

REASONS
AGAINST A
UNION.

IN WHICH

“ ARGUMENTS for and against a UNION,”
Supposed to have come from a PERSON in
High Station, are particularly considered;

BY AN IRISH MAN.

*Sensus morefque repugnant
Atque ipfa Utilitas, iusti prope Mater et æqui.*

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R E A S O N S

AGAINST A

U N I O N.



THE public mind has been for many weeks much agitated, by obscure and unauthenticated reports, of a projected Union, between the Legislatures of this Country, and of England. At last a Pamphlet has appeared, avowing and defending the measure, which though not official, bears a strong appearance of having come from the pen of a Person, in a high and confidential

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situation. The uncommon avidity with which this Pamphlet was purchased, is an evident proof, of the great degree of interest with which the Question is considered, by the Inhabitants of this City; even by those whose habits of Life, are the most remote from Political Disquisitions. At such a season, it is in some measure the duty of every one, to suggest such Thoughts as occur to him, on a subject so momentous and important.

Though the design of these Sheets, is to establish a Conclusion, directly opposite to that drawn by the Writer of the Pamphlet above mentioned; there are many things in the progress of his work, with which I do most implicitly agree, particularly that it is a Question, than which none "could be devised, more fit
"for sober and philosophical argument; that
"the subject ought to be discussed with Temper, and that it deserves much Discussion."

That there might not advantages arise from an Union if adopted, which would make it highly desirable, if not counterbalanced by equal or superior disadvantages, I shall by no means contend; few transactions in the poli-

tical world are purely beneficial, or purely detrimental, it is the part of a wise Legislator, to ascertain to which side the balance of good inclines, and to regulate his conduct accordingly.

Before I enter into the expediency of the measure, I shall say a few words on its general principle, and on general principles I cannot but doubt, that the omnipotence of Parliament (as it is somewhat profanely called) is competent for this purpose. I much doubt that the Parliament of Great Britain, has a right to give a deputy from Dublin, a share in legislating for the Citizen of London, even though the Citizen of London preserves his former number of Representatives; but I much more strongly doubt, that the Parliament of Ireland, can consistently with justice and their duty, deprive a great portion of their constituents of their elective Franchise, *Restrain* the exercise of it in others, and by admitting a vast majority of persons over whom they have no controul into the Legislature, perhaps *render it useless* to all.

There is no maxim more established in the law of nature, or more evident to common

sense, than that the Representative can have no lawful power to destroy his Constituent (for from whence could he have derived it,) that an attempt of the kind is a dereliction of his trust, which the Constituent immediately acquires a right, to resume into his own hands.

All writers of character upon political jurisprudence, have laid down (and their theory has been confirmed by the practice of every Government in Europe, Constantinople not excepted,) that there are certain fundamental points in every state, which the supreme power cannot lawfully change, without the consent of the people at large. Many of these will necessarily be different in different countries, according to their respective constitutions, but it is common to all Countries, and to all Constitutions, that neither the form of Government, be it what it may; nor the persons of the Governors, can be changed, without breaking up the establishment and recurring anew to the people,*

* Si tamen Rex reipfa etiam tradere Regnum, aut sub-
 jicere moliatur, quin ei resisti in hoc possit non dubito:
 aliud est enim ut diximus Imperium, alius habendi Mo-
 dus, qui ne mutetur ob stare potest populus.

GROTIUS de Jure Belli et Pacis, 1, 4, 10.

I believe no one will be hardy enough to assert, that the Parliament of this country, would be *competent* to declare, the House of Commons use-

‘ Ubi una Civitas alteri ita conjungitur, ut uni quidem, sua Respublica sedesque maneat, alterius vero cives, relicta sua sede, in alterius civitatis jura sedemque adsciscantur, unam quidem *penitus perire constat*, illa autem quæ remanet eadem esse non definit, utut tali accessione insignia capiat incrementa.’

PUFFENDORFF de Legibus Naturæ et Gentium, 8, 12, 6.

