſh, cenſure, and impeach, from the loweſt to the higheſt Miniſter of the Crown, the neareſt and deareſt, perhaps, to the royal Perſon, without the leaſt Intimation of *Conſent* for ſo doing, or thinking it at all neceſſary to wait for it; a ſudden Change with them for the better, this! To-day, they are as low as a Parliament of *Paris*; to-morrow, they find themſelves in all the Liberty of *Britons*; they may *cenſure*, but not *adviſe*; they may *puniſh*, but not *prevent*.

Thus, the late Bill would not be *ſuffered* to paſs, without a Clauſe acknowledging his Majeſty's *previous Conſent* to the bringing it in; ſuppoſe the Money which was, by that Bill, intended to diſcharge the public Debt, had, on the dropping of the Bill, been taken out of the Treaſury by ſome of his Majeſty's Servants, and applied to any *private* Purpoſe, inſtead of the public Service; certain it is that the very Houſe of Commons, who would not be permitted to propoſe an Application of this Money until *Leave* was obtained, and who incurred the Cenſure of Diſaffection in general, and ſevere Penalties on ſome of their Individuals, for refuſing to acknowledge the Neceſſity of ſuch *Leave*, this very Houſe of Commons *may (by the Nature of our Conſtitution)* cenſure, animadvert, and puniſh thoſe who had *miſapplied* that *very* Money of which they themſelves have been deny'd the Liberty of even *propoſing* an Application.

The Connection between the Right of *cenſuring*, and the Right of *propoſing*, is ſo glaring, that, I believe, the ſmalleſt Share of Attention will be ſtruck with it; and a little Attention will ſuggeſt more, and more ſtrongly, in Favour of it, than any Words can do. Let the courteous Reader, if he deſires to judge right on this Point, either for the Benefit of himſelf or others, purſue this *Connection*, and it will ſoon lead him to the TRUTH; and lead him ſo ſteadily, that no poor Fallacy in Words, or Argument, will be able to divert him from the Purſuit.

If the Parliament be allowed to know whether the public Money *has been* rightly applied, ſurely they may know *beforehand* how it *may be* rightly apply'd, or, at leaſt, be capable of forming not a deſpicable Judgment of what may be for the Intereſts of the People; and if ſo, why in the Name of common Senſe, may they not ſpeak this their Judgment, put it into Form of a Bill, and preſent it to his Majeſty, to know whether he thinks with them, and will concur in making this their *Plan* a Law? Or what is it that can deprive them of this *Right*, by making the Conſent of the Crown previouſly *neceſſary?*

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The memorable Author of the CONSIDERATIONS, who really does not want *Sagacity*, foreſaw that if the Parliament be allowed a *Right* of calling for the *public Accounts*, all the World would ſee that they muſt have a Right to *propoſe* an Application of *the public Money*, and, therefore, cunningly enough, chuſes to lop off this Right, though he generouſly indulges them in the Right of puniſhing Miſapplications; that is, Miſapplications may be puniſhed when they can be found out, which never *can* be, becauſe *the Means* of finding them the Parliament have no Right to look into. I ſhall point out, by and by, the Places where, in the plaineſt Terms, he has deny'd the Right of *Inquiry*.

As the Queſtion ſtands in its original State, I believe an ingenuous Mind would never be able to divine, where the leaſt poſſible Colour could be found, for maintaining any other Doctrine, than what thus ſpontaneouſly preſents itſelf; but nothing is impervious to Art, Art, rendered ſtill more ſagacious by *Intereſt*; and accordingly a Defence of the Neceſſity of *previous Conſent* was framed, and moſt induſtriouſly propagated; but ſuch a *Defence*, ſurely, no Cauſe was ever bleſſed with. We muſt, however, obſerve that, on the Queſtion in the Houſe, no *one* Argument appeared to be the ruling Motive of the Advocates for the Preamble, but a different one was ſtarted by every Man who ſpoke in its Favour; they had all however, without Doubt, *ſome* Principle to act on, and it required ſome Leiſure, indeed, to *make* Reaſons fit to appear in Public.

Though great Allowances are to be made, for the Confuſion of Mind which muſt attend a Diſappointment in a darling Scheme, and the Panic occaſioned by popular Outcry; yet is it not a little ſurpriſing, that ſome among the Party could not have Preſence of Mind to foreſee the Conſequences of attempting a Defence of a Meaſure ſo rotten, that it could not be ſupported, without making free with ſome of the Pillars of our Conſtitution? Such an Attempt neceſſarily, as it has done, muſt alarm the People more than ever, becauſe it diſplays the true Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine; but to patronize and avow ſuch a Plan ſeems to be the very Height of Temerity. Every Sentiment contained in it, comes from hence authorized to us, as the Principle which actuates its Patrons; and if every ſuch Sentiment ſhall, on Examination, appear to correſpond with the reſt of their Conduct, my Reader will allow it to co-operate in producing *Conviction*.

Then, to the CONSIDERATIONS; thoſe modern *Inſtitutes*, whence every ſmaller Penman has taken his Subject of Paraphraſe; I would give any Length of Time, to a Man who had not read them, for gueſſing, what Article of the Caſe, as I above ſtated it, this much celebrated Writer has choſen for his Argument;

ment; why indeed, the grand Article which forms the Confutation of all *his* Doctrine, and, at the ſame Time, the Happineſs of *our Conſtitution*; to wit, that *the King is, by his Station, the* TRUSTEE *for expending* THE MONEY OF THE PUBLIC.

If the Reader has not ſeen this Book, he will, doubtleſs, ſtare at what I tell him; yet the Fact is ſo, and the whole Argument of the CONSIDERATIONS (or rather the *inſinuated* Inference, for he hardly attempts to *prove* it) is this; *becauſe* the King is, by the Nature of his Station, employed by the People to lay out their Money for their Service, and this Money is, for this Purpoſe, put into his Hands, that he may have it in his *Power* ſo to lay it out, that *therefore* the People muſt not, after it is once put into his Hands, preſume even to ſpeak their Minds by Bill, humbly *offered* for his *Approbation*, about what appears to them to be the beſt Method of applying Part of it for their own Benefit, until they have obtained *Leave* from him for ſo doing.

If this be not the plain *Engliſh*, and Sum total, of all the Learning and fine Language in his Book, I will give up the Cauſe. Let my Reader run through it, and he will ſee: Every one, it is true, has not Attention or Leiſure enough to diſengage it from the Diſguiſe it is muffled in; and on this the Author preſumed: But if the Reader finds this to be really the Caſe, will he think this monſtrous Diſguiſe *deſigned* or *involuntary*; and, if *deſigned*, for a *good* or a *bad* Purpoſe?

The chief Art he makes uſe of is, the laying all the Streſs of his Proof upon that Part of the Argument which every one will allow him without any Proof at all; to wit, that the King is, by the Nature of our Conſtitution, the *Agent*, or *Truſtee*, for laying out the Money of the People for their Service; or, as he *chuſes* to phraſe it, "That the *Truſt* of applying the Money "*given* by Parliament to the Crown, without any ſpecial Ap- "propriation, is, by the Laws and Conſtitution of this King- "dom, *veſted in* the Crown *for public Services*." Theſe two Manners of wording will, I preſume, be allowed to come juſt to the ſame Thing, as the TRUST, the *eſſential* Idea, is expreſly mentioned in *his*. — Yet, who does not ſee into the poor little Art with which he varniſhes this ſimple Sentiment, in order to make it *look* as like as poſſible to *the Thing* which he wiſhes, yet dares not *aſſert* it *to be!* The Word *given*, though joined to a *Truſt*, may look to ſome People as a *Gift*, and what is *veſted in* the Crown may ſeem to imply the Idea of *Property*.

To *prove* this *Truſt*, had to him theſe ſeveral good Conſequences. Firſt, it engages the Favour of a Reader, by ſetting out with a Truth to which all muſt aſſent. Secondly, it looks as if this were the only Point that *requires* to be proved, and that when it is proved, the Queſtion is at once decided. Thirdly, it

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tires the Attention of the Generality of Readers, before they can come in View of the Point which really wants to be proved. Fourthly, it gives the Opportunity of hawling in the Hiſtory of the public Revenue, the moſt deſirable Thing for dazling and perplexing an ordinary Reader. And, Fifthly, the beſt Conſequence of all, to inſinuate, by all his Pains, that *this* was the Point the Commons meaned to deny by their rejecting the Preamble, and that conſequently, they intended to ſtrip the Crown of (what he juſtly denominates an *ancient* Right) the Right of acting AS TRUSTEE for the People, in the Application of their Money for *their* Service. This ſerved to promote the Inſinuation, which has been propagated both on this and the other Side of the Water, of their being actuated by *Diſaffection*, and mature for *Rebellion*.

How fair, how honeſt, ſuch a Proceeding! How ingenuous the *Advocate!* How ſound the *Cauſe!*

My Reader will obſerve, that his prolix and important Diſſertation on the ſeveral Kinds of public Revenue proves nothing, even by his own Confeſſion, but that all theſe Revenues are *granted to* the King, or (in a *ſafer* and leſs *equivocal* Phraſe) *put into his Hands*, merely for the Service of *the Public*; ſome in Perpetuity, and others from Two Years to Two Years.

