OBSERVATIONS

ONTHE

MUTINY BILL;

WITH SOME

STRICTURES

ON


LORD BUCKINGHAMSHIRE's

ADMINISTRATION IN IRELAND.

by mr A. Grattah

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M.DCC.LXXXI



TER, T E T. ADDRESSED TO THE

A

PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

YOU have been active in the fervice of your country, you have been liberal in rewarding individuals, you have fet an example of public virtue in your own conduct, and have encouraged it in others by the warmeft panegyric.

You have done this, in a country where patriotifm had been timid, infrequent and treacherous; and in an age when the principle was fuppofed to have perifhed. When the hearty intercourfe of private life reconciled to ftate offenders, and clumfy good-B humour humour compromifed every public indignity. A great change in a fhort time has been wrought in the public mind; an alteration has followed in the national condition. I remember the flate of this country before you formed your affociations; I fee the change, and rejoice at it.—It was not your fault that we have not more reafon to rejoice, and that trade and conflitution, fo near a happy fettlement, fhould be thrown back into a flate of fufpenfe, and the nation flung when fhe began to repofe.

The people of Ireland are not ungrateful, nor infatiable, nor feditious; but no people will be fatisfied who conceive themfelves cheated of a free grant of trade, and fee a conftitution refcued out of the hands of one parliament to be mangled by another. —You perceive I allude to the Sugar and Mutiny Bills.—I mean to make the latter the fubject of this letter.—I am not afraid of the people of Ireland.

I don't agree in the vulgar and courtly notion that political difcuffion idles a nation;

tion; with the examples before me of Great Britain, and the north of Ireland, I fay the fpirit of liberty brings on the fpirit of trade, and that our immediate intereft is our proper fludy; arms and liberty, the great fecurities of acquisition, cannot be inconfistent with the habits of acquiring. The manufacturer does not become weak by difcipline, nor is the elector disfranchifed by being armed. In every free flate, politics should be the fludy of all; a mystery to the people, they become the trade of the great; the political monopolist is a hardened jobber. That state is indeed prosperous which can produce an armed, disciplined, industrious, vigilant and conftitutional people.

But of all nations, Ireland fhould apply herfelf to the fludy of her own rights becaufe her conflitution is now forming: whatever hurt it now receives, we muft carry that caft of infirmity from the cradle to the grave. Our liberty as yet has received no acknowledgments from the minifters of juffice, but depends upon the fleady fenfe B 2 which which the people entertain of their own laws. We obtained trade and liberty in the character of an armed, active community; in that character will we preferve them. Nor have we only a right to difcufs political queftions, but debate and condemn fuch as have received the approbation of parliament; otherwife corruption prevailing in the fenate would filence the nation, and render it criminal to condemn, and therefore impoffible to repeal a difgraceful law. Upon thefe principles, I fubmit to you fome obfervations upon the Mutiny Bill.

I conceive that flanding armies in peace are againft the principles of the conftitution, and the fafety of public liberty; they have fubverted the freedom of all nations, except in those inflances where their numbers were finall, or the power of the Sovereign over fuch an inflrument, limited in quality or duration; for it is in vain to fet bounds to the authority of the chief magiftrate in other matters by the general tendency of law, if a specific flatute or ordinance

nance shall give him a perpetual and irrefiftible force. In fuch a cafe, the law would inveft the king with a power too ftrong for herfelf, and would make provifion for her own violation; and as the army itfelf is dangerous, fo alfo is that code of law by which fuch an eftablishment is regulated and accommodated .--The Mutiny Bill or martial law methodized, is not only different from, but directly opposite to the common law of the land; it sets aside her trial by jury, departs from her principles of evidence, declines her ordinary tribunals of juffice, and in their place establishes a fummary proceeding, arbitrary crimes, arbitrary punishments, a fecret fentence, and a fudden execution. -It invests his Majesty with a power to ordain what new offences, and eftablish what new punishments he shall in his difcretion think fit, provided the punishment don't extend to life or limb. "A vaft and im-" portant truft," fays the author of the Commentaries speaking of an annual, not a perpetual Mutiny Bill, " an unlimited " power

" power to create crimes, and annex to "them any punifhment not extending to "life or limb. Thefe are forbidden to be "inflicted, except for crimes declared to be

" punifhable by this act; among which we may obferve that any difobedience to lawful commands, is one."

The object of this code is to bring those who are reached by it to a flate of implicit fubordination, and to create in their Sovevereign an abfolute authority .- It furnishes a perfect image of arbitrary power. Accordingly the people of England, whofe maxims we should admire and emulate, jealous on all fubjects which relate to liberty, have exceeded, on the fubject of the army, their ufual caution; they have, in the preamble of their annual Mutiny Bill, claimed their birthright; they recite that part of the declaration of right, " that flanding armies and martial law in peace without the confent of parliament, are illegal:" and having flated the fimplicity and purity of their antient conflitution, and fet forth a great principle of of Magna Charta, they admit a partial and temporary repeal of it; they admit an army and a law for its regulation, but they limit the number of the former, and the duration of both; confining all, the troops themfelves, the law that regulates, and the power that commands them, to one year. Thus is the army of England rendered a parliamentary army, the conftitutional afcendency of the fubject over the foldier, preferved; the military rendered effectually fubordinate to the civil magistrate because dependent on parliament, the government of the fword controlled in its exercife becaufe limited in its duration and the King entrusted with the command of the army during good behaviour only. And yet, that wife people have hitherto confidered the army thus limited, thus dependent, thus qualified, and sheathed, as a neceffary evil; and will not even admit of barracks left the foldier should be still more alienated from the state of a fubject, and thus alienated and armed have a post of

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of ftrength, and the dangerous nature of his condition, be aggravated by fituation.

When the Parliament of Ireland proceeded to regulate the army, I conceive it should have adopted the maxims of the British constitution as much as the rules of British discipline. I conceive that it ought to be the policy of this country to go, flep by flep, with the British nation in all her wife regulations; and not only adopt her conftitution, but purfue the wife and aged maxims which fhe has formed for its prefervation; that mutual liberty may be common ftrength; that England may not be our tyrant nor we her enflaver; that Ireland may not be a prerogative country with a conftitution inverted, a bad leffon to Kings, poifoning their minds with falfe notions of government, and arming their hands with unconstitutional powers. We have, however, departed from the example and maxims of England; we have done fo in the most important concern, the government of the fword; and in three most material

terial inftances: in our Mutiny Bill, we have omitted the preamble which declares the great charter of liberty, we have left the number of forces in the breaft of his Majefty, and under these circumftances we

have made the bill perpetual.

This is to depart from the prudence of England, and in the very cafe where we should have furpassed her in caution, becaufe we have all her reasons to dread a standing army, and many of our own likewife: we have no foreign dominions to preferve and we have a conftitution to lofe by the violence of an army, by the encroachments of the Prince and by the usurped authority of the British parliament. The liberty of this country has indeed been afferted by the inhabitants, but has received no adequate acknowledgment on the part of his Majesty; on the contrary, his Excellency's confidential fecretary did on the part of the government officially from a written paper declare that he opposed the introduction of the Irish Mutiny C Bill,

Bill, upon the principle, "that he con-" ceived it unneceffary,-that the English "Act extended to Ireland;" alfo his Majefty's' Attorney-General did affert that the British parliament could bind Ireland. Likewife his Excellency just before the arrival of the Irifh bill, ordered the troops to change quarters, guarding by a cotemporary comment against whatever the Bill might import in favour of our liberty. Alfo the Post-office is kept up in this country without feeking an Irifh act, contrary to an express engagement, and though I know very well that it has no legal existence, yet it affects to stand upon British ftatute.

