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


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
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BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.



BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA
OR BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
OF MY LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS
BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

SECOND EDITION PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION IN PART
BY THE LATE HENRY NELSON COLERIDGE
COMPLETED AND PUBLISHED
BY HIS WIDOW



VOL. I.

LONDON
WILLIAM PICKERING

1847

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TO
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Esq. P. L.

MY DEAR MR. WORDSWORTH,

I HAVE received with great pleasure your permission to inscribe to you this new edition of my Father's *Biographia Literaria*. You will find in it some of the latest writings of my dear departed Husband;—some too of my own, to which I know you will be indulgent; but my chief reason for dedicating it to you is, that it contains, though only in a brief and fragmentary form, an account of the Life and Opinions of your friend, S. T. Coleridge, in which I feel assured that, however you may dissent from portions of the latter, you take a high and peculiar interest. His name was early associated with your's from the time when you lived as neighbours, and both together sought the Muse, in the lovely Vale of Stowey. That this association may endure as long as you are both remembered,—that not only as a Poet, but as a Lover and a Teacher of Wisdom, my Father may continue to be spoken of in connection with you, while your writings become more and more fully and widely appreciated, is the dearest and proudest wish that I can form for his memory.

I remain, dear Mr. Wordsworth,
With deep affection, admiration, and respect,
Your Child in heart and faithful Friend,

SARA COLERIDGE.

REGENT'S PARK,
January 30, 1847.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS new edition of my Father's *Biographia Literaria* was partly prepared for publication by his late Editor. The corrections of the text in the first nine or ten chapters of Vol. I. and in the first three or four of Vol. II. are by his hand; the notes signed "Editor" were written by him; and he drew up the *Biographical Supplement*, (the first three chapters of it containing the Letters), which is placed at the end of the second volume. His work it has fallen to me to complete, and the task has been interesting, though full of affecting remembrances, and brought upon me by the deepest sorrow of my life. The biographical sketch I have published as I found it, with trifling alterations and omissions, filling up a few gaps and supplying the mottoes. Had the writer himself taken it up again, he would probably have improved and continued it.

I have only to add that my thanks are due to many kind friends, who have assisted me in my part of the undertaking with advice, information, or loan of books; especially my Father's dear Friend and Fellow Student, Mr. Green, Archdeacon Hare, and my brother-in-law, Mr. Justice Coleridge. I am also much indebted for help toward my work to Mr. Pickering, by whom a great number of the books referred to in the notes were placed in my hands.

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INTRODUCTION.

Mr. Coleridge's obligations to Schelling, and the unfair view of the subject presented in Blackwood's Magazine.



SOME years ago, when the late Editor of my Father's works was distantly contemplating a new edition of the *Biographia Literaria*, but had not yet begun to examine the text carefully with a view to this object, his attention was drawn to an article in Blackwood's Magazine of March 1840, in which "the very large and unacknowledged appropriations it contains from the great German Philosopher Schelling" are pointed out; and by this paper I have been directed to those passages in the works of Schelling and of Maasz, to which references are given in the following pages,—to most of them immediately, and to a few more through the strict investigation which it occasioned. Whether or no my Father's obligations to the great German Philosopher *are* virtually unacknowledged to the extent and with the unfairness which the writer of that article labours to prove, the reader of the present edition will be able to judge for himself; the facts of the case will be all before him, and from these, when the whole of them are fully and fairly considered, I feel

assured that by readers in general,—and I have had some experience on this point already,—no such injurious inferences as are contained in that paper will ever be drawn. The author, it must be observed, before commencing his argument, thinks fit to disclaim the belief, that conscious intentional plagiarism is imputable to the object of his censure; nevertheless, throughout great part of it, Mr. Coleridge is treated as an artful purloiner and selfish plunderer, who knowingly robs others to enrich himself, both the tone and the language of the article expressing this and no other meaning. Such aspersions will not rest, I think they never *have* rested, upon Coleridge's name; the protest here entered is a duty to his memory from myself rather than a work necessary to his vindication, and the remarks that follow are made less with a view to influence the opinions of others than to record my own.

The charge brought against my Father by the author of the article appears to be this, that, having borrowed largely from Schelling,¹ he has made no adequate acknowledgments of obligation to that philosopher, only such general admissions as are quite insufficient to cover the extent of his debt; that his anticipatory defence against a charge of “ungenerous concealment or intentional plagiarism” is no defence at all; and that his particular references are too few and inaccurate to vindicate him from having dealt

¹ The passages borrowed by my Father from Schelling and Maasz are pointed out in this edition in notes at the foot of the pages where they occur. For the particulars and amount of the debt, therefore, readers are referred to the body of the work, chapters v. vii. viii. ix. xii. in the first volume.

unfairly toward the author from whom he has taken so much. The plaintiff opens his case with giving as the *whole* of this defence of my Father's,—(that it is *not* the whole will appear in the sequel,)—certain parts of a passage upon Schelling that occurs in the ninth chapter of the *Biographia Literaria*; and although, in that passage, the author desires, that, “whatever in this or any future work of his resembles or coincides with the doctrines of his German predecessor though contemporary be *wholly attributed to him*,” yet he insists that Coleridge has *defrauded* Schelling of his due, and seeks to support the impeachment on these two grounds, first that very “absence of distinct references to his books,” which he himself plainly admits and particularly accounts for; or, in the accuser's own words, his omission of specific acknowledgments in the instances in which he was indebted to him; secondly, his having affirmed that he had in some sort anticipated the system which he proposed to teach.

Now it must be remarked, by way of preliminary, that no man can properly be said to *defraud* another, nor ought to be so spoken of, who has not a fraudulent *intention*: but it never yet has been proved, after all the pains that have been taken to this effect, that Mr. Coleridge *intended* to deprive Schelling of any part of the honour that rightfully belongs to him, or that he has, by Mr. Coleridge's means, been actually deprived of it, even for an hour. With regard to the first ground of accusation, it is doubtless to be regretted by every friend of the accused, that he should have adopted so important a portion of the words and thoughts of Schelling without himself making those *distinct* and *accurate* references, which he might have

viii *Mr. C.'s Literary Habits indicative of*

known would eventually be required as surely as he succeeded in his attempt to recommend the metaphysical doctrines contained in them to the attention of students in this country. Why did Mr. Coleridge act thus, subjecting himself, as he might well have anticipated, aware as he was of the hostile spirit against his person and principles, that existed in many quarters, to suspicion from the illiberal, and contumelious treatment at the hands of the hard and unscrupulous? Why he so acted those who *best* knew him can well understand, without seeing in his conduct evidence of unconscientiousness: *they* see the truth of the matter to be this, that to give those distinct and accurate references, for the neglect of which he is now so severely arraigned, would have caused him much trouble of a kind to him peculiarly irksome, and that he dispensed himself from it in the belief, that the general declaration which he had made upon the subject was sufficient both for Schelling and for himself. This will be the more intelligible when it is borne in mind, that, as all who knew his literary habits will believe, the passages from Schelling, which he wove into his work, were not transcribed *for the occasion*, but merely transferred from his note-book into the text, some of them, in all likelihood, not even from his note-book immediately, but from recollection of its contents. It is most probable that he mistook some of these translated passages for compositions of his own, and quite improbable, as all who know his careless ways will agree, that he should have noted down accurately the particular works and portions of works from which they came.

“ But even with the fullest conviction,” says Archdeacon Hare, “ that Coleridge cannot have been guilty

of intentional plagiarism, the reader will, probably, deem it strange, that he should have transferred half a dozen pages of Schelling into his volume without any reference to their source. And strange it undoubtedly is. The only way I can see of accounting for it is from his practice of keeping note-books or journals of his thoughts, filled with observations and brief dissertations on such matters as happened to strike him, with a sprinkling now and then of extracts and abstracts from the books he was reading. If the name of the author from whom he took an extract was left out, he might easily, years after, forget whose property it was, especially when he had made it in some measure his own, by transfusing it into his own English. That this may happen I know from experience, having myself been lately puzzled by a passage which I had translated from Kant some years ago, and which cost me a good deal of search, before I ascertained that it was not my own.”²

My Father says himself, in the ninth chapter of this work, “I have not indeed (*eheu! res angusta domi!*) been hitherto able to procure more than two of his books, viz. the first volume of his collected Tracts, and his *System of Transcendental Idealism*; to which, however, I must add a small pamphlet against Fichte, the spirit of which was to *my* feelings painfully incongruous with the principles, and which (with the usual allowance afforded to an antithesis) displayed the love of wisdom rather than the wisdom of love.” From this pamphlet (entitled *Darlegung &c. Exposition of the true relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the*

² From Mr. Hare’s defence of Coleridge in the British Magazine of January 1835, pp. 20, 21.

improved doctrine of Fichte,) he had just cited a striking passage, and it is represented as strangely disingenuous, that he should have given that extract merely as "observations from a contemporary writer of the continent," without specifying the particular work from which it was taken, or even the writer's name. So indeed it may appear on an examination undertaken ostensibly for the *love of wisdom*, but a still closer one, conducted in the *wisdom of love*, will convince any reader that there was as little of self-regard in this transaction as of accuracy. At that stage of his work, at which the citation is made, my Father had not yet introduced Schelling to his readers, readers unacquainted, as he doubtless imagined, with the German philosopher and his writings. He immediately proceeds, however, to give an account of the authors whom he successively studied, when he had "found no abiding place for his reason" in the "schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley;" and *then*, after doing honour to Kant and justice to Fichte, he speaks of Schelling by name, and mentions *every work of his to which he ever owed anything*. The "*Vorlesungen über die Methode des Academischen Studiums*," which, as well as the *Darlegung*, is mentioned as containing the word *In-eins-bildung*, the original, as is supposed, of his "esemplastic," he never possessed and probably never saw. In mentioning the pamphlet against Fichte he, naturally enough, described its general character, and probably either forgot, while he was so doing, that from this same work his previous citation had been made, or felt that for readers,

³ See vol. i. p. 146. Of the use made by the writer in Bl. of this passage I shall have to speak again further on.

to whom the very name of Schelling was new, such particularity as that of reciting its long title, and referring to it the passage he had brought forward, was superfluous.

Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur was one of the works of Schelling which my Father had not in his possession, when he composed the *Biographia Literaria*, and it is *remarked* that he entitled it Schelling's *Natur-Philosophie*!—that he had presumed to contract the proper name of a book he had once read, from its fuller form in the title-page, to that abridged one, which it probably wore upon its back. No comment is made, indeed, upon this important fact, but *that* is supplied by the strain of the article.

His accuser urges against him that he did not elaborate over again what he had borrowed and thus make it, in some sense, his own. It is not easy to see how *that which is borrowed* can ever, strictly speaking, become the property of the borrower, so as to cease to be that of the original possessor; the new form in which he invests it, or the fresh matter which he engrafts upon it, will be his, but the debt to him who has furnished the substance, in the one case, or the *nucleus*, in the other, is not cancelled because of these additions, and honesty as well as gratitude would equally require its acknowledgment, though the obligation will be less apparent to the general reader. And surely if there had been any design of *appropriating* in my Father's mind, he would have sought to make the borrowed passages *appear* his own, by change of expression at least. It has been well said of the genuine Plagiary that his

“easy vamping talents lies
First wit to pilfer, then *disguise*.”

This is the plan which all crafty plagiarists adopt ; this is the way in which numberless writers have dealt with my Father himself, the major part of them, however, not craftily or selfishly, but doubtless unawares to themselves ; there being far less of conscious, far more of unconscious, plagiarism among authors than the world is apt to suppose. But Coleridge repeated the *very words* of Schelling, and in so doing made it an easy task for the German to reclaim his own, or for the dullest wight that could read his books to give it him back again. Must he not have been careless of the *meum* at least as much as of the *tuum*, when he took whole pages and paragraphs, unaltered in form, from a noted author—whose writings, though unknown in this country, when he first brought them forward, were too considerable in his own to be finally merged in those of any other man,—at the same time that he was doing all that in him lay to lead Englishmen to the study of that author, and was referring readers to his works both generally, and in some instances, and those the most important, particularly ? From his accuser's blustering conclusion, — “ Plagiarism, like murder, will out ! ” it might be supposed that Mr. Coleridge had *taken pains* to prevent his “ plagiarisms ” from coming out,—that with the “ stealthy pace ” of the *murderer* he had “ moved towards his design like a ghost. ” Verily, if no man ever tried to murder an author's good name with more of malice prepense than he to steal one, the literary world would be freer from felonious practices than it is at present.⁴

⁴ “ Of a truth,” says Mr. Hare, “ if he had been disposed to purloin, he never would have stolen half a dozen pages from the head and front of that very work of Schelling's which was

One of the largest extracts my Father accompanies with these words in a parenthesis (See *Schell. Abhandl. zur Erläuter, des Id. der Wissenschaftslehre.*)⁵ “But from this reference,” asks the censor, “would not a reader naturally deduce the inference that C. was here referring to Schelling in support of *his own* views, and not literally translating and appropriating the German’s?”

There are some who have eyes to see and microscopically too, but only in certain directions. To those whose vision is more catholic I address the plain question, Did not my Father say fully enough to put every reader of a studious turn, every reader able to take up his philosophical views in earnest,—(and to whom else were these borrowed passages more than strange words, or Schelling’s claims of the slightest consequence?)—into the way of consulting their original source? *The longer extracts are all either expressly acknowledged, as that from the Darlegung in chap. ix. and that beginning at p. 255; or taken from the Transcendental Idealism, which he speaks of more than once, or from the above-mentioned treatise, of which he gives the long title.*

the likeliest to fall into his reader’s hands; and the first sentence of which one could not read without detecting the plagiarism. Would any man think of pilfering a column from the porch of St. Paul’s? The high praise which Coleridge bestows on Schelling would naturally excite a wish in such of his readers as felt an interest in his philosophy, to know more of the great German. The first books of his they would take up would be his *Natur-Philosophie* and his *Transcendental Idealism*; these are the works which Coleridge himself mentions; and the latter, from its subject, would attract them the most.”—*Brit. Mag.* of 1835, p. 20.

⁵ See p. 255.

Most of these extracts the Writer in Blackwood refers, *not to the treatise, which my Father did name, but to the collection at large—the Philosophische Schriften*—which it so happened that he did *not*; and moreover he asserts, that it would be *next to impossible* for a reader to find the tract referred to by this same long title, for that it is “*buried* among a good many others in Schelling’s *Phil. Schrift.*” of which it occupies 137 pages out of 511—as if it could not *possibly* enter his head or the head of any bookseller that he might employ, to look for it in the “volume of Schelling’s collected Tracts” which my Father speaks of in chapter ix. If the works of Schelling were as good as dead and buried for all here, that was not through any fault of his; had he named every one of their titles at full length, and given an abstract of all they contained, the bill of fare, at that time, would have attracted no guests. Grill would be Grill, and have his unmetaphysic mind.

Fairly considered his conduct in this matter does but help to prove the truth of his assertion, that he “regarded Truth as a divine ventriloquist, not caring from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible.”

The Writer in Blackwood, however, takes a very different view of it: *he* rather supposes the true interpretation of my Father’s conduct to be that he would have *nothing* ascribed to Schelling, which appeared in the works of both, though he desires that *everything* may be, and that this expression was used to provide a refuge for himself, should he ever be discovered to have “cabbaged from his works *ad libitum.*” The style of these strictures resembles the reasoning; things look *rough* and *coarse* on the wrong side, and

the reasoning they contain is of that kind, which turns things wrong side out. It represents my Father's apology as being penned under a notion that he should *gain credit* for the transcendentalism contained in his book, while at the same time no comparison betwixt his writings and those of the original transcendentalist would for years, if ever, be made. It was the fact that for years his obligations to Schelling were not discovered; but it is ridiculous to suppose that he *calculated* on this, with the amount of those obligations distinctly present to his mind, for this could only have happened through the failure of the attempt he was making to interest his countrymen in the transcendental system. When a doctrine comes into credit, in days like these, the first teacher of it is as soon discovered as the lake that feeds the glittering brook and sounding waterfall is traced out, when *they* have gained the traveller's eye. It is not true, that to the end of his life my father *enjoyed the credit* of originality;—originality was not *denied* him, simply because he had no enjoyment and no credit.

The fact is, that these "borrowed plumes" drest him out but poorly in the public eye, and Sir Walter Scott made a just observation on the fate of the *Biographia Literaria*, when he said that it had made no impression upon the public. Instead of gaining reputation as a metaphysical discoverer, at the expense of Germany, the author was generally spoken of as an introducer of German metaphysics into this country, *in which light he had represented himself*,—a man of original power, who had spoiled his own genius by devoting himself to the lucubrations of foreigners. It is the pleasure of the Writer in Blackwood to give him a vast metaphysical reputation, founded on the *Biographia*

Literaria, and, at the end of one of his paragraphs, he implies, that the passages taken from Schelling had been “paraded for upwards of twenty years as specimens of the wonderful powers of the English philosopher.” Some, perhaps, have been weary enough of hearing him called *wonderful*,—but the friends of Coleridge well know, that the work was generally neglected till the author’s name began to rise by various other means ; and that although passages of his writings have been often quoted of late years, and some in the B. L. have been in the mouths of many, while the book itself was in the hands of a very few, yet that the transcendental portions of it were unknown to his admirers in general, till some of them, after his decease, were declared to be the property of Schelling in Tait’s Magazine. If the transcendentalism adopted in the *Biographia* be a jewel of great price, no gem lodged in a dark unfathomed cave of ocean was ever more unseen and unknown than this was for many a year. In making an estimate of a man’s intellectual wealth we cannot abstract the influence upon his thoughts of other thinkers, precedent or contemporary ; but all Mr. Coleridge’s direct debts to the great Transcendentalist may be refunded, and whatever obligations reflective men of this age have felt and acknowledged that they owe to him, the sum of them will not be sensibly diminished.

In other quarters Mr. Coleridge has been accused of denying his obligations to Schlegel ; yet he never denied having borrowed those illustrations and detached thoughts, which are brought forward in support of the charge. His words on the subject neither say nor imply, in assertion of his originality, more than this, that, in his first course of lectures, which

were delivered "before Mr. Schlegel gave his on the same subjects at Vienna,"—(I believe it was in 1804, previously to his departure for Malta,)—he put forth the same general principles of criticism as in the following courses; so that whatever substantial agreement there might be between them, *on this head*, must be co-incidence.

It was said of my Father by his late Editor, that, "in thinking passionately of the principle, he forgot the authorship—and sowed beside many waters, if peradventure some chance seedling might take root and bear fruit to the glory of God and the spiritualization of man."⁶ He was ever more intent upon the pursuit and enunciation of truth than alive to the collateral benefits that wait upon it, as it is the exclusive property of this or that individual. The incautious way in which he acted upon this impulse was calculated to bring him under suspicion with those to whose minds any such feeling was alien and inconceivable. Yet no unprejudiced person, who reviews my Father's life, on an intimate acquaintance with it, will deny that he showed an unusual disregard of this property in thought, where his own interests were concerned, and that he spent in letters and marginal notes, and in discourse at all times and to all auditors a great deal both of thought and brilliant illustration, which a more prudential and self-interested man would have kept back and presented in a form better fitted to procure for himself a permanent reward; that he would spend time and labour on a critical examination of the works of others, and earnest

⁶ Preface to the Table Talk of S. T. Coleridge, pp. 18-19, 2nd edition.

consideration of their affairs, for their sakes only, in a manner almost peculiar to himself. If he was not always sufficiently considerate of other men's property, he was profuse of his own; and, in truth, such was his temper in regard to all *property*, of what kind soever; he did not enough regard or value it whether for himself or his neighbour. Nor is it proof to the contrary that he did at times speak of his share in the promulgation of truth and awakening of reflection, and of the world's unthankfulness. This he did, rather in self defence, when he was accused of neglecting to employ or of misemploying his natural gifts, than from an inordinate desire to parade and exalt them. He was goaded into some degree of egotism by the charges continually brought against him, that he suffered his powers to lie dormant, or to spend themselves in a fruitless activity. But they who spoke thus on the one hand under-rated his actual achievements, the importance of which time and trial were to discover, since speculations like his shew what they are worth in the using, and come into use but slowly; and on the other hand, over-rated his powers of literary execution. They were struck by his marked intellectual gifts, but took no note of his intellectual impediments,—were not aware that there was a want of proportion in the faculties of his mind, which would always have prevented him from making many or good books; for, even had he possessed the ordinary amount of skill in the arranging and methodizing of thought with a view to publication and in reference to the capacities of a volume, this would have been inadequate to the needs of one whose genius was ever impelling him to trace things down to their deepest source, and to follow them out in their remotest ramifications. His powers,

And his "Body did him grievous wrong." xix

compounded and balanced as they were, enabled him to do that which he did, and possibly that alone.

Great as was the activity of his intellect in its own congenial sphere, he wanted that agility of mind, which can turn the understanding from its wonted mode of movement to set it upon new tasks necessary to the completeness and efficiency of what has been produced of another kind, but uninteresting in themselves to the mind of the producer. He loved to go forward, expanding and ennobling the soul of his teaching, and hated the trouble of turning back to look after its body. To the healthful and vigorous such trouble appears nothing, simply because they *are* healthful and vigorous; but to feel all exertion a labour, all labour pain and weariness, this is the very symptom of disease and its most grievous consequence.

The nerveless languor, which, after early youth, became almost the habit of his body and *bodily mind*, which to a great degree paralysed his powers both of rest and action, precluding by a torpid irritability their happy vicissitude,—rendered all exercises difficult to him except of thought and imagination flowing onward freely and in self-made channels; for these brought with them their own warm atmosphere to thaw the chains of frost that bound his spirit. Soon as that spontaneous impulse was suspended, the apathy and sadness induced by his physical condition reabsorbed his mind, as sluggish mists creep over the valley when the breeze ceases to blow; and to counteract it he lacked any other sufficient stimulus:

With lips unbrightened, wreathless brow, I stroll;
And would you learn the spells that drowse my soul!
Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve,
And hope, without an object, cannot live.

He had no *hope* of gainful popularity, even from the most laborious efforts that *he* was capable of making ; nor would this in itself have been an adequate object of hope to him, without a further one, more deeply satisfying, a dream of which was ever unbracing his mind, but which life, such as he had made it, and such as it was given him from above, had not afforded. Then the complaints and warnings from "all quarters," of the obscurity of his prose writings, were, as he expressed it, like "cold water poured" upon him. It may be questioned whether they who thus complained were making any attempt to meet him half way,—whether they had done their part toward understanding what they called unintelligible. It is the chief use and aim of writings of such a character as his to excite the reader to think,—to draw out of his mind a native flame rather than to make it bright for a moment by the reflection of alien fires. All literary productions indeed demand *some* answering movement on the part of readers, but, in common cases, the motion required is so easy, so much in known ways and smooth well-beaten tracks, that it seems spontaneous and is more like rest than labour. This is the difficulty with which introducers of new thought have to contend ; the minds that are to receive these accessions must themselves, in order to their reception of them, be renewed proportionately, renewed not from without alone, but by co-operation from within,—a process full of conflict and struggle, like the fermenting of raw juices into generous wines. Though my Father understood this well in the end, he was by no means prepared for it, and for all its consequences, in the beginning ; coming upon him as it did, it acted as a narcotic, and by deepening his despondency increased

his literary inertness. Speaking of "The Friend" he observes, "Throughout these Essays the want of illustrative examples and varied exposition is the main defect, and was occasioned by the haunting dread of being tedious."

The *Biographia Literaria* he composed at that period of his life when his health was most deranged, and his mind most subjected to the influence of bodily disorder. It bears marks of this throughout, for it is even less methodical in its arrangement than any of his other works. Up to a certain point the author pursues his plan of writing his literary life, but, in no long time his "slack hand" abandons its grasp of the subject, and the book is filled out to a certain size, with such miscellaneous contents of his desk as seem least remote from it. To say, with the writer in Blackwood, that he stopped short in the process of unfolding a theory of the imagination, merely because he had come to the end of all that Schelling had taught concerning it, and thus to account for the abrupt termination of the first volume, is to place the matter in a perfectly false light; he broke down in the prosecution of his whole scheme, the regular history of his literary life and opinions, and this not for want of help in one particular line, but because his energies for regular composition in any line were deserting him, at least for a time. It is suggested, that "interspersed throughout the works of Schelling, glimpses and indications are to be found of some stupendous theory on the subject of the imagination;" that Coleridge expected to "catch and unriddle these shadowy intimations," but that, finding himself unable to do this, he "had nothing else for it but to abandon his work altogether, and leave his readers in the lurch." What these glimpses of a

“stupendous theory” are, and where they are, except “throughout the works of Schelling,” the announcer does not inform us: his own imagination may have discovered to him what was never discerned by Coleridge, in all whose notes upon Schelling not a hint is given of this *stupendous theory in embryo*. In the last part of the *Transcendental Idealism*, which relates to the Philosophy of Art, at p. 473, a passage occurs in which the poetic faculty and the productive intuition are identified, and that which is active in both, that one and the same, declared to be the Imagination: but this appears to be the crown and completion of a system already laid down, not a germ of a system to be evolved in future. The Imagination is also characterized in aphorisms 34, 35, of Schelling’s *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*; but we must strain our eyes very much to find any indications of a grand philosophical design there.⁷ I suspect that this “stupendous theory” has its habitation in the clouds of the accuser’s fancy,—*clouds without water*, though black as if they were big with showers of rain.

The extent of Schelling’s teaching on the subject of the Imagination my father well knew before he commenced the *Biographia Literaria*, and he must also have known how far he was able to “catch and unridle his shadowy intimations;” what he did not know or sufficiently consider was the space, which such a disquisition ought to occupy in his work, and the relation which it had to his undertaking. But for the failure of his powers, he might have recast what he

⁷ I have asked two students of Schelling if they ever met with this theory in traversing his works, but could learn nothing of it from either of them.

had already written, and given it such shape and proportions, as would have made it seem suitable to the work in which he was engaged. Of this effort he felt incapable, and the letter was devised in order to enable him to print what he had already written without farther trouble. But he still cherished the intention of continuing the subject, thus commenced, in a future work, which was to explain his system of thought at large, and to this object he devoted much time and thought, during the latter years of his life,—with what fruit will, it is to be hoped, hereafter appear in a philosophical work by his friend and fellow student Mr. Green.

The second great ground of accusation against my father is his having laid claim to "the main and fundamental ideas" of Schelling's system. "We ourselves," says the critic, "in our day have had some small dealings with 'main and fundamental ideas,' and we know thus much about them, that it is very easy for any man or for every man to have them; the difficulty is in bringing them intelligibly, effectively, and articulately out,—in elaborating them into clear and intelligible shapes." He proceeds to illustrate his argument, on the hint of an expression used by Mr. Gillman, in his *Life of Coleridge*, with a choice simile. "Wasps," says he, "and even" other insects, which I decline naming after him, "are, we suppose, capable of collecting the juice of flowers, and this juice may be called their 'fundamental ideas;' but the bee alone is a genius among flies, because he alone can put forth his ideas in the shape of honey, and make the breakfast-table glad." True or false, all this has little to do with anything that my father has said in the *Biographia Literaria*. As for the bare "raw material,"

xxiv *Honey and Honey-makers of Literature.*

(to use the critic's own expression,) out of which intellectual systems are formed, it is possessed by every human being, from Adam to his children of the present day, by one just as much as another. Clodpates, who draw no lines save with the plough across the field, have all the geometry folded up in their minds that Euclid unfolded in his book; Kant's doctrine of pure reason is a web woven out of stuff that is in every man's brain; and the simplest Christian is *implicitly* as great a divine as Thomas Aquinas. But when a man declares that the fundamental ideas of a system are *born* and *matured* in his mind, he evidently means, not merely that he possesses the mere material or elements of the system, but that the system itself, as to its leading points and most general positions, has been evolved from the depths of his spirit by his own independent efforts; this has certainly more relation to the wrought honey than to the raw. My father's allegation, that the principal points of Schelling's system were not new to him when he found them uttered in Schelling's words shall be considered presently; his own full belief of what he asserted, I, of course, do not make matter of question or debate.

First however, reverting for a moment to the simile of the "wasps," I beg to observe, that even if such insects might suck the juice of flowers if they would, mechanically *might*, (though their organs are not adapted for the purpose like those of bees,) yet it is certain that instinctively they never do. In vain for them not only the "violets blow," but all the breathing spring beside. On the other hand, a habit of searching the nectaries of delicate blossoms, far sought on heights or in hidden glades, has been found by naturalists to be generally connected with honey-making

faculties; and thus, without admitting any proper analogy betwixt *flower-juice* and *fundamental ideas*, I will so far avail myself of the illustration as to suggest that, in like manner, he who sought truth far and near, amid the pages of abstruse and neglected metaphysicians of former times, and discovered the merits of new ones, just sprung up in a foreign country, before they were recognized in his own, was probably led to such researches by some special aptitude for studies of this nature and powers of thought in the same line. The wasps and baser flies of literature neither collect juice nor make honey; they only buzz and sting, flitting around the well spread board, to which *they* have never furnished one wholesome morsel, to the disturbance of those who sit thereat; a meddlesome but not, like certain wasps of old, *the manliest race*,⁸ for they most attack those who have the powers of the world least on their side, or, being gone out of this world altogether, can neither resist nor return their violence. Time was that when a lion died bees deposited their sweets in his carcase; but now, too often, wasps and vulgar flies gather about the dead lion, to shed upon his motionless remains only what is bitter and offensive!⁹

⁸ ἀνδρικώτατον γένος. *Runæ*, v. 1077.

⁹ “No sooner is the lion dead than these hungry flesh-flies swarm about him, verifying a part only of Samson’s riddle, they find meat, but they produce no sweetness.” *Omniana*, I. p. 234. I certainly did not recollect this sentence when I wrote the sentence above. My father did not *recollect* Samson Agonistes, l. 136,

“When insupportably his foot advanced—”

at the time of his writing in the *France*,

To insects of this class too much countenance is given by the tone and spirit in which Mr. Coleridge's censor conducts his argument. In order to find full matter of accusation against him, he puts into his words a great deal which they do not of themselves contain. According to him my Father's language intimates, that what he was about to teach of the transcendental system in the *Biographia Literaria* was not only his own by some degree of anticipation, but his own and no one's else—that "he was prepared to pour from the lamp of an original, though congenial, thinker a flood of new light upon the dark doctrines in which he so *genially coincided*." Now so far from pretending to pour a flood of *new* light upon the doctrines of Schelling, he not only speaks of him as "the *founder* of the Philosophy of Nature and most successful improver of the Dynamic system,"¹⁰ but declares that to him "we owe the *completion*, and the most important victories of this revolution in philosophy."¹¹ He calls Schelling his predecessor though contemporary. Predecessor in what? Surely in those

"When insupportably advancing
Her arm made mockery of the warrior's tramp."

Mr. Dequincey represented him as *denying* the debt to Milton. Now I verily think that I had never read the passage in the *Omniana*, when the lion illustration occurred to me; I never yet have read the book through, though I have had it within reach all my life. It is not *worth* acknowledging like the other; but this and a thousand similar facts make me feel how much of eo-incident in such matters is possible. If my father had read *Samson Agonistes*, still he may have thought that he should have written the line even if he had not.

¹⁰ *Biog. Lit.* vol. 1. chap. ix.

¹¹ *Ib.*

same doctrines which he was about to unfold. That he had not originally learned the general conceptions of this philosophy from Schelling he does indeed affirm, but he expressly ascribes them to Schelling as their discoverer and first teacher, nor does he claim to be considered the author of the system in any sense or in any degree. All he lays *claim* to, and that only by anticipation, as what he hoped to achieve, is "the honour of rendering it intelligible to his countrymen," and of applying it to "the most awful of subjects for the most important of purposes:" and certainly in the application of philosophical principles to the explanation, and, as he believed, support of the Catholic faith, by which means the soundness of the principles themselves is tested, he had a walk of his own in which "no German that ever breathed" has preceded or outstripped him.¹²

Plainly enough it was the sum of his future labours in the furtherance of truth, not his metaphysical doctrines alone, but his entire system of thought that he had in contemplation, when he intimated a confident belief, that the work he should produce would "appear to be the offspring of his own spirit by better tests than the mere reference to dates:" and although his actual performance fell very far short of what he was ever expecting to perform, yet surely his writings at large contain an amount of original thought sufficient to render this anticipatory pretension at least not ridi-

¹² Mr. Dequincey said of him, with reference to another application of his thoughts, that "he spun daily, from the loom of his own magical brain, theories more gorgeous by far, and supported by a pomp and luxury of images, such as no German that ever breathed could have emulated in his dreams."

culous. That his meaning was thus general more clearly appears from the circumstance that, just before this appeal concerning his originality of authorship, he refers to his design of applying philosophy to religion; and without doubt his *religious* philosophy differed materially from that of the great German. In connexion too with the same subject he mentions "this or *any future* work of his;" so that to suppose him, when he thus expressed himself, to have had in his mind's eye just that portion of his teaching in the *B. L.* which he had borrowed or was to borrow from Schelling, is gratuitous indeed.¹³ Is it conceivable that Mr. Coleridge would have appealed to tests of originality, which his future writings were to furnish, had he not believed in his heart that they would furnish those tests?—that he would have defied a comparison of dates, had he been claiming originality merely on the score of what he had consciously borrowed?

But that pretension of his to having anticipated much of what Schelling taught has been treated with vehement scorn, as a mere pretence.

His accordance with the German Philosopher, it is peremptorily asserted, could *not* have been co-incident, because he gave forth Schelling's own doctrine in Schelling's own words, without any important addition or variation. "Genial coincidences, forsooth!

¹³ His *good friend* in the Ed. Review of Aug. 1817, sees this matter in a truer light, for he says Mr. C. "proceeds to defend himself against the charge of plagiarism, of which he suspects that he may be suspected by the readers of Schlegel and Schelling, when he comes to unfold, *in fulness of time*, the mysterious laws of the drama and the human mind." *Fas est et ab hoste juvari.*

where every one word of the one author tallies with every one word of the other ! ” That it is ill-judged in any man to tell the world, in his own favour, one tittle more than he is prepared to prove, I have no intention to dispute, nor is it for the sake of maintaining my father’s claims as a metaphysical seer, that I trouble myself with the above position : for another reason, more deeply concerning, I must contend, that his having neither added to, nor varied from, the doctrines of Schelling does not make it clear as noon-day, that he had not some original insight into them, nor is even his adoption of Schelling’s words any absolute proof, that he had in no degree anticipated their *sense*. There can be no reasonable doubt, that he was at least in the same line of thought with him,—was in search of what Schelling discovered—before he met with his writings ; and on this point it is to be remarked, that the writer in Blackwood, though he professes to give the *whole* of Mr. Coleridge’s defence, omits a very important part of it, that in which he accounts for his averred *co-incidence* with the German writer, and thus establishes its probability.¹⁴ True enough it is that the transcendental doctrine contained in the *Biographia Literaria* is conveyed for the most part in the language of Schelling, and this seems to shew, that he had not formed into a regular composition any identical views of his own before he read that author’s works ;¹⁵

¹⁴ See, in the ninth chapter of this work, the passage beginning, “ We had studied in the same school—” vol. 1. p. 164.

¹⁵ This admission refers to such parts of the book as expressly convey the transcendental doctrine. Certain observations on religious philosophy cited by Mr. Coleridge he declares himself to have anticipated in writing. A few sentences with which he prefaces the extract in the ninth chapter, which have

xxx *Possible Anticipation of the Expansion*

but that the main conceptions of Schelling's system were wholly new to his mind, when he met with them there, cannot be determined by any such test.

Coincidences in the discoveries of science are more common, especially among contemporaries, than in the products of fancy and imagination, because *these* are not, like the last, mere arbitrary combinations of materials drawn from the storehouse of the universe, capable of being infinitely varied; but revelations of truths which manifest themselves, one and the same, to every inquirer who goes far enough in a certain direction of thought to meet with them—which lie in

been strongly animadverted upon, I give here, together with the defence of them, in order to avoid any recurrence to the present subject hereafter: "While I in part translate the following observations from a contemporary writer of the Continent, let me be permitted to premise, that I might have transcribed the substance from *memoranda* of my own, which were written many years before his pamphlet was given to the world; and that I prefer another's words to my own, partly as a tribute due to priority of publication; but still more from the pleasure of sympathy in a case where *co-incidence* only was possible." "This passage," says my Father's late Editor, "is noted with particular acrimony by the writer in Blackwood, as "outraging common sense and the capacities of human belief," with more about "cool assurance," and "taking upon him to say," and the like. And why all this? Is there anything in the substance or leading thought in the following paragraph so peculiar and extraordinary, as to make it incredible, that the same may have passed through the mind of such a man as even this writer seems to admit Mr. Coleridge to have been? He studied in Germany in 1798, and Schelling's pamphlet was published in 1806. The writer cannot comprehend how Mr. C. could take upon him to say, "that *co-incidence* only was possible" in the case, "except on the ground, that it was impossible for any human being to write anything but what he (Mr. C.) had written

the path of the human intellect, and must be arrived at, when it has made a certain progress in its pre-appointed course. In all scientific product two factors are required; energy of thought in the discoverer, and a special state of preparation for the particular advance in the state of science itself. Real Idealism could never have dawned on the mind of Schelling had he not been born into the meridian light of the Idealism of Kant, which was surely founded on the Idealism of Berkeley. Is it anything then so very incredible, that a man, from his childhood an ardent metaphysical inquirer, who had gone through the same preparatory

before." And yet no human being but one could ever suppose that Mr. Coleridge meant any such folly. What can be simpler? He says he had before 1806 noted down—and his friends and his enemies—(that he should have such still!)—know his habit in this particular—the substance, that is, as most people understand it, the general thought of the paragraph. If that were so, there having been no personal intercourse between Schelling and Coleridge, coincidence, in Italics or Roman, was only possible in the case.

A complaint is also made that a passage of 49 lines comprising six only of original writing, should be said to be only in part translated; which Coleridge never said. "The following observations" very obviously extend to the words "William Law," two pages beyond the 49 lines; *of the whole* it is truly said, that it is partly translated, about one half of it, in different parts, not being so. H. N. C.

Upon this false supposition that my father referred only to the 49 lines in his acknowledgment, he is not only attacked for having spoken of them as *in part translated*, but declared to have taken without acknowledgment "two other long sentences from the *Darlegung*," which occur in the following paragraph, and which, because he altered them a little for the occasion, he is reproached with having "curiously transmogrified."

discipline with Schelling, by reflection upon the doctrines of Kant, their perfect reasonableness, so far as they advanced beyond all previous thought, their unsatisfactoriness where they stopped short, and clung, in words at least, to the old dogmatism, might have been led into modes of rectifying and completing his system similar to those which Schelling adopted? That Coleridge does not appear to have gone beyond the subtle German in the path of discovery is insufficient to prove, that he might not independently have gone as far; for we do not commonly see that more than one important advance is made in metaphysical science at any one period. Berkeleyanism presented itself to the mind of Arthur Collier before he had read a syllable of Berkeley's metaphysical writings, and he maintained the non-existence of matter by arguments substantially the same as those employed in the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and "*Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, without communication, as we may reasonably suppose, with their admirable author.¹⁶ Let us suppose Collier to have been a man careless and immethodical in his habits, continually diverted from regular scientific inquiry by a "shaping spirit of imagination,"—one whose disposition led him to be ever seeking matter for new thought, rather than labouring to reduce into presentable order that which he had already acquired; let us further suppose that, before he had given expression to his views in a regular treatise, the works of Berkeley had fallen in his way; would it not almost inevitably have happened, that the conceptions, floating in his mind, but not yet fixed in language, would have

¹⁶ See Mr. Benson's *Memoirs of Collier*, pp. 18, 19.

mixed themselves up indistinguishably with those of the older author, and assumed the same form? But if the *form* into which his thoughts were thrown had been the same with that adopted by his "predecessor though contemporary," the philosophy of the two would have been identical, for Collier's view neither materially added to Berkeley's nor varied from it. On such considerations as these it may surely be deemed possible, that my Father did not wholly deceive himself, much less wilfully seek to deceive others, when he affirmed that "the main and fundamental ideas" of Schelling's system were born and matured in his mind before he read the works of Schelling; and if such a belief would do no great discredit to the head of any inquirer into this question, how much more honourable to his heart would be the readiness to think thus, especially of one whose services in the cause of truth are at this time wholly denied by none but his personal or party enemies, than the impulse to fling it aside with a scornful "*credat Judæus Apella, non ego!*" Those were the words of a Heathen Satirist. We *Christians* know, that it was not *credulity*, but want of faith and of a spirit quicker to discern truth and goodness than to suspect imposture and evil, by which they of the circumcision were most painfully characterized.¹⁷

¹⁷ When I had written thus far I received a letter from Mr. Green, containing the following remarks: "It would not be difficult, I apprehend, to shew that he (Coleridge) might have worked out a system, not dissimilar to Schelling's in its essential features. What however did Coleridge himself mean by *the fundamental truths* of Schelling's scheme? It is very true that the reader of the *Biographia* is under the necessity of supposing, that he meant the doctrines, which he has adopted in the passages taken from Schelling's works: but I confess that

But the writer in Blackwood, *out of his great zeal in behalf of the plundered and aggrieved*, would not only deprive Coleridge of his whole credit as a philosopher—he would fain take from him “some of the

I strongly doubt that such was the meaning of Coleridge. My acquaintance with S. T. C. commenced with the intention of studying the writings of Schelling; but after a few interviews the design was given up, in consequence of Coleridge declaring his dissent from Schelling's doctrines; and he began immediately the exposition of his own views.

“This perhaps renders the *Biographia* more inexplicable. For herein S. T. C. assumes the originality of Schelling—which can only be received with great qualifications—and is content to have it admitted, that the agreements between himself and Schelling were the coincidences of two minds working on the same subject and in the same direction. Now this is the more remarkable, that it may be shewn, that many or most of the views entertained by Coleridge, at least at the period of our first acquaintance, might have been derived from other sources, and that his system differs essentially from that of Schelling. Some light might perhaps be thrown upon this interesting question by a knowledge, which unfortunately I do not possess, of the circumstances under which the fragment called the *Biographia* was drawn up. It is possible, no doubt, that Coleridge's opinions might have undergone a change between the period, at which the B. L. was published, and that at which I had the happiness of becoming acquainted with him. But at the latter period his doctrines were based upon the self same principles, which he retained to his dying hour, and differing as they do fundamentally from those of Schelling, I cannot but avow my conviction, that they were formed at a much earlier period, nay that they were growths of his own mind, growing with his growth, strengthening with his strength, the result of a Platonic spirit, the stirrings of which had already evinced themselves in his early boyhood, and which had been only modified, and indirectly shaped and developed by the German school.”

“That in the B. L. when developing his own scheme of thought, he adopted the outward form, in which Schelling had clothed his thoughts, knowing, that is to say, that the *formula*

brightest gems in his poetic wreath itself." It is thus that two couplets, exemplifying the Homeric and Ovidian metres,¹⁹ are described by his candid judge; and in the same spirit he describes my Father as hav-

was Schelling's, though forgetting that it was also the language of Schelling, may be attributed to idleness, carelessness, or to any fault of the *kind* which deserves a harsher name; but certainly not to dishonesty, not to any desire of obtaining reputation at the expense, and by the spoliation, of the intellectual labours of another—and can form no ground for denying to him the name of a powerful and original thinker. And the unacknowledged use of the quotations from Schelling in the B. L. which have been the pretext for branding him with the opprobrious name of plagiarist, are only evidences, in my humble judgment at least, of his disregard to reputation, and of a *selflessness*, (if I may be allowed such a term, in order to mark an absence of the sense of self, which constituted an inherent defect in his character,) which caused him to neglect the means of vindicating his claim to the originality of the system, which was the labour of his life and the fruit of his genius."

¹⁹ He pronounces them in part worse, in no respect a whit better than the originals.

Im pentameter drauf fällt sie melodisch herab.

In the pentameter aye *falling in melody back*.

To my ear, *as I fancy*, the light dactylic flow of the latter half of the pentameter, is still more exquisite in the English than in the German, though the spondee which commences the latter is an advantage. The English line is rather the more liquid of the two, and the word "*back*," with which it closes, almost imitates the splash of the reflux water against the ground.

Even from the sentence on the inferiority of Coleridge's Homeric verses there might perhaps be an appeal: but neither in German nor in English could a pair of hexameters be made to present such variety in unity, such a perfect little whole, as the elegiac distich.

Readers may compare the translated verses with the original in the last edition of Coleridge's Poems in one volume; where they will also find the poem of Stolberg, which suggested, and partly *produced*, my Father's *Lines on a Cataract*.

ing sought to *conceal* the fact, that they were translated from Schiller, a poet whose works are perhaps as generally read here as those of Shakespeare in Germany.

The expression "brightest gems" however is meant to include *Lines on a Cataract*, which are somewhat more conspicuous in Coleridge's poetic wreath than the pair of distiches; in these he is said to have closely adopted the metre, language and thoughts of another man. Now the metre, language and thoughts of Stolberg's poem are all in Coleridge's expansion of it, but those of the latter are not *all* contained in the former, any more than the budding rose contains all the riches of the rose full blown. "It is but a shadow," says the critic, "a glorified shadow perhaps," but still only a shadow cast from another man's "substance." Is not such *glory* the *substance*, or part of the substance, of poetic merit? How much of admired poetry must we not *unsubstantialize*, if the reproduction of what was before, with additions and improvements, is to be made a shadow of? That which is most exquisite in the *Lines on a Cataract* is Coleridge's own: though some may even prefer Stolberg's striking original. These and the verses from Schiller were added to the poetical works of Mr. Coleridge by his late Editor. Had the author superintended the edition, into which they were first inserted, himself, he would, perhaps, have made references to Schiller and Stolberg in these instances, as he had done in others; if he neglected to do so, it could not have been in any expectation of keeping to himself what he had borrowed from them.

Lastly, Mr. Coleridge's obligations to Schelling in Lecture VIII. on Poesy and Art are spoken of by the writer in Blackwood, after his own manner.

Defrauding without meaning to cheat. xxxvii

It is true, that the most important principles delivered in that Lecture are laid down by the German Sage in his *Oration on the relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature*,²⁰—yet I cannot think it quite correct to say that it is “closely copied and in many parts translated” from Schelling’s discourse. It not only omits a great deal that the other contains, but adds, and, as it seems to me, materially, to what is borrowed: neither, as far as I can find, after a second careful perusal of the latter, has it any *passage* translated from Schelling, only a few words here and there being the same as in that great philosopher’s treatise.

Let me add, that *Mr. Coleridge did not publish this Lecture himself*. Whenever it is re-published, what it contains of Schelling’s will be stated precisely. Would that an equal restitution could be made in all quarters of all that has been borrowed, with change of shape but little or no alteration of substance! In this case, not a few writers, whose originality is now unquestioned, would lose more weight from their coinage than my Father will do, by subtraction of that which he took without disguise from Schelling and others:—for how commonly do men imagine themselves producing and creating, when they are but metamorphosing!

“That Coleridge was tempted into this course by vanity,” says the writer in Blackwood toward the end of his article; “by the paltry desire of applause, or by any direct intention to defraud others of their due, we do not believe; this never was believed and never will be believed.” Truly I believe *not*; but no thanks to the accuser who labours to convict him of “want-

²¹ *Phil. Schrift.* p. 343.

ing rectitude and truth ;” who reads his apologies the wrong way, as witches say their prayers backward ; —who *hatches* a grand project for Schelling in order to bring him in guilty of a design to steal it ; who uses language respecting him which the merest vanity and dishonesty alone could deserve. *This never has been or will be believed* by the generous and intelligent, though men inclined to fear and distrust his opinions are strengthened in their prejudices by such imputations upon their maintainer, and many are prevented from acquiring a true knowledge of him and of them. What Schelling himself thought on the subject will be seen from the following extract of a letter of Mr. Stanley, author of the *Life of Dr. Arnold*, kindly communicated to me by Archdeacon Hare. “Schelling’s remarks about Coleridge were too generally expressed, I fear, to be of any use in a vindication of him, except so far as proving his own friendly feeling toward him. But as far as I can reconstruct his sentence it was much as follows, being in answer to a question whether he had known Coleridge personally. “Whether I have seen Coleridge or not, I cannot tell ; if he called upon me at Jena, it was before his name had become otherwise known to me, and amongst the numbers of young Englishmen, whom I then saw, I cannot recall the persons of individuals. But I have read what he has written with great pleasure, and I took occasion in my lectures to vindicate him from the charge, which has been brought against him, of plagiarising from me ; and I said that it was I rather who owed much to him, and that, in the *Essay on Prometheus*, Coleridge in his remark, that “*Mythology was not allegorical but tautegorical,*”²¹ had con-

²¹ *Remains*, II. p. 352.

centrated in one striking expression (*in einem schlagenden Ausdruck*) what I had been labouring to represent with much toil and trouble. This is all that I can be sure of."

Such was this *truly great Man's* feeling about the *wrongs* that he had sustained from my Father. Had the writer in Blackwood pointed out his part in the *Biographia Literaria without one word of insult* to the author's memory, he would have proved his zeal for the German Philosopher, and for the interests of literature *more* clearly than now, because more purely, and deserved only feelings of respect and obligation from all who love and honour the name of Coleridge.

It will already have been seen, that no attempt is here made to *justify* my Father's literary omissions and inaccuracies, or to deny that they proceeded from anything defective in his frame of mind; I would only maintain that this fault has not been fairly reported or becomingly commented upon. That a man who has been "more highly gifted than his fellows," is therefore to have less required of him in the way of "rectitude and truth," that he is to be "held less amenable to the laws which ought to bind all human beings," is a proposition which no one sets up except for the sake of taking it down again, and some man of genius along with it; but there is another proposition, confounded by some perhaps with the aforesaid, which is true, and ought, in justice and charity, to be borne in mind; I mean that men of "peculiar *intellectual* conformation," who have peculiar powers of intellect are very often peculiar in the rest of their constitution, to such a degree that points in their conduct, which, in persons of ordinary faculties and habits of mind, *could* only result from conscious wilful departure from

xl *Origin of Mr. C.'s Inaccuracies stated.*

the rule of right, may in their case have a different origin, and though capable, more or less, of being controlled by the will may not arise out of it. Marked gifts are often attended by marked deficiencies even in the intellect: those best acquainted with my Father are well aware that there was in him a special *intellectual* flaw; Archdeacon Hare has said, that his memory was "notoriously irretentive;" and it is true that, on a certain class of subjects, it was extraordinarily confused and inaccurate; matter of fact, as such, laid no hold upon his mind; of all he heard and saw, he readily caught and well retained the spirit, but the *letter* escaped him; he seemed incapable of paying the due regard to it. That it is the duty of any man, who has such a peculiarity, to watch over it and endeavour to remedy it, is unquestionable; I would only suggest that this defect, which belonged not to the moral being of Coleridge but to the frame of his intellect, and was in close connection with that which constituted his peculiar intellectual strength, his power of abstracting and referring to universal principles, often rendered him unconscious of incorrectness of statement, of which men in general scarcely could have been unconscious, and that to it, and not to any deeper cause, such neglects and transgressions of established rules as have been alleged against him, ought to be referred.²²

²² At all times his incorrectness of quotation and of reference and in the relation of particular circumstances was extreme; it seemed as if the door betwixt his memory and imagination was always open, and though the former was a large strong room, its contents were perpetually mingling with those of the adjoining chamber. I am sure that if I had not had the facts of my Father's life at large before me, from his letters and the relations of friends, I should not have believed such confusions as

A certain infidelity there was doubtless in the mirror of his mind, so strong was his tendency to overlook the barrier between imagination and actual fact. No

his possible in a man of sound mind. To give two out of numberless instances,—in a manuscript intended to be perused by his friend Mr. Green, he speaks of a composition by Mr. Green himself, as if he, S. T. Coleridge, were the author of it. A man, who thus forgets, will oftener ascribe the thoughts of another, when they have a great cognateness with, and a deep interest for, his own mind, to himself, than such cognate and interesting thoughts to another; but my Father's forgetfulness was not always in the way of appropriation, as this story, written to me by Mrs. Julius Hare, will shew. She says, it was "told him (Archdeacon Hare,) many years ago by the Rev. Robert Tennant, who was then his Curate, but afterwards went to Florence and died there. He had a great reverence and admiration for Mr. Coleridge, and used occasionally to call upon him. During one of these visits, Mr. C. spoke of a book, (Mr. Hare thinks it was on Political Economy,) in which there were some valuable remarks bearing upon the subject of their conversation. Mr. Tennant immediately purchased the book on this recommendation, but on reading it was surprised to find no such passages as Mr. C. had referred to. Some time after he saw the same book at the house of a friend, and mentioned the circumstance to him; upon which his friend directed him to the margin of the volume before him, and there he found the very remarks in Mr. C.'s own writing, which he had written in as *marginalia*, and forgotten that they were his own and not the author's. Mr. Hare had always intended asking Mr. T. to give him this story in detail in writing, but unfortunately delayed it too long till Mr. T.'s very sudden death prevented it altogether; but he can vouch for its general correctness."

My Father trusted to his memory, knowing it to be powerful and not aware that it was inaccurate, in order to save his legs and his eyes. I suspect that he quoted even longish passages in Greek without copying them, by the slight differences that occur. Another *phenomenon* of his memory was its curious way of interchanging properties; as when he takes from Hobbes

man had a keener insight into character than he, or saw moral and mental distinctions more clearly; yet his judgments of particular persons were often rela-

and gives to Des Cartes, what is *not* to be found in the latter and *is* to be found in the former. (See chapter v.) This he did in the face of Sir James Mackintosh, one of the most clear-headed and accurately learned men of the day, after inciting him to examine his own positions by contradiction; so incautious and dreamy was he. It seems as if he was ever dreaming of blows and caring for them no more than for the blows of a dream. How much strength of memory may co-exist with weakness, the intellect remaining quite sound in the main, may often be observed in old men. Just so many a nervous man can walk twenty miles when he cannot walk straight into a room, or lift a cup to his lips without shaking it.

It was from this same mixture of carelessness and confusedness that my Father neglected all his life long to make regular literary acknowledgments. He did it when he happened to think of it, sometimes disproportionately, at other times not, but without the slightest intention, and in some cases without the possibility of even temporary concealment. He published *The Fall of Robespierre* as *An Historic Drama by S. T. Coleridge*, without joining Mr. Southey's name with his in the title page, though my Uncle and all his many friends knew that he wrote the second and third act of it; and in a note to the *Conciones* he spoke of the first act only as his own. He did not call the *Catullian Hendecasyllables* a translation, though at any hour I might have seen the original in the copy of Matthisson's poems which he had given me, and in which he had written, after the presentation, "*Die Kinderjahre*, p. 15-29; *der-Schmetterling*, p. 50; and the *Alpenreise*, p. 75, will be especial favourites with you, I dare anticipate. 9th May, 1820, Highgate." His Hendecasyllables contain *twelve* syllables, and as metre are, to my ear, a great improvement, on Matthisson's eleven-syllable lines. He acted in the same way with regard to two epigrams of Lessing's, one in the Poetic Works, ii. p. 78, called *Names*, and another on Rufa and her Lapdog, which has been printed somewhere,—(*Die Namen* and *An die Dorilis*. Works of Lessing, vol. i. p. 19. and p. 46.) He had spoken of them as trans-

tively wrong; not that he ascribed to them qualities which they did not possess, or denied them those which they had, but that his feelings and imagination height-

lations to Mr. Cottle. Mr. Green tells me that in the *Confessions* are a few phrases borrowed from Lessing, which will be pointed out particularly hereafter. My Father once talked of translating all that author's works. An epigram printed in the *Remains, Hoarse Mævius* is also from the German; he seems to have spoken of it as such to Mr. Cottle. The fourth and sixth stanzas of *Separation* (P. W. i. p. 262.) are adopted from Cotton's *Chlorinda*. The late Mr. Sidney Walker thought that my Father was indebted to Casimir's xiiith Ode for the general conception of his *Lines in answer to a melancholy Letter*, one of the Juvenile Poems. The second stanza looks like an expansion of the commencement:

Non si sol semel occidit,
Non rubris iterum surget ab Indiis.

I see no likeness elsewhere, except of subject. Mr. S. W. also pointed out to me an image taken from the opening of Ossian's *War of Inisthoma*, in *Lines on an Autumnal Evening*, "As when the Savage," &c. (P. W. I. p. 39.) *The Rose* (Ib. p. 40.) is, I believe, from the French.

"And I the while, the sole unbusy thing
Nor honey make, nor build, nor pair, nor sing," (Ib. ii. p. 72.)

would probably have been written, even if Herbert had not written, as Mr. Walker reminded me,

All things are busy; only I
Neither bring honey with the bees,
Nor flowers to make that, nor the husbandry
To water these. (*Employment, Poems*, p. 53.)

I think it will hardly be supposed that Mr. Coleridge meant to cheat Casimir, Cotton, Lessing and Matthisson of the articles he borrowed from them. The two former he celebrated in his writings, when they were not much in the world's eye; the two latter are popular and well known authors, whose works are in every hand in Germany, and here in the hands of many. Mr. Dequincey says he relied "too much upon the slight know-

ened and magnified that side or aspect of a mind, which was most present to him at the time when his estimate was drawn; the good and the beautiful, which he beheld at the moment, appeared in his eyes the very type of goodness and beauty: the subjects of it were transfigured before him and shone with unearthly hues and lineaments. Of principles he had the clearest intuition, for that which is without degree is in no danger of being exaggerated; nor was he liable, from his peculiar temperament, to miss poetic truth; because nature, as she lends to imagination all her colours, can never be mis-represented by the fullest expenditure of her own gifts upon herself. And even in his view of the particular and individual,—though, as has been said of him in his literary character, “often like the sun, when looking at the planets, he only beheld his own image in the objects of his gaze, and often, when his eye darted on a cloud, would turn it into a rainbow,”²³—yet possibly even here far more of truth re-

ledge of German literature in this country;”—a blind remark! Who relies for concealment on a screen which he is doing his best to throw down? Had my Father *calculated* at all he would have done it better; but to *calculate* was not in his nature. If he ever deceived others it was when he was himself deceived first. Hazlitt said he “always carried in his pocket a list of the Illustrious Obscure.” I think he made some writers, who were obscure when he first noticed them, cease to be so; and it will be found, that he did not generally borrow from the *little known* without declaring his obligations; that most of his adoptions were from writers too illustrious to be wronged by plagiarism. It is true that Maasz, from whom he borrowed some things, never was famous: but had he “*relied*” on the world’s ignorance of him he would not have mentioned him as a writer on mental philosophy at all.

²³ See *Guesses at Truth*, 2nd. edit. p. 241.

vealed itself to his earnest gaze than the world, which ever observes too carelessly and superficially, was aware of. Many of his poems, in which persons are described in ecstatic language were suggested by individuals, and doubtless did but pourtray them as they were constantly presented to him by his heart and imagination.

Such a temper is ever liable to be mistaken for one of fickleness, insincerity, and lightness of feeling; and even so has Coleridge at times been represented by persons, who judging partially and superficially, conceived him to be wanting in depth of heart and substantial kindness, whose depths they had never explored and with whose temperament and emotions there was no congeniality in their own. But it is not true, as others will eagerly testify, that the affections of Coleridge were slight and evanescent, his intellectual faculties alone vigorous and steadfast; though it is true that, in persons constituted like him, the former will be more dependent on the latter, more readily excited and determined through the powers of thought and imagination than in ordinary cases. His heart was as warm as his intellectual being was lifesome and active, nay it was from warmth of heart and keenness of feeling that his imagination derived its glow and vivacity, the condition of the latter, at least, was intimately connected with that of the former. He loved to share all he had with others; and it is the opinion of one who knew him *well* and *early*, that, had he possessed wealth in his earlier years, he would have given great part of it away. If there are any who conceive that his affections were apt to evaporate in words, I think it right to protest against such a notion of his character. Kind words are not to be contrasted with good deeds,

except where they are substituted for them, and those kindly feelings which, in the present instance, so often overflowed in words were just as ready to shape themselves into deeds, as far as the heart was concerned;—how far the hand can answer to the heart depends on circumstances with which the last has no concern. Had there been this tenuity and shallowness in his spirit, he could never have made that sort of impression as an author, which many thoughtful persons have received from his works, much less as a man have inspired such deep love and esteem as still waits upon his memory from some who are themselves loved and honoured by all that know them well.²⁴ That the objects of his affections oftener changed than consisted with, or could have arisen in, a happy even tenour of life, was, in his case, no symptom of that variableness which results from the union of a lively fancy with a shallow heart; if he soon formed attachments, this arose from the quickness of his sympathies,—the ease with which he could enter into each man's individual being, loving and admiring whatever it contained of amiable or admirable; from a “constitutional *communicativeness* and utterancy of heart and soul,” which, speedily attracting others to him, rendered them again on this account doubly interesting in his eyes; if he “stood aloof,” during portions of his life, from any once dear to him, this was rather occasioned by a morbid intensity and tenacity of feeling than any opposite quality of mind,

²⁴ Some persons appear to have confounded the general courtesy and bland overflowing of his *manners* with the state of his *affections*, and because the feelings which prompted the former flitted over the surface of his heart, to suppose that the latter were flitting and superficial too.

the same disposition which led him to heighten the lights of every object, while its bright side was turned toward himself, inclining him to deepen its shadows, when the chances and changes of life presented to him its darker aspect,—the same temper which led him to over-estimate marks of regard, rendering him too keenly sensible of, or quick to imagine, short-comings of love and esteem, his claims to which he not unnaturally reckoned by his readiness to bestow, which was boundless, rather than his fitness to receive, which he ever acknowledged to be limited. He was apt to consider affection as due simply to affection, irrespectively of merit in any other shape, and felt that such a “fund of love” as his, and that too from one so highly endowed as few denied him to be, ought “almost” to “supply desert.” He too much desired to idolize and be idolized, to fix his eye, even in this mortal life, only on perfection, to have the imperfections which he recognised in himself severely noted by himself alone.

“ For to be loved is all I need,
And whom I love, I love indeed.”

This turn of mind was at least partly the cause of such change and fluctuation in his attachments through life as may have subjected his conduct to unfavourable construction; another cause he himself indicated, at an early period of his career, when, after speaking of the gifts assigned him by heaven, he sadly exclaims,

“ — and from my *graspless hand*
Drop friendship’s precious pearls like hour-glass sand ! ”

Some of these precious pearls he let fall, not from wanting a deep sense of their value, or any lightness of feeling, but because he lacked resolution to hold them fast, or “stoop” to recover what he yet “wept”

to lose. Still it was but a cruel half truth, when one strangely converted from a friend into an enemy, ever shooting out his arrows even bitter words, spoke of him thus: "*There* is a man all intellect but without a will!" Sometimes indeed to will was present with him when he found not how to perform; *all* the good that he would he did not; but his performance, taken upon the whole, his involuntary defects considered, inspired his many friends with the belief that he was not only a wise, but humanly speaking, a *good* man.—"Good and great" some say: whether or no he was the latter, and how far, let others declare, time being the umpire; *it signifies, comparatively, nothing to the persons most interested in and for him what the decision on this point may be*; but the good qualities of his heart must be borne witness to by those in the present day who knew him best in private. Thus much may be said for the correctness of his intuitions and the clearness of his moral sense, that, through life, his associates, with few exceptions, were distinguished by high qualities of head and heart; from first to last of his course here below he was a discoverer and a proclaimer of excellence both in books and men.

Mr. Coleridge's Religious Opinions; their formation; misconceptions and misrepresentations on the subject.

SUCH imputations as those I have had the painful task of discussing, are apt to circulate rapidly and meet a ready credence from part of the public, when they concern a writer whose opinions are obnoxious to various parties in politics and religion, and who has never secured the favour and admiration of the light reading and little thinking world. For one man who

will fully and deeply examine any portion of the opinions, religious or philosophical, of a full and deep thinker, there are hundreds capable of comparing the run of sentences and paragraphs and being entertained by a charge of plagiarism: if some are grateful to him for light thrown, as *their* eyes tell them, upon truth, far more are offended because this same light reveals to them the untruth which they would fain not see in its proper hues and proportions; who not being prepared to overthrow his reasonings by a direct attack are glad to come at them obliquely, by lowering his personal character and thereby weakening his authority. The whole Romish world was bent on convicting Luther of Antinomianism, and as they could not discover it in his writings, they were resolved, if possible, to find it in his life, and as it was not forthcoming in either, they put it into both; they took all his rhetoric the wrong way up and hunted for unsoundness in his mind and libertinism in his conduct, as vultures hunt for things corrupt in nature.¹ The spirit evidenced in this procedure,—*that* “ancient spirit is not dead;” religious writers, even at the present day, are far too prone to discredit a man’s opinions at second-hand by

¹ I believe that Bayle’s article caused a dead silence on the subject of the great Reformer’s personal “carnality” for ages. Of late years it has been revived and there is a faint attempt to bring up some of the old stories circulated against him to the effect that he made *liberty a cloak for licentiousness*. (See on Luther’s Life and opinions Hare’s *Mission of the Comforter*, vol. ii. pp. 656-878.) It was an “easy feat” to put Pantheism into the “bottom of Luther’s doctrine and personal character,” (Essay on Developement, p. 84.) because the *bottom* of doctrine is one knows not where, and *Pantheism*, as modern polemics employ the term, one knows not what; but to fasten dissoluteness on his conduct is by no means easy.

1 *Unfair and uncertain Methods*

tracing them to some averred evil source in his character, or perverting influence in the circumstances of his life. This seems exceptionable however gently done, first because it is a very circuitous and uncertain mode of arriving at truth; a man's opinions we know on his own statements of them; but in attempting to discover the means through which they have been formed, we are searching in the dark, or the duskiest and most deceptive twilight, and, having no clear light to guide us, are apt to be led astray by some *ignis fatuus* of our own prejudices and delusions. Let the opinions be tried on their own merits, and if this is beside the inquirer's purpose, and he chooses to assume the truth of those he himself holds, considering them too certain and too sacred to be made a question of, in the same spirit let him disdain to snatch an argument in their favour, out of themselves, from doubtful considerations. Alas! how many of those who hold this lofty tone, calling their own belief *the truth*, and other men's belief mere *opinion*, only because they have an opinion of the validity of a certain test of truth which others cannot assent to, will yet resort to questionable methods of recommending this their unquestionable creed, and bring elaborate sophisms and partial representations, fit only to impose upon prepossessed and ductile readers, to the aid of "practical infallibility!"

But the second and even stronger objection to this mode of proceeding is, that the desire to find the origin of a man's way of thinking in the facts of his history, brings the inquirer under great temptation to depart from strict truth in regard to the facts themselves,—to mould them, often perhaps unconsciously, into such a shape as best suits his purpose.

Now in order to show that these inconveniences do

attach to the principle itself, I will take my example of its operation from a respectable quarter, where no unkindly spirit is manifested in tone or language. The seventh number of the *Christian Miscellany* of July 1842 contains fifteen or sixteen pages of short extracts from Mr. Coleridge's writings, which are entitled "Contributions of S. T. Coleridge to the Revival of Catholic Truths." I would suggest, by the way, that if my Father had taught only as such eclectics from his works would have him appear to have taught, his contributions to catholic truth would have been meagre enough, and might even have told in favour of much that he considered most uncatholic falsehood ; had his views been compressed within the bounds into which an implicit faith in the formal theology of early times must have compressed them, his system would have been lifeless and unreal as that which he was ever seeking to enliven and organize ; he would have done little toward *enlightening his generation*, though he might have aided others to strengthen particular parties by bringing up again for current use obsolete religious metaphysics and neglected arguments—a very different process from that of a true revival, which, instead of raising up the dead body of ancient doctrine, calls forth the life and substance that belong to it, clothed in a newer and more spiritual body, and gives to the belief of past ages an expansion and extension commensurate with the developed mind of our progressive race. Such was the revival of catholic truth at which he *aimed*, with whatever success, and to bring him in as an assistant in one of an opposite character, is, in my opinion, to do him injustice.

My immediate purpose, however, was not to notice the extracts themselves, but certain observations, re-

iii *The Tree, or the Soil and Air in which it grew,*

specting my Father, prefixed to them. They are contained in the little introduction, which speaks as follows :

“ These excerpts are not brought forward as giving an accurate representation of Mr. Coleridge’s opinions in all their modifications, or as specimens of his writings generally ; they are rather the chance metal of a mine, rich indeed, but containing ores of every degree of value. They may however serve to shew, how much he contributed by his elimination of powerful truths, in the then unhealthy state of literature, to the revival of sounder principles. In doing this it is not surprising that one, who relied so much on himself, and was so little guided, at least directly, by external authority, should have fallen into some inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are rather the result of an undue development of certain parts of Christian philosophy, than the holding of opinions immediately heretical.”

“ The circumstances in his Christian course, which we may regard as having impaired his power of duly appreciating the relative value of certain Catholic truths, were his profession of literature, his having edited a newspaper, and having been engaged in a course of heretical and schismatical teaching. That he was rescued from these dangers and crimes, and to a great extent saved from their effects, is, it is not improbable, owing to the circumstances of his early education. He was the son of a clergyman, admitted into the Church, and taught its doctrines by his pious and simple-hearted father, was impressed by his instructor, the Rev. James Bowyer, with the unrealities and hollowness of modern literature, and during his whole life was the subject of severe afflictions, which he received in patience, expressing for his past and often confessed sins, peni-

tence in word, and doubtless penance in deeds. Through those means he may have attained his happy privilege, of uttering the most important truths, and clothing them in such language as rendered their reception more easy to minds not entirely petrified by the materialism of the day."

For Mr. Coleridge's sake alone it might be thought scarcely worth while to discuss the accuracy of remarks, which are perhaps at this time remembered by few, and, like a thousand others of similar tendency, cannot fail to be counteracted in their drift, so far as it is erroneous, by the ever renewed influence of his writings, as the returning waters sweep from the sea shore what children have scattered there during the ebb.¹ For the sake of right principle, I must observe, that in seeking to strengthen our own faith by casting any measure of discredit on minds which have not received it, we rather shew our zeal in its behalf, than any true sense of its intrinsic excellence or confidence in its power. When a critic or biographer has a man's whole life,—whole body of opinions—under review, he may fairly enough,—though it is always a most difficult process,—*attempt* to show how, and to what extent, his character and modes of thought were affected by external circumstances; but I cannot help thinking it very unfair to pre-occupy a reader's mind with two or three

¹ The reader will perceive that I use this simile of the Sea to denote, not the size or importance, but the comparative permanence of my Father's writings. That he has achieved a permanent place in literature, (I do not say what or where,) I certainly believe; and I also believe that no persons well acquainted with his writings will be disposed to deny the position, except those who represent the Edinburgh Review of twenty and thirty years ago.

points of a man's life selected out of his personal history, previously to introducing a few of his opinions to their notice. Every man who is in error, who cannot see the truth when it is before him, labours under some defect, intellectual or moral, and this *may* have been *brought out*,—I think such defects are never *caused* or *implanted*,—by circumstances; but it is hardly fair play to impute such defects to a writer or describe them as having corrupted his opinions, when the nature of the opinions themselves is *adhuc sub lite* among Christians and good men.²

My principal objection however to the statements I have quoted is, that they are incorrect either in the letter or the spirit or both. It is plain enough that the real aim of the Miscellanist was not to exhibit the amount of Catholicity in an individual mind, but to spread what he considered to be Catholic truth, and to this my Father's character as a man was made subservient. On first reading his prefix I regarded one of its assertions as a pure mistake, and on this subject received the following testimonial from Mr. Wordsworth, with whose great and honoured name it must ever be the pride and pleasure of the friends of Coleridge to associate his.

² I wish the reader to observe that I attach little or no importance to the remarks of the Chr. Miscellany *in themselves*; as an index of a state of feeling in certain quarters and an instance of what is daily practised, to the production of injury and irritation more than any real good, they are not insignificant. Personality is a poisoned weapon in religious warfare; and all religious statements in these days are necessarily a warfare, open or undeclared. Personal character should never be dealt with at second hand; it should be left to those who undertake the trouble and responsibility, while they possess the zeal, of the biographer.

that Mr. C. had been a Newspaper Editor. lv

—“I feel absolutely certain that your Father never was *Editor* of any periodical publication whatsoever except *The Watchman* and *The Friend*, neither of which, as you know, was long continued, and *The Friend* expressly excluded even allusion to temporary topics; nor, to the best of my remembrance, had *The Watchman* anything of the character of a newspaper. When he was very young he published several sonnets in a London newspaper. Afterwards he was in strict connexion with the editors or at least proprietors of one or more newspapers, *The Courier* and *The Morning Post*; and in one of these, I think it was the latter, your Father wrote a good deal.”—

“So convinced was I of the great service that your Father rendered Mr. Stuart’s paper, that I urged him to put in his claim to be admitted a proprietor; but this he declined, having a great disinclination to any *tie* of the kind. In fact he could not bear being shackled in any way. I have heard him say that he should be sorry, if any one offered him an estate, for he should feel the possession would involve cares and duties that would be a clog to him.”—³

The “Newspaper” which is supposed to have retarded my Father’s growth in Catholicism, it now occurs to me, may have been *The Watchman*, as in that miscellany the domestic and foreign policy of the preceding days was reported and discussed; but I still think, that the impression which this statement, together with the inference drawn from it, is calculated to convey, is far from just. To be for any length of time the editor of a periodical work, which is the suc-

³ The reader is referred to chap. v. of the Biographical Supplement for an account of Mr. C.’s connection with Mr. Stuart.

cessful organ of a party, whatever principles that party may profess, nay even if they call themselves *Catholic*, is indeed to be in a situation of some danger to the moral and spiritual sense: but such was never my father's situation. When he is described as having been impaired in his religious mind by editing a newspaper, would any one guess the fact to be this, that, in his youth, he put forth ten numbers of a miscellaneous work, one portion of which was devoted to the politics of the times, and was unable to make it answer because he would not adapt it to the ways of the world and of newspapers in general? Let those who have been led to think that Mr. Coleridge's services to public journals may have deadened his religious susceptibilities consider, not only the principles which he professes and the frame of mind which he displays on this very subject in the tenth chapter of the present work, but the character of his newspaper essays themselves; had the writer, to whose remarks I refer, done this, before he pronounced judgment, I think he could not have failed to see that my Father conformed the publications he aided to himself and his own high views, in proportion to the extent of his connection with them, not himself to vulgar periodical writing. The Edinburgh Reviewers indeed, in the year 1817, flung in his teeth, "*Ministerial Editor.*" With them the reproach lay in the word *Ministerial*. *Tempora mutantur*—but the change of times has not yet brought truth to the service of my Father, or made him generally understood.

Not however the connection with newspapers merely, but the profession of literature is specified as one among other causes, which alienated my Father's mind from Catholicity. The peculiar disadvantages of the

“*trade* of authorship” Mr. Coleridge has himself described in this biographical fragment; he has shewn that literature can scarcely be made the means of living without being debased; but he himself failed in it, as the means of living, because he would not thus debase it,—would not sacrifice higher aims for the sake of immediate popularity. Literature, pursued *not* as a mere trade, is naturally the ally, rather than the adversary, of religion. It is indeed against our blessed Lord, if not for him; but though it has its peculiar danger, inasmuch as it satisfies the soul more than any other, and is thus more liable to become a permanent substitute for religion with the higher sort of characters, yet surely, by exercising the habits of abstraction and reflection, it better disciplines the mind for that life which consists in seeking the things that are above while we are yet in the flesh, than worldly business or pleasure. Inferiour pursuits may sooner weary and disgust, but during their continuance they more unfit the mind for higher ones; and the departure of one set of guests does not leave the soul an empty apartment, swept and garnished for the reception of others more worthy.

And how should literature indispose men toward *Catholic* views in religion? The *common* argument in behalf of those which are *commonly* so called rests upon historical testimony and outward evidence; why should the profession of literature render men less able to estimate proof of this nature? A pursuit it is which leads to reflection and inquiry, and what can be said for the soundness of that system to which these are adverse? Some indeed maintain that our persuasions in such matters depend little upon argument; that none can truly enter into the merits of the Church

system, save those who have been in the habit of obeying it, and that from their youth up. Now it is not, of course, contended that my Father was, during his whole life, in the best position for appreciating Catholicity and becoming attached to it; but this may be fairly maintained, that he never was so circumstanced, as to be precluded from drawing nigh to any truthful system, existing in the world, and in due time coming under its habitual sway.

Again in what sense can it be truly said of Coleridge that he disregarded authority? It would be difficult to instance a thinker more disposed to weigh the thoughts of other thinkers, more ready to modify his views by consideration of their's or the grounds on which they rest. Can those who bring the charge against him substantiate of it more than this, that he had not *their* convictions respecting the authority attributable to a certain set of writers of a certain age? And does it not appear that this theory of the consentient teaching of the Fathers and its "practical infallibility" involves the depreciation of authority, at least in one very important sense? He who binds himself by it, strictly, must needs hold human intelligence to be of little avail in the determination of religious questions, since it is the leading principle of this theory of faith, that our belief has been fixed by an outward revelation, —the commentary of tradition upon Scripture,—and that we are not to look upon the reason and conscience of man, interpreted by the understanding, as the everlasting organ of the Spirit of Truth? The weakest intellect can receive doctrine *implicitly* as well as the strongest, and to hand on that which has been already settled and defined requires no great depth or subtlety of intellect. If the weightiest matters on which the

thoughts of man can be employed are already so determined by an outward oracle, that all judgment upon them is precluded, and the highest faculties of the human mind have no concern in establishing or confirming their truth, authority, as the weight which the opinion of the good and wise carries along with it, in regard to the most important questions, is superseded and set aside. And the fact is, I believe, that professors of this sort of *Catholicity*, whether for good or for bad, whether from narrowness or from exaltedness, are by no means remarkable for a spirit of respect toward highly endowed men, or for entering into the merits of a large proportion of those who have conciliated the esteem and gratitude of earnest and thoughtful persons. None are burning and shining lights for them except such as exclusively irradiate their own sphere, (which is none of the widest;) and *their* radiance appears the stronger to their eyes because they see nothing but darkness elsewhere. Let it be clearly understood that I here refer to that antiquarian theory, according to which every doctrine bearing upon religion, held by the Fathers, *even though the matter of the doctrine be rather scientific and metaphysical than directly spiritual and practical*,—as for instance the doctrine of free will,—constitutes *Catholic consent*, is the voice of the Holy Catholic Church, and therefore the voice of its heavenly Head; that the early Christian writers, where they agree, are to be considered practically infallible, on account of their external position in reference to the Apostles; that succeeding writers are of no authority, except so far as they deliver what is agreeable to “Catholic doctrine,” so understood, and in so far as they differ from it are at once to be considered unsound and unworthy of attention. If such a

theory is not, as I imagine, maintained by a certain class of High Churchmen, I shall be very glad to find that it is only a shadow; though in this case I should be more than ever perplexed to understand what it is that the *Catholic* and *orthodox* so much disapprove in the opinion of my Father on the subject in question; or why he should be accused of disregarding *authority*, because, though he thought the consentient teaching of the early Christian writers worthy of deep consideration, he did not hold it to be absolutely conclusive upon theological questions, or *certainly* the voice of God. Something very different was, to his mind, implied in the promise of Christ to his Church; for without His presence in any special sense, as the life-giving Light, a fully developed system of doctrine, capable of being received implicitly, might have been transmitted from age to age. He saw the fulfilment of it, partly at least, in the power given to individual minds to be what the prophets were of old, by whom the Holy Ghost spake, religious instructors of their generation.⁴

Literature, liberally pursued, has no other bearing on a man's religious opinions than as it leaves him more at liberty to form them for himself than any other. Looking at the matter in another point of view I readily admit, that, so far as it is the want of any

⁴ I find the same argument in Dr. Arnold's Fragment on the Church. He words it thus: "The promise of the Spirit of Truth to abide for ever with his Church, implies surely that clearer views of truth should be continually vouchsafed to us; and if the work were indeed fully complete when the Apostles entered into their rest, what need was there for the Spirit of Wisdom, as well as of Love, to be ever present even unto the end of the world?"

regular profession at all, it may be in some degree injurious to the *man*, and consequently to the *thinker*.⁵ But if a regular calling tends to steady the mind, restraining it from too tentative a direction of thought, and what may prove to be a vain activity, it tends perhaps in an equal degree to fix and petrify the spirit, of which I believe abundant evidence may be found in the writings of professional men. Perhaps there is no fixed occupation which does not in some measure tend to disturb the balance of the soul; the want of one permits a man to commune with human nature more variously and freely than is possible for those to whom a stated routine presents persons and things with a certain uniformity of aspect; it is not mere experience that gives knowledge, but a diversified experience, and the power of beholding the diversity it contains through the absence of a particular bias and leisure for contemplation. So far, therefore, as it presents facilities for the acquirement of the philosophic mind, even the want of a regular calling may in some degree facilitate the acquirement of truthful views in religion. "It is scarcely possible," said my Father himself, addressing Mr. Frere, "to conceive an individual less under the influence of the ordinary disturbing forces of the judgment than your poor friend; or from situation, pursuits, and habits of thinking,

⁵ After speaking in warm eulogy, according to his wont, of S. T. C. Dr. Arnold says, "But yet there are marks enough that his mind was a little diseased by the want of a profession, and the consequent unsteadiness of his mind and purposes; it always seems to me, that the very power of contemplation becomes impaired or diverted, when it is made the main employment of life." See Arnold's Life and Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 57.

lxii *Relation of Party Union and Compact*

from age, state of health, and temperament, less likely to be drawn out of his course by the under-currents of hope or fear, of expectation or wish. But least of all by predilection for any particular sect or party; for wherever I look, in religion or in politics, I seem to see a world of power and talent wasted on the support of half truths, too often the most mischievous because least suspected of errors.”⁶

It was the natural consequence of his having no predilection for any sect or party that parties and party organs have either neglected or striven against him; they were indeed his natural opponents, as they must ever be of any man, whose vocation it is to examine the truth of modes of thought in general, while an *assumption* of the truth of certain modes of thought is the ground of their existence as parties, and the band that keeps them together. It has been observed by Mr. Newman, in condemnation of “the avowed disdain of party religion;” that “Christ undeniably made a party the vehicle of his doctrine, and did not cast it at random on the world, as men would now have it;”⁷ and undeniable it surely is, that there is nothing radically wrong in the union of members for the support or propagation of truth. But then, from the weakness of human hearts and fallibility of human understandings it comes to pass, that while *party union* is right in the abstract, *parties* are generally more or less wrong, both in principle and conduct, and do more or less depart from truth in their resolution to maintain some particular portion or representation of it. The

⁶ *Church and State*. Advertisement, pp. 4, 5.

⁷ *Sermons preached before the University of Oxford*. Serm. viii. p. 165.

party that has our Lord at its head and fights for Him and Him only is one with the Church of Christ, considered as still militant; but this host, like the fiery one that surrounded Elisha, is invisible. The party which Christ instituted was not invisible, but it differs essentially from all parties within the precincts of Christendom for this very reason, *that it was undeniably instituted by Him*, and that they who composed it had to defend the moral law in its depth and purity, theism itself in its depth and purity—(the acknowledgment of God as a Spirit, one and personal, with the relations to each other of the Creator and the creature—a faint distorted shadow of which was alone preserved by Polytheists)—against a popular religion, which, though pious and spiritual in comparison with utter want of faith in the things that are above, was the very world and the flesh,⁸ as opposed to Christianity. Thus *they* were striving for the life and soul which animates the

⁸ Heathenism in Scripture is represented as one with sensuality, profaneness and disregard of the life to come; to work the will of the Gentiles was to run to every kind of evil excess; and almost the same, I suppose, may be said of the monstrous heresies, against which the Apostles and their successors spoke in terms of unqualified reprobation. In his Fragment on the Church, Dr. Arnold remarks, that “the heresies condemned by the Apostles were not mere erroneous opinions on some theoretical truth, but absolute perversions of Christian holiness; that they were not so much false as wicked. And further, where there was a false opinion in the heresy, it was of so monstrous a character, and so directly connected with profligacy of life, that it admits of no comparison with the so-called heresies of later ages.” pp. 89, 90. Does it appear that our Lord ever rebuked either unbelief or misbelief, except as one and the same with worldliness and wickedness, or at least, as in the case of Thomas, subjection of the mind to the flesh?

religion of Christ, whereas I would fain believe, that the contentions among parties of Christians are less for this life and soul than for the forms in which they severally hold that it is most fitly clothed, and with which they identify it.⁹ And this is no unworthy subject of contention, because the life and spirit are best preserved and most fully expressed in the truest forms,—a correct and distinct intellectual system is the best preservative of the essential portion of faith; but yet, because they *are* forms, the strife concerning them will be more apt to degenerate into an unholy warfare than a struggle *pro aris et focis*,—for the very ideas of a spiritual religion and for a pure and pregnant morality, the testimony to which every soul may find at home, if it looks deep into its own retirements.

In reference to the present subject, however, I need only observe that party compact operates chiefly for the preserving and extending of truth, considered as already established, while the discovery or development of it is only to be achieved by individual efforts; it even tends to retard such progress in the beginning,

⁹ To take the extreme case, Socinianism, I have long thought that a man may, that many a man does, athwart the negative lines of this creed, which in some cases appear to be quite negative in operation, behold in heart and spirit every deep truth on which Christians around them are dwelling, every truth meet to bring forth the fruit of good living, and to fit the soul for a higher life than the present. I hope and believe that such persons do practically embrace the divinity of Christ, because they worship, serve and obey Him,—they address their religious thoughts to Him habitually—they attribute to Him that which is properly divine, the work of Creation and Redemption, although they have wrong conceptions of the method of this work. On the other hand I should suppose that many Ro-

to expand and strengthen divine Knowledge. lxx

because, as essentially conservative, it ventures upon no experiments, but is bound to consider every departure from that form of teaching, which has hitherto served to convey and preserve spiritual truth, as endangering its purity and stability; and thus it may easily happen that, although religious doctrine may and must be diffused and maintained by men acting in concert, yet they who are labouring to advance the truth, to reform and expand the stock of divine knowledge, may be in continual antagonism and collision with those who are intent only on keeping it from going back. My Father's vocation, if he had any in this province, was to defend the Holy Faith by developing it, and shewing its accordance and identity with ideas of reason; he has described himself as one who "feels the want, the necessity of religious support; who cannot afford to lose any the smallest buttress; who not only loves Truth even for itself, and when it reveals itself aloof from all interest, but who loves it with an indescribable awe"—which causes him to—"creep toward the light, even though it draw him

manists must practically impute divinity to the blessed Mother of Jesus, from the addresses which they make to her, and the extent to which they seem to devote their religious minds to her. At best they appear to make her one with our Saviour, and not merely with the man Christ Jesus but with the Eternal Son of the Father, extending His attributes to her, and making of the twain two persons and one God. How awfully dangerous would it be to address Christ as the Mediator betwixt God and man if he were not himself both God and Man! It will not, I trust, be supposed that I am here instituting any general comparison between Socinianism and Romanism with a preference of the former. I am merely considering what either may *possibly* be to the heart and mind of the professor.

away from the more nourishing warmth." "Yea, I should do so," he adds, "even if the light had made its way through a rent in the wall of the Temple."¹⁰

But the gravest allegation contained in the passage I have quoted, is, that Mr. Coleridge was once engaged in "a course of heretical and schismatical teaching:"—a statement which seems to imply, that he had been at one time pledged to teach a particular set of doctrines, as a man is pledged upon undertaking the charge of a spiritual congregation, who expect that he shall confine himself within certain lines in his teaching, and will listen to him no longer than he keeps faith with them on that point. In such a case as this, supposing the doctrines false, to be engaged in a course of teaching them, must tend to confirm the man's mind in alienation from truth; because it weds him to the false doctrines, not by inward love and preference only, but by an outward and formal union. That Mr. Coleridge was never bound to Heresy and Schism by any such bonds as these might be gathered from the present work alone, and would be fully manifest to any one who considered the matter with care. Soon after leaving Cambridge he delivered lectures on revealed religion, in which he set forth such views as he entertained at the time: after this he preached occasionally at Bath, at Taunton, and as an "hireless volunteer" in most of the great towns which he passed through on a tour from Bristol to Sheffield. Once indeed he entertained thoughts of taking upon him the charge of an Unitarian congregation; but after preaching

¹⁰ It is best to peruse his fuller exposition of this sentiment in the passage itself, which occurs in the *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*. Letter I.

one sermon, in which, from the account of an ear-witness, there seems to have been more of poetry and the general principles of religion than of vulgar heresy and schism, he abandoned the prospect that had been held out to him. Not that the offer, by which he was suddenly called away from it, tended to bias his opinions in an opposite direction ; it left them free as air, operating solely to detach him from all outward connection with religious bodies, and exempt him from the least temptation to place himself in binding relations with them, or any sort of dependence upon them. To this indeed it is unlikely that he would ever have submitted ; for, as he mentioned to an acquaintance at the time, had he preached a second sermon at Shrewsbury, it would have been such an one as must “effectually have disqualified him for the object in view ;” so little was he disposed to keep within the lines of doctrine marked out by any sect, or to let the body of his opinions live and grow under external form and pressure. It is extravagant to suppose that my Father was impaired for life in the power of religious discernment by a course of teaching, which taught himself to perceive the deficiencies and errors of the creed in which he had sought refuge : that he was perverted by the very process which his mind went through in order to arrive at a more explicit knowledge of the truth. That which to the passive and inert may be a tainting experience, to minds like his, full of activity and resistency, is but a strengthening experiment : he doubted and denied in order to believe earnestly and intelligently. His Unitarianism was purely negative ; not a satisfaction in the positive formal divinity of the Unitarians, but what remained with him to the last, a revulsion from certain explanations of the Atonement commonly received

lxviii *His Opinions not governed from without.*

as orthodox, together with that insight which he believed himself afterwards to have attained into the whole scheme of Redemption, so far as it can be seen into by man, and its deep and perfect harmony with the structure of the human mind as it is revealed to the eye of Philosophy.

Against those, on the one hand, who describe him as "intellectually bold but educationally timid,"¹² those on the other who suppose him to have been indebted to his early education for all that is consonant with the true faith and fear of the Lord in his religious creed, and lay to the account of after circumstances all that they disapprove in it, I must firmly maintain, that what they are so anxious, from the way in which their own spirit has been moulded, to cast upon outward things in the formation of his opinions, was, in the main, the result and product of his own intellect and will. When the years of childhood were past, he left behind him the Eden, as some consider it, of implicit faith: the world of belief was all before him where to chuse, and

¹¹ See his own remarks on this subject in the middle of the tenth chapter of the *Biographia*.

¹² Quoted from a volume of poetical selections and criticisms by Leigh Hunt, entitled "Imagination and Fancy." Having referred to this agreeable book I cannot refrain from expressing my belief that, had the author gone as deep into Coleridge's theosophy as into his poetry, or made himself as well acquainted with his religious writings as with his poems, he could never have said that "nine-tenths of his theology would apply equally to their own creeds in the mouths of a Brahmin or a Mussulman." On the contrary, nothing more characterizes the religious conceptions of Coleridge than the ever present aim and endeavour to shew that Christianity is religion itself, religion in its deepest, highest and fullest expression, the very ground as well as the summit of divine truth.

Embraced neither Pantheism nor Mysticism. lxix

for a time he sojourned with the Unitarians, beholding in them only the firm and honest rejectors of a creed, which, as yet, he could not receive explicitly. When he had once entered their ranks no circumstances existed to prevent him from remaining a Psilanthropist and becoming more and more confirmed in opposition to the sum of tenets and opinions commonly called Catholic; many men so situated, even if they had been nurtured as he was in the bosom of the Church, would either have abode finally within those precincts or left them only to proceed in an opposite direction to that which he took, and combined German metaphysics with an atheistic Pantheism, instead of bringing them to the service of revealed religion. On the other hand, when he had quitted the Unitarians, what *outward* influence was there to prevent him from adopting High Church doctrine, as it is taught either by Anglican or by Romish divines? Some men have passed from a deeper and earlier training in "heresy and schism" than his to that Church theory which exhibits an earthly and visible system and proclaims it the shrine of a mystic and heavenly one, not simply as God's instrument, whereby the spirit is awakened in man's heart and mind by communion with Him, but as being *in itself*, independently of all such effects and prior to them, a receptacle of the divine Spirit; and calls upon men to receive it as thus divine not principally on internal evidence, the harmony of the whole scheme within itself, attested by its proper moral and spiritual effects, but on an outward historic proof, reaching no higher than probability, yet assumed to be that which only the unspiritual mind can reject.

That he did neither the one nor the other, that he came to consider the notions of the Church entertained

by ordinary Protestants inadequate and unspiritual, without adopting the Romish doctrines respecting the *clergy* and the nature of their intervention betwixt God and man in the mode of salvation ; that he exalted the spirituality of sacraments without admitting the primitive materialism, by many styled Catholic, that he saw the very mind of St. Paul, in the teaching of Luther on the Law and Justification by Faith, yet was open-eyed to the misuse of that teaching and the practical falsities deduced out of it by modern Methodists—all this and much more in his system of religious opinion, distinguishing it equally from over-sensualized, and from “*minimifidian*” Christianity, ought not to be traced to peculiar circumstances and to accident as its principal cause. Doubtless it was a blessing to “the Christian philosopher” that he had a good Christian for his father—that he had in him the pattern of “an Israelite without guile.” But of his Churchmanship I believe that he was himself almost wholly the Father ; and I verily think, that even if he had been born in the Church of Rome, or in the bosom of some Protestant sect, he would have burst all bonds asunder, have mastered the philosophy of his age, and arrived at convictions substantially the same as those which now appear on the face of his writings.

There are some, perhaps, among the intelligent readers of Coleridge, who take a different view of the character of his opinions from that which I have expressed : who believe that, during his latter years, he became in the main what High Churchmen consider Catholic and orthodox, whilst any notions he still held of a different character were anomalies, remnants of his early creed, which would have been worked out of his mind had his years been prolonged. There are

was never begun in the Aids to Reflection. lxxi

others amongst the proselytes to the Oxford theology, who see nothing more in his teaching than a stunted Anglo-catholicism; some of these aver that, in the beginning of their course they were conducted for a little way by the writings of Mr. Coleridge; that he first led them out of the dry land of negative Protestantism; but that now, by help of newer guides, they have advanced far beyond him, and can look down on his lower station from a commanding eminence. They view the *Aids to Reflection* as a half-way house to Anglo-catholic orthodoxy, just as others, who have got beyond them, in a certain direction, consider their Anglo-catholic doctrine a half-way house to what they consider the true Catholicism,—namely that of the Church of Rome. My own belief is, that such a view of my Father's theological opinions is radically wrong; that although an unripe High Church theology is all that some readers have found or valued in his writings, it is by no means what is there; and that he who thinks he has gone a little way with Coleridge, and then proceeded with Romanizing teachers further still, has never gone along with Coleridge at all, or entered deeply into any of his expositions of Christian doctrine; though there may be in many of them a tone and a spirit with which he has sympathized, and an emphatic condemnation of certain views of religion, which has gratified his feelings. But, though I conceive my Father's religious system, considered as to its intellectual form, to be different throughout from that of Anglo or Roman Catholic, as commonly expounded, that it coincided in *substance* with that which these parties both agree to consider Catholic doctrine, I entirely believe. If *they* are steering Northward, his course is to the North as much as theirs, but while

they seek it by the West he reaches it by an Easterly voyage; I mean that he is as consistently and regularly opposed to them in his *rationale* of doctrine as consentient with them respecting the great objects of faith, viewed in their essence; at least in his own opinion, though not in theirs; for he was accustomed to make a distinction between religious ideas and the intellectual notions with which they have been connected, or the dogmas framed in relation to them, to which they appear strangers. His Christian divinity agreed more with "Catholicism" than with the doctrines of any sect, since according to his judgment and feelings *that* contains, whether in a right or wrong form, the spiritual ideas in which the true substance of Christianity consists, more completely: on some points it coincided with the "Catholicism" of Rome rather than with that of Anglicans; he recognised for instance the idea of the immanence of spiritual power and light in the Church, independently of the authority of a revelation completed in past ages, opposed as he was to the application of that idea made by Papists. His religious system, according to his own view of it, might be described as exhibiting the universal ideas of Christianity, not those which have been consciously recognised always, everywhere and by all, but those which the reason and spiritual sense of all men, when sufficiently developed, bear witness to, explained according to a modern philosophy, which purports to be no mere new thinking, but inclusively, all the thought that has been and now is in the world. Such was the aim and design of his doctrine. How far he made it good is not to be determined here.¹³

¹³ Since the chief part of this preface was written I have become acquainted with Archdeacon's Hare's *Mission of the*

They who differ from me on this question may have gone deeper into my Father's mind than myself. I will only say in support of my own impressions, that they are derived from a *general* survey of his writings, late and early, such as few beside myself *can* have taken, and that I came to the study of them with no interest but the common interest in truth, which all mankind possess, to bias my interpretation. Indeed I can conceive of no influence calculated to affect my judgment, except the natural wish, in my mind sufficiently strong, to find my Father's opinions as near as may be to established orthodoxy,—as little as possible out of harmony with the notions and feelings of the great body of pious and reflective persons in his own native land. To me, with this sole bias on my mind, it is manifest, that his system of belief, intellectually considered, differs materially from "Catholic" doctrine as commonly understood, and that this difference during the latter years of his meditative life, instead of being shaded off, became more definite and boldly developed. How

Comforter, which I dare to pronounce a most valuable work, meaning that I find it so, without the presumption, which in me would be great indeed, of pretending to enter fully into its merits. I have had the satisfaction of meeting with remarks upon my Father in the preface and in the notes of which the second volume consists, confirmatory of some which I have ventured to make myself. Even the dedication coincides with the views given above, for it is this: "To the honoured memory of S. T. Coleridge, the Christian philosopher, who through dark and winding paths of speculation was led to the light, in order that others by his guidance might reach that light, without passing through the darkness, these Sermons on the Work of the Spirit are dedicated, with deep thankfulness and reverence, by one of the many pupils, whom his writings have helped to discern the sacred concord and unity of human and divine truth."

lxxiv *How his Christian Philosophy differs from*

should it have been otherwise, unless he had abandoned that modern philosophy, which he had adopted on the deepest and fullest deliberation ; and how, without such abandonment, could he have embraced a doctrinal system based on a philosophy fundamentally different? How could he who believed that “a desire to bottom all our convictions on grounds of right reason is inseparable from the character of a Christian,” acquiesce in a system, which suppresses the exercise of the individual reason and judgment in the determination of faith, *as to its content* ; would have the whole matter, for the mass of mankind, decided by feeling and habit apart from conscious thought ; and bids the soul take refuge in a *home of Christian truth*, in which its higher faculties are *not* at home, but reside like slaves and aliens in the land of a conqueror? To his latest hour, though ever dwelling with full faith on the doctrines of Redemption and original sin, in what he considered the deepest and most real sense attainable by man, he yet, to his latest hour, put from him some of the so-called orthodox notions and modes of explaining those doctrines. My Father’s whole view of what theologians term *grace*—the internal spiritual relations of God with man, his conception of its nature in a theoretical point of view, differs from that which most “Catholics” hold themselves bound to receive unaltered from the primitive and mediæval Christian writers ; for in my Father’s belief, the teachers of those days knew not what spirit was, or what it was not, metaphysically considered ; in no wise therefore could he receive their explanations of the spiritual as sound divinity, readily as he might admit that many of them had such insight into the Christian scheme as zeal and the ardour of a new love secure to the student of Holy

Writ. Religion must have *some* intellectual form; must be viewed through the medium of intellect; and if the medium is clouded the object is necessarily obscured. The great aim and undertaking of modern mental philosophy is to clarify this inward eye, rather than to enlarge its sphere of vision, except so far as the one involves the other—to shew what spiritual things are *not*, and thus to remove the obstructions which prevent men from seeing, as mortals may see, what they are.

Those who maintain certain doctrines, or rather *metaphysical views of doctrine*, and seek to prove them Scriptural, simply because they were doctrines of early Christian writers, ought to look in the face the plain fact that some of the *most influential of those early writers were materialists*,—not as holding the soul to be the mere result of bodily organization, but as holding the soul itself to be material;—ought gravely to consider, whether it is reasonable to reject the *philosophy* of a certain class of divines, and yet cling “limpet-like” to their forms of thought on religious questions, forms obviously founded upon, and conformed to, that philosophy. They believed the soul to be material,—corporeal. Of this assertion, the truth of which is well known to men who have examined into the history of metaphysical and psychological opinion,¹⁴ I cannot give detailed proofs in this place; but in passing I refer the reader to Tertullian *De Resurr. Carn.* cap. xvii. and *De Anima*, cap. ix.; to Irenæus, *Contra Hæreses*, *Lib. ii.* cap.

¹⁴ Mr. Scott, in his impressive Lectures on the evolution of Philosophy out of Religion, maintained the materialism of the early Christian writers.

lxxvi *He did not admit the religious Psychology*

xix. 6. and to the preface of the learned Benedictine to the latter, p. 161. Artic. XI. *De Animarum natura et statu post mortem*. What! are we to be governed in religious *metaphysique* and the *rationale* of belief by men who thought that the soul was poured into the body and there thickened like jelly in a mould?—that the inner man took the form of the outer, having eyes and ears and all the other members, like unto the body, only of finer stuff?—its *corpulency being consolidated by densation and its effigy formed by expression?* This was the notion of Cyprian's master, the acute Tertullian, and that of Irenæus was like unto it. He compares the soul to water frozen in a vessel, which takes the form of the vessel in which it freezes,¹⁵ evidently supposing, with Tertullian, that the firm substantial body moulded the fluent and aerial soul¹⁶—that organization was the organizer. It appears that in those days the *vulgar* held the soul to be incorporeal,¹⁷ according to the views of Plato and other stupid philosophers, combated in the treatise *De Anima*; but that orthodox Christian divines looked upon that as an impious unscriptural

¹⁵ *Contra Hæreses*. Lib. ii. cap. xix. 6.

¹⁶ A primordio enim in Adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius substantiæ, ita et conditionis istius semen efficit. Tertull. *De Anima*. Cap. ix. *ad finem*.

¹⁷ Tertull. *De Res. Car.* Cap. xvii. *in initio*.—aliter anima non capiat passionem tormenti seu refrigerii, utpote incorporalis: *hoc enim vulgus existimat*. Nos autem animam corporalem et hic profitemur et in suo volumine probamus, &c. On this passage Dr. Pusey observes in a note, that it attests "the immateriality of the soul" to have been "the general belief." I think it attests it to have been the belief of the common people, but not that it was the prevailing opinion with Christian divines of that age.

opinion. Justin Martyr argues against Platonic notions of the soul in his Dialogue with Trypho.¹⁸ As for the vulgar, they have ever been in the habit of *calling* the soul incorporeal, yet reasoning and thinking about it, as if it had the properties of body. The common conception of a ghost accords exactly with Tertullian's description of the soul—a lucid aerial image of the outward man. Thus did these good Fathers change soul into body, and condense spirit into matter; thus did they reverse the order of nature, contradict the wisdom of ages, and even run counter to the instinctive belief of mankind, in recoiling from Gnosticism; thus deeply did they enter into the sense of St. Paul's high sayings about the heavenly body and the utter incompatibility of flesh and blood with the Kingdom of Heaven! As they conceived the soul to be *material*, so they may very naturally have conceived it capable of receiving and retaining the Spirit, as a material vessel may receive and retain a liquid or any other substance; and, in their conception, *within the soul* may no more have implied any affection of the soul itself, than within the box or bason implies any change in the stone or metal of which the receptacle was made. Indeed this sensuous way of conceiving spiritual subjects is apparent in some of the passages from old writers that are appealed to in support of what Archdeacon Hare happily calls, "baptismal transubstantiation;" as, for instance, one cited in the Tract for the Times called, by a misnomer, as I think, *Scriptural* views of Holy Baptism,¹⁹ the

¹⁸ Ven. 1747. pp. 106 and 111. Justin Martyr and Tatian denied the original immortality of the soul on religious grounds, and the former affirms that it is not simple, but consists of many parts, p. 271.

¹⁹ "If the sun being without, and fire by being near or at a

lxxviii *Influence of the primitive Materialism*

author whereof is so fervent, so scriptural in spirit and intention, that he almost turns all he touches into Scripture, as Midas turned all he touched into gold. How the gold looked when Midas was away I know not; but to me Dr. Pusey's *Scriptural* views, apart from his persuasive personal presence, which ever pervades his discourses and constitutes their great effect upon the heart,—seem but brass beside the pure gold of Holy Writ; his alien piety gilds and *hides* them. The more we polish brass the more brassy it appears; and so, these views only seem to my mind the more discrepant from Holy Writ, the more clearly and learnedly they are set forth. In Scripture faith is required as the condition of all spiritual influence for purely spiritual and moral effects, and that primary regeneration, which precedes a moral one in time, and

little distance from bodies, warmeth our bodies, what must we say of the Divine Spirit, which is indeed the most vehement fire, kindling the inner man, although it dwell not within but be without? It is possible then, in that all things are possible to God, that one may be warmed, although that which warmeth him be not in himself." From Ammonius. *Scriptural Views*, p. 264, 4th edit. This writer evidently supposes the proper Indwelling to be distinct from influence. My Father, in his MS. remains, declares against the opinion of those who make "the indwelling of the Spirit an occupation of a place, by a vulgar equivoque of the word *within, inward, &c.*" "For example," says he, "a bottle of water let down into the sea.—The water contained and the surrounding water are both alike in fact outward or without the glass, but the antithetic relation of the former to the latter is expressed by the preposition *in* or *within*: and this improper, sensuous, merely relative sense of *within, indwelling, &c.* it is alas! but too plain that many of our theological *Routiniers* apply, though without perhaps any distinct consciousness of their *Thought*, to spiritual Presence!"

is not necessarily the ground of a change of heart and life, was never *derived* from the Word of God, but has been put into it by a series of inferences, and is supported principally by an implicit reliance on the general enlightenment of the early Christian writers. The doctrine may not be directly injurious to morality, since it allows actual faith to be a necessary instrument in all moral renovation; but the indirect practical consequences of insisting upon shadows as if they were realities, and requiring men to accept as a religious verity of prime importance a senseless dogma, the offspring of false metaphysics, must be adverse to the interests of religion. Such dogmatism has a bad effect on the habits of thought by weakening the love and perception of truth, and it is also injurious by producing disunion and mutual distrust among Christians.

