

# THOMAS AQUINAS

BY ≈ RUDOLF STEINER



# THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

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# THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

BY

RUDOLF STEINER

Three Lectures given in the Goetheanum, Dornach, at Whitsuntide, 1920.

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# PREFACE

IN this historic sketch of the life of thought in the Middle Ages, the author tries as far as possible in three short lectures to show how Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics of the twelfth century gave an impetus towards what in the twentieth century has come to be known as Spiritual Science, or Anthroposophy.

A system of thinking and a method of investigation, in order to be effective, must go forward with the requirements of the century, otherwise philosophy and religion lag behind and miss their object. The theories of Thomas Aquinas, which were intended to be progressive, have become the property of a mighty sect, and the method, instead of being an instrument for progress, becomes an impediment in the machine.

Rome, while glorifying Thomas Aquinas as a Church Father, has relegated his stupendous thought to a closed compartment only to be opened by those specially authorized. Rudolf Steiner puts him in the forefront of evolution, and, by Spiritual Science, endeavours to liberate him from the fetters of dogma.

THE EDITOR.

# *PART ONE*

# THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

# The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas

## I

## THOMAS AND AUGUSTINE

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I should like in these three days to speak on a subject which is generally looked at from a more formal angle, as if the attitude of the philosophic view of life to Christianity had been to a certain extent dictated by the deep philosophic movement of the Middle Ages. As this side of the question has lately had a kind of revival through Pope Leo XIII's Ordinance to his clergy to make " Thomism " the official philosophy of the Catholic Church, our present subject has a certain significance. But I do not wish to treat the subject which crystallized as mediæval philosophy round the personalities of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, only from this formal side ; rather I wish in the course of these days to reveal the deeper historical background out of which this philosophic movement, much underrated to-day, has arisen. We can say : Thomas Aquinas tries in the thirteenth century quite clearly

to grasp the problem of the total human knowledge of philosophies, and in a way which we have to admit is difficult for us to follow, for conditions of thought are attached to it which people to-day scarcely fulfil, even if they are philosophers. One must be able to put oneself completely into the manner of thought of Thomas Aquinas, his predecessors and successors ; one must know how to take their conceptions, and how their conceptions lived in the souls of those men of the Middle Ages, of which the history of philosophy tells only rather superficially.

If we look now at the central point of this study, at Thomas Aquinas, we would say : in him we have a personality which in face of the main current of mediæval Christian philosophy really disappears *as* a personality ; one which, we might almost say, is only the co-efficient or exponent of the current of world philosophy, and finds expression as a personality only through a certain universality. So that, when we speak of Thomism, we can focus our attention on something quite exceptionally impersonal, on something which is revealed only *through* the personality of Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand we see at once that we must put into the forefront of our inquiry a full and complete personality, and all that term includes, when we consider the individual who was the immediate and chief predecessor of Thomism, namely Augustine. With him everything was personal, with Thomas Aquinas everything was really impersonal. In Augustine we have to deal with a fighting man, in Thomas


*ALBERTUS MAGNUS*

Aquinas, with a mediæval Church defining its attitude to heaven and earth, to men, to history, etc., a Church which, we might say, expressed itself *as* a Church, within certain limitations it is true, *through* the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

A significant event separates the two, and unless one takes this event into consideration, it is not possible to define the mutual relationship of these mediæval individuals. The event to which I refer is the declaration of heresy by the Emperor Justinian against Origen. The whole direction of Augustine's view of the world becomes clear only when we keep in mind the whole historical background from which Augustine emerged. This historical background, however, becomes in reality, completely changed from the fact that the powerful influence—it was actually a powerful influence in spite of much that has been said in the history of philosophy—that this powerful influence on the Western world which had spread from the Schools of Philosophy in Athens, ceased to exist. It persisted into the sixth century, and then ebbed, but so that something remains which in fact, in the subsequent philosophical stream of the West, is quite different from that which Augustine knew in his lifetime. I shall have to ask you to take note that to-day's address is more in the nature of an introduction, that we shall deal to-morrow with the real nature of Thomism, and that on the third day I shall make clear my object in bringing before you all I have to say in these three days.

For you see, ladies and gentlemen, if you will excuse the personal reference, I am in rather a

special position with regard to Christian mediæval philosophy, that is, to Thomism. I have often mentioned, even in public addresses, what happened to me once when I had put before a working-class audience what I must look upon as the true course of Western history. The result was that though there were a good many pupils in agreement with me, the leaders of the proletarian movement at the turn of the century hit on the idea that I was not presenting true Marxism. And although one could assert that the world in future must after all recognize something like freedom in teaching, I was told at the final meeting : This party recognizes no freedom in teaching, only a rational compulsion ! And my activity as a teacher, in spite of the fact that at the time a large number of students from the proletariat had been attracted, was forced to a sudden and untimely end.

I might say I had the same experience in other places with what I wanted to say, now about nineteen or twenty years ago, concerning Thomism and everything that belonged to mediæval philosophy. It was of course just the time when what we are accustomed to call " Monism " reached its height, round the year 1900. At this time there was founded in Germany the " Giordano-Bruno-Bund " apparently to encourage a free, independent view of life, but *au fond* really only to encourage the materialistic side of Monism. Now, ladies and gentlemen, because it was impossible for me at the time to take part in all that empty phrase-making which went out into the world as Monism, I gave an address on Thomism in the Berlin " Giordano-Bruno-Bund ",

In this address I sought to prove that a real and spiritual Monism had been given in Thomism, that this spiritual Monism, moreover, had been given in such a way that it reveals itself through the most accurate thought imaginable, of which more recent philosophy, under the influence of Kant and Protestantism has at bottom not the least idea, and no longer the capacity to achieve it.

And so I fell foul also of Monism. It is, in point of fact, extraordinarily difficult to-day to speak of these things in such a way that one's word seems to be based sincerely on the matter itself and not to be in the service of some Party or other. I want in these three days to try once more to speak thus impartially of the matters I have indicated.

The personality of Augustine fits into the fourth and fifth centuries, as I said before, as a fighting personality in the fullest sense. His method of fighting is what sinks deep into the soul if we can understand in detail the particular nature of this fight. There are two problems which faced Augustine's soul with an intensity of which we, with our pallid problems of knowledge and of the soul, have really no idea.

The first problem can be put thus : Augustine strives to find the nature of what man can recognize as truth, supporting him, filling his soul. The second problem is this : How can you explain the presence of evil in a world which after all has no sense unless its purpose at least has something to do with good ? How can you explain the pricks of evil in human nature which never cease—according to Augustine's

view—the voice of evil which is never silent, even if a man strive honestly and uprightly after the good ?

