
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## MODERATION

Recommended to the

FRIENDS


OF

IRELAND,

Whether of the COURT,

COUNTRY PARTY. In a Letter to the PUBLICK.

By an Honeft IR ISHMAN. THE SECOND EDITION; DUBLIN: Printed in the YEAR, 1754



## MODERATION

Recommended to the

FRIENDS of IRELAND, &c.

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F any of my Readers are curious to know the Author of this Letter, they may understand, that he is defirous of lying concealed; as the Knowledge of his Person may perhaps subject him to Personal Abuse, and can be of no real Service to the Cause of Truth and sincere Inquiry: But as far as a knowledge of his Circumstances and Situation in Life, may gratify the Curiosity of the Reader, He may believe, if he pleases, that the Author is one, who for the most part lives retired in the Country; em-A 2 ployed

ployed in his own Busines; and endeavouring to do all the Good he can in his Neighbourhood; yet is never wholly inattentive to the Affairs of the Publick, and the Concerns of his Country: that he is careful to live within the Bounds of a small Fortune, that he may at all Times preferve himfelf independent, and avoid any Temptations to mean or fervile Compliances : that he is not fo much as known at this Time to the Lord Primate, the Speaker, or any other of the leading Men in the Kingdom; nor has he any Thoughts of being farther known to any of them: that he efteems it an Honour to be beloved and regarded by all that know him; but would rather approve his Actions to his own Heart and Confcience, than to the Judgment of a capricious World : That he has been ever follicitous for promoting Union and Harmony among his Neighbours, and Peace and Profperity in his Country; and is particularly at this Time deeply concerned for the Wounds, which have been given to both, by our prefent Divisions, and furious Proceedings: That he has not the least Ambition to appear in Print, upon this,

or

or any other Occasion; being fensible of his own Defects, and confcious of his having no Pretensions to appear as a Writer, on this Subject, fave only from the Uprightness of his Intentions: that nothing should have induced him to put Pen to Paper, but his observing that the Writers on both Sides, (tho' one Side indeed much more than the other) have been too much actuated by the Spirit of

Party; and that, inftead of healing our Sores, or ftopping our Breaches, many of them have rather contributed to inflame the one, and to widen the other.

After fo much by way of Preface and Apology, I hope, I may more eafily find Gredit in advancing this Pofition ; that the two principal Parties, in which the Nation feems divided, have been blown up to their prefent Pitch of Hatred and Ill-will ; not fo much from a Difference of Sentiments, as from a Mif-reprefentation, and a Mif-understanding of the Principles, Tenets, and Views of each other : And that, as it is to be feared, that Passion, Pique, or Prejudice may have taken Possession of the Breasts of some eminent nent Men, on both Sides; fo, it is to be hoped, that there may be many honest Men found, who are well-affected to their King and Country; and whose Attachment to this, or that Side, is not owing to felfish, or fordid and partial Motives; but to a Mistake in their Judgment, or a Mis-apprehension of the Positions, Consequences, and Views of the others.

From this Notion (which is at least a charitable one; and the only one likely to cure our Divisions, or allay our Animosities;) I have ventured to step forth, and offer myself as a kind of Moderator in this Dispute : And tho? I cannot hope to have any great Influence upon such as are actuated merely by Pique, or any other selfish Passion, (but on the contrary must expect, rather, to offend and provoke all fuch, by expofing their Views :) yet I shall attempt, and would fain hope, to be able to remove the mutual Prejudices of fuch, as are honest and difinterested; and as far as any Men have really one and the fame End in View, (namely, the Honour of their King and the Good of their Country,) so far, to. bring bring them towards an Union of Affection ; as that they may be able, (at least,) to bear with one another, with Patience; though they may have thought it necessary to purfue that one End by different and contradictory Means.

With this View I now write this Letter, and I think I may take upon me to fay, that the best Writers on each Side do agree in the principal Points; which feem of most Importance in this Debate; and which therefore might have been Sufficient to have determined the Whole; had not fome other Motives intervened, which helped to warp and byafs our Judgments.

It is agreed, on both Sides, that not only the occafional or additional Supplies, (which are ufually granted from Seffion to Seffion,) but alfo the feveral Branches of the Hereditary Revenue, (whether derived from the Common or Statute Law) were all vefted in the Crown, as a Royal Truftee for the whole Community; more particularly, for the Support of His Majefty's Perfon and Dignity; nity; for the Maintenance of the Civil and Military Powers; for the Defence and Prefervation of the Kingdom against Intestine and Forcign Enemies; and for its Improvement in Trade and Manufactures; or in general Terms for the Service of the Publick; and the Benefit of the whole Nation : It is agreed alfo, that in our Constitution, the King is the visible Head of the Community ; the regular and standing Executor of the Laws; and, as fuch, must therefore have the Command of the whole civil and military Forces of the Kingdom, and the Management and Application of its Revenues; and that the actual and particular Direction of its Forces and Revenues must therefore be, in his Name, and by his Authority :

