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
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


Baden Powell 7(2)



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AIDS TO REFLECTION

BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

EDITED BY

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PRELIMINARY ESSAY.

BY THE REV. JAMES MARSH.

WHETHER the present state of religious feeling, and the prevailing topics of theological inquiry among us, are particularly favourable to the success of the Work herewith offered to the Public can be determined only by the result. The question, however, has not been left unconsidered; and however that may be, it is not a work, the value of which depends essentially upon its relation to the passing controversies of the day. Unless I distrust my own feelings and convictions altogether, I must suppose, that for some, I hope for many, minds, it will have a deep and enduring interest. Of those classes, for whose use it is more especially designated in the Author's Preface, I trust there are many also in this country, who will justly appreciate the objects at which it aims, and avail themselves of its instruction and assistance. I could wish it might be received, by all who concern themselves in religious inquiries and instruction especially, in the spirit which seems to me to have animated its great and admirable author; and I hesitate not to say, that to all of every class, who shall so receive it, and pe-

ruse it with the attention and thoughtfulness, which it demands and deserves, it will be found by experience to furnish, what its title imports, "AIDS TO REFLECTION" on subjects, upon which every man is bound to reflect deeply and in earnest.

What the specific objects of the Work are, and for whom it is written, may be learned in few words from the Preface of the Author. From this, too, it will be seen to be professedly didactic. It is designed to aid those who wish for instruction, or assistance in the instruction of others. The plan and composition of the Work will to most readers probably appear somewhat anomalous; but reflection upon the nature of the objects aimed at, and some little experience of its results, may convince them that the method adopted is not without its advantages. It is important to observe, that it is designed, as its general characteristic, to aid REFLECTION, and for the most part upon subjects which can be learned and understood only by the exercise of reflection in the strict and proper sense of that term. It was not so much to teach a speculative system of doctrines built upon established premisses, for which a different method would have been obviously preferable, as to turn the mind continually back upon the premisses themselves—upon the inherent grounds of truth and error in its own being. The only way in which it is possible for any one to learn the science of words, which is one of the objects to be sought in the present Work, and the true import of those words especially, which most concern us as rational and accountable beings, is by reflecting upon and bringing forth into distinct consciousness, those mental acts, which the words are intended to designate. We must discover and distinctly apprehend different meanings,

before we can appropriate to each a several word, or understand the words so appropriated by others. Now it is not too much to say, that most men, and even a large proportion of educated men, do not reflect sufficiently upon their own inward being, upon the constituent laws of their own understanding, upon the mysterious powers and agencies of reason, and conscience, and will, to apprehend with much distinctness the objects to be named, or of course to refer the names with correctness to their several objects. Hence the necessity of associating the study of words with the study of morals and religion; and that is the most effectual method of instruction, which enables the teacher most especially to fix the attention upon a definite meaning, that is, in these studies, upon a particular act, or process, or law of the mind—to call it into distinct consciousness, and assign to it its proper name, so that the name shall thenceforth have for the learner a distinct, definite, and intelligible sense. To impress upon the reader the importance of this, and to exemplify it in the particular subjects taken up in the *Work*, is a leading aim of the Author throughout; and it is obviously the only possible way by which we can arrive at any satisfactory and conclusive results on subjects of philosophy, morals, and religion. The first principles, the ultimate grounds, of these, so far as they are possible objects of knowledge for us, must be sought and found in the laws of our being, or they are not found at all. The knowledge of these, terminates in the knowledge of ourselves, of our rational and personal being, of our proper and distinctive humanity, and of that Divine Being, in whose image we are created. “We must retire inward,” says St. Bernard, “if we would ascend upward.” It is by self-

inspection, by reflecting upon the mysterious grounds of our own being, that we can alone arrive at any rational knowledge of the central and absolute ground of all being. It is by this only, that we can discover that principle of unity and consistency, which reason instinctively seeks after, which shall reduce to an harmonious system all our views of truth and of being, and destitute of which all the knowledge that comes to us from without is fragmentary, and in its relation to our highest interests as rational beings but the patch-work of vanity.

Now, of necessity, the only method, by which another can aid our efforts in the work of reflection, is by first reflecting himself, and so pointing out the process and marking the result by words, that we can repeat it, and try the conclusions by our own consciousness. If he have reflected aright, if he have excluded all causes of self-deception, and directed his thoughts by those principles of truth and reason, and by those laws of the understanding, which belong in common to all men, his conclusions must be true for all. We have only to repeat the process, impartially to reflect ourselves, unbiassed by received opinions, and undeceived by the idols of our own understandings, and we shall find the same truths in the depths of our own self-consciousness. I am persuaded that such, for the most part, will be found to be the case with regard to the principles developed in the present Work, and that those who, with serious reflection and an unbiassed love of truth, will refer them to the laws of thought in their own minds, to the requirements of their own reason, will find there a witness to their truth.

Viewing the Work in this manner, therefore, as an

instructive and safe guide to the knowledge of what it concerns all men to know, I cannot but consider it in itself as a work of great and permanent value to any Christian community. Whatever indeed tends to awaken and cherish the power and to form the habit, of reflection upon the great constituent principles of our own permanent being and proper humanity, and upon the abiding laws of truth and duty, as revealed in our reason and conscience, cannot but promote our highest interests as moral and rational beings. Even if the particular conclusions, to which the Author has arrived, should prove erroneous, the evil is comparatively of little importance, if he have at the same time communicated to our minds such powers of thought, as will enable us to detect his errors, and attain by our own efforts to a more perfect knowledge of the truth. That some of his views may not be erroneous, or that they are to be received on his authority, the Author, I presume, would be the last to affirm ; and although in the nature of the case it was impossible for him to aid reflection without anticipating, and in some measure influencing, the results, yet the primary tendency and design of the Work is, not to establish this or that system, but to cultivate in every mind the power and the will to seek earnestly and steadfastly for the truth in the only direction, in which it can ever be found. The work is no further controversial, than every work must be, "that is writ with freedom and reason" upon subjects of the same kind ; and if it be found at variance with existing opinions and modes of philosophizing, it is not necessarily to be considered the fault of the writer.

In republishing the Work in this country, I could wish that it might be received by all, for whose instruc-

tion it was designed, simply as a didactic work, on its own merits, and without controversy. I must not, however, be supposed ignorant of its bearing upon those questions, which have so often been, and still are, the prevailing topics of theological controversy among us. It was indeed incumbent on me, before inviting the attention of the religious community to the Work, to consider its relation to existing opinions, and its probable influence on the progress of truth. This I have done with as severe thought as I am capable of bestowing upon any subject, and I trust too with no want of deference and conscientious regard to the feelings and opinions of others. I have not attempted to disguise from myself, nor do I wish to disguise from the readers of the Work, the inconsistency of some of its leading principles with much that is taught and received in our theological circles. Should it gain much of the public attention in any way, it will become, as it ought, an object of special and deep interest to all, who would contend for the truth, and labour to establish it upon a permanent basis. I venture to assure such, even those of them who are most capable of comprehending the philosophical grounds of truth in our speculative systems of theology, that in its relation to this whole subject they will find it to be a Work of great depth and power, and, whether right or wrong, eminently deserving their attention. It is not to be supposed that all who read, or even all who comprehend it, will be convinced of the soundness of its views, or be prepared to abandon those which they have long considered essential to the truth. To those, whose understandings by long habit have become limited in their powers of apprehension, and as it were identified with certain schemes of doctrine, certain modes of contem-

plating all that pertains to religious truth, it may appear novel, strange, and unintelligible, or even dangerous in its tendency, and be to them an occasion of offence. But I have no fear that any earnest and single-hearted lover of the truth as it is in Jesus, who will free his mind from the idols of preconceived opinion, and give himself time and opportunity to understand the *Work* by such reflection as the nature of the subject renders unavoidable, will find in it any cause of offence, or any source of alarm. If the *Work* become the occasion of controversy at all, I should expect it from those, who, instead of reflecting deeply upon the first principles of truth in their own reason and conscience and in the word of God, are more accustomed to speculate—that is, from premisses given or assumed, but considered unquestionable, as the constituted point of observation, to look abroad upon the whole field of their intellectual vision, and thence to decide upon the true form and dimensions of all which meets their view. To such I would say with deference, that the merits of this *Work* cannot be determined by the merely relative aspect of its doctrines, as seen from the high ground of any prevailing metaphysical or theological system. Those on the contrary who will seek to comprehend it by reflection, to learn the true meaning of the whole and of all its parts, by retiring into their own minds and finding there the true point of observation for each, will not be in haste to question the truth or the tendency of its principles. I make these remarks because I am anxious, as far as may be, to anticipate the causeless fears of all, who earnestly pray and labour for the promotion of the truth, and to preclude that unprofitable controversy, which might arise from hasty or prejudiced views of a *Work* like this. At the same

time I should be far from deprecating any discussion which might tend to unfold more fully the principles which it teaches, or to exhibit more distinctly its true bearing upon the interests of theological science and of spiritual religion. It is to promote this object, indeed, that I am induced in the remarks which follow to offer some of my own thoughts on these subjects, imperfect I am well aware, and such as, for that reason, as well as others, worldly prudence might require me to suppress. If, however, I may induce reflecting men, and those who are engaged in theological inquiries especially, to indulge a suspicion that all truth, which it is important for them to know, is not contained in the systems of doctrine usually taught, and that this Work may be worthy of their serious and reflecting perusal, my chief object will be accomplished. I shall of course not need to anticipate in detail the contents of the Work itself, but shall aim simply to point out what I consider its distinguishing and essential character and tendency, and then direct the attention of my readers to some of those general feelings and views on the subjects of religious truth, and of those particulars in the prevailing philosophy of the age, which seem to me to be exerting an injurious influence on the cause of theological science and of spiritual religion, and not only to furnish a fit occasion, but to create an imperious demand, for a Work like that which is here offered to the public.

In regard then to the distinguishing character and tendency of the Work itself, it has already been stated to be didactic, and designed to aid reflection on the principles and grounds of truth in our own being; but in another point of view, and with reference to my present object, it might rather be denominated A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT AND VINDICATION OF

THE DISTINCTIVELY SPIRITUAL AND PECULIAR DOCTRINES OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM. In order to understand more clearly the import of this statement, and the relation of the Author's views to those exhibited in other systems, the reader is requested to examine in the first place, what he considers the *peculiar doctrines of Christianity*, and what he means by the terms *spirit* and *spiritual*. A synoptical view of what he considers peculiar to Christianity as a revelation is given in pp. 152—153, vol. I. and, if I mistake not, will be found essentially to coincide, though not perhaps in the language employed, with what among us are termed the Evangelical doctrines of religion. Those who are anxious to examine further into the orthodoxy of the Work in connexion with this statement, may consult the articles on ORIGINAL SIN and REDEMPTION beginning at pp. 204 and 269, vol. I. though I must forewarn them that it will require much study in connexion with the other parts of the Work, before one unaccustomed to the Author's language, and unacquainted with his views, can fully appreciate the merit of what may be peculiar in his mode of treating those subjects. With regard to the term *spiritual*, it may be sufficient to remark here, that he regards it as having a specific import, and maintains that in the sense of the New Testament, *spiritual* and *natural* are contradistinguished, so that what is spiritual is different in kind from that which is natural, and is in fact *super-natural*. So, too, while morality is something more than prudence, religion, the spiritual life, is something more than morality. For his views at large, the reader may recur to the note,* and the references there made.

* Not reprinted. Ed.

In vindicating the peculiar doctrines of the Christian system so stated, and a faith in the reality of agencies and modes of being essentially spiritual or supernatural, he aims to show their consistency with reason and with the true principles of philosophy, and that indeed, so far from being irrational, **CHRISTIAN FAITH IS THE PERFECTION OF HUMAN REASON.** By reflection upon the subjective grounds of knowledge and faith in the human mind itself, and by an analysis of its faculties, he develops the distinguishing characteristics and necessary relations of the natural and the spiritual in our modes of being and knowing, and the all-important fact, that although the former does not comprehend the latter, yet neither does it preclude its existence. He proves, that "the scheme of Christianity, though not discoverable by reason, is yet in accordance with it—that link follows link by necessary consequence—that religion passes out of the ken of reason only where the eye of reason has reached its own horizon—and that faith is then but its continuation."* Instead of adopting, like the popular metaphysicians of the day, a system of philosophy at war with religion, and which tends inevitably to undermine our belief in the reality of any thing spiritual in the only proper sense of that word, and then coldly and ambiguously referring us for the support of our faith to the authority of Revelation, he boldly asserts the reality of something distinctively spiritual in man, and the futility of all those modes of philosophizing, in which this is not recognized, or which are incompatible with it. He considers it the highest and most rational purpose of any system of philosophy, at least of one professing to be Christian, to investigate those higher

* *Biographia Literaria*, vol. ii. p. 309. 2d Edit. S. C.

and peculiar attributes, which distinguish us from the brutes that perish—which are the image of God in us, and constitute our proper humanity. It is in his view the proper business and the duty of the Christian philosopher to remove all appearance of contradiction between the several manifestations of the one Divine Word, to reconcile reason with revelation, and thus to justify the ways of God to man. The methods by which he accomplishes this, either in regard to the terms in which he enunciates the great doctrines of the Gospel, or the peculiar views of philosophy by which he reconciles them with the subjective grounds of faith in the universal reason of man, need not be stated here. I will merely observe, that the key to his system will be found in the distinctions, which he makes and illustrates between *nature* and *free-will*, and between the *understanding* and *reason*. For the first of these distinctions the reader may consult the note,* and for the other, pp. 168—184, vol. I. It may meet the prejudices of some to remark farther, that in philosophizing on the grounds of our faith he does not profess or aim to solve all mysteries, and to bring all truth within the comprehension of the understanding. A truth may be mysterious, and the primary ground of all truth and reality must be so. But though we may believe what *passeth all understanding*, we *cannot* believe what is *absurd*, or contradictory to *reason*.

Whether the Work be well executed, according to the idea of it, as now given, or whether the Author have accomplished his purpose, must be determined by those who are capable of judging, when they shall have examined and reflected upon the whole as it deserves. The inquiry which I have now to propose to

* Not reprinted. Ed.

my readers is, whether the idea itself be a rational one, and whether the purpose of the Author be one which a wise man and a Christian ought to aim at, or which in the present state of our religious interests, and of our theological science, specially needs to be accomplished.

No one, who has had occasion to observe the general feelings and views of our religious community for a few years past, can be ignorant, that a strong prejudice exists against the introduction of philosophy, in any form, in the discussion of theological subjects. The terms *philosophy* and *metaphysics*, even *reason* and *rational*, seem, in the minds of those most devoted to the support of religious truth, to have forfeited their original, and to have acquired a new import, especially in their relation to matters of faith. By a philosophical view of religious truth would generally be understood a view, not only varying from the religion of the Bible in the form and manner of presenting it, but at war with it; and a rational religion is supposed to be of course something diverse from revealed religion. A philosophical and rational system of religious truth would by most readers among us, if I mistake not, be supposed a system deriving its doctrines not from revelation, but from the speculative reason of men, or at least relying on that only for their credibility. That these terms have been used to designate such systems, and that the prejudice against reason and philosophy so employed is not, therefore, without cause, I need not deny; nor would any friend of revealed truth be less disposed to give credence to such systems, than the Author of the Work before us.

But, on the other hand, a moment's reflection only can be necessary to convince any man, attentive to the

use of language, that we do at the same time employ these terms in relation to truth generally in a better and much higher sense. *Rational*, as contradistinguished from *irrational* and *absurd*, certainly denotes a quality, which every man would be disposed to claim, not only for himself, but for his religious opinions. Now, the adjective *reasonable* having acquired a different use and signification, the word *rational* is the adjective corresponding in sense to the substantive *reason*, and signifies what is conformed to reason. In one sense, then, all men would appeal to reason in behalf of their religious faith; they would deny that it was irrational or absurd. If we do not in this sense adhere to reason, we forfeit our prerogative as rational beings, and our faith is no better than the bewildered dream of a man who has lost his reason. Nay, I maintain that when we use the term in this higher sense, it is impossible for us to believe on any authority what is directly contradictory to reason and seen to be so. No evidence from another source, and no authority could convince us, that a proposition in geometry, for example, is false, which our reason intuitively discovers to be true. Now if we suppose (and we may at least suppose this,) that reason has the same power of intuitive insight in relation to certain moral and spiritual truths, as in relation to the truths of geometry, then it would be equally impossible to divest us of our belief of those truths.

Furthermore, we are not only unable to believe the same proposition to be false, which our reason sees to be true, but we cannot believe another proposition, which by the exercise of the same rational faculty we see to be incompatible with the former, or to contradict it. We may, and probably often do, receive with

a certain kind and degree of credence opinions, which reflection would show to be incompatible. But when we have reflected, and discovered the inconsistency, we cannot retain both. We cannot believe two contradictory propositions knowing them to be such. It would be irrational to do so.

Again, we cannot conceive it possible, that what by the same power of intuition we see to be universally and necessarily true should appear otherwise to any other rational being. We cannot, for example, but consider the propositions of geometry as necessarily true for all rational beings. So, too, a little reflection, I think, will convince any one, that we attribute the same necessity of reason to the principles of moral rectitude. What in the clear day-light of our reason, and after mature reflection, we see to be right, we cannot believe to be wrong in the view of other rational beings in the distinct exercise of their reason. Nay, in regard to those truths, which are clearly submitted to the view of our reason, and which we behold with distinct and stedfast intuitions, we necessarily attribute to the Supreme Reason, to the Divine Mind, views the same, or coincident, with those of our own reason. We cannot, (I say it with reverence and I trust with some apprehension of the importance of the assertion,) we *cannot* believe that to be right in the view of the Supreme Reason, which is clearly and decidedly wrong in the view of our own. It would be contradictory to reason, it would be irrational, to believe it, and therefore we cannot do so, till we lose our reason, or cease to exercise it.

I would ask, now, whether this be not an authorized use of the words reason and rational, and whether so used they do not mean something. If it be so—and I

appeal to the mind of every man capable of reflection, and of understanding the use of language, if it be not—then there is meaning in the terms *universal reason*, and *unity of reason*, as used in this Work. There is, and can be, in this highest sense of the word but one reason, and whatever contradicts that reason, being seen to do so, cannot be received as matter either of knowledge or faith. To reconcile religion with reason used in this sense, therefore, and to justify the ways of God to man, or in the view of reason, is so far from being irrational that reason imperatively demands it of us. We cannot, as rational beings, believe a proposition on the grounds of reason, and deny it on the authority of revelation. We cannot believe a proposition in philosophy, and deny the same proposition in theology; nor can we believe two incompatible propositions on the different grounds of reason and revelation. So far as we compare our thoughts, the objects of our knowledge and faith, and by reflection refer them to their common measure in the universal laws of reason, so far the instinct of reason impels us to reject whatever is contradictory and absurd, and to bring unity and consistency into all our views of truth. Thus, in the language of the Author of this Work, though “the word *rational* has been strangely abused of late times, this must not disincline us to the weighty consideration, that thoughtfulness, and a desire to rest all our convictions on grounds of right reason, are inseparable from the character of a Christian.”

But I beg the reader to observe, that in relation to the doctrines of spiritual religion—to all that he considers the peculiar doctrines of the Christian revelation, the Author assigns to reason only a negative validity. It does not teach us what those doctrines

are, or what they are not, except that they are not, and cannot be, such as contradict the clear convictions of right reason. But his views on this point are fully stated in the *Work*, and the general office of reason in relation to all that is proposed for our belief is given with philosophical precision in other parts of his *Works*.*

If then it be our prerogative, as rational beings, and our duty as Christians, to think, as well as to act, *rationally*,—to see that our convictions of truth rest on the grounds of right reason; and if it be one of the clearest dictates of reason, that we should endeavour to shun, and on discovery should reject, whatever is contradictory to the universal laws of thought, or to doctrines already established, I know not by what means we are to avoid the application of philosophy, at least to some extent, in the study of theology. For to determine what *are* the grounds of right reason, what are those ultimate truths, and those universal laws of thought, which we cannot rationally contradict, and by reflection to compare with these whatever is proposed for our belief, is in fact to philosophize; and whoever does this to a greater or less extent, is so far a philosopher in the best and highest sense of the word. To this extent we are bound to philosophize in theology, as well as in every other science. For what is not rational in theology, is, of course, irrational, and cannot be of the household of faith; and to determine whether it be rational in the sense already explained or not, is the province of philosophy. It is in this sense that the *Work* before us is to be considered a philosophical work, namely, that it proves the

* See Statesman's Manual, Appendix (B) p. 258, 2d edit. *Ed.*

doctrines of the Christian Faith to be rational, and exhibits philosophical grounds for the *possibility* of a truly spiritual religion. The *reality* of those experiences, or states of being, which constitute experimental or spiritual religion, rests on other grounds. It is incumbent on the philosopher to free them from the contradictions of reason, and nothing more; and who will deny, that to do this is a purpose worthy of the ablest philosopher and the most devoted Christian? Is it not desirable to convince all men that the doctrines, which we affirm to be revealed in the Gospel, are not contradictory to the requirements of reason and conscience? Is it not, on the other hand, vastly important to the cause of religious truth, and even to the practical influence of religion on our own minds, and the minds of the community at large, that we should attain and exhibit views of philosophy and doctrines in metaphysics, which are at least compatible with, if they do not specially favour, those views of religion, which, on other grounds, we find it our duty to believe and maintain? For, I beg it may be observed, as a point of great moment, that it is not the method of the genuine philosopher to separate his philosophy and religion, and adopting his principles independently in each, to leave them to be reconciled or not, as the case may be. He has, and can have, rationally but one system, in which his philosophy becomes religious, and his religion philosophical. Nor am I disposed in compliance with popular opinion to limit the application of this remark, as is usually done, to the mere external evidences of revelation. The philosophy which we adopt will and must influence not only our decision of the question, whether a book be of divine authority, but our views also of its meaning.

But this is a subject, on which, if possible, I would avoid being misunderstood, and must, therefore, exhibit it more fully, even at the risk of repeating what was said before, or is elsewhere found in the Work. It has been already, I believe, distinctly enough stated, that reason and philosophy ought to prevent our reception of doctrines claiming the authority of revelation only so far as the very necessities of our rational being require. However mysterious the thing affirmed may be, though *it passeth all understanding*, if it cannot be shown to contradict the unchangeable principles of right reason, its being incomprehensible to our understandings is not an obstacle to our faith. If it contradict reason, we cannot believe it, but must conclude, either that the writing is not of divine authority, or that the language has been misinterpreted. So far it seems to me, that our philosophy ought to modify our views of theological doctrines, and our mode of interpreting the language of an inspired writer. But then we must be cautious, that we philosophize rightly, and “do not call *that* reason which is not so. Otherwise we may be led by the supposed requirements of reason to interpret metaphorically, what ought to be received literally, and evacuate the Scriptures of their most important doctrines. But what I mean to say here is, that we cannot avoid the application of our philosophy in the interpretation of the language of Scripture, and in the explanation of the doctrines of religion generally. We cannot avoid incurring the danger just alluded to of philosophizing erroneously, even to the extent of rejecting as irrational that which tends to the perfection of reason itself. And hence I maintain, that instead of pretending to exclude philosophy from our religious inquiries, it is very important that we

philosophize in earnest—that we should endeavour by profound reflexion to learn the real requirements of reason, and attain a true knowledge of ourselves.

If any dispute the necessity of thus combining the study of philosophy with that of religion, I would beg them to point out the age since that of the Apostle's, in which the prevailing metaphysical opinions have not distinctly manifested themselves in the prevailing views of religion; and if, as I fully believe will be the case, they fail to discover a single system of theology, a single volume on the subject of the Christian religion, in which the author's views are not modified by the metaphysical opinions of the age or of the individual, it would be desirable to ascertain, whether this influence be accidental or necessary. The metaphysician analyzes the faculties and operations of the human mind, and teaches us to arrange, to classify, and to name them, according to his views of their various distinctions. The language of the Scriptures, at least to a great extent, speaks of subjects that can be understood only by a reference to those same powers and processes of thought and feeling, which we have learned to think of, and to name, according to our particular system of metaphysics. How is it possible then to avoid interpreting the one by the other? Let us suppose, for example, that a man has studied and adopted the philosophy of Brown, is it possible for him to interpret the 8th chapter of Romans, without having his views of its meaning influenced by his philosophy? Would he not unavoidably interpret the language and explain the doctrines, which it contains, differently from one, who should have adopted such views of the human mind as are taught in this Work? I know it is customary to disclaim the influence of philosophy in

the business of interpretation, and every writer now-a-days on such subjects will assure us, that he has nothing to do with metaphysics, but is guided only by common sense and the laws of interpretation. But I should like to know how a man comes by any common sense in relation to the movements and laws of his intellectual and moral being without metaphysics. What is the common sense of a Hottentot on subjects of this sort? I have no hesitation in saying, that from the very nature of the case, it is nearly, if not quite, impossible for any man entirely to separate his philosophical views of the human mind from his reflections on religious subjects. Probably no man has endeavoured more faithfully to do this, perhaps no one has succeeded better in giving the truth of Scripture free from the glosses of metaphysics, than Professor Stuart. Yet, I should risk little in saying that a reader deeply versed in the language of metaphysics, extensively acquainted with the philosophy of different ages, and the peculiar phraseology of different schools, might ascertain his metaphysical system from many a passage of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. What then, let me ask, is the possible use to the cause of truth and of religion, from thus perpetually decrying philosophy in theological inquiries, when we cannot avoid it if we would? Every man, who has reflected at all, has his metaphysics; and if he reads on religious subjects, he interprets and understands the language, which he employs, by the help of his metaphysics. He cannot do otherwise.—And the proper inquiry is, not whether we admit our philosophy into our theological and religious investigations, but whether our philosophy be right and true. For myself, I am fully convinced that we can have no right views of

theology, till we have right views of the human mind; and that these are to be acquired only by laborious and persevering reflection. My belief is, that the distinctions unfolded in this Work will place us in the way to truth, and relieve us from numerous perplexities, in which we are involved by the philosophy which we have so long taken for our guide. For we are greatly deceived, if we suppose for a moment that the systems of theology which have been received among us, or even the theoretical views which are now most popular, are free from the entanglements of worldly wisdom. The readers of this Work will be able to see, I think, more clearly the import of this remark, and the true bearing of the received views of philosophy on our theological inquiries. Those who study the Work without prejudice, and adopt its principles to any considerable extent, will understand too how deeply an age may be ensnared in the metaphysical webs of its own weaving, or entangled in the net which the speculations of a former generation have thrown over it, and yet suppose itself blessed with a perfect immunity from the dreaded evils of metaphysics.

But before I proceed to remark on those particulars, in which our prevailing philosophy seems to be dangerous in its tendency, and unfriendly to the cause of spiritual religion, I must beg leave to guard myself and the Work from misapprehension on another point of great importance in its relation to the whole subject. While it is maintained that reason and philosophy, in their true character, *ought* to have a certain degree and extent of influence in the formation of our religious system, and that our metaphysical opinions, whatever they may be, *will* almost unavoidably, modify more or less our theoretical views of religious truth

generally, it is yet a special object of the Author of the Work to show that the spiritual life, or what among us is termed experimental religion, is, in itself, and in its own proper growth and development, essentially distinct from the forms and processes of the understanding; and that, although a true faith cannot contradict any universal principle of speculative reason, it is yet in a certain sense independent of the discursions of philosophy, and in its proper nature beyond the reach "of positive science and theoretical *insight*." "Christianity is not a *theory* or a *speculation*; but a *life*. Not a *philosophy* of life, but a life and a living process." It is not, therefore, so properly a species of knowledge, as a form of being. And although the theoretical views of the understanding, and the motives of prudence which it presents, may be, to a certain extent, connected with the development of the spiritual principle of religious life in the Christian, yet a true and living faith is not incompatible with at least some degree of speculative error. As the acquisition of merely speculative knowledge cannot of itself communicate the principle of spiritual life, so neither does that principle, and the living process of its growth, depend wholly, at least, upon the degree of speculative knowledge with which it co-exists. That religion, of which our blessed Saviour is himself the essential Form and the living Word, and to which he imparts the actuating Spirit, has a principle of unity and consistency in itself distinct from the unity and consistency of our theoretical views. Of this we have evidence in every day's observation of Christian character; for how often do we see and acknowledge the power of religion, and the growth of a spiritual life in minds but little gifted with speculative knowledge, and little versed in

the forms of logic or philosophy! How obviously, too, does the living principle of religion manifest the same specific character, the same essential form, amidst all the diversities of condition, of talents, of education, and natural disposition, with which it is associated; every where rising above nature, and the powers of the natural man, and unlimited in its goings on by the forms in which the understanding seeks to comprehend and confine its spiritual energies. *There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit*; and it is no less true now than in the age of the Apostles, that in all lands, and in every variety of circumstances, the manifestations of spiritual life are essentially the same; and all who truly believe in heart, however diverse in natural condition, in the character of their understandings, and even in their theoretical views of truth, are *one in Christ Jesus*. The essential faith is not to be found in the understanding or the speculative theory, but “the *life, the substance, the hope, the love*—in one word, the *faith*—these are derivatives from the practical, moral, and spiritual nature and being of man.” Speculative systems of theology indeed have often had little connection with the essential spirit of religion, and are usually little more than schemes resulting from the strivings of the finite understanding to comprehend and exhibit under its own forms and conditions a mode of being and spiritual truths essentially diverse from their proper objects, and with which they are incommensurate.

This I am aware is an imperfect, and I fear may be an unintelligible, view of a subject exceedingly difficult of apprehension at the best. If so, I must beg the reader's indulgence, and request him to suspend his judgment, as to the absolute intelligibility of it, till he

becomes acquainted with the language and sentiments of the Work itself. It will, however, I hope, be so far understood, at least, as to answer the purpose for which it was introduced—of precluding the supposition that, in the remarks which preceded, or in those which follow, any suspicion was intended to be expressed, with regard to the religious principles or the essential faith of those who hold the opinions in question. According to this view of the inherent and essential nature of Spiritual Religion, as existing in the *practical reason* of man, we may not only admit, but can better understand the possibility of what every charitable Christian will acknowledge to be a fact, so far as human observation can determine facts of this sort—that a man may be truly religious, and essentially a believer at heart, while his understanding is sadly bewildered with the attempt to comprehend and express philosophically, what yet he feels and knows spiritually. It is indeed impossible for us to tell, how far the understanding may impose upon itself by partial views and false disguises, without perverting the will, or estranging it from the laws and the authority of reason and the divine word. We cannot say to what extent a false system of philosophy and metaphysical opinions, which in their natural and uncounteracted tendency would go to destroy all religion, may be received in a Christian community, and yet the power of spiritual religion retain its hold and its efficacy in the hearts of the people. We may perhaps believe that in opposition to all the might of false philosophy, so long as the great body of the people have the Bible in their hands, and are taught to reverence and receive its heavenly instructions, though the Church may suffer injury from unwise and unfruitful speculations, it

will yet be preserved; and that the spiritual seed of the divine word, though mingled with many tares of worldly wisdom and philosophy falsely so called, will yet spring up, and bear fruit unto everlasting life.

But though we may hope and believe this, we cannot avoid believing, at the same time, that injury must result from an unsuspecting confidence in metaphysical opinions, which are essentially at variance with the doctrines of Revelation. Especially must the effect be injurious, where those opinions lead gradually to alter our views of religion itself, and of all that is peculiar in the Christian system. The great mass of the community, who know little of metaphysics, and whose faith in revelation is not so readily influenced by speculations not immediately connected with it, may, indeed, for a time, escape the evil, and continue to *receive with meekness the ingrafted word*. But in the minds of the better educated, especially those who think and follow out their conclusions with resolute independence of thought, the result must be either a loss of confidence in the opinions themselves, or a rejection of all those parts of the Christian system which are at variance with them. Under particular circumstances, indeed, where both the metaphysical errors, and the great doctrines of the Christian Faith, have a strong hold upon the minds of a community, a protracted struggle may take place, and earnest and long-continued efforts may be made to reconcile opinions which we are resolved to maintain, with a faith which our consciences will not permit us to abandon. But so long as the effort continues and such opinions retain their hold upon our confidence, it must be with some diminution of the fulness and simplicity of our

faith. To a greater or less degree, according to the education and habits of thought in different individuals, the word of God is received with doubt, or with such glozing modifications as enervate its power. Thus the light from heaven is intercepted, and we are left to a shadow-fight of metaphysical schemes and metaphorical interpretations. While one party, with conscientious and earnest endeavours, and at great expense of talent and ingenuity, contends for the Faith, and among the possible shapings of the received metaphysical system, seeks that which will best comport with the simplicity of the Gospel,—another more boldly interprets the language of the Gospel itself in conformity with those views of religion to which their philosophy seems obviously to conduct them. The substantial being and the living energy of the WORD, which is not only the light but the life of men, is either misapprehended or denied by all parties; and even those who contend for what they conceive the literal import of the Gospel, do it—as they must to avoid too glaring absurdity—with such explanations of its import as to make it to become, in no small degree, *the words of man's wisdom*, rather than a simple *demonstration of the Spirit and of power*. Hence, although such as have experienced the spiritual and life-giving power of the Divine Word, may be able, through the promised aids of the Spirit, to overcome the natural tendency of speculative error, and, by *the law of the spirit of life* which is in them, may at length be made *free from the law of sin and death*, yet who can tell how much they may lose of the blessings of the Gospel, and be retarded in their spiritual growth when they are but too often fed with the lifeless and starveling products of the human understanding,

instead of that *living bread which came down from heaven*? Who can tell, moreover, how many, through the prevalence of such philosophical errors as lead to misconceptions of the truth or create a prejudice against it, and thus tend to intercept the light from heaven, may continue in their ignorance, *alienated from the life of God*, and groping in the darkness of their own understandings?

But however that may be, enlightened Christians, and especially Christian instructors, know it to be their duty, as far as possible, to prepare the way for the full and unobstructed influence of the Gospel, to do all in their power to remove those natural prejudices, and those errors of the understanding, which are obstacles to the truth, that the word of God may find access to the heart, and conscience, and reason of every man, that it may have *free course, and run, and be glorified*. My own belief, that such obstacles to the influence of truth exist in the speculative and metaphysical opinions generally adopted in this country, and that the present Work is in some measure at least calculated to remove them, is pretty clearly indicated by the remarks which I have already made. But, to be perfectly explicit on the subject I do not hesitate to express my conviction, that the natural tendency of some of the leading principles of our prevailing system of metaphysics, and those which must unavoidably have more or less influence on our theoretical views of religion, are of an injurious and dangerous tendency, and that so long as we retain them, however we may profess to exclude their influence from our theological inquiries, and from the interpretation of Scripture, we can maintain no consistent system of Scriptural theology, nor clearly and distinctly apprehend the spiritual

import of the Scripture language. The grounds of this conviction I shall proceed to exhibit, though only in a very partial manner, as I could not do more without anticipating the contents of the Work itself, instead of merely preparing the reader to peruse them with attention. I am aware, too, that some of the language, which I have already employed, and shall be obliged to employ, will not convey its full import to the reader, till he becomes acquainted with some of the leading principles and distinctions unfolded in the Work. But this also is an evil which I saw no means of avoiding without incurring a greater, and writing a book instead of a brief essay.

Let it be understood, then, without further preface, that by the prevailing system of metaphysics, I mean the system, of which in modern times Locke is the reputed author, and the leading principles of which, with various modifications, more or less important, but not altering its essential character, have been almost universally received in this country. It should be observed, too, that the causes enumerated by the Author, as having elevated it to its "pride of place" in Europe, have been aided by other favouring circumstances here. In the minds of our religious community, especially, some of its most important doctrines have become associated with names justly loved and revered among ourselves, and so connected with all our theoretical views of religion, that a man can hardly hope to question their validity without hazarding his reputation, not only for orthodoxy, but even for common sense. To controvert, for example, the prevailing doctrines with regard to the freedom of the will, the sources of our knowledge, the nature of the understanding as containing the controlling principles of

our whole being, and the universality of the law of cause and effect, even in connection with the arguments and the authority of the most powerful intellect of the age, may even now be worse than in vain. Yet I have reasons for believing there are some among us, and that their number is fast increasing, who are willing to revise their opinions on these subjects, and who will contemplate the views presented in this Work with a liberal, and something of a prepared feeling, of curiosity. The difficulties in which men find themselves involved by the received doctrines on these subjects, in their most anxious efforts to explain and defend the peculiar doctrines of spiritual religion, have led many to suspect that there must be some lurking error in the premisses. It is not that these principles lead us to mysteries which we cannot comprehend; they are found, or believed at least by many, to involve us in absurdities which we can comprehend. It is necessary indeed only to form some notion of the distinctive and appropriate import of the term spiritual, as opposed to natural in the New Testament, and then to look at the writings, or hear the discussions, in which the doctrines of the Spirit and of spiritual influences are taught and defended, to see the insurmountable nature of the obstacles, which these metaphysical dogmas throw in the way of the most powerful minds. To those who shall read this Work with any degree of reflection, it must, I think, be obvious, that something more is implied in the continual opposition of these terms in the New Testament, than can be explained consistently with the prevailing opinions on the subjects above enumerated; and that through their influence our highest notions of that distinction have been rendered confused, contradictory, and inadequate. I have already directed

the attention of the reader to those parts of the Work, where this distinction is unfolded ; and had I no other grounds than the arguments and views there exhibited, I should be convinced that so long as we hold the doctrines of Locke and the Scotch metaphysicians respecting power, cause and effect, motives, and the freedom of the will, we not only can make and defend no essential distinction between that which is *natural*, and that which is *spiritual*, but we cannot even find rational grounds for the feeling of *moral obligation*, and the distinction between *regret* and *remorse*.

According to the system of these authors, as nearly and distinctly as my limits will permit me to state it, the same law of cause and effect is the law of the universe. It extends to the moral and spiritual—if in courtesy these terms may still be used—no less than to the properly natural powers and agencies of our being. The acts of the free-will are pre-determined by a cause *out of the will*, according to the same law of cause and effect which controls the changes in the physical world. We have no notion of power but uniformity of antecedent and consequent. The notion of a power in the will to act freely is therefore nothing more than an inherent capacity of being acted upon, agreeably to its nature, and according to a fixed law, by the motives which are present in the understanding. I feel authorized to take this statement partly from Brown's Philosophy, because that work has been decidedly approved by our highest theological authorities ; and indeed it would not be essentially varied, if expressed in the precise terms used by any of the writers most usually quoted in reference to these subjects.

I am aware that variations may be found in the

mode of stating these doctrines; but I think every candid reader, who is acquainted with the metaphysics and theology of this country, will admit the above to be a fair representation of the form in which they are generally received. I am aware, too, that much has been said and written to make out, consistently with these general principles, a distinction between natural and moral causes, natural and moral ability, and inability, and the like. But I beg all lovers of sound and rational philosophy to look carefully at the general principles, and see whether there be, in fact, ground left for any such distinctions of this kind as are worth contending for. My first step in arguing with a defender of these principles, and of the distinctions in question, as connected with them, would be to ask for his definition of nature and *natural*. And when he had arrived at a distinctive general notion of the import of these, it would appear, if I mistake not, that he had first subjected our whole being to the law of nature, and then contended for the existence of something which is not nature. For in their relation to the law of moral rectitude, and to the feeling of moral responsibility, what difference is there, and what difference can there be, between what are called natural and those which are called moral powers and affections, if they are all under the control of the same universal *law* of cause and effect? If it still be a mere nature, and the determinations of our will be controlled by causes out of the will, according to our nature, then I maintain that a moral nature has no more to do with the feeling of responsibility than any other nature.

Perhaps the difficulty may be made more obvious in this way. It will be admitted that brutes are possessed

of various natures, some innocent or useful, otherwise noxious, but all alike irresponsible in a moral point of view. But why? Simply because they act in accordance with their natures. They possess, each according to its proper nature, certain appetites and susceptibilities which are stimulated and acted upon by their appropriate objects in the world of the senses; and the relation—the law of action and reaction—subsisting between these specific susceptibilities and their corresponding outward objects, constitutes their nature. They have a power of selecting and choosing in the world of sense the objects appropriate to the wants of their nature; but that nature is the sole law of their being. Their power of choice is but a part of it, instrumental in accomplishing its ends, but not capable of rising above it, of controlling its impulses, and of determining itself with reference to a purely ideal law, distinct from their nature. They act in accordance with the law of cause and effect, which constitutes their several natures, and cannot do otherwise. They are, therefore not responsible—not capable of guilt, or of remorse.

Now let us suppose another being, possessing, in addition to the susceptibilities of the brute, certain other specific susceptibilities with their correlative objects, either in the sensible world, or in a future world, but that these are subjected, like the other, to the same binding and inalienable law of cause and effect. What, I ask, is the amount of the difference thus supposed between this being and the brute? The supposed addition, it is to be understood, is merely an addition to its nature; and the only power of will belonging to it is, as in the case of the brute, only a capacity of choosing and acting uniformly in accordance with its

nature. These additional susceptibilities still act but as they are acted upon; and the will is determined accordingly. What advantage is gained in this case by calling these supposed additions moral affections, and their correlative stimulants moral causes? Do we thereby find any rational ground for the feeling of moral responsibility, for conscience, for remorse? The being acts according to its nature, and why is it blameworthy more than the brute? If the moral law existing out of the will be a power or cause which, in its relation to the specific susceptibility of the moral being, produces under the same circumstances uniformly the same result, according to the law of cause and effect; if the acts of the will be subject to the same law, as mere links in the chain of antecedents and consequents, and thus a part of our nature, what is gained, I ask again, by the distinction of a moral and a physical nature? It is still only a nature under the law of cause and effect, and the liberty of the moral being is under the same condition with the liberty of the brute. Both are free to follow and fulfil the law of their nature, and both are alike bound by that law, as by an adamant chain. The very conditions of the law preclude the possibility of a power to act otherwise than according to their nature. They preclude the very idea of a free-will, and render the feeling of moral responsibility not an enigma merely, not a mystery, but a self-contradiction and an absurdity.

Turn the matter as we will—call these correlatives, namely, the inherent susceptibilities and the causes acting on them from without, natural, or moral, or spiritual—so long as their action and reaction, or the law of reciprocity, which constitutes their specific natures, is considered as the controlling law of our whole

being, so long as we refuse to admit the existence in the will of a power capable of rising above this law, and controlling its operation by an act of absolute self-determination, so long we shall be involved in perplexities both in morals and religion. At all events, the only method of avoiding them will be to adopt the creed of the Necessitarians entire, to give man over to an irresponsible nature as a better sort of animal, and resolve the will of the Supreme Reason into a blind and irrational fate.

I am well aware of the objections that will be made to this statement, and especially the demonstrated incomprehensibility of a self-determining power. To this I may be permitted to answer, that, although the power to originate an act or state of mind may be beyond the capacity of our understandings to comprehend, it is still not contradictory to reason; and that I find it more easy to believe the existence of that, which is simply incomprehensible to my understanding, than of that which involves an absurdity for my reason. I venture to affirm, moreover, that however we may bring our understandings into bondage to the more comprehensible doctrine, simply because it is comprehensible under the forms of the understanding, every man does, in fact, believe himself possessed of freedom in the higher sense of self-determination. Every man's conscience commands him to believe it, whenever for a moment he indulges the feeling of moral self-approbation, or of remorse. Nor can we on any other grounds justify the ways of God to man upon the supposition that he inflicts or will inflict any other punishment than that which is simply remedial or disciplinary. But this subject will be found more fully explained in the course of the Work. My present

object is merely to show the necessity of some system in relation to these subjects different from the received one.

It may perhaps be thought, that the language used above is too strong and too positive. But I venture to ask every candid man, at least every one who has not committed himself by writing and publishing on the subject, whether in considering the great questions connected with moral accountability and the doctrine of rewards and punishments, he has not felt himself pressed with such difficulties as those above stated; and whether he has ever been able fully to satisfy his reason, that there was not a lurking contradiction in the idea of a being created and placed under the law of its nature, and possessing at the same time a feeling of moral obligation to fulfil a law above its nature. That many have been in this state of mind I know. I know, too, that some whose moral and religious feelings had led them to a full belief in the doctrines of spiritual religion, but who at the same time had been taught to receive the prevailing opinions in metaphysics, have found these opinions carrying them unavoidably, if they would be consequent in their reasonings, and not do violence to their reason, to adopt a system of religion which does not profess to be spiritual, and thus have been compelled to choose between their philosophy and their religion. In most cases indeed, where men reflect at all, I am satisfied that it requires all the force of authority, and all the influence of education, to carry the mind over these difficulties; and that then it is only by a vague belief that, though we cannot see how, there must be some method of reconciling what seems to be so contradictory.

If examples were wanting to prove that serious and

trying difficulties are felt to exist here, enough may be found, as it has appeared to me, in the controversy respecting the nature and origin of sin, which is at this moment interesting the public mind. Let any impartial observer trace the progress of that discussion, and after examining the distinctions which are made or attempted to be made, decide whether the subject, as there presented, be not involved in difficulties, which cannot be solved on the principles to which, hitherto, both parties have adhered; whether, holding as they do the same premisses in regard to the freedom of the will, they can avoid coming to the same conclusion in regard to the nature and origin of sin; whether in fact the distinctions aimed at must not prove merely verbal distinctions, and the controversy a fruitless one. But in the September number of the *Christian Spectator*, the reader will find remarks on this subject, to which I beg leave to refer him, and which I could wish him attentively to consider in connexion with the remarks which I have made. I allude to the correspondence with the editors near the end of the number. The letter there inserted is said to be, and obviously is, from the pen of a very learned and able writer; and I confess it has been no small gratification and encouragement to me, while labouring to bring this Work and this subject before the public, to find such a state of feeling expressed, concerning the great question at issue, by such a writer. It will be seen by reference to p. 545 of the C. S., that he places the "*nucleus* of the dispute" just where it is placed in this Work and in the above remarks. It will be seen, too, that by throwing authorities aside, and studying his own mind, he has "come seriously to doubt," whether the received opinions with regard to *motives*, the law of *cause and*

effect, and the *freedom of the will*, may not be erroneous. They appear to him "to be bordering on fatalism, if not actually embracing it." He doubts whether the mind may not have within itself the adequate cause of its own acts; whether indeed it have not a self-determining power, "for the power in question involves the idea of originating volition. Less than this it cannot be conceived to involve, and yet be *free* agency." Now this is just the view offered in the present Work; and, as it seems to me, these are just the doubts and conclusions which every one will entertain, who lays aside authority, and reflects upon the goings on of his own mind, and the dictates of his own reason and conscience.

But let us look for a moment at the remarks of the editors in reply to the letter above quoted. They maintain, in relation to original sin and the perversion of the will, that from either the *original* or the *acquired* strength of certain natural appetites, principles of self-love, &c., "left to themselves," the corruption of the heart will certainly follow. "In every instance the will does, in fact, yield to the demands of these. But whenever it thus yielded, *there was power to the contrary*; otherwise there could be no freedom of moral action." Now I beg leave to place my finger on the phrase in italics, and ask the editors what they mean by it. If they hold the common doctrines with regard to the relation of cause and effect, and with regard to power as connected with that relation, and apply these to the acts of the will, I can see no more possibility of conceiving a *power to the contrary* in this case, than of conceiving such a power in the current of a river. But if they mean to assert the existence in the will of an *actual* power to rise above the

demands of appetite, &c., above the law of nature and to decide *arbitrarily*, whether to yield or not to yield, then they admit that the will is not determined *absolutely* by the extraneous *cause*, but is in fact *self-determined*. They agree with the letter-writer ; and the question for them is at rest. Thus, whatever distinctions may be attempted here, there can be no real distinction but between an irresponsible nature and a will that is self-determined. The reader will find a few additional remarks on this topic in a note, and for the general views of the Work is again referred to a former note and the references there made. To the subject of that note and to the great distinction between nature and the will, between the natural and the spiritual, as unfolded in the Work, I must beg leave, also, again to request the special and candid attention of the reader. I must beg, too, the unprejudiced attention of every reader, friendly to the cause of practical and spiritual religion, to the tendency of this part of the Author's system, and of the remarks hazarded above.

I cannot but be aware, that the views of the Will here exhibited will meet with strong prejudices in a large portion, at least, of our religious community. I could wish that all such would carefully distinguish between the Author's views of the doctrines of religion and the philosophical grounds on which he supposes those doctrines are to be defended. If no one disputes, and I trust no one will dispute, the substantial orthodoxy of the Work, without first carefully examining what has been the orthodoxy of the Church in general, and of the great body of the Reformers, then I should hope it may be wisely considered, whether, as a question of philosophy, the metaphysical principles of this Work are not in themselves more in accordance with

the doctrines of a spiritual religion, and better suited to their explanation and defence, than those above treated of. If on examination it cannot be disputed that they are, then, if not before, I trust the two systems may be compared without undue partiality, and the simple question of the truth of each may be determined by that calm and persevering reflection, which alone can determine questions of this sort.

If the system here taught be true, then it will follow, not, be it observed, that our religion is necessarily wrong, or our essential faith erroneous, but that the *philosophical grounds*, on which we are accustomed to defend our faith, are unsafe, and that their *natural tendency* is to error. If the spirit of the Gospel still exert its influence; if a truly spiritual religion be maintained, it is in *opposition* to our philosophy, and not at all by its aid. I know it will be said, that the practical results of our peculiar forms of doctrine are at variance with these remarks. But this I am not prepared to admit. True, religion and religious institutions have flourished; the Gospel, in many parts of our country, has been affectionately and faithfully preached by great and good men; the word and the Spirit of God have been communicated to us in rich abundance; and I rejoice with heartfelt joy and thanksgiving, in the belief, that thereby multitudes have been regenerated to a new and spiritual life. But so were equal or greater effects produced under the preaching of Baxter, and Howe, and other good and faithful men of the same age, with none of the peculiarities of our theological systems. Neither reason nor experience indeed furnish any ground for believing that the living and life-giving power of the Divine Word has ever derived any portion of its efficacy, in

the conversion of the heart to God, from the forms of metaphysical theology, with which the human understanding has invested it. It requires, moreover, but little knowledge of the history of philosophy, and of the writings of the 16th and 17th centuries to know, that the opinions of the Reformers, and of all the great divines of that period, on subjects of this sort, were far different from those of Mr. Locke and his followers, and were in fact essentially the same with those taught in this Work. This last remark applies not only to the views entertained by the eminent philosophers and divines of that period on the particular subject above discussed, but to the distinctions made, and the language employed, by them with reference to other points of no less importance in the constitution of our being.

It must have been observed by the reader of the foregoing pages, that I have used several words, especially *understanding* and *reason*, in a sense somewhat diverse from their present acceptation; and the occasion of this I suppose would be partly understood from my having already directed the attention of the reader to the distinction exhibited between these words in the Work, and from the remarks made on the ambiguity of the word 'reason' in its common use. I now proceed to remark, that the ambiguity spoken of, and the consequent perplexity in regard to the use and authority of reason, have arisen from the habit of using, since the time of Locke, the terms *understanding* and *reason* indiscriminately, and thus confounding a distinction clearly marked in the philosophy and in the language of the older writers. Alas! had the *terms* only been confounded, or had we suffered only an inconvenient ambiguity of language, there would be

comparatively little cause for earnestness upon the subject; or had our views of the things signified by these terms been only partially confused, and had we still retained correct notions of our prerogative, as rational and spiritual beings, the consequences might have been less deplorable. But the misfortune is, that the powers of understanding and reason have not merely been blended and confounded in the view of our philosophy;—the higher and far more characteristic, as an essential constituent of our proper humanity, has been as it were obscured and hidden from our observation in the inferior power, which belongs to us in common with the brutes which perish. According to the old, the more spiritual, and genuine philosophy, the distinguishing attributes of our humanity—that *image of God* in which man alone was created of all the dwellers upon earth, and in virtue of which he was placed at the head of this lower world, was said to be found in the *reason* and *free-will*. But understanding these in their strict and proper sense, and according to the true *ideas* of them, as contemplated by the older metaphysicians, we have literally, if the system of Locke and the popular philosophy of the day be true, neither the one nor the other of these—neither reason nor free-will. What they esteemed the image of God in the soul, and considered as distinguishing us specifically, and so vastly too, above each and all of the irrational animals, is found, according to this system, to have in fact no real existence. The reality neither of the free-will, nor of any of those laws or ideas, which spring from, or rather constitute reason, can be authenticated by the sort of proof which is demanded, and we must therefore relinquish our prerogative, and take our place with becoming humility among our

more unpretending companions. In the ascending series of powers, enumerated by Milton, with so much philosophical truth, as well as beauty of language, in the fifth book of *Paradise Lost*, he mentions

Fancy and understanding, whence the soul
REASON receives. And reason is her *being*,
Discursive or intuitive.

But the highest power here, that which is the being of the soul, considered as any thing differing in kind from the understanding, has no place in our popular metaphysics. Thus we have only the *understanding*, "the faculty judging according to sense," a faculty of abstracting and generalizing, of contrivance and forecast, as the highest of our intellectual powers; and this we are expressly taught belongs to us in common with brutes. Nay, these views of our essential being, consequences and all, are adopted by men, whom one would suppose religion, if not philosophy, should have taught their utter inadequateness to the true and essential constituents of our humanity. Dr. Paley tells us in his *Natural Theology*, that only "CONTRIVANCE," a power obviously and professedly belonging to brutes, is necessary to constitute *personality*. His whole system both of theology and morals neither teaches, nor implies, the existence of any specific difference either between the understanding and reason, or between nature and the will. It does not imply the existence of any power in man, which does not obviously belong, in a greater or less degree, to irrational animals. Dr. Fleming, another reverend prelate in the English Church, in his "*Philosophy of Zoology*," maintains in express terms, that we have no faculties differing in kind from those which belong to brutes. How many other learned, and reverend, and wise men adopt the

same opinions, I know not: though these are obviously not the peculiar views of the individuals, but conclusions resulting from the essential principles of their system. If, then, there is no better *system*, if this be the genuine philosophy, and founded in the nature of things, there is no help for us, and we must believe it—*if we can*. But most certainly it will follow, that we ought, as fast as the prejudices of education will permit, to rid ourselves of certain notions of prerogative, and certain feelings of our own superiority, which somehow have been strangely prevalent among our race. For though we have indeed, according to this system, a little *more* understanding than other animals—can abstract and generalize and forecast events, and the consequences of our actions, and compare motives *more* skilfully than they; though we have thus *more* knowledge and can circumvent them; though we have *more* power and can subdue them; yet, as to any *distinctive* and *peculiar* characteristic—as to any inherent and essential *worth*, we are after all but little better—though we may be better off—than our dogs and horses. There is no essential difference, and we may rationally doubt—at least we might do so, if by the supposition we were rational beings—whether our fellow animals of the kennel and the stall are not unjustly deprived of certain *personal rights*, and whether a dog charged with trespass may not *rationally* claim to be tried by a jury of his *peers*. Now however trifling and ridiculous this may appear, I would ask in truth and soberness, if it be not a fair and legitimate inference from the premisses, and whether the *absurdity* of the one does not *demonstrate* the utter falsity of the other. And where, I would beg to know, shall we look, according to the popular

system of philosophy, for that *image of God* in which we are created? Is it a thing of *degrees*? And is it simply because we have something *more* of the same faculties which belong to brutes, that we become the objects of God's special and fatherly care, the *distinguished* objects of his Providence, and the *sole* objects of his Grace?—*Doth God take care for oxen?* But why not?

I assure my readers, that I have no desire to treat with disrespect and contumely the opinions of great or good men; but the distinction in question, and the assertion and exhibition of the higher prerogatives of reason, as an essential constituent of our being, are so vitally important, in my apprehension, to the formation and support of any rational system of philosophy, and—no less than the distinction before treated of—so pregnant of consequences to the interests of truth, in morals, and religion, and indeed of all truth, that mere opinion and the authority of names may well be disregarded. The discussion, moreover, relates to facts, and to such facts, too, as are not to be learned from the instruction, or received on the authority, of any man. They must be ascertained by every man for himself, by reflection upon the processes and laws of his own inward being, or they are not learned at all to any valuable purpose. We do indeed find in ourselves then, as no one will deny, certain powers of intelligence, which we have abundant reason to believe the brutes possess in common with us in a greater or less degree. The functions of the understanding, as treated of in the popular systems of metaphysics, its faculties of attention, of abstraction, of generalization, the power of forethought and contrivance, of adapting means to ends, and the law of association, may be, so

far as we can judge, severally represented more or less adequately in the instinctive intelligence of the higher orders of brutes. But, not to anticipate too far a topic treated of in the Work, do these, or any and all the faculties which we discover in irrational animals, satisfactorily account to a reflecting mind for all the *phenomena* which are presented to our observation in our own consciousness? Would any supposable addition to the *degree* merely of those powers which we ascribe to brutes, render them *rational* beings, and remove the sacred distinction, which law and reason have sanctioned, between things and persons? Will any such addition account for our having—what the brute is not supposed to have—the pure *ideas* of the geometer, the power of ideal construction, the intuition of geometrical or other necessary and universal truths? Would it give rise, in irrational animals, to a *law of moral rectitude* and to *conscience*—to the feelings of moral *responsibility* and *remorse*? Would it awaken them to a reflective self-consciousness, and lead them to form and contemplate the *ideas* of the *soul*, of *free-will*, of *immortality*, and of God. It seems to me, that we have only to reflect for a serious hour upon what we mean by these, and then to compare them with our notion of what belongs to a brute, its inherent powers and their correlative objects, to feel that they are utterly incompatible—that in the blessing of these we enjoy a prerogative, which we cannot disclaim without a violation of reason, and a voluntary abasement of ourselves—and that we must therefore be possessed of some *peculiar* powers—of some source of ideas *distinct* from the understanding, differing *in kind* from any and all of those which belong to us in common with inferior and irrational animals.

But what these powers are, or what is the precise nature of the distinction between the understanding and reason, it is not my province, nor have I undertaken, to show. My object is merely to illustrate its necessity, and the palpable obscurity, vagueness and deficiency, in this respect, of the mode of philosophizing, which is held in so high honour among us. The distinction itself will be found illustrated with some of its important bearings in the *Work*, and in the notes and Appendix attached to it; and cannot be too carefully studied—in connexion with that between nature and the will—by the student who would acquire distinct and intelligible notions of what constitutes the truly spiritual in our being, or find rational grounds for the possibility of a truly spiritual religion. Indeed, could I succeed in fixing the attention of the reader upon this distinction, in such a way as to secure his candid and reflecting perusal of the *Work*, I should consider any personal effort or sacrifice abundantly recompensed. Nor am I alone in this view of its importance. A literary friend, whose opinion on this subject would be valued by all who knew the soundness of his scholarship, says in a letter just now received,—“if you can once get the attention of thinking men fixed on his distinction between the reason and the understanding, you will have done enough to reward the labour of a life. As prominent a place as it holds in the writings of Coleridge, he seems to me far enough from making too much of it.” No person of serious and philosophical mind, I am confident, can reflect upon the subject, enough to understand it in its various aspects, without arriving at the same views of the importance of the distinction, whatever may be his conviction with regard to its truth.

But indeed the only grounds, which I find, to apprehend that the reality of the distinction and the importance of the consequences resulting from it, will be much longer denied and rejected among us, is in the overweening assurance, which prevails with regard to the adequateness and perfection of the system of philosophy which is already received. It is taken for granted, as a fact undisputed and indisputable, that this is the most enlightened age of the world, not only with regard to the more general diffusion of certain points of practical knowledge; in which, probably, it may be so, but *in all respects*; that our whole system of the philosophy of mind as derived from Lord Bacon, especially, is the only one, which has any claims to common sense; and that all distinctions not recognized in that are consequently unworthy of our regard. What those Reformers, to whose transcendant powers of mind, and to whose characters as truly spiritual divines, we are accustomed to look with feelings of so much general regard, might find to say in favour of their philosophy, few take the pains to inquire. Neither they nor the great philosophers with whom they held communion on subjects of this sort, can appear among us to speak in their own defence; and even the huge folios and quartos, in which, though dead, they yet speak—and ought to be heard—have seldom strayed to this side of the Atlantic. All our information respecting their philosophical opinions, and the grounds on which they defended them, has been received from writers, who were confessedly advocating a system of recent growth, at open war with every thing more ancient, and who, in the great abundance of their self-complacency, have represented their own discoveries as containing the sum and substance of all philosophy, and the ac-

cumulated treasures of ancient wisdom as unworthy the attention of "this enlightened age." Be it so—yet the *foolishness* of antiquity, if it be *of God*, may prove *wiser than men*. It may be found that the philosophy of the Reformers and their religion are essentially connected, and must stand or fall together. It may at length be discovered, that a system of religion essentially spiritual, and a system of philosophy which excludes the very idea of all spiritual power and agency, in their only distinctive and proper character, cannot be consistently associated together.

It is our peculiar misfortune in this country, that while the philosophy of Locke and the Scottish writers has been received in full faith, as the only rational system, and its leading principles especially passed off as unquestionable, the strong attachment to religion, and the fondness for speculation, by both of which we are strongly characterized, have led us to combine and associate these principles, such as they are, with our religious interests and opinions, so variously and so intimately, that by most persons they are considered as necessary parts of the same system; and from being so long contemplated together, the rejection of one seems impossible without doing violence to the other. Yet how much evidence might not an impartial observer find in examining the theological discussions which have prevailed, the speculative systems which have been formed and arrayed against each other, for the last seventy years, to convince him that there must be some discordance in the elements, some principle of secret but irreconcilable hostility between a philosophy and a religion, which, under every ingenious variety of form and shaping, still stand aloof from each other and refuse to cohere. For is it not a fact, that in re-

gard to every speculative system which has been formed on these philosophical principles,—to every new shaping of theory which has been devised and has gained adherents among us,—is it not a fact, I ask, that, to all, except those adherents, the *system*—the philosophical *theory*—has seemed dangerous in its tendency, and at war with orthodox views of religion—perhaps even with the attributes of God? Nay, to bring the matter still nearer and more plainly to view, I ask, whether at this moment the organs and particular friends of our leading theological seminaries in New England, both devotedly attached to an orthodox and spiritual system of religion, and expressing mutual confidence as to the *essentials* of their mutual faith, do not each consider the other as holding a philosophical *theory* subversive of orthodoxy? If I am not misinformed, this is the simple fact.

Now, if these things be so, I would ask again with all earnestness, and out of regard to the interests of truth alone, whether serious and reflecting men may not be permitted, without the charge of heresy in RELIGION, to stand in doubt of this PHILOSOPHY *altogether*; whether these facts which will not be disputed, do not furnish just grounds for suspicion, that the principles of our philosophy may be erroneous, or at least induce us to look with candour and impartiality at the claims of another and a different system?

What are the claims of the system, to which the attention of the public is invited in this Work, can be understood fully, only by a careful and reflecting examination of its principles in connexion with the conscious wants of our own inward being—the requirements of our own reason and consciences. Its purpose and tendency, I have endeavoured in some measure to ex-

hibit; and if the influence of authority, which the prevailing system furnishes against it, can and must be counteracted by any thing of a like kind—(and whatever professions we may make, the influence of authority produces at least a predisposing effect upon our minds)—the remark which I have made, will show, that the principles here taught are not wholly unauthorized by men, whom we have been taught to reverence among the great and good. I cannot but add, as a matter of simple justice to the question, that however our prevailing system of philosophizing may have appealed to the authority of Lord Bacon, it needs but a candid examination of his writings, especially the first part of his *Novum Organum*, to be convinced that such an appeal is without grounds; and that in fact the fundamental principles of his philosophy are the same with those taught in this work. The great distinction especially, between the understanding and the reason, is fully and clearly recognized; and as a philosopher he would be far more properly associated with Plato, or even Aristotle, than with the modern philosophers, who have miscalled their systems by his name. For further remarks on this point, the reader is requested to refer to the notes. In our own times, moreover, there is abundant evidence, whatever may be thought of the principles of this Work here, that the same general views of philosophy are regaining their ascendancy elsewhere. In Great Britain there are not few, who begin to believe that the deep-toned and sublime eloquence of Coleridge on these great subjects may have something to claim their attention besides a few peculiarities of language. In Paris, the doctrines of a rational and spiritual system of philosophy are taught to listening and admiring thousands

by one of the most learned and eloquent philosophers of the age ; and in Germany, if I mistake not, the same general views are adopted by the serious friends of religious truth among her great and learned men.

Such—as I have no doubt—must be the case, wherever thinking men can be brought distinctly and impartially to examine their claims ; and indeed to those who shall study and comprehend the general history of philosophy, it must always be matter of special wonder, that in the Christian community, anxiously striving to explain and defend the doctrines of Christianity in their spiritual sense, there should have been a long-continued and tenacious adherence to philosophical principles, so subversive of their faith in every thing distinctively spiritual ; while those of an opposite tendency, and claiming a near relationship and correspondence with the truly spiritual in the Christian system, and the mysteries of its sublime faith, were looked upon with suspicion and jealousy, as unintelligible or dangerous metaphysics.

And here I must be allowed to add a few remarks with regard to the popular objections against the system of philosophy, the claims of which I am urging, especially against the writings of the Author, under whose name it appears in the present Work. These are various and often contradictory, but usually have reference either to his peculiarities of language, or to the depth—whether apparent or real,—and the unintelligibility, of his thoughts.

To the first of these it seems to me a sufficient answer, for a mind that would deal honestly and frankly by itself, to suggest that in the very nature of things it is impossible for a writer to express by a single word any truth, or to mark any distinction, not recognized

in the language of his day, unless he adopts a word entirely new, or gives to one already in use a new and more peculiar sense. Now in communicating truths, which the writer deems of great and fundamental importance, shall he thus appropriate a single word old or new, or trust to the vagueness of perpetual circumlocution? Admitting for example, the existence of the important distinction, for which this writer contends, between the understanding and reason, and that this distinction when recognized at all, is confounded in the common use of language by employing the words indiscriminately, shall he still use these words indiscriminately, and either invent a new word, or mark the distinction by descriptive circumlocutions, or shall he assign a more distinctive and precise meaning to the words already used? It seems to me obviously more in accordance with the laws and genius of language to take the course which he has adopted. But in this case and in many others, where his language seems peculiar, it cannot be denied that the words had already been employed in the same sense, and the same distinctions recognized, by the older and many of the most distinguished writers in the language. But the reader will find the Author's own views of the subject in the Work.

With regard to the more important objection, that the *thoughts* of Coleridge are *unintelligible*, if it be intended to imply, that his language is not in itself expressive of an intelligible meaning, or that he affects the appearance of depth and mystery, while his thoughts are common-place, it is an objection, which no one who has read his Works attentively, and acquired a feeling of interest for them, will treat their Author with so much disrespect as to answer at all.

Every such reader *knows* that he uses words uniformly with astonishing precision, and that language becomes, in his use of it—in a degree, of which few writers can give us a conception—a living power, “consubstantial” with the power of thought, that gave birth to it, and awakening and calling into action a corresponding energy in our own minds. There is little encouragement, moreover, to answer the objections of any man, who will permit himself to be incurably prejudiced against an Author by a few peculiarities of language, or an apparent difficulty of being understood, and without inquiring into the cause of that difficulty, where at the same time he cannot but see and acknowledge the presence of great intellectual and moral power.

But if it be intended by the objection to say simply, that the thoughts of the Author are often difficult to be apprehended—that he makes large demands not only upon the attention, but upon the reflecting and thinking powers, of his readers, the fact is not, and need not be, denied; and it will only remain to be decided, whether the instruction offered, as the reward, will repay us for the expenditure of thought required, or can be obtained for less. I know it is customary in this country, as well as in Great Britain—and that too among men from whom different language might be expected—to affect either contempt or modesty, in regard to all that is more than common-place in philosophy, and especially “Coleridge’s *Metaphysics*,” as “too deep for them.” Now it may not be every man’s duty, or in every man’s power, to devote to such studies the time and thought necessary to understand the deep things of philosophy. But for one who professes to be a scholar, and to cherish a manly love of truth for the truth’s sake, to object to a system of metaphy-

sics because it is "too *deep* for him," must be either a disingenuous insinuation, that its depths are not worth exploring—which is more than the objector knows—or a confession, that—with all his professed love of truth and knowledge—he prefers to "sleep after dinner." The misfortune is, that men have been cheated into a belief, that all philosophy and metaphysics worth knowing are contained in a few volumes, which can be understood with little expense of thought; and that they may very well spare themselves the vexation of trying to comprehend the depths of "Coleridge's *Metaphysics*." According to the popular notions of the day, it is a very easy matter to understand the philosophy of mind. A new work on philosophy is as easy to read as the last new novel; and superficial, would-be scholars, who have a very sensible horror at the thought of studying Algebra, or the doctrine of fluxions, can yet go through a course of moral sciences, and know all about the philosophy of the mind.