I do not believe that we can get near to Augustine if we take these two questions in the sense in which the average man of our time, even if he were a philosopher, would be apt to take them. You must look for the special shade of meaning these questions had for a man of the fourth and fifth centuries. Augustine lived, after all, at first a life of inner commotion, not to say a dissipated life ; but always these two questions ran up before him. Personally he is placed in a dilemma. His father is a Pagan, his mother a pious Christian ; and she takes the utmost pains to win him for Christianity. At first the son can be moved only to a certain seriousness, and this is directed towards Manichaeism. We shall look later at this view of life, which early came into Augustine's range of vision, as he changed from a somewhat irregular way of living to a full seriousness of life. Then—after some years—he felt himself more and more out of sympathy with Manichaeism, and fell under the sway of a certain Scepticism, not driven by the urge of his soul or some other high reason, but because the whole philosophical life of the time led him that way. This Scepticism was evolved at a certain time from Greek philosophy, and remained to the day of Augustine. Now, however, the influence of Scepticism grew ever less and less, and was for Augustine, as it were, only a link with Greek philosophy. And this Scepticism led to something which without doubt exercised for a time a quite unusually deep influence on his subjectivity, and the whole

attitude of his soul. It led him into a Neoplatonism of a different kind from what in the history of philosophy is generally called Neoplatonism. Augustine got more out of this Neoplatonism than one usually thinks. The whole personality and the whole struggle of Augustine can be understood only when one understands how much of the neoplatonic philosophy had entered into his soul ; and if we study objectively the development of Augustine, we find that the break which occurred in going over from Manichaeism to Platonism was hardly as violent in the transition from Neoplatonism to Christianity. For one can really say : in a certain sense Augustine remained a Neoplatonist ; to the extent he became one at all he remained one. But he *could* become a Neoplatonist only up to a point. For that reason his destiny led him to become acquainted with the phenomenon of Christ-Jesus. And this is really not a big jump but a natural course of development in Augustine from Neoplatonism to Christianity. How this Christianity lives in Augustine—yes—how it lives in Augustine we cannot judge unless we look first at Manichaeism, a remarkable formula for overcoming the old heathenism at the same time as the Old Testament and Judaism.

Manichaeism was already at the time when Augustine was growing up a world-current of thought which had spread throughout North Africa, where, you must remember, Augustine spent his youth, and in which many people of Western Europe had been caught up. Founded in about the third century in Asia by Mani, a Persian, Manichaeism

had extraordinarily little effect historically on the subsequent world. To define this Manichaeism we must say this : there is more importance in the general attitude of this view of life than in what one can literally describe as its contents. Above all, the remarkable thing about it is that the division of human experience into a spiritual side and a material side had no meaning for it. The words or ideas " spirit " and " matter " mean nothing to it. Manichaeism sees as " spiritual " what appears to the senses as material and when it speaks of the spiritual it does not rise above what the senses know as matter.

It is true to say of Manichaeism—much more emphatically true than we with our world grown so abstract and intellectual usually think,—that it actually sees spiritual phenomena, spiritual facts in the stars and their courses, and that it sees at the same time in the mystery of the sun that which is manifest to us on earth as something spiritual. It conveys no meaning for Manichaeism to speak of either matter or spirit, for in it what is spiritual has its material manifestation and what is material is to it spiritual. Therefore, Manichaeism quite naturally speaks of astronomical things and world phenomena in the same way as it would speak of moral phenomena or happenings within the development of human beings. And thus this apposition of " Light " and " Darkness " which Manichaeism, imitating something from ancient Persia, embodies in its philosophy, is to it at the same time something completely and obviously spiritual. And it is also something obvious that this same Manichaeism still speaks of what apparently

moves as sun in the heavens as something which has to do with the moral entities and moral impulses in the development of mankind ; and that it speaks of the relation of this moral-physical sun in the heavens, to the Signs of the Zodiac as to the twelve beings through which the original being, the original source of light delegates its activities. But there is something more about this Manichaeism. It looks upon man and man does not yet appear to its eyes as what we to-day see in man. To us man appears as a kind of climax of creation on earth. Whether we think more or less in material or spiritual terms, man appears to man now as the crown of creation on earth, the kingdom of man as the highest kingdom or at least as the crown of the animal kingdom. Manichaeism cannot agree to this.

The thing which had walked the earth as man and in its time was still walking it, is to it only a pitiful remnant of that being which ought to have become man through the divine essence of light. Man should have become something entirely different from the man now walking the earth. The being now walking on earth as man was created through original man losing the fight against the demons of darkness, this original man who had been created by the power of light as an ally in its fight against the demons of darkness, but who had been transplanted into the sun by benevolent powers and had thus been taken up by the kingdom of light itself. But the demons have managed nevertheless to tear off as it were a part of this original man from the real man who escaped into the sun and to form the

earthly race of man out of it, the earthly race which thus walks about on earth as a weaker edition of that which could not live here, for it had to be removed into the sun during the great struggle of spirits. In order to lead back man, who in this way appeared as a weaker edition on earth, to his original destination the Christ-being then appeared and through its activity the demonic influences are to be removed from the earth.

I know very well, that all that part of this view of life which is still capable of being put into modern language, can hardly be intelligible; for the whole of it comes from substrata of the soul's experience which differ vastly from the present ones. But the important part which is interesting us to-day is what I have already emphasized. For however fantastic it may appear, this part I have been telling you about the continuation of the development on earth in the eyes of the Manichaeans—Manichaeism did not represent it at all as something only to be viewed in the spirit, but as a phenomenon which we would to-day call material, unfolding itself to our physical eyes as something at the same time spiritual.

That was the first powerful influence on Augustine, and the problems connected with the personality of Augustine can really only be solved if one bears in mind the strong influence of this Manichaeism, with its principle of the spiritual-material. We must ask ourselves : What was the reason for Augustine's dissatisfaction with Manichaeism ? It was not based on what one might call its mystical content as I have

just described it to you, but his dissatisfaction arose from the whole attitude of Manichaeism. At first Augustine was attracted, in a sense sympathetically moved by the physical self-evidence, by the pictorial quality with which this philosophy was presented to him ; but then something in him appeared which refused to be satisfied with this very quality which regarded matter spiritually and the spiritual materially. And one can come to the right conclusion about this only if one faces the real truth which often has been advanced as a formal view ; namely, if one considers that Augustine was a man who was fundamentally more akin to the men of the Middle Ages and even perhaps to the men of modern times than he could possibly be to those men who through their soul-mood were the natural inheritors of Manichaeism. Augustine has already something of what I would call the revival of spiritual life. In other places I have often pointed, even in public lectures, to what I mean. These present times are intellectual and inclined to the abstract, and so we always see in the history of any century the influences at work from the preceding century, and so on. In the case of an individual it is of course pure nonsense to say : something which happens in, let us say, his eighteenth year is only the consequence of something else which happened in his thirteenth or fourteenth year. In between lies something which springs from the deepest depths of human nature, which is not just the consequence of something that has gone before in the sense in which one is justified in speaking of cause and effect, but is rather some-

thing which is inherent in the nature of man, and takes place in human life, namely, adolescence. And such a gap has to be recognized also at other times in human evolution—in individual human evolution, when something struggles from the depths to the surface ; so that we cannot say : what happens is only the direct uninterrupted consequence of whatever has preceded it. And such gaps occur also in the case of all humanity. We have to assume that *before* such a gap Manichaeism occurred, and after such a gap occurred the soul-attitude, the soul-conception in which Augustine found himself. Augustine could simply not come to terms with his soul unless he rose above what a Manichaean called material-spiritual to something purely spiritual, something built and seen in the spiritual sphere ; Augustine had to rise to something much more free of the senses. So he had to turn away from the pictorial, the evidential philosophy of Manichaeism. This was the first thing that developed so intensively in his soul. We read it in his words : the heaviest and almost the only reason for error which I could not avoid was that I had to imagine a bodily substance when I wanted to think of God.

