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
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
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




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
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




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




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



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







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GENERAL FOY.

Drawn on Stone by M. Gaudet

Printed by Engelmann & Co. N.Y.

✓ *S.H. 1827*
HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA,

UNDER NAPOLEON;

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

**A VIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STATE OF THE FOUR BELLIGERENT POWERS.**

BY GENERAL FOY.

PUBLISHED BY THE COUNTESS FOY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

VOL. I.



LONDON:

TREUTTEL AND WÜRTZ, TREUTTEL, JUN. AND RICHTER;

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THE COUNTESS FOY

TO THE

FRENCH NATION.

IN publishing the first part of a work which is far from having received a final revision, I think myself bound to give the Reader some details, in order to meet the reproaches which may possibly be made to it by severe criticism, and to satisfy the wishes of a more friendly interest as to what it contains.

When in 1814 my husband returned into the bosom of private life, he conceived the idea of writing the History of the Peninsular War, a war in which he had been engaged for seven years, and the narrative of which, mingled with political considerations, seemed destined to be the commencement of his apprenticeship to a new career. From that moment he devoted himself to it, with that conscientious research and activity of mind which he displayed in every thing he undertook. After collecting numerous materials in France and England, he proceeded to write, uninterruptedly, what I now publish. The first half of the work was revised by himself, rather with a view to improve the arrangement and division of his materials, (as is proved by the corrections, which are entirely in his own handwriting,) than to purify the style, a labour which he deferred until a later period. The second half was written over only once; it was his first idea; it was, as it were, an improvisation. In 1817, his bad state of health having compelled him to interrupt his labours, he left the work imperfect and never afterwards revised it.

DEDICATION.

Such as it is, however, I conceive it to be my duty to publish it—not so much with the hope of increasing the inheritance of renown which he left to his children, as with the idea of restoring to his Country a work which he had consecrated to it; for his Country was the constant object of his fidelity and his affections, in hours of danger as well as in hours of leisure.

I hope that Country will allow me to take this method of discharging a small portion of the sacred debt contracted by a family whose misfortunes have been supported and illustrated by their Country's adoption. France has covered the tomb of my husband and the name of his sons with such glory, that I hope she will pardon me for venturing, as a widow and a mother, to quit for a moment the solitude in which my sorrow has placed me, in order to express my gratitude to her.

L. COUNTESS FOY.

V I E W
OF THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY STATE
OF THE
BELLIGERENT POWERS.

BOOK I.—FRANCE.

VOL. I.

B

State of France in 1799—Napoleon Buonaparte seizes the supreme authority—His progress towards absolute power—Consular government—General peace—Recal of the emigrants—Imperial monarchy—Fondness of Napoleon for Nobility—Institution of a new nobility—Passion of Napoleon for war—Encampment of the army on the sea-coast—Public spirit of the army—Campaign of 1805 in Austria—Campaigns of 1806 and 1807 in Prussia and Poland—Peace of Tilsit—Situation of the French army at the conclusion of 1807—Military conscription—Manners and habits of the army—By whom and in what manner the power was exercised in the army—Promotion and rewards—Subordination and discipline—Military organization—Infantry—Method of fighting in the time of the Republic—Changes effected during the encampment of the army on the coast—Cavalry—Artillery—Engineers—Staff—Establishment of the *corps d'armée*—Imperial guard—Administration of the armies—Military legislation—Science of war—Napoleon.

BOOK I.

FRANCE.

AT the close of the eighteenth century France withstood the attacks of coalesced Europe. The throne had been violently overturned. The privileged castes had been mutilated and dispersed: their spoliation, and the establishment of paper money, by transferring part of the wealth of the classes which consume, to the classes which produce, had meliorated the soil and awakened industry. The agitation, nay, the very excesses of the insurgent population, had tended towards its improvement: they had left behind them a tincture of gravity, and given more nerve to the national character. The political troubles at home and war abroad, concurred to bring talents to light, and to inflame courage. Every thing afforded the promise of a more just and more vigorous direction of ideas in the rising generation, and in that which should succeed it, than their predecessors had manifested. Notwithstanding the

sanguinary proscriptions, notwithstanding emigration and war, the population had kept progressively increasing, and the French territory was enlarged to the limits fixed by Nature. France contained within itself the active germs of prosperity and power.

It was in the name of liberty and equality that the people had risen. Equality had already triumphed. The influence of the press, which had propagated human knowledge; of commerce, which had augmented and circulated wealth; of war, rendered plebeian by the use of fire-arms: had produced equality in manners, even before the Revolution. The only point now was to introduce it into the laws.

Nations attend to the main chance. Thus, while equality was establishing itself and striking deep root, liberty, which is a passion for generous minds alone, and which becomes not a universal want till after a long and sad experience; liberty was invoked alternately by the vanquished parties, and alternately trampled under foot by the victorious factions. The struggle which daily grew more vehement between ancient interests and those created by the Revolution was not yet finished; the laws served for weapons of war and instruments of violence.

Such an order of things could not have the character of durability. The Revolution threatened by

its prolongation to destroy the very benefits of which it was the source. Anarchy was preparing to devour the state. After several years of splendid victories, the fruits of which were lost through the unskilfulness of the rulers, foreign armies were on the point of invading the French territory. As governments are instituted to maintain the public peace at home, as well as to make the political body respected abroad, and the Executive Directory had shown itself incapable of performing these duties, it could do no otherwise than fall. A more solid establishment was desired, both by the victims of the Revolution who were weary of suffering, and by those who had acquired wealth or elevation, and who wished to enjoy in peace their new existence. Already were some sticklers for liberty, confounding it with the tyranny which had abused its name, on the point of uttering against it the blasphemy of the last Brutus against virtue.

Napoleon Buonaparte appeared, and the supreme authority fell into his hands. He offered sufficient guarantees to the Revolution. It was he, who, in spite of his aversion to the principles and manners of the revolutionists, perceiving that they were the stronger, had put himself at their head on the 13th of Vendemiaire, and dispersed with cannon-balls the armed partisans of the old system. It was he, who on the 18th of Fructidor, had, at the expense of liberty and justice, preserved the existence of the

Republic, by throwing the weight of his sword into the balance of parties. The reputation of the warrior, thus placed by choice and by necessity at the head of the new interests, re-assured those who had been alarmed by the progress of foreign arms. From his studious habits, from the profundity of his ideas, from the Ossianic elevation of his language, the friends of liberty took him for one of their number, notwithstanding the prejudices excited by his past conduct. The classes distinguished by education expected more liberality from an illustrious general, than from demagogue tribunes who had risen amid the saturnalia of the latter times. The whole nation wished for the restoration of social order. It was the only want with which it was pre-occupied. Nations never wish for more than one thing at a time. Nothing is so improvident as the public voice; it relates invariably to the present, never to the future. The people demanded order, as they had before demanded equality, without thinking of liberty.

Happy would it have been for France, had her youthful chief understood the spirit of the age and divined that of posterity. Washington, in America, had shown on what condition a man may be the "first in war, the first in peace, and the first in the social affections."* Buonaparte pursued a different track,

* These words are extracted from a funeral panegyric on Washington, delivered in the American Congress.

and furnished an additional proof that brilliant geniuses and naturally predominant spirits are not always the best gifts that Heaven can bestow on nations.

He was born in the island of Corsica, out of the pale of the manners of France and of the age. With an iron constitution, Nature had conferred on him a head mighty in conception, an ardent imagination, and inflexible obstinacy. The belles lettres, which humanize the character, and which are accused of enfeebling the mind, by substituting words for things—the belles lettres had had no charms for him. He had been delighted with the mathematics as methods capable of imparting the faculty of discerning truth, and furnishing positive results. Had he continued to resolve problems, he would have become a Newton or a Lagrange. But mathematical truth was too abstract, too much detached from real life, to afford employment to his will. The insatiability of his mind transported him into the spaces of the moral world. The period at which he lived directed his inquiries to war and politics. Enlightened by the torch of investigation, and supported by his characteristic temperament, he soon outstripped those who blindly crawled on in beaten tracks.

The French Revolution was still a chaos to the ablest men when Napoleon already had a glimpse of its possible results. About the end of 1792, one of

his countrymen advised him to try his fortune in Corsica, holding out to him the prospect of succeeding to the fame of the aged Paoli. "Oh!" replied the young man, full of the future, "it is easier to become king of France than king of Corsica!" Ever since that time, in what rank soever Fortune placed him, his ascendancy raised him above it. As *chef de bataillon* in the artillery, at the siege of Toulon, where he was but the second in that branch of the service, having to contend with Marescot, an engineer who possessed the reputation of being most expert in taking strong places, Buonaparte, supporting his opinions before esteemed generals, and representatives of the people, who spread around them terror and death, appeared with the assurance, the superiority, and almost the tone, of their master. As commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, he kept, from the first, his lieutenants at the same respectful distance as he afterwards did the great men of the earth. The Directory appointed him merely to command the troops and to fight: he received ambassadors from princes and republics, concluded treaties with them, set himself up for a legislator, overthrew and erected States. At the age of thirty his glory eclipsed that of all his contemporaries.

The thirst of rule, and the necessity of keeping admiration employed, carried him to Egypt. "The East," said he, as he crossed the desert which sepa-

rates Africa from Asia, "expects a man." Would to God that the Genius of France had then appeared to apprise it that this man was cast out by the West ! Ancient Europe requires nothing more than the motion necessary to ensure the gradual advance of the human mind, and to guarantee to each the degree of personal independence compatible with the peaceful enjoyment of the gifts of nature and the productions of art.

Napoleon did not at first completely unmask himself: though passionately fond of war, he offered peace to Europe. The refusal of England compelled the First Consul to conquer. At the head of an army of conscripts, he again subdued, by a single manœuvre, and a single victory, that Italy which had four years before cost his soldiers and him eleven months' heroic efforts and luminous conceptions. The passage of the Alps carries the mind back to the time of Hannibal ; the series of marches which ended in the battle of Marengo, attest the point at which science had arrived. The capitulation of the Austrian general Melas had no parallel in the annals of war.

Equally great in other departments, Buonaparte re-constructed the State and re-composed the government. His predecessors at the helm of affairs were the leaders of the Revolution ; he was its master. A code of civil laws was given to the French, and the glory of it belongs to the head of the State, not only

as the director of the work, but also on account of the flashes of light which his superior mind repeatedly threw into the discussions on that monument of modern reason. The administration assumed a steady and rapid march, from the application of the principle, fertile in happy consequences, of invariably confiding the action to a single individual, and the deliberation to several. Order, which is the symptom of strength and durability, was established in the different branches of the public service ; the finances were re-established ; the laws were strictly executed ; by so much splendour, tempered by so much wisdom, factions were quelled, and the last sparks of civil war were extinguished.

Buonaparte again erected the throne ; posterity will say for whose benefit. The heir of the Revolution, and the successor of the republic, the imperial authority was without curb and without limits. The Senate showed the people to what a depth of baseness an assembly may sink, the members of which, otherwise commendable for the individual exercise of virtues or talents, are not united either by a sense of duty to their country, or even by the *esprit de corps*. The nation lost the little liberty left it by the old system, and all which it had gained under the new. Political rights, private interests, corporate property, education, science, thought, were all seized by the government. Its weight was felt in families as well as in cities. The French now

formed but one vast battalion, moved at the command of a single man. The clergy, notwithstanding its propensity to labour for its own aggrandizement, was reduced to the part of a docile instrument in the hands of its master. In that France which shortly before had been so agitated by turbulent assemblies, the citizens no longer possessed the power of meeting. There was no longer left, either in manners or in the laws, any means of resistance to the errors or the abuses of power. It was the political carcase of Constantinople, without the anarchy of the pachas, the secret opposition of the ulemas, or the obstreperous mutiny of the janissaries.

He who would govern men by their vices ought to beware of enlightening them, for the effect of illumination is to infuse into the mind just ideas of the rights and duties of each. In this respect there was in the conduct of Napoleon a contradiction, which is accounted for by his fondness for every thing that had *éclat*. On the one hand, the press was enslaved; the police kept off truth with as much care as if it had to repel the invasion of an enemy; hireling writers undertook sometimes to justify the frenzy of power, at others to divert by literary and theatrical quarrels the attention of a public, eager after novelty; on the other hand Napoleon patronized the sciences, and regretted that he no longer had leisure to cultivate them; he encouraged literature and the arts. During his reign, France was

covered with edifices in a style analogous to the grandeur of the epoch. Paris merited its appellation of Capital of the Great Empire. Bridges built over all the rivers, canals dug as soon as planned, roads carried across mountainous precipices, opened new channels for commerce. The impulse given since 1789 to agriculture and manufactures became stronger as it grew more steady. The population kept increasing. There is not to be found in history another example of such prosperity accumulated in a country engaged in continual war. The reason is, because Napoleon was a despot on his own account, but did not delegate his despotism. With him the vexation of subalterns, the insolence of castes, and the intolerable domination of parties, were alike unknown: the law was strong, frequently harsh, but equal for all. The sublimity of his conceptions and the illusions of glory, disguised the deformities of absolute power.

In a few years the tears of contemporaries who have lost their sons or their brothers in battle will be dried up; the evil will be past, the good will remain. In that warlike activity of which we have been the instruments and the victims, will be seen nothing but glory. Military glory is like fire; when near it burns, at a distance it warms. The virtuous hatred excited by despotism will subside before a feeling of admiration for so many useful creations and restorations. It will be admitted, that undis-

puted power was perhaps necessary to carry them into effect. Fathers will relate to their children, how, in the time of Napoleon, amid the glorious din of arms, France was far from having lost the lustre and prosperity conferred by science, literature, industry, and commerce.

The transition from the forms of the republic to those of the monarchy produced but little impression on the multitude, because it took place progressively, and displaced no interests. But the pomp of royalty rapidly developed in the Emperor a caprice, the germs of which had been already perceived in the conduct of the First Consul. No man surpassed him in pride, and assuredly he was excusable for having more of it than other men. But with that noble pride, which is the consciousness of genius, he united an unfortunate predilection for noble extraction. Will posterity believe it?—the warrior of the Pyramids, the man of glory, the king of kings, loved to repeat that he was by birth a gentleman! In him this was no doubt one of those impressions of childhood, which are perpetuated throughout the whole of life, and to which a person gives way in spite of reason and reflection. Who knew better than Buonaparte, why, for fifteen years past, the lower classes had ascended so high, and the upper descended so low? Who was better able than he to appreciate at their just value, both that frivolous politeness which serves as a varnish to weakness,

and that insolence of manners which contrasts with servility of mind? On what other foundation than the Revolution and equality was his throne erected? And yet, instead of placing an entirely new title beyond received prejudices and old habits, the Emperor of the French adopted the bearing of the Kings of France and Navarre. In order to effect the sudden revival of a ceremonial, and usages slowly introduced by the succession of ages, it was found necessary to recur to the depositaries of antiquated traditions. "The antechambers of the imperial court were opened to the nobility, and the nobility rushed into them."* Some brought back to their new master the sentiments of loyalty instilled into them from their youth; others, in greater number, prided themselves only on their fidelity to the system to which their first homage had been paid. It was the fashion to vilify in the saloons of the Faubourg Saint Germain the power to which incense was offered at the Tuilleries.

Installed on the throne of the Bourbons, and seated upon it in their manner, Napoleon fancied himself as firm as Louis XIV. He resolved also to have a nobility to form a retinue to his dynasty. Opinion was adverse to an hereditary system, which harmonizes neither with our legislation, nor with the passion of our people for equality. The feudal titles added no relief to the glorious names of the present

* An expression of Napoleon's.

era, and they drew the shafts of malignity upon gentlemen of recent date, who had not conquered the public esteem by great achievements, or by superior talents. 'Tis in vain to say that the new nobility was popular "because persons were entering it at all times and on all sides."* This democratic tint was destined to be effaced after the first generation. The fathers had been created nobles because they exercised the power; the sons would have usurped the power in virtue of the right of birth. Even if hereditary titles conferred neither functions or prerogatives, there would still have been reason for alarm. The class invested with them, haughty to the citizens, would have wearied the government with its demands and its intrigues. In modern states, the spirit of all nobility, whether new or old, is but the avowed pretension to obtain offices without being capable of filling them, and to live in idleness at the expense of those who work.

Before the battle of Marengo, France would have received peace; after that of Hohenlinden she dictated it. The English Government, seeing the lassitude of the continental nations, consented, in spite of itself, to allow humanity to take breath. By the peace of Amiens the Revolution acquired the right of denizenship in Europe.

The reconciliation of the French with one another and with foreign powers, rested, however, on

* *Memorial of St. Helena.*

but a frail and temporary foundation. France had been saved, but by a dictatorship. If this dictatorship was to last beyond the dangers of the country, the remedy might, in the long run, be more baneful than the evil. The liberty of the press, the safeguard of all other liberties, remained suspended. The judicial power continued dependent on the executive power. The tribunate, the only portion of the national representation which was allowed the privilege of speech, had been reduced to silence. Sober minds demanded of the genius of Buonaparte, institutions consistent with the dignity of the human species, and which, like safety-anchors, should stay the vessel of the State amid the fury of tempests.

Buonaparte conceived that he was fulfilling the wishes of the nation in causing himself to be nominated consul for life, in re-establishing religious worship, and in recalling the emigrants. The first of these three acts was but the forerunner of a more extensive plan which soon began to be developed; the second accorded with the opinion of a certain number of the French, and associated religion as a guarantee of the changes recently effected in society; the third compromised the destiny of the Revolution.

Admitting, what we are far from believing, that emigration was a duty to some, and a noble sacrifice on the part of all, still it is true that the emigrants had ranged themselves in opposition to the immense

majority of their fellow-citizens, and that they had invoked the arms of foreigners.* The nation having proved victorious, they had not recovered their privileges, and their property had been confiscated. The exile which they had imposed on themselves, had become a perpetual punishment to them. The First Consul gave them back their country and the domains which the State had not disposed of. This was a judicious measure, if he was really and truly desirous of closing the Revolution, preserving peace, and governing for the benefit of all; an absurd one, if he designed to put his military ardour in the place of the popular fury, and to stake the country on the game of war.

The half-consolated victims exceeded fifty thousand in number, and were formerly proprietors of a tenth part of the soil of France. Though despoiled of their ancient honours and reduced in their wealth, elegance of manners, a power genuinely French, that is nearly equal to superiority of understanding, secured to their wives and themselves the supremacy in society: they overthrew the opinion not of the people but of the saloons. This might easily have been foreseen. Could they wish harm to the English, they, whom the English had succoured in their

* It would be almost superfluous to remark, that we are here alluding to voluntary emigrants, and not to friends of liberty, or peaceable citizens, who were forced by the fury of factions to forsake their homes.

adversity? Would it not have been superhuman heroism in them to identify themselves with that new country, lately so zealous in outrage, and now so slow in reparation? What could they care about the triumph of a standard, which in their eyes was the standard of rebellion? Was it not fair to presume that they would consent to see France pent up within the walls of Bourges, and there ransomed again by foreigners, if it were possible that they could there recover the social advantages of which they were unjustly deprived?

When the soil of the Revolution was covered with its enemies, it was necessary to prevent their doing mischief. The ordinary means of repression were insufficient; new ones were devised. Hence the flight taken by the high police. The pledge of the duration of the new order of things was diminished by the restitution of part of the national domains to the ancient proprietors. The purchasers of property which had been sold, whose rights a long possession had not yet confirmed, knew not where this incipient re-action would stop. Buonaparte then thought to repair a political error by an abominable act, in whatever point of view it is considered. The head of the Duke d'Enghien was then offered as a sacrifice to his own uneasiness and to the alarms of the revolutionists.

There was reason to believe for a moment that all parties were agreed, for revolutionists and emi-

grants, republicans and royalists, gave vent at once to a burst of indignation felt by them all with equal force.

This piece of state policy, so discordant with the liberal character of the age in which we live, is however the only stain in the life of this great personage. If his ambition has caused many tears to be shed, it has been the effect of general combinations, and not of a particular disposition to cruelty. Let us not confound a despotism, the wrath of which paused at the limit of what it considered as its interest, with a passionate, blind, and sanguinary tyranny. Napoleon was not naturally cruel; nor could he even hate his enemies long or bitterly. Read the history of men who have raised themselves from a private station to supreme power, and you will find that most of them purchased the crown by more atrocious actions.

It was not enough for Napoleon to reign over the Great Nation; he aspired openly to universal monarchy. In this gigantic idea perhaps the end flattered his imagination less than the track to be pursued in order to arrive at it. For, bustle was his element; he delighted in the midst of storms; the globe scarcely furnished wherewithal to appease his rage for adding to the celebrity of a name which became too soon celebrated. He was passionately fond of war: he loved it as we love a mistress in the spring of life. To justify to others and perhaps to

himself the extravagance of his projects, he exhibited the French Revolution as *incompatible with the prejudices on which the world had revolved since the fall of the Roman empire*. "His mission," he said, "was not merely to govern France, but to subject the world to her, without which the world would have annihilated her." Setting out with this gratuitous supposition, he organized the empire for war and for everlasting war. It was not to acquire the right of being an absolute prince that he fought under all latitudes. Nothing prevented his becoming so at a less expense. On the contrary, he founded despotism that he might create, vivify, and incessantly renew the elements of combats.

Men who do not belong to the military profession can form no conception of that turbulent restlessness which carried Alexander to the banks of the Ganges and Charles XII. to Pultawa. War is a passion even in the very lowest ranks of the soldiery; for those who command, it is the most imperious and the most intoxicating of passions. Where will you find a wider field for energy of character, the calculations of intellect, the flashes of genius? In him who is inflamed by glory, hunger, thirst, wounds, incessantly impending death itself, produce a sort of intoxication; the sudden combination of indeterminate causes with foreseen chances, throws into this exalted game a never-ceasing interest, equal to the emotion excited at long intervals by the most terrible

situations of life. What power in the present like that will of the commander, which chains and unchains at pleasure the rage of so many thousands of men! What supremacy over the future in that talent, the inspirations of which are about to decide the lot of several generations! When the God of Israel would crush his worshippers with the weight of his omnipotence, he says to them: "I am the Lord of Hosts!"

The warlike temper of Buonaparte found a powerful auxiliary in the cabinet of St. James's. The leaders of England had permitted the truce of Amiens, merely for the purpose of satisfying the nation of the impossibility of remaining at peace: the experiment once made, the treaty was broken. Napoleon assembled the French army in camps on the sea-coast, from the Texel to the extremity of Brittany. He covered the shore at Boulogne, the nearest point to England, with artillery. The soldiers dug canals and havens. Light boats were built in the harbours and the large rivers: in spite of the efforts of the British navy, they were collected in the new ports. At the same time numerous squadrons issued from our naval arsenals, and the French flag flew on all the seas. For fifteen months Rome and Carthage were in sight of each other.

It has been asked, and it is still a problem whether Napoleon designed to invade England, or merely

to frighten the English. We have no doubt that it was his intention to attempt a landing. How few circumstances were there to prevent the combined fleet of France and Spain from successively raising the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, Brest and the Texel, and making itself mistress of the Channel for a few days successively? The flotilla of Boulogne, which had been purposely exhibited as a bugbear of war, would then have fulfilled its natural destination, and served for transporting the army. In two tides, one hundred thousand men would have landed on the English shore. Five marches to the banks of the Thames would have carried the French further in the conquest of the world than thirty victories on the Continent. To obtain immense results it was not indispensable that the invasion should be complete and definitive. Retreat, it is true, presented almost insurmountable obstacles; but the hopes of landing were so dazzling as to divert the thoughts from the difficulty of return.*

The proscriptions had cut off or removed most of

* Napoleon was of opinion that, London being once taken, England would be conquered. General Marmont told him at Augsburg, in October 1805, that if the invasion had taken place the Austrians would probably have begun war immediately. "I don't think so," replied the Emperor; "but if they had come, the women of Strasburg would have been sufficient to prevent them from crossing the Rhine." So thoroughly was he persuaded that the splendor of his enterprize would petrify the sovereigns of the Continent, and produce an immense national movement in France.

the generals who had commanded the first armies of the Republic ; others had fallen in the field of battle. There was no longer Hoche with that soul of fire and unbending disposition, who never bowed to a master, and whose talents attested to France how much true nobility was concealed in the ranks of her simplest citizens. Kleber had been stabbed by an assassin ; Kleber, whose head rose like a standard above the battalions, and whose possible worth was not appreciated, because he obeyed reluctantly and was unwilling to command. The morose and reserved Pichegru had died for France by entering into the pay of England. Moreau was alive : his life was then pure and his glory entire. A general by inspiration, he was the first of his age in the art of making a limited number of troops fight on a given space. But his character was not equal to his talents. He was seen confident even to weakness, assisting in the 18th Brumaire, and shortly afterwards his name served as a rallying-point for the enemies of that day. Among the latter, but marching single in patriotic and modest paths, was distinguished the conqueror of Fleurus. The principal chiefs of the army of Italy did not dissemble their discontent ; some were indignant at the proud dictator, who had banished his comrades so far from him, and only waited to treat them as subjects ; others lamented that such toils and so many dangers had terminated only in the overthrow of the Republic.

The blow by which Napoleon consummated the ruin of Moreau struck terror into the murmurers against his authority : some kept themselves aloof for a longer or shorter time. Most of them entered willingly or unwillingly, into the new system ; there was room in it for everybody.

Soult, Davoust, Ney, and other able men, chosen on the second plan, devoted themselves without reserve : the boundless field of hope lay before them. At the same time that they taught the soldiers to forget the Republic, they took pains to give a new activity to their martial passions. The influence of the leaders, and the difference of positions, had introduced into the armies, along with the valour and patriotism common to all, distinct shades of opinion, especially among the officers. These were effaced in the barracks of Boulogne, Ostend, and Montreuil.

The democratic zeal of the brave troops of the Sambre and Meuse, the liberal and enlightened spirit of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, the encroaching turbulence of the conquerors of Italy, were all blended into one general feeling of enthusiasm, which was ready to become fanaticism. Henceforward there was but one army and one general : the children of the country, separated from the citizens, were no longer the soldiers of the Republic, but of the man who had elevated himself into the sole representative of the national glory. Their sturdy arms raised this new Pharamond upon the shield, at the same time that the Senate, the people and

the Sovereign Pontiff placed the imperial diadem upon his brow.

Napoleon's object in invading England was that he might become the arbiter of Europe: in the hope of reducing England to extremity, he proceeded to combat the powers of the Continent. This inverse course was necessarily more slow, more uncertain, and cost more blood. It accorded with the interests of Britain. The famous Pitt, weary of the efforts in which his nation had been exhausting itself singly for two years past, ceased not to preach up a crusade to the cabinets of Europe, and to offer subsidies to induce them to undertake it.

So early as the spring of 1805, the court of Vienna armed and formed a cordon in Italy, under the pretence of securing the hereditary states against the yellow fever; but its real intention was to meet and combat another evil still more threatening and pernicious, the French Revolution, which had become identified with the person of Buonaparte. At the end of summer the Austrian troops overran Bavaria; the Russians, likewise paid by the English Government, but delayed by the distance, followed their allies far in the rear in this impetuous onset.

It was no easy matter to take the Emperor of the French unawares. His columns hastened from the coasts of Picardy and Flanders, from Holland and Hanover, to the Danube; in Ulm he captured an Austrian army and the famous General Mack. This

was the result of a strategic movement, conceived with bold foresight and executed with rare precision. Forty days afterwards, the Russian army was beaten in the plains of Moravia. The battle of Austerlitz may be accounted the most scientific in modern history, and was not one of the least decisive. The Emperor Francis II. profited by the forces which the Archduke Charles was bringing from Italy, to purchase peace at the price of some ceded provinces. The Czar returned to his own country with his Muscovites.

After the treaty of Presburg, Napoleon might have stopped the progress of his triumphal car. The electors and petty princes of the German empire came, partly from compulsion, partly from policy, to unite their fortunes with those of that three-coloured flag, which was so lately out of the pale of European law. France had acquired the supremacy in Germany; her excessive influence on the southern states was no longer disputed. Thenceforward it depended on the head of the fourth dynasty to choose himself a consort among the daughters of kings.

The Emperor sent an army to Naples. This was an act of just reprisals; but on the throne of the sovereign who had fled he placed the eldest of his brothers, and soon afterwards erected Holland into a monarchy to form an appanage for the third. France and Europe had reason to be alarmed at the

extension given to the imperial system : France, because she was doomed to shed her blood to en-throne successively the members of a family which was no longer suffered to remain mingled in the ranks of society ; Europe, because the establishment of the new dynasty could not be effected but at the expense of the old ones. Italy, incessantly tormented by its recollections, in vain supplicated Napoleon to form it into a single state. He continued to extend France beyond the Alps and the Rhine, caring little about changing the French character by the intermixture with Italian manners, and still less about depriving his monarchy of that consistency resulting from a disposition of frontiers favourable to the defence of the country and suitable to the site of the capital. The German empire was falling from age ; he gave it the finishing blow, and established himself upon its ruins. The Confederation of the Rhine was a cohort of vassals susceptible of being indefinitely augmented.

Under the modest title of protector, Napoleon appropriated to himself the money and soldiers of one-half of Germany : his armies, constantly encamped on its territory, threatened the independence of the other half.

Prussia found herself exposed to the first fire of the conqueror. A neutrality of ten years had given prosperity to her commerce ; but, continuing stationary whilst others gained strength from victory,

or were re-tempered by adversity, she had ceased to be a power of the first rank, and was not aware of this till too late. All was in arms around her. Her territory had been violated by two French *corps d'armée*, during the march destined to envelope the fortress of Ulm. No attention was paid to her just remonstrances, and on the part of Napoleon contempt was the forerunner of destruction. Still her honourably minded king hesitated to involve his country in a quarrel, the issue of which might prove disastrous. He was still deliberating with his councils, when the Austrian monarchy was shaken at Austerlitz, and the empire of Germany in consequence overthrown. In exchange for the margraviate of Anspach and some portions of territory requisite for rounding off the allies of the conqueror, Frederic William received Hanover which the French had no right to dispose of, as it had not been ceded to them by any treaty. The timid policy of the Prussian monarch robbed him of respect, without diminishing the dangers which threatened his kingdom. The nobility, taking to their own account the national humiliation, were eager for war, into which they urged the Government almost in spite of itself. The gold of the English did the rest.

This war with Prussia accorded neither with the interests of France, nor with the spirit of the Revolution. The object no longer was, at least it did not appear to be, to counteract the attempts of

England, or to punish the animosity of Austria. The attack was made on a power, which, ever since 1795, had recognized the Republic, and whose conduct ever since the peace of Basle, had been but a long and continued recantation of a first effervescence. Still Paris and the provinces manifested as yet no indication of that discontent, which burst forth two years later on account of the more revolting iniquity that led to the war in Spain. Napoleon profited by the want of reflection in the French people to obtain pardon for his glory.

The memory of the great Frederic had ceased to protect the palace of Potzdam. People had heard talk of a king and an army, who amused themselves with parade manœuvres in the sands of Brandenburg; but they did not even know that there was a nation there. The Parisians had not forgotten the insolent manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick. They had even retained some recollection of the disgrace at Rosbach. Besides, our armies had not recrossed the Rhine; since the peace of Presburg, they had been engaged in continual marches and manœuvres. In the eyes of an ill informed public, the invasion of Prussia appeared but as the continuation of the Austrian campaign.

The imbecility of a state destitute of natural or artificial frontiers was clearly proved on this occasion. The Emperor chose his point of departure. The battle of Jena decided the fate of the Prussian mo-

narchy, owing not so much to the superiority of tactical evolutions, as to the direction taken by the columns in the preparatory marches. After that disastrous day, the Prussian generals, quite panic-stricken, surrendered the fortresses without defending them, and the conquest of the country seemed to be the prize of a race.

Napoleon had neither generosity nor pity for the Prussians. He had commenced his enterprize with meanly insulting a beautiful, heroic, and unfortunate queen. Contributions and vexations, devised by the genius of taxation, drained the conquered country of what the pillage of the soldiery had spared. Frederic William despaired not of the salvation of the country. Wounded to the heart, he threw himself covered with blood into the arms of the Emperor of Russia. Happy had it been for him if he had been a year earlier in adopting this tardy resolution, and found inspirations at the tomb of the hero of his race!*

Alexander had again descended into the arena, to avenge the cause of kings and to deliver nations. The empires of the North and South met in the plains of Poland. For the third time the troops of Napoleon encountered, not their masters—the French have no masters in the art of war—but rivals, pow-

* The Emperor of Russia passing through Berlin in 1805, while his army was marching to join Austria, accompanied the King of Prussia into the vault where the remains of the great Frederic are deposited.

erful from their number, their contempt of death, and their religious devotedness to their sovereign—a quality which, in the infancy of civilization, is equal to patriotism. The French fought at the distance of twelve hundred miles from their country, on a line of operation that was but ill secured; the Russians, close to their frontier, were within reach of magazines, reinforcements, resources of all kinds, and they had rallied the wreck of the Prussian army. Had there been one man less in the world, the contest would have been prodigiously unequal. But Napoleon alone was equivalent to a hundred thousand men. The occupation of Warsaw did not excuse him from a second campaign, which, in any other age and with any other general, would have been deemed bold and rapid. To the French, accustomed to prodigies, which other prodigies were continually surpassing, it appeared slow and timid. Genius was engaged with material force, with the power of Nature. In this struggle it was possible for genius to triumph. Calculation was not yet constrained, as at a later period, to give up too great a number of chances to hazard: the means might still be proportioned to the end.

The battles of Pultusk and Eylau ought to have furnished salutary hints. They were not defeats; but what army, what power, could afford to have such victories frequently to gain! The French had tackled almost on its own ground, that colossus back-

ed upon the extremities of the world, the preponderant strength of which is not dependent either on the internal administration of the country, or the personal qualities of its monarch. It was already foreseen with horror that it was destined to devour Europe, unless Europe should succeed in weakening and demolishing it by the infiltration of her manners. Napoleon, however, thought it right to halt before he proceeded to Moscow. The battle of Friedland enabled him to conquer the interview at Tilsit. On a field of battle, the devotedness of the officers, the courage of the soldiers, a thousand circumstances which it is impossible to foresee, are every moment disconcerting the talents of the general; and the advantage is not always to the most skilful. In a single combat, where the understanding is the weapon employed, Napoleon was sure of attaining his ends; his conversation was inexpressibly fascinating, and we know no man who possessed in so high a degree as he did, the secret of penetrating into the hearts of his hearers. The Czar was not proof against this charm. The true and lively picture of the anti-social pretensions of England, fired the soul of that prince; after a week spent in the interchange of sentiments and attentions, the two emperors parted on the Niemen, Napoleon declaring, and Alexander believing, that they should ever afterwards be united, whether in peace or war.

From the arrangements at Tilsit sprung the

sketch for Poland and the erection of a kingdom in Westphalia for Jerome Bonaparte. France derived no other benefit from them than a momentary interruption of the hostilities on land. The treaty of Presburg, in 1805, had removed Austria, Prussia, and Russia, far from our frontiers. To preserve peace, nothing more was necessary than to adhere to that treaty. By the treaty of 1807, France found herself again in contact with all the military powers, so that the successes of the last two years had in reality made her situation worse. The question became more complex and more undecided than ever. Napoleon scarcely knew how to stop. He had advanced too far for the happiness of his country, not far enough for the accomplishment of his policy.

In fact, the condescensions with which he had purchased the friendship of Alexander, might be considered as so many retrograde steps. After promising those valiant Poles, our friends in life and death, the restoration of their republic, he disappointed them by the creation of the grand-duchy of Warsaw. The arrangements adopted with the house of Brandenburg were still more incomplete and more fertile in disgrace.

Napoleon deemed himself strong enough to forgive the injury he had done. The interference of a powerful and faithful ally saved Frederic William his crown. Cherishing in his heart the desire of

vengeance, he reigned over a kingdom parcelled out, devastated, and occupied by foreign troops.

The greatest humiliation for a king is, not to be vanquished, but to be the accomplice of his conqueror. Frederic William had fought at the head of his troops : he was oppressed as well as his subjects. Sharing good and bad fortune with his people, he was never reproached by it with his disasters. It charged them to the account of antiquated institutions, inveterate prejudices, and narrow policy. Democratic ideas sprang up on the ruins which conquest had heaped together. In the North of Germany there was formed a holy alliance between the nations over which the conqueror tyrannized, and the virtuous men who laboured in secrecy to retrieve the moral dignity of their country and of humanity. The enlightened youth at the universities, the ministers of religion, military men retired from service, thronged into the secret societies in which the sacred flame of patriotism was kept alive. This invisible power was destined soon to become more formidable than cannon and bayonets. Hence sprang the independence, perhaps some day the liberty of Germany.

The advantages gained by the victory bore no proportion to the efforts which it had cost, and the Emperor of the French would not have caressed at Tilsit with such refined delicacy the prince whom he called his great friend, had he not found the aid of

the Russian government necessary for the success of his ulterior projects. Nothing was achieved on the Continent so long as the power of Great Britain remained unbroken. The destruction of flotillas and squadrons forbade the idea of grappling with the English hand to hand. Napoleon attempted an aggression of a different kind against them.

We shall have occasion in another place, to develop the principle and the consequences of the Continental system. It was this vast political conception which served as a pretext for the invasion of the Spanish peninsula. We shall state what was then the force of the French army, and in what points it surpassed the mechanical troops of Germany, as much as it surpassed in discipline and science the army of the old monarchy composed of the populace and the nobility. We shall study it in its formation and in its manners. For the better explanation of the changes wrought in it at this period, by the government of a single individual and the habit of conquest, we shall frequently have occasion to carry our views beyond the precise period at which this History commences.

At the close of the year 1807 the Emperor had six hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, horse and foot: namely, three hundred and eighty thousand infantry, and seventy thousand cavalry, divided into four hundred and seventeen national battalions, and three hundred and fifty-three squadrons; thirty-

two thousand Swiss, Germans, Irish, and Hanoverians, in the pay of France ; forty-six thousand men employed in the active service of the artillery and engineer department ; and a force of ninety-two thousand men, under the names of gendarmerie, demi-brigade of veterans, companies of reserve, and coast-guards, forming a domestic army specially appropriated to the police and the protection of the territory. He had moreover at his disposal the military forces of the kingdom of Italy, Naples, Spain, Holland, the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and the States of the Confederation of the Rhine. The allies of yesterday and the allies of a century, whatever difference there might be in their affection, were all moved by a single mind towards one and the same end.

The Republic and the war had trained for Napoleon the ablest generals, the most devoted officers, the bravest soldiers. The army was not as formerly the scum of cities, which debauched recruiting-officers had artfully enlisted and poured into the regiments : it was the flower of the population—it was the purest blood in France. During the first eight years of the Revolution, enlistment, the calling-out of the battalions of volunteers, partial levies and the great requisition, introduced more than a million of men into the camps. In 1798 the law of the conscription was produced ; an excellent law, which will be in future ages the palladium of our independence : excellent, even though it were not necessary, because, by placing the nation in the army and the army in the na-

tion, it furnishes inexhaustible resources for defence. The young men between the age of twenty and twenty-five years, were to be attached to military corps, not that they were all to go and for ever into camps and barracks, and there be weaned from manual labour or the exercise of their intellectual faculties, but to be summoned to the defence of the country, according to its necessities, and on condition of being kept no longer than four years from their homes, unless in extraordinary circumstances, of the urgency of which the national representation was to be the sole judge. In consequence of the disasters in the campaign of 1799, the legislative councils placed at the disposal of the Executive Directory the five entire classes of the conscription, amounting to nearly five hundred thousand men, independently of more than two hundred thousand veteran soldiers who still remained under the colours.

Thus, on his accession to power, Buonaparte had a mine of soldiers to work, which far exceeded the means of recruiting possessed by the other belligerent powers. The unpopularity of the measure did not attach to him, and he reaped the first fruits of it by introducing into the management of the conscription the same spirit of order which he then displayed in the other branches of the Government. By permitting conscripts to find substitutes, most of the old soldiers who had quitted the service were restored to it. This was so much gain to the army and so much spared to agriculture and the arts. The levies

were superintended by authorities half-civil, half-military, divided into immediate recruiting and reserve. The reserve was to be a kind of militia, always in readiness to fill up deficiencies.

From the 18th Brumaire 1799, up to 1805, only two hundred and twenty thousand men were demanded of the nation, not quite the seven hundredth part of its population per annum: a moderate number compared with the wants of the time, since it was necessary to complete the army which had been weakened by discharges and colonial expeditions.

The abuse of the conscription began with the renewal of hostilities on the Continent. The aggression of Austria had unrolled before Napoleon a long futurity. He had it in his power to augment at pleasure armies destined to live at the expense of foreigners. The legislative enactment which fixed the duration of the regular service of conscripts at four years, was wholly disregarded; men entered the military service not to leave it again for life; the reserves had but a momentary existence, and the young men were sent to the war as soon as they were drawn: nay, those to whom certain legal exemptions applied remained debtors of their blood to the country, not only till the age of twenty-five years, but so long as they were not liberated by a formal act of the Government. The vote of the annual levies was transferred from the legislative body to the Senate. A counsellor of state was appointed to the direction of

the conscription, and the supply of the lion's den was not the least important of the ministerial departments. Moveable columns traversed the territory of France, and, sword in hand, forced her to become a conquering nation. It was found necessary to establish a legislation of exception for a multitude of offences, the offspring of a new tyranny. This tyranny, harsh against persons, was also fiscal, as well from the nature of the penalties as on account of the enormous sums which substitutes cost. The limit of twenty to twenty-five years fixed by the fundamental law, was not long sufficient for the consumption of the species. Government fell back upon the past, and anticipated upon the future. Uniting the cunning which destroys respect, and the force which excites hatred, it devised unusual appellations to deceive the people. Sometimes legions, called *legions of reserve*, were created for a special destination, and were no sooner formed than they were transferred to another. Sometimes calls of *volunteers* were made, as if the word alone had not been a laughing stock. Citizens married and engaged in useful occupations were put in requisition, and removed to a different part of the country, by the name of *national guards in activity*. Young soldiers were allured into regiments nominally added to the imperial guard, but not allowed to share its prerogatives. The conscripts who escaped the service by the payment of money, were subsequently taken into

the guards of honour, the *ban* and the *arrière-ban*. Thenceforward the natural death for a Frenchman was that which he found on the field of honour. The ruling power even went so far as to demand eleven hundred thousand soldiers in a single year, from a population exhausted by three thousand battles and engagements.

The number of the troops contributes less perhaps to the strength of States than the spirit which actuates them. The term *discipline* is to be taken in two different significations. Discipline teaches men to subject their own will to that of the chief who provides for the wants of all; it transforms into a considerate calculated movement, which the veteran acquires by experience and practice, that instinct which causes the conscript to keep himself close in the rank, in order to add to his strength the strength of his comrade. The more an army has fought the more accustomed it is to conquer, and the more attentive it is to the voice of command. Our veteran bands trembled with a sacred awe at the sight of the eagles of the legion.

We also apply the term discipline to the rule which enjoins respect for usages, property and persons, in the countries which are the theatre of war. It is a law of nations established on express or tacit conventions, which civilized States have made for the purpose of mitigating a scourge terrible to mankind. This discipline is strongly to be recommended

in a moral point of view, and even in the well understood interest of armies : nevertheless, it is not in the essence of war. Had Napoleon strictly enforced this discipline among his soldiers, he would have failed in the object which he was desirous of accomplishing.

The Romans, conquering foot by foot, plundered methodically. The booty of each was thrown into the common mass, to be afterwards regularly divided. Excepting the pillage and murder prescribed by the chiefs, discipline applied itself to tame individual passions. We read in the ancient historians, that the soldiers of Cato were more afraid of the axe of the lictor than of the swords of the Spaniards.

When, in 1793, France had to combat the European coalition, the national instinct separated the cause of people from that of kings; it was proposed to give us for our war-cry: *Peace to the cottage! war to the palace!* but the manor-house of the lord was as much protected from the licentiousness of arms as the shepherd's hut. The old soldiers long remembered Saint Just and Lebas, representatives of the people, who, during the campaign of 1794, caused some volunteers to be shot for having taken a few eggs from the poultry-yard of a peasant of Brabant. A year later, the brigade of Latour d'Auvergne, surnamed by the Spaniards *the infernal column*, on account of the terror which it excited on the field of battle, was encamped in cherry-

orchards in Biscay, and the grenadiers durst not pick the cherries from the boughs which hung over their tents.

The work which the Romans had laboriously accomplished in five hundred years, Napoleon strove to achieve by himself, and with a single generation. He would fain have snatched as he ran the conquest of the world; his secret consisted still more in arriving quickly than in striking forcibly. Deeply versed in the art of working upon the imagination, the day on which he should not be believed on his word, that day his star would turn pale in its course. The terror of his name which long paralyzed the courage of his enemies, he commanded by marches of glorious rapidity. Thenceforward no more magazines on unforeseen lines of operation, no more convoys of provisions organized in continually variable directions, and as little as possible of that heavy baggage which the ancients so justly denominated *impedimenta*. Like the avalanche rushing from the tops of the Alps into the valleys, our innumerable armies, by their mere passage, destroyed in a few hours the resources of a whole country. They habitually bivouacked, and wherever they halted our soldiers demolished houses which had stood for half a century, to construct with their materials those long right-lined villages, which were frequently destined to last but for a day. When forest wood was not at hand, fruit-trees, the most valuable vegetables, such as

the mulberry, olive, and orange-tree served to warm them. Had they waited for food till the administration of the army caused rations of bread and meat to be distributed, they might have starved. The young conscripts, transported by a magic power from their hearths to the extremities of Europe, intermingled all at once with men of all countries, and irritated by want and danger, contracted a moral intoxication, of which we sought not to cure them, because it prevented their sinking under unparalleled fatigues. We have seen them, at an age when the body has not yet attained its full growth, scorched by the sun in summer, having the snow for their bed in winter, marching without shoes in the morasses of Poland, or among the craggy peaks of the Alps and the Pyrenees, constrained to wrest from the labourer the frugal fare of his children. On more than one occasion we, their generals and their fathers, have been obliged to shut our eyes on the sufferings of the inhabitants, in order to preserve the lives of those young Frenchmen, till they should be sacrificed more usefully for the country. "My soldiers must live," was the reply of Marshal Turenne, in less difficult circumstances, to the complaints made by the intendant of Lorraine concerning the pillage of the army. And Turenne is not the only one whom the necessities of war have forced to hold this language: we might mention illustrious generals of all ages and among all the modern nations, who have shown as much indur-

gence for plunder, as aversion for the clandestine exactions which humanity deplores, and from which the soldier derives no benefit.

This disorder being considered inevitable, it was not always possible to fix its limit and duration; it attached itself to the war of invasion like a consuming sore. This scourge became still more terrible, when exasperated passions put arms into the hands of those who were not called by their condition in life to bear them. Woe then, three-fold woe to the soil traversed by the car of victory! The war between army and people partakes of the nature of civil war; in which crimes are perpetrated on both sides which excite neither disgust nor horror. Our soldiers, always generous in their relations with warriors, were inexorable to the patriot who had taken arms to defend the fruit of his garden or the honour of his daughter; the tool concealed beneath the garb of labour seemed to them the poniard of the disguised assassin. The military reports now presented nothing but a bloody series of villages plundered and towns taken by assault; and if it happened that the ministers of a God of peace transformed themselves into leaders of insurrection and war, one could not be surprized to see young soldiers accustomed to religious practices, throw aside their former habits, and violate convents, churches, even the asylum of the grave itself.

Europe will admit, that amid this delirium, the

enemies who were opposed to us, and in particular the foreigners who fought under our banners, far surpassed our Frenchmen in ferocity. It will long remember the savage rudeness of the Poles, the exaltation of the Italians, the brutality of the Germans. The French, at least, are of a sociable disposition; they have open hearts, and pass away life merrily. When the tumult of battle had subsided, they returned to make themselves beloved individually, on the same spots where they had collectively rendered themselves detested. Associating with the peasant and quick at learning his language, they were seen returning with gaiety of heart to rustic labours, and striving to repair the ravages of war. The new guest supplied to the father and mother the place of their absent son, and during winter-quarters he was another child in the house. The traveller, who now visits the countries into which our French armies carried fire and sword, expects a burst of execration against the devastating bands: instead of which he hears at every step accents of gratitude, celebrating the names of some good Frenchmen, whose respect for the claims of misfortune had been studiously delicate.

Our regimental officers, and especially those of the infantry, were resplendent patterns of purity and glory. Valiant as Dunois and Lahire, sober and inured to fatigue, because they were sons of the husbandman and artisan, they marched on foot at the head of

their companies, and were the first to rush to battle and the breach. Their life was a tissue of privations, for the military administration could not always supply their wants, and so high-spirited were they that they would have considered themselves disgraced by sharing in the pillage. Strangers to the gratifications of self-love enjoyed by the general officer, exempt from the intoxication of the soldier, these martyrs of patriotism lived that moral life which wastes itself in the resignation of duty. An almost certain death awaited them far from their country, and the names of most of them were destined to remain unknown. How many bright characters in a class which can never be sufficiently praised! Our enemies appreciated it better than ourselves; they knew that *these* were the honour and the buckler of France. When victorious, the first thing they did was to deprive her of it, and to require the dissolution of the national army.

Foreigners and their French allies have complaisantly inveighed against the depredations committed on the conquered by a small number of military chiefs. During the first years of the Republic, the French generals made war with an austerity and moderation befitting the noble cause for which they had taken up arms. The pay was then eight francs per month for the higher ranks. At head-quarters they ate at table no other bread than the bread of the soldier, and no other meat than the meat which he received.

The conquest of Italy changed the manners of the head of the army. It was not merely by bringing the modest habits of the conquerors in continual contact with the opulence and luxury of the conquered. The man who wished to make himself a king, needed to reduce his comrades to be his dependents. Now, the readiest way to bind men is by their vices, and when they have none, they must be taught to contract them. There he was then, exciting the thirst of gold, and setting the example of the profusion of luxury to prevent its quenching. This tacit combination on the part of the commander-in-chief in Italy, became a professed system at the time of the consulate and the empire. Napoleon expected that the men who were selected to live on the steps of the throne, should contract luxurious habits, harmonising with their elevated situation. More than once he entrusted them with missions, in which he enjoined them to enrich themselves, by means, which, in ancient wars, had in their favour the authority of great names and great examples.* The immense majority of our superior officers, nevertheless, rejected with disdain the wealth, which after all, was nothing but plunder. More than five hundred general officers have had occasion to repeat the refusal of

* The generals of the age of Louis XIV. were accustomed to take payment for the safeguards which they granted in time of war. Villars boasted that he had never taken any thing but from the enemy. The flag of Hanover attests that the same was the case under Louis XV.

that general of the old monarchy, who took no presents except from the king his master. History has celebrated the disinterestedness of Bayard, who converted into a portion for the girl of Brescia, the purse filled with gold, which her terrified father emptied before the conqueror. We know not a single one of our officers, of those brave men with threadbare garments, and worn-out shoes, who, in similar circumstances, would not have done as much as the "Knight without fear and without reproach."

Our power has passed away, and facts speak for themselves. The governors of conquered kingdoms and provinces have returned into the rank of citizens. Where are their domains acquired, and their palaces cemented, with the tears of nations? Few of them now possess a place wherein to lay their heads. The property of others consists in what is left them of the gifts bestowed without measure, to reward services rendered with a courage and a devotion also without measure. Let them come forward then, the interested slanderers of our national honour, and say, in what country, after a war of such length and such vicissitudes, with a total absence of control, under the influence of a master indulgent by nature and a corrupter by calculation, there would have been found so few Verres', and so many Curii?

The system of terror pressed still more heavily

upon the military than upon the citizens. Our chiefs were decimated by the axe of the executioner. When some fell, others stepped forward to fill the gap, as is usual in the battalions when files are swept away by the balls of the enemy. They faced without fear the risks of a tremendous responsibility; life, character, every thing, were sacrificed to the public welfare.

When the revolutionary austerity was softened down, there was no longer room for so sublime a devotedness. Ambition soon resumed its course, and the re-establishment of the monarchy revived in the heads of the army some reminiscence of the disregard of discipline, with which the upper ranks of the French military were formerly reproached. The Government found it difficult to make a general officer serve under another of equal rank. Their lamentable contests for precedence caused the failure of more than one well concerted operation: the extravagance of vanity often found an excuse and even a support in the policy of the new prince, who, agreeably to the advice of Machiavel, divided that he might reign.

The lustre of dignity, and the reflection of the grandeur of the monarch, placed the marshals of the empire at a distance from the other general officers. Above them all, rose a man whom chance had brought near General Buonaparte in Italy, and who was long his confident and companion in the field of

battle. Intrepid in war, and indefatigable at a time of life when others feel the first attacks of age, Berthier, at fifty, passed his days on horseback, and his nights at the desk. It was he who directed with such zeal the details of sixteen campaigns, the first of which were so glorious, and the others so disastrous. His memory of names, numbers, and places, was prodigious, and the Emperor called him a walking register. His thorough knowledge of the person whose scarcely hinted intentions it was his duty to translate, made amends in some respects for his deficiencies in vigour of conception.

Carnot, minister at war for a moment, conceived it to be his duty to remonstrate with the First Consul on his application of the blood and treasure of the French. His successor, though a man of probity, and naturally disposed to mitigate the blows of despotism, was a more convenient co-operator for a chief who expected to be understood and never contradicted. The developement of our military power having rendered the burden of the ministry at war too heavy, the *materiel* of the armies was separated from it, and committed at first to a man of antique manners, General Dejean, and afterwards to Count Lacuée de Cessac, distinguished for his patriotic economy. The artillery and engineer department were administered under the inspection of the principal officers in those two branches. The conscription, reviews, clothing, formed special departments

under counsellors of state. At a later period, Marshal Berthier, having become Prince of Neufchatel, resigned the ministry, and confined himself to the functions of major-general to the Emperor. He retained however the conduct of the military operations and promotions, that is to say, all that had an immediate influence on events. The ministry of war, mutilated in its noble parts, and stripped of its more important positive functions, was now but the office of a laborious clerk.

The Revolution having scattered the old troops of the line, the battalions of national volunteers raised in 1791 and 1792 became the nucleus of the new army. In these battalions the soldiers appointed their officers. It was right that it should be so among chosen youths possessed of equal rights. It was to be expected that the choice of equals would bring merit to light. From this source have sprung almost all the celebrated generals of whom France has to boast. After the first campaign, the volunteers were constrained to adopt as a profession the career into which patriotic ardour had accidentally thrown them : and the legislation of permanent troops was then applied to them in all its latitude. It was laid down as a principle, that a man must obey in order to learn how to command. The rule which obliges the soldier to ascend the steps of the military hierarchy one by one, is in fact advantageous to him ; the arm wounded in

handling the musket carries the marshal's baton more nobly. But good may also have its excess: by an exaggeration of republican justice, rank was conferred exclusively on seniority of service. This measure, the immediate effect of which was to fill the upper ranks with blockheads and drivellers, did not survive a trial of six months. In its stead were substituted three modes of promotion: the first by seniority of rank, the second by the nomination of the officers, and the third by the promotion of the Government. The haste with which it was requisite to fill up vacancies afterwards reduced these different modes to one, the nomination of the Emperor upon a triple list presented by the colonel. In the last years the consumption of officers and subalterns was so enormous, that it was very difficult to find proper persons to fill the vacancies. Every soldier who could read and write, who had any influence whatever upon the opinion of his comrades, and who did not flinch at the approach of danger, was sure of promotion, if death spared him long enough.

For the interest of his absolute power, as well as to train successors to the generals of the Revolution, Napoleon instituted prytaneums, lyceums and military schools. Here were intermingled the children of the rich with the indigent sons of the defenders of the country. Several sprigs of the ancient nobility went there to unlearn the affectation of

domestic education. The exercises of the banks of the Eurotas and the Campus Martius were revived at Fontainebleau and St. Cyr. The privations of camps, bivouacs, and forced marches, were in the sequel but a continuation of a hard noviciate. The imperial Military School was a nursery of excellent officers. It did not turn out good citizens: pains were taken to warp the ideas of youth, and to give an indiscreet impulse to the passions. Never was the name of liberty, and rarely that of country, pronounced before the pupils: implicit obedience to the orders of the sovereign was instilled into them as the first duty of a Frenchman.

The number of officers sent from the schools was very small compared with that of those who had attained their rank by regular promotion. Napoleon suffered the lot of military men to depend as little as possible on civilians. At Paris, or when travelling, he delegated the subaltern nominations to the generals in chief and the governors of fortresses. When with the army, he himself nominated, and almost always the day before or the day after a battle, while reviewing the troops on the ground. The absent, from what cause soever it might be, were irrevocably replaced. Even for the most elevated ranks, Napoleon above all things required health and youth. On the latter point he began to be less particular; and those who bore in mind the date of the 15th of August 1769, prophesied that, about

the year 1819, a general officer of fifty would be considered as being in the prime of life.

When, in 1792, the national territory was relieved from the presence of enemies, the grateful Convention decreed that property to the amount of a thousand millions should be taken from the public domain and distributed among the army. The destroyer of the Republic fulfilled, in some measure, this promise of its founders. He improved the condition of the officer and soldier retired from the service. An imperial decree reserved for wounded military men all the civil employments which they could reasonably fill. The brave man, when expiring on the field of honour, felt no pang for the lot of those whom he left behind. The Emperor was there to succour the widow, and to be a father to the orphan.

The Legion of Honour was created. The nation, dazzled by this brilliant halo, which embraced every species of glory, did not perceive the maze into which it was led by this first return to institutions which the spirit of equality had proscribed. Hereditary titles and grants became likewise the reward of valour. The order of Reunion and the Three Fleeces came next. With each campaign a new stimulus strengthened attachment. But of all the favours conferred on the soldiers, none electrified them to such a degree as that of seeing and hearing the Emperor.

Napoleon had at the age of thirty the imposing attitude of old Frederic. He went through the ranks on foot and at a slow pace. The grandees of the court and the army kept behind at a considerable distance, that there might be no intermediate person between the Emperor and the soldiers. Every one approached him freely, and related to him the history of his grievances and his pretensions. He looked at every thing, answered every one, and on the spot satisfied well-founded claims, and even such as were not so. The cheerfulness of his look showed that he was amidst his family. On those solemn days, favours were showered upon the brave, and lessons of discipline on the generals, sometimes on the colonels, but never lower. The troops manœuvred, and Napoleon always taught the most skilful some new secret. After the review, the oracles which had issued from the lips of the master of the art were repeated in the camp. The men knew by heart the burning proclamations in which so few words comprised such heroic presages. On the approach of danger, what was felt for him was more than admiration: he was worshipped as if he had been the tutelar deity of the army.

The favours conferred on the army did no direct injury to the municipal administration. Excepting in the very rare cases of revolt, there is no instance under the imperial government of military chiefs having commanded in France any others but sol-

diers. The terrible power of the Convention had produced in the soldiers a respect mingled with fear for the civil authority. The tri-coloured scarf of the representatives of the people excited more awe than the insignia of the generals. The new administrative organization had taken from the governors of towns and provinces, the high police with which under the old system they were invested. Napoleon, on reinstating the general officers in their honorary rights, did not restore them these functions. There, where a prefect arbitrarily decided concerning the interests and even the liberty of the most respectable citizens, the general, had he even been covered with testimonies of the favour of the sovereign, could not have caused an obscure culprit to be apprehended. In the not unfrequent conflicts between the military authority and the civil authority, the latter was almost always declared to be in the right. The Government probably lost nothing by this, and the civil officers of all classes, the auditors and the agents of the police, fulfilled its intentions better than grenadiers and hussars would have done: it is certain at least, that our army had no authority over the people, and that the despotism of the latter time was not a military despotism.

Fear, considered as a principle of order, was a motive nearly unknown to the great majority of our soldiers. They were treated in most of our regiments with extreme lenity; they were not subject

to corporal punishments, which the opinion of our nation condemns, and which cannot be inflicted in cold blood, except in countries where those who award them deem themselves of a species superior to those who suffer them. The gendarmerie, so dreaded in the interior of the empire, lost its terrifying influence with the armies; the power of trying had passed from the hands of the commissary of war to functionaries of the civil order, and from these to permanent councils for ordinary offences, and to temporary commissions for certain special cases. Councils of war were rarely summoned, and still more rarely did they unsheath the sword of the law; military justice lacked solemnity.

Subordination, nevertheless, pervaded our army as much, and perhaps more than any other army in Europe. The reason was, that, with some slight exceptions, the inequalities of situation harmonized with the natural inequalities, and that the French have an exquisite sense of what is right and fitting. The imperial system introduced among the chiefs a harshness, which appeared in the general forms of the Government, but which was not in the disposition of the Emperor. This precision, this harshness, was a medium of discipline substituted in place of the republican austerity.