And, once for all, I muſt caution him againſt being deceived by the Words, *granted to the Crown*, which this Author uſes in Ambiguity through his whole Work. It can mean no more, on this Occaſion, than *lodging the* TRUST, *putting it into the Power of the King to receive it from the People, that he may have it in his Power to lay it out for their Service.* Without *ſuch a Grant* the Money could never be raiſed, nor could he diſcharge his *Office* of *conſtitutional Truſtee.* This let my Reader bear all along in Mind. The Author dares not *avow* any other Definition of it.

Then he proceeds to heighten the Parade, by demanding why the King's Letters are *obeyed* at the Treaſury, if he has not *the Right of Application?* The King *has* the *Right* of Application, but it is a Right for the Uſe of which he is ever *accountable* to the People, a Right of applying their Money *for their Service*; and not an *abſolute, uncontroulable* Right of applying it as he pleaſes, ſuch as attends on the Nature of PRIVATE PROPERTY. This too my Reader muſt remember in every Page he reads of the CONSIDERATIONS, where the word *Right* is carefully made uſe of in an ambiguous Senſe, and confounded with *Power*: The Crown has, by being *intruſted*, a *Power* of *miſapplying* the public Money, but no *Right*; it is of the nature of a *Truſt* to inveſt a *Power* of *Abuſe.*

The Reaſon then is plain why theſe *Letters* are obeyed; becauſe, as he ſays himſelf, the King has this *(limited)* Right of Application;

Application; this *Obedience* proves that he *has*, and is the natural Conſequence of his *having* it. Surely, If I *intruſt* a Man to manage my Money which is locked up in my *Cheſt*, I muſt alſo intruſt him with the *Key* that he may get at it; but will my giving him the Key imply, that I do any Thing more than *intruſt* him? If not, why need the Circumſtance of the *Key* be ſo much inſiſted on, when I am ready to acknowledge the *Truſt?* All his Zeal in Support of theſe *Letters* leaves us therefore juſt where we were, and confirms what we had confeſſed long before his Book was thought of, to wit, *That, by the Nature of our Conſtitution, the King has the Right of acting as* TRUSTEE *for the People, in receiving and expending, for their Uſe, the Money raiſed out of their Pockets by Authority of Parliament; and that, in the natural Conſequence of ſuch* TRUST, *he is ever accountable to them for his Diſcharge of it, and the Application of their Money thus committed to his Care.*

Who his Adverſaries, on this Point, can be, I really don't know; if he ever met with any, they are moſt diſmally uninformed; for, one of the firſt Things we are taught to know is, that the King is the firſt Magiſtrate, the grand Officer of the State, and the Head of the executive Power; but we are alſo taught to know that every *Magiſtrate*, every *Officer*, every *executive Power*, not only implies, but is totally founded on *a Truſt* repoſed *for the Good of the Society*; for the Service of *that* were they originally conſtituted, but to promote *its* Welfare they would never have exiſted, and to *it* muſt they be ever anſwerable for the Manner in which they exert their delegated Authority.

All this the Author knew as well as any one, but it was convenient to *miſtake*; the real Point of Argument was to be ſlurred over, and a falſe one pompouſly inſiſted on, that the Houſe of Commons might appear to have *attacked* the royal Prerogative, by denying that *Truſt* in the Crown which he takes ſuch indefatigable Pains to evince.

One principal Purpoſe of this Book is, to inculcate ſome Maxims which, though eſſential to ſupport his main Doctrine, are too groſs for the People of this Iſland as yet to digeſt, he foreſaw this in ſome Sort, and has therefore dreſſed them out with Care, in order to diſguſt as little as poſſible. Thus he will not, in plain Terms, aſſert, that the Money raiſed from the People, for public Uſe, is *the Property of the Crown*, yet it is palpable that he *implicitly* aſſerts it in almoſt every Page; and, indeed, he was under a Neceſſity of doing ſo to ſupport the Doctrine of previous Conſent.

But of his Art in this Way I have ſpoken before; what ſtarted it to me now, was his oſtentatious Manner of inſiſting on the

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the Authority of the King's Letters; he would plainly give them by Inſinuation the Air of *abſolute*, and make an ordinary Reader imagine, that the King muſt have ſome Kind of Property in Money which he can thus ſend for *whenever he pleaſes*; but ſurely the meaneſt Capacity muſt ſee, that to inveſt him with a *Truſt*, without giving him *ſuch* a *Power*, would be downright Nonſenſe; he muſt have a *Power* of getting at the Money, in order to apply it according to his *Truſt*; and the beſt Method of doing ſo with Eaſe to himſelf, and Security to the Treaſury Officers who have the Charge of it, is by ſending his *Letters*, which are the legal Vouchers for their Juſtification.

Numberleſs other little Shifts and Evaſions, in the Courſe of this Pamphlet, I paſs over, as they would ſwell my Letter too much; my Reader, will, however, very eaſily detect them, if he will conſtantly, during the Peruſal, keep in his Eye that one grand Circumſtance of *the Truſt*; let him never loſe Sight of it, nor admit any one Maxim that is not ſtrictly conſentaneous to its Nature. This ſingle Idea decides, indeed, at once the whole Diſpute, and is an infallible Antidote againſt all the Fallacy that has been deviſed by the miniſterial Advocates. I ſhall, therefore, detain him as little as poſſible.

Our Author has thus proved the Truſt, and we allowed it before it was proved. But what is become of *previous Conſent?* I believe nobody ſees it in Company with the *Truſt*; I fancy, if we look a little farther, we ſhall ſee it with its inſeparable Companion, *private Property.*

If it does not reſult from the Nature of a *Truſt*, the CONSIDERATIONS have laboured to no Purpouſe; he does not pretend to prove that it *does*, through the whole Courſe of his Book, except in his 35th Page; this is, conſequently, the only Place for *real* Argument in the Performance; for the grand Article to be proved is, that BECAUSE *the King is the People's* TRUSTEE, *that* THEREFORE *his Conſent is neceſſary to their even* RECOMMENDING, *by Bill, any Application of their own Money.*

This, *therefore*, is a tough unpliant Word; our Author thought ſo, and could not ſpare more than ſeven Lines upon it, which are theſe; " If ſuch Truſt be in the Crown, the King's " Conſent is neceſſary previous to PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS " on the Application; otherwiſe ſuch Deliberations thereon " might lay the Crown under *great Difficulties*, and be attended " with bad Conſequences to Government." Here are the ſeven Lines which contain all the Proof that could be invented to ſupport this much conteſted Doctrine; on the Strength of theſe is the whole to be decided, and the moſt loyal Set of Subjects that ever a Monarch had, muſt be convicted of an illegal Attempt on his Prerogative.

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If any Man in the Community, with a Head reaſonably free from Dulneſs, and a Heart from Prejudice, will allow, that this ſhort Sentence, compoſed entirely of Words of a very vague and undeterminate Meaning, or, rather, without any at all, is a ſatisfactory Proof, and a firm Foundation for this mighty Superſtructure, I give up the Argument.

I do not find that this Point, this *Proof* of neceſſary Connexion between a *Truſt* and *previous Conſent*, has been inſiſted on by the Followers of our Author, except by the florid *Haberdaſher*; a Gentleman who has taken it in his Head to ape *the Drapier*; as like him in his Abilities as his Cauſe, and in the Popularity he affects, as like him as in either. With the reſt of his ſmall Brethren, however, he has contrived to write *a new Book* by a Change of Phraſe, and is, indeed, the moſt *faithful Interpreter* of the CONSIDERATIONS that we have.

He, indeed, ventures to go a few Lines farther on this Point, but ſtill carefully keeping his *Text* (above quoted) in his Eye. If the Reader thinks it worth while, he may find the Place I mean in Page 23 and 24 of the ſecond Letter. The Sum of it is, that, ſhould the People have a Right to propoſe any Application of their Money to the King, their Truſtee, without his *previous* Leave, they may happen, by ſome Chance or other, to do ſo exactly at the Time, when he was on the Point of applying this very Money to ſome important public Service; which may happen to be of ſo nice a Nature, that he could not divulge it without, perhaps, ruining the State; hence he would be under a Neceſſity of rejecting their Propoſal without giving them any Reaſon, and this may incur the public Reſentment. Beſides, a wicked Parliament may make ſome ſuch Propoſal on Purpoſe to draw him into this Dilemma.

There ſeems ſuch a Faintneſs in this Attempt at an Argument, and ſuch an Air of Deſpondency in the Inventor of it, that it is almoſt cruel to attack it. But, as it comes originally from the CONSIDERATIONS, it ſhall have a Word or two.

In ſome very *rare* Caſes it *may* happen, that the Crown may be ingaged in Tranſactions not proper to divulge, *at the Time*, even to the Parliament, but *very* rarely, indeed, can ſuch an Occaſion occur, with reſpect to the *particular* Intereſts of this Kingdom; ſtill more rare muſt ſuch a Caſe be, if this ſhould happen juſt at the very Nick, when the Parliament might propoſe *another* Application of this very Money, and no Fund be found ſufficient to anſwer *both*: How often, in a thouſand Years, ſuch a Concurrence of unlucky Circumſtances may be met with, I ſhall not now attempt to compute; but I fear that few will be got to believe, that ſuch a framed *Poſſibility* is a Reaſon ſtrong enough to cut off from the Parliament all Right of deliberating

on the Application of the People's Money, without previous *Conſent* from *the Crown*. But ſuppoſing this ſtrange Affair ſhould happen, is not the Remedy very eaſy? Surely a good King (directed by good Miniſters) and an affectionate Parliament, could never diſagree upon it; between *ſuch* a Confidence muſt ever ſubſiſt, that could, in an Inſtant, diſperſe the moſt unlucky Combination of Incidents that can be deviſed; and, in a Caſe like this, muſt baniſh every Shadow of Difficulty; the King has a Scheme on Foot for the public Benefit, which, in its Nature, requires Secrecy; the People humbly approach with their Advice on the Diſpoſal of that Share of their Money, which is deſtined for the Completion of this Scheme; a Propoſal does no Harm, and the King, in ſuch a Caſe, might, and muſt refuſe his Concurrence, without divulging the Particulars of his Plan: Their Experience of his former Conduct, and continued Care of their Intereſts, muſt ſurely prevent every the leaſt Tendency to Uneaſineſs or Diſtruſt; and beſides, all ſuch Secrets can be but temporary, and the *Application* lies ever open to their Scrutiny. A moſt delicate and vapouriſh Being indeed muſt be the Genius of Government, to be ſcared out of its Abilities, and perplexed in the Diſcharge of its Office, if THE PEOPLE, whoſe Welfare ought to be the ſole Object of its Concern, ſhould approach uninvited to offer their *Opinion*.

