

S P E E C H

PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L.L.D.

THE
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OF

PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L.L.D.

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS OF
IRELAND.

February 5th, 1800.

THE
S. P. E. C. H.
OF
PATRICK DUFFIN, ESQ. F.R.S.
IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS OF
IRELAND.
February 1800.

THE
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OF
PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L. L. D.
IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS OF IRELAND,
FEBRUARY 5, 1800,
ON HIS EXCELLENCY THE LORD LIEUTENANT'S MESSAGE
ON THE SUBJECT OF AN
INCORPORATING UNION
WITH
G R E A T B R I T A I N.

EARNESTLY RECOMMENDED TO THE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF
THE LOYAL CITIZENS OF DUBLIN.

D U B L I N :
PRINTED FOR J. MILLIKEN, 32, GRAFTON-STREET.

1800.

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PATRICK DUGAN, Esq. M.P.

HOUSE OF COMMONS OF IRELAND

FEBRUARY 2, 1800

ON HIS EXCELLENCY THE LORD LIEUTENANT'S MESSAGE

ON THE STATE OF THE

INCORPORATING A M. O.

WITH

GREAT BRITAIN

RECOMMENDED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF

THE LOYAL OFFICERS OF DUBLIN

DUBLIN

PRINTED FOR J. MURPHY, IN GREAT BRITAIN

1800

S P E E C H

OF

PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L. L. D.

&c. &c. &c.

MR. SPEAKER,

I AM unwilling to give my vote in support of a measure of such importance, as the consolidation of the realms of Great Britain and Ireland by an incorporating Union, without explaining to my Countrymen the reasons which have influenced me to contribute my weak assistance to so momentous a measure. I shall endeavour to compress them into as small a compass as possible: premising, however, that I feel no inconsiderable portion of dissatisfaction and regret in perceiving that my sentiments on this occasion are different from those of many able men, as remarkable for their public spirit, as for integrity, extent and strength of talents, natural and acquired, and with whose political opinions, since I took any part in public business, I have heretofore generally concurred. I confess that I feel some consolation in observing, that I differ also in opinion on the present business from other Gentlemen, with whose political

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cal opinions I never did, nor ever will concur; and, that although there is a division among the loyal and staunch friends of the Constitution on the present question, yet there is an entire coincidence of opinion on it among all Jacobin Traitors throughout the kingdom,—they to a man are hostile to it,---their principles I abhor: and I cannot refrain from expressing my uneasiness at perceiving many loyal Citizens of Dublin in this particular, dupes to the practices and deceptions of that dangerous anarchical blood-thirsty crew. I am fortified in my opinion on this occasion by reflecting, that, notwithstanding the hostility of some able honest men to the measure, men of equal integrity and ability support it, and I think the persons of that description, friends to it, are much more numerous than those of the same description, who appear in the ranks of the adversary.

I shall first make a few observations on the present state of the natural and political connexion between Great Britain and Ireland. The latter kingdom, from its geographical situation, is shut out from all intercourse with the northern parts of Europe, except by the permission of Great Britain: and as Great Britain lies between it and all parts of Europe, from Brittany to the Northern Pole, so it is in its power to prevent in a great measure its communication with all the southern parts of Europe; for Ireland, in respect to all Europe, lies as it were behind Great Britain; it is also divided from Great Britain by a narrow channel only, extending the whole length of Ireland from North to South, in some places not above six leagues wide. Its political connexion with Great Britain I shall take up on the basis of its settlement in 1782, which is now insisted upon by the adversaries of an incorporating Union, as a final Settlement between the two kingdoms, never to be changed or altered. Ireland is connected with Great Britain by having one branch of its Legislative Power, to wit, the regal branch
and

and the whole of its Executive Power, in common with Great Britain, and the person invested with its whole Executive Power, and with a part of its Legislative Power, endowed with a veto on all deliberative resolutions of the other two branches of the Legislative, resides in Great Britain: By the settlement of 1782, no bill, after it has passed the two Houses of Parliament in Ireland can become a law, till after it has been sent into Great Britain, under the Great Seal of Ireland, and is returned from thence under the Great Seal of Great Britain; that is in fact, 'till after it has been approved of by his Majesty, and his British Cabinet Council; so that, under the Settlement of 1782, the British Ministry can prevent the enactment of any law whatsoever in this kingdom; and it seems to me that there is some inaccuracy in stating the Legislature of this Kingdom to be independent under these circumstances. Certain I am, that I have heard grievous complaints of the control of the British Cabinet exercised over the Legislature of this Kingdom; and the disastrous effects on this kingdom of a double Cabinet, English and Irish, very pathetically insisted upon by Gentlemen, who now oppose an Incorporating Union on the principle of its subverting the Settlement of 1782, and the Independence of this Kingdom. I have been somewhat surprised at finding this House so frequently amused with declamations on the point, whether the Settlement of 1782 was intended by the two kingdoms as a final adjustment of all matters then in dispute, so as effectually to secure their perpetual connexion necessary to the happiness, almost to the existence of both as free States, and to preclude all future possibility of separation.—I look on the Question, whether that Settlement at the time it was concluded, was considered or intended to be final or not, as totally immaterial. Debates upon it put me in mind of the conduct of Lawyers in a suit, as described by that sagacious

