


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
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ELEMENTS

OF

CRITICISM.

In THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME I.

EDINBURGH:
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AND
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CRITICISM.

VOLUME I.

TO THE

KING.

SIR,

THE fine arts have ever been encouraged by wiſe princes, not ſingly for private amuſement, but for their beneficial influence in ſociety. By uniting different ranks in the ſame elegant pleaſures, they promote benevolence: by cheriſhing love of order, they inforce ſubmiſſion to government: and by inſpiring delicacy of feeling, they make regular government a double bleſſing.

THESE conſiderations embolden me to hope for your Majeſty's patronage in behalf of the following work, which treats of the fine arts, and attempts to form a ſtandard of taſte by unfolding thoſe principles that ought to govern the taſte of every individual.

IT is rare to find one born with ſuch delicacy of feeling, as not to need inſtruction: it is equally rare to find one ſo low in feeling, as not to be capable of inſtruction. And yet, to refine our taſte with reſpect to beauties of art or of nature, is ſcarce endeavoured in any ſeminary of learning; a lamentable defect, conſidering how early in life taſte is ſuſceptible of culture, and how difficult to reform it if unhappily perverted. To furniſh materials for ſupplying that defect, was an additional motive for the preſent undertaking.

To promote the fine arts in Britain, has become of greater importance than is generally imagined. A flouriſhing commerce begets opulence; and opulence, inflaming our appetite for pleaſure, is commonly vented on luxury and on every ſenſual gratification: Selfiſhneſs rears its head; becomes faſhionable; and infecting all ranks, extinguiſhes the *amor patriæ* and every ſpark of public ſpirit. To prevent or to retard ſuch fatal corruption, the genius of an Alfred cannot deviſe any means more efficacious, than venting opulence upon the fine arts. Riches ſo employ'd, inſtead of encouraging vice, will excite both public and private virtue. Of this happy effect, ancient Greece furniſhes one ſhining inſtance; and why ſhould we deſpair of another in Britain?

In the commencement of an auſpicious reign, and even in that early period of life

life when pleaſure commonly is the ſole purſuit, your Majeſty has uniformly diſplay'd to a delighted people, the nobleſt principles, ripened by early culture; and for that reaſon, you will be the more diſpoſed to favour every rational plan for advancing the art of training up youth. Among the many branches of education, that which tends to make deep impreſſions of virtue, ought to be a fundamental meaſure in a well-regulated government: for depravity of manners will render ineffectual the moſt ſalutary laws; and in the midſt of opulence, what other means to prevent ſuch depravity but early and virtuous diſcipline? The Britiſh diſcipline is ſuſceptible of great improvements; and if we can hope for them, it muſt be from a young and accompliſhed Prince, eminently ſenſible of their importance. To eſtabliſh a complete ſyſtem of education, ſeems reſerved by providence for a Sovereign who commands

the

the hearts of his ſubjects. Succeſs will crown the undertaking, and endear GEORGE THE THIRD to our lateſt poſterity.

THE moſt elevated and moſt refined pleaſure of human nature, is enjoy'd by a virtuous prince governing a virtuous people; and that, by perfecting the great ſyſtem of education, your Majeſty may very long enjoy this pleaſure, is the ardent wiſh of

Your Majeſty's

Devoted Subject,

HENRY HOME.

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In deſcribing the ſcale of ſounds made in pronouncing the five vowels, *vol.* 2. *p.* 239. it ought to have been mentioned, that the letter *i* muſt be pronounced as in the word *intereſt*, and other words beginning with the ſyllable *in*; the letter *e* as in *perſuaſion*; and the letter *u* as in *number*.

The reference intended, *vol.* 2. *p.* 419. is to *p.* 404. of the ſame volume.

ELE-

INTRODUCTION.

THE five ſenſes agree in the following particular, that nothing external is perceived till it firſt make an impreſſion upon the organ of ſenſe; the impreſſion, for example, made upon the hand by a ſtone, upon the palate by ſugar, and upon the noſtrils by a roſe. But there is a difference as to our conſciouſneſs of that impreſſion. In touching, taſting, and ſmelling, we are conſcious of the impreſſion. Not ſo in ſeeing and hearing. When I behold a tree, I am not ſenſible of the impreſſion made upon my eye; nor of the impreſſion made upon my ear, when I liſten to a ſong*. This difference in the manner of perception, diſtinguiſhes remarkably hearing and ſeeing from the other ſenſes; and diſtinguiſhes ſtill more remarkably the feelings of the former from thoſe of the latter. A feeling pleaſant or painful cannot exiſt but in the mind; and yet be-

* See the Appendix, § 13.

cauſe in taſting, touching, and ſmelling, we are conſcious of the impreſſion made upon the organ, we naturally place there alſo, the pleaſant or painful feeling cauſed by that impreſſion. And becauſe ſuch feelings ſeem to be placed externally at the organ of ſenſe, we, for that reaſon, conceive them to be merely corporeal. We have a different apprehenſion of the pleaſant and painful feelings derived from ſeeing and hearing. Being inſenſible here of the organic impreſſion, we are not miſled to aſſign a wrong place to theſe feelings; and therefore we naturally place them in the mind, where they really exiſt. Upon that account, they are conceived to be more refined and ſpiritual, than what are derived from taſting, touching, and ſmelling.

The pleaſures of the eye and ear being thus elevated above thoſe of the other external ſenſes, acquire ſo much dignity as to make them a laudable entertainment. They are not, however, ſet upon a level with thoſe that are purely intellectual; being not leſs inferior in dignity to intellectual pleaſures, than ſuperior to the organic or corporeal.

They

They indeed reſemble the latter, being like them produced by external objects: but they alſo reſemble the former, being like them produced without any ſenſible organic impreſſion. Their mixt nature and middle place betwixt organic and intellectual pleaſures, qualify them to aſſociate with either. Beauty heightens all the organic feelings, as well as thoſe that are intellectual. Harmony, though it aſpires to inflame devotion, diſdains not to improve the reliſh of a banquet.

The pleaſures of the eye and ear have other valuable properties beſide thoſe of dignity and elevation. Being ſweet and moderately exhilerating, they are in their tone equally diſtant from the turbulence of paſſion, and languor of inaction; and by that tone are perfectly well qualified, not only to revive the ſpirits when ſunk by ſenſual gratification, but alſo to relax them when overſtrained in any violent purſuit. Here is a remedy provided for many diſtreſſes. And to be convinced of its ſalutary effects, it will be ſufficient to run over the following particulars. Organic pleaſures

have naturally a ſhort duration: when continued too long, or indulged to exceſs, they loſe their reliſh, and beget ſatiety and diſguſt. To relieve us from that uneaſineſs, nothing can be more happily contrived than the exhilerating pleaſures of the eye and ear, which take place imperceptibly, without much varying the tone of mind. On the other hand, any intenſe exerciſe of the intellectual powers, becomes painful by overſtraining the mind. Ceſſation from ſuch exerciſe gives not inſtant relief: it is neceſſary that the void be filled with ſome amuſement, gently relaxing the ſpirits *. Organic pleaſure, which hath no reliſh but while we are in vigour, is ill qualified for that office: but the finer pleaſures of ſenſe, which occupy without exhauſting the mind, are excellently well qualified to reſtore its uſual tone after ſevere application to ſtudy or buſineſs, as well as after ſatiety from ſenſual gratification.

Our firſt perceptions are of external ob-

* Du Bos judiciouſly obſerves, that ſilence doth not tend to calm an agitated mind; but that ſoft and ſlow muſic hath a fine effect.

jects,

jects, and our firſt attachments are to them. Organic pleaſures take the lead. But the mind, gradually ripening, reliſheth more and more the pleaſures of the eye and ear; which approach the purely mental, without exhauſting the ſpirits; and exceed the purely ſenſual, without danger of ſatiety. The pleaſures of the eye and ear have accordingly a natural aptitude to attract us from the immoderate gratification of ſenſual appetite. For the mind, once accuſtomed to enjoy a variety of external objects without being conſcious of the organic impreſſion, is prepared for enjoying internal objects where there cannot be an organic impreſſion. Thus the author of nature, by qualifying the human mind for a ſucceſſion of enjoyments from the loweſt to the higheſt, leads it by gentle ſteps from the moſt groveling corporeal pleaſures, for which ſolely it is fitted in the beginning of life, to thoſe refined and ſublime pleaſures which are ſuited to its maturity.

This ſucceſſion, however, is not governed by unavoidable neceſſity. The God of nature offers it to us, in order to advance

our

our happineſs; and it is ſufficient, that he hath enabled us to complete the ſucceſſion. Nor has he made our taſk diſagreeable or difficult. On the contrary, the tranſition is ſweet and eaſy, from corporeal pleaſures to the more refined pleaſures of ſenſe; and not leſs ſo, from theſe to the exalted pleaſures of morality and religion. We ſtand therefore engaged in honour, as well as intereſt, to ſecond the purpoſes of nature, by cultivating the pleaſures of the eye and ear, thoſe eſpecially that require extraordinary culture *, ſuch as are inſpired by poetry, painting, ſculpture, muſic, gardening, and architecture. This chiefly is the duty of the opulent, who have leiſure to improve their minds and their feelings. The fine arts are contrived to give pleaſure to the eye

* A taſte for natural objects is born with us in perfection. To reliſh a fine countenance, a rich landſcape, or a vivid colour, culture is unneceſſary. The obſervation holds equally in natural ſounds, ſuch as the ſinging of birds, or the murmuring of a brook. Nature here, the artificer of the object as well as of the percipient, hath ſuited them to each other with great accuracy. But of a poem, a cantata, a picture, and other artificial productions, a true reliſh is not commonly attained without ſtudy and practice.

and

and the ear, diſregarding the inferior ſenſes. A taſte for theſe arts is a plant that grows naturally in many ſoils; but, without culture, ſcarce to perfection in any ſoil. It is ſuſceptible of much refinement; and is, by proper care, greatly improved. In this reſpect, a taſte in the fine arts goes hand in hand with the moral ſenſe, to which indeed it is nearly allied. Both of them diſcover what is right and what is wrong. Faſhion, temper, and education, have an influence upon both, to vitiate them, or to preſerve them pure and untainted. Neither of them are arbitrary or local. They are rooted in human nature, and are governed by principles common to all men. The principles of morality belong not to the preſent undertaking. But as to the principles of the fine arts, they are evolved, by ſtudying the ſenſitive part of human nature, and by learning what objects are naturally agreeable, and what are naturally diſagreeable. The man who aſpires to be a critic in theſe arts, muſt pierce ſtill deeper. He muſt clearly perceive what objects are lofty, what low, what are proper or improper, what are manly,

ly, and what are mean or trivial. Hence a foundation for judging of taſte, and for reaſoning upon it. Where it is conformable to principles, we can pronounce with certainty, that it is correct; otherwiſe, that it is incorrect, and perhaps whimſical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, become a rational ſcience; and, like morals, may be cultivated to a high degree of refinement.

Manifold are the advantages of criticiſm, when thus ſtudied as a rational ſcience. In the firſt place, a thorough acquaintance with the principles of the fine arts, redoubles the entertainment theſe arts afford. To the man who reſigns himſelf entirely to ſentiment or feeling, without interpoſing any ſort of judgment, poetry, muſic, painting, are mere paſtime. In the prime of life, indeed, they are delightful, being ſupported by the force of novelty, and the heat of imagination. But they loſe their reliſh gradually with their novelty; and are generally neglected in the maturity of life, which diſpoſes to more ſerious and more important occupations. To thoſe who deal in criticiſm as a regular ſcience, governed by juſt principles,

ciples, and giving ſcope to judgment as well as to fancy, the fine arts are a favourite entertainment; and in old age maintain that reliſh which they produce in the morning of life *.

In the next place, a philoſophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts, inures the reflecting mind to the moſt enticing ſort of logic. Reaſoning upon ſubjects ſo agreeable tends to a habit; and a habit, ſtrengthening the reaſoning faculties, prepares the mind for entering into ſubjects more difficult and abſtract. To have, in this reſpect, a juſt conception of the importance of criticiſm, we need but reflect upon the common method of education; which, after ſome years ſpent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the leaſt preparatory diſcipline, into the moſt profound philoſophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abſtract ſcience, is beyond the reach of invention.

* "Though logic may ſubſiſt without rhetoric or poetry, "yet ſo neceſſary to theſe laſt is a ſound and correct logic, "that without it they are no better than warbling trifles." Hermes, p. 6.

With reſpect to ſuch ſpeculations, the bulk of our youth contract a ſort of hobgoblin terror, which is ſeldom, if ever, ſubdued. Thoſe who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner. They are led, ſtep by ſtep, from the eaſier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion, till they be perfected in thoſe which regularly precede it. The ſcience of criticiſm appears then to be an intermediate link, finely qualified for connecting the different parts of education into a regular chain. This ſcience furniſheth an inviting opportunity to exerciſe the judgement: we delight to reaſon upon ſubjects that are equally pleaſant and familiar: we proceed gradually from the ſimpler to the more involved caſes: and in a due courſe of diſcipline, cuſtom, which improves all our faculties, beſtows acuteneſs upon thoſe of reaſon, ſufficient to unravel all the intricacies of philoſophy.

Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reaſonings employed upon the fine arts are of the ſame kind with thoſe which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphyſical

ſical reaſonings have no tendency to improve ſocial intercourſe: nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life. But a juſt taſte in the fine arts, derived from rational principles, is a fine preparation for acting in the ſocial ſtate with dignity and propriety.

The ſcience of criticiſm tends to improve the heart not leſs than the underſtanding. I obſerve, in the firſt place, that it hath a fine effect in moderating the ſelfiſh affections. A juſt taſte in the fine arts, by ſweetening and harmonizing the temper, is a ſtrong antidote to the turbulence of paſſion and violence of purſuit. Elegance of taſte procures to a man ſo much enjoyment at home, or eaſily within reach, that in order to be occupied, he is, in youth, under no temptation to precipitate into hunting, gaming, drinking; nor, in middle age, to deliver himſelf over to ambition; nor, in old age, to avarice. Pride, a diſguſtful ſelfiſh paſſion, exerts itſelf without control, when accompanied with a bad taſte. A man of this ſtamp, upon whom the moſt ſtriking beauty makes but a faint impreſſion,

feels no joy but in gratifying his ruling paſſion by the diſcovery of errors and blemiſhes. Pride, on the other hand, finds in the conſtitution no enemy more formidable than a delicate and diſcerning taſte. The man upon whom nature and culture have beſtowed this bleſſing, feels great delight in the virtuous diſpoſitions and actions of others. He loves to cheriſh them, and to publiſh them to the world. Faults and failings, it is true, are to him not leſs obvious: but theſe he avoids, or removes out of ſight, becauſe they give him pain. In a word, there may be other paſſions, which, for a ſeaſon, diſturb the peace of ſociety more than pride: but no other paſſion is ſo unwearied an antagoniſt to the ſweets of ſocial intercourſe. Pride, tending aſſiduouſly to its gratification, puts a man perpetually in oppoſition to others; and diſpoſes him more to reliſh bad than good qualities, even in a boſom-friend. How different that diſpoſition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour, is, by refinement of taſte, ſet in its ſtrongeſt light; and defects or blemiſhes, natu-

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ral to all, are ſuppreſſed, or kept out of view?

In the next place, delicacy of taſte tends not leſs to invigorate the ſocial affections, than to moderate thoſe that are ſelfiſh. To be convinced of this tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of taſte neceſſarily heightens our ſenſibility of pain and pleaſure, and of courſe our ſympathy, which is the capital branch of every ſocial paſſion. Sympathy in particular invites a communication of joys and ſorrows, hopes and fears. Such exerciſe, ſoothing and ſatisfactory in itſelf, is productive neceſſarily of mutual good-will and affection.

One other advantage of criticiſm is reſerved to the laſt place, being of all the moſt important, that it is a great ſupport to morality. I inſiſt on it with entire ſatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty than that of cultivating a taſte in the fine arts. A juſt reliſh of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for diſcerning what is beautiful, juſt, elegant,

or

or magnanimous, in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a taſte ſo acute and accompliſhed, every action, wrong or improper, muſt be highly diſguſtful. If, in any inſtance, the overbearing power of paſſion ſway him from his duty, he returns to it upon the firſt reflection, with redoubled reſolution never to be ſwayed a ſecond time. He has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happineſs depends on regularity and order, and that a diſregard to juſtice or propriety never fails to be puniſhed with ſhame and remorſe *.

Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reaſon. Philoſophers anciently were divided into ſects: they were either Epicureans, Platoniſts, Stoics, Pythago-

*Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conſtitution, delicacy of taſte to calmneſs and ſedateneſs. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every paſſion; which can ſcarce happen with reſpect to delicacy of taſte. Upon a man poſſeſſed of this bleſſing, the moral duties, as well as the fine arts, make a deep impreſſion, ſo as to counterbalance every irregular deſire. And even ſuppoſing a ſtrong temptation, it can take no faſt hold of a calm and ſedate temper.

reans,

reans, or Sceptics. Men relied no farther upon their own judgement than to chuſe a leader, whom they implicitly followed. In later times, happily, reaſon hath obtained the aſcendant. Men now aſſert their native privilege of thinking for themſelves, and diſdain to be ranked in any ſect, whatever be the ſcience. I muſt except criticiſm, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be not leſs ſlaviſh in its principles, nor leſs ſubmiſſive to authority, than it was originally. Boſſu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can diſcover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, ſupported by the authority of Ariſtotle. Strange, that in ſo long a work, the concordance or diſcordance of theſe rules with human nature, ſhould never once have entered his thoughts! It could not ſurely be his opinion, that theſe poets, however eminent for genius, were intitled to give laws to mankind, and that nothing now remains but blind obedience to their arbitrary will. If in writing they followed no rule, why ſhould they be imitated? If they ſtudied nature, and were

were obſequious to rational principles, why ſhould theſe be concealed from us?

With reſpect to the preſent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to give a regular treatiſe upon each of the fine arts in particular; but only, in general, to apply to them ſome remarks and obſervations drawn from human nature, the true ſource of criticiſm. The fine arts are calculated for our entertainment, or for making agreeable impreſſions; and, by that circumſtance, are diſtinguiſhed from the uſeful arts. In order then to be a critic in the fine arts, it is neceſſary, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally diſagreeable. A complete treatiſe on that ſubject would be a field by far too extenſive to be thoroughly cultivated by any one hand. The author pretends only to have entered upon the ſubject ſo far as neceſſary for ſupporting his critical remarks. And he aſſumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diſtinctly than hitherto has been done, that the genuine rules of criticiſm are all of them derived from the human heart. The

ſenſitive

ſenſitive part of our nature is a delightful ſpeculation. What the author hath diſcovered or collected upon that ſubject, he chuſes to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticiſm; becauſe he imagines, that this form will be more reliſhed, and perhaps be not leſs inſtructive, than a regular and laboured diſquiſition. His plan is, to aſcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments, inſtead of beginning with the former, handled abſtractly, and deſcending to the latter. But though criticiſm be thus his only declared aim, he will not diſown, that all along he had it in view, to explain the nature of man, conſidered as a ſenſitive being, capable of pleaſure and pain. And though he flatters himſelf with having made ſome progreſs in that important ſcience, he is however too ſenſible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeſſedly, or to avow it as the chief purpoſe of the preſent work.

To cenſure works, not men, is the juſt prerogative of criticiſm; and accordingly all perſonal cenſure is here avoided, unleſs where neceſſary to illuſtrate ſome general

propoſition. No praiſe is claimed on that account; becauſe cenſuring with a view merely to find fault, is an entertainment that humanity never reliſhes. Writers, one would imagine, ſhould, above all others, be reſerved upon that article, when they lie ſo open to retaliation. The author of this treatiſe, far from being confident of meriting no cenſure, entertains not even the ſlighteſt hope of ſuch perfection. Amuſement was at firſt the ſole aim of his inquiries. Proceeding from one particular to another, the ſubject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ſtruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly uſeful. In public, however, he would not appear in a ſlovenly dreſs; and therefore he pretends not otherwiſe to apologiſe for his errors, than by obſerving, that, in a new ſubject, not leſs nice than extenſive, errors are in ſome meaſure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to juſtify his taſte in every particular. That point muſt be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in ſome matters ſuſceptible of great refinement,

ment, time is perhaps the only infallible touch-ſtone of taſte. To this he appeals, and to this he chearfully ſubmits.

N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too aſſuming for this work. A number of theſe elements or principles are here evolved: but as the author is far from imagining, that he has completed the liſt, a more humble title is proper, ſuch as may expreſs any undetermined number of parts leſs than the whole. This he thinks is ſignified by the title he has choſen, *viz.* ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

ELEMENTS

OF

CRITICISM.

CHAPTER I.

Perceptions and ideas in a train.

A MAN while awake is ſenſible of a continued train of objects paſſing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train: nor has he power to vary it by calling up an object at will *. At the ſame time we learn

* For how ſhould this be done? What object is it that we are to call up? If this queſtion can be anſwered, the object is already in the mind, and there is no occaſion to exert the power. If the queſtion cannot be anſwered, I next demand, how it is poſſible that a voluntary power can be exerted without any view of an object to exert it upon? We

learn from daily experience, that a train of thought is not merely caſual. And if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, we muſt try to evolve by what law it is governed. The ſubject is of importance in the ſcience of human nature; and I promiſe beforehand, that it will be found of great importance in the fine arts.

It appears that the relations by which things are linked together, have a great influence in directing the train of thought; and we find by experience, that objects are connected in the mind preciſely as they are externally. Beginning then with things external, we find that they are not more remarkable by their inherent properties than by their various relations. We cannot any where extend our view without perceiving things connected together by certain relations. One thing perceived to be a cauſe, is connected with its ſeveral

We cannot form a conception of ſuch a thing. This argument appears to me ſatisfactory: if it need confirmation, I urge experience. Whoever makes a trial will find, that objects are linked together in the mind, forming a connected chain; and that we have not the command of any object independent of the chain.

effects;

effects; ſome things are connected by contiguity in time, others by contiguity in place; ſome are connected by reſemblance, ſome by contraſt; ſome go before, ſome follow. Not a ſingle thing appears ſolitary, and altogether devoid of connection. The only difference is, that ſome are intimately connected, ſome more ſlightly; ſome near, ſome at a diſtance.

Experience as well as reaſon may ſatisfy us, that the train of mental perceptions is in a great meaſure regulated by the foregoing relations. Where a number of things are linked together, the idea of any one ſuggeſts the reſt; and in this manner is a train of thoughts compoſed. Such is the law of ſucceſſion; whether an original law, or whether directed by ſome latent principle, is doubtful; and probably will for ever remain ſo. This law, however, is not inviolable. It ſometimes happens, though rarely, that an idea preſents itſelf to the mind without any connection, ſo far at leaſt as can be diſcovered.

But though we have not the abſolute command of ideas, yet the Will hath a conſiderable

ſiderable influence in directing the order of connected ideas. There are few things but what are connected with many others. By this means, when any thing becomes an object, whether in a direct ſurvey, or ideally only, it generally ſuggeſts many of its connections. Among theſe a choice is afforded. We can inſiſt upon one, rejecting others; and we can even inſiſt upon what has the ſlighteſt connection. Where ideas are left to their natural courſe, they are generally continued through the ſtrongeſt connections. The mind extends its view to a ſon more readily than to a ſervant, and more readily to a neighbour than to one living at a diſtance. This order may be varied by Will, but ſtill within the limits of connected objects. In ſhort, every train of ideas muſt be a chain, in which the particular ideas are linked to each other. We may vary the order of a natural train; but not ſo as to diſſolve it altogether, by carrying on our thoughts in a looſe manner without any connection. So far doth our power extend; and that power is ſufficient for all uſeful purpoſes. To give us more

power,

power, would probably be detrimental inſtead of being ſalutary.

Will is not the only cauſe that prevents a train of thought from being continued through the ſtrongeſt connections. Much depends on the preſent tone of mind; for a ſubject that accords with this tone is always welcome. Thus, in good ſpirits, a chearful ſubject will be introduced by the ſlighteſt connection; and one that is melancholy, not leſs readily in low ſpirits. Again, an intereſting ſubject is recalled, from time to time, by any connection indifferently, ſtrong or weak. This is finely touched by Shakeſpear, with relation to a rich cargo at ſea.

My wind, cooling my broth,
Would blow me to an ague, when I thought
What harm a wind too great might do at ſea.
I ſhould not ſee the ſandy hour-glaſs run,
But I ſhould think of ſhallows and of flats;
And ſee my wealthy Andrew dock'd in ſand,
Vailing her high top lower than her ribs,
To kiſs her burial. Should I go to church,
And ſee the holy edifice of ſtone,
And not bethink me ſtrait of dangerous rocks?

Which touching but my gentle veſſel's ſide,
Would ſcatter all the ſpices on the ſtream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my ſilks;
And, in a word, but now worth this,
And now worth nothing.

Merchant of Venice, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

Another cauſe clearly diſtinguiſhable from that now mentioned, hath alſo a conſiderable influence over the train of ideas. In ſome minds of a ſingular frame, thoughts and circumſtances crowd upon each other by the ſlighteſt connection. I aſcribe this to a defect in the faculty of diſcernment. A perſon who cannot accurately diſtinguiſh betwixt a ſlight connection and one that is more ſolid, is equally affected with both. Such a perſon muſt neceſſarily have a great command of ideas, becauſe they are introduced by any relation indifferently; and the ſlighter relations, being without number, muſt furniſh ideas without end. This doctrine is, in a lively manner, illuſtrated by Shakeſpear.

Falſtaff. What is the groſs ſum that I owe thee?
Hoſteſs. Marry, if thou wert an honeſt man, thyſelf

thyſelf and thy money too. Thou didſt ſwear to me on a parcel-gilt goblet, ſitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a ſea-coal fire, on Wedneſday in Whitſun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening him to a ſinging man of Windſor, thou didſt ſwear to me then, as I was waſhing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my Lady thy wife. Canſt thou deny it? Did not Goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Goſſip Quickly? Coming in to borrow a meſs of vinegar; telling us ſhe had a good diſh of prawns; whereby thou didſt deſire to eat ſome; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound? And didſt not thou, when ſhe was gone down ſtairs, deſire me to be no more ſo familiarity with ſuch poor people, ſaying, that ere long they ſhould call me Madam? And didſt thou not kiſs me, and bid me fetch thee thirty ſhillings? I put thee now to thy book-oath, deny it if thou canſt.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 2. *ſc.* 2.

On the other hand, a man of accurate judgement cannot have a great flow of ideas. The ſlighter relations making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas. And hence it is, that accurate judgement is not friendly to declamation or copious elo-

quence. This reaſoning is confirmed by experience; for it is a noted obſervation, That a great or comprehenſive memory is ſeldom connected with a good judgement.

As an additional confirmation, I appeal to another noted obſervation, That wit and judgement are ſeldom united. Wit conſiſts chiefly in joining things by diſtant and fanciful relations, which ſurpriſe becauſe they are unexpected. Such relations being of the ſlighteſt kind, readily occur to that perſon only who makes every relation equally welcome. Wit, upon that account, is, in a good meaſure, incompatible with ſolid judgement; which, neglecting trivial relations, adheres to what are ſubſtantial and permanent. Thus memory and wit are often conjoined: ſolid judgement ſeldom with either.

The train of thought depends not entirely upon relations: another cauſe comes in for a ſhare; and that is the ſenſe of order and arrangement. To things of equal rank, where there is no room for a preference, order cannot be applied; and it muſt be indifferent in what manner they be ſurveyed; witneſs

witneſs the ſheep that make a flock, or the trees in a wood. But in things of unequal rank, order is a governing principle. Thus our tendency is, to view the principal ſubject before we deſcend to its acceſſories or ornaments, and the ſuperior before the inferior or dependent. We are equally averſe to enter into a minute conſideration of conſtituent parts, till the thing be firſt ſurveyed as a whole. In paſſing from a part to the whole, and from an acceſſory to its principal, the connection is the ſame as in the oppoſite direction. But a ſenſe of order aids the tranſition in the latter caſe, and a ſenſe of diſorder obſtructs it in the former. It needs ſcarce be added, that in thinking or reflecting on any of theſe particulars, and in paſſing from one to another ideally, we are ſenſible of eaſineſs or difficulty preciſely as when they are ſet before our eyes.

Our ſenſe of order is conſpicuous with reſpect to natural operations; for it always coincides with the order of nature. Thinking upon a body in motion, we follow its natural courſe. The mind falls with a heavy body, deſcends with a river, and aſcends with

with flame and ſmoke. In tracing out a family, we incline to begin at the founder, and to deſcend gradually to his lateſt poſterity. On the contrary, muſing on a lofty oak, we begin at the trunk, and mount from it to the branches. As to hiſtorical facts, we love to proceed in the order of time; or, which comes to the ſame, to proceed along the chain of cauſes and effects.

But though, in following out a hiſtorical chain, our bent is to proceed orderly from cauſes to their effects, we find not the ſame bent in matters of ſcience. There we ſeem rather diſpoſed to proceed from effects to their cauſes, and from particular propoſitions to thoſe which are more general. Why this difference in matters that appear ſo nearly related? The caſes are ſimilar in appearance only, not in reality. In a hiſtorical chain, every event is particular, the effect of ſome former event, and the cauſe of others that follow. In ſuch a chain, there is nothing to bias the mind from the order of nature. Widely different is the caſe of ſcience, when we endeavour to trace out

cauſes

cauſes and their effects. Many experiments are commonly reduced under one cauſe; and again, many of theſe under ſome one ſtill more general and comprehenſive. In our progreſs from particular effects to general cauſes, and from particular propoſitions to the more comprehenſive, we feel a gradual dilatation or expanſion of mind, like what is felt in proceeding along an aſcending ſeries, which is extremely delightful. The pleaſure here exceeds what ariſes from following the courſe of nature; and it is this pleaſure which regulates our train of thought in the caſe now mentioned, and in others that are ſimilar. Theſe obſervations, by the way, furniſh materials for inſtituting a compariſon betwixt the ſynthetic and analytic methods of reaſoning. The ſynthetic method deſcending regularly from principles to their conſequences, is more agreeable to the ſtrictneſs of order. But in following the oppoſite courſe in the analytic method, we have a ſenſible pleaſure, like mounting upward, which is not felt in the other. The analytic method is more agreeable to the imagination. The other method will

will be preferred by thoſe only who with rigidity adhere to order, and give no indulgence to natural emotions *.

It appears then that we are framed by nature to reliſh order and connection. When an object is introduced by a proper connection, we are conſcious of a certain pleaſure ariſing from that circumſtance. Among objects of equal rank, the pleaſure is proportioned to the degree of connection; but among unequal objects, where we require a certain order, the pleaſure ariſes chiefly from an orderly arrangement. Of this one may be made ſenſible, in tracing objects contrary to the courſe of nature, or contrary to our ſenſe of order. The mind proceeds with alacrity from a whole to its parts, and from a principal to its acceſſories; but in the contrary direction, it is ſenſible of a ſort of retrograde motion, which is unpleaſant. And here may be remarked the great influence of order upon the mind of man. Grandeur, which makes a deep impreſſion,

* A train of perceptions or ideas, with reſpect to its uniformity and variety, is handled afterward, chap. 9.

inclines

inclines us, in running over any ſeries, to proceed from ſmall to great, rather than from great to ſmall. But order prevails over this tendency; and in paſſing from the whole to its parts, and from a ſubject to its ornaments, affords pleaſure as well as facility, which are not felt in the oppoſite courſe. Elevation touches the mind not leſs than grandeur doth; and in raiſing the mind to elevated objects, there is a ſenſible pleaſure. But the courſe of nature hath ſtill a greater influence than elevation; and therefore the pleaſure of falling with rain, and deſcending gradually with a river, prevails over that of mounting upward. Hence the agreeableneſs of ſmoke aſcending in a calm morning. Elevation concurs with the courſe of nature, to make this object delightful.

I am extremely ſenſible of the diſguſt men generally have at abſtract ſpeculation; and for that reaſon I would avoid it altogether, were it poſſible in a work which profeſſes to draw the rules of criticiſm from human nature, their true ſource. There is indeed no choice, other than to continue for ſome

time in the ſame track, or to abandon the undertaking altogether. Candor obliges me to notify this to my readers, that ſuch of them whoſe averſion to abſtract ſpeculation is invincible, may ſtop ſhort here; for till principles be explained, I can promiſe no entertainment to thoſe who ſhun thinking. But I flatter myſelf with a different taſte in the bulk of readers. Some few, I imagine, will reliſh the abſtract part for its own ſake; and many for the uſeful purpoſes to which it may be applied. For encouraging the latter to proceed with alacrity, I aſſure them beforehand that the foregoing ſpeculation leads to many important rules of criticiſm, which ſhall be unfolded in the courſe of this work. In the mean time, for inſtant ſatisfaction in part, they will be pleaſed to accept the following ſpecimen.

It is required in every work of art, that, like an organic ſyſtem, the conſtituent parts be mutually connected, and bear each of them a relation to the whole, ſome more intimate, ſome leſs, according to their deſtination. Order is not leſs eſſential than connection; and when due regard is paid to

theſe,

theſe, we have a ſenſe of juſt compoſition, and ſo far are pleaſed with the performance. Homer is defective in order and connection; and Pindar more remarkably. Regularity, order, and connection, are painful reſtraints on a bold and fertile imagination; and are not patiently ſubmitted to, but after much culture and diſcipline. In Horace there is no fault more eminent than want of connection. Inſtances are without number. In the firſt fourteen lines of ode 7. lib. 1. he mentions ſeveral towns and diſtricts which by ſome were reliſhed more than by others. In the remainder of the ode, Plancus is exhorted to drown his cares in wine. Having narrowly eſcaped death by the fall of a tree, this poet * takes occaſion properly to obſerve, that while we guard againſt ſome dangers, we are expoſed to others we cannot foreſee. He ends with diſplaying the power of muſic. The parts of ode 16. lib. 2. are ſo looſely connected as to disfigure a poem otherwiſe extremely beautiful. The 1ſt, 2d, 3d, 4th, 11th, 24th, 27th odes of the

* Lib. 2. ode 13.

3d book, lie open all of them to the ſame cenſure. The 1ſt ſatire, book 1. is ſo deformed by want of unity and connection of parts, as upon the whole to be ſcarce agreeable. It commences with an important queſtion, How it happens that perſons who are ſo much ſatisfied with themſelves, are generally ſo little with their condition? After illuſtrating the obſervation in a ſprightly manner by ſeveral examples, the author, forgetting his ſubject, enters upon a declamation againſt avarice, which he purſues till the line 108. There he makes an apology for wandering, and promiſes to return to his ſubject. But avarice having got poſſeſſion of his mind, he follows out that theme to the end, and never returns to the queſtion propoſed in the beginning.

In the Georgics of Virgil, though eſteemed the moſt finiſhed work of that author, the parts are ill connected, and the tranſitions far from being ſweet and eaſy. In the firſt book * he deviates from his ſubject to give a deſcription of the five

* Lin. 231.

zones.

zones. The want of connection here is remarkable, as well as in the deſcription of the prodigies that accompanied the death of Cæſar, with which the ſame book is concluded. A digreſſion upon the praiſes of Italy in the ſecond book *, is not more happily introduced. And in the midſt of a declamation upon the pleaſures of huſbandry, that makes part of the ſame book †, the author appears perſonally upon the ſtage without the ſlighteſt connection. The two prefaces of Salluſt look as if they had been prefixed by ſome blunder to his two hiſtories. They will ſuit any other hiſtory as well, or any ſubject as well as hiſtory. Even the members of theſe prefaces are but looſely connected. They look more like a number of maxims or obſervations than a connected diſcourſe.

An epiſode in a narrative poem being in effect an acceſſory, demands not that ſtrict union with the principal ſubject which is requiſite betwixt a whole and its conſtituent parts. The relation however of prin-

* Lin. 136. † Lin. 475.

cipal

cipal and acceſſory being pretty intimate, an epiſode looſely connected with the principal ſubject will never be graceful. I give for an example the deſcent of Æneas into hell, which employs the ſixth book of the Æneid. The reader is not prepared for this important event. No cauſe is aſſigned, that can make it appear neceſſary or even natural, to ſuſpend, for ſo long a time, the principal action in its moſt intereſting period. To engage Æneas to wander from his courſe in ſearch of an adventure ſo extraordinary, the poet can find no better pretext, than the hero's longing to viſit the ghoſt of his father recently dead. In the mean time the ſtory is interrupted, and the reader loſes his ardor. An epiſode ſo extremely beautiful is not at any rate to be diſpenſed with. It is pity however, that it doth not ariſe more naturally from the ſubject. I muſt obſerve at the ſame time, that full juſtice is done to this incident, by conſidering it to be an epiſode; for if it be a conſtituent part of the principal action, the connection ought to be ſtill more intimate. The ſame objection lies againſt that elaborate

rate deſcription of Fame in the Æneid *. Any other book of that heroic poem, or of any heroic poem, has as good a title to that deſcription as the book where it is placed.

In a natural landſcape, we every day perceive a multitude of objects connected by contiguity ſolely. Objects of ſight make an impreſſion ſo lively, as that a relation, even of the ſlighteſt kind, is reliſhed. This however ought not to be imitated in deſcription. Words are ſo far ſhort of the eye in livelineſs of impreſſion, that in a deſcription the connection of objects ought to be carefully ſtudied, in order to make the deeper impreſſion. For it is a known fact, the reaſon of which is ſuggeſted above, that it is eaſier by words to introduce into the mind a related object, than one which is not connected with the preceding train. In the following paſſage, different things are brought together without the ſlighteſt connection, if it be not what may be called verbal, *i. e.* taking the ſame word in different meanings.

* Lib. 4. lin. 173.

Surgamus

Surgamus: ſolet eſſe gravis cantantibus umbra.
Juniperi gravis umbra: nocent et frugibus umbræ.
Ite domum ſaturæ, venit Heſperus, ite capellæ.
Virg. Buc. 10. 75.

The metaphorical or figurative appearance of an object, is no good cauſe for introducing that object in its real and natural appearance. A relation ſo ſlight can never be reliſhed.

Diſtruſt in lovers is too warm a ſun;
But yet 'tis night in love when that is gone.
And in thoſe climes which moſt his ſcorching know,
He makes the nobleſt fruits and metals grow.
Part 2. *Conqueſt of Granada, act* 3.

The relations among objects have a conſiderable influence in the gratification of our paſſions, and even in their production. But this ſubject is reſerved to be treated in the chapter of emotions and paſſions *.

There is perhaps not another inſtance of a building ſo great erected upon a foundation ſo ſlight in appearance, as that which is

* Part 1. ſect. 4.

erected

erected upon the relations of objects and their arrangement. Relations make no capital figure in the mind: the bulk of them are tranſitory, and ſome extremely trivial. They are however the links that, uniting our perceptions into one connected chain, produce connection of action, becauſe perceptions and actions have an intimate correſpondence. But it is not ſufficient for the conduct of life that our actions be linked together, however intimately: it is beſide neceſſary that they proceed in a certain order; and this alſo is provided for by an original propenſity. Thus order and connection, while they admit ſufficient variety, introduce a method in the management of affairs. Without them our conduct would be fluctuating and deſultory; and we would be hurried from thought to thought, and from action to action, entirely at the mercy of chance.

CHAP. II.

Emotions and Paſſions.

THE fine arts, as obſerved above *, are all of them calculated to give pleaſure to the eye or the ear; and they never deſcend to gratify the taſte, touch, or ſmell. At the ſame time, the feelings of the eye and ear, are of all the feelings of external ſenſe, thoſe only which are honoured with the name of *emotions* or *paſſions*. It is alſo obſerved above †, that the principles of the fine arts are unfolded by ſtudying the ſenſitive part of human nature, in order to know what objects of the eye and ear are agreeable, what diſagreeable. Theſe obſervations ſhow the uſe of the preſent chapter. We evidently muſt be acquainted with the nature and cauſes of emotions and paſſions, before we can judge with any accuracy how far they are

* Introduction. † Introduction.

under

under the power of the fine arts. The critical art is thus ſet in a fine point of view. The inquiſitive mind beginning with criticiſm the moſt agreeable of all amuſements, and finding no obſtruction in its progreſs, advances far into the ſenſitive part of our nature; and gains inſenſibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its deſires, and of every motive to action; a ſcience which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greateſt importance.

Upon a ſubject ſo extenſive, all that can be expected here, is a general or ſlight ſurvey. Some emotions indeed more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, I propoſe to handle in ſeparate chapters; a method that will ſhorten the general ſurvey conſiderably. And yet, after this circumſcription, ſo much matter comes under even a general view of the paſſions and emotions, that, to avoid confuſion, I find it neceſſary to divide this chapter into many parts; in the firſt of which are handled the cauſes of thoſe emotions and paſſions that are the moſt common and familiar; for to explain

plain every paſſion and emotion, however ſingular, would be an endleſs work. And though I could not well take up leſs ground, without ſeparating things intimately connected; yet, upon examination, I find the cauſes of our emotions and paſſions to be ſo numerous and various, as to make a ſubdiviſion alſo neceſſary by ſplitting this firſt part into ſeveral ſections. Human nature is a complicated machine, and muſt be ſo to anſwer all its purpoſes. There have indeed been publiſhed to the world, many a ſyſtem of human nature, that flatter the mind by their ſimplicity. But theſe, unluckily, deviate far from truth and reality. According to ſome writers, man is entirely a ſelfiſh being: according to others, univerſal benevolence is his duty. One founds morality upon ſympathy ſolely, and one upon utility. If any of theſe ſyſtems were of nature's production, the preſent ſubject might be ſoon diſcuſſed. But the variety of nature is not ſo eaſily reached; and for confuting ſuch Utopian ſyſtems without the intricacy of reaſoning, it appears the beſt method to enter

enter into human nature, and to ſet before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exiſt.

PART I.

Cauſes evolved of the emotions and paſſions.

SECT. I.

Difference betwixt emotion and paſſion.—— Cauſes that are the moſt common and the moſt extenſive.—— Paſſion conſidered as productive of action.

THeſe branches are ſo interwoven, as to make it neceſſary that they be handled together. It is a fact univerſally admitted, that no emotion nor paſſion ever ſtarts up in the mind, without a known cauſe. If I love a perſon, it is for good qualities or good offices: if I have reſentment againſt a man, it muſt be for ſome injury he has done me; and I cannot pity any one, who is under no diſtreſs of body or of mind.

The

The circumſtances now mentioned, if they cauſe or occaſion a paſſion, cannot be entirely indifferent: if they were, they could not move us in any degree. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent. Looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable. If an injury were not diſagreeable, it would not occaſion any reſentment againſt the author; nor would the paſſion of pity be raiſed by an object in diſtreſs, if that object did not give us pain. Theſe feelings antecedent to paſſion, and which ſeem to be the cauſes of paſſion, ſhall be diſtinguiſhed by the name of *emotions*.

What is now ſaid about the production of paſſion, reſolves into a very ſimple propoſition, That we love what is pleaſant, and hate what is painful. And indeed it is evident, that without antecedent emotions we could not have any paſſions; for a thing muſt be pleaſant or painful, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

As it appears from this ſhort ſketch, that paſſions are generated by means of prior emotions,

motions, it will be neceſſary to take firſt under conſideration emotions and their cauſes.

Such is the conſtitution of our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are inſtantaneouſly conſcious of pleaſure or pain. A flowing river, a ſmooth extended plain, a ſpreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of ſight that raiſe pleaſant emotions. A barren heath, a dirty marſh, a rotten carcaſs, raiſe painful emotions. Of the emotions thus produced, we inquire for no other cauſe but merely the preſence of the object.

It muſt further be obſerved, that the things now mentioned, raiſe emotions by means of their properties and qualities. To the emotion raiſed by a large river, its ſize, its force, and its fluency, contribute each a ſhare. The pleaſures of regularity, propriety, convenience, compoſe the emotion raiſed by a fine building.

If external properties make a being or thing agreeable, we have reaſon to expect the ſame effect from thoſe which are internal; and accordingly power, diſcernment, wit,

wit, mildneſs, ſympathy, courage, benevolence, render the poſſeſſor agreeable in a high degree. So ſoon as theſe qualities are perceived in any perſon, we inſtantaneouſly feel pleaſant emotions, without the ſlighteſt act of reflection or of attention to conſequences. It is almoſt unneceſſary to add, that certain qualities oppoſite to the former, ſuch as dullneſs, peeviſhneſs, inhumanity, cowardice, occaſion in the ſame manner painful emotions.

Senſible beings affect us remarkably by their actions. Some actions ſo ſoon as perceived, raiſe pleaſant emotions in the ſpectator, without the leaſt reflection; ſuch as graceful motion and genteel behaviour. But as the intention of the agent is a capital circumſtance in the bulk of human actions, it requires reflection to diſcover their true character. If I ſee one delivering a purſe of money to another, I can make nothing of this action, till I diſcover with what intention the money is given. If it be given to extinguiſh a debt, the action is agreeable in a ſlight degree. If it be a grateful return, I feel a ſtronger emotion; and the pleaſurable

ſurable emotion riſes to a great height when it is the intention of the giver to relieve a virtuous family from want. Actions are thus qualified by the intention of the agent. But they are not qualified by the event; for an action well intended is agreeable, whatever be the conſequence. The pleaſant or painful emotion that ariſeth from contemplating human actions, is of a peculiar kind. Human actions are perceived to be *right* or *wrong*; and this perception qualifies the pleaſure or pain that reſults from them *.

Not

* In tracing our emotions and paſſions to their origin, it once was my opinion, that qualities and actions are the primary cauſes of emotions; and that theſe emotions are afterward expanded upon the being to which theſe qualities and actions belong. But I have diſcovered that opinion to be erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, ſeparable from the being to which it belongs; and for that reaſon, cannot of itſelf be the cauſe of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or ſubſtance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwiſe than by their means. But ſtill, when an emotion is raiſed, it is the being itſelf, as we apprehend the matter, which raiſes the emotion; and it raiſes it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we can in idea abſtract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be anſwered,

Not only are emotions raiſed in us by the qualities and actions of others, but alſo by their feelings. I cannot behold a man in diſtreſs, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleaſure.

The beings or things above deſcribed, occaſion emotions in us, not only in the original ſurvey, but when they are recalled to the memory in idea. A field laid out with taſte, is pleaſant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye. A generous action deſcribed in words or colours, occaſions a ſenſible emotion, as well as when we ſee

That an abſtract idea, which ſerves excellently the purpoſes of reaſoning, is too faint and too much ſtrained to produce any ſort of emotion. But it is ſufficient for the preſent purpoſe to anſwer, That the eye never abſtracts. By this organ we perceive things as they really exiſt, and never perceive a quality as ſeparated from the ſubject. Hence it muſt be evident, that emotions are raiſed, not by qualities abſtractly conſidered, but by the ſubſtance or body ſo and ſo qualified. Thus a ſpreading oak raiſes a pleaſant emotion, by means of its colour, figure, umbrage, *&c.* It is not the colour ſtrictly ſpeaking that produces the emotion, but the tree as coloured: it is not the figure abſtractly conſidered that produces the emotion, but the tree conſidered as of a certain figure. And hence by the way it appears, that the beauty of ſuch an object is complex, reſolvable into ſeveral beauties more ſimple.

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it performed. And when we reflect upon the diſtreſs of any perſon, our pain is of the ſame kind with what we felt when eye-witneſſes. In a word, an agreeable or diſagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occaſion of a pleaſant or painful emotion, of the ſame kind with that produced when the object was preſent. The only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleaſure or pain produced by the former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter.

Having explained the nature of an emotion and mentioned ſeveral cauſes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obſervation of conſiderable importance in the ſcience of human nature, that ſome emotions are accompanied with deſire, and that others, after a ſhort exiſtence, paſs away without producing deſire of any ſort. The emotion raiſed by a fine landſcape or a magnificent building, vaniſheth generally without attaching our hearts to the object; which alſo happens with relation to a number of fine faces in a crowded aſſembly. But the bulk of emotions are accompanied with deſire of

one ſort or other, provided only a fit object for deſire be ſuggeſted. This is remarkably the caſe of emotions raiſed by human actions and qualities. A virtuous action raiſeth in every ſpectator a pleaſant emotion, which is generally attended with a deſire to do good to the author of the action. A vicious action, on the other hand, produceth a painful emotion; and of conſequence a deſire to have the author puniſhed. Even things inanimate often raiſe deſire. The goods of fortune are objects of deſire almoſt univerſally; and the deſire, when more than commonly vigorous, obtains the name of *avarice*. The pleaſant emotion produced in a ſpectator by a capital picture in the poſſeſſion of a prince, ſeldom raiſeth deſire. But if ſuch a picture be expoſed to ſale, deſire of having or poſſeſſing is the natural conſequence of the emotion.

