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LYSIMACHUS:

OR, A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING THE

UNION

OF

*Great-Britain and Ireland.*

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# LYSIMACHUS:

OR, A

DIALOGUE, &c.

NICANDER.



O W cautiously hath Art followed Nature, *Lysimachus*, in adorning this Retirement; not a Spot that is not new in its Appearance; and all, though different, consent in beautifying the Whole. Those brown and barren Mountains, with what Grandeur they inclose and recommend these Hills, and their greener Valleys. Even yon Craggs with their climbing Inhabitants want not their Beauty, but relieve the Eye from a sated Indulgence on the rich Pastures and sleek

Herds that graze the neighbouring Meadows.

LYSIMACHUS.

Yes, *Nicander*; but all these Beauties, different though they are, make but one Picture; and although each Part hath some peculiar Charm, the Whole wears an unchanged Appearance. There *Nicander*, there my Admiration turns itself, to that spacious Bay, that Sea which knows no Bound to its Extent, nor is confined one Hour to the same Aspect; grand even with its calmest Countenance, but, when disturbed, sublimely terrible. Art too hath added to its Variety; not a Sail which Industry wafts over its Surface but diversifies the Prospect, and calls up different Passions to please or to afflict us. What Delight it is to behold a prosperous Fleet laden with Merchandize, every Vessel crowding her white Sails, and trying all her Art to catch the most favourable Breeze, and win the first Welcome from the Merchant. These, after various Toils, sleep securely within the Arms of  
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that great City, and are happy if compared with him whom Storms have driven from his Course, who arriveth late at his destined Port, yet just when he thinks his Dangers past, and embraceth his little Offspring in Imagination, sees a new Tempest gathering round him, and after the last Efforts to save his shattered Bark, escapes upon a Plank, only to view the Shipwreck of his Fortunes. Such Sights, *Nicander*, though for a while they may afflict, call up the worthiest Feelings of Humanity, and give this moving Picture such Power, as the loveliest Paradise with all its Variety of Hill and Valley, Wood and Water cannot boast. What Pleasure can be greater, or indulged more justly, than of seeing the Riches of the new World, whatever grows on the Banks of the *Ohio*, or employs the cold *Indians* of *Labrador*, the Furs of *Canada*, and the Silk of *Carolina*, waisted by my Garden to employ our Artificers, to be the Summer Ornaments, and Winter Security of our Matrons and their Daughters: To behold the Labours of  
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our own Fields and of our Looms, conveyed to Nations, yet ignorant of our Arts; whose Wants support our Affluence, and to whose Fields and Forests our Gardens and Parks are indebted for so large a Share of that Beauty which you so much admire. This fragrant Sassafras, the Hickery that shades my Avenue, and yon wavy Cedars, Cypresses and Pines, that cloath their Hills with perpetual Green, are the transplanted Natives of *Virginia*. Every Ship comes freighted with new Beauty to our Fields, and Treasure to our Artists; and I consider the different Fleets that steer along my Garden as introducing new Worlds to my View.

N I C A N D E R.

*Lysimachus*, these Scenes are justly pleasing; and often I have seen with Transport, all that *Persia*, *Indus* and *China*, whatever the World produces, born on the *Thames* by Fleets that hold the Empire of the Seas. The Ships are the Strength, the Riches and the Glory of *Britain*; for the Navy which

which fill her Rivers and Harbours, the Sailors who man them, and the Burthens they bear, are her own. But these Things call to my Remembrance what I would endeavour to forget; it is far otherwise here; the Sails which pass this Garden are the Property of other Nations, and Proofs of the confined Condition of our Commerce. Every Ship that visits our Harbour carries home the Price of the Visit, while we have none that bring an equivalent to ballance the Loss. By these Means, our Commodities which should swell the Riches of our own, increase the Wealth of other Nations; nor is this the only Loss, for our naval Strength is necessarily little, because our Shipping are few; the Glory of our Kingdom is also little, and the Desire of Glory in no wise greater. Hence it is, that I behold with Regret, the Commerce of this Kingdom carried on by other States, and the Means of peopling a fruitful Island, and strengthening the Hands of its Monarch, restrained by the Laws of Navigation made in the neighbouring Kingdom: And I often wish

wish to see the two States more completely united, the Ports of the known World open to both, the same Rewards and the same Glory proposed, and a general Competition among his Majesty's Subjects for the Strength, Riches, and Honour of his Dominions. We should not then behold one Kingdom making partial Laws to the Disadvantage of another, nor Jealousies and Fears disturbing the Minds of the Multitude, and distracting the separate Councils of the States. The Vessel would be navigated by the same Hands, and not by contending Crews; the public Weal would be the public Concern; and the same Men would no longer act different Parts by voting one Way in the Parliament of *Great Britain* to favour the Minister, and another Way in the Parliament of *Ireland*, to support an Influence in their native Country. The Restlessness of those Peers, who, not contented with a Share in the Councils of this Kingdom, covet an inferior Honour in *Britain*, would receive a deserved Check, since only a limited Number would be admitted into  
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the general Council, and consequently others would seek that Authority at Home, which alone could recommend them to a Seat among the *British* Peerage. A septennial Rotation would whet the Emulation of the Peers and Commoners to merit the Re-election of their Countrymen, and *Ireland* no longer would be compelled to submit to that severest Test of her Slavery, the Acceptance of Laws in the framing of which she never had a Part. Our Pastures would be Objects of Pleasure and Emolument, and our Wool, which at present cloaths the Armies of *France*, intitle us to the Order of the Golden Fleece, that honourable Ensign of Industry, which so long adorned the Merchants of the *Netherlands*. No Divisions would subsist, but like the Scene around us, the Parts, how distinct and distant soever, would compose an intire Piece, and the whole wear one unchanged Appearance.

All were surprized, and many were pleased with the happy Effects of an  
 B Union

Union so clearly enumerated by *Nican-*  
*der*; even those who heard him with  
 least Delight, were unprepared to plead  
 against one who seemed to come arm-  
 ed, with all that could be urged to re-  
 commend it. Yet *Lysimachus* thus  
 shortly answered; Judge not hastily, *Ni-*  
*cander*, for Matters of such Import re-  
 quire our best Consideration. What if  
 we should adjourn a Subject too impor-  
 tant for the Conversation of the Table  
 that now expects us, and reserve it for  
 the Festival of our young Prince's Nati-  
 vity which you have all promised to ce-  
 lebrate at this Lodge; for what Subject  
 can so worthily employ us on the Birth-  
 Day of our Prince, as one which so  
 nearly concerns the Strength and Welfare  
 of his Dominions and the Dignity of  
 his Crown? *Nicander* readily assent-  
 ed, and *Critias* who was fondly partial  
 to his native Island, modestly desired that  
*Lysimachus* would undertake to answer  
 what *Nicander* had urged so strongly, as  
 to make a serious Impression on all who  
 heard him. *Lysimachus* would have de-  
 clined a Task, which he represented as  
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the general Concern, but being induced by the Intreaties of young *Theramenes*, who was then forming himself for the public Service, he consented to submit his Opinion as well concerning the Advantages as the Evils which might follow such an Union of the Kingdoms as *Nicander* had ardently desired. The Festival came, and at Twelve, when the Sun made the Shade most inviting, they retired into an Arbour overhanging the Bay, which was open to the cool Breezes of the Sea, and being seated there, *Lyfimachus*, at whose Feet sat young *Theramenes*, thus began the Conversation.