sagacious observer of mankind, Capt. Lemuel Gulliver:—
*“ In pleading,” says the Captain, “ they studiously avoid en-
 “ tering into the merits of the cause; but are loud, violent and
 “ tedious in dwelling upon all circumstances which are not to the
 “ purpose; for instance, if my neighbour claims my cow, they
 “ never desire to know what title my adversary has to my cow;
 “ but whether the said cow were red or black, her horns long or
 “ short, whether the field I graze her in were round or square,
 “ and the like.”*—The true question on the Settlement of
 1782 to be resolved by this House, is, whether that Settle-
 ment be such as does effectually secure the perpetual Con-
 nexion of the two kingdoms? and not, whether it was confi-
 dered as final at the time it was entered into?—Sir, the pre-
 sent Connexion between Great Britain and Ireland is such as
 has no parallel in the history of the world: it contains in
 it anomalies heretofore unknown to the law of nations,
 and the seeds of dissolution; these anomalies must be cor-
 rected, and these seeds must be effectually prevented from
 striking roots, which can be only effected by an In corpo-
 rating Union of the two Kingdoms. Separation, or rather
 an unsuccessful attempt at separation, which will be at-
 tended with the utter ruin and desolation of this kingdom
 by civil war, will be the unavoidable and necessary con-
 sequence of the rejection of that only effectual remedy.---
 The present Connexion between these two Kingdoms is
 not similar to an alliance offensive and defensive between
 two independent Nations, which depends on stipulations
 entered into by the two contracting parties for mutual
 defence and security; for, if the conditions of the alliance
 are not performed by one of them, the other may break
 off from the alliance, and look to other security, or take
 such measures as it may think proper for its own defence,
 and may at any time enter into Leagues and Treaties
 with other Powers, not inconsistent with its offensive and
 defensive

defensive alliance; and either party has a right to proclaim war or make peace on reasonable terms, and to call on the other to assist in war with its stipulated quota, or to concur in a pacification on reasonable terms, or such as it may deem reasonable: but the case is quite otherwise with Ireland in respect to Great Britain; proclamation of war on the part of Great Britain against any power whatsoever immediately involves Ireland in hostilities, as part of the British Empire; and Great Britain may make Peace without consulting in any manner with Ireland on the terms or conditions, and without stipulating in any manner for her indemnity or compensation for her losses in the war. Ireland cannot enter into any Treaty whatsoever, either commercial or otherwise, with any foreign power, but is bound by all the Treaties into which Great Britain enters, without being even consulted on the expediency of them.---Surely, Sir, these are great badges of dependency; I have heard Gentlemen at the other side of the House complain bitterly of them; and, whilst they assert the independence of this nation on Great Britain, and assert that such independence was secured by the Settlement of 1782, and on that score struggle to support that Settlement as final, and reprobate all alteration, and consequently an incorporating Union, they cannot but admit the present connexion between the two nations, as settled in 1782, to be a connexion degrading, and in a high degree detrimental to this nation; and that it contains within itself a mine of combustibles, which one day or other will be sprung, and involve the country in confusion, ruin and desolation, which it will take a century to repair. Exclusive of the aforesaid great imperial sources of discontent and animosity between the two nations, arising from the very nature of their present connexion, are there no other causes

causes of disunion interwoven with it? What loud complaints have we repeatedly heard in this House of the shackled state of our commerce by our present connexion with Great Britain since the year 1782? Are these causes removed? It is admitted that the Settlement of 1782 was not final with respect to the Tariff between the two Nations; we rejected the Commercial Propositions since 1782, which were designed to settle that Tariff, with disdain, on a supposition that they trenched on our imaginary independence; professing that we would not barter Constitution for commerce. Is the Channel Trade between Great Britain and Ireland yet settled to our satisfaction? Is the India Trade? Are numberless other causes of discontent, jealousy and emulation on the point of trade between these two commercial and adjacent nations, yet removed? Are the mouths of our ranting patriots, continually bellowing in our ears, that the interests and pursuits of the two nations in point of trade are incompatible and irreconcilable; and that the animosity of the inhabitants of the two countries is instinctive, yet closed? Or are they ever likely to be closed in the present state of correspondence and brittle connexion of the two countries? Surely not; the present connexion between them is rather a faithless Truce, *infidæ induciæ*! than a permanent state of harmony and peace. Federal Unions, such as was that of the United Provinces, being an union of a number of small Republics for mutual defence, the present Union of the several States of America, and of the Germanic Body, have been always accounted weak and inefficient; we know by experience they are so: look to Germany, look to the United Provinces; they will all in process of time submit to the same fate with the United Provinces, that is, be reduced to slavery by a potent neighbour; or will break and separate into distinct Sovereignities independent of each other. Yet the present connexion be-