In this way he refers to the time when Manichaeism with its material spirituality and its spiritual materiality lived in his soul ; he refers to it in these words and characterizes this period of his life thus as an error. He needed something to look up to, something which was fundamental to human nature. He needed something which, unlike the Manichaean

principles, does not look upon the physical universe as spiritual-material. As everything with him struggled with intensive and overpowering earnestness to the surface of his soul, so also this saying : " I asked the earth and it said : ' I am not it,' and all things on it confessed the same."

What does Augustine ask ? He asks what the divine really is, and he asks the earth and it says to him, " I am not it." Manichaeism would have : " I am it as earth, in so far as the divine expresses itself through earthly works." And again Augustine says : " I asked the sea and the abysses and whatever living thing they cover : " " We are not your God, seek above us." " I asked the sighing winds," and the whole nebula with all its inhabitants said : " The philosophers who seek the nature of things in us were mistaken, for we are not God."

(Thus not the sea and not the nebula, nothing in fact which can be observed through the senses.)

" I asked the sun, the moon, and the stars." They said : " We are not God whom thou seekest."

Thus he gropes his way out of Manichaeism, precisely out of that part of it which must be called its most significant part, at least in this connection. Augustine gropes after something spiritual which is free of all sensuousness. And in this he finds himself exactly in that era of human soul-development in which the soul had to free itself from the contemplation of matter as something spiritual and of the spiritual as something material. We entirely misunderstand Greek philosophy in reference to this. And because I tried for once to describe Greek

philosophy as it really was, the beginning of my "*Riddles of Philosophy*" seems so difficult to understand. When the Greeks speak of ideas, of conceptions, when Plato speaks of them, people now believe that Plato or the Greeks mean the same by ideas as we do. This is not so, for the Greeks spoke of ideas as something which they observed in the outer world like colours or sounds. That part of Manichaeism which we find slightly changed, with—let us say—an oriental tinge, that is already present in the whole Greek view of life. The Greek sees his idea just as he sees colours. And he still possesses that material-spiritual, spiritual-material life of the soul, which does not rise to what we know as spiritual life. Whatever we may call it, a mere abstraction or the true content of our soul, we need not decide at the present moment; the Greek does not yet reckon with what we call a life of the soul free from matter; he does not distinguish, as we do, between thinking and outward use of the senses. The whole Platonic philosophy ought to be seen in this light to be fully understood.

We can now say, that Manichaeism is nothing but a post-Christian variation (with an oriental tinge) of something already existing among the Greeks. Neither do we understand that wonderful genius who closes the circle of Greek philosophy, Aristotle, unless we know that whenever he speaks of concepts, he still keeps within the meaning of an experienced tradition which regarded concepts as belonging to the outer world of the senses as well as perceptions, though he is already getting close to the border of understanding abstract thought free from all evi-

dence of the senses. Through the point of view to which men's souls had attained during his era, through actual events happening within the souls of men in whose rank Augustine was a distinctive, prominent personality, Augustine was forced not just only to experience within his soul, as the Greeks had done, but he was forced to rise to thoughts free from sense-perceptions, to thoughts which still kept their meaning even if they were not dealing with earth, air and sea, with stars, sun and moon ; thoughts which had a content beyond the sense of vision.

And now only philosophers and philosophies spoke to him which spoke of what they had to say from an entirely different point of view, that is, from the super-spiritual one just explained. Small wonder, then, that these souls striving in a vague way for something not yet in existence and trying with their minds to seize what was there, could only find something they could not absorb ; small wonder that these souls sought refuge in scepticism. On the other hand, the feeling of standing on a sound basis of truth and the desire to get an answer to the question of the origin of Evil was so strong in Augustine, that equally powerful in his soul lived that philosophy which stands under the name of Neoplatonism at the end of Greek philosophic development. This is focused in Plotinus and reveals to us historically what neither the Dialogues of Plato and still less Aristotelian philosophy can reveal, namely, the course of the whole life of the soul when it looks for a greater intensiveness and a reaching beyond the

normal. Plotinus is like a last straggler of a type which followed quite different paths to knowledge, to the inner life of the soul, from those which were gradually understood later. Plotinus must appear fantastic to present-day men. To those who have absorbed something of mediæval scholasticism Plotinus must appear as a terrible fanatic, indeed, as a dangerous one.

I have noticed this repeatedly. My old friend Vincenz Knauer, the Benedictine monk, who wrote a history of philosophy and who has also written a book about the chief problems of philosophy from Thales to Hamerling was, I may well say, good-nature incarnate. This man never let himself go except when he had to deal with Neoplatonism, in particular with Plotinus, and he would then get quite angry and would denounce Plotinus terribly as a dangerous fanatic. And Brentano, that intelligent Aristotelian and Empiric, Franz Brentano, who also carried mediæval philosophy deeply and intensely in his soul, wrote a little book : *Philosophies that Create a Stir*, and there he fumes about Plotinus in the same way, for Plotinus the dangerous fanatic is the philosopher, the man who in his opinion " created a stir " at the close of the ancient Greek period. To understand him is really extraordinarily difficult for the modern philosopher.

Concerning this philosopher of the third century we have next to say this : What we experience as the content of our understanding, of our reason, what we know as the sum of our concepts about the world

is entirely different for him. I might say, if I may express myself clearly : we understand the world through sense-observations which through abstraction we bring to concepts, and end there. We have the concepts as inner psychic experience and if we are average men of to-day we are more or less conscious that we have abstractions, something we have sucked as it were out of things. The important thing is that we end there ; we pay attention to the experiences of the senses and stop at the point where we make the total of our concepts, of our ideas. It was not so for Plotinus. For him this whole world of sense-experience scarcely existed. But that which meant something to him, of which he spoke as we speak of plants and minerals and animals and physical men, was something which he saw lying above concepts ; it was a spiritual world and this spiritual world had for him a nether boundary, namely, the concepts. While we get our concepts by going to concrete things, make them into abstractions and concepts and say : concepts are the putting-together, the extractions of ideal nature from the observation of the senses, Plotinus said—and he paid little heed to the observation of the senses : " We, as men, live in a spiritual world, and what this spiritual world reveals to us finally, what we see as its nether boundary, are concepts." For us the world of the senses lies *below* concepts : for Plotinus there is *above* concepts a spiritual world, the intellectual world, the world really of the kingdom of the spirit. I might use the following image : let us suppose we were submerged in the sea, and

