

SPEECHES

DELIVERED IN THE

House of Lords and Commons

OF

I R E L A N D :

WITH OTHER TRACTS

ON THE SUBJECT

OF A

LEGISLATIVE UNION

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

BEING THE

EIGHT VOLUME

OF

UNION TRACTS.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. Lord Viscount
CASTLEREAGH, February 5, 1800.

Speech of PATRICK DUGENAN, L.
L. D. February 5, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. JOHN FOSTER,
February, 17, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. JOHN FOSTER,
March, 19, 1800.

Speech of WILLIAM SAURIN, Esq.
February, 21, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. JOHN BERES-
FORD, March 19, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. the Earl of
CLARE, Lord High Chancellor of
Ireland, February 10, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. Lord KIL-
WARDEN, February 10, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. Lord CARLE-
TON, February 10, 1800.

Speech of the Rt. Hon. Lord YEL-
VERTON, March 22, 1800.

A Reply to the SPEAKER'S Speech, of
February 17, 1800.

A Letter to the King, in behalf of the
Irish Nation.

An Exposition of the principle Terms
of the Union.

An Appeal to the loyal Citizens of
Dublin. A Hint to the Inhabitants
of Ireland.

An Answer to the Speech of the Rt.
Hon. the Lord CHANCELLOR, by
HENRY GRATTAN, Esq.

Debates in the House of Commons, on
Sir LAURENCE PARSON'S Amend-
ment to an Address to his Majesty,
January 15 and 16, 1800.

Debates in the House of Commons, on
Lord CASTLEREAGH delivering his
Majesty's Message, recommending
a Legislative Union with Great
Britain, February 5 and 6, 1800.

Debates of the House of Commons on
the Union, the House in a Com-
mittee, February 14, 1800.

DUBLIN:

PRINTED FOR J. MILLIKEN, NO. 32, GRAFTON-STREET.

1800.

SPEECHES

DELIVERED IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS

BY
JAMES STUART

ON THE SUBJECT
OF THE

UNION OF THE
KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

WITH THE
HISTORY OF THE

UNION OF THE
KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

THE HISTORY OF THE UNION OF THE KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, WITH THE SPEECHES OF JAMES STUART, ESQ. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE UNION OF THE KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, WITH THE HISTORY OF THE UNION OF THE KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

DUBLIN

PRINTED FOR J. MURPHY, AT THE CORNER OF ST. MARTIN'S STREET

1800.

THE
S P E E C H
OF THE
RIGHT HONORABLE
LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,
UPON DELIVERING TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS OF IRELAND
HIS EXCELLENCY THE
LORD LIEUTENANT'S MESSAGE
ON THE SUBJECT OF AN
INCORPORATING UNION WITH GREAT BRITAIN,
WITH THE RESOLUTIONS;
CONTAINING THE TERMS ON WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO
CARRY THAT MEASURE INTO EFFECT.

FEBRUARY 5, 1800.

Dublin :

PRINTED BY J. REA, 57, EXCHEQUER-STREET,
AND TO BE HAD OF ALL THE BOOKSELLERS,

1800.

Houses of the Oireachtas

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1800.

THE House having met pursuant to adjournment, the Right Hon. Lord CASTLEREAGH delivered to the House a Message from his Excellency the LORD LIEUTENANT, it was read by the SPEAKER from the Chair, and is as follows:

“ *CORNWALLIS.*

“ At the close of the last session, in obedience to the particular
“ commands which I received from his Majesty, I acquainted this
“ Parliament that a joint Address of the two Houses of Parliament of
“ Great Britain had been laid before his Majesty, accompanied by resolutions proposing and recommending a complete and entire Union
“ between Great Britain and Ireland, to be established by the mutual
“ consent of both Parliaments, founded on equal and liberal principles, on the similarity of laws, constitution and government, and
“ on a sense of mutual interests and affections.

“ I have it now further in command from his Majesty to lay those
“ resolutions before this House, and solemnly to recommend to the
“ consideration of his faithful Commons the great objects they embrace.

“ His Majesty has observed with increasing satisfaction that the
“ sentiments which have continued to be manifested in favour of
“ this important and salutary measure, by such numerous and respectable descriptions of his Irish subjects, confirm the hope he
“ has expressed, that its accomplishment will prove to be as much
“ the joint wish as it unquestionably is the common interest of
“ both his kingdoms, an event to which his Majesty looks forward
“ with the utmost earnestness, as the only means by which the common interests of all his People can be indissolubly united, and their
“ security and happiness can be permanently established.

“ His Majesty therefore relies on the wisdom of his Parliaments,
“ and the loyal concurrence of his People, for the completion of
“ this great Work, with a firm persuasion that a full and unserved participation of constitutional and commercial advantages
“ will augment and perpetuate the prosperity of his Subjects of
“ his united Kingdom, and that under the favour of Divine Providence the Freedom and Power of the British Empire will be established on a foundation not to be shaken by the efforts either of its
“ foreign or domestic enemies.

“ C.”

The Message being read from the Chair,

Lord CASTLEREAGH said : Mr. Speaker, e'er I submit any motion upon the great and momentous subject communicated in his Excellency's message, I feel it my duty to put you in full possession of the exact views of the English and Irish Governments, and to lay before you all those details it has been found necessary to investigate, in order to arrive at a just arrangement of the measure which I shall submit to the House. Upon entering into this detail, at once so extensive and important—important to all the interests of this country, to the restoration of its tranquillity, and to the security of our connexion with Great Britain, I find it necessary to throw myself upon the indulgence of the House, for a larger portion of their attention and patience than I have ever before presumed to solicit, and which the weak state of my health, from recent indisposition, obliges me to require.

Before I enter into the general question, I must request leave to make a few observations upon that topic, to which the attention of this House has been so anxiously and repeatedly called in the present session—I mean, the expression of the public sentiment. By the British constitution, the deliberative power of the state is solely and exclusively placed in parliament; and, although parliament would act unwisely, were it not to consult in some measure, for the guidance of its councils, the great majority of those, whose stake in the property and the interests of the country give them a fair claim to due consideration; yet, parliament would be equally unwise, were it to suffer any temporary and artificial clamour, to divert them from the first of all its duties, that of deliberating solemnly, and deciding impartially on the measures which affect the interests of the country.

Last

Last year, when it was wished that this great question should be put into a state of deliberation and enquiry, such was the sudden and unreasonable clamour which was made against it, that it was not even allowed to be discussed. The measure was withdrawn ; and Government felt it their duty to declare, that they would not again bring it forward until its introduction should be justified by public sentiment. Government felt that the resistance which was made to the question, was from ignorance of its nature, and misrepresentation of its effects. They acquiesced in delay, that time might be given for understanding the subject ; and the event has justified their expectations. The question, in proportion as it has been enquired into, and better understood, became more and more popular with those persons, who were most interested in the welfare of the country. The great body of the landed property in Ireland, became friendly to the principle : the property of those, who have declared in favour of it in the two Houses of Parliament, is in comparison with those who oppose it, nearly in the proportion of three to one ; nineteen counties, whose superficial contents form five-sevenths of the island, have come forward in its support. I do not mean to assert, that these counties are unanimous in approving the measure. Complete and perfect unanimity is not to be hoped for upon any great political question ; but I can venture to assert, that a very great proportion of the property in those counties decidedly favours it ; most of the great commercial towns in the kingdom, have also declared in its favour. When I speak, Sir, of Dublin, I beg to be understood as speaking of it with that high respect, which the zeal and loyalty of its inhabitants conspicuously displayed in the trying circumstances of the late rebellion, so fully demand ; but I cannot

cannot help observing, that they seem at present to be affected with the same unreasonable apprehensions and alarms, which were felt by the citizens of Edinburgh at the time of the Union with Scotland. Those apprehensions, those alarms, have been proved to be ideal and unfounded ; and, I trust, that the citizens of Dublin will live to change their fears into satisfaction ; and, like the citizens of Edinburgh, have cause to be thankful to Providence for the accomplishment of an Union with Great Britain ; and grateful to those who shall assist in its completion.

I acknowledge, Sir, that some counties have manifested a disposition adverse to this measure ; but this circumstance does not affect me with surprize, as it is known that their sentiments have been greatly influenced by the exertions and the connexions of the Gentlemen on the other side of the House ; nor, Sir, is it to be wondered at, that much opposition should have recently broke forth in some parts of the country, when we advert to the new political phenomenon which has appeared in this metropolis since the last debate. We have seen, Sir, a part of the Minority not satisfied with exercising their deliberative powers within these walls, but organizing themselves in another place, and empowering certain persons to send their letters missive through the country, and establishing agents in the different counties, to bring the mass of the people to the Bar of this House, as petitioners against the measure of Union. From my knowledge of the characters of many of these Gentlemen, who constitute this new authority, I am induced to believe that they never entertained an intention of employing popular interference to intimidate Parliament ; and I am equally convinced, that if such an intention had existed, the Commons of Ireland would not yield their independence to any such desperate

perate attempt. But I am sorry to say, that some of the agents of those Gentlemen, some of those persons who have been employed to disseminate their letters missive through the country, have gone forth with the most unwarrantable pretences, and adopted the most treacherous artifices, and the most ludicrous misrepresentations to deceive and distract the populace, whose signatures against an Union they wished to obtain. Every one knows the ignorance of the lower classes in this kingdom, and how easily they may be misled by the most shallow and pitiful misrepresentations. In a county of the North, with which I have the honor of being connected, it has been given out by these agents, that the Union was a project of Mr. Pitt, by which he might lay a tax of five shillings on every wheel, and ten shillings on every loom. In another place, the tenantry were told, that an Union would put an end to all their leases; and, as the great proportion of the landed interest in the County of Down supported the measure, this circumstance was urged to the tenantry as a proof of their assertion. "Do you not see," they said, "that the landlords are all for the measure? and is not that a demonstration that it will break your leases?" Such are the wretched deceptions and paltry practices resorted to, in order to mislead the lower classes, and to obtain success in soliciting the petitions that had been produced to the House. So far, Sir, from being struck with their number, when I reflect upon the situation of the country, and the practices of the agents who have been employed, I am only surprised that they are not more numerous. But what, Sir, was the case on the Scotch Union? The table of the parliament was, day after day, for the space of three months, covered with such petitions; but the Scotch Parliament acted, as I trust the Irish Parliament will act; they considered only

only the advantage of the country, and steadily pursuing that object, neither misled by artifices, nor intimidated by tumult, they received, in the gratitude of their country that reward which amply compensated for their arduous labours in the great work they so happily accomplished. I hope the House will, on the present occasion, behave with similar fortitude, and unseduced by party, and unawed by clamour, they will steadily look to the real merits of the measure, will steadily attend to the sound and informed part of the community, looking to a compensation for their toils in the tranquillity and happiness of their country, and in the gratitude and praises of posterity.