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tween Great Britain and Ireland is more infirm and fleeting than even a federal Union: For in a federal Union an Assembly is formed by Deputies sent from all the States which compose it, as the States General of the United Provinces, the Diet of the German Empire, the Congress of America, which Assembly is empowered to decide and determine on all matters necessary to their common security and interest, and to whose decisions the whole Union is bound to submit. But there is no such common Assembly to support the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, and to consult for the respective interests of both. Such a connexion can never be supported but by the decided superiority of the one State, arising from superior strength and opulence, and the decided inferiority of the other in both particulars. Hence it arises, that it will always be the interest of the stronger to retain the weaker in its state of inferiority; and of the weaker, to struggle for equality at least, and to endeavour to free itself from subjection to the other by every possible or feasible means. Such a connexion is always hollow, attended by tumult and disorders, constantly increasing and fermenting, and at length ending in civil war and absolute subjugation; or separation by the interested assistance of some ambitious neighbour. The probable durability of the present connexion between Great Britain and Ireland cannot be supported by any arguments drawn from the circumstance, that his Majesty and his Progenitors for three generations have enjoyed the Crown of Great Britain, and the Electoral dignity, as Sovereign of Hanover, without any convulsion, or probability of being disturbed in the enjoyment of both; it cannot be from thence inferred, that the connexion of Great Britain and Ireland, which, since 1782, depends on their having a common Sovereign, may be reasonably expected to endure without the prospect of any convulsive pangs of disunion or separation. For the King of Great Britain is not Elector of Hanover, by virtue of his

his being King of Great Britain: And the interests of Great Britain and Hanover are so completely distinct, that the English Ministry can have no necessity of interfering with the Regency of Hanover, or its interests, external or internal, nor can they ever clash: His Majesty of Great Britain, as Elector of Hanover, is a vassal and subject of the Emperor; and Hanover is a Province of the German Empire, from which it cannot be severed whilst the Germanic body exists; it never can have any further connexion with Great Britain than it has at present; and the intercourse between the two countries is extremely confined, as Hanover lies on the Continent, is almost surrounded by the other German Provinces, and has but a very contracted communication with the sea; nor can there exist any cause of dissension between Gt. Britain and Hanover, considered as a distinct principality: and the King of Great Britain may ever remain a subject of the Empire, as Elector of Hanover, without the interference of Great Britain to support his title to the Electorate, and without its being at all material to Great Britain, whether he is or is not Elector of Hanover. But every one of these circumstances is directly reversed when the connexion between Great Britain and Hanover is compared with that which has subsisted between Great Britain and Ireland since the year 1782.

When Gentlemen insist that the settlement between the two nations in 1782 is final, and consequently wants no amendment or alteration, that it is of itself sufficient to maintain a perpetual connexion between the two countries, and that any further union is unnecessary; I cannot but wonder by what arguments many of them will support their own consistency. Gentlemen whom I have heard arguing with the utmost vehemence in every session of Parliament since that period, for the necessity of alterations in the established Constitution of Ireland, as well in respect to its internal provisions for the government of the subjects, as in its external regulations respecting its connexion with England,

land, which they now assert were finally and for ever settled in 1782.—Witness the complaints of the inequality of the Channel Trade; of the exclusion from the East India Trade; of the importation of English Manufactures; of the contraction of the Colony Trade, and of the Woollen Manufacture of Ireland; the want of protecting Duties; of the interference of the English Cabinet with Irish Affairs; and of the double Cabinet; of the history of the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, being a history of oppression and injury on the part of Britain, as well before as since the year 1782; of fugacious English Administrations in Ireland not accountable for their conduct to the Irish Parliament; of Ireland being involved in the wars of Great Britain, without being consulted on the expediency of war or peace, or having any power to promote or obstruct either the one or the other; of the incapacity of Ireland to treat with Foreign States; its total deprivation of all federative capacity: with a multitude of other inconveniencies, defects and imperfections of the settlement of 1782; and perpetual declamations of the necessity of Reforms, Emancipation, &c. directly tending to the utter subversion of the present Constitution and the settlement of 1782, yet these are the very Gentlemen who now rest their principal argument against an incorporating Union on the perfection of the system of 1782, insisting that all attempts further to strengthen the connexion between the two realms as settled in 1782, and to extinguish national animosities, are not only unnecessary, but pernicious and destructive to Ireland.

I will now proceed to state and answer the other objections which I have heard urged against an Incorporating Union of the two kingdoms; as I shall have an opportunity in my progress of stating, and I hope of proving, the positive advantages which must result to Ireland from it: and the ruin and destruction which will be the certain consequences of its rejection. It is first objected, that

the independence of Ireland will be destroyed by an Incorporating Union with Great Britain. I have already pretty fully demonstrated, that Ireland in its present situation cannot be considered as an independent Kingdom, properly speaking: and besides if independence applied to Ireland, means *the substantive Independence of a Kingdom, unconnected with any other Nation, save by treaties of amity containing reciprocal obligations entered into between equals, and possessing an Imperial Government within itself*; it is pretty plain to common understandings that Ireland in that sense is not now an independent nation, for Ireland is a Province of the British Empire. The Crown of Ireland is not an Imperial Crown, it is inseparably united, annexed to, and dependent upon the Imperial Crown of England, (now the Imperial Crown of Gt. Britain), and whoever is King of Gt. Britain, is ipso facto, King of Ireland. Such is the language of our Statute law, repeated over and over again in our Statute books unrepealed, and which never can be repealed; because his Majesty of Great Britain can never give his Royal assent to any law authorising the spoliation of his Royal Diadem, by tearing the most valuable jewels from it, unless compelled by fatal necessity, and the successful issue of Rebellion, which Heaven avert!—but should it be even admitted that Ireland is an independent nation, how can it be inferred or proved that she would lose her independence, or any degree of independence which she may now enjoy, by an incorporating Union with Great Britain? By such Union she becomes one body with Great Britain, and consequently must enjoy equal independence with Great Britain: they will together form one consolidated independent Empire: the part of that Empire West of the Irish Channel, will be as independent as that part of England South of the Trent, and that part North of the Trent, or that part of Great Britain North of the Tweed; and Ireland will be no more a province dependent on England,