It is agreed alfo, That the Houfe of Commons is the Reprefentative of the People; and alfo the King's grand and national Council: That, as fuch, it has the Power of granting, or with-holding Supplies; and of punishing by Impeachment fuch Ministers, as shall advise a Mis-application thereof: That, in order to effect these Ends, the House must confequently confequently have a Power of calling for, and examining into, the Publick Accounts; not only to form Estimates of what Supplies may be neceffary for the Publick Service; but also to cenfure such Ministers as have at any Time advised a Mis-application of the Past; and, by modest Addresses to the Throne, to recommend such Methods as seem useful, and remonstrate against such as seem useful, and remonstrate against such as seem useful, and proposed will have no Effect, there to give the more effectual Check, of denying future Grants.

All these Points are plainly confessed, or strongly implied in the Writings of the Authors on both Sides; and, as well to avoid multiplying detached Quotations, (which often deceive;) as also to ingage my Readers, to take a more serious Review of what has been already wrote on both Sides, and to reconfider the Subject with greater Attention; I shall here take them for granted; and only refer all such, as find any difficulty in allowing them, for farther Satisfaction, to the se-

larsvCommons interrering in this Matter,

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veral Pamphlets lately published on this Subject.

- But, tho' the above Principles feem to be pretty well agreed on, yet it must be owned, that each Party have drawn Conclusions from them, which are somewhat different; probably as their Thoughts may have been used to dwell, either on the Dignity of the Crown, or the Liberty of the Subject.

The one, (looking on the King as the visible Head of the Community, and the standing Executor and Administrator of the Laws,) think it an Incroachment on his Prerogative, and an invading of his peculiar Province in our Constitution; that the House of Commons should (of their own mere Motion,) take upon them, to draw up a Bill, directing the particular Application of that Treasure, or those Funds, which had been formerly granted, and before intrusted to his Majesty's Management, for the Support of his Government: They look upon the Commons interfering in this Matter, as carrying

carrying in it the Appearance of an Infinuation, that his Majesty had some how abused the Royal Trust and Confidence, reposed in him; and of Consequence, that fuch an Attempt may be looked upon as affrontive to his Dignity, and tending to alienate the Affections of his Subjects : And therefore they think it a Right due to every good King, that his Confent and Approbation should be first had (either by his own free and voluntary Declaration, or by his gracious Answer to their humble Petition and Address) before the Commons shall prefume to prepare or bring in Heads of a Bill, which in their Opinion, seem to divest him of a constitutional Right, to rob him of the Glory of his Administration, and to carry Rudeness and Affront in the Attempt.

The others, looking on the Commons, as the Reprefentatives of the People, (by whom Supplies are raifed and paid,) and also as the grand Council of the King, and as having confessed a Power, in any Bill for granting of new Supplies, to point out and advise (in fuch Bill) fome Appropriations,  $B_2$  or

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or particular Applications, of some Parts of fuch new Supplies; are inclined to think, that the like Power might extend backwards, without Inconvenience; and, that they might in like Manner take upon them, without any Offence, to point out and advife (by bringing in a Bill for that Purpofe,) the particular Application of any Surplus or Redundancy, which hath arisen from the Funds formerly granted ; without waiting for his Majesty's Leave, or addressing him for his Confent, or even, (when that Confent has been freely offered,) without taking any Notice thereof, or paying any Respect to his Goodness therein : Which in their Notion would be to compliment away their own Rights, and the Liberties of the People.

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This feems to have been the true Question in Debate, on the Merits of which the Committee of the whole House divided; and chose to reject an allow'd useful Bill, rather than (by passing it,) seem to pay that acknowledgement, which his Majesty expected.

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That the King has the general Right of Application is confessed on both Sides; and that the Commons have the Right of pointing out or advising any particular Application, by an humble Petition, or Address, is likewife allowed : But whether this Right extends so far, as to justify them in bringing in a Bill for that Purpose, as if by their own mere Motion, and without any Acknowledgement of his Majesty's Right to be previoufly confulted; this (I must again repeat it) was the Question in Dispute ; And this Question, with Respect to the King, was reputed a Question of positive Right, but, with Respect to the Commons, was deem'd by many, only a Question of Form, and mere Compliment; because of no real Importance to the Nation; nor in its Consequences effential to the Liberties of the People; and therefore the rejecting an useful Bill, thro' mere Formality, was looked upon by the other Side, as carrying Matters with a little too high an Hand; and not with fuch Respect as was due to a good and gracious King; especially in a Matter, where (by his Recommendation

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mendation) he had paid them the Compliment of joining with him in doing what he might by his own mere Motion have folely done; and has accordingly fince actually done, to the general Satisfaction of his People.