The old royal army of France was composed of two distinct classes: the soldiers, who were doomed to deserve every thing and to obtain nothing; and

the officers, who were called to fill all the ranks without doing any thing to gain them. This latter class was subdivided into provincial nobility and court nobility. The first furnished a certain number of military men devoted to the profession, and many amateurs to whom the service was a mere pastime. The second supplied the regiments with beardless colonels, and the staffs with drawing-room generals. Between men placed on such different grounds, and separated by such insurmountable obstacles, there might be community of danger but never community of opinions and interests. This army was disposed to desertion to foreigners, and prone to mutiny. In time of peace a delay in the distribution of provisions or pay would not have passed with impunity, and the officers durst not exercise the troops on the 31st of a month, because for that day they received no pay. In war, the soldiers had the character of being impetuous in attack, but soon sinking into languor. When the Revolution broke out, the officers, stripped all at once of the consideration conferred by birth, remained without authority and without influence amidst inflamed passions; the subalterns had neither the will nor the power to maintain discipline; the soldiers denounced, reviled their chiefs, and did not recover the virtues of their profession till they had passed under new banners.

Since that time our soldiers were better born, for

they were no other than the whole of the youth of France; and our officers better bred, as no frivolous occupations disturbed them in the study of their art, and the performance of their duties. The army being recruited with young men of nineteen or twenty, and promotion in the corps having devolved to the seniority or quality of service, it soon came to pass that, from the corporal to the colonel, age, or the merit which is equivalent to it, were in general in proportion to the rank. The institution of the Military School produced no change in this particular, for the number of sub-lieutenants furnished by it was inconsiderable, compared with the force of the army. The subordinate officers beheld in their chief their senior and the professor of their science; they respected his experience and relied on his superior knowledge: an intimate fraternity continued to subsist between men who had started from the same level, and yet obedience knew no restrictions towards those who commanded, because they were the most worthy. The army formed an homogeneous and indivisible mass. From the conscript enrolled six months ago you came to the marshal of the empire, without encountering any transition that shocked either the sight or the feelings. The sons of France have in battle surpassed the impetuosity of their predecessors, and they have not been seen discouraged by obstacles; and yet the same men have bivouacked by the cataracts

of the Nile, and in the frozen plains of Moscow. You might have withheld from them their clothing and pay for a year, without hearing a murmur, at least without incurring the risk of mutiny. Placed under the colours by the effect of legal constraint, they hastened in crowds, as soon as they found opportunity, to their paternal homes; very few of them, even in extreme distress, have renounced their country to go over to the enemy.

If such an army perish, it perishes entire, with its officers, its generals, its eagles. Whatever judgment may be passed on its political conduct, it will be proclaimed faithful to its renown to the last moment, and France will not resume her rank among nations but by carefully collecting the wrecks of her illustrious bands, or by creating another military force upon the same principle of organization as the former.

A philosopher called upon the doctors of the Christians, the Jews, and the Mussulmans, to declare which doctrine they would prefer had they not each been born in the bosom of a positive religion. All replied:—the doctrine of Socrates and Plato. Their unanimity led the philosopher to recognize the pre-eminence of natural morality above the revealed dogmas. Ask an Englishman, a German, a Russian, which are the best soldiers in the world? and each of them will tell you: *Ours, and next to them the French.* In equal number, and equally well pro-

vided with material means for acting, no army is capable of balancing in the field the superiority of a French army, composed of national elements, and with such a commander as the popular voice shall designate. Others await death better : they do not go to meet it more gaily than we. Where else will you find soldiers whom glory solaces under hardship and hunger, whom a look, a word, urge into danger? Europe has witnessed the celerity of our strategical and tactical movements, and it has been panic-stricken ; for the secret of war lies in the legs. But if the French march quickly and for a long time, though small and carrying heavy burdens, it is not merely because they are physically well formed, and eat a great deal of bread ;* it is because they excel in their *moral*.† The mind and the sentiments enable

* The soldiers who eat most bread and least butcher's meat are in general more muscular and can march farther and longer than others. On forming a graduated scale of the aptitude of the different armies of Europe in this particular, we shall find at its two extremities, the Frenchman, who in the field requires two pounds of bread per day, and the Dutchman, whom less than half-a-pound suffices, if he can get a piece of beef and vegetables to eat with it.

† This expression, applied to an army, is wholly French, and has no equivalent in any other language. Colonel Dillon, in his *Commentary on the Military Establishments and Defence of the British Empire*, (vol. i. p. 137) says with reference to the troops destined to protect England against invasion, that they will possess what the French call *tout le moral d'une armée* ; and to explain his idea, he adds, that they will be animated with the truest courage produced by the purest patriotism.

them to surpass physical force, unlike nations without passion and beasts of burden, which, after a given time, sink under a certain load. How often have we seen our foot-soldiers, nearly swallowed up in bogs and morasses, encouraging one another to get out of them, by telling each other the motives of the forced march : motives, which their leader was interested in keeping secret, and which their sagacity had divined ! Guns were heard, the enemy appeared, and all at once fatigue was forgotten. They hurried forward, they ran ; and when victory was in sight, our young soldiers were always fresh and untired.*

These brilliant qualities constitute a nation essen-

* A general officer† was marching in Biscay in pursuit of a corps of Spanish troops, which always escaped, because its leaders had a perfect knowledge of the mountains, and because it was protected by the inhabitants. The French general had made his soldiers march all night and the whole of the next day ; the men murmured : " Where will he lead us to ? It is plain enough that he has a good horse under him ; he does not know that we are on foot." The sun was just setting, when, issuing from the mountains, they arrived on the sea-coast. "'Twas high time that the light and the land should end," said the old soldiers, looking grim, " or we should be marched still farther." All at once the Spanish corps was discovered ; fatigue was forgotten. It took more than an hour's running to overtake them. The general now had greater difficulty to check his men than he had before to excite them. They rushed upon the Spaniards, attacked them and made them prisoners—and all before dark.

† It was General Foy himself.

tially warlike. Between that and a conquering nation the distance is great. When Attila with his finger pointed out the walls of the Capitol to his Huns, they all rushed to the attack, animated by the attractions of a mild air, of beautiful women, and of a rich booty. Since a more advanced civilization has brought with it juster notions of the obligations of the soldiery, and of the slenderness of the rights conferred by victory, there is no longer a parity between the calamities and the profits of the profession. For soldiers, as for citizens, endless war is contrary to nature. Thus Napoleon alone set his heart on the conquest of the world. Not a Frenchman was his accomplice. His most passionate admirers had restrained their ambition far within the circle of his insensate hopes. Saving a few young officers but just come from the schools, there was not in the army a thinking being who was not deeply pained to see, after so many wars, more wars still undertaken. The soldiers had not always a fever in the brain. In their cool moments an invincible attraction drew them back towards their country. It was not the Parisian alone who was led by the abstinence of the bivouac to regret the abundance of his native city. We have heard our conscripts incessantly cursing with imprecations the smiling valleys of Lusitania, and that happy *Boetica* in which the ancients placed their Elysian Fields, regarding themselves there as in exile, and from a spirit of opposition praising to the skies in

their conversations the picturesque beauties of *La Sologne*, and the fertility of *Champagne pouilleuse*! How many, on receiving the wound which made cripples of them for life, exclaimed: "So much the better! I shall now see my father and mother again!" Almost all the general officers had wives and children, for the Emperor encouraged marriages. To the applications, with which he was beset, for leave to pass some time in France, he usually replied by refusals and favours. The refusals were positive; the favours turned out to be illusory, even in the days of our prosperity; for of what use were estates and mansions to men doomed to pass their nights on the hard ground, with no other shelter than the canopy of heaven? And then those estates, those mansions, were on the confines of Poland, within reach of the cannon of the Prussians, or in the sands of Hanover, ready to be reclaimed on the first inconstancy of victory. Meanwhile, deceived by all this parade of grants and gratuities, the people unjustly conceived that the sole end of perpetual war was to enrich those by whom it was carried on.

After having described the habits and dispositions of our warriors, we shall proceed to exhibit the wheels of the machine organized for combating. The army dates, as we have observed, from the incorporation of the national volunteers with the old troops of the line. This excellent operation was the

foundation of our military power, and left but little to be done by those who came afterwards.

The general officers exchanged the vague denominations of lieutenant-general, and marechal de camp, for those of general of division and general of brigade, which expressed with precision the extent of their several commands. The corps of infantry, three battalions strong, were called demi-brigades, because they stood in that relation with the brigade. Napoleon judged that a whole ought never to be designated by a fractional indication. He restored the name of regiment, and gave that of colonel to the chiefs.

The regiments of all arms were distinguished from each other by numbers. Several of these were entirely destroyed in the colonial expeditions which followed the peace of Amiens. The emperor determined that their numbers should remain vacant. The corps subsequently created took the order of battle commencing after the last in their branch of the service. By this means the French army appeared to foreigners to be more numerous than it really was.

Let us begin with the organization of the infantry, which a writer has so aptly termed *that nation of camps*.* This expression was no doubt

* M. de Barante, in his work "*Des Communes et de l'Aristocratie*."

suggested to him by the wars of the Revolution, and it applies with perfect justice to our French army.

The battalion of infantry consisted of nine companies, including that of the grenadiers. Napoleon augmented it with another picked company, the *voltigeurs*. It was a happy idea to raise in the public esteem men of small stature, who are in general the most intelligent and most active. The *voltigeurs* constituted the real light infantry of France, inasmuch as they were made to perform habitually the service of *railleurs*. The regiments of light infantry, as they were called, were only so in name, for they were composed, armed, and exercised like the rest of the infantry.

An imperial decree issued before the war in Spain, reduced the battalions to six companies, and made each regiment consist of five battalions, one of which was a battalion of depot. This division of the battalion into six fractions was ill adapted to the arrangement of manœuvres; it diminished the real value of the best soldiers by increasing their number, and the centre companies were thinned in order to keep the companies of grenadiers and *voltigeurs* always complete. But Napoleon did nothing uselessly: it was of importance to him to have many skeletons, that he might divide among them with the greater facility the produce of the conscription, and the more speedily train soldiers for war. A battalion which was cut up in battle, or dur-

ing a campaign, transferred the men that were left to battalions which had suffered less severely. The skeleton, consisting only of officers and subalterns, went to France to be filled up with recruits collected by the levies : the shuttle was continually flying from the depot to the army, and from the army to the depot. The unobtrusiveness of these partial movements enabled the Emperor frequently to reinforce, unobserved, such points of the lines of occupation, as his plans made it necessary to secure for the early commencement of offensive operations. In such cases the first two battalions of a corps served in one army with the eagle and the colonel, and the other two field battalions, under the command of the major, formed elsewhere a duplicate of the same number. Europe heard with astonishment the exploits of the same regiment extolled at the same time, on theatres of war at some hundreds of leagues distant from one another.

We need say nothing of the accidental formations occasioned by the universality and rapidity of the military operations. They figure as exceptions to the rule ; and the corps out of line were sooner or later incorporated with the others.

The French disdained not, any more than the Romans, to imitate whatever was good in the practices of their adversaries. Thus, almost all the parts of the dress of the Austrian troops were introduced among us in succession. The bivouac has taught

the value of the *capote*: a round and solid covering for the head has superseded the cocked hat, the form of which was so ridiculous, and the material so perishable. The coat has been shortened, and the facings, instead of being a useless ornament, have been made to fulfil their primitive destination, that is, to protect the chest and body with a double covering. The ligatures which compressed the joints have disappeared. The pantaloons and the other parts of the dress have been made wider. It has been found impossible to naturalize boots among our infantry; it has given the preference to the shoe and gaiter, united by means of the indispensable strap that passes under the foot.

The Emperor yielded to the applications made to him to change the colour of the uniform. They were enforced by representations of the saving which would accrue to the state from having less indigo to purchase of the English. In the campaign of 1806 some regiments appeared in white. The soldiers showed their dislike to it: they regretted the dress in which for seventeen years they had been accustomed to make their enemies tremble. Napoleon soon returned to the national colours.

Ever since the year 1794, a period of the most unbounded aversion for old traditions and methods, our youthful army, commanded by new men, who had quitted their studies and their counting-houses, was destroying the reputation of old armies

and veteran generals. Attempts were then made to ascertain the causes of our triumphs. Foreigners ascribed the honour of it to the fire of our light troops,* because the tirailleurs, who were rarely employed, and whose name was almost unknown in former wars, were now multiplied and prodigally used in these. The French, on the contrary, reading in the bulletins of the Convention, of nothing but battalions in mass, hollow lines, redoubts assaulted at the *pas de charge*, seriously believed that muskets and cannon had lost their virtue, and that every thing had been carried at the point of the bayonet.

These two opinions, diametrically opposite in appearance, were neither of them destitute of foundation. Though the men trained to the use of fire-arms were more numerous in the first battalions of volunteers, than among the conscripts of Napoleon, neither of them were distinguished by

* It was a remark of the Prussian General Bulow in 1795, that "the employment of light infantry is the final perfection of war, and that, strictly speaking, infantry of the line may henceforward be dispensed with in armies." See his work, entitled, *Spirit of the System of Modern Warfare, by an old Prussian officer.*

It was also said in England, that the Continent was subdued by the French tirailleurs; and it was believed that they won battles by killing the officers of the hostile army one after another. Such is the language of Colonel Robinson in a work entitled, *A Letter to a General Officer on the Establishment of Rifle Corps in the British Army.*

accuracy of aim ; and they have been sometimes justly reproached with a useless expenditure of ammunition. But the sort of combat which favoured the greatest developement of the individual faculties, was eminently suited to the restless spirit and the courage for attack peculiar to our nation. We had almost always the offensive: this was the consequence of the movement of patriotic opinion, and of the severity of the Committee of Public Safety, which sent inactive, as well as defeated generals, to the scaffold.

The action was commenced with swarms of *tirailleurs* on foot and on horseback : propelled agreeably to a general idea, rather than directed in the details of movements, they harassed the enemy, escaped from his masses by their velocity, and from the effect of his cannon by their dispersion. They were relieved that the fire might not slacken ; they were reinforced to render them more efficient.

It is rarely the case that an army has its flanks supported in an impregnable manner : besides, all positions present, in themselves, or in the arrangement of the troops by which they are defended, some gaps that favour an assailant. The *tirailleurs* rushed into these by inspiration, and inspiration was never wanting at such a time, and with such soldiers. The defect of the defence being once discovered, all vied in their efforts against it. The flying artillery (such was the name given to pieces served by gunners on horseback) dashed up at a gallop, and

discharged their pieces quite close. The main army moved in the direction pointed out to it: the infantry in columns, for it had not to fire; the cavalry interposed by regiments or in squadrons, that it might be disposable every where, and for every purpose. When the shower of the enemy's balls began to thicken, an officer, a soldier, sometimes a representative of the people, struck up the hymn of victory. The general raised his hat, surmounted with a tri-coloured plume, on the point of his sword, that it might be seen at a distance, and serve for a rallying-point to the brave. The soldiers quickened their pace to a run; those in the first ranks crossed their bayonets; the drums beat the charge; the air was rent with shouts a thousand and a thousand times repeated, of, "On! On!—The Republic for ever!"

To withstand the sons of France our enemies required to be actuated by similar passions. We had to do with German armies, cold, disinterested in the quarrel, commanded by sexagenarian generals. We soon knew as well as the Prussians and the Austrians all that is to be learned, and they were completely ignorant of what is only to be divined. It was sufficient for the acquittal of their conscience that the wings were turned or merely passed; their battalions drawn up so laboriously in right lines, immediately took to their heels. Some threw away their muskets, that they might run the

faster ; others, having no objection to visit the good country of France, preferred being made prisoners to running the risk of being killed.* Our foot-soldiers of five feet high brought in the giants of Germany and Croatia by hundreds. Our horse chasseurs made themselves masters of the cannon, and the ill-appointed equipages. The fugitives owed their safety to the firmness of their cavalry, which was then superior to ours ; sometimes to the disposition of the reserves ; more frequently to the coolness of our pursuit—a necessary consequence of the unconnected nature of our attacks.

The habit of this sort of success led our generals to believe that to overpower the enemy was to conquer him. This principle once admitted, it followed as a necessary consequence that an army could never extend itself too much. Accordingly, during the campaigns on the Rhine in 1795 and 1796, offensive warfare was carried on with armies

* The French have been humane and kind to their prisoners. The degree of liberty and comfort granted to them forms a contrast with the slavery and misery of the French prisoners abroad. Only compare Verdun with the prison-ships at Plymouth !— Besides, there resulted from the ill treatment of French prisoners by foreigners, an advantage which furthered the views of the Emperor ; he did not like his soldiers to be prisoners, neither did they themselves like to be so. The facility of surrendering as prisoners was during the war a great source of disasters to the German armies ; many an Austrian soldier has been a prisoner three or four times in France.

broken into several divisions, operating on several parallel routes, one or two marches apart, and mostly without any other reserve than a few regiments of cavalry. Buonaparte came, and by his victories in Italy overthrew this vicious system. The doctrine of his school was, that troops ought not to be dispersed at a distance from the enemy, unless for the purpose of procuring them provisions and rest; but that, whenever they were intended to fight, they ought to march sufficiently compact to engage masses simultaneously on the points against which the principal effort was to be made.

This improvement in the application of the rules of war was subsequently combined with important moral considerations. Napoleon was not a man to deceive himself respecting the causes of the superiority of our arms. His mind never stopped at the surface of things; he was too well acquainted with the human heart, he was too conscious of his own intentions, to rely on the continuity of miracles which the republican effervescence had produced. Absolute power would extinguish the love of country; devotedness would wear out; the brave and the skilful would perish first: those who came after them would be inferior in energy and talent; for the Revolution was past, and extraordinary men do not spring up in ordinary times. It was also clear, that by warring without intermission, the adversaries who were beaten to-day, would lea

from the conqueror to withstand him to-morrow. In running all over the world, he might possibly meet with enemies on whose *moral* he would have no hold. Napoleon therefore found it requisite to make victory depend on the calculated employment of forces; and France was obliged to have recourse to fixed methods, in order to keep Fortune faithful to her banners.

The education of the troops was recommenced in the military stations on the sea-coast, under the inspection of the Emperor, and the military spirit underwent a change analogous to the new political direction. The enemy was near enough to keep the soldiers on the alert, and not so dangerous as to divert them from their occupations. This mixed state of peace and war, so different from the monastic life of barracks and the frivolity of garrisons, produced important changes in the manners of the army. The soldiers were made to turn up the ground, in spite of their aversion to that species of moderate and continued labour, and they were exercised morning and evening in the evolutions of tactics. A laudable emulation was excited among the colonels, as to which of them should have their regiments in the best order and most perfect in their manœuvres.

The general officers learned to move a brigade, a division, a *corps d'armée*, at the word of command, and with the precision familiar to the experienced

chef de bataillon, who holds his troop in his hand and does with it what he pleases. It was no slight innovation to bring the soldiers into closer contact with the chiefs appointed to lead them to victory. The Regulations for the infantry manœuvres of 1791, exhibit a model of conciseness and perspicuity. They continued to be the book of the law to the subalterns; but the chiefs were accustomed to vary their application according to the emergencies of war. Thus was adopted the practice of facing and fighting with the third rank as well as with the first. The movements were frequently made upon two ranks, to show that the third is only a reserve destined to support and consolidate the other two. The square, which the Arabs had taught the French in Egypt, became a fundamental formation. The successive fire by ranks was recommended as the best to be employed against cavalry, because it has not the defenceless intervals of the battalion fire, and because it combines better than the fire of files with the dispositions for using the bayonet.

Never had France a more formidable army. Doubtless the brave men who, in the first three years of the war of liberty, started from the earth to the number of eight hundred thousand at the cry of the country in danger, were more virtuous; but the warriors of 1805 united more experience with almost equal enthusiasm. All were new men, all children of their own works, all were the fortunate favourites

of glory. The aristocratic spirit of the drawing-rooms had not yet infected any of them. Each, according to his rank, knew his duty better than in 1794. The imperial army was more scientifically regulated, more plentifully supplied with money, clothing, arms, and ammunition, than the armies of the Republic had ever been. The same eye overlooked, the same arm wielded, the same mind directed it;—and these were the eye, the arm, the mind of the great general and master.

Napoleon resolved to have but one sort of infantry, because the same is fit for every purpose: it is the reverse with the cavalry. Different arms, equipments, and horses, are required, according to the different purposes for which they are designed. He endeavoured to render the shades of this service more distinct. The heavy cavalry was reduced to the number indispensable for its employment, which was confined to pitched battles. The men wore cuirasses. It has long been matter of surprise that sovereigns do not give some pieces of defensive armour to all soldiers who fight on horseback.

The dragoons, the amphibious production of an age when fire-arms were not brought to perfection, were nearly disorganized for the expedition to England: part of them were dismounted; this furnished, instead of good cavalry, a small increase of indifferent and expensive infantry. Replaced on their horses, they supplied exclusively almost the

whole service of the cavalry in the war in Portugal and Spain. During the latter years of the imperial government, several regiments of dragoons were converted into lancers. Montecuculli calls the lance, "*la reine des armes blanches*;" it is, in fact, the most destructive in the hands of the horseman, because it is the one that reaches farthest.

The horse chasseurs and the hussars, who differ only in certain modifications in their uniform, have been the easiest to mount, recruit, and train. They have also rendered most service in war. Napoleon increased their number. The army of the line had in 1807 two regiments of carabineers, twelve of cuirassiers, thirty of dragoons, twenty-four of chasseurs, ten of hussars, making a total of seventy-eight regiments of cavalry.

The troops on horseback retained the monarchical physiognomy longer than the troops on foot. The Revolution was less beneficial to them. During the first campaigns we could scarcely cope with the German cuirassiers, the Walloon dragoons, and the Hungarian hussars. We rarely presented large bodies of cavalry on the ground, and when we did, it was most frequently to our disadvantage.

Napoleon made but few changes in the internal regulation of the cavalry. The vicissitudes of war often compelled him to form in haste provisional squadrons and regiments with fresh men and horses. It is however by no means so easy to form a cavalry

on the sudden as infantry. As the greatest part of our soil is cultivated by oxen, the French are not naturally horsemen, and they find it difficult, on account of their restless vivacity, to identify themselves with the horse.

With these organic vices it was to be apprehended that the cavalry would decline. The contrary has happened, and may be thus accounted for : conquest facilitated the remounts, and furnished finer breeds of horses. The troops on horseback sustained less loss than those on foot, and the old regiments having the provisional organizations always added to them, continued to be richer in veteran soldiers. Young men of family, who find it so difficult to accustom themselves to the austere life of the foot-soldier, furnished in a short time active, ardent, and well-mounted horsemen. These causes however are insufficient to account for the un hoped-for improvement of our cavalry ; the principal one lay in the system adopted by Napoleon for the conduct of that arm in war.

Before his reign a few regiments of heavy cavalry formed a reserve to each army. The rest were scattered among the divisions of infantry. The Emperor formed not only the cuirassiers and dragoons, but also the chasseurs and hussars, into brigades and divisions. He did more ; he united several divisions together, to compose with them stronger masses, which received the strange name of *corps d'armée de cavalerie*. This arrangement has caused some opportu-

nities for bold and decisive strokes to be lost. It has often happened that bodies of three thousand horse have not done what would have been accomplished with three hundred, because their leader wished to keep his three thousand horse together for the moment and the ground which would permit them to be brought into action all at once. The rivalry of the two arms has sometimes prevented them from assisting each other. The battalions, being destitute of scouts, have marched on at random, and efforts have been without result, for want of a few parties of horse to pour upon the enemy when thrown into disorder.

To counterbalance these inconveniencies, most of which might be done away by a less exclusive application of this system, considerable advantages were obtained. The cavalry has been better preserved, because in marches and cantonments it has not been forced to accommodate itself to the paces, the halts, and the habits of the infantry. Having been better instructed and more flourishing, it has been more terrible to our adversaries. We have not confined the employment of it as formerly to the completion of the victory. It has entered the lists against unbroken masses of infantry and cavalry, and its ardour has sometimes decided the fate of battles.*

* Three-fourths of the horses in France were frozen to death in Russia. Our cavalry, re-established after this disaster, surpassed itself; and subsequently, in a sadly memorable campaign

Officers of cavalry, like the Neys* and the Richempanses, were thinly strewed in the armies of the Republic. We have seen at the head of the imperial squadrons, at the same time, a Murat, a Lasalle, a Kellermann, a Montbrun, and other men who excelled in the art of regulating and directing the vast hurricanes of the cavalry, the *procella equestris*, according to the beautiful expression of Scripture. Next to the qualities requisite for a commander-in-chief, the most sublime military talent is that of the general of cavalry. Though you had a *coup d'œil* more rapid, and a flash of determination more sudden than the steed bounding away at full gallop, they are of no avail unless you combine with them the vigour of youth, good eyes, a powerful voice, and the address and agility of a centaur. Above all, it is requisite that Heaven should have prodigally endowed you with that precious faculty, which no other can replace, and of which it is more niggardly than is generally supposed,—I mean bravery.

The French royal corps of artillery had the reputation of being the first in Europe. It was in the regiment of La Fère, the first of that arm, that Buonaparte commenced his military career. The artil-

of three days, it roughly handled the cavalry of the Prussians, and crushed that of the English.

* From the very commencement of the war, and before he entered upon a more extensive career, Ney was accounted one of the best cavalry officers of France.

lery gave itself up with enthusiasm to the impulse of the Revolution, but its discipline scarcely suffered at all, because it comprehended a great fund of good sense and patriotism. The artillery took accordingly an active part in the defence of the country, and in the offensive attempts of the armies in 1792 and 1793. At that time great numbers of cannon were taken into battle. The four-pounders were attached to the battalions of infantry. The howitzers, the eight, the twelve, and even the sixteen-pounders particularly appropriated to sieges, then formed batteries of six to twelve guns, called batteries of position. An improvement suited to French impetuosity had recently been borrowed from the Prussians, for the field-service. It consisted in mounting on horseback a certain number of gunners, who, by that means, arrived on the ground at the same time as the best horsed pieces, were always ready to work them, and having it in their power to escape more easily from those who would have attacked them, kept up the cannonade longer and closer. The horse artillery was composed, on its first formation, of the nimblest artillery-men, and was afterwards recruited with the *élite* of the grenadiers. It performed prodigies. In the campaigns in Germany, mere captains of that arm were seen to acquire the reputation of generals. It was not long before the generals would not have any other artillery, as from being more moveable and more efficient, less of it was re-

quired, and the columns of the train were lightened in proportion.

Over-fondness for good things is always productive of bad consequences. The artillery on foot, discouraged by the formation and augmentation of the horse-artillery, began to lose the military spirit, and the new gunners, being limited to the manual labour of the arsenals and parks, remained peasants and became reasoners. This was perceived in the defence of the fortresses in Italy during the disastrous campaign of 1799.* The well-educated officers, left in great number in a corps less mutilated than others by emigration, had voluntarily confined themselves within the establishments of the *materiel*. The young were discouraged at the sight of a career in which promotion appeared to be obstructed. The chiefs of the arm were reduced in the field to the essential but obscure part of commissaries of instruments of war and ammunition.

Napoleon made a revolution in the service of the artillery conformable with the changes which long wars could not fail to produce in the *moral* of the army. When the ardour of one side, opposed to the discouragement of the other, is no longer sufficient for gaining battles, it becomes necessary to break the lines

* After the retreat of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, in 1796, General Moreau had companies of gunners on horseback to perform the service of the artillery in the advanced works of the *têtes du pont* of Huningen and Kehl.

which resist. The surest method of accomplishing this is, to concentrate on the point of attack, a stronger fire than the enemy can bring to bear for its defence. It is the judicious disposition and simultaneous employment of a numerous artillery that furnish these multiplied fires. The Emperor increased the field artillery to such an extent, as to have in the armies beyond the Rhine five guns to every thousand men, and augmented the number of men of this arm to one hundred thousand three hundred and thirty-six; nearly as many as the whole army of the King of France formerly contained.*

Among these myriads of cannon the horse-artillery reverted to its natural destination. It was employed in the reviews, and principally in the cavalry, which having no fire of its own, is chiefly obliged to borrow it elsewhere, at least to defend itself. The artillery, habitually disposed by large batteries, returned under the command of its immediate chiefs.

Well-educated artillerymen then thronged to the armies, old ones from the work-shops and manufactories, as well as new ones from the schools where the instruction of the profession had been brought to perfection. The services of such were not

* During the campaign of Wagram, the Emperor gave the regiments of infantry four-pounders which were served by foot-soldiers: it was an expedient for getting a numerous artillery forwarded with less embarrassment than if it had been collected together in divisions and parks.

rejected as had passed through all the details of manipulation in the state of privates, and made amends for a less enlightened theory by their superior practice. Could it be forgotten that in more difficult times they had almost singly supported the glory of the corps? Eblé, the first officer of artillery in the war of the Revolution, belonged to this class. The subalterns were assured of a share in promotion sufficiently large to reconcile their just claims with the destination of a scientific body. The corps of artillery has manifested little ambition for the luxury of the science. It has been contented with not remaining behind-hand in the knowledge necessary for its art, and always to do more and better than was required of it. The regiments of this arm, choosing recruits out of the conscription before the other troops, kept up a vigorous set of men; and the soldiers who dealt death at a distance, continued to show themselves the most intrepid in braving it close at hand.

The artillery train was indisputably one of the most useful military institutions of the Emperor Napoleon's. The business of horsing and driving the cannon and ammunition-waggon had been previously committed to contractors destitute of either patriotism or virtue. Although the new arrangement probably cost a little more money, nothing was lost by it, for the soldiers of the train rivalled the gunners in discipline and courage.

Twenty-five years of war, and a comparison with

the arsenals and machines of the Continent of Europe which have fallen into our power, have not led to any important change in what was practised in France. Some alterations in the calibre and new ammunition waggons have been tried; but these have been again relinquished for the old mode of construction fixed by Gribeauval. The management of this important part of the public expenditure has been conducted by the officers of the corps with rigid economy, and according to the forms established a century ago. In this corps and in that of the engineers antique probity took refuge, when banished from the other administrative services.

It was frequently proposed to Napoleon to unite the artillery and the engineers. According to the general position, the division of labour contributes to the perfection of the arts: but in this particular instance, why incorporate bodies so useful in their present organization? The Emperor had not the imprudence to try the experiment; but he collected the pupils of both arms in an institution to which the Polytechnic School served as a nursery. This school, after having been a focus of light to France and Europe, was re-constructed on a narrower and less liberal plan. The profession of arms took the preference of all others in the mind of Napoleon. He transformed a nursery of savans into a seminary for warriors.

Ever since the second campaign of the war of

liberty, when the use of tents was abandoned, our soldiers built their huts with a dexterity and promptitude which proved their great aptitude for every kind of work. The Emperor made them dig sea-ports on the coast of Boulogne, and frequently employed them in constructing fortifications. Still they always manifested a dislike to handle the shovel and the pickaxe any where but under the fire of the enemy.

Vauban, in the year 1688, urgently solicited the minister Louvois for a body of men to execute the labours of sieges under the direction of engineers. A century later there was not yet such a corps. Before the Revolution the name of sappers was given to certain companies of the regiments of artillery, which, besides working the guns, were employed in sapping in the polygons, and were also occasionally lent to the engineers. To employ for two purposes soldiers obeying two masters was a mistaken economy. The National Convention instituted the genuine sappers, who were at first organized in companies and afterwards in battalions, and soon acquired a renown proportionate to the degree of intelligence and audacity which the exercise of their profession requires.

The miners were restored to the engineers, from whom they ought never to have been separated. The engineers also reclaim the pontonniers. Notwithstanding the apparent reasonableness of this claim, the artillery has retained them. It has been

thought that the power which this arm has at its disposal, from its arsenals, its parks, its train, and the numerous persons it employs, would furnish better resources for constructing, transporting and working moveable bridges, than any other combination could supply.

The engineers raise permanent and temporary fortifications ; they attack and defend strong places ; and they go to war. It may be affirmed that in these three respects there is no military body in the world which possesses greater skill and patriotism than our corps of engineers. The constructions, repairs and enlargements of Alexandria, Antwerp, Juliers, and of five hundred other places, afford sufficient proofs that the art of Vauban has not declined in the hands of the Marescots, the Chasseloups and the Haxos. Europe has been studded with our redoubts and our entrenchments. In sieges the officers of the engineers were the soul of the attack and the nerve of the defence. In these operations their experience has collected a multitude of improvements, the publication of which would extend the domain of science. In the field they undertook the duty of reconnoissances, and were the best, not to say our only staff-officers. Where else should we have found men so highly educated and whose devotedness might be put to so many trials ?

The staff properly so called has not had any consistence, or formed a corps, in our armies. In this

collective denomination were included, the general officers and their aid-de-camps, the commandants and adjutants of fortresses, the adjutant-commandants, and their assistants.

The sons of placemen, the ancient nobles, the new nobles, all who wished to pursue the military profession pleasantly, and to arrive rapidly at honours and power, obtained the post of aid-de-camp. Napoleon tried to check their rage for promotion; he decided that aid-de-camps should serve in the corps of infantry and cavalry, where officers learn to lead soldiers by living with them, before they could pretend to superior rank. The influence of the court atmosphere, however, often ran counter to the sound doctrines of the generalissimo, and the rule was frequently violated. It is the nature of courts to infect armies.

The posts of commandants and adjutants of the home fortresses were reserved, as honourable retreats for officers maimed or grown old in the service: abroad, these posts, being rather political than military, became the prey of persons who belonged to no corps, and offered but little guarantee to the government. Several officers employed as commandants of towns who had been previously disbanded, and returned to the service in hopes of amassing, or increasing their little savings, became the habitual intermediators between the army and the inhabitants of the conquered countries. The vulgar insolence and arbitrary

deportment of some of them have contributed to render the French name odious to foreigners.

The adjutant-generals and their assistants were created by the Constituent Assembly, to combine the functions exercised by the general staff of the army and the particular staffs of the infantry and cavalry. The institution had subsisted scarcely three years, when it was discredited by the bad choice of the Committee of Public Welfare and the representatives of the people on missions. Nevertheless, in the army of the Rhine, which was the least shaken of all by the revolutionary tempest, the officers who were fond of study devoted themselves to the duties of the staff. Desaix, Saint Cyr,* Abatucci, Decaen, and others of the same class, were adjutant-generals: functions imperfectly defined were thus enlarged by the personal merit of those who exercised them. It was otherwise in Italy. General Buonaparte thought lightly of men who neither directed machines of war nor soldiers; he considered the service of the staff as a passage, not as a career. The adjutant-generals were nearly assimilated to general officers by the resemblance of name and uniform: the First Consul stripped them of those ornaments, and joining two words which were astonished to find themselves coupled together, called them adjutant-commandants. The door of promotion was almost closed

* Moreau said of Desaix and St. Cyr: "With the one you are sure to gain battles, with the other not to lose them."

against them when it was thrown open to all besides. To punish a negligent or culpable chief of a corps he was made adjutant-commandant. By abridging the consideration of a class of officers placed high in the hierarchy, it was to be expected that less service would be obtained from them.

The labour of the desk, which was inconsiderable in the old wars, became with the increase of our armies and our parade of responsibility, complicated beyond measure. The Emperor insisted on having before him, wherever he was and at all hours, the most circumstantial statements of the force and position of his troops, of the hospitals, arsenals, and magazines: hence the preparation of such statements came to be considered as one of the most important duties of the staff. The secrets of castrametation and the opening of the march, formerly so highly prized, have fallen in estimation, as well on account of the different manner of making war, as because the experience common to all has reduced to its just value what is but the A B C of the profession. The regiments, familiarized with the study of grounds and geographical processes, performed the reconnoissances better than assistants promoted without examination and without selection. The general officers took entirely on themselves the duty of determining the positions and placing the troops. What then was left to the adjutant-commandants em-

ployed as chiefs of the staff of divisions? Nothing but the transmission of orders, the obligation to second the general, and the dispatch of daily reports and statements to the chief of the staff of the army. Every body did not understand in the same sense the direct action which they had a right to exercise on the troops and in the administration; though invested with the rank of colonel, their importance was still farther diminished when the separation of the arms and the institution of the *corps d'armée* gave a shock to the divisionary system.

This change, like many others, sprang from the great encampment on the shores of the Channel. The divisions of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, in which the cavalry and infantry were united, and hastened, whenever their company of horse-artillery was compromised, to the assistance of their comrades and friends in distress—these fine divisions exhibited as close a resemblance to the Roman legions as is compatible with the nature of our weapons. When the military forces were deployed on a greater space, several generals in chief, and Moreau in particular, judged that a too minute division was detrimental to the execution of orders, and to the unity of movements. In the year 1800, several divisions of the armies of the Rhine and Italy were united under the command of a general officer, who received for this purpose the temporary commission

of lieutenant to the general in chief. The division, nevertheless, remained united, and in this mechanism the lieutenancy was a superfluous wheel.

Three years later, some generals in chief, who were nominated marshals of the empire as soon as that dignity was instituted, commanded the *corps d'armée* at Boulogne, Ostend, and Montreuil. These bodies were real armies, for they carried with them all that was requisite for marching, supporting themselves, and fighting. The divisions lost their consistency; the cavalry, as we have said, was withdrawn from them, and the artillery figured in them only on paper. The different arms were separated; the general officers, being limited to the command of a single class of troops, were no longer more than downright colonels.* It may be questioned whether this modification of the system under which the army had conquered, was either beneficial or necessary. The Emperor adopted it, not so much as an absolute improvement as for his own convenience; the fixed commands of his lieutenants, which were calculated by the number of men capable of being directed with success on the ground, by a chief of mode-

* We are here stating the imperial organization, that is, the organization of the armies commanded by the Emperor in person. Part of the war in Spain was carried on without any intermediary between the general staffs of armies and the divisions, and things were found to go on perfectly well. The campaigns in the Peninsula also produced numerous modifications in the service of the troops, and in the manners of the officer and soldier, to which we shall not fail to advert.

rate abilities, served to relieve him from the necessity of attending to a multitude of troublesome details. To them belonged the mechanical arrangements and technical execution ; to him alone the conception and direction of enterprizes.

In the rear of the *corps d'armée* of Napoleon, marched a reserve which never had its equal : the Imperial Guard represented the glory of the army, and the majesty of the empire. Its officers and men were selected from among those whom the brave had designated as the bravest ; all of them were covered with scars. Bred amid dangers, they had lived much in a few years ; and no one was astonished to hear the name of old guard given to a corps, the oldest members of which had not reached the age of forty. Though their sovereign loaded them with favours, still the recompense was always inferior to the service. Napoleon, honour, and France, were blended in their admiration and fidelity. Not one of them thought that this fidelity would ever call them to defend the imperial crown against popular tumult ; all were proud that to their courage had been committed the duty of keeping it resplendent in the eyes of foreigners ; the pleasures of the great city never relaxed their discipline. Carried to the fields of battle, on foot by forced marches, in boats or in carriages, the news of their arrival struck terror into the hearts of their enemies. By successive aug-

mentations the Emperor raised the effective of his guard to sixty-eight battalions, thirty-one squadrons and eighty pieces of artillery. In the days of his prosperity he employed it only in detached portions : fifteen whole years it remained standing amid horrors and ruins, solid as a *pillar of granite*.* One day it succumbed.—On that day the yoke of the foreigner pressed heavily upon France. On the tombs of these heroes our children will inscribe these words, which were uttered during the heat of the conflict : “ The Guard may perish, but will never surrender.”

The system of our army administration was vicious. It was not however, destitute either of good regulations, or of men capable of enforcing their execution. The evil arose from two capital causes : the one is, that the art of supplying the wants of the soldier, depending like other arts on material processes, cannot be applied to armies surpassing a certain numerical force, or the movements of which exceed a certain degree of rapidity. The other cause was inherent in the character of the man who governed our destinies. As the fabulous Eolus sets the winds at liberty to disturb the waves, so Napoleon let loose the passions to convulse the world. Now the passions, even the noblest, are always ready to fire with indignation at the order which chalks out a line for talents and destroys enthusiasm.

* Such was the term applied to it by General Buonaparte on the field of battle at Marengo.

The commissariat, the name of which is old under the monarchy, gained importance at the Revolution. At that time a disposition prevailed to diminish the military power; which it is always proper to do, when the safety of the state is not compromised. To the management of the military stores both in the interior of the regiments and elsewhere, was united for some time the cognizance of offences committed by the officers and soldiers, and the conduct of the trials. The discredit which attached to old institutions scarcely at all affected the commissaries of war. Very few of them considered themselves obliged to go to the crusade beyond the Rhine. Their corps, almost untouched, and therefore rich in traditions, was reinforced by distinguished persons. So long as our soldiers who were engaged in repelling the first hostile invasion, continued stationary at the fortresses and lived upon the magazines, the commissariat retained the importance of an independent magistracy.

When offensive war commenced, the republican armies, broken into divisions, marched on an extended front, because they were obliged to draw their subsistence from the country which they traversed. No such thing as centrality in the administration was any longer practicable. Recourse was had to requisitions in kind, made partially, and from day to day, at all points where any want was felt. This mode of supply requiring the continual co-operation

of the military authorities, as well for the calculation of the resources as for levying them, imposed on the general of division the performance of an additional duty—that of subsisting the soldiers. For the fulfilment of this duty, sometimes more difficult than any other, the commissary of war was an enlightened, active, indispensable, but subordinate agent. If the administrative corps had chosen to entrench itself behind the law by which it had been constituted, and which was not changed, it would have had most part of the time nothing to do. It chose rather to suffer its functions to be debased than to relinquish them. The military, accustomed to judge by what they see, ceased to regard the depository of ministerial power as more than a subaltern, and the director of the provision department but as a sutler, although the first of his class. The fundamental distinction between inspectors, responsible persons, and manipulators, was done away ; for there was no trace of responsibility, and all was manipulation. Add to these causes of decline, the contempt naturally felt by soldiers for men who go to war without incurring the dangers of the field of battle, and none will be surprised that the commissaries of war should not have retained sufficient consistence to direct and control with success the financial administration of the regiments. The duty of reviews, the basis of all responsibility, suffered in consequence ; and they even soon ceased to be practised in the field.

The troops were fed at the expense of the conquered countries, and it was of very little consequence whether the functionaries appointed to the superintendence of this service enjoyed more or less consideration. They were paid, however, by the national exchequer, and as the application of the public money nearly affected the Government, it was natural that it should seek to give importance to the dispensers of its funds. The decree of the consuls, dated 9 Pluviose, year VIII. deprived the commissaries of war of the administrative police of the armed corps, and transferred it to another corporation, the first members of which were taken from the head of the commissariat, and from among the general and superior officers not on actual service. The inspectors of reviews assumed at the outset an imposing attitude, because high ranks were conferred upon them. They kept it up after they had lost the insignia of rank, because their functions only gave them relations of superiority with the military, individually or collectively.

The divisionary system had contributed to the decline of the commissaries of war. The establishment of *corps d'armée*, and a more concentrated system of war, had the effect of restoring to them, if not their former consequence, at least a less general dependence, and better defined functions. But the wound inflicted by the dismemberment of the inspection of reviews was then still bleeding.

The new corps had carried with it the traditional authority and the honorary rights. The old corps, suddenly deprived of a considerable number of its best subjects, did not comprise the stuff requisite for filling this void, and the career was too readily opened to men who were not qualified for it by their early education and the nature of their acquirements.

The zeal of the commissariat appeared nevertheless to increase more and more, the less it was appreciated. In the course of a quarter of a century all the systems of administration have been tried, from that which provides supplies long beforehand, to that of authorised plunder. The commissaries of war have submitted to every thing. Assiduous application of mind, bodily fatigue, sacrifices of self-love—nothing has damped their desire of being useful. Rarely assisted, and at times thwarted by the superior authority, their efforts have been particularly meritorious in the wars between army and people, in which the generative elements of order were to spring from the very bosom of confusion. We shall see in the course of this work commissaries of war displaying, in the formation of a magazine, the organization of a convoy, the provisioning of a fortress, more administrative talent, and greater strength of understanding, than would have been requisite in regular times for governing a state. Acts of this nature are in general consigned to

obscurity, but when the energy of the resistance overcome, and the importance of the results obtained, have impressed on them the stamp of greatness, it is right that history should record them for the encouragement of those who may be placed in similar circumstances.

The persons employed in the civil administration were taken at random, and removable at the pleasure of the first comer. In the time of the Directory their ill-gotten wealth insulted the noble poverty of the warriors; under Napoleon they had the manners of their condition. The services which they rendered, though not always disinterested, were more valuable than we had a right to expect from a class of men consigned to the uncertainty of a precarious situation.

As we made continual use of the local resources, the *materiel* of the administration which our armies carried with them was very limited, and experience in war had not improved it. Our *ambulances* were not proportionate to our wants. We used neither portable bake-houses nor moveable ovens. The provision-waggons were heavy and clumsy. The imperial decree of the 26th of March 1807, formed the equipages into battalions. This innovation, the idea of which was suggested by the artillery train, was not supported by the same stimulants of patriotism and honour.

The subaltern agents of the medical service also received a military organization. It was easy to establish it; for the attendants on the infirmaries were chosen from among the old soldiers; although little advantage has been derived from it for the improvement of the system of hospitals. The hospitals! . . . It is here that humanity in tears accuses ambition of its crimes. Generous hearts could no longer throb at the tale of victory; our laurels were drowned in a sea of blood. The conscripts lived too fast to last long. Pectoral affections in the north, and diseases of the stomach in the south, swept them off by thousands. The constant movements of the armies, and the uncertainty of the lines of operation, did not always admit of the establishment of regular hospitals, and incessantly compromised evacuations. The wounded were frequently left behind for want of the means of conveyance. Whether victors or vanquished, we lost four times as many men by the disorders inseparable from our system of war, as by the fire or the sword of the enemy.

The army, nevertheless, adored its fortunate general, and it still doated on him, even when undeceived respecting his providence for it. To be able to solve this enigma one must have known Napoleon, the life of camps and of glory; and above all, one must have a French head and heart. Did the plague-stricken soldier at Jaffa push away the hand applied to his sore, because that hand had snatched him

from his native soil and dragged him into the focus of contagion? The Emperor strove to repair by individual attentions a small portion of the evils resulting from his combinations. After a battle he visited the hospitals in person, or sent thither his principal officers. After his example the generals took a lively interest in the welfare of the sick and wounded. Our surgery, directed in the armies by able chiefs, has retained its pre-eminence in Europe. The country owes unbounded gratitude to the modest services of the officers of health. Placed between the cupidity of the administrators and the ambition of the military officers, this respectable class of citizens has set an example of devotedness, the purity of which was never sullied by mercenary views.

To the corps of inspectors of reviews the law had confided the direction of the councils of administration of the regiments: this is what was termed the administrative police. The councils had but a nominal authority. They deliberated *pro formâ*, or rather they did not deliberate at all, and the members signed individually the collective acts. In point of fact, the colonel was the sole administrator; the inspector of reviews, satisfied with insuring the interests of the treasury by precisely ascertaining the effective, deemed the operations completed on the presentation of the vouchers, and rarely carried his scrutiny any farther. The ministerial pro-

hibitions were eternally repeated, but did not prevent illegal deductions being made from the pay of the troops, under favour of the comforts which they occasionally enjoyed in cantonments, sometimes for the purpose of keeping sappers, and paying musicians, at others to add frivolous embellishments to their dress. Many a colonel altered by his private authority important portions of the uniform: one ordered the hair to be cropped; another enjoined the resumption of hair-powder. A multitude of details which in other countries are determined by regulations, were left in France to the caprice of the chiefs, who succeeded each other with a rapidity equal to that of the military movements. The arbitrary part of this system was tempered only by the paternal influence of the captains, and by the interest which the colonels had in being honoured and beloved by those from whose conduct they expected their reputation and promotion. Napoleon said that a little irregularity was not unbecoming the French character; but he would have begun to be uneasy had the troops appeared dissatisfied. He required above all things good officers and intrepid soldiers. This thought always diverted him from secondary considerations.

He who, in order to make himself acquainted with the French army, should study its written legislation would undertake an irksome and useless task. In this mass of imperial ordinances and ministerial decisions, which would fill a hundred volumes, con-

traditions would meet him at every step: he would be unable to distinguish what orders are still in force, what have been abrogated, and what never were acted upon. In every country, but especially in our France, there is a prodigious difference between precept and action, between what ought to be done and what is done. Amidst a sterile abundance our codes sinned by inexcusable omissions. Thus we waited till the 1st of May, 1812, before we inserted in them a penal law against those who should treat about capitulation in the open field. We never had for the service of the army a regulation adapted to the system of divisions and permanent *corps d'armée* :* the relations between the artillery and the engineers, and above all those of the administration with the staff have continued vague and undefined. By the side of such imperfections some splendid acts revealed the finger of the great man. Of this class we shall cite the imperial decree relative to the eagles of the regiments, which one might imagine to have been

* There existed for the service of the troops in the field two regulations, one of the 12th of April 1788, relative to the cavalry, the other of the 5th of April 1792, relative to the infantry, both founded on old arrangements and both nearly unknown to the army. During the war with Austria, in 1809, the Emperor felt the necessity of a regulation for the field. It would have taken time and trouble to draw up a good one, and nothing more was done than to reprint in haste the regulation of the 5th of April 1792, with some alterations, the principal of which was the substitution of the word *baraque* for *tente*.

framed in the Roman senate on the motion of Scipio; and that of the 24th of December, 1811, on the defence of places of war, which breathes such an heroic knowledge of the human heart and of the military profession.

War, considered as a technical science, has made constant but slow advances, from the first employment of gunpowder to the revival of the equal step, and to the improvement of the system of firing in the Prussian armies. It will now probably remain stationary till some capital discovery shall produce a revolution in the arts. In fact, twenty-four years of battles, fought with the whole world by the most intellectual of nations, have not suggested any alteration in the principal weapon of the moderns, the musket provided with the bayonet; and the science of tactics has scarcely been carried beyond the combinations devised by the great Frederic.

But the applications of the science of war have been varied to infinity; sound notions have become general, and prejudices have been dispelled. The lowest officer of our infantry would smile with pity at the grave dissertations of our predecessors on deep order and shallow order.

Could a horse-artillery-man believe, that twelve years before the Revolution volumes were written to prove that moveableness is a superfluous quality for cannon, and that the same pieces mounted on the same carriages, are equally serviceable along the

coasts, on ramparts, in sieges, and in the field! We have shaken off the yoke of useless fortresses. We are no longer satisfied with victories attended with no result. The luxury which returned with monarchical institutions, having penetrated no deeper than the first layers of the army, it has been enabled, light in baggage, and industrious in regard to the means of subsistence, to emancipate itself to a certain extent from the trammels of lines of operation. A general has brought into action at once a hundred and eighty thousand men, and five hundred pieces of cannon, on the same field of battle.

Strategy has made great advances and completed the science of war. Michael Angelo said one day concerning the Pantheon at Rome: "I will raise it four hundred feet above the ground:" and he placed it on the top of the church of St. Peter. The same kind of thing was done in our days with the theory of the movements of armies. The old King of Prussia gained battles by the employment of the oblique order; Napoleon made use of it to conquer kingdoms in a week or in a month. He obtained more extensive advantages from it because he applied it on a larger scale. Follow the profound strategist in the brilliant manœuvres of talent and hardihood which preceded the days of Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena. See him afterwards take his field of battle, and you will no longer be surprized that a single victory should overthrow a state.

Such things, indeed, are not benefits to nations. Better were it for them that the quarrels of kings should be settled with twenty thousand men than with two hundred thousand. The prejudice which doomed the most numerous armies to besiege Bergen-op-Zoom preparatory to entering Holland, or to reduce the most paltry town in Flanders before they could think of penetrating into the heart of France—this prejudice diminished the evils of war, if not in their intensity, at least in their developement. The use of tents preserved the troops from pernicious diseases.

All this is true; but still people will never return to the system of small armies, or to sieges of convention, or to canvas houses.* Every belligerent power will continue to do much harm to itself, in the hope more or less founded of doing still more to its adversary. Let us look higher for the remedy:

* Some philanthropic warriors have wished that the use of tents might be revived. This wish resembles that expressed in the sixteenth century by the Montlucs and the Bayards, that people would relinquish the use of those treacherous weapons, by means of which a coward lurking behind a bush dispatches the brave man whom he would not dare to look in the face. He who should carry on war with tents, would always have encumbrances of transport, which would render him inferior to another who is without them. If the nations of the North ever make irruptions into the South, which is as much to be apprehended now as at any former period, they will not come and encamp under canvas houses.

let us seek it in the free manifestation of public opinion, in institutions strong enough to resist the individual will of rulers, and to limit their power, so that they shall be no more than the servants, more or less able, of the general interests. The spirit of liberty will destroy the military spirit. Princes will no longer be allowed to make nations slaughter one another for the interest of dynasties or the whims of ambition. Governors, whatever may be their title or the origin of their power, will not be able to maintain themselves without the sacrifice of self to the general will. Nations, on comparing the calamities of war with the slender advantages of victory, will no longer set up the war-cry, excepting in very rare circumstances, when the point at issue is to live free or perish, as was the case with France in 1792, when her existence was threatened by the unjust coalition of the sovereigns of Europe.

Great events are the best school for mankind, and war is the apprenticeship to war. As the last campaigns of the thirty years' war formed the Condés and the Turennes for the age of Louis XIV., so Napoleon had his choice among the mighty geniuses to which the Revolution had given birth. He also made generals, and in great numbers: some whom accident placed about him in the campaigns in Italy; others who were brought to his notice during the wars in which he was subsequently engaged. To conquer and to find the instruments of conquest

were the business of his life. Provided they were disposed to have no other prospects, no other designs, no other will, than the prospects, the designs, and the will, of their master, he never asked men what were their former or what were their present opinions, but what they could do. History will record that several of his aid-de-camps, and these not such as he had least esteem for, had voted against the Consulship for life.*

The military reputations founded in his reign are nevertheless far from having equalled those acquired in the time of the Republic, and the generals who have rendered their names celebrated during both periods, have shone with less lustre in the second. This need not be matter of astonishment. In the first place, a court, how new soever it may be, were it even a head-quarters transformed but yesterday, is a field opened to mediocrity. The necessities of the profession of courtier are constantly lowering the men who have most real value. Napoleon exercised greater influence over minds as a monarch than he did as a warrior, and he trained up servants about him and not pupils. The example of his high fortune, the ambition which

* Drouot, one of the finest characters of our age; Mouton, Count de Lobau, an excellent soldier; Bernard, general officer of engineers, forced by the misfortunes of the times to offer to the United States of North America services which were accepted with avidity, and which will there at least be useful to the cause of humanity.

he loved to excite, the great existences which he created, inspired not merely the desire of glory, but a passion for exaltation; and his lieutenants dreamt as much of winning kingdoms as of winning battles, or of the honour of shedding lustre on themselves and on France.

Besides, to which of his pupils did Homer transmit the secret of the Iliad? The talent of Napoleon, redolent of inspiration and genius, was not of a nature to form a school. On the one hand, his immense superiority over those around him produced in them an extreme diffidence of their own abilities; on the other hand, his absolute power fettered independent minds, and scarcely allowed a happy idea to spring from any brain but his own. It suited neither his politics nor his humour to awaken transcendent merit, and especially to give it too free scope. In the armies which the Emperor commanded in person, the generals had no opportunities fully to display themselves. Besides, Napoleon sometimes employed men against the grain of their aptitude, or he gave them forces insufficient to succeed; or perhaps he prosecuted with coolness operations hotly begun, diverted as he was by new conceptions. This favoured lover of Fortune would have been disposed to consider as infidelities any favours which the goddess might grant to another. Under the mortification arising from the miscarriage of enterprizes, he consoled himself when informed that the soldiers

had exclaimed, "Oh! if the Emperor had been there!"

Moreover, the brilliant lustre shed by the exploits of a single individual has eclipsed all other glories; and if, during a protracted war, there have been circumstances in which our greatest warriors have appeared but dwarfs, it is because they were seen by the side of a giant.

Several generals classed by us in the second order would hold the first rank among the troops of rival powers. It would be difficult to conceive what varied capacities and what elevated characters were comprised in our army of glorious memory. In Spain especially, the war was less subordinate to a general direction, and thus afforded more scope for the development of individual talent; hence it had occasion to form officers and generals sufficient in number to supply all the armies in the world.

With his passions, and in spite of his errors, Napoleon is, taking him all in all, the greatest warrior of modern times. He carried into battle a stoical courage, a profoundly calculated tenacity, a mind fertile in sudden inspirations, which by unhopèd-for resources disconcerted the plans of the enemy. Let us beware of attributing a long series of success to the organic power of the masses which he set in motion. The most experienced eye could scarcely discover in them any thing but elements of disorder. Still less let it be said that he was a suc-

cessful captain because he was a mighty monarch. Of all his campaigns, the most memorable are,—the campaign of the Adige, where the general of yesterday, commanding an army by no means numerous, and at first badly appointed, placed himself at once above Turenne and on a level with Frederic ;—and the campaign in France in 1814, when, reduced to a handful of harassed troops, he combated a force of ten times their number. The last flashes of the imperial lightning still dazzled the eyes of our enemies ; and it was a fine sight to see the bounds of the old lion tracked, hunted down, beset, presenting a lively picture of the days of his youth, when his powers developed themselves in the fields of carnage.

Napoleon possessed, in an eminent degree, the faculties requisite for the profession of arms ; temperate and robust, watching and sleeping at pleasure, appearing unawares where he was least expected, he did not disregard details to which important results are sometimes attached. The hand which had just traced rules for the government of many millions of men would frequently rectify an incorrect statement of the situation of a regiment, or write down whence two hundred conscripts were to be obtained, and from what magazine their shoes were to be taken.* A patient and easy interlocutor, he

* We could adduce, in support of this assertion, thousands of letters written by Napoleon, from all places and in all the circumstances of his life, not only to his ministers and his mar-

was a home questioner, and he could listen; a rare talent in the grandees of the earth. He carried with him into battle a cool and impassible courage: never was mind so deeply meditative more fertile in rapid and sudden illuminations. On becoming Emperor he ceased not to be the soldier. If his activity decreased with the progress of age, that was owing to the decrease of his physical powers.*

In games of mingled calculation and hazard, the greater the advantages which a man seeks to obtain, the greater risks he must run. It is precisely this

shals, but also to functionaries of a less elevated order. To go no farther than the war in Spain, we shall here transcribe a letter written by the Emperor at Aranda del Duero, during the campaign of 1808, to General Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division, the head-quarters of which had been transferred from Bourdeaux to Bayonne:—

“Monsieur le General Drouet. Review the fusileers of my guard at Marrac, and dispatch two hundred fusileers well clothed, well armed, and provided with every thing. Let them be conducted by an officer, two serjeants and four corporals. Direct this detachment of two hundred men upon Burgos. They must each have two pair of shoes in their knapsacks, and one on their feet, their *capote* and fifty rounds of cartridge. Let them not set out before you are certain that they are provided with all this. On which I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

“NAPOLEON.”

“Aranda, the 29th November, 1808.”

* In the latter years the Emperor had grown fat: he ate more, slept longer, and rode less; but he had retained all the vigour of his mind, and his passions had lost little of their strength.

that renders the deceitful science of conquerors so calamitous to nations. Napoleon, though naturally adventurous, was not deficient in consistency or method : and he wasted neither his soldiers nor his treasures where the authority of his name sufficed. What he could obtain by negotiations or by artifice he required not by force of arms. The sword although drawn from the scabbard was not stained with blood, unless it was impossible to attain the end in view by a manœuvre. Always ready to fight, he chose habitually the occasion and the ground. Out of fifty battles which he fought, he was the assailant in at least forty.

Other generals have equalled him in the art of disposing troops on the ground. Some have given battle as well as he did ; we could mention several who have received it better : but in the manner of directing an offensive campaign he has surpassed all.

The wars in Spain and Russia prove nothing in disparagement of his genius. It is not by the rules of Montecuculli and Turenne, manœuvring on the Renchen, that we ought to judge of such enterprizes. The first warred to secure such or such winter-quarters ; the other to subdue the world. It frequently behoved him not merely to gain a battle, but to gain it in such a manner as to astound Europe and to produce gigantic results. Thus political views were incessantly interfering with the strategic genius ; and to appreciate him properly we must not confine our-

selves within the limits of the art of war. This art is not composed exclusively of technical details; it has also its philosophy. To find in this elevated region a rival to Napoleon, we must go back to the times when the feudal institutions had not yet broken the unity of the ancient nations. The founders of religions alone have exercised over their disciples an authority comparable with that which made him the absolute master of his army. This moral power became fatal to him, because he strove to avail himself of it even against the ascendancy of material force, and because it led him to despise positive rules, the long violation of which will not remain unpunished.*

When pride was hurrying Napoleon towards his fall, he happened to say: "France has more need of me than I have of France." He spoke the truth. But why had he become necessary? Because he had

* When Napoleon commanded small armies in Italy, on the Adige, all was observation of rules, all was excellent, all was grand. Successively he accomplished great things, but frequently the employment of the *moral* predominated over the positive. The sphere enlarged; all became hazardous, all calculated for great results. However able a man may be, there are almost always in this terrible game risks proportionate to the magnitude of the gains. Success became still more hazardous. The armies were more numerous. His enemies, after his example, had also vast masses. At length the physical world got the better of the moral world. Talents, character, profundity, have their limits. The machine was no longer manageable; it was broken in pieces.

committed the destiny of the French to the chances of an interminable war; because, in spite of the resources of his genius, that war, rendered daily more hazardous by his staking the whole of his force, and by the boldness of his movements, risked in every campaign, in every battle, the fruits of twenty years of triumph; because his government was so modelled that with him every thing must be swept away, and that a re-action proportioned to the violence of the action must burst forth at once both within and without. The mania of conquest had reversed the state of things in Europe; we, the eldest born of liberty and independence, were spilling our blood in the service of royal passions against the cause of nations, and outraged nations were turning round upon us more terrible, from being armed with the principles which we had forsaken.