Having thus, Sir, adverted to the state of the public sentiment, it is natural for me to enter into the general principle of the question of Union? This point, however, has been so fully, so frequently, and so ably discussed, both in this House and in various publications, that I feel it unnecessary to dwell further upon it than may be incidentally useful to support the various parts of my argument. In particular, it has been investigated with such depth of argument, and such sound ability, by an honourable and learned friend of mine (Mr. Smith) in the speech which he last year delivered within these walls, and has since communicated to the public, that I consider the general principle be placed beyond question or dispute. I shall, therefore, proceed to lay before the House the method of proceeding which it is intended to adopt. If the Parliament, Sir, had in the last session entertained the discussion of this measure, and allowed it to be put in progress, it was my intention to have followed the form of proceedings pursued in the Union with Scotland; and to have proposed to enable his Majesty by bill to appoint Commissioners, to treat of and digest articles
of

of Union, in concert with other Commissioners to be appointed on the part of Great Britain. This plan having been prevented by the refusal of the House, to allow a discussion of the question, it became his Majesty's Ministers to adopt measures which might defeat the misrepresentations which had been circulated respecting their intentions, and should unfold to this kingdom the liberal disposition of Great Britain. For this purpose his Majesty's Ministers introduced into the British Parliament a set of resolutions containing the leading principles of the arrangement. These, after a full discussion, have been almost unanimously adopted, have been transmitted to our common Sovereign by a joint address, and are now communicated to this Parliament by his Majesty's command. These resolutions form merely the general principles of the measure of Union; I shall, therefore, only consider them as a basis for other resolutions of a more extended nature, which will set forth those principles in detail, and ultimately form the articles of Union.

These resolutions I now hold in my hand, but I shall do no more this night than lay them before the House, giving time to every Gentleman fully to consider and examine them before any question shall be put upon them; with this view, it is my intention to move, that his Majesty's Message should be referred to a Committee of the whole House on this day se'nnight, when the Committee will have the assistance, and advantage, Sir, of your abilities in debate; and in the mean time I shall print and circulate the deferred Resolutions for the information of the House.

Let us then look, Sir, what will be the result of this proceeding: Great Britain will have said to Ireland, we are willing to unite with you upon the principles we have adopted, and which we consider

B

highly

highly advantageous to your interests ; Ireland will adopt those principles, and propose Resolutions, which shall contain the application of them in detail ; and if these shall be agreed to by the respective Parliaments, they will be carried into execution, and solemnly ratified by acts of the two Legislatures, confirming and concluding the whole proceeding.

Having now stated the form of proceeding, I shall lay before the House the substance of those articles, which I intend to submit for their consideration.

The first resolution which I shall propose, will contain the general principle alone, and will be similar in purport and tenor to the first resolution of the British Parliament. If this shall be agreed upon, I shall move the articles which will constitute the Treaty of Union between the two kingdoms.

The first article will declare the Union of the two Kingdoms and the two Crowns.

The second, will recognize the succession to the Crown, as now by law established.

The third will declare, that the United Kingdom shall be represented in one and the same Parliament.

These three articles will ascertain the future Constitution of the Executive Power.

I consider, Sir, that the great and fundamental object of this arrangement, is the establishment of the complete identity of the Executive Power in every possibility of circumstance, and in every application of authority. It will be said, that this object is already ascertained by the act of Annexation, and that any further provision on the subject is useless and unnecessary. No one, Sir, can entertain a higher veneration for the act of Annexation than myself ; and, if I had been in Parliament at an earlier period I should have felt it my duty to have acted up to the full meaning and spirit of that act ; and I should

should not have suffered myself to have been misled by any private views, to an abandonment of its provisions, and a desertion of its principles, when its validity was so fatally impeached in the time of the Regency. Much, however, as I venerate that act, as the only bond which now connects this kingdom with Great Britain, I cannot but consider it, both in principle and operation, extremely defective. In principle it goes to hand over to the Parliament of another country, in *which we are not represented*, one of the most important legislative powers, that of regulating the succession of the Crown; a power which never can be exercised by Great Britain, without jealousy and distraction on the part of this country. Nor is the practice less defective than the principle, as was proved in the case of the Regency: for the Prince of Wales was absolutely constituted Regent by the address of the two Houses of the Irish Parliament, before any Regent was appointed by Great Britain; so that the unity of the Executive Power, the only bond of our present connexion, was made to depend not on the provisions of the act of Annexation, but upon the British Parliament coinciding in the choice of the Irish Parliament. To prove the dangers of this species of connexion, I have not only the measures adopted in the time of the Regency, but the authority of a Right Hon. and learned Member, (the late Prime Serjeant) who opposed the measure of Union. That Right Hon. Gentleman, Sir, introduced a Bill in the course of the last session, to provide for the case of Regency. He so far admitted the inadequacy of the act of annexation. But when it was shewn to the Right Hon. Gentleman, that his Bill could be of no avail, unless he surrendered to the Parliament of another Kingdom the complete Legislation on this subject, his friends were so averse to the idea, that he was obliged to abandon his Bill, thus at once confessing the weakness of the bond by which the unity of the

executive powers are secured, and the impossibility of maintaining it without a surrender of legislative independence. But the case of the Regency, Sir, is not the only case which has occurred to prove the dangers to which the Empire is exposed by separate legislatures. What, Sir, was the conduct of James the Second, when, after his abdication of the Crown of England, he came into this Country, and found a separate Irish Parliament a convenient instrument for erecting his opposition to England, and establishing a distinct Monarchy in Ireland, and thus afforded the strongest practical proof of the tendency of distinct Legislatures to ultimate and total separation? What, Sir, also was the case of Scotland, where, from the time of the Accession of James the First, to the Reign of Queen Anne, the unity of the executive power with distinct legislatures, produced a continued scene of jealousy and distraction, until the Scotch Parliament finally introduced a measure for the entire separation of the Crowns as well as the Parliaments.

Now, Sir, let me ask the House, upon all the great and complicated questions of war, of peace, of treaties, what is the situation of Ireland? Is she not, in order to avoid the danger of separation, and to prevent the ruin of the empire, absolutely obliged to adopt, and register, without deliberation, the edicts of Great Britain? In registering her assent, is she not forced to give up every consideration of her private interests, and to sacrifice every feeling of pride and independence? Does she not feel jealousy and discontent from this circumstance? and, if the country shall advance in wealth, and prosperity, and power, will she not grow more and more discontented at such a state of subordination; and will not, of course, the danger of separation encrease with the motives for effecting it? Nor, Sir, are these the only objections to our present mode of connexion? It has been often and justly complain-
ed

ed of in this House, that the Minister of this country, acting as he did under the directions of a British Cabinet, was not responsible to the Irish Parliament, from the moment he should withdraw from this kingdom, unless by a derogation from our independence, we were to impeach him at the Bar of the British Parliament for offending against the Irish Constitution.

This incapacity of a separate Parliament, to effect a due responsibility in the Ministers of the Crown, was so ably demonstrated by an honourable and learned Member (Mr. Fox) in his admirable speech on a former debate, that it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon the subject; but, let me ask who advises the measures of the Irish Government? The English Minister. And how can the Irish Parliament reach *him*? Who administers the Great Seal of England, without which no legislative act can be ratified? An English Minister. And how can the Irish Parliament reach *him*? In short, Sir, how can an efficient and constitutional responsibility be effected, but by making the jurisdiction of Parliament as comprehensive as the power of the Executive? And this, I must ever maintain, can be effected by an Union alone.

It is said, Sir, that an Union will reduce Ireland to the abject situation of a colony. Is it, Sir, by making her a constituent part of the greatest and first empire in the world? For my part, Sir, if I were to describe a colony, I would picture a country in a situation somewhat similar to that of Ireland at present. I would describe a country, whose Crown was dependent on that of another country, enjoying a local Legislature, but without any power entrusted to that Legislature of regulating the succession to that Crown. I would describe it as having an executive power administered by the orders of a non-resident Minister, irresponsible to the colony for his acts or his advice; I would describe

it

t as incapable of passing the most insignificant law without the licence of the Minister of another country ; I would describe it as a country unknown to foreign nations, in the quality of an independent state, and as subject to another power with regard to all the questions which concern alliances, the declaration and conduct of war, or the negotiations for peace.

Another objection has been started, that an Imperial Parliament could not be possessed of such local knowledge of the kingdom, as is necessary for the due encouragement of its interests. But I ask, Sir, what is there to prevent the Representatives of Ireland from carrying with them to the Imperial Parliament, all their local knowledge of the wants and interests of Ireland ? And what is there to prevent an Imperial Parliament from attending as anxiously to the concerns of this part of the Empire, as to the concerns of the west of England, or the concerns of Scotland ?

It has also been asserted, that an Union would have the effect of weakening the Executive Power in Ireland. Convinced, Sir, as I am, that Ireland cannot exist without a strong Executive Power, and that the lives and properties of its loyal inhabitants cannot be otherwise secured, I could not argue in favour of the advantages which are promised by this measure, were it to be followed by such a consequence. But I feel so satisfied, that the contrary would be the case, that it is upon this very principle of giving new vigour to the Executive Power, and of giving additional security to the persons and properties of the inhabitants, that I embrace the measure. It is a Union alone that can give us strength, by removing the cause of our weakness. It will take away from the Executive all those jealousies which hang upon its motions, and prevent its constitutional effects ; it will get rid of the plausible insinuation, that

that we are governed by the influence of a Parliament, where we are not represented ; that we are directed by the councils of Ministers who are irresponsible ; that our interests are sacrificed to those of Great Britain ; in short, it will get rid of all those constitutional anomalies, and constitutional awkwardnesses, which render all the exertions of the Executive Power suspected and inefficient ; and, by rendering it unpopular, diminish and counteract its influence.

