

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF
ENGLISH

THREE

MEMORIALS

ON

FRENCH AFFAIRS.

WRITTEN IN THE YEARS

1791, 1792 AND 1793.

BY THE LATE

RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE.

London:

PRINTED FOR F. AND C. RIVINGTON,

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1797.

PREFACE.

TO be engaged in a contention with ingratitude and fraud, is neither pleaſing nor honourable; but they who in diſcharging the ſacred obligations of friendſhip are forced into it, muſt ſubmit to the humiliation. They would themſelves be criminal in the next degree, were they to conſult their own perſonal feelings; they are bound to conſider only their duty.

In the beginning of the preſent year, a confidential paper, written by the late Mr. Burke, was ſurreptitiouſly publiſhed in his name; and at the end of it was advertiſed a volume of pretended memoirs, anecdotes, and letters, of the Author. Some of his friends (he was himſelf at Bath, ſtruggling with the diſeaſe which ultimately proved fatal to him) obtained an injunction from the Court of

Chancery, on the very day of publication. By this prompt interference of the law, by the general diſcountenance of all liberal men, and by the bankruptcy of the bookſeller, which ſoon followed, the ſale, though not wholly ſtopped, was conſiderably checked; and the memoirs, for the time, ſuppreſſed. But ſcarcely is the hand that wrote, and the tongue that dictated, yet cold in death, when, before it has been practicable even to examine and arrange the numerous papers which that admirable man has left behind him, and which bear impreſſed upon them the living traces of his great mind through his whole career of publick action, and during the previous courſe of ſevere ſtudy, by which he prepared himſelf to be what he became, a new notice is thrown forth, enlarged and improved a little in the language and arrangement, but in ſubſtance nearly the ſame with the former. It clearly comes, it can only come, from the ſame quarter; though perhaps the work itſelf may be coloured with ſome more oſtenſible name.

By this conduct, in addition to the turpitude which marked the former attempt, the will

will of the dead, regarded by all civilized nations with peculiar ſanctity, is violated. The friends, to whoſe care and judgment Mr. Burke confided the ſelection and uſe of his manuſcripts, are no longer at liberty to exerciſe their own diſcretion. They are not maſters even of the time, order, and method to be obſerved in the execution of their truſt. Without a choice, they are dragged along to meet or to overtake the diverſified arts of a man, who, fed by his bounty while alive, endeavoured to diſquiet the laſt moments of his dying benefactor, and ceaſes not to injure him in his grave. It is true, they have already obtained another injunction, but they are well aware, that crafty men will too often contrive to evade the law; deſperate men will dare to defy it. They know, indeed, from the former experiment, that no deliberate encouragement will be given to the thefts and fabrications of avarice or indigence: the new ſyſtem of morals has not made quite ſo much progreſs in this kingdom: but they alſo know that publick curioſity, ſtrongly excited as it muſt be, by a promiſe of "Mr. Burke's ſe-"cret correſpondence with the moſt diſtin-

" guiſhed characters of Europe," will demand to be indulged. It will ſeek irregular, if it be denied regular means of gratification. The thirſt which is not permitted to drink of the freſh fountain or the clear ſtream, will ſlake itſelf wherever it can, at the weedy pool or the muddy ditch.

Their determination therefore is taken. It is, upon the whole, they believe, the beſt which their circumſtances would allow; though they may be in ſome danger of thus furniſhing genuine materials, which are in their hands alone, and which mingled up with others of a different deſcription, may be employed to lend a fallacious credit to the idle tales of credulity and folly, or the abſurd calumnies of enmity and envy.

The preſent publication conſiſts of three Memorials, which were written in the years 1791, 1792, 1793, and relate to three very intereſting epochs in the French Revolution. They more particularly treat of the effects, which, at thoſe reſpective periods, the author imagined that event likely to produce on the political

political ſtate of all Europe. There is reaſon to ſuppoſe that incorrect copies of two out of the three have been fraudulently taken.

Some other pieces are in the hands of the Printer, and will ſhortly appear in a ſecond pamphlet. They relate to the conduct of our two great parties at home, with a view to French politicks.

Theſe two publications will fill up a very important chaſm in the recorded opinions of the Author. There is nothing on French affairs in the quarto edition of his works later than the middle of the year 1791; long before the firſt approach to actual hoſtilities between the French and the neighbouring Powers of Germany. What he afterwards publiſhed takes up the ſubject at the point of time, when the King's Miniſters, deſpairing of ſucceſs in the great purpoſe of continuing, whatever was the immediate cauſe of beginning the war, had avowed a diſpoſition to negociate a peace with the French Republick.

A collection alſo of Mr. Burke's more important

portant letters, during the laſt years of his life, eſpecially on the ſubject of France, is preparing for the preſs. Of courſe it will be much more ample, than any thing which can be furniſhed by the perſon from whoſe ſcandalous breach of truſt alone any ſpurious compilation can draw it's materials.

Many of theſe letters were intended, not for the preſs indeed, but for free circulation in manuſcript; a channel, which through all the principal tranſactions of his political life, he uſed inſtead of the publick prints, for explaining, as occaſion required, his principles or his conduct. Of theſe compoſitions, ſometimes himſelf, and ſometimes thoſe around him kept copies.

Some few of his letters were preſerved by him as a ſort of private proteſt and record of his opinions, when on queſtions of importance he had the misfortune, (ſuch he always ſincerely felt it to be) of diſſenting from thoſe with whom he generally acted. He was, from conviction, a party-man; but he ever thought that party ſhould be ſubſervient to principle,

principle, not principle to party. His principles are now, unhappily for his country and the world, become mere matter of hiſtory, and whatever can elucidate them is due to the inſtruction of the publick.

His other letters, which paſſed in the unreſerved freedom of confidential intercourſe, can only be obtained from the liberality of the friends to whom they were addreſſed, many of whom have kindly promiſed their contributions, and all of whom are reſpectfully deſired to tranſmit to Meſſrs. Rivingtons whatever they may have in that kind, which they may judge not unfit for the publick eye. There is very little indeed of his correſpondence (and no man wrote more) which does not contain ſome portion of a great body of ethicks and politicks, from which mankind may grow wiſer and better.

All theſe, and other ſuch productions of his pen, as it may be thought right to print ſeparately, will be given with all convenient ſpeed in the octavo ſize, which he himſelf in his life-time choſe for the firſt editions of his

Speeches

Speeches and Tracts. They will afterwards be formed, with many other original pieces of a leſs temporary nature, into quarto volumes; and to the whole will be prefixed a Life of the Author, accompanied with various letters and papers of a more early date, ſome of which were pointed out by himſelf as "documents for the hiſtory, not of his own life," he obſerved, "but of his times."

It has been frequently ſuppoſed, that he was himſelf employed in writing ſuch a hiſtory. But they who ſuppoſed this knew little of him. He bore too large a ſhare, much beyond what is commonly known, in the literature and politicks of the age, to be himſelf the hiſtorian. Though not without a juſt ſenſe of his own merits, he truly loved and practiſed that humility, which he has ſo beautifully called, "the low, but deep and firm foundation of all real virtue." On principle, he would never have conſented to undertake a taſk, in performing which, to have done juſtice to himſelf he muſt have riſked the imputation of vanity; a vice which he abhorred to a degree, that by ſuch as were

not intimately acquainted with his heart, might have been ſometimes miſtaken for vanity itſelf. He has left in manuſcript ſome biographical ſketches both of his ſon and his brother; none of himſelf. None are oſtentatiouſly introduced in any of his works. Cicero ſeems to have written ſome of his books almoſt for the purpoſe of putting his own praiſes into the mouths of others, and of ſcattering around thoſe numberleſs little intimations, which at this diſtance of time we gather up with ſo much delight, of his childhood, his education, his ſtudies, his amuſements, his manners, his relations, his friends, his houſes and pleaſure-grounds, the gallery of Tuſculum, and the oak of Arpinum; but whatever of that kind has fallen from Mr. Burke is only to be found incidentally interſperſed, where to have ſuppreſſed it would have been to betray his own fair reputation, in which his family, friends, and country, had an intereſt as well as himſelf: it is to be found in his public or private anſwers to thoſe who had brought charges againſt him, and who were of a dignity to make a vindication of himſelf decorous, if not neceſſary. The reſt

muſt be ſupplied by the diligence and judgment of others, partly from memory and partly from information, which, it is hoped, all who in any part of his life have been intimate with him will be ſo obliging to communicate; but principally from the different ſources already mentioned above, and the rich ſtore of detached hints, looſe notes, and unfiniſhed fragments which remain in his handwriting, relative to all the more momentous buſineſs in which he was engaged. His pen was always in his hand. He ſeldom thought or read without it.

In the mean time, ſome important parts of his conduct and character will receive light from this, and the ſucceeding publications. It will at once be ſeen, whether the ſentiments recently expreſſed by him were indeed the genuine concluſions of an early ſagacity, anticipating calamities to come with a certainty that almoſt approached to inſpired prediction, or nothing more than the falſe pretences of a tardy wiſdom too late inſtructed by the event.

Theſe papers will contain his inmoſt doctrines. His countrymen have heard him in the Senate; they have read him in his demegorick writings deſigned for popular effect; they will now attend him, as it were, into the Cabinet.

The year 1791 was highly critical in the developement of the French Revolution. Mr. Neckar and his colleagues had been driven with ignominy from their poſts and the country. A new miniſtry had been patched up from the accomplices and creatures of the original leaders in the National Aſſembly. Thoſe leaders, to ſecure the power which they had obtained, ſhewed a diſpoſition to put a ſtop to thoſe confuſions, which they had themſelves excited or promoted. In their turn, they were themſelves attacked by a new ſet of bolder, more ferocious, but more conſiſtent demagogues. The Prieſts were declaredly perſecuted; the Nobles plundered and hunted into emigration. Civil authority there was none. The army and navy were corrupted, and all diſcipline deſtroyed. The King and Queen, after a ſhort and inſecure

interval of comparative tranquillity, were again repeatedly inſulted, and their lives openly endangered.

In this ſituation of things, Mr. Burke was of opinion, that our Ambaſſador ought not to be an idle ſpectator of ſuch ſcenes at the Court of a Monarch, who was in effect a priſoner; that he ought to be recalled, or to interpoſe the good-offices of our Court between Louis the XVIth and his ſeditious ſubjects, agreeably to our duty under the general law of nations, and the ſpirit of our poſitive treaties. On this plan he drew up "Hints for a Memorial to be delivered to M. Montmorin," by Lord Gower.

Whether theſe Hints were ever actually ſeen by the King's Miniſters, there is no trace among his papers to ſhew, neither can thoſe friends, from whom he was accuſtomed to conceal nothing, undertake to ſay from their recollection. It is probable, that they were not ſeen, as at that period he had no direct intercourſe with Government, and events ſoon enſued in France, which left no room for

for ſuch a mediation. The paper, however, will be printed at the end of this Preface: it was diſcovered too late to be inſerted, where it ought to have ſtood in the body of this publication. It will bear a ſtrong, but not the only, teſtimony to the Author's real practical views, which have been ſo malignantly miſrepreſented, with regard to the French Revolution. However much he diſapproved and contemned the falſe and treacherous principles, ſince renounced even by themſelves, in which it glorified itſelf at it's outſet; however early he warned his own country of their pernicious tendency, and the ſteady and uniform march of their operation to break down a flouriſhing Monarchy into a hideous barbariſm; however feelingly his nature deteſted the cruelties and atrocities of all kinds, with which their progreſs was ſyſtematically accompanied, for the purpoſe of cruſhing all oppoſition under the dominion of terrour; yet while there appeared to him a chance of any quiet termination to theſe miſeries and horrours, his counſels were moderate, conciliatory, and healing. The very baſis of any agreement which the King of Great Britain,

as the King of a people "*perfectly and ſolidly, becauſe ſoberly, rationally and legally* free," could undertake to negociate, was to be the ſettlement, and, if required, the guarantee of a free conſtitution in France, but under an efficient Monarchy; both their government and their freedom being eſtabliſhed "upon "principles of moderation, as the only means "of ſecuring permanence to both theſe bleſ- "ſings, as well as internal and external tran- "quillity to the kingdom of France, and to "all Europe." It will hereafter appear from his letters that, at a later period in the ſame year, he held a very ſimilar language to the exiled French Princes and their agents, when they were preparing to aſſert their rights by the ſword. We muſt now paſs to the three Memorials, which form the immediate contents of this pamphlet.

The King of France in the April of that year was prevented by the populace, with every kind of menace and outrage, from going to his Palace at St. Cloud. He complained to the National Aſſembly. The reſult was that he was compelled to ſanction a circular letter,

letter, which was ſoon after ſent by M. Montmorin to all foreign Courts, announcing the new Conſtitution of France, it's nature, and principles. This was followed by new indignities and encreaſed licentiouſneſs, by the flight to Montmedi, the actual cuſtody of the Royal Family, the mockery of reviſing the Conſtitution, and the final acceptance of it by the King, which was notified in another circular letter from M. Montmorin. By theſe two official communications, unprecedented in diplomacy, the right of conſidering the internal Conſtitution of France was not only given to other States, if they had no ſuch right before, but their attention was directly called to the ſubject. Nor was the purpoſe of the communications concealed. It was profeſſedly to lead to ſimilar Revolutions in other countries. When the firſt of theſe extraordinary diſpatches was originally ſubmitted to the Aſſembly, long before any concert of Princes againſt France, it was enthuſiaſtically applauded as "a ſplendid example of a "great King proclaiming afar the liberty of "all people." It was, in fact, a general defiance to all the old Governments of Europe.

Mr.

Mr. Burke had particular means of knowing the diſpoſitions of the continental Powers. His ſon during that ſummer was at Coblentz, though not at the expence, nor with the formal authority, yet with the knowledge and approbation of Government. He was early convinced that the Declaration ſigned at Pilnitz by the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia was in a manner extorted by the Count d'Artois, and was never deſigned to be carried into ſerious effect. The King of Pruſſia refuſed to ſtir, till the Emperor ſhould have put himſelf in motion; and the Emperor heſitated to move from a real or pretended diſtruſt of this country. In general, the neighbouring Potentates ſeemed for a long time blind to the peril of their ſituation, and when the audacity of Briſſot's faction, as ſoon as he had eſtabliſhed his aſcendency in the ſecond Aſſembly, made them reluctantly open their eyes, they were ſtruck with a ſudden dread, from which they ſought refuge in ſubmiſſion.

At home Mr. Burke found as little agreement with his views. Thoſe leaders of Oppoſition

Oppoſition, who in reality did not differ much from him, naturally wiſhed to avoid as long as they could, any queſtion that might precipitate a direct breach with ſome others of the ſame party, who from a long connexion ſtood high in their confidence, and were dear to their affections. Between Miniſters and himſelf he believed there was a more eſſential difference. He underſtood them to think (as he afterwards told one of them) "that the "new principles might be encouraged; that "they might triumph over every interior and "exterior reſiſtance, and even overturn other "States, as they had that of France, without "any ſort of hazard, that they would extend "in their conſequences to this kingdom." His own opinion thus early was, that there never exiſted a criſis ſo important to the world; that the power of France, which the preceding year had ſeen in a manner annihilated by her internal anarchy, now appeared more formidable than ever; that all hope of a quiet ſettlement to the diſorders of that diſtracted country was gone; that the more furious part of the Jacobin faction, who from the firſt had been eager to diſturb the peace of all

Europe, was daily encreaſing in ſtrength and ſolidity; and as France had not then re-eſtabliſhed her army after it's diſſolution by decrees and intrigues, while the northern powers had not yet begun to diſband their forces after the Turkiſh war, that every thing was to be gained to the former, every thing loſt to the latter by delay.

Under theſe impreſſions he wrote the Memorial of December 1791. It was ſent to ſome of the leaders of Oppoſition, and to the Miniſters, by one of whom it was communicated to the King. The ſtyle and the topicks are thoſe of a ſtateſman addreſſing ſtateſmen. It takes it's riſe from M. Montmorin's two letters. It points out the features and character which diſtinguiſh this Revolution from moſt others of ancient or modern times: it delineates with a maſterly hand the political map of Europe, and marks with wonderful preciſion the track which the new principles were likely to purſue in their progreſs: it combats the ſuppoſition that the Revolution would fall by it's own weakneſs, by internal force, or the diſcredit of it's paper money: it conſiders the diſpoſitions

ſitions of the neighbouring powers, who were moſt intereſted in ſtopping the courſe of the miſchief, and the general leaning of all Kings, Ambaſſadors, and Miniſters of State in theſe days; but it modeſtly profeſſes only to make a caſe without offering advice, to ſhew the nature of the evil, without ſuggeſting a remedy. His country, the world, and poſterity, will now be able to judge how far his ſpeculations on this great queſtion of politicks were juſt: "the paper," he conceived at the time, "did not meet the ideas of Mi-"niſters."

The invaſion of France by the Duke of Brunſwick in 1792, after the French had declared war, and been repulſed in an attack on the Netherlands, excited the moſt ſanguine hopes of many. Mr. Burke, it is known to thoſe who converſed with him, and will appear by ſome of his letters, always diſtruſted the event. Beſides the incalculable difference which time had made, he ſaw a radical error in not giving more importance and lead to the exiled Princes and Nobility of France. He had from the firſt a ſettled conviction that neither

inſurrections of the Royaliſts within, nor a foreign force from without, could ſeparately avail. There was no ſound hope, in his judgment, but from a well-combined, and cordial co-operation of both. On the diſaſtrous and ignominious retreat of the Duke of Brunſwick, he haſtily threw down his thoughts in an unformal manner, and ſubmitted them to the conſideration of thoſe who had ſeen the former paper. He now proceeded further, and intimated in general terms, what he thought ſhould be done for the ſafety of Europe. Upon all maxims of ancient policy, upon all views of the actual circumſtances, he was decided in his opinion, that England ſhould interpoſe as the protectreſs of the balance of power. It was eſſential, he thought, that ſhe ſhould be the preſiding ſoul of that concert, which ſeemed to be now indiſpenſable; that ſhe ſhould govern it's counſels, and direct it's efforts; ſhe ſhould negociate and confederate, exhort on one ſide, and remonſtrate on the other; ſhe ſhould not precipitate a war, but riſk it, and firmly meet it, for the ſafety of Europe. But before this paper had been communicated to thoſe for whoſe uſe it was intended,

tended, the French Convention ventured on decrees and acts directly ſtriking at this country, and her old ally Holland. A ſort of unofficial negociation enſued, which ended in a declaration of war by the French Republick againſt Great Britain and Holland. Thus forced ſeparately into open hoſtility, Miniſters were under the neceſſity of joining the Powers already in arms, on their own conditions. They could not take that lead which, Mr. Burke believed, might have been conceded to them as the price of their voluntary interpoſition.

After the firſt ſucceſſes of 1793, Mr. Burke was curſorily informed in a converſation with one of the King's Miniſters, that they purpoſed to iſſue a declaration of the motives, objects, and end of the war. Sometime in the ſubſequent autumn, he heard again of the ſame deſign. He doubted the prudence and expediency of the meaſure, eſpecially at that time, juſt after our retreat from Dunkirk. He ſought, but was not able to obtain, a conference on the ſubject.

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He had recourſe, therefore, to his pen. This was the origin of the third memorial. Accordingly at the head of one of the copies found in his poſſeſſion, it was called, "Thoughts reſpectfully ſubmitted on the "propoſed Manifeſto;" though it was endorſed with the preſent title. He had not, however, proceeded far before he learnt that the Declaration was to be immediately iſſued. He deſired it might be delayed a ſingle day, that he might have an opportunity of previouſly ſtating his doubts; but was told that no alteration could be admitted, as the paper had been approved by the allied Courts.

The Memorial in conſequence lay for ſome time unfiniſhed. But ſome agents of the Royaliſts of Britanny and Poitou having about that period prevailed on Mr. Burke to ſecond their repreſentations to Government with his influence, and the ſurrender of Toulon having made an opening in their favour, he reſumed what he had laid aſide, and completed it upon a more comprehenſive plan. It ſeems in it's ſtyle and ſpirit to approach more nearly,

ly, than either of the other two Memorials, to the animation and deciſion of his own former publications. It begins by ſtating the time to be that of calamity and defeat. When it proceeds to the main conſideration, it paints with a firm but rapid pencil the miſerable ſituation of France under the reign of Roberſpierre and terrour, the full effects of which Mr. Burke confeſſes himſelf not to have foreſeen. The whole nation was divided into the oppreſſors and the oppreſſed. He then argues that the very ſucceſs of the Allies on their own plan would not reſtore France to a condition ſafe for herſelf and for Europe, and he ultimately ventures to give his own advice. Perhaps, if there is any paſſage in it more eſpecially deſerving of attention than another, it is the noble ſcheme of awful, but diſcriminating juſtice, tempered with enlightened mercy, which he recommends and enforces, in the event of the Monarchy, and ancient orders of the State being once more reſtored in France. The Memorial concludes with an emphatick proteſt againſt what he always conſidered as the great, fruitful ſource

of

of every miſcarriage, the great leading miſtake, that of conducting the war, by precedent, as a common war againſt a common enemy, for the uſual objects of ordinary appeals to arms, and ſearching hiſtory for leſſons of civil prudence, to be derived from former Revolutions, which reſembled this portent of our times in nothing but the name.

In every one of theſe three Memorials reference is made to the writers on the law of nations; and in one or two places Vattel is expreſsly named. It has been thought proper, therefore, to ſubjoin an Appendix, conſiſting of paſſages from that eminent publiciſt, which were found among Mr. Burke's papers, drawn out for his private uſe under diſtinct heads, as they are here printed, and illuſtrated in his hand-writing with marginal comments and ſhort notes, which are here preſerved. Some few notes have been added to complete his plan. Even theſe are not wholly without his authority. They are the faint veſtiges of much diſcourſe had with him at different times on the effect and application

of

of the extracts. A genius like his, rich in ſo much natural and acquired wealth, might be ſuppoſed to have been confident in itſelf. Yet this was the laborious and accurate method which to the end of his life he was habituated to purſue, in collecting and digeſting the beſt information upon every ſubject that occupied his mind; working upon all, and ever mingling up with it ſomething of his own.

In explaining and connecting the hiſtory of the three Memorials, nothing, it is hoped, has been ſaid, which can be conſtrued to imply a cenſure on thoſe who direct the affairs of this kingdom. They may have formed to themſelves a wiſer ſyſtem of action, and been defeated in it by accidents, which could neither be foreſeen nor controuled; they may have unwillingly compromiſed in their counſels with the irreſiſtible force of circumſtances, and been compelled to adopt a ſyſtem which they knew to be imperfect; they may even, by attempting leſs, have actually done more. Theſe are queſtions too extenſive and important for this place. All that it ſeems

proper to ſay here, is ſimply, that whatever may have been their ſyſtem, and the merits of that ſyſtem, it was not that of Mr. Burke. And thus much is due to his memory, and to truth. Whatever has been the failure of the war, it is in no manner to be aſcribed to him: the time and mode of beginning it were not his choice: the plan of operations for conducting it was not his ſuggeſtion: and the declaration of principles, on which it has been juſtified, was not made by his advice, nor with his concurrence. Neither did he flatter thoſe in power by a ſilent acquieſcence in a courſe of policy which he did not approve. According to his practice, in more inſtances than one, during his oppoſition to Lord North's Adminiſtration, "he choſe rather," as he has ſaid, "reſpectfully to ſtate a "doubt to Miniſters whilſt a meaſure was "depending, than to reproach them after-"wards with it's conſequences."

In truth, he who never uſed any ſolicitation to advance his own perſonal intereſts, was indefatigable in ſoliciting ſupport to that cauſe,

cauſe, which he conſidered as the common intereſt of mankind. There was no perſon of rank or eminence in Europe with whom he had any occaſion of correſpondence, that he did not endeavour to conciliate, confirm, or animate on the ſide of religion, morals, and ſocial order, connected with moderated liberty. He applied to each the ſeveral topicks which were beſt ſuited to his circumſtances, his condition, his prejudices, or his wants, but all centered in one point. If to the people he again and again recommended, and inculcated, and enforced, with all the varied beauty and energy of his faſcinating eloquence, a principle of obedience, ſubmiſſion, and reſpect to their lawful Rulers of every denomination; to Princes and to all men in the exerciſe of authority he did not ſpare to recount, in the calmer tone of more argumentative diſcuſſion, the faults and errors to which their ſtations render them peculiarly liable, to impreſs upon them the neceſſity of that union between Mercy and Juſtice, without which one degenerates into weakneſs, and the other into cruelty; and to admoniſh

them, for their own tranquillity and happineſs, to protect, not oppreſs, their people, to improve, not impair, the legal ſecurity of the ſubject in his perſon and property, according to the true nature of their reſpective governments, for the great end of all government. Founding, as he always did, his political on his moral philoſophy, he told the different claſſes of ſociety, not of their extreme rights, but of their duties, the root of which is in the rights of others. He ardently loved his country and wiſhed her proſperity: yet he has not ſcrupled to ſay, that "he dreaded our "own power and our own ambition; he "dreaded our being too much dreaded." He conſtantly profeſſed a jealouſy of France as the natural rival and enemy of England; yet he was not leſs alarmed at her weakneſs, when, in the moment of the Monarchy being diſſolved, ſhe ſeemed to leave a chaſm in the map of Europe, than afterwards at her terrific power, when the monſtrous republic of Briſſot and Roberſpierre grew too big for her ancient limits; nor was he without his fears of her being again reduced too low, if the Allies

had

had ſucceeded in what he believed to be their ſyſtem of diſmembering her. In general, men ſee that ſide only, which is neareſt to them, in the order of things, by which they are ſurrounded, and in which they are carried along; but the clear and penetrating ſight of his mind comprehended in one view all the parts of the immenſe whole, which varying from moment to moment, yet continuing through centuries eſſentially the ſame, extends around and above to every civilized people in every age, and unites and incorporates the preſent with the generations which are paſt. To preſerve that whole unbroken to a late poſterity, he knew no other way than by reſiſting all mad or wicked attempts to deſtroy any of the great prominent parts. Not that he was the enemy of reformations. Quite the reverſe. But he would allow the honour of that name to no changes which affected the very ſubſtance of the thing: thoſe he approved, thoſe he called true reformations, which patiently ſeeking the degree of perfection alone attainable by man, and ordained to be only the ſlow reſult of long experience

perience and much meditation, put the happineſs of none to the hazard, while they better the condition of all. If, like the early ſages of Greece, he were to be characterized by ſome peculiar ſentiment, it ſhould be that to which he deſired to give the currency of a proverb—*to innovate is not to reform.*

This Preface has been drawn by degrees into an unexpected length. Much of Mr. Burke's character may have been here anticipated, which might have come with more propriety and force, hereafter. But on the ſpot where every object, to which the eye can be directed, is full of his image, it was impoſſible that many little remembrances of his opinions and habits, which muſt involuntarily ariſe in the boſom, ſhould not run over on the paper. They will not be the leaſt intereſting part to thoſe who enjoyed the bleſſing of an intimacy with him; and when the name of a deceaſed friend has been already forged to a deſpicable libel againſt him, when intelligence has been received, even while this Preface has been paſſing under the preſs,

of

of new artifices, which have been practiſed through the country, to ſolicit a party-ſupport to an inſidious attack upon his fame, that ſome correct notion of ſuch a man ſhould be early given, ſeemed to be of moment to the cauſe of public virtue.

Beaconsfield, Sept. 2, 1797.

HINTS

HINTS

FOR

A MEMORIAL

TO BE DELIVERED TO

MONSIEUR DE M. M.

[WRITTEN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1791.]

THE King my Maſter, from his ſincere deſire of keeping up a good correſpondence with his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and the French nation, has for ſome time beheld with concern, the condition into which that ſovereign and nation have fallen.

Notwithſtanding the reality and the warmth of thoſe ſentiments, his Britannick Majeſty has hitherto forborne in any manner to take a part in their affairs; in hopes, that the common intereſt of King and ſubjects would render all parties ſenſible of the neceſſity of ſettling, their government and their freedom, upon principles of moderation; as the only means of ſecuring permanence to both

theſe bleſſings, as well as internal and external tranquillity, to the Kingdom of France, and to all Europe.

His Britannick Majeſty finds, to his great regret, that his hopes have not been realized. He finds, that confuſions and diſorders have rather increaſed than diminiſhed, and that they now threaten to proceed to dangerous extremities.

In this ſituation of things, the ſame regard to a neighbouring Sovereign living in friendſhip with Great Britain, the ſame ſpirit of good-will to the Kingdom of France, the ſame regard to the general tranquillity, which have cauſed him to view with concern, the growth and continuance of the preſent diſorders, have induced the King of Great Britain to interpoſe his good offices towards a reconcilement of thoſe unhappy differences. This his Majeſty does with the moſt cordial regard to the good of all deſcriptions concerned, and with the moſt perfect ſincerity, wholly removing from his Royal mind, all memory of every circumſtance which might impede him in the execution of a plan of benevolence which he has ſo much at heart.

His Majeſty, having always thought it his greateſt glory, that he rules over a people, perfectly and

and ſolidly, becauſe ſoberly, rationally, and legally free, can never be ſuppoſed to proceed in offering thus his Royal mediation, but with an unaffected deſire and full reſolution, to conſider the ſettlement of a free conſtitution in France, as the very baſis of any agreement between the Sovereign and thoſe of his ſubjects who are unhappily at variance with him; to guarantee it to them, if it ſhould be deſired, in the moſt ſolemn and authentick manner, and to do all that in him lies to procure the like guarantee from other powers.

His Britannick Majeſty, in the ſame manner, aſſures the moſt Chriſtian King, that he knows too well, and values too highly, what is due to the dignity and rights of crowned Heads, and to the implied faith of treaties which have always been made with the *Crown* of France, ever to liſten to any propoſition by which that Monarchy ſhall be deſpoiled of all its rights, ſo eſſential for the ſupport of the conſideration of the Prince, and the concord and welfare of the people.

If unfortunately, a due attention ſhould not be paid to theſe his Majeſty's benevolent and neighbourly offers, or, if any circumſtances ſhould prevent the Moſt Chriſtian King from acceding, (as his Majeſty has no doubt he is well diſpoſed to do) to this healing mediation in favour of himſelf and

all his ſubjects, his Majeſty has commanded me to take leave of this Court, as not conceiving it to be ſuitable to the dignity of his Crown, and to what he owes to his faithful people, any longer to keep a publick Miniſter at the Court of a Sovereign who is not in poſſeſſion of his own liberty.

THOUGHTS

THOUGHTS
ON
FRENCH AFFAIRS,
&c. &c.

WRITTEN IN DECEMBER, 1791.

IN all our tranſactions with France, and at all periods, we have treated with that State on the footing of a Monarchy. Monarchy was conſidered in all the external relations of that kingdom with every Power in Europe as it's legal and conſtitutional Government, and that in which alone it's federal capacity was veſted.

Montmorin's Letter.

It is not yet a year ſince Monſieur de Montmorin, formally, and with as little reſpect as can be imagined, to the King, and to all crowned heads, announced a total revolution in that country. He has informed the Britiſh Miniſtry that it's frame of Government is wholly altered; that he is one of the Miniſters of the new ſyſtem; and in effect, that the King is no longer his maſter (nor does he even call him ſuch) but the "*firſt of the Miniſters*" in the new ſyſtem.

Acceptance of the Conſtitution ratified.

The ſecond notification was that of the King's acceptance of the new Conſtitution; accompanied with fanfaronades in the modern ſtyle of the French bureaus, things which have much more the air and character of the ſaucy declamations of their clubs, than the tone of regular office.

It has not been very uſual to notify to foreign Courts, any thing concerning the internal arrangements of any State. In the preſent caſe, the circumſtance of theſe two notifications, with the obſervations with which they are attended, does not leave it in the choice of the Sovereigns of Chriſtendom to appear ignorant either of this French Revolution, or (what is more important) of it's principles.