After fuch declarations and fuch acts of government, (the name of Ireland exhibited in the British Mutiny Act,) during the fubsistence of the contest, with the example of America before us, to arm the chief magistrate or rather indeed to arm the claims of the British parliament with a perpetual law for the regulation and accommodation of of any indefinite number of troops his Majefty is pleafed to keep up in Ireland, appears to me a meafure of an unwarrantable and unfeafonable, corrupt and a crazy confidence.

I must observe that the army thus rendered by your law unconfined in its numbers and by the fame law made independent of parliament for its regulation, however brave and respectable, is not a native army, but of that very country which claims to make law for Ireland; alfo I must obferve that the minister who in fact governs that army, is the British minister, not responsible to your parliament, nor resident in your country: fo that now by this pernicious bill, this minister, a foreign and contemptuous character, in a fafe and diftant capacity, free from the controul of an expirable authority, may fend into this country any number of troops which the return of his pride may require, the collected ftrength of the empire at the close of the war shall be able to furnish; and he may billet them upon

upon you in execution of any project of power or avarice or revenge, to collect a British tax or difperse an Irish affociation, or trample on an Irish spirit; and the people of this country have the mortification to think that they may by their own law, a law grafted on their best exertions, be obliged to billet and accommodate troops quartered upon them for their destruction : or though his Majesty's ministers may not choose to come to extremity, yet may they gradually and at their leifure, armed with our law and encouraged by our humiliation, raise new regiments, a measure both of corruption and force; or throw into this kingdom fuch a body of troops as may break her fpirit, watch her motions, controul her free action, and finally make those who before thought it inexpedient to deny, foon think it inexpedient to refift, the ufurped authority of the British parliament .-- I fay, the minister may do this at his leifure, and build by degrees a fystem of tyranny on the foundation of our own law .-- Princes could not deftroy liberty by force if they had not

not obtained that force by law; nor was any nation ever enflaved, who might not have found in herfelf the efficient caufes of her own fervitude: her laws become a fuggestion to the tyrant. The principle of political death is laid by the falfe guardians of public liberty; indeed from the critical fituation of this kingdom, fo ftriking is the danger, that a Mutiny Bill for eighteen months was an act of confidence justified by neceffity only, that the minister would not have abused that confidence is more than probable. Limitation of period changes the nature and foftens the exercise of power: before an attempt could be brought to bear, before a fufficient number of forces could be conveniently collected, or before they could be ready for action, the act which kept them together might expire, and the crown in the attempt lose its revival: defpotifm would have wanted a root; the law in this cafe (and the wifdom of a free people can do no more than take the beft chance for their liberty, and multiply difficulties on those who should invade it, inflead

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ftead of making the paffage eafy and natural) the law I fay in this cafe would fland in the way of the early encroachment; the apprehension of this would deter the attempt; the army is prevented from flying off for ever from the law, by periodically touching the fphere of the conftitution. England has found a limited Mutiny Bill innoxious but would not listen to a perpetual one. In fact, Mutiny Bills are limited on the fame principle as Money-Bills; both are certain to be renewed; but on the return to the people of the powers which both include, the purfe and the fword, depends whatever of limitation is annexed to prerogative or of privilege is annexed to parliament.

I have ftill hopes if his Majefty's minifters fhould make an unconftitutional ufe of this perpetual Mutiny Bill our parliament would ftruggle for freedom, would refufe its affent to the additional fupply and the military eftablifhment, expecting that his Majefty's forces would want provision under

under the first measure and disperse under the authority of the laft. I think they ought, but believe they would not: in ftrict conflitution I do think the fpecific confent of parliament is still neceffary for the continuation of the army. I think farther that the prefent Mutiny Bill expires with the parliament that made it; but thefe are points which an army will not comprehend, no, it will make good its quarters by the fword. Our beft fecurity therefore for the privileges which we have left does not confift in the powers which our parliament has referved, but in other refources: the pirit of the nation is high, her minifters distracted, her liberty in force, her volunteers numerous, and the mifchief of a military government fufpended by an armed people.

I must further observe to you, that the Mutiny Bill is not only dangerous from the above confiderations but others which I will state to you.—The revenue of this country is not granted in a manner favourableable to public liberty .- The hereditary revenue is above 600,0001. per annum; the encreafe of that revenue, affifted by trade, and eafed of additional duties, would be confiderable. Hitherto his Majesty's minifters in Ireland have lavished the public money for the purpose of encreasing the undue influence of the crown, but if what is now employed to render parliament fubfervient, should be applied to maintain an army independent of parliament; if power in this country fhould take the fhape of ceconomy, if his Majefty's minister, encouraged by this law, fhould try new councils and old refources; I do not fay they would fucceed, God forbid! But I do fay, it was worthy of parliament to have removed the danger by a limited Mutiny Bill, inftead of prompting the experiment by a perpetual law. I must add, that as an ample revenue is perpetual, fo is the power' of collecting it perpetual, provided his Majefty don't call a parliament; for the Revenue Bill is by an express clause to continue until the end of the then next feffion of parlia-

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parliament. These are great defects in our conftitution, very great indeed! they have produced a train of the worft confequences; for to these perpetual grants of revenue and power, capable of being cured by a limited Mutiny Bill but aggravated by a perpetual one, to thefe grants do I attribute the frequent infults, which with the interval of a few months in the beginning of the laft Seffion have been offered to the Irish parliament, and the fottifh compliance with which those infults have been borne; the frequent, studious, and almost periodical breach of the privilege of the Irish House of Commons in the alteration of her Money Bills; the folemn proteft imposed, and I might fay branded on the Journals of the Lords against the inherent and exclusive right of the Commons, to originate bills of fupply; the tedious, lawlefs, wanton and fucceffive embargoes frequently laid during the fitting of parliament, and without its confultation The continuing to pay by virtue of King's Letter the very penfions which the Houfe of Com-D

Commons had repeatedly diffallowed, the refufing to give any account of great fums difburfed by the Privy Council under the denomination of Concordatum, and fcreened from enquiry under the impudent hypocrify of an oath; from the grants I fpeak of has proceeded the plunder of our people as well as the infults on our parliament; the vaft, indecent, and encreafing number of places, penfions, falaries, additional falaries, &c. &c. and all that bold rapine, promoted by a defperate feries of wretched Viceroys .- From these grants has proceeded another evil, the pregnant caufe of many more, no man in Ireland is refponfible for any thing, the Lord Lieutenant is not refponfible, his fecretary is not responsible, his dependents are not refponfible, the inferior fervants of the Crown glorying in a base impunity plead they are but instruments of power: the fuperior criminal is fhifted, the crime continued, the grievance accumulated, and the nation cheated both of redrefs and justice. From these grants has proceeded that argument or threat of infolent

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folent admonition and court common place which juftifies prodigality as the only fecurity and charter for the being of parliament. " viz. you have granted fo much for ever, " that if government were as frugal as you " defire, it could do without you," fays the flippancy of the Caftle to a committee of accounts. And certainly though these grants were not arguments for crimes, they were ftrong reasons against concessions,- they were ftrong reasons for a limited Mutiny Bill neceffary to the general principles of the conftitution and a specific for the weaknefs of ours, better than an encrease of expence or an accumulation of debt, or any of those bankrupt experiments which would cure the mifchief of giving for ever by wafting the grant, and feek in the beggary of the flate the powers of the conflitution. But we have rejected the remedy and have nourished and invigourated the disease: for to an ample revenue independent of parliament and a Revenue Bill in a great measure independent of parliament, we have added a Mutiny Bill independent of parliament likewife;

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likewife; a mifchief greater than the others, added to the others, and bringing all the others to bear, forming in this kingdom into an operative fyftem, arbitrary power, a perpetual revenue, an eventual perpetual power of collection, and the perpetual dominion of the fword.

