

P R O and C O N :

BEING

AN IMPARTIAL ABSTRACT

OF THE

PRINCIPAL PUBLICATIONS

ON THE SUBJECT OF A

LEGISLATIVE UNION,

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

IN WHICH THE

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THAT MEASURE,
BY THE FOLLOWING WRITERS,
ARE FAIRLY CONTRASTED;

VIZ.

EARL OF CLARE,
LORD AUCKLAND,
LORD MINTO,
RT. HON. MR. ADDINGTON,
RT. HON. MR. PITT,
RT. HON. MR. DUNDAS,
RT. HON. MR. DOUGLAS,
DEAN TUCKER,
MR. WM. SMITH,
DR. CLARKE,
MR. PEELE,
DR. M'KENNA,

EARL OF FARNHAM,
RT. HON. MR. FOSTER,
SIR J. W. JERVIS, BT.
MR. SPENCER,
MR. BOUSFIELD,
MR. EDGEWORTH,
MR. RUDD,
MR. GOOLD,
MR. TAAFFE,
MR. WELD,
MR. SHEEHY,
DR. DRENNAN:

A L S O,

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST, &c.—CEASE YOUR FUNNING,—
IMPARTIAL VIEW OF THE CAUSES LEADING TO, &c.—
TIT FOR TAT,—AND MANY OTHER ANONYMOUS
WRITERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

BY A SEARCHER AFTER TRUTH.

DUBLIN:

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Houses of the Oireachtas

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INTRO.

INTRODUCTION.

AMONG the boasted and valuable privileges of a British subject, one of the most important, and most essential to real liberty, is the Freedom of the Press. Before the invention of the Art of Printing, liberty may have been enjoyed at certain times, and at certain places; but it could not have been either permanent, or secure, for want of an easy circulation of sentiment, and a free communication of idea. This a free press secures to the subject; it imposes a check upon the conduct of the most exalted and powerful, and protects the order of society, from the danger of any violent infraction. It is productive of another and more positive advantage, though perhaps of less immediate and universal value to society: it furnishes the easiest vehicle, and the surest criterion of the real sentiments of a people; it supplies, from a multitude of counsellors, opinions upon public matters, which have no other means of communication; it provides the statesman with assistance to effect his designs, or to correct his errors, from talents that would otherwise lie buried in obscurity, and that would shrink from a direct application, or from a more conspicuous exertion.

Thus, ever since Freedom has been regularly established in the British empire, the Press, upon every important point in agitation, has teemed with declarations, of the opinions, or of the fancies of men, on each side of every great question. The present subject of public debate, a Legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland, has roused the attention of all ranks of men, from the capital to the remotest extremities of the island: and as it is the most momentous topic, that has ever yet come under the discussion of the Irish Parliament, it has produced a greater number of publications, than, probably, any other matter of state policy has ever given rise to.

On this, as on all similar occasions, some of the pamphlets offered to the public, are the children of passion, and devoid of all argument: some are mere declamation; and
among

among those that are argumentative, different authors have viewed the subject under different lights; and in support of the same opinion, arguments are sometimes urged, dissimilar to each other, and even contradictory. It is of moment to the welfare of the people, that the Public, as well as those whose province it is to decide, should entertain just conceptions of so important an object: but there are few, whose leisure, or whose inclination will permit them, to take the trouble of wading through the prodigious number of pages, that have been written on this subject; and fewer still, who are capable, in the rapid view that a pamphlet usually obtains, of reaping much information, from a loose and desultory collection of arguments, scattered wide, without order, or connexion.

It occurred therefore that some service might be rendered to the Public, by collecting into one point of view, all that has been urged in print; and by opposing to each other, the arguments on either side, so as that the solidity of each might become apparent at a glance, and that a few moments might suffice to go through the condensed substance of what, in a more dilated form, would require weeks, or months to peruse.

Having read all the principal pamphlets and speeches, that have been published on the subject, whether in support of the expediency of an Union, or in opposition to that measure, the compiler has extracted every argument, that offered itself to his observation, and, in methodizing them here, has endeavoured to preserve to each, the full force which its respective authors seemed to attribute to it. Impartiality and perspicuity have been his chief aim; and, as he has sought with equal assiduity to procure for himself satisfactory information, as to contribute to public convenience, he is not conscious of having, in any case, either over-rated, or under-valued any argument, which has presented itself in the writings, either of the advocates, or the opponents of an Union.

For the sake of clear arrangement, the various arguments are disposed under three distinct heads, viz.

1st. *Political*, as respecting the *external relations* of Ireland in connexion and intercourse with Great Britain.

2dly. *Political*, as respecting the *internal peace and prosperity* of Ireland. And,

3dly. *Commercial*.

In

In the margin, opposite to each argument, stand the names of the principal authors, by whom it has been urged: when any argument, or any part of an argument, has been repeated by more than one writer, the names annexed are connected by the conjunction, *and*: when a name stands without that conjunction, it designates the sole author, of the argument, to which it is affixed.

In like manner, the name and number printed at the bottom of the page, present a reference to the author, by whom, on the other side of the question, respectively, the adjoining argument has been opposed, and to the page in which his answer may be found.

It seems to be the natural order, that those arguments should be placed first, which have been urged in support of a proposed measure; and that, those, by which its opponents have combated, should follow. For the sake of a more easy comparison, each head contains immediately contrasted the arguments on each side.

P R O

PRO AND CON,

Æc. Æc.

IN FAVOUR OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS POLITICAL, RESPECTING THE EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF IRELAND, IN CONNEXION AND
INTERCOURSE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

A PERPETUAL and intimate connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, is essential to the interests of both :* the geographical situation of the two islands render any medium in possible, between the most intimate connexion, and rivalry or enmity : the connexion between them is regarded, by the enemies of the empire, as its most vulnerable point ; and, as the disjunction of the two great limbs would annihilate the power of the empire, their chief object, and almost only remaining hope, is to effect a separation ; this connexion has, in consequence, been exposed to the repeated attacks both of foreign enemies and domestic traitors ; it ought, therefore, to be sufficiently strengthened, to be capable of withstanding these efforts of the enemy.

The settlement of 1782, which is called *final*, consisted merely in the demolition of the injurious system, by which the two countries were before held together, § without substituting any other in its place : and, though such a state of things as was then established, might have subsisted for a while, during a period of tranquillity, it was ill suited to bear the agitation of the tempest that has since convulsed the greater part of Europe, and has imparted its malignant principles to Ireland. Such was the opinion, with regard to that settlement, of the British Parliament at the time, of the ministry by whom it was proposed and conducted, and of those very persons who now call it a *final* adjustment : it was the declared opinion of the gentleman who now takes the lead in its support, that it could not last : the Irish Parliament, in their answer to the message from the throne recommending the adoption of

Weakness of present connexion.
Pitt,
& Lord Minto.

Lord Minto.
Pitt,
& Addington,
& Douglas,
& Lord Minto.

Settlement of 1782 inadequate.
Pitt,
& Addington,
& Dundas.

Addington,

Pitt,

B

some

* Foster, 27.

§ Ibid. 26.

& Addington. some plan of *final adjustment between the two countries*, are totally silent with regard to that part of it contained in the word *final*. So far was that settlement from being then looked on as final and complete, that the then minister thought it necessary to move, that a further settlement was necessary for the maintenance of connexion; and an address was voted to the King,* praying him to take such *further* measures as he should think fit to strengthen the connexion: his Majesty's answer stated his compliance with the request of the House, and was delivered by Mr. Fox. In objection to this statement, it is urged, that the address contains not the word *further*, and that it, therefore, alluded only to the measures then about to be embraced: but Mr. Fox, in his speech on the occasion, said expressly, that *something more than what he had stated to be his intention, was fit and proper to be done, &c. but it was not to be proposed by him, it was the duty of the Crown to look to that*. In 1785, the same gentleman declared, that no idea of commercial regulation had been entertained by the administration of 1782, in the resolution proposed.

Douglas.

But, however interesting to ascertain, the opinions of men at that time cannot be binding on them now, nor upon the parliament of either country; nor even, if by either parliament a formal and express declaration had been made against any further adjustment, or against a legislative union, would it by any means prevent that subject from being now entertained.

Smith,
& Addington,
& Douglas.

But it is a mere dispute about words to dwell upon the term *final adjustment*, as applied to that of 1782; for, admitting that adjustment to be *final*, as it undoubtedly was, so far as the limits of those doubts and controversies, to which it was the object of that arrangement to put an end, still it was not *preclusive*; it did not deprive the King of the right to recommend, nor the parliament of the power to receive any proposal for deliberation. The object of that settlement was to remove those grievances of which Ireland then complained; viz. the claim of Great Britain to bind Ireland by her laws; the appellent jurisdiction of the British House of Lords; Poynings' law; and the frame and perpetuity of the mutiny-bill. These, it did finally remove, by a compact which cannot be violated without a gross breach of faith; and no more than this was meant in the expression, *final*; together with a *hope* that *no constitutional question* would exist afterwards, to disturb the harmony of the two kingdoms—that is, no cause of dispute or contention; it could not have been intended to exclude all amicable proposals from one to the other, or from the Sovereign to both: and, being only an abolition of abuse, and a restitution of the original principles

Douglas.

Smith.

principles of the constitution, it left Ireland as free to receive any proposal of treaty or compact as before such abuse took place; therefore this proposal is no violation of the compact of 1782.

It appears, then, from the expressions used by ministers,* Pitt.
as above, that the system of connexion was at that time deemed imperfect; it still remains the same: and, while it declares the most strict and intimate connexion to be essential to the individual interests, and general welfare of both countries, it leaves them connected by no other tie, than the community of the executive government, with the privilege of assenting to Irish acts of parliament under the great seal of Great Britain, and directing Irish affairs by the advice of British ministers:—a bond of connexion which is insufficient to consolidate the strength of the two countries in time of war; to unite them in time of peace; to guard against local jealousies and doubts, which must exist between countries so connected; to give to Ireland all the commercial and political advantages, which she might derive from a closer connexion with Great Britain; or to improve both nations to that degree of strength and prosperity of which they are capable.—
A connexion of affection is mere sentiment and nonsense; it Lord Minto.
cannot exist between nations, for they can be guided by interest alone, and are incapable of affection; and reason is required in sober argument, not sentiment.

The present imperfect system of connexion has this fundamental vice, that by the very law of its constitution and nature, it must tend gradually, though not always with rapidity, yet certainly and inevitably to dissolution. Such a connexion, between two unequal countries, is the means of ascendancy in one, and the cause of subordination in the other.—But the natural love of independency will set a spirit of jealousy at work in the weaker, which will continually strive to improve and enlarge that independency, by the only possible means; that is by striking off link after link of the connexion, which imposes some restraint, till the last thread shall be broken: this statement is supported by the uniform testimony of all history. † Ditto.

There are but two possible methods, by which the imperfection of this system can be remedied;—by a compact between the two kingdoms, or by the blending and indentification of their legislatures. The former has been already tried, and found to be impracticable (commercial propositions of

* Foster, 27, and Taaffe, &c. 28.

† In Lord Minto's speech the reader will find an analysis of the various possible modes of connexion between two countries, stated in order to prove that no other can be secure or permanent but entire consolidation.

of 1785): the alternative, therefore, is to remain in the present situation, subject to endless jealousies and dissensions, exposed to the malignity of the enemy in a point of the highest importance, where weakness invites attack; or, to adopt the measure proposed.

Pitt,
& Addington. Experience proves the imperfection of the present system; for the ill effects of jarring legislatures have been felt, in the only instance, which has yet occurred, where they could have been felt, in the affair of the regency:* there the two legislatures acted upon different principles; and though they happened to coincide in the choice of the person, yet the regent would have held his authority upon different tenures in the two countries. It is possible for many other questions to arise, which may occasion dissension; as, for instance, that of peace or war. Supplies might be granted by the one, and withheld by the other. And this danger of dissension must very greatly increase, if the Roman Catholics should obtain admission into the legislature, and influence its decisions; for many causes of difference might arise between them and the British Parliament, on points less capable of reconciliation.

Addington.

*Union will
strengthen the
empire.*
Pitt,
& Ld. Minto.

Ditto.

Pitt.

It is the opinion of every statesman of abilities, acquainted with the interests of the British empire,§ and of every well-informed writer who may have touched upon the subject, that the general power of the empire would be very greatly extended by such a consolidation of the strength of the two kingdoms, in a far greater proportion than the simple addition of their respective amounts.

The commercial resources of the empire, in which its strength consists, would evidently be much increased by any measure that should communicate to Ireland the commercial advantages of England, open the market of one country to the other, and give them the common use of British capital. And since, in case of attack, Ireland now depends for protection upon the power, naval and military, of Great Britain, the best method of guarding her against danger is to enable Ireland to defend herself, and to strengthen her by a participation of the wealth and power of Britain.

Douglas,
& Anon.

Anon.

The strength of any people is best increased and secured by an identity of government, and identity of interest. One general superintending legislature is best fitted for the steady consistent government of all the parts of which it is composed. France well knows the principle and the force of incorporations, and has practised it with success in her own case, while, on the contrary, she maintains with regard to the politics of the British empire the principle of separation, as essential to freedom,

* Foster, Bousfield, 30.

§ Foster, 31.

ARGUMENTS POLITICAL, EXTERNAL.

freedom, and, with as sound policy, aims at forming into independent republics its two members, Scotland and Ireland. In whatever part of an united people wealth may be accumulated, its benefits will pervade and fructify the whole. London feels no detriment to its interests in the prosperity of Bristol or Liverpool; for one country, under a common legislature, has a common interest. In the present precarious state of connexion, the idea of *distinctness of interest*, which is but a convertible term for separation, is ever present; and, with the increasing strength and wealth of the inferior country, that of a *possible* future separation becomes more practicable, and more formidable. While there is a *possibility* of such an event, it is the interest of the wealthier country to restrain, to a certain degree, this rising prosperity; and before England will promote the interests of Ireland to the extent of which they are capable, she must be well assured that they are identified with her own.

The measure proposed is not, in the least, derogatory to the honor and dignity of Ireland, nor does it imply any inferiority on her part. This jealousy for the independence of Ireland is a natural feeling or passion, but it is ill directed; for true patriotism is guided by utility, and embraces those measures which contribute to the welfare and prosperity of the country. It is an union, by treaty, of two independent nations, upon equal terms, by which no part of the united country is more subjugated or dependent than the rest; it is a confederacy, which in the very act recognises the independence of both; and, without this acknowledged independence, a treaty of union could not take place, because both parties could not treat fairly and equally. It was never objected, by the most captious opponent of the Scotch union, that the independence of the Scotch parliament was attacked by the proposal, and yet its independence was to the full as complete as that of the Irish parliament. In the present case it is manifestly for the advantage of a country incapable of defending or providing for herself, to unite, upon terms of equality, with that country whence she has derived every thing valuable or important in her possession. Distinctness is not to be confounded with independence, nor union with subordination.

The independence of the British parliament was not infringed by the addresses of the Irish houses to the Queen in 1703 and 1707, asking for an union: neither can that of the Irish parliament, equally free and independent, be violated by such a *proposal* coming from England; but, as before stated, the very proposal is a solemn recognition of its independence, and its exclusive competence to decide upon the question.—The compact of 1782 cannot have done more, than make Ireland as independent of Britain as that country is of Ireland;
but

Is not derogatory to Ireland.

Pitt,
& Dundas,
& Lord Minto,

& Addington.

Dundas.

Pitt,
& Smith.

Smith.

but the *adoption of an union* would not encroach on the independence of England; neither can it on that of Ireland, which is not greater.

AROD.

The number of Irish representatives may be diminished, but a representation proportioned to the territory, population, resources, and contribution of Ireland, in an union identifying the interests of the two countries, is sufficient to secure to her an independence equal to that enjoyed by any part or district of Great Britain ; which may yet bear but a small proportion in the sum of British representation. It is therefore an idle objection to say, that the Irish members may be outvoted by the superior number of the British members. An union would neither annihilate the Irish legislature, nor transfer its authority into other hands ; but would combine it, upon equal terms, with another independent legislature, where having its due proportion of weight and influence, it might much better support the independence and dignity of the country, than in its present situation : for never, but at a moment of general terror and alarm, has it been known to have a will of its own, except on the one question of the regency : and there it served only to shew, how loose the connexion is, and how near folly or wickedness might go to dissolve the only bond.

Douglas.

Ireland, by an union, no more becomes a *province* in any offensive sense of the word, than Great Britain: they both become provinces, or component parts, of one whole; one integral empire.

*Prosperity of
Ireland not to
be attributed to
the settlement of
1782.*

Douglas.

Prosperity of Ireland not to be attributed to the settlement of 1782.
Neither is it to the transaction of 1782 that the progressive improvement in the trade, manufactures, and prosperity of Ireland, is to be attributed. Its prosperity* is not secured by that settlement, but is in a great degree dependent on the policy and wisdom of Great Britain; and the only safeguard of its permanence is that very measure which it is pretended would produce a contrary effect.

The great points gained by Ireland in the way of commerce, were the fruits of several British acts of parliament† of 1779 and 1780, which first opened her trade with America and the West India colonies, as well as with the rest of the world.— And it was not till 1793§ that permission was granted her to trade to the colonies on the same footing with Great Britain. This act will hardly be said to be an effect of the arrangement of 1782, and the others were antecedent to it. But Ireland was growing fast in industry, enterprise, manufactures, trade, and

* Foster, 27.

† 19 George III. c. 35. 20 George III. c. 6.

- - - - - c. 37. - - - - - c. 10.

... .. C. 18.

§ 33 George III. c. 63.

and agriculture, before either the acknowledgment of her independence, or the grant of her free trade; and all the three kingdoms have flourished with an accelerated rapidity for about fifty years, since the general pacification of Europe by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1776 it was the opinion of Lord Chief Baron Foster, (a man of great acuteness and accurate enquiry) as recorded by Mr. Arthur Young,* that "Ireland had improved more within the last twenty years than in a century before; that the great spirit of improvement had begun in 1749 and 1750; and that, in the space of about thirty years, the exportation of linen and yarn had arisen from 500,000*l.* to between 1,200,000*l.* and 1,500,000*l.*;" nearly treble.—And yet, since that time, notwithstanding the transaction of 1782, improvement has not continued to advance in the same ratio; so that it seems much more reasonable to ascribe the growing improvement of Ireland to the spirit which began about 1750.

That the settlement of 1782 is no security for the permanence of the advantages enjoyed by Ireland, is plain. For, however Great Britain may have renounced the power of binding Ireland by British laws, she cannot have restrained herself from repealing her own acts; and the encouragements which have promoted the prosperity of the linen manufacture of Ireland, as well as her trade with the colonies, are derived merely from British laws, which are of course liable to be repealed by the British legislature.

It is sometimes *admitted* that these advantages are derived from British laws, and are therefore dependent on Great Britain; but, in answer it is urged, that, though by a war of duties and prohibitions Britain might injure Ireland, she herself must also inevitably suffer in the contest, and therefore wisdom and policy, as well as liberality, must ever prevent her from engaging in such hostilities. This is certainly true, but wisdom is not a possession in perpetuity; the principles now held with regard to commerce, it is possible, may change hereafter; succeeding administrations may entertain different opinions from those of the present day, with regard to policy and expediency; disputes and animosities may arise, and, in such a case, there is no treaty, no security that Ireland can have recourse to.

The conduct of England towards Scotland,† before the union, is a case exactly in point: and yet it seems to have been as much the interest of England to promote the welfare of that country, as to further the prosperity of Ireland.

In

* It is from the same period nearly that Dr. Adam Smith dates the rapid progress of improvement in Scotland, and the establishment of country banks.

† Foster, Spencer, Rudd, Goold, Bousfield, 33.

*Propositions
of 1785.*

In 1785 it was thought that the commercial connexion was not sufficiently secure under such protection, and those who were best acquainted with the interests of Ireland, wished for the "security of a legislative compact;" yet the warmest advocates of that imperfect measure are now the foremost to reject a legislative security of a more binding nature, which cannot be dissolved.

Smith.

The modification of Poynings' law in 1782 (by which it is required that the royal assent be affixed to Irish statutes under the great seal of England) is said to have sufficiently secured the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland: but, on the contrary, that very circumstance is a proof of its frailty, by the application, to an *admitted evil*, of a weak and inadequate remedy; viz. the responsibility of an individual to the British parliament; and that law, instead of asserting the independence of Ireland, places her in a state of absolute dependence upon the British minister; and thus subjected to the possible wickedness or caprice of an individual, or a cabinet.

It was admitted in 1785, when the commercial propositions were rejected, that things could not remain as they were; that commercial jealousy might arise, and separation of interest lead to separation of connexion. No change has since taken place in the arrangement, therefore the danger must still remain the same; for, though partial evils have been remedied by separate laws, that mode is inadequate to remove the danger, because there is no security for the permanence of those laws; and because the exercise of distinct rights is liable to produce dissension between the two legislatures. The good sense, which has hitherto obviated the evil, has not annihilated the risk.

Ld. Auckland,
& Addington,
& Dean Tucker.

If the independence of Ireland be real, it presents a field for endless dissensions; and, if she chuses to exercise the power of dissent, the consequences must be contest, and, either separation, or the conquest of the weaker, with all its attendant misfortunes. If it be merely nominal, it will produce distrust, abhorrence, and suspicion; and will probably render the very connexion odious, and reduce Ireland to the necessity of submitting to the control of a British minister, no way accountable to her, but amenable only to the parliament of Great Britain. If it be between both, it combines the evils of both systems; so that, in any case, the present *distinctness* furnishes a store of weapons to wound and sever a connexion so frail: a danger, which is now redoubled by the efforts of foreign and domestic enemies to effect a separation.

Smith.

Ld. Auckland,
& Addington,
& Dean Tucker,
& Dundas.
Smith.

*Irish parliament
not independent.*

Douglas,
& Dundas.

But, in fact, the parliament of Ireland is not independent; it is in a state, not of shadowy, but of real and substantial subordination on the parliament of Great Britain. For, by that very act (21 and 22 George III.) which is boasted of by the adversaries of an union, as securing the connexion between the two kingdoms; it is ordained that no act of the Irish parliament,

liament, whether it affect the empire at large, or regard only the most minute local concern, can pass into a law, till it be returned under the great seal of England. The affixing of that seal is an executive, not a legislative act; and the minister who does so, does it at his peril, and liable to impeachment in the British parliament, if done amiss. Thus is the Irish parliament under the absolute control of the British, whilst it claims a perfect equality of independence. That topic, then, so much insisted on, and so well suited to rouse a passionate opposition,—the loss of independence—has no weight, for Ireland has no independence to lose; and though the separate parliaments lose, each of them, their respective identity and distinctness, that of Ireland no more becomes dependent than the British; but both equally become proportionate parts of one whole.

The present situation is, what is called *Imperium in imperio*, Arguments for a supposed independent government within an independent and against, &c. government, and this, all writers have agreed in condemning. Such was the first constitution of the American states, when each state was supreme and independent; but as soon as peace allowed time for reflection, the absolute necessity appeared of remedying by consolidation a constitution incapable of standing. Such also is the constitution of the Swiss Cantons, which incapacitated that nation from opposing with effect the intrigues or the violence of the French.

The subordination of the Irish executive to Great Britain Douglas. is more obvious still, than that of the legislative body: the Lord Lieutenant acts in obedience to the King's commands, signified either in his commission under the great seal of England, or by the King's letter, countersigned by a secretary of state, or, in revenue matters, by the lord treasurer, or three lords of the treasury.