We know that very ſoon after this Manifeſto of Monſieur de Montmorin, the King of France, in whoſe name it was made, found himſelf obliged to fly, with his whole family; leaving behind him a Declaration, in which he diſavows and annuls that Conſtitution, as having been the effect of force on his perſon and uſurpation on his authority. It is equally notorious that this unfortunate Prince was, with many circumſtances of inſult and outrage, brought back priſoner, by a deputation of the pretended National Aſſembly, and afterwards ſuſpended by their authority, from his Government. Under

der equally notorious conſtraint, and under menaces of total depoſition, he has been compelled to accept what they call a Conſtitution, and to agree to whatever elſe the uſurped power which holds him in confinement, thinks proper to impoſe.

His next brother, who had fled with him, and his third brother, who had fled before him, all the Princes of his blood, who remained faithful to him, and the flower of his Magiſtracy, his Clergy, and his Nobility, continue in foreign countries, proteſting againſt all acts done by him in his preſent ſituation, on the grounds upon which he had himſelf proteſted againſt them at the time of his flight; with this addition, that they deny his very competence, (as on good grounds they may) to abrogate the Royalty, or the ancient conſtitutional Orders of the Kingdom. In this proteſt they are joined by three hundred of the late Aſſembly itſelf, and in effect, by a great part of the French Nation. The new Government (ſo far as the people dare to diſcloſe their ſentiments) is diſdained, I am perſuaded, by the greater number; who as M. de la Fayette complains, and as the truth is, have declined to take any ſhare in the new elections to the National Aſſembly, either as candidates or electors.

In this ſtate of things (that is in the caſe of a *divided* kingdom) by * the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part ſhe pleaſes. She may decline, with more or leſs formality, according to her diſcretion, to acknowledge this new ſyſtem; or ſhe may recognize it as a Government *de facto*, ſetting aſide all diſcuſſion of it's original legality, and conſidering the ancient Monarchy as at an end. The law of nations leaves our Court open to it's choice. We have no direction but what is found in the well-underſtood policy of the King and kingdom.

This Declaration of a *new ſpecies* of Government, on new principles (ſuch it profeſſes itſelf to be) is a real criſis in the politicks of Europe. The conduct which prudence ought to dictate to Great-Britain, will not depend (as hitherto our connexion or quarrel with other States has for ſome time depended) upon merely *external* relations; but, in a great meaſure alſo upon the ſyſtem which we may think it right to adopt for the internal government of our own country.

If it be our policy to aſſimilate our Government to that of France, we ought to prepare for this change, by encouraging the ſchemes of authority eſtabliſhed there. We ought to wink at

* See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. ſect. 56. and b. iii. c 18. ſect. 296.

the

the captivity and depoſition of a Prince, with whom, if not in cloſe alliance, we were in friendſhip. We ought to fall in with the ideas of Monſ. Montmorin's circular Manifeſto; and to do buſineſs of courſe with the functionaries who act under the new power, by which that King to whom his Majeſty's Miniſter has been ſent to reſide, has been depoſed and impriſoned. On that idea we ought alſo to with-hold all ſorts of direct or indirect countenance from thoſe who are treating in Germany for the re-eſtabliſhment of the French Monarchy and the ancient Orders of that State. This conduct is ſuitable to this policy.

The queſtion is, whether this policy be ſuitable to the intereſts of the Crown and ſubjects of Great Britain. Let us therefore a little conſider the true nature and probable effects of the Revolution which, in ſuch a very unuſual manner, has been twice diplomatically announced to his Majeſty.

Difference between this Revolution and others.

There have been many internal revolutions in the Government of countries, both as to perſons and forms, in which the neighbouring States have had little or no concern. Whatever the Government might be with reſpect to thoſe perſons and thoſe forms, the ſtationary intereſts of the nation concerned, have moſt commonly influenced the new Governments in the ſame manner in which they

they influenced the old; and the Revolution, turning on matter of local grievance or of local accommodation, did not extend beyond it's territory.

Nature of the French Revolution.

The preſent Revolution in France ſeems to me to be quite of another character and deſcription; and to bear little reſemblance or analogy to any of thoſe which have been brought about in Europe, upon principles merely political. *It is a Revolution of doctrine and theoretick dogma.* It has a much greater reſemblance to thoſe changes which have been made upon religious grounds, in which a ſpirit of proſelytiſm makes an eſſential part.

The laſt Revolution of doctrine and theory which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation. It is not for my purpoſe to take any notice here of the merits of that Revolution, but to ſtate one only of it's effects.

It's effects.

That effect was *to introduce other intereſts into all countries, than thoſe which aroſe from their locality and natural circumſtances.* The principle of the Reformation was ſuch, as by it's eſſence, could not be local or confined to the country in which it had it's origin. For inſtance, the doctrine of "Juſtification by Faith or by Works," which was the original baſis of the Reformation, could not have one of

of it's alternatives true as to Germany, and falſe as to every other country. Neither are queſtions of theoretick truth and falſehood governed by circumſtances any more than by places. On that occaſion, therefore, the ſpirit of proſelytiſm expanded itſelf with great elaſticity upon all ſides; and great diviſions were every where the reſult.

Theſe diviſions however, in appearance merely dogmatick, ſoon became mixed with the political; and their effects were rendered much more intenſe from this combination. Europe was for a long time divided into two great factions, under the name of Catholick and Proteſtant, which not only often alienated State from State, but alſo divided almoſt every State within itſelf. The warm parties in each State were more affectionately attached to thoſe of their own doctrinal intereſt in ſome other country than to their fellow citizens, or to their natural Government, when they or either of them happened to be of a different perſuaſion. Theſe factions, wherever they prevailed, if they did not abſolutely deſtroy, at leaſt weakened and diſtracted the locality of patriotiſm. The publick affections came to have other motives and other ties.

It would be to repeat the hiſtory of the two laſt centuries to exemplify the effects of this Revolution.

Although

Although the principles to which it gave riſe, did not operate with a perfect regularity and conſtancy, they never wholly ceaſed to operate. Few wars were made, and few treaties were entered into in which they did not come in for ſome part. They gave a colour, a character, and direction to all the politicks of Europe.

New ſyſtem of Politicks.

Theſe principles of internal, as well as external diviſion and coalition, are but juſt now extinguiſhed. But they who will examine into the true character and genius of ſome late events, muſt be ſatisfied that other ſources of faction, combining parties among the inhabitants of different countries into one connexion, are opened, and that from theſe ſources are likely to ariſe effects full as important as thoſe which had formerly ariſen from the jarring intereſts of the religious ſects. The intention of the ſeveral actors in the change in France, is not a matter of doubt. It is very openly profeſſed.

In the modern world, before this time, there has been no inſtance of this ſpirit of general political faction, ſeparated from religion, pervading ſeveral countries, and forming a principle of union between the partizans in each. But the thing is not leſs in human nature. The antient world has furniſhed

niſhed a ſtrong and ſtriking inſtance of ſuch a ground for faction, full as powerful and full as miſchievous as our ſpirit of religious ſyſtem had ever been, exciting in all the States of Greece (European and Aſiatick) the moſt violent animoſities, and the moſt cruel and bloody perſecutions and proſcriptions. Theſe ancient factions in each commonwealth of Greece, connected themſelves with thoſe of the ſame deſcription in ſome other States; and ſecret cabals and publick alliances were carried on and made, not upon a conformity of general political intereſts, but for the ſupport and aggrandizement of the two leading States which headed the Ariſtocratick and Democratick Factions. For, as in later times, the King of Spain was at the head of a Catholick, and the King of Sweden of a Proteſtant intereſt, France, (though Catholick, acting ſubordinately to the latter,) in the like manner the Lacedemonians were every where at the head of the Ariſtocratick intereſts, and the Athenians of the Democratick. The two leading Powers kept alive a conſtant cabal and conſpiracy in every State, and the political dogmas concerning the conſtitution of a Republick, were the great inſtruments by which theſe leading States choſe to aggrandize themſelves. Their choice was not unwiſe; becauſe the intereſt in opinions (merely as opinions, and without any experimental reference to their effects) when once they take ſtrong hold of the

mind, become the moſt operative of all intereſts, and indeed very often ſupercede every other.

I might further exemplify the poſſibility of a political ſentiment running through various ſtates and combining factions in them, from the hiſtory of the middle ages in the Guelfs and Ghibellines. Theſe were political factions originally in favour of the Emperor and the Pope, with no mixture of religious dogmas; or if any thing religiouſly doctrinal they had in them originally, it very ſoon diſappeared; as their firſt political objects diſappeared alſo, though the ſpirit remained. They became no more than names to diſtinguiſh factions; but they were not the leſs powerful in their operation, when they had no direct point of doctrine, either religious or civil, to aſſert. For a long time, however, thoſe factions gave no ſmall degree of influence to the foreign Chiefs in every commonwealth in which they exiſted. I do not mean to purſue further the track of theſe parties. I allude to this part of hiſtory only, as it furniſhes an inſtance of that ſpecies of faction which broke the locality of publick affections, and united deſcriptions of citizens more with ſtrangers than with their countrymen of different opinions.

French fundamental principle.

The political dogma, which upon the new French ſyſtem, is to unite the factions of different nations,

nations, turns is this, " That the majority told, by " the head, of the taxable people in every country, " is the perpetual, natural, unceaſing, indefeaſible " ſovereign; that this majority is perfectly maſter " of the form, as well as the adminiſtration of the " ſtate, and that the magiſtrates, under whatever " names they are called, are only functionaries to " obey the orders, (general as laws or particular as " decrees) which that majority may make; that " this is the only natural government; that all " others are tyranny and uſurpation."

Practical project.

In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the Republicans in France, and their aſſociates in other countries, make it always their buſineſs, and often their publick profeſſion, to deſtroy all traces of antient eſtabliſhments, and to form a new commonwealth in each country, upon the baſis of the French *Rights of Men.* On the principle of theſe rights, they mean to inſtitute in every country, and as it were, the germe of the whole, parochial governments, for the purpoſe of what they call equal repreſentation. From them is to grow, by ſome media, a general council and repreſentative of all the parochial governments. In that repreſentative is to be veſted the whole national power; totally aboliſhing hereditary name and office, levelling all conditions of men, (except where money *muſt* make a difference) breaking all connexion between ter-

ritory and dignity, and abolishing every species of nobility, gentry, and church establishments; all their priests, and all their magistrates being only creatures of election, and pensioners at will.

Knowing how opposite a permanent landed interest is to that scheme, they have resolved, and it is the great drift of all their regulations, to reduce that description of men to a mere peasantry, for the sustenance of the towns, and to place the true effective government in cities, among the tradesmen, bankers, and voluntary clubs of bold, presuming young persons;—advocates, attornies, notaries, managers of newspapers, and those cabals of literary men, called academies. Their Republick is to have a first functionary, (as they call him) under the name of King, or not, as they think fit. This officer, when such an officer is permitted, is however, neither in fact nor name, to be considered as sovereign, nor the people as his subjects. The very use of these appellations is offensive to their ears.

Partizans of the French system.

This system, as it has first been realized, dogmatically as well as practically, in France, makes France the natural head of all factions formed on a similar principle, wherever they may prevail, as much as Athens was the head and settled ally of all democratick factions, wherever they existed. The other system has no head.

This

This ſyſtem has very many partizans in every country in Europe, but particularly in England, where they are already formed into a body, comprehending moſt of the diſſenters of the three leading denominations; to theſe are readily aggregated all who are diſſenters in character, temper, and diſpoſition, though not belonging to any of their congregations—that is, all the reſtleſs people who reſemble them, of all ranks and all parties—Whigs, and even Tories—the whole race of half-bred ſpeculators;—all the Atheiſts, Deiſts, and Socinians;—all thoſe who hate the Clergy, and envy the Nobility,—a good many among the monied people;—the Eaſt Indians almoſt to a man, who cannot bear to find that their preſent importance does not bear a proportion to their wealth. Theſe latter have united themſelves into one great, and in my opinion, formidable Club*, which, though now quiet, may be brought into action with conſiderable unanimity and force.

Formerly few, except the ambitious great, or the deſperate and indigent, were to be feared as inſtruments in revolutions. What has happened in France teaches us, with many other things, that there are more cauſes than have commonly been

* Originally called the Bengal Club, but ſince opened to perſons from the other Preſidencies, for the purpoſe of conſolidating the whole Indian intereſt.

taken

taken into our conſideration, by which Government may be ſubverted. The monied men, merchants, principal tradeſmen, and men of letters (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even timid part of ſociety) are the chief actors in the French Revolution. But the fact is, that as money increaſes and circulates, and as the circulation of news, in politicks and letters, becomes more and more diffuſed, the perſons who diffuſe this money, and this intelligence, become more and more important. This was not long undiſcovered. Views of *ambition* were in France, for the firſt time, preſented to theſe claſſes of men. Objects in the State, in the Army, in the ſyſtem of civil offices of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this new proſpect. They were, as it were, electrified and made to loſe the natural ſpirit of their ſituation. A bribe, great without example in the hiſtory of the world, was held out to them—the whole government of a very large kingdom.

Grounds of ſecurity ſuppoſed for England.

There are ſeveral who are perſuaded that the ſame thing cannot happen in England, becauſe here, (they ſay) the occupations of merchants, tradeſmen, and manufacturers, are not held as degrading ſituations. I once thought that the low eſtimation in which commerce was held in France, might be reckoned among the cauſes of the late revolution; and I am ſtill of opinion, that the excluſive

cluſive ſpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the wealthy of other claſſes. But I found long ſince, that perſons in trade and buſineſs were by no means deſpiſed in France in the manner I had been taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were ſo far from being deſpiſed or neglected, that there was no country perhaps in the univerſe, in which they were ſo highly eſteemed, courted, careſſed, and even feared; tradeſmen naturally were not ſo much ſought in ſociety (as not furniſhing ſo largely to the fund of converſation as they do to the revenues of the ſtate) but the latter deſcription got forward every day. M. Bailly, who made himſelf the popular Mayor on the rebellion of the Baſtile, and is a principal actor in the revolt, before the change poſſeſſed a penſion or office under the Crown, of ſix hundred pound Engliſh, a year, for that country, no contemptible proviſion: And this he obtained ſolely as a man of letters, and on no other title. As to the monied men—whilſt the Monarchy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as ſuch, they did not enjoy the *privileges* of nobility, but nobility was of ſo eaſy an acquiſition, that it was the fault or neglect of all of that deſcription, who did not obtain it's privileges, for their lives at leaſt, in virtue of office. It attached under the royal government to an innumerable multitude of places, real and nominal, that were vendible; and ſuch nobility were as capable of every thing as their

Literary intereſt.

Monied intereſt.

their degree of influence or intereſt could make them, that is, as nobility of no conſiderable rank or conſequence. M. Necker, ſo far from being a French gentleman, was not ſo much as a Frenchman born, and yet we all know the rank in which he ſtood on the day of the meeting of the States.

Mercantile intereſt.

As to the mere matter of eſtimation of the mercantile or any other claſs, this is regulated by opinion and prejudice. In England a ſecurity againſt the envy of men in theſe claſſes, is not ſo very complete as we may imagine. We muſt not impoſe upon ourſelves. What inſtitutions and manners together had done in France, manners alone do here. It is the natural operation of things where there exiſts a Crown, a Court, ſplendid Orders of Knighthood, and an Hereditary Nobility;—where there exiſts a fixed, permanent, landed Gentry, continued in greatneſs and opulence by the law of primogeniture, and by a protection given to family ſettlements;—where there exiſts a ſtanding Army and Navy;—where there exiſts a Church Eſtabliſhment, which beſtows on learning and parts an intereſt combined with that of Religion and the State;—in a country where ſuch things exiſt, wealth, new in it's acquiſition, and precarious in it's duration, can never rank firſt, or even near the firſt; though wealth has it's natural weight, further, than as it is balanced and even preponderated

rated amongſt us as amongſt other nations, by artificial inſtitutions and opinions growing out of them. At no period in the hiſtory of England have ſo few Peers been taken out of trade or from families newly created by commerce. In no period has ſo ſmall a number of noble families entered into the counting-houſe. I can call to mind but one in all England, and his is of near fifty years ſtanding. Be that as it may, it appears plain to me from my beſt obſervation, that envy and ambition may by art, management and diſpoſition, be as much excited amongſt theſe deſcriptions of men in England, as in any other country; and that they are juſt as capable of acting a part in any great change.

Progreſs of the French Spirit.—It's courſe.

What direction the French ſpirit of proſelytiſm is likely to take, and in what order it is likely to prevail in the ſeveral parts of Europe, it is not eaſy to determine. The ſeeds are ſown almoſt every where, chiefly by newſpaper circulations, infinitely more efficacious and extenſive than ever they were. And they are a more important inſtrument than generally is imagined. They are a part of the reading of all, they are the whole of the reading of the far greater number. There are thirty of them in Paris alone. The language diffuſes them more widely than the Engliſh, though the Engliſh too are much read. The writers of

theſe papers indeed, for the greater part, are either unknown or in contempt, but they are like a battery in which the ſtroke of any one ball produces no great effect, but the amount of continual repetition is deciſive. Let us only ſuffer any perſon to tell us his ſtory, morning and evening, but for one twelvemonth, and he will become our maſter.

All thoſe countries in which ſeveral States are comprehended under ſome general geographical deſcription, and looſely united by ſome federal conſtitution; countries of which the members are ſmall, and greatly diverſified in their forms of government, and in the titles by which they are held —theſe countries, as it might be well expected, are the principal objects of their hopes and machinations. Of theſe, the chief are Germany and Switzerland: after them, Italy has it's place as in circumſtances ſomewhat ſimilar.

Germany. As to Germany (in which from their relation to the Emperor, I comprehend the Belgick provinces) it appears to me to be from ſeveral circumſtances, internal and external, in a very critical ſituation, and the laws and liberties of the Empire are by no means ſecure from the contagion of the French doctrines and the effect of French intrigues; or from the uſe which two of the greater German powers may make of a general derangement, to the

the general detriment. I do not ſay that the French do not mean to beſtow on theſe German States, liberties and laws too, after their mode; but thoſe are not what have hitherto been underſtood as the laws and liberties of the Empire. Theſe exiſt and have always exiſted under the principles of feodal tenure and ſucceſſion, under Imperial conſtitutions, grants and conceſſions of Sovereigns, family compacts and publick treaties, made under the ſanction, and ſome of them guaranteed by the Sovereign Powers of other nations, and particularly the old Government of France, the author and natural ſupport of the treaty of Weſtphalia.

In ſhort, the Germanick body is a vaſt maſs of heterogeneous States, held together by that heterogeneous body of old principles which formed the publick law poſitive and doctrinal. The modern laws and liberties which the new power in France propoſes to introduce into Germany, and to ſupport with all it's force, of intrigue and of arms, is of a very different nature, utterly irreconcileable with the firſt, and indeed fundamentally the reverſe of it: I mean the *Rights and Liberties of the Man*, the *Droit de l'Homme*. That this doctrine has made an amazing progreſs in Germany, there cannot be a ſhadow of doubt. They are infected by it along the whole courſe of the Rhine, the Maeſe, the

Moſelle, and in the greater part of Suabia and Franconia. It is particularly prevalent amongſt all the lower people, churchmen and laity, in the dominions of the Eccleſiaſtical Electors. It is not eaſy to find or to conceive Governments more mild and indulgent than theſe Church Sovereignties; but good government is as nothing when the Rights of Man take poſſeſſion of the mind. Indeed the looſe rein held over the people in theſe provinces, muſt be conſidered as one cauſe of the facility with which they lend themſelves to any ſchemes of innovation, by inducing them to think lightly of their governments, and to judge of grievances not by feeling, but by imagination.

Eccleſiaſtical State.

It is in theſe Electorates that the firſt impreſſions of France are likely to be made, and if they ſucceed, it is over with the Germanick body as it ſtands at preſent. A great revolution is preparing in Germany; and a revolution, in my opinion, likely to be more deciſive upon the general fate of nations than that of France itſelf; other than as in France is to be found the firſt ſource of all the principles which are in any way likely to diſtinguiſh the troubles and convulſions of our age. If Europe does not conceive the independence, and the equilibrium of the Empire to be in the very eſſence of the ſyſtem of balanced power in Europe, and if the ſcheme of publick law, or maſs of laws upon

Balance of Germany.

upon which that independence and equilibrium are founded, be of no leading conſequence as they are preſerved or deſtroyed, all the politicks of Europe for more than two centuries have been miſerably erroneous.

Pruſſia and Emperor.

If the two great leading Powers of Germany do not regard this danger (as apparently they do not) in the light in which it preſents itſelf ſo naturally, it is becauſe they are powers too great to have a ſocial intereſt. That ſort of intereſt belongs only to thoſe, whoſe ſtate of weakneſs or mediocrity is ſuch, as to give them greater cauſe of apprehenſion from what may deſtroy them, than of hope from any thing by which they may be aggrandized.

As long as thoſe two Princes are at variance, ſo long the liberties of Germany are ſafe. But if ever they ſhould ſo far underſtand one another as to be perſuaded that they have a more direct and more certainly defined intereſt in a proportioned mutual aggrandizement than in a reciprocal reduction, that is, if they come to think that they are more likely to be enriched by a diviſion of ſpoil, than to be rendered ſecure by keeping to the old policy of preventing others from being ſpoiled by either of them, from that moment the liberties of Germany are no more.

That

That a junction of two in ſuch a ſcheme is neither impoſſible nor improbable, is evident from the partition of Poland in 1773, which was effected by ſuch a junction as made the interpoſition of other nations to prevent it, not eaſy. Their circumſtances at that time hindered any other three States, or indeed any two, from taking meaſures in common to prevent it, though France was at that time an exiſting power, and had not yet learned to act upon a ſyſtem of politicks of her own invention. The geographical poſition of Poland was a great obſtacle to any movements of France in oppoſition to this, at that time unparalleled league. To my certain knowledge, if Great Britain had at that time been willing to concur in preventing the execution of a project ſo dangerous in the example, even exhauſted as France then was by the preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterprizing Prince, ſhe would have at every riſque taken an active part in this buſineſs. But a languor with regard to ſo remote an intereſt, and the principles and paſſions which were then ſtrongly at work at home, were the cauſes why Great Britain would not give France any encouragement in ſuch an enterprize. At that time, however, and with regard to that object, in my opinion, Great Britain and France had a common intereſt.

But

But the poſition of Germany is not like that of Poland, with regard to France, either for good or for evil. If a conjunction between Pruſſia and the Emperor ſhould be formed for the purpoſe of ſecularising and rendering hereditary the Eccleſiaſtical Electorates and the Biſhoprick of Munſter, for ſettling two of them on the children of the Emperor, and uniting Cologne and Munſter to the dominions of the King of Pruſſia on the Rhine, or if any other project of mutual aggrandizement ſhould be in proſpect, and that to facilitate ſuch a ſcheme, the modern French ſhould be permitted and encouraged to ſhake the internal and external ſecurity of theſe Eccleſiaſtical Electorates, Great Britain is ſo ſituated that ſhe could not with any effect ſet herſelf in oppoſition to ſuch a deſign. Her principal arm, her marine, could here be of no ſort of uſe.

Poſſible project of the Emperor and K. of Pruſſia.

France, the author of the treaty of Weſtphalia, is the natural guardian of the independence and balance of Germany. Great Britain (to ſay nothing of the King's concern as one of that auguſt body) has a ſerious intereſt in preſerving it; but, except through the power of France, *acting upon the common old principles of State policy*, in the caſe we have ſuppoſed, ſhe has no ſort of means of ſupporting that intereſt. It is always the intereſt of Great Britain that the power of France ſhould

To be reſiſted only by France.

ſhould be kept within the bounds of moderation. It is not her intereſt that that power ſhould be wholly annihilated in the ſyſtem of Europe. Though at one time through France the independence of Europe was endangered, it is and ever was through her alone that the common liberty of Germany can be ſecured againſt the ſingle or the combined ambition of any other power. In truth, within this century the aggrandizement of other Sovereign Houſes has been ſuch that there has been a great change in the whole ſtate of Europe, and other nations as well as France may become objects of jealouſy and apprehenſion.

New principles of alliance.

In this ſtate of things, a new principle of alliances and wars is opened. The treaty of Weſtphalia is, with France, an antiquated fable. The rights and liberties ſhe was bound to maintain are now a ſyſtem of wrong and tyranny which ſhe is bound to deſtroy. Her good and ill diſpoſitions are ſhewn by the ſame means. *To communicate peaceably* the rights of men is the true mode of her ſhewing her *friendſhip*; to force Sovereigns to *ſubmit* to thoſe rights is her mode of *hoſtility*. So that either as friend or foe her whole ſcheme has been and is, to throw the Empire into confuſion: and thoſe Stateſmen, who follow the old routine of politicks, may ſee in this general confuſion, and in the danger of the *leſſer* Princes, an occaſion as protectors

protectors or enemies, of connecting their territories to one or the other of the *two great* German Powers. They do not take into conſideration that the means which they encourage, as leading to the event they deſire, will with certainty not only ravage and deſtroy the Empire, but if they ſhould for a moment ſeem to aggrandize the two great houſes, will alſo eſtabliſh principles, and confirm tempers amongſt the people, which will preclude the two Sovereigns from the poſſibility of holding what they acquire, or even the dominions which they have inherited. It is on the ſide of the Eccleſiaſtical Electorates that the dykes, raiſed to ſupport the German liberty, firſt will give way.

The French have begun their general operations by ſeizing upon thoſe territories of the Pope, the ſituation of which was the moſt inviting to the enterprize. Their method of doing it was by exciting ſedition and ſpreading maſſacre and deſolation thro' theſe unfortunate places, and then under an idea of kindneſs and protection, bringing forward an antiquated title of the Crown of France and annexing Avignon and the two cities of the Comtat with their territory to the French Republick. They have made an attempt on Geneva, in which they very narrowly failed of ſucceſs. It is known that they hold out from time to time the idea of uniting all the other provinces of which Gaul was an- Geneva.

Savoy. tiently compoſed, including Savoy on the other ſide, and on this ſide bounding themſelves by the Rhine.

Switzerland. As to Switzerland, it is a country whoſe long union rather than it's poſſible diviſion, is the matter of wonder. Here I know they entertain very ſanguine hopes. The aggregation to France of the Democratick Swiſs Republicks appears to them to be a work half done by their very form; and it might ſeem to them rather an encreaſe of importance to theſe little Commonwealths, than a derogation from their independency, or a change in the manner of their Government. Upon any quarrel amongſt the Cantons nothing is more likely than ſuch an event. As to the Ariſtocratick Republicks, the general clamour and hatred which the French excite againſt the very name, (and with more facility and ſucceſs than againſt Monarchs) and the utter impoſſibility of their Government making any ſort of reſiſtance againſt an inſurrection, where they have no troops, and the people are all armed and trained, render their hopes in that quarter, far indeed from unfounded. It is certain that the Republick of Berne thinks itſelf obliged to a vigilance next to hoſtile, and to impriſon or expel all the French whom they find in their territories. But indeed thoſe Ariſtocracies which comprehend whatever is conſiderable, wealthy, and valuable in Switzerland, do now ſo wholly depend upon

upon opinion, and the humour of their multitude, that the lighteſt puff of wind is ſufficient to blow them down. If France, under it's antient regimen, and upon the antient principles of policy, was the ſupport of the Germanick Conſtitution, it was much more ſo of that of Switzerland, which almoſt from the very origin of that confederacy reſted upon the cloſeneſs of it's connexion with France, on which the Swiſs Cantons wholly repoſed themſelves for the preſervation of the parts of their body in their reſpective rights and permanent forms, as well as for the maintenance of all in their general independency.

Old French maxims the ſecurity of its independence.

Switzerland and Germany are the firſt objects of the new French politicians. When I contemplate what they have done at home, which is in effect little leſs than an amazing conqueſt wrought by a change of opinion, in a great part (to be ſure far from altogether) very ſudden, I cannot help letting my thoughts run along with their deſigns, and without attending to geographical order, to conſider the other States of Europe ſo far as they may be any way affected by this aſtoniſhing Revolution. If early ſteps are not taken in ſome way or other to prevent the ſpreading of this influence, I ſcarcely think any of them perfectly ſecure.

Italy is divided, as Germany and Switzerland are, into many ſmaller States, and with ſome con-

Italy.

ſiderable diverſity as to forms of Government; but as theſe diviſions and varieties in Italy are not ſo conſiderable, ſo neither do I think the danger altogether ſo imminent there as in Germany and Switzerland. Savoy I know that the French conſider as in a very hopeful way, and I believe not at all without reaſon. They view it as an old member of the Kingdom of France which may be eaſily re-united in the manner, and on the principles of the re-union of Avignon. This country communicates with Piedmont; and as the King of Sardinia's dominions were long the key of Italy, and as ſuch long regarded by France, whilſt France acted on her old maxims, and with views on Italy; ſo in this new French empire of ſedition, if once ſhe gets that key into her hands, ſhe can eaſily lay open the barrier which hinders the entrance of her preſent politicks into that inviting region. Milan, I am ſure, nouriſhes great diſquiets—and if Milan ſhould ſtir, no part of Lombardy is ſecure to the preſent poſſeſſors—whether the Venetian or the Auſtrian. Genoa is cloſely connected with France.

Lombardy.

Bourbon Princes in Italy.

The firſt Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon has been obliged to give himſelf up entirely to the new ſyſtem, and to pretend even to propagate it with all zeal; at leaſt that Club of intriguers who aſſemble at the Feuillans, and whoſe cabinet meets

meets at Madame Stahl's, and makes and directs all the Miniſters, is the real Executive Government of France. The Emperor is perfectly in concert, and they will not long ſuffer any Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon, to keep by force the French emiſſaries out of their dominions; nor whilſt France has a commerce with them, eſpecially thro' Marſeilles, (the hotteſt focus of ſedition in France) will it be long poſſible to prevent the intercourſe or the effects.

Naples has an old inveterate diſpoſition to Republicaniſm, and (however for ſome time paſt quiet) is as liable to exploſion as it's own Veſuvius. Sicily I think has theſe diſpoſitions in full as ſtrong a degree. In neither of theſe countries exiſts any thing which very well deſerves the name of Government or exact police.

Eccleſiaſtical State.

In the Eſtates of the Church, notwithſtanding their ſtrictneſs in baniſhing the French out of that country, there are not wanting the ſeeds of a revolution. The ſpirit of Nepotiſm prevails there nearly as ſtrong as ever. Every Pope of courſe is to give origin or reſtoration to a great family, by the means of large donations. The foreign revenues have long been gradually on the decline, and ſeem now in a manner dried up. To ſupply this defect the reſource of vexatious and impolitick jobbing

jobbing at home, if any thing, is rather encreaſed than leſſened. Various, well intended but ill underſtood practices, ſome of them exiſting, in their ſpirit at leaſt, from the time of the old Roman empire, ſtill prevail; and that Government is as blindly attached to old abuſive cuſtoms, as others are wildly diſpoſed to all ſorts of innovations and experiments. Theſe abuſes were leſs felt whilſt the Pontificate drew riches from abroad, which in ſome meaſure counterbalanced the evils of their remiſs and jobbiſh Government at home. But now it can ſubſiſt only on the reſources of domeſtick management; and abuſes in that management of courſe will be more intimately and more ſeverely felt.

In the midſt of the apparently torpid languor of the Eccleſiaſtical State, thoſe who have had opportunity of a near obſervation, have ſeen a little rippling in that ſmooth water, which indicates ſomething alive under it. There is in the Eccleſiaſtical State, a perſonage who ſeems capable of acting (but with more force and ſteadineſs) the part of the Tribune Rienzi. The people once inflamed will not be deſtitute of a leader. They have ſuch an one already in the Cardinal or Archbiſhop *Buon Campagna*. He is, of all men, if I am not ill informed, the moſt turbulent, ſeditious, intriguing, bold, and deſperate. He is not at all made for a Roman

Roman of the preſent day. I think he lately held the firſt office of their State, that of Great Chamberlain, which is equivalent to High Treaſurer. At preſent he is out of employment, and in diſgrace. If he ſhould be elected Pope, or even come to have any weight with a new Pope, he will infallibly conjure up a democratick ſpirit in that country. He may indeed be able to effect it without theſe advantages. The next interregnum will probably ſhew more of him. There may be others of the ſame character, who have not come to my knowledge. This much is certain, that the Roman people, if once the blind reverence they bear to the ſanctity of the Pope, which is their only bridle, ſhould relax, are naturally turbulent, ferocious, and headlong, whilſt the police is defective, and the Government feeble and reſourceleſs beyond all imagination.