If now an emotion be ſometimes productive of deſire, ſomtimes not, it comes to be a material inquiry, in what reſpect a paſſion differs from an emotion. Is paſſion in its nature or feeling diſtinguiſhable from emotion? I have been apt to think that there

there muſt be a diſtinction, when the emotion ſeems in all caſes to precede the paſſion, and to be the cauſe or occaſion of it. But after the ſtricteſt examination, I cannot perceive any ſuch diſtinction betwixt emotion and paſſion. What is love to a miſtreſs, for example, but a pleaſant emotion raiſed by a ſight or idea of the perſon beloved, joined with deſire of enjoyment? In what elſe conſiſts the paſſion of reſentment, but in a painful emotion occaſioned by the injury, accompanied with deſire to chaſtiſe the author of the injury? In general, as to every ſort of paſſion, we find no more in the compoſition, but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleaſant or painful accompanied with deſire. What then ſhall we ſay upon this ſubject? Are *paſſion* and *emotion* ſynonymous terms? This cannot be averred. No feeling nor agitation of the mind void of deſire, is termed a paſſion; and we have diſcovered that there are many emotions which paſs away without raiſing deſire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be ſolved? There appears to me but one ſolution, which I reliſh the more,

as

as it renders the doctrine of the paſſions and emotions ſimple and perſpicuous. The ſolution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it paſſeth away without raiſing deſire, is denominated *an emotion:* when deſire is raiſed, the motion or agitation is denominated *a paſſion.* A fine face, for example, raiſeth in me a pleaſant feeling. If this feeling vaniſh without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion. But if ſuch feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become ſufficiently ſtrong to raiſe deſire, it is no longer termed an emotion, but a paſſion. The ſame holds in all the other paſſions. The painful feeling raiſed in a ſpectator by a ſlight injury done to a ſtranger, being accompanied with no deſire of revenge, is termed an emotion. But this injury raiſeth in the ſtranger a ſtronger emotion, which being accompanied with deſire of revenge, is a paſſion. Again, external expreſſions of diſtreſs, produce in the ſpectator a painful feeling. This feeling is ſometimes ſo ſlight as to paſs away without any effect, in which caſe it is an emotion. But if the feeling

feeling be ſo ſtrong as to prompt deſire of affording relief, it is a paſſion, and is termed *pity*. Envy is emulation in exceſs. If the exaltation of a competitor be barely diſagreeable, the painful feeling is reckoned an emotion. If it produce deſire to depreſs him, it is reckoned a paſſion.

To prevent miſtakes, it muſt be obſerved, that deſire here is taken in its proper ſenſe, *viz.* that internal impulſe which makes us proceed to action. Deſire in a lax ſenſe reſpects alſo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I deſire that my friend may have a ſon to repreſent him, or that my country may flouriſh in arts and ſciences. But ſuch internal act is more properly termed a *wiſh* than a *deſire*.

Having diſtinguiſhed paſſion from emotion, we proceed to conſider paſſion more at large, with reſpect eſpecially to its power of producing action.

We have daily and conſtant experience for our authority, that no man ever proceeds to action but through the impulſe of ſome antecedent deſire. So well eſtabliſhed is this obſervation, and ſo deeply rooted in the

the mind, that we can ſcarce imagine a different ſyſtem of action. Even a child will ſay familiarly, What ſhould make me do this or that when I have no inclination to it? Taking it then for granted, that the exiſtence of action depends on antecedent deſire; it follows, that where there is no deſire there can be no action. This opens another ſhining diſtinction betwixt emotions and paſſions. The former, being without deſire, are in their nature quieſcent: the latter, involving deſire, have a tendency to action, and always produce action where they meet with no obſtruction.

Hence it follows, that every paſſion muſt have an object, *viz.* that being or thing to which our deſire is directed, and with a view to which every action prompted by that deſire is performed. The object of every paſſion is that being or thing which produced it. This will be evident from induction. A fine woman, by her beauty, cauſes in me the paſſion of love, which is directed upon her as its object. A man by injuring me, raiſes my reſentment; and becomes thereby the object of my reſentment.

ment. Thus the cauſe of a paſſion, and its object, are the ſame in different views. An emotion, on the other hand, being in its nature quieſcent and merely a paſſive feeling, muſt have a cauſe; but cannot be ſaid properly ſpeaking to have an object.

As the deſire involved in every paſſion leads to action, this action is either ultimate, or it is done as a means to ſome end. Where the action is ultimate, reaſon and reflection bear no part. The action is performed blindly by the impulſe of paſſion, without any view. Thus one in extreme hunger ſnatches at food, without the ſlighteſt reflection whether it be ſalutary or not: Avarice prompts to accumulate wealth without the leaſt view of uſe; and thereby abſurdly converts means into an end: Fear often makes us fly before we reflect whether we really be in danger: and animal love not leſs often hurries to fruition, without a ſingle thought of gratification. But for the moſt part, actions are performed as means to ſome end; and in theſe actions reaſon and reflection always bear a part.

The end is that event which is deſired; and the action is deliberately performed in order to bring about that end. Thus affection to my friend involves a deſire to make him happy; and the deſire to accompliſh that end, prompts me to perform what I judge will contribute to it.

Where the action is ultimate, it hath a cauſe, *viz.* the impulſe of the paſſion. But we cannot properly ſay it hath a motive. This term is appropriated to actions that are performed as means to ſome end; and the conviction that the action will tend to bring about the end deſired, is termed a motive. Thus paſſions conſidered as cauſes of action, are diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; inſtinctive, and deliberative. The firſt operating blindly and by mere impulſe, depend entirely upon the ſenſitive part of our nature. The other operating by reflection and by motives, are connected with the rational part.

The foregoing difference among the paſſions, is the work of nature. Experience brings on ſome variations. By all actions performed through the impulſe of paſſion, de-

ſire

ſire is gratified, and the gratification is pleaſant. This leſſon we have from experience. And hence it is, that after an action has often been performed by the impulſe merely of paſſion, the pleaſure reſulting from performance, conſidered beforehand, becomes a motive, which joins its force with the original impulſe in determining us to act. Thus a child eats by the mere impulſe of hunger: a young man thinks of the pleaſure of gratification, which is a motive for him to eat: and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive that it will contribute to his health.

Inſtinctive paſſions are diſtinguiſhed into two kinds. Where the cauſe is internal, they are denominated *appetites:* where external, they retain the common name of *paſſions.* Thus hunger, thirſt, animal love, are termed *appetites*; while fear and anger, even when they operate blindly and by mere impulſe, are termed *paſſions.*

From the definition of a motive above given, it is eaſy to determine, with the greateſt accuracy, what paſſions are ſelfiſh, what ſocial. No paſſion can properly be

termed ſelfiſh, but what prompts me to exert actions in order for my own good; nor ſocial, but what prompts me to exert actions in order for the good of another. The motive is that which determines a paſſion to be ſocial or ſelfiſh. Hence it follows, that our appetites, which make us act blindly and by mere impulſe, cannot be reckoned either ſocial or ſelfiſh; and as little the actions they produce. Thus eating, when prompted by an impulſe merely of nature, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh. But add a motive, That it will contribute to my pleaſure or my health, and it becomes in a meaſure ſelfiſh. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert actions to the end ſolely of advancing my friend's happineſs, without the ſlighteſt regard to my own gratification, ſuch actions are juſtly denominated *ſocial*; and ſo is the affection that is their cauſe. If another motive be added, That gratifying the affection will contribute to my own happineſs, the actions I perform become partly ſelfiſh. Animal love when exerted into action by natural impulſe ſingly, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh: when exerted with a view to gratification

tification and in order to make me happy, it is ſelfiſh. When the motive of giving pleaſure to its object is ſuperadded, it is partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh. A juſt action when prompted by the love of juſtice ſolely, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh. When I perform an act of juſtice with a view to the pleaſure of gratification, the action is ſelfiſh. I pay my debt for my own ſake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me ſuppoſe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereſt, purely to oblige me. In this caſe, together with the inclination to do juſtice, there ariſes a motive of gratitude, which reſpects the creditor ſolely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good. Here the action is partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh. Suppoſe again I meet with a ſurpriſing and unexpected act of generoſity, that inſpires me with love to my benefactor and the utmoſt gratitude. I burn to do him good: he is the ſole object of my deſire; and my own pleaſure in gratifying the deſire, vaniſheth out of ſight. In this caſe, the action I perform is purely ſocial. Thus it happens, that when a ſocial motive becomes ſtrong, the action is exerted

erted with a view ſingly to the object of the paſſion; and the ſelfiſh pleaſure ariſing from gratification is never once conſidered. The ſame effect of ſtifling ſelfiſh motives, is equally remarkable in other paſſions that are in no view ſocial. Ambition, for example, when confined to exaltation as its ultimate end, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh. Let exaltation be conſidered as a means to make me happy, and the paſſion becomes ſo far ſelfiſh. But if the deſire of exaltation wax ſtrong and inflame my mind, the ſelfiſh motive now mentioned is no longer felt. A ſlight degree of reſentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleaſure ariſing to myſelf from gratifying the paſſion, is juſtly denominated *ſelfiſh*. Where revenge flames ſo high as to have no other aim but the deſtruction of its object, it is no longer ſelfiſh. In oppoſition to a ſocial paſſion, it may be termed *diſſocial* *.

Of

* When this analyſis of human nature is conſidered, not one article of which can with any ſhadow of truth be controverted, I cannot help being ſurpriſed at the blindneſs of ſome philoſophers, who, by dark and confuſed notions, are led to deny all motives to action but what iſe from ſelf-love.

Man,

Of ſelf, every one hath a direct perception: of other things, we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes. Hence it is, that of ſelf, the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reaſon now given, muſt be more agreeable than any other object. Is not this ſufficient to account for the prevalence of ſelf-love?

In the foregoing part of this chapter, it is ſuggeſted, that ſome circumſtances make beings or things fit objects for deſire, others not. This hint muſt be purſued. It is a truth aſcertained by univerſal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenſion is beyond reach, never is the object of deſire. No man, in his right ſenſes, deſires to walk in the air, or to deſcend to the centre of the earth. We may amuſe ourſelves in a reverie, with building caſtles in the air, and

Man, for ought appears, might poſſibly have been ſo framed, as to be ſuſceptible of no paſſions but what have ſelf for their object. But man thus framed, would be ill fitted for ſociety. Much better is the matter ordered, by enduing him with paſſions directed entirely to the good of others, as well as with paſſions directed entirely to his own good.

wiſhing for what can never happen. But ſuch things never move deſire. And indeed a deſire to act would be altogether abſurd, when we are conſcious that the action is beyond our power. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with reſpect to things within reach, often inflames deſire; yet where the proſpect of attainment is faint and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, ſeldom raiſeth any ſtrong deſire. Thus beauty or other good qualities in a woman of rank, ſeldom raiſes love in any man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raiſe emotions in different degrees; and when deſire accompanies any of theſe emotions, its ſtrength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its cauſe. Hence the remarkable difference among deſires directed upon beings inanimate, animate, and rational. The emotion cauſed by a rational being, is out of meaſure ſtronger than any cauſed by an animal without reaſon; and an emotion raiſed by ſuch an animal, is ſtronger than what is cauſed by any thing inanimate. There is a

ſeparate

ſeparate reaſon why deſire of which a rational being is the object ſhould be the ſtrongeſt. Deſire directed upon ſuch a being, is gratified many ways, by loving, ſerving, benefiting, the object; and it is a well known truth, that our deſires naturally ſwell by exerciſe. Deſire directed upon an inanimate being, ſuſceptible neither of pleaſure nor pain, is not capable of a higher gratification than that of acquiring the property. Hence it is, that though every feeling which raiſeth deſire, is ſtrictly ſpeaking a paſſion; yet commonly thoſe feelings only are denominated paſſions of which ſenſible beings capable of pleaſure and pain are the objects.

SECT. II.

Cauſes of the emotions of joy and ſorrow.

THis ſubject was purpoſely reſerved for a ſeparate ſection, becauſe it could not, with perſpicuity, be handled under the general head. An emotion involving deſire is termed *a paſſion*; and when the deſire is

fulfilled, the paſſion is ſaid to be gratified. The gratification of every paſſion muſt be pleaſant, or in other words produce a pleaſant emotion; for nothing can be more natural, than that the accompliſhment of any wiſh or deſire ſhould affect us with joy. I cannot even except the caſe, where a man, through remorſe, is deſirous to chaſtiſe and puniſh himſelf. The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion; becauſe it makes us happy in our preſent ſituation, and is ultimate in its nature, not having a tendency to any thing beyond. On the other hand, ſorrow muſt be the reſult of an event contrary to what we deſire; for if the accompliſhment of deſire produce joy, it is equally natural that diſappointment ſhould produce ſorrow.

An event fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident without being foreſeen or thought of, and which therefore could not be the object of deſire, raiſeth an emotion of the ſame kind with that now mentioned. But the cauſe muſt be different; for there can be no gratification where there is no deſire. We have not however far to

ſeek

ſeek for a cauſe. A man cannot be indifferent to an event that affects him or any of his connections. If it be fortunate, it gives him joy; if unfortunate, it gives him ſorrow.

In no ſituation doth joy riſe to a greater height, than upon the removal of any violent diſtreſs of mind or body; and in no ſituation doth ſorrow riſe to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The ſenſibility of our nature ſerves in part to account for theſe effects. Other cauſes alſo concur. We can be under no violent diſtreſs without an anxious deſire to be free from it; and therefore its removal is a high gratification. We cannot be poſſeſſed of any thing that makes us happy, without wiſhing its continuance; and therefore its removal by croſſing our wiſhes muſt create ſorrow. Nor is this all. The principle of contraſt comes in for its ſhare. An emotion of joy ariſing upon the removal of pain, is increaſed by contraſt when we reflect upon our former diſtreſs. En emotion of ſorrow upon being deprived of any good, is increa-

ſed by contraſt when we reflect upon our former happineſs.

Jaffier. There's not a wretch that lives on common charity,
But's happier than me. For I have known
The luſcious ſweets of plenty: every night
Have ſlept with ſoft content about my head,
And never wak'd but to a joyful morning.
Yet now muſt fall like a full ear of corn,
Whoſe bloſſom 'ſcap'd, yet's wither'd in the ripening.

Venice preſerv'd, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

It hath always been reckoned difficult to account for the extreme pleaſure that follows a ceſſation of bodily pain; as when one is relieved from the rack, or from a violent fit of the ſtone. What is ſaid, explains this difficulty in the eaſieſt and ſimpleſt manner. Ceſſation of bodily pain is not of itſelf a pleaſure; for a *non-ens* or a negative can neither give pleaſure nor pain. But man is ſo framed by nature as to rejoice when he is eaſed of pain, as well as to be ſorrowful when deprived of any good. This branch of our conſtitution, is chiefly the cauſe

cauſe of the pleaſure. The gratification of deſire comes in as an acceſſory cauſe; and contraſt joins its force, by increaſing the ſenſe of our preſent happineſs. In the caſe of an acute pain, a peculiar circumſtance contributes its part. The briſk circulation of the animal ſpirits occaſioned by acute pain, continues after the pain is vaniſhed, and produceth a very pleaſant feeling. Sickneſs hath not that effect, becauſe it is always attended with a depreſſion of ſpirits.

Hence it is, that the gradual diminution of acute pain, occaſions a mixt emotion, partly pleaſant, partly painful. The partial diminution produceth joy in proportion; but the remaining pain balanceth our joy. This mixt feeling, however, hath no long endurance. For the joy that ariſeth upon the diminution of pain, ſoon vaniſheth; and leaveth in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion, that degree of pain which remains.

What is above obſerved about bodily pain, is equally applicable to the diſtreſſes of the mind; and accordingly it is a common artifice, to prepare us for the reception of good news by alarming our fears.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Sympathetic emotion of virtue, and its cauſe.

ONE feeling there is, that merits a deliberate view, for its ſingularity, as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a paſſion, ſeems uncertain. The former it can ſcarce be, becauſe it involves deſire; and the latter it can ſcarce be, becauſe it has no object. But this feeling and its nature will be beſt underſtood from examples. A ſignal act of gratitude, produceth in the ſpectator love or eſteem for the author. The ſpectator hath at the ſame time a ſeparate feeling; which, being mixed with love or eſteem, the capital emotion, hath not been much adverted to. It is a vague feeling of gratitude, which hath no object; but which, however, diſpoſes the ſpectator to acts of gratitude, more than upon ordinary occaſions. Let any man attentively conſider his own heart when he thinks warmly of any ſignal act of gratitude, and he will be conſcious of this feeling, as diſtinct from the

the eſteem or admiration he has for the grateful perſon. It merits our utmoſt attention, by unfolding a curious piece of mechaniſm in the nature of man. The feeling is ſingular in the following reſpect, that it involves a deſire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any particular object; though in this ſtate the mind, wonderfully diſpoſed toward an object, neglects no object upon which it can vent itſelf. Any act of kindneſs or good-will that would not be regarded upon another occaſion, is greedily ſeized; and the vague feeling is converted into a real paſſion of gratitude. In ſuch a ſtate, favours are returned double.

Again, a courageous action produceth in a ſpectator the paſſion of admiration directed upon the author. But beſide this well-known paſſion, a ſeparate feeling is raiſed in the ſpectator; which may be called *an emotion of courage*, becauſe while under its influence he is conſcious of a boldneſs and intrepidity beyond ordinary, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion.

Spumantemque

Spumantemque dari, pecora inter inertia, votis
Optat aprum, aut fulvum deſcendere monte leonem.

Æneid. iv. 158.

Non altramente 'il tauro, oue l' irriti
Geloſo amor con ſtimoli pungenti
Horribilmente mugge, e co' muggiti
Gli ſpirti in ſe riſueglia, e l'ire ardenti:
E'l corno aguzza a i tronchi, e par ch' inuiti
Con vani colpi a' la battaglia i venti.

Taſſo, canto 7. *ſt.* 55.

So full of valour that they ſmote the air
For breathing in their faces.

Tempeſt, act. 4. *ſc.* 4.

For another example, let us figure ſome grand and heroic action, highly agreeable to the ſpectator. Beſide a ſingular veneration for the author, the ſpectator feels in himſelf an unuſual dignity of character, which diſpoſeth him to great and noble actions. And herein principally conſiſts the extreme delight every one hath in the hiſtories of conquerors and heroes.

This ſingular feeling, which may be termed *the ſympathetic emotion of virtue*, reſembles,

ſembles, in one reſpect, the well-known appetites that lead to the propagation and preſervation of the ſpecies. The appetites of hunger, thirſt, and animal love, ariſe in the mind without being directed upon any particular object; and in no caſe whatever is the mind more ſolicitous for a proper object, than when under the influence of any of theſe appetites.

The feeling I have endeavoured to evolve, may well be termed *the ſympathetic emotion of virtue*; for it is raiſed in a ſpectator by virtuous actions of every kind, and by no other ſort. When we contemplate a virtuous action, which never fails to delight us and to prompt our love for the author, the mind is warmed and put into a tone ſimilar to what inſpired the virtuous action. The propenſity we have to ſuch actions is ſo much enlivened, as to become for a time an actual emotion. But no man hath a propenſity to vice as ſuch. On the contrary, a wicked deed diſguſts him, and makes him abhor the author. This abhorrence is a ſtrong antidote ſo long as

any impreſſion remains of the wicked action.

In a rough road, a halt to view a fine country is refreſhing; and here a delightful proſpect opens upon us. It is indeed wonderful to ſee what incitements there are to virtue in the human frame. Juſtice is perceived to be our duty, and it is guarded by natural puniſhments, from which the guilty never eſcape. To perform noble and generous actions, a warm ſenſe of dignity and ſuperior excellence is a moſt efficacious incitement *. And to leave virtue in no quarter unſupported, here is unfolded an admirable contrivance, by which good example commands the heart and adds to virtue the force of habit. Did our moral feelings extend no farther than to approve the action and to beſtow our affection on the author, good example would not have great influence. But to give it the utmoſt force, nothing can be better contrived than the ſympathetic emotion under conſidera-

* See Eſſays upon morality and natural religion, part 1. eſſay 2. ch. 4.

tion,

tion, which prompts us to imitate what we admire. This ſingular emotion will readily find an object to exert itſelf upon; and at any rate, it never exiſts without producing ſome effect. Virtuous emotions of this ſort, are in ſome degree an exerciſe of virtue. They are a mental exerciſe at leaſt, if they ſhow not externally. And every exerciſe of virtue, internal and external, leads to habit; for a diſpoſition or propenſity of the mind, like a limb of the body, becomes ſtronger by exerciſe. Proper means, at the ſame time, being ever at hand to raiſe this ſympathetic emotion, its frequent reiteration may, in a good meaſure, ſupply the want of a more complete exerciſe. Thus, by proper diſcipline, every perſon may acquire a ſettled habit of virtue. Intercourſe with men of worth, hiſtories of generous and diſintereſted actions, and frequent meditation upon them, keep the ſympathetic emotion in conſtant exerciſe, which by degrees introduceth a habit, and confirms the authority of virtue. With reſpect to education in particular, what a ſpacious and commodious avenue to the heart of a young perſon, is here opened?

SECT. IV.

In many inſtances one emotion is productive of another. The ſame of paſſions.

IN the firſt chapter it is obſerved, that the relations by which things are mutually connected, have a remarkable influence in regulating the train of our ideas. I here add, that they have an influence not leſs remarkable, in generating emotions and paſſions. Beginning with the former, it holds in fact, that an agreeable object makes every thing connected with it appear agreeable. The mind gliding ſweetly and eaſily through related objects, carries along the beauty of objects that made a figure, and blends that beauty with the idea of the preſent object, which thereby appears more agreeable than when conſidered apart *. This

* Such proneneſs has the mind to this communication of properties, that we often find properties aſcribed to a related object, of which naturally it is not ſuſceptible. Sir Richard Greenville in a ſingle ſhip being ſurpriſed by the Spaniſh fleet, was adviſed to retire. He utterly refuſed to turn from the enemy;

This reaſon may appear obſcure and metaphyſical, but it muſt be reliſhed when we attend to the following examples, which eſtabliſh the fact beyond all diſpute. No relation is more intimate than that betwixt a being and its qualities; and accordingly, the affection I bear a man expands itſelf readily upon all his qualities, which by that means make a greater figure in my mind than more ſubſtantial qualities in others. The talent of ſpeaking in a friend, is more regarded than that of acting in a perſon with whom I have no connection; and graceful motion in a miſtreſs, gives more delight than conſummate prudence in any other woman. Affection ſometimes riſes ſo high,

nemy; declaring, "he would rather die, than diſhonour him-"ſelf, his country, and her Majeſty's ſhip." *Hakluyt, vol.* 2. *part* 2. *p.* 169. To aid the communication of properties in ſuch inſtances, there always muſt be a momentary perſonification. A ſhip muſt be imagined a ſenſible being, to make it ſuſceptible of honour or diſhonour. In the battle of Mantinea, Epaminondas being mortally wounded, was carried to his tent in a manner dead. Recovering his ſenſes, the firſt thing he inquired about was his ſhield; which being brought, he kiſſed it as the companion of his valour and glory. It muſt be remarked, that among the Greeks and Romans it was deemed infamous for a ſoldier to return from battle without his ſhield.

as

as to convert defects into properties. The wry neck of Alexander was imitated by his courtiers as a real beauty, without intention to flatter. Thus Lady Piercy, ſpeaking of her huſband Hotſpur,

——————————— By his light
Did all the chivalry of England move,
To do brave acts. He was indeed the glaſs,
Wherein the noble youth did dreſs themſelves.
He had no legs that practis'd not his gait:
And ſpeaking thick, which Nature made his blemiſh,
Became the accents of the valiant:
For thoſe who could ſpeak low and tardily,
Would turn their own perfection to abuſe,
To ſeem like him.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 2. *ſc.* 6.

When the paſſion of love has ended its courſe, its object becomes quite a different creature.——Nothing left of that genteel motion, that gaiety, that ſprightly converſation, thoſe numberleſs graces, that formerly, in the lover's opinion, charmed all hearts.

The ſame communication of paſſion obtains

tains in the relation of principal and acceſſory. Pride, of which ſelf is the object, expands itſelf upon a houſe, a garden, ſervants, equipage, and every thing of that nature. A lover addreſſeth his miſtreſs's glove in the following terms:

Sweet ornament that decks a thing divine.

A temple is in a proper ſenſe an acceſſory of the deity to which it is dedicated. Diana is chaſte, and not only her temple, but the very iſicle which hangs on it, muſt partake of that property:

The noble ſiſter of Poplicola,
The moon of Rome; chaſte as the iſicle
That's curdled by the froſt from pureſt ſnow,
And hangs on Dian's temple.
Coriolanus, act 5. ſc. 3.

Thus it is, that the reſpect and eſteem, which the great, the powerful, the opulent naturally command, are in ſome meaſure communicated to their dreſs, to their manners, and to all their connections. It is this principle,

principle, which in matters left to our own choice prevails over the natural taſte of beauty and propriety, and gives currency to what is called *the faſhion*.

By means of the ſame eaſineſs of tranſition, the bad qualities of an object are carried along, and grafted upon related objects. Every good quality in a perſon is extinguiſhed by hatred; and every bad quality is ſpread upon all his connections. A relation more ſlight and tranſitory than that of hatred, may have the ſame effect. Thus the bearer of bad tidings becomes an object of averſion:

Fellow begone, I cannot brook thy ſight,
This news hath made thee a moſt ugly man.
King John, act 3. ſc. 1.

Yet the firſt bringer of unwelcome news
Hath but a loſing office: and his tongue
Sounds ever after, as a ſullen bell
Remember'd, tolling a departing friend.
Second part, Henry IV. *act 1. ſc. 3.*

This diſpoſition of the mind to communicate the properties of one object to another,

ther, is not always proportioned to the intimacy of their connection. The order of the tranſition from object to object, hath alſo an influence. The ſenſe of order operates not leſs powerfully in this caſe, than in the ſucceſſion of ideas *. If a thing be agreeable in itſelf, all its acceſſories appear agreeable. But the agreeableneſs of an acceſſory, extends not itſelf ſo readily to the principal. Any dreſs upon a fine woman is becoming; but the moſt elegant ornaments upon one that is homely, have ſcarce any effect to mend her appearance. The reaſon will be obvious, from what is ſaid in the chapter above cited. The mind paſſes more eaſily from the principal to its acceſſories, than in the oppoſite direction.

The emotions produced as above may properly be termed *ſecondary*, being occaſioned either by antecedent emotions or antecedent paſſions, which in this reſpect may be termed *primary*. And to complete the preſent theory, I muſt now remark a difference betwixt a primary emotion and a

* See chap. 1.

primary paſſion in the production of ſecondary emotions. A ſecondary emotion cannot but be more faint than the primary; and therefore, if the chief or principal object have not the power to raiſe a paſſion, the acceſſory object will have ſtill leſs power. But if a paſſion be raiſed by the principal object, the ſecondary emotion may readily ſwell into a paſſion for the acceſſory, provided the acceſſory be a proper object for deſire. And thus it happens that one paſſion is often productive of another. Examples are without number: the ſole difficulty is a proper choice. I begin with ſelf-love, and the power it hath to generate other paſſions. The love which parents bear their children, is an illuſtrious example of the foregoing doctrine. Every man, beſide making part of a greater ſyſtem, like a comet, a planet, or ſatellite only; hath a leſs ſyſtem of his own, in the centre of which he repreſents the ſun diſperſing his fire and heat all around. The connection between a man and his children, fundamentally that of cauſe and effect, becomes, by the addition of other circumſtances, the completeſt that can

be

be among individuals; and therefore, ſelf-love, the moſt vigorous of all paſſions, is readily expanded upon children. The ſecondary emotion they at firſt produce by means of their connection, is, generally ſpeaking, ſufficiently ſtrong to move deſire even from the beginning; and the new paſſion ſwells by degrees, till it rival in ſome meaſure ſelf-love, the primary paſſion. The following caſe will demonſtrate the truth of this theory. Remorſe for betraying a friend, or murdering an enemy in cold blood, makes a man even hate himſelf. In this ſtate, it is a matter of experience, that he is ſcarce conſcious of any affection to his children, but rather of diſguſt or ill-will. What cauſe can be aſſigned for this change, other than the hatred which beginning at himſelf, is expanded upon his children? And if ſo, may we not with equal reaſon derive from ſelf-love the affection a man for ordinary has to them?

The affection a man bears to his blood-relations, depends on the ſame principle. Self-love is alſo expanded upon them; and the communicated paſſion, is more or leſs

vigorous in proportion to the connection. Nor doth ſelf-love reſt here: it is, by the force of connection, communicated even to things inanimate. And hence the affection a man bears to his property, and to every thing he calls his own.

Friendſhip, leſs vigorous than ſelf-love, is, for that reaſon, leſs apt to communicate itſelf to children or other relations. Inſtances however are not wanting, of ſuch communicated paſſion ariſing from friendſhip when it is ſtrong. Friendſhip may go higher in the matrimonial ſtate than in any other condition: and Otway, in *Veniceˇ preſerv'd*, ſhows a fine taſte in taking advantage of that circumſtance. In the ſcene where Belvidera ſues to her father for pardon, ſhe is repreſented as pleading her mother's merit, and the reſemblance ſhe bore to her mother.

Priuli. My daughter!

Belvidera. Yes, your daughter, by a mother
Virtuous and noble, faithful to your honour,
Obedient to your will, kind to your wiſhes,
Dear to your arms. By all the joys ſhe gave you,
When

When in her blooming years ſhe was your treaſure,
Look kindly on me; in my face behold
The lineaments of hers y' have kiſs'd ſo often,
Pleading the cauſe of your poor caſt-off child.

And again,

Belvidera. Lay me, I beg you, lay me
By the dear aſhes of my tender mother.
She would have pitied me, had fate yet ſpar'd her.
Act 5. *ſc.* 1.

This explains why any meritorious action or any illuſtrious qualification in my ſon or my friend, is apt to make me overvalue myſelf. If I value my friend's wife or his ſon upon account of their connection with him, it is ſtill more natural that I ſhould value myſelf upon account of my own connection with him.

Friendſhip, or any other ſocial affection, may produce oppoſite effects. Pity, by intereſting us ſtrongly for the perſon in diſtreſs, muſt of conſequence inflame our reſentment againſt the author of the diſtreſs. For, in general, the affection we have for any man, generates

generates in us good-will to his friends and ill-will to his enemies. Shakeſpear ſhows great art in the funeral oration pronounced by Antony over the body of Cæſar. He firſt endeavours to excite grief in the hearers, by dwelling upon the deplorable loſs of ſo great a man. This paſſion raiſed to a pitch, intereſting them ſtrongly in Cæſar's fate, could not fail to produce a lively ſenſe of the treachery and cruelty of the conſpirators; an infallible method to inflame the reſentment of the multitude beyond all bounds.

Antony. If you have tears, prepare to ſhed them now.
You all do know this mantle; I remember
The firſt time ever Cæſar put it on,
'Twas on a ſummer's evening in his tent,
That day he overcame the Nervii——
Look! in this place ran Caſſius' dagger through;—
See what a rent the envious Caſca made.——
Through this the well-beloved Brutus ſtabb'd;
And as he pluck'd his curſed ſteel away,
Mark how the blood of Cæſar follow'd it!
As ruſhing out of doors, to be reſolv'd,
If Brutus ſo unkindly knock'd, or no:
For Brutus, as you know, was Cæſar's angel.

Judge,

Judge, oh you gods! how dearly Cæſar lov'd him;
This, this, was the unkindeſt cut of all;
For when the noble Cæſar ſaw him ſtab,
Ingratitude, more ſtrong than traitors' arms,
Quite vanquiſh'd him; then burſt his mighty heart:
And, in his mantle muffling up his face,
Which all the while ran blood, great Cæſar fell,
Even at the baſe of Pompey's ſtatue.
O what a fall was there, my countrymen!
Then I and you, and all of us fell down,
Whilſt bloody treaſon flouriſh'd over us.
O, now you weep; and I perceive you feel
The dint of pity; theſe are gracious drops.
Kind ſouls! what, weep you when you but behold
Our Cæſar's veſture wounded? look you here!
Here is himſelf, marr'd, as you ſee, by traitors.

Julius Cæſar, act 3. ſc. 6.

Had Antony directed upon the conſpirators the thoughts of his audience, without paving the way by raiſing their grief, his ſpeech perhaps might have failed of ſucceſs.

Hatred and other diſſocial paſſions, produce effects directly oppoſite to thoſe above mentioned. If I hate a man, his children, his relations, nay his property, become to me

me objects of averſion. His enemies, on the other hand, I am diſpoſed to eſteem.

The more ſlight and tranſitory connections, have generally no power to produce a communicated paſſion. Anger, when ſudden and violent, is one exception; for if the perſon who did the injury be removed out of reach, this paſſion will vent itſelf upon any related object, however ſlight the relation be. Another exception makes a greater figure. A group of beings or things, becomes often the object of a communicated paſſion, even where the relation of the individuals to the principal object is but faint. Thus though I put no value upon a ſingle man for living in the ſame town with myſelf; my townſmen however, conſidered in a body, are preferred before others. This is ſtill more remarkable with reſpect to my countrymen in general. The grandeur of the complex object, ſwells the paſſion of ſelf-love by the relation I have to my native country; and every paſſion, when it ſwells beyond its ordinary bounds, hath, in that circumſtance, a peculiar tendency to expand itſelf along related

ted objects. In fact, inſtances are not rare, of perſons, who, upon all occaſions, are willing to ſacrifice their lives and fortunes for their country. Such influence upon the mind of man, hath a complex object, or, more properly ſpeaking, a general term *.

The ſenſe of order hath, in the communication of paſſion, an influence not leſs remarkable than in the communication of emotions. It is a common obſervation, that a man's affection to his parents is leſs vigorous than to his children. The order of nature in deſcending to children, aids the tranſition of the affection. The aſcent to a parent, contrary to this order, makes the tranſition more difficult. Gratitude to a benefactor is readily extended to his children; but not ſo readily to his parents. The difference however betwixt the natural and inverted order, is not ſo conſiderable, but that it may be balanced by other circumſtances. Pliny † gives an account of a woman of rank condemned

* See Eſſays on morality and natural religion, part 1. eſſ. 2. ch. 5.

† Lib. 7. cap. 36.

to die for a crime; and, to avoid public ſhame, detained in priſon to die of hunger. Her life being prolonged beyond expectation, it was diſcovered, that ſhe was nouriſhed by ſucking milk from the breaſts of her daughter. This inſtance of filial piety, which aided the tranſition and made aſcent not leſs eaſy than deſcent is for ordinary, procured a pardon to the mother, and a penſion to both. The ſtory of Androcles and the lion * may be accounted for in the ſame manner. The admiration, of which the lion was the cauſe, for his kindneſs and gratitude to Androcles, produced goodwill to Androcles, and pardon of his crime.

And this leads to other obſervations upon communicated paſſions. I love my daughter leſs after ſhe is married, and my mother leſs after a ſecond marriage. The marriage of my ſon or my father diminiſhes not my affection ſo remarkably. The ſame obſervation holds with reſpect to friendſhip, gratitude, and other paſſions. The love I bear my friend, is but faintly extended to his married daughter. The reſentment I have

* Aulus Gellius, lib. 5. cap. 14.

againſt

againſt a man, is readily extended againſt children who make part of his family: not ſo readily againſt children who are foriſfamiliated, eſpecially by marriage. This difference is alſo more remarkable in daughters than in ſons. Theſe are curious facts; and to evolve the cauſe we muſt examine minutely, that operation of the mind by which a paſſion is extended to a related object. In conſidering two things as related, the mind is not ſtationary, but paſſeth and repaſſeth from the one to the other, viewing the relation from each of them perhaps oftener than once. This holds more eſpecially in conſidering a relation betwixt things of unequal rank, as betwixt the cauſe and the effect, or betwixt a principal and an acceſſory. In contemplating the relation betwixt a building and its ornaments, the mind is not ſatisfied with a ſingle tranſition from the former to the latter. It muſt alſo view the relation, beginning at the latter, and paſſing from it to the former. This vibration of the mind in paſſing and repaſſing betwixt things that are related, explains the facts above mentioned.

The mind paſſeth eaſily from the father to the daughter; but where the daughter is married, this new relation attracts the mind, and obſtructs, in ſome meaſure, the return from the daughter to the father. Any obſtruction the mind meets with in paſſing and repaſſing betwixt its objects, occaſions a like obſtruction in the communication of paſſion. The marriage of a male obſtructs leſs the eaſineſs of tranſition; becauſe a male is leſs ſunk by the relation of marriage than a female.

The foregoing inſtances, are of paſſion communicated from one object to another. But one paſſion may be generated by another, without change of object. It may in general be obſerved, that a paſſion paves the way to others, ſimilar in their tone, whether directed upon the ſame or upon a different object. For the mind heated by any paſſion, is, in that ſtate, more ſuſceptible of a new impreſſion in a ſimilar tone, than when cool and quieſcent. It is a common obſervation, that pity generally produceth friendſhip for a perſon in diſtreſs.

Pity

Pity intereſts us in its object, and recommends all its virtuous qualities. For this reaſon, female beauty ſhows beſt in diſtreſs; and is more apt to inſpire love, than upon ordinary occaſions. But it is chiefly to be remarked, that pity, warming and melting the ſpectator, prepares him for the reception of other tender affections; and pity is readily improved into love or friendſhip, by a certain tenderneſs and concern for the object, which is the tone of both paſſions. The aptitude of pity to produce love is beautifully illuſtrated by Shakeſpear.

Othello. Her father lov'd me, oft invited me;
Still queſtion'd me the ſtory of my life,
From year to year; the battles, ſieges, fortunes,
That I have paſt.
I ran it through, e'en from my boyiſh days,
To th' very moment that he bad me tell it:
Wherein I ſpoke of moſt diſaſt'rous chances,
Of moving accidents by flood and field;
Of hair-breadth 'ſcapes in th' imminent deadly breach;
Of being taken by the inſolent foe,
And ſold to ſlavery; of my redemption thence,
And with it, all my travel's hiſtory.
——————— All theſe to hear

Would

Would Deſdemona ſeriouſly incline;
But ſtill the houſe-affairs would draw her thence,
Which ever as ſhe could with haſte diſpatch,
She'd come again, and with a greedy ear
Devour up my diſcourſe: which I obſerving,
Took once a pliant hour, and found good means
To draw from her a prayer of earneſt heart,
That I would all my pilgrimage dilate,
Whereof by parcels ſhe had ſomething heard,
But not diſtinctively. I did conſent,
And often did beguile her of her tears,
When I did ſpeak of ſome diſtreſsful ſtroke
That my youth ſuffer'd. My ſtory being done,
She gave me for my pains a world of ſighs:
She ſwore, in faith, 'twas ſtrange, 'twas paſſing
ſtrange —
'Twas pitiful, 'twas wondrous pitiful —
She wiſh'd ſhe had not heard it: — yet ſhe wiſh'd,
That heav'n had made her ſuch a man: — ſhe
thank'd me,
And bad me, if I had a friend that lov'd her,
I ſhould but teach him how to tell my ſtory,
And that would woo her. On this hint I ſpake,
She lov'd me for the dangers I had paſt,
And I lov'd her, that ſhe did pity them:
This only is the witchcraft I have us'd.

Othello, act 1. *ſc.* 8.

In

In this inſtance it will be obſerved that admiration concurred with pity to produce love.

SECT. V.

Cauſes of the paſſions of fear and anger.

FEar and anger, to anſwer the purpoſes of nature, are happily ſo contrived as to operate either inſtinctively or deliberately. So far as they prompt actions conſidered as means leading to a certain end, they fall in with the general ſyſtem, and require no particular explanation. If any object have a threatening appearance, reaſon ſuggeſts means to avoid the danger. If I am injured, the firſt thing I think of, is in what manner I ſhall be revenged, and what means I ſhall employ. Theſe particulars are not leſs obvious than natural. But as the paſſions of fear and anger, ſo far as inſtinctive, are leſs familiar to us, and their nature generally not underſtood; I thought it would not be unacceptable to the reader

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to have them accurately delineated. He may alſo poſſibly reliſh the opportunity of this ſpecimen, to have the nature of inſtinctive paſſions more fully explained than there was formerly occaſion to do. I begin with fear.

Self-preſervation is to individuals a matter of too great importance to be left entirely under the guardianſhip of ſelf-love, which cannot be put in exerciſe otherwiſe than by the intervention of reaſon and reflection. Nature hath acted here with her uſual precaution and foreſight. Fear and anger are paſſions common to all men; and by operating inſtinctively, they frequently afford ſecurity when the ſlower operations of deliberative reaſon would be too late. We take nouriſhment commonly, not by the direction of reaſon, but by the incitement of hunger and thirſt. In the ſame manner, we avoid danger by the incitement of fear, which often, before there is time for reflection, placeth us in ſafety. This matter then is ordered with conſummate wiſdom. It is not within the reach of fancy, to conceive any thing better fitted

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to anſwer its purpoſe, than this inſtinctive paſſion of fear, which, upon the firſt ſurmiſe of danger, operates inſtantaneouſly without reflection. So little doth the paſſion, in ſuch inſtances, depend on reaſon, that we often find it exerted even in contradiction to reaſon, and when we are conſcious that there is no hazard. A man who is not much upon his guard, cannot avoid ſhrinking at a blow, though he knows it to be aimed in ſport; nor cloſing his eyes at the approach of what may hurt them, though he is confident it will not come their length. Influenced by the ſame inſtinctive paſſion of fear, infants are much affected with a ſtern look, a menacing tone, or other expreſſion of anger; though, being incapable of reflection, they cannot form the ſlighteſt judgement about the import of theſe ſigns. This is all that is neceſſary to be ſaid in general. The natural connection betwixt fear and the external ſigns of anger, will be handled in the chapter of the external ſigns of emotions and paſſions.

Fear provides for ſelf-preſervation by fly-

ing from harm; anger, by repelling it. Nothing indeed can be better contrived to repel or prevent injury, than anger or reſentment. Deſtitute of this paſſion, men, like defenceleſs lambs, would lie conſtantly open to miſchief *. Deliberate anger cauſed by a voluntary injury, is too well known to require any explanation. If my deſire be in general to reſent an affront, I muſt uſe means, and theſe means muſt be diſcovered by reflection. Deliberation is here requiſite; and in this, which is the ordinary caſe, the paſſion ſeldom exceeds juſt bounds. But where anger ſuddenly inflames me to return a blow, the paſſion is inſtinctive, and the action ultimate; and it is chiefly in ſuch caſes that the paſſion is raſh and ungovernable, becauſe it operates blindly, without affording time for reaſon or deliberation.

* Braſidas being ſurpriſed by the bite of a mouſe he had catched, let it ſlip out of his fingers. "No creature (ſays "he) is ſo contemptible, but what may provide for its own "ſafety, if it have courage to defend itſelf."

Plutarch. Apothegmata.

Inſtinctive

Inſtinctive anger is frequently raiſed by bodily pain, which, when ſudden and exceſſive as by a ſtroke on a tender part, ruffling the temper and unhinging the mind, is in its tone ſimilar to anger. Bodily pain by this means diſpoſes to anger, which is as ſuddenly raiſed, provided an object be found to vent it upon. Anger commonly is not provoked otherwiſe than by a voluntary injury. But when a man is thus beforehand diſpoſed to anger, he is not nice nor ſcrupulous about an object. The man who gave the ſtroke, however accidentally, is by an inflammable temper held a proper object, merely becauſe he was the occaſion of the pain. It is ſtill a ſtronger example of the kind, that a ſtock or a ſtone, by which I am hurt, becomes an object for my reſentment. I am violently incited to bray it to atoms. The paſſion indeed in this caſe is but momentary. It vaniſheth with the firſt reflection, being attended with no circumſtance that can excuſe it in any degree. Nor is this irrational effect confined to bodily pain. Inward diſtreſs, when exceſſive, may be the occaſion of effects equally irrational.

When a friend is danger and the event uncertain, the perturbation of mind occaſioned thereby, will, in a fiery temper, produce momentary fits of anger againſt this very friend, however innocent. Thus Shakeſpear, in the *Tempeſt*,

Alonzo. ——— Sit down and reſt.
Ev'n here I will put off my hope, and keep it
No longer for my flatterer: he is drown'd
Whom thus we ſtray to find, and the ſea mocks
Our fruſtrate ſearch on land. Well, let him go.
Act 3. ſc. 3.

The final words, *Well, let him go*, are an expreſſion of impatience and anger at Ferdinand, whoſe abſence greatly diſtreſſed his father, dreading that he was loſt in the ſtorm. This nice operation of the human mind, is by Shakeſpear exhibited upon another occaſion, and finely painted. In the tragedy of *Othello*, Iago, by dark hints and ſuſpicious circumſtances, had rouſed Othello's jealouſy; which, however, appeared too ſlightly founded to be vented upon Deſdemona, its proper object. The perturbation and diſtreſs of mind there-

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by occaſioned, produced a momentary reſentment againſt Iago, conſidered as occaſioning the jealouſy though innocent.

Othello. Villain, be ſure thou prove my love a whore;
Be ſure of it: give me the ocular proof.
Or by the wrath of man's eternal ſoul
Thou hadſt been better have been born a dog,
Than anſwer my wak'd wrath.
Iago. Is't come to this?
Othello. Make me ſee't; or, at the leaſt, ſo prove it,
That the probation bear no hinge or loop
To hang a doubt on: or woe upon thy life!
Iago. My Noble Lord ——
Othello. If thou doſt ſlander her and torture me,
Never pray more; abandon all remorſe;
On horrors head horrors accumulate;
Do deeds to make heav'n weep, all earth amaz'd:
For nothing canſt thou to damnation add
Greater than that.

Othello, act 3. ſc. 8.

This blind and abſurd effect of anger, is more gaily illuſtrated by Addiſon, in a ſtory, the *dramatis perſonæ* of which are a cardinal, and a ſpy retained in pay for intelligence. The cardinal is repreſented as minuting down

down every thing that is told him. The ſpy begins with a low voice, "Such an one "the advocate whiſpered to one of his "friends within my hearing, that your E-"minence was a very great poltron;" and after having given his patron time to take it down, adds, "That another called him a "mercenary raſcal in a public converſation." The cardinal replies, "Very well," and bids him go on. The ſpy proceeds, and loads him with reports of the ſame nature, till the cardinal riſes in great wrath, calls him an impudent ſcoundrel, and kicks him out of the room *.

We meet with inſtances every day of reſentment raiſed by loſs at play, and wreaked on the cards or dice. But anger, a furious paſſion, is ſatisfied with a connection ſtill ſlighter than that of cauſe and effect, of which Congreve, in the *Mourning Bride*, gives one beautiful example.

Gonſalez. Have comfort.
Almeria. Curs'd be that tongue that bids me be of comfort,

* Spectator, N° 439.

Curs'd

Curs'd my own tongue that could not move his pity,
Curs'd theſe weak hands that could not hold him here,
For he is gone to doom Alphonſo's death.

Act 4. *ſc.* 8.

I have choſen to exhibit anger in its more rare appearances, for in theſe we can beſt trace its nature and extent. In the examples above given, it appears to be an abſurd paſſion and altogether irrational. But we ought to conſider, that it is not the intention of nature to ſubject this paſſion, in every inſtance, to reaſon and reflection. It was given us to prevent or to repel injuries; and, like fear, it often operates blindly and inſtinctively, without the leaſt view to conſequences. The very firſt ſenſation of harm, ſets it in motion to repel injury by puniſhment. Were it more cool and deliberate, it would loſe its threatening appearance, and be inſufficient to guard us againſt violence and miſchief. When ſuch is and ought to be the nature of the paſſion, it is not wonderful to find it exerted irregularly and capriciouſly, as it ſometimes is where the miſ-

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chief is ſudden and unforeſeen. All the harm that can be done by the paſſion in this caſe, is inſtantaneous; for the ſhorteſt delay ſets all to rights; and circumſtances are ſeldom ſo unlucky as to put it in the power of a paſſionate man to do much harm in an inſtant.

SECT. VI.

Emotions cauſed by fiction.

THE attentive reader will obſerve, that in accounting for paſſions and emotions, no cauſe hitherto has been aſſigned but what hath a real exiſtence. Whether it be a being, action, or quality, that moveth us, it is ſuppoſed to be an object of our knowledge, or at leaſt of our belief. This obſervation diſcovers to us that the ſubject is not yet exhauſted; becauſe our paſſions, as all the world know, are moved by fiction as well as by truth. In judging beforehand of man, ſo remarkably addicted to truth and reality, one ſhould little dream that

that fiction could have any effect upon him. But man's intellectual faculties are too imperfect to dive far even into his own nature. I ſhall take occaſion afterward to ſhow, that this branch of the human conſtitution, is contrived with admirable wiſdom and is ſubſervient to excellent purpoſes. In the mean time, I muſt endeavour to unfold, by what means fiction hath ſuch influence on the mind.

That the objects of our ſenſes really exiſt in the way and manner we perceive, is a branch of intuitive knowledge. When I ſee a man walking, a tree growing, or cattle grazing, I have a conviction that theſe things are preciſely as they appear. If I be a ſpectator of any tranſaction or event, I have a conviction of the real exiſtence of the perſons engaged, of their words, and of their actions. Nature determines us to rely on the veracity of our ſenſes. And indeed, if our ſenſes did not convince us of the reality of their objects, they could not in any degree anſwer their end.

By the power of memory, a thing formerly ſeen may be recalled to the mind

with different degrees of accuracy. We commonly are ſatisfied with a ſlight recollection of the chief circumſtances; and, in ſuch recollection, the thing is not figured as preſent nor any image formed. I retain the conſciouſneſs of my preſent ſituation, and barely remember that formerly I was a ſpectator. But with reſpect to an intereſting object or event which made a ſtrong impreſſion, the mind ſometimes, not ſatisfied with a curſory review, chuſes to revolve every circumſtance. In this caſe, I conceive myſelf to be a ſpectator as I was originally; and I perceive every particular paſſing in my preſence, in the ſame manner as when I was in reality a ſpectator. For example, I ſaw yeſterday a beautiful woman in tears for the loſs of an only child, and was greatly moved with her diſtreſs. Not ſatisfied with a ſlight recollection or bare remembrance, I inſiſt on the melancholy ſcene. Conceiving myſelf to be in the place where I was an eye-witneſs, every circumſtance appears to me as at firſt. I think I ſee the woman in tears and hear her moans. Hence it may be juſtly ſaid, that in a complete idea of memory

mory there is no paſt nor future. A thing recalled to the mind with the accuracy I have been deſcribing, is perceived as in our view, and conſequently as preſently exiſting. Paſt time makes a part of an incomplete idea only: I remember or reflect, that ſome years ago I was at Oxford, and ſaw the firſt ſtone laid of the Ratcliff library; and I remember that at a ſtill greater diſtance of time, I heard a debate in the houſe of Commons about a ſtanding army.

