



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1A-I
6 June 1984

RECENT ARTICLES FROM UNDERGROUND PUBLICATIONS IN POLAND


Compiled and translated
by Teresa Hanicka and Nika Krzeczunowicz

	<u>No.</u>
"Are We Threatened with Sovietization?" from <i>Spectator</i> , no. 6, Winter 1983/1984	1A
"The Europe of the Future" from <i>Niepodleglosc</i> , no. 26, February 1984	1B
"Anachronism or Martyrdom?" from <i>Krytyka</i> , no. 16, 1983	1C
"Youth in Times of Social Tension" from <i>Krytyka</i> , no. 16, 1983	1D
"Is It To Be Another Thaw?" from <i>Tygodnik Mazowsze</i> , no. 83, 6 April 1984	1E
"Byelorussia--Good Russia" from <i>Tygodnik Mazowsze</i> , no. 84, 12 April 1984	1F
"The Party, Ceausescu, Romania" from <i>Agencja Informacyjna "Solidarnosci,"</i> no. 21, 18 March 1984	1G
A Special Publication of Fighting Solidarity	1H
Leaflet Announcing the Marriage of a Jailed Solidarity Leader	1I

INTRODUCTION

This is the first in what is planned as a series of packages to be issued by the RFE Research and Analysis Department's Samizdat Section. The object is to present selections of articles from the Polish underground press that transcend purely Polish concerns and raise general issues of East European and broader interest.

The articles in this first package, for instance, include a few longer pieces concerned with the ethics and practice of living under communist domination as well as articles devoted to Poland's neighbors and other nations in the communist camp. This selection was intended to show the range of interests that for obvious reasons dominate in the underground press; the selection also reflects the efforts made to broaden the scope of Polish concerns beyond national boundaries. Also included are the results of a poll showing to what extent Polish youth rejects the party and the military regime.



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*
Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1A
6 June 1984

"Are We Threatened with Sovietization?"

From: *Spectator*, no. 6, Winter 1983-1984

Introduction: *Spectator* is an irregular social and political journal published by NOWA (The Independent Publishing House). In this article five anonymous participants (Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon) discuss the question of whether Polish society is in danger of being Sovietized. How real is the threat? How does it manifest itself? How can Sovietization be avoided?

* * *

Alpha: Sovietization is the transformation of the psyche of the conquered people while maintaining the appearance of national independence. Broadly speaking, the aim is to force society to "go to the dogs." This takes the form, for example, of unreliability, bribery, theft, widespread drinking on the job, and so forth.

[This debasement of Polish culture is not a conscious policy on the part of the Soviet authorities but rather an inherent aspect of the system.]

Delta: The paramount requirement of the system is the absolute and total submission of the individual, and in the case of the satellite countries this submission is doubly important as it requires the individual to accept both the system and to recognize his country's dependence on the state that imposed the system. . . . The system cannot succeed without first breaking down all the existing social bonds that give the nation its identity. . . . Thus, "Russification" is not even necessary, . . .

Moreover, in such a situation emphasis on symbols of national independence, on the notions of patriotism, and so on, can all be encouraged.

Beta: This process of "mongrelization" of society is accompanied by . . . constant talk of the individual, of his happiness, of all-round development, etc. Where does this come from?

Delta: It comes from inconsistencies inherent in the system, which, I believe, also offer the best chance of opposing it. Quite simply, the system cannot openly articulate its aims; it has to hide them behind a screen of slogans. Our aim should be to exploit this screen as skillfully as possible, to use these slogans to defend the values that the system formally embraces but does not really want.

[Epsilon compares the system to a prison in which the prisoners, although they outnumber the wardens, do not rebel. Such is the nature of all dictatorships. In a socialist system, however, the prisoners are also expected to "feel happy that they live in a prison, to believe that their prison is the most magnificent boarding house in the most magnificent resort and that what lies beyond the walls is hell!" Here an important role is played by propaganda.]

The participants believe the Polish people to be fairly resistant to the system because of their particular history, but they agree that the struggle is not over yet. It is essential to understand the workings of the system in order to be able to oppose it.

An excellent example of the effects of Sovietization is the economy.]

Epsilon: We are constantly being called upon to work more productively, more effectively [and there are people who think we should work hard because] . . . the system is in any case undefeatable and therefore certain positive values should be upheld for their own sake; also, an efficient economy should be created as a condition for national existence. Such people believe that work is of paramount importance and maintain that only a country that is independent economically can be independent politically. . . . It is the system, however, that makes the economy inefficient and not the fact that people work badly. . . .

Gamma: The question is whether this is the result of mistakes, a lack of instruments for directing the economy, poor planning methods, and so on or, does the fault lie in the model? I agree with the view that is fast becoming almost universally accepted--that it is the model that is at fault and that no number of computers of the n^{th} generation will make it efficient. Quite simply, the number of variables is too great, each variable being the behavior of each individual times the number of choices we face in life. Thus, the only way out for a socialist economy is

to impose maximum uniformity; and this, of course, means the denial of individual rights. The system, therefore, has to break the individual and force him to operate within ineffective economic structures; hence, calling for the upholding of the quality and quantity of work cannot be an effective defense against the system. Most people are conscious of how ineffective their work is. This, in turn, is the cause of many negative attitudes at work such as drunkenness, theft, unreliability, and so forth. Most working people are fully aware of the fact that their sins are negligible in comparison with the overwhelming waste caused by the system. . . .

Alpha: At the same time, instead of calling on people to work as slowly as possible, I would rather encourage the following slogan: "Allow us to work better!" That is one way of resisting Sovietization.

Gamma: But what is to allow us to work better? The system against which this slogan is directed? The unreformability of the system depends on the fact that any far-reaching reform--and only such a reform can make the system more efficient--would undermine the system's own dogma, and it is this that is impossible. . . .

Beta: It is not only the case with economic matters. Every thought process must lead to an undermining of the philosophy of the system, so the system must, in self-defense, prevent independent thought; and to this end it rewrites history, removes books from the libraries, emasculates theatrical repertoires, stops films from being shown--all in order to facilitate a fictitious vision of the world to be fixed in people's minds. . . .

Gamma: Let us then define the battlegrounds for the fight against Sovietization. It seems that the most important of these is to supply information about the real world and to counteract attempts by the system to alter social consciousness. . . . Together with this should go the creation of independent, alternative organizations of the widest range possible, covering everything from intellectual life to the economy.

[People are tired and there is an atmosphere of defeatism, but the system and the authorities have not won. If the ideal Sovietized citizen is a thoughtless automation, then the participants believe, that Poles are far from being completely Sovietized. Gamma points out, however, that the system has managed to cause a certain amount of havoc in the sphere of morality.]

Delta: Unfortunately, a characteristic of the system is that people find it difficult to live in accordance with their ethical beliefs; at almost every step they are forced to compromise. I fear that it is only babies who have never done anything illegal; a normal citizen would simply perish if he adhered to the laws of

morality. There is also the system of distributing so-called privileges, which now include the most basic needs of life, and which induce large sections of the community to line up for favors from the authorities. . . .

[This leads to what Beta describes as a "schizophrenic consciousness" or a dual mentality--one for show in public life and the other private.]

Gamma: . . . Very often this "homely" defense against the attacks of propaganda can lead to such things as an unrealistic view of the world, the consolidation of myths, an attack on the principles of rational thought, and so on. It is essential that a system of independent education be established, that there be a free flow of independent ideas. . . .

[The changes in circumstances have also made the struggle against Sovietization easier.]

Beta: The system no longer has the possibility that Gierek had of buying people for itself; the crisis has deprived it of that possibility. . . . The new situation has also broadened the scope and scale of circulation of illegal information.]

[The discussion is concluded by the editors expressing their hope that their raising the issue has contributed to the process of de-Sovietization.]

- end -



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1B
6 June 1984

"THE EUROPE OF THE FUTURE"

by Wojtek Wojskowy

From: *Niepodleglosc*, no. 26, February 1984.