At times, this immense mass of passions which he was accumulating against him, this multitude of avenging arms ready to be raised, filled his ambitious spirit with involuntary apprehension. Looking around him, he was alarmed to find himself solitary, and conceived the idea of strengthening his power by moderating it. Then it was that he thought of creating an hereditary peerage, and reconstructing his monarchy on more secure foundations.* But Napo-

* On his return from the Russian campaign, after Mallet's conspiracy, Napoleon reflected seriously on the personality and instability of his situation. He thought of creating an heredi-


leon saw without illusion to the bottom of things. The nation, wholly and continually occupied in prosecuting the designs of its chief, had previously no had time to form any plans for itself. The day on which it should have ceased to be stunned by the din of arms it would have called itself to account for its servile obedience. It is better, thought he, for an absolute prince to fight foreign armies than to have

tary peerage. He proposed to select its members out of, 1stly, the most eminent persons in his state, especially of the military order; 2ndly, the landed proprietors, the wealthiest in each department, attached to his system, or at least having never declared themselves formal and official enemies to it; 3dly, those or the sons of those, who, under certain circumstances, had rendered signal services to the country, or had saved it in any career whatsoever. In that list we should have seen the heir of Sully of the conqueror of Denain, and of Vauban, figuring by the side of Carnot, who saved France in 1794 by the display of the resources of the country before the Committee of Public Safety. This grand and generous idea was not followed up; it ended only in a senatus-consultum on the regency, and in a more regular and imperial composition of the Senate. Napoleon had no idea of making the heads of his army independent of himself and his ambition; he had no wish for a Chamber of Peers that might refuse him soldiers. Perhaps it was still time to preserve France

In the campaign in France, in the first months of 1814, Napoleon was conversing on the state of affairs with one of his generals, at Troyes in Champagne: "Our enemies," said the latter "are too numerous. We cannot make head against them with our soldiers, who are falling every day, and whose place is not supplied; France must rise."—"And how is France to rise?" exclaimed Napoleon, interrupting him. "There is no clergy there is no nobility, and liberty I have destroyed!"

to struggle against the energy of the citizens. Despotism had been organized for making war; war was continued to uphold despotism. The die was cast: France must either conquer Europe, or Europe subdue France.

Napoleon fell: he fell, because with the men of the nineteenth century he attempted the work of an Attila and a Genghis Khan; because he gave the reins to an imagination directly contrary to the spirit of his age, with which nevertheless his reason was perfectly acquainted; because he would not pause on the day when he felt conscious of his inability to succeed. Nature has fixed a boundary, beyond which extravagant enterprizes cannot be carried with prudence. This boundary the Emperor reached in Spain, and he overleaped it in Russia. Had he then escaped destruction, his inflexible presumption would have caused him to find elsewhere a Baylen and a Moscow.



V I E W
OF THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY STATE
OF THE
BELLIGERENT POWERS.

BOOK II.—ENGLAND.

Policy of England—Declaration of war—Insurrection in Ireland—Military events—Peace of Amiens—French plans of invasion—Campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807—Continental System—British ministry—View of the English army—Recruiting—Command of the military forces—Discipline, manners, and habits—Appointments and promotions—General officers—Military rewards—Marriages—Education of the soldiers—Religion—Justice—Administration of regiments—Infantry—Foreign troops—Cavalry—Ordnance department—Artillery—Engineers—Staff—Commissariat—Medical officers—General reflections.

BOOK II.

ENGLAND.

WE have displayed the spirit of the French Revolution and the character of Napoleon. We have stated conscientiously in what manner the passions of one man accelerated and gave a fatal direction to the march of a great nation. Although we have not hesitated to acknowledge the immediate causes of our misfortunes, we have notwithstanding had our doubts as to what would have happened had our conduct towards other nations always been guided by the principles of justice and moderation. Could France have remained free and powerful by the side of free and powerful England?

The French nation had commenced its career of conquest prior to the appearance of Buonaparte in our ranks, and the English had sworn our destruction before he meditated theirs. They were taught by their own history, that revolutions are to States the sources of amelioration, more or less painful, and

that if left to their free course, their net produce is always an increase of power.* Enough was exhibited of the national will to irritate our eternal enemies against the consolatory futurity of which new institutions gave us promise.

A feeling less justifiable in its motives and more active in its effects was united with this. England is a republic, guided by the hereditary and temporary representatives of the aristocracy, and in which the Royal Crown is only a peer's coronet somewhat more ornamented than the others. The cries of equality which were shouted with such ardour from the Gallic shores, found numerous echoes on the opposite side of the Channel. Almost all those who shared in the advantages of the government of Great Britain trembled for their authority and their wealth. Tracing the evil back to its source, they determined to exterminate the Revolution, and France. The decrees of aristocracies are immutable, because they are the expression of interests which never change.

With the year 1791, the English agents on the Continent began to stir up Europe against the

* Robert Jenkinson said to the English parliament : " France is your natural enemy ; she is more so as a republic than as a monarchy. We know less at what point a nation will stop than a king." The person who used this language in 1792, was the same who, as *Earl of Liverpool*, was prime minister of England in 1814.

French, as the violators of the majesty of thrones. The personal situation of Louis XVI. served merely as a pretext in these diplomatic intrigues; for at a later period, the Cabinet of St. James's, which is so skilful in the act of corruption, made not the slightest effort to save the head of that unfortunate monarch; and one would be almost tempted to believe that a ferocious policy was delighted at seeing two or three hundred individuals committing in the midst of us, less from opinion than from fear, a crime of English origin. Be that as it may, Europe was in arms, and the cannon was roaring from Antwerp to Nice, before the power which had first provoked the quarrel entered the lists as a combatant. The National Convention declared war against the Court of London, on the 1st of February, 1793.

England opposed France with her armies by sea and by land, and especially with her gold and her intrigues. Our navy, which had been regenerated during the American war, was disorganized by the Revolution. With fleets stripped of their officers, and manned by insubordinate sailors or novices, it was impossible for us to balance the superiority of that race of Tritons which had ranged nearly the whole of maritime Europe under its flag. Our ships were taken or destroyed, singly, or in squadrons.

The first military expeditions of the English were only successful so far as they depended on their navy. Toulon was delivered to them by treachery,

and they were unable to maintain themselves in its possession. The island of Corsica, unsupplied with troops, and a scene of faction, was an easy prey. They sent an army to attack the French West India islands, which the mother country had forsaken. St. Domingo escaped from their dominion, owing to the energy of the black population. The rest of our distant possessions were conquered. After Holland and Spain had entered into alliance with the French Republic, the Dutch colonies and the Spanish islands shared the same fate. But the conquest of the West Indian Archipelago cost England dear. Thirty thousand of her veterans fell a prey to disease on that land, whose poisons are always ready to avenge the ancient wrongs which she has suffered from Europe.

The standards of the army drew not to themselves, during the continental war, the smallest portion of the harvest of glory which the British flag was reaping on every sea. Ten thousand English who landed at Ostend shortly after the declaration of war, were united with 25,000 Hanoverians, Hessians, and Brunswickers. This Anglo-German army, commanded by the Duke of York, and in which two other sons of the King of England also served, was employed in the operations which preceded the investment and siege of Valenciennes. After the fall of that place, while Cambray was blockaded, and the French in no condition to accept a battle,

the road to Paris was open to the coalesced powers. The English then, determined to act for their own interest, turned suddenly to the right, and laid siege to Dunkirk. The French hastened to its assistance. The attack on the fortress was badly conducted. The Duke of York was incapable of acting decisively. His army of observation having been beaten at Bambecke and at Hondchoote, he raised the siege precipitately, abandoned the best part of his heavy artillery, and, but for the incapacity of his adversary, General Houchard, would have in all probability suffered a much greater disaster.

After this unfortunate experiment, the Duke of York's corps fought in conjunction with the Austrians and the Dutch. The fruitless defence of West Flanders, and of the United Provinces, during the campaign of 1794, was terminated by a plundering retreat. The English returned home, loaded with the maledictions of the people, and leaving with the Coalition the unpleasant recollection of their incompatibility of disposition with other troops, even with those of the Elector of Hanover.

The gold of England was a much more formidable instrument of destruction than her armies or her fleet. Modern war carries in its train a most costly *materiel*, and swarms of soldiers, the expense of which cannot be supported for any length of time but by a prodigiously active industry. The Kings raised men, and manufactured arms; the British

Ministry undertook to pay for all. It rekindled the passions, when they were on the point of becoming dormant, and rendered them cruel when they were beginning to be civilized ; by that Ministry, and by that alone, was the human race then condemned to eternal war.

Our internal troubles presented to the genius of evil an immense field to work upon ; the English Government was every where, with its purse in hand, in search of defection, exciting revolt, and enlisting traitors and outlaws. It happened that one of our remote provinces separated itself violently from the central authorities which had overturned the throne and the altar. This insurrection proceeded from the people. Every thing which is produced by popular conviction, bears on it a stamp of grandeur. The war of La Vendée, therefore, has covered with incomparable splendour some pages of our history. No where else has been displayed such noble gallantry, or such incomparable and devoted unanimity. When these heroes were about to be overwhelmed by numbers, England, on this occasion too late, came in as an auxiliary. She conveyed to the Peninsula of Quiberon an expedition of French emigrants, who certainly deserved a better fate, but whose ostentatious ardour did not at all harmonize with the native energy of the peasants who had first raised the white flag. From that moment La Vendée, polluted by the acceptance of foreign aid, changed

its character ; the war, which continued some years longer on both sides of the Loire, became a war of partizans, favoured by the intersected and difficult nature of the country ; our enemies were delighted at seeing French blood shed by French hands.

England also had a La Vendée ready to explode : this was Ireland, groaning under the double weight of political servitude and religious oppression. The annals of that country ever since its invasion by its neighbours at the end of the twelfth century, present a long narrative of confiscations and massacres. At the latter end of 1796, an army under the command of General Hoche was sent by the French Executive Directory to deliver the unhappy Irish. The vessels were dispersed by a storm, a few only showed themselves on the Western coast of the island, but did not attempt to effect a landing.

In the year following, the treaty of Campo-Formio restored peace to the Continent. The French troops were collected on the shores of the Ocean and the Mediterranean. At that time, our armies were designated by the names of the countries they were destined to invade. Almost all the national forces, divided into several corps, and commanded by the most illustrious general of the Republic, Buonaparte, formed part of the army of England. Mr. Pitt, who directed the counsels of our enemies, availed himself of these circumstances in order to develop the military energies of the English nation. The

anxiety to which our menaces had given birth was entirely dissipated when it was known to what part the armament from Toulon was directed.

If Buonaparte and his brave followers had landed in Ireland, instead of being transported to Egypt, another fate was prepared for the world. Romance was preferred to history. Ireland expected us,—Ireland, which is not less assimilated to the French character, by the ardent and impressionable character of its inhabitants, than by the hatred of the common enemy. Although neglected by their allies, the Irish flew to arms, in the month of May 1798. The insurrection however had been foreseen. The island was covered with English troops of the line and militia, devoted to the Government. They fought with cruelty, in a war of injustice. Their leaders did nothing but ravage and decimate. The United Irishmen received no assistance from abroad: of several incomplete expeditions which left the French ports, only one reached its destination, and it arrived too late. It consisted of a thousand vagabonds, commanded by Humbert, an ignorant but intrepid soldier, who had the rank of General of brigade. They landed at Killaloe on the North-West coast of Ireland. Prudential feelings prevented the inhabitants, who were still smarting under the calamities which had followed the last insurrection, from showing the spirit with which they were animated against their oppressors. Fifty thousand men, in-

fantry and regular cavalry, militia and fencibles, were put in motion from all parts of the island. The most able warrior of whom England had then to boast, the Marquis Cornwallis, took the field. The bay of Killaloe was blockaded by a squadron. After several glorious actions, and a desperate march of fifty leagues, our adventurous band, which had been diminished one-fifth by the fire and sword of the enemy, surrounded by 30,000 soldiers, pressed in front, and charged in the rear, was compelled to surrender. The London Gazette published an account of the victory obtained over the French army at the battle of Ballynamuck.* Great Britain triumphed, but the French Republic was not thereby shaken to its foundation.

We shall say nothing of the fifteen hundred English, all picked soldiers, who were sent to Ostend to destroy the sluices of Slickens, and who laid down their arms before a part of the forty-sixth demi-brigade. The Cabinet of St. James's waited for the renewal of hostilities on the Continent, in order to undertake something of importance against the French.

During the months of August and September,

* The English, whose caricatures so well express the truth, made a caricature on this event, representing two waggons loaded with infantry, followed by several squadrons, with a foot soldier behind each horseman, all going at full gallop against a little spectre dressed in French uniform.

1799, 45,000 English and Russians landed in Holland near the Helder Point. The Dutch fleet in the Texel fell into their hands. To obtain an equivalent advantage by land, they would have required wings, to fall like lightning in the midst of the French, who were dispersed and intimidated by their small numbers; they should also have excited public opinion among the Dutch. The point of attack was badly chosen; the disembarkation of the troops was not simultaneous; the Duke of York marched slowly. He expected that his partisans in the interior would declare for him; but they did not stir a step, and complained that their liberators did not make more rapid progress.

Meanwhile General Brune had drawn together the Gallo-Batavian army: either from design, or by chance, the greatest part of the English troops were opposed to the Dutch, and the Russians had to combat the French. After several battles, as the attacking army was getting every day weaker, while the defending one was receiving reinforcements, the Duke of York began to think of retreat: he obtained a capitulation for the re-embarkation of his troops, the terms of which would have been much more rigid, if the victorious general had been more sensible of his superiority.

The Russians who escaped from Holland were landed on the Island of Jersey, from which they threatened a descent on Normandy. England was

bargaining for the port of Brest with wretches who promised to sell it to her; she scattered germs of civil war on the coast of Brittany which never fructified. There is a time for all things, and the time of the miracles of La Vendée had long gone by. After ten years of emancipation it would have been madness to attempt a counter-revolution in France with English feelings and English soldiers. Besides, the illusions of the malcontents had been founded on the unpopularity of the Executive Power of the Republic; they vanished when Buonaparte, after his return from Egypt, was proclaimed First Consul.

The first act of the new Government was to offer peace to the enemies of France. The Emperor of Russia shortly after withdrew from the coalition. The British Government wished to continue the war; it had sent out several expeditions, which were then at sea. At the time that the Austrians were beat at Marengo, a corps under the orders of General Abercrombie took in refreshments at the Island of Minorca; the fleet which conveyed it afterwards proceeded to Cadiz, into which it threw bombs, at the time that city was ravaged by the yellow fever. Another corps, 11,000 strong, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney, disembarked near Ferrol, saw the walls of the place, and turned back. In 1797, England had furnished Portugal with troops which she kept in pay; she withdrew them, and in 1801, when the combined army of

France and Spain appeared on the frontiers, there only remained a weak detachment, just sufficient to compromise the Portuguese.

The Egyptian campaign was of a more serious character ; 7000 British troops, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, 7000 English and Sepoys sent from India, and 60,000 Turks, with the unanimous support of the Mahomedan population, fell upon a military colony which had only 16,000 soldiers to defend it.

The *moral* of the French army had been weakened by the departure of Buonaparte, and had perished with Kleber : the eyes of all were turned towards the West. Nevertheless, the battle of the 21st of March, 1801, honourable as it was for the English, would not have decided the fate of Egypt, if the Commander-in-Chief, Menou, had possessed the confidence of his soldiers, and if he had not divided the army between Alexandria and Cairo.

The peace of Amiens served to demonstrate that the world was not large enough to hold Buonaparte and England at the same time. The Cabinet of London broke the treaty, and, conformably to the maxims of its public law, seized all the French vessels which covered the sea. The First Consul, by way of legitimate reprisals, made prisoners of all the English individuals who were travelling in the countries subject to his dominion. France appeared on

the cliffs of Boulogne, on foot, and threatening ; England flew to arms on the opposite coast.

The question was not the same for the two belligerent powers. The one staked its fleet and a part of its army ; *to be or not to be* was the problem which the other had to solve. Not satisfied with adding fifty battalions to its regular army, and extending the service of its militia, British Government summoned the whole nation to arms. The English of all ranks and of all ages put on uniforms, and accustomed themselves to military exercises. The coasts of Kent and Essex were covered with batteries and Martello towers. The people were informed that the French were about to land ; they were told to what places to conduct the women and children, the cattle and provisions ; the roads that were to be broken up, and the points where the levies *en masse* were to assemble. They were recommended to avoid regular engagements, and to take advantage of the hedges and inclosures to carry on the war as sharpshooters. Even the capture of London, and the measures to be taken in consequence to save the country, were anticipated and resolved upon.

The French never came, and England preserved her additional regiments, her moveable militia, her 500,000 volunteers, the taste for military dress and warlike exercises, and consequently greater facilities

for the formation and recruiting of troops destined for foreign service. She collected, at the same time, the wreck of the Electoral army which had been driven out of Hanover. Afterwards came the defeat of Trafalgar, which was much more complete than that of La Hogue in the time of Louis XIV. The navy of England went to rest, having no longer any enemies to combat; the national energy was then turned to the standards of the land army, which had so long been neglected.

This was not at first observed on the Continent. At the beginning of the war, the English Ministry had hired and conveyed into France assassins, with a view to put Napoleon Buonaparte to death. When, at the end of 1805, the aggression of Austria had diverted the storm which menaced Great Britain, the latter power, being then unassailable on its own territories, contented itself with sending some troops, which joined a Russian corps, and occupied Naples during the campaign of Austerlitz. It might be said that they came for no other purpose but to attract the victorious arms of the French, and afford them a pretext for the invasion of that kingdom. These ill-timed auxiliaries however did not wait for the enemy, and left the Neapolitans the charge of defending their own fortress of Gaeta.

Six months afterwards, Lieutenant-General Sir John Stuart landed at St. Euphemia with 10,000 English, as many Sicilians, and a few Neapolitan refugees.

The place where they landed was soon after the scene of a short but warm action, in which the English repulsed a corps of French troops, commanded by General Regnier. This skirmish was unknown every where else but in England ; at that time renown did not give tongue to his trumpet but for deeds of arms of a more shining order. Notwithstanding the neighbourhood of Sicily, the co-operation of the Calabrian bands, and the little importance attached by Napoleon to operations in these distant countries, Sir John Stuart could not maintain himself permanently at the extremity of the Italian Peninsula.

In the war of the North of Germany, during the years 1806 and 1807, English ministers and money-bearers were seen in the Russian and Prussian corps, but no soldiers. The Cabinet employed squadrons and a few land troops in expeditions, the object of which was to complete its colonial and maritime supremacy. A plan of attack upon a great scale was attempted against Spanish America, and ended in the defeat of General Whitelocke at Buenos Ayres. The army in the Mediterranean, by an unseasonable landing in Egypt, completed the ruin of the Mamelukes. At the same time, Europe rang with the presumptuous appearance of Admiral Duckworth's fleet before the walls of the seraglio at Constantinople. Admiral Gambier and General Lord Cathcart succeeded better in the outrageous

attack upon Copenhagen; that capital was bombarded and taken; the Danish fleet was given up to plunder.

In India also, Great Britain gathered profit without honour; for twenty years she had there been incessantly aggrandizing herself, sometimes by arms, sometimes by corruption, sometimes by repeating the cruelties of Pizarro, without ever having occasion for the genius of Cortez. Her generals gave princes and nations lessons of morality according to the English fashion; the rebound of this increase of power in distant regions was felt in Europe; some officers there learned the art of war and the command of armies.

In a short time this art, new to the English, was about to become almost as necessary to them as the science of naval tactics. England has an unfruitful territory, invariably limited by nature; she bears a race of men which multiplies greatly, and whose consumption is enormous; their passions are ardent, and their desires boundless; the two hemispheres are scarcely sufficient for their devouring appetite. Although their bodies are robust, their souls energetic, and their understandings active, they are not sufficiently numerous to retain, at the same time, Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. But these kings of the sea were to every country the exclusive dispensers of the produce of the rest of the world. They had rendered tributaries to their industry na-

tions which they were not strong enough to reduce to the state of subjects; such a dominion could not be maintained and increased but by immoveable perseverance.

After the peace of Tilsit, Napoleon had no other enemies than the English. The British power, which was the ever-living principle of the resistance opposed to him, had never ceased to be the definitive object of his attacks. It was physically impossible for him to get within reach of it, but he might, by obstructing the *débouchés* of its industry, and depriving it of the profits of its maritime commerce, prevent it from extending its empire over us. Absolute master of the greatest part of the coasts of Europe, and swaying the rest by his influence over the cabinets, the Emperor of the French was determined that every coast should defend itself against the British merchandize and shipping, as they would against the waves of the sea.

If an armed champion were to descend into the arena, where gladiators unprovided with defensive arms were fighting, would it not be for the general interest of the combatants to suspend their quarrels and unite in a body against him who dealt about his blows without receiving any? This armed champion, according to the ideas of Napoleon, was England, which remained invulnerable, while the progress of the war rendered the States of the Contin-

so open to attacks. Behind her great ditch, England laughed at the miseries of the world; Napoleon attempted to punish her, and although the enterprise was unsuccessful, it will be an object of grandeur and of *éclat* in the eyes of posterity.

But even supposing that the system of exclusion was a means of future prosperity to the Continent, it is always a difficult task to make men sacrifice their present gratification to their future advantage. The sudden stoppage in the arrival of English merchandize, and especially of colonial produce, thwarted the tastes and habits of whole nations; while at the same moment their agricultural interests were attacked by the fall in the prices of produce, for which there was no longer any external vent. The unreserved consent of both princes and subjects over the whole Continent, was therefore the first and indispensable condition of putting the continental system in action. By what title had he obtained this consent? Since he had stifled liberty in his own country, his voice had lost the gift of persuasion; the evil of which he had been the cause even deprived him of the right of doing good; and his sword, which was never sheathed, was equally the terror of nations and of monarchs.

Thus, when the policy of their Emperor had opened to the French a career of honour and prosperity, they had lost the moral spring which would have enabled them to follow it successfully. The

English, driven out from all parts, and reduced to the alliance with the King of Sweden in Europe, and with the King of Hayti in America, were much nearer triumphing than in the year 1793, after the blockade of Cambray and the capture of Toulon. In fact, the immoderate and ever-growing ambition of their adversary gradually produced sympathetic relations between these islanders and the Continent, at which even they themselves were astonished. Between corsairs who plunder fleets, and legions which desolate the earth, the choice of nations could not be long doubtful. Even we ourselves, who were embarked at the mercy of the conqueror on that shoreless sea, has it not happened that we have secretly wished, not that England should triumph—a wish so impious never found access to our heart—but that she might not be utterly overwhelmed, as to our confident simplicity she appeared the bulwark of civilization, and the last refuge of liberty?

The anxiety which was displayed by the manufacturers and capitalists on the publication of the Berlin and Milan decrees, betrayed the peril of that commercial nation. The continental system was not one of those measures which fail every where, when they have failed on a single point, and which fail always when they have failed once. Without examining if its rigid execution would have speedily exhausted the resources of the British empire, it is

quite certain that mere experiments were sufficient to occasion her irreparable injury. Napoleon had found out her vulnerable point. Nothing less was at stake with our enemies than the national fortune, and consequently the national existence. England felt it; she made the masses of her own soldiers descend into the fields of battle, and Europe was at last a spectator of English funerals.

It is a consequence of the composition and forms of the British Parliament, that the Government follows without deviation the line of the interests of the landed and mercantile aristocracy, but its march is accelerated by the influence of talents, and according to the personal views of those who are at the helm of the state. George III. still reigned, venerable by a half century of national royalty and domestic virtues; he was upon the point of sinking for the third time into a state of mental derangement, and yet the people hardly knew it. In that country persons concern themselves much less about the inviolable personage who is the king, than about the responsible agents who are entrusted with the exercise of authority. The two great statesmen of the end of the eighteenth century, had disappeared at an interval of nine months from each other. Had Fox been prime-minister in 1792, he might perhaps have saved Louis XVI., France, and a number of other monarchies, principalities, and republics; for the intriguing animosity of the Cabinet of St. James's

was the most influential cause of our revolutionary storm, and of the irruption of military spirit which succeeded it. When he entered into office in 1806, after Pitt's death, Fox soon discovered, that evils which are easy to prevent are very difficult to cure. His administration was heavy and supine. The successors of Fox and his colleagues were ranked, in the public estimation, far beneath their predecessors; but the cabinet in which sat the Percevals, the Castlereaghs, and the Liverpools, was never checked in its course by any consideration of political probity, and its unanimity gave it a most energetical power of action. Disciples of Pitt, the new ministers, invoked the genius of their master, and conceived the idea of bombarding Copenhagen. Fortunately for the success of their cause, in this rivalry of oppression and public miseries, Napoleon's course was more rapid than their's. He was not long in supplying the English with a theatre of war, so disposed, that bringing into the field fewer troops than the French, our rivals could, notwithstanding, engage in every battle and in every action with a force numerically superior to ours.

There are paradoxes which, by dint of frequent repetition, at last become proverbs, and almost axioms. The English were universally looked upon as sea-wolves, unskilful, peplexed, and powerless, the moment they set their foot on land. If their national pride, revolting against this prejudice, re-

peated the names of Cressy, of Poitiers, and of Agincourt, the answer was ready—that the armies of Edward III. and of Henry V. were composed of Normans, of the people of Poitou, and of Gascons. There were, for all that, among the conquerors a goodly number of native Englishmen, and certainly the blows which they dealt were not the weakest. The Black Prince and Talbot were born in Albion. Nearer our own times, Marlborough and his twelve thousand soldiers were not the least formidable enemies of Louis XIV. The column of Fontenoy had suggested to a second Bossuet the image of a tower self-repairing its own breaches. Even since the strong *éclat* of French glory had thrown into shade both our own ancient history and the modern history of our enemies, there had been remarked in the British troops employed in Flanders, and more recently in Holland, along with a weak and vicious general direction, many acts of vigour and audacity. Our soldiers who had returned from Egypt talked to their comrades of the indomitable valour of the English. Besides, it did not require much reflection to divine, that ambition, capacity, and courage, are fit for other purposes than being embarked on board of ships.

You must not look in England for that warlike ardour, vague in its object, which sports with death, which is felt by all ranks, with different modifications, and diffuses a chivalrous tint over the man-

ners of the people. The English, taking them individually, are distinguished by their private virtues, by their fixed purposes, and by their sound judgment. Considered nationally, the lower classes are brutal, the upper ones proud, avaricious, and deeply calculating. In skill and intrepidity in braving the dangers of the sea, they have always been unrivalled. Revolutions have given them liberty, from liberty has sprung wealth, and wealth has not enervated their courage. Never breathing freely but in extent of space, cruel in their diversions, passionately fond of violent exercises, they have preserved, amidst a state of social corruption, the tastes, the sports, and the habits which their barbarous ancestors had in the forests. Their restless disposition and fondness for travelling fit them for the wandering life of warriors, and they possess that most valuable of all qualities in the field of battle—coolness in their anger.

A population thus gifted, might, although not numerous, be a most powerful lever in the hand of a Government which would proceed according to an absolute tendency. It would be the scourge of the human race, if this Government, having nothing to fear for the safety of the country, could, for the purposes of attack, dispose of the faculties of the present, and of the treasures of future generations, on which it might make drafts at pleasure. Such is the English power in its relations of internal police,

as well as with other nations. It is Buonaparte in action, but Buonaparte ever young and ever vigorous, Buonaparte persevering in his passion, Buonaparte immortal. Dominion and aggrandizement are the invariable objects of the British oligarchy, careless of the means by which they are obtained. The proof of this is to be found in the equal warmth with which it espouses causes that are just, and those that are unjust. To-day at the head of the league of Kings against nations, to-morrow it will be found aiding nations against Kings. *Here* it will accelerate the developement of the human mind; *there* it will arm the blind rage of the savage against the labours of civilized man. The same treasury will pay for the assassination of Paul I., and will relieve the sufferers by the conflagration of Moscow. The same torch will set fire to the sacred edifices of Washington, and to the piratical fleets of Algiers.

England was the last of the great European powers to keep up hired troops. Henry VII. and Elizabeth had body-guard. Charles II. who had learned despotism at the Court of Louis XIV. formed three regiments of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, which were the parent stock of the army of the line. Afterwards came the expulsion of the Stuarts, and the warlike reigns of William III. and Anne. At each new war, the army was increased, and on the return of peace the establishment remained more considerable than it was previously to

hostilities. The French Revolution favoured the disposition of the crown to the constant increase of the land forces. On the 1st of January 1792, the army consisted of 42,668 men, of which 12,703 were stationed in Great Britain, 9453 in Ireland, and 20,512 in the foreign possessions. On the 1st of January 1808, England had on foot 605,449 men; viz. 229,596 infantry, cavalry and artillery, which formed within about 10,000 of the complete army of the line; 77,184 militia men, in regiments completely disciplined, and subject to the regimen of regular troops, with the sole difference that they could not be sent beyond the territory of the three kingdoms; 298,669 volunteers, distributed into corps of all arms and of different denominations, such as volunteers, fencibles, and yeomanry. The greater number were clothed at the public expense. They were only assembled at fixed periods, and with the exception of a certain number of officers and non-commissioned officers in service, and paid the whole year, they only received pay for the time they were assembled. In this estimate of the numbers of the British army, we do not include, either the troops in the service of the East India Company, or 22,500 Germans and other foreigners in the pay of England, who were the first to be sent out on all expeditions.

The volunteer corps were instituted at the time when the terror caused by the propagation of revo-

lutionary principles was at its height, and with the secret purpose of keeping the population in order by classing and disciplining it. The number exceeded all bounds when the country was menaced with invasion. In 1808, a local militia was created, which was not, under any circumstances, to leave the country, and of which the skeletons only were permanent. As its strength exceeded 200,000 men, and it was ready to do the same and even better service than the volunteers, it certainly fully compensated for the diminution of force resulting from the gradual dissolution of these temporary corps. The old and new militia were recruited by ballot. They might be looked upon as reservoirs of soldiers, destined, by means more or less direct, to feed the army of the line, the only portion of the public forces which will occupy our attention, because it is the only one immediately disposable for foreign warfare.

The military institutions of Great Britain bear as little resemblance to those of other powers, as the English themselves to other nations. The army is only tolerated by the constitution as a necessary evil, and notwithstanding its name, the *standing army*, has only a temporary existence. An Act of Parliament, (*the Mutiny Act*) advised, consented to, and passed in the same form as the other legislative statutes, keeps it on foot from year to year; declares that no troops shall be levied without the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Com-

mons; determines the quota of troops according to the circumstances of the time; fixes certain details of the administrative department, and renews the regulations of police, and the penalties to which the military are subjected, by way of exception to the common law. Were this Act to expire, the army would be *legally* dissolved; and in the present state of opinion, there is reason to believe that it would *actually* disband itself. In the public estimation, the land troops come after the navy. This classification is reasonable, for the *wooden walls* are the best protection of Old England. Happy nation! which defends the tombs of its ancestors, and attacks its enemies, with arms which the Government cannot turn against the liberty of the citizens!

The solemn contract known by the name of the Bill of Rights, by virtue of which the House of Brunswick sits upon the throne of England, enacts that the army shall not be collected by portions in camps or barracks. As a consequence of this disposition, the soldiers were for a long time, whether on the march or in cantonments, lodged and even boarded in the inns and public-houses. The most celebrated publicists of the eighteenth century regarded the continual mixture of the military with the citizens as a preservative against the dangers arising from the necessary permanence and the augmentation of the army. But after the year 1791, the minister, Pitt, under frivolous pretences of internal

discipline and economy, obtained permission to build barracks near the capital. Subsequently, the alarm of invasion occasioned the concentration of troops on the coasts, where it became necessary to build extensive quarters for their use. The agents of the executive government have contrived to constitute into a definitive arrangement what was only a derogation from ancient usage, necessitated by the exigency of the moment. At present, almost the whole of the English infantry, cavalry, and artillery, live apart from the body of the people, in barracks, some of which are built on the borders of waste lands. An administrative office under the name of *Barrack Department*, is entrusted with the building, furnishing, and keeping the barracks in repair, and absorbs annually a portion of the public revenue sufficient for the whole military establishment of a power of the third order.

The King is the supreme head of the army as he is of the state; but, in the state, he can do nothing but what the law allows him. In the army he may take upon him to do every thing which the law does not forbid. This power, which was of small importance in the time of William III. and Mary, when the army consisted only of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, has become exorbitant, since the increase of the land forces and the aggrandizement of the empire have augmented tenfold the patronage of the crown. The royal prerogative has been compelled,

in order to preserve itself unbroken, to limit itself by rules, fixed and invariable as the law, and to amalgamate itself with the interest of the ruling class. With all the respect they entertain for their august head, the officers and even the soldiers know that the King is not the only, nor even the first authority in the kingdom; if they were ever to forget it, the Act by which they exist as a body, would, at the commencement of each Session of Parliament, take seasonable care to recall it to their remembrance.

The English army is distinguished from all other armies in the world, by its deference to the power of the law. This honourable feeling accompanies it every where, and we have seen soldiers convicted of crimes, submit without a murmur to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of subject nations. In their own country, officers never appear in public with their uniforms and decorations, except they are on actual duty. Every thing tells them that they were *citizens* before they were *soldiers*. The lowest *headborough* of the parish may, when he pleases, review a corps previous to his distributing the lodging billets to the men. The regiments fold up their colours, and their drums never beat, when they pass through the City of London: but not so when in the west end of the town, where, to the great regret of the friends of liberty, guard-houses and barracks are extending like a leprosy. Hitherto, at least, mili-

tary men have been modest and inoffensive. A quarrelsome sentinel, defending his ground, and fancying himself the representative of his sovereign, would not be able to remain a quarter of an hour in the streets of London.

As the army is out of the pale of the constitution, its leaders have no rank assigned to them among the public functionaries, and it has never been thought advisable to put the military on a par with the civil hierarchy. All the officers are admitted to the King's Court ; but in the order of precedence, the youngest son of the last created baronet of the three kingdoms, would take precedence of a field-marshal, if the latter had no superior title, independently of his military rank.

The army is recruited by voluntary enlistment. For this purpose, the territory of Great Britain and Ireland is divided into *recruiting districts*, to which are attached officers and recruiting sergeants detached from regiments. These last, who are renowned for their dexterity, have ample field for the exercise of it in the great manufacturing towns of England, such as London, Manchester, and Birmingham. They reap an abundant harvest of men from the provinces of Ireland, reduced to misery by the oppressive measures of the British Government. The Government also draws soldiers from the foundling hospitals, and from the poor who subsist on public charity. It enlists men

up to forty years of age, and receives into the service boys under sixteen, whose education is finished in the barracks. The recruit is paid by the State twenty-three pounds seventeen shillings and sixpence, nearly six hundred francs. This large bounty and the allurements of the taverns attract under the colours the populace of the towns and the mendicants of the country. It was a saying of a peer of the United Kingdom, (Lord Viscount Melville) expressed in his place in Parliament on the 18th of March 1817, that "the worst men were the fittest for soldiers, and it was desirable to keep the best at home." To enable our readers to appreciate in what low estimation the trade of a soldier is held in England, we will inform them as a final trait, that the Government has frequently taken into the army, as a commutation of punishment, criminals sentenced to death at the county assizes.

In former times, men were always enlisted for life. Since the year 1806, they might engage for seven years, or for life; but unlimited service is encouraged in preference, and bounties are given on re-enlistment. Men were allowed to change whenever they pleased, from the volunteer corps and the militia into the line. In the latter periods of the war, the Continental system, by diminishing the fabrication of manufactories, transformed a great number of workmen out of employment into soldiers. Notwithstanding these two advantages, it was found

that the regular recruiting system was not sufficient to fill up the gaps occasioned by the war; recourse was therefore had to the standing militia. The legislative power offered commissions in the regiments of the line to such militia officers as should induce a certain number of their men to enter into it with them. The effect of this measure has never failed in the provincial corps, in which, since their institution, rank has been distributed nearly in proportion to the landed property or influence of the individual in the county. At the end of the war in Spain, the recruits from the militia were twice as numerous as those obtained from other sources. Thus, compulsory service had become, in fact, the principal element of the formation of the army. This explains why the nation which is best acquainted with calculation, submitted to the costly and apparently useless establishment of a standing militia. The good quality of the men which it supplied modified the unpleasant results of immediate enlistment. The English army having promptly repaired its losses with soldiers already trained to a military life, was more formidable to its enemies.

The army receives, for its movements and operations, its orders from the *Secretary of State for War and the Colonies*. This department, one of the first offices of the Cabinet, was successively intrusted, while the war in Portugal and Spain lasted, to Lord Castlereagh, to Lord Liverpool, and to Lord Ba-

thrust. The administration of the accounts of the infantry and cavalry, (the artillery and engineers belong to a separate department,) their clothing, pay, provisions, marches, interpretation of Acts of Parliament relative to the army, and the counter-signature of the royal ordinances on these points, constitute the functions of another ministerial office, that of the *Secretary at War*. This office was filled in later times by Sir James Pulteney, and afterwards by Lord Palmerston. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, and the Secretary at War, are most frequently not military men. They owe their appointments to their parliamentary talents, or to party influence. A general officer, with the title of *Commander-in-Chief of all His Majesty's Forces*, is entrusted with the *personnel* of the army. Discipline, instruction, promotion, recruiting, and supplies of horses, enter into his province. He superintends the execution of the ordinances and Acts of Parliament, and prepares the regulations which are to explain them, or supply their deficiencies.

The Commandership in Chief of the forces was long an inferior employment. The person who filled it was kept at a great distance from the Government. As the army was small in number, and exposed to little risk, the old tracks were invariably followed. Commissions and royal favours were granted without the least discernment. Children were nominated to ensigncies at the time they were only learn-

ing their rudiments ; and as soon as they entered into manhood, all that they required to place them at the head of regiments, was the time necessary for the insertion in the Gazette of their successive promotions. Lieutenant-colonels and Majors had companies, which others commanded. The corps of officers were almost always incomplete, and such only remained with their regiments as were not rich enough to pay for leave of absence. The administration and the accounts were given up to a system of plunder, which made the soldier miserable.

Bad as well as good doctrines have a mutual connexion with and re-action upon each other. The regiments were as ignorant as they were badly commanded. There were regulations for manœuvring which were old and imperfect, and as the troops were not in that point subject to any control, every one was at liberty to conform to them or not, as he pleased. They could not be brigaded, because every colonel of a regiment manœuvred his soldiers according to his own fancy. Three or four regiments brought together accidentally knew not how to act in concert. The infantry did not preserve equal distance, and their movements were constantly wavering. Matters were still worse in the cavalry. The officers of all arms did nothing but drink and lead a life of dissipation. The Government paid for soldiers, but had no army.

The appointment of Frederick Duke of York to

be Commander-in-Chief, was the commencement of a new era for the English army. He had been educated expressly with a view to a military career. He had the advantage, when young, of a long residence upon the Continent, for the purpose of following and studying in its internal organization, the Prussian army, which was then considered the classical army of Europe. The post of Commander-in-Chief was raised in public estimation by his appointment to it in 1795. If his income was not always sufficient to place the persons immediately around him beyond the reach of seduction, his rank and his character at least raised him above a multitude of mercenary and paltry intrigues. He was able to attack some inveterate abuses. Would the Ministers have ventured to reject a useful proposition, when it was presented to them by the favourite son of the King, by the prince who, next to the Queen, was the first in the Cabinet behind the throne? The Duke of York's understanding was more just than enlarged. A taste for his functions and a feeling of duty subdued his natural tendency to dissipation. Seeing much with his own eyes, although he had the assistance of able co-adjutors, and personally acquainted with all the superior, and a great number of the inferior officers, he directed and administered the army as a good colonel leads the family of warriors from whom he expects to derive his reputation. We shall mention, in their place, several of the improve-

ments which he introduced into the service. He did not lead the English to victory, because he was general at a time when England had only kings for her allies ; but as soon as the cause of Britain was supported by the passions and the interests of nations, he prepared for the soldiers the means of victory. The opinion of the good which he effected has triumphed over the recollection of his misfortunes in war, over the natural prejudices of the English against princes of the blood-royal, and even over the scandal of his domestic improprieties. When the Duke of York, in consequence of the parliamentary inquiry in 1809, resigned the office of Commander-in-Chief for two years, every officer said : “ *I rejoice at it as a citizen ; I am grieved at it as a soldier.*”

We know of no troops so well disciplined as the British troops. Among several causes of their pre-eminence in this respect, the first, and that which seems to us to be the most influential, is one, which if applied to the French army, would produce an effect diametrically opposite. So true it is, that the varieties of character and condition lead to the employment of different means to attain the same end.

The soldiers and the officers form in England two classes, separated by an almost insurmountable barrier. This is the result of the institutions of the country. An army, raised by means of the conscription, chooses its officers from its own body, because

it is certain of their finding citizens, and because the country owes to its children the complete accomplishment of their destiny, in whatever situation she places them. An army recruited by money has no right to any thing beyond what was promised to it at the time of the engagement of its members, and the sergeant's halbert is the *ne plus ultra* of the ambition of a volunteer recruit. An army of this description only becomes national by the intermixture of officers taken beyond the pale of its ranks, and in the sphere of social interests. In their eyes, the soldiers are only passive instruments, wheels which must be well greased and carefully attended to, in order that the machine may produce its effect on all occasions.

The distinction of classes therefore establishes some resemblance between the English and the Russian army; for the great strength of the latter proceeds from masses of ignorant men suffering themselves to be led blindly by more enlightened men than themselves. The English soldier is stupid and intemperate. A rigid discipline turns some of his defects to advantage, and deadens the effect of others. His constitution is robust from the exercises of strength to which his youth has been accustomed. His soul is vigorous, because his father has told him, and his officers have never ceased repeating to him, that the sons of Old England, plentifully replenished with porter, and with

roast beef, are each of them equal to at least any three individuals of the pigmy races which vegetate on the Continent of Europe. Although of a sanguine complexion, he has no extraordinary ardour, but he stands firm, and when seasonably propelled, he keeps marching forward. When in action, he neither looks to the right nor to the left. The courage of his co-operators does not sensibly add to his own; their discouragement may diminish, but will not extinguish his ardour. When men of this stamp give way, it will not be by words, but by good hard blows of the cane that you will lead them back to the fight. To Frenchmen you must *always* speak; to Englishmen *never*. The latter form no plan of campaign; they combine nothing, and are still farther from imagining any thing. Their passions have no vivacity but within a very circumscribed circle. They have but one method of expressing what they feel, and the *huzzas* with which a fortunate general was occasionally saluted in the camp or on the field of battle, differ in no respect from the brutal applause bestowed by the London populace on the pugilist who amuses their idle hours.

You cannot say of the English, they were brave in such an action. They are brave at all times, when they have ate, drank, and slept. Their courage, being more physical than moral, requires to be supported by substantial fare. Glory never makes

them forget that they are hungry, or that their shoes are worn out. Each soldier receives annually a complete suit of clothing. The lowest pay in the army is a shilling (nearly 25 sous) per day, out of which, after certain deductions made for meat, clothes, and similar objects, there remains twopence halfpenny (at least 5 sous) at the soldier's disposal. This pay, which is moderate in England, considering the excessively high price of necessaries, is found to be on the Continent more than double the pay of the German or French soldier. No such thing as arrears of pay, or illegal drawbacks, are known. The English soldier eats a great deal, and particularly meat; and he drinks even more than he eats. At home, beer is his habitual beverage. When abroad, wine is distributed to him, when the country supplies it. When he is in the field he cannot do without fermented liquors, and rum comes very seasonably to revive his spirits in the hour of danger.

It is impossible not to be struck with the contrast presented by armies in their animal economy, and their daily course of life. Behold the French battalions arrive at their bivouac, after a long and fatiguing march. As soon as the drums have ceased to beat, the knapsacks are placed in a circle behind the piles of arms, and mark out the ground where the party is to pass the night. Coats are doffed: covered with nothing but their *capotes*, the soldiers

run about for the provisions, for the wood, the water, and the straw. The fire is lighted; the camp-kettle is soon put on and boiling; trees are brought from the wood and roughly shaped into posts and beams. While the huts are erecting, the air resounds in a thousand places at once with the blows of the axe and the shouts of the workmen. You might fancy that it was the city of Idomeneus, built by enchantment under the invisible influence of Minerva. While waiting till the meat is boiled, our young soldiers, impatient of idleness, are repairing their gaiter-straps, examining their cartouch-boxes, cleaning and polishing their muskets. When the soup is ready it is eaten. If there is no wine, the conversation is calm without being gloomy, and they are not long in endeavouring to recover, by a sound sleep, the strength necessary to encounter the next day's fatigue. If, on the contrary, wine has been procured by the scouts who had been sent in search of water, and brought into the camp in barrels or skins, the night-watch is prolonged, the mirth-inspiring liquor goes round, and the old soldiers relate to the conscripts ranged around the fire, the battles in which the regiment has acquired so much glory. They still tremble with delight in expressing the transports of joy which seized them, when the Emperor, whom they thought at a great distance, suddenly appeared in front of the grenadiers, mounted on his white horse, and followed by his Mameluke. "Oh

what a defeat we should have given the Russians and Prussians, if the regiment on our right had fought like our's; if the cavalry had been at hand when the enemy began to give way; if the general of the reserve had equalled in bravery and talent the one who commanded the vanguard! Not one of these beggars, not a man of them would have escaped." Sometimes the morning drum has beat, and day begun to dawn, before the storytellers have finished. Meanwhile, they have frequently moistened their narrative, as may be easily seen by the countenances of the auditory. But the intoxication of the French is gay, sparkling, and daring; it is a foretaste to them of the battle and the victory.

Turn your eyes to the other camp,—look at those weary Englishmen, listless and almost motionless; are they waiting, like the spahis of the Turkish armies, for their slaves to fix their tents and prepare their food? And yet they have only made an exactly measured short march, and have arrived before two in the afternoon on the ground where they are to pass the night. The bread and meat are brought to them; the sergeant distributes to them the camp-service and their several tasks; he tells them where they will find the water, the straw, and what trees are to be cut down. When the materials are brought, he shows them where each piece of wood is to be laid; he scolds the awkward, and punishes the idler. The lash is not well adapted to awaken intelligence,

as is easily seen by the slowness with which the shapeless huts are prepared. Where then is the industrious and enterprising spirit of that nation which has taken the start of all others in the perfection of the mechanical arts? The soldiers have no notion of doing any thing but what they are ordered; every thing which is out of the usual routine is to them a source of perplexity and disappointment. Once let loose from discipline, (can war be carried on without frequently relaxing it?) they give themselves up to excesses at which even the Cossacks would be astonished; they get drunk whenever they can, and their drunkenness is cold, apathetical, and deadly. The subordination of every moment is the *sine qua non* condition of the existence of the English armies. They are not composed of men calculated to enjoy abundance with moderation, and they would disband themselves in case of a scarcity.

The inferior classes of the English are little sensible of shame; the place of honour, a motive too delicate for obtuse organs, is in them filled by public spirit. An exclusive attachment to their own manners inspires them with contempt for those of other nations, and serves as a preservative against desertion. They are naturally inclined to mutiny, but cruel punishments keep them to their duty. For the least fault, the soldier is made to stand up flat against a ladder, stripped naked to the waist,

and in that position the drummers of the regiment tear his shoulders to pieces with a cat-o' nine tails. For some years past, the number of lashes which could be applied to him at one time has been limited to 500, with liberty to begin again the following and successive days, until he has received the full number awarded to him. Death and the lash were formerly the only punishments used in the army. Solitary imprisonment was introduced afterwards; but this punishment is generally looked upon as too mild for troops composed of boorish peasants and depraved labourers.

The English non-commissioned officers are excellent; their courage and their talent are there stopped short, and they are not allowed to rise any higher. As they are nominated by the commander of the regiment, they cannot be broke but by the sentence of a court-martial. Their authority is extended by the minute details of inspection, of discipline, and of daily instructions, which in other armies would not be committed to them. Far from looking upon the young officers who come into the regiment as usurpers of employments, they act towards them as useful counsellors, and respectful Mentors. The English live upon the past; the word equality rarely echoes upon the ears of the citizen, but never upon those of the soldier. From time to time, and particularly during war, a sergeant receives an ensign's commission; it is to him nearly the same as a marshal's

staff, and he is not disposed to murmur at it; so deeply are the social classifications engraved in his mind! And what is more, it frequently happens that the comrades of the fortunate man quiz him for his awkwardness, and for the habits unbecoming his new position. Birth or education make a *gentleman*; a commission is not supposed to confer that qualification.

The English officers have for a long time enjoyed little consideration either in Europe, or in their own country. Public education there follows a direction quite opposite to the military profession. The science of destruction is not one of those which are taught at the schools of Westminster, Eton, or Harrow, or in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The British Empire owes to Adjutant-General Jarry, founder of the school at High Wycombe, in Buckinghamshire, the first establishment where mathematics were applied to the different branches of the art of war. More recently, a special school (*the Royal Military College*) has been instituted under the auspices of the Duke of York, and upon a more extensive plan. It is divided into two departments, (according to the age of the pupil,) which are fixed at Marlow and Sandhurst, near Bagshot. The system of instruction is modelled upon that of France. Orphans of officers who have died in the service are admitted gratuitously; and for the sons of living

officers, the charge of instruction is reduced in proportion to the rate of their father's pay.

A nursery of officers has been formed by means of this establishment. The atmosphere of the country is too much impregnated with liberal ideas to create any apprehension of the Government schools producing satellites of despotism. Besides, it is not at all necessary that those who enter into the army should be educated at the Royal Military College. The Commander-in-chief selects the sub-lieutenants (called *ensigns* in the infantry, and *cornets* in the cavalry) from young men belonging to families interested in the support of order. Since the beginning of the present century, the military profession has found favour amid the higher classes of society. The want of birth is not however a motive for excluding any person whatever. The English aristocracy is a compound of the pride of nobility, of pecuniary or mercantile interest, of talent, of public employment, of landed or manufacturing property ; it presents a compact and formidable front to the lowest classes, because so many elements of different natures never combat with each other.

In England, among other points of difference with other countries, the males of the higher classes are generally taller and stronger than the common people ; and this proceeds from their restless and active country life. The regulations for admission into the

army require that candidates for ensigncies should not be under sixteen years of age, and endowed with a good physical constitution. The officers formerly were characterized as ignorant and dissipated, although most of them had received a liberal education. Some of them preserve their laborious habits even in the camp. They write, and sometimes publish, Journals of their Travels or Campaigns, in which the sincerity of the observer is more conspicuous than his talent of observation. Some young men, who had already attained the rank of Captain, have been known to avail themselves of intervals of inactivity, and resume at the military schools those studies which had been too early interrupted. A much greater number however will be found, who, in the movement of a dissipated life, forget the little they ever learned.

Besides, our neighbours across the Channel are serious even in their intemperance. The orgies at head-quarters and regimental messes are by no means boisterous; and they will become much more rare, in proportion as hard drinking is banished from good society. You will not find among the English officers that delicate and exclusive sense of honour, which repels the least weakness in presence of an enemy with more horror than a crime against social order. Still less will you find that touching alliance of the leaders with the soldiers, the paternal care of the captains, the simple manners of the lieutenants

and sub-lieutenants, or the affectionate community of sufferings which constituted the strength of our revolutionary armies. But unshaken patriotism, and tried and steady bravery, are to be met with every where. In a country where money is the universal stimulus, the officers receive little of it. Notwithstanding the successive depreciation of the precious metals, their pay has varied very little since the time of William III. The economical charge of the companies belongs to the non-commissioned officers. The administration of the regiments is in the hands of a few persons, and within certain limits marked out by a species of legality. Plunder and exactions in foreign countries are regarded with generous aversion by men, who, even in war, show every respect to institutions and to private property.

If, notwithstanding, with such an assemblage of honourable feelings and exalted virtues, a nation were condemned to remain insulated in the midst of nations; if with their gold the English purchased nothing but dislike; if a people which knows not what hatred is, were constantly attacking them with caricatures and sarcasms; if, after a residence of six years in a country which they wrested from a treacherous usurpation, not a woman, not a child, remembered the name of a single individual among their deliverers; if, at the conclusion of a general peace, their companions in the field of battle were more inimical to them than to those against whom

they had been fighting ; if, finally, Europe, America, and India, only waited for a plan and a leader to declare eternal war against them, we should be forced to admit that there is something in the character of these islanders contrary to all social sympathy.

The mutual subordination of officers is one of the peculiarities of the army of a democracy, because there no other superiority is acknowledged, except that of military rank. For this reason, political equality in the State is a means of discipline in the army. On the contrary, when citizens are born in classes, the social ties which result from this primitive classification are always in some degree at variance with the military hierarchy. This may be seen in the English troops. Between lords, sons of lords, sons of merchants, of bankers, of landed proprietors, the difference of rank is scarcely perceptible. A reserved politeness is not sufficient to indicate it. The authority of the heads of corps is not oppressive, and the shade of distinction between the captain and the lieutenant is not more apparent than between the lieutenant and the ensign. Duels between officers of unequal ranks, although severely punished, are not unfrequent. The field and subaltern officers mess together at the same table. There they argue and discuss with freedom. The plans of the campaign and the manœuvres of the general are treated in the same manner as a parliamentary question. Accustomed to appreciate all sorts of merit,

the English frequently give a leader credit for what he makes no pretension to ; they would refuse whatever was exacted of them. Their independent spirits equally revolt against pretensions which injure their rights, and prejudices which offend their reason. A certain military reputation, which party spirit would make colossal, was never appreciated, with greater justice than by these very persons who shed their blood to establish it.

The tendency to indiscipline is corrected by that moral rectitude which is produced by the long application of a constitutional form of government ; for the love of order leads to subordination. Detesting, above all things, the character of servility, or any thing approaching to it, the English dispute with the man ; they bow with humility before the organ of the law. From this however arises another inconvenience ; as there are such even in the best things. The same officers who would argue freely in the camp or round the dinner-table, become mere mechanical agents when called upon to act on the field of battle or elsewhere. Their responsibility seems to them like the sword of Damocles, suspended by a thread over their heads. More than one operation has turned out imperfect and ineffectual, because the officer in command paid more attention to the letter than to the spirit of his instructions.

Officers in the militia must be possessed of landed

property. The same condition was required a hundred years since of officers of the line. At present the Government is contented to sell them their commissions, all of which, from the ensigncy up to the lieutenant-colonelcy inclusive, have fixed prices. An ensign's commission costs four hundred pounds sterling, and that of lieutenant-colonel of infantry three thousand four hundred, including the first purchase, and the difference paid at each successive step of promotion. The prices are nearly double in the cavalry, and still higher in the guards. The officers are called *commissioned officers*, because they have obtained a commission by purchase or otherwise. As the inferior officers serve without commissions, they are called *non-commissioned officers*. Although a commission is bought and paid for, it does not on that account become the absolute property of the purchaser. The King may deprive him of it without any indemnification. It is only by sufferance, but one to which long usage has almost given the force of law, that officers are allowed to sell out. This favour is usually granted after twenty years service. The Government disposes of the commissions which become vacant by deaths; sometimes they are sold for the benefit of the widow and the children of the deceased; sometimes also they are given gratuitously, to reward actions of *éclat*, or exemplary behaviour. It is in this way

that non-commissioned rise to the rank of subaltern officers.

It was estimated that during the last war, the sale of commissions brought into the public treasury an annual revenue of four hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, (nearly ten millions of francs). The principle of purchase flatters the pride of the English aristocracy ; they conceive themselves more independent of the royal authority from having bought their employments, and they are delighted when the road to preferment is opened exclusively to money and to patronage. The Duke of York did all in his power to diminish the evils of a system which it was out of his power to abolish. He made regulations to prevent the trafficking in commissions, and their value from rising and falling like the public funds. The commissions which are vacant, or about to be so, are placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, who disposes of them for the advantage of the army. In this manner he is enabled to dedicate a small portion to long services or eminent merit. The vacant commissions are first offered to the senior officers in the grade immediately below, before the junior ones can be allowed to purchase them. An officer must have served three years as a subaltern before he can be a captain, seven to be a major, and nine to be a lieutenant-colonel. All persons are expressly forbidden, under penalties

fixed by Act of Parliament, from trafficking in commissions. The contracting parties must declare upon their honour that they have neither given nor received a higher price than that fixed by the regulation list. But in England, as well as in every other country, intrigue is ingenious in eluding the precautions which are taken against it; for it is certain that commissions are sold by private arrangement at much higher than the legal prices. The evil is too deeply rooted in British avarice and corruption, to be extirpated otherwise than by a strong legislative measure.

Every English officer, from the commander-in-chief to the lowest drummer, is included in the regimental rolls; all are paid according to the rank which they fill in them. Those who are not, are placed on half-pay, and are not considered liable to serve.*

The employments form the basis of the British army. The ranks then come as extraneous, and beyond the lieutenant's commission they do not always accompany the employment. Thus there are nominal captains who are majors, majors who are

* During the war in Spain, the rank of general officer was multiplied greatly beyond the usual proportions. As the number of regiments in the army was not increased, it was found impossible to give one to every general officer employed. A general order of the 8th of August 1814, gave them a special pay, according to their actual rank.

lieutenant-colonels, and lieutenant-colonels who are colonels. The ranks have been multiplied when on foreign service, in order that the English might always be above, or at least on an equality with the officers of other nations, with whom they might be called upon to act in the field. This is called brevet-rank in opposition to commission-rank. In the interior of the regiment, the officer ranks according to his commission ; in the general service of the army, and wherever detachments from different corps are marching together, he commands in right of his brevet rank.

The acting commander of a regiment is its eldest lieutenant-colonel. By a most inexplicable singularity the rank of colonel, which in every other army is so important, has no corresponding employment either in the English infantry or cavalry. The general officers in the army are colonels of regiments. We shall explain farther on, in what manner this empty title, which has no duty attached to it, enables them to derive a handsome income from their regiments.

Previously to 1810, brevet-colonels, who commanded brigades abroad, or even within the three kingdoms, were called brigadier-generals. This was not considered as a rank. At present the colonel who commands a brigade neither changes his title nor uniform. In the regular order, brigades are commanded by major-generals, divisions by lieu-

tenant-generals, and armies by generals or field-marshals.

It is the general idea in Europe, that if experience is sufficient for subaltern functions, it requires a particular inspiration for the successful performance of duties of a higher order. According to this principle, promotion in the inferior ranks follows the rule of seniority, and in the superior ranks it depends on selection. The contrary of this takes place in England. We have seen in what manner an officer rises to a lieutenant-colonelcy. From the rank of colonel to that of field-marshal exclusively, all rise in their turn. If brilliant exploits or special convenience have drawn an officer into a superior sphere, it follows that all the officers of the same rank, who stand above him in the army-list, are promoted also. No military man *ever* serves under the orders of his junior ; even if the senior consented, the Government would not allow him. This system may thwart the display of some remarkable talent ; but it is certainly most advantageous to discipline, and is in union with the methodically progressive march of the English power. The invariable succession of the Army-list is a barrier against the encroachments of the royal authority, as well as a protection to the personal tranquillity of the King against the intrigues and importunities of the rich and the powerful.

The King of England has imposed upon himself the law of seniority, and he never deviates from it

except for princes of his own family or for foreign princes.* He has not limited the right of conferring the highest military dignity where he thinks proper. The field-marshal's staff is a grace which emanates entirely from the crown, and is the more valuable, that the crown has hitherto been wisely chary of it. Of six field-m Marshals in the army in 1818, five are members of the royal family; the Duke of Wellington is the sixth.

The Government, when it has bestowed special commands on, or entrusted important missions to superior officers or generals, has sometimes given them a rank above that of which they have the brevet: this is called *local* or *temporary rank*, because the privileges of the rank are limited to a certain time and space. Although the King has been pleased to give a momentary illustration to the officer invested with his confidence, the classification of this officer remains the same in the army; and during his accidental elevation, the Government takes care to place no officers senior to himself in permanent rank under his command.

