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Religion of Humanity:

ORDER AND PROGRESS: LIVE FOR OTHERS.

EUROPE'S NEED

AND

ENGLAND'S DUTY.

BY

HENRY DIX HUTTON.

"The desire to prevent possible future wrong-doing can never justify resort to immorality the very same as that which is reprobated."—AUGUSTE COMTE.

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PREFACE.

THE impression produced by the breaking off of the negociations for an armistice is thus recorded in two papers which cannot be suspected of any undue leaning towards France :—

"It was no doubt through Bismarck refusing to admit food into Paris, that the negociations were yesterday broken off. There is no hope. Pestilence and slaughter may strike down besiegers and besieged. Villages may be burnt in France and families left fatherless in Germany. Two inflexible wills are in collision, and it is thus, and thus only, that it can be discovered which has strength enough to grind the other to powder."—*The Times* (London), 7th November.

And again—

"The telegram from Versailles announcing the failure of the negociations for an armistice did not reach us yesterday morning, until a few minutes before we went to press. Almost all the accounts previously received represented the negociations as progressing favourably, and we were therefore inclined to share the hope generally entertained by our contemporaries that M. Thiers had succeeded in his mission, and that there was a reasonable prospect of the war being brought to a termination without the bombardment and capture of Paris. Unhappily, there is now no doubt that the negociations have been broken off by the Government of the National Defence, and it appears to us, considering the position they have taken up from the first, and to which they are solemnly pledged to adhere, they had no other alternative. The chief difficulty in the case was the question of the revictualling of Paris, without which the Provisional Government could not consent to a suspension of hostilities, which in other respects would have been so favourable to France. Count Bismarck, however, resolutely refused to allow any food to be passed into Paris during the twenty-five days to be assigned for

the holding of the elections to the Constituent Assembly; and as this was his determination from the beginning, it is evident that he was merely playing with M. Thiers when raising a hope in the mind of the aged statesman that an armistice might be arranged."—*Saunders' News-Letter* (Dublin), 8th November.

Under these circumstances, I venture to submit the following three questions, with the considerations they suggest to my mind.*

First—For what did Germany enter on the war?

Secondly—For what does Germany prolong the war?

Thirdly—What is England's duty?

HENRY DIX HUTTON.

Dublin, 10, *Lower Mountjoy-street*,
20*th November*, 1870.

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* I also reproduce in two Appendices some views which I had previously submitted, on "France and her European Services;" "Prussia and her Citizen-Army."

EUROPE'S NEED AND ENGLAND'S DUTY.

I.—FOR WHAT DID GERMANY ENTER ON THE WAR ?

THE King of Prussia solemnly declared to the North German Parliament, that he made war only on the then Ruler of France and his soldiers, not on the French population, whom he described as a great and peace-loving nation, dragged into the conflict by Napoleon.* These were his precise words. He reiterated that declaration when he entered France as a conqueror. After Sedan he renewed—as is now admitted by his semi-official organ—the expression of his belief that the war was the act of Napoleon, not that of France.† How has this King, who endeavoured to hide, under a miserable subterfuge, his knowledge of the Hohenzollern

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* "*Those who hold power in France* have, by preconcerted misguidance, found means to work upon the legitimate, but excitable, national sentiment of our great neighbouring people, *for the furtherance of personal interests* and the gratification of passions."—*Times*, 20th July, 1870.

† The discovery and publication of Louis Napoleon's correspondence and papers by the Provisional Government have afforded many remarkable confirmations of this view. I quote the following English comments on their contents. The *Pall Mall Gazette* says :—"The papers really discreditable to the Emperor Napoleon were not of a private but of an official nature, and were found not in the private cabinet, but in the Ministry of the Interior. The replies of the Prefects who were consulted about the war *mean nothing if they do not mean that the country was against it ;* and the Emperor, when he said that he had been forced into it by public opinion, had been too careless to read the answers, or had been too obtuse to understand them ; or else he wilfully misdescribed the information he had received."

The *Spectator* observes (15th October, 1870, p. 1219) :—"Curious and convincing evidence has been produced *that France was really at heart very hostile to the war*, which the Emperor declared had been forced upon him against his will by the enthusiasm of the French nation. The Government of Paris have published the replies made to the official questions put to the Prefects of the eighty-eight Departments, as to the temper of the people in relation to war ; and it seems that almost all make its official language a confession of the utter unwillingness of the people to go to war. Most of them say the people were resolved to meet war, should it be essential for their dignity and honour ; but not one says that a wish for war exists, or so much as ardour for war, in case war should prove to be necessary."

intrigue, how has he kept his royal word? After he had shut in one army, and forced the capitulation of another; after the ruler who began the war was ruined and dethroned, the King of Prussia has persevered in a way that deprives Germany of all title to moral sympathy, and exhibits her to Europe in the light of a vindictive, rapacious aggressor. Since Sedan, the character of the war has been changed. Thus continued, it means for Germany no longer defence, but revenge, insolent triumph, a military orgie abroad, to be followed at home by her subjection to a retrograde Autocrat, and his unscrupulous and brutal Minister. For France, it means a struggle for her national existence, an heroic resistance to a dangerous and overgrown power, which, if victorious, must render "United Germany" a standing menace to Europe. "To be or not to be, that is the question" for France, whose humiliation, nay, whose moral and political annihilation, Prussia has sought, not Germany's security or welfare. The means which the victor has employed are worthy of the end he proposed. Since the day when Imperial Rome, on the plains of Châlons, hurled back the barbarian invader, there has been no worse invasion than that of King William and his "peaceable Germans." Never has war been waged in a way more ruthless or revolting. It is not I, but the *Times*, assuredly no hostile critic, that condemns the conduct of Germany. "*A third of France has been swept bare as if by locusts—as if by a wave of water or of fire—as if by Attila and his Huns.*" Not content with levying enormous requisitions, the German armies of the 19th century have burned villages, bombarded fortified and open towns, committed rapine and murder, outraged women, and threatened with death ministers of religion who dared to inspire Frenchmen with a noble and patriotic courage. Evidence of all this is to be found in the narratives of English correspondents.*

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* The following are selected from a multitude of statements coming from English sources :—

"HOW THE RAILWAYS OF LORRAINE ARE PROTECTED.

"The *Moniteur Officiel* of the general Government of Lorraine and of the Prefect of the Meurthe, published at Nancy, under the superintendence of the Prussian Government, contains the following :—

"'Nancy, October 18, 1870.—The railway having been injured in several places, the commandant of the 3rd German Army has issued an order directing that the trains shall be accompanied by inhabitants who are well known and generally respected. These inhabitants shall be placed on the locomotive, so that it may be made known that every accident caused by the hostility of the inhabitants will, in the first place, injure their countrymen. The prefects are requested to organise, in conjunction with railway managers and the commandants at military stations, a regular service to accompany the trains. (Signed) The Marquis DE VILLERS, Civil Commissary in Lorraine.' The following is the form of

The First Napoleon and his armies were never guilty of worse than this. Shall his evil example palliate excesses committed after nearly fifty years of peace within Western Europe (1815—1859), during which France never lifted her hand against Ger-

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the orders sent to the persons requested to accompany the trains :—'Nancy, ——, 1870. Mr. —— is requested to attend, on receiving this intimation, at the railway station at Nancy, under the charge of the undersigned, to accompany, as a measure of security, the train leaving at —— o'clock. ——, Minister for ——. In case of refusal, the police will take the person so refusing into custody. -——, Commandant of the Military Station.' With reference to this order, the *Independence Belge* of the 31st ult. says :—'The inhabitants of Nancy have been much affected at seeing M. Leclaire, the venerable President of the Court of Appeal, whose age. it was thought, should have protected him against such a requisition, obliged to take his place beside the stoker, and make a journey standing on the tender, which must have been anything but pleasant. The dignified and imposing attitude of the old magistrate deeply affected all who were present. Next day a young *avocat*, and the day after that two merchants, had to perform the same duty. We borrow these details from a German newspaper, of which the correspondent is very far from approving these practices. He disapproves them all the more, because the population of Nancy, in spite of their strong national feelings, have committed no act of hostility towards the German troops, and the latter have been compelled to acknowledge the propriety with which they have conducted themselves since the occupation commenced.' A correspondent, writing on the 22nd, adds to this information that the Procureur-Général, M. Izoard, was, at five o'clock at night, taken under the charge of two gendarmes, and placed on the locomotive of a German train, between the stoker and engineers, and that next day he had to return to the same duty with the Procureur of the Republic at Nancy."

"BURNING OF FRENCH VILLAGES.

"Within the last fortnight six villages near Orleans, whose inhabitants made common cause with the Franc-Tireurs, were burnt."

"BOMBARDING PRIVATE HOUSES.

"Verdun has been again and again bombarded, and a copy of a local paper, which has been brought out by a messenger who escaped by swimming the river Meuse, testifies that the Germans are adopting the same brutal tactics which they followed at Strasburg, namely an incessant bombardment of the habitations of the unfortunate inhabitants. The General in command, Baron Guerin de Waldenbach, has, in a letter upon the exchange of prisoners, addressed the following dignified reproof to the German commander:—'General. I take advantage of the occasion of this letter to express to you the sentiments with which I am penetrated, concerning the manner in which you have attacked Verdun. I had hitherto supposed that the war between Prussia and France should be a duel between two armies, and I was far from imagining that the inoffensive inhabitants, women and children, should have their fortune and life so unjustly engaged in the strife. If you think, General, that this manner of acting upon your part, which I decline to qualify, can contri-

many? If the war be continued, the invasion of France by Germany will be no longer defence but desolation; her generals and armies will be no longer soldiers, but plunderers* and assas-

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bute in any way to hasten the surrender of the place, you are suffering from a profound error; for all that the inhabitants have had to suffer up to the present time has but only contributed to augment the self-denial which their position and patriotism impose upon them. Neither the rain of shell and balls, nor the privations to which the National Guard and the army are exposed, can prevent their doing their duty to the last. Their greatest desire is to measure their strength in a hand-to-hand struggle with the Prussians. Permit me to tell you, General, it is at the breach we await you, and that we hope that some day you will come out from behind the hills which keep you hidden from our fire.' This letter was shown to the Maire before being sent off. He returned it with the following note:—'General, I have the honour to return the letter which you have had the great kindness to communicate to me. I think it my duty to express to you the thanks of the entire population for the noble and dignified language in which you have expressed the patriotic sentiments with which it is animated.'"

"THE GERMANS IN TOURAINE.

"The Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, writing from Tours, Nov. 7, says:—'I have this moment received a letter *from an Englishman who was an eye-witness of the burning of Chateaudun, and who is still living in the neighbourhood of that town.* He writes—The place was, for the most part, burned in cold blood. After the fight the Germans went from one end of a street to the other, setting fire to every second house; and they allowed no attempt to be made to extinguish the conflagration till the next day. About one hundred persons have been taken away as hostages, and sent, it is thought, to Germany. But here is an act of savagery which struck me more than all the rest. After the fight the National Guards, having changed their uniforms for the ordinary clothes, re-entered the town. One of them, for some unknown reason, did not take this precaution, and brought back his wife and children in a carriage. On his way he was met by two Prussian horsemen. He at once threw his gun at their feet, crying out that he gave himself up as a prisoner. One of the horsemen dismounted, picked up the gun, and shot the unfortunate man through the head as he sat between his wife and children. They also shot an old pensioned-off captain, over seventy years of age, as he sat in his house after the surrender of the town.'"

* "Our houses are furnished in the most remarkable fashion. Most of the original inhabitants have fled, some leaving behind a lot of valuable furniture, others removing everything that was at all portable; thus we found one house replete with all comforts, whilst its neighbour had nothing to show but four bare walls. Equality being now the order of the day in France, we speedily equalled this disparity, the fortunate owners of abundance giving to them that needed. *Then the detached houses lying beyond the villages were robbed of their contents, and, finally, we found treasures buried in the earth.* You may imagine what chaotic confusion reigns in our furniture, each man taking what he requires. What a face will the unfortunate villagers make when they return, and

sins ;* the conflict no longer war, but extermination, and, if that were possible, subjugation.