But the jealousy of Ireland revolts at the practical exercise of these legal and constitutional powers; and, partly from this, partly from other causes, the government of England is supposed, in general cases, to leave matters to the Irish parliament, and ministers. From time to time, however, occasions occur, where it is necessary for the British ministers to act contrary perhaps to the sentiments of the servants of the crown in Ireland. And, though in such cases the difficulty may often be surmounted by confidential intercourse, or by the adoption of a middle way, so as not to alarm the dignity of Ireland, or commit the imperial authority resident in England; yet situations have arisen more than once, when the ministry have thought it their duty, without such temperature, to exercise an immediate controlling authority in Ireland; even under the hazard of rousing the jealousy, or affronting the high spirits of the leading persons there. This dilemma, which has already occasioned many difficulties, and will be the source of growing embarrassments, is capable but of two remedies;

C

either

either the King must remove his residence to Ireland, which would only take off the difficulty from that country to throw it on Great Britain; or Ireland, by her representatives, must come to England, and thus place both countries, in theory as well as in effect, under the direction of the same ministers.— But while the present system remains, no alteration can work a remedy. By indentification with Great Britain, Ireland will become truly independent, in sharing her independence, and will no longer be bound to follow, tamely and subserviently, a will that is not her own. This can be no otherwise effected than by an union, unless it be by separation; supposing even that she had means and strength in that situation to preserve herself independent, which is not possible. Were the British islands separated, neither of them could subsist against any enemy combined with the other, nor supply sufficient means of defence against his inroads. It is evident that, in case of war, the weaker of the two would be more exposed to danger; and, though for a while, she might perhaps maintain herself by the mean arts of intrigue, she would be a constant bone of contention to surrounding nations, and at last would be forced to fly for refuge to her more powerful neighbour, either England or France; and either actually submit to her authority, or at least, by virtually yielding to her influence, lose her own independency.

Lord Minto.

Douglas.

There is another striking instance, in proof of the subordinate condition of Ireland; she is *obliged* to take part in all the wars of Great Britain, for the King's declaration of war involves all his dominions; she is exposed to all the risks and dangers of war; she may lose one of her provinces, or herself become a province to an enemy; and yet she cannot acquire an acre of territory; every conquest made, though perhaps at the expence of Irish blood, and Irish treasure, belongs solely to Great Britain. Ireland cannot either plant a colony, or establish a foreign settlement.

Smith.

It is a mistaken expression, to say that by an union the Irish parliament would merge in that of Great Britain; it merges in the imperial legislature, and an union merely changes the residence of the legislature of Ireland, leaving to it still, in partnership with that of Great Britain, the direction of Irish affairs.

Two legislatures
not similar to
two houses of
parliament.

Smith.

The separate deliberation of the two independent parliaments, is very erroneously compared to that of the two houses of the same parliament. These latter are connected together and consolidated into one body,* by having, for a middle term, the third estate, and, in case of disagreement, the measure merely falls to the ground, and no mischief ensues; but there is no bond of union between two bodies each complete and independent;

* Foster, 31.

independent; there is no middle term to connect them, and should a disagreement occur between them, and should each parliament, having a right to pursue its own measures, think proper to adhere with tenacity to its own designs, a contest must be the consequence; and, in such a case, the great seal would be but a pitiful guardian to the connexion. That disagreement is possible, the transactions of 1785 and 1789 evince; at the latter period the coincidence, in the *person* of the regent, was accidental; for the precipitation of Ireland waited not for his appointment in England; nor was any person, in fact, actually named in that kingdom, the King's fortunate recovery having happened just in time to prevent it. But, though the person had been the same, the disparity in the limitation of his prerogative would have given the two countries an executive government, with different constitutional powers in each: an evil, which is admitted by the late regency-bill, to have existed.

Besides, if a difference of opinion should arise between the two houses of parliament, they have not only much greater facility of discussion, and mutual explanation, but identity of interest between them is much more direct and sensible, than that between two separate kingdoms, though they be connected in, and form parts of the same empire. It is true, that to a certain degree, the separate legislatures may afford a check upon each other, similar to those of the three branches of parliament upon each other; yet, it must be of a very imperfect nature, having no formal or legal constitution; and can have no more force or efficacy than those checks upon each other, which prevail in the relation of different states, having a common interest, but without any link of connexion, and which serve to maintain what is called the balance of power.

A local parliament has been compared also, for the local knowledge, of which it is supposed to be possessed, to a jury, which, on the same account was formerly obliged to be selected from that spot, which was thought to furnish local knowledge of the circumstances to be tried; but the wisdom of legislators, finding the neighbourhood of a culprit too much exposed to prejudice, passion and party spirit to allow of justice, have thought it expedient in latter and more liberal times, to enlarge his vicinage to the whole county, and so to give a greater field for the selection of a jury; or, if it be suspected that a fair trial cannot there be had, they have allowed to *change the venue* to another place, where equal local knowledge may be exerted with less danger or prejudice. In like manner, to carry on the comparison, the Irish parliament, combined in the imperial, may possess all the local knowledge that they could obtain in their own country, and be at the same time exempt from local danger and local prejudice.

In

*Distance no
impediment.*

Douglas.

In some cases, distance may present an insuperable impediment to the union of legislatures, as in that of America, where the experiment was strongly recommended by Adam Smith; and in many others: but this objection will not apply to Ireland, for that country, though separated by a sea, is in the neighbourhood of Great Britain alone, and is separated from all other countries by an immense space. Its capital is nearer to that of England than Edinburgh, and notwithstanding the intervention of a sea, the journey thither from London usually occupies a shorter space of time; the most distant towns of Ireland, that are of any note, as Cork, Limerick, Londonderry, &c. are not so far from the metropolis of the empire as many towns in Scotland.

To these considerations should be added, the many important inducements to intercourse and incorporation, between Great Britain and Ireland, which did not exist in the case of Scotland: the same system of laws, civil and commercial; the same rules of property; similar tribunals; extensive consanguinity and intermarriages; the great and increasing number of those, who, by succession or acquisition, have become owners of land in both countries; the same established religion; the same course of education; and several others, which infinitely outweigh any consideration of territorial contiguity.

*The purse of
Ireland not the
object sought in
an Union.*

Smith.

It is an absurd supposition, that the object of an union is to place the purse of Ireland in the hands of the British minister: it is already open to him, to the extent of its abilities, and the efforts of the minister have ever been directed to lighten the burthens of the people, not to increase them beyond the power to bear. But if such were his design, even that would afford a certain proof of the sincerity of his opinion, that the prosperity of Ireland will be increased by an union, for he would scarcely grasp at a purse, and take measures at the same time to prevent its being filled: an empty purse is seldom an object of desire.

*Parliament cannot
rescind the
treaty afterwards.*

Douglas.

That the *omnipotence of parliament* has power to rescind hereafter any of the articles of compact, is a false assertion, as it shall presently be proved;* but, were it true, it would equally furnish an argument against the stability of any law, or treaty, or compact, and would overturn the principles of civil society; and, besides, such a violation of the compact being a subversion of the constitution, is one of those extreme cases, which would absolve the subject from his allegiance, and justify an appeal to the sword. Nor is there any foundation for imagining that, on account of the great majority of the British members of the legislature, the representatives of Ireland would be outvoted on all occasions of competition, and Ireland oppressed at the pleasure of the stronger

erty.

* Foster, Goold, 32, 33:

party. This would, at least, amount to an infraction of the treaty, and therefore to a dissolution of the union; but also, such a conspiracy is impracticable, because when the two countries are identified, there cannot exist any clashing of separate interests to occasion competition for power or profit. Both these suppositions are refuted too, by experience, in the case of Scotland; for, as to those instances produced, as breaches of the compact of union with Scotland, they have no existence in fact. The imposition of an income tax, in the proportion of one eighth to that of South Britain, in lieu of a land-tax, which, it was covenanted, should not exceed a fortieth, was certainly no infringement of the *letter*, and it was the exact accomplishment of the *spirit* and end of the treaty, which was to proportion the taxes of Scotland to her means. The objections to the malt-tax were merely, like other attempts of the violence of faction,* to serve the purpose of the day, no matter at what risk. When party ran extremely high in 1713, the Scotch representatives were persuaded to lay hold of one of the secondary clauses in the treaty of union, one of doubtful construction, and which at best was to be but of a temporary and short duration,† then virtually expired; and to raise a cry, that the articles of union, in favour of Scotland, were infringed, and even to bring forward a motion for the dissolution of the treaty.

Treaty with Scotland religiously observed.

Douglas.

In fact, that treaty, as will be confessed by every candid man, versed in the history of his country, has, in all its clear and important parts, all its fundamental and essential conditions, been adhered to, with sacred and scrupulous inviolability.

The example of Scotland is rejected by the adversaries of an union, upon the grounds of a difference in the situation of Scotland from that of Ireland,‡ which renders that unnecessary to the latter, which was absolutely requisite to the other; and of the great improvement of Scotland since the period of union being ascribable to other causes, rather than to the effects of that measure.

Case of Scotland not dissimilar.
Smith.

Scotland, they say, was driven by a series of repeated injuries the most intolerable, and by the constant jealousies of England, to such a state of hostility, as left no alternative, but union or separation. But the same reasoning applies, equally, to Ireland; the partial and oppressive conduct of Britain for a long series of years; the repeated injuries offered to the victualling trade of Ireland, which she harassed with her embargoes; the jealous tenor of almost all her transactions, and almost an equal danger of separation, render an union in this case equally necessary, as the only remedy that can be found. The union of the crowns of England and Scotland in the same

* Spencer, 34.

† Anon. 37.

‡ Foster, Spencer, Rudd, Bousfield, Goold, 33.

Douglas. same person, (which, but for the change made in the royal line of succession, by the abdication of James II. would have continued unalterable in the house of Stuart) was, at least, as durable a bond of connexion as that which keeps united the crowns of Great Britain and Ireland, viz. the annexation act, and the great seal. There was, in fact, no such difference between the constitutions of England and Scotland, as is said to have existed, and to have rendered an union necessary on account of the viciousness of the latter; there was, indeed, but one house of parliament in Scotland, but that was composed of three estates; (1. *Nobles*. 2. *Barons*, i. e. representatives for shires, and 3. *Burrows*, or members for boroughs †;) and, as the votes of each estate were taken separately, and a majority was required of each, it thus became impossible for the Crown to create a forced majority, by the privilege of adding at pleasure to the number of the peers. As to the lords of articles, that institution had been abolished many years before the union, by an act of the Scotch parliament; and was no more a part of the constitution of Scotland in 1707 than the star-chamber was at that time of the English constitution.

Douglas. Scotland made much greater sacrifices, for the purpose of obtaining an union, than any that are expected from Ireland, or that are in her power to make. Ireland has not been, for many centuries, free and independent of England; Scotland never had been subdued to her, nor under her control: Scotland gave up, what Ireland *cannot* give up, an independent parliament of King, Lords and Commons, and an *independent separate crown*.

Douglas, & Dundas. These sacrifices were made, at the time, indeed with great reluctance; and so strong was the hostility of the Scotch to the measure, that many violent insurrections took place. An army, even, of 7000 men was levied in the west, and was ready to march against the parliament; and the Duke of Queensbury, with other ministers, who took an active part in carrying the union into effect, were so attacked by the populace as to escape narrowly with their lives; while the Duke of Hamilton, Lord Belhaven, and others of the most inveterate opponents to it, became the idols of the people, and were carried in triumph through the streets of Edinburgh. Yet so quickly were the sentiments of the Scotch nation changed, with regard to that measure, when experience had made them acquainted with its happy effects, that only eight years after it had been concluded, in the midst of such violent clamour, the union had obtained the most universal popularity; insomuch that the pretender, having pledged himself, in a public manifesto, to repeal the act of union, was obliged, in 1715, to expunge that promise, in order to preserve the favour of his adherents.

The

Scotch Union
soon became
popular.

† Spencer, Gould, Bousfield, 34.

The event of an union would, probably, be similar in Ireland; and how great soever the unpopularity which attends it now, a few years would remove the delusion of the nation, and make clear its good consequences.

It is remarkable that the many attempts made towards an union, first of the crowns, and afterwards of the parliaments of England and Scotland, from the time of Henry VIII. down to the second year of Queen Anne, have been constantly frustrated through the means of French influence and intrigue; and England was first induced to become zealous for its accomplishment, by the ill effects that she experienced from French intrigue in Scotland; in order to remove entirely the influence of the French party. Ireland, by various accidents, is fallen into a situation exactly similar. France labours, by every means, to form a connexion in that country, and has, in a great measure succeeded. But French influence was by no means as mischievous in 1707 as it is in 1800; France was not then the advocate of sedition in the abstract, and the general ally of all rebellious subjects. As the surest method of putting an end to this dangerous conspiracy, by a consolidation of the powers of the whole empire, a legislative union with Great Britain is proposed.

The great improvement of Scotland since the period of the union, it is said, should not be attributed to that measure, because society has been every where, during that time, in a state of rapid improvement; and because the progress of Ireland in prosperity, without an union, has in the same period been still greater. It is not possible to determine,* exactly, how far the prosperity of Scotland may be attributable to the union; but it is fair to conclude, that, if she has improved during that period, in a proportion relatively greater than the improvement of England,† the cause of this excess may be ascribed to the effects of the union, and, if the advancement of England have surpassed that of North Britain, her superior opulence is owing to the superiority of her natural advantages, which were too great to be overbalanced by the benefits derived to Scotland from an union. But without an union Scotland could not have made such progress in improvement, to have kept pace with the general advances of society; because the circumstances attending her local situation, and internal policy, prevented her from having any part in the growing prosperity of other countries, as long as she continued separate; so it was ably argued in the Scotch parliament by Mr. Seton, one of the commissioners of the union. To this

* Foster, 86.

† The customs and excise of Scotland have increased between 1707 and 1797, upwards of *twenty fold*; while those of England have not been multiplied quite *eight times*. For the particulars of this detail, see the speeches of the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, and the Right Hon. Sylvester Douglas.

may be added the following well known fact, that the prosperity of Scotland took rise in the western parts, and near the ports, best suited to the colonial trade, which was first opened to Scotland by the union.

Douglas. Again it is objected, that, whatever may have been the improvement of Scotland in the last ninety years, Ireland,* on the other hand, has made still more rapid progress. This assertion has been much insisted on, but a closer inspection will shew that it is not founded in fact. No comparison can well be drawn between any particular branches of improvement, in those two countries, but a fair estimate may be made from the state of the public revenue in each. It will be found that Scotland with a smaller population, a less fertile soil, a climate less temperate, and ports for foreign trade much inferior, pays a share of public contribution equal in amount to the revenue of Ireland, and which is, at the least, not a greater burthen to her people than the taxes of Ireland are to her subjects; from thence it is a fair inference that the wealth of Scotland is not inferior to that of Ireland.

*Population no
test of improve-
ment.*

As to the population of Ireland, which is also urged as a test of her flourishing condition, its superiority is admitted; but it affords no proof of superior prosperity, and tends only to give additional strength to the above argument, from the greater difficulty under which Scotland labors in that particular also. The accuracy of those calculations, however, appears very questionable; they seem in general to exaggerate the population of Ireland, and to underrate considerably that of Scotland. †

*Adam Smith's
opinion,*

Smith.

It was the opinion of the learned and sagacious Dr. Adam Smith, that an union would procure for Ireland, beside commercial, many other important advantages; § and that without such a measure the inhabitants of the two countries were not likely for ages to coalesce as one people.

Addington.

and those of others.

To his opinion may be added, the authority of some of the most distinguished and enlightened men of the last century, by whom that measure was approved and recommended; of Sir Matthew Decker, Sir William Petty, Sir Josiah Child; and Molineux, who incurred the displeasure of the English House of Commons, for his bold assertion of the independence of his native country, thought the prospect of Irish representatives being admitted to the Parliament of England, "too great a happiness to be hoped for by Ireland," however it might be wished.

Anon.

Addington,
& Douglas.

In the present century, it has been recommended by many able writers and statesmen, of various political attachments: Doctor Campbell, Dean Tucker, Lord Egmont, Lord Hillsborough, Lord Sackville, Lord North, &c. The opinion held by

* Foster, Spencer, 85, 86.

† For the discussion of this subject, see Mr. Sylvester Douglas's Speech, p. 18.

§ Anon. 35.

by these great politicians with regard to the value of an union, is corroborated by the testimony of M'Nevin, and his associates in rebellion,* whose fears have expressed *their* conviction of its tendency to strengthen the empire, and to prevent that separation being effected, which has been the uniform object of their endeavours.

But why, it is asked, does Britain make an *offer* of such great advantages to Ireland, and of a participation in such mighty benefits?

Ireland's prosperity Britain's interest.
Dean Tucker,

Because she perceives her own interest equally concerned in the prosperity and the *security* of Ireland: because her interests are inseparable from those of Ireland, and Ireland's strength is Britain's strength, Ireland's greatness is Britain's glory; and because she has found, that a closer union is made now more requisite than ever, by the repeated attempts of enemies, to dissolve the connexion. Precautionary wisdom seldom has much influence on the conduct either of individuals, or nations; an evil, in general, must have been painfully felt, before measures are taken to remove it, or to guard against its recurrence.

& Addington,
& Douglas,
& Peel.
Addington.

When the commercial propositions were brought forward in 1785, they were opposed by all the commercial interests of Great Britain, because, while Ireland had separate interests, (as, with a separate legislature, she must have, since there is then a *possibility* of actual separation) such an arrangement might have been highly prejudicial to the manufactures of Great Britain: but the present plan, while it affords the highest advantages, political and commercial, prevents, by uniting the two countries into one, the possibility of separate interests existing; and therefore meets the approbation of the trading body of Britain. The same opinions were prevalent, so long since as the reign of Charles II. as is apparent in the answer to certain complaints made by the Scotch, of more favour being shewn to Ireland, than to their country: the commissioners stated in reply, "that Ireland was an appendage of the crown of England, was bound by the laws, and under the absolute control of England, and that, *therefore*, any favour might safely be granted to her, but that the separate state and independence of Scotland would not allow of the same treatment."

Concessions dangerous, when separation is possible.
Peel.

Dundas.

The case is now reversed, and the altered relation in which Ireland stands, makes it dangerous to grant the advantages, which would accrue to her from an Union, without the accompanying security of that measure. It admits, however, of a doubt, whether in a separate state Ireland be capable of profiting by such concessions, if made, without a communication of the capital of Great Britain.—But, in case of an union, though Great Britain will communicate her capital and industry to Ireland, they cannot be expected to flow in

Communication of capital cannot hurt Britain.
Douglas.

D

with

* Meeting at Francis-street chapel, April 9, 1795. See Report of Secret Committee.

with such rapidity, as to effect any instant benefit to the one, or to occasion any loss or detriment to the other; because capital and industry, so localized, are not easily influenced, at once to change their situation. Gradually, however, much wealth, capital and credit, will be attracted to Ireland, when uniformity of laws and legislature, give an increase of confidence to speculators and moneyed men; and this gradual benefit reaped by Ireland, instead of injuring the interests of individuals in England, will tend according to the known principles of public wealth, by multiplying the returns of profit, in and between both countries, to increase the riches of each.

*English capital
to spare.*

Douglas.

Some men have advanced an opinion, that the capital of England, is already so fully employed, that there is none to spare: but this cannot be reconciled with the eagerness constantly displayed, in pursuit of every new speculation;—with the small return of profit,* that many men are content to receive, in adventures subject to hazard and risk;—with the immense sums constantly invested in the funds, even when the dividends fall below 5 per cent.—or with the known fact, that a large proportion of foreign trade is carried on with British capital, exclusive of that portion, which, even under the present forbidding circumstances, is engaged in the commerce of Ireland.

*No danger from
the increase of
the parliament.*

Douglas.

Neither is there any more foundation for the imaginary evil, that is apprehended for Great Britain, from the increased number of the members of the legislature. † It is notorious, that the parliament possesses, and has ever been used to exercise the power of adding to, or diminishing the number of its members; and that no inconvenience has resulted from it. And the Scotch union is a remarkable instance in point, when an addition of *forty five* members was made to the House of Commons, without any inconvenient consequences arising from it. In addition to this, it may be observed, how very small a difference is occasioned to the convenience of gentlemen, (and none to the business of the House) by the most extreme fluctuation of the number of attending members, between 50 and 500.

The apprehension of the British Legislature being debased and corrupted by the intermixture of so many Irishmen in its body, is an argument that cannot be seriously urged by any one, who has any knowledge of the higher ranks of the Irish nation, or who has witnessed the many instances in which the natives of Ireland have become members of the British Parliament, and by their splendid talents, have shed a lustre upon that body, of which they have formed so distinguished a part.

Edgeworth.

But besides it must be recollected that as the Irish members to be added to the British House of Commons will be those, who represent

* Even so low as 5 per cent. though the fair returns in mercantile concerns are calculated on the LOWEST estimate at 10 PER CENT.

† Spencer, Goold, Taaffe, Bousfield, Weld, 36.

represent the counties of Ireland, with some others of the most independent in the Irish Legislature, there can be no grounds to apprehend from them any dangerous increase of ministerial influence, for men of that description are in general the least liable to corruption. But instead of adding to the corruption, an union will serve to effect a salutary reform of the British House of Commons. It may be supposed that of the 300 Members, there are in the Irish House 80 or 90 county and city Members, and in the British parliament 180 county and city members out of the 558. In the one House there is not nearly a third, in the other not more than a third of county and city members; but in the united Parliament the proportion would be materially altered: instead of one-third (or three-ninths) composed of county and city members, there would be four-ninths, which is nearer to one-half than to one-third. This of itself would serve to purify the English Commons; but it would also afford an excellent opportunity of cutting off from that House 100 of the borough members without any inconvenience; thus leaving a considerable majority of county and city members in the united Parliament, without diminishing the influence of the crown, to any dangerous degree, for influence is far preferable to prerogative. It will be a further advantage to supply their place by 100 new members from Ireland, rather than from English counties, where established families would thus acquire too great an increase of influence. Nor can it be imagined that the interest of Ireland should be neglected by her representatives at one side of the channel, more than at the other. The name of absentee will not prevent a man from attending to the interest of his own property, though it be divided from him by ten or twenty leagues of sea.—Besides it is probable that the younger branches of noble and opulent absentees, will come over to Ireland after an union, to manage the affairs, and to represent the families of their English relatives.

Another objection is drawn from the necessary imperfection of the union that would be enacted; since it is not possible, entirely to assimilate the two countries, with regard to revenue, taxes, &c. But to this, the case of Scotland affords a direct reply; for there a union, was to all intents and purposes, effected, notwithstanding the difference of taxation, and what seems of much greater moment, and was objected to by all the judges under James I. with the exception of Sir Francis Bacon, as an insurmountable impediment,—the difference of laws, and of the modes of administering justice. But it never was supposed, that the union of England with Wales, or with Lancashire, was imperfect, because Wales and Lancashire have each rules of property, forms of judicature, customs and usages, appropriate; which of course, form a difference, between their situation and that of England. The town of Calais was separated by a sea, and distinguished by the preservation of all its local

local customs ; yet the union of Calais with England was not objected to as imperfect, when it was admitted, by the charter of Henry VIII. to send two Burgesſes to ſit in the Parliament of England.

*Present time
not improper.*

Many, even of thoſe who expreſs a wiſh that an union may, at ſome future period, take place, * object to the preſent, as an improper time for the introduction of the meaſure, and deſire rather to wait for the moment of general tranquillity : but the preſent time is ſuch as to render this, which at any other ſeaſon might be a wiſe meaſure, now a *neceſſary* one. This is evidently demonſtrated by the *avowed fears* of an union being effected, which are entertained by thoſe, who have openly profeſſed themſelves the advocates of ſeparation ; by Tone, Emmet, M'Nevin, &c. The apprehenſions ſtill felt on this ſubject, by their aſſociates, whoſe deſperate attempts are too recent to be forgotten, proclaim a *ſpeedy union*, or a *ſeparation* to be the only alternative.