Now why will not men of sense, and men who have any just pretensions to scholarship, see that there must of necessity be gross sophistry somewhere in any system of metaphysics, which pretends to give us an adequate and scientific self-knowledge—to render comprehensive to us the mysterious laws of our own inward being, with less manly and persevering effort of thought on our part, than is confessedly required to comprehend the simplest of those sciences, all of which are but some of the *phænomena*, from which the laws in question are to be inferred?—Why will they not see and acknowledge—what one would suppose a moment's reflection would teach them—that to attain true self-knowledge by reflection upon the objects of our inward

consciousness—not merely to understand the motives of our conduct as conscientious Christians, but to know ourselves scientifically as philosophers—must, of necessity, be the most deep and difficult of all our attainments in knowledge? I trust that what I have already said will be sufficient to expose the absurdity of objections against metaphysics in general, and do something towards showing, that we are in actual and urgent need of a system somewhat deeper than those, the contradictions of which have not without reason made the name of philosophy a terror to the friends of truth and of religion. “False metaphysics can be effectually counteracted by true metaphysics alone; and if the reasoning be clear, solid, and pertinent, the truth deduced can never be the less valuable on account of the depth from which it may have been drawn.” It is a fact, too, of great importance to be kept in mind, in relation to this subject, that in the study of ourselves—in attaining a knowledge of our own being,—there are truths of vast concernment, and living at a great depth, which yet no man can draw for another. However the depth may have been fathomed, and the same truth brought up by others, for a light and a joy to their own minds, it must still remain, and be sought for by us, each for himself, at the bottom of the well.

The system of philosophy here taught does not profess to make men philosophers, or—which ought to mean the same thing—to guide them to the knowledge of themselves, without the labour both of attention and of severe thinking. If it did so, it would have, like the more popular works of philosophy, far less affinity than it now has, with the mysteries of religion, and those profound truths concerning our spiritual being and destiny, which are revealed in the *things*

hard to be understood of St. Paul and of the beloved disciple. For I cannot but remind my readers again, that the Author does not undertake to teach us the philosophy of the human mind, with the exclusion of the truth and influences of religion. He would not undertake to philosophize respecting the being and character of man, and at the same time exclude from his view the very principle which constitutes his proper humanity: he would not, in teaching the doctrine of the solar system, omit to mention the sun, and the law of gravitation. He professes to investigate and unfold the being of man *as man*, in his higher, his peculiar, and distinguishing attributes. These it is, which are hard to be understood, and to apprehend which requires the exercise of deep reflection and exhausting thought. Nor in aiming at this object would he consider it very philosophical to reject the aid and instruction of eminent writers on the subject of religion, or even of the volume of Revelation itself. He would consider St. Augustine as none the less a philosopher, because he became a Christian. The Apostles John and Paul were, in the view of this system of philosophy, the most rational of all writers, and the New Testament the most philosophical of all books. They are so because they unfold more fully, than any other, the true and essential principles of our being; because they give us a clearer and deeper insight into those constituent laws of our humanity, which as men, and therefore as philosophers, we are most concerned to know. Not only to those, who seek the practical self-knowledge of the humble, spiritually-minded Christian, but to those also, who are impelled by the "heaven descended *γνώθι σεαυτόν*" to study themselves as philosophers, and to make self-knowledge a science,

the truths of Scripture are a light and a revelation. The more earnestly we reflect upon these and refer them, whether as Christians or as philosophers, to the movements of our inward being—to the laws which reveal themselves in our own consciousness, the more fully shall we understand, not only the language of Scripture, but all that most demands and excites the curiosity of the genuine philosopher in the mysterious character of man. It is by this guiding light, that we can best search into and apprehend the constitution of that “marvellous microcosm,” which, the more it has been known, has awakened more deeply the wonder and admiration of the true philosopher in every age.

Nor would the Author of this Work, or those who have imbibed the spirit of his system, join with the philosophers of the day in throwing aside and treating with a contempt, as ignorant as it is arrogant, the treasures of ancient wisdom. *He, says the son of Sirach, that giveth his mind to the law of the Most High, and is occupied in the meditation thereof, will seek out the wisdom of all the ancient.* In the estimation of the true philosopher, the case should not be greatly altered in the present day; and now that two thousand years have added such rich and manifold abundance to those ancient “sayings of the wise,” he will still approach them with reverence, and receive their instruction with gladness of heart. In seeking to explore and unfold these deeper and more solemn mysteries of our being, which inspire us with awe, while they baffle our comprehension, he will especially beware of trusting to his own understanding, or of contradicting, in compliance with the self-flattering inventions of a single age, the universal faith and consciousness of the human race. On such subjects,

though he would call no man master, yet neither would he willingly forego the aids to be derived, in the search after truth, from those great oracles of human wisdom—those giants in intellectual power who from generation to generation were admired and venerated by the great and good. Much less could he think it becoming, or consistent with his duty to hazard the publication of his own thoughts on subjects of the deepest concernment, and on which minds of greatest depth and power had been occupied in former ages, while confessedly ignorant alike of their doctrines and of the arguments by which they are sustained.

It is in this spirit, that the Author of the work here offered to the public has prepared himself to deserve the candid and even confiding attention of his readers, with reference to the great subject of which he treats.

And although the claims of the Work upon our attention, as of every other work, must depend more upon its inherent and essential character, than upon the worth and authority of its Author, it may yet be of service to the reader to know, that he is no hasty or unfurnished adventurer in the department of authorship, to which the Work belongs. The discriminating reader of this Work cannot fail to discover his profound knowledge of the philosophy of language, the principles of its construction, and the laws of its interpretation. In others of his works, perhaps more fully than in this, there is evidence of an unrivalled mastery over all that pertains both to logic and philology. It has been already intimated, that he is no contemner of the great writers of antiquity and of their wise sentences; and probably few English scholars, even in those days when there were giants of learning in Great Britain, had minds more richly

furnished with the treasures of ancient lore. But especially will the reader of this Work observe with admiration the profoundness of his philosophical attainments, and his thorough and intimate knowledge, not only of the works and systems of Plato and Aristotle, and of the celebrated philosophers of modern times, but of those too much neglected writings of the Greek and Roman Fathers, and of the great leaders of the Reformation, which more particularly qualified him for discussing the subjects of the present Work. If these qualifications, and—with all these, and above all—a disposition professed and made evident seriously to value them, chiefly as they enable him more fully and clearly to apprehend and illustrate the truths of the Christian system,—if these, I say, can give an Author a claim to serious and thoughtful attention, then may the Work here offered urge its claim upon the reader. My own regard for the cause of truth, for the interests of philosophy, of reason, and of religion, lead me to hope that they may not be urged in vain.

Of his general claims to our regard, whether from exalted personal and moral worth, or from the magnificence of his intellectual powers, and the vast extent and variety of his accumulated stores of knowledge, I shall not venture to speak. If it be true indeed that a really great mind can be worthily commended only by those who adequately both appreciate and *comprehend* its greatness, there are few who should undertake to estimate, and set forth in appropriate terms, the intellectual power and moral worth of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Neither he, nor the public, would be benefited by such commendations as I could bestow. The few among us who have read his works with the attention

which they deserve, are at no loss what rank to assign him among the writers of the present age; to those who have not, any language, which I might use, would appear hyperbolic and extravagant. The character and influence of his principles as a philosopher, a moralist, and a Christian, and of the writings by which he is enforcing them, do not ultimately depend upon the estimation in which they may now be held; and to posterity he may safely entrust those “productive ideas” and “living words”—those

—truths that wake,
To perish never,

the possession of which will be for their benefit, and connected with which, in the language of the Son of Sirach,—*His own memorial shall not depart away, and his name shall live from generation to generation.*



J. M.

A P P E N D I X.





APPENDIX A.

Summary of the Scheme of the Argument to prove the diversity in kind of the Reason and the Understanding. See p. 175.

THE position to be proved is the difference in kind of the understanding from the reason.

The axiom, on which the proof rests, is: subjects, which require essentially different general definitions, differ in kind and not merely in degree. For difference in degree forms the ground of specific definitions, but not of generic or general.

Now reason is considered either in relation to the will and moral being, when it is termed the *practical reason = A: or relatively to the intellective and sciential faculties, when it is termed theoretic or speculative reason = a. In order therefore to be com-

* The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and substantive sense. It is Reason in its own sphere of perfect freedom; as the source of ideas, which ideas, in their conversion to the responsible Will, become ultimate ends. On the other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the universal and absolute in all logical conclusion, is rather the light of Reason in the Understanding, and known to be such by its contrast with the contingency and particularity which characterize all the proper and indigenous growths of the Understanding.

4 *Diversity of Reason and Understanding.*

pared with the reason, the understanding must in like manner be distinguished into the understanding as a principle of action, in which relation I call it the adaptive power, or the faculty of selecting and adapting means and medial of proximate ends = B: and the understanding, as a mode and faculty of thought, when it is called reflection = *b*. Accordingly, I give the general definitions of these four: that is, I describe each severally by its essential characters: and I find, that the definition of A differs *toto genere* from that of B, and the definition of *a* from that of *b*.

Now subjects that require essentially different definitions do themselves differ in kind. But Understanding and Reason require essentially different definitions. Therefore Understanding and Reason differ in kind.



APPENDIX B.

“**W**HAT is Instinct? * As I am not quite of Bonnet’s opinion “that philosophers will in vain torment themselves to define instinct until they have spent some time in the head of the animal without actually being that animal,” I shall endeavour to explain the use of the term. I shall not think it necessary to controvert the opinions which have been offered on this subject, whether the ancient doctrine of Descartes, who supposed that animals were mere machines; or the modern one of Lamark, who attributes instincts to habits impressed upon the organs of animals, by the constant efflux of the nervous fluid to these organs to which it has been determined in their efforts to perform certain actions, to which their necessities have given birth. And it will be here premature to offer any refutation of the opinions of those who contend for the identity of this faculty with reason, and maintain that all the actions of animals are the result of invention and experience;—an opinion maintained with considerable plausibility by Dr. Darwin.

“Perhaps the most ready and certain mode of

* Green’s *Vital Dynamics*, Appendix F. p. 88. See ante p. 190. *Ed.*

coming to a conclusion in this intricate inquiry will be by the apparently circuitous route of determining first, what we do not mean by the word. Now we certainly do not mean, in the use of the term, any act of the vital power in the production or maintenance of an organ: nobody thinks of saying that the teeth grow by instinct, or that when the muscles are increased in vigour and size in consequence of exercise, it is from such a cause or principle. Neither do we attribute instinct to the direct functions of the organs in providing for the continuance and sustentation of the whole co-organized body. No one talks of the liver secreting bile, or of the heart acting for the propulsion of the blood, by instinct. Some, indeed, have maintained that breathing, even voiding the excrement and urine, are instinctive operations; but surely these, as well as the former, are automatic, or at least are the necessary result of the organization of the parts in and by which the actions are produced. These instances seem to be, if I may so say, below instinct. But again, we do not attribute instinct to any actions preceded by a will conscious of its whole purpose, calculating its effects, and predetermining its consequences, nor to any exercise of the intellectual powers, of which the whole scope, aim, and end are intellectual. In other terms, no man who values his words will talk of the instinct of a Howard, or of the instinctive operations of a Newton or Leibnitz, in those sublime efforts, which ennoble and cast a lustre, not less on the individuals than on the whole human race.

“To what kind or mode of action shall we then look for the legitimate application of the term? In answer to this query, we may, I think, without fear of the consequences, put the following cases as exem-

plifying and justifying the use of the term, Instinct, in an appropriate sense. First, when there appears an action, not included either in the mere functions of life, acting within the sphere of its own organismus; nor yet an action attributable to the intelligent will or reason: yet at the same time, not referable to any particular organ, we then declare the presence of an Instinct. We might illustrate this in the instance of a bull-calf butting before he has horns, in which the action can have no reference to its internal economy, to the presence of a particular organ, or to an intelligent will. Secondly, likewise if it be not indeed included in the first, we attribute Instinct where the organ is present, if only the act is equally anterior to all possible experience on the part of the individual agent, as for instance, when the beaver employs its tail for the construction of its dwelling; the tailor-bird its bill for the formation of its pensile habitation; the spider its spinning organ for fabricating its artfully woven nets, or the viper its poison fang for its defence. And lastly, generally, where there is an act of the whole body as one animal, not referable to a will conscious of its purpose, nor to its mechanism, nor to a habit derived from experience, nor previous frequent use. Here with most satisfaction, and without doubt of the propriety of the word, we declare an Instinct; as examples of which, we may adduce the migratory habits of birds, the social instincts of the bees, the construction of their habitations, composed of cells formed with geometrical precision, adapted in capacity to different orders of the society, and forming store-houses for containing a supply of provisions; not to mention similar instances in wasps, ants, termites;

and the endless contrivances for protecting the future progeny.

“ But if it be admitted that we have rightly stated the application of the term, what we may ask is contained in the examples adduced, or what inferences are we to make as to the nature of Instinct itself, as a source and principle of action? We shall, perhaps, best aid ourselves in the inquiry by an example, and let us take a very familiar one of a caterpillar taking its food. The caterpillar seeks at once the plant, which furnishes the appropriate aliment, and this even as soon as it creeps from the ovum; and the food being taken into the stomach, the nutritious part is separated from the innutritious, and is disposed of for the support of the animal. The question then is, what is contained in this instance of instinct? In the first place what does the vital power in the stomach do, if we generalize the account of the process, or express it in its most general terms? Manifestly it selects and applies appropriate means to an immediate end, prescribed by the constitution; first of the particular organ, and then of the whole body or organismus. This we have admitted is not instinct. But what does the caterpillar do? Does it not also select and apply appropriate means to an immediate end prescribed by its particular organization and constitution? But there is something more; it does this according to circumstances; and this we call Instinct. But may there not be still something more involved? What shall we say of Hüber’s humble-bees? A dozen of these were put under a bell glass along with a comb of about ten silken cocoons, so unequal in height as not to be capable of standing steadily; to remedy this, two or three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched

themselves over its edge, and with their heads downwards, fixed their forefeet on the table on which the comb stood, and so with their hindfeet kept the comb from falling: when these were weary others took their places. In this constrained and painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little insects support the comb for nearly three days; at the end of which time they had prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with it. And what is still further curious, the first pillars having got displaced, the bees had again recourse to the same manœuvre. What then is involved in this case? Evidently the same selection and appropriation of means to an immediate end as before; but observe! according to varying circumstances.

“ And here we are puzzled; for this becomes Understanding. At least no naturalist, however predetermined to contrast and oppose Instinct to Understanding, but ends at last in facts in which he himself can make out no difference. But are we hence to conclude that the instinct is the same, and identical with the human understanding? Certainly not; though the difference is not in the essential of the definition, but in an addition to, or modification of, that which is essentially the same in both. In such cases, namely, as that which we have last adduced, in which instinct assumes the semblance of understanding, the act indicative of instinct is not clearly prescribed by the constitution or laws of the animal's peculiar organization, but arises out of the constitution and previous circumstances of the animal, and those habits, wants, and that predetermined sphere of action and operation which belong to the race, and beyond the limits of which it does not pass. If this be the case, I may

venture to assert that I have determined an appropriate sense for instinct: namely, that it is a power of selecting and applying appropriate means to an immediate end, according to circumstances and the changes of circumstances, these being variable and varying; but yet so as to be referable to the general habits, arising out of the constitution and previous circumstances of the animal considered not as an individual, but as a race.

“ We may here, perhaps, most fitly explain the error of those who contend for the identity of Reason and Instinct, and believe that the actions of animals are the result of invention and experience. They have, no doubt, been deceived, in their investigation of Instinct, by an efficient cause simulating a final cause; and the defect in their reasoning has arisen in consequence of observing in the instinctive operations of animals the adaptation of means to a relative end, from the assumption of a deliberate purpose. To this freedom or choice in action and purpose, instinct, in any appropriate sense of the word, cannot apply, and to justify and explain its introduction, we must have recourse to other and higher faculties than any manifested in the operations of instinct. It is evident, namely, in turning our attention to the distinguishing character of human actions, that there is, as in the inferior animals, a selection and appropriation of means to ends—but it is (not only according to circumstances, not only according to varying circumstances, but it is) according to varying purposes. But this is an attribute of the intelligent will, and no longer even mere understanding.

“ And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this investigation are greatly increased by

our not considering the understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by the co-operation of the will, the moral feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will,—having a self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and appropriating the means—seems best to account for that progressiveness of the human race, which so evidently marks an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the inferior animals; but which would be inexplicable, were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual faculties.

“Man doubtless has his instincts, even in common with the inferior animals, and many of these are the germs of some of the best feelings of his nature. What, amongst many, might I present as a better illustration, or more beautiful instance, than the *storge* or maternal instinct? But man’s instincts are elevated and ennobled by the moral ends and purposes of his being. He is not destined to be the slave of blind impulses, a vessel purposeless, unmeant. He is constituted by his moral and intelligent will, to be the first freed being, the master-work and the end of nature; but this freedom and high office can only co-exist with fealty and devotion to the service of truth and virtue. And though we may even be permitted to use the term instinct, in order to designate those

high impulses which in the minority of man's rational being, shape his acts unconsciously to ultimate ends, and which in constituting the very character and impress of the humanity reveal the guidance of Providence; yet the convenience of the phrase, and the want of any other distinctive appellation for an influence *de supra*, working unconsciously in and on the whole human race, should not induce us to forget that the term instinct is only strictly applicable to the adaptive power, as the faculty, even in its highest proper form, of selecting and adapting appropriate means to proximate ends according to varying circumstances,—a faculty which however, only differs from human understanding in consequence of the latter being enlightened by reason, and that the principles which actuate man as ultimate ends, and are designed for his conscious possession and guidance, are best and most properly named Ideas.”



APPENDIX C.

ON RATIONALISM,

WITH A PARTICULAR APPLICATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISMAL REGENERATION.

But we all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. (2 Cor. iii. 18.)

On Reason and the Ministrative Agency of the Understanding.

WHAT is Rationalism? The word is a derivative of *Ratio*, Reason, and from its form together with its usual application we know that it is to be understood *in malam partem*. It is commonly defined a wrong or unwarrantable use of reason; but there can be no misuse of reason in the primary and proper sense, as the light by which we read the law written in the heart, or rather the law itself, read by its own light, when that is enkindled from above.* As well might

* "It is true that natural reason cannot teach us the things of God: that is, reason instructed only by this world, which St. Paul calls *the natural man*, cannot discern the things of the Spirit; but though natural reason cannot, yet it is false to say that reason cannot; for reason illuminated can perceive the things of God; that is, when reason is taught in that faculty, under that master, and by those rules which are proper for spiritual things, then reason can do all its intentions."—Taylor *Ductor Dubitantium*, Book I. c. ii. s. 56.

we contend that the seeing faculty may at times lead men to stumble and fall as maintain that reason can misdirect or be misdirected. The luminary within us may be clouded and obscured, and the understanding, thus left to *grope in the dark*, may wander out of the right way; but light itself becomes darkness only by a figure of speech; nor can reason grow unreasonable and lead the soul into error.

But though light cannot minister to its opposite, nor reason lend itself to deceit, yet certainly men may reason amiss;* for reason or the power of seeing aright may be contemplated in two ways, either as a spiritual organ, or as the ground of formal principles, either in reference to actual (moral), or to abstract truth; and the understanding, considered as using reason in this latter sense, is allowably called by the same name. Now although reason is a light not a faculty,† yet the understanding, even when more or less enlightened by reason, is a “faculty of the finite,” and as such liable to perversion and abuse. Reason then, in reference to the term rationalism, must stand for the rationalized understanding, an instrumental faculty belonging to the intuitive mind by which alone it can act in this present world, a connective between the spirit of man and that system of external things in which he is placed; and we must understand by rationalism, wrong reasonings respecting the power of

* “It is true, reason is fallible; or rather, to speak properly, ratiocination, or the using of reason, is subject to abuse and deception; for reason itself is not fallible.”—*Ib.* s. 64.

† “The making reason a faculty, instead of a light, and using the term as a mere synonyme of the understanding, and the consequent ignorance of the true nature of ideas, and that none but ideas are objects of faith, are the grounds of all Jeremy Taylor’s important errors.”—*The Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, vol. iii. p. 272.

reasoning in human beings, a misconception of its nature, an attribution to it of that which it does not possess, or an application of it to functions of which it is essentially incapable. As for instance, if we should attempt to explain the article of Redemption, "in relation to the Redeemer's act, as the efficient cause and condition of Redemption,"*—this would be rationalism.

But if this be rationalism in general, what is it practically and historically? How has it manifested itself in the world? The grossest form of it is stated to be that which sets up the natural understanding as the standard and measure of divine truth;—which rejects as incredible all that is not comprehensible. I think it would be found on inquiry that this is rather a tendency of human nature than a professed principle of any sect or school of religion. I doubt whether any man can be found who openly avers that nothing exists which he is incapable of comprehending; and certainly no believer in God refuses to acknowledge that He has ways which are not as our ways. The notion has been disowned over and over again by Anti-Trinitarians to whom it is commonly imputed.† "We

* Aids to Reflection, vol. i. p. 258.

† "The fundamental rule of the Socinians necessarily supposes, that no doctrine ought to be acknowledged as true in its nature, or divine in its origin, *all whose parts* are not level to the comprehension of the human understanding."—*Mosheim's Eccles. Hist.* Translated by Dr. Maclaine, Part II. chap. iv. p. 16.

"It is true that God is an infinite being, and also true, that his powers and perfections, his purposes and operations, his ends and means, being unlimited, are *incomprehensible*.—In other words they cannot be *wholly taken in* or embraced by the human mind.—In comparison with the vastness of God's system, the range of the highest created intellect is narrow.—We grant that God is *incomprehensible*, in the sense already given. But he is not therefore *unintelligible*, and this distinction we conceive to be important.—We do not pretend to know the *whole* nature and

do not deny the High Church doctrine," they say, "because it declares that God is incomprehensible. We acknowledge that all around and all within us, as to its origin and the mode of its production, is a perfect mystery; that not only the union of soul and body is inconceivable, but that every phenomenon of the natural world, from the bursting of a bud to the flowing of the ocean tide, surpasses man's understanding. But why do we believe in this incomprehensible Nature by which we are surrounded? Because irresistible proof of its reality is afforded us. Give us equal evidence of the doctrine of which you speak, and we cannot help believing it." Socinians are assailed with the fact of the reciprocal action of matter and spirit, which is a seeming contradiction, because it is an evident truth that "the law of causality holds only between homogeneous things, that is, things having some common property, and cannot extend from one world into another its opposite."* But how easy to such an argument is the reply: "Here is no real contradiction to the laws of the human mind, for we do not know that anything in the spiritual world pro-

properties of God, but still we can form some *clear ideas* of him, and can reason from these ideas as justly as from any other. The truth is that we cannot be said to comprehend any being whatever, not the simplest plant or animal."—See *Discourses, Reviews, and Miscellanies*, by W. E. Channing, p. 225-6.

It may not be correct language to speak of the Divine Being as "intelligible," yet it cannot rationally be denied that He is to a certain degree apprehensible, for we are commanded to be holy because God is holy (1 Pet. i. 15.—Lev. xi. 44,) and perfect even as our Father in heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48); how could we be expected to copy an exemplar of which we have no knowledge? We know God even here, through his Son (John xiv. 7), though we do not yet see Him as He is. (1 John iii. 2.)

* *Biographia Literaria*, by S. T. Coleridge, chap. viii. p. 129.

perly *causes* anything in the material ; all we know is that certain volitions in us are followed by certain sensations, which by an irresistible impulse we refer to something without the mind. Moreover we cannot tell what matter is, nor have we any right to pronounce that there is an absolute and essential heterogeneity betwixt body and soul.* The speculative reason of man has no laws by which it can judge of these things, therefore none that can be contradicted : but the practical reason *can* judge of moral and spiritual things, and this reason, in a question of religious faith, *must* not be contradicted. If the doctrine of the Trinity, or that so-called Catholic view of the Gospel revelation, on which it is founded, involved only a seeming contradiction, or if it were merely incomprehensible, we should not reject it simply on that ground. We reject it not because we cannot understand *how* God can be one and yet three in different senses, not because it involves a mystery beyond our comprehension ; but first, because it positively is, and does not merely seem to be, contrary to reason and the moral sense ; secondly, because no sufficient reason is given us why we should receive it. We say that the doctrine is contrary to reason, because, as it is commonly explained, it seems to us inconsistent with the divine attributes, with that idea of God which the Creator has planted within us, and to which the inspired writers continually refer us as tests of the truth. We say that it not only wants internal consistency, but external proof ; that the tenor of the New Testament is clearly against it ; that it cannot be found in

* See Kant's *Werke*, vol. ii. pp. 326-7. Leipzig, 1838. See also on this subject the chapter of the *Biographia Literaria* referred to above.

the writings of the early Christians; that it was invented in course of time by metaphysical divines, together with numberless other fictions." Thus they reject this "substrative truth," the basis of the whole Christian faith, spiritually and practically considered, and, as viewed by speculative reason, "the form, manner, and involvent of all truths,"* on the ground that the belief in it is both reasonless and unreasonable, not simply because "the *modus* is above their comprehension."† But although there are few, if any, thinkers who openly profess that a doctrine is to be rejected simply and solely because it refers to that which we cannot comprehend, yet it is a common propensity of man to walk by sight rather than by faith, and, in proportion as men are governed by this propensity, they are apt to shrink from the contemplation of themes which are highly spiritual and deeply rational, and thus to contract the mysteries of religion into the narrowest possible compass. They know that there is a supersensuous world as well as a world of sense; they admit the fact when brought to think of it, but they do not dwell upon this truth, or bring it home to their thoughts habitually. They fail to find the Divinity of our Saviour in the Bible, because the union of the human and divine nature, though not more entirely mysterious than the twofold being of man, is yet an additional mystery, from which they may escape by keeping their eyes shut. They do not perceive the accordance of Catholic faith with spiritual ideas, from the want of a sufficiently awakened spirituality in themselves. But this I apply to the pure

* *The Literary Remains* of S. T. Coleridge, vol. iv. p. 227.

† *Ib.* p. 186. "None but the weakest men have objected to the Tri-unity merely because the *modus* is above their comprehension."

Socinian spirit, and not by any means to individual Socinians. The great mass of them become such from the accident of their birth, not from the constitution of their minds, as, on the other hand, numbers of orthodox professors obtain a spiritual faith by inheritance, not as an individual acquirement. I even believe that some who reject in ignorance the doctrine of the Trinity are less in subjection to the mind of the flesh than many who intellectually receive it; as among the heathen many were far more pious and devout persons than multitudes of professed Christians are at the present day.

Rationalism, then, is such a use of the rational understanding in reference to religion, as involves a forgetfulness of the spiritual and divine, a subserviency to the carnal, finite, and human. There are two great forms of it prevailing in the world. The one is that which tries "the modes and laws of spiritual existence" by the mere understanding;—which uses "rules abstracted or deduced from forms in time and space, as measures of spiritual being, yea, even of the Divine Nature which cannot be compared or classed."* The other is that which "states a sufficiency of grace in the bare proposal of things to be believed and practised, without a new powerful work of the Spirit upon the heart, that may determine and enable it to believe and accept of these things : "† which teaches, that "the mind of God clearly revealed and urged with due persuasions, is a suitable object to a rational understanding, which has power enough to close with every object agreeable to it."‡ In regard to the first of these, the

* *Statesman's Manual*, by S. T. Coleridge, Appendix D. p. 291.

† South, *Sermon on Deuter. xxix. 4.*

‡ *Ib.*

distinction so strongly urged by Mr. Coleridge betwixt the reason and the understanding, will prevent those who have fully mastered it from confounding that mode of thought from one of a very different character;—I mean the tenet that it is necessary and right to test the truth of doctrine, under certain rules and limitations, by its correspondency to the rational, moral, and spiritual ideas within us. That this can properly be designated rationalism, I must, in passing, express the strongest possible doubt. With this question, however, I do not propose to deal at present. What I mean to treat here, is a different view of the subject, according to which not only is it rationalism to maintain that the reasonable understanding, unaided from above, can make men *wise unto salvation*; but it is rationalism to believe that its concurrence is indispensable to the attainment of this wisdom: not only is it rationalism to reject the incomprehensible from our creed, and thus exalt *the mind of the flesh* into the supreme judge of spiritual realities; but we rationalize, though more speciously and subtly, when we maintain that, although the intellectual faculty is not to preside over our faith, it must yet be present and active when we receive power from above to become sons of God. These teachers maintain, that, although the understanding may be made a most important auxiliary in the work of our conversion, yet that its aid is by no means indispensable from the first; that it is “a medium of access to the affections,” even an appointed medium, but not *the way* by which they must be approached in order to our edification and salvation; that, although the communication of Christian knowledge may be described as the chief, the proper, the specific means of bringing men to

Christ; yet that there are other means, prior in time to this, and wholly unconnected with it, by which the soul may be brought into the way of eternal life, and the man may begin his career in the spirit.*

Now I shall endeavour to show that the soul of man cannot properly become religious, or possessed of a true and living faith, or be spiritually influenced and changed from evil to good, without the concurrence of the understanding in every stage of the process; that this process cannot even be commenced by the affections, independently of the intellectual faculty; that to prove the possibility of such an antecedence, were it proveable, would in no way tend to uphold and fortify the doctrine of grace; and, conversely, that in proving the necessity of divine grace in the work of religion, we go not one step towards proving that the *subordinate* and *ministrative* agency of the understanding is not necessary too. I shall endeavour to shew that the sayings which I have brought forward either signify what is contrary to truth, or what is so obviously true, that there is no class of thinkers upon religious subjects who do not acknowledge it.

* The reasonings against "rationalism" considered in this Essay,—though the mode of thought which they imply is common to writers of a certain cast, which I can best characterize in a word, by saying that their spirit is opposed to the spirit that produced the Reformation,—I have never yet found so systematically set forth as in the chapter on rationalism in Mr. Gladstone's "Church Principles considered in their Results." In venturing to oppose the line of argument, or at least to except against the ambiguity of expression, in this particular chapter, I must be allowed to express my strong sense of the great general merit of the work. Indeed, I should have avoided expressing dissent from one whose tone is so Christian, and whose teaching is for the most part so pure and true; if I did not feel it necessary to give a reality and substance to the subject of my remarks by shewing that the sort of language to which I advert

22. *Faith inseparable from Thought.*

We are told, that the agency of the understanding is not uniformly the condition on which the vital influences of religion are received into the soul;—that it is quite possible, nay, the more ordinary course of things, that spiritual light and life should be kindled, and good affections engendered within it by “no consciously reflective process.” To say the contrary is Rationalism. Now I would ask those who thus bring a charge of infidelity and forgetfulness of God against all who maintain that man becomes religious, according to the economy of the Gospel, through his faculty of thought, how they interpret the language of St. Paul in the 10th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans from the 8th to the 17th verse inclusively. In this passage, the Apostle is considering the appointed method of salvation in that spiritual order of things in which he was a minister; and he declares that it is by calling upon the name of the Lord, and further, that men cannot call unless they believe, nor believe unless they hear the word of God. This is styled by Master Latimer “the footstep of the ladder of heaven for our

has been used by an author of note: that the unscriptural view which it seems to set up is that to which a certain theory of Sacraments has conducted a most thoughtful and gifted writer; that I have not encountered a chimæra, or commented on the random sayings of superficial men, who have no character for profundity or logical acumen, nor stand conspicuous in a nation's eye among the teachers of their school. And let me add, I do not need to be reminded, that the ultimate aim of those who thus express themselves, is not the depreciation of the human mind, but the exaltation of divine grace as conveyed by Baptism and the Supper of the Lord; and this through the confutation of teachers who represent the Word, written or spoken, as the principal means of grace, either leaving Sacraments out of their scheme altogether, or describing them as useful but not essential ministrations; that is, treating them just as they themselves seem inclined to treat the teaching of the truth as it is in Jesus.

salvation,"* which rests upon the earth in order to raise us to the sky. In the same strain St. Paul addresses the Galatians, asking them twice over, *Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?*† I think it will hardly be disputed that to call upon the name of the Lord, so as to be saved thereby, is the same as to be religious: of this St. Paul intimates that it comes to man from without, by hearing, and no one will deny that inasmuch as it comes by the ear, it comes by the understanding likewise. If St. Paul does not specify an intelligent reception of the truth in the passage referred to, it is because this is implied for the common sense of mankind in hearing and believing; *eyes to see and ears to hear*, is a figure usual in Scripture to express mental apprehension. In the New Testament, the Gentiles are represented as alienated from God *through the ignorance that is in them*; their intellectual darkness is described as preclusive of spiritual life, and on the other hand it is always assumed that they who had obtained the knowledge of Christ, through the ministry of the Gospel, were *light in the Lord*. In the Old Testament there is an exact analogy to this manner of speaking: understanding is continually used for moral and spiritual apprehension, or as inclusive of it; not because they are one and the same, but because the first is the only avenue to the latter. *Give me understanding*, says the royal Psalmist, *and I shall observe thy law with my whole heart.*‡ No man observes the law of

* *Sermon on Romans*, xv. 4.

† *Gal.* iii. 2. 5.

‡ *Take fast hold of instruction: let her not go: keep her, for she is thy life.* Proverbs iv. 13.

24 *The function of Intellect in Religion*

God but in applying his reason to it, by aid from above, through his faculty of thought.

The knowledge of Christ is represented in Scripture not merely as *a* way of life, but as *the* way; and where this way is unattainable, for all who are to flee the wrath to come, there must surely be an *analogon* of it. It may be asked indeed, "Is no religion possible without an explicit knowledge of the Saviour? May we not at least begin our spiritual course before the truths of the Gospel have reached our outward ears? Cornelius had made no small attainment in piety, and seems to have been accepted with God, before he had received the least tincture of Christian doctrine: he had *learned Christ* virtually, even while the name was a stranger to his ears, and had a power of holiness vouchsafed to him before he had been told of that treasure of redemption, whence such a power can alone be derived. The answer to this objection is easy. A man may become religious without an explicit knowledge of Christ, but not surely without any kind of knowledge attained by means of the understanding. Religion, as an attribute of the soul, is light as well as life, and this light can only be realized within us by the faculty of thought, which first renders us conscious of possessing it, and brings it forward as a determinant of the will. It is only in thinking, a function of the intellect, that we enter into the use of reason: it is only when reason comes into play that the will, the constituent of humanity, begins to act or be actualized; it is only in willing conformably to right reason, when that has been potentiated from above, that man commences a religious course, a walking in the Spirit. In this process understanding is necessary, but not more so than the faculty

of sense; a higher station we may assign it from its contiguity to the higher powers of the soul, but its office is not higher in kind than that of the sensitive faculty, or even that of the outward organ; for it is strictly ministrative and subordinate; only, as pertaining to the mind, though connected with our corporeal part, it is capable of being expanded and refined by the spiritual objects presented to it, and thus of partaking in the general renovation of the soul. To be religious is a coming to God, and *he that comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.* The ideas to which revelation refers are irrepresentable in the forms of the human understanding, but the words and conceptions by means of which those ideas are brought to light within us are objects of that faculty. Before the will can be renewed, and the affections purified and sanctified, there must be a hearing of divine truth, or at all events, a reception of it by the percipient and concipient mind,* either from the written or spoken word, or from the face of the visible creation. Even the ministration of the Spirit supersedes not the work of the understanding; but it is plain from Scripture, that the knowledge of the truth by the eye and ear, and the thinking mind, has ever been the way to righteousness through the gift of God.

With such a principle as that against which I contend—the principle that righteousness may be engendered within us by spiritual agency previously to intel-

* “Perhaps the safer use of the term understanding, for general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as percipient being, and reason as a power supervening.” *Statesman’s Manual*, Appendix B. p. 264.

lectual apprehension of religious truth—the philosophy of Coleridge has no connexion, though the animated language in which he denounces the usurpations of the mere earthly intellect, considered as it is in itself, not as irradiated by divine light, may have seemed to countenance it. His warnings are directed against the “insulation of the understanding:” he never denies or forgets that, as an instrumental faculty, it is necessary to the acquisition of saving knowledge, and consequently to the rise and progress of religion in the soul.

In support of the doctrine that the understanding does not necessarily co-operate in the conversion of the heart, we find it urged that even as the different qualities and properties of matter are given to us by the faculty of sense, not of thought; and as it depends upon the sound condition of the former, not of the latter, that we have true perceptions of the external world, in the same way the affections “transmit” the notices of their appropriate objects to the mind; and, if their diseased condition falsifies the report, there is no more power in the understanding to transmute and correct the vitiated materials which it receives, than to shew him, who sees blue where he ought to see red, what is the proper hue of the rose or the lilac. Now if there are any who imagine that a “mere assent of the understanding to Gospel truths,” a bare “reception of the word according to the letter and notion,” is all that is necessary to constitute a Christian; the argument given above is exceedingly proper for their conviction. Let those who with the full light of the Gospel shining upon them, are yet so dark within, apply this euphrasy to cleanse their inward eye; but why should it be offered to such as simply assert that in

every operation, in and by which the soul is brought to God, the understanding subordinately co-operates? * To "rationalism" of this kind the forecited reasonings are irrelevant; for to prove that the intellect has no power *of itself* to change the heart and purify the affections, can surely do nothing to disprove the maxim that the faculty of thought is an indispensable instrument in the conversion of the soul, according to the ordinary method by which grace comes to man under the Christian dispensation, or without the sphere of it.

The notion, however, that grace enters the soul by the affections before the understanding has been excited, is supposed to hew out and prepare the way for

* Hear upon this subject the clear-headed Dr. South, who would have been surprised to find himself styled a rationalist, or undervaluer of grace. "Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the will, (which is a controversy too big to be discussed in a sermon,) yet this is certain, that it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything, till his judgment reports it to the will as amiable. This must be the only gate and portal through which we must introduce loving thoughts of Christ into the heart; he must first be valued before he can be embraced. For this is undoubtedly certain, that nothing can have a greater share of our affections than it has of our esteem." (*Sermon on Matthew*, x. 37.) Elsewhere this great writer observes, that "grace is a habit placed equally in the will and the understanding, but that it is expressed by the acts of the latter, and this because the understanding has the precedency and first stroke in holy actions, as well as in others;" (*Sermon on Deuteronomy*, xxix. 4.) "that it is the great wheel on which moves the submission of the soul to God;" (*Sermon on Psalm xxxix.* 9.) and that "whatsoever gives a clear representation of a thing to the apprehension, makes a suitable impression of it upon the will and affections." (*Sermon on Matthew*, xiii. 52.)

These are but echoes of voices coming from still farther in the vale of past time; as for instance Aquinas speaks thus: *Intellectus est prior voluntate; non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto.* Sum. Theol. II. I. Quæst. 83. Art. 3. and thus: *Ea quæ sunt in intellectu, sunt principia eorum quæ sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.* *Ib.* II. 2. Quæst. vii. Art. 2.

a certain doctrine of Sacraments, that, namely, which teaches that the grace they minister is conveyed into the soul before its acceptance by the will, antecedently to living faith, and not concurrently with it, even in those who are the conscious subjects of spiritual operations and graces. But how is this? If it is not through the "intelligent self," the conscious mind, that the grace of Sacraments operates, their efficacy has no more to do with divine influence received through the heart, than with the reception of Christianity through the understanding; for where the intellect is incapable of acting, the affections, which are awakened by the presentations of the intellect, can do nothing toward sanctifying the spirit. Though in one sense *a man was born into the world* when the infant saw the light, yet was there a *heart* in that new born *man* to feel the goodness of his Maker, any more than a tongue to sound his praise? Without the outward senses the soul must remain for ever in an infantine state; time could not educate it without that external ministry; but neither could the senses awaken the slumbering spirit except in conjunction with the faculty of thought.

What avails it then, in behalf of this theory, to urge that as the sense of seeing, not the power of reasoning, produces in our minds a faithful and vivid representation of external things, so the correspondent part of our nature, our feelings of love and aversion, of hope and their contraries, decide the character of our religion? Doubtless they do so, but the question is, can these feelings be brought into play any otherwise than through the faculty of thought? Do they not belong to the will, and is not the realization of the will in this present world dependent on the evolution

of the understanding? Even in our communication with the external world, through the mere recipient property of the soul no object could be presented to us. It does not indeed depend upon our *will* whether or no we see a rose when we have turned our eyes consciously toward the flower; yet we do not see a rose, our minds remaining wholly inactive as the crystal mirror when the image of a passing object flashes into it.* In every perception the matter is given, that is, excited within us by an outward stimulus; but, in order to its appearing in a definite form, the mind must act by "a mechanism of its own," must arrange the affections of sense, apprehend, connect, and reproduce them; and this is to *think* in the widest sense of the term. Now the understanding is the faculty of thinking; in its more restricted meaning, it is confined to that of forming conceptions, but, in the

* See Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, pp. 59-60-61. On the synthesis of apprehension he speaks thus at p. 127. Free Translation. "The variety of our representations, (or various parts of their matter, as distinguished from their form,) may be given in an intuition which is merely sensible, that is, this variety of matter belongs to intuition inasmuch as it is mere susceptibility, or the being passively impressed; and the form of this intuition may lie *a priori* in our faculty of representation, without being anything else than a way of being affected in the subject. But the *connection* of a variety in general can never take place in us through sense, and consequently cannot be contained in the pure form of the sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the representing power, and as this must be termed understanding in contradistinction from sensibility, it follows that all connection is the work of the understanding, and this whether we are aware of it are not; whether it be a connecting of the various matter of the intuition, or of different conceptions, and, in regard to the former, whether the matter connected be sensible or non-sensible: and to this (connecting operation) I shall give the general name of synthesis, partly with a view of drawing attention to the fact, that we can represent to ourselves nothing as connected in the object which we have not ourselves previously connected; and, of all that

larger, it is the whole connecting power of the mind, and all that is not merely passive and receptive in the business of representation falls into its province. I make this remark because it has been urged, in support of an argument against the necessary concurrence of intellect in the work of religion, that material objects have their "form from the sense," and respecting moral ones, that "the primary conception of them is in the affections, antecedent to any action of the understanding, which acts only on what is already conceived." On the contrary I imagine that as the face of nature, but for the substantiating faculty of the mind, would be but a "delirium, a chaos, a scudding cloudage of shapes," or rather of unshaped particles; so the elements of our spiritual cognition, were it not for the plastic agency of the understanding, would remain formless and blind. It seems to be imagined that because the affections are the stuff

belongs to representation, connection is that alone which cannot be given through objects, but must be wholly effected by the subject, because it is an act of its self-activity."

According to Kant the form of intuition belongs to sense, inasmuch as every object we behold is contained in space and time, which he considers merely subjective, though real, mere modes of the passive and receptive mind, with which all that we thus passively receive is invested. But that objects present themselves to us in any definite form, as wholes, having each its own unity, depends upon the understanding and imagination, that is the transcendental imagination, not that which reproduces past experience, compounds new things out of old, and thus dreams awake; but that which is prior to experience, which orders and shapes it, supplying form to the materials of sensation, and thus furnishing the original imagery of the mind. This is what I apprehend Kant to mean by his *synthesis speciosa*, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, pp. 140-1-2.

Translation.—In the first place, I remind the reader, that by the *synthesis of apprehension*, I understand the putting together of the manifold in an empirical intuition, on which depends perception, that is, the possibility of our becoming conscious of the same in experience as a phenomenon. *Ib.* p. 147.

which our religion consists of, because the understanding does not change and rectify them by its own immediate working, as does the grace of God, therefore they must needs be changed and rectified by an antecedent operation, in which the understanding has no concern. But we have all the reason in the world to say that this is not the order of the process. The mind does not become conversant with nature till it can arrange its intuitions, till it conceives as well as perceives; and even so the sense of spiritual things beams in upon the soul at the same time when the understanding begins to be manifested. We cannot bring the truth of this matter before us without considering the mind of man as at once subjective and objective, "a subject which is its own object."* The sky and the smooth expanse of skylike ocean, the one overhanging, and, as it were, looking down into the other,—the two, under a strong sun, appearing as one, a double heaven,—may image to us, for a momentary purpose, the mind reflecting and reflected, the mind as a power of representation, perception, thought, and the mind as a power of ideas, or spiritual realities, the substance and the life of all our knowledge. Darkness for a season occupies both, but at the morning's dawn both are gradually revealed together.

If indeed there are any who affirm that the presentation of sound Christian doctrine to the mind is that alone by which Christian thoughts and feelings can be excited,—who deny the influence of example, the power of outward events and circumstances, the force of habit and efficacy of practice in moulding

* *Aids to Reflection*, p. 131, and the works of the Author *passim*.

the character and affecting the heart,—who disregard these aids to a religious education, and maintain that in respect of this preaching and expounding is not merely the one thing needful but the only thing useful, such persons of course require to be taught better; but yet it should be remembered that not one of these means of grace can become such without the intervention of the understanding, and the consent of the will. We are not stamped with a character as the dead wax receives the impression of the seal; though the metaphors which men make use of on this subject are apt to convey such a notion. To maintain that nothing can operate toward the growth of piety in man but doctrinal instruction would be unreasonable: but who affirms this unreasonable proposition?

It is proclaimed a dangerous error to teach that spiritual life can only be initiated through an intellectual process. If by an intellectual process be meant one in which the faculty of thought concurs, it will be difficult to reconcile the contrary supposition with the teaching of Holy Writ, which represents faith as our access to grace, as that by which we spiritually live, by which Christ dwells in our hearts.* Can we believe

* It is difficult to read the Bible without perceiving that it represents belief in God or in Christ, and having them through the Spirit, as things so inseparably conjoined, that where the one is the other must needs be also. "The mind conceiveth Christ," says Hooker, "by hearing the doctrine of Christianity. The first intellectual conceit and comprehension of Christ so embraced, St. Peter calleth the seed whereof we be new born: our first embracing of Christ, is our first reviving from the state of death and condemnation." Sermon on Justification, vol. iv. p. 642, Keble's ed. In the Eccl. Pol. too, after speaking of the word as the "necessary mean" to eternal life. "To this end," he says, "it no otherwise serveth than in the nature of a doctrinal instrument. Wherefore the ignorant it saveth not; they

without thought, and is not thought an act of the understanding? The word is styled in Scripture *the sword of the Spirit*. Can the Spirit fight without his sword? Can he strive with the children of men unarmed? If He can, we have no ground in the Bible for believing that He ever does. All the conversions recorded in the New Testament bear witness to the truth that vital influences of religion are not admitted to the heart till a way has been opened to them by the understanding. The Keeper of the prison spoken of in the sixteenth chapter of the *Acts* seems to have adopted the Christian faith as suddenly as any whose case is on record, yet it would be easy to shew that he was brought to believe savingly by the medium of his understanding as truly as any other man. The earthquake might have terrified a mind in which no thought of religion had ever been entertained; but this terror could not have led to a search after spiritual safety, had it not been for its connexion with that evangelical teaching, on account of which Paul and Silas were then in custody. And when he fell on his knees, asking *What shall I do to be saved?* did the Apostles tell him that he was fit for baptism in right of his shapeless emotions and

which live by the word must know it." Hooker, book v. ch. xxi. p. 3. We are not to suppose it saves by *way of charm*, and that the mere repeating of the words of inspiration, unaccompanied with a belief that they stand for something true, whether they excite any ideas in our minds or no, is all that is necessary to faith in the Gospel. "Although this word cannot beget without Him," says Leighton, after declaring that the new birth is wholly dependent on God's hand, "yet it is by this word that He begets, and ordinarily not without it." Equally clear and positive is Taylor in his assertion of this doctrine, for, says he, "the first great instrument of changing our whole nature into the state of grace, the flesh into the spirit, is a firm belief, and a perfect assent to and hearty entertainment of the promises of the Gospel." *Sermon on the Flesh and the Spirit. Part. 2.*

indefinite religious apprehension? Were they content to make him a member of the Church at once, while he was stretching out his hands in the dark, to find the rock of salvation? It does not appear so. Their answer is, that he must *believe*. Did they expect him to believe without instruction? Did they intimate that intellectual apprehension was no necessary precondition of the awakening of spiritual life in the soul? * On the contrary, the sacred historian tells us that *they spake unto him the words of the Lord, and unto all that were in the house*; that is to say, they set orthodox doctrine before his mind as a preparation for baptism. Questionless, they who in those days were brought into the way of life, had not the whole scheme of doctrine unfolded to them, as learned theologians now expound it to their pupils in successive lectures. The question only is, were they converted by an impression made upon their hearts without any activity on the part of their understandings;—were not their reason and moral sense appealed to by means of the faculty of thought? The disciples at Ephesus, who had *not so much as heard if there be any Holy Ghost*, are generally cited as instances of very simple be-

* “It is rationalistic to maintain that intellectual apprehension is a necessary or invariable precondition of spiritual agency upon the soul.” Such are the words of the accomplished author of “Church Principles,” p. 84. To spiritual agency, considered in itself, apart from “the moral result, the specific form” of its manifestation, *before* and *after* are probably inapplicable terms; what the Author of “Aids to Reflection” held on this point will appear in the sequel. But we are here concerned with the initiation of spiritual life, or the life of Christ in the soul, through the affections. Is this anterior to acts of the understanding embracing Christian doctrine, at least *quantum ad hoc quod homo credat, Deum esse justificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi*?

lievers; though, as Pearson observes, they could not be supposed ignorant of the Holy Ghost, but only of the special gift of the spirit attendant on Christian baptism.* In respect of these, however, is it not plainly implied in the sacred narrative, that St. Paul removed this ignorance of theirs, before he united them to the Christian body? We need not suppose, indeed, that the apostles discoursed to the Ephesian converts upon the nature and office of the Holy Spirit, elaborately and scientifically displaying the subject in the whole length and breadth that it can occupy in the intellectual region of the human mind. But is it not something like fighting with shadows, to set about to establish the contrary? For who maintains the inculcation of Christian doctrine, as an indispensable preliminary to the work of grace, in any such sense as this?

On *Acts* xvi. 32, Bp. Beveridge remarks, "This clearly shows that a distinct knowledge of the word of God was necessary to his believing aright in Christ. Thus St. Paul did not require him to believe with an implicit faith, without knowing why or what he believed: but he required him to have an explicit solid faith, grounded on the word of God." Bishop Taylor, indeed, on a particular occasion, thinks proper to observe, respecting the jailor and his family, "in whose case there was no explicit faith aforehand in the mysteries of religion: and yet he, and not only he, but all his house, were baptized at that hour of the night, when the earthquake was terrible."† If after the

* See Pearson on the Creed, Art. viii. and Allestree's *Sermon on Acts* xiii. 2.

† *Life of Christ*, Part I. ix. 34.

preaching of Paul and Silas, which was before their baptism, they had *no* explicit faith in Christ, they must have been grievously wanting to themselves. How explicit the Apostles were in their discourses upon repentance and forgiveness of sins through the Saviour and the gift of the Holy Ghost, we may learn from the Acts.* A fully expanded faith was not to be acquired in a night, but an explicit faith in Christianity, in a spiritual salvation through Christ, may be apprehended we cannot say in how short a time, especially when sudden terror goads the conscience into activity, and strong excitement energizes the soul, and brings the work of years within the compass of an hour. It is strange indeed that some suppose the jailor to have inquired respecting his temporal safety alone! What! must he not have known that his prisoners professed to teach *the way of salvation*:† and could they show him any other than the spiritual way, and does not their answer imply that he inquired after that way; and is it not declared that, before the men of God departed, he believed in God with all his house? Believed in God. They were not atheists before, surely? But now they believed, explicitly believed, in *the Lord Jesus*, and that *God had raised him from the dead*, and doubtless also in remission of sins and true righteousness through the empowerment of the Spirit. The Holy Ghost appears to have been dwelt upon in the Apostles' discourses, as if it were a theme brought prominently forward on all sacred occasions; and, from the narrative in the Acts throughout, it would appear as if the general character of their mission,—that it

* Acts v. 31, 2; 8 x. 43, 4, 5; xiii. 38, 2, 47; xv. 8, 11.

† Acts xvi. 17.

concerned the world to come and heavenly influence upon the soul of man, an idea with which even the heathen were familiar,—was spread abroad among the people.

As for the man of Ethiopia, to whom Philip said, *Understandest thou what thou readest?*—if he, after having Scripture opened to him by *the Evangelist*,* was without an explicit faith, what can we say but that he made a poor use of a most rich opportunity?

“But who ever doubted these things?” some will be apt to exclaim on reading what has been said above on the participation of the understanding, as a subordinate agent, in the conversion of the soul. Who ever dreamed of denying “the power, the energy, the force of the word,” and that it is “that instrument which the Divine Omnipotence uses to convert souls?”† Who can be supposed to doubt that religious emotions exist only by and with religious thought; that though we *have* conscience and reason before we come to the *use* of the understanding, yet that we become conscientious and rational no otherwise than by means of reflection; that a man cannot be spiritualized so as to be freed from the dominion of sin, till he has received divine truth by his intellect into his heart?—And verily it is difficult to believe that any thoughtful writer can seriously intend to call these things in question. Strong and unqualified as are the expressions which have lately been used against the necessary concurrence of the understanding in the conversion of the soul to God, I cannot believe that even those who speak thus would deliberately deny its

* *Acts* xxi. 8.

† South. *Sermon on Genesis*, vi. p. 3.

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constant instrumentality in the very earliest process, in which, according to the present economy of salvation, religion is introduced into, or rather raised up within, the soul of man. But assuming this to be so, I would then inquire, if they do not mean what has just been put out of the question, as alike irrational and unscriptural, what is it they do mean by the sort of language to which I have adverted? What is it they would intimate by saying that "the natural entry of grace into the soul of man is by the affections, and anterior to the action of the understanding upon the subject;"*—by denying that "spiritual life can only be initiated through an intellectual process;"†—by insisting upon an "*antecedent* spiritual influence" to enable us to appreciate"‡ moral truth;—and by affirming that a "consciously reflective process"§ is not necessarily the medium through which right feelings are engendered in the heart?—as if divine grace could *work effectually* upon our souls to the production of the fruit of holiness before we had ever so much as heard or thought of our Maker and Redeemer, and of doing good for His sake!

We may indeed speak of the understanding in a restricted sense. In its wider acceptation it is the entire power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of sensibility; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing them into wholes according to a law of unity; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the representing mind; that which puts together the multifarious mate-

* *Church Principles*, by W. E. Gladstone, p. 84.

† *Ib.* 77.

‡ *Ib.* 77.

§ *Ib.* 42.

rials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may consider the understanding in another point of view; not as the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and comes into play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind; but as a power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself; which does not simply *think* and reflect, but which examines its thoughts, arranges and compares them; and this for scientific, not for directly practical purposes. To intellectualize upon religion, and to receive it by means of the understanding are two different things, and the common exertion of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement of them by exercise.

A simple peasant might have understood that Henry or Edward was King of England, and played the part of a loyal subject, who was quite unable to write an essay, or deliver a speech on the monarchical constitution of this realm. Even so a man may believe savingly all the articles of the Apostles' creed, who could not write like Bishop Pearson on the subject, or even understand all that Bishop Pearson has written. What Leighton remarks on the ability of the preacher applies equally to that of the hearer. "In this spiritual work, to revive a soul, to beget it anew, the influence of Heaven is the main thing requisite.— All instruments are alike in an Almighty hand."*

Intellectual conviction is no necessary precondition of legitimate belief.† If by intellectual conviction be

* *Commentary on St. Peter's 1st Epistle, c. i. v. 23.*

† *Church Principles, pp. 71—80.*

meant an assurance of the truth of that of which we are convinced by means of the understanding, and by legitimate belief, one that is taken up on grounds fit to satisfy a reasonable being, I cannot conceive how it can be reasonably denied that such conviction must precede such belief.* But if the proposition only means that conviction brought about by a long series of historical, logical, and metaphysical proofs and arguments, is not necessary to the institution of a sound faith, it must at once be admitted that a man may rationally believe what his heart and conscience assure him of, through the medium of thought, without circuitous reasonings and extensive abstract speculations. Unless we believe we cannot understand. In order to our perceiving divine truth, in its aspect to the reason and understanding, there must be a disposition in the will to embrace it, as an object of the moral and spiritual mind. No man can discourse correctly of natural things till he perceives them through sense; no man can reason rightly on religion till he can see the spiritual things of which religion essentially consists, beholding them with the eyes of the spirit. Yet it remains true that, even in spiritual matters, it is the understanding which *presents to the will its object*; and even that faith which is to precede a speculative insight into the doctrines of Christianity, a gradual opening out of the intellect to more and more clear perceptions of "their strict coincidence with the truths evolved by the mind, from reflections on its own nature," † must be excited by means of the understand-

* "The conviction of the affections is never greater than the illumination of the judgment," because "the spirit strikes the will and affections through the understanding." *South. Sermon, Gen. vi. 3.*

† *Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge, vol. i. p. 387.*

ing, through words or signs, and must repose upon reason, "the fountain of ideas and light of the conscience."*

Again, when it is affirmed that good affections may arise in the heart without a "consciously reflective process" as their precursor, the proposition is true or untrue according to the sense in which the terms of it are to be understood. Consciousness is the very character of thought, and the mark of humanity: brutes are scious, but they cannot be said to *think*, because they are not conscious; they do not refer the phenomena of representation within them to an *I* or intelligent self.† If it be only meant by this saying that a man may become religious without ever having his attention fixed on his understanding and its distinctive agency, and that he may *learn Christ* effectually without becoming a speculative divine, if there are any who seem to teach a different doctrine, it certainly is not the preachers of justification by faith alone. Most of them would be content to say that no affections are good which are not shaped and directed by an essentially religious principle, and that no man enters into possession of such a principle except by the medium of thought.

It is not necessary to the initiation of our spiritual life that we should have first considered the whole scheme of the Christian faith in its exclusively intellectual aspect; a man may have divine truth "so grafted inwardly in his heart, that it may produce in

* In what sense the understanding moves the will, is well determined, I think, by St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. II. 1. Quæst. ix. Art. 1.

† *Essay on Faith. Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, vol. iv. p. 428. See also Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 129.

him the fruit of good living," before he has mastered any system of divinity *as a system*. But is this and this only what is meant by those who argue, that the understanding does not necessarily concur in the work of grace?* The language to which I have referred, if this is all that it is intended to convey, appears rather too broad and unlimited; and indeed the strain of reasoning of which it forms a part seems plainly to shew that, in the minds of those who have recourse to it, the notion that a high amount of intellectual knowledge is not necessary to saving faith is blended with, and continually passes off into, a very different one; I mean the notion that we may be in a justified and sanctified state without any use of the understanding at all. For otherwise what connexion can their argument have with the doctrine that the conscious mind is not necessarily the vehicle of sacramental grace? Yet it is avowedly in behalf of this doctrine, and very obviously for the sake of rendering it credible and creditable, that the other is insisted upon. If a man may become godly and righteous without any exertion of thought, then indeed he may be made a *new creature*, from whom *old things are passed away*, (2 Cor. v. 17,) while all the higher powers and faculties of his soul are still and silent, as the mill, with its ap-

* The understanding, in its abstract exercise, as the organ of speculation, can hardly be termed the proper and specific means of spiritual instruction, or "a medium of access to the affections." So far as it is a direct avenue to the heart at all, it is an indispensable one. "There is a clear and open passage," says South, "between the understanding and the will." Intellectual exercitation upon religious points is useful and necessary for Christendom, but not for individual Christians; not for converting the heart immediately, though instrumentally, but for removing those errors by which it may be led astray from the contemplation of pure truth.

paratus of wheels and machinery, at dead of night. If a man may become a good and faithful servant, or at least enter his Lord's service, previously to conscious reflection, it will readily follow that we may be raised, "in our sleep," to sit in heavenly places where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God, and may descend into the world as soon as ever we awake, the first movements of our will bringing us down to earth again, after our involuntary ascent. For this must be the case with every soul which, after being internally regenerated before the dawn of reason and understanding, begins to sin as soon as it begins to think, which is the case with the greater number of persons.* But if the reasonings in question only aim to shew that men may become good Christians before they have ever abstracted the intellectual from the practical part of religion, and paid to the former for a set time an exclusive attention, I cannot perceive what there is in such a statement that can prepare the way for that view of regeneration with which it is so studiously connected.

Still we will suppose that the language I have cited means nothing more than that a man may become religious, or be put in the way of religion, before he has

* Donne, *Ser. cxvii.* on *John i. 8.* "As in the first creation, *vesper ac mane, dies unus*, the evening and morning made the day, evening before morning, darkness before light, so in our regeneration, when we are made new creatures, the Spirit of God finds us in natural darkness, and by Him we are made light in the Lord."

But according to the view of the new birth referred to above, the human spirit, after its regeneration, remains as dark as before;—what is imparted being no light that actually lighteneth, but only a power of being enlightened, if we, by a subsequent act of our own, permit the beams to break forth, and the daystar to arise in our hearts.

been instructed at length in all the doctrines that radiate from the faith in Christ as from a centre, or may have the foundations of a Christian character laid within him before he has fully thought out the religion he has embraced. But is there any considerable class of persons who teach that a man cannot believe and serve God, unless he first becomes an accomplished theologian, and inclusively a logician, metaphysician, and learned Church historian? Is this that subtly pernicious rationalism against which we are so solemnly warned? Instead of being subtle, it is so gross and glaring that it is denounced by theological writers of every denomination. I do not fear to assert that, if the notion just stated were cried aloud throughout the whole *arena* of religious thought, not a single sane individual would stand forward as its patron and advocate. It must be remembered, that the discourses against "Rationalism," to which I allude, are professedly intended for the correction of that really wide class of persons, who dwell upon the efficacy of the Word to the neglect of Sacraments. And how is the argument against them conducted? They are accused of over exalting the function of the rational intellect in reference to religion, and are argued with as if they lost sight of divine grace altogether, and believed either that the instructed understanding *per se* could entitle men to heaven, or that the soul could save itself by means of it, that is, by the light of an external revelation without the life and light of an internal one. In regard to the first mentioned notion, I need not fear to affirm that it has no hold upon the mind of any who call themselves Christians. It is generally considered that the least spiritual believers in Christendom are the Socinians; yet the writers of that sect

maintain and recommend their doctrine expressly on the ground that it is more favourable to piety, more calculated to promote the love of God and obedience to his commands, than the Catholic faith. But although there are no Christians with the Bible in their hands who imagine that mere intellectual knowledge of divine things is an admission-ticket to the courts of heaven, even as some of the Jews of old are said to have held in respect of themselves, because that *to them were committed the oracles of God* :* yet we know there have been professors of Christianity who have taught that it could save the soul instrumentally, without any internal operation of the divine spirit to render it effectual. Persons of their way of thinking believe as much as others that *every good and perfect gift comes down from the Father of lights*, but they imagine that all men have by nature every inward gift

* Bishop Bull cites some curious sentences from Maimonides, the Mishna, and the Talmud, to show that the Jews, against whom St. Paul contended in the Epistle to the Romans, believed that any Israelite, who had not renounced his profession of Judaism and his trust in the Abrahamic covenant, was sure to have his portion in a better world, let him be ever so unrighteous in this. One of these sayings is : " Abraham sits near the gates of hell, and suffers no wicked Israelite to descend into it." *Harm. Apost. Diss. Post. xvii. 6.*

St. Paul, however, contends with the Jew, on the supposition that he relies not only on his descent from Abraham, but on that knowledge of the divine law which came to all Abraham's seed as an inheritance ; and the Apostle's argument plainly implies that, even before the promulgation of the Gospel, he might have known better, a truth to which the writings of Philo, as understood by Neander, afford strong testimony. " Philo well knew," says that admirable Church historian, " that the human being cannot attain to the knowledge of God without enlightenment from a higher source. Far was he from entertaining the delusive notion that man can purify that which is allied to the divine in his nature by the exertion of his own spiritual powers alone, or that by the same means he can work out for himself a knowledge of the things of God. ' Every aspiration of the soul to-

that conduces to salvation. They suppose that the human soul issues from the hands of its Creator, invested with powers and capabilities which sufficiently enable it to please God, and attain to everlasting communion with him, by taking advantage of such outward opportunities as Providence affords. They deny that man is originally enslaved to evil, and that consequently his understanding is darkened and his reason obscured; but maintain that he has power to choose the better part, as soon as it is presented to him, without any special interposition of divine aid to energize and enlighten his soul. They seem to look upon the spirit of man as a finely constructed machine, wound up to a nicety, and capable of fulfilling the design of the machinist without the further intervention of his regulative hand, or the remodelling of the old springs on a new principle, so as to enable them to work after a wholly new fashion. Such a doctrine alters the

ward God,' says he, (*de Migrat. Abraham*, 414.) 'without divine grace, (*ἀνευ θείας ἐπιφροσύνης*) is corrupt: and it is better to abide here below, and stray up and down in mortal life, than to stumble through pride in the attempt to reach heaven.'" Philo remarks quite correctly, that as man consists of the spiritual and of the sensuous or carnal, in relation to these two there are two directions of the self idolatry, which dreams that it can do without God; that is to say, the worship of sense, and the worship of mere human reason, such as it is when left to itself and persuaded of its self-sufficiency. 'Never let us imagine,' says he, (*de Somniis*, 1111.) 'that man is able to purify the life that is full of stains without God's grace.' But although Philo undeniably referred to God as the source of light and holiness, it remains nevertheless true, that he brought more prominently forward the necessity of an illumination of the reason, than that of an entire practical change of mind; that he did not say enough of the nature and essence of this practical change of mind; was not sufficiently aware that all enlightenment in divine things may and must be grounded in the practical; and this short coming of his was very closely connected with his over-mastering and altogether unbalanced inclination toward the contemplative in religion." *Allgemeine Geschichte der. Ch. R. und K. I.*

whole aspect of Christianity, as it presents itself in the Catholic faith; yet it would be unjust to say, even of these wrong believers, that they transfer the glory of our salvation from God to man, by representing man as his own saviour; they rather describe him as needing no salvation, being safe by God's goodness and mercy from the first. They all acknowledge the Supreme Being to be the ultimate source of blessedness to the human race, as the creator of their powers and properties; since "that which gives the form," as South remarks upon this very subject, at the outset of one of his energetic denunciations of the doctrine, "gives also the consequents of that form; and the principle, with all its appendant actions, is to be referred to the same donor.* These deniers of *special* grace are deniers of original sin: but I believe that it is not so with all of them. Others there are of the same school who admit that man is a fallen being that requires to be raised up to his original type, but be-

Band 1. Abt. p. 45. According to this statement, it would appear as if Philo thought that "grace is placed only in the understanding, which, being informed with such a principle, is able to govern and practically to determine the will, without the help of any new principle infused into that," as South clearly expresses the distinction; instead of being "a habit equally placed in both these faculties;" though, more probably, he never became quite so particular in his speculations. And indeed it is not clear that such a theory of grace, incorrect as it is, would not answer all the intents and purposes of a mere theory against rationalism, where no practical principle interfered with its operation: for such an enlightenment as is here supposed, that is, a clear perception that the things of God are not only excellent, but most desirable; that they are "not only true, but good, and that to us," is the very mark of a mind regenerated by divine grace. But the error is to suppose that this sort of knowledge, this gift of God to the soul, which draws righteousness after it as its certain consequence, can ever be where the will is not itself quickened from above.

* *Sermon on 1 Cor. xii. 4.*

lieve this renovation to be brought about by a general assistance of the Spirit, recruiting our nature universally; so that, being perpetually assisted by the presence of the Sanctifier, and guided to things spiritual as unfailingly as "the sun is kept in its course" by divine power, we are ever able to will and to do the things that belong unto our peace. "According to this assertion," says South, "it is no more supernatural for a soul to believe than for the sun to rise and set in its appointed time."* More extraordinary it certainly is not; though the potentiation of our spiritual nature cannot properly be described as natural. But the drift of the remark is just, because this doctrine teaches, just as much as the other, that men have from their birth all that is necessary to bring them to God in the way of inward assistance.

The views which I have described will be recognized as Pelagianism in two different aspects. The Socinians, no doubt, have embraced them very generally, and yet some of the modern ones appear to insist upon "spiritual aid and blessings," as a distinct head of divine assistance from instruction and example. Dr. Channing explains the aid of the Spirit to be a "moral, illuminating, and persuasive influence;" but we are not obliged to suppose that he understands nothing more by it than external excitements unto faith and godliness; what he declares against is its compulsory character, not its mysterious nature; he denies that dispositions are "infused into us without our moral activity," not that God produces them in the soul immediately, and that in a manner to us wholly inconceivable.† In understanding the influence of the Spirit

* *Sermon on Deuter. xxix. 4.*

† See *Discourses, &c.* by W. E. Channing, pp. 322, 371,

to be moral in its *effects*, I think he agrees with orthodox protestant divines in general. I am not, however, concerned to prove that any view of grace fits well as a superstructure upon a Socinian foundation, or that such as any Psilanthropist holds can be in itself a perfect portion of the Christian edifice: I only wish to mark the fact, that even Unitarians do not universally deny "the influence of a divine spirit or power upon the minds of men,"* or teach that mere unaided intelligence can bring them into the way of life. And again, respecting Pelagianism itself, in its most unmodified form, its error rather consists in denying the natural weakness of the human will, than in any undue estimate of the powers of the understanding: on that scheme, as in all others which profess to be based upon the Bible, intellect plays but a subsidiary part, that of bringing the soul to contemplate the objects of religious faith. It does not state that the understanding rectifies the heart, much less that intellectual rectitude can of itself win heaven, but that every human heart can keep itself right by means of the knowledge of the truth, and that without *special* aid from above.