Thus far to the firſt Part of this Argument; his ſecond is built on what a bad Parliament *may* do; this Matter I will not conteſt with him, but, on the contrary, would be glad to know what a *bad Parliament* may *not* do; ſurely there is not a Branch of their Privileges which they may not pervert at their Diſcretion, either to diſtreſs their Sovereign, or betray their Conſtituents; but can this be a Reaſon for depriving them of theſe Privileges? or is it poſſible to contrive a human Syſtem of Power not liable to *Abuſe?*

The ſame Gentleman's own Words immediately after (alſo badly copied from the CONSIDERATIONS) will do well enough on this Occaſion; "As well on the ſame Principle may we "argue againſt all Kinds of human Government, becauſe, in "the Hands of whatever Men Power is lodged, there a Poſſi-"bility of Miſapplication muſt be admitted. The Debate, "therefore, is not about poſſible Abuſe of the Power claimed; "*an Abuſe not even to be preſumed at preſent.* The only Conſi-"derations of Moment to us in this Matter are — Is there ſuch "a Power eſtabliſhed? does this Eſtabliſhment naturally tend "to the national Proſperity?"

If then this Right of humbly offering their Opinions, about the Application of their own Money, be by the Rules of Nature, and our Conſtitution, inherent in the Repreſentatives of the People,

People, and that it be, in its direct Tendency, ſalutary to the Society, as the Loſs of it muſt be deſtructive, no *Poſſibility* that they may, at ſome Time or another, pervert it to a ſiniſter Purpoſe, can be a ſufficient Argument for taking it from them. Indeed, it happens a little unluckily for the Author, that there is not a ſingle Article of parliamentary Privilege which may not with much more Eaſe than this, be made an Inſtrument of diſtreſſing the Crown; and the Reaſon is plain; becauſe *this* is the *humbleſt*, the leaſt *energic*, of all *Rights*; it amounts to nothing more than a Liberty of *Opinion*; a Right that in itſelf can never hurt the Crown, nor can the worſt Intention give it a noxious Quality, without the Concurrence of a numberleſs Train of Fatalities, which never did, nor hardly ever can, exiſt.

But turn the Reverſe, deprive us of this Right, this humble Right, and *what* do we become? Then, indeed, the worſt of Conſequences glare upon the Eye, and fright the free-born Soul from a Doctrine teeming with Evils; no *Contingencies*, no *poſſible Abuſe:* Abuſe implies a Contraſt, implies a Benefit reſulting from the ſame Source through a different Channel. But inveſt the Crown with a Right of prohibiting the Subject's *propoſing* an Application of the national Wealth, and nothing *can* enſue but one uniform Series of Miſchiefs to the People, without one *poſſible Advantage* to them, or one Particle of Dignity to the Monarch, conſiſtent with the Nature of a FREE GOVERNMENT.

If then we agree with the Author of the CONSIDERATIONS, that to indulge the People, in this Right, *may be attended with bad Conſequences to* GOVERNMENT, we muſt underſtand that Kind of G——t which, it is too probable, he had chiefly in his Eye when he invented the Doctrine; that G——t which ſo furiouſly attempted the Meaſure, and ſo induſtriouſly diſperſed his Book; to ſuch a one, indeed, *this* Right, and, I fear, ſome others, muſt be very diſagreeable.

That a Neceſſity of *previous Conſent* can never be the natural Reſult of a *Truſt* is, therefore, not to be denied; its moſt celebrated Advocates have no where produced even a Shadow of a Proof that it is; and this is the true Reaſon why all their Pains have not effected a Particle of Conviction, nor, in any Sort, abated that honeſt Fervour among THE PEOPLE, which they were ſo induſtriouſly calculated to ſtifle. No Man, in his Senſes, can be brought to think, that *becauſe* a Perſon is *intruſted*, in general, with the Money of others, to be laid out *for their Uſe*, that *therefore* the Perſons, who intruſt him, can have no Right, even to *propoſe* an Application of any Part of this their Money, until they have previouſly obtained Leave from the Truſtee for ſo doing. There could not be two more unlucky Ideas joined together, than a *Truſt*, and *a Neceſſity of ſuch Conſent*; they are,

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in their Nature, as incongruous as Fire and Water, nor will the greateſt Art be ever able to extract one from the other.

If a Neceſſity of *previous Conſent* be not then the natural Growth of a *Truſt*, it is eaſy to ſee of *what* it *is* the natural Growth; and this will, I believe, lead us, at the ſame Inſtant, to a View of the grand Spring which actuated this whole Proceeding; which produced the furious Effort, and the implacable Reſentment. From hence too ariſe the Juſtification and the Merit of thoſe, who, at every Hazard, withſtood the inſidious Meaſure.

ABSOLUTE, PRIVATE PROPERTY, in the Perſon whoſe previous Conſent is thus neceſſary, will be found, without long Search, to be the *only* Baſis on which this Doctrine can be built. Every liberal minded Man will think that, while he continues to hold a Property in his Money, he muſt ever retain with it a Right of *ſpeaking his Mind* about the Application, though another Perſon may have the *Poſſeſſion* of it for *his* Uſe. This is the laſt Privilege that can be parted with, nor can it, indeed, be reſigned until the Property goes out of him. Take *this* away, and what becomes of the very Idea of *Property?* It is inſtantly fled; for this is its very Eſſence, Life, and Spirit: There is a Reverence eſſentially attending on its very Nature, which intitles a Man by the eternal Law of Nature to this Prerogative, and we find accordingly an univerſally innate Pride that aſſerts the Claim, and riſes againſt every Attempt to deprive us of it.

On the other Hand where the *Property* and *Poſſeſſion* are lodged together, *unincumbered with any* TRUST, *there*, AND THERE ALONE, the ſame great Law of Nature makes it abſolutely neceſſary, that *previous Conſent* be had, from the *Proprietor*, before any other Perſon on Earth can, with Juſtice or Decorum, enter into any Deliberation, or make any Propoſal, relative to the Diſpoſition of this his PROPERTY; ſuch a Conduct would be an Invaſion on its ſacred *Reverence*, and the ſame honeſt *Pride* would take Fire at the Inſolence.

If the Nature of a *Truſt* does not make a Neceſſity for *previous Conſent*, then to acknowledge ſuch a *Neceſſity* would be to go beyond the Nature of a Truſt; a *Grant*, not implying a *Truſt*, muſt be a *Gift*, an uncontroulable Gift; there is no Medium; you ſtep inſtantly out of one into the other; a Grant made to a Perſon muſt be either to *his* Uſe, or not; if not, then to *ſome other* Uſe, and ſo becomes a Truſt; here is a *Grant* made to the King, and *previous Conſent*, is, it ſeems, inſiſted on as, ſome Way or other, the neceſſary Conſequence of this *Grant*; if then it partake not of, but be totally inconſiſtent with, the Nature of *one* Senſe of the Grant, it muſt, doubtleſs, be the neceſſary Conſequence of the *other* Senſe; that

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is, if we cannot be brought to believe that it is neceſſary to the Nature of a *Truſt*, we muſt ſee that its inſeparable Inference is *abſolute Property*.

If, candid and honeſt Reader, you deſire to poſſeſs the TRUTH, follow this Clue, and you will find *it* in fuller Luſtre than a Pen can picture it. Among other Things, you will ſee, that if the Money in the Treaſury, had been the private Property of the Crown, uncharged with any *Truſt*, and the King had offered it to be applied by Act of Parliament to the public Service of diſcharging the national Debt, the rejected Preamble would, in every Phraſe, have been as ſtrong an Acknowledgment of his *private Right* in the Money, and of his Condeſcenſion in ſuffering it to come under a Parliamentary Diſpoſal for the public Service, as the Dignity of the Crown and the Greatneſs of the Action could require. Read over the Preamble, and it will ſtrike you — Should it then be admitted where the Money was *our own?* With what View was it ſo zealouſly puſhed for? What Inferences would have been eſtabliſhed had it ſucceeded? Should the ſame Form be made uſe of in the Application of *the People*'s Money, which would have been ſufficient had it been *the King*'s? Is there, can there be, the leaſt Shadow of a Reaſon for putting both on *the ſame* Footing? And muſt not ſuch a Conduct effectually break down the Barrier of Diſtinction between them, and thereby give a Colour, an irremediable Pretext to ſome future bad Prince, or a rapacious Miniſter *of any Time*, for making uſe of that Confuſion, and waſting the Money of the People as the abſolute Property of the Crown?