land, than England or Scotland are provinces dependent on Ireland, or on one another. The objection seems to me to be founded on sophistry, on this deceitful position, *that each part of the same body, being dependent in some measure upon the rest of the body, the whole thus composed of parts dependent on each other, cannot be said to form one independent body, because it is composed of dependent particles*: though whilst they adhere together they form one body detached from all others. The Gentlemen who support such a dogma would do well to consider how they can, in such reasoning, maintain the independence of Ireland: for by the same argument, the four provinces of Ireland being dependent each on the other three, the four together cannot form one independent body.

It is in the second place objected, that the superior number of British members in the Imperial Parliament, will give them the power of oppressing Ireland, and infringing the conditions on which an incorporating Union may be concluded.

I admit that there must be a power in all States paramount and supreme, that can alter or abrogate all the laws and regulations of the State, for the manifest good and advantage of the subjects, and enact new laws for the same purposes; but such supreme power is restrained within the bounds of reason and justice, and the present argument is founded on a presumption of fraud and ill-faith, which the principles of natural law, as well as the express maxims of our own municipal law, forbid us to entertain. Our own law tells us that fraud is not to be presumed. When King Henry VIII. consulted the judges, then removable at the will of the Crown, on the question whether a bill of attainder passed against a man by Parliament, then also enslaved, without calling on the object of it to answer or give him a trial—would be valid? the judges told him that such an act, from

from the transcendent power of Parliament, would be valid ; but they trusted that so great and honourable a Tribunal as that of Parliament would never degrade itself, and make so flagitious an use of their supreme authority, as to adopt such a proceeding against any man. And an answer of a similar nature might be sufficient to the present objection, the Parliament being now independent, because there is a mighty difference between power itself and the just or unjust exercise of it ; and the objection can have no weight if we are to presume, as by law we are directed, that the Imperial Parliament will be guided by justice in their proceedings. But there still remains a more powerful answer to the objection, and that is, that the conditions of an incorporating Union must be canvassed fully in the two Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland, before any Union can be effected ; and it is morally certain, that no conditions will be agreed to, which shall not be deemed by these Parliaments, who are supposed to understand the interests of their country, advantageous as well to the nations respectively, as to the empire at large. And when the two nations shall become one by an incorporating Union, can it be supposed that the Imperial Parliament will ever attempt to infringe the conditions promotive of the interest, of each country in particular, and of the whole body in general ? Such a proceeding with respect to either country would injure the whole body, and would be therefore contrary to the interest of the infringers ; as it would be destructive of the sanity and strength of the whole human body for all the parts, the leg excepted, to conspire to wither the leg ; therefore there can be no apprehension of the breach of the conditions of an incorporating Union by the Imperial Parliament, to the prejudice of Ireland ; unless we shall suppose that the British Members shall all become blind, as well to justice as to their own interest. Besides, it may be stipulated in the Treaty of Union, that
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any breach of the conditions shall be deemed a dissolution of the Union; as was done in the Treaty of Union of England and Scotland; and experience has proved, that no attempt at a breach of the conditions of that Union was ever made. I can only conceive one case in which the conditions of an incorporating Union of Great Britain and Ireland may be altered, and that is, when all, or a very great majority of the Representatives of one of the contracting nations, shall petition for an alteration of any of the articles which peculiarly affects one of them, without any special interest in the other to resist such a change: In that case I apprehend an alteration might be justly made, on the principle of *Volenti non fit injuria*.

It is objected 3dly, That Ireland by an Incorporating Union will become subject to the heavy Taxes and Debt of Great Britain.—This objection may be entirely done away, by inserting stipulations in the Treaty of Union, that Ireland shall be only liable to such portion of the public burthens, as are suitable to her means and finances. Such stipulations in favour of Scotland have been inserted in the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland, and have never been violated.—But this objection is in truth founded on deception, for it is founded on the baseless assumption, that Ireland, after an Incorporating Union shall take place, will remain in its present situation, or a worse, in points of trade, improvement and opulence. Whereas it is obvious, that Ireland, possessing as fertile a soil as Great Britain, and being as advantageously situated for Commerce, when incorporated with that nation, must become in time, and not at very remote period, equal to Great Britain, in local population, commerce and wealth. Her inhabitants being then on an exact level with those of Great Britain, intermixed with them, and becoming one people with them, the present industrious habits and pursuits of the one nation, its commerce and