Introduction: *Niepodleglosc* [Independence] is a monthly that has been appearing in Warsaw since early 1982. As its name implies, it takes a very tough stand on the situation in Poland and accepts no thoughts of compromise but does not call for violence. The author's name is a pseudonym.

* * *

In Polish oppositional activities, foreign policy has never been of much interest. The main reason for this state of affairs was the concern with current struggles and the winning of individual battles against the regime's legislation, for instance. An overall vision of the character of the future Poland had been put off indefinitely. It is obvious that it is impossible to conduct any activity in the political sphere without a precise outline of the foreign aspects of that policy. Only then is it possible to present a multilateral program of political solutions and seek allies in maintaining it. Our liberal-democratic group set as its ultimate aim the recovery of political independence by Poland. Without this there can be no question of observing civil rights, of civil influence on the system of government, of self-management, of increasing the wealth of the nation; and the only way in which this aim can be brought closer is by directing action toward the annulment of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam

decisions. A good way to further this aim is to change the mentality of the Poles themselves as well as that of their neighbors and [the people] in other countries to the East and West. In order to promote the aim of independence, one should present a political program that would be acceptable to all interested countries.

In other words, one must create a model of a future Polish foreign policy that, if advanced today, would successfully combine our joint efforts toward liberation; and later an independent Poland would be our common guarantee that colonial subjection would not recur. The matter is of the utmost importance, since among Poles, as among neighboring peoples, historical knowledge has been reduced in many respects to stereotypes that have their roots in centuries of prejudice.

Thus, it is almost a necessity to conduct a Polish foreign policy here and now, in the name of Polish interests, the interests of a nation that has only one solution open to it: achieving independence. In order for this to take place, however, a inevitable condition is the creation of a representative political body of the Polish people, made up of political groups representing a broad spectrum of views and political attitudes. As long as the Polish opposition here at home fails to realize this, it will be condemned to the narrow prospect of summary undertakings and wishful thinking. We believe, and we have been making this clear since the first issue of *Niepodleglosc*, that it has become necessary to create in Western Europe (the only place at present where overt activities are possible) an organization representative of the Polish opposition movement (political parties and groups), an organization of appropriate political and intellectual caliber, which we call Polish National Representatives [Polish acronym: PRN]. Its main task would be, at least in the first stage, to exert political pressure on the governments and parliaments of Western Europe, by representing the true interests of the Polish nation and, above all, by unequivocally rejecting the Yalta agreements. It would seem that a [group of] Polish National Representatives expressing Polish national interests could be accepted by the governments in the West, particularly now, when the Soviet threat has become more real than ever before. However the PNR might develop in the future, it would mean a step forward, reflecting the political changes taking place in Polish society itself. It is not impossible that in the future similar groups would emerge in other captive nations of the [Soviet] camp. Their possible cooperation would mean an important step toward cooperation among countries of Central and Eastern Europe following their liberation. Obviously, before creating the PNR, one must define as precisely as possible the Polish political interests that would determine an independent Polish foreign policy.

We would like to point out that we do not pretend to be the sole spokesman of the Polish nation and that we represent only the views of our own liberal-democratic group. Therefore, as with other suggestions, we submit this to the consideration of our readers, hoping for an honest discussion with those who stand [both] to the Left and to the Right of us.

Since we, like other European nations, cannot change our geographical situation, we remain and shall remain within the spheres of influence of both East and West. For centuries the most important question was the solution of the problems arising from our proximity to Germany and Russia. In order to remove, once and for all, the danger to our independence and freedom stemming from both these neighbors, our group expressed the need to adhere to the cardinal principle that the Polish state is equal to all other states, including its immediate neighbors. Yet, the guarantee of Polish interests cannot be reduced to international treaties and agreements, which, as we all know, are not enduring if they are not followed in political practice. This was well understood by the Jagellonians when they decided that Poland could defend itself against the Teutonic Knights and the Hapsburgs only through a coalition with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Polish-Lithuanian Union, created over the course of two centuries ensured peace and development to the republic for a long time. Obviously, giving this example is not to propose, for instance, a Polonization of other nations but only to make it obvious to the readers that a Poland left alone in the center of Europe will always be a tasty morsel for its mightier neighbors. This is why efforts must be made today to further an alliance of the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe, to be transformed later, after the collapse of Soviet imperialism, into a loose federation or league. Even today, Poland must be active in furthering the independence of the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Byelorussia not only for the sake of its own freedom but also for the freedom of those nations with which it should be allied politically and economically in the future. In practice, in addition to the states mentioned above, a Central-Eastern European Community might include, in our opinion, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and possibly Yugoslavia. The creation of such a community would create a third economic, political, and military power--after the Soviet Union and the West European Community--that would defend the interests of those nations, which have been so sorely tried in the past. At the same time it would further order, freedom, and peace in the region.

The states of Central and Eastern Europe would make agreements with one another, creating a community with a joint economy and a common passport; [it] would guarantee political and cultural freedom for minorities, create the possibility of residence in any country by any citizen of the community. In order to achieve such cooperation, the Poles, as the strongest and most populous nation of that region, must not be a threat to their potential partners in a confederation. As one of our correspondents wrote in a discussion of program principles, there are no

just boundaries in our part of Europe. Every concrete solution is unfair to someone. This is why we suggest that the Poles accept the present boundaries, that is, waive [our rights] to our Eastern territories, and especially the area around Wilno and Lwow, to an independent Lithuania, independent Byelorussia, and independent Ukraine--this according to a sovereign Polish decision and not as a result of some ultimatum in Yalta by the three powers. This would take care of a possible source of disagreement with Poland's Eastern neighbors and would greatly weaken, or so we hope, their fear of Polish domination in the federation we are suggesting.

An essential factor in the Polish foreign policy should be the development of a policy toward the Russian people and the future Russian state, which would be raised on the ruins of the Soviet Empire. In our view, it should be based on the principles of equality, partnership, and mutual noninterference in [the others'] internal affairs. The national interests of an independent Polish state and a Russian state freed from the communist yoke need not be contrary nor mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, Poland should insist on the absolute elimination of Russian imperialism, which has been burdening [our] country at least since the time of Peter I. We acknowledge the Russian nation as a nation enslaved by the Communists and deprived of its rights. We believe that this nation, like any other, has the right to live in freedom and peace. This is why we propose that Polish political groups offer support to those Russians who devote their efforts to the liberation of the Russian people from communist rule and to political, social, and cultural rebirth [in their country], those Russians who combat the deeply rooted Greater Russian chauvinism and nationalism on which imperialism and despotism thrive.

Poland should maintain friendly relations and conduct trade with a free and independent Russia which would include only ethnically Russian regions (the southern and Caucasian republics should also gain independence). Poles living within [Russian] territory must have the right either to return to their country or to enjoy full cultural autonomy. The solution of the problems of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe would facilitate the signing, if such would be the decision, of a treaty of double citizenship.

As far as our second contiguous neighbor, Germany, is concerned, we maintain the inviolability of the Polish-German boundary on the Oder-Neisse. Its temporary legal character, emphasized by certain political circles in the FRG, should be made permanent by a peace treaty or some other international agreement. The boundary on the Oder-Neisse constitutes, above all, some sort of compensation for the physical and moral losses suffered by Poland during World War II. It is impossible, however, to turn back the clock of history. This is why, while remembering the German crimes as well as the Soviet ones, we must look to the future, proposing an order in Europe that would ensure

that the frontiers of Poland and other countries would not [again] be the cause of war. One must remember that two generations not knowing Nazism have been born in free Germany. Generally speaking, the society in the FRG is friendly toward Poland, and the so-called revanchist tendencies are only on the political fringe, artificially magnified by communist propaganda in Poland in order to embroil Poles and Germans and to distract attention from Poland's main enemy at present--the Soviet Union. According to the principle of self-determination, the Germans, like any other nation, have the right to live in a unified state. We therefore support the reunification of Germany and the creation of a free, independent German state. This evolution should advance good relations between our two nations. Obviously, the rights of national minorities should be guaranteed in both states.