‘ Summa huc redit, nihil agere Regem qui regnum in alium, *propria auctoritate*, transferre aggreditur, nec subditos isto actu regis teneri, verum huic non minus populi quam regis consensum requiri; nam uti invito Rege regnum non recte eripitur, ita nec invito populo alius Rex obtrudi potest.’

IBID, 8, 5, 9.

TRANSLATIONS.

But if the supreme power, shall really attempt to hand over the Kingdom, or put it into subjection to another, I have no doubt, that in this it may be lawfully resisted. For as I have said before, it is in that case another Government, another manner of holding it, which change the People have a right to oppose.

GROTIUS on the Rights of War and Peace. 1, 4, 10,

When one state is so united with another, that to one its form and seat of Government remains, but that the Citizens of the other, leaving their own residence, are transplanted into the seat of Government, and placed under the laws of the other State, it is plain that the one is

less, and that the supreme power, should in future, be vested in the King and the Lords, and entirely dissolved: but that which remains does not cease to be the same, although by such an accession, she may have received a signal increase.

PUFFENDORFF on the Laws of Nature and Nations, 8, 12, 6.

The whole comes to this, that the supreme power is in a vain pursuit, if it endeavours by its own authority alone, to transfer the Government to other hands, and that the subjects are not bound by such an Act of their Governors, but that such a thing requires not less the consent of the people, than of the Government; for as the Government cannot be lawfully taken from the Governors without their consent, so neither without the consent of the People, can another Government be obtruded upon them.

IBID, 8, 5, 9.

It is to be noted that throughout the above extracts, *Rex* signifies not the King solely, but the supreme power of the state, whatever that may be.

‘ The Legislature cannot transfer the power of making
 ‘ laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated
 ‘ power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it
 ‘ over to others. The people alone can appoint the form
 ‘ of the Common wealth, which is by constituting the Le-
 ‘ gislature, and appointing in whose hands that shall be;
 ‘ and when the people have said, we will submit and be
 ‘ governed by laws made by such men; and in such terms,
 ‘ nobody else can say other men shall make laws for

it is scarcely less wild to assert, that the Parliament of this country is competent to declare, that the Irish Nation shall in future be represented, by Delegates chosen in the whole, or in part, by the county of Middlesex, or other counties in Eng-

‘ them. The power of the Legislature being derived from
 ‘ the people, by a positive voluntary act and institution,
 ‘ can be no other than what that positive act conveyed,
 ‘ *which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legis-*
 ‘ *lators*, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their
 ‘ authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

LOCKE on Government, 2, 11, 141.

‘ Governments are dissolved from within, when the Le-
 ‘ gislative is altered.—The constitution of the Legislative, is
 ‘ the first and fundamental act of Society, whereby provi-
 ‘ sion is made for the continuance of the Union, under
 ‘ the direction of persons authorised thereto, without which
 ‘ no one man or number of men amongst them, can have
 ‘ authority of making laws, which shall be binding to the
 ‘ rest. When any one or more shall take upon them to
 ‘ make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to
 ‘ do, they make laws without authority, which the peo-
 ‘ ple are not therefore bound to obey; by which means
 ‘ they come again to be out of subjection, and may con-
 ‘ stitute to themselves a new Legislative as they think best,
 ‘ being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who
 ‘ without authority, would impose any thing on them.”

IBID, 2, 19, 212.

land. No doubt the People may consent to the alteration, if they think proper, and may as well treat of it by delegation as otherwise, but the delegation for that purpose must be express, and cannot be included in any general or ordinary powers.

If we once suffer the fundamental laws to be trampled on, from motives of expediency, we have from that hour, established an arbitrary government, which is equally incompatible with freedom, whether the power be lodged in one hand, or in one thousand what security shall we then have, that the majority of the Parliament of Great Britain, or whatsoever other name the Union may bear, will not say, "These Irishmen are refractory, are troublesome, we will lessen their number, or, we will totally exclude them, *It is expedient.*" 'Tis true this would be a breach of faith, but would it be more so than the conduct of the Delegate, who deputed to *protect* the privileges of his Constituents, annihilates them, and thus employs the power with which he has been entrusted, to the destruction of those who gave it.