The subtlest matter has all the properties of matter as much as the grossest. Let us see how this notion, that the soul consists of subtle matter, affects the form of doctrine, by trying it on that of baptism. The doctrine insisted on as primitive by a large party in the Church, nay set forth as the very criterion *stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*, by some of them, is this, that, in the *moment* of baptism, the soul receives the Holy Spirit within it; that the Holy Spirit remains within the soul, even though the baptized, as soon as he becomes capable of moral acts, proves faithless and wicked, until it is expelled for ever by a large but indefinite amount of wickedness, entitled *utter reprobacy*. How intolerable this doctrine is in its moral and spiritual aspect, how it evacuates the Scriptural phrase, *Christ in us*, of its emphatic meaning, it is useless to urge upon those, who believe it to have been taught by the Apostles. I now only allege that no man origi-

lxxx *His ultimate scheme of Baptism substan-*
nally could have framed such a conception as this, who
had our modern conceptions of spirit, or had consid-
ered what is the idea involved in the words, *presence*
of the Holy Spirit to our spirit. When the doctrine
is unfolded and presented to the masters and doctors
of it, they fly off to the notion of an inward *potential*
righteousness. But this mere *capability* of being saved
and sanctified, we have from our birth, nor can it be
increased, because it is essentially, *extra gradum*,—not
a thing of degrees. Our capability of being spiritua-
lized by divine grace is unlimited. *Who are they*
that explain away the baptismal gift into a sha-
*dow ?*²⁰

My Father, in his latter years, looked upon baptism
as a formal and public reception into a state of spiri-
tual opportunities, (at least so I understand him),
which is equivalent, I suppose, to the doctrine of some
of our divines, Waterland among others, that it is a
consignment of grace to the soul. It is conceivable
that in consequence of such consignment, the soul, by
the will of God, may have more outward means of re-
ceiving spiritual influence than it would otherwise have
had; if prayer can affect the course and complex of
events in favour of those who are not praying, so may
the rite of baptism influence it in favour of the bap-
tized, though he be passive in baptism. The objec-
tion to the Antiquitarian doctrine is not that it implies
a mystery, not that it implies the reception of a spiri-
tual opportunity independently of the will of the re-
ceiver, but that, as it is commonly stated, it contradicts
the laws of the human understanding, and either af-

²⁰ See remarks on this subject in the *Mission of the Comforter*,
pp. 476-7.

tially accordant with that of the Church. lxxxix

firms what cannot be true,—what brings confusion into our moral and spiritual ideas,—or else converts the doctrine into an ineffectual vapour—“a potentiality in a potentiality or a chalking of chalk to make white white.”²¹ My Father, as I understand him, continued to deny that the gift of baptism is a spiritual re-creation

²¹ See this whole argument given at greater length in the *Essay on Rationalism* appended to the 5th edition of the *Aids to Reflection*.

Two fallacies are current on the subject of momentary baptismal transubstantiation. First—men say, that *as* we are passive in our original creation, *so* we are passive in our spiritual re-creation. The answer may be given from the Angelical Doctor, who teaches that we are *not* passive in our original creation; and indeed it needs not the wisdom of an angel to see, that neither man nor any other animal can become alive without a corresponsive act on his part—a sub-co-operation. If we throw a stone into the still unmoving pool, the waters leap up: the pool has not stirred itself, but it co-operates in the production of motion. The second commonplace fallacy is this:—*as* a seed is set in the ground and remains inert and latent for a time, then germinates, shoots up and bears fruit, *so* grace may be poured into the soul of a child incapable of moral acts, may remain latent for a time, then, when reason and the moral sense have come into play, may produce good thoughts and good works, the fruit of the Spirit. The objection to this is that a spiritual being is not *in* a spiritual being as a material thing is *in* a material thing; it is in it or *present* to it only inasmuch as it acts upon it. It is the heart itself which, by the power of the Spirit, must bear the fruit of virtue, not a something lodged within it, as the seed in the ground. Spiritual effects in the soul may exist unperceived by men,—may not produce outward works of holiness till long after they have been produced; but when the deeds are evil, as they are in many who were baptized in infancy, we may fairly say that the effects were not produced—in other words, that the person who shews such an unspiritual mind, was not spiritually regenerated in baptism.

lxxxii *The true Import of the Doctrine stated*

preceding actual faith or any moral capability,—an introduction of the spirit into the soul, which it passively undergoes, as the dead cage receives the living bird, or a lodgement of the Spirit within it irrespectively of its own moral state; a total change wrought all in a moment conferring upon it no positive moral melioration but only a power unto righteousness,—a capability of being renewed by grace in addition to that which inheres in man from the first; or on the other hand a partial and incipient spiritual change; since regeneration *ex vi termini* is something total and general; to be born again, *re-natus*, implies a new nature; is so described in Scripture and was so understood in the early Church. He looked upon it as an external grant, called regeneration in virtue of that which it is its object to promote and secure, a grant which comes into effect gradually, as the will yields to the pressure of the Spirit from without, but which may be made of none effect by the will's resistance. Such a view of the effect of baptism is well expressed by George Herbert in these lines—

“ O blessed streams ! either ye do prevent
“ And stop our sins from growing thick and wide,
“ Or else give tears to drown them as they grow—

and is explained by himself in this passage from some of his manuscript remains :

“ I see the necessity of greatly expanding and clearing up the chapter on Baptism in the *Aids to Reflection*, and of proving the substantial accordance of my scheme with that of our Church. I still say, that an act of the Spirit in *time*, as that it might be asserted, at the moment of the uttering of the words, I baptize thee in the name, &c.—*now* the Spirit *begins* to act —

by himself in his Manuscript Remains. lxxxiii

is false in Philosophy and contrary to Scripture, and that our Church service needs no such hypothesis. Further, I still say, that the communication of the Spirit as of a power or principle not yet possessed, to an unconscious agent by human ministry, is without precedent in Scripture, and that there is no Scripture warrant for the doctrine—and that the nature of the *Holy* Spirit communicated by the Apostles by laying on of hands is a very difficult question—and that the reasons for supposing it to be certain miraculous *gifts* of the Spirit peculiar to the first age of Christianity and *during* the formation of the *Church*, are neither few nor insignificant.

“Observe, I do not deny (God forbid!) the possibility or the reality of the influence of the Spirit on the soul of the infant. His first smile bespeaks a Reason, (the Light from the Life of the Word,) as already existent, and where the Word is, there will the Spirit act. Still less do I think lightly of the Graces which the child receives as a living Part of the Church, and whatever flows from the Communion of Saints, and the *περιχώρησις* of the Spirit.

“The true import is this. The operations of the Spirit are as little referable to Time as to Space; but in reference to our principles of conduct toward, and judgment concerning, our neighbour, the Church declares, that *before* the time of the baptism there is no authority for asserting, and that *since* the time there is no authority for denying, the gift and regenerative presence of the Holy Spirit, promised, by an especial covenant, to the members of Christ’s mystical Body—consequently, no just pretence for expecting or requiring another new Initiation or Birth into the state of Grace.”

My Father denied not that the Spirit may influence the soul of an infant, but he still refused to separate the presence of the Holy Spirit from spiritual effects, and these from reason and the moral being. Those whom he differed from are wont to argue, not that the infant is capable of moral effects in virtue of its awakening reason, but that it may be spiritually renovated in its whole soul before it is morally renewed at all: to *this opinion* he was ever wholly opposed. The new birth, as the change of the soul itself, is out of time; viewed phenomenally in its manifestations, it takes place, as my Father conceived, gradually, as a man becomes gradually a new creature, different from what he was by nature, (or in other words a good Christian,) the new *birth* indicating the spiritual ground, the new creature the effect and change produced.

Mr. Coleridge's view of the Eucharist with his view of Sacraments generally has been adopted and explained by his younger son.²² Would that all my labours in explaining our Father's views and clearing them from misrepresentation, could be so superseded! But my brother's present avocations are *all engrossing*, and more indispensable than the defence of opinions, however serviceable those may be deemed to the cause of truth. In connection however with the subject just touched upon, of primitive religious *metaphysique*, I am desirous, in times like these, to specify, what my Father's notion of the *real presence* was not: that

²² See the *Scriptural Character of the English Church, &c.* by the Rev. Derwent Coleridge, M.A. now Principal of St. Mark's College, Chelsea. Last six sermons, *passim*. See also Coleridge's *Remains*, III. 344. iv. 41.

was *not* the notion of a real presence in bread and wine. My Father has been called a Pantheist by the blunderers of the day, because he believed in the real presence of God throughout Creation animate and inanimate; that He is present to every blade of grass and clod of the valley, as well as to all things that breathe and live; that were He to *hide his face*, that is, withdraw his power, the World would vanish into nothing. But the presence in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence or *agency* for the production of spiritual effects. God sustains mere material things by his power, but is he present to them *as the Spirit of Holiness*, the life-giving Word? Can bread and wine become holy and spiritual and be nourished to everlasting life? What do we gain by this strange self-contradictory dogma, except an articulation of air? The sacrament is not for the bread and wine but for the soul of the receiver, and if we hope to receive the Spirit by means of the hallowed elements, have we not all that the doctrine can give us in the way of spiritual advantage? When I have urged this consideration upon a maintainer of the ancient view, the reply has been, "We must not *rationalize*—must not reason *à priori* on these matters, but receive faithfully what the voice of God has declared." Alas! that men should thus separate the voice of God from reason and the moral sense, which God has given us as an inward Holy of Holies, wherein He may appear to us, if we repair thither meetly prepared, our souls being *washed with pure water!* Alas! that they should so absolutely identify it with the voice of early Christian writers, men zealous and simple-hearted, but nursled for the most part in Paganism and all kinds of "sensuous and dark" imaginations on the subject of religion! One of these early

lxxxvi *Anachronisms in the Interpretation*

writers, if not more, believed in transubstantiation, that doctrine so condemned in our Church as not only irrational, but impious. Waterland interprets the passage in the ancient Father,²² to which I refer, in his own way, only allowing him to be "inaccurate in superinducing the Logos upon the symbols themselves, rather than upon the recipients;"²³ but I think if we attend, as the Benedictine editor requires, to the *series* of the holy Doctor's *whole argumentation*, we cannot fail to perceive that the conception present to his mind was at least nearer to *trans*, than to any kind of *con* substantiation.²⁴ He teaches that the Eucharist consists of two parts, an earthly and a heavenly; I think that by the earthly he understood not mere bread, but the material body of Christ; while by the

²² *Irenæus Contra Hæreses*, L. iv. c. 18. p. 251. Ed. Bened. Waterland's *Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, chap. vii. p. 221—et seq.

²³ The same Divine, after explaining the holiness of the consecrated symbols to be "a relative holiness," and declaring himself to be of the opinion judiciously expressed by Mr. Hooker, that grace is not to be sought in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament, presently adds, "not that I conceive there is any absurdity in supposing a peculiar presence of the Holy Ghost to inanimate things, any more than in God's appearing in a burning bush." Surely this is no parallel case. Who imagines that Jehovah was joined or united with the burning bush, or that the Omnipresent Creator was present there as a man is present in a place? The luminous appearance in the bush and in the pillar of fire and in the Holy of Holies was a sensuous sign of a supersensual reality, of the special agency, favour and protection of Almighty God to the chosen people. Has this any thing to do with a spiritual presence in bread and wine?

²⁴ *Diss. Præv. in Iren. Lib. Art. xiv.* 83-84-85. The Benedictine refers to Fisher's argument against Ecolampadius in which the same view of the passage in Irenæus is taken.

heavenly he meant Christ's quickening spirit: for he was contending against heretics who denied that our Lord was one with the Creator, and that the Word of God had assumed a true corporeal frame of substantial flesh and blood, and he uses the doctrine of the sacramental mystery as an illustrative argument against them.²⁵ But what becomes of this argument if the earthly part of the Eucharist is just that which it appears to be and nothing more? Waterland's interpretation of Irenæus on that point is, in my opinion, a perfect anachronism; it imputes to him modern immaterializing views, quite alien from the general frame of his mind; and is not an equal forgetfulness of the state of thought in those times evinced by his saying, that "the Christians despised the Pagans for imagining that Christ's body and blood were supposed to be *literally* eaten in the Eucharist"?²⁶ What the Pagans accused them of and what they "rejected with abhorrence" was probably this, that instead of bread and wine they placed upon the table real human flesh and blood and partook of it under the name of their Lord's body. Irenæus, who understood literally the saying of our Saviour, *I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine till I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom*, need scarcely be supposed to have been more refined than modern Romanists on the subject of the Eucharist.²⁷ Just in the same way Waterland mo-

²⁵ Tertullian expresses this plainly. He "proves the truth or reality of the Lord's body and blood against the phantasm of Marcion by the sacraments of the bread and the cup." *Advers. Marcion*, L. v. cap. 8.

²⁶ He supports this assertion by referring to a "fragment of Irenæus, p. 343, concerning Blandina," which does not, I think, really support it.

²⁷ *Contra Hæreses*. Lib. v. cap. xxxiii. 1. He proves by the

lxxxviii *Sensualism of the ancient Fathers*

dernizes Tertullian ; just so he refines upon a sentence in that unrefined treatise *De Resurrectione Carnis*. Toward the end of an epigrammatic passage enumerating the benefits that accrue to the soul through the body of flesh, and declaring, that as the Flesh and the Spirit are fellow workmen here so they shall be partners in bliss hereafter, the ancient writer speaks thus : *Caro corpore et sanguine Christi vescitur, ut et anima de deo saginetur*. The Anglican Divine understands this "in a mystical and constructional sense," and for no other reason, apparently, than that any other would be gross and puerile. Yet who that reads Tertullian can imagine that he was *not* gross and puerile in his philosophy, however refined in the play of fancy and exercise of logic, unless he is predetermined to find him otherwise? Doubtless Tertullian thought, that the bread which our Lord held in his hand at the last Supper was but "a figure of his body;" the bread in the Eucharist, I verily think, he took to be the material body of our Lord. The sixth chapter of St. John many of the ancients seem to have understood spiritually, because the meaning is expressly declared to be spiritual in the text itself : (verse 63.) and I think that the primitive Fathers always kept close to the text, though, when figurative, it sometimes led them away from the sense.

Our divines have generally rejected transubstantiation as irrational and unspiritual. Any one who rejects it

literal sense of Matt. xxvi. 29. the carnal resurrection of the disciples and millennial reign of Christ upon earth. Of course he takes Isaiah xi. vi. literally too, and presses into the service of his opinion of a future earthly Paradise every prophetic text about eating and drinking and sensuous delights that he can gather out of Holy Writ.

on this ground yet holds the presence of the redeeming Spirit in bread and wine, strains at a gnat after swallowing a camel. "If on all sides it be confessed," says Hooker, "that the grace of baptism is poured into the soul of man, that by water we receive it, although it be neither seated in the water nor the water changed into it, what should induce men to think that the grace of the Eucharist must needs be in the Eucharist before it be in us that receive it?"²⁸ But it was the *ancient*

²⁸ Can any one who reads what Hooker has written on this subject before and after the sentence I have quoted, in Bk. V. ch. lxvii. (pp. 445-51 of vol. ii. of Mr. Keble's ed.) imagine that he himself held what he describes as utterly vain and unnecessary, and which is out of analogy with his doctrine of baptism?

Of all the doctrines which suppose a presence in the elements my Father thought transubstantiation the best, and would have agreed, I believe, with Mr. Ward in denying the charge of rationalism brought against it by divines of the school of Dr. Pusey. How does it *explain* the mystery a whit more than their own view? It does but affirm what that denies, that the bread and wine are gone without pretending to say how: it neither rationalizes nor reasons, *internally* at least; but bluntly affirms a senseless proposition without throwing a gauze veil over its face.

The attempt made by Mr. W. to reconcile it with our article, however, appears to me one of the most sophistical parts of the whole Tract Ninety Argument—which is saying a good deal. The article declares against "the change of the substance of bread and wine in the Supper of the Lord." Mr. Ward affirms that it speaks popularly, and hence does not conflict with the Romish metaphysique of the Eucharist, according to which the *accidents* of bread and wine remain while the *substance* is changed; it being assumed in his argument that to speak popularly, in the language of the plain Christian, who knows nothing of philosophy, is to identify accidents with substance so as to do away with the latter entirely. Now not to mention

opinion that the spirit descended upon the water before it entered the soul of the baptized. It is not easy for a sensible man, like Hooker, to stick to ancient opinions on the subject of *spirit*.

Yet Irenæus is an evangelical writer when he is not theologizing, and loses sight of his Anti-Gnostic, which are often Anti-Platonic, metaphysics. Indeed he at all times leans with his whole weight upon Scripture and Reason, according to his notions of both, just as a Rationalist like S. T. C. may do nowadays. He seems to have no horror of rationalism at all, but looks as far into the internal consistency of things as he is able. Viewed in their place in the history of thought these primitive writers are interesting and venerable. The attempt to make them practically our masters on earth in doctrine, under a notion that they received their whole

the gross improbability, that the framer of the article was ignorant of, or had no respect to the metaphysique, of the doctrine current in the schools of Rome, and controverted in the schools of the Reformed,—it is surely quite wrong to say, that the unmetaphysical man means nothing more by an object of sense than its sensible qualities. It is true that he identifies the qualities with the substance, but yet he has the idea of substance too. The notion that a thing is only a congeries of accidents is the notion of the idealizing philosopher in his study; while the idea of a substrate or support of accidents is common to all mankind, and indeed is an original form of the human intellect. This is admitted in the reasonings of Berkeley, Schelling and every other Idealist. By the *substance* of bread the plain man means *not* the mere qualities of bread, but a thing which *has* those qualities: he means the bread itself with all that belongs to it. Mr. Ward pretends to considerable knowledge of the nature and history of thought—and, I believe, not without reason; but he did not *shew* [his knowledge of it by this argument. Indeed he is rather apt to use his logical skill and metaphysical acumen for the purpose of cleverly confounding a subject instead of making it clear.

structure of religious intellectualism ready built from the Apostles—*this* it is which anti-patricians of my Father's mind contemn. Belief in the phoenix was no sign that the early Christians were incapable of receiving a spiritual religion; but surely it *is* one among a hundred signs, that their intellectual development of it might be incorrect; that they had reflected but little on the nature and laws of evidence.

I believe that the whole of the opinions which my Father expresses on the Eucharist²⁹ may be reduced to this, that both transubstantiation and Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation may be so stated as not to involve a contradiction in terms; but that neither doctrine is necessary, that there is no real warrant for either in Scripture, and that the spiritual doctrine of the Supper of the Lord involves a different statement. The gift and effect of the Eucharist he believed to be "an assimilation of the spirit of a man to the divine humanity." How he sympathized with one who fought against the old sensualism appears in his poem on the dying words of Berengarius. But Berengarius certainly taught a presence in the elements, for he said that the true body is placed on the *table*. To the imperfection of light vouchsafed in that day my Father seems to refer in the last lines of his poem:

The ascending day star with a bolder eye
Hath lit each dew-drop on our trimmer lawn!
Yet not for this, if wise, shall we decry
The spots and struggles of the timid dawn;
Lest so we tempt th' approaching noon to scorn
The mists and painted vapours of our morn.

²⁹ Remains, iii. pp. 78-111-254-285-336-338-345-350-379, and iv. 41-186. The Romish dogma involves the supposition that a sensible thing can be abstracted from its accidents. This may not be false logic and yet may be false philosophy. The sub-

That my Father, though an ardent maintainer of the Church as a spiritual power, organized in an outward body, co-ordinate with the Spirit and the Scriptures, did not admit the ordinary mysticism on the subject of Apostolical succession, seems clear from this passage from some of his manuscript writings, dated 1827. "When I reflect on the great stress which the Catholic or more numerous Party of Christians laid on the uninterrupted succession of the Bishops of every Church from the Apostles, the momentous importance attached by the Bishops themselves at the first general council to this unbroken chain of the spiritual lightning, ever present to illumine in the decisions and to scathe in the anathemas of the Church—when I read, that on this articulated *continuum* which evacuated the time which it measured, and reduced it to a powerless *accident*, a mere shadow from the carnal nature intercepting the light, a shadow that existed only for the eye of flesh, between which and the luminary the carnal nature intervened, so that every Bishop of the true Church, speaking in and from the Spirit, might say, 'Before Peter was, or Paul, *I am!*'³⁰—Well!—Let all this pass for the poetry of the claims of the Bishops

stance of the *material* body could do nothing for our souls: the substance of the divine humanity can be present to our souls alone. So it seems to many of the faithful.

³⁰ After describing Episcopal succession as a "fixed outward mean by which the identity of the visible Church, as co-ordinate with the written Word, is preserved, as the identity of an individual man is symbolized by the continuous reproduction of the same bodily organs," as, "more than this, not merely one leading symbol of permanent visibility, but a co-efficient in every other," my brother says, "Yet it must be examined *according to this idea*. I dare not affect to think of it, in order to render it intelligible

to the same Spirit, and, consequently, to the same authority as the Apostles, unfortunately for the claim, enough of the writings of Bishops, ay, and of canonized Bishops too, are extant to enable us to appreciate it and to know and feel the woful difference between the Spirit that guided the pen of Tertullian, Irenæus, Epiphanius, &c. and the Spirit by which John and Paul spake and wrote! Descending into the cooler element of prose, I confine myself to the fact of an uninterrupted succession of Bishops in each Church, and the apparent human advantages consequent on such a means of preserving and handing down the memory of important events and the stedfast form of sound words,—and when I find it recorded that on this fact the Fathers of the Nicene Council grounded their main argument against the Arians, &c. I cannot help finding a great and perplexing difficulty in the entire absence of all definite Tradition concerning the composition and delivery of the Gospels.” He then goes on to suggest a solution of this perplexity.

Noscitur a sociis is a maxim very generally applied: we trust and love those who honour whom we honour, condemn whom we disapprove. My Father’s affectionate respect for Luther is enough to alienate from him the High Anglican party, and his admiration of Kant enough to bring him into suspicion with the anti-philosophic part of the religious world,—which is

and persuasive to faithless and mechanical minds, as of a mere *physical* continuity, by which the spiritual powers of the pastorate are conveyed, *like a stream of electricity along a metal wire.*” My brother had never seen the passage from my Father’s MS. Remains which I have given in the text when he wrote this, and I believe it to be a perfect co-incidence.

the whole of it except a very small portion indeed. My Father was a hero-worshipper in the harmless sense of Mr. Carlyle; and his worship of these two heroes, though the honours he paid to the one were quite different from those he offered to the other, was so deliberate and deep seated, that it must ever be a prominent feature on the face of his opinions. He thought the mind of Luther more akin to St. Paul's than that of any other Christian teacher, and I believe that our early divines, including Hooker and Field, would not have suspected his catholicity on this score. Indeed it is clear to my mind that in Luther's doctrines of grace, (no one has ever doubted his orthodoxy on the subject of the divine nature, but his doctrine of the dealings of God with man in the work of salvation,) there is nothing which ever would mortally have offended High Churchmen, Romish or Anglican; that they tried to find heresy in these because of the practical consequences he drew from them to the discrediting and discomfiture of their spiritual polity. On the doctrine of Justification he has been represented as a mighty corrupter; let us see how and how far he differs on that subject from his uncompromising adversaries.³¹ There are but three forms in which that doctrine can possibly be presented to the mind, I mean there are but three ways in which St. Paul's

³¹ My authorities for the following statements are the *Decrees and Canons of Trent*, Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*, and *Table Talk*, Bishop Bull's *Harmonia* with his thick volume of replies to the censures of it, and Mr. Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, all of which I have dwelt on a good deal. I have not yet read St. Augustine on the subject, but suspect from extracts, that his view was the same as Luther's so far as he developed it.

Three Forms of the Doctrine of Justification. xcv

justified by faith without the deeds of the law can be scientifically explained or translated into the language of metaphysical divinity;—namely the Tridentine, or that set forth by the Council of Trent,—the Anglican or High Church Protestant, set forth by Bishop Bull;—and that of Luther. Nay, I think that, really and substantially, there are but two, namely the Tridentine and High Anglican or doctrine of justification by faith and works as the condition of obtaining it, and Luther's solifidianism or doctrine of justification by means of faith alone,—a faith the necessary parent of works. *All parties agree that God is the efficient, Christ, in His sacrifice, the meritorious cause of salvation: all profess this in words, all the pious of all the different parties believe it in their hearts.* The dispute is not about the proper *cause* of salvation, but only concerning the internal *condition* on our part, or what that is *in us* whereon justification ensues,—which connects the individual man with the redemption wrought by Christ for all mankind. Bull teaches that this link within us to the redemption

Mr. Newman says in his Appendix—"I have throughout these remarks implied that the modern controversy on the subject of justification is not a vital one, inasmuch as all parties are agreed that Christ is the sole justifier, and that He makes holy those whom He justifies." Yet one who professed to hold Mr. Newman's religious opinions in general, could talk of Luther's doctrine as a doctrine too bad for devils to hold consistently, contrary to natural religion, corruptive of the heart and at war with reason. It should be remembered that *the state of mind in the justified is precisely the same in all the different schemes.* The dispute is only about the *name* to be given to certain constituents of it; whether they are to be *called* justifying or only inseparable from, or the necessary product of, the justifying principle.

without us is faith informed with love and works—faith quickened by love and put forth in the shape of obedience. The Tridentine teaches, in like manner, that we are justified directly upon our holiness and works wrought in us by the Spirit,—that faith and all other graces of which it is the root, are the condition of acceptance with God. Between this statement and Bull's I see no real difference at all ; it is but the same thought expressed in different words. The Anglican chooses to add that our holiness and works, in order to be thus justifying, must be *sprinkled with the blood of the covenant* ; the Tridentine declines that well sounding phrase : perhaps he thinks it a tautology offensive to Him who forbade vain repetitions ; and, for my own part, I cannot think that his Saviour requires it of him, whatever divines may do. His anathemas against those who say either more or less than he says on these points are, in my opinion, the only anti-christian part of his doctrine of justification. Drive the thing as far back as we may, still there must be something *in us*—in our very selves which connects us with salvation ; it seems rather nonsensical to say that *this* is the blood of Christ. We should never have obtained this something without Him ; He created it in us and to Him it tends ; what more can we say without nullifying the human soul as a distinct being altogether, and thus slipping into the gulf of Pantheism in backing away from imaginary Impiety and Presumption ? Even if with Luther we call Christ the form of our faith, and hence the formal cause of our salvation, still there must be that in our very selves which at least negatively secures our union with him ; to that we must come at last as the personal *sine qua non* of justification, whether we call it the *proximate* cause, or

interpose another, (the Holy Ghost dwelling in our hearts by faith,) betwixt ourselves and heaven. The Anglican may call our holiness inchoate and imperfect, and may insist that only as sanctified and completed by Christ's merits is it even the conditional cause of salvation; still this holiness, if it connects us with the Saviour or precludes the impediment to such connection is, in one sense, complete and perfect, for it does this all important work perfectly; it is no slight matter, for it is all the difference between salvation and perdition, as being indispensable to our gaining the first and escaping the last. Now in what other sense *can* the Romanist imagine that our holiness is perfect and complete? Does he think that it is perfect as God is perfect, or that it is more than a *beginning* even in reference to that purity which human nature may finally attain when freed from a temptible body and the clog of the flesh? ³²

I am even bold enough to say, after all South's valiant feats against the windmill giant, Human Merit, that the dispute on this subject seems to me a mere dispute about words. *That in us* which even negatively, (by preventing the prevention of it,) unites us with Christ, may be said to deserve Christ, and hence to be unspeakably meritorious. The Romanist has declared that *all the merit of procuring salvation is in Christ*—surely then he only leaves to man—what no man should seek to deprive him of,—the being rendered by the Holy Spirit a *meet* receptacle and *worthy*

³² To call our inherent righteousness *inchoate* in reference to the power of justifying would be incorrect, would it not?—for it is the beginning and end of what *we* contribute toward our salvation, and certainly not the commencement of what is done for us.

dwelling-place for Itself. As for grace of congruity and condignity—our Lord says that he who hath to him shall be given—does not this imply that he who hath grace *deserves* more, that it is *due* to his internal condition raised and purified by the Holy Spirit? Or does this notion really interfere with the Scriptural truth, that we are unprofitable servants, and in our best performances can do no more than we are *bound* to do?³³ Is it essential to the idea of *deserving* reward, that he who deserves should be the original author and source of the services by which he deserves it? If it be, then the *language* of the Council of Trent is incorrect; but its doctrine is not incorrect, because the very same sentence which affirms the good works of the justified to be *merits* declares them previously to be *gifts of God*. Very indefensible is

³³ My Father says “I am persuaded, that the practice of the Romish Church tendeth to make vain the doctrine of salvation by faith in Christ alone; but judging by her most eminent divines I can find nothing dissonant from the truth in her express decisions on this article. Perhaps it would be safer to say:—Christ alone saves us, working in us by the faith which includes love and hope. Rem. iii. p. 53. I neither do nor can think, that any pious member of the Church of Rome did ever in his heart attribute any merit to any work as being his work. A grievous error and a mischievous error there was practically in mooting the question at all of the condignity of works and their rewards.” *Ib.* p. 54.

Canons 24 and 32 of the 6th Session of the Council of Trent are given in a note at the foot of the page to be compared with this opinion. I think there is no harm in them; they affirm that the good works of the justified are both gifts of God and merits of the justified person himself, that they deserve increase of grace and eternal life. Now in the only sense in which a believer in the primary merits of Christ can mean to affirm this I do not see how any rational Christian can deny it. There is

means no more than Meetness for Heaven. xcix

the *next* sentence which *anathematizes* him who calls them only *signs* of justification obtained and fears to add that they are merits.

The Tridentine and the Anglican statements of Justification are tantamount to each other,—may be resolved into each other; but there is a *third* way of stating the matter—between this and the other two there is perhaps a logical, though, I believe, no practical difference whatever. I allude to the notion of Luther that *faith alone* is that *in us* which connects us with Christ, and consequently is our sole personal righteousness, (or that which entitles us to freedom from the penal consequences of sin;) that faith justifies, (in this conditional and instrumental way,) *in its own right*, not as informed with or accompanied by or productive of love and works, but as apprehending Christ. Luther maintained that faith, although it is righteous and the necessary parent of righteous

a notion connected with this subject, which is taught not only in the Romish schools, but I grieve to say in some of our own schools too of late years, which does seem to me both presumptuous and unscriptural; I mean the notion, that a man can do more in the way of good works and saintliness than he is bound to do as a Christian,—or at least that there is a kind and degree of holiness which some men may and ought to seek and obtain, which the generality of the faithful cannot attain and ought not to strive after. This seems to me both false and fraught with corruptive consequences to religion. When Peter said to Ananias respecting his land, *was it not thine own—in thine own power?*—he surely did not mean that in offering it Ananias did more than he was bound to do, as a Christian before God, but only that, as he was not compelled to surrender it by any outward force or authority, his pretending to give and yet *not* giving the whole of it, was a gratuitous piece of hypocrisy—something worse than a simple falsehood extorted by fear.

c *Mr. Newman agrees with Luther*

works, justifies only in bringing Christ to dwell in the heart,³⁴ and that the righteousness which flows from this inhabitation, is not our justification but the fruit of it, or in other words that faith not love is the justifying principle. Now I think it is a notable fact in favour of my Father's opinion that these different views are all but different aspects of the same truth, and are not substantially different one from another, that Mr. Newman's splendid work on justification, which is generally considered by the High Anglican party as an utter demolition of Luther's teaching in the Commentary, and perhaps was intended to be so, is, in fact, a tacit establishment of it, or at least of its most important position; since on this cardinal point, this hinge of the question, whether faith justifies alone, as uniting us with Christ, or as informed with love and works, and as itself a work and a part of Christian holiness,—he decides with Luther, *not* with Tridentines or High Anglicans.³⁵ For he expressly states that faith does in one sense, (the sense of uniting us with Christ, which is the same as Luther's sense,) justify alone; that it is the "only inward instrument" of justification; that, as such inward instrument, it is one certain property, act, or habit of the mind, distinct from love and other graces,³⁶ not a mere name for them all; that there is "a certain extraordinary and singular sympathy between faith and the grant of Gospel privileges, such as

³⁴ Galatians, ii. 3.

³⁵ Lecture X. throughout, p. 256—87.

³⁶ *Ib.* p. 258-9.—"when it" (faith) is called the sole instrument of justification, it must stand in contrast to them, (trust, hope, etc.) and be contemplated in itself, as being one certain property, habit, or act of the mind."

to constitute it, in a true sense, an instrument of it, that is of justification, which includes them all;" that "it alone coalesces with the sacraments, &c. and through them unites the soul to God."³⁷ Further he identifies his doctrine with that of our Homilies which declares that repentance, hope, love and the fear of God are shut out from the office of justifying.³⁸ It seems as if, while he contended against Luther, the Lutheran doctrine laid hold of him, and *held him and would not let him go*, till it brought him home to its own habitation.

Surely after all this Mr. Newman's apparent hostility to Luther, in the matter of justification, is a mere shadow-fight. He may dislike his tone and language, and disapprove some subordinate parts of his view, either as false or half true, but on the main point he has adopted the Reformer's doctrine; and his new *Harmonia*, which was to be the ruin of solifidianism, is solifidian itself, in the only sense in which any systematic divine ever was so. It is true that, while thus embracing Luther, unwillingly, he tries to fling the old giant away from him, by declaring that *he* holds an antecedent external instrument, even Baptism; that Baptism gives to faith all its justifying power. But this does not in reality separate him one hair's-breadth from his unhonoured master. Luther held the doctrine of regeneration in baptism as well as himself; he bids men cling fast to their baptism, recur to it as to a ground of confidence, and in the comment on verse 27 of chapter iii. of Galatians, he speaks of the "majesty of baptism" as highly as the Highest Churchman

³⁷ *Ib.* pp. 58-9, 270-71, 286, 333.

³⁸ Sermon of Salvation, Part i.

could speak of it, at the same time observing "these things I have handled more largely in another place, therefore I pass them over briefly here."³⁹ Luther believed in baptismal regeneration and must therefore have believed that every spiritual principle in the soul was derived from it: he taught that faith was the work of the Spirit and that the Spirit was given in baptism: his solifidianism is not incompatible with a sound belief on that subject, unless Mr. Newman's is so too, for they are one and the same.

What Luther fought against was not an external instrument of salvation preceding actual faith and producing it: he saw no harm in *that* notion; what he fought against with all his heart and soul and strength, was justification by charity and the deeds of charity, or what is commonly called a good life. He saw that practically

³⁹ Luther received baptismal regeneration as it had been handed down to him; he taught that "the renewing of the inward man is done in baptism." Would that he had been a reformer in this article also—had renewed the *form* of the doctrine, while he maintained its life and substance!—then probably disbelievers in "baptismal transubstantiation" would not have been disquieted by the wording of our Liturgy. Dr. Pusey did once cite Luther, in his *Scriptural Views*, p. 28, as a witness to the true doctrine of regeneration in baptism; why is not this remembered by writers of Dr. Pusey's school when Luther's doctrine of justification is under review?

Luther taught indeed that men are *born again of the Word of God*, that the Holy Ghost changes the heart and mind by faith in or through the hearing of the external word; but if the sayings of St. Peter and St. Paul and St. James, affirming the same thing, can be reconciled with inward renewal in baptism, so can Luther's, for he went not beyond Scripture on this point. There are certainly *comings* of the Holy Spirit spoken of in the N. T. unconnected with baptism. See among other places John xiv. 23.

salvation was given to outward works and money gifts, which might proceed from evil men, while, in theory, it was ascribed to love and the works of the Spirit. He thought to preclude this abuse and establish Scripture at the same time by declaring faith alone the means of salvation, and good works the necessary offspring of faith in the heart. And how could such a doctrine encourage Antinomianism, for is it not plain, that if good works flow necessarily from saving faith, where the works are not good, the mind whence they spring cannot have saving faith? ⁴⁰ This Luther expressly states. "Whoso obeyeth the flesh," says he, "and continueth without any fear of God or remorse of conscience in accomplishing the desires and lusts thereof, let him know that he pertaineth not unto Christ." ⁴¹ The whole strain of his commentary on chapters v. and vi. of Galatians is an utter shattering of Antinomianism, which indeed is precluded by the doctrine of the commentary from beginning to end. In one respect a Solifidian like Luther is a more effectual opponent to Antinomians than a teacher of justification by faith and works, because he more completely wrests out of their hands those sayings of St. Paul which *seem* to deny that works of any sort do in any sense justify.—But it is an insult to the apostolic man's memory to defend him from the charge of Antinomianism. He knocked down with his little finger more Antinomianism than his accusers with both hands. If his doctrine is the jaw bone of an ass, he must have been a very Samson, for he turned numbers with this instrument from the

⁴⁰ Burnet urges this plea for solifidians, though not one himself.

⁴¹ Commentary on Galatians, chap. v. verse 18.

evil of their lives; and the same instrument in the hands of mere pygmies in comparison with him has wrought more amendment of life among the Poor than the most eloquent and erudite preachers of works and rites have to boast, by their *preaching*. For this doctrine presents hope and fear more sharply to the mind than any other; it supplies the steam of encouragement and propels from behind while it draws on from before.

The following charges are brought against Luther. It has been said that he denied the power of Christians to fulfil the law or produce really good works; that he denied the use of conscience in keeping Christians from sin and wickedness; and that he separated justifying faith from love.

That he denied the good works of Christians is just as true as that he denied the sun in heaven. He beautifully compares them to stars in the night, the night and darkness of surrounding unjustification; and beautifully too does he say, that even as the stars do not *make* heaven, but only *trim* and *adorn* it, so the charity of works does not constitute blessedness but makes it shine to the eyes of men, that they may glorify the Father of Lights.⁴² That Luther denied the work of the Spirit to be really *good* is one of the many charges against him which sound loud and go off in smoke. He considered them relatively good, just as any man else does,—saw a wide world of difference betwixt the deeds of the justified and of the unjustified. If he thought that, as sin remains in the best men, so likewise something of human infirmity clings about the best deeds, who shall convict him of error? That he denied any portion or quality of real goodness to be in the soul in

⁴² Table Talk, chap. 14, p. 232.

which Christ lives, I cannot find and do not believe. But when Luther said that because our righteousness is imperfect, therefore it cannot be the ground of acceptance with God, he drew, in my opinion a wrong inference from his premiss. Our faith is as imperfect as our works; but if it unites us with Christ, it is, (not of course the deepest ground, Christ alone is that,) but the intermediate ground or condition of our acceptance. The question is, shall we call faith alone, or faith, love, obedience, all Gospel graces, the "connecting bond" between us and Christ? If faith alone, then faith alone is our intermediate ground of acceptance; and repentance, love and obedience are not excluded because they are imperfect, but because of their posteriority to faith.

That Luther denied the power of Christians to fulfil the law is the self-same charge in another shape and false in that shape as in the other. He reiterates that the faithful do fulfil the law and that they alone fulfil it; that by faith they receive the Holy Ghost and then accomplish the law.⁴³ "I come with the Lord Himself," says Luther; "on Him I lay hold, Him I stick to, and leave works unto thee: which notwithstanding *thou never didst.*" He shews that against the righteous there is no law, because he is a law to himself. "For the righteous," says he, "liveth in such wise that he hath no need of any law to admonish or constrain him, but without constraint of the law, he willingly doeth those things which the law requireth."⁴⁴

⁴³ Comm. Gal. v. 23.

⁴⁴ Mr. Ward thinks the Commentary on the Galatians such a "silly" work! Shakespeare has been called silly by Puritans, Milton worse than silly by Prelatists and Papists, Wordsworth

What more would we have a teacher of the Gospel say? Ought a Christian to perform the law *unwillingly* by a force from *without*? Luther teaches that in the justified there is an inward law superseding the outward: that the outward law remains, but only for the sinner: that it either drives him to Christ or bridles him in his carnality. This is the idea expressed in that passage at the end of the introduction to his commentary, which sets forth the *argument of the Epistle*. "When I have this righteousness reigning in my heart, I descend from heaven, as the rain maketh fruitful the earth: that is to say, I come forth into another kingdom, and I do good works how and whensoever occasion is offered." What is there in this that is worthy of condemnation or of sarcasm? Is it not true Pauline philosophy to say, that the realm of outward works is another kingdom from the realm of grace?—that the true believer is freed from the compulsion of the law?—to call the sum of outward things and all deeds, considered as outward, *the Flesh*? To me this animated passage seems the very teaching of the Apostle to the Gentiles uttered with a voice of joy. It is the unconfusing intoxication of Gospel triumph and gladness. Some say

was long called silly by Buonaparteans; what will not the *odium theologicum* or *politicum* find worthless and silly? To me, perhaps from my silliness, his Commentary appears the very Iliad of Solifidianism; all the fine and striking things that have been said upon the subject are taken from it; and if the author preached a novel doctrine, or presented a novel development of Scripture in this work, as Mr. Newman avers, I think he deserves great credit for his originality. The Commentary contains, or rather is, a most spirited Siege of Babylon, and the friends of Rome like it as well as the French like Wellington and the battle of Waterloo.

mocking, The man is *full of new wine*; but Luther was not really drunk when he spoke thus; he spoke it in the noon day of his vigorous life, with all his wits, and they were sound ones, about him.⁴⁵

It is affirmed that Luther denied the use of conscience in religion, and this is the grand engine which Mr. Ward brings to bear upon him in his *Ideal*; you would think from the account of the Gospel hero's doctrine therein contained that he was a very advocate for unconscientiousness, and would have men go on sinning that grace may abound; would have them "wallow and steep in all the carnalities of the world, under pretence of Christian liberty," and *continue without any fear of God or remorse of conscience in accomplishing the desires of the flesh*; or at least that his teaching involved this: I wonder how men can have the *conscience* to write thus of Luther on the strength of a few misconstrued passages, while the broad front of his massive fortress of Gospel doctrine, a stronghold against Antinomianism, must present itself to their eyes unless they are stone blind.⁴⁶ Luther

⁴⁵ Mr. Newman points out that fine passage on faith in Gal. ii. 16, and 334 *Paulus his verbis*, &c. and he quotes that admirable exposition of his on "incarnate faith or believing deeds," in Gal. vii. 10, in which he brings in the analogy of the Incarnation.

⁴⁶ I have read Mr. Ward's *Ideal* with so much interest, and, I humbly hope, benefit, that I am far more grieved by the chapter on Justification than if the writer were a narrow, stupid, uncharitable man. I have heard persons say it was the clever part of the book; the whole of the book is clever, but this part has no other merit than cleverness, and that is a sorry commendation of a discourse upon morals and religion: as the author himself would readily admit in general. It is the force with which he has made this and other cognate truths apparent, the way in which he has vitalized and, to use Luther's phrase, "en-

teaches that the constraints and terrors of the law remain to keep the flesh in subjection; what he says

grossed" them, for which I have to thank him. But he special-pleads against Luther, and in a way which no pleader could venture upon in a court of Justice. He presents his doctrines upside down—wrong side before. If we tear up the rose tree and place it root upward, with all its blossoms crushed upon the earth, where are its beauty and its fragrance?—if we take the mirror and turn its leaden side to the spectator, where are its clear reflections and its splendour?

By the bye it struck me that Mr. Ward, in his searches for Socinianism, after he had done demonizing the doctrine of Luther, slipped himself into something like heresy on the human nature of our Lord. His words seemed, (seem, for there they are still,) to imply that our Saviour had not, while upon earth, a human mind as well as a human body. He introduces the Godhead into the Manhood so as to destroy, as it seems to me, the character of the latter. Certainly Pearson and South, who were ever held orthodox on the Incarnation, and good Patriarchs, teach that our Lord, while upon earth, had the "finite understanding" of a man; that he "stooped to the meanness of our faculties;" and indeed it is evident from the language of the Evangelists, that they supposed Him to arrive at the knowledge of ordinary things in an ordinary way; to have *grown* in wisdom and knowledge, an expression not applicable to Omnipotence. If He foreknew all that was to happen to him in one matter, so Abraham and Isaiah foreknew the future. Doubtless He knew far more of the mind of God than they, even as a man. Perhaps Mr. Ward was led to this error, as I believe it to be, from following too heedlessly certain remarks of the Tract for the Times against Jacob Abbott. But surely it is a great and fundamental error to deny by implication, the real humanity of our Lord—that he assumed the *very soul* of man; which he must have done in order to redeem it;—a worse error than that of the Phantasists, who denied his fleshly body. How he could be very God and very Man at the same time is an inscrutable mystery, but no less than this is the Catholic Faith of the Incarnation, and to deny it is the heresy of Apollinaris. Shall "Catholics" rationalize away a mystery?

concerning conscience relates to sins that are past, not sins to come. He exhorts men to lay hold of Christ : not to let the sense of their ungodliness which aforetime they have committed make them doubt of his power to save them and purify their souls by the Holy Spirit. His reasons for insisting on this doctrine are obvious ; it was to prevent men from trusting for the washing out of sin to penance, the fearful abuse, or rather *use*, of which he had witnessed. His doctrine is, that in those who are in a state of grace through a living faith, the flesh remains, and is to be bruised, exercised and kept down by the Law,—(be it observed, that by *the* Law he always means the Law viewed carnally or as a force from *without*)—while the spirit rejoices in God its Saviour, the conscience sleeping securely on the bosom of Christ. And surely, so far as we can contemplate man in a state of grace at all, having firm faith in the Redeemer and His power to save, he must be contemplated as free and joyful, confident of salvation notwithstanding the infirmity of his mortal nature, not paralyzed by the Law in the conscience or agonized by a fearful looking back upon sins that are past. Surely the conscience may *sleep* on the bosom of Christ, if it be really His bosom on which it is resting ; that is, if we know that upon the whole our heart is set upon the things that are above we may safely cast our eye forward, in peace and gladness, hoping and striving through grace to live better from day to day ; not backward upon the detail of our past transgressions, with a soul-subduing solicitude to balance them by penance exactly proportioned to their amount.

Luther affirmed that we must make a god of the law out of the conscience, but that in the conscience it is a very devil. Doubtless he had seen fatal effects of the

tyranny of the law in the conscience, had seen how, like the basilisk's eye, it benumbed the gazer, and prevented him from flying at once to Christ for pardon and purification and power to follow His steps ; how it threw him into the hands of the priest, who, in those days, too often, instead of preaching faith in the Saviour and fulfilment of the law by faith, prescribed a certain set of outward observances, which never could take away sins, but which the terrified yet unrepentant spirit rested in, and substituted for general renovation. Looking at the Law in this point of view he called it with great force and truth the very *diabolus*, the malignant accuser, who by its informations and treacherous representations kept the soul separate and estranged from the Prince of Life. Bunyan has worked upon this thought powerfully in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, and he too makes the murderous Moses give way to Christ when He appears, and "depart out of the conscience." "Luther," says Mr. Newman contrasting him with the ancient Father, declares that "the Law and Christ cannot dwell together in the heart ; Augustine, that the Law *is* Christ." Well ! but *what* Law ? Surely not the outward Law, which St. Paul declares dead for the Christian,⁴⁷ which Luther declares incompatible with Christ, but the inward law, "the law of grace, the law of the law, the law of liberty, righteousness, and everlasting life," which Luther identifies with

⁴⁷ I know not whether there remains upon the face of the earth any of that generation of Scripture interpreters, who were wont to affirm, that, when St. Paul declared the law dead, he meant only the ceremonial law of Moses ! That such people existed in Bishop Bull's time seems clear from his taking the pains to refute the notion methodically. See *Harmonia*, cap. vii. Diss. Post. Oxford edit. vol. iii. 120-21.

Christ from first to last of his evangelical commentary.

Luther's language on the exceeding difficulty of believing unto salvation, on the relics of sin that cling even to the justified, does but shew how searchingly, how earnestly he looked on these subjects—how *hard he was to be pleased* in matters that pertain to justification. Perhaps he should have taught more distinctly that *all* men are sinners and require the coercions of the law more or less. Still it was but the *remnants* of sin which Luther spoke of, when he said, *prospectively*, that sin should not be imputed to the justified."⁴⁸ His fault as a teacher was that he stuck too close to Scripture in his mode of expression, and repeated without explanation, or imitated too closely, its strong figurative language. But this doctrine of his that the enormity of sin must not make the sinner despair is no figure; it is literal Gospel truth. *Though your sins be as scarlet they shall be as white as snow.* Did Luther in all his strong language on the power of faith, that is of Christ dwelling in the heart by faith, go beyond this glad message of salvation? Blessed be his name for the courage wherewith he re-proclaimed a saving truth, which a self-serving, self-exalting clergy were putting out of sight—were hiding by the complicated superstructure of outward ways and means, which they erected upon it! Luther's a lax system!—No man will find it such who tries to understand and practise rather than to criticise it.

But the grand charge against Luther's doctrine re-

⁴⁸ See Commentary, chap. xi. ver. 17. "But it followeth not therefore that thou shouldst make a light matter of sin, because God doth not impute it;" and many other places in the Commentary.

mains behind. He is said to have separated saving faith from love.⁴⁹ The anti-Lutherans are never weary of harping upon this string. Having failed to convict him of Antinomianism on one side—the denial of good works to Christians, they try to thrust it upon him on the other,—to find it in his definition of faith. But after all where has he said, speaking analytically, that saving faith exists apart from love as a mere *habit of the mind*? “Luther confesses, in so many words,” says Mr Newman, “that the faith that justifies is abstract *fides* as opposed to concrete, in Gal. iii. 10.” But if we look at Gal. iii. 10, I think we shall find, that by abstract faith as opposed to concrete he meant faith

⁴⁹ Mr. Newman in Lecture XI. argues that faith is not a virtue or grace in its abstract nature, that it is “but an instrument, acceptable when its possessor is acceptable.” Faith apart from love is not a virtue, but this seems to be no proof that it is not a distinct grace; faith is not mere belief, though it includes belief; no one in common parlance would say, that he had faith in that which he merely believed. Faith is of the heart, not of the head only, or it is not faith. Nor can I think that it “differs from other graces” in that “it is not an excellence except it be grafted into a heart that has grace.” Love, humility, meekness are all in the same case; abstract from these their direction, their object, and you leave a *caput mortuum* of mere human feeling. Love of God is excellent; love of man for God’s sake, is excellent; but the mere adhesion of the soul to a certain object has no excellence in it. So humility, as a low estimation of ourselves is not necessarily virtuous; it is only a virtue when it arises from a clear view of our relations to divine perfection,—a clear view of the relative goodness of others, which the mists of self-love and pride are apt to conceal from our sight. Have we *any natural* good acts or habits of mind; do not *all* our affections require to be raised and purified by divine grace before they can be acceptable? To say the contrary is Pelagianism. Love is as little a virtue without faith as faith without love, for

considered as a spiritual principle in opposition to faithful *works*, and that by *works* he meant not mere acts of the mind but outward actions. This is quite evident from his language, from the whole strain of his argument, and from all his illustrations. Let the reader, if he cares about the matter, look and see. Referring to the 11th chapter of Hebrews, he speaks of David who slew Goliath. The sophister, says he looks upon nothing but the outward appearance of the work; but we must consider what manner of person David was before he did this work—that he was a righteous man, beloved of God, strong and constant in faith. Luther could hardly have thought that David was without love

no man can love as Christ commands except he believe in God. It is not easy, indeed, to define Faith as a property of the will; but who can *define* primary feelings?

Consistently with the notion that Faith, in its abstract nature, is only Belief, Mr. Newman denies that it is to be identified with Trust: Yet surely Faith and Trust are only different attitudes of the same habit, the difference being in the tense or time of the habit. Faith believes that there is an Infinitely Good Being, and that he *is* good to us: Trust believes that he *will* be good to us. The devils believe; but they have not religious faith: for this *binds* us to its object. No man owes fealty except for benefit and protection. It is unwise to separate the idea of love of God or faith in Him from that of advantage to ourselves; they are reciprocal and co-inherent; the love of God is its own reward, its fruition union with Him. Mr. Newman teaches that faith in its own abstract nature is no grace; that it is merely such a sense of the spiritual as belongs to the devils; that union with love and all the graces of a religious spirit alone makes it virtuous; my Father looked upon Faith as that in the *will* which *corresponds* to belief in the understanding; he thought that faith includes belief, but is more than belief; that it is a grace distinct from love though inseparable from it.

when he was beloved of God. Mr. N. represents it as a monstrous extravagance⁵⁰ in the Reformer to teach that faith justifies *before and without charity*. Yet it is evident enough, and must have been plain as noon-day to simple hearers, that when Luther speaks of charity he speaks of this virtue as it is manifested in the *outward and visible course of life*. Works he described as the bright children of salvation not the parents of it. He insisted that a man must believe in God *before* he could perform godly actions, must lay hold on Christ before he could walk as a Christian. His commentary is practical, popular, and highly rhetorical in form, not scientific, though I think that every word of it may be scientifically defended. Where does he say that justifying faith, apart from love,—faith in the shape of bare belief, such as devils may have,—comes first, lays hold of Christ, and then becomes the parent of all graces? He merely explains the saying of St. Paul, that by faith we have *access to grace*. His doctrine amounts to no more than what Mr. Newman himself confesses when he calls faith the “sole inward instrument of justification.” That pale phantom of justifying faith, which flits about, a mere outline, a line without breadth or thickness, is not to be found in *Luther's pages*, but only in the pages of Luther's adversaries. Nor knew he aught of that other meagre shadow, justification by imputed righteousness alone;⁵¹

⁵⁰ That Luther never “renounced” any of his “extravagances” directly or “indirectly,” early or late, is a point strongly insisted on by Archdeacon Hare, in note W, p. 712-13. His *extravagances* were strictly within the bounds of Scripture.

⁵¹ Mr. N. does not give *this*, I believe to Luther, but calls it the high Protestant doctrine. *High* indeed in the heaven of absur-

he said that those three things, Faith, Christ, and imputation should always go together, and that faith and works should never be separated.⁵² They who say that Luther's scheme presents but half of the Gospel, know but half of his mind and *that* not rightly.⁵³

Surely no one can think that the sentences quoted in the *Lectures on Justification* at p. 10, from Luther's *Commentary*, contain any proof that he thought or taught that "justifying faith is without love when it

dity. It should be sent to Milton's Limbo with a *living Faith apart in time from Love*—and should not Mr. Newman's own *Justification precedent to justifying Faith*, go along with them? Indeed I think this last is the Queen Chimæra of the whole tribe.

⁵² The confusion respecting the priority of justifying faith to love perhaps arises in this way. Faith *includes* belief, or the mere assent of the understanding to divine truth; though it is more than belief; and intellectual assent or perception is the means whereby we obtain the faith of the heart, which is joined with love. The one may not indeed precede the other in time; we may perceive the truth and embrace it spiritually at the same moment; the willingness of the heart clearing the head and the head opening the heart; still there is a priority of faith to love in idea. *Fides est humanæ salutis initium, fundamentum et radix omnis justificationis*, says the Council of Trent. The Homily of Salvation shuts out love from the office of justifying; why is this, except that faith is conceived to have come first and done the work? Of course we make the notion both absurd and mischievous, if we suppose that justification is obtained by some *one act* of faith *once acted*. Faith is always coming first in the soul of the Christian, laying hold of Christ, (or in Mr. Newman's words, uniting the soul to God), and producing good works.

⁵³ Luther preaches the whole Gospel with an emphasis on particular parts to suit the exigences of the day. So in our *Tracts for the Times* there is an emphasis on sacraments, outward works, all kinds of ecclesiastical visibilities, and whatever can be brought forward relative to priestly power and authority.

justifies," which Mr. N. declares to be plainly his doctrine, and "no matter of words." Luther, in them, shews that faith not love is the root of good works, since Paul said *Faith worketh by Love*; not Love worketh; he shews that charity or following works do not inform faith, that is, do not impart to it its justifying power, but that faith informs charity, and is "the sun or sun-beam of this shining." What is this more than Mr. N. himself asserts in Lecture X. when he teaches that faith, as faith, in its distinct character, unites the soul with God, or as he expresses it elsewhere, is "the only connecting bond between the soul and Christ." I say again, that every where in the Commentary Luther connects charity with works and the outward life, and nowhere describes justifying faith as existing apart from the *habit* of love. His doctrine on this point is merely an expansion of St. Austin's sound maxim: *per fidem (hominem) posse justificari etiamsi Legis opera non præcesserint; sequuntur enim justificatum non præcedunt justificandum.* (Quoted by Mr. N. himself p. 438.)

Mr. Newman has beautifully described Luther's conception of justifying faith in his first Lecture. It was then perhaps that he fell in love with it, though he did not *tell his love* at the time, but acted the lover in Lecture X. taking it for better for worse. I hope he will never divorce it. Yes! Luther thought of faith as the mere turning or adhering of the soul to Christ, which "may be said" not "by a figure of speech" but literally and truly to "live in Him in whose image it rests." He thought that love lost itself in the object, Christ dwelling in the soul; that love of our neighbour, charity, and all the family of outward works, when set up as our justification or a part of it, were as

a solid screen betwixt us and the Saviour, while the former was a medium like the fluid air, colourless and transparent. St. Paul's language in the fourth of Romans *prima facie* favours Luther's view, because it so pointedly calls faith our righteousness, as if we had no other justifying principle within us; and declares salvation to be of *grace not of debt*, and if it were obtained, even in a conditional sense, by our virtues, it would seem to be in some sort our due. But, on second thoughts, we perceive that what is true of faith may be safely ascribed to the sanctification that is one with it, and that salvation is of *grace* if secured by the graces given us from above. St. Paul's only object was to shew that men cannot save themselves, and Luther's only object was to prevent the *practical* recurrence of this trust in self-salvation by detached and outside performances.

The great opponent of Luther, on the article of Justification, agrees with him on the following points, which, I think, are all the points of this high game. First, in holding Christ living in the heart to be the true form of our righteousness. This is the idea which is at the bottom of his whole theory, and it is very distinctly set forth in the comments on chap. ii. verses 16 and 20.⁵⁴ Secondly, in holding faith to be the sole inward

⁵⁴ Mr. Newman gives him credit for this, in Lecture I, p. 22, and appendix, pp. 405 and 409.—“the bold, nay correct language of Luther, that *Christ himself is the form of our justification*,”—My Father's deep satisfaction in this thought may be seen from the following passage in the *Remains*, vol. iv. pp. 33-4.

“And I, my loving Brentius, to the end I may better understand this case, do use to think in this manner, namely, as if in my heart were no quality or virtue at all, which is called faith, and love (as the Sophists do speak and dream thereof,) but I set

instrument by which the conjunction of the soul with Christ is effected. That Christ dwells in the heart by faith is directly affirmed in Scripture.⁵⁵ Thirdly, in holding works *necessary*,⁵⁶ in the order of salvation, as necessarily flowing from saving faith or rather from the Holy Ghost, united by faith with the soul, and the proper signs and manifestations of grace “impetrated by faith.” Fourthly, in holding that the outward law for the righteous is superseded by the inward law of the mind, though it remains *to keep the flesh in subjection*. Fifthly, which might have been firstly, that saving faith is itself produced by the Holy Ghost.⁵⁷ Sixthly, that the Holy Ghost is given, and the soul renewed, in baptism. Seventhly, that conversion is wrought, and I suppose I may add, since “St. James says so,” and St. Peter too, that we are divinely begotten or born again, in some spiritual sense, by the Word of God.

all on Christ, and say, my *formalis justitia*, that is, my sure, my constant and complete righteousness (in which is no want nor failing, but is, as before God it ought to be) is Christ my Lord and Saviour.” (Luther’s Table Talk, p. 213.)

“Aye! this, this is indeed to the purpose. In this doctrine my soul can find rest. I hope to be saved by faith, not by my faith, but by the faith of Christ in me.” S. T. C.

⁵⁵ Gal. ii. 20. Eph. iii. 17.

⁵⁶ Commentary, chap. iii. verse 11, and elsewhere, Luther teaches that the righteousness which saves is a *passive righteousness* given us from above. Had he taught that we were saved by faith, *as an act of our own* taking us to Christ and laying hold of Him, this would have been as false and injurious as to ascribe salvation to outward works. The faith which accepts grace is itself the effect of grace.

⁵⁷ Ib. chap. iii. verses 27, 28. Chap. iv. verse 6.

and a self-contradictory Disagreement. cxix

Wherein then do they differ? why truly in this. Luther denies that we are *justified* by the graces and works that flow out of our justification; Mr. Newman affirms that we are justified by them, that they help to justify together with the faith which makes them what they are. This appeared to Luther a *hysteron proteron*; and it certainly does look like a contradiction in Mr. Newman's scheme, that after confessing faith to be the *sole* inward instrument of justification he should call graces and works instruments also;—that after agreeing with the Homilist to shut them out from the office of justifying, he should think it essential to a sound belief—to shut them in again. Granted that the dispute is a verbal one, still if we decide that one form of words is the correct form, we surely ought not to adopt another form which directly contradicts it. As for St. James, when he said that man is not justified by *faith alone*, he evidently meant by faith not what Luther defines it, *a gift and a present of God in our hearts*, the substance whereof is our will,⁵⁸ but what Antinomians mean by it, mere *belief*; for this is a common art of rhetorical argument to adopt the adversary's expressions and turn them against him. With him *works* stood for a working spirit, by that

⁵⁸ Talk Talk, chap. 13. *Of Faith and the cause thereof.* Luther was vacillating in his definitions of faith, for he sometimes placed it in the understanding and sometimes in the will, whereas it is in both; but he always described it as a work of the Holy Ghost, (Comm. chap. iii. ver. 11.) he calls it a believing with the *heart*, and he declares that it cannot be separated from Hope which resteth in the will, the two having respect to the other, as the two cherubims of the mercy seat, which could not be divided. My Father says he discoursed best on Faith in his *Postills*. *Remains*, iv. p. 36.

cxx *Objection to the term Apprehensive*

common figure which puts the effect for the cause, as a man might say, this "spring was *health* to me," meaning the *cause* of health. The *outward* act of Abraham was nothing; in the *mind* of Abraham were an act of faith and an act of obedience intimately united. Now Luther taught that the *faith* in this joint act alone justified; and Mr. N. seems to say the same, when he calls faith the *sole inward instrument* of justification. Luther's opponents maintain, that the obedience, which is one with the faith, helps to justify, and this Mr. Newman affirms also: but how can he make it consist with the sole instrumentality of faith? Surely that which alone joins us to Christ alone justifies us. Now Mr. Newman declares that faith is "the only instrument or connecting bond between the soul and Christ." What signifies it, *as against Luther*, to say, that according to St. James, we are "justified *in* good works?" Luther only denied that we are justified *by* them.

Mr. Newman has a great objection to Luther's explanatory phrase *apprehensive*; he will not *say* that faith justifies by *laying hold* of Christ and *applying* Him to the soul, though this is said in our Homilies, with which he yet seeks, in his work on Justification, to be in accordance. He calls this way of speaking a human subtlety and alleges that such words are not in Scripture: yet surely there is quite as much of human subtlety and extra-scriptural language in his own scheme: where can we find it said by the Saviour or his Apostles, that faith is "but the secondary or representative instrument of justification," or its "sustaining cause," "not the initiation of the justified-state," or that "it justifies as including all other graces in and under it," as having "an unexplained connexion with the invisible world,"

or five hundred sayings of like sort? These are but inferences from Scripture—not Scripture itself. Luther's term *laying hold of Christ* seems to me a mere translation into figurative language of what Scripture repeatedly affirms, namely that Christ dwells in the heart *by faith*; and the very same thing appears to be implied in Mr. N.'s own admission that it alone unites the soul to God as the inward instrument of justification. Even if faith and works of faith are all one and what is true of the parent is true of the offspring, still if Christ alone is the meritorious cause of salvation, our personal righteousness justifies *as connecting* us with Him, that is as *apprehensive*, and not merely as purifying our souls in his sight. Luther denied that it *justified* in the latter sense at all, and whether he was right or wrong in this,—this is the doctrine of our Articles and Homilies, which certainly intimate that not the faithful *work*, but faith *in* the work justifies, by laying hold on Christ. They who condemn his teaching in the present day, copy his only fault, unfairness to his opponents—casting into one condemnation practical perverters with theoretic teachers—while they hide all his merits behind a bushel.

Many of Luther's opponents remind one of Jack the Giant-killer's doughty host, they think they are belabouring Jack, while they are but beating a stuffed bolster. Mr. Newman is too skilful a combatant for this; but his fight against Luther is not more effectual; he keeps gazing at him with a look of deep hostility, but rather makes feints than really strikes him, and when he does aim a stroke at the old swordsman it descends upon his shield or his breast armour. There is one point in Mr. Newman's scheme, and one alone, which seems to me utterly false, not in words alone but

in sense: I mean his assertion that justification *precedes* justifying faith; that faith does but take up and sustain a spiritual state already established in the soul; that the faith which is our *access to grace* is unjustified and unjustifying; contrary to the doctrine of Aquinas who teaches that the Spirit produces its own recipient, that it enters by the avenue of faith which it first opens out. Luther's own view of baptism implies as much undoubtedly, and it seems to me that he is wrong in too much agreement with Patrician theology not in too much departure from it.

As for the Apostolic teaching, I believe that it is quite on one side of these contentions; that the object of St. Paul was to refute Judaism, the notion that men can save themselves by the mere direction and compulsion of an outward law, without Christ in the heart; not to combat such an opinion as Bishop Bull's or that set forth in the Council of Trent; that the object of St. James was to put down Antinomianism, not such a Solifidian view as Luther's. I believe these inspired teachers would have assented to the statement of either party, and when they heard each confess Christ crucified and salvation by His merits, would have inquired no further. It is grievous to hear Christians accuse each other of irreligion and impiety on such grounds as their different views on this question.⁵⁹ "Satanic influence!" cry the parties one against

⁵⁹ Bishop Bull observes that there is but the difference of a *qua* and a *quæ* between his view and the Solifidian, when you come to the bottom of the latter; but is it not strange that he should ridicule the Lutheran because he fights fiercely for *quæ* (the opinion that faith alone *which* worketh by love justifies,) yet fight himself for *qua* (the opinion that faith *inasmuch as* it worketh by love justifieth,) as if the safety of the Church depended on

another:—as if Satan was simple enough to spend his time in weaving webs of justification! The nets with which he catches souls are of very different make and materials.⁶⁰

It was not these bubbles which my Father was thinking of when he called “Luther, in parts, the most evangelical writer he knew after the apostles and apostolic men:” it was the depth of his insight into the heart of man and into the ideas of the Bible, the fervour and reality of his religious feelings, the manliness and tenderness of his spirit, the vehement eloquence with which he assails the Romish practical fallacies and abuses. He even contends with Luther when he lays too much stress on his Solifidian dogma, the exclusion of charity from the office of justifying; and on the certainty and perpetuity of faith in the elect preferred the notions of Hooker to those of the earlier assertor of faith.⁶¹ Perhaps it may be ob-

the decision. I think if he had fought with Luther himself instead of certain narrow-minded disciples of Luther’s school, he would have been brought to see that the Solifidian statement was at least as good as his own. If *quæ* can be wrested into Antinomianism more easily than *qua*, on the other hand *qua* more readily slips into Judaism than *quæ*.

⁶⁰ Either the Romanist or the Lutheran doubtless may add to his belief of Redemption by the merits of Christ what overthrows or overshadows it, in practice. But these practical falsehoods and heresies do not appear in formal schemes of Justification; let them be hunted out and exposed, but not confounded with theories and confessions of faith.

⁶¹ *Remains*, iv. p. 32. His views on this subject are given in his note on Fenelon, *Remains*, ii. p. 368.—in the notes on a Sermon of Hooker’s, *Ib.* iii. p. 49—on Donne, p. 122—on Luther’s *Table Talk*, *Ib.* iv. p. 1—on *A Barrister’s Hints*, p. 320.—on *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, p. 401—and in his *Essay on Faith*, p. 425.

cxxiv *Contest of the Flesh and the Spirit.*

jected to Luther's teaching, that he does not expressly enough distinguish between the ideal and the actual, the abstract and the realized. Luther declares, after St. Paul, that the outward law remains for the outward man, is dead for the spiritual man: but in actual men and women the carnal and spiritual exist together in different proportions. If any Christian on the face of the earth should apply to himself without reserve what St. Paul and what Luther say of the spiritual man, he will fall into spiritual error of the deepest kind. There have been great disputes whether St. Paul in the viiith chapter of Romans, and in Galatians, v. 19, refers to the state of the justified or the unjustified. The disputants never seemed to ask themselves whether it appeared on the face of St. Paul's teaching, that he divided the world into the justified and unjustified, the regenerate and the unregenerate, as the shepherd divideth the sheep from the goats, after the manner of modern schools. But surely to suppose, that in describing those contests between the flesh and the spirit, he spoke of the absolutely unjustified, of persons in the main under the dominion of sin, and of them exclusively, is further from the truth than Luther's interpretation, namely, that the desires of the flesh will remain even in those who are believers unto salvation, and for the most part are walking in the light. There was a tendency in his time to understand fleshly desires of sensuality alone. He set himself to combat this notion and to show, that though *one set of vices* might be wholly kept down in this life, the flesh was never wholly subdued. Again in Luther's language, copied from Scripture, the *flesh* sometimes is to be understood in a neutral sense, and means the sum of outward things—

that "other kingdom" distinct from the kingdom of grace. This way of speaking offended Romanists, who were bent on exalting the outward. They sought to christen the whole visible creation, and I think they introduced flesh and blood too much into the kingdom of heaven.

These were *practical* points, though they seemed to be theory, and Luther's sins against Rome were of a practical description. His *rationale* of grace never made Catholic divines his fierce opponents. As for the "heroic man's" rhetorical atrocities, his "tiger-lilies" of speech, as my Father called them, they are all capable of an innocent meaning at least; they are but "sheep in wolves' clothing," silly sheep enough perhaps, yet harmless to the persons to whom they were addressed, who took them as they were meant, knowing the speaker's mind at large. Now, adversaries of Lutheranism take up these spent rockets, and fling them into the arena of religious contention!—of course they look black and smell sulphureously. What makes the host of catholic divines a host of enemies to Luther is his enmity to the mediæval Church system with all the net-work and ramification of doctrine developed for the temporal advantage of the clergy—all the branchery of mystic beliefs and superstitious practices, works, vows, religious abstinences, self tortures which supported,—all the mummeries rehearsed by Hans Sachs in his *Nachtigall*, which adorned, this clerical polity—his determination that men should read the Word of God *itself*, though with every help to the understanding of it—his determination, powerfully carried out, to *simplify the access of the soul to God*,—not to make the narrow a broad way, as, in common with St. Paul, he is falsely reported, but a straight and short passage,

though a passage through which no man could squeeze the bloated body of licentiousness—to batter down for as many as possible that labyrinth of priestly salvation, in the mazy windings of which the timid and tender-conscienced wander weary and distressed, while for the worldling and careless liver there lies a primrose path outside its gloomy walls, through which, if he will pay for salvation, he may saunter pleasantly to a better world; with many a short cut, such as Milton describes,⁶² and which, my Father, when he visited Sicily knew, as other sojourners in Roman Catholic countries have known, to be actually provided by or in a church, which is rather too much *all things to all men*.

It is for these things that staunch “Catholics” hate, for these things that my Father loved and honoured, Luther’s name. The Lutheran Church has not prospered well. But how would Christendom have fared without a Luther?—what would Rome have done and dared but for the Ocean of the Reformed that *rounds* her? Luther lives yet,—not so beneficially in the Lutheran Church as out of it—an antagonist spirit to Rome, and a purifying and preserving spirit in Christendom at large.⁶³

⁶² “ And they, who to be sure of Paradise,
Dying, put on the weeds of Dominick,
Or in Franciscan think to pass disguised.”

Par. Lost, B. iii. l. 478.

⁶³ After describing the Papacy, or “the Papal Hierarchy, which is, in truth the dilated Pope,” as “a power in the Christian Church, which in the name of Christ, and at once pretending and usurping his authority, is systematically subversive of the essential and distinguishing characters and purposes of the Christian Church,” my Father, in his *Church and State*, proceeds to say, “It is my full conviction, that the rights and doctrines, the *agenda et credenda* of the Roman Catholics, could we separate

Power of coarse Religious Systems. cxxvii

I do not deny but that the Romish system, with its low checks and coarse incentives, may have some special effect in moralizing the Poor, while Protestantism, except as Methodism, is apt to fly above them, or to fleet before them, like a cold and formless vapour. Paganism was more effectual upon the minds of the many than Platonism; Judaism or self salvation by outward works will restrain a few who care not for Pauline doctrine: Montanism did more for some than the discipline of the Church. Nevertheless whatever is the purest, highest and most spiritual form of faith, to *that* must men be raised up if possible. Make them but spiritual enough to embrace it, and there will be no lack of power or of substance in a philosophical Christianity to fill the deepest and the widest soul that ever yet appeared among the sons of men.

Mr. Coleridge's love and respect for Luther I might well have allowed to vindicate itself, had I not felt so strong a desire to shew how deeply I sympathize with

them from the adulterating ingredients combined with, and the use made of them, by the sacerdotal Mamelukes of the Romish monarchy, for the support of the Papacy and Papal hierarchy, would neither have brought about, nor have sufficed to justify, the convulsive separation under Leo X. Nay, that if they were fairly, and in the light of a sound philosophy, compared with either of the two main divisions of Protestantism, as it now exists in this country, that is, with the fashionable doctrines and interpretations of the Arminian and Grotian school on the one hand, and with the tenets and language of the modern Calvinists on the other, an enlightened disciple of John and of Paul would be perplexed which of the three to prefer as the least unlike the profound and sublime system he had learned from his great masters. And in this comparison I leave out of view the extreme sects of Protestantism, whether of the frigid or the torrid zone, Socinian or fanatic." pp. 145-6.

him on that subject; his esteem and admiration of another great German, of a totally different spirit, a reformer of *philosophy*, I wish to set in the true light, lest it be mistaken for what it is not. My Father himself supposed that he had fallen into suspicion through his partial advocacy of Spinoza; ⁶⁴ I believe he has done himself harm with those who, as Archdeacon Hare says, talk of Germany as if its history belonged to that of Kamschatka, by his language respecting Immanuel Kant.⁶⁵ Let the reader bear in mind that

⁶⁴ My Father alludes to the defects of Spinoza's system in several of his writings. His ultimate opinion of that philosopher has been published in Mr. Gillman's *Life of Coleridge*, p. 319-22.

⁶⁵ "He calls Calvin a great man!"—I have seen specified as a charge in a religious indictment. I cannot sympathize with that "*catholicity*" which looks upon Luther as a "bold bad man," and thinks it a crime to call Calvin a great one; defames the characters of our noble Reformers, and disparages the glorious poetry of Milton; holds the memory of King William infamous, and that of Cromwell execrable; contemplates coldly the flames that consumed Latimer, and fires at remembrance of the axe that beheaded Laud; finds out that Dr. Arnold was over happy to be a saint, and attributes the power of Mr. Carlyle's writings to the Prince of the Air. Mr. Carlyle's "irreligion"* as well as Mr. Irving's "religion" the author of *The Doctor* reckons among those non-entities which pass for substance with a misjudging world. To the religion of Irving Mr. Carlyle himself has paid a most beautiful and affecting tribute, (see his *Miscellanies*, vol. v. p. 1-6.) He quotes this saying of one who knew him well; "His was the freest, brotherliest, bravest human soul mine ever came in contact with :

* I find, on referring to the passage in *The Doctor*, that I have mistaken "Mr. Carlisle's irreligion," seriously meant for "Mr. Carlyle's irreligion" in the sense of irony. But the mistake is no misreport of my Uncle's opinion of Mr. Carlyle.

he spoke and felt thus at the same period when he was ardently defending Christianity among the Germans against those whom he deemed undoubtedly its opponents.⁶⁶ The truth was that he never beheld in Kant the foe of Christianity; he kept his eye on the great characteristic parts of Kant's teaching, and these, he maintained, might be brought to the service of Christianity, as far as they went; might strengthen the faith by purifying it and bringing it into co-incident with reason. They who pronounce the writings

I call him, on the whole, the best man I have ever, after trial enough, found in this world, or now hope to find." But my dear Uncle saw Irving under the most unfavourable circumstances, when he had drunk that "foulest Circean draught, the poison of Popular Applause;" when "Fashion crowded round him with her meteor lights and Bacchic dances," and he seemed himself, perhaps, in some respects, like one of the empty, gaudy, intoxicated and intoxicating throng.—But who holds all this cluster of opinions? I know not whether any man holds them all, but the spirit of exclusiveness in the religious partisan has maintained every one of them, and earnestly too. Mr. Maurice's remark, in his *Boyle Lectures*, on one strong point in Mr. Carlyle's writings, the sense they exhibit of an Absolute Will and the necessity of absolute submission to it on the part of man, which they bring out with special force in a practical way, is an instance of that power of recognising the *substance* of religion wherever it be, and under whatever form, which is so characteristic of his own genius.

⁶⁶ This is an extract from a letter of Dr. Parry, printed by Dr. Carlyon in his recollections of my Father in Germany.

"Eichorn, one of the principal theologians in Germany, and a lecturer here, seems, from all accounts, to be doing his utmost to destroy the evidences on which we ground our belief. He is a good man and extremely charitable, but this attempt speaks neither for his head nor for his heart. Coleridge, an able vindicator of these important truths, is well acquainted with Eichorn, but this latter is a coward, who dreads his arguments

cxxx *Tendency of the Critical Doctrines.*

of this great genius directly and positively adverse to pure religion, whether right or wrong, are but setting their judgment of what Christianity, historical as well as ideal, is and involves, of what Kant's doctrine is and involves, against my Father; they cannot accuse him of supporting a system of infidelity without first begging the question against him on both points. Kant is called an Atheist: yet who but he overthrew the grand atheistical argument of Hume? he is called a Pantheist, yet he it was who first discovered and clearly stated the fundamental error in the Pantheistic system of Spinoza: others had abused it as impious; he alone proved it to be irrational.⁶⁷

and his presence. Even atheism is not altogether unfashionable here, in the higher, and sometimes among the lower classes of society. The priests are *generally* weak and ignorant men, who pay little attention to their flocks, at least, out of the pulpit. *They are, however, paid badly.* I have twice mentioned Coleridge, and much wish you were acquainted with him. It is very delightful to hear him sometimes discourse on religious topics for an hour together. His fervour is particularly agreeable when contrasted with the chilling speculations of the German philosophers. I have had occasion to see these successively abandon all their strong-holds when he brought to the attack his arguments and his philosophy." (*Early Years and Late Recollections*, pp. 100-101.)

Dr. Carlyon himself, in my opinion, misunderstood my Father in many things, as he misunderstood some of his favourite authors: but I am obliged to him for his testimony on this point.

⁶⁷ "Zimmermann," says Dr. Carlyon, "gave us his opinion freely of Kant's philosophy, and no one could have more cordially reprobated its general tendency. After maintaining, as Kant has done, that the existence of a God can never be proved; to what purpose, asked Z. is it to tell the world that

Nature and Effect of German Speculation. cxxxix

Everything that the Germans teach requires to be substantiated by the English mind, to be enlivened and spiritualized. They are analyzers,—all, more or less, what Kant was pre-eminently, *Alles-zermalmendern*—shatterers to pieces. But this process is a necessary preliminary to the construction of what is sound—a necessary work *toward* pure religion. They *can* overthrow permanently only what is ready to fall, or incapable by its nature of re-construction. They cannot extinguish the spiritual instincts of mankind, or blot out the records of history. The draining of marshes will never render a country dry and barren, while there are yet springs in the mountains whence

the best argument which can be adduced in its favour is this very impossibility of proving it? The generality of mankind, he said, would recollect the possibility, but forget the inference." Dr. C. adds, "Coleridge attended to what he said, without showing any desire to defend the Philosopher of Königsburg on this occasion."

My Father perhaps thought it good economy to save his breath on *that occasion*, and to judge from the comments upon his writings of some who were present, very wisely. But I think I know what he would have said to this smart shallow objection of Zimmermann's, that if good for any thing it is good against every philosophical and religious argument that ever was published. What is there in the way of reasoning that may not be made false and injurious by being cut in half? That treatise of Kant's was addressed and adapted to students, and, if students had not misrepresented it the world would not have misunderstood it. So it is with the teaching of Luther: the simple hearers, who expect that the teacher will bring forth what is true rather than what is false, what accords with their moral ideas rather than what contradicts them, these found him scriptural enough I dare say. It was the systematic divines, the Romish and Romanizing sophisters, that turned his commentary into Antinomianism.

clear streams may flow. If Germans disbelieve, it is not from their activity of intellect ; their clear searching glances ; it is more from what they leave undone than from what they do ; from what they have not than from what they possess. Some of their marked writers want that imaginative power,—so necessary in religious speculation,—which brings the many into one, and judges the parts with reference to the whole.

Mr. Arthur Hallam, whose *Remains* inspire some who knew him not with deep regret that they are *remains*, not first fruits, and commencements, has said on this subject :⁶⁸ “ I do not hesitate to express my conviction, that the spirit of the critical philosophy, as seen by its fruits in all the ramifications of art, literature, and morality, is as much more dangerous than the spirit of mechanical philosophy, as it is fairer in appearance, and more capable of alliance with our natural feelings of enthusiasm and delight. Its danger-

⁶⁸ *Remains in Verse and Prose*, p. 189. I think that Mr. A. Hallam might perhaps have modified his opinion of the Critical Philosophy, had he lived and thought longer. As a *substitute* for Christianity it is indeed but a beautiful shadow ; unite the two and it becomes substantial. A really searching system can be injurious to none but those who are undone already, and adopt it as a goodly cloak for their own bare and hideous heart-unbelief. There will ever be in the world born Mechanicians, Pelagians, Psilanthropists, Antinomians, Judaizers, who will have systems that suit their feelings. But *these* systems are positively false and tend to corrupt the heart ; while the *Critical philosophy*, considered apart from the religious opinions of Kant and some of his followers, has never yet been proved so by systematic and searching argument. See remarks in the *Mission of the Comforter*, vol. ii. pp. 799-800, on injustice done to German writers by party judges, slightly acquainted with their writings, whose irrelevant fine sayings are taken for confutations of their untouched adversaries.

ous tendency is this, that it perverts those very minds, whose office it was to resist the perverse impulses of society, and to proclaim truth under the dominion of falsehood." The difference between the critical and the mechanical philosophy is this, that the latter is incongruous and inconsonant with Christianity; while the former (as far as it goes,) is capable of flowing along with it in one channel and even blending with it in one stream, as I contend that it does in the Christian philosophy of my Father. The latter blunts the religious susceptibilities—perverts the habits of thought—suppresses the inward fire which, at the impulse of the external revelation, springs upward into a living flame, as the flint draws the hidden fire from the rock. But the critical philosophy cultivates the moral sense while it clears the eye of reason; its positions are compatible with every spiritual truth, and to the spiritual are spiritual themselves. It is like the highest poetry—like the poetry of Mr. Wordsworth, not religion itself, much less dogmatic divinity, but cognate with it and harmoniously co-operative.⁶⁹

Let it be understood, however, that by the *critical philosophy*, I mean the really *critical* part of Kant's teaching,—all his purely philosophical and metaphy-

⁶⁹ I do not speak here of the *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*, or parts of *The Excursion* expressly Christian and Catholic, but of Mr. Wordsworth's poetry in general, including much of an earlier date than those productions, in which formal religion is not apparent, but in which the spirit of Christianity is "the spirit of the whole." I do not say so much as *this* of the Critical Philosophy, but still I think it has been evolved by Christianity, (that is, by the general spirit of the religion surrounding men's minds as an atmosphere,) and agrees with it, though by itself it is not Christianity.

sical doctrines, which have a most important bearing on religious belief *a posteriori*, but do not treat of it directly—of which the bulk of his works consist. I speak particularly of his *Logic, Prolegomena to every future system of Metaphysics, Critique of the Pure Reason*, (his greatest production), *Critiques of the Judgment and of the Practical Reason, Only possible ground of proof for demonstrating the Existence of God*, and *Metaphysical Elements of Natural Philosophy*. I do not speak of his *Religion within the bounds of pure Reason* so far as the doctrine of that work really conflicts with all outward Revelation and Historical Christianity. The treatise just mentioned,—which forms scarcely more than a four or five and twentieth part of the author's whole writings, though in the minds of some persons it seems to form the whole—contains an application of the critical philosophy, which many, who embrace the philosophy itself, may and do reject—which certainly my Father never adopted. His argument in the first *Lay Sermon* on miracles supposes the historical truth of the miracles recorded in the Bible, and the admiration he expresses of the treatise above-mentioned refers not to any portion of it, which is irreconcilable with the substance of the Catholic Faith, but to that part only which serves to place it in more complete accordance with Practical Reason, (the moral-intellighental mind,) than the primitive or mediæval conceptions. The general character and aim of the *critical* philosophy has been described by my Father, when he speaks of “that logical *προπαιδεία δοκιμαστική*, that critique of the human intellect, which previously to the weighing and measuring of this or that, begins by assaying the weights, measures, and scales themselves; that fulfilment of the heaven-

separable from his Views of Revelation. cxxxv

descended *nosce teipsum*, in respect to the intellectual part of man, which was commenced in a sort of tentative broad cast way by Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, and brought to a systematic completion by Immanuel Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, and *Metaphysische Anfangs-gründe der Naturwissenschaft*.⁷⁰ "It was of the Kantian Philosophy considered in this point of view that Schiller said, in his correspondence with Goethe, though its "form shall one day be destroyed, its foundations will not have this destiny to fear; for ever since mankind has existed, and any reason among mankind, these same first principles have been admitted and on the whole acted upon."

Mr. Dequincey has spoken with horror of Kant's table talk infidelity. What authority he has for such a horrid charge I know not: he does not write well on personal points, though admirably always, when he keeps away from the *Maremma* or Snake Marsh of private anecdote. This is certain, that Kant's disciples and commentators in general are a most silent and discreet set of men if their master "planted his glory in the grave and was ambitious of rotting for ever." They seem profoundly ignorant of this part of his creed. This also is certain that he has amongst the admirers of his writings Churchmen and good Christians, who have found a coincidence between the more important parts of his teaching and the ideas of the Catholic faith, together with suggestions, that throw light on some of the dark places of divinity by clearly exhibiting the structure and limits of the human

⁷⁰ Works. Leipzig, 1839. vol. ii.—vol. vii. p. 1-364.—vol. viii. p. 441-559.—*Remains* III. p. 157.

mind,—which enlighten the object by pouring light into the subject. Is it of no use to religion to clear and correct its intellectual form? A great deal of superstition may hold a great deal of spiritual truth, as the wax of the honeycomb holds the pure nourishing honey. The honey may be drawn off into a glass bason; and how necessary would this be if the comb were not merely insipid and innutritious but unwholesome or even poisonous! It should ever be remembered that intellectual error in religion injures those least who are least intellectual; and hence it is a fallacy to argue that because men in past times, or *simple* Christians at all times, have lived holy lives though their creed may be challenged as in part irrational, *therefore* contradiction to the laws of the understanding in theological articles is of no consequence. It is of the more consequence the clearer-sighted we become; it is one thing to shut our eyes to falsehood, and quite another not to see it.

Most desirable is it that philosophy should be independent of religious shackles in its operations in order that it may confirm religion. It is even a benefit to the world, however great a loss to himself, that Kant, with his mighty powers of thought and analysis, was not religiously educated. Had he been brought up a Churchman he could never have divested himself of dogmatic divinity; he could never have given the *a priori* map of the human mind as independently as he has given it; and, if it had been less independently and abstractly given, the correlation of Christianity with the mental constitution of man could never have been so evident as it now is to those who have studied his writings, and who know and love and revere the Bible. I do not, of course, mean that mere spirituality interferes

with speculative philosophy, but only that religious persons are generally such as have come early under the sway of some dogmatic system, which has guided their thoughts from the first; nor do I mean, that a man dogmatically educated may not become a great philosopher; but that it is an advantage to religious philosophy to obtain the undirected thoughts of a powerful investigator, who has considered the human mind by its own light alone; because thus the harmony of the outward revelation with our internal conformation is most incontrovertibly ascertained. No fervent devotee of the outward revelation could have done religion this particular service, or shewn how perfectly the reports of the mere intellectual explorer in the region of mental metaphysics coincide with the spiritual believer's scheme of faith; and, as on a clear view of this coincidence all correctness of religious theory depends, they who value such correctness ought not to despise the labours of a subtle analyst like Immanuel Kant, or deny, before examination, that they may be important "contributions to Catholic Truth." There is a maxim current among religious *Exclusives*, that he who is wrong positively or negatively in his creed can have no true insight into any province of human thought connected with Morals and Religion. This opinion if acted on would be most injurious to the cause of both, because great powers of thought belong to some who, unhappily for themselves, are not devout or spiritual-minded. Truth is advanced by the efforts of various minds, and what an irreligious man throws out may be converted to a use he little dreamed of by the religious. Mr. Dequincey has said finely of Kant contrasting him with my Father: "He was the Gog and he was the Magog of Hunnish desolation to the existing

schemes of philosophy. He probed them; he shewed the vanity of vanities which besieged their foundations,—the rottenness below, the hollowness above. But he had no instincts of creation or restoration within his Apollyon mind; for he had no love, no faith, no self-distrust, no humility, no child-like docility; all which qualities belonged essentially to Coleridge's mind, and waited only for manhood and for sorrow to bring them forward." It was because my Father had these qualities that to him the philosophy of Kant was religion; and, indeed, I think it may be maintained, that although Kant's process was analytic rather than synthetic, and was occupied in clearing away rather than in erecting, it was by no means purely destructive, but, after the clearance, had materials enough left wherewith to construct the base of a philosophy co-incident with a spiritual Christianity.

It was affirmed by Hume that religion must rest on faith—that reason could not prove its truth. This proposition was re-affirmed by Kant, but with an utterly opposite inference from that which Hume drew from it, for *he* saw what Hume saw not, that there is a power in the human mind sufficient to support and substantiate religion, apart from the mere speculative faculty; that spiritual truths must have their own specific evidence; that if there is no absolute demonstration in these matters for the mere understanding, none is needed, none would serve any purpose of religion; that theoretic reason has performed her whole office in religious proof when she has shewn the impossibility of disproving the objects of faith. Reason cannot oblige us to receive, said Kant, more than reason can prove. But what mere Speculative Reason cannot oblige us to receive, the Moral and

Spiritual within us may. This is the doctrine of the *Aids to Reflection*; I believe that my Father, in his latter years, added something to it, on the subject of Ideas, which will appear, I trust, hereafter.

The question *for us* is not, did Kant himself accept the outward Revelation, but does his teaching overthrow or does it establish the religion of the heart and conscience? If it establishes the law written in the heart it will assuredly strengthen the outward Revelation, when rightly used. There are some who say, that God and Christ and Law and Nature and Scripture have all placed religion on the rock of external evidence. The larger and stronger this rock can be made to appear so much the better. To rest the whole structure of the faith upon it my Father ever held to be a most venturous and blind proceeding. He held that beneath this rock there is a broad and deep foundation, out of which the rock grows and with which it coheres as one,—that this foundation was laid by the Creator himself—that His voice, both as it speaks in the heart and reasonable mind, and as it is uttered in the Written Word, refers us to internal evidence as the only satisfying and adequate evidence of religion;—that on this foundation, the accordance of the Bible with our spiritual wants and aspirations, the internal coherency of the whole scheme of Revelation within itself to the eye of Reason and the Spirit, Christianity ever has been and ever must be supported and maintained. They who term external evidence *the rock* of the Faith, its only *secure* foundation, never scruple to adopt from those whom they condemn as Rationalists, because they hold the internal evidence indispensable, thoughts and sentiments which they, with their professions, have but little right to. They make themselves

fine with borrowed plumes, and talk of spiritual ideas, instincts, needs, aptitudes, preconfigurations of the soul to religion and correspondences of the heart and spirit to doctrine.⁷¹ They say that religion is to be known by its fruits, the nobleness, the blessedness, the inward peace and beauty that it produces. Now if these deep ideas, these harmonies of the human spirit with objects of faith, presented by the Written Word and Tradition, exist, must not *they* be the rock that underlies the structure of external evidence and substantiates it? Can we think that it is in the power of any appearance to the outward sense, any vision or voice, to *implant* the ideas of God or of any spiritual reality? Can these outward signs do more than excite it? Maintainers of external evidence, as *the rock* of the faith, insist that religion must first be proved historically, and then brought home to the heart by its internal merits. It never can be proved historically unless, as a whole, it be ideally true, and if the power of ideas

⁷¹ Mr. Allies in his *Church of England cleared from the charge of Schism*, and Mr. Archer Butler in his *Letters on Mr. Newman's Essay on Development*, have treated in a searching and masterly way certain portions of the external evidence against Romanism in defence of our church. A man who clearly and learnedly sets forth historical records must throw light on the truth; but no good is done to the cause of religion by those declaimers, who exalt outward evidence without bringing it forward, and condemn the demand for internal evidence while they are presupposing the need and existence of it in their whole argument; who look one way and row another; who rave at Rationalism while they are picking her pocket, and jumble together whatever is most specious in different systems, without regard to consistency. This kind of writing pleases the mob of the would-be orthodox—the *Majoritarians*; but it is of no service to religion.

within us shew it to be such, this must be the deepest and only sufficient proof of its reality. To say that Reason and the Moral Sense may speak, but only after outward evidence has been given to the Understanding, is to annul the very being of Reason. For that is a spiritual eye analogous to the bodily one. What should we say of an eye that could not be sure whether a particular object was black or blue, round or square, till it was declared to be so by authority? Should we not say that it had no power of sight at all? Let the maintainers of external evidence and historical proof guard this rock and make as much of it as they may; but let them not cry out angrily against those who seek to probe and examine it; for assuredly if it will not bear the hammers of all the Inquisitors in Christendom it is no true granite but crumbly sandstone. Doubtless religion, as far as it is outward history, and involves facts and events, must be outwardly proved and attested: but how insignificant would be the mere historical and outward part of religion, how unmeaning and empty, if it were not *filled* and quickened by spiritual ideas, which no outward evidence can prove; which must be *seen* by the eyes of the spirit within us; must be embraced by the will, not blindly and passively received! Mr. Archer Butler, in his *Letters on Development*, observes: "A man who should affect to discard all revealed testimonies, and to prove the divinity of Christ or the Doctrine of the Trinity exclusively by internal reason, would be a rationalist, though his conclusion be not a negative, but a most positive dogmatic truth." Here the misemployment of reason, in which the formal nature of rationalism had just been declared to consist,⁷²

⁷² "The formal nature of rationalism is the undue employment

cxlii *Indispensability of Internal Evidence.*

is assumed, and we are told that rationalism is the discarding revealed testimonies and trusting solely to the internal; and indeed the term is constantly applied in a manner that begs the question,—applied to those who insist upon the paramount necessity of internal evidence in the things of religion. Certainly he who should *discard* all external testimonies of the Gospel Revelation, would be irrational and ungrateful to God who has given them; but the endeavour to shew, that by the light within us alone we may perceive their truth, is no misemployment of reason or evasion of the obedience of faith. Faithless far rather are they, who mistrust internal evidence and seek preferably the external; how must they want the spiritual mind, which *sees* what it believes and *knows* in what it is trusting! The question is this, Can external tes-

of reason in the things of religion, with a view to evade in some way the simplicity of the obedience of faith." Rationalism in one of the *Tracts for the Times* was called "asking for reasons out of place." According to these definitions rationalism is as general a term as impiety or presumption, with which indeed it is commonly identified. Now I think, that a man can be guilty of this error only in this way; he may ask for a *kind* of reasons in spiritual matters, which are inappropriate to such matters; he may ask for positive logical proof of spiritual verities, or outward evidence of that to which the spirit within can alone bear witness; but I believe, first that there is no religious article for the reception of which we are not bound to give a sufficient reason; secondly that sufficient reason for the reception of any religious article can never be found extrinsically; that its *internal* character, tried by the religious faculties given us by our Maker, ought to determine its acceptance or rejection. Leibnitz' *Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison*, contains a very clear view of this subject, as far as it goes. He maintains that the Fathers never simply rejected reason as modern teachers have done, both in the High Church and Puritan Schools, s. 51.

timony by itself or principally and primarily prove the truth of revelation? The "rationalism" of my Father assigns to outward testimony and internal evidence independent functions in the instruction of man; he conceived that the former must prove religious truth, so far as it is historical and logical; the latter must evidence it, so far as it is spiritual and ideal. Outward evidence can apply only to the outward event or appearance, and this, apart from the ideas of which it is the symbol, could never constitute an article of religion. The only office of external testimony with respect to the spiritual substance of the faith, in my Father's view, was that of exciting and evolving the ideas, which are the sole sufficient evidence of it,—at once the ground that supports it and the matter of which it is formed. The Incarnation and Atonement he believed to be both spiritual facts, eternal and incomprehensible, and also events that came to pass in the outward world of Time; he believed therefore, that in the proof of both, external and internal evidence must work together, but that the work of the last is the deeper and more essential. Before the publication of the Gospel no man could have discovered that the Son of God was to come in the flesh; nevertheless it is reason and the spirit that has, in one sense, *shewn* to men those deep truths of religion, the Redemption of mankind, the Divinity of the Redeemer, and the Tri-unity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Outward appearances have led men to the knowledge of them, but the recognition itself, which constitutes saving faith, is from within. To this *rationalism* Professor Butler himself draws very nigh when he says, that "the fundamental error" (of Mr. N.'s whole Development system,) "consists in this very thing,

that it conceives Christianity is to be investigated as a mere succession of historical events in order to determine faith." "This," he says, "is to confound the knowledge of Church history as a succession of events, with the knowledge of Christianity as a Rule of Duty: to confound Christianity as a mixed earthly Reality with Christianity as a pure heavenly Ideal." Can we attain the knowledge of a pure heavenly Ideal, or a Rule of Duty, by outward attestation? Is it not the law written in the heart that interprets and substantiates the teaching of the Scriptures?—and if the divinity of the Bible did not shine forth by its own light, could the belief of a certain number of persons, that it was the Word of God, have imposed it upon the world and sustained it in credit from age to age? This error of substituting historical for internal evidence runs through the whole Antiquarian theory of faith; that theory proposes to establish all religious doctrines by the former alone or chiefly, whereas but for the latter, the structure of external evidence would fall into a shapeless heap, as a brick wall would do if all the mortar were withdrawn. I will conclude this subject by referring the reader to a passage on the relations of evidence *a posteriori* and *a priori* in the notes to the First *Lay Sermon*, *Appendix E.* pp. 293-4; and requesting that it may be read in connection with the statement of belief on the evidences of Christianity contained in the last chapter of Vol. II. of this work. The whole is too long to quote, but this is a part of it:

“In each article of faith embraced on conviction, the mind determines, first intuitively, on its logical possibility; secondly discursively, on its analogy to doctrines already believed, as well as on its corres-

pondence to the wants and faculties of our nature ; and thirdly, historically, on the direct and indirect evidences. But the probability of an event is a part of its historic evidence, and constitutes its presumptive proof, or the evidence *a priori*. Now as the degree of evidence *a posteriori*, requisite in order to a satisfactory proof of the actual occurrence of any fact, stands in an inverse ratio to the strength or weakness of the evidence *a priori*, (that is, a fact probable in itself may be believed on slight testimony), it is manifest that of the three factors, by which the mind is determined to the admission or rejection of the point in question, the last, the historical, must be greatly influenced by the second, analogy, and that both depend on the first, logical congruity, not indeed, as their cause or preconstituent, but as their indispensable condition ; so that the very inquiry concerning them is preposterous, (σόφισμα τοῦ ὑστέρου προτέρου) as long as the first remains undetermined.”⁷³

Lest what has been said on my Father's view of the Atonement should be misconstrued, I would say a few words more upon that point. It is too common, I fear, to confound a denial, that the language in which “the nature and extent of the consequences and effects of the Redemptive act” is described in Scripture, ought to be literally understood, with a denial that these terms stand for a real act on God's part. Thus they who mean only to deny, that “*the essential character* of the causative act of Redemption can be exactly defined by the metaphors used in Scripture to describe its effects

⁷³ Mr. Newman's Presumptive character of the Proof, in his *Essay on Developement*, p. 131. coincides, as far as it goes, with my Father's positions in the above passage.

and consequences, are spoken of as if they had denied the *causative act itself*,—the remonstrance of those who humbly but firmly maintain that, this act being truly transcendent and mysterious, it can be known to us only in and through these effects and consequences; that the human conceptions in which the Sacred Writers present it to us do but shadow it forth, not properly express it; that we are not bound to receive as Gospel all that divines have laid down respecting the vindictive justice of God, of this *justice* being satisfied by a substitution of the sufferings of the innocent for those of the guilty, and of the divine wrath being transferred from the sinful to the sinless,—that “change of purpose” cannot be *properly* predicated of the eternal, omniscient, omnipotent God, any more than *arms* or *wings* or *bowels of mercy*, is strangely supposed to imply a notion, that Atonement is true only in a subjective sense, that instead of Redemption having been wrought for us by the act of God and our Saviour Christ, only the phantom of such a thing is made to play before our eyes,—a scenic representation of it set forth upon the theatre of Holy Writ in order to produce certain effects on the souls of spectators! For proof that the two views are wholly distinct and that the latter was foreign to the mind of Coleridge, I refer readers to the *Aids to Reflection*.⁷⁴

I believe too that it is foreign to other minds to which it has been imputed, “Thus Christ is emphatically said to be our Atonement; not that we may attribute to God any change of purpose towards man by what Christ has done; but that *we may know* that we have

⁷⁴ *On Spiritual Religion*. Comment on Aphorism, xix. p. 241, edit. 4, vol. 1, p. 248, edit. 5.

passed from the death of sin to the life of righteousness by him; and that our hearts may not condemn us." This passage has often been cited to fix a charge of deepest heterodoxy upon the writer, a living divine. It is conceived to contain a denial of the Atonement in any but a subjective sense, although it affirms that by *what Christ has done* we have passed from the death of sin to the life of righteousness; but further, that this mystery has been presented to us under a certain figure, in order that we may judge rightly of its effects and consequences for them that believe. Thus to speak and think is, in the apprehensions of some, to deny Redemption objectively considered! To believe that *by what Christ has done we have passed from death unto life* is nothing,—a mere shadow of faith, unless we are ready to say also, that the eternal Redemption, fore-ordained before the foundation of the world,⁷⁵ actually produced a *change* in the mind of Him who willed it, the Eternal, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning!—that after a manifestation made in these last times the *designs* of the Infinite were altered, and He began to consider that pardonable which before he had considered unpardonable. What has this latter doctrine beyond the former, save a contradiction? Can we ascribe *change of purpose*, in the literal sense, to the omniscient God without contradicting the very idea of a God? We might indeed believe that a something, veiled not revealed by those words, is true, had we assurance to that effect; but this would not be what seems to be contended for,

⁷⁵ See 1 Peter, i. 20. *Who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these last times for you.*

cxlviii *Spirituality of his Scheme of Faith.*

namely an admission, that they are true in the literal sense. I suppose there is no Christian who doubts that the mystery of Redemption has more in it than man can fathom. When I see how some men impregnate the writings of others with the products of their own swarming brains, supposititious heresies, felonies, fantasies, fooleries, false philosophies, demoniacal doctrines and so forth, I often recall a couplet of Dryden's respecting perversions of the Bible:—

The fly-blown text conceives an alien brood,
And turns to maggots what was meant for food.⁷⁶

I would fain learn of those, who look upon my Father's scheme of faith as something less satisfactory to a religious mind than that which they have embraced, if they can point out any important moral truth, any great spiritual idea, any soul-sustaining belief, any doctrine unquestionably necessary or highly helpful to the support and safety of the Christian faith, which was rejected or unrecognised by him. Can they shew that his "rationalizing," as some designate the efforts he made to free the minds of Christians from schemes of doctrine, which seemed to him "absolutely irrational," and therefore derogatory to God and injurious to man, excluded him from participating in any practical results, that can be deemed favourable to a pure, deep, earnest Christianity. If they are unable to do this, and neither on the doctrine of the Church, of Original Sin, of the Inspiration of Scripture, of Sacraments, of Justification, as far as I am aware, has any opponent of his Christian philosophy hitherto even attempted to shew that his conceptions were not as pregnant

⁷⁶ *Religio Laici.* This pungent couplet was pointed out to me, some years ago, by my friend, Mr. H. C. Robinson.

and spiritual, as deeply pervaded with the sense of the relations betwixt the creature and the Creator as those to which they adhere; instead of asserting that his creed is less pious and religious than their own, they should try to prove that it is less reasonable and stands upon a less secure foundation. When they have shewn this they will have inclusively proved, that, whatever spiritual ideas *he* may have possessed, his *system* did not properly contain them. But such a proof can only be furnished by strict logical processes; there can be no short cut to it by assumption, or representations concerning his state of mind, and the influences upon it, calculated to lessen the value of his testimony.

I cannot quit the subject of my Father's competency for the investigation of religious questions, without noticing another suggestion which has been thrown out on this same point, and which, from its partial truth, seems likely to confirm or convey what is very far from true. It has been observed that Coleridge was given to contemplation rather than to action, and that he even resembled Hamlet in carrying to excess the habit of abstracting. But religious doctrine is to be tried by its capability of practical application, its relation to appointed ends, and hence the speculative mind is ill qualified to judge truly on a subject of this nature; instead of acquiescing in a sound and pious creed, persons of such a character are apt to prefer a shallow, unsubstantial and fantastic one, framed by their limited understanding and human imagination. The following is part of a passage once applied to my Father in a striking article in the Quarterly Review. "When a religious creed is presented, say to a disputatious and subtle mind, in which the action of the critical

cl *His Belief that the Evidence of Religion*

faculty overbears and absorbs all other energies, that faculty regards the creed proposed polemically, considers it with reference to logical and technical precision, and not in respect to its moral characteristics and tendencies, and wastes upon this theoretic handling of sacred themes all the sedulity which ought to be employed in seeking to give effect to the proffered means of spiritual amelioration." ⁷⁷

All this may be true enough of the mere intellectualist; but who that was well acquainted with Coleridge, as an author or as a man, could suppose that such was his character, or speak of views like his as the product of understanding unirradiated by reason, and fancy uninspired by the spiritual sense? Of all men in the present age he was among the first and ever among the most earnest to maintain, that "religion must have a moral origin, so far at least that the evidence of its doctrines cannot, like the truths of abstract science, be wholly independent of the will:" ⁷⁸ that religion is designed to improve the nature and faculties of man, and that every part of religion is to be judged by its relation to this main end." ⁷⁹ These maxims he insisted on during his whole course as a religious writer; they plainly had a deep hold on his mind, and were uttered by him, not with the lip only, as if learned from others, but as if they had indeed been drawn from "the fountain-head of genuine self-research." If he then tried a religious creed "with reference to logical and technical precision, and *not in respect to its moral*

⁷⁷ See the Quarterly Review for December, 1841, pp. 11-12. The passage is from Mr. Gladstone's "*Church Principles considered in their results*," p. 68.

⁷⁸ *Biog. Literaria*, vol. i. pp. 206-7.