I am the more anxious at enlarging the independency of the minister on the Irish parliament, becaufe I recollect how tenacious the former has been of that independency; for he has ftrenuoufly endeavoured to fave the hereditary revenue from diminution, and has felt the most lively jealoufy of public bounties payable out of that revenue as fo much taken from the crown not paid by the fubject, and has given that ftyle in orders to those who are under him, and in the last feffion he exerted all his influence to diminish, and did diminish, the bounty on the carriage of corn, to eafe the perpetual revenue and refcue the crown from what he feemed to dread a growing dependency on his Irifh parliament: alfo the

the minister in 1772, did infert in the Revenue Bill the perpetuating clause though it was omitted here; from all which I conceive that the independence of the crown in Ireland is at least in the contemplation of his Majesty's minister, as something which may be reforted to hereaster, and which in the mean time fortifies the abuse of power, and intimidates the assertion of privilege.

Nor have we only, the hereditary revenue of Ireland to fear but all the refources of the Britifh nation capable of being employed to feed an army to enforce the laws of the Britifh parliament.—I hope the liberties of this country may laft for ever againft the ambition of kings, the ufurpation, or the compliance of parliaments againft power, corruption or fear, againft our enemies, againft ourfelves. I have that confidence in the Britifh nation, that I hope fhe would not agree to enforce by arms in this country the authority of her own parliament; but this confideration will never juftify juftify that unwarrantable law which enables his Majefty to regulate and billet in Ireland whatever number of forces the hereditary revenue of Ireland and all the aids he can get from England and mifapply, will fuftain to execute the worft purpofes of a minifter thus armed by the act of our parliament, provoked by the triumphs of our people and from the firft an enemy to our pretenfions.

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And while I fpeak of the liberties of Ireland diminifhed by this perpetual law, I cannot overlook thole of England confiderably expofed by it, expoled by a law which in the neighbourhood of the Britifh nation, forms a military government, eftablifhes an unconflictutional prerogative, and erects a place of arms, fo that hereafter if the Britifh parliament fhould attempt to controul a military prince by the power which fhe conceives is referved by her annual Mutiny Bill, her intention may be fruftrated by our law, the Britifh troops illegal in England may be removed to Ireland

land and kept up here against her, the limitation of her law is repealed in the perpetual duration of ours, its purpose loft, and this ifland formed into an immenfe barrack, to accommodate the military ambition of fome king in his defiance of the British nation, in the unconflitutional continuation and violent application of his army. The British nation has thought her liberty in danger, if the King by his own authority in peace could keep up an army on one fide the channel : will fhe think her liberty fafe if he can do of his own authority the very fame thing on the other? It was not the intention of the Irifh nation to endanger the conflitution of England, no, our object was to controul her usurpation and fecure her liberty.

Nor will the British minister be able to prove this bill innoxious to England, by stating the act of William, enlarged by the 9th of this reign, imposing on Ireland an army not exceeding 15,000 men; for though in the British fenate the minister may may affert the validity of fuch acts of power and maintain the fupremacy of the British parliament to enflave Ireland, yet if it were a measure to enflave England, he would affert his Irish prerogatives, occasionally applying the tyrannical claims of one country and the military refources of the other, against the liberty of both .- That the Irish minister shall have made his peace with the British cabinet by fuch a measure, I can well imagine; but will he ever be forgiven by England? Will England be reconciled to that minister who attoning for the fervice which Ireland has done to herfelf shakes a central principle of common liberty, and compenfate for partial good by general evil.

I must also confider this perpetual Mutiny Bill with respect to the army itself, as a great hardship; for it subjects to an absolute, endless, and irresponsible power, many thousand brave men, taken totally and for ever out of the protection of the common law, and delivered up to the clemency

mency of the monarch like the foldiers not of England, but of military governments and abfolute kings. And as the army is thus taken out of the protection of the common law, fo may it be weaned from all love and affection to it; and inftead of conftitutional principles, vain and empty notions inculcated, an extravagant spirit and zeal of obedience, a false veneration for power accompanied with a contempt for the law. And tho' no attempt fhould be made on liberty, yet may this kingdom feel long and feverely this bad law, in frequent infults on the civil power, in military tumults and armed outrage; events which are common in military provinces, and are the natural effect of a power of arms, independent of the legislature, refident in the state, and yet no part of the common law, inconfistent with the genius of the conftitution, fufpicious and fufpected, endlefs and unconfined .- For whatever may be the provisions of the Mutiny Bill, the military power is fubordinate to the civil, becaufe dependent on the legislature. It is in vain E to

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to expect the foldier made independent of parliament, will have any great refpect for a justice of peace. The cautionary parts of the Bill which we have taken from England, prove how much fhe feared that inftrument which we have made perpetual. We did not want admonition on this fubject; we had feen many military exceffes exhibited in this country with flight obfervation indeed, but which in England could not have happened without exemplary punishment; the only shocking outrages of late have been committed by men bearing the King's commission. Our country has been a theatre of fuch fcenes :---our go-vernment has been a fupine spectator of fuch practices, and has forwarded military diforders by barbarous mercy or unwarrantable indolence, as if it was not difpleafed to fee the army placed above the law by that very impunity which destroyed its discipline. The army of Ireland has not been regulated by the parliament of the country, and from thence is taught to conceive itfelf the army of another kingdom put upon a province, vince, and not the forces of a nation under her law. This affectation like the tumults I fpeak of has been encouraged by government and is now confirmed by the law.

I have ftated fome objections to this bill, but pafs over many; the creating crimes, courts, and punifhments without any exprefs words, but by a claufe of reference to illegal practices which obtained under the Britifh Act of Mutiny and Defertion, and which fhould not have received even a remote countenance from the Irifh parliament. I pafs over this and more, but muft dwell on one grand objection, that parliament in paffing a perpetual Mutiny Bill, has exceeded its powers.

I conceive that parliaments are neither eternal nor omnipotent, their powers are not original, but deligated, and their deligation is to act within the frame of the conflitution, not to alter, ftill lefs to deftroy it. I therefore conceive, that a perpetual Mutiny Bill is beyond the power of parliament, inafmuch

inafinuch as it creates in the crown a perpetual legiflative authority diffinct from, and totally independent of the constitutional legiflature of the realm : and I do imagine that parliament might with as much regard for the principles of the constitution and more regard for its fafety, have moulded a committee of either houfe of parliament, for certain great purposes into a diftinct fovereign legiflature, and have armed that committee with a perpetual power, as transfer the fame power to one man. I alfo conceive, that parliament has exceeded its authority, not only in making one eftate and that the chief magistrate, (who, by the genius of the conflitution has but a negative in the formation of laws) with refpect to the army in all cafes not affecting life or limb, a perpetual legiflature; but in divefting for ever, itfelf and the people, of a great portion of their legiflative authority; the Houfe of Commons is but your truftee; according to the nature of a truft, it is to exercife, not alienate, your power. A perpetual Mutiny Bill is not

not merely an act of pains and penalties; it is not merely a law of regulation, but a folid grant of vaft and fummary powers from the nation at large to the crown; and a perpetual Mutiny Bill is a perpetual alienation of the powers of the kingdom at large, by octennial truftees incompetent to alien for ever, whether we confider the nature of their truft, or the limited period of their existence. It is therefore, I fay, that in strict conftitution the prefent Mutiny Bill expires with the prefent parliament; and the crown lawyers are called upon and defied to fupport this measure on any ground, by any argument drawn from any legal fource, from practice or principle, the power of parliament, the maxims of the constitution, or the example of former time; and I am the more alarmed at this measure, because being a folemn furrender of a principal branch of the powers of parliament thus by its own act, divefted of its inherent attributes, or rather being a partial extinction of the body itself; it is founded upon a principle and difpofition which if tolerated at

at all, go too far, and threaten and authorife the furrender, not of a part only but of the whole, of what remains to the Irifh parliament of legiflative authority : it entitles parliament to repeal the octennial bill: it entitles parliament to give whatever the treafury will buy or the adventurer part with: it entitles parliament to make the King abfolute.