The author of the pamphlet to which I have alluded, seems to have been aware of this argument, and has thus endeavoured to guard against it;

“ If, says he, this argument had any real weight,
 “ we could never have obtained the Reformation,
 “ and the establishment of Protestantism : we could
 “ never have procured the Revolution, and have
 “ changed the line of hereditary succession to the
 “ throne : the Union of Scotland and England
 “ could not have been entertained.”

I shall examine these three instances, one by
 one, and hope to prove that they do not in the
 least impugn (however they may support) the doc-
 trine I wish to establish.

The first legislative step towards the Reforma-
 tion in these countries was 20th Hen. 8, (1534)
 at which time it had made considerable progress
 among the people, this was afterwards followed
 at intervals, by other gradual and moderate advan-
 ces, but so far were these from being in oppositi-
 on to the general sentiment, that as soon as the na-
 tion was freed from the very strong coercion, it
 laboured under during the reign of Henry, it
 seized the opportunity of the minority of his suc-
 cessor, to establish the Reformation, in as great
 extent, as in any part of Germany, and so rooted
 was it in the minds of the people, that upwards

of five years of unrelenting and unremitted persecution, were insufficient to eradicate it, or even to prevent its growth, and we find at the accession of Elizabeth, it was publicly professed, by almost the whole nation: at that time the rights of King, of Parliament, and of people were very ill understood indeed, and it was not to be expected, that the people would oppose a measure of which they approved, merely from a Punctilio of its having been passed irregularly, or by an incompetent authority.

The second instance is the Revolution.—How was that brought about? by an act of the legislature? No: but by the immediate agency of the people. A Convention, formed from themselves, without any of the forms directed by the particular law of the country, declared, “That King
“James the Second having endeavoured to sub-
“vert the constitution of the kingdom, by break-
“ing the original contract betwixt King and Peo-
“ple, and having, by the advice of Jesuits and
“other wicked persons, *violated the fundamental*
“*Laws*, and withdrawn himself out of the king-
“dom, has abdicated the government, and the
“Throne is thereby vacant.” This was instantly

and univerfally fubmitted to, and not only has continued to be fo, to this day, but is at prefent the boaft and glory of the nation. Does this militate againft my argument, or if I was to fearch the Hiftory of the World, could I find a ftronger example in fupport of it ; and does not the principle of it apply equally to the whole legiflature as to the King fhould they be guilty of the fame crime.

At the time the Union was under debate in Scotland, the very fame argument that I have adduced of the incompetence of Parliament, to furrender the Independence of their Country, was vehemently urged by the oppofers of the meafure, and how was it answered ? not by denying its validity, not by queftioning its principle, but by fhewing that to treat of the Union of the two countries was one of the caufes for afsembling the Parliament, mentioned in the Proclamation which fummoned it to meet, confequently that the members of it, were Delegates for that exprefs purpofe ; fo that from this inftance, not only no inference can be drawn againft my pofition, but whatever weight the authority of the Minifters of that day may have (who thought it neceffary to infert fuch

clause in the Proclamation) is decidedly in my favour.

But perhaps though the measure may not be strictly regular, and legal, the expediency of it may tempt us to neglect all forms, and adopt it. I shall now examine it in that point of view.

That there would probably be a considerable influx of British capital, on our Southern and South western shores, I do readily admit, that the consequence of it, would probably be, the erection of new manufactures, and the local increase of wealth, civilization and natural improvement.— That this would be highly beneficial to the nation is not to be disputed, nor do I mean to detract from its benefits, which would be sufficient at once to determine us on adopting the measure, were they not more than counterbalanced, by other considerations of superior moment.

