

167.
R E M A R K S

No. 141.
O N A

P A M P H L E T

I N T I T L E D,

C O N S I D E R A T I O N S

On the Late

B I L L

For Paying the

National DEBT, &c.

By W. William Armes

*He that is first in his own Cause seemeth just; but
his Neighbour cometh and searcheth him out.*

N U M B E R I V.

D U B L I N:

No. 71
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168. (

REMARKS

ON A

PAMPHLET

CONSIDERATIONS

On the

BILL

For Paying the

National Debt

It is that is first in his own Cause, secondly, but
his Neighbor's cause and finally his own.

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DUBLIN:

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No. 4.

REMARKS

ON A

PAMPHLET, &c.

THE Measures taken by King *Charles* the Second's Parliament, from 1662 to 1666, in granting such ample Funds in Perpetuity, having rendered future Parliaments useless, and no constitutional Parliament being held under King *James*; what next comes in Order, is, to trace down the Rights claimed by the House of Commons in regard to public Money during the Reign of King *William*.

The first Session of Parliament in this Kingdom, after the Revolution, was held under Lord *Sidney* in the Year 1692, and as our Author attempts to build a very extraordinary Doctrine on a single short Passage in the Journals of that Session, it may not be amiss, in this Place, to spend a few Minutes in examining into the TRUTH, and some other Circumstances, of his Representation of this Passage; for as to the Doctrine itself, perhaps the most fatal in its Consequences to parliamentary Rights and Liberties of any that has been broached since the most tyrannical Part of the Reign of King *Charles* the First, this will fall more properly under Consideration when

some few of the grosser Errors in this Author's Reasoning, shall, agreeably to the Plan laid down in the Beginning of these Remarks, come in course to be exposed: The Manner and Occasion of his Representation of this Passage you will find in his own Words, (p. 40.) where he tells his Reader, ' The *principal Objection* against ' the King's Claim of *previous Consent* is this, ' That the Produce of these several Funds is ' accounted for to Parliament; and from thence ' it has been inferred, that it is *public Money*, subject to parliamentary *Application*, without other *Consent*, than what is given by the ' Royal Assent to the Bill when passed into a ' Law. This seems founded on a Mistake, as ' to the Reason and Manner of laying the public ' Accounts before the House of Commons, as ' will appear from a short History of this Usage, ' and an Account of the Effects of it.

' No Account of the Disposition of the King's ' Revenue in this Kingdom was laid before Parliament till the Year One Thousand six Hundred and Ninety-two, when the Crown wanted ' further Supplies. Then indeed, a Motion was ' made, that such Accounts might be brought ' in: But the Reason of the Motion appears on ' the Journal, *viz.* " That it might be the better known what Supplies were necessary to be " given to their Majesties," ' so that they were ' not called for as a RIGHT, but desired as a ' DIRECTION for their Discretion in the Grants ' they were making: And *for the same Reason*, ' they have been, every Session since, brought ' into Parliament: So that, in Truth, were not ' Supplies demanded, such Accounts would not ' have been tendered: And the going through ' the Accounts, is only to enable the House to judge, what may be the Measure for the Supply; not to APPROPRIATE the Ballance, if any ' there

‘ there should be ; for that remains as Money
 ‘ already vested in the Crown, for public Ser-
 ‘ vices : And I do not know of any Instance,
 ‘ where such Ballance has ever been APPROPRI-
 ‘ ATED by Parliament. without the previous
 ‘ Consent of the Crown.’

The only Use intended to be made, at present, of this long Quotation is to observe, that unless the Author can support the Fact herein laid down, namely, that the Parliament in 1692, and all other subsequent Parliaments, in applying for the public Accounts to be laid before them, far from intending to CALL FOR such Accounts as THEIR RIGHT, meant only to *desire* them as a *Direction* ; it would seem to be acknowledged by himself that the Cause he had been contending for must be given up : Now, if, instead of the Author’s being able to support this Fact, the true Fact should, on the contrary, turn out, that the Accounts are, in reality, called for, as the Parliament’s RIGHT, and not merely desired as a *Direction* for their Discretion, and that their calling for them in this Light is a sufficient Proof, that ‘ the Produce of these Funds ‘ is ACCOUNTED FOR to Parliament,’ which latter the Author seems readily to admit ; then must he of Necessity confess, that this principal Objection to his Doctrine remains still in its original Force ; and the Inference, that therefore ‘ this Produce ‘ is *public Money*, subject to parliamentary Application, without other *Consent* than what is ‘ given by the royal Assent to the Bill, when ‘ passed into a Law,’ must likewise be confessed by him a legitimate Inference ; to the total Overthrow of all that he has been pleading for, in Support of his Clients.

The only Proof he adduces in Support of his Assertion, ‘ that the Accounts are not ‘ called for as a parliamentary Right,’ is the short Article in the Journal of 1692, just now quoted,

quoted, viz. that the Reason assigned for the Motion for the Accounts was, " That it might be the better known what Supplies were necessary to be given to their Majesties ;" and will any Man, who knows the very first Principles of Reasoning, admit, that so equivocal a Circumstance as this, in a Matter of such extensive Consequence to the Rights of the Nation, ought to be taken as a sufficient Warrant for the Author, first to assume, " That the Parliament in 1692, and all subsequent Parliaments, were sensible that they had no parliamentary Right to call for the public Accounts ;" and then, to draw this most destructive Conclusion, " That the public Money, once it is vested in the Crown for public Services, is no longer to be accounted for to Parliament ;" might not the Parliament, though ever so sensible of its being their Right to call for the public Accounts, yet give a Reason for their calling for them ; and can it possibly be thought to follow, that because they gave the Reason mentioned above for their calling for them at that Time, therefore they, and all subsequent Parliaments, meant to confine themselves solely to that Reason, and never to call for them for any other ? On the contrary, do not we find, in this very Parliament, a Committee appointed to inquire how the Committee of *Grievances* might come by Papers and Records in the Hands of the Commissioners of the Revenue, and other their Majesties Officers ; and afterwards, on having searched for Precedents, reporting in the following Manner : ' And from the said Precedents, we are humbly of Opinion, that the Committee of Grievances may come at Records, *Accompts*, and Papers, in the Hands of any of their Majesties Officers of the Revenue, or others, by the ORDERS of the said Committee, sent to the
' respective

‘ respective Persons in whose Custody the same
 ‘ remain.’ Here then we have an Instance of the
 House of Commons thinking themselves qualified
 in their own Right to call for public Accounts,
 for a very different Reason from what the House
 gives immediately after, for *ordering* the State of
 the Revenue of the Nation, and the Establishment,
 both civil and military, to be brought the
 next Day into the House, namely, the Reason
 just above-mentioned in the Author’s Quotation;
 and it is too material to be here overlooked,
 ‘ that in Consequence of the Application of this
 ‘ Committee of Grievances, a select Committee
 ‘ was appointed by the House to state the Ac-
 ‘ counts from the Papers brought in by the Com-
 ‘ missioners of the Revenue, and to *prepare a*
 ‘ *Charge* against any Person or Persons they
 ‘ should see occasion to charge, as to any *forfeited*
 ‘ Lands, Goods or Chattles embezzled or con-
 ‘ verted to private Use, &c.’ When the House
 of Commons thought themselves at Liberty in
 their own Right, and not in Virtue of any Con-
 sent or Direction, to inquire into the Application
 of *Forfeitures*, a Fund which they had not created,
 can there remain any Possibility of Doubt, that
 they must look upon themselves as most unques-
 tionably possessed of the Right of inquiring into
 the Application of all Money *granted by themselves*,
 for the Uses of Government in this Kingdom?
 and when we find them exercising a *Right of*
calling for Accounts in relation to Forfeitures,
 surely, no one can dispute but that their imme-
 diately afterwards ordering the State of the Re-
 venue to be brought in, was, likewise, exercising
 a Power in *Virtue of their own Right*, though they
 thought fit to mention the Purpose for which this
 State of the Revenue was then called for.

But though more than enough may have been
 said in Proof of the House of Commons at this
 Time

Time looking on it as their inherent Right to call for the public Accounts, yet would it be inexcusable to pass over this short Session without taking Notice of a very remarkable Incident that happened in the Course of it : It had been, without all Doubt, a Practice in former Reigns to send over, from *England*, Bills ready drawn, some of them Money-Bills, to be passed into Laws by the two Houses of Parliament of this Kingdom; and in Pursuance of this Practice, two Money-Bills of this Sort were by Order of the Lord Lieutenant presented to this House; soon after which we find the House of Commons came to the following Resolutions :

‘ Resolved, That it was, and is, the undoubted
‘ Right of the House of Commons of *Ireland*,
‘ in Parliament assembled, to prepare and resolve
‘ the Ways and Means of raising Money.

‘ Resolved, That it was, and is, the *sole* and
‘ undoubted Right of the Commons, to prepare
‘ Heads of Bills for raising Money.

‘ Resolved, That notwithstanding the afore-
‘ said Rights of the Commons, this House doth
‘ think fit, upon Consideration of the present Exi-
‘ gencies of Affairs, and the public Necessity of
‘ speedily raising a Supply for their Majesties, to
‘ order a Bill transmitted out of *England*, inti-
‘ tuled, an Act for an additional Duty of Excise
‘ upon Beer, Ale, and other Liquors, be now
‘ read :

‘ Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*, That the
‘ receiving or reading of the said Bill, so trans-
‘ mitted as aforesaid, be not drawn into Presi-
‘ dent hereafter.’

The next Day, a Motion being made that the other Bill, intituled, an Act for granting to their Majesties certain Duties for one Year, might be read, it passed in the Negative.