Yet the perpetrators of these horrible acts belong to a nation which can show foremost names in science, literature, and all the arts of peace ; whose army is undoubtedly composed of instructed men. Instruction they have, but are they educated ? Education means something more than knowledge, implies conscience, moral restraint, discipline not alone of the head, but of the heart. In all these, the attitude and conduct of the German nation has shown them to be no better, to say the least, than other people. Their citizen-soldiers write Sanscrit, and compose works of philosophy. They want the simpler language and true logic which are inspired by common sense, common honesty, and common humanity. The more lofty the pretensions, the deeper the fall. Germany, who vaunts her titles to respect, cannot afford to despise

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how on earth will they find their own property out of this confused heap ?"—*Extract from a German soldier's letter, before Metz.*

* A private letter to a German local paper, from a cavalry soldier, gives a full account of the details of the affair at Ablis on the 8th of October, and of the vengeance exacted, which was of the severest order. It seems that the squadron of Schleswick-Holstein Hussars, ninety-six strong, which had occupied the little town, turned in to rest without any special measures for security, there being an outpost of Bavarian troops just beyond the place in the direction of the supposed enemy. About three a.m. this post was driven off by a night attack ; and the Francs-Tireurs poured into the town on three sides at once, and commenced their attack on the hussars. The signal was given to boot and saddle, but many were shot down in the attempt to get to their horses, and the half of the squadron who escaped did so chiefly by fleeing individually, and gaining the covert of some adjacent woods. Some of the fugitives made their way after daybreak to Rambouillet, twelve miles off, where lay their brigade with a party of Bavarian rifles, and the whole moved forward at once to avenge a disgrace which they conceived could only have befallen them with the full assistance of the inhabitants of the place. On arriving at Ablis, and reoccupying it without resistance, it was found that the bodies of the slain had been all removed. From this it was at once taken for granted that they had been carried off to claim a reward, which the German soldiers fully believe to have been offered by the French Government for every one of their comrades slain by Francs-tireurs. Much more probably, as we conclude, they were removed by the frightened inhabitants in order to get rid of the traces of an affair so dangerous to them. Be this as it may, the scene of vengeance which followed was as terrible as anything in modern war. "Women, children, and greybeards were spared," says the eye-witness, one of the avengers himself ; "but the men of the place" (which contained 740 inhabitants before the war) "were all shot or cut down without mercy." Then "the word was given to plunder and destroy," and, after the soldiers had taken all they could, houses, barns, stacks, and all that would take fire, were set into one grand conflagration, which lasted till night. "My pen can hardly describe this

the moral judgment of Europe.* By persevering in her aggression, she prepares for herself a tremendous condemnation, and, not improbably, a terrible retribution.

II.—FOR WHAT DOES GERMANY PROLONG THE WAR?

Not to obtain security for Germany, but to gain territory for Prussia; to humiliate France; to menace Europe.

They demand two entire departments (Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin), nearly the whole of a third (Moselle), and a large part of a fourth (Meurthe). These four districts, comprising the Province of Alsace, and the northern portion of Lorraine, have a population of at least 1,500,000 persons. For this demand two reasons are alleged—military security for Germany, and ancient German claims. On neither ground can it be supported.

By the Treaty of Vienna (1815) three first-class fortresses, Coblentz, Mayence, and Landau, the last being taken from France, were assigned to Germany for the express purpose of giving her a strong frontier and line of defence. Even in that hour of prostration for France, Prussia did not carry her harsh and overbearing diplomacy—attested by the German historian Gervinus—so far as to demand Metz, or to reclaim Lorraine. She did ask for the line of the Vosges and Alsace as a defensive boundary, but the pretension was refused through the joint determination of England and Russia, as being both needless and impolitic. Metz, once an independent Bishopric, has been

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transaction," concludes the simple narrator; who fully believed he had been merely assisting in an act of obvious justice.

* The *Globe* (1st November) says:—"The position taken up by the Provisional Government of France, that the continuation of war after the overthrow of the Imperial system is essentially unjust, has found several able advocates among the neutral States. Herr Van Prinsterer, chief of what is called the Anti-Revolutionary party in Holland, protests in a pamphlet entitled, 'Idées Néerlandaises,' against the prosecution of the war by Germany in its present shape as a war of conquest, and condemns the Bismarckian system of annexation by decree, without reference to the wishes of the population, as exemplified in North Schleswig and Hanover, as even worse than annexation by sham plebiscites. In Hungary, M. Simonyi, one of the leaders of the Left, was only prevented from submitting a resolution to the same effect to the Hungarian Parliament by the intervention of the Deak party, on the ground of its impolicy. In the United States, the well-known Abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, has denounced the present attitude of Prussia in strong terms. It is remarkable that all three were strong sympathisers of Germany at first, and that the first-mentioned can have little love for the Republic, either on political or religious grounds. Although Germany is technically justified in pursuing her advantages to the utmost, it becomes every day more evident that her moral victory is diminishing almost in the same proportion that her material successes increase."

with Toul and Verdun) held by France under treaty (Cateau-Cambrésis, 1559) in undisturbed possession for more than three hundred years. If the Duke of Wellington, in 1815, declared the Prussian demand for Alsace groundless, in a military point of view, surely the war of 1870 confirms that conclusion. The like demand is still more groundless as to Metz, which Prussia wants as a menace to France, and through her to Europe. Northern and Central Germany are already amply protected. If the Southern boundary needs protection, this would be far more effectually obtained by erecting an isolated fortress on German ground, than by claiming a large fortified city like Strasburg.

The political history of the two provinces, in reference to France, is shortly as follows. Lorraine—the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun excepted—though nominally a German Duchy, owing fealty to the empire, had long been surrounded by French territory. The Ducal line, expelled for many years by Louis XIV., were fully restored in 1697, and remained in possession until 1737, when, by arrangement, Stanislas Leczinski obtained Lorraine in exchange for Tuscany, then ceded to the Duke Francis of the former duchy. Louis XIV. of France married the daughter of the Polish King (1737), and on the death of his father-in-law (1766) incorporated Lorraine with France by inheritance. In truth, the political assimilation of this province had long been prepared by the sentiments of the population, even while nominally under German dominion. It was a village of Lorraine—Domremy, department of the Vosges—which in the 15th century gave birth to the heroic saviour of France, Joan of Arc. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) confirmed France in her possession of the larger part of Alsace, conquered during the thirty years' war. The Treaty of Nymwegen (1678) between France and the Empire, assured to France Alsace with its dependencies. Subsequently (1681) Louis XIV. wrongfully seized Strasburg, then a free Imperial city. But the peace of Ryswick (1697), which deprived Louis XIV. of his other conquests, confirmed France in Alsace, with Strasburg, of which she has ever since remained in undisputed possession.

A claim, by mere right of conquest, to dismember France, and transfer a population of 1,500,000 against their will, was too barefaced even for Prussian diplomacy, and, besides, not calculated to awaken enthusiasm. Count Bismarck found a plausible and popular pretext ready to his hand, and professors in German universities equal to the task of making the worse appear the better reason. These "grave and reverend seignors" take various grounds. First, they allege that territory once German is by right always German. Let them then, at least, be consistent, and claim the entire left bank of the Rhone and Saone, with Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, and even large portions of Italy.

Some of these pretensions have actually been advanced, and, doubtless, only await the next war to be seriously argued by the "educated mind of Germany," and practically enforced by the arms of Prussia.* Again, the professors say ancient German populations must be rescued from Celtic demoralization. If consulted, however, Alsace and Lorraine might rather desire to be rescued from Teutonic barbarism, which, after ransacking their wealth, and slaughtering their population, makes no secret of their intention to rule them "as Russia governs Poland."† It is

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* Thus Prussia has again been intriguing in Luxembourg, whose population have protested against this unworthy proceeding, as England, too, ought to do, more especially after the recent treaty which was, at least, supposed to guarantee the neutrality of that territory.

"ANOTHER CONTEMPLATED ANNEXATION BY GERMANY.

"London, November 11, 1870.

"Professor Treitschke warmly advocates the annexation of Luxembourg to Germany, in an elaborate article in the *Prussiche Jarbucher*. He says that when the German frontier extends to Metz and Diedenbofen, which he takes it for granted will be the result of the present war, the reasons for the neutralization of Luxembourg will no longer exist, as that Duchy will no longer separate France from Prussia, but simply be an enclave in the territory of the latter State. Prussia will certainly not tolerate a state of things which makes the community between Metz and Treves pass through a neutral territory, especially as France will now be for many years a bitter enemy. To her, moreover, thinks Herr Treitschke, Luxembourg, refortified under Prussian hands, would be a valuable defence for Germany. The neutralization of Luxembourg, he proceeds, was a crime against reason and history, for it separated 20,000 Germans from their country, to place them under the protection of Europe. *He sorrowfully admits, however, that though the Luxembourgers are Germans, from an ethnological and historical point of view, their institutions, laws, and customs are French.*"

"BRITISH NAVAL SUPREMACY.

"In an article lately published in the *Zeitung Fur Nord Deutschland* there appeared the following :—'In England people look with philosophic calmness on the struggles of continental nations. They believe they are in no danger of invasion, Germany not being a naval power ; but let them not forget that we are well aware of our weakness on the sea, and that we are striving with the utmost eagerness to remedy this defect.' The writer having shown that there is nothing to prevent the German fleet being equal to our own in a few years, proceeds to threaten us after this fashion :—'The time will come when neither the North Sea nor the British Channel will stop us. On a German sea, near the mouth of two German rivers, lies a German island, Heligoland, which was torn from us in the days of our weakness. *We must recover that piece of German ground.* Also, if Heligoland had belonged to us, the French fleet could not have found a shelter, or pilots to lead it into the harbours of the North Sea. Well, we must keep our powder dry, that's all.'"

† A correspondent of the *Times* writes as follows :—"On my way to

undeniable, and not denied even by Germany, that the inhabitants of these provinces are profoundly French in sentiment and political attachment, and abhor German annexation. But this, according to the professors, makes no difference. They come, it is alleged, of a German stock, and speak the German language, *therefore* their transfer is a necessary homage to the "principle of nationalities." Pedantic logic may accept the inference; common sense questions the premises, and scouts the conclusion. The population of Alsace and Lorraine have become by immigration and intermarriage a mixed race. They speak a *patois*, neither German nor French, but compounded of both, while a very large proportion, especially in the towns, also speak French —the language of the administration and courts of justice. But, even were it otherwise, the test is erroneous.* Nationality does

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this place, I travelled last night from Cologne to Giessen in company with one of the Prussian Civil Commissioners charged with the organisation of the new Government established in Alsace and Lorraine, and obtained from him some interesting as well as curious information with regard to the future plans of the Germans. My *compagnon de voyage* admitted at once that it is not only the purpose of the Germans to retain possession of the two French provinces, but ultimately to annex them to Prussia proper, and not to either Bavaria or Baden. At first they will, however, be governed separately, and enjoy certain advantages, intended, if possible, to conciliate the inhabitants—though, as my informant frankly added, there was no hope of that. In time, perhaps, the peasantry might be reconciled to the change; but the people of the cities and towns never will be, and the only course Prussia could pursue would be to govern them despotically, or as Russia does Poland—*all idea of conciliation being entirely out of the question.*"

A German writing from Metz says:—"Let nobody expect to win the sympathies of these people for generations to come. They hate us more intensely than the French population proper, and if Metz remains German, only an iron rule will be possible here. Every forbearance and mildness would be misunderstood, and good deeds would fall on stony ground."

The *Augsburg Gazette* mentions that the irritation of the population of Strasburg increases daily. German soldiers are continually found assassinated. The Badenese seem to excite the anger of the inhabitants most, and are oftenest attacked.