And hereafter when the period of the present parliament shall arrive, the reprefentatives will not give back to the people the power with which for eight years only they were entrusted : they will not give you back your birthright, they will not give you back the British constitution; and tho' parliament did not exercise formerly its inherent right to regulate the army as well as every other branch of the state; and tho' the weakness of the kingdom furnished an excuse to her parliament for omitting to claim and put forth their privileges, yet until now for this last century we did not divest ourselves of any part of them, nor did

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did parliament difmember itself of its effential attributes nor prevent the conftitution from recovering itfelf by its own native vigour or recuperative principle. There is, I conceive a great difference between the dormant powers of parliament and a formal furrender of them; between a right in referve and a right which is no more : Neither do I think it just to draw parallels between what we are now, and what we were when afraid to affert conftitution and trade; implicit under the approaches of impending ruin. I do not conceive that any man proposed to himself that Ireland should remain everlaftingly a beggar and a flave. The nation feemed in humble expectation of fome happy redemption ; this was the time, your representatives are responsible to you for a great opportunity; never was a parliament fo favoured by the conjuncture or fo backed by the people. As foon as trade was opened, the Irifh nation conceiving that her affociations and charter would be a reproach, if notwithstanding both, the confented to be governed by laws which

which the did not make; conceiving alfo that nothing in justice or policy, in the real or the apparent intereft of Great Britain, ftood in the way of liberty, denied in her different counties and cities the fupremacy of the British parliament; and having herfelf afferted liberty, instructed her representatives to give that affertion, the folemnity of a law, or the countenance of a refolution. You faw the policy of declaring your fentiments, that England might fee the danger of invading, your own parliament the fafety of afferting, and all the prudence of allowing rights of which an armed and chartered nation proclaimed herfelf tenacious. You proceeded in this great bufinefs like a ferious animated nation, who entertained a deep fense of her privileges, and a calm determination to maintain them. It was not the measure of a faction, it was not the act of a party; but a people, rifing up like one man to claim their freedom, a whole people long depreffed, and cruelly derided, flocking together with the most perfect order, and each individual, man

man by man, from his own lips preferring his right to be free. That people! the Irifh nation, whose groffness, tameness, and diforder, had been a fubject of ribaldry to themfelves, to those very men of our own country, to whole inconftant, mean, frivolous, and venal political habits, you now gave the foundeft leffons of conftitution. and the brighteft example of order: neither was this great act confined to one perfuafion, but Protestant and Papist, their ancient animofity in fuch a caufe fubfiding, figned the fame declaration of right; and those whom neither time, nor feverity, nor lenity, nor the penal code, nor its relaxation, had been able to unite; in freedom found a rapid reconciliation; a certain flame rectified the humours of fuperstition. The time had arrived when the fpirit of truth and liberty should defcend upon the man of the Romish persuasion and touch his Catholic lips with public fire. He was tried and was found faithful, he was weighed in the balance and proved fufficient, we have learned at last a fimple but F great

great truth, that one man is like another, and that all men with to be free. I have been told the Roman Catholic had no right to fign instructions. I do not enquire into the right, but into the fact, for the Catholic taking a conftitutional test qualifies and is in conscience and equity, constituted a brother and fellow-citizen. In short fuch were your measures and declarations, that I defy the most learned of your traducers, from all the ftore of their reading, to produce any thing comparable to the conduct of the Irifh nation, And I will further fay, that if it had not been you who had spoken, but the laws you were employed to reftore,-if the law had put forth a voice and promulgated herfelf, fhe had not been revealed in accents of more truth, temper, and purity. You shook off the tyranny of the English, you deterred the invation of the French, you reftored the liberties of the Irish, you gave operation to law, you gave civilization to manners, you raifed a drooping province, you humbled a faucy ministry, you compassed a mighty revolution

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volution, you became a theme of public worfhip, and the fubject of juft and neceffary thankfgiving,---they who abhor revered you, nations you never heared of, fpoke of you.---Nothing was wanting but the uniform concurrence of your parliament to have placed the Irifh nation on the broad foundation of liberty and the fummit of fame.

In your great effort you met however with difficulties, not from the English nation, but the Irish administration, who had engaged to the British Minister, that Ireland indulged in her requisition for trade should not bethink herfelf of conflitutional reformation; and accordingly perfonal application was made to many, hoping that they would oppose the discussion of all political quesflions in parliament and alfo wherever they had property, credit, or character, would prevent the people from expressing their fentiments. The representations of our minister were to receive the colour of truth, by concealing the temper and state of the nation.

nation. In this application the Irish minifter found accomplices; by fuch the bleffings of the British constitution were reprefented as a speculative good, and the lofs of these bleffings as a speculative evil: attempts were made to debase and poifon the public mind, by detering it from queftions which related to liberty as above comprehenfion and incompatible with industry, resolutions expressive of our entire fatisfaction in the recent extent of trade, were proposed in the Commons with a dark defign to diffolve the nation's fpirit, and prevent the recovery of her conflitution; that fo this country might fit down a commercial province, and not feize the opportunity of becoming a free kingdom; nor did fuch men endeavour to mislead your underftanding only, they defamed your character.

The great and glorious effort which I have just related, to shake off the yoke of the British parliament, was vilified as an attempt to sever from the British nation; as if the connection was preferved by the circum-

circumstance which difgraced it, or the two nations were linked together like lord and vaffal, and not united by common privilege as fellow-fubjects and fellow-freemen. Theywhofe friends had been neglected, or whofe written propofals of a very corrupt nature had not been complied with, and who under that difgust, had opposed Lord Buckingham on the fubject of commerce, now, having made up matters with the court, opposed the people on the fubject of liberty. They who had been accuftomed to make private advantage of public injuries, and who supported their retainers on their fuffrages, bleffed indeed with ample property, but by a fervile following made dependent upon government, opposed the return of your liberty as they had until hurried away in the tide of 1779, opposed the extension of your trade. They charged your ftruggle for liberty as a defign against property, a confpiracy to rob the great by a pillaging commonalty; they made this charge with the ftyle and air of authority, as if property intitled the proprietor not only to fell himfelf,

felf, but to fell and load the public with his comrades and fycophants, and added confequence and confectation to fuch infamous traffic. They who hated the people from whom they had just proceeded, they who had little principle and no property, except your spoil they who fear left this kingdom fhould become too confiderable to be bought and fold; all those who flourish in a province, and would fink irra nation, that inferior species of plausible character actuated by little objects and a weak intellect, formed to shine in a court but shrivle in a free country, fell into the fame idle, infolent, conceited way of talking. On the other hand, they who wished to reftore the rights of this kingdom, were reprefented as feditious men, friends to anarchy, enemies to the British nation and their own, though they had no perfonal views, no friend no following, no mortification, no expectation, no object with respect to these nations, but to free one and endear both: in a word, the whole nation was traduced in a foolifh, wanton, and wicked addrefs concerted to flop her