As to Spain, it is a nerveleſs country. It does not poſſeſs the uſe, it only ſuffers the abuſe of a nobility. For ſome time, and even before the ſettlement of the Bourbon Dynaſty, that body has been ſyſtematically lowered, and rendered incapable by excluſion, and for incapacity excluded from affairs. In this circle the body is in a manner annihilated—and ſo little means have they of any weighty exertion either to controul or to ſupport the Crown, that if they at all interfere, it is only Spain.

by

by abetting deſperate and mobbiſh inſurrections, like that at Madrid which drove Squillace from his place. Florida Blanca is a creature of office, and has little connexion, and no ſympathy with that body.

As to the Clergy, they are the only thing in Spain that looks like an independent order, and they are kept in ſome reſpect by the Inquiſition, the ſole but unhappy reſource of publick tranquillity and order now remaining in Spain. As in Venice, it is become moſtly an engine of State, which indeed to a degree it has always been in Spain. It wars no longer with Jews and Hereticks: It has no ſuch war to carry on. It's great object is to keep atheiſtick and republican doctrines from making their way in that kingdom. No French book upon any ſubject can enter there which does not contain ſuch matter. In Spain, the clergy are of moment from their influence, but at the ſame time with the envy and jealouſy that attend great riches and power. Though the Crown has by management with the Pope got a very great ſhare of the eccleſiaſtical revenues into it's own hands, much ſtill remains to them. There will always be about that Court thoſe who look out to a farther diviſion of the Church property as a reſource, and to be obtained by ſhorter methods than thoſe of negotiations with the Clergy and their Chief. But at preſent I think it likely that they will ſtop, leſt the

buſineſs

buſineſs ſhould be taken out of their hands; and leſt that body in which remains the only life that exiſts in Spain, and is not a fever, may with their property loſe all the influence neceſſary to preſerve the Monarchy, or being poor and deſperate, may employ whatever influence remains to them as active agents in it's deſtruction.

Caſtile different from Catalonia & Arragon.

The Caſtilians have ſtill remaining a good deal of their old character, their *Gravidad*, *Lealdad*, and *il Timor de Dios*; but that character neither is, or ever was exactly true, except of the Caſtilians only. The ſeveral kingdoms which compoſe Spain, have perhaps ſome features which run through the whole; but they are in many particulars as different as nations who go by different names; the Catalans, for inſtance, and the Arragonians too, in a good meaſure have the ſpirit of the Miquelets, and much more of republicaniſm than of an attachment to royalty. They are more in the way of trade and intercourſe with France; and upon the leaſt internal movement, will diſcloſe and probably let looſe a ſpirit that may throw the whole Spaniſh Monarchy into convulſions.

It is a melancholy reflection that the ſpirit of melioration which has been going on in that part of Europe, more or leſs during this century, and the various ſchemes very lately on foot for further

advancement are all put a ſtop to at once. Reformation certainly is nearly connected with innovation —and where that latter comes in for too large a ſhare, thoſe who undertake to improve their country may riſque their own ſafety. In times where the correction, which includes the confeſſion of an abuſe, is turned to criminate the authority which has long ſuffered it, rather than to honour thoſe who would amend it (which is the ſpirit of this malignant French diſtemper) every ſtep out of the common courſe becomes critical, and renders it a taſk full of peril for Princes of moderate talents to engage in great undertakings. At preſent the only ſafety of Spain is the old national hatred to the French. How far that can be depended upon, if any great ferments ſhould be excited, it is impoſſible to ſay.

As to Portugal, ſhe is out of the high road of theſe politicks—I ſhall, therefore, not divert my thoughts that way; but return again to the North of Europe, which at preſent ſeems the part moſt intereſted, and there it appears to me that the French ſpeculation on the northern countries, may be valued in the following, or ſome ſuch manner.

Denmark. Denmark and Norway do not appear to furniſh any of the materials of a democratick revolution, or the diſpoſitions to it. Denmark can only be *conſequentially*

ſequentially affected by any thing done in France; but of Sweden I think quite otherwiſe. The preſent power in Sweden is too new a ſyſtem, and too green and too ſore from it's late Revolution, to be conſidered as perfectly aſſured. The King by his aſtoniſhing activity, his boldneſs, his deciſion, his ready verſatility, and by rouzing and employing the old military ſpirit of Sweden, keeps up the top with continual agitation and laſhing. The moment it ceaſes to ſpin, the Royalty is a dead bit of box. Whenever Sweden is quiet externally for ſome time, there is great danger that all the republican elements ſhe contains will be animated by the new French ſpirit, and of this I believe the King is very ſenſible. Sweden.

The Ruſſian Government is of all others the moſt liable to be ſubverted by military ſeditions, by Court conſpiracies, and ſometimes by headlong rebellions of the people, ſuch as the turbinating movement of Pugatchef. It is not quite ſo probable that in any of theſe changes the ſpirit of ſyſtem may mingle in the manner it has done in France. The Muſcovites are no great ſpeculators—But I ſhould not much rely on their uninquiſitive diſpoſition, if any of their ordinary motives to ſedition ſhould ariſe. The little catechiſm of the Rights of Men is ſoon learned; and the inferences are in the paſſions. Ruſſia.

Poland. Poland, from one cauſe or another, is always unquiet. The new Conſtitution only ſerves to ſupply that reſtleſs people with new means, at leaſt new modes, of cheriſhing their turbulent diſpoſition. The bottom of the character is the ſame. It is a great queſtion, whether the joining that Crown Saxony. with the Electorate of Saxony, will contribute moſt to ſtrengthen the Royal authority of Poland, or to ſhake the Ducal in Saxony. The Elector is a Catholick; the people of Saxony are, ſix ſevenths at the very leaſt, Proteſtants. He *muſt* continue a Catholick according to the Poliſh law, if he accepts that Crown. The pride of the Saxons, formerly flattered by having a Crown in the Houſe of their Prince, though an honour which coſt them dear; the German probity, fidelity and loyalty; the weight of the Conſtitution of the Empire under the Treaty of Weſtphalia; the good temper and good nature of the Princes of the Houſe of Saxony; had formerly removed from the people all apprehenſion with regard to their religion, and kept them perfectly quiet, obedient, and even affectionate. The ſeven years war made ſome change in the minds of the Saxons. They did not, I believe, regret the loſs of what might be conſidered almoſt as the ſucceſſion to the Crown of Poland, the poſſeſſion of which, by annexing them to a foreign intereſt, had often obliged them to act an arduous part, towards the ſupport of which that foreign intereſt afforded

no

no proportionable ſtrength. In this very delicate ſituation of their political intereſts, the ſpeculations of the French and German *Œconomiſts*, and the cabals, and the ſecret, as well as public doctrines of the *Illuminatenordens* and *Free Maſons*, have made a conſiderable progreſs in that country; and a turbulent ſpirit under colour of religion, but in reality ariſing from the French Rights of Man, has already ſhewn itſelf, and is ready on every occaſion to blaze out.

The preſent Elector is a Prince of a ſafe and quiet temper, of great prudence, and goodneſs. He knows that in the actual ſtate of things, not the power and reſpect belonging to Sovereigns, but their very exiſtence depends on a reaſonable frugality. It is very certain that not one Sovereign in Europe can either promiſe for the continuance of his authority in a ſtate of indigence and inſolvency, or dares to venture on a new impoſition to relieve himſelf. Without abandoning wholly the ancient magnificence of his Court, the Elector has conducted his affairs with infinitely more œconomy than any of his predeceſſors, ſo as to reſtore his finances beyond what was thought poſſible from the ſtate in which the ſeven years war had left Saxony. Saxony during the whole of that dreadful period having been in the hands of an exaſperated enemy, rigorous by reſentment, by nature and by neceſ-

ſity,

ſity, was obliged to bear in a manner the whole burthen of the war; in the intervals when their allies prevailed, the inhabitants of that country were not better treated.

The moderation and prudence of the preſent Elector, in my opinion, rather perhaps reſpites the troubles than ſecures the peace of the Electorate. The offer of the ſucceſſion to the Crown of Poland is truly critical, whether he accepts, or whether he declines it. If the States will conſent to his acceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already great, of his ſituation between the King of Pruſſia and the Emperor. But theſe thoughts lead me too far, when I mean to ſpeak only of the interior condition of theſe Princes. It has always however ſome neceſſary connexion with their foreign politicks.

Holland. With regard to Holland and the ruling party there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to be ſo except by fear; or that it is likely to be miſled unleſs indirectly and circuitouſly. But the predominant party in Holland is not Holland. The ſuppreſſed faction, though ſuppreſſed, exiſts. Under the aſhes, the embers of the late commotions are ſtill warm. This Anti-Orange party has from the day of it's origin been French, though alienated in ſome degree for ſome time, through the pride and folly of Louis the Fourteenth. It will ever hanker

hanker after a French connexion; and now that the internal Government in France has been aſſimilated in ſo conſiderable a degree to that which the immoderate Republicans began ſo very lately to introduce into Holland, their connexion, as ſtill more natural, will be more deſired. I do not well underſtand the preſent exterior politicks of the Stadtholder, nor the Treaty into which the newspapers ſay he has entered for the States with the Emperor. But the Emperor's own politicks with regard to the Netherlands ſeem to me to be exactly calculated to anſwer the purpoſe of the French Revolutioniſts. He endeavours to cruſh the Ariſtocratick party—and to nouriſh one in avowed connexion with the moſt furious Democratiſts in France.

Theſe Provinces in which the French game is ſo well played, they conſider as part of the Old French Empire: certainly they were amongſt the oldeſt parts of it. Theſe they think very well ſituated, as their party is well-diſpoſed to a re-union. As to the greater nations, they do not aim at making a direct conqueſt of them, but by diſturbing them through a propagation of their principles, they hope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and thus render all their efforts againſt them utterly impracticable,

impracticable, whilſt they extend the dominion of their ſovereign anarchy on all ſides.

England.

As to England, there may be ſome apprehenſion from vicinity, from conſtant communication, and from the very name of Liberty, which, as it ought to be very dear to us, in it's worſt abuſes carries ſomething ſeductive. It is the abuſe of the firſt and beſt of the objects which we cheriſh. I know that many who ſufficiently diſlike the ſyſtem of France, have yet no apprehenſions of it's prevalence here. I ſay nothing to the ground of this ſecurity in the attachment of the people to their Conſtitution, and their ſatisfaction in the diſcreet portion of liberty which it meaſures out to them. Upon this I have ſaid all I have to ſay, in the Appeal I have publiſhed. That ſecurity is ſomething, and not inconſiderable. But if a ſtorm ariſes I ſhould not much rely upon it.

Objection to the ſtability of the French ſyſtem.

There are other views of things which may be uſed to give us a perfect (though in my opinion a deluſive) aſſurance of our own ſecurity. The firſt of theſe is from the weakneſs and ricketty nature of the new ſyſtem in the place of it's firſt formation. It is thought that the monſter of a Commonwealth cannot poſſibly live—that at any rate the ill contrivance of their fabrick will make it fall in pieces

of

of itſelf—that the Aſſembly muſt be bankrupt, and that this bankruptcy will totally deſtroy that ſyſtem, from the contagion of which apprehenſions are entertained.

For my part I have long thought that one great cauſe of the ſtability of this wretched ſcheme of things in France was an opinion that it could not ſtand; and, therefore, that all external meaſures to deſtroy it were wholly uſeleſs.

Bankruptcy. As to the bankruptcy, that event has happened long ago, as much as it is ever likely to happen. So ſoon as a nation compels a creditor to take paper currency in diſcharge of his debt, there is a bankruptcy. The compulſory paper has in ſome degree anſwered; not becauſe there was a ſurplus from Church lands, but becauſe faith has not been kept with the Clergy. As to the holders of the old funds, to them the payments will be dilatory, but they will be made, and whatever may be the diſcount on paper, whilſt paper is taken, paper will be iſſued.

Reſources. As to the reſt, they have ſhot out three branches of revenue to ſupply all thoſe which they have deſtroyed, that is, *the Univerſal Regiſter of all Tranſactions*, the heavy and univerſal *Stamp Duty*, and the new *Territorial Impoſt*, levied chiefly on the

reduced eſtates of the gentlemen. Theſe branches of the revenue, eſpecially as they take aſſignats in payment, anſwer their purpoſe in a conſiderable degree, and keep up the credit of their paper; for as they receive it in their treaſury, it is in reality funded upon all their taxes and future reſources of all kinds, as well as upon the church eſtates. As this paper is become in a manner the only viſible maintenance of the whole people, the dread of a bankruptcy is more apparently connected with the delay of a counter-revolution, than with the duration of this Republick; becauſe the intereſt of the new Republick manifeſtly leans upon it; and in my opinion, the counter-revolution cannot exiſt along with it. The above three projects ruined ſome Miniſters under the old Government, merely for having conceived them. They are the ſalvation of the preſent Rulers.

As the Aſſembly has laid a moſt unſparing and cruel hand on all men who have lived by the bounty, the juſtice, or the abuſes of the old Government, they have leſſened many expences. The royal eſtabliſhment, though exceſſively and ridiculouſly great for *their* ſcheme of things, is reduced at leaſt one half;—the eſtates of the King's Brothers, which under the ancient Government had been in truth royal revenues, go to the general ſtock of the confiſcation; and as to the crown lands,

lands, though under the Monarchy they never yielded two hundred and fifty thouſand a year, by many they are thought at leaſt worth three times as much.

As to the eccleſiaſtical charge, whether as a compenſation for loſſes, or a proviſion for religion, of which they made at firſt a great parade, and entered into a ſolemn engagement in favour of it, it was eſtimated at a much larger ſum than they could expect from the church property, moveable or immoveable: they are completely bankrupt as to that article. It is juſt what they wiſh; and it is not productive of any ſerious inconvenience. The non-payment produces diſcontent and occaſional ſedition; but is only by fits and ſpaſms, and amongſt the country people who are of no conſequence. Theſe ſeditions furniſh new pretexts for non-payment to the church eſtabliſhment, and help the Aſſembly wholly to get rid of the Clergy, and indeed of any form of religion, which is not only their real, but avowed object.

Want of Money how ſupplied.

They are embarraſſed indeed in the higheſt degree, but not wholly reſourceleſs. They are without the ſpecies of money. Circulation of money is a great convenience, but a ſubſtitute for it may be found. Whilſt the great objects of production and conſumption, corn, cattle, wine, and the like,

exiſt in a country, the means of giving them circulation with more or leſs convenience, cannot be *wholly* wanting. The great confiſcation of the church and of the crown lands, and of the appenages of the princes, for the purchaſe of all which their paper is always received at par, gives means of continually deſtroying and continually creating, and this perpetual deſtruction and renovation feeds the ſpeculative market, and prevents, and will prevent, till that fund of confiſcation begins to fail, a *total* depreciation.

Monied Intereſt not neceſſary to them.

But all conſideration of public credit in France is of little avail at preſent. The action indeed of the monied intereſt was of abſolute neceſſity at the beginning of this Revolution; but the French Republicks can ſtand without any aſſiſtance from that deſcription of men, which, as things are now circumſtanced, rather ſtands in need of aſſiſtance itſelf from the power which alone ſubſtantially exiſts in France; I mean the ſeveral diſtricts and municipal republicks, and the ſeveral clubs which direct all their affairs and appoint all their magiſtrates. This is the power now paramount to every thing, even to the Aſſembly itſelf called National, and that to which tribunals, prieſthood, laws, finances, and both deſcriptions of military power, are wholly ſubſervient, ſo far as the military power of either deſcription yields obedience to any name of authority.

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The world of contingency and political combination is much larger than we are apt to imagine. We never can ſay what may, or may not happen, without a view to all the actual circumſtances. Experience upon other data than thoſe, is of all things the moſt deluſive. Prudence in new caſes can do nothing on grounds of retroſpect. A conſtant vigilance and attention to the train of things as they ſucceſſively emerge, and to act on what they direct, are the only ſure courſes. The phyſician that let blood, and by blood-letting cured one kind of plague, in the next added to it's ravages. That power goes with property is not univerſally true, and the idea that the operation of it is certain and invariable, may miſlead us very fatally.

Power ſeparated from Property.

Whoever will take an accurate view of the ſtate of thoſe Republicks, and of the compoſition of the preſent Aſſembly deputed by them (in which Aſſembly there are not quite fifty perſons poſſeſſed of an income amounting to 100l. ſterling yearly) muſt diſcern clearly, *that the political and civil power of France is wholly ſeparated from it's property of every deſcription*; and of courſe that neither the landed nor the monied intereſt poſſeſſes the ſmalleſt weight or conſideration in the direction of any publick concern. The whole kingdom is directed by the *refuſe of it's chicane*, with the aid of

of the buſtling, preſumptuous young clerks of counting-houſes and ſhops, and ſome intermixture of young gentlemen of the ſame character in the ſeveral towns. The rich peaſants are bribed with church lands; and the poorer of that deſcription are, and can be, counted for nothing. They may riſe in ferocious, ill-directed tumults—but they can only diſgrace themſelves and ſignalize the triumph of their adverſaries.

Effect of the Rota.

The *truly* active citizens, that is, the above deſcriptions, are all concerned in intrigue reſpecting the various objects in their local or their general government. The rota which the French have eſtabliſhed for their National Aſſembly, holds out the higheſt objects of ambition to ſuch vaſt multitudes as, in an unexampled meaſure, to widen the bottom of a new ſpecies of intereſt merely political, and wholly unconnected with birth or property. This ſcheme of a rota, though it enfeebles the ſtate, conſidered as one ſolid body, and indeed wholly diſables it from acting as ſuch, gives a great, an equal, and a diffuſive ſtrength to the democratick ſcheme. Seven hundred and fifty people, every two years raiſed to the ſupreme power, has already produced at leaſt fifteen hundred bold, acting politicians; a great number for even ſo great a country as France. Theſe men never will quietly ſettle in ordinary occupations, nor

ſubmit

ſubmit to any ſcheme which muſt reduce them to an entirely private condition, or to the exerciſe of a ſteady, peaceful, but obſcure and unimportant induſtry. Whilſt they ſit in the Aſſembly they are denied offices of truſt and profit—but their ſhort duration makes this no reſtraint—during their probation and apprenticeſhip they are all ſalaried with an income to the greateſt part of them immenſe; and after they have paſſed the novitiate, thoſe who take any ſort of lead are placed in very lucrative offices, according to their influence and credit, or appoint thoſe who divide their profits with them.

This ſupply of recruits to the corps of the higheſt civil ambition, goes on with a regular progreſſion. In very few years it muſt amount to many thouſands. Theſe, however, will be as nothing in compariſon to the multitude of municipal officers, and officers of diſtrict and department, of all ſorts, who have taſted of power and profit, and who hunger for the periodical return of the meal. To theſe needy agitators, the glory of the ſtate, the general wealth and proſperity of the nation, and the riſe or fall of publick credit, are as dreams; nor have arguments deduced from theſe topicks any ſort of weight with them. The indifference with which the Aſſembly regards the ſtate of their Colonies, the only valuable part of the French commerce, is a full proof

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how little they are likely to be affected by any thing but the ſelfiſh game of their own ambition, now univerſally diffuſed.

Impracticability of Reſiſtance.

It is true, amidſt all theſe turbulent means of ſecurity to their ſyſtem, very great diſcontents every where prevail. But they only produce miſery to thoſe who nurſe them at home, or exile, beggary, and in the end, confiſcation, to thoſe who are ſo impatient as to remove from them. Each Municipal Republick has a Committee, or ſomething in the nature of a *Committee of Reſearch*. In theſe petty Republicks the tyranny is ſo near it's object, that it becomes inſtantly acquainted with every act of every man. It ſtifles conſpiracy in it's very firſt movements. Their power is abſolute and uncontroulable. No ſtand can be made againſt it. Theſe Republicks are beſides ſo diſconnected, that very little intelligence of what happens in them is to be obtained, beyond their own bounds, except by the means of their clubs, who keep up a conſtant correſpondence, and who give what colour they pleaſe to ſuch facts as they chooſe to communicate out of the track of their correſpondence. They all have ſome ſort of communication, juſt as much or as little as they pleaſe, with the center. By this confinement of all communication to the ruling faction, any combination grounded on the abuſes and diſcontents in one, ſcarcely

ſcarcely can reach the other. There is not one man, in any one place, to head them. The old Government had ſo much abſtracted the Nobility from the cultivation of provincial intereſt, that no man in France exiſts, whoſe power, credit or conſequence extends to two diſtricts, or who is capable of uniting them in any deſign, even if any man could aſſemble ten men together, without being ſure of a ſpeedy lodging in a priſon. One muſt not judge of the ſtate of France by what has been obſerved elſewhere. It does not in the leaſt reſemble any other country. Analogical reaſoning from hiſtory or from recent experience in other places is wholly deluſive.

In my opinion there never was ſeen ſo ſtrong a government internally as that of the French Municipalities. If ever any rebellion can ariſe againſt the preſent ſyſtem, it muſt begin, where the Revolution which gave birth to it did, at the Capital. Paris is the only place in which there is the leaſt freedom of intercourſe. But even there, ſo many ſervants as any man has, ſo many ſpies, and irreconcileable domeſtick enemies.

Gentlemen are Fugitives.

But that place being the chief ſeat of the power and intelligence of the ruling faction, and the place of occaſional reſort for their fierceſt ſpirits,

even there a revolution is not likely to have any thing to feed it. The leaders of the ariſtocratick party have been drawn out of the kingdom by order of the Princes, on the hopes held out by the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia at Pilnitz; and as to the democratick factions in Paris, amongſt them there are no leaders poſſeſſed of an influence for any other purpoſe but that of maintaining the preſent ſtate of things. The moment they are ſeen to warp, they are reduced to nothing. They have no attached army—no party that is at all perſonal.

It is not to be imagined becauſe a political ſyſtem is, under certain aſpects, very unwiſe in it's contrivance, and very miſchievous in it's effects, that it therefore can have no long duration. It's very defects may tend to it's ſtability, becauſe they are agreeable to it's nature. The very faults in the conſtitution of Poland made it laſt; the *veto* which deſtroyed all it's energy preſerved it's life. What can be conceived ſo monſtrous as the Republick of Algiers? and that no leſs ſtrange Republick of the Mammalukes in Egypt? They are of the worſt form imaginable, and exerciſed in the worſt manner, yet they have exiſted as a nuiſance on the earth for ſeveral hundred years.

From

From all theſe conſiderations, and many more, that croud upon me, three concluſions have long ſince ariſen in my mind— Concluſions.

Firſt, that no counter-revolution is to be expected in France from internal cauſes ſolely.

Secondly, that the longer the preſent ſyſtem exiſts, the greater will be it's ſtrength; the greater it's power to deſtroy diſcontents at home, and to reſiſt all foreign attempts in favour of theſe diſcontents.

Thirdly, that as long as it exiſts in France, it will be the intereſt of the managers there, and it is in the very eſſence of their plan, to diſturb and diſtract all other governments, and their endleſs ſucceſſion of reſtleſs politicians will continually ſtimulate them to new attempts.

Princes are generally ſenſible that this is their common cauſe; and two of them have made a publick declaration of their opinion to this effect. Againſt this common danger, ſome of them, ſuch as the King of Spain, the King of Sardinia, and the Republick of Berne, are very diligent in uſing defenſive meaſures. Proceedings of Princes; Defenſive Plans.

If they were to guard againſt an invaſion from France, the merits of this plan of a merely defenſive reſiſtance might be ſupported by plauſible topicks; but as the attack does not operate againſt theſe countries externally, but by an internal corruption (a ſort of dry rot); they who purſue this merely defenſive plan, againſt a danger which the plan itſelf ſuppoſes to be ſerious, cannot poſſibly eſcape it. For it is in the nature of all defenſive meaſures to be ſharp and vigorous under the impreſſions of the firſt alarm, and to relax by degrees; until at length the danger, by not operating inſtantly, comes to appear as a falſe alarm; ſo much ſo that the next menacing appearance will look leſs formidable, and will be leſs provided againſt. But to thoſe who are on the offenſive it is not neceſſary to be always alert. Poſſibly it is more their intereſt not to be ſo. For their unforeſeen attacks contribute to their ſucceſs.

The French Party how compoſed.

In the mean time a ſyſtem of French conſpiracy is gaining ground in every country. This ſyſtem happening to be founded on principles the moſt deluſive indeed, but the moſt flattering to the natural propenſities of the unthinking multitude, and to the ſpeculations of all thoſe who think, without thinking very profoundly, muſt daily extend it's influence. A predominant inclination towards

towards it appears in all thoſe who have no religion, when otherwiſe their diſpoſition leads them to be advocates even for deſpotiſm. Hence Hume, though I cannot ſay that he does not throw out ſome expreſſions of diſapprobation on the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines of *John Ball* were "conformable to the ideas of primitive equality, *which are engraven in the hearts of all men.*"

Boldneſs formerly was not the character of Atheiſts as ſuch. They were even of a character nearly the reverſe; they were formerly like the old Epicureans, rather an unenterprizing race. But of late they are grown active, deſigning, turbulent and ſeditious. They are ſworn enemies to Kings, Nobility and Prieſthood. We have ſeen all the Academicians at Paris, with Condorcet, the friend and correſpondent of Prieſtley, at their head, the moſt furious of the extravagant Republicans.

Condorcet.

The late Aſſembly, after the laſt captivity of the King, had actually choſen this Condorcet by a majority on the ballot, for Preceptor to the Dauphin, who was to be taken out of the hands and direction of his parents, and to be delivered over to this fanatick Atheiſt, and furious democratick Republican. His untractability to theſe leaders, and his figure

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in the Club of Jacobins, which at that time they wiſhed to bring under, alone prevented that part of the arrangement, and others in the ſame ſtyle, from being carried into execution. Whilſt he was candidate for this office, he produced his title to it by promulgating the following ideas of the title of his royal pupil to the crown. In a paper written by him, and publiſhed with his name, againſt the re-eſtabliſhment, even of the appearance of monarchy under any qualifications, He ſays, " Juſqu'à " ce moment ils [l'Aſſemblée Nationale] n'ont " rien préjugé encore. En ſe reſervant de nom- " mer un Gouverneur au Dauphin, ils n'ont pas " prononcé *que cet enfant dût regner* ; mais ſeule- " ment qu'il *étoit poſſible* que la Conſtitution l'y deſ- " tinât ; ils ont voulu que l'éducation, effaçant " tout ce que *les preſtiges du Trône* ont pu lui in- " ſpirer de préjugés ſur les droits prétendus de ſa " naiſſance, qu'elle lui fit connoître de bonne heure, " et *l'Egalité naturelle des Hommes, et la Souve-* " *raineté du peuple* ; qu'elle lui apprit à ne pas ou- " blier que c'eſt *du peuple* qu'il tiendra le tître de " Roi, et que *le peuple n'a pas même le droit de re-* " *noncer à celui de l'en depouiller.*

Doctrine of the French.

" Ils ont voulu que cette éducation le rendit " également digne, par ſes lumières, et ſes vertus, " de recevoir *avec reſignation*, le fardeau dangereux " d'une couronne, ou de la *dépoſer avec joie* entre les

" mains

" mains de ces frères, qu'il ſentit que le devoir, et " la gloire du Roi d'un peuple libre, eſt de hâter le " moment de n'être plus qu'un citoyen ordinaire.

" Ils ont voulu que *l'inutilité d'un Roi*, la néceſ- " ſité de chercher les moyens de remplacer *un pouvoir* " *fondé ſur les illuſions*, fût une des premières véri- " tés offertes à ſa raiſon; *l'obligation d'y concourir* " *lui même un des premières devoirs de ſa morale*; *et* " *le deſir, de n'être plus affranchi du joug de la loi,* " *par une injurieuſe inviolabilité, le premier ſentiment* " *de ſon cœur.* Ils n'ignorent pas que dans ce mo- " ment il s'agit bien moins de former un Roi que " de lui apprendre à *ſavoir*, à *vouloir ne plus l'ê-* " *tre.*"*

Such

* Until now, they (the National Aſſembly) have prejudged nothing. Reſerving to themſelves a right to appoint a Preceptor to the Dauphin, they did not declare that *this child was* to reign; but only that *poſſibly* the Conſtitution *might* deſtine him to it: they willed that while education ſhould efface from his mind all the prejudices ariſing from *the deluſions of the throne* reſpecting his pretended birth-right, it ſhould alſo teach him not to forget, that it is *from the people* he is to receive the title of King, and that *the people do not even poſſeſs the right of giving up their power to take it from him.*

They willed that this education ſhould render him worthy by his knowledge, and by his virtues, both to receive *with ſubmiſſion* the dangerous burden of a crown, and *to reſign* it *with pleaſure* into the hands of his brethren; that he ſhould be conſcious that the haſtening of that moment when he is to be only a com-

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Such are the ſentiments of the man who has occaſionally filled the chair of the National Aſſembly, who is their perpetual ſecretary, their only ſtanding officer, and the moſt important by far. He leads them to peace or war. He is the great theme of the Republican faction in England. Theſe ideas of M. Condorcet, are the principles of thoſe to whom Kings are to entruſt their ſucceſſors, and the intereſts of their ſucceſſion. This man would be ready to plunge the poignard in the heart of his pupil, or to whet the axe for his neck. Of all men, the moſt dangerous is a warm, hot-headed, zealous Atheiſt. This ſort of man aims at dominion, and his means are, the words he always has in his mouth, "L'é-"galité naturelle des Hommes, et la Souveraineté "du Peuple."

All former attempts grounded on theſe Rights of Men, had proved unfortunate. The ſucceſs of this

mon citizen, conſtitutes the duty and the glory of a King of a free people.

They willed that the *uſeleſsneſs of a King*, the neceſſity of ſeeking means to eſtabliſh ſomething in lieu of *a power founded on illuſions*, ſhould be one of the firſt truths offered to his reaſon; *the obligation of conforming himſelf to this, the firſt of his moral duties; and the deſire of no longer being freed from the yoke of the law, by an injurious inviolability, the firſt and chief ſentiment of his heart.* They are not ignorant that in the preſent moment the object is leſs to form a King than to teach him *that he ſhould know how to wiſh no longer to be ſuch.*

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laſt makes a mighty difference in the effect of the doctrine. Here is a principle of a nature, to the multitude, the moſt ſeductive, always exiſting before their eyes, *as a thing feaſible in practice.* After ſo many failures, ſuch an enterprize previous to the French experiment, carried ruin to the contrivers, on the face of it; and if any enthuſiaſt was ſo wild as to wiſh to engage in a ſcheme of that nature, it was not eaſy for him to find followers: Now there is a party almoſt in all countries, ready made, animated with ſucceſs, with a ſure Ally in the very center of Europe. There is no cabal ſo obſcure in any place, that they do not protect, cheriſh, foſter, and endeavour to raiſe it into importance at home and abroad. From the loweſt, this intrigue will creep up to the higheſt. Ambition, as well as enthuſiaſm, may find it's account in the party and in the principle.

Character of Miniſters.

The Miniſters of other Kings, like thoſe of the King of France (not one of whom was perfectly free from this guilt, and ſome of whom were very deep in it) may themſelves be the perſons to foment ſuch a diſpoſition and ſuch a faction. Hertzberg, the King of Pruſſia's late Miniſter, is ſo much of what is called a philoſopher, that he was of a faction with that ſort of politicians in every thing, and in every place. Even when he defends himſelf from the imputation of giving extravagantly into

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theſe principles, he ſtill conſiders the revolution of France as a great publick good, by giving credit to their fraudulent declaration of their univerſal benevolence, and love of peace. Nor are his Pruſſian Majeſty's preſent miniſters at all diſinclined to the ſame ſyſtem. Their oſtentatious preamble to certain late edicts, demonſtrates (if their actions had not been ſufficiently explanatory of their caſt of mind) that they are deeply infected with the ſame diſtemper of dangerous, becauſe plauſible, though trivial, and ſhallow ſpeculation.