‘ Resolved,

‘ Resolved, That the said Bill be rejected by this House.

‘ Resolved, That it be entered in the Journal of this House, that the Reason why the said Bill was rejected, is, that the same had not its Rise in this House.’

In a few Days after, we find the Lord Lieutenant putting an End to the Session ; and just before the Prorogation, in an Article of his Speech, expressing himself to the following Effect :

I am troubled that you Gentlemen of the House of Commons should so far mistake yourselves as to intrench on their Majesties Prerogative, and the Rights of the Crown of England, as you did on the 27th of October last, when, by a declaratory Vote, you affirmed, That it is the sole and undoubted Right of the Commons of Ireland to prepare Heads of Bills for raising Money ; and also again, on the twenty-eighth of the same Month, when you rejected a Bill sent over in the usual Form, intituled an Act for granting to their Majesties certain Duties for one Year, you voted, That it should be entered in your Journals, that the Reason why the said Bill was rejected, was, that the same had not its Rise in your House.

These Votes of yours being contrary to the Statutes of the Tenth of Henry the Seventh, and the Third and Fourth of Philip and Mary, and the continued Practice ever since ; I find myself obliged to assert their Majesties Prerogative and the Rights of the Crown of England, in these Particulars, in such a Manner as may be most public and permanent ; and therefore I do here, in full Parliament, make my Protest against those Votes, and the Entry of them in the Journal of the House of Commons : Which Protest I require the Clerk of this House to read, and afterwards to enter it in the Journals of this House, that it may remain as a Vindication of their Majesties

B

Prerogative,

Prerogative, and the Right of the Crown of England in these Particulars, to future Ages.

Here let it be observed, that though the Lord Lieutenant appears to be not a little in bad Humour, yet no Part of his Resentment is occasioned by the House of Commons having called for the public Accounts, in the Manner it has just now been shewn they did, nor occasioned by their inquiring, in Virtue of their own Right, into the Manner of their Majesties Officers applying of Forfeitures: The Doctrine, ‘ That the King is possessed of Powers and Prerogatives over the Properties of the People, for the Exercise of which he is accountable only to God,’ and the Practice consequent upon it, being amongst the worst of the Evils from which we were delivered by King *William*, of ever glorious Memory; it was not in Nature, that so recently, under a Revolution Government, this most poisonous Doctrine should be attempted to be revived; it is plain, that the sole apparent Cause of his Displeasure was, not even the rejecting of the Bill, but the *Reason* that had been given for rejecting it, “ Because the same had not its Rise in their House;” this he asserts to be such a Violation of their Majesty’s Prerogative, and the Right of the Crown of *England*, that he finds himself obliged to enter his *Protest*; at the same Time, founding this Right of the Crown solely on the Statutes of *Henry* the Seventh, and of *Philip* and *Mary*, when this Country bore no other Resemblance to what it is now, than an helpless Infant bears to a well-grown Man; but be this as it will, no Part of the present Debate can be in the least affected by the Doctrine of this Speech; the *contrary* being universally, at this Day, acknowledged to be an essential Article in our constitutional parliamentary Rights; nay, even

even *our Author* admits ' That the Right of *granting Money* is in the Commons : ' From the Whole we may learn, that it is no impossible Thing for a Chief Governor of this Country to wax wroth, and to charge, and represent the faithful, and thoroughly well-affected Commons of *Ireland* as guilty of a violent Invasion of the Prerogative of the best of Kings, when, all the while, those zealously loyal Subjects were doing no more than what, our Author himself being Judge, they might reasonably think themselves *necessarily obliged* to do, in Vindication of their own Rights, and the essential Rights of their Country. This Parliament never after got Leave to meet, but, after two or three Prorogations, were, some time before *September, 1693*, in the Issue dissolved.

A new Parliament was called in the Year 1695, in which the Practice was continued of sending a Money-Bill from *England* ; which was received, and passed by the House, without any Objection appearing in their Journals : But will any Man, at this Time of Day, alledge, that ' that is a *Precedent of the greatest Weight*, to prove a parliamentary Acknowledgment of this Practice being no more than an *Affirmance of his Majesty's Prerogative and Right of the Crown* * ? Had not a very large Number of the Parliament of 1695 been likewise Members of the Parliament of 1692, and do not we see above, that it was *unanimously* resolved, that even the receiving and reading of a Money-Bill, brought into the House according to this Practice, should not be brought into Precedent hereafter ? And should this Practice have continued ever so long, what could it have proved ? It might, indeed, possibly prove, that, in some Instances, Right had been overborn by Power,

* See CONSIDERATIONS, &c. Page 12.

Power, and that in others, an incautious or over-cautious House of Commons had, from Considerations of Prudence, been induced to wave the Claiming, or Exertion, of this Right; nay, it might possibly have proved, that a Majority of a House of Commons might have been so wretchedly corrupted and seduced, as basely to give up what they knew to be the undoubted and essential Right of their own Body, and from the nature of the thing, necessarily inherent at all Times in the Representatives of the People; one or other, or all of these at different Times, such a Practice might possibly have proved; but surely it is *impossible* it ever should prove, that the *real Right* of granting Money is not in the Commons; this Right had been, in the strongest Terms, asserted by the House of Commons, a few Years before, and is now universally acknowledged to be their undoubted, inherent, and constitutional Right.

This however demonstrably shews, that in determining Questions concerning constitutional Rights, Resort must of Necessity be had to much more invariable Principles than Practice and Precedents: God and Nature have conferred certain inherent Rights on Men; Reason and Sense, for the more effectual Conservation of these Rights, and for this Purpose principally, have conferred certain delegated Rights on the various Orders or Powers of civil Government; whatever Claims of Rights therefore, in any of those Orders, shall be found essential for this original and unchangeable Purpose, must of Necessity be allowed strictly constitutional, whether Practice and Precedent have been for, or against them: And for the same Reason, whatever Precedents or Practices shall be found destructive or injurious to those essential Rights, let them be ever so ancient, or of long Continuance, they must of course be acknowledged anticonstitutional, and therefore

therefore to be abrogated as soon as the Nature and Circumstances of the Case, according to the Judgment of Reason and Sense, will permit: It is true, that the present Article of Inquiry doth not stand in immediate need of the Aid of this Observation, as it fortunately happens, that Practice and Precedent are on the same Side with Right; but there may be great Propriety in keeping it in the Reader's Mind notwithstanding, as neither the Nature nor the Importance of the Question now under Debate can possibly be understood without it:

But though this Parliament waved the claiming of a Right, to which, it is now universally acknowledged, they had an unquestionable constitutional Title; yet we shall find them, in very express Terms, *exercising* that Right, which our Author would have us believe neither the former or any subsequent Parliament had ever *claimed*, namely, the Right of calling for the public Accounts, and calling for them for a quite different Purpose, than only to 'judge what might *be the Measure for the Supply.*' There are many Passages in the Journal of that Parliament, which are direct to this Purpose; but it will be sufficient, for the Satisfaction of the Reader, to point out the few following, in the second Volume of the printed Journals; where he will find the House, *p.* 655. applying for a distinct yearly Account of all Receipts and Payments of his Majesty's Revenue, from 1689 to 1695, to be laid before the House, and likewise of all Arrears standing out; which was accordingly laid before them. Surely this could not be for a *Direction of their Discretion in the Grants they were making.* *P.* 657. The Accounts of his Majesty's *certain and casual* Revenue were likewise laid before them, from 1689 to 1695. *P.* 660. They grant a Supply to his Majesty, not exceeding 163,325 *l.* And afterwards,

wards, order a Committee to examine the several public Accounts, which had been laid before them by the several Officers of the Revenue. As this was done posterior to their granting the Supply, most evident it is, that the Design of it must be something very different from a Direction what Quantity to grant. And in p. 666. we find Papers called for relating to the *Miscarriages* of the Revenue. P. 680. The Committee, appointed to examine the public Accounts, make a long Report, after having perused those several Papers, in which the Reader will find, that notwithstanding that the King's Letter had been produced, authorizing the Commissioners of the Revenue to dispose of the Product of his Majesty's Revenue, in a certain Manner; and notwithstanding this related wholly to his Majesty's hereditary Revenue; and notwithstanding, likewise, that this Manner had been laid before the Commissioners of Accounts in *England*, and approved of by them; yet we find here the Committee censuring this Manner, as an Inlet to Fraud and Deceit in the Accounts of his Majesty's Revenue, and censuring, likewise, the Pay-master-General, for his Manner of accounting, though it had been warranted by the Commissioners of Accompts in *England*, and Vouchers sent over by him thither pursuant to their Warrant; and the Reason they give, is, that Vouchers should appear here for the several Payments made in this Kingdom: And to mention no more from this Parliament, the last in K. *William's* Reign. (P. 847.) We find the Committee desiring, that the House might order, that a Particular of the Debt due by his Majesty, and the particular Years and Times when it became due, and also an Account of the *Forfeitures*, and the Receiver-General's Receipts and Payments since *January* 1691, might be laid before the House; which the House ordered

ordered accordingly. Thus far it would seem very evident that the House of Commons, throughout King *William's* Reign, had no Kind of Doubt of their *Right*, not only to call for Accounts of Money given by themselves, but Accounts likewise of the *hereditary* Revenue, and also of the *casual*, such as Forfeitures, &c. in direct Contradiction to the Doctrine of our Author. It can hardly be necessary to observe, that the chief Governor, in this Reign, gave the strongest Assurances from the Throne, 'that whatever Monies the House of Commons gave, should be *applied* to the Uses for which they were given; and that, in all these Things, the King expected nothing from them, but what was necessary for their own Establishment and Safety.'