⁷⁹ *Aids to Reflection*, p. 138. edit. 5.

characteristics and tendencies," how strangely must he have deserted a principle which his own experience had established!—how unaccountably shut his eyes to the light of a "safety lamp,"⁸⁰ which his own hands had hung up for the guidance of others! Let any candid reader consult on this subject the *Aids to Reflection*, especially that portion in which the author maintains, that revealed truths are to be judged of by us, as far as they are grounds of practice, or in some way connected with our moral and spiritual interests,"—that "the life, the substance, the hope, the love, in one word, the faith,—these are derivatives from the practical, moral and spiritual nature and being of man;" and then ask himself whether he who wrote thus could be capable of falling into the error described above. And again let him see whether he can cite a single passage from his writings in which he appears to be trying a creed according to logical precision alone, without regard to its deeper bearings. So far from being apt to consider articles of belief exclusively in their intellectual aspect, in his departures from received orthodoxy he was chiefly influenced by moral considerations, by his sense of the discrepancy betwixt the tenet, in its ordinary form, and the teachings of conscience,—his conviction that the doctrine, as commonly understood, either meant nothing or something which opposed the spiritual sense and practical reason.⁸¹

⁸⁰ See the *Aids to Reflection* on Spiritual Religion. Comment on Aph. II. p. 124, edit 4. p. 127, edit. 5.

⁸¹ The interesting Article on Development in the *Christ. Remembrancer* for January, which has just come into my hands, and in which I find a confirmation of some remarks of mine, in this Introduction, on the Romish doctrine of the Eucharist, contains the following sentences, which I take the liberty to

The *mere intellectualists*, who try divine things by human measures, had in my Father a life-long opponent. Why then is a charge of mere intellectualism brought against himself? Is it because he resisted the insidious sophism which splits the complex being of man; separates the moral in his nature from the ra-

quote for the sake of explaining more clearly my Father's mode of thought on the relation of divine truth to the mind of man: "Our ideas on mysterious subjects are necessarily superficial; they are intellectually paper-ideas; they will not stand examination; they vanish into darkness if we try to analyze them. A child, on reading in fairy tales about magical conversions and metamorphoses, has most simple definite *ideas* instantly of things, of which the reality is purely unintelligible. His ideas are paper ones; a philosopher may tell him that he cannot have them really, because they issue, when pursued, in something self-contradictory and absurd; that he is mistaken and only thinks he has them; but the child has them, such as they are, and they are powerful ones, and mean something real at the bottom. Our ideas, in the region of religious mystery, have this childish character; the early Church had such. It held a simple, superficial, childlike idea of an absolute conversion of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood; and with this idea, as with an hieroglyphic emblem of some mysterious and awful reality, it stopped short," pp. 135-6. Our ideas on the supersensual and spiritual are without the sphere of the understanding, the forms of which are adapted to a world of sense, though it is by the mediation of the understanding alone, by its "hieroglyphic emblems," that we can take any cognizance of them or bring them into the light of consciousness: still to describe these ideas as "superficial," and as merely indicating "some mysterious and awful reality," appears to be scarcely doing them justice. There is indeed a background of mere mystery and undefined reality in all our religious beliefs; *exeunt omnes in mysterium*; but they have a foreground too, a substance apprehensible by faith, visible to the eye of reason and the spirit, as truly and actually as the things of sense are perceptible by our senses. A vague belief that *something*, referred to

Definiteness of Religious Conceptions. ciii

tional, the spiritual from conscience and reason; thrusts aside the understanding from its necessary office of organizing and evolving the whole mind, and thus brings half truth and confusion into every department of thought? Did he shew himself unspiritual in declaring that superstition is not, as some will have it,

by the words "conversion of bread and wine into the Body and Blood," is a religious reality,—can this be dignified with the name of an *Idea*? What can verify or attest the truth of a vague spiritual *Something*? What spiritual benefit can such vague belief confer upon our spirits? If religious ideas are vague and superficial, what ideas are positive and profound? Again, is it true that the ideas of children and of the early Church were of this description? I more than doubt that. A child who reads of magical metamorphoses has very *definite* conceptions before his mind, and so had the early Church in regard to the Eucharist. The early Fathers seem to have held, that the consecrated elements became the material body and blood of Christ; that, his body being immortal, to feed upon it immortalized our bodies, even as his Word and Spirit gave eternal life to our souls; that by miracle the divine Body and Blood were multiplied as the loaves and fishes had been, and retained the *phenomena* of bread and wine. This ancient sensuous notion of the Real Presence is definite enough; and equally definite is the modern spiritual notion, that by the Body and Blood we are to understand the life-giving power and influence of the Redeemer upon our whole being, body and soul, and that this power of eternal life is conveyed to us in an especial manner when we receive the appointed symbols in faith. The sensuous tenet has been exchanged for the spiritual doctrine because that sensuous tenet was no mere mystery but a plain absurdity,—a poor, weak, grovelling, shallow conception. Yet this low conception preserved the substantial truth; it was a cocoon in which the spiritual idea was contained, as in a tomb-cradle, buried, yet kept alive. The spiritual ideas contained in the doctrine of the Eucharist, and the intellectual statement of the doctrine, are of course different things; the former ought to be positive and certain,—the latter intelligible and distinct.

a debased form of *faith*, but a disguised infidelity, since men become superstitious inasmuch as they are “sensuous and dark, slaves by their own compulsion ;” or heartless because he refused to establish faith on feeling and fancy, apart from reflection, and to adopt the slavish maxim, that forms of doctrine, which have been associated with religious ideas are to be received implicitly,—are not to be examined whether they stifle the truth or convey it rightly? No! it is not from a strict and careful examination of his *writings* that these notions have arisen, but from a partial view of his *life* and its bearing upon his character. It has been thought that he led too exclusively a life of contemplation to be thoroughly well qualified for a moral preceptor, that he dwelt too much on the speculative side of philosophy to have, in fullest measure, a true philosopher’s wisdom. It has been affirmed that he dealt with “thoughts untried in action, unverified by application, mere exercises of the thinking faculty revolving into itself:” that he “lived a life of thinking for thinking’s sake.” I cannot admit that this is true. Whether or no it would have been better for Mr. Coleridge’s own mind and character had he exercised a regular profession, and been less withdrawn from family cares, it is not for me to determine: but this I can affirm, that to represent him as having spent a life of inaction, or of thinking without reference to practical ends, is an injustice both to him and to the products of his mind. To write and to think were his chief business in life; contemplation was the calling to which his Maker called him; but to *think merely for thinking’s sake*,—merely for the excitement and pastime of the game, is no man’s calling; it is an occupation utterly unworthy of a rational and immortal being.

Whether or no he deserves such a judgment let men determine by a careful survey of his writings ; in connection with all those studies which are necessary in order to make them understood ; let them pronounce upon his character afterwards ; perhaps they will see it with different eyes, and with clearer ones when they have finished the course. I cannot of course attempt here to vindicate his claim to some " gift of genuine insight," as an ethical writer ; but in reference to the remarks lately cited I ask, of what sort are the thoughts dealt with in *The Friend*, the *Aids to Reflection*, the *Lay Sermons*, the *Church and State*, the *Literary Remains*? May it not be said that, of the thoughts they contain, one large class, that relating to politics, cannot, by their nature, " issue out of acts,"—out of the particular acts of an individual life,—or be tried and applied in action by the individual who treats of them, though they *tend* to acts and are to have practical consequences ; seeing that they relate to national movements, interests of bodies, dealings of communities ; while another still larger class, which concern the moral and spiritual being of man, are capable of being tried and verified in the life of every Christian, whether he be given to outward action, or whether activities of an inward character, have been his chief occupation upon earth? To deny their author *this* practical knowledge and experience would be a satire on his personal character rather than a review of his philosophic mind. All the poetry, all the poetical criticism which my Father produced has a practical end ; for poetry is a visible creation, the final aim of which is to benefit man by means of delight. As for his moral and religious writings, if practical wisdom is not in them, they are empty indeed, for their whole aim is

practical usefulness—the regulation of action, the actions of the heart and mind with their appropriate manifestations—the furtherance of man's well being here and hereafter. This remark, that my Father lived a life of thinking for thinking's sake is either the severest of judgments, more severe than his worst and most prejudiced enemies ever passed on him in the heat of conflict, or it is no censure at all, but rather a commendation; inasmuch as the soul is better than the body and mental activity nobler than corporeal.

It may interest the reader to see in conclusion, Mr. Coleridge's own opinion of an excessive *practicality*, or what is commonly so called, for the term is commonly, though I believe incorrectly, applied to a mere *outward* activity.⁸² Thus he spoke of an excellent

⁸² Men who are given to outward action think all else idleness or worse, while men of thought can estimate *their* usefulness and do them honour, when they are consistent and at one with themselves. But thought is the *active business* of a certain part of mankind. Literary men and teachers who affect to be men of the world and unite a great deal of ordinary *practicality* with their peculiar vocation, are apt to become low in their aims and superficial in execution. A poet is, in my opinion, far better employed in perfecting an ode, if it be worth writing at all, or conforming a drama to the rules of art, than in directing a farm or regulating a railway or arranging a public spectacle. If his poetry is what poetry ought to be, it is worth the devotion of all his time and energies, save what are required for the charities of life, or for procuring the means of subsistence.

The article in the *Quarterly*, referred to above, speaks so well and powerfully of Mr. Wordsworth, that I the more regret its containing anything calculated to strengthen misunderstandings in regard to my Father. They who best understand the Poet and Philosopher best understand the Philosophic Poet his Friend. Let them not be contrasted, but set side by side to throw light and lustre upon each other.

man, whom he deeply honoured and loved, to his friend Mr. Stutfield :

“ I was at first much amused with your clever account of our old and valued Friend’s occupations—but after a genial laugh, I read it again and was affected by its truth, and by the judicious view you have taken. My poetical predilections have not, I trust, indisposed me to value utility, or to reverence the benevolence, which leads a man of superiour talents to devote himself to the furtherance of the Useful, however coarse or homely a form it may wear, provided, I am convinced that it is, first, actually useful in itself, and secondly, comparatively so, in reference to the objects on which he would or might otherwise employ himself. It seems to me impossible but that this incessant bustle about little things, and earnestness in the removal of stupid impediments, with the irritations arising out of them, must have an undesirable effect on any mind constituted for nobler aims ;—and this unquiet routine is, in my judgment, the very contrary to what I should deem a salutary alterative to the qualities in our friend’s nature, of which the peccant excess is most to be apprehended. It is really grievous, that with a man of such a head and such a heart, of such varied information and in easy circumstances too, the miracle of Aaron should be reversed, a swarm of little snakes eat up the great one, the sacred serpent, symbol of intellect, dedicated to the God of Healing. I could not help thinking, when I last saw him, that he looked more aged than the interval between that and his former visit could account for.”

Mr. Coleridge's "Remarks on the present mode of conducting Public Journals."

THERE is one other subject, on which, after going through the present work in order to finish preparing it for the press, I have found it necessary to give some explanation. Throughout this edition I have abstained from interference with the *text*, as far as the *sense* was concerned, though the changes wrought in the course of thirty years would probably have led the author to make many alterations in it himself, had he republished the work at all in its present form. In one or two sentences only I have altered or removed a few words affecting the *import* of them, in order to do away with unquestionable mistakes respecting literary facts of slight importance. But from the end of the last chapter of the critique on Mr. Wordsworth's poetry I have withdrawn a paragraph concerning the detractors from his merits—the mode in which they carried on their critical warfare against him and some others—for the same reason which led the late editor to suppress a note on the subject in Vol. I.—namely this; that as those passages contain *personal* remarks, right or wrong, they were anomalies in my Father's writings, unworthy of them and of him, and such as I feel sure he would not himself have reprinted. This reason indeed is so obvious, that no explanation or comment on the subject would have been given, if I had not been told that Lord Jeffrey had of late years republished his reply to those remarks of Mr. Coleridge; this makes me feel it proper to say, that I suppress the passages in question, and should have done

from the present Edition of this Work. clix

so if no contradiction had been offered to them, simply because they are personal, and now also because I believe that some parts of them, conveying details of fact, are inaccurate as to the letter; but at the same time with an assurance that in *spirit* they are just and true. They may be inaccurate in the letter: the speeches referred to may never have been uttered just as they were told to my Father and repeated by him; Mr. Jeffrey's language to himself he may not have recalled correctly; and I am quite willing to allow that in the way of hospitality he received more than he gave, the fact of *apparent cordiality*, however, being equally attested whether Mr. Jeffrey asked Mr. Coleridge to dinner or received a similar invitation from him. By the mention of these particulars my Father injured, as I think, a good cause; a volume of such anecdotes, true or false, would never have convinced men of the party which he had opposed, or brought them to confess, that the criticisms of the E. Review were in great measure dictated by party spirit; to men not of the party, who should take the trouble of referring to them, I have little doubt, that this would be apparent on the face of those writings themselves,—from the manner and from the matter of them. I must repeat, that I believe the suppressed passages to be neither mistaken nor untruthful as to their *main drift*, which I understand to be *this*: that the E. Reviewers expressed a degree of *contempt* for the poetical productions of their opponents in politics, which it is scarcely conceivable that they could have really felt, or would have felt had politics been out of the question—more especially with regard to the poems of Mr. Wordsworth, that they imputed a character to them, and as far as in them lay, stamped that character upon them to the eye of the

public, which those productions never could have borne to the mind of any unprejudiced, careful, and competent critic—indeed such characters at once of utter imbecility and striking eccentricity as appear at first sight to be the coinage of an ingenious brain, rather than the genuine impression which any actual body of poetry could make upon any human mind, that was not itself either imbecile or highly eccentric. This charge was, indeed, not capable of a precise proof, and Mr. C. acted with his usual incaution in openly declaring what he felt quite certain of but could not regularly demonstrate. Whether or no he had good reason to feel this certainty—waiving his personal recollections, even those that have not been denied—I willingly leave to the judgment of all who are capable of comparing the critiques in question with the poems of Mr. Wordsworth, and with the general estimate of them in the minds of thoughtful readers and lovers of poetry in general, from the time when the *Lyrical Ballads* first appeared till the present day. There was doubtless a *petitio principii* on Mr. Coleridge's part in this dispute; he assumed the merits of his friend's poetry; for though this was a point which he often sought to prove, by shewing that, taken at large, it treated of the most important and affecting themes that can interest the heart of man, and, for the most part, in a manner that would stand the test of any poetical rule or principle that could be applied to it, and this without contradiction from any one meeting him on his own ground, not merely baffling him by rude, reasonless irony, and boisterous banter—those heavy blunt weapons of disputants who abound more in scorn than in wisdom,—still questions of poetical merit are so fine and complex, that they can hardly be decided

altogether by rule, but must be determined, as spiritual matters are to be determined, by specific results and experiences, which are, in this case, the effects produced on the poetic mind of the community. Before this proof was complete he in some sort assumed the point at issue;—he knew the critic to be possessed of superiour sense and talent, and he felt sure that though it might be possible for a man of good understanding and cultivated taste not to love and admire the poetry of Mr. Wordsworth, it was almost morally impossible that the great body of it could appear to such a person as it was presented in the pages of *The Ed. Review*,—a thing to be yawned or hissed off the stage at once and for ever.—Such strains of verse as *Tintern Abbey, The Old Cumberland Beggar, Address to my infant Daughter, Boy of Wynander-mere, Lines left upon a Yew-tree seat, Character of the Happy Warriour*;—such poems as the *Ode to Duty, Evening Walk, Rob Roy's Grave, Highland Girl, Yarrow revisited, Ruth, Landamin, The Brothers, Female Vagrant, Forsaken Indian Woman*,¹

¹ This *Complaint* of the perishing mother may be compared with Schiller's admired *Nadowessische Todtenklage*; but I think that both in poetry and in pathos the English poem strikes a far deeper note. The anguish of a bereaved mother's heart no other poet, I think, has ever so powerfully pourtrayed as Mr. Wordsworth.

Warmly as I admire the poetry of Keats I can imagine, that an intelligent man might read the *Endymion* with care, yet think that it was not genuine poetry; that it shewed a sheer misuse of abundant fancy and rhythmical power. For its range is narrow; like the artificial comedy it has a world of its own, and this world is most harmonious within itself, made up of light rich materials; but it is not deep enough or wide enough to furnish satisfaction for the general heart and mind. The passion of love excited by

clxii *Treatment of Mr. Wordsworth's Poetry*

The two April Mornings, The Fountain, Yew-trees, Nutting, Peel Castle, 'Tis thought that some have died for love, Lines to H. M. ;—such sonnets as that Composed on Westminster Bridge, On the Eve of a Friend's Marriage, The World is too much with us, Milton ! thou shouldst be living at this hour, those four called *Personal Talk*, so frequently quoted—could any cultivated and intelligent man read these productions attentively without feeling that in them the author had shewn powers as a poet which entitled him at least to a certain respect and even deference? Is there anything very strange or startling in *these* compositions? Or are they flat and empty, with nothing in them—no freshness of thought or feeling? Seen through a fog the golden beaming sun looks like a dull orange or a red billiard ball ;—the fog that could rob these poems of all splendour must have been thick indeed ! I have not mentioned all the most admirable of Mr. Wordsworth's poems ; but those which a general acquaintance with poetry, and general sense of the poetical might enable any one to understand ; for we may understand and respect what we do not deeply enjoy. The multitude of laughers knew nothing of the Wordsworthian poetry but what they saw in the pages of the Review, through the Reviewer's tinted spectacles ; the Reviewer himself must have known it all, in its length and breadth. If he seriously avows that the pages of that Journal give a

beauty is the deepest thing it contains, and therefore, though its imagery is so richly varied, we have a sense of the monotonous in reading it long together. It is *toujours perdrix* or something still more dainty delicate, and we long for more solid diet, when we have had this fare for a little while. But if ever a poet addressed the common heart and universal reason it is Mr. Wordsworth.

correct view of his notion of Mr. Wordsworth's poetry, nothing more can be said than that it is a curious fact in the history of the human mind;—Mr. Coleridge could but judge by appearances, and I think he has not misrepresented *them*.

In regard to the review of the *Lay Sermon*, I am not surprised that the Editor saw nothing in it to disapprove; though few, I think, who, at this hour, standing without the charmed circle of party, perused that article, would fail to see, that it is not so much a critique of the *Sermon* as a personal pasquinade—(what are “caprice, indolence, vanity,” but *personal* charges?)—penned by one, who had scanned the author narrowly, in order to abuse him scientifically, and with a certain air of verisimilitude.³ He had enjoyed special opportunities of taking those observations, which he afterwards recurred to for such an ill purpose. My Father had received him, (at Stowey and, I believe, once again at Keswick), with frank hospitality under his own roof; had extolled his talents when others saw no lustre in the rough diamond; had furnished his mind with pregnant hints—intellectual seed, which, as the soil was very capable, bore, in due time, a harvest

³ This air of verisimilitude is less in that article than in the parent lampoon, (in Mr. Hazlitt's *Political Essays*), any distorted resemblance which the latter may be thought to contain, being frittered away, in the Edinboro' copy, by an evident desire that the portrait should be pure deformity. In the former Mr. Coleridge is described as “belonging to all parties,” and “of service to none.” This might be favourably interpreted; he who belongs to all parties at one and the same time, belongs to none in particular and can serve none in particular; but he may serve his country all the more. *This* feature was not copied; but the portion that follows, “he gives up his independence of mind,” in which there was no truth at all, was carefully transfused,—the spirit of it at least,—into the second portrait. Both

clxiv *Lord Jeffrey's own Representation*

of fruit for his own enrichment. I think *he* did not deny these obligations, even while he was privately expressing that personal pique and hostile feeling, which he vented to the public under cover of patriotism and concern for the people. Under cover, I say, without impugning his sincerity and earnestness in either; the former, the angry feeling against Mr. Coleridge, he made no secret of among his associates in general. Under the circumstances my Father was to be excused for supposing that this gentleman of "judgment and talents" had been *employed* to run down the *Lay Sermon* in the E. Review, on account of his known *talents* for satire, and the severe *judgments* he had already published on himself in particular; but, as this has been denied, I have withdrawn two expressions which contain the imputation; the passage concerning the satirist himself I have *not* thought fit to withdraw.

Mr. Jeffrey's demeanour at the Lakes in 1810 should never have been brought into this question; but from a natural wish to maintain the general truthfulness, if not the prudence and propriety, of my Father's lan-

contain the same insinuation respecting my Father's fundamental religious principles—the same attempt to cast them into suspicion with the unphilosophic world—upon which *I need make no remark*. At *that time* it may perhaps have brought some additional discredit upon his name, that he imputed catholicity to his mother church. "The Church of England, which he sometimes, by an hyperbole of affectation, affects to call the Catholic Church"—!!!

These things are said in the supposition that my Father was not wrong in believing the author of the critique in the E. R. and the writer of the two critiques in the Pol. Essays, to be the same person. Either they are identical, or the one is a close copyist of the other,—his spleen the same, only colder and more unrelenting.

guage on the subject, I cannot help saying, that Lord Jeffrey's own account of it serves quite as well as Mr. Coleridge's, to illustrate the difference,—I think I may say the discrepancy,—between the gentleman conducting himself kindly and courteously in social life, and the same gentleman performing his *duty* as a reviewer. My Father had undergone no essential change, in the interval, either as a poet, a politician, or a man, nor had he shewn any. *The Friend* was before the public. To pay compliments, even when they are no more than the genuine overflow of the soul, is a mark of complacency; but to have made efforts to “gratify” a gentleman under a notion that he “liked to receive compliments,” was a still greater exercise of politeness. The critique of *Christabel* did not seem quite symphonious with compliments paid to the poetic mind of him who was best known to the public as the author of *The Ancient Mariner*, a poem which, equally with that and on very similar grounds, deserved to be called a “mixture of raving and drivelling.”⁴ “I cheerfully

⁴ An article on Coleridge in the *Penny Cyclopædia*, which, together with some misstatements of fact, contains the Ed. Review opinions on my Father's merits as an author, to wit, that he had next to none at all, and seems to have been written by a disciple of the critic who pronounced *Christabel* worthless with the exception of one passage, after referring to what was pointed out on this subject by Mr. Dequincey, proceeds thus: “Of this habit,” (that of “trusting to others for suggestions which he improved, and for ideas which he elaborated,”) another instance is supplied by Alvar's dungeon soliloquy in the *Remorse* (Act. v. Scene 1.) the ideas, and, to a certain extent, the words of which are derived from Caleb's prison soliloquy in *Caleb Williams*.” Impressive writer in his own line as I knew Mr. Godwin to be, I was surprised to learn that he had written anything so *poetical* as Alvar's dungeon soliloquy. Anxious how-

acquit" the writer of any the least perception of merit in the poem ; although Scott and Byron, the most ad-

ever to give him his *due* I took up *Caleb Williams*, and for pleasure, as well as duty, read it all through for the second time in my life. I perused with special care the three powerful chapters in which Caleb describes his imprisonment ; I found that he dwells upon the "squalid solitude" of his forced abode, and Alvar mentions "friendless solitude ;" that he speaks of a "groan" uttered in sleep, and Alvar speaks of "groaning and tears ;" but with these exceptions I found neither the ideas nor the words of Alvar's soliloquy in *Caleb Williams*. My Father may possibly have been led to make the reflections and form the images of that soliloquy by Godwin's striking novel, as Thomson was led to write *The Seasons* by the perusal of Nature ; but he certainly did not borrow them ready-made therefrom. The closest resemblance to *Caleb Williams* that I can find in the *Remorse* is not in Act. v. but in Act. i. where Alvar says,

" My own life wearied me !

And but for the imperative voice within,

With mine own hand I had thrown off the burthen."

At the end of Chap. xi. Vol. ii. Caleb says, "I meditated suicide and ruminated, in the bitterness of my soul, upon the different means of escaping from the load of existence." Caleb is restrained from self-murder, not by "an imperative voice within," a voice which "calmed" while it "quelled ;" his words are, "still some inexplicable suggestion withheld my hand. I clung with desperate fondness to this shadow of existence, its mysterious attractions and its hopeless prospects." The three preceding pages are very fine in their way, but have nothing in common with the *Remorse* except of the most general description. Indeed unless my Father had been the first man that ever described imprisonment, he could not have avoided some general similarity with former describers.

The whole article I would recommend as a study to those who are desirous of acquiring the art of depreciation ; the principle of which rests on the force of contrast with a pretence of candour, and may be thus thrown into the form of a rule ; give the man praise *a minori* in order to take away all the

and their different ways of borrowing. clxvii

mired poets of the day, were known to have expressed admiration of it, he naturally preferred his own judg-

credit commonly given him *a majori*: exalt other men, in order to pull *him* down from his seat, although these other men would themselves be the first to replace him in it. The Cyclopædist denies my Father originality of mind on plausible grounds, perhaps, and yet, I think, on insufficient ones. The habit of obtaining from others "suggestions to improve" and "ideas to elaborate" may be almost called common to the *genus vatum*. Dante is esteemed a vigorous and original writer: yet it has been clearly shewn that the vision of the boy monk Alberico "served as a model for the entire edifice of his poem," and furnished him with some of his striking details.* Dante adopted everything in the *Vision* that he could turn to advantage, and left it to his commentators to make his acknowledgments to the youthful Visionary. Milton borrowed from all quarters, as may be seen in Todd's edition of his works. Tasso took wholesale from preceding Italian poets and from the Classics. Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard* contains scarcely a single image or sentiment that is entirely new, and in all his other poems he helps himself without scruple to the ideas and sometimes to the words of other poets. Shakespeare is full of borrowed pegs to hang his thoughts upon. Lord Byron declared that these charges of plagiarism against particular poets were a folly, since all poets are guilty of it. I think that almost all poets borrow a good deal in one way or another; but there is a difference in the mode of their borrowing; some take the thoughts and images of other writers and combine them with new matter; some take a great deal of what constitutes the substance and brilliancy of their compositions from historical or descriptive books in prose. Writers of a rich and ornate style borrow more than those of a severer cast: Byron borrowed far more from books than Crabbe, and Mr. Wordsworth has borrowed less, I believe, than any other great poet. Nature is

* See the Essay on this subject, extracted from an ancient manuscript, prefixed to Zotti's Dante, p. 19-42.

clxviii *Character of the Anti-Jacobin Poets*

ment; but I will take upon me to say, however true this may be, that no mere *poetical* demerits ever called forth such a vehement explosion of hisses as that with which *Christabel* was greeted in the E. Review; that the hisses were at the *author*, because his "daily prose" was "understood to be dedicated to the support of all

the book that he has studied the most. The Penny Cyclopædist has added nothing but a mare's nest to Mr. Dequincey's instances of borrowing in my Father, of which Mr. Dequincey himself thought so little, that in spite of them all, he "most heartily believed" my Father "as entirely original in all his capital pretensions, as any one man that ever has existed; as Archimedes in ancient days, or as Shakespeare in modern."

An author is to be judged, in respect of original power, by the total result of his productions. Is *the whole* a new thing, or is there *in the whole* a something new interfused? Can you find the like elsewhere? By this test my Father's writings must be tried, and perhaps they will be found to stand it better than those of many an author, who has carefully abstained from any formal or avoidable borrowing. That his are "the works of one who requires something from another whereon to hang whatever he may himself have to say," is just such a specious objection as the former. But it should be considered that every writer, in moral or religious disquisition, starts in fact from previous thought, whether he expressly produces it or not. In the *Aids to Reflection* and in the *Remains* my Father has given his thoughts in the form of comments on passages in the works of other men; and this he did, not from want of originality of mind, but from physical languor,—the want of continuous energy,—together with the exhaustive intensity, with which he entered into that particular portion of a subject to which his attention was directed. I do not believe, however, that the value of what he has left behind is so much impaired by its immethodical form as people at first sight imagine. The method and general plan of a literary work are often quite arbitrary, and sometimes, for the sake of preserving regularity of structure in the architecture of a book, a writer is obliged to say a great deal which is but introductory to that of his own which he has to impart.

in the Ed. Review of thirty years since. clxix
 that courtiers think should be supported :”⁵ what Mr. Coleridge endeavoured to support being first, *the war against the would-be invader and subjugator of his country* ; secondly, *the Church of England*. No matter for the “compliments ;” *now in 1847* ; no, nor the disparagements either ; “not of a pin ;”—as the tedious man says in *Measure for Measure*. I do not recur to them on their own account. Perhaps an editor may “lawfully” make himself pleasant to gentlemen whom afterwards he shall be obliged to expose as “whining and hypochondriacal poets” in his review : but it does seem rather a special, and somewhat pliant and elastic law, that can permit a gentleman to be sociable and friendly in his private behaviour toward persons, whom, some years afterwards, casting his eye back on their literary and political career, it will be his duty to stigmatize, not only as men of “inordinate vanity and habitual effeminacy,”—that is a trifle,—but—upon whose heads he is bound to pour that dark flood of politico-personal accusations which may be seen and analyzed at this day in pages 314-15 of vol. xxviii. of the *Ed. Review*.⁶ Utter disregard of consequences to the public,—vanity and effeminacy,—violence and vulgarity,—fantastic trickery,—a morbid appetite for infamy with an ardent love of corruption,—folly that reels with a sickening

⁵ *Ed. Review*, vol. xxvii. p. 67.

⁶ This fine specimen of a modern Philippic,—an Edinboro’, *Anti-Lakiad*,—is contained in the review of the *Literary Life* of August, 1817. I would wish any reader who has the opportunity, to compare it with the language, tone, and character of *Remarks on the present mode of conducting Critical Journals*, contained in the second volume of this work. The reviewer adds, “This is the true history of our reformed Anti-Jacobin poets, the life of one of whom is here recorded ;” and then takes

clxx *Literary Criticism made subservient*

motion from one absurdity to another,—adherence to notions that are audacious and insane, revolting and nonsensical,—entire want of charity, common sense, wisdom and humanity,—romantic servility,—heartless vice,—these are attributes of the *man*—they cannot be confined solely to the politician. We may charitably presume, indeed, that he who penned this tirade, (one stroke of which I have passed by as too “*rank*” for my pen,) never imagined that the characters he was blackening in effigy would look a single shade the darker to any one who beheld them as a neighbour of flesh and blood in actual life—the life of truth and reality; but is it not a strange state of things, when we must believe respecting an organ of public opinion, that it is not most unconscientious only because it is out of the domain of conscience altogether, and declaims upon virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, —*the* vice and folly of individuals—without any earnest feeling or belief on subjects, which demand the utmost earnestness and carefulness from all who think or speak of them? Thirty years ago many things were done by honourable men which honourable men would not do now, or would gain great dishonour by doing; money intended for the benefit of the Public, especially for making men living members of the Church and

up Mr. C. by himself again, still more in that style, which is described in the B. L., where it speaks of the critic losing himself in the *pasquillant*.

The readers of the E. R. of that day were not fond of subtleties or fine-drawn sketches; otherwise we might say of the writers:

Νήπιοι, οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἡμῖσιν πάντος.

Such *criticism* prevents the assailed from seeing their real faults, while it precludes others from any knowledge of their excellencies.

followers of Christ, public functionaries too often thought they might employ according to their own private fancies; and such a notion has even been acted on by men undoubtedly public-spirited and disinterested. A dimness of vision on the subject of duty prevailed among the servants of the public in general; and reviewers were not more clear-sighted than the rest; they thought themselves quite at liberty to make the public taste in literature subservient to their own purposes as members of a party; to choke up with rubbish and weeds the streams of Parnassus, if a political adversary might be annoyed thereby, though all parties alike had an interest in the water;—to bring the most sweeping and frightful charges against their opponents in general terms, whether they had or had not the slightest power to verify them in particulars. Against this system the *Biographia Literaria* contains a strong protest, a protest to which private feeling has given a piquancy, but which in the main it has not corrupted or falsified. I regret that my Father, in exposing what he held to be wrong methods of acting on the public mind, should have been betrayed into any degree of discomposure in his own; but I feel confident, that he would not have given way to indignation on these subjects, if he had not believed his cause to be the cause of the public also; that the things of which he complained were parts of a *system*, the offences of which against principle it was matter of principle to point out.

I have not brought forward these grounds of complaint out of any resentment against those who shewed so much against my Father, or,—(I say it for my own sake not as deeming it important to others,)—in any feeling of disrespect for their characters in the main. I make no doubt of their possessing all the wit, worth

and wisdom which their friends ascribe to them, and am better pleased to think that my Father was beset and hindered on his way by lions than by assailants of a more ignoble kind. I have recurred to those grounds of complaint in justification of the language used in this work on the "present mode of conducting public journals," and also to justify the children of Coleridge in republishing it, aware as we are, that it will have an interest and even an importance as a voice from the grave of one whom, now that he is removed from all eyes in this world, many desire to have heard and looked upon, which it had not when the author was still struggling through his earthly career. Some persons will say, that hostility which so little succeeded in its object of casting my Father's works into general contempt and oblivion, is unworthy of present regard. But there is a little anachronism in this. It is like saying, that because a few storms or an inclement season did not ruin a nascent colony, and years afterwards the colony is in a flourishing state, it was therefore of no consequence to the colonist and not worth mentioning in his history. The colony lives and blooms, like the baytree by the river-side, while the poor worn colonist moulders in the grave. What is literary reputation now to the author of *Christabel* and the *Lay Sermon*?⁷ Those works are read by many at this

⁷ My Father has observed, that an insignificant work was sometimes reviewed for the sake of attacking the author; on the other hand the more important works of obnoxious authors were often absolutely unnoticed. Some of his own were never reviewed in any leading journal; but *Christabel*, the *Lay Sermon*, and the *Biographia* were caught up and violently twisted into whipcord to lash him who had written them, and drive him if possible out of the temple.

time with as much pleasure as if they had never been declared worse than waste paper by the E. Review; they could not be slain by arrows of criticism if they had any vitality of their own; if they had it not, who would wish to give them a galvanized life—the only life which some productions ever have to sustain them—a mere emanation from the hot orb of party spirit? But he who wrote those works wanted a “little here below” ere he went hence and was no more seen: he wanted a little encouragement from friends, a little fair play from adversaries, a little sympathy, and a little money. That he wanted these things was at least a grievance, whether it was most the fault of others or chiefly his own. But I think it will be granted by impartial persons, that there was some fault and deficiency on this score in others; an honest argumentative review, if ever so severe, would have done my Father’s works good, had the reviewer strained every nerve to convict them of absurdity. But he was reviewed in a way not to expose his errors but to prevent people from attending to him at all; not to make him understood but to stamp upon him a character of hopeless unintelligibility; with an artful shew of contempt, and a sort of ridicule, that might have been employed with equal success upon Plato or upon Shakespeare. A searching criticism, even from a determined opponent, would have been to him like that *excellent oil* of reproof, concerning which the Psalmist says that it *breaks not the head* nor depresses it.⁸

A few words in conclusion on Mr. Coleridge’s “abuse of his contemporaries;” for on this score he

⁸ The same method of shooting at him from a distance and declining close fight is practised even now by writers of a newer

clxxiv *Mr. C.'s "Abuse of his Contemporaries"*

was assailed in the review of the *Biographia*, with a particular reference to his critique on *Bertram*; though without a syllable to shew that the censures it contained were unjust, or not rather a *service* to his contemporaries in general. This "abuse" was not, I think, of the same nature as that which he condemned in others. It was of two or three different kinds: the first, to which belong the Letters to Fox, Letters to Fletcher, strictures on Lord Grenville, character of Pitt, sketches of Buonaparte, consists in examinations of the public conduct and published opinions of eminent men under the light of principles; not a prejudging of their acts and opinions by supposed circumstances made to cast their colouring upon the former, as stained lamps dye the radiance of the flames they inclose; but an examination of the acts and opinions themselves, and only in due subordination to the former, if at all, a notice of *circumstances* which may have tended to produce their peculiar character.⁹

school, who dispose of him *en passant*, in their way to other objects of attack, by settling that he was certainly a man of some genius, and had a modicum of light to dispense, going before the torch-bearers of their party with his little fancy lamp in his hand; but that he is by no means a safe or sound writer; though where, how, and why, he is unsafe and unsound they are far too much in a hurry to state. They seem indeed to consider him not only unsafe, but so dangerous, that prudence requires them to keep a good way off; as if the poor old steed, though *uusound* and superannuated, might still give an uncomfortable kick, if you came too close to his heels.

⁹ The *Character of Pitt*, which I like the least of my Father's political writings, except certain passages against the same minister in his youthful *Conciones ad Populum*, the general drift of which, however, he has shewn to be strictly in consonance with all his later politics,—and in *these* passages it is the tone

and his Contemporaries' Abuse of him. clxxv

These treatises are chiefly composed of close reasoning and illustration; the censures they contain are expressed in stern and vehement, but not in coarse or bitter language; and they burst forth from a carefully constructed argument like strong keen flames from a well heaped funeral pile. If they quiver as they stream upward—those flames of censure—it is from a meditative emotion, not from the turbulence of a spirit agitated by personal or party rage. Could any specimen of “abuse” be extracted from his writings at all similar to that “true history of the Anti-Jacobin poets,” referred to above, in which three men of different characters and courses of life are put into a heap and conjointly accused of every turpitude which a politician can be guilty of, the language of the E. Review respecting his “abuse of his contemporaries” would so far not be unmerited. The strictures on that Journal in this work are also pieces of reasoning, and, when cleared from a few excrescences of personal

and language not the opinions that he would ever have wished to retract,—commences with an account of Mr. Pitt's education and its effect on the formation of his mind; “he was *cast*,” my Father says, “rather than grew.” But this is only a subordinate part of a general survey of his character as evinced in his public conduct. There is no attempt to characterize opinions *not under examination by conjectures* respecting the circumstances under which they may have been formed. The *Character* contains also a few sentences relating to Mr. Pitt's private life; but it should be remembered that some parts of a Prime Minister's private life, or what is private life in other cases, are necessarily before the public. My Father referred to tastes and habits of Mr. Pitt which were matters of notoriety. Still that passage is a blot in the essay, and I doubt not that, though interesting as a psychological analysis, the whole *Character* is too unmodified and severe.

anecdote and complaint, are not unworthy of a writer who ever strove to keep principle in view. Of the *Critique of Bertram* I have spoken elsewhere.

The second sort of "abuse" that he dealt in, and which it were to be wished that all men would refrain from, consisted in pointed remarks, made in private respecting private things and persons. Some of these were as strictly true as they were clever and rememberable; some were just in themselves, but sounded unjust as well as unkind, when repeated unaccompanied by what should have gone along with them to take off their edge, expressed or understood by the utterer. Some, I dare say, were not wholly just; few men are wise or just at all hours; my Father had *fits* of satirizing with a habit of praising. I have heard a friend of his and mine remark, that some men "talk their gall cleverly," while there are others, who will shew their cleverness though at the expense of being, for the moment, ill-natured. My Father's sharp speeches were not mere improvements of gall. But I do not defend them. Psychological analysis on the living individual subject is an operation that can with difficulty be kept within the bounds of Christian justice and charity; even if we have a right to cut the pound of flesh at all, how can we be sure of cutting it exactly? But *most* to be blamed are they who repeat these keen sayings,—treasuring up the darts which they have not the skill to forge,—and bring them to the ears of those very persons, who are least likely to see their truth and most liable to feel their sharpness,—the persons of whom they are said.

There is a third part of this subject, respecting which I refer the reader to an apology by Mr. C. himself, placed at the end of vol. i. of the *Poetical Works*;

I mean his flights of extravagant satire, the *real* objects of which existed no where but in the Limbo of wild imagination. These extravagancies of his early day, though I believe his own account of them to be strictly true—indeed can *see* the truth of it on the face of the productions themselves,—have given me great pain ; not for the vials of wrath that have been poured forth on occasion of them ; *they* were filled, I well knew, mainly from another cistern ;¹⁰ but because I see in these productions, though inspired by a petulant fancy rather than by an angry heart, the one stain upon the face of my Father's literary character. Yet though I deeply regret in regard to both, but by far the most in regard to one of them, that he should ever have

¹⁰ It is not my Father's rash sayings, but his conscientious and well weighed ones, his warm opposition to the "anti-national" policy, his free opinion of the philosophy of certain Northern schools,—his venturing to find fault with some of their Most Profound and Irrefragable Doctors—that ever has excited, and still does excite, the animosity of the Northern critics against him. His politics were a reproach, his philosophy a disparagement to theirs, and the B. L. added vinegar to the bitters of the cup. What my Father said of Hume in the *Lay Sermon*, p. 222, is styled by the E. Reviewer, (who puts on the Scotch mantle for the nonce,) "a mean and malignant fabrication," "a transition from cant to calumny," "a sting, the venom of which returned into his own bosom, to exhaust itself in a bloated passage," &c. Supposing the anecdote untrue, of which the reviewer gives no proof, (his calling it a fabrication of my Father's is a "gratuitous assertion" on his own part,) where was the deep *malignity* of ascribing to Hume at his *death* a sentiment undeniably consonant with the tenour of his *life*? The reviewer could not deny that he "devoted his life to undermining the Christian religion;" why then should he rage so at the second clause of the sentence, "expended his last breath in a blasphemous regret that he had not survived it?"

penned such pieces or suffered them to get abroad, I do *not* blame him for including them in his works when it was plain that they could not be suppressed. The wine was coarse and burning, but it was the same, however bad a sample, as that which glows in *Kubla Khan* and *The Ancient Mariner*, and no production, marked with a peculiar genius, if short and rememberable, will perish, though of small merit,—especially when other more considerable fruits of that

Was it more discreditable to *wish* Christianity extinct than to have deliberately endeavoured to destroy it? However if there be no authority for the anecdote reported in the *Lay Sermon*, a mark shall be set against it in future.

Mr. Coleridge's "ignorant petulance" on the subject of Hume's history has been amply confirmed by examiners on opposite sides in politics since the opinion was expressed. If that history be faulty at all, it is not superficially so but internally and radically—it is to a considerable extent virtually faithless and misleading; no one less cool, calm, and able than Hume *could* have given so misleading a representation of a certain most important part of English history. Like Hobbes, because he had no eye for a spiritual law, and because man must find firm ground to rest on somewhere, Hume rested his whole weight on human authority and kingship—an *earthly* divine right. Every one must admire his fine talents, must like his kindly and gentle nature; but is not an Infidel writer's hand against every Christian, and must not every Christian's hand be against him,—not of course to write a word that is untrue concerning his life and actions, but to struggle with him when he strives against eternal hopes,—nay to trample on him, when, like Caiaphas in Dante's penal realm, he lies across the way—if that be the way of faith and salvation? Surely the Scotch may well afford to let Hume be judged according to his *works*,—I should rather say to let his works be judged according to their contents. They are not so deficient in worthies whom a Christian can approve that they must vehemently patronize the patron of despotism and infidelity. My Father did not abuse him because he was a Scotch-

genius are before the world. It will ever be a grief to those interested in my Father's name that, when a young man, he wrote a lampoon, in sport, upon a good and gifted contemporary; but I scarce know what he could do more, after shooting off an arrow, which others would preserve on account of its curious make or some fantastic plumage with which its shaft was adorned, than try to blunt its point, and beg that it might be considered only as a plaything.

man; he had contended warmly against Infidels in Germany, partial as he was to Germans and German writers. One thing I regret in Mr. Carlyle's admirable essay on Johnson, that deep-hearted essay!—the parallel at the end between Johnson and Hume. Oh! surely Hume should not have been set over against Johnson, who could not have looked him in the face without shuddering, and turning pale for sorrow!

Right loth should I be to consider these Boreal blasts and Scotch mists, that have so outraged and obscured the Exteesian domain, as coming from bonny Scotland at large. The man of genius—the wise and liberal critic—is always a true Briton—neither English, Irish, nor Scotch. *Acer Septentrio* to S. T. C.—but this is a synecdoche—part for the whole. I have necessarily been looking of late more at the bad weather of my Father's literary life,—the rough gales and chilling snow-falls,—than at its calm and sunshine: but these were not present always, and I trust they will henceforth be infrequent.

Non semper imbres *dulce-poeticos*
Manant in agros; nec mare *lucidum*
Vexant inæquales procellæ
Usque; nec *ætheriis* in oris,
Esteese Parens, stat glacies iners
Menses per omnes; aut Aquilonibus
Myrteta Colerigi laborant
Vitibus et viduantur ulmi.

The twining vines are popularity and usefulness: the elms literary productions of slow growth and stately character.

clxxx *Difference between petulant Satire*

The Apologetic Preface has been much misrepresented: it has been represented as a defence and a sophistical one; if it were intended as a defence or vindication it would be sophistical indeed; but it is no such thing: it is an apology in the modern sense of the term; that is an excuse. "It was not my intention, I said, to *justify the publication*, whatever its author's feelings might have been at the time of composing it. That they are calculated to call forth so severe a reprobation from a good man, is not the worst feature of such poems. Their moral deformity is aggravated in proportion to the pleasure which they are capable of affording to vindictive, turbulent and unprincipled readers."¹¹ Notwithstanding this declaration, an admirer of Mr. Pitt has affirmed that "the Apology is throughout defensive." As this charge is made in the shape of mere assertion "to refute it with *not*" will perhaps be sufficient. This and other assertions of the Pittite may be met with the counter-assertion, that the Preface contains neither "metaphysical jargon," "unphilosophical sentimentality," nor "wire-drawn argumentation," but expresses in clear language, and illustrates, I think, with some eloquence, the simple but not uninteresting psychological fact, that the wilder and more extravagant a satire appears, the more it contains of devious irrelevant fancy, and the less of individual application, or any attempt to give an air of reality and truth of fact to the representation, the less harm it does and the less of deliberate malice it shews.¹²

¹¹ *Poet Works*. vol. i. p. 275. The next sentence shews impliedly that *palliation* is the writer's aim. See also p. 280.

¹² Mere outward marks for the identifying of the object, as 'letters four do form his name,' are distinct from individualizing features of mind.

The admirer of Mr. Pitt, who is so dissatisfied with the Apo-

and the Spirit of malicious Libel. clxxxii

Such attacks may indeed be insults, but they are very seldom injuries, except so far as the one is the other. Had no one said *worse* of Mr. Coleridge himself than that the Old One was sure of him at last, he would never have complained so bitterly as he sometimes did of the mischiefs of the tongue. When Mr. Hate-light and Mr. Enmity employ a skilful artist to paint their enemy's portrait, he does not take a plain likeness of Satan and put the enemy's name under it; he takes the enemy's face as a foundation and superinduces that of Satan upon it; there are perhaps few strongly marked minds that may not, with pains and skill, be made to assume somewhat of a Satanic aspect. On these points I think indeed that my Father, upon the whole, was more sinned against than sinning; but I should be far from attempting to vindicate *all* the condemnatory parts even of his serious writings. Since he was laid in the grave there have been vehement renewals of former attacks upon him; but if I had not been called upon to republish his Literary Life personalities of this sort would not have engaged my thoughts for more than a passing moment. He is at rest; no longer to be disquieted by injustice or capa-

logetic Preface, is highly displeased because Mr. Coleridge did not express the deepest contrition for his censures of that minister, without sufficiently considering, that, as Mr. Coleridge's opinion of the Pitt policy continued pretty much the same throughout his life, he could not *repent* of it, to please Mr. Pitt's devotees; and that he expressed quite as much regret for, and disapproval of, his "flame-coloured" *language* on the subject as may suffice to satisfy any but partisans and bigots, whom he never considered it his duty to conciliate. Let them pour out their streams of "trash," "nonsense," "jargon," "muddy metaphysics" over his pages; of the abundance of the *head* the mouth speaketh when it speaks at this rate.

clxxxii *Reports of Lovers and Friends*

ble of being harmed by it; "the storms, reproaches and vilifyings" of this angry world come not nigh his dwelling. But some willingly hear his voice, as it yet speaks in his written remains, and will read with pleasure the following extract from the *Aids to Reflection*, "on the keen and poisoned shafts of the tongue," which I give in conclusion, as applicable to the subject that has been discussed, but without intending any particular application whatever.

"The slanders, perchance, may not be altogether forged or untrue; they may be the implements, not the inventions, of malice. But they do not on this account escape the guilt of detraction. Rather it is characteristic of the evil spirit in question, to work by the advantage of real faults; but these stretched and aggravated to the utmost. It is not expressible how deep a wound a tongue sharpened to the work will give, with no noise and a very little word. This is the true white gunpowder, which the dreaming projectors of silent mischiefs and insensible poisons sought for in the laboratories of art and nature, in a world of good; but which was to be found in its most destructive form, in "the World of Evil, the Tongue."¹³

I have heard it said that the lives and characters of men ought never to be handled by near relations and friends, whose pride and partial affection are sure to corrupt their testimony. This is like saying that animal food should never come to table because it is liable, in warm weather, to become tainted; reports of

¹³ Edit. 5. vol. i. p. 78.

friends and relations are the flesh diet of the Biographical Muse, whereby she is kept in health and strength; without them her form would become attenuated and her complexion sallow and wan. Contemporary biography can only proceed either from friends, from enemies, or from indifferent persons; the last class may be the most unbiassed in their testimony, but for the most part they have little testimony to give; they know nothing and care nothing about him whose life is to be recorded, till the task of writing it falls into their hands. It should be remembered too that a man's enemies,—(and it is wonderful how many enemies men of mark are sure to acquire—among the vulgar-minded, who hate genius, for its own sake, while they envy its outward rewards—among the high-minded and strong-headed, who are in violent antagonism to an individual genius through the bent of their own,)—that these will give *their* testimony against him gratuitously, and that unconcerned persons will adopt it for mere amusement's sake,—will carelessly repeat the severest judgments, insensible as the “two handed engine” itself, that cares not whether it descends upon a reprobate or a royal martyr. The testimony of friends is needed, if only to balance that of adversaries; and indeed what better grounds for judging of a man's character, upon the whole, can the world have, than the impression it has made on those who have come the nearest to him, and known him the longest and the best? I, for my part, have not striven to conceal any of my natural partialities, or to separate my love of my Father from my moral and intellectual sympathy with his mode of thought. I have endeavoured to give the genuine impressions of my mind respecting him, believing that if reporters will but be

honest, and study to say that and that alone, which they really think and feel, the colour, which their opinions and feelings may cast upon the subject they have to treat of, will not finally obscure the truth. Of this I am sure, that no one ever studied my Father's writings earnestly and so as to imbibe the author's spirit, who did not learn to care still more for Truth than for him, whatever interest in him such a study may have inspired.

These few lines are an attempt to bring out a sentiment, which my Father once expressed to me on the common saying that "Love is blind."

Passion is blind not Love : *her* wond'rous might
 Informs with three-fold pow'r man's inward sight :—
 To her deep glance the soul at large display'd
 Shews all its mingled mass of light and shade :—
 Men call her blind when she but turns her head,
 Nor scans the fault for which her tears are shed.
 Can dull Indifference or Hate's troubled gaze
 See through the secret heart's mysterious maze ?—
 Can Scorn and Envy pierce that "dread abode,"
 Where true faults rest beneath the eye of God ?
 Not their's, 'mid inward darkness, to discern
 The spiritual splendours how they shine and burn.
 All bright endowments of a noble mind
 They, who with joy behold them, soonest find ;
 And better none its stains of frailty know
 Than they who fain would see it white as snow.

OMISSA.

. "principles in no danger of being exaggerated." Introd. p. xliv. Principles cannot go too far, because they have the boundless realm of spirit to move in : manifestations,—thoughts, words, deeds, (for *thoughts* are manifestations to the mind of the subject,)—are in that other kingdom of Space and Time, which is essentially limited ;

and hence they *may* exceed in degree, even if they correspond to what is right. We cannot really possess any *virtue* in excess. Rashness, for example, is not exaggerated courage; it is courage unattended by good sense, consequently wrong in the mode, and possibly extreme in the measure, of its *manifestations*; and the same may be said of every vice which appears to be the wrong side of a virtue; it is a vice, not from intensity of degree, but from the want of true discernment and just feeling, *quoad hoc*, in the subject. For surely the prodigal giver is not more *liberal* than the generous man; neither are the rash more *courageous* than the truly brave. To be rash is to be *fool-hardy*; to be prodigal is to be a *spendthrift*. The truth is, that the *matter* of every virtue and vice is simply indifferent; it is the *form* alone that constitutes it good or evil. The mere natural disposition, which may be called the base of a virtue or a vice, is neutral; it becomes good by the direction which it receives from the Practical Reason; or evil from the obliquity which it is sure to assume in the *silence* of the Divine Light. Compare with our 9th and 13th Articles.

. “Waterland modernizes Tertullian.” *Ib.* p. lxxxviii. Dr. Pusey does the same, I think, when he argues that the ancient writer *could* not have separated the *new birth* from *reception of the Spirit*. (*Script. Views*, pp. 152-4 and *Lib. of the Fathers*, 10, p. 263.) From T.’s own language it seems clear enough that he *did* separate them; that he believed the soul to be *reformed* by water and *supernal virtue* first, *informed* by the Spirit afterwards; the *tenement* to be prepared before the Divine Tenant entered. His words are, (I give Dr. P.’s own translation, only changing *water* for *waters*, as more literal,) “Thus man, who had aforetime been in the image of God, will be restored to God after his likeness, &c. For he receiveth again that Spirit of God, which he had then received by his breathing upon him, but had afterwards lost by sin. *Not that we obtain the Holy Spirit in the waters*, but being cleansed in the water, under the Angel, *we are prepared for the Holy Spirit.*” To make his plain meaning doubly plain he adds, “For thus was John aforetime the forerunner of the Lord, preparing his way.” I do not forget that, in those days, Anointing and Imposition of hands were immediate adjuncts of Baptism, and T. affirms that in them “the Spirit descends upon the flesh;” but to call them *parts* of Baptism, is surely to use a deceptive phrase; if they were component *parts*, the

Church could not have detached them from that which they helped to constitute; they are either distinct sacraments or no sacraments, in the higher sense here in question, at all. On this and *other* points Tertullian's doctrine of baptism differs *essentially*, as it seems to me, from that which is now set forth as *the* doctrine of the Fathers,—which *was* the doctrine of *some* of them. True it is, that such a separation of ideas as I have ascribed to Tertullian, argues an utter want of metaphysical insight into the ideas themselves; but I believe that in the early times of Christianity there *was* this want of insight in Christian writers; Hermas, the *inspired* Shepherd, as Irenæus and others then thought him, separates ideas still more strangely, and his strange separation seems to be adopted by Clemens Alexandrinus! (Hefele's edit. p. 224. with extract in note from *Strom.* II. p. 452.)

. “tacit establishment.” Ib. p. c. I mean silent as to its coincidence with Luther's doctrine. But Mr. N. expressly admits that Luther is “in the right” with regard to “the exact and philosophical relation of justification to sanctification,” and “prefers” his statement *scientifically* considered, to that of St. Austin; Luther himself considered St. Augustine to be substantially of his mind in the matter. See *Table Talk*, p. 211. Truly as now Mr. N. teaches a “rationalistic Romanism,” so formerly he taught a Lutheran-Anglicanism: he never has succeeded in blinding his mind's eye to one whole side of truth. His literary genius and intellectual power are as apparent in his last work as ever; but it is one thing to walk in the high road, and quite another to make paths in an untrodden territory.

. “faith justifies before and without charity.” Ib. cxiv. In Gal. ii. 16, the *grace*, charity, is so connected with *deeds* of charity, *bona opera*, that it is not easy to tell, from the author's mere words, whether he meant the former by itself, or as *incarnated* in the latter, when he says, *hæc fides sine et ante charitatem justificat*. But even if he meant that faith justifies before the inward grace of charity, this is but asserting that priority of faith, in the order of thought, which the mind cannot reject,—which is involved in the Tridentine saying, that faith is the *root* of all justification; for the *root* is before the stem and branches. Faith justifies before outward charity in time; before inward charity in order of nature. Mr. Newman asks, in reference to Melancthon's and Calvin's statements on this point, “what

is the difference between saying, that faith is not justifying unless love or holiness be *with* it, or with Bellarmine that it is not so, unless love be *in* it?" Answer, none at all, if *in* be taken merely to denote the relative situation of love and faith in the human mind. But that is not the point; the point is, does the justifying power belong to faith, as faith, or does love help it to justify? By denying that faith is informed with charity, Luther only meant to deny that it is rendered justifying by charity. Mr. N. himself teaches that faith has the exclusive privilege of connecting the soul with Christ, and thus implicitly denies, that love is *in* it for the purpose of such connection; while to works he seems to ascribe another sort of justifying power. What Luther meant to insist upon is, that it is the *apprehension of Christ* that justifies rather than any quality of the mind considered *as such*.

. "substituted for general renovation." Ib. p. cx. Mr. Ward holds it a sure sign of moral corruptness in Luther's doctrine of faith that it is proposed as affording relief to the conscience. But how does it propose this? By deadening the conscience? No but by giving it rest. *He giveth his beloved rest*; but they must be *His beloved* who can obtain this rest, according to Luther. It proposes to relieve the conscience by substituting simple faith in Christ as the means and instrument of justification, which includes righteousness and spiritual peace, for outward works of penance as the preparatory means. His opponents affirm that such performances are the way to true Faith; but this Luther denied; he thought that men might go on all their lives obeying a priest's prescriptions, yet never turn to God with their whole heart and soul, but be kept walking to and fro in a vain shadow; he saw too that spiritual physicians often acted selfishly, making a worldly profit of the means without the least real desire to promote the end, or render the patient independent of their costly services; that they even hid the Gospel, lest men should see by its light how, under God, to heal themselves. He denounced the whole system not merely as liable to corruption, but as certainly, in the long run, involving it, being based on untruth and mere human policy. The cross of the Christian profession, in the Bible, is wrapped up in Christian duty strictly performed; the Papist makes a separate thing of it, and thus converts it into an engine of superstition.

So wenig er auch bestimmt seyn mag, andere zu belehren, so wünscht er doch sich denen mitzuthellen, die er sich gleichgesinnt weiss, (oder hofft,) deren Anzahl aber in der Breite der Welt zerstreut ist; er wünscht sein Verhältniss zu den ältesten Freunden dadurch wieder anzuknüpfen, mit neuen es fortzusetzen, und in der letzten Generation sich wieder andere für seine übrige Lebenszeit zu gewinnen. Er wünscht der Jugend die Umwege zu ersparen, auf denen er sich selbst verirrt.

(Goethe. Einleitung in die Propyläen.)

TRANSLATION. Little call as he may have to instruct others, he wishes nevertheless to open out his heart to such as he either knows or hopes to be of like mind with himself, but who are widely scattered in the world: he wishes to knit anew his connections with his oldest friends, to continue those recently formed, and to win other friends among the rising generation for the remaining course of his life. He wishes to spare the young those circuitous paths, on which he himself had lost his way.



BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA.

CHAPTER I.

Motives to the present work—Reception of the Author's first publication—Discipline of his taste at school—Effect of contemporary writers on youthful minds—Bowles's Sonnets—Comparison between the poets before and since Pope.



IT has been my lot to have had my name introduced both in conversation, and in print, more frequently than I find it easy to explain, whether I consider the fewness, unimportance, and limited circulation of my writings, or the retirement and distance, in which I have lived, both from the literary and political world. Most often it has been connected with some charge which I could not acknowledge, or some principle which I had never entertained. Nevertheless, had I had no other motive or incitement, the reader would not have been troubled with this exculpation. What my additional purposes were, will be seen in the following pages. It will be found, that the least of what I have written concerns myself personally. I have used the narration chiefly for the purpose of giv-

ing a continuity to the work, in part for the sake of the miscellaneous reflections suggested to me by particular events, but still more as introductory to a statement of my principles in Politics, Religion, and Philosophy, and an application of the rules, deduced from philosophical principles, to poetry and criticism. But of the objects, which I proposed to myself, it was not the least important to effect, as far as possible, a settlement of the long continued controversy concerning the true nature of poetic diction; and at the same time to define with the utmost impartiality the real poetic character of the poet, by whose writings this controversy was first kindled, and has been since fuelled and fanned.¹

In the spring of 1796, when I had but little passed the verge of manhood, I published a small volume of juvenile poems.² They were received with a degree of favour, which, young as I was, I well know was bestowed on them not so much for any positive merit,

¹ [The first volume of the *Lyrical Ballads* was published in the summer of 1798, by Mr. Joseph Cottle, of Bristol, who purchased the copyright for thirty guineas. That copyright was afterwards transferred with others to Messrs Longman and Co. And it is related by Mr. Cottle, that in estimating the value the *Lyrical Ballads* were reckoned as nothing by the head of that firm. This copyright was subsequently given back to Mr. Cottle, and by him restored to Mr. Wordsworth. Would that he and his might hold it for ever!

The second volume, with Mr. Wordsworth's Preface, appeared in 1800. Ed.]

² [This volume was published by Mr. Cottle at Bristol in the Spring of 1796, in conjunction with the Messrs. Robinson in London. It contained fifty-one small pieces, of which the best known at the present day are the *Religious Musings*, *Monody on Chatterton*, *Song of the Pixies*, and the exquisite lines written at Clevedon, beginning, "My pensive Sara, &c." To this

as because they were considered buds of hope, and promises of better works to come. The critics of that day, the most flattering, equally with the severest, concurred in objecting to them obscurity, a general turgidness of diction, and a profusion of new coined double epithets.³ The first is the fault which a writer is the least able to detect in his own compositions: and my mind was not then sufficiently disciplined to receive the authority of others, as a substitute for my own conviction. Satisfied that the thoughts, such as they were, could not have been expressed otherwise, or at least more perspicuously, I forgot to inquire, whether the thoughts themselves did not demand a degree of attention unsuitable to the nature and objects of poetry. This remark however applies chiefly, though not exclusively, to the Religious Musings. The remainder of the charge I admitted to its full extent, and not without sincere acknowledgments both to my private and public censors for their friendly admonitions. In

poem Mr. Coleridge many years afterwards added the magnificent passage—

O the one life within us and abroad,
 * * * * *
 * * * * * and the mute still air
 Is Music slumbering on her instrument.

Poet. Works, I. p. 191.

He was then twenty-three years and a half old. Ed.]

³ The authority of Milton and Shakespeare may be usefully pointed out to young authors. In the *Comus* and other early poems of Milton there is a superfluity of double epithets; while in the *Paradise Lost* we find very few, in the *Paradise Regained* scarce any. The same remark holds almost equally true of the *Love's Labour Lost*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Venus and Adonis*, and *Lucrece*, compared with the *Lear*, *Macbeth*, *Othello*, and *Hamlet* of our great Dramatist. The rule for the admission of dou-

the after editions,⁴ I pruned the double epithets with no sparing hand, and used my best efforts to tame the swell and glitter both of thought and diction; though in truth, these parasite plants of youthful poetry had insinuated themselves into my longer poems with such

ble epithets seems to be this: either that they should be already denizens of our language, such as *blood-stained*, *terror-stricken*, *self-applauding*: or when a new epithet, or one found in books only, is hazarded, that it, at least, be one word, not two words made one by mere virtue of the printer's hyphen. A language which, like the English, is almost without cases, is indeed in its very genius unfitted for compounds. If a writer, every time a compounded word suggests itself to him, would seek for some other mode of expressing the same sense, the chances are always greatly in favour of his finding a better word. *Ut tanquam scopulum sic fugias insolens verbum*, is the wise advice of Cæsar to the Roman Orators,* and the precept applies with double force to the writers in our own language. But it must not be forgotten, that the same Cæsar wrote a Treatise† for the purpose of reforming the ordinary language by bringing it to a greater accordance with the principles of logic or universal grammar.

⁴ [The second edition appeared in May 1797 with the same publishers' names. Upwards of twenty of the pieces contained in the first edition were omitted in this, and ten new poems were added. Amongst these latter were the Dedication to his brother, the Reverend George Coleridge, the Ode on the Departing Year, and the Reflections on having left a place of Retirement. (Poet. Works, I.) The volume comprised poems by Lamb and Lloyd, and on the title page was printed the prophetic aspiration:—*Duplex nobis vinculum, et amicitie junctarumque Camænarum;—quod utinam neque mors solvat; neque temporis longinquitas!* Ed.]

* [The expression is so given by A. Gellius (Noct. Att. I. 10). Macrobius says, *infrequens atque insolens verbum*. (Saturn. I. 5.) Ed.]

† [*De Analogia Libri duo*, the first of which contained the precept above mentioned. Ed.]

intricacy of union, that I was often obliged to omit disentangling the weed, from the fear of snapping the flower. From that period to the date of the present work I have published nothing, with my name, which could by any possibility have come before the board of anonymous criticism.⁵ Even the three or four poems, printed with the works of a friend,⁶ as far as they were censured at all, were charged with the same or similar defects, (though I am persuaded not with equal justice),—with an excess of ornament, in addition to strained and elaborate diction. I must be permitted to add, that, even at the early period of my juvenile poems, I saw and admitted the superiority of an austerer and more natural style, with an insight not less clear, than I at present possess. My judgment was stronger than were my powers of realizing its dictates; and the faults of my language, though indeed partly owing to a wrong choice of subjects, and the desire of giving a poetic

⁵ [This is certainly not strictly accurate, if the date of the publication of the *Biographia* (1817) be taken as the period intended. The *Remorse* appeared in 1813, and *Christabel* in 1816. *Zapolya*, the two *Lay Sermons*, and the *Sibylline Leaves*, all came out nearly contemporaneously with this work. I believe the fact to be, that Mr. Coleridge wrote the passage in the text several years before 1817, and never observed the misstatement which lapse of time had caused at the date of publication. The first *Essays of The Friend*, indeed, came out in 1809; but he probably did not consider them as constituting a published work in the ordinary sense of the term. Ed.]

⁶ See the criticisms on the *Ancient Mariner*, in the *Monthly and Critical Reviews* of the first volume of the *Lyrical Ballads* *

* [The first volume of the *Lyrical Ballads* contained *The Ancient Mariner*, *Love*, *The Nightingale*, and *The Foster Mother's Tale*. Ed.]

colouring to abstract and metaphysical truths, in which a new world then seemed to open upon me, did yet, in part likewise, originate in unfeigned diffidence of my own comparative talent.—During several years of my youth and early manhood, I revered those who had re-introduced the manly simplicity of the Greek, and of our own elder poets, with such enthusiasm as made the hope seem presumptuous of writing successfully in the same style. Perhaps a similar process has happened to others; but my earliest poems were marked by an ease and simplicity, which I have studied, perhaps with inferior success, to impress on my later compositions.

At school, (Christ's Hospital,) I enjoyed the inestimable advantage of a very sensible, though at the same time, a very severe master, the Reverend James Bowyer.⁷ He early moulded my taste to the preference of Demosthenes to Cicero, of Homer and Theocritus to Virgil, and again of Virgil to Ovid. He habituated me to compare Lucretius, (in such extracts as I then read,) Terence, and above all the chaster poems of Catullus, not only with the Roman poets of the, so called, silver and brazen ages; but with even those of the Augustan æra: and on grounds of plain sense and universal logic to see and assert the superiority of the former in the truth and nativeness both of their thoughts and diction. At the same time that we were studying the Greek tragic poets, he made us read Shakespeare and Milton as lessons: and they were the lessons too, which required most time and trouble to *bring up*, so as to escape his censure. I learned

⁷ [See the Table Talk, p. 185, 2nd edit. and Lamb's exquisite Essay, Christ's Hospital five and thirty years ago. Prose Works, II. p. 26. Ed.]

from him, that poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In the truly great poets, he would say, there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word; and I well remember that, availing himself of the synonymes to the Homer of Didymus, he made us attempt to show, with regard to each, why it would not have answered the same purpose; and wherein consisted the peculiar fitness of the word in the original text.

In our own English compositions, (at least for the last three years of our school education,) he showed no mercy to phrase, metaphor, or image, unsupported by a sound sense, or where the same sense might have been conveyed with equal force and dignity in plainer words.⁸ *Lute, harp, and lyre, Muse, Muses, and inspirations, Pegasus, Parnassus, and Hippocrene* were all an abomination to him. In fancy I can almost hear him now, exclaiming "Harp? Harp? Lyre? Pen and ink, boy, you mean! Muse, boy, Muse? Your nurse's daughter, you mean! Pierian spring? Oh aye! the cloister-pump, I suppose!" Nay certain introductions, similes, and examples, were placed by name on a list of interdiction. Among the similes, there was, I remember, that of the manchineel fruit, as suiting equally well with too many subjects;

⁸ This is worthy of ranking as a maxim, (*regula maxima*,) of criticism. Whatever is translatable in other and simpler words of the same language, without loss of sense or dignity, is bad. N. B. By dignity I mean the absence of ludicrous and debasing associations.

in which however it yielded the palm at once to the example of Alexander and Clytus, which was equally good and apt, whatever might be the theme. Was it ambition? Alexander and Clytus!—Flattery? Alexander and Clytus!—Anger—drunkenness—pride—friendship—ingratitude—late repentance?⁹ Still, still Alexander and Clytus! At length, the praises of agriculture having been exemplified in the sagacious observation that, had Alexander been holding the plough, he would not have run his friend Clytus through with a spear, this tried, and serviceable old friend was banished by public edict *in sæcula sæculorum*. I have sometimes ventured to think, that a list of this kind, or an *index expurgatorius* of certain well known and ever returning phrases, both introductory, and transitional, including a large assortment of modest egoisms, and flattering illeisms, and the like, might be hung up in our Law-courts, and both Houses of Parliament, with great advantage to the public, as an important saving of national time, an incalculable relief to his Majesty's ministers, but above all, as insuring the thanks of country attornies, and their clients, who have private bills to carry through the House.

Be this as it may, there was one custom of our master's, which I cannot pass over in silence, because I think it imitable and worthy of imitation. He would

⁹ [“ This lecture he enriched with many valuable quotations from the ancients, particularly from Seneca; who hath, indeed, so well handled this passion, that none but a very angry man can read him without great pleasure and profit. The Doctor concluded his harangue with the famous story of Alexander and Clytus; but, as I find that entered in my Common-place under title *Drunkenness*, I shall not insert it here.” The History of a Foundling, by Henry Fielding, Book vi. chap. ix. Ed.]

often permit our exercises, under some pretext of want of time, to accumulate, till each lad had four or five to be looked over. Then placing the whole number abreast on his desk, he would ask the writer, why this or that sentence might not have found as appropriate a place under this or that other thesis: and if no satisfying answer could be returned, and two faults of the same kind were found in one exercise, the irrevocable verdict followed, the exercise was torn up, and another on the same subject to be produced, in addition to the tasks of the day. The reader will, I trust, excuse this tribute of recollection to a man, whose severities, even now, not seldom furnish the dreams, by which the blind fancy would fain interpret to the mind the painful sensations of distempered sleep; but neither lessen nor dim the deep sense of my moral and intellectual obligations. He sent us to the University excellent Latin and Greek scholars, and tolerable Hebraists. Yet our classical knowledge was the least of the good gifts, which we derived from his zealous and conscientious tutorage. He is now gone to his final reward, full of years, and full of honours, even of those honours, which were dearest to his heart, as gratefully bestowed by that school, and still binding him to the interests of that school, in which he had been himself educated, and to which during his whole life he was a dedicated thing.

From causes, which this is not the place to investigate, no models of past times, however perfect, can have the same vivid effect on the youthful mind, as the productions of contemporary genius. The discipline, my mind had undergone, *Ne falleretur rotundo sono et versuum cursu, cincinnis, et floribus; sed ut inspiceret quidnam subesset, quæ sedes, quod firmentum, quis fundus verbis; an figuræ essent mera*

*ornatura et orationis fucus; vel sanguinis e materiæ ipsius corde effluentis rubor quidam natus et incallescencia genuina;*¹⁰—removed all obstacles to the appreciation of excellence in style without diminishing my delight. That I was thus prepared for the perusal of Mr. Bowles's sonnets and earlier poems, at once increased their influence, and my enthusiasm. The great works of past ages seem to a young man things of another race, in respect to which his faculties must remain passive and submissive, even as to the stars and mountains. But the writings of a contemporary, perhaps not many years older than himself, surrounded by the same circumstances, and disciplined by the same manners, possess a reality for him, and inspire an actual friendship as of a man for a man. His very admiration is the wind which fans and feeds his hope. The poems themselves assume the properties of flesh and blood. To recite, to extol, to contend for them is but the payment of a debt due to one, who exists to receive it.

There are indeed modes of teaching which have produced, and are producing, youths of a very different stamp; modes of teaching, in comparison with which we have been called on to despise our great public schools, and universities,

in whose halls are hung
Armoury of the invincible knights of old—¹¹

modes, by which children are to be metamorphosed into prodigies. And prodigies with a vengeance have

¹⁰ [I presume this Latin to be Mr. Coleridge's own—not being able to find the passage in any other author, and believing that *incallescencia* is a good word not countenanced by any classic writer of Rome. Ed.]

¹¹ [Wordsworth. *Poet. W.* III. p. 190. Ed.]

I known thus produced;—prodigies of self-conceit, shallowness, arrogance, and infidelity! Instead of storing the memory, during the period when the memory is the predominant faculty, with facts for the after exercise of the judgment; and instead of awakening by the noblest models the fond and unmixed love and admiration, which is the natural and graceful temper of early youth; these nurslings of improved pedagogy are taught to dispute and decide; to suspect all but their own and their lecturer's wisdom; and to hold nothing sacred from their contempt, but their own contemptible arrogance;—boy-graduates in all the technicals, and in all the dirty passions and impudence of anonymous criticism. To such dispositions alone can the admonition of Pliny be requisite, *Neque enim debet operibus ejus obesse, quod vivit. An si inter eos, quos nunquam vidimus, florisset, non solum libros ejus, verum etiam imagines conquireremus, ejusdem nunc honor præsentis, et gratia quasi satietate languescet? At hoc pravum, malignumque est, non admirari hominem admiratione dignissimum, quia videre, complecti, nec laudare tantum, verum etiam amare contingit.*¹²

I had just entered on my seventeenth year, when the sonnets of Mr. Bowles, twenty in number, and just then published in a quarto pamphlet,¹³ were first made known and presented to me, by a schoolfellow who had quitted us for the University, and who, during the

¹² [Epist. I. p. 16. Ed.]

¹³ [The volume here mentioned appears to have been the second edition of Mr. Bowles's Sonnets, published in 1789, and containing twenty-one in number. The first edition with fourteen sonnets only had been published half a year previously. Ed.]

whole time that he was in our first form, (or in our school language a Grecian,) had been my patron and protector. I refer to Dr. Middleton, the truly learned, and every way excellent Bishop of Calcutta :

qui laudibus amplis
*Ingenium celebrare meum, calamumque solebat,
 Calcar agens animo validum. Non omnia terræ
 Obruta ; vivit amor, vivit dolor ; ora negatur
 Dulcia conspicerè ; at flere et meminisse relictum est.*¹⁴

It was a double pleasure to me, and still remains a tender recollection, that I should have received from a friend so revered the first knowledge of a poet, by whose works, year after year, I was so enthusiastically delighted and inspired. My earliest acquaintances will not have forgotten the undisciplined eagerness and impetuous zeal, with which I laboured to make proselytes, not only of my companions, but of all with whom I conversed, of whatever rank, and in whatever place. As my school finances did not permit me to purchase copies, I made, within less than a year and a half, more than forty transcriptions, as the best presents I could offer to those, who had in any way won my regard. And with almost equal delight did I receive the three or four following publications of the same author.

Though I have seen and known enough of mankind to be well aware, that I shall perhaps stand alone in my creed, and that it will be well, if I subject myself to no worse charge than that of singularity ; I am not therefore deterred from avowing, that I regard, and ever have regarded the obligations of intellect among the most sacred of the claims of gratitude. A valua-

¹⁴ [Petrarc. Epist. I. 1. *Barbato Subnonensi*. Bishop Middleton left Christ's Hospital on the 26th of September, 1788, on having been elected to Pembroke College, Cambridge. Ed.]

ble thought, or a particular train of thoughts, gives me additional pleasure, when I can safely refer and attribute it to the conversation or correspondence of another. My obligations to Mr. Bowles were indeed important, and for radical good. At a very premature age, even before my fifteenth year, I had bewildered myself in metaphysics, and in theological controversy.¹⁵ Nothing else pleased me. History, and particular facts, lost all interest in my mind. Poetry—(though for a school-boy of that age, I was above par in English versification, and had already produced two or three compositions which, I may venture to say, without reference to my age, were somewhat above mediocrity,¹⁶ and which had gained me more credit than the sound, good sense of my old master was at all pleased with,)—poetry itself, yea, novels and romances, became insipid to me. In my friendless wanderings on our *leave-days*,¹⁷ (for I

¹⁵ [“Come back into memory,” says Lamb, “like as thou wast in the day-spring of thy fancies, with hope like a fiery column before thee—the dark pillar not yet turned—Samuel Taylor Coleridge.—Logician, Metaphysician, Bard!—How have I seen the casual passer through the cloister stand still, intranced with admiration, (while he weighed the disproportion between the *speech* and the *gurb* of the young *Mirandula*,) to hear thee unfold, in thy deep and sweet intonations, the mysteries of Iamblichus, or Plotinus (for even in those years thou waxedst not pale at such philosophic draughts,) or reciting Homer in his Greek, or Pindar,—while the walls of the old Grey Friars re-echoed to the accents of the *inspired charity-boy!*”

Prose Works, II. p. 46. Ed.]

¹⁶ [See amongst his Juvenile Poems the lines entitled, Time real and imaginary, (Poet. Works, I. p. 5.) which is the first decided indication of his poetic and metaphysical genius together, and was written in his sixteenth year. Ed.]

¹⁷ The Christ’s Hospital phrase, not for holidays altogether, but for those on which the boys are permitted to go beyond the precincts of the school.

was an orphan, and had scarcely any connections in London,) highly was I delighted, if any passenger, especially if he were dressed in black, would enter into conversation with me. For I soon found the means of directing it to my favourite subjects

Of providence, fore-knowledge, will, and fate,
Fixed fate, free will, fore-knowledge absolute,
And found no end in wandering mazes lost.

This preposterous pursuit was, beyond doubt, injurious both to my natural powers, and to the progress of my education. It would perhaps have been destructive, had it been continued; but from this I was auspiciously withdrawn, partly indeed by an accidental introduction to an amiable family, chiefly however, by the genial influence of a style of poetry, so tender and yet so manly, so natural and real, and yet so dignified and harmonious, as the sonnets and other early poems of Mr. Bowles. Well would it have been for me, perhaps, had I never relapsed into the same mental disease; if I had continued to pluck the flower and reap the harvest from the cultivated surface, instead of delving in the unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic lore. And if in after time I have sought a refuge from bodily pain and mismanaged sensibility in abstruse researches, which exercised the strength and subtilty of the understanding without awakening the feelings of the heart; still there was a long and blessed interval, during which my natural faculties were allowed to expand, and my original tendencies to develop themselves;—my fancy, and the love of nature, and the sense of beauty in forms and sounds.¹⁸

¹⁸ [For not to think of what I needs must feel,
But to be still and patient, all I can;

The second advantage, which I owe to my early pe-

And haply by abstruse research to steal
 From my own nature all the natural man—
 This was my sole resource, my only plan :
 Till that which suits a part infects the whole,
 And now is almost grown the habit of my soul.

Poet. Works, I. p. 238.

The passage in the text has been more than once cited by those who cite nothing else from the writings of Coleridge, as warning authority against the pursuit of metaphysic science. With what candour or good sense let those judge, who know and appreciate the persistent labour of his life, and recollect that all the great verities of religion are ideas, the practical apprehension of, and faith in, which have in every age of the Church been, as from the constitution of the human mind they must necessarily be, vitally affected by the metaphysic systems from time to time prevailing. It is indeed to be observed that those who are so zealous in decrying metaphysic, and more especially psychological investigations, and spend entire sermons in reasoning against reason, have nevertheless invariably a particular system of metaphysics and even of psychology of their own, which they will as little surrender as examine. And what system?— In nine cases out of ten, a patchwork of empirical positions, known historically to be directly repugnant to the principles maintained as well by the Reformers as the Fathers of the Catholic Church, and leading legitimately to conclusions subversive of the fundamental articles of the Christian faith. That those conclusions indeed have not been able to obtain a fixed footing within our Church as they have long since done, to a fearful extent elsewhere, is, under God's providence, mainly attributable to the reading of the Liturgy and Scriptures in the ears of the people. Yet who will not tremble at the dilemma in the case of an individual clergyman, who either sees the contrariety between his philosophical and religious creeds, and continues to hold both, or not seeing it, is at the mercy of the first Socinian reasoner who helps him to perceive it?

This vulgar scorn of the science of the human mind, its powers, capacities, and objects, as an essential part or fore-ground of the science of theology, is to be found *passim* in the written and oral teaching of those who, to use a confessedly inaccurate

rusal, and admiration of these poems, (to which let me

but very significant phrase, lead the Calvinistic and Arminian parties within the Church in England. To the former it seems more natural in respect of their being, upon the whole, men of lower education, meaner attainments and more limited abilities:—in the latter, and especially in the most eminent of the latter, it is self contradiction, and has the appearance, to calm observers, of mere wilfulness. For in the perusal of the many eloquent volumes which have proceeded of late years from the latter, there may be found metaphysic and even psychological arguments, which shew a knowledge of Aristotle, and also—*quod minime reris*—an acquaintance with Coleridge,—the last, however, without recognition by name, and speedily atoned for in a following page by some religious dehortation, or sullen dogma of contrary import. It is evident, therefore, that the particular system is the object of dislike. Would it not be more agreeable to the sincerity of lovers of truth, and to the courtesy of men of letters, to meet, commend, or censure, adopt or reject, what stands in their path in a perfectly questionable shape, than to pass by on the other side in affected ignorance or contempt? Can the Aids to Reflection be honestly pretermitted by a divine of this day, or ought the only use made of it by a gentleman to be—to borrow from it without acknowledgment?—But it is a true saying, that they who begin by loving Christianity better than truth, will proceed by loving their own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving themselves better than all.

This is something of a digression, but it is needed.

It can hardly be necessary to remark, that Mr. Coleridge is only speaking relatively to his youth, and his vocation as a poet, and the proportion which metaphysical studies should bear in a well ordered education to the exercise of the imagination, and the observation of external nature. Something also was, no doubt, intended against particular books and lines of research, which, in his almost limitless range, he had perused or followed. There are unwholesome books in metaphysics as there are in divinity and romance, but not so many or so injurious by half; and it is just as wise to proscribe the former on account of Spinoza or Hume, as it would be to prohibit the latter for Socinus or Paul de Kock. No man could be a great metaphysician, or make an epoch in the history of the science, without an acquain-

add, though known to me at a somewhat later period, the Lewesdon Hill of Mr. Crowe¹⁹ bears more immediately on my present subject. Among those with whom I conversed, there were, of course, very many who had formed their taste, and their notions of poetry, from the writings of Pope and his followers; or to speak more generally, in that school of French poetry, condensed and invigorated by English understanding, which had predominated from the last century. I was not blind to the merits of this school, yet, as from inexperience of the world, and consequent want of sympathy with the general subjects of these poems, they gave me little pleasure, I doubtless undervalued the kind, and with the presumption of youth withheld from its masters the legitimate name of poets. I saw that the excellence of this kind consisted in just and acute observations on men and manners in an artificial state of society, as its matter and substance; and in the logic of wit, conveyed in smooth and strong epigrammatic couplets, as its form: that even when the subject was addressed to the fancy, or the intellect, as in the Rape of the Lock, or the Essay on Man; nay, when it was a consecutive narration, as in that astonishing product of matchless talent and ingenuity, Pope's Translation of the Iliad; still a point was looked for at the

tance as extensive as Mr. C's with all that had been done or attempted before him; but such a course is not more necessary to the education of the mind in general, to which the elements of metaphysic knowledge are essential, than five years' attendance at the State Paper Office to the accomplishment of a gentleman in the history of England; and it may perhaps be admitted that the philosophic spell which overmastered Coleridge's advancing manhood for ever slacked the strings of the enchanting lyre of his youth. But on this we can only speculate. Ed.]

¹⁹ [Lewesdon Hill was first published in 1786; there was a second edition in 1788, and a third in 1804. Ed.]

end of each second line, and the whole was, as it were, a *sortes*, or, if I may exchange a logical for a grammatical metaphor, a conjunction disjunctive, of epigrams. Meantime the matter and diction seemed to me characterized not so much by poetic thoughts, as by thoughts translated into the language of poetry. On this last point, I had occasion to render my own thoughts gradually more and more plain to myself, by frequent amicable disputes concerning Darwin's Botanic Garden,²⁰ which, for some years, was greatly extolled, not only by the reading public in general, but even by those, whose genius and natural robustness of understanding enabled them afterwards to act foremost in dissipating these "painted mists" that occasionally rise from the marshes at the foot of Parnassus. During my first Cambridge vacation,²¹ I assisted a friend in a contribution for a literary society in Devonshire: and in this I remember to have compared Darwin's work to the Russian palace of ice, glittering, cold and transitory. In the same essay too,²² I assigned sundry reasons, chiefly drawn from a comparison of passages in the Latin poets with the original Greek, from which they were borrowed, for the preference of Collins's odes to those of Gray; and of the simile in Shakespeare

How like a younker or a prodigal,
The scarfed bark puts from her native bay,
Hugg'd and embraced by the strumpet wind!
How like the prodigal doth she return,
With over-weather'd ribs and ragged sails,

²⁰ [The Botanic Garden was published in 1781. Ed.]

²¹ [Mr. Coleridge entered at Jesus College, Cambridge, on the 5th of February, 1791. Ed.]

²² [I have never been able to discover any traces of this essay, which I presume was not printed. Ed.]

Lean, rent, and beggar'd by the strumpet wind !
(*Merch. of Ven. Act II. sc. 6.*)

to the imitation in the Bard ;

Fair laughs the morn, and soft the zephyr blows
While proudly riding o'er the azure realm
In gallant trim the gilded vessel goes,
Youth at the prow and pleasure at the helm ;
Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway,
That hush'd in grim repose, expects it's evening prey.

(in which, by the bye, the words "realm" and "sway" are rhymes dearly purchased)—I preferred the original on the ground, that in the imitation it depended wholly on the compositor's putting, or not putting, a small capital, both in this, and in many other passages of the same poet, whether the words should be personifications, or mere abstractions. I mention this, because, in referring various lines in Gray to their original in Shakespeare and Milton, and in the clear perception how completely all the propriety was lost in the transfer, I was, at that early period, led to a conjecture, which, many years afterwards was recalled to me from the same thought having been started in conversation, but far more ably, and developed more fully, by Mr. Wordsworth ;—namely, that this style of poetry, which I have characterized above, as translations of prose thoughts into poetic language, had been kept up by, if it did not wholly arise from, the custom of writing Latin verses, and the great importance attached to these exercises, in our public schools. Whatever might have been the case in the fifteenth century, when the use of the Latin tongue was so general among learned men, that Erasmus is said to have forgotten his native language ; yet in the present day it is not to be supposed, that a youth can think in Latin, or that he can have any other reliance on the force or fitness of his phrases,

but the authority of the writer from whom he has adopted them. Consequently he must first prepare his thoughts, and then pick out, from Virgil, Horace, Ovid, or perhaps more compendiously from his *Gradus*,²³ halves and quarters of lines, in which to embody them.²⁴

I never object to a certain degree of disputatious-

²³ [In the *Rusticus* of Politian* there occurs this line :

Pura coloratos interstrepit unda lapillos.

Casting my eye on a University prize-poem, I met this line,

Lactea purpureos interstrepit unda lapillos.

Now look out in the *Gradus* for *purus*, and you find as the first synonyme, *lacteus* ; for *coloratus*, and the first synonyme is *purpureus*. I mention this by way of elucidating one of the most ordinary processes in the *ferrumination* of these centos.]

²⁴ [The description in the text may be true of those who never in any proper sense succeed in writing Latin verse. But the experience of many scholars in England, amongst boys, would enable them with sincerity to deny its universal application. The chief direct use of the practice of Latin verse composition consists in the mastery which it gives over the vocabulary and constructive powers of the language. But it is, perhaps, greatly to be regretted that spoken and written Latin has to so great a degree ceased to be a mean of communication between liberally educated Europeans. The pretence that the extended knowledge of modern languages is an adequate substitute, is in five cases out of ten generally, and in the pre-eminent instances of Germany and England, in three out of four, notoriously untrue. Mere school editions of the Classics may properly enough be accompanied with notes in a modern language, but every work designed for the promotion of scholarship generally ought, by literary comity, to be published in a language which every scholar can read. This remark does not touch the question of dictionaries ; as to which nothing but necessity can justify the ordinary use of any interpretation but into the native idiom of the student. Ed.]

* Angelus Politianus was born July 14, 1454, at Monte Pulciano in Tuscany ; died at Florence, Sept. 24, 1494. The line quoted is the fourteenth of the *Silva cui titulus Rusticus*. S. C.

ness in a young man from the age of seventeen to that of four or five and twenty, provided I find him always arguing on one side of the question. The controversies, occasioned by my unfeigned zeal for the honour of a favourite contemporary, then known to me only by his works, were of great advantage in the formation and establishment of my taste and critical opinions. In my defence of the lines running into each other, instead of closing at each couplet; and of natural language, neither bookish, nor vulgar, neither redolent of the lamp, nor of the kennel, such as *I will remember thee*; instead of the same thought tricked up in the rag-fair finery of,

—— thy image on her wing
Before my fancy's eye shall memory bring,—

I had continually to adduce the metre and diction of the Greek poets from Homer to Theocritus inclusively; and still more of our elder English poets from Chaucer to Milton. Nor was this all. But as it was my constant reply to authorities brought against me from later poets of great name, that no authority could avail in opposition to Truth, Nature, Logic, and the Laws of Universal Grammar; actuated too by my former passion for metaphysical investigations; I laboured at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance. According to the faculty or source, from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived, I estimated the merit of such poem or passage. As the result of all my reading and meditation, I abstracted two critical aphorisms, deeming them to comprise the conditions and *criteria* of poetic style;— first, that not the poem which we have read, but that

to which we return, with the greatest pleasure, possesses the genuine power, and claims the name of essential poetry;—secondly, that whatever lines can be translated into other words of the same language, without diminution of their significance, either in sense or association, or in any worthy feeling, are so far vicious in their diction. Be it however observed, that I excluded from the list of worthy feelings, the pleasure derived from mere novelty in the reader, and the desire of exciting wonderment at his powers in the author. Oftentimes since then, in perusing French tragedies, I have fancied two marks of admiration at the end of each line, as hieroglyphics of the author's own admiration at his own cleverness. Our genuine admiration of a great poet is a continuous undercurrent of feeling; it is every where present, but seldom any where as a separate excitement. I was wont boldly to affirm, that it would be scarcely more difficult to push a stone out from the Pyramids with the bare hand, than to alter a word, or the position of a word, in Milton or Shakespeare, (in their most important works at least,) without making the poet say something else, or something worse, than he does say. One great distinction, I appeared to myself to see plainly between even the characteristic faults of our elder poets, and the false beauty of the moderns. In the former, from Donne to Cowley, we find the most fantastic out-of-the-way thoughts, but in the most pure and genuine mother English; in the latter the most obvious thoughts, in language the most fantastic and arbitrary. Our faulty elder poets sacrificed the passion and passionate flow of poetry to the subtleties of intellect and to the starts of wit; the moderns to the glare and glitter of a perpetual, yet broken and heterogeneous imagery, or rather to an amphibious some-

thing, made up, half of image, and half of abstract²⁵ meaning. The one sacrificed the heart to the head; the other both heart and head to point and drapery.

The reader must make himself acquainted with the general style of composition that was at that time deemed poetry, in order to understand and account for the effect produced on me by the Sonnets, the Monody at Matlock, and the Hope,²⁶ of Mr. Bowles; for it is peculiar to original genius to become less and less striking, in proportion to its success in improving the taste and judgment of its contemporaries. The poems of West,²⁷ indeed, had the merit of chaste and manly diction; but they were cold, and, if I may so

²⁵ I remember a ludicrous instance in the poem of a young tradesman :

“ No more will I endure love’s pleasing pain,
Or round my *heart’s leg* tie his galling chain.”

²⁶ [The Monody at Matlock was published in 1791, and the Vision of Hope in 1796. Ed.]

²⁷ [Meaning of course, Gilbert West, the Translator of Pindar; to whose merit as a poet, it may be doubted whether the author does full justice in the text. West’s two imitations of Spenser are excellent, not merely, as Johnson seems to say, for their ingenuity, but for their fulness of thought and vigour of expression. The following stanza is but one of many other passages of equal felicity :—

Custom he hight, and aye in every land
Usurp’d dominion with despotic sway
O’er all he holds; and to his high command
Constrains e’en stubborn Nature to obey;
Whom dispossessing oft he doth assay
To govern in her right; and *with a pace*
So soft and gentle doth he win his way
That she unwares is caught in his embrace,
And tho’ deflower’d and thrall’d nought feels her foul disgrace.
Education. Ed.]

express it, only dead-coloured; while in the best of Warton's²⁸ there is a stiffness, which too often gives them the appearance of imitations from the Greek. Whatever relation, therefore, of cause or impulse Percy's collection of Ballads may bear to the most popular poems of the present day; yet in a more sustained and elevated style, of the then living poets

²⁸ [Thomas Warton; whose English poems, taken generally, seem as inferior to G. West's in correctness of diction as in strength of conception. Some of his Latin verse is beautiful; and, if he had written nothing else, his epigram addressed to Sleep would perpetuate his name at least among scholars:—

*Somne veni; et quanquam certissima mortis imago es,
Consortem cupio te tamen esse tori.
Huc ades, haud abituro cito: nam sic sine vita
Vivere quam suave est—sic sine morte mori!*

A few stray lines of Warton's have crept into familiar use and application without ever being attributed to their author, such as:—

— while with uplifted arm
Death stands prepared, but still delays, to strike.
Ode to Sleep.

O what's a table richly spread
Without a woman at its head!
Progress of Discontent.

Nor rough, nor barren are the winding ways
Of hoar Antiquity, but strown with flowers.
In Dugdale's Monasticon.

Warton's best poem, as a whole, is the Inscription in a Hermitage:—

Beneath this stony roof reclin'd, &c.

But his great work is the History of English Poesy, imperfect and inadequate as it is: τὸν τελοῦντα μένει.

It is somewhat remarkable that Mr. C. should not upon this occasion have mentioned Akenside, and, as compared with Warton, the beautiful Hymn to the Naiads. Ed.]

Cowper and Bowles²⁹ were, to the best of my knowledge, the first who combined natural thoughts with natural diction; the first who reconciled the heart with the head.

It is true, as I have before mentioned, that from diffidence in my own powers, I for a short time adopted a laborious and florid diction, which I myself deemed, if not absolutely vicious, yet of very inferior worth. Gradually, however, my practice conformed to my better judgment; and the compositions of my twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth years—(for example, the shorter blank verse poems, the lines, which now form the middle and conclusion of the poem entitled the *Destiny of Nations*,³⁰ and the tragedy of *Remorse*)³¹—are not more below my present ideal in respect of the general tissue of the style than those of the latest date. Their faults were at least a remnant of the

²⁹ Cowper's *Task** was published some time before the *Sonnets* of Mr. Bowles; but I was not familiar with it till many years afterwards. The vein of satire which runs through that excellent poem, together with the sombre hue of its religious opinions, would probably, at that time, have prevented its laying any strong hold on my affections. The love of nature seems to have led Thomson to a cheerful religion; and a gloomy religion to have led Cowper to a love of nature. The one would carry his fellow-men along with him into nature; the other flies to nature from his fellow men. In chastity of diction however, and the harmony of blank verse, Cowper leaves Thomson immeasurably below him; yet still I feel the latter to have been the born poet.

³⁰ [Poet. Works, I. 98. Ed.]

³¹ [Poet. Works, II. 153. Ed.]

* [Cowper's *Task* was first published in 1785—his *Table Talk* in 1782. Ed. Thomson was born in 1700; published his works, collected in 4to, in 1730. The *Castle of Indolence*, his last piece, appeared in 1746. S. C.]

former leaven, and among the many who have done me the honour of putting my poems in the same class with those of my betters, the one or two, who have pretended to bring examples of affected simplicity from my volume, have been able to adduce but one instance, and that out of a copy of verses half ludicrous, half splenetic, which I intended, and had myself characterized, as *sermoni propiora*.³²

Every reform, however necessary, will by weak minds be carried to an excess, which will itself need reforming. The reader will excuse me for noticing, that I myself was the first to expose *risu honesto* the three sins of poetry, one or the other of which is the most likely to beset a young writer. So long ago as the publication of the second number of the Monthly Magazine, under the name of Nehemiah Higginbottom, I contributed three sonnets, the first of which had for its object to excite a good-natured laugh at the spirit of doleful egotism, and at the recurrence of favourite phrases, with the double defect of being at once trite and licentious;—the second was on low creeping language and thoughts, under the pretence of simplicity; the third, the phrases of which were borrowed entirely from my own poems, on the indiscriminate use of elaborate and swelling language and imagery. The reader will find them in the note³³ below, and will I

³² [Not meaning of course the exquisite Reflections on having left a place of Retirement, to which Coleridge himself affixed the motto from Horace. Poet. Works, I. 193. Ed.]

³³ SONNET I.

PENSIVE at eve, on the hard world I mused,
 And my poor heart was sad; so at the Moon
 I gazed, and sighed, and sighed; for ah how soon
 Eve saddens into night! mine eyes perused

trust regard them as reprinted for biographical purposes alone, and not for their poetic merits. So general at that time, and so decided was the opinion con-

With tearful vacancy the dampy grass
 That wept and glitter'd in the paly ray :
 And I did pause me on my lonely way
 And mused me on the wretched ones that pass
 O'er the bleak heath of sorrow. But alas !
 Most of myself I thought ! when it befel,
 That the soothe spirit of the breezy wood
 Breath'd in mine ear : " All this is very well,
 But much of one thing, is for no thing good."
 Oh my poor heart's inexplicable swell !

SONNET II.

OH I do love thee, meek Simplicity !
 For of thy lays the lulling simpleness
 Goes to my heart, and soothes each small distress,
 Distress tho' small, yet haply great to me.
 'Tis true on Lady Fortune's gentlest pad
 I amble on ; and yet I know not why
 So sad I am ! but should a friend and I
 Frown, pout and part, then I am very sad.
 And then with sonnets and with sympathy
 My dreamy bosom's mystic woes I pall ;
 Now of my false friend plaining plaintively,
 Now raving at mankind in general ;
 But whether sad or fierce, 'tis simple all,
 All very simple, meek Simplicity !

SONNET III.

AND this reft house is that, the which he built,
 Lamented Jack ! and here his malt he pil'd,
 Cautious in vain ! these rats, that squeak so wild,
 Squeak not unconscious of their father's guilt.
 Did he not see her gleaming thro' the glade !
 Belike 'twas she, the maiden all forlorn.
 What tho' she milk no cow with crumpled horn,
 Yet, aye she haunts the dale where erst she stray'd :
 And aye, beside her stalks her amorous knight !

cerning the characteristic vices of my style, that a celebrated physician (now, alas! no more) speaking of me in other respects with his usual kindness to a gentleman, who was about to meet me at a dinner party, could not however resist giving him a hint not to mention *The house that Jack built* in my presence, for "that I was as sore as a boil about that sonnet;" he not knowing that I was myself the author of it.

Still on his thighs their wonted brogues are worn,
 And thro' those brogues, still tatter'd and betorn,
 His hindward charms gleam an unearthly white.
 Ah! thus thro' broken clouds at night's high noon
 Peeps in fair fragments forth the full-orb'd harvest-moon!

The following anecdote will not be wholly out of place here, and may perhaps amuse the reader. An amateur performer in verse expressed to a common friend a strong desire to be introduced to me, but hesitated in accepting my friend's immediate offer, on the score that "he was, he must acknowledge, the author of a confounded severe epigram on my *Ancient Mariner*, which had given me great pain." I assured my friend that, if the epigram was a good one, it would only increase my desire to become acquainted with the author, and begged to hear it recited: when, to my no less surprise than amusement, it proved to be one which I had myself some time before written and inserted in the *Morning Post*, to wit—

To the Author of the *Ancient Mariner*.

Your poem must eternal be,
 Dear sir! it cannot fail,
 For 'tis incomprehensible,
 And without head or tail.

CHAPTER II.

Supposed irritability of men of genius brought to the test of facts—Causes and occasions of the charge—Its injustice.



HAVE often thought, that it would be neither un instructive nor unamusing to analyze, and bring forward into distinct consciousness, that complex feeling, with which readers in general take part against the author, in favour of the critic; and the readiness with which they apply to all poets the old sarcasm of Horace upon the scribblers of his time:

—— *genus irritabile vatum.*

A debility and dimness of the imaginative power, and a consequent necessity of reliance on the immediate impressions of the senses, do, we know well, render the mind liable to superstition and fanaticism. Having a deficient portion of internal and proper warmth, minds of this class seek in the crowd *circum fana* for a warmth in common, which they do not possess singly. Cold and phlegmatic in their own nature, like damp hay, they heat and inflame by co-acervation; or like bees they become restless and irritable through the increased temperature of collected multitudes. Hence the German word for fanaticism, (such at least was its original import,) is derived from the swarming of bees, namely, *schwärmen, schwärmerey*. The passion being in an inverse proportion to the insight,—that the more vivid, as this the less distinct—anger is the inevitable consequence. The absence of all foundation within

their own minds for that, which they yet believe both true and indispensable to their safety and happiness, cannot but produce an uneasy state of feeling, an involuntary sense of fear from which nature has no means of rescuing herself but by anger. Experience informs us that the first defence of weak minds is to recriminate.

There's no philosopher but sees,
That rage and fear are one disease ;
Tho' that may burn, and this may freeze,
They're both alike the ague.

But where the ideas are vivid, and there exists an endless power of combining and modifying them, the feelings and affections blend more easily and intimately with these ideal creations than with the objects of the senses ; the mind is affected by thoughts, rather than by things ; and only then feels the requisite interest even for the most important events and accidents, when by means of meditation they have passed into thoughts. The sanity of the mind is between superstition with fanaticism on the one hand, and enthusiasm with indifference and a diseased slowness to action on the other. For the conceptions of the mind may be so vivid and adequate, as to preclude that impulse to the realizing of them, which is strongest and most restless in those, who possess more than mere talent, (or the faculty of appropriating and applying the knowledge of others,)—yet still want something of the creative, and self-sufficing power of absolute genius. For this reason therefore, they are men of *commanding* genius. While the former rest content between thought and reality, as it were in an *intermundium* of which their own living spirit supplies the substance, and their imagination the ever-varying form ; the latter must impress their preconceptions on

the world without, in order to present them back to their own view with the satisfying degree of clearness, distinctness, and individuality. These in tranquil times are formed to exhibit a perfect poem in palace, or temple, or landscape-garden; or a tale of romance in canals that join sea with sea, or in walls of rock, which, shouldering back the billows, imitate the power, and supply the benevolence of nature to sheltered navies; or in aqueducts that, arching the wide vale from mountain to mountain, give a Palmyra to the desert. But alas! in times of tumult they are the men destined to come forth as the shaping spirit of ruin, to destroy the wisdom of ages in order to substitute the fancies of a day, and to change kings and kingdoms, as the wind shifts and shapes the clouds.¹ The records of biography seem to confirm this theory. The men of the greatest genius, as far as we can judge from their own works or from the accounts of their contemporaries, appear to have been of calm and tranquil temper in all that related to themselves. In the inward assurance of permanent fame, they seem to have been either indifferent or resigned with regard to immediate reputation. Through all the works of Chaucer there reigns a cheerfulness, a manly hilarity,

¹ Of old things all are over old,
Of good things none are good enough :—
We'll show that we can help to frame
A world of other stuff.

I too will have my kings, that take
From me the sign of life and death :
Kingdoms shall shift about, like clouds,
Obedient to my breath.

*Wordsworth's Rob Roy.**

* Poet. Works. vol. III. p. 127.

which makes it almost impossible to doubt a correspondent habit of feeling in the author himself.² Shakespeare's evenness and sweetness of temper were almost proverbial in his own age. That this did not arise from ignorance of his own comparative greatness, we have abundant proof in his Sonnets, which could scarcely have been known to Pope,³ when he asserted, that our great bard—

² [I take unceasing delight in Chaucer. His manly cheerfulness is especially delicious to me in my old age. How exquisitely tender he is, and yet how perfectly free from the least touch of sickly melancholy or morbid drooping! The sympathy of the poet with the subjects of his poetry is particularly remarkable in Shakespeare and Chaucer; but what the first effects by a strong act of imagination and mental metamorphosis, the last does without any effort, merely by the inborn kindly joyousness of his nature. *Table Talk*, March 15, 1834, p. 290, 2nd edit. Ed.]

³ Pope was under the common error of his age, an error far from being sufficiently exploded even at the present day. It consists (as I explained at large, and proved in detail in my public lectures,*) in mistaking for the essentials of the Greek stage certain rules, which the wise poets imposed upon themselves, in order to render all the remaining parts of the drama consistent with those, that had been forced upon them by circumstances independent of their will; out of which circumstances the drama itself arose. The circumstances in the time of Shakespeare, which it was equally out of his power to alter, were different, and such as, in my opinion, allowed a far wider sphere, and a deeper and more human interest. Critics are too apt to forget, that rules are but means to an end; consequently, where the ends are different, the rules must be likewise so. We must have ascertained what the end is, before we can determine what the rules ought to be. Judging under this im-

* [See the Author's Literary Remains, vol. II. p. 60, and generally the fragments of his lectures and notes on Shakespeare collected in that volume. Ed.]

—grew immortal in his own despite.⁴

Speaking of one whom he had celebrated, and contrasting the duration of his works with that of his personal existence, Shakespeare adds :

Your name from hence immortal life shall have,
 Tho' I once gone to all the world must die ;
 The earth can yield me but a common grave,
 When you entomb'd in men's eyes shall lie.
 Your monument shall be my gentle verse,
 Which eyes not yet created shall o'er-read ;
 And tongues to be your being shall rehearse,
 When all the breathers of this world are dead :
 You still shall live, such virtue hath my pen,
 Where breath most breathes, e'en in the mouth of men.

SONNET LXXXI.⁵

pression, I did not hesitate to declare my full conviction, that the consummate judgment of Shakespeare, not only in the general construction, but in all the details, of his dramas, impressed me with greater wonder, than even the might of his genius, or the depth of his philosophy.* The substance of these lectures I hope soon to publish ; and it is but a debt of justice to myself and my friends to notice, that the first course of lectures, which differed from the following courses only, by occasionally varying the illustrations of the same thoughts, was addressed to very numerous, and I need not add, respectable audiences at the Royal Institution, before Mr. Schlegel gave his lectures on the same subjects at Vienna.

⁴ Epist. to Augustus.

⁵ [These extraordinary sonnets form, in fact, a poem of so many stanzas of fourteen lines each ; and, like the passion which inspired them, the sonnets are always the same, with a variety of expression,—continuous, if you regard the lover's soul,—distinct, if you listen to him, as he heaves them sigh after sigh.