One of the great Excellencies of a Parliamentary Conſtitution, its greateſt under a good King, is this; that the Repreſentatives of the People, coming together from all Quarters, after reſiding among their Conſtituents, and having every the beſt Opportunity of perfectly comprehending both THEIR Intereſts and THEIR Sentiments, and from hence being qualified, in the higheſt Degree, to repreſent both to their Sovereign, are conſidered as the GRAND COUNCIL of the Realm, whoſe Opinions and Advice carry the greateſt Authority, and are generally, or rather always, the Source and Baſis of thoſe Laws, by which the Welfare of the People is promoted and ſecured. The King cannot, from his own mere Knowledge, be equally enabled, and the *only true* Method for his Information is, to liſten to THEM. Now, it will be allowed, that, as the public Wealth is the Sinew, the Life, of every public Meaſure, there cannot come under the Deliberation of a Parliament, an Article more worthy their Attention, more eſſential to the public Happineſs, than the proper Application of the public Wealth: One (among many) bleſſed Conſequence therefore of the Doctrine before us

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is, the abridging the grand Council of the Realm, of all Power of acting as ſuch, in the moſt important Article that can ever come before them; they may ſee the moſt ſalutary Purpoſes retarded, nay, the whole Nation on the Brink of Ruin, for Want of Aid from the PUBLIC TREASURE, yet muſt they not preſume to offer to their Sovereign's Acceptance, the Sentiments that burn within them on the great Occaſion, until they have obtained Leave from him for ſo doing; and for this, they muſt often break through a Crowd of Miniſters, who have already apportioned among themſelves this very Money, on which the Preſervation of a PEOPLE may depend — And all for what? Becauſe the King was before made a *Truſtee* for the People, to expend this Money for *their Uſe*; or thus, becauſe the King is *intruſted* to act for the Service of the People, therefore the People can have no Right to point out to him, by what Method this *Service* may beſt be anſwered.

The CONSIDERATIONS, indeed, obviate this Inconvenience by the only Method of doing it, by aſſuring us, in the 18th Page, that NO PART of the Community, BUT the King, *can* judge how the *public Service* may be promoted. His Words are, "If the Affirmative be true, [to wit, that the King is the *acting* "*Truſtee* for the People] his Majeſty, under that conſtitutional "*Truſt* muſt be THE JUDGE of *the Occaſion*, *the Time*, *and the* "*Sum*; for *he* SOLELY has the executive Power, AND knows "the various Exigences of Government, and which of them "ought to have the Preference in the Application." — And from hence, indeed, very *conſiſtently*, he infers the Neceſſity of *previous Conſent*. On ſuch Tenets as theſe, it is manifeſt, it can only be founded.

I ſhall not detain you with any Obſervations on this Poſition, or its innumerable neceſſary Conſequences. A Minute's Reflection will ſhew, that it takes away every the leaſt Trace of Liberty out of our Conſtitution. Of what Nature muſt a Proceeding be, that cannot be ſupported without Recourſe to ſuch a Doctrine as this? And what Men muſt they be, what Deſigns muſt they have had, who, at infinite Pains and Expence, both endeavoured the Completion of the *Proceeding*, and openly avowed and propagated the *Doctrine?*

I think I promiſed to point out where this Author denied the Parliamentary Privilege of overhauling and cenſuring the public Accounts: This brings me to it. *Dionyſius* has already convicted him, ſo that I ſhall dwell the leſs upon it. In the Paragraph I lately quoted from his 35th Page, all ſuch Privileges are expreſly cut off under the general Article of PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS; and here we have indeed a very conſiſtent Reaſon for it; for, if the King be the only Judge of the Occaſion, the Time,

Time, and the Sum, it is apparent that the Commons could not, without the greateſt Abſurdity, inquire into the Propriety of Accounts, which are ſuppoſed to be grounded upon his Authority, and directed by his Judgment; and to call for them for this Purpoſe, would be the Height of impudent Stupidity. And accordingly, he afterward tells us (as *Dionyſius* has obſerved) that the public Accounts have been ever brought into Parliament, not as a Matter of *Right* to give Room for their *Cenſure*, but only as a *Direction*, to aſſiſt them in making *farther Grants*; that is, though they have not Capacities for *applying* Money, they are ſagacious enough to *raiſe* it for thoſe who have. Yet I really think he muſt, of Conſequence, cut off alſo this Privilege; for a Parliament, in ſuch a Caſe, would ſurely follow *infallible* Direction, and they may as well leave it to the ſame Infallibility to act entirely in their Stead.

To confirm this Sentiment, that the Parliament can have no *Right* to call for the public Accounts, and that they are laid before them only as a Matter of Aſſiſtance, he tells us in Page 44, That "The ſaying that this is public Money, being given "by the Public, and *therefore* to be accounted for to them, is "*unfair Reaſoning.*" If I underſtand *Engliſh*, the plain Meaning of this Sentence is this, "It does not follow, becauſe this "Money was given by the Public, that therefore they have any "Right to inquire into its Application." He then proceeds to give his *Reaſon*, "Becauſe the Public have once intruſted the "Crown by the general Grant, therefore, while that Truſt "remains, the Diſpoſition is in the Crown, ſubject always to "the Truſt upon which it was veſted, for the Uſe of the Pub-"lic." He found himſelf obliged to *qualify* this Sentence a little, or it would have been very *conſiſtent*; but, as it ſtands, this is the *Purport*; "The Crown is not to account for the public "Money to the Public, *becauſe* the Crown is *intruſted*; and the "Diſpoſition of this Money continues in the Crown, always "ſubject to this *Truſt*, and yet no Power on Earth ſhall in-"quire whether this *Truſt* is adhered to or not."

For a full Diſplay of theſe and his other principal Fallacies, and a true Repreſentation of all his miſtated Facts, and, indeed, for the moſt lively Information in every Article belonging to this Affair, I refer my Reader to the inimitable Pamphlet from which I have taken my Motto.

What more ſhall I ſay? or what more is neceſſary to be ſaid? Surely every Perſon, who thinks at all, will ſee, that the Proceeding of our ever glorious Houſe of Commons in rejecting this newly introduced Form, left the Crown in full Poſſeſſion of its ANCIENT RIGHT, of being the *conſtitutional Truſtee* for the People, and of every Privilege conſequent on that great and honourable

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honourable Relation; nay, it was a ſtrong Declaration in Affirmance of this *Right*; for had the Crown *not* been a *Truſtee*, the Preamble might, and muſt, have been admitted. He will ſee that, by the ſame noble and intrepid Step, they reſcued the Nation from a parliamentary Acknowledgment of A DISCRETIONARY DOMINION IN THE CROWN, OVER THE PUBLIC TREASURY OF THIS KINGDOM.

Who they were that had the Advantages reſulting from ſuch an Acknowledgment in their Eye, may eaſily be imagined, by reflecting who they were that were ſo *aſſiduous* to obtain it; who FIRST imported the Doctrine? who ſollicited, who fawned, who bribed, who menaced, to promote it? Who ſtopped the public Commerce a whole Week, to gain Time for *Miſrepreſentation* on its Defeat, and gave the Rein to every Suggeſtion of diſappointed Rage? But on this I need not dwell;

> ——*Their* DESIGNS
> *Are known to all* Mycenæ; WHO, *indeed*,
> WHO CAN HAVE GOOD ONES THAT CORRUPTS A PEOPLE?

It is humbly hoped, that from what has been ſaid, an Anſwer inſtantly reſults to the Queſtion ſo pompouſly produced by the miniſterial Advocates, "Whether any, and what, new "Power could accrue to the Crown from a parliamentary Ac- "knowledgment of the Neceſſity of *previous Conſent*?"

It is evident, that ſuch an Acknowledgment would confer on the Crown a Power unconſentaneous with the Nature of a *Truſt* for the public Service, and, in its neceſſary Conſequence, inveſt it with an uncontroulable Sway over the Treaſury of this Kingdom for ever-more. That ſuch a Dominion is no Part of the Crown's *ancient Prerogative*, will, I preſume, be hardly denied.

I ſhall detain you no longer on this Head; the concurring Arguments that pour in to the Illuſtration of Truth, have already employed me longer than I deſigned, and would do ſo ſtill were I to indulge them. You will, on conſidering the Subject, find its Force increaſe on you every Moment, and with it your Admiration, that Men could be hardy or intoxicated enough to inſult the Underſtandings of a Nation by attempting to diſguiſe it. I have dwelled on this Topic the longer, becauſe (as the VINDICATION obſerves) "the principal Argument drawn "from Law and Reaſon is, undoubtedly, the Power of the "Crown over the Revenue *being but a Truſt for* PUBLIC SER- "VICE, and ſtands the foremoſt Objection to the Doctrine of "*previous Conſent*."

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With a few Words from the ſame excellent Writer, I ſhall cloſe this Part of my Argument.

" A *private Intereſt* cannot, by the greateſt Art, be extracted " out of a *public Truſt*; and, conſequently, a *private* Wrong " cannot grow, by the *Public* controuling the Truſt, which was " of *its own Creation, and for its own Uſe.*"

" This ſeems to be undeniable. The Concluſion then drawn " from the above Premiſſes, *That when an Application ſhall be* " PROPOSED *by any Power, the* CONSENT *of the Crown muſt* " *be* PREVIOUS *thereto*, is abſurd."