But tho' this feems to have been the true Queftion, upon which the moft knowing of the Commons differed; and upon the Merits of which, the laft Writers for the Majority would now be thought to lay the whole Force of their Arguments: Yet many of the Commons, on both Sides, (with all due reverence be it fpoken,) as well as many of their Abettors, feem fo far to have miftaken the Nature of this Queftion, as to have charged their Antagonifts with holding very abfurd and unreafonable Confequences; and fuch as are utterly inconfiftent with the Principles allowed on both Sides.

That many, both in and out of the House, charged their Opponents with such unfair Consequences, is evident from the Debates and Arguings in the House, as well as from the Pamphlets since published, and the clamours mours that were raifed both before and fince the Debate in the House,

Some of the Majority, and their Defenders, argued, that the paffing this Bill would have been an Acknowledgement of his Majesty's absolute Power over the Treasury, and his Right to apply the Publick Revenue to any private Uses he pleased, even the most inconfistent with the public Welfare; the Effect of which might have been, that a wicked or avaricious Prince might in some future Time entirely exhaust the Treasury; leave the Kingdom destitute of its Species; and of all Means to carry on its Trade, or provide for its Defence. Now, tho' this was a Topic made Use of by many in the House; and tho' it was the dreadful Apprehenfion of this, which raifed fuch an Outcry against this Bill all over the Kingdom; yet it must be plain to all attentive and impartial Men; that there could not be the least Foundation in Reason for this apprehended Consequence : because the Advocates for the Prerogative claimed no Power for his Majesty over the Treasury; but (as a Royal Trustee) for the Publick

Publick Service; and as accountable to the Publick : And because it was notorious, that during his present Majesty's long Reign, there never had been any Abuse or Mis-application of the public Treasure; nor had his Majesty ever refused to submit the Publick Accounts to the Inspection of his faithful Commons; or ever demanded any greater Supplies, than what they themselves should judge necessary: And, if it should ever happen, that any future King should, (by ill Advice, or otherwife,) be tempted to a Mifapplication of the publick Revenue; an eafy and effectual Remedy was then at Hand ; it being allowed, on both Sides, that the Commons might not only humbly remonstrate against it, but also stop the additional Duties fo misapplied; and even proceed to impeach fuch Ministers, as should advise fuch Mis-application. So that in Truth fuch a Confequence was laid to the Charge of the Preamble to this Bill, without the least Grounds, either, from Reason, or Experience; and the Fears of it were imaginary, wild, and chimerical; tho' to them were chiefly owing the Clamours raifed against it all over the W: DEL (as a Koyal I ru On Nation,

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On the other hand, fome of the Minority, and their Defenders, argued, that the rejecting this Bill; feemed to arrogate to the Commons an Independency, both, on his Majefty, and his Kingdom of England; that it looked like taking upon them to be the Executors of our Laws, inftead of the King; and to change our Conftitution, from a ftrong and well-temper'd Monarchy, to a weak and licentious Republick.

And yet, if the main Queffion in Debate be impartially confidered, the Fears of this alfo were imaginary, and without a fufficient Foundation. For, the Majority claimed a Right of advifing and pointing out to his Majefty, by the Heads of a Bill, fuch particular Applications of any Surplus in the Treafury, as they judged falutary to the Kingdom, by their own mere Motion ; and without paying any Regard, or taking any Notice of his Majefty's previous Confent, (to whose Difpofal those Funds had been before intrusted ;) yet ftill they allowed an Approbation, or Negative in his Majefty, before fuch their C Advice Advice could take Effect, or have the Force of a Law; fo that the Power of controuling or over-ruling their Advice was still in his Majesty; and in this Light the Contest of many seem'd to have been; whether his Majesty's Consent ought to be signified, previous to the Motion in the House, or whether his subsequent Consent to the Bill, (when prepared and transmitted) should be deemed sufficient.

Upon the Whole then, the bare paffing or rejecting of this Bill, upon Account of the added Preamble (which recites his Majefty's previous Confent and Recommendation;) does not feem to have been neceffarily fraught with fuch terrible Confequences, as the Abettors of each Side would fix upon the other: And they may in great Measure have arisen, on both Sides, from a Mis-apprehenfion of the real Question in debate, and its natural Tendency.

When the Question is impartially confidered, it must be allow'd; that in all fuch Funds as are granted in general Terms (without any particular Appropriation) for the Support

Support of Government; there his Majesty by our Conftitution hath the positive and actual Right and Title of ordering and applying the Money which hath arifen from those Funds, to fuch particular Uses of Government, as He in his Diferetion shall think proper; but still, as a Trustee for the Publick; and as accountable to the Publick: And every good King will at all Times be pleased with the Advice of his Commons; provided it be tendered in a proper Manner, and with a due Respect to that peculiar Power, in our Community, which our Conffitution and Laws have given him, and which the Dignity and Authority of his Crown requires. But with respect to the Funds already granted, and the Money actually in the Treasury, it is feared, that his Majesty may think it a little odd; that his Commons should take upon them (of their own mere Motion, and by Heads of a Bill) to refume those Grants already made ; and to direct the Application of the Money already vested in him; especially, when he has ever shewn himself disposed to ask, and be directed by, their Advice, upon all proper C 2 Occasions ;