A stricter Union of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, is a Subject which during these latter Years, hath engaged the Attention of many thinking well-minded Men besides you, *Nicander*, and more particularly those who have turned their Thoughts to the present Commerce of *Britain*, and the neighbouring Nations, which have been so industrious and successful as to rival her antient and valuable

ble Manufactures. What they have said on this Occasion deserves our Regard ; but some have touched lightly on the Advantages of that indefinite Word, an Union ; others have been more copious without suggesting any probable or plausible Terms thereof, and all have confined themselves principally to the Benefits which thereby would accrue to *Great-Britain*. I do not know that it hath yet been considered in that extensive Sense in which *Nicander* hath represented it, and in which it deserves to be viewed by all who think it an Object worthy of their Attention. Often I have endeavoured to collect the Consequences of uniting the great national Councils, have often turned my Thoughts from Object to Object, and formed Opinions which another Day's Examination entirely removed ; and to confess a Truth, after frequent Reflections, I am unwilling to deduce any Conclusion. A true State of Facts is not easily had, and without it all Reasoning is little better than the Delusions of Fancy. The Arguments which occurred to me

me since our last Conversation, are far from being satisfactory, and, at the best, only lead to a more perfect State of the Case; yet I will submit them with Pleasure, desiring to be informed, as often as you find me wrong, and leaving to you to draw the Conclusions, if any can be deduced from these Facts.

When great Changes become the subjects of Debate, and great civil Changes are always preceded by Diversity of Opinions, it is natural to look into the Reasoning which attended Facts of a similar Nature, and the Subject of *Nicander's* Wishes, immediately led me to an Event, which lives in the Memory of many, and those not very aged Persons, the Union of *England* and *Scotland*. It is not intended to enter into the Ambition or Avarice, the Steadiness or Levity, the Virtues, Vices, or Foibles of those who effected the Union of those Kingdoms. A Variety of Characters appear on such great Occasions, and a Variety of Arts are practised, accordingly, as the Designs of the Agents are general or partial. To  
lay

lay open these is the Business of History; nothing more is intended here than to place in a simple View the Arguments on one Side inviting, and on the other, dissuading an Union, as they appeared at that Time, to the Espousers and to the Opposers.

The Reasoning in Favour of that Union was founded on such Arguments as these.

*First*, In many Points the Kingdoms were united; the Relations of Sovereign and of Subject were in both the same.

*Secondly*, The Language, though not the same, was similar, and a Coalition seemed more likely to produce a Refinement, by incorporating into one Language the most expressive and agreeable Words of both, than to debase the Language of either.

*Thirdly*, Their Religion was the same, for notwithstanding a Difference in the Forms of Worship, as also in the Church-

Church-Government and Order, the great Lines and Principles of Religion were so much alike, that no Danger could be apprehended from a few formal external Dissentions.

*Fourthly*, The two Nations were Inhabitants of the same Island, and therefore intended by Nature for the Protection of each other, which could never be so well effected as by an Union of the national Councils.

*Fifthly*, *Scotland*, by enjoying a free Commerce with *England* and her Plantations, and the Protection of an *English* Fleet, would be securely enriched, and the Intermixture occasioned by Commerce and Marriage, would add to the Harmony and Strength of the whole Island.

*Sixthly*, The ambitious Hopes of some *Scottish* Families, which disturbed the Tranquility of the Kingdom, would be frustrated.

*Seventhly*,

*Seventhly*, The whole Island would find a general Security in the House of Commons against partial Administration of Justice, and the violent Measures of Ministers, which had been so often and so justly, but in vain complained of in *Scotland*.

*Eighthly*, The Seeds of Faction and civil Dissention were sown in the *Scottish* Aristocracy, and grew to Strength in the Vassalage; and the restless Ambition of the Lords rendered the Administration of the Kingdom, and all its Leagues with *England* unstable.

Such were the Arguments employed by the Friends and Advocates for the Union, both in and out of Parliament in both Kingdoms. The Opposers of it took their Arguments deeper; they went to the Root of their own Power, and had Honesty enough to set Lines to their Privileges; they argued,

*First*, That there are certain Fundamentals of every just Constitution, unalterable,

alterable, but by the Voice of the People, from whom all just Government is derived, and for whose Benefit constituted.

*Secondly*, That although the Parliament in the Exercise of its several Powers was regulated by a Majority of its Voices, yet the national Right of having Parliaments, was a Fundamental not to be abrogated by the unanimous Voice of the Parliament itself, but dependent on the Consent of those whose Privilege it was to be represented.

*Thirdly*, That if the Parliament of *Scotland* could alter the Fundamentals of the Constitution, so also could the Parliament of *England*; and what Security could be had, that a *British* Parliament compounded of the *English* and *Scotch* might not do the same?

*Fourthly*, That an Union of the General Councils was a Destruction of the Independent Monarchy of *Scotland*; and that the Dignity of the Peerage, to whom

whom Votes in Parliament were Rights of Inheritance, would be diminished, unless by the Union all its Peers should be, as the Lords of *England* are, Voters in the Upper House of National Council and Judicature.

*Fifthly*, That a Destruction of the *Scottish* Parliament, was a Deprivation of all Security as to the Rights that might be stipulated for by the Treaty : For, the Independent Constitution of *Scotland* being destroyed ; Redress was to be had only in a *British* Parliament, where the *Scottish* Members never could prevail, how just soever their Arguments, when the Question was between *English* and *Scotch* Men.

*Sixthly*, That Attendance on a *British* Parliament would be a great Expence to the remote Representatives of *Scotland*, and therefore a Source of as great Corruption.

*Seventhly*, That a small Number of *Scottish* Peers, as the Prelate of *Bath* remarked,

remarked, would only increase the dead Weight of the Prelates.

These were the Arguments of the Opponents of an Union, the strongest of which, although over-ruled even in *Scotland* at the Time of the Union, nevertheless after a few Years, were in the Mouths of some who had over-ruled them. And whatever Justice may be in those which concern the Right and Privilege of a Parliament, common Prudence seems to recommend those which touched upon *Scottish* Security.