There is another objection which has been strongly urged, and plausibly supported. It is this :—that our local Parliament has, from the circumstance of its being local, been able to make exertions for suppressing the rebellion which an Imperial Parliament would not have attempted. I most cordially admit, that the Irish Parliament has most materially assisted the Government, by arming it with those ample powers which have been employed to suppress the rebellion. But, if it was Parliament gave the powers, it was the Executive who employed them. And I ask, by what constitutional scruples would an Imperial Parliament be prevented from giving the same powers in similar circumstances, or the Executive of the Empire be arrested in the exercise of them ? Nor, Sir, is it agreeable to common sense, or truth, that the acts of the Parliament of the Empire, would have less authority than the acts of only a part of the Empire ? It has also been said, that a local Parliament alone could have traced and developed the conspiracy which produced the late rebellion. Here, Sir, is a mistake in point of fact. It was not the local Parliament, but the Executive Government which discovered the conspiracy. It was the Executive Government that detected the plans of the traitors ; and it was upon the documents produced by the Executive Government, that the accurate report of the Secret Committee was formed. The merits of the report in disclosing the information

tion as a warning to the public, after the treason was detected and defeated, may be owing to Parliament; but the discovery of the conspiracy, and the suppression of the rebellion, were owing to the energies of the Executive Government.

I have thus shortly descanted upon that part of the plan which concerns the executive power, and the advantages which will be gained to Ireland in this essential part of the constitution, by adopting the measure of an Union. If I were to follow the order of the resolutions, my next object would be to consider the formation of the legislature; but, as the propositions I shall submit on this head, will in a great measure result from the consideration of the contributive powers of the island; I wish first to lay before the House those points which concern our finances and our commerce, and from them proceed to the legislative question.

I shall now, therefore, state to the House the substance of the 7th article which I mean to submit for their adoption, and which embraces the detail of the contribution which Ireland is to furnish to the general expences of the empire.

The enemies of the measure of Union, have founded much of their clamour upon the groundless supposition, that it is a mere financial project of the British Minister, to put his hands into the pockets of the Irish people. But, sir, I believe it will be found upon examination of the terms, that if any sacrifice be made, it will not be on the part of Ireland, but upon the part of Great Britain. The settlement which is offered, is that of advantage to Ireland; but it is offered not as a bribe, not upon the mercenary principle that Ireland would sacrifice what is essential to her happiness to any pecuniary consideration, but it is offered upon the fair and liberal ground of equal contribution.

I shall

I shall then first consider upon what principles the two kingdoms are to be incorporated in point of contribution ; secondly, the regulations which are to carry these principles into effect ; and thirdly, I shall examine the operation of these regulations, as tending to increase or diminish the expences of Ireland.

The first principle which has been laid down by the liberality of the British Parliament is, that there should be no retrospect in regard to expences. Ireland is to have no concern whatever with the past debt of Great Britain. All the wealth, all the territories, all the commercial power and advantages of Great Britain, are to be fully laid open and communicated to Ireland, without demanding from her any contribution whatever to the support of that immense debt, which she has contracted in acquiring and securing them. Such is the liberality of Great Britain ; but, as to the future, it is expected that the two countries should move forward together, and unite with regard to their expences in the measure of their relative abilities. I should have considered it, Sir, as a most valuable circumstance in this arrangement, if the two countries could at once have been so completely incorporated, as not to be under the necessity of having distinct revenues. This principle made a part of the Scotch Union ; and it was naturally felt to be of such importance, that a great effort was made to equalize the circumstances of the two countries for that purpose. England had at that period a considerable debt ; Scotland had none. An accurate calculation was therefore made of the sum which Scotland ought to receive, as an indemnity for subjecting herself to the charges of the debt of England, and the sum being ascertained, was paid by England as an equivalent. The taxation of the two countries was accordingly subjected to the same scale, except in the article of

C

land-

land-tax, which was fixed on a separate proportion. And this difference arose from the circumstance, that the land-tax in England was levied lightly and unequally, and the land-tax in Scotland was levied strictly; so that, if the same rate of land-tax had been imposed in Scotland, as was imposed in England, Scotland would have been taxed much more than her just proportion. I mention these circumstances, in order to shew the pains which were wisely taken to incorporate Scotland with England, as far as possible in point of finance; and I lament that the circumstances of Great Britain and Ireland, do not at present enable us to pursue the measure of identity with equal strictness. It were to be wished, that there was not an insurmountable bar to a common system, and a common treasury, and that we could become like counties of the same kingdom, subject to the same system of finances. Were our entire expenditures common (which would happen if neither kingdom had any separate debts, or if their debts were in the proportion of their ability) by no system whatever could they be made to contribute so strictly according to their means, as by being subject to the same taxes, equally bearing upon the great objects of taxation in both countries. Such, however, is the disproportion of the debts of the two kingdoms to each other at present, that a common system for the present is impossible; nor could any system of equivalent be applied for equalizing their contributions. It is, therefore, necessary that the debts of the two kingdoms should be kept distinct, and that, of course their taxation should be separate and proportionate. The great point, therefore, to ascertain, is, the best criterion which can be formed of the relative means of the two countries, in order to fix the relative proportion of their contributions.

Sir,

Sir, I conceive, the best possible criterion of the relative means and ability of two countries to bear taxation would be the produce of an income tax, levied on the same description of incomes in each, and equally well levied in both. This criterion, however, is not at present to be found in Ireland, nor is it likely that for some time our local circumstances will permit its operation. We must, therefore, resort to some other test. I consider then that the criterion next in order, is the joint result of commerce and consumption, and that this may be satisfactorily ascertained by a review of their exports and imports together with the quantities and values of the chief articles of their consumption? I propose then to consider the proportion which those articles bear to each other, separately and conjointly in Great Britain and Ireland; and if they nearly coincide, I shall take it for granted, that the best means of deciding the relative ability of the two countries have been fairly taken.

Upon a comparison of the average value of the imports and exports of Great Britain for three years, ending January 1799, compared with those of Ireland ending the 25th of March preceding, I find that the value of British commerce

amounted to	-	-	-	£.73,961,899
Of Irish commerce to	-	-	-	10,925,961

and that they bear the proportion to each other of nearly seven to one.

Upon a similar comparison of the values of the following articles, viz. malt, beer, spirits, wine, tea, tobacco, sugar, consumed in the respective countries, I find that the value of the

British articles amounted to	-	-	£.46,891,655
Of the Irish articles to	-	-	5,954,856

which form a proportion of 7 7-8ths to one.

The medium, therefore, or $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, may be taken as the fair proportion; and I would maintain, that

upon this principle Great Britain ought to contribute fifteen parts, and Ireland two, to the general expences of the empire.

Having stated the principle of the article, I shall now enumerate its provisions.

The first section provides, that the past debts of the two kingdoms shall be borne by them respectively; and if we couple this liberal provision with the 9th section of the article, which gives to Ireland a participation in whatever sums may be produced from the territorial revenues of the dependencies of Great Britain in India, we must acknowledge not only the justice but the generosity of the terms. Great Britain holds out to Ireland a fair participation in all the advantages of the Empire, without requiring the smallest participation in the burthens which she has incurred to procure them; and Ireland will acquire a revenue of 58,000*l.* a year, in ease of her own burthens, out of the revenues paid by the East India Company, from the territories subdued by British arms.

The second section will provide, that the proportionate contribution of 15 to 2, shall continue for twenty years, in order that the system of the Union may acquire stability, before it be subjected to the slightest modification.

When I stated the system of contributing on the principle of proportional ability, I was aware that a natural objection would arise, that however fair or liberal this system might appear at present, it might at a future period, and under different circumstances, prove to be both partial and disadvantageous. It is, therefore intended, that the Imperial Parliament shall have a power to revise the proportion at the given period I have mentioned; but that the revision should be grounded upon the same principles upon which the original proportion is formed, and limited to the result of those principles.

ples. Our contributions, therefore, may hereafter vary according to our relative increased or diminished ability; but, until the period of a common taxation shall arise, the principles, and the basis of our contribution, are unalterably fixed. The only power reserved to the Imperial Parliament, is to examine and ascertain the criterions by which the abilities of the two countries are to be decided upon: the criterions themselves are to remain unaltered and unalterable; and, as they are of such a nature as that they cannot possibly fail of leading to a fair result, Ireland has by these means the utmost possible security, that she cannot be taxed beyond the measure of her comparative ability, and that the ratio of her contribution must ever correspond with her relative wealth and prosperity.

The 4th Section will provide, that the revenues of Ireland should constitute a consolidated fund, which will be charged in the first place with the interest and sinking fund of the debt of Ireland, and be afterwards appropriated to its proportionate contribution. The 5th Section gives power to the Imperial Parliament, to impose such taxes in Ireland as may be necessary for her contingent; but that in no case it shall be enabled to impose higher taxes, after the Union, upon any article in Ireland, than the same article shall be liable to in Great Britain. The 6th Section ascertains the manner in which any surplus of the revenues of Ireland may be applied. There are four considerations which occur with respect to any excess of revenue, which may take place. The first, and most obvious, is the diminution of taxes; the second, is the application of such excess to local purposes of ornament or improvement in Ireland; the third, is to provide against any possible failure of revenue, which may be expected in time of peace; the fourth, is to suffer such excess, or surplus, to accumulate at compound interest,
in

in ease of our contribution in a future period of war. The reason which induces me to suggest the last method of disposing of any surplus of revenue, arises from the different systems of Great Britain and Ireland, with respect to raising their supplies. Great Britain has at length established the great principle, of raising a great part of her supplies within the year: this island is not at present in a situation to adopt a similar system.—The consequence of which is, that the debt of Great Britain will hereafter increase in a much less degree, and be more rapidly liquidated, whilst the debt of Ireland will be increasing with greater rapidity, especially if she shall continue a separate country; but, as an Union will greatly diminish her expences in time of peace, it is proposed that this arrangement, with respect to any surplus of revenue should be adopted, to prevent her too rapid accumulation of debt in time of war.