A moment of general tranquillity may be expected for ever ; it is not likely to be obtained by any other means than this meaſure, which muſt, therefore, firſt take place before the effect can follow. The Scotch union was completed during a foreign war of great magnitude, and at a ſeaſon of as much political difficulty and internal diſſenſion as the preſent.

And it cannot, with any colour of truth, be objected, that Ireland is taken by ſurpriſe, or that a novel meaſure is ſuddenly introduced ; for, not to ſpeak of the actual incorporation under the uſurpation of Cromwell, an union was recommended by the Council of Trade in Ireland, ſo early as the year 1676, in the reign of Charles II. It was long a very favourite object of Ireland under Queen Anne, and the Iriſh Parliament failed, in repeated endeavours, to obtain it. After that period, it became a ſubject of general diſcuſſion, and gave riſe to numerous publications ; and it has ever ſince been familiar to the ears of the Iriſh, and has been the ſubject of various works, published at different periods of time. Never till now, was a ſuſpicion entertained by any writer, ſpeaker, or ſtateſman, of the incompetency of Parliament to carry it into effect.

*Parliament is
competent.*

Pitt,
& Douglas,
& Smith.

The competence of Parliament to debate, or to adopt the ſcheme of a legiſlative union, cannot be diſputed without calling in queſtion the conſtitutional exiſtence of the united kingdom of Great Britain † and the legality of its legiſlature ſince the period of the Scotch Union, for the plea of incompetence muſt be equally applicable to the Parliaments of that day, as to the preſent. But ſuch a doctrine would ſhake the title of the royal family to the throne (the act of ſettlement) and is a republican principle, degradatory to the Parliament, and ſubverſive of the conſtitution. The power of Parliament has no limits, but in the uſefulneſs of the meaſure ; all queſtions, therefore,

* Spencer, Bousfield, Weld, Sheehy, &c. 63.

† Spencer, Taaffe, Bousfield, Goold, 36.

therefore, are open to *discussion* and *investigation*, because the demonstration of utility brings any measure within the sphere of parliamentary competence to achieve.

But the boasted and valuable settlement of 1782, was Edgeworth. made by Parliament. How then can a doubt be entertained of the competency of Parliament to make changes in the legislature of the kingdom, when the whole constitution of Parliament was changed by that very settlement? If Parliament was authorized in 1782, to make such an agreement for the benefit of Ireland, so must the present Parliament. But, it is assumed that an Union is a dereliction of the rights and liberties of the people; and then it is argued, justly upon that assumption, that Parliament is not competent to enact it, because, though capable of negotiating for what is advantageous, Parliament cannot surrender the rights or liberties of the people. If the premises were true, the conclusion must follow; but the premises are not true; they are indeed assumed but not proved, and it is absurd to say that any deviation however advantageous from the settlement of 1782 is impossible: the Irish legislature has not surely lost the power of doing good, or of distinguishing good from evil.

But, if not in Parliament, where can the power to effect any Addington, measure be imagined to reside? Not in the constituent body, & Douglas. for they cannot be supposed to have delegated a trust, with a tacit reservation in particular cases; nor does the constitution of Great Britain and Ireland acknowledge, in that body, any Douglas. power or right of deliberation whatever; their entire function consists in the act of election of their representative, and with that act it ends; though it be always the duty of the latter, without doubt, to pay a certain attention to the wishes of his constituents, and the opinions of the people. It is from the incompetency of the people at large, to decide upon acts Lord Minto. of government, and from the physical impossibility of their deliberation, that has arisen the institution of Parliament, or the nomination of persons authorized by the people *to act in all cases for them*: if therefore, in any instance, the power were to revert to the people, it would occasion what is called *the vicious circle*; for, from the same cause as at the first, it must again return to the representatives, and so, it might for ever perform the same course from the one body to the other, and back again: but the greater the magnitude and importance of the subject, the greater is the absurdity of supposing it to revert to the decision of those, who had deputed the power to decide in matters of inferior moment, because they were judged, by the constitution, to be incompetent themselves. The House of Commons, in all legislative matters, is equivalent to the people at large; and therefore, as the Parliament consists Smith. of three branches, King, Lords and Commons, if it were necessary on *any* occasion to recur to the consent of the people, who are equivalent to *one* only of these branches, that act would destroy the equilibrium, extinguish the legislative capacity

capacity of the King and the Peerage, and annihilate the constitution.

Addington,
& Douglas.

The power then cannot rest in the people at large, for such a supposition would imply a dissolution of the government. It is an established truth, that while the constitution exists, the *only legitimate* sanction of public opinion, and its *only* efficient authority must be derived from the Parliament. The extent and absolute supremacy of parliamentary power are asserted by the highest legal authorities, Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir William Blackstone, Lord Somers and others, who, to say the least, have never been suspected of any bias against the constitution and liberties of their country.

Douglas,

To assert that there are acts, which, however beneficial, the constitutional legislature has not the right to perform, without a previous special commission from the mass of the nation, leads directly to the false and mischievous principle of the sovereignty of the people: a principle, which is proved, by all attempts to put it in practice, either by the ancient Jacquerie in France, by the Wat Tylers and Jack Straws of England, or by the Jacobins of modern France, to be as pernicious and as impossible in fact, as in theory the supposition is absurd.

There are no cases where the powers of the people at large begin, though there may exist some extraordinary cases, which the legislature cannot reach; but such a circumstance, instead of conveying a rightful power to the people, would occasion a dissolution of the constitution and government, and give rise to anarchy.

There are cases of another description, to which the supreme power of the legislature, in our constitution, cannot reach; but this arises not from any supposed compact, but from the moral impossibility of the act, or an implied contradiction of terms: for instance, no law of any Parliament can bind a subsequent Parliament, for such an act must suppose the next Parliament less absolute and supreme than the present, but the constitution gives them equal powers.

Again, in the case of an Union or incorporation of distinct parts, enacted by the legislature, by treaty or otherwise, Parliament is there incompetent to decompose and separate them again: because, the essential condition of such Union being the combination of each of the constituent parts into a new whole, the identical characters and qualities of those parts are so lost, that they can no more afterwards be found, or restored; the contracting parties cease to exist, and therefore become incapable of being reinstated.

And this affords a sufficient answer to the apprehensions of Britain's assuming to herself, hereafter, the right of setting aside at her pleasure any incorporation of the two kingdoms. Ireland may, by civil convulsion or foreign force, be torn asunder from her; so may Scotland, or Wales; but it never

can

can be disjoined by any regular act of the united legislature. It is in the power of the common Parliament to alter or repeal any act of either Parliament, made previous to the Union, but it cannot alter or rescind any fundamental article of the treaty by which they are united, because the parties, by whom it was concluded, no longer exist; nor is it possible for either to return, at such dissolution, to the same situation, as they were in before their Union took place.

But, say the advocates of parliamentary incompetence, the members of the Irish House of Commons were delegated to exercise, but not to alienate the powers committed to them; —to support the independence, and exclusive authority of Ireland; and therefore, they have no power to make surrender of that independence and authority, into the hands of the British legislature, which on account of the great majority of the British above the Irish members, would, in effect, possess alone, supreme power. Both this alleged fact, and the inference of incompetency, are controverted by the example of Scotland. It is well known, with regard to the former, that, though Scotland has but forty-five representatives, yet, on all local questions where the interests of their country have been particularly concerned, they have always been able to influence the decision of the house. Respecting the supposed incompetency of the representative body, it is further argued, in order to obviate the instance of Scotland, that the act of Union passed by the Scotch Parliament either is become valid now by the length of time which has since elapsed and has sanctioned it, as it were, by prescription, from long acquiescence; —or that it was made so at first by an express power or commission being given to the Scotch representatives for the purpose.

& Dundas.
Dundas,
& Douglas,

But no prescription can render that valid, which was at the first a mere nullity; and if that argument be admitted, every law since enacted, depending for its validity, on the validity of that transaction, is equally null and void; and, as a necessary consequence, it will follow that the present legislature of Great Britain has no legitimate authority: —a dangerous absurdity!

& Smith.

The obvious weakness of this argument has obliged gentlemen to resort to a supposed special delegation from the constituent body to their representatives. But, as before said, the incompatibility of such a transaction with the constitution, is such that no validity or force could thence be derived to any act that was not valid without it, nor could that body grant to the elected any powers, beyond those incident to the character of representative.

Douglas.

Besides, it is easy to shew that no such thing was attempted in Scotland in 1707; nor was the necessity, or possibility of it conceived to exist, with regard to any treaty since the accession of James VI. to the crown of England; though it does seem as if such a thing were intimated in an obscure passage of

No special delegation to the Scotch deputies, for an Union.

De

De Foe, by whom alone it is even hinted. The fact was thus. The convention of estates in Scotland, which met on the abdication of James II. continued undissolved through the whole reign of William, and were summoned by Queen Anne, a few months after her accession. At the time when this anomalous assembly was nominated, no measure of Union was in agitation; but, as soon as it met after King William's demise, it passed an act, in consequence of a similar act passed by the English Parliament, empowering the Queen to appoint commissioners for Scotland, to treat of an Union. Commissioners, on the part of each kingdom, met at Westminster in October, 1702. Mean while the Scotch convention was dissolved, but the commission still continued in full force, and no want of competency was urged against it. Soon after, a proclamation was issued in Scotland calling a new Parliament, in which it was cursorily mentioned that "commissioners *had been nominated* to treat of an Union, &c." as it was also in the same way, that "the Queen was engaged in a just and necessary war." This slight passage is the only one that affords the least grounds for the assertion of a special delegation; and the similar passage relative to the war, then carried on, may furnish as good a proof of the necessity of a special notice to electors and a special delegation on that head also, which will scarcely be alleged: and no notice was taken, in any way, of so unusual a circumstance as that would have been, if the proclamation had intended to require particular instructions to be given to the representatives. But the proclamation gives no particular directions; neither do the summonses of election, the returns, (or as they are called in Scotland the commissions) — the minutes of election, or the corporation books bear the slightest marks of any thing special. History, memoirs, tradition, and the act of the Scotch Parliament are all silent on that head. In 1703 this Parliament voted the commission, then existing, to be terminate and extinct; and in 1705 the Queen, being again empowered by *that* Parliament, as well as by the English Parliament, appointed new commissioners, and by them, without any further communication with the people, the treaty was executed in 1706: the articles were ratified in 1707, and took effect on the first of May in that year, and there was no other election or delegation of power whatever.*

But the inequality in the numbers of the Irish and British members of the common Parliament does not evince any dereliction or surrender of her authority on the part of Ireland,† because each country being still represented preserves its own power

* For a more particular detail, see the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Sylvester Douglas, April 22, 1799, Page 18, et seq.

† Foster, 33.

Ireland will be proportionably represented.

power of legislation, though at the same time either gives and mutually receives a power of legislation over the other; and this power is exactly equal, provided the representatives be in exact proportion to the relative consequence of each country respectively. Were a perfect arithmetical equality of numbers requisite, the incorporation of the whole legislature of Ireland, as it now stands, would be insufficient to effect a legal Union: but such an incorporation would be highly unjust, because it would give Ireland much more than her due proportion of influence.

The essential principles of the constitution, are, in both countries the same; and the legislature of the empire may be considered as one great machine consisting of a supreme head, and two branches, each similarly divided into two parts: one of these branches regulates the affairs of Great Britain and the general concerns of the empire at large; the other legislates only, but exclusively for Ireland. This machine, it appears, might be greatly simplified, and therefore materially improved, by blending, in due proportion, these two separate members into one, which, by one act, could adjust the concern of the whole state; thus lending to each other additional strength, and removing the possibility of weakness and distraction of councils.

E

AGAINST

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS POLITICAL, RESPECTING THE EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF IRELAND, IN CONNEXION AND
INTERCOURSE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

Settlement of
1782 final
and adequate.

Foster,

THE expressions * made use of, in the resolutions of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, on the occasion of the settlement of 1782 † in their address to the King and the Lord Lieutenant, and in both the answers to these addresses, are such as afford ample proofs, that that adjustment was regarded as *final*, and was deemed sufficient; for it is repeatedly termed a *full and perfect establishment of the constitution of Ireland; an indissoluble connexion in unity of interests, and unity of constitution;—from which, no constitutional question can ever avail to disturb the harmony of the two kingdoms, &c. &c.*

When Mr. Flood moved for leave to introduce a bill declaratory of *the sole and exclusive right of Ireland to make laws, &c.* leave was refused, and a resolution was passed; that it was refused, “*because the sole, separate, and exclusive right of legislation in the Irish Parliament, in all cases, whether internal or external, had already been asserted by Ireland, and fully and finally and irrevocably, acknowledged by the British Parliament.*” And so great was the general joy and satisfaction, at this conclusive event, that in their last address upon the subject, the Irish Parliament desire a day of public and solemn thanksgiving to God, for so great a blessing. That settlement removed from Ireland, all those evils of subjection, which an Union would again heap upon her.

The sentiments of the British Parliament on that subject, seem to have been exactly similar; and the arrangement of the points then in question was the *ultimate* object of the then ministers, Lord Shelburne and Mr. Fox; for, though it has been said, that, after the passing of the bill repealing 6 Geo. I. ‡ an address to the King was voted praying him *to take such further measures as, &c.* no such address was ever voted; but when the first resolution had been passed in the British Commons, declaring “*the connexion indispensable,*” &c. and leave “*had been given to bring in a bill,*” an address was voted containing the substance of the resolution, viz. “*that the King would be graciously pleased to take such measures as his Majesty, in his royal wisdom, should think most conducive*”
“to

* For full quotations, see the Speech of the Rt. Hon. John Foster, April 11th, 1799, in the Irish Commons.

† Pitt, Addington, Dundas, I.

‡ Pitt, I.

“ to the establishing by mutual consent, the connexion between this kingdom and Ireland, upon a solid and *permanent* basis.” The address contains not the word “ further,” and was *not* voted after the passing of the bill (repealing 6 Geo. I.) which was not presented till June 11th: the address was voted on the 17th of May.

The resolution, in respect to future measures, seems to have had only commerce in view; and so it was asserted in 1785, by Mr. Pitt, and by the Earl of Liverpool (then Mr. Jenkinson) and on that it was that ministers relied, as the grounds for the necessity of the commercial system of 1785; and though, it is true, that in reply, Mr. Fox, said it was to extend to political objects only, * yet he explains those political objects to be what really are commercial, by saying that they were to “ comprehend the whole system of navigation of the empire.”

The connexion between the two kingdoms was rendered sufficiently permanent and secure, by the act passed in 1782, which modifying Poynings’ law, † enacts, that “ no bill shall pass into a law in Ireland, till it be returned under the

Great Seal of Great Britain:” not leaving the connexion a *bare junction of two kingdoms under one Sovereign*, as it is said; but, making the British minister answerable to the Parliament of Britain for any law passed in Ireland injurious to the empire, or tending towards the separation of Ireland. This act does indeed certainly create a theoretic difference in the constitutions of the two kingdoms, which renders that of Ireland inferior to the other: yet it is a difference not injurious, but necessary from the situation of Ireland in the empire. And though Ireland be not therefore absolutely independent, and cannot be so consistently with her connexion with Great Britain, yet she is independent with regard to the right of making laws for her own internal regulation and taxation, which she solely and exclusively possesses. For though Ireland has not *absolutely* the power of enacting any such law, as it must be ratified by Great Britain, yet there is a moral certainty that such ratification never will be withheld, unless in cases where it is really injurious, because the interest of Great Britain necessarily obliges her to consult the interest of Ireland.

This power of the British Parliament to control the third estate of the Irish Parliament, (in the King’s power of assent) is an effectual pledge to Great Britain, that no Irish act can pass to weaken, or impair the connexion: Ireland also, at the same time, is, on her part, secured as well in her connexion with Britain, as in her independence, because, as she cannot be bound by British law, so neither can any act of Britain atter, or rescind the connexion, unless confirmed, by the act of Ireland herself. An act simply of the British Parliament is inadequate to throw off the connexion of Ireland, for no British act is capable of rescinding the Irish annexation act of Henry VIII.

* Douglas, 2. † Pitt, Addington, Lord Minto, Douglas, 1, 4.

as it was directly stated by Mr. Eden, (now Lord Auckland) when he moved the repeal of 6 Geo. I.

Taafe, & Anon. The connexion was further strengthened by Yelverton's act, which was passed the same day as the former, adopting *all* the British laws, respecting commerce, and making them the uniform law of the empire. An Union is the only possible event, that can endanger the connexion between the two kingdoms; for then the discontent of the people, magnifying every trifle, and construing every act of the legislature into an injury, would render martial law, or rebellion, the only alternative for the unhappy country. But, it is said, that the *present connexion* has been tried in various shapes, and in all, has failed of the expected effects: if so, there cannot be derived from thence any inducement to Ireland, to put herself implicitly in the hands of a country, from which, in mere partnership, she has derived so little benefit; it is rather an argument for complete separation and entire independence.

Foster. The constitution of 1782,* has obtained for Ireland greater blessings, than at any former period, she had ever enjoyed;—an increased and increasing affluence;—a flourishing trade;—an extended commerce. Her progress in improvement, which, in the twenty years that succeeded that establishment, was greater, than in a century before, can be attributed to no other cause, than the restoration of her independence. But the establishment of 1782, which effected this, is incompatible with an Union; they are in direct opposition to each other, and by an Union the adjustment of 1782, which is sufficient for every purpose of happiness, must be annihilated.

The introduction of the propositions of 1785, is no argument against the permanency, or sufficiency of the adjustment of 1782: those propositions were entirely commercial, and did not in any way, touch upon the constitution; they were stated by Mr. Pitt, as being a supplement to the measures of 1779 and 1780 and 1782; and, as *all* that was necessary to secure the connexion inviolate, and form a *complete* arrangement: so was it expressed by him in the address to the King moved by him, in the Commons, and accompanied by a similar address from the Lords, expressive of the same thing.

It was said, at the time, when the commercial propositions were debated in 1785, that “things could not remain as they were,”—that “commercial jealousy was roused, and would increase with two independent legislatures;” and it is now argued from thence, that because no compact has since taken place, matters are still in the same dangerous situation, and require a remedy to be applied to the existing evil, by one of the only two measures, which, as is asserted, are capable of producing that effect, viz. a Legislative Union, or a Commercial

* Douglas, 6.

mercial Compact. The situation of things, however, is now materially different from that of 1785; the grounds of commercial jealousy, that then existed, have been removed; and all the essential parts of the propositions then debated, have been adopted in subsequent laws, which have been passed separately, as occasion required: for instance;—Lord Hobart's act of 1793, to permit the importation into Great Britain from Ireland, of all goods the produce of the British colonies, or of Asia, Africa, or America:—The Irish act, restraining the *acknowledged* right of Ireland, to trade within the East India Company's limits:—the adoption in *toto* of the navigation acts; the acts for the registry of shipping; the increase of shipping; the regulation of Greenwich Hospital, &c. &c.

Thus, a third method of accommodation has been found, and has been practised, equally effectual with the others, and more permanent, because it is founded on mutual interest and good will.

The connexion of Ireland with Great Britain very much Anon. resembles that of the British House of Commons with the crown. In former times that house had no concern whatever with matters of state, and acted merely as a check to control the legislative prerogative of the crown: this prerogative, in course of time, has dwindled into nothing; and, as the commons now enter into all the detail of business, prerogative has given way, to the milder, but equally efficacious organ, influence. The effects are nearly similar, but cases have sometimes arisen, when the proposed measure appeared so hostile to the interests of the country, that it was beyond the power of the crown to effect it, and no influence was able to obtain consent to it.

So, in all common cases, Ireland is in the habit of thinking with Great Britain, and acquiescing in her plans, but still she retains the *power* of dissenting, whenever the welfare of her country may seem to be menaced. It is not probable that the Irish Parliament would take so bold a step, as to dissent from any imperial measure proposed in the British legislature, without a sufficient conviction, that in so doing, they were expressing the will of the people: and there is much less danger to be apprehended, from such a legal expression of public disapprobation, through the constituted authorities, than from any other, that might irregularly burst forth, when there were no public organ to speak the sentiments of the nation.

The falsehood of the assertion, that the two legislatures Anon. cannot exist, without a virtual subordination of the inferior to the decisions of the other, is proved by the fate of the very question under discussion, when it was agitated in the Irish Parliament.

Rudd. Parliament. The government of Ireland, composed of the King, Lords and Commons of Ireland,* is perfectly independent, and subject to the control of no power under Heaven; nor is the crown of Ireland any way subordinate to the crown of Britain, but equal and free.

Spencer. It would be absurd of Ireland, with a greatly increased population, with a flourishing agriculture, extensive, and still extending commerce, to resign into the hands of another country that distinct, and independent legislature, which she enjoyed while inconsiderable in point of agriculture, commerce, and population. A temporary state of disturbances can afford no grounds for adopting a measure of so great magnitude, and in its nature *irrevocable*: nor is there any connexion between the evil, and the remedy proposed.

Foster,
& Bousfield,

But great fears are entertained of the consequences that may arise from dissension between the two legislatures; and many questions, it is said, may be hereafter productive of such fatal disagreement. Of all these possible questions, however, none are pointed out, except those of peace and war, including treaties, and that of regency.

The declaration of war is the King's prerogative, and in him, solely, the power is vested, independent of either legislature. The only means possessed by Parliament of controlling that power, is by withholding supplies. But if, in that point the two legislatures should disagree, and the one should support the crown in a war, while the other should refuse to concur, the only inconvenience that could result from thence, would be, that one country would withhold its assistance, till its good sense should induce it to acquiesce; while it would still be exposed, equally with the other to all the losses, and calamities of war, because the King's declaration of war involves equally all his subjects: So that there is little probability of resistance, in such a case, on the part of the weaker, and more exposed.

Lord Farnham,

But history does not furnish one instance, where the Irish Parliament has withheld its support. The motive which has produced this uniform concurrence, is one which must *ever* produce the same effect, self-interest, and self-preservation. The same motive ever has, and ever will occasion the same concurrence of the British Parliament with the crown in such cases, but it must operate with greater force upon Ireland than Great Britain in proportion as the former stands in a more defenceless condition than the latter.

In making peace, the executive is not subject to embarrassment of the same sort, by the denial of supply; and it is very unlikely that any nation, especially the weaker, should decline

* Douglas, Dundas, 8.

decline accepting the blessings of peace, when offered. And, on the subject of treaties, not concerning peace or war, which may therefore require the confirmation of a legislative act, there is less reason for apprehending a disagreement between the Irish Parliament, and that of Great Britain, than between the latter and the executive; both, therefore, may rest upon the same footing. There are many things hazardous and alarming in theory, which yet in practice are safe and easy.

The only question upon which a difference of opinion can be said to have ever actually existed, between the two legislatures, is that of the regency in 1789. But, in that case, it was the disagreement of *two estates* of each Parliament only, deprived of the third which was common to both legislatures; and it is an instance of a case, where the control of the British council over the third estate, in its power of assent to the acts of the Irish Parliament, was necessarily extinguished. It affords strong presumptive evidence of the efficacy of the connexion established in 1782, that the only instance of disagreement, happened during the suspension of the bond of Union then established.