looking upward to the surface of the water, we saw nothing but this surface, nothing above the surface, then this surface would be the upper boundary. Suppose we lived in the sea, we might perhaps have in our soul the feeling : This boundary would be the limit of our life-element, in which we are, if we were organized as sea-beings. But for Plotinus it was not so. He took no notice of the sea round him ; but the boundary which he saw, the boundary of the concept-world in which his soul lived, was for him the *nether* boundary of something *above* it ; just as if we were to take the boundary of the water as the boundary of the atmosphere and the clouds and so on. At the same time this sphere above concepts is for Plotinus what Plato calls the " world of ideas ", and Plotinus throughout imagines that he is continuing the true genuine philosophy of Plato. This " idea-world " is, first of all, completely a world of which one speaks in the sense of Plotinism. Surely it would not occur to you, even if you were Subjectivists or followers of the modern Subjectivist philosophy, when you look out upon the meadow, to say : I have my meadow, you have yours, and so and so has his meadow ; even if you are convinced that you each have only before you the image of a meadow, you speak of the meadow in the singular, of one meadow which is out there. In the same way Plotinus speaks of the one idea-world, not of the idea-world of *this* mind, or of another or of a third mind. In *this* idea-world—and this we see already in the whole manner in which one has to characterize the thought-process leading to this

idea-world—in this idea-world the soul has a part. So we may say : The soul, the Psyche, unfolds itself out of the idea-world and experiences it. And the Soul, just as the idea-world creates the Psyche, in its turn creates the matter in which it is embodied. So that the lower material from which the Psyche takes its body is chiefly a creation of this Psyche.

But precisely there is the origin of individuation, there the Psyche, which otherwise takes part in the single idea-world, becomes a part of body A, and body B, and so on, and through this fact there appear, for the first time, individual souls. It is just as if I had a great quantity of liquid in one mass, and having taken twenty glasses had filled each with the liquid, so that I have this liquid, which as such is a unity, thus divided, just so I have the Psyche in the same condition, because it is incorporated in bodies which, however, it has itself created. Thus in the Plotinistic sense a man can view himself according to his exterior, his vessel. But that is at bottom only the way in which the soul reveals itself, in which the soul also becomes individualized. Afterward man has to experience within him his very own soul, which raises itself upward to the idea-world. Still later there comes a higher form of experience. That one should speak of abstract concepts—that has no meaning for a Plotinist ; for such abstract concepts—well, a Plotinist would have said : " What do you mean—abstract concepts ? Concepts surely cannot be abstract : they cannot hang in the air, they must be suspended from the

spirit ; they must be the concrete revelations of the spiritual."

The interpretation therefore that ideas are any kind of abstractions, is therefore wrong. This is the expression of an intellectual world, a world of spirituality. It is also what existed in the ordinary experience of those men out of whose relationships Plotinus and his fellows grew. For them such talk about concepts, in the way we talk about them, had absolutely no meaning, because for them there was only a penetration of the spiritual world into souls. And this concept-world is found at the limit of this penetration, in experiencing. Only when we went deeper, when we developed the soul further, only then there resulted something which the ordinary man could not know, which the man experienced who had attained a higher stage. He then experienced that which was above the idea-world—the One, if you like to call it so—the experience of the *One*. This was for Plotinus the thing that was unattainable to concepts, just because it was above the world of concepts, and could only be attained if one could sink oneself into oneself without concept, a state we describe here in our spiritual science as Imagination. You can read about it in my book, *Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and How to Attain It*. But there is this difference : I have treated the subject from the modern point of view, whereas Plotinus treated it from the old. What I there call the Imagination is just that which, according to Plotinus stands *above* the idea-world.

From this general view of the world Plotinus really

also derived all his knowledge of the human soul. It is, after all, practically contained in it. And one can be an individualist in the sense of Plotinus if one is at the same time a human being who recognizes how man raises his life upwards to something which is above all individuality, to something spiritual ; whereas in our age we have more the habit of reaching downwards to the things of the senses. But all this which is the expression of something which a thorough scientist regards as fanaticism, all this is in the case of Plotinus, not something thought out, these are no hypotheses of his. This perception—right up to the One which only in exceptional cases could be attained—this perception was as clear to Plotinus and as obvious, as is for us to-day the perception of minerals, plants and animals. He spoke only in the sense of something which really was directly experienced by the soul when he spoke of the soul, of the Logos, which was part of the Nous, of the idea-world and of the One. For Plotinus the whole world was, as it were, a spirituality—again a different shade of philosophy from the Manichaean and from the one Augustine pursued. Manichaeism recognizes a sense-supersense ; for it the words and concepts of matter and spirit have as yet no meaning. Augustine strives to reach a spiritual experience of the soul that is free from the sense and to escape from his material view of life. For Plotinus the whole world is spiritual, things of the senses do not exist. For what appears material is only the lowest method of revealing the spiritual. All is spirit, and if we

only go deep enough into things, everything is revealed as spirit.

This is something which Augustine could not accept. Why ? Because he had not the necessary point of view. Because he lived in his age as a predecessor—for if I might call Plotinus a " follower " of the ancient times in which one held such philosophic views,—though he went on into the third century,—Augustine was a predecessor of those people who could no longer feel and perceive that there was a spiritual world *underneath* the idea-world. He just did not see that any more. He could only learn it by being told. He might hear that people said it was so, and he might develop a feeling that there was something in it which was a human road to truth. That was the dilemma in which Augustine stood in relation to Plotinism. But he was never completely diverted from searching for an inner understanding of this Plotinism. However this philosophical point of view did not open itself to him. He only guessed : in this world there must be something. But he could not fight his way to it.

This was the mood of his soul when he withdrew himself into a lonely life, in which he got to know the Bible and Christianity, and later the sermons of Ambrosius and the Epistles of St. Paul ; and this was the mood of his soul which finally brought him to say : " The nature of the world which Plotinus sought at first in the nature of the idea-world of the Nous, or in the One, which one can attain only in specially favourable conditions of soul, why ! that

has appeared in the body on earth, in human form, through Christ-Jesus." That leapt at him as a conviction out of the Bible : " Thou hast no need to struggle upward to the One, thou needest but look upon that which the historical tradition of Christ-Jesus interprets. There is the One come down from heaven, and is become man." And Augustine exchanges the philosophy of Plotinus for the Church. He expresses this exchange clearly enough. For instance, when he says, " Who could be so blind as to say : ' The Apostolic Church merits no Faith ', " the church which is so faithful and supported by so many brotherly agreements that it has transmitted their writings as conscientiously to those that come after, as it has kept their episcopal sees in direct succession down to the present Bishops. This it is on which Augustine, out of the soul-mood described, laid the chief stress :—that, if one only goes into it, it can be shown in the course of centuries that there were once men who knew the Lord's disciples, and here is a continuous tradition of a sort worthy of belief, that there appeared on earth the very thing which Plotinus knew how to attain in the way I have indicated.