The 7th section provides, that all future loans, for the interest and liquidation of which the respective countries have made provisions in the proportion of their respective contributions, shall be considered as joint debt; and on the other hand, that where they do not make corresponding provisions, that their respective quotas of the sum so raised should remain a separate charge, in like manner as debt contracted previous to the Union.

The 8th section contains a provision that, when the separate debts of the two kingdoms shall be either extinguished, or in the proportion of their respective Contributions, the general expences of the empire may be thenceforward borne by common taxes, in lieu of proportionate contribution.—I have, Sir, already explained the importance of an assimilation of the taxes of the two kingdoms. The obstacle to its adoption at present, has been stated to be the disparity of burthens, which arise from
their

their respective debts, and which possibly may be removed by time. I shall, therefore, endeavour to obviate an impression which may be made, that common taxes with Great Britain will impose upon this kingdom heavier burdens than she would otherwise be called upon to support. Let the House then first consider that the charges of the debt of Great Britain amount to 20 millions a-year, and the charges of the debt of Ireland to 1,300,000l. British a-year; that common taxes are not to take place, till either the past and separate debts of both countries shall be liquidated, or till they shall become to each other in the proportion of their contributions; that is, in the ratio of 15 to 2. Before this can take place, the taxes of Gt. Britain must be reduced by the amount of ten millions a-year; in which case, the scale of her remaining taxation would be lowered to the scale of taxation in Ireland, and the adoption of British taxation would become a benefit; a similar result would take place, and to a greater degree, were the past debt of the two countries to be entirely liquidated; for, in this case, Ireland would be exonerated from taxes, to the amount of 1,300,000l. a-year, and Britain to the amount of 20,000,000l. and the system of common taxation would become still more beneficial to Ireland. It may happen, however, that if war should continue, and Ireland fund her supplies, whilst England raises a great part of her's within the year, and mortgages her income tax to their rapid reduction in peace, that the proportion of the debt of Ireland may rise, and her scale of taxation increase accordingly. In this case, also, the system of common taxation perfectly secures the interests of Ireland being produced by natural causes, and in no degree forced. It cannot impose any burthen on this country to which she must not in the ordinary course of her expenditure be liable, whilst the provision which goes to preclude any article from being sub-
ject

ject to a higher rate of duty in Ireland than the same article pays in Great Britain, will exempt her from having the scale of her taxation raised above that of England, even though the natural progress of her expence should lead to it. And whilst Ireland is thus secured against any injustice in substituting a system of common taxes in lieu of proportionable contribution, the United Parliament will be enabled to make abatements in Ireland as the Parliament of Great Britain always has done in Scotland since the Union; where, from local circumstances, the high duty cannot be levied without either rendering the revenue unproductive, or pressing too hard upon the poorer classes.

It now, Sir, remains for me to consider the operation and effect of this article, and how far the proportion of $7\frac{3}{2}$ to 1 is favourable or otherwise to Ireland, considered with reference to the past expences of the two countries, as also to their probable future expenditure.

The Peace Establishment of Great Britain in the year preceding the war, amounted to	£5,806,744
That of Ireland amounted in the same year to	- - -
The proportion of these sums is about	$5\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.

Upon an average of seven years, from the commencement of the war, Great Britain has expended each year	- - - - -	27,650,649
Ireland has expended	- - -	3,076,651
The proportion of these sums is about	9 to 1.	

As, however, upon the experience of the past century, it is found that there are three years of peace to two of war; if we form our calculations upon this proportion, the past expences of Great Britain and Ireland may be considered in the ratio of $7\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.

Such is the result as to past expenditure. I shall now state what we may expect from the proposition of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, in our future expences.

The

The expence of Great Britain for the		
year 1799, was	- -	£.32,700,000
That of Ireland,	- -	5,439,000

If this expence had been borne in the proportion of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, Great Britain would have

expended	- -	33,695,101
Ireland would have expended	-	4,492,680

And Ireland would have, consequently, saved	-	947,311
---	---	---------

Or 1,020,181l. in Irish currency.

So long, Sir, as the war shall last, and we shall continue separate from Great Britain, it is not possible to suppose that our expence can be reduced; and, therefore, we shall in future expend more by one million a year, than if we were united with Great Britain.

I shall now advert to the probable future expences of Ireland in time of peace; and, if we consider the advanced pay of the army, the increased charge of the militia, the necessity of keeping up some part of that invaluable force, the yeomanry, we shall find it impossible to maintain a peace establishment of only 12,000 men at home, at a less charge than 1,500,000l. a year; and, if we were to increase our establishment to 20,000 men, the whole charge would amount to 1,900,000l. a year. Now, Sir, from the best documents I have been able to procure, it appears that

The Peace Establishment of Great

Britain is likely to amount to about	£.7,500,000
Add that of Ireland,	1,500,000

£.9,000,000

If this charge be borne in the ratio of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, there would be a saving to Ireland of 450,000l. British or nearly 500,000l. Irish currency.

It may be asked, Sir, how Great Britain can assent to an arrangement which seems calculated to

D

charge

charge her with near half a million in time of peace, and a million in time of war? The answer is, that Great Britain is willing to become one kingdom with Ireland, and contribute proportionably with this kingdom, according to their relative means. If the proportion of expence shall be rightly fixed and ascertained upon just principles, for every part of the empire, it is immaterial to Great Britain where the expenditure takes place. If the internal circumstances of Ireland call for a large proportion of the army to be cantoned in this island, the expence will be greatest here. If the southern coast of England requires to be strengthened, the expenditure will be directed to that quarter; but, can Scotland, and other parts of the empire, which equally contribute, but do not require any expensive protection, feel any umbrage or jealousy that their state of security requires a less portion of troops, and a less proportion of expence, than the more exposed or convulsed part of the two islands?

Now, Sir, let us for a moment turn to the situation of the public revenues. The produce of all the taxes in the last year amounted merely to 1,850,000*l.* and the present charges of the debt alone are near 1,400,000*l.* Irish currency. I will, however, admit that the revenues of this kingdom have, during the present year, experienced an extraordinary increase; but it is not possible to suppose, that the whole of this increase can be permanent, when it can be accounted for by the particular circumstances of the times. I will, however, suppose that the revenues may produce a permanent

sum of	-	-	-	£.2,300,000
The charge of our debt is,	1,400,000			
The Peace Establishment, at				
the lowest computation,				
will be	-			
				1,500,000

Total expence, - £.2,900,000

So

So that, if we remain a separate state, we shall have an annual deficiency of 600,000*l.* which we must endeavour to supply by new burthens upon the people; besides raising additional taxes of 250,000*l.* a year, so long as the war shall continue. If, on the contrary, we wisely unite with Great Britain, and agree in a system of contribution proportionate to our respective means, the future charge of our war expence will be diminished a million a year; and we shall be able to support our Peace Expenditure with a very slight addition to the present taxes. I now then confidently appeal to those gentlemen around me, who have a real stake in the interests and happiness of this country; and, I trust, they will seriously pause and deliberate before they suffer advantages, like these which I have stated, to be rejected without discussion, or to be decided by wild and senseless clamour.

I shall now proceed to submit those regulations, by which it is proposed that the commerce of this kingdom should be adjusted. The principles which are to form its basis will not materially differ from those adopted in the commercial propositions in 1785, which you, Mr. Speaker, supported with such ability at that period, and which are fresh in the recollection of the House. I trust, however, that what I shall have the honor to submit, will in some instances go beyond the proposed settlement of that day; and I have no doubt that my statement will receive the approbation of the House, as the propositions of 1785 were approved on a commercial view of the subject, and rejected merely on constitutional grounds.

I could have wished, Mr. Speaker, that the situation of Ireland could have been so entirely assimilated at once to that of Great Britain, as that there should be no greater difference between them, than between two counties in the same kingdom, and

their commerce and intercourse should be mutually free. There are, however, two circumstances which may for a time prevent this complete and entire identity. The first, is the necessity of consulting the situation of particular manufactures, which may require, to a certain degree, a continuance of that guard and protection, which they have received to shelter their infant state. The second arises from the unequal burthens of Great Britain, in consequence of her past debt, and which has unavoidably created an inequality of internal taxes. As, therefore, it is proposed that the export to each country shall be free, it is necessary that duties, on importation, should be imposed, to balance and counter-vail the internal duties in either country. These will naturally cease when a system of common taxes shall be adopted; and, as a perfect freedom of trade is the great object to contend for, I would suggest also, that in the articles to be secured by protecting duties, the exceptions ought to be as few as circumstances will admit; and that the departure from that freedom, ought to cease when the necessity ceases, which justifies their adoption.

The regulations, Sir, on these subjects, are contained in the 6th article which I shall propose, and the article itself is divided into six sections.

By the first section, the subjects, and the produce of either country, are placed upon an equal footing for ever as to all privileges, encouragements, and bounties. This, Sir, gives the continuance for ever of the British and Irish bounties on the export of Irish linens, and affords us a full participation in the great article of sail-cloth. It is at present provided that the sail cloth used in the British Navy, and the first set of sails used in British merchant ships, should be of British manufacture; by this section, Irish sail-cloth will be admitted to all the privileges of British, and we shall have the great and immense market

market arising from the British Navy, and the supply of British shipping given as an encouragement to pursue a manufacture, for which both the soil and habits of this kingdom are peculiarly calculated.

By the second Section, all prohibitions on the export of the produce of either country to the other are to cease, and all articles are to be exported duty free. This secures to Ireland for ever the raw materials which she receives from Great Britain, and which she can no where else procure: coals, tin, bark, allum, hops and salt. It also concedes to Ireland the staple commodity of English wool. I said, Sir, that the present plan went beyond the propositions in 1785. By the treaty of 1785, Great Britain retained a duty of 1s. 6d. per ton upon coals exported to Ireland; that duty she gives up to Ireland as the consuming country; and the produce of it will hereafter assist the revenues of Ireland. By the treaty of 1785, the exports of British wool remained prohibited; it is here offered to the Irish manufacturers. The system of Union puts an end at once to all jealousy between the nations, and gives to each the full and free participation of their respective advantages.