Finally, being deprived of our own statehood, in fact, subjected to foreign occupation, we count on understanding and aid from Western Europe and from other free and democratic states throughout the world. This world must understand that the reconstruction of a sovereign and free Poland is clearly in [the whole world's] interests; and it is not just the fact that "there can be no just Europe without an independent Poland," [Pope John Paul II] because the policy of the West was never guided by sentiment or moral consideration, but also the understanding of the basic principle that only the weakening of the Soviet empire can provide a successful defense for the political independence of the free world. A lasting peace will reign in Europe only when it becomes a continent of democratic states and free nations, cooperating with one another to ensure freedom and wealth for their citizens, a continent on which there will be no room for anachronistic "reservations" for so-called socialist democracy, communist welfare, and limited sovereignty.

In order to achieve this state, however, one must give up the policy of temporary gains (such as the Siberian gas or trade with the Soviet Union) for the sake of long-term advantages, making it easier for the people (or societies) of Central and Eastern Europe to struggle for the implementation of the principles written down in the Declaration of the Rights of Man.



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1C
6 June 1984

"ANACHRONISM OR MARTYRDOM?"

by Andrzej Kaminski

From: *Krytyka*, no. 16, 1983

Introduction: These are excerpts from a lengthy article on Cardinal Mindszenty, based in part on his *Memoirs* that were published in German in Vienna (1974); they have now appeared in *Krytyka*, an occasional sociopolitical journal, printed in Warsaw since the late 1970s by a group of KOR members and supporters.

* * *

A 1,000 years of Christian tradition in Hungary collided with the communism that was brought by Soviet bayonets; the reluctant martyrs suffered and died not only because they did not understand that "might is right," but because they did understand the ideology of the invader and were therefore prepared to fight to the end. Among these martyrs was, without any doubt, Jozef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Primate of Hungary from 1945 to 1974. In all his statements he pointed out the anti-Church, anti-national, and antidemocratic character of communism; in a communist state he paid for this with torture, prison, and finally exile. His *Memoirs* are a burning proclamation of faith in the final victory of the Church and a warning against compromise with an opponent who respects no laws. The *Memoirs* also provide an example of a man ready for total sacrifice in the name of freedom of the Church and of the nation: they convey his controversial

personality, worthy of respect but also capable of causing antagonism with its anachronistic views. Mindszenty was condemned to an anachronistic role when he was made prince primate by Pope Pius XII in a country ruled by Communists.

[The author next explains the changes introduced by the Communists that circumscribed and attempted to eliminate the power of the Church in Hungary. The land reform deprived the Church of income from its large estates; the religious schools, attended by three quarters of young Hungarians, were closed down; and the Smallholders Party disappeared soon after winning the first postwar elections.]

The turn of events foretold of the most difficult period of Church persecution in the history of Hungary. These fears were supported by the fate of the Christian Churches in the Soviet Union: destruction or complete subordination to the state administration. Mindszenty wanted to preserve among his clergy the hope for a better future and to prepare the nation for a struggle to maintain its identity. He perceived a means of successful defense against communism through deeper faith and by including "days of national remembrance in Church festivities"; in other words, by creating strong ties between Hungary and Christianity. Catholic faith and the nurturing of a tradition were to be an antidote to an ideology that exploits human weakness. This was no easy task in a country that lost the war, and among people burdened with guilt. . . . The primate had to combine the defense of the Church before aggressive atheism with the reconstruction of the fabric of life and the morale of the Hungarian nation. In a radio speech on 31 December 1945 he called the faithful to penance--churches were overfilled. . . .

He was above all to be the pastor of all Hungary and all Hungarians. He visited prisoners and internees; he protested against the holding of thousands of people in camps without trial; he demanded a general amnesty. . . . Through his apostolic work, uniting the whole nation against the Communists, Mindszenty became the main obstacle on the road to socialism. His uncompromising stand was the target of a ceaseless barrage of propaganda. He was accused of belonging to the feudal era, of chauvinism, of hostility to democracy. In reply he explained:

The archbishop is not "an open enemy of democracy." On the contrary, he is a supporter of true democracy, not one that calls itself a democracy but is in fact a thinly white-washed remnant of a not quite bankrupt, totalitarian regime..

He explained and he admonished. The tone of his announcements was always strong, he did not water down his words with understatement: the pastoral letters, the sermons, the speeches that showed a great attachment to the disappearing past, at the same time these all expressed strong protest against breaking the law and the persecution of innocents. To bear witness to the truth,

this was his message in the years of silence. In the face of total falsehood, with which the Communists wanted to enslave the nation, he used the weapons of historic truth and the truth of his own era. Whether or not others believed that a compromise between the Church and the communist regime could be achieved, Mindszenty would not tolerate this belief.

The postwar terror only helped to increase his earlier hostility to communism. . . . Always well-informed about communist ideology, he was consistent in his refusal to accept the new rule. He believed it illegal . . . and his pride did not allow for compromise. In his *Memoirs* one can read the disdain he felt, for the rulers who were supported solely by might and the presence of the Soviet army, not by laws going back 900 years. . . . Stubbornly refusing to recognize the dictatorship of the communist party and the actual balance of power, Mindszenty could not pursue the political realism that was supported not only by "patriot priests" (who were no more than agents) and Catholics collaborating with the regime, but also by the conservative historian Gyula Szekfu and the outstanding musician Zoltan Kodaly. . . .

For Mindszenty, the struggle was between Christianity and evil. The devil could not be saved. The authorities, at the same time, were no longer bound by Lenin's injunction that the struggle with religion should be waged in a way that would not deter the faithful, and that the clergy should be used, as far as possible, for party aims. In a "people's democracy" Stalinism soon became the order; and Stalinism wanted to subjugate, come what may, all the institutions within the state.

The Primate of Hungary was determined not to permit any "agreement" with the government, seeing in it the implementation of the Soviet model for "freedom of religion"; the kind of "freedom" granted by the Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Sergiei. . . . Mindszenty liked to repeat that "the harder the hammer strikes, the harder the anvil becomes." Yet the times demanded that one be flexible. In the event, Mindszenty had to be arrested; two occasions during the primate's freedom indicate his willingness to embrace martyrdom.

[The first occasion was in February 1946, when Pope Pius XII gave him the cardinal's hat, the red color of which is a symbol of martyrdom. The second was the speech he gave in October 1948, his "Appeal to the Nation" in which he proclaimed his immovable stand in the defense of truth and of those who suffer.]

The last act of the drama took place on 26 December 1948. The primate was arrested by the Security Police and taken to prison on Andiassy Street. The same night the interrogation began, Mindszenty was beaten and drugged. Four weeks later, after this "preparation," Cardinal Mindszenty was given a show trial in a "people's tribunal" in Budapest. He was accused of spying,

currency transgressions, and running an organization aimed at overthrowing the state. Three days later he was sentenced to life in a high security prison.

In his *Prison Notes*, Cardinal Wyszynski wrote that in Mindszenty's trial "Europe was shown that anything is possible. In the last analysis, this was an extreme and isolated incident aimed at testing the temperature of Christian Europe." The imprisonment of the Primate of Hungary was certainly a warning to other Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe. . . .

The Primate of Hungary, the constitutional head of state during an interregnum, refused to accept the rule imposed by force and chose martyrdom. In doing so he showed his greatness; but he had failed to understand that compromises accepted by a persecuted Church (up until the moment of *non possumus*) need not lead to a decline of its authority and can be perceived by the faithful as a tactic aimed at deflecting the blows of the adversary. After all, not just Mindszenty but surely Sapieha and Wyszynski as well, saw communism as the embodiment of the anti-Christ. Not only the Hungarian Church but also the Polish Church were burdened by their traditional role as bulwarks of Christianity.