Lamentable is the imperfection of language, almoſt in every particular that falls not under external ſenſe. I am talking of a matter exceeding clear in itſelf, and of which every perſon muſt be conſcious; and yet I find no ſmall difficulty to expreſs it clearly in words; for it is not accurate to talk of incidents long paſt as paſſing in our ſight, nor of hearing at preſent what we really heard yeſterday or perhaps a year ago. To this neceſſity I am reduced, by want of proper words to deſcribe ideal preſence and to diſtinguiſh it from real preſence. And thus in the deſcription, a plain ſubject becomes obſcure and intricate. When I recall any

thing in the diſtincteſt manner, ſo as to form an idea or image of it as preſent; I have not words to deſcribe this act, other than that I perceive the thing as a ſpectator, and as exiſting in my preſence. This means not that I am really a ſpectator; but only that I conceive myſelf to be a ſpectator, and have a conſciouſneſs of preſence ſimilar to what a real ſpectator hath.

As many rules of criticiſm depend on ideal preſence, the reader, it is expected, will take ſome pains to form an exact notion of it, as diſtinguiſhed on the one hand from real preſence, and on the other from a ſuperficial or reflective remembrance. It is diſtinguiſhed from the former by the following circumſtance. Ideal preſence ariſing from an act of memory, may properly be termed *a waking dream*; becauſe, like a dream, it vaniſheth upon the firſt reflection of our preſent ſituation. Real preſence, on the contrary, vouched by eye-ſight, commands our belief, not only during the direct perception, but in reflecting afterward upon the object. And to diſtinguiſh ideal preſence from the latter, I give the following

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ing illuſtration. Two internal acts, both of them exertions of memory, are clearly diſtinguiſhable. When I think of an event as paſt, without forming any image, it is barely reflecting or remembering that I was an eye-witneſs. But when I recall the event ſo diſtinctly as to form a complete image of it, I perceive it ideally as paſſing in my preſence; and this ideal perception is an act of intuition, into which reflection enters not more than into an act of ſight.

Though ideal preſence be diſtinguiſhed from real preſence on the one ſide and from reflective remembrance on the other, it is however variable without any preciſe limits; riſing ſometimes toward the former, and often ſinking toward the latter. In a vigorous exertion of memory, ideal preſence is extremely diſtinct. When a man, as in a reverie, drops himſelf out of his thoughts, he perceives every thing as paſſing before him, and hath a conſciouſneſs of preſence ſimilar to that of a ſpectator. There is no other difference, but that in the former the conſciouſneſs of preſence is leſs firm and clear than in the latter. But this is ſeldom

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the caſe. Ideal preſence is often faint, and the image ſo obſcure as not to differ widely from reflective remembrance.

Hitherto of an idea of memory. I proceed to conſider the idea of a thing I never ſaw, raiſed in me by ſpeech, by writing, or by painting. This idea, with reſpect to the preſent matter, is of the ſame nature with an idea of memory, being either complete or incomplete. An important event, by a lively and accurate deſcription, rouſes my attention and inſenſibly transforms me into a ſpectator: I perceive ideally every incident as paſſing in my preſence. On the other hand, a ſlight or ſuperficial narrative produceth only a faint and incomplete idea, preciſely ſimilar to a reflective recollection of memory. Of ſuch idea, ideal preſence makes no part. Paſt time is a circumſtance that enters into this idea, as it doth into a reflective idea of memory. I believe that Scipio exiſted about 2000 years ago, and that he overcame Hannibal in the famous battle of Zama. When I revolve in ſo curſory a manner that memorable event, I conſider it as long paſt. But ſuppoſing me

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to be warmed with the ſtory, perhaps by a beautiful deſcription, I am inſenſibly transformed to a ſpectator. I perceive theſe two heroes in act to engage; I perceive them brandiſhing their ſwords, and exhorting their troops; and in this manner I attend them through every circumſtance of the battle. This event being preſent to my mind during the whole progreſs of my thoughts, admits not any time but the preſent.

I have had occaſion to obſerve *, that ideas both of memory and of ſpeech, produce emotions of the ſame kind with what are produced by an immediate view of the object; only fainter, in proportion as an idea is fainter than an original perception. The inſight we have now got, unfolds the means by which this effect is produced. Ideal preſence ſupplies the want of real preſence; and in idea we perceive perſons acting and ſuffering, preciſely as in an original ſurvey. If our ſympathy be engaged by the latter, it muſt alſo in ſome meaſure

* Part 1. ſect. 1. of the preſent chapter.

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be engaged by the former. The diſtinctneſs of ideal preſence, as above mentioned, approacheth ſometimes to the diſtinctneſs of real preſence; and the conſciouſneſs of preſence is the ſame in both. This is the cauſe of the pleaſure that is felt in a reverie, where a man, loſing ſight of himſelf, is totally occupied with the objects paſſing in his mind, which he conceives to be really exiſting in his preſence. The power of ſpeech to raiſe emotions, depends entirely on the artifice of raiſing ſuch lively and diſtinct images as are here deſcribed. The reader's paſſions are never ſenſibly moved, till he be thrown into a kind of reverie; in which ſtate, loſing the conſciouſneſs of ſelf, and of reading, his preſent occupation, he conceives every incident as paſſing in his preſence, preciſely as if he were an eye-witneſs. A general or reflective remembrance hath not this effect. It may be agreeable in ſome ſlight degree; but the ideas ſuggeſted by it, are too faint and obſcure to raiſe any thing like a ſympathetic emotion. And were they ever ſo lively, they paſs with too much precipitation to have this effect.

effect. Our emotions are never inſtantaneous: even thoſe that come the ſooneſt to perfection, have different periods of birth, growth, and maturity; and to give opportunity for theſe different periods, it is neceſſary that the cauſe of every emotion be preſent to the mind a due time. The emotion is completed by reiterated impreſſions. We know this to be the caſe of objects of ſight: we are ſcarce ſenſible of any emotion in a quick ſucceſſion even of the moſt beautiful objects. And if this hold in the ſucceſſion of original perceptions, how much more in the ſucceſſion of ideas?

Though all this while, I have been only deſcribing what paſſeth in the mind of every one and what every one muſt be conſcious of, it was neceſſary to enlarge upon it; becauſe, however clear in the internal conception, it is far from being ſo when deſcribed in words. Ideal preſence, though of general importance, hath ſcarce ever been touched by any writer; and at any rate it could not be overlooked in accounting for the effects produced by fiction. Upon this point, the reader I gueſs has prevented me. It already muſt have occur-

red to him, that if, in reading, ideal preſence be the means by which our paſſions are moved, it makes no difference whether the ſubject be a fable or a reality. When ideal preſence is complete, we perceive every object as in our ſight; and the mind, totally occupied with an intereſting event, finds no leiſure for reflection of any ſort. This reaſoning, if any one heſitate, is confirmed by conſtant and univerſal experience. Let us take under conſideration the meeting of Hector and Andromache in the ſixth book of the Iliad, or ſome of the paſſionate ſcenes in King Lear. Theſe pictures of human life, when we are ſufficiently engaged, give an impreſſion of reality not leſs diſtinct than that given by the death of Otho in the beautiful deſcription of Tacitus. We never once reflect whether the ſtory be true or feigned. Reflection comes afterward, when we have the ſcene no longer before our eyes. This reaſoning will appear in a ſtill clearer light, by oppoſing ideal preſence to ideas raiſed by a curſory narrative; which ideas being faint, obſcure, and imperfect, occupy the mind ſo little as to ſolicit reflection. And accordingly,

cordingly, a curt narrative of feigned incidents is never reliſhed. Any ſlight pleaſure it affords, is more than counterbalanced by the diſguſt it inſpires for want of truth.

In ſupport of the foregoing theory, I add what I reckon a deciſive argument. Upon examination it will be found, that genuine hiſtory commands our paſſions by means of ideal preſence ſolely; and therefore that with reſpect to this effect, genuine hiſtory ſtands upon the ſame footing with fable. To me it appears clear, that our ſympathy muſt vaniſh ſo ſoon as we begin to reflect upon the incidents related in either. The reflection that a ſtory is a pure fiction, will indeed prevent our ſympathy; but ſo will equally the reflection that the perſons deſcribed are no longer exiſting. It is preſent diſtreſs only that moves my pity. My concern vaniſhes with the diſtreſs; for I cannot pity any perſon who at preſent is happy. According to this theory, founded clearly on human nature, a man long dead and inſenſible now of paſt misfortunes, cannot move our pity more than if he had never exiſted. The misfortunes deſcribed in a

genuine hiſtory command our belief: but then we believe alſo, that theſe misfortunes are at an end, and that the perſons deſcribed are at preſent under no diſtreſs. What effect, for example, can the belief of the rape of Lucretia have to raiſe our ſympathy, when ſhe died above 2000 years ago, and hath at preſent no painful feeling of the injury done her? The effect of hiſtory in point of inſtruction, depends in ſome meaſure upon its veracity. But hiſtory cannot reach the heart, while we indulge any reflection upon the facts. Such reflection, if it engage our belief, never fails at the ſame time to poiſon our pleaſure, by convincing us that our ſympathy for thoſe who are dead and gone is abſurd. And if reflection be laid aſide, hiſtory ſtands upon the ſame footing with fable. What effect either of them may have to raiſe our ſympathy, depends on the vivacity of the ideas they raiſe; and with reſpect to that circumſtance, fable is generally more ſucceſsful than hiſtory.

Of all the means for making an impreſſion of ideal preſence, theatrical repreſentation is the moſt powerful. That words independent

pendent of action have the ſame power in a leſs degree, every one of ſenſibility muſt have felt: A good tragedy will extort tears in private, though not ſo forcibly as upon the ſtage. This power belongs alſo to painting. A good hiſtorical picture makes a deeper impreſſion than can be made by words, though not equal to what is made by theatrical action. And as ideal preſence depends on a lively impreſſion, painting ſeems to poſſeſs a middle place betwixt reading and acting. In making an impreſſion of ideal preſence, it is not leſs ſuperior to the former than inferior to the latter.

It muſt not however be thought, that our paſſions can be raiſed by painting to ſuch a height as can be done by words. Of all the ſucceſſive incidents that concur to produce a great event, a picture has the choice but of one, becauſe it is confined to a ſingle inſtant of time. And though the impreſſion it makes, is the deepeſt that can be made inſtantaneouſly; yet ſeldom can a paſſion be raiſed to any height in an inſtant, or by a ſingle impreſſion. It was obſerved above, that our paſſions, thoſe eſpecially of the

the ſympathetic kind, require a ſucceſſion of impreſſions; and for that reaſon, reading and ſtill more acting have greatly the advantage, by the opportunity of reiterating impreſſions without end.

Upon the whole, it is by means of ideal preſence that our paſſions are excited; and till words produce that charm they avail nothing. Even real events intitled to our belief, muſt be conceived preſent and paſſing in our ſight before they can move us. And this theory ſerves to explain ſeveral phenomena otherwiſe unaccountable. A misfortune happening to a ſtranger, makes a leſs impreſſion than happening to a man we know, even where we are no way intereſted in him: our acquaintance with this man, however ſlight, aids the conception of his ſuffering in our preſence. For the ſame reaſon, we are little moved with any diſtant event; becauſe we have more difficulty to conceive it preſent, than an event that happened in our neighbourhood.

Every one is ſenſible, that deſcribing a paſt event as preſent, has a fine effect in language. For what other reaſon than that

it

it aids the conception of ideal preſence? Take the following example.

And now with ſhouts the ſhocking armies clos'd,
To lances lances, ſhields to ſhields oppos'd;
Hoſt againſt hoſt the ſhadowy legions drew,
The ſounding darts an iron tempeſt flew;
Victors and vanquiſh'd join promiſcuous cries,
Triumphing ſhouts and dying groans ariſe,
With ſtreaming blood the ſlipp'ry field is dy'd,
And ſlaughter'd heroes ſwell the dreadful tide.

In this paſſage we may obſerve how the writer inflamed with the ſubject, inſenſibly ſlips from the paſt time to the preſent; led to this form of narration by conceiving every circumſtance as paſſing in his own ſight. And this at the ſame time has a fine effect upon the reader, by advancing him to be as it were a ſpectator. But this change from the paſt to the preſent requires ſome preparation; and is not graceful in the ſame ſentence where there is no ſtop in the ſenſe; witneſs the following paſſage.

Thy fate was next, O Phæſtus! doom'd to feel
The great Idomeneus' protended ſteel;

Whom

Whom Borus ſent (his ſon and only joy)
From fruitful Tarne to the fields of Troy.
The Cretan jav'lin reach'd him from afar,
And pierc'd his ſhoulder as he mounts his car.
Iliad, v. 57.

It is ſtill worſe to fall back to the paſt in the ſame period; for this is an anticlimax in deſcription:

Through breaking ranks his furious courſe he bends,
And at the goddeſs his broad lance extends;
Through her bright veil the daring weapon drove,
Th' ambroſial veil, which all the graces wove:
Her ſnowy hand the razing ſteel profan'd,
And the tranſparent ſkin with crimſon ſtain'd.
Iliad, v. 415.

Again, deſcribing the ſhield of Jupiter,

Here all the terrors of grim War appear,
Here rages Force, here tremble Flight and Fear,
Here ſtorm'd Contention, and here Fury frown'd,
And the dire orb portentous Gorgon crown'd.
Iliad, v. 914.

Nor is it pleaſant to be carried backward and forward alternately in a rapid ſucceſſion:

Then

Then dy'd Seamandrius, expert in the chace,
In woods and wilds to wound the ſavage race;
Diana taught him all her ſylvan arts,
To bend the bow and aim unerring darts:
But vainly here Diana's arts he tries,
The fatal lance arreſts him as he flies;
From Menelaus' arm the weapon ſent,
Through his broad back and heaving boſom went:
Down ſinks the warrior with a thund'ring ſound,
His brazen armor rings againſt the ground.

Iliad, v. 65.

It is wonderful to obſerve, upon what ſlender foundations nature, ſometimes, erects her moſt ſolid and magnificent works. In appearance at leaſt, what can be more ſlight than ideal preſence of objects? And yet upon it entirely is ſuperſtructed, that extenſive influence which language hath over the heart; an influence, which, more than any other means, ſtrengthens the bond of ſociety, and attracts individuals from their private ſyſtem to exert themſelves in acts of generoſity and benevolence. Matters of fact, it is true, and truth in general, may be inculcated without taking advantage of ideal preſence. But without it, the fineſt ſpeaker or

writer would in vain attempt to move any of our paſſion: our ſympathy would be confined to objects that are really preſent: and language would loſe entirely that ſignal power it poſſeſſeth, of making us ſympathize with beings removed at the greateſt diſtance of time as well as of place. Nor is the influence of language, by means of this ideal preſence, confined to the heart. It reaches alſo in ſome meaſure the underſtanding, and contributes to belief. When events are related in a lively manner and every circumſtance appears as paſſing before us, it is with difficulty that we ſuffer the truth of the facts to be queſtioned. A hiſtorian accordingly who hath a genius for narration, ſeldom fails to engage our belief. The ſame facts related in a manner cold and indiſtinct, are not ſuffered to paſs without examination. A thing ill deſcribed, is like an object ſeen at a diſtance or through a miſt: we doubt whether it be a reality or a fiction. For this reaſon, a poet who can warm and animate his reader, may employ bolder fictions than ought to be ventured by an inferior genius. The reader, once thoroughly engaged,

engaged, is in that ſituation ſuſceptible of the ſtrongeſt impreſſions:

Veraque conſtituunt, quæ bellè tangere poſſunt
Aureis, et lepido quæ ſunt fucata ſonore.
Lucretius, lib. 1. *l.* 644.

A maſterly painting has the ſame effect. Le Brun is no ſmall ſupport to Quintus Curtius; and among the vulgar in Italy, the belief of ſcripture-hiſtory is perhaps founded as much upon the authority of Raphael, Michael Angelo, and other celebrated painters, as upon that of the ſacred writers *.

In eſtabliſhing the foregoing theory, the reader has had the fatigue of much dry reaſoning. But his labour will not be fruitleſs. From this theory are derived many uſeful rules in criticiſm, which ſhall be mentioned

* At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero longe citra æmulum, vel ſi nihil niſi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciſſet, cujus pulchritudo adjeciſſe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeſtas operis Deum æquavit.
Quintilian, lib. 12. *cap.* 10. § 1.

in their proper places. One ſpecimen, being a fine illuſtration, I chuſe to give at preſent. In a hiſtorical poem repreſenting human actions, it is a rule, that no improbable incident ought to be admitted. A circumſtance, an incident, or an event, may be ſingular, may ſurpriſe by being unexpected, and yet be extremely natural. The improbability I talk of, is that of an irregular fact, contrary to the order and courſe of nature, and therefore unaccountable. A chain of imagined facts linked together according to the order of nature, find eaſy entrance into the mind; and if deſcribed with warmth of fancy, they produce complete images, including ideal preſence. But it is with great difficulty that we admit any irregular fact; for an irregular fact always puzzles the judgement. Doubtful of its reality we immediately enter upon reflection, and diſcovering the cheat, loſe all reliſh and concern. This is an unhappy effect; for thereafter it requires more than an ordinary effort, to reſtore the waking dream, and to make the reader conceive even the more probable incidents as paſſing in his preſence.

I never was an admirer of machinery in an epic poem; and I now find my taſte juſtified by reaſon; the foregoing argument concluding ſtill more ſtrongly againſt imaginary beings, than againſt improbable facts. Fictions of this nature may amuſe by their novelty and ſingularity: but they never move the ſympathetic paſſions, becauſe they cannot impoſe on the mind any perception of reality. I appeal to the diſcerning reader, whether this be not preciſely the caſe of the machinery introduced by Taſſo and by Voltaire. This machinery is not only in itſelf cold and unintereſting, but is remarkably hurtful, by giving an air of fiction to the whole compoſition. A burleſque poem, ſuch as the Lutrin or the Diſpenſary, may employ machinery with ſucceſs; for theſe poems, though they aſſume the air of hiſtory, give entertainment chiefly by their pleaſant and ludicrous pictures, to which machinery contributes in a ſingular manner. It is not the aim of ſuch a poem, to raiſe our ſympathy in any conſiderable degree; and for that reaſon, a ſtrict imitation of nature is not required. A poem profeſſedly

ludicrous,

ludicrous, may employ machinery to great advantage; and the more extravagant the better. A juſt repreſentation of nature, would indeed be incongruous in a compoſition intended to give entertainment by the means chiefly of ſingularity and ſurpriſe.

For accompliſhing the taſk undertaken in the beginning of the preſent ſection, what only remains is, to ſhow the final cauſe of the power that fiction hath over the mind of man. I have already mentioned, that language, by means of fiction, has the command of our ſympathy for the good of others. By the ſame means, our ſympathy may be alſo raiſed for our own good. In the third ſection it is obſerved, that examples both of virtue and of vice raiſe virtuous emotions; which becoming ſtronger by exerciſe, tend to make us virtuous by habit as well as by principle. I now further obſerve, that examples drawn from real events, are not ſo frequent as to contribute much to a habit of virtue. If they be, they are not recorded by hiſtorians. It therefore ſhows great wiſdom, to form us in ſuch a manner, as to be ſuſceptible of the ſame improvement from

from fable that we receive from genuine hiſtory. By this admirable contrivance, examples to improve us in virtue may be multiplied without end. No other ſort of diſcipline contributes more to make virtue habitual; and no other ſort is ſo agreeable in the application. I add another final cauſe with thorough ſatisfaction; becauſe it ſhows, that the author of our nature is not leſs kindly provident for the happineſs of his creatures, than for the regularity of their conduct. The power that fiction hath over the mind of man, is the ſource of an endleſs variety of refined amuſement, always ready to employ a vacant hour. Such amuſement is a fine reſource in ſolitude; and by ſweetening the temper, improves ſociety.

PART II.

Emotions and paſſions as pleaſant and painful, agreeable and diſagreeable. Modifications of theſe qualities.

IT will naturally occur at firſt view, that a diſcourſe upon the paſſions ſhould commence

mence with explaining the qualities now mentioned. But upon trial, I found this could not be done diſtinctly, till the difference were aſcertained betwixt an emotion and a paſſion, and till their cauſes were evolved.

Great obſcurity may be obſerved among writers with regard to the preſent point. No care, for example, is taken to diſtinguiſh agreeable from pleaſant, diſagreeable from painful; or rather theſe terms are deemed ſynonymous. This is an error not at all venial in the ſcience of ethics; as inſtances can and ſhall be given, of painful paſſions that are agreeable, and of pleaſant paſſions that are diſagreeable. Theſe terms, it is true, are uſed indifferently in familiar converſations, and in compoſition for amuſement, where accuracy is not required. But for thoſe to uſe them ſo who profeſs to explain the paſſions, is a capital error. In writing upon the critical art, I would avoid every refinement that may ſeem more curious than uſeful. But the proper meaning of the terms under conſideration muſt be aſcertained, in order to underſtand the paſ-

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ſions, and ſome of their effects that are intimately connected with criticiſm.

I ſhall endeavour to explain theſe terms by familiar examples. Viewing a fine garden, I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable; and I conſider the beauty or agreeableneſs as belonging to the object, or as one of its qualities. Again, when I turn my thoughts from the garden to what paſſes in my mind, I am conſcious of a pleaſant emotion of which the garden is the cauſe. The pleaſure here is felt, not as a quality of the garden, but of the emotion produced by it. I give an oppoſite example. A rotten carcaſs is loathſome and diſagreeable, and raiſes in the ſpectator a painful emotion. The diſagreeableneſs is a quality of the object: the pain is a quality of the emotion produced by it. Agreeable and diſagreeable, then, are qualities of the objects we perceive: pleaſant and painful are qualities of the emotions we feel. The former qualities are perceived as adhering to objects; the latter are felt as exiſting within us.

But a paſſion or emotion, beſide being felt, is frequently made an object of thought

or reflection: we examine it; we inquire into its nature, its cauſe, and its effects. In this view it partakes the nature of other objects: it is either agreeable or diſagreeable. Hence clearly appear the different ſignifications of the terms under conſideration, as applied to paſſion. When a paſſion is termed *pleaſant* or *painful*, we refer to the actual feeling: when termed *agreeable* or *diſagreeable*, it is conſidered as an object of thought or reflection. A paſſion is pleaſant or painful to the perſon in whom it exiſts: it is agreeable or diſagreeable to the perſon who makes it a ſubject of contemplation.

When the terms thus defined are applied to particular emotions and paſſions, they do not always coincide. And in order to make this evident, we muſt endeavour to aſcertain, firſt, what paſſions and emotions are pleaſant what painful, and next, what are agreeable what diſagreeable. With reſpect to both, there are general rules, which, ſo far as I gather from induction, admit not any exceptions. The nature of an emotion or paſſion as pleaſant or painful, depends entirely on its cauſe. An agreeable object produceth

always

always a pleaſant emotion; and a diſagreeable object produceth always a painful emotion *. Thus a lofty oak, a generous action, a valuable diſcovery in art or ſcience, are agreeable objects that unerringly produce pleaſant emotions. A ſtinking puddle, a treacherous action, an irregular ill-contrived edifice, being diſagreeable objects, produce painful emotions. Selfiſh paſſions are pleaſant; for they ariſe from ſelf, an agreeable object or cauſe. A ſocial paſſion directed upon an agreeable object is always pleaſant: directed upon an object in diſtreſs, is painful †. Laſtly, all diſſocial paſſions, ſuch as envy, reſentment, malice, being cauſed by diſagreeable objects, cannot fail to be painful.

It requires a greater compaſs to evolve the general rule that concerns the agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs of emotions and paſſions. An action conformable to the common nature of our ſpecies, is perceived by us to be

* See part 7. of this chapter.

† See the place above cited.

regular and good *; and conſequently every ſuch action appears agreeable to us. The ſame obſervation is applicable to paſſions and emotions. Every feeling that is conformable to the common nature of our ſpecies, is perceived by us to be regular and as it ought to be; and upon that account it muſt appear agreeable. By this general rule we can aſcertain what emotions are agreeable what diſagreeable. Every emotion that is conformable to the common nature of man, ought to appear agreeable. And that this holds true with reſpect to pleaſant emotions, will readily be admitted. But why ſhould painful emotions be an exception, when they are not leſs natural than the other? The propoſition holds true in both. Thus the painful emotion raiſed by a monſtrous birth or brutal action, is not leſs agreeable upon reflection, than the pleaſant emotion raiſed by a flowing river or a lofty dome. With reſpect to paſſions as oppoſed to emotions, it will be obvious from the foregoing propoſition, that their agreeableneſs or diſagree-

* Eſſays on the principles of morality and natural religion, part 1. eſſ. 2. chap. 1.

ableneſs,

ableneſs, like the actions of which they are productive, muſt be regulated entirely by the moral ſenſe. Every action vicious or improper is diſagreeable to a ſpectator, and ſo is the paſſion that prompts it. Every action virtuous or proper is agreeable to a ſpectator, and ſo is the paſſion that prompts it.

This deduction may be carried a great way farther; but to avoid intricacy and obſcurity, I make but one other ſtep. A paſſion, which, as aforeſaid, becomes an object of thought to a ſpectator, may have the effect to produce a paſſion or emotion in him; for it is natural that a ſocial being ſhould be affected with the paſſions of others. Paſſions or emotions thus generated, ſubmit, in common with others, to the general law above mentioned, *viz.* that an agreeable object produces a pleaſant emotion, and a diſagreeable object a painful emotion. Thus the paſſion of gratitude, being to a ſpectator an agreeable object, produceth in him the pleaſant paſſion of love to the grateful perſon. Thus malice, being to a ſpectator a diſagreeable object, produceth in him

him the painful paſſion of hatred to the malicious perſon.

We are now prepared for examples of pleaſant paſſions that are diſagreeable, and of painful paſſions that are agreeable. Self-love, ſo long as confined within juſt bounds, is a paſſion both pleaſant and agreeable. In exceſs it is diſagreeable, though it continues to be ſtill pleaſant. Our appetites are preciſely in the ſame condition. Again, vanity, though pleaſant, is diſagreeable. Reſentment, on the other hand, is, in every ſtage of the paſſion, painful; but is not diſagreeable unleſs in exceſs. Pity is always painful, yet always agreeable. But however diſtinct theſe qualities are, they coincide, I acknowledge, in one claſs of paſſions. All vicious paſſions tending to the hurt of others, are equally painful and diſagreeable.

The foregoing diſtinctions among paſſions and emotions, may ſerve the common affairs of life, but they are not ſufficient for the critical art. The qualities of pleaſant and painful are too familiar to carry us far into human nature, or to form an accurate judgement in the fine arts. It is further neceſſary,

neceſſary, that we be made acquainted with the ſeveral modifications of theſe qualities, with the modifications at leaſt that make the greateſt figure. Even at firſt view every one is ſenſible, that the pleaſure or pain of one paſſion differs from that of another. How diſtant the pleaſure of revenge from that of love? So diſtant, as that we cannot without reluctance admit them to be any way related. That the ſame quality of pleaſure ſhould be ſo differently modified in different paſſions, will not be ſurpriſing, when we reflect on the boundleſs variety of pleaſant ſounds, taſtes, and ſmells, daily felt. Our diſcernment reaches differences ſtill more nice, in objects even of the ſame ſenſe. We have no difficulty to diſtinguiſh different ſweets, different ſours, and different bitters. Honey is ſweet, and ſo is ſugar; and yet they never paſs the one for the other. Our ſenſe of ſmelling is ſufficiently acute, to diſtinguiſh varieties in ſweet-ſmelling flowers without end. With reſpect to paſſions and emotions, their different feelings have no limits; for when we attempt the more delicate modifications,

they

they elude our ſearch, and are ſcarce diſcernible. In this matter, however, there is an analogy betwixt our internal and external ſenſes. The latter generally are ſufficiently acute for all the uſeful purpoſes of life, and ſo are the former. Some perſons indeed, Nature's favourites, have a wonderful acuteneſs of ſenſe, which to them unfolds many a delightful ſcene totally hid from vulgar eyes. But if ſuch refined pleaſure be refuſed to the bulk of mankind, it is however wiſely ordered that they are not ſenſible of the defect; and it detracts not from their happineſs that others ſecretly are more happy. With relation to the fine arts only, this qualification ſeems eſſential; and there it is termed *delicacy of taſte*.

Should an author of ſuch a taſte attempt to deſcribe all thoſe differences and ſhades of pleaſant and painful emotions which he himſelf feels, he would ſoon meet an invincible obſtacle in the poverty of language. No known tongue hitherto has reached ſuch perfection, as to expreſs clearly the more delicate feelings. A people muſt be thoroughly refined, before their language become

become ſo comprehenſive. We muſt therefore reſt ſatisfied with an explanation of the more obvious modifications.

In forming a compariſon betwixt pleaſant paſſions of different kinds, we conceive ſome of them to be *groſs* ſome *refined.* Thoſe pleaſures of external ſenſe that are felt as at the organ of ſenſe, are conceived to be corporeal or groſs*. The pleaſures of the eye and ear are felt to be internal; and for that reaſon are conceived to be more pure and refined.

The ſocial affections are conceived by all to be more refined than the ſelfiſh. Sympathy and humanity are reckoned the fineſt temper of mind; and for that reaſon, the prevalence of the ſocial affections in the progreſs of ſociety, is held to be a refinement in our nature. A ſavage is unqualified for any pleaſure but what is thoroughly or nearly ſelfiſh: therefore a ſavage is incapable of comparing ſelfiſh and ſocial pleaſure. But a man after acquiring a high reliſh of the latter, loſes not thereby a taſte for the former. This man can judge, and he

* See the introduction.

will give preference to ſocial pleaſures as more ſweet and refined. In fact they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but alſo when we make them the ſubject of reflection. The ſocial paſſions are by far more agreeable than the ſelfiſh, and riſe much higher in our eſteem.

Refined manners and polite behaviour, muſt not be deemed altogether artificial. Men accuſtomed to the ſweets of ſociety, who cultivate humanity, find an elegant pleaſure in preferring others and making them happy, of which the proud or ſelfiſh ſcarce have a conception.

Ridicule, which chiefly ariſes from pride, a ſelfiſh paſſion, is at beſt but a groſs pleaſure. A people, it is true, muſt have emerged out of barbarity before they can have a taſte for ridicule. But it is too rough an entertainment for thoſe who are highly poliſhed and refined. Ridicule is baniſhed France, and is loſing ground daily in England.

Other modifications of pleaſant paſſions will be occaſionally mentioned hereafter. Particularly the modifications of *high* and *low*

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are handled in the chapter of grandeur and ſublimity; and the modifications of *dignified* and *mean*, in the chapter of dignity and meanneſs.

PART III.

Interrupted exiſtence of emotions and paſſions. ——Their growth and decay.

WEre emotions of the ſame nature with colour and figure, to continue in their preſent ſtate till varied by ſome operating cauſe, the condition of man would be deplorable. It is ordered wiſely, that emotions ſhould more reſemble another attribute of matter, *viz.* motion, which requires the conſtant exertion of an operating cauſe, and ceaſes when the cauſe is withdrawn. An emotion may ſubſiſt while its cauſe is preſent; and when its cauſe is removed, may ſubſiſt by means of an idea, though in a fainter degree. But the moment another thought breaks in and occupies the mind, ſo as to exclude not only this cauſe, but alſo its idea, the emotion

is gone: it is no longer felt. If it return with its cauſe or idea, it again vaniſheth with them when other thoughts crowd in. This obſervation is applicable to emotions and paſſions of every kind. And theſe accordingly are connected with perceptions and ideas, ſo intimately as not to have any independent exiſtence. A ſtrong paſſion, it is true, hath a mighty influence to detain its object in the mind; but not ſo as to detain it for ever. A ſucceſſion of perceptions or ideas is unavoidable*: the object of the paſſion may be often recalled; but however intereſting, it muſt by intervals yield to other objects. For this reaſon, a paſſion rarely continues long with an equal degree of vigour. It is felt ſtrong and moderate, in a pretty quick ſucceſſion. The ſame object makes not always the ſame impreſſion; becauſe the mind, being of a limited capacity, cannot, at the ſame inſtant, give great attention to a plurality of objects. The ſtrength of a paſſion depends on the impreſſion made by its cauſe; and a cauſe

* See this point explained afterwards, chap. 9.

makes

makes its ſtrongeſt impreſſion, when happening to be the ſingle intereſting object, it attracts our whole attention *. Its impreſſion is ſlighter when our attention is divided betwixt it and other objects; and at that time the paſſion is ſlighter in proportion.

When emotions and paſſions are felt thus by intervals and have not a continued exiſtence, it may be thought a nice problem, to aſcertain their identity, and to determine when they are the ſame when different. In a ſtrict philoſophic view, every ſingle impreſſion made even by the ſame object, is diſtinguiſhable from what have gone before, and from what ſucceed. Neither is an emotion raiſed by an idea the ſame with what is raiſed by a ſight of the object. But ſuch accuracy is not found in common apprehenſion, nor is neceſſary in common language. The emotions raiſed by a fine landſcape in its ſucceſſive appearances, are not diſtinguiſhed from each other, nor even from thoſe raiſed by ſucceſſive

* See the appendix, containing definitions and explanation of terms, ſect. 33.

ideas

ideas of the object: all of them are held to be the ſame. A paſſion alſo is always reckoned the ſame, ſo long as it is fixed upon the ſame object. Thus love and hatred may continue the ſame for life. Nay, ſo looſe are we in this way of thinking, that many paſſions are reckoned the ſame even after a change of object. This is the caſe of all paſſions that proceed from ſome peculiar propenſity. Envy, for example, is conſidered to be the ſame paſſion, not only while it is directed upon the ſame perſon, but even where it comprehends many perſons at once. Pride and malice are in the ſame condition. So much was neceſſary to be ſaid upon the identity of a paſſion and emotion, in order to prepare for examining their growth and decay.

The growth and decay of paſſions and emotions, is a ſubject too extenſive to be exhauſted in an undertaking like the preſent. I pretend only to give a curſory view of it, ſo far as neceſſary for the purpoſes of criticiſm. Some emotions are produced in their utmoſt perfection, and have a very ſhort endurance. This is the caſe of ſurpriſe,

priſe, of wonder, and ſometimes of terror. Emotions raiſed by inſenſible objects, ſuch as trees, rivers, buildings, pictures, arrive at perfection almoſt inſtantaneouſly, and have a long endurance: a ſecond view produceth nearly the ſame pleaſure with the firſt. Love, hatred, and ſome other paſſions, increaſe gradually to a certain pitch, and thereafter decay gradually. Envy, malice, pride, ſcarce ever decay. Again, ſome paſſions, ſuch as gratitude and revenge, are often exhauſted by a ſingle act of gratification. Other paſſions, ſuch as pride, malice, envy, love, hatred, are not ſo exhauſted; but having a long continuance, demand frequent gratification.

In order to explain theſe differences, it would be an endleſs work to examine every emotion and paſſion in particular. We muſt be ſatisfied at preſent with ſome general views. And with reſpect to emotions, which are quieſcent and not productive of deſire, their growth and decay are eaſily explained. An emotion cauſed by an external object, cannot naturally take longer time to arrive at perfection, than is neceſſary for

a leiſurely ſurvey. Such emotion alſo muſt continue long ſtationary, without any ſenſible decay; a ſecond or third view of the object being nearly as agreeable as the firſt. This is the caſe of an emotion produced by a fine proſpect, an impetuous river, or a towering hill. While a man remains the ſame, ſuch objects ought to have the ſame effect upon him. Familiarity, however, hath an influence here, as it hath every where. Frequency of view, after ſhort intervals eſpecially, weans the mind gradually from the object, which at laſt loſes all reliſh. The nobleſt object in the material world, a clear and ſerene ſky, is quite diſregarded, unleſs perhaps after a courſe of bad weather. An emotion raiſed by human virtues, qualities, or actions, may grow imperceptibly by reiterated views of the object, till it become ſo vigorous as to generate deſire. In this condition it muſt be handled as a paſſion.

As to paſſion, I obſerve firſt, that when nature requires a paſſion to be ſudden, it is commonly produced in perfection. This is frequently the caſe of fear and of anger. Wonder and ſurpriſe are always produced

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in perfection. Reiterated impreſſions made by their cauſe, exhauſt theſe paſſions in place of inflaming them. This will be explained afterward *.

In the next place, when a paſſion hath for its foundation an original propenſity peculiar to ſome men, it generally comes ſoon to perfection. The propenſity, upon repreſenting a proper object, is immediately enlivened into a paſſion. This is the caſe of pride, of envy, and of malice.

In the third place, love and hatred have often a ſlow growth. The good qualities or kind offices of a perſon, raiſe in me pleaſant emotions; which, by reiterated views, are ſwelled into a paſſion involving deſire of that perſon's happineſs. This deſire being often put in exerciſe, works gradually a change internally; and at laſt produceth in me a ſettled habit of affection for that perſon, now my friend. Affection thus produced, operates preciſely like an original propenſity. To enliven it into a paſſion, no more is required but the real or ideal pre-

* Chap. 6.

ſence of the object. The habit of averſion or hatred is brought on in the ſame manner. And here I muſt obſerve by the way, that love and hatred ſignify commonly affection, not paſſion. The bulk indeed of our paſſions, are theſe affections inflamed into a paſſion by different circumſtances. The affection of love I bear to my ſon, is inflamed into the paſſion of fear, when he is in danger; becomes hope, when he hath a proſpect of good fortune; becomes admiration, when he performs a laudable action; and ſhame, when he commits any wrong. Averſion, again, becomes fear when there is a proſpect of good fortune to my enemy; becomes hope when he is in danger; becomes joy when he is in diſtreſs; and ſorrow when a laudable action is performed by him.

Fourthly, the growth of ſome paſſions depends often on occaſional circumſtances. Obſtacles to gratification never fail to augment and inflame a paſſion. A conſtant endeavour to remove the obſtacle, preſerves the object of the paſſion ever in view, which ſwells the paſſion by impreſſions frequently reiterated. Thus the reſtraint of conſcience,

when

when an obſtacle to love, agitates the mind and inflames the paſſion:

Quod licet, ingratum eſt: quod non licet, acrius urit.
Si nunquam Danaën habuiſſet ahenea turris,
Non eſſet Danaë de Jove facta parens.
Ovid. Amor. l. 2.

At the ſame time, the mind diſtreſſed with the obſtacle, is diſpoſed to indulge its diſtreſs by magnifying the pleaſure of gratification; which naturally inflames deſire. Shakeſpear expreſſes this obſervation finely:

All impediments in fancy's courſe,
Are motives of more fancy.

We need no better example than a lover who hath many rivals. Even the caprices of a miſtreſs have the effect to inflame love. Theſe occaſioning uncertainty of ſucceſs, tend naturally to make the anxious lover overvalue the happineſs of fruition.

So much upon the growth of paſſions. Their continuance and decay come next under conſideration. And firſt, it is a ge-

neral law of nature, that things ſudden in their growth, are equally ſudden in their decay. This is commonly the caſe of anger; and with reſpect to wonder and ſurpriſe, another reaſon concurs, that their cauſes are of ſhort duration. Novelty ſoon degenerates into familiarity; and the unexpectedneſs of an object, is ſoon ſunk in the pleaſure which the object affords us. Fear, which is a paſſion of greater importance as tending to ſelf-preſervation, is often inſtantaneous, and yet is of equal duration with its cauſe. Nay it frequently ſubſiſts after the cauſe is removed.

In the next place, a paſſion founded on a peculiar propenſity, ſubſiſts generally for ever. This is the caſe of pride, envy, and malice. Objects are never wanting, to inflame the propenſity into a paſſion.

Thirdly, it may be laid down as a general law of nature, that every paſſion ceaſes upon attaining its ultimate end. To explain this law, we muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt a particular and a general end. I call a particular end what may be accompliſhed by a ſingle act. A general end, on the contrary, admits

admits acts without number; becauſe it cannot be ſaid that a general end is ever fully accompliſhed while the object of the paſſion ſubſiſts. Gratitude and revenge are examples of the firſt kind. The ends they aim at may be accompliſhed by a ſingle act; and when this act is performed, the paſſions are neceſſarily at an end. Love and hatred are examples of the other kind. The deſire of doing good or of doing miſchief to an individual, is a general end, which admits acts without number, and which ſeldom is fully accompliſhed. Therefore theſe paſſions have frequently the ſame duration with their objects.

Laſtly, it will afford us another general view, to conſider the difference betwixt an original propenſity and an affection produced by cuſtom. The former adheres too cloſe to the conſtitution ever to be eradicated; and for that reaſon the paſſions to which it gives birth, endure during life with no remarkable diminution of ſtrength. The latter, which owes its birth and increment to time, owes its decay to the ſame cauſe. Affection decays gradually as it grew. Hence long

ong abſence extinguiſheth hatred as well as love. Affection wears out more gradually betwixt perſons, who, living together, are objects to each other of mutual good-will and kindneſs. But here habit comes in luckily, to ſupply decayed affection. It makes theſe perſons neceſſary to the happineſs of each other, by the pain of ſeparation *. Affection to children hath a long endurance, longer perhaps than any other affection. Its growth keeps pace with that of its objects. They diſplay new beauties and qualifications daily, to feed and augment the affection. But whenever the affection becomes ſtationary, it muſt begin to decay; with a ſlow pace indeed, in proportion to its increment. In ſhort, man with reſpect to this life, is a temporary being. He grows, becomes ſtationary, decays; and ſo muſt all his powers and paſſions.

* See chap. 14.

PART

PART IV.

Coexiſtent emotions and paſſions.

TO have a thorough knowledge of the human paſſions and emotions, it is not ſufficient that they be examined ſingly and ſeparately. As a plurality of them are ſometimes felt at the ſame inſtant, the manner of their coexiſtence, and the effects thereby produced, ought alſo to be examined. This ſubject is extenſive, and it will be difficult to evolve all the laws that govern its endleſs variety of caſes. Such an undertaking may be brought to perfection, but it muſt be by degrees. The following hints may ſuffice for a firſt attempt.

We begin with emotions raiſed by different ſounds, as the ſimpleſt caſe. Two ſounds that mix, and are, as it were, incorporated before they reach the ear, are ſaid to be concordant. That each ſound produceth an emotion of its own, muſt be admitted. But then theſe emotions, like the ſounds that

that produce them, mix ſo intimately, as to be rather one complex emotion than two emotions in conjunction. Two ſounds, again, that refuſe incorporation or mixture, are ſaid to be diſcordant. Being however heard at the ſame inſtant, the emotions produced by them are conjoined; and in that condition are unpleaſant, even where ſeparately they are each of them pleaſant.

Similar to the emotion raiſed by mixed ſounds, is the emotion that an object of ſight raiſes by means of its ſeveral qualities. A tree, for example, with its qualities of colour, figure, ſize, *&c.* is perceived to be one object; and the emotion it raiſes is one, not different emotions combined. But though the emotion be one, it is however not ſimple. The perception of the tree is complex, and the emotion raiſed by it muſt alſo be complex.

With reſpect to coexiſtent emotions produced by different cauſes or objects, it muſt be obſerved, that there cannot be a concordance among objects of ſight like what is perceived in ſounds. Objects of ſight are never mixed or incorporated in the act of viſion.

viſion. Each object is perceived as it exiſts, ſeparately from others; and each raiſeth its own emotion, which is felt diſtinctly however intimately connected the objects may be. This doctrine holds in all the cauſes of emotion or paſſion, ſounds only excepted.

To explain the manner in which ſuch emotions coexiſt, ſimilar emotions muſt be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe that are diſſimilar. Two emotions are ſaid to be ſimilar, when they tend each of them to produce the ſame tone of mind. Chearful emotions, however different their cauſes may be, are ſimilar; and ſo are thoſe which are melancholy. Diſſimilar emotions are eaſily explained by their oppoſition to what are ſimilar. Grandeur and littleneſs, gaiety and gloomineſs, are diſſimilar emotions.

Emotions perfectly ſimilar, readily combine and unite *, ſo as in a manner to be-

* It is eaſier to conceive the manner of coexiſtence of ſimilar emotions, than to deſcribe it. They cannot be ſaid to mix or incorporate like concordant ſounds. Their union is rather of agreement or concord; and therefore I have choſen the words in the text, not as ſufficient to expreſs clearly the manner of their coexiſtence, but only as leſs liable to exception than any other I can find.

come one complex emotion; witneſs the emotions produced by a number of flowers in a parterre, or of trees in a wood. Emotions again that are oppoſite or extremely diſſimilar, never combine nor unite. The mind cannot ſimultaneouſly take on oppoſite tones: it cannot at the ſame inſtant be both joyful and ſad, angry and ſatisfied, proud and humble. Diſſimilar emotions may ſucceed each other with rapidity, but they cannot exiſt ſimultaneouſly.

Betwixt theſe two extremes, emotions will unite more or leſs, in proportion to the degree of their reſemblance and the greater or leſs connection of their cauſes. The beauty of a landſcape and the ſinging of birds, produce emotions that are ſimilar in a conſiderable degree; and theſe emotions therefore, though proceeding from very different cauſes, readily combine and unite. On the other hand, when the cauſes are intimately connected, the emotions, though but ſlightly reſembling each other, are forced into a ſort of union. I give for an example a miſtreſs in diſtreſs. When I conſider her beauty, I feel a pleaſant emotion; and

and a painful emotion when I conſider her diſtreſs. Theſe two emotions, proceeding from different views of the object, have very little reſemblance to each other: and yet their cauſes are ſo intimately connected, as to force them into a ſort of complex emotion, partly pleaſant partly painful. This clearly explains ſome expreſſions common in poetry, *a ſweet diſtreſs, a pleaſant pain.*

We proceed to the effects produced by means of the different manners of coexiſtence above deſcribed; firſt, the effects produced within the mind, and next, thoſe that appear externally. I diſcover two mental effects clearly diſtinguiſhable from each other. The one may be repreſented by addition and ſubtraction in numbers, and the other by harmony in ſounds. Two pleaſant emotions that are ſimilar, readily unite when they are coexiſtent; and the pleaſure felt in the union, is the ſum of the two pleaſures. The combined emotions are like multiplied effects from the co-operation of different powers. The ſame emotions in ſucceſſion, are far from making the ſame figure; becauſe the mind at no

inſtant of the ſucceſſion is conſcious of more than a ſingle emotion. This doctrine may aptly be illuſtrated by a landſcape comprehending hills, vallies, plains, rivers, trees, *&c.* The emotions produced by theſe ſeveral objects, being ſimilar in a high degree as falling in eaſily and ſweetly with the ſame tone of mind, are in conjunction extremely pleaſant. And this multiplied effect is felt from objects even of different ſenſes; as where a landſcape is conjoined with the muſic of birds and odor of flowers. Such multiplied effect, as above hinted, depends partly on the reſemblance of the emotions and partly on the connection of their cauſes; whence it follows, that the effect muſt be the greateſt, where the cauſes are intimately connected and the emotions perfectly ſimilar.

The other pleaſure ariſing from coexiſtent emotions, which may be termed *the pleaſure of concord or harmony*, is aſcertained by a different rule. It is directly in proportion to the degree of reſemblance betwixt the emotions, and inverſely in proportion to the degree of connection betwixt the cauſes.

ſes. To feel this pleaſure in perfection, the reſemblance cannot be too ſtrong, nor the connection too ſlight. Where the cauſes are intimately connected, the ſimilar emotions they produce are felt like one complex emotion. But the pleaſure of harmony, is not felt from one emotion ſingle or complex. It is felt from various ſimilar emotions, diſtinct from each other, and yet ſweetly combining in the mind; and the leſs connection the cauſes have, the more entire is the emotion of harmony. This matter cannot be better illuſtrated, than by the foregoing example of a landſcape, where the ſight, hearing, and ſmelling, are employed. The accumulated pleaſure of ſo many different ſimilar emotions, is not what delights us the moſt in this combination of objects. The ſenſe of harmony from theſe emotions ſweetly uniting in the mind, is ſtill more delightful. We feel this harmony in the different emotions proceeding from the viſible objects; but we feel it ſtill more ſenſibly in the emotions proceeding from the objects of different ſenſes. This emotion of concord or harmony, will

be

be more fully illuſtrated, when the emotions produced by the ſound of words and their meaning are taken under conſideration *.

This emotion of concord from conjoined emotions, is felt even where the emotions are not perfectly ſimilar. Love is a pleaſant paſſion; but then its ſweetneſs and tenderneſs make it reſemble in a conſiderable degree the painful paſſion of pity or grief; and for that reaſon, love accords better with theſe paſſions than with what are gay and ſprightly. I give the following example from Catullus, where the concord betwixt love and grief, has a fine effect even in ſo ſlight a ſubject as the death of a ſparrow.