* I quote with pleasure the following passage from Dr. Bridges' pamphlet on "Irish Disaffection." (1868. E. Truelove, 256, High Holborn, London.):—"I am no adherent of the doctrine of 'nationalities,' stated in the absolute and abstract form which is now perplexing and distracting Europe. The elements that go to form what by common consent is called a nation, are very numerous, and their combination may vary almost infinitely. Neither race, nor religion, nor geographical boundary, nor language, nor subjection to a common government, is of itself sufficient to constitute a nation. Not race: for there is not a nation in Europe that is not a mixture of widely divergent races. Of England, Wales, and Scotland there is no need to prove this. Spain is a

not mean identity of race or language, but that fundamental harmony of social sympathies, ideas, and institutions, the creation of successive generations, which slowly engenders the political unity we call national existence. Genuine philosophy, guided by this historic criterion, declares that few or no examples exist of a national attachment more intense than that which binds Alsace and Lorraine to France,* and condemns the sophistry by which

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compound of Gothic, Roman, and Basque ; France, the most firmly knit of modern nations, shows the unchanged Celt in Britany, the Scandinavian in Normandy, the German in Alsace, and elsewhere the Romanized Celt, modified by Frankish conquest. The German nation, hardly yet formed, boasts of the unity and purity of its race and language. But many who speak German are not German patriots, and many German patriots are not of German race. The German-speaking Alsatians and the Swiss have no intention of joining the North-German kingdom; and in the Eastern regions of Germany, which are to the full as patriotic as the rest (I am not speaking now of Prussian Poland, or of Bohemia) there is a very large infusion of Sclavonic blood. And as race will not suffice to constitute a nation, so neither will the presence or the absence of any one of the other conditions, taken separately, be sufficient to determine the question. Not language ; else why are England and Wales one ; England and the United States two ? Why are Britany and Alsace one with France, while German Switzerland stands aloof from the German Kingdom ? Not religion ; for Holland is half Protestant, half Catholic ; the Catholics of the Rhine are patriotic Prussians ; thousands of Protestants are patriotic Frenchmen. Not geographical boundary ; else why is a Jersey man, living within twelve miles of the French coast, insulted by a doubt of his British loyalty ? and why do not the inhabitants of Canada clamorously demand annexation to the American Union ? Finally, not subjection to a common government, as the American Union proved in the last century ; as Lombardy and Venetia have proved in our own time ; as Poland and, in certain respects, Ireland, seem to show yet. What, then, is it which constitutes a nation ? I would reply, no one of these five elements taken separately, but a combination in various degrees of all or several of them. And the only test that this combination has been successful, that a nation in the true sense of the word has been actually formed, is the fact that its members, amid all kind of partial differences, do in the main work together as fellow-citizens, linked by common memories and common objects. Union in political action is the essential characteristic of a nation."

"Some day the theory which affirms that all men who speak languages philologically connected ought to be under the same rule, will come into competition with the theory that the closest ultimate unity results from common political institutions. The first theory has natural affinity for despotism, and we fear that influences which militate against the growth of liberty in Germany will long be strengthened by complicity with the despotic principle into which Germans will be forced by the acquisition of the border of France."—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

* The following statement, copied from an article in the *Pall Mall Gazette,* Nov. 3, 1870, as to the sentiments of the Protestant Alsatian,

learned Germany supports the determination of her rulers to "abstract"—as Dr. Russell judiciously phrases it—French territory.

Germany, again, now seeks not alone the dismemberment, but the humiliation of France. To continue the war after the French standing army has practically disappeared, is to wage war against the people of France. "Long-headed Germans," as the *Times'* Special Correspondent coolly states, contemplate a one-year's or two-years' occupation of the capitals of all the French provinces.*

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confirms this view:—"The Protestants have, on the whole, enjoyed for nearly a century, no common share of good government; and they are grateful for it. There are no better citizens, no firmer patriots than the Protestants of France. They have, in truth, to rate their virtue at the lowest, no inducement to be otherwise. The most high-flying enthusiast among them could not possibly cherish any dream of supremacy, or even hope of profiting by a radical change in existing institutions. They have not, as Catholics in Protestant countries have, any foreign object of veneration to divide their allegiance; they are Frenchmen first, and not subject to any prior claim. They were amongst the most earnest patriots of the Revolutionary period, and such, though without the illusions and extravagance of their fathers, they remain to this day. The case of the Lutheran Alsatians is doubtless somewhat different. They are a tolerable numerous body—about 250,000 according to the official estimate—in all probability 400,000 at least. They are even more German in language and habits than their Catholic fellow-provincials. Well-educated and industrious, they are only too much the object of that unhappy jealousy of the results of comfort and industry in others which is the besetting sin of the lower orders in France. And they have, no doubt, many Lutheran brethren with whom they are ready to shake hands across the Rhine. And yet, notwithstanding all these minor temptations to disloyalty, they have hitherto shown, so far as our information goes, no sign of it whatever—no token of any inclination to separate their cause from that of their brethren of the opposite confession, or to waver in the protest which they have hitherto kept up against the pretensions of Germany. Even Professor Wagner, whose pamphlet "Elsass and Lothringen," is about the ablest and most terse expression of German or Bismarckian reasoning on the subject of annexation which we have met, can only say, respecting the Alsatian Protestants, that he hopes to see the time when they will be won over to cast their lot willingly with the great German nation. In this manner, by the unimpeachable loyalty of a portion of her population, much more important than mere numbers would indicate, is France rewarded for the exercise of righteousness, not toleration, towards her Protestant people for some generations past; and in this manner, "if we will but watch the hour," shall we find that justice, like injustice, always reaps her harvest at last."

* Dr. Russell again writes (27th October, 1870):—"There will be more than 600,000 victorious German soldiers in France, overrunning its finest provinces, laying waste its magazines, and destroying industry, preparing the fields for a crop of famine, occupying its towns, and, in spite of themselves, be they ever so well-disposed, doing an amount of

Meanwhile, their rulers make war by fomenting intrigues and encouraging treason. Hardly a week passes without some semi-official Prussian announcement of civil dissensions in Paris.* The conduct of Prussia since Sedan has created that very difficulty of establishing a regularly constituted Government, which she alleges as one reason for persevering in the war. Since the military action of Austria in Piedmont and Naples (1821), of Louis XVIII., in restoring Ferdinand VII. to the throne of Spain (1823), there has been no example of attempted interference with the internal affairs of a foreign state so scandalous as that of Count Bismarck in those of France. Yet, in a country thus deprived of a legalized government, and with hardly any police, what a spectacle of freedom from crime, and general respect for law and order, is offered to our view. Surely, a Press which falls into raptures over Prussian military discipline, might find some ground for reflection and admiring comment in the demeanour of the French population, especially of the artisans, even though these include the much dreaded, and absurdly decried, "Reds."

Finally, in continuing the war, Germany not alone attacks France, but menaces Europe. The official Press of Prussia resents every expression of European public opinion which tends to moderate her demands, and diminish her power of doing harm. She, backed by Germany, pretends to annex French provinces, avowing her full belief that their possession will not procure a lasting peace, but only put her in a more favourable position when war, provoked by her previous aggression, breaks out again. She hesitates not, it would seem, to sacrifice, for

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mischief no pen can describe, which years and years cannot compensate, by devotion to works of peace and the greatest and most unhoped-for prosperity. There is still a greater evil to be apprehended than all these—the destruction of the bases of naval power and the annihilation of her mercantile marine."

* The correspondents of the *Echo* and the *Manchester Examiner*, writing from inside Paris, state as follows :—"I must warn you of a clever dodge of Bismarck's. He has started a French newspaper called *Nouvelliste de Versailles*, full, of course, of most alarming news. A copy of this print has reached us, in which the German dictator endeavours to show that civil war reigns in the streets of Paris."

"The reports circulated by the Prussians regarding internal troubles in Paris, are gross exaggerations. Of course, it is not to be expected that a population situated like ours will not be subject to temporary excitement, produced by circumstances over which the authorities cannot at all times exercise control. These, I am happy to say, have been of very rare occurrence ; and I can with truth aver that in the history of the world no instance can be pointed to, in which such a population as ours has, under the influence of a protracted siege, manifested greater patriotism, abnegation, and unity of purpose, than have the people of Paris up to the present time."

years to come, to her lust of conquest and selfish interests, the prospects of Europe. More than that, she seeks, it is believed, a fortress (Metz) not needed for Germany's security, to defy France and Europe; to resume at leisure her schemes of aggrandizement; then, if successful, to quote her own self-made cruel precedents of annexation and robbery. With Metz a German fortress, of what avail will be the neutralisation of Luxemburg, and the demolition of those fortifications? How, in that event, could England effectively support France, according to the recent treaty, if Belgium were menaced by Prussia? In claiming, too, Alsace and Northern Lorraine, Prussia well knows she creates an artificial necessity for keeping up her military system, and those gigantic citizen-armies, without which she could never maintain her autocratic ascendancy, so fatal to free thought and free institutions in Germany. Grant this triumph of humiliation and annexation to the harsh and overbearing diplomacy of Prussia, then, indeed, there may be little to dread from the "Cossack and the Gaul," but there will be much to fear from a Prussianized Germany, united, not by any principle of freedom, but by the interests of foreign conquest, and exalted in her own esteem above the salutary control, and even the public opinion of Europe.

III.—WHAT IS ENGLAND'S DUTY?

Our duty, I submit, is twofold.

1. To form just convictions upon the real issues involved in the war.
2. To give effect, in the right way, to such convictions.

The first of these especially concerns the English Public; the second mainly devolves on the English Government.

I.

The Franco-Prussian war can only be judged, and its real issues understood, by regarding it not simply as a struggle between two nations, but as an *international* conflict, a EUROPEAN convulsion. The most vital issue is not what shall befall France or Prussia individually, but what effect will be produced on the dearest and most sacred interests of EUROPE, and, through her, of HUMANITY. Hitherto this point of view has been ignored, or very partially recognized. Yet the reality of Western Europe, as an organized "body politic," a living whole—past, present and future—is the fundamental fact, whence flow the principle of international duty, the necessity for a social Providence destined to watch over and protect the progress, nay, the very being of EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION—that hard won, imperfectly secured victory of three thousand years over the ruggedness of nature, and the barbarism of man. Deny or neglect that fact, we let in short-sighted selfishness, debasing and dangerous; admit that

fact, follow it out, we gain a clue to just philosophy and wise statesmanship. In the name alike of the highest moral and social, of the most palpably material, interests, let us consider what does this word Europe mean. What is the essence of that political system in which we live, and move, and have our social being? A high authority* thus defines it, "An essential property of the European States-system is its internal freedom—that is, the STABILITY and MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE of its members."

This view, simple, yet profound, enforces two considerations, distinct in their nature, but inseparably connected—the common interest and reciprocal duty of preserving *the general peace* of confederated Europe—the like interest and duty of respecting, and, if necessary, causing to be respected, the *independence* of each political unit of the European States-system, be this great or small in point of size and power. For the last three centuries the efforts of statesmanship and diplomacy, seconding the spontaneous growth of public opinion, have been directed with increasing earnestness to this twofold aim; and, despite of shortcomings and failures, these efforts have had a large measure of success. I can here only refer to the latest of such great European transactions, that which is practically the starting point of *our* Europe—the Peace of Vienna (1815). Its scope and importance are well described in the following passage:—

"The order of the European world was thenceforth to repose on the two treaties of peace concluded at Paris, as well as on the treaties of Vienna. This was the greatest work of pacification ever undertaken in modern times. Even the Congresses of Münster (Peace of Westphalia) and Utrecht were more occupied with the local affairs of a small number of States, though, no doubt, powerful ones; the Congress of Vienna, on the contrary, embraced all the countries of Europe, down to the smallest, except Turkey. At this epoch the whole of that part of the world, more than ever before, felt that it constituted, so to speak, *a single family composed of confederated States.*"—*Gervinus' History of the Nineteenth Century, vol.* 1.

Unquestionably, this treaty had many and serious faults. For the first time England gave her deliberate sanction to the two previous partitions of Poland, repeated a third time in the redistribution of Europe by the allied powers. In some respects the just claims of nationality—not based on the superficial and misleading tests of race and language, but on genuine historic and moral affinities—were disregarded. The former aberration has never ceased to haunt the conscience, has sometimes even threatened, the peace of Europe. The latter miscarriages have been, in their gravest instances, Belgium and Italy, rectified by the sub-

* Heeren, "Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies," p. 6.

sequent course of events. Yet, with all errors and shortcomings, the Treaty of Vienna sufficed to secure nearly half a century of uninterrupted peace, inappreciable in itself, still more invaluable as the indispensible condition of intellectual, political, and moral progress in Western Europe. How did it assist this great aim? Mainly, I think, by fortifying the conviction that the best interests of general European order demanded the repression of all needless interference with the territorial arrangements, sanctioned after long and grave deliberation by the collective powers of Europe; and by furnishing a rallying point around which the neutral powers grouped themselves, when the disturbance of that order was from any cause threatened by some of its members. Surely, the importance of the result thus obtained is not diminished, nor the general duty of sustaining the Treaty of Vienna impaired, by secondary changes, still less by innovations made in defiance of its provisions and spirit. Whatever may be our opinion as to "German unity," and the prospects of Germany under the leadership of Prussia, I submit that the territorial confiscations which followed her victories over Denmark and Austria, furnish an additional very strong ground why the neutral powers ought not to permit, or by a culpable silence, encourage further and even greater encroachments on national independence, and violations of European integrity.