These sonnets, like *The Venus and Adonis*, and *the Rape of Lucrece*, are characterised by boundless fertility, and laboured

* See * note on preceding page.

I have taken the first that occurred; but Shakes-peare's readiness to praise his rivals, *ore pleno*, and the confidence of his own equality with those whom he deemed most worthy of his praise, are alike manifested in another Sonnet.

Was it the proud full sail of his great verse,
Bound for the praise of all-too-precious you,
That did my ripe thoughts in my brain inhearse,
Making their tomb, the womb wherein they grew?
Was it his spirit, by spirits taught to write
Above a mortal pitch that struck me dead?
No, neither he, nor his compeers by night
Giving him aid, my verse astonished.
He, nor that affable familiar ghost,
Which nightly gulls him with intelligence,
As victors of my silence cannot boast;
I was not sick of any fear from thence!
But when your countenance fill'd up his line,
Then lack'd I matter, that enfeebled mine.

S. LXXXVI.

In Spenser, indeed, we trace a mind constitutionally tender, delicate, and, in comparison with his three great compeers, I had almost said, effeminate; and this additionally saddened by the unjust persecution of Burleigh, and the severe calamities, which overwhelmed his latter days. These causes have diffused over all his compositions "a melancholy grace," and have drawn forth occasional strains, the more pathetic from their gentleness. But no where do we find the least trace of irritability, and still less of quarrelsome or affected contempt of his censurers.

condensation of thought, with perfection of sweetness in rhythm and metre. These are the essentials in the budding of a great poet. Afterwards habit and consciousness of power teach more ease—*præcipitandum liberum spiritum*. Table Talk, May 14, 1833, p. 231, 2nd. edit. Ed.]

The same calmness, and even greater self-possession, may be affirmed of Milton, as far as his poems, and poetic character are concerned. He reserved his anger for the enemies of religion, freedom, and his country. My mind is not capable of forming a more august conception, than arises from the contemplation of this great man in his latter days;—poor, sick, old, blind, slandered, persecuted,—⁶

Darkness before, and danger's voice behind,—
in an age in which he was as little understood by the

⁶ [In illustration of Milton's magnanimity of patience I cannot refrain from quoting the conclusion of his letter to Leonard Philaras, *the Athenian* :

“ At present every species of illumination being, as it were, extinguished, there is diffused around me nothing but darkness, or darkness mingled and streaked with an ashy brown. Yet the darkness in which I am perpetually immersed, seems always, both by night and day, to approach nearer to white than black, and when the eye is rolling in its socket, it admits a little particle of light as through a chink. And though this may perhaps offer to your physician a like ray of hope, yet I make up my mind to the malady as quite incurable; and I often reflect, that as the wise man admonishes, days of darkness are destined to each of us, the darkness which I experience, less oppressive than that of the tomb, is, owing to the singular goodness of the Deity, passed amid the pursuits of literature and the cheering salutations of friendship. But if, as is written, man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God, why may not any one acquiesce in the privation of his sight, when God has so amply furnished his mind and his conscience with eyes? While He so tenderly provides for me, while He so graciously leads me by the hand and conducts me on the way, I will, since it is his pleasure, rather rejoice than repine at being blind. And, my dear Philaras, whatever may be the event, I wish you adieu with no less courage and composure than if I had the eyes of a lynx.”

Westminster, September 28, 1654.

What a proof is it of the firmness of Milton's mind to the last

party, for whom, as by that against whom, he had contended; and among men before whom he strode so far as to dwarf himself by the distance; yet still listening to the music of his own thoughts, or if additionally cheered, yet cheered only by the prophetic faith of two or three solitary individuals, he did nevertheless

————— argue not

Against Heaven's hand or will, nor bate a jot
Of heart or hope; but still bore up and steer'd
Right onward.

From others only do we derive our knowledge that Milton, in his latter day, had his scorers and detractors; and even in his day of youth and hope, that he had enemies would have been unknown to us, had they not been likewise the enemies of his country.⁷

I am well aware, that in advanced stages of literature, when there exist many and excellent models, a high degree of talent, combined with taste and judgment, and employed in works of imagination, will acquire for a man the name of a great genius; though

that, when driven into a late marriage by the ill treatment of his daughters, who, inheriting, as appears, their mother's unworthy temper,—without either devotion of spirit or even the commoner sense of duty,—tyrannized over him in his days of darkness; though blind and infirm and in all the dependence which blindness brings, he could yet resist the entreaties of a wife whom he loved, and who was properly indulgent to him, that he should accept the royal offer of the restitution of his place,—because he must “*live and die an honest man!*”

See Symmons's *Life of Milton*, confirmed on these points by Todd, in his edition of the great man's *Poetical Works* of 1826. S. C.]

⁷ [“In Milton's mind there were purity and piety absolute,—an imagination to which neither the past nor the present were interesting, except as far as they called forth and enlivened the great ideal in which and for which he lived; a keen love of

even that *analogon* of genius, which, in certain states of society, may even render his writings more popular than the absolute reality could have done, would be sought for in vain in the mind and temper of the author himself. Yet even in instances of this kind, a close examination will often detect, that the irritability, which has been attributed to the author's genius as its cause, did really originate in an ill conformation of body, obtuse pain, or constitutional defect of pleasurable sensation. What is charged to the author, belongs to the man, who would probably have been still more impatient, but for the humanizing influences of the very pursuit, which yet bears the blame of his irritability.

How then are we to explain the easy credence generally given to this charge, if the charge itself be not, as I have endeavoured to show, supported by experience? This seems to me of no very difficult solution. In whatever country literature is widely diffused, there will be many who mistake an intense desire to possess the reputation of poetic genius, for the actual powers,

truth, which, after many weary pursuits, found a harbour in a sublime listening to the still voice in his own spirit, and as keen a love of his country, which, after a disappointment still more depressive, expanded and soared into a love of man as a probationer of immortality. These were, these alone could be, the conditions under which such a work as the *Paradise Lost* could be conceived and accomplished. By a life-long study Milton had known—

— what was of use to know,

What best to say could say, to do had done.

His actions to his words agreed, his words

To his large heart gave utterance due, his heart

Contain'd of good, wise, fair the perfect shape :

and he left the imperishable total, as a bequest to the ages coming, in the *Paradise Lost*." Lit. Rem. I. p. 170. Ed.]

and original tendencies which constitute it. But men, whose dearest wishes are fixed on objects wholly out of their own power, become in all cases more or less impatient and prone to anger. Besides, though it may be paradoxical to assert, that a man can know one thing and believe the opposite, yet assuredly a vain person may have so habitually indulged the wish, and persevered in the attempt, to appear what he is not, as to become himself one of his own proselytes. Still, as this counterfeit and artificial persuasion must differ, even in the person's own feelings, from a real sense of inward power, what can be more natural, than that this difference should betray itself in suspicious and jealous irritability? Even as the flowery sod, which covers a hollow, may be often detected by its shaking and trembling.

But, alas! the multitude of books, and the general diffusion of literature, have produced other and more lamentable effects in the world of letters, and such as are abundant to explain, though by no means to justify, the contempt with which the best grounded complaints of injured genius are rejected as frivolous, or entertained as matter of merriment. In the days of Chaucer and Gower, our language might (with due allowance for the imperfections of a simile) be compared to a wilderness of vocal reeds, from which the favourites only of Pan or Apollo could construct even the rude *syrinx*; and from this the constructors alone could elicit strains of music. But now, partly by the labours of successive poets, and in part by the more artificial state of society and social intercourse, language, mechanized as it were into a barrel-organ, supplies at once both instrument and tune. Thus even the deaf may play, so as to delight the many. Sometimes (for it is with similes, as it is with jests at a

wine table, one is sure to suggest another) I have attempted to illustrate the present state of our language, in its relation to literature, by a press-room of larger and smaller stereotype pieces, which, in the present Anglo-Gallican fashion of unconnected, epigrammatic periods, it requires but an ordinary portion of ingenuity to vary indefinitely, and yet still produce something, which, if not sense, will be so like it as to do as well. Perhaps better: for it spares the reader the trouble of thinking; prevents vacancy, while it indulges indolence; and secures the memory from all danger of an intellectual *plethora*. Hence of all trades, literature at present demands the least talent or information; and, of all modes of literature, the manufacturing of poems. The difference indeed between these and the works of genius is not less than between an egg and an egg-shell; yet at a distance they both look alike.

Now it is no less remarkable than true, with how little examination works of polite literature are commonly perused, not only by the mass of readers, but by men of first rate ability, till some accident or chance⁶ discussion have roused their attention, and

⁶ In the course of one of my Lectures, I had occasion to point out the almost faultless position and choice of words, in Pope's original compositions, particularly in his Satires and moral Essays, for the purpose of comparing them with his translation of Homer, which, I do not stand alone in regarding as the main source of our *pseudo-poetic* diction. And this, by the bye, is an additional confirmation of a remark made, I believe, by Sir Joshua Reynolds, that next to the man who forms and elevates the taste of the public, he that corrupts it, is commonly the greatest genius. Among other passages, I analyzed sentence by sentence, and almost word by word, the popular lines,

As when the moon, refulgent lamp of night, &c.

(Iliad. B. viii.)

put them on their guard. And hence individuals below mediocrity not less in natural power than in acquired knowledge; nay, bunglers who have failed in

much in the same way as has been since done, in an excellent article on Chalmers's British Poets in the Quarterly Review.* The impression on the audience in general was sudden and evident: and a number of enlightened and highly educated persons, who at different times afterwards addressed me on the subject, expressed their wonder, that truth so obvious should not have struck them before; but at the same time acknowledged—(so much had they been accustomed, in reading poetry, to receive pleasure from the separate images and phrases successively, without asking themselves whether the collective meaning was sense or nonsense)—that they might in all probability have read the same passage again twenty times with undiminished admiration, and without once reflecting, that

ἄστρο φαεινὴν ἀμφὶ σελήνην
φαίνεται ἀριπρεπέα—

(that is, the stars around, or near the full moon, shine pre-eminently bright)—conveys a just and happy image of a moonlight sky: while it is difficult to determine whether, in the lines,

Around *her throne* the vivid planets roll,
And stars *unnumber'd* gild the glowing pole,

the sense or the diction be the more absurd. My answer was; that, though I had derived peculiar advantages from my school discipline, and though my general theory of poetry was the same then as now, I had yet experienced the same sensations myself, and felt almost as if I had been newly couched, when, by Mr. Wordsworth's conversation, I had been induced to re-examine with impartial strictness Gray's celebrated Elegy. I had long before detected the defects in *The Bard*; but the Elegy I had considered as proof against all fair attacks; and to

* [The article to which the Author refers was written by Mr. Southey, and may be found in Vol. XI. of the Quarterly Review, p. 480. But it contains nothing corresponding to Mr. Coleridge's remark, whose reference is evidently mistaken. Ed.]

the lowest mechanic crafts, and whose presumption is in due proportion to their want of sense and sensibility; men, who being first scribblers from idleness

this day I cannot read either without delight, and a portion of enthusiasm. At all events, whatever pleasure I may have lost by the clearer perception of the faults in certain passages, has been more than repaid to me by the additional delight with which I read the remainder.

Another instance in confirmation of these remarks occurs to me in the Faithful Shepherdess. Seward first traces Fletcher's lines;

More foul diseases than e'er yet the hot
Sun bred thro' his burnings, while the dog
Pursues the raging lion, throwing the fog
And deadly vapour from his angry breath,
Filling the lower world with plague and death,

to Spenser's Shepherd's Calendar,

The rampant lion hunts he fast
With dogs of noisome breath;
Whose baleful barking brings, in haste,
Pine, plagues, and dreary death!

He then takes occasion to introduce Homer's simile of the appearance of Achilles' mail to Priam compared with the Dog Star; literally thus—

“For this indeed is most splendid, but it was made an evil sign, and brings many a consuming disease to wretched mortals.”* Nothing can be more simple as a description, or more accurate as a simile; which, (says Seward,) is thus finely translated by Mr. Pope:

Terrific Glory! for his burning breath
Taints the red air with fevers, plagues, and death!

Now here—(not to mention the tremendous bombast)—the Dog Star, so called, is turned into a real dog, a very odd dog, a

* [λαμπρότατος μὲν ὄδ' ἐστὶ, κακὸν δὲ τε σῆμα τέτυκται,
καὶ τε φέρει πολλὸν πυρετὸν δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν.

Iliad xxii. 30. S. C.]

and ignorance, next become libellers from envy and malevolence,—have been able to drive a successful trade in the employment of the booksellers, nay, have raised themselves into temporary name and reputation with the public at large, by that most powerful of all adulation, the appeal to the bad and malignant passions of mankind.⁹ But as it is the nature of scorn, envy, and all malignant propensities to require a quick change of objects, such writers are sure, sooner or later, to awake from their dream of vanity to disappointment and neglect with embittered and envenomed feelings. Even during their short-lived success, sensible in spite of themselves on what a shifting foundation it rests, they resent the mere refusal of praise as a robbery, and at the justest censures kindle at once into violent and undisciplined abuse; till the acute disease changing into chronical, the more deadly as the less violent, they become the fit instruments of literary detraction and moral slander. They are then no longer to be questioned without exposing the complainant to ridicule, because, forsooth, they are anonymous critics, and authorized, in Andrew Marvell's

fire, fever, plague, and death-breathing, red-air-tainting dog: and the whole visual likeness is lost, while the likeness in the effects is rendered absurd by the exaggeration. In Spenser and Fletcher the thought is justifiable; for the images are at least consistent, and it was the intention of the writers to mark the seasons by this allegory of visualized puns.

⁹ Especially in this age of personality, this age of literary and political gossiping, when the meanest insects are worshipped with a sort of Egyptian superstition, if only the brainless head be atoned for by the sting of personal malignity in the tail;—when the most vapid satires have become the objects of a keen public interest, purely from the number of contemporary characters named in the patch-work notes, (which possess, however, the comparative merit of being more poetical than the text,) and because, to increase the stimulus, the author has sa-

phrase, as “synodical individuals” to speak of themselves *plurali majestatico* ! As if literature formed a caste, like that of the Paras in Hindostan, who, however maltreated, must not dare to deem themselves wronged ! As if that, which in all other cases adds a deeper dye to slander, the circumstance of its being anonymous, here acted only to make the slanderer inviolable !¹⁰ Thus, in part, from the accidental tempers of individuals—(men of undoubted talent, but not men of genius)—tempers rendered yet more irritable by their desire to appear men of genius ; but still more effectively by the excesses of the mere counterfeits both of talent and genius ; the number too being so incomparably greater of those who are thought to be, than of those who really are men of genius ; and in part from the natural, but not therefore the less partial and unjust distinction, made by the public itself between literary and all other property ;—I believe the prejudice to have arisen, which considers an unusual irascibility concerning the reception of its products as characteristic of genius.

It might correct the moral feelings of a numerous

gaciously left his own name for whispers and conjectures. [From *The Friend*, Vol. II. Essay 1. *On the Errors of Party Spirit*, pp. 9-10. 4th edit. S. C.]

¹⁰ If it were worth while to mix together, as ingredients, half the anecdotes which I either myself know to be true, or which I have received from men incapable of intentional falsehood, concerning the characters, qualifications, and motives of our anonymous critics, whose decisions are oracles for our reading public ; I might safely borrow the words of the apocryphal Daniel ; “ Give me leave, O SOVEREIGN PUBLIC, and I shall slay this dragon without sword or staff.” For the compound would be as the “ pitch, and fat, and hair, which Daniel took, and did seethe them together, and made lumps thereof ; this he put in the dragon’s mouth, and so the dragon burst in sunder ; and Daniel said, Lo, THESE ARE THE GODS YE WORSHIP.”

class of readers, to suppose a Review set on foot, the object of which should be to criticise all the chief works presented to the public by our ribbon-weavers, calico-printers, cabinet-makers, and china-manufacturers; which should be conducted in the same spirit, and take the same freedom with personal character, as our literary journals. They would scarcely, I think, deny their belief, not only that the *genus irritabile* would be found to include many other *species* besides that of bards; but that the irritability of trade would soon reduce the resentments of poets into mere shadow-fights in the comparison. Or is wealth the only rational object of human interest? Or even if this were admitted, has the poet no property in his works? Or is it a rare, or culpable case, that he who serves at the altar of the Muses, should be compelled to derive his maintenance from the altar, when too he has perhaps deliberately abandoned the fairest prospects of rank and opulence in order to devote himself, an entire and undistracted man, to the instruction or refinement of his fellow-citizens? Or, should we pass by all higher objects and motives, all disinterested benevolence, and even that ambition of lasting praise which is at once the crutch and ornament, which at once supports and betrays, the infirmity of human virtue,—is the character and property of the man, who labours for our intellectual pleasures, less entitled to a share of our fellow feeling, than that of the wine-merchant or milliner? Sensibility indeed, both quick and deep, is not only a characteristic feature, but may be deemed a component part, of genius. But it is not less an essential mark of true genius, that its sensibility is excited by any other cause more powerfully than by its own personal interests; for this plain reason, that the man of genius lives most in the ideal world,

in which the present is still constituted by the future or the past; and because his feelings have been habitually associated with thoughts and images, to the number, clearness, and vivacity of which the sensation of self is always in an inverse proportion. And yet, should he perchance have occasion to repel some false charge, or to rectify some erroneous censure, nothing is more common than for the many to mistake the general liveliness of his manner and language, whatever is the subject, for the effects of peculiar irritation from its accidental relation to himself.¹¹

For myself, if from my own feelings, or from the less suspicious test of the observations of others, I had been made aware of any literary testiness or jealousy; I trust, that I should have been, however, neither silly nor arrogant enough to have burthened the imperfection on genius. But an experience—(and I should not need documents in abundance to prove my

¹¹ This is one instance among many of deception, by the telling the half of a fact, and omitting the other half, when it is from their mutual counteraction and neutralization, that the whole truth arises, as a *tertium aliquid* different from either. Thus in Dryden's famous line

Great wit (meaning genius) to madness sure is near allied.

Now if the profound sensibility, which is doubtless one of the components of genius, were alone considered, single and unbalanced, it might be fairly described as exposing the individual to a greater chance of mental derangement; but then a more than usual rapidity of association, a more than usual power of passing from thought to thought, and image to image, is a component equally essential; and in the due modification of each by the other the genius itself consists; so that it would be just as fair to describe the earth, as in imminent danger of exorbitating, or of falling into the sun, according as the assertor of the absurdity confined his attention either to the projectile or to the attractive force exclusively.

words, if I added)—a tried experience of twenty years, has taught me, that the original sin of my character consists in a careless indifference to public opinion, and to the attacks of those who influence it; that praise and admiration have become yearly less and less desirable, except as marks of sympathy; nay that it is difficult and distressing to me to think with any interest even about the sale and profit of my works, important as, in my present circumstances, such considerations must needs be. Yet it never occurred to me to believe or fancy, that the *quantum* of intellectual power bestowed on me by nature or education was in any way connected with this habit of my feelings; or that it needed any other parents or fosterers than constitutional indolence, aggravated into languor by ill-health; the accumulating embarrassments of procrastination; the mental cowardice, which is the inseparable companion of procrastination, and which makes us anxious to think and converse on any thing rather than on what concerns ourselves; in fine, all those close vexations, whether chargeable on my faults or my fortunes, which leave me but little grief to spare for evils comparatively distant and alien.

Indignation at literary wrongs I leave to men born under happier stars. I cannot afford it. But so far from condemning those who can, I deem it a writer's duty, and think it creditable to his heart, to feel and express a resentment proportioned to the grossness of the provocation, and the importance of the object. There is no profession on earth, which requires an attention so early, so long, or so unintermitting as that of poetry; and indeed as that of literary composition in general, if it be such as at all satisfies the demands both of taste and of sound logic. How difficult and delicate a task even the mere mechanism of verse is,

may be conjectured from the failure of those, who have attempted poetry late in life. Where then a man has, from his earliest youth, devoted his whole being to an object, which by the admission of all civilized nations in all ages is honourable as a pursuit, and glorious as an attainment; what of all that relates to himself and his family, if only we except his moral character, can have fairer claims to his protection, or more authorize acts of self-defence, than the elaborate products of his intellect and intellectual industry? Prudence itself would command us to show, even if defect or diversion of natural sensibility had prevented us from feeling, a due interest and qualified anxiety for the offspring and representatives of our nobler being. I know it, alas! by woful experience. I have laid too many eggs in the hot sands of this wilderness, the world, with ostrich carelessness and ostrich oblivion. The greater part indeed have been trod under foot, and are forgotten; but yet no small number have crept forth into life, some to furnish feathers for the caps of others, and still more to plume the shafts in the quivers of my enemies, of them that unprovoked have lain in wait against my soul.

*Sic vos, non vobis, mellificatis, apes!*¹²

¹² [“He was one of those who with long and large arm still collected precious armfuls, in whatever direction he pressed forward, yet still took up so much more than he could keep together, that those who followed him gleaned more from his continual droppings than he himself brought home;—nay, made stately corn-ricks therewith, while the reaper himself was still seen only with his armful of newly-cut sheaves.” Lit. Rem. I. p. 13. Ed.]

CHAPTER III.

The Author's obligations to Critics, and the probable occasion—Principles of modern Criticism—Mr. Southey's works and character.



O anonymous critics in reviews, magazines, and news-journals of various name and rank, and to satirists with or without a name, in verse or prose, or in verse-text aided by prose-comment, I do seriously believe and profess, that I owe full two-thirds of whatever reputation and publicity I happen to possess. For when the name of an individual has occurred so frequently, in so many works, for so great a length of time, the readers of these works—(which with a shelf or two of Beauties, elegant Extracts and Anas, form nine-tenths of the reading of the reading Public¹)—

¹ For as to the devotees of the circulating libraries, I dare not compliment their pass-time, or rather kill-time, with the name of reading. Call it rather a sort of beggarly day-dreaming, during which the mind of the dreamer furnishes for itself nothing but laziness, and a little mawkish sensibility; while the whole *materiel* and imagery of the doze is supplied *ab extra* by a sort of mental *camera obscura* manufactured at the printing office, which *pro tempore* fixes, reflects, and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of a hundred other brains afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite purpose. We should therefore transfer this species of amusement,—(if indeed those can be said to retire *a musis*, who were never in their company, or relaxation be attributable to those, whose bows are never bent)—from the *genus*, reading, to that comprehensive

cannot but be familiar with the name, without distinctly remembering whether it was introduced for eulogy or for censure. And this becomes the more likely, if (as I believe) the habit of perusing periodical works may be properly added to Averroes'² catalogue of Anti-Mnemonics, or weakeners of the memory.³ But where this has not been the case, yet the reader will be apt to suspect, that there must be something more than usually strong and extensive in a reputation, that could either require or stand so merciless and long-continued a cannonading. Without any feeling of anger there-

class characterized by the power of reconciling the two contrary yet co-existing propensities of human nature, namely, indulgence of sloth, and hatred of vacancy. In addition to novels and tales of chivalry in prose or rhyme, (by which last I mean neither rhythm nor metre) this *genus* comprises as its *species*, gaming, swinging, or swaying on a chair or gate; spitting over a bridge; smoking; snuff-taking; *tête à tête* quarrels after dinner between husband and wife; conning word by word all the advertisements of a daily newspaper in a public house on a rainy day, &c. &c. &c.

² [The true polyonomous appellative of Averroes was Abul Walid Mohammed Ebn Achmed Ebn Mohammed Ebn Raschid. He was born at Cordova about 1150, and died in Morocco in 1206 or 1207. ED.]

³ Ex gr. *Pediculos e capillis excerptos in arenam jacere incon-tusos*; eating of unripe fruit; gazing on the clouds, and (*in genere*) on movable things suspended in the air; riding among a multitude of camels; frequent laughter; listening to a series of jests and humorous anecdotes,—as when (so to modernize the learned Saracen's meaning) one man's droll story of an Irishman inevitably occasions another's droll story of a Scotchman, which again, by the same sort of conjunction disjunctive, leads to some *étourderie* of a Welshman, and that again to some sly hit of a Yorkshireman;—the habit of reading tomb-stones in church-yards, &c. By the bye, this catalogue, strange as it may appear, is not insusceptible of a sound psychological commentary.

fore—(for which indeed, on my own account, I have no pretext)—I may yet be allowed to express some degree of surprise, that, after having run the critical gauntlet for a certain class of faults which I had, nothing having come before the judgment-seat in the interim, I should, year after year, quarter after quarter, month after month—(not to mention sundry petty periodicals of still quicker revolution, “or weekly or diurnal”)—have been, for at least seventeen years consecutively, dragged forth by them into the foremost ranks of the proscribed, and forced to abide the brunt of abuse, for faults directly opposite, and which I certainly had not. How shall I explain this?

Whatever may have been the case with others, I certainly cannot attribute this persecution to personal dislike, or to envy, or to feelings of vindictive animosity. Not to the former, for, with the exception of a very few who are my intimate friends, and were so before they were known as authors, I have had little other acquaintance with literary characters, than what may be implied in an accidental introduction, or casual meeting in a mixed company. And as far as words and looks can be trusted, I must believe that, even in these instances, I had excited no unfriendly disposition. Neither by letter, nor in conversation, have I ever had dispute or controversy beyond the common social interchange of opinions. Nay, where I had reason to suppose my convictions fundamentally different, it has been my habit, and I may add, the impulse of my nature, to assign the grounds of my belief, rather than the belief itself; and not to express dissent, till I could establish some points of complete sympathy, some grounds common to both sides, from which to commence its explanation.

Still less can I place these attacks to the charge of

envy. The few pages which I have published, are of too distant a date, and the extent of their sale a proof too conclusive against their having been popular at any time, to render probable, I had almost said possible, the excitement of envy on their account; and the man who should envy me on any other,—verily he must be envy-mad!

Lastly, with as little semblance of reason, could I suspect any animosity towards me from vindictive feelings as the cause. I have before said, that my acquaintance with literary men has been limited and distant; and that I have had neither dispute nor controversy. From my first entrance into life, I have, with few and short intervals, lived either abroad or in retirement. My different essays on subjects of national interest, published at different times, first in the *Morning Post* and then in the *Courier*, with my courses of Lectures on the principles of criticism as applied to Shakespeare and Milton,⁴ constitute my

⁴ [“Mr. Coleridge’s courses of Lectures on literary and other subjects between 1800 and 1819 were numerous, but the Editor is unable to record them accurately. They were delivered at the Royal Institution, the Crown and Anchor, the Surrey Institution, the London Philosophical Society, Willis’s Rooms, and, it is believed, in several other places in London. The subjects were Shakespeare and the Drama generally, particular plays of Shakespeare, the history of English and Italian Literature, the history of Philosophy, Education of Women, connection of the Fine Arts with education and improvement of the mind, and many others of which the Editor can learn nothing certain. The most remarkable of his contributions to the newspapers mentioned in the text, were the character of Mr. Pitt in the *Morning Post* in 1800, and the Series of Letters on the Spanish War in the *Courier* in 1809. What the Author says as to these exertions constituting his whole publicity, must not be taken too strictly; for besides *The Friend*, the *Remorse*,

whole publicity; the only occasions on which I *could* offend any member of the republic of letters. With one solitary exception in which my words were first misstated and then wantonly applied to an individual, I could never learn that I had excited the displeasure of any among my literary contemporaries. Having announced my intention to give a course of Lectures on the characteristic merits and defects of English poetry in its different æras;⁵ first, from Chaucer to Milton; second, from Dryden inclusively to Thomson; and third, from Cowper to the present day; I changed my plan, and confined my disquisition to the former two periods, that I might furnish no possible pretext for the unthinking to misconstrue, or the malignant to misapply my words, and having stamped their own meaning on them, to pass them as current coin in the marts of garrulity or detraction.

Praises of the unworthy are felt by ardent minds as robberies of the deserving; and it is too true, and too frequent, that Bacon, Harrington, Machiavel, and Spinoza, are not read, because Hume, Condillac, and Voltaire are. But in promiscuous company no prudent man will oppugn the merits of a contemporary in his own supposed department; contenting himself with praising in his turn those whom he deems excellent. If I should ever deem it my duty at all to oppose the pretensions of individuals, I would oppose them in books which could be weighed and answered, in which

Christabel and his other Poems published before the *date* of this work, Mr. Coleridge had made his name well known long before by his courses of Lectures at Bristol on the French Revolution, Christianity, Slavery, and other subjects, some of which were printed. ED.]

⁵ [This alludes to the Lectures at the London Philosophical Society, which began on the 18th of November, 1811. ED.]

I could evolve the whole of my reasons and feelings, with their requisite limits and modifications; not in irrecoverable conversation, where however strong the reasons might be, the feelings that prompted them would assuredly be attributed by some one or other to envy and discontent. Besides I well know, and, I trust, have acted on that knowledge, that it must be the ignorant and injudicious who extol the unworthy; and the eulogies of critics without taste or judgment are the natural reward of authors without feeling or genius. *Sint unicuique sua præmia.*

How then, dismissing, as I do, these three causes, am I to account for attacks, the long continuance and inveteracy of which it would require all three to explain? The solution seems to be this,—*I was in habits of intimacy with Mr. Wordsworth and Mr. Southey!* This, however, transfers, rather than removes the difficulty. Be it, that, by an unconscionable extension of the old adage, *noscitur a socio*, my literary friends are never under the water-fall of criticism, but I must be wet through with the spray; yet how came the torrent to descend upon *them*?

First then, with regard to Mr. Southey. I well remember the general reception of his earlier publications; namely, the poems published with Mr. Lovell under the names of Moschus and Bion; the two volumes of poems under his own name, and the Joan of Arc.⁶ The censures of the critics by profession are extant, and may be easily referred to:—careless lines, inequality in the merit of the different poems, and (in

⁶ [The joint volume appeared in 1795. Bion was Southey, Moschus, Lovell. It contained "the Retrospect," in its original form. Joan of Arc appeared in 1796—the "two volumes" in 1797—both published by Mr. Cottle. Ed.]

the lighter works) a predilection for the strange and whimsical; in short, such faults as might have been anticipated in a young and rapid writer, were indeed sufficiently enforced. Nor was there at that time wanting a party spirit to aggravate the defects of a poet, who with all the courage of uncorrupted youth had avowed his zeal for a cause, which he deemed that of liberty, and his abhorrence of oppression by whatever name consecrated. But it was as little objected by others, as dreamed of by the poet himself, that he preferred careless and prosaic lines on rule and of forethought, or indeed that he pretended to any other art or theory of poetic diction, except that which we may all learn from Horace, Quinctilian, the admirable dialogue, *De Oratoribus*, generally attributed to Tacitus, or Strada's *Prolusions*; if indeed natural good sense and the early study of the best models in his own language had not infused the same maxims more securely, and, if I may venture the expression, more vitally. All that could have been fairly deduced was, that in his taste and estimation of writers Mr. Southey agreed far more with Thomas Warton, than with Dr. Johnson. Nor do I mean to deny, that at all times Mr. Southey was of the same mind with Sir Philip Sidney⁷ in preferring an excellent ballad in the humblest style of poetry to twenty indifferent poems that strutted in the highest. And by what have his works, published since then, been characterized, each more strikingly than the preceding, but by greater splendour, a deeper pathos, profounder reflections, and a more sustained dignity of language and of metre? Distant

⁷ ["I never heard the old song of Percie and Douglas that I found not my heart moved more than with a trumpet." *Defence of Poesie*. Ed.]

may the period be, but whenever the time shall come, when all his works shall be collected by some editor worthy to be his biographer, I trust that an appendix of *excerpta* of all the passages, in which his writings, name, and character have been attacked, from the pamphlets and periodical works of the last twenty years, may be an accompaniment. Yet that it would prove medicinal in after times I dare not hope; for as long as there are readers to be delighted with calumny, there will be found reviewers to calumniate. And such readers will become in all probability more numerous, in proportion as a still greater diffusion of literature shall produce an increase of sciolists, and sciolism bring with it petulance and presumption. In times of old, books were as religious oracles; as literature advanced, they next became venerable preceptors; they then descended to the rank of instructive friends; and, as their numbers increased, they sank still lower to that of entertaining companions; and at present they seem degraded into culprits to hold up their hands at the bar of every self-elected, yet not the less peremptory, judge, who chooses to write from humour or interest, from enmity or arrogance, and to abide the decision “of him that reads in malice, or him that reads after dinner.”

The same retrograde movement may be traced, in the relation which the authors themselves have assumed towards their readers. From the lofty address of Bacon: “these are the meditations of Francis of Verulam, which that posterity should be possessed of, he deemed *their* interest:”⁸ or from dedication to Monarch

⁸ [§ *Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit; talemque apud se rationem instituit, quam viventibus et posteris notam fieri, ipsorum interesse putavit.* Nov. Org. Ed.]

or Pontiff, in which the honour given was asserted in equipoise to the patronage acknowledged : from Pindar's

————— 'επ' ἄλλοι-
 -σι δ' ἄλλοι μεγάλοι: τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυ-
 -φᾶται βασιλευσι* Μηκέτι
 πάπταινε πόρσιον.
 εἴη σέ τε τῆτον
 ὑψῆ χρόνον πατεῖν, ἐμέ
 τε τοσσάδε νικαφόρου
 ὀμιλεῖν, πρόφαντον σοφίαν καθ' Ἑλ-
 -λανας ἔόντα παντᾶ.

OLYMP. OD. 1.

there was a gradual sinking in the etiquette or allowed style of pretension.

Poets and Philosophers, rendered diffident by their very number, addressed themselves to “*learned* readers;” then aimed to conciliate the graces of “the *candid* reader;” till, the critic still rising as the author sank, the amateurs of literature collectively were erected into a municipality of judges, and addressed as the Town! And now, finally, all men being supposed able to read, and all readers able to judge, the multitudinous Public, shaped into personal unity by the magic of abstraction, sits nominal despot on the throne of criticism. But, alas! as in other despotisms, it but echoes the decisions of its invisible ministers, whose intellectual claims to the guardianship of the Muses seem, for the greater part, analogous to the physical qualifications which adapt their oriental brethren for the superintendence of the Harem. Thus it is said, that St. Nepomuc was installed the guardian of bridges, because he had fallen over one, and sunk out of sight; thus too St. Cecilia is said to have been first propitiated by musicians, because, having failed in her own attempts, she had taken a dislike to the art and

all its successful professors. But I shall probably have occasion hereafter to deliver my convictions more at large concerning this state of things, and its influences on taste, genius and morality.

In the *Thalaba*, the *Madoc*, and still more evidently in the unique⁹ *Cid*, in the *Kehama*, and, as last, so best, the *Roderick*; Southey has given abundant proof, *se cogitare quam sit magnum dare aliquid in manus hominum: nec persuadere sibi posse, non sæpe tractandum quod placere et semper et omnibus cupiat*.¹⁰ But on the other hand, I conceive, that Mr. Southey was quite unable to comprehend, wherein could consist the crime or mischief of printing half a dozen or more playful poems; or to speak more generally, compositions which would be enjoyed or passed over, according as the taste and humour of the reader might chance to be; provided they contained nothing immoral. In the present age *perituræ parcere chartæ* is emphatically an unreasonable demand. The merest trifle he ever sent abroad had tenfold better claims to its ink and paper than all the silly criticisms on it, which proved no more than that the critic was not one of those, for whom the trifle was written; and than all the grave exhortations to a greater reverence for the

⁹ I have ventured to call it unique; not only because I know no work of the kind in our language, (if we except a few chapters of the old translation of Froissart)—none, which uniting the charms of romance and history, keeps the imagination so constantly on the wing, and yet leaves so much for after reflection; but likewise, and chiefly, because it is a compilation, which, in the various excellencies of translation, selection, and arrangement, required and proves greater genius in the compiler, as living in the present state of society, than in the original composers.

¹⁰ [Accommodated from Pliny the younger. L. vii. Ep. 17. Ed.]

public—as if the passive page of a book, by having an epigram or doggrel tale impressed on it, instantly assumed at once loco-motive power and a sort of ubiquity, so as to flutter and buz in the ear of the public to the sore annoyance of the said mysterious personage. But what gives an additional and more ludicrous absurdity to these lamentations is the curious fact, that if in a volume of poetry the critic should find poem or passage which he deems more especially worthless, he is sure to select and reprint it in the review; by which, on his own grounds, he wastes as much more paper than the author, as the copies of a fashionable review are more numerous than those of the original book; in some, and those the most prominent instances, as ten thousand to five hundred. I know nothing that surpasses the vileness of deciding on the merits of a poet or painter,—(not by characteristic defects; for where there is genius, these always point to his characteristic beauties; but)—by accidental failures or faulty passages; except the impudence of defending it, as the proper duty, and most instructive part, of criticism. Omit or pass slightly over the expression, grace, and grouping of Raffael's figures; but ridicule in detail the knitting-needles and broom-twigs, that are to represent trees in his back grounds; and never let him hear the last of his galli-pots! Admit, that the Allegro and Penseroso of Milton are not without merit; but repay yourself for this concession, by reprinting at length the two poems on the University Carrier! As a fair specimen of his Sonnets, quote

“ A Book was writ of late called Tetrachordon; ”

and, as characteristic of his rhythm and metre, cite his literal translation of the first and second Psalm! In order to justify yourself, you need only assert, that had you dwelt chiefly on the beauties and excellencies of the

poet, the admiration of these might seduce the attention of future writers from the objects of their love and wonder, to an imitation of the few poems and passages in which the poet was most unlike himself.

But till reviews are conducted on far other principles, and with far other motives ; till in the place of arbitrary dictation and petulant sneers, the reviewers support their decisions by reference to fixed canons of criticism, previously established and deduced from the nature of man ; reflecting minds will pronounce it arrogance in them thus to announce themselves to men of letters, as the guides of their taste and judgment. To the purchaser and mere reader it is, at all events, an injustice. He who tells me that there are defects in a new work, tells me nothing which I should not have taken for granted without his information. But he, who points out and elucidates the beauties of an original work, does indeed give me interesting information, such as experience would not have authorized me in anticipating. And as to compositions which the authors themselves announce with

*Hæc ipsi novimus esse nihil,*¹¹

why should we judge by a different rule two printed works, only because the one author is alive, and the other in his grave? What literary man has not regretted the prudery of Spratt in refusing to let his friend Cowley appear in his slippers and dressing gown? I am not perhaps the only one who has derived an innocent amusement from the riddles, conundrums, tri-syllable lines, and the like, of Swift and his correspondents, in hours of languor, when to have read his more finished works would have been useless

¹¹ [The motto prefixed by Mr. Southey to his *Minor Poems*. Ed.]

to myself, and, in some sort, an act of injustice to the author. But I am at a loss to conceive by what perversity of judgment, these relaxations of his genius could be employed to diminish his fame as the writer of *Gulliver*, or the *Tale of a Tub*. Had Mr. Southey written twice as many poems of inferior merit, or partial interest, as have enlivened the journals of the day, they would have added to his honour with good and wise men, not merely or principally as proving the versatility of his talents, but as evidences of the purity of that mind, which even in its levities never dictated a line which it need regret on any moral account.

I have in imagination transferred to the future biographer the duty of contrasting Southey's fixed and well-earned fame, with the abuse and indefatigable hostility of his anonymous critics from his early youth to his ripest manhood. But I cannot think so ill of human nature as not to believe, that these critics have already taken shame to themselves, whether they consider the object of their abuse in his moral or his literary character. For reflect but on the variety and extent of his acquirements! He stands second to no man, either as an historian or as a bibliographer; and when I regard him as a popular essayist,—(for the articles of his compositions in the reviews are, for the greater part, essays on subjects of deep or curious interest rather than criticisms on particular works)—I look in vain for any writer, who has conveyed so much information, from so many and such recondite sources, with so many just and original reflections, in a style so lively and poignant, yet so uniformly classical and perspicuous; no one, in short, who has combined so much wisdom with so much wit; so much truth and knowledge with so much life and fancy. His prose is always intelligible and always entertaining. In

poetry he has attempted almost every species of composition known before, and he has added new ones; and if we except the highest lyric,—(in which how few, how very few even of the greatest minds have been fortunate)—he has attempted every species successfully;—from the political song of the day, thrown off in the playful overflow of honest joy and patriotic exultation, to the wild ballad; from epistolary ease and graceful narrative, to austere and impetuous moral declamation; from the pastoral charms and wild streaming lights of the *Thalaba*, in which sentiment and imagery have given permanence even to the excitement of curiosity; and from the full blaze of the *Ke-hama*,—(a gallery of finished pictures in one splendid fancy piece, in which, notwithstanding, the moral grandeur rises gradually above the brilliance of the colouring and the boldness and novelty of the machinery)—to the more sober beauties of the *Madoc*; and lastly, from the *Madoc* to his *Roderick*, in which, retaining all his former excellencies of a poet eminently inventive and picturesque, he has surpassed himself in language and metre, in the construction of the whole, and in the splendour of particular passages.

Here then shall I conclude? No! The characters of the deceased, like the *encomia* on tombstones, as they are described with religious tenderness, so are they read, with allowing sympathy indeed, but yet with rational deduction. There are men, who deserve a higher record; men with whose characters it is the interest of their contemporaries, no less than that of posterity, to be made acquainted; while it is yet possible for impartial censure, and even for quick-sighted envy, to cross-examine the tale without offence to the courtesies of humanity; and while the eulogist, detected in exaggeration or falsehood, must pay the full

penalty of his baseness in the contempt which brands the convicted flatterer. Publicly has Mr. Southey been reviled by men, who, as I would fain hope for the honour of human nature, hurled fire-brands against a figure of their own imagination; publicly have his talents been depreciated, his principles denounced; as publicly do I therefore, who have known him intimately, deem it my duty to leave recorded, that it is Southey's almost unexampled felicity, to possess the best gifts of talent and genius free from all their characteristic defects. To those who remember the state of our public schools and universities some twenty years past, it will appear no ordinary praise in any man to have passed from innocence into virtue, not only free from all vicious habit, but unstained by one act of intemperance, or the degradations akin to intemperance. That scheme of head, heart, and habitual demeanour, which in his early manhood, and first controversial writings, Milton, claiming the privilege of self-defence, asserts of himself, and challenges his calumniators to disprove;¹² this will his school-mates, his fellow-collegians, and his maturer friends, with a confidence proportioned to the intimacy of their knowledge, bear witness to, as again realized in the life of Robert Southey. But still more striking to those, who by biography or by their own experience are fami-

¹² [*Ad me quod attinet, te testor, Deus, mentis intimæ cogitationumque omnium indagator, me nullius rei (quanquam hoc apud me sapius et, quam maxime potui, serio quasivi, et recessus vitæ omnes excussi,) nullius vel recens vel olim commissi mihimet conscium esse, cujus atrocitas hanc mihi præ cæteris calamitatem creare, aut accersisse merito potuerit.*—Def. Sec.

Tu senties eam esse vitæ meæ et apud me conscientiam, et apud bonos existimationem, eam esse et præteritæ fiduciam et reliquæ spem bonam, ut nihil impedire me, aut abstertere possit, quo minus flagitium tua, si pergis lacessere, etiam liberius adhuc et diligentius persequar.—Def. cont. Alex. Morum. Ed.]

liar with the general habits of genius, will appear the poet's matchless industry and perseverance in his pursuits; the worthiness and dignity of those pursuits; his generous submission to tasks of transitory interest, or such as *his* genius alone could make otherwise; and that having thus more than satisfied the claims of affection or prudence, he should yet have made for himself time and power, to achieve more, and in more various departments, than almost any other writer has done, though employed wholly on subjects of his own choice and ambition. But as Southey possesses, and is not possessed by, his genius, even so is he master even of his virtues. The regular and methodical tenor of his daily labours, which would be deemed rare in the most mechanical pursuits, and might be envied by the mere man of business, loses all semblance of formality in the dignified simplicity of his manners, in the spring and healthful cheerfulness of his spirits. Always employed, his friends find him always at leisure. No less punctual in trifles, than steadfast in the performance of highest duties, he inflicts none of those small pains and discomforts which irregular men scatter about them, and which in the aggregate so often become formidable obstacles both to happiness and utility; while on the contrary he bestows all the pleasures, and inspires all that ease of mind on those around him or connected with him, which perfect consistency, and (if such a word might be framed) absolute *reliability*, equally in small as in great concerns, cannot but inspire and bestow; when this too is softened without being weakened by kindness and gentleness. I know few men who so well deserve the character which an antient attributes to Marcus Cato, namely, that he was likest virtue, in as much as he seemed to act aright, not in obedience to any law or outward motive, but by

the necessity of a happy nature, which could not act otherwise.¹³ As son, brother, husband, father, master, friend, he moves with firm yet light steps, alike unostentatious, and alike exemplary. As a writer, he has uniformly made his talents subservient to the best interests of humanity, of public virtue, and domestic piety; his cause has ever been the cause of pure religion and of liberty, of national independence and of national illumination. When future critics shall weigh out his guerdon of praise and censure, it will be Southey the poet only, that will supply them with the scanty materials for the latter. They will likewise not fail to record, that as no man was ever a more constant friend, never had poet more friends and honourers among the good of all parties; and that quacks in education, quacks in politics, and quacks in criticism were his only enemies.¹⁴

¹³ [— *homo virtuti simillimus, et per omnia ingenio Diis quam hominibus propior, qui nunquam recte fecit, ut facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere non poterat.*—Vell. Paterc. II. 35. Ed.]

¹⁴ It is not easy to estimate the effects which the example of a young man as highly distinguished for strict purity of disposition and conduct, as for intellectual power and literary acquirements, may produce on those of the same age with himself, especially on those of similar pursuits and congenial minds. For many years, my opportunities of intercourse with Mr. Southey have been rare, and at long intervals; but I dwell with unabated pleasure on the strong and sudden, yet I trust not fleeting, influence, which my moral being underwent on my acquaintance with him at Oxford, whither I had gone at the commencement of our Cambridge vacation on a visit to an old school-fellow.* Not indeed on my moral or religious principles, for they had never been contaminated; but in awakening the sense of the duty and dignity of making my actions accord with those

* [Mr. Coleridge first became acquainted with Mr. Southey, then an under-graduate at Balliol College, in June 1794. Ed.]

CHAPTER IV.

The Lyrical Ballads with the Preface—Mr. Wordsworth's earlier poems—On Fancy and Imagination—The investigation of the distinction important to the Fine Arts.



HAVE wandered far from the object in view, but as I fancied to myself readers who would respect the feelings that had tempted me from the main road; so I dare calculate on not a few, who will warmly sympathize with them. At present it will be sufficient for my purpose, if I have proved, that Mr.

principles, both in word and deed. The irregularities only not universal among the young men of my standing, which I always knew to be wrong, I then learned to feel as degrading; learned to know that an opposite conduct, which was at that time considered by us as the easy virtue of cold and selfish prudence, might originate in the noblest emotions, in views the most disinterested and imaginative. It is not however from grateful recollections only, that I have been impelled thus to leave these my deliberate sentiments on record; but in some sense as a debt of justice to the man, whose name has been so often connected with mine for evil to which he is a stranger. As a specimen I subjoin part of a note, from *The Beauties of the Antijacobin*, in which, having previously informed the public that I had been dishonoured at Cambridge for preaching Deism, at a time when, for my youthful ardour in defence of Christianity, I was decried as a bigot by the proselytes of French phi- (or to speak more truly, psi-) losophy, the writer concludes with these words; “since this time he has left his native country, commenced citizen of the world, *left his poor children fatherless, and his wife destitute.* Ex his disce his friends, LAMB and SOU-

Southey's writings no more than my own furnished the original occasion to this fiction of a new school of poetry, and to the clamours against its supposed founders and proselytes.

THEY."* With severest truth it may be asserted, that it would not be easy to select two men more exemplary in their domestic affections than those whose names were thus printed at full length as in the same rank of morals with a denounced infidel and fugitive, who had left his children *fatherless and his wife destitute!* Is it surprising, that many good men remained longer than perhaps they otherwise would have done adverse to a party, which encouraged and openly rewarded the authors of such atrocious calumnies? *Qualis es, nescio; sed per quales agis, scio et doleo.*

* [Of this now harmless injustice Mr. Talfourd speaks as follows, in his interesting sketch of the life, accompanying the delightful Letters of Charles Lamb. "It was surely rather too much, even for partisans, when denouncing their political opponents,"—(in the poem of the 'New Morality' published in the 'Anti-Jacobin,')—"as men who 'dirt on private worth and virtue threw,' thus to slander two young men of the most exemplary character—one of an almost puritanical exactness of demeanour and conduct—and the other persevering in a life of noble self-sacrifice, chequered only by the frailties of a sweet nature, which endeared him even to those who were not admitted to the intimacy necessary to appreciate the touching example of his severer virtues." Vol. i. p. 120.

This passage I quote not, of course, for the sake of refuting The Anti-Jacobin of 1798, but for its warm testimony to the virtues of my father's friend, Mr. Lamb. Having quoted it, I cannot but observe, as regards the terms in which it speaks of Mr. Southey, (my revered uncle,) that his purity,—a pureness of heart and spirit, far beyond any that mere exactitude of demeanour and conduct could evidence or express,—was utterly unmixed, as to me it seems, with puritanism, either in opinion or in spirit. May we not say that the deepest and most pervading purity is preclusive of *puritanism*? On this point he might be favourably contrasted with Cowper, as well as honour-

As little do I believe that Mr. Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads were in themselves the cause. I speak exclusively of the two volumes so entitled.¹ A careful and repeated examination of these confirms me in the belief, that the omission of less than a hundred lines would have precluded nine-tenths of the criticism on this work. I hazard this declaration, however, on the supposition, that the reader has taken it up, as he would have done any other collection of poems purporting to derive their subjects or interests from the incidents of domestic or ordinary life, intermingled with higher strains of meditation which the poet utters in his own person and character; with the proviso, that these poems were perused without knowledge of, or reference to, the author's peculiar opinions, and that the reader had not had his attention previously directed to those peculiarities. In that case, as actually happened with Mr. Southey's earlier works, the lines and passages which might have offended the general taste, would have been considered as mere inequalities, and attributed to inattention, not to perversity of judgment. The men of business who had passed their lives chiefly

ably compared to him in moral strictness, and perhaps raised above him on the score of that deeper purity which is a nature rather than a principle.

Of Mr. Lamb's character in this respect Mr. Coleridge gave a brief description which has been preserved in the specimens of his Table Talk. It was of Charles Lamb that he said, "Nothing ever left a stain on that gentle creature's mind, which looked upon the degraded men and things around him like moonshine on a dunghill, which shines and takes no pollution. All things are shadows to him, except those which move his affections." (P. 107, 2nd edit.)

Some further account of Mr. Lamb will be found in the biographical supplement at the end of the second volume. S. C.]

¹ [See *ante* note p. 2. Ed.]

in cities, and who might therefore be expected to derive the highest pleasure from acute notices of men and manners conveyed in easy, yet correct and pointed language; and all those who, reading but little poetry, are most stimulated with that species of it, which seems most distant from prose, would probably have passed by the volumes altogether. Others more catholic in their taste, and yet habituated to be most pleased when most excited, would have contented themselves with deciding, that the author had been successful in proportion to the elevation of his style and subject. Not a few, perhaps, might, by their admiration of the Lines written near Tintern Abbey, on revisiting the Wye, those Left upon a Yew Tree Seat, The Old Cumberland Beggar, and Ruth, have been gradually led to peruse with kindred feeling The Brothers, the Hart-leap Well, and whatever other poems in that collection may be described as holding a middle place between those written in the highest and those in the humblest style; as for instance between the Tintern Abbey, and The Thorn, or Simon Lee.² Should their taste submit to no further change, and still remain unreconciled to the colloquial phrases, or the imitations of them, that are, more or less, scattered through the class last mentioned; yet even from the small number of the latter, they would have deemed them but an inconsiderable subtraction from the merit of the whole work; or, what is sometimes not unpleasing in the publication of a new writer, as serving to ascertain the natural tendency, and consequently the proper direction of the author's genius.

² [The poems here mentioned are now found in the collected edition of Mr. Wordsworth's Works as follows: II. p. 161. V. p. 7.—p. 282. II. p. 106. I. p. 109. II. p. 141.—p. 124. V. p. 17. Ed.]

In the critical remarks, therefore, prefixed and annexed to the Lyrical Ballads,³ I believe, we may safely rest, as the true origin of the unexampled opposition which Mr. Wordsworth's writings have been since doomed to encounter. The humbler passages in the poems themselves were dwelt on and cited to justify the rejection of the theory. What in and for themselves would have been either forgotten or forgiven as imperfections, or at least comparative failures, provoked direct hostility when announced as intentional, as the result of choice after full deliberation. Thus the poems, admitted by all as excellent, joined with those which had pleased the far greater number, though they formed two-thirds of the whole work, instead of being deemed (as in all right they should have been, even if we take for granted that the reader judged aright) an atonement for the few exceptions, gave wind and fuel to the animosity against both the poems and the poet. In all perplexity there is a portion of fear, which predisposes the mind to anger. Not able to deny that the author possessed both genius and a powerful intellect, they felt *very positive*,—but yet were not *quite certain* that he might not be in the right, and they themselves in the wrong; an unquiet state of mind, which seeks alleviation by quarrelling with the occasion of it, and by wondering at the perverseness of the man, who had written a long and argumentative essay to persuade them, that

Fair is foul, and foul is fair ;

in other words, that they had been all their lives admiring without judgment, and were now about to censure without reason.⁴

³ [This Preface, published in 1800, is now printed II. p. 303. Ed.]

⁴ In opinions of long continuance, and in which we have

That this conjecture is not wide from the mark, I am induced to believe from the noticeable fact, which

never before been molested by a single doubt, to be suddenly convinced of an error, is almost like being convicted of a fault. There is a state of mind, which is the direct *antithesis* of that, which takes place when we make a bull. The bull namely consists in the bringing together two incompatible thoughts, with the sensation, but without the sense, of their connection. The psychological condition, or that which constitutes the possibility, of this state, being such disproportionate vividness of two distant thoughts, as extinguishes or obscures the consciousness of the intermediate images or conceptions, or wholly abstracts the attention from them. Thus in the well known bull, "*I was a fine child, but they changed me;*" the first conception expressed in the word "*I,*" is that of personal identity—*Ego contemplan*: the second expressed in the word "*me,*" is the visual image or object by which the mind represents to itself its past condition, or rather, its personal identity under the form in which it imagined itself previously to have existed,—*Ego contemplatus*. Now the change of one visual image for another involves in itself no absurdity, and becomes absurd only by its immediate juxtaposition with the first thought, which is rendered possible by the whole attention being successively absorbed in each singly, so as not to notice the interjacent notion, *changed*, which by its incongruity with the first thought, *I*, constitutes the bull. Add only, that this process is facilitated by the circumstance of the words *I*, and *me*, being sometimes equivalent, and sometimes having a distinct meaning; sometimes, namely, signifying the act of self-consciousness, sometimes the external image in and by which the mind represents that act to itself, the result and symbol of its individuality. Now suppose the direct contrary state, and you will have a distinct sense of the connection between two conceptions, without that sensation of such connection which is supplied by habit. The man feels as if he were standing on his head, though he cannot but see that he is truly standing on his feet. This, as a painful sensation, will of course have a tendency to associate itself with him who occasions it; even as persons, who have been by painful means restored from derangement, are known to feel an involuntary dislike towards their physician.

I can state on my own knowledge, that the same general censure has been grounded by almost every different person on some different poem. Among those, whose candour and judgment I estimate highly, I distinctly remember six who expressed their objections to the Lyrical Ballads almost in the same words, and altogether to the same purport, at the same time admitting, that several of the poems had given them great pleasure ; and, strange as it might seem, the composition which one cited as execrable, another quoted as his favourite. I am indeed convinced in my own mind, that could the same experiment have been tried with these volumes, as was made in the well known story of the picture, the result would have been the same ; the parts which had been covered by black spots on the one day, would be found equally *albo lapide notatæ* on the succeeding.

However this may be, it was assuredly hard and unjust to fix the attention on a few separate and insulated poems with as much aversion, as if they had been so many plague-spots on the whole work, instead of passing them over in silence, as so much blank paper, or leaves of a bookseller's catalogue ; especially, as no one pretended to have found in them any immorality or indelicacy ; and the poems, therefore, at the worst, could only be regarded as so many light or inferior coins in a rouleau of gold, not as so much alloy in a weight of bullion. A friend whose talents I hold in the highest respect, but whose judgment and strong sound sense I have had almost continued occasion to revere, making the usual complaints to me concerning both the style and subjects of Mr. Wordsworth's minor poems ; I admitted that there were some few of the tales and incidents, in which I could not myself find a sufficient cause for their having been recorded in metre.

I mentioned Alice Fell⁵ as an instance; "Nay," replied my friend with more than usual quickness of manner, "I cannot agree with you there!—that, I own, does seem to me a remarkably pleasing poem." In the Lyrical Ballads, (for my experience does not enable me to extend the remark equally unqualified to the two subsequent volumes,) I have heard at different times, and from different individuals, every single poem extolled and reprobated, with the exception of those of loftier kind, which as was before observed, seem to have won universal praise. This fact of itself would have made me diffident in my censures, had not a still stronger ground been furnished by the strange contrast of the heat and long continuance of the opposition, with the nature of the faults stated as justifying it. The seductive faults, the *dulcia vitia* of Cowley, Marini,⁶ or Darwin might reasonably be thought capable of corrupting the public judgment for half a century, and require a twenty years war, campaign after campaign, in order to dethrone the usurper and re-establish the legitimate taste. But that a downright simpleness, under the affectation of simplicity, prosaic words in feeble metre, silly thoughts in childish phrases, and a preference of mean, degrading, or at best trivial associations and characters, should succeed in forming a school of imitators, a company of almost religious

⁵ [Poet. Works, I. 13. Ed.]

⁶ [John Baptist Marini or Marino, a celebrated poet, known by the name of Il Cavalier Marino, was born at Naples, Oct. 18, 1569, died in the same city, March 21, 1625. He wrote a poem called *Adonice*, which was dedicated to Louis XIII. and first published at Paris in folio, 1651. He left many other poems, among them, *La Strage de gl'Innocenti*, Ven. 1633, 4to, and *La Lira, Rime Amoroze, Maritime, Boscherecce*, &c. 16to, Ven. 1629. S. C.]

admirers, and this too among young men of ardent minds, liberal education, and not

— with academic laurels unbestowed;

and that this bare and bald counterfeit of poetry, which is characterized as below criticism, should for nearly twenty years have well-nigh engrossed criticism, as the main, if not the only, butt of review, magazine, pamphlet, poem, and paragraph;—this is indeed matter of wonder. Of yet greater is it, that the contest should still continue as⁷ undecided as that between

⁷ Without however the apprehensions attributed to the Pagan reformer of the poetic republic. If we may judge from the preface to the recent collection of his poems, Mr. W. would have answered with Xanthias—

σὺ δ' ἐκ ἔδεισας τὸν ψόφον τῶν ῥημάτων,
καὶ τὰς ἀπειλάς; ΞΑΝ. ἔμὰ Δί', ἐδ' ἐφρόντισα.*

And here let me hint to the authors of the numerous parodies, and pretended imitations of Mr. Wordsworth's style, that at once to conceal and convey wit and wisdom in the semblance of folly and dulness, as is done in the Clowns and Fools, nay even in the Dogberry, of our Shakespeare, is doubtless a proof of ge-

* *Rana*, 492-3.

[“ And if, bearing in mind the many Poets distinguished by this prime quality, whose names I omit to mention; yet justified by recollection of the insults which the ignorant, the incapable, and the presumptuous, have heaped upon these and my other writings, I may be permitted to anticipate the judgment of posterity upon myself, I shall declare (censurable, I grant, if the notoriety of the fact above stated does not justify me) that I have given in these unfavourable times, evidence of exertions of this faculty upon its worthiest objects, the external universe, the moral and religious sentiments of Man, his natural affections, and his acquired passions; which have the same ennobling tendency as the productions of men, in this kind, worthy to be holden in undying remembrance.”—Preface to Wordsworth's Poems, 1815. Ed.]

Bacchus and the frogs in Aristophanes; when the former descended to the realms of the departed to bring back the spirit of old and genuine poesy;—

X. βρεκεκεκέξ, κοάξ, κοάξ.

Δ. ἀλλ' ἐξόλοισθ' ἀντῶ κοάξ.
ἐδὲν γὰρ ἔστ' ἄλλ', ἢ κοάξ.

οἰμῶζετ' ἐ γάρ μοι μέλει.

X. ἀλλὰ μὴν κεκραζόμεσθά
γ', ὅποσον ἢ φάρυγξ ἂν ἡμῶν
χανδάνη δι' ἡμέρας,
βρεκεκεκέξ, κοάξ, κοάξ!

Δ. τέτῳ γὰρ ἐ νικήσετε.

X. ἐδὲ μὲν ἡμᾶς σὺ πάντως.

Δ. ἐδὲ μὴν ὑμεῖς γε δὴ μ'
οὐδέποτε. κεκραζομαι γὰρ,
κᾶν με δέη, δι' ἡμέρας,
ἕως ἂν ὑμῶν ἐπικρατήσω τοῦ κοάξ!

X. βρεκεκεκέξ, ΚΟ'ΑΞ, ΚΟΑ'Ξ!⁸

During the last year of my residence at Cambridge, 1794, I became acquainted with Mr. Wordsworth's

nus, or at all events of satiric talent; but that the attempt to ridicule a silly and childish poem, by writing another still sillier and still more childish, can only prove (if it prove any thing at all) that the parodist is a still greater blockhead than the original writer, and, what is far worse, a malignant coxcomb to boot. The talent for mimicry seems strongest where the human race are most degraded. The poor, naked half human savages of New Holland were found excellent mimics: and, in civilized society, minds of the very lowest stamp alone satirize by copying. At least the difference which must blend with and balance the likeness, in order to constitute a just imitation, existing here merely in caricature, detracts from the libeller's heart, without adding an *iota* to the credit of his understanding.

⁸ [Ranae, 225-7, 257-66. Ed.]

first publication entitled *Descriptive Sketches*;⁹ and seldom, if ever, was the emergence of an original poetic genius above the literary horizon more evidently announced. In the form, style, and manner of the whole poem, and in the structure of the particular lines and periods, there is a harshness and acerbity connected and combined with words and images all a-glow, which might recall those products of the vegetable world, where gorgeous blossoms rise out of a hard and thorny rind and shell, within which the rich fruit is elaborating. The language is not only peculiar and strong, but at times knotty and contorted, as by its own impatient strength; while the novelty and struggling crowd of images, acting in conjunction with the difficulties of the style, demands always a greater closeness of attention, than poetry,—at all events, than descriptive poetry—has a right to claim. It not seldom therefore justified the complaint of obscurity. In the following extract I have sometimes fancied, that I saw an emblem of the poem itself, and of the author's genius as it was then displayed.—

'Tis storm; and hid in mist from hour to hour,
 All day the floods a deepening murmur pour;
 The sky is veiled, and every cheerful sight:
 Dark is the region as with coming night;
 Yet what a sudden burst of overpowering light!
 Triumphant on the bosom of the storm,
 Glances the fire-clad eagle's wheeling form;
 Eastward, in long perspective glittering, shine
 The wood-crowned cliffs that o'er the lake recline;
 Those Eastern cliffs a hundred streams unfold,
 At once to pillars turned that flame with gold;
 Behind his sail the peasant strives to shun
 The *west*, that burns like one dilated sun,

⁹ [Published in 1793. Ed.]

Where in a mighty crucible expire
The mountains, glowing hot, like coals of fire."¹⁰

The poetic Psyche, in its process to full development, undergoes as many changes as its Greek namesake, the butterfly.¹¹ And it is remarkable how soon genius clears and purifies itself from the faults and errors of its earliest products; faults which, in its earliest compositions, are the more obtrusive and confluent, because as heterogeneous elements, which had only a temporary use, they constitute the very ferment, by which themselves are carried off. Or we may compare them to some diseases, which must work on the humours, and be thrown out on the surface, in order to secure the patient from their future recurrence. I was in my twenty-fourth year, when I had the happiness of knowing Mr. Wordsworth personally, and while memory lasts, I shall hardly forget the sudden effect produced on my mind, by his recitation of a manuscript poem, which still remains unpublished, but of which the stanza and tone of style were the same as those of *The Female Vagrant*, as originally printed in the first volume of the *Lyrical Ballads*.¹² There was here no mark of strained thought, or forced dic-

¹⁰ [Poet. Works, I. p. 80. Ed.]

¹¹ The Butterfly the ancient Grecians made
The soul's fair emblem, and its only name—
But of the soul, escaped the slavish trade
Of mortal life! For in this earthly frame
Our's is the reptile's lot, much toil, much blame,
Manifold motions making little speed,
And to deform and kill the things whereon we feed.

¹² [The poem to which reference is here made was intitled "An Adventure on Salisbury Plain." Mr. Wordsworth afterwards broke it up, and "The Female Vagrant" is composed out of it. Ed.]

tion, no crowd or turbulence of imagery; and, as the poet hath himself well described in his *Lines on revisiting the Wye*, manly reflection and human associations had given both variety, and an additional interest to natural objects, which, in the passion and appetite of the first love, they had seemed to him neither to need nor permit.¹³ The occasional obscurities, which had risen from an imperfect control over the resources of his native language, had almost wholly disappeared, together with that worse defect of arbitrary and illogi-

¹³ [For nature then
 (The coarser pleasures of my boyish days,
 And their glad animal movements all gone by)
 To me was all in all.—I cannot paint
 What then I was. The sounding cataract
 Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
 The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
 Their colours and their forms, were then to me
 An appetite, a feeling, and a love,
 That had no need of a remoter charm,
 By thought supplied, nor any interest
 Unborrowed from the eye.—That time is past,
 And all its aching joys are now no more,
 And all its dizzy raptures. Not for this
 Faint I, nor mourn nor murmur; other gifts
 Have followed; for such loss, I would believe,
 Abundant recompence. For I have learned
 To look on nature, not as in the hour
 Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes
 The still, sad music of humanity,
 Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power
 To chasten and subdue. And I have felt
 A presence that disturbs me with the joy
 Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
 Of something far more deeply interfused,
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
 And the round ocean and the living air,
 And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:

cal phrases, at once hackneyed and fantastic, which hold so distinguished a place in the *technique* of ordinary poetry, and will, more or less, alloy the earlier poems of the truest genius, unless the attention has been specifically directed to their worthlessness and incongruity.¹⁴ I did not perceive any thing particular in

A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

II. pp. 164-5. Ed.]

¹⁴ Mr. Wordsworth, even in his two earliest poems, 'The Evening Walk and the Descriptive Sketches, is more free from this latter defect than most of the young poets his contemporaries. It may however be exemplified, together with the harsh and obscure construction, in which he more often offended, in the following lines:—

“'Mid stormy vapours ever driving by,
Where ospreys, cormorants, and herons cry ;
Where hardly given the hopeless waste to cheer,
Denied the bread of life the foodful ear,
Dwindles the pear on autumn's latest spray,
And *apple sickens* pale in summer's ray ;
Ev'n here content has fixed her smiling reign
With independence, child of high disdain.”

I hope, I need not say, that I have quoted these lines for no other purpose than to make my meaning fully understood. It is to be regretted that Mr. Wordsworth has not republished these two poems entire.*

* [The passage stands thus in the last and corrected edition :—

Where ospreys, cormorants, and herons cry,
'Mid stormy vapours ever driving by,
Or hovering over wastes too bleak to rear
That common growth of earth the foodful ear ;
Where the green apple shrivels on the spray,
And pines the unripened pear in summer's kindest ray ;
Even here Content has fixed her smiling reign
With Independence, child of high Disdain.

I. p. 80. Ed.]

the mere style of the poem alluded to during its recitation, except indeed such difference as was not separable from the thought and manner; and the Spenserian stanza, which always, more or less, recalls to the reader's mind Spenser's own style, would doubtless have authorized, in my then opinion, a more frequent descent to the phrases of ordinary life, than could without an ill effect have been hazarded in the heroic couplet. It was not however the freedom from false taste, whether as to common defects, or to those more properly his own, which made so unusual an impression on my feelings immediately, and subsequently on my judgment. It was the union of deep feeling with profound thought; the fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying, the objects observed; and above all the original gift of spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew drops.

This excellence, which in all Mr. Wordsworth's writings is more or less predominant, and which constitutes the character of his mind, I no sooner felt, than I sought to understand. Repeated meditations led me first to suspect,—(and a more intimate analysis of the human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, and effects matured my conjecture into full conviction,)—that Fancy and Imagination were two distinct and widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power. It is not, I own, easy to conceive a more opposite translation of the Greek *φαντασία* than the Latin *imaginatio*; but it is

equally true that in all societies there exists an instinct of growth, a certain collective, unconscious good sense working progressively to desynonymize¹⁵ those words originally of the same meaning, which the conflux of dialects supplied to the more homogeneous languages, as the Greek and German : and which the same cause, joined with accidents of translation from original works of different countries, occasion in mixed languages like our own. The first and most important point to be proved is, that two conceptions perfectly distinct are confused under one and the same word, and—this done—to appropriate that word exclusively to the one

¹⁵ This is effected either by giving to the one word a general, and to the other an exclusive use ; as “ to put on the back” and “ to indorse ;” or by an actual distinction of meanings, as “ naturalist,” and “ physician ;” or by difference of relation, as “ I” and “ Me” (each of which the rustics of our different provinces still use in all the cases singular of the first personal pronoun). Even the mere difference, or corruption, in the pronunciation of the same word, if it have become general, will produce a new word with a distinct signification ; thus “ property” and “ propriety ;” the latter of which, even to the time of Charles II. was the written word for all the senses of both. There is a sort of *minim* immortal among the *animalcula infusoria*, which has not naturally either birth, or death, absolute beginning, or absolute end : for at a certain period a small point appears on its back, which deepens and lengthens till the creature divides into two, and the same process recommences in each of the halves now become integral. This may be a fanciful, but it is by no means a bad emblem of the formation of words, and may facilitate the conception, how immense a nomenclature may be organized from a few simple sounds by rational beings in a social state. For each new application, or excitement of the same sound, will call forth a different sensation, which cannot but affect the pronunciation. The after recollection of the sound, without the same vivid sensation, will modify it still further ; till at length all trace of the original likeness is worn away.

meaning, and the synonyme, should there be one, to the other. But if,—(as will be often the case in the arts and sciences,)—no synonyme exists, we must either invent or borrow a word. In the present instance the appropriation has already begun, and been legitimated in the derivative adjective: Milton had a highly *imaginative*, Cowley a very *fanciful* mind. If therefore I should succeed in establishing the actual existence of two faculties generally different, the nomenclature would be at once determined. To the faculty by which I had characterized Milton, we should confine the term ‘imagination;’ while the other would be contra-distinguished as ‘fancy.’ Now were it once fully ascertained, that this division is no less grounded in nature than that of *delirium* from *mania*,¹⁶ or Otway’s

¹⁶ [“ You may conceive the difference in kind between the Fancy and the Imagination in this way;—that, if the check of the senses and the reason were withdrawn, the first would become delirium and the last mania. The fancy brings together images which have no connection natural or moral, but are yoked together by the poet by means of some accidental coincidence; as in the well-known passage in Hudibras;—

The Sun had long since in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap,
And like a lobster boil’d, the morn
From black to red began to turn,

The Imagination modifies images, and gives unity to variety: it sees all things in one, *il più nell’ uno*. There is the epic imagination, the perfection of which is in Milton; and the dramatic, of which Shakespeare is the absolute master. The first gives unity by throwing back into the distance; as after the magnificent approach of the Messiah to battle, the poet, by one touch from himself,—

Far off their coming shone —

makes the whole one image. And so at the conclusion of the

Lutes, laurels, seas of milk, and ships of amber,¹⁷

from Shakespeare's

What! have his daughters brought him to this pass?¹⁸

or from the preceding apostrophe to the elements; the theory of the fine arts, and of poetry in particular, could not but derive some additional and important light. It would in its immediate effects furnish a torch of guidance to the philosophical critic; and ultimately to the poet himself. In energetic minds, truth soon changes by domestication into power; and from directing in the discrimination and appraisal of the product, becomes influence in the production. To admire on principle, is the only way to imitate without loss of originality.

It has been already hinted, that metaphysics and psychology have long been my hobby-horse. But to have a hobby-horse, and to be vain of it, are so commonly found together, that they pass almost for the

description of the entranced Angels, in which every sort of image from all the regions of earth and air is introduced to diversify and illustrate, the reader is brought back to the simple image by—

He called so loud, that all the hollow deep
Of Hell resounded.

The dramatic imagination does not throw back but brings close; it stamps all nature with one, and that its own, meaning, as in *Lear* throughout." *Table Talk*, p. 305.—2nd edit.

There is more of imagination in it—that power which draws all things to one,—which makes things animate and inanimate, beings with their attributes, subjects and their accessories, take one colour and serve to one effect! *Lamb's Essay on the Genius of Hogarth*. *Prose Works*, I. p. 189. Ed.]

[See also Mr. Wordsworth's Preface, pp. 29-30. S. C.]

¹⁷ [*Venice Preserved*. Act V. Ed.]

¹⁸ *Lear*. Act III. Sc. 4.—1. Ed.]

same. I trust therefore, that there will be more good humour than contempt, in the smile with which the reader chastises my self-complacency, if I confess myself uncertain, whether the satisfaction from the perception of a truth new to myself may not have been rendered more poignant by the conceit, that it would be equally so to the public. There was a time, certainly, in which I took some little credit to myself, in the belief that I had been the first of my countrymen, who had pointed out the diverse meaning of which the two terms were capable, and analyzed the faculties to which they should be appropriated. Mr. W. Taylor's recent volume of synonyms¹⁹ I have not yet seen;²⁰

¹⁹ [“British Synonyms discriminated, by W. Taylor.” Ed.]

²⁰ I ought to have added, with the exception of a single sheet which I accidentally met with at the printer's. Even from this scanty specimen, I found it impossible to doubt the talent, or not to admire the ingenuity, of the author. That his distinctions were for the greater part unsatisfactory to *my* mind, proves nothing against their accuracy; but it may possibly be serviceable to him, in case of a second edition, if I take this opportunity of suggesting the query; whether he may not have been occasionally misled, by having assumed, as to me he appears to have done, the non-existence of any absolute synonyms in our language? Now I cannot but think, that there are many which remain for our posterity to distinguish and appropriate, and which I regard as so much reversionary wealth in our mother tongue. When two distinct meanings are confounded under one or more words,—(and such must be the case, as sure as our knowledge is progressive and of course imperfect)—erroneous consequences will be drawn, and what is true in one sense of the word will be affirmed as true *in toto*. Men of research, startled by the consequences, seek in the things themselves—(whether in or out of the mind)—for a knowledge of the fact, and having discovered the difference, remove the equivocation either by the substitution of a new word, or by the appropriation of one of the two or more words, which had before been used promiscuously. When this distinction has been so natu-

but his specification of the terms in question has been clearly shown to be both insufficient and erroneous by Mr. Wordsworth in the Preface added to the late collection of his Poems. The explanation which Mr. Words-

ralized and of such general currency that the language does as it were think for us—(like the sliding rule which is the mechanic's safe substitute for arithmetical knowledge)—we then say, that it is evident to common sense. Common sense, therefore, differs in different ages. What was born and christened in the Schools passes by degrees into the world at large, and becomes the property of the market and the tea-table. At least I can discover no other meaning of the term, *common sense*, if it is to convey any specific difference from sense and judgment *in genere*, and where it is not used scholastically for the universal reason. Thus in the reign of Charles II. the philosophic world was called to arms by the moral sophisms of Hobbes, and the ablest writers exerted themselves in the detection of an error, which a school-boy would now be able to confute by the mere recollection, that *compulsion* and *obligation* conveyed two ideas perfectly disparate, and that what appertained to the one, had been falsely transferred to the other by a mere confusion of terms.*

* [See Hobbes's Treatise on Liberty and Necessity. (Eng. Works, IV. Sir W. Molesworth's edit.) The term *obligation* is not used by Hobbes. His position is that some actions are not compelled, but that all are necessitated. (Pp. 261-2.) 'Natural efficacy of objects,' he says, 'does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the Will and consequently the Action; but for moral efficacy, I understand not what he means. (P. 247.)—“When first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.” (P. 274.)

A voluntary action, therefore, with Hobbes, is an action

worth has himself given, will be found to differ from mine, chiefly, perhaps as our objects are different. It could scarcely indeed happen otherwise, from the advantage I have enjoyed of frequent conversation with him on a subject to which a poem of his own first

necessarily consequent on or identical with, the last opinion, judgment, or dictate of the understanding,—which last opinion, judgment, or dictate of the understanding is necessarily determined by the presentation of certain ‘external objects to a man of such or such a temperature.’ (P. 267.) Of course Obligation, or a law of Duty grounded on conviction of a universal Right and Wrong, True and False, has no place in Hobbes’s system; nor can that system be consistently defended against the charge that it destroys the very foundations of all morality properly understood. It is true that Hobbes himself in this Treatise denies the imputed consequence; but his reasoning in this respect is so weak,—depending upon a covert use of the terms ‘will’ and ‘willingly’ in a sense inconsistent with that necessarily attached to them in the previous positions,—that it cannot but be suspected that Hobbes himself felt the legitimacy of the charge that upon his principles Morality, in any shape but that of positive Law, was an empty name. Practically, what other conclusion can be drawn?

This Treatise is one of the least agreeable of all Hobbes’s Works. It contains in all its naked terrors that frightful dogma, which, strange to say, has with scarcely any modification but in form been reproduced and advocated with zealous reiteration in the sermons and other writings of those popular divines who have so largely influenced the public mind for the last seven or eight years. ‘I say,’ says Hobbes, ‘that the power of God alone, without other helps, is sufficient justification of any action he doth.’ (P. 249.) ‘Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found.’—‘This I know;—God cannot sin, *because* his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin—and therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say God can so order the world, as a sin may be *necessarily caused thereby* in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to Him.’ (Pp. 250-1.) If this is true, God—the *Good*—differs from Moloch in nothing but power. Ed.]

directed my attention, and my conclusions concerning which he had made more lucid to myself by many happy instances drawn from the operation of natural objects on the mind. But it was Mr. Wordsworth's purpose to consider the influences of fancy and imagination as they are manifested in poetry, and from the different effects to conclude their diversity in kind; while it is my object to investigate the seminal principle, and then from the kind to deduce the degree. My friend has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with their poetic fruitage. I wish to add the trunk, and even the roots as far as they lift themselves above ground, and are visible to the naked eye of our common consciousness.

Yet even in this attempt I am aware that I shall be obliged to draw more largely on the reader's attention, than so immethodical a miscellany as this can authorize; when in such a work (the *Ecclesiastical Policy*) of such a mind as Hooker's, the judicious author, though no less admirable for the perspicuity than for the port and dignity of his language,—and though he wrote for men of learning in a learned age,—saw nevertheless occasion to anticipate and guard against “complaints of obscurity,” as often as he was to trace his subject “to the highest well-spring and fountain.” Which, (continues he) “because men are not accustomed to, the pains we take are more needful a great deal, than acceptable; and the matters we handle, seem by reason of newness (till the mind grow better acquainted with them) dark and intricate.”²¹ I would gladly therefore spare both myself and others this labour, if I knew how without it to present an intelligible statement of my poetic creed,—not as my

²¹ [B. I. ch. i. s. 2. Ed.]

opinions, which weigh for nothing, but as deductions from established premises conveyed in such a form, as is calculated either to effect a fundamental conviction, or to receive a fundamental confutation. If I may dare once more adopt the words of Hooker, "they, unto whom we shall seem tedious, are in no wise injured by us, because it is in their own hands to spare that labour, which they are not willing to endure."²²

Those at least, let me be permitted to add, who have taken so much pains to render me ridiculous for a perversion of taste, and have supported the charge by attributing strange notions to me on no other authority than their own conjectures, owe it to themselves as well as to me not to refuse their attention to my own statement of the theory which I do acknowledge; or shrink from the trouble of examining the grounds on which I rest it, or the arguments which I offer in its justification.

CHAPTER V.

On the law of Association—Its history traced from Aristotle to Hartley.



HERE have been men in all ages, who have been impelled as by an instinct to propose their own nature as a problem, and who devote their attempts to its solution. The first step was to construct a table of distinctions, which they seem to have formed on the principle of the absence or presence of the

²² [B. I. ch. i. s. 2. Ed.]

Will. Our various sensations, perceptions, and movements were classed as active or passive, or as *media* partaking of both. A still finer distinction was soon established between the voluntary and the spontaneous. In our perceptions we seem to ourselves merely passive to an external power, whether as a mirror reflecting the landscape, or as a blank canvass on which some unknown hand paints it. For it is worthy of notice, that the latter, or the system of Idealism may be traced to sources equally remote with the former, or Materialism; and Berkeley can boast an ancestry at least as venerable as Gassendi¹ or Hobbes.² These conjectures, however, concerning the mode in which our perceptions originated, could not alter the natural difference of Things and Thoughts. In the former, the cause appeared wholly external, while in the latter, sometimes our will interfered as the producing or determining cause, and sometimes our nature seemed to act by a mechanism of its own, without any conscious

¹ [Pierre Gassendi, a philosopher whose aim it was to revive, reform, and improve the system of Epicurus, and who wrote against Des Cartes, was born in 1592, at Chantersier in Provence and died at Paris in 1656. S. C.]

² [Thomas Hobbes was born at Malmesbury, in 1588, died 1679, aged ninety-one. His works, which are philosophical and political, moral and mathematical, and translations, are now first collected and edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth—the Latin works in five vols. 8vo.; of the English 9 vols. 8vo. have appeared. Cousin observes that the speculative philosophy of Hobbes, who was a materialist in doctrine, has not attracted as much attention as the practical. His style is very excellent, condensed, yet with all the ease and freedom of diffuse writing. It is sharp and sparkling as a diamond. Sir James Mackintosh praises it highly in his well known Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy. He says of it; “short, clear, precise, pithy, his language never has more than one meaning, which never requires a second thought to find.” See his whole character of it at p. 40. S. C.]

effort of the will, or even against it. Our inward experiences were thus arranged in three separate classes, the passive sense, or what the School-men call the merely receptive quality of the mind; the voluntary; and the spontaneous, which holds the middle place between both. But it is not in human nature to meditate on any mode of action, without inquiring after the law that governs it; and in the explanation of the spontaneous movements of our being, the metaphysician took the lead of the anatomist and natural philosopher. In Egypt, Palestine, Greece, and India the analysis of the mind had reached its noon and manhood, while experimental research was still in its dawn and infancy. For many, very many centuries, it has been difficult to advance a new truth, or even a new error, in the philosophy of the intellect or morals. With regard, however, to the laws that direct the spontaneous movements of thought and the principle of their intellectual mechanism there exists, it has been asserted, an important exception most honourable to the moderns, and in the merit of which our own country claims the largest share. Sir James Mackintosh, —(who, amid the variety of his talents and attainments, is not of less repute for the depth and accuracy of his philosophical inquiries than for the eloquence with which he is said to render their most difficult results perspicuous, and the driest attractive,)—affirmed in the Lectures, delivered by him in Lincoln's Inn Hall, that the law of association as established in the contemporaneity of the original impressions, formed the basis of all true psychology; and that any ontological or metaphysical science, not contained in such (that is, an empirical) psychology, was but a web of abstractions and generalizations. Of this prolific truth, of this great fundamental law, he declared Hobbes to have been the original discoverer, while its full appli-

cation to the whole intellectual system we owed to Hartley; who stood in the same relation to Hobbes as Newton to Kepler; the law of association being that to the mind, which gravitation is to matter.

Of the former clause in this assertion, as it respects the comparative merits of the ancient metaphysicians, including their commentators, the School-men, and of the modern British and French philosophers from Hobbes to Hume, Hartley, and Condillac, this is not the place to speak. So wide indeed is the chasm between Sir James Mackintosh's philosophical creed and mine, that so far from being able to join hands, we could scarcely make our voices intelligible to each other: and to bridge it over would require more time, skill, and power than I believe myself to possess. But the latter clause involves for the greater part a mere question of fact and history, and the accuracy of the statement is to be tried by documents rather than reasoning.

First then, I deny Hobbes's claim *in toto*: for he had been anticipated by Des Cartes, whose work *De Methodo*, preceded Hobbes's *De Natura Humana*, by more than a year.³ But what is of much more importance, Hobbes builds nothing on the principle which

³ [Hobbes's Treatise, "Human Nature," written by him in English, was published in 1650, although his dedication of it to the Earl of Newcastle is dated in 1640. Des Cartes (born at La Haye, in Touraine, in 1596) died in Sweden, to which country he had been called by Queen Christina, in 1650. His treatise, *De Methodo*, was originally written in French, and published in 1637; the Latin version, revised and augmented by Des Cartes himself, appeared in 1644. But neither the one nor the other contains any thing upon the subject mentioned in the text. The incident, to which Mr. Coleridge afterwards refers, as told in the *De Methodo*, is to be found in the *Principia Philosophiæ*,

he had announced. He does not even announce it, as differing in any respect from the general laws of ma-

Part IV. s. 196. This latter work was published in 1644. But neither in the *Principia* is the law of the contemporaneity of impressions stated. In another and posthumous work, however, *Tractatus de Homine*, Part V. s. 73, Des Cartes certainly does, in a short incidental paragraph, mention the fact and the ground of it:—

Quinetiam notandum est, quod si tantum aliqua ejusmodi foramina recluderentur, ut A. et B., hoc unum in causa esse posset, ut etiam alia, puta C. et D. eodem tempore recludantur; præcipue si sæpius omnia simul reclusa fuissent, nec solita sint una sine aliis seorsum aperiri. Quod ostendit, quo pacto recordatio rei unius excitari possit per recordationem alterius, quæ aliquando una cum ea memorie impressa fuit. Ut si videam duos oculos cum naso, continuo frontem, et os, omnesque alias faciei partes imaginor, quia assuetus non sum unas sine aliis videre. Et cum video ignem, recordor colorem ejus, quem viso igne percepi aliquando.

That Hobbes was not the discoverer or first propounder of this law of association is, indeed, clear enough; but it does not appear that he was indebted to Des Cartes for his knowledge of it; and it must be admitted that he states the rule with distinctness.

“The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another, is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they are produced by sense.” H. N. c. iv. 2. See also *Leviathan*, Pt. I. c. iii.

Neither is it, perhaps, quite correct to say that Hobbes builds nothing on this law. He at least clearly saw its connection with speech.

“It is the nature almost of every corporal thing, being often moved in one and the same manner, to receive continually a greater and greater easiness and aptitude to the same motion, insomuch as in time the same becometh so habitual, that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it. The passions of man, as they are the beginning of voluntary motions, so are they the beginning of speech, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to show others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions, which are in themselves, and to that end having invented language, have by that means transferred all that dis-

terial motion and impact : nor was it, indeed, possible for him so to do, compatibly with his system, which was exclusively material and mechanical. Far otherwise is it with Des Cartes ; greatly as he too in his after writings (and still more egregiously his followers De la Forge, and others) obscured the truth by their attempts to explain it on the theory of nervous fluids, and material configurations.⁴ But, in his interesting work, *De Methodo*, Des Cartes relates the circumstance which first led him to meditate on this subject, and which since then has been often noticed and employed as an instance and illustration of the law. A child who with its eyes bandaged had lost several of his fingers by amputation, continued to complain for many days successively of pains, now in this joint and

cursion of their mind mentioned in the former chapter, by the motion of their tongues, into discourse of words: and *ratio* now is but *oratio*, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word ; the rest follow habitually, and are not followed by the mind," &c. H. N. c. v. 14. Ed.]

⁴ [It may well be doubted whether Mr. Coleridge is not more indulgent here to Des Cartes than the truth of the case warrants. The *Tractatus de Homine* is, no doubt, a part of the great Work of which he gives an account in his *De Methodo*, as being then written ; and in it the nervous fluids and material configurations are displayed as precisely, if not as copiously, as by his commentator De la Forge himself. The "animal spirits" move mind and body. See *De Hom.* P. IV. s. 55, &c. See even in the *De Methodo* itself. *Denique id quod hic super omnia observari meretur, generatio est spirituum animalium, quæ aut instar venti subtilissimi, aut potius fiammæ purissimæ ; quæ continue e corde magna copia in cerebrum ascendens, inde per nervos in musculos penetrat, et omnibus membris motum dat, &c.* P. 30. edit. 1664. See Spectator, No 417. And indeed their agency is distinctly recognized in the same part of the *Principia*, in which the story of the child is related. Ed.]

now in that, of the very fingers which had been cut off.⁵ Des Cartes was led by this incident to reflect on the uncertainty with which we attribute any particular place to any inward pain or uneasiness, and proceeded after long consideration to establish it as a general law; that contemporaneous impressions, whether images or sensations, recall each other mechanically. On this principle, as a ground work, he built up the whole system of human language, as one continued process of association. He showed in what sense not only general terms, but generic images,—under the name of abstract ideas,—actually existed, and in what consist their nature and power. As one word may become the general exponent of many, so by association a simple image may represent a whole class.⁶ But

⁵ This story is told by Des Cartes in these words as one of many proofs that *animam, non quatenus est in singulis membris, sed tantum quatenus est in cerebro, ea quæ corpori occidunt in singulis membris, nervorum ope sentire.*—

Cum puellæ cuidam, manum gravi morbo affectum habenti, velarentur oculi, quoties chirurgus ucedebat, ne curationis apparatus turbaretur, eique, post aliquot dies brachium ad cubitum usque, ob gangrenam in eo serpentem, fuisset amputatam, et panni in ejus locum ita substituti, ut eo se privatam esse plane ignoraret, ipsa interim varios dolores, nunc in uno ejus manus quæ abscissa erat digito, nunc in alio se sentire querebatur. Quod sane aliunde contingere non poterat, quam ex eo, quod nervi, qui prius ex cerebro ad manum descendebant, tuncque in brachio juxta cubitum terminabantur, eodem modo ibi moverentur, ac prius moveri debuissent in manu, ad sensum hujus vel illius, digiti dolentis animæ in cerebro residenti imprimendum. Princ. IV. 196. Ed.]

⁶ [The Editor has never been able to find in the writings of Des Cartes any thing coming up to the statement in the text. Certainly nothing of the sort follows the paragraph containing the story of the amputated hand. That Des Cartes was a Nominalist is clear from the following passage ;—

in truth Hobbes himself makes no claims to any discovery, and introduces this law of association, or (in his own language) discursion of mind, as an admitted fact, in the solution alone of which, and this by causes purely physiological, he arrogates any originality. His system is briefly this ;⁷ whenever the senses are impinged on by external objects, whether by the rays of light reflected from them, or by effluxes of their finer particles, there results a correspondent motion of the innermost and subtlest organs. This motion constitutes a *representation*, and there remains an *impression* of the same, or a certain disposition to repeat the same motion. Whenever we feel several objects at the same time, the *impressions* that are left, (or in the language of Mr. Hume, the *ideas*,) are linked together. Whenever therefore any one of the movements, which constitute a complex impression, is renewed through the senses, the others succeed mechanically. It follows of necessity, therefore, that Hobbes, as well as Hartley and all others who derive association from the connection and interdependence of the supposed matter, the movements of which constitute our thoughts, must have reduced all its forms to the one law of Time. But even the merit of announcing this law with philosophic

Et optime comprehendimus, qua pacto a varia magnitudine, figura et motu particularum unius corporis, varii motus locales in alio corpore excitentur ; nullo autem modo possumus intelligere, quo pacto ab iisdem (magnitudine scilicet, figura, et motu,) aliquid aliud producat, omnino diversæ ab ipsis naturæ, quales sunt illæ formæ substantiales et qualitates reales, quas in rebus esse multi supponunt ; nec etiam quo pacto postea istæ qualitates aut formæ vim habeant in aliis corporibus motus locales excitandi. Princip. IV. 198. Ed.]

⁷ [See *Human Nature*. C. ii. 111. *Leviathan ubi supra*. Ed.]

precision cannot be fairly conceded to him. For the objects of any two ideas⁸ need not have co-existed in

⁸ I here use the word *idea* in Mr. Hume's sense on account of its general currency amongst the English metaphysicians; though against my own judgment, for I believe that the vague use of this word has been the cause of much error and more confusion. The word, *ἰδέα*, in its original sense as used by Pindar, Aristophanes, and in the Gospel of St. Matthew, represented the visual abstraction of a distant object, when we see the whole without distinguishing its parts.* Plato adopted it as a technical term, and as the antithesis to *εἶδωλον*, or sensuous image; the transient and perishable emblem, or mental word, of the idea. Ideas themselves he considered as mysterious powers, living, seminal, formative, and exempt from time.† In

* [———— τὸν εἶδον
κρατέοντα χερὸς ἀλκᾶ, βωμὸν παρ' Ὀλύμπιον
κεῖνον κατὰ χρόνον γ' ἰδέα τε καλὸν
ῶρα τε κεκραμένον,—Olymp. XI. (X.) 121.

οὐ γινώσκων, ὅτι τοῦ Πλούτου παρέχω βελτίονας ἄνδρας,
καὶ τὴν γνώμην, καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν.—Aristoph. Plut. 558-9.

ἦν δὲ ἡ ἰδέα αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀστραπή, καὶ τὸ ἔνδυμα αὐτοῦ λευκὸν
ὡσεὶ χιών.—Matt. xxviii. 3. Ed.]

† [See the *Timæus*. (Bekk. III. ii. 23.) ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ
δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον βλέπων ἀεὶ, τοιούτῳ τινὶ
προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δύναμιν
ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν. But
the word *ἰδέα* is used by Plato in several senses, modified ac-
cording to the natures, divine or human, in which he represents
the ideas as placed. See the fine moral passage in the *Repub-
lic* (vii. 3.)—ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ
μόγις ὀρᾶσθαι, ὀφθῆῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάν-
των αὐτῆ ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἐν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν
τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἐν τε νοητῷ αὐτῆ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ
νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμ-
φρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδία ἢ δημοσίᾳ.

The notes appended by the enthusiastic Thomas Taylor to
his translation of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle are full of learned
illustration upon this subject. Ed.]

the same sensation in order to become mutually associable. The same result will follow when one only of

this sense the word Idea became the property of the Platonic school; and it seldom occurs in Aristotle, without some such phrase annexed to it, as according to Plato, or as Plato says. Our English writers to the end of the reign of Charles II. or somewhat later, employed it either in the original sense, or Platonically, or in a sense nearly correspondent to our present use of the substantive, Ideal; always however opposing it, more or less to image, whether of present or absent objects. The reader will not be displeased with the following interesting exemplification from Bishop Jeremy Taylor. "St. Lewis the King sent Ivo Bishop of Chartres on an embassy, and he told, that he met a grave and stately matron on the way with a censer of fire in one hand, and a vessel of water in the other; and observing her to have a melancholy, religious, and phantastic deportment and look, he asked her what those symbols meant, and what she meant to do with her fire and water; she answered, My purpose is with the fire to burn paradise, and with my water to quench the flames of hell, that men may serve God purely for the love of God. But we rarely meet with such spirits which love virtue so metaphysically as to abstract her from all sensible compositions, and love the purity of the idea."* Des Cartes having introduced into his philosophy the fanciful hypothesis of *material ideas*,—or certain configurations of the brain, which were as so many moulds to the influxes of the external world,—Locke adopted the term, but extended its signification to whatever is the immediate object of the mind's attention or consciousness.† Hume, distinguishing those representations which are

* [The passage here ascribed to Bishop Taylor I cannot find in his works, nor have I been able to light upon the expression, "him that reads in malice or him that reads after dinner," also attributed to him by Mr. Coleridge, in any of his writings. S. C.]

† ["It (Idea) being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can

the two ideas has been represented by the senses, and the other by the memory.

Long⁹ however before either Hobbes or Des Cartes

accompanied with a sense of a present object from those reproduced by the mind itself, designated the former by *impressions*, and confined the word *idea* to the latter.*

⁹ [For the substance of the following paragraph, and in part for the remarks upon the doctrine of association of ideas as represented in the writings of Aristotle, Mr. Coleridge is indebted to the very interesting and excellent treatise of J. G. E. Maasz, On the Imagination, *Versuch über die Einbildungskraft*, pp. 343-4-5-6. A copy of this work, (1797,) richly annotated on the margins and blank spaces, was found amongst Mr. Coleridge's books; and in so "immethodical a miscellany of literary opinions" as this the insertion of these notes may not be out of place.

"In Maasz's introductory chapters," says Mr. Coleridge, "my mind has been perplexed by the division of things into matter (*sensatio ab extra*) and form (i. e. *per-et-con-ceptio ab intra*). Now as Time and Space are evidently only the universals, or *modi communes*, of sensation and sensuous Form, and consequently appertain exclusively to the sensuous *Einbildungskraft*, (= *Eisemplasy*, *πλάττειν εἰς ἐν*) which we call Imagination, Fancy, &c. all poor and inadequate terms, far inferior to the German, *Einbildung*, the Law of Association derived *ab extra* from the contemporaneity of the impressions, or indeed any other difference of the characterless Manifold (*das Mannichfaltige*) except that of *plus* and *minus* of impingence, becomes incomprehensible, if not absurd. I see at one instant of time a Rose and a Lily.—Chemistry teaches me that they differ only

be employed about in thinking." Human Understand. I. i. s. 8. Ed.]

* ["By the term, *Impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from *Ideas*, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned." *Inquiry concerning the Hum. Under. S. 2.* Ed.]

the law of association had been defined, and its important functions set forth by Ludovicus Vives.¹⁰ *Phantasia*, it is to be noticed, is employed by Vives to express the mental power of comprehension, or the *active*

in form, being both reducible to the same elements. If then form be not an external active power, if it be wholly transfused into the object by the esemplastic or imaginative faculty of the percipient, or rather creator, where and wherein shall I find the ground of my perception, that this is the Rose and that the Lily. In order to render the creative activity of the imagination at all conceivable, we must necessarily have recourse to the *Harmonia præstabilita* of Spinoza and Leibnitz: in which case the automatism of the Imagination and Judgment would be perception in the same sense as a self-conscious watch would be a percipient of Time, and inclusively of the apparent motion of the sun and stars. But, as the whole is but a choice of incomprehensibles, till the natural doctrine of physical influx, or modification of each by all, have been proved absurd, I shall still prefer it: and not doubt, that the pencil of rays forms pictures on the retina, because I cannot comprehend how this picture can excite a mental fac-simile."

Maasz, Introd. S. 1. *Denn die Merkmale, wodurch ein Objekt angestellt wird, müssen entweder individuelle oder gemeinsame seyn.*

Coleridge. "Deceptive. The *mark* in itself is always individual. By an act of the reflex understanding it may be rendered a sign or general term. The word *Vorstellung* has been as often mischievous as useful in German philosophy." Ed.]

¹⁰ [Originally thus—"by Melancthon, Ammerbach, and L. Vives; more especially by the last;"—part of which statement appears to have been an imperfect recollection by Mr. C. of the words of Maasz, who, after observing that in the sixteenth century the spirit of inquiry took a new turn, and that men then came forth who knew the value of empirical psychology, and took pains to enforce and elucidate its truths, proceeds as follows:

"Among the first to whom this merit belongs were Melancthon, Ammerbach, and Lud. Vives, whose psychological writings were published all together by Getzner (Zurich 1662). But far the most was done by Vives. He has brought together

function of the mind ; and *imaginatio* for the receptivity (*vis receptiva*) of impressions, or for the *passive* perception.¹¹ The power of combination he appropriates to the former : “ *quæ singula et simpliciter*

many important observations upon the human soul, and made striking remarks thereon. More especially in the theory of the association of representations, which Melancthon and Ammerbach do not bring forward at all, he displays no ordinary knowledge.” Transl. p. 343.

Philip Melancthon, a Reformer in Philosophy as well as in Religion, published, among other philosophical works, a book *De Anima*, 1540, in 8vo.

Vitus Amerbach, a learned author and Professor of Philosophy at Ingolstadt,—was born at Wedinguen in Bavaria, and died in 1557 at the age of seventy. He also published, amongst other works, one on the Soul—*De Anima*, libb. iv. Lugd. Bat. 1555, 8vo, and one on Natural Philosophy—*De Philosophia Naturali*, libb. vi. 8vo.

John Lewis Vives was born in 1492 at Valencia in Spain, died at Bruges, according to Thuanus in 1541 : was first patronized by Henry VIII. of England, who made him preceptor in Latin to the Princess Mary, and afterwards persecuted by him for opposing his divorce. He was a follower of Erasmus and opponent of the Scholastic Philosophy. His works, which are of various kinds, theological, devotional, grammatical, critical, as well as philosophical, were printed at Basle in 1555, in two vols. fol. The Treatise *De Anima et Vita* is contained in vol. ii. p. 497-593. S. C.]

¹¹ [*Et quemadmodum in altrice facultate videre est inesse vim quandam, quæ cibum recipiat, aliam quæ contineat, aliam quæ conficiat, quæque distribuat et dispenset : ita in animis et hominum et brutorum est functio, quæ imagines sensibus impressas recipit, quæ inde Imaginativa dicitur: est quæ continet hæc, Memoria ; quæ conficit, Phantasia : quæ distribuit ad assensum aut dissensum, Extrinatrix. Sunt enim spiritalia imagines Dei, corporalia vero spiritalium quædam veluti simulachra : ut mirandum non sit, ex corporalibus spiritalia colligi, ceu ab umbris aut picturis corpora expressa. Imaginativæ actio est in animo, quæ oculi in corpore, recipere imagines intuendo : estque velut orificium quoddam*

acceperat imaginatio, ea conjungit et disjungit phantasia."¹² And the law by which the thoughts are spontaneously presented follows thus; "*quæ simul sunt a phantasia comprehensa, si alterutrum occurrat, solet secum alterum representare.*"¹³ To time therefore he subordinates all the other exciting causes of association. The soul proceeds "*a causa ad ef-*

vasis, quod est Memoria. Phantasia verò conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simplicia Imaginatio acceperat. *Equidem haud sum nescius, confundi duo hæc a plerisque, ut Imaginationem Phantasiam, et vice versa hanc Imaginationem nominent, et eandem esse functionem quidam arbitrentur. Sed nobis tum ad rem aptius, tum ad docendum accommodatius visum est ita partiri: propterea quod actiones videmus distinctas, unde facultates censentur. Tametsi nihil erit quandoque periculi, si istis utamur promiscue. Accedit his sensus, qui ab Aristotele communis dicitur, quo judicantur sensilia absentia: et discernuntur ea, quæ variorum sunt sensuum: hic sub Imaginationem et Phantasiam venire potest. Phantasia est mirifice expedita et libera: quicquid collibitum est, fingit, refingit, componit, devincit, dissolvit, res disjunctissimas connectit, conjunctissimas autem longissime separat. Itaque nisi regatur, et cohibeatur a ratione, haud secus animum percellit ac perturbat, quam procella mare. Jo. Ludovici Vivis, De Anima et Vita. Lib. I. Opera, Tom. II. p. 509. Basil. 1555. S. C.]*

¹² [Maasz, p. 344. Note. Vives *De Anim.* I. s. d. *cogn. intern.* *Phantasia conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simpliciter, acceperat imaginatio.* Imagination, according to Vives, says Maasz, is the capability of perceiving an impression. S. C.]

¹³ [*De Anima* I. sect. d. cited by Maasz in a note *ibid.* Vives proceeds thus—*unde sedes illæ existunt in artificio memoriæ, quippe ad aspectum loci de eo venit in mentem, quod in loco scimus evenisse, aut situm esse: quando etiam cum voce aut sono aliquo quippiam contingit lætum, eodem sono audito delectamur: si triste tristamur. Quod in brutis quoque est annotare: quæ si quo sono vocata gratum aliquid accipiunt, rursus ad eundem sonum facile ac libenter accurrunt: sin cædantur, sonitum eundem deinceps reformidant, ex plagarum recordatione.*—Lib. II. Opera, Tom. II. p. 519. S. C.]

fectum, ab hoc ad instrumentum, a parte ad totum;"¹⁴ thence to the place, from place to person, and from this to whatever preceded or followed, all as being parts of a total impression, each of which may recall the other. The apparent springs "*saltus vel transitus etiam longissimos,*"¹⁵ he explains by the same thought having been a component part of two or more total impressions. Thus "*ex Scipione venio in cogitationem potentiae Turcicae, propter victorias ejus de Asia, in qua regnabat Antiochus.*"¹⁶

But from Vives I pass at once to the source of his doctrines, and (as far as we can judge from the remains yet extant of Greek philosophy) as to the first, so to the fullest and most perfect enunciation of the associative principle, namely, to the writings of Aristotle; and of these in particular to the treatises *De Anima*, and "*De Memoria*," which last belongs to the series of essays entitled in the old translations *Parva Naturalia*.¹⁷ In as much as later writers have either deviated from, or added to his doctrines, they appear to me to have introduced either error or groundless supposition.

In the first place it is to be observed, that Aristotle's

¹⁴ [*De Anima* II. sect. d. *mem. et record.*—Cited by Maasz in a note, *ibid.* S. C.]

¹⁵ [*Ibid.*—*ibid.* See Maasz, pp. 345-6. That the springs are only "apparent" is explained by Maasz, commenting on the words of Vives, *Sunt (in phantasia) transitus quidam longissimi, immo saltus.* S. C.]

¹⁶ [Cited by Maasz from the same place, p. 346. S. C.]

¹⁷ [This collection, *τὰ μικρὰ καλούμενα Φυσικά*, which is connected with the treatise in three books, on the Soul, (as Trendelenburg distinctly shows in the Preface to his elaborate commentary on that work of Aristotle,) contains the books On Sense and Things Sensible, On Memory and Recollection, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, (*καθ' ὕπνου*), On

positions on this subject are unmixed with fiction.¹⁸ The wise Stagyrice speaks of no successive particles propagating motion like billiard balls, as Hobbes;¹⁹ nor of nervous or animal spirits, where inanimate and irrational solids are thawed down, and distilled, or filtrated by ascension, into living and intelligent fluids, that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain, as the followers of Des Cartes, and the humoral pathologists in general; nor of an oscillating ether which was to effect the same service for the nerves of the brain considered as solid fibres, as the animal spirits perform for them under the notion of hollow tubes, as Hartley teaches—nor finally, (with yet more recent dreamers) of chemical compositions by elective affinity, or of an electric light at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ of inward vision, which rises to the brain

Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, On Respiration, and On Life and Death. S. C.]