In the case of Regency, however, no difficulty, in fact, exists, because, not only the identity of person in the Regent is, by the annexation Act of Hen. VIII. equally secured with that of the Sovereign; but by the law of 1782, concerning the Great Seal, the matter is put beyond all doubt, for the Great Seal must be in the hands of the Regent of Great Britain, and without the use of that Seal, and consequently without the concurrence of that Regent, all the functions of the Irish Legislature must be suspended. If any & Bousfield. difference of situation should require any local difference of power to be put into the Regent's hands, the Irish Parliament would be as fully competent to establish it, as it now is with regard to the Sovereign. But it would be silly from any apprehension of theoretic inconvenience, in a casualty that may never happen, to surrender the independence and honor of the country.

The true principle, to which is to be ascribed the preservation and stability of the British Constitution, is the balancing check of the three estates of Parliament upon each other,* which maintains a just equilibrium and proportion between them all. The same principle may be applied to the two separate Parliaments, which, by a similar operation, may serve to secure each other in their just relations; so that their mixed powers, like those of the mixed government, shall by their separate exertions, so checked, preserve the symmetry of the whole.

If

* Smith, 10.

Union will not
strengthen the
Empire,
Foster,

& Spencer.

Lord Farnham.

If the effects of an Union* were to be such as are promised, the strengthening the Empire, and increasing its resources, such an object would certainly justify very important sacrifices made to obtain it. But the consolidation of the kingdoms is already as strong, as human policy, or individual interest can make it; and an Union could have no other effect, but to deprive Ireland of the residence of her Parliament: in all other respects she would remain precisely as she is; so that no addition would be made through her means, to the power of the Empire by an Union. On the contrary, it would be lessened, by debilitating Ireland: her spirit would be debased, and her resources weakened, by being reduced to a state of subjection, by the increase of Absentees, and by the check that her trade and manufactures would suffer.

Lord Minto.

It has been argued by the advocates of Union, that the only mode of connexion, which is sufficient to guard against the danger of separation, is the *perfect identity* and *incorporation* of the governments. But admitting this to be just, it affords an argument against the proposed Union, between Great Britain and Ireland: For, according to the scheme proposed, there is not any substantial distinctness between those countries, which will not continue to exist, except the very material one of the Parliaments. The executive governments will be distinct, the revenues, the appropriation of the funds in each, the treasury will remain distinct, and from thence must ever arise, more or less, a distinctness of interest. These circumstances render a *perfect identification* impossible, and according to the same just reasoning, serve only to increase the tendency to separation. The situation of Scotland and Wales with regard to England, was totally different upon these points; they admitted of a complete incorporation and identity. In order to *consolidate* the Scotch Union, it is said, that it was found necessary to remove, by the abolition of the Privy Council of Scotland, that remaining *nuclens of local government, and separate interest*. And yet Union with Ireland, accompanied with the distinctnesses of Viceroy, Privy Council, Revenues and expences, is expected to produce a perfect identity and incorporation.

and is irrevocable.

Foster,
& Spencer.

But whatever may be the possible, or probable advantages to be derived from an Union, it should always be recollected, that the measure once adopted, is *irrevocable*; that no means will exist on obtaining the redress of any inconveniencies that may be found to result from it; whereas that if a change of circumstances should ever hereafter make it necessary to have recourse to an Union, it will always be within the power of the Parliament to do so when occasion may require.

No

* Pitt, 4.

No very brilliant prospect can offer itself to Ireland, of the advantages to be derived, from putting herself again into the hands of a Parliament, whose partial and oppressive conduct towards her, till 1782, was so truly and forcibly described by Mr. Pitt. It is a mere play upon words, to say that Ireland will be secured from a similar situation, by such a mockery of representation as 100 Members among 558.* The small proportion of Irish Members would annihilate the salutary control of the constituents over the representatives; and would answer no other purpose, than to sanction as the voluntary act of Ireland, an usurpation, which was before suffered only by compulsion, and from which she was reserved by the energy of her own Parliament: No *articles*† of Union can serve as a security, because it equally lies within the omnipotence of Parliament, that established them, to alter, or rescind them altogether, at its pleasure. And even if there should hereafter arise some liberal-minded Minister in England, who should be inclined to treat Ireland, with a justice that she has not experienced these 500 years; still the narrow selfishness of the British character, would tie up his hands, and oppose such an attempt. Nor is any reliance to be placed upon its being the duty of the legislature to provide equally, for the benefit of the whole Empire. For public virtue is not to be depended on; and therefore it is, that government is made to consist of a system of checks. The argument of *duty* may as well be adduced in support of a system of absolute power. If the British legislature be entitled to such implicit confidence, it were as wise to send no representatives from Ireland, but let that country give to Britain, *formally*, the sway, which really she will have.

At the Union of Scotland, it was stipulated, that the Land-tax upon Scotland, should never exceed *one fortieth* of that which was laid upon England; but now, by the contrivance of substituting a tax on income for a land-tax, Scotland is made to pay *one eighth* of the English tax. This is not quoted as a breach, or even an evasion of any of the articles of Union, but it served to shew how futile any language, in which such articles can be expressed, may, by the accidents of time and unforeseen circumstances, be rendered. And Ireland would have the less security in Parliament, because the great distance would place her representatives beyond the reach of public opinion or censure.

The example of Scotland is constantly urged, in favour of the necessity and good consequences of an Union:‡ but there is no similarity between the situations of Scotland and of Ireland. Scotland was connected with England, by no other tie, than the accidental circumstance of the crown of

F

England & Bousfield.

* Douglas, 24.

† Ibid. 13.

‡ Douglas, 8. Smith, 13.

Imprudent to confide in Great Britain.

Foster,

& Goold, & Anon.

Spencer.

Foster, & Goold, & Anon.

Anon.

Spencer, & Goold, & Bousfield, & Anon.

Case of Scotland not similar.

Foster, & Spencer, & Rudd, & Goold,

England having descended to the Scottish King; in all other respects, it was perfectly foreign. Scotland had no constitution, the two houses of Parliament sat together, and the Commons had no control over the purse of the Nation,* for the King, by exerting his prerogative in the creation of Peers, could at pleasure outnumber the votes of the Commons: nor were they possessed of the power of deliberation, for no subject could come before them, without being first proposed by the *Lords of Articles*. Depressed in trade, subject on all occasions to mischievous foreign influences, led by a train of gross injuries to the very brink of hostilities, (so far as even to *have passed* an act disjoining the realm from the crown of England, at the demise of the then reigning Sovereign,) Scotland was fortunate, in her declining state, and under such disadvantages, to obtain, by incorporation with a rich and inimical nation, all the benefits of a great and increasing commerce, not otherwise attainable to her, the cessation of a vexatious system of enmity and oppression, and the certainty of a powerful and friendly alliance, together with security from the impending dangers of total separation: Not one of these circumstances is applicable to the state of Ireland.

Spencer. But even in Scotland, so ill-relished was the Union, that only six years after the conclusion of the treaty, its dissolution was moved in the Upper House; and was supported by *all* the Scotch Peers;† upon the plea of one of the articles of the treaty having been violated, in the imposition of a Malt tax; of there no longer being a council in Scotland; and of their laws being altered in matters of the highest importance.

Anon. There is no inconsistency in arguing, from the same grounds; the oppression exercised by England over each country, that great benefits were derivable to Scotland from an Union, but that the measure would be injurious to Ireland. Because the misfortunes of Scotland were in existence and sensibly felt at the time, and not to be remedied by any other means than an Union: Ireland *has already freed herself* from the oppression, that she suffered; and to her an Union would answer no end, but to expose her to a repetition of the same calamities.

It may be observed also that the efficacy of an Union, is not proved to be so complete and universal, as its advocates assert, by the condition of Scotland; for it has not had power sufficient to prevent two rebellions from taking place in that country in the course of forty years: Nor was it able to counteract the introduction of French principles and

* Douglas, 14.

† Ibid. 23.

and republicanism, very lately, which made considerable progress in Scotland, as the fate of Muir, Palmer, &c. sufficiently testify.

But it appears from the secret correspondence between Ld. Farnham, the Duke of Portland and Lord Shelburne in 1782, which has been lately disclosed, that the Duke had then in contemplation certain acts of Parliament, which were calculated to produce all the good effects that are now expected from an Union, so that Ministers *then* thought that such acts were sufficient, without depriving Ireland of her constitution.

The authority of the justly-celebrated political economist, Dr. A. Smith, has been quoted in support of an Union : but it should be observed that that gentleman's works were published previous to the material alteration which was produced in the condition of Ireland, by the recovery of Free trade in 1779. He wrote in 1776, and that very acquisition, which was likely to have flowed from an Union, is the principal point upon which he dwells, as an argument of the benefits to be derived from an Union. His opinion also embraced equally the case of North America, and recommended an incorporative Union with Britain to those States ; but the American colonies spurned his remonstrance, and vindicated their own independence.

*Adam Smith's
opinion not relevant.
Anon.*

The injuries that will result from an Union between Great Britain and Ireland, are not confined to the latter ; Britain will also feel its ill effects.* Ireland, reduced to the miserable condition of a West-India colony, will, like St. Domingo, furnish an eternal sink to the blood and treasure of Britain, which must be expended in order to maintain it.

*Union will injure
Britain.
Anon.*

Instead of purifying the corrupt condition of Parliament, by mixture with another corrupt body, it will serve only to deteriorate still further the British Parliament, by the admission of the Irish Members ; and of men so peculiarly exposed to temptation. It will be a dangerous innovation in the constitution of Great Britain, by the admission of foreigners into the Legislature, for at the moment that a single Member, over whom the country has no control, contributes to enact any law to bind that country, its constitution is at an end. It will commit England, in a breach of faith with Scotland, by infringing on the stipulated proportion of the Scotch Members, to those of the English houses of Parliament. And in the wound, which Ireland will receive in her constitution, Britain ought to feel herself equally attacked ; for so close and intimate is the connexion between the two countries, that there can be no invasion of the rights of the one, without enfolding in its mantle the liberties of the

Spencer.

Goold.

Taaffe.

Bousfield.

Goold,
& Weld,
& Anon.

*Parliament not
competent.*

Spencer,
& Taaffe,
& Sheehy,
& Bousfield,
& Goold, &c.

the other. But in this measure the grand object of the Minister seems to be the overthrow of the British constitution, by means of the additional strength which he will derive from the body of Irish representatives.

But, further though all the supposed advantages of an Union were justly to be expected from it, yet Parliament is not competent to effect such a measure, without the directly expressed approbation of the people.* The power of the British Parliament has been held in doubt by some very able men, with regard to the septennial bill, by which it only prolongs its own duration for a few years: Much more then may the extent of Parliamentary power be called in question, as to a measure, which goes to abolish the Parliament itself, and transfers the right of legislation into the hands of another country.

A Member of Parliament has no right to delegate that, which was only a delegated trust to himself, or to substitute another Parliament for that chosen by the people. Some years since, when a bill was introduced in the Irish House of Commons, to incapacitate revenue officers, from voting at elections of Members of Parliament, it was contended on the part of Administration, and successfully too, that Parliament had not a right to disfranchise men not convicted of any crime.

If then Parliament was not impowered to disfranchise some obscure individuals, surely it cannot be competent to adopt a measure, which will render the franchises of the whole Kingdom a mere nullity.

Anon.

But, it is argued, the Septennial Bill was passed, and the *fact* is a proof of the competence of Parliament; so also the various limitations of the Crown. But neither the Septennial Bill of Geo. I. nor the limitations of the crown, at all trench upon the constitution; they relate only to the *regulation* of distinct branches of the constitution, but that in itself remains unaltered. The question of an Union affects immediately the constitution; for it is an *essential* part of it, to have an House of Commons chosen *solely* by the people, and any Act, which substitutes for that assembly an House of Commons of which five-sixths, are chosen by a foreign Nation, alters materially, and impairs the constitution. The introduction of a single member not chosen by the people is a breach of the constitution.

At a period of the world, when constitutional rights were so little known or understood, as in the twelfth century, King John's resignation of his crown and kingdom to the Pope was opposed with violence, by the Barons, because he

was

* Douglas, Addington, Lord Minto, &c. 20.

was not competent, to hand over his people, without their consent, to any other master. The instance of competence in the Scotch Parliament to a similar measure proves nothing, because the Scotch Union was treated of and concluded, by deputies from the Nation, expressly chosen for that purpose; and Lord Somers, who was a constitutional lawyer, and was well aware of the incompetency of Parliament,† took care to authorize their proceedings by an *appeal to the people*, and by stating expressly in the summons, which called together the Scotch Parliament, that an Union between the two kingdoms was one of the subjects to be laid before them.

The power of Parliament, though not absolute and unlimited, is competent to every act, which is not a violation of the constitution. No more than this, is asserted either by Coke or Blackstone, and both those Lawyers give instances of acts, to which Parliament is not competent. So it stands recorded upon the authority of the Parliament and people of England—an endeavour to subvert the constitution, or violate the fundamental laws, was declared to amount, on the part of the King, to an abdication of his Crown: it will not, surely, be contended that the King is the *only* branch of the Legislation that may not with impunity subvert the constitution, or that has an original compact with the people.

Lord Coke,* and Sir William Blackstone,† however high Anon. their authority, are not the only writers on this subject, who have asserted the incompetence of any Sovereign, whether an absolute monarch or a delegated Parliament, to alienate or transfer into other hands the right of legislation: it is equally the opinion of Grotius,‡ Puffendorf,§ and Locke.|| Lord Coke¶ goes so far as to deny the power of Parliament to depute its authority, even for a single session, and even to men selected from itself, and members of its own body.

But in case an Union be enacted, Parliament will be competent hereafter to rescind it,—or it will not. If not, the whole doctrine of the omnipotence of parliament vanishes. If it be competent, then that power of dissolving the Union will rest in the British Parliament; and if it should happen that an Union prove injurious to Britain, then the British Legislature will make use of that power, and Ireland will be cast off. But, on the other hand, if the unfortunate consequences of an Union should fall upon Ireland, however heavy

† Douglas, 23. * Instit. p. 43. † Com. B. 1. c. 1.

‡ De jure belli et pacis, L. 1. c. 4. § 10.

§ De leg: naturæ et gen. L. 8. c. 12. § 6.

|| On Government, Part 2d. c. 11. § 141.

Ib. c. 19. § 212.

¶ 4 Instit. p. 42.

& Ld. Farnham.

heavy the calamities that she may suffer, she may cry in vain for relief, she will have no power over the United Parliament, and consequently no power, on her part, to procure the revision of the compact of Union. Thus, when Scotland, a few years after the conclusion of the Union, thought herself aggrieved by the imposition of a malt tax, in violation, at least of the letter of the treaty, and wished for a dissolution of the Union, she failed of success in the attempt, notwithstanding the unanimous support of the Scotch Peers, in the Upper-house, where the motion was made.

Taaffe.

Britain, at the least, would have it in her power always, to make such alteration in the terms of the treaty, as might suit her interest, or caprice: and numberless instances exist in proof of the little reliance that is to be placed on the good faith of England; as the breach of the treaty of Limerick, &c. &c.

Dr. Drennan.

It is argued by another gentleman, who seems to stand alone, in his opinion, that the present connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, cannot be permanent, that it is already hastening towards dissolution, but that instead of adding strength to it, an Union will lead *immediately to separation, hostile and republican*; and that the only method of guarding against this, and consolidating the connexion by firmly uniting the interests of the two kingdoms, is a *complete, friendly, separation*, and the establishment of total independence; constituting, in each island, a *separate and independent monarchy*, and securing the *alliance*, by placing the Crown of Ireland on the head of some of the younger branches of the reigning family, on the British throne.

IN

IN FAVOUR OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

ARGUMENTS POLITICAL, AS RESPECTING THE
INTERNAL INTERESTS, PEACE, AND
PROSPERITY OF IRELAND.

SMALL states are always, exposed to the dangers of internal convulsion, and of external fraud and oppression. It is *Small states exposed to danger.* large states only, and extensive communities, which can possess power sufficient, for protection against foreign encroachments, and internal dissensions. History affords a confirmation of this remark, in the conduct of the ancient states of Greece and Italy, of the small kingdoms of the Saxon Hierarchy, of the ancient divided territories of Ireland itself, of the separate governments of England and Scotland in the course of several centuries, &c. At the present æra the insecurity of small states is evinced, in the misfortunes, to which the discordant powers of Italy, and the imperfect confederacy of Switzerland, have been exposed. *Irish Patriot. Anon.*

It was by a firm Union of her separate Members, that Great Britain was enabled, to overcome the difficulties which embarrassed her, to put an end to internal quarrels, and raise her power and influence among nations to that exalted rank in which she now stands. Ireland, too small to be capable of maintaining herself independent, is the only part of the British Empire, that, at this day, is not united to the rest, by a firm and undivided Government. The security of such an Union is equally necessary for the removal of his own internal commotions, as for the strengthening the resources and powers of the Empire at large.

The least reflection upon the internal condition of Ireland; the dreadful cruelties exercised by the ferocious enemy; the lamentable severities that in consequence became necessary; the hostile divisions of sects; the animosities existing between the original inhabitants, and the more recent settlers; the unfortunate want of civilization, more remarkable in that country, than any other almost in Europe; the unhappy prevalence of Jacobin principles, arising out of the foregoing causes, and augmenting their malignity.—The least reflection on these melancholy and too evident circumstances, *Internal condition of Ireland wants remedy. Pitt, & Addington, & Anon.*

stances, will point out the absolute necessity of some change of system. No measure seems so likely to effect a remedy, as the formation of a legislature removed from danger, and uninflamed by the prejudices and passions, that distract the country.* These qualities a general Imperial Parliament would eminently possess, combined, at the same time, with all the requisite local information and attachment.

& Douglas.

The interests of the two Islands are so united, that it is not possible, to speak to that of either, without including, in the consideration, the concerns of the other; but, though Ireland were alone implicated in the present discussion, the adoption of another system is of the highest importance, and the distracted state of that country seems to point out the establishment of an Imperial legislature, as the only means of healing its bleeding wounds, and restoring its long-lost tranquillity.

Smith.

Ireland is as well calculated, by nature, as any country upon earth, to enjoy every possible blessing, and yet, its state has never, at any period, been such as to afford satisfaction, on account of the feuds, and animosities that have ever prevailed, and have alternately injured and irritated both Roman Catholic, and Protestant, and prejudiced them against each other. The form of Government, though similar to that of Great Britain, was not competent to remove these calamities, because it did not bestow and receive general confidence and protection; for it was not connected by an indissoluble tie, with the obvious interests, the feelings, and the opinions of the great body of the people: No remedy can be effectual, but such as will strike at the root of the evil, by putting an end to the struggles for power between different bodies of the people, and rendering the Protestants and Catholics of the two countries one Nation, under the authority and protection of one Parliament;† which shall be free from the prejudices, the fears and the hatreds of either of the contending parties in that kingdom.

Present Government of Ireland, not able to procure it.

Addington.

Ireland the most vulnerable part of the Empire.
Smith.

That Ireland is regarded by the enemy, as the most vulnerable part of the Empire, and that her condition is, by them, attributed to her domestic convulsions and distractions, we have too ample testimony in the declarations and conduct of Hoche, Humbert, Tone, &c.‡ in the Reports of the Secret Committees, &c. &c. But the state of Scotland has been urged, in this respect, in opposition to the benefits of an Union, because treason has, notwithstanding, found its way into that country also: If, however, the Scotch have been

* Foster, 54.

† Ibid. 56.

‡ Foster, Bousfield, 58.

been tainted with disaffection, and sedition did appear among them, it should be remembered that the disease was derived from the contagion of Ireland; and this circumstance serves only to afford a more convincing proof, of the necessity to the whole empire, of some measure, that will purify that source of sedition.

Some of the principal defects of Ireland, and an abundant fountain of calamities, are well known to be the want of capital and industry; these wants, no method is so likely to remedy, as mixing with a people, that can amply supply her with both.

But the great misfortune of Ireland is the division of its people, by the distinction of religions: this more particularly requires the interference of some regulating power, that is placed, beyond the sphere of danger, or prejudice.* In the present state of things, the Protestant sees the ascendancy, and even the existence of his religion, exposed to danger, from any further extension of the privileges, and powers of the Roman Catholics: and on the other hand the Romanists, increasing every day in power and influence, equally feel the establishment of the National Church to be a grievance; so that it is equally perilous to comply with the fears of one party, or to grant the claims of the other. This difficulty would be obviated by an united legislature, which might be able, in time, to remove all the grievances of the Roman Catholic, without subjecting the Protestant to any possible risk.

Religious Distinction the misfortune of Ireland.
& Douglas,

& Addington,
& Lord Minto,
& Dundas.

In that case, if the Roman Catholics were to be admitted into the united Parliament, their weight, in the general representation, would be but as feathers in the scale;† all possibility of encroachment on the Protestant establishment, through the means of an Imperial Parliament, would be done away; and the favourite argument of preponderating numbers, would be dissipated in a moment. On the other hand, should the Romanists continue to be excluded; a barrier of tenfold strength, would be placed between their wishes and the accomplishment of them: Instead of a minority of fellow citizens, they would have to contend with the united legislature, and a majority of Protestants in the empire, greater than their own boasted majority at home.

Remedied by an Union.
Smith,
& Addington,
& Lord Minto,
& Anon.

It has been said that the concessions, made to the adherents of that religion in 1793, are such as to "threaten the overthrow of the Protestant establishment in Ireland, and hazard both the connexion with Great Britain and the succession of the House of Hanover." There are but two modes, in which the effects of that measure can be remedied; either by an Incorporative Union, or by the re-enactment of the repealed code of popery laws. To the latter, it is universally

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* Taaffe, Sheehy, 57.

† Foster, 57.

verfally allowed, there are radical and infuperable objections? And it is worthy of remark, that it was not till after the repeated efforts of the Irish Parliament had proved abortive, and the object was abandoned, that, as the only remaining resource, in the distressed state of the kingdom, the penal code of popery laws was enacted.

Addington,
& Dundas.

It would, besides, be a satisfactory reflection to those Romanists, who are possessed of the elective franchise, that, in the exercise of that power, they were no longer about to delegate a body of men, whom they are too apt to regard as hereditary enemies, adverse to their interests and religion; but that those, whom they should elect, would be mixed among a great majority of men, uninfluenced by the prejudices, which are by them imputed, whether justly, or not, to the Protestants, and Parliament of Ireland.

Parliamentary
system of Ireland
vicious.

Anon.

Impartial view
of the causes
leading to, &c.

A review of the origin and progress of the parliamentary system of Ireland, will clearly shew that, as well as the system of government, it is also in itself radically vicious; that it cannot subsist in its present state, and can only be remedied by, either a reform, or an Union with Great Britain. At a time like the present, when the pruning knife of reform, has been changed for the axe of demolition, so that the smallest inlet to innovation admits a torrent sufficient to destroy the fabric, which it was the design to secure, no thinking man will wish to have recourse to the former means. An Union then remains, as the sole remedy.

The rebellion, under Queen Elizabeth, had occasioned forfeitures to a great extent, in point both of number and value. In order to occupy those lands and contribute to their improvement, James I. sent over a colony of Protestants. But these settlers were exposed to all the animosities of the barbarous natives, who differed from them in religion, in language, in laws, and in all the habits of social intercourse. It became necessary, therefore, to provide for their security by some extraordinary means; and for that purpose the King erected *sixty-seven* Protestant corporations, which were allowed the privilege of sending, each, two representatives to sit in Parliament; and in this circumstance, it was, that the institution of an Irish Parliament commenced; for previously, there had existed only the *Assembly of the Pale*, which was no Parliament.