* Two or three instances may be mentioned, however, as exceptions to the general rule. Sir Thomas Graham, now Lord Lynedoch, passed from the militia, in which he was colonel, into the line, in which he is now lieutenant-general. This favour was shown him on account of his special services, and because he had, in the situation of Commissioner of the English Government with the Austrian army, served in the memorable campaign of 1796 and 1797 in Italy.

The operations which are connected with the commandship-in-chief of the army all receive publicity. This publicity, which in England accompanies all the acts of the Government, is the strongest security for the observance of the laws. The changes of every description which take place in the corps of officers of all ranks are published in the London Gazette; and the insertion in this is received as evidence of the new promotion. A general Army-list is also published every year, and another at the beginning of every month, that every one may be aware of his claims by the knowledge of his own position and that of his comrades.

The manner in which general officers are promoted tends to make them very numerous. At the peace in 1814 there were more than six hundred and fifty field-m Marshals, generals, lieutenant-generals, and major-generals on the list: in ordinary times there is not room for a hundred. Some are sent to distant settlements, to the colonies, or to India; or they are appointed to the command of the military districts of the three kingdoms. The authority of these last, which is powerless over the citizens, is extensive and minute over the regiments; for in the English service, the inspection is not separated from the command; the troops are not collected in the great garrisons, nor in camps for exercise. The small number of general officers who are on actual service, and consequently the little chance which each of

them has to be called out, throws back nearly the whole class of them into the habits of general society ; most of them engage in agricultural pursuits ; a few get into Parliament or into the administration ; the rest travel about and amuse themselves. When war recalls them to the camp, the mode of life which they there lead does not at all agree with the ideas which are entertained elsewhere of the military profession in the higher ranks.

We have been in a situation to observe this during the campaigns in the Peninsula. While a French general of division was wearying himself in studying the topography of the country and the dispositions of the inhabitants, in feeding, training, and haranguing his soldiers, in persuading the Spanish people to adopt systems of administration and of political conduct ; the English lieutenant-general opposed to him divided his time between hunting, horse exercise, and the pleasures of the table. The one, alternately governor, engineer, and commissary, had his mind continually on the rack, and was never at rest, even when he was in line ; the nature of his daily conceptions led him to enlarge his sphere of activity, to imagine and to produce. The other troubled himself as little about the local circumstances of the country in which he was carrying on war, as he did about the manners and prejudices of the people who inhabited it ; he looked to the commissariat for the supply of provisions ; to the

quarter-master general's department for surveys of the ground and preparing the marches, and to the adjutant-general's department for smoothing all difficulties. Excepting in cases where he was employed in the command of a detached corps, he took as little interest as possible in the military combinations, and was only anxious to narrow as much as possible the circle of his own responsibility. In the quiet of cantonments, the habitual duties of the English general officer were confined to police regulations, inspections, and the transmission of orders and reports ; in the day of battle he led his troops into action, with no effort, and with wonderful bravery. In this point also there are distinct shades in the system of each army : the Englishman is only expected to do his duty ; he must be on all occasions equally intrepid and devoted. The Frenchman, who commands men of intellect and reasoning, need not expose himself on ordinary occasions ; but whenever the pressure of danger calls for the *coup-d'œil* and genius of the leader to secure the general safety, he must show himself more than a man, if he does not wish to be looked upon as less than nothing. Our soldier rates himself highly, and has no idea of obeying any one who is not better than himself.

War is looked upon by the English in a narrow point of view ; the bulk of the nation possess the instinctive qualities for it, such as exalted courage and contempt of death ; but men of cultivated minds see

nothing in it but a regular employment of physical force and material means. In vain would you tell them, that the genius of destruction has also his sublime revelations, and that he awakens a power of thought superior to that which presides at the creations of poetry and of philosophy ; still less would you persuade them that the highest part of the art, strategy, is philanthropic in its developements. Their error proceeds from two causes. England having rarely large bodies of troops collected, her warriors are still at the alphabet of tactics, and they have not had time to dignify or to enlarge the science which they cultivate. It may also be said that Fortune has been pleased to justify the prejudice we have alluded to, by elevating generals of ordinary abilities to the skies.

The glory of the British army has arisen principally from its excellent discipline, and from the cool and steady bravery of the people. The military commands may be distributed with impunity according to combinations, or parliamentary influence ; it is the army itself which can most easily dispense with extraordinary talent. The officers who have returned from the wars of Portugal and Spain, while they are loud and unanimous in doing justice to the prudence and intrepidity of their leader, allow him the possession of no quality which eminently distinguishes him from the other conspicuous generals of their nation. While they extol his characteristic

firmness, which from an early period liberated him from the trammels of responsibility, they have nothing to say in praise of the resources of his understanding or the productions of his genius. We have heard it asserted by men whose opinion is not without weight, that there were twenty officers, (and to mention only some of these who served in this war, Picton, Crawford, and Sir George Murray,) any one of whom would have commanded with as much, and perhaps with more ability and success than Wellington, *if* they had had the same soldiers under them, the same passions to work upon, the same immense resources at command, and, above all, the same certainty of support from the favourable dispositions of the administration.

Honours, decorations, and titles of nobility, were not formerly considered as the proper modes of rewarding military services; the peerage and orders of knighthood were only bestowed on officers who had been the commanders-in-chief on fortunate expeditions. When the English army began to run the same risks as the armies of the continental powers, it was natural that it should borrow from them the institutions which tend to excite and support their courage. In 1800 there were not more than forty Knights of the Bath. Since that time it has been divided into different classes, in imitation of the Legion of Honour of Napoleon, and, like that, destined to all kinds of merit; in 1814 it

had nearly six hundred military knights, although none were admitted into it below the rank of major. The military of all ranks have received medals commemorative of the actions in which they had borne a part. A sergeant in each company, distinguished for his bravery and deserts, wears an embroidered trophy on the skirts of his coat, receives higher pay, and takes his place near the regimental colours. The royal favour has granted particular emblems and devices to such corps as have in critical circumstances done more than their duty; these marks of honour are embroidered on the colours, and are modelled in relief on the plates in front of the soldiers' caps. In England at least, the generous devotedness of the soldier does not remain unknown; a hundred journals, daily read with avidity notwithstanding their length, state the name of the lowest officer wounded, and the nature of his wound. The country never ceases to cast a watchful eye over the fate of her children with affectionate tenderness; pecuniary rewards and eulogiums pronounced in the national assemblies are the expressions of public gratitude to the living. The walls of St. Paul's, of Westminster Abbey, and of other religious edifices, have no other ornaments but the tombs of great men, and of warriors who have died on the field of honour. Never will the armed foreigner violate their sepulchres. Whenever that revolution breaks out, which must sooner or later devour one genera-

tion of Englishmen, however furious may be its irruption, it will never produce wretches so devoid of shame as to take pleasure in mutilating the monuments of the national glory.

Marriages are frequent in the British army; the Government encourages them; it is a consolation to men who are mostly doomed never again to see the steeple of the church where they were baptized. The State is bound to restore them a family in place of that which they have lost. In the embarkations of troops, six women per company are allowed to accompany the battalions, if the expedition is to the Continent; twelve, if it is destined for the colonies; and the whole of the married women, if it is a veteran battalion. This is the source of a military population, which is employed in recruiting the army; it is not so numerous, nor is the condition of a soldier so much honoured, as to create fears in the friends of liberty of the influence of a race to which the sword would be transmitted by inheritance.

The Duke of York obtained of the Government the foundation of a school, in which eight hundred boys and four hundred girls, the children of soldiers, are educated for the military service, and for the wants of society. *The Royal Military Asylum* (which is the name given to this school) is situated in the village of Chelsea near London, close to the Hospital for Invalids. What a happy idea to place the magic of hope by the side of the charm of recollections!

There is no establishment of the kind in Europe which is better kept or managed. The elementary education is directed according to the plans of Dr. Bell. The Duke of York also, after his re-appointment to the Commandership-in-Chief in 1811, introduced the system of mutual instruction into the regimental schools. Long previous to this, however, there were in the ranks of the army a great number of soldiers who knew how to read and write; this was the effect of the civil institutions. On one hand the Government is prodigal of the benefits of primary instruction, because it considers the education of the poor man as forming the safeguard of the rich; on the other, it carefully shuts out the inferior classes from access to instruction in the higher branches of knowledge by the exorbitant price which it fixes upon it. But it is not in the power of man to fix limits to the development of thought. The introduction of economical and short methods will not be confined to the elementary schools, and will end in making all kinds of instruction common and familiar; the populace will become the people. The British army will soon obtain from the progress of knowledge the mitigation of its penal legislation, and even in the counting houses of the London merchants, the noble title of defender of his country will be fully appreciated.

In principle, the national army is recruited by natives; but an Act of Parliament was passed in

1806, authorizing the King to admit a certain number of foreigners into the English regiments, the total number of whom cannot exceed sixteen thousand men, with the restriction that the principal part shall be employed abroad. The King has also the privilege of granting letters of service to foreign officers, and particularly to engineers. By this mode he has collected several who had belonged to his Electoral army of Hanover; and occasionally a German baron has been seen commanding one of the English military districts, and retaining his place, in spite of the clamours of the opposition.

When officers enter the service, no questions are asked them as to what religion they profess; still less are the soldiers questioned; and if we may believe well-informed politicians, the policy of the Cabinet has sometimes made use of the recruiting system to thin the Catholic population of Ireland. The state provides a chaplain to every regiment; in the *Articles of War* and the *Mutiny Bill*, (which together form the English military code,) there is a whole section relating to our duties to God; and the regulations require, that during the absence of the chaplain, an officer of serious deportment should repeat the church-service of the day. Those who do not belong to the Established Church are dispensed from attendance. Religious intolerance is diminishing daily, although it is but two years since the statutes relative to nonconformity and the penal laws of George I.

against the Catholics were in force. Two justices of peace might require the first officer they met to take the oath of supremacy ; and whoever refused it was liable to legal penalties. An Act of Parliament, passed in 1816, makes the military capable of filling all ranks, without exception on account of religion. This measure of justice has not yet been acted upon to its fullest extent. From the Revolution of 1688 to the moment in which we are now writing, not a single Roman Catholic has become a general officer in the English service.

The King, by virtue of his prerogative, may dismiss any officer, even if he has been acquitted by a court-martial ; but there is a great difference between the law and the fact ; the general spirit of the legislation also protects the Englishman who lives out of the pale of the common-law. The direction of military trials is entrusted to a corps of civil magistrates. Their head, who resides in London, has the title of *Judge Advocate General*, and his assistants (*Deputy Judge Advocates*) are detached in the armies : it is their duty to take informations as to offences committed by military men, and to require the commanding officers to assemble courts-martial, in which they appear as public officers, to see that justice is done between the crown and the prisoner. The *Mutiny Act* settles the details of the system of courts-martial : they are composed according to a rotation of service, and their mode of

procedure assimilates them to juries, as much as the constitution of an armed force will allow. The king may mitigate the punishments, and pardon. Generally, he delegates this portion of his prerogative to the commanding officers; in other respects there is no appeal from the sentences of courts-martial; and although they are frequently assembled, they impress a salutary terror.

Besides the general courts-martial of which we have been speaking, there are regimental courts-martial, which try with less solemnity and as much independence. These last can never be composed of less than five members, all of them officers. The non-commissioned officers and soldiers only are subject to their authority. They decide in all matters of pay and clothing; and the party who considers himself aggrieved by their sentence, may appeal from it to a general court-martial. The commander of the regiment has the power of pardoning.

The notions of distributive justice are so widely diffused by the English constitution, that the soldiers constitute, of their own motion, in the several companies, a species of court-martial, composed of three soldiers, a corporal, and a sergeant, who presides. These confidential tribunals look particularly to infractions of discipline in their immediate relations with the interest of their comrades: they punish

the delinquents with leathern thongs, and their early justice frequently prevents one more severe.

In England there is no absolute dominion but that of public opinion, from which no one is exempt. Whenever the national honour appears to require a rigid inquiry into a military operation, the King hastens to submit the conduct of the leaders to a court of inquiry, which determines if there is ground for bringing them before a court-martial.

During war, a *provost-marshal* rides round the environs of the camp at the head of detachments of the staff corps of cavalry, who has authority to arrest, condemn to death, and to hang, under his eyes, all plunderers, ravishers, and forcers of safeguards caught in the fact. This species of summary justice is repugnant to the English character, and it is rarely exercised in the army. We think that no one would ever dare to try it in the interior, even if Great Britain itself were accidentally to become the theatre of war.

The councils of administration are unknown in the English army. The internal economy of the corps has been at all times founded on the bases derived from mercantile ideas; every nation has its own manners. He who goes to law to obtain a compensation for the honour of his wife will not blush to increase his fortune with the clippings of soldiers' coats. We have mentioned that every regiment of infantry

or cavalry has a general-officer for its colonel. This colonel, who is always absent, or supposed to be so, has no relations with the corps but such as are purely administrative; in other words, he is the contractor at a fixed price for the clothing, which is purchased, made, and delivered to the parties taking it, at his expense, and under the charge of his agents. The other military employments have fixed appointments; those of the colonel are variable, and arise from the profits on the supply of the various articles of soldiers' clothing, and on the strength of the corps when complete or only effective; so that a major-general, who is colonel of a regiment of two battalions, receives twice as much as a lieutenant-general who has a regiment of only one battalion. It is estimated that a regiment fairly administered brings the colonel a guinea a year for each man present, and four times as much for every non-effective. His gains are still more considerable if the lieutenant-colonel commandant is not punctual in applying for the periodical renewals of clothing, and in making his subordinate officers be allowed what is due to them. What an odious system that must be where the nominal commander is enriching himself, whilst the soldiers are perishing, or the regiment going to wreck! The Duke of York's vigilance has struggled with the abuses arising from it; he has frequently repeated orders to prevent the soldiers' coats from being made

too short, too tight, or of bad materials. A *clothing board*, composed of general officers, is appointed to inspect the supplies before they are delivered to the troops, and to compare each article with the approved pattern. Rules are also established for the mode of receiving the articles when sent to the corps. Generally speaking, the thefts are not so scandalous as they would be elsewhere under the ægis of so convenient a legislation. Corruption being general in England, there are for that very reason certain bounds of decency, which if the thieves attempted to pass, they would run the risk of being overwhelmed by the public contempt.

Every regiment has an agent in London, who is named by the colonel, and transacts its business. Some of these agency-houses are establishments of great magnitude, and manage the business of several regiments. The immense extent and division of the British possessions on one hand, and on the other the financial organization of the army, would make it a difficult matter to dispense with them. The agents act as the medium of communication between the Government, the colonel, and the regiment. Applications are made to them on all affairs of a personal nature, such as the sale or purchase of commissions, claims for indemnities, and the means of obtaining embarkations; they employ the tailors and transmit the clothing. The funds allowed by the Treasury for pay, and other regimental expenses,

pass, or are supposed to pass, through their hands; they expend them, and submit their accounts to the Board of Comptrollers of the army accounts. The salary of the agents is derived from a commission of one penny per pound sterling upon the sums which they pay.

The accounts are made up by battalions in the infantry, and by regiments in the cavalry troops. There are in each of these two administrative officers, who are nominated by the colonel, and these are the *paymaster* and the *quartermaster*. The paymaster is the subordinate of the agent: although he does no military duty, he bears the rank of *captain*, merely to give him more consideration; he finds securities for his good behaviour, which circumstance however does not prevent him from gaining money by illicit means, whenever he can. His business consists in preparing the applications for the funds necessary to pay the soldiers and other expenses, in receiving them, and making the distribution of them among the companies, and in sending accounts to the agent. The quartermasters were formerly the highest of the non-commissioned officers, and the cavalry regiments had quartermasters of companies. These last have been suppressed; at present the quartermaster is an officer; his duty is to receive and distribute the articles of clothing sent by the agents, the provisions, and the supplies of all kinds.

The *Mutiny Bill* directs that the troops shall be reviewed at least twice a year, and fixes the penalties to which officers, commissaries, and muster-masters are subject who make or sign false musters. The lists drawn up by the captains and superior officers, and sworn to before the civil authorities, serve as the basis for most of the deliveries of money and stores. The lieutenant-colonel inquires every month of the companies, and the general in command of the battalion, if they have any complaints to make against their superior. The commanders of companies and of regiments having no natural or necessary connexion or complicity with the quarter-master, the paymaster, the agent, or the colonel, it follows that they must act as a check on these four administrators, and feel their reputation interested as well as their conscience satisfied in securing the comfort and happiness of the soldier. The accounts of the regiments are not overloaded with unnecessary papers and forms. As to a number of private claims, the simple statement of an officer is considered sufficient.

A sum, proportioned to the number of men present under arms, is allowed to the captains for keeping the muskets in order: whatever excess remains over the disbursements for this purpose, constitutes an addition to their pay. Formerly the superior officers had companies, but the Duke of York deprived them of them. It would have only

required another step to suppress the colonels of clothing, but it would have been necessary to create new employments in their place. The opposition carefully abstains from proposing or supporting any measure which would increase the influence of the crown. Men who live on abuses labour to perpetuate them. These two motives, coupled with the inherent respect for institutions, tend to make reforms slow and difficult.

In the classification of the different branches of service the artillery is placed first, then the cavalry, and the infantry last. They who placed the latter lowest in the scale were certainly not far advanced in the art of war. This however is a mere rank of parade. Under all circumstances the senior officer of highest rank takes the command, whatever may be the arm to which he belongs.

At the beginning of 1808, the infantry consisted of three regiments of foot-guards, one hundred and four of infantry of the line or light infantry, nineteen specifically destined for the service of the West Indies, of Africa, of Ceylon, of Canada, and Nova Scotia; eighteen garrison and veteran battalions on sedentary service; ten battalions of the King's German Legion; four Swiss regiments, and seven corps not included in the line, originally composed of Germans, French, Sicilians, and Greeks, and recruited with deserters and prisoners of all nations.

The three regiments of Foot-guards form seven

battalions, and are all crack regiments. They have better pay and richer uniform; and though the men are obtained by the same mode of recruiting as the rest of the army, they are of higher stature. The officers have a step of rank above their employment, and are almost all of them sons of the best families in the country. Although their original destination be to guard the palaces and the person of the King, they are sent on service during war, nearly the same as other regiments. The Guards are not beloved in the army, which gives them the nickname of feather-bed-soldiers, is jealous of their privileges, and asks why they are entitled to them. A very different feeling to that which was entertained in the French army towards the Imperial Guard!

The regiments of the line are distinguished by numbers. Fifty-two of these have but one battalion, forty-seven have two, four have three; a single regiment (the sixtieth) has eight. We see no plausible motives for this medley, and think there are serious inconveniencies in having regiments with only one battalion. Every one knows how fast a solitary battalion melts away during war, and what an alteration that produces in the order of battle.

The regiments are organized upon the principle that the battalions should serve separately from each other. There are no regimental staffs. Every battalion has a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, an adjutant, a paymaster, a quarter-master, a surgeon, and

an assistant-surgeon. It is divided into ten companies, of which the grenadier and the light, placed at the two wings, are for that reason called flank companies. Each company is commanded by a captain, who has under him a lieutenant and an ensign. It is by raising or lowering the effective strength of the companies that the Government usually increases or diminishes the military establishment. In time of peace they are seldom below forty men, and during war they have never been so high as a hundred. At the period when the English troops took a part in the events of the Peninsula, the average strength of the companies was sixty-five effective men.

The infantry, when it goes into the field, is distributed into brigades of two, three, and even four regiments, according to the number and strength of the battalions. The grenadiers have not, in the eyes of the other soldiers, the *éclat* and pre-eminence of the French or Hungarian grenadiers. It is not customary to unite those of one or more brigades in order to attempt bold strokes. The light companies are sometimes formed into provisional battalions, which is a practice directly in opposition to the purpose for which that species of troops was originally instituted.

Several regiments of the line, such as the forty-third, the fifty-first, the fifty-second, &c., &c., are called *light infantry regiments*. These corps, as

well as the light companies of the battalions, have nothing light about them but the name ; for they are armed, and, with the exception of a few ornaments, clothed like the rest of the infantry. It was thought, that the English soldier had not the necessary intelligence and flexibility to go through the regular duty of the line, and the service of inspiration of the sharp-shooter, with equal success. When the necessity of a special light-infantry began to be felt, some trials were first made with the best marksmen of different corps. Afterwards it was determined to devote exclusively to the office of sharpshooters the eight battalions of the sixtieth, the three of the ninety-fifth, and some of the foreign corps. These troops have received the name of *riflemen*, on account of the rifle-guns with which they were armed during the last war ; they were detached by companies into the brigades. The echoing sound of their horns answered two purposes—to direct the riflemen conformably to the views of the general in command,—and to apprize the latter of such manœuvres of the enemy as it would be impossible for him to discover from his station in the field.

The English, the Scotch, and the Irish are all mixed together in the regiments. Ireland supplies more soldiers in proportion to its population than the other two kingdoms. It might be supposed that the general character which we have attributed to the English troops would be altered by this mixture ;

but the English discipline is like the bed of Procrustes to all that come within its sphere. Minds as well as bodies are subject to the law of the ruling people. Four Scottish regiments, consisting of nine battalions, are styled *Highland Regiments*. They are recruited almost exclusively from the mountains of Scotland, and their officers are selected in preference from natives of the country. The Highlanders wear their national *kilt* instead of small-clothes. This neither harmonizes with the rest of their dress, nor is it convenient for war. This is of no consequence: a distinction which has its source in popular customs always imposes the performance of an additional duty. There are no regiments in the service of the King of England which are more steady in battle than the Scotch.

The infantry is the best portion of the British army. It is the *robur peditum*, the expression applied by the Romans to the *triarii* of their legions. The English do not scale mountains, or skim along the plain, with the suppleness and rapidity of the French; but they are more silent, more quiet, and more obedient, and for that very reason their fire is better directed and more destructive. You will not find them resigned under the bullets like the Russians, but they draw together with less confusion, and preserve their original formation better. In their composition there is something of the German mechanism, with a more active and more moral

execution. The system of manœuvres which they have adopted since the year 1798, is borrowed from the Prussians. The infantry, although on system formed three deep, like the other infantries of Europe, is most frequently drawn up only two deep. When making or receiving a charge, it is drawn up four deep. Sometimes it has made offensive movements and even charged columns, when in open order. In a retreat it stands firm, and commences by volleys from the battalions, followed by a well supported fire of files. It turns round coolly to keep off those who are hanging on its rear. While marching it fires without separating.

The English infantry is not afraid of charging its enemy with the bayonet. The leader, however, who would wish to use without compromising it, must move it seldom and cautiously, and reckon more upon its fire than upon its manœuvres.

The English infantry is dressed in scarlet; it is the national colour, and the soldier is much attached to it. The riflemen wear green. There are also in England some martinets tormented with the mania of wearying the soldiers by punctilious attention to their dress and accoutrements, and by perpetual alterations in their clothing. This whim, although encouraged by the particular taste of an exalted personage, has not done any great mischief. From time to time such changes as the experience of other armies has stamped with utility, are adopt-

ed. The use of hair powder was abolished in 1808, by an order of the Commander-in-chief. The English sergeants carry halberts. The soldiers' muskets are heavier than ours, and the barrel is a little stronger. The other parts of their arms and equipments are in general preferable to our own.

The foreign troops in the English service follow the same system, without any exception, as the national army. Almost all of them were employed in the Spanish peninsula. While invasions and tumultuous retreats were heaping miseries on our French soldiers, of which no one can have any idea who has not felt them ; while the Austrian and Prussian troops, fighting in their own country under the eyes of their sovereign, never ventured but on insignificant attacks or feeble defences ; fifteen thousand German mercenaries, recruited without selection, and serving without affection, but who were punctually paid, clothed with a species of luxury, well fed, and still better provided with liquor, showed themselves rivals for glory with the English who paid them. So powerful is the influence of good treatment and vigorous organization !

The pains bestowed by the English on the rearing of their horses, and the superior qualities of their native breeds, had given a more favourable idea of their cavalry than the experience of war has justified. The horses are badly trained for fighting. They have narrow shoulders and a hard mouth, and

neither know how to turn nor to halt. The cropping their tails is a serious inconvenience in hot climates. The luxurious attentions which are lavished upon them render them quite unfit to support fatigue, scarcity of food, or the bivouac. The men are excellent grooms; but you will not find in them those feelings of tenderness which in Turkey, in Poland, and in Germany, make the warrior and his horse inseparable companions in life and death. During the retreat to Corunna, the cavalry corps made a halt; the word of command was "*Dismount—present pistols;*" and, at the third command, each horseman blew out the brains of his horse at one time and in two movements. There was a necessity for it; but an English army was the only one in which this barbarous execution could have been attempted without raising the soldiers' indignation.

Recruits for the cavalry are selected with more care than for the infantry. They are enlisted for ten years. Young men of family enter into it in preference as officers. There are thirty-five national regiments of cavalry; three of horse-guards, a crack corps, similar to the corresponding foot regiments; seven regiments of dragoon-guards, and six of dragoons, dressed in scarlet, and known by the general appellation of *heavy dragoons*, from being mounted on strong horses; fifteen regiments of light dragoons, and four of hussars, dressed in blue, and mounted on horses of inferior strength to

the others.* Every regiment, in time of war, consisted of five squadrons, and each squadron of two troops, of from sixty to eighty horses on taking the field.

The heaviest English cavalry is far from possessing the uniformity and the firm seat of the French and Austrian cuirassiers; and the lightest is still more inferior in intelligence and activity to the Hungarian hussar and the Cossack. The horsemen have neither cuirasses nor lances. They have no idea of the artifices of partizan warfare, and they know as little how to charge *en masse*. When the fray commences, you see them equally vulnerable and offensive, cutting instead of thrusting, and directing furious but not very dangerous blows with the sabre against the face. The system of manœuvring of the English cavalry is the same as that of the other European powers. Previously to the campaigns on the Continent, the general and superior officers of this army had had no opportunity of managing large bodies; the war in the Peninsula does not appear to have

* During the war in the Peninsula, our soldiers were so struck with the elegant dresses of the light dragoons, their shining helmets, and the graceful shapes of the men and horses, that they gave them the name of *Lindors*. In 1813 this dress, which was peculiar to the British troops, was exchanged for the head-dress and jacket of the German light cavalry. The Polish lances at Albuera, and the French cuirasses at Waterloo, have also given the English the idea of having lancers and cuirassiers.

developed that talent in them. It may be safely predicted that whenever the English cavalry shall be engaged with another cavalry well commanded, it will be worsted. The soldiers are brave and the horses are good; but that is not enough: there must also be science and unity. We have seen more than once weak detachments charge our battalions through and through, but in disorder. The horseman, drunk with rum, spurred on his horse, and the horse carried his rider beyond the mark. The squadrons could not be again re-formed; there were no others at hand to finish the work: the bold stroke passed away, without the least advantage.

England also kept up two regiments of dragoons, and three of hussars, attached to the foreign corps, denominated *The King's German Legion*. They have surpassed the national cavalry both in the duty of vanguards and in battle. The finest charge during the war in Spain, was made (as we shall see in its place) on the day after the battle of Arapiles (Salamanca) by the Hanoverian Bock, at the head of the heavy brigade of the German Legion.

The artillery and engineers are distinct from the War Department, and belong to another ministry. The *Ordnance* is the name given to the office which has the charge of the fortifications, and the supply of the arms and ammunition of both the land and sea forces. The Ordnance has its treasury, its sinecures, its budget, its establishments, and its particular

army. It forms a state within the state, under the government of a *Master-General of the Ordnance*. This supreme head exercises the command entirely by himself, and has no dependance on his assistants, the *Board of Ordnance*, excepting in a few points of the administration. His power over the *personnel* and the *materiel* of his department, is greater than that of the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief if they were united. He nominates and recalls the officers and the accountants : he does and undoes in the name of the King. Having a place in the cabinet, he enters into and retires from it like the other ministers. Although any English citizen may be appointed to this elevated post, it is commonly filled by general officers. The Earl of Chatham and Lord Mulgrave were Masters-General of the Ordnance during the war in the Peninsula.

The artillery and engineers have no connexion with each other except that of being directed by the same minister, of a preparatory system of instruction common to both, and a similar regimen. To become an officer in either of these two arms, it is necessary to pass through the special school of *gentlemen cadets*, established at Woolwich. The age at which they are admitted is from fourteen to sixteen. They attend the practical exercises of the gunner and sapper, and are at the same time instructed in the theory of the physical and mathematical sciences,

in drawing, fortification, and the military art. After a course of four years, they undergo an examination, and are admitted second lieutenants, on the certificates of their qualifications being transmitted by the professors to the Master-general of the Ordnance. The officers of the artillery and engineers rank with those of the army; they do not purchase their commissions; they rise by seniority. Extraordinary talents, or brilliant actions, are rewarded by ranks superior to the employment (*brevet rank*.)

The functions which are in France entrusted exclusively to the corps of artillery, are in England dispersed in several hands. The artillery troop is only employed in the working of the pieces. It consists of a regiment of ten battalions (*the Royal Regiment of Artillery*) of which the Master-general of the Ordnance is the colonel. Each battalion has ten companies, of one hundred and twenty men each. Besides the Colonel-commandant, there are five superior officers. The companies are commanded by two captains and three lieutenants. One company of horse-artillery is attached to each battalion, which makes ten in all. They are on the same footing as the foot artillery as to promotion and service.

The artillery holds the first rank in the army; it is better paid, its recruits are more carefully selected, and its period of enlistment is limited to twelve years. The gunners are dressed in blue. They are

distinguished from other soldiers by their excellent spirit. In battle they display judicious activity, a perfect *coup d'œil*, and a stoical bravery.

You must not look amongst the officers of the English artillery for that universality of information and fertility of resources, which are found in France in the corps which is entrusted with the fabrication of warlike engines, and with combining and bringing into play the principal elements of the art of destruction. The former will never *improvisate* either bridge, field, or siege equipages; both officers and soldiers have shown their want of skill in the attack of strong places. Administrative foresight is not required of persons who have nothing to administer. They do not pride themselves on their ingenuity in the placing of batteries, nor in executing the *tir à ricochet*; their great merit consists in keeping in proper state, and in working with intrepidity the cannon and equipage confided to them.

The artillery corps has, notwithstanding its legal classification, an inferior relative importance to what it has in other countries; the commanders being too old to take the field, the active commands are given to officers of a rank less elevated than the importance of their functions ought to carry. A mere lieutenant-colonel has frequently had the principal command of Lord Wellington's artillery. Besides, the prospect of glory held out to a talented corps is limited. Promotions out of the regular order are

looked upon with too much horror, to allow an artillery or engineer officer who should feel himself too much cramped in his own arm, to launch into the general service of the line: the school at Woolwich will never produce a Buonaparte.

The English got the start of us in the institution of the artillery-train; the first trials of it were made in 1793, under the auspices of the Duke of Richmond, then Master-general of the Ordnance. The corps of *Royal Artillery Drivers* is organized as soldiers. Very high prices are paid for the horses which are used to draw the guns, and they are consequently extremely good. Their harness is as good as the harness of our carriages. No nation can rival the English for the equipments, and the speed of their conveyances. Are not these men destined to trouble the world, who by land as well as by sea, have means organized for arriving safely and quickly in all places?

The regimental administration is not the same in the troops belonging to the Ordnance as in the corps of infantry and cavalry. The clothing and equipments are supplied by the department, which always possesses in its magazines sufficient of each for thirty thousand soldiers and ten thousand artillery horses.

The English take few pieces into the field with them; the most that Lord Wellington ever had in the Peninsula did not amount to two for every thousand

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You must not look amongst the officers of the English artillery for that universality of information and fertility of resources, which are found in France in the corps which is entrusted with the fabrication of warlike engines, and with combining and bringing into play the principal elements of the art of destruction. The former will never *improvisate* either bridge, field, or siege equipages; both officers and soldiers have shown their want of skill in the attack of strong places. Administrative foresight is not required of persons who have nothing to administer. They do not pride themselves on their ingenuity in the placing of batteries, nor in executing the *tir à ricochet*; their great merit consists in keeping in proper state, and in working with intrepidity the cannon and equipage confided to them.

The artillery corps has, notwithstanding its legal classification, an inferior relative importance to what it has in other countries; the commanders being too old to take the field, the active commands are given to officers of a rank less elevated than the importance of their functions ought to carry. A mere lieutenant-colonel has frequently had the principal command of Lord Wellington's artillery. Besides, the prospect of glory held out to a talented corps is limited. Promotions out of the regular order are

form a branch of the administrative service, which the Ordnance most frequently entrusts to the superior officers of the artillery.

The continental powers, which distribute their arsenals of construction in several places, and upon several frontiers, can none of them boast of possessing any thing at all comparable to the unique and commanding establishment at Woolwich, a small town about nine miles below London, on the right bank of the Thames. This is the storehouse of all the military and naval artillery of the British empire. Five thousand workmen were constantly employed in it during the war. We saw there several acres of ground quite black from the cannon laying, and the bullets piled in heaps. The expeditions of the *materiel* are made with wonderful rapidity to all parts of the world. Woolwich is the town of the artillery : all the troops of that arm are garrisoned there, and such as are employed in the colonies or in the armies are considered detachments. An immense heath, called *Blackheath*, extends in front of the barracks, and is used for the exercises. The buildings alone, which have been erected here since the beginning of the present century, have cost £700,000 sterling—above seven million millions of francs.

A corps is employed, under the immediate direction of the Ordnance Office, in the management and responsibility of the equipages and warlike ammu-

nition. The members of it do duty both at home and with the armies. It is they who deliver the arms, the cartridges, the cannon, and the caissons, to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery troops. Their appointments are assimilated to military ranks. They are called *Officers of the Field Train Department of the Ordnance*.

The Master-general of the Ordnance is also the colonel of the *Royal Engineers*. This corps consists of between two and three hundred officers, inferior in theory and practice to those who exercise the same profession elsewhere. The instruction of the school at Woolwich is derived from French books; and up to a very recent period, not a single national author had written *ex professo* on the scientific branches of warfare. The great ditch between Dover and Calais enables the English to dispense with building ramparts round their cities, which would alarm the citizens. It is not unreasonable to suppose that engineers who never build fortresses, and who never even see any, have nearly the same knowledge of fortification that sailors would have of naval tactics who had never seen the sea.

In this respect, the army is, as might be expected, still more behindhand than the corps whose special branch is the attack and defence of fortified places. Previously to the institution of military schools, a gentleman, in the course of his studies, never heard the names of either Vauban or Koe-

horn. From the campaigns of the Spanish Succession War to those of the French Revolution, the exploits of the British troops in the war of sieges were confined to the reduction of some badly fortified and weakly defended places in the colonies. When the Duke of York was employed in 1793 to take Valenciennes, the generals of the allied army were afraid of committing the direction of the works to the inexperience of the English engineers, and their behaviour a few months afterwards before Dunkirk proved that the fears of the allies were not unfounded.

The English forces at that time only appeared as auxiliaries; but they have not done better in this department since they became principals. In the sieges of the Peninsula the front of attack was often badly chosen, and the batteries were fixed without discernment. They attempted to batter in breach at such distances that the bullets scarcely grazed the mason-work. The soldiers were awkward at making gabions and fascines, and still more awkward in covering themselves with them. The artillery had no mortars, made a bad use of the howitzers, and seemed quite ignorant of the use of vertical fires. They had not the least idea of the infallible processes, by which the besieger is enabled, foot by foot, and with the least possible risk, to penetrate into the heart of the defences of the besieged. The engineers seemed to be placed there

for no other purpose but that of erecting *places d'armes*, from which the troops destined for the assault or the escalade might sally forth; and with soldiers so determined it would have scarcely been risking too much to have dispensed with such services altogether. Such want of method does no honour to the corps of engineers, and it forms a still greater reproach to the conceptions of the commander-in-chief. There are absurdities which failure renders more conspicuous, and others which success does not redeem. If the members of the British Parliament had possessed but a tenth part of the information on the subject of war, which they have on finance and legislation, a rigid account would have been demanded of the ignorance which made English blood flow in torrents at the sieges of Badajos and of the castle of Burgos.

In the field service, the engineers are distributed between head-quarters and the divisions. Is it necessary to blow up a bridge? The results which they obtain are almost always imperfect; they are slow in destroying and repairing roads; they construct few works in the field. In the Peninsula, we know of no remarkable monument of the industry of our enemies, but the lines which were raised in 1810 for the defence of Lisbon, and a portion of the honour of them is due to the Portuguese engineers, who communicated to the English, both for the conception of the plan and the execution of the works, many lu-

minous ideas and correct data which had been collected long previously.

The experience of sieges showed the necessity of raising the engineer corps in public estimation, and of bringing the materials of which it disposes to a greater degree of perfection. An order of the 25th March, 1813, placed the officers on the same footing with those of the line as to capability of commanding, an act of justice of which they had till then been deprived. There was a corps of *royal artificers* (workers in wood and iron) employed in keeping up the fortifications; this has been converted into a corps of *Royal Sappers and Miners*, whose instruction has been re-modelled in conformity with its appellation, and its new destination. It is intended to supply overseers for field and siege works; the construction of moveable and other bridges forms part of its functions. The practical school of the engineers is established at Chatham.

The number of officers in the English army accustomed to reconnoissances, and to making rapid surveys of the ground, is very small: the traditions of war are not preserved there as they are in France. General Lloyd is the first author who considered England in regard to its means of defence. On the occasion of the last menaces of invasion, the Ordnance undertook the task of constructing an expensive and accurate map of the Three Kingdoms. This important work is carried on and will be com-

pleted by the corps of *Royal Military Surveyors and Draftsmen*, which has its establishment in the Tower of London, but has no connection with the military engineers.

There is no regular staff corps ; and yet no where are orders drawn up more distinctly, transmitted with more promptitude, or executed more scrupulously. This also is an ornament to the institutions of the country ; the Commander-in-chief exercises his authority through the medium of the adjutant-general and the quarter-master-general, two officers of high rank in the army. To the first belong the discipline, the current service, the recruiting, the clothing, the reports, the preparatory labours of military legislation,—in a word, the details which constitute the *efficiency* of the army, that is to say, all that puts it in a state to produce the effects which may be reasonably expected from it. The second is entrusted with the movements, the *feuilles de route*, encampments, lodgings, barracks, embarkations and disembarkations of troops, correspondence with the hospital and victualling service, and temporary arrangements relative to the defensive service. He has under his authority the war dépôt, established since the peace of 1814, in imitation of that of Paris ; the *Royal Waggon Train*, a corps of waggoners who drive the equipages ; and the *Staff Corps*, a troop of foot and horse, employed in leading the columns, opening the marches, tracing the camp, and

in the subsidiary duty of performing the police of the army. All correspondence which does not enter into the departments of the adjutant-general and the quarter-master-general, and particularly what relates to promotions, commissions, and favours, goes through the medium of another officer, bearing the title of Secretary to the Commander-in-chief: he has also his department and offices.

The staff of the commander-in-chief is the model of the other staffs, both at home and abroad. In every command, every army, every division of territory or of troops, there are two or more officers, performing under the titles of Adjutant and Quartermaster-general, or even under those of *Assistant* or *Deputy*, the same functions as those of the Adjutant-general and Quartermaster-general of all the British forces under the immediate orders of the Duke of York. One of the aid-de-camps of the general in command always fills the office of Military Secretary. This distribution of the service of the staff into several departments is exceedingly convenient to the chief command of the forces, which is a real ministry, the multifarious details of which necessitate the division of labour; it would be vicious in an active army, where unity and secrecy are the first qualities required for the transmission of the orders of the commander.

The infantry and the cavalry are formed during war in separate divisions, to each of which is attached

a battery of foot or horse artillery. Even in time of peace an officer is attached to each brigade, with the title of *Brigade-major*, whose duty it is to communicate to the adjutants of regiments, and to see to the execution of, the orders of the general in command, and of the central authorities of the army.

The employments in the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general's departments, of brigade-major and aid-de-camp, are exercised by officers detached from their regiments, whose places are not filled up: they must have seen at least four years' service. They are understood to be chosen from the most intelligent of their class, and from among those whose education has been directed to the science of war; but for all that, it is favour which procures the greatest number of them their situations in the staff service.

The English army when at home costs twice as much as any other army of the same strength. This proceeds from the high bounties paid to recruits, from the dearness of necessaries and of substances, the expensive equipages, and the comforts bestowed on the soldier. When it is employed on foreign service, the expenses of the campaign exceed all bounds. Whenever the troops have reason to apprehend a scarcity, the Government spends its money profusely; and when no provisions are to be purchased on the spot, it sends them in kind. Distance is of no consequence to the masters of the sea.

The English horses in Portugal were fed on hay cut in the meadows of Yorkshire, and the men with flour brought from America.

It is the business of the commissariat to provide the means of subsistence; it makes the bargains, issues the requisitions, pays for the necessaries, prepares warehouses, and distributes them. It would seem natural that the administering corps should possess a degree of importance, greater in proportion to the want which the army felt of its services. The case is not so with the English commissariat; its members are almost all taken from the class of petty tradesmen, or even from the lower orders of society. Although they are subject to military authority, and amenable to courts-martial, in what relates to their management, they are not enrolled in the graduated hierarchy of the army, and have no participation in its rewards. Some of them get rich by irregular means. Very little reliance can be placed on the probity of persons who unite the discordant characters of buyer, payer, cashier, storekeeper, inspector, and accountant. As their functions give them no connection with the internal administration of the regiments, they are treated with no sort of respect by either officers or soldiers.

Twenty thousand French would live for nothing, where ten thousand English would die of hunger with money in their hands. During the first campaign in the Peninsula, the London newspapers were

filled with letters from the army, all complaining bitterly of the want of skill of the commissaries of the army. The subsistence of troops during war is sometimes a more difficult task than that of commanding them. In order to draw towards you the resources of a country, you must seek them out, guess at them, sympathise with the possessors, speak to their passions, and enlighten them as to their real interests. The English had neither traditions nor experience to guide them. Acuteness is not their distinguishing quality, and they know of no influence in the world but force and money. Some inconveniences, which were principally attributable to the unbending national character, were all placed to the account of the bad organization of the commissariat. In order to regenerate it, Colonel Sir Willoughby Gordon, who had filled with distinction the office of Military Secretary to the Duke of York, was nominated Commissary-in-chief. Before his time, persons jumped at once into the first employments in the commissariat; this abuse he put an end to; and thenceforward no one could be appointed commissary-general who had not first given proofs of capacity in the situations of *clerk*, *deputy*, *assistant*, and *deputy-assistant*. He established good regulations for the service, and gave the corps a stability and a portion of the consideration which it stood in want of. The office of *Commissary-in-chief* which is always filled by a person who has no con-

nection with the commissariat, is a ministerial department, under the authority of the lords of the treasury.

The English system is to prepare the provisions long beforehand, and to pay for every thing. They never have recourse to requisitions but in extreme cases. A victualling officer is attached to each brigade of infantry and each regiment of cavalry. There are no troops specially devoted to the service of military subsistence. They keep on hire, in the rear of the army, parks of waggons, or brigades of bat horses, according to the nature of the country in which they are operating.

The medical service is independent of the commissariat: it forms a separate department, called the *Army Medical Department*, and is superintended by three physicians, one of whom has the title of *Director-general*, and the other two that of *Inspector-general*. Upon them devolve the examination and selection of the medical officers of the army, their promotion, their distribution, the superintendence of the hospital administration, and the accounts of the expenditures. The inspectors, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, hospital assistants, &c, are under their orders. In the hospitals, the physician, or, in his absence, the principal surgeon, has the direction. In the regiments, the surgeon receives an extra retribution in proportion to the number of effective men. This system, which secures a proper

degree of respect to scientific ability, and gives it the superintendence of the administration, is found to work well. Persons devoted to the exercise of a liberal profession are more to be depended on than greedy speculators.

The *ambulances* are the object of most particular attention on the part of the heads. Each corps of infantry or cavalry has its own hospital. The sick and wounded are removed on spring-carriages. Formerly the British armies wasted themselves in inactivity ; but they have cured themselves of that fault. A better system, and the co-operation of other nations, have enabled them to carry on war without undertaking any thing very hazardous ; this system requires the expenditure of a great many guineas, and of very few soldiers. According to the calculation of the old King of Prussia, an army requires an annual supply of one-third of its whole number to keep it up. The six campaigns of the Peninsula, taken one with the other, did not annually cost England more than a sixth of the army she employed in it.

We have represented the English army as being on a respectable footing ; it already surpasses other armies in discipline, and in some particulars of internal management. It proceeds slowly in the career of improvement, but it never retrogrades. It is impossible to fix limits to the power of organization to which a free and thinking people may attain.

But is it necessary on that account to raise the cry of alarm? Is Europe irrevocably doomed, like the continent of India, and all the islands of the globe, to support the insults of British morals, and of British arms?

We may set ourselves at ease. We have seen the English face to face. Napoleon procured them a momentary gleam of popularity in Europe; but Napoleon also passed the decree which will sooner or later destroy their pre-eminence over their civilized nations. Long wars have compelled nations to be sufficient to their own wants; these have taught them to expend their capital upon their own soil, in preference to risking it on distant expeditions. In both hemispheres, industry is making gigantic strides, guided by the lights of the age, and encouraged by the spirit of liberty. A more active production multiplies the enjoyments of the consumers under their own eyes, and limits the necessity of distant exchanges. The colonies are in a fair way to detach themselves from the mother countries. People are on their guard against the policy of a cabinet, the permanent interests of which are in opposition to those of the rest of the world. Losing every day the power of doing mischief by her intrigues, England has never been, and never will be, in a situation to attempt any thing considerable on the Continent by the mere force of her arms.

The profession of a soldier is repulsive to the feel-

ings of English citizens; the army costs enormous sums to feed, to equip, and to put in motion, and it is also difficult to recruit. If ever it becomes necessary, from the insufficiency of voluntary enlistments, to have recourse to a conscription to repair its losses, we should soon see it calling for a more liberal discipline, for civic rights, and for promotion; and it would then be no longer the army of the aristocracy. Its detachments are scattered over the four quarters of the globe; not a rock shows its head above the waves of the Mediterranean or the immense Atlantic ocean, where it does not deposit a few troops of soldiers; it is actually split for the progressive invasion of India. After such a dispersion, what remains for any great expedition upon the Continent? We have seen that the British Government only succeeded in bringing a corps of 50,000 native troops into action in the Spanish Peninsula, by keeping 500,000 men on foot, at home, and in its distant possessions.

Thus, the most numerous active army of the English would be 50,000 men. It presents itself suddenly on the most vulnerable points of the enemy's coast: the soldiers are landed; think you that the commander will burn his ships? Before he sets a foot on shore, prudence has prescribed to him the means of securing a re-embarkation; when a general is thinking of the possibility of being defeated, he is already as good as vanquished.

The first troops landed get possession of a fortified place, where provisions and ammunition are collected. The eyes of the soldiers continue long directed to their floating country; and when they have ceased to see the sea, they begin to be melancholy. Destitute of light troops, the army moves on blindly; of the country, the inhabitants, and their manners, it is entirely ignorant, and knows not how to learn any thing; weak battalions of women and children are intermingled with the fighting cohorts. The soldier never carried bread with him for more than three days; camp kettles and wooden bowls are never suspended from his back—these cooking utensils are loaded on the beasts of burden; other bat-horses carry the regimental equipages, the tents, the light baggage of the subalterns, the table-service, and the plate of the general officers; the lowest subaltern has several horses and several soldiers at his command. Behind the columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are long columns of waggons laden with the heavy baggage, the bread, the flour, the rum, the barley, and trusses of hay. An army so embarrassed with its equipments may be said rather to crawl than to march. When the day of battle comes, you will find you have to do with the soldiers of Alexander; but till then, the luxuries with which they are surrounded remind you of the army of Darius.

Nothing in the world so easy as to avoid, to

harrass, and to paralyse troops with this indolent organization. The privations and constant fatigues will, in the long run, wear out their spirits. The general whom they have to encounter may be allowed to retard the decisive moment as long as possible, and to wait until all the probabilities of victory are in his favour, before he gives or receives battle. Even then, should fortune prove false to valour and talent, all would not yet be lost. An English army, left entirely to itself, might conquer, but it would never know how to turn a victory to advantage; if, however, it happened to be itself defeated, at a distance from its point of departure, it would experience not merely a check, but the most dreadful of all calamities. In writing the history of the war in the Peninsula, that war in which the English hatred to Buonaparte showed itself so strongly, we shall have occasion to show how nearly the army of Great Britain had more than once met with such a catastrophe as would not have allowed a man to escape, to carry the news of it to London.

As we have already said, such a system inevitably circumscribes the talent of the general. His first duty is to be careful of the machine committed to his charge, completely wound up, so as not to wear it out by useless or extraneous movements. In his eyes the plans of operation will never have several aspects. A sound but limited judgment will be sufficient to direct him in the means of exe-

cution; he will prefer the defensive, which avails itself of all that has been foreseen, to the offensive, which, by its uncertain chances, requires more frequently the resources of genius. The war will be reduced to a series of bold strokes. In the eyes of an English general, the perfection of the art consists in bringing into the field fresh and well-conditioned troops, in posting them advantageously, and there coolly waiting for the enemy's attack.* On the day

* Lord Wellington has followed literally in his campaigns in the Peninsula, the ironical advice which the author of the charming little work, "*Advice to the Officers of the British Army*," has given to the commanders in chief. "Nothing is so commendable as generosity to an enemy. To pursue him vigorously after a victory would be taking advantage of his distress. It is enough for you to show that you can beat him whenever you think proper. You should always act openly and candidly with both friends and enemies. You should be cautious, therefore, never to steal a march, or lay an ambuscade. You should never attack the enemy during the night. Recollect what Hector said when he went to fight with Ajax: *Heaven, light us, and combat against us!* Should the enemy retreat, let him have the start of you several days, in order to show him that you can surprize him when you please. Who knows if so generous a proceeding will not induce him to halt? After he has succeeded in retreating to a place of safety, you may then go in pursuit of him with your whole army Never promote an intelligent officer; a hearty boon companion is all that is necessary to execute your orders. Any officer who has a grain of knowledge beyond the common, you should look upon as your personal enemy, for you may depend on it that he is laughing in his sleeve at both you and your manœuvres."

of our disaster, we saw these sons of Albion formed in square battalions in the plain between the wood of Hougomont and the village of Mount-Saint-John. To effect this compact formation they had doubled and re-doubled their ranks several times. The cavalry which supported them was cut to pieces, the fire of their artillery completely silenced. The general and staff officers were galloping from one square to another, not knowing where to find shelter. Carriages, wounded men, parks of reserve, and auxiliary troops, were all flying in disorder towards Brussels. Death was before them and in their ranks; disgrace in their rear. In this terrible situation, neither the bullets of the Imperial guard, discharged almost point-blank, nor the victorious cavalry of France, could make the least impression on the immoveable British infantry. One might have been almost tempted to fancy that it had rooted itself in the ground, but for the majestic movement which its battalions commenced some minutes after sunset, at the moment when the approach of the Prussian army apprized Wellington, that—thanks to numbers, thanks to the force of inert resistance, and as a reward for having contrived to draw up brave fellows in battle, —he had just achieved the most decisive victory of our age.

Yes! doubtless the instinctive determination which, even when it errs, is better than skilful hesitation; the strength of mind which no danger can

appal, the tenacity which carries off the prey by sticking to it to the last,—these are rare and sublime qualities, and where these are sufficient to secure the triumph of national interests, it is but justice to load with honours the privileged possessor of them. But the thinkers of all ages will not take upon trust the exaggeration of a glory so confined; they will point out the interval which separates the man of the profession from the man of genius. What similitude, in fact, can there be between the vulgar warrior who, favoured by the temper of his weapons, fences on beaten paths, and the demi-gods of the Iliad, who make three bounds and are at the end of their career? Great generals were always great, without accessaries, without attendants, and they will remain great in spite of adversity: they borrow not their lustre from institutions which existed before them, and which will live after them; quite the contrary, it is they who infuse lofty ideas into the minds of the multitude. Equal to themselves in the display of all the powers of the human mind, no species of elevation escapes from their immensity; such appeared, with different destinies, Hannibal and Cæsar among the ancients, Frederick and Napoleon among the moderns.

V I E W
OF THE
MILITARY AND POLITICAL STATE
OF THE
BELLIGERENT POWERS.

BOOK III.—PORTUGAL.

General notices on Portugal—Its incorporation into the Spanish Monarchy—Liberation from the yoke of Spain—Spanish Succession war—Consequences of the Methuen treaty—Political organization—Administration of Pombal—Formation of the army by the Count de Lippe—Government of Queen Mary—War with the French Republic—Government of the Prince of Brazil—Negociations with the French Executive Directory—Exclusive influence of England—Military establishment—Administration of the army—Relations with Spain and France—The Prince of Brazil declared Regent—War of 1801—Treaty of peace of Badajoz between Portugal and France—Plan for removing the Court of Lisbon to the Brazils—Neutrality of Portugal after the rupture of the treaty of Amiens—Illness of the Prince Regent—Arrival of an English fleet at the mouth of the Tagus—Apathy of the Portuguese Government.

BOOK III.

PORTUGAL.

As a boat is drawn along in the wake of the vessel to which it is attached, so for a century past has Portugal followed in the wake of England ; and yet, if there are in the civilized world two nations completely opposite to each other in physical constitution, complexion, character, prejudices, and disposition, they are the English and the Portuguese.

Portugal was called by the Romans Lusitania, and formed a portion of Iberia. It extends in the form of a parallelogram along the west coast of the Peninsula, being one hundred and thirty leagues in length from north to south, and from thirty to sixty in breadth. Its surface is nearly equal to one-fifth of that of Spain. Its population is in proportion more considerable : according to statements recently and carefully drawn up, it exceeds two million eight hundred thousand souls. In this number are not included the inhabitants of the trans-

marine dominions, who amount to twelve hundred thousand.

In the twelfth century, when armies of natives and adventurers reconquered, foot by foot, the Spanish soil, which had been long trodden by the Moors, Portugal became a distinct monarchy, like Castile, Navarre, and Arragon. Its princes were of French extraction, belonging to the first House of Burgundy, founded by a grandson of Hugh Capet. Several of them were men of activity and ability. They fought the Moors and the Castilians at the head of their subjects. After dangers incurred together by king and people in a legitimate defence, the one always gains renown, and the other some melioration in its social state: the Portuguese nation prospered. Having its principal seat near the mouths of the two great rivers, the Duero and Tagus, it was natural that its activity should be directed towards the sea. A government which must be called moderate, if compared with the contemporary governments in the rest of the Peninsula, attracted at intervals* the industry and capitals

* When the Jews were expelled from Spain in 1482 by Ferdinand and Isabella, Emanuel, King of Portugal, admitted them into his dominions, merely prohibiting the public exercise of their religion. More than thirty thousand families resorted thither. They paid a capitation tax of eight crowns per head, and threw large capitals into trade. But at that time the spirit of nations, like that of kings, was turned towards intolerance and persecution. The Portuguese Government proscribed the

which intolerance drove away from other kingdoms. Portugal covered the ocean with her fleets, and subjected to her laws the shores of India, and the finest portions of South America. After the world was enlarged by Christopher Columbus and Vasco

Jews in mass, fourteen years after it had afforded them an asylum. Those who did not quit the kingdom by the expiration of a certain time, were reduced to slavery, and their children were taken from them to be brought up in the Catholic religion. In 1506, two thousand Jews were massacred by the populace of Lisbon. In 1540, the Inquisition, introduced by the fanatic John III., began to burn alive such as were convicted of Judaism. In spite of this barbarous treatment, more than one-third of the Jewish emigrants remained in Portugal. Some, turning Christians, became so blended with the population, that the characteristic traits of their physiognomy are to be found even in persons of the highest birth. Others feigning conversion, have formed, as it were, a nation amidst the nation. They are to be met with throughout the whole kingdom, and especially in the mountains of Beira, where they are known by the name of new Christians, *Christaos novos*, in contradistinction to the ancient inhabitants, who assume the appellation of *Christaos velhos*.

The Marquis of Pombal procured an edict abolishing all distinctions between the old and new Christians. The latter, though baptized, and eternally adhering to the discipline of the Catholic church, still retain in their families some rites of the religion of Moses; for instance, the custom of sacrificing a lamb on Easter-day. They may also be recognized by their fondness for dealing in small wares, and for smuggling. Since Pombal's edict, new Christians are to be seen filling all sorts of posts, and several of them are invested with the order of Christ, the first order of knighthood in the kingdom.

de Gama, Lisbon took the place which Constantinople had held on the ancient continent; and as all the faculties of the human mind keep pace with each other, shortly after a European tribe had made the inhabitants of the countries which bounded the conquests of Alexander, adopt its language; that language, ennobled by victory, produced an epic poem, ancient in its form, and national in its subject. Camoens is the poet of his country and of glory. His *Lusiad* combines with the magnificence of the *Iliad* somewhat of the charms of the *Odyssey*.

The elevation to which Portugal raised herself was owing to her excellent institutions, some of which still subsist at the moment in which we are writing. Born soldiers, the men of this country remain till the age of sixty years subject to the obligation of military service for the defence of their homes. The male population has been always divided into companies of two hundred and fifty men, called *ordenances*, each of which has a captain, an ensign, a sergeant, an officer of justice, *meirinho*, a clerk, and ten corporals. The captain is bound to deliver to the ensign, whenever the company is called together, a flag with the national colours, blue and red, and to be attended by one of his servants, whom he has had instructed to beat the drum. Those who possess the means of keeping horses, form corps of mounted *ordenances*. The companies of the same district are under the

command of a chief named *capitão mor*, who reviews them at least twice a year. The feudal lord, when resident on the spot, is *capitão mor* by right. In his absence, another is appointed by the King, who always selects from among the principal tenants in the district. The captain mor, the major, *sargento mor*, his second, and the captains of companies take an oath, in the presence of the chief magistrate, *corregidor da comarca*, to keep the population in arms, to fight at their head, to obey the commands of the sovereign, to respect the laws, and not to employ the *ordenances* for any other purpose whatsoever than the service of the king. In consequence of the liberty to shoot, and the vicinity of sea-ports, many of the peasants are furnished with fire-arms and gunpowder; others have a long stick, at the end of which is fastened a bayonet, or at least a piece of sharp-pointed iron. The *chueco*, which is the name given to this species of pike, is considered in Portugal as a piece of household furniture.

Such a system of defence, founded on the employment of an armed population, is perfectly adapted to the nature of the country. It consists entirely of steep mountains, across which good care has been taken not to make communications. The rivers are without bridges. Gothic or Moorish castles are perched on the tops of rocks. The smallest hamlets, *villas*, are surrounded with walls.

The laurels which overshadow the cradle of the

monarchy were gathered by the armed dependents of feudality and by the companies of *ordenances*. Corps of volunteers were raised for distant expeditions. Ever since the conclusion of the fifteenth century there have been permanent troops. Agreeably to the axiom, that every Portuguese owed himself and all that he possessed to the country, the army was recruited by ballot, and no foreigner was admitted into the ranks of the soldiers.

The prosperity of Portugal was not destined to be lasting. One day, the King Don Sebastian, a rash young prince, crossed the sea at the head of an army, raised at a great expense, with the intention of hurling the Emperor of Morocco from his throne, and setting up another in his stead. The Musulmans awaited the Portuguese in the sands of Alcazarquivir, at a little distance from the port of Larache. The battle was fought on the 4th of August, 1574. The King, his nobility, and his soldiers perished, and with them the Portuguese glories in the four quarters of the world.* Thirty years ago people

* Don Sebastian is the Messiah of the Portuguese. They long believed that this prince, slain in the battle of Alcazarquivir, in Africa, at the age of twenty-four years, was still alive. They waited for his re-appearance upwards of sixty years, and some of them are expecting it to this day. This absurd opinion has its source in the obscurity of the circumstances which attended the death of the King, and particularly in the calamities which overwhelmed the country in consequence of the disaster

could scarcely form a conception of those prodigious calamities which consign a state to the tomb in the space of a few hours; but we, of the nineteenth century, have learned by fatal experience to be less incredulous.

At the time of the disaster of Alcazar, all the crowns of Spain were united on the head of the great-grandson of Ferdinand and Isabella; and Philip II. possessed, besides, the rich inheritance of the house of Burgundy, and the better portion of Italy. After the brief two years' reign of Cardinal Henry, great-uncle and successor to Don Sebastian, Philip claimed the throne of Braganza in virtue of rights which the famous Duke of Alba and forty thousand soldiers were sent to enforce. Portugal was incorporated with the great monarchy. The Spanish troops occupied the fortresses and castles. The arsenal of Lisbon was drained of artillery and ammunition. There was no longer either commerce, arts, or navy. The gold of India and Brazil poured into Madrid. The spirit of enterprize was extin-

of Alcazar. The partizans of independence had an interest in propagating the notion, that the Spanish domination was but a temporary state, and encouraging the insulted nation to look to futurity for an avenger. They proved so successful, that in the first years of the seventeenth century, there were frequently seen Sebastianists ready to lend sums of money, on condition of being paid double or treble the amount when King Sebastian should re-appear.

guished. The population decreased. What liberty was left was engulfed in the wreck of the national independence. Literature itself, which warmed the hearts of the citizens, and in which a certain degree of bombast was not unbecoming, when it had to record the achievements of heroes,—literature lost its colour and its force. How could the Spanish empire, ready to tumble in pieces, have preserved a province, then its subject, and lately its enemy, from a rapid decay?