Occafions; and particularly, on this Occafion, has condefcended to afk their Advice; And to recommend to them, and defire their Concurrence, in a particular Application of the Publick Money, which he might have made by his own fole Authority : In fuch a Cafe, must not his Majesty think it agreeable to Order, and highly becoming his Commons, that some Notice should be taken, and some Respect shown, to this his Condefcension; wherein he seems to wave

his Right of being the fole Director, and only claims the Acknowledgement of being the first Mover?

In the Grants of new or additional Supplies, He allows his Commons to appropriate or point out the Application, as particularly as they pleafe; and claims no Right of Application in himfelf, but (as the Publick Truftee) where the Funds are granted in general for the publick Service : And even in thefe, acknowledges Himfelf, and his Servants, accountable to the Commons; and that in them is the Right, not only of punifhing his Servants, but of remonstrating to himfelf, felf, and (if neceffary) of leffening or ftop= ping fuch new and additional Funds.

And this furely must cut off all Apprehenfion and Danger of those future and imaginary Mis-applications, which have stalked round the Land, like the nightly Apparitions of the Vulgar, in gigantic Sizes, and in all Kind of frightful and terrifying Shapes.

On the other Hand, it must be allowed, and is confessed, that the Commons have the Right of granting or with-holding all new or additional Supplies; and that in feveral of the granting Bills, they have taken upon them to point out the Application to fuch particular Uses as they judged proper, without its being ever objected to by his Majesty: They have been also allowed to address his Majesty, and often to recommend to his Bounty, fuch particular Applications of the Public Money, as they thought convenient, and I believe have feldom been re. fused, when such Addresses have been properly transmitted : but to take upon them, by drawing up Heads of a Bill, to appropriate

ate to particular Uses, any Surplus or Redundancy in the Treasury: (the Application of which, had been before intrusted to his Majesty.) This it is feared he will look upon as invading his Province, and therefore, tho? he will be at all times ready to join with his Commons in fuch an Application; yet he may expect, that they should not, of their own mere Motion, and without his Confent, take it upon them; because there may be feveral Uses of Government, for which his Majesty may intend that Surplus; and, if it, should be otherwife applied by the Commons, those Opportunities may be lost, and the Nation thereby fuffer. Whereas, tho? the Commons should claim no such Right of interfering in his Majesty's Administration, nor of applying to any particular Use, any Surplus which they find in the Treasury, but leave that, according to the original Truft, in the Hands of his Majesty; yet it could be attended with no poffible Inconvenience to the Nation, because, when the publick Accounts come before them, they may very properly confider fuch Surplus then actually in the Treasury, (or Arrear outstanding on any

any of the Branches of the Revenue,) as a Balance in his Majefty's Hands, ready to be applied by him to the Service of the Publick; and therefore, in laying on new or additional Supplies, for the infuing Years, may make those Supplies fo much lefs, than wou'd be otherwife Neceffary, (in cafe there had been no Surplus or Balance in the Treafury,) or they may in the granting Bill appropriate fuch Parts of the new Supplies, as they may judge neceffary for answering any particular Purpose, not usually provided for under the general Denomination of the Publick Service.

And all this being allowed by the Advocates for the Prerogative, will be as effectual for the Service and Benefit of the Nation, as if the Commons had the Right of actually applying fuch Surplus ; and alfo must ever be a a Tye upon the Crown, fufficient to prevent any fuch Mif-application, as fome Men feem willing to forebode.

So that in Truth, had this Bill passed without any Opposition on Account of the Preamble;

amble; and had the Recital of his Majesty's previous Confent been an express Acknowledgement of his Prerogative; and his Power of applying the Publick Treasure to fuch Uses of Government as He in his Diferetion thought proper; yet confidering the Checks and Tyes which the Commons have, both; on his Majesty and his Ministers, in Case of any Mif-application; I cannot fee any probable Inconveniencies likely to have arisen from it; nor any real Caule for the smallest Part of that Heat and Animofity, which it has given Occasion to: And had the Abettors of each Side behaved with Calmness; and made a candid Allowance for their different." ways of thinking, there wou'd have been no harm done; nor any Offence taken; but each might have injoy'd their different Perfuafions, quietly, and without occafioning any Disturbance to the Peace of Society; and every Member of the House of Commons might have voted, according to his Judgment, without Danger of incurring his Majesty's Displeasure, on the one Hand; or, on the other, of being condemned by his Constituents, as a Betrayer of his Country. But