From the day of the Union being agreed on, we may date the destruction of the Constitution, not only of Ireland but of England also. It is not many years since the House of Commons of England resolved, “ That the influence of the “ Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought “ to be diminished.” Any steps that may have

been taken since, to accomplish the object of that Resolution, I believe have not been very effectual, but by this measure, a new accession of strength, must be thrown into the hands of the Minister. It needs no argument to prove, that men removed from the eye of their Constituents, beyond the reach of the voice of their praise or censure, far from their homes, immersed in the pleasures of a dissolute and expensive capital, must be in an high degree exposed to temptation; and I fear the race of the Fabricii and Dentati is nearly extinct among us. Similar consequences were foretold by the opposers of the Union between Scotland and England, and I believe the event has fully verified their prediction; and now so indifferent are the people of Scotland become about their share of the Representation, that through the whole of the Northern part of the united kingdom, there was not a single contested election for the present Parliament, nor even an attempt at opposition to the ministerial Candidate; except in a single instance by General Maitland, and that seemed more designed for an opportunity of publishing an angry advertisement than for any other purpose, and it went no farther.

But objectionable as this measure is, as it regards the Commons, it becomes tenfold worse, if

we consider the effect it would have upon the Lords. As there is no probability that the whole house would be transplanted into England, I shall assume it as certain, that the Peerage of Ireland would be represented by a delegation. Above two-fifths of the Peerage of Ireland, is composed of perpetual Absentees, the majority of whom, have not the smallest interest in this country, either from property, or connexion, these from their continual residence near, and intercourse with the Minister, will be the most likely to obtain his favour and patronage; and as we have no reason to doubt, that a ministerial list would be received at an Election here with the same respect that it is in Scotland, the representatives of our Peerage, would probably in a few years be complete strangers, persons who only knew the country in the map. This is a feature which very strongly distinguishes the situation of this country at present, from that of Scotland at the time of the Union. All the Peers of Scotland who were capable of being elected, were natives of Scotland, attached to it by the strong bands of natural affection and of interest. The Peerage of Scotland had not been profusely conferred as an inferior

dignity, upon persons totally unconnected with the country.

Though the consequence of a Union might be an influx of wealth, through one channel, into the kingdom, it would flow out again through many; it can scarcely be doubted, that its completion would be immediately followed, by the emigration, not only of those whose duty in Parliament required their attendance, of those, who either through powerful connections, or confidence in their own abilities, sought preferment in any shape, but also of a large proportion of those, whose affluent fortunes enabled them to consult only their pleasure in their place of residence, and the rents of all these would necessarily be drawn out of the kingdom. If the number of her Absentees has always been considered as the bane of Ireland, surely that measure cannot be beneficial to her, which tends to increase them. But detrimental as it appears considered in this point of view, in another it is still more destructive, when Democracy is making such rapid strides, surely it cannot be prudent, to withdraw those who from their rank are most interested, and from their influence most able to oppose it. If the country is stripped of men of opulence, and liberal education, if it is

left to the uninformed country gentleman, the manufacturer, and farmer, the lawyer, and the merchant, it requires not the gift of prophecy to foresee, that the Aristocracy and Monarchy are lost. Then may we exclaim with Pantheus,

Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium, et ingens
Gloria Teucrorum: ferus omnia Jupiter Argos
Transfudit,

I have already admitted that it is probable that a part of the kingdom might be improved by the Union, but at the same time, another and a much greater part, would be devoted to inevitable destruction. The effects it would have in this capital are really melancholy to reflect on. The large sums of money that have been expended on buildings in this City—the extensive speculations in the Canals leading to it—the high prices that have been given either by purchase or by rent for Land in its vicinity, so much exceeding its natural value—the loans that have been advanced on the security of these buildings, and this land must, when they are depreciated, as will inevitably be the case, involve numerous families in utter ruin, nor will they have even the poor consolation (if it is any) to reflect, that they have been ruined by their own