Even if we give to this view the fairest face which it is capable of wearing, it is far unlike the countenance of Christian truth. I think I may say that even those who depart further in their tenets from the Catholic

386. "Many of us," says Dr. Channing, "are dissatisfied with this explanation" (that which supposes that the death of Christ procures forgiveness by "leading to repentance and virtue") "and think that the scriptures assign the remission of sins to Christ's death with an emphasis so peculiar, that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the Scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end." *Ib.* p. 318.

* Mosheim. *Eccl. History*, Part. ii. c. iv. 18.

faith than any other believers in revelation are beginning to turn away from it in dislike and suspicion. But the question I would ask is this, are we justified in imputing this grossly anti-scriptural doctrine to all whom we hold unorthodox on the question of sacraments? because they neglect or deny certain outward means of special grace appointed by God, is it either just or judicious to argue with them on the assumption that they forget special grace, prevenient and auxiliary, altogether? Great as their error may be, shall we bring them to a sense of its greatness by doubling it, nay, by increasing it incalculably? For who can venture to say how much more injurious it may be to misunderstand the whole economy of salvation, than only a part? The more fearfully important this question is, the more cautious and tender should we be in considering the degree of error which men actually fall into respecting it. Those who unhappily have been ill instructed in the nature and efficacy of sacraments, cannot but feel themselves wronged when they are summarily accused of bringing in a notion that salvation is not the work of God in us, but the work of the human intellect, instructed and divinely aided by *outward* means, that is, of downright Pelagianism, or indeed something more irrational; for the veriest Pelagian does not teach that the understanding saves otherwise than mediately, or denies that the will is the principal agent of good in us, so far as our own powers are concerned? Must they not with some colour of reason consider it an unfair imputation upon their religious opinions when they are informed, as if they denied it, that the intellect does not perform that part which Scripture assigns to the Holy Spirit? Hooker, in his day, reminded the deniers of sacraments, that

faith is not the only thing "necessary for the attainment of all grace;" but he did not reason with them as if they had taught that faith is to supersede grace altogether, or consider it needful to tell them that "the word" is but as a "dark lantern,"* that conceals rather than displays its light when exhibited to a soul which is blind through natural corruption, uncleaned by divine grace. He goes so far indeed as to say, that they who deny the necessity of sacraments in their place draw very nigh to the error of some among the Valentinians, who pretended that "as ignorance had made us subject to all misery, so the full redemption of the inward man, and the work of our restoration must needs belong unto *knowledge only*."† These Valentinians were hardly to be called Christian heretics, or sects of the Christian world, but dreamers in religious philosophy, who thought fit to enrich their visionary system by infusing into it just so much of the Gospel as it could absorb without losing its own original character. To judge by the representations of Irenæus and Tertullian, they admired the Christian theology rather than embraced Christianity, as some of the Chinese idolaters add a compendious history of our Lord, and an account of the Virgin Mary to their repositories of religious fable; and the same may be said, I believe, of all the other Gnostics. It would be trifling to ask what views of grace were entertained by men whose religion, as represented by the Christian Fathers, bore the same sort of resemblance to that of the Bible, as the celestial globe with its mixed multitude of men and monsters, *miracula cæli*, to the face

* South, *Sermon on Psalm xcvi.* 11.

† Eccl. Pol. Keble's ed. vol. ii. p. 342. book v. c. ix. § 4.

of the starry heaven. They are accused of holding knowledge to be our only redemption; but so far they did homage to a power above them that they confessed this saving knowledge to be a *spiritual* seed conferred by a celestial giver; and those among them who rejected ceremonies, and thought that the mystery of ineffable and invisible virtue or power cannot be carried on through visible and corruptible creatures,* might well enough have held this tenet, together with a general belief in the special influence of the Spirit, as Quakers and others have done since their time, if scriptural views of grace could have found their way into the minds of men who distinguished the Creator from the Supreme Being,† sacrilegiously divided the divine Son into a cluster of Æons, and apparently substituted the fable of Achamoth, mother of Demiurge, for what Revelation teaches of the Holy Ghost.†

The owners of these notions can scarcely be included within the limits of Christendom; yet even among them there seems to have been a sense that knowledge redeems and purifies, not as the mere product of the natural man, but as a heavenly infusion, a something superhuman borrowed from an unearthly source. That any who have received Christianity unmixed with an alien system, should so far lose sight of its spirit as to hold that “an apprehension of things divine in the understanding” only can bring us to God, is almost incredible; and Hooker spoke strongly and by way of hyperbole, when he said that there is a *near* approach

* Irenæus. lib. 1. cap. 21. Ben. ed. p. 96.

† See Irenæus. Ben. ed. Diss. Præv. *Eodem sacrilegii genere Christum ab Unigenito, Horo, Verbo, Salvatore et Jesu dividentes*, &c. p. 30, et passim.

to this most irreligious view in the notion that faith, without sacraments, suffices for the attainment of all grace: for surely, to believe that knowledge, even of God and Christ, can *cleanse us from all unrighteousness*, instead of believing that Christ by his Spirit cleanses those who know and believe in Him, is separated by a very long interval from the heresy, which consists in a denial or misrepresentation of certain ordinances whereby he has promised in an especial manner to bestow the blessing. This I say without the slightest desire to extenuate the evil of disparaging any portion of divine truth, or to represent the one here spoken of as otherwise than a most considerable portion. Sacraments are an essential part of the visible church system as truly as the ministry of the word, though in this respect I hold them subordinate, that they depend wholly upon the latter for their efficacy, faith wrought immediately, by *the knowledge of the truth* being the condition upon which the grace annexed to them is received; since even in the case of infant baptism, it must be present in those who bring the child to the font: whereas it would be too bold a thing to say that the word can in no case regenerate, as an instrument, unless the sacrament of regeneration be duly administered. It is not ordinarily the will of God to bestow spiritual life without both, or rather it is ordinarily his will to bestow it by means of both; yet "there may be in divers cases life by virtue of inward baptism, even where outward is not found;" * but baptism never bestows its vital blessings except where the teaching of the word prepares the way for its due administration and reception.

* Eccl. Pol. book v. ch. lx. 5.

54 *Divine Knowledge the universal medium*

There is no objection to the strongest language respecting the preciousness of sacraments, which does not set them before rather than after the ministry of the word, and those who thrust them aside, or put them out of their right place, assigned by the Head of the Church himself, are grievously gone astray. I would be the last to deny that every error in the faith is more or less remotely connected with every other, that errors upon grace are more especially and closely connected with errors upon grace. Still we are not justified in imputing to a man every wrong notion to which he holds any cognate opinion. A chain in which two or three links are loosened is not like one in which all are broken, so that the whole is actually falling to pieces. It will probably last out the wearer's time; it may be repaired at comparatively small expense and trouble; it has not lost all its beauty nor all its utility, though, till repaired, it will not bear tight straining. They who neglect or undervalue sacraments, are deprived of that great witness to the doctrine of grace which Christ has established in His church. Believing the knowledge of the Gospel to be the sole appointed means of grace, and feeling that this can come only through the understanding, they are liable to forget that grace itself, whether conveyed by the word alone, or by sacraments in conjunction with the word, is equally mysterious and unintelligible; even as on the other hand, they who speak of sacraments as anterior, in their actual operation upon the soul, to the knowledge of the truth, as separate channels of divine influence, do so far turn the doctrine into that *opus operatum* which Hooker describes and disclaims.* The know-

* Eccl. Pol. book v. ch. lxii. 15.

ledge of the truth is a broad channel which contains its own separate streams of grace, but the streams which sacraments convey are poured into the same bed, and coalesce with the former.

To deny the grace of sacraments because it is unintelligible, would indeed be rationalism ; but I believe it is a mistake to suppose that the unorthodox notions which have crept in upon this subject, and which prevail so much in the masses of the people, originate in any over-high estimate of the rational understanding, or any dislike to mystery in matters of faith. That the intellectual faculty has but a subordinate function in religion, procuring salvation mediately as the minister of the Spirit through whose agency the soul is brought to behold the things that concern her eternal welfare ; that the word has no power to save, as furnishing the head with doctrine, but as enabling men to substantiate things hoped for and to behold things unseen with the bodily eye, is, I believe, very generally felt by those who dwell upon the necessity and power of sound teaching, whether they have correct views of sacraments, or incorrect ones. Can we believe that the very numerous and influential body, who are characterized positively by special fervour in shewing the necessity of faith and the spiritual mind, and negatively by a comparative indifference to sacraments, are tainted to the core with Pelagianism ; or can they fairly be accused of leading others to adopt it?* Surely by

* As a specimen of the way in which the mere dwelling on the power of the word is supposed to indicate rationalistic and Pelagianizing tendencies, I give the following note from one of the "Tracts for the Times." "Hence (that is, from 'extolling the efficacy of certain motives, when faithfully set forth, to move and win men's affections') the unconscious tendency to rationalism among many of our evidence-writers, who set forth the

means of them, and the zealous men from whom they inherit their opinions, there has been an influx of living waters into the channel of the church, in which before the stream was so low, so languid in its motion, though the freshening tide brought no small portion of impurity along with it. Even those amongst us who have less sympathy with them than any other class of religious teachers, except the Socinians, are found to admit that "Wesleyanism has been an agency permitted by God in the restoration of our church;" one by which, or with which, "men passed from careless-

inherent efficacy of the great Christian doctrines, and thereby teach others to substitute the doctrines of the Gospel for the operations of the Holy Spirit. To take a passage of this kind from a popular American work, 'A knowledge of the death of Christ, with the explanation of it, given in the Scriptures, touches men's hearts; it shews the nature and tendencies of sin; it produces fear of God's displeasure, and resolution to return to duty; and thus produces effects by which justice is satisfied.'—(Mr. Abbott's *Corner-Stone*, p. 174.) Tracts for the Times, vol. II. Part ii. p. 92. Pelagianism may be taught in two ways, either positively or negatively; positively, by certain assertions concerning man's power to will or to do, without special aid from above; or negatively, by a studious exaltation of the means of grace, *apart from all mention of grace itself.* That "the *Corner-Stone*" errs in the first article, is not asserted; neither can it be truly said that it errs in the second, for it repeatedly declares the necessity of divine influence, and that in strong and distinct language, such as cannot possibly be misunderstood.† Nay,

† Allusions to divine influence are scattered throughout the "*Corner-Stone*," but it is more particularly treated at the end of the first chapter, at the end of the fourth, in the seventh and tenth. In the ninth too, on the means of spreading the gospel, the author expresses himself thus: "The work which we have to do is to touch the heart, not to pour cold light on the mind. *Now to awaken warm feeling in the heart is unquestionably the province of the Spirit of God.* We cannot effect it alone, but we may adapt our efforts to this design; and, at all events, we may so manage them as not to thwart or oppose it." So afterwards:—"The Holy Spirit can operate anywhere and with any means—to-day he gives meaning and power to the Scriptures; to-mor-

ness to more earnest lives."* An agency which helped to restore the church and make men religious, must have been effectuated by the Spirit, and though God may overrule evil for good, yet it would be too much

more, the tendency of its teaching is decidedly Anti-Pelagian, for several of its homely but vivid illustrations are devoted to the express purpose of shewing how utterly ineffective *all outward* teaching of religion too frequently becomes.‡ But perhaps the passage cited is incorrect in itself, perhaps it attributes too much to the power of the word, as the instrument of salvation? *Too much?* Can we speak more strongly on this point than the Bible itself has spoken? Can we say more than that it *worketh effectually in them that believe?*—more than is expressed by the Psalmist, when he declares that *the law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul?*—more than is intimated by the prophets when they compare it to fire, than which nothing in creation is fitted to denote the most rapid and vehement efficacy? Who doubts that it owes this efficacy to the Spirit? Does the writer of the extract given above ascribe to it any *independent* power? Must we needs suppose that he *substitutes* motives for the working of the Spirit, merely because he speaks of the former, in popular inexact phrase, as influential? And is this more dangerous language than that adopted by our Anti-Protestant writers, when they say that alms-deeds *purify* the soul,§ which doubtless in one sense they do? But the truth is, that in the recoil from a certain error on the subject of the means of grace, these writers are going into the opposite extreme. There is a manifest tendency among them to remove the word of God from that prominent place in the economy of salvation which the Bible assigns to it; a disposition to put on the same ground with inspired discourses, that speak to the reason and spirit of man,

row, he indites a prayer, or gives to reflections which have been utterly unable to affect the heart, power to overwhelm it with emotion." There is much more in the little volume to the same effect: but as the author's aim plainly is to incite men to set about the business of religion, rather than to improve them in theology, he very naturally dwells a good deal on the human means and methods by which we may be *labourers together with God*, (1 Cor. iii. 9.) (if without offence I may use a phrase of scripture,);—on what *we are to do* in working out our own salvation.

‡ There are several examples of this kind in chap. iii.

§ In what sense we may allowably so speak is explained in the Second Part of the Sermon of Alms deeds.

to suppose that the very subversion of Christianity and denial of divine grace could have directly served to make men Christians through submission to power from above. Could they *of whom the fruit of righteous-*

the subsequent teaching of the Church in summaries and formularies of doctrine, evinced by an excessive jealousy of an attempt to shew, what the interests of Christianity require to be shewn, that teaching, thus addressed to the intellect immediately, and to the heart but indirectly, can never convey the whole truth as it is in Jesus, however exactly coincident with it and admirably adapted to guard it inviolate: and further, an eager desire to prove that sacraments are instruments of grace in a higher sense than that which an Apostle pronounced to be *the power of God unto salvation to them that believe!*

The objection taken to Mr. A.'s language, in the Tract on Holy Baptism, I cannot but believe unwarranted; that this language is not reprehensible on another ground, I am far from denying. The author's view of the *chief design* of the Incarnation, and consequently of the Eucharist, appears to be fundamentally erroneous. But my aim is to show or suggest, that a genuine, though imperfect Christian faith may exist without losing its vitality, in close connexion not only with important logical errors, but with grievous deficiencies of spiritual knowledge thence arising. Mr. A. gives a Socinian turn to his account of the Incarnation and Atonement, yet seems to feel with fervour the truth of our Lord's Divinity. He appears to lose sight of the fountain of spiritual life opened by the Transcendant Act of Redemption, yet dwells with power on the inadequacy of outward means of grace and the necessity of divine influence to change the heart. I cannot but agree with his editor, Dr. Henderson, that the contents of his work are singularly adapted to "arrest the attention of the careless," to excite an ardent admiration of the example set by our Lord, and stimulate to practical earnestness in his service; but, on the other hand, there is much to reprehend in his way of drawing out into detail the perfect manhood of our Lord. Something akin to this unchastened boldness may be observed in the accounts given by some writers of the crucifixion, and still more in the treatment of that subject by painters, who choose it as affording an opportunity for the display of anatomical knowledge and skill in the painting of flesh in its various aspects of life and death. But this over familiarity with sacred subjects and objects has often been found in conjunction with deep devotional feeling among men of all schools. When it appears in a modern production it is particularly offensive, because there is the vulgar air of to-day about it, which does not belong to the coarseness of a bygone age. The

ness was surely sown, have been deniers of the Holy Ghost? Could spiritual-mindedness have been the end where want of faith in the operations of the Spirit was the beginning? They who "helped in a degree to unsecularize the church,"† though wanting some points

incomprehensible union of the divine with the human in our Lord and Saviour, even in his life upon earth, is left unimpugned, so far as I can see, by Mr. A.'s descriptions. Where does he speak of "Him as ignorant, imperfect, and dependent on the creature," as he is said to have done? The more serious are a man's errors, the more anxiously should we guard against a statement of them in any respect inaccurate or overcharged.

Some of the illustrations in the "Corner-Stone" are affecting and not out of harmony with their subject; there is one which not only is wrong in theology, but dishonours the most awful of mysteries by a homely attempt to bring it home to the mind. Would that this fault of placing the things of our holy faith in juxtaposition with the familiar and the trivial, were confined to Mr. Abbot and his school. How commonly now are grave church questions and points of doctrine referred to in little volumes, the general strain of which fits them for a place in the juvenile library! We all know the force of association. Are chit-chat dialogue and childish adventure fit introductions to subjects of this sort? When, however, the religious tale is written in a serious and affectionate spirit, though solemn themes are best approached in solemn books, it is comparatively harmless: but the tone of mimicry and irony adopted in some works of this kind is by all means to be deprecated. Satire and sarcasm, especially when levelled at modes of conduct and practice rather than at mere abstract opinions, are not wholesome food for the minds of simple children, and to place them in any kind of connexion with the Gospel of Christ, is scarcely to show due reverence to the latter. The heart of a little child is a temple which the world has as yet not trodden and soiled. We desecrate this sanctuary by introducing into it the evil spirit of ridicule and contempt. Why should they be led to trace the effect of erroneous principle on the conduct and manners of parents and teachers who are themselves in a state of pupilage, and in most cases are quite incompetent to judge of the principle itself? Why should they be prejudiced against the persons of religious professors, who are as yet too young to have any real acquaintance with their opinions or the grounds on which they are taken up? At all events, whether young or old readers be concerned, error on such a subject as spiritual conversion is no subject for jeering and mockery.

* Dr. Pusey's Letter to the Abp. of Canterbury, p. 152. † *Ib.*

of catholic truth, so far as they detached her from the world, must have transferred her to the region of the Spirit.

I think we should consider how fundamental a charge that of rationalism is; should be careful how we even insinuate it against those who hold to the same foundation as ourselves, or speak of any who spiritually interpret the words, *by grace are ye saved through faith*,* as if they shared the pomp and pride of Oriental doctors, walking in the cold light of their own fantastic fires rather than in the sunny beams of the Gospel, respecting the might of the human understanding; though in regard to them it is not quite clear that they believed man able to save, any more than originally to create himself. Men of the Wesleyan school, from Wesley's day to the present, have rather been depreciators of reason, than exaggerators of intellectual efficiency; they dwell on faith as the work of the Spirit; and chiefly rely on a bold plain urgent preaching of the word,—a direct assertion of the truth, not proofs and arguments in its favour. Pelagianism rests on a denial of original sin, and these men have ever been the strongest assertors of it. They have never said "There is no catholic Church,"† whence it immediately follows, that Jesus is not the Saviour of the *world*, and that he was not to gather a church out of all nations; but they have lost sight of one essential part of the structure of this church, as it is "an institution consisting of visible and public communities."‡ In misunderstanding sacraments,§ they fell into an

* Eph. ii. 8.

† Hooker, Sermon ii. vol. iii. Pt. ii. p. 662-3. Keble's ed.

‡ Coleridge's Church and State, p. 126, 3rd ed.

§ The character of the Evangelical or Wesleyan school which

error which has existed in the church almost from the beginning, but has naturally increased since its area widened. The principle causes of it have no connexion with rationalism, rightly so called. May we not explain them thus? In the first place, men have easily lost sight of sacraments, because they are far less distinctly marked in the Bible, as instruments of the Spirit, than the preaching of the word, and, in general, those means of grace which are such according to the economy of Providence, and the constitution of things since the beginning of the world, not merely by appointment under the New Dispensation. Sacraments are signs and symbols as well as conveyances of divine blessings: hence they came to be considered as signs and symbols only: they are generally introduced in scripture incidentally, and so implicated with the doctrine of the Spirit at large, that to the minds of many they become merged in it.

To seek our faith in the book of revelation, or to

I have given, is taken chiefly from the books which it has put forth, and the conversation of persons belonging to it whom I have intimately known. I have spoken of its characteristic principles, not of the weak and unamiable practices, or the coarse and silly preachings and teachings which these principles have fallen into company with. What else can be the fate of principles which spread among the masses of the people, and lose themselves in spreading? Even the completest system of truth will not *of itself* draw all men up to it. But that the "evangelical" principles have borne fruits of righteousness, however imperfect, however largely mingled with a blighted and corrupted produce, is sufficient to show that they do to a certain extent deserve their name, and are in the main directly opposed to an Anti-Christian rationalism. With the ignorance, indiscretion, or hypocrisy of individual disciples of Wesley I have no concern; my aim only is to show what are the true relations between rationalism and an uncatholic view of the sacraments, and that they are not exactly such as they have been represented; which I think the interests of truth require; for perhaps there is no surer way to confirm men in error than to represent them as

receive it from thence even without seeking, proceeds from no rationalistic temper. Right reason and piety lead men to this, and in general it is want of sound instruction or capacity to understand it, that have brought numbers to neglect those truths a reception of which the mere knowledge of the Bible will not ensure even to the well disposed, rather than a tendency to exalt the original powers of humanity, or to forget that all have sinned and stand in need of the glory of God.

Secondly, and this is the more important reason, and that from which the other borrows a part of its force, because the doctrine of sacraments rests in great measure on external testimony for its proof, not on the broader basis of external and internal, mutually bearing up each other. Every religious man, inasmuch as he is religious, perceives the disharmony between his carnal nature and that spiritual state which reason and conscience bid him aspire to: such a man

more erroneous than they really are. We are all too ready to imagine ourselves invulnerable, when many missiles are hurled at us, which we can easily repel. Doddridge's "Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul" may be mentioned as a fair sample of the "evangelical" style of writing. No one will say that it does not represent the work of the Spirit as the alpha and omega of conversion. How strongly the special exalters of faith have ever dwelt on a spiritual regeneration is too notorious to be insisted on; and, till they depart from this doctrine, they cannot be very hard upon rationalism.

One may read Treatises on the Lord's Supper by "evangelical" writers, which overflow with declarations of grace, yet make no distinct mention of the peculiar way in which it comes sacramentally. Dr. Owen's notion seems to have been that the Eucharist is a more special and particular representation of Christ as our Redeemer, than either the written or preached word.* Undoubtedly this memorial, instituted as it was by the

* See Bickersteth's Treatise on the Lord's Supper.

cannot but feel that whatever power he has to mortify the one or rise into the other, must be a gift from Him to whom he owes his being—must needs acknowledge that the perpetual actuation of a Redeemer can alone sustain his higher life, if even his lower exists but in the presence of God; and that special holiness can only proceed from the special empowerment of heaven. But that divine influence should come to man through certain outward signs, and this not from their significance, not from any appeal to the heart and mind through the imagination, but mystically, or, even if they were instruments of grace merely as symbols, that we are bound to the use of the symbols actually appointed and no others,—these are points to be proved

Saviour himself, and under such marked circumstances, is calculated to have an effect on the imagination and feelings quite peculiar. It would be unjust to say of such a view, deficient as it is, that it assigns to the holy sacrament “no end but only to *teach* the mind, by other senses, that which the word doth teach by hearing.”† It is not the instruction of the mind that it refers to, for that is indeed far better effected by preaching, but the address to the heart and feelings through the imagination, and this as an instrument of the Spirit. Such a believer too as he acknowledges that the symbols of the sacrament were appointed by God, must feel that He will be disposed to give them a special efficacy, more than they would have as symbols merely; that the faith and obedience which uses and believes in them, at God’s command, will bring down a peculiar blessing. He fully confesses that an inestimable gift of grace belongs to the Eucharist, though he rather connects it with attendance at the table, than with reception of the elements. How he reconciles this view of sacramental influence with the administration of baptism to infants, I know not. The child at the time cannot benefit by the rite through his imagination, though it may strongly affect his mind in after years to see others introduced into the church as he was himself before his mind was awakened. I would fain hope that many do practically attach a richer boon of grace to sacraments, than their explanations of sacramental efficacy properly imply.

† Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. book v. ch. lvii. 1.

by external evidence alone. Aid from heaven is asked for by the spiritual sense, but this particular method is not asked for, is not borne witness to by the spirit within us. A pious mind receives the doctrine joyfully, springs forward to meet it, feels daily more and more its preciousness, when it is proved to be divine truth; but does not, cannot know it to be such, as soon as it is proposed, by an inward attestation, independently of all extrinsic proof. Reason teaches that grace is indispensable; for, when the doctrine is revealed from without, by reason we recognize its truth. But reason cannot shew us that the particular channels opened by sacraments are indispensable, though it often has shewn what perfection they add to the scheme of the Visible Church, even as we apprehend it. Now certainly it is not a spirit of rationalism, but a spirit of faith which leads a man to embrace the fundamentals of Christianity from their accordance with the divine law written in his heart, in other words, from a religious impulse; for *blessed are they who have not seen, (outwardly) and yet have believed*; and if such a man rejects or neglects a particular doctrine from its wanting this evidence, he is not therefore necessarily a rationalist, or devoid of that faith on which true religion rests, but more probably an incompetent reasoner. He who denies a truth which he should see with the eyes of the Spirit, because he cannot comprehend it with his understanding, deserves this odious name; but numbers forego the truth of sacraments, not because it is incomprehensible in itself, but because they do not comprehend, or are prevented from seeing the proofs in its favour; not because it is too spiritual for their taste, but because they are precluded, by some intellectual obstruction, from embracing its spirituality.

Never can I believe that any man who receives the doctrine of redemption through Christ, not merely with his understanding, but with his heart and reason, rejects the catholic doctrine of sacraments under the influence of rationalistic principles. If it were asked how such an able reasoner as Calvin should have missed this truth, I should reply, neither from natural inability, nor from unspirituality, nor from a tendency to rationalism, but more probably, so far as he did miss it, from disgust at the "gross profanation of the mysteries,"* "practised under the tyranny of the pope;"* from indignation at the "effectual care taken that all should be unintelligible to the people;" from scorn of the superstition, that by separating the sacramental word from the preaching of the Gospel reduced that word to "a mere whisper like a magical incantation,"*—by disconnecting the sign from the doctrine, reduced that sign to worse than insignificance. No man speaks with more energy than Calvin against the unreasonableness of attempting to penetrate the inmost recesses of the divine counsels, to "investigate that sublimity of wisdom which God would have us to adore and not comprehend:"† and he treats the question of sacraments completely on scriptural grounds, referring to the Apostle's rule, which directs us to examine every interpretation of Scripture by the proportion of faith.‡

Thirdly: Men have a less firm hold of the true doctrine of sacramental efficacy than of the efficacy of the Word, because it is not equally attested by their spiritual experience. How the soul of man is melted within

* Calvin's Institutes, book iv. c. xiv. sec. iv.

† Ib. Book iii. ch. xxi. sec. 1.

‡ Ib. Book iv. ch. xvi. sec. iv.

66 *Effects of Preaching more recognizable*

him on occasion of persuasive preaching is not in the least degree more intelligible than how it is wrought upon at the presence of an outward sign ; and yet men more readily believe the former than the latter, because moral effects are continually found to follow close upon representations made to the mind through the understanding, while the sequence of spiritual change upon the reception of sacraments neither enters into the ordinary course of Providence, nor can be so readily assigned to its true source when it actually occurs. For such change can only be manifested to the mind in recognizable effects where faith is present ; and faith comes from hearing the Gospel ; and thus it seems to mere unaided reflection, that hearing the Gospel is the real instrument of that good thing which has been wrought in the soul, and not the sacramental ordinance. How the word heard or read is the *sword of the Spirit dividing asunder the joints and marrow*, who can tell ? This agency is as mysterious as any other on the human soul.* But men feel in regard to this efficacy of the Gospel that *so it is*, and thus the many marked passages of Scripture that refer to it make the stronger impression upon them. They are conscious that religious emotion follows close upon religious thought, and though they know not *how* the former arises, yet they do know the occasion and the conditions upon which it is manifested. Now I maintain that it is not rationalism, though it has lately become the fashion to give it this name, which looks to moral effects as the test of spiritual operations. How can it be a misuse

* "The word of God operates as secretly as the sacraments, and the sacraments as powerfully as the word." *Taylor's Worthy Communicant*, ch. i. sect. 3.

of the rational understanding to try the spirits whether they be of God, by the only means in our power? Does not Scripture bid us look to actual righteousness as the effect and sign of the spiritual presence of Christ; does it not teach that, so far as we have the *seed* of God remaining in us, *we cannot sin*? It is a spirit of faith, not of rationalism, which leads men to insist upon those tests of divine operations which God himself has proposed. But it is very possible that, in the application of this principle, a man may err from want of intellectual clearness or information. He may forget or doubt the efficacy of sacraments, not from any indisposition to admit that the ways of God are above man's understanding, or any deadness to revealed truth; but from a fear that, by admitting it, he may go beyond the warrant of God's word, and from inability to comprehend the argument which proves the ordained rites to be *moral* instruments of salvation, or, what is still more common, because circumstances have prevented him from ever coming fairly in sight of that argument. The doctrine of Sacraments does not appeal directly to the spiritual sense, as does that of Redemption through Christ and the Aids of the Spirit; therefore want of spiritual apprehension is not necessarily implied in the non-acceptance of it, incalculable as *may* be the loss incurred by that soul, which, even in ignorance rejects such means of grace as Heaven has provided. But this last is a subject upon which Reason and Revelation cast no clear light;—till we see the end we cannot fully understand the beginning.

If there is any thing right in these suggestions, it would seem to follow, that a clear exhibition of the external evidence on which the truth of sacraments

rests, is the surest and safest way to establish it among all sorts of men, and that dissuasives from rationalism, taking the form of imputations, should not be employed to combat this error, with those who have adopted it, on grounds as they suppose, and allege, of Scripture and reason, but not from forgetfulness of the power and incomprehensibility of God. If those who practise and uphold this way of writing, appeal to its success as full proof in its favour; I ask, what success? Who doubts that more admirers and proselytes are won by broad strong statements, than by such as are very refined and discriminating; that infinitely more credit is gained with the world by treating religious offenders with a seemingly pious severity, than by dealing with them in a style more exquisitely conscientious and tenderly charitable? But is it enough to win men over to sacraments, whatever be the frame of mind in which they come; and is it not possible that by arguments, all the more effective in the beginning, because they deal in half truths, many a man is brought to exchange his old belief for a new one, from being partly mispersuaded in regard to the true nature of both? Are the proselytes and admirers, who have gained so much in orthodoxy, entertaining thoroughly just sentiments towards their fellow Christians; and can the cause of pure truth and genuine Christianity be promoted by any method of reasoning which is not thoroughly Christian and true? All religious discussion tends to throw light upon the subject discussed, whether it be fairly conducted or no; but in the mean time evil is done by any sort of unfairness, more especially in the teachers of the Gospel; and, even if more good than harm were, in the end, to be the result, this would not justify the employment of a single accusatory word

which goes beyond the truth. But the really good fruits that have been borne by the system of teaching in which these questionable modes of argument are interwoven, is less to be attributed to them, than to much of an opposite character that accompanies and recommends them.

It is difficult to maintain the necessary agency of the intellect in the work of religion without incurring the charge of over-rating intellectual acquirement and under-rating the part performed by the heart and moral being in the salvation of man. Those who glance their eye over the surface of an argument, and judge of it, not from its contents, but from this superficial view, interpreted by their own preconceptions, cannot be put in possession of its true drift by any statements, even the clearest and most guarded. To others I address the following summary:—

My object in this disquisition has not been to shew that any intellectual processes are necessary for the conversion of the heart, except such as Christians of all schools, to judge from their ordinary practice and discourse, consider necessary or highly helpful: my object has only been to shew that *the power of Thought concurs in all the earliest and simplest processes by which the soul is brought to Christ*, even those processes which are commonly called non-intellectual, and in which the movements of the heart and moral being are the principal agents; that writers, who have declared the work of the intellect not indispensable to the production of a spiritual faith and all other Christian graces, have confounded the use of the understanding in speculation and abstraction, with what may be called its concrete and practical use. The former I conceive to be indispensable for the

Church at large, and in some cases conducive to piety and true religion for the individual, though not indispensable nor even useful, except on certain conditions: the latter,—the practical use of the understanding, as the organ of reason and the moral mind,—I conceive to be universally necessary in the *conversion of the soul to God*. For *faith cometh by hearing*, and hearing with the ear apart from the mind can hardly be supposed by any one to be that hearing of which the Apostle spoke.

To adduce the internal regeneration of infants as a proof that the work of the understanding is not always necessary in the conversion of the soul, is a vain proceeding. If infants have an internal regeneration, this, even according to the maintainers of that position, is no conversion of the soul to God; it is but a mystic transformation which makes the subject of it pleasing in God's sight. If it is more, if we are to believe that infants have actual faith and knowledge of God, then why may we not believe that they have understanding too? Faith is an act of the *understanding*, as one school of divinity teaches, an act of the will, embracing an object presented by the understanding, as others maintain. If infants have actual faith, and all manner of religious energies that we know not of, they must have understanding also; if they have *not* actual faith and understanding, but merely undergo a mystic change distinct from a change of the spiritual and moral mind, what has this to do with *conversion of the soul to God*? Shew me a single instance in which the will has been converted and the heart purified, apart from the subordinate ministrative agency of the understanding, and I will yield the point for which I contend in this essay.

Actual Faith a Necessary Condition of the Efficiency of Sacraments.

I WILL now proceed to examine the relation of the present subject to Sacraments, since it is intimated by certain anti-rationalist reasoners, that they who maintain the necessary concurrence of the understanding in the chief business of religion are not in the way to form right notions of these holy ordinances. To believe that God usually begins the work of grace in the soul through the affections, without aid or co-operation on the part of the understanding faculty, leads immediately, they say, to an orthodox belief in sacraments as channels by which grace is conveyed into the soul "in a separate and transcendant manner." My attempt, then, shall be to shew, that the agency of conscious thought and reflection has just as much to do with the efficiency of sacraments, as with the reception of light and life by the word, or by any other means of grace whatsoever.

In regard to the distinctness of the channels, that of sacraments, and that of the understanding giving access to the word, before affirming or denying it, I think we should ascertain what this metaphorical way of speaking precisely imports. I believe the true doctrine of sacraments to be, that God gives to the receiver of them a peculiar spiritual blessing; peculiar, not as being different in kind and in its internal nature and being, from that which He bestows in other ways:* but peculiar inasmuch as it is annexed to the

* Waterland speaks to this point as follows: "What then is the point of controversy still remaining? It appears to be this principally, that we assert the very act of communion (in persons

performance of an outward rite, and attends upon that rite, not merely from its exciting ideas of religion in the soul, but because it has been appointed by divine wisdom; and this not for any reasons that we can apprehend, but, so far as appears to us, arbitrarily, though we have no right whatever to affirm that the appointment *is* arbitrary, and why there should be such an appointment in general we are able to conjecture. If then by calling Sacraments distinct channels of grace, nothing more is signified, than that, as means of divine influence, they are *sui generis*, God having connected with them a gift peculiar to them, so that the partaker obtains by them a real benefit or opportunity of benefit beyond what he could have without them, just as truly as all Christians have an oppor-

rightly disposed) to be spiritual manducation, a present receiving of spiritual blessings and privileges, additional to what was before; this they deny, alleging that there are no special benefits annexed to the Eucharist as such, nothing more conferred than what is constantly conferred to good men, at all other times, and in all other good offices or common duties. Now in defence of our doctrine we plead St. Paul's authority, who asserts that the eucharist is actually a communion of Christ's body and blood; let them shew that any common service, or any other service, office, or duty, (except baptism) is so; and then they will come close to the point."‡ I believe that in sacraments there is a receiving of spiritual blessings and privileges, *additional to what was before*, and that they were also appointed by God as outward tokens and remembrancers of his inward communications to the human soul. If I am called upon to say that the grace coming by these ordinances differs in kind, or essentially differs, from grace coming in other ways, I would ask in return, what the essence of baptismal and eucharistical grace is conceived to be by those who make this requisition; whether it does not consist in spiritual power flowing out of the everlasting fountain of redemption, and whether any essential difference can be established betwixt the produce of that fount at one time and at another. In the passage above cited Waterland seems to deny that

‡ Waterland's *Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, ch. viii.

tunity of spiritual benefit by the knowledge of divine things imparted in the Gospel, which the saints of old did not enjoy when those divine things were taught less explicitly, I believe the saying to be just and true. The dews of heaven descend upon the whole earth, but sacraments are reservoirs, by admission to which, men obtain them in special abundance. If, on the other hand, the terming Sacraments distinct channels of grace is intended to imply, that through them the soul is brought into an effective communion with the Holy Spirit, when the understanding and consequently the will are not acting, nor in a condition to act; that

there are other ways of receiving the flesh and blood of Christ beside Sacraments, and this he appears to have done for the sake of securing to Baptism and the Lord's supper a grace of a kind peculiar to themselves; yet in his discourse on spiritual eating and drinking, according to *John vi.* he seems to acquiesce in the doctrine of those older divines, who teach that men eat the flesh of Christ, and drink his blood, that they "feed upon his death and passion," not in and by the Sacraments only; and Taylor's opinion must have been substantially the same as that which I wish to express, when, after admitting, that "coming to Christ in all the ministries of faith,—is eating of the body and drinking of the blood of Christ," he says that "whatsoever moral or mysterious is done without, is, by a worthy communicant, done more excellently in this divine sacrament,"† and that in it we eat the flesh and drink the blood of Christ, with *much eminency and advantage*, and further, that "As it was with our fathers in the beginning, so it is with us, and so it ever shall be, world without end; for they fed upon Christ, that is, they believed in Christ, they expected his day, they lived upon his promises, they lived by faith in him; and the same meat and drink is set upon our tables."‡ "The same meat and drink," and yet the grace of the sacrament different in kind from any which the Saints of old could be sharers of! The spiritual body and blood of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world not yet in existence! Taylor at least could never have dreamed that God has himself taught his Church to believe this.

† Taylor's *Worthy Communicant*, ch. iii. s. 5.

‡ *Ib.* ch. i. s. 2. See too the whole of this Section.

74 *Proper Sense of the term Instrument*

they are channels of divine blessings, not only distinct from that of thought and imagination, but not necessarily conjoined with it and wholly independent of it, I believe it implies a notion, which is contrary to the teaching of Holy Writ, and though put forward in the present day as catholic, has no proper catholic consent in its favour.

In order to examine this question accurately, we ought to lay aside for the time all that apparatus of metaphor which has been brought into its service, since the tropes and figures which are so convenient in the practical use and enforcement of a doctrine, are but incumbrances in the exact explanation of it. It is usual to say that preaching the word or the divine ordinances are *instruments* of grace; that they are vehicles, conveyances, conduits, channels of it; or gates, doors, avenues by which it enters the mind. When we translate these various phrases into the most definite meaning which can be assigned to them, can we reasonably give them any other interpretation than this, that it is God's will and pleasure, at the presence of certain circumstances, outward or inward, to exert his power effectively upon the human soul? Bishop Berkeley has shewn, with his usual clearness and force, that "there is something, even in the most general notion of *instrument*, as taken in a distinct sense from *cause*, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the divine attributes."* How can it be supposed, he asks, "that an all-perfect Spirit, on whose will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing, make use of it?"† On this

* *Hylas and Philonous*—Second Dialogue.

† *Ib.*

subject Dr. South is very explicit in his sermon on Matt. xiii. 52. Having first declared that "conversion is the sole immediate work of God," he shews in what sense alone the preacher may be said to be God's instrument in it; he explains him to be such, not "by a properly physical efficiency, but only morally, and by persuasion." "A physical instrument," says he, "is that, which, partaking of the power, force, and causality of the principal agent from thence derived to it, produces a suitable effect. As when I cut or divide a thing, the force of my hand is conveyed to the knife, by virtue of which, the knife cuts or divides. And thus, I say, the preacher cannot be the instrument of conversion, for the reason above mentioned; *because that infinite power, which does convert, cannot be conveyed to any finite being whatsoever.* But a moral instrument is quite of another nature; and is that, as I may so express it, *non quo producente, sed quo interveniente sequitur effectus*: not that which conversion is effected by, but that without which, ordinarily at least, it is not. So that while the minister is preaching and persuading, God puts forth another secret influence, quite different from that of the preacher, though still going along with it: and it is this, by which God immediately touches the sinner's heart, and converts him. Howbeit, the preacher is still said to be instrumental in this great work; forasmuch as his preaching is subordinate to, and most commonly, as has been said, accompanies it: God not being pleased to exert his action, but in concurrence with the preacher exerting his." On just the same ground does Bishop Bull argue that faith cannot be an instrument of justification in the proper and primary sense of the word instrument: no action of ours, he says,

can be an instrumental cause of justification, to which the production of the effect may be properly attributed, because to justify is an action or operation of God alone.* Now surely the very same reasonings which serve to shew that neither the preaching of the Gospel, nor the faith which that preaching excites, can be other than a condition, or *causa sine qua non* of saving grace, will prove as much in regard to the outward signs of sacraments. But we are not left to infer this

* He adds, "an action too carried on wholly without us." But whether the divine agency be carried on without or within us, it holds equally true that it must be performed without any proper instrument, and that, strictly speaking, no act of ours concurs to the production of the effect. The passage to which I refer is as follows: "*Si instrumentum stricte et proprie sumatur pro causa efficiente minus principali, clarum est, fidem justificationis instrumentum nullo modo dici posse. Nam primo, cum justificatio sit actio Dei solius, eaque tota extra nos producta, quomodo vel fides nostra, vel quævis nostra actio ad justificationis effectum producendum physicam ullam efficientiam habeat, prorsus ἀκατάληπτον est. Deinde omnis causa instrumentalis suo modo in effectum influit, eique effecti productio proprie attribui potest.*" Harm. Apost. Diss. Pr. ii. 9. See also the same author's *Examen Censuræ, Resp. ad Animadv.* ix. 4. That justification, as the forgiveness of sin, and the grant of salvation, is carried on wholly without us, no one can deny: but Gospel justification includes in its idea the establishment of the law of the spirit and life *in the soul*, and thus recurs to and fulfils the original meaning of the word, which is a making, not a pronouncing, accounting, or dealing with as just. I do not dispute but that the forensic sense of justification is the uppermost sense in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans; this being obviously required by the direction of the argument; for the question with the opponents of the Apostle was not: how is actual righteousness to be acquired? But how do men obtain God's favour and a portion in the world to come? How are we to be dealt with, not how are we to be made worthy to dwell in the divine presence for ever. The Apostle's answer implies that eternal blessedness cannot be secured except by that which produces inherent righteousness, and that, whosoever is acquitted in the courts of heaven, is at the same time rendered a fit subject for such acquittal by the work of the Spirit upon and in him, which work must surely be performed without an *instrument* in the strict and proper sense.

merely from the language of our great divines: Hooker expressly teaches that "sacraments contain *in themselves* no vital force or efficacy;"* that "they are not physical but *moral instruments* of salvation;"* that the benefit which comes along with them, is "received from God Himself the author of sacraments, and not from any other natural or supernatural quality in them;"* that "grace is a consequent of sacraments, a thing which accompanieth them as their end,"* rather than a thing literally and truly produced by them, as furrows are produced in a field by the plough. The instrumentality of sacraments, according to this great Protestant divine, is nothing more than a concomitance, and he denies by implication that God has taught His Church any otherwise.† "It passeth a man's conceit," says he, "how grace should proceed but merely from the influence of God's spirit." Coleridge observes; "To spiritual operations the very term mode is perhaps inapplicable, for these are immediate."‡ To return, however, to the older writer: "As for operations through the motions of signs, they are dark, intricate and obscure; perhaps possible; howbeit not proved either true or likely, by alleging that the touch of our Saviour's garment restored health, clay sight, when he applied it. Although ten thousand such examples should be brought, they overthrow not this one principle, that, *where the instrument is without inherent virtue, the effect must necessarily proceed from the only agent's adherent power.*"§ A little further on he adds, "where God doth work and use

* Eccl. Pol. Book V. ch. lvii. 4. † Ib. Book VI. ch. vi. 11.

‡ *Literary Remains*, iii. 111.

§ Hooker Eccl. Pol. Book VI. ch. vi. 11. See also on this subject Book V. Appendix No. I. pp. 703-4-5.—Keble's ed.

these outward means, *wherein he neither findeth nor planteth force and aptness towards his intended purpose,** such means are but signs to bring man to the consideration of his own omnipotent power, which without the use of things sensible would not be marked.

* "It is in the sacraments," says Jeremy Taylor, "as it is in the word preached, in which not the sound, or the letters, or syllables, that is, not the material part, but the formal, the sense and signification, prepare the mind of the hearer to receive the impresses of the Holy Spirit of God, without which all preaching and all sacraments are ineffectual; so does the internal and formal part, the signification and sense of the sacrament, dispose the spirit of the receiver the rather to admit and entertain the grace of the Spirit of God there consigned, and there exhibited, and there collated. *But neither the outward nor the inward part does effect it, neither the sacrament nor the moral disposition; only the Spirit operates by the sacrament, and the communicant receives it by his moral dispositions, by the hand of faith.* And what have we to do to inquire into the philosophy of sacraments? These things do not work by the methods of nature: but here the effect is imputed to this cause, *and yet can be produced without this cause,* because this cause is but a sign in the hand of God, by which he tells the soul when he is willing to work." *The Worthy Communicant*, ch. i. sect. 3. Elsewhere too the eloquent man places the subject in the same point of view: "Even signs of secret graces," he says, "do exhibit as well as signify,—it is in the method of the Divine economy, to dispense the grace which himself signifies in a ceremony of his own institution. And therefore, although it ought not to be denied, that when, in Scripture and the writings of the holy doctors of the church, *the collation of grace is attributed to the sign, yet it is by a metonymy and a sacramental manner of speaking,* yet it is also a synecdoche of the part for the whole; because both the sacrament and the grace are *joined* in the lawful and holy use of them, by sacramental union, or rather by a confederation of the parts of the holy covenant. * * * For although, in natural effects, we can argue from the cause to the event, yet, in spiritual things, we are to reckon only from the sign to the event. And the signs of grace we are to place instead of natural causes, because a sacrament in the hand of God is a proclamation of his graces, he then gives us notice that the springs of heaven are opened; and then is the time to draw living waters from the fountains of salvation." The truth is that, strictly speaking, we know of no causes, natural or supernatural, except the "immediate and sole operation of God."

At the time therefore when he giveth his heavenly grace, he applieth by the hands of his ministers that which betokeneth the same; nor only betokeneth, but being also accompanied for ever with such power as doth truly work, is, in that respect, termed God's instrument, a true efficient cause of grace; a cause not in itself, but only by connection of that which is in itself a cause, namely God's own strength and power. Sacraments, that is to say, the outward signs in sacraments, work nothing till they be blessed and sanctified of God. But what is God's heavenly benediction and sanctification, *saving only the association of His Spirit?*"* This view, Hooker certainly believed incapable of being disproved by such authorities of Councils and Fathers, as had been alleged on the other side by the ablest of its adversaries, and that the older schoolmen entertained it seems to be admitted even by the Romanistic divines who eagerly sought to put it down.

Now I think it is clear that if Sacraments cause grace in a figure only, if they are but signs with which "God inseparably joins his spirit," not proper instruments whereby He induces grace into the souls of men, "even as the axe and saw do serve to bring timber into that fashion which the mind of the artificer intendeth;" † if they are but conditions and ac-

* Eccl. Pol. Book VI. ch. vi. 11.

† *Ib*—9. "Duties, as such," says Waterland, in his work on the Eucharist, chap. viii. "are *conditions* only, on our part, applications of men to God, and therefore are not properly instruments in the hand of God for conveying his graces: but sacraments are applications of God to men, and therefore, are properly his instruments of conveyance, his appointed means or conduits, in and by which he confers his graces." After repeating this notion over and over again, amplifying but not strengthening it, he adds: "This is a distinction which ought

companiments or precursors of its entrance, and if moral conditions are necessary likewise, the under-

carefully to be heeded." It may be a useful distinction for certain purposes, but I think it has this inconvenience attending it, that it seems to countenance a Romanistic conception of the office of sacramental signs. Doubtless they appear connected with the giving of grace, because they signify the gift, while faith appears to be more immediately connected with the reception of it. But justification has a passive as well as an active sense, and the means of receiving the grace that justifies, must be as truly an instrument in the process, as the means whereby or whereupon it is given. May it not be suggested too, that water is an application of man to God, inasmuch as man employs it in obedience to Him, and that faith by which God purifies the heart, as Scripture expressly says, must be an instrument in His hand, as truly as the sign which He appoints.

On the present subject, Waterland adds, "Preaching of the word is most like to sacraments in the instrumental capacity; for by the word also *God conveys his graces*. But still inviting, exhorting or calling men to be reconciled to God, comes not up to signing and sealing the reconciliation; neither is preparing men for the covenant, the same thing with covenanting. The Eucharist is an actual communion, wherein God gives, and man receives *at that instant*, or in the very act." If "by the word God conveys his graces," the Gospel's inviting, calling, and exhorting is not the mere preparation of the hearer for the reception of grace by other means. Cornelius and his company were to be baptized, as Taylor observes, because they had already received the Holy Ghost on hearing St. Peter preach. The soul is as truly spiritualized at the *time* of hearing and believing, as at the *time* of communicating. That "time is not with things of spirit," is, I believe, a truth, and it is one which the mind that has once received, can no more unlearn than it can forget what sunlight is, after having once beheld it. But though spiritual action, in itself, is "irreferable to time," yet the inward effects and manifestations of divine influence upon the soul are contemporaneous with hearing the Gospel in those who hear aright, as truly as with receiving the sacraments in those who receive worthily. Again, the blessings of the Covenant are conveyed in conversion by preaching, as well as in Baptism and the Lord's Supper, though not so richly as when the power of sacraments unites with that of the word: and if deeds of conveyance be an appropriate title for the latter more especially, it is because they convey the benefit of Christ's death in an extraordinary manner, in a way, that is, by an outward mean, unknown before the New Dispensation; (whereas the Gospel had been preached,

standing must perform just the same part in the spiritualization of the soul by sacraments as in its reception of divine energy by any other means; since in both cases it is that which renders man capable of beholding the things of heaven, when the light within him is kindled by power supreme; and it is in beholding these things of heaven, in conforming itself to the image of God, thus presented to it by acts of will, that the soul, that is the man himself, becomes a *new creature*. When a man is awakened to a sense of religion by preaching, we say that the Spirit operates upon him through his conscious mind? Does this signify anything more, than that, in the case supposed, the Spirit operates on a mind that is conscious; and, if to the efficacy of sacraments faith is required, have not consciousness and intelligence as true an operancy in the one case as in the other? We are told that sacraments are *moral instruments* of salvation:* and why is this, since, as outward signs, mysteriously subservient to the purposes of God, they are not moral to our apprehensions? They are moral instruments, first because they are efficacious on certain moral conditions only, because they are “duties of service and worship, which, unless we perform as the Author of grace requireth, they are unprofitable:” † secondly, because their proper effect is moral, not the investing the soul with “a formal habit or inherent quality,” ‡ distinct

and grace thus conveyed, from the beginning;) and, moreover, because they convey privileges as well as introduce to immediate possession. Preaching and sacraments are two different ways by which men obtain the aid of heaven; but surely the benefits they confer cannot be shown to differ in kind, however they may differ as to intensity.

* Eccl. Pol. Book V. ch. lvii. 4.

† Ibid.

‡ Ib. Book V. Appendix No. 1. p. 702. Keble's ed. “But

from righteousness of will and true heart holiness, but the enduing it with "saving virtues, such as are faith, charity, and hope;" thirdly, because they represent and signify to the mind that which is spiritual and moral. To call them *moral instruments* of salvation, is as much as to say that, whensoever they minister to the soul's health, the understanding, according to the will of God, ministers too. In all cases an intelligent reception of divine truth must accompany the operation of the Spirit, in no case can we say that either this or any other so called instrument does more than accompany it.

I am well aware however that attempts are made in the present day, by teachers of the Church of England, to supersede that doctrine of sacramental efficacy which seemed most reasonable, most consonant with antiquity, not only to the English reformers generally, but to our most eminent theologians; that same notion respecting sacramental signs, that they are "true co-efficients with God," which Hooker set aside as contradicted by the elder schoolmen, and sanctioned only by those of "the newer mint," is now *virtually* brought forward again as catholic not Romanistic, by the Anti-protestant writers of our communion. According to their doctrine, Baptism is *the instrument* of the New Birth, that which conveys to the soul the regenerative gift of the Spirit, no inward instrumentality whatsoever concurring in this process. Faith, previously to Baptism, is a mere condition, a mere forerunner; but,

you are to remember, that all outward things and ceremonies, all sacraments and institutions work their effect in the virtue of Christ, by some moral instrument—our absolution *does but manifest the work of God.*" (Bishop Taylor's *Letter to a person newly converted to the Church of England.*)

after the awakening of new life within us by the sacred ordinance, it enters upon the office of sustaining what has been already bestowed, and is raised to the rank of an inward instrument of justification.* As to the in-

* "There is nothing inconsistent, then, in Faith being the sole instrument of justification, and yet Baptism also the sole instrument, and that at the same time, because in distinct senses; an inward instrument in no way interfering with an outward instrument. Baptism might be the hand of the giver, and Faith the hand of the receiver. However, it is not so, as is plain, for this reason, that Baptism occurs but once, whereas justification is a state, and Faith "abides." Justification, then, needs a perpetual instrument, such as Faith can, and Baptism cannot be. Each, then, has its own office in the work; Baptism at the time and Faith ever after. Faith secures to the soul continually those gifts which Baptism primarily conveys. The Sacraments are the immediate, Faith is the secondary, subordinate, or representative instrument of justification. Or, we may say, varying our mode of expression, that the Sacraments are its instrumental, and Faith its sustaining cause."

"Faith, then, being the appointed representative of Baptism, derives its authority and virtue from that which it represents. It is justifying because of Baptism; it is the Faith of the baptized, of the regenerate, that is, of the justified. Faith does not precede justification; but justification precedes Faith, and makes it justifying. And here lies the cardinal mistake of the views on the subject now in esteem. They make Faith the sole instrument, not after Baptism, but before; whereas, Baptism is the primary instrument, and creates faith to be what it is, and otherwise is not, giving it power and rank, and constituting it as its own successor."

"That this is the doctrine of our Church, appears from the Homilies."

Mr. Newman's Lectures on Justification, x. 259-60. It will be admitted, that I give to the doctrine I oppose the utmost advantage, by citing in illustration of it, the language of the author of Lectures on Justification. It is not from any insensibility to the great services, which, upon the whole, he has rendered to the cause of truth, that I bring forward what I consider irreconcilable with truth in his teaching; on the contrary, it is my keen sense of those services, and the impression which I feel they must make on the best part of the community, that incites me to do as I have done. If piety, genius, and learning could make the worse cause always appear the best, I should indeed despair of mine; but views that want truth, however adorned and beautified, like the rose, in being fully expanded, are but hastening to decay.

ternal moral conditions of justification in the soul itself, such as repentance and faith, "upon these, not in and through them, comes Gospel grace, meeting, not cooperating with them, by a distinct process and with an interval."

Now if we were permitted to try this statement by the principles laid down upon the present subject by some of our greatest divines, these subtle distinctions between conditions and instruments on which it is established that faith is secondary to sacraments in the work of salvation, that Baptism alone introduces us into the Kingdom of Heaven, unaided by any moral act on our own part, will vanish into air, out of which Hooker seems to suppose that they were originally made; for if it is inconsistent with the attributes of God that he should use an instrument in his operations, if what are called instruments are but concomitant or precedent conditions of divine influence, if the blessing bestowed "proceeds wholly from the will of the giver, and not from the efficacy of the sign," and if at the same time faith is necessarily present in the soul, which the Holy Ghost recreates in righteousness, what good reason can we have for setting the sacramental ordinances above faith as the means and occasions of spiritual blessedness? How can it be properly said that the soul is born from above, changed into the divine image, justified and sanctified by the instrumental power of baptism, without the instrumentality of faith, if the truth is, that God operates upon the human spirit immediately on occasion of the outward sign, but not really by the aid of it? * The grace that spiritually recreates the soul

* That all who assign a higher and earlier office to Baptism than to Faith in the business of justification are prepared to es-

belongs not to baptism alone, as our greatest divines teach, but to Faith and Baptism in conjunction ;* even

pouse the opinion of the later schoolmen on the efficacy of sacramental signs, as Bellarmine and other papistical divines appear to have done, I cannot of course pretend to determine ; though I think their view needs some such notion to help it out. Of the notion itself no one can say that it has any character of catholicity ; on the contrary, under what influences calculated to interfere with the right exercise of the judgment such a theory of sacramental power may have been devised, it is not difficult to imagine, the aid it lends to that Romish system, against which the Reformation was a protest, being obvious at first sight. But it is not so easy to conceive how the elder schoolmen should explain the operation of sacraments in a manner irreconcilable with the doctrine, that faith is subordinate to them in the work of grace, if that doctrine was really catholic, or so universally acknowledged in the early church, that it ought not to be impugned or debated on.

* So Bishop Bull teaches, and such he considers to have been the opinion of Basil the Great ; this appears from the following passages in one of his works : “ Elsewhere also he (Basil) teaches no less expressly, that Faith is not perfected except by Baptism with which our covenant with the Lord is sealed. For thus he speaks ; (*lib. De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 12. prope finem*). Faith and Baptism are two ways of obtaining salvation, inter-related and inseparable (*συμφυεῖς ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀδιάιρετοι.*) For Faith is perfected by Baptism ; but Baptism is supported on the foundation of Faith.” And presently, at the very end of the chapter : “ profession indeed comes first introducing to salvation ; but Baptism follows sealing our consent.” After speaking of the necessity of Baptism, Bishop Bull adds : “ For hence it appears that Faith does not suffice of itself for justification ; that beside this, external Baptism is required, *where it can be had ;* but that at all events that promise of a new life, which is wont to be made by Baptism, is necessary, “ *Apologia pro Harmonia Sectio. iv. § 9.*” At the end of the paragraph he speaks still more explicitly to the following effect : “ Now to this (answer or) stipulation of a good conscience Peter plainly attributes the salvation which is conferred by Baptism, namely, remission of sins and the claim to eternal life (*jus ad vitam æternam ;*) not to the outward washing itself. Forasmuch as without this stipulation, (which is nothing else than the undertaking of Christianity at full, or of the evangelical law, the command to take up the cross included,) no man, let him have what Faith he may, can obtain forgiveness and a title to heaven ; but *these effects of Baptism are by no means absolutely suspended on the outward ceremony of the sacrament, since this a man may be hindered of, who has become*

those who maintain that the privilege of regeneration, annexed to the baptismal ordinance, is realized in the infant spirit before faith comes into play, cannot deny that, on the other hand, according to the judgment of the ancient church, martyrs obtained the blessing through faith whether they had been baptized or no; and if they, why not others equally faithful? Was not this judgment the indication of a principle rather than the laying down of a rule, or ought we not so to consider it? * “That Spirit which works by means,”

in mind sincerely a Christian. *Sed isti baptismi effectus nequaquam absolute suspenduntur exteriori sacramenti ceremonia, utpote qua, aliqua rerum humanarum περιστάσει, prohiberi possit is, qui sincerum intra animum Christianismum conceperit.*

* Some insist that we are not warranted in extending the privileges of Baptism to any unbaptized persons, save to them in whose favour the ancient Church pronounced an exception, as catechumens and martyrs. But reason tells us that the faith of catechumens and martyrs, on which alone the exception was grounded, may belong to others, whose outward circumstances are not the same as theirs. Cyprian says beautifully on this subject. *Aliud est martyrio animum deesse; aliud animo defuisse martyrium.* It is one thing to want a mind unto martyrdom; another to want that martyrdom to which our mind is equal. Such as God findeth thee when he calleth thee, such likewise doth He judge thee; since it is Himself that testifieth and saith: *All the churches shall know that I am He which searcheth the reins and the heart,* Rev. ii. 23. For God coveteth not our blood, but it is Faith that he desires of us. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were not slain, yet merited they, for the worthiness of their faith and patience, to be first honoured among the Patriarchs, at whose banquet are assembled whosoever are found faithful and righteous and deserving of praise.” D. Cypriani, Lib. de Mortalitate, cap. iii. Bishop Field says of catechumens who are kept from Baptism by any unavoidable impediment:—“These, therefore, are within, as the Apostle speaketh, though not by that solemn outward and sacramental admission which they do desire, yet in desire, purpose and preparation fitting them unto it, which is so far forth necessary to salvation, that no man ever was, or shall be saved, that either wilfully neglected or contemned the same.” *Field on the Church*, Book I. Ch. 12. If men go thus far in limiting the declaration of our Lord, in *John* iii. 5, can they consistently stop short of Mr. Coleridge’s explanation of

says Hall on the present subject, "will not be tied to means." * Not to *these* means undoubtedly. Rege-

such sayings, that they are true to all *intents and purposes*: true in respect of all under the circumstances which they suppose.

* This expression occurs in the letter of Bishop Hall to my Lady Honoria Hay, in which the writer argues at some length, and with divers examples, that "Baptism without Faith cannot save a man, and with Faith does save him: and that a Faith without Baptism, (where it cannot be had, not where it may be had and is contemned,) may save him."

Perhaps there are some who will say, "but this is a question of regeneration, not of salvation merely." "It is possible," as Hall observes, "that a man may have a *saving* faith before baptism," that "some dying before their baptism may, yea, must be saved;" but to die justified and entitled by God's mercy, to eternal bliss, and to have been regenerated are two different things. That they are distinguishable in idea no man denies; that some divines and doctors have thought fit to propose a practical separation between them, is too apparent; but what does revelation "explained by reason" teach us on the subject; does it sanction the divorce? This doctrine, that the spiritual working which enables a man to please God and win heaven is not in all cases regeneration, that it does not necessarily apply the blood of Christ, though it is the fruit of his death, and that some who wrought out their salvation here had no such appliance made to them till *after* their probationary term was ended, till *after* the law of the spirit and life had enabled them to fulfil the law of God,—this doctrine does appear such an inversion of the whole scheme of the Gospel, as it is presented in the sacred Book, and I think I may add by Christian writers in general, except so far as they have the defence of this particular dogma in hand, that overpowering testimony of its having been taught by Christ to his Church ought certainly to be produced, before either it, or any exposition which is based upon and involves it, is given to the world as *the Catholic view*.

"The Catholic considers regeneration a gift of the Spirit, not promised except under the Gospel; the Protestant as common to all who have any holiness or insight into the spiritual world, or perform any obedience." Does the "Protestant" believe that power to become a son of God has ever flowed from any source but that of the eternal redemption, even the sacrifice of the *Lamb slain from the foundation of the world*? Can the "Catholic" deny that by the virtue and merits of that sacrifice alone all that ever pleased God and escaped the wrath to come, whether they lived before or after the promulgation of the Gospel, obtained this Gospel blessedness?

neration has never been confined to Baptism, though Baptism is the great ritual way to it, set open by God. To faith it *is* confined, according to His will, if we may judge by Scripture and reason. Faith *the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever*, must not be subordinated to Baptism, which began at a certain period of the world's history. As to faith of the will, it is the very character of the new creature, the effect and manifestation of a birth from above; and of this faith *some* intellectual knowledge and belief is the necessary precursor and institutor, according to the plan of salvation laid down in the New Testament.

But Scripture evidence is claimed for this view, that faith is secondary to sacraments, that the New Birth is completed *before* the human will has become confluent with the will of God, and has acted under the influence of the Spirit. "Faith might be," we are told, "an inward instrument of justification, and Baptism an outward instrument. Baptism the hand of the giver, and faith the hand of the receiver.*" However, it is not so, as is plain for this reason,—that Baptism occurs but once, whereas justification is a

* "The flesh and blood of Christ crucified are, in Baptism, reached to us by the hand of God, by his Holy Spirit, and received by the hand of man, the ministry of a holy Faith." Taylor's *Worthy Communicant*, Ch. i. s. ii. "From these excellent words" of St. Chrysostom, "we are confirmed in these two things. 1. That the Divine mysteries are of very great efficacy and benefit to our souls. 2. That faith is the great instrument in conveying these blessings to us. * * * Unless we believe all this that Christ has said, there is nothing remaining but the outward symbols and the sense of flesh and blood, which profits nothing." Ch. iii. s. 5.

For there are but two ways of applying the death of Christ, an internal grace, and an external ministry. *Faith is the inward applicatory*; and if there be any outward at all, it must be by the sacraments; and both of them are of remarkable virtue in this particular. Ch. i. s. 4.

state, and faith *abides*." * * It is indeed undeniable, that justification, in the passive sense, is a state; con-

* * See Mr. Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, X. 260. It is intimated that the Homilies impliedly teach this doctrine, and hence it is inferred to be that of our Church. Doubtless the Homilies represent faith as the sustainer of justification: but do they deny, or do they not affirm that it is the original gainer of justification too, an inward instrument not interfering with an outward one? They speak as follows. "Here you have heard the office of faith in our justification, and how we receive it of him freely by his mercy, without our deserts, *by true and lively faith*." * "This justification, which we so receive of God's mercy and Christ's merits, *embraced by faith*, is taken, accepted, and allowed of God, for our perfect and full justification." † "Three things are required to the *obtaining of our righteousness*; that is God's mercy, Christ's justice, and a true and lively faith." ‡ "The *first coming* unto God is through faith, *whereby we be justified* before God." § "Here is the mean whereby we must apply the fruits of Christ's death unto our deadly wound. Here is the mean whereby we must *obtain* eternal life; namely, faith." || The Homilist thus teaches that Faith is that by which we *gain* the blessings of the New Covenant. Could it be shewn that he knew of that distinction betwixt the entrance of the Spirit into the *soul*, and the reception of the same into the *will*, on which the view that disconnects Faith with the new birth is founded, we might conclude that all his language about receiving, obtaining, embracing, applying the fruits of Christ's death, refers to a secondary justification, how the primary one is gained, being beyond its scope. But can a trace of such belief be found in either book of Homilies? The doctrine, it will perhaps be said, is deducible from what is there spoken of the baptismal ordinance, that it makes even little infants *children of God*. But again, will it be maintained that all divines who speak thus do in fact consider it a necessary inference from the belief that babes are saved by Baptism, and in some sense made children of God, that Faith in adult persons is not the initiation, either with or without the initiatory sacrament, into a state of grace? Infants *must* be put on a different footing from grown persons as to the way in which they are saved, let us theorize on justification as we may. *They* are transferred to a better world without undergoing trial in this; *they* are taken to heaven without having taken up their cross here; *they* enter upon their eternal inheritance without a previous temporary service upon earth;

* Sermon of Salvation, Part 3. † *Ib.* Part 1. ‡ *Ib.* Part 2. § Sermon of Faith, Part 1. || Sermon of the Passion. Part 2.

sidered on God's part, a continuous act, and that faith is the sustainer of that state, and the co-operator with that act, though not of course the sharer of it; but is it so very plain and evident that the state of grace is not commenced by faith in precisely the same way that it is sustained by it; that faith does not perform the same office in the work of salvation from first to last? Faith fit to receive the Holy Spirit cannot of course prevent the Spirit, or come to meet it: the Divine visitant in approaching the soul, produces within it the receptivity of Himself;* * and in the same way

how can it be argued that because the gift of Baptism brings them to bliss, though they receive it not by faith, that therefore it is not accepted by the hand of faith in him who *has* a hand of faith to stretch forth to receive it? The obedience of the will is not required of them: of grown persons it *is* required: this places betwixt the justification of the former and the latter so wide an interval that it is vain to talk of assimilating the mode of their blessedness to ours, except that both are by water and the Spirit.

Who that reads through the Homilies can imagine that there was any intention on the part of the writer or writers to exclude faith from the new birth, "*reserving*" it "for Baptism," and this too in face of the known fact that it was the fashion of the English Church in the Homilist's day to maintain with Luther and Calvin, that infants have faith infused into them?* in which case there was the inward instrument ready for co-operation, even in the case of the unconscious receiver. It is no affair of mine to defend the soundness of such a dogma; but it may be adduced as part of a proof, that if the early English divines did teach that infants are justified by Baptism as well as grown persons, it does not follow that they must have meant to shut out faith from all original instrumentality in the work of justification; nay more, is it not plain upon the whole, that they *meant* to teach the contrary; that they rather strove to bring the child up to a level with the man than brought down the man to an infantine reception of baptismal grace?

* * *Et ideo in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a Deo ad justitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiæ justificantis quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbi-*

* See Field, *Of the Church*, Part II. Section II. pp. 837-8.

His presence perpetually keeps up the conditions under which alone that presence can be retained. But that the New Birth can be said to have taken place, before the will has re-acted under the heavenly actuation, that lively faith comes into being not in the process of regeneration, but after it has been completed, and that moral conditions on our part are necessary to the *continuance* of Christ in the soul, but not to his first *entering in and blessing it*, is a notion which can never be proved by Holy Writ, unless its internal reasonableness is first made evident; indeed I do not think it can be fairly reconciled with the language of the inspired Writers.