The same section puts an end to all bounties whatever on the articles of trade between the two kingdoms, with exception to malt, flour and grain, which it is proposed may be still regulated on the present system, unless it shall appear hereafter expedient to the united Parliaments to alter it.

The 3d section enumerates the articles which are to be subject to duty in either country, and fixes the rate of duty on each article. I have said, that a perfect freedom of trade, is the great object to be contended for; and, therefore, the quantum of duty should not be greater than absolutely necessary, nor should it remain longer, or be imposed on more articles than necessity requires. As to the amount

of

of duty, I have adverted to the propositions in 1785, which assumed a duty of $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. as an adequate duty of protection; the duties which have been since imposed on British goods, have been with a view of creating revenue more than of giving protection; and, as the fabrics of Ireland have certainly made a considerable advance since 1785, I am of opinion that a duty of 10 per cent. on the true value, will be fully sufficient, in addition to the charges of freight, &c. which are estimated at $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to give adequate protection to the fabrics of this kingdom. I must submit, that any manufacture in this kingdom that cannot be carried on with a protecting guard of $15\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. against the manufacturer of England, where taxes are higher and labour dearer, cannot deserve much encouragement. Nor is it fair in such a case to sacrifice the interests of the consumer, or encourage by high duties the habits of indolence. When I fix this rate of protection, I wish it should continue for such a period of years, as will give security to the speculations of the manufacturers, at the same time I wish to look forward to a period when duties of this kind may gradually be diminished, and ultimately cease. It must be evident to every man, that if our manufactures keep pace in advancement for the next twenty years, with the progress they have made in the last twenty years, that they may at the expiration of it, be fully able to cope with the British; and that the two kingdoms may be safely left, like any two counties of the same kingdom, to a free competition. It is, therefore, provided, that after twenty years, the United Parliament may diminish the duties of protection in such a ratio, as the situation of our manufactures at that period may render expedient. As all articles, except those enumerated in the resolution, are to be hereafter free from duty upon import,

port, I must draw the attention of the House to the perpetual security which is here offered to the linen manufacture of this kingdom. I know, Sir, that it has been frequently asserted, that the linen manufacture derives all its prosperity from the encouragement it has received from our local Parliament; but I have ever contested the truth of that statement. The prosperity of the linen manufacture results not from domestic encouragement, but from its possession of the British market, and the British bounties on re-export. What then, Sir, is it gives us that market, but the liberality of Great Britain, who lays a duty of 33 per cent. upon foreign linens, and admits Irish linens duty free. The whole quantity of linens imported into Great Britain, amounts to 50,000,000l. of yards, of which 33 millions go from Ireland. Now, if a duty of 33 per cent. were laid upon Irish linens, as well as foreign, it would produce a sum of more than a million a year to the revenue of Great Britain; and, in doing so, it must evidently throw the trade altogether into the hands of the foreign manufacturer.

It has also been urged, that these encouragements granted to Irish linens, were in consequence of a compact that the Irish Parliament should give up the woollen manufacture. It must be a singular compact indeed, by which Great Britain was irrevocably to bind herself, to impose on her own subjects the burthen of a million sterling a year, in order to secure an export of woollen goods which has never exceeded 680 000l. a year. But, if I were to allow that a compact existed, Ireland, by this proposal, will have both parts of it, she will keep what she has by linens, and recover what she is supposed to have given up in woollens, as the price of these encouragements. She will not only enjoy for ever the British markets for her linen trade, but will receive the raw material of England, for the improve-
ment

ment and extension of her woollen trade. And she will have British bounties to favour the re-exports of the former, and low British duties to encourage the import of the latter.

It has been stated, that Great Britain lays the high duty on the foreign linens to protect her own manufacture, and not to favour ours. Let it be admitted. Then what prevents her from laying the same duty on Irish linens? Can any other reason be assigned than disposition to protect the manufactures of Ireland? Suppose Great Britain was only to lay on a protecting duty of 10l. per cent. to be laid on the import of Irish linens in favour of her own. In doing so, she would only act towards us as we do towards her in almost all the leading articles of British manufacture; and what would be the effect? It would exclude us in a great measure from her market. The foreign manufacturer, who now supplies nearly 1-3 of her demand, ever under the disadvantage of a duty of 33l per cent. would then supply nearly the whole. The English consumer would buy his linens nearly as cheap, whilst the state would levy an annual revenue on the import, which is now sacrificed to the encouragement of the manufacture of this country. Is it then to the local Parliament, or to the Parliament of Great Britain, that Ireland is indebted for these advantages? Sir, it is to the Parliament of Great Britain alone—to the Parliament of that country; which has been described in a former debate, as the natural and instinctive enemy of Ireland, that we owe the obligation. That hostile country sacrifices a sum annually to the protection of the Linen Trade of this country, equal in amount to the total expence of our Peace Establishment, as it stood before the war; and, by this treaty, she binds herself to continue it for ever.

I need not expatiate upon the 6th section, which merely goes to lay such countervailing duties as may
balance

balance internal duties. These are, as I have said, necessary upon the principles of justice, so long as the two kingdoms shall be subject to unequal taxes, and when the inequality of taxes shall cease, and a common revenue take place, they will be discontinued.

The 5th and 6th section may be of great commercial consequence, as they provide, that the charges upon the re-export of native, foreign, and colonial goods, shall be the same in both countries, and that no drawbacks shall be retained upon any article exported from either country to the other.—Whoever, Sir, considers and understands the nature of our commerce, and the advantages of our situation, must allow that the securing the perpetuity of these regulations to Ireland, must be attended with the greatest benefits. It is acknowledged, that the situation of Ireland is much more advantageous for the re-export trade than Great-Britain, as we are not subject to the dangerous and tedious navigation of the Channels: and when it is considered that the transit, or re-export trade of Britain, amounts to 14,000,000*l.* a year, Gentlemen will admit, that the prospect of national advantage from this part of the system, is highly worth our attention; and I appeal to the House, that there is no benefit which the cities of Cork and Dublin may not expect, when in order to carry this article into effect, the system of bonding foreign goods for exportation shall be extended, and arrangements be made for converting those harbours as far as possible into free ports.

Upon the review of the result of this article, we find our linen trade secured, the prospect of a great woollen trade opened, a great manufactory of sail-cloth encouraged, the British market opened to us by low duties, in case we shall skilfully make use of our domestic advantages; and at the same time the British market secured for our great provision trade,

E

whilst

whilst an additional encouragement is given to our farmers, in taking off the duty on the produce of their lands.

This leads me to consider the effect of the proposed Commercial Regulations upon the Revenue; and here we shall again find the advantage of the system: First, the duties on the export of our hides, tallow, cattle, and provisions, will cease, which produce,

The loss of Revenue by taking off duties,		
and by lowering duties from $12\frac{1}{2}$ to 10		
per Cent. will amount to	-	32,000

Total loss,	-	£.44,000
		<hr/>
		£.76,000

But, to balance this loss, we shall gain the duty of 1s. 6d. a ton upon coals, which is raised at present upon Irish consumption, and amounts, per ann. to,

£.17,000

We shall gain the duties which are retained in England on subsidy goods

9000

And we shall receive our proportion of 500,000l. from the India company,

58,000

Gain	-	£84,000.
------	---	----------

Thus taxes are remitted, which at present are raised either on Irish produce or Irish consumption, whilst the loss of revenue is fully compensated by a transfer of duties now payable into the Exchequer of Great Britain.

The 8th section of this article, provides that a sum equal to what is now applied to charitable purposes, and to the encouragement of manufactures, shall continue to be so applied annually by the United Parliament; thus securing a continuance of

of the Linen Board, and other local institutions, which have hitherto received the bounty of Parliament.

I have now explained the nature of this article, as it affects us in our manufacture, our commerce, and our revenue, I trust, I have demonstrated it, to be fair and liberal, and calculated to invite into this kingdom the capital of Great Britain, and to introduce an industrious race of manufacturers, and a mercantile people.

I now proceed to that part of the question which concerns Religion and the Church Establishment of this country. One State, one Legislature, one Church; these are the leading features of the system, and without identity with Great Britain, in these three great points of connexion, we never can hope for any real and permanent security. The Church in particular, whilst we remain a separate country, will ever be liable to be impeached upon local grounds, and can never be sheltered from the argument of physical force, which is so continually brought against it; but when it shall be once completely incorporated with the Church of England, it will be placed upon such a strong and natural foundation, as to be above every apprehension and fear from adverse interest, and from all the fretting and irritating circumstances connected with our colonial situation. There must be a perpetual question afloat as to the fundamental principles of our constitution, so long as we remain a separate country; and no country can ever know permanent tranquillity, whose constitution is made a perpetual subject of question.

So long as the countries remain separate, the Government of Ireland must be a choice between dangers and difficulties; pressed by these difficulties, different ministers will entertain different opinions, as to the best mode of preserving Ireland in connexion with Great Britain, and of upholding its establish-

ments. This Minister will approve of maintaining the Protestant authority in its utmost strictness, and will consider the principle of Catholic exclusion as the means of security, and the best bond of connexion. Another Minister, finding the difficulty still prominent and pressing, may throw himself for relief on principles more consonant to the population of the country, and may incline to open the constitution to all sects; hence a perpetual source of fluctuation in the principles upon which our separate Government will be conducted, and this circumstance alone must bring into action, with tenfold violence, the natural dissensions of Ireland, by alternately flattering and discouraging the hopes of the contending interests; and a firm Government, and a steady system, can never be hoped for so long as the constitution and establishments of Ireland can be made a subject of separate question and experiment.

The Protestant, so long as the establishment remains separate, and is impeached on local grounds, will feel his power, his property, and his Establishment insecure, and must naturally look with distrust and jealousy on the Catholic; the Catholic will feel proportionate alienation and resentment, and will continually urge his claims against the establishment of the minority; and there appears no hope whatever of a termination to distrust, jealousy, and alarm. But, so soon as the Church Establishments of the two kingdoms shall be incorporated into one church, the Protestant will feel himself at once identified with the population and property of the Empire, and the establishment will be placed upon its natural basis. The cause of distrust must vanish with the removal of weakness. Strength and confidence will produce liberality, and the claims of the Catholics may be temperately discussed, and impartially decided before an Imperial Parliament, divested

ed of those local circumstances which produce irritation and jealousy, and prevent a fair and reasonable decision.