Unhappily, the direction given to public opinion in England as regards the present war has hitherto, with but slight exception, been wholly opposed to that above indicated as the just and wise one. The minds of men, directed simply to considering the merits or demerits of either side, have not grasped the European aspects of the question, or realized the duties which these impose on neutrals. The decision which, in the main justly, I think, condemned France as the original aggressor, still exclusively influences English opinion and conduct; although the present attitude of Germany, and the demands she makes (at all events, *when considered in a European light*) render her NOW the wrongdoer. Hence those perverted judgments, and that assumed duty of silence and inaction on the part of the Government, which leave England voiceless and powerless in a crisis when her duty to Europe demands plain speaking, and, as I believe, action.

Unhappily, the influences set in motion, and calculated to give an exaggerated, even false direction to public opinion in England, have been varied and powerful.

Official Christianity has supported the aggressive attitude of Germany. Who has not heard of Bishop Frazer's too famous sermon on "Sodom and Gomorrah"—glorifying by anticipation the fiery hail of bombs which even the modern Attila hesitates to hurl on the most beautiful city and noblest town-population in

Europe? It is deplorable that such presumptuous self-deception should find support and applause among Englishmen. All, of whatever creed, who respect religion, and identify her teaching with self-knowledge and charity, will unite with the Positivist, the disciple of the religion of Humanity, in condemning this senseless and cruel encouragement of a war already more than usually barbarous.

Again, German aggression is aided and abetted by a large proportion of the English press, who, with a few honourable exceptions, have shown a total ignorance, or great disregard, of the European issues of the war, as well as a degrading and dangerous subserviency to mere success. Even when rightly condemning the declaration of war by France, these journalists made themselves partisans of Prussia; for did they not in 1866, after Sadowa applaud her unjust attack on Austria? Can we wonder that they who saw, without any deep reprobation, the national life of three German States crushed out by the iron heel of military despotism, now raise their voice to counsel base submission for France—not to urge stern and European resistance to Prussian injustice and self-aggrandizement. After Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Hanover—Alsace and Lorraine. Should Prussia secure these, what next? What prospects of peace will remain for Europe?

Lastly, our Government have done not a little to encourage a spirit favourable to German aggression. The Prime Minister publicly stated that the war was, politically speaking, an affair which concerned Prussia and France alone. The Home Secretary, while mildly suggesting that it would be better not to annex reluctant populations, said, after the investment of Paris, "It was unfair to charge Prussia with needlessly protracting the war." Even the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose language and attitude have been far superior to those of his colleagues, has, I think, fallen far short of the occasion. I appreciate and respect the humane and dignified tone of Lord Granville's despatch (20th October, 1870) on the threatened bombardment of Paris, and his distinct intimation that an exercise, so extreme and harsh, of the rights of war, would be not only cruel to France, but dangerous to Europe. It was natural, and even right, to give due weight to the moral grounds which justified the original invasion of France by Germany, and entitled her to our sympathy so long as, but no longer than, she acted in necessary self-defence, and sought only legitimate indemnification and fair security for the future. Neither would I blame the Minister of a nation which did its best, so far as diplomacy could go, to avert this terrible conflict, for avoiding language of menace, and endeavouring to obtain, by persuasion and an appeal to his vanity, from a haughty conqueror, "conditions just, moderate, and in accordance with true policy and the feelings of the age."

Still I cannot but feel that it would have done honour to the moral sense and statesmanship of England, and greatly enhanced her influence in bringing about an honourable and durable peace, if her Government, on this momentous occasion, had possessed the wisdom and courage to express their condemnation of the pretensions undisguisedly put forward and persevered in by Prussia, to dismember and humiliate France.* How can Englishmen, who mourned over the oppression of Hungary, who rejoiced in the liberation of Venetia, view, without the deepest reprobation, a new attempt to create national wrong and international discord in the heart of Europe, and that by the instrumentality of a war originally waged to vindicate the independence and nationality of Germany? And if Englishmen feel thus, how can the English Government do their duty to England and to Europe, yet give no expression to that feeling? But there is more than this. Lord Granville's despatch suggests the idea—almost warrants the conclusion—that under no circumstances will the Ministry throw the real weight and effective strength of England, as a European power, into the scale, even though Prussia should, perversely and wickedly, insist on a cession of territory as wrong in principle as it is uncalled for and dangerous. The Minister deprecates the bombardment of Paris, but he gives no intimation that England will refuse to sanction, much less that she will actively oppose, the conclusion of a peace—or rather of an armed truce—on conditions extorted by force of arms, in defiance of European treaties and the lasting interests of Europe.

II.

While blaming the Government for contributing to turn public opinion from the true and European view of the struggle between France and Prussia, I by no means wish to convey that their erroneous attitude is irremediable; still less do I overlook their merits in certain respects, as regards the earlier stages of their diplomatic action. Those will be best considered under the second branch of the third question, in reference to the active duties which I conceive devolve on England at the present stage of the war.

In considering what the general foreign policy of England should be, we ought not to ascend higher than the Treaty of Vienna (1815). I leave it to the patron of slavery and the vassal of autocracy, to Mr. Thomas Carlyle and Count Bismarck, to explore ante-diluvian politics, to rake up antiquated claims and

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* It should be borne in mind that the claim to Alsace and a large portion of Lorraine was distinctly put forward by Count Bismarck, in his circular dated Meaux, 16th September, and reaffirmed in his own account of the interview with M. Favre at Ferrières, 20th September.

disturb settled accounts.* If the partisans of Prussia insist on opening up such matters, they must be reminded that their view will not command the assent of impartial explorers of history. The invasion of France by Prussia in 1792 was as unjustifiable and wanton as any of Louis XIV.'s aggressions, and has affected the fortunes of modern Europe far more deeply. To it and the coalition of despots which Germany sent forth to attack the French Republic, must be traced, in great measure, the popular sympathy, so deplorably given by France, to the subsequent excesses of Napoleon, who veiled his personal ambition under the plausible pretext of resistance to anti-social aggression.

When the wars kindled by evil traditions and bad passions had subsided, the European States-system was reconstructed in a way which, however faulty, has permitted, and even aided, the growth of principles more just and wise than those of former times, and better suited to modern ideas and wants. England has played an important part in promoting this new policy, especially since the ministry of Mr. Canning (1822-7). His example—unhappily too little understood or followed of late years—was the first to show that, though difficult, it is possible to combine a paramount regard for the preservation of general European peace with a prudent yet effective recognition of the duty of supporting national independence. The principles which guided his conduct as Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reference to the invasion of Spain by France† (1823)—notwithstanding the difference of circumstances—strike me as deserving of careful study in the present crisis, and more especially as regards the now aggressive attitude of Germany.

While Prussia with Russia, at the Congress of Verona (1822), encouraged Austria to declare war against the revolutionary movements in Naples and Piedmont, and France, to restore Ferdinand of Spain, Mr. Canning discouraged all such proceedings, and peremptorily refused to join in them. As little would he interfere by arms against them ; yet he found the means of depriving them of all danger for Europe. His large mind had firmly grasped the two-fold object of modern policy—*European peace* and *national independence.* His far-seeing sagacity supplied the means of securing the first, while advancing the second, as far as possible, without compromising the greater and more lasting good.

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* The Treaty of Vienna, besides reducing France to her territorial limits as these existed in 1789, imposed an indemnity payment to the allied powers, fixed at the sum of 700,000,000 francs, or 28,000,000 sterling, and an army of occupation of 150,000 men, which was not withdrawn until 1818.

† These, with the main events of that period, are briefly but clearly stated in Miss Martineau's "History of England during the Thirty Years' Peace," vol. 1, book 2, chap. v.

The invasion of Spain by Louis XVIII., in order to put down the new Constitution, was felt by Mr. Canning to be most unjustifiable, yet he did not directly or immediately interfere ; mainly because he saw such interference might not prevent the contemplated aggression, and would, under the existing attitude of the other powers, almost certainly bring on a general war. But he made it clear at the outset, both to the English Parliament and to the invading Power, that, in certain eventualities, England would actively interfere.

The English Foreign Minister valued European peace above everything ; yet he felt that to secure this *for the future* was part of his duty, and that, in order to accomplish this object, victory must not be abused, or international obligations set at naught by the victor with impunity. He stated his intentions openly and beforehand. He acted in due time on his previous declaration, by vindicating the independence (then first acknowledged) of the Spanish colonies when menaced by France after her triumph ; next, by effectually preventing the prolonged occupation of Spanish fortresses and cities by French troops ; lastly, by sustaining Portugal against the attack of the despot restored to the Spanish throne.

The example of Mr. Canning appears to teach two important lessons. It shows that neutrality is not inconsistent with a frank and explicit declaration of purpose to intervene, should events render such a course right. It proves that armed intervention may at one period be uncalled for and undesirable—at another, not only admissible, but an imperative duty. Let us endeavour to apply these principles to the present crisis.

I think that our Government acted wisely in adopting neutrality at the outset—securing a like attitude on the part of the other powers, as well as a general understanding that it should not be departed from by any without consulting the rest. I do not believe that by joining with Prussia against Louis Napoleon, England would have prevented the conflict, while such action must, in all probability, have brought on a general war. But, in adopting this course for herself, and exerting her influence to ensure concerted action among the non-combatant European powers, the English Government fulfilled only part of her duty. They were bound to look before them, and consider the probable eventualities of the war, to make clear to themselves, and known to all, the circumstances under which her duty to Europe and herself would oblige England to take part in the conflict. On one point they actually did this. The guarantee of Belgian independence was properly appreciated and rightly vindicated, against both Prussia and France, by the diplomatic action of the Ministry, which resulted in the recent treaty binding England to join either of the contending parties in case the other should attack Belgium.

So far well. But was there no other contingency which ordinary foresight would have warned our rulers to take into account? I think there plainly was. For many years past French journalists, *littérateurs*, and public men have, unquestionably, excited the old but slumbering tradition of the Rhine as the "natural limit" of France, thus stimulating the love of military glory and territorial acquisition which had been gradually undermined by years of peaceful toil, with the growth of education, and the development of social relations. On the other hand, there had been growing indications, less obvious, but not less real, of similar aspirations in Germany, for regaining her so-called "lost provinces."*

Now, surely, if our Government may point to the precedent afforded by Mr. Canning's policy, above mentioned, as justifying their original neutrality, may we not demand why they have not, like him, made neutrality consistent with forethought, by a sagacious estimate of England's duties to Europe, and a courageous announcement of her future attitude, should just causes for intervention arise. Why did they not say impartially to both combatants: whoever the victor may be, he need not expect our sanction or acquiescence in any attempt to disturb international boundaries settled by the Treaty of Vienna, still less to tear unwilling populations from their political allegiance. If, as was believed, the real object of Louis Napoleon was the possession of the Rhine provinces, and he had succeeded in his aggression, English public opinion would never have sanctioned the dismemberment of Prussia. It seems, therefore, strange that the Government did not foresee this contingency, and give a warning to the then aggressor. The intention of the rulers of Prussia to take advantage of the popular German craving for Alsace and Lorraine, was not so easy of anticipation, and was only revealed when the fortune of war took a turn contrary, I think, to the general expectation. Besides, the claim to dismember France stands in flagrant contradiction to the original declared intention of the King of Prussia, not to wage war against the French people. A protest, therefore, by anticipation, from our Government, against territorial claims by Germany, was not so obviously required at the outset, nor can its absence *at that time* be construed into an argument against making it *now*, when the necessity for doing so has been rendered manifest by the course of events, and the unexpected conduct of Germany.

What, then, ought our Government to do? The answer to this will not be difficult if we consider the position of England in

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* See the article in the *Quarterly Review* for November, on the popular German War songs, not of recent date, but long circulated. Gervinus' "History of the Nineteenth Century" (published 1855) furnishes strong proofs of this tendency, and must have powerfully strengthened it.