and manufactures must be speedily communicated to the other, and become common to both: and when we contemplate the happiness, wealth and comforts of life which the inhabitants of Great Britain enjoy at present in a much superior degree (though liable to the present heavy debts and taxes) to the inhabitants of Ireland, what Irishman would repine, or have cause to complain, if the inhabitants of Ireland were put on an exact level in all these particulars with the inhabitants of Great Britain? If we shall, in case of an Incorporating Union, have heavier taxes, they will be no grievances if we shall have more ample sources of wealth, a greater capacity of paying, and greater funds remaining to expend on our comforts and enjoyments.—I am aware that it has been asserted by a very great and truly respectable authority, that the Trade of Ireland cannot and will not be increased by an Incorporating Union: and it has been attempted to be proved that the Trade of Ireland could not be injured by Great Britain, if she should design to injure it, for that Ireland has other and as lucrative markets for her commodities as Great Britain: my own want of skill in commercial affairs, and my settled opinion of the ability and extensive information of the asserter of these doctrines, to me at least novel, induced me, after their publication, to consider them with great attention, to examine the documents on which they were founded, and to read the several answers to them which have appeared, as well in the English as the Irish Prints, and after the very best and most mature consideration of them, I profess I cannot acquiesce in them; for, in the first place, as the proportionate commerce and opulence of Great Britain vastly exceed those of Ireland, I cannot well conceive, when Ireland, situated as she is, and possessing as fertile a soil as Great Britain, shall form one and the same body with Great Britain by an Incorporating Union, that part of that body shall
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continue in the greatest health and vigour, and that another part, with all the vital juices in full and free circulation, without any obstruction whatsoever to impede their course, shall remain in a debilitated and withered state: on the contrary, I am clearly of opinion, that the wealth and commerce of Great Britain must by an Union be communicated with Ireland, and that Ireland will thereby acquire a proportionate and local equality in trade with Great Britain and every part of it.—In the second place, I am convinced that Ireland is indebted for almost her whole commerce to Great Britain; she has opened to Ireland the trade of her colonies; she has shielded her principal manufactures, to which she has opened her own markets, with bounties, and restrained the importation of manufactures of the same nature from other countries by duties.—At no other markets on the face of the globe could the manufactures of Ireland be disposed of to the same advantage; she affords a ready market, ready sale, and speedy return for the commodities of Ireland, which no other nation could afford, and which few would offer: nor could Irish capitals support the same trade with other nations, who would require longer credits. British Fleets secure the foreign commerce of Ireland throughout the globe, and the hostility of Great Britain to Ireland would at once annihilate almost all Irish commerce and manufactures; and the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland is much in favour of the latter kingdom.

Fourthly, it is objected, that the City of Dublin will be depopulated and injured, and its trade ruined by an Incorporating Union. Of all the objections against the measure, this has the greatest weight with the mass of the people, and yet it is infinitely the weakest: Such has been the power of deception, that this fallacious argument has imposed upon and misled the loyal Citizens of Dublin, who in the late atrocious Rebellion so courageously stood

flood forth the champions and the bulwarks of the Constitution in Church and State, and has so far blinded their understandings as to render them careless of their own preservation, of their liberties and properties, and induced them to permit themselves to be made the dupes and tools of the sanguinary Jacobin Traitors, who so lately deluged their country with the best Protestant blood in the nation; the Conspirators who originally planned that bloody insurrection, and the ruffians employed in the massacres with which it was accompanied, and whose carcases justly forfeited to the law, have been bailed from the executioner, by what has been stiled the lenity of Government, now openly and triumphantly appear, leading the deluded citizens to the altars of rebellion, conspiracy and sedition, there to enter into engagements for the subversion of the constitution, and to affix their signatures, at the desire of the pardoned and ungrateful traitors, to the manifestoes of threatened and meditated insurrection. Bound as I am from general, and in many instances personal attachment, gratitude and interest, to promote to the extremity of my abilities the welfare and prosperity of the city of Dublin, in which, though not my native place, I have been nurtured and educated from my early infancy; and which comprehends so many of my closest and most valued connexions, I cannot view with indifference this fatal delusion of many of its most loyal and worthy citizens. I heartily deplore it, and shall use my endeavours to awake them to the calls of loyalty, honour, security and peace.

I have already, I trust, proved, that the trade and wealth of Ireland must be increased by an Union, which will open sources of commerce yet unknown in this country; it will increase wealth in the same proportion, and capital must increase by the additional security which the lives and properties of the inhabitants of Ireland will acquire by such

such Union; and the city of Dublin must participate largely in the increased commerce, wealth and capital of the nation at large. Dublin is situated about midway in the Irish channel. Its port, though not accessible by ships of as great burthen as that of Liverpool, is a much better port than that of the latter place, much more easily accessible, and ships of three or four hundred tons, large enough for carrying on commerce to any part of the globe, may resort to it. Dublin is capable of receiving great improvements as a commercial city, sufficient to secure to it for ever a decided superiority in point of trade over every other town in Ireland; and if an annual sum shall be appropriated out of the treasury for compleating the two canals, which communicate with it on the north and south, (already far advanced) under proper regulations, so as to finish the water carriage from Dublin to the Shannon, it will extend into Connaught, and may be further extended in that province by means of the river Suck. Such an improvement will secure for ever to Dublin the exclusive import and export trade of this island, in a tract of country the best in the kingdom, of near one hundred miles broad, and reaching almost from the channel to the Western Ocean. The compleating these canals, at the public expence, may be made one of the articles of the Union, and will alone compensate tenfold for any partial loss which it is suggested that Dublin may suffer by it; for it is not even pretended that the nation at large will suffer by an Union in point of commerce; all that is attempted to be proved (and the proof has totally failed) is, that Ireland will not gain in point of trade by this measure. Other advantages to the city of Dublin, not prejudicial to the kingdom at large, may be stipulated for in the treaty of Union.