I shall here, Sir, notice the imputation that the Roman Catholic Clergy have been *bribed* to the support of this measure; it is an illiberal imputation thrown out for the dangerous purpose of weakening their authority over, by lowering them in the opinion of their flocks; for it is known, that an arrangement, both for the Catholic and Dissenting Clergy, has been long in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government. As to the insinuation, that the measure of Union is a measure of bribery; if bribery and publick advantage are synonymous, I must readily admit, that it is a measure of the most comprehensive bribery that was ever produced: It bribes the whole community of Ireland, by offering to embrace them within the pale of the British constitution, and to communicate to them all the advantage of British commerce. It is this kind of bribe which is held out to the Protestant, to the Catholic, to the Dissenter; it is this kind of bribe which is held out to the merchant, to the manufacturer, to the landholder——indeed, I know but of one class in the community to which an Union would not act as a bribe: It is to those who call themselves the lovers of liberty and independence. That liberty, which consists in the abdication of the British Constitution, that independence, which consists in the abandonment of British Connexion, and I acknowledge that these are bribes which I am not prepared to offer. There are many with whom I am not prepared to make any treaty, but the treaty of the law.

I now, Sir, beg leave to recur to the question of Representation, which in the early part of my argument I had requested to postpone; and before I enter into the subject, I must beg leave to protest against
The

the reasoning of those, who pretend to assume, that there can be no equality in the principles of an Union, where the uniting parties shall not be represented in a common legislature by equal numbers. This principle, Sir, is founded upon the common and refuted error, that the two kingdoms, after an Union, will still retain distinct and adverse interests. But, Sir, if I were to allow the fact, the remedy which is proposed, so far from curing would augment the disorder. Distinct and rival interests, so far from being remedied by equality of numbers, in the representation of the two uniting kingdoms, would, from the very circumstance of such equality, break forth into jealous and hostile competition. I shall, therefore, proceed on a principle directly the reverse: and arguing upon the precedent of Scotland, and assuming that two kingdoms, when once united and incorporated, will no longer have a separate but a common interest, and a common sense of that interest, I shall lay it down, that the best security for the liberty of an empire, is to form its representation upon the basis of its wealth and population. These principles were the guides to those great Characters who formed the Union with Scotland; and it is upon these that I shall ground the system I intend proposing to the House.

The population of Ireland is in general estimated from 3,500,000l. to 4,000,000l.—The population of Great Britain is calculated to exceed 10,000,000l. The contribution which it is proposed, that Ireland shall furnish to the expences of the empire, is as one to $7\frac{1}{2}$.—These two proportions taken together, will produce a mean proportion of about $5\frac{1}{4}$ to 1.—I shall, therefore, submit, that if Ireland shall send 100 Members to represent her in the imperial House of Commons, she will be fairly and adequately represented.

With regard to the Peerage, I would propose that
the

the Representative Body for that part of the Legislature, should consist of four spiritual, and twenty-eight temporal Lords : and, when it is considered that above forty Irish Peers, having great interests and stake in this kingdom, are already Peers of Great Britain, I flatter myself that our interests in that branch of the Legislature, will be sufficiently maintained by a body so numerous and respectable.

With regard to the election of the Peerage, who are to sit in the imperial Parliament, I would propose that the four spiritual Peers should sit by rotation of Sessions ; and that, in order to prevent the inconveniences which result from septennial elections, the 28 temporal Peers should be returned for life. Such an arrangement appears, Sir, at once best calculated to secure their independence, and to preserve, as far as possible the hereditary principle of the Peerage. It is also intended to interfere in as small a degree as possible with any existing privileges of the Peerage of Ireland ; and I shall suggest, with this view, that the Peers of Ireland may still be allowed to sit in the House of Commons of the United Parliament, for any county or borough of Great Britain ; but, that during the period of their thus sitting as Commoners, they shall be tried as Commoners, and be precluded from being chosen to represent the Irish Peerage, or vote at the election of any Peer ; and, as the Irish Peerage materially differs from the Scotch, in as much as the Peers of the latter are entailed generally, and the former limited to the heirs male, it is intended to reserve a power to the Crown of creating Irish Peers, so that the number of Peers existing at the time of the Union be not augmented.

In forming the Representation of the Commons of Ireland, I shall suggest the expediency of increasing the proportion, and strengthening the influence of the counties. This principle was wisely adopted in the Scotch Union, when the Representatives for the
 . counties

counties amounted to 30, and those of the boroughs to 15. In following this precedent, I intend proposing that the 64 county Members should be elected, as at present, and that 35 should represent the chief cities and towns of the kingdom. Here the proportion is nearly the same.

In order to produce a return of 35 Members only, to represent the boroughs and cities of Ireland, which consist of 118 places, some principle must be resorted to, either of selection or combination. The latter principle was resorted to in the Scotch Union, where the boroughs were divided into 15 classes, each class consisting of four or five boroughs, each borough electing a delegate, and the majority of delegates electing a burges. It has, however, been found by experience, that this mode of election is subject to much inconvenience and cabal, and I would therefore suggest as preferable, and as the least objectionable mode, that the most considerable towns in the kingdom should alone be permitted to send Representatives, and that the privileges of the other boroughs should cease. I shall therefore submit, that the two great cities of Cork and Dublin should each send two Representatives, as at present; that one should be returned by the University; and that the thirtyone most considerable cities and towns of Ireland, whose relative importance is to be measured by the joint consideration of their wealth and population, should each send a Member to the Imperial Parliament.

For this purpose, it is not my intention, to suggest any alteration of the existing Charters. For the British Constitution does not exclusively prefer any particular mode of election; but, from wise considerations, admits every possible variety; and the perfection of that Constitution is not the direct consequence of any one peculiar principle, but is owing to the harmonious result of according but various principles.

In

In forming, however, the criterion by which the cities and boroughs, who are to retain the privilege of returning Representatives, is to be ascertained, some broad principle of preference must be assumed, without reference to any supposed constitutional preference; and I should therefore suggest, that there are no means by which the relative importance of towns can be so adequately ascertained, as by the compound result of the Hearth-money and Window Tax.

I have to regret, that this great Measure cannot be carried into effect, without its being felt as a grievance by those persons, whose property is connected with the Parliamentary Boroughs, and whose influence will be greatly diminished by the discontinuance of their privilege to return burgesses to Parliament. At the same time I feel, that the consideration of the injury they may sustain, is a subject of the greatest constitutional delicacy.

As, however, upon every subject of national improvement, the claims of private justice, and personal privilege and property, must ever demand an adequate consideration, I shall think it my duty, should it fortunately happen, that the plan I have submitted shall be finally approved, to offer to the House some measure of compensation to those whose peculiar interests shall have suffered in the arrangement.

Much and deep objection may be stated to such a measure; but it, surely, is consonant to the principles of private justice; it is calculated to meet the feelings of the moderate; and it is better to resort to such a measure, however objectionable, than adhere to the present system, and keep afloat, for ever, the dangerous question of Parliamentary Reform. If this be a measure of purchase, let us recollect that it will be the purchase of peace, and the expence of it will be redeemed by one year's saving of the union.

It may be objected, that a representation formed on the principle I have suggested, may be too popular in its nature and effects; and, I confess, that if Ireland were to remain separate from Great Britain, I should feel the full weight of that objection; but, as our representation is to be mixed with the representation of Great Britain, I conceive, that any danger arising from its popular constitution, will be sufficiently counteracted by the consistency and stability of that body.

The great danger of our present and distinct constitution, peculiarly arises from the defective arrangement of the House of Commons; and, in the early part of my parliamentary life, I was so sensible to this defect, that I was for some time a strenuous advocate for parliamentary reform. When, however, the policy of government thought fit to alter the constituency, and introduce into the elective body a new class of the inhabitants, I felt the danger of the measure so far supersede the inconvenience of our existing constitution, that I desisted from my ideas of reform, and acquainted my constituents with the reasons of my conduct. And this is my answer to the Honourable Gentleman opposite me, and to all those charges of inconsistency, which he has so often levelled against me.

I have now only to state, that the last article will provide for the continuance of the existing laws, for the preserving the Courts of Justice in their present state, and for the removal of appeals to the house of Lords of the Imperial Parliament, and for subjecting the Prize Court of Admiralty to the Lord High Admiral of the Empire. These are necessary provisions which are unavoidably incident to the measure of Union; and do not at present require any particular explanation and detail.

Having now, Sir, gone through the outline of the plan, with as much conciseness as possible, I trust I have
proved

proved to every man who hears me, that the proposal is such an one as is at once honourable for Great Britain to offer, and for Ireland to accept. It is one, which will entirely remove those anomalies from the executive, which are the perpetual sources of discontent and jealousy. It is one, which will relieve the apprehensions of those who fear that Ireland was in consequence of an Union to be burthened with the debt of Great Britain. It is one, which, by establishing a fair principle of contribution, goes to release Ireland from an expence of one million in time of war, and of 500,000l. in time of peace. It is one, which increases the resources of our commerce, protects our manufactures, secures to us the British market, and encourages all the products of our soils. It is one, that by uniting the Church Establishments, and consolidating the Legislatures of the Empire, puts an end to religious jealousy, and removes the possibility of separation. It is one, which places the great Question, which has so long agitated the country upon the broad principles of imperial policy, and divests it of all its local difficulties. It is one, which establishes such a Representation for the country, as must lay asleep for ever the question of Parliamentary Reform; which, combined with our religious divisions, has produced all our distractions and calamities.

Rash, indeed, would be the man who should assert, that the dangers in which we have been involved are entirely past. We have, however, made some progress towards security; and it is worth while for Gentlemen to consider, that it is to that great character we owe the present proposal, by whose penetrating sagacity, and invincible constancy of mind, under the most tremendous dangers, not only this island owes the security in which it stands, but all Europe is indebted for its preservation from anarchy and desolation. If such a period of danger were to

recur, it is more than possible, that Great Britain may not have such a character to rise up again for her salvation. It becomes us, therefore, to seize the present moment, and to strengthen the Irish Constitution by blending and uniting it for ever with the great and powerful Empire of Great Britain.