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But when a Clamour was previoufly raifed without Doors, against his Majesty and his Servants, as having artfully laid Schemes for obtaining an unlimited Power over the Treafury; a Power quite new, and unknown to our Constitution : When they were reprefented, as just ready to Transport into Great-Britain all the Treasure of this Nation, in order to be employed there in influencing the approaching Elections, to the Ruin of both Kingdoms : When the Lord Lieutenant and other Officers of the State were openly libelled in a mean, porterly, seurrilous Manner : When the whole Minority were charged with being bribed and corrupted, and hooted at as the Betrayers of their Country : When publick Feasts were instituted, and Associations made, to strengthen a Party; and when at these Meetings, Bonfires were publickly exhibited, and Drink given in large Quantities to influence the Mob; by which Methods many were spirited up, to infult the Government, and intimidate all the Friends thereof : And when by printed Accounts these riotous Proceedings were propagated over the King-D dom ;

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dom; in order to raife the fame licentious Spirit in every Town and County of it : Then indeed it became our Governors to take fome Notice of fuch tumultuary Proceedings, and to iffue their Proclamation, against the Incendiaries and Disturbers of the publick Peace; then every sober and thinking Man looked about him with Concern, and anxious Sollicitude, for the Confusions, which such mad Practices must Occasion.

As far as fuch a Behaviour has been found in either Party; fo far they are most certainly to blame; however Innocent they might have been in espousing this, or that Side of the Question: And as far as such Methods have blinded the Judgment, or influenced the Opinion of any Man; fo far he is Criminal, and has been actuated by improper Motives, whether he declares for the Prerogative of the King, or for the Power of the People.

Which Side has been the most Faulty in these Respects, is easy for an impartial Observer to determine; but not so easy for either Side to be brought to acknowledge, either

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either in their Friends, or in themfelves. Let each of us then ceafe to recriminate one another, and rather choofe to look into our own Hearts; and, as far as we have Reafon either to condemn, or to acquit ourfelves of Partiality in forming our own Judgments; fo far let us learn to compaffionate the Imperfections or failings of others; and to make a charitable Allowance for their different ways of thinking.

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The Matter in itfelf (though it had been decided either way) never cou'd have been productive of fuch formidable Effects, as each fide were taught to apprehend from it : Any Man who confidered it in its true Light, might honeftly have given his Opinion for or against the Bill, without being an Enemy, either, to his King, or to his Country.

The most strenuous Advocates for the King's Prerogative, yet allow'd in the House of Commons a Right of addressing his Majesty upon all proper Occasions, and on all Subjects; and particularly of pointing out and advising in such Address the Application of

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any Surplus in the Treasury, and of remonfirating against a wrong one; and also of calling to Account and punishing any Minister who should advise such wrong Application; and, on failure of such gentle Methods, then of denying all future Grants.

On the other Hand, they who contended most strongly for a Right in the Commons of bringing in and preparing (of their own mere Motion) a Bill for applying such Surplus in the Treasury ; yet always allow'd in his Majesty a Right of rejecting that Bill if he pleased, and of applying such Surplus in such other Manner, as he should judge more Expedient for the Service of the Publick.

So that, each fide allowing fuch a Check in the other, as was fufficient to guard againft and prevent any Abufe in either ; tho' there was fome little diverfity in their Opinions on this Point; yet it would be very unfair, merely from that diverfity of Opinion, either to charge the one with an Intention to deftroy the Prerogative of the Crown, or the other with

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with a Defign to betray the Liberties of the People.

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All therefore, on either Side, who have been weakly alarmed with the Apprehenfions of Danger, from the Principles of the other Side, may see from hence, how much Reafon they have, to let fall their imaginary Fears, and to lay afide their mutual upbraidings : And as far as they have been induced by fuch imagined Danger, either to traduce the Administration, or their Brethren; fo far let them confess their Mistakes, and make Reparation to both, by a contrary Behaviour ; and let us all learn from hence to be more vigilant for the future, and not to be fo eafily led into Parties; left, by fuch Folly and Rashness, we become the Dupes of artful Men, and are made use of, only as Tools, to promote their factious and felfish Defigns.

And as far as any fuch difgusted or disappointed Statesmen have been at the bottom of our lateFeuds; and through Resentment or other felfish Views, have blown up the Coals of Contention among us; it stands them upon, (as

Subject to his King.

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(as they will Anfwer it to God and their owh Confeience, or to their King and their Country,) to labour now with as much Industry to undeceive their weak, but well-meaning Brethren, as they have heretofore used all kind of Artifice; (with loud Cries of Danger,) to delude and deceive them.

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This is the Method they fhould take, in order to put a Stop to the Flames they have already kindled. This is the leaft that fuch Incendiaries can do, in order to make fome Attonement for the Wafte and Ravage they have already committed upon the Publick Peace. This is what their King and Country have a Right to expect of them. And this is what every Man, who has been deceived himfelf, or has contributed to deceive others, must have the Honesty and Resolution to perform; if he wou'd be reputed a good Subject to his King, or a Friend to his Country.

