

AN
EXAMINATION
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN A PAMPHLET,
ENTITLED
THE SPEECH OF LORD MINTO,
WITH SOME
REMARKS UPON A PAMPHLET
ENTITLED
OBSERVATIONS ON THAT PART OF THE SPEAKER'S
SPEECH WHICH RELATES TO TRADE.

Απλῆς ὁ μῦθος τῆς Ἀληθείας ἐστὶ,
Κ' ἔ ποικιλῶν δεῖ τὰ ἐνδίκ' ἔξηνευμαλῶν,
Ἐχει γὰρ αὐτὰ καιρὸν, ὃ δ' ἀδίκος λόγος
Νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, φαρμακῶν δεῖλαι σφῶν.

EURIPIDES.

Simple by nature is the speech of *Truth*,
Fair reasonings need no various glosses,
For they have soundness; but the *unfair*,
Distemper'd in itself, requires sophistic falves.

Irish Pursuits of Literature.

BY THE RIGHT HON. BARRY, EARL OF FARNHAM.

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1800.

EXAMINATION
OF THE
MARRIAGES
AND
BAPTISMS
IN THE
PARISH OF
ST. MARY'S
DURING THE
YEAR
1800

AN
EXAMINATION,

8c. 8c.

MY LORD,

I HAVE read your lordship's speech with the attention that it deserves; it has been composed with much consideration, and logically arranged. Your first position, that from the relative situation of Great Britain and Ireland, a connexion is necessary for their mutual security, is so evident, that it needs not argument to support it. The real question for consideration is, (as you properly express it) what is the *best* and *most eligible* form of such connexion.

Your second position is, "That when two countries are so circumstanced as mutually to require connexion, the *only* mode of connexion which can perfectly remove the evil of separation, and fully confer the benefit of Union, is a *perfect identity* and *incorporation of their government.*" From this position, you declare it to be your decided opinion, that if the intended connexion between Great Britain and Ireland be not such as shall produce a *perfect identity and incorporation of their government*, it will not remove the evil of separation, or confer the benefit of Union. It will therefore be a proper subject for enquiry, whether the Union intended to be formed between these two nations, constituting

distinct islands, and adjusted in such manner as may be agreeable to the outlines of the plan laid before his Majesty by the British Parliament, will so perfectly *identify* and *incorporate* their government, as that there shall not remain any solid distinctness of interest between them: the professed object of such Union being, that it shall be so formed, as by consolidating those nations, to remove all danger of separation.

The present connexion between Great Britain and Ireland has for many centuries maintained their Union; it has arisen from the only natural bond which can form a permanent cement between two nations, that of their mutual interest. To this has been added the most powerful artificial measure that can bind two nations, the irrevocable act of the legislature. I say *irrevocable*, as Ireland, under its *present* constitution, has not a power to repeal it. From the experience we have had of its salutary and powerful effects, there is not any reason to apprehend that such connexion shall not continue, so long as it shall be their mutual interest to support it. Alteration in their mode of connexion may be attended with great danger, and it appears to me unwise to listen to the wild speculation of empirics, and substitute a new system in the place of that, the advantage of which we have for such a length of time experienced; an exchange which may occasion the destruction of our constitution, and a separation between the two united kingdoms.

Your lordship refers to preceding Unions which have taken place in Great Britain, that of the heptarchy, the Union of England with Wales; and lastly, that which
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was formed between England and Scotland. You observe that all those Unions were of great advantage to the nations which formed them; and argue from analogy, that similar benefits must flow from an Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Such reasoning would apply with great force, if Ireland stood in the same relative situation to Great Britain in which Wales and Scotland did to England, and that the Union now in contemplation could effect that *perfect identity of government* between Great Britain and Ireland, which was produced by the Union of those nations with England.

All those nations were part of the same island, and nature pointed out the propriety of their constituting one kingdom. From the time of their Union they have been as perfectly identified as if they had never formed distinct kingdoms; the royal functions throughout all are executed by the king *personally*, the produce of their revenues all form *one* aggregate fund, applicable to the *general* expences of the united kingdoms, the intercourse of trade is carried on with the same facility, as between the respective parts of any of them, their Parliament meets in their capital, and the representatives of all those united kingdoms attend it without difficulty, or inconvenience. Being so perfectly identified by nature and situation, there subsists no distinctness of interest between them, their Parliament is so essentially interested in the general welfare of the *whole*, that it cannot be induced to act with partiality towards any of its parts, sitting in the capital contiguous to the boards of revenue, treasury, trade, and others, it can daily and hourly receive every necessary article of information in their departments,

partments, all these are necessary concomitants of *perfect* identification.

Let us now compare the state of Ireland with theirs in those particulars, should the proposed Union take place. The royal functions will *still* be executed by a viceroy assisted by a privy council, the produce of the respective revenues of Ireland and Great Britain will still create *distinct* funds, distinctly applicable to the expences of the respective kingdoms; the taxes imposed by the joint legislature are not to extend alike to the whole united empire, but to affect Great Britain and Ireland *separately*; the commercial intercourse between both islands will still be carried on through the medium of distinct revenue officers, according to an adjustment of reciprocal duties, founded upon similar principles with the treaty of commerce between France and Great Britain; the attendance upon Parliament of the Irish Members will be in another island, with no slight inconvenience and with much additional expence, far beyond the means *perhaps* of many who may be delegated. While from the unavoidable distinctness of their local and commercial interest, Ireland can scarcely hope for a perfect impartiality, and an unbiassed attention to her peculiar concerns, in the Parliament assembled at Westminster, the British Members will no doubt avail themselves of the preponderancy of their majority, and apply it to the interest of that country which they represent. Such real and substantial *differences* as I have pointed out, will I trust convince your lordship, that the two nations will not be easily identified, and that the inferences drawn from the benefits which England, Wales and Scotland derive from their joint parliamentary Union,

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by no means apply to the projected Union between Great Britain and Ireland. The propositions laid before his Majesty intimate, that each nation is to defray the expence of her own sinking fund, that Ireland is to pay a certain *proportion* of the ordinary expences of the united kingdoms, and that the duties to arise from their commercial intercourse are to constitute part of the revenue of that kingdom into which the commodities shall be imported. From these provisions it necessarily follows, that their respective revenues must still be kept perfectly distinct; that each nation must still have its separate boards of treasury, revenue, and accounts, as at present. Will not this necessarily be productive of *distinct interests* between the two nations? in truth, I scarcely know any substantial distinctness now subsisting between Great Britain and Ireland under their present connexion, which will not continue after the proposed Union, save that very material one, that Ireland shall be deprived of that distinct and independent Parliament which belongs to her, under her present constitution. Whether the consequences of such a change will be salutary or injurious, it behoves every Irishman to consider *well*, before he shall consent to merge his own in the united Parliament. At present the Parliament of Ireland sits in her capital, and every member can attend it without inconvenience; its whole attention is *concentered in Irish affairs*, each member shares in the operation of every law enacted, and feels every tax imposed; her Parliament sitting in Dublin can receive without difficulty or delay from her own boards of revenue, treasury, or accounts, every necessary information concerning such matters as belong to their respective departments, her lawyers and merchants may then constitute a part of such Parliament,

from

from whom every necessary information within their peculiar province, respecting the laws and commerce of Ireland may be obtained. By means of the appellat jurisdiction lately restored to the Irish Parliament, the suitor can have his cause finally determined at home, without the trouble, expence and delay of resorting to another court of supreme judicature abroad. The members from their residence, their station, and their intercourse with its inhabitants, must necessarily be the best judges of the ability of the people to support the taxes to be imposed, and of the ways and means which will render them least oppressive, and of such laws as may be best adapted to their internal regulation.

These are the *solid* and *substantial* advantages which Ireland may expect from retaining her own Parliament, I trust they will fix her determination not to yield to wild speculations, but to adhere to that constitution, the salutary effects of which she has felt since the time that it has been established.

Having thus pointed out such important distinctnesses in the government and in the interests between the two nations which must subsist, if the intended Union between them shall be effected, surely, my lord, you who have *asserted*, that the abolition of the privy council of Scotland was necessary to *consolidate* the Union, by removing that remaining *nucleus* of a local government, and *separate interest*," (fol. 92) cannot think, that a Union, accompanied with all the foregoing distinctnesses of viceroy, privy-council, revenues and expences, will produce that perfect identity and incorporation of their government, which you represent as the *only* mode of connexion which

can perfectly remove the evils of separation, and confer the benefit of Union. The principle of the intended Union, we are told, is, that it will effectually remove the danger of separation between Great Britain and Ireland. I am of opinion that danger will rather be increased. The real object which has induced Great Britain to press this measure by means of promises and menaces, rewards and punishments, is very far from that which she professes.

To the Protestant is held out protection against the Catholic, who is represented as still retaining claims not only upon their liberties, but also upon their properties. To the Catholic, fallacious expectations are held out of being admitted into Parliament, and being placed upon a level with the Protestants in point of political power. Far be it from me, however, to insinuate, that such expectations have originated from the Parliament of Great Britain; their language has been manly and direct, and authorises no such delusive hopes as the understrappers of administration have held out to them.