Europe. By the neutrality concerted at the outset of the war, she has taken the lead among the neutrals, and has thus taken on herself an additional responsibility to assume the position which so peculiarly falls on her as an insular power—that of acting as an arbitrator in European conflicts. I assume, that whenever the conflict is finally suspended, England will insist on being a party to the deliberations for making peace. Austria and Prussia took no part in the Crimean war, yet they had a share in settling the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856). England, who has acted as mediator, with the consent both of Prussia and France, cannot allow herself to be excluded from the deliberations for peace. The Prime Minister has just declared his hope that a peace will be, at last, concluded "upon principles agreeable to the ideas and to the just sense of modern civilization." To secure this end, however, the neutrals must surely look forward, speak out, and act firmly *beforehand*. I assume that England would never put her hand to a treaty dismembering a friendly power, an ancient ally, and a united nationality. To ratify the dismemberment of Poland was bad, to sanction that of France would be an unpardonable dereliction of England's duty to Europe, a virtual abandonment of her position as a European power. But if no official protest be entered against the annexations threatened, Germany may say, with considerable plausibility, that silent acquiescence meant consent. The first and plainest duty of the English Government, therefore, I submit, is to declare diplomatically and forthwith, that England cannot sanction, or permit any arrangement based on territorial aggrandisement, more especially one in which the wishes of the population are disregarded.*

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* The *Times* writes as follows :—"If we have the power thus to restore peace to Europe, we cannot neglect the opportunity without abandoning the axioms of national duty we have always professed. The guarantee of Luxembourg is a recent acknowledgment of the responsibility to assist in keeping the peace. But there are other reasons which should move us to exertion. Without being in any way alarmists, we may say that Europe is in danger of becoming once more the theatre of an old struggle. The conflict between the principle of autocracy and the free government of nations must be waged anew, and in the attempt to ward it off at home, the supporters of the autocratic principle are ready to run the risk of any foreign adventures. With the possibility of such dangers before us, we ask what are the influences on which England should rely? Are we not bound to strengthen the authority of public law, to maintain the supremacy of the free will of nations? The institution of reciprocal guarantees against wanton aggression is the first step towards the creation of a real public law which shall be able to control the violence of individual members of the body politic. A solemn recognition of the principle that the will of a people cannot be coerced, a recognition attested by a willingness to incur responsibility rather than see the principle lightly broken, would be of the highest value in the struggle between power and liberty. What-

Reverting to the Crimean war, Austria had laid a special claim for her admission to the Peace Conference by proposing conditions of peace. She felt that she was thus doing her duty as a neutral. There is no analogy between the conditions of an armistice and those of peace. The one are mainly military, the other essentially political. One great mischief now for Europe, and for Germany herself, is that purely military considerations are allowed a weight wholly beyond their due. A mere strategist, like Count Moltke, a horde of citizen-soldiers thirsting for military triumphs,* are allowed, if not encouraged, to decide questions which, concerning as they do *the whole of Europe, and the future of European peace and progress*, demand the calmest and most dispassionate consideration. Never was there an occasion when the intervention of neutrals was more needed.

The proffer to both parties of counsel by England, reduced to definite proposals for peace, is, therefore, I submit, a plain duty. I believe that it ought not to be difficult to arrive at reasonable terms—including pecuniary indemnity and military security by the demolition of certain fortresses, particularly those of Metz and Strasburg, associated as these are with large cities. Such terms, even without any European guarantee—though this might, I conceive, be wisely tendered as an additional term—ought surely to be adequate reparation and security for Germany. I have no doubt they would now be, and I believe they would always have been, accepted by the French Government and people. If the Provisional Government were to signify their acceptance of such terms, or any others not involving dishonour and a permanent hostile attitude towards Germany, I should feel that their rejection by Prussia ought to be followed by a declaration of war on the part of the Neutrals. But if their united action for that purpose cannot be secured by England, the mere proposal of definite terms, sustained by a vigorous diplomatic action, would almost certainly influence the conclusion of arrangements of peace.†

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ever storms might arise, we should have with us something more than our own powers of defence; we could appeal to the sanctions of the public law we promoted when we might have trusted to the security of isolation, we could rally around us the influences of freedom in all nations, whatever plots might be contrived to confound them."

* The *Times* says :—"The King of Prussia himself could scarcely, in our correspondent's opinion, have dared to sanction the revictualling of Paris. The resentment of his soldiery could not be so trifled with. Their language was simple—'Why should we let Paris be revictualled? Let statesmen do what they please. Our object is victory. We wish to conquer France, and the most tangible proof of our conquest will be our entry into Paris, or, at all events, its submission.'"

† The *Times* observes :—"When the issues that have been raised between two belligerents have become confused, and the motives and

Lastly, it seems plain that England should now give a formal and a definite recognition to the French Republic. The Provisional Government have done their utmost to meet the English Government's anxiety for an armistice, in order to obtain a regularly-constituted government. Englishmen, however favourable to Germany, but capable of appreciating facts, will not endorse Count Bismarck's audacious charge brought against the French leaders,* of bad faith, and a fear of ascertaining the real sense of the French people. After the popular vote of confidence in Paris (9 to 1) in favour of M. Favre and his colleagues; after the general and marked adhesion in their policy and measures of defence throughout France, it is absurd to refuse diplomatic recognition of the French Government *de facto* established.†

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objects of either, or of both, are not plain even to themselves, it is of the highest advantage to the cause of peace to reduce to a definite shape terms of settlement that shall make each understand what he is fighting for, and why he is fighting for it. When, for example, Austria interposed in the Crimean war, and terms of peace between Russia and the allies were debated at the Vienna Conference, the attempt to make peace was not immediately successful, but it had a most important bearing on the final settlement of the contest. The public opinion of the moment decisively rejected the solution of the question recommended at the close of the Conference; but Lord Russell came back from Vienna, like M. Drouyn de Lhuys, converted to it; Mr. Gladstone and his friends—the Peelites of that day—strongly supported it, because they thought it sufficient; the scheme of the suggested settlement became familiar to the popular mind, and the moderation of the treaty of peace ultimately adopted was in a great degree made possible by the discussion of the Vienna proposals. A form of settlement which cannot command immediate assent may thus be properly advanced, if it tends to clear up the position of neutrals so as to make belligerents conscious of the mixture of motives that urges them onwards, and to separate the good from the evil in their demands."

* Circular by Count Bismarck, dated 8th November.

† "The desire to convene a Constituent assembly under the present circumstances of France is purely pedantic. The business of the country now is defence, the Government is the Government of Defence, and unless there was reason to believe that a Constituent Assembly would abandon the resolution of resistance, there is no adequate motive for calling it together. So far from believing that the Assembly would be less resolute than the existing Ministry, we are persuaded there would be scarcely a voice raised in it in favour of peace; the dissidents from the majority would be like the dissidents of Paris, whose proportions were revealed last Thursday."—*Times*.

"INSIDE PARIS."

"PARIS, NOV. 7.—The English at last are about to leave. They are very indignant at having been, as they say, humbugged so long, and loud in their complaints against their Embassy. I do not think, however, that the delay has been the fault either of Colonel Claremont or of

Such recognition would be most important, both as branding with deserved censure the miserable intrigues of Prussia, and as summoning to the aid of France the moral sympathies, and, I trust, the active aid of Europe.

The present juncture is surely opportune for the intervention of England; an intervention free from insolence or menace, dignified, firm, and decisive. Now, if ever, let our Government abandon their ill-timed attitude of "benevolent neutrality."

What considerations does the situation suggest to us for a prompt and vigorous fulfilment by England of her duty to Europe?

France undoubtedly would make heavy sacrifices, submit to onerous conditions to end this devastating and odious war. Onerous, I say, but not dishonourable; or such as would mean simply an armed truce, not a genuine and lasting Peace. This is what the French Government and People ardently desire. Proofs accumulate daily, showing that France did not desire this war. It was planned by a dynastic intriguer,* approved by a corrupt and servile legislature, which was representative in name only,† not by the real France. Impartial evidence proves that the same

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Mr. Wodehouse. These gentlemen have done their best, but they were unable to get the Prussian and French authorities to agree upon a day for the exodus. On the one hand, to send to Versailles to receive an answer took forty-eight hours; *on the other, from the fact that England had not recognised the Republic, General Trochu could not be approached officially.*"

* Extract from papers edited by one of the heads of the press department of the Ministry of the Interior under Louis Napoleon, dated 15th April, 1870:—"The plan of action would naturally embrace all the means of influencing public opinion. *Le Petit Journal*, which publishes 250,000 copies, is not, it is true, a political journal, but it circulates among the popular classes. M. Millaud, the manager, has commenced to publish a certain number of portraits of ministers, of the chief members of the majority, &c. These portraits, very skilfully executed, sail close to politics without touching them. This journal, besides, will publish a military romance of the First Empire, *conceived in a sense opposed to the declamations and political romances of the Opposition, which are directed against the army.* This romance is going to be given to us by the Cabinet of the Empire."

† The causes of this extraordinary anomaly are well shown in Professor Beesly's "A Word for France," dated 5th September, 1870, from which I extract the following passage:—"Perhaps by this time the reader will be ready to say, 'You bring a heavy indictment against Germany, but what apology have you to offer for France? Why did she wickedly provoke the war? Why, if she is the model nation, did she accept such a ruler as Napoleon? How is it that she has exhibited such a spectacle of corruption, weakness, and disorder?" I have no desire to shirk the question. To answer it is one of my main objects in writing. The truth is that France has been for many years in a state of smothered civil war. The burning questions of property, capital, and labour, which are beginning to arrest attention in England, have in France swallowed

anxiety for *honorable* peace continues, yet, coupled with a noble resolve to exhaust their last franc and last man in resisting robbery and forced cession of territory. It is a slander worthy of Count Bismarck, and characteristic of Prussia, to say that the terms of peace are immaterial ; alleging that her recent military disasters will necessarily stimulate France to recommence, as soon as possible, a war of revenge. I am convinced that the vast majority of the French people detest conscription and that compulsion, which is essential in our industrial societies for maintaining large armies. The more intelligent classes, especially the artizans, wish to make an end of imperialism and militarism. They already regard "Sedan" and "Metz," not as humiliating badges of forfeited prestige, but as instruments of recovered liberty, destroyers of Napoleonism, "that great Serbonian bog where armies whole were lost." The true France knows that she has lost a phantom and gained a reality. She desires above everything, what King William and his minister before everything dread, that crown which "sears the eyes" of despots—the victory of Republicanism, embodying freedom at home and peace abroad. The French people, re-ascending to their native place, now fight this good fight with calm and heroic constancy. Will England, whose "heart of hearts" is never insensible to heroism, refuse sympathy and aid to such efforts in such a cause? Will the real people of England, whose generous instincts, far more even than views of policy, forced the English Government to wage war with Russia—will they who applauded and sustained Turkey, stand coldly by

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up all others. The middle and the lower classes glare on each other like foemen about to close in mortal struggle. Upper class there is none ; or if there is some shadow of such a thing, it is absolutely without political significance ; it was ground to powder in the old revolution. The town artizans have for two generations been meditating on such themes as the distribution of property, the remuneration of labour, the increase of wealth and luxury above, of poverty and toil below. They believe, some in one form of socialism, some in another ; but they are all agreed that the evils of society might be remedied by vigorous governmental measures. They are all for a republic, of course, but they look on it as worthless unless it is the "social republic." Now many of the middle class are republicans, and many more would be, were they not afraid that the republic to-day would mean socialism to-morrow. With them, as with the lower class, the economic question takes precedence of the political, and a king, an emperor, or even a Prussian army, is more tolerable in their eyes than the ascendancy of the working class. The lot of these men has been cast by fate in the central country of Europe, in which, as republicanism made its appearance eighty years ago, so socialism has made its first appearance in our own generation. It has fallen to them to elect whether they will acquiesce in a new order of relations between wealth and poverty, or whether they will make their backs stiff and fight it out. In June, 1848, the middle-class republicans

while a despot and a titled scoundrel conspire against the integrity of France, the liberties and existence of Europe ?*

It no longer admits of doubt that Russia now avails herself of the opportunity afforded by the weakness of France, to compel, if possible, the rescinding of those stipulations† in the Treaty of Paris (1856), which were the fruit of the Crimean war ; stipulations enforced by the French and English Governments, supported by Austria and Prussia, in no vindictive spirit, but as being

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poured grapeshot for three days upon the Paris workmen, who thought the time had come to inaugurate their social millennium ; and the blood that then flowed has not been forgotten. In the terror and confusion of that year Louis Napoleon was carried to power by the votes of the peasantry. Established in that position, one might almost say by accident, he profligately maintained himself by playing off the middle-class and the workmen against each other, and the army against both. The leaders of the workmen were massacred or sent to Cayenne. The mass of them were kept quiet by an extravagant outlay on public works, and the consequent artificial demand for labour. Political life of all kinds was crushed. The Press was silenced. Public meetings were forbidden. Naturally the middle-class, with its republican tendencies, writhed under this system, but whenever it assumed a threatening attitude, the Emperor, by a speech like that of Auxerre, or by a measure such as the repeal of the combination laws, or the abolition of the *livret*, intimated that if driven to extremities he would throw himself on the proletariat. The menace always succeeded. It was like a lash cracked over a pack of hounds. The middle-class trembled and subsided. They knew that the blood of June, 1848, was an impassible barrier between them and the people. A new generation of workmen has grown up. But socialism, so far from having been extinguished by grapeshot, is found to be more widely spread and deeply rooted than ever. The workmen remain steady in their detestation of the Imperial system, but they do not care to rise against it for the benefit of the middle-class."