In the Year 1706-7, an Union was concluded, and the Articles thereof are so well known, that a Recital to you is neither necessary nor pertinent; an Union very favourable to the Commerce of *Scotland*, which being a naked Country, barren of Products for Manufactures and Trade, was now at Liberty to import from all Quarters of the World the rude Materials, and stamp the Value of its Labour and Genius upon them.

In the Year 1708-9, a Law was made by a *British* Parliament which changed the Proceedings of the *Scottish* Courts concerning Matters of high Treason; and in the Debates upon that Law it was maintained, that the only fundamental and unalterable Parts of the Union, were those which concerned Religion and the Proportion of public Taxes.

In the Year 1712, the *Scottish* Members were almost unanimous in an Inquiry which of the Articles of the Union were fundamental and unalterable, and which not: A strange Appearance, if we consider, that very few Years had passed since a Majority of the *Scottish* Parliament had undertaken, without the Leave of the People, to change what was deemed by some, and if any Thing be so, must ever be deemed most fundamental and unalterable, the very Constitution of their Kingdom.

In the Year 1713, before the War was concluded, during which the Union  
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commenced, a Law was made by which a Duty on Malt was imposed on *Scotland*, as well as *England*, expressly contrary to the fourteenth Article of the Union, which provides, *That any Malt to be made and consumed in that Part of the united Kingdom called Scotland, shall not be charged with any Imposition on Malt during the present War.* Hence it appears that the Articles concerning publick Taxes were to a *British* Parliament no more fundamental and unalterable than any others.

Here *Theramenes* interposed ; if truly I recollect, *Lysimachus*, at the time when this Law was enacted, the Preliminaries of a Peace were debated by the Ambassadors of the contending Powers. But pardon my Interposition, for I mean not to interrupt your Application of the *Scottish* Arguments, to the more intimate Connection proposed by *Nicander*, between *Great Britain* and *Ireland*.

## LYSIMACHUS.

Truth will not want an Advocate, *Theramenes*, when you are present ; I remember well the Period, nor did I seek by strict and captious Arguments to throw a Shade on the *British* Conduct ; but the Law was made before the War was concluded ; and, if the proposed Preliminaries had been rejected, and the War had subsisted in its fullest Vigour, the Tax would have subsisted also. It was imposed in Contradiction to the Letter of the Union, and the smallest Deviations from fundamental Articles lead to a Latitude which admits of no Restraint. It would be not unpleasing now to examine which of the Arguments before-mentioned are conclusive for and against an Union of the Parliaments of these Islands ; but such Inquiry seems with no less Propriety to follow a short View of the present State of *Ireland*, particularly of its Legislature and Commerce.

*Ireland*, a separate Island, under a mixed Monarchy, hath the same Head or King with *Britain*, but separate Parliaments.

The Peerage of *Ireland* is hereditary as in *England*, and originally was intitled to the like Powers: But *Britain* hath gained from the *Irish* Peerage their judiciary Power, by Management. *Irish* Suitors appeal to the *British* Nobles, who by their own Vote or Opinion, which they have lately passed into a Law, and by the Custom of a few Years, are the ultimate Judges of all Controversies concerning Property in *Ireland*. This hath added to the Dependence of *Ireland*, and to the Wealth of *England*.

The Commons of *Ireland* are Elective as in *Britain*, but Elections are not so frequent; the Duration of the Parliaments being arbitrary in the King, and not fixed by any Laws. The Power of the Commons is the same as in *Britain*.

Whether

Whether Conquest or willing Submission of the Inhabitants first gave the Kings of *England* the Sovereignty of *Ireland*, hath been much debated ; it seems that they cannot derive it from a better Original than the latter. But, if the first Submission was the Consequence of Conquest, and not founded on a Treaty of Union, yet without doubt, the *English* Colony, which settled here, and in the Course of Time, overspread the Kingdom, were voluntary Subjects, and in no Way obnoxious to the Treatment which Conquerors claim a Right of giving the Conquered. It is certain, that during many Ages this Island was governed solely by its own Laws, and adopted those of *England* when they seemed convenient, as *Rome* and other States, adopted the Laws of *Greece* and the neighbour Countries.

During the Reign of his Majesty's Predecessor, under the Pretext of better securing the Dependence of *Ireland*, (which Nature had secured) *Britain* by her

her own separate Act, impowered herself to bind *Ireland* by Laws made without the Advice, Consent, or Knowledge of the *Irish* Parliament. With what Justice, or how *Ireland* had provoked *Great-Britain* to make a Law; which, if enforced in its utmost Extent, would render insignificant all *Irish* Parliaments, it is of no Consequence here to inquire; a Search for Right between a weak and a powerful State, being generally found a fruitless Employment. Had Circumstances been reversed, perhaps *Ireland* would have acted a similar Part. Notwithstanding that Law, this Island hath hitherto enjoyed her own Legislative, and is principally governed by her own Laws.

The King's Privy Council here exerciseth a Power very injurious to the Liberty of the Parliament; it receiveth all Bills or Petitions, which are framed by the Lords or the Commons, and sometimes destroys them before they are transmitted to the *English* Court; at other Times totally changes them, and

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sends to *England* Petitions very different from those which are approved by the Parliament. By these Means, it may happen, that the King may be a Stranger to the Desires of his People; or what is equally dangerous, the King in the Person of his Viceroy, may sit down with his own Privy Council to frame the Heads of Laws. Such Power vested in the Privy Council of *Britain* would be deemed an Establishment of Arbitrary Power, and such Power *Britons* will not give till they are ripe for a Change unfavourable to Liberty.

Excepting the Points now mentioned, the Constitutions of *Britain* and *Ireland* are the same; but these Points make a remarkable Difference between the Liberty of the two Nations. The Prince, who by the *British* Constitution hath no Share in the Legislature, but the Power of refusing or ratifying, hath by the *Irish* Constitution, the Power of proposing and debating; and thereby Liberty,

Liberty, though not lost, at the least is indangered. One Reason seems to demonstrate this. The Prince alone hath the executive Power; if he hath a Power also to propose Laws, such Proposals go to the two Houses of Parliament, loaded with all the Weight of Royal Regard and Affection; all the Prince's Servants in the Exercise of the executive Power, will feel a Partiality to them; the Freedom and Candour of Debate is thereby restrained; and, if the Prince hath a Majority of his Servants or Placemen in the Legislature; the State owes much to his Virtue or his Ignorance, if its Liberties receive no Injury.