But it is maintained that Scripture does warrant this view, and its concurrence is sought to be established in the following manner: "There *are* texts," it is alleged, "that speak of Baptism as the *beginning* of a state of grace; are there any which so speak of faith? * * * The act of justifying *is* expressly ascribed to Baptism as an immediate means; is it any where ascribed to faith? Are we any where said to *rise up* by faith as well as stand? Is faith ever said to *wash away* sins, as Baptism is? To effect our New Birth as Baptism is? To *begin* that new life, which doubtless it *sustains*, to *gain* what it certainly holds?" * It seems to me that this is an argument to the ear rather than to the mind; that it stands upon words rather than upon ideas. Scripture does not describe faith as *the beginner* of a state of grace, in express language, because it is so much more than the beginner of it; but that it does in fact commence and insti-

trium ad donum gratie acceptandum in his qui sunt hujus motionis capaces. Tho. Aquin. Sum. Theod. II. 1. Quæst. 113. Art. 3.

* Lectures on Justification, X. 274-5.

tute our justification, as well as continue it, is surely implied in the general teaching of Holy Writ upon this subject. St. Paul says that men are *justified by faith*; are we at liberty to paraphrase the saying thus: men are *kept* in a state of justification by faith? Even if the turn of the phrase admitted such a construction, how does it fall in with the strain of the Apostle's argument? Surely this aims to show not merely how men are to retain, but how they are to gain, have, and hold the favour of God. To be *justified by faith* is practically the same thing as to be *justified freely by grace*, and if grace commences our justification, so does faith also, since the former cannot actually enter the soul till faith opens the door from within. To the Galatians, St. Paul writes, *Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.** If a man says, "He is my son by adoption;" or, "She is my daughter by marriage:" do we not understand him thus, "Through adoption he came to be and still is my son?" "Marriage has made her my daughter?" So too in that pregnant saying of scripture, *The just shall live by faith*, the entering into life is as much implied as the continuing in it; that which is a necessary condition of the last being equally indispensable to the other also: since no man is actually alive in the Spirit without the presence of faith in his soul. Then St. Paul asks the Galatians, "*received ye the Spirit by the hearing of faith?*" and certainly, I think, he must have referred to the first reception of the Spirit by those whom he addressed. And to the Romans he says, *We have access by faith to this*

* Gal. iii. 26. Compare with Romans, iii. 22, and iv. 16. The promise is of *faith*, ἐκ πίστεως, that is, it comes to pass or is fulfilled by faith.

*grace wherein we stand.** Will it be argued, this only means, by faith men come to Baptism, and Baptism admits them into a state of grace? It may be asked in reply, has faith then no immediate connection with grace? Can it never receive the Divine Spirit without the intervention of Baptism? Does not St.

* Δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν τῇ πίστει εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν. Compare with Eph. ii. 18. where access *προσαγωγή* is said to be by the Spirit to the Father. But why is Faith described in Scripture as the access to grace? A mere intellectual persuasion brings no man to Christ. It must be an act of the will that operates toward our highest good, and the will that thus acts is already under the influence of heaven. We may solve this riddle by attending to the twofold character of faith, which is both the assent of the understanding to divine truth, and the readiness of the will that this assent should be given. The former does not in fact always precede the latter, but in the order of thought it does so; for the soul cannot be attracted toward divine truth till it has been presented to it by means of thought, and although it generally happens that the understanding and the will both close with it at once, and that a man believes in the Saviour because he feels the need of the Saviour, and rejoices to find Him, yet the act of the former in making it known to the mind is the occasion of that spiritual agency whereby justifying faith is produced; and thus saving belief seems to precede salvation, because understanding precedes willing, as hearing comes before understanding. *Intellectus quodammodo præcedit voluntatem, in quantum proponit ei suum objectum; alio vero modo voluntas præcedit intellectum secundum ordinem motionis ad actum.* S. Theol. II. 1. Quæst. 83, Art. 3.

But faith might be called our access to grace merely as an attribute of the moral mind, because the willingness of the spirit of man to receive divine truth, or, in Scripture language, *believing with the heart* is the primary form in which the submission of the will to divine influence is manifested; but, till the will thus submits, we are not actually in a state of grace, and therefore faith may be said to be our access to it. A *continuing* belief of heart and mind is one and the same with fealty or fidelity; it is the firm and steadfast adherency of the whole soul, intellectual and moral, to its Lord and God; and in this character faith is the *sustainer* of justification. In truth it is ever the same, differing only as to its seat and residence, whether in the head or heart; and in respect of time, whether considered as a first act or a continual agency.

94 *The Justification of Abraham by Faith*

Paul intimate the contrary in what he declares respecting Abraham in this same discourse on justification. And why does he introduce the example of the Patriarch into the very heart and centre of that discourse, if *his* acquirement of God's favour is not essentially the same as *ours*? Was it his intention to illustrate the necessary relationship of faith to the work of the Spirit in the economy of salvation, or had his solemn reference to God's dealing with Abraham no other meaning than this; as the ancient Saint received a *sort* of justification immediately upon faith, so we receive a very *different* justification, not immediately upon faith, but by faith as it brings us to Baptism? Surely on such a ground as this the Father of the faithful would scarce deserve his glorious appellation. When Saint Paul said that a man is justified by faith, he must surely have meant something more than that by faith a man is sent to the true instrument of justification, even Baptism. It would be rather strained language if one were to say, the sick man was healed by his journey; because his journey brought him to the physician, who effected his cure. *As many as received him, says St. John, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.** Does the Apostle mean spiritual power itself, or Baptism? Some say the latter; yet it is not the true believers alone that enjoy the opportunity of Baptism, though it is the receivers of Christ only that have power given them to be born of God. The expression *washing away* of sin is very naturally applied to the baptismal rite rather than to faith, because the former is a literal washing, the latter

* Compare with Acts xi. 17.

not; the one is the symbol as well as instrument of purification, the other only the instrument; but, as it is written of faith that God purified men's hearts by it, I think we ought hardly to shut it out from the office of cleansing the soul, either in conjunction with Baptism or separately. That which is the necessary condition of baptismal efficacy, must be as truly the instrument of the New Birth as the sacrament itself; which indeed, but for that faith whereby its blessings are applied to the soul, either at the time of administration or subsequently, would be no sacrament at all. Again, why baptism is connected in Scripture with Regeneration in a very especial manner, and in a way that faith is not, we may surely explain without excluding the latter from all participation in the New Birth. For the baptismal ordinance was appointed to stand at the threshold of the Christian life, and its whole character is initiatory and introductory; whereas faith only commences justification because it is a constituent part of the justified state; it is ever with us, in our spiritual career, from the beginning to the end, and is therefore not expressly assigned to any particular stage or period of it.

On the necessity of subordinating the word of God, as the instrument of salvation, to water in God's ordinance, one of the Tracts for the Times speaks thus.*

* The whole passage referred to is as follows. "But, secondly, not only is there nothing in Scripture to sever Regeneration from Baptism, but Baptism is spoken of as the source of our spiritual birth, as no other cause is, save God: we are not said, namely, to be born again *of* faith, or love, or prayer, or any grace which God worketh in us, but to be born *of* water "and the Spirit," in contrast to our birth *of* the flesh; in like manner as we are said to be born *of* God: and in order to express that this our New Birth *of* God is, as being *of* God, a deathless birth, it is described as a birth *of* seed incorruptible,

“Holy scripture *connects* other causes besides Baptism with the New Birth, but it at once marks, by the

in contrast with our birth after the flesh. * * * * Holy Scripture, indeed, *connects* other causes besides Baptism with the New Birth, or rather that one comprehensive cause, the whole dispensation of mercy in the Gospel, (for this, not the written or spoken “word,” is meant by the “word of truth:”) but it at once marks, by the very difference of language, that these are only more remote instruments: we are not said to be born *of* them as *of* parents, but *by* or *through* them. They have their appointed place, and order, and instrumentality, *towards* our new birth, but we are not said to be born *of* them. Thus we are said to be “born” (as was noticed) “*of* seed incorruptible,” *i. e.* of an immortal birth, but only *through* the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever; “in Jesus Christ have I begotten you *through* the Gospel;” “of his own will begat He us by the word of truth;” “no other instrument being spoken of as having the same relation to our heavenly birth as this of Water.” Tracts for the Times, Vol. II. Part II. 3rd edition, pp. 25-6.

Now ye are clean, said our Saviour, *through the word which I have spoken to you.* John xv. 3. And *The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.* John vi. 63. Surely this cleansing life-giving word is that with which the spiritual children are begotten; and safely enough might the *incorruptible* seed, of which men are born again, be identified with the word of God which *liveth and abideth for ever.* Great exceptions have been taken to this rendering, so common among divines of our reformed and *scriptural* church, from Latimer to Leighton.* Yet methinks it does little to disguise the truth, and nothing at all to “exclude the Father of Spirits from his privilege.” Had these interpreters represented the gospel preached to the outward ear as a *true co-efficient* with God in the work of salvation, their view ought indeed to be denounced as most injurious; but to imagine that the teaching of Christianity might be figuratively styled, in so figurative a book as the Bible, an immortal sowing; † that the Gospel addressed to the mind might be described in Holy Writ, as our spiritual parent, surely argues neither want of critical sagacity nor of orthodox belief. It seems not improbable that St. Peter in this expression alluded to the parable of the sower, contained in each of the first three Gospels; and as, in that illustration, what is merely the means and occasion of

* Taylor, I think, sometimes understands it of the spiritual infusion alone.

† Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Book V. Ch. LX. p. 4.

very difference of language, that these are only more remote instruments; we are not said to be born *of* them as *of* parents, but *by* or *through* them." According to Hooker's and Taylor's doctrine, the outward parts of sacraments are just such causes of spiritual blessings, as the brazen serpent was of corporeal ones, mere *signs* at the presence of which God is pleased to operate savingly, as he does not in their absence, proclaimers and indicators of his mercy:* now we are told that Baptism is "the source of our spiritual birth, as no other cause is, save God!" I do not say that this expression represents water as a true co-efficient with God Almighty in the work of the New Birth, although it seems to do so, and would, I fear, introduce a notion indistinguishable from this into the minds

righteousness is called the seed of righteousness, why may not the Gospel, as the means and occasion of spiritual life, be described as an immortal sowing? Whether we say that the incorruptible sowing, or thing sown, (for *σπορά* means either,) refers to the spiritual infusion alone, or to the means of it, the general sense of the passage remains precisely the same; but the former interpretation may have been preferred by some, both from the tenor of the previous discourse, which relates in a very special manner to the Gospel revelation and the manifestation of Christ, and from the turn of the particular passage: for, directly after the expression referred to, the Apostle compares flesh to grass, and contrasts with it, not the Spirit simply, but the vehicle of the Spirit,‡ the word of the Lord which *endureth for ever*, plainly referring to Isaiah xl. 8. Then follows the conclusion. *And this is the word which by the Gospel is preached unto you.* Can any one read this chapter and believe that the revelation of truth to the *mind* is not the primary and prominent subject of it, rather than sacramental efficacy?

* The same view is given in the Homily of Common Prayer and Sacraments.

‡ Our Liturgy speaks of the true and *lively* word, in reference to its power of communicating the Spirit in the sense above explained. So in the Homilies we read of the "*living waters*" of God's Word. Sermon concerning the Sacrament, Part I.

of most readers ; I would only enquire whether such a method of *searching scripture* as that here suggested is the true way to elicit the genuine sense? We are much warned against departing from the literal meaning of the inspired book ; but may we not pore so narrowly into the letter as to lose sight of its very nature and character, and so to prevent ourselves from discerning the truth, which must come to us, not from itself alone, but partly from elsewhere ?

“ We dim (too closely o’er the semblance bent)
With our own breath pure Reason’s mystic glass.”

So says a thoughtful Poet.* If we can dim even Reason by poring on it too closely, and “ distort the image of God” which it presents, much more may we dim the glass of Holy Writ, which holds divine truth in a human medium, the medium of language, and is not so immediately the mirror of the divine image as the inward revelation.

Are we indeed born *of* water *as* we are born of the Holy Ghost? This no man would affirm: but if there is an absolutely illimitable and unfathomable interval, as every pious mind must admit, betwixt the agency of the Spirit, and any that we can assign to water in Baptism, and yet they are joined together in a sentence of our Lord, what argument respecting the power of the latter can we fairly draw from this combination, or how are we to infer that it is raised from the level of earthly agencies to a station nearer heaven by any such arrangement of words? Human language is confessedly incompetent to the *proper* expression of super-human things; it can but speak of them improperly, so that to strain it to the uttermost when thus employed must lead to error; yet if this mode of interpreting inspired

* Author of *The Fall of Rora*, &c. and *Sonnets worth studying*.

documents were right, how easily might one literalism on the present subject be set up against another! St. Paul says to the Corinthians, *For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the Gospel,** (1 Cor. iv. 15.) Compare this with those texts in which a spiritual begetting is ascribed to God. Are we to argue from the turn of this phrase that to his disciples St. Paul was the source of spiritual knowledge in a diviner sense than the Gospel; † that the word had only a remoter instrumentality in the work of their salvation? On the other hand Baptism itself is put into the lowest rank of instrumentalities, in that text of the Epistle to Titus, where it is said that *according to his mercy he saved us through the washing of regeneration, (διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας); and renewing of the Holy Ghost.* Again, that the seed in our Lord's parable of the sower, is the *Word of God* we are expressly told by Himself; thus the word received by the understanding into the heart is described as the *source* of righteous-

* St. Paul uses a similar expression respecting himself in the Epistle to Philemon, verse 10. In another text (1 Cor. iii. 9,) men are said to be *labourers together with God*; though man's labour and the work of God are heterogeneous, and, except in a figure, incomparable.

† Compare with Gal. iv. 19. It would be little to the purpose to object that these texts refer not to regeneration, but to instruction in Christ, formation in faith and holiness, conversion, renovation; for of all these things, just as truly as of the former, the Spirit is the sole agent; and St. Paul uses as strong a figure in calling himself the Father of the Corinthians in respect of their faith and holiness and the formation of Christ within them, as our Lord in saying that man must be born of water. The baptismal sign is for an obvious reason associated with the bestowal of spiritual life, as faith with the reception of it; and if on this account alone a priority and superiority be assigned to the first, the question is one of words and ways of speaking rather than of things, and therefore of secondary importance.

ness, and that which is the source of righteousness must be also the originator of spiritual life from which alone the former can proceed. In strictness of language it is no source, no originator of spiritual life and of righteousness, but the occasion of them only; and in like manner the outward sign of Baptism, though we are *said* to be born of it, is but the "conditional mean," as Hooker teaches, of our birth from above.

We are told however that where "the direct means"* of this heavenly birth are spoken of, no other instrument than water is mentioned. Does the Gospel teach us to draw these unintelligible and inexpressible distinctions betwixt one kind of minister in the work of grace and another? Water is not spoken of as an *instrument* at all when we are said to be born *of* it, but when we are said to be saved *by* or *through* it, no difference betwixt its instrumentality and that of the Word is intimated. In Scripture language occasions are raised up into causes, and causes, such as grace itself, are spoken of as if they were mere instruments in the hand of God. The words of inspired teachers are indeed no "dead letters;"† each passage has an individual soul of its own, and must be regarded with the reverence due to divine spirit and life; we may not use it as an empty shell to animate with any soul we please. But this is a general caution, needed equally, I think, by all classes of commentators on Scripture; for all are too apt to make the volume of Revelation a servant to their own cherished theories, rather than faithfully and humbly to obey it. And although Scripture language *is* no dead letter, yet, like all human language, it is but an imperfect minister of the soul

* Tracts for the Times, Vol. II. Part II. pp. 26-7.

† Ibid p. 28.



within it; so that reason must both add to it and take away from it, in order to discern the truth to which it is meant to be subservient.

But are we not to draw some inference from the fact that regeneration is three times mentioned in Scripture in connection with the New Birth or with salvation, the instrumentality of faith or of the written or spoken word not being mentioned. Certainly, I think, none in favour of the doctrine that there is not a moral entrance to the soul as well as a ritual, by which the Sanctifier is to enter it, "two doors of the tabernacle, which our Lord hath pitched and not man:"* none in favour of the doctrine that water is actually in "closer union" with our New Birth than aught else save God alone. Such views are not proveable from the letter of Holy Writ, but, if at all, from the interpretation put upon it by ancient Christian writers, an interpretation to which men of the present day would never have been guided by the text considered at large on approved principles of criticism. Derived from Scripture in part they doubtless were, but the internal evidence of Scripture, fully and ma-

* Taylor's Worthy Communicant, Ch. III. s. ii. He is speaking of faith as necessary to the right reception of the Lord's Supper in the particular passage from which the words are cited.

Christ approaches the soul before the soul draws nigh to Christ, and we must be drawn before we go to Him: but does He enter the soul before he has made to himself the entrance of faith; is He received into it passively, or does faith *open the door* to Him? Whatever inconceivability attends this belief, the difficulty cannot be escaped by any one who admits that the will must be spiritualized and renewed before the man can attain eternal life. We do not get out of it by putting baptismal regeneration on one side, and sanctification and a claim to heaven on the other; by granting that faith is connected with the latter, and yet denying that it is connected, as nearly as water is, with the former.

turely considered, will never, as I conceive, establish or ratify them. They are more properly patristic than scriptural views of holy Baptism. Why Faith is not mentioned in that passage of the Epistle to Titus, in which *the working of regeneration* is coupled with *the renewing of the Holy Ghost*, is easily understood, without degrading faith to a secondary rank among the means of our New Birth,—making it “the recipient of justification,” after justification has been passively received. The Apostle is there showing in particular what God has done for man in the work of salvation, not, as in the Epistle to the Romans and Galatians, what man must do to be saved; he therefore names only divine grace together with the sacrament, which is the symbol and proclaimer of it, the sign and seal of the *promise and contract on God's part*; it would have been manifestly less proper, on such an occasion, to speak of faith, which, though a divine gift as much as Baptism, is the voluntary offering of man to God; or even of the Word, which, though a vehicle of grace in a most high and comprehensive sense, is yet no special representative and remembrancer of grace, as the outward signs of sacraments are, and which quickens the soul only in being understood and believed, operations on our part; whereas Baptism saves not merely by setting our minds in action, but by ministering the Spirit to those who are in a fit state to receive it. Faith is the receptive instrument of salvation, not the introductive one, and is in the order of thought connected with man rather than with God in the process; he saves us by Baptism, and we *are saved* through faith. The same explanation may be given of a similar text in Ephesians, (Eph. v. 25-6-7.) Christ's love for the Church is there the principal

theme, therefore, the only points adverted to, are what He does for the Spouse, the Bride, the Beloved. There was an additional inducement too in this case for the mention of the cleansing water; St. Paul may have been led to it in part because the purification of women appointed to be consorts of kings afforded an apt illustration for his subject; just as St. Peter was plainly brought to the water of Baptism by the water of the flood. In saying this I do not at all mean to imply that there is anything incidental in the teaching of Scripture considered upon the whole. All, even to the expressions, was doubtless pre-arranged by God, according to a perfect plan. I believe, however, that the choice of language in the sacred writers themselves was plainly in some cases directed by what to them was chance, not by particular design, though the general design of commending their subject to the hearts and imaginations of their hearers was always present to them. No one doubts that the Apostles intended to teach a certain fixed number of truths,—that even as to them the sense of their discourses was not incidental; but I think there is no question that they varied their expressions, for the sake of variety, and its known effect upon the mind, without meaning to inculcate something substantially new by each variation. That the Holy Ghost gave prominence to Baptism in the passages lately referred to in order that men might understand it to be a higher instrument of grace than faith or the word, is surely a gratuitous supposition.

From the Apostles we must ascend to our Lord himself, in whose declaration to Nicodemus respecting the New Birth no instrument save water is mentioned. But neither in this case are we driven to the inference that really, and in the truth of things, it has a nearer

relationship to the regeneration of the soul than other means of grace. Our Saviour commenced his discourse with no secondary matter ; he came at once into the centre of Christianity, as it presents itself to us in the Gospel, and announced that man must be born again. When Nicodemus inquired how this could be, our Lord explained that he spoke of a birth *of* the Spirit, and with the Spirit he joined that, which to the mind of an Israelite was already a sign of adoption to sonship and admission to favour with God,* that which was to be to every Christian a sign of regeneration in the highest sense. He began at once with the eternal redemption which He had wrought for mankind, the power conferred on men to become Sons of God ; not with the Gospel revelation, which is the means of life, but with life itself ; not with faith, which is the effect and consequence of salvation, but with salvation itself. Thence he passed in due course to the condition on our part, to the belief in Him which is the reception of the proffered boon. As for the baptismal sign, it is wrapped up, in the words of our Lord, with the grace which it signifies : as the symbol of remission of sin, and the purifying agency of the Spirit of Holiness, it properly attends upon the redemptive gift to man in the order of thought and of language. It is, as Taylor says, the proclamation of God's graces. But what is there in the arrangement of this divine discourse, placing heavenly things at the beginning, and next the things of earth that are to be *exalted unto heaven*,—everything in its order,—from which we are compelled to infer that practically, and in the realization of this blessedness, the water of Baptism is to come first, and

* Regeneration Stated and Explained, p. 344.

by its sole ministry, a ministry separate in time from that of all other means and instrumental agencies, to convey the gift of righteousness into the soul, and that faith is, not to admit or open the way for it, but, only to come forth and meet it—after an interval?—that Baptism is to usher it into the mere *soul*, by an antecedent process—and that faith, now transmuted from a moral virtue into a grace, now for the first time *made justifying*, is to receive it into the heart, will, and affections, by a subsequent and wholly distinct one? To draw such an inference, would be to forget that an idea actualized, does not necessarily follow the same course and order as when presented to the mind in the abstract; and this is so obvious that the divines who hold the doctrine in question, some of whom are men of acute and powerful minds, must, I think, have more substantial reasons for believing it, than any which can be derived from the collocation of words, and sequence of sentences in Scripture; although, from an instinct of piety, they behold that view, which they consider to be Catholic truth, in the most Catholic of all books, even the Bible.

Idea of Regeneration according to Scripture and Reason compared with the Idea of Regeneration according to Mediæval Theology.

AND now in order that the views I am endeavouring to set forth may not be misunderstood, nor assume a more negative character to the reader's mind, than really belongs to them, let me state once more what doctrine of regeneration, by some in the present day announced as catholic, (that it is founded on the

language of ancient Christian writers is not denied,) I conceive to be unreasonable and anti-scriptural, and certainly not catholic in any sense which renders our acceptance of it necessary on grounds of conscience. That doctrine, if I do not misunderstand it, is this : that by a certain mysterious and undefinable instrumentality of water, duly administered with the word, in Baptism, an instrumentality not differing from that of faith, merely as outward from inward, but pertaining more to an actual efficiency and concurrence to the production of the effect, the human soul, when not in a state of active infidelity and unrepented sin, undergoes an internal spiritual change, not necessarily involving or even growing up into sanctification,* and yet, in the most intimate manner, connected

* The following very clear statement is extracted from Mr. Newman's *Sermon on the Church Visible and Invisible*. "What is Regeneration? It is the gift of a new and spiritual nature, but men have, through God's blessing, obeyed and pleased him without it. The Israelites were not regenerated; Cornelius, the Centurion, was not regenerate when his prayers and alms came up before God. No outward conduct, however consistent, can be a criterion to our mortal judgments, of this unearthly and mysterious privilege."

"Regeneration, I say, is a new birth, or the giving of a new nature. Now, let it be observed, that there is nothing impossible in the thing itself, (though we believe it is not so,) but nothing impossible in the very notion of a Regeneration being accorded even to impenitent sinners. I do not say Regeneration in its fulness, for that includes in it the notion of perfect happiness and holiness, to which it tends from the first; yet Regeneration in a true and sufficient sense in its primary qualities. For the essence of Regeneration is the communication of a higher and diviner nature; and sinners may have this gift, though it would be a curse to them and not a blessing. The devils have a nature thus higher and more divine than man, yet they are not thereby changed from evil to good."

A Regeneration might be accorded to impenitent sinners! Supposing it might, what has this to do with *the* Regeneration which Christ brought into the world for the salvation of it? Can *that* be effected without a spiritual act or acts on the part of

with it and tending toward it: that this change is not wrought upon the heart, the will, the moral being, (if it were, it must involve sanctification, whereas many thus internally regenerated in infancy grow up wicked,)

the subject?—Can that have been effected where the will, “the spiritual part of our humanity,” remains unchanged? It signifies not much to speculate on a Regeneration, angelical or diabolical; to decide that it might be super-human without being moral; a regeneration might be infra-human and brutal; might be anything. But *the* regeneration with which we are concerned is *divine*: it is a participation of the divine nature, which is essentially holy and good. It has been purchased for us with the blood of the Lamb, that we may be holy as our father in heaven is holy.

“And if this is the case even with sinners, much more is Regeneration conceivable in the instance of children, who have done neither good nor evil. Nor does it at all follow, even though they grow up disobedient and are a scandal to the Church, that therefore the Church has not conveyed to them a great gift, an initiation into the powers of the world to come.” “If, indeed, this gracious privilege ensured religious obedience, then truly, disobedience in those who have been admitted into the Church, would prove that the Church had not conveyed it to them. But, until a man is ready to maintain that the Spirit cannot be quenched, he has no warrant for saying that it has not been given.”

If regeneration *tends* to holiness, why does it not produce holiness, as the vine bears grapes, and the apple-tree apples? Because it is counteracted, shall we say, by the forces of the world, the flesh and Satan? But the Spirit of sonship is essentially a spirit that *overcomes the world*,—that has triumphed over the carnal principle and the power of the Evil one. To be regenerate is not merely to possess a potential holiness which the world may overcome.

If the spiritual change is in the will and moral being, it must issue in holiness. If it is *not* in the moral being, how can it *tend* to holiness, any more than a change in the bones, skin, or muscles? *Donum gratiæ justificantis præcipue ordinat hominem ad bonum, quod est objectum voluntatis: et ideo ad ipsum movetur homo per motum voluntatis, qui est motus liberi arbitrii.* Sum. Theol. II. I. Quæst. 113. Art. 3. So thought Aquinas, a right good Churchman, and in thinking with him, that to be born of God is especially and essentially an ordination to goodness, I trust we are not closing our ears to the voice of Christ to His Church.

108 *Regeneration severed from Renovation,*

but somehow in the soul apart from the will; that such internal change taken by itself, *is* regeneration, justification, righteousness, in the proper and primary meaning of the terms; that the becoming a *new creature* in thought and feeling, actually triumphant over sin, and fraught with Christian graces, is not inseparably one with this, but only its contingent produce, the offspring which will surely be born of it in case of its union with the will; and that to this internal change we are bound to apply all that fervent and solemn language of Scripture, in which Christians are described as having a moral renovation by the power of the Spirit, in which they are spoken of as freed from the dominion of sin, translated from darkness into light, renewed in the image of God, clad in robes of purity, and raised to sit in heavenly places with Christ Jesus. Regeneration, according to this view of it, is the mere base of an edifice afterwards to be erected, and yet is complete in itself; a foundation not for the superstructure alone, but having an independent use and value. It is not the putting a *right* spirit within us, but only a *new* spirit, which, though characterized as a power unto righteousness, leaves the will as impotent as it is by nature; it is not connected with renewal as the ripening of fruit by the sun with the ripeness produced;* for it is perfected, even in him whose will

* It would seem as if they who hold this view sought to hide from themselves the actual separation which it establishes betwixt the reception of regenerative grace, and the acquirement of freedom by the will. The most celebrated work of the present day on this subject, though it teaches, to my apprehension, the doctrine stated above, at the same time declares Regeneration to be "directly productive of renewal," and speaks as follows:—"Christ's sacred presence, which shines forth in the heart, straight upon the word of justification, creates a renewal there as certainly as light involves illumination, or fire heat.—And

and reason are actually existent, during the entire passivity of the soul; it is a finished work, before faith has done any part even in the reception of it; and thus regeneration is one process in the grown man and in the infant, whose rational and moral being, though *not dead yet sleepeth*, in whom for awhile, after the body has emerged from its ante-natal tomb into light and motion, the spirit yet lies still as with the stillness of the grave.* In a word, this doctrine dimidiates the

the one cannot be separated from the other, except in idea, unless the sun's rays can be separated from the sun, or the power of purifying from water." Lectures on Justification, VI. 170-171. The power of purifying cannot be separated from water, nor the power of sanctifying from the Holy Ghost; but a power possessed, and a power exerted, are two different things; and the question is, can the Holy Ghost be present to a soul without sanctifying it, any more than water can be present to a thing that is soiled without cleansing it? And do we not answer this question in the negative, when we affirm that every child, duly baptized, certainly has the Spirit dwelling within him, though some baptized children grow up as carnal and unholy as if they had lived from their birth in a Heathen land; do we not answer it in the negative when we say, in respect of adults, as some do say, that they may have the Sacred Presence yet abiding in them while they are "almost in all evil." Christ is with all men, even the most wicked; but for his presence they must fall to dust:—but does he abide regeneratively, spiritually, in the unspiritual, and those who obey not the commandments?

* Aquinas observes, that children are incapable of acts of free will, and are therefore moved by God to righteousness through the information of their souls alone; but that this is not done without the sacrament: because, as the original sin from which they are justified came to them not by their own will, but by way of the flesh, so also grace is derived to them from Christ through a spiritual regeneration. Sum. Theol. II. 1. Quæst. cxiii. Art. 3. Against the consistency of this reasoning, within its own sphere, there is nothing to be said. Sin that does not originate in the act of the will, may be removed without the act of the will. It seems to me that the earliest Christian writers looked upon Baptism chiefly as the cleanser of the soul from an inherited fleshly taint, which they did not consider to be one and the same thing with the proneness of the will to evil. There has been a disjunctive process going on in divinity ever since it began to be a human science; a process of disjoining regenera-

Scriptural idea of regeneration, divides it, (sacrilegiously in the *thing* with whatever pious intent,) into primary and secondary, concedes the last to Faith, and reserves the first altogether for Baptism.

Do we reject such views because they issue out into mystery, because they involve an admission that things which most deeply concern our peace are yet not contained within the compass of our philosophy? Do we put them aside as unintelligible and not adequately expressible? O no; but because we hold them most intelligibly and expressibly untrue, most sensibly inharmonious with the strain of Scripture; because we think there is no sufficient ground for believing them, only plausible grounds for defending such a belief; because we hold them to be founded on no true Catholic consent, no consentaneous attestation of competent witnesses, but, so far as they reflect the mind of the early Christians at all, which I think they do only in part, on a prevalent *specific* ignorance, on common sources of misapprehension, and an undeveloped state of the mind of the human race *in a particular province of thought*. They who so far exceed us in zeal for Christianity, so it is urged, must needs *understand* Christianity far better than we; and love is, indeed, a better guide than mere cold criticism to the mind of Christ, so far as the knowledge of it immediately bears upon salvation; but love alone is no sufficient guide

tion from renewal, justification from being made just, power to attain unto heaven from reception here upon earth of the atoning blood, the divine presence to the soul from the blessed effects of that presence, (that is to say Christian virtues,) forgiveness of sin from abolition of sin, and the removal of native corruption from purification of heart and the restoration of the will to freedom. Thus everything in the face of the Gospel is "insulated, dislocated, deadened," and the whole rendered indistinct, because men will *divide* where they ought only to *distinguish*.

through all the labyrinths of theology. I can but hint these opinions here however; the necessary limits of this essay preclude any attempt to prove the truth of them in particulars. To proceed with my statement:—

According to the views now coming into esteem in our Church, under the colours of catholicity, an infant incapable of actual sin, or an adult whose sin is not such as to preclude faith and repentance in any degree, upon receiving Baptism, becomes at once a temple of the Holy Ghost, having the Incarnate Word, in whom is the Father, dwelling in him through the Spirit. This is the first justification, the primary regeneration, and it is absolute, not a matter of degree, of increase or decrease. It commences in a moment, through a lifeless faith, or at least a faith which has no spiritual life in it, (since “lively faith comes after regeneration, not before it,”) and nothing but utter reprobacy, from which this divine presence does not protect the possessor, can bring it to an end, when it ceases for ever. This is the first justification; but in addition to this there is a secondary one, with which renovation keeps pace, which *is* capable of degree, of increase and decrease, and appears altogether much the same thing with that sonship to God whereof St. John speaks in his Epistle. Thus justification is double; there is an outer and an inner portion of the edifice, which, like the Temple, has a sanctuary within a sanctuary, a Holy and a Holy of Holies. That justification *is* at once absolute, and yet matter of degree, is not to be denied, but according to this view, there are two justifications. not merely one with a double aspect;—two justifications interconnected, yet practically separable, so that the first may be without the last, and the last may

virtually be without the first; two justifications, the one distinct from renewal, though tending toward it, the other having the same relationship to renewal as the liquefaction of ice by the sun, to the melting of ice through the sun's effectual beaming; both inward, yet one only the actual introducer of purity into *the inward parts*.* *This* doctrine of a twofold justification, as it appears to me, is self-contradictory, unless we conceive the soul itself as twofold; in order to render it conceivable, we must imagine the moral being, will, reason, understanding, in a word *the powers of the soul*, to be, as it were an inner structure inclosed in an outer court, which outer court is the essence or substance of the soul, as distinguished from its powers and faculties. We must suppose that, in the first justification, the Spirit enters only the outer court, while the second is his effective presence in the temple it-

* In reference to this subject, as against a certain statement of justification by "strict Protestants," it is argued, "Can a draught be separated from the drinking it, or a bath from being bathed in it? In like manner the gift of righteousness, which is justification as given, is renewal as received." Lectures on Justification, VII. 197. It is renewal as received, where the condition of renewal, that is, a will which consents to be drawn by the Spirit is actually existing, at least in proportion to the faith of the recipient. But what is it, according to the anti-protestant theory, in the case of the infant, as yet incapable of renovation, and whose will may oppose the Spirit with its first act, the thoughts of whose heart may be evil continually as soon as they arise? If such infant has undergone an internal change called regeneration, it must sure be essentially distinct from that of which the freedom of the will is the characteristic result; if he has been justified by the internal presence and agency of the Spirit, it cannot reasonably be called the *same* justification as that of him to whom the possession of the Holy one is an actual sanctifying of the moral being. Both are a presence of God to the soul, the end of which is salvation; but God is not present to the *spirit of man* except in acting upon the *will*, and it is hard to conceive that his presence to the soul, in any other way, can quicken it to everlasting life.

self, his permeating it more and more with heat and light. As a man may come into a house all at once, and go out of it all at once, and yet sweep and garnish it by little and little; or, as a heap of incense may be brought into an outer apartment, and may dispense its fragrance to an inner chamber, just in proportion as the doors are opened for its admission, so, on this theory, the Justifier is introduced into the essence of the soul* by Baptism, there takes up his abode, and

* The Angelical Doctor teaches, that the essence of the soul is related to its powers as subjects to their own accidents, which are posterior to the subject both in the order of generation and also of perfection. Sum. Theol. II. 1. Quæst. 83. Art. 2. The logic of substance and accidents, as Mr. Coleridge remarks, is one thing, their actual meaning, in metaphysics, another. Literary remains, iii. 342. We know the external world only as a power to produce motions in us; the accidents, as we view them, are in ourselves; we behold the soul only as a phenomenon through consciousness. By reason we know that both the external world and the soul, as they are in themselves, independently of their presentation to us, are to be distinguished from the appearance they make to our intuitive mind; we know that there is a something beneath, a subsisting reality behind the veil, a power of which we see only the products. But have we any right to assume, that the unseen power can be affected, its products remaining unaltered? Can the table itself be acted upon all its accidents continuing just as they were before such action? Will, reason, understanding, are but the man himself in different attitudes of his being, and can we legitimately argue on the assumption, that the Holy Spirit may be present to the spirit of man itself, without changing and modifying its aspect to us? Scripture seems to imply the contrary,—to speak as if the presence of Christ to the soul were recognizable in its effects; and to no other presence except such as is thus recognizable, does it direct our attention. “The aids of the divine Spirit” are “deeper than our conscience can reach,” but “thanks to God! in all points in which the knowledge is of high and necessary concern to our moral and religious welfare, from the effects it may safely be inferred by us, from the workings it may be assuredly known.” *Aids to Reflection. Moral and Religious Aphorisms, Comment on Aph. VI.* I think we may safely conclude that the soul, considered as a *noumenon* (thing in itself), has never been changed by the Spirit of Holiness, when the soul as a *phenomenon* remains unholy.

from thence renews the will day by day, in case it is willing to be renewed, as soon as it becomes actual. I do not now stay to inquire what is meant by the essence of the soul† as distinguished from its powers, whether the soul itself be anything but an assemblage of powers, or more properly one power having a variety of characters or determinations, like an opal with its many dyes, or a diamond with its many faces; whether the infant spirit be not a latent power which is to become actual when certain conditions exist; whether the Holy Spirit can reside in the hidden ground of action, that is, the man himself, without influencing and regulating the action thence proceeding; I do not ask what is meant by an indwelling of Christ which practically differs from his living in the heart by faith, and yet is not to be confounded with the sustainment of our whole being by the Lord of Heaven and

† St. Thomas Aquinas determines that original sin is in the essence of the soul, rather than in its powers: *Ergo anima est subjectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum suam essentiam*: Sum. Theol. II. 1. Quæst. 83. Art. 2. that grace considered as a quality of the soul, is not the same as virtue: Ib. Quæst. 110. Art. 3. that virtue resides in the powers of the soul as in its subject. Ib. Q. lvi. Art. 1. and that grace is in the essence of the soul before it is in its powers. Hooker thought these things hard to be understood, and I do not think they have become any easier since his day. St. Thomas says, that, as man participates divine knowledge by his intellective faculty, through the virtue of faith, and divine love according to the power of the will, through the virtue of charity, so also, after a certain similitude, he partakes the divine nature through a certain regeneration or recreation. II. 1. Quæst. cx. Art. iv. That the nature of man is changed in the New birth, and his inmost being reformed cannot admit of a doubt; but is not this one and the same thing with the conversion of his will from evil to good by divine power? I believe, however, that the views of Aquinas upon this subject, were evangelical in the main, for he teaches, unless I misapprehend his meaning, first, that the grace by which we are regenerated, through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us, is essentially the principle of renewal, the root of those virtues

Earth, in respect of which, it is said, that we are *all his offspring*, baptized or unbaptized; but granting it were not irreconcilable with Scripture and reason, where is the substantial practical difference betwixt this doctrine and that which its assertors condemn, not merely as untrue, but as too outward and unreal. To have a presence of God in our souls, distinct from his energizing presence to our heart, will, and affections, how is this more truly an incorporation into Christ than to have Him, by special covenant, ever on *our right hand*, to help and to guide us when we resist not His leading? Grace, (be it where it may,) so long as it has not penetrated the will, is external to the man; it has as yet effected nothing for the salvation of the possessor; and the Sanctifier is not *within* the soul, in a *religious* sense, while it remains unsanctified. I must repeat, a spiritual gift that is apart from the powers of the soul, is not properly *in* the

which dispose men to the highest end which they can ever be made capable of; that, when infused into the essence of the soul, it flows forth into its powers and regulates their action, as vital operations proceed from the life within; secondly, that the grace of Christ is conveyed into all who are spiritually begotten by Him *through faith and baptism*: Ib. Quæst. 81. Art. 3. that men cannot obtain justification in their sleep, after their spiritual part has once been awakened, but that the gift of righteousness is received in adult subjects of grace, by the act of the will; on which subject he speaks excellently well, as follows:—*Justificatio impii fit Deo movente hominem ad justitiam. Ipse enim est qui justificat impium ut dicitur. Rom. iii. Deus autem movet omnia secundum modum uniuscujusque; sicut in naturalibus videmus quod aliter moventur ab ipso gravia, et aliter levia, propter diversam naturam utriusque. Unde et hominem ad justitiam movet secundum conditionem naturæ humanæ. Homo autem secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii. II. 1. Quæst. cxiii. Art. 3.* See also Article 4. The only thing to be objected to this statement is the “flattering epithet *free*,” which, “in the only Scriptural sense, as concerning the unregenerate, is implied in the word *will*, and is, therefore, superfluous.” *Literary Remains*, III. 318-19.

man at all, but only appended *to* the man. It is the special gift of Baptism to append this gift *to* the man, and, by appending it outwardly to be the means of introducing it inwardly, whensoever the conditions of its acceptance exist within the baptized. And, till he has a will that acts, a mind that discerns betwixt good and evil, they do not exist; while the spirit of the human being is potential, the regenerative grace bestowed upon that spirit must be potential too; but to affirm that divine grace received into the soul is a mere potentiality, appears unmeaning; for what is the presence of spirit to spirit, but an influence and an actuation? If terms that denote relations in space are but *impropria vocabula* when applied to supersensuous things, what can we mean by saying that grace is *in* us, except that the Divine Spirit moves, changes, produces an effect in us? * And what is the specific

* The teaching of South on this point is as follows: "The Spirit," he says, "may be said to be in men in two ways. 1. Substantially, as he is God filling all things, &c. 2. The Spirit may be said to be in men, in respect of the effects he produces in them. And thus God is said to be in heaven, and sometimes in one place more than in another, because of some notable operation which he exerts in that place and not in another. In like manner the Spirit of God is said to be in that man, whom, by any immediate impulse or motion, he causes to do a thing; or in whom he creates those habits or dispositions to action, by which he is enabled to act with more proneness and facility one way than another." *Sermon on Romans*, viii. 14. Against such doctrine a Divine of the present day writes thus: "Who bade us so explain, or explain away, the word of God, that when he says 'the Holy Ghost dwelleth in man,' we should say this *only* means that 'the Holy Ghost enables a man to do good works? How does this come up to the other? We see, indeed, that the Holy Ghost doth dwell in others by the good works which He enables them to perform; we may know of ourselves that he dwelleth in us, by our keeping the commandments of God; and so by a man's acting, moving, speaking, we may tell that there is life in him, that his soul is *in* him; yet acting, moving, speaking are not the soul's indwelling

effect of saving grace? Does it work effectually upon our souls in keeping alive in them a new nature, which, though it raise them above humanity, brings them never the nearer to divinity, except as Satan

in him, but only the fruits and proofs of it; why then should we think that no more is meant by the Holy Ghost's dwelling in us, than that we are influenced *by* Him? We influence each other, act upon one another, yet will no one say that we dwell in one another. Yet this is said in so many different ways as if to prevent our throwing away our birthrights." *Plain Sermons*, Serm. 79, *Holy Communion*, 1 Cor. x. 3—5, p. 93. "Acting, moving, speaking, are not the soul's indwelling." If there is any one who needs to be told that the saving virtues wrought in us by the agency of the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit acting, are to be distinguished from the agency itself, or that cause and effect are not one and the same thing, he is as little qualified for metaphysical reasoning as the man, who cannot perceive that two and two make four, for mathematical. But how does this affect the question, whether the indwelling of the Spirit of Holiness in the heart be not a metaphorical phrase, denoting a continued actuation of the heart unto holiness, rather than a local presence? Do we indeed say that the soul of the man dwells *in* the man? Should we not rather say that it *is* the man himself? St. Paul speaks, indeed, of the *spirit of man that is in him*, but here he is distinguishing the reasonable mind from the man considered as to his total being. We say that the soul dwells in the *body*, because the outward phenomenal frame is a thing extended in space, and sensuous imagination presents to us the soul caged within it, like the man in the body of Death in Quarles's Emblems, (*Book v. Emblem viii.*) But is not the residence of the soul in the body of flesh and blood essentially a *continuous actuation*? When we say that the soul is *in* the body, do we mean any thing else than this, that a *power*, which we know by its effects, informs and actuates it? Withdraw this power from its earthy tabernacle, and what it has been doing there becomes apparent; the whole and every part of it is changed, and the once living organ is a mere mould of clay before it falls to dust and ashes.

As to our influence upon each other, it is but a second-hand affair. We do not operate upon the minds of our fellow-beings *immediately*, as God operates. It would therefore be absurd to talk of our being *in* one another except so far as we are one with Christ and the Father, having *been all made to drink into one Spirit*. Do we "*give away our birthright*" in thinking that the inhabitation of Christ in the justified is a continued actuation, a quickening unto righteousness? Nay, this is rather a claiming

himself is nearer;* which *ex hypothesi* assimilates them to devils as truly as to *Jesus Christ the righteous*,—as truly as to him by participation of whose Spirit and resemblance of whose character we are heirs of eternal life? Viewed in the glorious light of the Gospel, methinks the two justifications, primary and secondary, coalesce into one, as the double objects which present themselves to a disordered eye, straight-way become single when its sanity of vision is restored.

Why can we not receive this doctrine of a primary regeneration, preceding the new birth of the will and separable from it? Let not any weakness of mine, in answering this question, throw doubt upon the strength of the cause I seek to defend; for the establishment of which, indeed, I rely far more on a simple exhibition of the doctrine itself, in its bareness, divested of the jewels and purple and gold, the high terms and glorious characters in which the eloquence of its defenders have arrayed it, than on reasonings against its rationality, or a citation of contrary texts from the Bible, which, if they do not of themselves preclude such opinions, neither will they put them out of countenance when summoned to take their place in an argument; the same deep-rooted persuasion which paralyses their native force in the one case, being quite equal to a like feat in the other. Before proceeding

it, a looking it thankfully in the face. Sure we have dimness enough in this our tenement of clay. Why should we wilfully envelop ourselves in clouds, for the sake of bestowing upon the objects of our faith, a "misty-magnific" grandeur, when they appear so noble and sublime beneath the blended light of reason and revelation, even then far, far transcending our limited mortal sight?

* See Note p. 106.

however to give what answer I may, let me protest against the unfair inference so commonly made, that we who reject this tenet are led to do so by a spirit of rationalism; that we are irreligiously and senselessly inquiring into the divine *mode of operation* when we ask *how* an infant *can* be the subject of that birth from above, whereof our Lord spake to Nicodemus. In what way, or by what manner of working God changes a soul from evil to good, how He impregnates the barren rock with priceless gems and gold, is to the human mind an impenetrable mystery in all cases alike; we dream not of looking into this mystery; we only ask whether, according to Scripture and reason, regeneration is not that of which an unactualized spirit is essentially incapable? How *can* a thoughtless babe be a new creature in Christ, is only such a question as *how shall we that are dead to sin live any longer therein?* It is no inquiry at all into the *mode* of God's working, but a conscientious and necessary consideration of the sense of God's word. So again we are accused of rationalism and want of faith, because we look for manifestations of the new birth. Do we suppose that the operations of the Divine Spirit are in themselves visible to mortal eyes, or that in this present life we can behold the total sum of their effects, and are able to follow the upspringing fount of life throughout its whole ascent? If we refuse to believe that the Spirit abides where there neither are, nor can be, the fruits of the Spirit, this is not through ignorance that faith beholds the invisible, but in obedience to the voice of Scripture, which bids us look for holiness, not nominal, but real, not mystical only, but moral, where the Sanctifier abides. Not that we can know of any individual that he is absolutely a son of

God; but neither can we know of any man that he is absolutely a new creature, and yet newness of heart and the virtues of the Spirit are recognizable things: we have an idea of them and know what they are as well as we know what light and sound are, or what is meant by shape and colour. We do not pronounce who is regenerate, we only maintain that he who undeniably has not the mind of Christ in a characteristic degree can never have been born from above. The question here is not what God has power to do, as some would imply, but what He actually does and *must* do, unless He were to counteract his own immutable design. Is regeneration a change of the will? Can the will be changed without its own consentient act? Has an infant a will that consents to be changed? It is on these points that we inquire, and on these alone.

Now there are teachers who affirm that regeneration is not essentially a change of the will from evil to good, seeing that an infant has no will that can be changed from evil to good, and many baptized in infancy give manifest proofs that their wills have never been so converted, and yet we are bound to believe that every baptized child is inwardly regenerate. Their explanation of the new birth has already been given, and why can we not receive it? Because we hold it unwarranted by Revelation, nay, contrary to the plain tenor of it; because it seems to us a chimæra having no support in the truth of things; and these two objections run into each other, since the sense of Scripture is partly decided by the nature of the subject with which it deals, and this itself we are made conscious of, though it be within us, by outward revelation. In Holy Writ the presence of the Divine Spirit to the

human soul is put into such relations with recognizable effects, that, if our creed is to be really derived from the Bible, not derived from elsewhere and reconciled with its expressions by artifices of logic, I think we are not justified in forming any theory of sacramental power by which they are put asunder.* Is it conceiv-

* I have said that the presence and indwelling of the Spirit is always connected in Scripture, either expressly or by implication, with effects of a nature to be recognized by the conscious mind; and that it is an unwarrantable departure from the positive teaching of Holy Writ, to say that *the presence of the Spirit promised* under the Covenant of grace, is not necessarily and essentially a presence which may be thus recognized. *Hereby know we that we dwell in Him and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit.* (1 John iv. 13—iii. 24, &c.) The Spirit of God may act upon the body or the soul, upon the heart and mind, or upon the mere intellectual faculties, and to say that *as soon as* the Spirit acts the effects are perceivable, I hold to be inexact language, because spiritual operations are not in time, the *phenomena*, the apparent effects alone are so. What I contend for is, that God speaking to man in the inspired volume directs his faith toward no spiritual operations, except so far as they are evidenced either to the eyes of the Spirit within us, or to the outward senses. I deny that according to Scripture, we are bound to believe in, or turn our thoughts toward any presence of God to the soul, the specific effects of which are not recognizable by the mind in its highest state of spiritual power and illumination. Certain texts in the first Epistle to the Corinthians are alone, out of the whole Bible, even capable of being alleged as tending to bear out a contrary supposition. (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17—vi. 11, 19.) But after all, why is it necessary to infer from these expressions of St. Paul, that there is a spiritual regenerative presence of the Holy Ghost, and that in an absolute sense, to the souls of carnal and worldly persons, or that men are to be called *sons of God*, (not merely in God's gracious purpose towards them—but actually,) *who are almost in all evil*, having a *character* of ungodliness. If, in the passages in question, St. Paul refers at all, which I think he does not, to the actual condition of soul of those whom he addresses, we may suppose him to be reminding them that, in their Baptism, if they had received it in true faith and repentance, they must have been *sealed* by that *Holy Spirit of Promise*; that if they were not reprobates, this *earnest* of an *internal inheritance* must be yet *abiding* in them. Thus to warn them against unholiness, or to reproach them with it, at the same time that he ascribes to them

able that our Lord should have expressed himself, as we read in the 14th and 15th chapters of St. John's Gospel, if his communion with the human spirit depended not necessarily on the state of the will? Could he have said—*If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will*

a presence of the Holy Spirit, is but to warn them against falling from grace and undoing that good work which, so far as they were what they called themselves, must have been begun in them; or it may have been meant to represent to them forcibly, that, if they were full of sin they could not really be, what in professing Christianity they assumed to be, possessors of the Spirit of Christ. But I confess I take a different view of these texts, and believe that in them, the term Temple of the Holy Ghost would never have been understood distributively, had it not been for the confused notions of spiritual indwelling derived from the early ages. St. Paul says not, *ye are Temples*; but, *ye are the Temple of God*. A sense more accordant, not only with the reason of the thing, but with the strain of the Apostle's previous discourse will be given, if we render *ἐν ὑμῖν among you*, rather than understand it to mean, *in each of you individually*: the converts collectively formed a Temple of the Holy Ghost, and such a Temple it is that is impaired or corrupted, by the introduction of false doctrine into it.† Compare the texts in question with the passage at the end of the 2nd chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, with 2 Cor. vi. 14—2 Cor. xiii. 5‡—1 Pet. ii. 4, 5, 6—and Rev. ii. 1. When St. Paul says your *body* is the Temple of the Holy Ghost, he could only mean, that men who were *builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit* were, even as to their bodies, a portion of such building, therefore dedicated to holiness. “Your bodies are,” so Hammond paraphrases 1 Cor. vi. 19, “by your being Christians, consecrated to the service of the Spirit. This benefit of the Spirit ye have received from God, and it is an engagement to you to think your own bodies are not now at your own disposal, to use them as you please.” “The words import

† *εἰ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τοῦτον ὁ Θεός.* If any man injures, or goes about to destroy the Temple of God, him will God injure, or destroy. Our translation weakens the antithesis of the original.

‡ Hammond understands the Corinthians to be addressed collectively even in this last text, and renders *ἐν ὑμῖν* “among you” here also.

come unto him, and make our abode with him, were it true that the great gift of the Gospel was an indwelling of Christ in the soul, not such as these words give any account of? It is an easy way of meeting the difficulty to reply without more ado, that our Lord here spoke of a special inhabitation vouchsafed to pro-

no more," says South, "than that we should be as wholly devoted to God's use and service as a Temple is: and that, as it is sacrilegious to alienate a temple to other worldly and profane uses; so is it a piece of no less sacrilege and impiety, after we have consigned over, and in a manner, dedicated ourselves to the Spirit, to make ourselves servants to sin, Satan, or the world. He that would strain any more from such texts, may sooner fetch blood than any sound sense out of them." *Sermon on Romans*, viii. 14.

St. Ignatius in his Epistle to the Ephesians (c. xv.) speaks of men as *Temples* of God individually; but I avow my belief that in so doing he departed from St. Paul; for in the passage, of which I speak, he obviously refers to 2 Cor. vi. 16, and who can doubt that *there*, at all events, the Apostle was speaking of the Temple formed by many worshippers, not of each worshipper as a separate Temple? Doubtless he who is filled with the Holy Ghost may very properly be called, in a figure, a Temple of God; I only doubt that this happened to be the meaning of Paul in certain parts of his writings commonly cited in support of dogmas, which, I verily believe, neither the hearers of Christ nor the hearers of the Apostles ever dreamed of; I mean those dogmas which represent the possession of the Spirit of holiness and truth, and the having a holy and truthful spirit as not only distinguishable in idea, but separable in fact. Further, it is to be remarked that, in the passage above-mentioned, and another of similar import in the same Epistle (c. ix.) the blessed Martyr does not express himself at all as he *ought*, according to the Tracts for the Times. He says not "ye are Temples of God, (so made in Baptism,) therefore ye are steadfast in the faith;" nor does he imply this; but he says, "ye have shewn yourselves steadfast; therefore ye are θεοφόροι καὶ ναοφόροι, χριστοφόροι, ἁγιοφόροι; and elsewhere, "Let us do all things, as having God dwelling in or amongst us, *that we may be his temples*, and that He may be our God in or amongst us." To speak after this fashion now, to pray that God *will* cleanse our hearts, *will* infuse into them His Holy Spirit, *will* forgive us our sins, is condemned as a modern innovation!

To the Philadelphians our ancient author speaks in Pauline

ficients in righteousness. This may be indeed the right answer, *if* the doctrine of a primary and passive regeneration be true; but does not the turn of phrase in this text go far to shew that it is *not* true? How does the bare assertion just stated serve to explain the strangeness of our Lord's saying, that He would come and abide with the faithful and obedient, if it be indeed the rule of the New Dispensation, that He comes and abides sometimes with those who have no faith and obedience at all, as infants, sometimes with those who have only an incipient faith and obedience, who are but just beginning to put on the new man, and are still in great part unclothed with holiness, though good enough to be made temples of the Holy Ghost in baptism? * According to all ordinary rules of interpretation, is it not implied in such language, that Christ will come and abide with *none* but such as are servants of righteousness in the main? Now this text is not a solitary instance of that way of speaking, on which I ground my argument for the inseparable connection betwixt spiritual gifts and moral conditions and results; it is rather a sample of the

style—*τὴν σάρακα ὑμῶν ὡς ναὸν Θεοῦ τηρεῖτε*—which is framed with an evident reference to certain parts of the Old Testament. Exodus xxix. 45, &c.

It may be observed that St. Augustine speaks of baptized children as *belonging to the Temple of God*, not as being, each in its own person, a Temple. See the passage cited in a note of Keble's edition of Hooker, vol. ii. p. 397.

* "Baptized persons do not so put on Christ as to be forthwith altogether different men from what they were before: at least this is not the rule as far as we have means of deciding.—The inward presence of Christ, ministered to us by the Holy Ghost—it is plain, admits of being immediately vouchsafed in its fulness, as a sort of invisible Shekinah, or seal of God's election, yet without involving the necessity of a greater moral change than is promised and effected in baptism." *Lectures on Justification*, vii. 177—8. *Who hath also sealed us*, says St. Paul, (2 Cor. i. 22), *and given the earnest of the Spirit in our*

language of the New Testament on the point in question. Let us proceed, however, from St. John's Gospel at once to the 8th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and I ask whether any one, who allows the strain of that discourse to produce its natural effect upon his mind, can believe that the great blessing of the New Covenant was understood by St. Paul to be a spiritual gift not necessarily renewing the heart. *If Christ be in you, so he speaks, the body is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness;* and are we to believe that Christ is in us before we are either dead to sin or alive in righteousness? *As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God:* could the Apostle have written thus, if he had been commissioned to teach that Baptism makes many sons of God, who are not led by His Spirit at all, or not wholly led by Him? St. Paul declares that by the Spirit of adoption, they who receive it, *cry Abba Father;* that the Spirit *witnesses with our spirit that we are children of God.* What strange language for one who at the same time knew that the Spirit might be received by

hearts; and he speaks of the Ephesians, as being *sealed with that holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, *** after that they believed.* (Eph. i. 13, 14.) He seems to be speaking not of a mere moral condition of heart, but of a spiritual influence upon the heart involving moral effects, that is, the virtues of the Spirit, as the influence of the sun upon the earth produces a proportionate fertility. Can we believe that the robe of righteousness, the special gift of the Gospel, is a spiritual covering, with which actual righteousness is not commensurate? The garments which the men of Sardis were said not to have defiled, do these designate a habit of grace, not one with a habit of moral purity, or do they not rather mean the soul itself, or the holiness of the soul? The citation from Shabbath, fol. 152, 2, given by Adam Clarke, seems to prove that the Hebrews used this sort of metaphor. Compare Rev. iii. 4 with chap. xix. 8. See too how St. Hermas applies this metaphor, Lib. iii. Sim. ix. c. 13.

an unconscious subject! They who believe that doctrine now are very far from expressing themselves in this manner.

It seems almost superfluous to dwell upon the language of St. John's first Epistle on the doctrine of Regeneration; it is there said absolutely, *Every one that doeth righteousness is born of Him*; and in face of this declaration, we are to maintain that a man has done righteousness habitually, eminently, has been justified in God's sight, yea, and has been brought forward by an Apostle in the very heart of a discourse upon the salvation of the world through *the Redemption that is in Christ Jesus*, as a model of acceptability by faith, which is the same as by grace, without having been born of Him; or that if some sort of regeneration was accorded to him it was not that of which our Lord spoke,—to be compared with that only as substance with shadow! St. John says, *Whosoever is born of God does not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God*. According to the Anti-protestant we must interpret the saying thus: "Whosoever lives as a man *ought* to live, (not as he inevitably *will* live,) who has been born of God in Baptism, does not commit sin, but preserves the grace imparted to him." What may not be put into or out of Scripture by such a latitude of construction as is here assumed? Throughout his Epistle the Evangelist teaches that *to be born of God* is to be so changed in heart and mind by divine power as to be rendered incapable of sinning; that he only is a son who has taken such firm hold of Christ that he can never be brought to let Him go. This is his account of regeneracy, of the thing abstractedly considered. Are we then at

liberty to set up a different definition of it; to affirm that it does not essentially involve moral excellence, when St. John says that it does? Can we seriously imagine that the Apostle would have written in such a strain without modification or explanation, if he well knew, and was at the same time giving his disciples to understand, that the glory of the New Covenant is a trans-creation of soul which confers upon the subject of it an angel's nature without making him necessarily a whit the better man, the new nature itself not including spiritual-mindedness, but being completely present where the mind of the flesh is not at all, or but in a slight degree subdued? Is it imaginable that this great element of his oral teaching would have been absolutely out of sight in his written instructions,—that it would not have been present to his mind to mould and modify his language? Are we to establish a doctrine of regeneration upon which Scripture is wholly silent, and to let it over-ride that doctrine of regeneration which *is* laid down in Scripture? Are we to persist in calling every baptized child regenerate in the *primary* sense, and to abstain from so designating those hidden christians, who *being turned* by God, *have turned* to Him with their whole heart, and mind, and soul? Is the language of our Homilies, of Hooker, and Taylor, and South, to be condemned as uncatholic, when they use the *term** as inspired writers use it, and describe the *thing* as they describe it? Because a certain school of religious professors have blundered in their practical applications of this doctrine, and have thought that the members of the In-

* By "the term" I do not merely mean the word *regeneration*, but all phrases referring to the same sense; as *sons of God*, *born of God*, and so forth.

visible Church were to be pointed out in this or that street or square, attendants on this or that man's ministry, has it therefore ceased to be a genuine part of Gospel truth? It cannot justly be advanced in reply that the two regenerations are one, the first but an earlier stage of the last. There is a radical difference between them, seeing that the will is not the subject of the one, it *is* the subject of the other; nor does the former *necessarily* flow into the latter. St. John describes a change in the principle of action, and no internal process which leaves that principle unaffected can properly be identified with his description. It might be admissible to say that he speaks of a state, and that correspondent to this there is a primary act; that he is speaking of sonship, and that regeneration may be also described as the first becoming a son. But the Anti-protestant does not say this, and this only; he insists both upon an act and a state different in kind from that which the Evangelist sets forth. If we allow the Bible to determine the nature and character of regeneration, those texts in which the new birth is affirmed to be through the word of God, the word that is preached by the Gospel,* the word of truth,† compared with those which speak of the re-

* 1 Pet. i. 23. 25.

† James i. 18. Surely they who are prepared to say, that in *these texts* the knowledge of divine truth is not principally intended to be pointed out as the means whereby the soul is regenerated, must have brought themselves to consider the words of Scripture as mere wrappages for some more definite revelation out of Scripture, mere wrappages that may be turned about any way, so as they may best cover up and defend the latter. Compare the texts in question with that in the Epistle to the Ephesians, (Eph. i. 13), where reception of the Spirit is so plainly ascribed to the hearing and believing of the Gospel of salvation, as the great *instrument* (improperly so called) of this blessedness; compare them also with John xx. 31, and with

ception of the Spirit by the hearing of faith, † must preclude the belief that regeneration takes place in an unconscious spirit, independently of voluntary co-operation, or “an energy of non-resistance” on the part of the subject.

*Review of Certain Scriptural Arguments on Behalf
of the Mediæval Theory of Regeneration.*

BUT the strength of that view which assigns regeneration and all the blessings of the New Covenant, except renewal of heart and mind, to the moment of Baptism, so far as relates to Scripture evidence, is found by its advocates in the circumstance that the gifts and benefits of redemption are described

2 Pet. i. 2, 3, 4, and ii. 20; and with that sublime passage of the Epistle to the Corinthians, in which the explicit revelation of Christ and his Gospel is described as a polished mirror, which luminously reflects the glory of the Lord, in gazing whereon perpetually we are *changed into the same image, from glory to glory*. Is this *only* renovation? Is not such a renewing by divine power, a being continually created anew? Renovation is no doubt *primarily* referred to but as the result of the continuous agency of the Spirit.

To subordinate the word of God to *any other means* of spiritual life is to subordinate inspired Scripture itself to uninspired commentaries on it. We should not dare, in this question, to consider the Bible wholly through the eyes of any set of mere human teachers, whatever advantages they may have possessed. We should really and truly let it speak for itself, and that *to us*, bearing carefully in mind that all human interpretations are liable to error, and those of one age to common and generally prevailing error.

‡ On the office of faith Pearson speaks thus: “Now by the tenure of the Gospel we shall find that those are truly and properly saints which are *sanctified in Christ Jesus*; first in respect of their holy faith, *by which they are regenerated*; for *whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God*.”—*Expos. of the Creed*, Art. IX.

in the language of the inspired Epistles generally, as having been already conferred at full, by the mere act of God, on all the followers of Christ, not as if they were in the course of receiving them from Him continually through co-operative acts of their own. "Whenever the justification of individuals is spoken of," says a celebrated Tract on Holy Baptism, "it is expressed that that justification was bestowed upon them, in time past, by one act, once for all; it is spoken of as passive on their part, and as complete;" and after citing very many instances of this manner of speaking from the writings of the Apostles, wherein justification in its various aspects is referred to in a perfectly past tense of the passive voice, he contends, and with very good right, that "a peculiarity so uniform, so extensive, is not to be glossed over," but to be adequately accounted for by all theorists who really seek to know the sacred Writer's meaning. That this peculiarity is to be fully considered and the extent of it attended to, is a position which I have no desire whatever to dispute; but I must express my conviction, that there are two ways of accounting for it, either of which makes it sufficiently intelligible why the passive past form of the verb is made use of; that from circumstances which it would take much time and space to set forth adequately, the early Christians naturally fell into that which is not the most reasonable, nor the most accordant with the whole teaching of Scripture; but further that the complete theory of baptismal regeneration now taught by those who profess to revive primitive Christianity, was not only undeveloped at the commencement of the age next after that of the Apostles, but is even contradicted by much that was present to the minds of those earnest

students of the written word, the Ante-Nicene Fathers, according to fair and natural inferences and conclusions. If we are only called upon to reconcile the Bible with itself and with reason, rather than to accept without reasoning the views of ancient Bishops and Doctors, we will not scruple to reply that, whatever this peculiarity indicates, it is quite insufficient to establish that view of an entire internal change, at the moment of Baptism, which it is alleged in defence of. For it ought to be observed that the Apostles speak of the Christian converts, not only as having been redeemed, regenerated, justified, created anew, made possessors of Christ by the Spirit, and collectively, Temples in which the Holy Ghost takes up His abode, but also as having been freed from sin, made servants of righteousness, sanctified, purified, renewed. It is implied in the apostolic language that the professors of the Gospel religion were not only removed from Heathen ignorance to the knowledge of Gospel truth, but from an evil and corrupt course of life had been brought over to a life of righteousness.* *If any man be in Christ, says St. Paul, he is a new creature, or a new creation; old things are passed away, behold all things are become new.*† A strange reader of the Bible must he be who can see in this language *only* the independent operations of the human mind trying to be religious by dwelling upon the

* Rom. vi. 17, 18. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, 11. Eph. ii. 1, 2, 3. Col. iii. 7, 9, 10. The new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him, includes moral renovation. Titus iii. 3, 4, 5. 1 Pet. iv. 3, 4. 2 Pet. ii. 20.

† I believe this text is understood by teachers of all schools as relating to renovation; and yet why more than Col. iii. 1—10? In both passages, union with Christ and an attendant moral change are described as *practically* inseparable.

example which our Lord set upon earth: but I hold it to be as great and, though not as ill sounding, yet in the end as injurious an error, to see nothing in it but a mysterious presence of God to the soul of man apart from that exaltation of the moral being, that beaming forth of the divine attributes from the heart and understanding which is essentially and necessarily and universally, the effect and manifestation of the regenerating presence of God to creatures endowed with reason. Present the Supreme Being is to every part of his creation, and that actually and truly; * He is present to every blade of grass as well as to those whom their Lord called friends rather than servants; † but what is His regenerative presence, His presence to Christians under the covenant of grace? Does it not bring out the image of God in the heart and mind, as certainly and inseparably as the pressure of the seal on softened wax produces the correspondent impression? "If any man be in Christ," says St. Paul, "he is a new creature;" not a new creature in some undefinable way, independently of a reformation of the heart and affections, but renewed in his whole spiritual and moral being, possessing a faith

* "All other things that are of God have God in them, and he them in himself likewise. God hath his influence into the very essence of all things, without which influence of Deity supporting them their utter annihilation could not choose but follow." *Hooker's Eccl. Pol.* Book v. Ch. lvi. 5.

† There is a fine passage containing the same thoughts as those which I have here more humbly expressed in Mr. Maurice's "Kingdom of Christ," vol. ii. pp. 37-8, 2d ed. In the earlier edition of his work, in reference to "the unconscious energies of life," which are all to be traced to the same Divine source, he adds: "But these are not spiritual acts and energies, though they have a spiritual author. Those only can deserve the name, which are in the highest sense voluntary, which are acted in the will and spirit of man."

which is "exerted in each and all of his constituents or incidents, faculties or tendencies," all his acts and habits of mind being new and heavenly. What I would urge is, that the inspired writers attribute to every professor of Christianity the whole body of Gospel blessedness, and not merely one element of it, the power unto righteousness apart from the righteousness which is its specific effect. An inward gift of the spirit, which has as yet been but partially, or not at all, accepted by the will, does not necessarily involve sanctification and salvation; if such a thing could be, it would but put the possessor in the way of them; and so likewise, in the fullest and most important sense, is a man put in the way of them, who has the Gospel preached unto him, through Baptism has been brought into connexion with Christ and those that are Christ's, and invested with a special claim to that spiritual assistance which gives men *ears to hear* what the preacher announces. No one purpose of explaining the language of Holy Writ, as to the method of justification, is answered by the theory of an inward change wrought all at once by an outward washing, which is not effected, with less attendant inconvenience, by that of an external but real relationship to the Source of life, conferred by Baptism, and the possession of the peculiar means and opportunities of grace annexed to the New Dispensation. If then the sacred writers ascribe to every baptized man, every professed follower of Christ, not spiritual gifts alone, but all the moral exaltation which they bring along with them, is it not obvious that this manner of speech *cannot* be literally understood, which ever of the prevalent interpretations we adopt? It is plain enough that St. Paul referred not to facts and the actual state of individual minds when

he says of those whom he addresses, that they have *put off the old man and his deeds*, and put on the new, which yet elsewhere he exhorts them to set about doing, as if it were yet to be done.* The inspired teachers take it for granted that every baptized man possesses the conditions of effective baptism,† consequently has received the Spirit, and that to receive the Spirit is a reception of the virtues of the Spirit. They address the professors of Christianity in their character of Christians, imputing to them all the spiritual and moral gifts which must be theirs,—so far as they are what they call themselves.‡ Any one can see the force and significance of the figure by which a man's

* Compare Romans vi. 18, 22 with 19; Col. iii. 3 with 5, 10 with 11, and 1 Cor. v. 7, with itself.