Lugete, ô Veneres, Cupidineſque,
Et quantum eſt hominum venuſtiorum!
Paſſer mortuus eſt meæ puellæ,
Quem plus illa oculis ſuis amabat.
Nam mellitus erat, ſuamque norat
Ipſam tam bene, quam puella matrem:
Nec ſeſe a gremio illius movebat;
Sed circumſiliens modo huc, modo illuc,

* Chap. 18. ſect. 3.

Ad

Ad ſolam dominam uſque pipilabat.
Qui nunc it per iter tenebricoſum,
Illuc, unde negant redire quemquam.
At vobis male ſit, malæ tenebræ
Orci, quæ omnia bella devoratis;
Tam bellum mihi paſſerem abſtuliſtis.
O factum male, ô miſelle paſſer,
Tua nunc opera, meæ puellæ
Flendo turgiduli rubent ocelli.

To complete this branch of the ſubject, I proceed to conſider the effects of diſſimilar emotions. Theſe effects obviouſly muſt be oppoſite to what are above deſcribed; and in order to explain them with accuracy, diſſimilar emotions proceeding from connected cauſes, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from what proceed from cauſes that are unconnected. Diſſimilar emotions of the former kind, being forced into a ſort of unnatural union, produce a feeling of diſcord inſtead of harmony. It holds alſo that in computing their force, ſubtraction muſt be uſed in place of addition, which will be evident from what follows. Diſſimilar emotions forced into union, are felt obſcurely and imperfectly;

perfectly; for each tends to vary the tone of mind that is ſuited to the other; and the mind thus diſtracted betwixt two objects, is at no inſtant in a condition to receive a full impreſſion from either. Diſſimilar emotions proceeding from unconnected cauſes, are in a very different condition. Diſſimilar emotions in general are averſe to union; and as there is nothing to force them into union when their cauſes are unconnected, emotions of this kind are never felt but in ſucceſſion. By that means, they are not felt to be diſcordant, and each hath an opportunity to make a full impreſſion.

This curious theory muſt be illuſtrated by examples. In reading the deſcription of the diſmal waſte, book 1. of *Paradiſe Loſt*, we are ſenſible of a confuſed feeling, ariſing from diſſimilar emotions forced into union, *viz.* the beauty of the deſcription and the horror of the object deſcribed.

Seeſt thou yon dreary plain, forlorn and wild,
The ſeat of deſolation, void of light,
Save what the glimmering of theſe livid flames
Caſts pale and dreadful?

Many

Many other paſſages in this juſtly celebrated poem produce the ſame effect; and we always obſerve, that if the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject be obſcured by the beautiful deſcription, this beauty is not leſs obſcured by its diſcordant union with the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject. For the ſame reaſon, aſcending ſmoke in a calm morning is improper in a picture full of violent action. The emotion of ſtillneſs and tranquillity inſpired by the former, accords not with the lively and animated emotion inſpired by the latter. A parterre, partly ornamented partly in diſorder, produces a mixt feeling of the ſame ſort. Two great armies in act to engage, mix the diſſimilar emotions of grandeur and of terror.

Sembra d'alberi denſi alta foreſta
L' un campo, e l'altro; di tant' aſte abbonda.
Son teſi gli archi, e ſon le lance in reſta:
Vibranſi i dardi, e rotaſi ogni fionda.
Ogni cavallo in guerra anco s' appreſta:
Gli odii, e'l furor del ſuo ſignor ſeconda:
Raſpa, batte, nitriſce, e ſi raggira,
Gonfia le nari; e fumo, e fuoco ſpira.

Bello in sì bella viſta anco è l' orrore:
E di mezzo la tema eſce il diletto.
Ne men le trombe orribili, e canore
Sono a gli orecchi lieto, e fero oggetto.
Pur il campo fedel, benchè minore,
Par di ſuon più mirabile, e d' aſpetto.
E canta in più guerriero, e chiaro carme
Ogni ſua tromba, e maggior luce han l' arme.
Geruſalemme liberata, cant. 20. *ſt.* 29. *&* 30.

A virtuous man has drawn on himſelf a great misfortune, by a fault incident to human nature, and therefore venial. The remorſe he feels aggravates his diſtreſs, and conſequently raiſes our pity to a high pitch. We indeed blame the man; and the indignation raiſed by the fault he has committed, is diſſimilar to pity. Theſe two paſſions however proceeding from different views of the ſame object, are forced into a ſort of union. But the indignation is ſo ſlight as ſcarce to be felt in the mixture with pity. Subjects of this kind, are of all the fitteſt for tragedy. But of this afterward *.

* Chap. of epic and dramatic compoſitions.

Oppoſite

Oppoſite emotions are ſo diſſimilar as not to admit any ſort of union, even where they proceed from cauſes the moſt intimately connected. Love to a miſtreſs, and reſentment for her infidelity, are of this nature. They cannot exiſt otherwiſe than in ſucceſſion, which by the connection of their cauſes is commonly rapid. And theſe emotions will govern alternately, till one of them obtain the aſcendent, or both be obliterated. A ſucceſſion opens to me by the death of a worthy man, who was my friend as well as my kinſman. When I think of my friend I am grieved; but the ſucceſſion gives me joy. Theſe two cauſes are intimately connected, for the ſucceſſion is the direct conſequence of my friend's death. The emotions however being oppoſite, do not mix: they prevail alternately, perhaps for a courſe of time, till grief for my friend's death be baniſhed by the pleaſures of opulence. A virtuous man ſuffering unjuſtly, is an example of the ſame kind. I pity him, and I have great indignation at the author of the wrong. Theſe emotions proceed from cauſes nearly connected; but being directed upon different objects, they

are not forced into union. The oppoſition preſerves them diſtinct; and accordingly they are found to govern alternately, the one ſometimes prevailing and ſometimes the other.

Next of diſſimilar emotions ariſing from unconnected cauſes. Good and bad news of equal importance arriving at the ſame inſtant from different quarters, produce oppoſite emotions, the diſcordance of which is not felt becauſe they are not forced into union. They govern alternately, commonly in a quick ſucceſſion, till their force be ſpent. In the ſame manner, good news arriving to a man labouring under diſtreſs, occaſions a vibration in his mind from the one to the other.

Oſmyn. By heav'n thou'ſt rous'd me from my lethargy.
The ſpirit which was deaf to my own wrongs,
And the loud cries of my dead father's blood,
Deaf to revenge—nay, which refus'd to hear
The piercing ſighs and murmurs of my love
Yet unenjoy'd; what not Almeria could
Revive, or raiſe, my people's voice has waken'd.
O my Antonio, I am all on fire,

My

My ſoul is up in arms, ready to charge
And bear amidſt the foe with conqu'ring troops.
I hear 'em call to lead 'em on to liberty,
To victory; their ſhouts and clamours rend
My ears, and reach the heav'ns: where is the king?
Where is Alphonſo? ha! where! where indeed?
O I could tear and burſt the ſtrings of life,
To break theſe chains. Off, off, ye ſtains of royalty!
Off, ſlavery! O curſe, that I alone
Can beat and flutter in my cage, when I
Would ſoar and ſtoop at victory beneath!

Mourning Bride, act 3. ſc. 2.

If the emotions be unequal in force, the ſtronger after a conflict will extinguiſh the weaker. Thus the loſs of a houſe by fire or of a ſum of money by bankruptcy, will make no figure in oppoſition to the birth of a long-expected ſon, who is to inherit an opulent fortune. After ſome ſlight vibrations, the mind ſettles in joy, and the loſs is forgot.

The foregoing obſervations, will be found of great uſe in the fine arts. Many practical rules are derived from them, which I ſhall

ſhall have occaſion afterward to mention. For inſtant ſatisfaction in part, I propoſe to ſhow the uſe of theſe obſervations in muſic, a theme I inſiſt upon at preſent, not being certain of another opportunity more favourable. It will be admitted, that no combination of ſounds but what is agreeable to the ear, is intitled to the name of muſic. Melody and harmony are ſeparately agreeable and in union delightful. The agreeableneſs of vocal muſic differs from that of inſtrumental. The former being intended to accompany words, ought to be expreſſive of the ſentiment that is conveyed by the words. But the latter having no connection with words, may be agreeable without expreſſing any ſentiment. Harmony properly ſo called, though delightful when in perfection, is not expreſſive of ſentiment; and we often find good melody without the leaſt tincture of it.

Theſe preliminaries being eſtabliſhed, I proceed directly to the point. In vocal muſic, the intimate connection of ſenſe and ſound rejects diſſimilar emotions, thoſe eſpecially that are oppoſite. Similar emotions produced

produced by the ſenſe and ſound go naturally into union; and at the ſame time are felt to be concordant or harmonious. Diſſimilar emotions, on the other hand, forced into union by cauſes intimately connected, not only obſcure each other, but are alſo unpleaſant by diſcordance. From theſe principles it is eaſy to ſay what ſort of poetical compoſitions are fitted for muſic. It is evident that no poem expreſſing the ſentiments of any diſagreeable paſſion is proper. The pain a man feels who is actuated with malice or unjuſt revenge, diſqualifies him for reliſhing muſic or any thing that is entertaining. And ſuppoſing him diſpoſed, againſt nature, to vent his ſentiments in muſic, the mixture would be unpleaſant; for theſe paſſions raiſe diſguſt and averſion in the audience *, a tone of mind oppoſite to every emotion that muſic can inſpire. A man ſeized with remorſe cannot bear muſic, becauſe every ſort of it muſt be diſcordant with his tone of mind; and when theſe by an unſkilful artiſt are forced into

* See part 2. of the preſent chapter, toward the cloſe.

union,

union, the mixture is unpleaſant to the audience.

In general, muſic never can have a good effect in conjunction with any compoſition expreſſive of malice, envy, peeviſhneſs, or any other diſſocial paſſion. The pleaſure of muſic, on the other hand, is ſimilar to all pleaſant emotions; and muſic is finely qualified for every ſong where ſuch emotions are expreſſed. Muſic particularly in a chearful tone, is concordant in the higheſt degree with every emotion in the ſame tone; and hence our taſte for chearful airs expreſſive of mirth and jollity. Muſic is peculiarly well qualified for accompanying every ſympathetic emotion. Sympathetic joy aſſociates finely with chearful muſic, and ſympathetic pain not leſs finely with muſic that is tender and melancholy. All the different emotions of love, *viz.* tenderneſs, concern, anxiety, pain of abſence, hope, fear, *&c.* accord delightfully with muſic. A perſon in love, even when unkindly treated, is ſoothed by muſic. The tenderneſs of love ſtill prevailing, accords with a melancholy ſtrain. This

is

is finely exemplified by Shakeſpear in the fourth act of *Othello*, where Deſdemona calls for a ſong expreſſive of her diſtreſs. Wonderful is the delicacy of that writer's taſte, which fails him not even in the moſt refined emotions of human nature. Melancholy muſic again is ſuitable to ſlight grief, which requires or admits conſolation. But deep grief, which refuſes all conſolation, rejects for that reaſon even melancholy muſic. For a different reaſon, muſic is improper for accompanying pleaſant emotions of the more important kind. Theſe totally ingroſs the mind, and leave no place for muſic or any ſort of amuſement. In a perilous enterpriſe to dethrone a tyrant, muſic would be impertinent, even where hope prevails, and the proſpect of ſucceſs is great. Alexander attacking the Indian town and mounting the wall, had certainly no impulſe to exert his proweſs in a ſong. It is true, that not the leaſt regard is paid to theſe rules either in the French or Italian opera; and the attachment we have to theſe compoſitions, may at firſt ſight be conſidered as a proof that the foregoing doctrine cannot be founded on human nature. But the gene-

ral taſte for operas is at bottom no authority againſt me. In our operas the paſſions are ſo imperfectly expreſſed, as to leave the mind free for reliſhing muſic of any ſort indifferently. It cannot be diſguiſed, that the pleaſure of an opera is derived chiefly from the muſic, and ſcarce at all from the ſentiments. A happy coincidence of emotions raiſed by the ſong and by the muſic, is extremely rare; and I venture to affirm, that there is no example of it unleſs where the emotion raiſed by the former is pleaſant as well as that raiſed by the latter.

The ſubject we have run through, appears not a little entertaining. It is extremely curious to obſerve, in many inſtances, a plurality of cauſes producing in conjunction a great pleaſure: in other inſtances, not leſs frequent, no conjunction, but each cauſe acting in oppoſition. To enter bluntly upon a ſubject of ſuch intricacy, might gravel an acute philoſopher; and yet by taking matters in a train, the intricacy vaniſheth.

Next in order, according to the method propoſed, come external effects. And this leads to paſſions in particular, which involving

ving deſire are the cauſes of action. Two coexiſtent paſſions that have the ſame tendency, muſt be ſimilar. They accordingly readily unite, and in conjunction have double force; which muſt hold whether the two paſſions have the ſame or different cauſes. This is verified by experience; from which we learn, that different paſſions having the ſame end in view, impel the mind to action with united force. The mind receives not impulſes alternately from theſe paſſions, but one ſtrong impulſe from the whole in conjunction. And indeed it is not eaſy to conceive what ſhould bar the union of paſſions that have all of them the ſame tendency.

Two paſſions having oppoſite tendencies, may proceed from the ſame object or cauſe conſidered in different lights. Thus a miſtreſs may at once be the object both of love and reſentment. Her beauty inflames the paſſion of love: her cruelty or inconſtancy cauſes reſentment. When two ſuch paſſions coexiſt in the ſame breaſt, the oppoſition of their aim prevents any ſort of union. They are not felt otherwiſe than in ſucceſſion.

And the conſequence muſt be one of two things: the paſſions will balance each other, and prevent external action; or one of them will prevail, and accompliſh its end. Guarini, in his *Paſtor Fido*, deſcribes beautifully the ſtruggle betwixt love and reſentment directed upon the ſame object.

Coriſca. Chi vide mai, chi mai udi più ſtrana
E più folle, e più fera, e più importuna
Paſſione amoroſa? amore, ed odio
Con sì mirabil tempre in un cor miſti,
Che l'un per l'altro (e non ſo ben dir come)
E ſi ſtrugge, e s'avanza, e naſce, e more.
S' i' miro alle bellezze di Mirtillo
Dal piè leggiadro al grazioſo volto,
Il vago portamento, il bel ſembiante.
Gli atti, i coſtumi, e le parole, e 'l guardo;
M'aſſale Amore con sì poſſente foco
Ch'i' ardo tutta, e par, ch' ogn' altro affetto
Da queſto ſol ſia ſuperato, e vinto:
Ma ſe poi penſo all' oſtinato amore,
Ch' ei porta ad altra donna, e che per lei
Di me non cura, e ſprezza (il vo' pur dire)
La mia famoſa, e da mill' alme, e mille
Inchinata beltà, bramata grazia;
L'odio così, così l'aborro, e ſchivo,
Che impoſſibil mi par, ch'unqua per lui

Mi

Mi s'accendeſſe al cor fiamma amoroſa.
Tallor meco ragiono: o s'io poteſſi
Gioir del mio dolciſſimo Mirtillo,
Sicche foſſe mio tutto, e ch' altra mai
Poſſeder no 'l poteſſe, o più d' ogn' altra
Beata, e feliciſſima Coriſca!
Ed in quel punto in me ſorge un talento
Verſo di lui sì dolce, e sì gentile,
Che di ſeguirlo, e di pregarlo ancora,
E di ſcoprirgli il cor prendo conſiglio.
Che più? così mi ſtimola il deſio,
Che ſe poteſſi allor l'adorerei.
Dall' altra parte i' mi riſento, e dico,
Un ritroſo? uno ſchifo? un che non degna?
Un, che può d'altra donna eſſer amante?
Un, ch'ardiſce mirarmi, e non m'adora?
E dal mio volto ſi difende in guiſa,
Che per amor non more? ed io, che lui
Dovrei veder, come molti altri i' veggio
Supplice, e lagrimoſa a' piedi miei,
Supplice, e lagrimoſo a' piedi ſuoi
Soſterro di cadere? ah non fia mai.
Ed in queſto penſier tant' ira accoglio
Contra di lui, contra di me, che volſi
A ſeguirlo il penſier, gli occhi a mirarlo,
Che 'l nome di Mirtillo, e l'amor mio
Odio più che la morte; e lui vorrei
Veder il più dolente, il più infelice

Paſtor, che viva; e ſe poteſſi allora,
Con le mie proprie man l'anciderei.
Così ſdegno, deſire, odio, ed amore
Mi fanno guerra, ed io, che ſtata ſono
Sempre fin qui di mille cor la fiamma,
Di mill' alme il tormento, ardo, e languiſco:
E provo nel mio mal le pene altrui.

Act 1. *ſc.* 3.

Ovid paints in lively colours the vibration of mind betwixt two oppoſite paſſions directed upon the ſame object. Althea had two brothers much beloved, who were unjuſtly put to death by her ſon Meleager in a fit of paſſion. She was ſtrongly impelled to revenge; but the criminal was her own ſon. This ought to have with-held her hand. But the ſtory makes a better figure and is more intereſting, by the violence of the ſtruggle betwixt reſentment and maternal love.

Dona Deûm templis nato victore ferebat;
Cum videt extinctos fratres Althæa referri.
Quæ plangore dato, mœſtis ululatibus urbem
Implet; et auratis mutavit veſtibus atras.
At ſimul eſt auctor necis editus; excidit omnis
Luctus: et a lacrymis in pœnæ verſus amorem eſt.

Stipes

Stipes erat, quem, cum partus enixa jaceret
Theſtias, in flammam triplices poſuêre ſorores;
Staminaque impreſſo fatalia pollice nentes,
Tempora, dixerunt, eadem lignoque, tibique,
O modo nate, damus. Quo poſtquam carmine dicto
Exceſſere deæ; flagrantem mater ab igne
Erripuit torrem: ſparſitque liquentibus undis.
Ille diu fuerat penetralibus abditus imis;
Servatuſque, tuos, juvenis, ſervaverat annos.
Protulit hunc genitrix, tædaſque in fragmina poni
Imperat; et poſitis inimicos admovet ignes.
Tum conata quater flammis imponere ramum
Cœpta quater tenuit. Pugnat materque, ſororque,
Et diverſa trahunt unum duo nomina pectus.
Sæpe metu ſceleris pallebant ora futuri:
Sæpe ſuum fervens oculis dabat ira ruborem,
Et modo neſcio quid ſimilis crudele minanti
Vultus erat; modo quem miſereri credere poſſes:
Cumque ferus lacrymas animi ſiccaverat ardor;
Inveniebantur lacrymæ tamen. Utque carina,
Quam ventus, ventoque contrarius æſtus,
Vim geminam ſentit, paretque incerta duobus:
Theſtias haud aliter dubiis affectibus errat,
Inque vices ponit, poſitamque reſuſcitat iram.
Incipit eſſe tamen melior germana parente;
Et, conſanguineas ut ſanguine leniat umbras,
Impietate pia eſt. Nam poſtquam peſtifer ignis
Convaluit:

Convaluit: Rogus iſte cremet mea viſcera, dixit.
Utque manu dirâ lignum fatale tenebat;
Ante ſepulchrales infelix adſtitit aras.
Pœnarumque deæ triplices furialibus, inquit,
Eumenides, ſacris vultus advertite veſtros.
Ulciſcor, facioque nefas. Mors morte pianda eſt;
In ſcelus addendum ſcelus eſt, in funera funus:
Per coacervatos pereat domus impia luctus.
An felix Oeneus nato victore fruetur;
Theſtius orbus erit? melius lugebitis ambo.
Vos modo, fraterni manes, animæque recentes,
Officium ſentite meum; magnoque paratas
Accipite inferias, uteri mala pignora noſtri.
Hei mihi! quo rapior? fratres ignoſcite matri.
Deficiunt ad cœpta manus. Meruiſſe fatemur
Illum, cur pereat: mortis mihi diſplicet auctor.
Ergo impune feret; vivuſque, et victor, et ipſo
Succeſſu tumidus regnum Calydonis habebit?
Vos cinis exiguus, gelidæque jacebitis umbræ?
Haud equidem patiar. Pereat ſceleratus; et ille
Spemque patris, regnique trahat, patriæque ruinam.
Mens ubi materna eſt; ubi ſunt pia jura parentum?
Et, quos ſuſtinui, bis menſûm quinque labores?
O utinam primis arſiſſes ignibus infans;
Idque ego paſſa forem! vixiſti munere noſtro:
Nunc merite moriere tuo. Cape præmia facti;
Biſque datam, primum partu, mox ſtipite rapto,
Redde animam; vel me fraternis adde ſepulchris.

Et

Et cupio, et nequeo. Quid agam? modo vulnera fratrum
Ante oculos mihi ſunt, et tantæ cædis imago;
Nunc animum pietas, maternaque nomina frangunt.
Me miſeram! male vincetis, ſed vincite, fratres:
Dummodo, quæ dedero vobis ſolatia, voſque
Ipſa ſequar, dixit: dextraque averſa trementi
Funereum torrem medios conjecit in ignes.
Aut dedit, aut viſus gemitus eſt ille dediſſe,
Stipes; et invitis correptus ab ignibus arſit.

Metamorph. lib. 8. *l.* 445.

In caſes of this kind, one circumſtance always augments the fluctuation. A reſolution to prefer one action before another after balancing betwixt them, is an inchoated gratification of the prevailing paſſion, which ſoftens it in ſome degree. This circumſtance tends to give a ſuperiority to the oppoſite paſſion. And another circumſtance alſo concurs, that this oppoſite paſſion has by reſtraint acquired in the interim ſome additional force.

Love and jealouſy connected by a common object, occupy the mind alternately. When the object is conſidered as beautiful,

love prevails: when conſidered as poſſibly unfaithful, jealouſy prevails. A ſituation of this kind, affords great ſcope for fluctuation of paſſion, which is painted to the life by ſeveral maſterly hands in words as well as in colours. Shakeſpear handles the ſame ſubject, but in a manner uncommon and peculiar to himſelf. In Othello's ſoliloquy before putting his wife to death, love and jealouſy are repreſented, each exerting its whole force, but without any ſtruggle. Othello was naturally inflexible; and the tendereſt love could not divert him from a purpoſe he approved as right, not even for a moment. But every thing conſiſtent with ſuch a character is done to reconcile the two oppoſite paſſions. He is reſolved to put her to death, but he will not ſhed her blood, nor ſo much as ruffle her ſkin.

Othello. It is the cauſe, it is the cauſe, my ſoul;—
Let me not name it to you, you chaſte ſtars!
It is the cauſe.——Yet I'll not ſhed her blood,
Nor ſcar that whiter ſkin of hers than ſnow,
And ſmooth as monumental alabaſter.
[*Lays down the ſword.*
Yet ſhe muſt die; elſe ſhe'll betray more men.
Put out the light, and then — Put out the light?—

If

If I quench thee, thou flaming miniſter,
I can again thy former light reſtore,
Should I repent: but once put out *thy* light,
Thou cunning'ſt pattern of excelling nature,
I know not where is that Promethean heat
That can thy light relumine.—[*Sets down the taper.*
When I have pluck'd thy roſe,
I cannot give it vital growth again;
It needs muſt wither.— I'll ſmell thee on the tree;
[*Kiſſing her.*
Oh balmy breath, that doſt almoſt perſuade
Juſtice to break her ſword!—— One more; one more;
Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee,
And love thee after.——One more, that's the laſt;
So ſweet was ne'er ſo fatal! I muſt weep,
But they are cruel tears? this ſorrow's heav'nly;
It ſtrikes where it doth love.—— She wakes——
Act 5. ſc. 6.

In Otway's *Orphan*, we have an illuſtrious example of the addreſs employed to gratify oppoſite paſſions directed upon the ſame object. Caſtalio and Polydore, brothers and rivals, had ſworn mutual confidence. Caſtalio broke his faith by a private marriage. By this concealment, Polydore was unwarily betrayed into a diſmal deed, that of

polluting his brother's bed. Thus he had injured his brother, and was injured by him. Juſtice prompted him to make full atonement by his own death: reſentment againſt his brother required a full atonement to be made to himſelf. In coexiſtent paſſions ſo contradictory, one of them commonly prevails after a ſtruggle. But here happily an expedient occurred to gratify both; which was, that Polydore ſhould provoke his brother to put him to death. Polydore's crime in his own opinion merited this puniſhment; and juſtice was ſatisfied when he fell by the hands of the man he had injured. He wanted at the ſame time to puniſh his brother for breach of faith; and he could not do this more effectually than by betraying his brother to be his executioner.

If difference of aim prevent the union of two paſſions though having the ſame object, much more will it prevent their union when their objects are alſo different. In both caſes there is a fluctuation; but in the latter the fluctuation is ſlower than in the former. A beautiful ſituation of this kind is exhibited in the *Cid* of Corneille.

Don

Don Diegue, an old ſoldier worn out with age, having received a mortal affront from the Count father to Chimene, employs his ſon Don Rodrigue, Chimene's lover, to demand ſatisfaction. This ſituation occaſions in the breaſt of Don Rodrigue a cruel ſtruggle. It is a conteſt betwixt love and honour, one of which muſt be ſacrificed. The ſcene is finely conducted, chiefly by making love in ſome degree take part with honour, Don Rodrigue reflecting, that if he loſt his honour he could not deſerve his miſtreſs. Honour triumphs. The Count, provoked to a ſingle combat, falls by the hand of Don Rodrigue.

This produceth another beautiful ſituation reſpecting Chimene, which for the ſake of connection is placed here, though it properly belongs to the foregoing head. It became the duty of that lady to demand juſtice againſt her lover, for whoſe preſervation, in other circumſtances, ſhe chearfully would have ſacrificed her own life. The ſtruggle betwixt theſe oppoſite paſſions directed upon the ſame object, is finely expreſſed in the third ſcene of the third act.

Elvire.

Elvire. Il vous prive d'un pére, et vous l'aimez encore!

Chimene. C'eſt peu de dire aimer, Elvire, je l'adore;
Ma paſſion s'oppoſe à mon reſſentiment,
Dedans mon ennemi je trouve mon amant,
Et je ſens qu'en depit de toute ma colére,
Rodrigue dans mon cœur combat encore mon pére.
Il l'attaque, il le preſſe, il céde, il ſe défend,
Tantôt fort, tantôt foible, et tantôt triomphant;
Mais en ce dur combat de colére et de flame,
Il déchire mon cœur ſans partager mon ame,
Et quoique mon amour ait ſur moi de pouvoir,
Je ne conſulte point pour ſuivre mon devoir.
Je cours ſans balancer où mon honneur m'oblige;
Rodrigue m'eſt bien cher, ſon interêt m'afflige,
Mon cœur prend ſon parti; mais malgré ſon effort,
Je ſai ce que je ſuis, et que mon pére eſt mort.

Not leſs when the objects are different than when the ſame, are means ſometimes afforded to gratify both paſſions; and ſuch means are greedily embraced. In Taſſo's *Geruſalem*, Edward and Gildippe, huſband and wife, are introduced fighting gallantly againſt the Saracens. Gildippe receives a mortal wound by the hand of Soliman. Edward inflamed with revenge as well as concern

cern for Gildippe, is agitated betwixt the two different objects. The poet * deſcribes him endeavouring to gratify both at once, applying his right hand againſt Soliman the object of his reſentment, and his left hand to ſupport his wife the object of his love.

PART V.

The power of paſſion to adjuſt our opinions and belief to its gratification.

THere is ſuch a connection among the perceptions paſſions and actions of the ſame perſon, that it would be wonderful if they ſhould have no mutual influence. That our actions are too much directed by paſſion, is a ſad truth. It is not leſs certain, though not ſo commonly obſerved, that paſſion hath an irregular influence upon our opinions and belief. The opinions we form of men and things, are generally directed by affection. An advice given by a man of figure, hath great weight; the

* Canto 20. ſt. 97.

ſame

ſame advice from one in a low condition, is utterly neglected. A man of courage under-rates danger; and to the indolent, the ſlighteſt obſtacle appears unſurmountable. Our opinions indeed, the reſult commonly of various and often oppoſite views, are ſo ſlight and wavering, as readily to be ſuſceptible of a bias from paſſion and prejudice.

This ſubject is of great uſe in logic; and of ſtill greater uſe in criticiſm, being intimately connected with many principles of the fine arts that will be unfolded in the courſe of this work. Being too extenſive to be treated here at large, ſome curſory illuſtrations muſt ſuffice; leaving the ſubject to be proſecuted more particularly afterward when occaſion ſhall offer.

Two principles that make an eminent figure in human nature, concur to give paſſion an undue influence upon our opinions and belief. The firſt and moſt extenſive, is a ſtrong tendency in the mind to fit objects for the gratification of its paſſions. We are prone to ſuch opinions of men and things as correſpond to our wiſhes. Where the object, in dignity or importance, cor-

reſponds

reſponds to the paſſion beſtowed on it, the gratification is complete and there is no occaſion for artifice. But where the object is too mean for the paſſion ſo as not to afford a complete gratification, it is wonderful how apt the mind is to impoſe upon itſelf, and how diſpoſed to proportion the object to its paſſion. The other principle is a ſtrong tendency in our nature to juſtify our paſſions as well as our actions, not to others only, but even to ourſelves. This tendency is extremely remarkable with reſpect to diſagreeable paſſions. By its influence, objects are magnified or leſſened, circumſtances ſupplied or ſuppreſſed, every thing coloured and diſguiſed, to anſwer the end of juſtification. Hence the foundation of ſelf-deceit, where a man impoſes upon himſelf innocently, and even without ſuſpicion of a bias.

Beſide the influence of the foregoing principles to make us form opinions contrary to truth, the paſſions themſelves, by ſubordinate means, contribute to the ſame effect. Of theſe means I ſhall mention two which ſeem to be capital. Firſt, There was occa-

ſion formerly to obſerve *, that though ideas ſeldom ſtart up in the mind without connection, yet that ideas which correſpond to the preſent tone of the mind are readily ſuggeſted by any ſlight connection. By this means, the arguments for a favourite opinion are always at hand, while we often ſearch in vain for thoſe that croſs our inclination. Second, The mind taking delight in agreeable circumſtances or arguments, is ſtrongly impreſſed with them; while thoſe that are diſagreeable are hurried over ſo as ſcarce to make any impreſſion. The ſelf-ſame argument, accordingly as it is reliſhed or not reliſhed, weighs ſo differently, as in truth to make conviction depend more on paſſion than on reaſoning. This obſervation is fully juſtified by experience. To confine myſelf to a ſingle inſtance, the numberleſs abſurd religious tenets that at different times have peſtered the world, would be altogether unaccountable but for this irregular bias of paſſion.

We proceed to a more pleaſant taſk,

* Chap. I.

which

which is, to illuſtrate the foregoing obſervations by proper examples. Gratitude when warm, is often exerted upon the children of the benefactor; eſpecially where he is removed out of reach by death or abſence *. Gratitude in this caſe being exerted for the ſake of the benefactor, requires no peculiar excellence in his children. To find however theſe children worthy of the benefits intended them, contributes undoubtedly to the more entire gratification of the paſſion. And accordingly, the mind, prone to gratify its paſſions, is apt to conceive a better opinion of theſe children than poſſibly they deſerve. By this means, ſtrong connections of affection are often formed among individuals, upon the ſlight foundation now mentioned.

Envy is a paſſion, which, being altogether unjuſtifiable, is always diſguiſed under ſome more plauſible name. But no paſſion is more eager than envy, to give its object ſuch an appearance as to anſwer a complete gratification. It magnifies every bad quali-

* See part 1. ſect. 1. of the preſent chapter.

ty, and fixes on the moſt humbling circumſtances.

Caſſius. I cannot tell what you and other men
Think of this life; but for my ſingle ſelf,
I had as lief not be, as live to be
In awe of ſuch a thing as I myſelf.
I was born free as Cæſar, ſo were you;
We both have fed as well; and we can both
Endure the winter's cold as well as he.
For once, upon a raw and guſty day,
The troubled Tyber chafing with his ſhores,
Cæſar ſays to me, Dar'ſt thou, Caſſius, now
Leap in with me into this angry flood,
And ſwim to yonder point? — Upon the word,
Accoutred as I was, I plunged in,
And bid him follow; ſo indeed he did.
The torrent roar'd, and we did buffet it
With luſty ſinews; throwing it aſide,
And ſtemming it with hearts of controverſy.
But ere we could arrive the point propos'd,
Cæſar cry'd, Help me, Caſſius, or I ſink.
I, as Æneas, our great anceſtor,
Did from the flames of Troy upon his ſhoulder
The old Anchiſes bear; ſo from the waves of Tyber
Did I the tired Cæſar: and this man
Is now become a god, and Caſſius is

A wretched creature; and muſt bend his body,
If Cæſar careleſsly but nod on him.
He had a fever when he was in Spain,
And when the fit was on him, I did mark
How he did ſhake. 'Tis true, this god did ſhake;
His coward lips did from their colour fly,
And that ſame eye whoſe bend doth awe the world,
Did loſe its luſtre; I did hear him grone:
Ay, and that tongue of his, that bade the Romans
Mark him, and write his ſpeeches in their books,
Alas! it cry'd —— Give me ſome drink, Titinius ——
As a ſick girl. Ye gods, it doth amaze me,
A man of ſuch a feeble temper ſhould
So get the ſtart of the majeſtic world,
And bear the palm alone.

Julius Cæſar, act 1. *ſc.* 3.

Glo'ſter inflamed with reſentment againſt his ſon Edgar, could even work himſelf into a momentary conviction that they were not related.

O ſtrange faſten'd villain!
Would he deny his letter?—I never got him.

King Lear, act 2. *ſc.* 3.

When by a great ſenſibility of heart or other

other means, grief ſwells beyond what the cauſe can juſtify, the mind is prone to magnify the cauſe, in order to gratify the paſſion. And if the real cauſe admit not of being magnified, the mind ſeeks a cauſe for its grief in imagined future events.

Buſhy. Madam, your Majeſty is much too ſad:
You promis'd, when you parted with the King,
To lay aſide ſelf-harming heavineſs,
And entertain a chearful diſpoſition.

Queen. To pleaſe the King, I did; to pleaſe myſelf,
I cannot do it. Yet I know no cauſe
Why I ſhould welcome ſuch a gueſt as grief;
Save bidding farewell to ſo ſweet a gueſt
As my ſweet Richard: yet again, methinks,
Some unborn ſorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb,
Is coming tow'rd me; and my inward ſoul
With ſomething trembles, yet at nothing grieves,
More than with parting from my Lord the King.

Richard II. *act.* 2. *ſc.* 5.

The foregoing examples depend on the firſt principle. In the following, both principles concur. Reſentment at firſt is wreaked on the relations of the offender, in order

der to puniſh him. But as reſentment when ſo outrageous is contrary to conſcience, the mind, to juſtify its paſſion as well as to gratify it, is diſpoſed to paint theſe relations in the blackeſt colours; and it actually comes to be convinced, that they ought to be puniſhed for their own demerits.

Anger raiſed by an accidental ſtroke upon a tender part, which gives great and ſudden pain, is ſometimes vented upon the undeſigning cauſe. But as the paſſion in this caſe is abſurd, and as there can be no ſolid gratification in puniſhing the innocent; the mind, prone to juſtify as well as to gratify its paſſion, deludes itſelf inſtantly into a conviction of the action's being voluntary. This conviction however is but momentary: the firſt reflection ſhows it to be erroneous; and the paſſion vaniſheth almoſt inſtantaneouſly with the conviction. But anger, the moſt violent of all paſſions, has ſtill greater influence. It ſometimes forces the mind to perſonify a ſtock or a ſtone when it occaſions bodily pain, in order to be a proper object of reſentment. A conception

ception is formed of it as a voluntary agent. And that we have really a momentary conviction of its being a voluntary agent, muſt be evident from conſidering, that without ſuch conviction, the paſſion can neither be juſtified nor gratified. The imagination can give no aid. A ſtock or a ſtone may be imagined ſenſible; but a notion of this kind cannot be the foundation of puniſhment, ſo long as the mind is conſcious that it is an imagination merely without any reality. Of ſuch perſonification, involving a conviction of reality, there is one illuſtrious inſtance. When the firſt bridge of boats over the Helleſpont was deſtroyed by a ſtorm, Xerxes fell into a tranſport of rage, ſo exceſſive, that he commanded the ſea to be puniſhed with 300 ſtripes; and a pair of fetters to be thrown into it, enjoining the following words to be pronounced. "O thou ſalt and bitter water! thy maſter "hath condemned thee to this puniſhment "for offending him without cauſe; and is "reſolved to paſs over thee in deſpite of thy "inſolence. With reaſon all men neglect

"to

" to ſacrifice to thee, becauſe thou art " both diſagreeable and treacherous *."

Shakeſpear exhibits beautiful examples of the irregular influence of paſſion in making us conceive things to be otherwiſe than they are. King Lear, in his diſtreſs, perſonifies the rain, wind, and thunder; and in order to juſtify his reſentment, conceives them to be taking part with his daughters.

Lear. Rumble thy belly-full, ſpit fire, ſpout rain!
Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire, are my daughters.
I tax not you, you elements, with unkindneſs;
I never gave you kingdom, call'd you children;
You owe me no ſubſcription. Then let fall
Your horrible pleaſure.—— Here I ſtand, your brave;
A poor, infirm, weak, and deſpis'd old man!
But yet I call you ſervile miniſters,
That have with two pernicious daughters join'd
Your high engender'd battles, 'gainſt a head
So old and white as this. Oh! oh! 'tis foul.

Act 3. *ſc.* 2.

King Richard, full of indignation againſt

* Herodotus, book 7.

his favourite horſe for ſuffering Bolingbroke to ride him, conceives for a moment the horſe to be rational.

Groom. O, how it yearn'd my heart, when I beheld,
In London ſtreets, that coronation-day;
When Bolingbroke rode on Roan Barbary,
That horſe that thou ſo often haſt beſtrid,
That horſe that I ſo carefully have dreſs'd.
K. Rich. Rode he on Barbary? tell me, gentle friend,
How went he under him?
Groom. So proudly as he had diſdain'd the ground.
K. Rich. So proud that Bolingbroke was on his back!
That jade had eat bread from my royal hand.
This hand hath made him proud with clapping him.
Would he not ſtumble? would he not fall down,
(Since pride muſt have a fall), and break the neck
Of that proud man that did uſurp his back?

Richard II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 11.

Hamlet, ſwelled with indignation at his mother's ſecond marriage, is ſtrongly inclined to leſſen the time of her widowhood; becauſe this circumſtance gratified his paſſion;

ſion; and he deludes himſelf by degrees into the opinion of an interval ſhorter than the real one.

Hamlet. ——————That it ſhould come to this!
But two months dead! nay, not ſo much; not two;—
So excellent a King, that was, to this,
Hyperion to a ſatire: ſo loving to my mother,
That he permitted not the wind of heav'n
Viſit her face too roughly. Heav'n and earth!
Muſt I remember — why, ſhe would hang on him,
As if increaſe of appetite had grown
By what it fed on; yet, within a month,——
Let me not think— Frailty, thy name is *Woman!*
A little month! or ere thoſe ſhoes were old,
With which ſhe follow'd my poor father's body,
Like Niobe, all tears——Why, ſhe, ev'n ſhe —
(O heav'n! a beaſt that wants diſcourſe of reaſon,
Would have mourn'd longer—) married with mine uncle,
My father's brother; but no more like my father,
Than I to Hercules. Within a month!——
Ere yet the ſalt of moſt unrighteous tears
Had left the fluſhing in her gauled eyes,
She married.—— Oh, moſt wicked ſpeed, to poſt
With ſuch dexterity to inceſtuous ſheets!

It is not, nor it cannot come to good.
But break, my heart, for I muſt hold my tongue.
Act 1. *ſc.* 3.

The power of paſſion to falſify the computation of time, is the more remarkable, that time, which hath an accurate meaſure, is leſs obſequious to our deſires and wiſhes, than objects which have no preciſe ſtandard of leſs or more.

Even belief, though partly an act of the judgment, may be influenced by paſſion. Good news are greedily ſwallowed upon very ſlender evidence. Our wiſhes magnify the probability of the event as well as the veracity of the relater; and we believe as certain what at beſt is doubtful.

Quel, che l' huom vede, amor li fa inviſibile
E l' inviſibil fa veder amore.
Queſto creduto fu, che'l miſer ſuole
Dar facile credenza a' quel, che vuole.
Orland. Furioſ. cant. 1. *ſt.* 56.

For the ſame reaſon, bad news gain alſo credit upon the ſlighteſt evidence. Fear, if once alarmed, has the ſame effect with hope

hope to magnify every circumſtance that tends to conviction. Shakeſpear, who ſhows more knowledge of human nature than any of our philoſophers, hath in his *Cymbeline* * repreſented this bias of the mind: for he makes the perſon who alone was affected with the bad news, yield to evidence that did not convince any of his companions. And Othello † is convinced of his wife's infidelity from circumſtances too ſlight to move an indifferent perſon.

If the news intereſt us in ſo low a degree as to give place to reaſon, the effect will not be quite the ſame. Judging of the probability or improbability of the ſtory, the mind ſettles in a rational conviction either that it is true or not. But even in this caſe, it is obſervable, that the mind is not allowed to reſt in that degree of conviction which is produced by rational evidence. If the news be in any degree favourable, our belief is augmented by hope beyond its true pitch; and if unfavourable, by fear.

* Act 2. ſc. 6.
† Act 3. ſc. 8.

The

The obſervation holds equally with reſpect to future events. If a future event be either much wiſhed or dreaded, the mind, to gratify its paſſion, never fails to augment the probability beyond truth.

The credit which in all ages has been given to wonders and prodigies, even the moſt abſurd and ridiculous, is a ſtrange phenomenon. Nothing can be more evident than the following propoſition, That the more ſingular any event is, the more evidence is required. A familiar event daily occurring, being in itſelf extremely probable, finds ready credit, and therefore is vouched by the ſlighteſt evidence. But a ſtrange and rare event, contrary to the courſe of nature, ought not to be eaſily believed. It ſtarts up without connection, and without cauſe, ſo far as we can diſcover; and to overcome the improbability of ſuch an event, the very ſtrongeſt evidence is required. It is certain, however, that wonders and prodigies are ſwallowed by the vulgar, upon evidence that would not be ſufficient to aſcertain the moſt familiar occurrence. It has been reckoned difficult to

explain

explain this irregular bias of the mind. We are now no longer at a loſs about its cauſe. The proneneſs we have to gratify our paſſions, which diſplays itſelf upon ſo many occaſions, produces this irrational belief. A ſtory of ghoſts or fairies, told with an air of gravity and truth, raiſeth an emotion of wonder, and perhaps of dread. Theſe emotions tending ſtrongly to their own gratification, impoſe upon a weak mind, and impreſs upon it a thorough conviction contrary to all ſenſe and reaſon.

Opinion and belief are influenced by propenſity as well as by paſſion; for the mind is diſpoſed to gratify both. A natural propenſity is all we have to convince us, that the operations of nature are uniform. Influenced by this propenſity, we often raſhly conceive, that good or bad weather will never have an end; and in natural philoſophy, writers, influenced by the ſame propenſity, ſtretch commonly their analogical reaſonings beyond juſt bounds.

Opinion and belief are influenced by affection as well as by propenſity. The noted

ted ſtory of a fine lady and a curate viewing the moon through a teleſcope is a pleaſant illuſtration. I perceive, ſays the lady, two ſhadows inclining to each other, they are certainly two happy lovers. Not at all, replies the curate, they are two ſteeples of a cathedral.

APPENDIX to Part V.

Concerning the methods which nature hath afforded for computing time and ſpace.

I Introduce here the ſubject propoſed, becauſe it affords ſeveral curious examples of the power of paſſion to adjuſt objects to its gratification; a leſſon that cannot be too much inculcated, as there is not perhaps another bias in human nature that hath an influence ſo univerſal, and that is ſo apt to make us wander from truth as well as from juſtice.

I begin with time; and the queſtion ſhortly is, What was the meaſure of time before artificial meaſures were invented? and,

and, What is the meaſure at preſent when theſe are not at hand? I ſpeak not of months and days, which we compute by the moon and ſun; but of hours, or in general of the time that runs betwixt any two occurrences when there is not acceſs to the ſun. The only natural meaſure we have, is the train of our thoughts; and we always judge the time to be long or ſhort, in proportion to the number of perceptions that have paſſed through the mind during that interval. This is indeed a very imperfect meaſure; becauſe in the different conditions of a quick or ſlow ſucceſſion, the computation is different. But however imperfect, it is the only meaſure by which a perſon naturally calculates time; and this meaſure is applied on all occaſions, without regard to any occaſional variation in the rate of ſucceſſion.

This natural meaſure of time, imperfect as it is, would however be tolerable, did it labour under no other imperfection than the ordinary variations that happen in the motion of our perceptions. But in many particular circumſtances, it is much more fallacious;

and in order to explain theſe diſtinctly, I muſt analize the ſubject. Time is generally computed at two different periods; one while time is paſſing, another after it is paſt. I ſhall conſider theſe ſeparately, with the errors to which each of them is liable. It will be found that theſe errors often produce very different computations of the ſame period of time. The computation of time while it is paſſing, comes firſt in order. It is a common and trite obſervation, That to lovers abſence appears immeaſurably long, every minute an hour, and every hour a day. The ſame computation is made in every caſe where we long for a diſtant event; as where one is in expectation of good news, or where a profligate heir watches for the death of an old man who keeps him from a great eſtate. Oppoſite to theſe are inſtances not fewer in number. To a criminal the interval betwixt ſentence and execution appears miſerably ſhort; and the ſame holds in every caſe where one dreads an approaching event. Of this even a ſchoolboy can bear witneſs: the hour allowed him for play, moves, in his apprehenſion, with a very ſwift pace: before

fore he is thoroughly engaged, the hour is gone. A reckoning founded on the number of ideas, will never produce computations ſo regularly oppoſite to each other; for a ſlow ſucceſſion of ideas is not connected with our wiſhes, nor a quick ſucceſſion with our fears. What is it then, that, in the caſes mentioned, moves nature to deſert her common meaſure for one very different? I know not that this queſtion ever has been reſolved. The falſe reckonings I have ſuggeſted are ſo common and familiar, that no writer has thought of inquiring for their cauſe. And indeed, to enter upon this matter at ſhort hand, without preparation, might occaſion ſome difficulty. But to encounter the difficulty, we luckily are prepared by what is ſaid above about the power of paſſion to fit objects for its gratification. Among the other circumſtances that terrify a condemned criminal, the ſhort time he has to live is one. Terror, like our other paſſions, prone to its gratification, adjuſts every one of theſe circumſtances to its own tone. It magnifies in particular the ſhortneſs of the interval betwixt the preſent time

and that of the execution; and forces upon the criminal a conviction that the hour of his death approaches with a ſwift pace. In the ſame manner, among the other diſtreſſes of an abſent lover, the time of ſeparation is a capital circumſtance, which for that reaſon is greatly magnified by his anxiety and impatience. He imagines that the time of meeting comes on very ſlow, or rather that it will never come. Every minute is thought of an intolerable length. Here is a fair and I hope ſatisfactory account, why we reckon time to be tedious when we long for a future event, and not leſs fleet when we dread the event. This account is confirmed by other inſtances. Bodily pain fixt to one part, produceth a ſlow train of perceptions, which, according to the common meaſure of time, ought to make it appear ſhort. Yet we know, that in ſuch a ſtate time has the oppoſite appearance. Bodily pain is always attended with a degree of impatience and an anxiety to be rid of it, which make us judge every minute to be an hour. The ſame holds where the pain ſhifts from place to place; but not ſo remarkably, becauſe ſuch

a pain is not attended with the ſame degree of impatience. The impatience a man hath in travelling through a barren country or in bad roads, makes him imagine, during the journey, that time goes on with a very ſlow pace. We ſhall ſhow afterward that he makes a very different computation when his journey is at an end.

How ought it to ſtand with a man who apprehends bad news? It will probably be thought, that the caſe of this man reſembles that of a criminal, who, in reckoning the ſhort time he has to live, imagines every hour to be but a minute, and that time flies ſwift away. Yet the computation here is directly oppoſite. Reflecting upon this difficulty, there appears one capital circumſtance in which the two caſes differ. The fate of the criminal is determined: in the caſe under conſideration, the man is ſtill in ſuſpenſe. Every one knows how diſtreſsful ſuſpenſe is to the bulk of mankind. Such diſtreſs we wiſh to get rid of at any rate, even at the expence of bad news. This caſe therefore, upon a more narrow inſpection, reſembles that of bodily pain.

The

The preſent diſtreſs in both caſes, makes the time appear extremely tedious.

The reader probably will not be diſpleaſed, to have this branch of the ſubject illuſtrated in a pleaſant manner, by an author acquainted with every maze of the human heart, and who beſtows ineffable grace and ornament upon every ſubject he handles.

Roſalinda. I pray you, what is't a clock?

Orlando. You ſhould aſk me, what time o' day; there's no clock in the foreſt.

Roſ. Then there is no true lover in the foreſt; elſe, ſighing every minute, and groaning every hour, would detect the lazy foot of Time, as well as a clock.

Orla. Why not the ſwift foot of Time? Had not that been as proper?

Roſ. By no means, Sir. Time travels in diverſe paces with diverſe perſons. I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he ſtands ſtill withal.

Orla. I pr'y thee whom doth he trot withal?

Roſ. Marry, he trots hard with a young maid, between the contract of her marriage, and the day it is ſolemnized: if the interim be but a ſe'en-

night,

night, Time's pace is ſo hard that it ſeems the length of ſeven years.

Orla. Who ambles Time withal?

Roſ. With a prieſt that lacks Latin, and a rich man that hath not the gout: for the one ſleeps eaſily, becauſe he cannot ſtudy; and the other lives merrily, becauſe he feels no pain: the one lacking the burden of lean and waſteful learning; the other knowing no burthen of heavy tedious penury. Theſe Time ambles withal.