* I reproduce in Appendix No. 1, a paper on "France and her European Services," lately published in a separate form.

† The following are the articles in the treaty whose revision or modification is most likely to be insisted upon by Russia :—Article XI. of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 27th April, 1856, declares that the Black Sea is neutralised ; its waters and its ports thrown open to the mercantile service of every nation, and formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the vessels of war, either of the powers possessing its coast, or any other power. By Article XIII. of the same treaty, the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan engage not to establish or maintain upon the Black Sea coast any military-marine arsenal. By conventions signed on the 30th of March, 1856, and annexed to the treaty, the Sultan bound himself so long as he remained at peace to admit no ship of war of any foreign power to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, thus closing the egress from the Black Sea to the Russian fleet ; while Russia engaged not to maintain in the Black Sea more than six war steamships of eight hundred tons at the maximum, and four light steamers of war not exceeding two hundred tons each.

essential to restrain aggression, and guarantee the peace of Europe. The occasion, therefore, may speedily arise when diplomatic considerations, which the Government of England cannot afford to disregard, will concur with the generous instincts of the English people, to compel armed intervention in favour of European order and progress, threatened alike by the proceedings of Russsia and of Prussia.

Germany, too, would gladly end the war, which is ruining her maritime trade, injuring her agriculture and manufactures,* which desolates her homes,† and degrades her public men into

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* A correspondent at Leipsic, writing on the 14th October, says :— "Hitherto German trade has not suffered very much in consequence of the war. The brilliant victories of the German army with which it was begun prevented any fear of invasion, and there was consequently no panic to paralyse credit. Money was dear, but still to be had, and the men who were not called upon for military service found plenty of work. The blockade has done a certain amount of injury to the seaports, but has not produced much effect on the commerce of the country generally, as the import and export trade passed through Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Trieste, while the merchant ships, being warned in time, kept carefully out of the way of the French fleet. It is only now that the evil consequences of the war are beginning to make themselves really felt. It is not alone that France is absent from the market, but everyone seems to feel the necessity of avoiding all superfluous expenditure. The members of the European family are in such constant communication with each other, that every loss suffered by one of them is more or less felt by all the others. Germany has already, in one respect, lost more than France, for her army contained numbers of men trained to science, commerce, and manufactures, who have died on the battle field, and whose loss it will take a generation to replace. Another, though a less important, consequence of the war is the incompleteness of the harvest operations, owing to most of the horses used for that purpose having been taken for the army. The result is that immense quantities of hay, corn, and potatoes have been spoilt by the rain, as it was impossible to gather them in quickly enough."

† "A terrible feeling of 'depression and apprehension' is reported among the people throughout Germany. Distress at home, and the daily bulletins of sick and wounded which arrive, awakening the fear and anxiety of the people at home, depress the ardent and furnish food for the minds of the discontented. The loudest murmurs are heard in reference to the hard treatment endured by the army, from want of the shelter and clothing essential to the health and comfort of troops in the field. 'They say that they are willing that their husbands, sons, and brothers should go to defend their country, and would not murmur if they should fall victims to the God of War ; but it is quite another matter to have their dear ones dying of typhus fever and dysentery, brought on by the want of proper clothing and shelter to preserve them from the fatal consequence of a winter campaign.' It is the Landwehr it seems, that suffers most. 'The greater part of them being well-to-do shopkeepers

ministering slaves of ignoble greed and passion.* Despite the outcry of certain professors and journalists, the voice of reason and humanity is making itself heard among the Germans. Men like Dr. Strauss and Professor Vogt condemn the thirst for foreign conquest. The imprisonment of Dr. Jacoby, and similar measures, raise a well-founded apprehension that military triumphs mean political slavery; that Germans dearly purchase their "unity"—if even they obtain that—by sacrificing freedom, morality, and the respect of Europe, at such a shrine as Prussian militarism. Germany has relieved France from an incubus of corruption and tyranny; for her own honour and real good, let us hope—not simply to bind upon herself that yoke of despotism and intrigue, which conquest gilds and confirms.

Englishmen, those at least who love fair play, and are open to conviction, begin to see that Prussia was not mere "injured innocence;"† that France, if really consulted, would have repudiated

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and mechanics, quite unaccustomed to exposure to bad weather, very soon give way and fall sick when, after marching all day in the rain, they have to rest all night on the damp ground, with no protection from the cold night air but their drenched uniforms.' Poor victims of an iron system and a remorseless ambition, they are stricken by the terrible fever pest, and die in hundreds."

* The burgomaster of Breslau, Herr Ziegler, who was thought of as the Democratic candidate for the city in the Landtag, but rejected as not "thorough," has written a letter in which he says:—"If Bismarck and Moltke are of opinion that our political existence and military security demand the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, I am immediately for annexation; if they say, 'Hands off,' I am also contented. For my countryman, Bismarck, is, as we all are, 'God-fearing and bold,' and of Moltke may be said what an Englishman said of Goethe, 'He is no fool.' In foreign affairs I am particularly cautious, and keep aloof from every unruly faction." According to the *Cologne Gazette*, *such abnegation of one's own opinion in important political questions is a wide-spread feeling, even in Democratic circles.* It adds the very natural reflection that this excites grave doubts whether such a people is ripe for self-government, representative institutions, and a constitutional system.

† Among the papers found at the Tuilleries is a letter under date of Strasburg, October 28, 1868, from General Ducrot to General Froissard, the governor of the Prince Imperial, in which the former explains in a very striking manner to the advisers of the Emperor, what were the views entertained at the time in Prussia towards France. He said he had just seen the Countess de Pourtalis, who had returned from Berlin. She had always been an enthusiastic admirer of Count Bismarck and King William, and the Prussians generally, and had maintained that no motive could exist for a war between France and Prussia—countries made to understand and love each other. She said she had found reasons to change her opinion. She said she returned from Berlin sick at heart that war was inevitable, and that it could not fail to break out shortly; that the Prussians found themselves so well prepared, and so ably

the war.* This conviction must operate, and has already materially operated, to qualify the original outburst of indignation against France, and sympathy with Germany. The German mode of conducting this war has contributed to the same result. The following documents show that men who are, in the best sense, educated, regard the menaced bombardment of Paris as a proceding which threatens the gravest consequences to the lasting interests, intellectual and moral, of civilization :—

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directed, that they were sure of success. The General says he replied that the Countess was sounding an alarm of war at a time when nothing was spoken of but peace, and the desire of Bismarck was to avoid all pretext of quarrel. "Why," he added, "they are talking of reducing the army, and to such an extent that I am making ready to retire and plant cabbages in Nivernois." What follows is the General's report of her answer. "Oh, General!" she exclaimed, "it is frightful. These people deceive us shamefully, and count on surprising us unarmed. . . . Yes, the watchword has been given. In public they speak of peace—of the desire of living on good terms with us—but when in private one converses with the persons who surround the King, they put on a cunning look, and ask, 'Do you believe all that you hear? Do you not see that great events are rapidly succeeding each other, and that henceforth nothing can avert the crisis?' They shamefully ridicule our Government, our army, our Garde Mobile, our Ministers, the Emperor, the Empress, and assert that before long France will be another Spain. Last of all—would you believe it—M. de Schleinitz, Minister of the Royal Household, ventured to tell me that in a year and a half our province Alsace would belong to Prussia? You do not know what enormous preparations they are making on all sides; with what ardour they are wishing to transform and fuse together the armies of the States recently annexed; what confidence prevails among all ranks in society, and in the army. "Oh, General, I come home full of trouble and fear. I am broken-hearted. I am certain of it now—nothing can protect us from war—and what a war!"

Among the official papers found in the Tuileries is a despatch to the French Minister of War from Captain Samuel, writing from Forbach on the 9th of April, 1868 :—"Since Monday I have followed General Moltke, who is visiting the frontier of France, and studying the positions. On Monday I overtook him at Mayence. Tuesday he stopped at Berkenfeld, and took notes of the heights near the ruins of the old castle. He slept that night at Saarbruck, and has taken the dispositions of the defence at the station and at the canal. Yesterday he was at Saarlouis, where he is now. This morning, in spite of the bad weather, he went out in a carriage to visit the heights surrounding Vaudevangue and Berns. I suppose, from information, that he will go to-night or to-morrow to Treves, whence he will descend the Moselle."

* "The victorious Germans have since been bidden to stay their onward steps, on the ground that the war was not the war of the French people. We fear that, as between nation and nation, there is little force in such a plea. It is impossible to exempt a people from plenary responsibility to another people for the acts of its Government. *And yet the allegation in itself is true.* It was a faction, in the narrowest sense,

MEMORIAL TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

ADOPTED BY THE

ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY.

"TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE EARL GRANVILLE, K.G.,

"*Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:*

"WE, the President and Members of the Royal Irish Academy, desire to call the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government to the irreparable loss which would be sustained by the whole civilized world if the inestimable scientific, literary, and other collections of Paris should be destroyed or seriously injured during the siege. That city contains galleries stored with treasures of art, libraries rich in every species of literary monument, and scientific museums which are amongst the foremost in their several kinds. These collections represent the accumulated labours of many generations, and are, in truth, the property not of France only, but of the whole civilized world. Many of the objects contained in them, if once allowed to perish, no subsequent exertion could ever replace. The fate of the Library at Strasburg shows that these pricelessc ollections are in real and imminent peril from the operations of the war. It is not for us to pronounce any opinion on the merits of the lamentable struggle, or on the conduct of either of the contending parties; but as members of a body, having for its object the cultivation of Science, Literature, and Archæology, we protest, in the name of the intellectual interests of Humanity, against the destruction of these collections; and we respectfully call upon Her Majesty's Government to use their utmost efforts for their preservation, by impressing on the belligerents the duty of taking every possible precaution for their protection from the dangers to which they are likely to be exposed.

14*th November*, 1870. "JOHN H. JELLETT, *President.*"

MEMORIAL TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

ADOPTED BY

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,

ON THE DANGER TO WHICH THE SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY, AND ART COLLECTIONS OF PARIS ARE NOW EXPOSED.

"We, the undersigned, Provost, Fellows, and Scholars, of Trinity College, and Professors of the University of Dublin, desire to express our satisfaction with the efforts made by Her Majesty's Government to restore

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which sympathised with the worse and overruled the better minds of the Emperor and his Government; and which, by clamour in the Chamber and intrigue in the Court, hurled France into the war, from the anticipated success of which they reckoned on receiving a new lease of power and of emolument. There is too much reason to believe that the agency of the Government was employed in Paris during the early part of July to draw from the excitable, the venal, and the worthless, an artificial but violent applause, and to check and discountenance any public expression of the sober judgment of the country, *which would have spoken in very different accents.*"—"Germany, France, and England," *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1870, p. 581.

peace in Europe, and our earnest hope—shared, we believe, by the nation at large—that these efforts may be eventually successful.

"But if, unhappily, our desire should not be realised, your Memorialists venture to urge that the interposition of Her Majesty's Government may be directed to preserve, if possible, the great scientific, literary, and art collections of Paris, which are, in truth, the property of the whole civilized world.

"It is impossible to contemplate calmly the irreparable loss which the destruction of these collections, or even any serious injury to them, would inflict upon students of every nation.