Miniſters turning their backs on the reputation which properly belongs to them, aſpire at the glory of being ſpeculative writers. The duties of theſe two ſituations are, in general, directly oppoſite to each other. Speculators ought to be neutral. A Miniſter cannot be ſo. He is to ſupport the intereſt of the publick as connected with that of his maſter. He is his maſter's truſtee, advocate, attorney, and ſteward—and he is not to indulge in any ſpeculation which contradicts that character or even detracts from its efficacy. Necker had an extreme thirſt for this ſort of glory; ſo had others; and this purſuit of a miſplaced and miſunderſtood reputation, was one of the cauſes of the ruin of theſe miniſters, and of their unhappy maſter. The Pruſſian miniſters in foreign courts, have (at leaſt not long ſince) talked the moſt democratick

tick language with regard to France, and in the moſt unmanaged terms.

Corps diplomatique.

The whole corps diplomatique, with very few exceptions, leans that way. What cauſe produces in them a turn of mind, which at firſt one would think unnatural to their ſituation, it is not impoſſible to explain. The diſcuſſion would however be ſomewhat long and ſomewhat invidious. The fact itſelf is indiſputable, however they may diſguiſe it to their ſeveral courts. This diſpoſition is gone to ſo very great a length in that corps, in itſelf ſo important, and ſo important as *furniſhing* the intelligence which ſways all cabinets, that if Princes and States do not very ſpeedily attend with a vigorous controul to that ſource of direction and information, very ſerious evils are likely to befal them.

Sovereigns--their diſpoſitions.

But indeed Kings are to guard againſt the ſame ſort of diſpoſitions in themſelves. They are very eaſily alienated from all the higher orders of their ſubjects, whether civil or military, laick or eccleſiaſtical. It is with perſons of condition that Sovereigns chiefly come into contact. It is from them that they generally experience oppoſition to their will. It is with *their* pride and impracticability, that Princes are moſt hurt; it is with *their* ſervility and baſeneſs, that they are moſt commonly diſguſted; it is from their humours and cabals, that they

find their affairs moſt frequently troubled and diſtracted. But of the common people in pure monarchical governments, Kings know little or nothing; and therefore being unacquainted with their faults (which are as many as thoſe of the great, and much more deciſive in their effects when accompanied with power) Kings generally regard them with tenderneſs and favour, and turn their eyes towards that deſcription of their ſubjects, particularly when hurt by oppoſition from the higher orders. It was thus that the King of France (a perpetual example to all ſovereigns) was ruined. I have it from very ſure information (and it was indeed obvious enough from the meaſures which were taken previous to the aſſembly of the States and afterwards) that the King's counſellors had filled him with a ſtrong diſlike to his nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magiſtracy. They repreſented to him, that he had tried them all ſeverally, in ſeveral ways, and found them all untractable. That he had twice called an Aſſembly (the Notables) compoſed of the firſt men of the clergy, the nobility, and the magiſtrates; that he had himſelf named every one member in thoſe aſſemblies, and that though ſo picked out, he had not, in this their collective ſtate, found them more diſpoſed to a compliance with his will than they had been ſeparately. That there remained for him, with the leaſt proſpect of advantage to his authority in the States General,

General, which were to be compoſed of the ſame ſorts of men, but not choſen by him, only the *Tiers Etat*. In this alone he could repoſe any hope of extricating himſelf from his difficulties, and of ſettling him in a clear and permanent authority. They repreſented (theſe are the words of one of my informants) "That the Royal Authority compreſſed "with the weight of theſe ariſtocratick bodies, full "of ambition, and of faction, when once unloaded, "would riſe of itſelf, and occupy it's natural place "without diſturbance or controul:" That the common people would protect, cheriſh, and ſupport, inſtead of cruſhing it. "The people," (it was ſaid) "could entertain no objects of ambition;" they were out of the road of intrigue and cabal; and could poſſibly have no other view than the ſupport of the mild and parental authority by which they were inveſted, for the firſt time collectively with real importance in the State, and protected in their peaceable and uſeful employments.

King of France.

This unfortunate King (not without a large ſhare of blame to himſelf) was deluded to his ruin by a deſire to humble and reduce his Nobility, Clergy, and his corporate Magiſtracy; not that I ſuppoſe he meant wholly to eradicate theſe bodies, in the manner ſince effected by the Democratick power: I rather believe that even Necker's deſigns did not go to that extent. With his own hand, however,

Louis

Louis the XVIth pulled down the pillars which upheld his throne; and this he did, becauſe he could not bear the inconveniences which are attached to every thing human; becauſe he found himſelf cooped up, and in durance by thoſe limits which nature preſcribes to deſire and imagination; and was taught to conſider as low and degrading, that mutual dependance which Providence has ordained that all men ſhould have on one another. He is not at this minute perhaps cured of the dread of the power and credit like to be acquired by thoſe who would ſave and reſcue him. He leaves thoſe who ſuffer in his cauſe to their fate; and hopes by various mean deluſive intrigues in which I am afraid he is encouraged from abroad, to regain, among Traitors and Regicides, the power he has joined to take from his own family, whom he quietly ſees proſcribed before his eyes, and called to anſwer to the loweſt of his rebels, as the vileſt of all criminals.

Emperor. It is to be hoped that the Emperor may be taught better things by this fatal example. But it is ſure that he has adviſers who endeavour to fill him with the ideas which have brought his brother-in-law to his preſent ſituation. Joſeph the Second was far gone in this philoſophy, and ſome, if not moſt who ſerve the Emperor, would kindly initiate him into all the myſteries of this free-maſonry.

ſonry. They would perſuade him to look on the National Aſſembly not with the hatred of an enemy, but the jealouſy of a rival. They would make him deſirous of doing, in his own dominions, by a Royal deſpotiſm, what has been done in France by a Democratick. Rather than abandon ſuch enterpriſes, they would perſuade him to a ſtrange alliance between thoſe extremes. Their grand object being now, as in his brother's time, at any rate to deſtroy the higher orders, they think he cannot compaſs this end, as certainly he cannot, without elevating the lower. By depreſſing the one and by raiſing the other, they hope in the firſt place to encreaſe his treaſures and his army; and with theſe common inſtruments of Royal Power they flatter him that the Democracy which they help, in his name, to create, will give him but little trouble. In defiance of the freſheſt experience, which might ſhew him that old impoſſibilities are become modern probabilities, and that the extent to which evil principles may go, when left to their own operation, is beyond the power of calculation, they will endeavour to perſuade him that ſuch a Democracy is a thing which cannot ſubſiſt by itſelf; that in whoſever hands the military command is placed, he muſt be in the neceſſary courſe of affairs, ſooner or later the maſter; and that being the maſter of various unconnected countries, he may keep them all in or-

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der by employing a military force, which to each of them is foreign. This maxim too, however formerly plauſible, will not now hold water. This ſcheme is full of intricacy, and may cauſe him every where to loſe the hearts of his people. Theſe Counſellors forget that a corrupted army was the very cauſe of the ruin of his brother-in-law; and that he is himſelf far from ſecure from a ſimilar corruption.

Brabant. Inſtead of reconciling himſelf heartily and *bonâ fide* according to the moſt obvious rules of policy to the States of Brabant *as they are conſtituted*, and who in the *preſent ſtate of things* ſtand on the ſame foundation with the Monarchy itſelf, and who might have been gained with the greateſt facility, they have adviſed him to the moſt unkingly proceeding which, either in a good or in a bad light, has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken from the ſpirit of the loweſt chicane, they have counſelled him wholly to break the publick faith, to annul the amneſty, as well as the other conditions through which he obtained an entrance into the Provinces of the Netherlands, under the guarrantee of Great Britain and Pruſſia. He is made to declare his adherence to the indemnity in a criminal ſenſe, but he is to keep alive in his own name, and to encourage in others a *civil* proceſs in the nature of an action of damages for what has been

been ſuffered during the troubles. Whilſt he keeps up this hopeful law-ſuit in view of the damages he may recover againſt individuals, he loſes the hearts of a whole people, and the vaſt ſubſidies which his anceſtors had been uſed to receive from them.

Emperor's conduct with regard to France.

This deſign once admitted, unriddles the myſtery of the whole conduct of the Emperor's Miniſters with regard to France. As ſoon as they ſaw the life of the King and Queen of France no longer as they thought in danger, they entirely changed their plan with regard to the French nation. I believe that the chiefs of the Revolution (thoſe who led the Conſtituting Aſſembly) have contrived as far as they can do it, to give the Emperor ſatisfaction on this head. He keeps a continual tone and poſture of menace to ſecure this his only point. But it muſt be obſerved, that he all along grounds his departure from the engagement at Pilnitz to the Princes, on the will and actions of *the King* and the majority of the people, without any regard to the natural and conſtitutional orders of the State, or to the opinions of the whole Houſe of Bourbon. Though it is manifeſtly under the conſtraint of impriſonment and the fear of death, that this unhappy man has been guilty of all thoſe humilities which have aſtoniſhed mankind, the adviſers of the Emperor will conſider nothing

but the *phyſical* perſon of Louis, which, even in his preſent degraded and infamous ſtate, they regard as of ſufficient authority to give a compleat ſanction to the perſecution and utter ruin of all his family, and of every perſon who has ſhewn any degree of attachment or fidelity to him, or to his cauſe; as well as competent to deſtroy the whole antient conſtitution and frame of the French monarchy.

The preſent policy therefore of the Auſtrian politicians, is to recover deſpotiſm through democracy; or at leaſt, at any expence, every where to ruin the deſcription of men who are every where the objects of their ſettled and ſyſtematick averſion, but more eſpecially in the Netherlands. Compare this with the Emperour's refuſing at firſt all intercourſe with the preſent powers in France, with his endeavouring to excite all Europe againſt them, and then his not only withdrawing all aſſiſtance and all countenance from the fugitives who had been drawn by his declarations from their houſes, ſituations, and military commiſſions, many even from the means of their very exiſtence, but treating them with every ſpecies of inſult and outrage.

Combining this unexampled conduct in the Emperor's adviſers, with the timidity (operating as perfidy) of the King of France, a fatal example is held

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out to all ſubjects, tending to ſhew what little ſupport, or even countenance they are to expect from thoſe for whom their principle of fidelity may induce them to riſque life and fortune. The Emperor's adviſers would not for the world reſcind one of the acts of this or of the late French Aſſembly; nor do they wiſh any thing better at preſent for their maſter's brother of France, than that he ſhould really be, as he is nominally, at the head of the ſyſtem of perſecution of religion and good order, and of all deſcriptions of dignity, natural and inſtituted; they only wiſh all this done with a little more reſpect to the King's perſon, and with more appearance of conſideration for his new ſubordinate office; in hopes that yielding himſelf for the preſent, to the perſons who have effected theſe changes, he may be able to game for the reſt hereafter. On no other principles than theſe, can the conduct of the Court of Vienna be accounted for. The ſubordinate Court of Bruſſels talks the language of a club of Feuillans and Jacobins.

Moderate party.

In this ſtate of general rottenneſs among ſubjects, and of deluſion and falſe politicks in Princes, comes a new experiment. The King of France is in the hands of the Chiefs of the Regicide Faction, the Barnvaes, Lameths, Fayettes, Perigords, Duports, Robeſpierre's, Camus's, &c. &c. &c. They who had impriſoned, ſuſpended, and conditionally de-

poſed him, are his confidential counſellors. The next deſperate of the deſperate rebels, call themſelves the *Moderate* Party. They are the Chiefs of the firſt Aſſembly, who are confederated to ſupport their power during their ſuſpenſion from the preſent, and to govern the exiſtent body with as ſovereign a ſway as they had done the laſt. They have, for the greater part, ſucceeded; and they have many advantages towards procuring their ſucceſs in future. Juſt before the cloſe of their regular power, they beſtowed ſome appearance of prerogatives on the King, which in their firſt plans they had refuſed to him; particularly the miſchievous, and in his ſituation, dreadful prerogative of a *Veto*. This prerogative (which they hold as their bit in the mouth of the National Aſſembly for the time being) without the direct aſſiſtance of their Club, it was impoſſible for the King to ſhew even the deſire of exerting with the ſmalleſt effect, or even with ſafety to his perſon. However, by playing through this *Veto*, the Aſſembly againſt the King, and the King againſt the Aſſembly, they have made themſelves maſters of both. In this ſituation, having deſtroyed the old Government by their ſedition, they would preſerve as much of order as is neceſſary for the ſupport of their own uſurpation.

French Ambaſſador.

It is believed that this, by far the worſt party of the miſcreants of France, has received direct encouragement from the counſellors who betray the Emperor,

Emperor. Thus ſtrengthened by the poſſeſſion of the captive King (now captive in his mind as well as in body) and by a good hope of the Emperor, they intend to ſend their Miniſters to every Court in Europe; having ſent before them ſuch a denunciation of terror and ſuperiority to every nation without exception, as has no example in the diplomatick world. Hitherto the Miniſters to foreign Courts had been of the appointment of the Sovereign of France *previous to the Revolution*; and either from inclination, duty or decorum, moſt of them were contented with a merely paſſive obedience to the new power. At preſent the King being entirely in the hands of his jailors, and his mind broken to his ſituation, can ſend none but the enthuſiaſts of the ſyſtem—men framed by the ſecret Committee of the Feuillans, who meet in the houſe of Madame de Stahl, Mr. Necker's daughter. Such is every man whom they have talked of ſending hither. Theſe Miniſters will be ſo many ſpies and incendiaries; ſo many active emiſſaries of Democracy. Their houſes will become places of rendezvous here, as every where elſe, and centers of cabal for whatever is miſchievous and malignant in this country, particularly among thoſe of rank and faſhion. As the Miniſter of the National Aſſembly will be admitted at this Court, at leaſt with his uſual rank, and as entertainments will be naturally given and received by the King's

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own Miniſters, any attempt to diſcountenance the reſort of other people to that Miniſter would be ineffectual, and indeed abſurd, and full of contradiction. The women who come with theſe Ambaſſadors will aſſiſt in fomenting factions amongſt ours, which cannot fail of extending the evil. Some of them I hear are already arrived. There is no doubt they will do as much miſchief as they can.

Connexion of Clubs.

Whilſt the publick Miniſters are received under the general law of the communication between nations, the correſpondences between the factious clubs in France and ours, will be, as they now are, kept up: but this pretended embaſſy will be a cloſer, more ſteady and more effectual link between the partizans of the new ſyſtem on both ſides of the water. I do not mean that theſe Anglo-Gallick clubs in London, Mancheſter, &c. are not dangerous in a high degree. The appointment of feſtive anniverſaries has ever in the ſenſe of mankind been held the beſt method of keeping alive the ſpirit of any inſtitution. We have one ſettled in London; and at the laſt of them, that of the 14th of July, the ſtrong diſcountenance of Government, the unfavourable time of the year, and the then uncertainty of the diſpoſition of foreign Powers, did not hinder the meeting of at leaſt nine hundred people, with good coats on their

their backs, who could afford to pay half a guinea a head to ſhew their zeal for the new principles. They were with great difficulty, and all poſſible addreſs, hindered from inviting the French Ambaſſador. His real indiſpoſition, beſides the fear of offending any party, ſent him out of town. But when our Court ſhall have recognized a Government in France, founded on the principles announced in Montmorin's Letter, how can the French Ambaſſador be frowned upon for an attendance on thoſe meetings wherein the eſtabliſhment of the Government he repreſents is celebrated? An event happened a few days ago, which in many particulars was very ridiculous; yet even from the ridicule and abſurdity of the proceedings, it marks the more ſtrongly the ſpirit of the French Aſſembly. I mean the reception they have given to the Frith-Street Alliance. This, though the delirium of a low, drunken alehouſe-club, they have publicly announced as a formal alliance with the people of England, as ſuch ordered it to be preſented to their King, and to be publiſhed in every province in France. This leads more directly and with much greater force than any proceeding with a regular and rational appearance, to two very material conſiderations. Firſt, it ſhews that they are of opinion that the current opinions of the Engliſh have the greateſt influence on the minds of the people in France, and indeed of all the people in

Europe,

Europe, ſince they catch with ſuch aſtoniſhing eagerneſs at every the moſt trifling ſhew of ſuch opinions in their favour. Next, and what appears to me to be full as important, it ſhews that they are willing publickly to countenance and even to adopt every factious conſpiracy that can be formed in this nation, however low and baſe in itſelf, in order to excite in the moſt miſerable wretches here, an idea of their own ſovereign importance, and to encourage them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into ſomething of more force, for aſſiſtance in the ſubverſion of their domeſtick Government. This addreſs of the alehouſe club was actually propoſed and accepted by the Aſſembly as an *alliance*. The procedure was in my opinion a high miſdemeanor in thoſe who acted thus in England, if they were not ſo very low and ſo very baſe, that no acts of theirs can be called high, even as a deſcription of criminality; and the Aſſembly in accepting, proclaiming and publiſhing this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain aggreſſion, which would juſtify our Court in demanding a direct diſavowal, if our policy ſhould not lead us to wink at it.

Whilſt I look over this paper to have it copied, I ſee a Manifeſto of the Aſſembly, as a preliminary to a declaration of war againſt the German Princes on the Rhine. This Manifeſto contains the whole

ſubſtance

ſubſtance of the French politicks with regard to foreign States. They have ordered it to be circulated amongſt the people in every country of Europe—even previouſly to it's acceptance by the King and his new Privy Council, the club of the Feuillans. Therefore, as a ſummary of their policy avowed by themſelves, let us conſider ſome of the circumſtances attending that piece, as well as the ſpirit and temper of the piece itſelf.

Declaration againſt the Emperor.

It was preceded by a ſpeech from Briſſot, full of unexampled inſolence towards all the Sovereign States of Germany, if not of Europe. The Aſſembly, to expreſs their ſatisfaction in the ſentiments which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This Briſſot had been in the loweſt and baſeſt employ under the depoſed Monarchy; a ſort of thief-taker, or ſpy of police, in which character he acted after the manner of perſons in that deſcription. He had been employed by his maſter, the Lieutenant de Police, for a conſiderable time in London, in the ſame or ſome ſuch honourable occupation. The Revolution which has brought forward all merit of that kind, raiſed him, with others of a ſimilar claſs and diſpoſition, to fame and eminence. On the Revolution he became a publiſher of an infamous newſpaper, which he ſtill continues. He is charged, and I believe juſtly, as the firſt mover of the troubles in Hiſpaniola. There is no wick-

edneſs, if I am rightly informed, in which he is not verſed, and of which he is not perfectly capable. His quality of news-writer, now an employment of the firſt dignity in France, and his practices and principles, procured his election into the Aſſembly, where he is one of the leading members.—Mr. Condorcet produced on the ſame day a draft of a Declaration to the King, which the Aſſembly publiſhed before it was preſented.

Condorcet (though no Marquis, as he ſtyled himſelf before the Revolution) is a man of another ſort of birth, faſhion, and occupation from Briſſot; but in every principle, and in every diſpoſition to the loweſt as well as the higheſt and moſt determined villainies, fully his equal. He ſeconds Briſſot in the Aſſembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival in a newſpaper, which in his own name and as ſucceſſor to Mr. Garat, a Member alſo of the Aſſembly, he has juſt ſet up in that Empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was choſen to draw the firſt Declaration preſented by the Aſſembly to the King, as a threat to the Elector of Treves, and the other Princes on the Rhine. In that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins concurred, they declared publickly, and moſt proudly and inſolently, the principle on which they mean to proceed in their future diſputes with any of the Sovereigns of Europe, for they ſay, " That

" it

" it is not with fire and ſword they mean to attack " their territories, but by what will be *more dread-* " *ful* to them, the introduction of liberty."—I have not the paper by me to give the exact words —but I believe they are nearly as I ſtate them. *Dreadful* indeed will be their hoſtility, if they ſhould be able to carry it on according to the example of *their* modes of introducing liberty. They have ſhewn a perfect model of their whole deſign, very complete, though in little. This gang of murderers and ſavages have wholly laid waſte and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of the Comtat Venaiſſin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the Sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great miſtake of their honour and intereſt, have permitted even without a remonſtrance to be carried to the deſired point, on the principles on which they are now themſelves threatened in their own States; and this, becauſe, according to the poor and narrow ſpirit now in faſhion, their brother Sovereign, whoſe ſubjects have been thus traiterouſly and inhumanly treated in violation of the law of nature and of nations, has a name ſomewhat different from theirs, and inſtead of being ſtyled King or Duke, or Landgrave, is uſually called Pope.

State of the Empire.

The Electors of Treves and Mentz were frightened with the menace of a ſimilar mode of war.

The Aſſembly, however, not thinking that the Electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough under their firſt terror, have again brought forward Condorcet, preceded by Briſſot, as I have juſt ſtated. The Declaration which they have ordered now to be circulated in all countries, is in ſubſtance the ſame as the firſt, but ſtill more inſolent, becauſe more full of detail. There they have the impudence to ſtate that they aim at no conqueſt; inſinuating that all the old lawful Powers of the World had each made a conſtant open profeſſion of a deſign of ſubduing his neighbours. They add, that if they are provoked, their war will be directed only againſt thoſe who aſſume to be *Maſters*. But to the *People* they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. &c. There is not the leaſt hint that they conſider thoſe whom they call perſons "*aſſuming to be Maſters,*" to be the lawful Government of their country, or perſons to be treated with the leaſt management or reſpect. They regard them as uſurpers and enſlavers of the people. If I do not miſtake they are deſcribed by the name of tyrants in Condorcet's firſt draft. I am ſure they are ſo in Briſſot's ſpeech, ordered by the Aſſembly to be printed at the ſame time and for the ſame purpoſes. The whole is in the ſame ſtrain, full of falſe philoſophy and falſe rhetorick, both however calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite ſedition in the countries in which it is or-

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dered to be circulated. Indeed it is ſuch, that if any of the lawful acknowledged Sovereigns of Europe had publickly ordered ſuch a manifeſto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the Ambaſſador of that power would inſtantly be ordered to quit every Court without an audience.

Effect of Fear on the Sovereign Powers.

The powers of Europe have a pretext for concealing their fears, by ſaying that this language is not uſed by the King; though they well know that there is in effect no ſuch perſon, that the Aſſembly is in reality, and by that King is acknowledged to be *the Maſter*, that what he does is but matter of formality, and that he can neither cauſe nor hinder, accelerate or retard any meaſure whatſoever, nor add to or ſoften the manifeſto which the Aſſembly has directed to be publiſhed, with the declared purpoſe of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the ſeveral countries governed by theſe powers. By the generality alſo of the menaces contained in this paper (though infinitely aggravating the outrage) they hope to remove from each power ſeparately the idea of a diſtinct affront. The perſons firſt pointed at by the menace are certainly the Princes of Germany, who harbour the perſecuted houſe of Bourbon and the Nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general, and goes to every ſtate with which they may have a cauſe of quarrel. But the terror of France has fallen upon all nations: A few months ſince all Sovereigns ſeemed diſpoſed

to

to unite againſt her, at preſent they all ſeem to combine in her favour. At no period has the power of France ever appeared with ſo formidable an aſpect. In particular the liberties of the Empire can have nothing more than an exiſtence the moſt tottering and precarious, whilſt France exiſts with a great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greateſt in the weakeſt; but with neither power nor diſpoſition to ſupport the ſmaller ſtates in their independence againſt the attempts of the more powerful.

I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breaſt, and the ſubſtance of which I muſt repeat over and over again, that the ſtate of France is the firſt conſideration in the politicks of Europe, and of each ſtate, externally as well as internally conſidered.

Moſt of the topicks I have uſed are drawn from fear and apprehenſion. Topicks derived from fear or addreſſed to it, are, I well know, of doubtful appearance. To be ſure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm ſome men—you do not drive them to provide for their ſecurity; you put them to a ſtand; you induce them not to take meaſures to prevent the approach of danger, but to remove ſo unpleaſant an idea from their minds; you perſuade them to remain as they are, from a new fear that their activity may bring on the apprehended miſchief before it's time. I confeſs freely

freely that this evil ſometimes happens from an overdone precaution; but it is when the meaſures are raſh, ill choſen, or ill combined, and the effects rather of blind terror than of enlightened foreſight. But the few to whom I wiſh to ſubmit my thoughts, are of a character which will enable them to ſee danger without aſtoniſhment, and to provide againſt it without perplexity.

To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifeſtos, and of keeping emiſſaries of ſedition in every Court under the name of Ambaſſadors, to propagate the ſame principles and to follow the practices, will go, and how ſoon they will operate, it is hard to ſay—but go on it will—more or leſs rapidly, according to events, and to the humour of the time. The Princes menaced with the revolt of their ſubjects, at the ſame time that they have obſequiouſly obeyed the ſovereign mandate of the new Roman Senate, have received with diſtinction, in a publick character, Ambaſſadors from thoſe who in the ſame act had circulated the manifeſto of ſedition in their dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the degradation and diſgrace of the Germanick Body.

The Ambaſſadors from the Rights of Man, and their admiſſion into the diplomatick ſyſtem, I hold to be a new æra in this buſineſs. It will be the moſt important ſtep yet taken to affect the exiſt-

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ence of Sovereigns, and the higher claſſes of life—I do not mean to exclude it's effects upon all claſſes—but the firſt blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.

What is to be done?

It would be preſumption in me to do more than to make a caſe. Many things occur. But as they, like all political meaſures, depend on diſpoſitions, tempers, means, and external circumſtances, for all their effect, not being well aſſured of theſe, I do not know how to let looſe any ſpeculations of mine on the ſubject. The evil is ſtated in my opinion as it exiſts. The remedy muſt be where power, wiſdom and information, I hope are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this ſubject, I believe for ever. It has given me many anxious moments for the two laſt years. If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who perſiſt in oppoſing this mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to reſiſt the decrees of Providence itſelf, than the mere deſigns of men. They will not be reſolute and firm, but perverſe and obſtinate.

HEADS

FOR

CONSIDERATION

ON THE

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.

HEADS
FOR
CONSIDERATION,
&c. &c.

WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.

THAT France, by it's mere geographical poſition, independently of every other circumſtance, muſt affect every State of Europe; ſome of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote.

That the ſtanding policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the *external* proceedings of France (whatever form the *interiour* Government of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the extenſion of it's dominion or it's ruling influence, over other States.

That, there is nothing in the preſent *internal* ſtate of things in France, which alters the national policy with regard to the exteriour relations of that country.

That there are, on the contrary, many things in the internal circumſtances of France (and perhaps

of this country too) which tend to fortify the principles of that fundamental policy; and which render the active aſſertion of thoſe principles more preſſing at this, than at any former time.

That, by a change effected in about three weeks, France has been able to penetrate into the heart of Germany; to make an abſolute conqueſt of Savoy; to menace an immediate invaſion of the Netherlands; and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetick Body, which is in a moſt perilous ſituation. The great Ariſtocratick Cantons having, perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own people whom they arm, but do not chuſe or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which againſt all publick faith has butchered their troops, ſerving by treaty in France. To this picture, it is hardly neceſſary to add, the means by which France has been enabled to effect all this, namely the apparently entire deſtruction of one of the largeſt, and certainly the higheſt diſciplined, and beſt appointed army ever ſeen, headed by the firſt military Sovereign in Europe, with a Captain under him of the greateſt renown; and that without a blow given or received on any ſide. This ſtate of things ſeems to me, even if it went no further, truly ſerious.

Circumſtances

Circumſtances have enabled France to do all this by *land*. On the other element ſhe has begun to exert herſelf; and ſhe muſt ſucceed in her deſigns, if enemies very different from thoſe ſhe has hitherto had to encounter, do not reſiſt her.

She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at ſea, by which ſhe is enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and if not ſo known, it is in the nature of things highly probable) that ſhe propoſes the ravage of the Eccleſiaſtical State, and the pillage of Rome, as her firſt object; that next ſhe means to bombard Naples; to awe, to humble, and thus to command all Italy—to force it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence—to compel the Italian Princes and Republicks to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an open intercourſe, and the ſure concomitant of that intercourſe, the *affiliated ſocieties*, in a manner ſimilar to thoſe ſhe has eſtabliſhed at Avignon, the Comtat, Chamberry, London, Mancheſter, &c. &c. which are ſo many colonies planted in all theſe countries, for extending the influence, and ſecuring the dominion of the French Republick.

That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would have ſuffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force

force ITALY to ſubmit to ſuch terms as France would think fit to impoſe—to ſay nothing of what has been done upon land in ſupport of the ſame ſyſtem. The great object for which we preſerved Minorca, whilſt we could keep it, and for which we ſtill retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over the Mediterranean.

Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports may have upon SPAIN, on the ſide of the Mediterranean, is worthy of the ſerious attention of the Britiſh councils.

That it is moſt probable, we may ſay, in a manner certain, that if there ſhould be a rupture between France and Spain, France will not confine her offenſive piratical operations againſt Spain, to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which ſide, however, ſhe may grievouſly affect Spain, eſpecially if ſhe excites Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly ſhe will, to fall upon that power.

That ſhe will fit out armaments upon the ocean, by which the flota itſelf may be intercepted, and thus the treaſures of all Europe, as well as the largeſt

largeſt and ſureſt reſources of the Spaniſh monarchy, may be conveyed into France, and become powerful inſtruments for the annoyance of all her neighbours.

That ſhe makes no ſecret of her deſigns.

That, if the inward and outward bound flota ſhould eſcape, ſtill France has more and better means of diſſevering many of the provinces in the Weſt and Eaſt Indies, from the ſtate of Spain, than Holland had when ſhe ſucceeded in the ſame attempt. The French marine reſembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibuſtriers, which about a century back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought ſuch calamities upon the Spaniſh colonies. They differ only in this, that the preſent piratical force is, out of all meaſure and compariſon, greater; one hundred and fifty ſhips of the line, and frigates being ready built, moſt of them in a manner new, and all applicable in different ways to that ſervice. Privateers and Mooriſh corſaires poſſeſs not the beſt ſeamanſhip, and very little diſcipline, and indeed can make no figure in regular ſervice, but in deſperate adventures, and animated with a luſt of plunder, they are truly formidable.

That the land forces of France are well adapted to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions

of

of this nature. In ſuch expeditions, enterprize ſupplies the want of diſcipline, and perhaps more than ſupplies it. Both for this, and for other ſervice (however contemptible their military is, in other reſpects) one arm is extremely good, the Engineering and Artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being compoſed for the greater part of thoſe who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly ſuch, few have abandoned the ſervice, and the men are veterans well enough diſciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they muſt make war with good advantage. They muſt do ſo, even on the ſide of Flanders, either offenſively or defenſively. This ſhews the difference between the policy of Louis the XIVth. who built a wall of braſs about his kingdom; and that of Joſeph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier.

That Spain from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is in a moſt perilous ſituation; perfectly dependent on the mercy of that Republick. If Auſtria is broken, or even humbled, ſhe will not dare to diſpute it's mandates.

In the preſent ſtate of things, we have nothing at all to dread from the power of Spain by ſea, or by land, or from any rivalry in commerce.

That

That we have much to dread from the connexions into which Spain may be forced.

From the circumſtances of her territorial poſſeſſions, of her reſources, and the whole of her civil and political ſtate, we may be authorized ſafely, and with undoubted confidence to affirm, that

Spain is not a ſubſtantive Power:

That ſhe muſt lean on France, or on England.

That it is as much for the intereſt of Great Britain to prevent the predominancy of a French intereſt in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the Crown of Great Britain, or a State actually dependent on it; full as much ſo as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a dependency of much greater value: and it's deſtruction, or it's being carried to any other dependency, of much more ſerious misfortune.

One of theſe two things muſt happen. Either Spain muſt ſubmit to circumſtances, and take ſuch conditions as France will impoſe; or ſhe muſt engage in hoſtilities along with the Emperor, and the King of Sardinia.