The ostensible argument in favour of the Union arises from *supposed* apprehensions being entertained of a separation between the two kingdoms. Be assured, that this is a mere pretence; and that, when it is considered for what a great length of time those nations have continued united under the present connexion, such apprehensions cannot be *really* entertained. The real motive that lurks in the bottom of this measure I suspect to be widely different; to me it appears, that the recovery of reluctantly relinquished power is the real object of the British Minister. It is to recover the power of binding Ireland by

her acts of Parliament. This right, asserted in the British act of the 6th George I. she exercised until she lost America; then, indeed, she *reluctantly* yielded to the nervous exertions of the Irish Parliament, and consented that Ireland should have a constitution founded upon the basis of British freedom. And how reluctantly this emancipation of Ireland was granted, clearly appears from the Duke of Portland's correspondence in 1782, lately, and, perhaps, *unwittingly* produced by Mr. Pitt; and from the assiduous exertions of Mr. Pitt to do away that parliamentary constitution of Ireland, which was *solemnly* adjusted in 1782, by denying that it was intended to be a *final* adjustment of constitutional questions between both nations. The British Cabinet now seems anxious to *re-assume* that power in its fullest extent, claimed by the 6th Geo. I. of binding Ireland in *all cases* whatsoever, thus including the momentous and alarming power of *taxation*: this, in truth, appears to me the great object of the Minister's exertions.—He wishes that the power over the whole property of the kingdom of Ireland should be at his disposal; and how is this to be effected? By Ireland's transferring a part of *her* Parliament to be added to that of Great Britain, such part sufficient to *legalize* the acts of such united Parliament, under the *fimsy* pretence of Ireland's being represented there, although such *insignificant part* will not give her any more power in such Parliament than she would have had if she was not represented in it at all.

If the Parliament of Ireland shall be once melted down into an united Parliament, the power which she now has over her liberty and property, will be thereby
transferred

transferred to the disposal of the preponderating majority which Great Britain will have in such united Parliament. Ireland should well consider, that if she *once* gives up her own Parliament, the act cannot be *re-called*.—Should the articles be infringed, she will be left without redress; there is not any tribunal upon earth to which she can appeal. He is little read in the book of mankind who expects to have good faith observed between nations, where it is inconsistent with their interest. Let Ireland consider, that by giving up her Parliament, she parts with the only security she can have for her liberties, and will thenceforth hold them at the *precarious tenure* of the liberality and good-will of the *British* majority in the united Parliament.

I now proceed to that part of your Lordship's speech relative to the internal and political regimen of Ireland. You observe, that nothing "can be less rational, or
 " more dangerous, and often fatal, than *abstract* views
 " of practical questions affecting the interests of multi-
 " tudes and of nations; that in the pursuit of abstract
 " right, we shall often find ourselves (innocently, no
 " doubt, if our intention is considered, but yet too effec-
 " tually) the instruments of great *practical injustice and*
 " *oppression*; that there are *few cases* to which that ob-
 " servation applies more closely than that which you are
 " considering," (fol. 72.) It appears to me rather extraordinary, that your Lordship, entertaining ideas of the danger of such *abstract views*, should enter into the discussion of such; and the more so, if it should appear that your mode of treating them is of a hazardous tendency, originating, perhaps, from want of due information respecting the present state of Ireland. You assert,

“ that Ireland is a divided country as to property and numbers, the least numerous class (alluding, I presume, to the *Protestants*) possessing the property and the power; the more numerous (the Catholics) entertaining claims both on the property and the power.” So far as relates to the division of property and power, your representation appears to me to be well founded.—You next state the violence “ of those passions which influence and ex-
 “ asperate both parts of the Irish nation against each
 “ other, the firm and immoveable basis on which their
 “ mutual hatred stands, the irreconcilable nature of its
 “ motives, its bitter, malignant, and implacable cha-
 “ racter. You represent them as two nations in Ire-
 “ land, two Irish peoples; the one sovereign, the other
 “ subject. You consider them as two enraged and im-
 “ placable opponents, shut up on the very arena of their
 “ ancient and furious contentions.” To me the tendency of such representations appears calculated to stimulate animosity between the two parties, by impressing an idea on their minds, that an inveterate hatred subsists between them, which is rooted in such principles, and actuated by such motives, as must make it continue for ever.

But to shew how totally unfounded these assertions are, I shall appeal to the parliamentary transactions in Ireland for the last twenty-two years. Until the year 1777, the penal statutes affecting Catholics remained in force. From the time of their enactment, the Catholics had conducted themselves peaceably and loyally. Two rebellions had taken place in Scotland, notwithstanding the Union; the one in 1715, and the other in 1745; in the course of which, the Irish Catholics (though strongly solicited)

solicited) took no share. Such conduct naturally conciliated the regards and alluaged the prejudices of their Protestant brethren, who were convinced that the penal statutes might with safety be repealed.—Parliament cheerfully and freely engaged in that laudable business, warmly wishing to contribute to the happiness and comfort of their fellow-subjects, and enacted the statutes of the 17th and 18th of Geo. III. whereby, after reciting, that from the uniform peaceable behaviour of the Catholics for a long series of years, it was expedient to relax those laws; that it would tend to the prosperity and strength of all his Majesty's dominions; that his subjects of all denominations should enjoy the blessings of a free constitution, and should be bound to each other by mutual interest and mutual affection; for these purposes, therefore, they enacted, that persons professing the Popish religion should be capable to take, hold, and enjoy, any leases for years, not exceeding 999 years; should have full power of disposing of them, or of any estates whereof they were, or to which they should become entitled; that they should be capable of taking any estate by descent; that no maintenance or portion should be granted to a child of a Popish parent, upon a bill filed against such parent; that it should not be in the power of the eldest son of a Popish parent to make his father tenant for life by conforming, but that the father, notwithstanding such conformity, should have full power over his estate, thereby repealing all those laws which were most grievous and galling to the Catholics of Ireland. The remaining disability to purchase the *inheritance*, subjecting Catholics to many legal inconveniences peculiar to chattel interests, the act of the 21st and 22d Geo. III. was made, whereby Catholics were enabled to purchase

liberality of Great Britain to her *protesting* Catholics, intimate, that a bitter, malignant, and implacable hatred subsists between the Irish Protestants and Catholics? No, surely. Your Lordship has been strangely misinformed. These facts, I conceive, fully refute that charge, and are sufficient to satisfy the Catholics that their Protestant brethren ardently wish to unite with them in heart and hand, and in every respect to contribute to their happiness, as far as is consistent with the *established constitution* in church and state.

After this injurious *mis-statement* of the disposition of the Protestants and Catholics of Ireland towards each other, you next proceed to venture upon the *delicate* and *bazardous question of abstract rights*. You say that you cannot “ admit of the ascendancy of one part of the
 “ nation over another part of the same nation, to the
 “ extent and purpose claimed in Ireland, as capable of
 “ assuming any character deserving the denomination of
 “ right. That which is wrong on one side cannot, in-
 “ telligibly to you, become right on the other. You
 “ do not think the virtues of *possession, prescription, or*
 “ any other limitation of time, at all applicable to the
 “ case of perpetually subsisting, and as it were renovat-
 “ ing wrongs, especially such as affect the *political*
 “ *rights* of great numbers of men. That the fre-
 “ quency of the repetition of wrongs, instead of di-
 “ minishing the injury, must be felt as a grievous ag-
 “ gravation of it; and, instead of converting wrong
 “ into right, seems only to *improve* and *fortify* the title
 “ of those who suffer, to shake off the injury on the first
 “ opportunity that offers. You say, that part of Ire-
 “ land which you wish to redress, claims not only *politi-*
 “ *cal*

" *cal equality* in the government of their country, in
 " which you cannot help *sympathising* with them, but
 " are known to entertain *claims of a very different na-*
 " *ture.*" (fol. 69.) How revolutionary is this mode
 of reasoning? How inflammatory? How perfectly
 does it coincide with the principles of Paine, in his
 Rights of Man? Does it not tend to awaken discon-
 tents among the Catholics of Ireland, to justify their re-
 sorting to first principles, to vindicate their political
equality, to authorise downright rebellion? Is not all
 this *treason* against the *constitution* which it encourages
 the Catholics to overturn? And may not government be
fairly taxed with countenancing those principles adopted
 by your Lordship? They have circulated, as I am in-
 formed, at the public cost, your elaborate speech, al-
 though the printer of Paine's Rights of Man, founded
 upon the *very same principles*, has been prosecuted and
 punished in England.

If I understand your Lordship, you consider every part
 of his Majesty's subjects entitled to an equality of civil
 and political rights, and that it is an act of *injustice* to
 the Catholic to deprive him of a participation of them.
 The exclusion of the Catholics from a share in the legis-
 lature results from the *oath of supremacy*, which is re-
 quired to be taken by persons of *every persuasion*,
 previous to their admission into Parliament. This oath
 relates merely to the *political*, not the *religious* tenets of
 the Catholics. I will state for your information the in-
 troduction of that oath. Immediately after the revolu-
 tion, by the *English* stat. 1st of William and Mary, it
 was enjoined to be taken by every person before his ad-
 mission into the *English* parliament; by the *English* stat.
 of 3d William and Mary, it was enacted, that it should
 be

be taken before any person should be permitted to sit in the *Irish* Parliament; for at that time the English Parliament did claim the right, and did actually exercise the power of binding Ireland by its laws. The exclusion, therefore, of the Catholics from sitting in Parliament was the act of the *English* legislature, not of that *part of the Irish people* whom you consider as *unduly invested with legislative power*. If such exclusion from an equality of political rights be a wrong, it is a wrong enacted by the *English* Parliament, not by the *Irish*, who in fact never made any law to that effect, until after the restoration of their legislative constitution in 1782, at which time they, by an act of their own, adopted *generally* all those English laws, which related to the taking of such oaths. The political creed of the English Catholic being the same with that of the Irish, equally induces the expediency of enjoining the oath of supremacy to be taken in both countries, and excludes *both* from a share in the legislature. If such exclusion then be a wrong to the *Irish* Catholic, it must be a wrong to the *English* Catholic also. The distinctions of right and wrong equally apply to both, surely the ascendancy of *one part* of a nation over *another part* of the same nation, cannot assume the denomination of right in the one kingdom, and that of wrong in the other. Your Lordship's feelings are alive to the oppression of the *Irish* Catholic, occasioned by his being deprived of an equality of political rights by the *English* Parliament, and you *sympathise* with him on account of that injustice committed by an English Parliament. But your compassion does not extend to the *British* Catholic who is in the very same predicament, and who suffers the very same wrongs. Are the principles of right and wrong different in Ireland and

Great Britain? The Irish *Protestant* has been by the foregoing English act subjected to the same penalties and disabilities, if he shall omit to take the oaths, and there are instances where the punishment for omission has been inflicted upon the Protestant both in England and Ireland. Thus, my Lord, the censure which you levelled against the *Irish* Parliament, recoils against the *English*. I am happy, however, to be able to vindicate the wisdom and justice of the English Parliament in excluding persons from a share in the legislature, who professed such political principles as are avowed by persons of the Catholic persuasion in Great Britain and Ireland.