"To avert, if possible, such a calamity, is now the duty of all; it is more especially the duty of every Scientific and Literary Institution. Your Memorialists would, therefore, in the name of our ancient University, earnestly entreat Her Majesty's Government to interpose their good offices with the belligerents, for the purpose of saving these matchless treasures from a danger which the fate of the Library of Strasburg proves to be only too real."

Here follow 51 signatures.

17*th November*, 1870.

There is one peculiarity in the relations of England with Europe, which, if she could view it as impartial observers do, might induce her to exert every influence in urging the conclusion of a real and durable peace. A remarkable expression has been attributed to Count Bismarck, in connexion with his territorial demands. "We will make Strasburg the Gibraltar of Germany." Now, Gibraltar has been the possession of England from the early part of the eighteenth century, and Strasburg that of France for a still longer period. But the former German town, with its surrounding territory, has become, in fact and in feeling, thoroughly French; while the fortress has ever remained a mere English outpost and dependency, yet a galling thorn in the side of high-spirited Spain. Englishmen themselves have so fully recognised this, as to propose the surrender of Gibraltar.* Even those who will not join in urging so magnanimous a sacrifice of national pride, can surely realize the dreadful significance of the language attributed to Count Bismarck, and deprecate a new inheritance of sullen ill-will, containing, perhaps, the germ of fresh wars, amid the civilization of the nineteenth century.

The reasons I have urged in favour of the conclusion that England should at once assume a decided diplomatic attitude, followed, if necessary, by concerted action and armed intervention, to stay the German aggression, are, it will be observed, based on *European* considerations. But it seems absurd to exclude from these, as some argue, the actual condition of Government in France, as at least *indirectly* influencing the international

* See Dr. Congreve's pamphlet, *Gibraltar, or the Foreign Policy of England*, Second Edition.

aspect of the question. If the original aggressor, Louis Napoleon, were still on the throne, it would be less easy to sustain interference than now, when his wrong-doing has been punished. On the other hand, the difficulties which the continuance of the war puts in the way of reorganizing French society, must be regarded as serious mischiefs for Europe,* especially by all who feel that her future largely depends on the establishment of a stable and peaceful Republic in France. This consideration does not involve any interference with the internal affairs of another country, but simply points to existing facts, and enforces the duty of recognizing them in the general interest of European civilization, of the well-being and progress of Europe.

The present crisis strikingly manifests the community of social interests between the European States in one point—the urgency of providing, as far as possible, against the outbreak of WAR, at all events against its needless prolongation, or its forced cessation on terms which signify not peace, but an armed truce. The frightful destruction of valuable property, the interruption and misdirection of commerce and industry involved in struggles so gigantic as all European wars must henceforth be, are far-spreading evils, not material, but social, since they chiefly affect the masses who must earn their daily bread. Nor are the permanent moral mischiefs of such conflicts less enormous or general. What thoughtful and humane heart can be indifferent to the bitter enmities thus aroused, sundering for long years nations already disposed to kindlier feelings ; or to the spirit of excitement and mischievous partizanship, so fatal to sober reflection and impartial judgment, fostered among those not directly engaged. It would be easy to enlarge upon these topics. It is even more urgent to consider the grievous and abiding injuries which the conflict of two European nations threatens to inflict on the political constitution of Europe. These I have endeavoured to point out in the course of this essay. I cannot close it without offering a suggestion as to the duty which devolves on England, with every other European nation, to do her part to prevent the recurrence of international conflicts.

Since the chief mischief of international conflicts falls upon Europe, it follows that the main guarantee against their recurrence must be European. The only sure and abiding guarantees are moral. They presuppose the diffusion of rational convictions,

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* "Until France can lay more firmly the foundations of her own government, she never can fulfil all the duties of good neighbourhood to Europe ; for those who rule her, feeling themselves dependent on momentary and factitious aids for the maintenance of power, will endeavour to extract, from an imposing and ambitious policy abroad, the materials of popularity at home."—"Germany, France, and England," *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1870, p. 579.

the creation of a strong public opinion opposed to war. Awaiting the full development of this, and pending its growth, we need a provisional policy, which may avert, or at least mitigate, attacks prompted by dynastic ambition and national vain-glory. Europe is not only entitled, but bound, to protest against, and with all her force oppose, schemes of purely national defence, which are inadequate, and endanger the general peace. Such were the "material guarantees"* imposed by Napoleon on Prussia by the peace of Tilsit: how vain they were we know. Such also would be the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, or even the cession of Strasburg and Metz,† to Prussia. Still more inadmissible, from the European point of view, would be a general organization of citizen armies. Against the extension of this wasteful and immoral institution Europe should exert all her influence, and do all she can to secure its overthrow.

On the other hand, I fear that any *mere* arrangements for referring international disputes to arbitration would fail when most needed. The Treaty of Paris (1856) attempted this plan; but we have seen that its execution was defeated by the angry passions and crooked diplomacy which roused the war of 1870. What is needed, and I think even feasible, is rather A LEAGUE OF INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE; an understanding between Governments, supported by public opinion, that in cases of disputes arising within Europe, the neutral powers should intervene, employing their diplomacy, and, if necessary, their armies, as A EUROPEAN POLICE to arrest aggression and prevent the abuse of victory. Such an understanding or league would be simply an extension of the acknowledged principle by which certain minor states—Belgium for example—are guaranteed against attack. A precedent for it is furnished by the Crimean alliance, which really carried on "a war to prevent war," by repelling the unjustifiable aggression of Russia on Turkey. When the English Government recently renewed the Belgian guarantee, they entered into an arrangement with Austria, Russia, and Italy, each to take no step without consulting the other. The object of this was, I fear, mainly selfish, to keep England safely out of the quarrel.‡ Under different inspirations, this

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* The retention of Magdeburg, the creation of the kingdom of Westphalia, the partial restoration of an independent Poland.

† The dismantling of these fortresses is quite another question. The experience of the present war, besides, shows decisively how comparatively worthless for defence are fortresses associated with cities. If southern Germany really needs protection, she can secure it far more effectually by the erection of separate fortresses on her own territory. But Germany would do well to remember the language of one among their wisest historians, Heeren:—"The taste for political freedom is a stronger bulwark than a chain of fortresses, however desirable this also might be."—*European States-system.*

‡ England may yet discover that selfish apathy does not mean safety;

concert of the neutral powers might have been turned to a noble purpose. If it could not have arrested the prosecution of the war, in any case it might have afforded impartial security against the abuse of victory to whichever side the fortune of war leaned. That would have been a noble use of English diplomacy—one far different from the attitude of her Government and her press, which now makes for England a political solitude, and calls that peace.

In writing at a special crisis of this terrible convulsion, I have stated opinions which will seem one-sided, and used expressions which may be deemed exaggerated and harsh. Nevertheless, it is my earnest desire to avoid partizanship, and make a fair estimate of difficulties and faults on both sides. When the French Government attacked Prussia, and through her menaced Germany, I felt it was right and expedient that their aggression should be foiled and their purpose of dictation frustrated. If I did not rejoice, as many did, in the military triumphs of Germany, the reason was simply my distrust of the power she had placed at her head. I feared that Germans would find themselves coerced or induced by Prussia to change a noble and just defence into an indefensible and impolitic aggression. This, in my judgment, actually happened, when, after the fall of Napoleon and the overthrow of his armies at Sedan, the war was continued for the avowed purpose of territorial aggrandizement, the dismemberment of France, and the humiliation of—I use King William's own words—the "great and peace-loving" French nation. Myself acquainted with Germany, having enjoyed and reciprocated friendship and hospitality with Germans, profoundly admiring their noble literature and fine traits of character, I feel even more pain than indignation that their present attitude should belie the hopes of Europe, and contradict the aspirations for European peace promoted by such men as Leibnitz, Herder, and Kant.

As little do I wish to palliate wrong-doing on the part of France. The exasperation caused by the prolongation of the war will be deplored by her best friends. These, recognising the faults which mar the performance of her great mission of peaceful reconstruction—intellectual, political, and moral—in Europe, will perceive that the tension of national sentiment, and the revulsion of public opinion outside France, may cause much to be forgotten which ought to be clearly recognised and made a beacon of warning in her future course. While fully convinced that the heart of France has been more and more turned to the wishes of peace and peaceful reform, and making a large allowance for the enormous difficulties within and without which have

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if, as is not unlikely, Russia finds her opportunity of undoing the work jointly accomplished by England and France in the Crimea. It appears certain now that she is intent on effecting this object.

impeded their realization, I do not for a moment ignore the perilous influence of evil traditions, or overlook the duty, for nations as for individuals, of self-knowledge and self-discipline. It is truly satisfactory to know that these obligations have been not only admitted, but loudly proclaimed, by eminent French thinkers.* I trust that their views will in the end prevail, and arouse throughout France and Europe the feeling that national egotism is synonymous with national guilt and misfortune. Only let our condemnation be impartial. Let it extend alike to every phase of national egotism ; whether this take the shape of military vain-glory, of territorial self-aggrandizement, or of that industrial selfishness which sacrifices principle to material gain, and tramples on the independence of extra-European nations.

Neither do I overlook or undervalue the munificent and impartial humanity shown by the English people in their contributions and exertions for alleviating the sufferings caused by the war. I cannot, however, accept such an extension of the domestic charities of life as a substitute for the civic duties and public sacrifices which England, as a nation, in my judgment, owes to Europe.

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* "In reference to the war [the European wars of Napoleon the First], posterity should mainly censure French opinion, not simply an empirical dictator (Napoleon I.), who was impelled by his military instinct, the growth of which could easily have been prevented by the public. It would have been sufficient, at the beginning of the aberration, to condemn the despoiling of Italy and the invasion of Egypt ; yet this twofold oppression excited in France a unanimous enthusiasm, especially among the literary classes. So soon as the provisional occupation of Belgium and Savoy had proved the complete efficacy of the republican defence, military action, of necessity, stood in direct contradiction with the mission of France in Western Europe."—" Auguste Comte, Systeme de Politique Positive," Tome 3, p. 606.

Monsieur Laffitte and Dr. Robinet, eminent French adherents of the Positive Philosophy and Religion, have more recently (1866) expressed similar convictions ; the former condemning the vague and subversive declamations of French *littèrateurs* about nationalities, " as destined to satisfy, instead of restraining, as they ought, our deplorable national vanity ;" the latter pointing out the error of those influential sections or the French Democracy which persistently represented the Treaties of 1815 as "an insult to France, a defeat for the Revolution: when they only delivered us from an overwhelming despotism, and fairly reduced our military preponderance, which had become excessive and dangerous."

THE END.

APPENDIX No. I.

FRANCE AND HER EUROPEAN SERVICES.

FRANCE may justly claim our respect and sympathy on grounds, not simply national—as her co-operation in the Crimean war and the Treaty of Commerce—but European. These England cannot ignore without abandoning her duties and forfeiting her position in Western Europe. They are of two kinds, political and social.

The French Revolution was the crowning victory of civil and religious Liberty,—the outcome of three centuries of independent yet converging effort. The city-leagues and peasant-war of Germany; the Netherlands' heroic conflict under William the Silent; England's Great Rebellion; the revolt of the United States; the Irish Volunteers of 1782; all these were forecasts and preparations of that supreme struggle. France then inflicted on Feudalism and Absolutism a mortal wound. Since that epoch, despite of lingering prejudices, and halting, incoherent liberalism, the sentiment has sprung up, slowly gaining the strength and consistency of a conviction, condemnatory of unequal institutions and laws, favourable to social freedom and human fraternity. Governments and the ruling classes have been taught that the people are not made for them, but they for the people. The growth and spread of these ideas was mainly due to the great uprising of the French people in the eighteenth century. The experience of its benefits, the proud consciousness of having had a share in it, moulded a multitude of provinces into one nation. Alsace and Lorraine bear witness to this truth, and will own no allegiance save to their true mother, France.

Each succeeding revolution in France has proved her great hold on the sympathies of liberal and progressive Europe. Even the dynastic change of 1830 showed its effects in the English Reform Bill and the Belgian Revolution. What was the condition of continental Europe from the Peace of Vienna (1815) to the French revolution of 1848? Neither liberty of the press nor of public meeting existed. The Second Republic gave both, and with these laid the foundation of much else, including "German Unity."