Orla. Whom doth he gallop withal?

Roſ. With a thief to the gallows: for though he go as ſoftly as foot can fall, he thinks himſelf too ſoon there.

Orla. Whom ſtays it ſtill withall?

Roſ. With lawyers in the vacation; for they ſleep between term and term, and then they perceive not how Time moves.

As you like it, act 3. ſc. 8.

Reflecting upon the natural method of computing preſent time, it ſhows how far from truth we may be led by the irregular power of paſſion. Nor are our eyes immediately opened when the ſcene is paſt: the deception continues while there remain any traces of the paſſion. But looking back upon paſt time when the joy or diſtreſs is no longer

longer remembered, the computation we make is very different. In this ſituation, paſſion being out of the queſtion, we apply the ordinary meaſure, *viz.* the courſe of our perceptions; and I ſhall now proceed to the errors that this meaſure is ſubjected to. In order to have an accurate notion of this matter, we muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt a train of perceptions, and a train of ideas. Real objects make a ſtrong impreſſion, and are faithfully remembered. Ideas, on the contrary, however entertaining at the time, are apt to eſcape an after recollection. Hence it is, that in retroſpection, the time that was employed upon real objects, appears longer than the time that was employed upon ideas. The former are more accurately recollected than the latter; and we meaſure the time by the number that is recollected. I proceed to particulars. After finiſhing a journey through a populous country, the frequency of agreeable objects diſtinctly recollected by the traveller, makes the time ſpent in the journey appear to him longer than it was in reality. This is chiefly remarkable in a firſt journey, where every

object

object is new and makes a ſtrong impreſſion. On the other hand, after finiſhing a journey through a barren country thinly peopled, the time appears ſhort, being meaſured by the number of objects, which were few and far from intereſting. Here in both inſtances a reckoning is brought out, directly oppoſite to that made during the journey. And this, by the way, ſerves to account for a thing which may appear ſingular, that in a barren country the computed miles are always longer, than near the capital, where the country is rich and populous. The traveller has no natural meaſure of the ſpace gone through, other than the time beſtowed upon it; nor any natural meaſure of the time, other than the number of his perceptions. Theſe being proportioned to the number of viſible objects, he imagines that he hath conſumed more time on his day's journey, and accompliſhed a greater number of miles, in a populous than in a waſte country. By this method of calculation, every computed mile in the former muſt in reality be ſhorter than in the latter.

Again, the travelling with an agreeable

companion produceth a ſhort computation both of the road and of time; eſpecially if there be few objects that demand attention, or if the objects be familiar. The caſe is the ſame of young people at a ball, or of a joyous company over a bottle. The ideas with which they have been entertained, being tranſitory, eſcape the memory. After all is over, they reflect that they have been much diverted, but ſcarce can ſay about what.

When one is totally occupied in any agreeable work that admits not many objects, time runs on without obſervation; and upon an after recollection muſt appear ſhort, in proportion to the paucity of objects. This is ſtill more remarkable in cloſe contemplation and in deep thinking, where the train, compoſed wholly of ideas, proceeds with an extreme ſlow pace. Not only are the ideas few in number, but are apt to eſcape an after-reckoning. The like falſe reckoning of time may proceed from an oppoſite ſtate of mind. In a reverie, where ideas float at random without making any impreſſion, time goes on unheeded and the

reckoning

reckoning is loſt. A reverie may be ſo profound as to prevent the recollection of any one idea: that the mind was buſied in a train of thinking, will in general be remembered; but what was the ſubject, has quite eſcaped the memory. In ſuch a caſe, we are altogether at a loſs about the time: we have no *data* for making a computation. No cauſe produceth ſo falſe a reckoning of time, as immoderate grief. The mind, in this ſtate, is violently attached to a ſingle object, and admits not a different thought. Any other object breaking in, is inſtantly baniſhed, ſo as ſcarce to give an appearance of ſucceſſion. In a reverie, we are uncertain of the time that is paſt: but in the example now given, there is an appearance of certainty, ſo far as the natural meaſure of time can be truſted, that the time muſt have been ſhort, when the perceptions are ſo few in number.

The natural meaſure of ſpace appears more obſcure than that of time. I venture however to enter upon it, leaving it to be further proſecuted, if it be thought of any importance.

The ſpace marked out for a houſe, appears conſiderably larger after it is divided into its proper parts. A piece of ground appears larger after it is ſurrounded with a fence; and ſtill larger when it is made a garden and divided into different copartments.

On the contrary, a large plain looks leſs after it is divided into parts. The ſea muſt be excepted, which looks leſs from that very circumſtance of not being divided into parts.

A room of a moderate ſize appears larger when properly furniſhed. But when a very large room is furniſhed, I doubt whether it be not leſſened in appearance.

A room of a moderate ſize, looks leſs by having a ceiling lower than in proportion. The ſame low ceiling makes a very large room look larger than it is in reality.

Theſe experiments are by far too ſmall a ſtock for a general theory. But they are all that occur at preſent; and without attempting any regular ſyſtem, I ſhall ſatisfy myſelf with a few conjectures.

The largeſt angle of viſion ſeems to me the

the natural meaſure of ſpace. The eye is the only judge; and in examining with it the ſize of any plain, or the length of any line, the moſt accurate method that can be taken is, to run over the object in parts. The largeſt part that can be taken in at one ſtedfaſt look, determines the largeſt angle of viſion; and when that angle is given, one may inſtitute a calculation by trying with the eye how many of theſe parts are in the whole.

Whether this angle be the ſame in all men, I know not. The ſmalleſt angle of viſion is aſcertained; and to aſcertain the largeſt angle, would not be leſs curious.

But ſuppoſing it known, it would be a very imperfect meaſure; perhaps more ſo than the natural meaſure of time. It requires great ſteadineſs of eye to meaſure a line with any accuracy, by applying to it the largeſt angle of diſtinct viſion. And ſuppoſe this ſteadineſs to be acquired by practice, the meaſure will be imperfect from other circumſtances. The ſpace comprehended under this angle, will be different according to the diſtance, and alſo according to the ſituation of the object.

ject. Of a perpendicular this angle will comprehend the ſmalleſt ſpace. The ſpace will be larger in looking upon an inclined plain; and will be larger or leſs in proportion to the degree of inclination.

This meaſure of ſpace, like the meaſure of time, is liable to ſome extraordinary errors from certain operations of the mind, which will account for ſome of the erroneous judgements above mentioned. The ſpace marked out for a dwelling-houſe, where the eye is at any reaſonable diſtance, is ſeldom greater than can be ſeen at once without moving the head. Divide this ſpace into two or three equal parts, and none of theſe parts will appear much leſs than what can be comprehended at one diſtinct look; conſequently each of them will appear equal, or nearly equal, to what the whole did before the diviſion. If, on the other hand, the whole be very ſmall, ſo as ſcarce to fill the eye at one look, its diviſions into parts will, I conjecture, make it appear ſtill leſs. The minuteneſs of the parts is, by an eaſy tranſition of ideas, transferred to the whole. Each part hath a diminutive appearance, and by the

the intimate connection of theſe parts with the whole, we paſs the ſame judgement upon all.

The ſpace marked out for a ſmall garden, is ſurveyed almoſt at one view; and requires a motion of the eye ſo ſlight, as to paſs for an object that can be comprehended under the largeſt angle of diſtinct viſion. If not divided into too many parts, we are apt to form the ſame judgement of each part; and conſequently to magnify the garden in proportion to the number of its parts.

A very large plain without protuberances, is an object not leſs rare than beautiful; and in thoſe who ſee it for the firſt time, it muſt produce an emotion of wonder. This emotion, however ſlight, tending to its own gratification, impoſes upon the mind, and makes it judge that the plain is larger than it is in reality. Divide this plain into parts, and our wonder ceaſes. It is no longer conſidered as one great plain, but as ſo many different fields or incloſures.

The firſt time one beholds the ſea, it appears to be large beyond all bounds. When

it

it becomes familiar, and raiſes our wonder in no degree, it appears leſs than it is in reality. In a ſtorm it appears larger, being diſtinguiſhable by the rolling waves into a number of great parts. Iſlands ſcattered at conſiderable diſtances, add in appearance to its ſize. Each intercepted part looks extremely large, and we ſilently apply arithmetic to increaſe the appearance of the whole. Many iſlands ſcattered at hand, give a diminutive appearance to the ſea, by its connection with its diminutive parts. The Lomond lake would undoubtedly look larger without its iſlands.

Furniture increaſeth in appearance the ſize of a ſmall room, for the ſame reaſon that diviſions increaſe in appearance the ſize of a garden. The emotion of wonder which is raiſed by a very large room without furniture, makes it look larger than it is in reality. If completely furniſhed, we view it in parts, and our wonder is not raiſed.

A low ceiling hath a diminutive appearance, which, by an eaſy tranſition of ideas, is communicated to the length and breadth, provided they bear any ſort of proportion to the

the height. If they be out of all proportion, the oppoſition ſeizes the mind, and raiſes ſome degree of wonder, which makes the difference appear greater than it really is.

PART VI.

Of the reſemblance emotions bear to their cauſes.

That many emotions bear a certain reſemblance to their cauſes, is a truth that can be made clear by induction; though, ſo far as I know, the obſervation has not been made by any writer. Motion, in its different circumſtances, is productive of feelings that reſemble it. Sluggiſh motion, for example, cauſeth a languid unpleaſant feeling; ſlow uniform motion, a feeling calm and pleaſant; and briſk motion, a lively feeling that rouſes the ſpirits and promotes activity. A fall of water through rocks, raiſes in the mind a tumultuous confuſed agitation, extremely ſimilar to its

cauſe. When force is exerted with any effort, the ſpectator feels a ſimilar effort as of force exerted within his mind. A large object ſwells the heart. An elevated object makes the ſpectator ſtand erect.

Sounds alſo produce emotions that reſemble them. A ſound in a low key, brings down the mind. Such a ſound in a full tone, hath a certain ſolemnity, which it communicates to the emotion produced by it. A ſound in a high key, chears the mind by raiſing it. Such a ſound in a full tone, both elevates and ſwells the mind.

Again, a wall or pillar that declines from the perpendicular, produceth a painful emotion, as of a tottering and falling within the mind. An emotion ſomewhat ſimilar is produced by a tall pillar that ſtands ſo tickliſh as to look like falling. For this reaſon, a column upon a baſe looks better than upon the naked ground. The baſe, which makes a part of the column, inſpires a feeling of firmneſs and ſtability. The ground ſupporting a naked column, is too large to be conſidered as its baſe. And for the ſame reaſon, a cube as a baſe, is preferred before

a cylinder, though the latter is a more beautiful figure. The angles of a cube, being extended to a greater diſtance from the centre than the circumference of a cylinder, give the column a greater appearance of ſtability. This excludes not a different reaſon, that the baſe, ſhaft, and capital, of a pillar, ought, for the ſake of variety, to differ from each other. If the ſhaft be round, the baſe and capital ought to be ſquare.

A conſtrained poſture, uneaſy to the man himſelf, is diſagreeable to the ſpectator; which makes it a rule in painting, that the drapery ought not to adhere to the body, but hang looſe, that the figures may appear eaſy and free in their movements. Hence the diſagreeable figure of a French dancing-maſter is one of Hogarth's pieces. It is alſo ridiculous, becauſe the conſtraint is aſſumed and not forced.

The foregoing obſervation is not confined to emotions raiſed by ſtill life. It holds alſo in thoſe which are raiſed by the qualities, actions, and paſſions, of a ſenſible being. Love inſpired by a fine woman, aſſumes her qualities. It is ſublime, ſoft, ten-

der, ſevere, or gay, according to its cauſe. This is ſtill more remarkable in emotions raiſed by human actions. It hath already been remarked *, that any ſignal inſtance of gratitude, beſide procuring eſteem for the author, raiſeth in the ſpectator a vague emotion of gratitude, which diſpoſeth him to be grateful. I now further remark, that this vague emotion, being of the ſame kind with what produced the grateful action, hath a ſtrong reſemblance to its cauſe. Courage exerted inſpires the reader as well as the ſpectator with a like emotion of courage. A juſt action fortifies our love to juſtice, and a generous action rouſes our generoſity. In ſhort, with reſpect to all virtuous actions, it will be found by induction, that they lead us to imitation by inſpiring emotions reſembling the paſſions that produced theſe actions. And hence the benefit of dealing in choice books and in choice company.

Grief as well as joy are infectious: the emotions they raiſe in a ſpectator reſemble

* Part 1. of this chapter, ſect. 3.

them

them perfectly. Fear is equally infectious: and hence in an army, fear, even from the ſlighteſt cauſe, making an impreſſion on a few, ſpreads generally through all, and becomes an univerſal panic. Pity is ſimilar to its cauſe. A parting ſcene betwixt lovers or friends, produceth in the ſpectator a ſort of pity, which is tender like the diſtreſs. The anguiſh of remorſe, produceth pity of a harſh kind; and if the remorſe be extreme, the pity hath a mixture of horror. Anger I think is ſingular; for even where it is moderate and cauſeth no diſguſt, it diſpoſes not the ſpectator to anger in any degree *. Covetouſneſs, cruelty, treachery, and other vicious paſſions, are ſo far from raiſing any emotion ſimilar to themſelves, to incite a ſpectator to imitation, that they have an oppoſite effect. They raiſe abhorrence, and fortify the ſpectator in his averſion to ſuch actions. When anger is immoderate, it cannot fail to produce the ſame effect.

* Ariſtotle, poet. cap. 18. § 3. ſays, that anger raiſeth in the ſpectator a ſimilar emotion of anger.

PART

PART VII.

Final cauſes of the more frequent emotions and paſſions.

IT is a law in our nature, that we never act but by the impulſe of deſire; which in other words is ſaying, that it is paſſion, by the deſire included in it, which determines the will. Hence in the conduct of life, it is of the utmoſt importance, that our paſſions be directed upon proper objects, tend to juſt and rational ends, and with relation to each other be duly balanced. The beauty of contrivance, ſo conſpicuous in the human frame, is not confined to the rational part of our nature, but is viſible over the whole. Concerning the paſſions in particular, however irregular, headſtrong, and perverſe, in an overly view, they may appear, I propoſe to ſhow, that they are by nature adjuſted and tempered with admirable wiſdom, for the good of ſociety as well as for private good. This

This ſubject is extenſive: but as the nature of the preſent undertaking will not admit a complete diſcuſſion, it ſhall ſuffice to give a few obſervations in general upon the ſenſitive part of our nature, without regarding that ſtrange irregularity of paſſion diſcovered in ſome individuals. Such topical irregularities, if I may uſe the term, cannot fairly be held an objection to the preſent theory. We are frequently, it is true, miſled by inordinate paſſion: but we are alſo, and perhaps not leſs frequently, miſled by wrong judgement.

In order to a diſtinct apprehenſion of the preſent ſubject, it muſt be premiſed, that an agreeable object produceth always a pleaſant emotion, and a diſagreeable object one that is painful. This is a general law of nature, which admits not a ſingle exception. Agreeableneſs in the object or cauſe is indeed ſo eſſentially connected with pleaſure in the emotion its effect, that an agreeable object cannot be better defined, than by its power of producing a pleaſant emotion. Diſagreeableneſs in the object or cauſe, has the

the ſame neceſſary connection with pain in the emotion produced by it.

From this preliminary it appears, that to inquire for what end an emotion is made pleaſant or painful, reſolves into an inquiry for what end its cauſe is made agreeable or diſagreeable. And from the moſt accurate induction it will be diſcovered, that no cauſe of an emotion is made agreeable or diſagreeable arbitrarily; but that theſe qualities are ſo diſtributed as to anſwer wiſe and good purpoſes. It is an invincible proof of the benignity of the Deity, that we are ſurrounded with things generally agreeable, which contribute remarkably to our entertainment and to our happineſs. Some things are made diſagreeable, ſuch as a rotten carcaſs, becauſe they are noxious. Others, a dirty marſh, for example, or a barren heath, are made diſagreeable in order to excite our induſtry. And with reſpect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor diſagreeable; it will be made evident, that their being left indifferent is not a work of chance but of wiſdom. Of ſuch I ſhall have occaſion to give ſeveral inſtances.

Having

Having attempted to aſſign the final cauſes of emotions and paſſions conſidered as pleaſant or painful, we proceed to the final cauſes of the deſires involved in them. This ſeems a work of ſome difficulty; for the deſires that accompany different paſſions have very different aims, and ſeldom or never demand preciſely the ſame gratification. One paſſion moves us to cling to its object, one to fly from it; one paſſion impels to action for our own good, and one for the good of others; one paſſion prompts us to do good to ourſelves or others, and one to do miſchief, frequently to others, and ſometimes even to ourſelves. Deliberating upon this intricate ſubject, and finding an intimate correſpondence betwixt our deſires and their objects, it is natural to think that the former muſt be regulated in ſome meaſure by the latter. In this view, I begin with deſire directed upon an inanimate object.

Any pleaſure we have in an agreeable object of this kind, is enjoyed by the continuance of the pleaſant impreſſion it makes upon us; and accordingly the deſire involved in

the pleaſant emotion tends to that end, and is gratified by dwelling upon the agreeable object. Hence ſuch an object may be properly termed *attractive*. Thus a flowing river, a towering hill, a fine garden, are attractive objects. They fix the attention of the ſpectator, by inſpiring pleaſant emotions, which are gratified by adhering to theſe objects and enjoying them. On the other hand, a diſagreeable object of the ſame kind, raiſes in us a painful emotion including a deſire to turn from the object, which relieves us of courſe from the pain; and hence ſuch an object may be properly termed *repulſive*. A monſtrous birth, for example, a rotten carcaſs, a confuſion of jarring ſounds, are repulſive. They repel the mind, by inſpiring painful or unpleaſant emotions, which are gratified by flying from ſuch objects. Thus in general, with regard to inanimate objects, the deſire included in every pleaſant paſſion tends to prolong the pleaſure, and the deſire included in every painful paſſion tends to put an end to the pain. Here the final cauſe is evident. Our deſires, ſo far, are modelled

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in ſuch a manner as to correſpond preciſely to the ſenſitive part of our nature, prone to happineſs and averſe to miſery. Theſe operations of adhering to an agreeable inanimate object, and flying from one that is diſagreeable, are performed in the beginning of life by means of deſire impelling us, without the intervention of reaſon or reflection. Reaſon and reflection directing ſelf-love, become afterward motives that unite their force with deſire; becauſe experience informs us, that the adhering to agreeable objects and the flying from thoſe that are diſagreeable, contribute to our happineſs.

Senſible Beings conſidered as objects of paſſion, lead us into a more complex theory. A ſenſible being that is agreeable by its attributes, inſpires us with a pleaſant emotion; and the deſire included in this emotion has evidently different means of gratification. A man regarding himſelf only, may be ſatisfied with viewing and contemplating this being, preciſely as if it were inanimate; or he may deſire the more generous gratification of making it happy. Were man altogether

ſelfiſh, it would be conformable to his nature, that he ſhould indulge the pleaſant emotion without making any acknowledgement to the perſon who gives him pleaſure, more than to a pure air or temperate clime when he enjoys theſe benefits. But as man is endued with a principle of benevolence as well as of ſelfiſhneſs, he is prompted by his nature to deſire the good of every ſenſible being that gives him pleaſure. And the final cauſe of deſire ſo directed, is illuſtrious. It contributes to a man's own happineſs, by affording him more means of gratification than he can have when his deſire terminates upon himſelf alone; and at the ſame time it tends eminently to improve the happineſs of thoſe with whom he is connected. The directing our deſires in this manner, occaſions a beautiful coalition of ſelf-love with benevolence; for both are equally promoted by the ſame internal impulſe, and by the ſame external conduct. And this conſideration, by the way, ought to ſilence thoſe minute philoſophers, who, ignorant of human nature, teach a moſt diſguſtful doctrine, That to

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ſerve others unleſs with a view to our own good, is weakneſs and folly; as if ſelf-love only contributed to happineſs and not benevolence. The hand of God is too viſible in the human frame, to permit us to think ſeriouſly, that there ever can be any jarring or inconſiſtency among natural principles, thoſe eſpecially of ſelf-love and benevolence, which regulate the bulk of our actions.

Next in order come ſenſible Beings that are in affliction or pain. It is diſagreeable to behold a perſon in diſtreſs; and therefore this object muſt raiſe in the ſpectator an uneaſy emotion. Were man purely a ſelfiſh being, he would be prompted by his nature to turn from every object, animate or inanimate, that gives him uneaſineſs. But the principle of benevolence gives an oppoſite direction to his deſire. It impels him to afford relief; and by relieving the perſon from diſtreſs, his deſire is fully gratified. Our benevolence to a perſon in diſtreſs is inflamed into an emotion of ſympathy, ſignifying in Greek the painful emotion that is raiſed in us by that perſon.

Thus

Thus ſympathy, though a painful emotion, is in its nature attractive. And with reſpect to its final cauſe, we can be at no loſs. It not only tends to relieve a fellow-creature from pain, but in its gratification is greatly more pleaſant than if it were repulſive.

We in the laſt place bring under conſideration perſons hateful by vice or wickedneſs. Imagine a wretch who has lately perpetrated ſome horrid crime. He is diſagreeable to every ſpectator; and conſequently raiſes in every ſpectator a painful emotion. What is the natural gratification of the deſire that accompanies this painful emotion? I muſt here again obſerve, that ſuppoſing man to be entirely a ſelfiſh being, he would be prompted by his nature to relieve himſelf from the pain by averting his eye, and baniſhing the criminal from his thoughts. But man is not ſo conſtituted. He is compoſed of many principles, which, though ſeemingly contradictory, are perfectly concordant. The principle of benevolence influences his conduct, not leſs remarkably than that of ſelfiſhneſs. And in order to

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anſwer the foregoing queſtion, I muſt introduce a third principle, not leſs remarkable in its influence than either of thoſe mentioned. It is that principle common to all, which prompts us to puniſh thoſe who do wrong. An envious, malicious, or cruel action, is diſagreeable to me even where I have no connection with the ſufferer, and raiſes in me the painful emotion of reſentment. The gratification of this emotion, when accompanied with deſire, is directed by the principle now unfolded. Being prompted by my nature to puniſh guilt as well as to reward virtue, my deſire is not gratified but by inflicting puniſhment. I muſt chaſtiſe the wretch by indignation at leaſt and hatred, if not more ſeverely. Here the final cauſe is ſelf-evident.

An injury done to myſelf, touching me more than when done to others, raiſes my reſentment in a higher degree. The deſire accordingly included in this paſſion, is not ſatisfied with ſo ſlight a puniſhment as indignation or hatred. It is not fully gratified without retaliation; and the author muſt by my hand ſuffer miſchief, as great at leaſt

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as he has done me. Neither can we be at any loſs about the final cauſe of this higher degree of reſentment. The whole vigor of this paſſion is required to ſecure individuals from the injuſtice and oppreſſion of others*.

A wicked or diſgraceful action, is diſagreeable not only to others, but even to the delinquent himſelf. It raiſes in him as well as in others a painful emotion including a deſire of puniſhment. The painful emotion which the delinquent feels, is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *remorſe*; and in this caſe the deſire he has to puniſh is directed againſt himſelf. There cannot be imagined a better contrivance to deter us from vice; for remorſe is the ſevereſt of all puniſhments. This paſſion and the deſire of ſelf-puniſhment derived from it, are touched delicately by Terence.

Menedemus. Ubi comperi ex iis, qui ei fuere conſcii,
Domum revortor mœſtus, atque animo fere
Perturbato, atque incerto præ ægritudine:
Adſido, adcurrunt ſervi, ſoccos detrahunt:
Video alios feſtinare, lectos ſternere,

* See Hiſtorical law-tracts, tract 1.

Cœnam

Cœnam adparare: pro ſe quiſque ſedulo
Faciebat, quo illam mihi lenirent miſeriam.
Ubi video hæc, cœpi cogitare: Hem! tot mea
Solius ſolliciti ſint cauſa, ut me unum expleant?
Ancillæ tot me veſtiant? ſumptus domi
Tantos ego ſolus faciam? ſed gnatum unicum,
Quem pariter uti his decuit, aut etiam amplius,
Quod illa ætas magis ad hæc utenda idonea 'ſt,
Eum ego hinc ejeci miſerum injuſtitia mea.
Malo quidem me dignum quovis deputem,
Si id faciam. nam uſque dum ille vitam illam colet
Inopem, carens patria ob meas injurias,
Interea uſque illi de me ſupplicium dabo:
Laborans, quærens, parcens, illi ſerviens,
Ita facio prorſus: nihil relinquo in ædibus,
Nec vas, nec veſtimentum: conraſi omnia,
Ancillas, ſervos, niſi eos, qui opere ruſtico
Faciundo facile ſumptum exercerent ſuum:
Omnes produxi ac vendidi: inſcripſi ilico
Ædeis mercede: quaſi talenta ad quindecim
Coëgi: agrum hunc mercatus ſum: hic me exer-
ceo.
Decrevi tantiſper me minus injuriæ,
Chreme, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miſer:
Nec fas eſſe ulla me voluptate hic frui,
Niſi ubi ille huc ſalvos redierit meus particeps.

Heautontimorumenos, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

Otway reaches the ſame ſentiment:

Monimia. Let miſchiefs multiply! let ev'ry hour
Of my loath'd life yield me increaſe of horror!
Oh let the ſun to theſe unhappy eyes
Ne'er ſhine again, but be eclips'd for ever!
May every thing I look on ſeem a prodigy,
To fill my ſoul with terror, till I quite
Forget I ever had humanity,
And grow a curſer of the works of nature!

Orphan, act 4.

The caſes mentioned are, where benevolence alone or where deſire of puniſhment alone, governs without a rival. And it was neceſſary to handle theſe caſes ſeparately, in order to elucidate a ſubject which by writers is left in great obſcurity. But neither of theſe principles operates always without rivalſhip. Caſes may be figured, and caſes actually exiſt, where the ſame perſon is an object both of ſympathy and of deſire to puniſh. Thus the ſight of a profligate in the venereal diſeaſe, over-run with botches and ſores, actuates both principles. While his diſtreſs fixes my attention, ſympathy exerts itſelf;

itſelf; but ſo ſoon as I think of his profligacy, hatred prevails, and a deſire to puniſh. This in general is the caſe of diſtreſs occaſioned by immoral actions that are not highly criminal. And if the diſtreſs and the immoral action be in any proportion, ſympathy and hatred counterbalancing each other will not ſuffer me either to afford relief or to inflict puniſhment. What then will be the reſult of the whole? The principle of ſelf-love ſolves the queſtion. Abhorring an object ſo loathſome, I naturally avert my eye, and walk off as faſt as I can, in order to be relieved from the pain.

The preſent ſubject gives birth to ſeveral other obſervations, for which I could not find room above, without relaxing more from the ſtrictneſs of order and connection, than with ſafety could be indulged in diſcourſing upon a matter that with difficulty is made perſpicuous, even with all the advantages of order and connection. Theſe obſervations I ſhall throw out looſely as they occur, without giving myſelf any further trouble about method.

No action good or bad is altogether indif-

ferent even to a mere ſpectator. If good, it inſpires eſteem; and indignation, if wicked. But it is remarkable, that theſe emotions ſeldom are accompanied with deſire. The abilities of man are limited, and he finds ſufficient employment, in relieving the diſtreſſed, in requiting his benefactors, and in puniſhing thoſe who wrong him, without moving out of his own ſphere for the benefit or chaſtiſement of thoſe with whom he has no connection.

If the good qualities of others excite my benevolence, the ſame qualities in myſelf muſt produce a ſimilar effect in a ſuperior degree, upon account of the natural partiality every man hath for himſelf. This increaſes ſelf-love. If theſe qualities be of a high rank, they produce a feeling of ſuperiority, which naturally leads me to aſſume ſome ſort of government over others. Mean qualities, on the other hand, produce in me a feeling of inferiority, which naturally leads me to ſubmit to others. Unleſs ſuch feelings were diſtributed among individuals in ſociety by meaſure and proportion, there could be no natural ſubordination of ſome

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to others, which is the principal foundation of government.

No other branch of the human conſtitution ſhows more viſibly our deſtination for ſociety, nor tends more to our improvement, than appetite for fame or eſteem. The whole conveniencies of life being derived from mutual aid and ſupport in ſociety, it ought to be a capital aim, to form connections with others ſo ſtrict and ſo extenſive as to produce a firm reliance on many for ſuccour in time of need. Reaſon dictates this leſſon. But reaſon ſolely is not relied on in a matter of ſuch conſequence. We are moved by a natural appetite, to be ſolicitous about eſteem and reſpect as we are about food when hungry. This appetite, at the ſame time, is finely adjuſted to the moral branch of our conſtitution, by promoting all the moral virtues. For what infallible means are there to attract love and eſteem, other than a virtuous courſe of life? If a man be juſt and beneficent, if he be temperate modeſt and prudent, he will infallibly gain the eſteem and love of all who know him.

The communication of paſſion to related objects,

objects, is an illuſtrious inſtance of the care of Providence, to extend ſocial connections as far as the limited nature of man can admit. This communication of paſſion is ſo far unhappy as to ſpread the malevolent paſſions beyond their natural bounds. But let it be remarked, that this unhappy effect regards ſavages only, who give way to malevolent paſſions. Under the diſcipline of ſociety, theſe paſſions are ſubdued, and in a good meaſure eradicated. In their place ſucceed the kindly affections, which, meeting with all encouragement, take poſſeſſion of the mind and govern our whole actions. In this condition, the progreſs of paſſion along related objects, by ſpreading the kindly affections through a multitude of individuals, hath a glorious effect.

Nothing can be more entertaining to a rational mind, than the œconomy of the human paſſions, of which I have attempted to give ſome faint notion. It muſt however be confeſſed, that our paſſions, when they happen to ſwell beyond their proper limits, take on a leſs regular appearance. Reaſon may proclaim our duty, but the will influenced

ced by paſſion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of paſſion, which, when in exceſs, cannot be reſiſted but by the utmoſt fortitude of mind. It is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without diſtinction. Thus joy inſpired by a fortunate event, is diffuſed upon every perſon around by acts of benevolence; and reſentment for an atrocious injury done by one out of reach, ſeizes the firſt object that occurs to vent itſelf upon. Thoſe who believe in prophecies, even wiſh the accompliſhment; and a weak mind is diſpoſed voluntarily to fulfil a prophecy, in order to gratify its wiſh. Shakeſpear, whom no particle of human nature hath eſcaped, however remote from common obſervation, deſcribes this weakneſs:

K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong
Unto that lodging where I firſt did ſwoon?
Warwick. 'Tis call'd *Jeruſalem*, my Noble Lord.
K. Henry. Laud be to God! even there my life muſt end.
It hath been propheſy'd to me many years,

I ſhould not die but in Jeruſalem,
Which vainly I ſuppos'd the holy land.
But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie:
In that Jeruſalem ſhall Henry die.
Second part, Henry IV. *act* 4. *ſc. laſt.*

I could not deny myſelf the amuſement of the foregoing obſervation, though it doth not properly come under my plan. The irregularities of paſſion proceeding from peculiar weakneſſes and biaſſes, I do not undertake to juſtify; and of theſe we have had many examples *. It is ſufficient that paſſions common to all and as generally exerted, are made ſubſervient to beneficial purpoſes. I ſhall only obſerve, that in a poliſhed ſociety inſtances of irregular paſſions are rare, and that their miſchief doth not extend far.

* Part 5. of the preſent chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

BEAUTY.

HAVING diſcourſed in general of emotions and paſſions, I proceed to a more narrow inſpection of ſome particulars that ſerve to unfold the principles of the fine arts. It is the province of a writer upon ethics, to give a full enumeration of all the paſſions; and of each ſeparately to aſſign the nature, the cauſe, the gratification, and the effects. But a treatiſe of ethics is not my province. I carry my view no farther than to the elements of criticiſm, in order to ſhow that the fine arts are a ſubject of reaſoning as well as of taſte. An extenſive work would be ill ſuited to a deſign ſo limited; and to keep within moderate bounds, the following plan may contribute. It has already been obſerved, that things are the cauſes of emotions, by means of their properties and attributes *. This

* Chap. 2. part. 1. ſect. 1. firſt note.

furniſheth a hint for diſtribution. Inſtead of a painful and tedious examination of the ſeveral paſſions and emotions, I propoſe to confine my inquiries to ſuch attributes, relations, and circumſtances, as in the fine arts are chiefly employed to raiſe agreeable emotions. Attributes of ſingle objects, as the moſt ſimple, ſhall take the lead; to be followed with particulars that depend on the relations of objects, and are not found in any one object ſingly conſidered. Diſpatching next ſome coincident matters, I approach nearer to practice, by applying the principles unfolded in the foregoing parts of the work. This is a general view of the intended method; reſerving however a privilege to vary it in particular inſtances, where a different method may be more commodious. I begin with beauty, the moſt noted of all the qualities that belong to ſingle objects.

The term *beauty*, in its native ſignification, is appropriated to objects of ſight. Objects of the other ſenſes may be agreeable, ſuch as the ſounds of muſical inſtruments, the ſmoothneſs and ſoftneſs of ſome ſurfaces;

ſurfaces: but the agreeableneſs denominated *beauty* belongs to objects of ſight.

Of all the objects of the external ſenſes, an object of ſight is the moſt complex. In the very ſimpleſt, colour is perceived, figure, and length breadth and thickneſs. A tree is compoſed of a trunk, branches, and leaves. It has colour, figure, ſize, and ſometimes motion. By means of each of theſe particulars, ſeparately conſidered, it appears beautiful: how much more ſo, when they enter all into one complex perception? The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a compoſition of numberleſs beauties ariſing from the parts and qualities of the object, various colours, various motions, figure, ſize, *&c.*; all uniting in one complex perception, and ſtriking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality ſo remarkable in viſible objects, lends its name to expreſs every thing that is eminently agreeable. Thus, by a figure of ſpeech, we ſay a beautiful ſound, a beautiful thought or expreſſion, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful diſcovery in art or ſcience.

But as figurative expreſſion is not our preſent theme, this chapter is confined to beauty in its genuine ſignification.

It is natural to ſuppoſe, that a perception ſo various as that of beauty, comprehending ſometimes many particulars, ſometimes few, ſhould occaſion emotions equally various. And yet all the various emotions of beauty maintain one general character of ſweetneſs and gaiety.

Conſidering attentively the beauty of viſible objects, we diſcover two kinds. One may be termed *intrinſic* beauty, becauſe it is diſcovered in a ſingle object viewed apart without relation to any other object. The examples above given, are of that kind. The other may be termed *relative* beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The former is a perception of ſenſe merely; for to perceive the beauty of a ſpreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but ſingly an act of viſion. The latter is accompanied with an act of underſtanding and reflection; for of a fine inſtrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its uſe and deſtination.

deſtination. In a word, intrinſic beauty is ultimate: relative beauty is that of means relating to ſome good end or purpoſe. Theſe different beauties agree in one capital circumſtance, that both are equally perceived as ſpread upon the object. This will be readily admitted with reſpect to intrinſic beauty; but is not ſo obvious with reſpect to the other. The utility of the plough, for example, may make it an object of admiration or of deſire; but why ſhould utility make it appear beautiful? A principle mentioned above *, will explain this doubt. The beauty of the effect, by an eaſy tranſition of ideas, is transferred to the cauſe, and is perceived as one of the qualities of the cauſe. Thus a ſubject void of intrinſic beauty, appears beautiful from its utility. An old Gothic tower that has no beauty in itſelf, appears beautiful, conſidered as proper to defend againſt an enemy. A dwelling-houſe void of all regularity, is however beautiful in the view of convenience; and the want of form or ſymmetry in a tree,

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 4.

will

will not prevent its appearing beautiful, if it be known to produce good fruit.

When theſe two beauties concur in any object, it appears delightful. Every member of the human body poſſeſſes both in a high degree. The ſlender make of a horſe deſtined for running, pleaſes every taſte; partly from ſymmetry, and partly from utility.

The beauty of utility, being proportioned accurately to the degree of utility, requires no illuſtration. But intrinſic beauty, ſo complex as I have ſaid, cannot be handled diſtinctly without being analized into its conſtituent parts. If a tree be beautiful by means of its colour, its figure, its ſize, its motion, it is in reality poſſeſſed of ſo many different beauties, which ought to be examined ſeparately, in order to have a clear notion of the whole. The beauty of colour is too familiar to need explanation. The beauty of figure requires an accurate diſcuſſion, for in it many circumſtances are involved. When any portion of matter is viewed as a whole, the beauty of its figure ariſes from regularity and ſimplicity. Viewing

ing the parts with relation to each other, uniformity, proportion, and order, contribute to its beauty. The beauty of motion deſerves a chapter by itſelf; and another chapter is deſtined for grandeur, being diſtinguiſhable from beauty in a ſtrict ſenſe. For the definitions of regularity, uniformity, proportion, and order, if thought neceſſary, I remit my reader to the appendix at the end of the book. Upon ſimplicity I muſt make a few curſory obſervations, ſuch as may be of uſe in examining the beauty of ſingle objects.

A multitude of objects crowding into the mind at once, diſturb the attention, and paſs without making any impreſſion, or any laſting impreſſion. In a group, no ſingle object makes the figure it would do apart, when it occupies the whole attention *. For the ſame reaſon, even a ſingle object, when it divides the attention by the multiplicity of its parts, equals not, in ſtrength of impreſſion, a more ſimple object com-

* See the appendix, containing definitions and explanation of terms.

prehended

prehended in a ſingle view. Parts extremely complex muſt be conſidered in portions ſucceſſively; and a number of impreſſions in ſucceſſion, which cannot unite becauſe not ſimultaneous, never touch the mind like one entire impreſſion made as it were at one ſtroke. This juſtifies ſimplicity in works of art, as oppoſed to complicated circumſtances and crowded ornaments. There is an additional reaſon for ſimplicity, in works that make an impreſſion of dignity or elevation. The mind attached to beauties of a high rank, cannot deſcend to inferior beauties. And yet, notwithſtanding theſe reaſons, we find profuſe decoration prevailing in works of art. But this is no argument againſt ſimplicity. For authors and architects who cannot reach the higher beauties, endeavour to ſupply their want of genius by dealing in thoſe that are inferior. In all ages, the beſt writers and artiſts have been governed by a taſte for ſimplicity.

Theſe things premiſed, I proceed to examine the beauty of figure, as ariſing from the above-mentioned particulars, *viz.* regularity,

gularity, uniformity, proportion, order, and ſimplicity. To exhauſt this ſubject, would of itſelf require a large volume. I limit myſelf to a few curſory remarks, as matter for future diſquiſition. To inquire why an object, by means of the particulars mentioned, appears beautiful, would I am afraid be a vain attempt. It ſeems the moſt probable opinion, that the nature of man was originally framed with a reliſh for them, in order to anſwer wiſe and good purpoſes. The final cauſes have not hitherto been aſcertained, though they are not probably beyond our reach. One thing is clear, that regularity, uniformity, order, and ſimplicity, contribute each of them to readineſs of apprehenſion; and enable us to form more diſtinct images of objects, than can be done with the utmoſt attention where theſe particulars are not found. This final cauſe is, I acknowledge, too ſlight, to account ſatisfactorily for a taſte that makes a figure ſo illuſtrious in the nature of man. That this branch of our conſtitution hath a purpoſe ſtill more important, we have great reaſon to believe. With reſpect to proportion, I

am ſtill leſs ſucceſsful. In ſeveral inſtances, accurate proportion is connected with utility. This in particular is the caſe of animals; for thoſe that are the beſt proportioned, are the ſtrongeſt and moſt active. But inſtances are ſtill more numerous, where the proportions we reliſh the moſt, have no connection, ſo far as we ſee, with utility. Writers on architecture inſiſt much upon the proportions of a column; and aſſign different proportions to the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian. But no architect will maintain, that the moſt accurate proportions contribute more to uſe, than ſeveral that are leſs accurate and leſs agreeable. Neither will it be maintained, that the proportions aſſigned for the length breadth and height of rooms, tend to make them the more commodious. It appears then, ſo far as we can diſcover, that we have a taſte for proportion independent altogether of utility. One thing indeed is certain, that any external object proportioned to our taſte, is delightful. This furniſhes a hint. May it not be thought a good final cauſe of proportion, that it contributes to our entertainment? The author of our

nature

nature has given many ſignal proofs, that this end is not below his care. And if ſo, why ſhould we heſitate in aſſigning this as an additional final cauſe of regularity, and the other particulars above mentioned? We may be confirmed in this thought, by reflecting, that our taſte, with reſpect to theſe, is not occaſional or accidental, but uniform and univerſal, making an original branch of human nature.

One might fill a volume with the effects that are produced by the endleſs combinations of the principles of beauty. I have room only for a ſlight ſpecimen, confined to the ſimpleſt figures. A circle and a ſquare are each of them perfectly regular, being equally confined to a preciſe form, and admitting not the ſlighteſt variation. A ſquare however is leſs beautiful than a circle, becauſe it is leſs ſimple. A circle has parts as well as a ſquare; but its parts not being diſtinct like thoſe of a ſquare, it makes one entire impreſſion; whereas the attention is divided among the ſides and angles of a ſquare. The effect of ſimplicity may be illuſtrated by another example. A ſquare, though not

more regular than a hexagon or octagon, is more beautiful than either; for what other reaſon, than that a ſquare is more ſimple, and the attention leſs divided? This reaſoning will appear ſtill more ſolid when we conſider any regular polygon of very many ſides; for of ſuch figure the mind can never have any diſtinct perception. Simplicity thus contributes to beauty.

A ſquare is more beautiful than a parallelogram. The former exceeds the latter in regularity and in uniformity of parts. But this holds with reſpect to intrinſic beauty only; for in many inſtances, utility comes in to caſt the balance on the ſide of the parallelogram. This figure for the doors and windows of a dwelling-houſe, is preferred becauſe of utility; and here we find the beauty of utility prevailing over that of regularity and uniformity.

A parallelogram again depends, for its beauty, on the proportion of its ſides. The beauty is loſt by a great inequality of ſides. It is alſo loſt, on the other hand, by the approximation toward equality. Proportion in this circumſtance degenerates into imperfect

fect uniformity; and the figure upon the whole appears an unſucceſsful attempt toward a ſquare.

An equilateral triangle yields not to a ſquare in regularity nor in uniformity of parts, and it is more ſimple. But an equilateral triangle is leſs beautiful than a ſquare, which muſt be owing to inferiority of order in the poſition of its parts. The ſides of an equilateral triangle incline to each other in the ſame angle, which is the moſt perfect order they are ſuſceptible of. But this order is obſcure, and far from being ſo perfect as the paralleliſm of the ſides of a ſquare. Thus order contributes to the beauty of viſible objects, not leſs than ſimplicity and regularity.

A parallelogram exceeds an equilateral triangle in the orderly diſpoſition of its parts; but being inferior in uniformity and ſimplicity, it is leſs beautiful.

Uniformity is ſingular in one capital circumſtance, that it is apt to diſguſt by exceſs. A number of things contrived for the ſame uſe, ſuch as chairs ſpoons, *&c.* cannot be too uniform. But a ſcrupulous uniformity

formity of parts in a large garden or field, is far from being agreeable. Uniformity among connected objects, belongs not to the preſent ſubject. It is handled in the chapter of uniformity and variety.

In all the works of nature, ſimplicity makes an illuſtrious figure. The works of the beſt artiſts are directed by it. Profuſe ornament in painting, gardening, or architecture, as well as in dreſs and language, ſhows a mean or corrupted taſte.

Poets, like painters, thus unſkill'd to trace
The naked nature and the living grace,
With gold and jewels cover ev'ry part,
And hide with ornaments their want of art.
Pope's Eſſay on criticiſm.

No one property recommends a machine more than its ſimplicity; not ſingly for better anſwering its purpoſe, but by appearing in itſelf more beautiful. Simplicity hath a capital effect in behaviour and manners; no other particular contributing more to gain eſteem and love. The artificial and intricate manners of modern times, have little of dignity

dignity in them. General theorems, abſtracting from their importance, are delightful by their ſimplicity, and by the eaſineſs of their application to a variety of caſes. We take equal delight in the laws of motion, which, with the greateſt ſimplicity, are boundleſs in their influence.

A gradual progreſs from ſimplicity to complex forms and profuſe ornament, ſeems to be the fate of all the fine arts; reſembling behaviour, which from original candor and ſimplicity has degenerated into artificial refinements. At preſent, written productions are crowded with words, epithets, figures, *&c.* In muſic, ſentiment is neglected, for the luxury of harmony, and for difficult movement which ſurpriſes in its execution. In *taſte* properly ſo called, poignant ſauces with complicated mixtures of different ſavours, prevail among people of condition. The French, accuſtomed to the artificial red on their women's cheeks, think the modeſt colouring of nature diſplayed on a fine face altogether inſipid.

The ſame tendency appears in the progreſs of the arts among the ancients. Of this

this we have traces ſtill remaining in architecture. Some veſtiges of the oldeſt Grecian buildings prove them to be of the Doric order. The Ionic ſucceeded, and ſeems to have been the favourite order, while architecture was in its height of glory. The Corinthian came next in vogue: and in Greece, the buildings of that order appear moſtly to have been erected after the Romans got footing there. At laſt came the Compoſite with all its extravagancies, where proportion is ſacrificed to finery and crowded ornament.

But what taſte is to prevail next? for faſhion is in a continual flux, and taſte muſt vary with it. After rich and profuſe ornaments become familiar, ſimplicity appears by contraſt lifeleſs and inſipid. This would be an unſurmountable obſtruction, ſhould any man of genius and taſte endeavour to reſtore ancient ſimplicity.

In reviewing what is ſaid above, I am under ſome apprehenſion of an objection, which, as it may poſſibly occur to the reader, ought to be obviated. A mountain, it will be obſerved, is an agreeable object, without

without ſo much as the appearance of regularity; and a chain of mountains ſtill more agreeable, without being arranged in any order. But theſe facts conſidered in a proper light, afford not an objection. Regularity, order, and uniformity, are intimately connected with beauty; and in this view only, have I treated them. Every regular object, for example, muſt in reſpect of its regularity be beautiful. But I have not ſaid, that regularity, order, and uniformity, are eſſential to beauty, ſo as that it cannot exiſt without them. The contrary appears in the beauty of colour. Far leſs have I ſaid, that an object cannot be agreeable in any reſpect independent of theſe qualities. Grandeur, as diſtinguiſhed from beauty, requires very little regularity. This will appear more fully when that article is handled. In the mean time, to ſhow the difference betwixt beauty and grandeur with reſpect to regularity, I ſhall give a few examples. Imagine a ſmall body, let it be a globe, in a continual flux of figure, from the moſt perfect regularity till there remain no appearance of that quality. The beauty of this globe,

depending on its regular figure, will gradually wear away with its regularity; and when it is no longer regular, it no longer will appear beautiful. The next example ſhall be of the ſame globe, gradually enlarging its ſize, but retaining its figure. In this body, we at firſt perceive the beauty of regularity only. But ſo ſoon as it begins to ſwell into a great ſize, it appears agreeable by its greatneſs, which joins with the beauty of regularity to make it a delightful object. In the laſt place, let it be imagined, that the figure as well as the quantity of matter are in a continual flux; and that the body, while it increaſes in ſize, becomes leſs and leſs regular, till it loſe altogether the appearance of that quality. In this caſe, the beauty of regularity wearing off gradually, gives place to an agreeableneſs of a different ſort, *viz.* that of greatneſs: and at laſt the emotion ariſing from greatneſs will be in perfection, when the beauty of regularity is gone. Hence it is, that in a large object the want of regularity is not much regarded by the ſpectator who is ſtruck with its grandeur. A ſwelling eminence is agreeable, though not ſtrictly

regular.

regular. A towering hill is delightful, if it have but any diſtant reſemblance of a cone. A ſmall ſurface ought to be ſmooth; but in a wide-extended plain, conſiderable inequalities are overlooked. This obſervation holds equally in works of art. The ſlighteſt irregularity in a houſe of a moderate ſize hurts the eye; while the mind, ſtruck with the grandeur of a ſuperb edifice, which occupies it totally, cannot bear to deſcend to its irregularities unleſs extremely groſs. In a large volume we pardon many defects that would make an epigram intolerable. In ſhort, the obſervation holds in general, that beauty is connected with regularity in great objects as well as in ſmall; but with a remarkable difference, that in paſſing from ſmall to great, regularity is leſs and leſs required.