If this great work shall be effected, and if at any future day the enemies of Great Britain and mankind shall again be let loose upon the social world, I doubt not that Ireland will be in such a situation of unanimity and power as to bear a conspicuous part with Great Britain in the glorious task of again delivering and restoring the liberties of Europe.

FIRST RESOLUTION.

That in order to promote and secure the essential interest of Great Britain and Ireland, and to consolidate the strength, power, and resources of the British empire, it will be advisable to concur in such measures as may best tend to unite the two kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland into one kingdom, in such manner, and on such terms and conditions, as may be established by the acts of the respective Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland.

ARTICLE I.—Resolved, That for the purpose of establishing an Union upon the basis stated in the resolutions of the two Houses of the Parliament of Great Britain, communicated by his Majesty's command in the message sent to this House by his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant, it would be fit to propose as the first article of Union, that the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland shall, upon the 1st day of January, which shall be in the year of Our Lord 1801, and for ever after, be united into one kingdom, by the name of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that the royal title and titles appertaining to the Imperial Crown of the said united kingdom and its dependencies, and also the ensigns armorial, flags and banners thereof, shall be such as his Majesty, by his royal proclamation under the great seal of the united kingdom, shall be pleased to appoint.

ART. 2.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that the succession to the Imperial Crown of the said united kingdom, and of the dominions thereunto belonging, shall continue limited and settled in the same manner as the succession to the Imperial Crown of the said kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland now stands limited and settled, according to the existing laws, and to the terms of the Union between England and Scotland.

ART. 3.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that the said united kingdom be represented in one and the same Parliament, to be stiled the Parliament of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

ART. 4.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that of the Peers of Ireland at the time of the Union, four Spiritual Lords, by rotation of sessions, and twenty eight Temporal Peers for life, shall be the number to sit and vote in the House of Lords, and one hundred Commoners (viz. two for each county of Ireland, two for the city of Dublin, two for the city of Cork, and one for each of the thirty-two most considerable cities, towns, and boroughs)

boroughs) be the number of Representatives of Ireland in the House of Commons of the Parliament of the united kingdom; that for the same purpose such acts as shall be passed by the Parliament of Ireland previous to the Union, to regulate the mode by which the Spiritual Lords and Temporal Peers, and the Commoners to serve in the Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, shall be summoned or returned to the said Parliament, shall be considered as forming part of the Union, and shall be incorporated in the acts of the respective Parliaments by which the said Union shall be ratified and established. That all questions touching the election of Peers of Ireland to sit in the Parliament of the united kingdom, shall be decided by the House of Lords thereof; and whenever there shall be an equality of votes in the election of Peers, the names of such Peers who have an equal number of votes in their favour, shall be written on pieces of paper of a similar form, and shall be put into a glass by the clerk of the Parliament, at the table of the House of Lords, whilst the House is sitting; and the Peer whose name shall be first drawn out by the clerk of the Parliament shall be deemed the Peer elected. That any Peer of Ireland shall be capable of being elected as a representative for any county, city, or borough of Great Britain, in the House of Commons of the united kingdom, provided that so long as such Peer of Ireland shall serve in the House of Commons he shall not be capable of being elected to serve as a Peer on the part of Ireland, or be qualified to vote at the election of any Peer, and that he shall be liable to be tried as a Commoner. That it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his heirs and successors, to create Peers of that part of the united kingdom called Ireland, and to make promotions in the Peerage thereof after the Union, provided the number of Peers shall not by such creation at any time be increased beyond the number existing on the said first day of January, 1801; and if any Peerage shall at any time be in abeyance, such Peerage shall be deemed and taken as an existing Peerage, and no Peerage shall be deemed extinct unless on default of claimants to the inheritance of such Peerage for the space of one year from the death of the person who shall have been last possessed thereof; and if no claim shall be made to the inheritance to such Peerage in such form and manner as may from time to time be prescribed by the House of Lords of the united kingdom before the expiration of the said period of a year, then, and in that case such Peerage shall be deemed

ed extinct, and a new Peer may be created, provided that nothing herein shall exclude any person from afterwards putting in a claim to the Peerage so deemed extinct, and if such claim shall be made good, no Peer shall be created to supply the place of the next Peerage which may be deemed extinct, after such claim being made good and established. That all questions touching the election of Members to sit on the part of Ireland in the House of Commons of the united kingdom, shall be decided in the same manner as questions touching elections on the part of Great Britain now are, or at any time hereafter shall by law be decided, subject nevertheless to such particular regulations in respect of Ireland, as from local circumstances the Parliament of the said united kingdom may from time to time deem expedient. That all qualifications as to property which are or shall be required by law of the Members elected on the part of England by counties, cities, or boroughs respectively, to sit in the House of Commons of the united kingdoms, shall be required of the Members to be hereafter elected to sit therein on the part of Ireland for places of the like description. That when his Majesty, his heirs or successors, shall declare his, her, or their pleasure for holding the first or any subsequent Parliament of the united kingdom, a proclamation do issue under the Great Seal of the united kingdom, to cause the four Spiritual Lords and twenty-eight Temporal Peers, and one hundred Commoners who are to serve in the Parliament thereof on the part of Ireland, to be returned in such manner as by an act of this present session of the Parliament is or shall be settled; and that if his Majesty, on or before the 1st day of January, 1801, on which day the Union is to take place, shall declare, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, that it is expedient that the Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, and Commons of the present Parliament of Great Britain, should be the Members of the respective Houses of the first Parliament of the united kingdom, for and on the part of Great Britain; then the said Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, shall be the Members of the respective Houses of the first Parliament thereof, for and upon the part of Great Britain. And his Majesty may, by his royal proclamation, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, appoint the said first Parliament of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, to meet at such time and place as his Majesty shall think fit, and the 4 Spiritual Peers and 28 Temporal Peers, and 100 Commoners, who shall

shall have been returned or elected to sit in the first Parliament of the united kingdom, in the event of such proclamation being issued as aforesaid, in the manner which shall be prescribed by an act of the present Session of the Parliament of Ireland, for regulating the mode by which the Spiritual Lords and Temporal Peers and the Commons to serve in the Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, shall be summoned or returned to the said Parliament, shall be the Members of the respective Houses of the first Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, and the Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, and the four Spiritual Lords, and twenty-eight Temporal Peers of Ireland being summoned and returned as herein before provided, and the Members of the House of Commons of the said Parliament of Great Britain, and the hundred Members for Ireland, such hundred Members being elected and returned as herein before provided, shall assemble and meet respectively in their respective Houses of the Parliament of the united kingdom, at such time and place as shall be so appointed by his Majesty, and shall be the two Houses of the first Parliament of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that Parliament may continue for such time only as the present Parliament of Great Britain might have continued, if the Union of the two kingdoms had not been made, unless sooner dissolved by his Majesty; and that every one of the Lords of Parliament of the united kingdom, and every Member of the House of Commons of the united kingdom in the first and all succeeding Parliaments, shall take the oaths, and make and subscribe the declarations which are at present by law enjoined to be taken, and made and subscribed by the Lords and Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain, until the Parliament of the united kingdom shall provide otherwise, that the said four Spiritual Lords to sit in rotation of Sessions, and the said twenty-eight Temporal Peers to sit for life in the House of Lords of the Parliament of the united kingdom, shall have all privileges of Parliament, which the Spiritual and Temporal Peers of Great Britain respectively now have and which they or any Spiritual or Temporal Peer after the Union may enjoy, and the said four Spiritual Lords and twenty-eight Temporal Peers shall have the same right of sitting upon the trial of Peers as any other Spiritual Lords or Temporal Peers may enjoy; and in the case of the trial of any Peer during the adjournment or prorogation of Parliament, the said twenty-eight Temporal Peers shall be summoned

moned in like manner, and have the same powers and privileges at such trial as any other Spiritual Lords or Temporal Peers of the united kingdom; and that all Spiritual Lords of Ireland, and their successors, shall have rank and precedence next and immediately after the Spiritual Lords of the same rank and degree of Great Britain; and that all Temporal Peers of Ireland shall, from and after the Union, have rank and precedence next and immediately after the Peers of the like orders and degrees in Great Britain at the time of the Union, and before all Peers of Great Britain who may be created after the Union, and shall be tried as Peers of Great Britain, and shall enjoy all privileges of Peers as fully as the Peers of England do now, or as any other Peers of Great Britain may hereafter enjoy the same, the right and privilege of sitting in the House of Lords, and the privileges depending thereon, and particularly the right of sitting on the trial of Peers, excepted; and that all Peers for that part of the united kingdom called Ireland, created after the Union, shall have rank and precedence among the Peers of the united kingdom according to the dates of their creation, and enjoy all the privileges which may be enjoyed by the Peers of Ireland as herein above specified and declared.

Art. 5.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that the Churches of that part of Gt. Britain called England, and of Ireland, shall be united into one Church, and the Archbishops, Bishops, Priests, &c. of the Churches of England and Ireland, shall from time to time be summoned to, and entitled to sit in Convocation of the United Church, in the like manner, and subject to the same regulations as are at present by law established with respect to the like orders of the Church of England; and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government of the said United Church, shall be preserved as now by law established for the Church of England; and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government of the Church of Scotland, shall likewise be preserved as now by law established for the Church of Scotland.

Art. 6.—Resolved 1st, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that his Majesty's subjects of Gt. Britain and Ireland shall, from and after the 1st day of January, 1801, be entitled to the same privileges, and be on the same footing as to encouragements and bounties on the like articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom respectively and generally, in respect of trade and navigation

gation, in all ports and places of the united kingdom, and its dependencies. And that in all treaties made by his Majesty, his heirs, and successors, with any foreign power, his Majesty's subjects of Ireland shall have the same privileges, and be on the same footing as his Majesty's subjects of Great Britain.