Turning next to the social movement, I understand by that, the movement which seeks to incorporate the working classes with society, extending to them the education and comforts heretofore monopolized by the few. The indispensable condition of this policy is a conviction that the happiness of nations lies in the

arts of peace; their dignity, not in asserting, but in renouncing pretensions of conquest and military ascendancy. Notwithstanding appearances, France can claim a large and even foremost share in these European efforts of social regeneration. Count Bismarck, with his usual craft, avers that no peace will bind France, and Prussian resentment, unsatiated by Leipsic or Waterloo, may accept this statement. Its real character and object will be gathered from the imprisonment of Dr. Jacoby, of Königsberg, a man of attainment, highly respected, but guilty of harbouring republican sentiments, and of regarding the "right of conquest," whether employed to annex German States or to tear provinces from France, as an outrage on reason and humanity. The Prussian autocrat and his minister see in an exasperated and humiliated nation the best guarantee against the establishment of a peaceful and Republican government. Therefore, to force they add calumny, and to calumny effrontery, inviting all men to believe* that from "French initiative *alone* the disturbances of Europe have resulted;" that dismemberment and a German Venetia mean peace!

The services rendered by France to social progress have been great; and would have been greater, but for the difficulties which spring from the conflicting tendencies of European thought, and those inherent in her own situation as the true historic centre of European politics. A few words on each of these topics must here suffice.

The mental anarchy which results from our transitional state of society—the old in dissolution, the new half-formed—is conspicuous in all our views of international relations and war. They are not unlike what those on duelling were but a few years ago, and still remain in every country but England. The 'balance of power,' the doctrine of 'natural limits,' that of 'nationalities,' have been and are used by diplomatists and *littérateurs* to pervert the public mind, and thus to pave the way for the ambitious schemes of unscrupulous rulers. French journalists have declaimed about the Rhine; grave German professors have—since 1866 especially—preached the recovery of the "lost German provinces" in a style hardly calculated to reassure their neighbours. All this does not justify a wrong; but it enforces moderation in our judgment of the wrong doer, and an impartiality in the application of just principles, unhappily wanting in the current English estimate of France and Prussia. Not merely is France no worse than her antagonist; if we look below the surface and consider tendencies as well as results, she is a great deal better. She can point to three great thinkers—Turgot, Condorcet, Auguste Comte—whose philosophic writings have deeply

* Circular of Count Bismarck, dated 16th September, 1870.

affected European thought—identifying the prospects of peace, with the historic law of progress and the Republican order of society.

Again, in every nation of Western Europe there has been gaining strength for the last fifty years, an antagonism between the ignorant, superstitious, supine majority—easily led to do wrong, and the more energetic and intelligent minority; on one hand the agricultural classes, on the other the artizans. In France more than any other nation has this contrast existed. She thus became a nation divided against herself. A celebrated song of Beranger well describes the hold which the military glories of the First Napoleon long kept over the French peasants; the policy of his successor sedulously fostered these baneful traditions. Among the French artizans, especially those in Paris and other great cities, a desire for reform within and peace without has been steadily growing up. Louis Napoleon, raised to power by perfidy, felt these classes to be the natural enemies of his despotic rule and the aggressive projects of his latter years. He steadily sought to banish, intimidate, and corrupt them. Yet it was they who chiefly furnished the million and a half of noes to the plebiscite; and their representatives in the Legislative Chamber pronounced the condemnation passed upon the war by the enlightenment and humanity of France. Even in that servile assembly, 83 votes against 164 supported what was virtually a censure on the government—the motion of the present Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic, for the production of documents, if such existed, justifying the declaration of war.*

The above remarks are not made to extenuate wrong-doing, or to absolve a nation from the consequences of misdeeds of its ostensible government. I simply desire to point out the injustice of unmeasured, one-sided censure—the impolicy of encouraging thereby demands which cannot be accepted with honour, and which, whether accepted or refused, must compromise and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the prospects of a government seeking reform at home and peace abroad. The chiefs of the French Republic have nobly acknowledged that a wrong has been done. They are willing, as there is good reason for believing, to make reparation, and give securities, ample in themselves and yet not dishonourable, certain therefore, if accepted, to be ratified by the National Assembly. Under these circumstances, can England

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* It is right to state that only 10 members of the Opposition refused, at a subsequent sitting on the same day (15th July, 1870), to vote supplies for the war. Those members of the Opposition who joined in the vote stated they did so because war had been virtually declared, and not as approving of it. M. Jules Favre was one of the ten who refused to vote the supplies.

longer refuse to come forward and urge an honorable termination of this desolating and barbarous warfare which now threatens with ruin the accumulated treasures of generations, the inheritance not alone of Paris, but of Europe and Humanity? England's greatest poet himself pleads the cause of the nation, once the rival, now the friend of his own.

> "Let it not disgrace us,
> If we demand, before this royal view,
> What rub, or what impediment there is,
> Why that the naked, poor, and mangled Peace,
> Dear nurse of arts, plenties, and joyful births,
> Should not, in this bestgarden of the world,
> This fertile France, put up her lovely visage?"

APPENDIX No. II.

PRUSSIA AND HER CITIZEN-ARMY.

Some years ago, in 1867, I had personal opportunities of studying the institutions of Prussia, the character of her rulers, and the tendencies of her people. I confess they inspired me with little confidence, and with no desire to see their influence augmented, either as regards Germany or Europe. The sovereign would have made an excellent Crusader, and has the stuff of a new Brunswick; but he has no claim to be foremost man in the nineteenth century, unless fanatical notions of divine right, military ambition, and an unscrupulous choice of aim and agent give him that title. In Prussia, despite of Stein and Hardenberg's land reforms, a semi-feudal aristocracy not only reigns but governs. They fill all important political positions, and officer the army. The Prussian Herren-Haus is a body beside which, in point of enlightenment and accessibility to public opinion, our own House of Lords shows to great advantage. In social life this aristocratic military influence is the same. We all remember the murder of a cook by Count Eulenberg, and his mild imprisonment for the offence. During my stay in Berlin, at least one murder of an unoffending civilian by an officer took place, and complaints of lesser outrages committed by the unchecked license of military and caste insolence were frequent. In point of political and civil liberty Prussia struck me as inferior to France even under Napoleon's régime, and resembling England under the Stuarts. A member of the Prussian Parliament was imprisoned

simply for free speech in his place, and that in the direct teeth of the constitution by a forced construction of servile judges.

I noticed among the middle classes in Berlin and their newspaper organs, not only a tone of extreme hostility to France, but an intense desire to assert Prussian supremacy in arms, in science, and in arts. Civilisation was moving steadily northwards, and had found a refuge among Protestant populations! These ideas were widely diffused. Yet a Prussian working man, chosen by his comrades to visit the Paris Exhibition of 1867, stated in his report, at a meeting of artisans where I was present, that he had left in the full belief of Berlin being *the* "world-city," but had returned with the conviction that this title could only belong to Paris. Of individual Prussians I formed a high opinion, and have good reason to estimate highly their intelligence and courtesy. But I saw clearly that the Prussian people were no favourites in Germany, while their ascendancy and the enforced spread of their military system were regarded with aversion, though tolerated for the sake of "German unity."

I regard it as one of the worst results of Napoleon's unjustifiable and impolitic declaration of war, that it places Germany more than ever at the feet of the apostle of a Germany united by "blood and steel," and almost annihilates, for the time at least, the steady resistance of Central and Southern Germany to Prussian taxation and ascendancy. I must add that the alleged peaceableness of the Germans, and their good feeling towards other nations, seem to me partly a delusion, partly a false issue. They speak of Alsace and Lorraine as having been torn from Germany. But what people oppressed and plundered Italy for centuries? Who shared the spoil of divided Poland? Who weighed on Hungary, and still weigh on Bohemia? Germany and her rulers. When, in 1848, moved by the enthusiasm of France, Germany was striving to effect her own unity, was any generous voice raised on behalf of oppressed Venetia, Tuscany, and other appanages of German princelets?

But let Germany be ever so peaceable and sympathetic, it is only too clear that her people are utterly passive in the hands of her rulers by divine right and feudal might. The Prussians themselves did not desire the civil war of 1866. It was the bidding of Bismarck and the King. I am not alone in thinking that these two wanted war in 1870, and devised the Hohenzollern-Spanish scheme as a trap for Napoleon.*

It seems, then, idle to deny that the Prussian military system of converting all citizens into soldiers is fraught with social evils and political danger to Europe. It converts the nation into one

* See the article in the *Contemporary* for September, "Bismarck and Napoleon." The writer strongly favours German unity.

vast camp, and imbues society with the spirit of passive obedience so essential to military organization, so inimical to civil liberty and peaceful pursuits. There is the closest connection between the military system of Prussia and her intensely beaurocratic government. I was told on high authority that Prussians habitually preferred a very small salary under Government, to working in private undertakings with much better prospects. Officialism is rampant in Prussia. I commend this aspect of things to the study of those who advocate a citizen-army for England. Regarded as a mere temporary expedient for repelling the First Napoleon, the military system of Prussia was praiseworthy; but, when made a permanent institution, it is eminently retrograde, a step back in the direction of barbarism, and only proves that Prussia, in point of real civilisation, has no claim to the leadership of Europe.

I have already noticed the injurious influence of a Citizen-Army on home-policy, in promoting a bureaucracy, and strengthening the despotic power of monarch and aristocracy. Even more fatal are its effects on international relations and the highest European interests.

Military despotism, directed by a crafty and self-seeking diplomacy, will never want pretext and power to make war, whether the armed force be composed of trained citizens or of professional soldiers; but the citizen-army offers special difficulties to the conclusion of a wise and lasting peace. The war of 1866 proves the first proposition; the second, paradoxical as it may seem, is verified by the war of 1870. Commenced with professions of simple defence against the ruler of France and his soldiers, it is now waged against the French nation, aimed with deadly intent against their civil re-organization, and made the excuse, thinly disguised under a claim for security, for carrying away "trophies," in the shape of territorial aggrandizement, at the sacrifice of Germany's morality and the future peace of Europe. Unquestionably this project of King William and Count Bismarck has been greatly helped by the exasperation which the loss of so many citizen-soldiers has produced; and hardly less by the intoxication of national pride which military success has spread through every German household. Again, the citizen-army opposes an insurmountable obstacle to any effective step towards a general disarmament in the interests of European peace and progress. When, a few years ago, English diplomacy made some attempt in this direction, whence did the difficulty come? Not, it was stated, from France, but from Prussia, whose rulers alleged that they could not arrange a reduction of their forces. The reason lay in the nature of their own military system, which renders disarming unreal and illusory. The origin of the Prussian army proves this; for, though nominally restricted by Napoleon I. after Jena to about 40,000 men, they

managed to have some 250,000 drilled citizen-soldiers at Leipsic. Yet another general mischief of the gravest import requires notice. International migrations and colonization have become a European institution. They are part and parcel of the industrial system of modern Europe, admirably suited to break down animosities, to enlarge the circle of social knowledge, to foster personal and domestic sympathies favourable to peace. But how do they operate under the citizen-army *régime* in the time of war? They operate, of necessity, to convert the endearing intimacies of private life, the honourable relations of public life, into a frightful system of *espionage*, ruinous for one combatant, degrading to the other. The immigrant has lived, received hospitality, and been trusted in his adopted country for ten, twenty, thirty years, or a life-time: a war breaks out, and the citizen-soldier is expected not only to take arms for the country to which he owes allegiance, but to use for her benefit all the knowledge which long residence and familiar acquaintance with persons and places have procured. It was experience of such perfidy—the more dangerous that it is almost unavoidable—and not any unworthy animosity, which, I believe, mainly led to the wholesale expulsion of Germans from France. Let England consider in what position she would be placed if the Germans that fill her great cities, honourable and trusted men as they are, were some day to return as citizen-soldiers, knowing all her resources, her strength and her weakness, and expected to use such knowledge for every purpose of war, even to requisitions of provisions and money on her merchants and her bankers. Or suppose Mr. Lowe's idea carried out, what might be the consequence to England of arming as citizen-soldiers the Irish population of her manufacturing towns, perhaps more disposed to assist than to repel an invading force?

The Citizen-Army, therefore, as a permanent institution, must entail the deepest international mischief. Without preventing war, it hinders wise and durable peace, renders disarmament impracticable, and, worst of all, saps that mutual confidence which underlies all private and public morality, and is essential to the industrial constitution of modern Europe.