From these Particulars, it seems, that the Fundamental Constitutional Laws of *Ireland* are not so favourable to Liberty as those of *Britain*, howsoever the Civil or Municipal may be. But as *Britain* hath more Liberty by her Laws than she enjoyeth; *Ireland* enjoyeth more than she hath by them.

Let us turn now to the Commerce of this Kingdom. No Island is more fitted for Trade, whether you consider the Situation of the Island, the Fertility of the Soil, or the Commodiousness of its Bays and Havens. Yet with all these Advantages, I confess, *Nicander*, that its Trade is comparatively insignificant. Commerce, which hath different Foundations in different Governments, naturally hates all Restrictions; *it traverses the Earth*, says a learned Writer, *flies from the Place where it is oppressed, and stays where it has Liberty to breath.* It is therefore found most extensive in Republics, and Governments nearly Republican.

It is supported by foreign or domestic Products; by foreign in those States, which bring from one Nation what is necessary or desired by another, buying cheap and selling dear. Such is the Trade of *Holland*, whose Merchants are  
Carriers,

Carriers, and whose Gain is little, but constant.

By domestic Products ; or by both, as in *England*, and many other Nations.

*Ireland* enjoys no Trade of the former Kind, for that is a Traffic founded on Oeconomy which flourishes most where Liberty is greatest. A sterile Country, and an equal Government, determine Men to that Species of Commerce of supplying the Wants of one foreign Nation with the Commodities of another : Great Spirit, which is the Consequence of great Freedom, extends it ; and therefore it cannot flourish in a Country straitened by the commercial Laws of another trading State. High Customs on Exportation and Importation are also great Bars to this Species of Traffick ; but this Species greatly promotes Navigation, and Navigation increases the Number of Sailors and the Strength of an Island ; therefore high Customs are not apparently conducive to the well-being of the Community.

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The Trade of *Ireland* ariseth from its domestic Products. The native Products of *Ireland* are Corn, Cattle, Wool, Flax, Fish, Lead, Iron, Copper, and from these its chief Commodities for Export are derived. A very modern Writer in enumerating its Exports hath introduced Honey, Hemp, and Pipe-Staves, and omitted Linen Cloth; and his Account might have been true a Century ago; but, it is univerversally known that the only Manufacture which is now carried to any great Degree of Perfection is that of Flax, and that all the Hemp Seed produced in the Island would not feed the Gold-finches in the Cages.

The three great Commodities are its Cattle, its Flax, and its Wool. Beef, Butter, Hydes, and Tallow, support the Traffic of the *Southern*, and Linen-Cloth that of the *Northern* Counties. If no Restraints were laid on the Woollen Manufacture, the Trade of *Ireland*, in that single Commodity, would always create a Ballance in its Favour.

Favour. But *England*, neglectful of the general Weal, restrained this Traffic, and by Means of this partial Regard, and the additional Aid of stolen Wool from *Ireland* as well as *Great-Britain*, *France* hath rivalled *England* in her favourite Manufacture, and acquired a Trade, which *Ireland* only is able to take from her. *Decker*, speaking of the same Subject, argues thus, “ Suppose one Pack of *Irish* Wool of “ six Pounds Value to make four Cloths; “ that Pack of Wool, being smuggled “ to *France*, works up two Packs of “ *French* Wool (which is too coarse to “ be manufactured alone) making all “ together twelve Cloths.

“ A Pack of *Irish* Wool  
 “ smuggled to *France* hin-  
 “ ders the Sale of twelve  
 “ *English* Cloths, supposing  
 “ them of six Pounds Va- 1. s. d.  
 “ lue each, and prevents  
 “ the Circulation of 72 0 0

“ A Pack of Wool ma-  
 “ nufactured in *Ireland* can

“ hinder

“ hinder the Sale only of  
 “ four Cloths at six Pounds  
 “ each, and can prevent  
 “ the Circulation but of 24 0 0

48 0 0

“ It is computed that  
 “ one Third of what *Ire-*  
 “ *land* gets, centers at last  
 “ in *England*, which on  
 “ the four Cloths at six  
 “ Pounds each, making  
 “ twenty-four Pounds, is 8 0 0

“ Consequently the Be-  
 “ nefit that *England* re-  
 “ ceives by every Pack of  
 “ Wool manufactured in  
 “ *Ireland*, instead of being  
 “ smuggled into *France*, is 56 0 0

The only Branch of the Woollen  
 Manufacture, of which *Ireland* enjoys  
 a licit Export, is her Woollen Yarn;  
 she hath enjoyed that Privilege but a  
 few Years, and is allowed to export it  
 only to *England*.

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The great Support of *Ireland* arises therefore from Cattle and Flax. By a Law lately made, *Great-Britain* hath again permitted the Importation of living Cattle from this Island, and our Legislature should be singularly cautious, that, while our breeding Farms are extended, our fattening Grounds are not neglected, for on these depends our Commerce in Beef, Tallow and Hydes, and all the profitable Business of our Dairy, to which we so long were Strangers. In the fourth Year of *Queen Anne*, *Ireland* was first permitted to export her Linens to the *British* Plantations. In Exchange for these, she may Import, without Delay, Corn and Spirituous Liquors; but by a *British* Law made in the fourth Year of the present King, many principal Materials for Inland Manufactures, such as Dyes, Sugar, Tobacco, and all Materials for Shipping and Navigation which are produced by the Plantations, must be landed first in *England*, and this is such a Load as Trade can never rise under. To this it is owing, among other Discouragements, That such as the

Commerce of this Kingdom is, it is generally carried on by the means of Foreign Bottoms, except in Cases where they are particularly prohibited; and thereby the Advantage of Freight or Carriage is lost, which *Nicander* so justly laments.

Two great, I was about to say, the greatest Drains from *Ireland*, are Bread and Fuel. It has Coal-Mines, but does not work them; it has fruitful Land, but does not till it.

The Lands fittest for Corn are distant from the Capital and the great Sea-Ports; and *Ireland* having little Water-Carriage, hath therefore little Tillage. *England* and her Plantations supply it largely with Bread, and the former alone with Fuel. By a late prudent Law which gives a Præmium for the Inland Carriage of Corn to the Capital, and by the Pains daily taken to cut navigable Canals through the Island, both these Inconveniences will be found to decrease, and Time may effectually remove them.

Of all that the Commerce or the Lands of *Ireland* produce, *Decker* says, 'That one Third is sent to England for Goods, or spent by Absentees.' *Gee* says, 'That it is thought near one Third Part of the Rents of the whole Island belong to English Noblemen and Gentlemen resident in England.' This is not the present Case; but heavy Drains there are; Places and Pensions of Two, Three and Four Thousand Pounds annually from the *Irish* Revenues, to the Natives and Inhabitants of *Britain* and more remote Countries; Remittances to Absentees; *British* Schools; *British* Judicature, and the *British* Court, where some resort for Education, some for Justice that might be had at Home, and where others go in Quest of Preferments. By these Means more than one Third of all which the Industry and restrained Commerce of *Ireland* produceth, centers at last in *Great-Britain*.