In the Reign of Queen *Anne*, we have not only numerous and unquestionable Instances of the House of Commons calling for the public Accounts, in their own Right, but likewise, most evident Proof of the hereditary Revenue being considered as public Money, to be accounted for to Parliament; and, in one or two Instances, *redundant Money* remaining in the Treasury, after the Purposes of Government for the preceding Years had been answered, *applied* to the Credit of the Nation, and afterwards accounted for to Parliament; which last, will not only be an unanswerable Refutation of every material Article alledged by our Author, but an Instance, bearing a very strong Resemblance of the principal Subject at present in Debate, namely, that the House of Commons considers it as their constitutional Right, to apply any redundant Money which they shall happen to find in the Treasury, to the Credit and future Exigencies of the Nation, without any Imagination of a previous Leave from the Crown, in any Sense, being necessary. Of the numerous

numerous Instances in regard to the first Article, it will be needless, after what has already been pointed out under the former Reign, to mention more than the few following. *Printed Journals*, Vol. III. p. 25.

‘ *Ordered*, an Account of the additional Funds, of
 ‘ the Produce or Value of the present Branches of
 ‘ the Revenue, and the present Establishment, and
 ‘ *all former Establishments*, since 1692, to be laid be-
 ‘ fore the House by the proper Officers:’ Can there
 be a more direct Evidence of the Commons
 calling for the public Accounts in their own
 Right? (P. 54.) We find the House came to the
 two following remarkable Resolutions; first,
 Resolved, ‘ that the *Funds granted by Parliament*,
 ‘ and *the Revenue of the Kingdom*, were sufficient
 ‘ to support the Government, and discharge the
 ‘ public Debts to and for *Michaelmas*, 1703.’
 Here it is carefully to be remarked, that the
 Funds granted by Parliament, which are now
 generally known by the Name of the additional
 Duties, and which were granted by the last Par-
 liament of K. *William*, had all of them expired
 before *Michaelmas* 1703; consequently, that
 there must have been, according to their Manner
 of stating the public Accounts, a Redundance of
 Money in the Treasury, at the Time they expired;
 and that this Redundance, together with the
 growing Produce of *the Revenue of the Kingdom*,
 (consisting so materially of the hereditary Duties,
 that the whole is now generally expressed by that
 Phrase) was all of it Money which ought, in Jus-
 tice, to be applied to the *Support of Government*,
 and *the Discharge of the public Debts*: And that
 they insisted, as far as in them lay, on its being
 all of it public Money, and subject to no other
 Application, is evident, from their second Reso-
 lution, in these Words, ‘ Resolved, that the
 ‘ *Supply to be granted* to her Majesty, be a Sum
 ‘ sufficient, to make up the Deficiency of the
 ‘ Revenue

‘ Revenue to support the necessary Branches
 ‘ of the Establishment for two Years ending
 ‘ at *Michaelmas* 1705.’ Here we see, that
 whatever the State of the Accounts, given in by
 the Officers of the Crown, might represent to the
 contrary, the House of Commons insisted that
 there *had*, or *soon must*, so much Money come
 into the Treasury, from the Funds formerly
 granted by Parliament, and from the standing
 Revenue of the Kingdom, as fully to answer all
 the Exigencies of Government, and the Dis-
 charge of the public Debts, down to *Michaelmas*
 1703; and that no other Provision should be
 made *by them* for these Purposes: Doth not this
 look very like the claiming and actually exer-
 cising a Power over all Money brought into the
 Treasury, whether from the hereditary Duties,
 or the temporary Funds? We see it here like-
 wise insisted on, in as strong Terms as Words
 can express, that all the standing Revenue of
 the Kingdom *must* be applied in Support of the
 necessary Branches of the Establishment; and
 that the temporary parliamentary Supplies are
 only to come in Aid, and to make up the Defi-
 ciency of this established Revenue. The House
 afterwards proceed to return Thanks to their
 Committee, for saving to the Nation, by their
 Care in stating the Accounts, the Sum of
 103,388 *l.* 8 *s.* 4 *d.* which, by Misrepresentation,
 was charged as a Debt on the Nation; and in
 some Time after, on finding that the then Audi-
 tor-General had been the Author of that Misre-
 presentation, they did not indeed expel him,
 for this was carried in the Negative, but they
 resolved, that he was unfit for any public Em-
 ployment in this Kingdom, and that he should
 be committed to the Constable of the Castle,
 during the Pleasure of the House, for such Mis-
 representation.

The Supply granted for the two Years to come, by this Session, was the Sum of 150,000*l.* and, on the Opening of the next Session, we do not find, in the Speech from the Throne, that there was any Disgust conceived against the Conduct of the House of Commons, in the Session preceding, as having invaded the Queen's Prerogative, in meddling with her hereditary Revenue without her previous Consent; very much otherwise: The utmost which at that Time the Court seemed to think themselves intitled, not so properly to claim, as to point out, as reasonable Measures to the Commons, in stating the public Accounts, were, ' That the Arrears, ' *not any Money in the actual Receipt of the* ' *Treasury, but the Arrears still standing out,* ' *uncollected, of the preceding Year, must* ' *always be applied to make good the Payments* ' *of the present Year; and that in a Time of* ' *War and Danger, there is a Necessity of having* ' *Money in the Treasury, to answer sudden* ' *Emergencies:*' And it is remarkable that, notwithstanding what had been said from the Throne, the Supply granted that Session for the two succeeding Years, was no more than what had been granted the Session before.

In the next Session, held in the Year 1707, we find the Committee of Accounts moving the House, that a *proper Officer be appointed, who may stand obliged to ballance the Accounts of the Nation, and lay them before the House in a just and proper Method:* Could our Author have known any Thing of this, and yet allow himself to say, that ' Accounts were *not called for*, as a Right, ' *but desired as a Direction, &c.* and that for ' the same Reason, they have, every Session ' since, been brought into Parliament?' If he did not know how so material a Fact stood, how came he to rest his Answer to what he

he calls the principal Objection, solely upon an Assertion, without making any Inquiry whether it was true or false? If he did know, can that be thought an honest Cause, which requires such Arts to support it? But be it as it will, in respect to the Advocate, most certain it is, that several of his Clients, who have been zealous in propagating this Production, could not but know that this grand Article, on which so much depends, was utterly false. The Supply granted in this Session was for one Year and three Quarters, ending the 24th of *June*, 1709, and the Sum 135,000*l*.

In the next Session, held in *May*, 1709, Lord *Wharton*, in his Speech from the Throne, acquaints the House of Commons, ‘ that in order
 ‘ to their having no Cause to *doubt* or to com-
 ‘ plain in any Particular, her Majesty had com-
 ‘ manded him to direct the proper Officers, that
 ‘ a perfect State be laid before them of the Re-
 ‘ venue, and of all Accounts relating to the Pub-
 ‘ lic, which he had Reason to hope and believe
 ‘ would be done in such a Manner, as should be
 ‘ to every Gentleman’s Satisfaction: And after-
 ‘ wards, in the same Speech, assuring them,
 ‘ that whatever Money should be paid by them,
 ‘ would be laid out among themselves, and em-
 ‘ ployed wholly for their own Service, and for
 ‘ their own Security.’

In this Session, we find, on stating the national Accounts, a Report from the Committee, in these Words, ‘ So that upon the Whole,’ (a Quarter of a Year’s Quit Rent being included)
 ‘ there will remain, in *Credit to the Nation*,’ mark the Words, it is not said ‘ to the Crown,’ but, ‘ in Credit to the Nation, at Midsummer
 ‘ 1709, over and above all Charges, the Sum of
 ‘ 71,019*l*. 1*s*. 5*d*. $\frac{1}{4}$.’ which Report was referred by the House to the Committee of Supply: And

And next Session held in 1710, the Committee of Accounts report to the House, ' that the Balance due to the NATION at Midsummer 1709, amounting to 71,019 *l.* 1 *s.* 5 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. has been duely credited to the Public.' Is not this a direct Proof, that Redundancies were understood by the Administration, as well as the House of Commons, to be alike subjected to Account, with the current Supplies? Doth not this still farther appear, from the State of the Accounts in that Session, on which the Committee reported, that a Balance would remain at Midsummer, *due to the Nation*, of 11,547 *l.* 7 *s.* 11 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. which Sum, in the succeeding Session 1711, is reported to have been duely credited to the Public, and that on stating the Accounts, there remained at Midsummer 1711, in Credit to the NATION, a Balance of 6433 *l.* 17 *s.* 7 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$. which Sum, together with the growing Revenue, and new Accounts, were carried forward to Christmas 1711; and the Charge of the Public happening so far to exceed its Credit, that they computed there would be then a Deficiency of 34,010 *l.* 14 *s.* 5 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$; doth it not clearly appear, that the above redundant Sum of 6433 *l.* 17 *s.* 7 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$. was liquidated with the growing Revenue, and new Aids, and considered by the House of Commons as subjected to the same Appointment and Application with the usual Supplies? And is not that redundant Sum, by this Report, to which the House agreed, taken and applied towards discharging a Debt which they foresaw would be incurred by the Nation, at the Christmas following?