The diſtinction betwixt primary and ſecondary qualities in matter, ſeems now fully eſtabliſhed. Heat and cold, though ſeeming to exiſt in bodies, are diſcovered to be effects cauſed by theſe bodies in a ſenſitive being. Colour, which the eye repreſents as ſpread upon a ſubſtance, has no ex-

iſtence but in the mind of the ſpectator. Perceptions of this kind, which, by a deluſion of ſenſe, are attributed to external ſubjects, are termed *ſecondary qualities*, in contradiſtinction to figure, extenſion, ſolidity, which are primary qualities, and which are not ſeparable, even in imagination, from the ſubjects they belong to. This ſuggeſts a curious inquiry, Whether beauty be a primary or only a ſecondary quality of objects? The queſtion is eaſily determined with reſpect to the beauty of colour; for if colour be a ſecondary quality exiſting no where but in the mind of the ſpectator, its beauty muſt be of the ſame kind. This concluſion muſt alſo hold with reſpect to the beauty of utility, which is plainly a conception of the mind, ariſing not merely from ſight, but from reflecting that the thing is fitted for ſome good end or purpoſe. The queſtion is more intricate with reſpect to the beauty of regularity. If regularity be a primary quality, why not alſo its beauty? That this is not a good conſequence, will appear from conſidering, that beauty, in its very conception, refers to a percipient; for

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an object is ſaid to be beautiful, for no other reaſon but that it appears ſo to a ſpectator. The ſame piece of matter which to man appears beautiful, may poſſibly to another being appear ugly. Beauty therefore, which for its exiſtence depends upon the percipient as much as upon the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property of either. What elſe then can it be, but a perception in the mind occaſioned by certain objects? The ſame reaſoning is applicable to the beauty of order, of uniformity, of grandeur. Accordingly, it may be pronounced in general, that beauty in no caſe whatever is a real quality of matter. And hence it is wittily obſerved by the poet, that beauty is not in the countenance, but in the lover's eye. This reaſoning is undoubtedly ſolid: and the only cauſe of doubt or heſitation is, that we are taught a different leſſon by ſenſe. By a ſingular determination of nature, we perceive both beauty and colour as belonging to the object; and, like figure or extenſion, as inherent properties. This mechaniſm is uncommon; and when nature, to fulfil her intention, chuſeth any ſingular

ſingular method of operation, we may be certain of ſome final cauſe that cannot be reached by ordinary means. It appears to me, that a perception of beauty in external objects, is requiſite to attach us to them. Doth not this mechaniſm, in the firſt place, greatly promote induſtry, by prompting a deſire to poſſeſs things that are beautiful? Doth it not further join with utility, in prompting us to embelliſh our houſes and enrich our fields? Theſe however are but ſlight effects, compared with the connections which are formed among individuals in ſociety by means of this ſingular mechaniſm. The qualifications of the head and heart, are undoubtedly the moſt ſolid and moſt permanent foundations of ſuch connections. But as external beauty lies more in view, and is more obvious to the bulk of mankind than the qualities now mentioned, the ſenſe of beauty poſſeſſes the more univerſal influence in forming theſe connections. At any rate, it concurs in an eminent degree with mental qualifications, to produce ſocial intercourſe, mutual good-

will,

will, and conſequently mutual aid and ſupport, which are the life of ſociety.

It muſt not however be overlooked, that this ſenſe doth not tend to advance the intereſts of ſociety, but when in a due mean with reſpect to ſtrength. Love in particular ariſing from a ſenſe of beauty, loſes, when exceſſive, its ſociable character *. The appetite for gratification, prevailing over affection for the beloved object, is ungovernable; and tends violently to its end, regardleſs of the miſery that muſt follow. Love in this ſtate is no longer a ſweet agreeable paſſion. It becomes painful like hunger or thirſt; and produceth no happineſs but in the inſtant of fruition. This diſcovery ſuggeſts a moſt important leſſon, that moderation in our deſires and appetites, which fits us for doing our duty, contributes at the ſame time the moſt to happineſs. Even ſocial paſſions, when moderate, are more pleaſant than when they ſwell beyond proper bounds.

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Grandeur and Sublimity.

NATURE hath not more remarkably diſtinguiſhed us from the other animals by an erect poſture, than by a capacious and aſpiring mind, inclining us to every thing great and elevated. The ocean, the ſky, or any large object, ſeizes the attention, and makes a ſtrong impreſſion *. Robes of ſtate are made large and full to draw reſpect. We admire elephants and whales for their magnitude, notwithſtanding their unwieldineſs.

The elevation of an object affects us not leſs than its magnitude. A high place is choſen for the ſtatue of a deity or hero.

* Longinus obſerves, that nature inclines us to admire, not a ſmall rivulet, however clear and tranſparent, but the Nile, the Iſter, the Rhine, or ſtill more the ocean. The ſight of a ſmall fire produceth no emotion; but we are ſtruck with the boiling furnaces of Ætna, pouring out whole rivers of liquid flame. *Treatiſe of the Sublime, chap.* 29.

A tree growing upon the brink of a precipice viewed from the plain below, affords by that circumſtance an additional pleaſure. A throne is erected for the chief magiſtrate, and a chair with a high ſeat for the preſident of a court.

In ſome objects, greatneſs and elevation concur to make a complicated impreſſion. The Alps and the pike of Teneriff are proper examples; with the following difference, that in the former greatneſs ſeems to prevail, elevation in the latter.

The emotions raiſed by great and by elevated objects, are clearly diſtinguiſhable, not only in the internal feeling, but even in their external expreſſions. A great object dilates the breaſt, and makes the ſpectator endeavour to enlarge his bulk. This is remarkable in perſons, who, neglecting delicacy in behaviour, give way to nature without reſerve. In deſcribing a great object, they naturally expand themſelves by drawing in air with all their force. An elevated object produces a different expreſſion. It makes the ſpectator ſtretch upward and ſtand a tiptoe.

Great and elevated objects conſidered with relation to the emotions produced by them, are termed *grand* and *ſublime*. Grandeur and ſublimity have a double ſignification. They generally ſignify the quality or circumſtance in the objects by which the emotions are produced; ſometimes the emotions themſelves.

Whether magnitude ſingly in an object of ſight, have the effect to produce an emotion diſtinguiſhable from the beauty or deformity of that object; or whether it be only a circumſtance modifying the beauty or deformity, is an intricate queſtion. If magnitude produce an emotion of its own diſtinguiſhable from others, this emotion muſt either be pleaſant or painful. But this ſeems to be contradicted by experience; for magnitude, as it would appear, contributes in ſome inſtances to beauty, in ſome to deformity. A hill, for inſtance, is agreeable, and a great mountain ſtill more ſo. But an ugly monſter, the larger, the more horrid. Greatneſs in an enemy, great power, great courage, ſerve but to augment our terror. Hath not this

this an appearance as if grandeur were not an emotion diſtinct from all others, but only a circumſtance that qualifies beauty and deformity?

I am notwithſtanding ſatisfied, that grandeur is an emotion, not only diſtinct from all others, but in every circumſtance pleaſant. Theſe propoſitions muſt be examined ſeparately. I begin with the former, and ſhall endeavour to prove, that magnitude produceth a peculiar emotion diſtinguiſhable from all others. Magnitude is undoubtedly a real property of bodies, not leſs than figure, and more than colour. Figure and colour, even in the ſame body, produce ſeparate emotions, which are never miſapprehended one for the other. Why ſhould not magnitude produce an emotion different from both? That it has this effect, will be evident from a plain experiment of two bodies, one great and one little, which produce different emotions, though they be preciſely the ſame as to figure and colour. There is indeed an obſcurity in this matter, occaſioned by the following circumſtance, that the grandeur and beauty of the

ſame object mix ſo intimately as ſcarce to be diſtinguiſhed. But the beauty of colour comes in happily to enable us to make the diſtinction. For the emotion of colour unites with that of figure, not leſs intimately than grandeur does with either. Yet the emotion of colour is diſtinguiſhable from that of figure; and ſo is grandeur, attentively conſidered: though when theſe three emotions are blended together, they are ſcarce felt as different emotions.

Next, that grandeur is an emotion in every circumſtance pleaſant, appears from the following conſiderations. Magnitude or greatneſs, abſtracted from all other circumſtances, ſwells the heart and dilates the mind. We feel this to be a pleaſant effect; and we feel no ſuch effect in contracting the mind upon little objects. This may be illuſtrated by conſidering grandeur in an enemy. Beauty is an agreeable quality, whether in a friend or enemy; and when the emotion it raiſeth is mixed with reſentment againſt an enemy, it muſt have the effect to moderate our reſentment. In the ſame manner, grandeur in an enemy, undoubtedly

doubtedly ſoftens and blunts our reſentment. Grandeur indeed may indirectly and by reflection produce an unpleaſant effect. Grandeur in an enemy, like courage, may increaſe our fear, when we conſider the advantage he hath over us by this quality. But the ſame indirect effect may be produced by many other agreeable qualities, ſuch as beauty or wiſdom.

The magnitude of an ugly object, ſerves, it is true, to augment our horror or averſion. But this proceeds not from magnitude ſeparately conſidered. It proceeds from the following circumſtance, that in a large object a great quantity of ugly parts are preſented to view.

The ſame chain of reaſoning is ſo obviouſly applicable to ſublimity, that it would be loſing time to ſhow the application. Grandeur therefore and ſublimity ſhall hereafter be conſidered both of them as pleaſant emotions.

The pleaſant emotion raiſed by large objects, has not eſcaped the poets:

——— He doth beſtride the narrow world

Like

Like a Coloſſus; and we petty men
Walk under his huge legs.

Julius Cæſar, act 1. ſc. 3.

Cleopatra. I dreamt there was an Emp'ror Antony;
Oh ſuch another ſleep, that I might ſee
But ſuch another man!
His face was as the heav'ns: and therein ſtuck
A ſun and moon, which kept their courſe and lighted
The little O o' th' earth.
His legs beſtrid the ocean, his rear'd arm
Creſted the world.

Antony and Cleopatra, act 5. ſc. 3.

——————————— Majeſty
Dies not alone, but, like a gulf, doth draw
What's near it with it. It's a maſſy wheel
Fixt on the ſummit of the higheſt mount;
To whoſe huge ſpokes, ten thouſand leſſer things
Are mortis'd and adjoin'd; which when it falls,
Each ſmall annexment, petty conſequence,
Attends the boiſt'rous ruin.

Hamlet, act 3. ſc. 8.

The poets have alſo made good uſe of the

the emotion produced by the elevated ſituation of an object.

Quod ſi me lyricis vatibus inſeres,
Sublimi feriam ſidera vertice.

Horace, Carm. l. 1. *ode* 1.

Oh thou! the earthly author of my blood,
Whoſe youthful ſpirit, in me regenerate,
Doth with a twofold vigour lift me up,
To reach at victory above my head.

Richard II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Northumberland, thou ladder wherewithal
The mounting Bolingbroke aſcends my throne.

Richard II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 2.

Anthony. Why was I rais'd the meteor of the world,
Hung in the ſkies and blazing as I travell'd,
Till all my fires were ſpent; and then caſt downward
To be trod out by Cæſar?

Dryden, All for love, act 1.

Though the quality of magnitude produceth a pleaſant emotion, we muſt not conclude that the oppoſite quality of littleneſs produceth a painful emotion. It would be unhappy

unhappy for man, were an object diſagreeable from its being of a ſmall ſize merely, when he is ſurrounded with ſo many objects of that kind. The ſame obſervation is applicable to elevation of place. A body placed high is agreeable; but the ſame body placed low, is not by that circumſtance rendered diſagreeable. Littleneſs, and lowneſs of place, are preciſely ſimilar in the following particular, that they neither give pleaſure nor pain. And in this may viſibly be diſcovered peculiar attention in fitting the internal conſtitution of man to his external circumſtances. Were littleneſs, and lowneſs of place agreeable, greatneſs and elevation could not be ſo. Were littleneſs, and lowneſs of place diſagreeable, they would occaſion uninterrupted uneaſineſs.

The difference betwixt great and little with reſpect to agreeableneſs, is remarkably felt in a ſeries when we paſs gradually from the one extreme to the other. A mental progreſs from the capital to the kingdom, from that to Europe—to the whole earth —to the planetary ſyſtem—to the univerſe, is extremely pleaſant: the heart ſwells and the

the mind is dilated, at every ſtep. The returning in an oppoſite direction is not poſitively painful, though our pleaſure leſſens at every ſtep, till it vaniſh into indifference. Such a progreſs may ſometimes produce a pleaſure of a different ſort, which ariſes from taking a narrower and narrower inſpection. The ſame obſervation is applicable to a progreſs upward and downward. Aſcent is pleaſant becauſe it elevates us. But deſcent is never painful: it is for the moſt part pleaſant from a different cauſe, that it is according to the order of nature. The fall of a ſtone from anyheight, is extremely agreeable by its accelerated motion. I feel it pleaſant to deſcend from a mountain: the deſcent is natural and eaſy. Neither is looking downward painful. On the contrary, to look down upon objects, makes part of the pleaſure of elevation. Looking down becomes then only painful when the object is ſo far below as to create dizzineſs: and even when that is the caſe, we feel a ſort of pleaſure mixt with the pain. Witneſs Shakeſpear's deſcription of Dover cliffs:

——————— How fearful
And dizzy 'tis, to caſt one's eyes ſo low!
The crows and choughs, that wing the midway air,
Shew ſcarce ſo groſs as beetles. Half-way down
Hangs one, that gathers ſamphire; dreadful trade!
Methinks he ſeems no bigger than his head.
The fiſhermen that walk upon the beach,
Appear like mice; and yon tall anchoring bark
Diminiſh'd to her cock; her cock, a buoy
Almoſt too ſmall for ſight. The murmuring ſurge,
That on th' unnumber'd idle pebbles chafes,
Cannot be heard ſo high. I'll look no more,
Leſt my brain turn, and the deficient ſight
Topple down headlong.

King Lear, act 4. ſc. 6.

An obſervation is made above, that the emotions of grandeur and ſublimity are nearly allied. Hence it is, that the one term is frequently put for the other. I give an example. An increaſing ſeries of numbers produceth an emotion ſimilar to that of mounting upward, and for that reaſon is commonly termed *an aſcending ſeries*. A ſeries of numbers gradually decreaſing, produceth an emotion ſimilar to that of going downward, and for that reaſon is commonly

ly termed *a deſcending ſeries*. We talk familiarly of going up to the capital, and of going down to the country. From a leſſer kingdom we talk of going up to a greater, whence the *anabaſis* in the Greek language when one travels from Greece to Perſia. We diſcover the ſame way of ſpeaking in the language even of Japan *; and its univerſality proves it the offspring of a natural feeling.

The foregoing obſervation leads us naturally to conſider grandeur and ſublimity in a figurative ſenſe, and as applicable to the fine arts. Hitherto I have conſidered theſe terms in their proper meaning, as applicable to objects of ſight only: and I thought it of importance, to beſtow ſome pains upon that article; becauſe, generally ſpeaking, the figurative ſenſe of a word is derived from its proper ſenſe; which will be found to hold in the preſent ſubject. Beauty in its original ſignification, is confined to objects of ſight. But as many other objects, intellectual as well as moral, raiſe emotions reſembling that

* Kempfer's hiſtory of Japan, b. 5. ch. 2.

of beauty, the reſemblance of the effects prompts us naturally to extend the term *beauty* to theſe objects. This equally accounts for the terms *grandeur* and *ſublimity* taken in a figurative ſenſe. Every emotion, from whatever cauſe proceeding, that reſembles an emotion of grandeur or elevation, is called by the ſame name. Thus generoſity is ſaid to be an elevated emotion, as well as great courage; and that firmneſs of ſoul which is ſuperior to misfortunes, obtains the peculiar name of *magnanimity*. On the other hand, every emotion that contracts the mind and fixeth it upon things trivial or of no importance, is termed *low*, by its reſemblance to an emotion produced by a little or low object of ſight. Thus an appetite for trifling amuſements, is called *a low taſte*. The ſame terms are applied to characters and actions. We talk familiarly of an elevated genius, of a great man, and equally ſo of littleneſs of mind. Some actions are great and elevated, others are low and groveling. Sentiments and even expreſſions are characteriſed in the ſame manner. An expreſſion or ſentiment that raiſes

ſes the mind, is denominated *great* or *elevated*; and hence the ſublime * in poetry. In ſuch figurative terms, the diſtinction is loſt that is made betwixt *great* and *elevated* in their proper ſenſe; for the reſemblance is not ſo entire, as to preſerve theſe terms diſtinct in their figurative application. We carry this figure ſtill farther. Elevation in its proper ſenſe, includes ſuperiority of place; and lowneſs, inferiority of place. Hence a man of ſuperior talents, of ſuperior rank, of inferior parts, of inferior taſte, and ſuch like. The veneration we have for our anceſtors and for the ancients in general, being ſimi-

* Longinus gives a pretty good deſcription of the ſublime, though not entirely juſt in every one of the circumſtances, "That the mind is elevated by it, and ſo ſenſibly affected as "to ſwell in tranſport and inward pride, as if what is only "heard or read, were its own invention." But he adheres not to this deſcription. In his 6th chapter he juſtly obſerves, that many paſſions have nothing of the grand, ſuch as grief, fear, pity, which depreſs the mind inſtead of raiſing it. And yet in chapter 8th, he mentions Sappho's ode upon love as ſublime. Beautiful it is undoubtedly, but it cannot be ſublime, becauſe it really depreſſes the mind inſtead of raiſing it. His tranſlator Boileau is not more ſucceſsful in his inſtances. In his 10th reflection he cites a paſſage from Demoſthenes and another from Herodotus as ſublime, which are not ſo.

lar

lar to the emotion produced by an elevated object of ſight, juſtifies the figurative expreſſion, of the ancients being raiſed above us, or poſſeſſing a ſuperior place. And we may remark by the way, that as words are intimately connected with ideas, many, by this form of expreſſion, are led to conceive their anceſtors as really above them in place, and their poſterity below them:

A grandam's name is little leſs in love
Than is the doting title of a mother:
They are as children but one ſtep below.
Richard III. *act* 4. *ſc.* 5.

The notes of the gamut, proceeding regularly from the blunter or groſſer ſounds to thoſe which are more acute and piercing, produce in the hearer a feeling ſomewhat ſimilar to what is produced by mounting upward; and this gives occaſion to the figurative expreſſions, *a high note*, *a low note*.

Such is the reſemblance in feeling betwixt real and figurative grandeur, that among the nations on the eaſt coaſt of Africk, who are directed purely by nature, the different

different dignities of the officers of ſtate are marked by the length of the batoon each carries in his hand. And in Japan, princes and great lords ſhew their rank by the length and ſize of their ſedan-poles *. Again, it is a rule in painting, that figures of a ſmall ſize are proper for groteſque pieces; but that in an hiſtorical ſubject, which is grand and important, the figures ought to be as great as the life. The reſemblance of theſe feelings is in reality ſo ſtrong, that elevation in a figurative ſenſe is obſerved to have the ſame effect even externally, that real elevation has:

K. Henry. This day is call'd the feaſt of Criſpian.
He that outlives this day, and comes ſafe home,
Will ſtand a tiptoe when this day is nam'd,
And rouſe him at the name of Criſpian.

Henry V. *act* 4. *ſc.* 8.

The reſemblance in feeling betwixt real and figurative grandeur, is humorouſly illuſtrated by Addiſon in criticiſing upon the Engliſh tragedy. "The ordinary me-

* Kempfer's hiſtory of Japan.

"thod

" thod of making an hero, is to clap a huge " plume of feathers upon his head, which " riſes ſo high, that there is often a greater " length from his chin to the top of his " head, than to the ſole of his foot. One " would believe, that we thought a great " man and a tall man the ſame thing. As " theſe ſuperfluous ornaments upon the " head make a great man, a princeſs gene- " rally receives her grandeur from thoſe " additional incumbrances that fall into her " tail. I mean the broad ſweeping train " that follows her in all her motions, and " finds conſtant employment for a boy who " ſtands behind her to open and ſpread it " to advantage *." The Scythians, impreſſed with the fame of Alexander, were aſtoniſhed when they found him a little man.

A gradual progreſs from ſmall to great, is not leſs remarkable in figurative than in real grandeur or elevation. Every one muſt have obſerved the delightful effect of a number of thoughts or ſentiments, artfully

* Spectator, N° 42.

diſpoſed

diſpoſed like an aſcending ſeries, and making impreſſions ſtronger and ſtronger. Such diſpoſition of members in a period, is diſtinguiſhed by a proper name, being termed a *climax*.

In order to have a juſt conception of grandeur and ſublimity, it is neceſſary to be obſerved, that within certain limits they produce their ſtrongeſt effects, which leſſen by exceſs as well as by defect. This is remarkable in grandeur and ſublimity taken in their proper ſenſe. The ſtrongeſt emotion of grandeur is raiſed by an object that can be taken in at one view. An object ſo immenſe as not to be comprehended but in parts, tends rather to diſtract than ſatisfy the mind *. In like manner, the ſtrongeſt emotion produced by elevation is where the object is ſeen diſtinctly. A greater elevation leſſens in appearance the

* It is juſtly obſerved by Addiſon, that perhaps a man would have been more aſtoniſhed with the majeſtic air that appeared in one of Lyſippus's ſtatues of Alexander, though no bigger than the life, than he might have been with Mount Athos, had it been cut into the figure of the hero, according to the propoſal of Phidias, with a river in one hand and a city in the other. *Spectator*, N° 415.

object, till it vaniſh out of ſight with its pleaſant emotion. The ſame is equally remarkable in figurative grandeur and elevation, which ſhall be handled together, becauſe, as obſerved above, they are ſcarce diſtinguiſhable. Sentiments may be ſo ſtrained, as to become obſcure, or to exceed the capacity of the human mind. Againſt ſuch licence of imagination, every good writer will be upon his guard. And therefore it is of greater importance to obſerve, that even the true ſublime may be carried beyond that pitch which produces the higheſt entertainment. We are undoubtedly ſuſceptible of a greater elevation than can be inſpired by human actions the moſt heroic and magnanimous; witneſs what we feel from Milton's deſcription of ſuperior beings. Yet every man muſt be ſenſible of a more conſtant and pleaſant elevation, when the hiſtory of his own ſpecies is the ſubject. He enjoys an elevation equal to that of the greateſt hero, of an Alexander or a Cæſar, of a Brutus or an Epaminondas. He accompanies theſe heroes in their ſublimeſt ſentiments and moſt hazardous exploits, with

with a magnanimity equal to theirs; and finds it no ſtretch to preſerve the ſame tone of mind for hours together, without ſinking. The caſe is by no means the ſame in deſcribing the actions or qualities of ſuperior beings. The reader's imagination cannot keep pace with that of the poet; and the mind, unable to ſupport itſelf in a ſtrained elevation, falls as from a height; and the fall is immoderate like the elevation. Where this effect is not felt, it muſt be prevented by ſome obſcurity in the conception, which frequently attends the deſcription of unknown objects.

On the other hand, objects of ſight that are not remarkably great or high, ſcarce raiſe any emotion of grandeur or ſublimity; and the ſame holds in other objects. The mind is often rouſed and animated without being carried to the height of grandeur or ſublimity. This difference may be diſcerned in many ſorts of muſic, as well as in ſome muſical inſtruments. A kettledrum rouſes, and a hautboy is animating; but neither of them inſpire an emotion of ſublimity. Revenge animates the mind in a conſiderable

degree; but I think it never produceth an emotion that can be termed *grand* or *ſublime*; and I ſhall have occaſion afterward to obſerve, that no diſagreeable paſſion ever has this effect. I am willing to put this to the teſt, by placing before my reader the moſt ſpirited picture of revenge ever drawn. It is a ſpeech of Antony wailing over the body of Cæſar.

Wo to the hand that ſhed this coſtly blood!
Over thy wounds now do I propheſy,
(Which, like dumb mouths, do ope their ruby lips,
To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue),
A curſe ſhall light upon the kind of men;
Domeſtic fury, and fierce civil ſtrife,
Shall cumber all the parts of Italy;
Blood and deſtruction ſhall be ſo in uſe,
And dreadful objects ſo familiar,
That mothers ſhall but ſmile, when they behold
Their infants quarter'd by the hands of war,
All pity choak'd with cuſtom of fell deeds.
And Cæſar's ſpirit, ranging for revenge,
With *Atè* by his ſide come hot from hell,
Shall in theſe confines, with a monarch's voice,
Cry *Havock*, and let ſlip the dogs of war.

Julius Cæſar, act 3. *ſc.* 4.

When

When the ſublime is carried to its due height and circumſcribed within proper bounds, it inchants the mind and raiſes the moſt delightful of all emotions. The reader, ingroſſed by a ſublime object, feels himſelf raiſed as it were to a higher rank. When ſuch is the caſe, it is not wonderful that the hiſtory of conquerors and heroes ſhould be univerſally the favourite entertainment. And this fairly accounts for what I once erroneouſly ſuſpected to be a wrong bias originally in human nature. The groſſeſt acts of oppreſſion and injuſtice, ſcarce blemiſh the character of a great conqueror. We notwithſtanding warmly eſpouſe his intereſt, accompany him in his exploits, and are anxious for his ſucceſs. The ſplendor and enthuſiaſm of the hero transfuſed into the readers, elevate their minds far above the rules of juſtice, and render them in a great meaſure inſenſible of the wrong that is done:

For in thoſe days might only ſhall be admir'd
And valour and heroic virtue call'd;
To overcome in battle, and ſubdue
Nations, and bring home ſpoils with infinite
Manſlaughter,

Manſlaughter, ſhall be held the higheſt pitch
Of human glory, and for glory done
Of triumph, to be ſtyl'd great conquerors,
Patrons of mankind, gods, and ſons of gods.
Deſtroyers rightlier called, and plagues of men.
Thus fame ſhall be atchiev'd, renown on earth,
And what moſt merits fame in ſilence hid.

Milton, b. 11.

The attachment we have to things grand or lofty may be thought to proceed from an unwearied inclination we have to be exalted. No deſire is more univerſal than to be reſpected and honoured. Upon that account chiefly, are we ambitious of power, riches, titles, fame, which would ſuddenly loſe their reliſh, did they not raiſe us above others, and command ſubmiſſion and deference *. But the preference given to things grand and ſublime muſt have a deeper root in human nature. Many beſtow their time

* Honeſtum per ſe eſſe expetendum indicant pueri, in quibus, ut in ſpeculis, natura cernitur. Quanta ſtudia decertantium ſunt! Quanta ipſa certamina! Ut illi efferuntur lætitia, cum vicerunt! Ut pudet victos! Ut ſe accuſari nolunt! Ut cupiunt laudari! Quos illi labores non perferunt, ut æqualium principes ſint! *Cicero de finibus.*

upon

upon low and trifling amuſements, without ſhowing any deſire to be exalted. Yet theſe very perſons talk the ſame language with the reſt of mankind; and at leaſt in their judgement, if not in their taſte, prefer the more elevated pleaſures. They acknowledge a more refined taſte, and are aſhamed of their own as low and groveling. This ſentiment, conſtant and univerſal, muſt be the work of nature; and it plainly indicates an original attachment in human nature to every object that elevates the mind. Some men may have a greater reliſh for an object not of the higheſt rank: but they are conſcious of the common nature of man, and that it ought not to be ſubjected to their peculiar taſte.

The irregular influence of grandeur, reaches alſo to other matters. However good, honeſt, or uſeful, a man may be, he is not ſo much reſpected, as one of a more elevated character is, though of leſs integrity; nor do the misfortunes of the former affect us ſo much as thoſe of the latter. I add, becauſe it cannot be diſguiſed, that the remorſe which attends breach of

of engagement, is in a great meaſure proportioned to the figure that the injured perſon makes. The vows and proteſtations of lovers are an illuſtrious example of this obſervation; for theſe commonly are little regarded when made to women of inferior rank.

What I have ſaid ſuggeſts a capital rule for reaching the ſublime in ſuch works of art as are ſuſceptible of it; and that is, to put in view thoſe parts or circumſtances only which make the greateſt figure, keeping out of ſight every thing that is low or trivial. Such judicious ſelection of capital circumſtances, is by an eminent critic ſtyled *grandeur of manner* *. The mind, from an elevation inſpired by important objects, cannot, without reluctance, be forced down to beſtow any ſhare of its attention upon trifles. In none of the fine arts is there ſo great ſcope for this rule as in poetry, which, by that means, enjoys a remarkable power of beſtowing upon objects and events an air of grandeur. When we are ſpectators, every

* Spectator, N° 415.

minute

minute object preſents itſelf in its order. But in deſcribing at ſecond hand, theſe are laid aſide, and the capital objects are brought cloſe together. A judicious taſte in ſelecting, after this manner, the moſt intereſting incidents to give them an united force, accounts for a fact which at firſt ſight may appear ſurpriſing, that we are more moved by a poetical narrative at ſecond hand, than when we are ſpectators of the event itſelf in all its circumſtances.

Longinus exemplifies the foregoing rule by a compariſon of two paſſages *. The firſt from Ariſtæus is thus tranſlated.

Ye pow'rs, what madneſs! how on ſhips ſo frail
(Tremendous thought!) can thoughtleſs mortals
ſail?
For ſtormy ſeas they quit the pleaſing plain,
Plant woods in waves and dwell amidſt the main.
Far o'er the deep (a trackleſs path) they go,
And wander oceans in purſuit of wo.
No eaſe their hearts, no reſt their eyes can find,
On heaven their looks, and on the waves their
mind.

* Chap. 8. of the Sublime.

Sunk are their ſpirits, while their arms they rear,
And gods are wearied with their fruitleſs prayer.

The other from Homer I ſhall give in Pope's tranſlation.

Burſts as a wave that from the cloud impends,
And ſwell'd with tempeſts on the ſhip deſcends.
White are the decks with foam: the winds aloud
Howl o'er the maſts, and ſing through every ſhrowd.
Pale, trembling, tir'd, the ſailors freeze with fears,
And inſtant death on every wave appears.

In the latter paſſage, the moſt ſtriking circumſtances are ſelected to fill the mind with the grand and terrible. The former is a collection of minute and low circumſtances, which ſcatter the thought and make no impreſſion. The paſſage at the ſame time is full of verbal antitheſes and low conceit, extremely improper in a ſcene of diſtreſs. But this laſt obſervation is made occaſionally only, as it belongs not to the preſent ſubject.

The following paſſage from the twenty-firſt book of the Odyſſey, deviates widely from

from the rule above laid down. It concerns that part of the hiſtory of Penelope and her ſuitors, in which ſhe is made to declare in favour of him who ſhould prove the moſt dexterous in ſhooting with the bow of Ulyſſes.

Now gently winding up the fair aſcent,
By many an eaſy ſtep, the matron went:
Then o'er the pavement glides with grace divine,
(With poliſh'd oak the level pavements ſhine);
The folding gates a dazling light diſplay'd,
With pomp of various architrave o'erlay'd.
The bolt, obedient to the ſilken ſtring,
Forſakes the ſtaple as ſhe pulls the ring;
The wards reſpondent to the key turn round;
The bars fall back; the flying valves reſound.
Loud as a bull makes hill and valley ring;
So roar'd the lock when it releas'd the ſpring.
She moves majeſtic through the wealthy room
Where treaſur'd garments caſt a rich perfume;
There from the column where aloft it hung,
Reach'd, in its ſplendid caſe, the bow unſtrung.

Virgil ſometimes errs againſt this rule. In the following paſſages minute circumſtances are brought into full view; and what is ſtill worſe, they are deſcribed in all

the ſublimity of poetical deſcription. *Æneid*, *L.* 1. *l.* 214. *to* 219. *L.* 6. *l.* 176. *to* 182. *L.* 6. *l.* 212. *to* 231. And the laſt, which is a deſcription of a funeral, is the leſs excuſeable, as it relates to a man who makes no figure in the poem.

The ſpeech of Clytemneſtra, deſcending from her chariot in the Iphigenia of Euripides, beginning of act 3. is ſtuffed with a number of low, common, and trivial circumſtances.

But of all writers Lucan in this article is the moſt injudicious. The ſea-fight betwixt the Romans and Maſſilians *, is deſcribed ſo much in detail without exhibiting any grand or general view, that the reader is quite fatigued with endleſs circumſtances, and never feels any degree of elevation. And yet there are ſome fine incidents, thoſe for example of the two brothers, and of the old man and his ſon, which, ſeparated from the reſt, would affect us greatly. But Lucan once engaged in a deſcription, knows no bounds. See other paſſages of the ſame

* Lib. 3. beginning at line 567.

kind,

kind, *L.* 4. *l.* 292. *to* 337. *L.* 4. *l.* 750. *to* 765. The epiſode of the ſorcereſs Erictho, end of book 6. is intolerably minute and prolix.

To theſe I venture to oppoſe a paſſage from an old hiſtorical ballad:

Go, little page, tell Hardiknute
That lives on hill ſo high *,
To draw his ſword, the dread of faes,
And haſte to follow me.
The little page flew ſwift as dart
Flung by his maſter's arm.
Come down, come down, Lord Hardiknute,
And rid your king from harm.

This rule is alſo applicable to other fine arts. In painting it is eſtabliſhed, that the principal figure muſt be put in the ſtrongeſt light; that the beauty of attitude conſiſts in placing the nobler parts moſt in view, and in ſuppreſſing the ſmaller parts as much as poſſible; that the folds of the drapery muſt be few and large; that foreſhortenings are bad, becauſe they make the parts ap-

* *High*, in the old Scotch language, is pronounced *hee*.

pear

pear little; and that the muſcles ought to be kept as entire as poſſible, without being divided into ſmall ſections. Every one at preſent is ſenſible of the importance of this rule when applied to gardening, in oppoſition to the antiquated taſte of parterres ſplit into a thouſand ſmall parts in the ſtricteſt regularity of figure. Thoſe who have ſucceeded beſt in architecture, have governed themſelves by this rule in all their models.

Another rule chiefly regards the ſublime, though it may be applied to every literary performance intended for amuſement; and that is, to avoid as much as poſſible abſtract and general terms. Such terms, perfectly well fitted for reaſoning and for conveying inſtruction, ſerve but imperfectly the ends of poetry. They ſtand upon the ſame footing with mathematical ſigns, contrived to expreſs our thoughts in a conciſe manner. But images, which are the life of poetry, cannot be raiſed in any perfection, otherwiſe than by introducing particular objects. General terms, that comprehend a number of individuals, muſt be excepted from this rule. Our kindred, our clan, our country,

and

and words of the like import, though they ſcarce raiſe any image, have notwithſtanding a wonderful power over our paſſions. The greatneſs of the complex object overbalances the obſcurity of the image.

What I have further to ſay upon this ſubject, ſhall be comprehended in a few obſervations. A man is capable of being raiſed ſo much above his ordinary pitch by an emotion of grandeur, that it is extremely difficult by a ſingle thought or expreſſion to produce that emotion in perfection. The riſe muſt be gradual and the reſult of reiterated impreſſions. The effect of a ſingle expreſſion can be but momentary; and if one feel ſuddenly ſomewhat like a ſwelling or exaltation of mind, the emotion vaniſheth as ſoon as felt. Single expreſſions, I know, are often juſtly cited as examples of the ſublime. But then their effect is nothing compared with a grand ſubject diſplayed in its capital parts. I ſhall give a few examples, that the reader may judge for himſelf. In the famous action of Thermopylæ, where Leonidas the Spartan King with his choſen band fighting for their country,

country, were cut off to the laſt man, a ſaying is reported of Dieneces one of the band, which, expreſſing chearful and undiſturbed bravery, is well intitled to the firſt place in examples of this kind. Talking of the number of their enemies, it was obſerved, that the arrows ſhot by ſuch a multitude would intercept the light of the ſun. So much the better, ſays he; for we ſhall then fight in the ſhade *.

Somerſet. Ah! Warwick, Warwick, wert thou
as we are,
We might recover all our loſs again.
The Queen from France hath brought a puiſſant
power,
Ev'n now we heard the news. Ah! couldſt thou
fly!
Warwick. Why, then I would not fly.
Third part, Henry VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 3.

Such a ſentiment from a man expiring of his wounds, is truly heroic, and muſt elevate the mind to the greateſt height that can be done by a ſingle expreſſion. It will not

* Herodotus, book 7.

ſuffer

ſuffer in a compariſon with the famous ſentiment *Qu'il mourut* in Corneille's Horace. The latter is a ſentiment of indignation merely, the former of invincible fortitude.

In oppoſition to theſe examples, to cite many a ſublime paſſage, enriched with the fineſt images, and dreſſed in the moſt nervous expreſſions, would ſcarce be fair. I ſhall produce but one inſtance from Shakeſpear, which ſets a few objects before the eye, without much pomp of language. It works its effect, by repreſenting theſe objects in a climax, raiſing the mind higher and higher till it feel the emotion of grandeur in perfection.

The cloud-capt tow'rs, the gorgeous palaces,
The ſolemn temples, the great globe itſelf,
Yea all which it inherit, ſhall diſſolve, *&c.*

The cloud-capt tow'rs produce an elevating emotion, heightened by the *gorgeous palaces*. And the mind is carried ſtill higher and higher by the images that follow. Succeſſive images, making thus ſtronger and ſtronger impreſſions, muſt elevate more than any ſingle image can do.

I proceed to another obſervation. In the chapter of beauty it is remarked, that regularity is required in ſmall figures, and order in ſmall groups; but that in advancing gradually from ſmall to great, regularity and order are leſs and leſs required. This remark ſerves to explain the extreme delight we have in viewing the face of nature, when ſufficiently enriched and diverſified by objects. The bulk of the objects ſeen in a natural landſcape are beautiful, and ſome of them grand. A flowing river, a ſpreading oak, a round hill, an extended plain, are delightful; and even a rugged rock or barren heath, though in themſelves diſagreeable, contribute by contraſt to the beauty of the whole. Joining to theſe, the verdure of the fields, the mixture of light and ſhade, and the ſublime canopy ſpread over all; it will not appear wonderful, that ſo extenſive a group of glorious objects ſhould ſwell the heart to its utmoſt bounds, and raiſe the ſtrongeſt emotion of grandeur. The ſpectator is conſcious of an enthuſiaſm, which cannot bear confinement nor the ſtrictneſs of regularity and order. He loves

to

to range at large; and is ſo inchanted with ſhining objects, as to neglect ſlight beauties or defects. Thus it is, that the delightful emotion of grandeur, depends little on order and regularity. And when the emotion is at its height by a ſurvey of the greateſt objects, order and regularity are almoſt totally diſregarded.

The ſame obſervation is applicable in ſome meaſure to works of art. In a ſmall building the ſlighteſt irregularity is diſagreeable. In a magnificent palace or a large Gothic church, irregularities are leſs regarded. In an epic poem we pardon many negligences, which would be intolerable in a ſonnet or epigram. Notwithſtanding ſuch exceptions, it may be juſtly laid down for a rule, That in all works of art, order and regularity ought to be governing principles. And hence the obſervation of Longinus *, "In works of art we have regard to exact "proportion; in thoſe of nature, to gran-"deur and magnificence."

I ſhall add but one other obſervation,

* Chap. 30.

That no means can be more ſucceſsfully employed to ſink and depreſs the mind than grandeur or ſublimity. By the artful introduction of an humbling object, the fall is great in proportion to the former elevation. Of this doctrine Shakeſpear affords us a beautiful illuſtration, in a paſſage part of which is cited above for another purpoſe:

The cloud-capt tow'rs, the gorgeous palaces,
The ſolemn temples, the great globe itſelf,
Yea all which it inherit, ſhall diſſolve,
And like the baſeleſs fabric of a viſion
Leave not a rack behind——

Tempeſt, act 4. *ſc.* 4.

The elevation of the mind in the former part of this beautiful paſſage, makes the fall great in proportion when the moſt humbling of all images is introduced, that of an utter diſſolution of the earth and its inhabitants. A ſentiment makes not the ſame impreſſion in a cool ſtate, that it does when the mind is warmed; and a depreſſing or melancholy ſentiment makes the ſtrongeſt impreſſion, when it brings down the mind from its higheſt ſtate of elevation or chearfulneſs.

This

This indirect effect of elevation to ſink the mind, is ſometimes produced without the intervention of any humbling image. There was occaſion above to remark, that in deſcribing ſuperior beings, the reader's imagination, unable to ſupport itſelf in a ſtrained elevation, falls often as from a height, and ſinks even below its ordinary tone. The following inſtance comes luckily in view; for a better illuſtration cannot be given: "God ſaid, Let there be light, "and there was light." Longinus cites this paſſage from Moſes as a ſhining example of the ſublime; and it is ſcarce poſſible in fewer words, to convey ſo clear an image of the infinite power of the Deity. But then it belongs to the preſent ſubject to remark, that the emotion of ſublimity raiſed by this image is but momentary; and that the mind, unable to ſupport itſelf in an elevation ſo much above nature, immediately ſinks down into humility and veneration for a being ſo far exalted above us groveling mortals. Every one is acquainted with a diſpute about this paſſage betwixt

two French critics *, the one poſitively affirming, the other as poſitively denying, it to be ſublime. What I have opened, ſhows that both of them have reached the truth, but neither of them the whole truth. Every one of taſte muſt be ſenſible, that the primary effect of this paſſage is an emotion of grandeur. This ſo far juſtifies Boileau. But then every one of taſte muſt be equally ſenſible, that the emotion is merely a flaſh, which vaniſheth inſtantly, and gives way to the deepeſt humility and veneration. This indirect effect of ſublimity, juſtifies Huet on the other hand, who being a man of true piety, and perhaps of inferior imagination, felt the humbling paſſions more ſenſibly than his antagoniſt. And even laying aſide any peculiarity of character, Huet's opinion may I think be defended as the more ſolid; upon the following account, that in ſuch images, the depreſſing emotions are the more ſenſibly felt, and have the longer endurance.

The ſtraining an elevated ſubject beyond

* Boileau and Huet.

due

due bounds and beyond the reach of an ordinary conception, is not a vice ſo frequent as to require the correction of criticiſm. But falſe ſublime is a rock which writers of more fire than judgement generally ſplit on. And therefore a collection of examples may be of uſe as a beacon to future adventurers. One ſpecies of falſe ſublime, known by the name of *bombaſt*, is common among writers of a mean genius. It is a ſerious endeavour, by ſtrained deſcription, to raiſe a low or familiar ſubject above its rank; which inſtead of being ſublime, never fails to be ridiculous. I am extremely ſenſible how prone the mind is, in ſome animating paſſions, to magnify its objects beyond natural bounds. But ſuch hyperbolical deſcription has its limits. If carried beyond the impulſe of the propenſity, the colouring no longer pleaſes: it degenerates into the burleſque. Take the following examples.

Sejanus. ——— Great and high
The world knows only two, that's Rome and I.
My roof receives me not; 'tis air I tread,

And

And at each ſtep I feel my advanc'd head
Knock out a ſtar in heav'n.

Sejanus, Ben Johnſon, act 5.

A writer who has no natural elevation of genius, is extremely apt to deviate into bombaſt. He ſtrains above his genius; and the violent effort he makes carries him generally beyond the bounds of propriety. Boileau expreſſes this happily:

L'autre à peur de ramper, il ſe perd dans la nue *.

The ſame author Ben Johnſon abounds in the bombaſt:

——————— The mother,
Th' expulſed Apicata, finds them there;
Whom when ſhe ſaw lie ſpread on the degrees,
After a world of fury on herſelf,
Tearing her hair, defacing of her face,
Beating her breaſts and womb, kneeling amaz'd,
Crying to heav'n, then to them; at laſt
Her drowned voice got up above her woes:
And with ſuch black and bitter execrations,
(As might affright the gods, and force the ſun
Run backward to the eaſt; nay, make the old

* L'art poet. chant 1. l. 68.

Deformed

Deformed Chaos riſe again t' o'erwhelm
Them, us, and all the world) ſhe fills the air,
Upbraids the heavens with their partial dooms,
Defies their tyrannous powers, and demands
What ſhe and thoſe poor innocents have tranſ-
greſs'd,
That they muſt ſuffer ſuch a ſhare in vengeance.
Sejanus, act 5. ſc. laſt.

——————Lentulus, the man,
If all our fire were out, would fetch down new,
Out of the hand of Jove; and rivet him
To Caucaſus, ſhould he but frown; and let
His own gaunt eagle fly at him to tire.
Catiline, act 3.

Can theſe, or ſuch, be any aids to us?
Look they as they were built to ſhake the world,
Or be a moment to our enterpriſe?
A thouſand, ſuch as they are, could not make
One atom of our ſouls. They ſhould be men
Worth heaven's fear, that looking up, but thus,
Would make Jove ſtand upon his guard, and draw
Himſelf within his thunder; which, amaz'd,
He ſhould diſcharge in vain, and they unhurt.
Or, if they were, like Capaneus at Thebes,
They ſhould hang dead upon the higheſt ſpires,
And aſk the ſecond bolt to be thrown down.
Why Lentulus talk you ſo long? This time

Had been enough t' have ſcatter'd all the ſtars,
T' have quench'd the ſun and moon, and made the world
Deſpair of day, or any light but ours.

Catiline, act 4.

This is the language of a madman:

Guilford. Give way, and let the guſhing torrent come,
Behold the tears we bring to ſwell the deluge,
Till the flood riſe upon the guilty world
And make the ruin common.

Lady Jane Gray, act 4. near the end.

Another ſpecies of falſe ſublime, is ſtill more faulty than bombaſt; and that is, to force an elevation by introducing imaginary beings without preſerving any propriety in their actions; as if it were lawful to aſcribe every extravagance and inconſiſtence to beings of the poet's creation. No writers are more licentious in this article than Johnſon and Dryden.

Methinks I ſee Death and the furies waiting
What we will do, and all the heaven at leiſure
For the great ſpectacle. Draw then your ſwords:

And

And if our deſtiny envy our virtue
The honour of the day, yet let us care
To ſell ourſelves at ſuch a price, as may
Undo the world to buy us, and make Fate,
While ſhe tempts ours, to fear her own eſtate.

Catiline, act 5.

———————The furies ſtood on hills
Circling the place, and trembled to ſee men
Do more than they: whilſt Piety left the field,
Griev'd for that ſide, that in ſo bad a cauſe
They knew not what a crime their valour was.
The Sun ſtood ſtill, and was, behind the cloud
The battle made, ſeen ſweating to drive up
His frighted horſe, whom ſtill the noiſe drove backward.

Ibid. act. 5.

Oſmyn. While we indulge our common happineſs,
He is forgot by whom we all poſſeſs,
The brave Almanzor, to whoſe arms we owe
All that we did, and all that we ſhall do;
Who like a tempeſt that outrides the wind,
Made a juſt battle ere the bodies join'd.
Abdalla. His victories we ſcarce could keep in view,
Or poliſh 'em ſo faſt as he rough drew.

Abdemelech. Fate after him below with pain did
move,
And Victory could ſcarce keep pace above.
Death did at length ſo many ſlain forget,
And loſt the tale, and took 'em by the great.
Conqueſt of Granada, act. 2. at beginning.

The gods of Rome fight for ye; loud Fame calls
ye,
Pitch'd on the topleſs Apenine, and blows
To all the under world, all nations,
The ſeas and unfrequented deſerts, where the
ſnow dwells,
Wakens the ruin'd monuments, and there
Where nothing but eternal death and ſleep is,
Informs again the dead bones.
Beaumont and Fletcher, Bonduca, act. 3. ſc. 3.

I cloſe with the following obſervation, That an actor upon the ſtage may be guilty of bombaſt as well as an author in his cloſet. A certain manner of acting, which is grand when ſupported by dignity in the ſentiment and force in the expreſſion, is ridiculous where the ſentiment is mean, and the expreſſion flat.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Motion and Force.

THAT motion is agreeable to the eye without relation to purpoſe or deſign, may appear from the amuſement it gives to infants. Juvenile exerciſes are reliſhed chiefly upon that account.

If to ſee a body in motion be agreeable, one will be apt to conclude, that to ſee it at reſt is diſagreeable. But we learn from experience, that this would be a raſh concluſion. Reſt is one of thoſe circumſtances that are neither agreeable nor diſagreeable. It is viewed with perfect indifferency. And happy it is for mankind that the matter is ſo ordered. If reſt were agreeable, it would diſincline us to motion, by which all things are performed. If it were diſagreeable, it would be a ſource of perpetual uneaſineſs; for the bulk of the things we ſee appear to be at reſt.

reſt. A ſimilar inſtance of deſigning wiſdom I have had occaſion to explain, in oppoſing grandeur to littleneſs, and elevation to lowneſs of place *. Even in the ſimpleſt matters, the finger of God is conſpicuous. The happy adjuſtment of the internal nature of man to his external circumſtances, diſplayed in the inſtances here given, is indeed admirable.

Motion is certainly agreeable in all its varieties of quickneſs and ſlowneſs. But motion long continued admits ſome exceptions. That degree of continued motion which correſponds to the natural courſe of our perceptions, is the moſt agreeable †. The quickeſt motion is for an inſtant delightful. But it ſoon appears to be too rapid. It becomes painful, by forcibly accelerating the courſe of our perceptions. Slow continued motion becomes diſagreeable for an oppoſite reaſon, that it retards the natural courſe of our perceptions.

There are other varieties in motion, be-

* See chap. 4.

† See chap. 9.

ſide

ſide quickneſs and ſlowneſs, that make it more or leſs agreeable. Regular motion is preferred before what is irregular, witneſs the motion of the planets in orbits nearly circular. The motion of the comets in orbits leſs regular, is leſs agreeable.

Motion uniformly accelerated, reſembling an aſcending ſeries of numbers, is more agreeable than when uniformly retarded. Motion upward is agreeable by the elevation of the moving body. What then ſhall we ſay of downward motion regularly accelerated by the force of gravity, compared with upward motion regularly retarded by the ſame force? Which of theſe is the moſt agreeable? This queſtion is not eaſily ſolved.

Motion in a ſtraight line is no doubt agreeable. But we prefer undulating motion, as of waves, of a flame, of a ſhip under ſail. Such motion is more free, and alſo more natural. Hence the beauty of a ſerpentine river.

The eaſy and ſliding motion of fluids, from the lubricity and incoherence of their parts, is agreeable upon that account. But

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the agreeableneſs chiefly depends upon the following circumſtance, that the motion is perceived, not as of one body, but as of an endleſs number moving together with order and regularity. Poets ſtruck with this beauty, draw more images from fluids than from ſolids.