The Revenues or Taxes of *Ireland* introduce themselves into a View of its  
 E 2 Trade.

Trade. Taxes are the Portion of private Property paid for securing the Remainder; and the several Degrees of Liberty are the Equivalents for which the various Loads of Taxes in different Countries are paid.

No Country enjoys a higher Degree of Liberty than *Britain*; the Constitution and the Subject are no where more free; and no Kingdom pays higher Taxes. Indeed the Taxes of *Great-Britain* are not only heavy, but what is worse, they are unequal, particularly the Land-Tax; and Disproportion is a sufficient Cause of Discontent. Some Men pay too much, and their Ruin is a public Loss; others pay too little, and their Exemption is a public Vexation: the Cause of the Disproportion in this Tax adds also to the Discontent.

That *Ireland* enjoys little Liberty comparatively with *England*, appears from the Laws which make its Constitution; it enjoys but little Trade, for there too it is cramped by *Great-Britain*;  
it

it is not admitted to receive the Reward of manufacturing its native Commodities, and being denied the Benefits consequent of Industry, it is not so industrious as *Britain*; for where Labour produceth the Reward, there only the Reward will produce Labour: but *Ireland* also pays small Taxes comparatively; To say that *Ireland* is therefore happier even in this Respect than *England*, would be too hasty a Conclusion. The Baron MONTESQUIEU, who writes professedly to make Men think, says,

“ There have been Instances in particular Monarchies of small States exempt from Taxes, which have been as miserable as the circumjacent Places that groaned under the Weight of Exactions. The chief Reason of this is, that the small State can hardly have any such Thing as Industry, Arts, or Manufactures; because in this Respect it lies under a thousand Restraints from the great State. The great State is blessed with Industry, Manufactures and Arts, and establishes Laws by which these very Advantages

“ are

“ are procured. The petty State there-  
 “ fore becomes necessarily poor, let it  
 “ pay ever so few Taxes. And yet  
 “ some have concluded from the Pover-  
 “ ty of those petty States; that in or-  
 “ der to render the People industrious  
 “ it is necessary to load them with  
 “ Taxes; but it would be a much better  
 “ Conclusion to say that they ought to  
 “ have no Taxes at all.”

At the first View he might seem to speak of *Ireland*; nor at the second is his Observation inapplicable, although *Ireland* is not totally exempted from Taxes. Its Revenues are hereditary, additional and appropriated. The hereditary consist of,

1. The Crown and Quit-Rents.
2. The Composition-Rents.
3. Casual Revenue from Forfeitures, Fines, &c.
4. Prizage on Wines.
5. Light-house Duties.
6. Tunnage and Poundage.
7. Hearth-Money.
8. Ex-

8. Excise.
9. Ale-Licences.
10. Wine-Licences.

These amount to more than five hundred thousand Pounds annually.

The additional Revenues are imposed every alternate Year, to make good the Deficiencies of the hereditary in supporting the Establishment, and these with the Poundage thereon and other Duties and Aids, amount generally to two hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum*.

The appropriated Duties are such as are vested in the Crown for the Purposes of improving and extending particular Arts and Manufactures, the Linen-Trade, and the Tillage of the Kingdom; for encouraging the Protestant Religion and extending Navigation thro' the Island: And all these Taxes are paid for the particular Support of this Island.

We will return now, *Theramenes*, and endeavour to find which of the Arguments used in favour of the *Scotish* Union will conclude for an Union of these Islands of *Britain* and *Ireland*.

We enjoy, *Theramenes*, the same Sovereign, and we use the same Language. The same Mode of Religion is established by Law; but here a Difference ariseth; the Number of Papists exceeds that of Protestants in *Ireland*. Many Laws are already made to prevent the Growth of Popery, and others may be needful hereafter; the Persons fit to propose and inforce such Laws are those who accurately know the Circumstances and Occasions requiring them; and these can be minutely known only to the People residing in the Kingdom. But if the two Parliaments are incorporated, the Members from *Ireland* cannot reside in their Country. Or, admitting that the Laws already made concerning that Article are sufficient, is it of any Consequence or none, that  
the

the Legislators are dispersed throughout the Kingdom to oversee the Execution of the Laws? If it be of any, that Advantage will be lost, by sending the *Irisb* Parliament to a separate Island; and such as this Reasoning is, it may be extended to all Laws with equal Justice as to those concerning Popery.

From the Argument, that Nature, by placing *England* and *Scotland* on the same Continent, and surrounding them with the same Barrier, pointed out an Union of their Councils, what can be inferred, but that Nature, by disuniting these Islands and placing a Sea between them, pointed out the Necessity of separate Councils for their distinct internal Governments.

That the Commerce of this Island would increase, as that of *Scotland* hath, will not be denied, and it is a favourable Argument for a commercial Union. *Scotland* was torn by the Broils of its Barons; but we have here no ambitious Families, as that Kingdom had, to disturb

Peace of this Island; and the Seeds of Dependence on *England* are laid in our Constitution, our Situation, and even in our Desires.

*Scotland* sought by the Union a Security in the House of Commons against the partial Administration of Justice and the oppressive Measures of its Ministers, and Officers of the executive Power. But would *Scotland* or *England* have the same Security against Corruption of Law or the Mal-administration of public Affairs, if their Parliament resided in a separate Island?

View the Arguments urged against an Union of *Scotland* and *England*, and see which of these may be pleaded against an incorporating Union of *Ireland*.

Such as respect the Right of a Parliament, to change the whole Constitution without the Consent of the Constituents, have their full Weight in this Case, and are equally conclusive against the Peerage and the Commonalty.

If

If a Nation chufeth to be governed by a Prince, Nobility and Commons, and gives the Prince the Power of nominating his Nobles, referving to the People the Election of the Commons; neither the Peers, when nominated, nor the Commons when elected, are invested with the Power of commanding the People to be governed by other Lawgivers and in other Manner than they prefcribed.

If the Parliament of *Ireland* can remove the Seat and change the Mode of Government; *Great-Britain* can make new Changes, and who may fay what Part, or how long *Ireland* fhall hold any Part in the Legislation? Or what Security is there that the Conditions of the Treaty will be fulfilled, fince all Questions concerning the Obfervation of them muft be difcuffed in a *British* Houfe of Legislature, where the Representatives of *Ireland* will be fo insignificant in Number? The Monarchy of *Ireland* will ceafe, and the Dignity of the Peerage be diminished. At-

tendance on a *British* Parliament will be a heavy Drain from *Ireland*, if we may judge from the Remittances now made to Absentees and Solicitors at the Court of *England*; and how easy would it be for a *British* Minister, by the Aid of *Irish* Places and Pensions, to add to the Number of his Followers the few Commons and Peers which *Ireland* would be permitted to send, thereby throwing Weight into the Hands of the Crown, and making the legislative dependent on the executive Power?