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her growth, and fix her political diffempers, but attended with the immediate effect of roufing her virtue. You perfifted, and tho' these obstructions held you out to England as a divided people, and loft you the terror of your name,-loft you the declaratory refolution,-loft you the repeal of the law of Poyning's,-entailed upon you the leffer duty on Sugar, and the perpetual Mutiny Bill; yet, in a great degree, you prevailed. but if some men of property, I fay, some (for the weight of property beyond comparifon, was on your fide;) had acted as they ought,---if fome of them had not gone the last length against their country upon every question,---if fome had been steady on any question, --- if some of them had taken as much pains to eftablish the British constitution as they did take to promote or tranflate their creatures; or if they had not taken pains to keep the nation down, the feffion had been perfect, yet in a great degree you prevailed, and having univerfally denied the fupremacy of the British parliament, and by your act and energy, fupported by the

the individual declarations of your reprefentatives, put an end to the British law of Mutiny and Defertion in Ireland, you made it neceffary for the crown to apply to the Irish parliament for a law to regulate the army; you revived to your own parliament its inherent and dormant authority, its fole and exclusive right to regulate his Majesty's forces in Ireland; you gave the power into the hands of your representatives, and they furrendered it for ever to the crown .--- I lament this act, not only on account of the conftitution which we have endangered, of the power and opportunity which we have loft, but of the example which we have left; for the nobleft struggle ever made by a people to shake off tyranny, has been, in this inftance, converted into a change of tyrants, and the British minister put in the place of the British parliament .--- A government approaching to a military one has been imposed upon us by our own law, our virtue turned against ourselves, and punished by our own parliament, a public and concluding difgrace

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grace thrown upon our past efforts, and a melancholy damp cast on our future. I conceive there is a certain national character, there is a dignity without which no people can look for respect or privilege, a nation's character is her shield, the people's Majesty a facred defence, public pride a mighty protection. 'Tis therefore I not only feel the conflitution stabbed by this perpetual Mutiny Bill, but fee with concern other great and folid fecurities trampled upon, the maxims of public pride, of parliamentary confiftency and national dignity violated. A parliament the most respectable that ever fat in this country, made to adopt the dictates of the British council and forego its own recorded opinions, fuffering the Britifh minister to mould our constitution as the British manufacturers have been fuffered to regulate our commerce. The nation itself involved and scandalized in the compliance of her legiflature and exhibited to Great Britain as a vain boaster; a certain ridicule cast upon her declarations, exertions and arms, and the British minif-

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ter taught by ourfelves to repent of paft conceffions, and encouraged for the future to make a bold and unconftitutional ftand against the just defires and obvious rights of the Irish nation.

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I have heard it urged as an excuse for this pernicious and difgraceful measure, that it was a matter of neceffity. A Mutiny Bill was neceffary, you made it neceffary, but the neceffity lay on the king, not on his people, you did not want an army to defend your lives and properties, you did not want an army to fupport your claims, you did not want an army to give protection and confidence to your fervants, you were yourfelves an army adequate to all your own purposes, your fafety reposed with your liberty, where both ought ever to refide in the nation's right hand .- It was his Majesty, whose power, influence, servants, pride and attachment were all in that great queftion involved .- You had the key to the royal heart,-the inftrument of power was in your hand, the crown was a fuppliant to

to the Irish nation, not for revenue, but for what princes value more, the army; and must have taken it, as the king takes his revenue, and took his crown, upon the terms which his fubjects, in their wifdom, are pleased to ordain; and had your parliament chofen to have annexed the great charter which they who formed the bill, knowing the Houfe prudently declined; but had your parliament chosen to have annexed the great charter to the Mutiny Bill, the British minister must have finally complied, his own bayonet would have forced Magna Charta upon him, and ftanding armies in general hoftile to liberty, might have been rendered the involuntary and miraculous inftrument of its cftablifhment. Never did a nation ftand fo entrenched; never was a post of strength fo lost. Don't believe that vulgar threat that the king would have difbanded his army; arguments of this kind are not to be liftened to, nor are those in earnest who refort to them, nor should the ministers of kings be fuffuffered to tell the fubjects of this country that his Majefty won't permit his Irish parliament, like that of Great Britain, from time to time, to regulate its own military establishment, or that his Majesty won't receive great and unconstitutional powers, fuch as a limited Mutiny Bill communicates, except upon terms more extraordinary and more unconflitutional, as well might the minister ask for absolute power and denounce, on the hefitation of parliament, an abdication of the crown : but this argument was not founded on the firmnels of the minister by whom it was invented, but in the folly or the corruption of those to whom it was applied. The Mutiny Bill was not made perpetual becaufe the British minister would not take a limited, but becaufe the Irish parliament was known to be ready to give him a perpetual dominion

over the army, the minister would have

been fatisfied with a good bill, but prefered

a bad one. The attack on your liberty had

never been made if the furrender had not

beeen previoufly and clandeftinely cove-

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nanted; it was not a determined minister, but a willing parliament.

I have heard that the Bill, though perpetual, is a benefit, becaufe it carries the principle, viz. that the King, Lords, and Commons are the only body competent to make law for Ireland .- Parliament might have declared that principle; but this bill does not declare it by express words or neceffary construction, or concomitant circumftances. The principle to the extent of this kingdom was carried before, and being once established here, carried itself in Great Britain. Unless we gave the crown a power of fhaking this principle by arms; the Bill coming back under the feal of Great Britain had the affent of the crown to whatever proposition it contained; if the House of Commons had sought an argument in fupport of liberty, they fhould have paffed the express declaration of rights; if they looked to folid ftrength, they fhould have kept the army dependent upon themfelves, they should have acted upon a principle

ciple that could be reconciled to theory or practice; they fhould not upon any ground either of argumentative or actual fecurity have declined a declaration of right, and furrender the dominion of the fword, adopting a line of conduct far below firmnefs, and above caution; arming without fear by a perpetual Mutiny Bill that power which they trembled to provoke by an affertion of their liberty.

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The objection prefered against a declararation of right, was, that a nation's liberty could not be determined by the words of the House of Commons but the powers of the country; had the declaration weakened her power, though it afferted her liberty, the passing it had been inexpedient, and therefore a perpetual Mutiny Bill, not afferting in any terms, the right, and in the most full and effectual terms, diminishing the power of the country, was upon no principle to be justified neither by the arguments of those who supported a declaration of right, nor of the men who

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opposed it. That we have gotten free from all the laws of the British parliament by the Mutiny Bill, I deny; for the Post-office remains .- That we have gotten free from the infult, I deny; for Ireland is named in the new British act .- That we have gotten free from the exercise of the British Mutiny Bill by our own, I deny; for the British act had expired in our determination to difobey it .- Our fituation, vigour and fpirit was fuch, at that particular time that nothing could have injured us but our own laws, nor have difgraced us but our own parliament: nor let the nation deceive itfelf to much as to think that the British minister, who has fent us a perpetual Bill, admits the liberty of Ireland. No ! he is an enemy to your liberty, he thinks that the Britifh parliament, by its laws, the king by his prerogative, that each and both, can make articles of war for this country, and therefore he has made the Bill perpetual, that the Irifh parliament may never again attempt to exercife, what in his opinion, better belongs to others, the power of regulating

gulating his Majefty's forces.—It was impoffible to prevent the juft claims of the Irifh nation: the minifter who denied, could do no more than get rid of them for ever; and accordingly has annexed a claufe of furrender to the very law in which those claims were advanced; faving his own pretenfions and rebuking yours: he has ftriken the nation in the height of her glory.