† See Pearson on the Creed, Art ix. p. 355, where he explains why the baptized were all called Saints, by the writers of the New Testament. "Being, though the work of grace be not perfectly wrought, yet when the means are used without something appearing to the contrary, we ought to presume of the good effect."

‡ *If we live in the spirit*, says St. Paul to the Galatians, *let us also walk in the Spirit*, ch. v. ver. 25. This is as much as to say, according to our profession, we are Christ's, partakers of a spiritual ministry; let us then *walk in the Spirit*, that is, let the reality of that which we profess be manifested by our lives: or rather the meaning at the bottom is this, if we really are living by the Spirit, or have spiritual life, our actions, inward and outward, cannot but be determined accordingly. St. Paul rather wishes to remind the converts that they are *not* alive in the spirit if they live carnally, than that they ought not to live carnally, because they *are* alive in the spirit. For he says in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, that if the Spirit of God dwell in us, we are not in the flesh, and that they who are *after the flesh*, (which is surely the same as *in the flesh*) *do mind the things of the flesh*, which is *death*; that if Christ be in us the body, (not merely ought to be, but) *is dead because of sin*; and that *as many as are led by the Spirit of God* (not merely as many as have passively received Him) *they are the sons of God*; and again to the Galatians, just before the other text cited from that Epistle, *that they which are Christ's, have crucified the flesh with*

state, in that he is a follower of Christ, is sharply contrasted with all unchristian acts and habits. It is at least as intelligible that the writers of the New Testament should ascribe renewal and moral excellence to men in right of their profession, as in virtue of a spiritual gift which does not necessarily reform the moral being.

In regard to the employment of the passive form

the affections and lusts, not merely that they ought, and have the power to crucify them.

As many as are baptized into Christ have put on Christ, (Gal. iii. 27.) This is one of the texts cited to shew that a gift, spiritual and inward, but *not moral*, is conveyed into the soul, once for all, in the moment of Baptism; yet both the strain of the discourse, and the analogy of language, permit, nay even, I think, require another sense. St. Paul represents to the Galatians that, in adopting the religion of Christ, and entitling themselves to all its privileges in Baptism, they had taken Christ for their Lord and Master, whom alone they were bound to obey, observe, and imitate, by faith in whom Jews and Gentiles were all one, having one common service. He intimates that, to be a follower of Christ is to be transferred from the bondage and burthensome yoke of Moses to the freedom of the Spirit; that for baptized men to submit to the impositions of the defunct letter, is to forfeit *the blessing of Abraham*, and make Christ to have died in vain. His words must therefore be supposed to refer to a *voluntary conformity* manifested in *action*, a considerate and determinate renunciation of the *external law*, rather than to a passive investment with a spiritual potentiality. *Ye have put on Christ*, he says; ye have dressed yourselves in Him, rather than had Him clothed upon you. Not that the Galatians had all done this *in fact*, but that to do this was implied in their Baptism. I remain true that no man, of his own will, can put on Christ, by way of imitation and obedience, till Christ, by the will of God, (as the principal agent,) has first been put on him: but I am persuaded that this is not the immediate sense of the passage in question. Compare it with Romans xiii. 14, where *to put on Christ*, obviously signifies a voluntary adherency and imitation; and see the examples from old writers cited by Adam Clarke, which prove that to *put on* or *clothe oneself with a man*, is a phrase borrowed from the stage, signifying an assumption of the character, or an entering into the views, interests, modes of life, or behaviour of the person in question. Clarke says there are many pertinent examples of this in *Kypke*.

where justification and other gifts of the New Covenant are spoken of, it is by no means to be inferred from this circumstance, that they are passively received. For, if in the work of individual salvation there are two parts, the first and principal of which belongs to God, and the secondary and subordinate only to man, who can wonder that, where both cannot be expressed at once, the former should have the preference? Yet that we do co-operate in the process from first to last, is most manifestly deducible from the tenor of Holy Writ. A man can as little purify his soul as regenerate it; yet hear what St. Peter says: *Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth: (1 Peter i. 22.)* the real meaning of his words being only this, that those whom he addressed, in obeying the truth, had suffered the Holy Spirit to purify and renew them.* Further, it may be observed, that some of the passages in question, in which the blessings of the Covenant are spoken of in past and passive forms, refer principally to that which Christ did alone for the salvation of mankind, rather than to the way in which this salvation comes to the objects of His wonderful love. For we *have all been* redeemed in the *transcendent act of redemption*; we *were* all raised up out of the world and placed in realms of bliss and glory, when Christ said, *Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.*†

Another Scriptural argument of the Anti-Protestant divines in favour of their peculiar view of regeneration, to which they appeal in support of their asser-

* Compare this text and 1 John iii. 3, with Acts xv. 9, and with Titus ii. 14, and Eph. v. 26, where purification of the heart is ascribed to God.

† See "Aids to Reflection," p. 243, note.

tion, that it is a gift bestowed upon the members of the Christian Church *different in kind* from any that was received by men before the institution of Baptism, is founded on the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, together with that of St. Paul in the second chapter of Colossians, which, as they allege, plainly intimates that Christ, after his Resurrection and Ascension, bestowed spiritual blessings upon the world, which it could not have known before he came in the flesh. It seems to me that this argument proves too much for those who make use of it; for even they cannot deny that men pleased God and obtained the world to come, before the *way unto the holiest of all was yet made manifest*; but the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches, that there is but one Redemption, but one way of entering the Holy of Holies which is above, that is the blood of Christ. There is abundant internal evidence in this discourse, that the contrast intended is not principally between the spiritual state of the world before and after the manifestation of our Saviour, but between the Law and the Gospel, the Jewish ritual and the ministration of the Spirit.* Christ gave to the world, after He *had been made flesh and dwelt among us*, a new Dispensation of spiritual life, a system of means and provisions designed to give greater effect to the covenant of grace which he had entered into with mankind from the beginning, a fuller knowledge of himself, with ampler opportunities of obtaining inward power to profit by

* *Author vero Epistolæ ad Hebræos fædus respicit evangelicum, quatenus per ac post adventum Christi plenissime revelatum, atque consummato Redemptoris nostri sacrificio sancitum fuit; qua acceptione abolito fæderi Mosaico successit. Ex. Cens. Append. ad Ex. Anim. xvii. 7.*

that knowledge. To this institution, all the Gospel promises have a *special*, but surely not an exclusive application. *The Holy Ghost was not yet given*, says St. John, in reference to the outpouring of the Spirit in the day of Pentecost. No one will say that these words are to be understood to the letter. Why then must a literal interpretation of a like mode of expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews—a mode obviously serving to animation and emphasis—be insisted on? Yet, if we affirm, with Pearson* and Bull,† and our English divines in general, that a

* See in his Exposition of the Creed, article v. p. 247, folio, the paragraph in which he declares it most infallibly certain that the death of Christ was as powerful and effectual for the Redemption of the Saints before Him as for those which follow Him; and in Article x. this passage: “Now as to the Atonement made by the sacrifices, it clearly had relation to the death of the Messias, and whatsoever virtue was in them did operate through his death alone. As he was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, so all atonements which were ever made, were only effectual by his blood. But though no sin was ever forgiven but by virtue of that satisfaction, though God was never reconciled unto any sinner but by intuition of that propitiation, yet the general doctrine of remission of sins was never *clearly revealed, and publicly preached* to all nations till the coming of the Saviour of the world, whose name was therefore called Jesus, because he was to *save his people from their sins.*”

“Being, therefore, we are assured, that the preaching Remission of sins belongeth not only certainly, but *in some sense peculiarly*, to the Church of Christ, it will be next considerable how this Remission is conferred upon any person in the Church.”

On Article viii. he describes the giving of the Holy Ghost after Christ’s glorification as “the plentiful effusion of it;” that it came to man at that period in a wholly new way, as to its internal character, he nowhere intimates.

See also his language on Article ix. p. 354.

† Harm. Apost. Diss. Post. x. 6. *Examen. Censura Resp. ad Animadv.* xxi. Bishop Bull’s resolute assertion, that spiritual knowledge and advantages were possessed by the old world, that the grace of Christ came, not to the worthies of Scripture alone, but to the good and pious in general, whose names are

fuller manifestation of Christ, an ampler dispensation of grace, with a new method of its distribution, is the character of the Christian æra, we are met by those teachers who have formed their faith, if not founded it, on the words of the Fathers, rather than on the words of the Apostles, that this is not the voice of the Bible, and that we must stick a little closer to the obvious meaning of the sacred text. Yet even St. Augustine, that great dogmatist on Christian Baptism, who wound such painful cords around himself and others, by insisting on a stricter interpretation of our Lord's declaration of the indispensability of a New Birth by water than right reason warrants, gave up but half his mind to the hard notions which this dogma necessitates. Who can read his work, *De Civitate Dei*, and believe that he saw a wide and *essential* difference betwixt good men before the manifestation of Christ, and good men after,* or ima-

mentioned only in the *book of life*, excited the spleen of Warburton,† who, as Mr. Coleridge observes, “dressed up with such trappings and trammels of erudition” a contrary opinion, “in direct contempt of the plain meaning of the Church's Article.” The Gospel was preached from the beginning, and surely not to a favoured few alone, but, in some sense, to every heart and conscience. It was the Israelites in general of whom St. Paul says, that they *drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them which Rock was Christ*; (1 Cor. x. 4.) and the writer to the Hebrews speaks indefinitely of numbers who were examples of heavenly-mindedness, and witnesses to divine truth. The whole scriptural argument for this view is set forth by Bishop Bull in his Sermons on Psalm ciii. 15, 16, 17, and on Heb. xi. 26.

* The spiritual privileges and dispositions of men who lived in times before that which may emphatically be called *the day of grace*, are taught and implied throughout St. Augustine's “City of God;” but I would particularly call to notice the strain of chapter 47, of the 18th book, in which, after affirming that, although there was no other people which could properly

† Divine Legation, Book vi. Note A.

gined that the former had but moral virtues, not the graces of the Spirit; or that, if they had a spirituality, it was of an inferior order to ours, and not essentially Christian; or that they were but *occasionally* helped,

be called *the people of God* except the children of Israel, yet it could not be denied but that, in other nations also, there were individual men belonging to the true Israelites, citizens of the country that is above, he goes on to say: "But doubtless it was divinely provided, that, by this thing alone, we might know how that, even among other nations, there might be men who lived according to God and pleased Him, pertaining to the spiritual Jerusalem. A thing which, it is to be believed, could have been vouchsafed to no one, save to whom had been divinely revealed the *one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus*; who was so foretold to the ancient Saints as about to come in the flesh, even as He has been announced to us to have already come, that through Him one and the same faith may bring to God all that are predestinated to the City of God, the House of God, the Temple of God." This same thought is reproduced by Luther in his Commentary on Galatians,† and it appears again in our Homilies, and in Taylor's Treatise Of The Real Presence, sect. vi. 10.

Bp. Bull cites some very striking sentences of Augustine to the same effect, in the *Examen Censuræ*—as that even in the times of the Old Testament there were spiritually righteous men, *quos non occidebat litera jubens, sed vivificabat spiritus juvans—qui in sacramentis V. T. viventes, ad N. T. quod tum occultabatur, occulte pertinerent*. How should they *not* be spiritual who fulfilled the spiritual law, as Irenæus and Tertullian declare, and we know from Holy Writ, that the Saints of old did; who, as St. Augustine affirms, had the law of Christ given to them? But if spiritual life procured by Christ's death was in existence for *any man*, before the crucifixion of our Lord at Calvary, there can be no reason, in the nature of the thing, why it might not exist for *all men*. If Abraham and Elijah benefited by the Atonement of Christ, before it was acted out on the theatre of the world, (and it seems to be admitted that spiritual life *was* in existence for *them* and a favoured few beside, even by those who represent it as non-existent for all around them,) it is vain to say that others *could* have no such blessing *because* the Atonement as yet was not.

† Chap. iii. ver. 7. "By this we may see that the faith of our fathers in the Old Testament, and ours now in the New is all one," &c.

not *constantly* sustained, as to their higher life, by God ; or that their best works were done out of Him by His aid, not *in* as well as *by* Him ? Compare with this dogma the doctrine of God's omnipresence laid down in the "Lectures on Justification," vi. 161.* How can we rationally confine the sustaining presence of Deity to spiritual life within the pale of the visible Christian Church ? Were Seth and Enoch alive in the Spirit only once now and then ?

That this interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is not the *prima facie* meaning of the text, at least of one part of it, I admit. An uninstructed reader, who had never maturely weighed the scheme of salvation through Christ, deducible from the whole teaching of Scripture, or one who was incapable of keeping all the parts of it steadily before his mind at all times, would naturally suppose, from some of the language of this discourse, that remission of sins and all spiritual blessings were first procured for mankind when the blood of the Lamb first flowed upon earth, when the Saviour's visible tangible body was nailed to a material cross : for *this* is the obvious and literal sense of it. The Anti-Protestant doctrine, that the men of old time were enabled to work out their own salvation, and obtained the grace of Christ in a certain sense, but that they did not obtain the same sort of grace, nor become acceptable to God by the same sort of gift as Christians, is as far from the outside meaning of the text as that which I hold to be more

* This appears to be fundamentally the same as that taught in the *Aids to Reflection* ; only what Mr. Coleridge says of all spiritual vitality is, in the work named above, applied to the regenerate condition of members of the Christian Church. See *Comment on the VIth Moral and Religious Aphorism*.

consonant with reason and the general tenor of Scripture. According to the letter of the document, in certain chapters, hope of a better world was first brought in when our Lord came in the flesh, before whose birth at Bethlehem, types and shadows of heavenly things were all that men had of heaven, and perishable toys of earth the most substantial blessings which they obtained from their Father above. But even the simplest reader of the Epistle to the Hebrews must plainly perceive, before he comes to the end of it, that the sacred writer *could* not have meant to be taken thus at the foot of the letter. He will find it plainly laid down in the discourse itself, that the Saints of old obtained the blessings of the Covenant of grace; that faith, the key of the kingdom of Christ, was in their hands; that by some means or other, "they had a future state in their eye, and lived by the faith of it as well as we." Then if he goes back to the Epistle to the Romans, he will find that the characteristic blessing of the New Covenant, *to have our sins and iniquities remembered no more*, (Heb. x. 17.) is imputed by St. Paul to one who lived long before the day of Jesus of Nazareth, (Rom. iv. 7, 8, 9, 10.) and he will feel at once, without any long train of reasoning, or artificial process of argument, that *to have the divine law put into the heart and written in the mind*, must pertain to all justified persons, who walk in the commandments of the Lord blameless, let them have lived at what period of the world's history they may, although it may be emphatically described as the blessing of a peculiar æra.*

* "On account of the inestimable plenitude of grace," says Calvin, "which has been displayed to us in Christ, the celestial kingdom of God is justly said to have been erected in the earth at his advent." *Institutes*, Book II. chap. ix. 4.

To make a certain portion of the discourse to the Hebrews, that contained in the four chapters preceding the 11th, square with other parts of undoubted revelation, we must fill up the blank spaces of the sketch, whereby the character of the whole will doubtless be altered. The only question is, *how* we are to fill out and modify the language of those chapters, not whether they are to be understood according to their bare literal import; and I contend, that the mode of explaining it which presented itself to the understandings of many among the primitive Christians, that, in some undefinable way, the righteousness of the old world was different from our righteousness, that the blood of Christ was not applied to the ancient Saints till after the material blood had been shed upon earth,* that after they had finished their course, had been purified by the *same spirit of faith*, (2 Cor. iv. 13.) as that by which St. Paul spake, had performed the law that is spiritual, and holy, and just, had pleased God and won heaven, the power unto salvation procured by the Atonement was yet to be conferred upon them, is not the soundest nor the best, nor ever was so universal nor so consistently maintained among the early Christian writers, as to deserve the name of Catholic.† Christ has promised to be always with

* "That the material blood itself is applied to the souls of sinners, no one can pretend: that which saves is a spiritual energy resulting from the sacrifice of Christ. *They* are the rationalists, the searchers into and pronouncers upon the inscrutable, who take upon them to deny that this sacrifice *could* operate savingly in man before it had been acted otherwise than as "a *Fiat* of the Eternal."

† St. Augustine, *miserabile dictu!* has declared it *not* absurd to believe that the ancient Saints, who believed in Christ to come, were in the realms below, *donec eos inde sanguis Christi et ad ea loca descensus erueret!* *De Civit. Dei*, xx. 15. Many of the speculations of this work, spiritual as it is in the main, are of the like unsubstantial character; spun out of words and

his Church, and why may not the doctrine of grace, held in substance from the beginning, be more clearly explained, for the satisfaction of the intellect, but ultimately for a spiritual purpose, as time goes on and thought advances ?

It should be observed, that the sort of departure from the *first appearance* of the text here maintained to be necessary, is of a very different kind from that which I have so strongly protested against, in certain interpretations of passages of Holy Writ, wherein sonship to God is characterized. These last directly contradict direct assertions of the inspired writers ;— whereas *they* declare, that incapability of sinning is of the essence of regeneration, the former maintain that it is *not* essential to it, but that the new birth may be predicated of those who remain capable of becoming scandalous sinners ; whereas *they* teach, that to walk in the Spirit is a sign of divine sonship, the former insist that no outward conduct can be a criterion of it ; and, at the same time, it is an article of faith with them, that what they call regeneration was a doctrine delivered to the Church by those very same writers who give so different an account of the new birth in Scripture. It is not thus that I propose to deal with the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews : I would not run counter to its statements, or disregard the spirit of them, but only place them in their due relation to other Scriptural truths contained in the same Epistle, and in the New Testament

sensuous language, not founded on ideas. I believe, too, that the contest with Pelagius, who was not wrong in *everything*, led this great Father of much of our divinity into some extravagances. The particular *dream* here adverted to is well treated by Pearson in his *Expos. of the Creed*, Art. V.

generally. The way of salvation through Christ, in virtue of his Incarnation, Death, and Passion, is *a new and living way*, in reference to the Jewish ceremonial; and the Covenant of grace came into effect in an especial sense, when the Gospel was promulgated. It is plain enough, upon a consideration of the whole Epistle, that the writer is not speaking directly of individual salvation, nor contradicting, as, according to the *literal* view of this discourse, he must be supposed to contradict, what St. Paul teaches of the evangelical blessedness of Abraham, and his justification by grace, through *the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*. He is comparing the Christian religion with the Mosaic Law, the Visible Christian Church, its gifts and privileges with the Levitical system: and, as the manifested life and death of Christ are essential parts of the eternal redemption, and symbols of the whole of it,* we may even give a literal sense, though not ex-

* From a Note on Donne, Serm. iv. Luke ii. 29, 30.—“O! would that Donne, or rather that Luther before him, had carried out this just conception,” (that the preparation which Simeon had in his epiphany, in his visible seeing of Christ then, is offered to us in this epiphany, this manifestation and application of Christ in the Sacrament,) “to its legitimate consequences;—that as the sacrament of the Eucharist is the epiphany for as many as receive it in faith, so the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension of Christ himself in the flesh, were the epiphanies, the sacramental acts and *phenomena* of the *Deus patiens*, the visible words of the invisible Word that was in the beginning, symbols in time and historic fact of the redemptive functions, passions, and procedures of the Lamb crucified from the foundation of the world;—the incarnation, cross, and passion,—in short, the whole life of Christ in the flesh, dwelling a man among men, being essential and substantive parts of the process, the total of which they represented: and on this account proper symbols of the acts and passions of the Christ dwelling in man, as the Spirit of truth, and for as many as in faith have received him, in Seth and Abraham no less effectually than in John and Paul! For this is the true definition of a symbol, as distinguished from the thing on the one hand, and from a mere metaphor, or conventional exponent of a thing, on

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clusively of a deeper one, to the expressions of the Sacred Writer respecting them.

Upon the present subject it is worth while to observe, for the satisfaction of those who would carefully consider the genuine contents of the Sacred Text itself, that whereas we hear much, in certain theological schools, concerning the *righteousness* of the world before Christ came in the flesh, and its undefinable inferiority, (though some attempts at defining it *are* made,) to that which came in at the *day of Pentecost*, we read only in the *Bible* of its sin and wickedness, *whenever its condition is contrasted* with that of the Saints under the New Dispensation. From Holy Writ we learn that Christ came to put away *unrighteousness*; that He came to supersede any sort of righteousness we are taught by uninspired pens alone. It is constantly implied in Scripture, that they who come to Him have passed away not from mere morality, or a humbler spirituality, but from utter darkness and death, or at least from a system of shadows to a dispensation of light and life. *With whom was He grieved forty years? Was it not with them that had sinned? And to whom sware He that they should not enter into His rest, but to them that believed not?*

the other." *Literary Remains*, vol. iii. pp. 109-10. It seems to me that there is no stable middle ground, no solid standing-place betwixt this "great idea, this master-truth," as Mr. Coleridge calls it, and that "miserable Tridentinism" which represents the old world to be as *good as dead* in point of spiritual life, the Church of God, before the manifestation of Christ, to have been no Church of God at all, but a congregation gathered together like swine, and supplied with no better food by their Father in heaven, than "the husks of earthly vanities." This "wicked construction" is vehemently denounced by Field, *On the Church*, Book I. Chap. 4.

Unless then we go so far as to say, what Scripture itself negatives, that *every* Gentile before Christ's Advent, was *given over to a reprobate mind* and *filled with all unrighteousness*,* and that every Jew had his conversation among the Gentiles, and walked *according to the prince of the power of the air*, (and both Peter and Paul repeatedly assure us that the sons of Abraham were *even as others*,† partaking their ungodliness,) how can we allege the words of Holy Writ, as the warrant for that comparison betwixt *good men* before the appearing of our Lord and good men after, so deeply disparaging the first, which some theorists insist upon? Does the letter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as they aver, establish it? Nay, but the letter of that discourse subverts it; for it proves, by its very silence, as well as by its pronounced voice, that to introduce a new kind of internal holiness, and to supplant the holiness of ancient times, was not the object of the Christian Dispensation. To strengthen, to deepen, to extend what heavenly excellence had subsisted upon earth from the beginning, through the *Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, was the New Jerusalem founded. In the whole *volume of the book* not a syllable is written depreciatory of the faith and love and obedience that was found among men before *the holy city came down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband*.‡

For an explanation of the last verse of the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, shewing its

* *Romans* i. 28-9.

† *Romans* ii. 1. *Eph.* ii. 3. 1 *Pet.* iv. 5, &c.

‡ *Rev.* xxi. 2.

consistency with the views above stated, I refer the reader to Dr. Hammond's Paraphrase and Annotations on the New Testament. That "devout and laborious" writer shews, and, as it seems to me, satisfactorily, that the *promise* expected by those who sought a *better country*, crowned, as some of them were, with temporal prosperity in this life, the *κρεῖττόν τι*, without which their hope could not be fulfilled, their faith accomplished or perfected,* refers to the establishment of the Church of Christ upon earth, and the triumph of the Christian religion outwardly over the powers of the world, not to the application of the benefits of our Lord's Atonement to the holy and justified individuals who thus hoped and believed. It is too great an outrage to sense and reason to maintain, that those believers in Christ to come, those witnesses to divine truth, *of whom the world was not worthy*, lived and died without having their

* The Greek verb *τελειῶν* signifies, in a general way, to give an end or consummation to anything; when passively used, it often denotes that they of whom it is spoken, have *gained their ends*, whatever they be, the particular meaning depending on the context. In *Heb. x. 1—14*, it doubtless means to *obtain remission of sin*, because this is the end and aim of those who offer sacrifice for sin; in *Heb. vii. 11*, *τελείωσις* is the attainment of such remission; in *Heb. xii. 23*, *the spirits of just men made perfect*, are the souls of the righteous who have received their reward; in *Phil. iii. 12*, *τετελείωμαι*, relates to an apprehension of spiritual aims; in *Heb. xi. 31*, the word rendered *should be made perfect*, must certainly be construed with reference to a reception of the *promise* mentioned in the preceding verse. Now the subject of the promise we find plainly described in verses 22-3-4 of the following chapter: it was *the heavenly Jerusalem*, where indeed *remission of sin* is especially to be found, but which, as an outward and visible institution, founded at a particular time, can by no means be said to have an entire monopoly of it. See Hammond's notes on the term *perfected*, in his *Paraphrase and Annotations*; and Bull's *Harm. Apost. Diss. Pr. ii. 5*. "The word *τετελείωμαι*," says the former, "is an agonistical word, and signifies likewise the being *crowned or receiving the reward*."

sins forgiven them: and to say that there are two kinds of remission of sin, whereof the old world had only the first and poorest, is to make a new Gospel, which reason and conscience do not substantiate and verify as they do the old. The ancient Saints, though they lived before the establishment of the Visible Church, were *heirs of the righteousness that is by faith*. God had *prepared for them a city*; and can we doubt that on their departure from this world, they entered the Jerusalem that is altogether above, that part of it which is *passed into the heavens*, though they never entered the New Jerusalem upon earth? *

Farther Objections to the Mediæval View.

SUCH are some of the Scriptural objections to the doctrine which states, that in Baptism the soul is invested all at once with a garment of grace, while

* On the unity of the way of salvation Bishop Jewel speaks thus in his "Apology:" "*Neve quis dicat hæc in lege tantum, in umbra atque infantia contigisse, cum figuris et cærimoniis veritas tegeretur, cum nihil adhuc ad perfectum adductum esset, cum lex non in cordibus hominum, sed in lapidibus incideretur, (etsi ridiculum est illud quoque); idem enim omnino erat etiam tum Deus, idem Spiritus, idem Christus, eadem fides, eadem doctrina, eadem spes, eadem hæreditas, idem fædus, eadem vis verbi Dei: et Eusebius ait: Omnes fideles usque ab Adamo, re quidem ipsa Christianos fuisse, (quamvis non ita dicerentur:) ne quis, inquam, ita dicat Paulus Apostolus jam tum in Evangelio, in perfectione, in luce, similes errores et lapsus deprehendit. The same Spirit, the same Christ, the same Covenant! May we not add with Bishop Bull, the same Gospel preached from the beginning?*

If we ascend to the Apostolical Fathers, we find that they saw the subject in a very similar light. The ninth Section of the Epistle of St. Ignatius to the Philadelphians, beginning *Καλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς* gives a brief summary of the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews, not discrepant from that which I have brought forward: "The priests," says this ancient teacher, "are good,

the robe of renewal is put on gradually afterwards; as if regeneration were like the warp that is first stretched on the loom, and renovation like the woof interwoven, thread by thread. But, further, we conceive that the tenet is unmeaning and incoherent in itself. For what is meant by a spiritual endowment, which neither potentiates the reason, nor energizes the moral being, nor strengthens the intellectual nor the physical faculties? What is that grace which *beautifies the soul* without giving it any of those perfections of the heart and spirit, which to the meditative mind "alone seem truly fair." Abstract from an angel's nature superior goodness, intelligence and power, and what remains that is superhuman? He whose will is in bondage, though he may have a potentiality of righteousness,* has as yet no actual power to be righteous at all. But an inherent potentiality of righteousness we have from the first Adam: a capability of entering into communion with God, and becoming a new creature by such communion, belongs to man as man: Christ never

but much better is the High Priest, who alone has had the secret things of God entrusted to Him: *He being the door of the Father; through which enter in Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and the Prophets, and the Apostles, and the Church.* Πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐνότητά Θεοῦ. All these things converge and fall into the unity of God. But the Gospel has somewhat pre-eminent, the appearing (τὴν παρουσίαν,) of our Lord Jesus Christ, his death and passion." In Section v. of the same epistle he speaks thus: "Let us also love the Prophets, forasmuch as they have led us to the Gospel, and to hope in Christ, and to expect Him. *In whom also believing they were saved in the unity of Jesus Christ; being holy men, worthy to be loved and had in wonder; who have received testimony from Jesus Christ, and are numbered in the Gospel of our common hope.*"

* "All that Taylor can make out is, that Baptism effects a potentiality in a potentiality, or a chalking of chalk to make white white." *The Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, p. 290.

died to *give* us this, but to call it into action; to awaken the spirit within us; to justify, to sanctify, to glorify it by union with His own.

Now to say that God sent His only Son into the world to bestow upon the world that which it already possessed, would be intolerable; consequently, if we maintain the scheme in question, we are driven to the hypothesis of two different kinds of righteousness, or ways of becoming righteous. It is ruled, and, in case we hold fast to this Anti-Protestant view, we can but assent to the rule, that the ancient Saints, though they are cited as examples of a steadfast faith, which rendered the course of their lives righteous, though they *endured* as seeing Him who is Invisible, had but occasional aids, not the constant presence and indwelling of the Holy Spirit, such as Christians enjoy; while on the other hand, they that have been outwardly washed at the font, though by no means redeemed from their vain conversation, but carnal as the Corinthians, having still to *purge out the old leaven*, are filled with the Holy Ghost, and have the Divine Spirit abiding in them; it is laid down, and we must acquiesce in the sentence, that they who partook of Christ as well as we, to whom the Gospel was preached as well as to us, had a different kind of righteousness from the baptized world; a righteousness not evangelical, not Christian. Assertions like these are hardly to be dealt with by argument: if we urge that black is black, and white is white, and it is said in reply: "Nay, but the blackness and whiteness of which *I* speak, are essentially different from those to which *you* refer;" we can but wonder and hold our peace. So likewise, That righteousness, like the Sun of Righteousness Himself, is the same

yesterday, to-day, and for ever, is no subject for demonstration; they who can need proof of such a point would regard none that could be given. If a man affirms that the simplest child under the New Dispensation is *more* holy than Abraham or Moses, this I can understand, though I may find it hard to believe; or if it be said that he has, in some respects, far higher opportunities of becoming righteous, this I can understand and can believe also: but to assert that he has a better and nobler *kind* of righteousness actually introduced into his soul, though he has yet but little faith, little charity, little self-denial or love of God, this does appear to me, I own, to be a divorcing of words from the thoughts which properly belong to them.*

To look at another side of the question, great diffi-

* It is strange that men should cite, in behalf of this notion, those texts in which *the least in the Kingdom of Heaven* is set above John the Baptist; for surely those same texts furnish a key to an interpretation of Scripture by which it is set aside. Our Lord was speaking of that eminent Saint in his public character, as the converter of hearts, who prepared the way for Christ. *Among them that are born of woman there is not a greater*, said our Lord; he did not say a *more righteous* or a *holier*; there is not a *greater prophet*; he said not a *better man*. "He is not there commending the persons of men," says Calvin, "but, after having preferred John to all the Prophets, He allots the highest degree of honour to the preaching of the Gospel."† Who doubts that the New Dispensation and its ministers are higher than the Old? But were good men who lived under the Old Dispensation nothing more than what that Dispensation made them: was their faith, and righteousness, their justice, mercy, and truth, a mere shadow, because the Levitical rites and ceremonies shadowed forth the *body which is Christ*? The substance and the shadow preclude not each other; they are side by side in the ministration of the Spirit. Men had *under* the law, as Bp. Bull teaches, much more than they had *by* the law.

† *Institutes*, Book ii. Ch. ix. v.

culties and contradictions attend the belief that a store of spiritual life is laid up in the soul in Holy Baptism, whereof more or less, as may happen, is made use of afterwards ; that, in the ceremonial act, Christ comes to us as he can never come again from that time forth for evermore, this indwelling of the Spirit in the soul, being an entirely distinct thing from His actuation of the will, whereby we lead a life of righteousness. For which of these several endowments carries along with it salvation and heavenly felicity? We cannot sever it from the first, for *He who hath the Son, hath life* : and *If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in us, by His Spirit dwelling in us our mortal bodies shall also be quickened ; for The Spirit is life because of righteousness.* But neither can we deny that it belongs properly to the latter : since *glory, and honour, and immortality, wait on patient continuance in well doing, and This is life eternal to know God and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent.* It is the presence of the Divine Spirit in the soul that renders it pleasing in God's sight (Romans viii. 8, 9. 1 Pet. i. 2) ; yet how can such acceptability be entire, where purity and holiness are not only imperfect, but almost wanting? Does God love that soul in a high and special sense, which, even in comparison with many frail mortals, but faintly or scarce at all reflects his image ; in which the features of his Son barely begin to be manifested amid a far stronger general resemblance to those of the Prince of this world? Our original potentiality of union with Christ, which belongs to us as creatures endued with will, reason, understanding, has salvation conditionally annexed to it ; and the same may be said of the outward potentiality, which we acquire in being enrolled members of

the visible and outward Church ; but to affirm that an *inward* gift of the Spirit, even the inhabitation of Christ, if retained to the last, does not necessarily instate the possessor in bliss, would be to contradict Scripture ; and yet if such a gift does not secure the possessor from being *almost in all evil*, how can we believe that it has heaven inseparably annexed to it without coming into conflict with the Bible in another way ? Would those carnal Corinthians who defrauded their brethren, had they died without improving their spiritual privileges any more than they seem to have done when St. Paul remonstrated with them, have entered at once into a fulness of bliss, proportioned to the fulness of their *inward* gifts ? Would they have been put on a par with the *good and faithful servant* who is permitted, *because he has improved* his talent, to enter into the joy of his Lord ? How so, if men are to be judged *according to their works* ? How not, if, in spite of their fraud and envy, they yet have Christ living in them, they in Him, and He in them ? Can the branches abide in the vine, yet be cast out and burned ? Can a man have the kingdom of heaven within him when he dies, yet be shut out from heaven after death ? On the other hand, to say that these men had utterly quenched the Spirit, and, like Pharaoh, sinned themselves out of a possibility of repentance, would be awful indeed.

Such are the consequences, which, to many minds, appear to flow from the Anti-protestant theory of justification ; that they are contemplated by the propounders of that theory, I am very far from supposing ; on the contrary, they continually use language that seems to negative them, and are wont to maintain that all who see any such consequences of their system,

entirely misapprehend it. They frequently speak as if the Sacred Presence, or Divine Power, or Virtue, or Glory, which constitutes our acceptability in God's sight, were capable of increase and of decrease; as if it were liable to waste before the broad bold face of sin, like wax beside a glowing furnace, or rivulets beneath a cloudless summer's sun. They declare it to be a mysterious gift, which is first conveyed into us in Baptism, afterwards, still more sacredly, in the Holy Communion; which is given partly here, and about to be given more fully hereafter. But herein is the difficulty, that they describe this possession as irrespective of the conversion of the will to God; the soul of the baptized infant is pervaded with the heavenly effluence; the baptized adult receives it in its fulness, although he has as yet put on Christ but in part. It is obvious then to inquire what is the eternal prospect of this latter subject of regeneration, if he dies directly after his baptism, or before he has entirely lost his baptismal gift? Has he a crown of righteousness laid up for him, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give him at that day? Or is he to enter heaven without one? Crowned or uncrowned, he is surely entitled to dwell in the presence of God for ever by reason of the *perfect inward* gift of which he dies possessed. Yet if a solemn truth be indicated by those words of the Preacher, *in what place soever the tree falleth, there it lieth*; if that be true which the martyr Cyprian said, *Qualem te invenit Dominus cum vocat, talem pariter et judicat*; if our portion above shall be proportioned to our holiness here below; and if *Christ at that day will give to every man according as his work shall be*; how can we reconcile our minds to a belief that many baptized persons leave

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this world, having a store of spiritual life still remaining in them, of which their Christian proficiency is not the gauge and measure? An endowment which does not necessarily reform the moral being upon earth, will not necessarily, it might well be supposed, endue it with blessedness above; yet who can venture to say that a gift of so exalted a nature as that, of which we are treating, can fail to place the owner in the highest heaven? * Though unimproved here, yet when the world and the flesh are withdrawn, "the material organism that rendered the man temptible to evil" done away, it must surely work its full effect. It is obvious at once that the notion of a purgatory intervening betwixt the soul's departure from this world, and its entrance into final bliss and fulness of glory, is the natural and necessary pendant to such a scheme as has been described; and yet a painless purgatory, which Anglican Anti-protestants can alone venture upon, though not so plainly contradicted, is yet as

* Observe that according to the *metaphysique* of the doctrine in question, the Sacred Presence, in and by itself, apart from its acceptance by the will or its work in us, is that which properly constitutes our acceptability with God; not Christ living in our hearts, and, so far as He lives in them, enlivening them; but Christ present in our souls, ready to quicken and convert them, when they can receive His influence. The gift is thus represented as a potentiality of being *made just*, not as a mere potentiality of being justified. And, if there were any such Sacred Presence, a distinct thing from Divine Efficacy enabling the human will to raise itself above itself, and to be one with that of God; and if it could be shewn that the great Promise of the Gospel, in which no less than our eternal well-being is comprehended, respects this Sacred Presence, we could not believe otherwise than that, in and by itself alone, it must entitle us to heaven. But, were there no other means of proving its unreality, we might suspect it from hence, that it divides the grounds of our acceptance with God into two sorts, which do not necessarily go together.

unwarranted by God's word as the fearfulest den of torture which a monkish imagination ever portrayed, and in one point of view is far more demoralizing in its tendency. No self-indulgent nominal Christian, no lingerer before the strait gate and narrow way, will, in the present life indeed, give broad pieces or lands to escape any such comfortable half-way house betwixt this world and the heavenlier part of that to come ; he will rather feel it a relief and a respite, that he has no chance of passing at once into the company of saints and angels, when he knows himself, if the answer of his conscience may decide the question, to have little that is saintly and angelic about him ; he will rather enjoy the thought of an intermediate sojourn, where he is sure to obtain, by some means or other, those qualifications for heaven which he took but little pains to *work out* for himself here. The tenet thus explained has not the remotest tendency to enrich or aggrandize the clergy ; but so far as it is taken into the mind, and becomes something more than a subject of discussion, it must surely serve to take the sting out of all their dehortatory preaching. We may revert too little to our Baptism ; but this doctrine, if conscience did not continually unsay what it says, would make our Baptism a down cushion to fall back and repose upon through life. It is not to be denied that this whole subject of individual salvation is full of darkness : it would seem to our apprehensions, if we permitted ourselves to speculate on such a point, that there must be many persons, who, though quite unfit for heaven, are yet scarce worthy of eternal burnings : but it should be remembered that when our Lord was questioned on this very subject, he gave no direct answer ; and it is plain enough, that the uncertainty,

whether or no we shall escape the worst, unless we are doing our best, when our Lord comes to look for us, is of high spiritual use. Moreover it is one thing to say, "I cannot see through the cloud;" and quite another to maintain that the confused shapes, which present themselves to us athwart the misty atmosphere, are the very forms of real objects.

Finally, is it not fair to ask of those who would reconcile this doctrine with reason, which its Antirationalist defenders leave no stone unturned to effect, only taking refuge in total darkness and mystery, when they have vainly sought a secure resting-place in the regions of light; how it stands with consistency to represent a gift which is capable of being passively received by the soul, as at the same time liable to be barred out by actual and positive sin? If the Sanctifier is not from the first admitted into the *will*, why should any affection of the will prevent His entrance into the *soul*, considered exclusively of the will? To affirm this, is not only a contradiction in metaphysics, but it is against the clear analogy of Scripture; for in respect of the *χαρίσματα*, "the qualities and perfections bestowed upon men," not for their own private edification, but, "for the better enabling them to preach the Gospel, and to settle the Christian religion in the world;" gifts which, we may conjecture, *were* passively received, as much as those pertaining to the body, the conferring of which "was an act of power requiring only an object," * respecting *these* we know, from Holy Writ, that they might belong to persons who were as nothing in the sight of God, and that there was a *more excellent way*, with which the possession

* *Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, iii. 289.

of them was not necessarily united.* This indeed is in strict harmony with the whole system and constitution of the manifested, outwardly operative Church of Christ; wherein to minister instrumentally to the inward blessedness of another, and to obtain a share of that inward blessedness, are things practically separable, and which, doubtless, often are separated in fact. It must be carefully borne in mind, that, according to the theory under examination, the new birth is represented as wholly passive even in adults, as passive as our birth by nature; nothing that we can do helps to bring it to pass, although, strange to say, unless we do a great deal it will not come to pass, if the will is actualized within us. Most justly might it be said of *such* a regeneration, that there is "nothing impossible in the very notion of" its "being accorded even to impenitent sinners;" and nevertheless, we must believe it to consist in the hallowing presence of the Spirit of Holiness to our inmost being,—in the *renewing of the Holy Ghost*.

Our innate potentiality of gaining the *spiritual mind*, to possess which is *life and peace*, is of course a predicate of the *will*; it is simply that capability of receiving divine influence, which is an essential constituent of its nature. But this is infinite. To talk of our gaining by Baptism another such potentiality, another "possibility of being saved, and arriving to a supernatural felicity," is it not as if we were to imagine that Time might be rendered more successive than at present, or that a new and superior length, depth, and breadth might be conferred upon Space?

* Respecting mere *gifts* of the Spirit, as distinguished from "*powers to do actions spiritual*," Taylor observes, that "even the wicked have them." *Liberty of Prophesying*, Sect. xviii.

Those, however, who maintain that a latent spiritual principle is infused into the soul in the first Sacrament, and that this, not the conversion of potential goodness within us into actual, is the primary regeneration, would perhaps reply to the objection stated above, that although this principle effects no change in the will from unrighteous to righteous, it yet concerns the will, as does that original susceptibility just spoken of, and therefore it is intelligible why operative sin has power to keep it back. But it is not possible to make the two ends of this theory agree with each other. For it is quite inevident why such a dormant principle might not be received by the faithless and unrepenting, since there is no opposition, no oppugnancy betwixt potential righteousness and actual sinfulness. Even while we are *dead in trespasses and sins* we still possess a soul to be saved,—a suspended vitality; but when the Spirit quickens us, or brings us to life, *we cannot do the things that we would*. Undoubtedly the term *awakened*, which men commonly use in speaking of an actual conversion, rather refers to life already possessed, than to the original grant of it. But who can say that this previous life, or capability of living, comes only in Baptism? Was not St. Paul *awakened* when the Lord called to him out of heaven? They who were *pricked to the heart* at the preaching of Peter, were not they awakened *before* they were baptized, and baptized because they *had been* awakened? Is it not enough to say that of this divine mystery, the quickening of man's spirit to eternal life, Christ's Holy Ordinance of Baptism is a perpetual witness and a most impressive monitor, at the same time that it is a powerful instrument in the hand of God for bringing it to pass, as a living reality

in the hearts and minds of men? Do we really promote the cause of Christian truth by adding the exclusive sentence, that "regeneration is the gift of God, bestowed by Him, in this life, *in Baptism only?*"

A good and evil principle are both imputable to man, and these two co-exist in one human soul; but, surely the good principle is preferred to the headship and government of the spiritual republic, so soon as ever the Spirit of Christ has taken up his abode within it. Are we treating this awful subject with due seriousness and reverence, when, after winding up and down in the labyrinth of metaphysical divinity, till we have almost lost sight of the Bible, and its plain appeals to reason and the moral sense, we sit down at last with the conclusion that the Sacred Presence of Christ, the great and glorious gift wrought out by the Atonement, may abide in the soul of man without replenishing it with righteousness; that all it *necessarily* does, is to endue it with a latent capability, such as even the wickedest of men must be supposed to possess till they are absolutely reprobate? Is it not far safer as well as more evangelical to believe that we have Christ in us, in a sense pertaining to salvation, only just so far as we are renewed in the spirit of our minds? If our whole *spiritual* nature is changed in Baptism, our whole *moral* nature being as yet unchanged, what spiritual gift can we yet be capable of receiving, either by the Eucharist or in any other way; and how can we reconcile this notion of a permanent character impressed upon the soul at the outset of our Christian career, with that other notion of a heavenly emanation, or effluence, or glory, which fluctuates and varies according to the state of the will, and of which fresh supplies may be given throughout the course of life?

Which of these is *the* gift of the Gospel? Or can we combine the two and make one of them?

Such difficulties attend the belief that the indwelling of Christ in the regenerate, is a distinct and *separable* thing from the conversion of the soul to holiness by the power of the Spirit. To set them aside unexamined, on the plea that they are founded on antecedent reasoning, would be "the greatest vanity in the world." When intellectual processes issue in conclusions, which come into conflict with plain truths of revelation and of conscience, we have the best of reasons for knowing that they *must* be fallacious. But *these* reasonings are set on foot for the sake of ascertaining the sense of revealed truths, not in defiance of truths the sense of which is already ascertained; they are obedient servants to conscience and universal experience, not rebels against both. An *a priori* philosophy and metaphysical principles lie at the bottom of the system we oppose, as much as at that of the system we uphold; for all religious doctrine, all scientific divinity must needs repose on such a basis, unless it is to be a "something-nothing-everything," having no determinate character at all. The difference between us and the professed Anti-rationalists is not that we reason antecedently more than they; not that we study the Bible less fixedly, less comprehensively than they; but it consists in this, that they are governed in their whole system of religious belief by submission to certain *external tests* of divine truth to which we cannot give the same latitude as they do; that, in submission to these tests, they resolutely adhere to certain intellectual representations of the objects of faith, originally founded upon, or supported by, metaphysical doctrines, which, as we believe, are

capable of being shewn to be baseless and untrue, and which have, in fact, been abandoned by all metaphysical thinkers, who are not bound to the ancient systems by a certain religious theory.

Now I ask whether all this "tangle of contradictions" can be disentangled and smoothed down, all this strife and disproportion harmonized, by a mere reference to the declaration of our Church, that "children which are baptized, dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved." I must avow my conviction that children dying before they commit, or can commit actual sin, are safe from the *wrath to come*, so far as their career in this world is concerned, whether baptized or no. Would it not be the highest imaginable presumption to suppose that He who gave them no opportunity of offending Him in thought, word, or deed, will cast them into that fire which is threatened to wilful transgressors, because, by no fault of their own, they have missed baptism, together with all other outward means of grace? "No, not into that fire," some will say. But what state after death does Scripture mention, which is neither heaven nor hell—not correlative either to moral evil or to moral goodness? The truth is, that all definite detailed doctrine on such a point is extra-scriptural, and, I believe, extremely unwise and unsafe. It is enough to say that young children dying before they have sinned, are safe in the mercy and infinite loving-kindness of God; that they will not perish without Baptism, missed through no fault of their own, and yet are not baptized without very sufficient reason. Surely the scheme of salvation exhibited in Holy Writ has respect to persons having responsible wills alone, as it is addressed to those who have *ears to hear* it.

That God gives a spiritual being to any creature in vain, it would be impiety to imagine; but it is irrational to suppose that they, who have no probation here, can be concerned in sentences which relate to such probation; as the *night cometh when no man can work, and where the tree falleth, there it shall be*; or in such as relate to faith and obedience, as *he who believeth not, shall be condemned*. Neither can I believe that the saying of our Lord to Nicodemus, *Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God*, is applicable to their case, as it is to that of adults. May we not extend this reservation even to the ignorant savage, to all whose moral and spiritual being, from defect of outward opportunity of grace, may be conceived to remain in an undeveloped and infantine state? “Not all,” says Athenagoras, “that are to rise again shall be judged, though all who die shall rise again. Were justice the sole cause of the resurrection, tender infants who have done neither good nor evil, should have no part in it.”* “Since some of them,” Calvin argues, “whom death removes from the present state in their earliest infancy, pass into eternal life, they are certainly admitted to the immediate contemplation of the presence of God. As the Lord therefore will illuminate them with the full splendour of his countenance in heaven, why may he not also, if such be his pleasure, irradiate them with some faint rays of it in the present life?”† Doubtless He can do this, *if* such be his pleasure, but here is the point at issue.‡ He may give them a knowledge of

* Athenagoras De Resurr. Mort. Sect. 15. *prope finem*.

† *Institutes*, Book iv. Ch. xvi. § 19.

‡ In an earlier part of this essay, I spoke of the tenet maintained in our Church, at the time of the publication of the Ho-

him, in an internal manner, without regarding the rule of his ordinary economy, which is to illuminate by His Spirit, through certain outward means. But how does

milies, that infants are not without faith when they are baptized, as though it implied that those "dear and precious *objects* of spiritual duties," are able to co-operate internally with the Spirit, given to them in the Sacrament. For the general allegation, that the early Reformed Church of England ascribed faith to infants at the font, Field was my authority, and it must be admitted, that, according to this worthy author, it was not a faith of the will, not an operative faith, that she thought it necessary to impute to them. His words are these, "The Papists are distracted into contrary opinions touching this point: for some think that grace, the root of faith, and other virtues, is infused into children in Baptism, but not faith; others, that not only grace, but the habit of faith, hope, and charity, is poured into them likewise; which opinion, as more probable, was admitted in the council of Vienna, and is embraced by us as true."

So then, if Field is to be trusted, it is not a true and actual, but occult or unmanifested faith; nor a mere imputative faith, which reposes on parents or the Church; nor a metaphorical faith, when a child is *said* to be faithful, inasmuch as he has the Sacrament of faith given to him; nor a germinal or root faith, that is to say, grace, which will certainly produce faith; least of all a *habit of grace* not necessarily producing faith, but only tending toward it, (which our early divines appear to have scouted as a Scholastical, Papistical figment,)—it is not any one of these upon which those grave and truly venerable men relied for the salvation of speechless babes, (whom Christ suffered to come unto Him, be it observed, independently of baptism, in right of their own native innocence,)—it is not any of these that was to furnish them for heaven, but a *habit of faith*, which neither apprehends the truth of the Gospel, nor holds fast to God and His Son, nor implies any motions of mind whatsoever, but only "a seed, root, and habit, whence actual motions in due time do flow;" though Hooker teaches, that baptized infants, the elect ones at least, for I think it is pretty plain that, like Calvin, his master in part, he believed only some to be chosen by God for eternal felicity,) are "in the first degree of their ghostly motion toward the actual habit of faith;" that is, I suppose, an *involuntary* motion of the *will*!

With all these varieties of a chameleon tenet, these shifting dyes, *tenues parvi discriminis umbrae*, presenting themselves one after another to our notice, to fall into some confusion of mind, and mistake this for that may be pardonable; for truly of this

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this prove that he enlightens or enlivens any soul of man before he has bestowed on it the condition of

same tenet may we say, what was said by Ovid, of Arachne's web, the prototype of cobwebs :

*In quo diversi niteant cum mille colores,
Transitus ipse tamen spectantia lumina fallit.*

But I believe it is not incorrect to affirm that the first of these opinions has had as good advocates as any of the others, and, whatever Luther's disciples may have put forth to the contrary, it stands more with Luther's own words than their gloss; for he declares, bluntly, and boldly, that "natural reason, sense, and understanding is the greatest hindrance to faith, neither hath it anything to do in spiritual causes;" and moreover, that "faith proceedeth out of God's word being heard, and that the children do hear God's word, when they are baptized, *therefore* they obtain faith in baptism;" and Calvin, whose discourse on Pædo-baptism in the Institutes, contains the substance of Taylor's answer to the Anabaptists, challenges any man to prove that God has not given to *elect* babes the knowledge of Himself; and both these great teachers, as soon as they approach the present subject, as if wrought upon by a spell, straightway become children themselves. Even to this day the notion is not wholly abandoned. "What can be more mysterious," says a distinguished writer now living amongst us, "than the Baptism of an infant? who can say, if we had eyes to see, in what state that infant soul is? Who can say it has not its energies of reason and of will, in some unknown sphere, quite consistently with the reality of its insensibility to the external world?" Whether or no, "without having a double self," the infant subject of baptism, that seems "unconscious as a flower of the dew falling on it;" can have its moral and spiritual being expanded in one sphere, unexpanded in another; or whether it is all the while inwardly self-conscious, inwardly reasoning and willing, while outwardly it bestows upon surrounding friends the burden of unreasoning babyhood, I do not presume to inquire; for Metaphysics must not give law to Divinity. But in the name of Divinity herself it may be permitted to ask a question which has been asked ever since the notion of faith in babes was first broached, and has never yet, as far as I can learn, received an answer? If infants, either in this sphere or any other, have will and reason, in this sphere or some other, they are under the condition of grown persons; they can choose cursing rather than blessing; and who is to decide that they have chosen the latter? But our Church allows them no such choice, for she decides that they are all certainly saved by baptism, "unconditionally translated from a state of wrath into a state of grace and acceptance for Christ's sake."

developed faculties? Those persons to whom he has revealed himself without the intervention of preaching, gave manifest proof that they had been thus dealt with: baptized infants give manifest proof that they have not. Nor can it easily be shewn that God has ever converted any human being to Himself without approaching him in some way through the avenue of external sense, and so rousing his inner man into spiritual activity. Whatever benefit Baptism can be thought to convey, on the hypothesis that it works an internal change, even where faith is absent, the same or a perfect equivalent it has on that view which states it to give a claim to the assistance of the Spirit, a claim to be effectuated, when the capability of receiving and profiting by such aid exists in the subject. An infant, remaining an infant, could enter but little into those *pleasures* that are *at God's right hand for evermore*. In the resurrection, every soul will surely obtain an *organism* adapted to a celestial sphere, in which immaturity and imperfection will be done away. The Divine Spirit may then regenerate the spirit of the child in expanding it, and a gift, which as received upon earth, was an outward privilege, may become an inward power unto blessedness in heaven.

*Language of Bishop Taylor and of Hooker on
Infant Regeneration.*

THAT none but negative qualifications are required for the reception of the first grace, none but non-hindrances and passive receptivities, such is Taylor's grand plea in favour of Infant Baptism, which needed, as others have thought, no such sophistical defence. It was not an invention of his, for so

Luther, who was fond of making much of the littleness of human power in the matter of salvation, talked before him; and probably this device has been the common resource and refuge of all divines who have taken it for granted, that, unless infants were *inwardly* changed in the moment of administration, they could not properly have the sacrament administered unto them, so soon as the conditions in man of the reception of divine grace began to be a subject of anxious inquiry. This argument, however, "the eloquent man" has adorned as, I suppose, it never was adorned before, herein employing himself as the Sun is so often employed when he expends his brilliant rays in gilding and empurpling cloud and vapour. What is meant by *reception of the first grace*? Nothing is more plainly written in Scripture than this, that men are objects of the gracious purposes of God even while they are positive sinners. Christ approaches the erring soul, and offers to clasp it in the arms of his infinite loving kindness, while as yet it is all unfit for his divine embrace; even while our sins are like scarlet, He comes to make them white as snow. The wicked man turneth not from his wickedness of his own accord, but whilst he is *in his wickedness*, even then the Just One draws nigh unto him, as he did to St. Paul in his persecuting career, and offers to make him able to do what is lawful and right. Man must not hinder the work of grace, and positive sinfulness will hinder it; but hindrances vanish before the Spirit of Christ, as do the shades of night before the uprising Daystar, and the Sun of Righteousness sheds light on his own path. *Quod Deus gratiam infundat animæ, nulla preparatio exigitur quam ipse non faciat.** If then by the "first

* *Sum. Theol.* II. 1 Q. 112. Art. 2.

reception of grace," the first opportunity or offer of Divine Assistance were meant, in saying that infantine innocence and absence of wilful unholiness alone is required, we should be saying an infinite deal too little, even as, on the other hand, we say infinitely too much in taking upon us to affirm that the Spirit of Holiness may not only approach, but come into us, may be lodged in the ground of our heart, and take up his residence in our inmost soul, before it *can* be made or when it never shall be made, really and actually righteous and holy. Scripture demands *positive* conditions for the reception of grace from first to last; veritable repentance and faith; thereby plainly intimating that a spiritual change implies a spiritual act in him that is changed,—that the will of man must concur with the operation of the Spirit, if it is to be an effective working. By what authority do we melt down positives into negatives, and thus exanimate and nullify the lessons of inspiration, by the mere human *dictum* that faith is not required of man in order that he may voluntarily receive the Spirit into his heart, but *only* that he may not oppose it? "The simplicity and nakedness, the passivity and negative disposition" of little infants, was never stated by our Lord Himself to be a true and all sufficient reciprocity of the Spirit; He teaches that if the adult man, he who can weigh and ponder the saying, with all his powers of thought and will, and consequently of refusing the offered salvation, "doth not receive the Kingdom of God, *as a little child*," that is, as unresistingly, and with as little of self-confidence as young children receive the benefits and services of those that care for them, "he shall in no wise enter therein." This is surely a very different thing from saying, as Taylor says, that nothing more than what children have is re-

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quired for a vitalizing communion with the Spirit of the Lord. It is not true, moreover, that there is no obstruction or impediment in the case under consideration; the Spirit of Christ is as much hindered from entering into and abiding in a soul wherein the spirit is not actual, as a man is from entering into and abiding in an apartment where there is as yet no floor to stand upon, except in the architect's design. Of *such* as little children is the kingdom of Heaven, that is, to say of grown persons who, with the opportunity of sinning, are sinless as they. Most true it is, that nothing is required or can be rendered by man toward the work of grace, beyond a non-resistance of the divine leading; but this non-resistance is no mere passivity or negativeness; it is an energy, and that of the intensest kind. Surely our Saviour could never have meant that they whom he addressed, and of whose case he was speaking, were to be *altogether* as little children, in order to their entering the kingdom; for what grown man can reduce himself to *that* child-likeness, to that absence of positive pride and oppugnancy indicated in our Lord's saying, without the most strenuous and persistent efforts, initiated and carried on under the power of the Holy Ghost? This grand argument then, upon which Taylor expended so many moving sentences, round which he has entwined a very garland of bright thoughts and tender feelings, when we look close into it, is found to be a double sophism, a fallacy having two faces, neither of which is able to sustain a searching steadfast gaze. He scarce indeed likes to look upon it fixedly himself: for when he comes to state what those gifts of the Spirit are which do *not* require "natural capacities to be their foundation," he mentions only the "inheritance and the title to the

promises." If this be all, then indeed *cadit quæstio*; but an internal regeneration, which Taylor at times appears to claim for infants, though but incipient, is far other and far more than this.

Taylor was Romish *on one side of his mind*; Hooker had no Romish side, in his view of grace. He seems latterly to have asserted free will, which in his discourse on justification he treats as an error; on all other points relative to regeneration his system appears to be substantially the same as that which is unfolded by the great Reformer of Geneva in his grand panoramic view of the Old and New Testament, doctrinally exhibited—the *Christian Institutes*. One of the many wonderful things belonging to the history of theological controversy is the number of attempts made by maintainers of the mediæval theory of regeneration, to thrust into this compact coherent Calvinistic system the mystic theory of sacraments. They might as well try to drive a brick into a stone wall. Hooker abjured that theory explicitly and earnestly; contemned the notion that any grace was received into the soul, which was not the seed and root of holiness, whence actual motions were in due time to flow. Believing that only the elect were regenerate, though all baptized children were to be *called* so by a kind of spiritual courtesy, and that all the regenerate were saved, predestinated, called, justified, glorified:—he could consistently represent the gift of Baptism as an *embryo sanctification*, sure to reveal itself in due season, if the life of the subject is prolonged, as the rose to bloom, if it is not cut off by some accident from without.* A mystic holiness, an infu-

* Eccles. Pol. b. v. pp. 396-7. Appendix, No. 1, pp. 700—703.

sion of divine virtue which may be blighted *from within*, which does not issue in saving virtues,—faith, hope, and charity,—unless the will is *afterwards* converted by the operation of the Holy Ghost, has no place in his system. He taught that the spirit given to the predestinated is “the root of their very first desires and motions tending to immortality;”* that “the first thing of His” (the Lord’s) “infused into our hearts in this life is the Spirit of Christ, whereupon because the rest of which kind soever do all both, necessarily depend, and *infallibly also ensue*, therefore the Apostles term it sometime the seed of God, sometime the handsel or earnest of that which is to come.”† A mere mystic change is no handsel or earnest of glory to come, if the heavenly state be a state of true holiness, and an earnest be a true portion of that the whole of which is to come afterwards.

He taught that all the elect are regenerated; that all the regenerate, in virtue of their regeneration, are morally renewed; that the divine seed is put into the hearts of all who are predestined to life; that it never can be lost; and that through the power of this principle the whole mind is gradually moulded into the image of God. “Baptism,” says he, “is a sacrament which God hath instituted in His Church, to the end that they which receive the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through his most precious merit obtain as well that saving grace of imputation, which taketh away all former guiltiness, as also that infused divine virtue of the Holy Ghost, which

* Eccles. Pol. b. v. Appendix, No. 1. The expression quoted occurs in his account of St. Augustine’s system, which he had himself adopted.

† *Ib.* b. v.

giveth to the powers of the soul their first disposition towards future newness of life."

Upon this passage it has been observed, "nor does he mean by future newness of life the whole change of the inward frame, which must commence in adults previous to baptism, but that newness of life, or covenanted state of holiness, which commences with the forgiveness of sin."*

"*Future newness of life*" is hardly the phrase which any one would choose to express a mystic passive holiness, obtained during a ritual moment. It usually denotes a course of *action*, suitable to a being renewed in mind and affections.† The *covenanted* state of holiness, considered as opposed to, or distinguished from moral renovation, is not *future* to the baptized; they enter upon it at once in baptism, and it is a thing without latitude. Persons who are not baptized till they are grown up may, must indeed, begin the process of renewal before they come to the font; but Hooker is evidently contemplating the introductory rite as administered at the threshold of life when change of heart and mind, or actual sanctification, is not begun. Why must we suppose him to have been so far gone in Mediæval Mysticism that he could not have meant by "newness of life," the power unto which he described as given to the elect through Baptism, moral renovation,—“that holiness which beautifieth all the parts and actions of our lives,”—that life of righteousness to which the soul that has received the seed of God is newly born? Is the other interpretation borne out by the tenor of his theology, or by the belief of his own

* Bp. Bethell on Baptismal Regeneration. Note, p. 123.

† Hooker doubtless referred to Romans vi. 4, where *newness of life* is identified with the Christian *walk*.

church in his day?*

Our early divines, who inherited the opinions of Luther and the Reformers, held baptismal regeneration to be in one sense seminal, in another initial: *seminal*, as consisting in the entire spiritual power, by which the new creature is to be gradually framed, conveyed into the soul at once: (on which point it seems to have agreed with the view put forth as the ancient one by Mr. Newman): *initial*, in this respect, that it only *begins* the moral change, the whole of which constitutes the entire regeneration. Such appears to have been the doctrine which prevailed here, when the Liturgy was constructed, and which continued till the times, when a tide of Romish or Mediæval opinion flowed into the church.

It is not easy to understand exactly what Hooker meant by saying that baptism is the "first *apparent* beginning of life, a seal, perhaps, to the grace of election before received, but to our sanctification here, a step that hath not any before it." What is the *grace of election*, if it be not the "seed of God and first fruits of Christ's Spirit," which he declares to be "the first thing of His infused into our hearts in this life."† How can that seed be first infused in Baptism, yet "perhaps" received before? What is "sanctification *here*" opposed to?

The elect receive the grace of election, *perhaps*, before baptism, the non-elect never receive regenerating grace at all, though in the "eye of the Church" all that receive the sacrament receive the grace of the Sacrament: and although we are "not able absolutely

* See the citation from Field on the Church. Part II. sec. ii. p. 838. See also Luther's Table Talk, chap. 13. *Of the Children's Faith*.

† Eccles. Pol. b. 5, ch. lvi. 11, 12.

to warrant the safety" of all baptized babes, yet we have as good a right to call such Christian innocents regenerate as the parties he opposed had to name "men of their own sort, *God's dear children*, (notwithstanding the large reign of hypocrisy!)" As good a right! *that* might be none at all.

This way of arguing seems rather evasive and ambiguous. It looks as if the author desired to avoid a direct conflict with the Liturgy, and therefore multiplied words which seem to ascribe much to baptism and yet ascribe nothing to it, in the case of any but the elect, for whom he supposed baptism to be pre-ordained as the means of their new birth together with the new birth itself. Surely if Hooker had not sheltered himself under the shield of his master St. Austin, he could never have made up his mind to say, that a soul is regenerate, when it is "in the first degree of its ghostly motion toward the actual habit of faith!"—in the face of the beloved disciple, who so emphatically declares that whosoever is born of God has a full grown faith, which can overcome the world!

Be this as it may, through the cross-bars of the Liturgy, Hooker's scheme of salvation gleams up, a consistent and nearly symmetrical whole in itself. I think it has a flaw at the commencement, because it represents the seed of God or power of regeneracy as received all at once into the soul, when renovation is but in its first degree. But it lends no support to the characteristic tenet of the Mediæval view of regeneration, namely, that the new birth is an internal reception of grace, which may never produce true heart holiness, but may be rendered vain by the resistance of the will. He teaches, on the contrary, that "the Spirit and the virtues of the Spirit" are received at

the same time; that "the Spirit in that very moment "when first it is given of God bringeth with it" "Christian righteousness:" that this Christian righteousness "consisteth of those infused virtues proper and particular unto saint;" that when once given it cannot be lost. He never lets go renovation altogether, or suffers it to slip out of his view of regeneracy; but holds the Achilles by the heel, *the first degree of a ghostly motion toward faith*, and draws in its whole person gradually afterwards. Hooker distinguishes between habitual and actual holiness: but he certainly did not mean by the former a mere mystic sanctification, which is no property of the heart and mind. He meant by actual holiness, as appears from his own words, that which flows forth *in action*; by habitual, that which constitutes the abiding character of the moral mind; and with this he declares our souls to be inwardly endued, the same instant when first we begin to be temples of the Holy Ghost.*

The Romish habit of grace, which beautifieth the soul without spiritualizing the will, Hooker renounced with disdain, justly holding that *the beauty of the soul is virtue*, and venturing to differ with the Angelical Doctor decidedly and openly on the philosophy of sacraments.† As for a potential principle of grace, which produces a spiritual change in the soul and a new divine nature, and yet neither adorns and beautifies it, nor renews it in holiness,—that duller phantom seems never to have presented itself within the precincts of his theological mind. Some of the Anti-Protestant divines, who are more evangelical,

* Serm. II. Works, vol. iii. pp. 631, 2.

† *Eccles. Pol. B. v. Appendix No. 1.*

though less afraid of Romanism, than any other section of the Anglo-Catholics, have said, that "justification is divisible from sanctification in idea only, not in fact." Why then do they separate them *in fact* by their Mediæval theory of baptism? This theory maintains its credit by means of borrowed wealth, by confounding the regeneration of the will with *baptismal regeneration*. Viewed in itself, apart from the warm rays of Gospel truth, which it puts on at pleasure, methinks it is the coldest moonshine that ever pretended to reflect the sun of righteousness.

*The Mediæval Theory considered with reference to
Forgiveness of Sin.*

THERE is yet another point of view, in which the doctrine of baptismal efficacy, mistakenly, as I trust will in time appear, called "Catholic," remains to be considered, and in which its unscriptural, and therefore, uncatholic character, may be seen in a strong light. The tenet that regeneration, as the work of the Spirit upon, or at its entrance into the soul, comes once for all in Baptism, involves the notion that forgiveness of sin, as promised under the Gospel, comes once for all in Baptism likewise. This desolating belief is denounced by numbers who make no stand against that "philosophy of sacraments" of which it is a living limb, an articulated member; first, because it is more *painfully*, though I think not more decidedly or even more obviously opposed to the tenor of the New Testament than the latter; and in the second place because it is still more difficult to recon-

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cile with the teaching of our own Church.* Yet to acquiesce in the Anti-protestant view of baptismal regeneration, and to reject that part of it which relates to remission of sin, is surely but incoherent reasoning; for the same line of argument, the same way of un-

* The 16th Article determines that the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism; that, not every deadly sin, willingly committed, is unpardonable. That forgiveness attends true repentance is admitted on all hands, but here it is declared in addition that even deadly sin, committed after Baptism, does not preclude true repentance. How can we reconcile with this statement the tenet that the evangelical promise of remission of sin relates only to the time of our entrance into the Church, that we are not *sure* of the advocacy of Jesus Christ on any other occasion, without reducing it to a nullity,—“converting it into its own negative?” Explained into accordance with the undeniable doctrine of our Church, it may be likened to a black and heavy cloud, which at a distance looks substantial and solid as a brick wall, but, when you examine it closely, proves to be a mere congregation of vapours.