indiscretion, for surely if there was any thing short of an exprefs declaration, that could juſtly give them confidence in the permanence of the preſent ſyſtem, it would be the reflexion, that in the miſt of an expenſive War, immense ſums had been levied from the People, for the purpoſe of building *at home* a magnificent Edifice for the reception of their Representatives, which is not yet entirely completed. I know not whether Statesmen may not eſteem it juſtifiable to deprive, ſuppoſe one thouſand Perſons of Advantages they at preſent enjoy, in order by that means to confer equal Advantages upon double the Number, but juſtifiable or not, I am ſure it is impolitic; it leſſens the value not only of the things immediately in queſtion, but of every other Poſſeſſion in the Community—for example, we are told that though Dublin will ſuffer ſome Loſs, by the abduction of the Parliament, other Parts of the Kingdom will gain, and that the Injury to Dublin will be but ſmall, as
 “ it *muſt* ſtill be the Reſidence of the Viceroy and
 “ his Court, that Sciences, Arts and Amuſements
 “ *may be* cultivated in proportion, as there will
 “ be leſs attention to Politics: that it will be the
 “ Seat of Juſtice, which will be adminiſtered as
 “ at preſent; the Chief Seat of Revenue, and

“ the Head Quarters of the Army :”—But what Security have we, that in a few Years when Cork or some of the Southern Cities has oustripped her (as must inevitably be the Consequence of this Measure taking Place) that it may not be *thought expedient* to remove the Seats of Government and of Justice to the more opulent and flourishing City—’tis true there may be compacts and engagements, but the Magic Talisman *Expediency* will dissolve them all,

mille adde Catenas

Effugiet tamen hæc sceleratus vincula Proteus.

If this was to take place, situated as Dublin is, in the middle of the Channel, remote from either Sea, how soon would it dwindle into a fishing Town.

Besides the injury that permanent property in this city and its vicinity would sustain, there is another evil perhaps not less deplorable, which though only temporary will be more immediate.—A large proportion of the working inhabitants of this city, earn their daily sustenance by ministring to the luxury of the rich—if the rich abandon the city, in any great degree, numbers of these must be thrown out of employment, many of them in-

capable of resorting to any other means for a livelihood—on this subject I shall not enlarge, I have pointed out the evil, I know not where to find the remedy.

We are likewise told, that “ the same argument was used most powerfully at the time of the Scotch Union, with regard to Edinburgh the desertion of that capital was predicted, the bankruptcy of its shopkeepers, the ruin of its proprietors was foretold, and insisted upon ; yet notwithstanding the Union, and the prophecy, Edinburgh so far from decaying has flourished more since the Union, than it had done before”. It is true Edinburgh remains a great city, as great as it was one hundred years ago, it has happened not to have been thought expedient to remove the seat of the provincial Government from it, it has therefore not declined, but look at the improvements of other parts of Scotland since 1707, and see if the improvement of Edinburgh and its vicinity has kept pace with them. Compare the improvements of Ireland and of Scotland in the above period, how much the former has been outstripped by the latter ; but compare Dublin with Edinburgh and in the same time, the in-

crease of the former will be found to have been fourfold of that of the latter.

The improvements of both Scotland and Ireland in the present century, have been astonishing, but Edinburgh, amid the general advancement of its country, has remained nearly stationary, because it has ceased to be the capital, while on the contrary there has been no step made to prosperity by Ireland, in which Dublin did not participate at least its full share.

One of the leading arguments of the supporters of this measure, is the example of Scotland, in consenting to a Union, and the increased degree of prosperity, that she since enjoyed. That Scotland has increased in prosperity and affluence since the year 1707, is indisputable, but that the Union was the sole cause, may I think without any extraordinary degree of scepticism be doubted—other nations, since that period, have improved, perhaps with equal rapidity—previous to the Union, there was a strong spirit of enterprize, and trade existing through the nation; for the unfortunate Darien Company, there was subscribed in a few days 400,000*l.* sterling, all the money of residents in Scotland. If the Union had never

taken place, this commercial spirit would still have remained, and would probably have found opportunities equally advantageous, and have been equally successful. By the Union Scotland was deprived of a very advantageous trade with France, from the loss of which St. Andrews, and other towns on the eastern coast, are to this day nearly in ruins.