From these several Articles above recited, during the Reign of Queen Anne, doth it not most evidently appear,

First, That the House of Commons uniformly claimed, in their own Right, a Power to order the public Accounts to be laid before them; and that, not merely to enable them to judge what may

may be the Measure for the Supply, as our Author would have us believe, p. 42. but for various other Purposes, and particularly *to prevent the Officers of the Crown from defrauding the Nation*. Indeed, if the Author meant any thing that is fair and honest, by the Words he makes use of, namely, ‘ to enable them to judge what may be ‘ the Measure for the Supply,’ a plain Man must imagine that he has himself well nigh *given up* the whole of his Cause; for if, on finding a Redundancy in the Treasury, the House ought to diminish the Supply, in Proportion, for the ensuing two Years, the Expenses of the Establishment continuing the same; what is this less, than admitting, to all Intents and Purposes, that the House has a constitutional Right to apply all this Redundancy to the Credit of the Nation, and for answering the ordinary Exigencies of Government, for the ensuing two Years? If this Author means, that it is only when the Treasury is empty, and the Funds have proved deficient, that the House of Commons should have any thing to do with the public Accounts; that is, that *their* Business is only to increase, and never to diminish the national Taxes, he is now to speak out, and not reserve this unpalatable Part of his Doctrine till a more seasonable Opportunity: An Opportunity, for Instance, when the Gentlemen of this Country shall come to be more thoroughly disciplined, and more *generally* reconciled to the wholesome Doctrine of ‘ ceasing ‘ to judge for themselves,’ or pretend to distinguish betwixt *material* and *not material*, Right and Wrong, in the Transactions of Parliament.

These are Matters, much too arduous for *Irish* Understandings; and not only so, but Matters which they shall find, to their Cost, are not to be meddled with, without exposing themselves to much personal Evil; forewarned,

forewarned, as some of them may think themselves already to be, ' that every Gentleman of the House of Commons, who shall scruple to follow implicitly, wheresoever a chief Governor's Secretary, or any other Person in whom he happens to place his Confidence, shall think proper to lead; or shall refuse placidly to register, without further Examination, whatever Edicts this Person of Confidence shall bring into the House; must lay his Account to be treated as disaffected to his Majesty, and deserving all the Severity which the Plenitude of the chief Governor's Power, for supporting what he may esteem the Dignity of Government, enables him to use; qualified by nothing but his own personal Humanity.' But,

2dly, The uniform Practice of the House of Commons, in the Course of the Reign of *Q. Anne*, must abundantly shew, ' that *all* Money brought into the Treasury, was counted by them as the Money of the NATION; and all Money found in the Treasury, or standing out in solvent Arrears, at the Time of their Inquiry into the public Accounts, was considered as so much Money applicable by them, towards discharging any national Debt which might happen to be incurred, before the growing Supplies could be brought in, and at all times to be *applied to the Credit of the Nation*.' These Rights, it is undeniable, were *claimed*; these Rights, it is undeniable, were *exercised* by the Commons of *Ireland*, and never once called into Question by the Administration under the Queen: And lastly, these Rights must be sufficient to justify the whole of the late Procedure in the House of Commons, which is now the Subject in Debate, unless some Reason can be shewn why the House of Commons, under the present Royal Family, should not

not enjoy the same Rights which they had done under the late Queen.

Sorrow and Confusion must be the unavoidable Portion of every honest Whig, if Prerogative should be found, in any Instance, under their singularly favourite Succession of the present royal Family, to be set up in Opposition to such Rights of the zealously loyal House of Commons of *Ireland*, as they were left in the full Enjoyment of, at the Demise of that Princess: But happily for all, in pursuing the present Method of Inquiry, it will evidently turn out, that not the least Symptom of this sort is to be found, till the Search is brought down to the Commencement of the present Administration in the Year 1751. +

In the first Session of Parliament of King George I. his Majesty, in his Answer to the Address of the House of Commons, thanks the House for their Promise of Supplies, and gives them his Assurance, that they shall be employed for the Welfare of so faithful, and obedient a People; and in p. 64. of the Journals, Vol. 4th, the House orders Accounts to be laid before them, of the hereditary Revenue, as well as the additional Duties, ever since the Year 1698: And, in p. 73. the Committee takes Notice of Accounts, &c. having been laid before them, 'both by Direction of the House, and by the respective Officers, from whom the same was required;' they next proceed to acquaint the House, 'that due Credit had been given to the Public, for the Sum which the Committee of 1711 had reported to be due to the Nation,' as mentioned above: In this Report they take Notice 'that the Accounts had been stated to their Satisfaction, by the Accountant-General, the Officer to that Service appointed upon former Orders of Parliament.' After this, there surely need be no more Proof that the House exercised the

the Power of calling for Accounts, &c. in their own Right.

The Committee of Supply, after having had the Report of the Committee of Accounts laid before them, came to the following Resolutions, that Credit ought to be given *to the Kingdom* for 7142*l.* 3*s.* being so much Money unissued of the Barrack Fund. Is not this Claim of Power over the Redundancy of a Fund set apart by his Majesty, a Circumstance peculiarly strong in Favour of the Right of the House of Commons over public Money remaining unapplied?

They next resolve, ' That 16106*l.* 11*s.* $\frac{1}{2}$. ' is the Sum due at *Michaelmas* 1715, to ' discharge the Debt of the Nation. *Thirdly* ' that a Supply be granted to his Majesty, for the ' Payment of said Debt, and towards the sup- ' porting of the necessary Branches of the Esta- ' blishment for two Years, from *Michaelmas* 1715, ' to *Michaelmas* 1717; and *fourthly*, that by the ' Death and Promotion of several half-pay Officers ' on the Establishment, there will be a Sum suf- ' ficient to make up the Pay of the half-pay Offi- ' cers *now* remaining on the said Establishment, ' full half-pay for themselves and Servants.' Is not this last likewise an Instance of the House claiming a Right to point out an Application of Money already granted by them?

In the last Place, they resolve that the Supply granted to his Majesty be a Sum not exceeding 187,587*l.* 12*s.* 4*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. to all which Resolutions the House did agree. It may not be amiss just to remark, that though the short Money-Bill, granting his Majesty several Duties for six Months, was passed into a Law before the House had fixed on the above Sum for the Quantum of the Supply, yet they make no Difficulty of applying the Produce of those Duties towards making good the said Supply: Some Time farther on in this Session, the

the House, upon Notice given them, from the Government, of a threatened Invasion of this Kingdom, came to the following Resolution, which laid the Foundation of the Loan Debt; the Remainder of which, the late Bill, which gave Occasion to the present Debate, was meant to discharge; ‘ Resolved, *nemine contradicente*, that
 ‘ whatever Sums of Money shall be advanced
 ‘ and paid into the Treasury, by any Person or
 ‘ Persons, &c. for the Defence of the Kingdom,
 ‘ shall be made good by this House, with legal
 ‘ Interest for the same, *out of such Aids, as shall*
 ‘ *be granted to his Majesty the next Session of Parlia-*
 ‘ *ment.*’

Here we have the Faith of the House of Commons solemnly pledged to the Public in Behalf of the Government, and pledged without any Limitation of Sum; with this further extraordinary Circumstance attending it, that this unbounded Vote of Credit was passed in the House, without one contradicting Voice: So true it is, that the Prince who rules in the Hearts of his faithful Commons and Subjects, may always be sure of their Purfes, for supplying every Exigency of Government, to the Extremity of their Power! Must it not then be an evil Office, to attempt raising Jealousies respecting Prerogative, in the Breast of such a Prince, to the exquisite Distress, and, perhaps, irreparable Injury of such a People?

The Sum borrowed by the Government, in consequence of this Vote of the Commons, was 50,000 *l.* and thus was laid the Foundation of the national Debt: And by tracing our parliamentary Proceedings, in regard to this Article, down to the present Time, the Reader will quickly be qualified to judge concerning the Merits of the Question now in Debate; a Question the most interesting of any that has arisen in this Country, at least since the latter End of

the Reign of Queen *Anne*, when it was made a Matter of Debate, whether this Country ought to concur in such ministerial Measures, as must necessarily have issued in bringing themselves under the Domination of a Popish Pretender; or gallantly to withstand them, by a vigorous Exertion of their constitutional Rights; animated by the Prospect of soon living free, and having their Property and Liberties effectually secured to them, in consequence of the Succession of the present royal Family; which may God, from Generation to Generation, preserve at the Head of a free *British* Empire!

In the next Session of Parliament, 1717, we find that the national Debt, including this 50,000 *l.* and the Interest, amounted, at *Michaelmas*, 1717, to 94,544 *l.* 13 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{3}{8}$. and a Supply, granted for the Payment of said Debt, and towards supporting the necessary Branches of the Establishment for two Years, ending *Michaelmas*, 1719, not exceeding 279,648 *l.* 11 *s.* 3 *d.* $\frac{3}{8}$. In 1719, the national Debt, including the Loan, amounted to 87,511 *l.* 4 *s.* 7 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. for Payment of which, and towards supporting the Establishment for two Years, ending *Michaelmas*, 1721, a Supply was granted, not exceeding 312,663 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. In 1721, the Accounts were carried on to *Christmas*, and then the national Debt, including the Loan, amounted to 77,261 *l.* 6 *s.* 7 *d.* $\frac{3}{8}$. and for Payment of said Debt, and supporting the Establishment for two Years, ending *Christmas*, 1723, a Supply was granted, not exceeding 331,880 *l.* 14 *s.* 8 *d.* $\frac{3}{8}$. In the several Acts of Parliament corresponding to these Resolutions, particular Care was taken to insert a Clause to secure the Payment of the 50,000 *l.* Loan, together with Interest for the same, during the Time it shall continue unpaid: In 1723, at *Christmas*, the whole Debt of the Nation

Nation was computed to 66,318 *l.* 8 *s.* 3 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. and for Payment of this Debt, and supporting the Establishment for two Years, ending *Christmas*, 1725, a Supply was granted, not exceeding 339,368 *l.* 6 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. Hitherto we see, that the Intention of the House was, to make Provision for the Discharge of the *whole* Debt, as well as for answering the ordinary Exigencies of Government, in the Course of the ensuing two Years, for which the respective Supplies were granted; for it is to be observed, that, in the Session of 1715, the Supply granted for answering these Exigencies, &c. was only 187,587 *l.* 12 *s.* 4 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$; and here, in the Session of 1723, no less than the above Sum of 339,368 *l.* 6 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. was granted. But though the Supplies, through various Accidents, always fell so far short of answering this Intention, as to leave the 50,000 *l.* Loan still undischarged, yet from two Years, to two Years, they exceeded the current Expences of the Establishment; and this Surplus was always applied towards reducing the national Debt, which, at *Michaelmas*, 1717, exclusive of the Loan, amounted to 44,544 *l.* and in 1723, to no more than 16,318 *l.* so that an Application does plainly appear here to have been made for discharging the national Debt without any previous Leave from his Majesty.