¹⁸ [Maasz has also said, (p. 345) speaking of Vives, that, though he set forth correctly the theory of association, he yet did not exhibit it with such entire purity as Aristotle. Mr. Coleridge, however is comparing the wise Stagyrice with Hobbes, Des Cartes, Hartley and others—Maasz is comparing him with Vives—observing that this author not only came after Aristotle in perceiving and expressing the general law of imagination, but, what is the principal thing, did not state the theory of association so consistently and purely as the former, because he made exceptions to the same, which are such in appearance only: though he thinks it may be assumed in his favour, that his language is incorrect rather than his conception of the subject. Mr. Coleridge, on the other hand, is objecting to the physical dreams, which modern metaphysicians introduced into the survey of psychological facts delivered by the sager ancient. He imputes to them an error in principle, while Maasz remarks upon a statement at variance with a law correctly laid down. S. C.]

¹⁹ [See Human Nature, chaps. ii. and iii. Hobbes does not use the expressions in which Mr. C. describes his doctrine, but speaks much of motions produced in the brain by objects. S. C.]

like an Aurora Borealis, and there, disporting in various shapes,—as the balance of *plus* and *minus*, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established,—images out both past and present. Aristotle delivers a just theory without pretending to an hypothesis; or in other words a comprehensive survey of the different facts, and of their relations to each other without supposition, that is, a fact *placed under* a number of facts, as their common support and explanation; though in the majority of instances these hypotheses or suppositions better deserve the name of *ὑποποιησεῖς*, or *suffictions*.²⁰ He uses indeed the word *κίνησεῖς*, to express what we call representations or ideas, but he carefully distinguishes them from material motion, designating the latter always by annexing the words *ἐν τόπῳ*, or *κατὰ τόπον*.²¹ On the contrary in his treatise

²⁰ [The discussion of Maasz on the part performed by Aristotle in explaining the general law of the Imagination extends from p. 319 to p. 335, from sect. 90 to 94 inclusively. S. C.]

²¹ [See Maasz, p. 321. He refers generally to the treatise *De Anima*, Lib. II. Cap. iii. and in particular to the words in s. 3. 'Ενίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν. "But some, beside these things, have also the faculty of motion according to place."

In the third and fourth chapters of the first book the subject of motion, *κατὰ τόπον*, is discussed, and the opinions of other philosophers that it is properly attributable to the soul refuted. Sections 3 and 4 of Lib. I. cap. iii. speak distinctly on this point: and so do sections 8-11 of cap. iv. In the latter the philosopher says; "That the soul cannot possibly be harmony, neither can be turned about in a circle is manifest, from the aforesaid. But that it may be removed *per accidens*—contingently,—may so move itself, even as we have declared, is possible: inasmuch as that, in which it is, is capable of being moved, and that (in which it is) may be moved by the soul: but in no other way is it possible for the soul to be moved according to place."

Maasz discusses Aristotle's use of the term *κινήσεις* in sections 91-2, pp. 321-333. He observes that it was not unusual with

tise *De Anima*, he excludes place and motion from all the operations of thought, whether representations or volitions, as attributes utterly and absurdly heterogeneous.²²

The general law of association, or, more accurately, the common condition under which all exciting causes act, and in which they may be generalized, according to Aristotle is this.²³ Ideas by having been together

the Greek philosophers to use the word for changes of the soul, and that Plato, for example, says expressly *κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα*, in the *Theætetus*, § 27. (Opera Bekker. Lond. Sumpt. R. Priestley, 1826. Vol. iii. p. 412.) S. C.]

²² [I. c. 3 in initio. *ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τῆν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι, οἷαν φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναί τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτὸ, ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνατῶν τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν.* Cited by Maasz, p. 322. Ed.]

[For perhaps not only it is false that the being of the soul is such as they suppose, who affirm that it is a thing which moves or is able to move itself; but it may be that it is a thing to which motion cannot possibly belong. Translation. S. C.]

²³ [See Maasz, pp. 324-5-6. In proof that Aristotle had a right conception of the common law of Association, though he did not call it by that name, and had not discovered all its fruitfulness, he cites from the treatise *De Memoria*, cap. ii. the following sentences:—*συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἠδὲ μενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε*—thus translated or paraphrased by Maasz—“The Representations come after one another to the consciousness, when the changes” (or movements) “of the soul thereto belonging are of such a nature that one arises after the other.” (I believe the stricter rendering to be—Recollections take place because it is the nature of the mind that its motions follow one another.)—*ἐνια ἰδόντες ἅπαξ μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν, ἢ ἕτερα πολλάκις.*

—“But such a connection among the changes of the soul, whereby one succeeds another, arises, though it be not necessary, through a kind of custom. For the production of this, however, it is sufficient, if we have only once perceived the objects of the representation together.” (This is a collection from

acquire a power of recalling each other ; or every partial representation awakes the total representation of which it had been a part.²⁴ In the practical determination of this common principle to particular recollections, he admits five agents or occasioning causes : 1st, connection in time, whether simultaneous, preceding, or successive ; 2nd, vicinity or connection in space ; 3rd, interdependence or necessary connection, as cause

the words of Aristotle rather than their direct sense, which seems to be as follows : “ The sequence of the mental motions is sometimes a necessary one, and this, as is evident, must always take place ; sometimes it is one that arises from custom, and this takes place only for the most part. Some men, by once thinking of a thing, acquire a habit, more than others by thinking ever so often. *Therefore we remember some things, that we have seen but once, better than other things, that we have seen many a time.*”)

“ Still plainer perhaps,” says he, “ speaks the place which follows the above ; as thus : *ὅταν οὖν ἀναμνησκόμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινά κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν κινήθῶμεν, μεθ’ ἣν ἐκείνη ἔιωθε.*—“ A representation is called up, (we remember it,) as soon as changes of the soul arise, with which that ” (change or movement) “ belonging to the said representation has been associated.” S. C.]

²⁴ [See Maasz, p. 326. “ Thus, representations which have been together, call forth each other, or : Every partial representation awakens its total representation.”

“ This rule holds good for the succession of representations generally, as well when we reflect upon a thing and strive to remember it, as when that is not the case ; it avails, as I have just now expressed, for the voluntary and involuntary series of imaginations. This Aristotle expressly asserts, and hereby we see, in what universality he had conceived the law of association.” He quotes in support of this the following sentence from the treatise *De Memoria*, cap. ii. *Ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω, καὶ μὴ ζητοῦντες δ’ οὕτως ἀναμνησκονται, ὅταν μεθ’ ἑτέρων κίνησιν ἐκείνη γίνηται.* In this way men try to recollect, and, when not trying, it is thus they remember ; some particular movement (of mind) arising after some other. S. C.]

and effect; 4th, likeness; and 5th, contrast.²⁵ As an additional solution of the occasional seeming chasms in the continuity of reproduction he proves, that move-

²⁵ [Maasz (at p. 327) shows that Aristotle gives "four distinct rules for Association"—that is to say, connexion in time, in space, resemblance, and opposition or contrast—in proof of which he cites the following passage—*διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρούμεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς, καὶ ἀφ' ὁμοίου, ἢ ἐναντίου, ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. Διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις.* Therefore in trying to remember we search (our minds) in regular order, proceeding from the present or some other time (to the time in which what we want to recollect occurred); or from something like, or directly opposite, or near in place. *De Mem. cap. ii.*

At pp. 27-8, Maasz writes thus: "That B. should be really immediately associated, with A. it is not necessary, that the whole representation B. should have been together with the whole representation A.; if only some mark of A. say M. has been associated with some mark of B., that is sufficient. If then A. being given, *m.* is consequently represented, *n.* is likewise associated therewith, because both have been already together; and then with *n.* are associated the remaining marks belonging to B. because these have been already together with *m.* in the representation B. Thus the whole representation B. is called up through A." "This seems to me a proof," says Mr. Coleridge in a marginal note on the passage, "that Likeness, as coordinate with, but not always subordinate to, Time, exerts an influence *per se* on the association. Thus too as to Cause and Effect;—they cannot of course be separated from Contemporaneity, but yet they act distinctly from it. Thus too, Contrast, and even Order. In short, whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct will determine the mind to recall these rather than others. Contemporaneity seems to me the common condition under which all the determining powers act rather than itself the effective law. Maasz sometimes forgets,—as Hartley seems never to have remembered,—that all our images are abstractions; and that in many cases of likeness the association is merely an act of recognition." *MS. note. S. C.]*

ments or ideas possessing one or the other of these five characters had passed through the mind as intermediate links, sufficiently clear to recall other parts of the same total impressions with which they had co-existed, though not vivid enough to excite that degree of attention which is requisite for distinct recollection, or as we may aptly express it, after consciousness²⁶ In association then consists the whole mechanism of the reproduction of impressions, in the Aristotelian Psychology. It is the universal law of the passive fancy and mechanical memory; that which supplies to all other faculties their objects, to all thought the elements of its materials.

In consulting the excellent commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on the *Parva Naturalia* of Aristotle, I was struck at once with its close resemblance to Hume's Essay on Association. The main thoughts were the same in both, the order of the thoughts was the same, and even the illustrations differed only by Hume's occasional substitution of more modern examples. I mentioned the circumstance to several of my literary acquaintances, who admitted the closeness of the resemblance, and that it seemed too great to be explained by mere coincidence; but they thought it improbable that Hume should have held the pages of the Angelic Doctor worth turning over. But some time after Mr. Payne showed Sir James Mackintosh some odd volumes of St. Thomas Aquinas, partly perhaps from having heard that he had in his Lectures passed a high encomium on this canonized philosopher; but chiefly

²⁶ [This is set forth at some length by Maasz, whose expositions of the present subject Mr. Coleridge seems to have mixed up in his mind with those of Aristotle. See *Versuch über die Einbildungskraft*. p. 27. S. C.]

from the fact, that the volumes had belonged to Mr. Hume, and had here and there marginal marks and notes of reference in his own hand writing. Among these volumes was that which contains the *Parva Naturalia*, in the old Latin version, swathed and swaddled in the commentary afore mentioned! ²⁷

It remains then for me, first to state wherein Hart-

²⁷ [This Commentary of Aquinas is contained in the third volume of the edition of his works, printed at Venice, in 1593-4, and in the Antwerp edition of 1612, end of tom. iii. It surrounds two translations of the text, one of which is the *Antiqua Translatio*.

When Mr. C. spoke of "Hume's Essay on Association," as closely resembling it, he must have had in his mind, not merely the short section on the Association of Ideas, but generally whatever relates to the subject in the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, from sections ii. to vii. inclusively. The similar thoughts and ancient illustrations are to be found in that part of the commentary which belongs to the treatise *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* (the second of the *Parva Naturalia*), particularly in sections v. and vi. pp. 25-6 of the Antwerp edit.

There the principles of connection amongst ideas, and "the method and regularity" with which they present themselves to the mind, are set forth at some length, for the purpose of explaining the nature of memory and describing our mental processes in voluntary recollection and unintentional remembrance. I think however that the likeness to Hume's treatise, wherein Association of Ideas is subordinate and introductory to another speculation, which it was the author's principal aim to bring forward, may have been somewhat magnified in Mr. C.'s mind from the circumstance, that the commentary, in addition to what it sets forth on connections of ideas, dwells much on certain other topics which are dwelt upon also in the Inquiry—as, the influence of custom in producing mental habits and becoming a sort of second nature; the liveliness and force of *phantasmata*, or images impressed on the mind by sensible things; and the distinctness and orderliness of mathematical theorems. These topics Hume handles somewhat differently from Aquinas, as his drift was different; but it is possible that the older disquisition

ley differs from Aristotle ; then, to exhibit the grounds of my conviction, that he differed only to err ; and next as the result, to show, by what influences of the choice and judgment the associative power becomes either memory or fancy ; and, in conclusion, to appropriate the remaining offices of the mind to the reason, and the imagination. With my best efforts to be as

may have suggested his thoughts on these points, though it cannot have exactly formed them.

It is rather remarkable, if Hume had indeed read this commentary before composing his own work, that he should have expressed himself thus at p. 22.—“ Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together, *I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of Association*, a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity.” Aquinas, in the commentary, does certainly attempt to enumerate them, though he does not classify them exactly as Hume and other modern philosophers have done. He does not make Cause and Effect a principle of Association over and above Contiguity in Time and Place ; and he mentions, as a separate influence, direct Dissimilarity or Contrast, which Hume refers to Causation and Resemblance, as a mixture of the two : in both which particulars he does but follow the leading of his text.

I will just add that, in commenting on two sentences of Aristotle, quoted in a former note,—explaining why some men remember, and some things are remembered, better than others under similar circumstances of association,—Aquinas observes, that this may happen through closer attention and profounder knowledge, because whatever we most earnestly attend to remains most firmly impressed on the memory ; and again, in accounting for false and imperfect remembrance, he states the converse fact, that by distraction of the imagination the mental impression is weakened. Lects. v. a. and vi. h. These remarks tend the same way with those in the Biographia, toward the end of chap. vii. concerning the superiour vividness of certain parts of a total impression, and the power of the will to give vividness to any object whatsoever by intensifying the attention. Mr. Coleridge’s aim was to show that these agents or occasion-

perspicuous as the nature of language will permit on such a subject, I earnestly solicit the good wishes and

ing causes of particular thoughts which have been specified, are themselves subject to a deeper law,—to the determination of the will, reason, judgment, understanding. S. C.]

[It was not till the new edition of this work was in the press that I became aware of a note, relating to chapter v. of the B. L. at the end of the Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Philosophy, by Sir J. Mackintosh, in which the author speaks as follows: “I have already acknowledged the striking resemblance of Mr. Hume’s principles of association to those of Aristotle.” After showing that the story of Mr. Hume was a mistake, and how the mistake arose, he proceeds to say—“It is certain that * * * * Aristotle explains recollection as depending on a general law,—that the idea of an object will remind us of the objects which immediately preceded or followed when originally perceived. But what Mr. Coleridge has not told us is, that the Stagyrite confines the application of this law *exclusively to the phenomena of recollection alone*, without any glimpse of a more general operation extending to all connections of thought and feeling,—a wonderful proof indeed, even so limited, of the sagacity of the great philosopher, but which for many ages continued barren of further consequences.” Perhaps Mr. C. thought, as Maasz appears to have done, that to discover the associative principle in respect of memory was obviously to discover the general law of mental association, since all connections of thought and feeling are dependent on memory. It is difficult to conceive a man writing a treatise on Memory and Recollection without hitting on this law of association, by observing the manner in which he *hunts* in his mind for any thing forgotten: but perhaps this remark savours of simplicity, for simple folks, when a truth is once clearly presented to them, can never again so abstract their minds from it as to conceive the possibility of its being unrecognized. “The illustrations of Aquinas,” Sir James adds, “throw light on the original doctrine, and show that it was unenlarged in his time, &c.” (Yet Aquinas almost touches the doctrine of Hobbes when he says *reminiscentia habet similitudinem cujusdam syllogismi, quare sicut in syllogismo pervenitur ad conclusionem ex aliquibus principiis, ita etiam in reminiscendo aliquis quodammodo*

friendly patience of my readers, while I thus go “ sounding on my dim and perilous way.”

syllogizat, &c.) “ Those of L. Vives, as quoted by Mr. C., extend no farther.”

“ But if Mr. Coleridge will compare the parts of Hobbes on *Human Nature*, which relate to this subject, with those which explain general terms, he will perceive that the philosopher of Malmesbury builds on these two foundations a general theory of the human understanding, of which reasoning is only a particular case.” This has been already admitted in note 2. Sir James seems to refer to the whole of chap. v. which begins thus: “ Seeing the succession of conceptions in the mind are caused * * * by the succession they had one to another when they were produced by the senses,” &c. He points out the forgetful statements of Mr. C. respecting the *De Methodo*, and expresses an opinion that Hobbes* and Hume might each have been unconscious that the doctrine of association was not originally his own. Either I should think had quite sagacity enough to discover it for himself; but the question is whether Hobbes was more sagacious on this part of the subject than any preceding philosopher.

Sir James makes an interesting reply to Mr. C.’s remark that he was unable to bridge over the chasm between their philosophical creeds, which I do not quote only from want of space. That Sir James was one of Mr. C.’s most intelligent readers is undeniable; yet I think it is not quite conclusive against the German doctrines,—either as to their internal character or the mode in which they have been enunciated—that they found no

* The language of Hobbes has somewhat of a Peripatetical sound, and when he discourses of the *motions* of the mind, reminds one of the Aristotelian commentator—*Causa autem remiscendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur in anima ex prima impressione ejus, quod primo apprehendimus*. Sir James says “ the term *θηρεύω* is as significant as if it had been chosen by Hobbes.” This term *may* have led Hobbes to talk about “ hunting,” “ tracing,” and “ ranging,” in the *Human Nature*.

CHAPTER VI.

That Hartley's system, as far as it differs from that of Aristotle, is neither tenable in theory, nor founded in facts.



F Hartley's hypothetical vibrations in his hypothetical oscillating ether of the nerves,¹ which is the first and most obvious distinction between his system and that of Aristotle, I shall say little. This, with all other similar attempts to render *that* an object of the sight which has no relation to sight, has been already sufficiently exposed by the younger Reimarus,² Maasz, and others, as outraging the very axioms of mechanics in a scheme, the merit of which consists in its being mechanical.³ Whether any other philosophy be possible, but the mechanical; and again, whether the mechanical system can have any claim to be called philosophy; are questions for another place. It is, however, certain, that as long as we deny the former, and affirm the latter, we must bewilder ourselves, whenever we would pierce into the *adyta* of causation; and all that laborious conjecture can do, is to fill up the gaps of fancy. Under that despotism of the eye (the emanci-

entrance into his mind; or at least no welcome there, or entire approval; for are not all new doctrines, even such as are ultimately established, opposed, on their first promulgation, by some of the strongest-headed persons of the age? S. C.]

¹ [Hartley, *Observ. on Man*, c. 1. s. 1. props. 4 and 5. Ed.]

² [John Albert H. Reimarus. Ed. See Note in the Appendix. S. C.]

³ [See Maasz, pp. 41-2. Ed.]

pation from which Pythagoras by his numeral, and Plato by his musical, symbols, and both by geometric discipline, aimed at, as the first *προπαίδευμα* of the mind)—under this strong sensuous influence, we are restless because invisible things are not the objects of vision ; and metaphysical systems, for the most part, become popular, not for their truth, but in proportion as they attribute to causes a susceptibility of being seen, if only our visual organs were sufficiently powerful.

From a hundred possible confutations let one suffice. According to this system the idea or vibration *a* from the external object A becomes associable with the idea or vibration *m* from the external object M, because the oscillation *a* propagated itself so as to re-produce the oscillation *m*. But the original impression from M was essentially different from the impression A : unless therefore different causes may produce the same effect, the vibration *a* could never produce the vibration *m* : and this therefore could never be the means, by which *a* and *m* are associated.⁴ To understand this, the attentive reader need only be reminded, that the ideas are themselves, in Hartley's system, nothing more than their appropriate configurative vibrations. It is a mere delusion of the fancy to conceive the pre-existence of the ideas, in any chain of association, as so many differently coloured billiard-balls in contact, so that when an object, the billiard-stick, strikes the first or white ball, the same motion propagates itself through the red, green, blue and black, and sets the whole in motion. No ! we must suppose the very same force, which *constitutes* the white ball, to *constitute* the red or black ; or the idea of a circle to *constitute* the idea of a triangle ; which is impossible.

⁴ [Maasz, pp. 32-3. Ed.]

But it may be said, that by the sensations from the objects A and M, the nerves have acquired a disposition to the vibrations *a* and *m*, and therefore *a* need only be repeated in order to re-produce *m*.⁵ Now we will grant, for a moment, the possibility of such a disposition in a material nerve, which yet seems scarcely less absurd than to say, that a weather-cock had acquired a habit of turning to the east, from the wind having been so long in that quarter: for if it be replied, that we must take in the circumstance of life, what then becomes of the mechanical philosophy? And what is the nerve, but the flint which the wag placed in the pot as the first ingredient of his stone-broth, requiring only salt, turnips, and mutton, for the remainder! ⁶But if we waive this, and pre-suppose the actual existence of such a disposition; two cases are possible. Either, every idea has its own nerve and correspondent oscillation, or this is not the case. If the latter be the truth, we should gain nothing by these dispositions; for then, every nerve having several dispositions, when the motion of any other nerve is propagated into it, there will be no ground or cause present, why exactly the oscillation *m* should arise, rather than any other to which it was equally pre-disposed. But if we take the former, and let every idea have a nerve of its own, then every nerve must be capable of propagating its motion into many other nerves; and again, there is no reason assignable, why the vibration *m* should arise, rather than any other *ad libitum*.

It is fashionable to smile at Hartley's vibrations and vibratiuncles; and his work has been re-edited by Priestley, with the omission of the material hypo-

⁵ [Maasz, pp. 33. Ed.]

⁶ [For the rest of this paragraph see Maasz, pp. 33-4. Ed.]

thesis.⁷ But Hartley was too great a man, too coherent a thinker, for this to have been done, either consistently or to any wise purpose. For all other parts of his system, as far as they are peculiar to that system, once removed from their mechanical basis, not only lose their main support, but the very motive which led to their adoption. Thus the principle of contemporaneity, which Aristotle had made the common condition of all the laws of association, Hartley was constrained to represent as being itself the sole law.⁸ For to what law can the action of material atoms be subject, but that of proximity in place? And to what law can their motions be subjected, but that of time? Again, from this results inevitably, that the will, the reason, the judgment, and the understanding, instead of being the determining causes of association, must needs be represented as its creatures, and among its mechanical effects. Conceive, for instance, a broad stream, winding through a mountainous country with an indefinite number of currents, varying and running

⁷ [Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Association of Ideas; with Essays relating to the subject of it. By Joseph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. London, 1775.]

Priestley explains and defends the doctrine of vibrations in his first Introductory Essay; the object of his publication, as he states in the Preface, is to exhibit Hartley's theory of the Human Mind, as far as it relates to the doctrine of *association of ideas* only, apart from the system of moral and religious knowledge, originally connected with it, which rendered the work too extensive,—and the material foundation of the theory, which rendered it too difficult and intricate,—for general reading.

“Haller has shown that the doctrine of vibrations attributes properties to the medullary substance of the brain and nerves, which are totally incompatible with their nature.” Quoted from Rees's Encyc. Art. Hartley. S. C.]

⁸ [Hartley, Observ. on Man, chap. i. s. ii. prop. 10. Ed.]

into each other according as the gusts chance to blow from the opening of the mountains. The temporary union of several currents in one, so as to form the main current of the moment, would present an accurate image of Hartley's theory of the will.

Had this been really the case, the consequence would have been, that our whole life would be divided between the despotism of outward impressions, and that of senseless and passive memory. Take his law in its highest abstraction and most philosophical form, namely, that every partial representation recalls the total representation of which it was a part;⁹ and the law becomes nugatory, were it only for its universality. In practice it would indeed be mere lawlessness. Consider, how immense must be the sphere of a total impression from the top of St. Paul's church; and how rapid and continuous the series of such total impressions. If, therefore, we suppose the absence of all interference of the will, reason, and judgment, one or other of two consequences must result. Either the ideas, or reliques of such impression, will exactly imitate the order of the impression itself, which would be absolute *delirium*: or any one part of that impression might recall any other part, and—(as from the law of continuity, there must exist in every total impression, some one or more parts, which are components of some other following total impression, and so on *ad infinitum*)

⁹ [At p. 29, Maasz thus expresses the common law of Association: "With a given representation all" (representations) "can be associated, which belong with it to a total representation, but those *only immediately*; or, as is also said, Every representation calls back into the mind its total representation." "Rather," says Mr. Coleridge in the margin, "*is capable, under given conditions, of recalling*; or else our whole life would be divided between the despotism of outward impressions and that of senseless memory." S. C.]

—*any* part of any impression might recal any part of any other, without a cause present to determine what it should be. For to bring in the will, or reason, as causes of their own cause, that is, as at once causes and effects, can satisfy those only who, in their pretended evidences of a God, having first demanded organization, as the sole cause and ground of intellect, will then coolly demand the pre-existence of intellect, as the cause and ground-work of organization. There is in truth but one state to which this theory applies at all, namely, that of complete light-headedness; and even to this it applies but partially, because the will and reason are perhaps never wholly suspended.

A case of this kind occurred in a Roman Catholic town in Germany a year or two before my arrival at Göttingen,¹⁰ and had not then ceased to be a frequent subject of conversation. A young woman of four or five and twenty, who could neither read, nor write, was seized with a nervous fever; during which, according to the asseverations of all the priests and monks of the neighbourhood, she became possessed, and, as it appeared, by a very learned devil. She continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones and with most distinct enunciation. This possession was rendered more probable by the known fact that she was or had been a heretic. Voltaire humorously advises the devil to decline all acquaintance with medical men; and it would have been more to his reputation, if he had taken this advice in the present instance. The case had attracted the particular attention of a young physician, and by his statement many eminent physiologists and psychologists visited the town, and cross-examined the case on

¹⁰ [In February, 1799. Ed.]

the spot. Sheets full of her ravings were taken down from her own mouth, and were found to consist of sentences, coherent and intelligible each for itself, but with little or no connection with each other. Of the Hebrew, a small portion only could be traced to the Bible; the remainder seemed to be in the Rabbinical dialect. All trick or conspiracy was out of the question. Not only had the young woman ever been a harmless, simple creature; but she was evidently labouring under a nervous fever. In the town, in which she had been resident for many years as a servant in different families, no solution presented itself. The young physician, however, determined to trace her past life step by step; for the patient herself was incapable of returning a rational answer. He at length succeeded in discovering the place, where her parents had lived: travelled thither, found them dead, but an uncle surviving; and from him learned, that the patient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor at nine years old, and had remained with him some years, even till the old man's death. Of this pastor the uncle knew nothing, but that he was a very good man. With great difficulty, and after much search, our young medical philosopher discovered a niece of the pastor's, who had lived with him as his house-keeper, and had inherited his effects. She remembered the girl; related, that her venerable uncle had been too indulgent, and could not bear to hear the girl scolded; that she was willing to have kept her, but that, after her patron's death, the girl herself refused to stay. Anxious inquiries were then, of course, made concerning the pastor's habits; and the solution of the phenomenon was soon obtained. For it appeared, that it had been the old man's custom, for years, to walk up and down a passage of his house into which the kitchen

door opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice, out of his favourite books. A considerable number of these were still in the niece's possession. She added, that he was a very learned man and a great Hebraist. Among the books were found a collection of Rabbinical writings, together with several of the Greek and Latin Fathers; and the physician succeeded in identifying so many passages with those taken down at the young woman's bedside, that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concerning the true origin of the impressions made on her nervous system.

This authenticated case furnishes both proof and instance, that reliques of sensation may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the very same order in which they were originally impressed; and as we cannot rationally suppose the feverish state of the brain to act in any other way than as a *stimulus*, this fact (and it would not be difficult to adduce several of the same kind) contributes to make it even probable, that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable; and, that if the intelligent faculty should be rendered more comprehensive, it would require only a different and apportioned organization,—*the body celestial* instead of *the body terrestrial*,—to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence. And this, this, perchance, is the dread book of judgment, in the mysterious hieroglyphics of which every idle word is recorded! Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, with all the links of which, conscious or unconscious, the free-will, our only absolute Self, is co-extensive and co-present. But not now dare I longer discourse of this, waiting for a loftier mood,

and a nobler subject, warned from within and from without, that it is profanation to speak of these mysteries τοῖς μηδὲ φαντασθεῖσιν, ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον, καὶ ἔτε ἔσπερος ἔτε ἔως ἔτω καλά. Τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὁμοῖον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον, ἠλιοειδῆς μὴ γεγενημένος· οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδῃ ψυχὴ, μὴ καλῆ γενομένη⁶⁷—“to those to whose imagination it has never been presented, how beautiful is the countenance of justice and wisdom; and that neither the morning nor the evening star are so fair. For in order to direct the view aright, it behoves that the beholder should have made himself congenerous and similar to the object beheld. Never could the eye have beheld the sun, had not its own essence been soliform,” (*i. e. pre-configured to light by a similarity of essence with that of light*) “neither can a soul not beautiful attain to an intuition of beauty.”

CHAPTER VII.

Of the necessary consequences of the Hartleian Theory—Of the original mistake or equivocation which procured its admission—Memoria technica.



WE will pass by the utter incompatibility of such a law—if law it may be called, which would itself be the slave of chances—with even that appearance of rationality forced upon us by the outward *phenomena* of human conduct, abstracted from our own con-

⁶⁶ [Plotinus. Enn. I. Lib. vi. ss. 4 and 9. Ed.]

sciousness. We will agree to forget this for the moment, in order to fix our attention on that subordination of final to efficient causes in the human being, which flows of necessity from the assumption, that the will and, with the will, all acts of thought and attention are parts and products of this blind mechanism, instead of being distinct powers, the function of which it is to control, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association. The soul becomes a mere *ens logicum*; for, as a real separable being, it would be more worthless and ludicrous than the Grimalkins in the cat-harpsichord, described in the Spectator. For these did form a part of the process; but, in Hartley's scheme, the soul is present only to be pinched or stroked, while the very squeals or purring are produced by an agency wholly independent and alien. It involves all the difficulties, all the incomprehensibility (if it be not indeed, *ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ*, the absurdity), of intercommunion between substances that have no one property in common, without any of the convenient consequences that bribed the judgment to the admission of the Dualistic hypothesis. Accordingly, this *caput mortuum* of the Hartleian process has been rejected by his followers, and the consciousness considered as a *result*, as a *tune*, the common product of the breeze and the harp: though this again is the mere remotion of one absurdity to make way for another, equally preposterous. For what is harmony but a mode of relation, the very *esse* of which is *percipi*?—an *ens rationale*, which pre-supposes the power, that by perceiving creates it? The razor's edge becomes a saw to the armed vision; and the delicious melodies of Purcell or Cimarosa might be disjointed stammerings to a hearer, whose partition of time should be a thousand times subtler than ours. But this obstacle too let us ima-

gine ourselves to have surmounted, and “at one bound high overleap all bound.” Yet according to this hypothesis the disquisition, to which I am at present soliciting the reader’s attention, may be as truly said to be written by Saint Paul’s church, as by me: for it is the mere motion of my muscles and nerves; and these again are set in motion from external causes equally passive, which external causes stand themselves in interdependent connection with every thing that exists or has existed. Thus the whole universe co-operates to produce the minutest stroke of every letter, save only that I myself, and I alone, have nothing to do with it, but merely the causeless and effectless beholding of it when it is done. Yet scarcely can it be called a beholding; for it is neither an act nor an effect; but an impossible creation of a *something-nothing* out of its very contrary! It is the mere quick-silver plating behind a looking-glass; and in this alone consists the poor worthless I! The sum total of my moral and intellectual intercourse, dissolved into its elements, is reduced to extension, motion, degrees of velocity, and those diminished *copies* of configurative motion, which form what we call notions, and notions of notions. Of such philosophy well might Butler say—

The metaphysic’s but a puppet motion
 That goes with screws, the notion of a notion;
 The copy of a copy and lame draught
 Unnaturally taken from a thought:
 That counterfeits all pantomimic tricks,
 And turns the eyes, like an old crucifix;
 That counterchanges whatsoe’er it calls
 By another name, and makes it true or false;
 Turns truth to falsehood, falsehood into truth,
 By virtue of the Babylonian’s tooth.¹

¹ [Miscellaneous Thoughts. Ed.]

The inventor of the watch, if this doctrine be true, did not in reality invent it; he only looked on, while the blind causes, the only true artists, were unfolding themselves. So must it have been too with my friend Allston, when he sketched his picture of the dead man revived by the bones of the prophet Elijah.² So must it have been with Mr. Southey and Lord Byron, when the one fancied himself composing his Roderick, and the other his Childe Harold. The same must hold good of all systems of philosophy; of all arts, governments, wars by sea and by land; in short, of all things that ever have been or that ever will be produced. For, according to this system, it is not the affections and passions that are at work, in as far as

² [This expression of regard for the great painter of America may well justify the publication of the following beautiful sonnet, which Mr. Allston, a master of either pencil, did the Editor the honour to send to him.]

SONNET

On the late *Samuel Taylor Coleridge*.

And thou art gone—most lov'd, most honour'd Friend!
 No—never more thy gentle voice shall blend
 With air of earth its pure, ideal tones,—
 Binding in one, as with harmonious zones,
 The heart and intellect. And I no more
 Shall with Thee gaze on that unfathom'd deep,
 The human soul;—as when, push'd off the shore,
 Thy mystic bark would thro' the darkness sweep,
 Itself the while so bright! For oft we seem'd
 As on some starless sea—all dark above,
 All dark below—yet, onward as we drove,
 To plough up light that ever round us stream'd.
 But he who mourns is not as one bereft
 Of all he lov'd:—Thy living Truths are left.

Cambridge Port, Massachusetts, America. Ed.]

they are sensations or thoughts. We only fancy, that we act from rational resolves, or prudent motives, or from impulses of anger, love, or generosity. In all these cases the real agent is a *something-nothing-everything*, which does all of which we know, and knows nothing of all that itself does.

The existence of an infinite spirit, of an intelligent and holy will, must, on this system, be mere articulated motions of the air. For as the function of the human understanding is no other than merely to appear to itself to combine and to apply the *phænomena* of the association; and as these derive all their reality from the primary sensations; and the sensations again all their reality from the impressions *ab extra*; a God not visible, audible, or tangible, can exist only in the sounds and letters that form his name and attributes. If in ourselves there be no such faculties as those of the will, and the scientific reason, we must either have an innate idea of them, which would overthrow the whole system; or we can have no idea at all. The process, by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect into a blind product of delusion and habit, into the mere sensation of proceeding life (*nisus vitalis*) associated with the images of the memory;³ this same process must be repeated to the equal degradation of every fundamental idea in ethics or theology.

Far, very far am I from burthening with the odium of these consequences the moral characters of those who first formed, or have since adopted the system! It is most noticeable of the excellent and pious Hartley, that, in the proofs of the existence and attributes of God, with which his second volume commences, he makes no reference to the principle or results of the

³ [See *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*. Sect. vii. Ed.]

first. Nay, he assumes, as his foundations, ideas which, if we embrace the doctrines of his first volume, can exist no where but in the vibrations of the ethereal *medium* common to the nerves and to the atmosphere. Indeed the whole of the second volume is, with the fewest possible exceptions, independent of his peculiar system. So true is it, that the faith, which saves and sanctifies, is a collective energy, a total act of the whole moral being; that its living *sensorium* is in the heart; and that no errors of the understanding can be morally arraigned unless they have proceeded from the heart. But whether they be such, no man can be certain in the case of another, scarcely perhaps even in his own. Hence it follows by inevitable consequence, that man may perchance determine what is a heresy; but God only can know who is a heretic. It does not, however, by any means follow that opinions fundamentally false are harmless. A hundred causes may co-exist to form one complex antidote. Yet the sting of the adder remains venomous, though there are many who have taken up the evil thing, and it hurted them not. Some indeed there seem to have been, in an unfortunate neighbour nation at least, who have embraced this system with a full view of all its moral and religious consequences; some—

————— who deem themselves most free,
 When they within this gross and visible sphere
 Chain down the winged thought, scoffing ascent,
 Proud in their meanness; and themselves they cheat
 With noisy emptiness of learned phrase,
 Their subtle fluids, impacts, essences,
 Self-working tools, uncaus'd effects, and all
 Those blind omniscients, those almighty slaves,
 Untenanting creation of its God! ⁴

⁴ [*Destiny of Nations*. Poet. Works, I. p. 99. Ed.]

Such men need discipline, not argument; they must be made better men, before they can become wiser.

The attention will be more profitably employed in attempting to discover and expose the paralogisms, by the magic of which such a faith could find admission into minds framed for a nobler creed. These, it appears to me, may be all reduced to one sophism as their common *genus*; the mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence; and the process, by which we arrive at the knowledge of a faculty, for the faculty itself. The air I breathe is the condition of my life, not its cause. We could never have learned that we had eyes but by the process of seeing; yet having seen we know that the eyes must have pre-existed in order to render the process of sight possible. Let us cross-examine Hartley's scheme under the guidance of this distinction; and we shall discover, that contemporaneity, (Leibnitz's *Lex Continui*,⁵) is the limit and condition of the laws of mind, itself being rather a law of matter, at least of *phænomena* considered as material. At the utmost, it is to thought the same, as the law of gravitation is to loco-motion.

⁵ [This principle of a *continuum*, *cette belle loi de la continuité*, as Leibnitz calls it in his lively style, which is even gay for that of a deep philosopher, intent on discovering the composition of the Universe, was introduced by him and first announced, as he mentions himself, in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres de Mr. Bayle*, which forms Art. xxiv. of Erdmann's edition of his works, under the title of *Extrait d' une Lettre à Mr. Bayle, &c.* He dwells upon this law in many of his philosophical writings. "C'est une de mes grandes maximes," says he, "et des plus vérifiées, que la nature ne fait jamais des sauts." (*Natura non agit saltatim.*) "J'appellois cela la loi de la continuité, &c. et l'usage de cette loi est très considérable dans la Physique." *Nouveaux Essais. Avant propos*, p. 198, of Erdmann's edit. S. C.]

In every voluntary movement we first counteract gravitation, in order to avail ourselves of it. It must exist, that there may be a something to be counteracted, and which, by its re-action, may aid the force that is exerted to resist it. Let us consider what we do when we leap. We first resist the gravitating power by an act purely voluntary, and then by another act, voluntary in part, we yield to it in order to light on the spot, which we had previously proposed to ourselves. Now let a man watch his mind while he is composing; or, to take a still more common case, while he is trying to recollect a name; and he will find the process completely analogous. Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, how the little animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength and a momentary *fulcrum* for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive.⁶ In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINA-

⁶ [Schelling describes an activity and passivity which reciprocally presuppose, or are *conditioned* through, one another. But he is endeavouring to solve the problem how the I beholds itself as perceptive. *Transsc. Id.* p. 136, *et passim.* S. C.]

TION.⁷ But, in common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we appropriate the name to a superiour degree of the faculty, joined to a superiour voluntary control over it.

Contemporaneity, then, being the common condition of all the laws of association, and a component element in the *materia subjecta*, the parts of which are to be associated, must needs be co-present with all. Nothing, therefore, can be more easy than to pass off on an incautious mind this constant companion of each, for the essential substance of all. But if we appeal to our own consciousness, we shall find that even time itself, as the cause of a particular act of association, is distinct from contemporaneity, as the condition of all association. Seeing a mackerel, it may happen, that I immediately think of gooseberries, because I at the same time ate mackerel with gooseberries as the sauce. The first syllable of the latter word, being that which had co-existed with the image of the bird so called, I may then think of a goose. In the next moment the image of a swan may arise before me, though I had never seen the two birds together. In the first two instances, I am conscious that their co-existence in time was the circumstance, that enabled me to recollect them; and equally conscious am I that the latter was recalled to me by the joint operation of likeness and contrast. So it is with cause and effect; so too with order. So I am able to distinguish whether it

⁷ [Maasz thus defines the Imagination at p. 2. "But all representations and modifications of the sense" (receptivity of impressions), "which are not really in it, so far as it is affected by an object, must be produced through an active faculty of the same, which is distinguished from the Senses, and may be called the Imagination in the widest sense. Transl. S. C.]

was proximity in time, or continuity in space, that occasioned me to recall B. on the mention of A. They cannot be indeed separated from contemporaneity; for that would be to separate them from the mind itself. The act of consciousness is indeed identical with time considered in its essence. I mean time *per se*, as contra-distinguished from our notion of time; for this is always blended with the idea of space, which, as the opposite of time, is therefore its measure.⁸ Nevertheless the accident of seeing two objects at the same *moment*, and the accident of seeing them in the same place are two distinct or distinguishable causes: and the true practical general law of association is this; that whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the rest, will determine the mind to recall these in preference to others equally linked together by the common condition of contemporaneity, or (what I deem a more appropriate and philosophical term) of *continuity*. But the will itself by confining and intensifying⁹ the attention may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object

⁸ [Schelling teaches that the most original measure of Time is Space, of Space Time; and that both are opposed to each other for this reason that they mutually limit one another. Transc. Id. Tübingen 1800, pp. 216-17. See also *Idem*, 325-6. S. C.]

⁹ I am aware, that this word occurs neither in Johnson's Dictionary nor in any classical writer. But the word, *to intend*, which Newton and others before him employ in this sense, is now so completely appropriated to another meaning, that I could not use it without ambiguity: while to paraphrase the sense, as by *render intense*, would often break up the sentence and destroy that harmony of the position of the words with the logical position of the thoughts, which is a beauty in all composition, and more especially desirable in a close philosophical investigation. I have therefore hazarded the word, *intensify*; though, I confess, it sounds uncouth to my own ear.

whatsoever; and from hence we may deduce the uselessness, if not the absurdity, of certain recent schemes which promise an artificial memory, but which in reality can only produce a confusion and debasement of the fancy. Sound logic, as the habitual subordination of the individual to the species, and of the species to the genus; philosophical knowledge of facts under the relation of cause and effect; a cheerful and communicative temper disposing us to notice the similarities and contrasts of things, that we may be able to illustrate the one by the other; a quiet conscience; a condition free from anxieties; sound health, and above all (as far as relates to passive remembrance) a healthy digestion; these are the best, these are the only Arts of Memory.

CHAPTER VIII.

The system of Dualism introduced by Des Cartes—Refined first by Spinoza and afterwards by Leibnitz into the doctrine of Harmonia præstabilita—Hylozoism—Materialism—None of these systems, or any possible theory of association, supplies or supersedes a theory of Perception, or explains the formation of the Associable.



O the best of my knowledge Des Cartes was the first philosopher, who introduced the absolute and essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence, and the body as matter.¹ The assumption, and the

¹ [*Principia Philosophiæ*, P. I. §§ 52-3, 63-4. S. C.]

form of speaking have remained, though the denial of all other properties to matter but that of extension, on which denial the whole system of Dualism is grounded, has been long exploded. For since impenetrability is intelligible only as a mode of resistance; its admission places the essence of *matter* in an act or power, which it possesses in common with *spirit*;² and body and spirit are therefore no longer absolutely heterogeneous, but may without any absurdity be supposed to be different modes, or degrees in perfection, of a common *substratum*. To this possibility, however, it was not the fashion to advert. The soul was a *thinking* substance, and body a *space-filling* substance. Yet the apparent action of each on the other pressed heavy on the philosopher on the one hand; and no less heavily on the other hand pressed the evident truth, that the law of causality holds only between homogeneous things, that is, things having some common property; and cannot extend from one world into another, its contrary.³ A close analysis evinced it to be no less absurd than the question whether a man's affection for his wife lay North-east, or South-west of the love he bore towards his child. Leibnitz's doctrine of a

² [Compare with Schelling's *Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre*—Philosophische Schriften. Landshut, 1809. (See note *infra*.) Compare also with what Leibnitz lays down on this point in the last paragraph of his paper *De Primæ Philosophiæ Emendatione*—which forms Art. xxxiv. of Erdmann's edition of his works, Berol. 1840, and with the *Nouveaux Essais*, (Liv. II. c. xxi. § 2. Erdmann, p. 250,) where he says that matter has not only mobility, which is the receptivity or capacity of movement, but also resistance which comprehends impenetrability and *inertia*. S. C.]

³ [*System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, pp. 112-13. See the next note but two. S. C.]

pre-established harmony ;⁴ which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza, who had himself taken the hint from Des Cartes's animal machines,⁵ was in its common in-

⁴ [This theory Leibnitz unfolds in his *Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances*, 1695. Opp. ed. Erdmann, p. 124, in his *Eclaircissements du nouveau système*. I. II. and III. Ibid. pp. 131-3, 4. *Réplique aux Réflexions de Bayle*, &c. 1702. Ibid. 183. He speaks of it also in his *Monadologie*, 1714, Ibid. 702, and many of his other writings. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz was born at Leipzig, June 21, 1746, died Nov. 14, 1716. This great man, whose intellectual powers and attainments were so various and considerable that he has been ranked among the universal geniuses of the world, appears to have been the principal founder of that modern school of philosophy which succeeded to the scholastic. He seems to have united the profundity of a German in the matter of his disquisitions, with something of the Frenchman's polish and lightness of touch in the manner of them ; which may be accounted for, in some measure, by his Teutonic birth on the one hand, and his use of the French language on the other. S. C.]

⁵ [*Specimina Philosophiæ*—Diss. de Meth. § v. pp. 30-3, edit. 1664. Des Cartes thought it a pious opinion to hold that brute creatures are mere *automata*, set in motion by animal spirits acting on the nerves and muscles—because such a view widens the interval betwixt man and the *beasts that perish*. Wesley thought it a pious opinion to suppose that they have souls capable of salvation. Leibnitz comments upon the Cartesian notion on this subject, in his essay *De Anima Brutorum*, wherein he distinguishes admirably between the intelligence of brutes and the reasonable souls of men. (§ 14. Opp. ed. Erdmann, pp. 464-5.) Mr. Coleridge remarks upon Wesley's opinion in a note printed in the new edition of Southey's *Life of Wesley*, chap. xx. Des Cartes compares the souls or quasi-souls of brutes to a well made watch, arguing from the uniformity, certainty, and limitedness of their actions, that nature acts in them according to the disposition of their organs. Leibnitz—(in his *Troisième Eclaircissement*, and elsewhere)—compares the body and soul of man to two well made watches, which perfectly agree with one another. It is easy to see how the latter, while he was refuting his predecessor's opinion as a whole, may have

terpretation too strange to survive the inventor—too repugnant to our common sense; which is not indeed entitled to a judicial voice in the courts of scientific philosophy; but whose whispers still exert a strong secret influence. Even Wolf, the admirer and illustrious systematizer of the Leibnitzian doctrine, contents himself with defending the possibility of the idea, but does not adopt it as a part of the edifice.

The hypothesis of Hylozoism, on the other side, is the death of all rational physiology, and indeed of all physical science; for that requires a limitation of terms, and cannot consist with the arbitrary power of multiplying attributes by occult qualities. Besides, it answers no purpose; unless, indeed, a difficulty can be solved by multiplying it, or we can acquire a clearer notion of our soul by being told that we have a million of souls, and that every atom of our bodies has a soul of its own. Far more prudent is it to admit the difficulty once for all, and then let it lie at rest. There is a sediment indeed at the bottom of the vessel, but all the water above it is clear and transparent. The Hylozoist only shakes it up, and renders the whole turbid.

But it is not either the nature of man, or the duty of the philosopher to despair concerning any important problem until, as in the squaring of the circle, the impossibility of a solution has been demonstrated. How the *esse* assumed as originally distinct from the *scire*, can ever unite itself with it;⁶ how *being* can transform itself into a *knowing*, becomes conceivable on one

borrowed something from it. The likeness to Spinoza's doctrine is more recondite, but may be traced in Part II. of the *Ethics*, on the nature and origin of the mind. S. C.]

⁶ [A passage in the *Transc. Id.* pp. 112-13-14, contains many thoughts brought forward by Mr. Coleridge in this and the three following pages. A translation of it is subjoined, with the

only condition ; namely, if it can be shown that the *vis representativa*, or the Sentient, is itself a species of being ; that is, either as a property or attribute, or as an *hypostasis* or self subsistence. The former—that thinking is a property of matter under particular conditions,—is, indeed, the assumption of materialism ; a system which could not but be patronized by the philosopher, if only it actually performed what it promises. But how any affection from without can meta-

borrowed passages marked in italics. The last sentence is borrowed in chapter ix. of B. L.

“ The act, through which the I limits itself, is no other than that of the self-consciousness, at which, as the explanation-ground of all Limitedness (*Begrüntztseyns*) we come to a stand, and for this reason, that how any affection from without can transform itself into a representing or knowing is absolutely inconceivable. Supposing even that an object could work upon the I, as on an object, still such an affection could only bring forth something homogeneous, that is only an objective determinateness (*Bestimmtseyn*) over again. Thus how an original *Being* can convert itself into a *Knowing* would only be conceivable in case it could be shown that even Representation itself (*die Vorstellung selbst*) is a kind of Being ; which is indeed the explanation of Materialism, *a system that would be a boon to the philosopher, if it really performed what it promises. But Materialism, such as it has hitherto been, is wholly unintelligible ; make it intelligible, and it is no longer distinguished in reality from transcendental Idealism. To explain thinking as a material phenomenon is only possible in this way, that we reduce matter itself to a spectre,—to the mere modification of an Intelligence whose common functions are thinking and matter.* Consequently Materialism itself is carried back to the Intelligent (*das Intelligente*) as the original. And assuredly just as little can we succeed in an attempt to explain Being out of Knowing, so as to represent the former as the product of the latter ; seeing that betwixt the two no causal relationship is possible, and they could never meet together, were they not originally one in the I. Being (Matter), considered as productive, is a Knowing ; Knowing considered

morphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has hitherto left, not only as incomprehensible as he found it, but has aggravated it into a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious *self*, as on a consubstantial object ; yet such an affection could only engender something homogeneous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no *Inward*. We remove one surface, but to meet with another.⁷ We can but divide a particle into particles ; and each atom

as product, a Being. If Knowing is productive in general, it must be wholly and throughout productive, not in part only. Nothing can come from without into the Knowing, for all that is is identical with the Knowing, and without it is nothing at all. If the one Factor of Representation lies in the I, so must the other also ; for in the object the two are inseparable. *Let it be supposed, for example, that the stuff (or material) belongs to the things, it follows that this stuff, before it arrives at the I, at least in the transition from the thing to the representation, must be formless, which without doubt is inconceivable.*" S. C.]

⁷ [Abhandlungen. Phil. Schrift. p. 240-241. Translation. "What matter, that is the object of the external intuition, is, we may analyse for ever—may divide it mechanically or chemically : we never get further than to the surfaces of bodies. That alone in matter which is indestructible is its indwelling power, which discovers itself to feeling through impenetrability. But this is a power which goes merely *ad extra*—only works contrary to the outward impact ; thus it is no power that returns into itself. Only a power that returns into itself makes to itself an *Inward*. Thence to matter belongs no *Inward*. But the representing being beholds an inner world. This is not possible except through an activity which gives to itself its own sphere, or, in other words, returns into itself. But no activity goes back into itself, which does not, on this very account and at the same time, also go outward. There is no sphere without limitation, but just as little is there limitation without space, which is limited."

See also Schelling's *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*. Introd. 2nd edit. Landshut, 1803, p. 22. S. C.]

comprehends in itself the properties of the material universe.⁸ Let any reflecting mind make the experiment of explaining to itself the evidence of our sensuous intuitions, from the hypothesis that in any given perception there is a something which has been communicated to it by an impact, or an impression *ab extra*. In the first place, by the impact on the percipient,

⁸ [For great part of the remainder of this paragraph see Schelling's *Transfc. Id.* pp. 149-50. Compare also with *Ideen*, Introd. p. 22.

Schelling concludes the former passage in the *Transfc. Id.* as follows: Transl. "The most consistent proceeding of Dogmatism,"—(that is, the old method of determining upon supersensible objects without a previous inquiry into the nature and scope of the faculties by which the inquiry is to be carried on,—without "a præ-inquisition into the mind,")—"is to have recourse to the mysterious for the origin of representations of external things, and to speak thereof as of a revelation, which renders all further explanation impossible; or to make the inconceivable origination of a thing so dissimilar in kind, as the representation from the impulse of an outward object, conceivable through a power, to which, as to the Deity, (the only immediate object of our knowledge, according to that system,) even the impossible is possible."

Schelling seems to have had in his mind such doctrine as that which is thus stated by Professor Stewart: "It is now, I think, pretty generally acknowledged by physiologists, that the influence of the will over the body is a mystery, which has never yet been unfolded; but, singular as it may appear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical language concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this; that the mind is so formed, that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects, are followed by correspondent sensations; and that these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote,) are followed by a perception of the existence and quali-

or *ens representans*, not the object itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now in our immediate perception, it is not the mere power or act of the object, but the object itself, which is immediately present. We might indeed attempt to explain this result by a chain of deductions

ties of the bodies by which the impressions are made ; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible ; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between the impression and the sensation may be both arbitrary : that it is therefore by no means impossible, that our sensations may be merely the occasions on which the correspondent perceptions are excited ; and that, at any rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject it follows, that it is external objects themselves, and not any species or images of these objects, that the mind perceives ; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be, upon the supposition, that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever." *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, pp. 69-70.

Such statements, in the view of the Transcendentalist, involve a contradiction,—namely, that the soul can penetrate, by perception, *into* that which is *without* itself : or that the human soul, by divine power, has present to it, or takes in essential properties not of mind, but of something alien from mind and directly contrary to it ; which is impossible. The exploded hypothesis of species and images was an attempt to do away the contradiction ; the doctrine found wanting by Schelling shows the futility of that attempt ; but in assuming the real outness or separateness of the objects of perception,—that they are, as things in themselves, apart from and extrinsic to our mind, appears to set up the contradiction again, or at least to keep it up. S. C.]

and conclusions; but that, first, the very faculty of deducing and concluding would equally demand an explanation; and secondly, that there exists in fact no such intermediation by logical notions, such as those of cause and effect. It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness. Or would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by a productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the percipient, of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul,

And like a God by spiritual art,
Be all in all, and all in every part.⁹

And how came the percipient here? And what is become of the wonder-promising Matter, that was to perform all these marvels by force of mere figure, weight and motion? The most consistent proceeding of the dogmatic materialist is to fall back into the common rank of *soul-and-bodyists*; to affect the mysterious, and declare the whole process a revelation given, and not to be understood, which it would be profane to examine too closely. *Datur non intelligitur*. But a revelation unconfirmed by miracles, and a faith not commanded by the conscience, a philosopher may venture to pass by, without suspecting himself of any irreligious tendency.

Thus, as materialism has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible, and owes all its proselytes to the propensity so common among men, to mistake distinct images for clear conceptions; and *vice versa*, to reject as inconceivable whatever from its own nature

⁹ [Altered from Cowley's *All over Love*. II. Ed.]

is unimaginable. But as soon as it becomes intelligible, it ceases to be materialism. In order to explain *thinking*, as a material phænomenon, it is necessary to refine matter into a mere modification of intelligence, with the two-fold function of *appearing* and *perceiving*. Even so did Priestley in his controversy with Price. He stripped matter of all its material properties; substituted spiritual powers; and when we expected to find a body, behold! we had nothing but its ghost—the apparition of a defunct substance!

I shall not dilate further on this subject; because it will, (if God grant health and permission), be treated of at large and systematically in a work, which I have many years been preparing, on the Productive Logos human and divine; with, and as the introduction to, a full commentary on the Gospel of St. John. To make myself intelligible as far as my present subject requires, it will be sufficient briefly to observe—1. That all association demands and presupposes the existence of the thoughts and images to be associated.—2. That the hypothesis of an external world exactly correspondent to those images or modifications of our own being, which alone, according to this system, we actually behold, is as thorough idealism as Berkeley's, inasmuch as it equally, perhaps in a more perfect degree, removes all reality and immediateness of perception, and places us in a dream-world of phantoms and spectres,¹⁰ the inexplicable swarm and equivocal generation of motions in our own brains.—3. That this hypothesis

¹⁰ [See *Abhandlungen, Phil. Schrift.* p. 217. “The Idealist in this sense is left lonely and forsaken in the midst of the world, surrounded on all sides by spectres. For him there is nothing immediate, and Intuition itself, in which spirit and object meet, is to him but a dead thought.” Transl. S. C.]

neither involves the explanation, nor precludes the necessity, of a mechanism and co-adequate forces in the percipient, which at the more than magic touch of the impulse from without is to create anew for itself the correspondent object. The formation of a copy is not solved by the mere pre-existence of an original; the copyist of Raffael's Transfiguration must repeat more or less perfectly the process of Raffael. It would be easy to explain a thought from the image on the *retina*, and that from the geometry of light, if this very light did not present the very same difficulty.¹¹ We might as rationally chant the Brahmin creed of the tortoise that supported the bear, that supported the elephant, that supported the world, to the tune of "This is the house that Jack built." The *sic Deo placitum est* we all admit as the sufficient cause, and the divine goodness as the sufficient reason; but an answer to the Whence and Why is no answer to the How, which alone is the physiologist's concern. It is a so-

¹¹ [The reasoning here appears to be the same as in the *Ideen*. Introd. pp. 22-3. Schelling says—"You curiously inquire how the light, radiated back from bodies, works on your optic nerves; also how the image inverted on the *retina*, appears in your soul not inverted but straight. But again, what is that in you which itself sees this image on the *retina*, and inquires how it can have come into the soul. Evidently something which so far is wholly independent of the outward impression and to which, however, this impression is not unknown. How then came the impression to this region of your soul, in which you feel yourself entirely free and independent of impressions? If you interpose between the affection of your nerves, your brain and so forth, and the representation of an outward thing ever so many intervening links, you do but cheat yourself: for the passage over from body to soul cannot, according to your peculiar representations," (mode of perceiving) "take place continuously, but only through a leap,—which yet you propose to avoid." Transl. Compare this chapter with the remarks on the Philosophy of the Dualists in *Ideen*. 57. Ed.]

phisma pigrum, and (as Bacon hath said) the arrogance of pusillanimity, which lifts up the idol of a mortal's fancy and commands us to fall down and worship it, as a work of divine wisdom, an *ancile* or *palladium* fallen from heaven. By the very same argument the supporters of the Ptolemaic system might have rebuffed the Newtonian, and pointing to the sky with self-complacent grin¹² have appealed to common sense, whether the sun did not move and the earth stand still.

CHAPTER IX.

Is Philosophy possible as a science, and what are its conditions?—Giordano Bruno—Literary Aristocracy, or the existence of a tacit compact among the learned as a privileged order—The Author's obligations to the Mystics—to Immanuel Kant—The difference between the letter and the spirit of Kant's writings, and a vindication of prudence in the teaching of Philosophy—Fichte's attempt to complete the Critical system—Its partial success and ultimate failure—Obligations to Schelling; and among English writers to Saumarez.



AFTER I had successively studied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley, and could find in none of them an abiding place for my reason, I began to ask myself; is a system of philosophy,

¹² And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley by a grin.*

* Dr. John Brown's Essay on Satire, (which was published in vol. ii. of Warburton's edit. of Pope, and in vol. iii. of Dodsley's Collection,) Part. ii. l. 224. S. C.]

as different from mere history and historic classification, possible? If possible, what are its necessary conditions? I was for a while disposed to answer the first question in the negative, and to admit that the sole practicable employment for the human mind was to observe, to collect, and to classify. But I soon felt, that human nature itself fought up against this wilful resignation of intellect; and as soon did I find, that the scheme, taken with all its consequences and cleared of all inconsistencies, was not less impracticable than contranatural. Assume in its full extent the position, *nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, assume it without Leibnitz's qualifying *præter ipsum intellectum*,¹ and in the same sense, in which the position was understood by Hartley and Condillac: and then what Hume had demonstratively deduced from this concession concerning cause and effect, will apply with equal and crushing force to all the other eleven categorical forms,² and the logical functions corresponding to

¹ ["On m'opposera cet axiome, reçû parmi les Philosophes : que rien n'est dans l'âme qui ne vienne des sens. Mais il faut excepter l'âme même et ses affections. *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe : nisi ipse intellectus.* Or l'âme renferme l'être, la substance, l'un, le même, la cause, la perception, le raisonnement, et quantité d'autres notions que les sens ne sauroient donner. Cela s'accorde assez avec votre Auteur de l'essai, qui cherche une bonne partie des Idées dans la réflexion de l'esprit sur sa propre nature."—*Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain.* liv. ii. c. 1. Erdmann, p. 223. Leibnitz refutes Locke, as commonly understood, on his own showing, and he maintained that if ideas come to us only by sensation or reflection, this is to be understood of their actual perception, but that they are in us before they are perceived. See also his *Réflexions sur l'Essai de Locke*—Art. xli. and *Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et ideis*, Art. ix. of Erdmann's edition of his works. S. C.]

² Videlicet; Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Mode, each

them. How can we make bricks without straw;—or build without cement? We learn all things indeed by *occasion* of experience; but the very facts so learned force us inward on the antecedents, that must be presupposed in order to render experience itself possible. The first book of Locke's *Essay*, (if the supposed error, which it labours to subvert, be not a mere thing of straw, an absurdity which, no man ever did, or in-

consisting of three subdivisions. See *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.* See too the judicious remarks on Locke and Hume.†

* [Pp. 104 and 110-11 vol. ii. Works. Leipzig, 1838. Ed.]

† [Ib. pp. 125-6. "The celebrated Locke, from want of this consideration, and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience, has also derived them from experience; and moreover he proceeded so inconsequently, that he ventured therewith upon attempts at cognitions, which far transcend all limits of experience. Hume acknowledged that, in order to the last, these conceptions must necessarily have their origin *a priori*. But, as he could not explain how it is that the understanding should think conceptions, not in themselves united in the understanding, yet as necessarily united in the object,—and not hitting upon this, that probably the understanding by means of these (*a priori*) conceptions was itself the author of the experience, wherein its objects are found—he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that is to say, from subjective necessity arising from frequent association in experience, erroneously considered to be objective:—I mean from *habit*: although afterwards he acted very consistently in declaring it to be impossible with these conceptions and the principles to which they give birth to transcend the limits of experience. However the empirical derivation, on which both Locke and Hume fell, is not reconcilable with the reality of those scientific cognitions *a priori* which we possess, namely, pure Mathematics and General Physics, and is therefore refuted by the fact." Ed. See also the whole Section entitled, *Uebergang zur transcendentalen Deduction der Kategorien*, pp. 123-6. S. C.]

deed ever could, believe,) is formed on a *σόφισμα ἑτεροζητήσεως*,³ and involves the old mistake of *Cum hoc: ergo, propter hoc*.

The term, Philosophy, defines itself as an affectionate seeking after the truth; but Truth is the correlative of Being. This again is no way conceivable, but by assuming as a postulate, that both are *ab initio*, identical and co-inherent; that intelligence and being are reciprocally each other's substrate. I presumed that this was a possible conception, (*i. e.* that it involved no logical inconsonance,) from the length of time during which the scholastic definition of the *Supreme Being*, as *actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate*, was received in the schools of Theology, both by the Pontifical and the Reformed divines. The early study of Plato and Plotinus, with the commentaries and the *THEOLOGIA PLATONICA* of the illustrious Florentine;⁴ of Proclus,⁵ and Gemistius Pletho;⁶ and at a later period of the *De Immenso et Innumerabili*,⁷ and the "*De la causa, principio et uno*," of the philosopher of Nola,

³ [See Maasz, *ubi supra*, p. 366. Ed.]

⁴ [Marsilii Ficini *Theologia Platonica, seu de immortalitate animorum ac æterna felicitate*. Ficinus was born at Florence 1433, and died in 1499. Ed.]

⁵ [Proclus was born at Constantinople in 412 and died in 485. Ed.]

⁶ [G. Gemistius Pletho, a Constantinopolitan. He came to Florence in 1438. *De Platonicæ atque Aristotelicæ philosophiæ differentia*. Ed.]

⁷ [*De Innumerabilibus, Immenso et Infigurabili, seu de Universo et Mundis*, libb. viii. S. C.]

T. Giordano Bruno was burnt at Rome on the 17th of February, 1599-1600. See note in *The Friend*, I. p. 154, 3rd edit. for some account of the titles of his works. He particularly mentions Sidney in that curious work *La Cena de le Ceneri*. Ed.]

who could boast of a Sir Philip Sidney and Fulke Greville among his patrons, and whom the idolaters of Rome burnt as an atheist in the year 1600; had all contributed to prepare my mind for the reception and welcoming of the *Cogito quia Sum, et Sum quia Cogito*; a philosophy of seeming hardihood, but certainly the most ancient, and therefore presumptively the most natural.

Why need I be afraid? Say rather how dare I be ashamed of the Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Boehmen?⁸ Many, indeed, and gross were his delusions; and such as furnish frequent and ample occasion for the triumph of the learned over the poor ignorant shoemaker, who had dared think for himself. But while we remember that these delusions were such, as might be anticipated

⁸ [Boehm was born near Goerlitz in Upper Lusatia in 1575. The elements of his theology may be collected from his *Aurora*, and his treatise "On the Three Principles of the Divine Essence." A little book about mystic writers, *Theologiæ Mysticæ Idea Generalior*, mentions that the son of Gr. Richter, the minister of Goerlitz, who wrote and preached against Boehm and silenced him for seven years by procuring an order against him from the senate of the city, after the decease of both the persecutor and the persecuted, undertook to answer, for the honour of his father's memory, an effective reply of the theosophist to a violent publication against his doctrine from the pen of his pastor. But that, contrary to all expectation, on reading and considering the books of our author, he not only abandoned his intention, but was constrained by conscience to take up the pen on his side, against his own father. Boehm was a Lutheran, and died in the communion of that church, in 1624. His most famous English follower was John Pordage, a physician, born in 1625, who tried to reduce his theosophy to a system, declaring himself to have recognized the truth of it by revelations made to himself. He published several works in favour of Behmen's opinions, which were read in Germany, and are said to have become the standard books of all enthusiasts. S. C.]

from his utter want of all intellectual discipline, and from his ignorance of rational psychology, let it not be forgotten that the latter defect he had in common with the most learned theologians of his age. Neither with books, nor with book-learned men was he conversant. A meek and shy quietist, his intellectual powers were never stimulated into feverous energy by crowds of proselytes, or by the ambition of proselyting. Jacob Behmen was an enthusiast, in the strictest sense, as not merely distinguished, but as contra-distinguished, from a fanatic. While I in part translate the following observations from a contemporary writer of the Continent, let me be permitted to premise, that I might have transcribed the substance from *memoranda* of my own, which were written many years before his pamphlet was given to the world; and that I prefer another's words to my own, partly as a tribute due to priority of publication; but still more from the pleasure of sympathy in a case where coincidence only was possible.⁹

⁹ [By "the following observations" Mr. Coleridge meant those contained in the two next paragraphs, as far as the words "William Law," part of which are freely translated from pages 154-56 of Schelling's *Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Natur-philosophie zu der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre*, Tübingen, 1806.

The whole of the first paragraph is thus taken from Schelling, except the last sentence but one, and the third clause of the fourth.

For parts at the beginning and at the end of the second he was indebted to the following sentences of the *Darlegung*, pp. 155-6.

"So now too may Herr Fichte speak of these enthusiasts with the most heartfelt scholar's pride, although it is not easy to see why he exalts himself so altogether above them, unless it is because *he* can write orthographically, can form periods, and has the fashions of authorship at command; while they, accord-

Whoever is acquainted with the history of philosophy, during the last two or three centuries, cannot but admit that there appears to have existed a sort of secret and tacit compact among the learned, not to pass beyond a certain limit in speculative science. The privilege of free thought, so highly extolled, has at no time been held valid in actual practice, except within this limit; and not a single stride beyond it has ever been ventured without bringing obloquy on the transgressor. The few men of genius among the learned class, who actually did overstep this boundary, anxiously avoided the appearance of having so done. Therefore the true depth of science, and the penetration to the inmost centre, from which all the lines of knowledge diverge to their ever distant circumference, was abandoned to the illiterate and the simple, whom unstilled yearning, and an original ebullieny of spirit, had urged to the investigation of the indwelling and living ground of all things. These, then, because their names had never been enrolled in the guilds of the learned, were persecuted by the registered livery-men as interlopers on their rights and privileges. All without distinction were branded as fanatics and phantasts; not only those, whose wild and exorbitant imaginations had actually engendered only extravagant and grotesque phantasms, and whose productions were, for the most part, poor copies and gross caricatures of

ing to their simplicity, just as they found it, so gave it utterance. No one, thinks Herr Fichte, that is not already wiser than these men, could learn any thing from the perusal of their writings; and so he thinks himself much wiser than they: nevertheless Herr Fichte might give his whole rhetoric, if in all his books put together he had shown the spirit and heart-fulness, which often a single page of many so called enthusiasts discovers." Translation. S. C.]

genuine inspiration ; but the truly inspired likewise, the originals themselves. And this for no other reason, but because they were the unlearned, men of humble and obscure occupations. When, and from whom among the *literati* by profession, have we ever heard the divine doxology repeated, *I thank thee O Father ! Lord of Heaven and Earth ! because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.*¹⁰ No ; the haughty priests of learning not only banished from the schools and marts of science all who had dared draw living waters from the fountain, but drove them out of the very Temple, which mean time *the buyers, and sellers, and money-changers* were suffered to make *a den of thieves.*

And yet it would not be easy to discover any substantial ground for this contemptuous pride in those *literati*, who have most distinguished themselves by their scorn of Behmen, Thaulerus,¹¹ George Fox, and others ; unless it be, that *they* could write orthographi-

¹⁰ St. Luke x. 21.

¹¹ [I have ventured to substitute “Thaulerus” for “De Thoyras” in the text, having reason to suppose that the latter name was a mistake or misprint for the former.

John Thaulerus or Taulerus, sometimes called Dr. Thaulerus, was a celebrated mystic divine of the fourteenth century, the time and place of whose birth is uncertain. He became a monk of the Dominican order, and died at Strasbourg, according to the epitaph on his tomb, on the 17th of May 1361.

He wrote several books of divinity in his own native language ; the original edition is very rarely found, but they were translated into Latin by Surius, and published at Cologne in 1548. Among them are Exercises on the Life and Passion of Christ, Institutions and Sermons. The *Theologia Germanica*, also entitled, in the English translation, a little Golden Manual, has been ascribed to him.

Very different judgments have been formed of the character

cally, make smooth periods, and had the fashions of authorship almost literally at their fingers' ends, while the latter, in simplicity of soul, made their words immediate echoes of their feelings. Hence the frequency of those phrases among them, which have been mis-

and value of his writings, as is commonly the case with respect to mystical productions, the thoughts and language of which are in a state of glowing fusion, and therefore capable of assuming different appearances, according to the moulds of mind into which they are received. Some behold in them heresy and fanaticism; some hold them good in substance but too capable of perversion; whilst on the other hand, many authors of weight and note, both Romanist and Protestant, especially the latter, as Arnd, Müller, Melancthon, and others,—have commended them highly and unreservedly. Blossius the Abbot styled their author a sincere maintainer of the Catholic faith. By Luther this Mystic is spoken of in a spirit very similar to that manifested by Schelling and Coleridge respecting the illiterate enthusiasts, whom they uphold against the *literati* by profession." "I know," says he, "that this Doctor is unknown to the schools of Divines, and therefore perhaps much despised; but I have found in him, though his writings are all in the German language, more solid and true divinity than is found in all the Doctors of all the Universities, or than can be found in their opinions." (Luther, tom. i. Latin. Jenens., page 86, 6, apud Heupelium, folio B. verso.) Dr. Henry More's opinion of him is thus given in the Gen. Biog. Dictionary, whence this account, with the quotation from Luther, is taken:

"But amongst all the writings of this kind there was none which so affected him, as that little book, with which Luther was so prodigiously pleased, intitled, '*Theologica Germanica*;' though he discovered in it, even at that time, several marks of a deep melancholy, and no small errors in matters of philosophy. 'But that,' says our author, 'which he doth so mightily inculcate, viz. that we should thoroughly put off and extinguish our own proper will, that being thus dead to ourselves, we may live alone to God, and do all things whatsoever by his instinct and plenary permission, was so connatural, as it were, and agreeable to my most intimate reason and conscience, that I could not of any thing whatsoever be more clearly and certainly convinced.'" S. C.]

taken for pretences to immediate inspiration ; as for instance, “ *It was delivered unto me ;* ” — “ *I strove not to speak ;* ” — “ *I said, I will be silent ;* ” — “ *But the word was in my heart as a burning fire ;* ” — “ *and I could not forbear.* ” Hence too the unwillingness to give offence ; hence the foresight, and the dread of the clamours, which would be raised against them, so frequently avowed in the writings of these men, and expressed, as was natural, in the words of the only book, with which they were familiar.¹² “ Woe is me that I am become a man of strife, and a man of contention,—I love peace: the souls of men are dear unto me : yet because I seek for light every one of them doth curse me ! ” O ! it requires deeper feeling, and a stronger imagination, than belong to most of those, to whom reasoning and fluent expression have been as a trade learnt in boyhood, to conceive with what might, with what inward strivings and commotion, the perception of a new and vital truth takes possession of an uneducated man of genius. His meditations are almost inevitably employed on the eternal, or the everlasting ; for “ the world is not his friend, nor the world’s law.” Need we then be surpris’d, that, under an excitement at once so strong and so unusual, the man’s body should sympathize with the struggles of his mind ; or that he should at times be so far deluded, as to mistake the tumultuous sensations of his nerves, and the co-existing spectres of his fancy, as parts or symbols of the

¹² An American Indian with little variety of images, and a still scantier stock of language, is obliged to turn his few words to many purposes, by likenesses so clear and analogies so remote as to give his language the semblance and character of lyric poetry interspersed with grotesques. Something not unlike this was the case of such men as Behmen and Fox with regard to the Bible. It was their sole armoury of expressions, their only organ of thought.

truths which were opening on him? It has indeed been plausibly observed, that in order to derive any advantage, or to collect any intelligible meaning, from the writings of these ignorant Mystics, the reader must bring with him a spirit and judgment superior to that of the writers themselves :

And what he brings, what needs he elsewhere seek? ¹³

—a sophism, which I fully agree with Warburton, is unworthy of Milton; how much more so of the awful Person, in whose mouth he has placed it? One assertion I will venture to make, as suggested by my own experience, that there exist folios on the human understanding, and the nature of man, which would have a far juster claim to their high rank and celebrity, if in the whole huge volume there could be found as much fulness of heart and intellect, as burst forth in many a simple page of George Fox, Jacob Behmen, and even of Behmen's commentator, the pious and fervid William Law. ¹⁴

¹³ [Paradise Regained, B. iv. l. 325. S. C.]

¹⁴ [William Law was born at King's Cliffe, Northamptonshire, in 1688, died April 9, 1761. A list of seventeen religious works written by him is given in the *Gent. Mag.* Nov. 1800. Toward the latter end of his life he adopted "the mystic enthusiasm of Jacob Behmen," which tintured his later writings; and of that author's works he prepared an English edition. (Behmen's, *Jacob, Works*, to which is prefixed the *Life of the Author*, with figures illustrating his principles. Left by the Rev. William Law, M. A. London, 1764-81. 4 vols. 4to.)

Mr. Southey has the following passage on Law in his *Life of Wesley*:

"About this time Wesley became personally acquainted with William Law, a man whose writings completed what Jeremy Taylor, and the treatise *De Imitatione Christi*, had begun. When first he visited him, he was prepared to object to his views of Christian duty as too elevated to be attainable; but Law silenced and satisfied him by replying, 'We shall do well to

The feeling of gratitude, which I cherish toward these men, has caused me to digress further than I had foreseen or proposed; but to have passed them over in an historical sketch of my literary life and opinions, would have seemed to me like the denial of a debt, the concealment of a boon. For the writings of these Mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to keep alive the heart in the head; gave me an indistinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that all the products of the mere reflective faculty partook of death, and were as the rattling twigs and sprays in winter, into which a sap was yet to be propelled from some root to which I had not penetrated, if they were to afford my soul either food or shelter. If they were too often a

aim at the highest degrees of perfection, if we may thereby at least attain to mediocrity.' Law is a powerful writer: it is said that few books have ever made so many religious enthusiasts as his *Christian Perfection* and his *Serious Call*: indeed, the youth who should read them without being perilously affected, must have either a light mind or an unusually strong one. But Law himself, who has shaken so many intellects, sacrificed his own at last to the reveries and rhapsodies of Jacob Behmen. Perhaps the art of engraving was never applied to a more extraordinary purpose, nor in a more extraordinary manner, than when the nonsense of the German shoemaker was elucidated in a series of prints after Law's designs, representing the anatomy of the spiritual man. His own happiness, however, was certainly not diminished by the change: the system of the ascetic is dark and cheerless; but mysticism lives in a sunshine of its own, and dreams of the light of heaven; while the visions of the ascetic are such as the fear of the devil produces, rather than the love of God." Vol. I. pp. 57-8.

The forthcoming new edition of the *Life of Wesley* contains numerous marginal notes by Mr. Coleridge. Among these are two, explaining and defending some of the German shoemaker's and his commentator's sense or "nonsense." S. C.]

moving cloud of smoke to me by day, yet they were always a pillar of fire throughout the night, during my wanderings through the wilderness of doubt, and enabled me to skirt, without crossing, the sandy deserts of utter unbelief. That the system is capable of being converted into an irreligious Pantheism, I well know. The Ethics of Spinoza,¹⁵ may, or may not, be an in-

¹⁵ [*Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*. Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, Nov. 24, 1632, was the son of a Portuguese Jew; died at the Hague, Feb. 21, 1677.

Cousin positively denies the charge of atheism, in the form in which it was laid, against Spinoza, declaring it to have originated in personal animosity, as did a similar one against Wolf. He affirms that Spinoza's is by no means, either in terms, or in the spirit of the author, an atheistic system, but rather a pantheism (formal and not material like that of the Eleatics) containing and unfolding a high and worthy notion of God. "Ce n'est qu'à une époque récente," says he, "qu'on a commencé à traiter avec plus de justice la personne et la doctrine de ce grand homme, et en même temps on a découvert, par la méthode critique, (the method of Kant,) le côté foible du système." Spinoza must indeed have been a most elaborate hypocrite if he was consciously and intentionally an atheist. How strange it appears that Christians, who are commanded to hope and believe all things favourably of others, should have such an appetite for discovering unbelief and misbelief even in those who manifest no evil heart or godless temper! It would seem as if some men's faith could not be kept alive and properly exercised, unless, like the passionate Lord in the play, it were

— allow'd a carcass to insult on,*

the vile body, to wit, of some other man's infidelity and irreligion.

"I have often thought," says Mr. Coleridge, in his Notes on Noble's Appeal, "of writing a work to be entitled *Vindiciæ Heterodoxæ, sive celebrium virorum παραδογματιζόντων defensio*;

* This line, from *The Nice Valour* or *The Passionate Madman of Beaumont and Fletcher*, I first saw quoted by Mr. Southey in a letter to Mr. Murray.

stance. But at no time could I believe, that *in itself* and *essentially* it is incompatible with religion, natural or revealed: and now I am most thoroughly persuaded of the contrary. The writings of the illustrious sage of Koenigsberg, the founder of the Critical Philosophy, more than any other work, at once invigorated and disciplined my understanding. The originality, the depth, and the compression of the thoughts; the novelty and subtlety, yet solidity and importance of the distinctions; the adamant chain of the logic; and I will venture to add—(paradox as it will appear to those who have taken their notion of Immanuel Kant from Reviewers and Frenchmen)—the clearness and evidence, of the Critique of the Pure Reason; and Critique of the Judgment; of the Metaphysical Elements of Natural Philosophy; and of his Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason, took possession of

that is, Vindication of Great Men unjustly branded; and at such times the names prominent to my mind's eye have been Giordano Bruno, Jacob Behmen, Benedict Spinoza, and Emanuel Swedenborg."

Still it was Mr. Coleridge's ultimate opinion, that Spinoza's system excluded or wanted the true ground of faith in God as the Supreme Intelligence and Absolute Will, to whom man owes religious fealty. He speaks thus in *The Friend*, vol. iii. Essay xi. p. 214, 5th edit.

"The inevitable result of all consequent reasoning, in which the intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply, and weens to possess within itself the centre of its own system, is—and from Zeno the Eleatic to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to the Schellings, Okens, and their adherents of the present day, ever has been—pantheism under one or other of its modes, the least repulsive of which differs from the rest, not in its consequences, which are one and the same in all, and in all alike are practically atheistic, but only as it may express the striving of the philosopher himself to hide these consequences from his own mind." S. C.]

me as with a giant's hand.¹⁷ After fifteen years familiarity with them, I still read these and all his other productions with undiminished delight and increasing admiration. The few passages that remained obscure to me, after due efforts of thought, (as the chapter on *original apperception*,¹⁸) and the apparent contradictions which occur, I soon found were hints and insinuations referring to ideas, which KANT either did not think it prudent to avow, or which he considered as

¹⁷ [The Critique of the pure Reason, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, occupies vol. ii. of the collective edition of the works of Kant in ten vols. Leipzig, 1838. It first appeared in 1781. The Critique of the Judgment, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 1790, is contained in vol. vii. The Met. El. of N. Philosophy, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786, may be found in vol. viii. at p. 439. Religion within the bounds of pure Reason—*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, 1793, in vol. vi. p. 159.

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg in 1724, was appointed Rector of the University there in 1786, after having declined repeated offers from the King of Prussia, of a Professorship in the Universities of Jena, Erlangen, Mittau, and Halle, with the rank of privy counsellor; and died at his native place, nearly 80 years old, Feb. 12, 1804. S. C.

The following note is pencilled in Mr. C.'s copy of Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften*, but the date does not appear.

"I believe in my depth of being, that the three great works since the introduction of Christianity are,—Bacon's *Novum Organum*, and his other works, as far as they are commentaries on it:—Spinoza's *Ethica*, with his Letters and other pieces, as far as they are comments on his Ethics: and Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, and his other works as commentaries on, and applications of the same." Ed.]

¹⁸ [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Transc. Elementarlehre II. Th. 1. Abth. I. Buch. 2. Hauptst. 2. Abschn. Transc. Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe. § 16 *Von der ursprünglich-synthetischen Einheit der Apperception*. Works, Leipzig, 1838, vol. ii. p. 129. Apperception is treated of, or referred to generally, throughout the division of the work entitled Transcend-

consistently *left behind* in a pure analysis, not of human nature *in toto*, but of the speculative intellect alone. Here therefore he was constrained to commence at the point of *reflection*, or natural consciousness: while in his *moral* system he was permitted to assume a higher ground (the autonomy of the will) as a postulate deducible from the unconditional command, or (in the technical language of his school) the categorical imperative, of the conscience. He had been in imminent danger of persecution during the reign of the late king of Prussia, that strange compound of lawless debauchery and priest-ridden superstition: and it is probable that he had little inclination, in his

dental Deduction of the pure conceptions of the Understanding, ending at p. 153.

Apperception is thus defined by Dr. Willich, in his *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, p. 143.

“ Apperception or Consciousness, or the faculty of becoming conscious, signifies

1. In general, the same as representation, or the faculty of representing:

2. In particular, the representation as distinct from the subject that represents, and from the object that is represented.

3. *Self-consciousness*, for which we have two faculties,

a. The *empirical*, the internal sense, i. e. the consciousness of our state at any time of our observations. This is as subject to change as the observations themselves; considered in itself, it is not confined to any one place, and does not relate to the identity of the subject.

b. The *transcendental*, pure, original, i. e. the consciousness of the identity of ourselves, with all the variety of empirical consciousness. It is that self-consciousness, which generates the bare idea ‘*I*,’ or ‘*I think*,’ as being the simple correlate of all other ideas, and the condition of their unity and necessary connection.”

See also Nitsch’s *General and Introductory View of Professor Kant’s Principles*, a very clear summary, pp. 111-113. S. C.]

old age, to act over again the fortunes, and hair-breadth escapes of Wolf.¹⁹ The expulsion of the first among Kant's disciples, who attempted to complete his system, from the University of Jena, with the confiscation and prohibition of the obnoxious work by the joint efforts of the courts of Saxony and Hanover, supplied experimental proof, that the venerable old man's caution was not groundless. In spite therefore of his own declarations, I could never believe, that it was possible for him to have meant no more by his *Noumenon*, or Thing in itself, than his mere words express; or that in his own conception he confined the whole *plastic* power to the forms of the intellect, leaving for the external cause, for the *materiale* of our sensations, a matter without form, which is doubtless inconceivable.²⁰

¹⁹ [Christian Wolf, the most celebrated supporter of the school of Leibnitz, was born at Breslau in 1679. In 1707 he became Professor of Mathematics at Halle; was accused of atheism by his envious colleagues, was driven from his employ by their cabals in 1723, and went to teach at Marburg, as Professor of Philosophy; he was afterwards honourably recalled to Halle in 1740, and died at that town, April 9, 1754. From Victor Cousin's *Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, II. 173-4. S. C.]

²⁰ [*Transfc. Id.* p. 114.]

The reader may compare this passage with Schelling's remarks on the doctrine of Kant, in the third tract of the *Phil. Schrift.* pp. 275-6, the title of which has already been given, and to which Mr. C. himself refers his readers in chap. xii.

In the Introduction to the *Ideen*, Schelling says of the Kantian philosophy, on this particular point, that, as acute men have objected, "it makes all conceptions of cause and effect arise in our mind,—in our representations alone; and yet the representations themselves again, according to the law of causality, operate upon us through outward things." *Note at p. 10.*

Thus the Idealism of Berkeley deprives us of Nature (or an objective world) altogether, giving us, instead of it, a seeming

I entertained doubts likewise, whether, in his own mind, he even laid *all* the stress, which he appears to do, on the moral postulates.²¹

An idea, in the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a *symbol*; and, except in geometry, all symbols of necessity involve an apparent contradiction.²² Φῶνῆσε συνετοῖσιν: and for those who could not pierce through this symbolic husk, his writings were not intended. Questions which cannot be fully answered without exposing the respondent to personal danger, are not entitled to a fair answer; and

copy of such a world in each individual mind:—the Idealism of Kant—(too *literally understood on one point*,)—leaves us Nature, but reduces her to a blank,—an unseen *cause* of all we see *without* us, although cause, by his own showing, exists only *within* us:—the system of Locke cuts Nature in two—lets her retain one half of her constituent properties, while it makes her but the unknown cause in us of the other half:—the Scotch system, (in the opinion of the Transcendentalist,) equally with the two last mentioned, cuts us off from Nature while it brings Nature to bear upon us as closely as possible; it affirms an evident absurdity, and calls it a hidden mystery; it tries to be cautious, yet is incautious enough to assume the whole matter in debate, namely, that the objective and the subjective systems are distinct from, and extrinsic to, one another; it teaches us to escape from a difficulty by shutting our eyes: but eyes were made to be open and not to be shut,—except for the sake of rest; when we unclose them again there is the same difficulty, staring us full in the face. S. C.]

²¹ [Kant's doctrine on this head is fully explained in his *Foundation for the Metaphysique of Morals*, first published in 1785, and *Critique of the Practical Reason*—1788. Works, vol. iv. S. C.]

²² [“Now this supersensuous ground of all that is sensuous, Kant symbolized by the expression *things in themselves*—which, like all other symbolic expressions, contains in itself a contradiction, because it seeks to represent the unconditioned through a conditioned, to make the infinite finite.” *Abhandlungen. Phil. Schrift.* pp. 276-7. S. C.]

yet to say this openly, would in many cases furnish the very advantage, which the adversary is insidiously seeking after. Veracity does not consist in saying, but in the intention of communicating, truth; and the philosopher who cannot utter the whole truth without conveying falsehood, and at the same time, perhaps, exciting the most malignant passions, is constrained to express himself either mythically or equivocally. When Kant therefore was importuned to settle the disputes of his commentators himself, by declaring what he meant, how could he decline the honours of martyrdom with less offence, than by simply replying, "I meant what I said, and at the age of near four-score, I have something else, and more important to do, than to write a commentary on my own works."

FICHTE'S *Wissenschaftslehre*,²³ or Lore of Ultimate Science, was to add the key-stone of the arch: and by commencing with an *act*, instead of a *thing* or *substance*, Fichte assuredly gave the first mortal blow to Spinozism, as taught by Spinoza himself; and supplied the *idea* of a system truly metaphysical, and of a *metaphysique* truly systematic: (i. e. having its spring and principle within itself.) But this fundamental idea he overbuilt with a heavy mass of mere *notions*, and psychological acts of arbitrary reflection. Thus his theory degenerated into a crude²⁴ *egoismus*, a

²³ [J. Gottlieb Fichte was born on the 19th of May, 1762, at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia, and died at Berlin, where he had occupied a Professor's chair in the recently founded University, Jan. 29, 1814. The *Wissenschaftslehre* was first published at Weimar in 1796; afterwards in an enlarged edition at Jena, 1798. V. Cousin's *Manuel*, II. 272, 289. S. C.]

²⁴ The following burlesque on the Fichtean *Egoismus* may, perhaps, be amusing to the few who have studied the system, and to those who are unacquainted with it, may convey

boastful and hyperstoic hostility to Nature, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy: while his religion consisted in the assumption of a mere *Ordo ordinans*,

as tolerable a likeness of Fichte's idealism as can be expected from an avowed caricature.

The Categorical Imperative, or the annunciation of the new Teutonic God, 'ΕΓΩΝΚΑΙΠΑΝ: a dithyrambic Ode, by QUERKOPF VON KLUBSTICK, Grammarian, and *Subrector in Gymnastic*.* * *

Eu! Dei vices gerens, ipse Divus,
 (Speak English, Friend!) the God *Imperativus*,
 Here on this market-cross aloud I cry:
 I, I, I! I itself I!

The form and the substance, the what and the why,
 The when and the where, and the low and the high,
 The inside and outside, the earth and the sky,
 I, you and he, and he, you and I,
 All souls and all bodies are I itself I!

All I itself I!

(Fools! a truce with this starting!)

All my I! all my I!

He's a heretic dog who but adds Betty Martin!
 Thus cried the God with high imperial tone;
 In robe of stiffest state, that scoffed at beauty,
 A pronoun-verb imperative he shone—
 Then substantive and plural-singular grown
 He thus spake on! Behold in I alone
 (For ethics boast a syntax of their own)
 Or if in ye, yet as I doth depute ye,
 In O! I, you, the vocative of duty!
 I of the world's whole Lexicon the root!
 Of the whole universe of touch, sound, sight
 The genitive and ablative to boot:
 The accusative of wrong, the nom'native of right,
 And in all cases the case absolute!
 Self-construed, I all other moods decline:
 Imperative, from nothing we derive us;
 Yet as a super-postulate of mine,
 Unconstrued antecedence I assign
 To X, Y, Z, the God *Infinitivus*!

which we were permitted *exoterice* to call GOD; and his *ethics* in an ascetic, and almost monkish, mortification of the natural passions and desires.²⁵

²⁵ [This account of Fichte's *theory*, however just, may convey to some readers a very unjust notion of the man and of his teaching in general. It may lead them to imagine him cold, hard, and dry, and, in his turn of mind, rather of the *earth earthy*, than heaven-ward tending; whereas he seems to have been an ardent spiritualist, "a clear calm enthusiast;" and whatever his system may have been, as mere metaphysics, yet in his thoughts on the Divine Idea, to have arrived at the same point, as far as feeling is concerned, and all that under God's grace inspires the heart and moulds the plan and course of action, with those who talk, in orthodox phraseology, of the *Life of God in the soul of man*. Mr. Carlyle has spoken of Fichte in the "Hero Worship," and some of his striking Essays, with his usual force and felicity, and power of casting an interest, either in the way of creation or of representation, around certain characters—investing, as it were, with a royal robe of glowing language and high attributions, whomsoever it delights him to honour. But the best illustration of Fichte's teaching is to be found in his life. "No man of his time,"—says Mr. Smith, who has lately published a translation of his work *On the Nature of the Scholar*, with a memoir of the author—"few perhaps of any time, exercised a more powerful spirit-stirring influence over the minds of his fellow countrymen. The ceaseless effort of his life was to rouse men to a sense of the divinity of their own nature—to fix their thoughts upon a spiritual life as the only true and real life—to teach them to look upon all else as mere show and unreality, and thus to lead them to constant effort after the highest Ideal of purity, virtue, independence and self-denial. To this ennobling enterprise he consecrated his being, &c. Truly indeed has he been described by one of our own country's brightest ornaments, as a 'colossal, adamantine spirit, standing erect and clear, like a Cato Major among degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa, and to have discoursed of beauty and virtue in the groves of Academe.' But the sublimity of his intellect casts no shade on the soft current of his affections, which flows, pure and unbroken, through the whole course of his life, to enrich, fertilize,

In Schelling's *Natur-Philosophie*,²⁶ and the *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*,²⁷ I first found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for myself, and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do.

I have introduced this statement, as appropriate to the narrative nature of this sketch; yet rather in refe-

and adorn it. We prize his philosophy deeply; it is to us an invaluable possession, for it seems the noblest exposition to which we have yet listened, of human nature and divine truth; but with reverent thankfulness we acknowledge a still higher debt, for he has left behind him the best gift which man can bequeath to man—a brave, heroic human life.”

“In the first churchyard from the Oranienburg gate of Berlin stands a tall obelisk with this inscription:—

The teachers shall shine
As the brightness of the firmament;
And they that turn many to righteousness
As the stars for ever and ever.

It marks the grave of Fichte. The faithful partner of his life sleeps at his feet.”

Fichte married a niece of Klopstock, a high-minded woman, by whom he had an only son, the author of writings on religious philosophy of some interest. Cousin speaks of the great influence which the Idealism of Fichte exercised over his contemporaries, and its serious direction toward anti-sensualistic doctrines, impressed on many minds by the masculine eloquence, which was one of the attributes of the author's talent. But he affirms that Fichte's theory finally shared the common destiny of all systems, and proved unable to acquire a general authority in philosophy. Pp. 113-115. S. C.]

²⁶ [On this title of Schelling's, Mr. C. makes the following remarks in a marginal note in the *Phil. Schrift*.

I cannot approve Schelling's choice of the proper name, *Natur-Philosophie*; because, in the first place, it is a useless paradox; in the second place, selected to make the difference between his own system and that of his old master Fichte greater than it is; and lastly, because the phrase has been long and universally appropriated to the knowledge which does not include the *peculia* of Man; that is, to Physiology. The identity of the one

rence to the work which I have announced in a preceding page, than to my present subject. It would be but a mere act of justice to myself, were I to warn my future readers, that an identity of thought, or even similarity of phrase, will not be at all times a certain proof that the passage has been borrowed from Schelling, or that the conceptions were originally learnt from him. In this instance, as in the dramatic lectures of Schlegel to

with the other is made to appear as the result of the system ; but for its title, that is, its proper, or appropriated, name, *qui bene distinguit, bene docet.* S. T. C.

Fichte speaks thus of the *Natur-Philosophie* in the second of his series of Lectures on the Nature of the Scholar, containing the definition of the Divine Idea. "Hence we should not be blinded nor led astray by a philosophy assuming the name of *natural*, which pretends to excel all former philosophy by striving to elevate Nature into absolute being and into the place of God. In all ages the theoretical errors, as well as the moral corruptions of humanity, have arisen from falsely bestowing the name of life on that which in itself possesses neither absolute nor even finite being, and seeking for life and its enjoyments in that which in itself is dead. Very far therefore from being a step towards truth, that philosophy is only a return to old and already most widely spread error." Translation by Mr. Smith. S. C.]

²⁷ [Friedr. Wilh. Joseph Schelling was born at Leonberg in Wurtemberg on the 27th of January, 1775. He was Professor at Erlangen in 1829 ; since that time he has moved about. During the last two years he has been lecturing at Berlin, where he holds a Professorship, and has been endeavouring to show the consistency of his philosophical views with a religious Theism : how far successfully or otherwise, I cannot say, but I believe, not so as to silence the great body of objectors.

Schelling's *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, (*Natur-Philosophie*,) was first published at Leipzig in 1797 ; a second edition entirely recast, appeared at Landshut, in 1803. The *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus* was published at Tübingen in 1800. The early age at which Schelling put forth his profound speculations, displaying so deep an insight into former philosophies, and so much general knowledge, renders them one of the intellectual wonders of the world. S. C.]

which I have before alluded, from the same motive of self-defence against the charge of plagiarism, many of the most striking resemblances, indeed all the main and fundamental ideas, were born and matured in my mind before I had ever seen a single page of the German Philosopher; and I might indeed affirm with truth, before the more important works of Schelling had been written, or at least made public. Nor is this coincidence at all to be wondered at. We had studied in the same school; been disciplined by the same preparatory philosophy, namely, the writings of Kant; we had both equal obligations to the polar logic and dynamic philosophy of Giordano Bruno; and Schelling has lately, and, as of recent acquisition, avowed that same affectionate reverence for the labours of Behmen, and other mystics, which I had formed at a much earlier period.²⁸ The coincidence of Schelling's system with certain general ideas of Behmen, he declares to have been *mere* coincidence; while *my* obligations have been more direct. *He* needs give to Behmen only feelings of sympathy; while I owe him a debt of gratitude. God forbid! that I should be suspected of a wish to enter into a rivalry with Schelling for the honours so unequivocally his right, not only as a great and original genius, but as the *founder* of the Philosophy of Nature, and as the most successful *improver* of the Dynamic²⁹ System which, begun by Bruno, was re-introduced (in a more philosophical form, and freed from all its impurities and visionary accompaniments) by Kant; in whom it was the native

²⁸ [Archdeacon Hare says in regard to this statement; "Schelling's pamphlet," (in which this avowal is contained,) "had appeared eleven years before; but, perhaps, it did not find its way to England till the peace; and Coleridge, having read it but recently, inferred that it was a recent publication." S. C.]

²⁹ It would be an act of high and almost criminal injustice to

and necessary growth of his own system. Kant's followers, however, on whom (for the greater part) their master's *cloak* had fallen without, or with a very scanty

pass over in silence the name of Mr. Richard Saumarez,* a gentleman equally well known as a medical man and as a philanthropist, but who demands notice on the present occasion as the author of "A new System of Physiology" in two volumes octavo, published 1797; and in 1812 of "An Examination of the natural and artificial Systems of Philosophy which now prevail" in one volume octavo, entitled, "The Principles of physiological and physical Science." The latter work is not quite equal to the former in style or arrangement; and there is a greater necessity of distinguishing the principles of the author's philosophy from his conjectures concerning colour, the atmospheric matter, comets, &c. which, whether just or erroneous, are by no means necessary consequences of that philosophy. Yet even in this department of this volume, which I regard as comparatively the inferior work, the reasonings by which Mr. Saumarez invalidates the immanence of an infinite power in any finite substance are the offspring of no common mind; and the experiment on the expansibility of the air is at least plausible and highly ingenious. But the merit, which will secure both to the book and to the writer a high and honourable name with posterity, consists in the masterly force of reasoning, and the copiousness of induction, with which he has assailed, and (in my opinion) subverted the tyranny of the mechanic system in physiology; established not only

* [Richard Saumarez was a native of Guernsey, and became Surgeon to the Magdalen Hospital, London. He published *A Dissertation on the Universe in general, and on the procession of the Elements in particular*, Lond. 1796, 8vo.—*A new System of Physiology, comprehending the Laws by which animated beings in general, and the human species in particular, are governed in their several states of health and disease.* Lond. 1798, 2 vols. 8vo.—*Principles and Ends of Philosophy.* 1811, 8vo.—*Principles of Physiological and Physical Science, comprehending the ends for which animated beings were created.* Lond. 1812, 8vo.—*Orations delivered before the Medical Society of London.* 1813, 8vo.—*Observations on Generation and the Principles of Life.* *Med. and Phys. Journ.* II. p. 242. 1799. S. C.]

portion of, his *spirit*, had adopted his dynamic ideas, only as a more refined species of mechanics. With exception of one or two fundamental ideas, which cannot be withheld from Fichte, to Schelling we owe the completion, and the most important victories, of this revolution in philosophy. To me it will be happiness and honour enough, should I succeed in rendering the system itself intelligible to my countrymen, and in the application of it to the most awful of subjects for the most important of purposes. Whether a work is the offspring of a man's own spirit, and the product of original thinking, will be discovered by those who are its sole legitimate judges, by better tests than the mere reference to dates. For readers in general, let whatever shall be found in this or any future work of mine, that resembles, or coincides with, the doctrines of my German predecessor, though contemporary, be wholly attributed to *him*: provided, that the absence of distinct references to his books, which I could not at all

the existence of final causes, but their necessity and efficiency in every system that merits the name of philosophical; and, substituting life and progressive power for the contradictory *inert force*, has a right to be known and remembered as the first instaurator of the dynamic philosophy in England. The author's views, as far as concerns himself, are unborrowed and completely his own, as he neither possessed nor do his writings discover, the least acquaintance with the works of Kant, in which the germs of the philosophy exist; and his volumes were published many years before the full development of these germs by Schelling. Mr. Saumarez's detection of the Braunonian system was no light or ordinary service at the time; and I scarcely remember in any work on any subject a confutation so thoroughly satisfactory. It is sufficient at this time to have stated the fact; as in the preface to the work, which I have already announced on the *Logos*, I have exhibited in detail the merits of this writer, and genuine philosopher, who needed only have taken his foundations somewhat deeper and wider to have superseded a considerable part of my labours.

times make with truth as designating citations or thoughts actually *derived* from him; and which, I trust, would, after this general acknowledgment be superfluous; be not charged on me as an ungenerous concealment or intentional plagiarism. I have not indeed (*eheu! res angusta domi!*) been hitherto able to procure more than two of his books, viz. the 1st volume of his collected Tracts,³⁰ and his System of Transcendental Idealism; to which, however, I must add a small pamphlet against Fichte,³¹ the spirit of which was to *my* feelings painfully incongruous with the principles, and which (with the usual allowance afforded to an antithesis) displayed the love of wisdom rather than the wisdom of love. I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist: I care not from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible. "Albeit, I must confess to be half in doubt, whether I should bring it forth or no, it being so contrary to the eye of the world, and the world so potent in most men's hearts, that I shall endanger either not to be regarded or not to be understood."³²

³⁰ [F. W. J. Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften, Erster Band*. (First volume.) Landshut, 1809. S. C.]

³¹ [This is the *Darlegung* referred to in a previous note. The mutual censures of Fichte and Schelling, and their quarrels about Nature and the nature of Nature, are harsh breaks in the bright current of their writings.]

There is to my mind a great metaphysical sublimity in the first part of Fichte's *Bestimmung des Menschen*, especially the passage beginning *In jedem Momente ihrer Dauer ist Natur ein zusammenhängendes Ganze*, and the preceding paragraphs, from the words *Das Princip der Thatigkeit*, p. 11. Very imaginative is the grand glimpse these passages give of the interconnected movements of the universe, presenting to the mind universality in unity, and a seeming infinitude of the finite. S. C.]

³² [Milton's Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty. Book II. chap. i. S. C.]

And to conclude the subject of citation, with a cluster of citations, which as taken from books, not in common use, may contribute to the reader's amusement, as a voluntary before a sermon:—" *Dolet mihi quidem deliciis literarum inescatos subito jam homines adeo esse, præsertim qui Christianos se profitentur, et legere nisi quod ad delectationem facit, sustineant nihil: unde et disciplinæ severiores et philosophia ipsa jam fere prorsus etiam a doctis negliguntur. Quod quidem propositum studiorum, nisi mature corrigitur, tam magnum rebus incommodum dabit, quam dedit barbaries olim. Pertinax res barbaries est, fateor: sed minus potest tamen, quam illa mollietates et persuasa prudentia literarum, si ratione caret, sapientiæ virtutisque specie mortales misere circumducens. Succedet igitur, ut arbitror, haud ita multo post, pro rusticana seculi nostri ruditate captatrix illa communi-loquentia robur animi virilis omne, omnem virtutem masculam, profligatura, nisi cavetur.*"³³

A too prophetic remark, which has been in fulfilment from the year 1680, to the present 1815. By *persuasa prudentia*, Grynæus means self-complacent common sense as opposed to science and philosophic reason.

Est medius ordo, et velut equestris, ingeniorum quidem sagacium, et commodorum rebus humanis, non tamen in primam magnitudinem patentium. Eorum hominum, ut sic dicam, major annona est. Sedulum esse, nihil temere loqui, assuescere labori, et imagine prudentiæ et modestiæ tegere angustiores

³³ [From "Symon Grynæus's premonition to the candid reader, prefixed to Ficinus's translation of Plato, published at Leyden, 1557." See *The Friend*, Essay III. vol. i. pp. 23-4, where also the same passage is quoted. In the original, as I learn from the Editor's note in that place, *gulam* stands for *delectationem*. S. C.]

*partes captus, dum exercitationem ac usum, quo isti in civilibus rebus pollent, pro natura et magnitudine ingenii plerique accipiunt.*³⁴

“As therefore physicians are many times forced to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be the fittest, and being overruled by the patient’s impatience, are fain to try the best they can: in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age, full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we would (*if our subject permitted it*) yield to the stream thereof. That way we would be contented to prove our thesis, which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked.”³⁵

If this fear could be rationally entertained in the controversial age of Hooker, under the then robust discipline of the scholastic logic, pardonably may a writer of the present times anticipate a scanty audience for abstrusest themes, and truths that can neither be communicated nor received without effort of thought, as well as patience of attention.

“Che s’io non erro al calcolar de’ punti,
Par ch’ *Asinina* Stella a noi predomini,
E’l Somaro e’l Castron si sian congiunti.
Il tempo d’*Apuleio* piu non si nomini:
Che se allora un sol huom sembrava un *Asino*,
Mille *Asini* a’ miei dî rassembran huomini!”³⁶

³⁴ [Barclay’s *Argenis*, lib. i. Leyden, 1630, 12mo. pp. 63-4, with some omissions. The original, after *assuescere labori*, runs thus: *et imagini Sapientiæ parere, tegere angustiores partes ingenii. Hæc neque summum hominem desiderunt, et sola interdum sunt quæ in laudatis Proceribus suspicias. Ut vel abesse vitia pro virtute sit; vel non invidiosus prudentiæ rivus in Oçeani famam se diffundat, dum exercitationem, &c.* S. C.]

³⁵ [Slightly altered, with omissions, from Hooker’s *Eccles. Polity*, B. I. c. viii. s. 2. S. C.]

³⁶ *Satire di Salvator Rosa*, [tom. i. p. 34. *La Musica*, Sat. i. l. 10. S. C.]

NOTE TO CHAPTER IX.

IN the preceding chapter Mr. C. speaks of Schelling's philosophy as if it had his entire approbation, and had been adopted by him in its whole extent. Yet it is certain that, soon after the composition of the B. L. he became dissatisfied with the system, considered as a fundamental and comprehensive scheme, intended to exhibit the relations of God to the World and Man. He objected to it as essentially pantheistic, though the author has positively disclaimed this reproach, and made great efforts to free his system from the appearance of deserving it. To Mr. C. however, it appeared, as originally set forth, to labour under deep deficiencies—to be radically inconsistent with a belief in God, as Himself Moral and Intelligent—as beyond and above the world—as the Supreme Mind to which the human mind owes homage and fealty—inconsistent with any just view and deep sense of the moral and spiritual being of man. The imposing grandeur of this philosophy, beheld from a distance, the narrowness into which it shrinks on a nearer view, are thus set forth by Cousin in his clear trenchant style. “La philosophie de Schelling se recommande par l'originalité de son point de vue, la profondeur du travail, la conséquence des parties, et l'immense portée des applications. Elle rallie à une seule idée tous les êtres de la nature. Par là elle écarte les barrières qu'on avoit données à la connaissance humaine, soutenant la possibilité pour l'homme non plus seulement d'une représentation subjective, mais d'une connaissance objective et scientifique, d'une science déterminée de Dieu et des choses divines, à ce titre que l'esprit humain et la substance de l'être sont primitivement identiques. Cette philosophie embrasse le cercle entier des connaissances spéculatives,” &c. Then he states the difficulties which beset the scheme, and after suggesting several root objections, he exclaims: “Quel homme enfin peut avoir la téméraire prétention de renfermer la nature de la Divinité dans l'idée de l'identité absolue?” He had previously observed,

“ La forme de ce système est moins scientifique en réalité qu’en apparence. Son problème étoit de déduire, par une démonstration réelle (par construction,) le fini de l’infini et de l’absolu, le particulier de l’universel. *Or ce problème n’est point résolu et ne peut l’être.*” And he concludes—
 “ En un mot, le système tout entier n’est, à proprement parler, qu’une poésie de l’esprit humain, séduisante par son apparente facilité pour tout expliquer, et par sa manière de construire la nature.”