On the other Hand, if fuch Men will go on still farther to imbroil the whole Kindom, through their factious and ambitious Attempts for

ed Statefmen have been

for Power and Place, I fee nothing in Profpect before us, but the Ruin and Defolation of our unhappy Country; and that this once flourishing Island shall soon become another *Corfica*.

I thought here to have finished, and to have put an End to the Reader's, and my own Trouble. But upon a Review of the Facts produced by the different Writers on this Subject, and their Manner of Reasoning on those Facts, in order to establish the different Points they contend for, I have taken up my Pen to make some further Observations.

As to the Facts, it must be allow'd, that there are fome certain ones, which feem to favour the different Positions of these Authors; and which therefore may be brought as fome kind of Precedents for each of them. But still the general Right of the Crown to be the Executor of our Laws, and Director of the Forces and Treasure of the Kingdom, must remain inviolate; otherwise our Constitution tution is altered, and fo far becomes a Republick.

conhagery Country ; and that this of

On the other Hand, the general Right of the Commons to grant or with-hold Supplies, and to examine into Mif-applications and Abufes in the Administration, must remain equally inviolate; otherwife our Monarchy, from being a limited one, fo far becomes abfolute.

As to the Reafoning from Facts, I cannot but obferve many specious Fallacies in the Authors of two Pamphlets: The one, intitled, Remarks on the Considerations; the other, The Proceedings of the Hon. House of Commons windicated: To point out all these, and to lay them fully open to my Readers, might require more Time and Pains than I care to spend on them; and after all, being many of them foreign to the Purpose, would contribute little to the real Merits of the Cause, or be of any Use, unless to amuse superficial Readers.

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But there is one very remarkable Fallacy, which runs thro' 40 or 50 Pages in both these Authors, and therefore may feem to call for a more particular Animadversion. They give us a long Detail, or Historical Account of the House of Commons, (in every Sellion fince the Revolution, ) having constantly called for, examined into, and stated the Publick Accounts; and in the Method of stating those Accounts, having regularly applied, or brought, to the Credit of the Nation, any Ballance which happened to remain in the Treasury, or any Arrear which happened to be out-standing on any of the Branches of the Revenue, as well the Here-ditary, as the additional Funds: And this was certainly very regular and right in an Account. But from hence these Authors very sophistically argue, that the Commons did actually direct the Application of fuch Ballance, or fuch Arrear, and not the King,

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the Government or otherwile,) but only an-

Whereas indeed the Commons did not take upon them to apply fuch Ballance or Arrear, to any particular Uses, (whether of E

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the Government or otherwife,) but only applied it in Account to the Credit of the Publick, (as indeed any Accomptant must have done,) and there left it on the Account, as fo much Cash on Hand, or Arrear due, and ready for his Majesty, to apply to any of the Uses of Government, as He in his Discretion thought most expedient for the Service of the Publick.

I allow indeed, that the Commons (in order to form their Estimates of the Quantum neceffary for the additional Supply,) generally (tho' not always) took into their Account, whatever Ballance appeared on Hand, or Arrears due; and to this they added, the computed Produce of the Hereditary Revenue; and then laid on fuch additional Duties, as they judged sufficient (together with the former) to answer the Expences of Government; and particularly in 1717, when they found the Nation involved in Debt, (from the Vote of Credit given the foregoing Seffion,) they then laid on fuch farther additional Duties, as (according to their Computation) might be sufficient to answer the Expences

pences of Government, and also to discharge the Interest and Principal of the National Debt.

Some Years afterwards, the National Debt ftill encreafing, and a large Arrear being due to the Civil and Military Establishment, so as to lay the Government under Difficulties, they then thought proper to borrow other Sums of Money, and farther increased the additional Duties; and at length appropriated particular and distinct Duties, for payment of the Interest and Principal of the Money lent the Nation, leaving the old additional Duties (as formerly) for the Support of Government,

It may be obferved here, that from the Time of this Appropriation, the Accounts, both of the Produce and Application of the Loan-Funds, were always kept diftingt, and never mixed with those of the Government Funds: tho' after these diftingt Accounts were made up, and their diftingt Ballances struck, a general Abstract was usually made of the Whole, in order to find out what was  $E_2$  the the real National Debt, that fo a proper Provision might be made for it. But the the Ballance arising from the Government Funds was fome Years pretty large, yet we don't find that the Commons ever took upon them to apply that Ballance : Whatever was done of that Sort, was always done by the King.

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But in the Year 1749, (for the first Time) the Commons prepared a Bill for applying Part of this Ballance, arising from the Government Funds, in discharge of a Part of the Loan.

Now it may be obferved, that in this Bill, there was no plain Avowal, (nor even any Intimation) of the Commons claiming any Right to be the first Movers, or Directors, of fuch an Application; on the contrary, as Mention was made in the Bill, of its being agreeable to his Majesty's Intentions, (without distinguishing, whether those Intentions had been any how fignified to them, or only prefumed upon,) therefore we find the Bill was agreed to by his Majesty, and returned (without

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(without Alteration) in the very Form in which it had been fent over.