The Money-Bill, in 1723, reduces the Interest of the 50,000 *l.* Loan from 8 to 7 *per Cent.* and in case the Creditors, or any of them, shall be unwilling to accept of such reduced Interest, it directs that they shall be paid their principal Money and Interest, on their assigning their Subscription to the Vice-Treasurer, or his Deputy: What can be an Evidence of the House of Commons claiming and exercising the Power of Application over the public Money, if this be not? Parliamentary Faith had been given, and

must be sacredly maintained ; therefore Provision is hereby made, that none who trusted to it, and lent their Money, should run the smallest Hazard, or have the least Reason to complain : This Law likewise enacts, for the farther Security of the Creditors, that the Principal and Interest of this Loan, or whatever Part of it shall remain unpaid at the 25th of *December*, 1725, shall then be paid without any Deductions whatsoever.

The national Debt, in the Session 1725, is stated at 118,844 *l.* 5 *s.* 11 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$; the Supply for the ensuing two Years is fixed at 292,181 *l.* 7 *s.* 3 *d.* from *Christmas*, 1725, to *Christmas*, 1727 ; the Clause of paying the Principal and Interest of the Loan, at the End of these two Years, is the same with what has just now been mentioned. In 1727, the first of his present Majesty, the present House of Commons stated the national Debt at 127,371 *l.* 15 *s.* 6 *d.* and granted a Supply of 398,011 *l.* 3 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and the Money-Bill of that Session continues all the Clauses of the Act of 1725, relating to the Loan. In 1729, the national Debt, on stating the Accounts, was found by the House of Commons to amount to 220,730 *l.* 15 *s.* 3 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$; for the Payment of which, and for answering the growing Exigencies of Government to 1731, they voted a Supply of 510,238 *l.* 16 *s.* 10 *d.* and the same Session reduced the Interest of the Loan of the 50,000 *l.* to 6 *per Cent.* in the same Manner, and on the same Terms, with the former Reduction ; and, likewise, directed that Debentures should be struck for 150,000 *l.* more, to be borrowed at the same Interest, and payable in the same Manner ; thus the Loan was now increased to 200,000 *l.*

On stating the Accounts in the Session 1731, the House found the national Debt increased to

335,466 *l.*

335,466 *l.* 7 *s.* 4 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and towards the Payment of this Debt, as well as towards supporting the Establishment for two Years, ending *December*, 1733, they grant a Supply of a Sum not exceeding 624,323 *l.* $\frac{1}{4}$.

Amongst the Accounts given in by the Officers of the Crown this Session, there is an Abstract of Receipts and Payments in the Treasury-Office, from *Lady-day*, 1729, to *Lady-day*, 1731, and this Abstract begins with a Ballance remaining in the Treasury at *Lady-day*, 1729. of 2,715 *l.* 1 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. True, the Ballance, at this Time, is not very considerable; but this alters not the Case; it is as plain, as Facts can make it, that there was no Imagination in those Days, nor, indeed, at any Time before or since, till our Author, and his Clients, have taken very strange Things, and full of malignant Tendency, into their Head; no Imagination but that *all* Money brought into the Treasury, *ought* to be accounted for to Parliament; and accordingly, this Ballance is the first Article in that Abstract now mentioned, brought, by the Officer of the Crown, to the Credit of the Nation; to this is added the Produce of *all* the Branches of his Majesty's Revenue, hereditary, casual, and biennial Supplies; and to the total of these, are set in Opposition all the Payments made out of the Treasury, and from thence a Ballance is struck either to the Credit or Debit of the Nation; just as on totting up the several Articles of the two opposite Columns, the Matter shall happen to turn out.

In this Session, we find the national Debt increased to such a Sum, that the House of Commons, despairing of being able to raise Supplies within the two Years, such as would be sufficient to support the Establishment, and, at the same Time, discharge this Debt, direct Debentures to be struck for the Loan of another hundred thousand

thousand Pounds, and, at the same Time, they reduce the Interest of the whole three hundred thousand Pounds to five *per Cent.* with the same Provisos in Favour of the Creditors, as were above-mentioned, when the former Reduction was made.

In the Session 1733, we find the Accounts carried on in the same Manner with that of the former Session; the Ballance in the Treasury being the first Article brought to the Credit of the Nation; we find likewise a Saving of 1,335 *l.* 1 *s.* 9 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. on the civil Establishment, occasioned by Vacancies on the Benches of the Exchequer and Common Pleas, and a farther Saving of 5,090 *l.* 4 *s.* $\frac{1}{2}$. claimed by the Committee to be applied to the Credit of the Nation; and, accordingly these two Sums were placed to Credit by the House, and the Debt of the Nation voted to be a Sum not exceeding 371,312 *l.* 12 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and to discharge this Debt, and answer the current Exigencies of the next two Years, they grant a Supply not exceeding 658,727 *l.* 4 *s.* 8 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. The Committee observe farther, that there is a Ballance of the Loan Duties, after paying the Interest, amounting to the Sum of 26,006 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$. which being applied as *the Act directs*, these are their own Words, it will reduce the principal Loan of 300,000 *l.* to the Sum of 273,993 *l.* 10 *s.* 9 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$.

It appears, from the Accounts in 1735, that 24,700 *l.* was applied to the Reduction of said principal Sum, and that a Ballance of 1,424 *l.* 17 *s.* 10 *d.* still remained in the Treasurer's Hands, to to be applied to the same Purpose: Is there the least Trace of previous Leave for this Application? Possibly, some Folks may think to get rid of this Instance, by saying, that this Redundancy arose from impropriated Duties, and therefore, there could be no Occasion for his Majesty's previous Consent; but before they rely upon this

as an Answer, they will do well to look back into the Origin of this Debt, and of the parliamentary Proceedings that were relative to, and consequent upon it.

When the House of Commons passed their Vote of Credit in 1715, did they not pledge their Faith, that whatever Money should be advanced to the Government, in consequence of this Vote, they would take care to repay, together with the legal Interest, that should be due, out of the Funds which should be granted to his Majesty next Session of Parliament? And do we not find them, in the Year 1717, making express Provision for the Re-payment of this Debt, by granting Funds, which, according to their Computation, were to produce upwards of ninety-two thousand Pounds more than the former? And in the Act where these Funds are first granted, is it not expressly declared, that they were intended for Re-payment of this Debt, as well as for supporting the Establishment for the two ensuing Years? And is there not an express Clause in this Act, to *make sure* to the Creditors the Money they had lent, whether the Funds hereby granted, should prove sufficient or not; enacting, that whatever Part of the said principal Sum and Interest shall be due and unpaid at *November 1719*, (when the Funds were to expire) *the same shall be well and truly satisfied and paid* to the respective Creditors, to whom the same shall be then due, without any Deductions whatsoever? This last Clause, which runs through all the Acts relative to our national Debt, even down to the present Administration, must surely cover the Advocates for *previous Consent* with no small Confusion: But the Purpose of what is now mentioned, is only to shew, that, at the Time we are now speaking of, there were no appropriated Funds; and, consequently, all the Funds, from Year to Year, paid into the Treasury,

fury, were subjected to this Debt, and this Method continued to the second Session of the present Parliament; then the Debt was become so large, notwithstanding all former Attempts to discharge or reduce it, that it was found convenient to take some of the Funds formerly granted at large, and to appropriate them, together with some new ones, to pay the Interest, and reduce the Principal of the national Debt, then increased to upwards of two hundred thousand Pounds: But will any one pretend to say, that by taking this Measure, either his Majesty, or his Parliament, intended to *weaken* the Security given to the Creditors, to whom this national Debt was due, and given by his Majesty and the Parliament, the very Session before? And if not, then must they of Necessity own, that the whole Revenue of the Kingdom, whether appropriated, or unappropriated, continued still a Security for the faithful Re-payment of this Debt.

In 1739, the Debt of the Nation was stated at 296,988 *l.* 17 *s.* 1 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and the Supply for discharging this Debt and supporting the Government for two Years, ending *Christmas* 1741, was fixed at 559,599 *l.* 1 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. the Ballance in the Treasury at *Lady-Day* 1737, and brought by the Officer to the Credit of the Nation, amounted to 15,070 *l.* 17 *s.* 1 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.

In 1741, the national Debt was stated at 353,856 *l.* 2 *d.* $\frac{5}{8}$. and the Supply for the two Purposes just now mentioned, fixed at 601,144 *l.* 18 *s.* 3 *d.* $\frac{7}{8}$. the Ballance remaining in the Treasury at *Lady-Day* 1739, and brought by the Officer of the Crown to the Credit of the Nation, amounted to 13,636 *l.* 17 *s.* 10 *d.* The Interest of the Loan was, in this Session, reduced to four *per Cent.*

In 1743, the Debt of the Nation, at *Lady-Day* preceding, was stated at 331,440 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.
and

and the Supply granted for answering the Purposes, as above, to *Christmas*, 1745, fixed at 521,906 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. the Ballance in the Treasury at *Lady-Day*, 1741, amounted to 13,786 *l.* 3 *s.* 9 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.