History proved Cardinal Wyszynski right. But if Stalin had lived longer, would the Polish Church have been destroyed as thoroughly as the Church in Hungary or could it have maintained its authority? The prospect of the Stalinist night offered no flicker of hope: it heralded the darkness of the catacombs of a underground, missionary Church (as in Lithuania). The uncompromising stand of Cardinal Mindszenty and his sufferings lightened the way for the broken Church and his memory inspired the work of monks after the dissolution of monasteries. Mindszenty's plight was a symbol of national integration; indeed, it probably played a great role in the education of the generation that was capable of taking up arms in defense of freedom in 1956.

One further question remains unanswered. What was the effect on Kadar's policy of Cardinal Mindszenty's presence in the US Embassy (where he took asylum until 1971)? Kadar did liquidate the gains of the Hungarian October 1956 but also broke with the Stalinist past. Undoubtedly, Jozef Cardinal Mindszenty has had a strong influence on the recent history of Hungary and of the Catholic Church. Was his martyrdom an anachronism? Secular, left-thinking Europe of the postwar years saw nothing but anachronism in his attachment to tradition and readiness for martyrdom. Conservatism, nationalism, and anticommunism most certainly ran contrary to the spirit, or rather the ghost, of Stalinism. Compromise and progress: these were the maxims the Hungarian Church was expected to follow by both the West and the East, but for entirely different ends. For the former, compromise and

progress were understood as a means of broadening human freedoms; for the latter, a means for their destruction. The paradox of Mindszenty's uncompromising attitude was that his militant conservatism worked in defense of the irreplaceable values of democratic societies, and his martyrdom was part of the price of freedom.

- end -



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1D
6 June 1984

"YOUTH IN TIMES OF SOCIAL TENSION"

From: *Krytyka*, no. 16, 1983

Introduction: During the first half of 1982, the Central Council of the Socialist Union of Polish Students (SUP) commissioned an opinion poll to be carried out among Warsaw high-school and college students on various student and social matters. The results of the question were presented in a report by Lechoslaw Dabowski entitled "Students in Times of Social Tension." We publish below a selection of the results which, so far as we know, have not been published elsewhere.

* * *

How Justified Was the Decision To Introduce Martial Law?		
	College students	High-school students
Completely justified	3.5%	2.0%
Correct in principle	15.0%	17.0%
Wrong in principle	20.5%	38.0%
Completely unjustified	48.5%	34.0%
No opinion	11.5%	9.0%

What Was the Reason for Introducing Martial Law? (86.5% of the college students and 78% of the high-school students gave a concrete answer)		
	Students	Pupils
The desire to hold onto power	51.5%	52.0%
Other reasons aimed at preserving the status quo	18.5%	3.5%
Pressure from abroad	16.5%	12.0%
State interests	5.5%	2.0%
Danger of civil war	5.0%	5.5%
Growing anarchy and an increase in the crime rate	9.5%	5.5%
The economic state of the country	5.5%	15.0%
The aggressive attitude of the opposition	1.5%	3.5%
An excessive entrenchment of attitudes, an inability to find a compromise by both sides	1.5%	0.5%

Attitude to Sanctions Employed by the USA		
	Students	Pupils
Positive	30.5%	27.0%
Essentially positive	6.5%	17.0%
Essentially negative	4.5%	7.0%
Negative	17.0%	23.5%
No precise opinion	41.5%	25.5%

Attitude to the Role Played by the Polish United Workers Party in the Events of 1981		
	Students	Pupils
Decidedly positive	3.5%	2.0%
Essentially positive	3.0%	5.0%
Essentially negative	14.5%	15.5%
Decidedly negative	58.0%	55.0%

Attitude to the Role of the Church in the Events of 1981		
	Students	Pupils
Decidedly positive	56.5%	79.0%
Essentially positive	10.5%	5.0%
Essentially negative	2.5%	1.0%
Decidedly negative	4.5%	1.0%

Attitude to the Role of Solidarity in the Events of 1981		
	Students	Pupils
Decidedly positive	48.5%	49.0%
On the whole positive	19.0%	15.0%
On the whole negative	6.0%	4.0%
Decidedly negative	4.0%	3.5%

To What Organization Would They Like to Belong?		
	Students	Pupils
Independent Students Association (disbanded in the first months of martial law)	40.0%	31.0%
Various official youth organizations	20.5%	22.5%
Others	0.5%	0.5%

- end -



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1E
6 June 1984

"IS IT TO BE ANOTHER THAW?"

by A. SAS

From: *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 83, 6 June 1984

Introduction: The *Mazowsze Weekly* is the official paper of the underground Solidarity leadership in the Warsaw region. The article contains intelligent analysis based on the information available to the author, but in light of recent events (the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics, the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20s in Czechoslovakia and the GDR), it is wrong; there has been no thawing in Soviet-American relations.

* * *

All of a sudden Pershing and cruise missiles have disappeared from our television screens, and instead of nuclear horrors we are shown a close-up of Chernenko clasping Bush, Kohl, and Thatcher in a feeble handshake. What on earth has happened to rid Editor Wozniak and his bosses of their fear of atomic extermination? On the face of it, nothing. The Pershings are still in place. It is simply that the matter is no longer making front page headlines but has been demoted to the small items on page three.

All this would indicate that the latest stage in the arms race has ended with defeat for the Kremlin gerontocracy. For the USSR the stake in this stage of the race was to maintain the military superiority they had won during the period of detente when the West had significantly slowed down the rate of arms growth. For the West the stakes were higher. The aim was not only to achieve parity, but to shake off the lethargy it had sunk

into and to reorientate its policy to meet the new situation after the failure of the hoped for thaw of the 1970s.

In the game over Pershing and cruise, Russia put all its hopes on one card--the Western peace movements. The idea was simple: that in a democratic system an efficient mass organization like the peace movement, with the help of television coverage, could put effective pressure on Western governments to withdraw from the plan to install Euromissiles. This calculation was not unfounded. Demonstrations drawing tens of thousands of participants, blockades of missile bases, "peace chains," questions in parliament, appeals by numerous politicians and by academics and artists (and not only from the left)--all this served to support the Kremlin strategists in their belief that they had adopted the correct course of action and that the West would be hoisted with its own petard.

To Moscow's surprise, however, the Western governments managed to resist all pressures; and the first missiles were installed according to plan. It was then that the Soviet Union made its cardinal mistake. It declared that it would install its missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and broke off all disarmament talks until all missiles were dismantled and plans to install new ones dropped. The idea was to frighten the pacifists by increasing tension and thus lead them to more decisive action.

The Soviet Union wanted to employ a strategy of burning their bridges. This involves making a decision from which it is difficult to step down without losing face, the voluntary limitation of one's own freedom of maneuver in order to place the full onus of finding a solution on the opponent; such a solution would thus be at the opponent's own cost. The West, however, quite simply ignored the desperate maneuvering of the Kremlin. The decision to install rockets in Czechoslovakia and East Germany came as no surprise to Western politicians, and it was insignificant from a military point of view. The reaction to the breaking off of talks was calm, and a "wait and see" attitude was adopted. A hard-line attitude was maintained toward pressure from the pacifists, who in turn weakened significantly in response to the maneuvers of the "defenders of peace" in Moscow. The Soviet ace did not draw the desired response. At the same time, voices of protest became audible in Czechoslovakia and East Germany; and the barest buds of the East German peace movement were given a powerful boost.

The Soviet Union must have realized that it had not only lost this round but had also fallen into its own trap, being caught in its hard-line stance. The West, having achieved its aim in full, also has no interest in maintaining tension. All that was needed was the right moment and Andropov's funeral provided an excellent opportunity. It allowed the blame to be put squarely on Yurii Vladimirovich and for all to have a fresh start. The first sign that the situation was changing were those handshakes we saw on television. The second sign was quick to

follow: the Russians agreed to mutual direct control over the processes for neutralizing chemical weapons. This is significant when we take into account how unwilling the Russians normally are to open themselves up to outside control and to show their military installations to outsiders.