Meanwhile, the national recollection still lived in some generous souls. After sixty years of oppression and disgrace, the Portuguese shook off their foreign yoke. In the glorious conspiracy of 1640, several voices were lifted up to propose the formation of a republic. This proposal came two centuries too early. A King of the national dynasty was selected. He was the legitimate monarch—he, whom the unanimous wishes of his subjects called to the throne.

There was no longer an army, and the Portuguese were obliged to combat their former masters. They collected in haste an infantry badly appointed and badly paid, which nevertheless fought well; but it was liable to disband itself after a battle,* or at the

* In 1659, the Portuguese, under the command of Don Antonio de Meneza, Marquis of Marialva, gained a great victory over the Spaniards, commanded by Don Louis de Haro, the favourite of Philip IV. The day after the battle, the Portuguese general

end of a campaign. The cavalry, composed of cuirassiers and light horse, manifested ardour, but was deficient in order and instruction. The troops marched and encamped in the manner of the Turks. Certain general officers regulated the operations of war by horoscopes constructed by judicial astrologers; and the soldiers had less confidence in the talents of their leaders than in the powerful intercession of St. Anthony of Padua, born generalissimo of the Portuguese army.*

prepared to pursue the enemy, but his army had disappeared. He was left without either friends or foes.

The Portuguese army acknowledges for its generalissimo and patron the great St. Anthony of Lisbon, erroneously and abusively called, out of Portugal, St. Anthony of Padua. He had never been a soldier while living, but it was resolved he should bear arms after his death. Accordingly, on the 24th of January, 1668, Don Pedro II., then Regent of the kingdom, ordered St. Anthony to be enrolled as a private in the regiment of Lagos (the second infantry). In Portugal, every man on entering the service has a surety who engages to find a substitute for him if he should desert his colours. The Blessed Virgin was accepted as the surety for St. Anthony. The new recruit never drew down upon himself either flogging or imprisonment: on the contrary, he displayed continual proofs of prudence and sanctity, so that on the 12th of September 1683, he was promoted to the rank of captain in the same regiment.

During the Spanish succession war, St. Anthony demonstrated by many miracles that he deserved the rank which had been conferred on him. One day, among others, the regiment of Lagos was to march from Olivenza to Jerumenha. The Spaniards in garrison at Badajoz were apprized of it, and formed an

Recourse was had to foreign officers. Some came from England, but more from France. Frederic Count Schomberg, the pupil and friend of Turenne, gained victories over the Spaniards in the battles of ambuscade near Merinillas, for the purpose of attacking the Portuguese during the march. The latter, however, reached Jerumenha without striking a blow. Nor did this circumstance astonish any one, when it was known that St. Anthony had been seen on the road marching at the head of the first platoon.

This story passed for fact during the reign of John V. Doubts began to be thrown upon it in Pombal's administration. The saint nevertheless retained his rank. On the accession of Queen Mary, the Colonel of the regiment of Lagos stated in a memoir, supported by documents, that St. Anthony was the oldest captain, not only in that corps, but in the whole army, and that in fact, he had then been a captain ninety years. After such a length of service, he thought the least that could be done was to appoint him major: but the court did more, and by a royal decree of the month of January 1780, St. Anthony of Padua received a commission of general officer.

This promotion was purely honorary. The general's name remained inscribed in the list of the regiment of Lagos as captain, and his annual pay of three hundred thousand reas, (about 80% sterling,) as fixed by Don Pedro II., continued to be received in his name. This sum was expended in decorating his chapel, and defraying the cost of his festival.

After the invasion of Portugal by the French in 1807, General Junot desired to have a statement of the brevets, commissions, and services of St. Anthony. He was determined not to be less generous to him than the sovereigns of Portugal had been; the pay of the old captain of Lagos was scrupulously delivered to the colonel till the moment when, by the new organization of the Portuguese army, the regiment ceased to exist.

Ameixial and Montes Claros, which saved the kingdom. He taught the Portuguese to throw up entrenchments, to encamp in line, and to make flank marches on one or more columns, for the purpose of forming quickly in order of battle, by one to right or one to left: his methods and doctrines had complete success in the country.

Schomberg was of opinion that places of safety were necessary for a state which ought to put more confidence in the courage and virtue of the citizens than in the skill and discipline of its army. He rebuilt a number of defensive towers called *Atalayas*,* which were falling into ruin. To his influence are owing the fortresses which stud the Alemtejo,† the least impenetrable of the provinces of Portugal.

* *Atalaya* is an ancient Arabic word which signifies *vidette*. The Portuguese and Spaniards have retained it to denote towers placed in general on elevated points, from which all that passes in a great extent of country may be observed. The frontiers of Portugal are bordered by *atalayas*. They are embattled towers, the walls of which are thick and solid. They have no door, but are entered by means of a ladder, which is afterwards drawn up by those within. In Schomberg's time each *atalaya* had a garrison of fifteen or twenty men. A piece of heavy cannon in battery on the platform served to defend the post, and also to apprize the country-people of the approach of the enemy. Don John of Austria, the natural son of Philip IV. was accustomed to order the commandants of the Portuguese *atalayas*, who dared resist his army, to be hanged.

† Country beyond the Tagus, from the words *alem*, beyond, and *Tejo*, Tagus.

French engineers, as Nicolas de Langres and Alain Mannesson-Mallet,* the Parisian, built or made additions to the fortifications and outworks of Evora, Jerumenha, Arronches, Estremos, Olivenza, and St. Ubes. An indefatigable engineer had even commenced an inclosure round Lisbon which was to have had thirty bastions on the land-side only. Some of the masonry still exists at the western extremity of the city.

The war of the Acclamation (such is the name given in Portugal to the war consequent on the revolution of 1640) lasted twenty-seven years. The valuable institution of the *ordenances* had survived unimpaired the yoke of the Spaniards; and for twenty-seven campaigns the peasants of the frontiers fought more frequently and more obstinately than the army of the King. Notwithstanding their efforts, and dilapidated as was the monarchy of Philip IV., the councils of that prince would never, but for the interference of France and England, have consented to treat with those whom they termed miserable rebels.

By the treaty signed at Lisbon in 1688, Spain recognized the independence of Portugal; but that kingdom, on resuming its place among the powers,

* Alain Mannesson-Mallet had the title of Engineer of the Camps and Armies of the King of Portugal, and Sergeant-Major of Artillery in the province of Alemtejo. He wrote a treatise on fortifications, entitled: *Les Travaux de Mars*.

did not recover its former splendour. Its colonial empire was reduced to some small islands in the Atlantic, a few factories on the coasts of Africa and Asia, and Brasil, an immense and productive possession, but which the Dutch disputed with them. European Portugal was drained of men and money. Don Pedro II. who governed the State during the malady of his brother King Alphonso VI., kept on foot only five thousand troops of the line, half of them cavalry, and a body of ten thousand militia, who served during the three summer months only, and then returned to their homes.

Portugal was obliged to continue to look abroad for support against the ambition of Spain. She had long the good fortune to retain the friendship of both France and England, while those two powers, to whom she owed equal gratitude, were almost always at variance with each other. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the dispute respecting the succession of Charles II. kindled a general war. The court of Lisbon was too near the focus of the quarrel to be able to remain neuter. It was not from inclination that the Portuguese declared themselves in favour of England; but the alliance of the greatest maritime power was necessary to them on account of their colonies. Besides, the establishment of the house of Bourbon on the throne of Spain deranged the balance of power in Europe, and changed the relations of Portugal with France,

After two years' hesitation, Don Pedro II. joined the coalition against Louis XIV. In 1703 he concluded with England the Methuen treaty, so called from the name of one of the negociators * by whom it was signed.

The Portuguese army, on the point of taking the field, had preserved neither military spirit nor discipline; but the nation was faithful to its ancient customs. When Philip V. entered Beyra, in 1704, at the head of the armies of France and Spain, and bringing with him Marshal de Berwick to command them, the whole province flew to arms. The troops of the line appeared no better than peasants, because they had not the uniformity produced by a good organization; and the peasants resembled soldiers, such was the military ardour which they displayed. The garrisoned places almost all surrendered at the first summons, and the governors of some of them begged pardon for having presumed to fire their cannon, *not being aware of the presence of the King of Spain, to whom they had no intention of showing any want of respect.* Such are the very terms quoted in Berwick's Memoirs, † and the Marshal expresses his surprize that places capable of making resistance had submitted with such facility, while the small towns,

* Sir John Methuen, Ambassador Extraordinary from England at Lisbon.

† See *Memoires du Marechal de Bernick*. Paris edition, tom i. p. 237-8.

villages, and open places, through which the army passed, defended themselves to the last extremity, and were not afraid of drawing upon them fire and sword by this honourable conduct,

The energy of the people and the arrival of English and Dutch troops saved Portugal: the enemy evacuated it, after having dismantled several fortresses on the right bank of the Tagus. During the other campaigns, the French and Spanish army, attacked at the same time at the two extremities of the Peninsula, was not in a condition to withstand its numerous foes in all quarters with equal success. Twice did the Portuguese *quinas** revenge at Madrid the long-continued insult which they had received from the Castilian flag, while it waved for sixty years on the towers of Lisbon.

This momentary splendour was not produced by the energy of the Government. It never had more than thirty thousand troops of the line, and they were of a wretched kind. At this period, as during the campaigns of the Acclamation, the most obstinate warfare was carried on between the inhabitants of the frontiers of the kingdoms of Portugal and Spain.

The Methuen treaty was made for peace as well

* The five scutcheons charged with five silver besants, which figure in the arms of Portugal, are called *quinas*. For the origin of these arms see a note to the first book.

as war. It contained but two articles. By the one Portugal agreed to admit the woollens of England; by the other Great Britain engaged to lay one-third less duty on Portuguese wines than on the wines of other countries. From this apparently reciprocal stipulation has sprung the economical system under which Portugal has lived for a century past, and still lives. It was impossible for the manufactures of the country, which were then still in their infancy, to support the competition with an already advanced industry. The English took care to clothe the Portuguese with their cloths, their linens, and their leather; to supply them with corn from the North, and the salt fish and cod of Newfoundland, which, with olives, constitute the chief part of the food of the lower orders; and to furnish the upper classes exclusively with the superfluities of luxury. They took in exchange some productions of the country, such as Port wine and oranges, and in a much more considerable proportion, the cotton, rare woods, gold-dust, and other productions of Brasil. It was a religious and political axiom, that labour did not become the wealthy, and that mankind ought to be content with the division which God has made of his bounty among nations, by giving industry to the one and the precious metals to the other. The Portuguese did not see that treasures buried at the distance of two thousand leagues from their country might one day slip away from them. The kingdom,

at the same time that it fell politically into the bondage of England, became, by commercial relations, the slave of its own colony.

There were at that time in the same nation, as it were, two populations, separated by position and interest; namely, the population of the country, neglected, diminished, and impoverished; and the population, increasing in number and wealth, of two cities happily situated, into which the profits arising from trade and the produce of the colonies were poured. Lisbon and Oporto were the accomplices of England in the ruin of the labourer and artisan. Lisbon, in particular, by reason of its prodigious population, of nearly three hundred thousand souls, belongs less to European Portugal than to the commercial and colonial system of the Portuguese empire. To no purpose then, whatever, would an enemy overrun, ravage, and subdue the provinces. So long as the capital is not reduced, all that has been done will count for nothing in the negotiations which are to lead to a definitive arrangement.

The Spanish Succession-war was followed by fifty years of peace, at the expiration of which a change, equivalent to a revolution, took place in the exercise of power. Though the feudal system had been long overthrown, the national assemblies, called *Cortes*, fallen into disuse, and the kings become absolute sovereigns,* the government was incessantly thwart-

* See note at the end of this volume.

ed in its career by the aristocracy and the monks. The Fidalgoes * (such is the name given to the

* Fidalgo comes from *filho de algo*, literally *son of something*. Though this name belongs to all the nobles indiscriminately, custom has made it the more peculiar distinction of families containing one or more titled personages. The Fidalgoes call themselves *Fidalgos da Casa Real*, Fidalgoes of the King's Household; and in fact, the sovereign keeps them in exclusive dependence: titles, commanderies, places, pensions, grants of land, all come to them from the crown. Titles are of three kinds; for life, for a certain number of generations, or for ever. Even in the last case, the son requires the favour of the monarch to succeed his father. The Fidalgoes are bound to a great number of court observances. They can neither travel nor marry without the royal permission. The entrance of their sons into the world is marked by the performance of some household service for the prince, and procures these young men the title of *Moço Fidalgo*, *Bachelor Fidalgo*.

Though the Portuguese Fidalgoiship is not of very ancient date, and is frequently tainted with bastardy, still no nobility in the world is vainer of the splendour of its origin. Compared with them, the Spanish grandees would pass for patterns of humility. King Don Sebastian, before he set out on his expedition to Africa, desired an interview at Our Lady's of Guadalupe with his uncle Philip II. King of Castile. The Duke of Alva was sent from Madrid, and Count de Rodondo from Lisbon, to make arrangements for the interview. "Who will accompany your King?" enquired the proud Spaniard, exalted so high by birth and glory. "With the King, my master, there will come," replied the Portuguese, "the Duke of Braganza, the Duke of Aveyro, the Marquis of Villa Real, and an infinite multitude of *fidalgos razos*, plain gentlemen, like me and you."

Portugal has its most noble houses, or which pretend to be so, because they had seats in the ancient Cortes. The dukes, marquesses, and counts, are styled Grandees of the kingdom. Many

high nobility in Portugal) resemble the rebel angels of Scripture, who, being hurled from their celestial abode by the Almighty, revenge themselves for their fall by doing evil to mankind. It would be vain to seek in most of them the virtues of their ancestors : it is even difficult to trace historical recollections amidst the court-titles under which the illustrious names of Castro, Pereyra, Menezes, &c. are buried. Almost all the titled nobility reside at Lisbon, where they squander away ample incomes, de-

very ancient families, nevertheless, remain unknown in the northern provinces, while men of obscure birth, and invested with new titles, place themselves at Lisbon in the train of the high nobility.

The *Don*, which every body assumes in Spain, is reserved in Portugal for members of the reigning family, fidalgoes descended from illegitimate branches of the blood royal, and a small number of houses. From the presence or absence of the *Don* no conclusion, however, can be drawn for or against the illustriousness of great families ; witness the saying,—

“ Mello con Don, et Menezes sin elle,
Nao facais cazo delle.”

“ *Take no account of Mello with Don, and Menezes without.*”

The bishops are the only persons to whom the *Don* is given otherwise than by right of birth.

In Portugal, and among persons of all conditions, there prevails an absolute anarchy of proper names. One calls himself after his father, another after his mother. This assumes the name of his estate ; a second that of the place of his birth ; and a third that of his benefactor. Many never took any other than their baptismal names. We shall take care in our history to state the entire series of the denominations, by means of which every one may recognize the persons of whom we shall have to treat.

rived (not from their patrimonies, for the vast territorial possessions are shared by a very small number of families, but) from public offices, commanderies instituted in former times to reward military valour, donations and largesses of the sovereign, and above all, the sale of their recommendations for money.* Despising the laws of morality which bind other citizens, the Fidalgoes consider themselves as not possessing any influence but when they do or obtain things contrary to the laws. In the time of John IV., his two sons, and John V., his grandson, they were seen carrying on open war against the social body. Their houses served for repositories of contraband goods, banks for illicit games, retreats for criminals. They kept in their pay assassins disguised under the name and livery of lacqueys. They frequently ran about the streets of the capital at night at the head of armed bands, carrying off fe-

* The Portuguese have a particular term, *empenho*, which expresses more strongly than the word *recommendation*, that kind of solicitude which is ever ready to interfere in matters of justice as well as of administration. It is admitted that an *empenho* has no merit, except when it procures a favour for some one who does not deserve it, or withdraws a culprit from the penalty of the law. The Fidalgoes have received from their fathers the precept to protect vagabonds. In the time of their power it was that they might have instruments of crime at their disposal; now-a-days it is from habit, and even out of charity: "We must," say they, "assist those to whom nobody affords protection."

males and attacking passengers; and the descendants of the great Albuquerque made it their glory to come off stained with blood from these ignoble combats.

The excesses with which the priests might justly be reproached, were not of the same nature. At no time had the secular clergy in Portugal a strong political consistence. The convents are not so numerous there as in Spain. At Lisbon the clerical importance was diminished by the arrogant predominance of the nobles, and by the activity of the commercial class. Though their association with the English taught the people to make a difference between heretics and demons, still a most disgraceful ignorance and superstition pervaded the lower classes. The monks, for the purpose of attaching to themselves the multitude, who from their nature are strongly tenacious of practices with which they are incessantly engaged, successively overloaded the external worship with ceremonies, and sprinkled the country with sanctuaries and wonder-working virgins. The monopoly of public instruction was granted to them. If the Inquisition appeared to slumber, it was not because its ministers were less zealous than their predecessors for torturing and burning such as had the misfortune to fall into their hands; but because the Jews, and the arch-heretics of the eighteenth century had lost the taste for martyrdom. When the Holy Office caught them in the fact, they chose

rather to recant and do penance, than to earn by excruciating torments in this world the presumed happiness of the next.

Joseph ascended the throne on the 31st of July, 1750. Not quite such a cipher as our Louis XIII. chance gave him a minister as able and more absolute if possible than the Cardinal de Richelieu. If the misfortunes or the errors of two centuries could have been repaired by the profound politics of a single reign, and if time in its rapid progress did not irrevocably change the relative situation of States, Jose Sebastino Carvalho, Marquis of Pombal,* would have restored to Portugal the times of John II. and Emanuel. His contemporaries reproached him with a violent and cruel disposition, and the frequent repetition of strokes of state policy. Liberal men cannot forgive him for having set up, in opposition to the judicial power, and on the wreck of municipal institutions, ministerial despotism, and especially that jealous police, which is more injurious to individual liberty than the disorders which it undertakes to repress are detrimental to the public welfare.

It is the property of certain remedies not to manifest their efficacy till long after they have been administered. The Portuguese at the present day

* Pombal is one of the heads of that school which says "Every thing for the people, nothing by the people." These tutors of nations have an interest in prolonging the infancy of their pupils.

always speak of him as the *Great Pombal*. You cannot stir a step in the country without meeting with some traces of his genius, in the social organization, as well as in material objects. During his ministry the revenue of the crown was increased without oppressing the people ; agriculture appeared to revive, and the encouragement of the Government produced some manufactures. The nobles, who would not behave as citizens, were made to feel that they were but subjects. Pombal gave the signal for the European war against the Jesuits ; he forbade the monks to receive novices ; he rendered the Inquisition subordinate to the civil authority. The censorship of books was taken from it ; the works of Voltaire and Montesquieu have in consequence been seen even in the monastic libraries, lovingly ranged on the same shelves with the *Summa* of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the dusty tomes of the Seraphic doctor.

Pombal had no need of soldiers for the accomplishment of his designs, and was from education a stranger to the profession of arms ; but he wished the power of his master to be equally respected abroad and at home. The English, having become almost necessary allies for Portugal, heard a language which was no longer that of vassalage. To maintain a suitable attitude, a military establishment by land and sea was requisite. This was evident to every one, when the family compact, concluded in

1761 between France and Spain, forced the court of Lisbon to enter into the quarrel which had for five years kept the powers of Europe in arms.

Portugal had no longer an army. After the Succession-war, John V. employed his infantry in extracting from the quarries, and drawing the stones destined for the erection of the palace-convent of Mafra, which he was building upon the model of the Escorial. Half the soldiers had neither muskets nor uniforms. The Fidalgoes held, as if by inheritance, the ranks of generals and colonels, without deigning to perform their functions, and they either sold the subaltern commissions, or gave them to their valets. The fortresses, dismantled by the French and Spaniards, or ruined by time, had not been rebuilt. The arsenals were empty. A peace of forty-eight years had effaced the very traditions of war, and it was scarcely known what was the use of an army.

General Schaumburg-Lippe,* immediate Count of the German empire, was selected to restore the Portuguese army. He had, during the campaigns in Hanover, commanded with distinction the artillery of the army of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Scarcely had he arrived in Portugal when he was obliged to hasten to the defence of the menaced frontiers. His army was composed of nine or ten

* The Portuguese still call Lippe *o Grande Conde*, as they call Pombal *o Gran Marquez*.

thousand Portuguese, who, not knowing, were mistrustful of him; and five or six thousand English and Irish, yielding a reluctant obedience. He had to face forty thousand Spaniards, commanded by the Count d'Aranda, and officered by chiefs, most of whom had made the campaigns in Italy; and an auxiliary corps of twelve French battalions, under the orders of the Prince de Beauvau.

With such a disproportionate force Count Lippe could not be expected to fight battles. He made a campaign of marches and positions, and found means to turn to his advantage the patriotism of the peasantry, as well as the incredible difficulties presented at every point by the country comprised between the Duero and the Tagus.* His talents were seconded by the manœuvres of diplomacy. After a campaign of some months, the French and Spanish army obtained no other advantage than the possession of Almeida.

The war of 1762 had been but a flash. The first moments of peace were devoted to the creation of a real army. The Portuguese are of the right stuff for soldiers: they are sober, disposed to war, and cor-

* Count Lippe Schaumburg left a narrative of his campaign in 1762, written in French: It was translated into the Portuguese language and printed in 1812, in the *Investigador*, a monthly journal published in London. It is the best work that has been written on war in Portugal, considered in its relations with the topography of the country.

dially detest the Spaniards. Besides, the facility of making levies to the utmost from among the population, and keeping the men as long as you please under their colours, sets no other limits to the extension of the military establishment than the distress of the finances. Count Lippe formed twenty-four regiments of infantry, (exclusive of three foreign regiments, which were not long kept up,) twelve of cavalry, and four of artillery, on the footing of the Prussian troops, at that time reputed the best in Europe. Under his direction two colonels, Hollard and Valleré, the one a Swiss and the other a Frenchman, organized a train of artillery for battle, light and appropriate to a mountainous country. Count Lippe passed the years 1762 and 1763 in Portugal, and again made his appearance there in 1767:—it was not enough to put the finishing hand to his work. He left a code of military regulations—*Regulamento para o exercicio e disciplina dos regimentos de infantaria dos exercitos de Sua Mayestad Fidelissima*, which was followed till of late. His name is retained by a fort built under his direction to complete the works of Elvas.

The new army of Portugal, however, might be compared to a pyramid which is deficient at the top and the base. The natives were not thought to be skilful or steady enough to be entrusted with the destinies of their own country, and by an extraordinary inconsistency, in a service in which foreigners

are not admitted to the honour of carrying the musket, the chiefs and all who were entrusted with the principal details of execution, were Germans, Swiss, French, and English, drawn thither by avarice, ambition, or the spirit of adventure.

Count Lippe, though a man of intelligence and tact, had not made himself intimately acquainted with Portugal: he had constructed his system without consulting the particular laws, manners, and circumstances of the nation for which it was designed. The methods of the Prussian school are nothing else but means more or less efficacious for working an army; but love of country, virtues, and even popular prejudices, must be its real foundation. Mechanical processes imported from Germany were not adapted to an ardent but inconstant people. Count Lippe set but little value on the militia, which he termed amphibious bodies; and, as a matter of course, he felt still greater contempt for the armed peasantry.

It was nevertheless that indocile host of *ordnances* rather than the secrets of strategy, which in 1762 paralyzed the Count d'Aranda's Spaniards, and the Prince of Beauvau's Frenchmen. The most skilful general will not long maintain himself in mountains, where the inexhaustible energy of an armed population is interposed between the acting army and its base of operations. The age in which we live, this age of universal wars and centralized

power, has opened under auspices fatal to small states. We know not how much longer the Portuguese will form a nation ; but at any rate we are not afraid to predict, that any military organization which shall not embrace the regular army, or which shall put it under foreign officers, may serve for a certain time and under certain circumstances, but must before long fall to pieces of itself. Woe to those who rely upon assistance from abroad ! Woe to those who pretend to defend their territory merely with the surplus of the population ! As for the Portuguese, who are called to fight the Spaniards at the rate of one against five, it is absolutely necessary that they should be always ready to set their whole population in motion. They require a system in which the troops of the line, the militia, the *ordenances*, the public spirit, the national habits, the topography, the old and new fortresses, shall all be combined, with a just appreciation of their respective value. The salvation of a nation of mountaineers rests on two magic words :—*country* and *liberty*.

The military establishment, alternately cultivated and neglected according to the changes in politics, dragged on till the period of which we have undertaken to write the history, according to the system framed by Count Lippe. In the course of the French revolution it underwent some modifications, which will be described in their proper places.

King Joseph died in 1777. The Salic law has not crossed the Pyrenees, and in the kingdoms of the Peninsula, females in the direct line have in all ages inherited the throne to the préjudice of the males of the collateral branch. Thus it happened to be a woman who succeeded Joseph. A re-action instantaneously took place. The old minister was persecuted. The Fidalgoes and the priests once more usurped power: the former resumed their course of venal intrigues and scandalous patronage. They rushed upon the public treasury, sometimes upon pretext of ancient donations which a strong government had taken back as illegal, sometimes claiming arrears of pensions which a rigid liquidation had suppressed. The latter again opened the cloisters, strove to rekindle the fires of the Inquisition, and caused the censorship of books to be restored to that absurd tribunal. But it was too late. A whole generation had imbibed the poison of philosophy. At the first *auto-da-fé* which was held, though there were neither Jews nor heretics burned, enlightened persons manifested a discontent, and the populace an indifference, which took away the inclination to begin again.

Queen Mary was a virtuous princess. The mildness of her disposition prevented the re-action from being bloody. She has been highly praised for encouraging the arts and sciences; but if she continued some of the useful works of her father, she was also guilty of some pious extravagances. What was

left of Pombal's savings was expended in the erection of churches and convents in Lisbon, where there were already a hundred monasteries and two hundred churches. One of these edifices alone, a nunnery dedicated to the heart of Jesus, *convento do Coração de Jesu*, cost nine millions of crusadoes,* or little short of a million sterling. The Queen's confessor, Don Jose Maria de Mello, since appointed Bishop of the Algarves and Inquisitor-general, was reputed to exercise over his penitent that empire which devout females, on the approach of old age, usually suffer those who direct their consciences to assume. An influence of this nature could not be favourable to liberty. Accordingly, when the demolition of Pombal's work was set about, it was not his illiberal and arbitrary arrangements that were attacked with most vigour. The ministers retained their exorbitant attributions. The government of Portugal exhibited the monstrous medley of the suggestions of fanaticism feebly repelled; the inordinate oppression of an aristocracy which is not even constituted a political aristocracy; and the harshness of a legal despotism, a thousand times more intolerable in a small state than in a large one.

Such was the situation of the kingdom when the French Revolution began to convulse Europe. The

* The crusadoe is a silver coin of the value of two francs fifty centimes, French money, or 2s. 1d. English.

governors of Portugal were not sharp-sighted enough to perceive at a distance the incursions of foreign troops. Their attention was drawn by the danger which appeared most urgent. The police and the clergy united against the freemasons and the philosophers, considered as the propagators of revolutionary principles. In America, the governor of Portuguese Guyana cut off the neighbourly intercourse with French Guyana, that the negroes of the two colonies might not communicate with one another. The court of Lisbon rejected proposals of neutrality, which were addressed to it by the National Convention. It could scarcely have abstained from taking part in a league into which England and Spain had entered.

A squadron of nine ships of the line was placed at the disposal of the British government ; and six regiments of infantry, with a suitable train of artillery, went by sea to join the Spanish army of the Pyrenees. The vessels rotted without honour in the harbour of Portsmouth. The auxiliary corps served with distinction along with battalions which had long been their enemies. Lieutenant-general Joao Forbes Skallater, one of the pupils of Lippe, commanded it. He had for adjutant-general Count d'Assumar, afterwards Marquis d'Alorne. After the fall of Pombal, the grandes had taken a liking to the service. Several Fidalgoes accompanied the expedition as volunteers. The Portuguese arrived

at the place of rendezvous in Roussillon time enough to contribute to the winning of the battle of Ceret, on the 26th of November, 1793. The French affairs were then at the worst on this frontier. A few months afterwards the Republic everywhere assumed a triumphant attitude. The Spaniards were put to the rout, and lost fortresses and ground in Catalonia. The auxiliary corps had its share in the general distress ; in either fortune the French considered it as the flower of the army which they had to encounter.

In 1795, Spain made peace with France, and offered her mediation in favour of Portugal. The treaty of Basle, at the distance of a year, was succeeded by the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded at St. Ildefonso. The French Republic, young in years and laden with victories, had soon no other enemy on the Continent than the small kingdom of Portugal.

The political system of the cabinet of Lisbon had till then been grounded on plausible motives. The house of Braganza, a junior and bastard branch of the royal family of France, could not with decency show an eagerness to be the first to recognize the new Republic ; it could not well do otherwise than place itself at the tail of the league of kings. In sending its soldiers, agreeably to the interests of the moment, to fight at the Pyrenees, it had merely defended its own frontiers.

But six years of war had created other rela-

tions, and could not but lead to other combinations. The question now was, whether Portugal, with her feeble army and wretched government, should expose herself to the combined efforts of France and Spain, or renounce her alliance with England?

For several years past the Queen had been afflicted with mental derangement, under different degrees of which several of her ancestors had laboured. As the malady became continually more and more aggravated, it was resolved in the Council of State, that, from the month of July 1796, the direction of public affairs should be committed to other hands. Don John, the second son of Mary, was now, by the death of his elder brother, presumptive heir to the crown. A wretched education had narrowed the mind of this prince. In the most superstitious country in Europe, his passion for religious ceremonies was spoken of with astonishment.* Distrustful and a stickler for trifles, he had neither sufficient capacity to guide himself by his own understanding, nor resolution to be guided by another; for it is a sign of some strength of mind in a king to desire constantly what is desired by the man in whom he puts confidence. The Prince of Brazil was never known to have either mistress or favourite; but he frequently changed his confessor. Hence a capricious will, influenced by the subalterns admitted in considerable

* He chanted vespers and matins, and had organs of the greatest beauty erected in the convent of Mafra.

numbers to his familiarity. The expression of timidity was legible in his countenance. His awkward personal habits and his difficulty in speaking excited kind commiseration rather than respect. Although a good son and a good father, he was deficient in all that constitutes a good king.

Thus the counsels were not directed by the personal opinions of the sovereign. The Marquis de Ponte de Lima, an upright and humane old man, but weak and conceited of his nobility, was at the head of the cabinet. To him had been committed the finances of the kingdom, though the tribunals had judged him incapable of managing the possessions of his house. Martino de Mello, a morose and eccentric person, had the department of marine and the colonies. The foreign affairs and war were in the hands of Luiz Pinto de Souza Coutinho, formerly ambassador in London. These three ministers belonged to the high aristocracy, and professed a decided antipathy to revolutionary France. Jose de Scabra da Silva, secretary of state for the interior, made a parade of independent sentiments. Caustic in language and harsh in manner, Scabra was not a friend to liberty; but he deplored the wretched state of affairs, the meannesses, and the intrigues; and though he had been cruelly persecuted for fifteen years by Pombal, he had not abjured the doctrines of the school to which the first success of his political career was owing. In 1796

Don Rodrigo de Souza succeeded Martino de Mello. The influence of the cabinet of St. James's daily pressed more heavily on the cabinet of Lisbon. It was not shaken when, at the death of the Marquis de Ponte de Lima, the post of prime minister was conferred on the Duke de Lafoës. This nobleman, the son of a legitimatized bastard of the King Don Pedro II., had nevertheless always manifested a predilection for France and the French.

Behind the secretaries of state was a man, who, though he had no seat in the cabinet, was yet more powerful than the ministers themselves. Diego Ignacio de Pina Manique, superintendent-general of the police, transacted business directly with the Prince of Brazil, and took delight in alarming him by pretended conspiracies, that he might afterwards have the merit of soothing his fears. He harassed with vexations the foreigners settled in Lisbon, and all persons who were suspected of liberal principles; as if the alienation of the hearts of the most enlightened class of society from their prince was not one of the surest means to clear the way into Portugal for the terrible French Revolution.

The nation suffered; for ever since the treaty of Basle its commerce sustained continual losses from the French privateers, which, secure of a retreat in the Spanish ports, cruized for Portuguese vessels in the very mouth of the Tagus. The English fleets were at that period not yet prepared to

protect their allies at all times and on all seas. The renewal of the family-compact threw down the bulwark behind which Portugal had conceived herself safe from the direct attacks of the French government.

The hope of living at peace with the continent was not, however, wholly extinguished. Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, Minister Plenipotentiary in Holland, repaired to Paris with a commission to sound the dispositions of the French government. The moment was favourable. The Executive Directory made it their pride to close the temple of Janus. On the 10th of August, 1797, a treaty was signed between the French Republic and his Most Faithful Majesty. France agreed to the establishment of new boundaries in the Guyanas. So far from claiming an exclusive market for the produce of its manufactures in the dominions of his Majesty, it suffered the English commerce to predominate there, because (such are the terms of the treaty) the consumption of the wines of Portugal in France was not considerable enough to compensate the introduction of French cloths into Portugal. A sacrifice of the national interests on the part of Republicans accustomed to humble kings, excited a suspicion that Barras, one of the directors at that period, had been seduced by arguments of a particular kind. Be this as it may, and highly advantageous as were the conditions of the treaty, the

Prince of Brazil refused to ratify them, on the pretence that Araujo was not furnished with sufficient powers to treat. The Directory, justly dissatisfied, sent the Portuguese diplomatist to the prison of the Temple.*

The impolitic *éclat* with which the negociation was disavowed, arose from foreign influence. The British Ministers felt the necessity of retaining Portugal in their alliance at any cost. Parliament voted it a subsidy of two hundred thousand pounds. Eight thousand men of emigrant regiments, French and Swiss, in British pay, embarked under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Stewart, and were received in Lisbon and in the forts of the Tagus. Their occupation took place at the very moment when the negociations of the Chevalier Araujo were on foot at Paris. It was like an invasion of the kingdom by England.

We do not think that Portugal had any room for hesitation in the choice of her allies. It is quite necessary in politics to make present determinations subordinate to combinations already consummated. A multitude of public interests were involved in the execution of the Methuen treaty. Great Britain would not have suffered a vassal of a century to

* M. d'Araujo was committed to the Temple about the 1st of February 1798, and released on the 1st of April. His liberation encouraged the notion that an arrangement had been effected between Portugal and the Republic.

shake off her yoke with impunity, and she would not have lacked the means of chastising the rebels. Stripped of Brazil, and of their maritime commerce, to what a state of insignificance would not Lisbon and Oporto have dwindled ! But, to open her fortresses to the British troops, was to rush headlong into an interminable war with the most formidable power of the Continent.

As the government adopted so decisive a policy, prudence enjoined Portugal to hold herself in readiness for fighting. Under the direction of Luiz Pinto, Secretary of State, and particularly from 1797 to 1801, the war department manifested an activity to which it had been unaccustomed ever since the campaign of 1762. Several useful regulations for the recruiting and organization of the army were framed or renewed, and efforts made to complete it. The period of service of the soldiers of all arms was fixed at ten years. Every year the *captain mor* caused a list of the males capable of bearing arms to be drawn up in his district by the captains of *ordenances*, from reviews held on the spot. In concert with the civil authority, he afterwards struck out the privileged persons, the married men, such as had attained the age of thirty-five years, the eldest sons of widows, and those who were particularly serviceable to agriculture and the arts. From the list thus reduced, the contingent required from the captainship for the service of the army of the line

was drawn by lot. Very frequently the recruits on whom the lot fell were detained in prison till they were numerous enough to form a marching detachment and to join the regiment. The militia was afterwards recruited in the same manner, but for life. It took bachelors before married men, and did not even spare retired soldiers when they were still able-bodied. The rest of the persons entered in the lists, after the levies for the line and the militia, composed the corps of *ordenances*.

The officers of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were chosen, two-thirds from among the cadets, and one-third from among the sergeants. The cadets are young men who accompany the regiments to learn the profession. The nobles alone could be cadets. Those from the provinces, and especially the poorest, flocked to the army. Above the rank of sub-lieutenant, (*afferez*,) promotion was not governed by any rule. The college of nobles, one of Pombal's institutions, and the royal academy of fortification, founded by Queen Mary, furnished the army with some distinguished officers: there were also young men of high birth at the head of the regiments and the companies, especially in the cavalry: but the officers in general were ill paid, held in low estimation, and formed a subaltern class in regard to education, and mode of life. From their perpetual sojourn in the same garrisons resulted an indolent life, low habits, and many unequal matches, which extin-

guished the generous sentiments peculiar to the military profession. For fear the time should ever return when officers waited at the tables of the Fidalgoes, a small addition was made to their pay. A *Mont de Piété* was established for the purpose of relieving after their death the widows and orphans, who had previously no other resource but the public charity. The order of Avis, the second of the three orders of knighthood in the kingdom, was particularly devoted to the recompense of military services.

The twenty-four regiments of infantry had been formed in 1762 into one battalion of ten companies. This battalion was now divided into two, of only five companies each, of which there was one of grenadiers in the first battalion, and one of chasseurs in the second. The complement of the company was one hundred and fifty men, so that the regiment amounted to fifteen hundred, and the total of the infantry to thirty-six thousand men. These troops were but little exercised. The regulations for manœuvres given to them by Count Lippe comprized scarcely any but a few elementary school notions of platoon and battalion. Detachments of men were selected from all the corps, and assembled near the village of Azambuja, in an experimental camp, where they were to receive an enlarged and uniform instruction, for the purpose of carrying it afterwards into the regiments. This experiment was not pro-

ductive of the benefit to the army in general that was expected from it.

The light-infantry could not but appear an ex-crescence, in a country where the peasants consider it as a sacred obligation to disperse themselves among the rocks, as soon as they hear the firing of the alarm-gun, and to shoot or dispatch with their pikes the armed stranger who violates their territory. However, a corps of light troops, consisting of eight companies of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a battery served by gunners on horseback, was created. It was called the Legion of Alorne, after the Marquis of that name by whom it was commanded.

The colonies had their military establishment distinct from the European troops. A special corps, *brigada real da marinha*, formed the garrison of the ships.

We have adverted to the militia. This subsidiary army consisted of forty-eight regiments of one battalion each, distinguished by the name of the districts where they were levied. Men of consequence, selected from among those who reside on their estates, commanded the militia regiments. The State equipped and armed them, and ensured to them local privileges, which were highly valued by the peasants. They clothed themselves at their own cost. They were paid only when on duty, and, with the excep-

tion of the annual reviews, they were not called together unless on extraordinary occasions.

The squadrons of cavalry had each four companies of forty-eight men, a most injudicious plan; for the troops intended to form a unit in the manoeuvres ought not to be cut into four for habitual service. Though certain regiments bore the name of dragoons, the cavalry was of a single kind, mounted on horses of unequal size, cuirassed before, armed with muskets, and trained to fight on foot. The Portuguese are graceful and steady horsemen. The complement of the twelve regiments, of four squadrons each, would have amounted to nearly ten thousand horse. There never were more than four thousand five hundred effective men, all natives of the country; and it would have been difficult to bring together a greater number, for but few large cattle are bred on the rocks of Portugal, and the Spanish government has at all times taken severe measures to prevent its fine breeds of horses from being drawn out of its territory.

The four regiments of artillery had their permanent quarters at Fort St. Julian, near Lisbon, Viana, in the province of Minho, Elvas, and Faro, in the Algarves. They were composed of ten companies: namely, one of bombardiers, one of sappers, one of miners, and seven of gunners. The sergeants and cadets underwent an examination before they became officers. The service of the *personnel*

was not centralized, and each regiment followed its own method. The *materiel* of the fortresses was in confusion, owing to the multiplicity of the calibres. The artillery for battle could not be numerous in a country where nine-tenths of the high roads are impassable for carriages. Not a beast was appropriated to draw the guns, while the court employed two thousand mules for its transports. It was proposed, in case the army should take the field, to have the service of the train of artillery performed by hired men and animals.

The royal corps of engineers did duty in the kingdom and in the colonies. It was composed of one hundred and forty officers of all ranks. In order to be admitted into this corps, it was necessary to give proof of attainments acquired in attending the complete courses of the higher sciences in the royal academies of fortification and the marine. To the officers of engineers were confided the duty of instruction in the chairs of the military art and mathematics, the construction of maps and reconnoissances, the civil works of bridges and roads, and even the superintendence of the ships belonging to the crown. There were among them a good number of clever men, but nearly strangers to the profession of military engineers. Where should they have learned it? It was a settled point in Portugal for more than a century, that attention should be paid to two fortresses only, Almeida, situated beyond the natural

frontier of Portugal, and Elvas, which is not upon any of the roads by which an army can march to Lisbon without crossing the Tagus. The other fortresses, not excepting even those, the erection of which had been imperatively commanded by their position at the principal *debouchés* of the frontier, such as Chaves, Castello-Branco, and Abrantes, were doomed to fall to ruin from age, without its being thought worth while to repair any part of their walls. Some old castles were garrisoned by companies of invalid gunners, called *pese de castello*. The names of all these half-demolished towers and batteries without cannon, were only to be found in the commissions of some decrepid veterans, who were sent thither with the pompous title of governors.

No troops in Europe received less pay than the soldiers of Portugal, and yet they were impudently robbed of it, especially in the cavalry, where the companies were paid by the captains. There was not in the establishment either a commissariat of war, or any corps of administrators specially appointed to attend to the welfare of the soldiers. It was the duty of the agents of the treasury, *thesourarias geraes das tropas*, to verify the legality of the payments which they made, and at distant intervals general officers came as inspectors to examine the affairs of the regiments. These were the only two sorts of control to which the colonels and captains were liable.

As for the general expenses of the army, a junta, which had its agents in the provinces, *junta da direcção geral dos provimentos das municoes de boca para o exercito*, purchased and distributed among the troops bread and other provisions. Another junta, *junta da real fazenda*, directed the operations of the artillery, and attended to the clothing, equipment, and different appointments. Several essential articles, the muskets among others, came from England. The troops of all arms were clothed in blue. They kept themselves in better condition, and looked better than those of Spain. The army medical service formed part of the duties of the protomedicate, *real junta do protomedicato*. The regimental surgeons were but ignorant manipulators, and were not allowed by law to perform medical functions, unless when no civil professor of the healing art happened to be within reach of their garrisons.

Portugal is the country of assemblies, (*juntas*), which never assemble, and of councillors, who never give counsel. It is not on the permanent service only that a greedy idleness erects its scaffolding of places, offices, and salaries; it fastens upon mere plans which the Government approves. The building of a bridge, the draining of a marsh, the embanking of a river, furnish occasion for lavishing the public money on a multitude of persons who never fail to present

themselves for the purpose of directing or superintending the works. Thus, in the department of war, it was once proposed to reform the penal code of the army, and to give a new organization to the studs of the kingdom. Immediately there appeared a junta, *ad hoc*, composed of twenty grandees, or persons of consequence, *junta do Codigo penal militare e melhoramento das caudelarias do reino*; but the code was neither reformed, nor the studs improved.

The Council of War instituted by John IV. in 1643, and composed of military chiefs and magistrates, was originally entrusted with the government of the army and the administration of justice in it. To these councillors no other real functions have been left than the trial of general officers and the revision of military proceedings. An auditor, taken from the legal profession, was attached to each regiment stationed at Lisbon. In the garrisons, the prosecution of crimes committed by soldiers was entrusted to the civil judges. Several chapters of the regulations of 1763 are devoted to the formation and the holding of regimental courts-martial. The military penal code, otherwise called Articles of War, *Artigos de Guerra*, was severe; but the national manners proved more powerful than the laws. Justice proceeded with slow step; and notwithstanding the eternal threat of blows with the flat of the

sword, shooting, and hanging, the internal discipline sinned rather by indulgence than by severity.

The Portuguese soldiers would have become excellent had pains been taken to make them so; tolerable officers could also be trained without much difficulty; but the leaders were good for nothing. The State kept about sixty marshals, lieutenant-generals, *marechals-de-camp*, and brigadiers. The Duke de Lafões, as Marshal-general, attached to the person of the sovereign, *marechal-general junto a real pessoa*, headed the list. Several names of Fidalgoes figured among them for form's sake. A lieutenant-general, already advanced in years, Joao Dordaz, had the general inspection of the cavalry; and what little value that arm had was owing to his enlightened measures. The two campaigns in Roussillon and Catalonia brought some talents to light. The chivalrous ardour of the *marechal-de-camp*, Marquis d'Alorne, the activity and firmness of Gomez Freire de Andrada, the analytical and cool mind of Colonel Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz, were highly extolled. There were but few veterans left of the time of Count Lippe, and these were past active service; but with money and promises that cosmopolitan school might be renewed at pleasure.

The union of the Ministry of War and of Foreign Affairs in the same person afforded facilities for

seeking generals abroad. In 1796 the Government procured the Prince of Waldeck,* who had lost an arm at the siege of Thionville, to take the command of the army. He did not live long, and was succeeded by Count de Goltz, a Prussian, formerly secretary to Frederick II. England also gave several French emigrants to Portugal. In this number were Carlet de la Rosière, who had served with distinction during the seven years' war, under the command of Marshal Saxe and the Count de Broglie, and who was considered as the cleverest staff-officer of the royal army of France; and Count de Viomenil, who had acquired some reputation by finding means to see a little of war, at a time when persons placed on the same line with himself saw nothing of it.† The post of Quarter-master-general of the Army was created for La Rosière. Viomenil received the title of Marshal; but, being thwarted by army and court intrigues, he hastened to quit the kingdom, and never returned to it. Other emigrants of less consequence preceded or accompanied these two general officers. All of them came to Portugal, elated with the idea of becoming a second Schomberg or Lippe. The Portuguese nobility, however, treated them

* Waldeck was an amiable man, and went to Portugal to recruit his finances.

† But, in consequence of his age and position, he had left off making war, since it began to be carried on upon a large scale.

with disdain as mere adventurers. The native officers were jealous of these intruders, because double pay was granted to them.* The soldier, by nature censorious, laughed at chiefs who mutilated his language. Six months were sufficient to extinguish the enthusiasm and to disappoint the schemes of the new-comers. The Portuguese Government derived at this period but little benefit from foreign military men. It neither knew what to do with, or how to do without them.

An army of forty thousand men, ill-regulated and badly commanded, was but a feeble resource in the difficult crisis in which Portugal had placed herself. In 1797 some alarm was felt respecting the destination that might be given to the French and Spanish squadrons united in the port of Brest. After the treaty of Campo Formio, an assemblage of French troops was indicated at the foot of the Pyrenees; and eighteen thousand Spaniards, cantoned in the provinces of Salamanca and Estramadura, were to form an army under the command of Don Joseph Urrutia, who had the reputation of being the ablest of the generals whom Charles IV. had at that time in his service. To meet the danger, the

* Double pay was given to the foreigners, because the pay of this country was absurdly small, and also that it might serve as a substitute for the rewards appropriated exclusively to natives.

auxiliary corps in the pay of England received reinforcements, which made it amount to ten thousand men. The Court of Portugal sent to the frontiers of Beira and Alemtejo some regiments more than it previously had in that quarter. At Lisbon the garrison was exercised in new manœuvres. The Prince of Brazil attended them more than once in uniform. The appearance of a sovereign, who had heretofore been seen only surrounded by monks and Fidalgoes, among the troops, and clothed in their garb, seemed to observers a sign of imminent hostilities.

The terror which the armament at Toulon, at the commencement of the year 1798, diffused among the enemies of France, is still remembered. The Cabinet of Lisbon had its share in the alarm. It was apprehensive of seeing the flower of the conquerors of Italy and Bonaparte arrive on its long, ill defended, and easily accessible line of coast; nor did its fears subside till it was known that the expeditionary army had landed in Egypt. The naval and military operations in the Mediterranean absorbed the attention of the British Cabinet. It despatched from Lisbon part of the auxiliary corps, for the purpose of employing it in the siege of Malta. A Portuguese squadron, under the command of the Marquis of Niza, appeared off Alexandria, after the battle of Aboukir, and afterwards acted in the Mediterranean under the ægis of the English fleet. Bonaparte never expected that the French would meet

with such enemies in that quarter. An order of the day, issued by that general to the army of the East, contained these prophetic words:—"A time will come when the Portuguese nation shall pay with tears of blood for the insult which it has offered to the Republic."

The execution of this threat was delayed by the continental war which broke out afresh in the spring of the year 1799. Victory had quitted France with Bonaparte, she returned, with him to it to make a long stay. The 18th Brumaire opened a period fertile in political convulsions. Nearly at the same time the Prince of Brazil assumed the title of Regent of the Kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves. He had for four years exercised absolute authority in the name of his mother; the change therefore was merely in the form. Scabra, the secretary of state, wished, agreeably to ancient usage, to celebrate the assumption of the regency with a solemnity, in which the three orders of the kingdom should participate by their acception and their oaths. This proposal might lead farther; it was treated as seditious, and Scabra was dismissed from the cabinet. His portfolio was transferred to Luiz Pinto, who resigned the war-department to the Duke de Lafões, and that of foreign affairs to Don Joao de Almeida. After the death of the Marquis de Ponte de Lima, Don Rodrigo de Souza had the finances. Joao Rodriguez de Sa, Vis-

count d'Anadia, succeeded the latter in the department of the marine and colonies.

It was not long before Bonaparte found himself in a situation to dictate peace to the Continent. No sooner had the treaty of Lunéville regulated the fate of Germany, than the wish for a general peace directed the attention of the First Consul towards Portugal. To invade that country would be striking England in the most accessible portion of her dominions. A convention was concluded at Madrid between the Government of the Republic and his Catholic Majesty, for the purpose of forcing Portugal to separate herself from her ally. The ports of that kingdom and a fourth of its territory were to be occupied by French and Spanish troops till the maritime peace. The high contracting powers protested that they had nothing in view but the independence and happiness of the Portuguese.

On the 27th of February, 1801, appeared the Spanish declaration of war. The troops were already in motion for the frontiers. A corps of ten thousand men was destined by the cabinet of Madrid to keep on the defensive in Galicia. The main army was to consist of forty thousand men. It assembled in the environs of Badajoz. At the same time, an auxiliary corps of fifteen thousand French passed the Pyrenees, and traversed the north of Spain. It took its cantonments about Ciudad Rodrigo, and along the frontiers as far as Zarza-la-Mayor.

Portugal was left alone to meet the storm. Of the corps in English pay, which had occupied Lisbon and the forts of the Tagus, there were only left four weak regiments of emigrant infantry, namely: *Dillon*, *Castries*, *Mortemart*, and *Loyal Emigrant*, some pieces of cannon, and a detachment of the 20th British light dragoons, the whole commanded by General Frazer. This, with a subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds, was the only succour that was to be expected from England. The Prince Regent announced to his subjects, in a proclamation dated the 26th of April, that France and Spain had made humiliating proposals to him, and that it was necessary to prepare to repel an unjust aggression. He called out the militia, and invited the people to form volunteer corps. With some regiments of the line, and the militia of Entre-Duero-e-Minho and Tras-os-Montes, an army was formed for the protection of the northern provinces. In the south, the marechal-de-camp Count de Castro Marim, grand huntsman of Portugal and captain-general of the Algarves, was entrusted with the defence of that province with two battalions of infantry of the line and the militia.

The grand acting army, thirty thousand strong, commanded by the Duke de Lafões, the prime minister, took position on both sides of the Tagus, having three-fourths of its number on the left bank, facing the principal Spanish force. The re-

mainder, placed on the right bank, was to observe the French auxiliary corps; the legion of light troops was cantoned in the villages of the plateau of Guarda. Two bridges of boats were thrown across the Tagus at Abrantes, and a passage in vessels was organized at Villa Velha de Rodao, to serve for the communication of the troops among themselves.

The armies were now in sight; but Pinto, the minister, had been sent to Badajoz, and many persons in both camps were of opinion that not a musket would be fired. The Portuguese commander accredited this opinion. His long travels in foreign countries had lowered in him that national exaltation, which is carried in his countrymen to infatuation. Steadily opposed to the war with France, being moreover upwards of half a century beyond the age of illusions, the Duke de Lafões awaited the issue of the negotiations in philosophic tranquillity at his head-quarters at Portalegre. At the age of eighty-two, the bravest may be allowed not to wish for war. "Why should we fight?" said the witty and gay veteran, to Don Francisco Solano, one of the principal Spanish officers, who had a conference with him. "Why should we fight? Portugal and Spain are sumpter mules. England urges *us* on; France spurs *you*. Let us frisk about, let us jingle our bells, if needful; but, for God's sake, let us not

harm one another. They would only laugh at our expense."

Such, too, were very nearly the sentiments of Charles IV. He had come to Badajoz with the Queen and Lucien Bonaparte, brother to the First Consul, and ambassador from France. Lucien urged the commencement of hostilities; but the King, whose eldest daughter was the wife of the Prince Regent of Portugal, had no intention whatever to dethrone his son-in-law: on the contrary, he was anxious to rid himself as speedily as possible of the French auxiliary corps. A more powerful will than that of the monarch threw obstacles in the way of a pacific arrangement. Don Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace, the favourite of the Queen, had the chief command of the army of operation. He had taken a fancy for military glory, and it was impossible to find an occasion for obtaining it at a cheaper rate.

On the 12th of May, 1801, the Spaniards debouched from Badajoz. One corps marched upon Olivença and the other upon Jerumenha. These two places, situated, one on the left, at the distance of a league and a quarter from the Guadiana, the other on the river itself, surrendered before one round of cannon had been fired. Elvas was summoned. The Portuguese lieutenant-general, Don Francisco Xavier de Noronha, returned such an answer as might be expected from the governor of a

strong fortress, having a garrison amounting to nine thousand troops of the line or militia, and having communication with the army and the country. The main body of the Spanish forces, commanded by the Prince of the Peace, came upon the Caya, a small stream which separates the two kingdoms. A reconnoissance appeared before Campo Mayor. Matthias Jose Dias Azedo commanded in the place. As he showed a disposition to defend himself, the left columns of the enemy fell back upon their right, and Campo Mayor was invested.

The right wing of the Portuguese army, under the command of old General Forbes, the same who had made the campaign of Roussillon, was composed of three divisions of infantry, and lined the frontier of the Alemtejo, from the environs of Jerumenha, nearly to Montalvao on the Tagus. An advanced guard of grenadiers and chasseurs, commanded by Brigadier Bernardin Freire de Andrada, who was accounted a man of execution, was encamped in the valley of Porto de Espada, facing the *debouché* of Valencia de Alcantara, and had in its rear almost the whole of the cavalry of the kingdom, assembled under the command of the marechal de camp, Baron de Carovey, a French emigrant. The foreign division of General Frazer was placed in reserve at Orato.

The movement of the Spaniards did not cause the Duke de Lafões to stir from Portalegre. He drew

back the division of his right, exposed by the fall of Jerumenha, and pushed the cavalry to Alegrete, and the advanced guard to the rear of Arronches. This little town was occupied by the second regiment of Olivença, and its approaches were covered by some main-guards of horse.

Meanwhile the enemy laid siege to Campo Mayor, which surrendered after a fire of nine days. On the 27th of May, the *marechals-de-camp*, Don Manuel de la Pena and the Marquis de Mora, advanced upon Arronches with six thousand Spaniards. It was a mere reconnaissance. The other divisions and the head-quarters of the army had not moved. Don Jose Carcome Lobo, colonel of the second regiment of Olivença, drew up his men in battle array before the town. The Spaniards, being much more numerous, threatened his flanks; he was apprehensive of being turned, and abandoned Arronches. Carovey's cavalry came to his succour. A squadron detached in advance, in a rapidly executed turn, came in collision with the extremity of a battalion. The troops took to their heels on all sides, and the grenadiers of Bernardin Freire, as well as the others. The fugitives halted at Alegrete, but the terror and confusion extended much farther. In the morning of the 28th the camps and cantonments were broken up. Although the Spaniards remained at Arronches, every one imagined them to be at his heels. A thick fog gave occasion to deplorable

mistakes. Some patrols discharged their muskets in the plain behind Portalegre. The Duke de Lafões gave orders for retreat by Alpalhao, on Gaviao, where the army re-assembled on the 29th and 30th.

The precipitation of the retreat caused considerable magazines formed at Niza, a small town two leagues from the Tagus, and at Flor da Rosa, near Orato, to be abandoned. Joao Dordaz, who commanded the left of the army, set out immediately from Castello-Branco, with four thousand men, posted them on the heights of Villa Velha, and caused the stores to be fetched from Niza, where the enemy had not yet made his appearance.

The success of this operation excited in the Duke a desire to repossess himself of his magazine at Flor da Rosa. He sent a detachment, which was surprised and made prisoners by the Spanish cavalry a few hours after entering the village. This fresh check determined the general-in-chief to return to Abrantes. The foreign brigade had been sent thither in advance to guard the bridges. The Portuguese crossed the Tagus on the 8th of June, and encamped between the town and the river. This assemblage did not deserve the name of an army. It numbered scarcely ten thousand men, all discontented and dispirited. The soldiers had thrown away their muskets during and after the flight of Arronches; and as the regiments, for the most part, drew their recruits from the Alemtejo, a considerable por-

tion of them, unwilling to leave their native country, had dispersed.

In the rest of the kingdom nothing of interest occurred. The hostile troops assembled at Ayamonte, near the mouth of the Guadiana, fired musketry and cannon from one bank to the other, and made a fruitless attempt to cross the river. In the north, the two opposite armies were commanded by two French emigrants, namely, that of Spain by the Marquis de St. Simon, and that of Portugal by the Marquis de la Rosière. Between adversaries uninterested in the ground of the quarrel, there was no reason to apprehend that the war would assume a very ferocious character. St. Simon confined his military operations to mounting guard upon the banks of the Minho. La Rosière had been directed to concentrate his force within the chains of Gerez and Marao; he took upon himself to continue to occupy the Tras-os-Montes, and by his resistance to a timid order he conceived that he had saved Portugal. The *marechal-de-camp*, Gomez Freire, was quartermaster-general of that army. He resolved to attempt a *coup-de-main* on Monterey, the garrison of which was supposed to be off its guard. He set out in the evening from Chaves, which is five leagues distant, at the head of a strong detachment of infantry and cavalry. He missed his way during the night, and when the mistake was discovered, it was too late to repair it. Gomez Freire returned to

Chaves, without being pursued beyond the frontier. There was reason to believe that the great blow would be struck in Beira. The Portuguese were there in presence of their most formidable enemies, but the First Consul had merely shown his troops to make the Spaniards take the field. The French never quitted their cantonments. When Joao Dordaz was apprized of the invasion of the territory by the Prince of the Peace, he moved his head-quarters from Idanha Nova to Castello Branco; and afterwards came, as we have said, to Villa Velha. The Marquis d'Alorne, finding no food for his activity, began to build a casemated fort, a thousand fathoms to the south of the Guarda, and caused a way to be opened over the top of the mountains between Da Cova da Beira and Abrantes.

On the 6th of June, during the retreat of the army of the Duke of Lafões, and a few days after the surrender of Campo Mayor, peace between Spain and Portugal was signed at Badajoz. The court of Lisbon engaged to shut its ports against English vessels. It made sacrifices in money, and ceded the town and territory of Olivença as far as the Guadiana. Spain found in this acquisition the advantage of ridding its frontier of a focus for smuggling: all the provisions of the treaty received the assent and the signature of the French ambassador.

The First Consul, however, disapproved what his

brother had done. As France and England were then negotiating the peace of the world, a separate arrangement with Portugal could only impede the progress of these negotiations; it was of importance to the common cause that Spain should possess herself of the whole country southward of the Tagus, that she might obtain in exchange for it the colonies which she had lost since the commencement of the war. The chief of the Republic therefore refused to ratify the treaty of Badajoz. The French journals announced that an additional thirty thousand men were about to cross the Pyrenees, to join the advanced guard commanded by Leclerc, and that the commission to invade Portugal would be entrusted to Gouvion St. Cyr. This general officer enjoyed a reputation for consummate prudence. Buonaparte had sent him to Spain before the hostilities, to accompany the Prince of the Peace, and to direct the operations of the war.

In the state of destitution to which the Portuguese were reduced, the French would have arrived at Lisbon without encountering any great obstacles. The Prince Regent sent Marshal Goltz, who had not previously been actively employed, to Abrantes, to take the command of the troops and to re-organize them. The Duke de Lafões lost his posts and his dignities, and was forbidden to appear at court.* It

* One morning, a placard, couched in these terms, was found posted in the streets of Lisbon: "Lost, between Pontalegre and

was necessary to throw upon some person the responsibility for the errors committed. The new general-in-chief caused the Portuguese in the country on the right bank of the Tagus to make marches and counter-marches, which gave great dissatisfaction, because they were fatiguing, and the motives for them could not be divined. Meanwhile, the corps of General Leclerc still continued motionless. The Chevalier d'Araujo, dispatched by sea to France, to treat directly with the First Consul, presented himself before the harbour of Lorient, and was not permitted to land: but the negotiations continued at Madrid under the mediation of the King of Spain.