By the constitution the King is supreme head of the church; his power both in temporals and spirituals, is limited to the laws of the land. It is contrary to every sound political principle of government, that any powers should be exercised therein, save such as are consistent with the constitution; the King is as much bound by the laws as the meanest of his subjects; every person partaking of the benefits of the constitution, is bound to *obey the King* in all his just prerogatives. This it is which creates the allegiance due by the subject to the King, and enables *him* to afford reciprocal protection to the subject. The oath required to be taken consists of two parts:—1st, The member is to swear that he *abhors, detests, and abjures that damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the pope, may be murdered and deposed by their subjects*. No person will attempt to maintain, that a man entertaining such detestable principles, is fit to be admitted into the legislature. Secondly, the oath declares, *that no foreign prince, prelate, state or potentate, has, or ought to have, any jurisdiction,*

diction, power, or authority, within this realm. To this part of the oath the Catholic objects, as repugnant to his creed, which maintains, that the pope has absolute power and authority within this realm in all matters *spiritual* or *ecclesiastical*. No article of faith is contained in the said oath—it is merely *political*, and relates only to the ecclesiastical government; it only excludes from Parliament such persons as support a power in the *pope*, which the constitution has vested in the crown. The principle which it opposes, aims to introduce a foreign power into this realm, absolute in its nature, above all law, uncontrouled and uncontroulable, and utterly repugnant to the fundamental principles of the constitution. Surely the establishment of such a power would be in fact to subject the *crown*, in spirituals, to the authority of the pope. The Catholic who supports such power thereby acknowledges himself the *subject* of the person who is invested therewith, he divides his *allegiance*, he professes himself subject to the King in *temporals*, and to the pope in *spirituals*. That such are the tenets of the Catholics, appears from Doctor Husley's Pastoral Letter: addressing himself to the soldiers he says, “their personal religion is their natural
 “ uncontrovertible imprescriptible right, subject to the
 “ spiritual authority of the Catholic Church, and in
 “ which the laws of the land cannot enjoin a coercive
 “ authority. In all *temporal* matters they are subject to
 “ their temporal rulers; in all *spiritual* matters they are
 “ subject to their spiritual rulers;” how then can a legislature vesting and establishing the supremacy of the church in the crown, disclaiming and resisting the authority of any foreign power, within the realm, admit persons into their body whose tenets are so re-

pugnant to their own? These observations will, I trust, vindicate the propriety of the English Parliament in framing for Ireland such a political test. Your Lordship will also observe, that every argument which you adduce to prove the injustice of excluding Catholics from the Irish Parliament, militates with equal force against their exclusion from the British, and with what consistency, my Lord, do you impeach the Irish Parliament, representing it as inadequate to make laws for binding Catholics, after having contended for the omnipotency of that very Parliament, and represented it as invested with sufficient power to bind for ever *those very Catholics* by an incorporative Union with Great Britain, in the formation of which, it appears from the propositions laid before his Majesty, and supported by your Lordship, that the very same oaths are required to be taken by the members of the United Parliament, as are now prescribed to be taken by the members of the respective Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland. I decline entering into the abstract view of the competency of Parliament, to substitute another constitution in the place of *that*, for the preservation of which they have been invested with their legislative functions; it is a question of so dangerous a tendency, and upon which such a diversity of opinions has prevailed among men of the first abilities, that I shall not venture to enter upon the consideration of it; but this much I shall venture to affirm, that if the formation of the Parliament of Ireland be so vicious and defective as you represent, it cannot be competent to bind the Catholics by establishing such articles of Union as shall exclude *them for ever* from participating in the legislature of the united kingdoms.

Expectations

Expectations have been held out to the Catholics that those laws of exclusion will be altered by the United Parliament: whether there be any reasonable foundation for such expectation, will be best ascertained by taking a retrospect view of the conduct of Parliament since the Revolution. There are in Great Britain as well as in Ireland a considerable number of Catholics, though not in so great a proportion to the Protestants, the English legislature have required such oaths to be taken by members before their admission into Parliament as have excluded Catholics from sitting in it; they are in Great Britain deprived of the elective franchise, they are rendered incapable of enjoying any employment, civil or military, in that kingdom. An attempt was made, not many years ago, in the British Parliament, to repeal the Test Act, but without effect. In the present case the British Parliament, by the propositions which they have laid before his Majesty, acted fairly and openly by the Catholics; they have *constitutionally* declared, that the churches of England and Ireland, and the doctrine, worship, discipline and government thereof, shall be preserved as by law established, thereby affirming, and securing the ascendancy of the Protestant religion and the King's *supremacy* in the government of the church; they have declared that the same oaths now in force shall continue to be taken by the members of the United Parliament. When such then is the language of Parliament, how unwarrantable must it be in individuals to use endeavours to impose upon the Catholics by holding out to them expectations totally incompatible with the spirit and meaning of the propositions themselves. Compare the condition of the Irish Catholic with that of the British; in Ireland he has the elective franchise, and is

capable of enjoying every office, civil and military, a few only excepted, from all which the British Catholic is excluded. Your Lordship, notwithstanding your feelings for the Irish Catholics, has never attempted to procure for the *British* Catholic the rights and privileges which the *Irish* Catholic enjoys. Should an Union take place, no distinction *can be made* between the Catholics of the united kingdoms; either the British Catholic must be raised to the level of the Irish Catholic, or the Irish lowered to the level of the British. This measure of adjustment must be determined by the United Parliament, where British influence must always predominate: and can it be expected that the British majority will concede to the Irish minority? That the standard of adjustment will probably be lowered, may be collected still further from the sagacious conjecture of that eminent statesman Lord Auckland, who expresses himself thus: "It has long been my opinion, that whatever may be the indulgences, more or less limited, to the Catholics of England, the measure of those indulgences ought to guide our discretion with respect to the Catholics of Ireland." Whether the Irish Catholic is more likely to be raised or depressed by the proposed Union, I leave to the sagacity of the most intelligent Catholics to decide, from the foregoing observations; earnestly wishing that they may not feed themselves with vain hopes of further concessions which will never be realized. The illiberal and mischievous policy of ruling by division in order to rule by *Union*, I am sorry to observe, seems to be your maxim, as well as that of several other ministerial speakers on the imperial question of Union. But let me tell you, my Lord, honesty is the best policy between states, as between individuals. The
 torch

torch of discord has been unhappily kindled in Ireland, and has blazed out into insurrection, and open rebellion. It has been the fashion to attribute it principally to popish fanaticism, but I apprehend without sufficient foundation; the primary promoters of that rebellion were Protestants and Presbyterians as well as Romanists, and the hostility of the united conspirators was levelled against all religious establishments, although they endeavoured to avail themselves of the political engines of superstition and bigotry. This clearly appeared upon the examination of the leaders of the conspiracy before the parliamentary committees; their object was the same with that of the English and Scotch conspirators; all were actuated by the same jacobinical principles; they wished to overturn the civil and religious government of both kingdoms, and to substitute in its place the anarchy and confusion of a democratic republic on the miserable model of France. The Irish rebels did not limit their revolutionary views, as has been insinuated by your Lordship, to regain the forfeited lands of which they considered themselves to have been *unjustly* deprived. Few, indeed, engaged in that rebellion, had any such claims to urge; their views extended to a new partition of the whole landed property of Ireland among themselves. In England also and Scotland, as well as in Ireland, the same revolutionary principles were unremittingly propagated and disseminated, where the Romish religion had small comparative influence. The reports of the parliamentary committees prove its progress through Great Britain. It appeared *there* sufficient to authorise the enacting of such laws, as the necessity of the case could alone justify. At that time Great Britain was secured by a great military force, Ireland was in a most defenceless state,

state, France clearly saw that Great Britain was most vulnerable in that part of her Empire, she applied herself with redoubled activity to diffuse her principles among the Irish people, with whom, from their poverty and ignorance, she had the greatest prospect of success. The object of the rebels was to overturn all government, which necessarily would have produced a separation between Great Britain and Ireland. Let the loyal Irish compare the state their country would have been in, if, at the time the rebellion broke out, the parliament, melted down into that of Great Britain, had been sitting at Westminster, and one hundred and thirty-two of her most distinguished characters for talents and property engaged in attending that parliament—with that in which she then stood, assisted by a parliament of her own, sitting in her capital, whose most diligent attention was exerted in investigating and defeating the machinations of the rebels, and whose principal gentry exercised their utmost influence in preserving and restoring good order and tranquillity among the inhabitants of their respective estates. Believe me, my Lord, the indefatigable industry of the Irish Houses of Parliament, and of the resident gentry, were, under Providence, the powerful means by which that rebellion was counteracted and suppressed. The meritorious conduct, therefore, of the Irish Parliament furnishes a most forcible additional argument against its extinction. Whilst Ireland has a constitution *worth preserving*, she will ever apply her most strenuous exertions in its support, her Parliament, she considers as the only security for the permanent preservation of the liberty she now enjoys.