Force is of two kinds; one quieſcent, and one exerted by motion. The former, dead weight for example, muſt be laid aſide; for a body at reſt is not by that circumſtance either agreeable or diſagreeable. Moving force only belongs to the preſent ſubject; and though it is not ſeparable from motion, yet by the power of abſtraction, either of them may be conſidered independent of the other. Both of them are agreeable, becauſe both of them include activity. It is agreeable to ſee a thing move: to ſee it moved, as when it is dragged or puſhed along, is neither agreeable nor diſagreeable, more than when at reſt. It is agreeable to ſee a thing exert force; but it makes not the thing either agreeable or diſagreeable, to ſee force exerted upon it.

Though motion and force are each of them

them agreeable, the impreſſions they make are different. This difference, clearly felt, is not eaſily deſcribed. All we can ſay is, that the emotion raiſed by a moving body, reſembles its cauſe: it feels as if the mind were carried along. The emotion raiſed by force exerted, reſembles alſo its cauſe: it feels as if force were exerted within the mind.

To illuſtrate this difference, I give the following examples. It has been explained why ſmoke aſcending in a calm day, ſuppoſe from a cottage in a wood, is an agreeable object *. Landſcape-painters are fond of this object, and introduce it upon all occaſions. As the aſcent is natural and without effort, it is delightful in a calm ſtate of mind. It makes an impreſſion of the ſame ſort with that of a gently-flowing river, but more agreeable, becauſe aſcent is more to our taſte than deſcent. A fire-work or a *jet d'eau* rouſes the mind more; becauſe the beauty of force viſibly exerted, is ſuperadded to that of upward motion.

* Chap. I.

To a man reclining indolently upon a bank of flowers, aſcending ſmoke in a ſtill morning is delightful. But a fire-work or a *jet d'eau* rouſes him from this ſupine poſture, and puts him in motion.

A *jet d'eau* makes an impreſſion diſtinguiſhable from that of a water-fall. Downward motion being natural and without effort, tends rather to quiet the mind than to rouſe it. Upward motion, on the contrary, overcoming the reſiſtance of gravity, makes an impreſſion of a great effort, and thereby rouſes and enlivens the mind.

The public games of the Greeks and Romans, which gave ſo much entertainment to the ſpectators, conſiſted chiefly in exerting force, wreſtling, leaping, throwing great ſtones, and ſuch like trials of ſtrength. When great force is exerted, the effort felt within the mind produces great life and vivacity. The effort may be ſuch, as in ſome meaſure to overpower the mind. Thus the exploſion of gun-powder, the violence of a torrent, the weight of a mountain, and the cruſh of an earthquake, create aſtoniſhment rather than pleaſure.

No

No quality nor circumſtance contributes more to grandeur than force, eſpecially as exerted by ſenſible beings. I cannot make this more evident than by the following citations.

——————Him the almighty power
Hurl'd headlong flaming from th' ethereal ſky,
With hideous ruin and combuſtion, down
To bottomleſs perdition, there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire,
Who durſt defy th' Omnipotent to arms.

Paradiſe Loſt, book 1.

——————Now ſtorming fury roſe,
And clamour ſuch as heard in heaven till now
Was never; arms on armour claſhing bray'd
Horrible diſcord, and the madding wheels
Of brazen chariots rag'd; dire was the noiſe
Of conflict; over head the diſmal hiſs
Of fiery darts in flaming vollies flew,
And flying vaulted either hoſt with fire.
So under fiery cope together ruſh'd
Both battles main, with ruinous aſſault
And inextinguiſhable rage: all heav'n
Reſounded; and had earth been then, all earth
Had to her centre ſhook.

Ibid, book 6.

They ended parle, and both addreſs'd for fight
Unſpeakable; for who, though with the tongue
Of angels, can relate, or to what things
Liken on earth conſpicuous, that may lift
Human imagination to ſuch height
Of godlike pow'r? for likeſt gods they ſeem'd,
Stood they or mov'd, in ſtature, motion, arms,
Fit to decide the empire of great Heav'n.
Now wav'd their fiery ſwords, and in the air
Made horrid circles; two broad ſuns their ſhields
Blaz'd oppoſite, while Expectation ſtood
In horror: from each hand with ſpeed retir'd,
Where erſt was thickeſt fight, th'angelic throng,
And left large field, unſafe within the wind
Of ſuch commotion; ſuch as, to ſet forth
Great things by ſmall, if Nature's concord broke,
Among the conſtellations war were ſprung,
Two planets, ruſhing from aſpect malign
Of fierceſt oppoſition, in mid ſky,
Should combat, and their jarring ſpheres confound.

Ibid, book 6.

We ſhall now conſider the effect of motion and force in conjunction. In contemplating the planetary ſyſtem, what ſtrikes us the moſt, is the ſpherical figures of the planets and their regular motions. The conception we have of their activity

and

and enormous bulk is more obſcure. The beauty accordingly of this ſyſtem, raiſes a more lively emotion than its grandeur. But if we could imagine ourſelves ſpectators comprehending the whole ſyſtem at one view, the activity and irreſiſtible force of theſe immenſe bodies would fill us with amazement. Nature cannot furniſh another ſcene ſo grand.

Motion and force, agreeable in themſelves, are alſo agreeable by their utility when employed as means to accompliſh ſome beneficial end. Hence the ſuperior beauty of ſome machines, where force and motion concur to perform the work of numberleſs hands. Hence the beautiful motions, firm and regular, of a horſe trained for war. Every ſingle ſtep is the fitteſt that can be for obtaining the end propoſed. But the grace of motion is viſible chiefly in man, not only for the reaſons mentioned, but alſo becauſe every geſture is ſignificant. The power however of agreeable motion is not a common talent. Every limb of the human body has a good and a bad, an agreeable and diſagreeable action. Some motions

tions are extremely graceful, others are plain and vulgar: ſome expreſs dignity, others meanneſs. But the pleaſure here, ariſing not ſingly from the beauty of motion, but from indicating character and ſentiment, belongs to a different chapter *.

I ſhould conclude with the final cauſe of the reliſh we have for motion and force, were it not ſo evident as to require no explanation. We are placed here in ſuch circumſtances as to make induſtry eſſential to our well-being; for without induſtry the plaineſt neceſſaries of life are not to be obtained. When our ſituation therefore in this world requires activity and a conſtant exertion of motion and force, Providence indulgently provides for our welfare in making theſe agreeable to us. It would be a blunder in our nature, to make things diſagreeable that we depend on for exiſtence; and even to make them indifferent, would tend to make us relax greatly from that degree of activity which is indiſpenſable.

* Chap. 15.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Novelty, and the unexpected appearance of objects.

OF all the particulars that contribute to raiſe emotions, not excepting beauty, or even greatneſs, novelty hath the moſt powerful influence. A new ſpectacle attracts multitudes. It produceth inſtantaneouſly an emotion which totally occupies the mind, and for a time excludes all other objects. The ſoul ſeems to meet the ſtrange appearance with a certain elongation of itſelf; and all is huſhed in cloſe contemplation. In ſome inſtances, there is perceived a degree of agony, attended with external ſymptoms extremely expreſſive. Converſation among the vulgar never is more intereſting, than when it runs upon ſtrange objects and extraordinary events. Men tear themſelves from their native country in ſearch of things rare and new; and curioſity

curioſity converts into a pleaſure, the fatigues, and even perils of travelling. To what cauſe ſhall we aſcribe theſe ſingular appearances? The plain account of the matter follows. Curioſity is implanted in human nature, for a purpoſe extremely beneficial, that of acquiring knowledge. New and ſtrange objects, above all others, excite our curioſity; and its gratification is the emotion above deſcribed, known by the name of *wonder*. This emotion is diſtinguiſhed from *admiration*. Novelty where-ever found, whether in a quality or action, is the cauſe of wonder: admiration is directed upon the operator who performs any thing wonderful.

During infancy, every new object is probably the occaſion of wonder, in ſome degree; becauſe, during infancy, every object at firſt is ſtrange as well as new. But as objects are rendered familiar by cuſtom, we ceaſe by degrees to wonder at new appearances that have any reſemblance to what we are acquainted with. A thing muſt be ſingular as well as new, to excite our curioſity and to raiſe our wonder. To ſave multiplying words, I would be underſtood to comprehend

comprehend both circumſtances when I hereafter talk of novelty.

In an ordinary train of perceptions where one thing introduces another, not a ſingle object makes its appearance unexpectedly *. The mind thus prepared for the reception of its objects, admits them one after another without perturbation. But when a thing breaks in unexpectedly and without the preparation of any connection, it raiſes a ſingular emotion known by the name of *ſurpriſe*. This emotion may be produced by the moſt familiar object, as when one accidentally meets a friend who was reported to be dead; or a man in high life, lately a beggar. On the other hand, a new object, however ſtrange, will not produce this emotion if the ſpectator be prepared for the ſight. An elephant in India will not ſurpriſe a traveller who goes to ſee one; and yet its novelty will raiſe his wonder. An Indian in Britain would be much ſurpriſed to ſtumble upon an elephant feeding at large in the open fields; but the creature

* See chap. 1.

itſelf, to which he was accuſtomed, would not raiſe his wonder.

Surpriſe thus in ſeveral reſpects differs from wonder. Unexpectedneſs is the cauſe of the former emotion: novelty is the cauſe of the latter. Nor differ they leſs in their nature and circumſtances, as will be explained by and by. With relation to one circumſtance they perfectly agree, which is the ſhortneſs of their duration. The inſtantaneous production of theſe emotions in perfection, may contribute to this effect, in conformity to a general law, That things ſoon decay which ſoon come to perfection. The violence of the emotions may alſo contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not ſuſceptible of increaſe, cannot have a long courſe. But their ſhort duration is occaſioned chiefly by that of their cauſes. We are ſoon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty ſoon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether theſe emotions be pleaſant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ſtrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities ſhould afford any matter for a

doubt.

doubt. But when we are ingroſſed by any emotion, there is no place for ſpeculation; and when ſufficiently calm for ſpeculation, it is not eaſy to recal the emotion with ſufficient accuracy. New objects are ſometimes terrible, ſometimes delightful. The terror which a tyger inſpires is greateſt at firſt, and wears off gradually by familiarity. On the other hand, even women will acknowledge, that it is novelty which pleaſes the moſt in a new faſhion. At this rate, it ſhould be thought, that wonder is not in itſelf pleaſant or painful, but that it aſſumes either quality according to circumſtances. This doctrine, however plauſible, muſt not paſs without examination. And when we reflect upon the principle of curioſity and its operations, a glimpſe of light gives ſome faint view of a different theory. Our curioſity is never more thoroughly gratified, than by new and ſingular objects. That very gratification is the emotion of wonder, which therefore, according to the analogy of nature, ought always to be pleaſant *.

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 2.

And indeed it would be a great defect in human nature, were the gratification of ſo uſeful a principle unpleaſant. But upon a more ſtrict ſcrutiny, we ſhall not have occaſion to mark curioſity as an exception from the general rule. A new object, it is true, that hath a threatening appearance, adds to our terror by its novelty. But from this experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itſelf diſagreeable. It is perfectly conſiſtent, that we ſhould be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another. A river in flood ſwelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object; and yet it may produce no ſmall degree of fear when we attempt to croſs it. Courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet when we view theſe qualities in an enemy, they ſerve to increaſe our terror *. In the ſame manner, novelty has two effects clearly diſtinguiſhable from each other. A new object, by gratifying curioſity, muſt always be agreeable. It may, at the ſame time, have an oppoſite effect indirectly, which is, to in-

* See chap. 4.

ſpire

ſpire terror. For when a new object appears in any degree dangerous, our ignorance of its powers and qualities affords ample ſcope for the imagination to dreſs it in the moſt frightful colours *. Thus the firſt ſight of a lion at ſome diſtance, may at the ſame inſtant produce two oppoſite feelings, the pleaſant emotion of wonder, and the painful paſſion of terror. The novelty of the object, produces the former directly, and contributes to the latter indirectly. Thus, when the ſubject is analized, we find, that the power which novelty hath indirectly to inflame terror, is perfectly conſiſtent with its being in every caſe agreeable. The matter may be put in a ſtill clearer light by varying the ſcene. If a lion be firſt ſeen from a place of ſafety, the ſpectacle is altogether agreeable without the leaſt mixture of terror. If again the firſt ſight put us within reach of this dangerous animal, our terror may be ſo great as quite to exclude any ſenſe of novelty. But this fact proves not

* Eſſays on the principles of morality and natural religion, part 2. eſſ. 6.

that

that wonder is painful: it proves only that wonder may be excluded by a more powerful paſſion. And yet it is this fact, which, in ſuperficial thinking, has thrown the ſubject into obſcurity. I preſume we may now boldly affirm, that wonder is in every caſe a pleaſant emotion. This is acknowledged as to all new objects that appear inoffenſive. And even as to objects that appear offenſive, I urge that the ſame muſt hold ſo long as the ſpectator can attend to the novelty.

Whether ſurpriſe be in itſelf pleaſant or painful, is a queſtion not leſs intricate than the former. It is certain, that ſurpriſe inflames our joy when unexpectedly we meet with an old friend: and not leſs our terror, when we ſtumble upon any thing noxious. To clear this point, we muſt trace it ſtep by ſtep. And the firſt thing to be remarked is, that in ſome inſtances an unexpected object overpowers the mind ſo as to produce a momentary ſtupefaction. An unexpected object, not leſs than one that is new, is apt to ſound an alarm and to raiſe terror. Man, naturally a defenceleſs being, is happily ſo conſtituted as to apprehend danger in all doubtful

doubtful caſes. Accordingly, where the object is dangerous, or appears ſo, the ſudden alarm it gives, without preparation, is apt totally to unhinge the mind, and for a moment to ſuſpend all the faculties, even thought itſelf *. In this ſtate a man is quite helpleſs; and if he move at all, is as likely to run upon the danger as from it. Surpriſe carried to this height, cannot be either pleaſant or painful; becauſe the mind, during ſuch momentary ſtupefaction, is in a good meaſure, if not totally, inſenſible.

If we then inquire for the character of this emotion, it muſt be where the unexpected object or event produceth leſs violent effects. And while the mind remains ſenſible of pleaſure and pain, is it not natural to ſuppoſe, that ſurpriſe, like wonder, ſhould have an invariable character? I am inclined however to think, that ſurpriſe has no invariable character, but aſſumes that of the object which raiſes it. Wonder is the gratification of a natural principle, and upon

* Hence the Latin names for ſurpriſe, *torpor*, *animi ſtupor*.

that

that account muſt be pleaſant. There, novelty is the capital circumſtance, which, for a time, is intitled to poſſeſs the mind entirely in one unvaried tone. The unexpected appearance of an object, ſeems not equally intitled to produce an emotion diſtinguiſhable from the emotion, pleaſant or painful, that is produced by the object in its ordinary appearance. It ought not naturally to have any effect, other than to ſwell that emotion, by making it more pleaſant or more painful than it commonly is. And this conjecture is confirmed by experience, as well as by language, which is built upon experience. When a man meets a friend unexpectedly, he is ſaid to be agreeably ſurpriſed; and when he meets an enemy unexpectedly, he is ſaid to be diſagreeably ſurpriſed. It appears then, that the ſole effect of ſurpriſe is to ſwell the emotion raiſed by the object. And this effect can be clearly explained. A tide of connected perceptions, glides gently into the mind, and produceth no perturbation. An object on the other hand breaking in unexpectedly, ſounds an alarm, rouſes the mind out of its calm

ſtate, and directs its whole attention upon the object, which, if agreeable, becomes doubly ſo. Several circumſtances concur to produce this effect. On the one hand, the agitation of the mind and its keen attention, prepare it in the moſt effectual manner for receiving a deep impreſſion. On the other hand, the object by its ſudden and unforeſeen appearance, makes an impreſſion, not gradually as expected objects do, but as at one ſtroke with its whole force. The circumſtances are preciſely ſimilar, where the object is in itſelf diſagreeable.

The pleaſure of novelty is eaſily diſtinguiſhed from that of variety. To produce the latter, a plurality of objects is neceſſary. The former ariſes from a circumſtance found in a ſingle object. Again, where objects, whether coexiſtent or in ſucceſſion, are ſufficiently diverſified, the pleaſure of variety is complete, though every ſingle object of the train be familiar. But the pleaſure of novelty, directly oppoſite to familiarity, requires no diverſification.

There are different degrees of novelty, and its effects are in proportion. The low-

eſt degree is found in objects that are ſurveyed a ſecond time after a long interval. That in this caſe an object takes on ſome appearance of novelty, is certain from experience. A large building of many parts variouſly adorned, or an extenſive field embelliſhed with trees, lakes, temples, ſtatues, and other ornaments, will appear new oftener than once. The memory of an object ſo complex is ſoon loſt; of its parts at leaſt, or of their arrangement. But experience teaches, that even without any decay of remembrance, abſence alone will give an air of novelty to a once familiar object; which is not ſurpriſing, becauſe familiarity wears off gradually by abſence. Thus a perſon with whom we have been intimate, returning after a long interval, appears like a new acquaintance. Diſtance of place contributes to this appearance, not leſs than diſtance of time. A friend after a ſhort abſence in a remote country, has the ſame air of novelty as if he had returned after a longer interval from a place nearer home. The mind forms a connection betwixt him and the remote country, and beſtows upon him the ſingularity

of

of the objects he has ſeen. When two things equally new and ſingular are preſented, the ſpectator balances betwixt them. But when told that one of them is the product of a diſtant quarter of the world, he no longer heſitates, but clings to this as the more ſingular. Hence the preference given to foreign luxuries and to foreign curioſities, which appear rare in proportion to their original diſtance.

The next degree of novelty, mounting upward, is found in objects of which we have ſome information at ſecond hand. For deſcription, though it contribute to familiarity, cannot altogether remove the appearance of novelty when the object itſelf is preſented. The firſt ſight of a lion occaſions ſome wonder, after a thorough acquaintance with the correcteſt pictures or ſtatues of that animal.

A new object that bears ſome diſtant reſemblance to a known ſpecies, is an inſtance of a third degree of novelty. A ſtrong reſemblance among individuals of the ſame ſpecies, prevents almoſt entirely the effect of novelty; unleſs diſtance of

place or ſome other circumſtance concur. But where the reſemblance is faint, ſome degree of wonder is felt; and the emotion riſes in proportion to the faintneſs of the reſemblance.

The higheſt degree of wonder ariſeth from unknown objects that have no analogy to any ſpecies we are acquainted with. Shakeſpear in a ſimile introduces this ſpecies of novelty.

As glorious to the ſight
As is a winged meſſenger from heaven
Unto the white upturned wondring eye
Of mortals, that fall back to gaze on him
When he beſtrides the lazy-pacing clouds,
And ſails upon the boſom of the air.

Romeo and Juliet.

One example of this ſpecies of novelty deſerves peculiar attention; and that is, when an object altogether new is ſeen by one perſon only, and but for once. Theſe circumſtances heighten remarkably the emotion. The ſingularity of the condition of the ſpectator concurs with the ſingularity of

of the object, to inflame wonder to its higheſt pitch.

In explaining the effects of novelty, the place a being occupies in the ſcale of exiſtence, is a circumſtance that muſt not be omitted. Novelty in the individuals of a low claſs, is perceived with indifference, or with a very ſlight emotion. Thus a pebble, however ſingular in its appearance, ſcarce moves our wonder. The emotion riſes with the rank of the object; and, other circumſtances being equal, is ſtrongeſt in the higheſt order of exiſtence. A ſtrange animal affects us more than a ſtrange vegetable; and were we admitted to view ſuperior beings, our wonder would riſe proportionably; and accompanying Nature in her amazing works, be completed in the contemplation of the Deity.

However natural the love of novelty may be, it is a matter of experience, that thoſe who reliſh novelty the moſt, are careful to conceal its influence. This reliſh, it is true, prevails in children, in idle people, and in men of a weak mind. And yet, after all, why ſhould one be aſhamed for indulging

a natural propenſity? A diſtinction will explain this difficulty. No man is aſhamed to own, that he loves to contemplate new or ſtrange objects. He neither condemns himſelf nor is cenſured by others, for this appetite. But every man ſtudies to conceal, that he loves a thing or performs an action, merely for its novelty. The reaſon of the difference will ſet the matter in a clear light. Curioſity is a natural principle directed upon new and ſingular objects, in the contemplation of which its gratification conſiſts, without leading to any end other than knowledge. The man therefore who prefers any thing merely becauſe it is new, hath not this principle for his juſtification; nor indeed any good principle. Vanity is at the bottom, which eaſily prevails upon thoſe who have no taſte, to prefer things odd, rare, or ſingular, in order to diſtinguiſh themſelves from others. And in fact, the appetite for novelty, as above mentioned, reigns chiefly among perſons of a mean taſte, who are ignorant of refined and elegant pleaſures.

The gratification of curioſity, as mentioned

tioned above, is diſtinguiſhed by a proper name, *viz. wonder*; an honour denied to the gratification of any other principle, emotion, or paſſion, ſo far as I can recollect. This ſingularity indicates ſome important final cauſe, which I endeavour to unfold. An acquaintance with the various things that may affect us, and with their properties, is eſſential to our well-being. Nor will a ſlight or ſuperficial acquaintance be ſufficient. It ought to be ſo deeply ingraved on the mind, as to be ready for uſe upon every occaſion. Now, in order to a deep impreſſion, it is wiſely contrived, that things ſhould be introduced to our acquaintance, with a certain pomp and ſolemnity productive of a vivid emotion. When the impreſſion is once fairly made, the emotion of novelty, being no longer neceſſary, vaniſheth almoſt inſtantaneouſly; never to return, unleſs where the impreſſion happens to be obliterated by length of time or other means; in which caſe the ſecond introduction is nearly as ſolemn as the firſt.

Deſigning wiſdom is no where more legible than in this part of the human frame.

If

If new objects did not affect us in a very peculiar manner, their impreſſions would be ſo ſlight as ſcarce to be of any uſe in life. On the other hand, did objects continue to affect us as deeply as at firſt, the mind would be totally ingroſſed with them, and have no room left either for action or reflection.

The final cauſe of ſurpriſe is ſtill more evident than of novelty. Self-love makes us vigilantly attentive to ſelf-preſervation. But ſelf-love, which operates by means of reaſon and reflection, and impells not the mind to any particular object or from it, is a principle too cool for a ſudden emergency. An object breaking in unexpectedly, affords no time for deliberation; and, in this caſe, the agitation of ſurpriſe is artfully contrived to rouſe ſelf-love into action. Surpriſe gives the alarm, and if there be any appearance of danger, our whole force is inſtantly ſummoned up to ſhun or to prevent it.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Riſible Objects.

SUCH is the nature of man, that his powers and faculties are ſoon blunted by exerciſe. The returns of ſleep, ſuſpending all activity, are not alone ſufficient to preſerve him in vigor. During his waking hours, amuſement by intervals is requiſite to unbend his mind from ſerious occupation. The imagination, of all our faculties the moſt active, and not always at reſt even in ſleep, contributes more than any other cauſe to recruit the mind and reſtore its vigor, by amuſing us with gay and ludicrous images; and when relaxation is neceſſary, ſuch amuſement is much reliſhed. But there are other ſources of amuſement beſide the imagination. Many objects, natural as well as artificial, may be diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of *riſible*, becauſe they raiſe in us a peculiar emotion ex-

preſſed externally by *laughter*. This is a pleaſant emotion; and being alſo mirthful, it moſt ſucceſsfully unbends the mind and recruits the ſpirits.

Ludicrous is a general term, ſignifying, as we may conjecture from its derivation, what is playſome, ſportive, or jocular. *Ludicrous* therefore ſeems the genus, of which *riſible* is a ſpecies, limited as above to what makes us laugh.

However eaſy it may be, concerning any particular object, to ſay whether it be riſible or not; it ſeems difficult, if at all practicable, to eſtabliſh beforehand any general character by which objects of this kind may be diſtinguiſhed from others. Nor is this a ſingular caſe. Upon a review, we find the ſame difficulty in moſt of the articles already handled. There is nothing more eaſy, viewing a particular object, than to pronounce that it is beautiful or ugly, grand or little: but were we to attempt general rules for ranging objects under different claſſes, according to theſe qualities, we ſhould find ourſelves utterly at a loſs. There is a ſeparate cauſe which increaſes the difficulty

culty of diſtinguiſhing riſible objects by a general character. All men are not equally affected by riſible objects; and even the ſame perſon is more diſpoſed to laugh at one time than another. In high ſpirits a thing will make us laugh outright, that will ſcarce provoke a ſmile when we are in a grave mood. We muſt therefore abandon the thought of attempting general rules for diſtinguiſhing riſible objects from others. Riſible objects however are circumſcribed within certain limits, which I ſhall ſuggeſt, without pretending to any degree of accuracy. And, in the firſt place, I obſerve, that no object is riſible but what appears ſlight, little, or trifling. For man is ſo conſtituted as to be ſeriouſly affected with every thing that is of importance to his own intereſt or to that of others. Secondly, with reſpect to the works both of nature and of art, nothing is riſible but what deviates from the common nature of the ſubject: it muſt be ſome particular out of rule, ſome remarkable defect or exceſs, a very long viſage, for example, or a very ſhort one. Hence nothing juſt, proper, decent,

beautiful, proportioned, or grand, is riſible. A real diſtreſs raiſes pity, and therefore cannot be riſible. But a ſlight or imaginary diſtreſs, which moves not pity, is riſible. The adventure of the fulling-mills in Don Quixote is extremely riſible; ſo is the ſcene where Sancho, in a dark night, tumbles into a pit, and attaches himſelf to the ſide by hand and foot, there hanging in terrible diſmay till the morning, when he diſcovers himſelf to be within a foot of the bottom. A noſe remarkably long or ſhort is riſible; but to want the noſe altogether, far from provoking laughter, raiſes horror in the ſpectator.

From what is ſaid, it will readily be conjectured, that the emotion raiſed by a riſible object is of a nature ſo ſingular as ſcarce to find place while the mind is occupied with any other paſſion or emotion. And this conjecture is verified by experience. We ſcarce ever find this emotion blended with any other. One emotion I muſt except, and that is contempt raiſed by ſome ſort of improprieties. Every improper act inſpires us with ſome degree of contempt for the author.

author. And if an improper act be at the ſame time riſible and provoke laughter, of which blunders and abſurdities are noted inſtances, the two emotions of contempt and of laughter unite intimately in the mind, and produce externally what is termed *a laugh of deriſion* or *of ſcorn*. Hence objects that cauſe laughter, may be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds. They are either *riſible* or *ridiculous*. A riſible object is mirthful only; a ridiculous object is both mirthful and contemptible. The firſt raiſes an emotion of laughter that is altogether pleaſant: the emotion of laughter raiſed by the other, is qualified with that of contempt; and the mixed emotion, partly pleaſant partly painful, is termed *the emotion of ridicule*. I avenge myſelf of the pain a ridiculous object gives me by a laugh of deriſion. A riſible object, on the other hand, gives me no pain: it is altogether pleaſant by a certain ſort of titillation, which is expreſſed externally by mirthful laughter. Ridicule will be more fully explained afterward: the preſent chapter is appropriated to the other emotion.

Riſible objects are ſo common and ſo well underſtood,

underſtood, that it is unneceſſary to conſume paper or time upon them. Take the few following examples.

Falſtaff. I do remember him at Clement's inn, like a man made after ſupper of a cheeſe-paring. When he was naked, he was for all the world like a forked radiſh, with a head fantaſtically carved upon it with a knife.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 3. *ſc.* 5.

The foregoing is of diſproportion. The following examples are of ſlight or imaginary misfortunes.

Falſtaff. Go fetch me a quart of ſack, put a toaſt in't. Have I liv'd to be carried in a baſket, like a barrow of butcher's offal, and to be thrown into the Thames? Well, if I be ſerv'd ſuch another trick, I'll have my brains ta'en out and butter'd, and give them to a dog for a new-year's gift. The rogues ſlighted me into the river with as little remorſe as they would have drown'd a bitch's blind puppies, fifteen i' th' litter; and you may know by my ſize, that I have a kind of alacrity in ſinking: if the bottom were as deep as hell, I ſhould down. I had been drown'd, but that the ſhore was ſhelvy and ſhallow; a death that I abhor;

for

for the water ſwells a man: and what a thing ſhould I have been, when I had been ſwell'd? I ſhould have been a mountain of mummy.

Merry wives of Windſor, act 3. *ſc.* 15.

Falſtaff. Nay, you ſhall hear, Maſter Brook, what I have ſuffer'd to bring this woman to evil for your good. Being thus cramm'd in the baſket, a couple of Ford's knaves, his hinds, were call'd forth by their miſtreſs, to carry me in the name of foul cloaths to Datchet-lane. They took me on their ſhoulders, met the jealous knave their maſter in the door, who aſk'd them once or twice what they had in their baſket. I quak'd for fear, leſt the lunatic knave would have ſearch'd it; but Fate, ordaining he ſhould be a cuckold, held his hand. Well, on went he for a ſearch, and away went I for foul cloaths. But mark the ſequel, Maſter Brook. I ſuffer'd the pangs of three egregious deaths: firſt, an intolerable fright, to be detected by a jealous rotten bell-weather; next, to be compaſs'd like a good bilbo, in the circumference of a peck, hilt to point, heel to head; and then to be ſtopt in, like a ſtrong diſtillation, with ſtinking cloaths that fretted in their own greaſe. Think of that, a man of my kidney; think of that, that am as ſubject to heat as butter; a man of continual diſſolution and thaw; it was a miracle to 'ſcape ſuffocation.

tion. And in the height of this bath, when I was more than half-ſtew'd in greaſe, like a Dutch diſh, to be thrown into the Thames, and cool'd glowing hot, in that ſurge, like a horſe-ſhoe; think of that; hiſſing hot; think of that, Maſter Brook.

Merry wives of Windſor, act 3. ſc. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Reſemblance and Contraſt.

HAVING diſcuſſed thoſe qualities and circumſtances of ſingle objects that ſeem peculiarly connected with criticiſm, we proceed, according to the method propoſed in the chapter of beauty, to the relations of objects, beginning with the relations of reſemblance and contraſt.

Man being unavoidably connected with the beings around him, ſome acquaintance with their nature, their powers, and their qualities, is requiſite for regulating his conduct. As an incentive to acquire a branch of knowledge ſo eſſential to our well-being, motives alone of reaſon and intereſt are not ſufficient. Nature hath providently ſuperadded curioſity, a vigorous propenſity which never is at reſt. It is this propenſity which attaches us to every new object *; and in

* See chap. 6.

particular incites us to conſider objects in the way of compariſon, in order to diſcover their differences and reſemblances.

Reſemblance among objects of the ſame kind, and diſſimilitude among objects of different kinds, are too obvious and familiar to gratify our curioſity in any degree. The gratification lies in diſcovering differences among things where reſemblance prevails, and in diſcovering reſemblances where difference prevails. Thus a difference in individuals of the ſame kind of plants or animals is deemed a diſcovery, while the many particulars in which they agree are neglected: and in different kinds, any reſemblance is greedily remarked, without attending to the many particulars in which they differ.

A compariſon however may be too far ſtretched. When differences or reſemblances are carried beyond certain bounds, they appear ſlight and trivial; and for that reaſon will not be reliſhed by one of taſte. Yet ſuch propenſity is there to gratify paſſion, curioſity in particular, that even among good writers, we find many compariſons too ſlight to afford ſatisfaction. Hence the frequent inſtances

inſtances among logicians, of diſtinctions without any ſolid difference: and hence the frequent inſtances among poets and orators, of ſimiles without any juſt reſemblance. With regard to the latter, I ſhall confine myſelf to one inſtance, which will probably amuſe the reader, being a citation not from a poet nor orator, but from a grave author writing an inſtitute of law. "Our ſtudent "ſhall obſerve, that the knowledge of the "law is like a deep well, out of which "each man draweth according to the "ſtrength of his underſtanding. He that "reacheth deepeſt, ſeeth the amiable and "admirable ſecrets of the law, wherein I "aſſure you the ſages of the law in former "times have had the deepeſt reach. And "as the bucket in the depth is eaſily drawn "to the uppermoſt part of the water, (for "*nullum elementum in ſuo proprio loco eſt "grave*), but take it from the water it "cannot be drawn up but with a great "difficulty; ſo, albeit beginnings of "this ſtudy ſeem difficult, yet when the "profeſſor of the law can dive into the "depth, it is delightful, eaſy, and with-

"out any heavy burden, ſo long as he "keep himſelf in his own proper ele-"ment *." Shakeſpear with much wit ridicules this diſpoſition to ſimile-making, by putting in the mouth of a weak man a reſemblance much of a piece with that now mentioned.

Fluellen. I think it is in Macedon where Alexander is porn: I tell you, Captain, if you look in the maps of the orld, I warrant that you ſall find, in the compariſons between Macedon and Monmouth, that the ſituaſions, look you, is both alike. There is a river in Macedon, there is alſo moreover a river in Monmouth: it is call'd *Wye* at Monmouth, but it is out of my prains what is the name of the other river; but it is all one, 'tis as like as my fingers to my fingers, and there is ſalmons in both. If you mark Alexander's life well, Harry of Monmouth's life is come after it indifferent well; for there is figures in all things. Alexander, God knows, and you know, in his rages, and his furies, and his wraths, and his cholers, and his moods, and his diſpleaſures, and his indignations, and alſo being a little intoxicates in his prains, did, in his ales and his angers, look you, kill his peſt friend Clytus.

* Coke upon Littleton, p. 71.

Gower.

Gower. Our King is not like him in that, he never kill'd any of his friends.

Fluellen. It is not well done, mark you now, to take the tales out of my mouth, ere it is made and finiſhed. I ſpeak but in figures, and compariſons of it: As Alexander kill'd his friend Clytus, being in his ales and his cups; ſo alſo Harry Monmouth, being in his right wits and his good judgments, turn'd away the fat knight with the great belly-doublet; he was full of jeſts, and gypes, and knaveries, and mocks: I have forgot his name.

Gower. Sir John Falſtaff.

Fluellen. That is he: I tell you, there is good men porn at Monmouth.

K. Henry V. act 4. ſc. 13.

Inſtruction, no doubt, is the chief end of compariſon, but not the only end. In works addreſſed to the imagination, compariſon may be employed with great ſucceſs to put a ſubject in a ſtrong point of view. A lively idea is formed of a man's courage, by likening it to that of a lion; and eloquence is exalted in our imagination, by comparing it to a river overflowing its banks, and involving all in its impetuous courſe. The ſame effect is produced by contraſt. A man in proſperity, becomes more ſenſible

ſible of his happineſs, by oppoſing his condition to that of a perſon in want of bread. Thus compariſon is ſubſervient to poetry as well as to philoſophy; and with reſpect to both, the foregoing obſervation holds equally, that reſemblance among objects of the ſame kind, and contraſt among objects of different kinds, have no effect. Such a compariſon neither tends to gratify our curioſity, nor to ſet the objects compared in a ſtronger light. Two apartments in a palace, ſimilar in ſhape, ſize, and furniture, make ſeparately as good a figure as when compared; and the ſame obſervation applies to two ſimilar copartments in a garden. On the other hand, oppoſe a regular building to a fall of water, or a good picture to a towering hill, or even a little dog to a large horſe, and the contraſt will produce no effect. But reſemblance, where the objects compared are of different kinds, and contraſt where the objects compared are of the ſame kind, have each of them remarkably an enlivening effect. The poets, ſuch of them as have a juſt taſte, draw all their ſimiles from things that in the main

differ

differ widely from the principal ſubject; and they never attempt a contraſt but where the things have a common genus and a reſemblance in the capital circumſtances. Place together a large and a ſmall ſized animal of the ſame ſpecies, the one will appear greater the other leſs, than when viewed ſeparately. When we oppoſe beauty to deformity, each makes a greater figure by the compariſon.

Upon a ſubject not only in itſelf curious, but of great importance in all the fine arts, I muſt be more particular. That reſemblance and contraſt have an enlivening effect upon objects of ſight, is made ſufficiently evident; and that they have the ſame effect upon objects of the other ſenſes, will appear from induction. Nor is this law confined to the external ſenſes. Characters contraſted, make a greater figure by the oppoſition. Iago, in the tragedy of *Othello*, ſays

He hath a daily beauty in his life,
That makes me ugly.

The character of a fop, and of a rough warrior,

rior, are no where more ſucceſsfully contraſted than by Shakeſpear.

Hotſpur. My liege, I did deny no priſoners;
But I remember, when the fight was done,
When I was dry with rage, and extreme toil,
Breathleſs and faint, leaning upon my ſword;
Came there a certain Lord, neat, trimly dreſs'd,
Freſh as a bridegroom; and his chin, new-reap'd,
Shew'd like a ſtubble-land at harveſt-home.
He was perfumed like a milliner;
And 'twixt his finger and his thumb he held
A pouncet-box, which ever and anon
He gave his noſe;—and ſtill he ſmil'd, and talk'd;
And as the ſoldiers bare dead bodies by,
He call'd them untaught knaves, unmannerly,
To bring a ſlovenly, unhandſome corſe
Betwixt the wind and his nobility.
With many holiday and lady terms
He queſtion'd me: amongſt the reſt, demanded
My pris'ners, in your Majeſty's behalf.
I then all ſmarting with my wounds; being gal'd
To be ſo peſter'd with a popinjay,
Out of my grief, and my impatience,
Anſwer'd, neglectingly, I know not what:
He ſhould, or ſhould not; for he made me mad,
To ſee him ſhine ſo briſk, and ſmell ſo ſweet,
And talk ſo like a waiting-gentlewoman,

Of

Of guns, and drums, and wounds; (God ſave the
mark!)
And telling me, the ſovereign'ſt thing on earth
Was parmacity, for an inward bruiſe;
And that it was great pity, ſo it was,
This villanous ſaltpetre ſhould be digg'd
Out of the bowels of the harmleſs earth,
Which many a good, tall fellow had deſtroy'd
So cowardly: and but for theſe vile guns,
He would himſelf have been a ſoldier.—

Firſt part, Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Paſſions and emotions are alſo inflamed by compariſon. A man of high rank humbles the byſtanders ſo far as almoſt to annihilate them in their own opinion. Cæſar, beholding the ſtatue of Alexander, felt a great depreſſion of ſpirits, when he reflected, that now at the age of thirty-two, when Alexander died, he had not performed one memorable action.

Our opinions alſo are much influenced by compariſon. A man whoſe opulence exceeds the ordinary ſtandard, is reputed richer than he is in reality; and the character of wiſdom or weakneſs, if at all re-

markable, is generally carried beyond the truth.

The opinion a man forms of his preſent condition as to happineſs or miſery, depends in a great meaſure on the compariſon he makes betwixt it and his former condition:

Could I forget
What I have been, I might the better bear
What I am deſtin'd to. I'm not the firſt
That have been wretched: but to think how much
I have been happier.

Southern's Innocent adultery, act 2.

The diſtreſs of a long journey makes even an indifferent inn paſs current. And in travelling, when the road is good and the horſeman well covered, a bad day may be agreeable, by making him ſenſible how ſnug he is.

The ſame effect is equally remarkable, when a man ſets his condition in oppoſition to that of others. A ſhip toſſed about in a ſtorm, makes the ſpectator reflect upon his own ſecurity and eaſe, and puts theſe in the ſtrongeſt light:

Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis,
E terra magnum alterius ſpectare laborem,
Non quia vexari quemquam eſt jocunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipſe malis careas, quia cernere ſuave eſt.
Lucret. l. 2. principio.

A man in grief cannot bear mirth. It gives him a more lively notion of his unhappineſs, and of courſe makes him more unhappy. Satan contemplating the beauties of the terreſtrial paradiſe, breaks out in the following exclamation.

With what delight could I have walk'd thee round,
If I could joy in ought, ſweet interchange
Of hill and valley, rivers, woods, and plains,
Now land, now ſea, and ſhores with forceſt crown'd,
Rocks, dens, and caves! but I in none of theſe
Find place or refuge; and the more I ſee
Pleaſures about me, ſo much more I feel
Torment within me, as from the hateful ſiege
Of contraries: all good to me becomes
Bane, and in heav'n much worſe would be my ſtate.
Paradiſe Loſt, book 9. l. 114.

Gaunt. All places that the eye of heaven viſits,
Are to a wiſe man ports and happy havens.

Teach thy neceſſity to reaſon thus:
There is no virtue like neceſſity.
Think not the King did baniſh thee;
But thou the King. Wo doth the heavier ſit,
Where it perceives it is but faintly borne.
Go ſay, I ſent thee forth to purchaſe honour;
And not, the King exil'd thee. Or ſuppoſe,
Devouring peſtilence hangs in our air,
And thou art flying to a freſher clime,
Look what thy ſoul holds dear, imagine it
To lie that way thou go'ſt, not whence thou com'ſt.
Suppoſe the ſinging birds, muſicians;
The graſs whereon thou tread'ſt, the preſence-floor;
The flow'rs, fair ladies; and thy ſteps, no more
Than a delightful meaſure, or a dance.
For gnarling Sorrow hath leſs power to bite
The man that mocks at it, and ſets it light.
Bolingbroke. Oh, who can hold a fire in his hand,
By thinking on the froſty Caucaſus?
Or cloy the hungry edge of Appetite,
By bare imagination of a feaſt?
Or wallow naked in December ſnow,
By thinking on fantaſtic ſummer's heat?
Oh, no! the apprehenſion of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worſe.

King Richard II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

The

The appearance of danger gives ſometimes pleaſure, ſometimes pain. A timorous perſon upon the battlements of a high tower, is ſeized with terror, which even the conſciouſneſs of ſecurity cannot diſſipate. But upon one of a firm head, this ſituation has a contrary effect. The appearance of danger heightens by oppoſition the conſciouſneſs of ſecurity, and of conſequence the ſatisfaction that ariſes from ſecurity. The feeling here reſembles that above mentioned occaſioned by a ſhip labouring in a ſtorm.

This effect of magnifying or leſſening objects by means of compariſon, is ſo familiar, that no philoſopher has thought of ſearching for a cauſe *. The obſcurity of the ſubject may poſſibly have contributed to their ſilence. But luckily in treating other ſubjects, a principle is unfolded which will clearly account for this phenomenon. It

* Practical writers upon the fine arts will attempt any thing, being blind both to the difficulty and danger. De Piles, accounting why contraſt is agreeable, ſays, "That "it is a ſort of war which puts the oppoſite parties in motion." Thus, to account for an effect of which there is no doubt, any cauſe, however fooliſh, is made welcome.

depends

depends upon the power of paſſion to model our opinion of objects for its gratification *. We have had occaſion to ſee many illuſtrious examples of this ſingular power of paſſion; and the preſent ſubject affords an additional inſtance. That this is the cauſe, will evidently appear, by reflecting in what manner a ſpectator is affected, when a very large animal is for the firſt time placed beſide a very ſmall one of the ſame ſpecies. The oppoſition is the firſt thing that ſtrikes the mind: the unuſual appearance gives ſurpriſe; and the ſpectator, prone to gratify this emotion, conceives the oppoſition to be the greateſt that can be. He ſees, or ſeems to ſee, the one animal extremely little, and the other extremely large. The emotion of ſurpriſe ariſing from any unuſual reſemblance, ſerves equally to explain why at firſt view we are apt to think ſuch reſemblance more entire than it is in reality. And it muſt be obſerved, that the circumſtances of more and leſs, which are the proper ſubjects of com-

* Chap. 2. part 5.

pariſon,

pariſon, raiſe a perception ſo indiſtinct and vague as to facilitate the effect deſcribed. We have no mental ſtandard of great and little, nor of the ſeveral degrees of any attribute; and the mind thus unreſtrained, is naturally diſpoſed to indulge its ſurpriſe to the utmoſt extent.

In exploring the operations of the mind, ſome of which are extremely nice and ſlippery, it is neceſſary to proceed with the utmoſt circumſpection. And after all, ſeldom it happens that ſpeculations of this kind afford any ſtrong conviction. Luckily, in the preſent caſe, we have at hand facts and experiments that ſupport the foregoing theory in a ſatisfactory manner. In the firſt place, the oppoſing a ſmall object of one ſpecies to a great object of another, produces not, in any degree, that effect of contraſt, which is ſo remarkable when both objects are of the ſame ſpecies. There is no difference betwixt theſe two caſes that promiſeth to have any influence, but only that the former is common, the latter rare. May we not then fairly conclude, that ſurpriſe from the rarity of appearance is the cauſe

of

of contraſt, when we find no ſuch effect where the appearance is common? In the next place, if ſurpriſe be the ſole cauſe of the effects that appear in making a compariſon, it follows neceſſarily that theſe effects will vaniſh ſo ſoon as a compariſon becomes familiar. This holds ſo unerringly, as to leave no reaſonable doubt that ſurpriſe is the prime mover in this operation. Our ſurpriſe is great the firſt time a ſmall lapdog is ſeen with a large maſtiff: but when two ſuch animals are conſtantly together, there is no ſurpriſe; and it makes no difference whether they be viewed ſeparately or in company. We put no bounds to the riches of a man who has recently made his fortune. The oppoſition betwixt his preſent and paſt ſituation, or betwixt his preſent ſituation and that of others, is carried to an extreme. With regard to a family that for many generations hath enjoyed great wealth, the ſame falſe reckoning is not made. It is equally remarkable, that a ſimile loſes its effect by repetition. A lover compared to a moth ſcorching itſelf at the flame of a candle, is a ſprightly ſimile, which by frequent

quent uſe has loſt all force. Love cannot now be compared to fire, without ſome degree of diſguſt. It has been juſtly objected againſt Homer, that the lion is too often introduced in his ſimiles. All the variety he is able to throw into them, is not ſufficient to keep alive the reader's ſurpriſe.

To explain the influence of compariſon upon the mind, I have choſen the ſimpleſt caſe, that of two animals of the ſame kind, differing in ſize only, ſeen for the firſt time. To complete the theory, other circumſtances muſt be taken in. And the next ſuppoſition I ſhall make, is where both animals, ſeparately familiar to the ſpectator, are brought together for the firſt time. In this caſe, the effect of magnifying and diminiſhing, will be found remarkably greater than in that firſt mentioned. And the reaſon will appear upon analyzing the operation. The firſt thing we feel is ſurpriſe, occaſioned by the uncommon difference of two creatures of the ſame ſpecies. We are next ſenſible, that the one appears leſs, the other larger, than they did formerly. This new circumſtance is a ſecond cauſe of ſurpriſe,

and augments it ſo as to make us imagine a ſtill greater oppoſition betwixt the animals, than if we had formed no notion of them beforehand.

I ſhall confine myſelf to one other ſuppoſition, That the ſpectator was acquainted beforehand with one of the animals only, the lapdog for example. This new circumſtance will vary the effect. Inſtead of widening the natural difference by enlarging in appearance the one animal and diminiſhing the other in proportion, the whole apparent alteration will reſt upon the lapdog. The ſurpriſe to find it leſs than judged to be formerly, will draw the whole attention of the mind upon it; and this ſurpriſe will be gratified, by conceiving it to be of the moſt diminutive ſize poſſible. The maſtiff in the mean time is quite neglected. I am able to illuſtrate this effect by a very familiar example. Take a piece of paper or linen reckoned to be a good white, and compare it with ſomething of the ſame kind that is a pure white. The judgement we formed of the firſt object is inſtantly varied; and the ſurpriſe occaſioned by finding it not ſo white

white as was thought, produceth a haſty conviction that it is much leſs white than it is in reality. Withdrawing now the pure white, and putting in its place a deep black, the ſurpriſe occaſioned by this new circumſtance carries our thought to the other extreme, and we now conceive the original object to be a pure white. Thus experience forces us to acknowledge, that our emotions have an influence even upon our eye-ſight. This experiment leads to a general obſervation, That whatever is found more ſtrange or beautiful than was expected, is judged to be more ſtrange or beautiful than it is in reality. Hence it is a common artifice, to depreciate beforehand what we wiſh to make a figure in the eyes of others.

The compariſons employed by poets and orators, coincide with the laſt-mentioned ſuppoſition. It is always a known object that is to be aggrandized or leſſened. The former is effectuated by likening it to ſome grand object, or by contraſting it with one that has the oppoſite character. To effectuate the latter, the method muſt be reverſed. The object muſt be contraſted with

ſomething ſuperior to itſelf, or likened to ſomething inferior. The whole effect is produced upon the principal ſubject, which by this means is elevated above its rank or depreſſed below it.

In accounting for the effect that any unuſual reſemblance or contraſt has upon the mind, I have hitherto aſſigned no other cauſe but ſurpriſe; and to prevent confuſion and obſcurity, I thought it proper to diſcuſs that principle firſt. But ſurpriſe is not the only cauſe of the effect deſcribed. Another cauſe concurs, which operates perhaps not leſs powerfully than ſurpriſe. This cauſe is a principle in human nature that lies ſtill in obſcurity, not having been evolved by any writer, though its effects are extenſive. As it is not diſtinguiſhed by a proper name, the reader muſt be ſatisfied with the following deſcription. No man who ſtudies himſelf or others but muſt be ſenſible of a tendency or propenſity in the mind to complete every work that is begun, and to carry things to their full perfection. This principle has little opportunity to diſplay itſelf upon natural operations, which are ſeldom left imperfect.