" Becauſe, THE CROWN HATH BUT A TRUST FOR PUBLIC SERVICE."

A ſtrong and pointed Epitome of all that can be ſaid on this Subject, and worthy of a Place in the Head and Heart of every IRISH-MAN!

The ſame Author, and the REMARKS, have illuſtrated this Topic, with a Force and Perſpicuity that muſt perpetuate them with Honour, while a Love of LIBERTY and TRUTH holds its Reſidence in the human Breaſt.

They have alſo gone minutely into all the Proceedings of Parliament that add Force to this Privilege of interfering where the public Money is concerned, and have ſhewn, to Demonſtration, a conſtant Exertion of this *Right*, through a Series of Years, in *calling for*, *inſpecting*, and *cenſuring* the Applications made of the public Money, under the general Truſt of the Crown, and, where any Surplus has remained, after the public Exigencies were anſwered, in carrying over this Surplus, of their own mere Motion, to the Service of the enſuing Two Years, although the Money that compoſed this Surplus, had been before granted to the Crown for the public Service.

The Author of the CONSIDERATIONS is miſerably offended at this; and, indeed, no Wonder, for it is an unlucky *Fact*. He won't allow that they *applied* the Surplus, but only carried it in their own Eſtimates to the Credit of the Nation, and ſo made the enſuing Grants the leſs. Few, I believe, will be ſatisfied with this Diſtinction; for, ſurely, it appears by this their repeated Conduct for many Years, that they have looked on themſelves as entitled to meddle with the Money *before intruſted to the King*, without aſking his Leave, or forbearing on a *Poſſibility that he might have deſtined this Money for ſome important ſecret Service*; they have entered into many ſucceſſive PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS on this Money without *previous Conſent*, they have paſſed ſolemn Reſolutions in relation to it as the Money of the Public, and have, at different Times, reduced the national Debt, by *making Uſe* of ſuch Surpluſes, and giving Credit for them to THE NATION.

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The ſame Gentlemen have ſhewn a Variety of Inſtances, where the Commons have pointed out to the Crown ſuch Methods, as ſeemed to them adviſeable for the Application of the public Money, that had before been intruſted to the Crown, and all without a Trace of *previous Conſent*. That the late Bill amounted to any Thing more than an humble *pointing out*, nobody will affirm, as the King's Aſſent remained ſtill in his own Hands; this Uſage, therefore, is confirmatory of its Propriety in the higheſt Degree, and the ſame Doctrine that prohibits the *bringing in a Bill*, muſt alſo inevitably prohibit *an Addreſs*, pointing out any Application of the public Money, without Leave firſt had from the Crown.

The CONSIDERATIONS have not ſhewn, why the Commons have always thus preſumed to *addreſs* without *Leave*, but they inſiſt much on the *humble Stile* of theſe Addreſſes, and infer from thence, that the Crown has *the Right* of Application; *i. e.* the *ſole*, *abſolute*, and uncontroulable Right of Application; in this Senſe evidently would he repreſent it. A good Plea would my *Agent* have for claiming a Property in my Money, becauſe I might have deſired that he would *pleaſe* to pay ſuch and ſuch Sums, and I ſhould be *much obliged* to him! A *royal Agent* may ſurely claim a ſtill farther Addition of Complaiſance; the Sublimity of his Station ſufficiently authorizes and ſupports the Change, without having Recourſe to a Change of Nature in the Subject.

I would aſk this Author whether, ſuppoſing that an Addreſs from the Commons, recommending a ſalutary Application of the public Money, ſhould, at any time, through the fraudulent Deſigns of ſome of the Royal Miniſters, be rejected by the Crown, the Commons, in ſuch a Caſe, have not a conſtitutional Redreſs againſt all ſuch Miniſters, and every other Perſon, who might have adviſed or aſſiſted in the Rejection of their Advice? If the Affirmative be true, many Conſequences will follow, not very agreeable to his Doctrine; and, among the reſt, this, that, be the *Stile* of ſuch Addreſſes ever ſo reſpectful, it confers no Power on the Crown, but that which, by the Nature of a FREE CONSTITUTION, it enjoys; *the Power of acting as an* ACCOUNTABLE TRUSTEE *for the People*.

Many things occur in the ſame Author's firſt and ſecond Performance, that, had I Leiſure and Room, I might, perhaps, however unneceſſary, be tempted to ſpeak to. Every Reader has obſerved how he has left the VINDICATION in full Poſſeſſion of all the principal Arguments, and modeſtly forbears to return to thoſe untenable lurking Holes, from whence his too powerful Adverſary had driven him.

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One Circumſtance I muſt mention, as a Specimen of his deplorable Condition: He had, in the CONSIDERATIONS, produced an Inſtance of *previous Conſent*, being mentioned to the *Houſe* by a Miniſter of the Crown, in relation to Lord *Bolingbroke*'s Forfeitures. To overſet this Attempt at a Precedent, the *Vindicator* quotes the Act of *Reſumption*, and the Act for encouraging Seamen; both infinitely ſtronger, eſpecially the latter; yet, who would think it? This Author, in his Reply, aſſures us, *they* are nothing to the Purpoſe, however *his own* may be: And why? Becauſe they are not exactly parallel; becauſe they did not relate to the national Debt: Nay, he condeſcends to grow facetious on the Occaſion, and throws the *Vindicator* into a terrible *Dilemma*. I need not point out to the Reader how powerfully theſe two laſt quoted Precedents operate as Arguments *a fortiori*: Surely if the King's *previous Conſent* be not neceſſary where his *acknowledged* Right is concerned, it cannot be deemed neceſſary where the Right is, by no means, an *acknowledged one*. But, as to the *Conſiderer*'s Precedent, we do not find, by that, or the others he produces, that the Neceſſity of this *previous Conſent* was *ſolemnly acknowledged* in the Acts of Parliament. If ſo, they are nothing to our Point, which ſolely relates to a *Parliamentary Acknowledgment*: For every one may ſee, that a Servant of the Crown, out of his Zeal for enhancing the Dignity of its Appearance, may, at any time, uſher in a majeſtic Form of Words, which the reſt of the Houſe never intended to acknowledge a *Neceſſity* for; and without ſuch an Acknowledgment, the Act of *one* Perſon, and he a Miniſter, will not, it is hoped, be deemed a Foundation for *Prerogative*, or be any Kind of Proof that the Crown's *previous Conſent* is, on all ſuch Occaſions, CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY. By the ſame Way of arguing, he might have at once determined the preſent Matter of Conteſt, by producing, as a deciſive *Precedent*, the L— L——'s Speech, wherein the like *Condeſcenſion* is promulgated to the People of *Ireland*: Or, indeed, he may, at any Time, eſtabliſh any Right in the Crown by the officious Expreſſions of its Servants.

One Inſtance more of this ingenious Gentleman's Powers in Argumentation, which juſt now occurred to me, I muſt mention: In his Reply he tells us, That "the Act for laying Taxes "on Penſions granted by the King, brought in by the Com-"mons *without previous Conſent*, and paſſed in 1703, was a "ſtrong Affirmance of his *Right* of granting them."—— I ſhould deſpair of a School-boy, who could be convinced, or hoped to convince another, by ſuch wretched Jargon. The meaneſt Capacity will inſtantly perceive, that the royal *Power* of granting Penſions out of the public Money, is but a Branch of the *Truſt*

for *public Service*, intended to reward and encourage Merit *for the public Weal*; where *this great End* is not promoted for want of adequate Merit in the Perſons, ſuch Penſions are a Deviation from That TRUST, and the public Money is ſo far waſted; This was the Caſe in this Seſſion, and the Commons accordingly, after ſolemn Inquiries, and ſolemn Cenſures, on ſuch Grants, proceeded to bring in a Bill for taxing them, *i. e.* for reducing them; which Bill, though it took its Riſe from an Exertion of the King's *Power* of granting Penſions, yet was the ſtrongeſt Denial of his *Right* of granting them in theſe particular Circumſtances, and the ſtrongeſt Demonſtration that they knew themſelves entitled to controul him in the Exerciſe of this *Power*, and reſtrain him to the Conditions of his *Truſt*, on which alone he had a *Right* to exert it, to wit, the Advancement of the PUBLIC SERVICE.

But it is needleſs to enter into farther Particulars. The VINDICATION ſtands on Record the Terror of the Party and its Doctrines, and has left but little Room for any additional Confutation. A Work that was not to be forgiven! The only Argument that remained was that of *Power*; though THE PEOPLE could not be deceived, *their* FRIENDS could be puniſhed, and, to ſtrip the Author of his Employment, proved to Demonſtration that he was on the *wrong* Side of the Queſtion.

As to the CONSIDERATIONS, I ſhall only add, that as they have already been adjudged, in every private Opinion, to be as ſcandalous and ſlaviſh a Libel againſt Truth, Liberty, and our Conſtitution, as ever diſhonoured the Preſs; ſo, had the Houſe of Commons, *that* GRAND BASIS *of our national Felicity*, been permitted to meet, they would, doubtleſs, have condemned it to the ſame ignominious Cenſure, which Books of leſs Demerit have frequently met with among us, as well as in *England*.