Thus arose a hostile Parliament, in a hostile country, a government, whose views were opposite to those of the people governed; and consequently whatever benefited the one must have been the injury of the other: and the degradation of either must have, reciprocally, served to exalt the other. No system could be more formidable; it induced a necessary reciprocity of coercion and resistance. The hands of the Protestants

Protestants were further strengthened by Cromwell; he erected new boroughs, and made new distributions of the property of the papists. It seems to have been the design of James II. to oppose this system of corporations, and to restore the Roman Catholic proprietors, to their due weight, in the scale of power. But his abdication, at once, put an end to these schemes, and made way for the Revolution; which while it provided England with security for life, liberty and property, served, in Ireland, only to throw additional chains upon the people, to exclude the Romanists from the legislature, to deprive them of all means of education, and to place new power in the hands of the Protestant aristocracy.

Too public notoriety and too sad experience render it unnecessary, to record the melancholy effects of this policy, both, upon the face of the country, and upon the manners of its inhabitants. Industry and emulation were banished; the Irish people was reduced to a nation of herdsmen, and the only art that remained to be cultivated, was that of making the rents for the oppressive landlords.

At the accession of the present Royal Family, the attention of Great Britain was in a great measure turned away from Ireland, by the agitation, which had succeeded the settlement of the House of Hanover upon the throne, together with the multiplied foreign concerns with which she was then occupied: and Ireland was left in the hands of her own aristocracy, which consequently increased in power; and, assuming to themselves the complete control over the Lords Lieutenant who were sent there, incapacitated them totally from paying attention to the complaints and sufferings of the people, when any of them should by chance penetrate to the viceroy's ear. In order to break this overbearing aristocracy, Lord Townshend was sent to Ireland, as Lord Lieutenant. That nobleman put down effectually the reigning faction, but it was only by elevating upon its ruins an opposite faction, whose conduct, and principles, and views were precisely similar.

The scheme, since then pursued, in order to carry on the business of government, has consisted in temporizing between the adverse parties; but still the same barrier remains between the crown and the people, and must remain without a possibility of being overcome, as long as the present system of representation continues, because the preponderance of the borough interest in the Irish Commons, puts it always in the power of the aristocracy, by the coalition of five or six principal possessors of boroughs, to take into their own hands, the power of government; and to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to the best intentions of the Sovereign towards the people. This system cannot be supported, unless the coercion

cion exercised by the aristocracy be increased, proportionably to the numerical increase of population: but, such a train of reciprocal exertion and coercion must necessarily tend to dissolution; the wisest ministers of Great Britain, therefore, from that period to the present time, have been of opinion, that an Union was the only measure capable of saving Ireland from the horrors of civil hostilities.

*Advantages of
1782, not obtained
by Parliament.*

It is in vain, that the advocates of the settlement of 1782, offer that adjustment, with the constitutional and commercial advantages obtained about that time, as a proof of the excellence of the parliamentary system, or, as they say, of a dormant patriotic energy in the constitution of Ireland, because those were not the measures of Parliament, but were wrung from a sulky aristocracy, by an armed people: the volunteer army was arrayed *against* the Irish Parliament.

The parliamentary constitution of 1782 had the same radical vice with that of James I. it did not embrace the body of the people; and its effects were to render the government of the country, impracticable to the executive minister, unless carried on by a system of corruption, commensurate to the extent and power of the aristocracy; because the interests of the aristocracy, and those of the people are at variance.

At this period it was, that the French principles of sedition and democracy were introduced into Ireland: but government was so clogged by the weight of that aristocratical faction, that the executive ministers had no power to oppose an effectual resistance; and thus, were these destructive principles allowed to extend, and fortify themselves.

At length the Sovereign, and the British cabinet thought proper, to attend to the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland. It was then, that the aristocracy, alarmed at the indulgence granted and afraid of further concessions, laid the foundation of the *Orange Society*, and formed themselves into an army of Orangemen. The oppressions exercised by this society upon the Romanists were very grievous, and served, in a great degree, to force the great body of the peasantry into the views of the opposite society of *United Irishmen*, and into rebellion.

At the same time, the power of that faction became so great as to oppose the inclinations and efforts of the Lord Lieutenant, and force out of the kingdom, the only officer, whose skill and experience were capable of saving the country, from the miseries of a rebellion on the eve of breaking out, and the dangers of an expected invasion. At last even the Lord Lieutenant himself was forced, by the violence of this faction, to leave Ireland.

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The vigour and steadiness of his successor, Marquis Cornwallis, has since in a great measure subdued them; but that Nobleman's administration must, at last, have an end; and at his departure, the flames of civil discord will revive, with increased fury, unless they be extinguished either by an Union, or by a Reform; which in the present temper of the world, is too dangerous to be practicable. Indeed, as long as the present state of things continues, the two factions, who contend for power, must be tolerated, or even, in some degree encouraged by the supreme Government; and consequently the country must ever be kept in a state of distraction. Till all the inhabitants be placed upon an equal footing, so that all jealousies shall be removed, and equal scope, and encouragement given to the industry of all, Ireland can never enjoy prosperity, or tranquillity: this an Union would serve to effect, by removing the cause and objects of contention.

M. Kenna.

And as, out of the very frame and constitution of the Parliament of Ireland, arises the want of that confidence between the governors and the governed, which is essential to good government, the interference of the British Parliament is admirably calculated to restore peace and confidence, by removing those constitutional vices, which are the source of the evils suffered, and by granting to the people of Ireland, what is beyond the reach of their local Parliament, a free participation of all the privileges, enjoyed by their fellow-subjects of Great Britain.

Dundas.

At present, Ireland has no share in the legislation of Great Britain, nor of the Empire; she can take no part in the regulations respecting the foreign possessions of Britain; nor even those in St. George's channel, or on the opposite coast of France, though, it is obvious, how much the commercial and political interests of Ireland may be affected, by such regulations. By the admission of her representatives to be incorporated with those of Great Britain, Ireland becomes a part of that body, whose voice is heard,—not in Europe only, but in the four quarters of the world; and immediately acquires her proportionate share in all these great concerns: and Ireland will speak, as well through the influence and suffrage of every Member chosen in Great Britain, as by the mouth of her own immediate representatives; for the interests of that island will be as much the object of the duty and interest of the *whole body*, to attend to, as those of any part of the British Empire. The decision, however, of all cases merely local, will probably be left to the Irish Members, as it usually happens, in similar cases, with regard to the Scotch representatives, when the subject of debate relates merely to Scotland.

Dundas,
& Douglas.

Ireland

Ireland has no control over the executive.

Dundas.

Ireland is not now possessed of any control over her own executive government; for the third estate, or executive of Ireland is necessarily and inevitably the same as that of Great Britain; and it, therefore acts, with regard to the whole Empire, by the advice of *British Ministers*, amenable to the *British Parliament* alone, and not, in any manner, to Ireland; not even as to the affairs of Ireland, which pass through the King's hands. From this important privilege, Ireland, as a separate state, must ever be debarred; but, becoming by an incorporate Union, a part of the British legislature, she obtains, equally with Great Britain, the privilege of control over the Ministers of the Crown.

Union will remedy the ignorance of Ministers.

It has been argued by many, (even of those, who have not borrowed, from their predecessors in Scotland, the absurd phraseology, of *foreign Government*, *foreign Ministers*, *foreign Parliament*, as applied to those of Great Britain,) that Ministers in London have neither opportunity, nor means of acquiring such detailed knowledge of the characters, circumstances, and interests of Ireland, as may be necessary, in order to form a true judgment of the justice or policy of their measures: and that *therefore*, they ought not to interfere in the government of that island. This conclusion is absurd, because the administrators of the supreme government must necessarily reside near the person of the Sovereign, who holds the executive authority equally over both; but the premises may in some instances have been true. This evil however, arising from the want of information of British Ministers, with regard to Ireland, will meet a perfect remedy in the incorporation of the two legislatures: for that measure will necessarily draw to the seat of government men from Ireland, who are acquainted with all parts of the kingdom and all its affairs, with the various circumstances of its trade and manufactures, with its characters and its property; who will be near the Minister, or the Sovereign, when the affairs of their country are under consideration; or will be ready, with their talents, their influence, and their suffrages, to support in the Imperial legislature, whatever their duty may require.

Douglas.

But, say they,* a Parliament, sitting in London, cannot be competent to tranquillize Ireland and establish submission to the Laws, or to promote its prosperity; because, "it will be at too great a distance to administer, in time, to the wants and wishes of the people, or to guard against excesses and discontents." But these cares fall into the department of the executive; it is the province of the executive government, and by no means of the Legislative body, to dispense instant

* Foster, Spencer, 55.

instant favours, or apply instant coercion, on emergencies; subject afterwards to the investigation of the Legislature.

Much stress has been laid upon the effects produced in Dublin by the procession of the House of Commons through the streets; it is, however, but an ill compliment to the Parliament, or the people of Ireland, to ascribe to such a circumstance as that, the distinguished part, which the Irish Legislature had in suppressing the rebellion.

Beside commercial advantages, and those of general and relative policy, and legislation, Ireland would gain, by an Union with Great Britain, others much more important,—general civilization; habits of morality and true religion, instead of blind superstition and fanatical rage;* uniform submission to law, together with a gradual extinction of the spirit of disturbance, insurrection, plunder, and massacre, which has prevailed, with more or less violence, among the people of Ireland, as far back as their authentic history can be traced; especially since the period, which established the division of them into Protestants and Papists.

Civil advantages of an Union.

The supposition that these good effects are more likely to be produced by a resident Parliament, is instantly controverted by experience, which reminds us, that in a course of ages, a resident Parliament has not been able to effect these improvements.

If an Union were to have the effect of increasing the number of Absentees from Ireland, yet that inconvenience would be counterbalanced, by the increased predilection, that such a change would probably occasion, for English habits, and for the English constitution;† and by promoting that connexion between the higher and lower orders of society, which is so much wanting in Ireland: it would be more than compensated, by the addition to the aggregate stock of wealth and commerce, which the adoption of an Union would produce; and by the supply of an useful set of men, who would replace absent proprietors of land, and, by their consumption, would equally encourage trade and manufactures, which their skill and industry would at the same time direct.

Increase of Absentees counterbalanced, Pitt.

Smith, & Douglas.

But, as the reduced number of representatives would much increase the difficulty of obtaining a seat in Parliament, no man, who was a permanent absentee, could expect to retain influence sufficient to be returned; and this circumstance would rather induce many, even of those now resident in England, to spend a large portion of time on their estates, in order to court the favour of electors.

counteracted,

The

* Foster, Cease your Fanning, 57.

† Foster, Spencer, Bousfield, Rudd, 58, &c.

and of no consequence to Dublin.

Pitt,
& Smith.

The metropolis of Ireland has no grounds for the alarm, which it has felt for its prosperity; because it would still continue to be the residence of the Viceroy, the seat of the Courts of Law, civil and ecclesiastical,—of the Revenue,—of the University,—and the Head-quarters of the Army;* and because it would still be the centre of the commerce of this Kingdom, in an increased state of vigour:—objects of much greater importance than the temporary residence of a certain number of Members of Parliament.

Dean Tucker.

But it is a vulgar notion, that *money is riches*; industry and frugality are the riches of a state, and money is only the sign of them; its circulation in a country is useful, only as it promotes the circulation of labour and industry: if not productive of this effect, the greatest quantity of gold and silver, instead of being beneficial, is a detriment to the community. Spain has had sad experience of this truth: Spain once abounded with industry and manufactures, but when gold and silver flowed in, from the mines of Mexico and of Peru, and were obtained without labour, all her apparatus of manufactures, her looms, and her industry were laid aside; and Spain became one of the poorest, and worst cultivated countries in Europe. Such is the case, in every town, which is the seat of dissipation and luxury, where money is idly scattered, and industry is not requisite to obtain it: idleness, and poverty were glaring amidst the splendor, and profusion of Versailles; so, also, it is found at Vienna, at Berlin, at Munich, at Dresden, at Naples, at every town, which is the residence of a Court; for the seat of prosperous manufacture is ever removed from the haunts of dissipation. The same contrast is found in our own towns; immense sums of money are spent, every year, at Bath, by a concourse, on an average, of 20,000 strangers, in every sort of luxury, pleasure, and extravagance; yet the inhabitants of Bath are not rich, nor has any one manufacture sprung up among them, though there is not any town more admirably situated, by nature, for the seat of manufacture.

When Edinburgh was the residence of a Court, and a Parliament, it was a very poor place, but it is now become a great and wealthy city, thriving in trade and manufactures. The contrast is apparent even in London, between the Court and the City end,—between the idle sickly business of Bond-street, and the stirring activity of Cheapside or Cornhill: And before dissipation and prodigality had arrived at so great a pitch in Dublin, there were flourishing manufactures, established in the *Liberty*; now a scene of misery and desolation: It is not, then, to the residence of a Parliament or a Court, that the success of those manufac-

tures

* Jervis, Goold, Taaffe, Weld, Rudd, 62.

tures is to be attributed; since they have failed while that Parliament and Court were still resident; in consequence, probably of the accompanying dissipation and luxury.

But Dublin is apprehensive, that the trade of its port, *Trade of Dublin in no danger.* will be transferred to better harbours; that Cork, Derry, Galway, Belfast, will attract it, while Dublin will decline: though were there any real probability of this being the case, still Dublin would be no loser; for it must not only profit by the increasing prosperity of any part of the Kingdom, but also, as it must ever continue to be the seat of the Treasury and National Bank, it must ever continue to be the centre of exchange for universal commerce, and, consequently, must become the scene of proportionate and increased trade: besides, the circumstance of the numerous canals cut through all the Western parts of England, and communicating with London, and those making from Dublin through Ireland, will contribute much to increase its commerce with England, and will make it the depôt, for the consumption of the kingdom, in all articles of British manufacture.

Arguments for and against, &c. Anon.

The fears of Dublin, however, for the local loss of trade *Dean Tucker.* are otherwise ill-founded, for trade does not always follow the best ports; and when once an establishment has taken place, it is difficult to remove it to another situation; its relations and habitudes are its security. No ports are more inconveniently circumstanced for trade than London, Bristol and Liverpool; yet this defect has not removed their trade to the spacious and admirable harbours of Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Milford, because the artificial basis of their establishment, has become too broad, for the disadvantages, under which they labour, to overturn it.

Dublin has, therefore, no reason for any such apprehensions: for on the contrary, increased commerce and increased industry will give increase of wealth and population, and consequently of value, to the lands and houses in the vicinity of Dublin.

But, if there were real grounds for the fears of any particular district, or of any particular class of men, yet their interests should not be put in competition with the benefit of the whole, from which their particular advantage, also, must ultimately flow: it matters little to the nation at large, whether it receive its treasures with the right hand, or with the left. The fate of Edinburgh since the Union *Pitt.* presents an example, sufficient to remove the fears of Dublin; for though the same apprehensions were, at the time, entertained for that city, and prophecies as loud and clamorous, were made, of its approaching ruin, it has, since the above *H* period,

period, increased in commerce and population, in the proportion of five or six to one; and has continued to be the resort of the gentry and nobility of Scotland, whose circumstances it did not suit, to visit the more remote metropolis of the Empire.

Douglas.

It is a well known fact that no nobility and gentry live more at home, than those of Scotland.

But the best method of preventing the increase of Absentees, will be, to restore tranquillity, police, and security of life and property: these, added to the natural advantages of Ireland, then free from impediment or restraint, will give new weight to the common partiality, that men feel for their native land, and will bring back to Ireland, her wandering sons, from all parts of the world.*

*Absentees no
serious evil.*

Peel.

It may be well doubted, however, whether the absence of noblemen, and gentlemen of rank and property, be so great an evil, as it is generally reckoned; † for industry is the riches of a country; and it is universally found that manufactures, and other considerable objects of labour, flourish most at a distance from the seat of luxury, and the gay pursuits of genteel life. The want of access to the money circulating in England, has kept Ireland comparatively poor, and unindustrious: when the British markets, therefore, are laid open, property drawn from Ireland, will be returned through the medium of industry; and thus the equilibrium will be restored; manufactures will be more likely, to establish themselves in a situation, remote from the influence of a domineering neighbour.

Benefit to Cork.
Smith.

If it were just, in arguing a measure that concerns the Empire at large, to consider the interests of any particular part, or district, the opinion of the people of Cork might be adduced; ‖ the inhabitants of that city ought best to understand their own interests, and they apprehend no injury, but on the contrary expect considerable benefit from a legislative Union; the abolition of all fears, jealousies and distrust; the intimate blending of the two countries, and the removal of all possibility of separation, may furnish motives, which did not before exist, and may remove all former objections to the establishment of a Naval dock-yard; which is in itself a considerable object of desire, and does not necessarily impede the progress of commercial prosperity; for though trade certainly does not resort to those ports where dock-yards are established, that circumstance must be ascribed to some other cause, and cannot merely arise from the vicinity of a naval station.

With

* See the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Sylvester Douglas, p. 124.

† Foster, 55, 58. ‖ Foster, Anon. 61.

With regard to Taxation; the known integrity of the British Parliament, the example of the good faith kept with Scotland, and the leading principles of English finance, are, to Ireland, a sufficient protection from the danger of being subjected to the burthens of Great Britain, or loaded with taxes beyond her ability. *No danger of exorbitant taxation to Ireland. Pitt.*

But, though Ireland were to have the whole of the annual burthen of England imposed on her, (too heavy undoubtedly for her present means,) still there would be no grounds for apprehension of the poorer part of the community being crushed by it, or driven to despair. The Taxes of England may be divided into six classes, viz. 1st. The Land tax. 2d. The Custom-house duties, on the importation of foreign produce, manufactures, and luxuries. 3d. The Excise on articles of home consumption. 4th. The Assessed taxes, as those on Houses, Windows, Horses, Carriages, Servants, Dogs, &c. 5th. The Stamp duties, and 6th. The Postage tax. *Dean Tucker.*

From almost the whole of these the lower class of people are exempt: to the first they cannot be subject: the Customs are felt by those only who choose to indulge in the luxuries of foreign produce, a thing no way necessary to the poor, who may enjoy all the comforts of good food, decent clothing, and warm dwellings, without the importation of any one foreign article; the duties on Horses, Carriages, &c. cannot fall upon them, and to the House and Window tax they are subjected in a very small degree; the Stamp duties do not concern any of their transactions, unless when they choose to spend their money in the purchase of newspapers; nor can the Postage tax affect them; but if it did, there would be no room for complaint, because it affords the cheapest mode, that they can make use of, for the conveyance of letters: the Excise is the only branch which must, to a certain degree, affect the poor, for they cannot, by the strictest frugality, save themselves from the excise on Malt, Hops, and Cyder, on Soap, Candles, and Leather, and the duty on Salt: these are not, however, to any great amount, and, except in the two last articles, would scarcely at all concern the same class of people in Ireland; so that if similar taxes were to be laid on that country, the poor would, according to their present mode of living, be subject to a very small portion of them, for they make much less use of any of the exciseable articles, than

* The greater part of the lower class are by law exempt, and the rest are rarely assessed, by a sort of connivance; to save them from the burthen. *Dean TUCKER.*

than the poor of England, and are at least as far beyond the reach of all the others.

Douglas.

But there is no reason to suppose, that, in the event of an Union, the taxes must be invariably the same in both countries: on the contrary, according to the || resolutions already agreed to, the rate of taxation is to be regulated upon certain rules, and fixed principles, previous to the Union; so that there shall be a constant difference proportioned to the comparative ability, of each country. The same resolution preserves Ireland from any wanton abuse of her purse; for, beside that it is as safe in the hands of her representatives sitting in Westminster, as assembled in Dublin,* Britain *cannot* lay any tax upon Ireland, without at the same time subjecting herself to a burthen, *heavier in the full proportion of her greater ability*, and the very selfishness of Britain thus becomes, of itself, a safeguard to Ireland.

Dean Tucker.

Many regulations might be suggested, especially with regard to the Land-tax, which would enrich Ireland instead of impoverishing it. Any tax, which promotes industry and encourages a circulation of labour, enriches a country; and in the same proportion, a country is necessarily impoverished by any tax which checks industry and stops labour: if a * land tax were laid upon Ireland under certain regulations, it would fill the towns with industrious inhabitants, and the country with laborious cottagers and working farmers. Thus a race of men would arise, who would create a demand for manufactures, and a home consumption: and † without home consumption foreign trade cannot flourish. But at present the great mass of the Irish are so destitute of food, raiment, and lodging, (the foundation of all commerce,

|| See 7th Resolution of the British Commons.

* A Land tax, so regulated as that the poorer class, and those possessed of no more than half an acre, should be exempt from it, and that larger farms should be *proportionably* burthened, would be productive of the best effects. For instance, let a farm under 50 acres, with an house, be subject to three pence per acre; under 100 acres, with an house, to six pence; and all lands and farms of greater extent, and not so circumstanced, to two shillings per acre.—From the time when the Land tax was laid upon England, the great improvement of landed estates may date its origin; and may be, in a great measure, attributed to the permanency of that tax, which remained always the same, without fluctuation, and operated as a quit-rent, to spur on the farmer to improvement: he knows that, however he may increase the value of his land, he cannot be called on for any greater proportion, and that however his negligence may suffer his land to lie uncultivated or run to waste, he is subject to no less, but that his quota of Land tax *must* be paid. DEAN TUCKER.

† Mr. Pitt estimates the profits of the home trade, in Britain, at 28 millions, and those of the foreign trade at only 12 millions.

merce, the most brilliant and extensive), that they are no customers to the community, nor is their consumption any encouragement to trade.

But, even if that greatest object of alarm, were to take place, and Ireland, by an Union, were to become subject to the national debt of Great Britain, and were called on, to supply her quota to its discharge, (which is indeed a mere fiction of the imagination, not capable of being realized) still would not Ireland on this account be in a worse situation, than at this moment; for though not legally, yet *effectively* Ireland is now pledged to support, with her resources, the credit of Great Britain. If the debt of Great Britain were to be effaced by a bankruptcy, that calamity would be followed by the failure, and consequent penury of an immense number of persons, who now consume or traffic in articles of Irish fabric and export; from thence would necessarily follow a stagnation of Irish trade, a cessation of demand and encouragement, and a depression of industry. As consumption was diminished, the value of lands and houses would fall, and the elegant arts, which thrive by the overflow of opulence would decline. Besides, it is the credit of Great Britain, which gives efficacy to her resources: her credit is the lever by which she moves mankind and influences the transactions of the world. If the artificial power of Britain were subverted, Ireland would be left without encouragement to improve, and without protection to preserve what she has,—a prey to the rapacity of France, should the power of that nation last;—or else a subject of contest, among the factions of the European states.

Ireland bound to support the credit of Great Britain now.

McKenna.

An Union would serve also to gratify the *real* well-wishers of those two great popular measures, which have so long agitated the country,* exciting the hopes of one party and the fears of the other, *Reform of Parliament*, and *Catholic emancipation*. It has already been shewn that the claims of the Roman Catholics would be favoured by such a measure. A reform would also be effected in Parliament; for as the number of Irish representatives would be confined perhaps to 100, among whom here would be 64 members for counties, and some for cities and large towns, the greater part of the boroughs, and with them the borough influence in the Commons House, would be cut off, and thus, though by a smaller number, the people would be *as fully and freely* represented as they now are.

Union will effect reform.
Peel.

AGAINST

* Spencer, Taaffe, &c.

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS POLITICAL, RESPECTING THE INTERNAL
INTERESTS, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY
OF IRELAND.

*Union will not
strengthen
Ireland.*

Foster.