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I have heard it urged in mitigation of the mifchief of this law, that notwithftanding this law, his Majesty cannot keep up his army without the express confent of parliament given from feffion to feffion. I have faid fo; I think alfo that his Majefty cannot charge his hereditary revenue with penfions; but I see though these are points of law, they are not posts of strength, the perpetual nature of the laws of which we fpeak and complain, those dangerous laws which give the king the purfe, and that difgraceful law which gives him the fword, enables him. to mifapply both, to waste your treasure, and keep up your army without the controul

troul of parliament. The latter law, the Mutiny Bill, I conceive, by this argument, not proved to be fafe, but rendered cruel and abfurd; for it is a statute at variance with the common law, a flatute making it capital at all times to defert the army which is at no time legal without the confent of parliament; and which may thus be kept together by force to be fed by rapine: and I cannot here but observe that this argument did not occur before, but was invented for the occafion, and is a defpicable apology and poor point of law to the observance of which we have annexed the penalty of death, giving up folid ftrength, and hanging on fuch perilous, speculative and fantastic fecurity, the vaft and weighty charge of public liberty. France, Spain, kingdoms that have no liberty, I dare fay, have fimilar points of law; but the ear of a military government will not liften to fuch things, they are the fad devices of an infamous cause, and the last gaspings of exhausted argument: they are only of weight when the people have referved a folid ftrength which H makes

makes fuch arguments unneceffary; they are fortreffes to which no man would retire, but he who was determined to capitulate.

I have heared it faid that the army is imperial in its nature, and therefore that no part of it should be left to the Irish parliament for its regulation, but this proposition wants truth in its premise, and is false and abfurd in its confequence.-The army is not imperial, the conftitution don't conceive an empire, neither is it founded upon maxims imperial or military .- The law of England which establishes the army makes it parliamentary not imperial, the law of Ireland which provides for the army, makes it an Irifh, not an Imperial army .--- The premise therefore is false, the conclusion is false and absurd; for if the premise were true, it would conclude, not for a perpetual but against any Irish Mutiny Bill .--- For the English Mutiny Bill; for the supremacy of the British parliament.

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This argument thus founded on an ignorance of the conflitution in general, and of the establishment of the army in particular, and leading to the entire destruction of our liberty, has fought for ftrength in another argument equally feeble: viz. "that unity of discipline is necessary, and that therefore the army in every part of the dominions fhould be fubject to one power." But this obfervation proceeds from an ignorance of the fervice, as the other was derived from an ignorance of the conftitution .--- Unity of discipline is not necessary, it is not the case of armies in actual fervice; it is not the cafe of the army now in America; it was not the cafe of the allied army in the laft war in Germany; neither is unity of command neceffary to establish unity of discipline, neither does the perpetual Mutiny Bill establish unity of command. Moreover, if unity of discipline is necessary, we are not to fuppose that the Irish parliament will not fecure it, by adopting the English military code; we are not to fuppofe our parliament inadequate to the wholefome exercife

exercise of its authority over every branch of the establishment, military as well as civil; neither are we to conceive the crown incapable of abufing, and the parliament incapable of using an important article of legiflative power, neither having trefpassed upon the common law to admit an army, are we to commit further and indefinite depredations to establish unity of command, under the quaint pretence of fecuring unity of difcipline .--- But the perpetual Mutiny Bill does neither. It does not eftablish unity of command, and it endangers unity and equality of discipline, by making the principal articles of war perpetual in Ireland, which are annual in Great Britain, by establishing an army here of a distinct nature, and military powers in the crown of a different extent and duration from what was ever attempted or would be endured in Great Britain. Imperial armies, imperial legislatures, imperial unities are terms, in my mind, of very little meaning; they are the vanities of the British court, harraffing the connections of the British nation; unconfeious confcious of limit, fubverfive of liberty, and a ftranger to the law; in their theory, they are infult, and in their application,—war.—

I have heard it fuggested that the mifchief of a perpetual Mutiny Bill exifts in fpeculation only, but I cannot think fo, no more than I could think that any political question, any constitutional injury, a total instead of a partial loss of liberty, was an evil in speculation only: a measure which changes the balance of the constitution to the fide of power, and thows into the scale of the monarch the perpetual dead weight of the fword is not a fpeculative evil, to any mind except of those to whom the bleffing of a free conftitution is a visionary good. But in political as in moral depravity, the flave like the finner, will not fee his crime untill he feels his punishment, and smarts under the lash either of the tyrant or the law .--- In this conftitution every diminution of the power of the people is an actual evil, every encrease of the power of the crown is an actual evil.---An injury in fpeculation is a measure

measure neutral in itself, but dangerous in its tendency .--- The perpetual and unbounded grant of the power of the fword is not the evil tendency, but the actual evil, --- that from this evil more will enfue, and that a military government will be used to eftablish an absolute one, is, I do acknowledge, a fpeculation, but by no means abfurd, becaufe the thing did happen. James II. in the last century did endeavour to make himfelf absolute, by affuming of his own authority that very power which we have now given the Sovereign a perpetual law to exercife: he kept together by martial law an army of 30000, paid by his civil lift; an English army however ready they may be found to enforce the fupremacy, were at that time reluctant to deftroy the liberty of the British nation .--- To guard against a fimilar attempt the declaration of right fets forth, that standing armies and martial law, in peace without the confent of parliament, are illegal; meaning the confent of parliament from time to time, of

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of the then exifting parliament who feeing the use which his Majesty makes of his army, may give their confent or withold it. We are bleffed if not benefited by experience.

I know very well, that in political queftions, arguments unanswerable, founded in the obvious nature of the question, when by a certain set of politicians, they are not treated as factious, will be derided as visionary; for men long loft in the fervice of a court, do not choose to consider the confequence or the fpring of their own action, their confcience informs their capacity that fufficient for the day is the crime and corruption thereof. Such men, for a very vicious conduct have an apparent retreat in a very bad understanding: but it has been by a different way of thinking, that liberty still exists in England, when in almost every other quarter of the globe she has perished, and that the British constitution furvives in a world of flavery, owing I fuppose to a perpetual vigilance, an Englifh

lish instinct, an unremitting jealousy, an apprehenfive people, wherever a ftab was given certain to gather about the wound, active on the frontier of privilege, and banking out oppreffion as the Hollander banks out the fea.-Such formerly was the conduct of England, fuch ought to be now the conduct of Ireland; for of all nations fhe has most reason to be apprehensive about her liberty, because it is but this moment refcued; it is but just recovered from the fupremacy of the British parliament, and it was within a caft of being furrendered by the compliance of our own; a propofal was made not many years ago, to grant a Money Bill for an immense period, and rejected by the accident of one majority: The danger to Irish liberty therefore is not visionary : no, her escape is miraculous!