But the relative situations of England and Scotland, at the time of the Union, and of Great Britain and Ireland, at present are so essentially different, both in respect of natural position and of accidental circumstances, that no argument can be drawn from the conduct of the one, to influence that of the other.—Separated as England and Scotland were from the rest of the world, and divided from each other only by an arbitrary and artificial boundary, they seemed to have been marked out by the hand of nature for one and the same Kingdom, though attachment to their respective royal lines, long kept them separate, this appeared so evident that before they were a second year under the dominion of the same Prince, the Parliaments of the two countries set on foot a treaty for a Union—Commissioners were appointed to negotiate, but unfortunately the terms

were not agreed on. The distracted state of England, for nearly the next sixty years, and the violent animosities of the different parties, left little leisure to attend to a subject that required much coolness and deliberation. During the greater part of the reign of Charles II. and the whole of the subsequent reign of James II. Scotland was nearly as much disturbed by religious commotions, but on almost the first moment of quiet, the subject was revived (I. of Anne) and at last in a very few years happily accomplished—on the contrary, nature has placed Ireland at a distance from Great Britain, has herself put a boundary between them determined and unalterable, and the nations have preserved their present form of alliance through six hundred years of war and peace, without an effort or a thought of alteration, beyond an idle rumour, unless a proposition to that purport in Parliament, is (which God avert) now seriously in contemplation.

In addition to the never ceasing arguments, afforded by the natural situation of the two countries, particular circumstances, at the time the Union between England and Scotland was concluded, called imperiously for the measure—from

a variety of unkindnesses and provocations on both sides, there seemed to be no alternative except complete Union or open war. The Scots had embarked a few years before, with great eagerness in a project of establishing a Colony on the Isthmus of Darien, by the miscarriage of which, not only the nation suffered great loss in point of wealth, but very many of the principal families had to mourn for a relative to whom the expedition proved fatal, this was the source of considerable animosity against England, to whose intrigues and opposition, the failure of the undertaking was principally attributed—mutual jealousies likewise prevailed relative to their different privileges in trade: however the advantages of a Union were so apparent to all men, as the most likely means of reconciling all differences, that in the First of Anne, Commissioners were appointed to prepare a treaty, who however separated without coming to any conclusion. On the breaking up of this negotiation, the two countries became in a state little short of open hostilities.—The Scotch Parliament not only refused to settle the Succession to the Crown, in the same manner that it was in England, but passed an Act, that on the death of Queen Anne, if a treaty should not have been pre-

viously concluded, the Parliament should proceed to appoint a successor, *different* from him who succeeded to the Crown of England, and when Lord Marchmont the Chancellor, on a subsequent day, moved for the settlement of the Crown on the House of Hanover, (on which the English Crown had been before settled) it was not only rejected, but it was vehemently demanded by many that the mover should be sent to prison, and it was actually resolved by a large majority that the motion should be expunged from the Journals.

Nor did the Parliament of England yield to them in violence—it passed an Act that until the Succession in Scotland was settled as in England, the Scotch should be considered as Aliens—that trade between the two Countries should be prohibited in a variety of Articles, &c. &c. and it was originally part of the same Act, and passed the Committee of the whole House of Commons, though it was thrown out on the Report, that the Freeholders of the six northern Counties should be required to arm: The Lords likewise addressed the Queen, to desire that she would give orders to her Admiral, to seize all Scotch vessels trading to France, and that she would have Newcastle and other fortresses put in a state of defence. It

would be an abuse of time, to offer any argument to shew, that there is no similitude between the relative situations of Great Britain and Ireland at present, and of England and Scotland at that period.