I think, as far as I am able to judge, that Mr. Coleridge’s view of the system, after long reflection upon it, coincided, as to its general character and result, with that of Victor Cousin, deeply as he must have felt obliged to the author for much that it contains. During the latter part of his life he was ever applying his thoughts to the development of a philosophy which should more satisfactorily perform what Schelling’s splendid scheme of modern Platonism had seemed to promise, a solution of the most important problems, which are presented to human contemplation, or at least an answer to them sufficient to set the human mind at rest. He sought to construct a system really and rationally religious; and since, in his philosophical inquiries, he “neither could nor dared throw off a strong and awful prepossession in favour” * of that great main outline of doctrine which came to us from the first in company with the highest and purest moral teaching which the world has yet seen; which was felt after, if not found, by the best and greatest minds before the preaching of the Gospel; which has been received in substance, with whatever variations of form and language, by a large portion of the civilized world ever since, and had actually been to himself the vehicle of all the light and life of the higher and deeper kind, which had been vouchsafed to him in his earthly career;—he therefore *set out* with the desire to construct a philosophical system in which Christianity,—based on the Tri-une being of God, and embracing

* This is said in regard to the Bible in the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, p. 8.

a Primal Fall and Universal Redemption,—Christianity ideal, spiritual, eternal, but likewise and necessarily historical,—realized and manifested in time,—should be shown forth as accordant, or rather as one with ideas of reason, and the demands of the spiritual and of the speculative mind, of the heart, conscience, reason, should all be satisfied and reconciled in one bond of peace. See what has been said of the labours of Mr. C.'s latter years in the Preface.


I am not aware however that he, at any time, altered or set aside the doctrine of Schelling put forth in the present work on Nature and the Mind of Man, with their mutual relations; or indeed that he discovered any positive error or incompatibility with higher truth in such parts of his system as are adopted in the *Biographia Literaria*, and which he believed himself in the main to have anticipated.

In the Table Talk he is reported to have said “The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of the *Biographia Literaria* is unformed and immature;—it contains the fragments of the truth, but it is not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to think how infinitely more profound my views now are, and yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is completing; the idea is coming round to, and to be, the common sense.” (2nd edit. p. 308.)

Some little insight into the progress of his reflections on philosophical subjects, and on the treatment of those subjects by Schelling, will perhaps be derived from his remarks on several tracts in that author's *Philosophische Schriften*, which I have thought it best to place at the end of the first volume. S. C.

CHAPTER X.

A Chapter of digression and anecdotes, as an interlude preceding that on the nature and genesis of the Imagination or Plastic Power—On pedantry and pedantic expressions—Advice to young authors respecting publication—Various anecdotes of the Author's literary life, and the progress of his opinions in Religion and Politics.

“ **SEMPLASTIC.** The word is not in Johnson, nor have I met with it elsewhere.” Neither have I! I constructed it myself from the Greek words, *εἰς ἓν πλάττειν*, to shape into one;¹ because, having to convey a new sense, I thought that a new term would both aid the recollection of my meaning, and prevent its being confounded with the usual import of the word, imagination. “But this is pedantry!” Not necessarily so, I hope. If I am not misinformed, pedantry consists in the use of words unsuitable to the time, place, and company. The language of the market would be in the schools as pedantic, though it might not be reprobated by that name, as the language of the schools in the market. The mere man of the world, who insists that no other terms

¹ [*Ist das Band die lebendige In-Eins-Bildung des Einen mit dem Vielen.* If the bond is the living formation-into-one of the one with the many. *Darlegung*, pp. 61-2. Schelling also talks of the absolute, perfect *In-Eins-Bildung* of the Real and Ideal, toward the end of his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des Akademischen Studiums*—p. 313. S. C.]

but such as occur in common conversation should be employed in a scientific disquisition, and with no greater precision, is as truly a pedant as the man of letters, who either over-rating the acquirements of his auditors, or misled by his own familiarity with technical or scholastic terms, converses at the wine-table with his mind fixed on his museum or laboratory; even though the latter pedant instead of desiring his wife to make the tea should bid her add to the *quant. suff.* of *thea Sinensis* the oxyd of hydrogen saturated with caloric. To use the colloquial (and in truth somewhat vulgar) metaphor, if the pedant of the cloister, and the pedant of the lobby, both smell equally of the shop, yet the odour from the Russian binding of good old authentic-looking folios and quartos is less annoying than the steams from the tavern or bagnio. Nay, though the pedantry of the scholar should betray a little ostentation, yet a well-conditioned mind would more easily, methinks, tolerate the fox brush of learned vanity, than the *sans culotterie* of a contemptuous ignorance, that assumes a merit from mutilation in the self-consoling sneer at the pompous incumbrance of tails.

The first lesson of philosophic discipline is to wean the student's attention from the degrees of things, which alone form the vocabulary of common life, and to direct it to the kind abstracted from degree. Thus the chemical student is taught not to be startled at disquisitions on the heat in ice, or on latent and fixible light. In such discourse the instructor has no other alternative than either to use old words with new meanings (the plan adopted by Darwin in his *Zoonomia*;) ² or to introduce new terms, after the example of

² [Erasmus Darwin's *Zoonomia*, or *Laws of Organic Life* was published Lond. 1794-6, 2 vols. 4to. There was another edition in 4 vols. 8vo. in 1801. S. C.]

Linnæus, and the framers of the present chemical nomenclature. The latter mode is evidently preferable, were it only that the former demands a twofold exertion of thought in one and the same act. For the reader, or hearer, is required not only to learn and bear in mind the new definition; but to unlearn, and keep out of his view, the old and habitual meaning; a far more difficult and perplexing task, and for which the mere semblance of eschewing pedantry seems to me an inadequate compensation. Where, indeed, it is in our power to recall an appropriate term that had without sufficient reason become obsolete, it is doubtless a less evil to restore than to coin anew. Thus to express in one word all that appertains to the perception, considered as passive and merely recipient, I have adopted from our elder classics the word *sensuous*; because *sensual* is not at present used, except in a bad sense, or at least as a moral distinction; while *sensitive* and *sensible* would each convey a different meaning. Thus too I have followed Hooker, Sander-son, Milton and others, in designating the immediateness of any act or object of knowledge by the word *intuition*, used sometimes subjectively, sometimes objectively, even as we use the word, thought; now as *the* thought, or act of thinking, and now as *a* thought, or the object of our reflection; and we do this without confusion or obscurity. The very words, *objective* and *subjective*, of such constant recurrence in the schools of yore, I have ventured to re-introduce, because I could not so briefly or conveniently by any more familiar terms distinguish the *percipere* from the *percipi*. Lastly, I have cautiously discriminated the terms, the reason, and the understanding, encouraged and confirmed by the authority of our genuine divines and philosophers, before the Revolution.

———— both life, and sense,
 Fancy and understanding; whence the soul
 Reason receives, and reason is her *being*,
 Discursive or intuitive: discourse³
 Is ofttest yours, the latter most is ours,
 Differing but in degree, in kind the same.⁴

I say, that I was confirmed by authority so venerable: for I had previous and higher motives in my own conviction of the importance, nay, of the necessity of the distinction, as both an indispensable condition and a vital part of all sound speculation in metaphysics, ethical or theological. To establish this distinction was one main object of *The Friend*;⁵ if even in a biography of my own literary life I can with propriety refer to a work, which was printed rather than published, or so published that it had been well for the unfortunate author, if it had remained in manuscript. I have even at this time bitter cause for remembering that, which a number of my subscribers have but a trifling motive for forgetting. This effusion might have been spared; but I would feign flatter myself, that the reader will be less austere than an oriental professor of the bastinado, who during an attempt to extort *per argumentum baculinum* a full confession from a culprit, interrupted his outcry of pain by reminding him,

³ But for sundry notes on Shakespeare, and other pieces which have fallen in my way, I should have deemed it unnecessary to observe, that *discourse* here, or elsewhere does not mean what we now call discoursing; but the discursion of the mind, the processes of generalization and subsumption, of deduction and conclusion. Thus, Philosophy has hitherto been discursive; while Geometry is always and essentially intuitive.

⁴ [*Paradise Lost*. Book V. l. 485. S. C.]

⁵ [Mr. Coleridge here refers to *The Friend* as it first came out in the North of England, in 1809-10. See the *Biog. Supplement* at the end of vol. ii. S. C.]

that it was “ a mere digression !” “ All this noise, Sir ! is nothing to the point, and no sort of answer to my questions !” “ Ah ! but,” (replied the sufferer,) “ it is the most pertinent reply in nature to your blows.”

An imprudent man of common goodness of heart cannot but wish to turn even his imprudences to the benefit of others, as far as this is possible. If therefore any one of the readers of this semi-narrative should be preparing or intending a periodical work, I warn him, in the first place, against trusting in the number of names on his subscription list. For he cannot be certain that the names were put down by sufficient authority ; or, should that be ascertained, it still remains to be known, whether they were not extorted by some over zealous friend’s importunity ; whether the subscriber had not yielded his name, merely from want of courage to answer, no ; and with the intention of dropping the work as soon as possible. One gentleman procured me nearly a hundred names for *THE FRIEND*, and not only took frequent opportunity to remind me of his success in his canvass, but laboured to impress my mind with the sense of the obligation, I was under to the subscribers ; for, (as he very pertinently admonished me,) “ fifty-two shillings a year was a large sum to be bestowed on one individual, where there were so many objects of charity with strong claims to the assistance of the benevolent.” Of these hundred patrons ninety threw up the publication before the fourth number, without any notice ; though it was well known to them, that in consequence of the distance, and the slowness and irregularity of the conveyance, I was compelled to lay in a stock of stamped paper for at least eight weeks beforehand ; each sheet of which stood me in five pence previously to its arrival at my printer’s ; though the subscription

money was not to be received till the twenty-first week after the commencement of the work; and lastly, though it was in nine cases out of ten impracticable for me to receive the money for two or three numbers without paying an equal sum for the postage.

In confirmation of my first caveat, I will select one fact among many. On my list of subscribers, among a considerable number of names equally flattering, was that of an Earl of Cork, with his address. He might as well have been an Earl of Bottle, for aught I knew of him, who had been content to reverence the peerage *in abstracto*, rather than *in concretis*. Of course THE FRIEND was regularly sent as far, if I remember right, as the eighteenth number; that is, till a fortnight before the subscription was to be paid. And lo! just at this time I received a letter from his Lordship, reproving me in language far more lordly than courteous for my impudence in directing my pamphlets to him, who knew nothing of me or my work! Seventeen or eighteen numbers of which, however, his Lordship was pleased to retain, probably for the culinary or post-culinary conveniences of his servants.

Secondly, I warn all others from the attempt to deviate from the ordinary mode of publishing a work by the trade. I thought indeed, that to the purchaser it was indifferent, whether thirty *per cent.* of the purchase-money went to the booksellers or to the government; and that the convenience of receiving the work by the post at his own door would give the preference to the latter. It is hard, I own, to have been labouring for years, in collecting and arranging the materials; to have spent every shilling that could be spared after the necessaries of life had been furnished, in buying books, or in journies for the purpose of consulting them or of acquiring facts at the fountain

head ; then to buy the paper, pay for the printing, and the like, all at least fifteen *per cent.* beyond what the trade would have paid ; and then after all to give thirty *per cent.* not of the net profits, but of the gross results of the sale, to a man who has merely to give the books shelf or warehouse room, and permit his apprentice to hand them over the counter to those who may ask for them ; and this too copy by copy, although, if the work be on any philosophical or scientific subject, it may be years before the edition is sold off. All this, I confess, must seem a hardship, and one, to which the products of industry in no other mode of exertion are subject. Yet even this is better, far better, than to attempt in any way to unite the functions of author and publisher. But the most prudent mode is to sell the copy-right, at least of one or more editions, for the most that the trade will offer. By few only can a large remuneration be expected ; but fifty pounds and ease of mind are of more real advantage to a literary man, than the chance of five hundred with the certainty of insult and degrading anxieties. I shall have been grievously misunderstood, if this statement should be interpreted as written with the desire of detracting from the character of booksellers or publishers. The individuals did not make the laws and customs of their trade, but, as in every other trade, take them as they find them. Till the evil can be proved to be removable, and without the substitution of an equal or greater inconvenience, it were neither wise nor manly even to complain of it. But to use it as a pretext for speaking, or even for thinking, or feeling, unkindly or opprobriously of the tradesmen, as individuals, would be something worse than unwise or even than unmanly ; it would be immoral and calumnious. My motives point in a far

different direction and to far other objects, as will be seen in the conclusion of the chapter.

A learned and exemplary old clergyman, who many years ago went to his reward followed by the regrets and blessings of his flock, published at his own expense two volumes octavo, entitled, A NEW THEORY OF REDEMPTION. The work was most severely handled in THE MONTHLY OR CRITICAL REVIEW, I forget which; and this unprovoked hostility became the good old man's favourite topic of conversation among his friends. Well! (he used to exclaim,) in the second edition, I shall have an opportunity of exposing both the ignorance and the malignity of the anonymous critic. Two or three years however passed by without any tidings from the bookseller, who had undertaken the printing and publication of the work, and who was perfectly at his ease, as the author was known to be a man of large property. At length the accounts were written for; and in the course of a few weeks they were presented by the rider for the house, in person. My old friend put on his spectacles, and holding the scroll with no very firm hand, began—"Paper, so much: O moderate enough—not at all beyond my expectation! Printing, so much: well! moderate enough! Stitching, covers, advertisements, carriage, and so forth, so much."—Still nothing amiss. *Selleridge* (for orthography is no necessary part of a bookseller's literary acquirements) £3. 3s. "Bless me! only three guineas for the what d'ye call it—the *selleridge*?" "No more, Sir!" replied the rider. "Nay, but that is *too* moderate!" rejoined my old friend. "Only three guineas for *selling* a thousand copies of a work in two volumes?" "O Sir!" (cries the young traveller) "you have mistaken the word. There have been none of them *sold*; they have been sent back from London long ago; and

this £3. 3s. is for the *cellaridge*, or warehouse-room in our book cellar." The work was in consequence preferred from the ominous cellar of the publisher's to the author's garret; and, on presenting a copy to an acquaintance, the old gentleman used to tell the anecdote with great humour and still greater good nature.

With equal lack of worldly knowledge, I was a far more than equal sufferer for it, at the very outset of my authorship.⁶ Toward the close of the first year from the time, that in an inauspicious hour I left the friendly cloisters, and the happy grove of quiet, ever honoured Jesus College, Cambridge, I was persuaded by sundry philanthropists and Anti-polemists to set on foot a periodical work, entitled THE WATCHMAN, that, according to the general motto of the work, *all might know the truth, and that the truth might make us free!*⁷ In order to exempt it from the stamp-tax, and likewise to contribute as little as possible to the supposed guilt of a war against freedom, it was to be published on every eighth day, thirty-two pages, large octavo, closely printed, and price only four-pence. Accordingly with a flaming prospectus,—“*Knowledge is Power,*” “To cry the state of the political atmosphere,”—and so forth, I set off on a tour to the North, from Bristol to Sheffield, for the purpose of procuring customers, preaching by the way in most of the great towns, as an hireless volunteer, in a blue coat and white waistcoat, that not a rag of the woman of Babylon might be seen on me. For I was at that time and

⁶ [See the last chapter but one of the Biographical Supplement, at the end of Vol. II. S. C.]

⁷ [Michaelmas Term, 1794, was the last he kept at Cambridge. The first number of The Watchman appeared March 1, 1796. See Biog. Sup. S. C.]

long after, though a Trinitarian (that is *ad normam Platonis*) in philosophy, yet a zealous Unitarian in religion ; more accurately, I was a Psilanthropist, one of those who believe our Lord to have been the real son of Joseph, and who lay the main stress on the resurrection rather than on the crucifixion. O ! never can I remember those days with either shame or regret. For I was most sincere, most disinterested. My opinions were indeed in many and most important points erroneous ; but my heart was single. Wealth, rank, life itself then seemed cheap to me, compared with the interests of what I believed to be the truth, and the will of my Maker. I cannot even accuse myself of having been actuated by vanity ; for in the expansion of my enthusiasm I did not think of myself at all.

My campaign commenced at Birmingham ;⁸ and my first attack was on a rigid Calvinist, a tallow-chandler by trade. He was a tall dingy man, in whom length was so predominant over breadth, that he might almost have been borrowed for a foundery poker. O that face ! a face *κατ' ἐμφασιν* ! I have it before me at this moment. The lank, black, twine-like hair, pingui-nitescent, cut in a straight line along the black stubble of his thin gunpowder eye-brows, that looked like a scorched after-math from a last week's shaving. His coat collar behind in perfect unison, both of colour and lustre, with the coarse yet glib cordage, which I suppose he called his hair, and which with a bend inward at the nape of the neck,—the only approach to flexure in his whole figure,—slunk in behind his waistcoat ; while the countenance lank, dark, very hard ; and with strong perpendicular furrows, gave me a dim

⁸ [This tour was made in January, 1796. See Biog. Sup. S. C.]

notion of some one looking at me through a used grid-iron, all soot, grease, and iron! But he was one of the thorough-bred, a true lover of liberty, and, as I was informed, had proved to the satisfaction of many, that Mr. Pitt was one of the horns of the second beast in THE REVELATIONS, that *spake as a dragon*. A person, to whom one of my letters of recommendation had been addressed, was my introducer. It was a new event in my life, my first stroke in the new business I had undertaken of an author, yea, and of an author trading on his own account. My companion after some imperfect sentences and a multitude of hums and has abandoned the cause to his client; and I commenced an harangue of half an hour to Phileleutheros, the tallow-chandler, varying my notes, through the whole gamut of eloquence, from the ratiocinative to the declamatory, and in the latter from the pathetic to the indignant. I argued, I described, I promised, I prophesied; and beginning with the captivity of nations I ended with the near approach of the millennium, finishing the whole with some of my own verses describing that glorious state out of the Religious Musings :

Such delights
 As float to earth, permitted visitants!
 When in some hour of solemn jubilee
 The massive gates of Paradise are thrown
 Wide open, and forth come in fragments wild
 Sweet echoes of unearthly melodies,
 And odours snatched from beds of amaranth,
 And they, that from the crystal river of life
 Spring up on freshened wing, ambrosial gales!⁹

My taper man of lights listened with perseverant and praiseworthy patience, though, as I was afterwards told,

⁹ [Religious Musings. Poet. Works, I. p. 82. S. C.]

on complaining of certain gales that were not altogether ambrosial, it was a melting day with him. "And what, Sir," he said, after a short pause, "might the cost be?" "Only four-pence,"—(O! how I felt the anti-climax, the abysmal bathos of that four-pence!)"—"only four-pence, Sir, each number, to be published on every eighth day."—"That comes to a deal of money at the end of a year. And how much, did you say, there was to be for the money?"—"Thirty-two pages, Sir! large octavo, closely printed."—"Thirty and two pages? Bless me! why except what I does in a family way on the Sabbath, that's more than I ever reads, Sir! all the year round. I am as great a one, as any man in Brummagem, Sir! for liberty and truth and all them sort of things, but as to this,—no offence, I hope, Sir,—I must beg to be excused."

So ended my first canvass: from causes that I shall presently mention, I made but one other application in person. This took place at Manchester to a stately and opulent wholesale dealer in cottons. He took my letter of introduction, and, having perused it, measured me from head to foot and again from foot to head, and then asked if I had any bill or invoice of the thing. I presented my prospectus to him. He rapidly skimmed and hummed over the first side, and still more rapidly the second and concluding page; crushed it within his fingers and the palm of his hand; then most deliberately and significantly rubbed and smoothed one part against the other; and lastly putting it into his pocket turned his back on me with an "*over-run* with these articles!" and so without another syllable retired into his counting-house. And, I can truly say, to my unspeakable amusement.

This, I have said, was my second and last attempt. On returning baffled from the first, in which I had

vainly essayed to repeat the miracle of Orpheus with the Brummagem patriot, I dined with the tradesman who had introduced me to him. After dinner he importuned me to smoke a pipe with him, and two or three other *illuminati* of the same rank. I objected, both because I was engaged to spend the evening with a minister and his friends, and because I had never smoked except once or twice in my life-time, and then it was herb tobacco mixed with Oronooko. On the assurance, however, that the tobacco was equally mild, and seeing too that it was of a yellow colour;—not forgetting the lamentable difficulty, I have always experienced, in saying, “No,” and in abstaining from what the people about me were doing,—I took half a pipe, filling the lower half of the bole with salt. I was soon however compelled to resign it, in consequence of a giddiness and distressful feeling in my eyes, which, as I had drunk but a single glass of ale, must, I knew, have been the effect of the tobacco. Soon after, deeming myself recovered, I sallied forth to my engagement; but the walk and the fresh air brought on all the symptoms again, and, I had scarcely entered the minister’s drawing-room, and opened a small packet of letters, which he had received from Bristol for me; ere I sank back on the sofa in a sort of swoon rather than sleep. Fortunately I had found just time enough to inform him of the confused state of my feelings, and of the occasion. For here and thus I lay, my face like a wall that is white-washing, deathly pale and with the cold drops of perspiration running down it from my forehead, while one after another there dropped in the different gentlemen, who had been invited to meet, and spend the evening with me, to the number of from fifteen to twenty. As the poison of tobacco acts but for a short time, I at length awoke from insensibility,

and looked round on the party, my eyes dazzled by the candles which had been lighted in the interim. By way of relieving my embarrassment one of the gentlemen began the conversation, with "Have you seen a paper to day, Mr. Coleridge?" "Sir!" I replied, rubbing my eyes, "I am far from convinced, that a Christian is permitted to read either newspapers or any other works of merely political and temporary interest." This remark, so ludicrously inapposite to, or rather, incongruous with, the purpose, for which I was known to have visited Birmingham, and to assist me in which they were all then met, produced an involuntary and general burst of laughter; and seldom indeed have I passed so many delightful hours, as I enjoyed in that room from the moment of that laugh till an early hour the next morning. Never, perhaps, in so mixed and numerous a party have I since heard conversation sustained with such animation, enriched with such variety of information and enlivened with such a flow of anecdote. Both then and afterwards they all joined in dissuading me from proceeding with my scheme; assured me in the most friendly and yet most flattering expressions, that neither was the employment fit for me, nor I fit for the employment. Yet, if I determined on persevering in it, they promised to exert themselves to the utmost to procure subscribers, and insisted that I should make no more applications in person, but carry on the canvass by proxy. The same hospitable reception, the same dissuasion, and, that failing, the same kind exertions in my behalf, I met with at Manchester, Derby, Nottingham, Sheffield,—indeed, at every place in which I took up my sojourn. I often recal with affectionate pleasure the many respectable men who interested themselves for me, a perfect stranger to them,

not a few of whom I can still name among my friends. They will bear witness for me how opposite even then my principles were to those of Jacobinism or even of democracy, and can attest the strict accuracy of the statement which I have left on record in the 10th and 11th numbers of *THE FRIEND*.¹⁰

From this rememberable tour I returned with nearly a thousand names on the subscription list of *THE WATCHMAN*; yet more than half convinced, that prudence dictated the abandonment of the scheme. But for this very reason I persevered in it; for I was at that period of my life so completely hag-ridden by the fear of being influenced by selfish motives, that to know a mode of conduct to be the dictate of prudence was a sort of presumptive proof to my feelings, that the contrary was the dictate of duty. Accordingly, I commenced the work, which was announced in London by long bills in letters larger than had ever been seen before, and which, I have been informed, for I did not see them myself, eclipsed the glories even of the lottery puffs. But alas! the publication of the very first number was delayed beyond the day announced for its appearance. In the second number an essay against fast days, with a most censurable application of a text from Isaiah for its motto, lost me near five hundred of my subscribers at one blow. In the two following numbers I made enemies of all my Jacobin and democratic patrons; for, disgusted by their infidelity, and their adoption of French morals with French *psilosophy*; and perhaps thinking, that charity ought to begin nearest home; instead of abusing the government and the Aristocrats chiefly or

¹⁰ [Vol. II. Essays i. p. 1, ii. p. 28 of the 3rd and 4th edits. See also in that volume Essay xii. p. 186. S. C.]

entirely, as had been expected of me, I levelled my attacks at "modern patriotism," and even ventured to declare my belief, that whatever the motives of ministers might have been for the sedition, or as it was then the fashion to call them, the *gagging* bills, yet the bills themselves would produce an effect to be desired by all the true friends of freedom, as far as they should contribute to deter men from openly declaiming on subjects, the principles of which they had never bot-tomed, and from "pleading *to* the poor and ignorant, instead of pleading *for* them." At the same time I avowed my conviction, that national education and a concurring spread of the Gospel were the indispensable condition of any true political melioration. Thus by the time the seventh number was published, I had the mortification—(but why should I say this, when in truth I cared too little for any thing that concerned my worldly interests to be at all mortified about it?)—of seeing the preceding numbers exposed in sundry old iron shops for a penny a piece. At the ninth number I dropt the work. But from the London publisher I could not obtain a shilling; he was a ——— and set me at defiance. From other places I procured but little, and after such delays as rendered that little worth nothing; and I should have been inevitably thrown into jail by my Bristol printer, who refused to wait even for a month, for a sum between eighty and ninety pounds, if the money had not been paid for me by a man by no means affluent, a dear friend,¹¹ who attached himself to me from my first arrival at Bristol, who has continued my friend with a fidelity unconquered by time or even by my own appa-

¹¹ [Josiah Wade. See the Biographical Supplement, where this gentleman is again spoken of. S. C.]

rent neglect; a friend from whom I never received an advice that was not wise, nor a remonstrance that was not gentle and affectionate.

Conscientiously an opponent of the first revolutionary war, yet with my eyes thoroughly opened to the true character and impotence of the favourers of revolutionary principles in England, principles which I held in abhorrence,—(for it was part of my political creed, that whoever ceased to act as an individual by making himself a member of any society not sanctioned by his Government, forfeited the rights of a citizen)—a vehement Anti-Ministerialist, but after the invasion of Switzerland, a more vehement Anti-Gallican, and still more intensely an Anti-Jacobin, I retired to a cottage at Stowey,¹² and provided for my scanty maintenance by writing verses for a London Morning Paper.¹³ I saw plainly, that literature was not a profession, by which I could expect to live; for I could not disguise from myself, that, whatever my talents might or might not be in other respects, yet they were not of the sort that could enable me to become a popular writer; and that whatever my opinions might be in themselves, they were almost equi-distant from all the three prominent parties, the Pittites, the Foxites, and the Democrats. Of the unsaleable nature of my writings I had an amusing memento one morning from our own servant girl. For happening to rise at an earlier hour than usual, I observed her putting an extravagant quantity of paper into the grate in order to light the fire, and mildly checked her for her wastefulness; “La, Sir!” (replied poor Nanny) “why, it is only Watchmen.”

¹² [In January, 1797. S. C.]

¹³ [The Morning Post. See the last chapter but one of the Biographical Supplement. S. C.]

I now devoted myself to poetry and to the study of ethics and psychology ; and so profound was my admiration at this time of Hartley's *ESSAY ON MAN*,¹⁴ that I gave his name to my first-born. In addition to the gentleman, my neighbour, whose garden joined on to my little orchard, and the cultivation of whose friendship had been my sole motive in choosing Stowey for my residence,¹⁵ I was so fortunate as to acquire, shortly

¹⁴ [*OBSERVATIONS ON MAN, HIS FRAME, HIS DUTY, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS*, in two parts, 8vo. published in 1748. Dr. Hartley, son of the Vicar of Armley, near Leeds, was born on the 30th of August, 1705, died at Bath in 1757. S. C.]

¹⁵ [The late Thomas Poole—"a man whom I have seen now in his harvest field, or the market, now in a committee-room with the Rickmans and Ricardos of the age ; at another time with Davy, Wollaston, and the Wedgwoods ; now with Wordsworth, Southey, and other friends not unheard of in the republic of letters ; now in the drawing-rooms of the rich and the noble, and now presiding at the annual dinner of a village benefit society ; and in each seeming to be in the very place he was intended for, and taking the part to which his tastes, talents, and attainments gave him an admitted right. And yet this is not the most remarkable, not the individualizing, trait of my friend's character. It is almost overlooked in the originality and raciness of his intellect ; in the life, freshness, and practical value of his remarks and notices, truths plucked as they are growing, and delivered to you with the dew on them, the fair earnings of an observing eye, armed and kept on the watch by thought and meditation ; and above all, in the integrity or entireness of his being, (*integrum et sine cera vas*,) the steadiness of his attachments, and the activity and persistency of a benevolence, which so graciously presses a warm temper into the service of a yet warmer heart, and so lights up the little flaws and imperfections incident to humanity in its choicest specimens, that were their removal at the option of his friends, (and few have or deserve to have so many,) not a man among them but would vote for leaving him as he is." Note to the Church and State, p. 98, edit. of 1839. S. C.]

after my settlement there, an invaluable blessing in the society and neighbourhood of one, to whom I could look up with equal reverence, whether I regarded him as a poet, a philosopher, or a man.¹⁶ His conversation extended to almost all subjects, except physics and politics; with the latter he never troubled himself. Yet neither my retirement nor my utter abstraction from all the disputes of the day could secure me in those jealous times from suspicion and obloquy, which

¹⁶ [The reader will recognize at once in this revered philosopher and poet, that

Friend of the wise and teacher of the good

whose great name has been so frequently joined with the name of Coleridge, ever since their association with each other in the lovely region of Quantock. It was in those days that after hearing his

Song divine of high and passionate thoughts
To their own music chanted,

my father thus addressed him :

O great bard

Ere yet that last strain dying awed the air,
With steadfast eye I viewed thee in the choir
Of ever-enduring men. The truly great
Have all one age, and from one visible space
Shed influence! They both in power and act
Are permanent, and Time is not with them,
Save as it worketh for them, they in it.
Nor less a sacred roll, than those of old,
And to be placed, as they, with gradual fame
Among the archives of mankind, thy work
Makes audible a linked lay of Truth,
Of Truth profound a sweet, continuous lay,
Not learnt but native, her own natural notes.

From the lines to WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, composed after his recitation of a poem on the growth of an Individual Mind.—
Poet. Works, I. 206. S. C.]

did not stop at me, but extended to my excellent friend, whose perfect innocence was even adduced as a proof of his guilt. One of the many busy sycophants of that day,—(I here use the word sycophant in its original sense, as a wretch who *flatters* the prevailing party by *informing* against his neighbours, under pretence that they are exporters of prohibited *figs* or *fancies*,—for the moral application of the term it matters not which)—one of these sycophantic law-mongrels, discoursing on the politics of the neighbourhood, uttered the following deep remark: “As to Coleridge, there is not so much harm in *him*, for he is a whirl-brain that talks whatever comes uppermost; but that ——! he is the *dark* traitor. *You never hear HIM say a syllable on the subject.*”

Now that the hand of Providence has disciplined all Europe into sobriety, as men tame wild elephants, by alternate blows and caresses; now that Englishmen of all classes are restored to their old English notions and feelings; it will with difficulty be credited, how great an influence was at that time possessed and exerted by the spirit of secret defamation,—(the too constant attendant on party-zeal,)—during the restless interim from 1793 to the commencement of the Ad-dington administration, or the year before the truce of Amiens. For by the latter period the minds of the partizans, exhausted by excess of stimulation and humbled by mutual disappointment, had become languid. The same causes, that inclined the nation to peace, disposed the individuals to reconciliation. Both parties had found themselves in the wrong. The one had confessedly mistaken the moral character of the revolution, and the other had miscalculated both its moral and its physical resources. The experiment was made at the price of great, almost, we may say,

of humiliating sacrifices ; and wise men foresaw that it would fail, at least in its direct and ostensible object. Yet it was purchased cheaply, and realized an object of equal value, and, if possible, of still more vital importance. For it brought about a national unanimity unexampled in our history since the reign of Elizabeth ; and Providence, never wanting to a good work when men have done their parts, soon provided a common *focus* in the cause of Spain, which made us all once more Englishmen by at once gratifying and correcting the predilections of both parties. The sincere reverers of the throne felt the cause of loyalty ennobled by its alliance with that of freedom ; while the *honest* zealots of the people could not but admit, that freedom itself assumed a more winning form, humanized by loyalty and consecrated by religious principle. The youthful enthusiasts who, flattered by the morning rainbow of the French revolution, had made a boast of *expatriating* their hopes and fears, now, disciplined by the succeeding storms and sobered by increase of years, had been taught to prize and honour the spirit of nationality as the best safeguard of national independence, and this again as the absolute pre-requisite and necessary basis of popular rights.

If in Spain too disappointment has nipped our too forward expectations, yet all is not destroyed that is checked. The crop was perhaps springing up too rank in the stalk to *kern* well ; and there were, doubtless, symptoms of the Gallican blight on it. If superstition and despotism have been suffered to let in their wolfish sheep to trample and eat it down even to the surface, yet the roots remain alive, and the second growth may prove the stronger and healthier for the temporary interruption. At all events, to *us* heaven has been just and gracious. The *people* of England

did their best, and have received their rewards. Long may we continue to deserve it! Causes, which it had been too generally the habit of former statesmen to regard as belonging to another world, are now admitted by all ranks to have been the main agents of our success. "*We fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera.*" If then unanimity grounded on moral feelings has been among the least equivocal sources of our national glory, that man deserves the esteem of his countrymen, even as patriots, who devotes his life and the utmost efforts of his intellect to the preservation and continuance of that unanimity by the disclosure and establishment of principles. For by these all opinions must be ultimately tried; and, (as the feelings of men are worthy of regard only as far as they are the representatives of their fixed opinions,) on the knowledge of these all unanimity, not accidental and fleeting, must be grounded. Let the scholar, who doubts this assertion, refer only to the speeches and writings of Edmund Burke at the commencement of the American war, and compare them with his speeches and writings at the commencement of the French revolution. He will find the principles exactly the same and the deductions the same; but the practical inferences almost opposite in the one case from those drawn in the other; yet in both equally legitimate and in both equally confirmed by the results. Whence gained he this superiority of foresight? Whence arose the striking difference, and, in most instances even, the discrepancy between the grounds assigned by him and by those who voted with him, on the same questions? How are we to explain the notorious fact, that the speeches and writings of Edmund Burke are more interesting at the present day than they were found at the time of their first publication;

while those of his illustrious confederates are either forgotten, or exist only to furnish proofs, that the same conclusion, which one man had deduced scientifically, *may* be brought out by another in consequence of errors that luckily chanced to neutralize each other. It would be unhandsome as a conjecture, even were it not, as it actually is, false in point of fact to attribute this difference to deficiency of talent on the part of Burke's friends, or of experience, or of historical knowledge. The satisfactory solution is, that Edmund Burke possessed and had sedulously sharpened that eye, which sees all things, actions, and events, in relation to the laws that determine their existence and circumscribe their possibility. He referred habitually to principles. He was a scientific statesman; and therefore a seer. For every principle contains in itself the germs of a prophecy; and, as the prophetic power is the essential privilege of science, so the fulfilment of its oracles supplies the outward and, (to men in general,) the only test of its claim to the title. Wearisome as Burke's refinements appeared to his parliamentary auditors, yet the cultivated classes throughout Europe have reason to be thankful, that he

— went on refining,

And thought of convincing, while they thought of dining.¹⁷

Our very sign-boards, (said an illustrious friend to me,) give evidence, that there has been a Titian in the world. In like manner, not only the debates in parliament, not only our proclamations and state papers, but the essays and leading paragraphs of our journals are so many remembrancers of Edmund Burke. Of this the reader may easily convince himself, if either by recollection or reference he will com-

¹⁷ [Goldsmith's Retaliation. S. C.]

pare the opposition newspapers at the commencement and during the five or six following years of the French revolution with the sentiments, and grounds of argument assumed in the same class of journals at present, and for some years past.

Whether the spirit of jacobinism, which the writings of Burke exorcised from the higher and from the literary classes, may not, like the ghost in Hamlet, be heard moving and mining in the underground chambers with an activity the more dangerous because less noisy, may admit of a question. I have given my opinions on this point, and the grounds of them, in my letters to Judge Fletcher occasioned by his charge to the Wexford grand jury, and published in the *Courier*.¹⁸ Be this as it may, the evil spirit of jealousy, and with it the Cerberian whelps of feud and slander, no longer walk their rounds, in cultivated society.

Far different were the days to which these anecdotes have carried me back. The dark guesses of some zealous *Quidnunc* met with so congenial a soil in the grave alarm of a titled Dogberry of our neighbourhood, that a spy was actually sent down from the government *pour surveillance* of myself and friend. There must have been not only abundance, but variety of these "honourable men" at the disposal of Ministers: for this proved a very honest fellow. After three weeks' truly Indian perseverance in tracking us, (for we were commonly together,) during all which time seldom were we out of doors, but he contrived to be within hearing,—(and all the while utterly unsuspected; how indeed *could* such a suspicion enter our fancies?)—he not only rejected Sir Dogberry's request that he would try yet a little longer, but declared to

¹⁸ [They appeared in November and December of 1814. S. C.]

him his belief, that both my friend and myself were as good subjects, for aught he could discover to the contrary, as any in His Majesty's dominions. He had repeatedly hid himself, he said, for hours together behind a bank at the sea-side, (our favourite seat,) and overheard our conversation. At first he fancied, that we were aware of our danger; for he often heard me talk of one *Spy Nozy*, which he was inclined to interpret of himself, and of a remarkable feature belonging to him; but he was speedily convinced that it was the name of a man who had made a book and lived long ago. Our talk ran most upon books, and we were perpetually desiring each other to look at *this*, and to listen to *that*; but he could not catch a word about politics. Once he had joined me on the road; (this occurred, as I was returning home alone from my friend's house, which was about three miles from my own cottage,) and, passing himself off as a traveller, he had entered into conversation with me, and talked of purpose in a democrat way in order to draw me out. The result, it appears, not only convinced him that I was no friend of jacobinism; but, (he added,) I had "plainly made it out to be such a silly as well as wicked thing, that he felt ashamed though he had only *put it on*." I distinctly remembered the occurrence, and had mentioned it immediately on my return, repeating what the traveller with his Bardolph nose had said, with my own answer; and so little did I suspect the true object of my "tempter ere accuser," that I expressed with no small pleasure my hope and belief, that the conversation had been of some service to the poor misled malcontent. This incident therefore prevented all doubt as to the truth of the report, which through a friendly medium came to me from the master of the village inn, who had been ordered to enter-

tain the Government gentleman in his best manner, but above all to be silent concerning such a person being in his house. At length he received Sir Dogberry's commands to accompany his guest at the final interview; and, after the absolving suffrage of the *gentleman honoured with the confidence of Ministers*, answered, as follows, to the following queries? D. Well, landlord! and what do you know of the person in question? L. I see him often pass by with maister ——, my landlord, (*that is, the owner of the house,*) and sometimes with the new-comers at Holford;¹⁹ but I never said a word to him or he to me. D. But do you not know, that he has distributed papers and hand-bills of a seditious nature among the common people? L. No, your Honour! I never heard of such a thing. D. Have you not seen this Mr. Coleridge, or heard of, his haranguing and talking to knots and clusters of the inhabitants?—What are you grinning at, Sir? L. Beg your Honour's pardon! but I was only thinking, how they'd have stared at him. If what I have heard be true, your Honour! they would not have understood a word he said. When our Vicar was here, Dr. L.²⁰ the master of the great school and Canon of Windsor, there was a great dinner party at maister ——'s; and one of the farmers, that was there, told us that he and the Doctor talked real Hebrew Greek at each other for an hour together after dinner. D. Answer the question, Sir! does he ever harangue the people? L. I hope, your Honour an't angry with me. I can say no more than I know. I never saw him talking with any one, but my landlord,

¹⁹ [Holford is the village near Alfoxton, where Mr. Wordsworth and Miss Wordsworth resided. S. C.]

²⁰ [Dr. Langford. S. C.]

and our curate, and the strange gentleman. D. Has he not been seen wandering on the hills towards the Channel, and along the shore, with books and papers in his hand, taking charts and maps of the country? L. Why, as to that, your Honour! I own, I have heard; I am sure, I would not wish to say ill of any body; but it is certain, that I have heard—D. Speak out, man! don't be afraid, you are doing your duty to your King and Government. What have you heard? L. Why, folks do say, your Honour! as how that he is a *Poet*, and that he is going to put Quantock and all about here in print; and as they be so much together, I suppose that the strange gentleman has some *consarn* in the business.”—So ended this formidable inquisition, the latter part of which alone requires explanation, and at the same time entitles the anecdote to a place in my literary life. I had considered it as a defect in the admirable poem of *THE TASK*, that the subject, which gives the title to the work, was not, and indeed could not be, carried on beyond the three or four first pages, and that, throughout the poem, the connections are frequently awkward, and the transitions abrupt and arbitrary. I sought for a subject, that should give equal room and freedom for description, incident, and impassioned reflections on men, nature, and society, yet supply in itself a natural connection to the parts, and unity to the whole. Such a subject I conceived myself to have found in a stream, traced from its source in the hills among the yellow-red moss and conical glass-shaped tufts of bent, to the first break or fall, where its drops become audible, and it begins to form a channel; thence to the peat and turf barn, itself built of the same dark squares as it sheltered; to the sheepfold; to the first cultivated plot of ground; to the lonely cottage and its bleak

garden won from the heath ; to the hamlet, the villages, the market-town, the manufactories, and the sea-port. My walks therefore were almost daily on the top of Quantock, and among its sloping coombes. With my pencil and memorandum-book in my hand, I was *making studies*, as the artists call them, and often moulding my thoughts into verse, with the objects and imagery immediately before my senses. Many circumstances, evil and good, intervened to prevent the completion of the poem, which was to have been entitled THE BROOK. Had I finished the work, it was my purpose in the heat of the moment to have dedicated it to our then committee of public safety as containing the charts and maps, with which I was to have supplied the French Government in aid of their plans of invasion. And these too for a tract of coast that, from Clevedon to Minehead, scarcely permits the approach of a fishing-boat !

All my experience from my first entrance into life to the present hour is in favour of the warning maxim, that the man, who opposes *in toto* the political or religious zealots of his age, is safer from their obloquy than he who differs from them but in one or two points, or perhaps only in degree. By that transfer of the feelings of private life into the discussion of public questions, which is the queen bee in the hive of party fanaticism, the partisan has more sympathy with an intemperate opposite than with a moderate friend. We now enjoy an intermission, and long may it continue ! In addition to far higher and more important merits, our present Bible societies and other numerous associations for national or charitable objects, may serve perhaps to carry off the superfluous activity and fervour of stirring minds in innocent hyperboles and the bustle of management. But the poison-tree is not

dead, though the sap may for a season have subsided to its roots. At least let us not be lulled into such a notion of our entire security, as not to keep watch and ward, even on our best feelings. I have seen gross intolerance shown in support of toleration; sectarian antipathy most obtrusively displayed in the promotion of an undistinguishing comprehension of sects; and acts of cruelty, (I had almost said,) of treachery, committed in furtherance of an object vitally important to the cause of humanity; and all this by men too of naturally kind dispositions and exemplary conduct.

The magic rod of fanaticism is preserved in the very *adyta* of human nature; and needs only the re-exciting warmth of a master hand to bud forth afresh and produce the old fruits. The horror of the Peasants' war in Germany, and the direful effects of the Anabaptists' tenets, (which differed only from those of jacobinism by the substitution of theological for philosophical jargon,) struck all Europe for a time with affright. Yet little more than a century was sufficient to obliterate all effective memory of these events. The same principles with similar though less dreadful consequences were again at work from the imprisonment of the first Charles to the restoration of his son. The fanatic maxim of extirpating fanaticism by persecution produced a civil war. The war ended in the victory of the insurgents; but the temper survived, and Milton had abundant grounds for asserting, that "Presbyter was but OLD PRIEST writ large!"²¹ One good result, thank heaven! of this zealotry was the re-establishment of the church. And now it might

²¹ [Line 20 of the irregular sonnet On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament. Todd's Milton, vol. vi. p. 92-7. S. C.]

have been hoped, that the mischievous spirit would have been bound for a season, "and a seal set upon him, that he should deceive the *nation* no more."²² But no! The ball of persecution was taken up with undiminished vigour by the persecuted. The same fanatic principle that, under the solemn oath and covenant, had turned cathedrals into stables, destroyed the rarest trophies of art and ancestral piety, and hunted the brightest ornaments of learning and religion into holes and corners, now marched under episcopal banners, and, having first crowded the prisons of England, emptied its whole vial of wrath on the miserable Covenanters of Scotland.²³ A merciful providence at length constrained both parties to join against a common enemy. A wise government followed; and the established church became, and now is, not only the brightest example, but our best and only sure bulwark, of toleration!—the true and indispensable bank against a new inundation of persecuting zeal—*Esto perpetua!*

A long interval of quiet succeeded; or rather, the exhaustion had produced a cold fit of the ague which was *symptomized* by indifference among the many, and a tendency to infidelity or scepticism in the educated classes. At length those feelings of disgust and hatred, which for a brief while the multitude had attached to the crimes and absurdities of sectarian and democratic fanaticism, were transferred to the oppressive privileges of the *noblesse*, and the luxury, intrigues and favouritism of the continental courts. The same principles, dressed in the ostentatious garb of a fashionable philosophy, once more rose triumphant and effected the French revolution. And have we not within the

²² Revelation xx. 3.

²³ See *Laing's History of Scotland*.—*Walter Scott's bards, ballads, &c.*

last three or four years had reason to apprehend, that the detestable maxims and correspondent measures of the late French despotism had already bedimmed the public recollections of democratic phrensy; had drawn off to other objects the electric force of the feelings which had massed and upheld those recollections; and that a favourable concurrence of occasions was alone wanting to awaken the thunder and precipitate the lightning from the opposite quarter of the political heaven?²⁴

In part from constitutional indolence, which in the very hey-day of hope had kept my enthusiasm in check, but still more from the habits and influences of a classical education and academic pursuits, scarcely had a year elapsed from the commencement of my literary and political adventures before my mind sank into a state of thorough disgust and despondency, both with regard to the disputes and the parties disputant. With more than *poetic* feeling I exclaimed:

The sensual and the dark rebel in vain,
 Slaves by their own compulsion! In mad game
 They break their manacles, to wear the *name*
 Of freedom, graven on a heavier chain.
 O Liberty! with profitless endeavour
 Have I pursued thee many a weary hour;
 But thou nor swell'st the victor's pomp, nor ever
 Didst breathe thy soul in forms of human power!
 Alike from all, howe'er they praise thee,
 (Nor prayer nor boastful name delays thee)
 From Superstition's harpy minions
 And factious Blasphemy's obscener slaves,
 Thou speedest on thy cherub pinions,
 The guide of homeless winds and playmate of the waves!²⁵

²⁴ [See The Friend, sect. 1, On the Principles of Political Knowledge. Essay III. vol. i. pp. 244-5, fifth edit. S. C.]

²⁵ [Poet. Works, vol. i. p. 131. Mr. C. here substitutes "Superstition" for "Priestcraft," and "cherub" for "subtle" in the last line but one. S. C.]

I retired to a cottage in Somersetshire at the foot of Quantock, and devoted my thoughts and studies to the foundations of religion and morals. Here I found myself all afloat. Doubts rushed in; broke upon me "*from the fountains of the great deep,*" and fell "*from the windows of heaven.*" The fontal truths of natural religion and the books of Revelation alike contributed to the flood; and it was long ere my ark touched on an Ararat, and rested. The *idea* of the Supreme Being appeared to me to be as necessarily implied in all particular modes of being as the idea of infinite space in all the geometrical figures by which space is limited. I was pleased with the Cartesian opinion, that the idea of God is distinguished from all other ideas by involving its reality; but I was not wholly satisfied. I began then to ask myself, what proof I had of the outward existence of any thing? Of this sheet of paper for instance, as a thing in itself, separate from the *phænomenon* or image in my perception. I saw, that in the nature of things such proof is impossible; and that of all modes of being, that are not objects of the senses, the existence is assumed by a logical necessity arising from the constitution of the mind itself,—by the absence of all motive to doubt it, not from any absolute contradiction in the supposition of the contrary. Still the existence of a Being, the ground of all existence, was not yet the existence of a moral creator, and governour. "In the position, that all reality is either contained *in* the necessary being as an *attribute*, or exists *through* him, as its *ground*, it remains undecided whether the properties of intelligence and will are to be referred to the Supreme Being in the former or only in the latter sense; as inherent attributes, or only as *consequences* that have existence in other things *through*

him.²⁶ Were the latter the truth, then notwithstanding all the pre-eminence which must be assigned to the Eternal First from the sufficiency, unity, and independence of his being, as the dread ground of the universe, his nature would yet fall far short of that, which we are bound to comprehend in the idea of GOD. For, without any knowledge or determining resolve of its own, it would only be a blind necessary ground of other things and other spirits; and thus would be distinguished from the FATE of certain ancient philosophers in no respect, but that of being more definitely and intelligibly described.”²⁷

For a very long time, indeed, I could not reconcile personality with infinity; and my head was with Spinoza, though my whole heart remained with Paul and John. Yet there had dawned upon me, even before I had met with the CRITIQUE OF THE PURE REASON, a certain guiding light. If the mere intellect could make no certain discovery of a holy and intelligent first cause, it might yet supply a demonstration, that no legitimate argument could be drawn from the intellect *against* its truth. And what is this more than St. Paul’s assertion, that by wisdom,—(more properly translated by the powers of reasoning)—no man ever arrived at the knowledge of God? What more than the sublimest, and probably the oldest, book on earth has taught us,

²⁶ Thus organization, and motion, are regarded as *from* God, not *in* God.

²⁷ [From Immanuel Kant’s treatise entitled *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration für das Dasein Gottes*. 1. Abth. 4. Betr. 3. *Anmerkung*, first published in 1763. Works, vol. vi. p. 42. Mr. C. gave the abbreviated name of this treatise, and referred it to the *Vermischte Schriften*. *Zweiter Band*. § 102 and 103. S. C.]

Silver and gold man searcheth out:
Bringeth the ore out of the earth, and darkness into light.

But where findeth he wisdom?
Where is the place of understanding?

The abyss crieth; it is not in me!
Ocean echoeth back; not in me!

Whence then cometh wisdom?
Where dwelleth understanding?

Hidden from the eyes of the living:
Kept secret from the fowls of heaven!

Hell and death answer;
We have heard the rumour thereof from afar!

God marketh out the road to it;
God knoweth its abiding place!

He beholdeth the ends of the earth;
He surveyeth what is beneath the heavens!

And as he weighed out the winds, and measured the sea,
And appointed laws to the rain,
And a path to the thunder,
A path to the flashes of the lightning!

Then did he see it,
And he counted it;
He searched into the depth thereof,
And with a line did he compass it round!

But to man he said,
The fear of the Lord is wisdom for thee!
And to avoid evil,
That is thy understanding.²⁸

I became convinced, that religion, as both the corner-stone and the key-stone of morality, must have a moral origin; so far at least, that the evidence of its doctrines could not, like the truths of abstract science,

²⁸ Job, chap. xxviii.

be wholly independent of the will. It were therefore to be expected, that its fundamental truth would be such as *might* be denied; though only, by the fool, and even by the fool from the madness of the *heart* alone!

The question then concerning our faith in the existence of a God, not only as the ground of the universe by his essence, but as its maker and judge by his wisdom and holy will, appeared to stand thus. The sciential reason, the objects of which are purely theoretical, remains neutral, as long as its name and semblance are not usurped by the opponents of the doctrine. But it then becomes an effective ally by exposing the false show of demonstration, or by evincing the equal demonstrability of the contrary from premises equally logical.²⁹ The understanding meantime suggests, the analogy of experience facilitates, the belief. Nature excites and recalls it, as by a perpetual revelation. Our feelings almost necessitate it; and the law of conscience peremptorily commands it. The arguments, that at all apply to it, are in its favour; and there is nothing against it, but its own sublimity. It could not be intellectually more evident without be-

²⁹ Wherever $A = B$, and A is *not* $= B$, are equally demonstrable, the premise in each undeniable, the induction evident, and the conclusion legitimate—the result must be, either that contraries can both be true, (which is absurd,) or that the faculty and forms of reasoning employed are inapplicable to the subject—i. e. that there is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Thus, the attributes of Space and Time applied to Spirit are heterogeneous—and the proof of this is, that by admitting them *explicite* or *implicite* contraries may be demonstrated true—i. e. that the same, taken in the same sense, is true and not true.—That the world had a beginning in Time and a bound in Space; and That the world had not a beginning and has no limit;—That a self-originating act is, and is not possible, are instances.

coming morally less effective; without counteracting its own end by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism of a worthless because compulsory assent. The belief of a God and a future state, (if a passive acquiescence may be flattered with the name of belief,) does not indeed always beget a good heart; but a good heart so naturally begets the belief, that the very few exceptions must be regarded as strange anomalies from strange and unfortunate circumstances.³⁰

From these premises I proceeded to draw the following conclusions. First, that having once fully admitted the existence of an infinite yet self-conscious Creator, we are not allowed to ground the irrationality

³⁰ ["I believe that the notion of God is essential to the human mind; that it is called forth into distinct consciousness principally by the conscience, and auxiliarily by the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the outward creation. It is, therefore, evident to my reason, that the existence of God is absolutely and necessarily insusceptible of a scientific demonstration, and that Scripture has so represented it. For it commands us to believe in one God. *I am the Lord thy God: thou shalt have none other gods but me.* Now all commandment necessarily relates to the will; whereas all scientific demonstration is independent of the will, and is apodictic or demonstrative only as far as it is compulsory on the mind, *volentem, nolentem.*"] Lit. Rem. I. pp. 390-1. "The Trinity of persons in the Unity of the Godhead would have been a necessary idea of my speculative reason, deduced from the necessary postulate of an intelligent creator, whose ideas, being anterior to the things, must be more actual than those things, even as those things are more actual than our images derived from them; and who, as intelligent, must have had co-eternally an adequate idea of himself, in and through which he created all things both in heaven and earth. But this would only have been a speculative idea, like those of circles and other mathematical figures, to which we are not authorized by the practical reason to attribute reality. Solely in consequence of our Redemption does the Trinity become a doctrine, the belief of which as real is commanded by our con-

of any other article of faith on arguments which would equally prove that to be irrational, which we had allowed to be *real*. Secondly, that whatever is deducible from the admission of a *self-comprehending* and *creative* spirit may be legitimately used in proof of the *possibility* of any further mystery concerning the divine nature. *Possibilitatem mysteriorum, (Trinitatis, &c.) contra insultus Infidelium et Hæreticorum a contradictionibus vindico; haud quidem veritatem, quæ revelatione sola stabiliri possit;* says Leibnitz in a letter to his Duke. He then adds the following just and important remark. "In vain will tradition or texts of scripture be adduced in support of a doctrine, *donec clava impossibilitatis et contradictionis e manibus horum Herculum extorta fuerit*. For the heretic will still reply, that texts, the literal sense of which is not so much *above* as directly *against* all reason, must be understood figuratively, as *Herod is a fox*, and so forth."³¹

These principles I held, *philosophically*, while in respect of revealed religion I remained a zealous Unitarian. I considered the *idea* of the Trinity a fair scholastic inference from the being of God, as a crea-

science." Ibid. pp. 393-4. The same distinction between the belief of mere intellectual positions or logical notions in religion and the reception of living substantive ideas correspondent to them, is set forth, and that religious faith consists in the latter alone is argued in the Aids to Reflection, Comment on Aphorism II. *On that which is indeed Spiritual Religion*, vol. i. p. 118-137. 5th edit. S. C.]

³¹ [I have looked through several collections of letters and other writings of Leibnitz, besides the collection of his works by Dutens, and that of all his philosophical works by Erdmann, but have not met with this letter. The edition of the philosophical works by Raspe, with a preface by Mr. Kästner, Amst. et Leips. 1765, I have never seen. S. C.]

tive intelligence ; and that it was therefore entitled to the rank of an esoteric doctrine of natural religion. But seeing in the same no practical or moral bearing, I confined it to the schools of philosophy. The admission of the Logos, as hypostasized (that is, neither a mere attribute, nor a personification) in no respect removed my doubts concerning the Incarnation and the Redemption by the cross ; which I could neither reconcile in reason with the impassiveness of the Divine Being, nor in my moral feelings with the sacred distinction between things and persons, the vicarious payment of a debt and the vicarious expiation of guilt. A more thorough revolution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into my own heart, were yet wanting. Nevertheless, I cannot doubt, that the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of Unitarians in general contributed to my final re-conversion to the whole truth in Christ ; even as according to his own confession the books of certain Platonic philosophers (*libri quorundam Platonicorum*) commenced the rescue of St. Augustine's faith from the same error aggravated by the far darker accompaniment of the Manichæan heresy.³²

³² [*Et primo volens, &c.* Confess. vii. 13. And thou willing first to show me, how Thou resistest the proud, but givest grace unto the humble, and by how great an act of Thy mercy Thou hadst traced out to men the way of humility, in that Thy Word was made flesh, and dwelt among men :—Thou procuredst for me, by means of one puffed up with most unnatural pride, certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. And therein I read, not indeed in the very words, but to the very same purpose, enforced by many and divers reasons, that In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, &c. (A former translation revised by the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D. D.)

Perrexi ergo ad Simplicianum, &c. Confess. viii. 3. To Sim-

While my mind was thus perplexed, by a gracious providence for which I can never be sufficiently grateful, the generous and munificent patronage of Mr. Josiah, and Mr. Thomas Wedgwood enabled me to finish my education in Germany.³³ Instead of troubling others with my own crude notions and juvenile compositions, I was thenceforward better employed in attempting to store my own head with the wisdom of others. I made the best use of my time and means; and there is therefore no period of my life on which I can look back with such unmingled satisfaction. After acquiring a tolerable sufficiency in the German language³⁴ at Ratzeburg, which with my voyage and

plicianus then I went, the father of Ambrose (a Bishop now) in receiving thy grace, and whom Ambrose truly loved as a father. To him I related the mazes of my wanderings. But when I mentioned that I had read certain books of the Platonists, which Victorinus, sometime Rhetoric Professor of Rome, (who had died a Christian, as I had heard,) had translated into Latin, he testified his joy that I had not fallen upon the writings of other philosophers, full of *fallacies and deceits, after the rudiments of this world*, whereas the Platonists many ways led to the belief in God and his Word. (*Ut supra.*) Ed.]

³³ [Mr. C. left England on the 16th of September 1698, when he sailed from Great Yarmouth to Hamburgh, in company with Mr. Wordsworth and his sister. S. C.]

³⁴ To those, who design to acquire the language of a country in the country itself, it may be useful, if I mention the incalculable advantage which I derived from learning all the words, that could possibly be so learned, with the objects before me, and without the intermediation of the English terms. It was a regular part of my morning studies for the first six weeks of my residence at Ratzeburg, to accompany the good and kind old pastor, with whom I lived, from the cellar to the roof, through gardens, farm yard, &c. and to call every, the minutest, thing by its German name. Advertisements, farces, jest books, and the conversation of children while I was at play with them, con-

journey thither I have described in *The Friend*,³⁵ I proceeded through Hanover to Göttingen.

Here I regularly attended the lectures on physiology in the morning, and on natural history in the evening, under Blumenbach, a name as dear to every Englishman who has studied at that university, as it

tributed their share to a more home-like acquaintance with the language, than I could have acquired from works of polite literature alone, or even from polite society. There is a passage of hearty sound sense in Luther's German Letter on interpretation, to the translation of which I shall prefix, for the sake of those who read the German, yet are not likely to have dipped often in the massive folios of this heroic reformer, the simple, sinewy, idiomatic words of the original. "*Denn man muss nicht die Buchstaben in der Lateinischen Sprache fragen wie man soll Deutsch reden; sondern man muss die Mutter im Hause die Kinder auf den Gassen, den gemeinen Mann auf dem Markte, darum fragen: und denselbigen auf das Maul sehen wie sie reden, und darnach dolmetschen. So verstehen sie es denn, und merken dass man Deutsch mit ihnen redet.*"

TRANSLATION.

For one must not ask the letters in the Latin tongue, how one ought to speak German; but one must ask the mother in the house, the children in the lanes and alleys, the common man in the market, concerning this; yea, and look at the *moves* of their mouths while they are talking, and thereafter interpret. They understand you then, and mark that one talks German with them.*

³⁵ [See *The Second Landing-place*. Essay III. vol. ii. p. 251. S. C.]

* [Archdeacon Hare has kindly communicated to me that this passage occurs in a *Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen der heiligen Schrift*, written to Wencesslaus Link, when Luther was in the Castle of Coburg, during the Diet of Augsburg 1530: that it is to be found in vol. xxi. of Walch's edit. of Luther's works, p. 318. The words *wie die Esel thun*, after *Deutsch reden*, were doubtless omitted intentionally. S. C.]

is venerable to men of science throughout Europe ! Eichhorn's lectures on the New Testament were repeated to me from notes by a student from Ratzeburg, a young man of sound learning and indefatigable industry, who is now, I believe, a professor of the oriental languages at Heidelberg. But my chief efforts were directed towards a grounded knowledge of the German language and literature. From professor Tychsen I received as many lessons in the Gothic of Ulphilas³⁶ as sufficed to make me acquainted with its grammar, and the radical words of most frequent occurrence ; and with the occasional assistance of the same philosophical linguist, I read through³⁷ Ottfried's

³⁶ [See note D. in the Appendix. S. C.]

³⁷ This paraphrase, written about the time of Charlemagne, is by no means deficient in occasional passages of considerable poetic merit. There is a flow, and a tender enthusiasm in the following lines (at the conclusion of Chapter XI.) which, even in the translation will not, I flatter myself, fail to interest the reader. Ottfried is describing the circumstances immediately following the birth of our Lord.

She gave with joy her virgin breast ;
 She hid it not, she bared the breast,
 Which suckled that divinest babe !
 Blessed, blessed were the breasts
 Which the Saviour infant kiss'd ;
 And blessed, blessed was the mother
 Who wrapp'd his limbs in swaddling clothes,
 Singing placed him on her lap,
 Hung o'er him with her looks of love,
 And sooth'd him with a lulling motion.
 Blessed ! for she shelter'd him
 From the damp and chilling air ;
 Blessed, blessed ! for she lay
 With such a babe in one blest bed,
 Close as babes and mothers lie !
 Blessed, blessed evermore,

metrical paraphrase of the gospel, and the most important remains of the Theotiscan, or the transitional state of the Teutonic language from the Gothic to the old German of the Swabian period.³⁸ Of this period —(the polished dialect of which is analogous to that of our Chaucer, and which leaves the philosophic student in doubt, whether the language has not since then lost more in sweetness and flexibility, than it has

With her virgin lips she kiss'd,
 With her arms, and to her breast
 She embraced the babe divine,
 Her babe divine the virgin mother!
 There lives not on this ring of earth
 A mortal, that can sing her praise.
 Mighty mother, virgin pure,
 In the darkness and the night
 For us she bore the heavenly Lord!*

Most interesting is it to consider the effect, when the feelings are wrought above the natural pitch by the belief of something mysterious, while all the images are purely natural. Then it is, that religion and poetry strike deepest.

³⁸ [See note E. in the Appendix. S. C.]

* [Otfridi Evang. Lib. I. cap. xi. l. 73-108, contained in Schilter's *Thesaurus Antiquitatum Teutonicarum*, pp. 50-51. The translation is a little condensed but faithful in sense. I shall give a few couplets of the original to show the rhyme and metre.

The bot si mit gilusti
 thio kindisgun brusti,

* * * *

Er n'ist in erdringe
 ther ira lob irsinge.

* * * *

Dag man ni rinit,
 ouh sunna ni biscinit,

Ther iz io bibringe,
 tho er es biginne. S. C.]

gained in condensation and copiousness)—I read with sedulous accuracy the *Minnesinger* (or singers of love, the Provençal poets of the Swabian court) and the metrical romances; and then laboured through sufficient specimens of the *master singers*, their degenerate successors; not however without occasional pleasure from the rude, yet interesting strains of Hans Sachs, the cobbler of Nuremberg.³⁹ Of this man's genius five folio volumes with double columns are extant in print, and nearly an equal number in manuscript; yet the indefatigable bard takes care to inform his readers, that he never *made a shoe the less*, but had virtuously reared a large family by the labour of his hands.

In Pindar, Chaucer, Dante, Milton, and many more, we have instances of the close connection of poetic genius with the love of liberty and of genuine reformation. The moral sense at least will not be outraged, if I add to the list the name of this honest shoemaker, (a trade by the bye remarkable for the production of philosophers and poets). His poem entitled THE MORNING STAR, was the very first publication that appeared in praise and support of Luther; and an excellent hymn of Hans Sachs, which has been deservedly translated into almost all the European languages, was commonly sung in the Protestant churches, whenever the heroic reformer visited them.

In Luther's own German writings, and eminently in his translation of the Bible, the *German* language commenced. I mean the language as it is at present written; that which is called the High-German, as contra-distinguished from the Platt-Teutsch, the dialect of the flat or northern countries, and from the Ober-

³⁹ [See note F. in the Appendix. S. C.]

Teutsch, the language of the middle and Southern Germany. The High German is indeed a *lingua communis*, not actually the native language of any province, but the choice and fragrancy of all the dialects. From this cause it is at once the most copious and the most grammatical of all the European tongues.

Within less than a century after Luther's death the German was inundated with pedantic barbarisms. A few volumes of this period I read through from motives of curiosity; for it is not easy to imagine any thing more fantastic, than the very appearance of their pages. Almost every third word is a Latin word with a Germanized ending, the Latin portion being always printed in Roman letters, while in the last syllable the German character is retained.

At length, about the year 1620, Opitz arose, whose genius more nearly resembled that of Dryden than any other poet, who at present occurs to my recollection.⁴⁰ In the opinion of Lessing, the most acute of critics, and of Adelung, the first of Lexicographers, Opitz, and the Silesian poets, his followers, not only restored the language, but still remain the models of pure diction. A stranger has no vote on such a question; but after repeated perusal of the works of Opitz my feelings justified the verdict, and I seemed to have acquired from them a sort of tact for what is genuine in the style of later writers.

Of the splendid æra, which commenced with Gellert, Klopstock, Ramler, Lessing, and their compeers, I need not speak.⁴¹ With the opportunities which I enjoyed, it would have been disgraceful not to have been familiar with their writings; and I have already said

⁴⁰ [See note G. in the Appendix. S. C.]

⁴¹ [See note H. ib. S. C.]

as much as the present biographical sketch requires concerning the German philosophers, whose works, for the greater part, I became acquainted with at a far later period.⁴²

Soon after my return from Germany⁴³ I was solicited to undertake the literary and political department in the *Morning Post*;⁴⁴ and I acceded to the proposal on the condition that the paper should thenceforwards be conducted on certain fixed and announced principles, and that I should neither be obliged nor requested to deviate from them in favour of any party or any event. In consequence, that Journal became and for many years continued anti-ministerial indeed, yet with a very qualified approbation of the opposition, and with far greater earnestness and zeal both anti-Jacobin and anti-Gallican. To this hour I cannot find reason to approve of the first war either in its commencement or its conduct. Nor can I understand, with what reason either Mr. Percival, (whom I am singular enough to regard as the best and wisest minister of this reign,) nor the present Administration, can be said to have pursued the plans of Mr. Pitt. The love of their country, and perseverant hostility to French principles and French ambition are indeed honourable qualities common to them and to their predecessor. But it appears to me as clear as the evidence of facts can render any question of history, that the successes

⁴² [See note I. in the Appendix. S. C.]

⁴³ [Mr. Coleridge arrived in London from Germany on the 27th of November, 1799. S. C.]

⁴⁴ [The reader is referred to the end of the Biographical Supplement in vol. ii. for remarks of Mr. Stuart, who edited the *Morning Post* from August 1795 to August 1803, on this part of the B. L. from the present paragraph to that ending in page 226 inclusively. S. C.]

of the Percival and of the existing ministry have been owing to their having pursued measures the direct contrary to Mr. Pitt's. Such for instance are the concentration of the national force to one object; the abandonment of the subsidizing policy, so far at least as neither to goad nor bribe the continental courts into war, till the convictions of their subjects had rendered it a war of their own seeking; and above all, in their manly and generous reliance on the good sense of the English people, and on that loyalty which is linked to the very⁴⁵ heart of the nation by the system of credit and the interdependence of property.

⁴⁵ Lord Grenville has lately re-asserted (in the House of Lords) the imminent danger of a revolution in the earlier part of the war against France. I doubt not, that his Lordship is sincere; and it must be flattering to his feelings to believe it. But where are the evidences of the danger, to which a future historian can appeal? Or must he rest on an assertion? Let me be permitted to extract a passage on the subject from *The Friend*. "I have said that to withstand the arguments of the lawless, the anti-Jacobins proposed to suspend the law, and by the interposition of a particular statute to eclipse the blessed light of the universal sun, that spies and informers might tyrannize and escape in the ominous darkness. Oh! if these mistaken men, intoxicated with alarm and bewildered by that panic of property, which they themselves were the chief agents in exciting, had ever lived in a country where there really existed a general disposition to change and rebellion! Had they ever travelled through Sicily; or through France at the first coming on of the revolution; or even alas! through too many of the provinces of a sister island; they could not but have shrunk from their own declarations concerning the state of feeling and opinion at that time predominant throughout Great Britain. There was a time—(Heaven grant that that time may have passed by!)—when by crossing a narrow strait, they might have learned the true symptoms of approaching danger, and have secured themselves from mistaking the meetings and idle rant of such sedition, as shrank appalled from the sight of a

Be this as it may, I am persuaded that the *Morning Post* proved a far more useful ally to the Government in its most important objects, in consequence of its being generally considered as moderately anti-ministerial, than if it had been the avowed eulogist of Mr. Pitt. The few, whose curiosity or fancy should lead them to turn over the journals of that date, may find a small proof of this in the frequent charges made by the *Morning Chronicle*, that such and such essays or leading paragraphs had been sent from the Treasury. The rapid and unusual increase in the sale of the *Morning Post* is a sufficient pledge, that genuine im-

constable, for the dire murmuring and strange consternation which precedes the storm or earthquake of national discord. Not only in coffee-houses and public theatres, but even at the tables of the wealthy, they would have heard the advocates of existing Government defend their cause in the language and with the tone of men, who are conscious that they are in a minority. But in England, when the alarm was at its highest, there was not a city, no, not a town or village, in which a man suspected of holding democratic principles could move abroad without receiving some unpleasant proof of the hatred in which his supposed opinions were held by the great majority of the people; and the only instances of popular excess and indignation were on the side of the government and the established church. But why need I appeal to these invidious facts? Turn over the pages of history and seek for a single instance of a revolution having been effected without the concurrence of either the nobles, or the ecclesiastics, or the monied classes, in any country, in which the influences of property had ever been predominant, and where the interests of the proprietors were interlinked! Examine the revolution of the Belgic provinces under Philip II.; the civil wars of France in the preceding generation; the history of the American revolution, or the yet more recent events in Sweden and in Spain; and it will be scarcely possible not to perceive that in England from 1791 to the peace of Amiens there were neither tendencies to confederacy nor actual confederacies, against which the existing laws had not provided

partiality with a respectable portion of literary talent will secure the success of a newspaper without the aid of party or ministerial patronage. But by impartiality I mean an honest and enlightened adherence to a code of intelligible principles previously announced, and faithfully referred to in support of every judgment on men and events; not indiscriminate abuse, not the indulgence of an editor's own malignant passions, and still less, if that be possible, a determination to make money by flattering the envy and cupidity, the vindictive restlessness and self-conceit of the half-witted vulgar; a determination almost fiendish, but which, I have been informed, has been boastfully avowed by one man, the most notorious of these mob-sycophants! From the commencement of the Addington administration to the present day, whatever I have written in *THE MORNING POST*, or (after that paper was transferred to other proprietors) in *THE COURIER*,⁴⁶ has

both sufficient safeguards and an ample punishment. But alas! the panic of property had been struck in the first instance for party purposes; and when it became general, its propagators caught it themselves and ended in believing their own lie; even as our bulls in Borrowdale sometimes run mad with the echo of their own bellowing. The consequences were most injurious. Our attention was concentrated on a monster, which could not survive the convulsions, in which it had been brought forth,—even the enlightened Burke himself too often talking and reasoning, as if a perpetual and organized anarchy had been a possible thing! Thus while we were warring against French doctrines, we took little heed whether the means by which we attempted to overthrow them, were not likely to aid and augment the far more formidable evil of French ambition. Like children we ran away from the yelping of a cur, and took shelter at the heels of a vicious war horse.” (Vol. II. Essay i. p. 21, 4th edit.)

⁴⁶ [Mr. Coleridge began to write for *The Courier* in 1811. One series of *Essays*, mentioned in a subsequent page, he had

been in defence or furtherance of the measures of Government.

Things of this nature scarce survive that night
That gives them birth ; they perish in the sight ;
Cast by so far from *after-life*, that there
Can scarcely aught be said, but that *they were!*⁴⁷

Yet in these labours I employed, and, in the belief of partial friends wasted, the prime and manhood of my intellect. Most assuredly, they added nothing to my fortune or my reputation. The industry of the week supplied the necessities of the week. From government or the friends of government I not only never received remuneration, nor ever expected it ; but I was never honoured with a single acknowledgment, or expression of satisfaction. Yet the retrospect is far from painful or matter of regret. I am not indeed silly enough to take as any thing more than a violent hyperbole of party debate, Mr. Fox's assertion that the *late* war (I trust that the epithet is not prematurely applied) was a war produced by the Morning Post ; or I should be proud to have the words inscribed on my tomb.⁴⁸ As little do I regard the cir-

published in that Paper in 1809. He wrote for the Morning Post in 1800 and 1802, but not regularly or throughout each of those years. See the Biog. Supplement. S. C.]

⁴⁷ [From the prologue to "The Royal Slave," a Tragi-comedy by William Cartwright.

The author of this play flourished in the reign of James I. and his successor, and died of the camp disease, in 1643, according to Wood's Athen. Ox. in the thirty-third year of his age. He wrote, beside The Royal Slave, The Ordinary, a Comedy ; The Lady Errant, a Tragi-comedy ; The Siege, or Love's Convert, a Tragi-comedy ; and Poems, all which were printed together in 1651. S. C.]

⁴⁸ [In the Autumn of 1802 Mr. Coleridge published in the Morning Post two long letters to Mr. Fox, the first of which

cumstance, that I was a specified object of Buona-
parte's resentment during my residence in Italy in

appeared on the fourth, and the second on the ninth, of No-
vember.

These Letters are not only Anti-Gallican and Anti-Jacobin, but strongly Anti-Napoleon. They breathe the same uncompromising hostility to the then master of France, the same disdain of the "upstart Corsican," not simply or chiefly as an invader of hereditary rights, but as an unprincipled despot and oppressor of liberty, whom force of circumstance more than inherent power had raised on high,—disdain unmitigated by a shade either of admiration or fear,—which continued to be his line of sentiment on that subject for the rest of his life. But the friends and admirers of Fox were displeased with the letters on *his* account, because they reflected on *him* for a departure from sound Anglicanism in his later policy, and expressed the deeper regret on this head, because his character, as previously manifested, had seemed to be that of a "genuine Englishman." The writer was reproached with inconsistency, because he had once been the satirist of Pitt and the eulogist of Fox. Whether or no these censures were deserved, whether the language of the Letters was indeed, as even his friend Lamb pronounced it, "a gentlemanly ushering in of most arrogant charges," or only such plain bold speaking as becomes an English subject,—an erection of strong blame upon a groundwork of real earnest praise;—whether or no its tone and import argue any essential inconsistency in a former eulogist of Fox, whom it declares to have "a just claim on the gratitude and admiration of his country for his counsels and exertions during the whole continuance of the ominous" revolutionary war; or a satirist of Pitt, when it affirms that the Jacobinical party in England had never been truly formidable, "unless it were during the Jacobinical career of Mr. Pitt's partisans" at the close of the contest with America;—these are questions, which will be answered more justly and dispassionately hereafter, by many even now, than they were in the year 1802. "Upon the whole," says Mr. Dequincey, in reference to my father's change of sides in politics, "I am of opinion, that few events of Mr. Coleridge's life were better calculated to place his disinterested pursuit of truth in a luminous point of view." An extract from Mr. Dequincey's defence of

consequence of those essays in the Morning Post during the peace of Amiens. Of this I was warned, directly, by Baron Von Humboldt, the Prussian Plenipotentiary, who at that time was the minister of the Prussian court at Rome; and indirectly, through his secretary, by Cardinal Fesch himself. Nor do I lay any greater weight on the confirming fact, that an order for my arrest was sent from Paris, from which danger I was rescued by the kindness of a noble Benedictine, and the gracious connivance of that good old man, the present Pope.⁴⁹ For the late tyrant's vindictive appetite was omnivorous, and preyed equally on a Duc d'Enghien,⁵⁰ and the writer of a newspaper paragraph. Like a true vulture,⁵¹ Napoleon with an eye not less telescopic, and with a taste equally coarse in his ravin, could descend from the most dazzling

Mr. Coleridge's political consistency, and an opinion expressed by him of his political writings, in allusion to what is said of "Buonaparte's resentment" in this paragraph of the B. L. will appear in the Appendix, note J. S. C.]

⁴⁹ [Rather unexpectedly he had a visit early one morning from a noble Benedictine with a passport signed by the Pope in order to facilitate his departure. He left him a carriage, and an admonition for instant flight, which was promptly obeyed by Coleridge. Hastening to Leghorn, he discovered an American vessel ready to sail for England, on board of which he embarked." Life of Coleridge, by James Gillman, pp. 180-1. S. C.]

⁵⁰ I seldom think of the murder of this illustrious Prince without recollecting the lines of Valerius Flaccus:

————— super ipsius ingens
 Instat fama viri, virtusque haud læta tyranno;
 Ergo anteire metus, juvenemque extinguere pergit.
 Argonaut, I. 29.

⁵¹ Θηρᾶ δὲ καὶ τὸν χῆνα καὶ τὴν δορκάδα,
 Καὶ τὸν λαγῶν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ταύρων γένος.
 Manuel Phile, *De Animal. Proprietat.* sect. i. l. 12.

heights to pounce on the leveret in the brake, or even on the field mouse amid the grass. But I do derive a gratification from the knowledge, that my essays contributed to introduce the practice of placing the questions and events of the day in a moral point of view; in giving a dignity to particular measures by tracing their policy or impolicy to permanent principles, and an interest to principles by the application of them to individual measures. In Mr. Burke's writings indeed the germs of almost all political truths may be found. But I dare assume to myself the merit of having first explicitly defined and analyzed the nature of Jacobinism; and that in distinguishing the Jacobin from the republican, the democrat, and the mere demagogue, I both rescued the word from remaining a mere term of abuse, and put on their guard many honest minds, who even in their heat of zeal against Jacobinism, admitted or supported principles from which the worst parts of that system may be legitimately deduced. That these are not necessary practical results of such principles, we owe to that fortunate inconsequence of our nature, which permits the heart to rectify the errors of the understanding. The detailed examination of the consular Government and its pretended constitution, and the proof given by me, that it was a consummate despotism in masquerade, extorted a recantation even from the *Morning Chronicle*, which had previously extolled this constitution as the perfection of a wise and regulated liberty. On every great occurrence I endeavoured to discover in past history the event, that most nearly resembled it. I procured, wherever it was possible, the contemporary historians, memorialists, and pamphleteers. Then fairly subtracting the points of difference from those of likeness, as the balance favoured the former or the latter, I

conjectured that the result would be the same or different. In the series of essays entitled "A comparison of France under Napoleon with Rome under the first Cæsars,"⁵² and in those which followed "On the probable final restoration of the Bourbons,"⁵³ I feel myself authorized to affirm, by the effect produced on many intelligent men, that, were the dates wanting, it might have been suspected that the essays had been written within the last twelve months. The same plan I pursued at the commencement of the Spanish revolution, and with the same success, taking the war of the United Provinces with Philip II. as the ground work of the comparison.⁵⁴ I have mentioned this from no motives of vanity, nor even from motives of self defence, which would justify a certain degree of egotism, especially if it be considered, how often and grossly I have been attacked for sentiments, which I had exerted my best powers to confute and expose, and how grievously these charges acted to my disadvantage while I was in Malta. Or rather they would have done so, if my own feelings had not precluded the wish of a settled establishment in that island. But

⁵² [Comparison of the present state of France, with that of Rome under Julius and Augustus Cæsar. Morning Post, Sep. 21, continued on Sep. 25, and on Oct. 2, 1802. S. C.]

⁵³ [Morning Post, 1802, Ed. This article On the circumstances that appear especially to favour the return of the Bourbons at this present time, was published on the 12th of October. It came after two by Mr. Coleridge on the affairs of France, the first of which appeared Oct. 5, and was followed on the 21st by an essay of his, entitled Once a Jacobin always a Jacobin, an extract from which was inserted in The Friend. S. C.]

⁵⁴ [Eight letters on the Spaniards, which appeared in The Courier on the 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd days of December, 1809, and on the 20th of January, 1810. S. C.]

I have mentioned it from the full persuasion that, armed with the two-fold knowledge of history and the human mind, a man will scarcely err in his judgment concerning the sum total of any future national event, if he have been able to procure the original documents of the past, together with authentic accounts of the present, and if he have a philosophic tact for what is truly important in facts, and in most instances therefore for such facts as the dignity of history has excluded from the volumes of our modern compilers, by the courtesy of the age entitled historians.

To have lived in vain must be a painful thought to any man, and especially so to him who has made literature his profession. I should therefore rather condole than be angry with the mind, which could attribute to no worthier feelings than those of vanity or self love, the satisfaction which I acknowledge myself to have enjoyed from the republication of my political essays (either whole or as extracts) not only in many of our own provincial papers, but in the federal journals throughout America. I regarded it as some proof of my not having laboured altogether in vain, that from the articles written by me shortly before and at the commencement of the late unhappy war with America, not only the sentiments were adopted, but in some instances the very language, in several of the Massachusetts state papers.

But no one of these motives nor all conjointly would have impelled me to a statement so uncomfortable to my own feelings, had not my character been repeatedly attacked, by an unjustifiable intrusion on private life, as of a man incorrigibly idle, and who intrusted not only with ample talents, but favoured with unusual opportunities of improving them, had nevertheless suffered them to rust away without any efficient

exertion, either for his own good or that of his fellow creatures. Even if the compositions, which I have made public, and that too in a form the most certain of an extensive circulation, though the least flattering to an author's self-love, had been published in books, they would have filled a respectable number of volumes, though every passage of merely temporary interest were omitted. My prose writings have been charged with a disproportionate demand on the attention; with an excess of refinement in the mode of arriving at truths; with beating the ground for that which might have been run down by the eye; with the length and laborious construction of my periods; in short with obscurity and the love of paradox. But my severest critics have not pretended to have found in my compositions triviality, or traces of a mind that shrunk from the toil of thinking. No one has charged me with tricking out in other words the thoughts of others, or with hashing up anew the *cramben jam decies coc-tam* of English literature or philosophy. Seldom have I written that in a day, the acquisition or investigation of which had not cost me the previous labour of a month.

But are books the only channel through which the stream of intellectual usefulness can flow? Is the diffusion of truth to be estimated by publications; or publications by the truth, which they diffuse or at least contain? I speak it in the excusable warmth of a mind stung by an accusation, which has not only been advanced in reviews of the widest circulation, not only registered in the bulkiest works of periodical literature, but by frequency of repetition has become an admitted fact in private literary circles, and thoughtlessly repeated by too many who call themselves my friends, and whose own recollections ought to have suggested

a contrary testimony. Would that the criterion of a scholar's utility were the number and moral value of the truths, which he has been the means of throwing into the general circulation; or the number and value of the minds, whom by his conversation or letters, he has excited into activity, and supplied with the germs of their after-growth! A distinguished rank might not indeed, even then, be awarded to my exertions; but I should dare look forward with confidence to an honourable acquittal. I should dare appeal to the numerous and respectable audiences, which at different times and in different places honoured my lecture rooms with their attendance, whether the points of view from which the subjects treated of were surveyed, whether the grounds of my reasoning were such, as they had heard or read elsewhere, or have since found in previous publications. I can conscientiously declare, that the complete success of the REMORSE on the first night of its representation did not give me as great or as heart-felt a pleasure, as the observation that the pit and boxes were crowded with faces familiar to me, though of individuals whose names I did not know, and of whom I knew nothing, but that they had attended one or other of my courses of lectures. It is an excellent though perhaps somewhat vulgar proverb, that there are cases where a man may be as well "*in for a pound as for a penny.*" To those, who from ignorance of the serious injury I have received from this rumour of having dreamed away my life to no purpose, injuries which I unwillingly remember at all, much less am disposed to record in a sketch of my literary life; or to those, who from their own feelings, or the gratification they derive from thinking contemptuously of others, would like Job's comforters attribute these complaints, extorted from me by the sense of

wrong, to self conceit or presumptuous vanity, I have already furnished such ample materials, that I shall gain nothing by withholding the remainder. I will not therefore hesitate to ask the consciences of those, who from their long acquaintance with me and with the circumstances are best qualified to decide or be my judges, whether the restitution of the *sum cuique* would increase or detract from my literary reputation. In this exculpation I hope to be understood as speaking of myself comparatively, and in proportion to the claims, which others are entitled to make on my time or my talents. By what I *have* effected, am I to be judged by my fellow men ; what I *could* have done, is a question for my own conscience. On my own account I may perhaps have had sufficient reason to lament my deficiency in self-control, and the neglect of centering my powers to the realization of some permanent work. But to verse rather than to prose, if to either, belongs the voice of mourning for

Keen pangs of Love, awakening as a babe
 Turbulent, with an outcry in the heart ;
 And fears self-willed that shunned the eye of hope ;
 And hope that scarce would know itself from fear ;
 Sense of past youth, and manhood come in vain,
 And genius given and knowledge won in vain ;
 And all which I had culled in wood-walks wild,
 And all which patient toil had reared, and all,
 Commune with thee had opened out—but flowers
 Strewed on my corpse, and borne upon my bier,
 In the same coffin, for the self-same grave !⁵⁵

These will exist, for the future, I trust, only in the poetic strains, which the feelings at the time called forth. In those only, gentle reader,

⁵⁵ [Poet. Works, I. p. 209. Ed.]

Affectus animi varios, bellumque sequacis
 Perlegis invidiæ, curasque revolvis inanes,
 Quas humilis tenero stylus olim effudit in ævo.
 Perlegis et lacrymas, et quod pharetratus acuta
 Ille puer puero fecit mihi cuspide vulnus.
 Omnia paulatim consumit longior ætas,
 Vivendoque simul morimur, rapimurque manendo.
 Ipse mihi collatus enim non ille videbor;
 Frons alia est, moresque alii, nova mentis imago,
 Vox aliudque sonat—Jamque observatio vitæ
 Multa dedit—lugere nihil, ferre omnia; jamque
 Paulatim lacrymas rerum experientia tersit.⁵⁶

CHAPTER XI.

*An affectionate exhortation to those who in early life
 feel themselves disposed to become authors.*



IT was a favourite remark of the late Mr. Whitbread's, that no man does any thing from a single motive. The separate motives, or rather moods of mind, which produced the preceding reflections and anecdotes have been laid open to the reader in each separate instance. But an interest in the welfare of those, who at the present time may be in circumstances not dissimilar to my own at my first entrance into life, has been the constant accompaniment, and (as it were) the under-song of all my feelings. Whitehead¹ exerting the prerogative of his laureatship addressed to youthful poets a poetic Charge, which is perhaps the

⁵⁶ [Epist. Fr. Petrarchæ Lib. i. *Barbato Salmonensi*, Opp. Basil, 1554, vol. ii. p. 76. S. C.]

¹ [See Appendix, note J. S. C.]

best, and certainly the most interesting, of his works.² With no other privilege than that of sympathy and sincere good wishes, I would address an affectionate exhortation to the youthful *literati*, grounded on my own experience. It will be but short; for the beginning, middle, and end converge to one charge: *never pursue literature as a trade*. With the exception of one extraordinary man, I have never known an individual, least of all an individual of genius, healthy or happy without a *profession*, that is, some *regular* employment, which does not depend on the will of the moment, and which can be carried on so far *mechanically* that an average *quantum* only of health, spirits, and intellectual exertion are requisite to its faithful discharge. Three hours of leisure, unannoyed by any alien anxiety, and looked forward to with delight as a change and recreation, will suffice to realize in literature a larger product of what is truly genial, than weeks of compulsion. Money, and immediate reputation form only an arbitrary and accidental end of literary labour. The hope of increasing them by any given exertion will often prove a stimulant to industry; but the necessity of acquiring them will in all works of genius convert the stimulant into a narcotic. Motives by excess reverse their very nature, and instead of exciting, stun and stupify the mind. For it is one contradistinction of genius from talent, that its predominant end is always comprised in the means; and this is one of the many points, which establish an analogy between genius and virtue. Now though talents may exist without genius, yet as genius cannot exist, certainly not manifest itself, without talents, I would advise every scholar, who feels the genial power work-

² [See Appendix, note K. S. C.]

ing within him, so far to make a division between the two, as that he should devote his talents to the acquirement of competence in some known trade or profession, and his genius to objects of his tranquil and unbiassed choice; while the consciousness of being actuated in both alike by the sincere desire to perform his duty, will alike ennoble both. "My dear young friend," (I would say) "suppose yourself established in any honourable occupation. From the manufactory or counting house, from the law-court, or from having visited your last patient, you return at evening,

Dear tranquil time, when the sweet sense of Home
Is sweetest —————³

to your family, prepared for its social enjoyments, with the very countenances of your wife and children brightened, and their voice of welcome made doubly welcome, by the knowledge that, as far as *they* are concerned, you have satisfied the demands of the day by the labour of the day. Then, when you retire into your study, in the books on your shelves you revisit so many venerable friends with whom you can converse. Your own spirit scarcely less free from personal anxieties than the great minds, that in those books are still living for you! Even your writing desk with its blank paper and all its other implements will appear as a chain of flowers, capable of linking your feelings as well as thoughts to events and characters past or to come; not a chain of iron, which binds you down to think of the future and the remote by recalling the claims and feelings of the peremptory present. But why should I say *retire*? The habits of active life and

³ [From the poem To William Wordsworth. Poet. Works, I. p. 210. S. C.]

daily intercourse with the stir of the world will tend to give you such self-command, that the presence of your family will be no interruption. Nay, the social silence, or undisturbing voices of a wife or sister will be like a restorative atmosphere, or soft music which moulds a dream without becoming its object. If facts are required to prove the possibility of combining weighty performances in literature with full and independent employment, the works of Cicero and Xenophon among the ancients; of Sir Thomas Moore, Bacon, Baxter, or to refer at once to later and contemporary instances, Darwin and Roscoe, are at once decisive of the question.

But all men may not dare promise themselves a sufficiency of self-control for the imitation of those examples; though strict scrutiny should always be made, whether indolence, restlessness, or a vanity impatient for immediate gratification, have not tampered with the judgment and assumed the vizard of humility for the purposes of self-delusion. Still the Church presents to every man of learning and genius a profession, in which he may cherish a rational hope of being able to unite the widest schemes of literary utility with the strictest performance of professional duties.⁴ Among the numerous blessings of Christianity, the introduction of an established Church makes an especial claim on the gratitude of scholars and philosophers; in England, at least, where the principles of Protestantism have conspired with the freedom of the government to double all its salutary powers by the removal of its abuses.

⁴ [All that follows, as far as "expected to withhold five" in the following paragraph, with but very little difference, is to be found in the *Church and State*, pp. 77-80. 3rd edit. S. C.]

That not only the maxims, but the grounds of a pure morality, the mere fragments of which

— the lofty grave tragedians taught
 In chorus or iambic, teachers best
 Of moral prudence, with delight received
 In brief sententious precepts; ⁵

and that the sublime truths of the divine unity and attributes, which a Plato found most hard to learn and deemed it still more difficult to reveal; that these should have become the almost hereditary property of childhood and poverty, of the hovel and the workshop; that even to the unlettered they sound as common place, is a *phænomenon*, which must withhold all but minds of the most vulgar cast from undervaluing the services even of the pulpit and the reading desk. Yet those, who confine the efficiency of an established Church to its public offices, can hardly be placed in a much higher rank of intellect. That to every parish throughout the kingdom there is transplanted a germ of civilization; that in the remotest villages there is a *nucleus*, round which the capabilities of the place may crystallize and brighten; a model sufficiently superiour to excite, yet sufficiently near to encourage and facilitate, imitation; this, the unobtrusive, continuous agency of a protestant church establishment, *this* it is, which the patriot, and the philanthropist, who would fain unite the love of peace with the faith in the progressive melioration of mankind, cannot estimate at too high a price. *It cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx, or the sapphire. No mention shall be made of coral, or of pearls: for the price of wisdom is above rubies.*⁶ The clergyman is

⁵ Paradise Regained. Book IV. l. 261.

⁶ [Job xxviii. 16, 18. S. C.]

with his parishioners and among them ; he is neither in the cloistered cell, nor in the wilderness, but a neighbour and a family-man, whose education and rank admit him to the mansion of the rich landholder, while his duties make him the frequent visiter of the farmhouse and the cottage. He is, or he may become, connected with the families of his parish or its vicinity by marriage. And among the instances of the blindness, or at best of the short-sightedness, which it is the nature of cupidity to inflict, I know few more striking than the clamours of the farmers against Church property. Whatever was not paid to the clergyman would inevitably at the next lease be paid to the landholder, while, as the case at present stands, the revenues of the Church are in some sort the reversionary property of every family, that may have a member educated for the Church, or a daughter that may marry a clergyman. Instead of being foreclosed and immovable, it is in fact the only species of landed property, that is essentially moving and circulative. That there exist no inconveniences, who will pretend to assert? But I have yet to expect the proof, that the inconveniences are greater in this than in any other species ; or that either the farmers or the clergy would be benefited by forcing the latter to become either Trullibers or salaried placemen. Nay, I do not hesitate to declare my firm persuasion, that whatever reason of discontent the farmers may assign, the true cause is this ; that they may cheat the parson, but cannot cheat the steward ; and that they are disappointed, if they should have been able to withhold only two pounds less than the legal claim, having expected to withhold five. At all events, considered relatively to the encouragement of learning and genius, the establishment presents a patronage at once so effective and unburdensome, that it

would be impossible to afford the like or equal in any but a Christian and Protestant country. There is scarce a department of human knowledge without some bearing on the various critical, historical, philosophical and moral truths, in which the scholar must be interested as a clergyman; no one pursuit worthy of a man of genius, which may not be followed without incongruity. To give the history of the Bible as a *book*, would be little less than to relate the origin or first excitement of all the literature and science, that we now possess. The very decorum, which the profession imposes, is favourable to the best purposes of genius, and tends to counteract its most frequent defects. Finally, that man must be deficient in sensibility, who would not find an incentive to emulation in the great and burning lights, which in a long series have illustrated the church of England; who would not hear from within an echo to the voice from their sacred shrines,

Et Pater Æneas et avunculus excitat Hector.⁷

But, whatever be the profession or trade chosen, the advantages are many and important, compared with the state of a mere literary man, who in any degree depends on the sale of his works for the necessaries and comforts of life. In the former a man lives in sympathy with the world, in which he lives. At least he acquires a better and quicker tact for the knowledge of that, with which men in general can sympathize. He learns to manage his genius more prudently and efficaciously. His powers and acquirements gain him likewise more real admiration; for they surpass the legitimate expectations of others. He is something

⁷ [Æneid III. 343. S. C.]

besides an author, and is not therefore considered merely as an author. The hearts of men are open to him, as to one of their own class; and whether he exerts himself or not in the conversational circles of his acquaintance, his silence is not attributed to pride, nor his communicativeness to vanity.⁸ To these advantages I will venture to add a superiour chance of happiness in domestic life, were it only that it is as natural for the man to be out of the circle of his household during the day, as it is meritorious for the woman to remain for the most part within it. But this subject involves points of consideration so numerous and so delicate, and would not only permit, but require such ample documents from the biography of literary men, that I now merely allude to it *in transitu*. When the same circumstance has occurred at very different times to very different persons, all of whom have some one thing in common; there is reason to suppose that such circumstance is not merely attributable to the

⁸ [These lines in *The Danger of writing Verse*, by Whitehead, describe the trials of the professed and noted author from the intensity with which the gaze of others is fixed upon him :

“ His acts, his words, his thoughts no more his own,
 Each folly blazoned and each frailty known.
 Is he reserv'd?—his sense is so refin'd
 It ne'er descends to trifle with mankind.
 Open and free?—they find the secret cause
 Is vanity; he courts the world's applause.
 Nay, though he speak not, something still is seen,
 Each change of face betrays a fault within.
 If grace, 'tis spleen; he smiles but to deride;
 And downright awkwardness in him is pride.
 Thus must he steer through fame's uncertain seas,
 Now sunk by censure, and now puff'd by praise;
 Contempt with envy strangely mix'd endure,
 Fear'd where caress'd, and jealous though secure.” S. C.]

persons concerned, but is in some measure occasioned by the one point in common to them all. Instead of the vehement and almost slanderous dehortation from marriage, which the *Misogyne*, Boccaccio⁹ addresses to literary men, I would substitute the simple advice: be not *merely* a man of letters! Let literature be an honourable *augmentation* to your arms; but not constitute the coat, or fill the escutcheon!

To objections from conscience I can of course answer in no other way, than by requesting the youthful objector (as I have already done on a former occasion) to ascertain with strict self-examination, whether other influences may not be at work; whether spirits, "*not of health,*" and with whispers "*not from heaven,*" may not be walking in the *twilight* of his consciousness. Let him catalogue his scruples, and reduce them to a distinct intelligible form; let him be certain, that he has read with a docile mind and favourable dispositions the best and most fundamental works on the subject; that he has had both mind and heart opened to the great and illustrious qualities of the many renowned characters, who had doubted like himself, and whose researches had ended in the clear conviction, that their doubts had been groundless, or at least in no proportion to the counter-weight. Happy will it be for such a man, if among his contemporaries elder than himself he should meet with one, who, with similar powers and feelings as acute as his own, had entertained the same scruples; had acted upon them; and who by after-research (when the step was, alas! irretrievable, but for that very reason his research undeniably disinterested) had discovered himself to have

⁹ *Vita e Costumi di Dante.* [See Appendix, note M. S. C.]

quarrelled with received opinions only to embrace errors, to have left the direction tracked out for him on the high road of honourable exertion, only to deviate into a labyrinth, where when he had wandered till his head was giddy, his best good fortune was finally to have found his way out again, too late for prudence though not too late for conscience or for truth! Time spent in such delay is time won: for manhood in the mean time is advancing, and with it increase of knowledge, strength of judgment, and above all, temperance of feelings. And even if these should effect no change, yet the delay will at least prevent the final approval of the decision from being alloyed by the inward censure of the rashness and vanity, by which it had been precipitated. It would be a sort of irreligion, and scarcely less than a libel on human nature to believe, that there is any established and reputable profession or employment, in which a man may not continue to act with honesty and honour; and doubtless there is likewise none, which may not at times present temptations to the contrary. But wofully will that man find himself mistaken, who imagines that the profession of literature, or (to speak more plainly) the *trade* of authorship, besets its members with fewer or with less insidious temptations, than the Church, the law, or the different branches of commerce. But I have treated sufficiently on this unpleasant subject in an early chapter of this volume. I will conclude the present therefore with a short extract from Herder, whose name I might have added to the illustrious list of those, who have combined the successful pursuit of the Muses, not only with the faithful discharge, but with the highest honours and honourable emoluments of an established profession. The translation the reader will

find in a note below.¹⁰ “ *Am sorgfältigsten, meiden sie die Autorschaft. Zu früh oder unmässig gebraucht, macht sie den Kopf wüste und das Herz leer; wenn sie auch sonst keine üble Folgen gäbe. Ein Mensch, der nur liest um zu drucken, liest wahrscheinlich übel; und wer jeden Gedanken, der ihm aufstosst, durch Feder und Presse versendet, hat sie in kurzer Zeit alle versandt, und wird bald ein blosser Diener der Druckerey, ein Buchstabensetzer werden.*”¹¹

¹⁰ TRANSLATION.

“ With the greatest possible solicitude avoid authorship. Too early or immoderately employed, it makes the head waste and the heart empty; even were there no other worse consequences. A person, who reads only to print, in all probability reads amiss; and he, who sends away through the pen and the press every thought, the moment it occurs to him, will in a short time have sent all away, and will become a mere journeyman of the printing-office, a *compositor*.”

To which I may add from myself, that what medical physiologists affirm of certain secretions applies equally to our thoughts; they too must be taken up again into the circulation, and be again and again re-secreted in order to ensure a healthful vigour, both to the mind and to its intellectual offspring.*

¹¹ See Appendix. (Note N.)

* See Appendix. (Note O.)

CHAPTER XII.

A Chapter of requests and premonitions concerning the perusal or omission of the chapter that follows.



IN the perusal of philosophical works I have been greatly benefited by a resolve, which, in the antithetic form and with the allowed quaintness of an adage or maxim, I have been accustomed to word thus: *until you understand a writer's ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his understanding.* This golden rule of mine does, I own, resemble those of Pythagoras in its obscurity rather than in its depth. If however the reader will permit me to be my own Hierocles,¹ I trust, that he will find its meaning fully explained by the following instances. I have now before me a treatise of a religious fanatic, full of dreams and supernatural experiences. I see clearly the writer's grounds, and their hollowness. I have a complete insight into the causes, which through the medium of his body had acted on his mind; and by application of received and ascertained laws I can satisfactorily explain to my own reason all the strange incidents, which the writer records of himself. And this I can do without suspecting him of any intentional falsehood. As when in broad day-light a man tracks the steps of a traveller, who had lost his way in a fog or by treacherous moonshine, even so, and with the same tran-

¹ [A Neo-Platonist of the fifth century, who left a *Commentary on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras*, as well as other works. S. C.]

quill sense of certainty, can I follow the traces of this bewildered visionary. *I understand his ignorance.*

On the other hand, I have been re-perusing with the best energies of my mind the *TIMÆUS* of Plato. Whatever I comprehend, impresses me with a reverential sense of the author's genius; but there is a considerable portion of the work, to which I can attach no consistent meaning. In other treatises of the same philosopher, intended for the average comprehensions of men, I have been delighted with the masterly good sense, with the perspicuity of the language, and the aptness of the inductions. I recollect likewise, that numerous passages in this author, which I thoroughly comprehend, were formerly no less unintelligible to me, than the passages now in question. It would, I am aware, be quite fashionable to dismiss them at once as Platonic jargon. But this I cannot do with satisfaction to my own mind, because I have sought in vain for causes adequate to the solution of the assumed inconsistency. I have no insight into the possibility of a man so eminently wise, using words with such half-meanings to himself, as must perforce pass into no-meaning to his readers. When in addition to the motives thus suggested by my own reason, I bring into distinct remembrance the number and the series of great men, who after long and zealous study of these works had joined in honouring the name of Plato with epithets, that almost transcend humanity, I feel, that a contemptuous verdict on my part might argue want of modesty, but would hardly be received by the judicious, as evidence of superiour penetration. Therefore, utterly baffled in all my attempts to understand the ignorance of Plato, *I conclude myself ignorant of his understanding.*

In lieu of the various requests which the anxiety of authorship addresses to the unknown reader, I ad-

vance but this one; that he will either pass over the following chapter altogether, or read the whole connectedly. The fairest part of the most beautiful body will appear deformed and monstrous, if dissevered from its place in the organic whole. Nay, on delicate subjects, where a seemingly trifling difference of more or less may constitute a difference in kind, even a faithful display of the main and supporting ideas, if yet they are separated from the forms by which they are at once clothed and modified, may perchance present a skeleton indeed; but a skeleton to alarm and deter. Though I might find numerous precedents, I shall not desire the reader to strip his mind of all prejudices, nor to keep all prior systems out of view during his examination of the present. For in truth, such requests appear to me not much unlike the advice given to hypochondriacal patients in Dr. Buchan's domestic medicine; *videlicet*, to preserve themselves uniformly tranquil and in good spirits. Till I had discovered the art of destroying the memory *a parte post*, without injury to its future operations, and without detriment to the judgment, I should suppress the request as premature; and therefore, however much I may wish to be read with an unprejudiced mind, I do not presume to state it as a necessary condition.

The extent of my daring is to suggest one criterion, by which it may be rationally conjectured before-hand, whether or no a reader would lose his time, and perhaps his temper, in the perusal of this, or any other treatise constructed on similar principles. But it would be cruelly misinterpreted, as implying the least disrespect either for the moral or intellectual qualities of the individuals thereby precluded. The criterion is this: if a man receives as fundamental facts, and therefore of course indemonstrable and incapable of further analysis, the general notions of matter, spirit,

soul, body, action, passiveness, time, space, cause and effect, consciousness, perception, memory and habit; if he feels his mind completely at rest concerning all these, and is satisfied, if only he can analyze all other notions into some one or more of these supposed elements with plausible subordination and apt arrangement: to such a mind I would as courteously as possible convey the hint, that for him the chapter was not written.

Vir bonus es, doctus, prudens; ast haud tibi spiro.

For these terms do in truth include all the difficulties, which the human mind can propose for solution. Taking them therefore in mass, and unexamined, it requires only a decent apprenticeship in logic, to draw forth their contents in all forms and colours, as the professors of legerdemain at our village fairs pull out ribbon after ribbon from their mouths. And not more difficult is it to reduce them back again to their different *genera*. But though this analysis is highly useful in rendering our knowledge more distinct, it does not really add to it. It does not increase, though it gives us a greater mastery over, the wealth which we before possessed. For forensic purposes, for all the established professions of society, this is sufficient. But for philosophy in its highest sense, as the science of ultimate truths, and therefore *scientia scientiarum*, this mere analysis of terms is preparative only, though as a preparative discipline indispensable.

Still less dare a favourable perusal be anticipated from the proselytes of that compendious philosophy, which talking of mind but thinking of brick and mortar, or other images equally abstracted from body, contrives a theory of spirit by nicknaming matter, and in a few hours can qualify its dullest disciples to explain the *omne scibile* by reducing all things to impressions, ideas, and sensations.