Since the Commons claimed no Right in themfelves, and of their own mere Motion, to prepare fuch a Bill; but expressed its being agreeable to the King's Intentions, his Majefty had no Reason to object to it. And therefore, tho' it has been claimed as a Precedent in favour of the Commons, yet it is certainly against them. However, for the present, let it be supposed to be doubtful, and no Stress be laid upon it. But then,

In the Seffion of 1751, when the Commons defignedly dropp'd all Acknowledgement of his Majefty's previous Confent, tho' it had been expressly fignified to them; then indeed his Majefty judged it proper, that fuch Acknowledgement should be insisted on; and accordingly a Clause of that Nature was inferted in the Bill returned from *England*; and the fame was passed unanimously in the House of Commons, without one Objection or Protest. Here then the Matter is confirm'd, in the most plain and express Manner possible, by every Branch of the Legislature, which

which furely is a Precedent of the greatest Weight, and most undoubted Authority; though fet at nought by the two Authors I have named, and by one of them termed spurious. In the Selfion of 1753, his Majefty also fignified his Confent, and recommended it to the Commons, that the National Debt should be paid out of the Treasury ; and could not but expect, that the fame Acknowledgement which had been unanimoufly passed in 1751, should now be originally inferted in this new Bill : But on the contrary the House of Commons did not in this new Bill fo much as thank his Majefty for his Recommendation of it, (as they had done in the Bill of the former Seffions ;) but proceeded, (without the least Notice of fuch Recommendation,) as if, from their own mere Motion, and by their fole Authority, they had a Right to apply the Surplus in the Treafury, without confulting his Majefty.

To this Bill, thus prepared in a Manner which fome interpreted Rudeness, his Majefty only added the very same Preamble, which had been unanimously passed the former mer Seffion: And moreover accompanied it with a Letter, from his Privy Council of *England*, fetting forth the Reafons of fuch Addition. And, merely for the fake of this Preamble, an ufeful and neceffary Bill was rejected, by a fmall Majority, and in direct Oppofition to their own unanimous Proceedings in the former Seffion of 1751. And this, we are told, hath given great Offence to his Majefty, and his Privy Council of *England*.

But it is injurious to his Majesty's Goodness to entertain such a Notion, that he can be offended with his faithful Commons, for a Difference in Opinion, or a Mistake in Judgment; and in a nice Point too, which seem'd not to have been so well understood at the Time, nor so accurately explained as it has since been.

So that, if his Majesty be really displeased at us, it must be for our riotous and seditious Proceedings before and fince; rather than for our not clearly apprehending, or perfectly discerning, the exact Limits, or nice Boundary dary, between his Prerogative, and the rights and Liberties of his People.

Had this Rejection therefore been attended with no tumultuary Meetings in the City; had it been immediately accompany'd by a dutiful and loyal Address to his Majesty, humbly fetting forth the Reasons of such Rejection, it might rationally have been alcribed to a Mistake in Judgment, or a Change in Temper, (brought on us by the Inconstancy of our Climate,) or to any other Cause, rather than to Difaffection to his Majesty, or difregard to his Ministers : But when base Infinuations instantly flew through the Kingdom ; when scurrilous Invectives were thrown directly in the Face of his Majesty's Servants; when Libels against them were daily published and hawked about the Streets; when Infults were offered them in every publick Place, without the least Regard to Decency or good Manners; and when the greatest Art and Industry was used to halloo and hunt down every loyal Subject, who would not join in the Cry: Then indeed there feemed Grounds to suspect, that something more, than a bare Mistake

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Mistake in the Understanding, or a variableness in the Temper, might possibly have been at the Bottom of all this; even a settled Pique and Malice towards some Persons, who seem to have been particularly distinguished with a large Share of his Majesty's Favour and Countenance; and this Conjecture is justified from the Confession of one of the Writers I have mentioned, in the Fourth Part of his Remarks, Page, 46.

And yet, though fome leading Men might have been actuated by felfish Passions, God forbid, that we should Judge all, who joined in Opinion with them, to have been influenced by the like Motives.

We are all apt to think well of our Friends and Relations; we are prone to judge favourably of the Principles and Actions of our Acquaintances; this infenfibly lays a byafs on our Minds, and inclines us, to approve of their Opinions, and to justify their Conduct: by conversing only with such, we preclude ourselves from any Opportunity of knowing the Sentiments, or judging impartially tially of the Reafons of the Conduct of others; and especially, if any Pains have been taken, to impress upon our Minds a Notion of the Publick Spirit of our own Party, and of the felfishness of our Adversaries.