IT is an exaggeration and an insult to the feelings of Irishmen, who know the falsehood of the assertion, to represent Ireland, as the vulnerable part of the Empire, torn by contending factions; and if such a statement were true, it would betray the most glaring want of prudence, and policy, thus to declare to the enemy, the weakness, and disunion of the Empire.* In whatever degree the country may be exposed to the attacks of the enemy, that danger arises to it, not from its independence, but from the destructive measures of the Minister, which have so long embroiled these kingdoms in a desolating war.

Bousfield.

Foster.

But the enemy, knows that such weakness is not the condition of Ireland; he knows that she is firmly united to Great Britain, in interest and affection: and it is of no consequence to him, in what manner her municipal laws may cement or qualify that Union. A roll of parchment will neither change the inclinations of secret enemies within the realm, or deprive them of the means of giving the expected assistance to their friends, nor will it strengthen the affections, the interests, or the resources of that part of the Empire. It was the energy of the legislature, that discomfited the late attempts to promote rebellion; and the depriving so large a kingdom of that legislature, will give to the secret partizans of the enemy a larger field for action, and more power to act with vigor. And a powerful invitation is held out to France to renew her attempts on Ireland, by the view of a measure forced upon the people, so notoriously contrary to their inclinations; for she may well conclude, that disgust and disunion will much abate the zeal of those who before resisted her arms and influence.

Goold.

Foster.

But, granting the position of the weakness of Ireland and of the effects of an Union in working a remedy, still it is not adequate to the danger. For the perils, to which Ireland is said to be exposed, are instant, and the remedy proposed must be a work of time, and its effects remote; though the disgust it may occasion, will be immediate. And the

* Smith, 40.

the chief dangers of Ireland, which arise from its geographical relation to France, and its physical position on the globe, cannot possibly be removed by an Union, for these causes admit of no change.

If energy in the government of a country were the sole object to be provided for, the administration should be put into the hands of a single Prince. But there are other considerations paramount to this, however desirable; and for that reason the British constitution is a system of checks, which, while they lessen the energy of government, secure the freedom of the country. And there is no pretence for saying that any increase of energy is required by the government of these realms: the Irish Parliament never yet has hesitated to come forward, with its full share of contribution and support to the exigencies of the Empire.

It is said that an Union will tranquillize Ireland: but the great misfortune of the country, from whence flow its internal discord, and the weakness of the laws, which ought to preserve tranquillity, is derived from the intervention of *middlemen*, between the proprietor and the occupier of the soil, and these are chiefly to be found on the estates of Absentees. If a resident Parliament, and resident gentry cannot soften the manners, amend the habits, and promote social intercourse, it is not likely to be effected by removing the Parliament and lessening the number of the gentry, at once depriving the country of their influence, and giving room for the increase of the pernicious class of middlemen. It is generally understood that the affections of the lower ranks are best conciliated, their manners most effectually improved, and good morals and habits of order most strongly promoted, by the example of the upper ranks, by their attention to the education, health, and comforts of their surrounding neighbours and dependents; and that veneration for the laws, and attachment to the country which affords them the blessings they enjoy, are chiefly to be inculcated by that benevolent protection, which every estate and every village ought to derive from its resident landlord, in the easy and impartial dispensation of justice, and the allaying those little feuds, which headstrong passions, untamed by education, are apt to carry to the last excesses. But the effects of the system now proposed, will be to deprive the kingdom of that beneficial class of men, to encourage land jobbers, and to degrade the hospitality of the ancient mansions into the penury of an agents dwelling.

Will not tranquillize Ireland.
Foster,

It is impossible that it can be as much within the reach of a Parliament unacquainted with local circumstances, and at
too

& Spencer.

too great a distance to receive information in time * for administering to the wants, and wishes of the people, or for guarding against their discontents and excesses,—to act beneficially for the country; as of a legislature which by being resident on the spot, is acquainted with all the habits, prejudices and dispositions of their fellow subjects, and knows how to apply relief.

Foster,

All the various consequences that may result from a change of system, even in a small affair, are not easily foreseen; but the difficulty is much increased when the change respects so stupendous a work as the constitution of a great Empire. If therefore the existing system go on practically, though it may have some, and even great speculative imperfections, it is rash to attempt a change, on the suggestions even of the most clear and persuasive theory. The most plausible theory is often defeated by practice; thus in the instance of *Juries from the vicinage*, the theory of Justice might object to them, as being liable to prejudices, friendships, and animosities, which might bias their decision, and which would not affect men collected from a more remote situation: and yet long experience has proved that what might have been apprehended, as an imperfection in this mode of trial, is that in which consists its great and peculiar excellence. Practice, in like manner refutes that theory, which supposes that the resident Irish Parliament may be influenced by the local prejudices and partialities of the country, whose interests are the objects of its concern, and which would, therefore, place those interests in the hands of a foreign Parliament, ignorant of all attending circumstances. Experience, in this instance also, shews that local knowledge is the very essence of the capability of Parliament to administer its functions. No Parliament sitting in Great Britain, could have developed the secret system of conspiracy, which has lately degraded Ireland;—or could have animated the loyal, and supported the executive power with the same effect, as did the Irish Parliament. The requisite concurrence of the legislature to the wise and necessary measure, of proclaiming Martial Law, could not have arrived in time, from London: and the support, derived from a Parliament, composed, five parts in six, of strangers, and sitting in another country,† would have been but very faint, in comparison with the impression made on the public mind, by the consciousness of its springing from Irishmen, all liable to the dangers of its operation, and all yielding up themselves and their property to its control. Personal character, respect for individuals, opinion of their attachment to their country where their stake lies, and in whose preservation and glory their interests, as well as their hearts

& Spencer,
& Ld. Farnham.

* Douglas, 46.

† Ibid. 47.

hearts are engaged, must have an irresistible effect on the people. On the other hand, by the removal of the legislature, not only such powerful means of strengthening the hands of government are lost, but at the same time, all means of control over the executive department of Ireland are taken away, and the country is left to the absolute disposal of the Minister or his deputy in Ireland. Sheehy.

Much reliance is placed upon the lamentable picture that is drawn with studied exaggeration, of the dissensions and hostility which prevail between the different religious persuasions of Ireland. Such representations are calculated only to create jealousy and distrust, and to foment any ill-will that may already exist. But the experience of the last twenty years proves the falsehood of the assertion; for during that period the Protestants have been constantly removing the burthens which oppressed the Romanists. The latter have expressed the highest gratitude; the professors of the two religions became as one family, and the most perfect cordiality appeared to subsist between them. Lord Farnham.

Those disputes and contentions, that arise from religious difference, are not the necessary consequence of a variety of religions, but the effect of the crooked policy of Great Britain, which has ever labored to keep alive and foment the spirit of bigotry and mutual hatred; in order the more easily to maintain her despotic sway over a divided country. An Union is not likely therefore to change her line of policy in that respect. It is not from any attachment or preference for that religion, that the British cabinet is induced to support the Protestant faction; but because the Protestants, being the minority, feel not as a nation for the honor and independence of the country, and are ready to sacrifice to it the rights and interests of that country. Taaffe, & Sheehy.

It is absurd to suppose that in points of internal policy, or in the arrangements with regard to religion and the claims of the Roman Catholics, a foreign uninformed assembly, can be a more competent judge, or better qualified to decide, than an Irish Parliament well acquainted with the grounds and extent of the claims, and with the local circumstances, upon which may depend the danger, or the expediency of compliance. An Union, therefore, cannot allay religious differences, nor remove the causes of discontent. Indeed the argument commonly drawn from this topic by the advocates of Union, amounts only to this: to the Protestant it says, Catholic emancipation cannot be refused unless there be an Union; and to the Roman Catholic it says, Catholic emancipation cannot be granted till there is an Union. Will not settle religious disputes. Foster.

I

But

Lord Farnham.

But in fact the Roman Catholics will have much less room for hope, in case of an Union, than they have now. No distinction can then be made between the Roman Catholic of the United Kingdoms. Either those of Britain must be raised to the level of the Irish Romanist, or the Irish must be lowered to that of the British. But Great Britain has not shewn any disposition to afford relief to her own subjects of that persuasion, and an attempt to remove the test laws, failed not long since. It is not probable then, that in the United Parliament, where this adjustment must be determined, the great British majority will concede to the Irish minority. The standard of adjustment then, it appears likely, would be lowered, and thus Lord Auckland has directly expressed his opinion, "that the measure of indulgences granted to the Catholics of England ought to guide the discretion of Government with regard to the Catholics of Ireland."

Taaffe.

And with regard to the danger, with which the property of Protestants is threatened, from the ascendancy, which the Romanists might by their numbers obtain, if admitted into Parliament, it is but false and illusory. Supposing it even likely that the proportion of property in the hands of Protestants, which is, to that of the Roman Catholics, as one hundred to one, could ever allow such an ascendancy to take place.

For much the greater part of the Romanists possessed of property derive their title from Protestants, either by lease or purchase, and consequently, in destroying the title of the latter, they would equally invalidate their own. As to the searching out the ancient heirs of estates, and re-establishing the forfeited titles, it might as well be apprehended, that they should recur to the predecessors of the Milesians for the true proprietor. Besides when the majority of Parliament were Papists, and great forfeitures had been recently made by Papists, no attempt was made for their recovery, or to wrest them out of the hands of Protestants.

Taaffe.

An Union is no way necessary to the arrangement of tythes; a modification of them may as well take place, and may be equally satisfactory with an Union.

Will not invite
English settlers.
Foster.

But the number of English settlers, it is said, who will be invited over by an Union, will introduce English manners and customs into Ireland: admirable however, and desirable as these are, they are not worth the sacrifice of Irish character; if such was to be the effect of an Union. The fact is, that no inducement will be offered by an Union. Adventurers will not be inticed to settle in Ireland—by the removal of the Legislature, of the men of fortune, and men of talents, those, to whom, in their schemes of traffic they must look, for success, as their principal customers. The residence of
Englishmen

Englishmen in Ireland is, on account of the unusual number of British forces quartered there, now greater than any that can be expected from an Union, and of a more useful kind; because the privates being of the same rank, mix with those classes, that stand most in need of improvement, and require examples of manners and civilization. In time of war, numbers of English soldiers come to Ireland, without an Union; in time of peace, an Union could not have the effect of bringing those over, as soldiers.

Scotland has been united to England for almost a century, and Wales above five centuries; yet English manners and habits have never been able to establish themselves, so far even as to bring the English language into full use, nor to obtain for them in England the character of natives; for a constant source of jealousy is furnished to that country, by the multitudes of Scotchmen, who push their fortunes successfully in England, in all professions and departments, and no pains can prevail upon the English to acknowledge them as countrymen. *Cease your Funning.*

An Union can hold out no inducement to British settlers that has not been of equal force, for these last eighteen years; it is the genius of a Briton, though he search the world for gain, to concentrate at last his riches and his enjoyments in his own country. The great emigrations, which peopled North America, were the effects of peculiar circumstances, of religious and political disputes under the reign of the Stuarts; and though it might again happen that similar causes might produce like effects, yet it never would be in poor enslaved provincial Ireland, that the covetous Englishman, who had once tasted liberty, would seek for refuge. *Bousfield.*

Population is by no means likely to be increased by an Union; for that of Ireland is already in a much higher proportion to the extent of the territory, than the population of England; and, by this measure, the management of all those concerns, on which depends the encouragement of population, will be removed from the kingdom;—the control of all measures necessary for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, manufactures, fisheries, &c. but, above all, of the public purse. The immense National debt of Great Britain, and the consequent weight of taxes, have prevented any increase almost in the population of England, for these last fifty years. *Will not increase population. Gould.*

Not only, the benefits held out to Ireland as the probable effects of an Union, are false and delusive, but the consequences of that measure would be positively injurious. By increasing the number of Absentees, it will reduce a still larger *Will injure Ireland. Foster,*

Absentees.

& Spencer,
& Bousfield,
& Rudd,
& Taaffe,
& Weld,
& Anon.

larger portion of the landed property of Ireland, to the miserable condition in which the estates of absent landlords are usually found. Every member chosen to the United Parliament must become a new absentee, for no man, now an absentee, can expect to be chosen; * and as, he must be a man of considerable property, to be able to bear the expenses of parliamentary attendance, a large part of the property of the kingdom would thus be continually drained from it; and the loss of so great a portion of the men of fortune would deprive the manufacturers of their best customers.

Anon.

The time, and expenses required for attendance in Parliament would have the effect also, of excluding from that body the whole bar, the whole commercial interests, and every gentleman who attends to the cultivation of his estate or has any sort of occupation, leaving the interests of the country in the hands of the idle and the ignorant.

Taaffe.

By habituating the rising generation, to hear Ireland spoken of with contempt, in a country where its inhabitants are despised, an Union will alienate the minds of Irishmen from their country, fill them with prejudices against it, induce them to treat it with the contempt and injustice that they see bestowed on it, by those with whom they associate; and domesticated in England from generation to generation, will change them into mere Englishmen, with Irish estates, who will be no more inclined to pay attention to the interests of Ireland, than the multitudes of that description, already members of the British legislature.

Foster.

Besides, an Union proposes the possibility of a period, when all protecting duties are to cease: the very notion of such a prospect may check the further expenditure of money, and induce individuals to draw in their capital, and look to the winding up of their business, against that period, when the cessation of all protection, must leave the infant manufactures to decay. Agriculture will decline, from the uncertainty of the Corn laws being continued; for the same principle, by which the bounty on the carriage of corn, was discontinued, from one part of the Kingdom to the other, may, by similar reasoning, be extended by the United Parliament, to the whole of the United Empire. Every law, and regulation now valued and relied on, may be subject to repeal by a foreign Parliament, difficult of access, and ignorant of the local causes that gave rise to them.

Spencer,
& Taaffe.

An Union will absorb the question † of parliamentary reform, and destroy the national dignity, honour, and importance of Ireland. It partakes strongly of a revolutionary hue, and the

* Pitt, Smith, Douglas, 48.

† M'Kenna, 53.

the degradation of the nobility, and extinction of the legislature, which would accompany the measure, might shake the crown upon the King's head, and would probably lead to revolution and separation. Bousfield,
& Anon.

New laws equal in appearance and alike in phrase, may be very unequal in effect in different countries; for instance, the same mode of taxation, which is suitable to a country, already arrived at the maturity of wealth and commerce, may be destructive to a poor country, young in trade and manufactures. Foster,

It is the interest of the one to borrow money, rather than raise an income by taxes, for the expences of a war; because the prospect of increasing prosperity offers the certain means of paying the debt gradually, and a sufficient increase of annual taxation to meet the exigency, might curb her spirit of enterprise. But, the other having the trade of the world in her hands, has no reason to expect any extension of her resources upon the return of peace, and ought rather to apprehend a decrease; she therefore ought to take advantage of her temporary affluence, and raise an annual income to support her expences, rather than incur a debt, which no increase of riches is likely to enable her, with greater facility, to discharge.

The inhabitants of Cork have been induced by some vague hopes of benefit to be derived to them from an Union, to express themselves in favour of that measure; but, in fact,* no part of Ireland is more exposed to injury from it, than that city. The only manufactures established there or in the neighbourhood are the woollen and cotton, neither of which can be promoted in Ireland by an Union: it cannot, in any way, increase her powers of export, or import; nor can it ever render her an emporium or depôt for foreign goods.† An Union then offers no hope to Cork, unless it be the establishment of a naval dockyard; but even to this it could furnish no one possible inducement, that does not now equally exist. There has hitherto been no impediment to the establishment of a dockyard there, but the natural situation of the place, which has not appeared to be useful or desirable for the purpose. In the course of almost a century, the effects of an Union has not produced a single dockyard for the navy, in Scotland. But, if the establishment of a naval station at Cork, were to be the certain consequence of an Union, the prospect ought not to mislead the wishes of that city, for it is not, in itself, a desirable object; the effect of it would probably prove prejudicial. Plymouth and Portsmouth are the finest harbours, and the best situated for trade in to,
Will injure Cork,
& Anon.
Foster.

* Smith, 50.

† See Commercial Arguments.

in England ; and yet no trade exists, where those great naval dockyards are established. Milford Haven is a magnificent harbour, and, though abandoned as a naval station, it has not however recovered any of the trade, that it formerly enjoyed.

The two grand articles of export from Cork,—corn and provisions,—are liable to be much affected by the injuries, to which agriculture may be exposed ; especially, as the demand for provisions has latterly run to much greater extent in the article of pork, than in that of beef : for pork depends much upon agriculture, and with its decline the pork trade must fall. Their provision trade, in this as well as the other article, beef, may be again obstructed and ruined, by those embargoes, which have so frequently already sacrificed the interest of Cork to the avarice of a British contractor ; a grievance for which an Irish Parliament only, was able to obtain redress.

Anon. But, if the expectations of Cork were well founded, and the greatest advantages were to flow into that city from an Union, still justice must resist any measure that would benefit Cork or any other district, at the expence of the rest of the kingdom, and by the depression of some other part. And at the same time, this partial exaltation, by affording a pretence for increasing the public burthens, would prove injurious to the very part, which might reap the profit, and totally ruinous, perhaps, to the rest, already impoverished by the same circumstance.

Will ruin Dublin. The prosperity of Dublin would be destroyed, her splendor Sir J. Jervis, would be effaced, and her streets would become a desert :
& Goold, her halls, her university,* her courts of law would be silent,
& Taaffe, and her future state would resemble the ruined walls of Baby-
& Anon. lon. Deserted by her Parliament, and her resident gentry,
& Weld, the loss of trade would soon follow, and carry with it, the
& Rudd. speedy reduction of rents, not only in Dublin, and its vicinity, but in every part of Ireland.

The time improper. If an Union of the legislatures of Great Britain and Ire-
land were necessary to the welfare of Ireland, that measure
Spencer. ought long since to have been concluded, at an earlier period, before habits were confirmed.† For if it be a political maxim that innovation is dangerous, the force of it must increase with the magnitude and irrevocability of the measure. The present at least is an ill-chosen time to bring it forward ; it is imprudent when the country is in such a state of agitation, to furnish a new cause of distraction and contention ; or while
France

* Pitt, Smith, Tucker, 50. † Douglas, 20.

France is endeavouring to propagate her democratical principles in Ireland, to remove from thence the presence and protection of the British constitution in its outward and visible signs.

It is neither generous nor just, to bring forward the proposal for an Union, at a moment when the country is distracted with the horrors of a recent rebellion, is exposed to all the calamities of an actual war, and apprehended invasion, and still languishes under the terror of new commotions; and while there are in the heart of the country 40,000 British soldiers. The choice of such a moment to seduce the people, or the use of such means to force them into any measure, is a strong argument of the notorious aversion that the country bears to it, and of the disadvantage, that is known to be the probable consequence of it to the kingdom.

But whatever might be the happy effects of a fair and equitable Union, it cannot be supposed that Ireland can be entitled to feel them: she cannot treat fairly, or upon equal terms with Great Britain, as long as the Irish ministers are named by those of Britain, and are of course subject to their control. It is Britain negotiating the terms with herself.

Another argument in favour of an Union, is drawn from the supposed degeneracy of the Irish Parliament. So great, say they, is its venality and corruption, that it is not fit to be trusted with the concerns of the country. This is the common outcry of United Irishmen and their partisans, against the government; and, if it be true, may be a strong argument in favour of the *reform*, but cannot be one for the *abolition* of that body: neither does it appear to be a well judged method of purifying a corrupt body, to plunge it into the midst of a larger one, equally vitiated; and placed, besides, at so great a distance from those constituents, who might have the power of control over these venal members, as is beyond the reach of their influence or their observation.

Perhaps it may be true, that Ireland is governed by British counsels, and that English influence predominates in her Parliament, so as to render her independence but a name; but it does not seem to be a very adequate remedy for such an evil, to transport the Parliament into that country, by which it is said to be too much influenced, at so great a distance; and whose voice it will no longer have the power to resist.

The example of the American states, in preferring an incorporative to a federal Union, is not applicable to the case of Ireland; because at the time of its adoption, the states were all equally in a state of infancy; they had nothing to gain from each other, nor any thing to give up, either commercial or constitutional. But Ireland has her own legislature, she

Bousfield,
& Weld,
& Sheehy,
& Anon. mul-
titude.

The mode unjust.
Anon.

Taaffe,
& Anon.

Rudd,
& Anon.

Cease your
Fanning.

has

has independence, she has freedom of commerce, and growing wealth. Neither are the effects of the measure in America such as to invite imitation; for the states have ever since been harassed and agitated by the influence of French intrigue.

Ditto,
& Rudd.

If from the incorporation of Geneva, Savoy, Belgium, &c. with France, any other argument can be deduced, than of the rapacity and ambition of the French republic, it is, of the necessity in which Ireland is placed, of guarding with all possible precaution, against a similar measure, which may reduce her to a similar state of subjection, under the dominion of *her* powerful incorporating neighbour.

IN

IN FAVOUR OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

ARGUMENTS COMMERCIAL.

AN Union would procure for Ireland the *secure and permanent* possession of those advantages, which in the present situation of things, she necessarily enjoys but as contingent and precarious. *Union will secure present advantages.*
Pitt,

In 1785 it was stated by those gentlemen who were best acquainted with the subject, that these advantages on the balance of trade were very great in favour of Ireland.* At present the trade is still more advantageous; Ireland imports of the manufactured produce of Great Britain to the amount of *one* million, on which she raises a revenue, by way of duty: while Irish manufactures to the amount of between *four* and *five* millions are imported into England, *duty free*; and that too, in linen, and provisions, the great articles of Irish manufacture.

All raw materials, all articles necessary to the trade or subsistence of Ireland are sent thither from Britain, *duty free*. The linen exported from Ireland, constitutes four-fifths of the Irish export trade to the whole world; and for the prosperity of this manufacture she is indebted to, and dependant on Britain: the British Parliament has furnished a market for Irish linens to the amount of three millions; and by the bounty on re-exportation affords her a double market, and ensures to her an advantage in competition with the linens of other countries, of 30 per cent.

But the effects of an Union will not be merely a confirmation of these advantages: † for a fairer and more perfect connexion of the two countries must lead to an equality of commercial advantages, and ultimately tend to the benefit of both countries. *Will procure others.*

Those now enjoyed by Ireland, are not to be ascribed to the Irish Parliament, but, if traced to their true source, will be found to have flowed from the voluntary and discretionary grants of the British Parliament, conferred from a regard for the interests of the Irish nation, as inseparably connected with the welfare of the empire; and that, in spite of rivalry and jealousy, at a time when the Parliaments were separate, when it was not *certain* whether what was given to Ireland, was given to Britain also, and when the countries were but partially and imperfectly united: there can therefore be no well grounded apprehensions *Those now enjoyed, the gift of Britain.*
& Ld. Auckland.

K

heptions

* Imports 1,000,000 to 4,500,000 of exports.

† Bousfield, 88. Taaffe, Rudd, 89.

ensions that Britain, if it were in her power, should be inclined to resume grants so made, from Ireland when parliamentarily united to herself, and identified in interests. But it would not be in her power so to do, because Ireland, in case of an Union, would have the security of a firm and irrevocable compact for that, which *now* rests on the independent discretion of the British Parliament.

*Union will invite
British capital.
Smith,
& Douglas.*

An Union, by promoting tranquillity, and securing the British connexion, will have the effect of increasing the commerce of Ireland, and inviting over British capital; for when property shall be rendered perfectly secure by the removal of internal convulsion; when all *distinctness* of interest between the two kingdoms, and all *possibility* of separation shall be done away, there will remain no impediment, to hinder the British capitalist from availing himself of the natural advantages of Ireland, and of the cheapness of labour and provisions, &c. in that kingdom;* because there will be no political difference between the islands, and the prosperity of Ireland will be equally the prosperity of Great Britain.

*Many branches
of industry open.*

Anon.