You

You have taken a review of the present Constitution of Ireland to shew that she is not an independent nation, in which I perfectly agree with you, the act of annexation of the crown of Ireland to that of Great Britain, the act of 1782, by which the legislative functions of the sovereign of Ireland can only be performed through the Great Seal of Great Britain, speak in the strongest language, the superiority of Great Britain over Ireland. The administration of the executive government of Ireland by a viceroy (which must still continue if the Union should take place) is another instance to which you resort, to prove her superiority over Ireland. I do not only *acknowledge* her superiority in those instances, but I consider such as necessary to her prosperity. In all imperial concerns, Ireland ought to follow in the wake of Great Britain, the sole power of making war and peace, entering into treaties with foreign powers is vested in the King of Great Britain by virtue of his royal prerogative: in all these particulars (as Blackstone expresses it) the constitution considers him as the representative of the people; but it has been observed, that although these powers are vested in the Crown, yet the support of a war depends upon the concurrent will of the Parliament. History does not furnish one instance where Parliament has withheld such support. The motive which has produced this uniform concurrence with the Crown is that which ever will produce the same effect—self-interest and self-preservation. This must operate with greater force upon Ireland than upon Great Britain, as she in such a case would be much more defenceless; wherefore, since Great Britain, under the present mode of connexion between her and Ireland, is, by *your own statement*, invested with all those powers in imperial concerns, which are ne-

cessary for the government of the Empire, I cannot find any occasion upon *that account* to resort to an incorporating Union.

A private correspondence between the Duke of Portland and Lord Shelburne, in May and June, 1782, has been rather unguardedly produced to the public by Mr. Pitt, which his Grace states to be *so delicate in its nature, requiring so much secrecy and management*, that he would not trust the communication of it to any hand but his own. I shall decline making any comment upon the nature of that transaction. Ireland, however, *may* profit from its being made public. The object of the acts of Parliament then in the contemplation of his Grace were, that the superintending power and supremacy of Great Britain, in all matters of state and general commerce, should be virtually and effectually acknowledged; but your Lordship has clearly shewn, that without any such act of Parliament, Great Britain is already invested with such powers. Another object in his contemplation was, that the share of the expence in carrying on a defensive or offensive war, either in the defence of our dominions or those of our allies, should be borne by Ireland in proportion to the actual state of her abilities. To this part of his plan, I do not imagine that any objection could reasonably be made in Ireland. Participating, as she now does, in the commerce of Great Britain, she is bound to contribute her proportion to the protection of the Empire of which she constitutes an essential part. He further proceeds, that Ireland should adopt such regulations as may be judged necessary by Great Britain for the better ordering and regulating the trade and commerce with foreign nations and her own colonies and dependencies,

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consideration being duly had to the circumstances of Ireland; this part of the plan also appears unobjectionable. These are the great objects which are avowed to be expected from the Union; and it appears that the corresponding parties *then* thought that they could be secured by such acts of Parliament as they described, without depriving Ireland of her present constitution.

Your Lordship having pointed out all those instances in which Ireland is dependent on Great Britain, I shall advert to those particulars in which I consider Ireland as independent under her present constitution. She now has the sole and exclusive right of making laws for her internal regulation and taxation; for although it may be said that she has not *absolutely* the power of enacting any law, as it must be first ratified under the Great Seal of Great Britain, yet she has a moral certainty, from the interest which Great Britain must necessarily take in the prosperity of Ireland, that such ratification will never be withheld by the executive of Great Britain, unless in cases where such law may be really injurious to her; nor is there more reason to apprehend that the King shall refuse his royal assent to bills really useful and expedient to the public, than that he should refuse to permit the Great Seal of Great Britain to be annexed to them. Upon those powers, therefore, with which her own Parliament is invested, Ireland relies, as the foundation on which her liberties are to be supported. The interest of Great Britain is intimately interwoven with that of Ireland; the strength, the opulence, the prosperity of Ireland, are the strength, the opulence, and the prosperity of the sister kingdom: Ireland must stand and fall with Great Britain. This measure of an Union is pressed upon Ire-

land, not *required* by her. The language held forth by Mr. Pitt, Lord Auckland, and others of the ministerial phalanx, has been that of persuasion mingled with menace, extolling the great advantages in commerce which Ireland enjoys through British bounty, their precarious tenure depending on the good will and pleasure of a British Parliament; at the same time insinuating the danger of their being withdrawn, should Ireland refuse this great boon now tendered to her, alleging that her protection depends upon the strength of Great Britain, which might, perhaps, be withdrawn from her. Such indirect menaces need not alarm Ireland: she well knows that the continuance of those benefits depends upon the best possible security;—the interest of Great Britain that she should continue to enjoy them. In truth, mutual interest is the only cement which can bind nations; it is that which has preserved the connexion of these kingdoms for so many centuries. To the powerful aid of that connexion and efficacious co-operation of Ireland, is surely to be attributed much of the high rank and proud station in which Great Britain now stands as the bulwark of the liberties of Europe. *Your* language, upon this part of the subject, has, indeed, materially differed from that of others of the ministerial phalanx; and it is but justice to your principles of liberality and sound policy, indicating the enlarged mind of a profound statesman, to state, that, (according to your representation) Ireland has a perfect right to claim, in times of danger, whether “from foreign or domestic enemies, the protection of the British navy and military, as well as pecuniary aid: that the preservation of Ireland is an English interest, and sufficiently precious to call for those exertions, even in a distinct and separate view of her

“ her own advantage. In the next place that she is
 “ intitled to it, as she is at all times contributory to the
 “ general service and security ; that her seamen, her
 “ foldiers, and her revenue all augment the general
 “ stock of British resources ; that if peculiar and tem-
 “ porary emergencies have at this or any other particular
 “ period, increased the local demands of Ireland upon
 “ the exertions of Great Britain, the scene of danger
 “ may, at any other times, be shifted ; and that there
 “ are recent grounds to be convinced that she will be
 “ ready to make extraordinary exertions upon extraordi-
 “ nary danger, in Great Britain, if such occasions should
 “ arise. That, in respect to the extensive commerce
 “ from without, and prosperous manufactures from
 “ within, which flow from a free participation of
 “ the imperial greatness of Great Britain, these, upon a
 “ view of the present connexion with Great Britain,
 “ belong to the very nature of the case, and naturally
 “ flow from the sentiments of fraternity and reciprocal
 “ kindness which should accompany such a connexion ;
 “ that such favours are prompted by a liberal, but, at the
 “ same time, by a wise policy.” (Fol. 106.) This is,
 indeed, my Lord, the true and rational principle upon
 which the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland
 should subsist ; and such connexion would never have
 been formed, but from an expectation of mutual advan-
 tages. Every increase of prosperity which Ireland re-
 ceives, contributes to the strength and prosperity of the
 British empire ; and most justly does your Lordship ob-
 serve, “ if identity of constitution be not founded on
 “ *identity of interest*, and is not followed by identity of
 “ sentiment and feeling towards the united empire, such
 “ an Union will not cure the evils of imperfect rela-
 “ tion,

“ tion, or even separation, but may bring some of them
 “ nearer and more home to both.” (Fol. 60.)—

This, indeed, is an observation well deserving the most *serious* attention.

The great object now held out to induce these two nations to adopt this measure of an incorporating Union is, that it will preclude all danger of separation. No man can feel more strongly than I do the ruinous consequences that would ensue from a separation; and therefore, upon that very ground, I deprecate such Union. I presume it will be admitted, as an incontrovertible position, that mutual interest and reciprocity of advantages, are the only strong and permanent bonds of Union between two nations. Their Union will continue so long as their mutual interest prompts them to it; no acts of Parliament will bind them longer than whilst the connexion continues to be useful to them. The present connexion has, for many centuries, preserved their union; each nation has felt the reciprocal assistance which they afforded each other. Great Britain was entitled to a superiority in all imperial concerns, and has enjoyed it. To the acquisition and peopling of her extensive colonies, Ireland has largely contributed. Still, however, Great Britain, for a long time, was so blind to her own interest, as to grudge to Ireland a participation of colonial commerce. We may further observe, that although the British Parliament has occasionally exercised the power of making laws for the internal regulation of Ireland, she never attempted to interfere with her *internal taxation*, that power having been solely exercised by her own Parliament. The dangerous consequences

sequences of attempting to impose internal taxation, may be illustrated by the American contest.

In 1770, Great Britain assumed a right of imposing an internal tax upon the article of tea imported into America. This occasioned much discontent : in consequence of which, the tax was so far repealed, as to leave only a remaining tax of three-pence a pound. This tax was not attempted to be collected, until 1774. At that time, unfortunately, the minister hazarded the experiment, whether America would submit to that unproductive tax, and thereby establish Great Britain's right to tax her. Ships freighted with tea were sent to Boston for that purpose, with orders to enforce the payment of the duty. The Americans felt the *magnitude* of the precedent, though the tax was *small*. They would not permit the cargoes to be landed, but threw them into the sea. Immediately upon this the Boston port act, and other compulsory acts, were passed, for the purpose of punishing the Americans, and forcing them to submit. This produced no other effect than that of uniting them in opposing the collection of the tax. I need not remind you of the hostile proceedings which followed ; but it is proper to observe, that the Americans had neither a *navy* nor an *army*, and that it was the universal opinion in Great Britain, that her power was sufficient to compel them to submit, if they should dare to resist. Ireland was not an inattentive observer of those proceedings ; she assimilated the case of the Americans to her own ; and sympathized with them during the progress of the war : she considered, that if Great Britain should establish her power of internal taxation on America, she herself was to become the *next* victim. Unable to cope with Great
Britain

Britain singly, America was secretly assisted by France. At length, in 1778, the French threw off the mask, and notified, by their ambassador, to the British minister, that they had formed an offensive and defensive alliance with America. Things then, indeed, assumed a most serious aspect: Great Britain was alarmed; Ireland grew discontented; and her manufacturers were starving. She exclaimed against the injustice of Great Britain, for withholding from her the colonial trade, and urged it most forcibly in her own Parliament. Alarmed by the danger of losing America, Great Britain yielded to the necessity of cultivating the affections of Ireland, and, by increasing Irish resources, to enlarge Irish ability to succour and support her. These considerations induced her to admit Ireland into a share of her trade with the colonies. The crisis at which this took place, may suggest a doubt, whether it proceeded from an enlarged spirit of liberality, or merely of self-interest. I wish I could satisfactorily ascribe it to the former motive. The attempt to tax America made a strong impression on the Irish mind. What advantage, they said, could accrue from the enlargement of their trade, if Great Britain should have a power to make laws by which their property might be affected? In 1782, Great Britain acknowledged the independence of America; and, learning wisdom from misfortune, she saw the necessity, as well as the justice, of yielding to the wishes of Ireland, and of admitting her to share in British freedom. By the constitutional adjustment of that year, the sole power of making laws for the internal regulation and taxation of Ireland was vested in her own Parliament. This solemn recognition of her independent legislative power is now considered by Ireland as her Magna Charta. Can we then
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be surprized, if she be tremblingly alive to any measure which may tend to infringe it?