Pearson's language on the present subject is sufficiently positive and express; he speaks thus: “For the first of these,” (the initiation and continuation of a Christian,) “it is the most general and irrefragable assertion of all, to whom we have reason to give credit, that all sins whatsoever any person is guilty of, are remitted in the Baptism of the same person. For the second, it is as certain that all sins committed by any person after Baptism, are remissible, and the person committing those sins, shall receive forgiveness upon true repentance at any time, according to the Gospel.” That a man may surely *have* true repentance after Baptism must be implied in this last declaration, otherwise it is nugatory and unmeaning; indeed his subsequent discourse would make this plain, could there be any doubt of it; for he says “that while we are in this life, encompassed with the flesh, we are always subject to offend, and so long as we can offend, so long we may apply ourselves unto God by repentance, and be renewed by his grace, and pardoned by his mercy.” *Exposition of the Creed*, Art. x.

“As particular acts of repentance,” says Barrow in his Sermon of Justification by Faith, “upon the commission of any particular sins, do not so much differ in nature, as in measure or degree, from that general conversion practised in embracing the Gospel; so the grace vouchsafed upon these penitential acts, is only in largeness of extent, and solemnity of administration, diversified from that,” “(first act of grace toward a Christian at his baptism).”

derstanding a certain portion of Scripture which confines the New Birth to Baptism, confines remission to it also. The cleansing of the soul is as clearly connected in Holy Writ with the baptismal waters as is the New Birth (Acts xxii. 16); and if *to be quickened together* with Christ belongs to Baptism, so does the *forgiveness* of trespasses likewise: (Col. ii. 13.) And in truth are we justified in making a practical separation betwixt the two? Is it not senseless to affirm that our sinful nature derived from Adam, is abolished at once, and that our sins are to be forgiven one by one as they arise afterwards? If the benefits of which Baptism is the sign and symbol are wholly and exclusively conveyed to the soul *in* Baptism, this applies as truly to forgiveness of sin as to the gift of new life. But once more I say this is a desolating belief, which steals away from the Christian the boundless treasure of mercies in Christ. If the Apostles baptized infants, it must be a part of the divine plan that mankind should enter the Church in infancy; but it is manifest that hearing the Gospel and all other means and opportunities, through which men commonly become religious, and without which the grace of Sacraments is not realized in the soul, not accepted by the will, occur long after Baptism, from time to time during the course of life; and that, in the meanwhile, temptations from without and within assail the Christian from the beginning of his earthly career to the end of it. These things being so, and human nature such as it is, it cannot but happen that he often falls into sin after Baptism, and, by means mercifully provided from above, is redeemed out of it, obtaining repentance and faith. But if the Gospel gives no assurance that his sins, committed after he has once entered the Church, will

be blotted out again ; if he is led to suppose that he can reckon upon no adequate repentance, except *before* he has been made a Christian ; he is robbed of the incentives, encouragements and consolations, the joys and hopes and confidences which the Gospel so abundantly supplies to all who really and deeply desire them : with none of these, according to the theory in question, has he any concern.* If those who teach and those who

* "Consolation," says an impressive and instructive writer, whose views and statements have excited much attention of late years, "is not the main object of the Gospel." (Tracts for the Times, Vol II. Part ii. p. 156, note.) If it be not the main *object* of the Gospel, yet of all the *methods* which the Spirit of Christ employs to bring us to Him, consolation and encouragement are, perhaps, the most effectual : for *he, who hath this hope in him, purifieth himself as he is pure* ; and our Saviour proposed it as an inducement to the wayfarers in this weary world to come unto Him, that He would *give them rest*. The design of the Christian religion is not merely to free men from fear of the wrath to come, but to endue them with power to escape it ; yet surely to give us *the peace which passeth all understanding* even here, and unimaginable bliss hereafter, to free us from the worm that never dies, the ceaseless torture of a self-accusing conscience, is the main object of the Gospel, so far as its object has been revealed.

But the note to which I refer contains stronger matter, for good or for evil, than this. A convert from Heathenism is about to die, and by the approach of death, as may fairly be inferred, is brought to a far keener sense of her heathen deeds, committed before baptism, than she had felt *in* baptism,—a very probable circumstance. The Missionary tells her of the blood of Christ, "which cleanseth from all sin ;" and in the end she departs in peace, believing that her sins *will* all be forgiven her,—that she shall not suffer for them in the world to come ; for such, I presume, was *here* her instructor's meaning, since the *future* of those who are even now entering the grave, must lie beyond it. This is censured as ignorance of the Gospel, which, says the author of the Tract, "would have brought far more consolation, had this teacher known it all, and could have told her of the 'one Baptism for the remission of sins ;' that she 'had been washed, had been cleansed ;' and so could he have declared authoritatively, without altering our Lord's own words, 'Thy sins *are* forgiven.'" What ! If at the time of Baptism she had not repented of those sins as she repented afterwards ? Can we kneel

receive this doctrine do not feel how it strikes death through the whole living frame of Christianity, I think it must surely be that, while they are agreeing to it with their lips and surrendering to it their understanding, their heart knows nothing of it. There is a time, it is said, when we *know* that God forgives sin. How can a man *know* that he is forgiven at any other? I think we may answer and say that, if a man's heart and conscience cannot assure him of this *after* Bap-

beside the anxious penitent, who knows and feels that long since Baptism his soul has needed spiritual cleansing, that never till now has he *actually* repented, therefore never before can he have been *actually* forgiven, and speak to him only or principally of grace conferred, either before he had committed those sins of which he is now ashamed, or before he had, as entirely as he now does, abhorred and renounced them? Granting, for argument's sake, that Gospel grace is received *in its fulness* in Baptism, even where repentance and renewal of heart are far short of the need, yet the benefits of that grace being but conditional, how can a recognition of it free the conscience from its burden, or satisfy the contrite spirit that it is not forsaken by God? Not because we have been baptized may we hope for heaven at our last hour, but because the grace of God has brought us to an adequate repentance; because the Divine Spirit, the Paraclete, whenever first consigned, has by this time effectually awakened us; or because we trust that his present work within us is an earnest of yet fuller operations to come. True it is that our sins, past, present and future, *are* all forgiven at the Font; true it is that, *in one sense*, they *have been* all forgiven from the foundation of the world; but surely not in any sense preclusive of the daily fervent prayer that Christ *will* cleanse us from our yet remaining sinfulness with his most precious blood, made over to us, more especially, in his precious ordinance of Baptism. For, "if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." This walking in the light, and having fellowship one with another, is a continuous process, not merely an act done once for all; *the being cleansed from sin* must therefore be continuous too. And as, to *confess our sins*, is not confined to the hour of Baptism, why should the *cleansing from all unrighteousness* belong solely to the same point or portion of time? It is written that there is *one Baptism for the remission of sins*, not one Baptism for *one remission*.

That "there is no one place in Holy Scripture, in which indi-

tism, neither can it *in* Baptism either. God never promised to forgive sin unconditionally, even by the sacrament of forgiveness. One who has been a wilful transgressor before he entered the Church, must feel a proportionate repentance, in order to have Christ for

viduals are spoken of otherwise than as *having been justified*," but little advantages the argument that, justification as an *actual inward* endowment, is never the continuous result of a continuous faith, or the present result of a present one. How, without a most unfit and probably injurious exposure of the secret heart, (not to mention the inconvenience of such a method where general instruction for the Church in all ages was concerned,) could the Sacred Writers have referred the Christian converts to the *use* which they had severally made of the means of grace afforded them? And is it quite accurate to say or infer that they speak of *individuals*, in their preceptive and doctrinal discourses, as a Minister of the Gospel now speaks of or to *the individual* whom he attends in his hour of spiritual penitence or hope? Do they not rather address Christians collectively, as professors of Christianity, rather than as learners of Christ; and consequently impute to them only that justification and forgiveness which they all had alike and in common,—to have received which is the note of a member of the Christian Church? In the *narrative* parts of the Bible, or in allusions to them, wherever they occur, the same rule is not observed. The justification of Abraham and of Rahab, and of other ancient worthies, is ascribed to their present faith; nor is this way of speaking confined to the Old Testament. In the Acts, where the *particular* case of Simon Magus is spoken of, it is plainly implied that a man may be forgiven after baptism, through faith and repentance *obtained* after baptism, actual infidelity and absence of the Spirit intervening betwixt the celebration of the rite and the reparation of the guilty soul.

But we are not without testimony to what we consider the truth of this subject, even in the Gospel. She to whom it was said, 'Ἀφέωνται σοι αἱ ἁμαρτίαι: "thy sins are (or have been) forgiven;" was not referred by our Lord to a *passive* reception of grace by the *sole* operation of God. Far other doctrine is implied in the account of her intercourse with the Saviour. She is described as having been forgiven on account of her *much love*; and Christ declared unto her, "Thy *faith* hath saved thee." Where *true* faith is, there must remission and removal of sin be likewise. It will be suggested that a *new* order of things, *internal* as well as *external*, came in at the day of Pentecost, the answer to which, according to my ability, is contained in the body of this Essay.

his advocate with the Father, even at the font. He knows that Baptism washes away sin from those who truly and earnestly repent of it; but how is he to know, before the rite any more than after it, that his repentance is sufficiently earnest and true? No man in the midst of his sin can be certain that he shall fully repent; but if he cannot tell when he *is* repenting or *has* repented, if consciousness is not as a lantern to his steps to guide his Christian course, how great must be his darkness! Deliberate and habitual sin daily increases the difficulty of repentance; but this is true in degree before as well as after Baptism. Doubtless to offend, after great means of grace have been afforded to the soul, is more sinful than to do wrong before we are less able to know and do what is right. To live carnally after hearing the Gospel, is vastly worse than to pursue the same course of action before its light has been presented to the mind. But the mercies of God are, like himself, infinite, and as we know not what hindrances and obstructions may prevent any hearer of the word or receiver of Baptism from profiting at the time by the one or the other, so can we not say to what extent he is responsible to God for the neglect of opportunity and resistance of the Holy Spirit. But if a change comes over the soul at the sacred font which never can be reiterated, if a purity is then imparted which never can be renewed, every subsequent deflection, great or small, from perfect rectitude, must leave behind a proportionate stain which never can be effaced, which must affect our heavenly interests world without end. A fount of grace is stored within us by Holy Baptism; so say the propounders of the theory under review; might one not suppose then, that the fresh coming waters of this

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well of salvation would perpetually purify and refresh the soul from the effects of such sinfulness as its very presence does not preclude? But no! it is as a *fountain sealed*, from the hour of its first opening: once, and once only, if that theory be correct, it *washes away sin*, according to the *promise of the Gospel*. I cannot close these remarks without adding for my own satisfaction, however otherwise unimportant, that even on this question, as on very many others, the champions of "Catholicity" among us, as it appears to me, have *fought a good fight*; and that, under the circumstances of the times, they seem to have done far more good by their energetic and animated exposure of the awful truths which really do belong to this subject, than permanent evil by "fluttering about" a doctrine, which the human heart very readily rejects, but which, I verily believe, if consistently carried out, would be no less than high treason against the Prince of life.

*Spiritual gifts for the Establishment of the Church
to be distinguished from those which relate to in-
dividual Salvation.*

ONE error, as it seems to me, runs through the "Anglo-Catholic" expositions of what the expositors call *Scriptural* views of Baptism, so far as those views are founded on the records of conversions in the New Testament; I mean the confounding of spiritual gifts bestowed upon men in order to the establishment of the Visible Church with those that pertain to individual salvation. It was inevitable, that in writings like the Holy Scriptures, the style of which is not

scientific, there should here and there be a blending and apparent unifying of the two, (as in *Acts* v. 32,) since, in general, it was they who believed, who were *ordained to eternal life*, that received ministerial powers, although the words of our Lord Himself clearly prove that these *might* belong to the unregenerate. In the "Acts of the Apostles," to be *filled with the Holy Ghost*, has generally a restricted meaning, and, as I think may be shewn, does not principally refer to that enlightenment by which the individual beholds the things that *belong unto his peace*, but to that preternatural excitation of the faculties which prepared men to spread the Gospel with miraculous rapidity, making it cover a certain space and strike to a certain depth within a short space of time, so that when the winds of persecution arose, they did but agitate a well-rooted tree, instead of uptearing an unconfirmed one. This character of the *gift of the Holy Ghost*, considered as belonging to a particular epoch, the prophecies that relate to it seem to declare. The *rivers of living water* that were to flow forth from the *strong* in faith, denote the extraordinary *powers of utterance* conferred on the believer in Christ; the Spirit was to be poured out upon all flesh in order to *prophecy*, to the *dreaming of dreams*, and *beholding of visions*, not as heretofore by a few select seers only, but by the multitude of the converted, who were to be *kings and priests unto God*, a *royal priesthood*. I think it is not too bold to say, that, throughout the Narrative of the Acts, the part performed by the *Holy Ghost* is that of spreading the Christian religion, rather than that of making men Christians, and that to this divine end all His operations, mentioned therein, appear to be directed. Even the Spirit of Truth, promised by our

Lord to His Apostles, is clearly promised to them *as Apostles and Pomulgators of the Gospel*. This is evident from the functions ascribed to Him, for it is not said that He shall comfort *them*,* the beloved of Jesus, His personal disciples and *friends*, that He shall purify *their* hearts and elevate *their* affections; but that He shall *reprove the world*, shall *testify of Christ*, shall teach His teachers what to speak, bringing to their remembrance all things needful to be reported, shewing them things to come, and guiding them into all truth. Hence in part perhaps, he is entitled the Paraclete, the Exhorter and Advocate, whose office it is to defend a cause; and, regarding Him with relation to the public Acts of the Apostles, principally in this light, as the Stimulator of the private mind for public ends, and Revealer of the objects of Faith to the Universal Church, we are enabled to understand why it was that He could not come till the whole of the Redeemer's course upon earth was fulfilled. The Gospel was not to be announced till it had been fully acted. It is further evident that the *gift of the Holy Ghost*, so often referred to in the Acts, was not annexed to Baptism, as the great spiritual gift of the Gospel is supposed to be by Romanists† and Anti-Protestants

* "I will not leave you *comfortless*," is in the original, "I will not leave you *orphans*," destitute of a Protector and Advocate.

† The *language* of the Tridentine Canons, if the mere language, tested by itself alone, be considered, is upon the whole as evasible, by logical ingenuity, as that of the Articles of the Church of England. Persons of our mind upon Baptism, however can, in no way, so double themselves up as to escape the fire of the following anathema. *Si quis dixerit, in tribus Sacramentis, Baptismo scilicet, Confirmatione, et Ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est, signum quoddam spiritale, et indelebile, unde ea iterari non possunt; anathema sit. De Sacramentis. Sess. VII. Canon ix.* We are anathematized if we do not be-

without the Church of Rome, since it attended upon Apostolic preaching, and the laying on of Apostolic hands more notably than on the regenerative rite; and if it seemed to be expected that the administration of that rite should be an investiture into the possession of it, still this, we may reasonably presume, argues no such specific connection betwixt the two as that just adverted to, but merely implies that ministerial powers were, in those days, commonly conferred upon all who believed in Christ, and took up the profession of Christians. It appears, too, that set signs, outwardly perceptible, announced to bystanders that heavenly infusion which specially enabled men to testify of Christ; a procedure how far unlike the secret process of regeneration, whose complex outward face can never present itself at full to any beholder, and would be scarce recognizable, by unambiguous marks of feature and physiognomy, if it did!

So far as the Anglo-Catholic deductions from the Narrative of the Acts go to prove the Apostolicity of Baptism, and that no previous or independent reception of spiritual gifts superseded that necessity, in other words, so far as they are directed against pure Anabaptism or Quakerism, they accomplish their aim, and to this extent, I believe, that the views which they support are Scriptural. But they are brought forward, if I mistake not, in proof of something beyond this, and of even deeper interest: there is an attempt to prove by their means that *Regeneration is given only*

lieve in an *indelible* character given in Baptism, and anathematized if we do believe that the baptized cannot, if he will, let him sin as he may, *lose grace*. (De Bap. Canon vi.) If he *will*, he *can*, that is certain; but if a spiritual character is impressed upon his soul, he neither can, nor will commit sin; for as the fountain is, such must be the waters.

in Baptism; and long before it has reached this further mark the spent arrow falls to the ground. It has been affirmed, that according to Holy Scripture, attentively considered, St. Paul, before baptism, was neither "pardoned, regenerated, justified, nor enlightened." A sweeping negative! And how is it established? The whole of this bulky inference appears to be drawn out of the following scanty premises. First, a double assumption, that St. Paul was not *filled with the Holy Ghost* till he was baptized, and that this reception of the Spirit was one and the same thing with being *pardoned, regenerated, justified, and enlightened*. Now even if it were clear as noon-day that the gift in question followed or accompanied, instead of preceding, the outward laver, this would be but a weak proof that St. Paul was not at all regenerate when he renounced his life after the flesh and resolved to obey Christ crucified; for he was a *chosen vessel to bear God's name before the Gentiles*, and it is natural to suppose, that as such *chosen vessel* he received that particular infusion from above, not merely or chiefly on his own behoof. God's work in regenerating body, soul, and spirit, is not wont, I believe, to be thus publicly proclaimed, nor thus tied to an individual moment; and although no man could have been enabled to make the Gospel a *power unto salvation*, as did the Apostles, through a mere gift to his intellect and physical faculties, yet the internal change by which the zealous Jew was suddenly qualified for a preacher of the new religion, cannot reasonably be identified with the change in his whole spiritual being. The Divine Spirit chose men of certain spiritual susceptibilities for the main work of the Gospel, and superadded the extraordinary power of communicating

the faith to the inward possession of it.* But whatever the gift was it does not appear to have been given by water: from both narratives of St. Paul's conversion, I think the more obvious inference is, that he was *filled with the Holy Ghost*, that is, ministerially empowered and enlightened, *before* he was baptized. For he had not yet been washed with water, when the scales fell from his eyes, and why must we take it for granted that there was an interval, long enough at least for Ananias to make a speech in, betwixt his outward enlightenment and that inward illumination which it symbolized, when in a striking case of the like kind recorded in Scripture, the supernatural effect was found to wait immediately upon the visible sign, apart from water-baptism?

But there is another branch to the argument; for secondly, Ananias said, *Arise, and be baptized and wash away thy sins*; and this seems to be relied upon as proof that St. Paul's *heart* was not *sprinkled from an evil conscience* before his *body* was washed with *pure water*,—that the effect did in no way precede the effectual sign. Such proof is surely most inadequate,

* To preclude mistake as to my meaning, let me add:—All I deny or doubt is, that the *direct* office of the Holy Ghost, as *first sent down from Heaven after Christ's Ascension*, was to regenerate, in the *instant* of Baptism, the individual that partook of His influence. I believe the Spirit of Christ, as the *Paraclete*, to be the Enlightener and Defender of the Holy Catholic Church, that, in this character, He not only came to the Apostles, but is with His Church *always, unto the end of the world*; that the aim and end of His operations is the regeneration of the human being; but on the other hand, that, regarded *exclusively* as the companion and potentiative Ally of the *Written Word* and the *Outward Church*, He ministers *unto* the New Birth rather than directly bestows it; since the Spirit of Christ, as the Remitter of sin and Regenerator of the sin-born soul, was in the world from the beginning.

for words are to be construed partly by what themselves import, but in part also by the tenor of the discourse in which they occur, and the nature of the subject respecting which they are spoken. This sentence, in and of itself, can never prove that the Apostle had not obtained pardon proportionate to his faith and repentance before Baptism,—that *all* his sins were yet upon his head, as they were before he had turned away from them and begun to look in a new direction. Is remission less distinctly connected, in Holy Writ, with repentance and righteousness, than with Baptism? Can the Divine Forgiveness thus divide itself from the everlasting conditions of its bestowal, and is not repentance itself the very test and evidence of having been forgiven? If any one imagines St. Paul, when the scales fell from his eyes, to have been in such sense regenerate, that God's grace could do no more for him, and that he needed not "mercy all the way" of his future Christian course, I believe his view to be unauthorized by Scripture; the turning-point in a man's life, when he first begins seriously to reflect and resolve upon reformation, which is not so distinctly marked in the lives of all good Christians as to be observed and remembered, may in a figure, *by synecdoche* (as Taylor would say,) be *called* regeneration; but no philosophic thinker ever supposed that this answers to the full idea of the New Birth. On the other hand, to assert that when Saul, *trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?* the change in his nature from carnal to spiritual, which is the great result of the Atonement, had not even commenced;—to draw a formal line betwixt his life before and after Baptism, and describe all on this side of the line as essentially different in the eye of God, from all,

on that side, appears to be but the same error in a still more unreasonable form: the same error, that is to say, the attempt to *comprehend the work of the Divine Spirit upon the soul of Man, a thing in itself not contemplable in the forms of the human understanding, within the bounds of Time, which is a mere form of our intuitive faculty; instead of recognizing it as an idea having objective reality (therefore necessarily transcendent), but such an one as we can only behold in its moral manifestation.*

After all however, some meaning Ananias must have had: why did he say to one already possessed with new thoughts and affections, *Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins?* I ask in reply, what could he possibly say else, if Baptism was adopted by Christ as the seal and symbol of the Gospel Covenant: if by it "we are admitted," to use the words of Taylor, "to the *state and grace* of repentance and pardon of sins;" let the inward condition of him whom he addressed have been ever so far advanced in Christian newness? Ananias speaks from without, in the name of the outward Church of Christ, which regards all men as *sinner*s of the *Gentiles* before, as *Saints* after, their entrance into her courts? Can he look into the heart of the "fusile Apostle," and there discern to what degree his sins have been removed? Or even if he could see them turning *white as snow*, must he not still invite him to wash them away publicly, in the sight, or to the knowledge of the Christian congregation,—must he not bid him gain in Baptism a federal claim to the forgiveness of sins in the aggregate, the sin of his whole life viewed as one mass? Calvin's paraphrase, "That you may be *assured*, Paul, that your sins are remitted, be baptized," contains truth, if

not the whole truth. Assurance, with the outward notification of it, is certainly among the purposes of Baptism, and is there any theory of Sacraments, in favour with "Anglo-Catholics," which does not necessitate greater freedoms with the Sacred Text—bolder expansions and fuller interpolations than this? It is not the importance of the addition made to the bare letter, in the interpretation of an inspired passage, that can determine it to be inadmissible; it may or it may not be in accordance with the laws of language, the style of Scripture, and the tenor of Holy Writ; and tried by these rules, the less literal construction *may* be the more legitimate.

From any thing specified in the sacred Record it will not be easily proved that the Eunuch was in no sense *born again of incorruptible seed*, when he believed in Christ *with all his heart* upon hearing the Gospel; nor does the story of the Jailor afford even a shadow of material for that argument, which affixes the great Redemptive blessing to a ritual point of time. It is observable, that neither of these persons is said to have received the *gift of the Holy Ghost*; perhaps because they were not to be used as instruments for the impartation of the Faith to others like the converts specifically inspired. Lydia's entrance into the new way is very simply related in two verses of the xvth chapter of Acts. After God had opened her heart to attend to the things spoken of Paul, *she was baptized and her household*; and then she constrained the Apostles to come into her house and abide there. "She thought not herself worthy," says a well known Tract, "to receive even the servants of the Most High God," until "she and her household" had, by Baptism, been made "a Temple of the Holy Ghost." Why if Baptism had been an empty sign, devoid of

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all efficacy, Lydia could have done no less than display that sign to the Apostles before she invited them to abide with her. Here is no proof that she had not become, to a great extent, a new creature when her heart was opened by divine grace, or that a different kind of regeneration was vouchsafed to her in the baptismal stream; or indeed that a spiritual change in her nature was not more largely wrought at the time of Paul's preaching than at the time of Baptism, in the only sense in which a spiritual change can be referred to *time* at all. They who are prepared to say, that the Jewish rite of proselytism could not have been adopted by Christ, unless the effect of it were precisely that which the "Anglo-Catholic" School declare it to be, may infer from these records of conversion, all that the Tract expressly or tacitly infers from them. Mark xvi. 16. is cited as proof that Baptism saves *as regenerating the soul at once*. Yet the words will better bear *this* paraphrase: He that believes the Gospel religion and *undertakes it, joining himself to the followers of Christ by a public pledge and declaration*, shall be saved. *To be baptized*, in those days, meant *to become a Christian*.

So great is the anxiety of certain defenders of the Visible Church to link regeneration in time with an external washing, that the Baptism of our blessed Lord himself has even been brought into their argument, apparently for no other reason than because, when He went up from the water, the Spirit of God was *seen* descending and lighting upon Him, *And, lo, a voice from heaven saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased!* The baptism of Jesus was "an example and pattern of that which he subsequently enjoined upon his followers," and by it we may be "confirmed in the belief that the spirit of adoption,

whereby we cry, Abba, Father, was henceforth to be bestowed in connexion with the 'outward laver.'* But here is an example which does not exemplify; for will the reflective writer of those sentences himself maintain, or rather has he ever for a moment imagined, that the spirit of *adoption* was received by Jesus when he *suffered* the ministry of the Baptist? Could He, the Sinless One, require either forgiveness of sin, or to be born *again* of the Spirit, which implies the need of such forgiveness. A public *annunciation* of divine Sonship attended His Baptism; in this respect only can it be a type and pattern of ours; and surely the remembrance that our "Saviour himself was baptized," and that persons, whom we dare not pronounce unregenerate before the symbolic rite was administered to them, yet received that rite as a matter of course, should lead us to freer thoughts upon the subject than those against which I am contending; should intimate to our minds that baptism may be a *fulfilment of righteousness*, whether it gives regeneration at the time when it is administered or no. If nothing more is meant to be inferred from this example than that the being a Son of God has *some kind* of connexion with baptism, either typical or real, (and surely it can prove nothing more,) the reference to it appears nugatory; for so much as this no reader of Scripture *can* doubt or ever has doubted. The only dispute is, as to what that connexion may be. If any inward and not merely "*formal* unction from the Holy One" was proclaimed by the visible sign which followed the Baptism of our Lord, we may suppose that it was *ministerial*, and had reference to His mission,

* *The Scriptural Character of the English Church*, p. 260.

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then commencing, so far as He had to perform it in His merely human nature.* Not that I venture to advance anything positive on a subject probably beyond the limits of revealed religion; I would only hint my belief that to certain conjectures which have been put forth upon it, more likely conjectures may be opposed.

Examination of Waterland's Theory of Baptismal Regeneration. Harmony of Tertullian's and of Cyprian's doctrine of Baptism and Confirmation.

NOW it is self-evident that if we adhere to this Scriptural idea of regeneration, and believe that to be a son of God signifies in the New Testament that which it signified in the Old, that is, to be a holy and righteous person; the latter exhibiting only in a much clearer light than the former, what to be really and truly righteous is and implies; we cannot admit that Baptism is regeneration, or that Christians are

* "By my receiving baptism from thee, God hath determined to inaugurate me to my office of preaching the Gospel, by sending down his Spirit upon me at that time, and giving me testimony from Heaven." Hammond's *Paraphrase of Matt.* iii. 15. Compare with *Acts* ii. 3. The Baptism of Christ is not set forth as an example of Christian Baptism by most of those who teach what is called the *high* doctrine of Sacraments, or that which exalts the outward and visible part of them: rather they are anxious to *contrast* the Laver of John with that of our Lord, *more antiquo*, as if the one were a Baptism of water *without* the Spirit, the other a Baptism of water *with* the Spirit; or as if an *essentially* different spiritually regenerative gift belonged to the latter from any that did or could wait upon the former: though it is hard to understand how John could *really* prepare the way for his Master, *really* minister unto repentance and removal of sin, which the Ancients seem to have admitted that he did, unless

196 *Waterland loses the Idea of Regeneration*

regenerate *in* Baptism, except in a secondary and derivative sense. There are indeed divines of name and authority, who describe the new birth as properly and primarily, not an inward change of soul, but the introduction into a state of external privilege, and are therefore able consistently to maintain that all persons alike, whether with or without the inward conditions of spiritual influence, are regenerated in and by Baptism. A very eminent defender of this view is the great controversialist, Waterland, and it was characteristic of one who was perhaps a more skilful manager of the logic of the Christian faith, than a deep contemplator of the ideas of which it essentially consists, to make a statement of the subject by which the phraseology of the early Church and the expressions of our baptismal service are brought into a striking word-harmony with the *language* of Holy Writ upon Baptism, although at some sacrifice of internal consistency. I believe it most true that the office of Baptism is to translate receivers into a state of outward privilege; but what is the characteristic of that state? Can it be any thing else than the opportunity of becoming internally and actually a son of God? Is it not then reversing the order of things to maintain that a man who is renewed in spirit, is *called* regenerate in right

his Baptism conduced to spiritual changes the same in essence as those which the Sacraments and Preaching of the Gospel far more powerfully brought about. In support of the view which I have been led to prefer, I would suggest that the antithesis in Acts i. 5 is evidently betwixt the ministry of John, unattended with a gift of the Holy Ghost *visibly* and *audibly* manifested, except in the case of our Lord, and the introductory ministration of the Gospel, when *fiery signs* were displayed, and that was shed forth which men *saw* and *heard*,—not primarily betwixt the spiritual consequences of the one and the other in the souls of those who were ministered unto.

of his baptism, rather than that he is *said* to be regenerate in baptism, because this rite is the specially appointed means by which we obtain communion with Christ? This is to be born of water only; not to be born of water and the Spirit. He who merges the idea of an internal heavenly state in the admission to outward privileges, however he may conform his language to Scripture and the Church, will in truth have Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity, with a host of our Anglican divines, all together in array against him. But if the idea is retained at all, surely it has a prior right to the name regeneration than that which is merely an introduction into it. Baptism is identified with regeneration in the *language* of Scripture: therefore men have forcibly accommodated regeneration to Baptism; which is as absurd as if, because medicine may, by a figure, be called health, we should therefore insist on it that health is nothing more than what comes with and by medicine.

Some indeed whose opinions are deserving of a respectful attention, maintainers of the mystic theory, have treated it as a mistake to suppose that Waterland did not include in his scheme of Regeneration the notion of an inward spiritual change, accomplished in the moment of baptism, and refer in proof of this opinion to his own account of his system. I have re-examined with care his own account of his system, and have but renewed the impression which I received on first studying it several years ago, that although he states regeneration to be "a spiritual change wrought upon any person by the Holy Spirit in the use of baptism," he did not mean by those words what our modern reviewers of ancient doctrine mean by them. I cannot but still think that, in his view, the proper office of

the Sacrament is not to produce, in all cases, an immediate alteration in the soul itself, but rather to *grant* or make over, the power by which it is to be gradually altered and renewed, according to the capacity of the recipient; not to introduce the grace of God, in all cases, into the soul, but only into the soul when suitably qualified and prepared. *That any internal operation or action of the spirit upon the soul producing a change in its nature necessarily commences in baptism, or that any such operation constitutes the new birth, is not, as far as I can perceive, the doctrine of Waterland.* For, in the first place, such a notion seems out of place in his theory; and in the second place, his language, fully and fairly considered, does *not* express it—nay even negatives it.

I think his theory precludes it, for he describes regeneration as “a renewal of the spiritual *state*, considered at large,” (and he distinguishes the spiritual state from the inward habit of the soul,) the “first entrance into the Christian life,” “admission or adoption into sonship or spiritual citizenship.”* He puts these ideas forward as if they contained the essence of regeneration. Had he meant that regeneration was a change of *nature*, he ought surely to have put *this* idea forward as the principal one in his theory; for a change of nature must carry along with it a change of state, circumstances and relations; he who is inwardly transformed thereby gains new relations to God and Heaven, and his state must be new, for he must be in the way of the Spirit who has been transnated by the Spirit; whereas there may be a change of state

* *Regeneration Stated and Explained.* Works, Vol. vi. pp. 346-8-9.

and circumstances where there is, as yet, no change of nature; to *live in the Spirit* is one thing; it is to have spiritual opportunities and privileges of a special kind secured by the covenant of Grace: to have been born of the Spirit or to have *gained a spiritual mind*, is quite another thing. The former is subordinate, in order of thought, to the latter.

Regeneration is either a re-creation, which carries along with it or presupposes a change of state, or it is a change of state and circumstances alone; it is either analogous to generation, production of being; or it is analogous to mere birth or nativity. If it is, (as the word imports, and the Greek term *γεννᾶσθαι* also,) the former, it ought surely to be something more than a mystical change, on the surface, as it were, of the soul, which leaves the faculties of the soul unaffected; a spiritual re-creation of the *man* can hardly be exclusive of the mind, will and affections, the entire spiritual being of the subject; for what spiritual being has man which these do not comprise? If it is the latter, if it is only the entrance into a new sphere of existence, a new complex of surrounding things, why should it include any change of the soul, mystical or otherwise? When the child, full formed and already alive, passes into the light of day, he undergoes no essential inward change; he does but enter into a new way of life,—into the world of light and motion. Even so one that has entered the Church by Baptism is born into the life in the Spirit: but till he is led, or actuated by the Spirit, can we rationally say that he is possessed by or has been changed, operated on, by the Spirit?

But an inward change may, *in some cases*, be necessary, according to Waterland, as a condition of the *new birth*, and at the same time, in such cases, “an

integral part" of it. "So far as a renewal of mind," says he, "is necessary to a renewal of state, so far it is a necessary ingredient of the new birth." But he does not think that, in the case of infants, any renewal of mind is necessary; for their innocence is, in his view, a sufficient qualification; their incapacity a sufficient capacity. The notion of an internal change or mystic baptismal renewal, distinct from a change of mind, he never mentions at all.

He seems to have but two ideas on this subject, that of translation into a spiritual state or way of life, and renovation, or reformation of heart and mind. That third notion of a change in the soul mystical not moral, which purifies from the stain of hereditary guilt, and yet leaves all its original carnality or proneness to sin within it, does not appear in his teaching in any explicit form; and yet he was eminently in general a distinct explicit writer, not at all apt to wrap up his opinions in misty ambiguity of language: in my opinion he let this *hidden mystery* fall through the sieve when he was searching and sifting the doctrines of antiquity. He carefully distinguishes between regeneration and a renewal of the inward frame and disposition: and I think we have no right to impute to any man so unintelligible a notion as a change of *nature* which is not a *renewal* of the *inward frame*, unless he himself expressly avows it; and this Waterland never does.

In explaining the new birth he does not describe it as "a change of nature," which implies an inward change of the soul, but "a change from the *state* natural into the *state* spiritual;" he says, that this translation carries with it remission of sins and a covenant claim to eternal happiness, and these he calls *privi-*



leges: he does not speak of them as *inherent qualities*. He uses no such phrases as “*infused* divine virtue,” “mystical effect of the sacrament,” “communication of spiritual life to the soul,” “mysterious earnest of the Holy Ghost,” “mysterious operation of the Holy Spirit which cannot be discerned in its effects.” He affirms of infants baptized, that they become “consecrated in solemn form to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;” but then he shews afterwards that this consecration of *persons* in baptism, is to be understood, like the consecration of the waters of Baptism, “in an outward and relative sense;”* he declares that pardon, mercy, and other covenant privileges are made over to them:” but this declaration he explains by an extract from Vitringa, in which that justification or remission of sins, of which infants are capable, is said to be an external benefit, *beneficium externum et σχετικόν*—in which it is affirmed, that infants are capable of the benefit *because* it is an external one: *Spiritu Sancto pro illorum conversione et renovatione spondente*. And in truth, remission of sins which is not one with removal of sin by effective repentance, sonship to God,

* *Regeneration Stated and Explained*. Works, Vol. vi. p. 361. What W. meant by “an outward and relative sense of holiness,” that he did not mean by it an infusion or conveyance of grace into the soul, which indeed would be contradictory to the word *outward*, appears in his work on the Eucharist. “If any one shall ask,” says he, “what is *conveyed* to the respective things to make them holy or sacred? we might ask in our turn, what was conveyed to the ground which the Temple was said to sanctify, or what to the gift when the altar sanctified it?” The holiness given to the soul in the moment of baptism is like that of a temple which is dedicated to the worship of God. The temple at the moment of dedication has not divine service within it, much less has the unconscious soul of an infant the divine spirit within it at the moment of dedication, except as it had the sustaining presence of the Deity from the first moment of its existence. But the temple is never holy as the child is to be.

membership to Christ, heirship in respect of heaven,—if these are separated from actual righteousness and renewal, what can they be but external benefits? Justification is either being *accounted* just, or being *made* just: the former is an external privilege, the latter an internal condition; is there any third justification, which is more than the one, and less than the other?

It is evident that Waterland did not imagine any infusion of grace into the soul of infants in the moment of baptism, for he says that, in their case, “regeneration precedes and renovation can only follow after: *though infants may perhaps be found capable of receiving some seeds of internal grace sooner than is commonly imagined.*” Could he have spoken thus, had he held that the grace they receive is internal from the first? He identifies their new birth with the “renewal of their *state* to Godward:” that is their relations to God in being adopted into His family and invested with a *claim*, to remain with them till forfeited, to eternal happiness. He tells us not a word of “the secret and mysterious operations of the grace infused into infants in baptism.” On the contrary he describes the effect of baptism upon infants, as if it were perfectly of a piece with the scheme of salvation for adults, neither more nor less mysterious,—describes it in a clear intelligible manner, not separating the spiritual from the moral and rational, or introducing the *mystical* into his explanation, but stating that “the renewal of the *heart* may come on gradually with their first dawnings of *reason*, in a way to us imperceptible.” Truly the *way* in which God converts the heart is, in all cases, imperceptible; but Waterland, in this passage, acknowledges that in the infant, as in the adult, the work of the Spirit upon the soul is in the presence of *Reason*, and has for its sure result the renewal of

the *Heart*. He tells us indeed that, from the time of their baptism, children are the *temple of God*. We all know what that phrase implies when used by teachers of a certain school—namely the Indwelling of Christ, of the undivided Trinity, in the soul. But no one conversant with Waterland's doctrine can suppose that he always meant this by it, or that when he applied it to an unconscious infant he meant more than that the soul of the child in baptism is consecrated, and dedicated to God, that He *should* dwell therein, when the will consents to receive Him.

Again he teaches that the grace of baptism is *savingly applied* to the souls of sinless babes, not savingly applied to adults baptized in hypocrisy and impenitency, till they repent, when "their regeneration, begun in baptism, and left unfinished, (like an indenture executed on one side only, or like a part without a counterpart,) comes at last, to be complete, that is, actually *salutary*." But what did he mean by a "saving application?" An internal reception of the Spirit, or spiritual affection of the soul? No such thing, in my opinion; I believe he meant, that a baptized infant, dying an infant, by virtue of the covenant claim conferred in baptism, will enter into bliss; as one who has received a title to an estate, in virtue of that title, afterwards enters into possession. We do not, in this case say, that the title is applied to the soul, because it is not a spiritual concern; but a title may be given on behalf of the soul, as well as on behalf of a man's temporal being.* Waterland describes only two kinds

* The Reader will bear in mind that I am here merely explaining what I conceive to be the doctrine of Waterland. Baptism confers a claim to divine aid, but that an infant enters at once into bliss merely in virtue of such a claim—this I can by no means hold to be sure doctrine. I look upon the Baptism of Infants as prospective.

of holiness; "an outward sanctification," and the "inward sanctification of any one's *heart and mind*,"* (mystic sanctification, or *covenanted inward* holiness, he never once mentions.) He considered Baptism valid by the former alone, the outward sanctification, not *saving* to *adults* without the latter, that is renovation. He thought that the *regenerating act*, on the part of God, might take place on behalf of unworthy adults when they are baptized; that the reception of the benefits of the sacrament must, in grown persons, be active, but that infants might benefit passively, without any movement of their spirits.

This eminent divine has no such horror of *outwardness* as that which distinguishes our Anglican divines since the late revival of ancient metaphysical divinity. He never describes the new birth as "a change *not of outward*, but of inward and spiritual state, circumstances and relations;" well knowing, I believe, that what stands *around* the soul cannot be *within* it. If by inward circumstances be meant such as relate to our inward and spiritual concerns, then preaching and all the outward means of grace are *inward* too, and the term is equivocal as applied to the change in baptism. He affirms the grace of the Spirit applied "inwardly to the soul" to be one part of regeneration, but here he is contrasting the consignation of grace to the spirit of the man within him, with the application of water to his outward body. Any one who believes in such a consignation at all would call it inward in contradistinction from a corporeal washing. † So a woman, when she is married, receives a ring outwardly

* See the note at p. 361.

† Burnet expressly teaches that infants are not internally regenerated in baptism, and that the inward effects of the Sacrament follow only upon the inward acts, which it implies in capable

on her finger ; but the claim to her husband's faithful love and protection is not applied outwardly to her body, but is conferred inwardly on her mind, or at least on her whole personal being, soul and body taken together. It is *applied* to her mind, yet does not *change* her mind,—it is no mental affection. Indeed, in that sentence, Waterland may have meant to express whatever regeneration, *taken at large*, comprehends, on his system : namely a grant of grace *to the soul* in all cases—a conveyance of it *into the soul*, according to the capacity of the recipient. In a word, if Waterland meant to teach the mystical change, he was extremely mysterious about the matter ; as dark as the mystic theory itself : if he thought such a tenet important, he seems to have neglected his duty, for, though a master of sentences, he has not put it plainly into any one sentence of his statement and explanation, and the tenor of that statement seems to negative it. Some of the Oxford divines have seen his doctrine apparently in the same light as that in which I see it,—in which Mr. Faber sees it,—to judge from the dissatisfaction they express in his prospective view as not fully Patrician, at the same time that they speak highly of the author for his great services to the Church.

It is true that Waterland professed to bring forward the sacramental doctrine of the ancients, but neither, on Baptism, nor on the Eucharist, did he adopt their notions precisely. He took a philosophical license of translating them into good sense—of steaming off the

subjects. His doctrine appears to be substantially the same as Waterland's ; differing only in the application of the term regeneration, by which *he* designates the spiritual and moral renewal, which he describes as “the second end of baptism,” the first being “admission to the society of Christians and to all the rights and privileges of that body, which is the church.”

vapoury part of them and retaining what was solid. Antiquity appears in his pages not in her old fashioned garb, but in modern attire. He tries to shew that Irenæus and Tertullian believed the consecrated elements to be the body and blood of the Saviour in a "mystical and constructional sense;" that they held the modern Anglican view of the eucharist. Those who will suffer him to lead them blindfold through the mind of the Fathers may think the same; but it can hardly be denied, that on another supposition, more consonant with the state of thought in that day, their reasoning comes off simple, straight forward and consecutive, while this makes "the tour of their argument," and "chain of ideas that forms it" not a little obscure and intricate. They were contending against the Phantasmists that Christ assumed true sensible flesh and blood: and, by way of refuting the opposing heresy, appealed to the belief of the Church in their day concerning the Eucharist. How can the material sensible bread and wine be His body and blood, they argue, if his body was but a phantom? What they indignantly disclaimed was the notion that natural apparent human flesh and blood was placed by Christians on the Lord's table instead of apparent bread and wine.*

* See the *Biographia Literaria*, 2nd edit., Introd., pp. 86, 7, 8. Irenæus *Contra Hæreses*, L. iv. c. 18, p. 251, ed. Bened. Diss. Præv. in Iren., Lib. Art. xiv. 83, 84, 85, and Iren. L. v. cap. 2. Tertullian *Adver. Marcion*. L. iv. c. 8., and *De Resurr. Carn.* c. viii. His whole argument goes to prove that sensible flesh and blood will enter into the kingdom of heaven after this life. The "mystical constructional sense" seems not to have entered his head. Why should it? How could a spiritual eating of a supersensuous body have proved the resurrection of sensible flesh and blood, which was what he wanted to prove? He certainly supposed the bread, which our Lord held in his hand at the last Supper, to have been the *figure* of His body, a substantial figure. *Contra Marcion*, L. iv. c. 40. But to have believed only *this* of

So again when Tertullian is engaged in proving the resurrection of the Flesh, he says that our bodies, in the holy feast, are nourished to eternal life by Christ's immortal body, as our souls are by partaking of his Spirit. Justin Martyr is just in the same strain. "As the Saviour," says he, "was made flesh and blood for our salvation, so we are taught that the food, by which our flesh and blood are nourished, *per mutationem*, are the flesh and blood of that incarnate Jesus." Cyprian and Cyril, in their language on this point, seem to repeat the same thought.‡ Not a word do they say of a *spiritual* eating and drinking of the *body* and *blood*: the spiritual feeding, with them, was of the spirit alone; and the mental quickening was with the *words*, of which our Lord had said, *they are spirit and they are life*.

Of St. Augustine's conceptions I do not speak. He was more refined and abstract in his views than the Fathers just mentioned: and brought in a new intellectual æra: though even *his* conceptions were doubt-

the bread in the Eucharist would not have been that golden Anglican belief, which Waterland wished to find in him. So, Theodoret calls the divine mysteries *antitypes* of the real body, τοῦ ὄντος σώματος ἀντίτυπα, and argues that the body must have been substantial as its representative. If Theodoret did not find the *real* presence in the typical substances, by a change, did he find it in the Supper at all?

‡ See Eccles. Pol. Vol. ii. pp. 457-8, Keble's edit. "It appeareth not," says Hooker, "that of all the ancient Fathers of the Church any one did ever conceive or imagine other than only a mystical participation of Christ's both body and blood in the sacrament." Do the citations made in support of this statement bear it out? The ancients took no pains to defend their notion, or give it an imposing name. They never dreamed that it needed defence. What could be simpler than to hold that there was indeed the flesh and blood of our Lord under the appearance of bread and wine? Hooker's explication of the ancient view seems to me forced and unwarranted. He puts his notion into the words of the Fathers; they do not express it.

less unrefined and sensuous compared with ours, when we think freely, unshackled by ancient thought. Dr. Wall is positive that he could not have believed in transubstantiation because he says, *Sicut ergo secundum quendam modum, (according to a certain fashion,) sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, etc. ita sacramentum fidei fides est.* This is very different reasoning and talking from that of his predecessors on the same point: it looks as if he thought that the child was only *said* to have faith, because he has that which will grant him faith hereafter. If he is refined and philosophical in his view of one sacrament, he is equally so in his view of the other, at least *in that passage*. He describes no inward affection of the infant soul, but declares that, till he comes to the use of reason, the sacrament will guard him against adverse powers, *valebit ad ejus tutelam*, and if he departs from this life will exempt him from the eternal consequences of original sin. The views of Justin Martyr, Irenæus and Cyril ought not to be interpreted by the views of St. Augustine. I do not believe that a spiritual eating and drinking of the Lord's *body*, (the Anglican doctrine,) was dreamt of by the early Fathers, but that they conceived the elements to be either a mere sign, as the sacramentaries taught, or to be the material flesh and blood, as Rome teaches.

For,—be it remembered,—the “gross notion” which I impute to those ancient thinkers is but that which prevails at this day, in this enlightened age, in the Church of Rome; a belief namely, that the consecrated elements* are the material flesh and blood of Christ,

* See the Catechism of the Council of Trent *De Eucharistiæ Sacramento*, in which the authority of Cyril, Justin, and Irenæus is claimed for the doctrine that the very flesh of our Lord is in the sacrament, the accidents of bread and wine remaining; and

although they *seem* to the senses to be bread and wine, that is, although they have the accidents of bread and wine. "What Romanist ever asserted that a communicant's palate deceived him, when it reported the taste of bread or of wine in the elements?"* But though Waterland took some pains in the endeavour to shew that the ancients held substantially the same doctrine of the Eucharist as that taught in the Anglican Church, he does not pretend to receive their dogmatic definitions on all points precisely. "I believe they were right in the main thing," says he, "only not always accurate in the expression."† (Should he not rather have said, they were right as to the practical result, not as to the metaphysical *rationale*?) He thought them wrong in saying that the symbols received the spiritual presence, whereas they should have said that the communicants received it: just so he may have thought them wrong in signifying that remission of sins, when conferred upon infants, is an internal benefit, whereas they should have called it *beneficium externum et σχετικόν*.‡

What Waterland did in this respect all revivers of ancient teaching do likewise. Our most rigid antiquarian divines are obliged to readjust Patrician doctrine and piece out the mind of one Father with that

the last is said to have spoken so plainly to the point that "by no fallacious and captious interpretations can his words be obscured."

* Lit. Remains, iii. p. 351.

† Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, Chap. v.

‡ Certe nemo neget, infantes capaces esse beneficii ἀφέσεως τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, quod δικαίωσιν, justificationem, appellare solemus: est enim id beneficium *externum et σχετικόν*, quod in infantes ad Christi Jesu intercessionem propter ejus ὑπακοήν, Spiritu Sancto pro illorum *conversione et renovatione* spondente, (liceat hic humano more balbutire) conferri potest. Vitringa, Obs. Sacr. lib. ii. cap. 6, p. 338. Cited by Waterland, p. 357.

of another, the mind of the earlier Fathers with the mind of the later ones. The bare primitive doctrine of baptism is not fairly reproduced in any school whatever; we have instead the Mediæval or at least later development; as if we were not bound to the earliest view if we are bound to any! Tertullian teaches plainly that the Spirit is not received into the soul in baptism, but in confirmation, which surely is a distinct sacrament. Cyprian, who called him his master, appears to have followed him in this opinion. Yet our antiquarians will not allow these ancients to speak for themselves. They must have *meant*, it is said, that the Spirit is received in Baptism, although they declare that it is *not*, because (which seems rather a circular argument,) all the Fathers *did* believe this. Yet the Fathers in the first three centuries, though they did indeed believe that a spiritual gift accompanies all valid baptism, appear to have distinguished the cleansing of the soul by the Holy Ghost and application to the soul of remission of sin, which they called the new birth, from the indwelling of the sanctifier in the soul,—the operation of the spirit *on* the soul in removing its hereditary taint, from its reception into the soul—though some of them, as St. Barnabas, speak of baptism, in the manner of Scripture, as if it conveyed all the spiritual blessings of which it is the symbol,—renewal of heart and mind—and all that belongs to the Christian life. When however they speak dogmatically and precisely they confine the effect of baptism to a purification, distinct from the presence of the Spirit in the soul as the producer of actual sanctification. It is easy to see how they were led into this view by their simple-minded adherence to the letter of the Sacred Text: for in Scripture the indwelling of Christ is

never expressly coupled with baptism; regeneration and washing away of sin are expressly coupled with it. Throughout the Acts of the Apostles reception of the Spirit is but once connected with the rite of initiation, that is in chap. ii. 38; in every other instance, reception of the Holy Ghost is described as taking place either before or after baptism, as connected with prayer, with preaching, with laying on of hands, not immediately with the rite of entrance into the Church. Even that one text does not expressly connect any gift of the Spirit with baptism, as its proper effect and immediate consequence; it connects remission of sins with repentance and the sacrament that symbolizes repentance, and promises an extraordinary ministerial gift on condition of both. When it was determined that baptism conveyed the Spirit into the soul there to dwell for its sanctification and renovation, this was a development of early doctrine in Mr. Newman's sense of the term development—that is to say an enlargement and amendment of it.† It was by put-

* *Non quod in aquis Spiritum Sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub Angelo Spiritui Sancto præparamur. Hic quoque figura præcessit. Sic enim Joannes ante præcursor Domini fuit præparans vias ejus: ita et Angelus baptismi arbiter superventuro Spiritui Sancto vias dirigit ablutione delictorum, &c. De Baptismo, cap. vi. in initio.* Cyprian taught that we are prepared for the kingdom of heaven by divine regeneration in baptism, that we are born of both sacraments—(Baptism and Imposition of hands or Confirmation,)—because it is written, *Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei.* Epist. Ad. Jubai-anum Epist. lxxii.

† The Apostles were regenerate without water baptism: Cornelius and his company were regenerate before baptism: the disciples at Ephesus received not the Holy Ghost till Paul had laid hands upon them: the converts in Samaria received not the Holy Ghost, when baptized, but when Peter and John laid hands on them. St. Paul was promised remission of sins in baptism: but neither in his case nor any other recorded in the Acts,

ting together various passages of Scripture, by inferences drawn from the Apostolic practice of infant baptism, and grounding these inferences on such a psychology and such modes of thought as prevailed in those early times, that the Mediæval doctrine of baptism, the best form of which is, in my opinion, the Tridentine rather than the Anglican, was gradually framed. The doctrine apparently took a leap in the time of St. Chrysostom and his imitators, who echoed his words: and he it was who introduced, as I believe, those sophistications and strained interpretations by which the plain testimony of Scripture to moral regeneration is set aside, or turned into stammering and confusion. Men began to see by that time that baptism must be either more or less than it had been described before: that it must have all the internal attributes of regeneration or none of them: St. Chrysostom boldly invested it with them all.

“See how many,” said he, “are the largesses of baptism; and whereas some think that the heavenly grace consists only in the remission of sins, lo, we have recounted ten glories thereof. Wherefore we baptize infants, although they have no sins, that holiness, righteousness, adoption, inheritance, brotherhood with Christ, may be added to them; that they may become His members.” Upon which passage the author of *Scriptural views of Holy Baptism*, remarks: “It appears from this that some already had begun to

is it declared that any spiritual infusion or introduction of the Spirit into the soul took place in the moment when the rite was administered. I think we may fairly understand the passage in chapter ii. thus: “Adopt the Christian religion; make public profession of your faith by baptism; and you shall receive forgiveness of sin, and ministerial gifts to enable you to assist in promoting the conversion of others.”

restrict themselves too rigidly to the words of the description given in the Creed of Constantinople." * Had *begun* ! There are two handles by which almost every subject may be taken : but may we not ask on the present one, whether, from all that appears, we should not rather say, that St. Chrysostom *had begun* to add to the doctrine of baptism, rather than that others had begun to take away from it, especially as the established creed connected with it no more than they did. This way of insisting that all which an early writer does not *express* of later belief is to be understood in his doctrine, of giving *silence a tongue* and making the *waste places of Jerusalem to sing aloud*, may be necessary to the support of mystic momentary regeneration ; but whether this necessity justifies the practice, so largely adopted with respect to the primitive Church writers, to the earlier divines of our Church, and to the Apostles themselves ; I would say to all thinkers not irrevocably committed to the system, *judge ye*.

Let us examine this question a little more particularly. Tertullian, as we have seen, declares positively that the Spirit is not received *into* the soul, in Baptism, but in Confirmation, which is certainly no proper part of the sacrament. This view he never contradicts or limits elsewhere. Cyprian, who studied his writings day by day, seems to have followed him in this distinction. He taught that we are *prepared* for the kingdom of heaven by divine regeneration in baptism ; that we are *born* of both sacraments, (Baptism and Imposition of hands or Confirmation ;) because it is written, *Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua*

* Note, p. 21, 4th edit.

et spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei. Ad Jubaianum. Epist. LXXII. Thus he gives regeneration to Baptism, the new birth to Baptism and Imposition of hands together:—the one as the Washer away of guilt; the other as the Infuser of the Spirit into the soul. His argument in a preceding paragraph concerning those who had been baptized in Samaria, is to the same effect; and in his Epistle to Pope Stephen (LXXI) he speaks in similar terms of the joint effect of Baptism and Confirmation. In his Epistle to Pompeius (LXXIII) he first declares that Baptism cannot be without the Holy Spirit, and directly afterwards explains that, as Adam was first formed and then received the breath of life, so a man is first born in baptism, and then receives the Spirit by Imposition of hands: *nec enim potest accipi Spiritus, nisi prius fuerit qui accipiat.** This is a plain proof that, when the ancients speak of Baptism as giving the Spirit or having the Spirit, or that we are *born of the Spirit* in the water, they are not to be taken to mean an internal reception of the Spirit to dwell in the soul. In those days ideas were split and divided in a manner which is to our modern minds, without a close

* This is an adoption of Tertullian's doctrine in the treatise *De Baptismo*: in which, in the passage referred to before, he teaches that in the new birth man receives back that spirit of God which was breathed into him at his first formation, but afterwards lost by sin: not that it is obtained in the waters, but that being cleansed in the water under the angel we are *prepared* for the Holy Spirit. The spiritual effect peculiar to baptism, he teaches to be *quod delictis liberamur*, cap. v. *in fine*, cc. vi. vii. viii. Compare Acts viii. 14—18, xix. 5, 6. Did the Church take away the gift of lodging the spirit in the soul from Confirmation and give it to Baptism, when she separated the one from the other? Did she then degrade Imposition of Hands from a sacrament into a mere sacred rite?

attention to the run of their thoughts, quite inconceivable. Hence I believe their expressions have been much misinterpreted, because they have been filled up with modern ideas. There can be no doubt that some, perhaps all of them, ascribed the power of salvation to the bare application of water to the body, and supposed that, even when the peculiar spiritual effects of the sacrament have preceded the administration of the rite, the claim to everlasting life went not along with them, but was indissolubly attached to the outward seal. Hermas the shepherd and Cyril of Jerusalem, both explicitly declare this notion. We may well believe then that Cyprian may have separated ideas in the manner that has been described,—may have supposed that the office of Baptism was to free the soul from its hereditary taint, not to receive the Spirit as an informing principle: to purify and prepare, not to raise, to strengthen and to glorify.

And I think it may be shewn that to this distinction Cyprian always adhered. To neutralize and disannul what he says so positively over and over again on this head with what he says elsewhere, which is, to our modern notions, irreconcilable with it, and infer that he thought the Spirit was received in Baptism as in Confirmation, only not so fully, is to reduce his doctrine to absolute incoherency and self-contradiction. The inconsistency of that belief *in itself*, namely, that spiritual regeneration can be a partial reception of what is more fully received afterwards, I do not allege as proving any thing in this case; but this I will say, that it is quite as irrational as the notion which I ascribe to Tertullian and Cyprian, namely that spiritual regeneration is a renewal of the soul as to original sin, not a presence of the Sanctifier within it. The burial in

baptism they viewed as a preparatory process for the newness of life, into which the reformed soul was afterwards to be led by the Spirit. I believe that Cyprian's doctrine is superficial, not founded in ideas of reason, therefore ever ready to glide off into its opposite; yet his view has an internal consistency, of a certain kind, which he never lost sight of. When in the Epistle to Magnus (LXXV.) he contends, that the Clinici received the Holy Spirit in their baptism, not in a slighter degree, but in *full measure*, his words must be construed according to his declared doctrine of that sacrament, and the tenor of the discourse in which they occur. In this same Epistle he plainly declares his belief, that all whose sins are forgiven in baptism *have the Holy Spirit*, and in the Epistle to Cæcilius he says that the Spirit is *received in Baptism*. He must therefore have conceived that the reception and possession in the sacrament were *of a different kind* from the gift of Confirmation, and he could not have supposed that this difference was only a difference of *quantity*, because he affirms that in the former the gift of the spirit is poured out in full measure on all believers. His meaning then may have been this, that *such grace as accompanies baptism* is received as largely by those who are baptized in bed as by others; that Christ the Sun of Righteousness, *quoad hoc*, shines on all the faithful alike, as the natural sun shines alike on all mankind.

He adds that the grace thus received is afterwards increased or diminished in our conversation and course of action; that the soul-cleansing virtue is drawn out, or shrinks and diminishes, so as not to cover the increasing extent of sin, according as we act after the

reception of it. Afterwards he says that evil spirits cannot abide in the body of a man, *in quo baptizato et sanctificato incipit Spiritus Sanctus habitare*. But even this sentence cannot absolutely prove, that he believed it to be the office of the initiatory sacrament to lodge the Spirit within the soul: because, in his day, that sacrament was joined with imposition of hands, and he may, wherever he does not distinguish between them, be supposed to refer to the two in conjunction, since he sometimes calls the two together, as we have seen, the new birth. He may have meant that the soul was sanctified, made a meet habitation for the Spirit in baptism, and that the Holy Spirit begins to dwell in it afterwards by other means.

The Epistle to Donatus which contains the oft cited glowing account of his own regeneration, may be construed in the same way. He doubtless received the two rites on the same occasion, and speaks of the effects which he experienced after the double reception. That letter is written in a warm style, and is practical rather than scientific or explanatory. Whereas the epistles in which he so pointedly distinguishes between the gift of the spirit in Baptism and in Confirmation are controversial and dogmatic, and must be supposed to convey the most deliberate and accurate expression of his sentiments. If his doctrine may not be harmonized thus, it cannot be harmonized at all; and *then* what can we say but that his mind fluctuated, and that the doctrine of baptism began to be extended in his hands? We can have no right to infer, that neither he nor Tertullian meant what they said, when they described the grace of Baptism to be a preparation for the Spirit rather than the reception of the divine guest within the soul. These ancient writers

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were wanting in metaphysical insight: we have no right to say that they were so deficient in mere superficial logical coherency, as Anglo-Catholic interpreters make them out. The idea of Tertullian and Cyprian plainly was, that the soul was made a Temple in Baptism, and received the Deity to dwell within His Temple in Confirmation. Cyprian entered more into details on the subject than his master, being led to this by the questions of his day; hence as he had to expand and develop his doctrine more, its inadequacy and incoherency began to appear, and he inevitably made use of expressions which led to a decided enlargement of the doctrine. It is important, however, to ascertain the ideas really held upon this point by these *earlier* teachers. It signifies little to quote on this subject the sayings and interpretations of Theophylact, who died A. D. 1100, or of Cyril, who died 444; or even of Chrysostom, born 344, died 407; if they do not agree with those of Cyprian, martyred A. D. 258; of Tertullian, who died about 216; and Origen, Basil, Ambrose, Gregory of Nazianzum, and the still earlier Fathers. Do any of these teach that Baptism introduces the Spirit to *dwell within the soul*, before the soul is renewed in holiness? The passages in St. Barnabas,* are mere paraphrases of St. Paul's *Buried by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.*† They do not explain the Apostolic teaching, or add any thing to it: they merely repeat it in a diffuse

* *Barnabæ Epistolæ*, vi. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀνεκαίνισας ἡμᾶς, &c. And xi. *passim* and *in fine*.

† Romans vi. 4.

form. They do not tell us *how* baptism is connected with walking in *newness* of life, or give any *rationale* of the question whatever. Thus it is with the earliest Christian writers, as far as I have examined. They either identify baptism with the Christian life, after St. Paul, or they are guided by the history in the Acts, to suppose it to be a mere preparation of the soul for the reception of grace by Confirmation; or they are led by a literal interpretation of John iii. 5, and Titus iii. 5, to look upon water applied outwardly to the body as a seal, and the naming of the Holy Trinity as an amulet, which carry with them, as by charm, a specific virtue to keep off evil spirits, and endue the soul with a claim to everlasting life, apart from any internal change whatsoever. Their theory of the Sacrament was certainly different from that which is called "Catholic," "Ancient," "Apostolic," now. I will venture this concluding remark. *They do not claim the oral authority of the Apostles for their notions of the effect of baptism, and the nature of its office.* For the *practice* of baptism and of baptizing infants they do, not for their *doctrine* of baptism. They talk on the subject like men conjecturing, reasoning, inferring, concluding, or as if they were paraphrasing the written word; *not* like men reporting Apostolic instructions given *viva voce*, or handing down a definite Apostolic tradition. Why are we bound to their *guesses*? Why must we accept their commentaries on Scripture? Why may we not rather judge, as they did, according to the best of our ability, by the Bible?

Waterland was not the man to bring those morning dreams of theology into what may be called, *by comparison*, the noonday of thought. His doctrine of

baptism is called dry and cold by some of the mystic theorists; to my mind it does full justice to baptism, but defrauds regeneration. In that explanatory sermon he aimed to confute and put out of countenance a set of enthusiasts, who brought the Scriptural doctrine of moral regeneration by the Spirit into disgrace, not so much by their way of conceiving, as by their way of applying it. I have seen a picture of two Cupids struggling for the possession of an unfortunate bird: one drags away the head and wing, leaving the other with the body in his hand. Such, methinks, was the strife of Waterland with the *warm men* of his day: he leaves the body of regeneration with them, and tears the miserable doctrine asunder in the attempt to rescue it from maltreatment. Regeneration apart from renovation is a shade, an outline, a circumference without a sphere, a line without breadth or thickness. In separating one from the other, he sunders what God, in His Holy Word, and in the constitution of spiritual things which He has appointed, has joined together.

*Scriptural View of Holy Baptism Reformed from
the Mediæval Theology.*

MOST cordially do I concur in the sentiment expressed in a celebrated Tract on Holy Baptism,—“If it were merely an outward change—a change of condition only, wherein were the solemnity of this declaration, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.*” But even as the tone and spirit, as

well as the terms of that annunciation, forbid our confining the subject of it to any change of circumstance or external position, so likewise to represent that all-concerning fact and mystery of which our Lord spake, that alone really important event of the life of man, as the exclusive appurtenance and property of any outward rite, or as absolutely annexed to any portion of an outward and positive system, however ennobled that system may be by the high purposes to which it is made subservient;—to narrow and impoverish the *kingdom of Heaven* in our Lord's discourse, by understanding it to the exclusion of the spiritual state established upon earth from the beginning; this, methinks, is not only to forget the true nature of the end in too intense a contemplation of the means, but it betrays an insensibility to the spirit of the passage itself, compared with numberless other passages of the New Testament, as truly to be deprecated as that which the author of the Tract so keenly exposes. Most worthy of all veneration is the Visible Church of Christ, transfigured as she is with the *glory of God*, that shines within and around her, with her walls and towers and battlements *white as the light*, and the "illumination of all gems" not only on her front, but on her stable foundations.* Yet, be it remembered, that far above her there is a Sun irradiating the ample firmament, that, before she rose conspicuous on the face of the earth, that Sun was beaming from the unfathomable depth of heaven,—that even now all His heat and all His light are not absorbed within her precincts.

Incorporation with Christ may be understood in a

* *Rev.* xxi. 19, 20, 23.

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double sense ; actually we are not members of Him till we are influenced unto holiness by his Spirit, not grafted into him till we *partake the root and fatness of the tree*, and no longer bear our own native fruits. But Baptism incorporates us into Him, by bringing us into certain relations to His Spirit. With every member of the Invisible Church He has actual communion ; with every member of the Visible Church He has bound himself by special promise to be spiritually present upon the fulfilment of certain conditions in the party to be thus benefited and blest. All that are added thereunto are as fresh stones cemented into the ever expanding Temple wherein His Spirit dwells, and are thus in a position to be visited by Him, each in his turn. To say more than this, is to confound the visible and outward Church with the mystic body of Christ, the spiritual Company of true believers.

If there be, in every heir of the kingdom, who is destined to enter on his eternal inheritance, a state or condition of the whole man, such as Scripture ascribes to the sons of God, and if this be regeneration in the proper and primary sense, it follows inevitably that men are not regenerated in baptism, except in a secondary and improper one. But this we may believe without denying to baptism a real power to sanctify and justify, such as "befits its nature:" consistently with this view, we may impute to it as important a relation to the growth of righteousness in the soul, as it has on any other theory. If "time is not with things of spirit," an idea by which alone the truths of Scripture can be harmonized with each other, regeneration, considered "in its actual self, opposed τῷ φαινομένῳ," is not assignable to a particular moment or moments ; its *phænomena* indeed are in time,

and respecting these, we know that they are not crowded into the moment of Baptism; the soul acquires saving virtues gradually, and its spiritual course does not in all cases even begin with the washing of water. But what of this? "Sacraments," to quote an orthodox divine, are "deeds of conveyance," and a deed is not the less valid because its provisions do not all come into effect immediately, no, nor even if the privileges it confers may be attained by other means. What more *can* we hold the outward ceremony to be than such a deed, unless we accept the unwarranted inventions of the later schoolmen, and ascribe to the mere outward sign an inconceivable causality, the like to which is not to be found elsewhere in the universe, material and spiritual? If it be, as there seems good reason as well as no mean authority for deciding, a mere act of obedience on man's part, required by God in the economy of his administration; no real cause of grace, no real instrument of grace, but only a condition of its bestowal: why are we bound to believe that the application of the sign and the reception of the thing signified, must needs go together in time? * *In*

* That grand religious moralist, South, may be cited, I think, by persons of our way of thinking, as more with than against us: for he speaks of the "spiritual life, which we do or should receive in baptism, or at least by a thorough conversion after it;"—a mode of expression which no man would have adopted, who did not feel the idea of conversion to be involved in the idea of spiritual life; who did not, in fact, look upon conversion as more indispensable to our highest interests than any outward appliance. In the next paragraph he unfolds a little more of his mind. Speaking of such as come to the Lord's Supper, (for the Sermon from which I quote is on *Sacramental Preparation*,—the text *Matt. xxii. 12*,) "Let them consider," says he, "whether, as by their baptism, they formerly washed away their original guilt, so they have not since, by their actual sins, washed away their baptism. And, if so, whether the converting grace of God has set them upon their legs again, by forming in

the eye of the church, we are not Christians before the initiatory rite of Christianity has been administered to us; from the time of the administration, we are in the way of the Spirit,—have entered “an ever en-

them a new nature. And that such an one, as exerts and shews itself by the sure, infallible effects of a good life.” Now this, though more roughly and racily expressed than it would be by most modern disciples of Wesley, is in substance, I believe, very much the same thing as that which has of late been imputed to them for unsoundness of doctrine; since it plainly implies that, let Baptism do what it may, many a man is or may be regenerated long after it.