With such Arguments, recommended by all the Warmth of Patriot Zeal, did the Advocates for the separate Legislature of *Scotland* plead against the Union. And who, my *Critias*, while Honour and the Love of our Country are dear to Mankind, will not reverence the Memory of *Belhaven* and that *Fletcher* of *Salton*, who acknowledged no Attachment to Kings or Legislators, but such as were the Guardians of their Country's Constitution?

But

But let us leave these Arguments drawn from an Example in some Points not correspondent to the Case before us, and therefore not always conclusive. We have seen that the Constitution of *Ireland* will admit of greater Freedom; That its Parliament wants many Powers essential to a truly mixed Monarchy; and how hardly soever we may think of its Restraints, we are now inquiring only, whether an Incorporation would increase or abridge it's Liberties? At the present, with all its Imperfections, *Ireland* is yet a Kingdom, and knows its own Parliament. The People have where to lay their Complaints, and many Means of Redress, though not attended to; And the Representatives have Honour and the Applauses of a grateful People to incite them to generous Conduct. The Internal Business of this Kingdom requires Time and much Deliberation, for it is a growing Kingdom; many Things demand a long Scrutiny and the Examination of the Inhabitants of different Parts. These are attainable while *Ireland* hath its  
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own Parliament and sendeth its Members instructed in its Grievances and Wants; there is a Dignity even in the Name of a Parliament which is grateful to a Nation. Place on one Side three hundred Commoners, the wealthiest, and, if you will allow so much, the most deserving of the People, with an indefinite Number of Lords, assembled every alternate Year to transact the Business of this Nation alone; possessed of the highest Honour a Kingdom can bestow, that of making its Laws; of Power to call Offenders to account for their Actions; of Emulation to deserve the Praises of their Country, and of an Interest which ties them to it; Subject to no controul of other Parliaments; the Guardians of the Wealth and Dignity of this Island. On another Side place this same Kingdom deprived of its ancient Legislature, sending to *Great-Britain* fifty Deputies of the Commons to mix among five hundred and fifty eight Commoners of that Island, and twenty Peers to assemble with its Nobles; intrusting to these all the Internal Business of the Nation;

Nation ; wanting many Laws and Amendments of Laws, yet from the multiplicity of Business in *Great-Britain* unable to obtain them, or, if Doubts and Difficulties arise, to support its Bills by the Testimony of its Inhabitants ; incapable of any Sway from the Number of its Deputies ; without any Internal Awe over the Executive Power ; lastly, disunited from *Britain* by the Sea, and therefore everlastingly of less intimate Connection, than attends an Union of Continent. View these Appearances, which are not exaggerated ; then tell me, *Nicander*, will an Union aid the Constitution of the Kingdom ? You say, one Kingdom will no longer make partial Laws to the Prejudice of the other ; but Laws, *Nicander*, which only extend the Privileges of one, without imposing Restraint or Compulsion on another, are not to be censured as severe Laws. Every Kingdom looks to its Welfare, and we shall condemn ourselves, if we censure others for seeking that Liberty which we so ardently desire. That *Ireland* will no longer be subjected to Laws, to  
 which

which she never assented, hath a captivating Sound; and it is true that all Laws will then imply the Assent of *Ireland*; but how can it be called more Free, when the Dissent of all its Members will be of no Avail?

Now, *Nicander*, we will turn with you to the Commercial Advantages attainable by an Union. A principal Argument used by many of the Writers in favour of uniting *Ireland*, is the Recovery of the woollen Manufacture which *France* hath Stolen from *England*; and all the Writers are copious on the Advantages which will accrue to *Great-Britain*. *England* would be profited, says Decker, by opening the Trade of *Ireland*, which Country being too Poor to give it the Extent it is capable of, it must therefore be carried on for Years to come by *English* Stocks, consequently a great Part of the Profits of it must fall into the Hands of the *English* Merchants. But this Island also would be advantaged, the Commerce of *France* would be distressed; and that of this Kingdom increased; greater

greater Wealth would admit greater Taxes, and greater Taxes would lighten the Burthen of *Great-Britain*. That such Advantages would follow an Extent of Trade, is not a Matter of Dispute; but whether they should be purchased at the Expence of a lost Constitution may admit of Argumentation. For a while we will suppose that the present Policy is, by incorporating the Parliament of *Ireland*, to increase the Wealth of the Kingdom, though its Freedom should be diminished; and we will endeavour to follow Trade, with all its Consequences to such a Nation, beyond the first seducing Appearances.

In the first Stage of Trade it creates Independence among Individuals; in its moderate Degree it animates, and rouseth a Spirit which usually seeks that Freedom most ardently which is most prohibited. Such a Spirit being inconsistent with a dependent slavish Constitution, should be rendered ineffectual, lest it should shake the Constitution; for the Means of exerting this Spirit, which

Riches supply, can not be taken away without taking away Trade also, which supplies the Individuals with Money. It may be rendered ineffectual by previous Laws to discourage the use of Arms and of manly Exercises; but thereby Effeminacy and Luxury are encouraged, which end in Dissoluteness of Manners, and lastly in the Ruin of the State.

Nor is the Discouragement of Arms by Laws the only Method of enervating such a State. From an Union calculated for the Inlargement of Commerce and the infeebling of the Constitution, the Neglect of Arms seemeth to follow of Necessity. If Trade and Arms are observed to agree, this will not be the Case. Commerce, when its Effects are happiest, polishes and refines Mankind; this Consequence hath been universal; Poets and Historians testify it; *Alcinous* a trading Prince of *Corfu* is the most elegant Host that is met in the Travels of *Ulysses*. Trade also introduceth little Arts of Dealing removed too far from Generosity and manly Dignity. This  
also

also might be illustrated; *Punic* Faith was Proverbial, and *Carthage*, a Colony from *Tyre*, from thence derived its Manners and its Trade: The Faith of the *Genoese* at present is not less remarkable; and Cities might be mentioned in the *British* Dominions which are celebrated for a Species of Ingenuity, not the most laudable. Trade also makes Men more selfish by accustoming them to make a Profit of every Thing; but Politeness, Dexterity of Dealing, and Selfishness are not the Characteristicks of a martial People; Simplicity, Roughness and Generosity seem more likely to form their Character; but, if Facts speak otherwise, this Reasoning must fall to the Ground. The *Tyrians*, a trading People opposed with Vigour the Arms of *Alexander*: But self-preservation was the Inducement, and that will operate when a Love of Martial Glory is extinct. A Tradesman avoids going forth, till the Necessity is immediate, till all is endangered; when the *Tyrians* fought, *Tyre* was besieged, and all was at Stake; yet they sunk under the Strength of the

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Besiegers.