On the 29th of September, 1801, the Plenipotentiaries, Lucien Buonaparte, on the part of France, and Cipriano Ribeiro Freire, on the part of Portugal, signed the peace between the two States at Madrid. By a secret article of the treaty, the Court of Lisbon engaged to pay the sum of twenty-five million of francs (one million sterling) to the French Government. By the public articles, she shut her ports against the shipping of England; she accepted

Abrantes, a boy about eighty-two years of age, with black velvet boots. Whoever may find him, is requested to bring him to the office for advertisements." The Duke de Lafões wore velvet gaiters on account of the gout, to which he was a martyr. His bon-mots had long annoyed all those who had any thing to do with the government of Portugal. After he became unfortunate, he was punished in the same way in which he had sinned.

in America limits dictated by the advantage of the stronger; she consented, as the basis of a treaty of commerce, to be very speedily concluded, to the introduction of French woollen cloths into Portugal on the same footing as the most favoured nations. These hard conditions were modified or set aside by the preliminaries of peace between France and England, which were signed in London two days after the treaty of Madrid. The secret article relative to the contributions was carried into complete effect.

We have related certain particulars of the campaign of 1801, not that such details have the least interest in a military point of view; but it was useful to fix the attention of the reader on the insignificance of the display of the regular forces of Spain and Portugal, at a period near the catastrophe common to both those monarchies. The Court of Lisbon, considering the aggression of the Spaniards as mere play, neglected to repair and provision the fortresses. Jerumenha, so important on account of the passage of the Guadiana, was guarded by a company of sixty chasseurs. In Olivença, a fortress with nine bastions, there were upon the ramparts but six pieces of cannon fit for service.

During the short period of hostilities, the military chiefs exhibited proofs of ignorance, and the troops that were engaged fought with little energy. Even at Campo Mayor, the resistance of which has been cried up, the governor capitulated before the be-

siegers opened the trenches; and the day of the surrender of the place was a day of rejoicing for the garrison. Only about one half of the militia took the field, for want of muskets to arm the whole. Not a patriot hand grasped the *chuço*, the pike of the *ordenances*, formerly so dreaded by invaders: on the contrary, the peasants of the Alemtejo remained in their houses to harbour the Spanish soldiers. The hope of peace imparted to the Government a reckless improvidence, which was communicated to the multitude. But a nation and an army never incur with impunity the contempt of other nations and armies. The French had learned the way which leads from their country to Portugal. They were destined to find it again in due time.

After the signature of the treaty of Badajoz, Pinto was invested with the title of Viscount de Balsemao, and was the nominal head of the cabinet. Don Rodrigo was the soul of it. On him, as secretary of state for the finances, lay the heaviest burden. On assuming that office, he found the treasury deeply in debt, and a paper money in circulation. To cover the expenses of the war and the peace contribution, he was necessitated to negotiate a loan in Holland. The crown diamonds were pawned as a security for this debt. Extraordinary taxes were devised, from which neither the nobility nor the clergy were exempted. The minister was even bold enough to lay his hands on the property of orphans and ab-

sentees, and on the funds proceeding from litigated inheritances, and to substitute paper for cash in all the chests; thus setting a pernicious example to those who should subsequently draw from the same sources with less disinterested views.

To this epoch is referred the conception of the plan for transferring the court of Portugal to Brazil. It is a received opinion among enlightened men on this point of history, that the principal object of the financial measures of Don Rodrigo was to secure and place at the disposal of the sovereign, against any event whatever, a considerable part of the metallic currency of the kingdom. Why should we have any difficulty to believe that a minister, whose abilities are not disputed, foresaw that his prince, feeble and disarmed, would sooner or later be crushed by the reciprocal action of the two colossal powers which were disputing the empire of the world? Besides, the idea of seeking an asylum beyond the sea for the sovereigns of the Peninsula was not new. It was the original conception of our immortal Vauban, who suggested it to Philip V. after the raising of the siege of Barcelona. In 1706, Don Luiz da Cunha, Ambassador of Portugal in France about the middle of the last century, applied it to the particular situation of his sovereign, and endeavoured to prove, that the transfer of the seat of government to America would be advantageous to the monarchy. It was revived at the time of the earthquake of Lisbon, and

again talked of at the opening of the campaign of 1762. The advantages of the scheme were becoming every day more feasible ; because Brazil, increasing in wealth and population, was daily acquiring greater importance among the States subject to the sceptre of the Braganzas.

It is foreign to our purpose to inquire whether it is beneficial to a nation for its sovereign to wear several crowns, or how far the choice of the place where he will fix his court depends on the pleasure of the monarch. The Brazilians and the Portuguese formed one and the same nation, parted in two by the ocean. There was no crime in considering America as a refuge, but only at some distant period, not till after the last battle, and at the last extremity. It would have been a noble spectacle to see the chief of a nation defending the inheritance of his ancestors with the resources of talent and the energy of despair, and when the ruins of the country had been driven back to the sea, sailing away amidst the conflagration of Lisbon, to prepare vengeance on another national soil, and to carry back in better days his mutilated household gods to their former home.

While, however, Don Rodrigo kept an eye on the distant American Portugal, he neglected nothing for the improvement of European Portugal. Lisbon is indebted to him for the institution of a police guard and the lighting of the streets. His opi-

nions and his plans were supported in the council by Don Joao de Almeida, who, after the dismissal of the Duke de Lafões, had, according to custom, united the portfolio of war with that of foreign affairs. Don Joao was not deficient in ability, but he was of a nervous constitution, full of prejudices, and subject to alternate fits of irritation and despondency. The campaign of 1801 had shown how little Portugal could reckon upon her army. A new organization was proposed and adopted by the minister: the plan embraced the recruiting which was to be founded on an exact census of the population, and purged of the abuses which, in Portugal, as in other countries, poison the most salutary institutions; likewise the reform of the militia, the harmonizing of the system of the *ordenances* with the service of the troops of the line, the introduction of the manœuvres practised by that nation which has brought the science of arms to the greatest perfection; in a word, all the branches of the military constitution. A certain number of capable officers were employed to digest the plan for these improvements, which was about to be made public, when the ministry was overthrown.

The peace of Amiens was but a suspension of arms between France and England. The first gun fired at sea renewed the embarrassments of the court of Lisbon. It would at once have placed itself under the accustomed ægis for protection; but, before they entered into any engagements, the British

ministers sent enlightened officers to Portugal to examine the army and to report on the co-operation which the English forces that might be employed in its defence had to expect from it. In the interim, for the purpose of terrifying the whole Peninsula, a corps of fifteen or eighteen thousand men was assembled at Bayonne, under the command of General Augereau. The demonstrations of France and the shuffling of England, determined the Prince Regent to confine himself within the limits of a strict neutrality. This was not sufficient for the First Consul; according to his politics, the continuance of the commercial relations of a continental nation with Great Britain was equivalent to a state of declared hostility. He insisted that Portugal should shut her ports against English vessels, as had been stipulated in the treaties of Badajoz and Madrid. General Lannes, his representative at Lisbon, presented threatening notes on this subject, which the rough manner of the ambassador rendered still more threatening. This brave soldier, who knew but little of the forms of diplomacy, fought the English and their auxiliaries in the cabinet, with the same warmth with which he would have attacked them in the field of battle. Now, Don Joao de Almeida, who had passed into the ministry through the embassy in London, was considered as the leader of the party opposed to France. On the refusal of Lannes to treat with him any longer, which refusal was accompanied with a for-

mal requisition that the ports should be immediately shut against the vessels of England, the Prince Regent took the portfolio from his minister. The dismissal of Don Joao was followed by the resignation of Don Rodrigo de Souza. In the month of September, 1803, Portugal engaged to pay France a million francs, (upwards of 40,000*l.*, sterling,) per month, so long as the maritime war should last.

Luiz Pinto, Viscount de Balsemao, died in 1804. The only member of the old ministry then remaining was the Viscount d'Anadia, an insignificant personage. Don Rodrigo and Don Joao were replaced, the one in the finances by Luiz de Vasconcellos e Souza, who acted at first with the title of President of the Royal Treasury, the other in the Foreign Affairs and War by Antonio de Araujo Azevedo, who had acquired in his long diplomatic career on the Continent, moderation, courtesy, and an exquisite taste for literature and the fine arts. Don Diego de Noronha, Count de Villaverde was Secretary of State for the interior, with the title of Prime Minister. This Fidalgo, despised even by those of his own class, on account of his dissolute life, exercised for two years such an ascendancy over the mind of the Prince Regent as no other minister had ever before acquired.

The credit of the Count de Villaverde was balanced for some time by another influence still more extraordinary. After the signature of the treaty

of neutrality, Lannes the ambassador gained the particular favour of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and he afterwards proved that he deserved it. These new relations only served to inspire the Prince with a still greater distrust of himself. As soon as France had resumed the forms of monarchy, he lost no time in despatching an ambassador extraordinary to congratulate the Emperor Napoleon. Precisely at that period war broke out between England and Spain. Lannes relinquished the embassy, and was succeeded by General Junot. The Court of Lisbon punctually performed its engagements, and though still attached by community of interests to the English, it was ostensibly bowed down under the yoke of France.

In this attitude of resignation, the military force came at length to be considered as useless lumber. It is quite enough—such was the language held in the councils of the Government—to pay subsidies to France, without keeping up, at a great expense, an army, which is not meant to fight, and which may expose us to danger. The Chevalier Araujo took up, from among the plans of his predecessor, the details which were of the least importance.—He numbered the regiments and changed the uniforms.—The army was formed into three grand divisions, those of the north, the centre, and the south, in which the infantry and cavalry, formed into perpetual brigades, the schools of artillery, the regiments of militia

and the brigades of *ordenances* were correspondent. The minister caused inspections to be held, and these diminished the effective strength of the corps. In consequence of the poverty of the finances, it was debated whether the establishment should not be reduced to the number of troops strictly necessary for the internal police of the kingdom.

Meanwhile the conquering armies of Napoleon were ravaging Germany, waiting till the turn of Portugal should arrive. The Prince Regent, as the moment approached when the dangers of the country should have claimed the exercise of all his faculties, was seized with physical debility and moral decay. He had from childhood been subject to whims. His humour turned to melancholy. He was recommended to travel for the purpose of diverting his mind; and the excursions which he took for the sake of his health on the frontiers, in the environs of his country-seat at Villa Viciosa, passed in the public journals for visits to the fortresses. The malady increased to such a degree that the patient was obliged to give up his favourite exercises of riding and hunting. About the conclusion of 1805 he suppressed the public levees on Thursdays, and soon afterwards those in the morning when going to and returning from mass. It was a subject of grief to the Portuguese of all classes, who were accustomed to see their Prince, to ask him for alms, and to be received by him with kindness. He became

inaccessible to the Ministers themselves, to whom he gave an ill reception, and to the officers of the household, whom he would not admit at all. One would have supposed that, foreseeing a speedy separation, he sought beforehand to make himself be forgotten by his people.

The malady of the Regent generated hopes which will be called factious or patriotic, according to the light in which they are viewed. If the Prince became incapable of governing, (and, from the deplorable example of his mother, this was no more than might be expected,) the regency passed by right to his wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, Infanta of Spain. This Princess, whose firmness of character was well known, had at that time a court of Fidalgoes, who disapproved the politics of the Government. Among those who were most desirous of a change, were Don Thomas Jose Xavier de Lima, Marquis de Ponte de Lima, grandson of the Minister; Don Miguel de Assis Marcarenhas, Count de Sabugal, a young and aspiring man; and, at the head of all, Don Pedro de Almeida, Marquis d'Alorne. We have several times had occasion to mention the latter personage. Sprung from two families which Pombal had oppressed, he was considered an enemy to ministerial power. He had travelled; and, by visiting foreign lands, he had not learned to despise his own countrymen. Endowed with a ready wit, sometimes making a good hit; undertaking every

thing, and finishing nothing; pious even to superstition; rigid in morals, and deranged in circumstances; light and superficial as a French Marquis, but attached to his country; warm-hearted, and a brave and loyal chevalier, Alorne exhibited in his person a compendium of the qualities and oddities of the Portuguese nation. He took upon himself to explain the ancient laws respecting the Regency to the Princess Charlotte, and to forewarn her against the attempts that were likely to be made to perpetuate power in incapable hands. He did not fail to hold up as a pattern to the Infanta of Spain another Castilian Princess, Donna Luisa Francisca de Guzman, wife of John IV., who contributed so much by her heroic counsels to the restoration of the House of Braganza. Two lawyers of distinguished merit were accused of having drawn up, under the influence of the Marquis, a decree proclaiming the Princess Regent of the kingdom.

During these transactions, the health of the Prince improved. When he found himself sufficiently composed to attend to business, he was made acquainted with the sort of conspiracy which had been planned during his malady. The Marquis d'Alorne and several others were forbidden to appear at court. The Prime Minister, Count de Villaverde, gave orders for a judicial inquiry; but the prosecution of it was suspended by his death, which occurred just at that time.

The nation recovered from the shock given by this intrigue to the public opinion. The interior no longer afforded any occasion for disturbance, nor the exterior for apprehension, when, on the 14th of August 1806, an English fleet, commanded by Lord St. Vincent, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus. Six vessels only ascended the river. A greater number could not, according to treaties, enter it at once. When the Earl of Rosslyn, envoy-extraordinary, landed at Lisbon, and was admitted into the council of the Prince Regent, he announced, that "All was over with Portugal; that a French army was assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, and ready to invade the country; that the conquest was divided beforehand between the King of Spain and the Prince of the Peace. This grand plan," added he, "has been communicated by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale, who had been sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris. The Ministers of his Britannic Majesty could not hear with indifference of the peril impending over their ancient ally; and have not lost a moment in flying to her succour. A corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of Lieutenant-general Simcoe, is at this moment embarking at Portsmouth, and will arrive in a few days at Lisbon. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Government may draw at discretion upon the British Exchequer for such sums as it may require for preparing the means of defending the country."

The extraordinary mission of the Earl of Rosslyn; the presence of a fleet, commanded by the ablest admiral of Great Britain; the offer of an army; in short, all this solicitude and kindness rested on an imaginary foundation. The alleged assemblage at the Pyrenees consisted of two Italian battalions in garrison at Bayonne. The Emperor Napoleon, so far from having a thought of taking Portugal, was at that moment wholly occupied with preparations for war with Prussia. But, for that very reason, a diversion in the south of Europe suited England: she hoped that the presence of a corps of her troops in Portugal would fix the irresolution of the Cabinet of Madrid, justly alarmed at the encroachments of France. This illusion was connected with political combinations, which we shall have occasion to develop, when we come to treat of the state of Spain at that period. After all, whatever might be the success of the experiment, the expense of the armament could not be thrown away; there were several other countries, where both land and sea forces could be employed against the French.

The Prince Regent, at the same time that he protested his gratitude for the warm friendship of his Britannic Majesty, declined offers which were likely to compromise him. The English negociator could but deplore the infatuation of the Court of Lisbon. The fleet of Lord St. Vincent sailed away. The Portsmouth expedition was sent to Sicily.

The ministers of Portugal conceived that they had saved the vessel of the state, because they had escaped a rock. Since the renewal of hostilities between England and Spain, Lisbon had become the mart for the commerce of the Peninsula, and part of Europe. One hundred and forty thousand bales of cotton annually entered the Tagus, and seventy thousand of them served to supply the manufactories of France. The old warehouses being found insufficient to contain the goods, more extensive ones had been built in the squares and on the quays. The city was enlarging; public prosperity, the outward sign of the wisdom of the national councils, seemed to justify the improvident resignation of the government.

In this manner did Portugal gently glide into the abyss. The crash of falling Europe scarcely reached the solitary palace of Mafra. Napoleon laid the British islands under interdict. This violent measure destroyed the neutrality of all the states of the Continent. It determined the government of the Prince Regent to equip a fleet in the port of Lisbon; but the army remained dispersed and incomplete. The people did not even know that France refused to admit the envoy of their sovereign to the negotiations at Tilsit. The cry of alarm was in vain raised abroad. Dumouriez, the same general who first showed the French Republicans the road to victory, Dumouriez addressed

from London to the Portuguese nation a manifesto,* fraught with truth and foresight, to apprize it of the

* During the year 1766 Dumouriez traversed Portugal in every direction. Forty-two years afterwards, at the farthest extremity of Beira-Baixa, we met with two old men who had been his guides, and who told us with what activity of mind the young French officer inquired respecting localities and institutions. The observations made by him during these travels are given in a work entitled *Etat Présent du Royaume de Portugal en 1766*, which was printed at Lausanne in 1775. This little volume, amidst a multitude of oversights, and even some important errors, contains valuable pieces of information, which might be regarded as discoveries at the period of their publication.

In 1807 General Dumouriez, forgotten by Europe, was vegetating in London. He conceived the idea of offering his services to the Portuguese, to avert the storm which was ready to burst over them. The moment was favourable. Their two marshals, Goltz and Viomenil, were both absent, and were only bound to the country by the pension which was paid them. Among the other general officers, native or foreign, in the service of Portugal, there was not one who, either from his position or his reputation, had any pretensions to the chief command of an army. Dumouriez was sixty-eight, certainly very old for carrying on war in a mountain country; but his robust constitution gave him confidence, and he still retained a youthful imagination and the greenness of talent.

As a first step, Dumouriez printed a brief narrative of the *Campaigns of Marshal Schomberg in Portugal, from the year 1662 to 1668*, with this motto: *C'est au cœur que je parle et non pas à l'esprit*. The work began and ended with a philippic against France. The old general of the Revolution knew the Portuguese better than they knew themselves. He knew what might be accomplished with a fiery nation, in a country studded with difficulties and strong places, where all the males are soldiers.

catastrophe with which it was threatened, and to make it an offer of his sword. The voice of the warrior was not allowed to echo within the walls of Lisbon. The Court Gazette was the only political compass for the mass of the inhabitants. The ministers conceived that their duties were at an end after they had provided for the flight of the Prince and about a hundred courtiers.

A nation delivered up, bound hand and foot, to the mercy of its foes, was a sight which could only be exhibited under the pressure of a taciturn despotism, but could never happen in a land of liberty. The publicity of the acts of government, and the easy circulation of written ideas, are the safeguards of national independence. The defensive energy of citizens continually armed, who govern themselves according to constitutional forms, cannot be measured. To the enthusiastic and communicative Portuguese, had they been free, one word would have been sufficient: *There is the enemy !*

from their birth. He foresaw that a weak prince, surrounded by weak advisers, would hesitate to adopt a courageous resolution ; but he hoped that, at the approach of the foreigner, the people would rise against courtiers ready to sacrifice the Portuguese name.

V I E W
OF THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY STATE
OF THE
BELLIGERENT POWERS.

BOOK IV.—SPAIN.

**General notions on the Spanish Peninsula—The Provinces of Spain united by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella—Expulsion of the Jews and Moors—Efforts in behalf of the public liberties—Spain a prey to foreign Sovereigns—Establishment of the House of Bourbon on the Spanish throne—War of the Succession—Abolition of the privileges of Arragon—Government of the Bourbons—Reign of the successors of Philip V.—Situation of Spain, from the treaty of Utrecht to the French Revolution—Reign of Charles IV. and Queen Maria Louisa—Administration of Count Florida Blanca and d'Aranda—Administration of Manuel Godoy, Duke of Al-
cudia—War between Spain and the French Republic—The family compact renewed—The Prince of the Peace removed from the Ministry—Campaign of 1801 against Portugal—Peace of Amiens—Overthrow of the throne of Naples—Warlike manifesto of the Prince of the Peace—Regular military force of Spain—Manners and habits of Spanish soldiers—Discipline—Promotion—General officers—Staff—Administration of the Army—The Household Troops—Infantry—Cavalry—Artillery—Engineers—Direction of military affairs—Godoy's manifesto disavowed after the battle of Jena—A corps of sixteen thousand Spaniards marched into France—New favours granted to the favourite—Portrait of Godoy—Character of the Spanish nation—The nobility—The clergy—The middle class—The lower class—General considerations.**

BOOK IV.

SPAIN.

THE English history affords the proof, how much advantageous topographical circumstances, free institutions, and a good government, can accomplish, to render a people strong, powerful, and happy, to urge forward and accelerate the expansion of its natural faculties, and to direct those faculties towards the acquisition of greatness and prosperity. In Spain, on the contrary, we shall see faulty institutions and corrupt governments degrade and brutalize the noblest of the European nations, and doom it to a futurity of obscure misery or of signal calamity.

If there is a country peculiarly favoured by nature, the Peninsula is that country. A fine climate, a fertile soil, the ocean which encompasses it open to its fleets and its commerce; the narrow space which links it to the Continent, closed up by the Pyrenees; nothing is wanting that can contribute to enrich and to defend it: the ancients considered it as having been the site of the terrestrial paradise.

The land thus favoured by Heaven is inhabited by a brave, generous, temperate, true-hearted, sincere people, susceptible of high moral enthusiasm, capable of being acted on by the noblest impulses, having no defects but those which are caused by despotism and superstition, and possessing all the qualities of which it has not been in the power of kings and priests to deprive them.

This fine country, which, from its situation, seems to be inaccessible to invasions and ravages, has been more subject to them than any other. It has almost always been governed by foreign races and foreign influence. Swallowed up, with the rest of Europe, first by the Romans, and next by the irruptions from the North, it was subsequently devastated by the tornado from the South. The Asiatic Arabs, in conjunction with the African Moors, spread themselves over Spain; were very near establishing there an universal empire; and for seven centuries held possession of a part of its provinces.

Those seven centuries were ages of battle, of chivalry, and of glory: the paladins of Charlemagne, the exploits of the Cid, the greatness of Almanzor, fill the pages of history. What was then the state of the people? that is not known. It is, however, known that they were numerous; and this proves, if not that they were happy, at least that there existed among them at once abundant means of sub-

sistence, and an active principle of reproduction, animating spirit, and life.

The invading Arabs destroyed some Spaniards on the field of battle; but they brought with them new modes of husbandry, the arts that civilize, the tolerance that increases population, and the labour that enriches it. The Christians, on their side, compressed within a narrow space, cultivated it the more carefully. There is reason for believing, that the tenth and eleventh centuries, which, in consequence of their barbarism, are denominated iron ages, were those in which Spain was most flourishing and populous.

The recovery of Spain from the Moors was more pernicious than its conquest by them. The Christian victors were less civilized than the vanquished Arabs.* The disciples of Mahomet respected the churches of Jesus Christ. The Christians threw down the mosques, and banished the unbelievers. The fields were wrested from those who made them produce thirty for one; from those whose industry had taught the cultivation of them. The Arab population, incessantly repelled, was driven towards

* This retrogradation towards barbarism is held up by the Chronicles as the heroic age of Spain; its recommendation to posterity must be looked for in the memory of the half-fabulous exploits of Bernard del Carpio, of the Cid Campeador, and of so many other warrior cleavers of Infidels.

the South of Spain. The agricultural part of the territory was depopulated; Moors were to be found only in the cities, where their industry had fixed them, where nothing could fill their place, and where the Government was better able to protect them against fanaticism.*

The calamities inflicted by war may be speedily repaired. The vacancies made by emigrations, and by disease, may be filled up. It is not the loss of men which depopulates states; it is bad institutions, bad laws; they exercise a fatal influence on the manners and habits of a people; they take from it the desire of labouring, the means of subsisting. A radical vice, a scourge, at that epoch fixed itself on the soil of Spain. It is the principal cause of the depopulation of that kingdom; so active a principle of

* With respect to their Christian brothers, the least which the conquerors could do for them, when they found them among the Arabs, was to confirm the franchises which had been granted to them by the latter, during the period of their dominion. Thus the laws, according to which the *mozarabic* communities were regulated, (that is to say, mixed with the Arabs,) served as a model for the regulations which were drawn up for the re-conquered towns and the new colonies. We say new colonies, because the devastation was so complete in the open country, that the kings and nobles were obliged to establish there colonies of labourers, from their ancient domains. History has preserved the honourable surname of the Peopler, which was given by contemporaries to Sancho II. of Portugal, who built Sabugal, and to Ferdinand II. of Leon, the founder of Ciudad Rodrigo.

evil, that several centuries of philosophy and social improvement have not been able to root it out.

The armies which, inch by inch, reconquered Spain from the Mussulmans, were composed of peasants led by their lords, and of bands of adventurers, commanded by numerous knights, whom the desire of fighting against the Infidels continually allured from the other States of Christendom. The great Spanish families are descended from these paladins. The kings of the Asturias, of Leon, of Castile, and of Arragon, who marched at their head, were rather chiefs of the conquering army, than sovereigns of the conquered people. The estates wrested from the cultivators of the soil they distributed among the companions of their labours. Often, too, warmed by a religious inspiration, they founded a monastery on the hill where rested the ashes of some martyr of the primitive church, and endowed it with the fields, houses, and even men, comprehended within the whole of the space as far as the eye could reach. The less value they were of, and the more deficient in hands to cultivate them, the greater was the extent of territory included in these endowments. The property acquired as hereditary provisions for eldest sons, indivisible possessors, entails, and other forms of mortmain, indestructible, and even capable of increase, constitutes, up to the present period, above three-fourths of the soil of Spain. There does not remain free a sufficient quantity of land to exercise

the industry of the proprietor, and give employment to capital. The proprietors have not been cultivators.

These immense spaces, depopulated, and in the hands of a single individual, brought about the neglect of agriculture, and the establishment of flocks. Flocks stood in need of privileges; and those privileges, themselves the effect of depopulation, have perpetuated it, have prevented agriculture from resuming its rights, have hallowed indolence, and have propagated the habitude of a contemplative life, of the inconvenience produced by which the smallest is that of being starved to death.*

In these ages of ignorance, the law forbade the division of vast estates, which would have acquired a value if they had been cultivated by persons who had an interest in rendering them productive; yet, at the same time, custom consecrated the dividing

* Indolent and proud, the Spaniard never bedewed any thing but his ponderous armour with the sweat of his body. The knight and the priest, who had only a life interest, paid little attention to the improvement of the soil. Barbarians, who could do nothing but fight and sleep, had a horror of the cares and labours which agriculture requires; they preferred cattle to harvests. Hence, waste lands, common lands, town lands, the *mesta*.†

† The *mesta* (the word means mixture) is an association composed of noblemen, monasteries, and rich individuals, who are owners of flocks, *trashumanles*. In speaking of sheep, *trashu-*

of kingdoms between the children of the monarch. Spain was split into several states, and those states were frequently at war with each other ; but these wars had a very trifling influence on the prosperity of the people, or their civil situation. A circumstance, however, which had an enormous influence, was the intestine wars which each sovereign carried on against the potent vassals of the crown ; history in Spain, from the middle age to the fifteenth century, is the history of a long contest between regal power and feudality. In Spain, as elsewhere, when the kings wished to crush their vassals, they recollected that the people were men ; and they emancipated the people, in order to have other soldiers than those who were led by the nobles. The latter they successively deprived of all the privileges of sovereignty, the levying of forces, the imposing of taxes ; privileges which they exercised in

mar means to pass the winter in the plains of Estremadura, and the summer on the mountains of Old Castile. Spain, at the moment when it was invaded by the French, had five or six millions of *trashumantes*. They are divided into flocks, each containing ten thousand. While travelling, they live upon the fallows ; and, when they reach their destination, they are fed for an exceedingly low price, which the owners of the pasturage are not allowed to raise. The *mesta* does not come within the purview of the common law ; it forms a species of travelling oligarchy, armed with a council and agents of justice, to protect its monstrous privileges, to the severe injury of agriculture.

those vast domains, which even now they denominate their states.

The power of the grandees was destroyed, in Spain, by Ferdinand and Isabella.* The fortunate circumstance of the marriage of those two princes reunited under the same sceptre all the people of the Peninsula, with the exception of Portugal, which its colonial greatness from that period raised to the rank of a rival state. The discovery of America, and what still remained of industry in the cities, created a class of traders and citizens, distinct from the proprietors of the soil, or the peasants by whom it was tilled. Ferdinand and Isabella gave municipal laws; they made war upon Grenada with troops which were raised by the commons. That holy brotherhood, (directed apparently against malefactors, but in reality against the nobles,) which holds so conspicuous a place in Spanish romances, was instituted by them. They encouraged companies, the *maestranzas*, in the towns, while they wrung from the nobles, and finally united to the crown, the grand masterships of the military orders. The unity of the Spanish nation, which had been broken since the downfall of the empire of the Goths, was now re-

* The grandees, those *ricos hombres*, who claimed to be on an equality with their sovereign, preserved the privilege of being seated on the steps of the throne; but only to indemnify them, by a mere ceremonial enjoyment, for being no longer the guardians and the counsellors of authority.

newed. There was much to be hoped, much to be done, with a homogeneous nation.

In Spain, the king, the priests, and the people, have always made common cause. The king availed himself of the aid of the clergy to oppose the nobles; and if a few steps towards civil liberty were occasionally made, others, not less vigorous, were taken towards superstition and error. The intolerant desire for an uniformity of belief,* the incessant action of the monks, and some exaggerated fears, induced the Catholic sovereigns (so Ferdinand and Isabella were called, and the title has descended to their successors), to expel the Jews and the Moors from Spain. The Inquisition was, in this instance, the auxiliary; the instrument and not the mover of the royal authority. The Jews and Moors were reproached with vices which were the offspring of that state of persecution to which they were reduced by the prejudices of the age. Ferdinand began and completed the expulsion of the Jews. He began the expulsion of the Moors, but that was terminated, a century later, by one of his successors.†

The evil thus occasioned by fanaticism, and which is dwelt on by historians, was, however, less disas-

* It was Ferdinand, the gloomy and austere Ferdinand, who established religious intolerance and founded the Inquisition.

† From the time of Ferdinand the Catholic to that of Philip III. two hundred thousand Jews or Mahometans were slaughtered by the Inquisition, and more than five millions, who were driven into exile, carried with them arts, trades, and capital.

trous to Spain than the marriage of the heiress of the crowns of Castile and Arragon with Philip the Handsome, heir to the States of Burgundy and Austria. Spain became the prey of foreign monarchs. It was only one of the gems in their diadem. Its blood and its riches were lavished for alien interests and alien vanities. The industry of Castile was sacrificed to the industry of the Netherlands and of Italy. The Austrian Princes continued the contest with the powerful vassals; but their other dominions rendered them strong enough to stand in no need of the people for their auxiliaries, and enabled them, without difficulty, to oppress the whole nation. At the time of the marriage of Joanna the Mad, all true Spaniards felt a foreboding of the calamitous effects resulting from the omnipotence of a monarch, and the idea filled their minds with horror. Love of country and hatred of foreigners were the principles which gave rise to the war of the *Comuneros*,* one of the most just and legitimate insurrec-

* Charles, the son of Philip the Handsome, (who afterwards acquired celebrity under the name of Charles V.,) was born and received his education in Flanders. As the policy of his family, and his own motives of personal ambition, had established his habitual place of residence at a great distance from Spain, he, shortly after his accession to the throne, entrusted the Regency of his Peninsular kingdom to Adrian of Utrecht, a Fleming; William de Croy was nominated Archbishop of Toledo, the highest ecclesiastical dignity in Castile, and the richest benefice in Spain. Posts, honours, riches, became the prey of greedy

tions in which a people ever failed. At a later period, the hatred against foreigners was manifested

foreigners. If the national historians may be credited, the Flemings, in less than a year, sent from Spain to the Netherlands six millions of livres (280,000*l.*); an enormous sum, when we consider what was the value of money at that epoch.

The Cortes of Arragon and Catalonia made a vigorous resistance to the exactions and acts of injustice committed by the delegates of the monarch. The Cortes of Castile having manifested a more submissive disposition, Segovia, Toledo, Seville, and many other considerable cities, entered into a confederacy to avenge the insult which was offered to the nation.

The citizens of Toledo, having at their head Don Juan Padilla, a young man of high birth, made themselves masters of their city, and formed a popular government. At Segovia, at Burgos, at Zamora, the persons who were known to be partisans of the foreigners, were either put to death or took flight, and their houses were razed to the very foundations. The Regent sent troops against them; but his troops were defeated. The insurgents kept the field, and for a time dictated the law in the two Castiles.

The confederation of the towns took the name of the Holy League. The name was justly assumed, and the result proves that it was: never was any cause more sacredly patriotic. The people were armed to obtain the redress of flagrant grievances. After victory, nothing less was thought of than an entire reform of the government. Though the Holy League availed itself of the name and authority of Queen Joanna, who, since her mental alienation, had lived secluded in the palace of Tordesillas, yet the opinions and the views of the leaders were democratical. This will be obvious to any one who reads the energetic remonstrances which they addressed to the Emperor, Charles V., to obtain an independent national representation. Symptoms of the same kind had already shown themselves in the states of the Crown

by continual remonstrances from the Cortes.* The writers of that time abundantly prove what was the general opinion of the nation.

of Arragon. Into the long remonstrances of the League there had stolen some articles restrictive of the exaggerated supremacy of the Court of Rome, the excesses of the clergy, and the abuses of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the secular clergy and the monks, therefore, took especial care not to lend their aid to an insurrection which must prove unfavourable to their interests. The nobles, who at first had participated in the exasperation of the commons against foreigners, were alarmed by the tendency towards democratic measures; their pride was less wounded by usurpations springing out of ancient violences, than they were terrified by the multitude insisting on the repeal of privileges onerous to the majority, and on the subjecting all descriptions of persons and property to contribute to the public burthens. They joined in arms with the Emperor's hired troops to march against the rebels. A militia, composed of timid citizens and inexperienced artisans, could not resist the shock of regular infantry, and of cavalry consisting of gentlemen inspired by a warlike spirit. The army of the Comuneros was defeated, on the 23d of April 1522, in the plain of Villalar, between Tordesillas and Toro. Padilla and the bravest of his party perished on the scaffold, the martyrs of liberty.

The house of Padilla, situated in Toledo, near Cambron-gate, was razed to the ground. Salt was sown on the spot, and a pillar was erected there, bearing an opprobrious inscription. The pil-

* The national assemblies originated with the Gothic sovereigns. The Spanish Cortes are coeval in existence with the monarchy. The commons were admitted into the Cortes in the twelfth century, eighty years before they were allowed to form a part of the English Parliament. The Cortes of Arragon were periodical in 1283.

The Austrian Princes reigned over Spain for two centuries. This is the epoch during which Spain shone in its highest splendour, its warriors performed the noblest achievements, its statesmen acquired the greatest reputation, and its literature attained the loftiest pitch of vigour and brilliancy. It is, nevertheless, the epoch in which a rapid decline rendered manifest the radical defects of the Spanish Government. It is less through the agency of new errors than of old ones that Spain has sunk into a deplorable state. It was neither the annual emigrations, occasioned by the Flemish and Italian wars, nor the colonizing of America, that depopulated Spain. Armies then were not numerous, and war was less sanguinary than it has since been made by the improvements in artillery. If America has been injurious to Spain, it has not been so much so by draining it of men, as by overlaying it with gold, and devoting to idleness the fortunate possessors of the riches which it poured into Europe.

lar is still standing. All round, to a great distance, are seen ruined edifices, and hillocks of bricks and tiles, which bear witness to the ancient grandeur of Toledo, at the same time that they manifest its present state of depopulation and misery, which is common to all the towns and agricultural districts of Castile. These are the calamities which the patriotic League of the Comuneros was anxious to avert. Had Padilla been the victor of Villalar, his name would have been venerated by the Spaniards, as the names of William Tell and Arnold of Winkelried now are in Switzerland.

The cause of the decline of Spain is to be found in the growing influence of the ancient faults which were inherent in the state of property. Estates, being confined to a few individuals, were not improved. The convents unceasingly absorbed a portion of the laborious population. The gulf of mortmain continued to swallow its prey. In this active nation there was no longer any stimulus, any animating stir. The towns, which, by means of their democratic privileges, and the laws which protected commerce, had retained some degree of splendour, could not remain populous when the country around them was depopulated. Indolence, in unison with the climate, and in unison with temperance, established its empire; not that luxurious indolence, the very evil of which supplies its own remedy, but a sober and proud indolence, which is consequently incurable. Amidst the vast circumferences of the cities, built by the Goths, the Moors, and the Spaniards, of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, might be reckoned as many *campos*, or void spaces, as of *despobledos*, or desert spots, in the surrounding country. The progress of the evil was accelerated by princes without talent, favourites devoid of honour, and the victory of despotism over public liberty. To such a height had it arisen under the reign of the sickly and incapable Charles II., that, at the close of the seventeenth century, Spain, which had formerly had thirty millions of inhabitants, had no longer a third

of that number. The revolts of the people were suffered to go unpunished; the ramparts of the fortresses fell into ruins, and were not repaired. All the gold which circulated throughout Europe, traversed Spain to return to it no more. The arsenals were empty, the ports were deserted, the entire marine of the sovereigns of America and the two Indies consisted in six galleons, which were rotting in the harbour of Carthagena; the arts of founding cannon and of ship-building were forgotten. In that vast empire, on which the sun never set, the great-grandson of Philip II. had not in his pay so many as twenty thousand men.

Some writers, either superficial enquirers, or having, from their situation, an interest in magnifying trifling benefits, and passing over great errors in silence, have described the establishment of the house of Bourbon on the Spanish throne as an epoch of regeneration. They have discovered improvement everywhere; they, indeed, have hardly stopped short of discovering glory too. This is a serious error, which it is of importance to refute.

The period at which Philip began to reign in peace was preceded by thirteen years of war. During those thirteen years Spain was overrun and desolated in all directions by foreign armies. The great majority of the nation considered the claim of Philip to the throne to be legitimate, because it was founded on the right of birth, and supported by the will of

the last Austrian sovereign. On this side, however, though there was co-operation, there was no enthusiasm. The nation saw with regret that the justice of the French cause compelled it to combat in conjunction with soldiers who were ever looked upon as enemies. Many of the most devoted partisans of Philip V. would have been glad to see the French withdraw, that they might have defended the king without their aid. Quarrels were perpetually breaking out between the two allies. The French were reproached with their vanity, their assuming conduct, and their plundering. Philip could neither keep the field with them nor without them.

In the ranks of the hostile party, on the contrary, there was energy. The Catalans fought for the house of Austria with more ardour than the Castilians did for the house of Bourbon. In the kingdom of Arragon the French had to encounter a national war. There, even after a victory, they possessed no more ground than that on which their battalions were encamped. On their approach the population retired; but it returned with fresh fury to harass their flanks and their rear. Barcelona gave splendid examples of courage, which, after the lapse of a century, Saragossa was destined to repeat. When the sovereign for whom the Catalan capital sacrificed itself gave up the contest from political considerations, that capital, vanquished without being reduced to submission, offered it-

self to the Grand Signior, hoping to preserve a larger portion of liberty under the protection of the Sultan of Constantinople, than under the yoke of the grandson of Louis XIV.

There was more of cool calculation than of passion in this conduct of the Catalans. In fact, as far back as the year 1707, they had seen Philip V. deprive the people of the kingdom of Arragon of their peculiar privileges. They had called to mind that noble conditional oath, the terror of absolute kings; that tribune of the people who had dared to struggle with the most despotic of the monarch's predecessors. The government of Philip did not act so much from hatred of the rebellion of the Arragonese, as with a design to bring every thing under the royal level. It was a favourable occasion to destroy all that yet existed of the elements of public liberty, and it was turned to account. The victory gained by the Bourbons was not a natural one, though it was assented to by the majority of the nation. From the war Spain reaped havock and carnage, but none of those moral improvements which are the result of great shocks being given to a nation.

The suppression of the Arragonian privileges opened the way for the establishment of a law common to all. There were no exceptions made except with respect to the privileges of Biscay and Navarre, which were defended by the mountains and by patriotism. These uniform modes of legislation,

this state levelling, where no corporation, no individual, is stimulated by private interest to stand up for the interests of the public, are constantly the aim and the means of despotism. The municipal administration was everywhere shorn of its beams. The posts called *officiers de republica*, in contradistinction from government posts, *officiers del rey*, were encroached upon, abridged, degraded in estimation; the royal authority absorbed them. The minor funds of communities were taken under the control of the treasury. The grandees were kept at a distance from the possession of power; they were no longer seen either in the ministry or in the army. The number of the nobles was increased in order to lower their consequence. They became nothing more than great consumers, whom a suspicious policy retained in the capital; they were prevented from being useful citizens, as resident landowners and agriculturists, because it was feared that they might prove dangerous subjects. Without losing any of the privileges which rendered them burthensome to the people, they lost those which rendered them formidable to the prince and useful to the country. The great bodies of the state were all shaken. The council of Castile, an ancient tribunal, sometimes acting as the guardian of kings, found its lustre dimmed by institutions which emanated from France. The Cortes, those old as-

sociates of the monarchy, also vanished.* They appeared again, merely as assemblies periodically invoked, to take an oath to the heirs of the throne, but were never consulted with respect to legislative errors or the welfare of the state.

A French sovereign introduced into his palace French dress, French etiquette, secretaryships of state, guards, academies, and an administrative and financial system, modelled on what existed in France. He transplanted Versailles to Saint Ildefonso; Madrid would soon have been only a faint copy of Paris, and Spain been denationalized, had it depended on kings and courtiers to change at will the manners and the habits of a great people.

Spanish pride was wounded by so many servile imitations; for the improvements were very far from compensating the destruction of ancient and sacred things; it was particularly wounded by seeing the administration of the state, the finances, and the king's conscience, in the hands of foreigners. Every thing shrunk up and dwindled. The antique foundations, on which a noble structure might have been raised, now disappeared; public spirit became extinct: literature, which is the expression of it, faded away; all was nerveless, motionless.

* The Cortes received a severe shock from Charles V.; for the last which deserved that name were those of Toledo, in 1539.

If, indeed, in losing enthusiasm, knowledge had been gained ! if, in losing its splendid qualities, the mind had acquired exactness and profundity ! But the Inquisition has been more fatal to Spain, under the Bourbons, than it was before. In the persecution of the Jews and Moors, it was the agent rather than the cause. By preserving an uniformity of religion, under the Austrian princes, it at least prevented Spanish blood from flowing in religious wars. That this was no trifling benefit is sufficiently shown by what took place in France and in Germany. Under the Bourbons, the Inquisition, which was sinking beneath the weight of years, recovered enough of its youthful strength to repel sound doctrines, to extinguish science and knowledge, and to stop the intellectual progress of the age. Spain was never more insulated from Europe than under the sceptre of the Bourbons. Previously, it took part in all the affairs of Europe ; its ambassadors, its warriors, returned from Italy, from Germany, and from France, with minds enlarged by an interchange of ideas.

In the eighteenth century, Spain was merely a vast convent, in which the Inquisition sat in the porter's lodge, to prevent truth from obtaining admittance. There are persons who have doubted whether it would not be better for the whole world to be the prey of ignorance than to be accessible to truth ; whether the total sum of individual happiness would

be larger in the one order of things than in the other. But never did it enter into the mind of a rational being to consider it as a matter of doubt, whether it might not be useful for a part of the European Continent to be overrun by ignorance, prejudice, and error, while the rest of the globe was advancing with rapid strides towards general information, and a state of perfectibility.

While we relate the evils which were caused by the enthroning of the Bourbons, we have no wish to attack the personal character of the princes of that ancient house who have reigned in Spain. Despotism is established, is cemented, as much by weakness as by energy. Philip V. had slender talents, but he had sound sense and a moderate disposition. He had been taught by Louis XIV. that kings held their power by divine right, that the king was the state, and that God, in delegating kings to rule over other men, endowed them with superior intellect. He took with him into Spain the convictions which had been impressed on his mind by his grandsire; but the purity of his morals, and the solemnity of his tranquil deportment, served to make him beloved by the Spaniards. At a later period, a gloomy melancholy, which consumed his heart, wore out his frame, attacked the organs of the brain, and deprived him of that small degree of fitness for business which he once, perhaps, possessed.

His two sons, who successively reigned after him,

were good, religious, and moderate princes. Faithful to the maxims of his family, as far as regarded government at home, Ferdinand VI. deviated from them with respect to his foreign connections. Spain was thus a gainer, by avoiding inglorious and unprofitable wars. Charles III. adopted a diametrically opposite system of policy. He entered into the family compact, and, by so doing, consummated the work of Louis XIV.

The reign of this prince was signalized by a considerable number of useful reforms, which were continued and increased by Charles IV., his son and successor. This was less the effect of the will of the sovereign than of the resistless infiltration of ideas of improvement, which penetrated in spite of the barrier opposed to them by the Pyrenees and the seas. In the eighteenth century, it was the fashion to make roads, dig canals, and establish manufactories, as in the twelfth century it was to erect cathedrals, and to found monasteries. Arts and trades were cultivated in Spain; the sciences were encouraged. Associations endeavoured to excite a taste for industry and labour. Some useful works were composed. Efforts were made to disseminate instruction. Some of the shackles which impeded industry and commerce were broken. America, though in a very scanty proportion, received a share of the benefits which were conferred upon Spain.

During three-fourths of a century, which elapsed between the peace of Utrecht and the French Revolution, Spain, enjoying peace, and having ceased to send her population abroad, found it increase at home. This increase, which, however, has been exaggerated, because the diminution under the Austrians was so, is particularly obvious on the sea coast; it would have been immense, if the commerce of the whole of Spain with her colonies had been free. For the eighteenth century was the age of colonies and commerce. But, while the coasts became more populous and rich, while the maritime towns were growing in size, the old Spanish towns were sinking into poverty and losing their inhabitants. The table lands of Old Castile and La Mancha, and the upper valley of the Tagus, became more and more deserted. Not one of the villages which, during the war of the succession, was destroyed on the borders of Portugal, was rebuilt. The laws pernicious to agriculture and property, the settlements in mortmain, the entails on elder sons, the clergy, were scarcely touched. Canals were begun, and left incomplete. High roads were opened, without any cross roads by which to reach them, so that, frequented only by muleteers, they have hitherto been nearly an useless luxury. The manufactures were unable to stand their ground without the assistance of government, because the workmanship was dear, and the product of an imperfect quality.

The end was wished for, but the means of attaining it would have excited alarm. With the Inquisition, can knowledge be diffused? With despotism, can emulation be called forth? With the prejudices and the clumsy materials of the tenth century, is it possible to obtain the results of modern reason?

The loss of the Flemish and Italian provinces was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance. It was a deliverance from wars, revolts, and the expenses of governing: the Peninsula, and the immense empire of America, were quite enough to find exercise for the talents of the Spanish ministers. But the ill-defined fraternity with France, the ancient rival of Spain, was a misfortune. It was decided, in the cabinet of Madrid, that, as Spain was connected with Europe only on the side of the Pyrenees, the French alliance ensured to her perpetual peace at home; that, thus shielded, the Spaniards might safely neglect the military profession, and devote themselves wholly to the trade with the Indies, the source of the national prosperity, to the coasting trade, and to all the other advantages arising from their favourable local situation. The partisans of this system even carried it so far, as to maintain, that the Spaniards could not at the same time preserve their colonies, support a naval force adequate to their protection, and keep large armies on foot. For the future, as far as regarded the political world, Spain was to stand in the same relation to France, as a satellite does to its

planet, or a laden raft to the light bark by which it is towed.* The idea of this subordination gained ground enough to contribute ultimately to bring about a change of dynasty in Spain, in conformity with the change of dynasty in France.

The dependence of a people long accustomed to rule over others, was particularly striking in the mode of organizing and employing the land and sea forces. The navy arose only to receive checks. Vessels seemed to be constructed for no other purpose than, sooner or later, to be carried into the English ports. It was easy to foresee, also, that the constant enmity of that power, as soon as a fit moment arrived, would occasion the loss of the Spanish colonies. The Spanish army was of small magnitude, had no good institutions but what it borrowed from France, and drew nothing from its own sources; nothing from the national disposition and habits. Not a single recollection, not a tradition, formed a connecting link between those Iberian bands which were destroyed at Rocroi, and the regiments which, a century later, fought in Italy to maintain the rights of Philip V. After the peace of 1748, the Spanish troops were never engaged in war on a

* Choiseul, the ablest French minister in the eighteenth century, said, that he was more sure of his preponderance in the cabinet of Madrid, than in that of Versailles. This he said during the reign of Charles III., the most able of the Spanish Bourbons.

large scale. The campaign of Portugal, in 1762, proves that they were incapable of conducting an operation; and that, even with the aid of their French allies, there was in them neither strength nor coherency, nor talent enough to conquer a kingdom, which, according to the laws of topography, ought to be one of their provinces. The expedition against Algiers, in 1774, does not afford a more favourable testimony in their behalf.

The American War did not offer them any opportunity of acquiring glory. In conjunction with the French troops, they made from the English the easy and unimportant conquest of the island of Minorca. With the French, also, they failed before the rock of Gibraltar. While praising the courage of the Spaniards, the French have given no praise to their discipline. Spain, which, from the nature of its situation, and the invincible bravery of its inhabitants, no less than from the immense extent of its colonial empire, ought to be a power of the first rank, held in diplomacy only the second, or even the third rank. How was its existence to be rendered obvious to Europe? It could exercise an influence on the affairs of the Continent only by hanging upon France; and it daily lost both the will and the ability to injure its neighbours. It opened a broad road to the exterior of the Pyrenees, to render them passable in all seasons, and facilitate the march of armies to Madrid. With the exception of San Fer-

nando de Figueras, which was built by Ferdinand VI., when he abandoned the system of his family, no fortification was raised in the Pyrenees, which are so easily defensible; those Pyrenees in which the frontier line, entirely to the disadvantage of France, still bears witness to the ancient power of Spain. The old fortresses were allowed to go to ruin, and were not repaired. Instead of measures being taken to stimulate the patriotism of the Pyrenean borders, it was kept down, it was smothered. It was not the fault of the Bourbon Government, if the Catalans were not as quiet as the Castilians. They preferred making them pliant to their rulers, rather than terrible to the enemy. No foresight whatever was shown with respect to the means of future defence.

Spain was in this weak and inoffensive state when the French Revolution burst forth and terrified kings on their thrones. The soil of Spain was not in a state calculated to receive and to nourish into life the seeds of the spirit of liberty. The lower classes shuddered at the insults offered to religion and to the royal authority. In the middle class, and even in the higher ranks and the clergy, the new ideas gained many partisans; they were propagated most extensively in the sea-ports, because there the communication is more open with the rest of the world.

By a very natural effect, the Spaniards who were the partisans of the new ideas pushed them to a wild

and dangerous excess, and became outrageous demagogues ; as among those who combat superstition, atheists are usually to be found. At the same time, the Spanish Government gave a warm reception to the fugitive and proscribed subjects of France. The confirmation of the Family Compact, by the Constituent assembly in 1790, in consequence of the affair of Nootka Sound, did not set the court of Madrid quite at ease with respect to the influence of Revolutionized France. In fact, it was evident that, in whatever situation France and Spain might stand with regard to each other, it must always be the interest of France to support Spain against England. The insulating system was, therefore, pushed as far as possible. Secure measures were also adopted to prevent the spreading of the revolutionary contagion.*

The throne was then occupied by one of those princes who, in private life, would deserve the attachment, and perhaps the esteem, of their friends ; who are fit to reign in times when nothing more is required from them than to eat, drink, hunt, and show themselves ; who are bearable in those constitutional

* The most rigorous watchfulness was exercised on the frontiers, and in the interior, by the Inquisition, which occasionally issued and posted up in the churches a summary catalogue of books recently prohibited. In these lists, mixed with the great names of Montesquieu, Robertson, and Filangieri, might be read the titles of the most obscure, and sometimes the most obscene, French novels.

monarchies, where kings have no action but that which is derived from their place, and connected merely with their person; but who, from want of talent, or want of decided character, are incapable of exercising absolute power when the storm begins to rage. Charles IV. ascended the throne at the age of forty-two; simple in his tastes, kind to those about him, appearing to have a confined understanding only because it was unequal to the task which difficult times imposed upon him; pacific, timid, accustomed to obey, having spent his youth under the yoke, he was constantly obsequious to the control of his Queen, Maria Louisa. Born in Italy, this Princess carried to the court of Spain that ardent impulse, that will, which is peculiar to the women of her country. She had over the King that superiority which, when the understanding and the improvement of the mind are equal on both sides, the woman always has over the man.

The faults and virtues of kings often decide the fate of the people. That which, in a private station, would not rouse the public attention, is seized upon the throne by inexorable history. The intention, the morality, of actions is less looked to than their consequences. The Queen of Spain is now in the hands of history, which, turning a deaf ear to the cries of party rage, will reject the insulting comparisons of her to Fredegonda and Brunehaut; but which must declare, that the ruin of the state was

probably caused, and was undoubtedly hastened, by an impure love, of which nothing does honour to the cause, nothing can excuse the excess.

Charles IV. at first left the state under the management of his father's ministers. During the early years of his reign, Spain was governed by Count de Florida Blanca.* An active and patriotic minister, his name is connected with the useful undertakings of the reign of Charles III. He was an enthusiastic lover of his country; he regarded the French Revolution with feelings of horror. The terrible expression of Mirabeau, "the national cockade will make the tour of the globe," incessantly rang in his ears. Against the Revolution, he directed the activity of his mind; against the French, he preached war. A court intrigue, however, hurled him from office. His harsh and haughty character was offensive to the Queen. He was not indulgent enough to her amours. The post of Florida Blanca was given to a venerable person, who, of all the Spanish statesmen, was the one most respected throughout Europe. Count d'Aranda† had always shewn himself the enemy of tyranny and superstition, the pro-

* Florida Blanca, who was brought up to the law, encroached upon and perverted the royal authority; he rendered the king a nullity, created ministerial power, offices, clerks, and commissions, and prepared the way for, and rendered easy, the vicarious domination of Godoy Esmenard.

† The veteran of Spanish diplomacy.

moter of philosophy and knowledge. Age had not impaired the accuracy of his mind, but it had diminished the energy of his character. At the end of a nine months' administration, he vanished from the political scene as suddenly as he had ascended to it nine months before.

Then rose by the side of, and above the throne, a man who had nothing of greatness but from its favour, and who was destined not to fall from his eminence till he involved the monarchy in his own ruin. At the close of 1792, Emanuel Godoy, recently made Duke of Alcudia, was appointed to the important office of which Florida Blanca and d'Aranda had successively been deprived. From the adulterous court of the Queen he sprang to the highest commands in the militia, to the presidency of the councils, to be the absolute arbiter of peace and war. If his power had been founded solely on the Queen's fondness for him, he would have had reason to fear, that a favourite rival might at once divest him of empire and of the heart of his mistress; but at his first onset he had gained over the weak Charles IV. a more extensive and a more durable ascendancy.

In the presence of the French Revolution, the policy of the Court of Madrid continued to be for some time hesitating. The King and his Ministers felt that war was indispensable, yet they wished to avoid it. A fatal event brought about a rupture. To those who held the reins of authority in France,

Charles IV. had made numerous applications, both publicly and privately, to save from the scaffold the head of the monarch who was the chief of the Bourbon family. When that sacred head fell beneath the axe of the executioner, he determined to take up arms. It was imperative on him to do so; for, had he refused to do it, his nation would have carried on war without him. The passing sentence upon a king by those who were formerly his subjects, had filled a religious and feeling people with horror. Cries of indignation and vengeance resounded through the towns. Individual Frenchmen, peaceable merchants, were assailed, assassinated, and suffered the penalty of crimes, in the commission of which they had no share.

The King of Spain had not forty thousand soldiers in Europe. His arsenals were unfurnished, his treasury was empty. Patriotic gifts* poured in from all quarters. Catalonia required permission to rise in a mass. The provinces of Biscay and Navarre published appeals to the population. The Grandees rushed forward at the head of their vassals. The monks formed themselves into regiments: this cause was their own. Bands of smugglers, forgetting

* The patriotic gifts offered to the National Assembly of France, in 1790, amounted to five millions of francs; those of England, in 1798, to forty-five; those of Spain to seventy-three. The nation was willing, but it was not seconded by the Government.

their habitual contests with the government, desired to be allowed to fight against the enemies of the altar and the throne. All classes, all ranks, were eager to conquer and to die for the country.*

How far did the Spanish Government turn this devotedness to account? Armies were formed at the two extremities of the Pyrenees; the regiments were completed; some battalions of militia were levied. Taken unawares on this frontier, which was naked of fortresses, the French at first experienced some trifling checks. The trivial advantages gained by the Spaniards were confined to the capture of two or three posts in Roussillon, and of one or two villages in the country of the Basques. The whole of Europe arriving on their northern and eastern frontier, the interior disturbed, the west a prey to civil war, the coasts threatened by the English, did not allow the French to dispatch to the Pyrenees any thing but battalions of raw troops. If the Spanish Government had displayed the same energy as the nation; if the war had been carried on with even a moderate degree of capacity, the Spanish armies, in 1793 and 1794, would have penetrated to

* The General of the Franciscans offered to march at the head of ten thousand monks. The Duke of Alba, and two other nobles, wished to raise ten thousand men at their own cost. The Catalans made an offer of fifty thousand troops; and the Chapter of Toledo of twenty-five millions of reals. The clergy perambulated the villages with the crucifix in their hands.

the banks of the Garonne ; but their valour was, as it were, benumbed by the lethargy of the Cabinet of Madrid. The favourite projected plans of campaign, which were badly executed ; the manner of making war in a mountainous country was not understood. In consequence of wishing to make head every where, they were strong no where.

The offensive war had a defensive character ; while, on the contrary, the defence of the French had the character of an offensive war. Vigorous enterprizes were seldom attempted, and produced but trifling results. The Spanish leaders manifested more bravery than talent : scarcely were there to be found among them a few generals of the second class. If the idea, which had formerly been prevalent, of the energy of the Spanish character, was not entirely destroyed, at least it was singularly modified, by what was now seen of the mode in which they were organized and commanded.

As soon as the French Republic had increased its forces, habituated its soldiers to warfare, and got rid of some of its internal enemies, it reinforced its armies on the frontier of Spain. In a short time the mountains became level before the courage of the Republicans. Those who passed the eastern Pyrenees made themselves masters of San Fernando de Figueras, considered as one of the strong places of Europe, and defended by a garrison of ten thousand men ; and this they accomplished with more ease

than, eighteen months before, the Spaniards had taken, on the French territory, a fort and two or three paltry towns. On their right, the French overran the Biscayan provinces, and passed the Ebro. Pampeluna was on the point of being besieged, Castile of being invaded, Madrid was threatened. The King of Spain hastened to ask for peace: he had satisfied his duties as a relation; he imagined that he had fulfilled his duties as a sovereign. The Minister, under whose auspices Spain was reconciled to France, by a treaty in which the reverses that had been sustained did not form the measure of the sacrifices made, took the title of Prince of the Peace. A general, of the age of thirty, might have been ambitious of another title.

The war had taught what the power of France was; there was no need of this experiment to make known what was the power of the Revolution. It was consequently necessary to strengthen Spain, both against the Revolution and against France. The opportunity was an excellent one: a nation fertile in great geniuses and great characters was inspired and directed by an omnipotent will. The Prime Minister was in the vigour of his days; the robust health and prudent morals of the Monarch gave assurance of his living to a good old age. What a favourable situation for re-tempering the monarchy, for restoring it to its vigour and youth, and for bringing the governors to the level of the governed!

But an entirely opposite system was adopted: Spain hastened to disarm; the militia were dismissed to their homes. The skeletons of twenty battalions and of eight squadrons, which had been added to the regular army, were, indeed, preserved; but recruiting was discontinued. The defects in the military organization were not corrected. While the laws of new France devoted indefinitely the whole of the population to arms, Spain deprived herself of every means of promptly raising armies, and the Spanish people were divested of all military spirit. The rapid march which the French had made from the banks of the Bidassoa to those of the Ebro, did not excite even an idea of throwing up entrenchments, and keeping fortresses in a defensible state. The Government wanted steadiness; the finances were badly administered; existence was supported upon the old abuses.

Nor did the thought ever occur, of anticipating the consequences of the impulse which was felt throughout Europe, by taking the lead in that which was felt in Spain, and silencing the discontent of the enlightened part of the nation, by admitting it to a prudent participation of power. The war, which for three centuries had been carried on against the national institutions, by the princes of the houses of Austria and Bourbon, was still persevered in. It is all over with nations in which institutions do not insure the duration of the principles that constitute

them; in which interests are without representatives; in which the public opinion has no organ; in which the maxims of government depend on a single and mutable will. Those nations may last for a day, they may even shine with some splendour; but the splendour is deceptive, the tranquillity is fallacious. Without institutions, empires lose themselves, in the clouds with Napoleon, in the mire with Godoy.