As for the excellent Hammond, though in one of his Sermons he favours the opinion, that Baptism puts a principle of holiness into infant children, (what becomes of it in the unholy ones he does not explain,) yet in his “Practical Catechism” we find nothing of the sort asserted, and only such reasons alleged for the baptizing of infants as are of equal force with those who believe them capable of an internal spiritual change, and those who believe the contrary: and further, it is certain that, in his “Paraphrase of the New Testament,” he expounds *every text* relative to that ordinance in such wise as if his mind were possessed with the thought, that it is the undertaking of Christianity at full, on the occasion of Baptism, as much as Baptism itself, to which the Sacred Writers refer, when they speak of it as life and salvation. John iii. 5, he expounds thus, “Jesus answers him, except a man be received as a proselyte,—such as are received by Baptism in the Christian Church, so as to undertake the law of Christ, and renounce his former (whether Heathen or) Jewish course, *the first expressed by being washed in water*, the ceremony of the Jews proselytism, (now also made use of by Christ,) by which a man was said by the Jews to be *new born*, and accordingly so here in a high degree, *the second by being born of the Spirit, &c.*” Compare this explanation with that of Mr. Coleridge in the “Aids to Reflection;” “Or if, as I myself think, the different position marks a different sense, yet the former must be *ejusdem generis* with the latter,—the water of repentance, *reformation in conduct*; and the Spirit that which purifies the inmost principle of action.” Surely this sense must be at least *included* in the entire meaning of our Lord, when he said that a man must be born of water and the Spirit. Hooker decries the notion that by water and the Spirit, “we are in that place to understand no more than if the Spirit alone had been mentioned, and water not spoken of.” Even this could not have been absolutely condemned on the score of *criticism*, nor proved

larging inclosed area of the opportunity of individual conversion to, and reception of, the Spirit of truth.”* Those without, in a Christian land, are not as the Heathen: they may hear the Gospel, and to hear the Gospel is a spiritual opportunity; who can venture to affirm that it is not, even by itself, a power unto salvation, a most effectual part of the means of redemption provided by him who *brought life and immortality to light*? But they who receive the sacrament of light, if they neglect not their privilege, will hear more understandingly, with more of spiritual intelligence than those who receive it not, will have an entrance into the eternal kingdom more abundantly ministered unto them,—the opportunity of regeneration and renewal more largely offered them.

Even those divines who are most eager to connect the baptism of the Spirit with the baptism of water, for the most part admit, that there is a case in which they may be disjoined in time; respecting hypocritical baptism,† St. Augustine, the great expositor of baptismal regeneration, plainly declared that it should not be held to preclude the recipient from the New Birth for ever; and this we have good ground to believe, not so much “*because he says it,*” mighty divine as he was, but because it may be inferred by any man,

altogether contrary to the style of Scripture; but according to the interpretations given above, the term *water* has its own separate sense, that is to say, repentance and reformation.

* *Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, Vol. III. p. 275.

† Whatever is here said of hypocritical, applies equally to schismatical baptism. “Bingham showed, by a *most elaborate search into the history of all ages of the church*, that such baptism, though valid, so far as to preclude re-baptization, had yet very great deficiencies; that it gives not spiritual grace, nor remission of sins.” See the Bishop of Exeter’s masterly Charge of 1842, p. 50, 51.

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from a certain passage of Holy Writ,* as well as generally from the reason of the thing. That positive sin of a high amount precludes the entrance of the Spirit into the soul, is a point upon which, I believe, there has never been any difference of belief among bodies of Christians. If then it is to be concluded as a general rule, that a man baptized in positive infidelity, may afterwards be regenerated through baptism then received, why may not a child, baptized before he has faith, obtain the benefit of the sacrament long after its reception, when he has become capable of co-operation with the Spirit?† If the virtue of the ordinance

* Acts viii. 22.

† “It is demanded in the second place, what is that regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and wherein it consists, whereof infants that are baptized can be thought capable. *For the wild conceits of those that imagine them to have faith in Christ, (which without actual motion of the mind, is not), require miracles to be wrought of course, by baptizing, that the effect thereof may come to pass. And if the state of grace, (which the habitual grace of God’s Spirit either supposeth or inferreth), is not to be attained but by the resolution of embracing the covenant of grace, (as by all the premises, it is not otherwise attained), it will be every whit as hard to say what is that habitual grace, that is said to be poured into the souls of infants that are baptized, being nothing else but a facility in doing what the covenant of grace requireth. But, if we conceive the regeneration of infants that are baptized to consist in the habitual assistance of God’s Spirit, the effects whereof are to appear, in making them able to perform that which their Christianity requires at their hands, so soon as they shall understand themselves to be obliged by it; we give reason enough of the effect of their baptism, whether they die or live, and yet become not liable to any inconvenience. For supposing the assistance of God’s Spirit, assigned them by the promise of baptism, to take effect when their bodily instruments enable the soul to act as Christianity requireth; if the soul, by death, come to be discharged of them, can any thing be said why original concupiscence, which is the law of the members, should remain any more, to impeach the subjection of all faculties to the law of God’s Spirit?” Thorndike, *Presbyter*.—Book iii. chap. viii. Cited in the *Tracts for the Times*, vol. iii. p. 31. “Requires*

may be suspended in the case of the unqualified adult, why not in the case of the unqualified infant? There is a baptism of the Spirit as well as a baptism of water, and, as Taylor teaches, the latter may be "performed by an internal and merely spiritual ministry, when we, by acts of our own election, verify the promise made in baptism, and so bring back the rite, by receiving the effect of baptism." They who hold that a habit of grace may supply the want of a habit of faith, and that man receives the gift of righteousness as passively as a vessel the liquor poured into it, will of course deny the necessity of this supposition; but this they cannot deny, that, even according to their own theory, the operation of the rite is not necessarily immediate; that the outward laver may be applied at one time and the gift which it is its office to bestow, received at another.*

miracles to be wrought:"—in accordance with this, Mr. Coleridge observes, "When God gave his Spirit miraculously to the young child Daniel, He at the same time miraculously hastened the development of his understanding." *Literary Remains*, vol. iii. p. 289. If it be said that after all, Thorndike believed this "habitual assistance," or, as he afterwards calls it, "habitual presence," to be an inward gift, *at the time when it is given*, though he declares that neither a habit of virtue in the mind, nor a habit of grace in the mind, is the immediate result; I can only reply, that his notion of an *inward gift* must have been very peculiar.

* That "Baptism and its effects may be separated, and do not always go in conjunction," "that the effect may be before, and therefore much rather may it be after its susception," is the doctrine of Jeremy Taylor; and that, *in this saying*, he referred to the total effects of the Sacrament, the spiritual change as well as the moral renovation, is clear from the context. Indeed, though he himself affirmed the separability of the spiritual effects from the moral, and held it to be "not certain" but that, in the instance of infants, some grace is "collated or infused;" yet he sanctions the view which I am endeavouring to defend, so far as to declare, that Baptism has all the same spiritual effi-

The Spirit given to the little ones in Baptism may, nay, must be conceived to suggest holy thoughts as soon as the soul is capable of thinking, determine the will as soon as the will is in being, enlighten the understanding when it begins to be manifested; but can it "act on mere potentialities?" As well may we imagine that sun and dew can operate upon the potential root and stem and foliage of the oak in the acorn. As Spring flowers open into a genial air which penetrates the bud and forwards its expansion, so the unfolding thoughts of a child are met by heavenly influences, which convert them more or less into holiness, according as the will resigns itself to such actuation. Is not this, in a true and high sense, to be "interested in Him from whom all spiritual renovation flows;" to "dwell beneath the overshadowing power of Him who is our Justifier;*" to have from infancy

cacy for the benefit of the receiver, whether it conveys grace into the soul at the time of the administration or no. "For the Church gives the sacrament," says he, "God gives the grace of the sacrament. But because he does not always give it at the instant in which the Church gives the sacrament, (as if there be a secret impediment in the suscipient,) and yet afterwards does give it, when the impediment is removed, (as to them that repent of that impediment,) it follows, that the Church may administer rightly, even before God gives the real grace of the sacrament; and, if God gives this grace afterwards by parts, and yet all of it is the effect of that Covenant, which was consigned in Baptism; he that defers some, may defer all, and verify every part, as well as any part." *Life of Christ*, Part I. Sect. ix. 8. So far was Taylor from agreeing with those who teach, that unless the infant is regenerate in Baptism, to baptize him is to deprive him of Christian regeneration in after life. His reasoning is nearly to the same effect in the "*Liberty of Prophesying*." Sect. xviii. 34.

* One of Mr. Newman's numberless fine expressions, applied by him to an *inward* Spiritual Presence, that works not always, (or at least is not always producing the *fruits of the Spirit*) but is always ready to work, if I understand the gifted author rightly. See *Lectures on Justification*. VIII. 218.

such a guardianship of the Spirit of Christ as may "keep even our most luxuriant years within bounds,"* —a blessedness ever around us, ever ready to be *within* us, when we can and will receive it? Lodged in a soul that neither believes, nor loves, nor hopes, nor thinks of heaven, the precious boon of the Gospel would be as "treasure in a dead man's hand or music in the grave."

Baptism is in a true and most important sense, the sacrament of regeneration, an ordinance appointed by God to stand at the threshold of the Christian life, not only to proclaim the entrance of a human soul into the Church, but in an especial manner to promote that change from the Flesh into the Spirit, without which no child of Adam ever yet saw *the kingdom of God, and His righteousness*. "Whatever we do by faith out of the sacrament," says Taylor, alluding to the Eucharist, "is done more excellently in it." Even so it is with Baptism. The initiatory rite does not necessarily and always commence the spiritual life of man. It is impossible to maintain such a tenet unless we also maintain that the Saints of old had no spiritual life at all in the sense in which we obtain it by Baptism, or that those servants of God who are brought forward in the New Testament as examples of righteousness through faith, which as St. Paul teaches, is the same as by grace,† are no examples of Gospel blessedness.‡ Does it not appear rather sweeping and summary, rather like a determination to cut a knot

* Cited from a Sermon of Hammond in the "*Tracts for the Times*," Vol. III.

† Compare *Romans* iv. 3, 4, 5. with 16.

‡ It is very considerable that, if the peculiar powers of the Gospel are not illustrated by the religious history of Abraham, then those peculiar powers are never once described in an

which cannot be untied, when men take upon them to say that St. Peter was grafted into Christ, when he made his famous confession, though the day of Pentecost was not yet come; that Cornelius had commenced his life in the Spirit before Baptism, and yet, that for their successors in the faith, regeneration must always wait for Baptism, even if by circumstances it is postponed beyond the time when other means of grace have brought the soul to a knowledge and love of its Redeemer; or that we have no ground in Scripture for believing the contrary? on the other hand to deny that the Apostles when they faithfully followed our Lord, before his resurrection and ascension, or Cornelius when his *prayers and alms came up for a memorial before God*; or even the jailor when he desired Christian Baptism, had not even begun to be

Epistle, which, by a most catholic consent of competent divines, has ever been supposed to give a general outline-view of the Christian religion, to teach and declare the nature and character of the Gospel of Christ: for certainly in this discourse those powers are never once distinguished, either expressly or by implication, from the powers unto holiness vouchsafed to the Patriarch. St. Paul, in this discourse, speaks of Baptism as a part of the New dispensation, but he attributes to Baptism only such effects as were in the world from the time that the *true Light which lighteth every man*, first entered it. Can we imagine the Apostle to have written thus, without a syllable to separate the blessing of Abraham from the blessedness showered upon the Christian Church, but an identification of the two in the clearest terms and with emphatic repetition, had he orally taught that the redeeming blood was not bestowed upon his great example of justification, when he was first justified, and in order to his being justified?—that after all his communion with God and foresight of Christ's day, he was still but in a *twilight state* betwixt the Heathen darkness he had left and spiritual regenerative illumination?

Such, however, is the teaching of men who have drawn their glittering sword and bent their supple bow against whatsoever borders upon undue license in the treatment, not only of the

children of God, or to receive the first fruits of the Spirit, is to make regeneration a thing of words, a coinage of the brain, which no idea substantializes; to convert it from a spiritual mystery, dark in its fathomless depth, yet with a broad and open face that smiles and brightens beneath our eye, into a heap of clouds and confusion, or rather into a transparent fallacy, which no man could help seeing through if he did not interpose betwixt himself and the object an opaque skreen of other men's determinations, which, on this plan of proceeding, grows thicker and thicker from age to age. This way of teaching regeneration does, indeed, make it a "deadening doctrine;" for to admit that men may be habitually obedient to their Master above, may have their hearts fixed on heaven, while here upon earth, be ready to give up their best earthly

Bible, but of the least tradition which may even be conjectured to have come from God. That they, these strenuous and devout men themselves, with *their* principles respecting the ground of faith, should perceive no shadow of licentiousness in the interpretations to which I have referred, is not to be wondered at; for by such interpretations alone can certain opinions, which prevailed among the early Christians, be *explained into Holy Writ*; and thus their freedom disguises itself to the eyes of these earnest theorists, under the becoming garb of submission to antiquity,—obedience to the voice of ages near to the Apostolic age. But it is wonderful, that they who are revolted by such daring departures from the plain meaning and spirit of the Sacred Text; who complain of them also as opposed to the plain meaning and spirit of the Seventh Article, should nevertheless cling desperately, as if religious life and safety depended upon it, to the very principle upon which these harsh and painful doctrines may for ever be unanswerably defended; I mean the principle, that every view of divine truth, (no matter how *really* discrepant from other views held at the same time,) which was current in the Church during any part of the first six or seven centuries, and was not authoritatively put down, subsequently to its reception, by a General Council, must be revered as if taught by God.

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blessings, through *faith that worketh by love*, or to brave tortures and death in order to *obtain a better resurrection*, yet want the great gift of the Gospel; and on the other hand that this glorious endowment may belong to a soul which neither is nor ever shall be holy and just, or that *Christ lives* spiritually in thousands who are not living a Christian life nor about to do so,—what is this but to remove the essence of evangelical blessedness from the domain of reason and conscience, into a region of utter silence and darkness that may be felt? * Does not an Apostle plainly tell us that the salvation of Baptism is *the answer of a good conscience toward God*, that is *moral* purity wrought by the Spirit; and shall we venture to say that this moral purity is *not* of the essence of the baptismal boon, which does *not* necessarily include it,—has no such relation to the virtues of the Spirit as the vital juices of the tree to its flower and fruit, which is the unvarying voice of Scripture? The great maxim of legislation, intellectual and political, is “*subordinate not exclude*. Nature in her ascent, leaves nothing behind, but at each step subordinates and glorifies.” † There may be morality where there is not a spiritual religion, though “all morality grounded in an awe of the invisible, is essentially religious:” ‡ but there is

* We do not read in Scripture that the Apostles, companions of our Lord, were baptized with water, after the demission of the Comforter: Cornelius and other converts WERE so baptized, but as far as appears, *after* reception of the Spirit. If Baptism were so connected with spiritual life as the “Anglo-Catholic” theory connects it, would it not be most strange that the Church, as far as her history is given in Holy Writ, should begin with all exceptions to her ordinary economy on this point, no plain examples?

† *Literary Remains of S. T. Coleridge*, IV. 92.

‡ *Aids to Reflection*.

no spirituality or holiness attributable to the human mind, as an inward property or possession, which does not involve moral excellence; we cannot be raised from human to divine by the presence of Christ's Spirit within us, our moral nature not being assimilated to that of Christ.

It is not to be denied that the early Christians had certain vague unsettled notions of an inward spiritual gift received by infants in Baptism;* of a purity conferred by the ritual washing, which left the disposition to sin uneradicated, and yet removed the hereditary taint of the soul. But if they took certain sayings of Scripture concerning this sacrament in a narrow and over literal sense, † was not this from inability to give them an adequate interpretation in any other way, rather than from any positive instruction received from the Apostles that so they were to be understood? Did they not construe numberless other texts according to their mere sensuous import, ‡ which by agree-

* Mr. Maurice's "*Kingdom of Christ*" contains a highly interesting disquisition upon the spirit of the ancient view of Sacraments. "We refer everything to consciousness," he says, "they almost nothing. The intellectual condition of the recipient is that which we dwell upon exclusively: the disposition and power of the Bestower was with them all in all." Vol. 1. p. 209, 1st edit. The author is here describing the tendency of the ancient and modern theologies, viewed at large. It is not to be supposed that all the individuals, in all their thoughts, were and are thus partial and one-sided.

† Burnet has said of the ancient Christians, and surely not without truth, that "they were too apt to expound places of Scripture according to their first appearances." See his Exposition of the xxxix Articles. Art. 22.

‡ *Exempli gratia.* Irenæus, in whose valuable work the *hay and stubble* are heaped up high upon the *gold and silver and precious stones*, sees in our Lord's saying, *I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom*, (Matt. xxvi. 29) plain proof of the

ment of a vast majority of pious and intelligent divines, (a true if not a technical Catholic consent,) have since had a far better meaning given to them by a different method of interpretation? All circumstances considered, can we imagine them to have done otherwise without supposing a perpetual miracle to prevent them from falling into those modes of thought, which prevailed in the world during their day,—an extraordinary

“carnal resurrection of his disciples.” (Irenæus Ben. ed. Lib. V. cap. xxxiii. 1.) “*The Scriptural character of the English Church,*” (in the Note to Sermon xvii.) contains some remarks on the early Fathers, which seem to me as judicious as they certainly are interesting. The writer does not pretend to a long or extensive acquaintance with the Fathers at large, but he has carefully perused a few of their books, and he describes the impression which that perusal has left on his mind.

It is often said in a broad indiscriminating way that the Incarnation and the Trinity, and all the great fundamental truths of the Christian religion have been handed down to us by those faithful zealous witnesses, and that we must therefore needs respect their testimony on every other subject. This remark shews little insight into the human mind, where, as all observant persons must be aware, the depths and the shallows are found closely adjoining one another. The principal doctrines of Christianity have preserved themselves, rather than been preserved by man’s care and intelligence; they stand on a broad basis; reason requires them, the heart seeks for them, and it is felt that nothing less than the great features of the Christian faith can satisfy the mind of man, considered at large, and in a certain state of advancement. But in secondary questions, such as the way in which sacraments communicate grace, more is left to the determination of the mere intellect, and herein, there will be a greater diversity of opinion in different ages. The Fathers have handed down to us the great truths of Revelation; but we do not receive them on their testimony alone, nor is even their *accordant* voice sufficient to establish a doctrine which wants what *those* truths so abundantly possess, internal evidence. I speak of *facts* or what I believe to be such; being fully persuaded that no man ever received the doctrines of our holy religion, to the salvation of his soul, who did not see their truth mirrored in the depths of his own spirit; and that only so far as we possess this inward *certainty* can we be said to have faith.

On points, a clear knowledge of which is not of prime im-

Providence to do that which was not necessary to be done for the preservation of the substance of the faith; since mere intellectual errors the human intellect itself, in its natural progress, is capable of correcting. Some of their notions I do indeed hold to be untrue, but such untruth did *them* no harm, for they held it in righteousness, not perceiving it to be such, or, under their circumstances, having it in their power to do so. Those over sensuous, over literal conceptions were even useful in their day, and were doubtless comprised in the design of Providence for the preservation of the truth; but for this rough envelope, the substance of Gospel doctrine might have evaporated into Gnosticism. It was that spiritual truth around which these notions were encrusted, not the notions themselves, which were to the Ancient Church so full of life. The doctrine of an *opus operatum*,* of a spiritual change

portance, a majority of the primitive teachers have sometimes fallen into error; See what Jeremy Taylor, a most learned Patrician, has given out, in the Liberty of Prophesying, Section VIII. "On the Disability of Fathers, or Writers Ecclesiastical, to determine our questions with certainty and truth." They were undeniably wrong about the relation of one sacrament to infants; why may they not have been wrong about the other also?

* In one of his earnest and impressive discourses Mr. Dodsworth observes, respecting the doctrine of the *opus operatum*, "It is rather difficult to discover what the Romish Church actually does hold on this subject. If that corrupt communion maintains the efficacy of the sacraments independent of the state of the receiver—that the receiving of the outward elements, altogether independent of the condition of the subject of them, does merit remission of sins and other spiritual benefits, *ex opere operato*, that is, mechanically, as it were, which some Romish writers seem to hold,—then the doctrine of the Church of England is altogether different. But I believe it would not be fair to charge this error on the Romish Church in principle, however it may attach to many of her members." Dodsworth on Romanism and Dissent, p. 145-6.

I am glad to have such good authority for believing, or being

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wrought in the human soul without a spiritual act of him that is to be changed, did they indeed find life in this? Say rather that, being full of life and health within, they took no hurt from its deadness and deathliness, nor saw how, under the name and guise of special spirituality, it embodies that virus of superstition, which creeps like a cancer over the body of the Christian's faith, and, if uncounteracted, must inevitably reduce it from an animated frame to a lifeless and corrupting mass. Nor ought we to suppose that now, in our day, the dogma is not injurious, because the propounders of it stave off the consequences to which it naturally leads by a double diligence in preaching the doctrine of good works, and seem even desirous to indemnify the moral sense for their offences against it by setting up inherent against imputed righteousness. It is not the doctrine itself, evacuated and nullified as it is even by those who teach it, in a land, where the

confirmed in the belief, that Romanists, as such, no more imagine than we do ourselves that Christians are altogether excused from working out their own salvation by sacramental privilege, and that the gift which certain sacred rites convey will bring a man to heaven in spite of a thoroughly evil course of life pursued *after the reception of it*, or that it can enter the soul in the face of positive infidelity. But surely this, and this *alone*, is not the doctrine repudiated by our divines under the above-named title. It is obvious that the term *opus operatum* implies an opposition to *opus operantis*, and, generally speaking, any man believes in the efficacy of the *mere work wrought* by or through the sacrament, who denies that the co-operation of the subject is necessary to its being brought to an end or consummated. To hold the doctrine of the *opus operatum* is not merely to suppose that the outward signs of holy mysteries "*transnature*" the human being by their sole agency, or even by a virtue infused into them from above; we are subjecting our minds to this yoke when we believe that God himself thus *transnatures* or regenerates the human being *by their sole instrumentality*, actual faith being either absent or taking no part in the change effected in its presence. The unscripturalness of the tenet

whole counsel of God is laid before all sorts of hearers, that is so much to be feared as the principles upon which it is vindicated, principles that mystify and obscure the foundations whereon all religious faith must ultimately rest, and separate Christians from one another. For he who has persuaded himself that it is his duty to suffer no appeal to reason and conscience upon the internal character of a doctrine, but to decide the question for or against it by a certain kind of external testimony alone, is apt to hold those who dissent from his exclusive view of authority as rebels against God,—and justly, if the will and teaching of his Lord, be indeed as much better known to him than to other men, as he assumes that it is—to shrink from *contact* with them or interchange of thought,—and prudently, if his own thought-stifling doctrine is necessary and right,—to sigh for the time, and on his principles he is even bound to *pray* for it, when the

consists in this, that it speaks as if the soul of man were capable of being rendered pleasing to God without being endued with a real internal holiness and actual will-righteousness: and well may the Romanist confute out of his own mouth the Anglican, who, like Jeremy Taylor, admits the *opus operatum* in relation to Infant Baptism, while he rejects it with scornful indignation in respect of everything else. This inconsistency Taylor has himself set forth as clearly and forcibly as words can express it. In vain did he afterwards attempt to weaken the tower of strength, which he had built on his adversary's ground, in order to shew how such a fortress was to be attacked and demolished.

As to the notion of a supernatural virtue inherent in sacramental signs, which Mr. Dodsworth declares to be not the doctrine of the Church of England, considered in itself, rather than as the auxiliary of a truly pernicious opinion, it seems scarce worth contending against; for the difference betwixt God working immediately on the heart *with* the elements, and His putting power into the elements whereby they work under Him, is probably a mere matter of words. The latter proposition, if metaphysically explained, would probably be found to mean no more than the former.

Church, if she cannot correct and convert, may at least silence all who now profanely dare to think aloud that we are not only permitted, but required, to use the spiritual eyes which God has given us for the determination of our faith as well as the regulation of our practice. If such opinions can be proved true, let them be established at all hazards; in this case they will, in the end, we may hope, be accepted by the better sort of men, and few worth caring for will remain to be incommoded by their stringency. But till they *are* proved true by fair argument,—while it remains a question whether they may not be founded on subtle error and confusion of thought,—sustained by the powers of this world, pride, prejudice, mental indolence, or inexpertness, fear of losing caste among the reputed pious and orthodox, or other such allies, let us never be diverted from a careful and even laborious attempt at the exposure of their falsity by the notion that such falsity is not worth exposing. Let us contend against them the more earnestly the more we value peace and concord; the more devoutly we desire that fellow Christians should dwell together as brothers; in mutual respect, without which love and unity cannot long subsist. Every false opinion in divinity must be mischievous directly or indirectly: but these opinions are productive of *immediate* mischief, as being, in their *own nature*, with whatever Christian mildness and even tenderness enforced, so especially intolerant, supercilious and estranging.*

* Many reasons may be given why this view of Infant Regeneration was retained by the Reformers, when some others, which might be equally well defended by an appeal to the primitive Church were set aside,—reasons with which the force of truth has no concern. Of these Mr. Coleridge suggested an important one, namely, the ill repute of Anabaptism, and conse-

“ I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins.” Whether do we most pregnantly interpret this article, attribute, most true honour and power to the Sacrament, if we say that it confers an unimaginable purity, upon the surface, as it were, of the soul, while within it remains full of death and corruption; (for where no change in the will, “the spiritual in man,” has been effected, as in a passive subject it

quently of all arguments which Anabaptists availed themselves of, at the time when the Protestant cause was yet struggling for life. It is not to be imagined, he observes, that the Fathers of the Reformation could have taken up the question with the requisite calmness and freedom of spirit. Now Luther and Calvin were pre-eminently the Fathers of the Reformation, so far as alteration of doctrine was concerned. Great pains have lately been taken to display the points of difference betwixt our Reformers and those of the continent; but these labours, however effectual, have in the end only served to make us feel the more, that Luther was the soul of our early Anglican theology, and that Calvin had more to do with the formation of its body than any other man. Thus the revulsion and recoil from Anabaptist associations, which operated strongly on them, must have influenced our divines at second hand, if in no other way; and I think it may be safely affirmed, that the Anti-anabaptist arguments of Luther and Calvin contain the substance and the spirit of all that has ever been brought forward in our Church upon the point of Pædo-baptism, or of Pædo-regeneration, in respect, at least, of the reason of the thing. Those great lights considered the Baptism of infants, as the ancients did, an *opus operans et in presenti*, and our Reformers dared proceed no further in the path of innovation than they.

But perhaps an equally strong reason, and one calculated to act immediately upon both parties, may be found in their common opposition to Rome. It may have been that they magnified the power of Baptism, in order to make a stand the more firmly against the Romish doctrine of penance, and exalted that Sacrament, as if to make up to it for the undue disparagement it had sustained through Papistic exaltation of the Eucharist. They could not afford to discover what the former is not and cannot be, lest they should seem to be veiling its light and dimming its glory; although, in very truth, to elevate Baptism at the inevitable expense of Regeneration is but to lower both. After large alterations, too, it was but natural that they should pause, with something of alarm and self-distrust, fearing also to give their

cannot be,) the evil principle must surely remain unmortified, the law in our members uncontrolled; or if we prefer to say that Baptism is the Sacrament of Remission, inasmuch as it grants and secures to all receivers alike the special assistance of the Spirit of Holiness, the cleanser of hearts, whereby, so far as we resign ourselves to His gracious leading, our sins are remitted in being removed, blotted out from the *record on high* in being purged away from the depth of our hearts. The laver of New Birth is no single ablution to make us clean in the eye of Heaven for once in our lives; but rather an introduction to a perennial fount of living waters, in which our souls are to be washed and purified perpetually, so that at the end of life they

adversaries an advantage by rendering their departure from the earlier forms of the Christian faith too strongly marked; on which account their professed veneration for antiquity outruns their actual submission to its voice.

It is further to be considered, that the Reformation was rather a protest against moral corruption, induced and fostered by ecclesiastical politicians in the name of the Catholic Church, than against erroneous theology, as such; and that this "wild conceit" of infant faith and infant spirituality, as far as immediate consequences were concerned, seemed innocent as infancy itself. To these causes we may ascribe it that the Baptismal Service was cast, by Anglican Liturgists, into that antique form which so delights our antiquarian divines; while that of the Holy Communion, though fashioned by the same school, bears traces of modern thought, disclaiming earnestly, or carefully precluding, the errors which primitive modes of conceiving spiritual subjects had engendered, and is consequently a grief of heart to those who eagerly seek to revive, not so much the earliest views of Christian truth, as the formal exhibition of them, with corrections and additions, in the ages next succeeding.

What I have stated however, I imagine to have been but the proximate causes. The ultimate one is doubtless to be found in the state of human thought and knowledge at the period in question. That was an age of light, an age of shining and burning lights, never since surpassed in force and brilliancy; but there was yet more light, there were yet fresh lights to come, and to us of the modern school it seems that the science of mind

may be far whiter, far more stainless and pure, than when those waters were first applied. For what has the *negative* purity of an unconscious spirit to do with the *positive* favour of God? Is it dearer in His sight than the whiteness of the new-blown lily, save "by anticipation," (to speak humanly,) "and in hope?" If Christ bade his disciples be humble as children, did he not in the same spirit charge them to be *wise as serpents and innocent as doves*? In the case of the earliest Christian converts, "faith," which "is nothing else but a hearty embracing Christianity," first exerted itself "by open declaration and avowal in Baptism;" their reception of the Spirit, therefore, on occasion of the sacrament, was a high representative instance of

was, at that time, if not lying in darkness, yet immersed in twilight shade. In a word, the metaphysical doctrines of the schools were not out of fashion, even among those who were railing at the Schoolmen; doctrines, as I conjecture, partly framed for the sake of substantiating those sensuous but *fluent* conceptions, (as D. Coleridge calls them,) of primitive Christianity, which the political Church found it convenient to fix and petrify into changeless articles of faith. These doctrines lent a semblance of reason to that which is reasonless, and diverted men's minds from the consideration that, even if the spiritual regeneration of an infant were "capable of being conceived as possible," it has never been "revealed as real;" it would not be *that* New Birth which we are bound to believe in on the faith of Scripture.

I suspect that the notion was dying out, or in the way to do so, even among our High Churchmen, just about the time when the Oxford School of Divines rose up amongst us, and revived this, among other things that were ready to perish, some of which were worth restoring to life and vigour. And then, to strengthen and secure them in *this* enterprize, they had, by way of rear-guard, the language of the Liturgy, which has probably made and retained more believers, and sincere ones too, in the regeneration of babes, than all the treatises on the subject that ever were penned. Verily to that School we owe so much, that, for gratitude's rather than for peace' sake, we might gladly give place to them by subjection,—willingly sacrifice, at their word, all but our strongest assurances and innermost convictions.

the whole work of God in regenerating and renewing their souls; and to the time of the ceremony the act of their justification might be supposed especially to appertain. So it is in every case of the Baptism of adults, who begin their actual Christian course with this holy and effective rite; where it precedes the whole Christian course of a recipient, it may with equal fitness be considered the initiator of his spiritual life, since it ensures to him the continual operations of the Regenerator, so far as he can and will avail himself of them. "It is a grace which, by virtue of the covenant consigned in Baptism, does, like a centre, transmit effluxes to all the periods and portions of our life."*

In the Apostolic language, Baptism, the ceremony of entrance into the Christian religion, is taken, by a synecdoche of the part for the whole, to represent all the spiritual changes and benefits which the Christian religion brings with it. In the rite, as originally practised, there was a going down under the water, and a rising up out of it: hence it was a striking type of Christianity in the soul of man; for it aptly represented a death and burial as to the world and the flesh, a resurrection from the grave of sin into newness of life here, and the final resurrection hereafter. St. Peter says, that *Baptism saves us, not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God.* He here refers to the baptismal vow, which is nothing less than the undertaking of Christianity at large; yet the Apostle could not have meant that we are saved by the engagement

* *Life of Christ, Part i. Sect. ix. 19.* See also Taylor's *Unum Necessarium*. Chap. ii. Sect. ii. 3.

made at the font, but by the fulfilment of it during the course of life, or rather the condition of the whole man which this implies. We may give a most pregnant interpretation to the passages of Scripture which refer to Baptism, in understanding it to be a symbol of the change of the soul from carnal to spiritual, from prospects of eternal woe to hopes of heaven, a symbol of Regeneration at large, as being the special minister of it, and performing a prominent part in that process the whole of which it represents; a sign that *effects*, (as *really* as any other efficient, God alone excepted,) and does not merely signify. And the same sort of symbolic relation which Baptism has to our birth from above, we must ascribe to the Eucharist in respect of our life and growth from above.* It is true that regeneration and the life in Christ, thus explained, are but the same thing in different aspects; we are passing from the world to God or being born again in the Spirit, while we are going on unto perfection; and conversely, we are living and growing in the Spirit in becoming children of God. And, if this be so, the functions of the correspondent ordinances must be essentially the same. Both are special means whereby we obtain the Aids of the Spirit; and however we may distinguish different ideas in the great boon of Redemption, it is ever objectively one and the same, the

* See further on this subject, "The Scriptural Character of the English Church," Sermon xvii. In the discourse on Infant Baptism in this work, there is an apparent adoption of Jeremy Taylor's splendid sophistry on a particular point, which, as a steadfast maintainer of the doctrines taught in the Aids to Reflection, according to the extent of my understanding, I must except against, at the same time that I refer the reader to the general view of Sacraments given in the book, as an able exposition, so far as I am a judge, of Mr. Coleridge's opinions.

presence of Christ to the human soul, whereby He changes it into the likeness of Himself. What then is the distinction betwixt the two? Substantially both perform the same office; as outward symbols only they differ. To our human understanding and imagination they address themselves differently. If there be any other diversity, I think it has not been revealed, nor has the belief in it been rendered necessary, by any inward evidence to reason and conscience, or clear outward testimony of the Universal Church. This we know, that even in the first sacrament we share the resurrection as well as the burial of our blessed Lord; that even by Baptism we have Christ dwelling in us, and that, if he dwells in us, he shall *quicken our mortal bodies* to everlasting life. And these blessings of Redemption which come to us through Sacraments “with great eminency and advantage,” the Saints of old must have enjoyed without Sacraments. For they are in the Kingdom of Heaven, and there is not a lower heaven for one set of the redeemed, and a heaven of heavens for a more favoured portion; since the highest honour and blessing reserved for the Saints of the New Dispensation is to sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the realms above.* They were born children of wrath; they died inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven. Was this through a mere arbitrary arrangement on the part of their Divine Master and Guide? Does Scripture permit us thus to trifle with the Idea of God? Does it not expressly teach a different lore? If we dare not even leave this point in suspense for a moment, if we are bound on the faith of Revelation to confess, that they were re-

* See Pearson's *Expos. of the Creed*, Art. V. p. 246.

deemed from the world and the flesh internally and spiritually, before they passed into another state of existence, can we deny them to have been born again of the Spirit even while they were *pilgrims on the earth*? “As the Fathers did eat Christ’s body, so do we under a diverse sacrament, and different symbols, *but in all the same reality; whatsoever we eat, the same they did eat.*” * That the faithful of old obtained a title to admission into that heavenly kingdom without the blood of the Lamb,† yet cannot enter into God’s presence till they have it applied to them, is a notion which, though undeniably ancient, has nothing but its antiquity to recommend it to our veneration. The wedding garment in which men are to appear before God above, must in all cases have been first bestowed upon them, first fitted to them, here below.

The truth is, we cannot receive the Word of God fully and fairly, if we limit the extension of the Covenant of Grace to the area of the Visible Church.‡ So far are these two from being commensurate, that the

* Taylor’s *Real Presence*, Sect. VI. 10.

† “Again, being though Christ was the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world, and *whosoever from the beginning pleased God were saved by his blood.*” Pearson’s *Exposition*, Art. IX. p. 336.

‡ See Hammond’s *Practical Catechism*, p. 5. “Both Jew and Gentile, that is, every man that ever was or shall be saved from the beginning of the world, was, and is, and shall be saved by this second covenant.”

I shall here cite, in connexion with this subject, a passage in Warburton’s “*Divine Legation*,” one of the best it contains.

“*Ye were redeemed, says St. Peter, with the precious blood of Christ, FOREORDAINED from the foundation of the World, but MANIFEST in these last times for you.* St. John explains, from the words of Jesus himself, what is to be understood by his being *foreordained*, viz. that it was receiving the *glory* which accompanies the entrance on an high office—*And now, O Father, glorify me, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.*

246 *The Covenant of Grace is for all Men.*

first was entered into with all mankind, all who suffered from Adam's transgression ; the second is a circle within a circle, embracing but a comparatively small portion of the children of men within its compass. That Christ came to dwell *among* us, after his manifestation, as He had never dwelt among men before, is no matter for *doubtful disputations*, nor is it a point which we are called upon to accept as a mere mystery, on the word of Scripture, without evidence of its realization ; for the evidence is around us ; and if Christendom has any moral and spiritual advantage over the world without the bounds of Christendom, and before it began to be ; if it has *some better thing*, through the promulgation of the Gospel, herein we have the proof and the result of our Saviour's gracious promise to be always with His Church. But we are not now discussing whether Christ dwells *amongst men*, in a *new and living way* ; but whether he dwells *in man* as he dwelt not in the faithful *πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*. An affirmation of the latter proposition would, I think, be as difficult to reconcile with the teaching of Scripture, as a denial of the former. Enough, I trust, has been said to vindicate from the charge of rationalism, the position which I have attempted to defend, that the

I have MANIFESTED thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world.

“ St. Peter, in the words above, distinguishes between the *Advent* of our Redeemer, and the *efficacy* of his death, in teaching us, that though his MANIFESTATION was late, yet the virtue of his FOREORDAINED *Redemption* operated from the most early times. For it would be trifling to speak of a *pre-ordination* which was not to be understood of a *pre-operation* ; since those to whom the Apostle wrote well understood, from the Attributes of the Godhead, that all things *that were*, had been *pre-ordained*, in the simple sense of the word. The *other* sense, of a *pre-operation*, St. John more forcibly expresses by the *Lamb SLAIN from the foundation of the world.*” Book IX. chap. 2.

whole system of the Visible Church, its mysteries included, is in strict harmony with the general plan of Providence for the redemption and exaltation of the human race; that its rites and ordinances are not intended to work their effect independently of thought and understanding, but to assist reflection, the great minister of divine grace, in bringing the will of man into conformity with the will of God; that sacraments are really and truly moral instruments, because the precious gift attendant on them is effectuated and realized, through the activity of our moral being. How spiritual life is originated in the soul, considered in its internal essence, and not as the object of our consciousness, is self-evidently a thing, which, save God, Angels alone are able to look into: of this we must say that it is eternal, beyond the bounds of time and circumstance. But the Bible speaks only of spiritual life, so far as it is recognizable in moral effects, in good and holy acts and habits of mind: we know not whence the wind cometh, nor whither it goeth: but when it is come we feel it, and *hear the sound thereof; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.* “We know that He abideth in us by the Spirit that he hath given us;” and this Spirit is not in us, it has not been called up into actual existence, till we are able to *know* it; or in other words, the soul is not alive in Christ till it has consciously received Him through the Father’s drawing. I cannot better conclude this humble attempt at a supplement to the Essay on Baptism in the Aids to Reflection, than in the words and with the affectionate admonition of “the evangelical apostolical Archbishop Leighton,” that “we should aspire to know the hidden rich things of God, that are wrapt up in his ordinances;” that, “we be more earnest with Him

who hath appointed them, and made this their end, to save us, that He would clear up the eye of our souls, to see them thus under this relation, and see how they suit to this their end, and tend to it, and seriously seek salvation in them from His own hand, and we shall find it.”



EXTRACTS FROM A NEW TREATISE ON REGENERATION.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

Misrepresentation.

I.

BEFORE commencing this discussion of what the new birth is, according to Reason and Scripture, and of what it has been said to be by theologians, I wish to explain and guard myself by some preliminary remarks. In all that follows I shall endeavour to describe my adversaries' opinions truly, and to give them as far as possible in their own words. But there is a way of bringing the charge of misrepresentation, a vague general sweeping way, against which no one can guard. People are apt, when they are strongly attached to a doctrine, which they never take the pains carefully to unfold and examine in all its parts, to fly out against those who present it to them plainly, as if they presented it unfairly. They see it for the first time in its bare unadorned reality, without that running accompaniment and deceptive commentary of assumptions and attributions, laudatory or reproachful, which has been to them in lieu of sound searching argument. When

these are left out, they think the doctrine cheated and abused, merely because it does not look so well in their eyes as it used to do, forgetting that the form of Truth will bear exposure, as well as that of Beauty herself—that Truth *is* Beauty inasmuch as it is symmetry and fair proportion. I shall endeavour to exhibit the doctrine, I disavow, in its true form ; I shall take off that softening veil and pompous drapery in which its adherents are wont to display it, and shew what it is *in itself* ; but readers will have all the materials for judgment before them ; they may look at the doctrine drest and undrest ; I wish to conceal *nothing* : revelation, exposition is my whole aim.

2. Another consideration the reader should bear in mind, and it is this. Arguments, when exposed, appear too bad ever to have been used ;—brought into the light of Reason,

They look as glow-worms look by day,

or like the scenes and tinsel of a play-house, viewed in the cool clear atmosphere of the morning. There is a large crop of mock arguments and shewy fallacies in current use upon the subject of baptismal Regeneration : when one half are shewn up, the defenders fall back on the other half, and declare that the refuter has done *them* no harm, and has only slain what was never alive, though the pretended analogy, or piece of false logic, up to the moment that it was knocked on the head, has been doing them as much active service as any argument of their whole force. A falsehood is, in one sense, a dead thing ; but too often it moves about, galvanized by self-will, and pushes the living out of their seats.

3. A word more on the subject of misrepresenta-

tion. There is abundance of this in popular productions on religious topics. Men write small argumentative discourses, affecting to be *multum in parvo*, in a taking style, brief, terse and pithy; clear but shallow brooks, that "run glittering in the sunshine" of anticipatory approbation. It would ruin the *effect* of these pieces, blunt their keen edge, and slack their animated flow if the authors were faithfully to trace out the fine lines of doctrine, the real systems of thought which possess the minds of men; if they honestly shewed how narrow is that mid space on which the real differences betwixt themselves and their opponents run. We constantly find High Churchmen arguing, in this effective compendious way, as if every man who doubts that spiritual life is *stored up* in the souls of infants at the font, must needs deny that it is God's work in the soul whence all human endeavours must proceed in the business of salvation; as if every man denied human sinfulness and forgot the remedial power of divine grace, who cannot be brought to admit that remission of sin is a mystic change wrought in the sacrament, rendering the soul no longer an object of divine wrath, but pure, holy, acceptable, beautiful in the eyes of God, though He, the Searcher of hearts, can still behold iniquity lying under this cleansed and brightened surface, like bones and all manner of uncleanness in whited sepulchres. On the other hand, some of their opponents broadly and roundly affirm, that all out of their own school forget Christ and his Atonement altogether, and rely on outward rites apart from spiritual conditions.

How often does the Anglican Divine, in order to show what a precious golden mean he is himself upon, misrepresent both the Romanistic and the Calvinistic

schemes of grace, making sheer brass of the one, and the vilest false metal of the other! To distinguish his own *opus operatum* from the Tridentine, he accuses Rome of teaching that man benefits by the grace of sacraments without any co-operant act of his own; as if the Romanist taught this any otherwise than as he teaches it himself, and does not go beyond the warranty of his own Church if he leads any adult person to expect that baptism will save him without faith, penitence, and resolution of not sinning!* To stigmatize the Calvinist, he represents him as teaching that the soul is morally renewed in a moment without gradual efforts of its own at self-reformation, and that the spiritual man is a new being distinct from the natural man altogether!

Peter is not quite such a flaunting madman, nor Jack such a crazy fool, as from these representations we might suppose. They do not dogmatize precisely after this fashion.

4. To be constantly addressing our friends about our adversaries is a snare to honesty and charity; to address our adversaries themselves is "work without hope;" but we should write as if the eyes of adversaries were upon us; should imagine candid readers, out of zeal for truth, taking their part; instead of composing in imagination for a primed and prepared circle, ever and anon lubricating our chariot wheels with the oil of their prepossessions and prejudices.

Popular sermons there ought to be which deal not in slow elaborate argument; but is it not a question whether such ought to deal with *argument* at all? *This* is no question, that we ought not to extract per-

* *Catechismi Concil. Trident. Pars. ii. pp. 144-5.*

nicious honey from poison-blossoms of misrepresentation and mendacious half truth, to pamper the coarse appetite of bigotry and self-love. If the poet rightly warns us

Never to blend our pleasure or our pride
With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels,

much less ought we to furnish a pseudo-religious pastime by false witness against our fellow-Christians—accusing men who in reality differ from us only in subordinate points of denying spiritual verities, which are written on the face of the Gospel as with a sunbeam and on the heart of man with the finger of God.

Evasion.

1. When I first wrote on these subjects I deemed it quite superfluous to define what I meant by spirit and spiritual, and what I did *not* mean, when I made use of these terms. But I have since found, that many persons will evade every argument against their theory of the new birth that relates to psychology, by this one assertion, that we *know nothing of the nature of the soul*; as if some knowledge of the nature of the soul was not presupposed in their reasonings as well as in ours, and in all reasonings on divine grace since the world began! We are ignorant of the laws and properties of spirit: and therefore, I suppose, if a man were to affirm that the soul may explode like gunpowder or be compressed like a cream cheese, we might neither laugh at him nor pronounce him in the wrong! But I think we do know spirit *to all intents and purposes*. We know the spirit of a man that is in him, not in its internal being, but, as we know all other powers, in its effects and operations; and in this way we know it fully as well as we know anything else

254 *Nothing better known to Man than the Soul.*

within the sphere of human cognition. Reason, will, the heart, the understanding,—all are great mysteries; but we know what they are as objects of consciousness; we know as well what is meant by a good will, a kind heart, a clear understanding, the use of reason, as what is meant by a sound tree, a fine harvest, a warm breeze, or a clear stream.

2. We cannot tell what matter is in itself or what spirit is in itself; but we mean by matter that which has length, depth and breadth,—the properties of which are revealed to us by our outward senses; we mean by spirit that which is not bound to the conditions of space, which is not made known to us by our bodily senses immediately, but by a revelation *sui generis*, called consciousness, for the reality and for the character of which every man may be referred to what goes on within himself. The mental *phænomena* are as plainly perceived as sensuous *phænomena*: a thought, an emotion are as recognizable as a bird, a flower, a wave; and are not more unintelligible than they. If a man will not admit, lest an opponent should take advantage of the admission, that the human soul has not properly the attributes of space, has not literally an inside and an outside, shape, hollowness and solidity; that it cannot inclose a something distinct from itself, as matter incloses matter; and that any expressions denoting relations of space when applied to the soul must be understood metaphorically, however substantial a sense they may be intended to convey, as when St. Paul says, *Christ liveth in me*, or as when in our beautiful Liturgy we pray that God will *graft in* our hearts the love of His name, or *pour into* them all the virtues of the spirit,—he must abide in his own peculiar region of psychology, *penitus toto orbe divisa*,

and forego all claim upon any ancient or modern system of divinity ; because all systems of divinity that have been in the world are founded on the supposition, that we *do* know something about the nature of the soul, and that it *is* possible to talk of it in an absurd and irrational manner.

Prejudgment.

1. A defence of any scheme of doctrine cannot be maintained without offence to that which is directly opposed to it. There must be an internecine war between two such decided opposites ; but this warfare may be carried on in perfect fairness, and even in charity and kindness. Even if no duty of self-defence were involved in the struggle, still it would be a duty for those who think themselves able, in any degree, to serve the cause, that they should undertake to do so. For false doctrine is an *offence* against Truth, whom all mankind are bound to serve and defend as far as in them lies.

I feel no scruple in defending, by any fair means in my power, that doctrine of regeneration, which I hold to be the only true one, and am not without hope that firmness in maintaining it in myself and others, undeterred by charges of heterodoxy, presumption, want of faith, low doctrine, and other such imputations,—the ready weapons of the weakest assailants—the earnest endeavour to shew that it is more consistent with a sound frame of religious thought and feeling, and with the real vital influencive opinions of the reflective and judicious, than any other, may lead some minds of greater power than mine to take up the argument and put it in a better form than any in which it has hitherto appeared.

256 *Presumptuous Charges of Presumption.*

2. There is a spirit of bigotry which reasoning exasperates ; against which there is no guarding by protestation or profession. It is manifested in various ways—by summary condemnation or by pointed silence ; by senseless ridicule, where nothing ridiculous is made to appear, the form of sarcasm without the matter ; or by injurious accusation couched in gentle phrases for the violent to translate into his own dialect at pleasure. To those who are not full of this predetermined enmity I would humbly suggest that the following, good or bad, is a process of reasoning ; that it ought not to be prejudged by a charge of presumption, because a counter-process of reasoning can alone shew that it is not a just argument in defence of the truth, and to maintain the truth by fair argument is a sort of presumption from which no one ought to shrink.

3. If indeed a piece of reasoning is, on the face of it, aimed against spiritual religion, a Christian may reasonably say at once, this *is* false, *is* evil ; it denies what I feel and know to be good and true. But when, as in the present case, the writer's professed aim is to shew what is the most spiritual belief on the points in question—to guard a spiritual faith from violation—to maintain what is most in harmony with the thoughts of spiritual minded persons in general, it is unreasonable in any one to condemn it, except by shewing that it has not fulfilled its aim, and has no right to that special congruity with spiritual feeling to which it makes pretension. I say congruity, for I would fain hope that there are none among the disputants who have not the spiritual faith itself in substance and in power—none who altogether deny any of the great religious verities that belong to the dealings of God with the soul of man ; though I believe that certain theo-

logical theories grievously shatter and distort them, and that through the medium of those theories they look as strangely as the sun during an eclipse.

Expression.

1. Lastly, I wish readers to understand that throughout this Essay, I shall dispense with circumlocutions of ceremony and of modesty, both for the sake of despatch, and also on a moral principle, because I am convinced that these paraphrases are a kind of drapery or veil, which hide from the mind the real character of what is deliberately put forth. If to argue on any given theme is presumptuous, these attendant phrases cannot convert it into modesty and discretion; if it be lawful and right, they are superfluous. A kindly and respectful spirit is shewn more substantially; it is shewn by paying due attention to what others advance; by carefully distinguishing their general claim on our regard from any particular of their teaching, from which we have to express dissent; by refraining from summary censures, or disparaging remarks unsupported by argument or authority.

2. In the course of this disquisition I must controvert parts of the opinions of many writers, for whose minds I have a deep respect and for whose talents I have a high admiration. This I shall do simply, and without apology, believing it in itself justifiable. "I may be in the wrong," is a formula, which it is needless to repeat before every argument: a strong assurance that, though fallible, we are *not* in the wrong in the things we advance can alone justify us in arguing on important questions at all. And indeed to those who read with an honest purpose of discovering the truth, or helping themselves to find it,—(and no

258 *Evidence on Regeneration Three-fold.*

others are we bound much to consider),—who do not quarrel with the *manner* of a discourse because they are irreconcilably averse to the *matter* of it, the plainest form will be the most welcome.

The evidence on the question of Regeneration comes under three heads,—Reason, or philosophical truth and coherency; Scripture; and Primitive Antiquity. I shall take each of these separately: under the first head I shall present 1. What I hold to be the true idea of Regeneration, with the objections to it and the answers to the same: 2. The view of the New Birth, which I conceive to be erroneous. Under the second head, I shall present the interpretations of Scripture, to which I adhere, and those of our opponents. Under the third, I shall examine the views of Regeneration, which prevailed among the successors of the Apostles and compare them with that doctrine of the New Birth, which is set forth amongst us at the present day as Catholic and Ancient.



PART I.

IDEA OF THE NEW BIRTH.

CHAPTER I.

“TRUTH.

“ Centre of Earth ! keystone of Heaven’s great dome !
In thee the world’s vast arches rest suspended :—
Within thy zodiac’s belt round all extended,
The orb of Knowledge evermore doth roam.
Thou art the lamp and hearth of each man’s home—
How many wondrous powers in thee are blended !
By thee we live : by thee from death defended,
We find a second cradle in the tomb.
In thee all good things breathe, without thee die ;
Strength, Justice, Loyalty, (Truth’s noble thrall),
Song, Science, all the Loves : *yea most of all,*
Though deem’d too oft thy rival, Charity,
Whose golden arrows swift as sun-beams fly,
And scatter seeds of life where’er they fall !”

BY THE YOUNGER A. DE VERE.

SECTION I.

1.

A WORLD of confusion has been brought into the subject of the New Birth, because divines have written upon regeneration apparently without having contemplated, with steady concentrated gaze and in sincerity of spirit, the idea of regeneration itself. How any one who calmly considers what *a new birth of the soul* implies, a new birth solemnly announced by the Lord of Heaven and Earth to man, as a thing in which all men are concerned, which a teacher in the chosen nation ought already to have known, which

translates the subject of it into the kingdom of heaven, can proceed to explain it according to the ordinary High Church doctrine, into something so impotent and shadowy, that if it were to vanish from the precincts of religious belief, no serious practical Christian, as I fully believe, would feel that he had sustained any loss, or that any thing was gone from him, is to me inconceivable. Take away mystic regeneration, and leave moral regeneration in its place, together with the *grant* of the Spirit and all blessings of the Covenant in baptism, would Christendom lose anything except an enigmatical form of words and a bone of contention?

2. But the truth is, that men who maintain this shadow under the name of regeneration, do not begin their defence with a contemplation of the idea, as it is revealed within the mind to itself, and in the luminous reflection of Scripture. No! They begin with the existing belief of a respectable majority—the belief of their party at large, and all the good, wise, and clever men it embraces—they start from the language of formularies, framed under certain circumstances in a certain age—from that language interpreted and methodized by their section of the Church: from thence they derive their conception of the new birth, and this conception they endeavour to force, first into primitive antiquity, and then into the Bible, by violent accommodations and interpolations *ad libitum*. Now we who disclaim this phantom birth of dark divinity, the bondmaid of a political Church, who maintain that spiritual regeneration is a general change of the whole spiritual being of man, that is, of his heart, mind, and will, wrought by the Spirit of Holiness and of Truth—that it is this and this alone—support that belief on the perfect harmony and correspondence between the

largest and deepest idea of a spiritual and heaven-meriting change in man which can be drawn from reason and the spiritual mind, and that idea of divine sonship which beams forth from the face of Scripture, the only idea of divine sonship therein contained and expressed. We, who believe that regeneration cannot by its nature be the work of a moment, or take place where the mind and will are not actually existent, who hold it to be a change in the spiritual constitution of the soul, whereby the will, freed from its original enslavement, acquires the power, which by nature it cannot have, to *perform the thing that is good*,—a change wrought by the Holy Spirit on the intelligent will, gradually effected, with the active but subordinate co-operation of man at every step and throughout every stage of the process: a change which manifests itself in correspondent effects recognizable by man, in holiness of thought, word and deed, so that to have been born again is to be a righteous person in the ordinary meaning of the term, not perfect in goodness, a sun without a spot, but predominantly and characteristically good,—one who may be called a true servant of God:—adduce on behalf of our doctrine every passage in Scripture, wherein the nature of sonship to God or regeneracy is described, and many others in which it is referred to.* See the texts named below.

That these passages, in their *prima facie* meaning express the idea which has just been announced, never has been, never can be denied. It is maintained by our opponents that rightly understood, they do not *ne-*

* John i. 12, 13; iii. 3—8. Rom. viii. 14—21. Phil. ii. 15. 1 Peter; 3, 4, 5—22, 3. 1 John ii. 29; iii. 1, 2, 9, 10; iv. 7; v. 14. James 1—18. 2 Cor. iii. 18; v. 17. Gal. vi. 15. Eph. ii. 10; iv. 22—34. (compare with Rom. xii. 2). Col. iii. 10. Rom. viii. 16, 17. Gal. iii. 26.

gative the doctrine that regeneration proper, that of which our Lord spake to Nicodemus, is a change of soul produced by the sole act of God without any co-operation on the part of man, a single act of God's grace limited to the rite of baptism—an act which does not necessarily produce holiness of heart and life, or any perceptible and conscious change of inward dispositions and habits; though it implies and requires, “both as a qualification for the new birth in capable subjects and as a duty to which it binds the regenerated person.” We, on the contrary, think it may be maintained that the *prima facie* meaning of these passages is their true and proper sense, according to all sound principles and right rules of interpretation: and our stronghold, in arguing Scripture to be on our side, is this, that the obvious and natural sense of the texts above cited, corresponds exactly to that idea of the new birth, which reason and the spiritual sense present to the mind, which the word regeneration, the nature of the expression, and the history of its application, suggest and confirm. We are persuaded that our view is the truth, because it is that which best harmonizes with reason and the word of God. To the proof of this position, the present essay will be devoted.

3. Let me remind the reader of what is laid down in *the Aids to Reflection* respecting the *New Birth*, that *the term is not a mere metaphor*: that the interpretation of it is to be “ascertained from its known sense in the more familiar connexion—birth, namely, in relation to our natural life, and to the organized body, by which we belong to the present world. Whatever the word signifies in this connection, the same essentially (in kind, though not in dignity or value,) must be its signification in the other.”

Spiritual life is life essentially and eminently; and we are as truly produced, or generated, as to our spiritual being, by the redemptive spirit, as we are the offspring of our natural parents, in respect of our human nature. How is God *spiritually Father* to the human soul? Is he not *in this sense* our Father, when of His own will He has begotten us with the word of truth—created us again—in his image, the similitude of his own divine perfections? If spiritual regeneration corresponds to merely human, generation, it can be no less than a reproduction of the soul, a reformation of it in all its parts and faculties, a recreation whereby it becomes a spiritual being as it was not a spiritual being from the first. He who has been *born of God*, must have the nature of God, as he who has been born of man has the nature of man. And if goodness and holiness, the same in kind as that of which He has implanted the idea within us, is essential to the nature of God, which no man who takes the Bible to be God's word can deny, he who has the nature of God raised up within him must be upon the whole pure and holy and good, and this in a positive, not a merely negative sense—actually, not in a mere potential signification. How can a man become actually a son of God by a mystical change, which merely gives him the *capability* of acquiring the divine nature in all its moral excellence, whensoever his will co-operates with the Spirit?

4. Bishop Beveridge says of true Christians, that they are born of God, “not by eternal generation, as Christ was, and none but He ever was, or can be, from the essence of His Father: but by spiritual regeneration, through the mighty power and efficacy of the Holy Ghost, renewing the spirit of their minds, and

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so infusing into them a principle of new life, whereby they become new creatures, and have the image of God enstamped again upon them, so as to be partakers of the divine nature, and holy in their capacities as He is holy.”*

Yes! “holy in their capacities as He is holy,” and holy in their actions: not as are thousands that were baptized in infancy, their will enslaved to sin, their spiritual understandings lying in utter darkness—an anti-Goshen amid Gospel illumination.

SECTION II.—*Relation of the New Birth to Renewal.*

REGENERATION is renovation viewed as God’s work in the soul: renovation is regeneration viewed in the moral result, the personal holiness of one that is born from above; and both are justification, when viewed with reference to acceptability in the sight of God, and the claim to eternal blessedness. There is no ground in Reason or Scripture for the dogma that regeneration is the work of a moment, while renovation is a continuous act: Scripture represents regeneration and the

* From Bishop Beveridge’s fine sermon, *Faith in Christ, our Title to the Privilege of Sonship*. Theo. Works, vol. iv. pp. 65-6. In this discourse baptismal regeneration is never once mentioned: and yet the author was vehemently *orthodox* upon Baptism, *when the subject of Baptism was before him*, and vehement in asserting that the name of regeneration ought to be allowed it: though he goes away and forthwith forgets what manner of thing he has pronounced it to be when he is upon the matter of regeneration itself. He never harmonizes his view of Baptism with his view of the New Birth,—never gives any intelligible account or rationale of his attributions to the sacrament. This is the way with our Anglican divines in general. Their scriptural and rational mind, and their ecclesiastical mind, are two minds, out of which it is impossible to make one mind.

renewing of the Holy Ghost as one : the two are represented in the New Testament as different aspects of the same thing, corresponding to each other as the face of a model to the reverse. Renewal must have a continuous ground in divine influence or effective agency, and this continuous influence can be no less than regeneration.† What is the specific effect or proper result of regeneration? According to Scripture it is that state of soul, which places it in heaven, and according to Scripture, that which entitles the soul to heaven is no mystic inconceivable change of nature, but a recognizable character of godliness and goodness, which is one with renewal, the end of which is salvation. But if renewal is the specific effect of regeneration, is it not irrational to separate the one from the other,—to suppose that the latter may be where the former is not and never is to be, or, that in the case of adults the former (renewal) can in whole or in part precede the latter (renovation)?—that is, that the effect can in part precede the cause?

† Hence the fourth effect of Baptism is described, by the Council of Trent in its Catechism, to be the *infusion of virtues* : and it adopts St. Augustine's explication of Titus iii. 5, 6. *Divus Augustinus verba illa abunde effudit explanans: Nimirum, inquit, ad remissionem peccatorum et copiam virtutum.*—p. 151. The Council teaches that a most noble company of all virtues are poured into the soul divinely with baptismal grace. Impossible as it is to reconcile this assertion with facts of the state and history of the baptized, it is equally impossible to sever the idea of the infusion of actual *virtues* from the idea of regeneration, without destroying the latter. That distinct and definite separation of the spiritual from the moral in Baptism was a development of a later age. It was long ere Christian divinity arrived at this pitch of sophistication.

SECTION II.—*Objection to the Statement that Regeneration is one with Renewal; and Reply to the same.*

1. IT is objected to this view of regeneration that it describes the gift of salvation, the regeneration brought by Christ into the world, as a thing which in this life is never realized. No man ever ceases to be carnal in his fleshly tabernacle, no man entirely ceases from sin; therefore no man is regenerate in his mind, will and affections, as St. John describes regeneracy. We realize our new birth here but in part, though it is imparted to us at full.

The abstract idea of regeneracy is simply that of being changed by divine grace; whenever we obtain by divine influence better dispositions than we had by nature, we are so far morally regenerate. In reference to this truth St. Chrysostom is reported by Theophylact to have written, "As often as we sin we are born of the devil; we are born of God as often as we act virtuously,"—(which shows how he connected regeneration with renewal.) Scripture puts forth the idea of regeneracy, not in an abstract *form*, but as it is in itself, by presenting it in the concrete and yet perfect, which in the concrete it never is. St. John does not say Regeneracy is freedom from sin and persistency in grace, but he says: *Whosoever is born of God doth not sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.*

2. This, in definite language, is the substance of an objection commonly brought against our view that regeneration and renewal are one. But we reply that, so far as it is correct, it confirms our opinion rather

than disproves it. If inasmuch as we *realize* our new birth, we are morally renewed, then regeneration embraces a moral change in its essence, and cannot be properly described as a mystical affection, which does not necessarily terminate in active habits of holiness. St. Chrysostom plainly believed that as long as we retain the seed of God we cannot sin; he is no authority for the opinion, that a man may retain the baptismal gift while he is actually sinful. In answer to the assertion that St. John sets forth only the abstract idea of regeneracy, I ask whether it is to be supposed that our Lord spoke only of abstract regeneracy, when he said that unless a man is born of the Spirit he cannot enter the kingdom of God?—whether any man in this life is justified, made meet for an inheritance of light, translated into heaven here upon earth? All these things are described in Scripture just as regeneration is described, in abstract perfection; yet Scripture implies that they are realized in this world; and by applying the term righteous to individuals, though it never declares righteous persons to be imperfect, which yet from Scripture and Experience we know they all must be, plainly warrants our supposing that the Scriptural accounts of regeneracy are realized in this world, truly though not literally, and that men may be what St. John describes the sons of God to be, in a very sufficient sense, although remnants of sin abide with them to the last. “In the regeneration of his children,” says Calvin, “God does indeed destroy the *kingdom* of sin in them; but it only ceases to *reign*; it does not cease to dwell in them. Wherefore we say that *the old man is crucified*, that the law of sin is abolished in the children of God; yet so that some reliques remain; not to predominate over them,

268 *Regeneration not passively undergone,*

but to humble them with a consciousness of their infirmity.”

3. *To have been born again* is the correlative of heaven and salvation obtained by man. According to the Romish system of Purgatory, regeneration begins here, is carried forward and completed in the intermediate state. But *we* say, as the tree is when it falleth so it shall be; when the night cometh no man can work: whensoever a man is meet, here on earth, for a heavenly inheritance, ready to soar into it, when he is released from the bonds and burden of the flesh, then he is internally and really a son of God—never before!

CHAPTER III.

SUBORDINATE CO-OPERATION OR RE-ACTION OF
THE SOUL IN THE WORK OF REGENERATION.
THE WILL ESSENTIALLY SELF-DETERMINATE.

1.

IF Regeneration is a spiritual change, for spiritual objects, wrought by the Spirit, the seat of it must be the spiritual in our humanity. The spiritual in us is the will. In the last section I have argued that as the change is wrought by the Spirit of Holiness, and as the object of it is to fit the soul for a divine and celestial state, it must be a sanctification, a change from evil to good. I now proceed to argue, that the change is not passively undergone; because the seat or subject of it is the will and the will is essentially active. A will which passively receives impressions, which is changed or in any degree affected, without a co-operant self-determining act of its own, is a contradiction.

2. The will is the mind considered as determining its own acts. Men talk as if the soul were a dead receptacle, a mere *nidus* or neutral substance, into which life and active energies and spiritual powers are poured, as water is poured into the soil of a flower bed; into which faculties are put as pins are stuck into a pin cushion. The ancient metaphors respecting the infusion of the Spirit have been taken, in a confused way, literally. The soul has been conceived as a lump of dough, into which life and spirit are infused, as the dough is imbued with leaven or yeast. When the soul has once been leavened with spiritual life, *then* it can co-operate with divine grace, (such is the *orthodox* hypothesis,) but at the time when it is first leavened or regenerated, there is nothing alive within it to co-operate with the principal agent; it can but receive what is poured into it as a cup or goblet receives the wine with which it is filled.

3. The teachers of this philosophy generally profess to have no metaphysics at all in their religion; they declare it quite superfluous. Now it seems to us that they *have* a metaphysical doctrine, and a very broad one; a sort of psychology made for a certain divinity, which divinity was originally moulded by sensuous habits of thought and in time brought forth a sensuous philosophy. The soul, *we* think, is essentially life and action, and the Holy Spirit acts upon it by exciting it to act in return, as the strings of a harp vibrate under the harper's hand, or those of an Æolian lute at the impulse of a passing breeze.

4. The cup or goblet affords to the wine a motionless reception; but our vessel is instinct with life, and at the touch of the living stream springs to embrace and retain it. We are recipients of the Spirit not re-

270 *How Man concurs in his own Salvation.*

ceptive merely: we are to *drink* the waters of salvation, when they are supplied to us from above, not merely to have them poured into us. The earth is said to *drink* the rain; but this is a metaphor, like to that employed by the poet when he said,

“The river windeth at its own sweet will.”

CHAPTER IV.

ORIGINAL SIN AND INHERITED GUILT.

I.

“**N**O man regenerates himself at all,” says Waterland; “that is, he has no part in the regenerating act, whatever he may have in the receptive.” That it would be “a solecism in speech and a contradiction in notion to call a man his own regenerator or parent in his new birth,” no one denies. But a question arises as to the *receptive part*. Does man receive the gift of life passively or actively? It is mere quibbling to bring forward the undenied position that man has no part in the regenerating act, against those who maintain that this act is not effectuated without a reciprocal action on the part of man. Strictly speaking no man is his own renovator any more than his own regenerator; yet men are commanded to *be renewed*, as if their own will was concerned in renewal. St. John says that men obtain *power* to become sons of God, when they *receive* Him and *believe* on His name. Thus man is not, and yet in one sense is, his own regenerator and renewer; even as he is not his own Saviour, and yet *works out his own salvation* and is a *fellow-workman with God*.

The maxim that *there can be no spiritual change without a spiritual act of him that is to be changed*, is a necessary and universal proposition, and is grounded on the very nature and being of the spiritual.

2. But men are apt to satisfy their souls as to the reasonableness of passive regeneration by the following ancient and venerable *rationale*.

As by our natural birth, passively and with no co-operation of our own, we receive original sin and the guilt of Adam's transgression, and are thus subject to divine wrath and condemnation, before we have *done* anything to deserve either, *so*, by our spiritual birth, passively and with no co-operation of our own, we receive *within us* a principle of new life—or as some say, “a sanctifying influence;” and this is properly our regeneration.