In 1745, the Debt of the Nation, at *Lady-Day*, 1745, was stated at 258,517 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* and the Supply not only for the two Uses above specified, but likewise for buying Arms for the Militia, and for erecting Batteries for the Harbour at *Cork*, was a Sum not exceeding 607,080 *l.* 1 *s.* 5 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. and for the more speedy and certain execution of the last two Purposes, Debentures were ordered to be struck for a further Loan of 70,000 *l.* at 4 *per Cent.* the Ballance, returned by the Officer, as lying in the Treasury at *Lady-Day*, 1733, to be applied to the Credit of the Nation, came to 14,858 *l.* 6 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.

In 1747, the Debt of the Nation, at *Lady-Day* preceding, is stated, by the Committee, at 314,304 *l.* 18 *s.* 3 *d.* and, by the Officer of the Crown, at 317,878 *l.* and the Supply for the usual Purposes, for two Years, ending *Christmas*, 1749, fixed at 575,027 *l.* 1 *s.* 10 *d.* the Ballance in the Treasury at *Lady-Day*, 1745, as returned by the King's Officer, amounted, to the Credit of the Nation, to 33,619 *l.* 7 *s.* 10 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.

And now we are come to the Session which, in regard to the Article in Debate, very well deserves the Reader's closest Attention; the Committee of the House drew up a State of the national Account in the following Manner.

First, They take Credit to the Nation for the net Produce of the *hereditary Revenue*, and next, of the additional Duties, for the two Years last past, ending the 25th of *March*, 1749, amounting to 1,007,994 *l.* 1 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. to which they add the Sum of 58,500 *l.* being such Part of the last Loan of 70,000 *l.* as had at that Time been

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paid

paid into the Treasury; they farther add the Sum of 17,682 *l.* 9 *s.* 10 *d.* which was the Ballance remaining in the Treasury, in Credit to the Nation, at *Lady-Day* 1747, making in the whole 1,084,176 *l.* 11 *s.* $\frac{1}{2}$. Then the Committee proceed to deduct out of the above Sum, the full Charge for Support of the civil and military Establishment for the last two Years, and likewise several Payments made by the Treasury, pursuant to Act of Parliament, King's Letters, &c. making in all the Sum of 905,972 *l.* 11 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and when this is deducted, the Remainder being 178,203 *l.* 19 *s.* 6 *d.* is the exact Ballance due to the Nation, at *Lady-Day* 1749, out of the Produce of the hereditary Revenue and additional Duties; for the Reader will here observe, that there is no Distinction made between the one and the other, or even between them and the Loan, but all are alike considered, and claimed, as the Money of the Nation; and claimed, in such an artless, obvious Manner, as plainly to shew, that the House of Commons had not the least Suspicion or Imagination, that any Person could call their Right of doing so, into Question, upon any Pretence whatsoever.

The Committee next proceeds to lay before the House the State of the national Debt. And *first*, They bring to charge the Sum which had been reported to be due, on the Loan, at *Lady-Day* 1747, amounting to 331,987 *l.* 8 *s.* 1 *d.* to which they add the Money which had been paid into the Treasury, on Account of the last Loan of 70,000 *l.* and likewise the Interest due on the whole of the Loan, to *Lady-Day* 1749, amounting in all to the Sum of 422,072 *l.* 8 *s.* 1 *d.* and then they deduct from this Sum, *first*, the whole Produce of the several Duties appropriated to pay the Interest of the Loan, to *Lady-Day* 1749, amounting to 38,750 *l.* 10 *s.* 1 *d.* which Deduction leaves a
Remainder,

Remainder, amounting to 383,321 *l.* 18 *s.* from which last Sum deducting the Ballance already mentioned, of the Money remaining in the Treasury at *Lady-Day* in Credit to the Nation, amounting to 178,203 *l.* 19 *s.* 6 *d.* the whole Debt of the Nation at *Lady-Day* 1749, was a Sum, so the Committee pronounce, not exceeding the Sum of 205,117 *l.* 1 *s.* 6 *d.* and agreeably to this State, the House resolved, that this, and no larger Sum, was the Debt of the Nation at *Lady-Day* 1749.

Thus the House of Commons considered Money redundant in the Treasury, as equivalent to Money already applied to the Credit of the Nation, in the actual Discharge of national Debt: They very well knew, that his Majesty was not only a royal, but a most righteous Trustee; and therefore, as his Majesty had, at the Opening of the Session, acquainted them by his Lord Lieutenant, that He had nothing to ask but the usual Supplies, they thought themselves sure, that nothing would be more acceptable to his Majesty than to *ease his faithful Subjects*, by relieving them of Part of the Burthen they had so long lain under, of national Debt; indeed, they were not only warranted to think in this Manner, from that paternal Regard which his Majesty had always graciously testified towards his truly dutiful and well-deserving Subjects of this Kingdom, but now the Time was come, when parliamentary Faith absolutely required it, as an Act of Justice, that such an Application should be made of this redundant Money; the Creditors had, in every Act of Parliament, relative to this Debt, been made secure of the punctual Payment of their Interest, and also of their Principal, as soon as they respectively should think fit to call for it; not only so, but in every Act, the *Nation* likewise were assured, that as soon as the Nature and Circum-

stances of Things would admit, they should be relieved of this Burthen, and consequently of the Taxes which were relative to it; this was done by enacting, that the Principal, as well as Interest of this Debt, *should* be paid off, at the End of the ensuing two Years.

The Nature and Circumstances of the present Situation, did not only obviously admit, but plainly point out, that this Stipulation should now be carried into actual specific Execution, in regard to a large Portion of this Debt; nor would it have been consistent with Truth, with Justice, or with any Principle of honest Policy, to have omitted it: Well then might the House of Commons take it for granted, that such an Application of public Money, as every Principle which can bind honest Men required to be made, must of Necessity be highly pleasing to his Majesty, who had, as expressly as Words and Actions could do it, signified this to be invariably his royal Intention by passing the several former Acts.

It was not in Nature, that the House of Commons could have the least Doubt of such a Measure being at present highly approved by his Majesty; as the only conceivable, or possible Circumstance of Hesitation had been already obviated by the Declaration from the Throne, ‘that the King ‘had nothing to ask from his People but the ‘usual Supplies.’ Should it be suggested, that still Emergencies might intervene, which would require a different and instantaneous Application of the whole or a large Part of this Money, let it be recollected, that these Emergencies might just as well happen after his Majesty had intimated that he would consent, as at any other Time; and if this Suggestion is to have any Weight, it is plainly in Opposition to this new Form of a previous Intimation of Consent; because it certainly would be more uncouth to
Majesty,

Majesty, to be laid under a Necessity of refusing the royal Assent to an Application of Money, which had been recommended from the Throne, and declared before-hand that the Crown would consent to it, than if the King had not brought himself into any such Intanglement; and yet, whatever Necessity would justify his with-holding his Assent in one Case, must be cogent enough to compel his with-holding it in the other.

Be this as it will, Heads of a Bill were ordered, in the very same Manner that all other Money-Bills had been ordered; in which the House direct a Clause to be inserted, for *applying* so much of the Ballance remaining in the Vice-Treasurer's Hands, at *Lady-Day* last, as shall be necessary to discharge a Sum of 70,000 *l.* remaining of the old Loan at five *per Cent.* and likewise, to pay off the Sum of 58,500 *l.* Part of the new Loan; amounting in the whole to 128,500 *l.* Pursuant to this Order, the Clause in the Heads of the Bill which soon after passed, and was sent to the Lord Lieutenant to be transmitted to *England*, is to the following Effect; after many Recitals, and particularly, after taking Notice, that the Aids and Duties, granted in the former Session, *had not proved sufficient to pay off the several Loan-Debts*, the Bill goes on in these Words; ‘ And whereas, ‘ on the 25th Day of *March* last, a considerable ‘ Ballance remained in the Hands of the Vice- ‘ Treasurers or Receivers-General of this King- ‘ dom, or their Deputy or Deputies, *unapplied*, ‘ and it will be for your Majesty's Service, and ‘ for the Ease of your faithful Subjects of this ‘ Kingdom, that so much thereof as can be con- ‘ veniently spared, should be paid, agreeably to ‘ your Majesty's most gracious Intentions, in ‘ Discharge of Part of the aforesaid national ‘ Debts, we pray it may be enacted, &c.’ and then goes

goes on, *first*, to direct the Payment of 70,000 *l.* remaining at five *per Cent.* and next, the Payment of a further Sum of 58,500 *l.* at four *per Cent.* with the Interest for the said Sums, to *March* 1750; which Interest was to be paid out of the growing appropriated Funds of the present Year; and then, in the Manner of former Acts, makes Provision for the Payment of Principal and Interest of the remaining Debt at *Christmas* 1751.

These Heads of a Bill were prepared and brought into the House by his Majesty's principal Lawyers, and passed by the House without any Opposition, and without one contradicting Voice; passed, likewise, without the least Symptom or Appearance of any Intention or Sense of Duty in his Majesty's Servants, or in any other Person, to acknowledge, in any Manner, an Intimation of his Majesty's previous Consent; indeed the Thing was impossible, unless they were to think it their Duty to have acknowledged a Falshood; for no such Intimation had been given, either from the Throne, or by Message from the Lord Lieutenant, or in any other Manner, if there be any other practised in Parliament; though if there had been ever so formal and express Intimation, this would not, in any Sort, have altered the Case; for it is always to be remembered, that it is not his Majesty's signifying his previous Consent, but the House of Commons, making a parliamentary Acknowledgment, that his previous Consent, and an Intimation thereof to the House, was necessary before they could bring in any such Heads of a Bill, which can be of the least Service to the Cause of this Advocate, or to that of his Clients: Would not his Clients then do well to advise him to cancel in his next Edition, the chimerical, and evidently dishonest, Representation of this Proceeding, contained in the 7th, 8th, and 9th Pages of his Considerations?