We are now to consider what the loss is, that it is suggested the city will sustain by an incorporating Union.

It is suggested, that many other port towns will rise in commerce on the ruins of that of Dublin in case of an Union. I cannot see any reasonable ground for such suggestion; but if there is any, I have already pointed out an effectual method, not only to secure Dublin in its present trade, but to increase it to a degree hitherto never experienced or hoped for.---It is next suggested, that Dublin will decay, as well in population as trade, by its ceasing to be the annual place of meeting of Parliament; and that absentees will be increased, as well from Dublin as from the rest of the kingdom, by an Union, which will therefore drain the kingdom in general, and Dublin in particular, of great sums of money annually. I cannot think that the kingdom in general, or Dublin in particular, will be drained of great sums of money by the increase of absentees, which, it is supposed, will happen on an Union taking place; for I do not think that it will cause any very material increase of absentees. Already our absentees, and most of them of very great landed estates, are very numerous, and most of our nobility and considerable gentry, who are reputed residents, spend their summers, or a considerable part of them, in England, either in or near London, or at the several watering places in England. Thirty of our Peers, and one hundred of our Commoners, are to sit in the Imperial Parliament; of these commoners, sixty-four are to be elected for the counties at large, eighteen more for cities or towns, which are also counties, and the remainder for corporate towns, considerable for their population and extent: so that almost the whole of the Irish Representatives in the Commons of the Imperial Parliament, will be returned on popular elections. And all such persons, to secure their interests in the counties and towns which they represent, will be obliged to spend their summers (the seasons of recess of the imperial parliaments) among

among their Irish constituents, instead of spending them, as they now do, in England. Of the thirty Peers, who are to represent the Irish Peerage in the Imperial Parliament, many will be such as at present spend their whole time, or almost the whole in England; from whence I infer, that Ireland in general will not suffer considerably, perhaps not at all, by an Union. The city of Dublin will certainly lose the partial residence of some of the members of parliament annually, but not of all; for many persons who are now members of the Irish parliament, such as the whole body of lawyers now in Parliament, and many others who always reside in or near Dublin, and who will not be of the number elected to the Imperial Parliament, will continue to reside in their usual places of abode. The city will also continue the metropolis of the kingdom, the seat of the courts of justice, and of the viceroy; and upon the whole, cannot, by my computation, suffer any greater annual loss than about fifty thousand pounds, perhaps less, by an union; and will certainly be a gainer of several hundreds of thousands annually by the means I have suggested, and by other stipulations in its favour, which may be inserted in the treaty of incorporating union: And the city of Dublin will be certainly increased, as well in wealth as population, by such a measure. Pending the treaty for an union between England and Scotland, the same methods for inflaming the inhabitants of Edinburgh to oppose that measure, were adopted by a discontented party in that kingdom, as are now made use of to inflame the citizens of Dublin: Yet Edinburgh, in less than a century since that union took place, has been more than doubled in extent and in population: and in trade, wealth and magnificence improved tenfold. My arguments are therefore warranted, not by reason only, but experience; and the citizens of Dublin will soon have good cause to reprobate and execrate the

the fraudulent and sanguinary jacobinical assassins, by whom they are at present so fatally misled.

It is in the fifth place objected, that the Irish Parliament is not competent to enter into and conclude a treaty with the sister kingdom for an incorporating union. The competency of the Irish Parliament to such a measure, has been so fully and ably proved by an hon. member of this House, in his speech on the expediency of an union in the last session of parliament, which speech has been since printed; and the futility and ineptitude of the objection so fully exposed, that it is not necessary for me to be at much trouble, in scouting that phantom of forensic quibbling inanity out of this House. A brief examination of this doctrine of incompetency of Parliament on the present occasion, may however not be amiss. The best writers on the British constitution, and those who have wound up their ideas of true political liberty to the highest tone which can consist with any harmony or stability of Government, Mr. Locke in particular, lay it down as a maxim, that each member of the commonwealth has surrendered to the state, or supreme legislative power, and vested in it, all his rights under the law of nature. In the 11th chapter of Mr. Locke's treatise on government, is to be found the following passage: *The supreme legislative power in every commonwealth is the joint power of every member of the society, given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, and is what those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into the society, and gave up to the community.* A little further on he adds, *This power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society.* And in the close of his 19th chapter he writes thus, *The power which every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again; as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which*

is contrary to the original agreement. So also, when the Society hath placed the Legislative in any Assembly of men to continue in them and their successors with direction and authority of providing such successors, the Legislative (which be in all places stiles the Supreme Power) can never revert to the People whilst that Government lasts: Because having provided a Legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the Legislative, and can never resume it. Montesquieu, in the 6th Chapter of his 11th Book, where he treats of the English Constitution, lays it down as a maxim: *That the People ought to have no share in the Government, but for the choosing of Representatives which is within their reach.* It is notorious, that a man in a state of nature has full authority and power to join any other man or set of men, and to form with them a community, or to connect himself with a community already formed, and become a member of that community which is willing to receive him as a member. This natural right each man has given up to the community, and the Supreme Legislative Power of the community is invested with that right, and consequently is competent to join any other community or commonwealth in an incorporating Union, and to bind all the subjects of the State to that incorporation; and that power of the Legislative is bounded only by the public good of the society, of which it is a better judge than tumultuous unconstitutional and illegal assemblies of the people, and of which, the members of the Commonwealth when they elected them their Representatives, supposed them to be the best judges. Mr. Locke published his treatise on Government in the year 1690; he had been the Secretary and Confidant of the famous Earl of Shaftesbury; and had been educated at Oxford, during the domination of the Republican Fanatics, and was brought up in the extremity of Whig principles, and published his Work at the time civil dissensions were