I have heard it faid that the Mutiny Bill is fafe, becaufe the king will not make a direct attack upon the rights of his people, but there are other ways of invading liberty befides

befides open and direct hoftility; great powers given to the crown, fuch as we have given; a perpetual and encreasing revenue, with a law to collect it of eventual perpetuity, accompanied with the perpetual and unbounded power of the fword, may in a course of time make the chief magistrate fo very strong, that the subject will be afraid to oppose him : in fuch a pofture of ftrength and weaknefs a nation capitulates without a blow, all her ftrong pofts are taken, revenue, army, purfe, and fword. ---- The question don't come to a trial; they who would not make a conftitutional refistance to the first encroachment, will not be called upon to make a treacherous stand against the last act of power their country will never know how little fuch men are to be depended upon : The king in fuch a cafe need not refort to arms; his folid strength operates without being put forth, and is an occult caufe influencing and depreffing the motions and fpirit of parliament and people : The fubject feels at a diftance an accumulated weight of T power

power coming against him, and by in-

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What elfe was it which until 1779 made the people of Ireland, with all the privileges of the British Nation afraid to refort to the benefit of their own laws? What but an evident fuperior strength arrayed against them? What elfe was it which in 1779 made the parliament and people ftruggle for their birthright? What, but that occult cause, a confcious strength, an inward security, an armed people; this furprifing change never came to a contest, the nation recovered her liberty with as much tranquillity as the had loft it : The volunteers never attempted force: no, but they flood by, giving a filent confidence to liberty; as an independent army; if these volunteers difperfe, will give a filent confidence to power.

Nor is liberty only endangered by the fudden irruption and filent growth of power, but by the fears and refentment of corruption, when when the venal man trembles for his fafety and is inflamed at his own infamy, and hating and hateful to his country, difables her refentment by deftroying her liberty; for flavery like death approaches in many fhapes and fhould be guarded againft in all.

A measure unconstitutional and corrupt may be adopted by parliament, at a time. when the expectation, pulse, and spirit of the nation are high. Inflamed at fuch a conduct the people may fall into a violent method of expreffing a just indignation, and may difclaim that majority which affented to a measure conceived to be destructive. This majority, or many of them, loft in public estimation, confcious of public detestation, fupported by public money, afraid of refponfibility, careless of liberty, shocked at popular enormities, and full of an ariftocratic impatience of the growth and confequence of the people, may apply to the crown for protection and revenge. And thus a venal fet of men, proftituted for hire and furious for punifhment, who at first only

only meant a corrupt vote, having once kindled the people, fortify themfelves by an accumulation of crimes, and having given the king an unconflitutional power for money, give him abfolute power for protection; the political degrees are natural and rapid; from perifhed principle to execrated character, and fo on to the laft act of defpotifm and defpair, the headlong tribe precipitate; and avenge the reputation they have loft, upon the liberties they have left.

This may be the cafe, for fomething like the feeds of this has been the cafe.---The Sugar and Mutiny Bills had received the fulleft confideration ever given to any public queftion; and after the nation had obtained in each, a victory over her adminiftration, they were transmitted to England with a zeal approaching to transport. They were returned, both altered, one alteration made a dangerous change in the conflitution, the other was an indirect detraction from the free trade and direct infraction of the

the privilege of the Commons: both were attended with a public affront, and both were adopted by parliament; that very parliament whofe privileges these alterations invaded, whofe powers they diminished, whole fense they superfeded, and whole pretensions they infulted. The nation had been tempered too high to bear this with filent fubmiffion ; that parliament which now funk itfelf, had before raifed the fpirit of the people. There is in this country an intelligent public, men who don't understand constitution like a Crown lawyer, nor equalization duties like a custom-house clerk, see the honest sense of every great question, and have a lively and uncorrupted feeling of a national infult. The truth was that every man in this kingdom underftood the motives and felt the final conduct of parliament, the whole nation felt it, fhe felt it as a mortification to her pride, a blaft to her expectations, a blow affecting her from the metropolis to the last and remotest of her affociations, electrifying her radically and univerfally from center to circumference.

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Some of the volunteer corps express this general difgust by the warmest resolutions, they discover the generous indignation of. independent citizens, and express that indignation in the unguarded language of foldiers. They who never deferted parliament until she deserted herself, charge the majority with having upon these queftions betrayed their country. It was a great charge; let me add, it was a great crime .--Alarmed at these proceedings, the administration, who by influencing had separated and detached parliament from the Volunteers, fummon their friends to a private meeting, affembled to maintain the dignity of the legiflature by the dependents of the Caftle. At this contemptible gathering it was agreed to take notice of the above refolutions in both Houfes. That parliament who had been corrupted to perpetuate the army of the king, are now inftigated to punish the army of the people *. A motion is made to addrefs

* Probably this motion was not then feen in all its confequences, certainly not by the perfon who feconded it; a young nobleman of great fpirit, integrity and fenfe.

drefs his Excellency to order a profecution. That House of Commons whose dignity was never entirely loft until the administration were petitioned to defend it, who had been until the court cashiered it, the head of the nation's army; that House of Commons who had brought to the refidence of the Lord Lieutenant, the Volunteers as their guard, and aftonished him in his own Caftle, now becomes an humble petitioner to that very Viceroy, to punish those very volunteer corps; who were by the inconfistency of parliament, in the course of one feffion, the fubject of its thanks, the partners of its triumph, and the object of its profecution.

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Fortunately for the kingdom, but moft ignominioufly for parliament, the miniftry who prompted their addrefs did not pay it the fmalleft attention. This unnatural conteft has ceafed; privilege is authority, and authority is character. The privilege of the Commons is the privilege of the people in the perfons of their reprefentatives and ferfervants; not a shield against the nation's fentiments, nor a fcourge to punish her discussion. The Commons therefore did not rely on the breach of privilege, but addreffed his Excellency to profecute; and his Excellency stopped because he could not pro-. ceèd. An army is too numerous for a profecution, and the country too free for a profcription. Moreover, it must be a great object to the minister who carried fuch a meafure as the Mutiny Bill, to establish a mutual amnesty,-information forgotten on the part of the court, conftitution on the part of the people : But tho' the Volunteers cannot be profecuted, yet if they were not more numerous and more united than Court agitators could wifh, I do believe they would be difperfed, and that the Merchants and the other high fpirited obnoxious corps would never have been fuffered to affociate again at a review; by a government, armed as ours now is with a perpetual power of the fword, and prompted by the address of both Houfes of parliament: fo little do men who make an encroachment on public.

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lic liberty, know to what length they will proceed when hurried on in a conteft and obliged to defend the dignity of doing wrong by the guilt of doing worfe.

I have flated the principal arguments in palliation of the Mutiny Bill, and their anfwers.

If any thing could aggravate fuch a meafure, it is the confideration that the motive was as profligate as the law was mifchievous; and that this bill has been accompanied as it was produced by a most. profuse application of honours and a faithless application of money. We have feen its confcientious fupporters paid for their vote, either in their own perfon or in that of their friends; or publicly balked when they expected to be bribed. The House of Commons was actually canvassed, and men desperate of corruption were solicited once more into their original state of mendicant importunity. Places, penfions, promises, ready money, the whole mystery of K eccle_

ecclesiaftical patronage, all like the foith of the Lord Lieutenant, were proftituted on this occafion. That this trade should have taken place under Lord Buckingham's administration, I did not expect: for I remember when his Secretary made the following engagement, after Chriftmas in 1778, when a motion was made to refolve to addrefs his Excellency, to know whether he had any powers, and how far they extended, to diminish the Penfion Lift; the Secretary role and made the following specific declaration, " that no " new place nor additional falary was to be " created, and that no new penfion was " to be added, except in the inftance of " one of the royal family or a judge defirous " to retire; and further, that the lift as " penfions dropt was not to be fupplied."