More

More than enough has already been said in regard to the Strefs this Author wants to have laid on the Words ‘ *agreeably to your Majesty’s Intentions,*’ making Part of the above Clause ; strange indeed, if doing Justice, and keeping his royal Word, might not, with the utmost Propriety, and Truth, at all times, be pronounced conformable to the gracious Intentions of his Majesty ! But it may not be amiss just to remark, in regard to his Observation, of his Majesty’s ‘ being allowed to be *Judge of what can conveniently be spared ;*’ that surely it never entered into any Man’s Imagination, that the King was not a Judge of this, and of every Article, in every Bill that is to be passed into a Law ; but is it not, at the same Time, most evident, that the House of Commons took upon them likewise to be Judges of what could conveniently be spared, when they immediately proceed to *specify* the Sum ? On the whole, it is hardly to be conceived, that any one plain-hearted Man can be found in this Kingdom, who will not find himself forced to confess, that the whole Procedure of the House of Commons, in regard to this Bill, testifies as strong a Sense of their Right of applying redundant Money, brought into the Treasury in virtue of the Authority of Parliament, towards the Discharge of the national Debt, as their Procedure in regard to raising the Loan, testified of their Right of subjecting the Nation to Debt and to Taxes, for the Support of Government.

In the above Manner and Words, the Heads of this Bill were carried to my Lord Lieutenant, and by him, and the Privy Council of *Ireland*, put into Form, passed unanimously by the Council, who are, at all times, presumed to be sufficiently careful of his Majesty’s *Prerogative* ; transmitted next to the Council of *England*, where it

was

was likewise unanimously passed, and after annexing the Great Seal, returned back again to *Ireland*, in the Words in which it went over; passed unanimously by the House of Lords, and then received the Royal Assent, and thus became a Law; a Law evidently accompanied with every Circumstance of Advantage which can give Weight to an Act of Parliament; founded in Reason and Justice; warranted by the strongest and most undeniable Precedents; every Article, throughout the whole of its Process, fair, open, and avowed, void of all Symptom of Art, Constraint, or clandestine Management, from beginning to ending; and, at length, enacted by the unanimous Consent of all the several Branches of our Legislature.

By this Act of Parliament, the Right of the House of Commons in pointing out to his Majesty, as original Movers, and in Virtue of the Constitution of this Country, such Applications of Money, already brought into the Treasury, as to them shall appear most conducive to his Majesty's Service, and the Ease of his Subjects of this Kingdom, is in the fullest Manner admitted and recognized; a Right, fully proved to be claimed and exercised by the House of Commons, as inherent in themselves, by a long Induction of Facts and Precedents, from the Reign of *Charles II.* without one Instance or Symptom of its having ever been called into Question, down to the Year 1751; when his Grace the Duke of *Dorset* was appointed Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland*, and his Son, Lord *George Sackville*, was appointed his Secretary.

And here, let it just be observed, that if the constitutional Rights of the House of Commons of this Kingdom, were not the same in this last Session 1753, that they were in the Session we have been speaking of, in 1749, and for near a Century

Century before, they must have been altered during this Administration; if they are the same, then must it be acknowledged, that the Transaction on the ever memorable 17th of *December*, 1753, was no other than what, in Duty, the House of Commons were obliged to go through with, in Vindication of an essential constitutional Right, which they, of all others, were under the strongest Ties of Duty to preserve, and transmit unviolated to the utmost of their Power.

If the Rights are not the same, then must it be maintained, that one single Precedent, if such can be produced, whether questionable or not, is sufficient, of itself, to *alter* our Constitution, in Opposition to Sense and Justice, and to the unquestionable Authority of Acts of Parliament, and Precedents almost innumerable; in which Case, it is fondly to be hoped, that future Parliaments will religiously adhere to the Precedent which has last of all been set to them, in resolutely vindicating that Right, which has, this Session at least, been reclaimed, to the everlasting Honour of those who reclaimed it, and which, it is demonstrated, was the unquestionable *constitutional Right* of the Commons, for near two hundred Years.

The Supply granted to his Majesty towards paying off the Remainder of the national Debt, and for the Support of Government, for two Years, ending *Christmas* 1751, was a Sum not exceeding 553,267*l* 12*s.* 1*d.*

In opening the Session 1751, his Grace takes Notice, in his Speech from the Throne, that it gave him great Satisfaction to observe the extraordinary Produce of the Funds which the Commons had formerly granted, and that he had nothing then to ask but the usual Supplies; and then goes on in these Words, ‘ I am commanded by the King to acquaint you, that his Ma-

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jesty,

‘ jeſty, ever attentive to the Eaſe and Happineſs
 ‘ of his Subjects, *will graciously conſent*, and
 ‘ recommends it to you, that ſuch a Part of the
 ‘ Money now remaining in *his* Treafury, as ſhall
 ‘ be thought conſiſtent with the public Service,
 ‘ be applied towards the further Reduction of the
 ‘ national Debt.’

No Body can diſpute that this was a Language altogether new, ſuch as never had been ſpoken from that Place before; and may it not be lawful, modeſtly to aſk, what Occaſion could there be for it? Surely it could not mean that, in all Events, whether urgent Emergencies happened or not, his Maſteſty would ſtill perſevere in his Purpoſe of applying this Money to diſcharge the national Debt; and if not, had not the Houſe of Commons the ſtrongeſt Affurances already, which could poſſibly be given them, of his Maſteſty’s gracious Intentions to pay off this Debt, by his paſſing the Act of Parliament of laſt Seſſion, wherein it is expreſſly enacted, that it ſhould be paid off, at this very Time? It is certainly no great Wonder, that a Language capable at leaſt of being conſtrued into a Senſe very unfriendly to the Rights, to the eſſential Rights, of this Country, proved a little alarming; but, without pretending to examine critically into their Meaning, the Houſe of Commons ſatiſfied themſelves in their Addreſs, with paſſing over the Words ‘ *will graciously conſent*,’ and only ‘ acknowledge, with all Thankfulneſs, his Maſteſty’s gracious Attention to our Eaſe and Happineſs, in recommending the Application of the Money remaining in the Treafury towards the farther Reduction of the national Debt.’ Already then there plainly appears a remarkable Difference between the Tranſaction of this Seſſion, and that of the laſt; in the former, there was *no* Notice taken in the Speech of applying this redundant Money,
 and

and yet the House of Commons proceeded to apply it without any Hesitation; in the present, there is abundant Notice taken in the Speech, but taken in such a Manner, as in Part of it proves very alarming, instead of being, as usual, Matter of Thankfulness to the House; and puts them upon a Caution always distressful to right-hearted faithful Subjects, when addressing their Prince.

In stating the Accounts, the Committee proceed in the very same Manner with that already mentioned under the Year 1749, and such was the Increase of the Funds, arising principally from the most pernicious, impoverishing Cause of monstrous Importation of Luxuries for some Time before, that, on ballancing the national Accounts at *Lady-Day* 1751, after making Provision for the Discharge of the whole Loan, there remained in *Credit* to the Nation a Sum not less than 22,370*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.* $\frac{1}{8}$. there remained however, at the Time of stating the Accounts, due to the Creditors, the Sum of 237,500*l.* and out of the large Ballance remaining in the Treasury, at *Lady-Day* 1751, the House instruct their Committee, who were to bring in the Heads of the Money-Bills, to insert a Clause for applying so much as should be necessary for paying off and discharging the principal Sum of 120,000. Heads of a Bill were accordingly drawn up, by the Prime-Serjeant, the Attorney and Sollicitor-General, the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts, and the Sollicitor to the Commissioners, and read and passed by the House; the Purposes of which Heads of a Bill were, *first*, to pay off the principal Sum above-mentioned, and then to grant his Majesty certain Duties, to be applied to the Discharge of the Interest of the said principal Sum, till it should be paid off, and to pay the Interest of the remaining Sum of 117,500*l.* and towards the Discharge of said Sum. In the

Preamble to these Heads of a Bill, the House made use of the Words in their own Address; expressing, ‘ thankful Acknowledgements of his Majesty’s gracious Attention to the Ease and Happiness of his Subjects, in recommending the Application of the Money remaining in the Treasury, so far as it might be consistent with the public Service, towards the further Reduction of the national Debt.’

In this Manner, these Heads of a Bill were sent to the Lord Lieutenant, and after being put into Form, and passed through the Privy-Council of *Ireland*, without any Alteration, were transmitted to *England*; doth not every Step hitherto taken, in regard to this Bill, most clearly evince, that not only in the Judgement of the House of Commons, but of his Majesty’s principal Lawyers, chief Judges, and his other privy Counsellors in this Kingdom, his Majesty’s previous Consent was so far from being *necessary*, that their making any Acknowledgment of it, might possibly not even be *harmless*; for if they had been sure, particularly his Majesty’s Lawyers in the House of Commons, that an Acknowledgment of ‘ Consent’ might be made with equal Safety, with that of ‘ recommending,’ no possible Reason can be assigned why they should omit, and purposely omit the one, and yet insert the other, when, according to the usual Form, of repeating in the Address the Words of the Speech, both ought to have been inserted: Our Author, when speaking on this Head, (*p.* 12.) so far acknowledges, as that leaving out the Word ‘ Consent,’ *implied*, that it was imagined, *that such Consent was not necessary*; but with what Grace he makes this Acknowledgment, after having so recently as in *p.* 7. represented his Majesty’s Lawyers as all looking on it as a clear and undoubted Point that his

his Majesty's Consent *was* necessary, and only that as the Case was new, the Gentlemen found themselves a little at a Loss in respect to the *Form in which this Consent OUGHT to appear*, let other Folks judge.