were at the highest, for the purpose of justifying the Revolution, at that time a recent transaction not compleatly and fully established. One principal accusation against the abdicated Family was, that they designed to subjugate the kingdom to France. This design was principally attributed to Charles the Second, and his ministry, and was one of the accusations of Lord Shaftesbury, the patron of Mr. Locke, against the Court in the reign of that Monarch. Mr. Locke therefore in his 19th Chapter on the dissolution of Governments, states, rather too largely, *that the alteration of the Legislative is a dissolution of Government*: And then subjoins, *that the delivery of the People into the subjection of a foreign Power, either by the Prince, or the Legislative, is certainly a change of the Legislative, and so a dissolution of the Government*. In respect to the first position of Mr. Locke, that a change of the Legislative is a dissolution of Government: I believe the Gentlemen who oppose this measure, will scarcely subscribe to the truth of it: For they have for a series of years been preaching on the necessity of a change in the Legislative, as well by abolishing most of the Boroughs, as by new-modelling the remainder; and by extending the Elective Franchise to large bodies of the People, heretofore disqualified by the Laws of the Commonwealth: Some of which pretended Reforming schemes have succeeded, and all which would immediately operate as alterations in the Legislative Body. But it is necessary to advert to the second position of Mr. Locke, and to try whether the conclusion of a Treaty of Incorporating Union with Great Britain by the Irish Legislature, on terms of absolute equality and communication of all privileges, can be deemed a delivery of the Irish Nation into a subjection to a *foreign Power*. It is to be observed in the first place, that Great Britain in respect to Ireland is not a *foreign Power*; both Nations compose

compose one Empire, whose interests with respect to all other Nations is one and the same. Secondly, the Legislatures of the two Nations are not distinct and separate in their present condition: For one branch of the Legislative, and the Supreme Executive, is one and the same in both. — Thirdly, the Irish Legislative is not a supreme power in Ireland, for the exercise of its authority may be at all times cramped and impeded by the English Cabinet in many and most instances; and it has no federative or imperial authority respecting foreign nations, nor has its Executive any such authority, as derived from the Irish Legislature; and if the Irish Legislature vested their whole Legislative Authority in the British Legislature, such a proceeding would not amount to the subjection of the Irish Nation to a *foreign* Power, even on Mr. Locke's principles, and to a consequent dissolution of Government. But an Incorporating Union with Great Britain admits of no such interpretation, as the delivery of the Irish Nation to *subjection to Great Britain*. Irish Peers and Irish Representatives of the Commons will sit in the Imperial Parliament with equal privileges, liberties, and immunities with British Peers and British Representatives; the superior numbers of the latter classes to those of the former, arising from superior extent and opulence of the British Nation, can never, as I trust I have already proved, operate to the peculiar disadvantage of Ireland; there can be no inequality of interest between the limbs of the same body, and consequently no subjection, unless the due subordination of all the parts of a body, to serve in their respective functions for the general and common advantage of the whole, be subjection. The Representative form of Government will be preserved in its purity and vigour, under the same Sovereign, the same Executive; and no objection on the score of change of the Legislature

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can, as I apprehend, come with any degree of consistency from the opposite side of the House founded on the diminution, or rather annihilation of the Irish Borough Representation in the new system, which Representation they have so often declaimed against, nor from the junction of the Peerage and Representatives of the Commons in both Nations in the same Houses, upon perfect terms of equality; bound together by the ties of common interest, to provide for the safety and prosperity of the whole Empire in general, and of each Nation in particular.

The last objection which I have heard urged against an Incorporating Union, is, that Ireland will be thereby reduced to the condition of a dependent Province.—To this it is a full answer, that Ireland by an Incorporating Union will become, from a really dependent Province, a part of the British Empire, equally independent with every other part of it; that England and Scotland are Provinces of the British Empire, and Ireland will be a Province no more dependent on any Power whatsoever, than England and Scotland are; all the Provinces of an Empire, such as the British, the very basis of whose Government is political Liberty, are so far dependent, the one on the other, as that they are all obliged to concur in the means for their common preservation, and without such concurrence they would all yield to a foreign Power: in such light, but in no other, are they dependent, the one on the other, for mutual defence and security: and may they ever continue in that sense dependent, and be for ever indissolubly united!