Having lost the battle for Euromissiles, the USSR is keen for there to be an easing of tension. Chernenko and his successor, unless they want to be faced with growing dissatisfaction and unrest, are confronted with the urgent task of improving their country's economy, and while the international situation remains tense the Soviet marshals are going to be unwilling to give one kopeck from the arms budget. In addition, the Russians have lost the technological race once and for all and cannot allow themselves to be cut off from the West altogether. They need Western technology to help manufacture everything from shoes and fertilizers to pipelines, submarines, and rockets. So is there to be another thaw? We shall live, we shall see.

- end -



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1F
6 June 1984

"BYELORUSSIA--GOOD RUSSIA"

From: *Tygodnik Mazowszé*, no. 84, 12 April 1984.

To the Polish ear "Byelorussia" sounds better than "The Ukraine." It is less burdened with the memory of mutual wrongs; and there are also people who have consistently defended the good name of that country, our neighbor. To quote Tadeusz Konwicki from his book *Kalendarz i Klepsydra* [The Calendar and the Hour-glass]:

Why are you called White Russia when you have no whiteness in you, when your whiteness is the russet of autumnal rye fields, when your whiteness is grey linen laid out in the sun, when your whiteness is the sweat of exhausted people? You should be called Good Russia, you should be called the Good Land of Good People. . . . Byelorussia, Byelorussia, gray-green with an enormous sky over a flaxen head. You are too good, too mild, too noble for our times.

Byelorussia has 9,000,000 inhabitants, 207,000 square kilometers--the same area and the same number of people as in the Russian republic. Isolated ethnically in a land inhabited by several Slav tribes and for a long time a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth, Byelorussia became a part of the Russian Empire during the partitions. During the 19th century Byelorussia took part in our insurrections, suffered religious persecution, and demanded recognition for its separate identity. The first modest freedoms came in 1905. The First World War devastated the country. Independence was declared after the Bolshevik Revolution in December 1917, but the new Byelorussian authorities in Minsk were quickly removed by the Bolsheviks. Then came the Germans, and after their defeat Byelorussian territory was disputed between Poland and the Soviet Union; finally, the territory was divided between them. Initially, on both sides of the border, ethnical and cultural differences were respected, but in the late 1920s a hard-line policy was adopted both in Poland and in the Soviet Union. The

tions, and deportations. Nonetheless, Byelorussians in Poland saw their chance for a fruition of their national aspirations on the other side of the border. "Warsaw pursued an absurd policy," wrote Czeslaw Milosz in *Rodzinna Europa* [The Native Realm]:


It forbade, with a few exceptions, separate schools and punished with prison any attempts at grassroots organization. . . . One thing is certain, the Byelorussians never had an easy life; their choice was that of a caught fish, the frying pan or the pot, that is, Polonization or Russification.

World War II brought the Soviet "liberation" of western Byelorussia and a brutal awakening. The Germans were initially greeted with hope, but their ruthless behavior only encouraged the partisan war, which was being organized on Moscow's orders. This war was particularly savage, with repressions, the massacre of whole villages, the liquidation of ghettos, deportations, etc., all of which cost close to 2,000,000 lives. After the war this number was swelled by the massive Stalinist repressions. All this, however, did not dampen the spirit of independence, especially in the field of culture. Culturally, Byelorussia once had strong ties with Poland, especially in the 19th century. We find many Byelorussian themes in Mickiewicz and in Syrokomla and Orzeszkowa as well. The Byelorussian classic writers Kupala and Kolas took much of their inspiration from us; and Polish influence is very noticeable in the work of many modern writers. One of Byelorussia's notable contemporary writers is the excellent stylist Basyli Bykau, who is well known in Poland. He was for many years tough and independent (especially noteworthy was his bold speech on creative freedom at the conference of Byelorussian writers in 1966), but he has recently become more restrained. Also noteworthy are Mielecz, Szamakin, Karatkiewicz, Ptasznikau, Adamowicz, and other poets of the older generation who grew up in Poland before the war. They include Maksym Tank and Janka Bryl, as well as Nil Gilewacz, Danuta Biczal-Zahnietawa, and others. Taking advantage of the modest liberalization under Khrushchev, Byelorussian literature began to defend its national interests more decidedly and has continued to do so, more or less successfully, to this day. Not much is heard about Byelorussian protests or calls for independence; but they did surface, for example, in 1956; and from time to time there are sharp attacks in the press on the "nationalistic" tendencies of certain artists and writers. So the flame is alive.

In the Bialystok region we have a Byelorussian minority that is culturally significant and active. A notable Polish Byelorussian writer of prose is Sokrat Janowicz. He and his friends lead a hard life because the current government policy is surprisingly similar to the prewar denationalizing policies and because Polish Byelorussia is separated from Soviet Byelorussia by the silent frontier wall--all the more reason for us to respect and understand the Byelorussians. We should also be aware of the fact that while we demand recognition for the wrongs done to us,

we ourselves have also been wrongdoers; and one day it will fall on us to make amends and ask our weaker brothers for forgiveness, because "A man who speaks Polish," Janowicz writes in a melancholy tone, "awakens in my mother an irresistable desire to remove herself, to get out of his sight." He, however, does much to improve relations. He travels and encourages others to travel "to the health-giving waters, from the sources of which Poland, together with Byelorussia, takes on the rosiness of health and greatness." So there is hope.

- end -





RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1G
6 June 1984

"THE PARTY, CEAUSESCU, ROMANIA"

From: *Agencja Informacyjna Solidarnosci*, no. 21, 18 March
1984

Introduction: The translation below is of an article on Romania that appeared in the March issue of the bulletin of the underground Solidarity Information Agency in Warsaw. This fortnightly bulletin of news and editorials is a source for other underground publications.

* * *

On the whole, Poles do not have a very high opinion of Romanians . . . which prevents us from having a clear picture of that country. The fate of Romania has, after all, been closely linked with our own and will probably continue to be so in the future. At the outset of this article I would like to draw attention to two matters: first, Romania was the only country in the Eastern bloc to witness large and organized worker protests during the period of Solidarity and strikes in Poland (there were strikes at Petrosan, in southern Carpathia). Secondly, of all the Eastern bloc countries, Romania is the most similar to Poland in terms of economic resources (population, natural reserves), which leads to a similarity in many aspects of economic life, especially in heavy industry. As a result, the Romanian crisis is very similar to our own.

I'll start with some external signs of the crisis that are evident to the Polish tourist: in Bucharest sugar and oil are rationed. In the provinces the number of rationed goods is far greater. Queues start forming early in the morning or late at

night. There is a significant difference between the supply of provisions to the provinces and Bucharest and to the tourist resorts on the coast--to the considerable advantage of the latter. There are constant price rises, both overt and disguised, while at the same time, as a result of various factors, real earnings have dropped, especially those of the intelligentsia. In the mass media there is constant talk of improved management methods. The authorities use all methods at their disposal to force the miners to increase coal production. . . .

On the other hand, the Romanian model of socialism has several characteristics peculiar to itself, the foremost of these being the presence of Comrade Ceausescu and his family (from now on to be referred to as C.). Comrade C. holds the European record in the "cult of the individual" contest (his only rival is perhaps the Albanians' savior E. Hoxa). . . . The beginning of his cult is considered to have been not the date that Chairman C. became First Secretary, but the date of his visit to China and his meeting with Mao in 1971. Currently Comrade C. is a great admirer of Comrade Kim Il-song of North Korea. . . . C. likes to travel to places that none of his subjects will probably ever visit, and from his journeys abroad he likes to bring back various foreign inventions. After his visit to the USA large numbers of neon lights began to appear in Bucharest and other towns. Western experience, however, does not adapt itself to Romanian life as readily as Eastern experience does. In recent years it was ordered that the neons be switched off in order to save electricity. The towns are now full of unlit neons--like in a screenplay by Mrozek.