In 1785, the commercial propositions were introduced in the Irish Parliament. They had been framed in Great Britain, and offered by Mr. Orde, for settling the intercourse in commerce between the two nations, and the contribution which was to be furnished by Ireland towards the support of the British navy. The mode of contribution was judiciously planned by regulating it according to the increase of her commerce.—These propositions were represented by Mr. Orde as perfectly satisfactory to Great Britain; and so much were they approved of in the Irish House of Commons, that, upon a division, the tellers of opposition had none to tell. The propositions having been sent back again to Great Britain, met with great opposition in the House of Commons, chiefly raised by petitions presented against them by the trading interest. They underwent many alterations, and had ten propositions added to them. They were again laid, as altered by Mr. Orde, before the Irish House of Commons; who moved for leave to bring in a bill for establishing them: but, upon the discussion of that motion, some of the additional propositions were strongly objected to, as tending to infringe upon the acknowledged independence of the Irish legislature. It is not improbable, that having been introduced as *additional* propositions to those which had been stated as satisfactory to Great Britain (no part of which in any sort pointed to constitutional questions) and the people of Ireland, being particularly jealous at *that time* of any thing which tended to touch upon her constitution so recently established, this circumstance might have cre-

ated an opposition to matters, which, in other circumstances, might have passed without notice. Although Mr. Orde's motion was carried by a majority of nineteen, he did not take any further step towards carrying that measure into execution, than that of introducing the bill; probably judging, that an adjustment of such importance to the connexion between the two nations, required a more general approbation. Had the bill been committed, it might, perhaps, have been so amended as to have obviated the particular objections urged against them: but those very propositions contained every thing which related to the commercial interests of Ireland, as fully, equitably, and beneficially to both nations, as can be effected by the proposed Union. Had that bill passed, all the commercial questions under debate would have been adjusted, and the specific contribution ascertained to be paid by Ireland towards the support of the navy; and surely such a bill as might have been then brought in, may still be passed, without infringing on the legislative independence of Ireland.

It has been reported, that meetings have been had between the British Minister and several persons holding high offices in Ireland, for the purpose of digesting the plan of the intended Union, and that the result in respect of the formation of the united Parliament has been to the following purport: That both Houses of the British Parliament shall remain in their present state, perfect and entire; that Ireland shall furnish to the House of Lords 32 members, namely, 28 lay Lords and 4 spiritual; and that 100 members shall be added by Ireland to the British House of Commons. In a Parliament thus constituted, the Irish Lords would make one-tenth of

of the united House of Lords, and the Commons amount to one-sixth of that body: Such is the intended plan of the united Parliament, to be substituted in the place of that which now exists in Ireland. By a Parliament thus composed, all laws to effect the united kingdoms are to be enacted; but what influence can so scanty a proportion of Irish members have upon the decisions of the legislative body? In the name of common sense, can any one imagine, that such laws will not be *actually* made by the preponderating power of the British members? The determination must ever be the same as if the 100 *cyphers* of Irish members did not sit in such Parliament: Irishmen cannot be satisfied with such a mockery of representation.—When they shall feel the increase of their taxes (which certainly will be the case) they will attribute it to their being laid on by the British members who impose taxes, the weight of which they do not feel, and which they may be induced to lay on in order to alleviate burdens of their own. Ireland may have abundant reason to compare the taxes to be imposed with those formerly laid on by her own Parliament. Irishmen will lament the irremediable change, and their *legal* inability to be restored to their former Constitution. Universal discontent may ensue, and what fatal consequences to the peace and tranquillity of the Empire may result, and how far it may endanger the connexion between the two islands, I tremble to anticipate.

It has been represented, that Ireland is so circumstanced that she *must* submit to the power of Great Britain; that she has no army, no navy, and no other alternative but to embrace French fraternity, the misery of which cannot be represented in too strong colours.

Wretched as the despotism of France is at present, by following wild theories of impracticable government, it is contrary to the nature of things, that she should remain for ever in her present state of anarchy; the fever must at length subside, and a rational form of government succeed. She may then gradually recruit her navy, and take her proper station in the scale of Europe, while her inveterate implacable animosity to Great Britain will never subside. She will court every opportunity of humbling that formidable rival, and should discontents at any future period prevail in Ireland, will take every step to foment them. She will not fail to insinuate how grossly Ireland has been duped, by exchanging her independent Parliament for the *mockery* of legislative representation. Should she find such insinuations operate, she will add her fraternal offers of emancipation, and enter into a similar offensive and defensive alliance with *Ireland* as she did with *America*.

Let Great Britain beware of presuming too much upon her own strength and our weakness.

If there be a prudent jealousy in the British Constitution, respecting the disposal of the public purse; if the Commons have been so tenacious of that right, that they will not suffer the Lords even to make an addition to a pecuniary fine, laid on by them, will Ireland be satisfied to be taxed at the discretion of the British Parliament? For such the imperial Parliament must in fact be considered.

I shall now shortly observe upon the circumstances of the two nations in respect of finance. A considerable

increase of taxation must necessarily take place in Ireland, if she is to bear a part of the discharge of the British debt. I shall state its amount from Mr. Pitt's representation during the last session. Great Britain owes about *four hundred millions*. The annual charge arising from that debt, for interest and annuities, amounts to upwards of *twenty millions and an half*, of which four millions and an half are appropriated as a sinking fund; on the other hand, the annual charge upon Ireland, for interest and annuities, amounts to somewhat more than one million one hundred thousand pounds, of which one hundred thousand pounds is applicable as a sinking fund. The rental of Great Britain scarcely reaches twenty-eight millions; and that of Ireland, whose contents are about one-third of those of Great Britain, may be estimated at about seven millions.

Certain resolutions have been laid before his Majesty by the Parliament of Great Britain, stating the outlines of the intended Union; one of which, the 7th, applies to this part of the subject. It is therefore proposed, "That the interest, or sinking fund, for the reduction of the principal of the debt incurred in either kingdom before the Union, shall continue to be separately defrayed by Great Britain and Ireland respectively." This applies to that part only of the interest which is appropriated as a sinking fund, but is totally *silent* in respect of the remaining part of the charge occasioned by their respective debts, the annual charge of which amounts to sixteen millions to be paid by Great Britain, and to one million to be paid by Ireland. I should collect from the silence of ministry, upon a subject of such magnitude, that it is intended that Ireland should be chargeable with,
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and subject to, *some part* of that enormous debt. Should this take place, and the part to be paid by Ireland be proportioned to her rental, it might occasion an additional annual charge upon Ireland of two millions and an half. Additional taxes must then be laid on Ireland to raise this enormous charge, which is far beyond her abilities to support. She will sink under the burden, will grow desperate, and embrace the first opportunity of relief. The rapid increase of debt in Ireland for these last two turbulent and disastrous years, has occasioned a great increase of taxes, which the poverty of her people feels already most heavily. But should such an addition to their taxes be made, as will be sufficient to raise this additional annual charge, it will in effect be putting Ireland into a state of requisition; and further, Ireland would not only suffer in the quantum of its amount, but also in its application. The whole sum so levied would be drawn out of this kingdom into Great Britain, and applied *there* to the discharge of her debt. Such a drain would gradually diminish, and in a few years annihilate the specie of Ireland; the course of exchange would come to be so high, that not a single guinea would be left in that kingdom. Commerce would cease from want of capital, bankruptcies ensue, and the taxes become unproductive, from the decay of trade. Great Britain would *too late* feel the impolicy of such a measure. If it is meant that Ireland should not be affected by the debt of Great Britain, it will require much ingenuity, indeed, to form such a plan of arrangement between the two nations, as shall secure each from being affected by the debt of the other; and more especially to secure Ireland, when it is considered that the power of taxing Ireland is to be vested in the united Parliament, more properly

properly to be called the *British* Parliament, and that Great Britain is not to be affected by the taxes which shall be imposed upon Ireland.

I would suppose that by the articles of Union it should be agreed, that Ireland should be indemnified against that debt, and thereupon consent to give up her only security—her own Parliament. Can she expect that such articles will be adhered to, longer than Great Britain shall find convenient? Is not self-interest the primary motive which governs the actions of one nation towards another? The *omnipotence* of Parliament does not extend to prevent any future Parliament from *repealing* or *altering* laws which former Parliaments have enacted. Where is the tribunal to which Ireland can appeal, if such articles solemnly entered into by the present Parliament shall be infringed by any succeeding Parliament. There is none other which I know of but that of resorting to first principles, which GOD forbid should ever become necessary! Ireland knows, that while her own Parliament subsists, her liberties are secure; and, I trust, will have more good sense and virtue than to change the security she now has, for the *precarious tenure* of retaining her liberties so long as the Parliament of Great Britain (for such I must ever consider the united Parliament constituted in the manner proposed to be) shall be graciously pleased to permit her to enjoy them.