2. That from the said first day of January, 1801, all prohibitions and bounties on the export of articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of either country to the other shall cease and determine; and that the said articles shall thenceforth be exported from one country to the other without duty or bounty on such export.

3. That all articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom, (not herein after enumerated as subject to specific duties) shall from henceforth be imported into each country from the other free from duty, other than such countervailing duty as is specific in the Schedule No. 1, annexed to this article; and that the articles herein after enumerated shall be subject, for the period of 20 years from the Union, or importation into each country from the other, to the duties specified in the Schedule No. 2, annexed to this article, viz. Apparel—Brafs, wrought—Cabinet Ware—Coaches—Copper, wrought—Cotton—Glasf—Haberdashery—Hats—Hardware—Lace, Gold and Silver—Millinary—Paper, stained—Pottery—Sadlery—Silk manufacture—Steel—Stockings—and that the Woollen Manufactures shall pay, on importation into each country, the duties now payable on importation into Ireland.

Salt and Hops, on importation into Ireland, the duties which are now paid in Ireland; and Coals, on importation, be subject to the same burdens to which they are now subject.

4. That any articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of either country, which are, or may be subject to internal duty, or to duty on the materials of which they are composed, may be made subject, on their importation into each country respectively from the other, to such countervailing duty as shall appear to be just and reasonable in respect of such internal duty or duty on the materials: and that for the said purposes the articles specified in the said Schedule No. 1, should, upon importation into Ireland, be subject to the duty set forth therein, liable to be taken off, diminished or encreased, in the manner herein specified; and that upon the like export of the like articles from each country to the other respectively, a drawback shall be given equal in amount to the countervailing

countervailing duty payable on the articles herein before specified on the import into the same country from the other and that in like manner, in future, it shall be competent to the united Parliament, to impose any new or additional countervailing duties, or to take off or diminish such existing countervailing duties as may appear, on like principles, to be just and reasonable in respect of any future or additional internal duty on any article of the growth, produce or manufacture of either country; or of any new or additional duty on any materials of which such article may be composed, or of any abatement of the same; and that when any such new or additional countervailing duty shall be so imposed on the import of any article into either country from the other, a drawback, equal in amount to such countervailing duty, shall be given in like manner on the export of every such article respectively from the same country.

5. That all articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom, when exported thro' the other, shall in all cases be exported subject to the same charges as if they had been exported directly from the country of which they were the growth, produce, or manufacture.

6. That all duty charged on the import of foreign or colonial goods into either country, shall, on their export to the other, be either drawn back, or the amount, if any be retained, shall be placed to the credit of the country to which they shall be so exported, so long as the general expences of the empire shall be defrayed by proportional contributions;—provided nothing herein shall extend to take away any duty, bounty, or prohibition which exist with respect to corn, meal, malt, flour, and biscuit, but that the same may be regulated, varied, or repealed from time to time, as the united Parliament shall deem expedient.

ART. 7.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that the charge arising from the payment of the interest or sinking fund for the reduction of the principal of the debt incurred in either kingdom before the Union, shall continue to be separately defrayed by Great Britain and Ireland respectively.

That for the space of 20 years after the Union shall take place, the contribution of Great Britain and Ireland respectively towards the expenditure of the united kingdom in each year, shall be defrayed in the proportion of fifteen parts for Great Britain, and two parts for Ireland. That at the expiration of the said 20 years, the future expenditure of the uni-

ted kingdoms, other than the interest and charges of the debt incurred before the Union, shall be defrayed in such proportion as the united Parliament shall deem just and reasonable, upon a comparison of the real value of the exports and imports of the respective countries, upon an average of the 3 years next preceding the period of revision, or on a comparison of the value of the quantities of the following articles consumed within the respective countries on a similar average, viz. Beer—Spirits—Sugar—Wine—Tea—Tobacco—Malt—Salt and Leather—or according to the aggregate proportion resulting from both those considerations combined, or on a comparison of the amount of income in each country, estimated from the produce for the same period, of a general tax if such shall have been imposed, on the same descriptions of income in both countries—and that the Parliament of the united kingdom shall afterwards proceed in like manner to revise and fix the said proportions according to the same rules, or any of them, at periods not more distant than 20 years, nor less than 7 years, from each other, unless previous to any such period, but subsequent to the 1st of January, 1821, the united Parliament shall have declared, as herein-after provided, that the general expences of the empire shall be defrayed indiscriminately by equal taxes imposed on the like articles in both countries.

That for the defraying the said expences according to the rules above laid down, the revenues of Ireland shall hereafter constitute a consolidated fund upon which charges equal to the interest of her debt and sinking fund, shall in the first instance be charged, and the remainder shall be applied towards defraying the proportion of the general expence of the united kingdom to which Ireland may be liable in each year.

That the proportion of contribution to which Gt. Britain and Ireland will by these articles be liable, shall be raised by such taxes in each kingdom respectively as the Parliament of the united kingdom shall, from time to time, deem fit : provided always, that in regulating the taxes in each country by which their respective proportion shall be levied, no article in Ireland shall be liable to be taxed to any amount exceeding that which will be thereafter payable in England on the like article.

That if at the end of any year any surplus shall accrue from the revenues of Ireland, after defraying the interest, sinking fund, and proportioned contribution and separate charge.

charges to which the said country is liable, either taxes shall be taken off to the amount of such surplus, or the surplus shall be applied by the united Parliament to local purposes in Ireland, or to make good any deficiency which may arise in her revenues in time of peace, or be invested by the Commissioners of the National Debt of Ireland, in the funds to accumulate for the benefit of Ireland, at compound interest, in case of her contribution in time of war, provided the surplus so to accumulate shall at no future period be suffered to exceed the sum of five millions.

That all monies hereafter to be raised by loan, in peace or in war, for the service of the united kingdom, by the Parliament thereof, shall be considered to be a joint debt, and the charges thereof shall be borne by the respective countries in the proportion of their respective contributions: Provided, that if at any time in raising the respective contributions hereby fixed for each kingdom, the Parliament of the united kingdom shall judge it fit to raise a greater proportion of such respective contribution in one kingdom within the year than in the other, or to set apart a greater proportion of sinking fund for the liquidation of the whole, or any part of the loan raised on account of the one country, than of that raised on account of the other country, then such part of the said loan, for the liquidation of which different provisions have been made for the respective countries, shall be kept distinct, and shall be borne by each separately, and only that part of the said loan be deemed joint and common, for the reduction of which the respective countries shall have made provision in the proportion of their respective contributions.

If at any future day the separate debts of each kingdom respectively shall have been liquidated, or the values of their respective debts (estimated according to the amount of the interest and annuities attending the same, of the sinking fund applicable to the reduction thereof, and the period within which the whole capital of such debt shall appear to be redeemable by such sinking fund) shall be to each other in the same proportion with the respective contributions of each kingdom respectively, or where the amount by which the value of the larger of such debts shall vary from such proportion, shall not exceed one hundredth part of the said value; and if it shall appear to the united Parliament that the respective circumstances of the two countries will thenceforth admit of their contributing indiscriminately, by equal taxes imposed on the same articles in each, to the future general expence of the united

united kingdom, it shall be competent to the said united parliament to declare that all future expences thenceforth to be incurred, together with the interest and charges of all joint debt contracted previous to such declaration, shall be so defrayed indiscriminately, by equal taxes imposed on the same articles in each country, and thenceforth, from time to time, as circumstances may require, to impose & apply such taxes accordingly, subject only to such particular exemptions or abatements in Ireland, and that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstances may appear from time to time to demand. That from the period of such declaration it shall no longer be necessary to regulate the contribution of the two countries towards the future general expences according to any specific proportion, or according to any of the rules herein before prescribed; provided nevertheless, that the interest or charges which may remain on account of any part of the separate debt with which either country is chargeable, and which shall not be liquidated or consolidated proportionably as above, shall, until extinguished, continue to be defrayed by separate taxes in each country.

That a sum not less than the sum which has been granted by the Parliament of Ireland, on the average of the last six years, as premiums for the internal encouragement of agriculture or manufacture, or for the maintaining institutions for pious and charitable purposes, shall be applied for the period of twenty years after the Union, to such local purposes, in such manner as the parliament of the united kingdom shall direct.

That from and after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and one, all public revenue derived from the territorial dependencies of the united kingdom, shall be applied to the general expenditure of the empire, in the proportions of the respective contributions of the two countries.

ART. 8.—Resolved, That for the same purpose it would be fit to propose, that all laws in force at the time of the Union, and all the Courts of Civil and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction within the respective kingdoms, shall remain as now by law established within the same, subject only to such alterations or regulations, from time to time, as circumstances may appear to the Parliament of the united kingdom to require, provided that all writs of error and appeals which may at present finally be decided by the House of Lords of Ireland shall, from and after the Union, be decided by the House of Lords of the united kingdom; and provided, that

from

from and after the Union all Admiralty Jurisdictions be under the Lord High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty of the united kingdom ; and that all laws at present in force in either kingdom which shall be contrary to any of the provisions which may be enacted by any act for carrying these articles into effect, be from and after the Union repealed.

SCHEDULE, No. 1.

Of the articles to be charged with countervailing duties upon importation into Great Britain and Ireland, respectively, according to the 6th Article of Union, to which this Schedule is annexed.

Articles to be charged with a countervailing duty in Great Britain.

Beer—Bricks and Tiles—Candles—Soap—Cordage—Printed Cottons—Cider—Glasses—Leather—Paper, stained—Silk—Spirits—Starch—Sugar, refined—Sweets—Tobacco.

Articles to be charged with a countervailing duty in Ireland.

Beer—Glasses—Leather—Paper, stained—Silk—Spirits—Sugar, refined—Sweets—Tobacco.

SCHEDULE, No. 2.

Of the articles to be charged, with the duties specified upon importation into Great Britain and Ireland respectively, according to the sixth article of Union, to which this schedule is annexed—Apparel—Brass, wrought—Cabinet Ware—Coaches—Copper, wrought—Cotton—Glasses—Haberdashery—Hats—Hardware—Lace, gold and silver—Millinery—Paper stained—Pottery—Saddlery and other manufactured Leather—Silk manufactures—Steel—Stockings, ten per cent. on the true value.