An equally important figure in today's socialist Romania is C.'s wife, Comrade Elena C. Of her many titles and functions, first place is always given to her Chairmanship of the Romanian Academy of Science. . . . Her role at the court of C. is considered to be very important.

Of the remaining members of the C. family, of whom the majority hold high offices both in the party and in the state administration, I'll mention C.'s son, also Nicolae (Nicu), who is head of the Romanian Komsomol. Next to him our rally driver Jaroszewicz seems a good young man. Apparently, Nicu once lost so much at the table in Las Vegas that he ended up in jail. Fortunately Ilie Nastase turned up and bailed him out.

It is not enough to be an observer of the cult--each Romanian must also participate. The cult of the individual is becoming a serious social disease in Romania. The various party-national events are a constant element of the Romanian political landscape. These are attended on a massive scale. Comrade C. himself and any resolutions announced at the events are greeted with standing ovations and raised arms expressing unlimited support.

As a result of Comrade C.'s orders, Romanian blue- and white-collar workers have to attend schooling sessions. Consequently, few of them read the press or watch the television news (perhaps even less than in Poland). Romanian propaganda in terms of its bias is at the top of the East European League together with Bulgaria and the USSR. . . . Most people in Romania listen to RFE, perhaps more so than in any other East European country. Western programs in Romanian are not jammed, which makes this easier. Some Romanians say that this is because Romania cannot afford a jamming installation. Poles may smile at this, we used to think our country was too poor to afford the ZOMO. Another source of uncensored thought is books in foreign languages . . . the supply of which is not suppressed too energetically. The Romanian intelligentsia, compared with that of other Eastern bloc countries, has a wide knowledge of foreign languages. The third, most original form of intellectual nonconformism in Romania is "legal samizdat," which consists of works by nonconformist writers published officially but in highly limited editions (e.g, 2,000 copies); such works are nonetheless read by many people on the "read and pass it on" basis. Augustyn Buzura, a doctor from Cluj, has achieved great popularity with his magnificent descriptions of, for example, the idiosyncrasies of collectivisation. Criticism of the Stalinist period is now permitted on a larger scale, especially when it is contrasted with the faultless rule of today. Other aspects of cultural life in Romania are more tightly controlled. Critical films or plays are rare, but Western films are often shown on television.

The present state of Romanian culture gives cause for concern. Recently C. called for a return to social-realism (Since things are so good, why are there not more works describing how good everything is?); this was followed by an [ideological] verification of theater programs. . . . Communist ideology is particularly alien to Romanian culture. Before the entry of the Red Army, Romania had fewer communists than any other central European country . . . and so communist ideology was only superficially accepted. . . . Traditionally Romanian culture tends to the West. . . . Romanian is a Romance language and Romanians feel spiritually close to the Italians. . . . On the other hand, blame for Romanian passivity and apathy is put on the centuries of Turkish rule.

The present state of consciousness of Romanians can be described as schizoid--the presence of an alien, irrational system (its party and C.) and the existence , however distant, of a normal world (the West on the air waves, Western films, Western tourists); the physical proximity of a spiritually alien ideology, alongside the awareness of a distinct Romanian identity. Add to this a certain apathy and you have some of the pieces that make up the psychological disintegration of Romanian society.

For a Pole it is difficult to see and understand the role of the Church in Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church has the reputation of being opportunistic (especially the hierarchy); the

intelligentsia seems to be largely secularized, while in the interior exists the prohibited and persecuted Uniat Church, which seems to be at a dead end. The Catholic Church does not seem to be doing anything to raise people. Active new sects are springing up, but inherently they do not develop into mass religious movements. Of course, religious matters are of concern to the individual and need not affect society as a whole. . . .

Romania has several significant national minorities. The largest group are the Hungarians who number several million and live mainly in Transylvania, the capital of which is Cluj, or Kolozsvar in Hungarian. There are also ethnic Germans and Gypsies; Moldavians also have a strong sense of their separate identity. Among the Hungarians and Germans there is a strong desire to emigrate. For an outsider it is difficult to assess the degree of assimilation among these groups and the roles played by totalitarian communism and local nationalism. The Hungarians seem to be particularly frustrated, many would like to emigrate to Hungary (it is difficult to say to what extent this is for economic reasons or for reasons of national discrimination), and they blame their own country for making this difficult.

Poles in Romania are few in number. On the whole they are former Polish soldiers and their wives and families, who found themselves in Romania in 1939. As in other countries, the Polish Embassy seems little concerned with encouraging cultural contacts with these emigres.

The most devastated aspect of Romanian social life under socialism is probably education, especially at the level of high school. For several years now, high school pupils have been obliged to attend three months training in a place of work, and if we add to this the hours spent on ideological training, there is not much time left for study. . . . An added problem for schools is the population bulge that came about during the beginning of the C. era in the mid-1960s, considered to be the period of greatest liberalization and growth in the history of postwar Romania. . . .

In the spirit of communist, nationalistic populism C. declared an absolute ban on abortions and introduced a heavy fine for breaking the ban. It took two years for the underground abortionists to return the birth rate to its former pace (this underground activity is to this day one of the shadier aspects of Romanian life). The children from the resulting baby boom were short of everything, starting with overcrowded maternity wards. Many found no room in kindergartens and in classrooms, and in some cases were even short of parental love. In two years some of these frustrated children will finish school and go to university. The question is, will they study peacefully? It is worth remembering that the student unrest in the late 1960s stemmed from the generation of another population bulge.

In recent years the economic crisis has become obvious in Romania, although the population has not yet suffered such a sharp fall in the economy as we have in Poland. The number one problem is, of course, agriculture, which is 99% collectivized and suffers from everyone's stealing what they can (if you can call a quite natural reaction under the circumstances, stealing) and from underinvestment as a result of all funds being pumped into heavy industry. Thus, in the cities people queue for hours to buy tomatoes in season. Romanians even envy neighboring Bulgaria where the socialist industrialization left more room for agriculture.

Despite this, Romania's economic future seems to me to be less gloomy. So far Romania, unlike Poland, has not invested in any colossal monstrosities of heavy industry, which would destroy any economy or environment. The extensive Romanian hills and plains, unspoilt by industrial waste, are what every Pole should envy the Romanians most. The massive hotel complex with rooms for over 100,000 guests is the largest and most elegant international tourist spot in the whole of the Eastern bloc. It is true that, as a result of a highly centralized administration, this complex is often not used efficiently. For example, to save money, Romanian television did not transmit the 1982 World Cup; this resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of Western tourists in Romania. The loss to the economy was incomparably greater than the savings made by the television. It would, however, appear that economic reform could make tourism function efficiently.

The present socialist Romanian state is an excellent subject for anyone studying the pathology of state law. Legislative institutions do not even pretend to work; only inertia preserves them. C. governs his country like a dictator, with the help of a whole intricate system of bans and punishments and a monstrous police organization. Two years ago the police showed their sordid methods when they liquidated in unexplained circumstances several strike leaders from Petrosan. The story of that strike and its tragic conclusion are very reminiscent of our strike in Szczecin in 1971 where several strike leaders, like Golazewski, disappeared without trace.

. . . It seems to me that the political atmosphere in Romania at the moment is one of stagnation. There is no more talk of protests such as the strikes in Petrosan. To many Romanians the events of December 13 in Poland were a severe blow. Their apathy is linked to fatalism. Few Romanians are concerned about the present tense international East-West situation. It is noticeable that the more effort C. puts into the Pershing and cruise issue, the more the average Romanian becomes indifferent to the matter. Moldavia is one important exception. Moldavians are very concerned with what they hear is going on across the border (that is in deepest, provincial USSR). Not much mention

is made of Andropov who was not gracious enough to invite C. immediately after he came to power--so he is not praised in the mass media as much as he would have otherwise been.