Having clearly shewn that an Union, to be formed agreeable to the outline laid before his Majesty, will not *identify* the two nations, but that all those *distinct* interests, in pecuniary and other matters, which I have pointed out, will continue as they do, under
the

the now subsisting connexion between them. It is not in the nature of things, that *one Parliament* should afford security to the liberties of two nations thus circumstanced.

Notwithstanding that it appears to *me* totally impracticable that any Union can be formed between those nations, by which they shall be so perfectly identified as that there shall not remain any distinct interest between them; yet, as it may be possible, that persons of *superior abilities* may, contrary to my expectation, be able hereafter to suggest such a plan of Union between those two nations, as shall perfectly identify them, in which case one legislature may be well suited to their government; it will become a matter of much importance, that their Parliament should be so formed as to produce satisfaction to both nations, be best suited to the exercise of the legislative functions, and should most effectually secure the liberties of the people.

In an arrangement for the *perpetual Union* of two nations, much regard ought to be had to the feelings of the people, and it should at least carry the *appearance* of being adjusted upon the scale of equality. Wherefore, then, should the diminution of the numbers entirely fall upon the Parliament of *one* of the nations to be united, whilst the Parliament of the *other* shall remain perfect and entire? The Irish House of Lords, consisting of about 230, is *intended* by the proposed plan to be decreased six-sevenths of its members, who are thereby to be deprived of their *hereditary* right of sitting in Parliament; and the Irish House of Commons to be reduced two-thirds of its members. The proportion of the
House

House of Lords is to consist of nearly nine-tenths British, and one-tenth Irish members; and that of the Commons five-sixths *British*, and one-sixth *Irish*. The circumstance of the numbers in the two houses being so *disproportionate* proves, that they have not been adjusted upon any scientific principle of calculation, but are intended to be *dictated* to Ireland, not proportioned to her claim. If reference is had to the history of the Union with Scotland, it will appear that consideration was had, both to the population and territorial property of the respective nations, from which the proportion of members for each nation was adjusted. That mode of proceeding was acting upon an acknowledged political principle—that of establishing their numbers according to their just claims. I shall not take upon myself to point out the just proportion to which each nation ought to be entitled, but shall state some extracts from the *statistical tables* published in 1789, which not having been framed for any particular party purpose, may with propriety be resorted to for information. From these it appears, that the supposed population of South Britain is 8,100,000; that of Scotland, *one million and an half*; and that of Ireland, *three millions forty thousand*. That the contents of South Britain are 54,112 square miles, that of Scotland 25,600 square miles, and that of Ireland 28,012 square miles—all English measure. I should suppose it not far from the truth, that the land contained in Ireland may be considered equal in point of value to the *average* of the lands contained in South and North Britain. It is observable, that at the time of the Union with Scotland, the English House of Lords did not consist of more than one moiety of its present number, which occasioned the proportion of Scotch peers in the British House to be

no more than sixteen. The British House of Commons, consisting of 558 members, is already so unwieldy a body for a deliberative assembly, that it would be extremely inconvenient to add to its numbers so many as the proportion to which Ireland would be entitled. I shall therefore submit the following plan for consideration, as better suited to the mode of forming the House of Commons, if such kingdoms should be united, than *that* of which it would be constituted, according to the arrangement herein before-mentioned.—In the first place, the due proportion should be ascertained to which Ireland ought to be entitled, the relative circumstances of each nation being justly compared with each other. I shall then recommend, that instead of adding such proportional number of Irish members to the British House of Commons, so many of the representatives of the minor boroughs of Great Britain shall be struck off, as will make sufficient room for the number to be added to the House of Commons as representatives for Ireland; these to consist of two members for each county, great town, and city, and of one representative for each of the towns next in consequence to them. This plan will prevent the inconvenience of enlarging that body, rather too numerous in its present state; and it will produce a most essential *parliamentary reform*, by purging the House of Commons of one moiety of the British representatives for such boroughs as have been considered as exceptionable; and its effect upon the *Irish part* of the representation will be still *more* comprehensive, as thereby the *whole* number of the members representing their insignificant boroughs will be struck off. This reform will be effected without infringing any one constitutional principle. If the legislative functions for both nations shall be performed

by *one Parliament*, it is essential to the interests of the *Empire*, that it be so arranged as to furnish the best possible security for the preservation of the constitutional liberties of the united nations. I shall again, however, repeat it, that where so many interests substantially distinct and incompatible as I have already pointed out, must necessarily subsist between the two kingdoms, it is not possible that the legislative functions for both nations can be performed by *one Parliament* with that equality and impartiality which might be expected from it, if those kingdoms were *perfectly identified*.—In respect of the House of Lords, it may be proper to add to the British House, such number of Irish Peers as may be their due proportion, according to the present number constituting the British House of Peers; and provision should be made, that if the number of the Peers should hereafter be increased, such number should be added to the Irish Peers to sit in such House, as should be necessary to preserve the same proportion.

There has lately been published a pamphlet, entitled, “Observations upon that part of the Speaker’s Speech which relates to Trade.” The author introduces several returns of the imports and exports from Great Britain and Ireland, for three years, ending the 5th January 1799, according to the *current prices* of the imports from Ireland into Great Britain, made by Mr. Thomas Irvine, Inspector General of the imports and exports of Great Britain. As I understand those returns, they state the current prices of the imports from Ireland, when brought into the *British market*. Those accounts were made out by the direction of Lord Auckland, and laid before the

British House of Lords. His object was, to shew how great the balance of trade carried on between the two kingdoms was in *favour* of Ireland, which his Lordship stated thus, "upon our intire trade with Ireland, the annual balance in her favour is above two millions*. The author of that pamphlet, adopting Lord Auckland's inference from said returns, states the balance of trade carried on between Great Britain and Ireland, to be £ 2,056,844 in favour of Ireland, which sum he alleges that Ireland annually *gains* by such trade.

In considering this subject, I shall suppose Mr. Irvine's returns correct, both in respect of the quantities of the commodities they relate to, and their respective values. Some mistakes may be noticed in them, which I attribute to errors in the press. It shall be my business to examine, whether the conclusion drawn from those returns be fallacious. In considering that question, I shall not enquire whether the articles included in such returns have been properly *named* by Mr. Foster, whether they are articles of the *first necessity*, or fall under this or that description; but I shall take them merely as articles of commerce, without any distinction whatsoever.

These returns state the current price in the *British market* of the different articles imported from Ireland, and also the current price in that market of the articles exported to Ireland, calculate their annual amount according to such prices, subtract the produce of the ex-

* Woodfall, 537.

ports to Ireland, from the produce of the imports from Ireland, and concludes that the difference between them is the amount of the gain of Ireland.

In order to form a proper judgment whether such conclusion be just, I shall analyse the sum produced in the British market upon the sale of the commodities imported from Ireland; it consists of four parts—the price paid in Ireland for those commodities, the expence of transportation to the London market, the profits of the merchant, and the customs paid upon their import. I am well informed that the average rate of insurance during these three years referred to, amounted to 4 per cent. taking therefore the whole expence of transportation at 5 per cent. must certainly under-rate it, which I choose to do, to prevent cavil. I shall take the expence of transportation at 5 per cent. and estimate the merchant's profit according to that stated by Mr. Pitt, in computing the income tax at 15 per cent. and take the amount of the customs at £47,500, as stated by Lord Auckland. Those parts of the value of the commodities according to their prices in the British market return into the merchant's pocket, they cannot produce any gain to Ireland, and therefore ought to be deducted from such estimated value. The remainder will be the sum *actually* received

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| by Ireland, as the price of her exported commodities; after deducting the amount of the customs paid, there will remain a sum of £5,565,189, five-sixths of which constitute the prime cost paid in Ireland, and one-sixth the twenty per cent. upon that sum thus, | £. | s. |
| Prime cost paid in Ireland | 4,637,627 | 10 |
| 20 per cent. upon such prime cost | 927,561 | 10 |
| Customs paid upon the import | 47,500 | 0 |
| | <hr/> | |
| Value as per Irvine's returns | 5,612,689 | 0 |
| | <hr/> | |

These sums of £927,561 10s. and £47,500 making £975,061 10s. must be deducted from Mr. Irvine's return of balance,

| £. | s. |
|-----------|----|
| 2,056,844 | 0 |
| 975,061 | 10 |
| <hr/> | |

Leaves the real balance of trade in favour of Ireland, } 1,081,782 10

An application to the inspector of imports and exports in the port of *London* was certainly well calculated, to *magnify the apparent balance in favour of Ireland*; I shall now state the balance, as it would have appeared upon similar returns made by the inspector of the imports and exports, in the port of *Dublin*, according to Mr. Irvine's mode of calculation.

| | £. | s. |
|---|-----------|----|
| Price paid in Dublin for the commodities exported from thence into Great Britain. } | 4,637,627 | 10 |
| Price paid in London for the commodities exported to Ireland. } | 3,555,845 | 0 |
| 20 per cent. upon that sum, | 711,169 | 0 |
| Customs upon their import into Ireland* as stated by Lord Auckland, } | 539,000 | 0 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Produce in the Irish market, | 4,806,014 | 0 |
| From above, | 4,637,627 | 10 |
| Balance in favour of Great Britain, . . . | 168,386 | 10 |

* Woodfall, 538.

The imports, therefore, from Great Britain, would have produced £.1,250,169 more in Dublin than what they cost in London, and a balance of £.168,386 10s. would have been struck in *favour* of Great Britain, instead of £.2,056,844 in *favour* of Ireland, as stated from Mr. Irvine's returns. That balance, however, struck in favour of Great Britain, would have been equally erroneous with that struck by Mr. Irvine in favour of Ireland, and for similar reasons. In my judgment, the proper mode of ascertaining the balance of trade between two nations, is, by comparing the amount of the sums paid in their respective markets with each other, for the commodities exported by them. Mr. Irvine's returns state the amount of the value of the exports from Great Britain to Ireland at

| | £. | s. |
|---|-----------|----|
| | 3,555,845 | 0 |
| I have shewn that the value of the exports from Ireland amounted there to | 4,637,627 | 10 |
| The real balance of trade is therefore* | 1,081,782 | 10 |

I am perfectly sensible, that the commerce between Great Britain and Ireland is a great advantage to Ire-

* It appears, from official documents laid before Parliament since the publication of this pamphlet, that the balance of trade in favour of Ireland, arising from her commerce with the whole world, taken upon an average of three years, ending the 25th of March, 1799, did not exceed the sum of £509,312.