In confequence of this folemn official engagement the motion was withdrawn. The departure from this engagement, the creation of additional falaries and penfions must embarrafs the advocate for the inviolable

violable purity of lord Buckingham's administration; and I do believe nothing could have induced his lordship to forget his word, if orders had not come from the British cabinet at any expence to carry the perpetual Mutiny Bill, and to break and corrupt the fpirit of Ireland as the best means whereby his Excellency could obtain forgiveness for the benefits which the Irish nation had obtained for herfelf. But tho' these orders were positive, I cannot see any excuse for obeying them. We live in a land of liberty. His Majesty cannot in this kingdom order a fubject to violate a public promise: the meanest peasant can defend his faith against the commands of his fovereign. The King could not difgrace Lord Buckingham, if previoufly he had not difgraced himfelf.

As lord Buckingham flood bound to Ireland, an order to increase a falary or add a pension was an attack upon his personal integrity, amounting to an infolent revocation of his commission. Had his Excellency, lency, instead of preffing by all the power of faithless engagement the perpetual Mutiny Bill, pleaded his honour, he would have made a refpectable retreat, and would have stood on the ground of our character and his own; but unfortunately for both, for his credit and our conftitution, he carried the perpetual Mutiny Bill, and taught the British minister to despise the Irish parliament, and to reprobate that chief governor, who had fo long and ineffectually dallied with its virtue : Instead of being thanked for the victory obtained, he became responsible for the mischief he had omitted. All our virtues were stated against him; and at the fame time that he exposed himself to the charge of past imbecillity, he has exposed us and our focieties to a future plan of vigorous operation .----But though the concluding part of his administration is exceptionable, the period for which he fuffers in the cabinet is to be admired, not cenfured. He faw this kingdom threatned by a foreign enemy, and felt

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felt the incapacity of the ftate to defend her-he therefore diffributed arms among the people to fecure the Irifh nation to the British crown. - He found the treasury empty, and the people begging ; he did not inflame hunger to frenzy, by attempting to apply an exhausted exchequer to prevent the trade of a famished people ;- he did not conceive the loyal armaments of the Irifh nation rebellious affociations,-he was not a fpy on our armed focieties,-he did not defpife moderation,-he was carried away in the tide of the times along the ftream of your prosperity,-his government seemed to partake of the triumphs of the people, and the non-refistance of the state fecured its tranquillity,-his virtue ceafed where his action began. His character was formed upon his defeats, and undone by his victories .- Pure in his own perfon, -with respect to his connections, pure and inexorable,-with respect to Ireland in the earlier part of his administration innoxious, and to the British cabinet odious, - he fought by a corrupt conclusion a return to the

the bofom of court-favour, and found the viceroy was unpardonable in the acquifitions of the people.

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I lament his ill-treatment, becaufe it proceeds from an alienation to the country that flourifhed under him; he has loft the countenance of the Britifh court on account of your Addrefs for Trade, your Short Money Bill, and above all, the growth of the armed focieties, and the thanks of both houfes of parliament.

His departure accordingly is marked with circumftances of public tendernefs: the nation foftens; there is a generofity in a free people which far exceeds the meafure of fcruplous juffice: to be injured under the fuppofition of being a public benefactor, is a claim to their protection; diftinct from any positive merit, Lord Buckingham excites a paffion in his favour approaching to love; we feel our caufe combined with his fortunes,—the fhield of the nation rifes up to encompafs and protect tect him, and we follow him with fympathy to the verge of the ifland.

A new administration fucceeds, which the expence of government and the growth of debt have put for the prefent in the power of parliament : Hereafter, it may be otherwife, when from commerce and peace the revenues shall encrease: and as a profuse establishment puts an administration in the power of parliament, fo an approaching election puts parliament in the power of the people. The refources of the conftitution, even as we have mangled it, are many,-adequate to the redrefs of all grievances by measures lenient and legal: You are the great creative radical part of the conftitution; the fource of the nation's vigour, and the feat of her foul : King, Lords and Commons stand upon your base : you form and may reform parliament. A list of measures, a general qualification, an elective creed to be tendered to every candidate, would extort national conditions from corruption itfelf: but

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but unlefs the nation shall be previously concerted and covenanted, she will be furprized by a diffolution, and a general election will be a radical defeat.

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Let the power of binding Ireland by the British parliament be utterly and for ever abolished and abjured, that there may be no feed of jealoufy between the two nations, on whofe heart-felt coalition their mutual happiness depends, that officious men may not traduce one country to the other, and that a future minister may not proceed, as in the inftance of America, on the referved principles of fupremacy, and unable to govern either country, embroil both. Let the power of the crown to alter, and of the Irifh council to alter and fuppress our bills, a power useless to his Majesty, opprobrious to his fubjects, and founded on misconstruction of law, be relinquished; let the Mutiny Bill be here as in England, dependent on parliament; let the Judges be here as in England, independent of the crown ; that the mouth of of the law may not be the will of power, nor the fword her inftrument.

Thefe are the principal conftitutional amendments. But should the British minister trample down America, and become haughty to Ireland, if instead of new, neceffary and humble acquisition, a blow is meditated, let me conjure you, in order to keep what you have gotten already, to preferve your armed affociations. I will conclude by appealing to them.

The Irifh conflictution, commerce and pride with you began, and with you they would vanifh. Until Britain is reconciled to our participation of trade,—while the Britifh parliament claims a right to take that trade away and make law for Ireland,—you are the great charter of the Irifh nation, our efficient caufe and final hope. Prompted by you we have conceived a vaft image of our own greatnefs—prompted by you we have fpoken definitively to Great Britain, and aftonifhing her pride and awakeningher juffice, have ftated in one fen-L

tence the provocation of a century .- Obnoxious for that virtue, you are to confirm your advocates, the objects of hatred and eftimation, and to preferve your affociations, the dreaded inftrument of national deliverance. Believe me, you have many enemies, you are to guard against false friends and natural foes, against the weaknefs of human nature and the depravity of man, against sloth, against security, against administration, against a militia. What! are we to go back to the days of confusion and power,-when the kingdom was lawlefs, and the trooper was the magistrate, and no act was executed but acts of the British parliament! I have heard your legality difputed. - Confcious as I am that no law prohibits the fubject to arm, convinced as I am of your legality, I conceive that question to be lost in the immenfity of your numbers. And with the pomp, and power, and trade, and all that train which await your progrefs, I shall not stop your army to ask, What law has made you? Sufficient that there is no

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no law againft you, fufficient that without you there would be neither law nor liberty. Go on and profper, thou fword of juffice and fhield of freedom : the living fource of an antient flame, the foundation of our pride; a providential interpofition, an army enriching the land with induftry, cofting the ftate nothing, adequate to all her enemies, and greater than all her revenues could pay! awful indeed to the tyrant, but to a juft prince unconquerable ftrength. The cuftody of the nation's character is in your hands. Go on, and multiply, and add immortal fecurity to the Caufe of your Country!

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Page 8. Part of the declaration, inflead of that part.

- 13. Line 4. For conrupt, read a corrupt.
 - ib. Line 22. For require the collected, read and the collected.
 - 18. Line 13. For minister, read ministers.
 - 26. Line 16. For compensate, read compensates.
 - 29. Delegates and delegation, instead of diligated and deligation.
 - 40. Inferior, instead of interior.
 - 50. Flight, instead of height.
 - 66. Line 8. For prescription, read proscription.
 - 92. Line 16. For scruplous, read scrupulous.