But

But in the operations of art it hath great ſcope; and diſplays itſelf remarkably, by making us perſevere in our own work, and by making us wiſh for the completion of what is done by another. We feel a ſenſible pleaſure when the work is brought to perfection; and our pain is not leſs ſenſible when we are diſappointed. Hence our uneaſineſs, when an intereſting ſtory is broke off in the middle, when a piece of muſic ends without a cloſe, or when a building or garden is left imperfect. The ſame principle operates in making collections, ſuch as the whole works good and bad of any author. A certain perſon endeavoured to collect prints of all the capital paintings, and ſucceeded except as to a few. La Bruyere remarks, that an anxious ſearch was made for theſe, not on account of their value, but to complete the ſet *.

The

* The examples above given are of ſubjects that can be brought to an end or concluſion. But the ſame uneaſineſs is perceptible with reſpect to ſubjects that admit not any concluſion; witneſs a ſeries that has no end, commonly called *an infinite ſeries*. The mind running along ſuch a ſeries, begins ſoon to feel an uneaſineſs, which becomes more and more ſenſible in continuing its progreſs.

An

The final cauſe of this principle is an additional proof of its exiſtence. Human works are of no ſignificancy till they be completed. Reaſon is not always a ſufficient counterbalance to indolence: and ſome principle over and above is neceſſary, to excite our induſtry, and to prevent our ſtopping ſhort in the middle of the courſe.

We need not loſe time in deſcribing the co-operation of the foregoing principle with ſurpriſe

An unbounded proſpect doth not long continue agreeable. We ſoon feel a ſlight uneaſineſs, which increaſes with the time we beſtow upon the object. In order to find the cauſe of this uneaſineſs, we firſt take under conſideration an avenue without a terminating object. Can a proſpect without any termination be compared to an infinite ſeries? There is one ſtriking difference, that with reſpect to the eye no proſpect can be unbounded. The quickeſt eye commands but a certain length of ſpace; and there it is bounded, however obſcurely. But the mind perceives things as they exiſt; and the line is carried on in idea without end. In that reſpect an unbounded proſpect is ſimilar to an infinite ſeries. In fact, the uneaſineſs of an unbounded proſpect differs very little in its feeling from that of an infinite ſeries; and therefore we may reaſonably conclude that both proceed from the ſame cauſe.

We next conſider a proſpect unbounded every way, as for example, a great plain, or the ocean, viewed from an eminence. We feel here an uneaſineſs occaſioned by the want of an end or termination, preciſely as in the other caſes. A proſpect unbounded

ſurpriſe in producing the effect that is felt upon the appearance of any unuſual reſemblance or contraſt. Surpriſe firſt operates, and carries our opinion of the reſemblance or contraſt beyond the truth. The principle we have been deſcribing carries us ſtill farther; for being bent upon gratification, it forces upon the mind a conviction that the reſemblance or contraſt is complete. We need no better illuſtration than the reſemblance that is fan-

unbounded every way is indeed ſo far ſingular, as at firſt to be more pleaſant than a proſpect that is unbounded in one direction only, and afterward to be more painful. But theſe circumſtances are eaſily explained without breaking in upon the general theory. The pleaſure we feel at firſt is a ſtrong emotion of grandeur, ariſing from the immenſe extenſion of the object. And to increaſe the pain we feel afterward for the want of a termination, there concurs a pain of a different kind, occaſioned by ſtretching the eye to comprehend ſo great a proſpect; a pain that gradually increaſes with the repeated efforts we make to graſp the whole.

It is the ſame principle, if I miſtake not, which operates imperceptibly with reſpect to quantity and number. Another's property indented into my field gives me uneaſineſs; and I am eager to make the purchaſe, not for profit, but in order to ſquare my field. Xerxes and his army in their paſſage to Greece were ſumptuouſly entertained by Pythius the Lydian. Xerxes getting a particular account of his riches, recompenſed him with 7000 Darics, which he wanted to complete the ſum of four millions.

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cied in ſome pebbles to a tree or an inſect. The reſemblance, however faint in reality, is conceived to be wonderfully perfect. This tendency to complete a reſemblance acting jointly with ſurpriſe, carries the mind ſometimes ſo far as even to preſume upon future events. In the Greek tragedy, intitled, *Phineides*, thoſe unhappy women, ſeeing the place where it was intended they ſhould be ſlain, cried out with anguiſh, "They now "ſaw their cruel deſtiny had condemned "them to die in that place, being the "ſame where they had been expoſed in "their infancy *."

This remarkable principle which inclines us to advance every thing to its perfection, not only co-operates with ſurpriſe to deceive the mind, but of itſelf is able to produce that effect. Of this we ſee many inſtances where there is no place for ſurpriſe. The firſt inſtance I ſhall give is of reſemblance. *Unumquodque eodem modo diſſolvitur quo colligatum eſt*, is a maxim in the Roman law that has no foundation in truth. For tying and

* Ariſtotle, poet. cap. 17.

looſing

looſing, building and demoliſhing, are acts oppoſite to each other, and are performed by oppoſite means. But when theſe acts are connected by their relation to the ſame ſubject, their connection leads us to imagine a ſort of reſemblance betwixt them, which the foregoing principle makes us conceive to be as complete as poſſible. The next inſtance ſhall be of contraſt. Addiſon obſerves *, "That the paleſt features look "the moſt agreeable in white; that a face "which is overflu ſhed appears to advantage "in the deepeſt ſcarlet; and that a dark "complexion is not a little alleviated by a "black hood." The foregoing principle ſerves to account for theſe appearances. To make this evident, one of the caſes ſhall ſuffice. A complexion, however dark, never approaches to black. When theſe colours appear together, their oppoſition ſtrikes us; and the propenſity we have to complete the oppoſition, makes the darkneſs of complexion vaniſh out of ſight.

The operation of this principle, even

* Spectator, N° 265.

where there is no ground for ſurpriſe, is not confined to opinion or conviction. So powerful is it, as to make us ſometimes proceed to action in order to complete a reſemblance or contraſt. If this appear obſcure, it will be made clear by the following inſtances. Upon what principle is the *lex talionis* founded other than to make the puniſhment reſemble the miſchief? Reaſon dictates, that there ought to be a conformity or reſemblance betwixt a crime and its puniſhment; and the foregoing principle impells us to make the reſemblance as complete as poſſible. Titus Livius, influenced by this principle, accounts for a certain puniſhment by a reſemblance betwixt it and the crime, far too ſubtile for common apprehenſion. Speaking of Mettus Fuffetius, the Alban general, who, for treachery to the Romans, his allies, was ſentenced to be torn to pieces by horſes, he puts the following ſpeech in the mouth of Tullus Hoſtilius, who decreed the puniſhment. "Mette "Fuffeti, inquit, ſi ipſe diſcere poſſes fi- "dem ac fœdera ſervare, vivo tibi ea diſci- "plina a me adhibita eſſet. Nunc, quo-

"niam

" niam tuum inſanabile ingenium eſt, at " tu tuo ſupplicio doce humanum genus, " ea ſancta credere, quæ a te violata ſunt. " Ut igitur paulo ante animum inter Fide- " natem Romanamque rem ancipitem geſ- " ſiſti, ita jam corpus paſſim diſtrahendum " dabis *." By the ſame influence, the ſentence is often executed upon the very ſpot where the crime was committed. In the *Electra* of Sophocles, Egiſtheus is dragged from the theatre into an inner room of the ſuppoſed palace, to ſuffer death where he murdered Agamemnon. Shakeſpear, whoſe knowledge of nature is not leſs profound than extenſive, has not overlooked this propenſity:

Othello. Get me ſome poiſon, Iago, this night; I'll not expoſtulate with her, leſt her body and her beauty unprovide my mind again; this night, Iago.

Iago. Do it not with poiſon; ſtrangle her in her bed, even in the bed ſhe hath contaminated.

Othello. Good, good: The juſtice of it pleaſes; very good.

Othello, act 4. *ſc.* 5.

* Lib. 1. § 28.

Warwick. From off the gates of York fetch down the head,
Your father's head, which Clifford placed there.
Inſtead whereof let his ſupply the room.
Meaſure for meaſure muſt be anſwered.
Third Part of Henry VI. *act* 2. *ſc.* 9.

Perſons in their laſt moments are generally ſeized with an anxiety to be buried with their relations. In the *Amynta* of Taſſo, the lover, hearing that his miſtreſs was torn to pieces by a wolf, expreſſes a deſire to die the ſame death *.

Upon the ſubject in general, I have two remarks to add. The firſt concerns reſemblance, which when too entire hath no effect, however different in kind the things compared may be. This remark is applicable to works of art only; for natural objects of different kinds, have ſcarce ever an entire reſemblance. Marble is a ſort of matter, very different from what compoſes an animal; and marble cut into a human figure, produces great pleaſure by the reſemblance. But let a marble ſtatue be coloured like a

* Act 4. ſc. 2.

picture,

picture, the reſemblance is ſo entire as to produce no effect. At a diſtance, it appears a real perſon. We diſcover the miſtake when we approach; and no other emotion is raiſed but ſurpriſe occaſioned by the deception. The idea of reſemblance is ſunk into that of identity. The figure ſtill appears to our eyes rather to be a real perſon than a reſemblance of it; and we muſt make uſe of our reflection to correct the miſtake. This cannot happen in a picture; for the reſemblance can never be ſo entire as to diſguiſe the imitation.

The other remark regards contraſt. Emotions make the greateſt figure when contraſted in ſucceſſion. But then the ſucceſſion ought neither to be precipitate nor immoderately ſlow. If too ſlow, the effect of contraſt becomes faint by the diſtance of the emotions; and if precipitate, no ſingle emotion has room to expand itſelf to its full ſize; but is ſtifled as it were in the birth by a ſucceeding emotion. The funeral oration of the Biſhop of Meaux upon the Duchеſs of Orleans, is a perfect hotchpotch of chearful and melancholy repreſentations

following

following each other in the quickeſt ſucceſſion. Oppoſite emotions are beſt felt in ſucceſſion: but each emotion ſeparately ſhould be raiſed to its due pitch, before another be introduced.

What is above laid down, will enable us to determine a very important queſtion concerning emotions raiſed by the fine arts, *viz.* What ought to be the rule of ſucceſſion; whether ought reſemblance to be ſtudied or contraſt? The emotions raiſed by the fine arts, are generally too nearly related to make a figure by reſemblance; and for that reaſon, their ſucceſſion ought to be regulated as much as poſſible by contraſt. This holds confeſſedly in epic and dramatic compoſitions: and the beſt writers, led perhaps by a good taſte more than by reaſoning, have generally aimed at this beauty. In the ſame cantata, all the variety of emotions that are within the power of muſic, may not only be indulged, but, to make the greateſt figure, ought to be contraſted. In gardening there is an additional reaſon for the rule. The emotions raiſed by that art, are at beſt ſo faint, that every

every artifice ſhould be uſed to give them their utmoſt ſtrength. A field may be laid out in grand, ſweet, gay, neat, wild, melancholy ſcenes. When theſe are viewed in ſucceſſion, grandeur ought to be contraſted with neatneſs, regularity with wildneſs, and gaiety with melancholy; ſo as that each emotion may ſucceed its oppoſite. Nay it is an improvement to intermix in the ſucceſſion, rude uncultivated ſpots as well as unbounded views, which in themſelves are diſagreeable, but in ſucceſſion heighten the feeling of the agreeable objects. And we have nature for our guide, who in her moſt beautiful landſcapes often intermixes rugged rocks, dirty marſhes, and barren ſtony heaths. The greateſt maſters of muſic, have the ſame view in their compoſitions: the ſecond part of an Italian ſong ſeldom conveys any ſentiment; and, by its harſhneſs, ſeems purpoſely contrived to give a greater reliſh for the intereſting parts of the compoſition.

A ſmall garden comprehended under a ſingle view, affords little opportunity for this embelliſhment. Diſſimilar emotions require

require different tones of mind; and therefore in conjunction can never make a good figure*. Gaiety and ſweetneſs may be combined, or wildneſs and gloomineſs; but a compoſition of gaiety and gloomineſs is diſtaſteful. The rude uncultivated copartment of furze and broom in Richmond garden, hath a good effect in the ſucceſſion of objects; but a ſpot of this nature would be inſufferable in the midſt of a poliſhed parterre or flower-plot. A garden therefore, if not of great extent, will not admit of diſſimilar emotions. And in ornamenting a ſmall garden, the ſafeſt courſe is to confine it to a ſingle expreſſion. For the ſame reaſon, a landſcape ought alſo to be confined to a ſingle expreſſion. It is accordingly a rule in painting, That if the ſubject be gay, every figure ought to contribute to that emotion.

It follows from the foregoing train of reaſoning, that a garden near a great city, ought to have an air of ſolitude. The ſolitarineſs again of a waſte country ought to

* See chap. 2. part 4.

be

be contraſted in forming a garden; no temples, no obſcure walks; but *jets d'eau*, caſcades, objects active, gay, and ſplendid. Nay ſuch a garden ſhould in ſome meaſure avoid imitating nature, by taking on an extraordinary appearance of regularity and art, to ſhow the buſy hand of man, which in a waſte country has a fine effect by contraſt.

It may be gathered from what is ſaid above *, that wit and ridicule make not an agreeable mixture with grandeur. Diſſimilar emotions have a fine effect in a ſlow ſucceſſion; but in a rapid ſucceſſion, which approaches to co-exiſtence, they will not be reliſhed. In the midſt of a laboured and elevated deſcription of a battle, Virgil introduces a ludicrous image, which is certainly out of its place:

Obvius ambuſtum torrem Chorinæus ab ara
Corripit, et venienti Ebuſo plagamque ferenti
Occupat os flammis: illi ingens barba reluxit,
Nidoremque ambuſta dedit.

Æn. xii. 298.

* Chap. 2. part 4.

The following image is not leſs ludicrous, nor leſs improperly placed.

Mentre fan queſti i bellici ſtromenti
Perche debbiano toſto in uſo porſe,
Il gran nemico de l'humane genti,
Contra i Chriſtiani i lividi occhi torſe:
E lor veggendo à le bell' opre intenti,
Ambo le labra per furor ſi morſe:
E qual tauro ferito, il ſuo dolore
Verſo mugghiando e ſoſpirando fuore.

Gieruſal. cant. 4. *ſt.* 1.

It would however be too auſtere, to baniſh altogether ludicrous images from an epic poem. This poem doth not always ſoar above the clouds. It admits great variety; and upon occaſions can deſcend even to the ground without ſinking. In its more familiar tones, a ludicrous ſcene may be introduced without impropriety. This is done by Virgil * in deſcribing a foot-race; the circumſtances of which, not excepting the ludicrous part, are copied from Homer †. After a fit of merryment, we are,

* Æn. lib. 5.

† Iliad, book 23. l. 879.

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it is true, the leſs diſpoſed to the ſerious and ſublime: but then, a ludicrous ſcene, by unbending the mind from ſevere application to more intereſting ſubjects, may prevent fatigue, and preſerve our reliſh entire.

CHAP. IX.

Of Uniformity and Variety.

WHEN I apply myſelf to explain uniformity and variety, and to ſhow how we are affected by theſe circumſtances, it appears doubtful what method ought to be followed. I foreſee ſeveral difficulties in keeping cloſe to my text; and yet by indulging a range, ſuch as may be neceſſary for a clear view, I ſhall certainly incur the cenſure of wandering.—Be it ſo. One ought not to abandon the right track for fear of cenſure. The collateral matters, beſide, that will be introduced, are curious, and not of ſlight importance in the ſcience of human nature.

The neceſſary ſucceſſion of perceptions, is a ſubject formerly handled, ſo far as it depends on the relations of objects and their

mutual

mutual connections *. But that ſubject is not exhauſted; and I take the liberty to introduce it a ſecond time, in order to explain in what manner we are affected by uniformity and variety. The world we inhabit is replete with things not leſs remarkable for their variety than their number. Theſe, unfolded by the wonderful mechaniſm of external ſenſe, furniſh the mind with many perceptions, which, joined with ideas of memory, of imagination, and of reflection, form a complete train that has not a gap or interval. This tide of objects, in a continual flux, is in a good meaſure independent of will. The mind, as has been obſerved †, is ſo conſtituted, "That it can by no effort "break off the ſucceſſion of its ideas, nor "keep its attention long fixt upon the "ſame object." We can arreſt a perception in its courſe; we can ſhorten its natural duration, to make room for another; we can vary the ſucceſſion by change of place or amuſement; and we can in ſome mea-

* Chap. 1.

† Locke, book 2. chap. 14.

ſure

ſure prevent variety, by frequently recalling the ſame object after ſhort intervals: but ſtill there muſt be a ſucceſſion, and a change from one thing to another. By artificial means, the ſucceſſion may be retarded or accelerated, may be rendered more various or more uniform, but in one ſhape or other is unavoidable.

The rate of ſucceſſion, even when left to its ordinary courſe, is not always the ſame. There are natural cauſes that accelerate or retard it conſiderably. The firſt I ſhall mention depends on a peculiar conſtitution of mind. One man is diſtinguiſhed from another, by no circumſtance more remarkably than the movement of his train of perceptions. A cold languid temper is accompanied with a ſlow courſe of perceptions, which occaſions dulneſs of apprehenſion and ſluggiſhneſs in action. To a warm temper, on the contrary, belongs a quick courſe of perceptions, which occaſions quickneſs of apprehenſion and activity in buſineſs. The Aſiatic nations, the Chineſe eſpecially, are obſerved to be more cool and deliberate than the Europeans: may not

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the reaſon be, that heat enervates by exhauſting the ſpirits? A certain degree of cold, ſuch as is felt in the middle regions of Europe, by bracing the fibres, rouſes the mind, and produces a briſk circulation of thought, accompanied with vigour in action. In youth there is obſervable a quicker ſucceſſion of perceptions, than in old age. Hence in youth a remarkable avidity for variety of amuſements, which in riper years give place to more uniform and more ſedate occupation. This qualifies men of middle age for buſineſs, where activity is required, but with a greater proportion of uniformity than variety. In old age, a ſlow and languid ſucceſſion makes variety unneceſſary; and for that reaſon, the aged, in all their motions, are generally governed by an habitual uniformity. Whatever be the cauſe, we may venture to pronounce, that heat in the imagination and temper, is always connected with a briſk flow of perceptions.

The natural rate of ſucceſſion, depends alſo in ſome degree upon the particular perceptions that compoſe the train. An agree-

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able object, taking a ſtrong hold of the mind, occaſions a ſlower ſucceſſion than when the objects are indifferent. Grandeur and novelty fix the attention for a conſiderable time, excluding all other ideas; and the mind thus occupied feels no vacuity. Some emotions, by hurrying the mind from object to object, accelerate the ſucceſſion. Where the train is compoſed of connected objects, the ſucceſſion is quick. For it is ſo ordered by nature, that the mind goes eaſily and ſweetly along connected objects *. On the other hand, the ſucceſſion muſt be ſlow where the train is compoſed of unconnected objects. An unconnected object, finding no ready acceſs to the mind, requires time to make an impreſſion. And that it is not admitted without a ſtruggle, appears from the unſettled ſtate of the mind for ſome moments after it is preſented, wavering betwixt it and the former train. During this ſhort period, one or other of the former objects will intrude, perhaps oftener than once, till the attention be fixt entirely upon

* See chap. 1.

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the new object. The ſame obſervations are applicable to ideas ſuggeſted by language. The mind can bear a quick ſucceſſion of related ideas. But an unrelated idea, for which the mind is not prepared, takes time to make a diſtinct impreſſion; and therefore a train compoſed of ſuch ideas, ought to proceed with a ſlow pace. Hence an epic poem, a play, or any ſtory connected in all its parts, may be peruſed in a ſhorter time, than a book of maxims or apothegms, of which a quick ſucceſſion creates both confuſion and fatigue.

Such latitude hath nature indulged in the rate of ſucceſſion. What latitude it indulges with reſpect to uniformity we proceed to examine. The uniformity or variety of a train, ſo far as compoſed of external objects, depends on the particular objects that ſurround the percipient at the time. The preſent occupation muſt alſo have an influence; one is ſometimes engaged in a multiplicity of affairs, ſometimes altogether vacant. A natural train of ideas of memory is more circumſcribed, each object being linked, by ſome connection, to what pre-

cedes and to what follows it. Theſe connections, which are many and of different kinds, afford ſcope for a ſufficient degree of variety; and at the ſame time prevent any exceſs that is unpleaſant. Temper and conſtitution alſo have an influence here, as well as upon the rate of ſucceſſion. A man of a calm and ſedate temper, admits not willingly any idea but what is regularly introduced by a proper connection. One of a roving diſpoſition embraces with avidity every new idea, however ſlender its relation be to thoſe that go before it. Neither muſt we overlook the nature of the perceptions that compoſe the train; for their influence is not leſs with reſpect to uniformity and variety, than with reſpect to the rate of ſucceſſion. The mind ingroſſed by any paſſion, love or hatred, hope or fear, broods over its object, and can bear no interruption. In ſuch a ſtate, the train of perceptions muſt not only be ſlow, but extremely uniform. Anger newly inflamed eagerly graſps its object, and leaves not a cranny in the mind for another thought than of revenge. In the character of Hotſpur, this ſtate of mind

is repreſented to the life; a picture remarkable for high colouring as well as for ſtrictneſs of imitation:

Worceſter. Peace, couſin, ſay no more.
And now I will unclaſp a ſecret book,
And to your quick-conceiving diſcontents
I'll read you matter, deep and dangerous;
As full of peril and advent'rous ſpirit
As to o'erwalk a current, roaring loud,
On the unſteadfaſt footing of a ſpear.
Hotſpur. If he fall in, good-night. Or ſink or ſwim,
Send danger from the eaſt into the weſt,
So honour croſs it from the north to ſouth;
And let them grapple. O! the blood more ſtirs
To rouſe a lion than to ſtart a hare.
Worceſter. Thoſe ſame Noble Scots,
That are your priſoners——
Hotſpur. I'll keep them all.
By Heav'n, he ſhall not have a Scot of them:
No, if a Scot would ſave his ſoul, he ſhall not;
I'll keep them, by this hand.
Worceſter. You ſtart away,
And lend no ear unto my purpoſes;
Thoſe pris'ners you ſhall keep.
Hotſpur. I will; that's flat:
He ſaid, he would not ranſom Mortimer:

Forbad my tongue to ſpeak of Mortimer:
But I will find him when he lies aſleep,
And in his ear I'll holla *Mortimer!*
Nay, I will have a ſtarling taught to ſpeak
Nothing but *Mortimer*, and give it him,
To keep his anger ſtill in motion.
Worceſter. Hear you, couſin, a word.
Hotſpur. All ſtudies here I ſolemnly defy,
Save how to gall and pinch this Bolingbroke:
And that ſame ſword-and buckler Prince of Wales,
(But that I think his father loves him not,
And would be glad he met with ſome miſchance),
I'd have him poiſon'd with a pot of ale.
Worceſter. Farewel, my kinſman, I will talk to you,
When you are better temper'd to attend.

Firſt part, Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Having viewed a train of perceptions as directed by nature, and the variations it is ſuſceptible of from different neceſſary cauſes, we proceed to examine how far it is ſubjected to will; for that will hath ſome influence, more or leſs, is obſerved above. And firſt, the rate of ſucceſſion may be retarded by inſiſting upon one object, and propelled

propelled by diſmiſſing another before its time. But ſuch voluntary mutations in the natural courſe of ſucceſſion, have limits that cannot be extended by the moſt painful efforts. The mind circumſcribed in its capacity, cannot, at the ſame inſtant, admit many perceptions; and when replete, it has no place for new perceptions till others be removed. For this reaſon, a voluntary change of perceptions cannot be inſtantaneous; and the time it requires ſets bounds to the velocity of ſucceſſion. On the other hand, the power we have to arreſt a flying perception, is equally limited. The longer we detain any perception, the more difficulty we find in the operation; till, the difficulty becoming unſurmountable, we are forced to quit our hold, and to permit the train to take its uſual courſe.

The power we have over this train as to uniformity and variety, is in ſome caſes very great, in others very little. A train ſo far as compoſed of external objects, depends entirely on the place we occupy, and admits not more or leſs variety but by change of place. A train compoſed of ideas of memory,

mory, is ſtill leſs under our power. Objects which are connected, afford the mind an eaſy paſſage from one to another. They ſuggeſt each other in idea by the ſame means; and we cannot at will call up any idea that is not connected with the train *. But a train of ideas ſuggeſted by reading, may be varied at will, provided we have books in ſtore.

This power which nature hath given us over our train of perceptions, may be greatly ſtrengthened by proper diſcipline, and by an early application to buſineſs. Its improved ſtrength is remarkable in thoſe who have a ſtrong genius for the mathematics: nor leſs remarkable in perſons devoted to religious exerciſes, who paſs whole days in contemplation, and impoſe upon themſelves long and ſevere penances. It is not to be conceived, what length a habit of activity in affairs will carry ſome men. Let a ſtranger, or let any perſon to whom the ſight is not familiar, attend the Chancellor of Great Britain through the labours but of one day,

* See chap. 1.

during

during a ſeſſion of parliament: how great will be his aſtoniſhment! what multiplicity of law-buſineſs, what deep thinking, and what elaborate application to matters of government! The train of perceptions muſt in this great man be accelerated far beyond the common courſe of nature. Yet no confuſion nor hurry; but in every article the greateſt order and accuracy. Such is the force of habit! How happy is man, to have the command of a principle of action, that can elevate him ſo far above the ordinary condition of humanity *!

We are now ripe for conſidering a train of perceptions with reſpect to pleaſure and pain: and to this ſpeculation we muſt give peculiar attention, becauſe it ſerves to explain the effects that uniformity and variety have upon the mind. A man is always in a pleaſant ſtate of mind, when his perceptions flow in their natural courſe. He feels himſelf free, light, and eaſy, eſpecially after any forcible acceleration or retardation. On the other hand, the reſiſtance felt in retarding or accelerating the natural courſe, excites a pain, which, though ſcarcely felt

* This chapter was compoſed in the year 1753.

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in ſmall removes, becomes conſiderable toward the extremes. An averſion to fix on any ſingle object for a long time, or to take in a multiplicity of objects in a ſhort time, is remarkable in children; and equally ſo in men unaccuſtomed to buſineſs. A man languiſhes when the ſucceſſion is very ſlow; and, if he grow not impatient, is apt to fall aſleep. During a rapid ſucceſſion, he hath a feeling as if his head were turning round. He is fatigued, and his pain reſembles that of wearineſs after bodily labour. External objects, when they occaſion a very ſlow or a very quick ſucceſſion, produce a pain of the ſame ſort with what it felt in a voluntary retardation or acceleration: which ſhows that the pain proceeds not from the violence of the action, but from the retardation or acceleration itſelf, diſturbing that free and eaſy courſe of ſucceſſion which is naturally pleaſant.

But the mind is not ſatisfied with a moderate courſe alone: its perceptions muſt alſo be ſufficiently diverſified. Number without variety conſtitutes not an agreeable train. In comparing a few objects, uniformity

mity is agreeable: but the frequent reiteration of uniform objects becomes unpleaſant. One tires of a ſcene that is not diverſified; and ſoon feels a ſort of unnatural reſtraint when confined within a narrow range, whether occaſioned by a retarded ſucceſſion or by too great uniformity. An exceſs in variety is, on the other hand, fatiguing. This is even perceptible in a train compoſed of related objects: much more where the objects are unrelated; for an object, unconnected with the former train, gains not admittance without effort; and this effort, though ſcarce perceptible in a ſingle inſtance, becomes by frequent reiteration exceeding painful. Whatever be the cauſe, the fact is certain, that a man never finds himſelf more at eaſe, than when his perceptions ſucceed each other with a certain degree, not only of velocity, but alſo of variety. Hence it proceeds, that a train conſiſting entirely of ideas of memory, is never painful by too great variety; becauſe ſuch ideas are not introduced otherwiſe than according to their natural connections *. The plea-

* Chap. 1.

ſure of a train of ideas, is the moſt remarkable in a reverie; eſpecially where the imagination interpoſes, and is active in coining new ideas, which is done with wonderful facility. One muſt be ſenſible, that the ſerenity and eaſe of the mind in this ſtate, makes a great part of the enjoyment. The caſe is different where external objects enter into the train; for theſe, making their appearance without any order, and without any connection ſave that of contiguity, form a train of perceptions that may be extremely uniform or extremely diverſified; which, for oppoſite reaſons, are both of them painful.

Any acceleration or retardation of the natural run of perceptions, is painful even where it is voluntary. And it is equally painful to alter that degree of variety which nature requires. Contemplation, when the mind is long attached to one thing, ſoon becomes painful by reſtraining the free range of perception. Curioſity and the proſpect of advantage from uſeful diſcoveries, may engage a man to proſecute his ſtudies, notwithſtanding the pain they give him; and

and a habit of cloſe attention, formed by frequent exerciſe, may ſoften the pain. But it is deeply felt by the bulk of mankind, and produceth in them an averſion to all abſtract ſciences. In any profeſſion or calling, a train of operation that is ſimple and reiterated without intermiſſion, makes the operator languiſh, and loſe his vigor. He complains neither of too great labour nor of too little action; but regrets the want of variety, and his being obliged to do the ſame thing over and over. Where the operation is ſufficiently varied, the mind retains its vigor, and is pleaſed with its condition. Actions again create an uneaſineſs when exceſſive in number or variety, though in every other reſpect agreeable. This uneaſineſs is extremely remarkable, where ſtrict attention muſt be given, at the ſame time, to a number of different things. Thus a throng of buſineſs in law, in phyſic, or in traffick, diſtreſſeth and diſtracts the mind, unleſs where a habit of application is acquired by long and conſtant exerciſe. The exceſſive variety is the diſtreſſing circumſtance; and the mind ſuffers

grievouſly by being kept conſtantly upon the ſtretch.

With relation to involuntary cauſes diſturbing that degree of variety which nature requires, a ſlight pain affecting one part of the body without variation, becomes, by its conſtancy and long duration, almoſt inſupportable. The patient, ſenſible that the pain is not increaſed in degree, complains of its conſtancy more than of its ſeverity, that it ingroſſes his whole thoughts, and gives admiſſion to no other object. Pain, of all feelings, ſeizes the attention with the greateſt force; and the mind, after fruitleſs efforts to turn its view to objects more agreeable, muſt abandon itſelf to its tormentor. A ſhifting pain gives leſs uneaſineſs, becauſe change of place contributes to variety. An intermitting pain, ſuffering other objects to intervene, is not increaſed by reiteration. Again, any ſingle colour or ſound often returning, becomes diſagreeable; as may be obſerved in viewing a train of ſimilar apartments painted with the ſame colour, and in hearing the prolonged tollings of a bell. Colour and

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found varied within certain limits, though without any order, are agreeable; witneſs a field variegated with many colours of plants and flowers, and the various notes of birds in a thicket. Increaſe the number or variety, and the feeling becomes unpleaſant. Thus a great variety of colours, crowded upon a ſmall canvas or in quick ſucceſſion, create an uneaſy feeling, which is prevented by putting the colours at a greater diſtance either of place or time. A number of voices in a crowded aſſembly, a number of animals collected in a market, produce an unpleaſant emotion; though a few of them together, or all of them in a moderate ſucceſſion, would be agreeable. And becauſe of the ſame exceſs in variety, a number of pains felt in different parts of the body, at the ſame inſtant or in a rapid ſucceſſion, make an exquiſite torture.

The foregoing doctrine concerning the train of perceptions, and the pleaſure or pain reſulting from that train in different circumſtances, will be confirmed by attending to the final cauſe of theſe effects. And as I am ſenſible that the mind, inflamed with

ſpeculations of this kind ſo highly intereſting, is beyond meaſure diſpoſed to conviction, I ſhall be watchful to admit no argument nor remark but what appears ſolidly founded. With this caution I proceed to the inquiry. It is occaſionally obſerved above, that perſons of a phlegmatic temperament, having a ſluggiſh train of perceptions, are indiſpoſed to action; and that activity conſtantly accompanies a briſk motion of perceptions. To aſcertain this fact, a man need not go abroad for experiments. Reflecting upon things paſſing in his own mind, he will find, that a briſk circulation of thought conſtantly prompts him to action; and that he is averſe to action when his perceptions languiſh in their courſe. But man by nature is formed for action, and he muſt be active in order to be happy. Nature therefore hath kindly provided againſt indolence, by annexing pleaſure to a moderate courſe of perceptions, and by making every remarkable retardation painful. A ſlow courſe of perceptions is attended with another bad effect. Man in a few capital caſes is governed by propenſity or inſtinct;

inſtinct; but in matters that admit deliberation and choice, reaſon is aſſigned him for a guide. Now, as reaſoning requires often a great compaſs of ideas, their ſucceſſion ought to be ſo quick, as readily to furniſh every motive that may be neceſſary for mature deliberation. In a languid ſucceſſion, motives will often occur after action is commenced, when it is too late to retreat.

Nature hath guarded man, her favourite, againſt a ſucceſſion too rapid, not leſs carefully than againſt one too ſlow. Both are equally painful, though the pain is not the ſame in both. Many are the good effects of this contrivance. In the firſt place, as the bodily faculties are by certain painful ſenſations confined within proper limits, beyond which it would be dangerous to ſtrain the tender organs, Nature, in like manner, is equally provident with reſpect to the nobler faculties of the mind. Thus the pain of an accelerated courſe of perceptions, is Nature's admonition to relax our pace, and to admit a more gentle exertion of thought. Another valuable purpoſe may be gathered, from conſidering in what manner objects

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are imprinted upon the mind. To make ſuch an impreſſion as to give the memory faſt hold of the object, time is required, even where attention is the greateſt; and a moderate degree of attention, which is the common caſe, muſt be continued ſtill longer to produce the ſame effect. A rapid ſucceſſion then muſt prevent objects from making impreſſions ſo deep as to be of real ſervice in life; and Nature accordingly for the ſake of memory, has by a painful feeling guarded againſt a rapid ſucceſſion. But a ſtill more valuable purpoſe is anſwered by this contrivance. As, on the one hand, a ſluggiſh courſe of perceptions indiſpoſeth to action; ſo, on the other, a courſe too rapid impels to raſh and precipitant action. Prudent conduct is the child of deliberation and clear conception, for which there is no place in a rapid courſe of thought. Nature therefore, taking meaſures for prudent conduct, has guarded us effectually from precipitancy of thought, by making it painful.

Nature not only provides againſt a ſucceſſion too ſlow or too quick, but makes the middle courſe extremely pleaſant. Nor is this

this middle courſe confined within narrow bounds. Every man can naturally without pain accelerate or retard in ſome degree the rate of his perceptions; and he can do this in a ſtill greater degree by the force of habit. Thus a habit of contemplation annihilates the pain of a retarded courſe of perceptions; and a buſy life, after long practice, makes acceleration pleaſant.

Concerning the final cauſe of our taſte for variety, it will be conſidered, that human affairs, complex by variety as well as number, require the diſtributing our attention and activity, in meaſure and proportion. Nature therefore, to ſecure a juſt diſtribution correſponding to the variety of human affairs, has made too great uniformity or too great variety in the courſe of our perceptions equally unpleaſant. And indeed, were we addicted to either extreme, our internal conſtitution would be ill ſuited to our external circumſtances. At the ſame time, where a frequent reiteration of the ſame operation is required, as in ſeveral manufactures, or a quick circulation, as in law or phyſic, Nature, attentive to all our wants, hath alſo provi-

ded for theſe caſes. She hath implanted in the breaſt of every perſon, an efficacious principle, which leads to habit. By an obſtinate perſeverance in the ſame occupation, the pain of exceſſive uniformity vaniſheth; and by the like perſeverance in a quick circulation of different occupations, the pain of exceſſive variety vaniſheth. And thus we come to take delight in ſeveral occupations, that by nature, without habit, are not a little diſguſtful.

A middle rate alſo in our train of perceptions betwixt uniformity and variety, is not leſs pleaſant, than betwixt quickneſs and ſlowneſs. The mind of man thus conſtituted, is wonderfully adapted to the courſe of human affairs, which are continually changing, but not without connection. It is equally adapted to the acquiſition of knowledge, which reſults chiefly from diſcovering reſemblances among differing objects, and differences among reſembling objects. Such occupation, even abſtracting from the knowledge we acquire, is in itſelf delightful, by preſerving a middle rate betwixt too great uniformity and too great variety.

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We are now arrived at the chief purpoſe of the preſent chapter; and that is to examine how far uniformity or variety ought to be ſtudied in the fine arts. And the knowledge we have obtained, will even at firſt view ſuggeſt a general obſervation, That in every work of art, it muſt be agreeable to find that degree of variety which correſponds to the natural courſe of our perceptions; and that an exceſs in variety or in uniformity, muſt be diſagreeable by varying that natural courſe. For this reaſon, works of art admit more or leſs variety according to the nature of the ſubject. In a picture that ſtrongly attaches the ſpectator to a ſingle object, the mind reliſheth not a multiplicity of figures or of ornaments. A picture again repreſenting a gay ſubject, admits great variety of figures and ornaments; becauſe theſe are agreeable to the mind in a chearful tone. The ſame obſervation is applicable to poetry and to muſic.

It muſt at the ſame time be remarked, that one can bear a greater variety of natural objects than of objects in a picture; and a greater variety in a picture than in a deſcrip-

tion. A real object preſented to the view, makes an impreſſion more readily than when repreſented in colours, and much more readily than when repreſented in words. Hence it is, that the profuſe variety of objects in ſome natural landſcapes, neither breed confuſion nor fatigue. And for the ſame reaſon, there is place for greater variety of ornament in a picture, than in a poem.

From theſe general obſervations I proceed to particulars. In works expoſed continually to public view, variety ought to be ſtudied. It is a rule accordingly in ſculpture, to contraſt the different limbs of a ſtatue, in order to give it all the variety poſſible. Though the cone in a ſingle view be more beautiful than the pyramid; yet a pyramidal ſteeple, becauſe of its variety, is juſtly preferred. For the ſame reaſon, the oval in compoſitions is preferred before the circle; and painters, in copying buildings or any regular work, endeavour to give an air of variety by repreſenting the ſubject in an angular view: we are pleaſed with the variety without loſing

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ſight of the regularity. In a landſcape repreſenting animals, thoſe eſpecially of the ſame kind, contraſt ought to prevail. To draw one ſleeping another awake, one ſitting another in motion, one moving toward the ſpectator another from him, is the life of ſuch a performance.

In every ſort of writing intended for amuſement, variety is neceſſary in proportion to the length of the work. Want of variety is ſenſibly felt in Davila's hiſtory of the civil wars of France. The events are indeed important and various: but the reader languiſheth by a tireſome uniformity of character; every perſon engaged being figured a conſummate politician, governed by intereſt only. It is hard to ſay, whether Ovid diſguſts more by too great variety or too great uniformity. His ſtories are all of the ſame kind, concluding invariably with the transformation of one being into another. So far he is tireſome with exceſs in uniformity. He alſo fatigues with exceſs in variety, by hurrying his reader inceſſantly from ſtory to ſtory. Arioſto is ſtill more fatiguing than Ovid, by exceeding the juſt bounds of variety.

riety. Not ſatisfied, like Ovid, with a ſucceſſion in his ſtories, he diſtracts the reader by jumbling together a multitude of unconnected events. Nor is the Orlando Furioſo leſs tireſome by its uniformity than the Metamorphoſes, though in a different manner. After a ſtory is brought to a criſis, the reader, intent upon the cataſtrophe, is ſuddenly ſnatched away to a new ſtory, which is little regarded ſo long as the mind is occupied with the former. This tantalizing method, from which the author never once ſwerves during the courſe of a long work, beſide its uniformity, hath another bad effect: it prevents that ſympathy which is raiſed by an intereſting event when the reader meets with no interruption.

The emotions produced by our perceptions in a train, have been little conſidered, and leſs underſtood. The ſubject therefore required an elaborate diſcuſſion. It may ſurpriſe ſome readers, to find variety treated as only contributing to make a train of perceptions pleaſant, when it is commonly held to be a neceſſary ingredient in beauty of whatever kind; according to the

definition,

definition, "That beauty conſiſts in uni-"formity amidſt variety." But after the ſubject is explained and illuſtrated as above, I preſume it will be evident, that this definition, however applicable to one or other ſpecies, is far from being juſt with reſpect to beauty in general. Variety contributes no ſhare to the beauty of a moral action, nor of a mathematical theorem; and numberleſs are the beautiful objects of ſight that have little or no variety in them. A globe, the moſt uniform of all figures, is of all the moſt beautiful; and a ſquare, though more beautiful than a trapezium, hath leſs variety in its conſtituent parts. The foregoing definition, which at beſt is but obſcurely expreſſed, is only applicable to a number of objects in a group or in ſucceſſion, among which indeed a due mixture of uniformity and variety is always agreeable, provided the particular objects, ſeparately conſidered, be in any degree beautiful. Uniformity amidſt variety among ugly objects, affords no pleaſure. This circumſtance is totally omitted in the definition; and indeed to have mentioned it, would at firſt glance

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ſhow the definition to be imperfect. To define beauty as ariſing from beautiful objects blended together in a due proportion of uniformity and variety, would be too groſs to paſs current; as nothing can be more groſs, than to employ in a definition the very term that is propoſed to be explained.

APPENDIX to Chap. IX.

Concerning the works of nature.

IN natural objects, whether we regard their internal or external ſtructure, beauty and deſign are equally conſpicuous. We ſhall begin with the outſide of nature, as what firſt preſents itſelf.

The figure of an organic body, is generally regular. The trunk of a tree, its branches, and their ramifications, are nearly round, and form a ſeries regularly decreaſing from the trunk to the ſmalleſt fibre. Uniformity is no where more remarkable than

than in the leaves, which, in the ſame ſpecies, have all the ſame colour, ſize, and ſhape. The ſeeds and fruits are all regular figures, approaching for the moſt part to the globular form. Hence a plant, eſpecially of the larger kind, with its trunk, branches, foliage, and fruit, is a delightful object.

In an animal, the trunk, which is much larger than the other parts, occupies a chief place. Its ſhape, like that of the ſtem of plants, is nearly round; a figure which of all is the moſt agreeable. Its two ſides are preciſely ſimilar. Several of the under parts go off in pairs; and the two individuals of each pair are accurately uniform. The ſingle parts are placed in the middle. The limbs, bearing a certain proportion to the trunk, ſerve to ſupport it, and to give it a proper elevation. Upon one extremity are diſpoſed the neck and head, in the direction of the trunk. The head being the chief part, poſſeſſes with great propriety the chief place. Hence, the beauty of the whole figure, is the reſult of many equal and proportional parts orderly diſpoſed; and the ſmalleſt variation in number, equality, pro-

portion, or order, never fails to produce a perception of uglineſs and deformity.

Nature in no particular ſeems more profuſe of ornament, than in the beautiful colouring of her works. The flowers of plants, the furs of beaſts, and the feathers of birds, vie with each other in the beauty of their colours, which in luſtre as well as in harmony are beyond the power of imitation. Of all natural appearances, the colouring of the human face is the moſt exquiſite. It is the ſtrongeſt inſtance of the ineffable art of nature, in adapting and proportioning its colours to the magnitude, figure, and poſition, of the parts. In a word, colour ſeems to live in nature only, and to languiſh under the fineſt touches of art.

When we examine the internal ſtructure of a plant or animal, a wonderful ſubtility of mechaniſm is diſplayed. Man, in his mechanical operations, is confined to the ſurface of bodies. But the operations of nature are exerted through the whole ſubſtance, ſo as to reach even the elementary parts. Thus the body of an animal, and of a plant, are compoſed of certain great veſſels;

veſſels; theſe of ſmaller; and theſe again of ſtill ſmaller, without end ſo far we can diſcover. This power of diffuſing mechaniſm through the moſt intimate parts, is peculiar to nature; and diſtinguiſhes her operations, moſt remarkably, from every work of art. Such texture, continued from the groſſer parts to the moſt minute, preſerves all along the ſtricteſt regularity. The fibres of plants are a bundle of cylindric canals, lying in the ſame direction, and parallel or nearly parallel to each other. In ſome inſtances, a moſt accurate arrangement of parts is diſcovered, as in onions, formed of concentric coats one within another to the very centre. An animal body is ſtill more admirable, in the diſpoſition of its internal parts, and in their order and ſymmetry. There is not a bone, a muſcle, a blood-veſſel, a nerve, that hath not one correſponding to it on the oppoſite ſide of the animal; and the ſame order is carried through the moſt minute parts. The lungs are compoſed of two parts, which are diſpoſed upon the ſides of the thorax; and the kidneys, in a lower ſituation, have a

poſition not leſs orderly. As to the parts that are ſingle, the heart is advantageouſly ſituated nigh the middle. The liver, ſtomach, and ſpleen, are diſpoſed in the upper region of the abdomen, about the ſame height: the bladder is placed in the middle of the body; as well as the inteſtinal canal, which fills the whole cavity by its convolutions.

The mechanical power of nature, not confined to ſmall bodies, reacheth equally thoſe of the greateſt ſize; witneſs the bodies that compoſe the ſolar ſyſtem, which, however large, are weighed, meaſured, and ſubjected to certain laws, with the utmoſt accuracy. Their places around the ſun, with their diſtances, are determined by a preciſe rule, correſponding to their quantities of matter. The ſuperior dignity of the central body, in reſpect of its bulk and lucid appearance, is ſuited to the place it occupies. The globular figure of theſe bodies, is not only in itſelf beautiful, but is above all others fitted for regular motion. Each planet revolves about its own axis in a given time; and each moves round the ſun, in an orbit nearly

nearly circular, and in a time proportioned to its diſtance. Their velocities, directed by an eſtabliſhed law, are perpetually changing by regular accelerations and retardations. In fine, the great variety of regular appearances, joined with the beauty of the ſyſtem itſelf, cannot fail to produce the higheſt delight in every perſon who can taſte deſign, power, or beauty.

Nature hath a wonderful power of connecting ſyſtems with each other, and of propagating that connection through all her works. Thus the conſtituent parts of a plant, the roots, the ſtem, the branches, the leaves, the fruit, are really different ſyſtems, united by a mutual dependence on each other. Thus in an animal, the lymphatic and lacteal ducts, the blood-veſſels and nerves, the muſcles and glands, the bones and cartilages, the membranes and viſcera, with the other organs, form diſtinct ſyſtems, which are united into one whole. There are, at the ſame time, other connections leſs intimate. Thus every plant is joined to the earth by its roots; it requires rain and dews to furniſh it with juices; and

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it requires heat to preſerve theſe juices in fluidity and motion. Thus every animal, by its gravity, is connected with the earth, with the element in which it breathes, and with the ſun, by deriving from it cheriſhing and enlivening heat. The earth furniſheth aliment to plants, theſe to animals, and theſe again to other animals, in a long train of dependence. That the earth is part of a greater ſyſtem, comprehending many bodies mutually attracting each other, and gravitating all toward one common centre, is now thoroughly explored. Such a regular and uniform ſeries of connections, propagated through ſo great a number of beings and through ſuch wide ſpaces, is wonderful: and our wonder muſt increaſe, when we obſerve this connection propagated from the minuteſt atoms to bodies of the moſt enormous ſize, and widely diffuſed, ſo as that we can neither perceive its beginning nor its end. That it doth not terminate within our own planetary ſyſtem, is certain. The connection is diffuſed over ſpaces ſtill more remote, where new bodies and ſyſtems riſe to our view, without end. All ſpace is filled with the

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works of God, which, being the operation of one hand, are formed by one plan, to anſwer one great end.

But the moſt wonderful connection of all, though not the moſt conſpicuous, is that of our internal frame with the works of nature. Man is obviouſly fitted for contemplating theſe works, becauſe in this contemplation he has great delight. The works of nature are remarkable in their uniformity not leſs than in their variety; and the mind of man is fitted to receive pleaſure equally from both. Uniformity and variety are interwoven in the works of nature with ſurpriſing art. Variety, however great, is never without ſome degree of uniformity; nor the greateſt uniformity, without ſome degree of variety. There is great variety in the ſame plant, by the different appearances of its ſtem, branches, leaves, bloſſoms, fruit, ſize, and colour; and yet when we trace this variety through different plants, eſpecially of the ſame kind, there is diſcovered a ſurpriſing uniformity. Again, where nature ſeems to have intended the moſt exact uniformity,


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as among individuals of the ſame kind, there ſtill appears a diverſity, which ſerves readily to diſtinguiſh one individual from another. It is indeed admirable, that the human viſage, in which uniformity is ſo prevalent, ſhould yet be ſo marked as to leave no room for miſtaking one perſon for another. The difference, though clearly perceived, is often ſo minute as to go beyond the reach of deſcription. A correſpondence ſo perfect betwixt the human mind and the works of nature, is extremely remarkable. The oppoſition betwixt variety and uniformity is ſo great, that one would not readily imagine they could both be reliſhed by the ſame palate; at leaſt not in the ſame object, nor at the ſame time. It is however true, that the pleaſures they afford, being happily adjuſted to each other, and readily mixing in intimate union, are frequently produced in perfection by the ſame individual object. Nay further, in the objects that touch us the moſt, uniformity and variety are conſtantly combined; witneſs natural objects, where this combination is always found in perfection. It is

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for that reaſon, that natural objects readily form themſelves into groups, and are agreeable in whatever manner combined: a wood with its trees, ſhrubs, and herbs, is agreeable: the muſic of birds, the lowing of cattle, and the murmuring of a brook, are in conjunction delightful; though they ſtrike the ear without modulation or harmony. In ſhort, nothing can be more happily accommodated to the inward conſtitution of man, than that mixture of uniformity with variety which the eye diſcovers in natural objects. And accordingly, the mind is never more highly gratified than in contemplating a natural landſcape.

End of the FIRST VOLUME.





William Adair Esq.