And now there arose in Augustine the effort, in so far as he could get to the heart of it, to make use of this Plotinism to comprehend that which had through Christianity been opened to his feeling and his inner perception. He actually applied the knowledge he had through Plotinism to understand Christianity and its meaning. Thus, for example, he transposed the concept of the One. For Plotinus

the One was something experienced ; for Augustine who could not attain this experience, the One became something which he defined with the abstract term " being " ; the idea-world, he defined with the abstract concept " knowing ", and Psyche with the abstract concept " living ", or even " love ". We have the best evidence that Augustine proceeded thus in that he sought to comprehend the spiritual world, with neoplatonic and Plotinistic concepts, that there is above men a spiritual world, out of which the Christ descends. The Trinity was something which Plotinism made clear to Augustine, the three persons of the Trinity, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost.

| | |
|---|---|
| .....Being. | Trinity. |
| One. | |
| ..... | |
| Idea-world.....knowing. | |
| Psyche.....living – love. | |
| Individuation. | |

And if we were to ask seriously, of what was Augustine's soul full, when he spoke of the Three Persons—we must answer : It was full of the knowledge derived from Plotinus. And this knowledge he carried also into his understanding of the Bible. We see how it continues to function. For this Trinity awakens to life again, for example, in Scotus Erigena, who lived at the court of Charles the Bald in the ninth century, and who wrote a book on the divisions and classification of Nature in which we

still find a similar Trinity : Christianity interprets its content from Plotinism.

But what Augustine preserved from Plotinism in a specially strong degree was something that was fundamental to it.

You must remember that man, since the Psyche reaches down into the material as into a vessel, is really the only earthly individuality. If we ascend slightly into higher regions, to the divine or the spiritual, where the Trinity originates, we have no longer to do with individual man, but with the species, as it were, with humanity. We no longer direct our visualization in this bald manner towards the whole of humanity, as Augustine did as a result of his Plotinism. Our modern concepts are against it. I might say : Seen from down there, men appear as individuals ; seen from above—if one may hypothetically say that—all humanity appears as one unity. From this point of view the whole of humanity became for Plotinus concentrated in Adam. Adam was all humanity. And since Adam sprang from the spiritual world he was as a being bound with the earth, which had free will, because in him there lived that which was still above, and not that which arises from error of matter—itself incapable of sin. It was impossible for this man who was first Adam to sin or not to be free, and therefore also impossible to die. Then came the influence of that Satanic being, whom Augustine felt as the enemy-spirit. It tempted and seduced the man. He fell into the material, and with him all humanity.

Augustine stands, with what I might call his derived knowledge, right in the midst of Plotinism. The whole of humanity is for him one, and it sinned in Adam as a whole, not as an individual. If we look clearly between the lines particularly of Augustine's last writings, we see how extraordinarily difficult it has become for him thus to regard the whole of mankind, and the possibility that the whole fell into sin. For in him there is already the modern man, the predecessor as opposed to the successor ; there lived in him the individual man who felt that individual man grew ever more and more responsible for what he did, and what he learnt. At certain moments it appeared to him impossible to feel that individual man is only a member of the whole of the human race. But Neo-Platonism and Plotinism were so deep in him that he still could look only at the whole of humanity. And so this condition in the whole man, this condition of sin and mortality—was transferred into that of the impossibility to be free, the impossibility to be immortal ; all humanity had thus fallen, had been diverted from its origin. And God, were He righteous, would have simply thrown humanity aside. But He is not only righteous, He is also merciful—so Augustine felt. Therefore, he decided to save a part of mankind, note well, a part. That is to say, God's decision destined a part of mankind to receive grace, whereby this part is to be led back from the condition of bondage and mortality to the condition of potential freedom and immortality, which, it is true, can only be realized after death. One part is re-

stored to this condition. The other part of mankind —namely, the not-chosen—remains in the condition of sin. So mankind falls into these two divisions, into those that are chosen and those who are cast out. And if we regard humanity in this Augustinian sense, it falls simply into these two divisions : those who are destined for bliss without desert, simply because it is so ordained in the divine management, and those who, whatever they do, cannot attain grace, who are predetermined and predestined to damnation.

This view, which also goes by the name of Predestination, Augustine reached as a result of the way in which he regarded the whole of humanity. If it had sinned it deserved the fate of that part of humanity which was cast out. We shall speak to-morrow of the terrible spiritual battles which have resulted from this Predestination, how Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism grew out of it. But to-day I would add as a final remark : we now see how Augustine stands, a vivid fighting personality, between that view which reaches upward toward the spiritual, according to which humanity becomes a whole, and the urge in his soul to rise above human individuality to something spiritual which is free from material nature, but which, again, can have its origin only in individuality. This was just the characteristic feature of the age of which Augustine is the forerunner, that it was aware of something unknown to men in the old days—namely individual experience. To-day, after all, we accept a great deal as formula. But Klopstock was in earnest and not

merely the maker of a phrase when he began his " Messiah " with the words : " Sing, immortal soul, of sinful man's salvation ". Homer began, equally sincerely : " Sing, O Goddess, of the wrath. . . ." : or " Sing, O Muse, to me now of the man, far-travelled Odysseus". These people did not speak of something that exists in individuality, they interpreted something of universal mankind, a race-soul, a Psyche. It is no empty phrase, when Homer lets the Muse sing, in place of himself. The feeling of individuality awakens later, and Augustine is one of the first of those who really feel the individual entity of man, with its individual responsibility. Hence, the dilemma in which he lived. The individual striving after the non-material spiritual was part of his own experience. There was a personal, subjective struggle in him. In later times that understanding of Plotinism, which it was still possible for Augustine to have, was—I might say—choked up. And after the Greek philosophers, the last followers of Plato and Plotinus, were compelled to go into exile in Persia, and after they had found their successors in the Academy of Jondishapur, this looking up to the spiritual triumphed in Western Europe—and only that remained which Aristotle had bequeathed to the after-world in the form of a filtered Greek philosophy, and then only in a few fragments. That continued to grow, and came in a roundabout way, *via* Arabia, back to Europe. This had no longer a consciousness of the idea world, and no Plotinism in it. And so the great question remained : Man must extract from himself the spiritual ; he must produce

the spiritual as an abstraction. When he sees lions and thereupon conceives the thought " lions ", when he sees wolves and thereupon conceives the thought " wolves ", when he sees man and thereupon conceives the thought " man ", these concepts are alive only in him, they arise out of his individuality. The whole question would have had no meaning for Plotinus; now it begins to have a meaning, and moreover a deep meaning.