In fuch a Situation, it is no eafy Matter to diveft ourfelves of our Prepoffeffions in Favour of our own Friends, or of our Prejudices against others : And yet, unless we will do so, our Minds will not be open to Conviction; nor can there be any Hopes of our finding out the Truth; or any Prospect of our acting right.

Let us then charitably hope, that there may be honeft Men and good Patriots on both Sides; let us in the Spirit of Meeknefs inftruct fuch as oppofe our Principles; but not mark out one another for Infults, by affixing Names of Reproach; let us not charge all who rejected the Bill with Madnefs or Folly; as actuated by Frenzy, or made the Dupes of Villains; nor all those who wou'd have passed the Bill, as cajoled by the Promises, or terrified by the Threats of the Court: Court : Let us make a mutual Allowance for our different Sentiments on this Head; and though Knaves and Hypocrites will often strengthen themselves, by throwing out Lures for honest Men to Associate with them, yet let us not brand a whole Party, as Rogues and Impostors; nor condemn one another, by Troops, and Companies.

Some Things have lately happened, which may help to open our Eyes, and let us fee, that neither his Majesty, nor his Ministers are such Enemies to our Country, as they have been represented.

When a Breach was made upon Credit by the Failure of Dillon and Farrel, and fuch a Run follow'd upon all the Banks, as must foon have put a stop to all Trade, and thrown us into a general Confusion; who were they, who immediately step'd forward; and were the first to set themselves in the Gap; and by their Influence effectually restored our finking Credit? Was it not the Lord Lieutenant, the Lord Primate, the Lord Shelburne, Mr. Rowley, and many other F 2 Gentlemen Gentlemen who have been ftigmatized as Enemies to this Country? All those others who afterwards joined in that good Work, ought not indeed to be forgot; — but these were the first, who laid their Shoulders to it, and to whom chiefly our Thanks are due.

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And when the Majority of the Commons, rejected the Bill for Payment of the National Debt, (though they knew, they had made no other Provision for it;) has not his Majefty generoufly paffed over, what might have been interpreted, as an Affront offered to him; and, in kindnels to our Country, order'd it to be immediately paid? hereby caufing a Circulation of Cash, and supporting the Honour and Credit of the Nation.

These are Instances of Affection to our Country, which carry Conviction along with them; and, unless we are resolved obstinately to shut our Eyes, must plainly point out to us, that his Majesty's Goodness is superior to All Resentment; and that, even in the midst of the Court, there may be Patriots found.

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The Lord Lieutenant and others have thus fupported our finking Credit, and given a new Spring to Trade and Commerce ; and his Majefty, by ordering the National Debt to be paid, has given us a ftrong Proof, that the Publick Faith and Intereft of this Kingdom lie near his Heart ; and his doing this, after fuch a feeming Indignity offered to him, may convince us, that he effeems it his Glory, to pass over a Transgreffion.

whole Kingdom at variance : What can we

Let us then imitate fuch noble, fuch Royal Examples ; and fhow his Majefty, that we also can conquer our Paffions ; and laying afide our Pride, Envy, Anger, Revenge, with all their furious Effects ; can now again pay a due Regard to his Ministers, and all those whom he is pleased to honour with diftinguished Marks of his Favour : That we can now join with chearfulnes, in promoting Peace and Union among one another, Sobriety and Industry among our Manufacturers and Labourers, and Religion and Loyalty among all Ranks of our People. If we can convince our Lord Lieutenant, that such a Tema Temper and fuch a Conduct is likely to prevail among us, we may then hope to be reprefented to his Majesty in such a light, as to obtain his gracious Pardon for what is past, and to be restored to our former Place in his Favour and Affection.

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But if, on the contrary, we go on still to infult our Governors; abuse the principal Officers of the State; spirit up the Populace to Rioting and Tumults; and set the whole Kingdom at variance: What can we expect, but to feel his Majesty's Displeasure?

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We all know, that a neighbouring Kingdom looks with a jealous Eye upon the Increase of our Linen Manufacture; they are our Rivals in that Branch of Business; would be glad of an Occasion to cramp it; and will not fail to make their Advantage, of any seeming Undutifulness in us, or any Resentment of his Majesty towards us.

For our own Sakes then, let us learn to be wife in Time ; and laying afide all Pique and Refentment, all Party Quarrels and Animofities, fities, let us unite in Love and mutual good Offices one to another; and in all fuch Actions, as are naturally expressive of Loyalty to his Majesty, and Respect to his Ministers: And let us not, by a contrary Behaviour, draw down on ourselves, and on our Children, such Discouragements from his Majesty's Resentment, and such Mischiefs from our own frowardness, as we may all live to regret.

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I have done ; and hope that all, who fincerely regard the Welfare of this Kingdom, will excufe the Freedom, and Pardon the Warmth of fome Expressions in this Letter ; for they have been really extorted from me, by an affectionate Concern, for my Country, and for my Countrymen.

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March 16, 1754.

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Farewell,

HIBERNICUS,