If Spain ſhould be forced or awed into a treaty with the Republick of France, ſhe muſt open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French labourers, who were accuſtomed annually to gather in the harveſt in Spain. Indeed ſhe muſt grant a free communication for travellers and traders through her whole country. In that caſe it is not conjectural, it is certain, the Clubs will give law in the Provinces; Bourgoing, or ſome ſuch miſcreant, will give law at Madrid.

In this England may acquieſce if ſhe pleaſes; and France will conclude a triumphant peace, with Spain under her abſolute dependence, with a broad highway into that, and into every State of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the ſpoils of the new world, and to make a partition of the Spaniſh Monarchy. Clearly it is better to do ſo, than to ſuffer France to poſſeſs thoſe ſpoils, and that territory alone; which, without doubt, unreſiſted by us, ſhe is altogether as able, as ſhe is willing to do.

This plan is propoſed by the French, in the way in which they propoſe all their plans; and in the only way in which indeed they can propoſe them, where there is no regular communication between his Majeſty and their Republick.

What

What they propoſe is *a plan*. It is a *plan* alſo to reſiſt their predatory project. To remain quiet, and to ſuffer them to make their own uſe of a naval power before our face, ſo as to awe and bully Spain into a ſubmiſſive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous war, without any meaſure on our part, I fear is no plan at all.

However, if the plan of co-operation which France deſires, and which her affiliated ſocieties here ardently wiſh and are conſtantly writing up, ſhould not be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and France ſhould continue, I think it not at all likely that Spain ſhould not be drawn into the quarrel. In that caſe, the neutrality of England will be a thing abſolutely impoſſible. The time is only the ſubject of deliberation.

Then the queſtion will be, whether we are to defer putting ourſelves into a poſture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both, until Spain is actually attacked; that is, whether our Court will take a decided part for Spain, whilſt Spain on her ſide, is yet in a condition to act with whatever degree of vigour ſhe may have; whilſt that vigour is yet unexhauſted;—or whether we ſhall connect ourſelves with her broken fortunes; after ſhe ſhall have received material blows, and when we ſhall have the whole ſlow

length of that always unwieldy, and ill conſtructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilſt our diſpoſition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herſelf in ſuch a ſtate of defence as will make her hoſtility formidable, or her neutrality reſpectable.

If the deciſion is ſuch as the ſolution of this queſtion (I take it to be the true queſtion) conducts to—no time is to be loſt. But the meaſures though prompt, ought not to be raſh and indigeſted. They ought to be well choſen, well combined, and well purſued. The ſyſtem muſt be general; but it muſt be executed, not ſucceſſively, or with interruption, but all together, *uno flatu*, in one melting, and one mould.

For this purpoſe, we muſt put Europe before us, which plainly is, juſt now, in all it's parts, in a ſtate of diſmay, derangement and confuſion; and very poſſibly amongſt all it's Sovereigns, full of ſecret heart-burning, diſtruſt, and mutual accuſation. Perhaps it may labour under worſe evils. There is no vigour any where, except the diſtempered vigour and energy of France. That country has but too much life in it, when every thing around is ſo diſpoſed to tameneſs and languor. The very vices of the French ſyſtem at home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The Generals *muſt* join the

the armies. They muſt lead them to enterprize, or they are likely to periſh by their hands. Thus without law or government of her own, France gives law to all the Governments in Europe.

This great maſs of political matter muſt, have been always under the view of thinkers for the publick, whether they act in office or not. Amongſt events, even the late calamitous events were in the book of contingency. Of courſe, they muſt have been in deſign, at leaſt, provided for. A plan which takes in as many as poſſible of the States concerned, will rather facilitate and ſimplify a rational ſcheme for preſerving Spain, (if that were our ſole, as I think it ought to be our principal object) than to delay and perplex it.

If we ſhould think that a provident policy (perhaps now more than provident, urgent and neceſſary) ſhould lead us to act, we cannot take meaſures as if nothing had been done. We muſt ſee the faults, if any, which have conducted to the preſent misfortunes; not for the ſake of criticiſm, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming perſons and counſels which have not been ſucceſsful; but in order, if we can, to adminiſter ſome remedy to theſe diſaſters, by the adoption of plans, more bottomed in principle, and built

built on with more diſcretion. Miſtakes may be leſſons.

There ſeem indeed to have been ſeveral miſtakes in the political principles on which the War was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was conducted; ſome of them very fundamental, and not only viſibly, but I may ſay, palpably erroneous; and I think him to have leſs than the diſcernment of a very ordinary Stateſman, who could not foreſee from the very beginning, unpleaſant conſequences from thoſe plans, though not the unparalleled diſgraces and diſaſters which really did attend them: for they were, both principles and meaſures, wholly new and out of the common courſe, without any thing apparently very grand in the conception, to juſtify this total departure from all rule.

For, in the firſt place, the united Sovereigns very much injured their cauſe by admitting, that they had nothing to do with the interiour arrangements of France; in contradiction to the whole tenour of the publick Law of Europe, and to the correſpondent practice of all it's States, from the time we have any hiſtory of them. In this particular, the two German Courts ſeem to have as little conſulted the Publiciſts of Germany, as their

their own true intereſts, and thoſe of all the Sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This admiſſion of a falſe principle in the Law of Nations, brought them into an apparent contradiction, when they inſiſted on the re-eſtabliſhment of the Royal Authority in France. But this confuſed and contradictory proceeding gave riſe to a practical error of worſe conſequence. It was derived from one and the ſame root; namely, that the perſon of the Monarch of France was every thing; and the Monarchy, and the intermediate orders of the State, by which the Monarchy was upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united Potentates had ſucceeded ſo far, as to re-eſtabliſh the authority of that King, and that he ſhould be ſo ill-adviſed as to confirm all the confiſcations, and to recognize as a lawful body, and to claſs himſelf with, that rabble of murderers (and there wanted not perſons who would ſo have adviſed him) there was nothing in the principle, or in the proceeding of the United Powers, to prevent ſuch an arrangement.

An expedition to free a brother Sovereign from priſon, was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous undertaking. But the ſpirit and generoſity would not have been leſs, if the policy had been more profound, and more comprehenſive; that is, if it had taken in thoſe conſiderations, and thoſe perſons, by whom, and, in ſome meaſure, for whom,

whom, Monarchy exiſts. This would become a bottom for a ſyſtem of ſolid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that ſyſtem.

The ſame fruitful error was the cauſe why nothing was done to impreſs the people of France (ſo far as we can at all conſider the inhabitants of France as a people) with an idea that the Government was ever to be really French, or indeed any thing elſe than the nominal government of a Monarch, a Monarch abſolute as over them, but whoſe ſole ſupport was to ariſe from foreign Potentates, and who was to be kept on his Throne by German forces; in ſhort, that the King of France was to be a Viceroy to the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia.

It was the firſt time that foreign Powers interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties, have thought proper to thruſt wholly out of their councils, to poſtpone, to diſcountenance, to reject, and in a manner to diſgrace the party whom thoſe Powers came to ſupport. The ſingle perſon of a King cannot be a party. Woe to the King who is himſelf his party! The Royal party with the King or his Repreſentatives at it's head, is the *Royal cauſe*. Foreign Powers have hitherto choſen to give to ſuch wars as this, the appearance of a civil conteſt, and not that of an hoſtile invaſion.

When

When the Spaniards, in the ſixteenth century, ſent aids to the chiefs of the League, they appeared as Allies to that League, and to the impriſoned King (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which that League had ſet up. When the Germans came to the aid of the Proteſtant Princes, in the ſame ſeries of civil wars, they came as Allies. When the Engliſh came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared as Allies to that Prince. So did the French always when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany. They came to aid a party there. When the Engliſh and Dutch intermeddled in the ſucceſſion of Spain, they appeared as Allies to the Emperor Charles the Sixth. In ſhort, the policy has been as uniform as it's principles were obvious to an ordinary eye.

According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the French Princes of the Blood, Nobles, and Parliaments, and then recognized by the combined Powers. Fundamental law and antient uſage, as well as the clear reaſon of the thing, have always ordained it during an impriſonment of the King of France; as in the caſe of John, and of Francis the Firſt. A Monarchy ought not to be left a moment without a Repreſentative, having an intereſt in the ſucceſſion. The orders of the State, ought alſo to have been recognized in thoſe amongſt

whom alone they exiſted in freedom, that is, in the Emigrants.

Thus laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the Kingdom of France, according to nature and to it's fundamental laws, and not according to the novel and inconſiderate principles of the uſurpation which the United Powers were come to extirpate. The King of Pruſſia and the Emperor, as Allies of the antient Kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, firſt, to free the Monarch, if poſſible; if not, to ſecure the Monarchy as principal in the deſign; and in order to avoid all riſques to that great object (the object of other ages than the preſent, and of other countries than that of France) they would of courſe avoid proceeding with more haſte, or in a different manner than what the nature of ſuch an object required.

Adopting this, the only rational ſyſtem, the rational mode of proceeding upon it, was to commence with an effective ſiege of Liſle, which the French Generals muſt have ſeen taken before their faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence to draw ſupplies, would have been behind them; a plentiful country of enemies, from whence to force ſupplies, would have been before them. Good towns were always within

within reach to depoſit their hoſpitals and magazines. The March from Liſle to Paris, is through a leſs defenſible country, and the diſtance is hardly ſo great as from Longwy to Paris.

If the *old* politick and military ideas had governed, the advanced guard would have been formed of thoſe who beſt knew the country, and had ſome intereſt in it, ſupported by ſome of the beſt light troops and light artillery, whilſt the grand ſolid body of an army diſciplined to perfection, proceeded leiſurely, and in cloſe connexion with all it's ſtores, proviſions, and heavy cannon, to ſupport the expedite body in caſe of miſadventure, or to improve and compleat it's ſucceſs.

The direct contrary of all this was put in practice. In conſequence of the original ſin of this project, the army of the French Princes was every where thrown into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to the laſt moment, the time of the commencement of the ſecret negotiation. This naturally made an ill impreſſion on the people, and furniſhed an occaſion for the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful ſubjects of the King were diſtruſted, deſpiſed, and abhorred by his allies. The march was directed through a ſkirt of Lorraine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the Duke of Brunſwick leaving all the ſtrongeſt places

behind him; leaving alſo behind him, the ſtrength of his artillery; and by this means giving a ſuperiority to the French, in the only way in which the preſent France is able to oppoſe a German force.

In conſequence of the adoption of thoſe falſe politicks, which turned every thing on the King's ſole and ſingle perſon, the whole plan of the war was reduced to nothing but a *coup de main*, in order to ſet that Prince at liberty. If that failed, every thing was to be given up.

The ſcheme of a *coup de main*, might (under favourable circumſtances) be very fit for a partizan at the head of a light corps, by whoſe failure nothing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of eighty thouſand men, headed by a King in perſon, who was to march an hundred and fifty miles through an enemy's country—ſurely this was a plan unheard of.

Although this plan was not well choſen, and proceeded upon principles altogether ill judged and impolitick, the ſuperiority of the military force, might in a great degree have ſupplied the defects, and furniſhed a corrective to the miſtakes. The greater probability was that the Duke of Brunſwick would make his way to Paris, over the bellies of the rabble

rabble of drunkards, robbers, aſſaſſins, rioters, mutineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced Captain of cavalry, who oppoſed that great Commander and great army. But—*Diis aliter viſum*—He began to treat, the winds blew, and the rains beat, the houſe fell—becauſe it was built upon ſand—and great was the fall thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the Duke of Parma into France.

There is ſome ſecret. Sickneſs and weather may defeat an army purſuing a wrong plan; not that I believe the ſickneſs to have been ſo great as it has been reported; but there is a great deal of ſuperfluous humiliation in this buſineſs, a perfect prodigality of diſgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, muſt compenſate to a great Sovereign, and to a great General, for ſo immenſe a loſs of reputation. Longwy, ſituated as it is, might (one ſhould think) be evacuated without a capitulation with a Republick juſt proclaimed by the King of Pruſſia as an uſurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious French in his flight. It does not appear to have been neceſſary that thoſe Magiſtrates who declared for their own King, on the faith, and under the immediate protection of the King of Pruſſia, ſhould be delivered over to the gallows. It was not neceſſary that

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the emigrant Nobility and Gentry who ſerved with the King of Pruſſia's army, under his immediate command, ſhould be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was ſo groſs, and ſo cruel a breach of the public faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumourier, has dropped very ſingular hints. Cuſtine, has ſpoken out more broadly. Theſe accounts have never been contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rupture between the Powers. The French have given out, that the Duke of Brunſwick endeavoured to negotiate ſome name and place for the captive King, amongſt the murderers and proſcribers of thoſe who have loſt their all for his cauſe. Even this has not been denied.

It is ſingular, and indeed, a thing, under all it's circumſtances, inconceivable, that every thing ſhould by the Emperor be abandoned to the King of Pruſſia. That Monarch was conſidered as principal. In the nature of things, as well as in his poſition with regard to the war, he was only an ally; and a new ally, with croſſing intereſts in many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At beſt, and ſuppoſing him to act with the greateſt fidelity, the Emperor, and the Empire, to him muſt be but ſecondary objects. Countries out of Germany, muſt affect him in a ſtill more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of it's doc-

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trinal principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiſs, are left to their fate. The King of Pruſſia has no *direct* and immediate concern with France; *conſequentially*, to be ſure, a great deal; but the Emperor touches France *directly* in many parts: he is a near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milaneſe territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, poſſeſſed by his uncle, is between Mentz and Treves, the King of Pruſſia's territories on the Lower Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of Italy and Germany; the natural balance againſt the ambition of France, whether Republican or Monarchical. His Miniſters and his Generals, therefore, ought to have had their full ſhare in every material conſultation, which I ſuſpect they had not. If he has no Miniſter capable of plans of policy, which comprehend the ſuperintendancy of a war, or no General with the leaſt of a political head, things have been as they muſt be. However, in all the parts of this ſtrange proceeding, there muſt be a ſecret.

It is probably known to Miniſters. I do not mean to penetrate into it. My ſpeculations on this head muſt be only conjectural. If the King of Pruſſia, under the pretext, or on the reality of ſome information relative to ill practice on the part of the Court of Vienna, takes advantage of his being

being admitted into the heart of the Emperor's dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to ſeize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, any thing more alarming for this country, ſeparately, and as a part of the general ſyſtem. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politicks, for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumſtances—But I never knew accidents to decide the *whole* of any great buſineſs; and I never knew temper to act, but that ſome ſyſtem of politicks, agreeable to it's peculiar ſpirit, was blended with it, ſtrengthened it, and got ſtrength from it. Therefore the politicks can hardly be put out of the queſtion.

Great miſtakes have been committed; at leaſt I hope ſo. If there have been none, the caſe in future is deſperate. I have endeavoured to point out ſome of thoſe which have occurred to me, and moſt of them very early.

Whatever may be the cauſe of the preſent ſtate of things, on a full and mature view and compariſon of the hiſtorical matter, of the tranſactions that have paſſed before our eyes, and of the future proſpect, I think I am authorized to form an opinion without the leaſt heſitation.

That

That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, or ever can be, the leaſt rational hope of making an impreſſion on France by any Continental Powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the ſoul, of the whole confederacy againſt it.

This, ſo far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former hiſtory—In ſpeculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

Firſt, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other Powers, as having leſs of croſſing intereſt, or perplexed diſcuſſion with any of them.

Secondly, Becauſe France cannot have to deal with any of theſe continental Sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime Power, greatly ſuperiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the excentrick aberration of Charles the Second, has always conſidered it as her duty and intereſt, to take her place in ſuch a confederacy. Her chief diſputes muſt ever be with France, and if England ſhews herſelf indifferent and unconcerned when theſe Powers are com-

bined againſt the enterprizes of France, ſhe is to look with certainty for the ſame indifference on the part of theſe Powers, when ſhe may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to diſconnect this kingdom from the ſyſtem of Europe, in which, if ſhe ought not raſhly to meddle, ſhe ought never wholly to withdraw herſelf from it.

If then England is put in motion, whether by a conſideration of the general ſafety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new ſyſtem on the Netherlands, it muſt embrace in it's project the whole as much as poſſible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as poſſible a leading and preſiding part.

I therefore beg leave to ſuggeſt,

Firſt, That a Miniſter ſhould forthwith be ſent to Spain, to encourage that Court to perſevere in the meaſures they have adopted againſt France; to make a cloſe alliance and guarantee of poſſeſſions, as againſt France, with that power, and whilſt the formality of the treaty is pending, to aſſure them of our protection, poſtponing any leſſer diſputes to another occaſion.

Secondly, To aſſure the Court of Vienna, of our deſire to enter into our antient connexions with her,

her, and to ſupport her effectually in the war which France has declared againſt her.

Thirdly, To animate the Swiſs, and the King of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the Grand Alliance.

Fourthly, To put an end to our diſputes with Ruſſia, and mutually to forget the paſt. I believe if ſhe is ſatisfied of this oblivion, ſhe will return to her old ſentiments, with regard to this Court, and will take a more forward part in this buſineſs than any other Power.

Fifthly, If what has happened to the King of Pruſſia is only in conſequence of a ſort of panick or of levity, and an indiſpoſition to perſevere long in one deſign—the ſupport and concurrence of Ruſſia will tend to ſteady him, and to give him reſolution. If he be ill diſpoſed, with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be eaſily led to derange the plan.

Sixthly, To uſe the joint influence of our Court, and of our then Allied Powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as ſhe can by ſea, and to make ſome addition by land.

Seventhly, To acknowledge the King of France's next brother (aſſiſted by ſuch a Council and ſuch Repreſentatives of the Kingdom of France, as ſhall be thought proper) Regent of France, and to ſend that Prince a ſmall ſupply of money, arms, cloathing and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to theſe negociations, an inſtant naval armament ought to be adopted; one ſquadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The ſeaſon is convenient, moſt of our trade being, as I take it, at home.

After ſpeaking of a plan formed upon the antient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of Europe; to which this is exactly conformable in every reſpect, with no deviation whatſoever, and which is, I conceive much more ſtrongly called for by the preſent circumſtances, than by any former, I muſt take notice of another which I hear, but cannot perſuade myſelf to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very ſame view of things which is here ſtated, namely, the danger to all Sovereigns, and old Republicks, from the prevalence of French power and influence.

It is to form a Congreſs of all the European powers, for the purpoſe of a general defenſive alliance, the objects of which ſhould be,

Firſt, The recognition of this new Republick (which they well know is formed on the principles, and for the declared purpoſe of the deſtruction of all Kings), and whenever the heads of this new Republick ſhall conſent to releaſe the Royal Captives, to make Peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themſelves with their joint forces againſt the open aggreſſions or the ſecret practices, intrigues and writings, which are uſed to propagate the French principles.

It is eaſy to diſcover from whoſe ſhop this commodity comes. It is ſo perfectly abſurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a ſerious entertainment in any Cabinet, I ſhould think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindneſs, the certain forerunner of the deſtruction of all Crowns and Kingdoms.

An *offenſive* alliance, in which union is preſerved, by common efforts in common dangers, againſt a common active enemy, may preſerve it's conſiſtency, and may produce for a given time, ſome

ſome conſiderable effect; though this is not eaſy, and for any very long period, can hardly be expected. But a *defenſive* alliance, formed of long diſcordant intereſts, with innumerable diſcuſſions exiſting, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is ſo evidently impoſſible, is ſuch a chimera, is ſo contrary to human nature, and the courſe of human affairs, that I am perſuaded no perſon in his ſenſes, except thoſe whoſe Country, Religion and Sovereign, are depoſited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the ſlighteſt petty boundary ſuit, no difference between a family arrangement, no ſort of miſunderſtanding, or croſs purpoſe between the pride and etiquette of Courts, that would not entirely diſjoint this ſort of alliance, and render it as futile in it's effects, as it is feeble in it's principle. But when we conſider that the main drift of that defenſive alliance muſt be to prevent the operation of intrigue, miſchievous doctrine and evil example, in the ſucceſs of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and ſyſtematick aſſaſſination and maſſacre, the abſurdity of ſuch a ſcheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the reſt follows of courſe.

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How far the interiour circumſtances of this country ſupport what is ſaid with regard to it's foreign politicks, muſt be left to better judgments. I am ſure the French faction here is infinitely ſtrengthened by the ſucceſs of the aſſaſſins on the other ſide of the water.—This evil in the heart of Europe muſt be extirpated from that center, or no part of the circumference can be free from the miſchief which radiates from it, and which will ſpread circle beyond circle, in ſpite of all the little defenſive precautions which can be employed againſt it.

I do not put my name to theſe hints ſubmitted to the conſideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to ſuppoſe the name of the writer could add any weight to the ſtate of things contained in this paper. That ſtate of things preſſes irreſiſtibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with an heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the Engliſh Conſtitution ought no more to ſtand againſt it than the antient Conſtitution of the kingdom in which the new ſyſtem prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick, and who is a faithful ſubject to the King, reſpectfully to ſubmit this ſtate of facts at this new ſtep

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in the progreſs of the French arms and politicks, to his Majeſty, to his confidential ſervants, and to thoſe perſons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wiſdom, ſeem to me to have a large ſtake in the ſtability of the antient order of things.

Bath, November 5, 1792.

REMARKS

ON THE

POLICY OF THE ALLIES

WITH

RESPECT TO FRANCE.

BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.

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ON THE

POLICY OF THE ALLIES.

BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.

AS the propoſed manifeſto is, I underſtand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more ſerious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumſtances of thoſe to whom it is addreſſed, and the matter it is to contain.

As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have ſome doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the iſſuing any Manifeſto, with regard to the intended government of France; and for this reaſon, that it is, (upon the principal

point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifeſtoes of this nature are commonly made when the army of ſome Sovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the impoſing authority of that force employs menaces towards thoſe whom he deſires to awe; and makes promiſes to thoſe whom he wiſhes to engage in his favour.

As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare muſt be that which ſubſtantially declares for Royalty as the baſis of the government.

As to menaces—Nothing, in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any Sovereign in the publick eſtimation, and to turn his defeats into diſgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The ſecond Manifeſto of the Duke of Brunſwick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that Manifeſto had been ſeaſonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might poſſibly have *prevented*, is done. Puniſhment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they ſhould ever be forgotten. But the puniſhment of enormous offenders, will

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not be the leſs ſevere, or the leſs exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other ſide, to paſs by proceedings of ſuch a nefarious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France, without any ſignification of reſentment, would be in effect to ratify them; and thus to become acceſſaries after the fact, in all thoſe enormities which it is impoſſible to repeat, or think of without horror. An abſolute ſilence appears to me to be at this time the only ſafe courſe.

The ſecond uſual matter of Manifeſtoes is compoſed of *promiſes* to thoſe who co-operate with our deſigns. Theſe promiſes depend in a great meaſure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the perſon who makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of diſaſter on the part of the promiſer, ſeems not to add much to the dignity of his perſon, or to the effect of his offers. One would hardly wiſh to ſeduce any unhappy perſons to give the laſt provocation to a mercileſs tyranny, without very effectual means of protecting them.

The time therefore ſeems (as I ſaid) not favourable to a general Manifeſto, on account of the unpleaſant ſituation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing ſcene, when a meaſure very imprudent to day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some

great victory may alter the whole ſtate of the queſtion, ſo far as it regards our *power* of fulfilling any engagement we may think fit to make.

But there is another conſideration of far greater importance for all the purpoſes of this Manifeſto. The publick, and the parties concerned, will look ſomewhat to the diſpoſition of the promiſer indicated by his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his engagements.

Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination of powers, are we quite ſure, that others can believe us to be ſincere, or that we can be even fully aſſured of our own ſincerity in the protection of thoſe who ſhall riſque their lives for the reſtoration of Monarchy in France, when the world ſees, that thoſe who are the natural, legal, conſtitutional repreſentatives of that Monarchy, if it has any, have not had their names ſo much as mentioned in any one publick act; that in no way whatever are their perſons brought forward, that their rights have not been expreſsly or implicitly allowed, and that they have not been in the leaſt conſulted on the important intereſts they have at ſtake. On the contrary, they are kept in a ſtate of obſcurity and contempt, and in a degree of indigence at times bordering on beggary. They are in fact, little leſs priſoners in the village of

Hanau,

Hanau, than the Royal captives who are locked up in the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to the common indications which guide the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the crown of France, in reality to uſurp it?

I am alſo very apprehenſive, that there are other circumſtances which muſt tend to weaken the force of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairneſs of our intentions as ſupporters of the Crown of France, or of the true principles of legitimate Government in oppoſition to Jacobiniſm, when it is viſible that the two leading orders of the State of France, who are now the victims, and who muſt always be the true and ſole ſupports of Monarchy in that country, are, at beſt, in ſome of their deſcriptions, conſidered only as objects of charity, and others are, when employed, employed only as mercenary ſoldiers; that they are thrown back out of all reputable ſervice, are in a manner diſowned, conſidered as nothing in their own cauſe, and never once conſulted in the concerns of their King, their country, their laws, their religion, and their property! We even affect to be aſhamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with them. In all our ideas of Treaty we do not regard

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them as what they are, the two leading orders of the kingdom. If we do not conſider them in that light, we muſt recognize the ſavages by whom they have been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilſt they diſgrace and perſecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.

I am much afraid, too, that we ſhall ſcarcely be believed fair ſupporters of lawful Monarchy againſt Jacobiniſm, ſo long as we continue to make and to obſerve cartels with the Jacobins, and on fair terms exchange priſoners with them, whilſt the Royaliſts, invited to our ſtandard, and employed under our publick faith, againſt the Jacobins, if taken by that ſavage faction, are given up to the executioner without the leaſt attempt whatſoever at repriſal. For this, we are to look at the King of Pruſſia's conduct, compared with his Maniſeſtoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Valenciennes, made in the courſe of the preſent campaign. By theſe two capitulations, the Chriſtian Royaliſts were excluded from any participation in the cauſe of the combined powers. They were conſidered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were in effect ſent againſt them. One of thoſe armies (that which ſurrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Chriſtians of Poitou, and

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the other (that which ſurrendered at Valenciennes) has actually cruſhed the people whom oppreſſion and deſpair had driven to reſiſtance at Lyons, has maſſacred ſeveral thouſands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole ſubſtance of the place, and purſued their rage to the very houſes, condemning that noble city to deſolation, in the unheard of manner we have ſeen it devoted.

It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thouſand declarations, that we take the Royaliſts of France only as an inſtrument of ſome convenience in a temporary hoſtility with the Jacobins, but that we regard thoſe atheiſtick and murderous barbarians as the bonâ fide poſſeſſors of the ſoil of France. It appears at leaſt, that we conſider them as a fair Government *de facto*, if not *de jure*; a reſiſtance to which in favour of the King of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equitably be conſidered by other nations, as the crime of treaſon.

For my part, I would ſooner put my hand into the fire than ſign an invitation to oppreſſed men to fight under my ſtandard, and then on every ſiniſter event of war, cruelly give them up to be puniſhed as the baſeſt of traitors, as long as I had one of the common enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to ſecure thoſe under my protection, and to

vindicate the common honour of Sovereigns. We hear nothing of this kind of ſecurity in favour of thoſe whom we invite to the ſupport of our cauſe. Without it, I am not a little apprehenſive that the proclamations of the combined powers might (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.

So far as to the correſpondence between our declarations and our conduct, let the declaration be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone it can be underſtood. This conduct acting on the declaration, leaves a Monarchy without a Monarch; and without any repreſentative or truſtee for the Monarch, and the Monarchy. It ſuppoſes a kingdom without ſtates and orders; a territory without proprietors; and faithful ſubjects, who are to be left to the fate of rebels and traitors.

The affair of the eſtabliſhment of a Government is a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act in as *principals*; though as *auxiliaries and mediators*, it has been not at all unuſual, and may be a meaſure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.

The firſt thing we ought to do, ſuppoſing us not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as friendly

friendly powers applied to for counſel and aſſiſtance in the ſettlement of a diſtracted country, is well to conſider the compoſition, nature, and temper of its objects, and particularly of thoſe who actually do, or who ought to exerciſe power in that ſtate. It is material to know who they are, and how conſtituted, whom we conſider *as the people of France?*

The next conſideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles the Government we propoſe is to be eſtabliſhed.

The firſt queſtion on the people is this, Whether we are to conſider the individuals *now actually in France, numerically taken and arranged into Jacobin Clubs*, as the body politick, conſtituting the nation of France? or, Whether we conſider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled ſince the Revolution, and the ſtates and the bodies politick, ſuch as the colleges of juſtice called parliaments, the corporations noble and not noble of balliages, and towns, and cities, the biſhops and the clergy, as the true conſtituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France?

In this ſerious concern it is very neceſſary that we ſhould have the moſt diſtinct ideas annexed to the terms we employ; becauſe it is evident, that an abuſe of the term *people*, has been the original fundamental cauſe of thoſe evils, the cure of which, by war and policy, is the preſent object of all the ſtates of Europe.

If we conſider the acting power in France in any legal conſtruction of publick law, as the people, the queſtion is decided in favour of the Republick one and indiviſible. But we have decided for Monarchy. If ſo, we have a King and Subjects; and that King and Subjects have rights and privileges which ought to be ſupported at home; for I do not ſuppoſe that the Government of that kingdom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbitrary Mandate of a foreign Confederacy.

As to the faction exerciſing power, to ſuppoſe that Monarchy can be ſupported by principled Regicides, Religion by profeſſed Atheiſts, Order by Clubs of Jacobins, Property by Committees of Proſcription, and Juriſprudence by Revolutionary Tribunals, is to be ſanguine in a degree of which I am incapable. On them I decide, for myſelf, that theſe perſons are not the legal Corporation of France, and that it is not with them we can (if we would) ſettle the Government of France.

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Since, then, we have decided for Monarchy in that kingdom, we ought alſo to ſettle who is to be the Monarch, who is to be the Guardian of a Minor, and how the Monarch and Monarchy is to be modified and ſupported? If the Monarch is to be elected, who the Electors are to be: if hereditary, what order is eſtabliſhed correſponding with an hereditary Monarchy, and fitted to maintain it? Who are to modify it in its exerciſe? Who are to reſtrain its powers where they ought to be limited, to ſtrengthen them where they are to be ſupported, or to enlarge them, where the object, the time, and the circumſtances, may demand their extenſion? Theſe are things which, in the outline, ought to be made diſtinct and clear; for if they are not (eſpecially with regard to thoſe great points, who are the proprietors of the ſoil, and what is the corporation of the kingdom) there is nothing to hinder the compleat eſtabliſhment of a Jacobin Republick, (ſuch as that formed in 1790 and 1791) under the name of a Democracie Royale. Jacobiniſm does not conſiſt in the having or not having, a certain Pageant under the name of a King, but "in taking the people as equal individuals, without any corporate name or deſcription, without attention to property, without diviſion of powers, and forming the government of delegates from a number of men ſo conſtituted,

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in deſtroying or confiſcating property, and bribing the publick creditors, or the poor, with the ſpoils, now of one part of the community, now of another, without regard to preſcription or poſſeſſion."

I hope no one can be ſo very blind as to imagine that Monarchy can be acknowledged and ſupported in France upon any other baſis than that of its property, *corporate and individual*, or that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or ſecurity upon any ſcheme of things, which ſets aſide all the antient corporate capacities and diſtinctions of the kingdom, and ſubverts the whole fabrick of its antient laws and uſages, political, civil and religious, to introduce a ſyſtem founded on the ſuppoſed *Rights of the Man, and the abſolute equality of the human race.* Unleſs, therefore, we declare clearly and diſtinctly in favour of the *reſtoration* of property, and conſide to the hereditary property of the kingdom, the limitation and qualifications of its hereditary Monarchy, the blood and treaſure of Europe is waſted for the eſtabliſhment of Jacobiniſm in France. There is no doubt that Danton and Robeſpiere, Chaumette and Barrere, that Condorcet, that Thomas Paine, that La Fayette, and the Exbiſhop of Autun, the Abbé Gregoire, with all the gang of the Syeyes's, the Henriots, and the Santerres, if they could ſecure themſelves in the fruits of their rebellion and robbery, would be perfectly indifferent, whether the moſt unhappy

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of all infants, whom by the leſſons of the ſhoemaker, his governour and guardian, they are training up ſtudiouſly and methodically to be an idiot, or what is worſe, the moſt wicked and baſe of mankind, continues to receive his civic education in the Temple or the Thuilleries, whilſt they, and ſuch as they, really govern the kingdom.