As to the leſſer Pamphlets, they are almoſt all, as I have obſerved before, tranſcribed from this; many Perſons ſtood, with Pen in Hand, and Hearts full of Zeal, waiting for the *Cue* to proceed on, and, when *this* came out under the Stamp of AUTHORITY, to Work they fell; every one ſtriving, according to his Abilities, to make his own Work look as *different* as poſſible from the Original. Let my Reader reduce their Words into ſome determinate Meaning as far as he can, and he will ſee the Truth of this Aſſertion; in ſome the Phraſe is ſwell'd, in others, very unaffectedly, lowered; in ſome, thickly mixed with Abuſe, in others, daſh'd with Solemnity; but, in ALL, the Burden of the Song is, *The King's Conſent is* PREVIOUSLY *neceſſary, becauſe he is the* TRUSTEE *of the People.*

One or two, either through the Heat of Dullneſs, or Deſign, tells the Public in plain Terms, that the Commons wanted to

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diſpoſe of the Treaſury Money without allowing the King any Share of Concurrence at all. I believe this muſt be downright Ignorance, for it could not be expected, that the meaneſt Perſon in the Community could be impoſed on by ſo groſs a Fallacy; for all the World knows it was to have been diſpoſed of by *Act of Parliament*, which cannot exiſt without the King's Aſſent, that the Bill for this Purpoſe was brought in and paſſed by the Houſe of Commons, and that its being afterward rejected by them, was entirely owing to a Clauſe put into it on the other Side of the Water, which imported, that the Conſent of the Crown was neceſſary, before the Repreſentatives of the People could *bring in a Bill* for the Application of the People's Money.

A few others, for the ſake of diverſifying the Argument, have ventured to affirm, that the whole Diſpute has been about nothing but *Forms* and *Ceremonies*, or *Words* and *Compliments*. If *theſe* had no Kind of *Meaning* or Tendency, nor contained any *Acknowledgment*, then they are but empty *Sounds*, or abſolute *Nothings*; and in ſuch a Caſe, I fancy, the Odium will fall heavier where theſe Gentlemen would not chuſe; for, though none but Children would ſquabble for *Nothings*, yet they muſt be *malicious* and *ill-minded* Children, who could give a *mortal Stab* for being diſappointed of a *Gew-gaw*. But if *Forms* and *Ceremonies* contain an *Acknowledgment*, and ſuch *Acknowledgment* intimately affect the public Happineſs, it then becomes a Conteſt about *ſomething*, and on the Merits of that *Acknowledgment* is the Conduct of the contending Parties to be try'd.

Were theſe *Forms* introduced for *no Purpoſe*, with no *Meaning*, no *Tendency?* Were they made the grand Buſineſs of a whole Ad——n, was every Head at Work to promote them, and all the Threats, the Donations, the Promiſes, the open *Purchaſes*, that Power and Wealth could afford, made uſe of to obtain a PARLIAMENTARY ESTABLISHMENT of thoſe *Forms*, and all for *nothing?*

Something this Way *the Caſe fairly ſtated* ſeems to run; little ſuperior, but in Phraſe, to *the Letter to the Public*. It would inſinuate, that, on the Face of the inſerted Clauſe, there appears nothing but a *Compliment* to the Crown, which, in its Conſequence, could never affect the People, however neceſſary to the Royal Dignity. It is not eaſy to conceive how a Matter can be of ſo great Concern to one Branch of our Conſtitution, and yet be quite nugatory to the others; for, if it be inſiſted on as Part of the King's Prerogative, it becomes highly incumbent on the People to ſee that *it is ſo*, and not to *acknowledge* it, but on the ſtrongeſt Conviction of its Certainty and Propriety. To get over this, however, he gives us to underſtand, that

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that the Inſertion of the Clauſe, by no Means, inferred a *Neceſſity* for the *previous Conſent* recited in it, and that the Meaning of it can, by fair Interpretation, only amount to a previous Declaration of the King, that he *would* conſent when the Bill ſhould be *afterward* offered to him.

I leave it to every Man, who underſtands the obvious Force of the *Engliſh* Language, whether the Words of that Clauſe do not plainly declare, that ſuch previous Conſent was not only obtained for the framing of that Act, but alſo, that it was *neceſſary* to be ſo obtained. Let my Reader throw his Eye over the Preamble of the Bill, which is always the *Foundation* of the enacting Part, and he will ſee the *previous Conſent* is made a material Article of it; it is coupled to the WHEREAS, which runs through the whole, and, upon the *Strength* and *Ground-work* of it, it is, that the Parliament *humbly pray that it be enacted*, &c. It is not poſſible for Words to be more clear and expreſſive of the NECESSITY of the Clauſe to *the bringing in of the Bill.* But grant him his Diſtinction, and what does it avail him? If the Form was not *neceſſary* to the *Prerogative*, accumulated Odium reflects on thoſe to whom he would recommend himſelf; if he affirms that it *was*, then is the Diſpute where it was before; for ſurely, it comes exactly to the ſame Thing, whether ſuch a previous *Promiſe* of conſenting to the Bill, when framed, ſhould be *neceſſary*, or that the *Conſent* to the framing of it ſhould be previouſly *neceſſary*; a Moment's Attention will ſhew the two Phraſes to be, in every Inſtance, preciſely of the ſame Amount.

But on ſuch wretched Quibbles it were needleſs to dwell; the CONSIDERATIONS are the avowed Maxims of the Party, and they openly promulge it, as the Rule of their Conduct, and the Baſis of their Doctrines, that the King's Conſent is NECESSARY, *previous* to any public *Deliberations* on the Application of the public Money, that he had before been intruſted with for the public Uſe. The Aſſertion, it is true, is an hardy one, but a ſhuffling Phraſe will mend it but little; in ſuch this *fair ſtated Caſe* abounds, and is, indeed, but a weak Attempt at ſoftening the Procedure of its Patrons, and the Sentiments made public by their Advocates in order to ſupport it, againſt which the popular Clamour had raiſed itſelf with additional Reſentment. A ſtudied Fulneſs of Periods, a careful Latitude in Terms, and an affected Shew of Moderation, are his Inſtruments for this Purpoſe, and conſtitute the Sum total of his Excellence.

Had this Pamphlet met with any extraordinary Share of the public Favour, I ſhould perhaps dwell longer on expoſing its Fallacies; but as that is not the Caſe, and the ſame one Rule will

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will be ſufficient to detect the Sophiſtry of this, and all the other minor Productions on this Topic, I ſhall do no more than apply this Rule to that Form of Words which runs pretty much alike through them all, and which they ſeem to expect may paſs for an Argument. It is this, *That as the King has a* SEPARATE RIGHT *of applying the unappropriated public Money, to ſuch public Uſes as he, in his great Wiſdom, ſhould think proper, it ſeems highly reaſonable, that, when any of this Money is to be applied by an Act of Parliament, his Conſent ſhould be given* PREVIOUS *to the bringing in a Bill for that Purpoſe.*

Let the candid Reader ſift this for a Moment, and reduce it into a preciſe and *legal* Meaning, and, I am ſure, he muſt find it amount exactly to the ſame Propoſition which we have been hitherto conſidering; to wit, That, *becauſe the King is the Conſtitutional* TRUSTEE *for the laying out the Money of the People for their Uſe, and accountable to them for the Manner in which he diſcharges this* TRUST, *therefore his Conſent ſhould be obtained, before the People can even* PROPOSE *to him, for his Acceptance, a Bill for the Application of their own Money to their own Service.* The former Phraſe is but a glittering Dreſs for this Abſurdity, rendered leſs diſguſting by the Addition of *ſeparate Right*; but every intelligent Perſon will give theſe Words no more than their intrinſic Value: They ſeem to mean, that ſuch *Right* is *abſolute* and *uncontroulable*: If it were, I grant the Conſequence very juſt; but in OUR Conſtitution, in a FREE one, they muſt never imply more than that the King is, by the Nature of his Station, the Perſon who is to *manage* the Money of the People for their Uſe, and to *account* to them for this *Management*. The only Senſe in which the Word *Right* can be applied, on this Occaſion, is this, That, by his Poſition in the Frame of our Conſtitution, as he is the *fitteſt*, ſo is he *intitled* to be, the Truſtee for them, who cannot be *always* aſſembled to watch a Viciſſitude of Occaſions, and conſult for themſelves; he can act *ſeparately from them* in no other Senſe but as every *Truſtee* may and muſt, when *they*, who have the PROPERTY, are not on the Spot; ſtill ſubject, when *they* meet, to their Scrutiny, Cenſure, and Direction. But as *a ſeparate Right* carries, in its common Acceptation, the Idea of a diſcretionary, unlimited Power, and gives an inadvertent Reader to underſtand, that the King may do *juſt as he pleaſes* with the public Treaſure, it was the moſt adviſeable Phraſe for this Author, and his Compeers, to build their Syſtem on; and, indeed, in *this* Senſe, it is the only Baſis that can ſupport it.