And, if the assertion were true that there are natural causes to prevent the *principal* manufacturers of England from profiting by these circumstances and flourishing in Ireland;† still, there are other branches in which capital may be vested, with equal advantage,—as in agriculture, in the provision trade, in the linen manufacture, &c. Nor is it fair to argue, that because the small advantages held out, in some particular branches, have failed by their encouragement to draw over the British adventurer under the present system, he may not find his account even without those encouragements in settling there, under such a change of circumstances as would produce security of property, and tranquillity. There is no probability, however, that the encouragements alluded to would cease upon an Union, or that the bounties, whether actual or constructive, or the regulations whether internal or relative, which now serve to promote the infant manufactures of Ireland, would be removed, as long as they may continue to be requisite, by an imperial legislature, whose interest it will be equally to promote the welfare of Ireland, with that of Great Britain or any other part of the empire.

By giving to Ireland the common use of British capital, it is meant, that the identification of the rights, interests, and privileges of the two countries, will induce the people of Great Britain, to employ their capital equally in either kingdom: each man preferring that spot in the empire, where he can carry on to the greatest advantage his own branch of trade or manufacture: and the security of money being the same

* Foster, Tit for Tat, 82.

† Foster, 83.

same in both countries, the money-holders of England will be induced to lend their money with as much facility to merchants and manufacturers in Ireland, as to those in the other island. Upon the alteration of the Irish constitution in 1782, immense sums of money, which had been lent on Irish security, were called in; above 40,000*l.* were drawn out of Ireland at that period by the Earl of Mansfield alone.

It is in this manner that the trade of the West Indies is carried on by British capital, though there are not any British manufactures established there.

There is a variety of manufactures and branches of trade, in which Ireland might furnish room for the advantageous employment of British capital. Some of the most profitable and most important to the nation, are the linen and leather manufactures; and the cultivation of waste and unprofitable lands. The first is too well known, to require any exemplification of its value: as to the manufacture of leather, it may suffice to state that Ireland exports yearly nearly 23,000 raw hides, and yet, for want of capital to carry on her works, she imports manufactured articles of leather to an immense amount; and though, having the *free* importation of Lord Auckland. bark, she can tan her own hides without any such additional burthen as duties would impose, yet in her own market she is underfold by British goods, which are there subject to an importation duty of 10 per cent. The cultivation of waste Anon. lands, it has been stated by Mr. Arthur Young, would yield a profit of from 15 to 20 per cent. but it requires a considerable capital, as does also the adequate improvement of the cultivated parts of the island.

Another field for the employment of British capital may be found in the colonial trade; for, notwithstanding the freedom of trade to the colonies, obtained in 1779, Ireland at this day imports colonial produce, to the value of more than a million, through Great Britain; while, for want of capital, she does not import *directly* above the value of 140,000*l.* There is scarcely an instance of any considerable British house Lord Auckland. being engaged, in Ireland, in Irish partnership.

Such were the advantages stated in 1785 by a most able Anon. politician,* as likely to result to Ireland from a partnership with Great Britain: it was his opinion "that the cheapness of labour and provisions, would invite the British settler, to a country situated in the neighbourhood of the rich, extended, and steady market of Great Britain, and that Ireland, with those advantages, with a climate as good, equal natural powers, and fewer taxes, would be able to manufacture cheaper than England."

But

* Right Hon. John Foster's Speech on the Propositions in Woodfall's Report, &c.

But since much weight has been laid, on the difficulty of introducing into Ireland what are called the principal and most profitable manufactures of Britain, (as if, for that reason, no others were admissible, or these alone were worth the pursuit) it may be proper to investigate that matter with some attention.

Principal manufactures of Great Britain may succeed in Ireland.

Coals exist.

There are stated four principal branches, which, it is said, *cannot exist* in Ireland for want of fuel, the Woollen, the Cotton, the Pottery, and the Iron manufactures.* But this impediment,† which is stated as the principal one, is directly removed by a view of the fact; for it is well known that Collieries exist (and are prevented only by want of capital from being worked to any extent) in the counties of Tipperary, Leitrim, Tyrone and Antrim, beside those so notorious in Kilkenny and Queen's county, which alone, according to the evidence of Mr. Evans, an Engineer of merit, given before the Irish Commons in 1783, are capable, if properly worked, of supplying annually 300,000 tons, delivered, by water carriage, at the distance of 40 miles, at so low a rate as 4½d. per hundred;—a lower price, than coals can be bought for at Leeds, Manchester, or Sheffield: Coals can also be furnished from England to most parts of Ireland, cheaper than they can be conveyed to many parts of England, where they are obliged to be brought by water carriage, on account of the heavy coasting duties, which amount to 5s. 9d. per chaldron, and in the port of London to 9s. 5d. per chaldron.

& Dr. Clarke.

But these manufactures do not depend on the cheapness of the one article of fuel alone, though it be a matter of importance; but on that of all the articles necessary for carrying them on, such as the raw material, labour, provisions, taxes, the command of water, &c. &c.; and these may more than counterbalance any difference that there might be in the expence of fuel.

Woollen.

The Woollen manufacture did once flourish so extensively in Ireland as to excite the jealousy of England, in the reign of William III. and, after the supply of her own market, to export to the annual value of £110,000.‡ At this day, there is in Ireland, an increasing manufacture of Woollens, sufficient to work up almost all her own wool (the export of

* For a more particular detail on this subject the Reader may have recourse to the Speech of Lord Auckland in the British House of Lords, April 11th, 1799: to that of the Right Hon. Sylvester Douglas in the British House of Commons, April 22d, 1799: or to an anonymous pamphlet, entitled "Observations on that part of the Speaker's Speech, which relates to Trade:" and Dr. Clarke's "Misconceptions, Mistatements, &c."

† Bousfield, 88. ‡ Foster, 83.

of which decreases every year) and that, carried on in parts of the country remote from any colliery.* The great woollen manufactures of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Devonshire and Norfolk, are situated where coals are not cheap. It is a fact, that, though wool is dearer in Ireland than in England, yet so much greater are the other relative advantages of the former, that in woollen, and worsted yarn, she can considerably undersell the English: notwithstanding which Ireland is obliged annually to import Woollen Cloths to the amount of near £700,000. Ld. Auckland.

The Cotton manufacture does not require, as an essential Cotton. article, the neighbourhood of Fuel, for the machinery can be as well worked by water as by the steam engine, and at a cheaper rate.† There are now carrying on, ‡ in many places in Ireland, very considerable Cotton manufactures, which are daily increasing, and which justify the opinions of the English manufacturers examined before Parliament in 1785, "that the superior advantages enjoyed by Ireland would enable her, soon to beat them out of their own market; and, after paying $10\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. duty, to send her goods into the English market at a cheaper rate by 12 or 13 per Cent. than they could do." So confident were those gentlemen in their opinion, that the greatest manufacturers in Britain, Mr. Peel, Mr. Smith, &c. declared that they already endeavoured to obtain partnerships in Ireland, in case the resolutions then depending should pass into a law. Still however, from the want of capital in Ireland, the importation of British cottons, amounts to £70,000 per Ann. Ld. Auckland.

With regard to the Iron manufacture, it is sufficient to Iron. repeat, that there are abundant collieries in the Kingdom; § and that the want of capital alone prevents the working of these, and the discovery of others: and to add, that there have been found there many species of Iron stone and ores, which are also neglected from the same cause; and that the English Iron manufacturers declared to the House of Commons, their opinion that Ireland could undersell them, and would beat them out of the American market; though her want of capital imposed on her the disadvantage of being obliged to purchase her bar iron in England, at a dearer rate than she could purchase it in Sweden or Russia, for the sake of the long credit, that England is able to give. Besides, London, where coals are far dearer than in Dublin, as well as labour, provisions, and taxes beyond comparison, carries on

* In Dublin, Cork, Bandon, Waterford, Lismore, Tallow, Carrick on Shannon, &c.

† Foster, 83.

‡ At Celbridge, Prosperous, Malahide, Balbriggen, Drogheda, Belfast, Clonmell, Cork, Michellstown, Kilmaclithomas, Mountrath, &c.

§ Foster, 82.

Douglas.

on very considerable Iron manufactures, in the coarser articles, which occasion the greatest consumption of fuel, such as anchors, &c. In the manufacture of the smaller articles, the price of fuel makes scarcely any perceptible difference; their success depends wholly on the labour and skill of the artizan; and notwithstanding that labour is dearer where the manufacture of these articles is carried on (Sheffield and Birmingham) than in most parts of the world, yet England can undersell at the rate of, from 15 to 20 per cent. those of the city of Liege, which has been long celebrated for its manufacture of Hardware, where labour and provisions are cheaper than on most parts of the continent, and firing is procured at the very gates of the city.

Pottery.

The value of the manufacture of Pottery depends almost wholly on the cheapness of labour; in this circumstance Ireland has an evident advantage, ‡ as well as the neighbourhood of the raw material, flintstones and clay; for both these articles are found in Ireland,* as well inland, as upon the coasts, in abundance, and of the best quality; while the English potteries, situated in the centre of the Kingdom, bring their raw material from the coasts of Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland. It was the opinion † both of Mr. Wedgewood, and of Mr. Brierly that England owed her superiority in that branch of manufacture, to the ingenuity of the workmen alone, and that the natural advantages of Ireland would induce them to migrate to that country; as had already been the case in the glass manufacture, in which the Irish are arrived at so great a degree of perfection, as to be able to hold a competition with Britain; and that manufacture demands as great a supply of fuel as the Pottery. Those gentlemen were also of opinion, that as the fine clay can be shipped on the coast for 6s. or 7s. per ton, but, on account of the inland carriage it stands them in Staffordshire in £1 16 0—to £2 2 per ton, Ireland would have been able, if the propositions had passed, to have undersold them by 40 or 50 per cent.

Douglas.

Douglas.

Because British capital has not been vested, nor British credit pledged in the establishment of new manufactures in Ireland, or in the encouragement of those already settled there, when there was no Union; it is thence *assumed*, that an Union will not furnish any invitations, which might not have been expected, nor remove any obstacles, which cannot be done away by other means. This is, however, a mere *petitio*

‡ Foster, 83.

* See the evidence of Mr. Evans, engineer of the Grand Canal, before the Irish House of Commons, in 1783.

† As delivered before the British House of Commons, in 1785.

petitio principii: besides, though British capital to any great amount has not actually settled in Ireland, yet it is not a correct inference from thence, that British money has had no influence in promoting the fabric of Irish linens, and other wares.

The Irish manufacturers and merchants, in general, immediately on shipping their linens, draw for two-thirds of the value, on their agents or factors in England, though great part of these goods often remains in the hands of such consignee for six, or nine months, beside the credit that he is obliged to give purchasers, amounting commonly, to twelve or eighteen months more.

In the Commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland,* the balance of trade is so much in favour of the latter†, and the demand for her produce in the British market is so great an advantage; that Ireland could not in any way receive compensation for the loss that would accrue, from the cessation of that intercourse.

Upon a general view of the exports and imports of each country to the other, as authentically reported in March, 1799, by Mr. Irving, Inspector-General of the imports and exports of Great Britain; it appears, that in the interchange of the produce of the two islands, the balance in favour of Ireland is *three millions and a half*; and, including that of foreign merchandize, in which the balance is against Ireland, still there remains in her favour a general balance of upwards of £2,000,000. and this depends on the commercial code, not of Ireland, but of Great Britain.

Those arguments are unfair which attempt to do away this statement,‡ by distinguishing the exports of Ireland into manufactured goods, and raw materials, which last, it is pretended, are of greater benefit, to the country importing, than the export is to that from whence they are sent; and are therefore said to incline the balance on that article, much in favour of England. But the articles there stated as raw materials, are in fact, the produce of agriculture, and articles of manufacture in the provision trade, as salt beef, pork, butter, &c. which employ a number of hands, and ought therefore to be classed under the head of manufacture, of which they are, to Ireland, a valuable and important branch. Besides, similar articles, as cheese, salted fish, &c. are classed among British exports as *manufactures*. Raw materials are those only, which constitute the basis of a subsequent manufacture.

There

* See the Speech of the Right Hon. John Foster in the House of Commons, April 11, 1799. † Foster, 77. ‡ Ibid. 77, &c.

There is another fallacy in the argument above alluded to; for that statement not only deducts from the exported manufactures of Ireland, all the above articles, to the amount of near £3,000,000, but adds to the manufactures of Great Britain, on the other side of the account, what are called *Colonial manufactures*, amounting to £970,000. * But these are all raw materials, or articles of consumption without manufacture, and above one-third not even the produce of the British colonies: † so that here a double fallacy is made use of, to prove that England reaps more profit, than Ireland, from their mutual intercourse; first in cutting off the above, one of the manufactures of Ireland, and with a change of name, placing them against Great Britain; and secondly by swelling still more the amount of British manufactures, with the addition of Indian merchandize, which is no part of them. Nor are any of those articles, the importation of which into Britain is stated as being so much in favour of that country, of such importance to her, as that she cannot do without them, or supply herself elsewhere. In order to favour the Irish provisions, Britain has prohibited the importation of that article, in time of peace, from all other countries, even the supply from America to the islands and fisheries. It is evident, then, that she does not *depend* on Ireland for a supply: and it was but very lately that Ireland was allowed to send her provisions into England (in consequence of which permission the prices of the produce are trebled in Ireland), and at this day all the boasted quantity of Beef, which that country supplies to England and her fleets, does not amount to one-third of the annual sale at Smithfield, in London, alone. It cannot be stated as a benefit conferred on Great Britain, that she *is allowed* the carrying of foreign produce to Ireland, notwithstanding the *power*, which Ireland has, were she so inclined of importing direct; for in mercantile affairs the want of inclination is only another name for the want of means, of which Ireland is absolutely destitute, and therefore incapable of taking that trade out of the hands of Britain.

To shew the comparative value of the British market to Ireland, it is enough to state, from Mr. Irving's report, that of the whole exports of Ireland, 6-7ths are to Great Britain and her colonies; and that with each of these the balance of trade

* In the statement alluded to, this sum, £970,000 is, by mistake, *twice* charged against Britain, first under the head of British manufactures; and again, as foreign produce, which occasion a very considerable error in the balance.

† The article of Tea alone, the produce of China, amounts to £367,887.

trade is in favour of Ireland; while, in the other seventh, consisting of her trade with all the rest of the world, the balance is against Ireland; that Britain does not raise on the goods imported from Ireland more than the *hundred and fortieth* part of her Customs, of which sum *seven-ninths* are expended in favour of Ireland by bounties on the re-exportation of Irish linens: and that the trade of Britain with Ireland amounts not to *one-ninth* of her whole trade, and her exported manufactures to Ireland, to no more than a *twentieth* of her whole export, while on these Ireland raises nearly *one-half* of her duties.

It should be added, that of the raw materials imported by Ireland from Great Britain, some of the most essential to the manufactures are of such a kind, as she can neither raise herself, nor procure elsewhere, unless at a greater charge than the article is capable of bearing.

The increase and prosperity of the Linen manufacture is, in a great degree, owing to the British duties on foreign linens imported, and to bounties on the re-exportation of Irish; || for, if foreign linens labouring under a duty of $36\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on an average * can yet find their way at all into the British market, it is evident that, without such a protection, the Irish would have been driven out by them. England is certainly entitled to acknowledgment for her kindness, in this respect, because it is notorious, that the foreign duties, imposed in return on her woollens, have injured their sale in the foreign market, and because she thus obliges herself to purchase her linens at a higher rate by $36\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. (beside the difference by which the foreign linens would be able if there were no duty, to undersell the Irish) than she could do, if such duties were not imposed.†

Prosperity of the Linen manufacture due to Great Britain.
Douglas.

It is however of no consequence to the present question Smith. to enquire what were the motives, which induced England to take those measures, which have served for the encouragement of the Irish Linen manufacture; it is sufficient to consider that, *such* has been the effect,‡ and that the continu-
ance

|| Foster, 80.

* It is stated by Mr. Douglas, on an average of the whole, to amount to about 25 per cent.; by Dr. Clarke also.

† This difference of price, together, amounts, on 30 millions of yards of Irish linen, and 11 millions of foreign linen, consumed in Great Britain, to £1,184,333, and this, with the bounties on the re-export of Irish linens, viz. £29,232, makes the sum of £1,213,565, the absolute expence to which England puts herself for the encouragement of the Linen manufacture of Ireland. Douglas, &c.

‡ The duty on foreign linens has served between the years 1785 and 1798 to alter the proportions of Irish, and foreign linen consumed in Great Britain as follows: in 1785, there were consumed of Irish, 18,500,000 yards;—of foreign 19,000,000 yards. In 1798 of Irish, 28,871,334 yards;—of foreign 11,748,164 yards. And in consequence
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Douglas.

ance of them *now* depends solely on the will of Great Britain. It is argued, indeed, that without the protecting duty Irish linens would maintain their ground in the British market, because, notwithstanding the late rise of 35 per cent. upon their price, merchants still purchase them with avidity. This extraordinary rise is owing to the reduced quantity manufactured on the continent; to the greatly increased demand, during the war, occasioned by the consumption of the armies, and of South America, which was formerly supplied by Germany, but now takes a large portion circuitously from Ireland; and to the unwise speculations, which both these circumstances have induced, and which alone have prevented the rise on the price of foreign linens from being *fully* equal to that on Irish: but as the price abroad has nearly kept pace with it, it is evident that from that increase of price in Ireland, no countervailing argument can be drawn, against the necessity to Ireland of the British duties on foreign linens.

The export bounty in Great Britain of 12 per cent. has operated it is said very much in favour of British linens, viz.—as 12 per cent. on them, and only as $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on Irish, the remainder barely compensating the expences of freight, carriage, &c. and by this unequal encouragement, which makes a difference of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. has so increased the quantity of British linen exported, that, from being *equal* in 1763, the bounty paid on British re-exported, was in 1798, to that on Irish, as 82 to 25: but if this be the case, it is plainly to be inferred from thence that if $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. could operate so greatly in favour of British linens, the operation of the remaining $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in favour of Irish linens, as opposed to foreign, must at least be of as great moment to them.

These advantages derived to the great staple manufacture of Ireland, from the consumption of Britain, and from the measures, which the legislature of that country has taken for its encouragement, are very generally admitted; but, in order to obviate any claim that Britain might from thence lay to an acknowledgment of liberality on her part, it is asserted that England is bound by solemn compact to give every encouragement to the Linen manufacture of Ireland, and that for so doing she did receive valuable consideration, in the

of the British export bounty granted in 1743, the quantity re-exported, increased between that year and 1798, from 7,500,000 yards to 41,500,000 yards. The important operation of bounties is evinced in their effect on the Sail-cloth manufacture, of which, in 1750, Ireland exported more than she imported: Britain then commenced a bounty on the export of her own Sail-cloths, and in 1784, Ireland *imported* 180,000 yards, and exported *none*. Foster's Speech, 1785. See Woodfall.

the suppression of the woollen manufacture, in Ireland. Of any such compact, however, no trace or monument exists; and the only circumstance that can be said, in any way to bear such an appearance, has, many years ago, been totally cancelled and done away. In the reign of Charles II. a duty of 8s. 6d. per yard was imposed in England upon the importation of *all* woollen cloth, from Ireland, and elsewhere: this duty, which in itself amounted to a prohibition, has never since been lessened, but, by the common operation of general subsidies, it has at different times, been increased to £1 17 5 per yard. No concurrence, then, on the part of Ireland, nor consequently any compact was necessary to exclude Irish woollens from the British *home* market. But to prevent the competition of the Irish in foreign markets, a law was obtained in the 10th of William III. from the Irish Parliament, (who seem to have been content, by relinquishing that hostile competition, to obtain the favour of England for their Linen manufacture, which had even then been carried to a considerable height) imposing an *ad valorem* duty of 4s. in the pound on broad cloths, and 2s. on serges, &c. exported from Ireland. This amounted to a prohibition, yet no act was passed to check the exportation of English linens, nor was any compact made for the encouragement of that manufacture in Ireland: the Lords and Commons of England had, indeed, each, in an address to the King, previous to this Irish act, intreated his Majesty "to countenance "as much as possible the Linen manufacture, in Ireland, in "case the Woollen should be relinquished." At that time, Irish linens, though made importable into England, duty free by an act of the 7 & 8 William III. was by a new subsidy of five per cent. on *all* goods imported, (8 & 9 Will. III.) made subject to that duty: no exemption for them, from this 5 per cent, was obtained, during the life of King William; but in the first of Anne, the free importation of Irish linen was restored, and has been continued ever since. The Irish woollen-exportation-act expired in 1702, and was not renewed: but a very harsh act, and not temporary, had been passed in the *English* Parliament, (10 & 11 Will. III.) which assumed the power of making such a law,—*totally prohibiting* the exportation of Irish woollens. This injurious restriction, which is the only transaction that can be construed into any thing bearing the appearance of *condition*, on the part of Ireland, was at the *express desire of Ireland*,* removed by the British act of 20 George III. and the free exportation of Irish woollens allowed, to all foreign places. If any *compact*, therefore, existed, respecting the Linen and Woollen manufactures, this law must have completely put an end to it:

Great

* Foster, 80.

Great Britain has, notwithstanding, still continued her encouragement to the Linens of Ireland,—her free entry, her bounty on exportation, her foreign duties; since that period at least, voluntarily and without any compact, or obligation, other, than what the general principles of good policy may impose.

Ireland well situated to be a depôt of foreign trade to Great Britain.

Ireland is particularly well situated, in many cases, to be a depôt of foreign trade to the British merchant; but at present, such is the confined commercial intercourse of Ireland, that she cannot make that use of her convenient situation, because in many instances, it would deprive him of the chance of the home market.† Owing to this circumstance, the redundancy of British capital has found its way more readily to Hamburgh, Ostend, and many other parts of the world, than to Ireland; because it can more easily be turned there, and returned from thence. But when there shall be no distinction between the ports of Ireland, and those of Great Britain; the former will feel the full benefit of her situation in that respect, and will enjoy the influence of the capital and commerce of Great Britain.

† Foster, Spencer, 88.

AGAINST

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS COMMERCIAL.

THE Commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland, has been much dwelt upon, as an argument in favour of an Union; as well as the misfortunes, which are represented as likely to fall upon the commercial interests of Ireland, from the loss of British protection and favour. But there is no danger of the loss of that protection, both, because its continuance on the part of Great Britain is ensured by the never-failing argument of self-interest, and because it is claimed by Ireland, not as a boon, but as a right, for the purchase of which, ample payment has been made, in the perpetual grant of an Irish marine, and in the constant supply of mariners, which the British navy draws from that Island.

*No danger of
Britain's with-
drawing her pro-
tection.
Foster.
Goold.*

The balance of trade is represented, as being so greatly in favour of Ireland, that, from her intercourse with Great Britain, she derives the greater part of the profits of her whole trade. And the encouragements afforded by the British Parliament,* to the Irish Linen manufacture, are said to be of such value, that from them the prosperity of that manufacture is derived, and upon them it depends for its support.

*Balance of trade
not in favour of
Ireland.
Foster.*

It is stated that, on an average of three years, to 1799, the whole imports into Britain, from Ireland amounted to

those into Ireland from Britain to	£5,612,689
leaving an <i>apparent</i> yearly balance in favour of	3,555,445
Ireland, of	2,057,244

But an investigation of the nature and amount of the several articles, and a comparison of the benefits, accruing to either country, will place the matter in a very different light, and shew that the advantage is in favour of Great Britain. The mere balance of value in money of the articles, imported and exported, which is vulgarly called the Balance of Trade, affords a very inadequate and often a very false criterion of the real advantage or disadvantage of a trade between two countries; for instance, in the trade between Great Britain and the East Indies, the value of imports greatly exceeds that of exports; so in the West India trade; yet both trades are highly advantageous and increase her wealth and her resources. Further, in her trade with Russia, the balance is always against her, yet the trade is greatly beneficial, as the imports are raw materials or articles of prime necessity;—and in every country there is further advantage or disadvantage in proportion as the navigation or carriage of articles is enjoyed by the one or the other. The trade therefore between Ireland and England may be considered in three points of view, as it regards manufactures, raw materials including provisions, and articles of prime necessity, and navigation or the carrying trade.