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land; but I trust that I have shewn, that the balance in her favour has been greatly exaggerated, both by Lord Auckland and the author of that pamphlet. It is by this balance that Ireland is enabled to remit those large sums which are annually drawn into Great Britain by her absentees, the produce of whose estates Mr. Pitt states at one million.

I have thought it necessary that Great Britain should know what the real loss amounts to, which she sustains by her trade with Ireland, and that Ireland should be informed of the amount of the gain which arises to her from her trade with Great Britain.

I have read, with much astonishment, that part of Lord Auckland's speech, wherein, after stating from Mr. Irvine's returns, that the value of the imports into Great Britain from all the world amounted to £.46,963,000, and that of her exports to £.58,000,000, he concludes, that the balance of trade carried on by Great Britain with *all the world* amounts to one million in her favour*. Thus stating that the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland amounts, in favour of *Ireland*, to *double* that balance of trade which Great Britain has in her favour, from her immense commerce *with all the world*. The statement supported by the authority of a person of such distinguished abilities and clearness of understanding, and upon a subject to which he had directed

* Woodfall, 537.

his greatest attention, could not fail to make a strong impression upon the mind of every man who read it;— certainly it at *first* produced that effect upon me, and yet I found it very difficult to reconcile it with the idea I had formed of the immense wealth which Great Britain derived from her extensive trade with all the world; nor could I conceive it *possible* that Great Britain should not gain more from her trade with the *whole world* than *one half* of what *Ireland* gained from her trade with *Great Britain*. I had ever considered the balance of trade in favour of Great Britain as one of her principal resources: these considerations have led me to examine the nature of those returns, not without hope that I should find that Lord Auckland's conclusion had arisen from some error or misconception. I do suppose, that in Mr. Irvine's returns the comparison of the trade of Great Britain with all the world is stated in the same manner as that of the trade between Great Britain and Ireland, and consequently that the value of the imports is therein rated, according to their current prices, *after* their being brought into the British market. It gives me much satisfaction to find, that understanding thus the nature of those returns, I am enabled to remove the alarming impression which Lord Auckland's representation must have occasioned in the mind of every man who feels, with me, a warm interest in the prosperity and welfare of Great Britain. Upon examining those returns, I find that the same cause which produced the erroneous representation of the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland has occasioned the mis-statement of that between Great Britain and the whole world. I have already

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shewn,

shewn, that the only mode by which the balance of trade between two nations can be ascertained, is, by comparing the sums actually received by each nation respectively for the commodities exported by them. Mr. Irvine's returns of the amount of the imports do not only include the sum paid for them in the countries from whence they came, but also the expence of their transportation, the customs upon their import, and the merchant's profit; all these make part of the price which the purchaser pays for them in the British market. These additions do not confer any benefit upon the country from whence they are *exported*, or occasion any loss to that country into which they are *imported*. I shall estimate the *average* charge of importation from the different parts of the world at ten per cent., which must in my judgment be much under-rated, when it is considered that the insurance *alone* from Ireland to Great Britain is *four* per cent. The amount of the customs paid upon the importation has been stated by Lord Auckland to amount to £.6,897,500*, that sum must therefore be deducted from the sum of £.46,963,000, the estimated value of the imports; the remainder will be £.40,065,500, which sum is made up of the prime-cost, the charge of transportation, and the merchant's profit. The merchant's profit, taken according to Mr. Pitt's estimate at 15 per cent., and being added to 10 per cent. (the expence of importation), making 25 per cent., that sum of £.40,065,500 will be divided thus:

* Woodfall, 543.

| | |
|--|--------------|
| First cost, | £.32,052,400 |
| Expence of importation and merchant's profit, making 25 per cent. upon that sum, | } 8,013,100 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 40,065,500 |
| Amount of customs, | 6,897,500 |
| | <hr/> |
| Value of import, by Irvine's return, | £.46,963,000 |

The *prime* costs, therefore, of the *imports*; compared with the *prime* cost of the *exports*, will give the amount of the real balance of trade in favour of Great Britain :

| | |
|---|----------------|
| Prime costs of exports from Great Britain, | £.48,000,000 |
| Prime cost of imports, | - - 32,052,400 |
| | <hr/> |
| Balance of trade in favour of Great Britain*, | £.15,947,600 |

The amount of the imports from the West Indies have been very properly introduced in Mr. Irvine's returns, as constituting a part of the balance of trade. However, the greater part thereof, instead of occasioning any *loss* to Great Britain, constitutes a considerable part of her *resources*; they are in fact remittances to the absentee proprietors in *commodities* instead of *money*. Mr. Pitt states the amount of remittances from possessions beyond sea at five millions, taxable as income. These, added to the above balance of trade, occasion an

* Mr. Rose states the balance of trade in favour of Great Britain at £.14,800,000.

annual *influx* of money into Great Britain of nearly twenty-one millions *. These are the resources which have enabled Great Britain to supply the state with those immense sums which have been raised during the present war.

The measure which has been under consideration is so momentous in its consequences, and so complicated in its nature, that it requires the most attentive investigation. I have endeavoured to examine it in its various ramifications, and to view it in its different bearings. I have particularly attended to your Lordship's position, that the *only mode* of connexion which can remove the *evil of separation*, or confer the *benefit of Union*, is a *perfect identity* of government. This you lay down as the *criterion* to determine whether such Legislative Union ought to be formed between these two nations. For this purpose I have examined the nature of the connexion intended to be formed, agreeable to the outlines laid before his Majesty by the Parliament of Great Britain, from which it clearly appears, that if such connexion shall take place, every distinctness in revenue, taxation and expenditure *now* subsisting between the two kingdoms will continue, and consequently, that they will not be thereby *identified*. I therefore consider myself justified by your Lordship's authority, in asserting, that such

* The author had, in the former editions, considered the sum of one million, remitted annually from Ireland, as not having been included in the said five millions, which statement he now finds to have been erroneous.

Union ought not to be adopted; it has been shewn, that the great object of the minister in the pursuit of this measure, is to acquire the command over the purse of Ireland. This will be procured by the Union, through the immense majority of British members in the united Parliament. Should an Union take place, Ireland will be chargeable with a proportion of the expences of the empire, her own sinking fund, and *at least* the interest of her own debt. Taxes must necessarily be laid on for providing for such expences which shall extend to *that kingdom* only, they will be imposed *nominally* by the united Parliament, but *actually* by the majority of British members in such Parliament. Of the taxes thus *confined* to Ireland in their operation, those British members will not feel the pressure, nor will either *they* or *those whom they represent* be in any sort affected by them. By the Constitution the power of taxation is lodged in those who are to pay them, *the people*: this arrangement furnishes a security, that such power shall not be improperly increased, but that constitutional check will here be *undermined*, and the *people of Ireland* will be taxed by the *representatives of another people*, who do not *participate* in the burdens they *impose*.

Although unaccustomed to write, I have ventured to lay my thoughts before the public, in the plain language of common sense, upon that momentous question, which must determine, whether Ireland shall continue to enjoy a free Constitution, or become a province of Great Britain. I shall now, with all due respect, take my leave of your Lordship, relying upon the good sense of

my Countrymen, that they will resist this ruinous measure.

FARNHAM.

THE END.

FOR THE DETECTOR.

THOSE parts of Lord Minto's celebrated speech on the Union, which were generally considered as practically argumentative, have, I believe, been acknowledged, or rather felt, to be irresistible by all candid and reflecting men, who read them with attention; but those parts, which went to establish general principles, applicable to nations connected by ties too slender to form perfect identity of interests, have, I fear, failed of producing effects so extensive as the great truths they inculcate, and the sound doctrines they teach seem to promise; the latter, indeed, have been considered by many, as forming a chain of abstract theoretic reasoning, better calculated to amuse the metaphysician, than to inform the politician and the patriot. Let us then see whether this opinion be not unfounded, and thence judge whether this enlightened and philanthropic Statesman be not entitled to even greater celebrity than he has attained.

In the year 1790, a work was published by a person possessing the unbounded confidence of those who professed themselves to be the patriots of Ireland of that day; he was their oracle, he was the *primus mobile* of all their plans for national aggrandizement and national independence; he was the confidential agent of a great body, composing nearly three-fourths of the physical force of the nation; and he was the founder of a tremendous conspiracy, which has nearly shaken the State to its very foundation. Fortunately, his ambition outran his caution; too impetuous and impatient to await the maturity of his projects, he early furnished grounds for his own condemnation; but the lenity of Government enabled him to fill the measure of his crimes. He has, however, fallen their victim—but, alas! their effects have deluged his country with blood.

The work I mention was read with the general avidity which the reputation of the author bespoke; and, had not the doctrines it contained, been tried by the unerring criteria of practice and time, an attempt to expose them to public infamy would probably have been fruitless and vain. I will state some of those doctrines as they were introduced, in the garb of practical opinions applying to a particular case; they are in point to my enquiry, but I will place a clue at their head, which will conduct the unsuspecting, and even the prejudiced mind, through the labyrinth of wickedness and error which they form.

EXTRACT from LORD MINTO'S Speech.

"I am to speak now of those connexions which consist in some circumstance of identity, in the municipal constitutions of the two countries; that is to say, in having some part or member of the Government the same, with a distinctness and separate independence in all the rest. Such is that of one King or Executive power, with separate Legislatures.