Sometimes we have the ſame Sentiment in Words like theſe: "The King had a *Right* to pay off the national Debt *by himſelf*, "as he has accordingly done; and, conſequently, when he "permitted

" permitted the Parliament to have a Share in the Tranſaction, " it was but reaſonable that his *previous Conſent* ſhould be ac- " knowledged." The firſt Propoſition may admit of much to be ſaid on it. I am not Lawyer enough to aſcertain, how far it was neceſſary to pay off a Debt, contracted on the Faith of Parliament, by a *joint* Act of all the ſame Branches of our Conſtitution, or, if any Creditors ſhould be hardy enough to refuſe their Money from any Authority but *that* under which they borrowed it, and, in Conſequence thereof, have their Intereſt ſtopped, how far a future Parliament may, with Juſtice and Propriety, eſpouſe and vindicate ſuch Refuſal. On ſuch arduous Points I will not venture to pronounce; and it becomes leſs neceſſary, as we have heard no Objection to the Thing being done by *Act of Parliament*; from whence we may conclude, that it was judged, at leaſt, the *moſt adviſeable* Form. But this I will rely on, as a *conſtitutional Truth*, that no Power, or Perſon, on Earth can ſay, with Propriety, that the Crown had or has a *Right* to apply the public Money to this, or that, or any other particular Uſe, excepting only THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED. Until THEIR Deciſion be paſſed, all ſuch Applications remain quite uncertain and undetermined, as to their Legality: For theſe Applications can be made only under the *general Truſt* repoſed in the Crown for *public Service*; and who is to aſcertain, whether this *Truſt* has been adhered to in ſuch Applications, or whether every ſuch Application be made for the *public Service*, in purſuance of that *Truſt?* Surely, indubitably, the Repreſentatives of THE PEOPLE, for whoſe Benefit the Truſt was repoſed; the *private* Opinion of any Perſon muſt, in ſuch Caſe, operate no farther than himſelf, and can never be introduced, as a Propoſition, into Argument, and be made the Baſis of a political Concluſion; the Approbation of this GREAT BODY can *alone* determine the Merit, and affix the Stamp of Legality to every particular Exertion of the Royal Truſt in the Application of the Money of the People.

The *acknowledged Principle*, therefore, as the *Fair Stater*, with much Modeſty, terms it, and on which he builds his Doctrine, is not a Particle ſounder than as it ſtands in the *Original:* For, THE RIGHT of judging of the *Time*, the *Occaſion*, and the *Sum*, ſeems to be *definitively* lodged in the People's Repreſentatives, and not in the Crown, which can never pretend to more than a Right of judging on theſe Heads as a *Truſtee*. While ſuch *Right* is attended with real Love for the People's Welfare, and every particular Exertion of it calculated ſolely for that great End (as under our preſent moſt Excellent Sovereign, bleſſed be God, it has ever been) there can be no Danger of any material

material Error: But, ſurely, for common Safety, we muſt be aſſured, that it *has been ſo*; and that can only be by a Parliamentary Inquiry. The Propriety of every Application muſt depend on the *Time*, the *Occaſion*, and the *Sum*; of all theſe Particulars, the Repreſentatives of the People muſt therefore be allowed THE RIGHT of judging.

Every one, in his Conſcience, muſt reſt ſatisfied, that the public Money could not be *better* applied, than in paying off the public Debt; and it being the very Purpoſe intended by the rejected Bill, ſhews that it was the univerſal Senſe of the Nation: But, as I have ſaid, whether it can *properly* be done *under the general Truſt of the Crown*, none but the Parliament can determine; and ſuppoſing it certainly *could*, what does it prove? Nothing, but what has been ever acknowledged, *That the King has* A TRUST *for the Uſe of the People, and that this is one, among many Inſtances, of his exerting it.*

To have omitted the Acknowledgment of *previous Conſent*, would not, as the ſame Gentleman infers, have, in any Sort, precluded the King from acting in *that* ſeparate Capacity *which* he *really* has by our Conſtitution: For, ſurely, the *Royal Truſt* could never have been hurted, by his being made a *joint* and an *equal* Actor in the Diſpoſition of the public Treaſure; and to have made him a *diſtinct* and a *ſuperior* one, would not, as I believe has been ſhewn, have been neceſſary to that *Truſt*, conſiſtent with the People's Privileges, or conſonant to the Parliamentary Right, enjoyed through a Courſe of Years, of pointing out Applications, and puniſhing Miſapplications, of the Money raiſed by themſelves out of the Pockets of the People.

The firſt exactly parallel Inſtance of 1749, is a Precedent not to be got over: The Conceſſion of 1751, however injudicious, was attended with every Circumſtance that can deſtroy its Force as a Precedent, and hurts not all. It took its Riſe from the ſame Principle that produced all the unparallelled Moderation of the Majority in that Seſſion; from the warmeſt Inclinations to Harmony, a Hope that an Attack ſo unpopular, ſo unconſtitutional, could not long ſubſiſt, and a Fear of the Conſequence of Miſrepreſentations, in a Matter where *Prerogative* was pretended to be concerned. Every Meaſure, every Inſtance, demonſtrates theſe, their truly Patriot Apprehenſions, at that Time; they preſented an unuſual Addreſs, ſolely to obviate them; and though they would not make the *Acknowledgment* required, an Act of *their own*, an Unwillingneſs to diſtract their Country, induced them to acquieſce under the Inſertion made in their Names, on the other Side of the Water.

But now, thanks be to God, and the Defenders of our Liberties, we have a BASIS for that Privilege which, as A FREE PEO-

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PLE, we inherit; *the Right of Interpoſition in the Diſpoſal of our public Treaſure*; a Baſis that, on any future Occaſion, where this great Principle may intervene, muſt be regarded by every Lover of *IRELAND*, as great in its Conſequences, and ineſtimable in its Value. We have had the whole of the Doctrine moſt thoroughly canvaſſed, every Argument minutely diſcuſſed, the Merits of the Queſtion made plain to the whole Community, and, as the Reſult of all, a ſolemn DETERMINATION in Behalf of the People, which, while they retain a Care for their COUNTRY, they can never ſurely be brought to part with.

I ſhall add no more on *previous Conſent*; I have been led farther already than I at firſt intended, and farther than was neceſſary, as I am convinced, that every Man, who dares to ſee with his own Eyes, muſt plainly diſcover the Purport and Tendency of this Doctrine, and the Deſign of its Introduction, and that, without any Aſſiſtance beyond a fair Diſplay of the Truth; he muſt ſee, that it was intended as a Snare, to extort a Parliamentary Acknowledgment of an unlimited abſolute Power in the Crown, over all Monies in the Receipt of the *Iriſh* Treaſury: That an Adminiſtration was employed to effect it, highly qualified for the Purpoſe in every Circumſtance, and, eſpecially, in its cloſe Connections with thoſe, whoſe Station neceſſarily confers an extenſive Share of Influence in this Kingdom, and whoſe private Ambition built all its Hopes on the temporary Aſſiſtance of ſuch Patrons: That, to inveſt this beneficial Right, *every Means* was employed, and, on its unexpected Failure, the baſeſt Miſrepreſentations have been too ſucceſsfully put in Practice, againſt the trueſt and moſt affectionate Servants that ever King could boaſt of.

One thing muſt be ever remembered, that, as under the preſent *Adminiſtration* this modern Branch of Prerogative was firſt introduced, ſo was the rejected Clauſe inſerted in *England*, by the Promotion, and at the Inſtance of our G——r, as may be ſeen by the Letter from the Privy Council there, on the Return of the altered Bill; a Circumſtance that beſpeaks the Project not ſo *deeply* laid as ſome have apprehended; the whole of it ſeems the Work of our *domeſtic Friends*, animated by the Concurrence of temporary Viſitors; by *Miſrepreſentation* it is plain this pernicious Clauſe was inſerted, and on *Miſrepreſentation* is built their every Meaſure and their Hope of Succeſs. This is, ſurely, a chearing Reflection; it ſhews the national Intereſts of our Parent Iſland to be utterly unconcerned in the Scheme, and, conſequently, our Safety and our Freedom to depend entirely on ourſelves.

We

We of this Iſland ſhould be ever moſt careful of admitting any Innovations in any Part of our public Proceedings; Conceſſions will always bear hard upon us, and be very difficult, if poſſible, to retrieve. We ſee how the Acquieſcence of 1751 has been raiſed againſt us as a *Precedent*, notwithſtanding all the combating Strength of Reaſon, our Conſtitution, and Uſage almoſt immemorial. We have not, as an ingenious Writer expreſſes it, the *Principles* of a Conſtitution in *ourſelves*, but derive them all as a *Branch* from the *Engliſh Stock*; *Redreſs* muſt therefore be to *us* an arduous Taſk, and *Prevention* our ſafeſt Dependence. As this Peculiarity is the weak Part of our Conſtitution, againſt it will every un-national Deſign be played, and our Circumſpection ſhould be always proportionably vigilant.

This important Maxim was the Foundation of the Rejection of the Clauſe; and, indeed, conſidering the whole Tenor of the Conduct purſued by thoſe who ſo violently puſhed its Eſtabliſhment, there remained no room to doubt, that every Conſequence which could, in any Sort, be drawn from it, beneficial to the Projectors, however unfriendly to the Intereſts of this Iſland, would infallibly be indulged in its fulleſt Scope. For, I imagine, that a commonly-attentive View of their Meaſures, muſt ſhew ſuch a ſtriking Similarity of Principle running through the whole, as, at once, to decide the Queſtion I at firſt propoſed; to wit, whether they can be reaſonably ſuppoſed to have acted all along on a pure Deſire of promoting the Welfare of *IRELAND*, or to have been actuated by an Ambition, of elevating ſome few Individuals to a Height of Dominion over us, which, by a NATIONAL and POPULAR Courſe of Proceedings, they could never hope to obtain.