Befiegers. *Carthage* maintained a Rivalship with *Rome*; but her Tradesmen never composed her Armies; they were compounded of Mercenaries whose Voices and Habits were unknown to one another. *Marseilles* opposed *Cæsar* with more Spirit than *Tyre* exerted against *Alexander*, for it was encouraged by *Pompey*. But was it defended by its Tradesmen? No, \* it gathered within its Walls a strong barbarous Peasantry which inhabited the Mountains, and when reduced to the last Extremity † its Artificers never approached Danger so nearly as when they were united with and animated by these Mountaineers. During the Period of the greatest Commerce which *Athens* saw, how does *Demosthenes* complain that no Citizen would Arm, that all was intrusted to Hirelings, without Affection for the City

\* Albicos, barbaros homines, qui in eorum fide Antiquitus erant, montesque supra Massiliam incolabant, ad se vocaverant. Cæsar. Elzevir. 242.

† Neque vero conjuncti Albicis, cominus pugnando deficiebant, neque multum cedebant Virtute nostris.

City and therefore regardless of its Fame? The *Venetians* waged War by Mercenaries, and when *Genoa* stepped forth as their Rival, and shone with greatest Glory, no Traders, but Allies and Mercenaries composed her Armies; her Success was due to the great Abilities of a few Captains, and adorned with the Spoils of their Wreaths the State for a Time assumed Glory to itself. *Rome* had no Traders, *Prussia* hath few, and *Switzerland* still fewer. If in States whose Constitutions breathed Liberty and Glory, Commerce ever fled from Arms, how shall they be reconciled to live together in a Nation robbed of its Legislature, and dependent on another for its Laws, and even for its Commerce?

N I C A N D E R.

But, *Lysimachus*, if Trade lessens the martial Spirit of Traders, it encreases the marine Strength, and thereby a new Species of Power is acquired to the State.

L Y S I M A C H U S.

## L Y S I M A C H U S.

True, *Nicander*, but will that Species of Strength remain undiminished, when all other Parts of the Community are languishing? From whence must it be recruited? Not intirely from itself: After the Revolution of a few Years it will consist of Men taken from the dissolute infeeble Landmen; or can the Marine be restrained from the Excesses introduced by Wealth, when all others are indulging in them? Wealth, whether acquired by Conquest or Commerce, seems in all Ages to have produced similar Effects; Luxury and Corruption have ever filled its Train. Indeed the Vigour of a free Constitution hath long held up a Nation against the utmost Workings of Wealth; and *Britain* owes to her Form of Government, that, in Despite of Traffic and its worst Consequences, she still maintains her Independence and Dignity. But how shall a State without a Parliament or national Councils, without the Vigour of Liberty, counteract the Effects of Commerce?

merce? It seems that Trade, by its necessary Consequences, is more effectual in suppressing a martial Spirit, than a positive Law which discourages the Use of Arms. The latter makes Men fearful only from Ignorance, the former from too great Selfishness and Enervation. Yet there are Stages of Trade consistent with a martial Spirit, the first, in which Industry acquires the bare Necessaries of Life, for which all Mankind will take Arms; and the middle Stage which brings also the Conveniencies of Life, which all Mankind are desirous to retain: But even in the latter, it would be rash to hope for more than a Spirit of Defence; a Spirit of Offence and Conquest being reserved for States formed, like the *Roman*, by their Constitution for Liberty and Glory: And, when the Spirit of Defence is weakened by exorbitant Luxury, the State is the Property of the first bold Invader.

If these Reflections deserve an Application, it might be in this Manner;  
*Ireland,*

*Ireland*, a subordinate Kingdom, is admitted to a Participation of Trade with *Britain*, a superior State, for the Price of becoming more dependent in its Frame of Government. In the first Stage of its Trade and Wealth, while its Vigour is unimpaired, it will strive against Restraints, and seek that Freedom of Constitution which gives Property its dearest Relish. If the superior State would maintain the Dependence and Subordinacy, Laws to discourage a martial Spirit may be thought necessary. If these prove sufficient in the first Stage of Commerce; in its farther Progress, Trade will co-operate with these Laws; and thus an Example may appear of a Nation without Reputation or Glory, arising to the highest Degree of Corruption that can be supposed in any State.

## N I C A N D E R.

I own, *Lysimachus*, my Views were confined to the immediate Consequences of an extended Commerce, a Concourse of People to this Island, the Tillage of those

those extensive Plains which are now inhabited only by Herds; a Spirit of Industry; Health and Strength consequent of Labour; a free Import of Necessaries and Elegancies from all Quarters of the Globe, and an Increase of the marine Strength of his Majesty's Dominions.

L Y S I M A C H U S.

Permit me, *Nicander*, to these happiest Consequences, to add others no less immediate; as Trade would fly to the most commodious Havens which are found in the western and south-west Parts of the Island; other Ports, and even the western Harbours of *England* would be comparatively neglected. The Capital would neither have Commerce nor a Parliament to induce Inhabitants; and the Courts of Justice can hardly be called an Allurement; it would cease therefore to be the Seat of Residence of the Nobles and the Gentry. This might be no Misfortune, if they were dispersed through the Country and adorned their  
 H Villas;

Villas; but, it is doubtful, whether such would be the Consequence. Duty would call some to *England*, and of those who have the Means of Pleasure, many daily go in quest of it. Besides, a Diminution of their Dignity would breed a Decay of the Nobility; for Title, unattended by Power, becomes contemptible, and a precarious uncertain Power is little better than none. The Removal of the Parliament would cause a Decay of Schools and Academies; and the Destruction of the Court, a Decay of the more elegant and liberal Arts, which always fly to the Patronage of Genius and Nobility. These are immediate Effects; but, lead the Nation farther, to exorbitant Wealth, and view it covered with Inhabitants, rich indeed, but sunk in Luxury; without any other internal Government than a King's Privy Council; awed by a military Force; ignorant of Arms by Disuse, and abhorrent of them by Effeminacy; spoiled of its Nobility and the liberal Arts; without national Councils to counteract  
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by prudential Laws the most dissolute Effects of Money; luxurious without Elegance, and avaricious without Justice. Then tell me, *Nicander*, is not *Ireland*, with its present Constitution and limited Commerce, a happier Nation?