One of my greatest wishes is to be in Romania at the end of the C. era. I think that the Romanians will be surprised to find how quickly the cult of C. can cease and how quickly the world can become more normal. I will be interested to know what conclusions the Romanians and C.'s successors will draw from this.

I hope that my piece will incline the reader to consider how many characteristics and matters Romania and Poland have in common. The basic thing we have in common is, I believe, a deep disbelief that any improvement of the system is possible.

- end -



RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

Polish Samizdat Unit

RAD Polish Samizdat Extracts/1H
6 June 1984

A SPECIAL PUBLICATION OF FIGHTING SOLIDARITY

Introduction: This is a leaflet that has been translated into Russian by Solidarity people in Lower Silesia, to be distributed among Soviet soldiers stationed there. It consists of a manifesto written by the Chairman of the Council of Fighting Solidarity and a commentary by the publishers of the leaflet. A copy of the leaflet reached the West and was reproduced in the Russian-language monthly appearing in Frankfurt, *Possev*, no. 3, March 1984.

* * *

Why the Struggle?

In order to achieve victory, to defend the weak and those who are poor, hungry or imprisoned, to return to the citizens and the nation their trampled rights; in order not to allow ourselves to be deprived of freedom; in order to be loyal to the tradition of [our] fathers and forefathers: "For your freedom and ours"; in order to show the world that evil and violence can and must be rebuffed; in order that a just social agreement be arrived at; in order not to have our honor discredited; in order to live.

Why Solidarity?

In order not to yield to hatred, to be with those who need us most; in order to revive the independent and self-governing "Solidarity," to realize our hopes, so that Poland can be Polish, so that it would be one for all and all for one, so that there

would not be any "equal" and "most equal," any obedient robots and mighty comrades; in order to fight against war; in order to live.

Our pride and duty: to serve the Polish people in their striving for independence and democracy, to serve the whole civilized world in its striving for justice, peace, and prosperity.

Our short-range goal: the growth of social self-consciousness and self-organization in the country and the legalization of the Solidarity trade union activity.

Our adversary: the totalitarian communist regime that deadens one's conscience and perverts individuals, ideas, and peoples.

Our ally: anyone who cherishes truth, freedom, and democracy.

Our no: to conciliation with the authorities, integration into the system. Because: the authorities violate any agreements as they violated the Gdansk Social Agreement of 1980; the people must not come to an agreement imposed by the authorities, they must elect the authorities themselves through democratic means.

Our yes: to holding free, democratic elections that would leave the PUPW [Polish United Workers Party] such a share of state authority as to be commensurate with the percentage [of votes] it would receive in competition with other freely active political parties. We want to achieve the realization of the most important point of the Yalta Conference: a democratic government in Poland.

Our methods:

Distributing information to our country's broad masses (through leaflets, newspapers, and the radio) and in the future to people in neighboring countries. Fight against lies. Self-education.

Cooperation with independent movements and organizations in our country and abroad that strive for democracy.

Support for and assistance in the organization of mass protests (large-scale strikes, street demonstrations) both those planned in advance and the spontaneous ones.

Supplementing, according to our needs and possibilities, the assistance provided by the Catholic Church and the underground Solidarity trade union network to repressed persons and their families.

Organization of and support for active social self-defense in the form of: factory strikes where working conditions have deteriorated or pay cuts enacted, as well as in case of persecution or dismissals; the persecution of informers; punishing the most cruel executors of communist terror. In each case, the selection of self-defense measures must be commensurate with the level of the immediate threat and guilt.

The penetration of repressive state organizations (the army, militia, UB (state security), and prisons).

Extending aid to independent organizations and the peace movement in communist countries. In particular: conducting antiwar propaganda among Soviet troops stationed in Poland; and slowing down the work tempo and sabotaging production at military plants.

The development and improvement of our own organization in order to enable it to come to the aid of the people in extreme situations, such as during intervention from the outside, war, and/or other complicated situations.

At the present time successful use of any of the above-listed methods is beyond the range of our possibilities. We shall therefore regard each of them as the task and the goal for the future.

Our Visionary Dream: Solidarity's Manifesto

What [our dream is]: the dawn of solidarity is breaking all over the world. It is breaking in the form of a revolutionary idea, in the form of a proposed new social system. To the vexation of the forces of power and money. To the vexation of totalitarianism and private property. Capitalism reflects general interests as the sum of the interests of the individuals. Communism reflects the interests of the party and the state at the cost of the interests of the individuals. But the term solidarism can be applied to a social system that protects the interests of the individuals while combining them with the interests of society. Characteristic of such a social order are conditions and institutions of community life that are needed in order to make everyone feel like a citizen.

One therefore [needs]: a parliamentary type of government formed by the free election of candidates from competing parties and representing [alternative] political programs; a market economy that exludes the large-scale ownership of the means of production and in which workers' self-management represents the principal form of management of enterprises; freedom of speech

and [public] gatherings; territorial self-government elected by and responsible to the residents of each given region; and an independent judiciary within this framework solidarism envisages; an independent trade union uniting, on a voluntary basis, the working people of all trades. For 16 months in Poland it was the Solidarity trade union that was just this kind of a union.

Work is the basis of society. The appropriation of someone else's work is the source of social injustice. It is against this, against the exploitation of man by man and by the state that the union should protect. It must protect the people and their labor against squandering, against humiliation, and against exploitation in the form of alien interests. It must be active at all levels: in the factory and [all over] the country.

Such is our general understanding of solidarism. But solidarity is something more than rights and institutions. It is unity in the struggle for common goals, it is the united protection of the weak and the oppressed, it is the realization of the slogan: "one for all and all for one." It is not a blueprint of a "brave new world." It is a blueprint of a world that would be a little better than the one existing either in the East or in the West. Without the abuse of power and without intense social inequality. A world where everyone's work will be justly paid and where there will be no abrogation of rights and no unemployment. Solidarity is a blueprint for a world of work that would humanize the earth and ennoble man.

Why? In order to live. In the East, in the countries of the so-called socialist camp, the power is in the hands of the party caste that ignores the wishes and the needs of the people. The dominant system here has turned citizens into subjects and has subjected these countries to Soviet imperialism. It aspires to rule the world by means of the reckless build-up of its military might and presents a mortal threat to civilization, to the twenty centuries of our faith, work, and struggle.

In the West public opinion is worried about inflation and stagnation, people strive for profit and enrichment. With the exception of the USA, where the leadership is beginning to understand the threat hanging over the world, Western countries entertain hopes for a relaxation [of international tension]. Economic inequality casts a shadow over democracy. The young generation, striving for a better life, protests against expenditures on armaments. It does not realize the danger of Soviet imperialism and that the peoples of Eastern Europe are suffering from unheard of social and national oppression. The West is in a state of confusion and does not see a way out of the endlessly rising spiral of nuclear armaments. There are two solutions: Western societies' denying the USSR technological assistance, while at the same time strengthening their armed forces and limiting consumption, all for the sake of gaining an advantage over the potential aggressor; and suffrage for the working people of the East who, like working people the West, want to live.

They know who is deceiving and oppressing them, who forces them to work for minimal pay, who strives for the might created by their hands. It is the communist ruling clique.

The first solution would not solve anything if it did not lead to the second one. The second solution could only result in a mass demonstration by the working people in the East--a demonstration similar to the one in Poland in 1980. Only solidary efforts, courage, and hope can save the world. Solidarity is peace and peace is solidarity.

There is no other way for Poland. Without Solidarity there will be neither justice nor prosperity on the banks of the Vistula. If the Poles are forced into slave labor by means of the whip and hunger, they will continue to vegetate in poverty. The taste of freedom that came about together with Solidarity has inspired both young people and the general masses. It is obvious that in order for Poland to be Polish, it must be the Polish Solidary Commonwealth.

How? Fighting Solidarity is a way to achieve victory over the Eastern regimes and Western egoism. The only thing necessary is for the working people in the cities and villages to realize their own solidarity and to find strength in themselves to demonstrate it. And then the red and golden thrones will tumble down.