It is worth while now to bestow a little consideration on what will be the fate of Ireland, in case an Incorporating Union be rejected.—In the first place it is evident, from the various causes of dispute and animosity between Great Britain and Ireland, now subsisting under their present system

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of precarious and imperfect connexion, and from the turbulence, avarice and ambition of some, and jacobinical, anarchical revolutionary principles of other agitators, with whom the country is at present cursed ; who have falsely assumed, and thereby debased and degraded the title of Patriots ; and from the bitter and malignant spirit of a great portion of the lower order of our inhabitants, inspired by the principles of a gloomy, unfociable, unrelenting, sanguinary superstition, of perverted religion, that the two Nations cannot be kept together for any considerable time by their present frail and brittle bonds of connexion. Separation, therefore, or rather an attempt at separation, from Britain, will be the certain consequence of the rejection of this measure. I will first assume, that a successful attempt at separation shall be effected ; it must, if at all, be effected by Rebellion, and the assistance of a French army : the civil war will waste this unhappy Country from one extremity to the other ; and exclusive of the miserable slaughter attendant on a civil war, the whole moveable property of the nation, and all its improvements, will be destroyed and ruined, and the successful surviving rebel will have the miserable triumph of subjecting himself and his posterity to the bondage of France, and becoming a member of a wretched, impoverished, democratic Republic, which will itself be a slave to French democracy. Ye Protestants of Ireland, let me call your attention to what will be your lot in such an event.—No successful attempt at separation can be made without your assistance and co-operation ; you are now possessed of infinitely the greatest portion of wealth and property, moveable and immoveable, of the nation ; you will therefore be infinitely the greatest losers by a Rebellion, which will be a gulph to swallow up all property ; you must associate yourselves and be companions in arms with the hungry French assassins, and murderous crew of United

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Irishmen; you do not amount to more than one-third of the inhabitants of Ireland, the other two-thirds are your mortal enemies, as well on the score of your religion, as your riches: when you shall have assisted in your own ruin, and separated yourselves from Britain, and concurred in establishing a democratic Irish Republic; when you shall be reduced to the same equality of indigence which in such case must be the lot of all; when therefore perfect equality of beggary is introduced, and the Irish Nation is become the vassal of France, do you expect that you will have any security for your lives? Will the descendants of the Irish murderers in 1641, who massacred in cold blood such multitudes of your ancestors, now double your numbers, and on a level with you in all other respects, and assisted by the sanguinary French robbers in the event of a successful rebellion, abstain from their habits of murder? Does their recent conduct at Scullabogue, at Wexford, at Vinegar-hill, inspire you with hopes of safety, when they shall have you in their power? As well may the trembling hind, inclosed in the paws of the ravenous hungry tyger, hope for mercy! The pike and the skeine will soon dispatch such remnant of you as may survive the horrors and miseries of even a successful Rebellion. And you, ye deluded Citizens of Dublin, whom traitors have found means to detach from your true interests, have you ever considered what is to be the unavoidable fate of your City in case of a separation from Great Britain—which, as I have already stated, can never be effected except by Rebellion and desolation? Even one year's war between Great Britain and Ireland would annihilate your trade, as well as the trade of the whole eastern coast of Ireland.—The naval force of Liverpool alone, which in the war before the present almost annihilated the trade of France, would completely lock up all the Irish ports in the Channel, and would not suffer one ship

ship to sail in or out of them, and in case of a separation of the two Countries, as they would certainly be in a state of almost perpetual war, whatever trade Ireland would enjoy, and it could be very little, its western ports would engross it, and Dublin would be effectually ruined. Such a state of separation, effected by a successful rebellion, would, in fact, in the first place desolate the kingdom, and destroy one half of its inhabitants; and in the next place would deprive the whole nation of almost all trade, entirely prevent its recovery, and reduce it to, and keep it in, the most miserable situation that any nation could be possibly reduced to. All that I have here mentioned would be the inevitable consequences of a successful rebellion, and consequent separation; but what would be the effects of an unsuccessful rebellion in the cause of meditated separation? for it is morally certain that such rebellion and such attempt would be unsuccessful. No person who knows the situation natural and political of Great Britain and Ireland, can deny, that Ireland of itself is unable to cope with Great Britain even if the inhabitants of Ireland were unanimous: but it is notorious, in case a rebellion was to break out for separation, that the country would be divided, and that before such rebellion could rage for one year, all the Protestants of Ireland, that is almost the whole property of the kingdom, would find it their interest to join the King's standard. The bloody remorseless cruelty, and insatiable thirst for plunder, of the rest of their countrymen, would soon convince them of the necessity of using their arms against them. The present feeble state of the French Marine, and the exhausted state of that wretched nation in general, would deprive the rebels of any effectual assistance from that quarter. When the whole Irish nation, (a handful of Protestants in the North of the kingdom excepted) took arms in the year 1688 in favour of King James the second, and the French Monarch,

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Louis XIV. at that time in the zenith of his glory, sent a French army, and an immense supply of all kinds of military stores to their assistance, and when his navy rode triumphant on the ocean, England reduced the whole kingdom to the most abject submission in two campaigns; and similar will be the event of any Irish Rebellion undertaken in the cause of separation; but it will be attended with infinite calamity to the inhabitants of Ireland of all descriptions. We have now our choice, whether we will rush on our own ruin, or embrace with joy the measure of an Incorporating Union, the sure pledge of national happiness, prosperity and security. Unconnected as I am with the Government, or its Ministers both in England and Ireland, and attached to it only as a good and loyal subject, in spite of clamour and faction, I must express my sincere wish that the nation may adopt the latter measure. I have long since made my choice;

Non ardor Civium prava jubentium

Mente quatit solidâ.

FINIS.