“ A Union, it is said, may be compared to a
 “ partnership in trade. If a Merchant finds that
 “ from circumstances of situation, want of credit,
 “ or capital, he cannot carry on his business alone
 “ with advantage, will he not be wise to unite
 “ himself, if possible, to an extensive and wealthy
 “ firm, and to become a sharer, in proportion
 “ to his contribution of industry and capital,
 “ in the secure profits of an established house.”

Perhaps a Merchant would not think it wise to engage his capital in an established house, if by so doing, he was to put it for ever from under his own controul, and thereby be prevented in future, from availing himself of his own caution or speculation, but could he deem the junction any thing but madness, if he knew the established house, notwithstanding its apparent affluence, and extensive dealing, to be immersed in debt, and had himself no means of judging of its resources.

We are told that on account of the increased power of France, “so ought the strength of the British empire to be augmented,” I admit it, but how will the incorporarion of the two Nations have that effect? Has the Parliament of Ireland ever refused, ever hesitated to contribute its full share to the general service of the empire—but by being a separate Kingdom we are more open to French intrigue? And has Ireland been the only part of the British dominions, into which French emissaries have found their way—has England, has Scotland been totally free from them? What were the Bond’s and the Sheares’s of this Country, but the disciples of the Hardy’s and Thelwall’s of London, of the Muir’s and Margarot’s of Edinburgh? ’tis true, taught by the dangers and the punishment of their masters, they acted with more caution, and from thence became more formidable—and is it reasonable to suppose that the vigilance of Administration in discovering, or its energy in suppressing the late Conspiracy, would have been increased by the seat of Government being removed to a distance of four hundred Miles.

Again, “it is notorious, it is said, that before the Union Scotland had always a connexion and

“alliance with France, which since the Union
 “has totally vanished? Her feelings, conduct
 “and policy, have since that period, been en-
 “tirely British.” This I acknowledge would be
 a strong argument, were it supported by the fact,
 but it is only necessary to refer to history to be
 convinced of its untruth. A strong party remain-
 ed in Scotland, attached to the Pretender, long
 after he had been forgotten in the other parts of
 the British empire. Where did the Rebellion in
 favour of the Pretender break out in 1715? where
 did he himself land in 1745, a generation after
 the Union, in Scotland? and why was it there?
 because in Scotland, in united Scotland, his parti-
 zans were most numerous and powerful, while on
 on the contrary, Ireland not only remained per-
 fectly quiet, but signalized herself at least by pro-
 fessions of zeal, in defence of the established Go-
 vernment.

The Author to whom I have so often referred
 speaking of the evils attending a division of power,
 goes on to say “Franklin and Washington, the
 “founders of the American empire, had not cou-
 “rage in their first project of a Constitution for
 “the American States, to exclude this radical

“ evil, but left each State independent.—So soon
 “ as the pressure of necessity, which had confe-
 “ derated the States, ceased in consequence of
 “ peace, the fault of such a Constitution became
 “ evident: it was clear to men of common capa-
 “ city, that an empire consisting of thirteen inde-
 “ pendent societies, without one common impe-
 “ rial controul, would soon divide into thirteen
 “ independent empires. To obviate this neces-
 “ sary, though possibly distant consequence, the
 “ wisdom of the Americans projected a new Con-
 “ stitution, in which this original vice was reme-
 “ died. The separate Independence of each State
 “ was wisely relinquished, a general Legislative
 “ and a general Executive were formed for the
 “ Government of the Union *in every imperial con-*
 “ *cern*, and each respective State was confined to
 “ local and municipal objects,” but does this ap-
 ply? the Union between Great Britain and Ire-
 land, will embrace not only *imperial Concerns*, but
 the most trifling *local and municipal Object*?—
 What would Franklin and Washington have
 thought of a plan of Constitution, by which the
 supreme Power was to sit in Philadelphia, and to
 legislate for all America, from Boston to Charle-
 town, in every petty and private Regulation?

What could be expected from such a System, but that it would immediately fall to pieces from its own unwieldy bulk. Even under her present arrangement, America appears to many of her Politicians, to be too large for a single State, and a plan has been long in contemplation of dividing her into northern and southern States.