France was desirous that Spain should take a part in its quarrel with England.* Disarmed and misgoverned, Spain was free to choose her system of policy. The family compact was renewed: the family compact between the younger branch of the Bourbons, and the Revolution which had recently exterminated the elder branch, between the Catholic king and the Republic hostile to the priesthood! From this time, the navy absorbed all the disposable funds, and the army was even more neglected than it had hitherto been. In case of success, this naval war would have been injurious to Spain, because it must necessarily add to the relative strength of France. On the other hand, reverses would strip Spain of its colonies, ruin its marine, and interrupt its intercourse with America. The fleets of Spain were sent to French ports. The fleets of France came to consume and exhaust the magazines in the ports of Spain.†

* See Notes and Illustrations, No. II. at the end of this volume.

† After the peace of Bâle a French squadron entered the

The Prince of the Peace was not a friend to the French. He was far from having any liking for the Revolution, and he had manifested a leaning towards England ; but it would have suited him best to be at peace with all parties. Compelled to make a choice between the rival powers, he decided in favour of that, the friendship of which could more directly ensure to him his tranquillity, his pleasures, his continuance in favour, and the disgrace of his masters. Other considerations threw him more and more, if not into the interests of France, at least into connexions with it. He was induced to believe that that country, tired of the Revolution, and incapable of fixing itself, would, sooner or later, look to the descendants of its former rulers; and that, to avoid a re-action, it would seek for them in that branch which had no injuries to avenge. He was the dupe of some intriguers, and he became an object of suspicion to the French government, which, in 1798, solicited, and obtained of the King of Spain his dismissal from the ministry. The Queen he alienated by publicly keeping Donna Josepha Tudo at Aranjuez.

Charles IV. was still more pacifically inclined than his minister ; his natural leaning was towards the French ; the Revolution made him tremble ; the

port of Cadiz ; there was subsequently always one there, even when there was no Spanish squadron at Brest. Arsenals, ships, every thing was in common between the two powers : it was the lion's partition.

scaffold of Louis XVI. was always before his eyes, and so much did he dread the enmity of the Republic that he would have purchased its friendship by any sacrifice. He was more carefully, more punctiliously polite to the fiery patriots who were sent to his court by the French Republic, than he had been to the family ambassadors who were accredited to him by the head of his house.

In losing the ministry, Godoy did not lose power; his influence with the royal couple was even increased; he placed and displaced the ministers, and when he ceased to be the arm of the government he became the soul of it. The ministers who were at the head of the various departments in Spain, subsequently to the fall of Count d'Aranda, have no claim to the notice of history. Of what consequence is it, whether the finances were managed by Gardozni, Varcles, or Soler? the navy by Valoz Varela, Grandellana, or Sol de Lemos? the war office by Campo Alanze, Asanza, Alvares, or Olugace Felix? the home department by Llanuzo, Jovellanos, or Caballero? foreign affairs by Saavedra, Urquijo, or Cevallos? Those who were of slender abilities, or cringing dispositions, obtained and preserved their places by a servile obedience to the behests of the favourite. The others had not time to render any service to their country; they are known only by the signal disgraces which were brought down upon them by ardent zeal and a lofty mind. Thus we have seen Counts Florida Blanca and d'Aranda expiate in

exile the crime of having been desirous to do good with different views and in different manners ; Count de Gabarras, transferred from prison and banishment to the court, coming nigh power, without recovering it ; Don Miguel Joseph de Asanza making a momentary appearance in the war department, and immediately retiring from it, that his seat might be filled by the favourite's uncle ; Don Gaspard Melchior de Jovellanos immured in a convent, because he had raised the voice of truth and reason in a corrupt and ignorant world ; Don Francisco de Saavedra called to the head of the council, pointed out by public opinion as worthy of that honour, and then, on the pretext of ill health, prevented, by a premature resignation, from proving the correctness of that opinion ; lastly, Don Luiz Mariano de Urquijo invested, while young, with high credit, because he was supposed to possess high talents, and almost immediately thrown into a dungeon, because it was discovered that his character was equal to his talents.

When a strong hand put down the factions in France, and annihilated the Revolutionary spirit, Charles IV. enthusiastically applauded the eighteenth of Brumaire. He was of opinion that his own throne acquired stability from the power of Napoleon.

The existence of a more energetic and concentrated government in France drew closer the ties of alliance.* The Court of Spain had for a long while

* In May 1799, O'Farrel led a division of infantry to Roch-

interposed to neutralize the enmity which subsisted between France and Portugal. It had refused to permit the Directory to march an army through its territory, to attack the latter country ; it was, however, obliged to give up the point to the First Consul. In 1801, a corps of eighteen thousand French traversed Spain, and established camps of observation in front of Ciudad Rodrigo. At the same time, an army of forty thousand Spaniards was assembled on the left bank of the Tagus. Godoy commanded this army, and in a brief campaign he justified his surname of Prince of the Peace. In vain, through the medium of its ambassador, and of a general sent to Godoy, did France press for the war being vigorously carried on ; hostilities were confined to the capture of some defenceless towns, and to incursions of cavalry. Charles IV. did not wish to dethrone his son-in-law, the Prince Regent of Portugal. It was in spite of himself that he served the policy of France. He was not desirous to make conquests, which Buonaparte would, perhaps, compel him to retain. This was the opposite of ordinary wars, in which conquests are forborne to be made, because it is known that they must be restored.

The campaign of 1801 was necessarily inglorious

fort, under pretence of a secret expedition. A short time after Mazaredo entered the harbour of Brest with his squadron. This was done that France might be secure of the naval and military forces of Spain.

to the Spanish arms; it did much to bring the public contempt upon the house of the Spanish Bourbons. The King and Queen were at the army with the favourite. Assuming those forms of gallantry which were not natural to him, he was seen to present pompously to the Queen a cluster of oranges, which some soldiers had gathered from the glaci^s of Elvas. He appeared at the head of the troops, conducting his royal mistress in triumph, and accompanied by the King, who marched behind them. The soldiers carried her in a palanquin interwoven with foliage. Maria Louisa was fifty when she thus exhibited herself to the people and the army.

The peace of Amiens reconciled Spain with England; Spain lost the island of Trinidad, and received in exchange the district of Olivença.* This did not compensate her; but she would have purchased by much greater sacrifices a peace which was necessary to enable her to restore her navy, revive her colonies, and fill up the gulph of the fiscal deficiency. By a treaty, supplementary to that of Amiens, and concluded between Spain and France, Spain ceded Louisiana† to France, who, in exchange for that co-

* Spain did not require the rest of the territory on the left bank of the Guadiana, though it was necessary, in order to put a stop to smuggling, which is entirely to the disadvantage of Spain while Portugal is the ally of England.

† France, which could not defend her colonies, was still less able to retain Louisiana. It was taken for the purpose of being sold to the Americans; a dangerous neighbour was thus given to Mexico.

lony, and for the inheritance of the Farnese family, gave Tuscany, raised to the rank of a kingdom, to the infant Don Louis, who was the son of the Duke of Parma, and the husband of the King of Spain's second daughter.

By this arrangement Spain was rendered a party in future combinations. There were some statesmen who, on this occasion, anticipated the resurrection of Spain in the diplomacy of Europe, and saw her presiding once more over the destiny of Italy, and acting as a counterpoise between Austria and France. This idea was relished, and even fostered, by distinguished characters of the Italian Republic, who, holding in equal abhorrence the French and the Austrian yoke, sought beyond the Mediterranean for a protector of their independence.* Other statesmen, on the contrary, were adverse to the state being thus extended, at the very moment when its weakness was increasing. They wished Spain to be concentrated within the Peninsula. It was their opinion, that uniting Portugal to Spain, if this could be accomplished without too great a shock, would complete and re-invigorate the monarchy, by bringing the whole of the Peninsula under the same sceptre. To bring this to bear, they thought that Italy, and even some colonial possessions, ought to

* M. de Melzi, vice-president of the Italian Republic, was at the head of those who held this opinion. He had family connections with Spain.

be sacrificed. It was, however, now impossible for Spain to form any political combinations out of the circle drawn round it by France.

Not that there was not a great number of Spaniards of the old school, who had long been weary of their subjection to a foreign policy and a foreign cabinet. England also had partisans; and, indeed, there were not a few of them in the councils of Madrid. But the time was gone by in which Spain could deliberate. Spain, whether she would or not, was whirled along in the system of France. To detach her from it would have required a gigantic effort; and how could such an effort be made by the feeble and degraded hand which held the reins of power!

Additional proofs of subserviency were soon given. The peace of Amiens being broken, France lost no time in claiming the succours for which she had stipulated in the offensive and defensive treaty of alliance. All the obligations imposed on Spain by the family compact, and by the treaty concluded at San Ildefonso in 1796, were arrayed in support of this claim.* The Prince of the Peace, however, seemed desirous to elude the literal performance of the treaty. For a moment there was a talk in Spain of levying sixty thousand men, and preserving an armed neutrality. France then threatened to at-

* See Notes and Illustrations, No. III. at the end of this volume.

tack the credit of Godoy ; and the Chevalier Azara,* ambassador at the Court of France, was pointed out, in the French journals, as his successor. This was an infallible method of proceeding. Spain purchased the privilege of neutrality, by engaging to pay annually to France the sum of fifty millions of francs.

Napoleon calculated that the money of the Spaniards would be of more use to him than their auxiliary forces. The English made the same kind of calculation : they were of opinion that it would be more advantageous to them to have Spain their enemy, than neutral, and supplying France with enormous sums. In the midst of peace, four Spanish frigates, laden with treasure, were attacked, taken, or sunk, by the English vessels. After having committed this outrage, the Cabinet of St. James's issued a lying manifesto to explain it ; thus giving the example of the injustice with which, ere long, Spain was to be treated by another power ; thus furnishing, by an atrocious act at sea, a prelude to the iniquities of which she was soon to be the victim by land.† In spite of itself, the nation was

* At this period, the Chevalier d'Azara, the Spanish ambassador in France, said to Napoleon, " What glory can a young and vigorous man, like you, gain by triumphing over such an old and broken down man as I am ?" Napoleon and Azara forgot that the people are always young.

† If the Cabinet of St. James's had publicly and officially made known its convention, instead of lulling the Spanish nation

again plunged into a war, the result of which could not fail to be calamitous.

The insult offered to the Spanish flag, the attack which had been so cruelly made, and so much in contempt of the law of nations, the scorn and barbarity which had been displayed, excited against the English a burst of hatred, which, however, would soon have given way to considerations of public good, had it not been kept alive, prolonged, and continually stimulated, by the policy of France. On the 14th of December, 1804, Spain declared war against England.* It was easy to frame a manifesto, there being a superabundance of motives for entering upon a war.

Charles IV. placed his avenging thunderbolts in the hands of him who was the habitual arbiter of his will, who, for twelve years, had assisted him in bearing the burden of his crown. The Prince of the Peace, who continued to have the direction and command of the military and naval forces, now appealed to the nation, represented energetically to it the outrages committed by England, and exhorted it to spare no sacrifices in the cause of the country and of honour. A part of the militia was promptly called out, and unusual means were adopted to re-

into security, and seizing the money of the Government and of individuals, the war would have appeared just, and the proceeding would not have been odious.

* See Appendix, No. III.*, at the end of the book.

eruit the army. Companies of grenadiers and chasseurs were draughted from the militia regiments to form the four divisions of Old Castile, New Castile, Andalusia, and Galicia. Under the name of *tercios*, a name which the Spaniards had rendered celebrated of old in the Italian and Flemish wars, an expeditionary corps of infantry and cavalry was raised for the protection of the province of Buenos Ayres. The camp of St. Roch before Gibraltar was reinforced; measures were taken to put the coasts and harbours in a state of defence; and the local militia of the sea-ports was placed upon duty.

In those military preparations there was however more of show than of reality. The Prince of the Peace had not a mind enlarged enough to turn to a proper account the attack which the English had made, and to render his nation strong, regardless of the risk there might be to run, as to the way in which it would employ its strength; even had he been capable of conceiving this generous idea, he had neither the talents nor the popularity requisite to carry it into effect. Napoleon was probably adverse to the augmentation of the land forces; for they were neither raised to their full complement, nor collected together. The Government turned its attention and its treasures to the naval service. The Spanish squadrons co-operated with the French squadrons in that memorable maritime campaign of 1805, which was so near being disastrous to England,

They bore a still larger share in the reverses which were sustained. The Spanish navy perished with the French navy at Trafalgar.

While Spain went halves with France in losses by sea, France triumphed alone by land. Charles IV. had applauded the First Consul Buonaparte, victor over the factions of his country, conquering peace in Europe, pleading and gaining the cause of order and of authority ; but he could not calmly see the Emperor Napoleon, without any motive, cementing the restoration of the throne with the blood of a Bourbon, whose right of succession to the crown was more remote than that of the Spanish monarch and his family. When, at a later period, writings, protected by the Government, taught that the Bourbon dynasty and the new French dynasty could not co-exist ; when official acts of the cabinet grounded the pretensions of Napoleon on the ancient power of the Bourbons, and their establishment on the three thrones of France, Spain, and Naples ; when he announced the project of distributing the thrones among the princes of his family ; when the public voice affirmed him to have said, that his dynasty would soon be the oldest in Europe ; then it was impossible for the King of Spain not to feel uneasy and offended.

Power and will were commensurate with each other in Napoleon. He thought it expedient to remove the fears of the Court of Spain. The efforts

which were made for this purpose succeeded in persuading the Spanish monarch that, whatever might be the views of the Emperor with respect to the imperial family, every thing should be postponed till after the death of King Charles : he was assured, that the Emperor would on no account hurt the feelings of his good, his old, his faithful ally. In truth, what other sovereign, even if selected from among his brothers, could have ensured to him on the part of Spain such satisfactory weakness and servility ? It was intimated, that, whenever the before-mentioned circumstance occurred, care should be taken to provide adequately for the Queen and the Prince of the Peace. The tranquillity of the King being guaranteed for life, and, after his death, the establishment of the Queen and the Prince of the Peace, what more could Charles IV. want ? Godoy was his people and his family.

The Prince of the Peace did not participate in this feeling of security. He believed that the hatred of the people would be brought upon him by the sufferings which arose from the war. Being still in the prime of life, he saw before him a longer, and consequently a clouded and threatening, future. Napoleon terrified him even more than the Revolution. This terror was very natural. Wavering in his policy, he preached friendship and alliance with France to the diplomatic agents of Spain, while, at the same time, he blamed them for being too much and too

closely connected with the French. If the ambassador, or the Spanish agents at Paris, made compulsory sacrifices, he reproached them with their submissiveness, as being unworthy of the Castilian high spirit. Scarcely had he done this before he himself made greater sacrifices, and descended still lower. His views were unsteady, and his conduct vacillating. In the situation in which Spain then was, the task would have been a difficult one for an abler man than he was.

The subversion of the throne of Naples was a result of the battle of Austerlitz. The policy of Spain had been unconnected with, and even in opposition to, that of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This difference, which arose from the topographical position of the two states, had not however broken the ties of friendship between the two brothers. More than once Charles IV. informed Ferdinand IV. of the steps which he was about to take in consequence of the combinations of France, and this information was transmitted by Ferdinand to the English, who availed themselves of it in a manner ruinous to Spain.* He had often interposed as mediator be-

* In Lord Nelson's will, he assigns as a reason for one of his legacies to Lady Hamilton, that, in 1796, she had obtained a letter written by the King of Spain, in which that monarch informed his brother, the King of Naples, of his intention to declare war against England. This letter was communicated to the British Cabinet. The ministers ordered Admiral Jervis,

tween France and Ferdinand IV. The connection between the two families had recently been drawn closer, by the marriage of the Prince of Asturias with a daughter of the Neapolitan monarch. The dethronement of that monarch affected the Court of Spain. It delayed, it hesitated to acknowledge Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples. This hesitation was rather caused by shame than policy; but Napoleon was indignant. He was then occupied with the preparations for the war against Prussia. As he was stepping into his carriage, to join his army in Franconia, he said, 'If Charles IV. will not acknowledge my brother as King of the Sicilies, his successor shall acknowledge him.'

This hostile shaft was thrown. England seized the lucky opportunity; it conceived hopes of arming the whole of the Peninsula against France. In the month of August, 1806, a numerous squadron, commanded by Earl St. Vincent, having on board an English negotiator and troops, appeared in the Tagus, for the purpose of fixing the wavering policy of the Portuguese cabinet. The Baron de Strogonoff, the Russian Ambassador at Madrid, who was recently arrived from England, had, on his way through Lisbon, laid the ground work of measures eventually inimical to France. He was an approximative me-
 who commanded the British squadron, to attack the fleets and ports of Spain, if a favourable opportunity should occur, without waiting for war being declared.

dium between that cabinet and the Prince of the Peace.

From that epoch the still increasing power of France had a tendency to unite the whole of Europe against her. Spain was the friend of France as long as France was combating against the states which had vowed her destruction. The invasions of Germany and Italy, the attacks upon Austria, were considered nearly as a following up of the defensive war. Spain had formerly concluded a peace with France at the same time as Prussia. She was, consequently, in a nearly similar situation with respect to France. The attack upon Prussia was going beyond the system of defence; it was an attack upon Europe; it was a subject of dread to neutrals and allies. Spain ought, therefore, to enter the arena, in order to stifle an ambition, of which she herself, from her closer proximity, must otherwise be, sooner or later, a victim. Such were the reflections, conformable to justice and policy, which, at this great epoch, gained credit in the Cabinet of Madrid.

At Madrid, the Ambassador Strogonoff, in concert with the Prince of the Peace and the Portuguese Ambassador, framed a system of aggression against France. The explosion was to burst forth at the moment when Russia entered the lists in the north of Europe. The preparations were to be artfully managed, in order to divert the attention of France.

Portugal was to arm. Spain was then to raise troops, and render her artillery rapidly effective, under pretence of opposing the armaments of Portugal. Expeditions were fitting out in the British ports. All at once, and at a decisive moment, a formidable Spanish and Portuguese army, supported by English troops, and certainly by maritime means, was to invade the south of France, and strike an unexpected blow in that portion of her territory which felt itself most secure, and had the fewest means of defence.

All this was arranged in the Cabinet of the Prince of Peace. No agent of the government, either at home or abroad, was let into the secret. The execution of it was not commenced. Nothing had transpired; there was yet a wide interval between plans undigested and hardly sketched out, and the beginning to carry them into effect. No direct communication had been opened with England. Not a step had been taken to provide men or money.

In the torrid climes of the South, in the midst of a fine day, and with a cloudless sky, we often see the lightning dart, and hear the thunder roll, yet all has remained as usual; scarcely have a few fleecy clouds collected in the horizon. Thus, unexpected by all, and unintelligible to almost every body, appeared the Prince of the Peace's proclamation of the 5th of October.* He summoned the nation to

* See Appendix, No. IV., at the end of the book.

arms, without pointing out the new enemy it was to encounter. The style was perplexed, and the object trivial. He recalled Philip V. to recollection. He demanded horses from Estramadura and Andalusia. Circulars were written to the intendants, bishops, corregidores, and captains-general of provinces; without naming the enemy who was to be combated, he was designated in such a manner as not to be mistaken; the patriotism of the nation was stimulated, to obtain from it efforts as strenuous as the cause in which it was about to be engaged was momentous and difficult. It was declared that the people would be called upon for their personal service; the rich for money. A decree for a levy of sixty thousand men, to be chosen by lot, was sent to the provinces. Don Sisto Espinosa, one of the financial counsellors, was directed to draw up a plan of finance for the imposing of new taxes. Nothing was to be neglected, in order *to enter gloriously upon the career which was about to be run.*

No body in Europe was prepared for this silly parade of war on the part of Spain. The most criminal levity, the most egregious ignorance, the most absurd presumption, had prompted this most outrageously hostile outbreaking; which, not being grounded on any effective measure, necessarily vanished in smoke. The Baron de Strogonoff was struck with dismay by this ill-timed declaration. Portugal hastened to destroy all vestiges of a con-

nivance which rendered her guilty in the eyes of Napoleon. The French party, gaining the ascendancy over the English party, had already compelled Earl St. Vincent to withdraw from the port of Lisbon. In foreign courts, the French and Spanish diplomatic agents were in doubt whether they ought to look upon each other as friends or as foes. A division of five thousand Spaniards, which was posted in Etruria, under the orders of Don Gonzalo O'Farrel, for the purpose of protecting that kingdom against the English, had reason to fear that it would be treated as an enemy by the French troops which were scattered throughout Italy.

The English, in the mean while, were doing all the injury in their power to the Spaniards. Prompted and aided by them, Miranda had just made, in the province of Caraccas, the first experiment of insurrection, which was to terminate by the complete independence of the New World: by means of Colonel Burr, England endeavoured to revolutionize Peru, and to interest the United States in behalf of the subjects of Spain; and her troops took possession of Buenos Ayres.

Subsequent to the issuing of the proclamation, the battle of Jena was fought, and the Prussian monarchy disappeared. Napoleon read, in the palace of Frederic, at Berlin, the warlike manifesto of the Prince of the Peace: he was not to be intimidated by threats. In reply to the armament and the rodo-

montade of Godoy, he directed the senator, Lamar-tilliere, an old man of more than seventy, to organize the National Guards in the departments which bordered on Spain.

Even had not both instinct and ambition rendered Napoleon aware of the mischief which Spain might one day do him, this mad freak of the Prince of the Peace was well calculated to afford irrefragable evidence of that political truth. Spain presses on France in a way which differs wholly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and being in contact only with a weak state, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral aggression; and, if she becomes the enemy of France, she can bear down with all her strength on her northern frontier. Napoleon knew that, behind the Pyrenees, a generous nation had preserved its energy, and had not sunk into degradation, even under the long oppression of a government inglorious abroad and despotic at home. He knew all that might be expected from the people, and especially from the people of the South, when governed in unison with their passions, and within the sphere of activity of their moral impressions. A man might arise who would regenerate Spain; a prince might reign who would suffer it to be regenerated; a palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give the impulse. It was not written in the Book of Fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible

favourite. While the eagles of France were flying to the banks of the Danube, and urging their course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at her gates on the south. The empire, which is so deeply and seriously vulnerable on one point, is strong no where. The increase of territory ought to be effected by concentric additions, and simultaneously on all sides. The French armies, which were fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might be turned by an enemy's army which presented itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, because that army would be the nearest to Paris. The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the buttress of its military power. Was not, then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed submission of Spain, a natural and necessary consequence of the extension of France beyond its natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine? Such were the thoughts which were suggested to Napoleon by the vain proclamation of Godoy.

With these sound political views were probably blended feelings hostile, and even not unreasonably so, to the race which had once occupied the throne on which the Revolution and his sword had seated him. It was, perhaps, consistent with his policy, to obliterate entirely the princes of that house from the list of European sovereigns, or, in case that task were too difficult, to mix their blood with his own, and incorporate them into his family. Perhaps, also, he deemed the occupation of Spain by the French

army necessary to the accomplishment of those views which his boundless genius had as yet allowed to be only partially disclosed. His eyes were turned towards the Mediterranean. In his early youth he had been desirous to serve in Turkey. He had meditated on the independence and the revolutionizing of Asia Minor; at a later period he had conquered Egypt. In his plan of liberating Europe from the yoke of England, he had often said that Africa would take the place of America, with respect to the old Continent; and that the northern coasts of that immense quarter of the world would some day or other abundantly supply Europe with those precious commodities which Europe requires from America, and which England has undertaken the office of distributing. All the beauties of nature, all the prodigies of art, the fragments and the trophies of civilization, are scattered around the Mediterranean. Here, its shores are inhabited by the most intellectual, the most ardent, of people; there, by barbarian conquerors. Napoleon sometimes said, that the Mediterranean would be the French lake. To accomplish this, in spite of the British naval domination, it was necessary to traverse Spain, and to be master of Algesiras and the harbours of Andalusia.

A contest with Spain was therefore rendered nearly inevitable, by the developement of the power of France, and the progress of the colossal empire of Napoleon; but we may be permitted to regret,

that this contest did not take place in a manner less terrible for the two nations, less shocking to humanity. Why did not the situation in which Europe then was, allow Napoleon to haste immediately into Spain with his victorious legions! The discredit into which the Spanish government had fallen, and the feeling of justice which prevails among the Spaniards, would have made them attribute all the odium of the war to the imprudent being who had excited it. Even supposing that the nation had not separated itself from its government, and thrown itself into the arms of Napoleon, at least it is certain, that it would have made no extraordinary efforts, no levies in mass; that the Spaniards would have contented themselves with the regular performance of their duties as good and loyal subjects.

Let us see what force Napoleon would in that case have had to contend with. The inquiry into this matter is connected with our subject; for, as the invasion of Spain occurred twelve months subsequently to the epoch of which we are now speaking, we shall, beforehand, have under our view a picture of the regular military strength of Spain.

Spain had at that period nearly twelve millions of subjects in Europe. The revenues of the state were insufficient to meet the expenses; yet the taxes were burthensome, both in themselves, and in the mode of collecting them. The maritime war, by diminishing the products from the colonies, and giv-

ing a mortal blow to commerce, dried up the principal source of opulence. The public debt, though inconsiderable when compared with the resources of the country, was enormous, because the war ruined public credit, and because, notwithstanding the sale of some ecclesiastical property, it swallowed up the funds intended for the liquidation of the debt. The public service suffered in all its departments; the recruiting of the troops and the repairing of the fortifications were interrupted. In every branch of the military there were heavy arrears; there were some regiments of the land and marine forces whose pay was fourteen months in arrear. But, as Spain, in case of its being engaged in a war with France, would have had the alliance and the subsidies of England, we must admit the supposition that she would have been sufficiently provided with money to cover her current expenditure.

The Spanish army, distinct from the permanent army employed in America,* might, in 1807, from its organization, be estimated at eighty thousand men, of which sixteen thousand were cavalry on the peace establishment. To this must be added thirty

* The military establishment of the Spanish colonies was distributed into kingdoms, provinces, and islands; it consisted of regiments of the line, veterans, disciplined white and black militia, the militia of the towns, horse and foot volunteers, and the troop of artillery and engineers. The general officers were in common to the continental and colonial armies.

thousand militia, of which a part were raised at the time of the last rupture with England, and the remainder could be called out in a fortnight. The customary defalcations, however, reduced the total to less than a hundred thousand men, in which number were comprehended the six thousand men detached to Tuscany and the garrisons in Africa, the Balearic Isles, and the Canaries.

In being raised from the peace to the war establishment, the army could receive a reinforcement of fifty-six thousand men, all consisting of infantry, and still keeping the militia regiments up to their full complement. It was recruited by voluntary enlistment, and, in urgent cases, by the *quinta*, a drawing by lot, which differed from the French military conscription only in not extending to the whole of the provinces, and in allowing of numerous exceptions. Drawing by lot was also the means resorted to for recruiting the militia.

The Prince of the Peace, being appointed generalissimo of the land forces, re-organized the army in 1803, and gave it regulations modelled on those of France. He increased the pay of the officers, and no soldier in Europe, save the English, received higher pay than the Spanish soldier;* enlistment was for a limited period; and the discipline was mild

* After a certain period of service, the officers were allowed pensions, and the soldiers found repose in invalid companies.

and easy. It would seem, therefore, that the profession of a soldier must have been quite in accordance with the contemplative instinct and innate indolence of Spaniards ; yet they manifested an extreme repugnance to military service, and especially that of the infantry. Voluntary enlistment was almost entirely confined to the towns, and was fed upon the vices and excesses of society. The use of the quinta was hateful to the nation ; and the Government never resorted to it except under extraordinary circumstances.

Courage is like love ; it stands in need of food and stimulus : a long peace, a state of topographical insulation, and the lethargic conduct of the Government, had almost extinguished the warlike spirit in a nation which had once filled the world with its renown. Abroad, the din of arms everywhere resounded, while in Spain scarcely the shadow of war was to be seen ; never did the sovereign put on the garb of a soldier ; the higher ranks of the nobility had forgotten at what price their grandeur and their titles had been purchased by their ancestors ; arms had scarcely the dignity of a profession ; there were no camps for the performance of manœuvres, none of those large garrisons in which regiments learn to know themselves and to act together. The officers passed, in small garrisons, a monotonous and obscure existence, at the coffee-house, in idleness, with-

out emulation, and accustomed to a degrading familiarity; there was no school of positive instruction; no generous feeling: even the sacredness of the point of honour had fallen into a state of relaxation.

Nature has endowed the Spaniard with the greatest part of the qualities which are requisite to form a good soldier: he is religious,—and religion, by elevating the thoughts of man, renders him more capable of that forgetfulness of self, that moral enthusiasm, that promptness to make sacrifices, for which war furnishes daily occasions. Calm, and thoroughly imbued with the principles of justice, he is naturally disposed to subordination, if the orders given to him are not absurd; he is susceptible of a warm attachment to an able and intelligent leader. His sobriety is extreme; his patience is inexhaustible; he lives upon a pilchard, or a bit of bread rubbed with garlic; a bed is a superfluity to him—he is accustomed to sleep on the ground and in the open air. Next to the French, the Spaniards are the best for long marches and climbing mountains. The Spanish soldier is neither froward, nor a prater, nor quarrelsome, nor a libertine, and he is very seldom seen intoxicated. He has less capacity than the French, he has more than the Germans and English; he loves his country, and talks of it with rapture; he has but one anti-military fault, it

is dirtiness and indolent habits, which generate disease, and spread among the sick a disorganizing lowness of spirits.

There was not much discipline in the Spanish armies;* the non-commissioned officers were but little respected; one third of the officers were taken from among them: the remaining two thirds were filled up from the cadets. According to the ancient regulations the cadets were to prove their noble descent.† This was no difficult matter in a country of which a twentieth of the population is noble. It was, however, no longer required, except in a part of the cavalry. In the same proportion that a numerous preferment of non-commissioned officers is good and useful in an army entirely recruited by military conscription, it is improper in an army raised from the dregs of the population. The Spanish non-commissioned officers were not men whose abilities gave them a claim to promotion. On the other hand, those who had given their children a

* The penal laws are exceedingly mild: soldiers are not amenable to military tribunals for all kinds of crime; the penalty of death is rare, and cannot be inflicted without the approbation of the king or of the captain-general of the province.

† A part of the nobles quit the service at the expiration of some years; the other class of officers never quit it. Hence it happens that the latter hold at least half of the commissions. The supply furnished by recruiting is not equal to this consumption; and the consequence is a mass of bad officers.

liberal education were averse from allowing them to enter into a career of debauchery. The church, the law, and the civil offices, absorbed the individuals who had been well educated. No study, no previous instruction, was required to become an officer of infantry or cavalry. The schools which had formerly been instituted at Puerto de Santa Maria, for the first of these branches, and at Ocana for the second, had been suppressed within the last twenty years.* Since that epoch a general falling off in the officers of the army had been visible. In general they were of a quality inferior to their men, with respect to education, discipline, and capacity. The nobility long held back from entering into the military service. Subsequently to the reign of Charles IV., however, they again took a part in it ; but here, as elsewhere, it was only to rise rapidly to unmerited rank. The preferment of officers was arbitrary ; the rules of it were susceptible of being changed.

Besides a small number of captain-generals, a rank equivalent to that of marshal in the other European armies, and which was granted only to old men after long service, or obtained by means of powerful interest, Spain had eighty-six lieutenant-generals, a hundred and thirty-nine major-generals,

* The military schools of Zamora and Barcelona, where engineer-officers taught the mathematics to some cadets and officers from the regiments, did not supply the place of the suppressed schools.

and eleven hundred and ninety-three brigadiers. Almost all the general officers were employed ; some on service in the provinces and fortresses, and others in inspecting the various descriptions of military force.* The brigadiers held regiments and offices. In regiments there were some ranks above office, particularly with respect to superior officers: no rank without functions; no command without residence.

Though promotion was arbitrary, the general officers of the Spanish army did not usually attain that rank till after long and good service. But none of them were known to Europe as having manifested military talents on a great scale. All of them had borne a part in the war of 1793, against France, and the majority had distinguished themselves on the staff, and at the head of regiments. The eldest, the most celebrated, had been taught in those schools which were established under the influence of Ricardo. Ignorant of the art of war, the favourite

* Each province had a military commandant, with the title of Captain-general of the Province: he was invested with authority over all military individuals, and the superintendence of the *superior police*, and was, ex-officio, President of the Tribunal.

Each fortress had a military commandant and a staff. The commandant had the title of Military and Political Governor, when he was at the same time charged with the civil power, and, in that capacity, at the head of the municipality.

was incapable of appreciating them; but he was desirous to avail himself of them, and he was gracious to those who had the reputation of possessing merit.

The Spanish army had no staff. This service, in time of war, was performed by general officers selected for the purpose, and by other officers drawn from the line at the moment when the army was on the point of taking the field. The instruction of the army was not directed to strategy and grand tactics. The Spaniards have no technical works on the military profession, except such as are translated from other languages. The Marquis de Santa Cruz, their Folard, has detailed very prolixly all that may be guessed by long experience in warfare: he has not written that which it is necessary to learn.

A corps of commissioners and military commissaries was entrusted with the administration of the army, responsibility, subsistence, &c. A corps of military surgeons was attached to the regiments and hospitals. The French administrative regulations were applied to every branch of the Spanish service. Since the time of Philip V., and especially since that of Napoleon, no institution has been fashionable in Spain, unless it has crossed the Pyrenees.

The king's household held the first rank in the army: it was the counterpart of that which Philip V. had been accustomed to at Versailles. It con-

sisted of three companies of body-guards, a company of halberdiers,* and two regiments of Spanish and Walloon guards, the whole forming a corps of six thousand men; and of the royal carabineers, six squadrons of horse, more than six hundred strong.

The king's body-guards were selected from the classes of society which were in easy circumstances, and whose moral principles and education consequently afforded a special guarantee of their fidelity to the monarch: intended for the defence of his person, they were a troop nearly useless for the purposes of war. The opinion of all the military men in Europe has decided on the merit of this corps of officer-soldiers, which was neither the one nor the other: in which talent was wasted without advantage to the country; in which personal bravery was thrown away for want of discipline, and might by chance be brilliantly manifested on some particular day, but was unable to bear up against one or more campaigns. The lives of the sovereigns of Europe are no longer in danger from the dagger of an assassin. Besides, this kind of danger is not of a nature to be averted by companies of body-guards: a government in unison with the interests of the people and the knowledge of the age, is a far better security.

* The body-guards and halberdiers were specially appropriated; the first to the person of the King, the second to his palace.

The Carabineers were recruited from the whole of the cavalry, among the old soldiers and those who had the best characters; they enlisted for life, and renounced marriage: this was the finest cavalry in Spain. There were four squadrons of heavy horse, and two squadrons of light horse; the latter of which were of later formation, and were raised to serve as the separate guard of the Prince of the Peace.

The Spanish infantry consisted of thirty-nine regiments, of three battalions each; four of which were called foreign regiments, because they were as much as possible recruited from foreigners, and because their officers were, in general, of foreign extraction. Some of these regiments were established prior to the accession of the Bourbons. Several of them were raised by Charles V. The oldest of all bore the name of *Immemorial del Rey*, and the date of its creation was beyond memory. Six Swiss regiments, of two battalions, were introduced by the kings of the Bourbon family. Twelve battalions of light-infantry, armed like the infantry of the line, differed from it only in the colour of the jacket, which was blue; while that of the national infantry was white. Most of these battalions were raised subsequently to the French Revolution. Each regiment of infantry of the line had a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a commandant, who had also the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and a major, (*sarjento-mayor*). Each battalion of light infantry had only two superior officers, a com-

mandant and a major. The battalions of the line were of four companies ; two companies of the first battalion were grenadiers. When this singular organization was adopted, it was intended, during war, to make a practice of severing from the regiments the companies of grenadiers, in order to form them into separate divisions or battalions, and then to unite the soldiers of the three battalions into two, which should be field-battalions ; leaving the skeleton of the third at the dépôt.

In war time, forty-two regiments of militia formed a body of infantry, more national, more brave, more calculated for great things, than the regular infantry. This institution, also, was borrowed from France by Philip V. It was extended by Charles III. These regiments were in the sole provinces of the Crown of Castile, and were recruited by lot in the provinces of which they bore the name. They were always kept up to their full complement. The state armed, clothed, and equipped them ; and likewise constantly allowed a portion of pay to the officers. In time of peace, they did not quit their homes, but attended to their avocations, except for a single month, when they received pay. The militia regiments consisted of only one battalion, commanded by a colonel and a major. The colonel was usually a man of consideration in the country, and the major was a superior officer of the army. There were but two companies in the battalion ; one of grenadiers, and one of chas-

seurs. In war time, the companies of grenadiers and of chasseurs of the same province were united, and they formed four divisions of provincial grenadiers of Old Castile, New Castile, Andalusia, and Galicia. These divisions, composed of the best soldiers in the nation, were picked troops, preferable even to the regiments of the King's household.

There were also some corps of town-militia,* wearing uniforms, but few in number; they were instituted by Charles III. to supply the want of garrisons in the fortified places, and in the forts which were exposed to the English and Portuguese. Lastly, some veterans were employed to keep the royal palaces, and a few towns and fortresses; and some free companies more particularly occupied in protecting the coasts of Andalusia and the presidencies in Africa.

The nation had no military organization or national guards. No vestige remained of the brotherhoods, or of the troops of the communities, which, in the fifteenth century, existed in Castile and Arragon. The single province of Biscay had regular levies in mass, which were bound to hasten to the defence of the territory within a time, and according to the

* The town-militia did not receive pay. Its service was confined to the defence of the place in which it resided. A hundred and thirty companies, among which were those employed in guarding the coasts, keeping watch on Gibraltar, and in the African presidencies.

manner prescribed by laws. The *Somatenes* of Catalonia had disappeared along with the privileges and the liberties of their province. The nobility, even in the provinces, where its small numbers, its possession of a competency, and its manners, distinguished it from the rest of the population, had no sort of organized militia, except the *Maestranzas*, a species of chivalric associations, composed of a few hundred mounted nobles; these were to be met with in the cities of Valencia, Seville, Granada, and Ronda, and were of no use but to parade for show in some diversions and public festivities. In the course of the disastrous campaign of 1706, when the Portuguese made themselves masters of Madrid, Philip V. ordered his Castilian nobles to join the army of Marshal Berwick, at Sopena, with their arms and baggage. Only a very few of them were obedient to the summons of their sovereign, and they were good for nothing. The change which has taken place in the manners of the nobles, and the perfection of the art of war, would have rendered this measure still more fruitless at the epoch of which we speak, even had the adoption of it been in consonance with sound policy.

History has consecrated the plains of Rocroi as the grave of the Spanish infantry. The cavalry preserved its ancient renown till the close of the war of the Succession. It has lost it since then. Spain, which, in the time of Charles V., could supply a hundred thousand horses for war, now has breeding

establishments in only one of her provinces. The Andalusian horses, though mettlesome, docile, and finely formed, have something of the rodomontade of that province, which is the Gascony of Spain.* They want the bottom and the muscular power which are requisite for the charging shock of heavy cavalry. They have not the robustness and capacity of fatigue which is necessary for the light cavalry service. It is the multiplication of mules which has caused the degeneracy of the horses. The soil is cultivated solely with oxen or mules; agricultural and commercial land-carriage is performed by female mules and asses. Horses are a luxury, not considered as coming under the head of necessities. The breeds have been gradually dwindling away since the downfall of the Moors, and the extinction of the military spirit.

The whole cavalry of Spain amounted to twelve thousand horse, in twenty-four regiments, each of five squadrons, which were never complete.† Each regiment is commanded by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major. There were dragoons, chasseurs, and hussars; but distinguished from each

* *Mozo arrogante sobre un cavallo sombroso.*

† The Spanish cavalry is mounted on young, elegant, stone-horses. It wants strength and solidity; with such cavalry affairs are soon decided, and no resource is left to it. It has need of a more phlegmatic, solid cavalry to support it. The different species of cavalry are distinguished by the manner in which they are armed, and not by their horses, which are all of one kind.

other rather by their colour than by the mode in which they were armed and equipped. The Spanish cavalry was badly trained, and in a very inferior state to the infantry.

Formed on the French model, at the accession of Philip V. the Spanish artillery had, in every thing connected with it, followed the changes and improvements of the French artillery.* Like the latter, it had, about the year 1780, been rendered less ponderous, and had adopted lighter calibres. In 1763, horse artillerymen were added to it. From the time of the war of the Succession it had one article of perfect military extravagance, which was unknown to the French artillery, namely, wrought iron cannon. After having remained in the same state since Philip V., the personal department was re-organized in 1807. The generalissimo took the place of the ancient head of the corps, and communicated his orders through the medium of a staff officer, chosen from among the general officers of the corps.† There were four regiments of artillery, of ten com-

* The Spaniards were among the first, in the wars of the fifteenth century, to carry cannon into the field. They had a large quantity of artillery, some very large, others very small. On this point, as on many others, the French have been their masters. Charles VIII. invading Italy, was the first to learn the utility of light artillery in battle.

† La Valliere, the most celebrated French artillery officer of his time, was employed to put the artillery of Philip V. on the same footing as that of Louis XIV.

panies each; and out of these forty companies, six were of horse artillery. Besides these, there were sixty-four companies of militia cannoneers, without officers or serjeants, being merely supplementary to the veteran cannoneers; and five companies of labourers. As in France, the *material* and *personal* departments were united. Including that of Segovia, at which place was the school for pupils, there were five artillery depôts. A regiment of artillery was in garrison in each principal place. The arsenals of construction were in the schools. A special corps of war-commissaries was responsible for the management of the *materiel*. Spain had no artillery train organized in a military manner.* The materials used in war, such as iron, lead, saltpetre, are abundant in Spain. Two founderies of brass cannon were kept up, at Seville and at Barcelona, for the land-service, and another of iron, at Cavada, near Santander, to supply the navy. The manufactories of cast iron and of fire-arms are situated conveniently for the forges of Biscay and the Asturias, but are subject to the serious inconvenience of being seized upon and destroyed in war-time.

The corps of Spanish engineers was established in 1711; the person who was employed in the formation of it was a French general, of the name of Vourbon, who animated it with as much of the

* It is supplied, in time of war, by contracts with the muleteers, or by requisitions of oxen.

spirit of Vauban as could be made to enter into the Spanish character. To the Spanish engineers was committed the construction of fortresses and of public buildings. Besides the alterations made in some places, their country is indebted to them for two new fortresses, Fort San Fernando de Figueras, in Catalonia, and Fort Conception, on the Portuguese frontier. These two places, the trophies of Spanish engineering in the eighteenth century, bear witness rather to the magnificence of the sovereign, and the skill of the architects and masons, than to the talent of the engineers. San Fernando displays all the luxury of fortification and building, without any attention to the proper lines of defence, or any evidence of a wish to adapt so much luxury to the local situation. At Conception, where all that was to be done was merely to occupy a flat summit, that result might have been obtained at one-tenth part of the expense which was incurred.

With respect to civil engineering, the engineers had a share in the plans of canals and in the forming the admirable roads by which the Peninsula is intersected. During the war of 1793, they manifested little skill in the construction of field works. The capture of Bellegarde, and of some trifling forts in Roussillon, added nothing to their reputation. Having been unaccustomed to war, they had, with regard to the attack and defence of places, but an indifferent theory, borrowed from French books.

In 1803, the Prince of the Peace gave to the engineer corps an organization similar to that of the artillery : he applied to it the regulations of the French service, with but one difference—that in France the directors of the fortifications receive their orders from the minister only ; while in Spain on the contrary, they were, in each province, made subordinate to a junta, of which the captain-general was president, and the artillery officers formed a part. Contemporaneous with the artillery corps was an engineer regiment, consisting of eight companies of sappers and two of miners. The school of Zamora, in which a certain number of officers and cadets were taught, was conducted by the engineers. The school of engineering itself, at Alcala de Henares, combined theory and practice, and was instituted in 1803.

The direction of military affairs was in the hands of a council of war and a secretary of state. Before the accession of the Bourbons this council had the sole administration of the forces ; it nominated and promoted officers, and directed the movements of the armies. Its functions were, however, rendered merely judicial and titular by the institution of ministers of state. Each branch of the military force had an inspector-general, who, as far as related to the personal department, transacted business with the minister. The latter received his or-

ders from the King, or, of late years, from the Prince of the Peace, who exercised the regal authority.

Thus, in 1806, Spain had an army in which the generals and persons who were men of talent bore but a scanty proportion, but which, under ordinary circumstances, might have been able to maintain a contest with any other, and which had in it the seeds of improvement. But to render this army warlike, to make it pass suddenly from a state of peace to a state of war, to extemporize an aggression against such a formidable power as France, required a firm and enlightened will, required the aid of the nation and of patriotism. Now, was it possible to believe in the talent of the ignoble man who held the reins of government? Could it be hoped that the nation would joyfully co-operate in a war branded by public opinion, and which it must have looked upon as the work of the favourite?

Scarcely had the Prince of the Peace allowed his hostile proclamation to escape, before the news of the battle of Jena arrived at Madrid. The King, the Queen, the favourite, the ministers, all were in consternation. Men of sound sense had asked each other, with anxious feelings, what could be the object of this warlike manifesto; they now, with feelings of terror, sought to know what would be the result. The Government, meanwhile, lost not a moment in giving orders to the captains-general, bishops, and intendants, to consider as null and void

the circular of the month of October. In all the European gazettes, its agents procured the insertion of articles designed to avert the blow which was impending over Spain. One party maintained, that the proclamation was apocryphal, and that it was forged at Madrid by an enemy of the Government; another declared, that the intrigues of England at the Turkish court had decided the emperor of Morocco to invade Andalusia at the head of forty thousand Moors, and that the appeal was addressed to the patriotism of the Spaniards, for the purpose of inciting them to repel and drive into the sea the miscreant infidels, who had left behind them in Spain such numerous and such terrible recollections. Rejecting the unfavourable interpretations which malice might give to the recent acts of the Cabinet of Madrid, others asserted that the augmentation of the forces was necessary, to frustrate the renewed efforts which were about to be made by the eternal enemies of the Continent, against a power closely connected with France by its interests and its situation, and still more so by its inclinations and its habits.

Articles in the journals* would have made very little impression on the mind of Napoleon. But Godoy humbled himself before him, confessed his enormous fault, and begged for mercy. He endeavoured to win the good graces of Murat and of the

* See Notes and Illustrations, No. VI., at the end of this book.

Grand Duchess ; they were destined to be ultimately of more use to him than he was then aware of. He lavished gold and presents among the agents of the French diplomacy. Don Eugenio Izquierdo hurried to Berlin to appease the Emperor. Izquierdo was the private agent of Godoy ; in that character we shall soon see him act a more prominent part. Godoy had his diplomacy entirely distinct from that of the monarch. It must be owned, to the honour of the Spanish diplomatic agents, that they always kept within the circle of their positive duties, and never participated in the intrigues and profligate actions of that period.

Napoleon, victor at Jena, had still to contend with the fragments of Prussia and the unbroken strength of Russia ; he knew that there was nothing done while there remained any thing for him to do. Fortune and power had not yet filled him with that intoxication by which, a few years later, his brain was turned. He did not think that it was practicable for France to maintain, at the same moment, a contest on the Pyrenees and on the Vistula, at Cadiz and at Moscow. He pardoned Spain, and seemed not to have noticed the perfidious attack which had been made upon him. Vengeance was deferred till the day when it should harmonize with policy. But, in the mean time, he wished to weaken Spain still more, by draining her of a part of her troops, and by plunging her still deeper into his anti-commercial,

anti-continental system; a system peculiarly injurious to a country which had many colonies and few manufactures. With this view, he deemed it useful still more to elevate and aggrandize the favourite: the higher that individual was raised the easier the Emperor thought it would be to overthrow him, as he derived no support from the interests or the wishes of the people.

A corps of sixteen thousand Spaniards marched through France, to fight on the shores of the Baltic, in the cause of Napoleon, and under the orders of his generals. They were joined in Germany by the six thousand Spaniards who had been stationed in Etruria. This corps was commanded by Romana,* a man of talent and information, who had served with distinction in 1793, and whom public opinion even now looked up to as one who would be a national leader, whenever Spain should again become a nation. Joseph Bonaparte was acknowledged as King of the Two Sicilies. The name of Ferdinand IV. ceased to appear in the Court Almanack, except merely as the King's brother, among the multitude of princes of the blood. The Berlin decree, which declared England in a state of permanent blockade, and condemned to the flames the products of English industry, was promulgated and executed in Spain. Charles IV. appointed Godoy protector of commerce,

* In April, 1807, O'Farrel's division quitted Tuscany for the purpose of joining Romana.

at the very moment in which the destruction of Spanish commerce was consummated. Mad with joy, and not knowing how he could sufficiently recompense the man whom he considered as the saviour of his monarchy, he conferred on him the title of Most Serene Highness, a title which had never been borne in Spain but by the two Don Johns of Austria, the natural sons of Charles the Fifth and Philip the Fourth. Early in January, 1807, the vain-glorious favourite made a sort of triumphal entry as His Most Serene Highness, amidst an immense multitude of gazers, who had been attracted by the spectacle, and whom he was tempted to denominate *his* people. He, no doubt, looked forward to the Regency : by this the Prince of Asturias was aroused.

The power of Godoy was now at a climax, was now in its amplest plenitude. Let us pause a moment, to ascertain the place which this personage will fill in history. He has been said to be the cause, the sole cause, of the misfortunes of Spain. This is an error: he was an accident, not a cause. The real cause must be looked for in the subversion of the national institutions, despotism, hostility to the diffusion of knowledge, the utter want of a rule of government and of conduct, and the efforts of two centuries to sully and obliterate the national character. A badly cultivated soil always produces weeds. In a despotic court, Dubarrys will arise when Kings bear sway,

and Godoys when the authority is in the hands of Queens.

The race of favourites is indigenous in Spain.* In every age some favourite has unhinged the state, but never was the power of a favourite so enormous, so shameful, or so little merited, as that of Emanuel Godoy. Alvaro de Luna, the celebrated minion of John II. held his master in bondage, but he had over him the ascendant which genius and decision possess over weakness of the mind and the heart. Alvaro de Luna was a warrior and a statesman, yet he perished on the scaffold. For thirty years Pacheco was the darling and the tyrant of the impotent Henry IV. Under the Austrian dynasty, the Lermas, the Olivares, the Varos, did a small portion of good and a great deal of mischief. But none of them ever stood on such an eminence as Godoy; beloved

* A political writer of that country, Don Diego Saavedra Faxardo puts this question : " Is it better for the prince to delegate his authority to several persons, or to a single individual?" and he decides in favour of the latter, " Because" (these are his own words) " the king is the image of the sun, and when the sun disappears below the horizon, he leaves to only one, (the moon,) and not to several, the task of presiding over the night."

These words are extracted from a political work which Saavedra composed for the instruction of the Prince of Asturias, afterwards Charles II. He was reputed one of the most able politicians of the Court of Madrid, which itself was reputed the most politic. How enlightened was the spirit of the times, may be judged from this circumstance !

by the Queen, adored by the King, he combined in his own person the double capacity of mistress and of favourite. He insulted, humiliated, and ill-treated the Queen, yet she never ceased to love him. In the King it was an absolute insanity. There were not wanting superstitious people in Spain, who believed that he had cast a spell upon the royal pair, and who attributed to the influence of the stars that greatness which terrestrial considerations were inadequate to explain.

A mere life-guardsman, who had at first attracted the queen only by his person and his talent for singing and playing the flute, took as it were by storm, in the course of five years, all the ranks in the militia, all the decorations, all the recompenses, all the dignities of the state. The customary titles and honours of the monarchy not being sufficient to satisfy the inexhaustible affection of his sovereign, the lucky Duke of Alcudia was created Prince of the Peace. This title of Prince had never before been borne by any subject of Spanish origin. A portion of the public domains presented to him as a free gift; trophies on his carriage; privileges in the palace, granted only to the members of the royal family; exclusive military honours; and, lastly, a military corps specially appropriated to the guard of his person;—placed him in a rank to which no one could aspire. The dignity of high-admiral, so formidable to the throne in feudal times, was re-esta-

blished in his favour. He was generalissimo of the army, and likewise general-in-chief and director of every branch of the service. Lastly, by royal letters-patent, he was appointed protector of commerce and of the colonies. Thus the monarch invested him with the plenitude of the regal power, in a country where there is no other power than that of the sovereign. To find a delegation like this we must go to the East, where the vizier is the shadow of the sultan; but the sultans at least do not choose for their viziers the paramours of their wives.

Emanuel Godoy was born at Badajoz, of a noble but obscure family: but the very obscurity of his family enabled the genealogists to connect it with other families, and with historical recollections. It was easy to confound it with a family of the same name, more ancient and more illustrious, and which resided in the same province. Flatterers proved that the Prince of the Peace was lineally descended from the emperor Montezuma. Abler genealogists went farther back into history, and discovered that the name of Godoy was evidently a contraction of the two words *Gotho soy*, "I am a Goth," and from this they concluded that the ancestor of his most serene highness was one of the nobles of the court of King Wamba.

While he was in search of his progenitors, he did not forget his relations. His uncles were ministers. His brother, created Duke of Almodovar del Campo,

commanded the regiment of Spanish guards; his sisters were wedded to Spanish grandees. For a long time, Don Pedro Cevallos considered the honour of being married to one of his relations, as his greatest and most valuable title to the confidence of the King and the nation. Was it wonderful that *his* alliance should be sought, whom Charles IV. had received into his own family? The King had given him the hand of his own niece, the legitimate daughter of the Infant Don Louis, his brother. For some time, it was intended to unite the sister of this niece to the Prince of Asturias, the heir to the crown. The union of Emanuel Godoy with Maria Theresa de Bourbon, gave birth to a daughter. The old kings (this was the appellation given by the Spaniards to Charles IV. and Maria Louisa) destined this daughter to be the wife of the young Infant, Louis II. King of Etruria, their grandson. Thus, sovereign already, by the entire, absolute, and unreserved delegation of authority to him, he looked forward to seeing his grandson ultimately a monarch by right of birth.

The early education of Godoy was neglected. His enemies have gone so far as to say, that when he entered the Council of State in 1792, he scarcely knew how to read.* Young and inexperienced, he ma-

* When, against the wish and to the great scandal of the nation, he was appointed minister of the foreign department, it was, at the outset, necessary to provide him with a kind of Men-

nifested pleasing manners and a conciliatory disposition. Though volatile and indolent, he was, nevertheless, not incapable of thinking correctly, nor without a certain aptitude for business. Those who knew him in the infancy of his favour, all agree that he was frank, affable, and humane.

In Godoy, power developed only vices. He, however, had not in him the seeds of malignity; he was not cruel. Notwithstanding his rioting in the full possession of authority, notwithstanding the irascibility which is natural to domination, he never shed blood. But his career began in ignorance, and he acquired no knowledge from the management of public affairs. The court, and the exercise of power corrupted all that was good in his nature; in power he saw nothing but the means of gratifying vile passions, or ignoble wants. No lofty idea, no idea of patriotism or of honour, ever could reach this man, sunk in the slumber of effeminate luxuriousness. His mind did not expand with the sphere of his activity: in his habits, in his proceedings, he displayed the wavering and perplexity which mark those who are born to hereditary sway, rather than the decision and vigour which are the distinguishing characteristics of the men, who, in the subversion of empires, raise themselves, and conquer

tor, to assist his inexperience. Don Eugenio Llaguno, a man thoroughly versed in affairs, was the person who filled this office.

the station assigned to them by nature, but refused to them by the existing social institutions. No exploit, no virtue, did honour to his youth ; his sword was never drawn in war. In a period of peace, he manifested neither talent in council, nor firmness in the government of the state.

Strict morals would have conciliated esteem for the Prince of the Peace, and would have diminished the disgust which was excited in all worthy persons when they thought of the impure source whence he derived his insane power.* But he was licentious and debauched. His passion for women was not even veiled in the forms of that courteous gallantry, which, while it makes vice appear amiable, at least avoids violating decorum, and preserves to public men the external respect of those who are about them. Neither the love of the queen, nor a marriage of which he ought to have been proud, had sufficient influence to prevent him from acting in the most profligate manner. He lived publicly with Dona Pepa Tudo, by whom he had two children, and whom he made Countess of Castellafiel. He married another of his mistresses to his uncle, a major in the army. Public report, unjust no doubt, but widely spread, accused him of having already

* Of all the great European nations, Spain is that in which there still exists the largest portion of those morals and habits of private life, which are the basis of public virtue.

been privately wedded, and consequently of having committed the crime of bigamy, when he received the hand of a grand-daughter of Louis XIV.

Insatiable and ostentatious, he loved riches like an upstart. His modern luxury, borrowed from foreign manners, insulted the antique and national luxury of his masters. He was deeply engaged in stock-jobbing, and the certain knowledge of the minister often procured enormous profit for the speculator. He accepted presents. Around him was carried on the sale of posts, offices, dignities, and favours. Every thing about him was venal. Hence the popular rumours of his immense fortune, his monopolizing the specie, his property invested in the Bank of England. Unforeseen events have shown the exaggeration of these rumours; they have, however, been insufficient to change the opinion of the Spaniards, or to make them believe that all the gold of Mexico and Peru had flowed anywhere but into the coffers of Godoy.

He had not a head strong enough to conceive and follow up any system of government whatever; he had not a mind lofty enough to comprehend his nation, to raise it once more, and, in the hour of calamity, to discover in its character and its institutions any means of safety. He had not a thousandth part of the positive knowledge which is indispensable to put in motion and to improve a vast

monarchy, whose elements of power were widely separated. Sometimes he called probity and understanding to his aid, sometimes he repulsed them. The Arandas, the Cabarruses, the Saavedras, the Jovellanos, the Urquijos, expiated in exile the fault of having done good, or wished to do it, to their native land. Before the epoch of Godoy, the government of the kings of Spain had the steadiness and regularity which extort the veneration of the people, even when the welfare of the people is not its object. Under Godoy, power was indecisive, versatile, inconstant; and one service at least he performed, that of bringing despotism into discredit, in the country in which, of all others, it was most deeply rooted.

Equity, however, prescribes to us the duty of acknowledging, that Spain is indebted to him for some benefits, and that for those he has a claim to the gratitude of the friends of their country and of humanity. The impulse given by the Bourbons to industry and the arts, he continued, he accelerated. For the arts and sciences he did more within a period of fifteen years, than had been done during the three preceding reigns. Notwithstanding an almost continual war, the public works which had been undertaken, were persisted in, and several new manufactures were established. It was not his fault, if Spain had not a share in the discoveries made in other countries, and in the amelioration of

the human mind.* He sent intelligent and capable men to travel, for the purpose of bringing back to and naturalizing in Spain, whatever they might have seen abroad that was likely to be of utility at home. The arts of design and the useful sciences, received numerous encouragements. By him were established twenty-four nurseries, to habituate to the climate of Spain the valuable vegetable productions of the other parts of the Spanish monarchy. The means devised in France to purify the air, and to revive suffocated and drowned persons, and infants apparently still born, were eagerly adopted. Vaccination,—that invaluable discovery, which would have given its name to the eighteenth century, had not that age been already characterized by so many blessings and so many evils,—vaccination was enthusiastically received in Spain, and the philanthropy with which Spain transmitted it to America deserves high praise. He also did much to secure the health of the people. The prohibition to bury in churches, which was issued by Charles III. but not executed, was enforced in large towns. For bull-fights the Spanish nation has a fondness which amounts to insanity. The favourite

* Subsequently to 1796, he instituted schools of astronomy, cosmography, hydrography, and meteorology, sciences highly important to navigation. He re-modelled the royal observatory, formed a corps of cosmographical engineers, and created a medical college.

was induced to believe that these sanguinary spectacles were hostile to civilization and prejudicial to agriculture ; and he did not hesitate to risk his popularity by abolishing them.

Other actions of the Prince of the Peace, more important because they are connected with interests of a higher order, do still greater credit to his administration. During a hundred years, Spain had reproached its kings with having filled their court with foreigners. Philip V. coming from Versailles, brought Frenchmen with him ; Charles III., coming from Naples, brought Italians. Godoy raised, distinguished, and put into office none but Spaniards, and threw strangers into the back-ground. This nationality was a merit, at a period when the French emigrants filled Europe with their vanity, and wearied foreign courts with their pretensions and their insignificance.

The regulations for re-organizing the army manifested a desire of doing good, if they did not show the capacity necessary to accomplish it. He struggled with the Inquisition, and snatched from it more than one victim.* He put a stop, by an express law, to the encroachments of mortmain. He did not fear to brave the religious prejudices which

* In December, 1796, he exerted himself decisively to bring before the Royal Council the process of Ramon Salus, Doctor of Laws at Salamanca, who had been condemned by the Inquisition.

consecrated the enormous accumulation of ecclesiastical property ; and he obtained from the sovereign Pontiff the right of bringing a part of it again into circulation. He openly attacked hypocrisy and vice, which sought to shelter itself from secular authority under the shadow of sacerdotal privileges.*

Had Godoy appeared in Spain three centuries earlier, the grandees would have confederated and armed against the error and infatuation of Charles. The aristocracy would have killed him, as they killed Alvaro de Luna, who began his career from a less humble rank, and did not rise so high ; or rather the commons would have united, and drawn the sword against this error and disgrace of the throne, in the same manner that they rose against Cardinal Fineros and the foreign governors, though the national pride was wounded by the latter in a slighter degree than it was by Godoy.