And, indeed, the Wonder does, by no Means, lie in the laſt Suppoſition, however miraculous the former muſt appear: For, conſider the *leading Perſons* engaged, and what elſe could be expected? When did we ſee or hear of a Set of Men, ſome of them without a Particle of Property in the Kingdom, inveſted only with a temporary Authority; others, from their Nature, their Connections, and all their antecedent Conduct, demonſtrably at the Beck of any Power that would lend them a Hand to that Advancement, for which they had been, for many Years, ſo ineffectually labouring; the joint Body acting under an extra-national Direction, and openly propagating their Schemes, by the loweſt and moſt corrupt of Means. —— When did we ever hear of *ſuch* a Combination being actuated by the noble Motive of promoting the Intereſts of the People they came among, and forcing upon them a Syſtem of Happineſs, which the whole

Body of that People was ſtupid enough not to ſee in ſuch a Light, and ſo perverſe as to refuſe?

I ſhall not detain you longer, by going into the many other Branches of the ſame Ad——n; nor is it at all ſtrange, that they, who ſo violently eſpouſed a bad Servant of the Public, in his Embezzlement of their Money, ſhould, afterward, throw out the Bill, brought in by the concurrent Voice of the Nation, to oblige him to *Reſtitution*; the common Act of Juſtice toward thoſe who had been the Sufferers by the Fraud. —— And, I believe, it will not appear more wonderful, that Perſons conſcious of their own Male-conduct, and afraid of a national Animadverſion, ſhould, for their own Sakes, prorogue the Parliament, although the moſt uſeful, ſalutary, and much wanted Laws, that were then ripe for Introduction, Laws, that would have added Life and Spirit to our Arts, Manufactures, Agriculture, and Improvements, ſhould, thereby, fall to the Ground, and their Benefits be loſt to the People; while others, on which the Security of our Properties, and the Advancement of our Religion, and our Intereſts, eſſentially depended, and by which they had long been ſignally promoted, were ſuffered to expire.

I have little more to add, than to obſerve, that, as under the Providence of GOD, the moſt dangerous Attack we have ever, in this way, experienced, has been gloriouſly baffled, ſo it can only be our own Fault, if it ſhould ever hereafter ſucceed. We are ſtill a FREE PEOPLE, and ſupported by a FREE PEOPLE; a People who, from the liberal Turn of their Nature and their Policy, as well as a true Regard for their own Intereſts, muſt ever wiſh well to our Liberties and Immunities. We have nothing to fear, but among *ourſelves*. We are in the Hands of thoſe who *repreſent* us; the preſent and future Happineſs of *Ireland* depends on *their* Behaviour, and *that*, in the greateſt Degree, on the Spirit of the People. Nothing, then, can ſave us, but our inviolably adhering, in Caſe of a general *Diſſolution*, or particular Vacancies, to thoſe, on whoſe Integrity we have the higheſt human Certainty for depending. They, who have already ſtood firm againſt the Storm, claim, in the firſt Rank, our Confidence and Services: A higher Teſt we cannot expect, nor need we deſire; and, when the Merit of the *red Liſt* ceaſes to draw our livelieſt Gratitude and Eſteem, PUBLIC SPIRIT muſt be vaniſhed, and *Ireland* on the Brink of Diſſolution.

Many there are, I doubt not, on the other Side, who wiſh for an Occaſion of atoning to their Country, and ſhewing, that their Error was not built on a bad *Intention*, however deſtructive in its Conſequences. To *ſuch* the Door lies ever open to a Reconciliation; but on no Footing but one as certain as their

their Tranſgreſſion. We *know* they have done Wrong, and we owe it to ourſelves, and our Poſterity, to be *as well* aſſured of their doing right, which can only be by *Experience*; the Criſis is too important for our believing on Aſſurances.

We ſhould be the more careful on this Head, as all the Writings, ſince the grand unpopular Attempt, have been plainly calculated to break down the Diſtinction between the *Black* and the *Red*; to diminiſh our Gratitude to our Preſervers, and our Reſentment againſt our Betrayers. This, indeed, is treating us with all that implyed Contempt, which runs through every Article of their Conduct; to expect that we ſhall forget ſubſtantial Bleſſings, which every Hour we feel, on the Strength of juridical Quibbles, and the chimerical Produce of byaſſed Imaginations. For my own Part, and, I believe, the Sentiment is pretty univerſal, I look on it as a DUTY, an indiſpenſible Duty to my COUNTRY, to perpetuate the Merit of its Protectors: For this Reaſon, do I preſerve the *diſtinguiſhing Liſts*, with a Care proportionable to my Senſe of the *Occaſion*, and ſhall tranſmit them, as a valuable Record, to Poſterity, who will never ceaſe to look, with Veneration, on every worthy Name, while they ſhudder at the Reflexion on thoſe Evils, from which they have been preſerved.

My Countrymen ſhould alſo guard againſt the Approach of Deſpondency and Irreſolution, at this particular Juncture: It is true, there have been Changes that no one expected to ſee; the *beſt-loved* Man in the Kingdom, the Darling of THE PEOPLE, and BEST FRIEND to his Sovereign, is diſplaced, and *others* have aſpired to one Point of the long wiſhed-for Grandeur: But let us not *deſpair*; the *Vox Populi* muſt at laſt be heard, however, for a while, precluded from the Royal Ear: While *that* remains unanimous and uncorrupted, there is the greateſt room for *Hope*; it ever had, and ever will have, a mighty Influence over political Counſels; and, though treated by ſome of our late miniſterial Advocates, as capable of no Interpretation but *the Huzza of* A MOB, yet is it a formidable Cloud over the Enjoyment of their Wiſhes, as, indeed, it ever has been in theſe Dominions, where ſuch unnatural and unpopular Meaſures have been purſued. —— The King may, at any time, diſmiſs his Servants; but let the People judge for themſelves, adhere firmly to their FRIENDS, and public Happineſs ſtill ſtands ſecure; nor ſhould *Regret* be permitted to ſlide into *Deſpair*, when the *Occaſion* promiſes, in its very Nature, to be but *temporary*.

My Sentiments thus thrown together, juſt as they occured, you have, my Friend, my Leave to publiſh, if you chuſe it. As

my

my Name will be reſerved, ſo am I free from the Apprehenſions that attend the invidious Light of *a Writer*; for no other Reaſon, indeed, would I deſire to be concealed, as I am not conſcious of unconſtitutional Aſſertions, or perſonal *Scurrility*. Here I muſt do Juſtice to the *Country* Writers in obſerving, that, in all their Productions, I have ſeen the Odium of all bad Meaſures has been thrown only on *the Authors:* Our excellent Sovereign has been ever particularly exempted from every the leaſt Share; nor have I met with an Expreſſion, inconſiſtent with that Duty and Reſpect, ſo eminently due to ſo good a Prince, and which may be ever expected from Subjects ſo affectionate and inviolable, as thoſe of *Ireland* have ever been.

For my own Part, as I know him too well to think, I ſhould alſo be moſt vilely ungrateful to inſinuate, that he hath, through the Courſe of theſe Revolutions, acted on any Motive, but the moſt upright Intentions, for the Welfare of his People: I was ſo happy as to ſerve near his Royal Perſon for many of my younger Years; and I know him, by repeated Demonſtration, to be ONE OF THE HONESTEST OF MEN, to have a moſt PATERNAL AFFECTION for all his Subjects, and as high a Pleaſure in their conſtitutional Liberty, with as fervent a Deſire for the Preſervation of it, as they can have themſelves. His repeated Goodneſs and Favours, crowned by a beneficent Grant of a lucrative and genteel Employment, call on me to make this Declaration, at the ſame time that they make it moſt pleaſing to me to do ſo. And yet what human Qualities, however great and excellent, can be Proof againſt the Fallacy of MISREPRESENTATION!

As to private Calumny, I can, I think, with equal Juſtice, vindicate them alſo on that Head; indeed they have been ſometimes too *perſonal*, in relation to one great Man, and, in Heat of Reſentment, for his being ſo largely concerned in our Diſtractions, have been tempted to give into an Opinion, for which there never yet has been, as I can find, an adequate Demonſtration. There ſeems, indeed, to be an Obſtinacy of Perſeverance, in ſuſpicious Circumſtances, that ſhews a perfect Tranquillity of Mind under the Accuſation, and a total Indifference about the Opinion of the World; how far this may go in breaking down the Barrier againſt the Guilt, I leave the Caſuiſts to determine. But this is certain, that a Man never yet made himſelf eminently odious in his public Character, who did not feel every private Foible expoſed in Retaliation.

On the other Side, there are, indeed, a Multitude of ſcandalous Invectives, though happily no room afforded for ſuch deteſtable

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deteſtable Inſinuations. One or two of their Penmen ſeem uncommonly dextrous at this Work; but the *Candid Inquirer* muſt be allowed the Palm. I find him again, lately, in another Diſguiſe, in which he gives his Adverſaries the *finiſhing Stroke.* For God's Sake, why don't they do ſomething for this poor Man? It would be a real Charity to the Public.

If you do expoſe this Letter, aſſure the good-natured Reader from me, that I have written it with a Heart full of the warmeſt and pureſt Inclinations for the Welfare of my Country, and, as it is pretty apparent, a Mind drawn off from an adequate Attention by a Viciſſitude of intereſting Circumſtances.

I am,

Dear SIR,

May 27th,
1754.

With much Truth,

Yours, &c.

ERRATA.

PAGE 5. Line 41. *for* a good good while, *read* a good while. — P. 39. L. 34. *for* but as every Truſtee, *read* than as every Truſtee. — P. 41. L. 32. *for* not all, *read* not at all. — P. 43. L. 28. *for* a Height, *read* an Height. — P. 46. L. 6. Take the Comma from after the Word *Productions*, and put it after *ſeen.* — P. *ib.* L. 36. Dele the Comma after *Perſeverance.*

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