After all, if an incorporating Union of Parliaments be thought desirable; if *Ireland* be doomed to share the Fate of all mercantile States, the dissolute Weakness of Superfluity, without tasting their Liberty; let us see in how many Cases the Nations must still remain divided.

1. There must be separate Councils of State; for the Privy Council of *Great-Britain* never can inform his Majesty of the Affairs of *Ireland*, to which they are Strangers.

2. There must be several Officers of the Crown; otherwise the Services cannot be performed.

3. A perfect Union of Laws is hardly practicable. Digests are difficult, and the Customs of a Country, sanctified by Age, and grown more sacred than Laws, are dear as the Life-blood.

4. To change the Process of Courts, should any Difference be found, would breed Confusion and Intricacy; but the Difference is held inconsiderable.

5. There must be separate Receipts and Finances; separate Imposts and Customs; and flourishing Commerce will require separate Admiralties.

The Nations remaining necessarily divided in these Articles; in how many Cases will *Ireland* be subject to Oppression? If there be no Power to awe the Courts of Justice, what Justice can be expected? If the Trade of *England* is so much injured by tedious and expensive Proceedings; how much would the  
Trade

Trade of *Ireland* suffer, whose Tradefmen would be subject not only to the Expence and Delay, but to the Abuse of Law? To prevent this, *Nicander*, you will advise the Establishment of Courts Merchant. The Institution hath been approved by the most prudent and honest Men of *Great-Britain*, and they are far from being single in the Thought. \* In the better Days of *Greece*, *Xenophon* recommended to his Countrymen of *Athens*, a trading City, to give Rewards to those Merchant-Judges who determined Controversies most equally and speedily, thereby giving Dispatch to Business, by which more States would trade, and trade more contentedly with them. The Consequences might be the same in *Ireland* from such Institutions, but these would affect Trade only: Where would be the Nation's Security against Injustice

\* Εἰ δὲ καὶ τῆ τῆ ἐμπορίας ἀρχῆ ἅθλα προτιθεῖται τις, ὅστις δικαιοτάτα καὶ τάχιστα διαιροῖν τὰ ἀμφιλόγα, ὡς μὴ ἀποκωλυέσθαι, ἀποπλεῖν τοῖς βυζόμενον, πολὺ ἂν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ ἥδιον ἐμποροῦντο.

Injustice in Articles distinct from Commerce?

Before I conclude my Thoughts, let me call to your Remembrance, how often in States joined only by fœderal Treaties, such as the *Achæan*, and the *Swiss*, the Virtue and Spirit of one State hath diffused an Ardor through the whole. Even the Addresses of the *Irish* Parliament in the latter Years of *Queen Anne*, may be mentioned among such Occurrences.

I hear it whispered by *Nicander*, shall *Ireland* by a Commercial Union share equal Advantages, and not bear a Part of the Burthen of *Great-Britain*? No, *Nicander*, every Extent of the Commerce of *Ireland* merits some Equivalent, and that Equivalent should ease the Load of *Britain*. *Theramenes* then interposed; tell me, *Lysimachus*, is it not Reasonable that *Ireland*, even in its present State, without any additional Advantages of Commerce, should contribute

tribute to the Ease of *Great-Britain*? For, if I am rightly informed, in the Course of fifty Years, the Value of our Lands is trebled, and yet no Tax in Consequence thereof hath been imposed on them.

## L Y S I M A C H U S.

Youth is ever prone to liberal Sentiments; but take not the relative for the intrinsic Value of our Lands. Money, my *Theramenes*, is an established Sign of the Value of other Things, and in the best regulated Governments, Money and Merchandize of every Kind are mutual Representatives of each other. As Coin is but the Means of acquiring the Conveniencies of Life, it should be considered how the Acquisition of other Things is affected by altering the Value of this Substitute or Sign. Its Value depends no less on its Quantity than its Quality, for among other Causes why Money was chosen as a sign of the Worth of other Things was its Scarcity; therefore its Quantity  
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in a great Measure determines its Worth; as more is imported, the Value of it is diminished, and the Price of other Things becomes relatively greater; in fewer Words, as Money is more plentiful, Men will have more of it for their Commodities. Therefore, though our Rents may be trebled, yet if the Price of the Necessaries of Life which those Rents are to purchase, be trebled also; can our Lands be called of more Intrinsic Value? That Money during many Years past hath grown more abundant in *Great-Britain*, its Public Funds will testify, which in Times of Tranquillity were daily reducing the Interest, and thereby regulating the Contracts of Individuals and the Value of all Purchases. The necessary Commerce between these Islands increased the Quantity of Gold and Silver among us, and their Value hath decreased proportionably. That Customs and Taxes established for the Support of a Government, should be increased as the Value of Money decreases, Justice seems to require; otherwise the Govern-

Government must grow more Poor as Gold and Silver grow more common; but it might prove an ill-deduced Conclusion to affirm, that Things which could not bear a Taxation while Money was scarce and highly valued, will admit it when Money is abundant, unless it could be proved, that notwithstanding an Increase of the Quantity of our Gold and Silver, the Price of all the Conveniences and Elegances of Life remained unchanged. To affirm also, because the Lands of *England* are Taxed, many of which are not more valuable than those which we inhabit, that the Lands of this Island therefore should be subjected to Taxes, would be reasoning from a too partial View of Things, without looking to those Equivalents for her Imposts which *Britain* enjoys, unconfined Traffic, and unexampled Liberty. It would be saying little less, than, that *Ireland* without the like Freedom either of Constitution or Commerce, in short, without equal Strength should support equal Burthens with

*Great-Britain.* If this Reasoning ever should prevail, who, *Theramenes*, would not chuse his Acre in that Island, where Liberty hath ever strove for Commerce, and Commerce hath been ready to pay the Price of Liberty. But I am falling into something like Conclusions, though I meant not to deduce any; I have submitted such Facts and Thoughts as occur to me, and had rather have your Reasoning upon them than my own. Such as they are, they respect the Utility and Inutility of an Incorporating Union in General, which is the first Object worthy of Attention; when the particular Articles of that Incorporation become the Subjects of serious Consideration, the Union is at Hand.

All were so Polite as to express their Pleasure, and even *Nicander* suspected the Validity of his former Arguments, when the Wife of *Lysimachus* passed the Arbour, and blushing, for she feared to interrupt their Conversation, sought to steal away unattended by them; but

*Theramenes,*

[ 67 ]

*Theramenes*, who admired her Modesty and Elegance, hastily crossed her Walk, and engaging her Attention to a Bed of Ranunculuses, she was joined by the rest of the Company, who chearfully mixed in the Amusements of her Garden.

F I N I S.



... who admired her Modesty  
and Elegance, hastily crossed her Walk,  
and engaging her Attention to a Bed of  
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Houses of the Oireachtas