Had he lived rather later, in the seventeenth century, or at the beginning of the eighteenth, when

* In 1797, Pope Pius VI., who was threatened in the capital of the Christian world by the Republican armies, had recourse to the protection of his Catholic Majesty. All the succour he received was a sort of homily, in which the Prince of the Peace exhorted his Holiness to renounce the temporal goods of this world, and not mix politics with religion. When he afterwards sent some Spanish prelates to condole with him, it was merely done to rid himself of those prelates, whose presence in Spain was disagreeable to him.

the aristocratical and democratical institutions had been absorbed by the regal authority, and there remained in Spain nothing which offered any resistance, he would, doubtless, have ruled in peace. Public and official history would have blazoned forth his talents, his virtues, his useful establishments; and would have seen, in the acts of his administration, the proofs of a heart and mind equally excellent. The scandalous chronicles of the period would, at the same time, have delineated by stealth the turpitude of his private life. Lastly, after his death, impartial publicists would have pointed out the fatal consequences of his sway, and rigorously judged the individual.

But the Prince of the Peace was neither placed amidst the storms of barbarous ages nor the calm of a peaceable despotism; he held the helm of an enormous, unwieldy, imperfectly-armed, awkwardly-manceuvring, badly-sailing vessel; he had to steer it through the most tremendous tempest that ever shook and subverted political society. The time is past in which a blind respect covered the faults of kings and of their representatives. In vain do priests now make religion declare that kings are the image of the Deity on earth; it is a voice crying in the desert: nobody listens to the tale. Those who govern are accountable to nations for the evil which they do, and for that which is done with and through them: the account is not even kept with

any prejudice in their favour. Contemporaries have, consequently, heaped on the head of Godoy, the abuses which existed before him, and the misfortunes he did not prevent; those which neither he nor any other human being could have prevented; swelling thus the burthen, they have made him responsible for all the public calamities. Yet the people are not unjust in thus deciding. Since, in prosperous times, kings and their ministers reap all the glory and the fruits of the good which they do *not* do; it is equally just, that, in adversity, they should sink and perish under the weight of the public miseries.

In retracing the political events in which, for a quarter of a century, Spain bore a part, we have shown Emanuel Godoy with his eyes invariably turned towards the Pyrenees, and regulating his conduct conformably to the different phases under which France presented itself while suffering the labour-pains of the Revolution: terrified by the Republic, intriguing with the Directory, alternately caressed and neglected by the republican envoys at Madrid, tired of being thus tyrannized over, frequently on the eve of escaping from the grasp of France to throw himself into the arms of England, but finally waiting for the sovereign decision from Paris. The elevation of Bonaparte fixed the irresolution of Godoy, and did not allow him to hesitate any longer in his politics. Lucien

Bonaparte, ambassador at Madrid, had an intimacy with the Prince of the Peace,—not an intimacy of friendship, for that could not exist between two men who differed so much in their minds, and especially in greatness of soul,—but a political intimacy. Lucien informed his brother that the Prince of the Peace was every thing in Spain, that his influence was equally indestructible and unlimited. This remark simplified the policy of France. Godoy might be a useful tool in the hands of Bonaparte.*

In the vast field of politics, it is necessary to cultivate the vanity of fools,† and likewise to make use of the worthless to serve our own purposes. Napoleon did not always observe this rule with respect to the Prince of the Peace; he did not always cajole him when he stood in need of him, and he often neglected him when he thought him

* A French diplomatic agent returned home in 1802, and gave an account of his mission. "What sort of a man is the Prince of the Peace? Has he ambition, impulse, sallies of enthusiasm?"—"General, he is a favourite without talent, without elevation of mind, without energy. When I carried him the news of your pacific intentions with respect to Portugal, he begged me not to let it be known that day, that he might have an opportunity of buying into the funds, which could not fail to rise."—"So much the worse! I had rather that he were good for something, that he were capable of dethroning Charles IV. and taking his place. I would rather see him than a Bourbon on the throne."

† Beaumarchais.

useless : it is to this want of attention that must be attributed the ill-timed warlike demonstrations of 1806.

This was a time when, conqueror and arbiter of the destinies of Europe, Napoleon distributed principalities and kingdoms, when he made annual promotions of grand-dukes and kings, when a crown was looked upon as the climax in the military and political hierarchy. Not only the brothers and relations of the Emperor, not only generals, like Murat and Bernadotte, but even a man who had no connexion with military affairs, had been comprized in those annual promotions. Why, then, should not Godoy, who ruled the fate of Spain, and who rendered such immense services to France, why should not he fancy that he had a still clearer title to such a great recompense ? The laurels of Miltiades prevented Themistocles from sleeping. Calculating that states ought to be given away in proportion to the service done, or the ability to do it, Godoy thought that if M. de Talleyrand had received the principality of Benevento, *he* might well be justified in aspiring to be grand-duke of Hanover. This hope, indeed, he had been encouraged to form.

The vanity of the Prince of the Peace was not the sole inspirer of his ambition. Policy prompted him to prepare an asylum, which the advanced years and infirmities of the King might soon make necessary. Ferdinand, the Prince of Asturias, was now come to an age at which, notwithstanding the al-

most infallible efficacy of a royal education to stunt the intellect and contract the mind, even princes begin to be men.

To him the power of Godoy was odious as to the present, and threatening as to the future. The malcontents became daily more numerous, and built their hopes on a new reign. The nobles, who had been irritated by the insolence of the favourite, or by his having disgraced them, gathered round the Prince of Asturias. Godoy had nothing to hope from those who seemed devoted to him in prosperity; while they crouched before the possessor of power, they were ready to offer their incense to new deities. As soon as the day should arrive when the better class of the nation could speak freely, it would bitterly reproach him with the profligacy of his life and the faults of his government. The clergy, and particularly the monks, only waited for that moment to consign him to the infernal regions. Even the people had withdrawn from him that good-will which he had acquired by his accessibility, his gracious and trivial manners, and the stupid admiration which his pageantry inspired. All parties were preparing to attribute to him the whole of the misfortunes with which the supreme potency of France was on the point of overwhelming Spain.

For a century it had, as it were, ceased to be customary to look upon the people of the Peninsula as forming a part of the great European family. Not

an idea, not a discovery, not an impulse, not an impression, came from beyond the Pyrenees. The Spaniards travelled very little; those who did travel soon lost the distinctive marks of their country. Besides, it is impossible correctly to know and estimate a people without living among them.

Spain, so little known, is a great and noble ruin, in which we meet with beautiful proportions, colossal masses, and an abundance of buried treasures. The Spanish people has shone in the world without having moved in the orbit of civilization. It has not blended with other people: it has remained with its native habits and virtues. It is a dethroned sovereign who has not lost the remembrance of his power, and whom adversity has beaten down without having degraded.

Good faith is the basis of the character of the Spaniards; they are habitually sincere, but it is that sincerity which springs from silence, not from the want of passions. They may dissemble, but they are incapable of feigning. Temperance and moderate desires do not prompt them to labour; they are inert and indolent. No nation, under a despotism, has preserved so well as they have done the consciousness of the dignity of man. The English rival them in this advantage, but with the English it is the result of the social order of things; with the Spaniards it is instinct, and this instinct is more remarkable in the lower class of society than in the

higher. With little greediness of gain, little tendency to shameful vices, they are religious, full of faith, enthusiastic ; they honour talent, courage, and misfortune. They are susceptible of devotedness. Being remote from the brutishness into which human beings are plunged by merely corporeal interests, whatever elevates the mind strikes and ravishes them. Not well calculated to be bent to a regular organization, not enough in subjection to physical wants, too ardent, too high-minded to be rendered amenable to social discipline, more proper for sudden burst than for that which requires continuous effort, it is among them that it has been said, " On such a day he was brave."

The Spanish nation is divided into four classes, distinct from each other in their manners, interests, and habits:—the higher rank of nobility, the clergy, the middle class, and the people.

A twentieth part of the Spaniards are noble by birth (*hidalgos*), an enormous proportion. This nobility, however, though it is real, since it gives personal privileges to those who possess it, makes scarcely a shade of difference in society. These *hidalgos* are not distinguishable from other citizens, either by elegance of language, forms of politeness, or vices. There are provinces in which one half of the population is composed of *hidalgos*.

The higher rank of nobility consists of seven or eight hundred families of *grandees*, Castilian men of

quality, or near relations of grandees and men of quality. It has the ignorance, the indolence, the sluggishness of the nation, without having its sincerity, frankness, and sudden bursts of enthusiasm. Almost the whole of these nobles reside in Madrid, or in the great cities. With the exception of a very few of them, they are quite strangers to their immense estates, which an army of agents manage nominally in their behalf, but really for their own profit. The policy of the House of Bourbon, by preserving for them at court places which degrade them, has kept them at a distance from occupations in the state and the army, in which they might have served their country and maintained the glory of their name. They are seldom to be found in the administration or the army: they are never seen at the head of any useful enterprise. The Government rejects them; the people know nothing of them; their race is degenerated; they are never spoken of but with contempt. Proud and useless consumers, they are merely a parasitical branch of the social tree, and whenever they shall be extirpated, the loss of them will be obvious only in the improvement of the state.

The Spanish clergy consists of a hundred and fifty thousand individuals, numerous in the towns, spread over the country, and introduced everywhere. It holds one-fourth of the territorial property of the monarchy, and it was not till within these few years

that it lost the faculty of increasing its domains. The monks constitute more than one-half of the ecclesiastical order. They form an independent republic in the midst of the state, which has its own maxims and rules of conduct: it is the firm support of absolute government, whether regal or papal. The convents are peopled from the lower classes of society. The Spanish monks are ignorant and stupid, but of regular morals. Convents are not haunts of licentiousness. The monks are a part of the populace, of the populace only, and as they are rather more enlightened than their compatriots, they possess great influence over them. The secular clergy is far from having the unity and consistence of the regular clergy. It is more diffused, more worldly. The bishops are rich, and are praiseworthy for the manner in which they employ their riches. The people revere them, and their virtues and their doctrine give them a claim to be revered. In case of the dissolution of the monarchy, the bishops are the natural leaders of the population.

The middle order is composed of the hidalgos scattered throughout the provinces, small towns, and villages; of the agents of authority; and of all those who fill public situations, even of the highest importance; for in Spain, in consequence of the exclusion of the grandees, even the posts of ministers are habitually given to those who have gone through the routine of office. In this class also must be in-

cluded a multitude of members of the secular clergy, nearly independent of episcopal authority and of religious duties, and the numerous barristers, scriveners, judges, and other persons connected with the law, too numerous indeed for a country in which there are not many landed proprietors, and very few occasions for lawsuits. To the middle order likewise belong the stewards, farmers, land-agents of the nobles and clergy, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, students in the universities, merchants in the principal towns, and, lastly, the *hacendados*, the small freeholders, disseminated over the surface of the kingdom. In this class the national character and virtues shine with their full lustre; all that exists of capacity is here. Without vanity, without jealousy, it wishes for reform; it wishes for it because every thing around it calls aloud for improvement, because every thing is degenerated. The Inquisition, despotism, the topographical insulation of Spain, have prevented knowledge from spreading among this large and useful class of citizens; but the members of it are accustomed to think and to reflect. For twenty years before the epoch of which we are speaking, it had paid considerable attention to political questions. Abuses were censured; prejudices were attacked; and, as men rarely stop when the road in which they have commenced their progress lies so invitingly open before them, there was in this class a decided leaning towards demo-

cracy; a leaning which finds a valid excuse in the vices of the Government and the inferiority of the higher ranks.

The lower class of society comprises the peasantry and the populace of the great towns. As there are few large towns, there is but little that can be called populace. Those adventurers of the mobility, with which the Spanish romances of the sixteenth century made Europe acquainted, no longer exist except in romances, and belong to history. The populace and the peasants have strong habits of religion. It is a spectacle which is suited to their imagination. It is something which fills up the voids of life. The priests, and especially the monks, have great influence over them. They know the *grandees* only by name, but they have an ancient respect for the regal authority. "God and the King!" is the watchword of the lower class. It is not tormented either by the jealousy of equality, or the thirst of liberty. What is nobility in a country where throngs of muleteers are noble? where servants, who go to be hired, show the parchments of their ancestors? where it is distinguished by no external sign, no shade of social difference? Individual liberty they confound with the right of robbing and murdering, and as they are used to fear highway robbers, it is easy to make them believe that a thief and a friend of liberty mean the same thing. The people have national recollections. They sing the paladins of Charlemagne, and the

triumphs over the Moors. They are convinced that Spain is the land of men, and they abominate foreigners.

In the year 1807, the signs which are the precursors of a tempest, became more apparent, more threatening; the fears which were excited from abroad increased the uneasiness which was felt at home. In the bowels of the volcano muttered those thunders which were prelusive of an eruption. The royal family awaited its destiny from Napoleon. Confiding in his promises, the King and Queen looked upon him as a rampart against the nation, from which they had separated themselves. From his intrigues at the imperial court, and his implicit submission, the favourite hoped for the preservation of his authority during the reign of Charles IV., and his subsequent safety. Humiliated by Godoy, the *grandees* longed for his overthrow, and they saw it in a new order of things. Surrounded and stimulated by some insulted nobles, and by those who had not bent before the idol, Ferdinand, full of disquiet as to the fate which was preparing for him by an unnatural mother and a deluded father, Ferdinand likewise, turned his eyes towards Napoleon. The Emperor alone, he was told, could snatch him from the snares of the Prince of the Peace, and the infatuation of an irritated father and mother. France must desire that Spain, her faithful ally, should not remain under a degrading system of government, which an-

nihilated her resources, and rendered her alliance almost valueless. Spain full of vigour could not be injurious to France. The union of the Prince of Asturias with a princess of the imperial blood, would cement the family compact, and be a firmer guarantee for the alliance of the two nations than could be supplied by the precarious will of the favourite. Such were the considerations which the councillors of Ferdinand laid before him: to Napoleon they looked for death or life.

In the enlightened classes, the ideas of philanthropy and of gradual perfectibility, which gave birth to the French Revolution and presided over its first flight, had a great number of partisans. This attachment to the Revolution they continued to Bonaparte, who was its sole legatee. In England, in Germany, and wherever the liberty of thinking and writing existed, it was perceived that France had reached despotism by passing through the horrors of anarchy; and in their eyes the French nation would have been degraded on the score of its servility, even had it not been hated as a conqueror: they did not confound immutable principles with men who had changed according to the dictates of their interests and their passions. What mattered it that the advantages possessed by a few were guaranteed, if by doing this the people were reduced to slavery, and made the docile instrument of the ruin of surrounding nations? Observations of this

kind were more difficult to make on the other side of the Pyrenees, where the Inquisition and the bondage of the press allowed only to see the results without perceiving the details. The glory and the grandeur of the French people had a dazzling effect on such beholders. The Spaniards, therefore, saw in Napoleon the propagator of knowledge and of the French Revolution.

The infinitely largest part of the nation, whom the irreligion and the sanguinary scenes of 1793 had inspired with a just horror, saw in Napoleon the man whose strong hand had muzzled the hundred heads of the revolutionary hydra. In him, the priests revered the religious prince, who had restored the altars of the true God : while the monks abhorred Godoy, who had dared to lay his sacrilegious hand on the holy ark. Expecting little from the court, and forming, in Spain more than any where else, a nearly independent order, they were ready to lend the aid of their prayers and of their courage to him who would undertake to break the idol which they refused to adore.

The glory of Napoleon had even reconciled the Spaniards with the French. In the posadas of Castile, wishes were uttered that victory might crown the invincible French armies and their illustrious leader. Tears were shed over humbled, degraded, impoverished Spain ; it was compared with France ; it had no longer an army, no longer any confidence ;

the King, the Queen, the favourite, daily became more unpopular. Undoubtedly, however, no one looked to foreign arms ; not a Spaniard formed the impious wish to see his native land sullied by foreign bayonets ; but it was felt that a great change was imminent, that it was necessary. There existed no power but the royal power, and that was debased and rotten to the core. There was no considerable man in the state, no political body which might serve as a rallying point ; there was not a single institution to be the organ of the national will. In all quarters there was a vehement desire to act, but no means of even expressing that desire. No corporations, no possible mode of uniting ; every where nothing but insulated wishes. All this called for and necessitated a foreign influence.

Thus, by an inspiration which was unanimous in its object, though various in its motives, almost the whole of Spain stretched out its suppliant hands to the great man, to the prince of the age. Kings and subjects, high and low, the oppressors and the oppressed, all were willing to remit the arbitration of their differences to the decision of the oracle ; all conjured him to restore youth and life to that old and worn-out monarchy. Far, indeed, were they from foreseeing, that, like the fabulous Medea, Napoleon was to regenerate them in a sea of blood !

NOTES

AND

ILLUSTRATIONS.

No. I.

See Page 245.

ROYALTY in Portugal springs from the people. There is still extant the original contract drawn up in the Cortes of Lamego between the first King Alphonso Henriquez and the nation, represented by the prelates, the nobles, and the deputies of the cities. Other Cortes placed the crown successively on the head of John I. of Philip II. and of John IV. Without their concurrence the king could neither impose taxes nor make war. Don Pedro II. was the last who convened these assemblies. Political liberty perished without violence, because the exploits of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, and their disasters in the seventeenth, had filled their souls with two exclusive passions, namely, in the first epoch the love of conquest, and in the second the desire of independence.

The King of Portugal considers himself at the present day as absolute sovereign of his dominions. He causes justice to be administered, lays on taxes, disposes of the public revenue, and concludes treaties with other powers. He acknowledges no superior on earth. The lawyers style him the living law.

The sovereign exercises his authority through the medium of councils and tribunals, instituted in ancient times, according to the wants of society, or by means of special delegates, called se-

cretaries of state, whose duty it is to give motion to the machine of government. The latter, though of recent creation, have absorbed almost all the powers previously vested in the great bodies of the State ; nay, they have even encroached on the royal majesty, by habitually substituting for the will of the prince their own will, expressed in the form of *avisos*, advice, which are obligatory for all classes of subjects.

According to the European custom, we call secretaries of state ministers, though, in the Peninsula, this denomination is extended to magistrates of all degrees, and public functionaries of all ranks.

There are four secretaries of state : the interior, *secretario de estado dos negocios do reino*, to whose department belong the general superintendence of police, and the relations with the Court of Rome ; the navy and colonies, *secretario de estado dos negocios da marinha e dominios ultramarinas* ; foreign affairs and war, *secretario de estado dos negocios estrangeiros e da guerra* ; finances, *secretario de estado do reparticao dos negocios da fazenda*.

The council of state is composed of a small number of distinguished personages. The prince selects from among the councillors of state such as he thinks fit to call to the cabinet councils, in which reside the thoughts of the government, and to which the ministers of state belong.

The councillors of state must not be confounded with the ordinary councillors. The latter have a mere title which does not give admission to the cabinet, and merely confers on him who is invested with it certain prerogatives of etiquette, such as the right to assume the *senhoria*, lordship, when, from other causes, he is not entitled *excellency*. The bishops, the fidalgoes, the general officers of the rank of marechal-de-camp and all above it, the members of the ancient executive councils and of the high courts of justice, and the municipal senators of Lisbon, are councillors by right. Those to whom the prince grants by name what are termed the honours of the council, *honores do conselho*, are councillors by special favour.

The legislative acts are promulgated under the name of *alvara*. They are in force for a year, and when they are designed to last longer, the expression *com força de ley* is added to the word *alvara*. The collection of the statutes issued on the subject are termed *ordonações*, ordinances.

The acts of the government appear under the form of decrees, *decretos reaes*, or even of letters, *cartas regias*, addressed to the persons whom they concern.

Portugal is divided into six provinces, namely : Entre Duero e Minho, which is more commonly called Minho, Tras-os-Montes, Beira, Estremadura, Alemtejo, and Algarves, which has the title of kingdom. This division is followed for the distribution of military commands. A general officer in each province has the troops and fortresses under his command, and assumes the title of *governador das armas*. The command of the Minho is divided between two. For the district of Oporto, *partido do Porto*, there is a governor fixed in that city, and for the rest of the province another resident at Viana.

Seventeen dioceses, and four thousand two hundred parishes, *freguezias*, compose the ecclesiastical circumscription. A patriarch, two archbishops, and fourteen bishops, are at the head of the clergy. The patriarch of Lisbon, notwithstanding the splendour of his dignity, has, like the other bishops, no authority but in his own diocese. There are in the kingdom, four hundred and eighteen convents of monks, and one hundred and twenty-eight of nuns. The ecclesiastics have their particular tribunals. The Inquisition is independent of the episcopal jurisdiction ; its establishment consists of a council of monks and magistrates, *conselho geral do Santo-Officio*, of which the inquisitor-general is president, and of three tribunals, which sit at Lisbon, Coimbra, and Evora.

La meza do dessembargo do paço, literally *the table for clearing away the affairs of the palace*, is the supreme court of Portugal. It derived its name from its assembling formerly in the palace, and under the presidency of the sovereign. Its members are

called *desembargadores*, clearers away ; the judicial authorities are subordinate to it. The *desembargo do paço* presents for the royal nomination the members of the courts of justice and the other lettered magistrates, *magistrado de letras*, that is to say, those who are required to take their degrees at the university of Coimbra. It decides in cases of disputes respecting jurisdiction. It shares the censorship of the press with the Holy Office and the episcopal tribunals. Confirmations, privileges, pardons, &c., are registered by it. The high chancellor, *chancellor-mor*, is the first magistrate of the *desembargo do paço* and of the kingdom. It is he who affixes the seal of state to the acts of the sovereign power, and if he perceives that they contain clauses contrary to the rights of the monarch and the people, and the customs of the monarchy, it is his duty to represent it to the prince. This right of remonstrance has long been but a mere formality.

Justice is administered to the citizens by two courts, which decide immediately in certain cases, civil or criminal, and on appeals from sentences pronounced by the judges of first instance, of whom we shall treat presently. The first court, known by the name of *casa da supplicação*, sits at Lisbon, and comprises in its jurisdiction the Algarves, Alemtejo, Estremadura, and a very small portion of the province of Beira. The second, called *Relação do Porto*, sits at Oporto. Its jurisdiction extends over the Minho, Tras-os-Montes, and almost the whole of Beira. From its decisions, appeals lie, in certain cases, to the *casa da supplicação*. Though the Roman law is taught at Coimbra, it is forbidden to quote it before the tribunals ; and the administration of justice is guided exclusively by the laws of the country.

The six provinces of Portugal are divided into forty-four *comarcas*. At the head of each *comarca* is a *corregidor*, in Portuguese, *corregedor*, a word derived from the Latin verb *corrigere*. The *corregidor* is both administrator and judge. In the latter capacity he forms a tribunal of himself, deciding without appeal up to a certain sum and a certain penalty. He is bound

to make an annual tour through his *comarca*. He may suspend and even imprison subordinate magistrates. In his administrative capacity he is dependent only on the superintendent-general of police and the secretaries of state.

The *provedor*, a magistrate independent of the *corregidor*, but holding the next rank to him, superintends the receipt of the royal revenue, assesses the amounts to be paid by the parishes, and carries the laws into effect in all that relates to wills, the succession of property, and the management of hospitals and charitable institutions. Sometimes the jurisdiction of the *provedor* extends over several *comarcas*; sometimes, too, the functions of *corregidor* and *provedor* are united in the same person.

Each *comarca* is composed of an irregular number of *ciudades* and *villas*. The pompous title of *ciudad*, city, belongs to ancient towns from time immemorial. On some it has been conferred by the king. It has been given to all those which have bishops. *Villa* corresponds with our town, though there are *villas* larger and more opulent than certain *ciudades*, and others smaller and poorer than mere villages.

All the *ciudades* and a certain number of *villas* have their *juiz de fora*, a judge named *de fora*, because he comes from without. The judge *de fora* exercises in the territory, *termo*, of his *ciudad* or *villa*, the same functions as the *corregidor* in the *comarca*; but he is subject to his control in matters of government, and to his jurisdiction in matters of justice. In the great cities the functions of judge *de fora* are divided between a civil judge, *juiz do civel*, and a criminal judge, *juiz do crime*; an inferior magistrate, *juiz dos orfaos*, judge of orphans, corresponds in office with the *provedor*, and is accountable to him. There are, besides, at Lisbon and elsewhere, particular judges for particular persons and crimes.

The *corregidores*, *provedors*, and judges *de fora*, are lettered magistrates. They are appointed by the king, excepting in some places where the choice of them remains with the *donataries*. Their offices last for three years, at the expiration of

which they are removed to other places. The gradation is as follows :—a person begins with being judge de fora in a town, and afterwards becomes so in a city ; he is then appointed provedor or corregidor ; lastly he attains a provedorship or corregidorship, called of the first bench, because the *cidade* or *villa*, the capital of the *comarca*, formerly voted in the Cortes of the nation.

The towns, *villas*, which have no judge de fora, are governed by an ordinary judge, *juiz ordinario*, also called *juiz da terra*. The inhabitants elect him from among themselves, and government only confirms the nomination. The ordinary judges are in office for a year only. Their functions are the same as those of the judges de fora, excepting that their jurisdiction is less extensive.

Each *cidade*, or *villa*, has its *camara*, or municipal chamber. The chambers are composed of the judge de fora, or ordinary president, two or three municipals, *vercadores*, and an attorney, *procurador*, who is appointed annually by the inhabitants. To the chambers belong the control over the expenses of parishes, *concelhos*, and over the administration of their property, the markets, the guilds, the cleansing of the streets, the maintenance of the fountains and public buildings ; in short, all that relates to the local police and administration. In concert with the principal persons of the country, they issue ordinances, *posturas* ; and they delegate the exercise of their authority to two magistrates called *almotaces*.

Lisbon has a particular municipal administration. Its chamber bears the name of a senate, *senado da camara*. A grandee of the kingdom is its president, and it is composed of magistrates appointed by the king, and four members elected from among the trades, *os quatro procuradores dos mestores*. The senate of Lisbon has rights and prerogatives which are not enjoyed by the other chambers.

The corregidores, provedors, judges, municipal chambers, and almotaces, employ for the performance of their office, clerks, or

writers, *escrivais*, and agents of police and justice, called *merinhos* and *alcaides*. In considerable places the merinhos and alcaides are assisted by subalterns called *homens da vara*, because they carry a rod, *vara*, a sign and instrument of authority.

The territory, *termo*, of a *cidade* or *villa*, is not confined to the inhabited space comprised within the walls. It includes also the houses dispersed without them, and adjacent hamlets and villages. These villages, *poras*, or *lugares*, are formed into small parishes, *concelhos*, and lordships, *senhorios*, called *contas*, from the Latin words *loci cauti*, when they belong to convents or chapters, and *jugal dos*, *behetrias*, *houras*, when they are the property of laymen. The affairs of the *concelhos* are administered by themselves, and those of the *senhorios* by the lord or his deputies.

This very subaltern administration is, with the donataries, all that is left of the feudal system in the country. The donataries, *donatarios*, are the corporations and individuals to whom the court has granted jurisdictions without land, or lands having a jurisdiction attached to them. The principal donataries, as the Queen's household, the family of Braganza, the household of the Princess of Brazil, that of the Prince, called *caso do infantado*, and the priory of Crato, are blended with the royal domain; and the lords now appoint no more than ten judges *de fora* throughout the whole kingdom. There is, nevertheless, good reason to believe that the Portuguese nobility, though they have lost their feudal supremacy, have not ceased to be offensive and encroaching; for the first instructions received by the corregidors and judges *de fora*, on repairing to their posts, are to curb the excesses of the Fidalgoes—*obstar a os excessos dos Fidalgos*.

We have endeavoured in this note to describe the mechanism of the political organization in Portugal, in order to make the history which we are writing more easily understood. It was not our business to enter into the circumstances of manners and localities which furnish some compensations for arbitrary power;

still less to examine how far the hatred produced by the excesses of the privileged classes can in every country give partisans to the despotism exercised with regularity by a master and his delegates.

No. II.

See Page 345.

SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ENGLAND.

Madrid, Oct. 11, 1796.

HIS MAJESTY has expedited to all his councils, a decree of the following tenor:

One of the principal motives which determined me to conclude a treaty of peace with the French Republic, so soon as its government began to assume a regular and stable form, was the manner in which England behaved to me during the whole of the war, and the just suspicions with which the experience of her faithlessness inspired me for the future. This faithlessness was first manifested at the most critical moment of the first campaign, in the manner in which Admiral Hood treated my squadron at Toulon, where he was entirely occupied with destroying whatever he himself could not carry away; and subsequently, in the secret expedition which he made against the island of Corsica, which he concealed with the greatest reserve from Don Juan de Langara, during the time they were together at Toulon.

The English Ministry allowed this faithlessness to appear clearly, in its silence respecting all its negotiations with other powers, particularly in the treaty concluded on the 19th November 1794, with the United States of America, without any regard to my rights, which were perfectly known to it. I remarked it also in its repugnance to adopt my plans and ideas tending to accelerate the termination of the war, and in the vague reply given by Lord Grenville to my ambassador the Marquis del Campo, when he applied to him for assistance in order to continue it. The certainty which I had of its faithlessness was

completely confirmed by its unjust appropriation of the rich cargo of the Spanish ship *San Jago* or the *Achilles*, which had been first captured by the French, and then retaken by the English squadron, and which vessel ought to have been restored to me, according to the stipulation entered into between my Secretary of State and Lord St. Helens, ambassador of His Britannic Majesty; subsequently by the detention of all the warlike ammunition which arrived on board of Dutch vessels, for the supply of my squadrons, under pretence of various difficulties, in order to delay the restitution; finally, I can have no longer any doubts of the faithlessness of England, on hearing of the frequent landings of her vessels on the coast of Peru and Chili for the purposes of contraband trade and reconnoitering the country, under pretence of fishing for whales, a privilege which she pretends to have acquired by the convention of Nootka. Such were the proceedings of the British Ministry with a view to cement the ties of amity and reciprocal confidence which she professed to have for Spain, according to our convention of the 25th of May 1793.

Since I have made peace with the French Republic, I have not only the strongest motives for imputing to England the intention of attacking my possessions in America, but have also received direct insults, which convince me that its ministry wishes to compel me to adopt an alternative contrary to the interests of humanity, which is torn to pieces by the sanguinary war which ravages Europe, for the termination of which I have never ceased to offer my good offices, and to express my constant solicitude.

In fact, England has disclosed her intentions, and clearly shown her plan for seizing my possessions, by sending a considerable force to the West-Indies, and particularly directed against St. Domingo, in order to prevent its union to the French territory, as is clearly demonstrated by the proclamations of her generals in that island. She has also shown her hostile intentions, by the establishments formed by her trading com-

panies on the banks of the Missouri, in North America, with a view to penetrate by these countries to the shores of the Pacific Ocean; finally, by the conquest which she has just made in South America of the colony of Demerary, belonging to the Dutch, the possession of which enables her to seize still more important posts.

But I can have no longer any doubt as to her hostile projects, when I consider the frequent insults offered to my flag, the violences committed in the Mediterranean by her frigates, which have presumed to carry away soldiers coming from Gênoa to Barcelona, in Spanish vessels, to complete my armies; the piracies and vexations committed by the Corsican and Anglo-Corsican privateers (protected by the English government of that island,) on the Spanish commerce in the Mediterranean, and even on the coasts of Catalonia, and the detention of different Spanish vessels laden with Spanish property, and taken to England on the most frivolous pretences; and especially the rich cargo of the Spanish frigate *La Minerva*, on which an embargo was laid in a manner the most insulting to my flag, and the release of which has not been obtained, although it was proved before the competent tribunals that it was entirely Spanish property; the outrage committed on my ambassador, Don Simon de las Casas, by a tribunal in London, which ordered him to be arrested on a claim made upon him for a very small sum by the owner of a vessel.

Finally, the Spanish territory has been violated in an intolerable manner on the coasts of Galicia and Alicant by the English sloops of war *Cameleon* and *Kingston*. Even more, Captain George Vaughan, commander of the *Alarm* frigate, has conducted himself in a manner equally insolent and scandalous in the island of Trinidad, where he landed with drums beating and colours flying, in order to attack the French, on whom he wreaked his vengeance for pretended injuries received from them, disturbing, by this violation of the rights of my sovereignty, the tranquillity of the inhabitants of the island.

By all these serious and unheard of insults, England has proved to the world that she knows no other laws than the aggrandizement of her commerce; and by her despotism, which has exhausted my patience and my moderation, she compels me, in order to support the honour of my crown, as well as to protect my people against her violence, to declare war against the King of England, his kingdoms, and his vassals; and to give orders for taking all necessary measures for the defence of my dominions, and of my well-beloved subjects, against the attacks of the enemy.

Given at the Palace of San Lorenzo, the 5th of October 1796. Signed by the King, and countersigned by the Secretary of the Council of War.

On Saturday the 8th, war was proclaimed at Madrid according to the usual forms.

No. III.

See Page 352.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE, OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE, BETWEEN
FRANCE AND SPAIN.

Paris, 28 Fructidor, (Wednesday, 16th September, 1796.)

THE Executive Directory of the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, animated by the desire of drawing closer the ties of amity and good understanding now happily subsisting between France and Spain, by the treaty of peace concluded at Basle, the 4th Thermidor, 3d year of the Republic, (22d July, 1795,) have resolved to form a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, for every thing connected with the advantage and common defence of both nations; and they have entrusted with this important negotiation, and given their full powers, viz: The Executive Directory of the French Republic to Citizen Dominique-Catherine-Perignon, general of division of the armies of the Republic, and its ambassador to His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain: and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain

to His Excellency Don Manuel de Godoy et Alvares de Faria, Rios, Sanchez, Zarsoza, Prince of the Peace, Duke of Alcudia, &c., &c.

Who, after communication and reciprocal exchange of their full powers, have agreed on the following articles.

ART. I. There shall be a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, between the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. II. The two contracting powers shall mutually guarantee to each other, without any reserve or exception, in the most authentic and absolute manner, all the states, territories, islands, and places which they possess or shall possess respectively; and if either of the two shall be, hereafter, under any pretext whatsoever, menaced or attacked, the other promises, binds, and obliges itself to aid it with its good offices, and to assist it upon its requisition, in the manner stipulated in the subsequent articles.

ART. III. In the space of three months from the date of the requisition, the power required shall have ready and place at the disposal of the power requiring, fifteen ships of the line, of which three shall be three-deckers, or of eighty guns, and twelve of from seventy to seventy-two; six frigates of proportional force, and four sloops, or light vessels, all equipped, armed, victualled for six months and fitted out for a year. This naval force shall be assembled by the power required in such of its ports as shall be designated by the power requiring.

ART. IV. In the event of the power requiring considering it desirable, in order to commence hostilities, to limit to one half the assistance which it is entitled to claim, in execution of the preceding article, it may, at any period of the campaign, require the other half of the said succours, which shall be furnished to it in the manner, and within the period stipulated, to be reckoned from the date of the second requisition.

ART. V. The power required shall, in like manner, on the requisition of the party requiring, place at the end of three

months from the date of the requisition, eighteen thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, with a proportionable train of artillery, in order to be employed in Europe, or in the defence of the colonies possessed by the contracting powers in the gulf of Mexico.

ART. VI. The power requiring shall be at liberty to send one or more commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining, if, conformably to the preceding articles, the power required has taken measures for opening the campaign on the day appointed, with the land and sea forces therein stipulated.

ART. VII. These succours shall be committed to the entire disposal of the requiring party, which may leave them in the ports or on the territory of the power required, or employ them in such expeditions as it may think proper to undertake, without being obliged to give an account of the motives which have determined it.

ART. VIII. The demand made by one of the powers for succours shall be sufficient to prove the want it has for them; and shall impose on the other power the obligation of furnishing them, without its being necessary to enter into any discussion whether the war undertaken is offensive or defensive; or without giving any explanation whatever, which might tend to elude the most speedy and punctual accomplishment of what is stipulated.

ART. IX. The troops and vessels demanded shall remain at the disposal of the power requiring during the whole of the war, without being, in any instance, at its expense; the power required shall maintain them in every place where its ally shall make them act, the same as if it employed them directly for itself. Only it is agreed, that during the whole time the said troops and vessels shall remain on its territory or in its ports, it shall, from its magazines or arsenals, supply them with every thing necessary, in the same manner and at the same prices as it would to its own troops or vessels.

ART. X. The power required shall instantly replace the ships of its contingent which shall be lost by the accidents of

war or of the sea ; in like manner it shall repair the losses sustained by the troops of its contingent.

ART. XI. In case the said succours are or become insufficient, the two contracting powers shall place in activity the greatest possible force by sea as well as by land, against the enemy of the power attacked, which shall use the said forces either by combining them, or making them act separately, according to the plan mutually concerted.

ART. XII. The succours stipulated by the preceding Article shall be furnished in all the wars which the contracting parties may have to wage ; even in those where the party required shall not be directly interested, and act only as an auxiliary.

ART. XIII. In the event, that from the motives of hostility being prejudicial to both parties, they should declare war in common against one or more powers, the limitations settled in the preceding Articles shall cease to operate, and the two contracting powers shall be bound to bring the whole of their land and sea forces into the field against the common enemy, and to concert their plan so as to direct them towards the most suitable points, either separately or in conjunction. They also bind themselves, in the event contemplated in the present Article, not to enter into any treaty of peace but in common, and so as that each of them shall obtain the satisfaction to which it is entitled.

ART. XIV. In the event of one of the powers acting only as an auxiliary, the power which shall be attacked singly may treat separately for peace, but in such a way that no prejudice shall result from it to the auxiliary power, and that it should even turn as much as possible to its direct advantage. For this purpose the auxiliary power shall be informed of the mode and the time agreed upon for the opening and carrying on the negotiations.

ART. XV. There shall be concluded very speedily a treaty of commerce upon equitable principles, and such as are advantageous to both nations, each of which secures to the other, in

the country of its ally, a distinct preference for the productions of its soil and its manufactures, or, at the very least, advantages equal to those enjoyed in their respective states, by the most favoured nations. Both powers bind themselves henceforward to make common cause in repressing and putting down any maxims adopted by any country whatsoever in opposition to their present principles, or which are detrimental to the safety of neutral flags, or to the respect due to them; as well as to relieve and replace the colonial system of Spain, on the footing on which it has existed, or ought to exist, according to treaties.

ART. XVI. The character and jurisdiction of consuls shall be at the same time recognized and settled by a special convention. Those antecedent to the present treaty shall be executed provisionally.

ART. XVII. In order to avoid all disputes between the two powers, they have agreed to proceed immediately and without delay to the explanation and developement of Article VII. of the Treaty of Basle, relative to the frontiers, according to the constructions, plans, and memoirs, which they shall communicate to each other through the same plenipotentiaries who have negotiated the present treaty.

ART. XVIII. England being the only power against which Spain has direct grievances, the present alliance shall only be executed against her during the present war, and Spain shall remain neutral towards the other powers in hostility with the Republic.

ART. XIX. The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanged within a month, reckoning from the date of its signature.

Done at Saint Ildefonso, the 2d Fructidor, the 4th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

(Signed,)

PERIGNON.

EL PRINCIPE DE LA PAZ.

The Executive Directory decrees and signs the present treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with his Catholic Majesty

the King of Spain, negotiated in the name of the French Republic, by Citizen Dominique-Catherine-Perignon, General of Division, furnished with powers to that effect by the decree of the Executive Directory, dated the 20th of Messidor last past, and entrusted with its instructions.

Done at the national palace of the Executive Directory, the 12th Fructidor, the 4th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

For expedition conformably,

(Signed,) REVEILLERE LEPEAUX, President.

By the Executive Directory,

LAGARDE, Secretary-general.

This treaty was ratified on the 26th, by the Council of Ancients.

No. III.*

See Page 354.

Madrid, 14th December.

His Excellency Don Pedro Cevallos, First Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has communicated, by the royal order, to all the councils, under the date of the 12th, the following manifesto:—

“ The peace, which the powers of Europe saw with so much pleasure restored by the treaty of Amiens, has been unfortunately of short duration, for the benefit of nations. The public rejoicings in celebration of it were scarcely finished, when the war began anew to disturb the public tranquillity, and the advantages offered by the peace began to vanish.

The cabinets of Paris and London kept Europe in suspense and indecision, between fear and hope, waiting the issue of their negotiations, until discord lighted up the fire of war between them, which naturally must communicate to other powers. Spain and Holland treated, in conjunction with France, at Amiens; and their interests and political relations united them

so closely with her, that it was very difficult for them not to take a part finally in the aggression and insults offered to their ally.

Under these circumstances, his Majesty, actuated by the strongest principles of good policy, preferred paying the pecuniary subsidy to furnishing the contingents of troops and ships which he was bound to do, in terms of the treaty of alliance with France in 1796; in consequence he gave the British Government to understand, by means of his ambassador in London, as well as by the English agents at Madrid, his positive and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. He had the consolation for the moment of hearing that this ingenuous declaration was apparently well received by the Court of London.

But that Cabinet, which had premeditated beforehand the renewal of the war with Spain, as soon as it should be in a situation to declare it, not with the forms and solemnities prescribed by the law of nations, but by the means of aggression which might be advantageous to it, sought the most frivolous pretexts for throwing doubts on the conduct of Spain, which was strictly neutral, and to lay greater stress on the desire of Great Britain to preserve peace: all done to gain time by lulling the vigilance of the Spanish Government, and keeping in uncertainty the public opinion of the English nation as to its unjust and premeditated designs, which it would by no means have approved of.

In this way the Court of London artfully feigned to receive different reclamations made by Spaniards, and its agents at Madrid exaggerated the pacific intentions of their sovereign; but the latter were never satisfied with the frank and friendly manner in which their notes were replied to; they endeavoured to magnify or to fancy armaments which had no existence; they contended (in the face of the most solemn protestations of the Court of Spain, that the pecuniary succours given to France were only the equivalent of the contingent of troops and ships stipulated in the treaty of 1796,) that it was an indefinite and enormous

sum, the payment of which entitled them to consider Spain as a principal in the war.

But as the time was not yet arrived to throw off the mask and show what they were plotting, they exacted, as the price of acknowledging the neutrality of Spain, a cessation of all armaments in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes made by the French in those ports; and notwithstanding both conditions, although demanded in a tone too haughty and unusual in political negotiations, were at first strictly complied with, they continued to show distrust, and finally left Madrid suddenly, after receiving despatches from their Court, without making any communication of their contents.

The contrast between the conduct of the Cabinets of Madrid and of London would be sufficient to prove to all Europe the bad faith and mysterious and perverse proceedings of the English Ministry; these, however, were not completely exhibited until the abominable atrocity committed by surprising, attacking, and capturing four Spanish frigates, sailing in the security of peace; this attack was artfully made by the orders of the English Government at the very moment it was negotiating the conditions for the prolongation of peace, and while its vessels were providing themselves with necessaries and refreshments in the ports of Spain.

Whilst the same vessels were there treated with the utmost hospitality, and experienced the good faith with which Spain guaranteed to England the sincerity of her engagements, and the firmness of her resolutions to maintain her neutrality, the commanders of them had already received the secret and iniquitous orders of the English Cabinet to attack the Spanish vessels and property at sea. The same orders were profusely circulated to the greatest distances, as is proved by their ships of war stopping and carrying into port every Spanish vessel they met with, without even respecting those laden with grain, which were coming from all parts to the assistance of a faithful nation, in a year of famine and calamity.

sitions in order, to ascertain what was erased, to take care that nothing should be printed which the author meant to suppress, but in no instance to substitute any thing for what was suppressed.

General Foy seemed to apprehend that his work would be found too long; he had intended to explain in his Preface in what way his manner of conceiving and treating the subject had necessarily led him to great length in his narrative.

“We write at length, because we write with the assistance of memoirs, of official documents, of conversations, and especially of recollections. Those who make books out of books and newspapers, will analyze and be more brief. . . .

“The greatest difficulty is to know the facts, and, when they are known, to relate them without altering the truth.”

We must also take into account the period at which the author wrote, and the feelings by which he must then have been actuated. Certainly his impartiality was not at all affected by them; he thought and judged then as he thought and judged since; but, at a later period, the expression might not have been precisely the same. He who was in his nature tolerant and kind, who in the warmth of debate probably never treated with disrespect either the opinions or the personal feelings of an opponent, would have pushed that sort of delicacy to a scrupulous extent. We see that such was his idea, not merely with respect to his own countrymen, but also to strangers and enemies.*

* The translator is afraid that there are more passages than one in the work, which, on this side of the Channel at least, are likely to require the full benefit of this apology. But he thinks it will require no extraordinary effort on the part of an English reader to accept it, and to make allowance for the feelings under which such passages were dictated.

“Why should we be the personal enemies of the English? Wilson at Oporto, and Stuart in Sicily, were generous men. And there are many such. Besides, the conduct of the English was compulsory; their morality is in them a second nature. When they serve their aristocracy at the expense of humanity, they ought to be judged as we Frenchmen should be, when our army was ravaging Europe for the want of administrative foresight . . .”

By publishing the History of the War in the Peninsula, in compliance with the advice which she received, the Countess Foy has not been merely anxious to fulfil a duty towards the memory of her illustrious husband; she conceives that she had also other duties to fulfil towards that public opinion which manifested so much enthusiasm and affection for one of the most eloquent organs of the national sentiments. The patriotic adoption of the family of General Foy forms a contract between her and the Country. The remains of his labours and the productions of his talent, which have not seen the light, form a sort of national property; and when, in the midst of such grave circumstances, we cannot yet accustom ourselves to the idea that we shall never more hear that voice which animated and encouraged us all, and which excited such sympathetic emotions in our hearts, let us at least, in the pages he has left us, look for generous opinions, wise councils, and noble inspirations.

hours, was also joined the hope of conferring lustre on his name. War was now closed to him, and the people had not yet chosen him for their representative and their orator. He therefore sought after the glory of an author, which he did not affect to despise, because he felt that he might aspire to it. But still it was on France, which was at the bottom of all his thoughts, and all his attachments, that he was anxious for that glory to be reflected.

“Happy is the writer who raises a monument to his country ! . . . that prospect may not be in store for me . . .”

His plan once fixed, General Foy laboured in its execution with that incredible ardour which he devoted to every thing. He was not satisfied with the notes which he had taken from day to day upon the spots, and in the midst of events. From every quarter he collected information, examined the correspondence and the orders of Ministers and Generals; sought for the testimony and the conversation of his military comrades. He made two journeys to England, in order to make himself thoroughly master of the organization of its army, and with the accounts which were current there of the war in Spain; he formed acquaintances with the Spanish exiles, in order to obtain information of them; every where he sought for notes and documents. Constantly verifying and comparing the information received from one quarter with that from another, he was exact almost to a fault, and anxious to make no statement on false or light grounds.

Such was the labour to which he gave himself up, during the years 1816 and 1817, with such determined perseverance, that this sedentary and studious life, succeeding to the active one of a soldier, made him seriously ill, and even excited fears for his life. He found it necessary in consequence to suspend his labours, and put himself under strict regimen. In 1819 he was named Deputy; and from that

moment a nobler career was opened to him. Every one knows how he followed it up.

The Countess Fox long hesitated about publishing the first part of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*. She was afraid of sending to the press an unfinished work. It required the solicitations of her friends to tranquillize, and to persuade her, that the public would recognize, in a work which had not received his finishing hand, that noble talent, the impression of which is still painfully recent; that it would there again discover the warmth which charmed and subjugated from the height of the tribune, the sincerity of opinion, the benevolent impartiality, the firm but not rigorous judgments, the quick and elevated views, and last, but not least, the tender attachment to his Country which especially secured to him the national sympathy. She has been induced to think that there might probably be an additional interest in observing the first cast of thought and the inspiration of the moment; that it would be another proof of the simplicity and the frankness of talent; finally, that she might, without apprehension, let every one read in the soul of him whose loss both she and we are daily deploring.

Under such impressions she has considered it an act of duty to publish the manuscripts exactly as they were left to her. The General was accustomed to write quickly, and never to allow the idea that crossed him, or the expression that struck him, to escape; afterwards he copied over, arranged, expunged, and began his corrections on the style, to which he did not completely devote himself till the very last moment.

Having no means of supplying the labour which there is no doubt the author would have imposed upon himself, all that could be done was to put the references and transpo-

They issued the barbarous orders (for they deserve no better name) for sinking all Spanish vessels below 100 tons burden, for burning all that had run ashore, and for stopping and taking to Malta all vessels exceeding 100 tons. This is proved by the declaration of the master of a Valencian sloop of 54 tons, who escaped in his boat on the 16th of November, to the coast of Catalonia, after the sloop had been sunk by an English vessel, the captain of which took his papers and his flag from him, and told him that he acted under the positive orders of his Government.

Notwithstanding these atrocities, which afford demonstrative proofs of the ambition and hostile views which the Cabinet of St. James's had long premeditated, it wishes still, according to its perfidious system, to dazzle public opinion, by alleging, that the Spanish frigates were taken to England, not as prizes, but as hostages to be detained until Spain gives security for her observing the strictest neutrality.

And what stronger security can or ought Spain to give? What civilized nation has ever yet made use of means so violent and insulting to exact securities from another? Even if England had any thing finally to exact of Spain, in what way could she excuse herself, after such an atrocity? What satisfaction can she give for the unfortunate loss of the frigate *La Mercedes* with all her cargo, ship's crew, and a great number of passengers of distinction, who perished the innocent victims of a policy so detestable?

Spain would neither satisfy what she owes to herself, nor believe that she was supporting her honour among the other powers of Europe, if she showed herself longer insensible to such insults, and did not endeavour to avenge them with the energy and dignity which are peculiar to her.

Actuated by these feelings, the King, after having exhausted every means compatible with the dignity of his crown, in order to preserve peace, finds himself under the hard necessity of making war upon the King of Great Britain, upon his subjects, and his people, and of doing away with the usual formalities con-

cerning the solemn declaration and publication of war; because the English Cabinet has begun and continues to carry on war without any declaration of it.

In consequence, His Majesty, after causing an embargo to be laid, by way of reprisal, on all the English property to be found in his dominions, has directed the necessary orders to be transmitted to the viceroy, captains-general, and other commanders, both by sea and land, for the defence of the kingdom and hostilities against the enemy; and he has ordered his ambassador to quit England with the whole of the Spanish legation.

His Majesty has no doubt, that when the subjects of his kingdom are informed of the just indignation with which the violent conduct of England has inspired him, they will spare no means which their valour can suggest to co-operate with His Majesty in exacting the most complete vengeance for the insult offered to the Spanish flag. For that purpose, His Majesty authorizes the arming of privateers for the purpose of attacking the enemy's ships and property, with the most extensive powers. His Majesty, at the same time, promises the greatest expedition in the adjudication of prizes, for the condemnation of which nothing else shall be required but the proof that they are English property. His Majesty hereby expressly renounces, in favour of the owners, all the claims which he might have reserved to himself on such occasions, so that they shall derive the whole benefit of the captures without any deduction.

Finally, His Majesty has ordered that this Declaration shall be inserted in the public papers, so that all the world may be informed of it; and that copies of it shall be sent to the ambassadors and ministers of the King in foreign Courts, in order that all Governments may be informed of these facts, and interest themselves in so just a cause, in the hope that Divine Providence will bless the Spanish arms, in order to obtain a proper and becoming satisfaction for the injuries they have received."

No. IV.

See Page 361.

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

IN circumstances less critical than those in which we are now placed, good and loyal subjects have been eager to assist their sovereigns by voluntary gifts and succours proportioned to the necessities of the state. In the present situation it is a matter of urgency to be generous to our country. The kingdom of Andalusia is favoured by nature in the breeds of horses fit for light cavalry; and the province of Estremadura rendered important services in this way to King Philip V.; will they now stand by with indifference and see the cavalry of the King of Spain diminished and incomplete for want of horses? No, I will never believe it; I hope, on the contrary, that following the example of the illustrious grandfathers of the present generation, who assisted the grandfather of the present king by levies of men and horses, the grandsons of those heroes will also hasten to furnish regiments or companies of skilful horsemen, to be employed in the service and for the defence of the country, so long as the present danger shall last. That once passed, they will return full of glory to the bosom of their families. Every one will dispute the honour of the victory; one will attribute the preservation of his family to his own arm; another, to that of his chief, his relation, or his friend; in short, all will have the credit of the salvation of their country. Come, my dear comrades, come and range yourselves under the banner of the best of sovereigns; come, and I will receive you with gratitude; I venture to promise it you beforehand, if the God of battles grant us a safe and durable peace, the only object of our wishes. No, you will neither yield to fear nor treachery; your hearts will be closed to every sort of foreign seduction. Come forward then; and if we are not compelled to cross bayonets with our enemies, you will not incur the danger of being marked as suspicious

persons, and of having given a false idea of your loyalty and honour, by refusing to answer the appeal I make to you.

But if my voice awakens in you no sentiment of your glory, be your own instigators ! become the fathers of the people in whose name I speak to you ; let your duty to them remind you of what you owe to yourselves, to your honour, and to the religion which you profess.

From the Royal Palace of San Lorenzo, October 6, 1806.

EL PRINCIPE DE LA PAZ.

Madrid, 12th October, 1806.

The Prince of the Peace has just addressed, on the 11th of October, a new circular to the intendants and corregidores in the spirit of the proclamation.

SIR,—The King orders me to inform you, that under the present circumstances he expects from you an effort of zeal and activity for his service ; and I, in his name, recommend you to use the greatest expedition in the ballot which is about to take place. I have to observe to you, that neither His Majesty nor myself will be satisfied with the ephemeral efforts which it has been usual to make in ordinary times. You may notify to the curates, in the name of the King, that they will be seconded by the Bishops in their endeavours to induce the common people to rally under the banners, and to prevail on the rich to make sacrifices to meet the expenses of the war, which we shall probably have to carry on for the general benefit ; and as it will require great efforts, the magistrates ought to feel that it is more especially their duty to employ all proper means to excite the national enthusiasm, in order to be able to enter the approaching lists with glory. His Majesty is confident that you will omit none of those which are likely to procure a greater number of soldiers in your province, and to excite the generous ardour of the nobility (for their privileges are not less at stake than those of the crown) and that you will do all in your power to effect both objects.

ninsula, the recollection of them was still quite fresh in his mind and in the public attention. That war formed as it were a sort of episode distinct from the other enterprizes of the French armies. Moreover, it was much more mixed up with popular movements, with the influence of opinions, with diversities of national character, and with political considerations. Finally, it was justly regarded as the first and principal cause of the fall of Napoleon. There, much better than elsewhere, was the genius of that great personage to be appreciated, who, after having reigned over all wills, still filled all imaginations.

General Foy felt that he was better entitled than most others to pass judgment upon him. A soldier of the army of the Rhine, unwilling to shed his blood for other objects than his Country's freedom, he had formerly refused to become the aid-de-camp of the General of the Army of Italy. Doubtless he admired the great warrior; doubtless he was proud of the glory which he had shed over the French name; but it was always with an eye of regret, looking back to the wars of his youth, the period of patriotic devotion and of disinterested valour. This double feeling he felt pleased in giving expression to, and at the moment he was writing, it could not be otherwise than sincere.

"I did all that it was possible for man to do to prevent his power; I refused to share his fortune. I have a right to speak well of him; his glory is our patrimony. We have suffered enough by his faults to vindicate his good qualities . . ."

The period also seemed to him favourable for speaking, not merely of Napoleon, but of all things and of all persons, with perfect frankness.

"What an excellent moment for writing history! The

heroes are dead. The honourable portion of the survivors is in obscurity and oblivion; the few of a different stamp are so different from their former selves, that one runs no risk in attacking them. Their principles are no longer the same since they have worshipped other gods."

Among the ideas which were uppermost in his mind when he began the work, was one which is quite in unison with all the sentiments which he has since manifested. That was, a certain degree of uneasiness at hearing remarks on the apparent contradiction between the sentiments of liberty and patriotism which formerly actuated the French army, and the ardour which it displayed in the service of the destroyer of our liberties. In the following passage, and also in the body of the work, will be found a consideration which history ought to treasure up: it is that the principal circumstance in the victories of Napoleon (a circumstance arising from the force of things, and his own ability) was his always compromising France and the army, in such a manner, that the national honour and the security of its territory were constantly at stake, even when they formed no part of the motives of the war.

"Let it not be said that the patriotism of the soldier was cooled, because they fought far from their Country for the cause of the conqueror A victory at Moscow and at Arapiles was a thousand times more important—than Jemappes or Valmy, but—than Fontenoi or Rosbach. The more distant the ground, the stronger the action, & much more sanguinary would be the re-action It was Moscow which brought Alexander to Paris, it was Spain which brought Wellington, the odious general foreigners, within the walls of our holy city!"

Finally, to the desire which he had for giving utterance to his sentiments, and of finding occupation for his leisure

P R E F A C E.

WHEN in 1815, after the battle of Waterloo, and during the occupation of France, the French army was dissolved, General Foy conceived that his military career was terminated. The field of battle was no longer the ground on which those opinions were to be defended which had twenty years before called him to arms. The honour and the national independence of France, which had been the two passions of his whole life, were now for him only motives of endurance. Even though the remains of our old army had been partially collected and incorporated in a new one, we can easily conceive that a proud mind, full of noble recollections, which felt nothing in the past to be ashamed of, would cast far from it the idea of claiming the least indulgence for, or of concealing in any way, its former sentiments and its present impressions. Besides, when we had at last obtained, as the price of our sufferings, and the consolation for our reverses, a government founded on free deliberation and publicity, the time was come when honour and promotion were only to be looked for from the glorious patronage of public opinion. In some lines which the General then wrote, intended to form part

of the Preface to his book, he thus expresses himself: "Places are not worthy of the ambition of an elevated soul ; in a popular government there is nothing good which does not spring from the people."

He had not, however, yet obtained access to that tribune to which his vocation and his glory called him; and his mind, greedy after action and information, could not vegetate in useless leisure. Removed all at once from the agitated and adventurous life of camps, he was not, like many others, reduced to sink under an oppressive indolence. The chances of war, and the warm and studious taste which he always had for his glorious profession, were not sufficient to occupy all his faculties; that sphere, however vast it might be, had never bounded his thoughts and his imagination. Stimulated by the thirst for information, wherever he had found a country to observe, a fact to note down, a book to read, a conversation to listen to, his whole attention was devoted to it. Exact knowledge and freedom of judgment were, under all circumstances, imperious wants with him. It was not merely necessary for him to collect and combine all that presented itself to his eyes, but his mind being more active than meditative, more practical than theoretical, he was anxious to derive some positive results from his continual studies. During the whole of his life, seldom a day passed without his writing, frequently even to minuteness, what he had seen, learned, or thought. The numerous volumes of this curious journal which he left behind him, afford the best evidence of his prodigious activity.

He had scarcely quitted the military profession when he conceived the plan of writing the *History of the War in Spain*. Other periods were no doubt dearer to his memory; but as he had made all the campaigns in the Pe-

No. V.

See Page 387.

Don Eugenio Izquierdo returned to Paris about the 10th of December. *He was probably the author of the following article inserted in the Journal of the 17th.*

Madrid, 1st December.

Great surprize has been excited here at the strange interpretation given by a French journal to the proclamations which had been made, in order to give a more imposing strength to our military establishment, and to prevent the aggressions which Spain has to apprehend from the situation of Europe, and the dangers which the genius of Napoleon so soon dissipated. United as Spain has been with France for several years past, both by commercial and political interests, so soon as she saw war again lighted up on the Continent, it was her duty to take measures either to assist her ally, or to resist the enterprizes which England might then undertake, either by herself, or by the aid of the powers engaged in the newly formed coalition against France. Nothing, certainly, but the most complete ignorance of the true situation of the country could have ever occasioned a doubt of the sincerity of the election which she had made, between a powerful nation which can do every thing to defend, and requires nothing that can be injurious to us, and an enemy who has been employed fifteen years in destroying our navy, in ruining our commerce, in pillaging our treasures, and in setting fire to our colonies with the torch of rebellion.

Bayonne, January 3, 1807.

The strictest inquiries are making in Spain, in order to discover the author of a pretended circular of the Prince of the Peace to the provincial intendants, inserted in several foreign papers, and which is said to be a forgery, executed at Madrid by some enemy of the Government.

May.

The Madrid Gazettes are full of accusations against Portugal, on account of the protection afforded at Brazil to the English expeditions. The English journals speak of the possibility of an approaching attack on Portugal by a French and Spanish army, and of the bad state of Portugal, which would be taken by surprize, without the possibility of England being able to assist her, in consequence of her forces being otherwise employed.

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