But it is time to tell the truth ; though it requires some courage to avow it in an age and country, in which disquisitions on all subjects, not privileged to adopt technical terms or scientific symbols, must be addressed to the Public. I say then, that it is neither possible nor necessary for all men, nor for many, to be philosophers. There is a philosophic (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness, which lies beneath or (as it were) behind the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness ; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy, which is therefore properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and *re*-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as *transcendent*.²

² This distinction between *transcendental* and *transcendent* is observed by our elder divines and philosophers, whenever they express themselves scholastically. Dr. Johnson indeed has confounded the two words ; but his own authorities do not bear him out. Of this celebrated dictionary I will venture to remark once for all, that I should suspect the man of a morose disposition who should speak of it without respect and gratitude as a most instructive and entertaining *book*, and hitherto, unfortunately, an indispensable book ; but I confess, that I should be surprised at hearing from a philosophic and thorough scholar any but very qualified praises of it, as a *dictionary*. I am not now alluding to the number of genuine words omitted ; for this

The first range of hills, that encircles the scanty vale of human life, is the horizon for the majority of its in-

is (and perhaps to a greater extent) true, as Mr. Wakefield has noticed, of our best Greek Lexicons, and this too after the successive labours of so many giants in learning. I refer at present both to omissions and commissions of a more important nature. What these are, *me saltem judice*, will be stated at full in *The Friend*, re-published and completed.*

I had never heard of the correspondence between Wakefield and Fox till I saw the account of it this morning (16th September 1815) in the *Monthly Review*. I was not a little gratified at finding, that Mr. Wakefield had proposed to himself nearly the same plan for a Greek and English Dictionary, which I had formed, and began to execute, now ten years ago. But far, far more grieved am I, that he did not live to complete it. I cannot but think it a subject of most serious regret, that the same heavy expenditure, which is now employing in the republication of *STEPHANUS* augmented, had not been applied to a new Lexicon on a more philosophical plan, with the English, German, and French synonymes as well as the Latin. In almost every instance the precise individual meaning might be given in an English or German word; whereas in Latin we must too often be contented with a mere general and inclusive term. How indeed can it be otherwise, when we attempt to render the most copious language of the world, the most admirable for the fineness of its distinctions, into one of the poorest and most vague languages? Especially, when we reflect on the comparative number of the works, still extant, written while the Greek and Latin were living languages. Were I asked what I deemed the greatest and most unmixed benefit, which a wealthy individual, or an association of wealthy individuals could bestow on their country and on mankind, I should not hesitate to answer, "a philosophical English dictionary; with the Greek, Latin, German, French, Spanish and Italian synonymes, and with correspondent indexes." That the learned languages might thereby be acquired, better, in half the time, is but a part, and not the most important part, of the advantages which would accrue

* [This is one of the many literary projects and promises of Mr. Coleridge that were never fulfilled. S. C.]

habitants. On *its* ridges the common sun is born and departs. From *them* the stars rise, and touching *them* they vanish. By the many, even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to penetrate. To the multitude below these vapours appear, now as the dark haunts of terrific agents, on which none may intrude with impunity; and now all a-glow, with colours not their own, they are gazed at as the splendid palaces of happiness and power. But in all ages there have been a few, who measuring and sounding the rivers of the vale at the feet of their furthest inaccessible falls have learned, that the sources must be far higher and far inward; a few, who even in the level streams have detected elements, which neither the vale itself nor the surrounding mountains contained or could supply.³ How and whence to these thoughts, these strong probabilities, the ascertaining vision, the intuitive knowledge may finally supervene, can be learnt only by the fact. I might oppose to the question the words with which⁴ Plotinus supposes Nature to answer a similar

from such a work. O! if it should be permitted by Providence, that without detriment to freedom and independence our government might be enabled to become more than a committee for war and revenue! There was a time, when every thing was to be done by Government. Have we not flown off to the contrary extreme?

³ April, 1825. If I did not see it with my own eyes, I should not believe that I had been guilty of so many hydrostatic *Bulls* as bellow in this unhappy allegory or string of metaphors! How a river was to travel *up* hill from a vale far *inward*, over the intervening mountains, Morpheus, the Dream weaver, can alone unriddle. I am ashamed and humbled. S. T. Coleridge.

⁴ Ennead, III. 8. 3. The force of the Greek *συνιέναι* is im

difficulty. "Should any one interrogate her, how she works, if graciously she vouchsafe to listen and speak, she will reply, it behoves thee not to disquiet me with interrogatories, but to understand in silence, even as I am silent, and work without words."⁵

Likewise in the fifth book of the fifth Ennead, speaking of the highest and intuitive knowledge as distinguished from the discursive, or in the language of Wordsworth,

"The vision and the faculty divine;"⁶

he says: "it is not lawful to inquire from whence it

perfectly expressed by "understand;" our own idiomatic phrase "to go along with me" comes nearest to it. The passage, that follows, full of profound sense, appears to me evidently corrupt; and in fact no writer more wants, better deserves, or is less likely to obtain, a new and more correct edition.—τί οὖν συνιέναι; ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον ἐστὶ θεάμα ἐμὸν, σιώπησις (*mallet, θεάμα, ἐμοῦ σιωπῶσῆς,*) καὶ φύσει γενόμενον θεώρημα, καὶ μοι γενομένη ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ὠδῆ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρκει. (*mallet, καὶ μοι ἡ γενομένη ἐκ θεωρίας αὐτῆς ὠδῆς*). "What then are we to understand? That whatever is produced is an intuition, I silent; and that, which is thus generated, is by its nature a theorem, or form of contemplation; and the birth, which results to me from this contemplation, attains to have a contemplative nature." So Synesius:

Ὁδῆς ἱερὰ,
"Ἀρρητα γονά*

The after comparison of the process of the *natura naturans* with that of the geometrician is drawn from the very heart of philosophy.

⁵ [Καὶ εἴ τις δὲ αὐτὴν ἔροιτο τίνος ἔνεκα ποιῆ, εἰ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἐθέλοι ἐπαίειν καὶ λέγειν, εἴποι ἄν· ἐχρῆν μὲν μὴ ἐρωτᾶν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σιωπῆ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σιωπῶ, καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι λέγειν. Ennead. III. 8. 3. *in initio*, p. 634 of Creuzer's edition. S. C.]

⁶ [Poet. Works. vi. p. 6. The Excursion, book I. S. C.]

* [Hymn. Tert. v. 226. S. C.]

sprang, as if it were a thing subject to place and motion, for it neither approached hither, nor again departs from hence to some other place; but it either appears to us or it does not appear. So that we ought not to pursue it with a view of detecting its secret source, but to watch in quiet till it suddenly shines upon us; preparing ourselves for the blessed spectacle as the eye waits patiently for the rising sun.”⁷ They and they only can acquire the philosophic imagination, the sacred power of self-intuition, who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, that the wings of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar; those only, who feel in their own spirits the same instinct, which impels the chrysalis of the horned fly to leave room in its *involucrum* for *antennæ* yet to come. They know and feel, that the potential works in them, even as the actual works on them! In short, all the organs of sense are framed for a corresponding world of sense; and we have it. All the organs of spirit are framed for a correspondent world of spirit: though the latter organs are not developed in all alike. But they exist in all, and their first appearance discloses itself in the moral being. How else could it be, that even worldlings, not wholly debased, will contemplate the man of simple and disinterested goodness with contradictory feelings of pity

⁷ [“Ὡστε ἀπορεῖν ὅθεν ἐφάνη, ἔξωθεν ἢ ἔνδον, καὶ ἀπελθόντος εἰπεῖν, ἔνδον ἄρα ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἔνδον αὐ· ἢ (οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν, πόθεν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πόθεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἔρχεται, οὔτε ἄπεισιν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται· διὸ οὐ χρὴ διώκειν, ἀλλ’ ἡσυχῇ μένειν, ἕως ἂν φανῇ, παρασκευάσαντα ἑαυτὸν θεατὴν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνατολᾶς ἡλίου περιμένει,) ὁ δὲ ὑπερφανεὶς τοῦ ὀρίζοντος, ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί, ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν θεάσασθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν. Enn. V. 5. 8. Ed.] P. 975 of Creuzer’s edit.

The parentheses note the part of the passage quoted in the text. S. C.]

and respect? "Poor man! he is not made for *this* world." Oh! herein they utter a prophecy of universal fulfilment; for man must either rise or sink.

It is the essential mark of the true philosopher to rest satisfied with no imperfect light, as long as the impossibility of attaining a fuller knowledge has not been demonstrated. That the common consciousness itself will furnish proofs by its own direction, that it is connected with master-currents below the surface, I shall merely assume as a postulate *pro tempore*. This having been granted, though but in expectation of the argument, I can safely deduce from it the equal truth of my former assertion, that philosophy cannot be intelligible to all, even of the most learned and cultivated classes. A system, the first principle of which it is to render the mind intuitive of the spiritual in man (*i. e.* of that which lies *on the other side* of our natural consciousness) must needs have a great obscurity for those, who have never disciplined and strengthened this ulterior consciousness. It must in truth be a land of darkness, a perfect *Anti-Goshen*, for men to whom the noblest treasures of their own being are reported only through the imperfect translation of lifeless and sightless motions. Perhaps, in great part, through words which are but the shadows of notions; even as the notional understanding itself is but the shadowy abstraction of living and actual truth. On the IMMEDIATE, which dwells in every man, and on the original intuition, or absolute affirmation of it, (which is likewise in every man, but does not in every man rise into consciousness) all the *certainty* of our knowledge depends; and this becomes intelligible to no man by the ministry of mere words from without. The medium, by which spirits understand each other, is not the surrounding air; but the *freedom* which

they possess in common, as the common ethereal element of their being, the tremulous reciprocations of which propagate themselves even to the inmost of the soul. Where the spirit of a man is not *filled* with the consciousness of freedom (were it only from its restlessness, as of one still struggling in bondage) all spiritual intercourse is interrupted, not only with others, but even with himself. No wonder then, that he remains incomprehensible to himself as well as to others. No wonder, that, in the fearful desert of his consciousness, he wearies himself out with empty words, to which no friendly echo answers, either from his own heart, or the heart of a fellow being; or bewilders himself in the pursuit of *notional* phantoms, the mere refractions from unseen and distant truths through the distorting medium of his own unenlivened and stagnant understanding! To remain unintelligible to such a mind, exclaims Schelling on a like occasion, is honour and a good name before God and man.

The history of philosophy (the same writer observes) contains instances of systems, which for successive generations have remained enigmatic. Such he deems the system of Leibnitz, whom another writer (rashly I think, and invidiously) extols as the *only* philosopher, who was himself deeply convinced of his own doctrines.⁸ As hitherto interpreted, however, they

⁸ [The observations of Schelling referred to here and in the previous paragraph are as follows:

“ A philosophy the first principle of which is to call forth to consciousness the spiritual in man, namely that which lies on the other side the consciousness, must needs have a great unintelligibility for those who have not exercised and strengthened this spiritual consciousness, or to whom even that in themselves, which is most excellent, is wont to appear only through dead

have not produced the effect, which Leibnitz himself, in a most instructive passage, describes as the criterion of a true philosophy; namely, that it would at once explain and collect the fragments of truth scattered through systems apparently the most incongruous. The truth, says he, is diffused more widely than is commonly believed; but it is often painted, yet oftener masked, and is sometimes mutilated and sometimes, alas! in close alliance with mischievous errors. The deeper, however, we penetrate into the ground of things, the more truth we discover in the doctrines of

intuitionless conceptions. The Immediate, which is in every one, and on the original intuition whereof, (which" [original intuition] "likewise is in every one, but comes not in every one to consciousness,) all certainty of our knowledge depends, is intelligible to no one through words, that pass into him from without. The medium, through which spirits understand one another, is not the surrounding air, but the common freedom, the vibrations whereof (*deren Erschütterungen*) propagate themselves even to the innermost part of the soul. When the spirit of a man is not filled with the consciousness of freedom, all spiritual connection is broken off, not only with others, but even with himself; no wonder that he remains unintelligible to himself as well as to others, and in his fearful solitude only wearies himself with empty words, to which no friendly echo—out of his own or another's breast—replies.

"To remain unintelligible to such a one is glory and honour before God and man.

"The history of philosophy contains examples of systems, which, for several centuries, have remained enigmatical. A philosopher whose principles are to solve all these riddles, declares lately of Leibnitz, that he is probably the only man, in the history of philosophy, who has attained conviction, the only man therefore who is right at bottom. This declaration is remarkable, because it shows that the time is come for understanding Leibnitz. For, as he has been hitherto understood, he is unintelligible, however right he may be at bottom." Transl. (*Abhandlungen zur Erläuter. des Id. der Wiss.*—Phil. Schrift. pp. 327-8.) S. C.]

the greater number of the philosophical sects. The want of *substantial* reality in the objects of the senses, according to the sceptics; the harmonies or numbers, the prototypes and ideas, to which the Pythagoreans and Platonists reduced all things; the ONE and ALL of Parmenides and Plotinus, without⁹ Spinozism; the

⁹ This is happily effected in three lines by Synesius, in his THIRD HYMN:

Ἐν καὶ Πάντα—(taken by itself) is *Spinozism*.

Ἐν δ' Ἀπαντων—a mere *Anima Mundi*.

Ἐν τε πρὸ πάντων—is mechanical Theism.*

But unite all three, and the result is the Theism of Saint Paul and Christianity.

Synesius was censured for his doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul; but never, that I can find, arraigned or deemed heretical for his Pantheism, though neither Giordano Bruno, nor Jacob Behmen ever avowed it more broadly.

Μύσας δὲ Νόος,
 Τά τε καὶ τὰ λέγει,
 Βυθὸν ἄρρητον
 Ἀμφιχορεύων.
 Σὺ τὸ τίκτον ἔφυς,
 Σὺ τὸ τικτόμενον·
 Σὺ τὸ φωτίζον,
 Σὺ τὸ λαμπόμενον·
 Σὺ τὸ φαινόμενον,
 Σὺ τὸ κρυπτόμενον
 Ἰδίαις ἀνγαῖς.
 Ἐν καὶ πάντα,
 Ἐν καθ' ἑαυτὸ,
 Καὶ διὰ πάντων.†

Pantheism is therefore not necessarily irreligious or heretical; though it may be taught atheistically. Thus Spinoza would agree with Synesius in calling God Φύσις ἐν Νοεροῖς, the *Nature*

* [Hymn. Tert. v. 180. S. C.]

† [Ibid. v. 187. S. C.]

necessary connection of things according to the Stoics, reconcilable with the spontaneity of the other schools; the vital-philosophy of the Cabalists and Hermetists, who assumed the universality of sensation; the substantial forms and *entelechies* of Aristotle and the schoolmen, together with the mechanical solution of all particular *phenomena* according to Democritus and the recent philosophers—all these we shall find united in one perspective central point, which shows regularity and a coincidence of all the parts in the very object, which from every other point of view must appear confused and distorted. The spirit of sectarianism has been hitherto our fault, and the cause of our failures. We have imprisoned our own conceptions by the lines, which we have drawn, in order to exclude the conceptions of others. *J'ai trouvé que la plupart des Sectes ont raison dans une bonne partie de ce qu'elles avancent, mais non pas tant en ce qu'elles nient.*¹⁰

A system, which aims to deduce the memory with all the other functions of intelligence, must of course place its first position from beyond the memory, and anterior to it, otherwise the principle of solution would be itself a part of the problem to be solved. Such a position therefore must, in the first instance be demanded, and the first question will be, by what right is it demanded? On this account I think it expedient to make some preliminary remarks on the introduction

in Intelligences; but he could not subscribe to the preceding *Νῶς καὶ νοερός*, i. e. Himself Intelligence and intelligent.

In this biographical sketch of my literary life I may be excused, if I mention here, that I had translated the eight Hymns of Synesius from the Greek into English Anacreontics before my fifteenth year.

¹⁰ [See Appendix P. S. C.]

of Postulates in philosophy.¹¹ The word *postulate* is borrowed from the science of mathematics.¹² In geometry the primary construction is not demonstrated, but postulated. This first and most simple construction in space is the point in motion, or the line. Whether the point is moved in one and the same direction, or whether its direction is continually changed, remains as yet undetermined. But if the direction of the point have been determined, it is either by a point without it, and then there arises the straight line which incloses no space; or the direction of the point is not determined by a point without it, and then it must flow back again on itself, that is, there arises a cyclical line, which does enclose a space. If the straight line be assumed as the positive, the cyclical is then the negation of the straight. It is a line, which at no point strikes out into the straight, but changes its direction continuously. But if the primary line be conceived as undetermined, and the straight line as determined throughout, then the cyclical is the third compounded of both. It is at once undetermined and determined; undetermined through any point without, and deter-

¹¹ [The following remarks, contained in this and the next two paragraphs, as far as the reference to Plotinus, are borrowed from Schelling, only a few words here and there being added or altered by Mr. Coleridge. See *Abhandlungen zur Erläuter. &c. Phil. Schrift.* pp. 329-30-31-32. Mr. C. has expanded the conclusion of the passage which in the German author stands thus: "Philosophy is to him a fabric of air, even as to one born deaf the most excellent theory of music if he knew not, or did not believe, that other men have a sense more than he, must seem a vain play with conceptions, which may have connection in itself indeed, but at bottom has absolutely no reality." Transl. S. C.]

¹² See Schell. *Abhandl. zur Erläuter. des Id. der Wissenschaftslehre.*

mined through itself. Geometry therefore supplies philosophy with the example of a primary intuition, from which every science that lays claim to *evidence* must take its commencement. The mathematician does not begin with a demonstrable proposition, but with an intuition, a practical idea.

But here an important distinction presents itself. Philosophy is employed on objects of the *inner* SENSE, and cannot, like geometry, appropriate to every construction a correspondent *outward* intuition. Nevertheless philosophy, if it is to arrive at evidence, must proceed from the most original construction, and the question then is, what is the most original construction or first productive act for the inner sense. The answer to this question depends on the direction which is given to the inner sense. But in philosophy the inner sense cannot have its direction determined by any outward object. To the original construction of the line I can be compelled by a line drawn before me on the slate or on sand. The stroke thus drawn is indeed not the line itself, but only the image or picture of the line. It is not from it, that we first learn to know the line; but, on the contrary, we bring this stroke to the original line generated by the act of the imagination; otherwise we could not define it as without breadth or thickness. Still however this stroke is the sensuous image of the original or ideal line, and an efficient mean to excite *every* imagination to the intuition of it.

It is demanded then, whether there be found any means in philosophy to determine the direction of the inner sense, as in mathematics it is determinable by its specific image or outward picture. Now the inner sense has its direction determined for the greater part only by an act of freedom. One man's consciousness

extends only to the pleasant or unpleasant sensations caused in him by external impressions; another enlarges his inner sense to a consciousness of forms and quantity; a third in addition to the image is conscious of the conception or notion of the thing; a fourth attains to a notion of his notions—he reflects on his own reflections; and thus we may say without impropriety, that the one possesses more or less inner sense, than the other. This more or less betrays already, that philosophy in its first principles must have a practical or moral, as well as a theoretical or speculative side. This difference in degree does not exist in the mathematics. Socrates in Plato shows, that an ignorant slave may be brought to understand and of himself to solve the most difficult geometrical problem. Socrates drew the figures for the slave in the sand. The disciples of the critical philosophy could likewise (as was indeed actually done by La Forge and some other followers of Des Cartes) represent the origin of our representations in copper-plates; but no one has yet attempted it, and it would be utterly useless. To an Esquimaux or New Zealander our most popular philosophy would be wholly unintelligible. The sense, the inward organ, for it is not yet born in him. So is there many a one among us, yes, and some who think themselves philosophers too, to whom the philosophic organ is entirely wanting. To such a man philosophy is a mere play of words and notions, like a theory of music to the deaf, or like the geometry of light to the blind. The connection of the parts and their logical dependencies may be seen and remembered; but the whole is groundless and hollow, unsustained by living contact, unaccompanied with any realizing intuition which exists by and in the act that affirms its existence, which is known, because it is, and is, because

it is known. The words of Plotinus, in the assumed person of Nature, hold true of the philosophic energy. *Τὸ θεωρῶν με, θεώρημα ποιῶ, ὡς περ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωρῶντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐμῶ μὴ γραφῆσης, θεωρήσης δὲ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαί.* With me the act of contemplation makes the thing contemplated, as the geometricians contemplating describe lines correspondent; but I not describing lines, but simply contemplating, the representative forms of things rise up into existence.¹²

The postulate of philosophy and at the same time the test of philosophic capacity, is no other than the heaven-descended KNOW THYSELF! (*E cælo descendit, Γνωθι σεαυτόν*). And this at once practically and speculatively. For as philosophy is neither a science of the reason or understanding only, nor merely a science of morals, but the science of BEING altogether, its primary ground can be neither merely speculative nor merely practical, but both in one. All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a subject.¹³ (My readers have been warned in a former chapter

¹² [Καὶ εἴ τις δὲ αὐτὴν ἔροιτο τίνος ἔνεκα ποιῶ, εἰ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἔθέλοι ἐπαίειν καὶ λέγειν, εἴποι ἂν· ἐχρῆν μὲν μὴ ἐρωτᾶν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σιωπῆ, ὡς περ ἐγὼ σιωπῶ, καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι λέγειν. Τί οὖν συνιέναι; ὅτι τὸ γενόμενόν ἐστι θέαμα ἐμὸν, σιώπησις, καὶ φύσει γενόμενον θεώρημα, καὶ μοι γενομένη ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ὡδὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μου, θεώρημα ποιῶ, ὡς περ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ μὴ γραφῆσης, θεωρούσης δὲ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαί, ὡς περ ἐκπίπτουσαι· καὶ μοι τὸ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῶν γειναμένων ὑπάρχει πάθος. Enn. III. 8. 3. Ed. P. 634, of Creuzer's Edit. S. C.]

¹³ [This sentence and, with the exception of the parenthesis immediately succeeding it, all that follows, as far as the words "mechanism of the heavenly motions," is to be found in Schelling's *Transc. Id.* pp. 1-4: but a few explanatory expressions are added, and some sentences are a little altered and differently arranged. S. C.]

that, for their convenience as well as the writer's, the term, subject, is used by me in its scholastic sense as equivalent to mind or sentient being, and as the necessary correlative of object or *quicquid obicitur menti.*) For we can *know* that only which is true: and the truth is universally placed in the coincidence of the thought with the thing, of the representation with the object represented.

Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE, we will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the *phænomena* by which its existence is made known to us. On the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name of the SELF OR INTELLIGENCE. Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis. Intelligence is conceived of as exclusively representative, nature as exclusively represented; the one as conscious, the other as without consciousness. Now in all acts of positive knowledge there is required a reciprocal concurrence of both, namely of the conscious being, and of that which is in itself unconscious. Our problem is to explain this concurrence, its possibility and its necessity.

During the act of knowledge itself, the objective and subjective are so instantly united, that we cannot determine to which of the two the priority belongs. There is here no first, and no second; both are instantaneous and one. While I am attempting to explain this intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved. I must necessarily set out from the one, to which therefore I give hypothetical antecedence, in order to arrive at the other. But as there are but two factors or elements in the problem, subject and object, and as it is left indeterminate from which of them I should commence, there are two cases equally possible.

I. EITHER THE OBJECTIVE IS TAKEN AS THE

FIRST, AND THEN WE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SUPERVENTION OF THE SUBJECTIVE, WHICH CO-ALESCES WITH IT.

The notion of the subjective is not contained in the notion of the objective. On the contrary they mutually exclude each other. The subjective therefore must supervene to the objective. The conception of nature does not apparently involve the co-presence of an intelligence making an ideal duplicate of it, that is, representing it. This desk for instance would (according to our natural notions) be, though there should exist no sentient being to look at it. This then is the problem of natural philosophy. It assumes the objective or unconscious nature as the first, and has therefore to explain how intelligence can supervene to it, or how itself can grow into intelligence. If it should appear, that all enlightened naturalists, without having distinctly proposed the problem to themselves, have yet constantly moved in the line of its solution, it must afford a strong presumption that the problem itself is founded in nature.¹⁴ For if all knowledge has, as it were, two poles reciprocally required and presupposed, all sciences must proceed from the one or the other, and must tend toward the opposite as far as the equatorial point in which both are reconciled and become identical. The necessary tendence therefore of all natural philosophy is from nature to intelligence; and this, and no other is the true ground and occasion of the instinctive striving to introduce theory into our views of natural *phænomena*. The highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualization of all the laws of nature into laws of in-

¹⁴ [Schelling's words correspondent to this last sentence are these. "That the science of Nature at least approximates to the solution of the problem really—and without knowing it—can be only briefly shown here." *Transl. Ib.* p. 3. S. C.]

tuition and intellect. The *phænomena* (*the material*) must wholly disappear, and the laws alone (*the formal*) must remain. Thence it comes, that in nature itself the more the principle of law breaks forth, the more does the *husk* drop off, the *phænomena* themselves become more spiritual and at length cease altogether in our consciousness. The optical *phænomena* are but a geometry, the lines of which are drawn by light, and the materiality of this light itself has already become matter of doubt. In the appearances of magnetism all trace of matter is lost, and of the *phænomena* of gravitation, which not a few among the most illustrious Newtonians¹⁵ have declared no otherwise comprehensible than as an immediate spiritual influence, there remains nothing but its law, the execution of which on a vast scale is the mechanism of the heavenly motions.¹⁶ The theory of natural philosophy

¹⁵ ["Which searchers of Nature themselves thought it only possible to conceive, &c." Schelling, *Ib.* p. 4. S. C.]

¹⁶ [After "the mechanism of the heavenly motions," Schelling proceeds thus.—"The perfected theory of nature would be that, in virtue of which all nature should resolve itself into an intelligence. *The dead and unconscious products of Nature are only abortive attempts of Nature to reflect herself; but the so named DEAD nature in general is an unripe intelligence; thence through her PHENOMENA, even while yet unconscious, the intelligent character discovers itself.*" The sentence in italics is omitted by Mr. C. who says of it, in a note: "True or false this position is too early. Nothing precedent has explained, much less proved, it true." "The highest aim, to become completely an object to self, Nature first attains through the highest and last reflection, which is no other than man, or that which we commonly call reason, through which Nature first returns completely into herself, and whereby it becomes evident, that Nature originally is identical with that which is known in us as intelligence and consciousness."]]

"This may suffice to show that the knowledge of Nature necessarily tends to represent Nature as intelligent; it is pre-

would then be completed, when all nature was demonstrated to be identical in essence with that, which in its highest known power exists in man as intelligence and self-consciousness; when the heavens and the earth shall declare not only the power of their maker, but the glory and the presence of their God, even as he appeared to the great prophet during the vision of the mount in the skirts of his divinity.

This may suffice to show, that even natural science, which commences with the material *phænomenon* as the reality and substance of things existing, does yet by the necessity of theorizing unconsciously, and as it were instinctively, end in nature as an intelligence;

cisely through this tendency that it becomes Nature-Philosophy, which is the one necessary ground-knowledge of philosophy."

The substance of the foregoing paragraphs is contained in pp. 261-3 of the *Biographia*, with some additions. Then after the second statement of the problem, which is given *verbatim* from Schelling by Mr. C., and, after six paragraphs which he omits, the *Transfc. Id.* proceeds as follows: "As the natural philosopher, whose attention is directed solely to the objective, seeks to prevent nothing so much as the blending of the subjective in his knowledge, so, conversely, the Transcendental philosopher (objects to nothing so much) as any admixture of the objective in the pure subjective principle of knowledge. The means of separation is absolute scepticism—not the half sort, directed only against the common prejudices of men, which yet never sees into the ground; but the comprehensive scepticism, which is aimed not against single prejudices, but against the fundamental prejudice, with which all others must fall of themselves. For beside the artificial prejudices, introduced into man, there are others, far more original, planted in him not by instruction or art, but by Nature herself; which with all but the philosopher, stand for the principles of all knowledge, and by the mere self-thinker are even considered the touchstone of all truth." *Transfc. Id.* p. 8. Transl. The substance of this passage the reader will find in the paragraph of the B. L. beginning with the words: "In the pursuit of these sciences," pp. 263-4. S. C.]

and by this tendency the science of nature becomes finally natural philosophy, the one of the two poles of fundamental science.

2. OR THE SUBJECTIVE IS TAKEN AS THE FIRST, AND THE PROBLEM THEN IS, HOW THERE SUPERVENES TO IT A COINCIDENT OBJECTIVE.

In the pursuit of these sciences, our success in each, depends on an austere and faithful adherence to its own principles with a careful separation and exclusion of those, which appertain to the opposite science. As the natural philosopher, who directs his views to the objective, avoids above all things the intermixture of the subjective in his knowledge, as for instance, arbitrary suppositions or rather suffictions, occult qualities, spiritual agents, and the substitution of final for efficient causes ; so on the other hand, the transcendental or intelligential philosopher is equally anxious to preclude all interpolation of the objective into the subjective principles of his science, as for instance the assumption of impresses or configurations in the brain, correspondent to miniature pictures on the *retina* painted by rays of light from supposed originals, which are not the immediate and real objects of vision, but deductions from it for the purposes of explanation. This purification of the mind is effected by an absolute and scientific scepticism, to which the mind voluntarily determines itself for the specific purpose of future certainty. Des Cartes who (in his meditations) himself first, at least of the moderns, gave a beautiful example of this voluntary doubt, this self-determined indetermination, happily expresses its utter difference from the scepticism of vanity or irreligion : *Nec tamen in eo Scepticos imitabar, qui dubitant tantum ut dubitent, et præter incertitudinem ipsam nihil quærunt. Nam contra totus in eo eram ut aliquid certi reperi-*

*rem.*¹⁷ Nor is it less distinct in its motives and final aim, than in its proper objects, which are not as in ordinary scepticism the prejudices of education and circumstance, but those original and innate prejudices which nature herself has planted in all men, and which to all but the philosopher are the first principles of knowledge, and the final test of truth.

¹⁸ Now these essential prejudices are all reducible to the one fundamental presumption, THAT THERE EXIST THINGS WITHOUT US. As this on the one hand originates, neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet on the other hand remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments (*naturam furca expellas tamen usque redibit*;) on the one hand lays claim to IMMEDIATE certainty as a position at once indemonstrable and irresistible, and yet on the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay even in opposition to ourselves, leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of our immediate consciousness; (in other words how that, which *ex hypothesi* is and continues to be extrinsic and alien to our being, should become a modification of our being) the philosopher therefore compels himself to treat this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural, but still a prejudice.

¹⁹ The other position, which not only claims but necessitates the admission of its immediate certainty,

¹⁷ Des Cartes, *Diss. de Methodo*. [Sect. III. Amstel. 1664, p. 16. S. C.]

¹⁸ [The contents of this paragraph are to be found in the *Transf. Id.* pp. 8, 9, only the second sentence in brackets "in other words, &c." being interpolated. S. C.]

¹⁹ [The passages from which this paragraph is taken stand thus in Schelling: *ib.* pp. 9-10. "The contradiction, that a position, which, by its own nature, cannot be immediately certain,

equally for the scientific reason of the philosopher as for the common sense of mankind at large, namely, I AM, cannot so properly be entitled a prejudice. It is groundless indeed; but then in the very idea it precludes all ground, and separated from the immediate consciousness loses its whole sense and import. It is groundless; but only because it is itself the ground of all other certainty. Now the apparent contradiction, that the former position, namely, the existence of things without us, which from its nature cannot be immediately certain, should be received as blindly and as independently of all grounds as the existence of our own being, the Transcendental philosopher can solve only by the supposition, that the former is unconsciously involved in the latter; that it is not only coherent but identical, and one and the same thing with our own immediate self consciousness. To demonstrate this identity is the office and object of his philosophy.

²⁰ If it be said, that this is idealism, let it be remem-

is nevertheless so blindly, and groundlessly received as such, the Transcendental philosopher can only solve by presuming that the aforesaid position, hiddenly and hitherto unperceivedly, does not (merely) cohere, but is identical—one and the same—with an immediate consciousness; and to demonstrate this identity will be the peculiar business of Transcendental philosophy.”

“Now for the common use of reason there is nothing immediately certain but the position *I am*, which, because out of immediate consciousness it even loses its meaning, is the most individual of all truths, and the absolute prejudice, which must be assumed in the first place if anything else is to have certainty. Consequently the position, *There are things without us*, for the Transcendental philosopher will only be certain through its identity with the position *I am*, and its certainty will only be equal to the certainty of the position from which it borrows its own.” Transl. S. C.]

²⁰ [For the contents of this paragraph as far as the words “mechanical philosophy,” see *Abhandlungen Phil. Schrift.* pp.

bered that it is only so far idealism, as it is at the same time, and on that very account, the truest and most binding realism. For wherein does the realism of mankind properly consist? In the assertion that there exists a something without them, what, or how, or where they know not, which occasions the objects of their perception? Oh no! This is neither con-natural nor universal. It is what a few have taught and learned in the schools, and which the many repeat without asking themselves concerning their own meaning. The realism common to all mankind is far elder and lies infinitely deeper than this hypothetical explanation of the origin of our perceptions, an explanation skimmed from the mere surface of mechanical philosophy. It is the table itself, which the man of common sense believes himself to see, not the phantom of a table, from which he may argumentatively deduce the reality of a table, which he does not see. If to destroy the reality of all, that we actually behold, be idealism, what can be more egregiously so, than the system of modern metaphysics, which banishes us to

273-4. Compare also the first sentence with the *Transsc. Id.* pp. 148-9. "Thence the improper Idealism, that is, a system which converts all knowledge into mere appearance, must be that which takes away all immediateness in our perceptions by placing originals out of us independent of our representations; whereas a system, which seeks the origin of things in the activity of the spirit, even because it is the most perfect Idealism, must at the same time be the most perfect Realism. That is to say, if the most perfect Realism is that which knows the things in themselves and immediately, this is possible only in a Nature, which beholds in the things only her own, through her own activity limited, Reality. For such a Nature, as the indwelling soul of the things, would penetrate them as her own immediate organism: and, even as the artificer most perfectly knows his own work, would look through their inner mechanism." Transl. S. C.]

a land of shadows, surrounds us with apparitions, and distinguishes truth from illusion only by the majority of those who dream the same dream? “*I* asserted that the world was mad,” exclaimed poor Lee, “and the world said, that I was mad, and confound them, they outvoted me.”

²¹It is to the true and original realism, that I would direct the attention. This believes and requires neither more nor less, than that the object which it beholds or presents to itself, is the real and very object. In this sense, however much we may strive against it, we are all collectively born idealists, and therefore and only therefore are we at the same time realists. But of this the philosophers of the schools know nothing, or despise the faith as the prejudice of the ignorant vulgar, because they live and move in a crowd of phrases and notions from which human nature has long ago vanished. Oh, ye that reverence yourselves, and walk humbly with the divinity in your own hearts, ye are worthy of a better philosophy! Let the dead bury the dead, but do you preserve your human nature, the depth of which was never yet fathomed by a philosophy made up of notions and mere logical entities.

In the third treatise of my *Logosophia*, announced at the end of this volume, I shall give (*Deo volente*) the demonstrations and constructions of the Dynamic Philosophy scientifically arranged. It is, according to my conviction, no other than the system of Pythagoras and of Plato revived and purified from impure mixtures. *Doctrina per tot manus tradita tandem*

²¹ [This paragraph is contained in *Abhandlungen*, Phil. Schrift, pp. 274-5. Compare also with *Ideen*, pp. 63-4. In the latter (p. 64), Schelling affirms—“Nature must be visible spirit, spirit invisible nature. Here then in the absolute identity of the spirit in us, and of nature out of us, must the problem, how a nature without us is possible, be solved.” S. C.]

*in vappam desiit!*²² The science of arithmetic furnishes instances, that a rule may be useful in practical application, and for the particular purpose may be sufficiently authenticated by the result, before it has itself been fully demonstrated. It is enough, if only it be rendered intelligible. This will, I trust, have been effected in the following Theses for those of my readers, who are willing to accompany me through the following chapter, in which the results will be applied to the deduction of the Imagination, and with it the principles of production and of genial criticism in the fine arts.

THESIS I.²³

Truth is correlative to being. Knowledge without a correspondent reality is no knowledge; if we know, there must be somewhat known by us. To know is in its very essence a verb active.

THESIS II.

All truth is either mediate, that is, derived from some other truth or truths; or immediate and original. The latter is absolute, and its formula A. A.; the former is of dependent or conditional certainty, and represented in the formula B. A. The certainty, which inheres in A, is attributable to B.

SCHOLIUM. A chain without a staple, from which all the links derived their stability, or a series without a first, has been not inaptly allegorized, as a string of blind men, each holding the skirt of the man before

²² [This quotation is applied by Schelling to Leibnitz in the same treatise. *Phil. Schrift.* p. 212. S. C.]

²³ [It has been said that these first six *Theses* are "mainly taken from Schelling." I can give no references to the works of that philosopher for any of the sentences as they stand. The reader, however, may compare the beginning of Thesis IV. with the *Transfc. Id.* p. 48; and the beginning of Thesis V. with the same, p. 49. S. C.]

him, reaching far out of sight, but all moving without the least deviation in one straight line. It would be naturally taken for granted, that there was a guide at the head of the file: what if it were answered, No! Sir, the men are without number, and infinite blindness supplies the place of sight?

Equally *inconceivable* is a cycle of equal truths without a common and central principle, which prescribes to each its proper sphere in the system of science. That the absurdity does not so immediately strike us, that it does not seem equally *unimaginable*, is owing to a surreptitious act of the imagination, which, instinctively and without our noticing the same, not only fills up the intervening spaces, and contemplates the *cycle* (of B. C. D. E. F. &c.) as a continuous *circle* (A.) giving to all collectively the unity of their common orbit; but likewise supplies, by a sort of *subintelligitur*, the one central power, which renders the movement harmonious and cyclical.

THESIS III.

We are to seek therefore for some absolute truth capable of communicating to other positions a certainty, which it has not itself borrowed; a truth self-grounded, unconditional and known by its own light. In short, we have to find a somewhat which *is*, simply because it *is*. In order to be such, it must be one which is its own predicate, so far at least that all other nominal predicates must be modes and repetitions of itself. Its existence too must be such, as to preclude the possibility of requiring a cause or antecedent without an absurdity.

THESIS IV.

That there can be but one such principle,²⁴ may be

²⁴ [See note 29. S. C.]

proved *a priori*; for were there two or more, each must refer to some other, by which its equality is affirmed; consequently neither would be self-established, as the hypothesis demands. And *a posteriori*, it will be proved by the principle itself when it is discovered, as involving universal antecedence in its very conception.

SCHOLIUM. If we affirm of a board that it is blue, the predicate (blue) is accidental, and not implied in the subject, board. If we affirm of a circle that it is equi-radial, the predicate indeed is implied in the definition of the subject; but the existence of the subject itself is contingent, and supposes both a cause and a percipient. The same reasoning will apply to the indefinite number of supposed indemonstrable truths exempted from the profane approach of philosophic investigation by the amiable Beattie, and other less eloquent and not more profound inaugurators of common sense on the throne of philosophy; a fruitless attempt, were it only that it is the two-fold function of philosophy to reconcile reason with common sense, and to elevate common sense into reason.

THESIS V.

Such a principle cannot be any THING or OBJECT. Each thing is what it is in consequence of some other thing. An infinite, independent²⁵ *thing*, is no less a contradiction, than an infinite circle or a sideless triangle. Besides a thing is that, which is capable of

²⁵ The impossibility of an absolute thing (*substantia unica*) as neither *genus*, *species*, nor *individuum*: as well as its utter unfitness for the fundamental position of a philosophic system, will be demonstrated in the critique on Spinozism in the fifth treatise of my Logosophia. [This is the great philosophical work, to preparations for which Mr. C. devoted so much time and thought during his latter years. S. C.]

being an object of which itself is not the sole percipient. But an object is inconceivable without a subject as its antithesis. *Omne perceptum percipientem supponit.*

But neither can the principle be found in a subject as a subject, contra-distinguished from an object: for *unicuique percipienti aliquid objicitur perceptum.* It is to be found therefore neither in object nor subject taken separately, and consequently, as no other third is conceivable, it must be found in that which is neither subject nor object exclusively, but which is the identity of both.

THESIS VI.

This principle, and so characterised manifests itself in the SUM or I AM; which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self, and self-consciousness. In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, each involving and supposing the other.²⁶ In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject. It may be described therefore as a perpetual self-duplication of one and the same power into object and subject, which presuppose each other, and can exist only as *antitheses.*

²⁶ ["The I is nothing separate from its thinking;—the thinking of the I and the I itself are absolutely one; the I therefore in general is nothing out of thinking, consequently no thing, no matter, but to all infinity the non-objective. The I is certainly an object, but only for itself; it is not therefore originally in the world of objects. It first becomes an object by making itself an object, and it becomes an object not for something without, but ever for itself alone." — *Transc. Id.* Transl. pp. 47-8. S. C.]

SCHOLIUM. If a man be asked how he *knows* that he is? he can only answer, *sum quia sum*. But if (the absoluteness of this certainty having been admitted) he be again asked, how he, the individual person, came to be, then in relation to the ground of his *existence*, not to the ground of his *knowledge* of that existence, he might reply, *sum quia Deus est*, or still more philosophically, *sum quia in Deo sum*.

But if we elevate our conception to the absolute self, the great eternal I AM, then the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality; the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are absolutely identical, *Sum quia sum*; ²⁷ I

²⁷ It is most worthy of notice, that in the first revelation of himself, not confined to individuals; indeed in the very first revelation of his absolute being, Jehovah at the same time revealed the fundamental truth of all philosophy, which must either commence with the absolute, or have no fixed commencement; that is, cease to be philosophy. I cannot but express my regret, that in the equivocal use of the word *that*, for *in that*, or *because*, our admirable version has rendered the passage susceptible of a degraded interpretation in the mind of common readers or hearers, as if it were a mere reproof to an impertinent question, I am what I am, which might be equally affirmed of himself by any existent being.

The Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum** is objectionable, because either the *Cogito* is used *extra gradum*, and then it is involved in the *sum* and is tautological; or it is taken as a particular mode or dignity, and then it is subordinated to the *sum* as the *species* to the *genus*, or rather as a particular modification to the subject modified; and not pre-ordinated as the arguments seem to require. For *Cogito* is *Sum Cogitans*. This is clear by the inevidence of the converse. *Cogitat, ergo est* is true, because it is a mere application of the logical rule: *Quicquid in genere est,*

* [*Principia Philosophiæ*. Pars Prima, ppgh. VI. and X. See also *De Methodo*, IV. pp. 18-19, edit. 1664. S. C.]

am, because I affirm myself to be; I affirm myself to be, because I am.

THESIS VII.²⁸

If then I know myself only through myself, it is contradictory to require any other predicate of self, but that of self-consciousness. Only in the self-consciousness of a spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation; for herein consists the

est et in specie. Est (cogitans), ergo est. It is a cherry tree; therefore it is a tree. But, *est ergo cogitat*, is illogical: for *quod est in specie, non NECESSARIO in genere est.* It may be true. I hold it to be true, that *quicquid vere est, est per veram sui affirmationem*; but it is a derivative, not an immediate truth. Here then we have, by anticipation, the distinction between the conditional finite I (which, as known in distinct consciousness by occasion of experience, is called by Kant's followers the empirical I) and the absolute I AM, and likewise the dependence or rather the inherence of the former in the latter; in whom "we live, and move, and have our being," as St. Paul divinely asserts, differing widely from the Theists of the mechanic school (as Sir J. Newton, Locke, and others) who must say from whom we had our being, and with it life and the powers of life.

²⁸ [The contents of Theses VII. VIII. may be found scattered about in Schelling's *Abhandlungen* Phil. Schrift. 223-4-5. Only the sentences at the end of Thesis VII. from "Again, the spirit" to the end, I do not find formally expressed in Schelling's treatise, with the exception of the words "identity of object and subject." At pp. 223-4 Schelling says, "In regard to every other object I am obliged to ask how the being of the same is brought into connection (*vermittelt*) with my representation. But originally I am not any thing that exists for a knowing subject, out of myself, as matter does, but I exist for myself; in me is the original identity of subject and object, of knowing and of being." See also how this doctrine is applied in the TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, p. 63.

The last sentence of Thesis VIII. I have not met with in Schelling. S. C.]

essence of a spirit, that it is self-representative. If therefore this be the one only immediate truth, in the certainty of which the reality of our collective knowledge is grounded, it must follow that the spirit in all the objects which it views, views only itself. If this could be proved, the immediate reality of all intuitive knowledge would be assured. It has been shown, that a spirit is that, which is its own object, yet not originally an object, but an absolute subject for which all, itself included, may become an object. It must therefore be an ACT; for every object is, as an *object*, dead, fixed, incapable in itself of any action, and necessarily finite. Again the spirit (originally the identity of object and subject) must in some sense dissolve this identity, in order to be conscious of it: *fit alter et idem*. But this implies an act, and it follows therefore that intelligence or self-consciousness is impossible, except by and in a will. The self-conscious spirit therefore is a will; and freedom must be assumed as a *ground* of philosophy, and can never be deduced from it.

THESIS VIII.

Whatever in its origin is objective, is likewise as such necessarily finite. Therefore, since the spirit is not originally an object, and as the subject exists in *antithesis* to an object, the spirit cannot originally be finite. But neither can it be a subject without becoming an object, and, as it is originally the identity of both, it can be conceived neither as infinite nor finite exclusively, but as the most original union of both. In the existence, in the reconciling, and the recurrence of this contradiction consists the process and mystery of production and life.

THESIS IX.

This *principium commune essendi et cognoscendi*, as subsisting in a WILL, or primary ACT of self-duplication, is the mediate or indirect principle of every science; but it is the immediate and direct principle of the ultimate science alone, i. e. of transcendental philosophy alone. For it must be remembered, that all these Theses refer solely to one of the two Polar Sciences, namely, to that which commences with, and rigidly confines itself within, the subjective, leaving the objective (as far as it is exclusively objective) to natural philosophy, which is its opposite pole. In its very idea therefore as a systematic knowledge of our collective KNOWING, (*scientia scientiæ*) it involves the necessity of some one highest principle of knowing, as at once the source and the accompanying form in all particular acts of intellect and perception.²⁹ This, it has been shown, can be found only in the act and evolution of self-consciousness. We are not investigating an absolute *principium essendi*; for then, I admit, many valid objections might be started against our theory; but an absolute *principium cognoscendi*.³⁰ The result of both the sciences, or their equatorial point, would be the principle of a total and undivided philosophy, as, for prudential reasons, I have chosen to anticipate in the *Scholium* to *Thesis* VI. and the note subjoined. In other words, philosophy would

²⁹ [Schelling says in the *Transfc. Id.* pp. 25-6 that, "if there is a system of knowledge the principle of the same must lie within the *knowing* itself:" that "this principle can be the only one" and that it is the "mediate or indirect principle of the science of knowing or transcendental philosophy." S. C.]

³⁰ [This sentence "We are not investigating," &c. is in the *Transfc. Id.* p. 27. S. C.]

pass into religion, and religion become inclusive of philosophy. We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in GOD.

THESIS X.³¹

The transcendental philosopher does not inquire, what ultimate ground of our knowledge there may lie out of our knowing, but what is the last in our knowing itself, beyond which *we* cannot pass. The principle of our knowing is sought within the sphere of our knowing. It must be something therefore, which can itself be known. It is asserted only, that the act of self-consciousness is for *us* the source and principle of all *our* possible knowledge. Whether abstracted

³¹ [Thesis X. as far as the words "farthest that exist for us" is taken from pp. 27-28 of the Transcendental Idealism;—the remainder of the second paragraph, as far as the words "will or intelligence" from p. 29, with the exception of some explanatory sentences. Schelling's words in the last passage from which Mr. Coleridge has borrowed, are as follows: "To go yet further, it may be shown, and has already been shown in part (Introd. § 1.) that even when the objective is arbitrarily placed as the first, still we never go beyond self-consciousness. We are then in our explanations either driven back into the infinite, from the grounded to the ground; or we must arbitrarily break off the series by setting up an Absolute, which of itself is cause and effect—subject and object; and since this originally is possible only through self-consciousness—by again putting a self-consciousness as a First; this takes place in natural philosophy, for which Being is not more original than it is for Transcendental philosophy, and which places the Reality in an Absolute, which is of itself cause and effect—in the absolute identity of the subjective and objective which we name Nature, and which again in its highest power is no other than self-consciousness." Transl. S. C.]

from us there exists any thing higher and beyond this primary self-knowing, which is for us the form of all our knowing, must be decided by the result.

That the self-consciousness is the fixed point, to which for *us* all is mortised and annexed, needs no further proof. But that the self-consciousness may be the modification of a higher form of being, perhaps of a higher consciousness, and this again of a yet higher, and so on in an infinite *regressus*; in short, that self-consciousness may be itself something explicable into something, which must lie beyond the possibility of our knowledge, because the whole *synthesis* of our intelligence is first formed in and through the self-consciousness, does not at all concern us as transcendental philosophers. For to us the self-consciousness is not a kind of *being*, but a kind of *knowing*, and that too the highest and farthest that exists for *us*. It may however be shown, and has in part already been shown in pages 258, 259, that even when the Objective is assumed as the first, we yet can never pass beyond the principle of self-consciousness. Should we attempt it, we must be driven back from ground to ground, each of which would cease to be a ground the moment we pressed on it. We must be whirled down the gulf of an infinite series. But this would make our reason baffle the end and purpose of all reason, namely, unity and system. Or we must break off the series arbitrarily, and affirm an absolute something that is in and of itself at once cause and effect (*causa sui*) subject and object, or rather the absolute identity of both. But as this is inconceivable, except in a self-consciousness, it follows, that even as natural philosophers we must arrive at the same principle from which as transcendental philosophers we set out; that is, in a self-consciousness in which the *principium essendi*

does not stand to the *principium cognoscendi* in the relation of cause to effect, but both the one and the other are co-inherent and identical. Thus the true system of natural philosophy places the sole reality of things in an ABSOLUTE, which is at once *causa sui et effectus*, πατήρ αὐτοπάτωρ, υἱὸς ἑαυτῆ—in the absolute identity of subject and object, which it calls nature, and which in its highest power is nothing else but self-conscious will or intelligence. In this sense the position of Malebranche,³² that we see all things in God, is a strict philosophical truth; and equally true is the assertion of Hobbes, of Hartley, and of their masters in ancient Greece, that all real knowledge supposes a prior sensation. For sensation itself is but vision nascent, not the cause of intelligence, but intelligence itself revealed as an earlier power in the process of self-construction.

Μάκαρ, ἴλαθί μοι·
 Πάτερ, ἴλαθί μοι
 Εἰ παρὰ κόσμον,
 Εἰ παρὰ μῶραν
 Τῶν σῶν ἔθιγον!³³

Bearing then this in mind, that intelligence is a self-development, not a quality supervening to a substance, we may abstract from all *degree*, and for the purpose of philosophic construction reduce it to *kind*, under the idea of an indestructible power with two opposite and counteracting forces, which, by a metaphor borrowed from astronomy, we may call the cen-

³² [See his treatise *De la Recherche de la Vérité*. Book III. especially chap. 6. See Appendix Q.]

³³ [Synesii Episcopi. *Hymn. III.* 113.]

trifugal and centripetal forces. The intelligence in the one tends to *objectize* itself, and in the other to *know* itself in the object. It will be hereafter my business to construct by a series of intuitions the progressive schemes, that must follow from such a power with such forces, till I arrive at the fulness of the *human* intelligence. For my present purpose, I *assume* such a power as my principle, in order to deduce from it a faculty, the generation, agency, and application of which form the contents of the ensuing chapter.

In a preceding page I have justified the use of technical terms in philosophy, whenever they tend to preclude confusion of thought, and when they assist the memory by the exclusive singleness of their meaning more than they may, for a short time, bewilder the attention by their strangeness. I trust, that I have not extended this privilege beyond the grounds on which I have claimed it; namely, the conveniency of the scholastic phrase to distinguish the kind from all degrees, or rather to express the kind with the abstraction of degree, as for instance *multeity* instead of multitude; or secondly, for the sake of correspondence in sound in interdependent or antithetical terms, as subject and object; or lastly, to avoid the wearying recurrence of circumlocutions and definitions. Thus I shall venture to use *potence*, in order to express a specific degree of a power, in imitation of the Algebraists. I have even hazarded the new verb *potenziate*, with its derivatives, in order to express the combination or transfer of powers. It is with new or unusual terms, as with privileges in courts of justice or legislature; there can be no legitimate *privilege*, where there already exists a positive law adequate to

the purpose; and when there is no law in existence, the privilege is to be justified by its accordance with the end, or final cause, of all law. Unusual and new coined words are doubtless an evil; but vagueness, confusion, and imperfect conveyance of our thoughts, are a far greater. Every system, which is under the necessity of using terms not familiarized by the metaphysics in fashion, will be described as written in an unintelligible style, and the author must expect the charge of having substituted learned jargon for clear conception; while, according to the creed of our modern philosophers, nothing is deemed a clear conception, but what is representable by a distinct image. Thus the conceivable is reduced within the bounds of the picturable. *Hinc patet, qui fiat, ut, cum irrepræsentabile et impossibile vulgo ejusdem significatus habeantur, conceptus tam continui, quam infiniti, a plurimis rejiciantur, quippe quorum, secundum leges cognitionis intuitivæ, repræsentatio est impossibilis. Quanquam autem harum e non paucis scholis explosarum notionum, præsertim prioris, causam hic non gero, maximi tamen momenti erit monuisse: gravissimo illos errore labi, qui tam perversa argumentandi ratione utuntur. Quicquid enim repugnat legibus intellectus et rationis, utique est impossibile; quod autem, cum rationis puræ sit objectum, legibus cognitionis intuitivæ tantummodo non subest, non item. Nam hic dissensus inter facultatem sensitivam et intellectualem, (quarum indolem mox exponam,) nihil indigitat, nisi, quas mens ab intellectu acceptas fert ideas abstractas, illas in concreto exsequi et in intuitus commutare sæpenumero non posse. Hæc autem reluctantia subjectiva mentitur, ut plurimum, repugnantiam aliquam objectivam, et incautos facile fallit, limitibus, quibus mens humana circumscibitur,*

*pro iis habitis, quibus ipsa rerum essentia continentur.*³⁴

³⁴ TRANSLATION.

“Hence it is clear, from what cause many reject the notion of the continuous and the infinite. They take, namely, the words *irrepresentable* and *impossible* in one and the same meaning; and, according to the forms of sensuous evidence, the notion of the continuous and the infinite is doubtless impossible. I am not now pleading the cause of these laws, which not a few schools have thought proper to explode, especially the former (the law of continuity). But it is of the highest importance to admonish the reader, that those, who adopt so perverted a mode of reasoning, are under a grievous error. Whatever opposes the formal principles of the understanding and the reason is confessedly impossible; but not therefore that, which is therefore not amenable to the forms of *sensuous* evidence, because it is exclusively an object of pure intellect. For this non-coincidence of the sensuous and the intellectual (the nature of which I shall presently lay open) proves nothing more, but that the mind cannot always adequately represent in the concrete, and transform into distinct images, abstract notions derived from the pure intellect. But this contradiction, which is in itself merely subjective (i. e. an incapacity in the nature of man), too often passes for an incongruity or impossibility in the object (i. e. the notions themselves), and seduces the incautious to mistake the limitations of the human faculties for the limits of things, as they really exist.”

I take this occasion to observe, that here and elsewhere Kant uses the terms intuition, and the verb active (*intueri* Germanice *anschauen*) for which we have unfortunately no correspondent word, exclusively for that which can be represented in space and time. He therefore consistently and rightly denies the possibility of intellectual intuitions. But as I see no adequate reason for this exclusive sense of the term, I have reverted to its wider signification, authorized by our elder theologians and metaphysicians, according to whom the term comprehends all truths known to us without a *medium*.

From Kant's Treatise *De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis*, 1770. [(Sect. I. § 1. Works, vol. III. pp. 126-7.) S. C.]

Critics,³⁵ who are most ready to bring this charge of pedantry and unintelligibility, are the most apt to overlook the important fact, that, besides the language of words, there is a language of spirits—(*sermo interior*)—and that the former is only the vehicle of the latter. Consequently their assurance, that they do not understand the philosophic writer, instead of proving any thing against the philosophy, may furnish an equal, and (*cæteris paribus*) even a stronger presumption against their own philosophic talent.

Great indeed are the obstacles which an English metaphysician has to encounter. Amongst his most respectable and intelligent judges, there will be many who have devoted their attention exclusively to the concerns and interests of human life, and who bring with them to the perusal of a philosophic system an habitual aversion to all speculations, the utility and application of which are not evident and immediate. To these I would in the first instance merely oppose an authority, which they themselves hold venerable, that of Lord Bacon: *non inutiles Scientiæ existimandæ sunt, quarum in se nullus est usus, si ingenia acuant et ordinant.*³⁶

There are others, whose prejudices are still more formidable, inasmuch as they are grounded in their moral feelings and religious principles, which had been alarmed and shocked by the impious and pernicious tenets defended by Hume, Priestley, and the French fatalists or necessitarians; some of whom had perverted metaphysical reasonings to the denial of the

³⁵ [This paragraph and the second sentence of the following are nearly the same as some sentences that occur in *Abhandlungen*, Phil. Schrift. pp. 203-4.]

³⁶ [*De Augment. Scient.* vi. c. 3. S. C.]

mysteries and indeed of all the peculiar doctrines of Christianity; and others even to the subversion of all distinction between right and wrong. I would request such men to consider what an eminent and successful defender of the Christian faith has observed, that true metaphysics are nothing else but true divinity, and that in fact the writers, who have given them such just offence, were sophists, who had taken advantage of the general neglect into which the science of logic has unhappily fallen, rather than metaphysicians, a name indeed which those writers were the first to explode as unmeaning. Secondly, I would remind them, that as long as there are men in the world to whom the *Γνώθι σεαυτόν* is an instinct and a command from their own nature, so long will there be metaphysicians and metaphysical speculations; that false metaphysics can be effectually counteracted by true metaphysics alone; and that if the reasoning be clear, solid and pertinent, the truth deduced can never be the less valuable on account of the depth from which it may have been drawn.

A third class profess themselves friendly to metaphysics, and believe that they are themselves metaphysicians. They have no objection to system or terminology, provided it be the method and the nomenclature to which they have been familiarized in the writings of Locke, Hume, Hartley, Condillac,³⁷ or perhaps Dr. Reid,³⁸ and Professor Stewart.³⁹ To objections from this cause, it is a sufficient answer, that one main object of my attempt was to demonstrate

³⁷ [Appendix Q.]

³⁸ [Appendix R.]

³⁹ [Schelling also says (in *Abhandlungen* Phil. Schrift. p. 204)

“Others were not prejudiced against nomenclature, terminology,—the spirit of system in general,—but only against *this*

the vagueness or insufficiency of the terms used in the metaphysical schools of France and Great Britain since the revolution, and that the errors which I propose to attack cannot subsist, except as they are concealed behind the mask of a plausible and indefinite nomenclature.

But the worst and widest impediment still remains. It is the predominance of a popular philosophy, at once the counterfeit and the mortal enemy of all true and manly metaphysical research. It is that corruption, introduced by certain immethodical aphorising eclectics,⁴⁰ who, dismissing not only all system, but all logical connection, pick and choose whatever is most plausible and showy; who select, whatever words can have some semblance of sense attached to them without the least expenditure of thought; in short whatever may enable men to talk of what they do not understand, with a careful avoidance of every thing that might awaken them to a moment's suspicion of their ignorance. This alas! is an irremediable disease, for

nomenclature" namely that of Kant; which he attributes to their having been long accustomed to the statements of Leibnitz, who had communicated his philosophical principles fragmentarily, in letters to friends, or to distinguished and great Lords, ever with much forbearance toward prevailing opinions, and on that account with less of sharpness and precision than is suitable to scientific explanation; or to their having *grown stiff* in the school-language and method of Wolf. S. C.]

⁴⁰ ["Finally, the last of all, through the impotent sham philosophy of some waterish authors, or the pandect wisdom of aphoristic eclectics, had lost all sense and taste, not perhaps for a determined system, but for philosophy in general, before Kant had published a syllable of his philosophy." Transl. (*Abhandlungen Phil. Schrift.* p. 204.) S. C.]

it brings with it, not so much an indisposition to any particular system, but an utter loss of taste and faculty for all system and for all philosophy. Like echoes that beget each other amongst the mountains, the praise or blame of such men rolls in volleys long after the report from the original blunderbuss. *Sequacitas est potius et coitio quam consensus: et tamen (quod pessimum est) pusillanimitas ista non sine arrogantia et fastidio se offert.*⁴¹

I shall now proceed to the nature and *genesis* of the Imagination; but I must first take leave to notice, that after a more accurate perusal of Mr. Wordsworth's remarks on the Imagination, in his preface to the new edition of his poems, I find that my conclusions are not so consentient with his as, I confess, I had taken for granted. In an article contributed by me to Mr. Southey's *Omniana*, *On the soul and its organs of sense*, are the following sentences. "These (the human faculties) I would arrange under the different senses and powers: as the eye, the ear, the touch, &c.; the imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating and realizing power; the speculative reason, *vis theoretica et scientifica*, or the power by which we produce, or aim to produce unity, necessity, and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles *a priori*⁴²; the

⁴¹ Franc. Baconis de Verulam, NOVUM ORGANUM. [Aphorisms LXXVII. and LXXXVIII. S. C.]

⁴² This phrase, *a priori*, is in common, most grossly misunderstood, and an absurdity burdened on it, which it does not deserve! By knowledge *a priori*, we do not mean, that we can

will, or practical reason; the faculty of choice (*Germanice*, Willkühr) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice,) the *sensation* of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch." ⁴³ To this, as far as it relates to the subject in question, namely the words (*the aggregative and associative power*) Mr. Wordsworth's "objection is only that the definition is too general. To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to the Imagination as to the Fancy." ⁴⁴ I reply, that if, by the power of evoking and combining, Mr. Wordsworth means the same as, and no more than, I meant by the aggregative and associative, I continue to deny, that it belongs at all to the Imagination; and I am disposed to conjecture, that he has mistaken the co-presence of Fancy with Imagination for the operation of the latter singly. A man may work with two very different tools at the same moment; each has its share in the work, but the work effected by each is distinct and different. But it will probably appear in the next chapter, that deeming it necessary to go back much further than Mr. Wordsworth's subject required or permitted, I have attached a meaning to both Fancy and Imagination, which he had not in view, at least while he was writing that preface. He will judge. Would to Heaven, I might meet with many such rea-

know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience (that is, something acting upon us from without) we then know, that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.

⁴³ [Literary Remains. I. pp. 326-7.]

⁴⁴ [Preface to the Poetical Works. Vol. I. p. xxxiv.]

ders! I will conclude with the words of Bishop Jeremy Taylor: "He to whom all things are one, who draweth all things to one, and seeth all things in one, may enjoy true peace and rest of spirit."⁴⁵

CHAPTER XIII.

On the imagination, or esemplastic power.

O Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
 All things proceed, and up to him return,
 If not deprav'd from good, created all
 Such to perfection, one first matter all,
 Endued with various forms, various degrees
 Of substance, and, in things that live, of life;
 But more refin'd, more spiritous and pure,
 As nearer to him plac'd, or nearer tending,
 Each in their several active spheres assign'd,
 Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
 Proportion'd to each kind. So from the root
 Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
 More aery: last the bright consummate flower
 Spirits odorous breathes: flowers and their fruit,
 Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublim'd,
 To *vital* spirits aspire: to *animal*:
 To *intellectual*!—give both life and sense,
 Fancy and understanding; whence the soul
 REASON receives, and reason is her *being*,
 Discursive or intuitive.¹

"Sane si res corporales nil nisi materiale continerent, verissime dicerentur in fluxu consistere, neque habere substantiale quicquam, quemadmodum et Platonici olim recte agnovere.

⁴⁵ Jer. Taylor's *Via pacis*. [Sunday. The First Decad. 8. S. C.]

¹ Par. Lost. Book V. l. 469.

“Hinc igitur, præter pure mathematica et phantasiæ subjecta, collegi quædam metaphysica solaque mente perceptibilia, esse admittenda: et massæ materiali *principium* quoddam superius et, ut sic dicam, *formule* addendum: quandoquidem omnes veritates rerum corporearum ex solis axiomatibus logisticis et geometricis, nempe de magno et parvo, toto et parte, figura et situ, colligi non possint; sed alia de causa et effectu, *actioneque* et *passione*, accedere debeant, quibus ordinis rerum rationes salventur. Id principium rerum, an *ἐντελεχείαν* an vim appellemus, non refert, modo meminerimus, per solam *Virium* notionem intelligibiliter explicari.”²

Σέβομαι νοερῶν
 Κρυφίαν τὰξιν.
 Χωρεῖ ΤΙ ΜΕΣΟΝ
 Ου καταχυθέν.³

² Leibnitz. Op. T. II. P. II. p. 53.—T. III. p. 321.

[The first sentence of this quotation is from the treatise of Leibnitz *De Ipsa Natura, sive de Vi insitu Actionibusque creaturarum*, § 8. ed. Erdmann. P. I. p. 157.:—the second is from his *Specimen Dynamicum, pro admirandis Naturæ legibus circa corporum Vires, et mutuas Actiones detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis*. Ex Actis Erudit. Lips. ann. 1695. In the second extract Mr. C. has substituted the word *phantasiæ* for *imaginationi*, and, in the beginning of the last sentence *rerum* for *formam*. He quoted from the edition of Lud. Dutens, a Frenchman resident in Britain, as I learn from Erdmann’s Preface, in which it is mentioned that neither his collection nor that of Raspe, who added posthumous works of Leibnitz, contains all his philosophical writings, and that both the one and the other *frustro a bibliopolis quæres, imo in publicis bibliothecis desiderabis*. The former however is at the British Museum, presented by himself in 1800. The new edition comprehends only the philosophical works,—the *Specimen Dynamicum* is classed among the mathematical,—but, as Erdmann himself observes, it is often very difficult to judge *utrum scriptio aliqua philosophicæ indolis sit an non sit*. See Appendix S. S. C.]

³ Synesii Episcop. Hymn. III. l. 231.



DES CARTES,⁴ speaking as a naturalist, and in imitation of Archimedes, said, give me matter and motion and I will construct you the universe. We must of course understand him to have meant; I will render the construction of the universe intelligible. In the same sense the transcendental philosopher says; grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or *find* itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences with the whole system of their representations to rise up before you. Every other science pre-supposes intelligence as already existing and complete: the philosopher contemplates it in its growth, and as it were represents its history to the mind from its birth to its maturity.

The venerable sage of Königsberg has preceded the march of this master-thought as an effective pioneer in his essay on the introduction of negative quantities into philosophy, published 1763.⁵ In this he has shown, that instead of assailing the science of mathematics by metaphysics, as Berkeley did in his ANALYST,⁶

⁴ [This first paragraph of Chap. XIII. with the exception of the second sentence, is freely translated from *Transsc. Id.* first § of Section C. p. 147. S. C.]

⁵ [*Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.* An attempt towards introducing the idea of negative magnitudes into philosophy, 1763. Works, vol. I. p. 19. S. C.]

⁶ [The Analyst was published soon after Berkeley's promotion to the see of Cloyne, March 17, 1834. It is said that the Bishop addressed it to Dr. Halley on learning from Mr. Addison that he, "who dealt so much in demonstration," had brought Dr. Garth into a state of general scepticism or even

or of sophisticating it, as Wolf did, by the vain attempt of deducing the first principles of geometry from supposed deeper grounds of ontology,⁷ it behoved the metaphysician rather to examine whether the only province of knowledge, which man has succeeded in erecting into a pure science, might not furnish materials, or at least hints, for establishing and pacifying the unsettled, warring, and embroiled domain of philosophy. An imitation of the mathematical *method* had indeed been attempted with no better success than attended the essay of David to wear the armour of Saul. Another use however is possible and of far greater promise, namely, the actual application of the positions which had so wonderfully enlarged the dis-

unbelief on religious subjects, as appeared in the latter's last illness. Its whole title is *The Analyst; or, a Discourse addressed to an infidel Mathematician: wherein it is examined whether the object, principles, and inferences, of the modern Analysis are more distinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced, than religious mysteries and points of faith.* He endeavoured to show that the doctrine of fluxions furnished a strong example of mathematical uncertainty and fallacy.]

⁷ [Cousin represents Wolf as having improved the Leibnizian philosophy by qualifying it in some directions and filling it up in others. He seems to consider his mathematical method as at once his strength and his weakness—for he says—“*Son mérite principal consiste dans l'unité, la solidité et l'enchaînement systématique qu'il sut donner à tout l'ensemble à l'aide de la méthode appelée mathématique, méthode qui, selon lui, n'étoit autre chose que l'application la plus parfaite des lois du raisonnement.*” Then after enumerating the defects of his philosophy he sums them up thus—“*Enfin*” il “*négligea la distinction des caractères propres qui séparent la philosophie et les mathématiques dans leur forme et leur matière.*” (Manuel. vol. ii. 175-6.) I suppose that no man before Kant's day had seen this distinction so clearly, and laid it down so determinately, as did the sage of Koenigsburg. S. C.]

coveries of geometry, *mutatis mutandis*, to philosophical subjects.⁸ Kant having briefly illustrated the utility of such an attempt in the questions of space, motion, and infinitely small quantities, as employed by the mathematician, proceeds to the idea of negative quantities and the transfer of them to metaphysical investigation.⁹ Opposites, he well observes, are of two kinds, either logical, that is, such as are absolutely incompatible; or real without being contradictory. The former he denominates *Nihil negativum irrepræsentabile*, the connection of which produces nonsense. A body in motion is something—*Aliquid cogitabile*; but a body, at one and the same time in motion and not in motion, is nothing, or, at most, air articulated into nonsense. But a motory force of a body in one direction, and an equal force of the same body in an opposite direction is not incompatible, and the result, namely rest, is real and representable. For the purposes of mathematical *calculus* it is indifferent which force we term negative, and which positive, and consequently we appropriate the latter to that, which happens to be the principal object in our thoughts. Thus if a man's capital be ten and his debts eight, the subtraction will be the same, whether we call the capital negative debt, or the debt negative

⁸ [Kant says in his Preface to the *Versuch* already referred to. "The use which may be made of mathematics in philosophy consists either in an imitation of the method or in the real application of their positions to the objects of philosophy." He shews the ill success of the former attempt and that the troublesome *non liquet* would not yield to all this pomp of demonstration. S. C.]

⁹ [Ibid. 1. Absch. Works I. 25-33. Mr. C. repeats the teaching of the *Versuch*, in language of his own, till he comes to the application, "It is equally clear," &c. S. C.]

capital. But in as much as the latter stands practically in reference to the former, we of course represent the sum as 10—8. It is equally clear that two equal forces acting in opposite directions, both being finite and each distinguished from the other by its direction only, must neutralize or reduce each other to inaction. ¹⁰ Now the transcendental philosophy demands; first, that two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature; not only not in consequence of the accidental direction of each, but as prior to all direction, nay, as the primary forces from which the conditions of all possible directions are derivative and deducible: secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible. The problem will then be to discover the result or product of two such forces, as distinguished from the result of those forces which are finite, and derive their difference solely from the circumstance of their direction. When we have formed a scheme or outline of these two different kinds of force, and of their different results by the process of discursive reasoning, it will then remain for us to elevate the *thesis* from notional to actual, by contemplating intuitively this one power with its two inherent indestructible yet counteracting forces, and the results or generations to which their inter-penetration gives existence, in the living principle and in the process of our own self-consciousness. By what instrument this is possible the solution itself

¹⁰ [The reader may compare the rest of the paragraph and the following one with the doctrine of the *Transfc. Id.* especially the section entitled *Deduction der productiven Anschauung*, pp. 156-185. But the sentences of the B. L. are not the same with those of Schelling, nor is the application of the analogy suggested by Kant made in the *Transfc. Id.* S. C.]

will discover, at the same time that it will reveal to and for whom it is possible. *Non omnia possumus omnes.* There is a philosophic, no less than a poetic genius, which is differenced from the highest perfection of talent, not by degree but by kind.

The counteraction then of the two assumed forces does not depend on their meeting from opposite directions; the power which acts in them is indestructible; it is therefore inexhaustibly re-ebullient; and as something must be the result of these two forces, both alike infinite, and both alike indestructible; and as rest or neutralization cannot be this result; no other conception is possible, but that the product must be a *tertium aliquid*, or finite generation. Consequently this conception is necessary. Now this *tertium aliquid* can be no other than an inter-penetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of both

* * * * *

Thus far had the work been transcribed for the press, when I received the following letter from a friend, whose practical judgment I have had ample reason to estimate and revere, and whose taste and sensibility preclude all the excuses which my self-love might possibly have prompted me to set up in plea against the decision of advisers of equal good sense, but with less tact and feeling.

“ Dear C.

“ *You ask my opinion concerning your Chapter on the Imagination, both as to the impressions it made on myself, and as to those which I think it will make on the Public, i. e. that part of the public, who, from the title of the work and from its forming a sort of introduction to a volume of poems, are likely to constitute the great majority of your readers.*

“As to myself, and stating in the first place the effect on my understanding, your opinions and method of argument were not only so new to me, but so directly the reverse of all I had ever been accustomed to consider as truth, that even if I had comprehended your premises sufficiently to have admitted them, and had seen the necessity of your conclusions, I should still have been in that state of mind, which in your note in Chap. IV. you have so ingeniously evolved, as the antithesis to that in which a man is, when he makes a bull. In your own words, I should have felt as if I had been standing on my head.

“The effect on my feelings, on the other hand, I cannot better represent, than by supposing myself to have known only our light airy modern chapels of ease, and then for the first time to have been placed, and left alone, in one of our largest Gothic cathedrals in a gusty moonlight night of autumn. ‘Now in glimmer, and now in gloom;’ often in palpable darkness not without a chilly sensation of terror; then suddenly emerging into broad yet visionary lights with coloured shadows of fantastic shapes, yet all decked with holy insignia and mystic symbols; and ever and anon coming out full upon pictures and stone-work images of great men, with whose names I was familiar, but which looked upon me with countenances and an expression, the most dissimilar to all I had been in the habit of connecting with those names. Those whom I had been taught to venerate as almost super-human in magnitude of intellect, I found perched in little fret-work niches, as grotesque dwarfs; while the grotesques, in my hitherto belief, stood guarding the high altar with all the characters of apotheosis. In short, what I had supposed substances were thinned away into

shadows, while everywhere shadows were deepened into substances :

If substance might be call'd that shadow seem'd,
For each seem'd either ! ¹¹

“ Yet after all, I could not but repeat the lines which you had quoted from a MS. poem of your own in the FRIEND, and applied to a work of Mr. Wordsworth's though with a few of the words altered :

————— An Orphic tale indeed,
A tale obscure of high and passionate thoughts
To a strange music chanted ! ¹²

“ Be assured, however, that I look forward anxiously to your great book on the CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY, which you have promised and announced : and that I will do my best to understand it. Only I will not promise to descend into the dark cave of Trophonius with you, there to rub my own eyes, in order to make the sparks and figured flashes, which I am required to see.

“ So much for myself. But as for the Public I do not hesitate a moment in advising and urging you to withdraw the Chapter from the present work, and to reserve it for your announced treatises on the Logos or communicative intellect in Man and Deity. First, because imperfectly as I understand the present Chapter, I see clearly that you have done too much, and yet not enough. You have been obliged to omit so many links, from the necessity of compression, that what remains, looks (if I may recur to my for-

¹¹ [Milton's Par. Lost. Book II. l. 669. S. C.]

¹² [Coleridge's Poet. Works, vol. I. p. 208.]

*mer illustration) like the fragments of the winding steps of an old ruined tower. Secondly, a still stronger argument (at least one that I am sure will be more forcible with you) is, that your readers will have both right and reason to complain of you. This Chapter, which cannot, when it is printed, amount to so little as an hundred pages, will of necessity greatly increase the expense of the work; and every reader who, like myself, is neither prepared nor perhaps calculated for the study of so abstruse a subject so abstrusely treated, will, as I have before hinted, be almost entitled to accuse you of a sort of imposition on him. For who, he might truly observe, could from your title-page, to wit, "My Literary Life and Opinions," published too as introductory to a volume of miscellaneous poems, have anticipated, or even conjectured, a long treatise on Ideal Realism, which holds the same relation in abstruseness to Plotinus, as Plotinus does to Plato. It will be well, if already you have not too much of metaphysical disquisition in your work, though as the larger part of the disquisition is historical, it will doubtless be both interesting and instructive to many to whose unprepared minds your speculations on the esemplastic power would be utterly unintelligible. Be assured, if you do publish this Chapter in the present work, you will be reminded of Bishop Berkeley's *Siris*, announced as an *Essay on Tar-water*, which beginning with *Tar* ends with the *Trinity*, the *omne scibile* forming the interspace. I say in the present work. In that greater work to which you have devoted so many years, and study so intense and various, it will be in its proper place. Your prospectus will have described and announced both its contents and their nature; and if any persons purchase it, who feel no interest*

in the subjects of which it treats, they will have themselves only to blame.

“ I could add to these arguments one derived from pecuniary motives, and particularly from the probable effects on the sale of your present publication ; but they would weigh little with you compared with the preceding. Besides, I have long observed, that arguments drawn from your own personal interests more often act on you as narcotics than as stimulants, and that in money concerns you have some small portion of pig-nature in your moral idiosyncrasy, and, like these amiable creatures, must occasionally be pulled backward from the boat in order to make you enter it. All success attend you, for if hard thinking and hard reading are merits, you have deserved it.

Your affectionate, &c.”

In consequence of this very judicious letter, which produced complete conviction on my mind, I shall content myself for the present with stating the main result of the chapter, which I have reserved for that future publication, a detailed *prospectus* of which the reader will find at the close of the second volume.

The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.¹³ The

¹³ [This last clause “ and as a repetition, &c.” I find stroked out in a copy of the B. L. containing a few MS. marginal notes of the author, which are printed in this edition. I think it best to preserve the sentence, while I mention the author’s judgment upon it, especially as it has been quoted. S. C.]

secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the *kind* of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation.¹⁴ It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially *vital*, even as all objects (*as* objects) are essentially fixed and dead.¹⁵

FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.

¹⁴ [Compare this distinction with that of the Productive and Reproductive Imagination given in the section on the Transcendental Synthesis of the Imagination (*synthesis speciosa*) in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Works, vol. II. p. 14. 1. 2.]

¹⁵ [For what is said of objects in the last sentence see *Transc. Id.* p. 68. *Abhandlungen*, Phil. Schrift. p. 224.]



APPENDIX.

I.



THE following *marginalia* of Mr. Coleridge's, which were spoken of in a note to chap. IX. were transcribed for a new edition of the *Biographia* by Mr. C.'s late editor, with the passages referred to in the original German. These passages are here given upon the whole a little more at large, and in English, but with a clear understanding that entire justice cannot in this way be done to the notions of Schelling, which, to be perfectly estimated, must be considered in the disquisitions to which they belong, as plants and flowers must be viewed in their native situations in order to be fully understood and admired.* S. C.

MS. note on Schelling's *Philosoph. Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit Zusammenhängenden Gegenstände. Phil. Schrift.* p. 397.

There are indeed many just and excellent observations in this work of Schelling's, and yet even more than usual over-meaning or un-meaning *quid pro quos*—thing-phrases, such as "*Licht*," "*Finsterniss*," "*Feuer*," "centre," "circumference," "ground," and the like—which seem to involve the dilemma, that either they are mere similes, where that which they are meant to illustrate has never been stated, or that they are degrees of a kind, which kind has not been defined. Hence Schelling seems to be looking objectively

* I wish the reader to know before perusing these notes, on the authority of Archdeacon Hare, that "for the last twelve years Schelling has been strongly contending against Hegel, and has made, or at all events professes to make, *the idea of personality and of a personal God the central principle of his system.*" Quoted from the Archdeacon's admirable defence of Luther, *Mission of the Comforter.* Vol. ii. note 10. p. 800.

at one thing, and imagining himself thinking of another; and after all this mysticism, what is the result? Still the old questions return, and I find none but the old answers. This ground to God's existence either lessens, or does not lessen, his power. In the first case it is, in effect, a co-existent God,—evil, because the ground of all evil;—in the second it leaves us as before. With that “before” my understanding is perfectly satisfied; and, vehemently as Schelling condemns that theory of freedom, which makes it consist in the paramountcy of the Reason over the Will, wherein does his own solution differ from this, except in expressing with uncouth mysticism the very same notion? For what can be meant by the “individuality, or *Ichheit*, becoming eccentric, and usurping the circumference,” if not this? He himself plainly says that moral evil arises not from privation—much less negation,—but from the same constituents losing their proper ordination, that is, becoming C. B. A. instead of A. B. C. But wherein does this differ from the assertion, that the freedom of man consists in all the selfishness of his nature being subordinated to, and used as the instrument and *materia* of, his Reason, that is, his sense of the universal Will?

In short nothing seems gained. To creation—*Werden*—he himself admits that we must resort; he himself admits it, in even a much higher sense, in the *Logos*, or the *alter Deus et idem*. Other creations were still possible, from the will of God, and not from His essence, and yet partaking of His goodness. A mere machine could be made happy, but not deserving of happiness; but if God created a Being with a power of choosing good, that Being must have been created with a power of choosing evil; otherwise there is no meaning in the word *Choice*. And thus we come round again to the necessity arising out of finiteness, with Leibnitz and Plato. For it is evident that by Matter Plato and Plotinus meant Finiteness;—or how else could they call it *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, without any qualities, and yet capable of all? The whole question of the origin of Evil resolves itself into one. Is the Holy Will good in and of itself, or only *relative*, that is, as a mean to pleasure, joy, happiness and the like? If the latter be the truth, no solution can be given of the origin of Evil compatible with the attributes of God; but, (as in the problem of the squaring of the circle,) we can demonstrate that it is impossible to be solved. If the former be true, as I more than believe, the solution is easy, and almost self-evident. Man cannot be a moral being without having had

the choice of good and evil, and he cannot choose good without having been able to choose evil. God, as infinite and self-existing, is the alone One, in whom Freedom and Necessity can be one and the same from the beginning: in all finite beings it must have been arrived at by a primary act, as in Angels, or by a succession of acts as in Man.

In addition it seems to me that Schelling unfairly represents Kant's system as the mere subjecting of the appetites to the Reason. Whereas Kant makes the enjoyment of freedom, not freedom itself, consist in the subjection of the particular to the universal Will, in order to their identification: and does not Schelling use Freedom often when he means no more than others mean by *Life*—that is, the power of originating motion. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 403. *Through Freedom, a power is asserted, in principle unconditioned, without and by the side of the divine power, which according to those conceptions is inconceivable. As the sun in the Firmament extinguishes all heavenly lights, even so, and far more does the Infinite Might (extinguish) every finite, absolute Causality in one Being leaves to all others unconditioned Passibility as their only portion.*

Note. But is not this still a carrying of the physical Dynamic into the moral? Even admitting the incongruous predicate, Time, in the Deity, I cannot see any absolute impossibility of Foresight with Freedom. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 413. *It is not absurd, says Leibnitz, that he who is God, should nevertheless be produced, or conversely: no more than it is contradictory that he who is the son of a Man should himself be Man.*

Note. I do not see the propriety of the instance; unless "God" is here assumed as an *Ens genericum* even as "Man." If this be a mere nominalism it proves nothing;—if it be meant as a realism, it is a *petitio principii sub lite*; just as the following instance of the eye; but this is a far better illustration. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 421. *But it will ever be remarkable, that Kant, when he had at first distinguished things in themselves from phænomena only negatively, through independence of Time, and subsequently, in the metaphysical investigations of his Critique of the Practical Reason, had treated independence of Time and Freedom as really correlate conceptions, did not proceed to the thought of extending to the things also this only possible positive conception of the in themselves, whereby*

he would have raised himself immediately to a higher standing-point of contemplation, and above the negativity, which is the character of his theoretic philosophy. Schell.

Note. But would not this have been opposite to Kant's aim? His purpose was a καθαριστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. In order to effect this thoroughly, within this he, by an act of choice, confined himself. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 422. For whether there are single things conceived in an Absolute Substance, or just so many single wills, conceived in one Arch Will (or original will *Urwille*), for Pantheism, as such, is all one.

Note. The question is, do not these single wills, so included in the one "*Urwille*" become "*Things*?" S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 424. For, if Freedom is a power unto evil, (*Vermögen zum Bösen*,) it must have a root independent of God.

Note. But God will not do impossibilities, and how can a *Vermögen* for moral good exist in a creature, which does not imply a *Vermögen zum Bösen*? S. T. C.

Ibid. pp. 437-8. Man has, by reason of his arising out of the Ground, (being creaturely,) an independent principle in himself relatively to God; but by reason that even this principle—without on this account ceasing to be dark in respect of the Ground—is illumed in Light, there arises in him at the same time a higher one, that is the Spirit.—Now, inasmuch as the soul is the living identity of both principles, it is Spirit, and Spirit is in God. Were the identity of both principles as indissoluble as in God, there would be no distinction, that is to say, God would not be revealed as Spirit. That unity which in God is inseparable, must therefore in man be separable,—and this is the possibility of good and evil.

Note. But the problem was—how to prove this distinction, *Unterschied*; and here it is assumed as a ground of proof! How exactly does this seem to resemble Schelling's own objection to Fichte? "It must be so."—"Why?"—"Because else my Theory would be false."—"Well! and what if it were?" In truth from p. 429 I find little but Behmenisms, which a reader must have previously understood in order to understand. And in the name of candour and common sense, where does this *Zertrennlichkeit* differ from the rejected *Vermögen zum Bösen*, involved in *dem freyen Vermögen zum Guten*? S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 438. The Principle raised up out of the ground of Nature, through which man is separate from God, is the

selfness in him, but which, through its unity with the ideal principle, becomes Spirit.

Note. We will grant for a while, that the principle evolved or lifted up from this mysterious *Ground* of existence, which is and yet does not exist, is separate (*geschieden*) from God; yet how is it separate from the Ground itself? How is it individualized? Already the material *phænomenon* of partibility seems to have stolen in. And at last I cannot see what advantage in reason this representation, this form of symbol, has over the old more reverential distinction of the Divine Will, relatively to the End, from the same Will, relatively to the Means; the latter of which we term his Wisdom, and to the former appropriate the name of the Divine Will *κατ' ἔμφασιν*.

Schelling has more than once spoken of the necessity of a thorough study of Logic; and he has admitted that a logical work suited to the present state and necessities of scientific discipline does not exist. Would that he had prefixed to this work a canon of his own Logic, and, if he could, had taught us wherein his forms of thinking differ from the trans-realization of not Ideas alone, but more often—Abstractions and arbitrary general terms in Proclus! S. T. C.

Ibid. pp. 439-40. *Note.* It is difficult to conjecture what advantage Schelling proposed to himself in thus allegorizing, and yet so imperfectly. Whatever he might dream as to the hidden identity of darkness with the natural yearning, yet no one can avoid distinguishing day-light from the mere sense of day-light. In short, Light here means something: why not substitute that meaning? S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 442. *Note.* How can I explain Schelling's strange silence respecting Jacob Boehme? The identity of his system was exulted in by the Tiecks at Rome in 1805, to me; and these were Schelling's intimate friends. The coincidence in the expressions, illustrations, and even in the mystical obscurities, is too glaring to be solved by mere independent coincidence in thought and intention. Probably prudential motives restrain Schelling for a while; for I will not think that pride or a dishonest lurking desire to appear not only *an* original, but *the* original can have influenced a man of genius like Schelling. S. T. C.

Ibid. Quotation in a note. *An instructive illustration is here given by Fire (as wild, consuming, painful, glowing heat) in opposition to the so-named organic beneficent life-glow,*

since here *Fire and Water enter into a Ground (of growth,) or a conjunction, whilst there they go out of one another in discord.*

Note. Water is the great Nurse and Mediatrix of all growth; an instrument of union—a marriage—of the comburent and combustible principles, oxygen and hydrogen. Fire, on the contrary, is the fierce combat of the two. This is better, as more accurate, than *Feuer und Wasser in Einem Grunde.* S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 445. *Leibnitz tries in every way to make it conceivable, how evil may arise out of a natural want or deficiency. The Will, says he, strives after the Good in general, and must desire Perfection, the highest measure of which is in God; but when it abides ensnared in the delights of the senses, with loss of higher goods, this very want of the counter-striving is the Privation, in which evil consists.*

Note. The modern English Unitarians contemplate the Deity as mere Mercy, or rather Goodnature, without reference to his Justice and Holiness; and to this Idol, the deification of a human passion, is their whole system confined. The Calvinists do the same with the Omnipotence of God with as little reference to his Wisdom and his Love. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 449. *For the weakness or non-efficiency of the intelligent Principle may certainly be a ground of the want of good and virtuous actions, but not a ground of actions positively bad and contrary to virtue.*

Note. Why not, if the *inertia* be voluntary? Suppose Heat to be a moral agent and voluntarily to withdraw itself; would not the splitting of the vessel by the frozen water be a positive act? I find a confusion in Schelling of the visible with the conceivable. As well might I say, that when I tossed a child into the air, and wilfully did not catch it again—this, being a mere negation of motion, was no moral act. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 452. *Note.* Schelling puzzles me for ever by his man *made up* of two separable principles; and yet he, (as a *tertium aliquid,*) whose and not *who* these principles are, has the free power of separating them. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 455-6. *But there are in Nature accidental determinations, which are explicable only by an excitement of the irrational or dark principle of the creature that has taken place directly in the first creation—only by a selfness made*

active (aktivirter Selbstheit.) Whence in Nature, beside the preformed moral relationships, there are unmistakable foretokens of Evil, although the power thereof has first been excited through man; whence phænomena, which, irrespectively of their being dangerous to man, excite a general natural abhorrence (Abschen.) Note. Thus the close connection, in which the imagination of all people, especially all fables and religions of the East, place the serpent with evil, is certainly not gratuitous or unmeaning. Transl.

Note. But some have supposed this to be the ape. The ape is the very opposite of the serpent. The eel, the trout, the salmon, these excite no *Abschen*.

P. S. I doubt the truth of my own remark as to the eel and earthworm. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 459. Note. Why not have quoted all this from Boehme, as an extract *raisonné*? But does the hypothesis, or *hypopoiesis* rather, explain the problem of evil? A nature—the ground, the *stratum*, of God, which is not *Er Selbst* God himself, but out of which God risen exists, and which yet is begotten by the self-existent, and yet is evil, morally evil—and yet the cause and parent, yea the very essence of Freedom, without which, as antecedent, *das Böse* cannot be—what is all this?

P. S. The bookbinder has docked my former notes; but I understand enough to find that my first impressions were the same as my present are, after repeated perusal, and too strong a prepossession. It is a mere day-dream, *somnium philosophans!* S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 462. Note. But where after all, is the *Evil* as contra-distinguished from calamity and imperfection? How does this solve the diversity, the essential difference between regret and remorse? How does it concur even with the idea of Freedom? I own I am disappointed, and that, with respect to the system, I remain in the same state, with the same hurrying dimly and partially light-shotten mists before my eyes, as when I read the same things for the first time in Jacob Boehme. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 463. Thence the universal necessity of sin and death, as the real destruction of all particularity (*Eigenheit*), through which every human will must pass, as through fire, in order to be purified. Transl.

Note. But is death to the wicked as to the better mortal? Shall we say that the redeemed die to the flesh, and therefore

from it; but that the reprobate die *in* the flesh and therefore *with* it? S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 467. *For that is free which acts conformably to the laws of its own proper being, and is determined by nothing else, either within it or without it.* Transl.

Note. And is not this a confirmation of the old remark, that he who would *understand* Freedom, instead of knowing it by an act of Freedom, (the mystery in the mystery,) must either flee to Determinism *à priori* or *ab extra*,—or to Fatalism, or the necessity *ex essentia propria*. In either case how can we explain Remorse and Self-accusation other than as delusions, the necessity of which does not prove the necessity of knowing them to be delusions, and, consequently, renews the civil war between the Reason and the unconquerable Feeling, which it is the whole duty and promise of philosophy to reconcile? S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 468. *Man is in the original creation, as has been shewn, an undivided being (which may be mythically represented as a state of innocence and original blessedness anterior to this life): himself alone can divide himself. But this severance cannot take place in Time: it takes place out of all Time, and thence together with the first creation, although, as I find, distinct from it.* Transl.

Note. But this makes it fall in time. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 469. Note. *So Luther in the 'Treatise De Servo Arbitrio; with justice, although he had not rightly conceived the union of such an unfailing necessity with the Freedom of actions.* Transl.

Note. Far better to have proved the possibility of Freedom, and to have left the mode untouched. The reality is sufficiently proved by the fact.

Ibid. *ibid.* Note. I still feel myself dissatisfied with the argument against Freedom derived from the influence of motives, *Vorstellungen*, &c. For are these things—and not rather mere general terms, signifying the mind determining itself? For what is a motive but a determining thought? and what is a thought but the mind acting on itself in some one direction? All that we want is to prove the possibility of Free-Will, or, what is really the same, a Will. Now this Kant had unanswerably proved by showing the distinction between *phænomena* and *noumena*, and by demonstrating that Time and Space are laws of the former only (*αἱ σύνθεσις αἱ πρῶται τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ὁ χρόνος μὲν, ἡ*

πρώτη καθ' όλον σύνθεσις τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς ἴσω· ὁ δὲ χῶρος, τῆς ἕξω.) and irrelative to the latter, to which class the Will must belong. In all cases of Sense the Reality proves the Possibility; but in this instance, (which must be unique if it be at all,) the proof of the Possibility only is wanting to effect the establishment of the Reality. Therefore I cannot but object to p. 468—*sie fällt ausser aller Zeit, und daher mit der erster Schöpfung zusammen.* (It takes place out of all Time and thence together with the first creation.) This has at least the appearance of a contradiction. S. T. C.

Ibid. pp. 469-70. *In the consciousness, so far as it is mere self-comprehension and ideal only, doubtless that free deed which comes to pass of necessity, cannot take place; since it precedes it as existence (the deed precedes consciousness as actually existent)—first makes it; yet is it not therefore no deed of which the human being can ever take cognizance; since he who in some way to excuse an unrighteous action, says, "Thus I am unalterably," is yet very well aware that he is thus through his own fault, however true it may be that it has been impossible for him to do otherwise.* Transl.

Note. I have long believed this; but surely it is no explanation beyond the simple idea of Free Will itself. S. T. C. (The remainder of this note is unfortunately lost.)

Ibid. p. 472. *And it is worthy of notice how Kant, who had not raised himself in theory to a transcendental fact determinant of all human existence, was led, in his later inquiries, through mere true observation of the phenomena of the moral judgment, to a recognition of a subjective, as he expresses it, ground of human actions, preceding every deed that occurs to the senses, which yet itself again must be an act of freedom.* Transl.

Note. But why this asserted superiority over Kant? Where is the proof,—where the probability, that by mere faithful observation he could arrive—(he alone of all other philosophers)—at this awful conclusion? Lastly, what has Schelling added to Kant's notion? S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 478. Here also is a note of Mr. C.'s partly obliterated, in which he exclaims, "How unfair is this, to attribute to Kant a slow motive-making process, separate by intervals of time. Most true, most reverently true is it that a Being imperfect does feel an awe as in the presence of a holier Self—*alter et idem*, where the I distinguishable through imperfection, &c." S. T. C.

These remarks seem to be made in reference to those of Schelling aimed against *unsre Empfindungsphilosophen*, "our sensation-philosophers." "To be conscientious," he affirms, "is for a man to act according as he knows, and not contradict in his deeds the light of knowledge. He is not conscientious, who, in any case that occurs, must first hold up to himself the law of duty, in order to decide upon right doing through respect to the same. Religiosity, according to the meaning of the word, leaves no choice between things opposed—no *equilibrium arbitrii*, the bane of all morality, but only the highest decidedness for that which is right, to the utter exclusion of choice."

Ibid. p. 493. *Still the question recurs, does Evil end and how?—has Creation in general a final aim, and if this be so, why is this not reached immediately,—why is not Perfection even from the beginning? To this there is no answer but what is already given: because God is a Life, not merely a Being. But all Life has a destiny, and is subject to suffering and becoming. Even to this then has God, of his own free will, subjected Himself, when even at first, in order to become personal, He divided the Light world and the world of Darkness.* Transl.

Note. These are hard sayings. Is not the Father from all eternity the Living one? and *freywillig sich unterwerfen um persönlich zu werden!* (The rest is lost.) S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 495. *Its state therefore is a state of not-being, a state of the continual becoming-consumed of the activity—(Verzehrtwerdens der Aktivität,) or of that in it which strives to become active.* Transl.

Note. Then will not the darkness become again what it was before its union with the light, and of course the object of the same process repeated? Surely this has too much the appearance of subjecting the supersensual to the intuitions of the senses, and really looks like pushing in a thing merely to take it out again. And still the question returns—Why not this in the first place? What can the process have effected?

Ibid. p. 502. *Note.* It seems to me that this whole work pre-supposes Des Cartes' "*quod clare concepimus, verum est.*"

Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Criticismus Philosoph. Schrift.

P. 119. *Note.* I have made repeated efforts, and all in

vain, to understand this first *Letter on Dogmatism and Criticism*. Substitute the World, *die Welt*, for a moral God, what do I gain *in der reinästhetischen Seite* more than in any other point of view? How can I combat or fight up against that which I myself am? Is not the very impulse to contend or to resist one of the links in the chain of necessary causes, which I am supposed to struggle against? If we are told that God is in us both to will and to do, that is, as the sole actual agent, how much more must this apply to the World, or Fate, or whatever other phantom we substitute. I say how much more, because upon the admission of a supersensual being, this may possibly be, and we therefore, from other reasons, do not doubt that it is really compatible with Free Will; but with a World-God this were a blank absurdity. *Der Gedanke mich der Welt entgegenzustellen,** not only *hat nichts grosses für mich,†* but seems mere pot-valiant nonsense, without the idea of a moral Power extrinsic to and above the World,—as much inconceivable by a sane mind, as that a single drop of the Falls of Niagara should fight up against the whole of the Cataract, of which itself is a minim!

How much more sublime, and, in other points of view, how infinitely more beautiful, even in respect of Taste or æsthetic judgment, is the Scriptural representation of the World as in enmity with God, and of the continual warfare, which calls forth every energy, both of act and of endurance, from the necessary vividness of worldly impressions, and the sensuous dimness of Faith, in the first struggles! Were the impulses and impresses from the faith in God equally vivid, as the sensuous *stimuli*, then indeed all combat must cease,—and we should have Hallelujahs for Tragedies and Statues. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 122. *Note.* I cannot see the force of any of these arguments. By theoretic, as opposed to practical Reason, Kant never meant two *Persons* or *Beings*; but only that what we could not *prove* by one train of argument, we might by another, in proportion to the purposes of knowledge. I cannot theoretically *demonstrate* the existence of God, as a moral Creatour and Governour, but I can theoretically adduce a multitude of inducements so strong as to be

* The thought of opposing myself to the world.

† Has nothing great for me.

all but absolute demonstration ; and I can demonstrate that not a word of sense ever was, or ever can be, brought against it. In this stage of the argument my conscience, with its categorical command, comes in and proves it to be my duty to *chuse* to believe in a God—there being no obstacle to my power so to chuse. With what consistency then can Schelling contend, that the same mind, having on these grounds fixed its belief in a God, can then make its former speculative infirmities, as applied to the idea of God, a pretext for turning back to disbelieve it?

Ibid. pp. 123-4. *With what law would you reach unto that Will? With the moral law itself? This is just what we ask, how you arrive at the persuasion that the Will of that Being is agreeable to this law? It would be the shortest way to declare that Being himself the author of the Moral Law. But this is contrary to the spirit and letter of your philosophy. Or must the Moral Law exist independently of all Will? Then we are in the domain of Fatalism ; for a law, which is not to be explained by any Being that exists independently of it, which rules over the highest power as well as over the least, has no sanction, save that of necessity.* Transl.

Note. Just as well might Schelling have asked concerning the Wisdom or any other attribute of God—and if we answered, they were essential,—that is God himself,—then object, that this was Fatalism. The proper answer is, that God is the originator of the Moral Law ; but not *per arbitrium*, (*Willkühr*), but because he is essentially wise and holy and good—rather, Wisdom, Holiness, and Love. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 142. *It is indeed no such uncommon case in human life, that one takes the prospect of a future possession itself.* Transl.

Note. Is there not some omission of the press here—that is *für den Besitz* after *Besitz*,—that we take the *look out* on a future possession for the possession itself? S. T. C.

Ibid. 152. (In a note.) *It is remarkable enough that language has distinguished so precisely between the Real,—dem Wirklichen (that which is present in the sensation or perception, which acts on me and whereon I react,) the Actually Existing, dem Daseyenden, (which, in general, is there present in Space and Time,) and Being, dem Seyenden, which is, through itself, quite independently of all conditions of Time.* Transl.

Note. But how can we know that anything is, except so far as it works on or in us; and what is that but Existence? Answer:—The means, by which we arrive at the consciousness of an idea, are not the idea itself. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 175. *Note.* It is clear to me that both Schelling and Fichte impose upon themselves the scheme of an expanding surface, and call it Freedom. I should say,—where absolute Freedom is, there must be absolute Power, and therefore the Freedom and the Power are mutually intuitive. Strange that Fichte and Schelling both hold that the very object, which is the condition of Self-consciousness, is nothing but the Self itself by an act of free Self-limitation.

P. S. The above I wrote a year ago; but the more I reflect, the more convinced am I of the gross materialism, which lies under the whole system. It all arises from the duplicity of human nature, or rather perhaps the triplicity. *Homo animal triplex.* The facts stated are mere sensations, the *corpus mortuum* of the volatilized memory. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 177. *Perhaps I should remind them of Lessing's confession, that with the idea of an infinite Existence he connected a representation of an infinitely tedious duration of Time, which was to him torment and misery; or even of that blasphemous exclamation: "I would not for all the world be (eternally) blessed."* Transl.

Note. Surely this is childish,—a mere confusion of Space with Intensity, of Time with Eternity. I cannot think that by the word "adequate" Spinoza meant "commensurate," but simply "immediate."

Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. Philosoph. Schrift.

P. 219. *I have sometimes heard the question asked, how it was possible, that so absurd a system, as that of the so-named Critical Philosopher should—not merely enter any human being's head—but take up it's abode there.* Transl.

Note. I cannot see the mystery. The man who is persuaded of the being of himself, *seines Ichs*, as a thing in itself, and that the bodily symbols of it are *phænomena*, *Erscheinungen*, by which it manifests its being to itself and others, easily, however unreasonably, conceives all other *phænomena* as manifestations of other consciousnesses—as unseen, yet actually separate, powers, or *Ichs*, or monads. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 221. *It is evident, that not only the possibility of a representation of outward things in us, but the necessity of the same must be explained. Further, not only, how we become conscious of a representation, but also why on this very account we are under the necessity of referring it to an outward object. Transl.*

Note. I cannot comprehend how it should be more difficult to assume a faculty of perception than of sensation, that is of self-perception.

Ibid. p. 224. *Now that which is an object (originally,) is, as such, necessarily finite. As then the spirit is not originally an object, it cannot according to its nature be originally finite. Transl.*

Note. That the Spirit is, in the modified sense here stated, infinite, may be proved by other reasons; but this is surely a strange twist of logic. If all Finites were necessarily objects, then indeed the Spirit, as far as it is no object, might be infinite. But that it is therefore infinite, by no means follows. The Finite may be the common predicate of both—of the one essentially, of the other by the will of the Creator. S. T. C.

Ibid. pp. 228-9. *We cannot abstract from the product of the intuition without acting freely, that is without freely repeating the original mode of action (of the Spirit) in the intuition, &c. &c. Now first through our abstracting the product of our action becomes an object. Transl.*

Note. In spite of Schelling's contempt of psychology, the fact of outness is more clearly stated in psychology, as dependent on vividness. In a fever, yet retaining our understanding, we see objects as outward, yet well know that they are not real. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 237. *In the first place, the whole hypothesis, (for more it is not), will explain nothing, for this reason, that, putting it at the highest, it does but make an impression on our receptivity conceivable, but not that we behold a real object. But no man will deny, that we not merely perceive, (have a feeling of,—empfinden,) the outward object, but that we have an intuition of it. According to this hypothesis, we should never get further than the impression: for, though it be said that the impression is first referred to the outward object (as its cause), and that thereby arises the representation of the latter, it is not recollected that on occasion of the intuition, we are conscious of no such act, no*

such going forth from ourselves, no such opposition and relationship; also that the certainty of the presence of an object, (which yet must be something distinct from the impression,) cannot rest on so uncertain a conclusion. In any case, therefore, the intuition must at least be considered as a free act, even though one that is occasioned by the impression.
Transl.

Note. This is, methinks, all very weak. The Realist may surely affirm that an impression of a given force is what we call an object, as Schelling affirms, that the mere self-excitation of our own self-directed operations are what we mean by objects.

I always thought one of the difficulties attending the notion of cause was its co-instanteity with the effect. The heat and the fire for instance. In all things, the effect is the presence of some other thing than the cause. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 239. *In fine between the cause and its effect, continuity holds good, not only according to Time, but according to Space also.* Transl.

Kant, justifying the logical possibility of attraction, as a cause acting at a distance, has shewn the sophistry of this assertion in his *Vermischte Schriften*, and Schelling himself adopts and confirms the argument of Kant in his *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*. S. T. C.

Notes written in Schelling's System des Transc. Id. on or before the title page.

Berkeley's scheme is merely an evolution of the positions—All perception is reducible to sensation, and All sensation is exclusively *subjective* (He who feels, feels *himself*).—*Ergo*, all Perception is merely subjective (“*Perceptum = percipi: or Dum percipitur, est.* The *principium cognoscendi* is raised into the *principium essendi*.) Now I should commence my reply to Berkeley by denying both positions—or, (what is tantamount,) the second. Sensation, I would say, is never merely subjective, but ought to be classed as a *minimum* or lower degree of Perception. Sensation, I assert, is not exclusively subjective, but of all the *known* syntheses of Subject + Object it is the least objective; but for that reason still objective—or, (to express my position in a somewhat more popular form), Sensation is Perception within the narrowest sphere. But, this admitted, Berkeleyanism falls at once. Now the facts of zoology are all in favour of my position, and the whole class of *Protozoa* so many in-

stances of its Truth. Nay, as Extremes meet, Sensation, in its first manifestation, is eminently *objective*. The light, warmth, and surrounding fluid are the brain and nerves of the polyp: even as the true Objective (the corporeal world as it is) exists only *subjectively*, that is, in the *mind* of the philosopher, while the true Subjective, (that is, the appearances resulting from the position and mechanism of the Percipient,) exists for our common consciousness only as independent and pure *Object*. S. T. C.