Therefore the principal weapon in this struggle is information. Oppression in our country is based on lies; only truth will bring us freedom, truth that must be proclaimed both in the East and in the West. Let us strive for creating a Solidarity radio station that would broadcast to the whole world. We want an exchange of ideas, not an exchange of bullets and rockets. We want to convince them that they will be better off and more secure in a solidary Poland, in a solidary world.

We have the right and the duty to express our views and aspirations. How can this be done? With the help of an independent press, radio, and self-education groups; with the help of street demonstrations and strikes; by refusing to give the fruit of our labor to those who expropriate it by force and terror. Most effective are solidarity demonstrations that begin spontaneously (and there can be no doubt that they will begin) at some large plant or in an industrial center and must be supported by everyone so that those who are unable to endure any longer [can be helped by others]. This will serve as the best signal for the start of united resistance.

It is our duty always to actively defend persecuted people and crushed ideals. We are building up the Fighting Solidarity organization. It is open to all who have chosen the struggle for the Solidary Commonwealth, for the solidarity of people and nations, and who are willing to sacrifice their time, their blood, and even their lives for the sake of achieving this goal. We do

not claim a monopoly on the Solidarity trade union's struggle. In various forms this struggle is being carried out by the best sons of Poland. We strive for cooperation and harmony with all who wish social justice. We are against conciliation with a government supported by an alien state. We want to deny authority to this [state] authority.

Is this realistic? It is unrealistic only as long as the people themselves are not convinced of its feasibility, as long as they do not understand that time has come to take their fate into their own hands.

We do not expect a swift victory as a result of one powerful stroke. A long preparatory struggle awaits us. We understand the danger of open hostility. We have no tanks. We want to convince those who have them not to use them against the unarmed. Ours is the right cause. Evil may achieve temporary success, but Solidarity is the truth and the good and it will triumph.

Chairman of the Council of Fighting Solidarity

Poland, 13 December 1982

Kornel Morawiecki

* * *

Our Commentary

Solidarism in this context envisions a social order based on democracy, pluralism, and self-management that takes into account the basic tenets of free economic development: market competition, albeit with limitations on the power of big capital and state authority. The latter must be controlled by the independent trade union (or a federation of such unions). The democratic representation of this union (or federation) in the whole country would serve as an alternative to the state authority as the workers' government. Union representatives at various levels would protect society against the tyranny of the state and its administrative, judiciary, and military institutions. This viewpoint is prompted by the European tradition and the practice of the society's control over the government by means of democratic elections, on the one hand, and, on the other, by means of separation of functions, such as: the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities. The first example of such a system was the Solidarity trade union, which even such a mighty and monolithic power as the communist one had to reckon with. That is why the state is doing everything to destroy the union both as an organization and as a symbol.

Most recent history confirms that democracy is not a sufficient guarantee against totalitarianism. On the other hand, the absence of large-scale private ownership of the means of production does not guarantee against exploitation (example: communism). A workers' union, such as described earlier, must--together with other democratic governmental and administrative

structures--protect the most vulnerable individuals and groups against economic and civil discrimination. Hence its name Solidarity. It [adopts] the principles of Christianity: love and aid to the poor and to the unfortunate.

Solidarism is not a dogma or a final solution. As a concept it needs further elaboration: [for example, where] the limits of private ownership of the means of production [should be drawn], correlation between the limits on private capital and market laws, and the respective spheres of competence and the duties of the workers' government and the state. Solidarism must also be tested in practice (the first such test was the 16 months of Solidarity's existence under the extreme conditions of a communist regime). We regard this as part of the social evolution that leads to the material and spiritual perfection of individuals and peoples. Not through individual success achieved at the cost of the weaker, but through success achieved as a result of a competition of personal and social efforts, labor, and talents. This should be a joint development, truly solidary.

We emphasize once more that we do not regard solidarism as a cure for all social ills and difficulties. We believe that it is capable of making the life of individuals and peoples somewhat better and humane than Western capitalism and a hundred times better and more diversified than Eastern communism. Here, in Poland, the struggle for the realization of this dream is, at the same time, a struggle for national and social liberation. It is a struggle for the liberation of the peoples of the East from the communist yoke and of the whole world from the despair of nuclear destruction.

Our Charter and Location. We began in June 1982. We are an independent, national organization. Our struggle is just one of the forms of public resistance. We give credit both to our adversary and to ourselves. In principle we support the decisions of the Solidarity trade union leadership. We reserve, however, the right to criticize these decisions, and to make our own initiatives.

Our Structure. As with our whole organization, it is still being formed. We aim for a hierarchical structure assuring a high level of democracy within individual territorial and professional units. The highest body is the council, which elects the chairman. The basic organizational unit is the Fighting Solidarity (FS) group. Anyone (regardless of nationality or membership in other organizations) can become a member of the FS, on the condition that he take the oath.

How many are we? Several hundred today but tomorrow even you will be part of us. Our sphere of activity: wherever there are active members of our organization.

Our Slogans: Self-Management, Solidarity, Independence.

Our Holiday: August 31

Our Attitude Toward:

a. The people of Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania: we wish these people independence and harbor no territorial claims against them;

b. The Russians: we want friendship, an equal relationship with the great Russian people, a relationship based on truth;

c. The Germans: we hope for friendly, equal relations with the great united German people.

Our Proposal. If you want to fight for an independent Solidary Commonwealth, lend all your strength, time, and, if necessary, even your life for the creation of such a Poland (or Russia); if you want to fight for solidarity among individuals and peoples, if you wish and promise to promote our ideas and carry out conscientiously the task either entrusted to you or initiated by yourself, join our ranks. If you agree with our goals and methods, then, without waiting for us to contact you, form Fighting Solidarity groups yourself at the plant, at your place of residence, in the village. Look for us, you'll meet us soon.

We are certain that by our very existence and our struggle we support the great aspirations of individuals, peoples, and cultures which are open to the exchange of blessings and goals, which are uniting for the sake of respect for the individual, which are seeking some new truths and are loyal to the ancient ones. This striving for brotherhood and progress overcomes the closed and fortified camps, destroys locked borders, lies, and fears. So, let us as people--the Poles or the Russians--and as members of the Fighting Solidarity be free and solidary.

Published by our agency, the Information Agency of the Fighting Solidarity.

Our request: Copy this, pass it on to acquaintances, and leave it in a public place.

September 1983

Our brotherly greetings:

LONG LIVE SOLIDARITY AMONG THE PEOPLE AND NATIONS OF POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION!

RAD Polish Samizdat Digest/11
6 June 1984

LEAFLET ANNOUNCING THE MARRIAGE OF A JAILED SOLIDARITY
LEADER, MARCH 1984

Introduction: This leaflet was distributed in Wroclaw in March this year. It announces, on the part of Solidarity, the wedding of its underground chairman in Lower Silesia, Jozef Pinior; it was planned to take place in the jail where he has been under investigation since his arrest in April 1983. He has since been sentenced to four years, reduced to two by last year's special amnesty. The text around the "SW" sign, which stands for "Fighting Solidarity," says "Freedom for Political Prisoners."



WOLNOŚĆ



WIĘZNIOM POLITYCZNYM

DNIA 19 MARCA 1984r ODBĘDZIE SIĘ ŚLUB
NASZEGO WSPÓTPRACOWNIKA
PRZEWODNICZĄCEGO NSZZ 'SOLIDARNOŚĆ'
CZŁONKA TTK REGION DOLNY ŚLĄSK

JÓZEFA PINIORA
Z
MARIĄ CHOJNACKĄ

W ARESZCIE ŚLED CZYM WOJ. URZĘDU SPRAW
WEWNĘTRZNYCH WROCLAW ul. ŚWIEBODZKA 1
O CZYM ZAWIADAMIA

SOLIDARNOŚĆ

* * *