It is acknowledged that this measure would be peculiarly detrimental to the Bar, but at the same time it is contended, that this very detriment will operate to the general benefit of the Country? Were the Bar alone concerned, I should leave them to defend themselves, I should not presume to be their Advocate, but I think the general interest of the Country, is deeply involved in the Fate of their Profession. “ It is a general habit
 “ of the Gentlemen of Ireland to educate their
 “ sons at the Temple,” and it is to that habit, to the liberal education that must precede, and to the knowledge of the World, that must be the consequence, of such an introduction into Life that the Gentlemen of Ireland owe their acknowledged Superiority, when considered as a Class, over those of equal Rank in the Sister Countries. Whence has this habit arisen? From the Bar hav-

ing been considered, for many years as the most open and certain road to preferment of almost every kind.—If the Lawyer was to be confined to his mere technical business, few Gentlemen of consequence and property, would educate their children for that profession, it would of course decline in respectability, in a little time it would get into meaner hands, on the mischief of which to the Community I need not expatiate. It is a maxim as old at least as Tacitus, that,

Sublatis studiorum pretiis, etiam studia peritura.

“ Land in England during times of peace, is sold
 “ from thirty to forty years purchase, in Ireland the
 “ price of land seldom exceeds twenty years purchase. The continual insurrections in different
 “ parts of the Country, of White Boys, Oak
 “ Boys, Right Boys, Defenders and United Irish-
 “ men, have made residence unsafe, and diminished the certainty of rents and the value of
 “ tenure,” Is this a fair or candid statement—has it been forgotten, that legal interest in this Country is six per Cent. and that in England it is only five—that twenty years purchase for land in Ireland, falls short in income of what can be legally made of money by lending, nearly in the same proportion that twenty-five does in England—and and it is notorious that in England for the last se-

ven years, notwithstanding the absence of the long Catalogue of White Boys, &c. Lands have rarely exceeded the last mentioned Price.

“ Ireland, independent Ireland, has at this
 “ moment its commerce in all parts of the
 “ World, protected without expence, by the
 “ British Navy—her supplies for the year, are
 “ chiefly raised by the British Minister in Eng-
 “ land, on the faith of the British Parliament—
 “ her country is protected from domestic and
 “ foreign enemies, by Forty Thousand British
 “ Troops, at the expence to Great Britain of
 “ Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds a year.”

All this is true: but let it not be forgotten, that the British Navy is manned in a great proportion, by the natives of Ireland: that Ireland was, for a series of years maintaining on her establishment, Twelve Thousand and afterwards Fifteen Thousand Men, who were dispersed over the Globe, fighting the battles of Great Britain. It was the almost defenceless state, in which this Island was left in the middle of a war, notwithstanding the numerous army in her pay, that was the proximate cause of embodying the Volunteers, whose services were afterwards so signally beneficial to their country.

There is an argument which has been often urged with justice and success, in opposition to the two great questions, which have agitated this Country for some years, and which applies at least with equal force to the present proposition, viz. our Country has been in an uniformly progressive state of improvement, for many years; can it be wise or prudent, to risque our present prosperity, in pursuit of an ideal advantage, particularly when a large majority of the people are adverse to the experiment.

I have not overlooked, in the pamphlet above mentioned, the threats of England breaking her compact, in respect of the Linen Manufacture, and of her supporting the Catholics here as a means of maintaining her own Protestant establishment; the sneer at the Clergy, the reflection on the Volunteers, and many other things of the same stamp, which were I writing an express answer to it, might call for some animadversions, but with these and such like, I have nothing to do, my purpose being only to *argue*.

I have now endeavoured to impress upon my Countrymen, the conviction I feel in my own mind of the impolicy of this measure, in so doing, it was my wish to discuss the question, with temper and moderation, to avoid all extraneous matter, and to give offence to none, in this at least I hope I have succeeded.