Ib. pp. 15, 16. *But with these two problems we see ourselves entangled in a contradiction. According to B. there is demanded a dominion of Thought (of the Ideal) over the world of sense: but how is such a dominion conceivable, when (according to A.) the representation, in its origin, is the mere slave of the Objective? Conversely, if the real world is something quite independent of us, according to which, as its archetype, our Representation (according to A.) must regulate itself, then it is inconceivable, how on the other hand the real world can regulate itself according to Representations in us. In a word, the practical certainty is lost to us by reason of the theoretical, the theoretical through the practical; it is impossible that there should be at the same time Truth in our Knowledge, and Reality in our will.* Transl.

Note. Written at the end of the volume.

Ye Gods, annihilate both Space and Time, and then this paragraph may become cogent logic. But as it is, one might with equal plausibility from the fact of one man's lying on his back deduce the impossibility of another man's standing on his feet; or from the impossibility of both positions in the same man at the same time infer the impossibility of both positions successively. Besides the *antitheta* are not adequate opposites, much less contraries. A wheel presented to me generates, without apparent materials, the image of the wheel in my mind. Now if the pre-conception of a wheel in the artist's mind generated in like manner a corporeal wheel in outward space, or even in a mass of timber, then indeed, (though even so I can see no contradiction in the two hypotheses,) a problem would arise of which the equality or sameness of kind in the two generators might be the most natural solution. Yet even here there is a flaw in the antithesis: for, to make it perfectly correspondent, the mass of wood ought to generate the image, wheel. Where is the inconsistency between the reality (i.e. actual realizing

power) of the Will in respect of the relative position of objects, and the reality of the objects themselves independent of the position? Is the marble of a statue less really marble than the marble in the quarry? What after all does the problem amount to more than the fact, that the Will is a *vis motrix*, and the mind a *directive* power at one moment and in relation to the Will, and a Re- or Per-cipient in relation to objects moving or at rest? Schelling seems at once to deny and yet suppose the objectivity—and on no other grounds than that he commences by giving objectivity to abstractions. A acting he calls Will; the same A acted on he calls *Truth*; and then, because acting and being acted on, are Antitheses or *opposite* States, he first turns them into *contrary things*, and then transfers this contrariety to the subject A. That A acts on B, and is itself acted on by C, is a fact, to *the How?* respecting which I may have no other answer than *Nescio*: but that my ignorance as to *the How?* makes any contradiction in the Fact, I can by no means admit, any more than that a mail coach moving ten miles an hour upon the road contradicts the fact of the same standing in a coach house the night following. S. T. C.

Written at the beginning of the volume.

Pp. 15, 16. § C. The remarks on the blank leaves at the end of this volume are, I still think, valid: so far that all Schelling's "contradictions" are reducible to the one difficulty of comprehending the co-existence of the Attributes, *Agere et Pati*, in the same subject, and that the difficulty is diminished rather than increased by the Facts of human *Art*, in which the *Pati* and the *Agere* take place in different relations and at different moments. Likewise that Schelling's position of Opposites, viz. Nature and Intelligence as the same with Object and Subject, already supposes Plurality, and this being supposed, the whole hypothesis becomes *arbitrary*, for the conception of Plurality once admitted, Object and Subject become mere relative terms, and no reason can be assigned why each existent should not be both Object and Subject. But if he begins at the beginning, then the objection applies—viz. that Schelling arbitrarily substantiates attributes. For, in the very act of opposing A to B, he supposes an X common to both, viz. Being, *ὄνσια*; but this given, there is no necessary reason, why Objectivity and Subjectivity should not both be predicable of both—so namely that the Subject B

is an Object to the Subject A, and the Subject A an Object to the Subject B; as in the instance of a lover and his mistress gazing at each other. Finally it is a suspicious Logic when no answer can be given to the question, "What do you mean? Give me an instance." The fact is, that every instance, Schelling would have brought, would simply give an object as the base of the Subject; and his *bewusste Thätigkeit ohne Bewusstseyn* I do not understand. At least if he mean the Will, it is a strange way of expressing himself; and at all events he should have previously explained the distinction between primary consciousness, ceasing on the coincidence of O. with S.—and the secondary, or consciousness of having been conscious, which is memory. It would be well to shew, how much better Schelling's meaning might have been given in simple common-life words. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 17. This argument grounds itself on the assertion "*es ist allerdings eine productive Thätigkeit, welche im Wollen sich äussert,*" in the very same sense of the word "productive," in which Nature "*im produciren der Welt productiv sey:*" only that the one is "*mit*" the other "*ohne Bewusstseyn productiv.*" Now this is merely asserted. I deny it, and for the reasons above stated. S. T. C.—i. e. at this moment. A book I value, I reason and quarrel with as with myself when I am reasoning. S. T. C.

P. S. Add to this, one scruple which always attacks my mind when I read Schelling or Fichte. Does Perception imply a greater mystery, or less justify a postulate, than the act of Self-consciousness, that is, Self-perception? Let Perception be demanded as an Act Specific of the mind, and how many of the grounds of Idealism become $0=0$!

No! I am wrong. For grant this mysterious Perception, yet ask yourself *what* you perceive and a contradiction ensues. (*The rest lost.* S. C.) S. T. C.

Transc. Id. last paragraph of p. 40-1. *How we, in respect of those positions, in which a wholly heterogeneous Objective falls in with a Subjective—(and this takes place in every synthetic judgment $A=B$; the Predicate, the conception here always represents the Subjective, the Subject the Objective)—can arrive at certainty, is inconceivable.* Transl.

Note. It seems to me that the Logician proceeds from the principles of Identity, Alterity and Multëity or Plurality, as already known:—that the Logical *I* attributes its own Subjectivity to whatever really *is*, and takes for granted that a

Not-he really is—and that it is a *Subject*; and this he proceeds to make objective for himself by the predicate. N.B. It does not follow, that the Logical *I* attributes its Egöity, as well as its Subjectivity, to the *not-itself*, as far as it is.

In other words the Logical *I* seems to me to represent the individual *I*, which must indeed be this or that or some other, but without determining which it is—individuality, or singularity, *in genere*, as when we say, every man is *an* individual.


In the position, “Greeks are handsome,” Schelling says, the *Subject* “Greeks” represents the Object,—the Predicate “handsome,” the Subjective. Now I would say “Greeks” is a Subject assumed by apposition with myself as a Subject. Now this Subject I render objective for myself by the Predicate. By becoming objective it does not cease to be a Subject.

It follows of course that I look on Logic as essentially empirical in its pre-conditions and postulates, and *posterior* to Metaphysics; unless you would name these the higher Logic.

N. B. The following remarks apply merely to the Logical form, not to the Substance of Schelling’s Philosophy.

Schelling finds the necessity of splitting, not alone Philosophy, but the Philosopher, twy-personal, at two several gates.

This system may be represented by a straight road from *B a* to *B b*.



with a gate at *A*, the massive door of which is barred on both sides: so that when he arrives at *A* from *B a*, he must return back, and go round by *C* to *B b*, in order to reach the same point from that direction.

Now I appear to myself to obviate this inconvenience by simply reversing the assumption that Perception is a species, of which Sensation is the genus, or that Perception is only a more finely organized Sensation. With me, Perception is the *essentia prima*, and Sensation *perceptio unius*; while Perception so called is *perceptio plurium simultanea*. Or

thus: single Intuition is Sensation, comparative and complex Intuition, Perception. The consequences of this position are wide and endless. S. T. C.

The whole difficulty lies in the co-existence of *Agere et Pati* as Predicates of the same subject. S. T. C.

(Written on a blank page before the title page of the *Transfc. Id.* S. C.)

P. 54, and then pp. 59-62. The *Spinozism* of Schelling's system first betrays itself; though the very comparison *des reinen Ichs zum geometrischen Raume* ought, by its inadequacy and only partial fitness, to have rescued him. *Im Raume* the *materia* and the limiting power are diverse. S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 118. (As I fear that these notes on the *Transfc. Id.* will scarcely interest or be intelligible to any but readers of that work, I do not give the long passage to which the following refers. S. C.)

But why, if there are many *Ichheiten*, should not No. 1 I act on No. 2 I? If I act on itself, it is acted on, therefore actible on by an I. But to assert that it can be acted on by this and no other incomprehensibly-determined-in-its-comprehensible-determinateness-I, is to assert, and no more. In short, the Attributes of the Absolute Synthesis, the *I AM in that I AM*, are falsely transferred to the *I AM in that God is*.

Aye, replies Schelling, this would be *secundum principium essendi*; but I speak only *secundum principium sciendi*.

True, I rejoin, but you assert that the two Principles are one; p. 18. l. 17-18.* What is this but to admit that the *I itself*, even in its absolute synthesis, supposes an already perfected Intelligence, as the ground of the possibility of its existing as it does exist? And what is Schelling's *Begränztheit überhaupt* but the *allgemeinerte* abstraction from the *bestimmten Begränztheiten*—a mere *ens logicum*, like motion, form, colour, &c.? S. T. C.

Note written in Schelling's *Syst. des Transfc. Id.* p. 121. above the section headed—*Problem: to explain how the I beholds itself as perceptive.* Transl.

* The two things taken together, that the defined Limitation cannot be defined through the Limitation in general, and yet that it arises at the same time with this, and through one Act, makes that it is the Incomprehensible and Inexplicable of Philosophy. Transl.

I more and more see the arbitrariness and inconveniences of using the same term, *Anschauung*, for the productive and the contemplative Acts of the Intelligential Will, which Schelling calls *das Ich*. If *this** were true, *the I* could never become self-conscious: for the same impossibility for the same reason will recur in the second act—and so in fact it is. We can no more pass without a *saltus* from mere Sensation to Perception, than from marble to Sensation.

Whether it is better to assume Sensation as a *minimum* of Perception, or to take them as originally diverse, and to contend, that in all Sensation a minor grade of Perception is comprised, deserves consideration. S. T. C.

Transc. Id. pp. 259-60. *Since then Intelligence beholds the evolution of the Universe, so far as it falls within its view (Anschauung), in an organization, it must consequently behold the same as identical with itself.*

Whether from acquired habit or no, I do not, and seem to myself never to have, regarded my body as identical with myself, my brain any more than my nails or hair, or my eyes than a pair of spectacles. S. T. C.

A few other notes of Mr. C. on Schelling have become partly illegible, or are too much interwoven with the text to be given here. S. C.

On a treatise in the *Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft*, entitled *Grundsätze zu einer künftigen Seelenlehre*, Ground-positions for a future Doctrine of the Soul,—Mr. Coleridge writes thus:

Never surely was work written so utterly unsatisfactory for both head and heart. What *we* are or are to be; what the *I* is, is not even spoken of. But we are gravely told in the last paragraph, that, if we act virtuously, the soul will remember a something of which *we*, while there was a *We*, had been likewise conscious: while our brother Nothings, who had not been virtuous, would be forgotten by this Soul!!—though how this unconscious Soul can be said to *forget* what, according to this hypothesis, she never knew anything at all about, I cannot even conjecture. And what is the basis of the whole system?—mere *Ipse dixit*s grounded on the mere

* This Intuition, (*Anschauung*), is an Activity, but *the I* cannot at once behold, and behold itself, as beholding, (*anschauen, und sich anschauen, als anschauend*.) *Ib.* p. 121. Transl.

assumptions of the scheme of dead mechanical emanation. S. T. C.

At the end of Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen, &c. des Herrn Friedr. Heinr. Jacobi, Mr. Coleridge has written :

Spite of all the superiour airs of the *Natur-Philosophen*, I confess that, in the perusal of Kant, I breathe the free air of Good Sense and Logical Understanding with the light of Reason shining in it and through it; while in the *Physics* of Schelling I am amused with happy conjectures, and in his *Theology* am bewildered by positions, which, in their first sense are transcendental (*über fliegend*), in their literal sense scandalous. S. T. C.

In the blank page at the beginning Mr. Coleridge, after speaking of Schelling's great genius and intellectual vigour, objects to his "exaltation of the Understanding over the Reason." "What understanding?" he says, "That of which Jacobi had spoken? No such thing! but an Understanding enlightened;—in other words, the whole Man spiritually regenerated. There is doubtless much true and acute observation on the indefiniteness, the golden mists of Jacobi's scheme; but it is so steeped in gall as to repel one from it. And then the Fancy is unlithe and wooden, jointed in the wilful open-eyed dream—and the wit, the would be smile, sardonic throughout. Dry humour with a vengeance." S. T. C.

On a margin of Schelling's *Philosophie und Religion*, in which the author contends with a work of Eschenmeyer's, the aim of which is to reintegrate Philosophy with Faith, at p. 7, Mr. C. writes:

Whatever St. Paul, (the Apostle to and through the Understanding) may have done, yet Christ and John use the word *Faith* not as Eschenmeyer, &c. but as a *total energy* of the moral and intellectual being, destitute of all anti-thesis. S. T. C.

On p. 5 Mr. Coleridge writes :

Here we have strikingly exemplified the ill effects of ambiguous (i. e. double meaning) words even on highest minds. The whole dispute between Schelling and Eschenmeyer arises out of this, that what Eschenmeyer asserts of *Faith* (the fealty of the partial faculty, even of Reason itself, as merely speculative, to the focal energy, i. e. Reason + Will + Understanding = Spirit) Schelling understands of

Belief, i. e. the substitution of the Will + Imagination + Sensibility for the Reason. S. T. C.

Philosophy and Religion, pp. 21-2.

If I do not deceive myself, the truth, which Schelling here *toils* in and after, like the moon in the scud and cloudage of a breezy November night, is more intelligibly and adequately presented in my scheme or Tetraxy.

1. Absolute Prothesis.

WILL absolutely and essentially causative of Reality. Therefore

2. Absolute Thesis

of its own reality. *Mens-Pater*. But the absolute Will self-realized is still absolutely creative of Reality. It has all Reality in itself; but it must likewise have all Reality in another. That is, all eternal relations are included in all Reality, and here there can be no difference but of *relation*, but this must be a real relation.

3. Absolute Antithesis.

But the absolute of *Mens* is *Idea, absoluta adæquata, Deus Filius*.

But where Alterity exists without difference of Attribute, the Father beholdeth himself in the only-begotten Son, and the Son acknowledgeth the Father in himself, an *Act* of absolute Unity is given, proceeding from the Father into the Son, from the Son into the Father—*περιχώρησις, processio intercircularis*.

4. Absolute Synthesis, Love, *Deus Spiritus*.

From the beginning I avoid the false opposition of Real and Ideal, which embarrasses Schelling. *Idea* with me is contradistinguished only from conception, notion, construction, impression, sensation. S. T. C.

The *Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft* and the *Zeitschrift der Spekulative Physik*, edited by Schelling, contain writings by a disciple of his, Dr. Steffens. On pp. 21-2 of a Review by Steffens of the later natural-philosophical writings of the Editor in the latter, Mr. Coleridge says :

The clear-headed perspicuous Steffens, whom I love and honour with heart and head, could not but feel the obscurity and limping of Schelling's theory of warmth, or the groundwork at least of the promised theory, as given in his *Einleitung* : and nothing but his reverential sense of Schelling's genius, would, I am persuaded, have influenced him to adopt so implicitly his great master's dynamico-atomistic assump-

tion of Simple Actions. As to Warmth, far more beautiful is Steffens's own doctrine, who regards it as the Indifference between Light and Gravity. And yet there must be a lower form of Light and Warmth, in which they stand in antagonism. Why not thus? Let the highest product of Light (n.b. not as the universal Antithesis to Gravity, including the power of sound, &c., but) as *Lux phænomenon* or Light commonly so called, be the outward pole or correspondent Excitant of Organization. A lower will be a chemical, or chemico-mechanical stuff, embodying the chemical powers of contraction, as Oxygen,—while the Warmth will appear as the dilation in Hydrogen, the substance or magnetic product with which the one is combined and made latent being the metal y, the stuff representative of—Magnetism, and the other the metal x, the stuff representative of + Magnetism, not improbably Nitrogen itself. The order would be thus:

<i>Lux phænomenon.</i>	Caloric.
— Electricity.	+ Electricity.
Oxygen.	Hydrogen.
Functions.	Functions.
1. Distinction.	1. Diffusion.
2. Contraction.	2. Dilation.
3. Fixation.†	3. Vis fluidifica.‡

† i.e. When it acts on a Fluid,—for a Fluid is that which has no distinguishable parts: the oxygen acts therefore on the whole as at all and one. But for the same reason, when it acts on a Solid (= *rectius*, Rigid) it exerts the same fixive power by causing a retraction of each particle in upon itself, as it were, and thus produces the phænomenon of pulverization or multëity, and the quality of positive hardness. The power exerted is the same in both, and differenced only by the subjects.

‡ Hydrogen. *Fluidum fluidissimum æreum quidem propter levitatem ejus relativam, haud vero aer. An Air.*

Jahrbücher der Med. Dritt. Band, zweyt Heft. *Ueber die Vegetation* von H. Steffens. P. 197.

Thou askest how we presume to say anything about vegetation, without having spoken on the nature of light. Hast thou seen it, or is it not seeing itself? Steff. Transl.

There is a quackery in passages like these, very unpleasant

to my feelings. This *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* without notice! *Du fragst*:—What do I ask?—or concerning what? Light as an object—that somewhat, in the absence of which vegetables *blanch*, &c. And Steffens answers me as if we had been conversing of *subjective* Light—and asks me, is it not the same as Light! Is not its *esse* in the *videre*? I see a herring,—I see milk,—I slice the fresh herring lengthways and suspend the slips in a clear phial of milk,—all this is *seeing*. But in an hour or two I see the phial shining, I see a luminous apparition, and, if I darken the room, I can see other things by it within the sphere of a foot. Now it is *this*, we were talking of: and what sense is there in saying: *Ist es nicht das Sehen selbst?* S. T. C.

At the end of some remarks on a treatise by Franz Baader *Ueber Starres und Fliessendes*, immediately following that of Steffens on Vegetation, Mr. Coleridge says:

The word matter, *materia*, ὕλη, is among the most obscure and unfixed in the whole nomenclature of metaphysics, and I am afraid that the knot must be cut, i. e. a fixed meaning must be arbitrarily imposed on the word, as I have done in defining

Matter as mere *videri* ✕ (opposed to) spirit as *quod agit et non apparet*, the synthesis being body. At all events I would have preferred the terms Quantity and Quality: thus:

Materia + *Spiritus* = *Corpus*. *Ergo Materia est in corpore: spiritus agit per Corpus*. Matter and Spirit are Body: then Spirit (2) re-emerges in moments, as a property or function of Body, but *in omni tempore* and as the whole *per totalitatem immamentem*—it is Quality—*Spiritus potentialis*. Again *Materia ens in corpore* = Quantity. S. T. C.

Note A. a. p. 28.

IT has been thought that this epigram was suggested by one in a book called *Terræ-Filius*, or The secret History of the University of Oxford, London, 1726. I give the older epigram, though I think its paternal relationship to the later one by no means clear on internal evidence, and know not that my father ever saw the volume which contains it.

Upon some verses of Father William.

“Thy verses are immortal, O! my friend,
For he who reads them, reads them to no end.”

No. xxvi. vol. i. p. 142.

Note A. b. p. 59.

PREFIXED to the works of Cowley is an Account of his Life and Writings by T. Sprat, afterwards Bishop of Rochester. Mr. Coleridge alludes to his suppression of Cowley's letters, on which subject Sprat says: "The truth is, the letters that pass between particular friends, if they are written as they ought to be, can scarce ever be fit to see the light. They should not consist of fulsome compliments, or tedious politics, or elaborate elegancies, or general fancies, but they should have a native clearness and shortness, a domestical plainness, and a peculiar kind of familiarity, which can only affect the humour of those to whom they were intended. The very same passages, which make writings of this nature delightful amongst friends, will lose all manner of taste, when they come to be read by those that are indifferent. In such letters the souls of men should appear undressed: and in that negligent habit, they may be fit to be seen by one or two in a chamber, but not to go abroad into the streets."

There are many very delightful domestic letters, which are quite unfit for publication; and on the other hand many letters fit for the public eye have been written to friends; as those of Cowper. In general it may be said that men of genius, especially if their intellectual powers have been cultivated, are apt to rise above mere home wit and wisdom even when they are speaking of home matters; they seldom treat details and particulars merely as such, but quickly bring them into the light of principles and general truths, and even in their chamber are fit to go abroad into the streets,—nay fitter sometimes than if they had dressed themselves for a public entertainment. Few will agree with Sprat that "*nothing* of this nature should be published," though care should be taken to publish nothing which really answers to his description in suiting only "the humour of those for whom it was intended." "Fulsome compliments and tedious politics" are fit neither for private nor public perusal. S. C.

Note A. c. p. 60.

THE illustration of St. Nepomuc occurs in Richter's *Blumen-Frucht-und-Dornen-Stücke* (Flower, Fruit, and Thorn Pieces) chap. v. The author says "Since the tasters," (critics or reviewers,) "seldom write books themselves,

they have the more leisure for looking over and valuing those of others; occasionally indeed they write bad ones, and therefore know immediately the look of a bad book when one comes in their way." (Noel's Transl. p. 135.) They know the *look* of it certainly; they recognise in it the old familiar features, and conceive an affection for it at first sight. But they are far from knowing or declaring it to be *bad*. The same delusion that led them to write bad books under the impression that they were writing good ones, attends them when they enter upon the office of critic, and then they mistake bad for good and good for bad; but doubtless the remembrance that they themselves have been condemned as writers makes them eager to find writers whom they may condemn in their turn; as boys at school, though they cannot retaliate upon their tormentors, yet feel it a compensation to inflict upon others what has been inflicted on them. But, as Mr. Carlyle says, "all flesh, and reviewer-flesh too, is fallible and pardonable;" and they who have suffered from reviewers, though their depositions may be heard in evidence, are not to pronounce the final judgment on their merits and demerits. S. C.

Note A. d. p. 96.

SINCE this was printed, being assured by a friend that the story contained in the author's note at p. 96, is told in one of Jeremy Taylor's Sermons, I sought again and found it in Sermon XII. of the Twenty-seven preached at Golden Grove, entitled The Mercy of the Divine Judgments; or, God's method in curing sinners. But either Mr. Coleridge has added to the passage given by him as a quotation, as well as slightly altered it, or he must have found the story with a different comment in some other place. The words of Taylor are these: "St. Lewis the king having sent Ivo, Bishop of Chartres, on an embassy, the bishop met a woman on the way, grave, sad, fantastic, and melancholic, with fire in one hand, and water in the other. He asked what those symbols meant. She answered, My purpose is with fire to burn paradise, and with my water to quench the flames of hell, that men may serve God without the incentives of hope and fear, and purely for the love of God." He then proceeds "But this woman began at the wrong end," &c. S. C.

Note A. p. 107.

AFTER the chapters which treat of Association of Ideas in this volume were printed I met with the following remarks in *The Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, a new publication by J. H. Burton, Esq. Advocate. The author quotes the passage in the B. L. concerning Hume's probable obligations to Aquinas,—then Sir J. M.'s explanation, which disposes of the external evidence undoubtedly: then proceeds to say:

“With regard to the internal evidence, the passage of Aquinas particularly referred to, which will be found below,* refers to memory, not imagination, to the recall of images in the relation to each other in which they have once had a place in the mind, not to the formation of new associations, or aggregates of ideas there; nor will it bring the theories to an identity, that, according to Hume's doctrine, nothing can be recalled in the mind unless its elements have already been deposited there in the form of ideas, because the observations of Aquinas apply altogether to the reminiscence of aggregate objects.”

Neither Maasz nor Coleridge could have been unaware, that both text and commentary relate to Memory and Recollection. But what is Memory? Stewart, so distinguished for psychological analysis, tells us, that the word “always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire.”† Locke says, “this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the Memory signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions

* *Quandoque reminiscitur aliquis incipiens ab aliqua re, cujus memoratur, a qua procedit ad aliam triplici ratione. Quandoque quidem ratione similitudinis, sicut quando aliquis memoratur de Socrate, et per hoc occurrit ei Plato, qui est similis ei in sapientia; quandoque vero ratione contrarietatis, sicut si aliquis memoretur Hectoris, et per hoc occurrit ei Achilles. Quandoque vero ratione propinquitatis cujuscumque, sicut cum aliquis memor est patris, et per hoc occurrit ei filius. Et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia propinquitate, vel societatis, vel loci, vel temporis, et propter hoc fit reminiscencia, quia motus horum se invicem consequuntur. Commentary Lectio V. b. p. 26. Antw. Edit. 1612.*

† *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. chap. vi. s. 1. p. 306.*

which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before."*

Memory then, as commonly understood, is the faculty of preserving and recalling mental representations, together with the consciousness that they have been presented to the mind before : and in this sense it is obviously a mode of the Imagination, which is in general "the faculty of representing an object without the presence of it in the intuition;" although likewise a modification of the Judgment, inasmuch as it judges of present thoughts and images that they are the same as past ones. Maasz observes indeed that, strictly taken, Memory is simply the power of perceiving this identity of present with past representations, which Hobbes calls a "mixt sense, but internal;" but that, since this presupposes the recalling of former ones, and we may add, the retaining them to be recalled, the common use of speech makes a *quid pro quo* and ascribes the latter also to Memory.† Now it is certainly the broad popular sense of Memory which Aristotle and Aquinas treat of; in which sense it belongs in part to Imagination; and surely the principle whereby we recall ideas and preserve them in a certain order is the same as the general principle of the association of ideas, though Aristotle does not expressly say this because his object did not require it. "The observations of Aquinas apply to the reminiscence of aggregate objects."—True—but do they not at the same time shew how the objects came to be aggregated? *Causa autem reminiscendi, says Aquinas, est ordo motuum qui relinquuntur in anima ex prima impressione ejus, quod primo apprehendimus.*‡ The process of recollection depends on the order of the motions left in the mind from the first impression; and Aquinas, after Aristotle, states the law of that order, though only, as Sir J. Mackintosh observes, for the sake of explaining recollection. The objects are strung together, like beads, upon the string of propinquity or relationship; in reminiscence we lay hold of the string, and follow it with the hand, till we arrive at the particular bead which we wish to bring close to the eye. Mr. Burton says that "the scope of Aquinas's remarks has more reference to mnemonics or artificial memory than to association." But since artificial memory depends wholly upon associa-

* Hum. Understand. b. 11. cap. x. s. 2.

† *Versuch der Einbildungskraft*, pp. 16-17.

‡ *Commentary, Lectio V. a. p. 26.*

tion, and association itself also depends on memory—(for we could not connect any one mental presentation with another if we could not *preserve* those we have once had and distinguish them from such as are immediately present;)—Aquinas could not well refer to the principles of the one without indicating the law of the other. Memory comes into act only in conjunction with other powers of the mind; its relation to phantasy or imagination is implied by Hobbes in his *Human Nature*, chap. iii. and it is plainly stated by Aristotle *De Memoria*, cap. i. Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνοσ οὐ φάντασμα, ἕξις. “What then memory and to remember is, hath been said, namely that it is the habit of the phantasm, as the image of that which the phantasm represents:” that is, says Aquinas, a certain habitual conservation of the phantasm, not indeed according to itself, for that belongs to the imaginative virtue, but inasmuch as the phantasm is the image *alicujus prius sensati*, of something previously perceived by sense. In this first chapter Aristotle shews that Memory has its seat in the same power of the soul as phantasy. Τίνος μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη, φανερόν, ὅτι οὐπὲρ καὶ ἡ φαντασία. It is true that Memory is concerned with intellectual representations as well as sensible ones, and therefore, as Maasz observes, does not belong to Imagination alone; but neither does association of ideas belong to Imagination alone; all our “ideas of reflection” are associable in the same way and by the same influences as those of sensation, though the former are not *imaged*. Mr. Coleridge did not think it necessary to state the connection between memory and other cognitive powers of the soul when he passed at once, at the end of chap. vii. from “Association of Ideas” to “Acts of Memory.”

Insisting upon the merits of Hume’s classification, Mr. Burton observes, that it embodies cause and effect but not contrariety; that of Aquinas contrariety* but not cause and

* By *contrariety* Aquinas does not seem to have meant contrast in being and character, but opposition or antagonism in position, at least in his first mention of it. His example of Achilles and Hector shows this, for they were signal adversaries, but not directly opposed to each other in qualities of mind or body. Aristotle’s expression *ἐναντίον* might signify any opposedness; and in a subsequent paragraph (*e. p. 26*) Aquinas explains contrariety as contrast, when he is concerned with Aristotle’s own

effect; and that "in a division into three elements this discrepancy is material." Hume refined upon the older classification no doubt; he was not likely to overlook cause and effect, on which subject he wrote his most remarkable essay; but I doubt whether this division into *three* elements is so very *material*. Nearness in time and nearness in space, though they may form one clause of a sentence, are different kinds of nearness, and on the other hand cause and effect must *in part* be subordinated to them when viewed in reference to association;—likeness and contrast are not quite reducible to one principle, if the last may "be considered as a mixture of *causation* and *resemblance*." It is perhaps better to say, as Mr. Coleridge does, that there are *five* occasioning causes of recollections, or five sorts of connections of ideas more or less distinguished from each other, all containing the idea of nearness,* but each, I should suppose, exerting an influence on the association, in its own individual right.

Mr. Burton's assumption that "Coleridge failed to keep in view, in his zeal to discover some curious thing, &c. that the classification is not that of Aquinas, but of Aristotle," is puzzling. Mr. Coleridge's aim all along is to shew the classification to have been originally Aristotle's, and Aristotle's commentator is only called into court by him to depose on this point. Those who imagine that Mr. Coleridge had no other object, than to detect Hume or any one else in plagiarism, are judging him not by himself but by others very unlike him.

Note B. p. 112.

THE elder Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, was a learned philologist of the eighteenth century, the author of

illustration of proceeding from the moisture of the atmosphere to Autumn, a dry season.

* Speaking of Dr. Brown Sir James Mackintosh says: "He falls into another and more unaccountable error, in representing his own reduction of Mr. Hume's principles of association (resemblance, contrariety, causation, contiguity in time or place) to the one principle of contiguity, as a discovery of his own, by which his theory is distinguished from "the universal opinion of philosophers." Nothing but too exclusive a consideration of the doctrines of the Scottish school could have led him to speak thus of what was hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac." *Ethical Philosophy*, p. 164.

several works, but best known by his writings on the instinct of animals, and since his death by the attribution to him of the famous Wolfenbüttel Fragments, published by Lessing in 1774 and 1777, his authorship of which was in the end put beyond doubt.

His son, Joh. Alb. Heinrich, was born at Hamburg in 1729, attained to eminence as a physician in his native city, became Professor of the Natural Sciences at the Gymnasium in 1796, died at Ranzau in 1814. Archdeacon Hare believes him to have been "a rationalizing moralist of the same class as Franklin, one of those who imagined that the world might be regenerated by philosophy;" and mentions that his writings were chiefly on electricity, conductors, &c. which led him into a kind of controversy with Kant. J. A. H. Reimarus, though of his Father's mind in regard to revelation, appears to have belonged to the higher order of those who profess to hold what is commonly called (by a misnomer as Mr. Coleridge has affirmed) *natural* religion. He maintained the existence of a Supreme Being, not as a mere abstraction,—which he insisted that on Spinoza's system He is made to appear, however the author of that system may have protested against such a consequence,—but as the living God, the source of all being, from our relations to whom, prayer, thanksgiving, and adoration naturally arise, but whose nature and ways are not properly apprehensible by us,—in whom *to know, to will, and to work are one thing*. His language on this subject is very similar to that used afterwards by Fichte in his *Bestimmung des Menschen*. But Reimarus declared that the proof of all which men ought to know and believe for their soul's good in religion can never be derived from appearances, occurrences, tradition, history or sayings of Fathers, nor through inward illumination or feeling or immediate inspiration, but,—mistaken man!—certainly through development, comparison and examination of the complex and connection of truths, or by the labour of the understanding set forth in due order through the connection of thought. These views he unfolds in a treatise *Ueber die Gründe der menschlichen Erkenntniss und der natürlichen Religion*, and I suppose it is to a brief passing refutation of materialism, given in sections 3-7, at the beginning of this work, that Mr. Coleridge refers in the second sentence of chap. vi. of this volume. S. C.

Note D. p. 213.

“**A**BOUT the close of the fourth century, and probably during the lifetime of Odin, Ulphilas, an Arian of Mœsia, undertook the conversion of the Goths. He translated from the Greek many portions of Scripture into the Mæso-gothic language, (*see Michaelis's Introduction to the New Testament*, § 82-87,) went as a missionary among the inhabitants of Dacia, and succeeded in drawing their attention to the contents of the Sacred Books. So many Dacians had served in the army at Constantinople, or had visited that city from motives of commerce or curiosity, that the foundation of Christian places of worship among them had become a public wish. Ulphilas obtained from the Emperor Valeus, at Constantinople, the requisite patronage, and was honoured with a sort of episcopal jurisdiction over the Churches which he had founded, and the tribes which he had undertaken to instruct; and he deserved by his virtues the confidence and allegiance of his extensive flock.

“Of his translations from Scripture, but a small portion of the Gospel has been preserved, which was edited at Oxford in 1750, by Lye, and in divers cities of the Continent by Junius, by Ihre, and lately by Zahn, at Weissenfels, 1805. This version disputes with the poems of Odin the honour of being the oldest monument of German literature.” From Taylor's *Historic Survey of German Poetry*. Vol. I. p. 93.

Note E. p. 214.

OTFRIDE or Otfride was a pious and learned monk, who spent the greater part of his life in the Monastery of Weissemburg in Lower Alsace. Taylor, in the *Historic Survey*, says that he studied at Fulda, and wrote before the year 876; that his rimed Pater Noster, rimed Eucharistic Hymn, metrical version of various portions of Scripture, and rimeless poem on the Nativity are to be found in Hicke. He also wrote a grammar for the sake of purifying the German language, or rather completed that which Charlemagne had begun. S. C.

Note F. p. 215.

HANS SACHS, whose proper name was Loutzdorffer, was born at Nürnberg in 1494, became a Protestant, edited his poems in 1558, and died in 1576. In early youth

he wandered from city to city, joining the *Meistersänger*, who composed godly poems and hymns, and sang them in the Churches, wherever he went. He has been described as a pattern of virtue, who withdrew others from the ways of vice to good and holy living. Taylor says that his poems filled three folio volumes, that they were received with noisy approbation, because they had a very popular turn and favoured the new doctrine; and compares the author to one Pierce the Plouman, who in like manner, by his satirical verses, lent an efficacious assistance to Wickliffe.

The collection of the poems of Hans Sachs, edited by Büsching at Nürnberg, 1816, contains Tragedies, Plays, Farces, Dialogues, Sonnets, Fables, Merry Tales, and Drolleries, the style of which is simple in thought and expression, but easy and flowing; the metre short and ballad-like, generally the eight or nine syllable iambic with rhyme. A tragic drama on the Creation and Fall of Adam and his Expulsion from Paradise, is placed first in the collection. This first volume (*erst. Buch.*) contains the grotesque Play on the story of Cain and Abel, which Mr. C. describes in the Remains, I. pp. 76-7.; translated by Sachs from the Latin of Melancthon. It is at p. 143. The first and last parts of this piece are not very congruous with each other. In the last act we have the awful adult Cain of the Old Testament; in the earlier ones, a naughty good for nothing boy, who runs away from his tasks to fight with dirty rough lads in the street, and longs to give that mammy-child, Abel, a good knock on the head. The dialogues between this sweet youth and his brother and parents, when he refuses to come and be washed and made smart to appear before the heavenly Examiners the next day, are amusingly natural, and show that Melancthon did not always abide in his study or the assemblies of the learned, but was acquainted with sin in its every day juvenile forms. This drama, which is entitled The unlike Children of Eve, and how God spake to them, is the prince of all naughty and good child stories: and if these are to be reckoned among the fruits of the Reformation, they are not among its best. But the tendency to bring the grotesque and the trivial into connection with serious and sacred subjects has been called "the disease of the age," and was by no means confined to the Reforming party. Archdeacon Hare thinks that the poem entitled—The Devil seeks him an abode upon earth, (*Zweit. Buch.* p. 52), may have suggested the general plan of the Devil's Walk. It describes

the Devil roaming about upon earth and observing the various ways of wickedness therein; but the details of the two poems are perfectly different. The drift of the older piece was puritanical; to warn youth against the ungodliness of the dance. The most marked piece of Hans Sachs about the Reformation is that called The Wittemberg Nightingale, (*die Wittembergisch' Nachtigall*), which describes the mummeries and corruptions of Popery, the Scriptural doctrine of Martin Luther, and the persecution undergone by his followers. This is a longish piece, consisting of 701 lines. In regard to what Mr. C. says in § 2 of p. 201, I have learned by the kindness of the Chevalier Bunsen, that there is a hymn by Hans Sachs, but one that does not at all answer to Mr. C's. description,—that he could not indeed have known of its existence, and that he must have been thinking of Luther's own Hymn of the Reformation; that he was also mistaken in ascribing The Morning Star, (*der Morgenstern*), to the Nürnberg poet. Both these devotional poems are contained in his Excellency's *Andachtbuch*, (Hymn and Prayer Book), the first at p. 263, the second at p. 203, with the name of the author, Phil. Nicolai. S. C.

Note G. p. 216.

“**M**MARTIN OPITZ was born at Breslau in 1595, and wrote Latin and German poems; which last are remarkable for a terseness hitherto unknown. Suspected of Socinianism, he was protected by Bethlem Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, who made him rector of a free-school at Weissenburg. His poems were printed at Frankfort, in 1623; and have since frequently been re-edited. He died of a contagious fever in 1639.”

The reputation of Opitz, perhaps, surpassed his merits, as it reposed rather on polish of diction than on strength of thought; his style however found many imitators.” *Historic Survey*, I. 172-3.

J. G. Eichhorn's *Geschichte der Literatur*, after stating that Wekhrlin and Opitz arose, the one in 1618, in the South, the other in 1620, in the North of Germany, that both took very much the same course in attempting to introduce a better taste and style in poetry, both sought to enoble and dignify the romantic material, by models selected from the ancients and the Italians, but that Wekhrlin with his inferior power and cultivation remained without imitators, proceeds to say: “Opitz on the contrary founded a poetical

school in Silesia, which maintained and propagated the good taste he had awakened for more than half a century. Such a model as Opitz deserved success. From how many irregular excrescences has he not cleared the German tongue! with how many new words, expressions, and applications, has he enriched it! For this purpose he availed himself with a very pure taste of the old German poets and later writers of ballads, through whom he obtained, as by inheritance, the romantic materials which he improved; along with these German sources he studied the Greeks and Romans, as the fathers of a sound taste, and the works of the genius of our western and southern neighbours, especially the Italians. From the last he borrowed the sonnet, and the melo-drama; the ancients he imitated in didactic and lyric poetry; successful in the former but far from happy in the latter, when he sought to rise above the light song; for of the loftier ode, either as regards its matter or spirit, he had not the remotest conception." Translation. (*Vierster Band. II. Abth. pp. 770-71.*) S. C.

Note H. p 216.

I NTERESTING accounts of the writers here mentioned are contained in the first volume of Taylor's *Historic Survey*. Christian Furchtegott Gellert was born July 4, 1715, at Haynichen in Saxony, where his father, who had twelve other children, was Pastor. He died, Dec. 5, 1769, longing for his release; for, like our own delightful Cowper, while he produced strains apt to inspire genial feelings in others, mirth and a love of nature, and even in hearts no longer young and gladsome for a while to renew

Vernal delight and joy able to drive
All sadness but despair,

he was himself saddened by miserable hypochondria, which, after shadowing his early life with passing clouds, at length, instead of dispersing itself, gathered round him and darkened his whole sky. In 1758, he became Professor of Moral Philosophy at Leipzig, and was very popular as a Lecturer. In 1746 he collected his *Fables in Verse*, which had "astounding success: and form, perhaps, the first native poetic work of the modern Germans, which became decidedly and nationally popular." The complete edition of his works, in five octavo volumes, appeared but a few months before his decease.

Friedric Gottlieb Klopstock was born in the Abbey at

Quedlinburg July 2, 1724; was the son of the land-steward of the domain, and eldest of ten children. He died in 1803, and was buried with great solemnity on the 22nd of March. The Danish Minister Bernstorff, struck with his poetical talents, invited him to Copenhagen, and obtained for him a pension of four hundred dollars for his support, while he completed his great work *The Messiah*, the first three cantos of which, already published, had made a great sensation in Germany. The Danish capital was his home till 1771. In 1798 he began to superintend a new and complete edition of his works, the first ten volumes of which contain his poetry, consisting of Odes, Epigrams, Dramas, and *The Messiah*, (with which vol. iii. commences), an Epic Poem of twenty books in Hexameter verse. Mr. Coleridge compares it with *Paradise Lost* in Lecture X. (*Lit. Remains*, I. p. 173.) According to Mr. Taylor, Klopstock was far from rivalling Milton in the "habitual demeanour" becoming a *great sacred poet*;—set no such example of Christian strictness, even after gaining fame by *The Messiah*, as that sublimest of Puritans, the author of *Paradise Lost*. Mr. Coleridge has protested against profaning "the awful name of Milton, by associating it with the epithet *Puritan*." Yet he would not have wholly dissented from the opinion of a well known writer, now amongst us, who calls "this Puritanism of ours,"—that is, the thing itself, in its pure rather than puritanical form,—“among the noblest Heroisms that ever transacted itself on this earth.”

Charles William Ramler was born in 1725 at Colberg in Pomerania, of needy parents, and received his early education at the orphan school of Stettin. He became Professor of Logic and Fine Literature in the Berlin Academy for cadets, which office and his various literary exertions maintained him comfortably till 1787, when he obtained a pension, a seat in the academy, and a share in the direction of the National Theatre. He died in 1798 of pulmonary consumption, after having withdrawn from his employments for some time before from ill health. His poems, consisting chiefly of odes, in the manner of Horace, obtained great popularity. They were first collected apart in 1772. Taylor observes that, though the lyric works of Ramler might be objected to by a severe critic, as having too much the character of imitations, yet while Lessing passed for an Aristotle, Mendelsohn for a Plato, and Gleim for an Anacreon,—and all of those were friends of his,—to him the epithet of the German Horace was applied with less hyperbole.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was born at Kamenz in Pomerania, in January 1729; was the son of a clergyman, (himself a voluminous writer) and the eldest of twelve children. He died at Hamburg, Feb. 15, 1781, after a life of many changes and various literary employments, having received the appointment of Librarian at Wolfenbüttel in 1769 from the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick. His poetry consists of Epigrams, Minor poems, Fables and Plays, of which Nathan the Wise, an argumentative drama, has been most celebrated, and, as curtailed by Schiller, became a favourite acting play throughout Germany. He appears however to have been far greater as a critic and polemic than as a poet, and wrote in an admirably clear style, and with considerable power of thought and erudition, on religion, philosophy, literature and art. A writer in the *Gent's Mag.* of May, 1846, contrasting him with Voltaire, after speaking of his close rigid logic, and eminently philosophical mind, affirms that "the love of *truth*, not the love of fame, was the active spring, the vital principle, of his intellectual activity."

Lessing is an author admired and extolled by men who have evidently no taste for German literature in its peculiar character, although it has lately been said, in an able article on Lessing in the *Edinboro' Review* (No. 166) that he "first gave to German literature its national tendencies and physiognomy;" that while Klopstock made it English, Wieland French, Lessing made it German. This remark rests, I think, upon no very solid grounds, at least as to Lessing's priority; for was not Klopstock, in all his attempts at rivaling the great English Epic,—with his cumulated ornaments and multitudinous imagery—"festoons of angels singing at every soar of the interminable ascension"—thoroughly Teutonic—and Wieland's Muse, even according to his own account, Germanized Italian rather than French? That some French poets endeavoured like him to turn their strains on Classic and on Italian models is but a limited ground of resemblance. The *Wallenstein* of Schiller and the finest parts of Goethe's *Faust* are perhaps more like English poetry of the first order, and have less unlikeness to it, than any other products of the German Muse; and for this reason that they are the *best* German poetry; and that, as the most beautiful forms and faces of all nations are alike in their predominant characteristics, so the finest and purest poetry of every nation has more in it which is common to all nations and less of mere national feature than the inferiour

kinds. But perhaps a national cast of *thought* is more to be discerned in prose writers than in poets. The *style* of Lessing is too good and pure to be eminently national.

The "compeers" of the four writers above mentioned were Hagedorn, Schlegel, Ebert, Kramer, Gleim, Kleist and others. Wieland, Herder and Bürger, more celebrated than those last named, came upon the field before they all had retired from it. S. C.

Note I. p. 217.

THE characteristics of German intellect Mr. Coleridge has given in *The Friend* (vol. iii. pp. 69-73. Essay I. 4th edit.) "If I take the three great countries of Europe," he says "in respect of intellectual character,—I should characterize them in the following way:—premising only that in the first line of the first two tables I mean to imply that genius, rare in all countries, is equal in both of these, the instances equally numerous; not, therefore, contra-distinguishing either from the other, but both from the third country.

GERMANY.	ENGLAND.	FRANCE.
Genius	Genius	Cleverness
Talent	Sense	Talent
Fancy	Humour	Wit,

So again with regard to the forms and effects, in which the qualities manifest themselves intellectually

GERMANY.	ENGLAND.	FRANCE.
Idea or Law Anticipated	Law discovered	Theory invented
Totality	Selection	Particularity
Distinctness	Clearness	Palpability.

Of "idea or law anticipated" he remarks that "this, as coordinate with genius, applies likewise to the few only, and, conjoined with the two following qualities, includes or supposes, as its consequences and accompaniments, speculations, system, method, &c." He represents the mind of the three countries as bearing the following relations to time,

GERMANY.	ENGLAND.	FRANCE.
Past and Future	Past and Present	The Present.

"The parent vice of German Literature," says the article on Lessing referred to in the last note, "is want of distinct purpose; and, as consequences of this, want of masculine character and chastened style." Hence, according to the

reviewer, its "manifest inferiority" to our own. Others, on the contrary, consider it a special merit in German literature that it does not attempt, or at least hold it necessary, to comprehend its whole purpose beforehand; that it has for its object to enlarge the domain of revealed truth and knowledge, the entire fruits of the discovery in these particulars being left for time to disclose. It is a besetting evil of English literature that scarcely any thing is produced here, the want of which is not felt and declared, before it makes its appearance. The vice of the English mind, in the present age, as many feel, is its pseudo-practicality; every thing treated of must issue in something to be *done* forthwith and outwardly, to be enjoyed sensuously or sentimentally. The Germans write on a different principle or from a different impulse; they are not such slaves to the *comforts of life* as we are, and consequently care more for pure intellectual activity; can better afford to say with Bacon: *opera ipsa pluris facienda sunt, quatenus sunt veritatis pignora, quam propter vitæ commoda.* They write far more than we do, in a free spirit of enterprize, that takes no bond beforehand, but carries on the adventurer with hopes the larger because undefined, and very slight fears of censure or contempt. They go exploring in all directions; and though doubtless in many directions nothing is to be found but barrenness,—though many of the travellers are not furnished with the powers and means necessary for drawing any advantage from such expeditions, though most of them are too little restrained by spiritual habits of awe and reverence; yet, can it be doubted that, acting in this spirit, they have made discoveries in fruitful regions, while the English have been making none; have been marching with a pompous measured gait along beaten tracks, and, what is more to be contemned, maintaining that by the old roads men may reach new places, the need of arriving at which they cannot but feel, even while they declaim against the presumption of travelling otherwise than as our fathers travelled before us; for instance, that by the *old* doctrine of Inspiration (the verbal doctrine) we can harmonize the *new* views of Holy Writ which present themselves to advancing thought and a development of mind as necessary and natural as that roses should blow in the summer season. The divinity of Scripture is a truth which no intellectual error can throw into total darkness, because it shines with light reflected from the very heart and moral being; but men obscure and dishonour it

by persisting in presenting it under the form which it seemed to wear in the twilight of reflection, even while a stronger day is revealing its true lineaments more clearly.

Let us judge the "worthy Teutones" as thinkers and writers not by the quantity of their chaff but by the quantity of their grain; the good grain which already enters into our own loaf. Much that is German may be found in the thoughts of our most marked writers, even those that are fighting against what they call *Germanism*. But no sooner do we abstract the solid matter from the mass of the unsound that floats around it, than we forget whence it came. When it is found to be Catholic it is no longer admitted to be Teutonic, and unless it is hollow and visionary it is not recognized as German.

Who can wonder that one who sees a "manifest inferiority" in German literature to English literature of the same period—(if our literature of past ages is meant to be included the comparison is hardly fair)—should ascribe this inferiority to a "want of culture" in the producers? I however conjecture, that a systematic education of the intellect is more general in Germany than here. Germans are taught to think—Englishmen to read and write; there are very fine specimens of style in German literature; and if German authors, as a body, write worse than the English I believe it is because they think more, and have a greater number of new thoughts to provide with new apparel. The streams of language run less smoothly when they are flowing through freshly opened channels. I will conclude this note with referring the reader to an interesting little essay in the form of comments upon a saying of Mr. Coleridge, on the advantages which the Germans owe to their philosophical education, to their "being better trained and disciplined" than ourselves "in the principles and method of knowledge." It is in the *Guesses at Truth*. pp. 244-9, 2nd edit. S. C.

Note J. p. 223.

Tait's Magazine, Jan. 1835, p. 9.

"THESE are things too unnatural to be easily believed; or, in a land where the force of partizanship is less, to be easily understood. Being true, however, they ought not to be forgotten: and at present it is almost necessary that they should be stated, for the justification of Coleridge. Too much has been written upon this part of his life, and

too many reproaches thrown out upon his levity or his want of principle in his supposed sacrifice of his early political connections, to make it possible for any reverencer of Coleridge's memory to pass over the case without a full explanation. That explanation is involved in the strange and scandalous conduct of the Parliamentary Whigs. Coleridge passed over to the Tories only in that sense in which all patriots did so at that time, and in relation to our great *foreign* interest—viz. by refusing to accompany the Whigs in their almost perfidious demeanour towards Napoleon Buonaparte. *Anti-ministerial* they affect to style their policy, but in the most eminent sense, it was *anti-national*. It was thus far—viz. exclusively, or almost exclusively, in relation to our great feud with Napoleon—that Coleridge adhered to the Tories. But because this feud was so capital and so earth-shaking a quarrel, that it occupied all hearts, and all the councils of Christendom, suffering no other question almost to live in its neighbourhood, hence it happened that he, who acceded to the Tories in this one chapter of their policy, was regarded as an ally in the most general sense. Domestic politics were then, in fact, forgotten: no question, in any proper sense, a Tory one, ever arose in that æra; or, if it had, the public attention would not have settled upon it, and it would speedily have been dismissed.”

Ib. October 1834, pp. 593-4.

“From Malta, on his return homewards, he went to Rome and Naples. One of the Cardinals, he tells us, warned him, by the Pope's wish, of some plot, set on foot by Buonaparte, for seizing him as an anti-Gallican writer. This statement was ridiculed by the anonymous assailant in *Blackwood*, as the very consummation of moon-struck vanity; and it is there compared to John Dennis's frenzy in retreating from the sea-coast, under the belief that Louis XIV. had commissioned emissaries to land on the English shore and make a dash at his person. But, after all, the thing is not so entirely improbable. For it is certain that some orator of the Opposition (Charles Fox, as Coleridge asserts) had pointed out all the principal writers in the *Morning Post*, to Napoleon's vengeance, by describing the war as a war “of that journal's creation.” And as to the insinuation that Napoleon was above throwing his regards upon a simple writer of political essays, *that* is not only abundantly confuted by many scores of analogous cases, but also is specially put

down by a case circumstantially recorded in the second tour to Paris, by the celebrated John Scott. It there appears, that on no other ground whatever, than that of his connexion with the London newspaper press, some friend of Mr. Scott's had been courted most assiduously by Napoleon during the *hundred days*. Assuredly, Coleridge deserved beyond all other men that ever were connected with the daily press, to be regarded with distinction. Worlds of fine thinking lie buried in that vast abyss, never to be disentombed, or restored to human admiration. Like the sea, it has swallowed treasures without end, that no diving bell will bring up again. But nowhere throughout its shoreless magazines of wealth does there lie such a bed of pearls confounded with the rubbish and "purgamenta" of ages, as in the political papers of Coleridge. No more appreciable monument could be raised to the memory of Coleridge than a republication of his essays in the *Morning Post*, but still more, of those afterwards published in the *Courier*. And here, by the way, it may be mentioned, that the sagacity of Coleridge, as applied to the signs of the times, is illustrated by the fact that distinctly and solemnly he foretold the restoration of the Bourbons, at a period when most people viewed such an event as the most romantic of visions, and not less chimerical than that "march upon Paris," of Lord Hawkesbury's, which for so many years supplied a theme of laughter to the Whigs." S. C.

Note I. 2. p. 230.

WILLIAM WHITEHEAD was born at Cambridge in 1714-15. He was the author of several successful plays—The Roman Father, Creüsa, and The School for Lovers; and of miscellaneous poems, that have scarce any individualizing characteristics, but are in the manner of writers of the time of Queen Anne. On his return from travelling with noble pupils he published an Ode to the Tiber and six Elegiac Epistles, which were applauded at first and, in course of time neglected; the usual fate of poems produced by Talent apart from Genius: the Junonian offspring of a female parent alone. This Ode to the Tiber is an excellent specimen of such poetry as may be written by a clever man, on command, having every thing that is to be desired, except a soul *of its own*: it reads like a first-rate school exercise, or such an exercise as might be produced in

an adult *School* of Poetry. Whitehead succeeded to the laureateship on the death of Cibber, and died suddenly, April 1845, after a life unusually calm and comfortable for a votary of the Muses, and for one who had originally to live by his wits, though very substantial patronage together with singlehood, exempted him from actually depending upon them; and in the opinion of those who agree with the "misogyne," Boccaccio, on the subject of marriage, will partly account for his ease and tranquillity. He published two volumes of his works in 1774: to these Mason added a third, with a Memoir of his Life and Writings prefixed to it.

His highest ambition as a poet, it is said, was to resemble Pope, whose notice he gained, when at Winchester School, by his talent in verse writing. It is remarkable that another imitator of Pope, named Whitehead, lived at the same time with the former: was born 1710, died 1774. In his satire entitled *Manners*, this Paul Whitehead complains, that he was not allowed, like Pope, to "lash the sins of men" without being himself lashed by scornful censure in return: and speaks of it as a hardship, that little satirists are punished while great ones are applauded. *How little* he was he probably never knew, nor do they appear to have felt it, who have given him a place in the tenth volume of the *British Poets*. S. C.

Note K. p. 231.

A *CHARGE to the Poets*. This poem, first printed in 1741, may be considered as a sequel to *The danger of writing verse*, an Epistle by the same Author, in which he observes shrewdly enough:

One fatal rock on which good authors split
Is thinking all mankind must like their wit;
And the great business of the world stand still
To listen to the dictates of their quill.
Hurt if they fail, and yet how few succeed!
What's born in leisure men of leisure read;
And half of those have some peculiar whim
Their test of sense, and read but to condemn.

In the latter he says,

If nature prompts you, or if friends persuade,
Why write, but ne'er pursue it as a trade.

After giving his reasons, and displaying the evils of a *life of writing*, he thus proceeds :

What refuge then remains ?—with gracious grin
Some practised bookseller invites you in :
Where luckless bards, condemn'd to court the town,
(Not for their parents' vices, but their own !)
Write gay conundrums with an aching head,
Or earn by defamation, daily bread,
Or, friendless, shirtless, pennyless complain,
Not of the world's, but "Cœlia's cold disdain."

A pendant to this picture might be obtained from Mrs. *Charlotte Smith's* poetical description of strolling actors.

While shivering Edgar in his blanket roll'd
Exclaims with too much reason, "Tom's a-cold !"
And vainly tries his sorrows to divert
While Goneril or Regan—wash his shirt !"

The author of this work observes that though "praises of the unworthy are felt by ardent minds as robberies of the deserving," yet in "promiscuous company no prudent man will oppugn the merits of a contemporary." On the same subject Whitehead, after advising the guardians of the sacred font to "keep the peace," writes thus :

What is't to you, that half the town admire
False sense, false strength, false softness, or false fire ?
Through heaven's wide concave let the meteors blaze ;
He hurts his own, who wounds another's bays.
What is't to you that numbers place your name
First, fifth, or twentieth in the lists of fame ?
Old Time will settle all your claims at once,
Record the genius and forget the dunce—

but sometimes not till "the genius" has settled his accounts with time altogether, and forgotten a world which once forgot him ! S. C.

Note M. p. 238.

B OCCACCIO does not appear a "Misogyne" when he is describing Dantes' adored Beatrice at eight years old,—"*assai leggiadretta e bella secondo la sua fanciullezza,*" with features "*piene, oltre alla bellezza, di tanta onesta vaghezza che quasi un' angioletta era reputata da molti*"—unless

he thought that, as certain fruits are not good till they are past maturity, ladies, on the contrary, are only in perfection before they have attained it. His account of woman as wife, if it be meant for that of the *genus* and not merely of some rare *species*, may be pronounced not *almost*, but altogether slanderous. Well might he exclaim of such a creature as he describes—who compels her husband to render an account, not only of weightier matters, but even of every little sigh; what caused it, whence it came and whither it is going; who, when he is glad ascribes it to love of some one else, and when he is sorry sets it down to hatred of herself—“*oh fatica inestimabile avere con così sospettoso animale a vivere, a conversare, ed ultimamento ad invecchiare e morire!*” The last is all he could be supposed likely to do with satisfaction in such company. “Who does not know,” says he, “that all other things are tried, before they are taken for better for worse, whether they please or not; but every one who takes a wife must have her, not such as he could wish, but such as Fortune grants her?” One might suppose that wives invariably turned out as ill as those of Socrates, of Dante and of Hooker, as the first espoused of Milton and the jealous partner of John Wesley. That he spoke generally is too plain by his concluding words: *Lascino i filosofanti lo sposarsi a’ ricchi stolti, a’ signori e a’ lavoratori; ed essi colla filosofia si dilettono, molto migliore sposa che alcuna altra.*

All the wives above-mentioned would have sown thorns in any bosom closely connected with them, unless they have been grievously belied. If men of letters and philosophers fare worse in marriage than other men, the last words of the sentence above quoted will suggest to the mind why this may be. It may be because too often at least, they not only wed philosophy and literature as no man weds an ordinary profession, but are apt to both think her the best of wives and to treat her as such; to make a Sarah of her, and to sink the poor mortal spouse into the place of Hagar; in consequence of which the children of the latter have to fight their way through life, like Ishmael, in a sort of wilderness. Kindly as well as wisely does Mr. C. advise that no man should permit the interests of an intellectual pursuit thus to over-ride those of the affections, but that the two should be made to bear equally upon the moral being and to sustain it. Philosophy has often sufficed so to fill a man’s mind that it has stood him in stead of marriage: he who unites it with marriage must not suffer it to be thus engrossing, nor expect

heart service from one to whom he has not given his heart,—in reality, though she may have no rival *breathing*.

Any reader who wishes to pursue Boccaccio's wicked but amusing remarks on this subject, which are written in very racy Italian, may find them in the *Opere Volgari di G. Boccaccio, Firenze 1833*, vol. xv. (which contains *La vita di Dante Alighieri*) pp. 17-27.

On behalf of Dante's wife I must add that marks of a harsh temper in the author of the *Inferno* seem to me plainly discernible in the Poem itself. His behaviour to Alberigo in the third sphere of the last circle was worthy of the place and unworthy of a gentleman.* Milton would not have suffered one of his Fallen Angels to behave so unhandsomely in the "heart of hell," or so to forget the "imperial palace whence they came." If it were true that brutality to one in bale was good manners—*costesia fu lui esser villano*—(which I deny, in such a case as this, where no ideal child of perdition, or abstraction of wickedness was exhibited, but a certain sinful suffering fellow creature,)—by what alchemy was false swearing and deceit rectified into righteous dealing? "May I go to the bottom of the ice myself," said he, "if I don't free thine eyes!" Yet after hearing his story went and left them cased in crystal! Here was the spirit that christens falsehood and ferocity by the name of religious zeal and strictness. A little further on he finds Brutus in the lowest depths of the descending circles—the patriot Brutus!—and he so great a patriot himself! It seems as if the Infernal journey had turned his brain, or touched his heart with madness.

We may well believe that such a man would act as the "Misogyne" boasts of his having acted, cast off the mother of his children utterly and for ever; unlike our *humane* as well as "*divine Milton*," who took back his wife after her most disloyal and disobedient conduct,—after a desertion which left him "nothing belonging to matrimony but its chain," and even extended his protection to her mean and insolent relations. S. C.

PS. Since writing these bold remarks on the "great philosophic poet" (as some consider him), of Italy, I have read Mr. Landor's delightful *Pentameron*, which contains a remarkable critique on Dante, and will just add that the pas-

* Canto xxxiii. l. 115—150.

sage concerning Alberigo, slight as it seems, spoke to my mind of Dante's *temper* more unequivocally than the striking instances of fierce and malignant sentiment which Mr. Landor adduces from the Poem; because it is possible to look upon *them* as the mere results of theory and opinion. Many a speculative atrocity may be found in the works of writers, who would have been incapable of conceiving and coolly describing such conduct on their own part toward an individual, as Dante's imaginary treatment of the ice-bound Alberigo. S. C.

Note N. p. 240.

I HAVE not yet been able to light upon the passage here quoted, in the labyrinth of Herder's prose writings. An account of this author is given in Vol. iii. of Taylor's *Historic Survey*. He was born in 1744, and was the son of a village schoolmaster, who taught at Mohrunge, in Prussia. He seems to have been one of those whom Nature and Fortune conspire to favour; till he fell under the dominion of that foe to genius, nervous derangement. He had a fine face, a fine figure, a fine voice, a fine flow of words; was thought by many to have a fine talent both for prose and poetry, and first brought himself into notice in boyhood by writing a remarkably fine hand. He took holy orders at the usual age, and "obtained the situation of Lutheran minister at Riga, as well as that of rector over the high school attached to the Cathedral there." After obtaining many honours, he died on the 18th of December, 1803; Taylor adds, "occupied in composing a hymn to Deity—which breaks off where he laid down at once his pen and his life." The biographer seems to have caught at this story, for the sake of one of his silent sneers at earnestness in religion: Herder's wife, however, declares that "he slept the whole day; nor in this world ever woke again; but at half past eleven at night, gently and without a groan, slumbered away into the arms of God,"—a very common mode of departure for those who are worn out by slow disease. It appears from the account of this "angelic wife," as Mr. Dequincey calls her, that Herder, with all his piety, was very loth to die and leave his many literary designs unexecuted—he seems to have clung to this world with little less tenacity than the poor unprincipled son of Genius,

* From an article on Herder in the *London Magazine*, of April, 1823.

Hoffmann. How often it is found that they who do their work well upon earth, even if it be work for the kingdom of heaven, are too unwilling to depart when summoned hence; while those, who mismanage all affairs entrusted to them here below, sometimes gain great credit by the passive graces which they exhibit in the near prospect of death!

Herder's works were edited after his decease by Heyne, who undertook the antiquarian, and Müller, who undertook the theologic part; they "issued from the Cotta press, at Tübingen, in 1805, and extend to thirty volumes." His poetry consists of popular songs, flowers from the Greek Anthology, which are translations of the more remarkable epigrams and minute poems in that collection, and miscellaneous productions of the minor kind. His prose too was poetical in its character. Taylor calls him the Plato of the Christian world. I see some general resemblance in Herder to Bishop Berkeley,—that beautiful soul in an amiable tabernacle,—and he too has been compared to Plato; indeed I should be surprised to find that any thing of Herder's so well bore out such a comparison as the dialogues of the admirable Bishop of Cloyne. Herder has been accused of obscurity and vagueness; but the orb of Berkeley's intellect was clear in its brilliance as that of the full moon on a frosty winter's night; while his heart and moral being glowed like the noon-day sun, filled and expanded by a steady religious enthusiasm, which secluded him from an unspiritual world in feeling and practice, even as his metaphysical theory confined him to a world of spirits.

Mr. Dequincey declares it "difficult to form any judgment of an author so "many-sided"—so polymorphous as Herder," but adds, "the best notion I can give of him to the English reader, is to say that he is the German Coleridge; having the same all-grasping erudition, the same spirit of universal research, the same occasional superficiality and inaccuracy, the same indeterminateness of object, the same obscure and fanciful mysticism (*schwärmerey*), the same plethoric fulness of thought, the same fine sense of the beautiful—and (I think) the same incapacity for dealing with simple and austere grandeur." (This judgment I quote not as assenting entirely to every part of it. Mr. Coleridge had one object in general—namely truth, especially truth of religion, morals, metaphysics and poetry; this he pursued in a desultory manner; but every disquisition which he entered into, whether it formed an essay or a brief marginal note, had a determinate object, and referred to a regular

system of thought. I think he was seldom superficial except sometimes in a survey of facts. His incapacity for dealing with *austere* grandeur is a truism; why should a writer be characterized by a negative; what boots it to say that Milton is not Shakespeare, or that a refreshing pomegranate has not the fine acid and sharp-edged crown of the pine-apple?) "I must add however that in fineness and compass of understanding, our English philosopher appears to me to have greatly the advantage. In another point they agree,—both are men of infinite title-pages. I have heard Mr. Coleridge acknowledge that his title-pages alone (titles, that is, of works meditated but unexecuted) would fill a large volume; and it is clear that, if Herder's power had been commensurate with his will, all other authors must have been put down:—"—and yet Mr. Dequincey can regret, as will be seen in the next note, that he was not permitted to produce more than "many generations would have been able to read;" instead of wishing that he had composed *less* and allowed his spirit more time to refresh itself and take in fresh stock! S. C.

Note O. p. 240.

Miseri quibus

Intentata nitet!—

AS I have availed myself of Mr. Dequincey's able pen when it has been used in doing honour to Mr. Coleridge, I feel prompted to notice his remarks, when they express dissent or disapprobation of his opinions; and shall therefore point out to the reader his strictures upon the xith chapter of this work, contained in the London Magazine of January 18, 1823, in the first of a series of "Letters to a young man whose education has been neglected." These observations are worth reading, and so far as they bear on the abstract question, apart from personality, I do not attempt to set myself in direct opposition to their drift; though I confess they leave my judgment and feelings, on one branch of that question at least, quite unaltered; what they are I can best express by saying, that even to a young man who should display all the powers of mind which Mr. Coleridge possessed, with all the bodily strength and mental resolution which he wanted, I should still, if my counsel were asked, address Mr. Coleridge's advice, *Never pursue Literature as the sole business of life or the means on which you rely for obtaining its comforts.* I am looking at the subject as it concerns the welfare of the literary man,—(for so it is

principally considered in the B. L.)—rather than as it bears on the interests of literature; looking at the *whole* subject, however, Mr. Coleridge states two main objections to professional authorship: first that literature, in this country at least, if a man depends upon it for bread, is apt either to starve him or be starved itself—starved in one way, and debased and corrupted in another: in the second place, that it is unfavourable to domestic ease and comfort. The first objection Mr. Dequincey does not consider at all; he never adverts to the mass of writing, exhaustive yet unsatisfactory, which men of high aims and capabilities are obliged to produce, if they live by their pen; nor of the low and pernicious *sort* of writing which men of less firm principle and elevated feeling are tempted to produce under the like circumstances. No one can estimate the works bequeathed to posterity by Walter Scott and Robert Southey,—(speaking of them thus, as mere *voices from the dead to the living*, I omit the social prefixes to their honoured names),—more highly than I do; no one can *value* them more though many may *appreciate* them better; yet a thousand times have I reflected with pain how still *more* valuable their writings might have been, if it had not been the duty of them both to consider the immediate sale of some part at least of what they gave to the public. Had it been otherwise their productions might have been less in quantity, weightier, as to the whole mass, in quality; we might have had the History of the Monastic Orders, instead of some less important works from the historian of Brazil; and from the Wizard of the North fewer volumes of romance but more perfect romances, compositions more careful in structure, if not of higher excellence in particular parts, than those which he has bequeathed to posterity; and I believe, that I am but reporting the opinion of the former, at least, of these gifted men when I venture to speak thus.

The first part of Mr. D's disquisition considers literature exclusively as the means of sufficiently exercising the intellect, which Mr. Coleridge had considered in conjunction with literature as the means of gaining a livelihood. His opponent charges him with "perplexing these arguments together, though they are incapable of blending into any real coalition." This perplexity I do not perceive; a *complexity* there certainly is in his mode of presenting the subject, and I think a justifiable one, because his aim was directly practical, and in actual life these two parts of the question,—the interests of the mind *per se*, and the interests of the man as

dependent on the external conditions of inward well-being—do usually present themselves in a concrete form. If the young man whose education has been neglected is born to a good fortune and moreover has no desire to marry, he may turn a deaf ear to Mr. Coleridge's counsel and attend only to that of Mr. Dequincey; but this is by no means a common case with neglected young men; the majority of them are poor, and yet rather more anxious to be married than the richest; since poor men snatch at marriage as the one comfort which lies within their reach—careful comfort as they too often find it. In regard to the difficulty itself, Mr. Dequincey adopts and confirms Mr. Coleridge's opinion; and if, on foreseeing that literature would not suffice for his mind with his purposes, he chose *not* to provide for the want of a *steadying* occupation in the way recommended by Mr. C. but according to a plan of his own, this does not prove the recommendation a bad one, or that it would not conduce to the student's happiness more than a plan quite barren of worldly profit, unless he have pecuniary resources independent of his own exertions. Herder says "with the greatest solicitude *avoid authorship.*" That authorship should be employed "too early and immoderately" is scarcely avoidable where it is a man's only profession, and Mr. Dequincey limits this experienced man's advice in a manner which the wording of the passage quoted by Mr. C. does not appear to warrant.

In illustration of his views Mr. D. institutes a comparison betwixt a *certain eminent English scholar* and the great German Leibnitz. There is much in his account of the former which would lead me to suppose that the description was meant for Mr. Coleridge; he commences it with saying "This Englishman set out in life, as I conjecture, with a plan of study modelled upon that of Leibnitz; that is to say, he designed to make himself, as Leibnitz most truly was, a Polyhistor or Catholic student." But when I come to the sentence wherein it is affirmed, that "in general, as both had minds not merely powerful, but distinguished for variety and compass of power, so in both were these fine endowments completed and accomplished for work of Herculean endurance and continuity, by the alliance of a *bodily constitution resembling that of horses.*"!—that they were "*Centaur*s; heroic intellects, with *brutal capacities of body*—"! I am completely at fault. I know of no literary man of the present age to whom the *brutal* part of this description would

properly apply. Sir Walter Scott had a vigorous frame, and gigantic powers of literary execution; a man to have success in literature on a large scale must have considerable physical energy, and a strong and lively imagination presupposes, as its condition, a lifesome and active body, that moves fast while it moves at all,—before it wears itself out or falls undermined by some malignant of its own household. But I know of no literary genius of the present age, who had great toughness of fibre, or resisting power of constitution, as well as this sort of vitality, unless we may ascribe it to Goethe; and there are few to whom it is more inapplicable than the author of *Christabel* and *The Friend*. Yet the flings which come afterwards, about “hydrophobia of reviewers and critics,” with a reference to the spray of the waterfall of criticism “mentioned in the B. L.” lead me to suppose that, after all, Mr. C. must be *the Centaur* of this truly *monstrous** description. He was indeed too sensitive to censure, and noticed reflections on himself more than for his *own sake* was worth while; yet it should be recollected that his “indignation at literary wrongs,” was at one and the same time a desire to ward off personal injuries, and this very fact strengthens his argument against professional authorship, because literary wrongs would not have been injuries affecting his peace of mind, if he had not depended on his literary reputation for what, in his circumstances, was much more important than itself. I cannot find, however, that he almost believed himself the “object of conspiracies and organized persecution,” except as he believed himself obnoxious to party men, who conspire against those that think it right to “follow and speak the truth;” neither can I admit that, in these contests, though “naturally no less amiable than Leibnitz,” he betrayed “uncharitable feelings;” would that all who enter into such contests confined themselves, as he did, to describing the literary offences themselves, instead of descanting on the affairs, motives, feelings and personal character

* Mr. Dequincey is fond of *the monstrous*—in some of his sketches of character, *desinit in piscem mulier formosa superne*. To quote the words of a celebrated writer used in conversation with me—“He says there was a man of the largest and most spacious intellect—of a regal and magnificent mind—and then he tells us, that the man was not commonly veracious!—Such a man as this never existed—no such man ever appeared upon the face of the earth.”

of those that have committed them!—then salving over their uncharitableness in the end, with some piece of pseudo-benignity and humility—as if this last and smoothest serpent could swallow up all the snakes that had gone before—or as if a chaplet of lilies, stuck upon the snaky head of Alecto, could make her look innocent and amiable.*

Mr. Dequincey next proceeds to discuss Mr. Coleridge's advice in its reference to the interests of literature, and declares his belief that the list of celebrated men adduced by him in proof of its practicability might be cut down to one, namely, Bacon. He makes no attempt to shew the "various grounds" on which it might be thus reduced, "as a list any way favourable for Mr. Coleridge's purpose;" and my own mind does not suggest them. On this point, as before professed, I do not hold myself competent directly to contend with Mr. Dequincey; but I cannot help saying, that his judgment surprises me, and that, having looked lately into a good many biographies of literary men, I have been left with a very different impression. "*Weighty* performances in literature" may be differently understood: very extensive and systematical ones are out of the scope of Mr. C.'s remarks: because *they* must be carried on with mechanical regularity and with a certain pecuniary provision; but surely the great mass of the more exquisite and the more valuable works of the pen have been produced by men, who did not depend upon literary performances for their livelihood—a large proportion of them by writers who, during a considerable part of their time, had regular employment in another way. Are not the works of Jeremy Taylor and all our great divines of this kind? Have not most of our eminent philosophers, as Locke, Newton, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and many more, either had professions or held posts and places, which would have prevented them from being idle if they had never written a line of original composition? Would not Milton have starved long before *Paradise Lost*

* There is often a great deal of personality where no name is mentioned, and individuals are satirized and caricatured under the guise of abstract description; and so too religious bodies are often injured and defamed by their opponents' connecting a certain character of heart and intellect with the creed they maintain. Party spirit warmly approves these methods. Truth hates and disdains them, knowing that to *her* they are injurious as well as superfluous.

was finished had he relied on his writings for bread? Leibnitz himself, whom Mr. D. considers the model of a scholar, not only was "busied during a great part of his time," as a recent account of him notices, "with the conduct of civil and ecclesiastical negotiations," but also held "a succession of legal and literary offices at Hanover."* In all these instances and hundreds of others that might be adduced, there was either the "faithful discharge of an established profession," or regular employment, independent of literary *adventure*, during great part of life; in all of them an entire exemption from dependence on mere literature, as distinguished from a literary *office*, for the means of living. Genius and native power will find time and place to manifest itself, and break forth with the more concentrated force from having met with some resistance: I doubt whether the power of composing every day and all day is not more apt to foster a literary growth of inferior value, than necessary to evolve and cherish the products of genuine power.

One of the most successful literary adventurers, of those who are not mere blowers of "soap-bubbles for their fellow-creatures,"† was David Hume. But Hume did not make his thousand a year by mere literary means. At different times of his life he had lucrative appointments, which helped him on; these he may have owed in part to his literary success; but no young man, on setting out in life, can reckon on such success; and though literature has its side-advantages as well as other professions, yet this cannot remedy or compensate the evil of the main wheel itself, on which others depend, being uncertain in its working, at least for the production of pecuniary effects. It is still more important to observe that Hume, till he was forty years old, had a paternal or fraternal home open to receive him, where he would probably have been *kept alive*,‡ even if his literary productions had

* Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, to judge from report, may be cited as a recent proof, that an important theme in literature may be well handled by one who "stands in the first rank of an emulous and laborious profession."

† Carlyle's Miscellanies, Vol. ii. p. 192.

‡ "For a man of Johnson's stamp," says Mr. Carlyle, in his very interesting review of Boswell's Johnson, "the problem was twofold: *First*, not only as the humble but indispensable condition of all else, to keep himself, if so might be, *alive*: but *secondly*, to keep himself alive by speaking forth the *Truth* that

been unpopular; and again, that Hume did not consider a *better half* among "the indispensable requisites of life,"—perhaps partly from a sense that such a complement to his being might not leave him wholly undisturbed in his tranquil atheism. Indispensable or not, however, a helpmate is included in Mr. Dequincey's plan for the votary of literature, as well as in Mr. Coleridge's: "and the more so, because if we do not allow him a wife, he will perhaps take one without our permission." Such as this, then, is not the case contemplated by Mr. Coleridge—that of dependance on the sale of literary works "for the necessaries and comforts of life," where there is, or may be, a family to provide for.

On the domestic part of the subject Mr. Dequincey expresses opinions rather different from those which my experience has led me to form; I pity the man who cannot enter into the pleasure of "social silence," and finds nothing in Mr. Coleridge's description of a literary man's evening but a theme for sarcasm. Mr. Dequincey, "when *he* sits with a young woman makes a point of talking to her and hearing her talk, even though she should chance to be his own wife, &c." Mr. Coleridge was by no means deficient in the power of addressing *young* women, to judge by specimens of his discourse in that kind which he has left behind him, as well as from other documents: but a wife is a *young* woman only for a time; it was in his manner of addressing the middle-aged, so full of kindly and judicious courtesy, and in his tenderness for the old of our sex, that the peculiar aspect of his character towards women was most clearly shewn. Somewhere else Mr. Dequincey eloquently declares, that "every man, who has once dwelt with passionate love on the fair face of some female companion through life, must have commended and adjured all-conquering Time, there at least, and upon that one tablet of his adoration,

To write no wrinkle with his antique hand."

There is tenderness of feeling in this, but a still better feeling

was in him, and speaking it *truly*, let the Earth say to this what she liked. Of which two-fold problem if it be hard to solve either member separately, how incalculably more so to solve it, when both are conjoined, and work with endless complication into one another!"—Miscellanies, Vol. iv. p. 69.

* This pleasure is feelingly alluded to by Mrs. Joanna Baillie in her interesting *Lines to Agnes Baillie on her Birthday*. *Fugitive Verses*, pp. 222-3.

is displayed in strains like those of Mr. Wordsworth, which, not content with drily exposing the emptiness of any such "rebellion against the laws that season all things for the inexorable grave," supply reflections whereby, even in this life, Time may be set at defiance,—grace and loveliness may be discerned in every age, as long as the body continues to be a translucent tenement of the mind. But without contending any longer on behalf of those whose charms of *youth* are departed or transmuted, I do maintain that a wife, whether young or old, may pass her evenings most happily in the presence of her husband, occupied herself, and conscious that he is still better occupied, though he may but speak with her and cast his eyes upon her from time to time: that such evenings may be looked forward to with great desire, and deeply regretted when they are passed away for ever.

Wieland, whose conjugal felicity has been almost as celebrated as himself, says in a letter written after his wife's death, that if he but knew she was in the room, or if at times she stepped in and said a word or two, that was enough to gladden him. Some of the happiest and most loving couples are those who, like Wieland and his wife, are both too fully employed to spend the whole of every evening in conversation. But Mr. Dequincey objects to Mr. Coleridge's evening plan that it introduces a sister into the circle, and excludes the "noisy boy or noisier girl, or, what is noisier than either, both." "Did a very little babby make a very great noise?" is the first line of a nursery song, in which Mr. Coleridge recorded some of his experience on this recondite subject; but he probably considered that children, however noisy by day, are usually in the silent domains of Morpheus in the evening. The suggestion of banishing them to the nursery seems brought in *ad invidiam*, and very unfairly as against Mr. Coleridge, who was not only fond of his own babes and prattlers, but what is uncommon, especially in a grave musing man, fond even of other people's, if tolerably attractive. But he knew that there is a time and a place for all things, and that in the evening, after they are "tired of boisterous play" in doors, or of trotting about after the daisies and buttercups, this "lively part of the creation" ought to shut up their flower-bright eyes and fold themselves to sleep—several hours at least before grown persons need retire from their employments. When they are no longer thus disposable a new state of things has taken place: the boys are at school: the girls form a party by themselves with the

“sister” or governess, and the wife can join them or the good man in his study,—unless a studious daughter takes her place,—as suits all parties best; and this is no mere fancy-piece, but a picture from life. If the picture now-a-days can seldom be realized by the professional man, it is not for the reasons alleged by Mr. Dequincey, as far as my observation extends, but because the profession itself, or the demands of society, engross the whole of his time. Busy men *can* see their little children only by snatches, as the traveller views refreshing waters on his way,—except in the deeply enjoyed holiday or vacation: there are not many, who even desire to spend *hours* in juvenile or infantine company, unless occupied in teaching.

It is true, as Mr. Dequincey observes, that professors of literature are not *absolutely obliged* to quarrel with their wives; yet I fear there is some truth also in Mr. Coleridge’s hint, that their wives often quarrel with them, unless the catastrophe be averted either by heavenly patience on their part, or what sometimes answers the same purpose, but brings its own evil along with it,—a stupid placidity. Love is strong as death; stronger than all the trials of life; that is, Love in ideal perfection; but in ordinary cases, it at least makes *toward* the window, when Pecuniary Embarrassment comes in at the door; and, even if it does not fly away for ever, yet sadly bruises its light wings, and dulls their plumage, by fluttering in and out of the embrasure. The morbid sensitiveness consequent on too continuous literary efforts, combined with anxiety about money matters, exposes it to imminent danger, even if the husband be less eccentric and irritable than Richter’s Advocate of the Poor, and the wife not quite so common-place and irritating as his pretty, but too womanish, Lenette; though even *she* could have loved her Siebenkäse, if he had had any thing to “crumble and to bite.” Jean Paul himself saw his “sunbeams weighed on hay-scales, and the hay-balance give no symptoms of moving,” and “his heart moved as little as the balance;”—for he was *alone*. Would his heart have lain as still, had the comfort of wife and children depended on the power of his sun-beams to weigh down a hay-scale? In drawing the parallel betwixt Leibnitz and Coleridge Mr. Dequincey leaves out of sight that the German scholar was born into good circumstances, obtained immediate success in his career in life,—partly by means of that effective patronage, which is so much oftener afforded to the philosophic student in Germany

than in England,—and moreover was exempt from matrimony. These advantages probably did more to keep the philosopher in a serene state of mind than even his *regular mathematical studies*. There is a story, indeed, that the disturbance and vexation caused by his dispute with Newton concerning the invention of the *differential calculus* hastened his end; and we need not this story to prove, that if men do not form personal attachments of the nearest kind, the art or science, to which they wed themselves, may grow too close to their heart, and make them as uneasy as a wife and children could do.

Mr. Dequincey concludes his discussion by declaring it clear to his judgment, “that literature must decay, unless we have a class wholly dedicated to that service, not pursuing it as an amusement only, with wearied and pre-occupied minds.” Literature, pursued only as an amusement, can never flourish in any high and worthy sense; that it must decay unless carried on by a class wholly dedicated to that service, seems to me very questionable: since the best part of the literature we already possess was not produced in that way. Mr. Dequincey thinks that he sufficiently corrects the “misrepresentation” of Mr. C. in regard to Herder, by giving a list of the works which this author vainly desired to write, and also by repeating his lamentations about want of “time, time, time!” and his longing to be “shut up for some years in a fortress, with permission to pursue his labours and to procure the books he might want.” All this appears to me a very doubtful proof, that Mr. C. sought to convey “delusive impressions” respecting unprofessional literature in the B. L. “His thesis was,” says Mr. D. “that the performance of this ordinary business might be so managed, as not only to subtract nothing from the higher employments but even greatly to assist them; and Herder’s case was alleged as a proof and an illustration.” Now I think Mr. C.’s thesis may be more fairly stated thus: first, that to pursue literature as the sole business of life and the sole means of support, is unfavourable to the welfare of the literary man himself, *consequently* unfavourable to literature; in the second place, that *weighty performances in literature may be, as they have been, produced in addition to regular employment of another kind*. That Herder might not have written *more*, if his whole time had been at his disposal, who ever doubted? The question is, would he have written *better*, upon the whole, even if he had been fortunate enough to be

“thrown into a dungeon,” or “shut up in a fortress with books at command:” did he not write much and well even as it was; would he not probably have written *worse*, had he composed under pain of starvation if his writing did not succeed and that immediately? For blink it who will, such is the alternative in the case of the persons whom Mr. Coleridge meant to address: such must have been the case with Herder himself,* if he had had no regular calling. Mr. Dequincey informs us that this gifted man lived uneasily and died before reaching a good old age, by reason of a “most exquisite and morbid delicacy of nervous temperament:” and this he would have had him counteract by uninterrupted composition! Doubtless his hypochondria was brought on, as the malady has been brought on in numberless other cases, by excessive mental exertion; he was overwrought by his two kinds of work, that of his profession and literature, pursued as he pursued them: but to have withdrawn the one and doubled the other, with a large infusion of anxiety over and above, would not have made him easier as a man, or more effective as an author.

Are not men apt to deceive themselves, when they fancy how much more they should have done but for some external hindrance? Surely original power and composing energy are no perennial fountain that will flow on as long as ever a vent is given to it; else why do so many authors cease to write well before they cease to write? *This* is of the highest importance, that men should be able to write genially while their intellect is in its prime; should then be free to choose the worthiest vehicle for their peculiar powers,

—and finally array
Their temple with the Muses' diadem.

Literature draws its life from all that enlivens and invigorates the man; and whatever the wearied Herder may have said, in his playful mood, “to be shut up in a fortress,” or confined to a study, is not the best preparation for writ-

* Of “a certain indifference to money matters,” specified by my father as one of the tokens of a gentleman, Mr. Carlyle says “which certain indifference must be wise or mad, you would think, exactly as one possesses much money, or possesses little!” Mr. Dequincey’s “indifference to money matters” in his treatment of the present question lifts him far out of sight of Mr. Coleridge’s practical view—quite into the clouds I fancy.

ing well; they who enter on the arena of public labour become in some respects better qualified. Little intellectual benefit indeed is to be gained from work, which "any stout man might do for a guinea a day." Must we account Herder's work in the ministry, with its collateral business, as of that sort? The "wearied and pre-occupied mind" is indeed an objection to Mr. C's plan, without being a recommendation of that which has been set up against it. The state of our social economy renders every man's trade or business so exigent and engrossing as to leave him very little time or energy for any other pursuit; and thus over civilization operates against cultivation.* Literature—any extensive pursuit of it,—whether carried on as a profession or in addition to another,—*must* be a struggle in England at the present time, and except where there is a strong mind in an almost Herculean body,—*a constitution like that of a Centaur*,—it is apt to wear out both before their time.

One word more. To some spirits perhaps, in their superfluity of strength and gladness, the risk of starvation may act as a stimulant; but was Mr. Coleridge in error when he intimated, that to the greater number of sensitive men—and men of genius are generally such—it acts as a narcotic? Mr. Carlyle's account of Jean Paul Richter's struggles with poverty is highly affecting and interesting. He almost puts a new spirit into the feeble mind, while he describes how this strong man of letters had "looked desperation full in the face, and found that for him she was not desperate;" how "his strength both of thought and resolve did but increase," while he was "sorely pressed on from without," and "establish itself on a surer and surer foundation;" how he "stood like a rock amid the beating of continual tempests; nay, a rock crowned with foliage; and, in its clefts, nourishing flowers of sweetest perfume." Very effective is his contrast of such a character, whose "better soul, from the depths of sorrow and abasement, rose purified and invincible, like Hercules from his long labours," with those who have "passed through as hard a probation," and "borne permanent traces of its good and evil influences; some, with their modesty and quiet endurance, combining a sickly dispiritment, others a hardened dulness or deadness of heart; others again whom misery it-

* Mr. Coleridge says in the *Church and State*, p. 52, that "a nation can never be a too cultivated, but may easily become an over civilized race."

self cannot teach, but only exasperate; who far from parting with the mirror of their vanity, when it is trodden in pieces, rather collect the hundred fragments of it, and with more fondness and more bitterness than ever, behold not one but a hundred images of self therein."

But after dwelling upon this representation, I conclude upon two things; first that if Jean Paul in Germany sixty years ago was "often in danger of starving," in England at this present time, a man of his genius, who had to live entirely by his wits, would starve outright, or live very miserably. He says himself concerning authors, "the sprig of laurel, like the lemon in the mouth of the wild boar, is not put into ours until we are shot and dished up." He would have been dished up in this country, "the finest in the world if a man could only live in it!"—long before he had written sixty volumes in a vein so peculiar as those by which he finally attained independence in his own land,—and perhaps have missed the laurel too. Compare his writings with those of any one of our popular novelists; if thought of the deeper sort, abundant fancy, and various learning go for weight in the scale, would not any of them kick the beam instantly if weighed against his? * Secondly, I imagine that the "massive portly cynic" had no small force of body to under-prop and sustain this "giant force within;" more at least than the majority of "*myriad minded men,*" whose corporeal energies are seldom to be computed by the same arithmetic as their mental ones. I imagine that he was at least a far better *Centaur* than S. T. C. † Such a man might sport for a while, in the hey-day of life, with "poverty, pain and all evil, as with bright-spotted wild beasts which he had tamed and harnessed;" but weaker bodied men would perish by their fangs in the midst of the process; *he* might travel through "a parched Sahara," "without losing

* This is not meant as a comparison of *merits*, but only of the more *recondite* merits with those which it requires less intellectual refinement to appreciate. I conjecture, that the German public are more cultivated, intellectually at least, than the English; I do not say, upon the whole, better educated, or as highly polished and civilized.

† Both however died at about the same age, a few months before completing their 63rd year. Richter was born March 21, 1763, died November 14, 1825. My Father was between nine and ten years younger, and lived about six weeks longer.

heart or even good humour ;” but to one of more delicate frame “the stern sandy solitude” would soon have yielded only a grave.* Men of letters and literary genius are too often what is styled, in trivial irony, “fine gentlemen spoilt in the making.” They care not for shew and grandeur in what surrounds them, having enough within, beside “the pomp of groves and garniture of fields,” and super-regal array of likes at their feet, when they go forth into outward nature ; but they are fine gentlemen in all that concerns ease and pleasurable, or at least comfortable, sensation. How can *they* live hard and sparingly who are relaxed and languid from muscular inaction ; exhausted by incessant activity of brain ; rendered sensitive, and therefore, in some sort, luxurious, by refinement of thought and vividness of imagination ? “Indifference to money matters” in men of genius is for the most part more gentlemanly than wise ; say rather downright incoherency and madness.

It is a noble doctrine that teaches how slight a thing is Poverty ; what riches, nay treasures untold, a man may possess in the midst of it, if he does but seek them aright ; how much of the fiend’s apparent bulk is but a fog-vapour of the sickly and sophisticated mind. It is a noble endeavour that would bring men to tread the fear of this phantom under their firm feet, and “*dare to be poor!*” † Herein I see an analogy between the teaching of a mighty Poet,—him who wrote of “the Leech Gatherer on the lonely moor,”—and the writings of Thomas Carlyle. I see a similarity of spirit between them, inasmuch as both shew how great a thing is man in his own original greatness, such as God made him and enabled him to become by his own energies, independently of all aid except from above ; how noble he is in his plain native dignity, the net work veil of social fictions and formalities, which “the dreary intercourse of daily life” spins out, being taken from before his face. And this theme the one has illumined with the glories of poetic imagination,

* “And mighty Poets in their misery dead.” Resolution and Independence. St. 17. l. 4.

† At least in the sense of being unable to “*keep a gig.*” I am glad that the last Quarterly notices with approbation “a manly cheerful tone in some remarks on the improved condition of literary labourers” in Mr Burton’s *Memoirs of David Hume*, and is able to add :—“the fact of the general improvement on which he dwells cannot be doubted.”

the other with the lambent many-coloured flame of wit and humour, and a playful yet powerful eloquence, teeming with bright fancies, like a river which foams and flashes and sparkles in the sunshine, while it flows onward with a strong and steady current. Nevertheless when we have blown into thin air and transparency whatever is unsubstantial in this object of dread, still Poverty, or an insufficiency of the external means of ease and enjoyment according to our actual condition, must ever remain one of life's great evils; if it be not the greatest of all those which we do not create by acts of our own will, yet surely none is greater, seeing that it too often brings in its train all the rest,—“cold, pain, and labour,” with unrelieved or unprevented sickness, and want or loss of lively joyous warm affection, that scatters flowers and sunshine on the path of life. It presses hard upon the body, and both directly and indirectly it presses hard upon the mind. Richter, with all his super-abundant energy, got rid of it as soon as possible, and no man who had not keenly felt how it can embitter and *impoverish* even a brave man's life could have written as he has done in his history of Siebenkase, the Advocate of the Poor. Indeed the *thorns* of this piece may be *felt*;—the *fruit* and *flowers* we can see and admire, but scarcely seem to taste them or inhale their living odours. S. C.

Note P. p. 254.

TROIS Lettres à Mr. Remond de Mont-Mort. 1741; (opp. ed Erdmann Berol. 1840. P. II. pp. 701-2.) “*Outre que j'ai eu soin de tout diriger à l'édification, j'ai tâché de déterrer et de réunir la vérité ensévelie et dissipée sous les opinions des différentes Sectes des Philosophes; et je crois y avoir ajouté quelque chose du mien pour faire quelques pas en avant.*”

I suppose that most philosophers attempt to traverse the ground of all foregoing philosophies, and flatter themselves that they make *quelques pas en avant*, while the unphilosophic insist upon it, that they do but move in a circle—that there is among them *vertigo quædam et agitatio perpetua et circulus*,—and the anti-philosophic poet is of opinion, that

— never yet did philosophic tube
That brings the planets home into the eye
Of observation, and discovers, else

Not visible, his family of worlds,
Discover Him that rules them.

After the sentence quoted *verbatim* by Mr. C. the letter proceeds thus.

“ *Les Formalistes comme les Platoniciens et les Aristotéliens ont raison de chercher la source des choses dans les causes finales et formelles. Mais ils ont tort de négliger les efficients et les matérielles, et d’en inférer, comme faisoit Mr. Henri Morus en Angleterre, et quelques autres Platoniciens, qu’il y a des Phénomènes qui ne peuvent être expliqués mécaniquement. Mais de l’autre côté les Matérialistes, ou ceux qui s’attachent uniquement à la Philosophie mécanique, ont tort de rejeter les considérations métaphysiques, et de vouloir tout expliquer par ce qui dépend de l’imagination.*”

“ *Je me flatte d’avoir pénétré l’Harmonie des différens règnes, et d’avoir vu que les deux partis ont raison, pourvu qu’ils ne se choquent point ; que tout ce fait mécaniquement et métaphysiquement en même tems dans les phénomènes de la nature, mais que la source de la mécanique est dans la métaphysique. Il n’étoit pas aisé de découvrir ce mystère, par ce qu’il y a peu de gens qui se donnent la peine de joindre ces deux sortes d’études.*” I have often thought that probably there is much one-sided reasoning and halving of truth amongst us at this day, because the men who are mathematical are not deeply and systematically metaphysical, and *vice versa*; those who are given to philosophical studies are not minutely acquainted with the history and present state of the Christian religion; while the great patricians and theologians have not been regularly trained and disciplined in metaphysical science,—do not appear to have patiently examined what a large portion of the studious world hold undoubtedly to be discoveries in that direction. They hear persons who have travelled in Germany, but never set foot in the region of German metaphysics, or inhaled one breath of its thin atmosphere, maintain that this science makes no real permanent advances,—that what one man builds up another pulls down, to erect his own equally unstable edifice in its place. Judging of the matter from without, and hearing only censure and contention instead of consent and approbation, they are not aware how large a part of his immediate predecessor’s opinions the successor quietly assumes. It is strange, however, that they should be ignorant of the

general fact, that a philosopher argues more against that teacher of philosophy from whom he has derived the main body of his opinions, whose system contains great part of that which his own consists of, than he does with the whole world beside. Could all that belongs to Leibnitz be abstracted from Kant, and all that belongs to Kant be abstracted from Fichte and Schelling, I should imagine that the metaphysical system of each would straightway fall into a shapeless, baseless wreck. There is perhaps no fallacy so common and so deluding as the imagination that we can understand another man's system of thought and feeling by looking at it from the outside, without having entered into it and abode in it, and learned experimentally its true nature and character. When a man is decrying German philosophy without having studied it, or perhaps read a word of what any German philosopher has written in his own books, his speech is sure to betray him: "so dangerous is it for the ablest man to attempt speaking of what he does not understand."* S. C.

Note Q. p. 283.

SEE his Treatise concerning the Search after Truth.—*De la Recherche de la Vérité*, book iii. especially chap. 6.

Father Malebranche was born at Paris, 1638, died in the same city, Oct. 13, 1715. Cousin speaks as follows of this pious philosopher.

"Nicolas Malebranche, l'un des Pères de l'Oratoire, génie profond, caché sous un extérieur peu avantageux, et incontestablement le plus grand métaphysicien que la France ait produit, développa les idées de Descartes avec originalité, en les reproduisant sous des formes plus claires et plus animées; mais son tour d'esprit éminemment religieux lui fit donner à sa philosophie un caractère mystique qui lui est particulier. La théorie de la connoissance, celle de l'origine des erreurs, surtout des erreurs qui tiennent aux illusions de l'imagination, enfin la méthode pour bien conduire notre pensée, telles sont les parties dont il a traité avec le plus de succès. Malebranche admit la théorie de la passivité de l'entendement et de l'activité libre de la volonté; il considéra l'étendue comme l'essence des corps, l'âme comme une substance essentiellement simple, et Dieu comme le fond commun

* Spoken by Mr. Dequincey in reference to a celebrated German writer.

de toute existence et de toute pensée : ces doctrines l'amènèrent à combattre les idées innées par des objections pleines de force, et à soutenir que nous voyons tout en Dieu : Dieu, suivant lui, comprend en soi toutes choses de la manière dont elles s'offrent à notre intelligence ; il est l'infini de l'espace et de la pensée, le monde intelligible et le lieu des esprits." *Manuel*, vol. ii. pp. 113-14.

It has been thought that there is a resemblance between the peculiar tenets of this philosopher and the doctrines of George Fox concerning divine illumination. They certainly prepared the way for the Idealism of Berkeley.

Among the posthumous works of Locke is An Examination of P. Malebranche's opinion of Seeing all things in God. (Works, fol. 1751. vol. iii. p. 410.) which examination is examined again by Leibnitz in his *Remarques sur le sentiment du P. Malebranche, &c.* 1708. (Opp. ed. Erdmann II. p. 456.) To compare these two discourses is highly instructive and interesting. There are other critiques by eminent men of the Father's doctrine. The following account of the last days of Malebranche is given in the Life of Berkeley prefixed to his Works, the materials of which were chiefly furnished by his brother. "At Paris, Mr. Berkeley took care to pay his respects to the illustrious Père Malebranche. He found this ingenious father in his cell, cooking in a small pipkin a medicine for a disorder with which he was then troubled, an inflammation on the lungs. The conversation naturally turned on our author's system, of which the other had received some knowledge from a translation just published. But the issue of this debate proved tragical to poor Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he raised his voice so high, and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity of a man of parts and a Frenchman, that he brought on himself a violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after."

Thus did the illustrious Father Malebranche melt away, as it were, like a man of snow, before the vigorous sun of Berkeley, who was then about one and thirty, splendid in mind, and person, and potent with his tongue, while the Father had entered his seventy-eighth year ; his great metaphysical mind,—the greatest perhaps that France ever produced,—joined with an eager spirit, proving at last too much for the decaying tenement of his body, which appeared from the first so weakly put together that the wonder was how it kept the metaphysician within the bounds of Time and Space so long. Yet his term of earthly existence exceeded by eight

years that of his robust rival, who expired Jan. 14, 1753, "as he was sitting in the midst of his family listening to a sermon,"—an end very suitable to the tenour of his gentle and pious yet strenuous life. S. C.

Note Q 2. p. 283.

ETIENNE BONNOT DE CONDILLAC was born in 1715 at Grenoble, died in 1780. Cousin says that he laboured to perfect the empirical system of Locke, and attempted to trace up all the active faculties of the soul to sensibility by means of the transformation of sensations. Others, as La Mettrie, carried forward this system, till they pushed it by its consequences, or what they deemed such, into Atheism, Materialism, and a rigorous Determinism. Condillac has remained to the present time the representative of French philosophy and its avowed chief. (*Manuel*, pp. 208-10.) Des Cartes and Malebranche, though Frenchmen, were philosophers of so different a character, that they had no more to do toward the founding of this *French* school than metaphysicians of other nations. S. C.

Note R. p. 283.

DR. Reid, who is considered by many to have been, as the *Biographie Universelle* describes him, *the founder of a new æra in the history of Modern Philosophy*, was born in 1710, at Strachan in Kincardineshire. In 1763 he succeeded Adam Smith in the chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University; died in October, 1796. He produced many works, the principal of which is *Essays on the powers of the human mind*: Lond. 1803, three vols. in 8vo.; and perhaps the most popular, *Inquiry into the human mind on the principle of common sense*, 8vo. which appeared in 1763: it came into a sixth edit. in 1804. He also wrote *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*: Edinb. 1786, in 4to.

Sir James Mackintosh, with his usual anxiety to give all men as well as all arguments their due, and to put down hasty and unjust depreciation, defends Dr. Reid from the charge of shallowness and popularity, and maintains his right to "a commendation more descriptive of a philosopher than that bestowed by Professor Cousin of having made *a vigorous protest against scepticism on behalf of common sense.*" He alleges that this philosopher's "observations on sugges-

tion, on natural signs, on the connection between what he calls sensation and perception, though perhaps occasioned by Berkeley, whose idealism Reid had once adopted, are marked by the genuine spirit of original observation." Sir James, however, admits that "Dr. Brown very justly considered the claims of Reid to the merit of detecting the universal delusion which had betrayed philosophers into the belief that ideas, which were the sole objects of knowledge, had a separate existence, as a proof of his having mistaken their illustrative language for a metaphysical opinion."* Whether a man who utterly misunderstands the language of preceding philosophers on a cardinal point can himself be a "deep thinker," is a question which I do not pretend to solve; I only think it is a question, and without offering a *philosophical* opinion I must say that Dr. Reid's literal way of understanding his predecessors in the matter of ideas, and his representing them accordingly as a set of cloud-weavers and phantasts, has always reminded me of certain amusing remarks in Lamb's Essay entitled "Imperfect Sympathies." His bantering style too is more popular than philosophic, and scarcely evinces that patience and modesty for which Sir James, I doubt not on sufficient grounds, upon a review of his whole works, gives him credit. I should say, if it were worth while to record my *impression*—(I do not call it a judgment)—that Cousin's summary of his merits is as clear-sighted and clever as his summaries usually are, and that a certain *vigour* in commanding and presenting a limited view of the subject of external perception, is the best characteristic of Dr. Reid's Inquiry. And was it not this mistaken part of his teaching more than his intelligent remarks in extension of that of Berkeley, which installed him in his high reputation of "the founder of a new æra?" Dr. Reid's great merit, even according to Stewart, consisted in his having "had courage to lay aside all the hypothetical language of his predecessors concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude by a plain statement of the fact."† But if he misunderstood that language, and combated, as Sir James affirms, (p. 164,) "imaginary antagonists," where was his victory? Was not this combat and seeming triumph the very pith and marrow of his book, and that

* In this misapprehension Professor Stewart has followed him, as is evident from Elements, chap. iv. section ii.

† Elements, p. 69.

which gave it great part of its savour to the public? Did he really advance the science of metaphysics materially beyond the point at which it had arrived in the days of Berkeley? The answer to Berkeley from the first had been: "Nevertheless we *do* perceive an external world, and what presents itself within us, which we instinctively refer to things without us, does really tell us that there *are* things without us, and *what* they are in reference to us; and that we feel as sure of this as of our existence, and are incapable, by the constitution of our minds, from thinking otherwise, is a sufficient proof that it is true. Does Reid's explanation amount to more than what has just been expressed! But so much as this Berkeley himself anticipated. He stated the objection to his theory contained in the fact of universal original belief of the contrary, and tried to push it aside—it was the only obstacle that did not yield to his victorious hand.*

That Dr. Reid's philosophy was received with applause in Paris, when taught there by M. Royer Collard, *favours* the supposition that it was clear rather than deep; smart, rather than characterized by the grave energy, which slowly and laboriously grasps a *something more* of truth,—a real and substantial something. Hume's compliment to Dr. Reid's profundity *may* have been mere gentlemanly courtesy to a gentlemanly antagonist. He would perhaps have been as polite to Dr. Beattie, if *he* had not "indulged himself in the personalities and invectives of a popular pamphleteer," and so departed from fairness and, what he undertook to defend, "common sense."

Dugald Stewart, the accomplished disciple of Reid, and improver of his philosophy, was born in the College of Edinburgh in 1753, became Professor of Moral Philosophy there in 1785, died in June 1828. He published *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* in 1792, *Philosophical Essays* in 1810, *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, *Philosophy of the Active and Moral powers of Man*, and other works. Sir James Mackintosh has given his character, as a man and an author, in his interesting *Dissertation*, p. 145. edit. 1830. S. C.


* *Principles of Human Knowledge*, ss. 54-5-6-7.

Note S. p. 288.

I TAKE this opportunity of mentioning that the solution of the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise brought forward in *The Friend* (see vol. iii. pp. 92, 3rd and 4th edits.) and in *Tait's Mag.* of 1834, is distinctly given by Leibnitz in his Letters to Mr. Foucher, *Sur quelques axiomes philosophiques*, in which he says, “*Ne craignez point, Monsieur, la tortuë que les Pirrhoniens faisoient aller aussi vite qu' Achille. * * ** Un espace divisible sans fin se passe dans un tems aussi divisible sans fin. Je ne conçois point d'indivisibles physiques sans miracle, et je crois que la nature peut réduire les corps à la petitesse que la Géométrie peut considérer.” In his rejoinder to Foucher's reply he says that P. Gregoire de St. Vincent has shewn, by means of geometry, the exact place where Achilles must have caught the tortoise. *Opp. ed. Erdmann, I. pp. 115-18.*

Aristotle, in his brief way, had given the solution long before, when he said that Time does not consist of indivisible *nows* or *now-existents*—ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἀδιαίρετων—any more than any other magnitude. See the editor's note upon the passage of *The Friend* referred to above. S. C.

END OF VOL. I.



1

2

3

4

Wear your seat belt
and please don't drink
and drive. It's the
only way to stay
alive. Please don't
drink and drive.
It's the only way
to stay alive.

X

11

12