Augustine, by means of the light Plotinism had shed into his soul, could understand the mystery of Christ-Jesus. Such Plotinism as was there was choked up. With the closing by the Emperor Justinian of the School of Philosophy at Athens in 529 the living connection with such views was broken off. Several people have felt deeply the idea : We are told of a spiritual world, by tradition, in Script— we experience by our individuality supernatural concepts, concepts that are removed from the material *How are these concepts related to " being " ? How to the nature of the world ? What we take to be concepts, are these only something spontaneous in us, or have they something to do with the outer world ?* In such forms the questions appeared ; in the most extreme abstractions, but such as were the deeply earnest concern of men and the mediæval Church. In this abstract form, in this inner-heartedness they appeared in the two personalities of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Then again, they came to be called the questions between Realism and Nominalism. " *What is our relationship to a world of which all we know is from conceptions which can come only from ourselves*

*and our individuality?* That was the great question which the mediæval schoolmen put to themselves.

If you consider what form Plotinus had taken in Augustine's predestinationism, you will be able to feel the whole depth of this scholastic question : only a part of mankind, and that only through God's judgment, could share in grace, that is, attain to bliss ; the other part was destined to eternal damnation from the first, in spite of anything it might do. But what man could gain for himself as the content of his knowledge came from that concept, that awful concept of Predestination which Augustine had not been able to transform—that came out of the idea of human individuality. For Augustine mankind was a whole ; for Thomas each separate man was an individuality.

How does this great World-process in Predestination as Augustine saw it hang together with the experience of separate human individuality ? What is the connection between that which Augustine had really discarded and that which the separate human individuality can win for itself? For consider : Because he did not wish to lay stress on human individuality, Augustine had taken the teaching of Predestination, and, for mankind's own sake, had extinguished human individuality. Thomas Aquinas had before him only the individual man, with his thirst for knowledge. Thomas had to seek human knowledge and its relationship to the world in the very thing Augustine had excluded from his study of humanity.

It is not sufficient, ladies and gentlemen, to put

such a question abstractly and intellectually and rationally ; it is necessary to grasp such a question with the whole heart, with the whole human personality. Only then shall we be able to assess the weight with which this question oppressed those men who, in the thirteenth century, bore the burden of it.

## II

## THE ESSENCE OF THOMISM

THE point I tried yesterday particularly to emphasize was that in the spiritual development of the West, which found its expression ultimately in the Schoolmen, not only is a part played by what we can grasp in abstract concepts, and what happened, as it were, in abstract concepts, and in a development of abstract thoughts, but rather that behind it all, there stands a real development of the impulses of Western mankind. What I mean is this : we can first of all, as happens mostly in the history of philosophy, direct our eyes on to what we find in each philosopher ; we can follow how the ideas, which we find in a philosopher of the sixth, seventh, eighth or ninth century are further developed by philosophers of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries ; and from such a review we can get the impression that one thinker has taken over the ideas from another, and that we are in the presence of a certain evolution of ideas. This is an historical review of spiritual life which had gradually to be abandoned. For what takes place there, what

so to speak is revealed by the individual human souls, is merely a symptom of something deeper which lies behind the scenes of the outer events ; and this something which was going on already a few centuries before Christianity was founded, and continued in the first centuries A.D. up to the time of the Schoolmen, is an entirely organic process in the development of Western humanity. And unless we take this organic process into account, it is as impossible to get an explanation of it, as we could of the period of human development between the ages of twelve to twenty, if we do not consider the important influence of those forces which are connected with adolescence, and which at this time rise to the surface from the deeps of human nature. In the same way out of the depth of the whole great organism of European humanity there surges up something which can be defined—there are other ways of definition,—but which I will define by saying : Those ancient poets spoke honestly and sincerely, who, like Homer, for instance, began their epic poems : " Sing to me, Goddess, of the wrath of Achilles ", or " Sing to me, O Muse, of the much-travelled man ". These people did not wish to make a phrase, they found as an inner fact of their consciousness, that it was not a single, individual Ego that wanted to express itself, but what in fact they felt to be a higher spiritual-psychic force which plays a part in the ordinary conscious condition of man. And again—I mentioned it yesterday—Klopstock was right and saw this fact to a certain extent, even if only unconsciously, when he began his " Messiah Poem "—

not " Sing, O Muse ", or " Sing, O Goddess, of man's redemption ", but when he said " Sing, immortal Soul. . . ." In other words, " Sing, thou individual being, that livest in each man as an individuality." When Klopstock wrote his " Messiah ", this feeling of individuality in each soul was, it is true, fairly widespread. But this inner urge, to bring out the *individuality*, to shape an *individual* life, grew up most pronouncedly in the age between the foundation of Christianity and the higher Scholasticism. We can see only the merest surface-reflection in the thoughts of the philosophers of what was taking place in the depths of all human beings—the individualization of the consciousness of European people. And an important thing in the spread of Christianity throughout these centuries is the fact that the leaders of its propagation had to address themselves to a humanity which strove more and more, from the depth of its being, towards an inner feeling of human individuality.

We can understand the separate events that occurred in this epoch only by keeping this point of view before us. And only thus can we understand what battles took place in the souls of such people who, in the profundity of the human soul, wanted to dispute with Christianity on the one side and philosophy on the other, like Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. The authors of the usual histories of philosophy to-day have understood so little of the true form of these soul-battles which had their culmination in Albertus and Thomas, that this epoch is only approximately clearly depicted in their

histories. There are many things to consider in the soul-life of Albertus and Thomas.

Superficially it looks as if Albertus Magnus, who lived from the twelfth into the thirteenth century, and Thomas, who lived in the thirteenth, had wished only to harmonize dialectically Augustinism, of which we spoke yesterday, on the one hand, and Aristotelianism on the other. One was the bearer of the church ideas, the other of the modified philosophical ideas. The attempt to find assonance between them runs, it is true, like a thread through everything either wrote. But there was in everything which thus became fixed in thoughts as in a flowering of Western feeling and will, a great deal which did not survive into the period which stretches from the fifteenth century into our own day, a period from which we have drawn our customary ideas for all sciences and for the whole of our daily life.

The man of to-day finds it really paradoxical when he hears what we heard yesterday of Augustine's beliefs ; that Augustine actually believed that a part of mankind was from the beginning destined to receive God's grace without earning it—for really after original sin all must perish—to receive God's grace and be spiritually saved ; and that another part of mankind must be spiritually lost—no matter what it does. To a modern man this paradox appears perhaps meaningless. But if you can get the feeling of that age in which Augustine lived, in which he absorbed all those ideas and influences I described yesterday, you will think differently. You will feel that it is possible to understand that

Augustine wanted to hold on to the thoughts which, as contained in the ancient philosophies, did not take the individual man into consideration ; for they, under the influence of such ideas as those of Plotinus, which I outlined yesterday, had in their minds nothing but the idea of universal mankind. And you must remember that Augustine was a man who stood in the midst of the battle between the thought which regarded mankind as a unity, and the thought which was trying to crystallize the individuality of man out of this unified mankind. But in Augustine's soul there also surged the impulse towards individuality. For this reason these ideas take on such significant aspects—significant of soul and heart ; for this reason they are so full of human experience, and Augustine becomes the intensely sympathetic figure which makes so great an impression if we turn our eyes back to the centuries which preceded Scholasticism.