This Bill was altered in *England*, and sent back hither under the great Seal, with the Words of the Speech inserted in Place of the Words of the Address: The general Uneasiness that was occasioned by this Alteration, and, in particular, to a considerable Number of Gentlemen in the House of Commons, who have since become zealous Advocates for the Doctrine of the Alteration, need not now to be remembered, farther than just to observe, that had the same Question been put upon this Bill which was put upon the last, instead of a Majority of five, there would, according to all Appearances at that Time, have been a Majority of upwards of fifty: Why this Question was not then put, and why the Measure of passing the Bill *sub silentio*, as it is phrased, and without the House appearing to be apprized of any such Alteration, why this Measure was, at that Time, preferred to rejecting the Bill, are Matters much easier asked, than it would be to resolve them: Many Causes and Circumstances, it is said, concurred; and among them, it has been alledged, that the Friends of this Country found themselves under a Kind of temporary Necessity, instead of marching straight forward in the plain, open, constitutional Road, to deviate for once into this political Winding, in order to avoid a Snare, which, they conceived, some Folks had been laying for them, with a View to entangle them with the Ministry of *England*, and of obtaining an Opportunity of covering their own personal and petulant Ambition with the specious Pretext of singular Zeal for his Majesty's Prerogative: If this was their Motive, or

Part

Part of their Motive for passing the Bill, it is plain, the Event has disappointed them; and it is to be hoped, that future Parliaments will be instructed from this Example, as, most happily for *Ireland*, the present has been already, never to venture on such a dangerous and unjustifiable an Experiment of Shifts and Expedients, from Conceits and Conjectures of Policy and Foresight for the Time to come.

Still it must be allowed, that the Temptation was a great one; no Wonder that the very Apprehension of being set in the Light of Frowardness to his Majesty, and of calling in Question any of his antient Rights, should be shocking to Subjects always distinguished for their zealous and most faithful Attachment to his Majesty's Person, his Family and Government; and conscious, that the least Intention of encroaching on his Majesty's Prerogative was abhorrent to their Thoughts: But bitter as this Cup was, they probably have, by this Time, been convinced, that they would have done well, rather than suffer themselves to deviate from the straight Rule of parliamentary Conduct, to have been contented to drink of it, and left it to Time and future Opportunities to set themselves right in the Eye of his Majesty, and of such of the Public, as might happen to be misled; a Time, they might be sure, could not have been far off, when they should have an Opportunity of manifesting to the whole World, that in regard to the Struggle which at that time was actually commenced, the sole Object which his faithful Commons had in View, was merely to prevent the Power of a Primate, and of a Lord Lieutenant's Secretary, from growing up into a Domination over all the Rights, Properties, and Priviledges of this Country, the last two Officers in the Kingdom, who should think themselves at Liberty to claim any Power whatsoever in the
Direction

Direction of the internal Interests, or over the Properties and civil Rights of such a Community.

But whatever were the Motives, the Fact is certainly true, and the Adversaries of this Country are welcome to make all the Use of it, which its real Nature will admit, or their Ingenuity can devise; the Bill, with the Alteration, was then actually passed, and is now to be found in the List of our Statutes: Use it however as they will, it is impossible that any Man, who looks upon Truth and fair Dealing to be essential Ingredients in order to give any Transaction the Weight of a Precedent, can ever be brought to admit the present Transaction into the Rank of Precedents. Do but compare, for a Moment, the Transaction of 1749, with this, we are now speaking of, in 1751: In the former, every thing was open, simple, and natural; the Parts all consistent and similar; and the whole the Result of universal Choice, and inward undissembled Consent; in the latter, every material Circumstance reversed; begun, like the former, in the Temper of chearful Consent, but evidently concluding in Dissatisfaction, Perplexity, and a painful Sense of Constraint: Will any Man contend that Transactions so different, are yet to be considered in the same Rank of Authority? Farther, ought not every Reason, which gives Authority to Precedents, have prevented the Alteration, which was so evident a Departure from the Precedent of 1749? And will not every Reason which shall justify the Administration in departing from this Authority, and in creating a new Precedent in the Year 1751, justify likewise the Representatives of the People in creating, in the same Manner, a new one in the Year 1753; and much more in returning back to an old one, practised, unquestionably, so lately as the Year 1749, and warranted

ranted by an uninterrupted Course of Practices, at least so far back as the Year 1662? And lastly, under this Article, may it not be asked, in what Sense is the Transaction in 1751 to be accounted a Precedent? Surely not in the whole, for that was made up of two very dissimilar Parts; and for a still stronger Reason, not in the first Part, because that was in direct Opposition to the Doctrine of *previous Consent*; what then is there left of this Transaction to constitute this singular Precedent of *greatest Weight*? Why, plainly, no other than this, 'That the House of Commons suffered an Acknowledgment in their Name to continue in a Bill, which had been inserted without their Consent; an Acknowledgment, which their whole Conduct had clearly demonstrated they never *meant to have made*, if left to themselves, and which they could not probably have made consistently with Truth, after the Sense they had so recently testified, in regard to the constitutional parliamentary Right of this Kingdom, respecting this Article;' a Precedent this, if it must be called a Precedent, which may well be lamented, but can never be envied to the Adversaries of the parliamentary constitutional Rights of this Kingdom. Men who are wanting to lay such a Stress on so spurious a Transaction, cannot more strongly confess that their Cause is utterly destitute of all legitimate Authority.

Thus, having laid the Foundation in one remarkable Act of Parliament in 1665, and concluded with another in 1749, the Remarker would gladly hope, that by the preceding Induction of so long a Series of intermediate Proofs, it must, at length, be made level to the Apprehension, and satisfactory to the Judgment of every plain honest Man, that the House of Commons of

Ireland,

Ireland, have been in full Possession, and in the uninterrupted Enjoyment and Exercise of the following constitutional Rights, for near a Century of Years.

First, The essential Right of ordering, in virtue of their own Authority, all the public Accounts of the Nation to be laid before them.

Secondly, The essential Right of calling the Officers of the Crown to an Account for all Applications of the public Money, and of punishing them for Mis-applications.

And, *Thirdly*, The most essential Right, never once called into Question before the Year 1751, of pointing out to his Majesty, by Heads of Bills, such Application of public Money at any Time redundant in the Treasury, as they, his Majesty's supreme Council for this Kingdom, judged most conducive to his Majesty's Service, and to the Ease and Safety of his Majesty's Subjects of this Kingdom.

In consequence of these, it must likewise demonstrably follow, that to acknowledge an antecedent Necessity of his Majesty's previous Consent, before the House can be at Liberty to point out such Applications of public Money, would be, in the strongest Terms, to give up and renounce one of the most essential and important of all parliamentary constitutional Rights; and,

Lastly, That the full Enjoyment of all these parliamentary Rights is perfectly consistent, and evidently correspondent with, his Majesty's full and undisturbed Enjoyment of every Article of his royal Prerogative, or ancient Rights; of every Prerogative and every Right that the worthy Heart of his present Majesty would wish to enjoy, and which any Prince can be permitted to enjoy consistently with a legal Government, or with any rational Security of the Property and Liberties of this Country; indeed, consistently with the Safety of the general Liberty of *Britain*, and of the present free *British* Empire.

Before proceeding to the third and last Purpose of these Remarks, it may not be amiss to conclude the present Article with the following Observation; that the Policy of the House of Commons in letting so large a Sum remain in the Treasury at that Time, without proposing any farther Application, would seem extremely well judged; for, as this large Redundancy was principally owing to an extravagant Importation of Luxuries, which, in the Nature of the Thing, must in some Time necessarily abate,
and,

and, in Consequence, the Produce of the Duties be in Proportion reduced, nothing would seem to be better judged, than to let Money remain in the Treasury against such an Event, in order to prevent the Necessity of increasing the Taxes for future Supplies: And it is to be hoped, that so obvious a Reflection will never be suffered by any Friend to this Country to go out of his Thoughts, that as there must always be a Necessity on the House of Commons of increasing the Taxes for the Support of Government, when the former Supplies have proved insufficient; so, in order to do equal Justice to their Constituents, there must be a like Necessity as often as there shall happen a Redundancy from these Supplies, to point out such an Application of this Redundancy as will best conduce to the Ease of the People, now that all the Exigencies of Government had already been answered.

Agreeably to this most evident Maxim of Justice and OEconomy, the House, who had granted a Supply of 553,267 *l.* 12 *s.* 1 *d.* in 1749, grant no more than 326,720 *l.* 4 *s.* 2 *d.* in the Year 1751.

If the above Detail of the Proceedings of Parliament proves acceptable to the Reader, he will readily excuse the lengthening out of these Remarks: But as it is not enough to point out the Fallacy of our Author, but likewise highly expedient to lay open the malignant Tendency of his Doctrine, a supplemental Number for answering this Purpose, and compleating the Remarker's Intention, shall be published next *Saturday*.

ERRATA in NUMB. III.

PAGE 12. Line 2. *for Having, read Waving.* P. 16.
 L. 25. *for And how, read And now.* ---- NUMB. IV.
 Page 41. Line 25. *for two, read one.*