It cannot be too often and too ſtrongly inculcated, that Monarchy and property muſt, in France, go together; or neither can exiſt. To think of the poſſibility of the exiſtence of a permanent and hereditary Royalty, *where nothing elſe is hereditary or permanent in point either of perſonal or corporate dignity*, is a ruinous chimera worthy of the Abbé Syeyes and thoſe wicked Fools his Aſſociates, who uſurped Power by the Murders of the 19th of July, and the 6th of October 1789, and who brought forth the Monſter which they called Democracie Royale, or the Conſtitution.

I believe that moſt thinking men, would prefer infinitely ſome ſober and ſenſible form of a Republick, in which there was no mention at all of a King, but which held out ſome reaſonable ſecurity to property, life, and perſonal freedom, to a ſcheme of things like this Democracie Royale, founded on impiety, immorality, fraudulent currencies, the confiſcation of innocent individuals, and the pretended Rights of Man; and which, in effect, excluding the whole body of the nobility, clergy,

and landed property of a great nation, threw every thing into the hands of a deſperate ſet of obſcure adventurers who led to every miſchief, a blind and bloody band of Sans-Culottes. At the head, or rather at the tail of this ſyſtem, was a miſerable pageant as its oſtenſible inſtrument, who was to be treated with every ſpecies of indignity, till the moment, when he was conveyed from the Palace of Contempt to the Dungeon of Horrour, and thence led by a Brewer of his Capital through the applauſes of an hired, frantick, drunken multitude, to loſe his head upon a ſcaffold.

This is the Conſtitution, or Democracie Royale; and this is what infallibly would be again ſet up in France to run exactly the ſame round, if the predominant power ſhould ſo far be forced to ſubmit as to receive the name of a King, leaving it to the Jacobins, (that is, to thoſe who have ſubverted Royalty and deſtroyed Property) to modify the one, and to diſtribute the other as ſpoil. By the Jacobins I mean indiſcriminately the Briſſotins and the Maratiſts, knowing no ſort of difference between them. As to any other party, none exiſts in that unhappy country. The Royaliſts (thoſe in Poitou excepted) are baniſhed and extinguiſhed; and as to what they call the Conſtitutionaliſts, or *Democrats Royaux*, they never had an exiſtence of the ſmalleſt degree of power, conſideration or authority;

rity; nor, if they differ at all from the reſt of the Atheiſtick Banditti (which from their actions and principles I have no reaſon to think) were they ever other than the temporary tools and inſtruments of the more determined, able, and ſyſtematick Regicides. Several attempts have been made to ſupport this chimerical Democracie Royale—the firſt was by La Fayette—the laſt by Dumourier:—they tended only to ſhew, that this abſurd project had no party to ſupport it. The Girondiſts under Wimpfen, and at Bourdeaux, have made ſome ſtruggle. The Conſtitutionaliſts never could make any; and for a very plain reaſon; they were *Leaders in Rebellion.* All their principles, and their whole ſcheme of government being Republican, they could never excite the ſmalleſt degree of enthuſiaſm in favour of the unhappy Monarch, whom they had rendered contemptible, to make him the Executive Officer in their new Commonwealth. They only appeared as traitors to their own Jacobin cauſe, not as faithful adherents to the King.

In an Addreſs to France, in an attempt to treat with it, or in conſidering any ſcheme at all relative to it, it is impoſſible we ſhould mean the geographical, we muſt always mean the moral and political country. I believe we ſhall be in a great errour if we act upon an idea that there exiſts in

that country any organized body of men who might be willing to treat on equitable terms, for the reſtoration of their Monarchy; but who are nice in balancing thoſe terms, and who would accept ſuch as to them appeared reaſonable, but who would quietly ſubmit to the predominant power, if they were not gratified in the faſhion of ſome conſtitution which ſuited with their fancies.

I take the ſtate of France to be totally different. I know of no ſuch body, and of no ſuch party. So far from a combination of twenty men (always excepting Poitou) I never yet heard, that *a ſingle man* could be named of ſufficient force or influence to anſwer for another man, much leſs for the ſmalleſt diſtrict in the country, or for the moſt incomplete company of ſoldiers in the army. We ſee every man that the Jacobins chuſe to apprehend, taken up in his village, or in his houſe, and conveyed to priſon without the leaſt ſhadow of reſiſtance; *and this indifferently*, whether he is ſuſpected of Royaliſm or Federaliſm, Moderantiſm, Democracy Royal, or any other of the names of faction which they ſtart by the hour. What is much more aſtoniſhing, (and if we did not carefully attend to the genius and circumſtances of this Revolution, muſt indeed appear incredible) all their moſt accredited military men, from a generaliſſimo to a corporal, may be arreſted,

No individual influence, civil or military.

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(each in the midſt of his camp, and covered with the laurels of accumulated victories) tied neck and heels, thrown into a cart, and ſent to Paris to be diſpoſed of at the pleaſure of the Revolutionary Tribunals.

No Corporations of Juſtice, Commerce, or Police.

As no individuals have power and influence, ſo there are no Corporations, whether of Lawyers or Burghers exiſting. The Aſſembly called Conſtituent, deſtroyed all ſuch inſtitutions very early. The Primary and Secondary Aſſemblies, by their original conſtitution, were to be diſſolved when they anſwered the purpoſe of electing the Magiſtrates; and were expreſsly diſqualified from performing any corporate act whatſoever. The tranſient Magiſtrates have been almoſt all removed before the expiration of their terms, and new have been lately impoſed upon the people, without the form or ceremony of an election: theſe Magiſtrates during their exiſtence are put under, as all the Executive Authorities are from firſt to laſt, the popular Societies (called Jacobin Clubs) of the ſeveral countries, and this by an expreſs order of the National Convention: it is even made a caſe of death to oppoſe or attack thoſe Clubs. They too have been lately ſubjected to an expurgatory ſcrutiny, to drive out from them every thing ſavouring of what they call the crime of *Moderantiſm*, of which offence however few were guilty.

But as people began to take refuge from their perſecutions—amongſt themſelves, they have driven them from that laſt aſylum.

The State of France is perfectly ſimple. It conſiſts of but two deſcriptions—The Oppreſſors and the Oppreſſed.

The firſt have the whole authority of the State in their hands, all the arms, all the revenues of the publick, all the confiſcations of individuals and corporations. They have taken the lower ſort from their occupations and have put them into pay, that they may form them into a body of Janiſaries to overrule and awe property. The heads of theſe wretches they never ſuffer to cool. They ſupply them with a food for fury varied by the day—beſides the ſenſual ſtate of intoxication from which they are rarely free. They have made the Prieſts and people formally abjure the Divinity; they have eſtranged them from every civil, moral, and ſocial, or even natural and inſtinctive ſentiment, habit, and practice, and have rendered them ſyſtematically ſavages, to make it impoſſible for them to be the inſtruments of any ſober and virtuous arrangement, or to be reconciled to any ſtate of order, under any name whatſoever.

The other deſcription, *the Oppreſſed*—are people of ſome property; they are the ſmall reliques of the perſecuted Landed Intereſt; they are the Burghers and the Farmers. By the very circumſtance of their being of ſome property, though numerous in ſome points of view, they cannot be very conſiderable as a *number*. In cities the nature of their occupations renders them domeſtick and feeble; in the country it confines them to their farm for ſubſiſtence. The National Guards are all changed and reformed. Every thing ſuſpicious in the deſcription of which they were compoſed is rigorouſly diſarmed. Committees, called of Vigilance and Safety, are every where formed; a moſt ſevere and ſcrutinizing Inquiſition, far more rigid than any thing ever known or imagined. Two perſons cannot meet and confer without hazard to their liberty, and even to their lives. Numbers ſcarcely credible have been executed, and their property confiſcated. At Paris and in moſt other towns, the bread they buy is a daily dole—which they cannot obtain without a daily ticket delivered to them by their Maſters. Multitudes of all ages and ſexes are actually impriſoned. I have reaſon to believe, that in France there are not, for various ſtate crimes, ſo few as twenty thouſand * actually in jail—a large portion of people of property in any State. If a father of a family ſhould ſhew any

* Some accounts make them five times as many.

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diſpoſitions to reſiſt, or to withdraw himſelf from their power, his wife and children are cruelly to anſwer for it. It is by means of theſe hoſtages, that they keep the troops, which they force by maſſes (as they call it) into the field—true to their colours.

Another of their reſources is not to be forgotten. —They have lately found a way of giving a ſort of ubiquity to the ſupreme Sovereign Authority, which no Monarch has been able yet to give to any repreſentation of his.

The Commiſſioners of the National Convention, who are the Members of the Convention itſelf, and really exerciſe all its powers, make continual circuits through every province, and viſits to every army. There they ſuperſede all the ordinary Authorities civil and military, and change and alter every thing at their pleaſure. So that in effect no deliberative capacity exiſts in any portion of the inhabitants.

Toulon, republican in principle, having taken its deciſion *in a moment under the guillotine*, and before the arrival of theſe Commiſſioners, Toulon, being a place regularly fortified, and having in its boſom a navy in part highly diſcontented, has eſcaped, though by a ſort of miracle; and it would not have eſcaped, if two powerful fleets had not been

been at the door to give them not only ſtrong, but prompt and immediate ſuccour, eſpecially, as neither this nor any other ſea-port town in France can be depended on, from the peculiarly ſavage diſpoſitions, manners, and connexions among the lower ſort of people in thoſe places. This I take to be the true ſtate of things in France; *ſo far as it regards any exiſting bodies, whether of legal or voluntary aſſociation, capable of acting or of treating in corps.*

As to the oppreſſed *individuals*, they are many; and as diſcontented as men muſt be under the monſtrous and complicated tyranny of all ſorts, with which they are cruſhed. They want no ſtimulus to throw off this dreadful yoke: but they do want (not Manifeſtoes, which they have had even to ſurfeit, but) real protection, force and ſuccour.

The diſputes and queſtions of men at their eaſe, do not at all affect their minds, or ever can occupy the minds of men in their ſituation. Theſe theories are long ſince gone by; they have had their day, and have done their miſchief. The queſtion is not between the Rabble of Syſtems, Fayetteiſm, Condorcetiſm, Monarchiſm, or Democratiſm or Federaliſm, on the one ſide, and the fundamental Laws of France on the other—or between all theſe ſyſtems amongſt themſelves. It is a controverſy

(weak indeed and unequal on the one part) between the proprietor and the robber; between the priſoner and the jailor; between the neck and the guillotine. Four-fifths of the French inhabitants would thankfully take protection from the Emperor of Morocco, and would never trouble their heads about the abſtract principles of the power by which they were ſnatched from impriſonment, robbery, and murder. But then theſe men can do little or nothing for themſelves. They have no arms, nor magazines, nor chiefs, nor union, nor the poſſibility of theſe things within themſelves. On the whole therefore I lay it down as a certainty, that in the Jacobins, no change of mind is to be expected —and that no others in the territory of France have an independent and deliberative exiſtence.

The truth is, that France is out of itſelf—The moral France is ſeparated from the geographical. The maſter of the houſe is expelled, and the robbers are in poſſeſſion. If we look for the *corporate people* of France exiſting as corporate in the eye and intention of public Law, (that corporate people, I mean, who are free to deliberate and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat and conclude) they are in Flanders, and Germany, in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and England. There are all the Princes of the Blood, there are all the Orders

Orders of the State, there are all the Parliaments of the kingdom.

This being, as I conceive, the true ſtate of France, as it exiſts *territorially*, and as it exiſts *morally*, the queſtion will be, with whom we are to concert our arrangements; and whom we are to uſe as our inſtruments in the reduction, in the pacification, and in the ſettlement of France. The work to be done muſt indicate the workmen. Suppoſing us to have rational objects, we have two principal, and one ſecondary. The firſt two are ſo intimately connected as not to be ſeparated even in thought; the re-eſtabliſhment of Royalty, and the re-eſtabliſhment of Property. One would think it requires not a great deal of argument to prove, that the moſt ſerious endeavours to reſtore Royalty, will be made by Royaliſts. Property will be moſt energetically reſtored by the antient proprietors of that kingdom.

When I ſpeak of Royaliſts, I wiſh to be underſtood of thoſe who were always ſuch from principle. Every arm lifted up for Royalty from the beginning, was the arm of a man ſo principled. I do not think there are ten exceptions.

The principled Royaliſts are certainly not of force to effect theſe objects by themſelves. If they

were, the operations of the preſent great Combination would be wholly unneceſſary. What I contend for is, that they ſhould be conſulted with, treated with, and employed; and that no Foreigners whatſoever are either in intereſt ſo engaged, or in judgment and local knowledge ſo competent, to anſwer all theſe purpoſes as the natural proprietors of the country.

Their number for an exiled party is alſo conſiderable. Almoſt the whole body of the landed proprietors of France, eccleſiaſtical and civil, have been ſteadily devoted to the Monarchy. This body does not amount to leſs than ſeventy thouſand—a very great number in the compoſition of the reſpectable claſſes in any ſociety.—I am ſure, that if half that number of the ſame deſcription were taken out of this country, it would leave hardly any thing that I ſhould call the people of England. On the faith of the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, a body of ten thouſand Nobility on horſeback, with the King's two brothers at their head, ſerved with the King of Pruſſia in the campaign of 1792, and equipped themſelves with the laſt ſhilling of their ruined fortunes and exhauſted credit *. It is not now the queſtion how that great force

* Before the Revolution the French Nobleſſe were ſo reduced in numbers, that they did not much exceed twenty thouſand,

force came to be rendered uſeleſs and totally diſſipated. I ſtate it now, only to remark, that a great part of the ſame force exiſts, and would act if it were enabled. I am ſure every thing has ſhewn us that in this war with France, one Frenchman is worth twenty foreigners. La Vendee is a proof of this.

If we wiſh to make an impreſſion on the minds of any perſons in France, or to perſuade them to join our ſtandard, it is impoſſible that they ſhould not be more eaſily led, and more readily formed and diſciplined, (civilly and martially diſciplined) by thoſe who ſpeak their language, who are acquainted with their manners, who are converſant with their uſages and habits of thinking, and who have a local knowledge of their country, and ſome remains of antient credit and conſideration, than with a body congregated from all tongues and tribes. Where none of the reſpectable native intereſts are ſeen in the tranſaction, it is impoſſible that any declarations can convince thoſe that are within, or thoſe that are without, that any thing

thouſand, at leaſt of full grown men. As they have been very cruelly formed into entire corps of ſoldiers, it is eſtimated, that by the ſword, and diſtempers in the field, they have not loſt leſs than five thouſand men; and if this courſe is purſued, it is to be feared, that the whole body of the French nobility may be extinguiſhed. Several hundreds have alſo periſhed by famine and various accidents.

elſe than ſome ſort of hoſtility in the ſtyle of a conqueror is meant. At beſt it will appear to ſuch wavering perſons, (if ſuch there are) whom we mean to fix with us, at beſt a choice whether they are to continue a prey to domeſtick banditti, or to be fought for as a carrion carcaſs, and picked to the bone by all the crows and vultures of the ſky. They may take protection, (and they would I doubt not) but they can have neither alacrity nor zeal in ſuch a cauſe. When they ſee nothing but bands of Engliſh, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Sardinians, Pruſſians, Auſtrians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Sclavonians, Croatians, *acting as principals*, it is impoſſible they ſhould think we come with a beneficent deſign. Many of thoſe fierce and barbarous people have already given proofs how little they regard any French party whatſoever. Some of theſe nations the people of France are jealous of; ſuch are the Engliſh, and the Spaniards—others they deſpiſe; ſuch are the Italians—others they hate and dread; ſuch are the German and Danubian powers. At beſt ſuch interpoſition of antient enemies excites apprehenſion; but in this caſe, how can they ſuppoſe that we come to maintain their legitimate Monarchy in a truly paternal French Government, to protect their privileges, their laws, their religion, and their property, when they ſee us make uſe of no one perſon who has any intereſt in them, any knowledge of them, or

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any the leaſt zeal for them? On the contrary, they ſee, that we do not ſuffer any of thoſe who have ſhewn a zeal in that cauſe, which we ſeem to make our own, to come freely into any place in which the Allies obtain any footing.

If we wiſh to gain upon any people, it is right to ſee what it is they expect. We have had a propoſal from the Royaliſts of Poitou. They are well intitled, after a bloody war maintained for eight months againſt all the powers of anarchy, to ſpeak the ſentiments of the Royaliſts of France. Do they deſire us to exclude their Princes, their Clergy, their Nobility? The direct contrary. They earneſtly ſolicit that men of every one of theſe deſcriptions ſhould be ſent to them. They do not call for Engliſh, Auſtrian, or Pruſſian officers. They call for French emigrant officers. They call for the exiled prieſts. They have demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their head. Theſe are the demands, (quite natural demands) of thoſe who are ready to follow the ſtandard of Monarchy.

The great means therefore of reſtoring the Monarchy which we have made *the main object of the war*, is to aſſiſt the dignity, the religion, and the property of France, to repoſſeſs themſelves of the means of their natural influence. This

ought to be the primary object of all our politicks, and all our military operations. Otherwiſe every thing will move in a prepoſterous order, and nothing but confuſion and deſtruction will follow.

I know that misfortune is not made to win reſpect from ordinary minds. I know that there is a leaning to proſperity however obtained, and a prejudice in its favour; I know there is a diſpoſition to hope ſomething from the variety and inconſtancy of villany, rather than from the tireſome uniformity of fixed principle. There have been, I admit, ſituations in which a guiding perſon or party might be gained over, and through him or them, the whole body of a nation. For the hope of ſuch a converſion, and of deriving advantage from enemies, it might be politick for a while to throw your friends into the ſhade. But examples drawn from hiſtory in occaſions like the preſent will be found dangerouſly to miſlead us. France has no reſemblance to other countries which have undergone troubles and been purified by them. If France, jacobiniſed as it has been for four full years, did contain any bodies of authority and diſpoſition to treat with you, (moſt aſſuredly ſhe does not) ſuch is the levity of thoſe who have expelled every thing reſpectable in their country, ſuch their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous ſpirit, their habits of defying every thing human

and

and divine, that no engagement would hold with them for three months; nor indeed could they cohere together for any purpoſe of civilized ſociety, if left as now they are. There muſt be a means not only of breaking their ſtrength within themſelves, but of *civilizing* them; and theſe two things muſt go together, before we can poſſibly treat with them, not only as a nation, but with any diviſion of them. Deſcriptions of men of their own race, but better in rank, ſuperiour in property and decorum, of honourable, decent and orderly habits, are abſolutely neceſſary to bring them to ſuch a frame as to qualify them ſo much as to come into contact with a civilized nation. A ſet of thoſe ferocious ſavages with arms in their hands, left to themſelves in one part of the country, whilſt you proceed to another, would break forth into outrages at leaſt as bad as their former. They muſt, as faſt as gained (if ever they are gained) be put under the guide, direction and government of better Frenchmen than themſelves, or they will inſtantly relapſe into a fever of aggravated Jacobiniſm.

We muſt not judge of other parts of France by the temporary ſubmiſſion of Toulon, with two vaſt fleets in its harbour, and a garriſon far more numerous than all the inhabitants able to bear arms. If they were left to themſelves I am quite

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ſure they would not retain their attachment to Monarchy of any name, for a ſingle week.

To adminiſter the only cure for the unheard of diſorders of that undone country, I think it infinitely happy for us, that God has given into our hands, more effectual remedies than human contrivance could point out. We have in our boſom, and in the boſom of other civilized ſtates, nearer forty than thirty thouſand perſons, providentially preſerved not only from the cruelty and violence, but from the contagion of the horrid practices, ſentiments and language of the Jacobins, and even ſacredly guarded from the view of ſuch abominable ſcenes. If we ſhould obtain in any conſiderable diſtrict, a footing in France, we poſſeſs an immenſe body of phyſicians and magiſtrates of the mind, whom we now know to be the moſt diſcreet, gentle, well tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious perſons, who in any order probably exiſted in the world. You will have a miſſioner of peace and order in every pariſh. Never was a wiſer national œconomy than in the charity of the Engliſh and of other countries. Never was money better expended than in the maintenance of this body of civil troops for re-eſtabliſhing order in France, and for thus ſecuring its civilization to Europe. This means, if properly uſed, is of value ineſtimable.

Nor

Nor is this corps of inſtruments of civilization confined to the firſt order of that ſtate, I mean the clergy. The allied powers poſſeſs alſo, an exceedingly numerous, well informed, ſenſible, ingenious, high principled and ſpirited body of cavaliers in the expatriated landed intereſt of France, as well qualified at leaſt, as I, (who have been taught by time and experience to moderate my calculation of the expectancy of human abilities) ever expected to ſee in the body of any landed gentlemen and ſoldiers by their birth. France is well winnowed and ſifted. Its virtuous men are, I believe, amongſt the moſt virtuous, as its wicked are amongſt the moſt abandoned upon earth. Whatever in the territory of France may be found to be in the middle between theſe, muſt be attracted to the better part. This will be compaſſed, when every gentleman, every where being reſtored to his landed eſtate, each on his patrimonial ground, may join the Clergy in reanimating the loyalty, fidelity and religion of the people; that theſe gentlemen proprietors of land, may ſort that people according to the truſt they ſeverally merit, that they may arm the honeſt and well affected, and diſarm and diſable the factious and ill diſpoſed. No foreigner can make this diſcrimination nor theſe arrangements. The antient corporations of Burghers according to their ſeveral modes ſhould be reſtored; and placed, (as they

ought to be) in thehands of men of gravity and property in the cities or baillages, according to the proper conſtitutions of the commons or third eſtate of France. They will reſtrain and regulate the ſeditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their own eſtates. In this way, and *in this way alone*, the country (once broken in upon by foreign force well directed) may be gained and ſettled. It muſt be gained and ſettled by *itſelf*, and through the medium of its *own* native dignity and property. It is not honeſt, it is not decent, ſtill leſs is it politick, for foreign powers themſelves to attempt any thing in this minute, internal, local detail, in which they could ſhew nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confuſion and oppreſſion. As to the Prince who has a juſt claim to exerciſe the regency of France, like other men he is not without his faults and his defects. But faults or defects (always ſuppoſing them faults of common human infirmity) are not what in any country deſtroy a legal title to Government. Theſe princes are kept in a poor obſcure country town of the King of Pruſſia's. Their reputation is entirely at the mercy of every calumniator. They cannot ſhew themſelves, they cannot explain themſelves, as princes ought to do. After being well informed, as any man here can be, I do not find, that theſe blemiſhes in this eminent perſon, are at all conſiderable, or that they at all affect a character, which is full of probity,

honour,

honour, generoſity, and real goodneſs. In ſome points he has but too much reſemblance to his unfortunate Brother; who with all his weakneſſes, had a good underſtanding and many parts of an excellent man, and a good King. But Monſieur, without ſuppoſing the other deficient, (as he was not) excells him in general knowledge and in a ſharp and keen obſervation, with ſomething of a better addreſs, and an happier mode of ſpeaking and of writing. His converſation is open, agreeable and informed, his manners gracious and princely. His brother the Comte d'Artois ſuſtains ſtill better the repreſentation of his place. He is eloquent, lively, engaging in the higheſt degree, of a decided character, full of energy and activity. In a word he is a brave, honourable, and accompliſhed cavalier. Their brethren of Royalty, if they were true to their own cauſe and intereſt, inſtead of relegating theſe illuſtrious perſons to an obſcure town, would bring them forward in their courts and camps, and exhibit them to, what they would ſpeedily obtain, the eſteem, reſpect, and affection of mankind.

Objection made to the Regent's endeavour to go to Spain.

As to their knocking at every door, (which ſeems to give offence) can any thing be more natural? Abandoned, deſpiſed, rendered in a manner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who have treated their unfortunate brethren with all the

giddy pride, and improvident inſolence of blind unfeeling proſperity, who did not even ſend them a compliment of condolence on the murder of their brother and ſiſter; in ſuch a ſtate is it to be wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every way, likely or unlikely, well or ill choſen, to get out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, and that in particular they tried whether the Princes of their own blood, might at length be brought to think the cauſe of Kings, and of Kings of their race, wounded in the murder and exile of the branch of France, of as much importance as the killing of a brace of partridges. If they were abſolutely idle, and only eat in ſloth their bread of ſorrow and dependence, they would be forgotten, or at beſt thought of as wretches unworthy of their pretenſions which they had done nothing to ſupport. If they err from *our* intereſts, what care has been taken to keep them in thoſe intereſts? or what deſire has ever been ſhewn to employ them in any other way than as inſtruments of their own degradation, ſhame, and ruin?

The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of the Regent is to be recognized (not made) according to the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize it, and to regiſter it, if a place of meeting was given to them, which might be within their own juriſdiction, ſuppoſing that only locality was required for the exerciſe

exerciſe of their functions: for it is one of the advantages of Monarchy, to have no local ſeat. It may maintain its rights out of the ſphere of its territorial juriſdiction, if other powers will ſuffer it.

I am well appriſed, that the little intriguers, and whiſperers, and ſelf-conceited thoughtleſs babblers, worſe than either, run about to depreciate the fallen virtue of a great nation. But whilſt they talk, we muſt make our choice—they or the Jacobins. We have no other option. As to thoſe, who in the pride of a proſperity, not obtained by their wiſdom, valour, or induſtry, think ſo well of themſelves and of their own abilities and virtues, and ſo ill of other men; truth obliges me to ſay, that they are not founded in their preſumption concerning themſelves, nor in their contempt of the French Princes, Magiſtrates, Nobility, and Clergy. Inſtead of inſpiring me with diſlike and diſtruſt of the unfortunate, engaged with us in a common cauſe againſt our jacobin enemy, they take away all my eſteem for their own characters, and all my deference to their judgment.

There are ſome few French gentlemen indeed who talk a language not wholly different from this jargon. Thoſe whom I have in my eye, I reſpect as gallant ſoldiers, as much as any one can do, but

on

on their political judgment, and prudence, I have not the ſlighteſt reliance, nor on their knowledge of their own country, or of its laws and conſtitution. They are, if not enemies, at leaſt not friends to the orders of their own ſtate; not to the Princes, the Clergy, or the Nobility; they poſſeſs only an attachment to the Monarchy, or rather to the perſons of the late King and Queen. In all other reſpects their converſation is Jacobin. I am afraid they or ſome of them, go into the cloſets of Miniſters, and tell them that the affairs of France will be better arranged by the allied Powers than by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by the Princes who have a right to govern; and that if any French are at all to be employed in the ſettlement of their country, it ought to be only thoſe who have never declared any decided opinion or taken any active part in the Revolution *.

I ſuſpect that the authors of this opinion are mere ſoldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity and honour, would as gladly receive military rank from Ruſſia, or Auſtria, or Pruſſia, as from the Regent of France. Perhaps their not having as much importance at his court as they could wiſh, may incline them to this ſtrange imagination. Perhaps having no property in old France, they

* This was the language of the Miniſterialiſts.

are

are more indifferent about its reſtoration. Their language is certainly flattering to all Miniſters in all courts. We all are men; we all love to be told of the extent of our own power and our own faculties. If we love glory, we are jealous of partners, and afraid even of our own inſtruments. It is of all modes of flattery the moſt effectual to be told, that you can regulate the affairs of another kingdom better than its hereditary proprietors. It is formed to flatter the principle of conqueſt ſo natural to all men. It is this principle which is now making the partition of Poland. The powers concerned have been told by ſome perfidious Poles, and perhaps they believe, that their uſurpation is a great benefit to the people, eſpecially to the common people. However this may turn out with regard to Poland, I am quite ſure that France could not be ſo well under a foreign direction as under that of the repreſentatives of its own King, and its own antient Eſtates.

I think I have myſelf ſtudied France, as much as moſt of thoſe whom the allied courts are likely to employ in ſuch a work. I have likewiſe of myſelf as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly have of themſelves. But if I could command the whole military arm of Europe, I am ſure, that a bribe of the beſt province in that kingdom, would not tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except

in perfect concurrence and concert with the natural legal intereſts of the country, compoſed of the Eccleſiaſtical, the Military, the ſeveral Corporate Bodies of Juſtice, and of Burgherſhip, making under a Monarch (I repeat it again and again) *the French Nation, according to its fundamental Conſtitution.* No conſiderate Stateſmen would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.

The Government of that kingdom is fundamentally Monarchical. The publick law of Europe has never recognized in it any other form of Government. The Potentates of Europe have by that law, a right, an intereſt, and a duty to know with what government they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the federative Society, or in other words into the diplomatick Republick of Europe. This Right is clear and indiſputable.

What other and further interference they have a right to in the interior of the concerns of another people, is a matter on which, as on every political ſubject, no very definite or poſitive rule can well be laid down. Our neighbours are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws, under which it is allowable or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men, whether they are conſidered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care of my own ſafety, calls forth my activity.

activity. Circumſtances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and diſcretion, the *general* principles of which never vary, muſt alone preſcribe a conduct fitting on ſuch occaſions. The lateſt caſuiſts of public law are rather of a Republican caſt, and in my mind, by no means ſo averſe as they ought to be to a Right in the people (a word which ill defined is of the moſt dangerous uſe) to make changes at their pleaſure in the fundamental laws of their country. Theſe writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbour to ſupport any of the parties according to his choice *. This interference muſt indeed always be a Right, whilſt the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every ſort of evil, is a Right: Circumſtances may render that Right a Duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a *bona fide* charity to a party, and a prudent precaution with regard to yourſelf, or whether under the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation, you act in ſuch a manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accompliſh its final deſtruction. In truth it is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction which is praiſed or blamed by the deciſion of an equitable judge.

* Vattel.

It will be a juſt and irreſiſtible preſumption againſt the fairneſs of the interpoſing power, that he takes with him no party or deſcription of men in the divided ſtate. It is not probable, that theſe parties ſhould all, and all alike, be more adverſe to the true intereſts of their country, and leſs capable of forming a judgment upon them, than thoſe who are abſolute ſtrangers to their affairs, and to the character of the actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and ſecondary ſympathy with their intereſt. Sometimes a calm and healing arbiter may be neceſſary; but, he is to compoſe differences, not to give laws. It is impoſſible that any one ſhould not feel the full force of that preſumption. Even people, whoſe politics for the ſuppoſed good of their own country lead them to take advantage of the diſſentions of a neighbouring nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propoſe to exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of conſulting and employing them which moſt nearly approaches to an excluſion. In ſome particulars they propoſe what amounts to that excluſion, in others they do much worſe. They recommend to Miniſtry, "that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion, or acted a decided part in this great Revolution for or againſt it, ſhould be countenanced, brought forward, truſted or employed, even in the ſtricteſt ſubordination to the Miniſters of the allied powers."

Although

Although one would think that this advice would ſtand condemned on the firſt propoſition, yet as it has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon practically, I think it right to give it a full conſideration.

And firſt, I have aſked myſelf who theſe Frenchmen are, that, in the ſtate their own country has been in for theſe laſt five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided part?

Looking over all the names I have heard of in this great Revolution, in all human affairs, I find no man of any diſtinction who has remained in that more than ſtoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This mean, ſtupid, ſelfiſh, ſwiniſh, and cowardly animal, univerſally known and deſpiſed as ſuch, has indeed, execept in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However his neutrality, which it ſeems would qualify him for truſt, and on a competition muſt ſet aſide the Prince de Condé, can be of no ſort of ſervice. His moderation has not been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers muſt draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great neutraliſt.

Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or talents, who by his ſpeeches or his votes, by his pen or by his ſword, has not been active on this ſcene. The time indeed could admit no neutrality in any perſon worthy of the name of man. There were originally two great diviſions in France; the one is that which overturned the whole of the Government in Church and State, and erected a Republic on the baſis of Atheiſm. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a ſort of ſeceſſion from which, but exactly on the ſame principles, begat another ſhort-lived one, called the Club of Eighty Nine *, which was chiefly guided by the Court Rebels, who, in addition to the crimes of which they were guilty in common with the others, had the merit of betraying a gracious Maſter, and a kind Benefactor. Subdiviſions of this faction, which ſince we have ſeen, do not in the leaſt differ from each other in their principles, their diſpoſitions, or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave ſucceeding wave, one faction has got the better and expelled the other. Thus La Fayette for a while got the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Briſſot overpower'd Orleans; Barrere and Roberſpiere, and their faction, maſtered

* The firſt object of this Club was the propagation of Jacobin principles.

them

them both and cut off their heads. All who were not Royaliſts have been liſted in ſome or other of theſe diviſions. If it were of any uſe to ſettle a precedence, the Elder ought to have his rank. The firſt authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monſtrous ſcheme, ſeem to me intitled to the firſt place in our diſtruſt and abhorrence. I have ſeen ſome of thoſe who are thought the beſt amongſt the original Rebels; and I have not neglected the means of being informed concerning the others. I can very truly ſay, that I have not found by obſervation or enquiry, that any ſenſe of the evils produced by their projects has produced in them, or any *one* of them, the ſmalleſt degree of repentance. Diſappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel: but to them, repentance is a thing impoſſible. They are Atheiſts. This wretched opinion, by which they are poſſeſſed even to the height of fanaticiſm, leading them to exclude from their ideas of a Commonwealth, the vital principle of the phyſical, the moral, and the political world, engages them in a thouſand abſurd contrivances, to fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious repoſe, or honourable action, or wiſe ſpeculation, in the lurking holes of a foreign land, into which (in a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads amongſt the innocent victims of their madneſs, they are at this very hour, as buſy in the confection of the dirt-pyes of their imaginary Conſtitutions, as if they

they had not been quite freſh from deſtroying by their impious and deſperate vagaries, the fineſt country upon earth.

It is however, out of theſe, or of ſuch as theſe, guilty and impenitent, deſpiſing the experience of others, and their own, that ſome people talk of chuſing their Negotiators with thoſe Jacobins, who they ſuppoſe may be recovered to a ſounder mind. They flatter themſelves, it ſeems, that the friendly habits formed during their original partnerſhip of iniquity, a ſimilarity of character, and a conformity in the ground-work of their principles, might facilitate their converſion, and gain them over to ſome recognition of Royalty. But ſurely this is to read human nature very ill. The ſeveral Sectaries in this ſchiſm of the Jacobins, are the very laſt men in the world to truſt each other. Fellowſhip in Treaſon, is a bad ground of confidence. The laſt quarrels are the foreſt; and the injuries received or offered by your own aſſociates, are ever the moſt bitterly reſented. The people of France of every name and deſcription, would a thouſand times ſooner liſten to the Prince de Condé, or to the Archbiſhop of Aix, or the Biſhop of St. Pol, or to Monſieur De Cazalès, than to La Fayette, or Dumourier, or the Vicomte De Noailles, or the Biſhop of Autun, or Necker, or his Diſciple Lally Tolendal. Againſt the firſt deſcription they have

not the ſmalleſt animoſity beyond that of a merely political diſſention. The others they regard as Traitors.

The firſt deſcription is that of the Chriſtian Royaliſts, men who as earneſtly wiſhed for reformation, as they oppoſed innovation in the fundamental parts of their Church and State. *Their* part has been *very decided.* Accordingly they are to be ſet aſide in the reſtoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind of diſqualification where the reſtoration of Religion and Monarchy is the queſtion. If England ſhould (God forbid it ſhould) fall into the ſame misfortune with France, and that the Court of Vienna ſhould undertake the reſtoration of our Monarchy, I think it would be extraordinary to object to the admiſſion of Mr. Pitt, or Lord Grenville, or Mr. Dundas into any ſhare in the management of that buſineſs, becauſe in a day of trial they have ſtood up firmly and manfully, as I truſt they always will do, and with diſtinguiſhed powers, for the Monarchy and the legitimate Conſtitution of their country. I am ſure if I were to ſuppoſe myſelf at Vienna at ſuch a time, I ſhould, as a Man, as an Engliſhman, and as a Royaliſt, proteſt in that caſe, as I do in this, againſt a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which can have no other tendency, than to make thoſe who wiſh to ſupport the Crown, meditate too profoundly on the conſequences

quences of the part they take—and conſider whether for their open and forward zeal in the Royal Cauſe, they may not be thruſt out from any ſort of confidence and employment, where the intereſt of crowned heads is concerned.

Theſe are the *Parties*. I have ſaid, and ſaid truly, that I know of no neutrals. But as a general obſervation on this general principle of chuſing neutrals on ſuch occaſions as the preſent, I have this to ſay—that it amounts to neither more nor leſs than this ſhocking propoſition—that we ought to exclude men of honour and ability from ſerving theirs and our cauſe; and to put the deareſt intereſts of ourſelves and our poſterity into the hands of men of no decided character, without judgment to chuſe, and without courage to profeſs any principle whatſoever.

Such men can ſerve no cauſe, for this plain reaſon—they have no cauſe at heart. They can at beſt work only as mere mercenaries. They have not been guilty of great crimes; but it is only becauſe they have not energy of mind to riſe to any height of wickedneſs. They are not hawks or kites; they are only miſerable fowls whoſe flight is not above their dunghill or henrooſt. But they tremble before the authors of theſe horrors. They admire them at a ſafe and reſpectful diſtance.

There

There never was a mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their hearts they believe ſuch hardy miſcreants to be the only men qualified for great affairs: if you ſet them to tranſact with ſuch perſons, they are inſtantly ſubdued. They dare not ſo much as look their antagoniſt in the face. They are made to be their ſubjects, not to be their arbiters or controllers.

Theſe men to be ſure can look at atrocious acts without indignation, and can behold ſuffering virtue without ſympathy. Therefore they are conſidered as ſober diſpaſſionate men. But they have their paſſions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper wherever the welfare of *others* is concerned. In ſuch cauſes, as they have no motives to action, they never poſſeſs any real ability, and are totally deſtitute of all reſource.

Believe a man who has ſeen much, and obſerved ſomething. I have ſeen in the courſe of my life a great many of that family of men. They are generally choſen, becauſe they have no opinion of their own; and as far as they can be got in good earneſt to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever happens to employ them (neither longer or

ſhorter, narrower or broader) with whom they have no diſcuſſion or conſultation. The only thing which occurs to ſuch a man when he has got a buſineſs for others into his hands, is how to make his own fortune out of it. The perſon he is to treat with, is not, with him, an adverſary over whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain: therefore he always ſyſtematically betrays ſome part of his truſt. Inſtead of thinking how he ſhall defend his ground to the laſt, and if forced to retreat, how little he ſhall give up, this kind of man conſiders how much of the intereſt of his employer he is to ſacrifice to his adverſary. Having nothing but himſelf in view, he knows, that in ſerving his principal with zeal, he muſt probably incur ſome reſentment from the oppoſite party. His object is to obtain the good will of the perſon with whom he contends, that when an agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him. I would not take one of theſe as my arbitrator in a diſpute for ſo much as a fiſh-pond—for if he reſerved the mud to me, he would be ſure to give the water that fed the pool, to my adverſary. In a great cauſe I ſhould certainly wiſh, that my agent ſhould poſſeſs conciliating qualities; that he ſhould be of a frank, open, and candid diſpoſition, ſoft in his nature, and of a temper to ſoften animoſities and to win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious to the perſon he treats with, by perſonal injury, by violence, or by deceit,

deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cauſe in any former tranſactions. But I would be ſure that my Negotiator ſhould be *mine*, that he ſhould be as earneſt in the cauſe as myſelf, and known to be ſo; that he ſhould not be looked upon as a ſtipendiary advocate, but as a principled partizan. In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeleſs. I would not truſt the cauſe of Royalty with a man, who, profeſſing neutrality, is half a Republican. The Enemy has already a great part of his ſuit without a ſtruggle — and he contends with advantage for all the reſt. The common principle allowed between your adverſary and your agent, gives your adverſary the advantage in every diſcuſſion.

Before I ſhut up this Diſcourſe about neutral Agency (which I conceive is not to be found, or if found, ought not to be uſed) I have a few other remarks to make on the cauſe, which I conceive gives riſe to it.

In all that we do, whether in the ſtruggle or after it, it is neceſſary that we ſhould conſtantly have in our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is carried on by men of no rank, of no conſideration, of wild ſavage minds, full of levity, arrogance and preſumption, without morals, without probity,

without prudence. What have they then to ſupply their innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even to the firmeſt minds? *One* thing, and *one* thing only—but that one thing is worth a thouſand —they have *energy*. In France, all things being put into an univerſal ferment, in the decompoſition of ſociety, no man comes forward but by his ſpirit of enterprize and the vigour of his mind. If we meet this dreadful and portentous energy, reſtrained by no conſideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always on the attack, that allows itſelf no repoſe, and ſuffers none to reſt an hour with impunity; if we meet this energy with poor commonplace pr ceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old ſaws, with doubts, fears and ſuſpicions, with a languid, uncertain heſitation, with a formal, official ſpirit, which is turned aſide by every obſtacle from its purpoſe, and which never ſees a difficulty but to yield to it, or at beſt to evade it; down we go to the bottom of the abyſs—and nothing ſhort of Omnipotence can ſave us. We muſt meet a vicious and diſtempered ene y with a manly and rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its reſources —we are doubly bound to uſe all that, in the circle drawn about us by our morals, we are able to command.

I do not contend againſt the advantages of diſtruſt. In the world we live in it is but too neceſſary.

ſary. Some of old called it the very ſinews of diſcretion. But what ſignify common-places, that always run parallel and equal? Diſtruſt is good or it is bad, according to our poſition and our purpoſe. Diſtruſt is a defenſive principle. They who have much to loſe have much to fear. But in France we hold nothing. We are to break in upon a power in poſſeſſion; we are to carry every thing by ſtorm, or by ſurprize, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure therefore, and not caution, is our policy. Here to be too preſuming is the better error.

The world will judge of the ſpirit of our proceeding in thoſe places of France which may fall into our power, by our conduct in thoſe that are already in our hands. Our wiſdom ſhould not be vulgar. Other times, perhaps other meaſures: But in this awful hour our politicks ought to be made up of nothing but courage, deciſion, manlineſs, and rectitude. We ſhould have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a royal and commanding policy; and as long as we are true to it we may give the law. Never can we aſſume this command if we will not riſque the conſequences. For which reaſon we ought to be bottomed enough in principle not to be carried away upon the firſt proſpect of any ſiniſter advantage. For depend upon it, that if we once give way to a ſiniſter dealing, we

ſhall

ſhall teach others the game, and we ſhall be outwitted and overborne: the Spaniards, the Pruſſians, God knows who, will put us under contribution at their pleaſure; and inſtead of being the head of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe, we ſhall, by our miſtakes, break up a great deſign into a thouſand little ſelfiſh quarrels; the enemy will triumph, and we ſhall ſit down under the terms of unſafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and diſgraced, whilſt all Europe, England included, is left open and defenceleſs on every part, to jacobin principles, intrigues, and arms. In the caſe of the King of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will ſtill be conſidering ourſelves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradiction, I am afraid, will, in ſpite of us, give a colour of fraud to all our tranſactions, or at leaſt will ſo complicate our politicks, that we ſhall ourſelves be inextricably entangled in them.

I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite ſorrow I heard that in taking the king of France's fleet in truſt, we inſtantly unrigged and diſmaſted the ſhips, inſtead of keeping them in a condition to eſcape in caſe of diſaſter, and in order to fulfil our truſt, that is, to hold them for the uſe of the owner, and, in the mean time, to employ them for our common ſervice. Theſe ſhips are now ſo

circumſtanced,

circumſtanced, that if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they muſt fall into the hands of the enemy, or be burnt by ourſelves. I know this is by ſome conſidered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the Engliſh, or Mr. Pitt leſs virtuous than Ariſtides.

Are we then ſo poor in reſources that we can do no better with eighteen or twenty ſhips of the line than to burn them? Had we ſent for French Royaliſt naval officers, of which ſome hundreds are to be had, and made them ſelect ſuch ſeamen as they could truſt, and filled the reſt with our own and Mediterranean ſeamen, which are all over Italy to be had by thouſands, and put them under judicious Engliſh commanders in chief, and with a judicious mixture of our own ſubordinates, the Weſt Indies would at this day have been ours. It may be ſaid that theſe French officers would take them for the King of France, and that they would not be in our power. Be it ſo. The iſlands would not be ours, but they would not be jacobinized. This is however a thing impoſſible. They muſt in effect and ſubſtance be ours. But all is upon that falſe principle of diſtruſt, which, not confiding in ſtrength, can never have the full uſe of it. They that pay, and feed, and equip, muſt direct. But I muſt ſpeak plain upon this ſubject. The French iſlands, if they were all our own, ought not to be all kept.

A fair

A fair partition only ought to be made of thoſe territories. This is a ſubject of policy very ſerious, which has many relations and aſpects. Juſt here I only hint at it as anſwering an objection, whilſt I ſtate the miſchievous conſequences which ſuffer us to be ſurprized into a virtual breach of faith, by confounding our ally with our enemy, becauſe they both belong to the ſame geographical territory.

My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made, what we ſet out with, a royal French city. By the neceſſity of the caſe, it muſt be under the influence, civil and military, of the allies. But the only way of keeping that jealous and diſcordant maſs from tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding the loſs of the whole, is to put the place into the nominal government of the regent, his officers being approved by us. This, I ſay, is abſolutely neceſſary for a poiſe amongſt ourſelves. Otherwiſe is it to be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place with us in a ſort of partnerſhip contrary to our mutual intereſt, will ſee us abſolute maſters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one ſide, and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and compoſed mind, whilſt we do little leſs than declare that we are to take the whole Weſt Indies into our hands, leaving the vaſt, unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spaniſh dominions in that part of the world, abſolutely at our mercy, without

any power to balance us in the ſmalleſt degree. Nothing is ſo fatal to a nation as an extreme of ſelf-partiality, and the total want of conſideration of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain muſt think ſhe ſees, that we are taking advantage of the confuſions which reign in France, to diſable that country, and of courſe every country from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the Spaniſh Monarchy into a province. If ſhe ſaw things in a proper point of light, to be ſure, ſhe would not conſider any other plan of politicks as of the leaſt moment in compariſon of the extinction of jacobiniſm. But her miniſters (to ſay the beſt of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they ſhould poſtpone this great point, or balance it, by conſiderations of the common politicks, that is, the queſtions of power between *ſtate and ſtate*. If we manifeſtly endeavour to deſtroy the balance, eſpecially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and the Weſt Indies, (the latter their ſore and vulnerable part) from fear of what France may do for Spain hereafter, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely weaker than we are, (weaker indeed that ſuch a maſs of empire ever was,) ſhould feel the ſame fears from our uncontroled power, that we give way to ourſelves from a ſuppoſed reſurrection of the antient power of France under a Monarchy? It ſignifies nothing whether we are wrong or right

in the abſtract; but in reſpect to our relation to Spain, with ſuch principles followed up in practice, it is abſolutely impoſſible that any cordial alliance can ſubſiſt between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will ſpeedily follow. Pruſſia is quite certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market of the preſent confuſions. Italy is broken and divided; Switzerland is jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have long ſeen with pain the progreſs of French principles in that country. Things cannot go on upon the preſent bottom. The poſſeſſion of Toulon, which, well managed, might be of the greateſt advantage, will be the greateſt misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The more we multiply troops there, the more we ſhall multiply cauſes and means of quarrel amongſt ourſelves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is to give a greater degree of ſimplicity to our politicks. Our ſituation does neceſſarily render them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, inſtead of increaſing it, we ought to apply all the remedies in our power.

See what is, in that place, the conſequence (to ſay nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an Engliſh, and a Spaniſh. The Engliſh gate is, by our policy, faſt barred againſt the entrance of any Royaliſts. The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very little judgment. By means,

means, however, of this fooliſh, mean, and jealous policy on our ſide, all the Royaliſts whom the Engliſh might ſelect as moſt practicable, and moſt ſubſervient to honeſt views, are totally excluded. Of thoſe admitted, the Spaniards are maſters. As to the inhabitants they are a neſt of Jacobins which is delivered into our hands, not from principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may be deſcribed in few words. It is *differtum nautis, cauponibus atque malignis.* The reſt of the ſeaports are of the ſame deſcription.

Another thing which I cannot account for is, the ſending for the Biſhop of Toulon, and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly contrary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of the allied powers. The King of Pruſſia did better. When he took Verdun, he actually re-inſtated the Biſhop and his Chapter. When he thought he ſhould be the maſter of Chalons, he called the biſhop from Flanders, to put him into poſſeſſion. The Auſtrians have reſtored the clergy wherever they obtained poſſeſſion. We have propoſed to reſtore Religion as well as Monarchy; and in Toulon we have reſtored neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that the Jacobin Sans-Culottes, or ſome of them, objected to this meaſure, who rather chuſe to have the atheiſtick buffoons of clergy they have got to ſport with, till they are

ready to come forward, with the reſt of their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to declare that they are a ſet of impoſtors, that they never believed in God, and never will preach any ſort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the government, civil and eccleſiaſtical, not in the King of France, to whom, as the protector and governor, and in ſubſtance the head of the Gallican Church, the nomination to the biſhopricks belonged, and who made the biſhop of Toulon; it does not leave it with him, or even in the hands of the King of England, or the King of Spain; but in the baſeſt Jacobins of a low ſea-port, to exerciſe, *pro tempore*, the ſovereignty. If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand inſtrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would, delude ourſelves about the true ſtate of this dreadful conteſt. *It is a religious war.* It includes in its object undoubtedly every other intereſt of ſociety as well as this; but this is the principal and leading feature. It is through this deſtruction of religion that our enemies propoſe the accompliſhment of all their other views. The French Revolution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other plan for domeſtick power and foreign empire. Look at all the proceedings of the National Aſſembly from the firſt day of declaring itſelf ſuch in the year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full

half

half of their buſineſs to be directly on this ſubject. In fact it is the ſpirit of the whole. The religious ſyſtem, called the Conſtitutional Church, was on the face of the whole proceeding ſet up only as a mere temporary amuſement to the people, and ſo conſtantly ſtated in all their converſations, till the time ſhould come, when they might with ſafety caſt off the very appearance of all religion whatſoever, and perſecute chriſtianity throughout Europe with fire and ſword. The Conſtitutional Clergy are not the Miniſters of any religion: they are the agents and inſtruments of this horrible conſpiracy againſt all morals. It was from a ſenſe of this, that in the Engliſh Addition to the Articles propoſed at St. Domingo, tolerating all Religions, we very wiſely refuſed to ſuffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.

This religious war is not a controverſy between ſect and ſect as formerly, but a war againſt all ſects and all religions. The queſtion is not whether you are to overturn the catholick, to ſet up the proteſtant. Such an idea in the preſent ſtate of the world is too contemptible. Our buſineſs is to leave to the ſchools the diſcuſſion of the controverted points, abating as much as we can the acrimony of diſputants on all ſides. It is for chriſtian Stateſmen, as the world is now circumſtanced, to ſecure their common Baſis, and not to riſque the ſubverſion of the whole Fabrick by purſuing theſe

diſtinctions

diſtinctions with an ill-timed zeal. We have in the preſent grand Alliance, all modes of Government as well as all modes of religion. In Government, we mean to reſtore that which, notwithſtanding our diverſity of forms we are all agreed in, as fundamental in Government. The ſame principle ought to guide us in the religious part; conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that point we have no ideas in common) but to what will beſt promote the great general ends of the Alliance. As Stateſmen we are to ſee which of thoſe modes beſt ſuits with the intereſts of ſuch a Commonwealth as we wiſh to ſecure and promote. There can be no doubt, but that the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France, muſt go with the Monarchy of France; we know that the Monarchy did not ſurvive the Hierarchy, no not even in appearance, for many months; in ſubſtance, not for a ſingle hour. As little can it exiſt in future, if that pillar is taken away, or even ſhattered and impaired.

If it ſhould pleaſe God to give to the Allies the means of reſtoring peace and order in that focus of war and confuſion, I would, as I ſaid in the beginning of this Memorial, firſt replace the whole of the old Clergy: becauſe we have proof more than ſufficient, that whether they err or not in the ſcholaſtick diſputes with us, they are not tainted

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with atheiſm, the great political evil of the time. I hope I need not apologize for this phraſe, as if I thought religion nothing but policy; it is far from my thoughts; and I hope it is not to be inferred from my expreſſions. But in the light of policy alone I am here conſidering the queſtion. I ſpeak of policy too in a large light; in which large light, policy too is a ſacred thing.

There are many, perhaps half a million or more, calling themſelves proteſtants, in the ſouth of France, and in other of the provinces. Some raiſe them to a much greater number, but I think this nearer to the mark. I am ſorry to ſay, that they have behaved ſhockingly ſince the very beginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly concerned in its worſt and moſt atrocious acts. Their Clergy are juſt the ſame atheiſts with thoſe of the Conſtitutional catholicks; but ſtill more wicked and daring. Three of their number have met, from their Republican aſſociates, the reward of their crimes.

As the antient catholick religion is to be reſtored for the body of France, the antient calviniſtick religion ought to be reſtored for the proteſtants with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one Miniſter concerned in this rebellion ought to be ſuffered amongſt them. If they have not

Clergy

Clergy of their own, men well recommended as untainted with Jacobiniſm, by the ſynods of thoſe places where calviniſm prevails and French is ſpoken, ought to be ſought. Many ſuch there are. The preſbyterian diſcipline ought, in my opinion, to be eſtabliſhed in its vigour, and the people profeſſing it ought to be bound to its maintenance. No man, under the falſe and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conſcience, ought to be ſuffered to have no conſcience at all. The King's commiſſioner ought alſo to ſit in their ſynods as before the revocation of the Edict of Nantz. I am conſcious, that this diſcipline diſpoſes men to Republicaniſm: but it is ſtill a diſcipline, and it is a cure, (ſuch as it is) for the perverſe and undiſciplined habits which for ſome time have prevailed. Republicaniſm repreſſed may have its uſe in the compoſition of a State. Inſpection may be practicable, and reſponſibility in the teachers and elders may be eſtabliſhed in ſuch an Hierarchy as the preſbyterian. For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that people ſhould be taught to meet, to combine, and to be claſſed and arrayed in ſome other way than in Clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the beſt mode of proteſtantiſm under a Monarchy, it is ſtill an orderly chriſtian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men uſeful citizens. It was the impolitick abolition of their diſcipline which

expoſed

expoſed them to the wild opinions and conduct, that have prevailed amongſt the Hugonots. The toleration in 1787 was owing to the good diſpoſition of the late King; but it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheiſtick Miniſter the Cardinal de Lomenie. This miſchievous Miniſter did not follow, in the Edict of toleration, the wiſdom of the Edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted to *Non-Catholicks*—a dangerous word, which might ſignify any thing, and was but too expreſſive of a fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I ſpeak for myſelf: I do not wiſh any man to be converted from his ſect. The diſtinctions which we have reformed from animoſity to emulation, may be even uſeful to the cauſe of religion. By ſome moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas people who change, except under ſtrong conviction (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their early prejudices, eſpecially if the converſion is brought about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright atheiſm.

Another political queſtion ariſes about the mode of Government which ought to be eſtabliſhed. I think the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this Memorial,) puts it on the beſt footing, by poſtponing that arrangement to a time of peace.

When our politicks lead us to enterprize a great, nd almoſt total political revolution in Europe, we ought to look ſeriouſly into the conſequences of what we are about to do. Some eminent perſons diſcover an apprehenſion that the Monarchy, if reſtored in France, may be reſtored in too great ſtrength for the liberty and happineſs of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other States. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that Monarchy. They are perſons too conſiderable from the powers of their mind, and from their ſituation, as well as from the real reſpect I have for them, who ſeem to entertain theſe apprehenſions, to let me paſs them by unnoticed.

As to the power of France, as a State, and in its exteriour relations, I confeſs my fears are on the part of its extreme reduction. There is undoubtedly ſomething in the vicinity of France, which makes it naturally and properly an object of our watchfulneſs and jealouſy, whatever form its Government may take. But the difference is great between a plan for our own ſecurity, and a ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of France. If there were no other countries in the political map but theſe two, I admit that policy might juſtify a wiſh to lower our neighbour to a ſtandard which would even render her in ſome meaſure, if not wholly,

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our dependent. But the ſyſtem of Europe is extenſive and extremely complex. However formidable to us as taken in this one relation, France is not equally dreadful to all other States. On the contrary, my clear opinion is, that the Liberties of Europe cannot poſſibly be preſerved, but by her remaining a very great and preponderating power. The deſign at preſent evidently purſued by the combined Potentates, or of the two who lead, is totally to deſtroy her as ſuch a Power. For Great Britain reſolves that ſhe ſhall have no Colonies, no Commerce, and no Marine. Auſtria means to take away the whole frontier from the borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their plan alſo to render the interiour Government lax and feeble, by preſcribing by force of the arms of rival and jealous nations, and without conſulting the natural intereſts of the kingdom; ſuch arrangements as in the actual ſtate of Jacobiniſm in France, and the unſettled ſtate in which property muſt remain for a long time, will inevitably produce ſuch diſtraction and debility in Government, as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old confuſion. One cannot conceive ſo frightful a ſtate of a Nation. A maritime country, without a marine, and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thouſand miles ſurrounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours! It is poſſible, that ſhe might ſubmit

to loſe her commerce and her colonies; her ſecurity ſhe never can abandon. If, contrary to all expectations, under ſuch a diſgraced and impotent Government, any energy ſhould remain in that country, ſhe will make every effort to recover her ſecurity, which will involve Europe for a century in war and blood. What has it coſt to France to make that frontier? What will it coſt to recover it? Auſtria thinks that without a Frontier ſhe cannot ſecure the *Netherlands*. But without her Frontier France cannot ſecure *herſelf*. Auſtria has been however ſecure for an hundred years in thoſe very Netherlands, and has never been diſpoſſeſſed of them by the chance of war, without a moral certainty of receiving them again on the reſtoration of peace. Her late dangers have ariſen not from the power or ambition of the King of France. They aroſe from her own ill policy, which diſmantled all her towns, and diſcontented all her ſubjects by Jacobinical innovations. She diſmantles her own towns, and then ſays, Give me the Frontier of France. But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of ſecurity, to aggrandize Auſtria, will diſcontent and alarm Pruſſia. Such a length of Frontier on the ſide of France, ſeparated from itſelf, and ſeparated from the maſs of the Auſtrian country, will be weak, unleſs connected at the expence of the Elector of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and other

other leſſer Princes, or by ſuch exchanges as will again convulſe the Empire.

Take it the other way, and let us ſuppoſe that France ſo broken in ſpirit as to be content to remain naked and defenceleſs by ſea and by land, is ſuch a country no prey? Have other Nations no views? Is Poland the only country of which it is worth while to make a partition? We cannot be ſo childiſh as to imagine, that ambition is local, and that no others can be infected with it but thoſe who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude? In this way I hold war equally certain. But I can conceive that both theſe principles may operate, ambition on the part of Auſtria, to cut more and more from France, and French impatience under her degraded and unſafe condition. In ſuch a Conteſt will the other Powers ſtand by? Will not Pruſſia call for indemnity as well as Auſtria and England? Is ſhe ſatisfied with her gains in Poland? By no means. Germany muſt pay; or we ſhall infallibly ſee Pruſſia leagued with France and Spain, and poſſibly with other Powers for the reduction of Auſtria; and ſuch may be the ſituation of things, that it will not be ſo eaſy to decide what part England may take in ſuch a Conteſt.

I am well aware how invidious a taſk it is to oppoſe any thing which tends to the apparent

aggrandizement of our own country. But I think no country can be aggrandized whilſt France is Jacobiniſed. This poſt removed, it will be a ſerious queſtion how far her further reduction will contribute to the general ſafety which I always conſider as included. Among precautions againſt ambition, it may not be amiſs to take one precaution againſt our *own*. I muſt fairly ſay, I dread our *own* power and our *own* ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to ſay we are not men; and that, as men, we ſhall never wiſh to aggrandize ourſelves in ſome way or other. Can we ſay, that even at this very hour we are not invidiouſly aggrandized? We are already in poſſeſſion of almoſt all the commerce of the world. Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we ſhould come to be in a condition not only to have all this aſcendant in commerce, but to be abſolutely able, without the leaſt controul, to hold the commerce of all other Nations totally dependent upon our good pleaſure, we may ſay that we ſhall not abuſe this aſtoniſhing, and hitherto unheard of power. But every other Nation will think we ſhall abuſe it. It is impoſſible but that ſooner or later, this ſtate of things muſt produce a combination againſt us which may end in our ruin.

As to France, I muſt obſerve that for a long time ſhe has been ſtationary. She has, during this whole

whole century, obtained far leſs by conqueſt or negotiation than any of the three great continental Powers. Some part of Lorraine excepted, I recollect nothing ſhe has gained; no not a village. In truth, this Lorraine acquiſition does little more than ſecure her Barrier. In effect and ſubſtance it was her own before.

However that may be, I conſider theſe things at preſent chiefly in one point of view, as obſtructions to the war on Jacobiniſm, which *muſt* ſtand as long as the Powers think its extirpation but a *ſecondary* object, and think of taking advantage under the name of *indemnity* and *ſecurity* to make war upon the whole Nation of France Royal, and Jacobin, for the aggrandizement of the Allies on the ordinary principles of intereſt, as if no Jacobiniſm exiſted in the world.

So far is France from being formidable to its neighbours for its domeſtick ſtrength, that I conceive it will be as much as all its neighbours can do by a ſteady guarantee, to keep that Monarchy at all upon its baſis. It will be their buſineſs to nurſe France, not to exhauſt it. France, ſuch as it is, is indeed highly formidable. Not formidable, however, as a great Republick; but as the moſt dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that ever was embodied. But this diſtempered ſtrength of

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France, will be the cauſe of proportionable weakneſs on its recovery. Never was a country ſo completely ruined; and they who calculate the reſurrection of her power by former examples, have not ſufficiently conſidered what is the preſent ſtate of things. Without detailing the inventory of what organs of Government have been deſtroyed, together with the very materials of which alone they can be recompoſed, I wiſh it to be conſidered what an operoſe affair the whole ſyſtem of taxation is in the old ſtates of Europe. It is ſuch as never could be made but in a long courſe of years. In France, all taxes are aboliſhed. The preſent powers reſort to the capital; and to the capital in kind. But a ſavage undiſciplined people ſuffer a *robbery* with more patience than an *impoſt*. The former is in their habits and their diſpoſitions. They conſider it as tranſient, and as what, in their turn, they may exerciſe. But the terrours of the preſent power are ſuch as no regular Government can poſſibly employ. They who enter into France do not ſucceed to *their* reſources. They have not a ſyſtem to reform, but a ſyſtem to begin. The whole eſtate of Government is to be re-acquired.

What difficulties this will meet with in a country exhauſted by the taking of the capital, and among a people, in a manner new principled, trained, and actually diſciplined to anarchy, rebellion,

lion, diſorder, and impiety, may be conceived by thoſe who know what Jacobin France is, and who may have occupied themſelves by revolving in their thoughts, what they were to do if it fell to their lot to re-eſtabliſh the affairs of France. What ſupport, or what limitations the reſtored Monarchy muſt have, may be a doubt, or how it will pitch and ſettle at laſt: But one thing I conceive to be far beyond a doubt: that the ſettlement cannot be immediate; but that it muſt be preceded by ſome ſort of power, equal at leaſt in vigour, vigilance, promptitude and deciſion to a military Government. For ſuch a *preparatory* Government, no ſlow-paced, methodical, formal, Lawyer-like ſyſtem, ſtill leſs that of a ſhewy, ſuperficial, trifling, intriguing Court, guided by cabals of ladies, or of men like ladies; leaſt of all, a philoſophic, theoretic, diſputatious ſchool of ſophiſtry. None of theſe ever will, or ever can lay the foundations of an order that can laſt. Whoever claims a right by birth to govern there, muſt find in his breaſt, or muſt conjure up in it, an energy not to be expected, perhaps not always to be wiſhed for, in well ordered States. The lawful Prince muſt have, in every thing but crime, the character of an uſurper. He is gone, if he imagines himſelf the quiet poſſeſſor of a throne. He is to contend for it as much after an apparent conqueſt as before. His taſk is to win it; he muſt leave poſterity to

enjoy and to adorn it. No velvet cuſhions for him. He is to be always (I ſpeak nearly to the letter) on horſeback. This opinion is the reſult of much patient thinking on the ſubject, which I conceive no event is likely to alter.