After Augustine, therefore, there survived for many—but only in his ideas—those links which held together the individual man as Christian with his Church. But these ideas, as I explained them to you yesterday, could not be accepted by those Western people who rejected the idea of taking the whole of humanity as one unity, and feeling themselves as it were only a member in it, moreover a member which belongs to that part of humanity whose lot is destruction and annihilation.

And so the Church saw itself compelled to snatch at a way out. Augustine still conducted his gigantic fight against Pelagius, the man who was already filled

with the individuality-impulse of the West. This was the person in whom, as a contemporary of Augustine, we can see how the sense of individuality such as later centuries had it, appears in advance. So he can only say : There is no question but that man must remain entirely without participation in his destiny in the material-spiritual world. The power by which the soul finds the connection with that which raises it from the entanglements of the flesh to the serene spiritual regions, where it can find its release and return to freedom and immortality—this power must be born of man's individuality itself. This was the point which Augustine's opponents stressed, that each man must find for himself the power to overcome inherited sin. The Church stood half-way between the two opponents, and sought a solution. There was much discussion concerning this solution—all the pros and cons, as it were—and then they took the middle way—and I can leave it to you to judge if in this case it was the golden or the copper mean—at any rate they took the middle way : semi-Pelagianism. A formula was found which was really neither black nor white, to this effect : It is as Augustine has said, but not quite as Augustine has said ; nor is it quite as Pelagius has said, though in a certain sense, it is as he has said. And so one might say, that it is not through a wise divine judgment, that some are condemned to sin and others to grace, but that the matter is this, that it is a case not of a divine pre-judgment, but of a divine prescience. The divine being knows beforehand if one man is to be a sinner or the other filled with grace. At the

same time no further attention was paid, when this dogma was agreed, to the fact that at bottom it is in no way a question of prescience but rather a question of taking a definite stand, whether individual man is able to join with those powers in his individual soul-life which raise him up out of his separation from the divine-spiritual being of the world and which can lead him back to it.

In this way the question really remains unsolved. And I might say that, compelled on one side to recognize the dogmas of the Church but on the other filled from deepest sensibility with profound respect for the greatness of Augustine, Albertus and Thomas stood face to face with what came to be the Western development of the spirit within the Christian movement. And yet several things from earlier times left their influence. One can see them, for instance, when one looks carefully at the souls of Albertus and of Thomas, but one realizes also that theythemselves were not quite conscious of it ; that they enter into their thoughts, but that they themselves cannot bring them to a precise expression. We must consider this, ladies and gentlemen, more in respect of this time of the high Scholasticism of Albertus and Thomas, we must consider it more than we would have to consider a similar phenomenon, for instance, in our day. I have permitted myself to stress the " Why ? " in my *Welt-und Lebensanschauung des* 19 *Jahrhundert*,—and it was further developed in my book *Die Rätzee der Philosophie*, where the proposition was put in another way so that the particular passage was not repeated, if I may be allowed to say

so. This means—and it will occupy us in detail tomorrow, I will only mention it now—this means that from this upward-striving of individuality among the thinkers who studied philosophically that in these thinkers we get the highest flowering of logical judgment ; we might say the highest flowering of logical technique.

Ladies and gentlemen, one can quarrel as one will about this or that party-standpoint on the question of Scholasticism—all this quarrelling is as a rule grounded on very little real understanding of the matter. For whoever has a sense of the manner quite apart from the subjective content in which the accuracy of the thought is revealed in the course of a scientific explanation—or anything else ; whoever has a sense of appreciating how things that hang together are thought out together, which must be thought out together if life is to have any meaning ; whoever has a sense of all this, and of several other things, realizes that thought was never so exact, so logically scientific, either before or afterwards as in the age of high Scholasticism. This is just the important thing, that pure thought so runs with mathematical certainty from idea to idea, from judgment to judgment, from conclusion to conclusion, that these thinkers account to themselves for the smallest, even the tiniest, step. We have only to remember in what surroundings this thinking took place. It was not a thinking that took place as it now takes place in the noisy world ; rather its place was in the quiet cloister cell or otherwise far from the busy world. It was a thinking that absorbed a

thought-life, and which could also, through other circumstances, formulate a pure thought-technique. It is to-day as a matter of fact difficult to do this ; for scarcely do we seek to give publicity to such a thought-activity which has no other object than to array thought upon thought according to their content, than the stupid people come, and the illogical people raise all sorts of questions, interject their violent partisanship, and, seeing that one is after all a human being among human beings, we have to make the best of these things which are, in fact, no other than brutal interruptions, which often have nothing whatever to do with the subject in question. In these circumstances that inner quiet is very soon lost to which the thinkers of the twelfth or thirteenth centuries could devote themselves, who did not have to yield so much to the opposition of the uneducated in their social life.

This and other things called forth in this epoch that wonderfully plastic but also finely-outlined thought-activity which distinguishes Scholasticism and for which people like Augustine and Thomas consciously strove.

But now think of this : on the one side are demands of life which appear as if one had to do with dogmas that have not been made clear, which in a great number of cases resembled the semi-Pelagianism already described ; and as if one fought in order to uphold what one believed ought to be upheld, because the Church justifiably had set it up ; and as if one wanted to maintain this with the most subtle thought. Just imagine what it means to light up

with the most subtle thought something of the nature of what I have described to you as Augustinism. One must look closely into the inside of scholastic effort and not only attempt to characterize this continuity from the Patristic age to the age of the Schoolmen from the threads of concepts which one has picked up. These spirits of High Scholasticism did a great deal half unconsciously and we can really only understand it, if we consider, looking beyond what I already described yesterday, such a figure as that which entered half mysteriously from the sixth century into European spiritual life and which became known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. To-day, because time is too short I cannot enter into all the disputes on the question of whether there is any truth in the view that these writings were first made in the sixth century, or whether the other view is right which ascribes at any rate the traditional element of these writings to a much earlier time. All that is after all not important, but the important thing is, that the philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite was available for the thinkers of the seventh and eighth centuries right up to the time of Thomas Aquinas, and that these writings throughout have a Christian tinge and contain in a special form that which I yesterday defined as Plotinism, as the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. And it had become particularly important for the Christian thinkers of the outgoing old world and the beginning of the Middle Ages up to the time of High Scholasticism, what attitude the author of the Dionysius writings took to the uprising of the

human soul till it achieved a view of the divine. This Dionysius is generally described as if he had two paths to the divine ; and as a matter of fact there are two. One path requires the following : if man wishes to raise himself from the external things which surround him in the world to the divine, he must attempt to extract from all those things their perfections, their nature ; he must attempt to go back to absolute perfection, and must be able to give a name to absolute perfection in such a way that he has a content for this divine perfection which in its turn can reveal itself and can bring forth the separate things of the world by means of individualization and differentiation. So I would say, for Dionysius divinity is that being which must be given names to the greatest extent, which must be labelled with the most superlative terms which one can possibly find amongst all the perfections of the world ; take all those, give them names and then apply them to the divinity and then you reach some idea of the divinity. That is one path which Dionysius recommends.