The close correspondence between these two Tenets no one can doubt. They answer to each other like the two cherubims at the end of the Mercy Seat; but to some of us they more resemble fiends of darkness, than angels of light,—the one with a flaming Gehenna countenance; the other, his face buried in impenetrable shadow—a featureless blank!

3. This *vindication* convicts not *us* of incoherency. We dare not say that any man inherits *guilt* from Adam; or that the son shall *bear the iniquity of the father*. We hold that man receives at his birth a mixed constitution,—tendencies to evil inherent in his flesh, or arising from the conjunction of the spirit therewith,—capabilities of submitting to divine influence and thereby partaking of the divine nature. We believe that man first becomes *guilty* in the sight of God when he *acts out* the sin of his nature, consenting to the suggestions of the flesh in opposition to the

272 *Parallel between our two Inheritances.*

motions of the Spirit; as on the other hand, that he obtains not acceptability in any degree, except so far as he consents freely to remedial and renovating grace.

Men may talk what they will of Pelagianism, (there are some who seem to derive their whole notion of it from the ninth article.) We think this belief of ours the best antidote to Pelagianism, as being the most rational reply to the allegations of Pelagius against the Catholic faith concerning original sin, and the most impregnable statement of the doctrine.

4. *But not as the offence so also is the free gift.* We offend *by our own acts alone*; our reception of grace is an act *produced in us from above*.

As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. We inherit from the first man a fleshly nature, and when like him we transgress, in consequence of it, we acquire the same guilt; from the second man, the Lord from heaven, we receive a heavenly nature, and in receiving it, by consentient voluntary acts, and acting it out, we acquire His righteousness. Adam's act, as it was external to us, subjects us not to wrath; the Redemptive act, as external, brings us not into a state of spiritual blessing and favour. We must *appropriate* both by movements of freewill ere they can entitle us to the consequence of weal or woe: and thus the parallel between our two inheritances is exact.

5. On the confusion betwixt original sin, considered as a tendency, and actual guilt, the whole structure of the mystical doctrine of regeneration has been erected. My father speaks thus on the subject, in a note on a passage in the *Unum Necessarium*.*

* Lit. Remains, Vol. iii. p. 312. Compare also p. 291 and pp.

“Origen said enough to be mistaken in the question. ‘Adam’s cause is common to all. And there is not a woman on earth, to whom may not be said those things which were spoken to this woman.’†—TAYLOR.

“Origen’s words ought to have prevented all mistake, for he plainly enough overthrows the phantom of hereditary guilt; and as to guilt from a corruption of nature, it is just such guilt as the carnivorous appetites of a weaned lion, or the instinct of a brood of ducklings to run to water. What then is it? It is an evil, and therefore seated in the will; common to all men, the beginning of which no man can determine in himself or in others. How comes this? It is a mystery, as the will itself. Deeds are in time and space, therefore have a beginning. Pure action, that is, the will, is a *noumenon*, and irreferable to time. Thus Origen calls it neither hereditary nor original, but universal sin. The curse of Adam is common to all men, because what Adam did, we all do: and thus of

332-3, in which last passages my father distinguishes betwixt original and hereditary sin, and enters deeper into this subject than I have followed him. But I am with him as far as I go.

† Ἡ ἀρὰ τοῦ Ἀδάμ κοινὴ πάντων ἐστὶ. Καὶ τὰ κατὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, οὐκ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἧς οὐ λέγεται.

On this question I refer the reader to Bishop Taylor’s *Unum Necessarium*, chap. v. sect. 1, 26—38. Of course we who think thus cannot take, in the natural sense, that sentence in the ninth article, “And therefore in every person born into the world it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation.” We can put a very good sense of our own upon it, but we cannot take it in what was doubtless the sense of the framers. Can any of our opponents take the whole body of the Articles, and the first book of Homilies, in the sense of the framers? Will they allow justification by *faith alone*, or the regeneracy of the ancient Saints, according to the views of our Church immediately after the Reformation—or do they understand the regeneracy of the infant spirit as it was understood in that day, when it was supposed that virtues were infused into the souls even of infant children in baptism?

Eve. You may substitute any woman in her place, and the same words apply. This is the true solution of this unfortunate question. The *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* is in the dividing the will from the acts of the will. The will is *ego-agens*."—S. T. C.

CHAPTER V.

THE INDEFECTIBILITY OF THE REGENERATE ESTATE.

SECTION I.—*Regeneration gradually attained, by conscious intelligent Acts, and when attained indefectible.*

1.

“ **A** WILL conceived separately from intelligence is a nonentity and a phantom of abstraction.” The acts of the will, choosing and rejecting, are in the *light*. The reason and the will come into act through the medium of the understanding: they are organized in the understanding. Where the intellect is not actual, the intelligent will is not actualized: the whole mind, moral, spiritual, intelligential is evolved together.

Regeneration is gradually attained by acts of free will subordinately co-operating with the Sanctifier, while Reason, energized by the word, and thus raised into the spiritual mind that discerns the things of God, presents to the soul the objects of faith, the religious verities which the will apprehends, embraces and retains. *For where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty; but we all, with open face beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the*

*same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord.**

2. And when this glorious state is completely attained it is indefectible. Men may fall from grace, but all grace is not the grace of sonship; men may be *enlightened*, and *taste of the heavenly gift*, and *partake of the Holy Ghost*; who are not altogether light in the Lord, or predominantly spiritual, or changed into the divine image.† All this does not amount to regeneracy.

He that is truly a son of God can never cease to be a son, any more than he who is born naturally can cease to be the son of his earthly parents. For as Justin Martyr observed respecting regeneration, "That it is not possible for those who are once born to enter again into their mother's womb is evident to all men." Job wished indeed that he had never been born, but he does not speak as if this were a wish that by any possibility could have been granted.

3. This is a truth of Scripture, for hear what St. John saith; (how the plain meaning of his words is set aside by mysticists shall be considered in due time;) *Whosoever is born of God doth not sin, for his seed remaineth in him.* The test, the criterion of his having been born again is retinence of the divine seed.

* 2 Cor. iii. 18. To this glorification by the agency of light, Dante refers in the *Paradiso*. After describing how he was *transhumanized* by gazing on Beatrice while she gazed fixedly on the eternal wheels, he exclaims:—

S'io era sol di me quel che creasti
Novellamente, Amor, che'l ciel governi,
Tu'l sai, che col tuo lume mi levasti,—

as if he had undergone a new celestial regeneration or ultimate change into divine glory.

† Eccles. Pol. b. v. Appendix, No. 1 p.750.

He that has been born of God retains the divine nature, as he that has been born of man retains the human nature. This is a truth of Scripture, and it is a truth of Reason. Perseverance is involved in the very idea of a predominance of the spiritual in our souls.

4. All positive sin consists in resistance to the Holy Spirit: all positive goodness in submission to the motions of that good Spirit.* The soul may remain, long after infancy in a partially neutral state, its spiritual being, either for good or evil, still infantine, still undeveloped. But when the spiritual being *is* fully expanded, when either the good or the evil principle has gained a complete ascendancy, what then can reverse the condition into which the soul is introduced? "The grace of God and the supreme power of Him to whom *all things are possible*," some will confidently reply; "or on the other hand the inspirations of the potent Spirit of Evil. For the flesh can never be put away in this life, and to the last moment of our abode here we retain the dust and clay of our original formation." But is there not a state of the soul, when, by long resistance, it has become insusceptible of divine influence? and likewise a state when it is proof against the inspirations of evil?—and are not these the states of predominant evil and predominant good? True, indeed, it is that we retain to the last a *temptible* constitution. Our Lord himself, when he took upon Him our flesh, had a temptible

* See Bp. Taylor's *Unum Necessarium*, chap. vii. 31. Innocence, as the mere absence of evil, is not goodness: when our Lord said to his disciples, "Be innocent as doves," he referred to a freedom from sin, which accompanies the habitual endeavour after virtue.

constitution. Hence was He *able to be touched with the feeling of our infirmities*. But though in all points *tempted like as we are* yet He was *without sin*.* And even as he took upon Him our flesh so in return He gives to us the power of resisting the flesh, while we are yet in it and have the clay of our earthly generation still clinging around us. As He was tempted yet was without sin, so we obtain the power to *overcome the world* while we are yet in the world, as to our mortal frame, though in heaven as to our spiritual condition. It was to this end that He came into the world, and the power to be perpetually on the watch against the suggestions of evil is a part of that gift of eternal life which He purchased for us with His blood.†

SECTION II.—*Permanence in Grace.*

“The grey-haired saint may fail at last
The surest guide a wanderer prove;
Death only binds us fast
To the bright shore of love.”

I. WHAT then? Are men always fluctuating in this preparatory state? Do they never enter a haven? Are they never anchored firmly on the rock of salvation? St. Paul prayed that he might not be a cast-away. Does this prove that his spiritual state, in the eye of God, was yet unfixed, or that his continuing steadfast was a

* Hebrews iv. 15.

† *Repentance, the End of Christ's coming into the World*, is the title of one of Beveridge's Sermons. I mention this because it has lately been called presumption to intimate that we know the end of His coming. Beveridge seems to think that we know it on divine authority.

mere contingency? Does he not elsewhere say, *I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course: I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day?* Could he have forfeited this crown had his years been prolonged to thrice the ordinary duration of the life of man?

2. It belongs to justification, that the justified act as if they were yet capable of sinning, that the stable guard themselves from falling. In this their stability consists. It is the direct effect of divine influence that men use *means* to keep themselves from backsliding. Yet they run *not as uncertainly*; they know that they can fall, if they will, but they also know that they will not. St. Chrysostom observes concerning the penitent thief, that had he outlived faith, and neglected to work well, he would have fallen from salvation. But we may well believe that He who said unto him *To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise*, saw in his heart a faith fraught with the works of a life-time.

3. There are certain passages of Scripture, from which it plainly appears, that after receiving the Holy Ghost, a man may depart by mortal sin from grace given: but none which affirms that one who has attained regeneration can lose it.* There is another set of texts, in which all the blessings of the Gospel, not merely potential principles and mystical infusions and passive spiritualities, but active righte-

* Matt. xviii. 32-5. John xv. 3-7, 9, 10. Rom. xi. 19-22. Gal. iii. 3, 4. Heb. iii. 14, and x. 23, 24, 26, 29, 35, 36. 2 John 8. Heb. vi. 4. 2 Peter i. 10, and ii. 20. 1 Cor. ix. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. 1 John ii. 1. 1 Cor. 10-12. Heb. iii. 12. 2 Pet. iii. 17.

ousness and positive freedom from sin, and a triumph over the great enemy,—yea, actual renovation and justification and a renewed mind, are by a strong and animated figure, according to the style of St. Paul, whose discourses abound in these impressive forms of rhetoric, ascribed to Christians on the score of their profession, just as all the attributes of Regeneration are ascribed in Scripture to Baptism, as the symbol and instrument of the new birth.* He reckons all that call on the name of Christ dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God, and he calls them so: just as he also calls them saints and chosen ones, the elect of God. But neither do these texts prove that they who are fully *washed, sanctified, and justified* can fall away; although they to whom they are applied, are warned against all manner of evils. They only prove that men may neglect great and glorious means and opportunities; may act inconsistently with their profession; may *live in the spirit* by privilege and Church membership, and yet not *walk in it*.†

4. How many there are that flee affrighted from the portals and lowering front of the great Fortress of Predestinarianism, deeming it the stronghold of Despair; but losing themselves in the intricate woodland that surrounds the edifice, come round to it again by the other side,—nay, enter its very courts through a back avenue, while by the glimmering light from amid the trees it gleams upon them as the Mansion of heavenly Hope! They who say that a man may fall from

* Col. iii. 1-10. Ephes. ii. 1-13. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, 11.

† Bishop Bull confesses that not a few theologians of our Church, and those not inconsiderable, *theologos ecclesie nostrae non paucos neque ignobiles*, led his opponent Tully into the error, as he deemed it, of thinking that a man once justified, and endowed with saving faith, can never wholly fail or finally perish.

280 *Christ realizes Heaven upon Earth,*

the regenerate estate, the highest state of grace attainable in this life, inferentially though unintentionally represent God as an author of Absolute Decrees, an arbitrary awarder of destruction or salvation: when, according to their theory, He allows some of the justified time to forfeit their inheritance, and rescues others by a timely deliverance from spiritual chance and change.

“The grey-haired Saint may fail at last,
The surest guide a wanderer prove :
Death only binds us fast
To the bright shore of Love.”

From *The Christian Year*.

O change that strain with man's best hopes at strife,
A recreant strain that wrongs the steadfast soul !*
Vainly against that bark the billows roll,
Which bears within the Eternal Lord of Life.

Bright sparks may glitter,—flames may mount on high
In quick warm hearts, yet faithless,—then expire :
But God can kindle in the soul a fire
Of force t' outlive yon Sun that lights the sky.

Can he be meet to dwell with Saints above,
And gaze upon his Saviour face to face,
Who might, were life prolonged, abandon grace,
And madly trample on redeeming love ?

Does God bind some to that bright heav'nly shore,
Who here on earth might wander from His way ;
And banish others from Eternal Day,
Who might return to paths of peace once more ?

Does Heav'n decide our fate for weal or woe,
Not we ourselves by choice of good or ill ;
Unfailing choice, persistency of will,
In Christ to live, or sink with fiends below ?

Just heav'n forefend ! Eternal joys or pains,
These wait on man by man's own changeless choice :
And God proclaims with no uncertain voice
His Sons are they in whom His seed *remains*.

The Saviour knows the saved ;—those sheep discerns
Who ne'er shall wander from His careful hand ;

* “A recreant harp, that sings of fear
And heaviness in Clifford's ear.”

and giveth His Beloved spiritual Rest. 281

He knows the sp'rits that shall for ever stand,
The calm bright cells where fire perpetual burns!

Then, gentle Harmonist, that strain forbear;
Oh! cast not out from joy the faithful heart!
Firmly they choose who gain the better part,
And ev'n in time eternal blessings share.

Heav'n even here surrounds the filial breast,
Even here our earthly cares and troubles cease.
And what were *heav'n* without a *settled* peace,—
Has He not promised His beloved rest?*

Perseverance involved in the idea of Sonship.
Eternity of Heaven and Hell.

I. PERSEVERANCE, I repeat, seems to be involved in the idea of sonship to God. When the divine nature has at length been acquired, it abides with a man for ever. Holiness is become the habit of his soul. And there is a dreadful counterpart to this blessed condition—the state of Pharaoh when his heart was hardened. Am I inventing?—developing?—or repeating the very records of the inspired Book?

What can the grace of God do for him, who by long and repeated resistance to the motions of the Holy One has rendered his heart immoveable? What can temptation or whispers of the Evil one do against him, who has gained power by exercise to resist, and thus at length to annul temptation?—whom Satan, continually repulsed, has abandoned in despair? The journey up hill is steep, and the climber is ever ready to slip back, but at the summit there is table-land, on which

* This address is to a phantom Harmonist, with whom I can speak as freely as my Uncle, Mr. Southey, does with the phantom Sir Thomas More, of his *Colloquies*.

* Rev. iii. 20. This text shews that the free will admits grace into the soul; that it is not *in* the soul, before the will has consented to its entrance.

he moves with ease and security. This is the true terrestrial Paradise, seated on the summit of the Purgatorial Mount, and from this there is but one step to heaven itself.

In both these states there is progression with perseverance—progress in good or in evil—perseverance in the state of predominant righteousness or unrighteousness.

The soul determines its own state by acts of free will—determinate elections of good or evil. Have we not reason to suppose that what a soul has once done deliberately, good and evil being fairly presented to it, and the influence of the Spirit fully offered, it would always do as often as ever a fresh opportunity, a full and free choice were allowed it? One probation is as good as a thousand. Hence the eternity of Heaven and Hell is a Catholic idea, founded on Reason and the spiritual sense, and though so fearful to contemplation, never has been, never can be, put away. At some particular time, some individual may have striven against it, and persuaded a few, for a while, to think with him. But like a huge mass heaved aside by a strong hand for a moment, which the next moment returns into its place, overpowering with its heavy pressure all resistance, this idea of the eternal duration of our spiritual doom has ever retained its sway amongst us: and this assuredly not from the *words* of Scripture alone: for words *alone* have no force in them: and such a thought as this, so tremendous, could never have been sustained on any basis except on that deepest basis of our human conscience and heart. The word within us and the word without both declare it aloud, their voices mingling indistinguishably together,

like the voices of a mountain torrent and rain rushing heavily from the sky.

3. Emphatically, may that which Lactantius affirms concerning virtue be applied to regeneracy, which is the pre-eminence and highest possible conception of Virtue. *Non est comprehensa, si deserit, si aliquando secedit. Cum vero sibi domicilium stabile collocavit, in omni actu versari eam necesse est: nec potest fideliter depellere vitia et fugare, nisi pectus quod insedit, perpetua statione munierit. Ipsa ergo virtutis perpetuitas indicat, humanum animum, si virtutem ceperit, permanere.**

SECTION III.—*Argument on the connection of Permanence in Good or Evil with Predominance of Good or Evil, in the Soul of Man.*

1. AGAIN, it may be objected that if regeneration is gradual, at the commencement of our career evil must predominate within us, and if we can be redeemed by God's grace out of this state of ungodliness, perseverance in good or evil does not belong to predominance of the one or the other.

2. To this it may be replied, that an unsanctified condition at the commencement of the soul's career, is negative rather than positive. Regeneration manifests itself by degrees, as the moon gradually fills her orb with light: but in this image we must not take the unillumined portion to represent deliberate wickedness. We may conceive that responsibility is extended as the sphere of the moral being is extended: that men

* *De Vita Beata*, lib. vii. 10.

284 *Early Sinfulness often but Ignorance.*

rise gradually from a neutral state into one of Christian excellence, rather than from determinate evil into holiness. Our Lord called on sinners to repent, but when addressing the Jews as children of the Devil, He spake not as if he expected *them* to be reclaimed. *Ye are of your father the Devil*, he said to them, *and the lusts of your father ye will do.**

3. But how do we reconcile with this philosophy of an inalienable divine nature, a Satanic nature equally permanent, those passages of Holy Writ, which describe men as passing from death unto life? *When the wicked man turneth away from the evil which he hath committed, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive; and When a righteous man turneth away from his righteousness and committeth iniquity, for his iniquity that he hath done shall he die.†* St. Paul plainly declares that the converts before they turned to Christ, had been *dead in trespasses and sins,—by nature the children of wrath, even as others.* Do not these voices of Scripture declare, that a state of positive predominant good or evil may be reversed and changed into its opposite?

4. Indeed, so it would seem at first sight: and yet it is not inconsonant with “the spirit and genius of Holy Writ” to suppose that, as the hearts of men cannot be seen, Scripture calls it wickedness to commit acts which the awakened conscience perceives to be evil. St. Paul was outwardly wicked when he was persecuting the Church, and our Lord addressed him as an evil-doer: yet the Apostle tells us himself that he *sinned in ignorance.* Can any one believe that he

* John viii. 38—47.

† Ezekiel xviii. 27, 26. See also Ephes. ii. 1, 2, 3.

was wicked as are those who reject Christ deliberately ; as he would have been had he disobeyed the heavenly vision ? Saints are wont to use strong language respecting their state of soul previous to conversion : they view it through the glass of their present spirituality, and speak of it as wickedness because it would be such, were it taken up again after enlightenment and participation of the Holy Ghost. But we may well believe that their primitive unholiness has been, like St. Paul's, a state of ignorance, or of Heathen deadness, like that of Abraham, before he became the *Father of the Faithful*. St. Paul calls the Heathen state a state of wrath and deadness, for such it is in itself : but if all sin be resistance to the Spirit, and if the Spirit works through outward means, then the Heathens, though in a low estate, could not be evil as they are evil, who *will* not open when Christ stands at the door and knocks.

5. These difficulties, however, let us think of them as we may, cannot disannul the plain intimations of Scripture, that there are states of reprobate impenitency and regenerate excellency, and the plain testimony of reason and conscience to the same. And if there *be* a state of abiding holiness, in which the soul has lost the power of committing mortal sin, surely this must be the regenerate condition. If there are sheep of whom *that great Shepherd* can say, that they shall *never perish*, and that *no man is able to pluck them out of His Father's hand*,—and if no man, then no *thing*, no outward circumstance, not life, nor death, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor height, nor death, nor any other creature,—these, and none but these, surely, are the *Sons of God*.

SECTION IX.—Doctrines of *Indefectibility* confounded with *Predestinarianism*.

I. BUT some maintainers of momentaneous and reversible regeneration, who will have it that the divine seed or nature may be lost, and that the Sons of God may be turned into Sons of Satan, adopt a short method with the doctrine of Indefectibility, to put it out of the way at once. In order to blast it with all "sound Churchmen," who look upon Calvin as the Beast in the Revelations, some of whom have seen about as much of Calvin, to judge from their remarks, as of the Dragon in the Apocalypse: with moderate men, who like all middle views, which being neither this nor

* "The chief, and indeed the only material difference that is between St. Austin's doctrine, and that of the Sublapsarians, is, That he, holding that with the Sacrament of Baptism, there was joined an inward Regeneration, made a difference between the Regenerate and the Predestinate, which these do not. He thought persons thus regenerate, might have all grace, besides that of Perseverance: but he thought that they, not being predestinated, were certainly to fall from that state, and from the grace of Regeneration. The other differences are but forced strains, to represent him and the Calvinists as of different principles: he thought that overcoming Delectation, in which he put the efficacy of grace, was as irresistible, though he used not so strong a word for it as the Calvinists do: and he thought that the Decree was as absolute, and made without any regard to what the Free Will would choose, as any of these do. So in the main points, the Absoluteness of the Decree, the Extent of Christ's Death, the Efficacy of Grace, and the Certainty of Perseverance, their opinions are the same, though their ways of expressing themselves do often differ." Burnet's exposition of the Thirty-nine articles, p. 149. Calvin went on to the supralapsarian way, Hooker adopted the sublapsarian hypothesis, though he latterly asserted the freedom of the Will: but Burnet shows convincingly, I think, at pp. 157, 8, 9, that there is not a pin to choose between them: that the sublapsarian doctrine is but the supralapsarian uttered in a softer tone.

that exactly, can commit them to nothing embarrassing : with the would-be orthodox, who must have ancient doctrine, but are apt to mistake mediæval for primitive antiquity, like picture fanciers who purchase the elaborate productions of later art for ancient paintings—in order to ruin it with these respectable parties, without the circuitous process of disproof,—they pronounce it to be part and parcel of the great and wicked scheme of Necessity—with which wicked scheme, I believe, it has about as much to do as with the explosive tendencies of the steam-engine.

2. I certainly believe that this doctrine of indefectible sonship has no connection whatever with the metaphysical doctrine of Necessity, broached by St. Augustine, pursued by Calvin, and adopted by our “judicious Hooker.” It supposes no necessity, but the necessity of a good nature, the law of the Spirit, which is perfect freedom, which binds the Omnipotent Himself. I do not perceive that it has any relation to those hard tenets concerning irresistible grace and absolute decrees. It simply affirms a deeply affecting truth of Reason and Scripture, that by *acts of free will* a man may cast his own soul into irredeemable captivity, that last state of the sinner which is worse than the first,—that contrariwise, a man may, by *voluntary* submission to the divine leading, place himself, even here, in a region of secure grace and unfailing glory—may enter a blessed sphere of saintliness—a heaven upon earth—whence he cannot pass or go forth, except into that heaven above, where he shall meet his Saviour face to face, and, having been made like unto Him, *shall see Him as He is !*

CHAPTER VI.

FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IRRESISTIBLE GRACE
IN A NEW FORM.

I.

I HAVE adverted to the insinuation of our opponents, that the doctrine which contemplates regeneracy as a moral condition of abiding grace and glory, is a branch of the scheme of necessity, and shown as I hope and believe, that the former is not necessarily connected with the latter, since it may be held and is held by the firmest maintainers of free will, who believe that Predestination, as taught by St. Austin and Calvin, was never taught or thought of by the Apostles. Now it is remarkable, but not surprising, because extremes meet and errors are gregarious in their nature, that this unjust imputation upon our system is made by divines, who are themselves teaching, in a certain way, a doctrine of necessity—a doctrine according to which the salvation of man is placed in circumstances external to himself, a doctrine, consequently, which by implication denies free will. For what do those Ultra-Arminian teachers, who insist upon momentary regeneration, affirm? Do they not openly declare that when the Christian has been internally regenerated through a rite procured for him by the care of others, without any preparatory or recipient act of his own, regenerated when “an infant laid in the Church’s lucid bosom,”—the grace thus planted within him will *certainly* work its effect to the saving of his soul, if it is not thwarted in its operation by

circumstances?—do they not affirm that if he is truly and entirely well educated, if his parents or those that have him in charge are sufficiently earnest and diligent in prayer on his behalf, if they give him right instruction, set him right example, and place him in circumstances conducive to his soul's health, he will infallibly grow up a righteous person, preserve his baptismal robe unsullied and gain the world to come?

2. God has promised a certain blessing, so they argue, on the use of certain means: if the means are used the result is sure, according to His promise. According as we approximate to perfection in the use of the means we approximate to certainty in the result. *Let God be true, and every man a liar.*

Yea, let God be true, and every man a liar!—but where, where has God said, either that the salvation of a responsible human being is wholly ensured by circumstances, things out of himself, or that his perdition is necessitated by a want of means which it was not in his own power to supply?

3. We are told that this statement, which “places the spiritual condition of a human soul at the discretion of a fellow-creature,” is quite in harmony with the general scheme of Providence as revealed in the Bible, or collected from the history of man and our common experience. Far otherwise does that scheme reveal itself to us; by a very different light do we read the history of man and the records of inspiration.

Man is dependent on outward conditions for the evolution of his being, physical and moral. He cannot believe unless he hears: he cannot hear without a preacher; he cannot be spiritually begotten by the Word of Truth unless that word reaches his heart, through his outward ear and his earthly understand-

ing. But to admit this is *toto cælo* a different thing from admitting that he can be made either positively wicked and liable to divine wrath; or righteous, acceptable and an heir of heaven without consentient acts of his own free will. Never can we admit that a human spirit is first regenerated by the *sole act* of God, and then certainly proves righteous in consequence of a gift *passively* received,—*if his parents do their part in his spiritual education.*

4. On the other hand is it not a fearful thing to imply, that if a baptized person proves reckless and perverse, his parents must have failed in their duty? To put in the saving clause, “Unless their care is frustrated by his own perverseness, when he comes to years,” is a sheer contradiction of the hypothesis. Here, we are told, is a soul informed with saving grace,—spiritualized and sanctified—which has had all that prayer, and care, and fostering circumstances can do for it, and yet turns out deliberately and determinately evil and perverse! The man’s “*will* has been sanctified” in his infancy and yet, in spite of all means and opportunities,

Fine webs and stratagems to catch him in!
Bibles laid open; millions of surprises;
Blessings beforehand; ties of gratefulness;
The sound of glory ringing in his ears,—

he *wills* the evil and rejects the good!

It is contrary to the hypothesis, if he, the regenerate person himself, can use or reject the means of grace and goodness; for then his spiritual condition is not placed “at the discretion of a fellow-creature.” The hypothesis means, if it is not utterly unmeaning, that he is furnished *inwardly* with spiritual power, which *must* lead him on in righteousness if it be *out-*

but cannot countervail Grace received. 291

wardly assisted; that is, if *others* do their duty by him, he cannot but do his by himself.

This we call the doctrine of Irresistible Grace in a new form, and one for which there is less to be said than for the old one of St. Austin, Calvin, and Hooker.

5. Through the mediation of circumstances divine influence is conveyed to the soul, as water is conveyed by channels, pipes, conduits, whither it is wanted. But he who *has been* divinely influenced is so far raised above circumstances; placed on a vantage ground.

Natural life may be stifled, injured, destroyed: as a plant or tree may be blighted, blasted, or stunted in its growth; but spiritual life, if the soul has truly received it, cannot be stifled from without; temptation cannot prevail against it; the world cannot overcome it:—*Be of good cheer*, said our Saviour, *I have overcome the world*; and all in whom He lives will overcome the world by Him; Death, so far from destroying, the spiritual principle, does but transplant it into a region of higher life and stronger vitality.*

CHAPTER VII.

IN WHAT SENSE REGENERATION IS A BIRTH INTO A
NEW AND SPIRITUAL LIFE.

1.

IN an able treatise on Regeneration, after shewing what we, on our side, are never tired of affirming,

* Some teachers of this theory affirm that “the *will* is sanctified” in baptism; others that the soul does but receive a potential principle of sanctification, yet receives it inwardly and at

292 *Spiritual Birth is the gradual Process*

that in St. John's Epistle, to *have been born of God* signifies the same thing as to *abide in the light*, to *know God*, to *abide in God*, to *dwell in God and God in us*, the author proceeds to urge, that we must either so far identify the commencement and continuance of the Christian life, the spiritual *birth* and the spiritual *life*, as to affirm that the one is the inseparable and indefectible consequence of the other, or we must allow that the phrase is here * used in an enlarged sense, expressing the continuance as well as the commencement of the spiritual life," &c.

2. Now let us go for help in the solution of this knot, to that arbitrator to which our opponents are perpetually referring—the analogy of the “metaphor” as they call it, though we say, that spiritual life is life *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. We ask if a man is not *completely alive* as soon as he is born;—if he is not perfectly a son as soon as he is really a son?† What is meant by the spiritual *life*? We understand by it a state of *predominant* spirituality; a state in which the spirit *reigns*; not a state in which it is struggling with the flesh. What is meant by the spiritual *birth*? We

once. If we ask, “Why then does not the baptized invariably prove holy?” The answer is, “Because the internal gift is rendered vain by things *without* ;” as if a power to resist temptation and overcome evil could be nullified by temptation and evil; as if the reception of a mere *potentiality* of holiness could be spiritual regeneration! See 1 John v. 4.

* That is in 1 John iii. 9. *Whosoever has been born of God does not commit sin.*

† See Eccles. Pol. b. v. chap. lvi. 12. He who loves his Saviour in such wise that he must love him for ever, is a son of God, and the bare notion of sonship is *extra gradum* ; yet, among the sons of God some may love more fervently than others; as “touching this that all are sons, they are all equals, some haply better sons than the rest are, but none any more a son than another.”

understand by it, that process during which the spirit obtains the ascendancy, not the mere acquirement of a capability of being *afterwards* reborn or spiritually and morally changed from above. Can that soul be said to have attained *the spiritual life*, in whom the flesh is not yet dead or even dying; in whom, as is notoriously the case with thousands after baptism, as the prayers and preachings of *all* earnest pastors imply, the process of its subjugation, or, in Pauline language, destruction, has not even commenced?

3. St. Paul describes the unregenerate state in the viith chapter of Romans; the state of nature, in which the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. In the beginning of the next, he describes the regenerate state of those who have been born into the spiritual life: when *the righteousness of the law is fulfilled* in them;—when they are *walking not after the flesh, but after the spirit*; when *the body is dead because of sin*, through Christ dwelling in the soul and conforming it to himself. Till we are in this state of confirmed holiness we are not *born of God*.

4. But may we not be said to have commenced our spiritual career, when we are beginning to mind the things of the spirit, and to mortify the deeds of the body? Doubtless. But this period is not properly the life in the spirit, in the absolute sense; it is the spiritual generation and birth. Some divines seem to argue, as if our spiritual birth must needs be at the beginning of our *natural* life, as if the spiritual life embraced a man's whole career in this state of probation. But it is plain that spiritual birth is correlative, not to natural, but to spiritual life; though the earlier it is placed in our earthly career the better. As na-

294 *Spiritual Life is, to be led by the Spirit.*

tural birth commences natural life, so spiritual birth commences a life of spirituality.

If to be a son of God is what St. Paul, St. John, and St. Peter say it is, to have the *mind of Christ*, a *faith that overcomes the world*, a true pervading love of God—then a man's whole spiritual career up to that point is his gradual birth in the spirit.

Some are blighted in their birth period and prove abortions; some never even commence the process; but such as I have said, is the case with those who die justified. If their justification has been gradual, their whole course up to the time of its completion, is their spiritual regeneration. When it is completed they *have been* born again, and are Sons of God.

CHAPTER VIII.

CREATION OR GENERATION AND BIRTH NOT NECESSARILY MOMENTANEOUS.

I.

IF renewal and justification are gradually wrought, Regeneration, if it be, as we suppose, their immediate cause, must proceed *pari passu* with them.

To this view it is objected that birth, generation, creation, must take place at once. I simply ask in reply, why *must* generation or creation take place at once?

Creation may be longer or shorter according to the subject. The mind of man is a microcosm, and the recreation of it may take up exactly the same time as is indicated by its gradual renewal. Natural birth and "whatsoever belongs to our human

generation," the formation and fashioning of the human being, with his introduction into the world of light, is not the work of a moment. When spiritual things are compared with natural things, the likeness is of course with a difference. It would be childish to suppose that spiritual regeneration must take place in a stated time, or exactly the same time as the natural process with which it is compared: but analogy justifies us in conceiving it to be gradual and a work of time. St. Paul says to the Galatians, *My little children of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you*, as if this birth process were not an affair of a moment or even of a day.*

3. According to that system of mental philosophy which my father adopted, the soul as it is in itself, not merely as the thing which *appears* to our consciousness, the object of itself as subject, has no relation to time. Its translation from death unto life, in this point of view, is out of time altogether. But this point of view is extrinsic to the present debate. No man who admitted that regeneration is not a mere mystical affection, but a moral exaltation, a change from evil to good, would deny that it comes about gradually. Now regeneration, in the active sense, is the divine operancy on the spirit of man, rendering it pure, strong, divine, able to overcome evil with good; in the passive sense, it is the spiritualized state of soul thus effected. We may separate in idea the ripening agency of the sun from the ripeness produced in the fruit, but the two are inseparable in fact, and the time

* Even if this text did not refer to *the New Birth*, it would help to prove, that generation is not necessarily a single momentary act.

296 *No Objections to gradual New Birth*

occupied by the causative agency is indicated by the perceptible progress of the effect.

The Apostles do not tell us how long a man is in becoming a son; but they tell us what it is to *have been* born again; and they identify the regenerate state with a state of predominant spirituality which is *eternal life*.

CHAPTER IX.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF GRADUAL REGENERATION: REPLY TO THE SAME.

1.

OBJECTIONS are raised to this doctrine of regeneration gradually attained and when attained indefectible, which are equally applicable to every other scheme of grace and salvation. We are asked, what becomes of him who dies after the process is begun and before it is completed? How can this doctrine be applied to children of three, five, seven years of age? Are they half in the kingdom of heaven and half out of it? Can we be partly born again—partly in the state natural, partly in the state spiritual?

2. May we not ask, in reply, what becomes of him whose *justification* is incomplete, who is but partly endued with inherent righteousness; whose wedding garment is but half put on? Justification, considered as an inward attribute, as meetness for heaven, is, on all hands, allowed to be gradual.* We identify rege-

* See among numberless other statements of gradual justification, one in Bishop Bull's *Harmonia*, vol. iii. pp. 73, 6, 234, and *Apologia*, vol. iv. p. 337. Oxford edit.

generation, in the way that has already been described, with justification and renewal, and hold that at whatever pace the effect is seen to proceed the same must be that of the operating cause, and that the one cannot be separated from the other in time any more than the melting of frozen water from the liquefying agency of the sun upon the ice.

3. Questions such as the above cannot be answered out of Scripture. The spiritual destiny of those in whom the spiritual being is not at all, or but partially developed, is no subject of revelation: for God's message to man is ever *practical*: Holy Writ addresses itself to the capable; who can act in consonance with what it announces. The threats and its promises concern those who can avoid the fulfilment of the one and by *patient continuance in well doing* secure the other.

4. For those, to whom a future spiritual being has been vouchsafed and yet not realized, we can but deduce from the nature and attributes of God, that they are safe in the bosom of Infinite Goodness. Such is our view and it is comprehensive; we feel as assured that *all* the innocents are resting in that bosom, as that babes, dying after baptism, are received into bliss. It was not on the score of baptism that Christ blest children and declared that of such is the kingdom of heaven. But if baptism can grant a special blessing and a privilege extending beyond the grave, available for those who have not time allowed them to work out their salvation here, whether this is a *consignation* to the soul, or, as our opponents will have it, *an infusion into* the soul, not immediately penetrating into the will and affections, the result will not be different. A change in the will and affections must be made, either

in this life or the next, to fit the soul for glory; on one scheme as much as on the other, those who have not become moral agents here, must have a development elsewhere and a change, in the course of it, from earthly to heavenly. Is this too bold a conjecture? Nay it is but a reply to the bold dogmatizing of others. If they have a right to say that infants benefit in heaven by the baptismal rite performed on earth, which is but a human inference from revelation, we have a right to our human inference too, namely that they benefit as they would have benefited on earth. Does the child rest on his inherent righteousness, and the fulfilment of the divine law within his narrow sphere of existence, for his claim to heaven? or does he rest on his baptismal privilege? or partly on one, partly on the other? In any case he is as safe on our plan as on that of those who maintain a mystic non-moral regeneration. Nay! that is a *shadow*—and, as a shadow, is powerless to effect any thing: all it seems to do is done by the substance, which it coldly and darkly represents.

CHAPTER X.

THE NEW BIRTH A RE-CREATION.

SECTION I.—*Regeneration not merely a Change of State and Circumstances.*

1.

THAT Regeneration is a change of state, not a change of nature, or that it is a change of state and of nature, yet not a spiritual re-creation, or that it is a spiritual re-creation, and yet not a conversion of the intelligent will with a renewal of the affections,—

all these are most unintelligible positions,—such as no man, except to save a theory from ruin, would ever have hit upon. The analogy of the new birth or regeneration is not surely to mere *nativity*—the act of coming into the light of day, body and soul, having both been given before,—but to generation,—production or reception of being. The Greek *γεννᾶσθαι** does not signify to be brought forth exclusively. Regeneration is surely not a change of state, as distinguished from a re-creation; he who has been begotten again of God is a new creature, not merely the occupant of a new sphere.

2. It is alleged in proof of the position that the new birth is no re-creation, but a change of state and circumstances, that the term regenerate was applied by Pagans to those who were initiated into certain religious mysteries; to slaves who obtained freedom; and by the Jewish doctors to proselytes from the Gentiles, who adopted their faith and religious polity. Surely in every one of these cases a change of the whole inward frame of mind was supposed in the regenerate person as the ground of his change of condition, although the *term* regeneration was applied to the ceremony of initiation or symbolical action which shewed, as in figure, the substantial change that was undergone. In each of these cases the regenerate person was looked upon as a new *man*; else he could never have been called *regenerate* or *begotten again*. So likewise when the term *regeneration* is applied to the final change of those that rise from the dead, it imports no mere change of state and circumstances exclusively

* *Γεννάω*, to engender; beget; produce; more rarely, to bring forth.—DONNEGAN. To beget; later, to bring forth.—LIDDELL and SCOTT.

300 *Lunar Scheme of Grace, called "Calvinism,"*
of a re-creation, but *primarily* a re-constitution adapt-
ing the subject of it to a celestial sphere. Will any
man maintain that this final new birth is not a refor-
mation of the mind, will and affection, and a glorification
of our *moral* being?



SECTION II.—*The Doctrine of Spiritual Re-creation
travestied.*

1. BUT our opponents endeavour to fasten upon this statement an absurd and untenable sense. They talk and argue, at least, as if we imagined that a regenerate person, in being born again, receives a new soul, the old soul being somehow shifted away; or that into his original soul a new set of faculties are inserted, the old will, reason, heart and understanding being annihilated; so that the Holy Spirit does not act upon materials in the human soul already existing, but creates materials, to form a new soul, out of nothing. And moreover we are represented as supposing that this new creation, (not re-creation,) takes place at one fixed point of time, all in a moment, by the sole act of God without any responsive act or sub-co-operation,—as if we had stolen our opponent's idea of the new birth and set it up in our own temple;—and to complete our folly and dereliction of the wisdom of the ancients, that this spiritual metamorphosis has no connection with forgiveness of sin. This is called by divines not of the Elizabethan or Stuartian, but of the Georgian æra, the Calvinistic theory of Regeneration.

2. Whether in the moon, to which all vain things ascend, (as the poets declare,) wafted upward by their

own levity, there resides any set of Calvinists, who thus expound spiritual regeneration, I cannot say. But I think I *can* say, that there are no true disciples of Calvin in our sublunary sphere who talk at this strange rate; and that those Lunar Calvinists, if such there be, have gone to a greater distance from their master's doctrine than the moon is distant from the earth.

3. For Calvin identifies regeneration with repentance, and unites repentance with remission of sins, which, taken together, he declares to be the sum and substance of the Gospel. He describes it as a recreation, because it makes the soul new to all intents and purposes,—gives a new heart, mind, and will by making our old heart, mind and will spiritual and holy. He teaches that this change is gradually effected by the Divine Spirit; and though he denies the freedom of the will, which we, who are but eclectic or comparative Calvinists, maintain; yet he certainly does not insinuate that man is idle, while the business of his salvation goes on, or is carried to heaven quietly, transported, like the prince of the Arabian tale, in sleep,—without any pains taken by himself. Man works as hard on the way to bliss, in the system of Calvin as in any other, though he does not work freely,—though his work is not properly his own.*

* Christian Institutes, b. iii. chap. ix., sects. VIII. IX. and chap. xvi. sects. I. and II. A perusal of the chapter on Repentance in this work, b. iii. chap. iv., and that on Baptism will convince any intelligent reader that the name of Calvin is very unjustly given to the system above described. Modern Methodism *may*, for aught I know, have sometimes talked thus, but never, I think, from the mouth of Wesley. A critical epoch, a turning point in our spiritual career, may be very differently explained.

4. With him we say that regeneration, repentance, or change of mind—*μετάνοια*—abolition of sin and forgiveness of sin, all go together and are practically inseparable ; that our regeneration, (which he calls our “restoration to the righteousness from which we fell in Adam,”) is “not accomplished in a single moment, or day or year ;” that “by continual, and even sometimes tardy, advances the Lord destroys the carnal corruption of his chosen ;” that is, as *we* hold, of those who choose Him by *freely* yielding to the motions of His good Spirit. And though with him we say, that men are new creatures, not in the irrational sense, which I have just disclaimed, but “when the Spirit of God has imbued their souls with His holiness, and given them such new thoughts and affections, that *they may be justly considered as new,*” we yet think it both more Scriptural and more philosophical to describe a regenerate person, as one in whom the natural man has expired, and the spiritual man lives, than to speak of him as *a natural man improved by divine grace.*

5. Man is born into the world with two principles in his constitution, the one natural, the other spiritual. It is literally true, and no mere *figure*, as some maintainers of mystic regeneration seem to teach, (in their interpretation of St. Paul,) that just so far as man is influenced by sanctifying grace, his mere mind of the flesh decays and becomes lost,—exists no longer as an active power within him. This we hold to be no inaccuracy but the more correct statement of the two ; though we believe the two statements differ in nothing as to the practical result.

6. We hold also with Calvin, that all mankind before and without the grace of Christ, are far gone from righteousness,—the thoughts of their heart only

evil continually; that the office of the Holy Ghost is not to make us *better* than by nature, but good instead of bad; not to draw out, and extend and amplify our original *good dispositions*, but to realize our original capabilities of being rightly disposed, and thus “create and make in us new and contrite hearts.” Some divines, even defenders of the Liturgy and Articles, think they cannot go too far from Calvin; but in going so *very far* from Calvin they depart unawares, from our Liturgy and Articles, and the view of Scripture taken therein; as well as from the main body of our Anglican divinity.*

CHAPTER XI.

SPIRITUAL EVIDENCE.

SECTION I.—*Signs of Regenerative Influence.*

1.

“**T**HE wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, &c. So is every one that is born of the Spirit.”

“The moral result, the specific form and character, in which the Spirit manifests its presence, is the only

* From the testimonies of Poole, (author of the Synopsis, no small authority on such a point,) Saunderson, Horsley, and Heylyn, it would appear that no one book has moulded English divinity so much as the Christian Institutes. It is indeed a grand panorama of Holy Scripture, in the Old and New Testaments, logically exhibited.

See also the high testimony to the merits of this book in the Preface to the Eccles. Polity. “We should be injurious to virtue itself,” says Hooker, on this subject, “if we did derogate from them whom their industry hath made great.”

sure pledge and token of its presence, which is to be, and which safely may be, inferred from its practical effects." "Inferred it may be from its workings: it cannot be perceived in them."

Thus wrote the author of *Aids to Reflection*, in correction of those who fanatically or hypocritically pretended to a knowledge of the divine presence in themselves from consciousness. But there is an opposite extreme to this error; and we are assured that the influence of the Spirit not only is indiscernible *in* its workings, but that it cannot be discerned *from* its workings, at least in the case of regeneration, the most eminent case imaginable. Nay, they declare the contrary belief to be want of faith! Our opponents charge us with want of *faith*, because we deny that any man has been spiritually regenerated whose life is evil!

2. It is going by sight, not by faith, in their theory, if we cannot believe that one who is habitually sinful has undergone that spiritual renewing which is to place the soul in a state of holiness!*

"God forbid but that men should believe
Wel more thing than they han seen with eye!"

We walk by sight when we attend only to the things, which appear without, and take no heed to the things

* "Heaven," says Bishop Wilkins, "may be considered under a twofold notion, either as a

} *State,*
} *Place.*

1. "In the first sense, 'tis the same with holiness, consisting in such godlike dispositions, as may make us partakers of the divine nature.

2. In the second sense, it denotes that other world where we hope to enjoy the beatific vision, in the blessed society of saints and angels. Which religion only and holiness can qualify us for, by working in our natures such a suitableness and congruity as must make such things to be felicities."

called 'walking by sight' & 'want of faith.' 305

that are spiritually discerned : but how does this apply to the present case? We do not disbelieve the regeneracy of those whose deeds are evil, simply because we cannot discern their invisible spiritual condition with our bodily eye, but because with our spiritual eye we have discerned the unholiness of their lives ; not for want of outward evidence, but because we have inward and spiritual evidence, which disproves the fact, and because Scripture and Reason declare that the inward and spiritual state of man may be known by his outward actions. Does the Word of God describe *faith* as rendering us blind to the signs of moral good and evil, or incapable of reading them? Is it faithless to say, that if the springhead has been filled with living water the streams will be pure? Verily, if faith were what their argument implies it would be the ruin of the soul rather than the salvation of it.

3. On this very point of the new birth our Lord refers us to the appropriate evidences, by which it may be known, whether a man, is or is not under divine influence. To disbelieve the doctrine that regeneration is mystic and indiscernible in its nature is to believe Him. As the wind is known by its sound, so is the regenerating influence to be heard by all that have spiritual ears to hear it. Are we to believe that the wind blows when all is still and not a leaf stirs around us?

4. Not that we can say *certainly* who is regenerate, speaking of regeneracy as a general character, or attribute. Our observation cannot be sufficiently deep and comprehensive to enable us to say more than conjecturally of any man that he has been born again, and is justified and qualified for heaven. We cannot take in at a glance a man's whole spiritual prospect. But

just so far as we can judge of any man, that he is a truly good Christian, just so far we can perceive and judge of regeneracy; and this we know from our Saviour's own mouth, that spiritual influence upon the soul, will shew itself in a spiritual mode of action, if the subject has time and scope to act outwardly at all. Even in the instance of the penitent thief upon the cross, a *sound* was heard of the spiritual breeze that was passing over him, and that sound was his confession of Christ!*

SECTION II.—*Assumptions and Confusions on the Subject of Spiritual Evidence.*

1.

BLESSED *are they who have not seen and yet have believed.* Yea, blessed are they who can see with the eyes of the Spirit, who can believe on spiritual evidence without aid of external proof. But not, blessed are they who believe on *no* evidence, —nay against spiritual evidence, disproving that which they affirm; who shut their eyes to the light of Reason,

* Some of our opponents cast the sound of the wind out of the *comparison* altogether. What Scriptural view may not be built up by a system of putting into Scripture and putting out of it *ad libitum!* But in the *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, the ordinary interpretation, which is that of Hammond and many other orthodox commentators, is adopted; and regeneration is defined as “to the Christian a new, real, though not physical beginning—an existence real though invisible—and, though worked by an unseen agent, yet *felt in its effects, like the energy of the viewless winds!*”—a beautiful description—but not surely a true one of any change wrought in baptism.

when her beams pierce through their phantom regeneration, revealing it as a “delusion of the night,” which now at noon-day—*ὄναρ ἡμερόφαντον ἀλαίνει*.

2. Our opponents assume that their doctrine of baptismal regeneration is revealed in the Bible, and thereupon accuse us of wanting faith because we look for *signs* of its reality. But this, we say, is placing the matter in a perfectly false point of view. For so far from admitting that it is revealed in the Bible, we think the passages, in which our maintainers find it contain no such thing till they have first put it there—contain something totally different; that it is positively negated by other passages of Holy Writ, and that in attempting to do away the testimony of those passages against it they convert them from strong wine into a weak and tasteless beverage, fit neither for babes nor men—at the same time using a licence of interpretation *mali exempli*.

2. “You do not find the doctrine in revelation, because, assuming it to be irrational, you cannot see it there.” We reply, shew us that it is a doctrine of Scripture by fair and ordinary methods of interpretation, without reference to rational or irrational, and you change the state of the question materially. But we think you can as little prove it from Scripture as you can reconcile it with Reason. We object to it on two *distinct* grounds, first because it is not only unscriptural but antiscritural: and secondly because it is unreasonable in itself; as we maintain.

3. Whether or no we ought to believe an invisible thing apart from all outward manifestation plainly depends upon the nature of the thing. We must believe the resurrection without outward sign, (except so far as our Lord’s reappearance in the body was one,)

because the life beyond the grave is not properly manifestable to outward sense. We must believe that the penitent thief was that day with his Lord in Paradise, though we cannot see him there. But when Christ has said, that spiritual influence is like the wind that is *heard*, that the tree shall be known by its fruits, when an apostle has declared, *By this the sons of God are manifest*, it is *want of faith* and disregard of Holy Writ to impute spiritual regeneration to men whose outward course is evil,—to whom no one would impute a pure heart or an enlightened mind.

CHAPTER XII.

PRACTICAL TENDENCIES OF THE OPPOSED SCHEMES OF REGENERATION.

SECTION I.—*Supposed Advantages of the Doctrine of New Birth in the Moment of Baptism.*

HE *that hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life: and again, He that heareth my word and believeth on Him that hath sent me, hath everlasting life. And again, These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God, that ye may know that ye have eternal life.**

What is really meant, what is it that can be seriously and in earnest maintained by those who say that before men have believed in the Son of God, they have new life abiding in them? If the teachers of mystic

* John v. 24; 1 John v. 12, 13.

regeneration examine their own thoughts on this matter can they find them to contain more than this, that we have that *in us* from the first, that we have that secured to us by a special grant, which may give us eternal life if we will do our part in gaining it?

Do we improve upon this awful portion of self-knowledge, by teaching that in Baptism new life is stowed away in the soul somewhere apart from the will, mind and affections? So far from believing this dogma to be persuasive and conducive to right thoughts and earnest feelings on the subject of religion, I cannot imagine that it has ever answered any other purpose than that of throwing an air of unreality and chill dimming mist over the face of the Gospel, and filling sermons that should be spent in rectifying and enlivening the hearts and strengthening the understandings of Christian auditors with dry artificial defences. I cannot imagine that a pulse of any human frame ever beat in answer to the annunciation that we have new life stored up within us before we have Christ in our heart of hearts.

What is gained by such a supposition? Do not we, with our views, believe that there is in us a power of everlasting life, a capability of righteousness, which must be guarded with an "agony of care" whilst we are sojourners in a world of temptation? Do not we believe that there is in us a principle given by God, whence all our work is to proceed? That He is the all-merciful cause, the eternal initiator of salvation?—that it is a frightful thing to defile the temple of the living God, even the human soul, which He has made for an habitation for himself? But to believe that Christ lives spiritually in us while we are committing sin, that if we die before we are absolute re-

probates, we have that earnest of our inheritance in our souls which must bring them to bliss, surely such a belief, if operative at all, must rather tend to wrap the soul in vain security, to deaden its fine sense of the incompatibility of moral evil with spiritual felicity and glory, than to stimulate it to exertion. The sinner is to be told that Christ is in him—while he is yet unconverted. Must not such a belief take from the awfulness of the Saviour's presence?—must it not abridge to his thought the interval between spirituality and the carnal mind?

We do not indeed compare this our capability of grace with a "flickering taper which men shelter from a sudden gust."* God forbid that it should be liable to sudden extinction! But we hold that by continued resistance to the motions of God's Spirit it may at length be worn quite away; and that every single act of repulsion impairs it.

What?—will a man "wink at a youthful season of folly and sin," though conscious that he has a soul that is to live for ever in misery and in blessedness, and a Saviour who died for his sins ever ready to deliver him from wrath and condemnation; capabili-

* "But then we must believe that this life is within us, or we shall not continue thus to watch over and shield it amidst the storms of the world, as men shelter a flickering taper from a sudden gust." I trust we may all read the discourse from which this sentence is quoted, (the third of an interesting set of Sermons by the Bishop of Oxford,) with advantage, by taking it practically; not as an argument against those who think that, before conversion, the soul has a spiritual being, consequently capabilities of *becoming* alive in the Spirit, not actual new life, but as an appeal to Christian professors to take heed how they neglect their powers and opportunities of religious improvement, day by day scattering

— "from their graspless hand
Redemption's precious pearls like hour-glass sand."

ties within him of being raised from glory to glory; the gift of reason at his original creation and the Spirit by special covenant attending on his soul—will he neglect so great salvation, knowing as he must, if he considers the scheme of grace rightly, that every day and every hour tells upon his immortal spirit for good or for evil; will he needs feel all this to be nothing, unless he takes into his creed a mediæval dogma concerning baptism, which is never in harmony with the Gospel except when it is at war with itself?

Let men preach what doctrine they may, some will delay repentance in hope of a change in their souls hereafter. Must we seek to prevent their fatal delusion by telling the profligate and the profane that they have new life within them *now*?—that there is no *radical* change to be wrought within them by the Holy Spirit of God? And why do so many delay repentance? Is it that they do not know they are endangering their souls; or is it not rather because they cannot forego the pleasures of sin, and shrink from the labour of co-operating with God, whose service, though it be indeed perfect freedom, seems to their captive souls a perfect slavery?

Our scheme, say the teachers of passive regeneration in baptism, alone does due honour to God. Our scheme alone fully testifies to the fact that from a benefactor above us all our spiritual blessings flow. Surely if a man feels that without prevenient grace he can neither do nor think any good thing, that he cannot move one step toward Christ till the Father draw him, it can scarcely be necessary to perfect humility and gratitude for him to add, that God pours life into him before He makes him alive. Is it not a nobler work to produce activity and active righteousness than

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to mould motionless clay or pour an infusion into a dead receptacle? Is not God's work in re-creating the living soul of man even greater than his work in creating the physical universe?

According to this view they would do *most* honour to God who should say that men are taken to heaven quietly and do nothing at all in their own salvation! What a failing concern must that be which tries to raise the wind by such expedients as these, and to extract a little credit from confusion of thought and one-sided representations!

SECTION II.—*Disadvantages of the Momentary Scheme.*

1. AND now, having declared what are not, in my opinion, the advantages of this scheme, I will state what seem to me some of its disadvantages. I think it is injurious to the mind not merely, as being false in itself, but because it generates a regular system of sophistication and logical fraud; because it leads men to take fearful liberties with inspiration under cover of reverence for antiquity. All the glorious attributions and honourable appellations and affectionate expressions which the Holy Ghost has bestowed upon true righteousness and holiness; all the beautiful similitudes and amiable comparisons which the Spirit of Truth has selected from the affluence of nature to adorn and exalt in the eyes of men, faith, love and hope, humility and purity, and earnest endeavour, attributes of the heart and mind,—all the gold and jewels and purple and fine linen are boldly carried out of the

sanctuary and borrowed for the nonce to deck out an image of regeneration, which is just so near to the real thing as a "mockery king of snow" to a living, breathing, governing monarch.

2. Is there anything dangerous to sincerity and earnestness of religious feeling, correctness and truthfulness in our habits of thought, and real practical regard for Scripture, which surely all men must *feel* to be the word of God more than any subsequent oracle, in thus abstracting from Righteousness the glowing robes with which Inspiration has invested her, and casting them around the shapeless body of Unconsciousness, soon in how many cases to be developed into the distorted form of Iniquity!

Not the righteous alone, not the constant, the noble-minded, the pure in heart, not these alone, as in Holy Writ, but the souls of the baptized *they* too are innocent, immaculate, pure, innoxious, acceptable, divinely endued!—*they* are clad in robes of snowy whiteness and raiment of light!—*they* glitter as dew-drops in the eye of the morning! *they* are bright as the wings of Seraphim, or "flames rising heavenward in sacrifice to God!" *

O vain expenditure! unhallowed waste!
Thus to bestow on the swathed infant heir
Full flowing robes, too large for him to wear!—
On his frail head, as if in mockery, placed
That crown with which the ample brows are graced
Of saints who, proud their Saviour's cross to bear,
His blessed steps pursue with ceaseless care,

* According to the Council of Trent the grace of baptism is *non solum per quam peccatorum fit remissio, sed divina qualitas in anima inhærens ac veluti splendor quidam et lux, quæ animarum nostrarum maculas omnes delet, ipsasque animas pulchriores et splendidiore reddi!*

Through arduous ways to do His bidding haste!
 Why should we give to the close-folded rose
 Those glowing tints that glad the gazer's eye?
 Soon shall it brightly blossom where it grows;
 Or, if at once transplanted to the sky,
 Such colours in that temperature disclose
 As here e'en light from heaven could ne'er supply.

The Infant soul is as a frozen lake,
 O'er which Heav'n smiles and playful breezes stray;
 It cannot smile as yet, nor lightly play,
 Nor of the skies one soft bright image take.
 But soon the slumbering waters are awake,
 Released from durance by the kindly ray;
 Then see it laugh beneath the eye of Day!
 Its lapsing bosom every breath can shake.
 Unconsciousness, our spirits' primal frost,
 Yields, "sure as day and night," to Pow'r supreme:
 How unlike that which not the fervid beam
 Of Love can melt, in souls for ever lost!—
 Amid that genial warmth self-frozen—grown
 No transient ice but undissolving stone!

CHAPTER XIII.

RELATION OF BAPTISM TO REGENERATION.

1. **B**UT what relation has Baptism to that general change of the soul, which we believe to be regeneration? Has the former a real connection with the latter, or is it only a sign and speaking representation of the New Birth? We hold it to be a sign, which has a real connection with the thing signified, not indeed an immediate—or an inevitable and indispensable connection—but still a real and a peculiar one. With Waterland we say that the office of Baptism is to grant or consign the Spirit unto a future gradual Regeneration; but we do not agree with Waterland, that this

grant is itself properly regeneration : if taken together with all that it symbolizes and was instituted to promote it may indeed be called so ; but, as distinguished from them, this baptismal consignment is surely not the new birth but only the instrument of it.

Adopting the language of Thorndike, without deciding in what sense he used it, we can say that Baptism grants to the baptized " the habitual assistance of God's Spirit," to take effect when the bodily instruments enable the soul to act as Christianity requireth." Thorndike afterwards calls this assistance of God's Spirit, " an habitual presence ;" and if by this expression he meant a spiritual infusion or a continuous actuation, or what Scripture calls *Christ living within us*, and this immediate upon baptism and its necessary effect, such a meaning we can by no means adopt : but as he carefully distinguishes the gift from a habit of virtue in the mind and a habit of grace in the mind, and as an internal spiritual gift cannot in reason be separated from either the one or the other, I think at least he *ought* to have meant by this constant presence, an attendancy of the Spirit upon the soul rather than a residence of the Spirit within the soul, a power granted to the soul, rather than a change of the soul itself. Such at least is the sense in which we use his words.

2. But there are some who say that the words " Baptism secures the assistance of the Spirit," convey to them no intelligible meaning. They understand what is meant by saying that Baptism spiritually changes the soul in a few seconds of time, without altering its moral nature ; but they do not understand what is meant by saying, that it grants the Spirit unto a future regeneration, and procures for the soul a special energy

of divine assistance. Yet they themselves affirm that, in virtue of the Sacrament, men have grace given them to repent of sins committed after baptism; and in so saying they assign to it what I believe to be its sole proper and immediate office,—the office of granting or giving a title to future operations of the Spirit.*

I think, if these objectors will but look fixedly into the doctrine which themselves are holding, it will teach them to understand that which they call so unintelligible. Their own doctrine is, that baptism does not operate itself upon the soul; but that the Spirit operates in or with Baptism. “Not as if there were any such virtue,” says Beveridge, “whereby it could regenerate us, but because this is the rite or ordinance appointed by Christ, wherein to regenerate us by His Holy Spirit; our regeneration is wholly the act of the Spirit of Christ.” What teacher of our Church would venture to deny that regeneration is wholly the act of the Spirit? Our opponents therefore agree with us, in supposing that Baptism only grants the Spirit unto regeneration: but *they* insist that in all cases, except that of unworthy adults, God regenerates the soul *at the time when the rite is administered*; whereas we say that Baptism “transmits effluxes to all the portions and periods of life.” It seems a strange thing, that they who talk about a mystical effect of Baptism, of which they themselves can give no account, should accuse us of dealing in the obscure, when we do but place in a clear light and consistently

* I think my Father ascribes as much to Baptism as is assigned to it really and truly by any scheme whatever, when he says that it consigns the Spirit to the soul “as protection and providence and as internal operation when those faculties are developed in and by which the Spirit co-operates.”

carry out a conception which lies at the bottom of their own doctrine. That the operations of the Holy Spirit should in any way be connected with or dependent on the application of an outward sign, or that more divine aid should be offered to the baptized than to the unbaptized, may seem strange to some; but this strangeness belongs not to one scheme of baptismal grace more than another.

3. Baptism secures the Spirit to the soul to be its guide and guardian and educator in holiness. But not only may the operations of the guide and guardian be frustrated: He may be repelled before He has operated at all. Christ may knock at the door without being admitted. It is this repulsion of the Divine Spirit and resistance to His attempts in which actual sin consists. But while He is thus *about* the soul, offering His aid, He certainly is not *within* it.

The Regenerative influence may be conceived as a wind breathing around that which may, or may not, bend beneath its breath; or as dew from heaven falling upon ground, that may or may not absorb the moisture. If the will can resist divine influence, not allowing itself to be influenced, if it can reject grace offered, and unless it could do this to sin were impossible, there must be applications, addresses to the soul of man, where no spiritual conversion, even partial and incipient, takes place. A change or affection of the soul is indeed produced by the very act of resistance; but that is a hardening of the will by itself, not a softening by the power of the Spirit. It is the office of Baptism, as we humbly conceive, to secure to the soul an extraordinary supply of these proffered aids, overtures and applications; *not merely outward means of grace or instrumentalities*, as some misapprehend our doctrine, but

direct attempts of the Spirit to operate upon the heart and mind of those, to whom this habitual assistance has been granted.

4. Is this a cold—a dry doctrine? Surely none will call it so, except those who are too intent upon exalting Baptism to care how they deal with Regeneration. Such accusers should reflect that, on the principles involved in this sentiment, the system of Rome is higher and warmer than that of the Anglican Church, the system of ancient Paganism far higher and warmer than either. They who think thus ought to regard Polytheism in a religious point of view as admiringly as Schiller in a poetical one; * for in that ancient system, more miraculous effects were ascribed to outward instruments, more honour done to sensible agents than in any system of Christianity: those

—gay religions full of pomp and gold,
Where devils were adored for deities,

furnished more material for the eye and ear and sensuous imagination, a more imposing array of worshipable objects than even Rome with all her train of Saints and her Regina Cœli is able to display. And what has the spirit of man gained by this shewy machinery? Why did the outward glories of Tabernacle and Temple with full directions for the forming of them belong to the Old Testament, while in the New far more is said of the Temple not made with hands, the human heart and mind, with large and particular instructions as to its building up and the style of its dedication?

5. There are some, who look upon Baptism as only a

* In his poem *Die Götter Griechenlands*.

sign of spiritual blessings, not a special and peculiar *instrument* of them. They hold that it is an impressive symbol, and as such of spiritual use by exciting the minds of Christians to a serious and fruitful contemplation of that great inward change which it represents. They believe it to be an occasion of prayer highly important to the Church; a publication of the entrance of a soul into the fold of Christ; and the assumption of a solemn pledge, which cannot but deeply affect the minds of those concerned when they come to years of reflection. They think that Baptism may be properly called a sacrament inasmuch as it is a sacred service conducive to religious thoughts and feelings—a visible preaching of the Gospel—a badge of union and brotherhood amongst the members of Christ's Body—a sign to all mankind of the existence of His kingdom upon earth. And I confess I can never agree with those who say that Baptism, if it is of no other use than this, is of no use, and ought to be discontinued. Such a view does not sever all spiritual efficiency from the sacrament, and as far as it goes, it is undoubtedly true. Baptism does answer all these ends—it does, as one among other means of teaching Christianity, perform an important office different from that of preaching though serving to the same end. But we suppose that it does all this and more than this. If it is the seal of the covenant it must convey the blessings of the covenant: it must consign to the soul the special protection of the Spirit.

6. On the other hand, holding as we do the views of Regeneration which have been described in this Essay, we can by no means admit that the New Birth of the soul is *confined to Baptism*. We cannot believe that it was even confined to the preaching of the Gospel, or

rather we believe that the Gospel was preached and the Spirit offered to the soul from the first, though since the day of grace in a far higher, fuller, deeper way than ever before. We cannot say that Baptism is *the* instrument of regeneration, though one which God may dispense with in certain cases; but we say, that it is appointed specially to promote regeneration, and, like all other ordinances of the Visible Church, is intended to further those blessed ends, which yet *were* in a certain way accomplished before the Visible Church was formed.

They who *confine* the New Birth to Baptism must needs *conform* the New Birth to Baptism: must frame to themselves a different conception of it from that which the language of Scripture, naturally interpreted, which reason and the spiritual mind supply. In these departures from the sure guidance of the word within and the word without, men are entangled in a web of inconsistencies and contradictory conception; they must, and they invariably do separate regeneration from renovation and inherent righteousness. Now renovation is not only "the intended and legitimate," it ought in all reason to be considered the proper, specific, and necessary effect of a new birth in the Spirit, if the idea of a new birth in the Spirit be taken in that deep and full sense which the words denote, not cramped, as it must be, when forced into the short bed of the momentaneous theory. But even if renovation be only the *legitimate and intended effect* of regeneration, how can we confine the new birth to Baptism? May not this characteristic effect, even by the express statements of those who adopt the views of Waterland, exist apart from Baptism—before it and without it? Dare we assert that there is either any

kind, or any amount of saving righteousness, the ground of which is laid wholly and exclusively in a ritual moment, and this by the terms of the New Covenant, if those terms are to be ascertained from Holy Writ? To say that Baptism is necessary to salvation, *where it can be had*, seems rather evasive. If any man may be renewed and glorified, in virtue of the eternal sacrifice, who misses Baptism by no fault of his own, then baptism is certainly not *necessary* to regeneration and salvation; and the saying amounts merely to this, that no man will be justified who wilfully neglects means of grace appointed by God.

7. Man passes from death unto life by acts of Will embracing proffered salvation; and this transition is "*the New Birth*," all on that side of it is Death, or at least not positive Life. Is the Soul born again into the realm of light and joy before the Will has received the Light that lighteth every man who finds the way to heaven?

Should we not stare to hear it affirmed, that a caterpillar is a butterfly, or a little dry brown seed a cluster of gorgeous blossoms, finer than Solomon in all his glory? Yet there is less difference betwixt the slow dull worm and the gay glancing insect, betwixt the dry seed and the glowing flower, than between a soul that is but baptismally regenerate, and that which has been really, internally, transformed by the renewing of the mind,—changed from glory to glory by the power of the Spirit, while it beholds with *open face* the glory of the Lord! For the caterpillar will surely become a butterfly, and, out of the seed, stem, leaf and blossom will surely arise, if outward conditions enable each to run its natural career. But alas! how many a soul has all the means and conditions of being

evolved into an immortal spirit, clad with light as with a garment, and with robes of righteousness, whereof the glories of Solomon's attire were but the faintest type, yet *will* not rise up out of its low grovelling estate,—its poverty and dryness!

A soul may be called, *by a figure*, regenerate, when it has received the grant of the Spirit unto regeneration in baptism—or, in a special way, a *potentiality* of new birth. But surely regeneration, in the proper and primary sense, is that which is actual and total, converting the soul, not that which is but potential, external to our spirit, and may never actually spiritualize the affections, and conform the Will, in the light of the Supreme Reason, to the Will of God.*

* It is with regret that for want of room, I withhold the remainder of the Treatise, especially the part which considers in detail the Scriptural evidence. It is my hope for a future edition to remodel the original Essay, and bring the whole subject within the compass of the volume in a better form than the present.



THE END.