A valuable friend of mine, who I hope will conduct theſe affairs ſo far as they fall to his ſhare, with great ability, aſked me what I thought of acts of general indemnity and oblivion, as a means of ſettling France, and reconciling it to Monarchy. Before I venture upon any opinion of my own in this matter, I totally diſclaim the interference of foreign powers in a buſineſs that properly belongs to the Government which we have declared legal. That Government is likely to be the beſt judge of what is to be done towards the ſecurity of that kingdom, which it is their duty and their intereſt to provide for by ſuch meaſures of juſtice or of lenity, as at the time they ſhould find beſt. But if we weaken it, not only by arbitrary limitations of our own, but preſerve ſuch perſons in it as are diſpoſed to diſturb its future peace, as they have its paſt, I do not know how a more direct declaration can be made of a diſpoſition to perpetual hoſtility againſt a Government. The perſons ſaved from the juſtice of the native Magiſtrate, by foreign authority, will owe nothing to his clemency. He will, and muſt, look to thoſe to

whom he is indebted for the power he has of diſpenſing it. A Jacobin faction, conſtantly foſtered with the nouriſhment of foreign protection, will be kept alive.

This deſire of ſecuring the ſafety of the actors in the preſent ſcene is owing to more laudable motives. Miniſters have been made to conſider the brothers of the late merciful King, and the Nobility of France, who have been faithful to their honor and duty, as a ſet of inexorable and remorſeleſs tyrants. How this notion has been infuſed into them, I cannot be quite certain. I am ſure it is not juſtified by any thing they have done. Never were the two Princes guilty, in the day of their power, of a ſingle hard or ill-natured act. No one inſtance of cruelty on the part of the Gentlemen ever came to my ears. It is true that the *Engliſh* Jacobins, (the natives have not thought of it) as an excuſe for their infernal ſyſtem of murder, have ſo repreſented them. It is on this principle that the maſſacres in the month of September 1792 were juſtified by a writer in the Morning Chronicle. *He* ſays, indeed, that " the whole French nation is to be given up to the hands of an irritated and revengeful Nobleſſe :"—and judging of others by himſelf and his brethren, he ſays, " Whoever ſucceeds in a civil war, will be cruel. But here the emigrants flying to revenge

in the cars of military victory, will almoſt inſatiably call for their victims and their booty; and a body of emigrant traitors were attending the King of Pruſſia, and the Duke of Brunſwick, to ſuggeſt the moſt ſanguinary counſels." So ſays this wicked Jacobin; but ſo cannot ſay the King of Pruſſia nor the Duke of Brunſwick, who never did receive any ſanguinary council; nor did the King's brothers, or that great body of Gentlemen who attended thoſe Princes, commit one ſingle cruel action, or hurt the perſon or property of one individual. It would be right to quote the inſtance. It is like the military luxury attributed to theſe unfortunate ſufferers in our common cauſe.

If theſe Princes had ſhewn a tyrannic diſpoſition, it would be much to be lamented. We have no others to govern France. If we ſcreened the body of murderers from their juſtice, we ſhould only leave the innocent in future to the mercy of men of fierce and ſanguinary diſpoſitions, of which in ſpite of all our intermeddling in their Conſtitution, we could not prevent the effects. But as we have much more reaſon to fear their feeble lenity than any blameable rigour, we ought, in my opinion, to leave the matter to themſelves.

If however I were aſked to give an advice merely as ſuch—here are my ideas. I am not for a total

a total indemnity, nor a general puniſhment. And firſt, the body and maſs of the people never ought to be treated as criminal. They may become an object of more or leſs conſtant watchfulneſs and ſuſpicion, as their preſervation may beſt require, but they can never become an object of puniſhment. This is one of the few fundamental and unalterable principles of politicks.

To puniſh them capitally would be to make maſſacres. Maſſacres only increaſe the ferocity of men, and teach them to regard their own lives and thoſe of others as of little value; whereas the great policy of Government is to teach the people to think both of great importance in the eyes of God and the State, and never to be ſacrificed or even hazarded to gratify their paſſions, or for any thing but the duties preſcribed by the rules of morality, and under the direction of public law and public authority. To puniſh them with leſſer penalties would be to debilitate the commonwealth, and make the nation miſerable, which it is the buſineſs of Government to render happy and flouriſhing.

As to crimes too, I would draw a ſtrong line of limitation. For no one offence, *politically an offence of rebellion*, by council, contrivance, perſuaſion or compulſion, for none properly a *military offence of rebellion*,

rebellion, or any thing done by open hoſtility in the field, ſhould any man at all be called in queſtion; becauſe ſuch ſeems to be the proper and natural death of civil diſſentions. The offences of war are obliterated by peace.

Another claſs will of courſe be included in the indemnity, namely, all thoſe who by their activity in reſtoring lawful Government ſhall obliterate their offences. The offence previouſly known, the acceptance of ſervice is a pardon for crimes. I fear that this claſs of men will not be very numerous.

So far as to indemnity. But where are the objects of juſtice, and of example, and of future ſecurity to the public peace? They are naturally pointed out, not by their having outraged political and civil laws, nor their having rebelled againſt the ſtate, as a State, but by their having rebelled againſt the law of nature, and outraged man, as man. In this liſt, all the regicides in general, all thoſe who laid ſacrilegious hands on the King, who without any thing in their own rebellious miſſion to the convention to juſtify them, brought him to his trial and unanimouſly voted him guilty; all thoſe who had a ſhare in the cruel murder of the Queen, and the deteſtable proceedings with regard to the young King, and the unhappy Princeſſes

ceſſes; all thoſe who committed cold-blooded murder any where, and particularly in their revolutionary tribunals, where every idea of natural juſtice and of their own declared Rights of Man, have been trod under foot with the moſt inſolent mockery; all men concerned in the burning and demolition of houſes or churches, with audacious and marked acts of ſacrilege and ſcorns offered to religion; in general, all the leaders of Jacobin Clubs;—not one of theſe ſhould eſcape a puniſhment ſuitable to the nature, quality and degree of their offence, by a ſteady but a meaſured juſtice.

In the firſt place, no man ought to be ſubject to any penalty, from the higheſt to the loweſt, but by a trial according to the courſe of law, carried on with all that caution and deliberation which has been uſed in the beſt times and precedents of the French juriſprudence, the criminal law of which country, faulty to be ſure in ſome particulars, was highly laudable and tender of the lives of men. In reſtoring order and juſtice, every thing like retaliation, ought to be religiouſly avoided; and an example ought to be ſet of a total alienation from the Jacobin proceedings in their accurſed revolutionary tribunals. Every thing like lumping men in maſſes, and of forming tables of proſcription ought to be avoided.

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In all theſe puniſhments, any thing which can be alledged in mitigation of the offence ſhould be fully conſidered. Mercy is not a thing oppoſed to juſtice. It is an eſſential part of it; as neceſſary in criminal caſes, as in civil affairs equity is to law. It is only for the Jacobins never to pardon. They have not done it in a ſingle inſtance. A council of mercy ought therefore to be appointed, with powers to report on each caſe, to ſoften the penalty, or entirely to remit it, according to circumſtances.

With theſe precautions, the very firſt foundation of ſettlement muſt be to call to a ſtrict account thoſe bloody and mercileſs offenders. Without it Government cannot ſtand a year. People little conſider the utter impoſſibility of getting thoſe who having emerged from very low, ſome from the loweſt claſſes, of ſociety, have exerciſed a power ſo high, and with ſuch unrelenting and bloody a rage, quietly to fall back into their old ranks, and become humble, peaceable, laborious and uſeful members of ſociety. It never can be. On the other hand is it to be believed, that any worthy and virtuous ſubject, reſtored to the ruins of his houſe, will with patience ſee the cold-blooded murderer of his father, mother, wife, or children, or perhaps all of theſe relations (ſuch things have been) noſe him in his own village, and inſult him with

with the riches acquired from the plunder of his goods, ready again to head a Jacobin Faction to attack his life? He is unworthy of the name of man who would ſuffer it. It is unworthy of the name of a Government, which taking juſtice out of the private hand, will not exerciſe it for the injured by the public arm.

I know it ſounds plauſible, and is readily adopted by thoſe who have little ſympathy with the ſufferings of others, to wiſh to jumble the innocent and guilty into one maſs, by a general indemnity. This cruel indifference dignifies itſelf with the name of humanity.

It is extraordinary that as the wicked arts of this regicide and tyrannous faction increaſe in number, variety, and atrocity, the deſire of puniſhing them becomes more and more faint, and the talk of an indemnity towards them, every day ſtronger and ſtronger. Our ideas of juſtice appear to be fairly conquered and overpowered by guilt when it is grown gigantick. It is not the point of view in which we are in the habit of viewing guilt. The crimes we every day puniſh are really below the penalties we inflict. The criminals are obſcure and feeble. This is the view in which we ſee ordinary crimes and criminals. But when guilt is ſeen, though but for a time, to be furniſhed with

the arms and to be inveſted with the robes of power, it ſeems to aſſume another nature, and to get, as it were, out of our juriſdiction. This I fear is the caſe with many. But there is another cauſe full as powerful towards this ſecurity to enormous guilt, the deſire which poſſeſſes people who have once obtained power, to enjoy it at their eaſe. It is not humanity, but lazineſs and inertneſs of mind which produces the deſire of this kind of indemnities. This deſcription of men love general and ſhort methods. If they puniſh, they make a promiſcuous maſſacre; If they ſpare, they make a general act of oblivion. This is a want of diſpoſition to proceed laborioufly according to the caſes, and according to the rules and principles of juſtice on each caſe; a want of diſpoſition to aſſort criminals, to diſcriminate the degrees and modes of guilt, to ſeparate accomplices from principals, leaders from followers, ſeducers from the ſeduced, and then by following the ſame principles in the ſame detail, to claſs puniſhments, and to fit them to the nature and kind of the delinquency. If that were once attempted, we ſhould ſoon ſee that the taſk was neither infinite, nor the execution cruel. There would be deaths, but for the number of criminals, and the extent of France, not many. There would be caſes of tranſportation; caſes of labour to reſtore what has been wickedly deſtroyed; caſes of impriſonment, and caſes of mere exile. But be

this as it may, I am ſure that if juſtice is not done there, there can be neither peace or juſtice there, nor in any part of Europe.

Hiſtory is reſorted to for other acts of indemnity in other times. The Princes are deſired to look back to Henry the Fourth. We are deſired to look to the Reſtoration of King Charles. Theſe things, in my opinion, have no reſemblance whatſoever. They were caſes of a civil war; in France more ferocious, in England more moderate than common. In neither country were the orders of ſociety ſubverted; religion and morality deſtroyed on principle, or property totally annihilated. In England the Government of Cromwell was to be ſure ſomewhat rigid, but for a new power, no ſavage tyranny. The country was nearly as well in his hands as in thoſe of Charles the Second, and in ſome points much better. The laws in general had their courſe, and were admirably adminiſtered. The King did not in reality grant an act of indemnity; the prevailing power, then in a manner the nation, in effect granted an indemnity to *him*. The idea of a preceding Rebellion was not at all admitted in that convention and that parliament. The Regicides were a common enemy, and as ſuch given up.

Among the ornaments of their place which eminently diſtinguiſh them, few people are better acquainted with the hiſtory of their own country than the illuſtrious Princes now in exile: but I caution them not to be led into errour by that which has been ſuppoſed to be the guide of life. I would give the ſame caution to all Princes. Not that I derogate from the uſe of hiſtory. It is a great improver of the underſtanding, by ſhewing both men and affairs in a great variety of views. From this ſource much political wiſdom may be learned; that is, may be learned as habit, not as precept; and as an exerciſe to ſtrengthen the mind, as furniſhing materials to enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory of caſes and precedents for a lawyer: if it were, a thouſand times better would it be that a Stateſman had never learned to read—*vellem neſcirent literas*. This method turns their underſtanding from the object before them, and from the preſent exigencies of the world, to compariſons with former times, of which after all, we can know very little and very imperfectly; and our guides, the hiſtorians, who are to give us their true interpretation, are often prejudiced, often ignorant, often fonder of ſyſtem than of truth. Whereas if a man with reaſonable good parts and natural ſagacity, and not in the leading-ſtrings of any maſter, will look ſteadily on the buſineſs before him, without being diverted by retroſpect and compariſon, he may be capable of forming

forming a reaſonable good judgment of what is to be done. There are ſome fundamental points in which nature never changes—but they are few and obvious, and belong rather to morals than to politicks. But ſo far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are ſuſceptible of infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly new and unlooked for. Very few, for inſtance, could have imagined that property, which has been taken for natural dominion, ſhould, through the whole of a vaſt kingdom, loſe all its importance and even its influence. This is what hiſtory or books of ſpeculation could hardly have taught us. How many could have thought, that the moſt complete and formidable Revolution in a great empire ſhould be made by men of letters, not as ſubordinate inſtruments and trumpeters of ſedition, but as the chief contrivers and managers, and in a ſhort time as the open adminiſtrators and ſovereign Rulers? Who could have imagined that Atheiſm could produce one of the moſt violently operative principles of fanaticiſm? Who could have imagined that, in a Commonwealth in a manner cradled in war, and in an extenſive and dreadful war, military commanders ſhould be of little or no account? That the Convention ſhould not contain one military man of name? That adminiſtrative bodies in a ſtate of the utmoſt confuſion, and of but a momentary duration, and compoſed of men

with

with not one impoſing part of character, ſhould be able to govern the country and its armies, with an authority which the moſt ſettled Senates, and the moſt reſpected Monarchs ſcarcely ever had in the ſame degree? This, for one, I confeſs I did not foreſee, though all the reſt was preſent to me very early, and not out of my apprehenſion even for ſeveral years.

I believe very few were able to enter into the effects of mere *terrour*, as a principle not only for the ſupport of power in given hands or forms, but in thoſe things in which the ſoundeſt political Speculators were of opinion, that the leaſt appearance of force would be totally deſtructive,—ſuch is the the market, whether of money, proviſion, or commodities of any kind. Yet for four years we have ſeen loans made, treaſuries ſupplied, and armies levied and maintained, more numerous than France ever ſhewed in the field, by the *effects of fear alone.*

Here is a ſtate of things of which, in its totality, if hiſtory furniſhes any examples at all, they are very remote and feeble. I therefore am not ſo ready as ſome are, to tax with folly or cowardice, thoſe who were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature. Even now, after the events, all the cauſes may be ſomewhat difficult to aſcertain. Very many are however traceable. But theſe things hiſtory and books

books of ſpeculation (as I have already ſaid) did not teach men to foreſee, and of courſe to reſiſt. Now that they are no longer a matter of ſagacity, but of experience, of recent experience, of our own experience, it would be unjuſtifiable to go back to the records of other times, to inſtruct us to manage what they never enabled us to foreſee.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS from *VATTEL*'s LAW of NATIONS.

[The Titles, marginal Abſtracts and Notes, are by Mr. BURKE, excepting ſuch of the Notes as are here diſtinguiſhed.]

CASES OF INTERFERENCE WITH INDEPENDENT POWERS.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. § 53.

IF then there is any where a Nation of a *reſtleſs and miſchievous* diſpoſition, always ready to *injure others, to traverſe their deſigns, and to raiſe domeſtic troubles* *, it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to join *in order to repreſs, chaſtiſe, and put it ever after out of its power* to injure them. Such ſhould be the juſt fruits of the policy which Machiavel praiſes in Cæſar Borgia. The conduct followed by Philip II. king of Spain, *was adapted to unite all Europe againſt him*; and it was from juſt reaſons that Henry the Great formed the deſign of humbling a power, *formidable by its forces, and pernicious by its maxims.*

§ 70. Let us apply to the unjuſt, what we have ſaid above (§ 53), of a miſchievous, or maleficent Nation. If there be any that makes an open profeſſion *of trampling Juſtice under foot, of deſpiſing and violating the right of*

* This the caſe of France—Semonville at Turin—Jacobin clubs—Liegois meeting—Flemiſh meeting—La Fayette's anſwer—Cloots's embaſſy—Avignon.

others *, whenever it finds an opportunity, *the intereſt of human ſociety will authorize all others to unite, in order to humble and chaſtiſe it.* We do not here forget the maxim eſtabliſhed in our preliminaries, that it does not belong to nations to uſurp the power of being judges of each other. In particular caſes, liable to the leaſt doubt, it ought to be ſuppoſed, that each of the parties may have ſome right: and the injuſtice of that which has committed the injury, may proceed from error, and not from a general contempt of juſtice. *But if, by conſtant maxims, and by a continued conduct,* one Nations ſhews, that it has evidently this pernicious diſpoſition, and that it conſiders no right as ſacred, the ſafety of the human Race requires that it ſhould be ſuppreſſed. To form and ſupport an unjuſt pretenſion, is to do an injury *not only to him who is intereſted in this pretenſion, but to mock at juſtice in general, and to injure all Nations.*

To ſuccour againſt Tyranny.

§ 56. If the Prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his ſubjects a legal right to reſiſt him; if Tyranny, *becoming inſupportable*, obliges the Nation to riſe in their defence; every foreign power has a right to ſuccour an oppreſſed people who implore their aſſiſtance. The Engliſh juſtly complained of James the Second. The *Nobility, and the moſt diſtinguiſhed Patriots*, reſolved to put a check on his enterprizes, which manifeſtly tended to overthrow the Conſtitution, and to deſtroy the liberties and the religion of the people; *and therefore applied for aſſiſtance to the United Provinces.* The authority of the Prince of Orange had, doubtleſs, an influence on the deliberations of the States-General; but it did not make them commit injuſtice; for when a people, from good reaſons, take up arms againſt an Oppreſſor, *juſtice and generoſity require, that brave men ſhould be aſſiſted in the defence of their liberties.* Whenever, therefore, a civil war is kindled in a ſtate, foreign powers may aſſiſt that party which appears to them to have juſtice on their ſide. *He who aſſiſts an odious* Tyrant; *he who declares* FOR AN UNJUST AND REBELLIOUS PEOPLE, *offends againſt his duty.* When the bands of the political ſociety are broken,

Caſe of Engliſh Revolution.

Caſe of Civil War.

An odious Tyrant. Rebellious people.

* The French acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the people.

or at leaſt ſuſpended between the Sovereign and his people, they may then be conſidered as two diſtinct powers; and ſince each is independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and each of thoſe who grant their aſſiſtance may believe that he ſupports a good cauſe. It follows then, in virtue of the voluntary Law of Nations, (ſee Prelim. § 21) that the two parties may act as having an equal right, and behave accordingly, till the deciſion of the affair.

Sovereign and his people, when diſtinct powers.

But we ought not to abuſe this maxim for authorizing odious proceedings againſt the tranquility of ſtates. It is a violation of the Law of Nations *to perſuade thoſe ſubjects to revolt who actually obey their Sovereign, though they complain of his Government.*

Not to be purſued to an extreme. Endeavour to perſuade ſubjects to a revolt.

The practice of Nations is conformable to our maxims. When the German Proteſtants came to the aſſiſtance of the reformed in France, the Court never undertook to treat them otherwiſe than as common enemies, and according to the Laws of War. France at the ſame time aſſiſted the Netherlands, which took up arms againſt Spain, and did not pretend that her troops ſhould be conſidered upon any other footing than as auxiliaries in a regular war. But no *power avoids complaining of an atrocious injury, if any one attempts by his emiſſaries to excite his ſubjects to revolt.*

Attempt to excite ſubjects to revolt.

As to thoſe Monſters who, under the title of Sovereigns, render themſelves the ſcourges and horror of the human race; theſe are ſavage Beaſts, from which every brave man may juſtly purge the Earth. All antiquity has praiſed Hercules for delivering the world from an Antæus, a Buſiris, and a Diomedes.

Tyrants.

Book 4. Chap. 2. § 14. After ſtating, that nations have no right to interfere in domeſtick concerns, he proceeds—"But this rule does not preclude them from eſpouſing the quarrel of a dethroned King, and aſſiſting him, if he appears to have juſtice on his ſide. They then declare themſelves enemies to the Nation who has acknowledged his rival, as when two *different Nations* are at war they are at liberty to aſſiſt that whoſe quarrel they think has the faireſt appearance."

CASE OF ALLIANCES.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. § 196.

When an alliance to preſerve a King takes place.

King does not loſe his quality by the loſs of his kingdom.

It is aſked if that Alliance ſubſiſts with the King and the Royal Family, when by ſome Revolution they are deprived of their Crown? We have lately remarked, (§ 194) that a perſonal alliance expires with the reign of him who contracted it: but that is to be underſtood of an alliance with the ſtate, limited as to its duration, to the reign of the contracting King. This, of which we are here ſpeaking, is of another nature. For though it binds the ſtate, ſince it is bound by all the public acts of its Sovereign, it is made directly in favour of the King and his Family; it would therefore be abſurd for it to terminate at the moment when they *have need of it, and at an event againſt which it was made.* Beſides, the King does not loſe his quality merely by the loſs of his kingdom. * *If he is ſtripped of it unjuſtly by an Uſurper, or by Rebels, he preſerves his rights, in the number of which are* his alliances.

* By the ſeventh Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, between France, England, and Holland, ſigned at the Hague, in the year 1717, it is ſtipulated, "that if the kingdoms, countries, or "provinces, of any of the Allies, are diſturbed by inteſtine quar-"rels, or *by rebellions, on account of the ſaid ſucceſſions*, [the Pro-"teſtant ſucceſſion to the throne of Great Britain, and the ſucceſſion "to the throne of France, as ſettled by the Treaty of Utrecht] "or *under any other pretext whatever*, the Ally thus in trouble "ſhall have full right to demand of his Allies the ſuccours above-"mentioned;" that is to ſay, the ſame ſuccours as in the caſe of an invaſion from any foreign Power; 8000 foot and 2000 horſe to be furniſhed by France or England, and 4000 foot and 1000 horſe by the States General.

By the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, between England, France, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, ſigned in the Year 1718, the contracting powers "promiſe and "oblige themſelves that they will and ought to maintain, guarantee, "and defend the right and ſucceſſion to the kingdom of France, "according to the tenor of the Treaties made at Utrecht the 11th "day of April, 1713; and this they ſhall perform *againſt all per-"ſons whatſoever who may preſume to diſturb the order of the ſaid "ſucceſſion*, in contradiction to the previous Acts and Treaties ſub-"ſequent thereon."

The above Treaties have been revived and confirmed by every ſubſequent Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France.

EDIT.

But

But who ſhall judge, if the King be dethroned lawfully or by violence? An independent Nation acknowledges no judge. If the Body of the Nation declares the King deprived of his rights by the abuſe he has made of them, and depoſes him, it may juſtly do it *when its grievances are well founded*, and no other power has a right to cenſure it. The perſonal Ally of this King, ought not then to aſſiſt him againſt the Nation that has made uſe of its right in depoſing him: if he attempts it, he injures that Nation. England declared war againſt Louis the XIVth, in the year 1688, for ſupporting the intereſt of James the Second, who was depoſed in form by the Nation. The ſame country declared war againſt him a ſecond time, at the beginning of the preſent century, becauſe that Prince acknowledged the ſon of the depoſed James, under the name of James the Third. In doubtful caſes, and *when the Body of the Nation has not pronounced, or* HAS NOT PRONOUNCED FREELY, a Sovereign may naturally ſupport and defend an Ally, and it is then that the voluntary Law of Nations ſubſiſts between different ſtates. The party that has driven out the King, pretends to have right on its ſide: this unhappy King and his Ally, flatter themſelves with having the ſame advantage, and as they have no common judge upon earth, they have no other method to take but to apply to arms to terminate the diſpute: they therefore engage in a formal war.

Caſe wherein aid may be given to a depoſed King.

In ſhort, when the foreign Prince has faithfully fulfilled his engagements towards an unfortunate Monarch, when he has done in his defence, or to procure his reſtoration, all he was obliged to perform, in virtue of the alliance; if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned Prince cannot require him to ſupport an endleſs war in his favour, or expect that he will eternally remain the Enemy of the Nation, or of the Sovereign who has deprived him of the Throne. He muſt think of peace, abandon the Ally, and conſider him as having himſelf abandoned his right, through neceſſity. Thus Louis XIV. was obliged to abandon James the Second, and to acknowledge K. William, though he had at firſt treated him as an Uſurper.

Not obliged to purſue his right beyond a certain point.

The ſame queſtion preſents itſelf in real alliances, and in general, in all alliances made with the ſtate, and not in particular with a King for the defence of his perſon.

An

Caſe of defence againſt ſubjects.

An Ally ought, doubtleſs, to be defended againſt every invaſion, againſt every foreign violence, *and even againſt his rebellious ſubjects; in the ſame manner a Republick ought to be defended againſt the enterprizes of one who attempts to deſtroy the public liberty.* But it ought to be remembered, that an Ally of the State, or the Nation, is not its Judge. If the Nation has depoſed its King in form; if the people of a Republick have driven out their Magiſtrates, and ſet themſelves at liberty, or acknowledged the authority of an Uſurper, either expreſsly or tacitly; to oppoſe theſe domeſtick regulations, by diſputing their juſtice or validity, would be to interfere in the Government of the Nation, and to do it an injury, (ſee § 54, and following of this book). The Ally remains the Ally of the State, notwithſtanding the change that has happened in it. *However, when this change renders the alliance uſeleſs, dangerous or diſagreeable, it may renounce it: for it may ſay, upon a good foundation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that Nation, had it been under the preſent form of Government.*

Caſe where real alliances may be renounced.

We may ſay here, what we have ſaid on a perſonal alliance: however juſt the cauſe of that King may be, who is driven from the throne, either by his ſubjects or by a foreign uſurper; his Allies are not obliged to ſupport *an eternal war* in his favour. After having made ineffectual efforts to reſtore him, they muſt at length give peace to their people, and come to an accommodation with the Uſurper, and for that purpoſe treat with him as with a lawful Sovereign. Louis XIV. exhauſted by a bloody and unſucceſsful war, offered at Gertruidenburg to abandon his grandſon, whom he had placed on the throne of Spain: and when affairs had changed their appearance, Charles of Auſtria, the rival of Philip, ſaw himſelf, in his turn, abandoned by his Allies. They grew weary of exhauſting their ſtates, in order to give him the poſſeſſion of a Crown, which they believed to be his due, but which, to all appearance, they ſhould never be able to procure for him.

Not an eternal war.

DANGEROUS POWER.

BOOK III. CHAP. III. § 45.

All nations may join.

It is ſtill eaſier to prove, that ſhould this formidable Power betray any unjuſt and ambitious diſpoſitions, by doing the leaſt injuſtice to another, every Nation may avail themſelves of the occaſion, and join their forces to thoſe of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambitious Power, and diſable it from ſo eaſily oppreſſing its neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives a Nation a right to provide for its future ſafety, by taking away from the violator the means of oppreſſion. It is lawful, and even praiſe-worthy, to aſſiſt thoſe who are oppreſſed, or unjuſtly attacked.

SYSTEM OF EUROPE.

§ 47. Europe forms a political ſyſtem, a body, where the whole is connected by the relations and different intereſts of Nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is not, as anciently, a confuſed heap of detached pieces, each of which thought itſelf very little concerned in the fate of others, and ſeldom regarded things which did immediately relate to it. The continual attention of Sovereigns to what is on the carpet, the conſtant reſidence of miniſters, and the *perpetual negociations, make Europe a kind of a Republick, the members of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common intereſt, for the maintenance of order and liberty.* Hence aroſe that famous ſcheme of the political equilibrium, or balance of power; by which is underſtood ſuch a diſpoſition of things, as no power is able abſolutely to predominate, or to preſcribe laws to others.

Europe a Republick to preſerve order and liberty.

§ 49. Confederacies would be a ſure way of preſerving the equilibrium, and ſupporting the liberty of Nations, did all Princes thoroughly underſtand their true intereſts, and regulate all their ſteps for the good of the ſtate.

CON-

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.

BOOK III. CHAP. IX. § 165.

INSTEAD of the pillage of the country, and defenceleſs places, a cuſtom has been ſubſtituted more humane and more advantageous to the Sovereign making war: I mean that of contributions. Whoever carries *on a juſt war* *, *has a right of making the enemy's country contribute to the ſupport of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war.* Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the ſubjects of the enemy, on ſubmitting to this impoſition, are ſecured from pillage, and the country is preſerved: but a general who would not ſully his reputation, is to moderate his contributions, and proportion them to thoſe on whom they are impoſed. An exceſs in this point, is not without the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity: if it ſhews leſs ferocity than ravage and deſtruction, it glares with avarice.

To be moderate.

ASYLUM.

BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. § 232.

IF an exile or baniſhed man is driven from his country for any crime, it does *not* belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to puniſh him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of puniſhing only for their defence and ſafety; whence it follows that he can only be puniſhed by thoſe whom he has offended.

§. 233. But this reaſon ſhews, that if the juſtice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the puniſhment of crimes committed within its own territories, we ought to except from this rule the villains who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all

* Contributions raiſed by the Duke of Brunſwick in France. Compare theſe with the Contributions raiſed by the French in the Netherlands. EDIT.

publick

public ſecurity, and declare themſelves the enemies of the human race. Poiſoners, aſſaſſins, and incendiaries by profeſſion, may be exterminated wherever they are ſeized; for they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundations of the common ſafety. Thus pirates are brought to the gibbet, by the firſt into whoſe hands they fall. If the Sovereign of the country where thoſe crimes have been committed reclaims the authors of them, in order to bring them to puniſhment, they ought to be reſtored to him, as one who is *principally* intereſted in puniſhing them in an exemplary manner: and it being proper to convict the guilty, and to try them according to ſome form of law; this is a *ſecond* [not ſole] reaſon, why malefactors are uſually delivered up at the deſire of the ſtate where their crimes have been committed.

Ibid. § 230. Every nation has a right of refuſing to admit a ſtranger into the country, when he cannot enter into it without putting it into evident danger, or without doing it a remarkable prejudice *.

FOREIGN MINISTERS.

BOOK IV. CHAP. 5. § 66.

THE obligation does not go ſo far as to ſuffer at all times, perpetual Miniſters, who are deſirous of reſiding with a Sovereign, though they have nothing to negociate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the ſentiments which nations owe to each other, that theſe reſident Miniſters, when there is *nothing to be feared from their ſtay*, ſhould be friendly received: but if there be any ſolid reaſon againſt this, what is for the good of the State ought unqueſtionably to be preferred; and the foreign Sovereign cannot take it amiſs if his Miniſter, who has concluded the affairs of his commiſſion, and has no other affairs to negotiate, be deſired to depart †. The cuſtom of keeping every

* The third Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, and the latter part of the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE ſtipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection ſhall be given to rebellious ſubjects of the contracting powers.—EDIT.

† Diſmiſſion of Mr. Chauvelin.—EDIT.

where Miniſters continually reſident, is now ſo ſtrongly eſtabliſhed, that the refuſal of a conformity to it would, without *very good reaſons*, give offence. Theſe reaſons may ariſe from *particular* conjunctures; but there are alſo common reaſons always ſubſiſting, and ſuch as relate to the conſtitution of *a Government*, *and the ſtate of a Nation*. The Republicks have often very good reaſons of the latter kind, to excuſe themſelves from continually ſuffering Foreign Miniſters, who *corrupt the Citizens*, *in order to gain them over to their Maſters*, *to the great prejudice of the Republick*, *and fomenting of the Parties*, &c. And ſhould they only diffuſe among a Nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous, a taſte for luxury, avidity for money, and the manners of courts, theſe would be more than ſufficient for wiſe and provident Rulers to diſmiſs them.

FINIS.