"The first defect, which I remark in this mode of imperfect connexion, is similar, or perhaps I may say, precisely the same, with that which I have already observed upon, in relations merely federal. I mean that the connexion being but partial, and intended for partial purposes, the great mass of interests in each nation continue distinct; the attention of each country is still pointed towards a separate view of individual interest; and the public mind, if I may so express it, of the two nations, is kept distinct. I have already observed that distinct interests are generally opposite interests, or felt to be so by the two parties; and speaking of nations, I may add, that distinct minds are generally hostile. In these circumstances, the vicinity, and the connexion of such countries, instead of improving, as they might otherwise do, friendship and harmony between them, seem to produce the very opposite effects, and to cultivate a jealous and angry temper, prone to take offence and umbrage, and inspiring every trivial dissent or difference into grounds of permanent alienation and even hostility.

"Another grand source of indispotion between such countries, and that from which every one

of the evils attending this mode of relation seems to me most immediately to derive, is the inequality in their relative power and influence, occasioned, no doubt, by their inequality in real and positive power and influence. It follows necessarily from the very nature and constitution of human affairs, and no artificial or conventional arrangement, no provisions of positive institution can alter it, that in the union of two distinct and unequal countries, the superior must be predominant, and the inferior subordinate in their common concerns, and in the administration of the common parts of their Government. Hence follows, however, a nominal independence in the inferior state, accompanied by a daily and irksome consciousness of real dependence and subordination. It is this contradiction between the real and nominal condition of the inferior country that I consider as the most fruitful source of those evils which afflict such connexions, and ultimately extinguish them.

In Governments administered in this manner, under external influence, the eyes of the nation pass over the immediate and domestic instruments of their administration, to that which most appear to them, and may indeed be truly accounted its efficient head, I mean the external power which directs its counsels. It is therefore natural that the grievances, real or imaginary of such a country, should be laid to the account of that higher cause; that its discontents, chagrins, and resentments should be directed against that object; and that the exertions of patriotism, or the struggles of faction, as the case may be, the clamour and the activity, the eloquence and even the virtues of popular leaders and ambitious men, should all aim at that obvious mark. They will find in the people a disposition, founded also in nature, extremely favourable to the success of such aims. I have said that the minds of two countries thus circumstanced are not only distinct, but hostile. Jealousy is the sentiment likely to prevail between them; and indeed where both being nominally, and according to their abstract rights, independent and equal, one of the two exercises, nevertheless, a clear and undisguised ascendancy over the other, jealousy may, in truth, be thought to have no very unreasonable foundation. The prevailing national sentiment, the ruling passion, then, of the inferior country, comes to be an angry, impatient and intolerant love of their independency. Whoever touches that string, reaches their heart, and commands their affections and actions. Hence we shall observe a restless and never satisfied struggling with every circumstance either in the constitution of their government, or in the counsels and measures of their administration, which seems, even to the most subtle refinements of jealousy, to affect that object; hence a perpetual straining after its improvement and perfection; and hence also those imprudent, and, surely, ungenerous advantages which are sought, in periods of common distress or danger, to extort concessions favourable to that object; concessions which do not excite gratitude in those who receive them, because they are claimed as rights, and seem to have been enforced by necessity; concessions too which seem rather to whet than to satisfy the appetite that calls for them. Each victory of this kind becomes only a vantage ground from whence another may be fought for; and thus each succession of patriots, or of demagogues, seeking to enhance on the exploits of their predecessors, the improvement of independency is pushed forward until the true goal of that course comes in view—I mean separation.

"That separation is in truth the goal or winning post of this race of independency, must appear very clearly when we consider what the fundamental cause of the subordination complained of is, and what therefore must be the means of redressing it. The ascendancy of the superior country consists, no doubt, in its superior power, but it is the constitutional connexion that furnishes the channel or organ, through which the power of the superior state is brought home to the inferior country. If they have the same executive power, the influence of the superior state operates through that channel on every

branch and department of public affairs. If their legislatures, distinct in other respects, have one branch or member in common, the legislation of the inferior is bent to uniformity with the other by that power. Connexion then is the means of ascendancy in one, and the cause of subordination in the other, and it is manifest that these grievances can be alleviated, or redressed, only by diminishing or abolishing the cause. That is to say, in other words, that independency can be improved only by striking off, link after link, of the connexion, and its entire perfection can be attained only by breaking the last thread which holds the countries together.

"From this account of the matter it appears unavoidable that the course I have described should be pursued in every similar case, and that these events are not to be considered as fortuitous, but as deriving from uniform and pregnant causes likely to produce the same consequences wherever they exist."

EXTRACTS from an Enquiry how far IRELAND is bound, to resist, to embark in the impending Contest.

"MANY of the ideas in the following pages may doubtless appear extraordinary, and some of them, to cautious men, too hardy. To the first, it may be answered, that until the present, no occasion has happened where such a question could arise as I venture to investigate. Since the lately acknowledged independence of Ireland, this is the first time when our assistance to Britain has become necessary."

"It is universally expected, that at your meeting the Secretary will come forward to acquaint you, that his Majesty is preparing for war with Spain, and hopes for your concurrence to carry it on, so as to procure the blessings of an honorable peace; this message he will endeavour to have answered by an address, offering, very frankly, our lives and fortunes to the disposal of the British minister in the approaching contest; and that this may not appear mere profession, the popular apprehension is, that it will be followed up by a vote of credit for three hundred thousand pounds, as our quota of the expense, a sum of a magnitude, very alarming to the finances of the country; but it is not the magnitude of the grant which is the great object; it is the consequence of it, involving a question between the two countries of no less importance than this, "Whether Ireland be, of right, bound to support a war, declared by the King of Great Britain."

"If the Parliament of England address his Majesty for war, and in consequence war be proclaimed; if we are at once, without our consent, perhaps against our will and our interest, engaged, and our Parliament bound to support that war, in pursuance of that address; then I say the independence of Ireland is sacrificed, we are bound by the Act of the British Parliament, and the charter of our liberties is waste paper."

"The rising prosperity of Ireland is immolated on the altar of British pride and avarice; we are forced to combat, without resentment, in the quarrel of an alien, where victory is unprofitable, and defeat is infamous."

"I confess, I am, in the outset, much staggered by a phrase so very specious, and of such general acceptance, as this of "the god of the empire." Yet, after all, what does it mean? or what is the empire? I believe it is understood to mean the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland with independent legislatures, united under one head. But this union of the executive does by no means, to my apprehension, imply so complete an union of power or of interest, that an injury, or a benefit to one, is an injury or a benefit to the other—on the contrary, the present emergency shews, that occasions may arise, wherein the direct opposite is the fact. It is not two kingdoms being united under one head that involves, as a necessary consequence, a unity of sentiment."

"I have shewn, as I presume, that in the use of the word "empire," we are the dupes of a sound."

ment for our interference, the honor of the British flag; an argument, on the face of it, degrading to our country, and dishonorable to our spirit an argument, the mention of which should make every Irishman hang his head in sorrow and abatement—WHERE IS THE NATIONAL FLAG OF IRELAND? I know there are those who, conceiving their apathy or their corruption with the specious garb of wise and prudent caution, may raise their hands in astonishment at this, as an idle exclamation; but I say, that such a badge of inferiority between the two kingdoms, is a serious grievance. Is the bold pride of patriotism nothing? Is the ardent spirit of independence nothing? Is national rank nothing? If the flag of England be, as it is dearer to every brave Englishman than his life, is the wish for a similar badge of honour to Ireland to be scouted as a chimera? Can the same sentiment be great and glorious on one side the channel, and wild and absurd on the other? It is a mortifying truth, but not the less true for its severity, that the honor of the British is the degradation of the Irish flag. We are compelled to flunk under the protection of England by a necessity of our own creation; or, if we have not created, we have submitted to it."

"If this be the protection of England, I, for one, could be well content that we were left to our own wisdom to avoid, or our own spirit to support a contest."

"We owe no gratitude where we have received no favour. If we did, in 1782, extort our rights from England at the very muzzle of the cannon, whom have we to thank but ourselves?"

"What should Irish policy be, by British example? First of all, take care of ourselves. We invade none of her rights, we but secure our own. Why then should we fear her resentment? But the timid will say, the may withdraw the protection of her flag from us, and I answer, let her do so—every thing is beneficial to Ireland that throws us on our own strength. We should then look to our internal resources, and scorn to look for protection to any foreign state; we should spurn the idea of moving an humble satellite round any power, however great, and claim at once, and enforce our rank among the primary nations of the earth. Then should we have what, under the present system we never shall see, A NATIONAL FLAG, and spirit to maintain it. If we then fought and bled, we should not feel the wound, when we turned our eyes to the Harp waving proudly over the ocean."

The writer, Theobald Wolfe Tone, was well acquainted with the human heart. He knew the force of prejudice—he knew the feebleness of reason, when passion and pride usurped her dominion, and his pen was directed by that knowledge. His talents were considerable, but his fortunes were desperate, his ambition great, and his principles profligate. No man was more capable of arguing with dexterity and force, but his object was to inflame, not to convince. He succeeded in raising a storm, although he failed in attaining a secure eminence from which to direct it. The light in which he viewed the judgment and information of those, whose minds he hoped to govern, is exemplified in the great national independent exertions, which he supposed practicable with resources, to which a vote of credit of 300,000, would be of alarming magnitude; by the aggrandizement which he attaches to the idea of becoming a petty independent state, torn to pieces by faction, and destitute of the means of defence against any invading enemy; and, by the glory of possessing a national flag, without a ship either to carry it, or to protect the commerce of the country. In short, this sarrago of frippety bombastic declamation, and fallacious argument, written by a popular demagogue, and read, at the time, with applause, would seem to exhibit the strongest possible proof of the justness of Lord Minto's theory, contained in the extract which I have given of his speech; and yet proofs, beyond all comparison stronger, are to be found in the inflammatory and seditious Anti-Union writings and speeches of the present day.