1st,

* Douglas, &c. 71, &c.

1st. MANUFACTURES.

British manufactures exported to Ireland, including colonial produce, (which may be placed under this head, on account of the manual labour and shipping employed in them)	£2,614,000
Irish manufactures exported to Great Britain, consisting of linen alone	2,600,000
Balance in favour of Britain	14,000

2d. RAW MATERIALS.

Raw material, supplied by Ireland to Great Britain, including articles of prime necessity, as, beef, pork, butter, bacon, corn, &c.	£2,910,724*
Raw material supplied by Britain to Ireland, including coals, hops, bark, salt, &c.	447,477
Excess of supply by Ireland	2,463,247

3d. NAVIGATION OR CARRYING TRADE.

Foreign articles taken from Britain, by Ireland	£1,468,170
Ditto - - taken from Ireland, by Britain	101,864
Excess taken by Ireland	1,366,306

Thus in manufactures the account is nearly equal:† in the raw material and articles of necessity, the balance of supply is very great in favour of Britain: and, (in the carrying trade of foreign articles,) the excess of gain to Britain is prodigious; and in addition to this last head it ought to be considered, that as of that sum, the produce of the East Indies amounts to no more than £407,000, the remainder consisting of trade to the value of £1,061,173, is open and free to Ireland, for direct importation, if she were inclined to import in that manner, and to deprive Great Britain of the benefits, that she derives from that branch of Commerce.

To the balance ought also to be added the value of the monopoly, which, in her direct importation of colonial produce, Ireland gives to that of the British colonies, amounting to £140,000; as well as the great importance that the Irish market is of to England for her East and West-India articles, because those goods are to England, the means of remitting home the wealth of the distant settlements.

Ld. Farnham. But without considering separately the different articles of import and export, it will appear, that in Mr. Irvine's report there

* This reasoning and calculation is confirmed by Lord Auckland, who in his Speech of 5th May, 1800, as reported in the Sun, says, "he would press on the committee the circumstance of the increased advantages which Britain for years past had derived from the importation of raw and unimproved produce from Ireland, of the average value of about three millions."

† Douglas, 71.

there is a fallacy, which will lead to a very erroneous conclusion with regard to the actual balance of trade. He states the value of both exports and imports according to their prices in the *British market*; the former therefore are truly stated at the prime cost, but to the latter is added the expence of transportation, of insurance, and of customs paid in England, and the British merchants profit, which are no addition to the profits of Ireland, nor no loss to England.

From the balance therefore of £2,056,844, which appears on the face of his reports, in favour of Ireland, these charges ought to be deducted. The customs are stated by Lord Auckland at £47,500; the freight, &c. amounts, at least to 1 per cent. and the insurance to 4 per cent. and, as estimated, in computing the Income tax by Mr. Pitt, the merchants profit to 15 per cent. This 20 per cent. upon the prime cost will amount to £927,561, and, together with the Customs, ought to be deducted from the estimated value of Irish exports: the remainder will be the sum *actually* received by Ireland, as the price of her exported commodities. The real balance in favour of Ireland, upon this view of the matter, will appear to be only £1,081,728. If the Inspector General in Dublin, were to make his reports in a similar manner with Mr. Irvine, he would with equal truth, make the balance appear to be in favour of England; but his statement for the same reasons would be erroneous also.

With regard to the Linen manufacture, the British market is undoubtedly of very great value to Ireland. But if Great Britain were to engage in a war of duties and to impose such as would exclude the Irish linens from her market, it would fall heavier on the British consumer, than on the manufacturer: for not being able to supply herself at home, England must then have recourse to Germany and Russia for the necessary supply, paying a heavy tax to the state, and her money to a stranger; while Ireland would probably be able very soon to find another market for her produce.

And it is evident that if Irish linens were made subject to equal duties with foreign linens, on importation into Great Britain, still, even under this disadvantage, they would obtain admission into her market, because it is the interest of Britain to purchase them: for, though, at this moment the prices of linen in Ireland, are 35 per cent. higher than their usual rate, yet the British merchants are anxious to secure them even the greens, before they go to market.

This rise, indeed, is temporary, but it serves to shew, that the Irish linens do not depend, for the possession of the British market, on the protection of those duties alone, but, without them, can find their way there.

Lord

Linen manufacture not dependent on Britain.

Lord Grenville, in 1785, stated it as his opinion that a prohibition of Irish linens from the British market, would operate more to the detriment of England, than of Ireland, by the injury it would occasion, in the article of shipping and the carrying trade, and by the intercourse which it would promote, between Ireland and foreign states.

Anon.

Nor would the loss of the British market for her linens be any such mighty evil to Ireland, as it is apprehended. Any restriction that had been imposed on the Linen manufacture, in its infancy, when it was the sole resource of the country, and no other manufacture was allowed, might have been extremely injurious; but, supposing that it were now in the power of Britain, by any regulations or restrictions, to prevent its further growth, the bad consequences would not be the same; for it is idle to suppose that money and industry would not re-produce as well to the risk, in some other article of manufacture, or trade, as in the Linen business; or that the loss of *one* market for one branch of manufacture, could materially depress a country which is increasing in skill, industry, and capital, when the whole world is her mark, and every branch of trade is open to her endeavours.

But Ireland does not, in the article of linen, possess exclusively the British market: the linens of Germany, Russia, Prussia, Scotland, and Ireland all gain admission there, and find ample room, without any grounds for jealousy. The *coarse* linens of foreign manufacture are esteemed superior, but the peculiar qualities of the Irish linens must ever secure them a market, and the unrivalled excellence of the fine linens of Ireland, ensures them a demand, as long as luxury and delicacy shall exist: the coarser sorts are equally sought, and certain of constant sale, on account of their superior fitness for the stamping business, which arises from their strong texture; and of their thinness, which adapts them for women's use and for hot climates. For these reasons they are preferred by America to the fabric of any other part of the world and the same qualities secure to them the British market.

Foster,

The danger is merely imaginary, to which the prosperity of the Linen manufacture is said to be exposed, from the power possessed by the British Parliament of recalling those measures, which have served as an encouragement. These are two: the British duties on foreign linens, and the British bounties on the export of Irish linens. But it was not for the sake of Ireland, that those duties were imposed, as appears, by the report of the board of trade in 1698, that the design of them was to protect the *British* linen manufacturer, and the *British* trader in Irish linens; and therefore their permanency

permanency depends not on the good will that Britain bears to Ireland, but on the interest of Britain.

Besides, Britain is bound also by solemn compact to protect and encourage in every instance the Irish linen manufacture,* and for so covenanting, she received valuable consideration from Ireland, in the suppression of the woollen trade of Ireland, at a time when the exports in that branch amounted to £110,000 (1-5th of her whole exports.)

Neither was the export bounty granted for the sake of Ireland, but in compliance with the petition of the London trader and the Scottish manufacturer, who asked for that preference to the plan then suggested, of refusing the drawback on foreign linens,—in which no benefit to Ireland could have been intended: and till the year 1780, those bounties were confined to persons residing in Great Britain, because they were intended for the benefits of the British merchant, and for the prevention of direct export from Ireland: And, as they are restricted to Irish linens of eighteen-pence per Anon. yard, and are forfeited on stamped linens, they are fully countervailed by the drawback of the duties, allowed on the re-exportation of German and Russian linens, and are thus almost reduced to nothing. The effect also which they have Foster. produced, has been much greater in favour of the British than the Irish manufacture, operating on the former as 12 per cent. but on the latter only as $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.;—for the remaining $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. serves only to compensate the charges of freight, commission, &c. These bounties commenced in 1743, and by the unequal encouragement thus afforded, the export of British linens was so raised as to equal that of the Irish in 1763; and since that period they have so much exceeded the Irish, that in 1797, the bounties paid on British linens (exclusive of £56,935, paid on *printed* linens and cottons, all British also) amounted to £82,935, and those on Irish, but to £24,459; and that was only on 3,000,000 yards.

All those threats, therefore, of displeasure and resentment on the part of Great Britain, which are held out, in order to urge Ireland into acquiescence in an Union, are idle and in- Anon. significant; and it is neither a necessary nor a probable consequence of the rejection of the proposal, that a system of oppressive and resentful regulations should commence; and if such a measure were adopted, its consequences would not be such as are apprehended.

It is a misstatement to value the amount of Irish manu- Foster, factures consumed in the British market, at so great a sum as *four or five millions*, for it consists of linens alone, M which

* Douglas, 76.

which do not exceed 2,600,000*l.* and for this article, if excluded from Britain, other markets may be found. All the raw materials with which Ireland is now supplied from the sister island, such as coals, salt, hops, bark,—may with a little care and diligence be procured at home, or perhaps obtained elsewhere: but, those which Ireland furnishes to Great Britain, are of equal importance to that country and of much greater amount; and if she turns away the source whence she now supplies herself, it will be *much more difficult for her* to substitute any other method of procuring a supply. Ireland, besides, is no contemptible customer to her neighbour; for the British manufactures exported to that island are equal to one-third of those exported to all the rest of Europe, including Jersey, Guernsey, Greenland, and the Isle of Man.

& Bousfield.

Foster.

An Union will not invite British settlers.

Tit for Tat.
Anon.

But an Union, they say, will invite British settlers and British capital to Ireland, and will induce speculation in so fair a field for adventure in the manufacturing line. The principal inducement, relied upon in this supposition, is the comparative cheapness of labour and provisions: but, as it was very justly argued by Mr. Pitt, in 1785, the price of labour consists not merely in the wages paid, for the coarse works of husbandry; the comparative skill, industry, and ingenuity of the labourer must be considered, together with the quantity of work produced; and taken in this point of view, labour will appear to bear a *higher* price in Ireland, than it does in Britain. Mr. Pitt quoted the authority of the first cotton manufacturer in Ireland, Major Brooke, who, he said, was several times in danger of losing his life, because he would not allow his workmen *higher wages* than were given at Manchester. The other inducement, the cheapness of provisions, would vanish, as soon as manufactures were established; for it arises now merely from the circumstance, that the raising of provisions is the sole occupation of the people.

English manufactures will not succeed in Ireland.

Foster.

But a more detailed view of the subject will make it appear, that not one of the chief manufactures of England, can succeed in Ireland. The principal and the most profitable are the woollen, the cotton, the iron and the pottery. Of these the two last depend so entirely on the plenty and cheapness of fuel, that they have never been known to form a settlement, in England, at any distance from a plentiful colliery; and fire forms so great a portion of their expences, that that part of the country, which affords it best and cheapest, must always have a decided preference.

Iron.

In the iron manufacture, the encouragements to establish it in Ireland are superior to those offered by Great Britain, for

for the former imports under a duty of 12s. 6d. per ton, while the British duty is 3l. nearly ;* this difference operates as a bounty of above 40s. per ton in favour of the Irish manufacturer ; and yet, this great advantage has brought no capital into Ireland. It is not likely then, that such an effect will be produced by the removal of that, in the proposed equalization of duties.

In the pottery, flint and clay, though so abundant in England, have not been found in any quantity in Ireland :† and there is not a single pottery established in the kingdom. *Pottery.*

The same facility of fuel must give England an unequivocal advantage in all manufactures, which make use of the steam engine.

Fuel is a matter of great consideration in the woollen manufacture ; so that, though that manufacture has been for centuries established in Yorkshire, it has never yet extended itself above ten miles from that circle of country, where coals abound.‡ There are other considerations too not to be overlooked, by him who forms speculations for extending himself in this business. England finds a full call for all she makes, and every year affords an increasing demand : And if a man speculate to vest more capital in his business, he will surely prefer his own spot, for extending himself, where his returns are known and his market certain, to a new and distant country, whose works he can already so much undersell, as to oblige its people to come and offer him their market, at his own door : he will conclude that, where he is, he can manufacture at a cheaper rate, than he could in Ireland, by the amount of the whole expence of carriage, freight, &c. and of the Irish duties charged on importation. *Woollen.*

An Union offers not one inducement to counterbalance these disadvantages : it will afford no additional supply of fuel ; it will not provide a better market, or a greater freedom of export, than Ireland has enjoyed for these twenty years ; it cannot procure for manufacturers a larger supply of wool than is now to be had, and already Ireland exports no unwrought wool, but works up all that she produces : even that quantity is likely to lessen, as the increase of agriculture and the linen manufacture give a better profit in land than sheep afford. An Union will obtain no additional protecting duties, for it is to be stipulated by the 6th Proposition, that these are never to be raised, but in time to cease.

In the cotton manufacture, the probability is as little favourable to Ireland. For many years the machinery made use of, in the cotton business was subject in England, to the heavy charge of 2s. 6d. annually, on every spindle for *Cotton.*
 Arkwright's

* Lord Auckland, Douglas, 69.

† Douglas, 70.

‡ Lord Auckland, 69.

Arkwright's patent : this operated as a bounty in favour of Ireland which was free from such a charge ; yet it never induced any adventurer to carry his capital into Ireland.

The patent is now expired, and that charge has ceased ; and there is little likelihood of that happening without its assistance, which so great an encouragement never could effect. Even on the coast nearest to Britain and immediately opposite the collieries, cotton twill cannot be made within 20 per cent. as cheap as England can supply it.

In 1785, when the Commercial Propositions were under discussion, the cotton manufacturers of England were much alarmed, lest their regulation should have the effect of removing the trade to Ireland. In order to quiet their fears, Mr. Pitt then stated it as his opinion,* " that there was no danger of so poor a country as Ireland, ever being able to draw from England either her workmen, her trade or her capital. It appears, then, that there is no prospect of an establishment being effected in Ireland, by British capital, of those manufactures in which Great Britain chiefly excels.

Linen manufacture will not invite British capital.

In the linen manufacture, Ireland can undersell England, and possesses advantages by nature, which England has not ; but that British capital should establish itself in Ireland, in that branch, is equally improbable : if, in the course of ninety years, during which the linen manufacture has been free and open, cherished and supported by laws and beneficial large grants from the Irish Parliament,† scarcely any British capital has been vested in it ; there is little prospect of that taking place, when its protecting guardian is no more, and no additional encouragement is held out to replace it ; and when the great progress of that manufacture in Britain shall have taught men, that equal profits may be derived from it in that country, and shall induce them to pursue it at home.

Thus it appears, that there is no room to expect from an Union any new motive, that can induce Britain to employ her capital in Ireland, in any manufactures for home consumption. Indeed if such an employment of English capital were to be the consequence of an Union ; its mischievous effects would serve only, to divert to purposes of frippery, fashion, and luxury, those exertions which are now employed in the substantial pursuits of agriculture.

Weld. Foster, If it be not worth the while of British capital to speculate for the home market, speculation for the supply of the foreign becomes consequently absurd ; for if Britain can undersell Ireland at home, she will, upon the same grounds, be able to do so abroad also, and that in a larger proportion, on account of her established credit.

¶

* Lord Auckland, 69. † Douglas, 70.

But if British capital should come to Ireland, to deal in foreign articles of import, its object must either be to provide those articles for home use, or to import them with a view to re-exportation. If for home use, such a dealer, instead of being beneficial becomes an injury to the country, by increasing the quantity of imports, to the prejudice of the home manufacture. If for re-exportation, little benefit can be derived to Ireland from such a traffic : * and it has been the declared opinion of an able statesman, that Ireland never can become the depôt, or emporium of foreign goods, for the supply either of the British, or the foreign market. But even supposing it a beneficial branch of commerce, no new inducement to pursue it, would be furnished by an Union, for Ireland is at this moment as free to trade with all the world, as Great Britain is herself. † & Spencer.

In point of commerce then Ireland has nothing to hope from an Union : nor is the influx of British capital, however useful it might be, by any means indispensable to the prosperity of Ireland. Irish industry has already created a capital, which the daily growth of that industry will continue daily to augment in an increased ratio—a capital infinitely more useful, than any that can be produced by the forced influx of wealth ; because it is the *gradual* produce of industry, and improving experience, which can alone be secure or permanent. Foster, & Spencer, & Bousfield.

But the British cabinet well knows, that there is no probability of British capital being transported to Ireland : and, were it not certain of this point, it would not be rash enough to propose a measure that might endanger the wealth, power, and ascendancy of Britain. That country has not natural resources to support the rank which it now holds among nations, but depends upon the returns of an extensive commerce : if then capital be removed elsewhere, and decrease at home, consequently so will commerce, and Great Britain must descend from the exalted station, which she has attained. Goold, & Anon.

The great improvement in the condition of Scotland, which has taken place since the period when that country was united to England, has been held out as a lure to Ireland, to follow the example. But the reasoning is false, because it falsely attributes to the effects of the Union, the increase of wealth population and trade, that has taken place in Scotland ; as if nothing was due to the progressive improvement of the world, during almost a century. But taking all her prosperity as the consequences of her Union, || still her progress has been inferior to that of *united* Ireland, the

* See Doctor Adam Smith's Enquiry into the Causes, &c.

† Douglas, 76. || Ibid. 16.

Anon. and of all surrounding nations in the same period. The improvement would probably have been considerably greater, but for the constant drain of her wealth to England, by her quota of supply, and by her absentees.

Foster. The Linen manufacture of Scotland, which is stated by Mr. Dundas, as the test of his country's prosperity, has increased between 1706 and 1796, in the proportion of 23 to 1, while that of Ireland made a progress, in the same time, of 88 to 1.* During that term, the population of Scotland has been enlarged from one million to one and a half; that of Ireland from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$.

The exports of Ireland have been multiplied more than tenfold; those of united Britain, not fourfold.†

Anon. Besides Scotland and England, at the time of the Union, were upon an equal footing; they were both poor, and have grown up together to opulence, and prosperity: but, while Ireland is still young and poor, Great Britain is arrived at full maturity.

Goold. But since the period of the Union the population of Scotland has advanced but little, the manufactures have scarcely improved, commerce and agriculture have been stationary, and civil liberty merely a name; for in all Scotland there are but 2000 voters, and many of these are nominal superiorities, without any property whatever: and the want of a resident Legislature has been the cause of Scotland's remaining in such a condition, in all these respects.

British Parliament ignorant of local interests.
Anon. In every country, but more especially in one which is poor and only beginning to rise, there are different interests, according to the relative situation of different parts.‡ These, it must be confessed, are frequently overlooked and misunderstood, even by a resident legislature; the great defect of which arises from its not admitting sufficiently the influence of the mercantile class of society. And there is little probability that such peculiar and various interests will be better understood, or better attended to by an alien Parliament, sitting in another kingdom, and composed of men never resident in the country, and unacquainted with all its local circumstances.

Union would lessen capital.
Anon. It is a maxim in political oeconomy, that the proportion between capital and revenue, ever regulates that between industry and idleness; that where capital predominates, industry prevails, and that idleness is apparent, where revenue bears the larger proportion. But by the increase of Absen-

tees,

* Douglas, 16.

† Exports of Ireland.			Exports of Great Britain.		
In 1706,	-	-	348,318	In 1706,	- - 6,512,086
In 1796,	-	-	5,064,834	In 1796,	- - 27,641,843

‡ Douglas, 46.

tees, and by additional taxation, an Union would cause a double diminution of capital in Ireland. Its direct tendency therefore would be to promote idleness, thus affording another, *accelerating* cause for the decrease of capital.

By giving to Britain the power of restricting, regulating, and controlling the trade with Ireland, an Union will enable her to take such measures, as always to undersell Ireland, even in the Irish market, and consequently to annihilate the rising manufactures of that country; the rents and prices of land would fall of *course*, because its produce would lose the market now supplied by the consumption of those numerous manufacturers, who would then be either reduced to beggary, or obliged to leave the kingdom in search of employment: and Ireland would be under the necessity of again having recourse to the corn and provision trade, from which she is just beginning to escape.

*Would ruin man-
ufacture.
Anon.*

Agriculture has no exclusive claim to preference, over every other means of employing industry: it deserves favour, only in that proportion, in which it may be found productive. The improvement of agriculture, and the cultivation of waste lands are best promoted by the extension of manufactures, which create a more certain and more profitable consumption for the produce of land, than can be any otherwise procured.

By an Union, Ireland would be compelled to direct a great part of her industry to agriculture: but many impediments exist, to prevent Ireland from receiving the full benefits of her agricultural industry, and not one of these would be removed by an Union. It would not abolish the system of primogeniture, which, in some cases prevents the possibility of letting lands on such leases, as are necessary to animate industry: nor that of tithes, which disgusts men, with agricultural exertion: it would neither induce the return of absent landlords, nor convince them of the pernicious consequences, that result from the usual mode of letting their estates, to middlemen. Beside this, after the restoration of peace in Europe, the agricultural produce of Ireland, will have no market left for its disposal, because the great political improvements, which are rapidly extending their influence to all nations, will enable them to take advantage of their natural resources, and supply their own consumption. Britain will be her only market, but even Great Britain will be rendered, by her improved cultivation of the country, adequate to her own supply.

A free and unrestricted intercourse of traffic with Great Britain would not tend to the advantage of Ireland, by augmenting the exportation either of those articles, which she is in the habit of sending to the British market or of others.

*Free intercourse
with Britain, not
beneficial.
Anon.
& Bousfield.*

others. All the principal articles of export from Ireland to Great Britain,—provisions, corn, hides, cordage, cables, sail-cloth, wool, yarn and linens, are *now* either free, or subject to very trifling duties; and in those articles of Irish produce, which by the heavy duties on importation, are now excluded from the British market, Ireland would be unable to undersell England, even though these duties were to be removed, so that in them also competition would be equally beyond her reach. Such was the opinion of the principal manufacturers of England, as declared before the Lords of Trade, with regard to woollens, printed cottons, silks, iron, pottery and the produce of the brewery. And the great improvements in agriculture, that have recently taken place in England, make it absurd to expect that Ireland shall be able, in that branch, to enter into competition with her, in the British market.

The apprehension of a war of duties is very futile, for England is as much benefited by the import, as Ireland by the export of those articles, with which Britain is from thence supplied: And, while Britain would suffer material injury from the loss of the raw material, which she procures from Ireland, it would be a considerable advantage to Ireland to have that exportation prevented.

But Ireland is threatened with the loss of British protection. To this it may be answered, that the best protection of a country, consists in forwarding her interests, not in reducing her to servitude; that Britain owes more to Ireland, than she can claim as due to her, by that country, which has ever been her best and most constant friend; that the interests of Britain will always oblige her to exert herself for the protection of Ireland; and that Ireland has a *right* to a protection, for which she has largely paid.

British partnership not desirable.
Taaffe.

But, an Union, we are told will procure for Ireland, admission to all the benefits of British commerce; as a younger sister, setting out in the world, she is to be taken into partnership in a great, wealthy, and extensive house. If however that great house be overloaded with immense debts, and stand on the verge of bankruptcy, and the younger partner be admitted merely to a state of subjection and dependence on her associate,—to share the risk, and not the profits of the firm; then this splendid partnership can have no other effect, than to prevent the younger partner from rising in the world by her own means, and to chain her to an over-grown, sinking firm; to which she has been obliged to resign her whole capital, without a possibility of ever being able to withdraw it, however uneasy the new situation may be found.

Rudd.

THE END.