The other path is different. Here he says : you will never attain the divinity if you give it only a single name, for the whole soul-process which you employ to find perfections in things and to seek their essences, to combine them in order to apply the whole to divinity, all this never leads to what one can call knowledge of a divinity. You must reach a state in which you are free from all that you have known of things. You must purify your consciousness completely of all that you have experienced

through things. You must no longer know anything of what the world says to you. You must forget all the names which you are accustomed to give to things and translate yourself into a condition of soul in which you know nothing of the whole world. If you can *experience* this in your soul-condition, then you experience the nameless which is immediately misunderstood if one attaches any name to it. Then you will know God, the Super-God in His super-beauty. But the names Super-God and super-beauty are already disturbing. They can only serve to point towards something which you must experience as nameless, and how can one deal with a character who gives us not one theology but two theologies, one positive, one negative, one rationalistic and one mystic? A man who can put himself into the spirituality of the time out of which Christianity was born can understand it quite well. If one pictures the course of human evolution even in the first Christian centuries as the materialists of to-day do, anything like the writings of the Areopagite appears more or less foolishness or madness. In this case they are usually simply rejected. If, however, one can put oneself into the experience and feeling of that time, then one realizes what a man like the Areopagite really wanted—at bottom only to express what countless people were striving for. Because for them the divinity was an unknowable being if one took only one path to it. For him the divinity was a being which had to be approached by a rational path through the finding and giving of names. But if one takes this one way one loses the

path. One loses onself in what is as it were universal space void of God. And then one does not attain to God. But one must take this way, for otherwise one can also not reach God. Moreover one must take yet another way, namely, the one that strives towards the nameless one. By either road alone the divinity cannot be found, but by taking both one finds the divinity at the point where they cross. It is not enough to dispute which of the roads is the right one. Both are right, but each taken alone leads to nothing. Both roads when the human soul finds itself at the crossing lead to the goal. I can understand how some people of to-day who are accustomed to what is called polemics recoil from what is here advanced concerning the Areopagite. But what I am advancing here was alive in those men who were the leading spiritual personalities in the first Christian centuries, and continued traditionally in the Christian-philosophical movement of the West to the time of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. For instance it was kept alive through that individual whose name I mentioned yesterday, Scotus Erigena, who lived at the court of Charles the Bald. This Scotus Erigena reminds one forcibly of what I said yesterday. I told you : I have never known such a meek man as Vincenz Knauer, the historian of philosophy. Vincenz Knauer was always meek, but he began to lose his temper when there was mention of Plotinus or anything connected with him ; and Franz Brentano, the able philosopher, who was always conventional became quite unconventional and abusive in his book *Philosophies that Create a Stir*—

referring to Plotinus. Those who, with all their discernment and ability, lean more or less towards rationalism, will be angry when they are faced with what so to speak poured forth from the Areopagite to find a final significant revelation in this Scotus Erigena. In the last years of his life he was a Benedictine Prior, but his own monks, as the legend goes—I do not say it is literally true, but it is near enough—tortured him with pins till he died, because he introduced Plotinism even in the ninth century. But his ideas survived him and they were at the same time the continuation of the ideas of the Areopagite. His writings more or less disappeared till later days ; then ultimately they reappeared. In the twelfth century Scotus Erigena was declared a heretic. But that did not mean as much then as it did later or does to-day. All the same, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were deeply influenced by the ideas of Scotus Erigena. That is the one thing which we must recognize as a heritage from former times when we wish to speak of the essence of Thomism.

But there is another thing. In Plotinism, which I tried to describe to you yesterday with regard to its Cosmology, there is a very important presentation of human nature which is derived from a material-supermaterial view. One really regains respect for these things if one discovers them again on a background of spiritual science. Then one admits at once the following : one says, if one reads something like Plotinus or what has come down to us of him, unprepared, it looks rather chaotic and intricate. But if one discovers the corresponding truths oneself,

his views take on a quite special appearance, even if the method of their expression in those times was different from what it would have to be to-day. Thus, one can find in Plotinus a general view which I should describe as follows :

Plotinus considers human nature with its physical and psychic and spiritual characteristics. Then he considers it from two points of view, first from that of the soul's work on the body. If I spoke in modern terms, I should have to say : Plotinus says first of all to himself ; if one considers a child that grows up in the world, one sees how that which is formed as human body out of the spiritual-psychic attains maturity. For Plotinus everything material in man is, if I may use an expression to which I trust you will not object, a " sweating out " of the spiritual-physic, a " crustation " as it were of the spiritual-psychic. But then, when a human being has grown to a certain point, the spiritual-psychic forces cease to have any influence on the body. We could, therefore, say : at first we are concerned with such a spiritual-psychic activity that the bodily form is created or organized out of it. *The human organization is the product of the spiritual-psychic.* When a certain condition of maturity has been reached by some part of the organic activity, let us say, for example, the activity on which the forces are employed which later appear as the forces of the memory, then these forces which formerly have worked on the body, make their appearance in a spiritual-psychic *metamorphosis.* In other words that part of the spiritual-psychic element which had

functioned materially, now *liberates* itself, when its work is finished, and appears as an independent entity : a mirror of the soul, one would have to call it if one were to speak in Plotinus' sense. It is extraordinarily difficult with our modern conceptions to describe these things. You get near it, if you think as follows : you realize that a human being, after his memory has attained a certain stage of maturity, has the power of remembering. As a small child he has not. Where is this power of remembering ? First it is at work *in* the organism, and forms it. After that it is liberated as purely spiritual-psychic power, and continues still, though always spiritual-psychically, to work on the organism. Then *inside this soul-mirror* inhabits the real vessel, the Ego. In characteristics, in an idea-content which is extraordinarily pictorial, these views are worked out from that which is spiritually *active*, and from that which then remains over, and becomes, as it were, *passive* towards the outer world—so that it takes up, like the memory, the impressions of the outer world and retains them. *This two-fold work of the soul*, this division of the soul into an *active* part, which practically builds up the body, and a *passive* part, derived from an older stratum of human growth and human attitude to the world, which found in Plotinus its best expression and then was taken up by Augustine and his successors, was described in an extraordinarily pictorial manner.

We find this view in Aristotelianism, but rationalized and translated into more physical conceptions. And Aristotle had it in his turn from Plato and again

from the same sources as Plato. But when we read Aristotle we must say : Aristotle strives to put into abstract conceptions what he found in the old philosophies. And so we see in the Aristotelian system which continued to flourish, and which was the rationalistic form of what Plotinus had said in the other form, we see in this Aristotelianism which continued as far as Albertus and Thomas a *rationalized mysticism*, as it were, a rationalized description of the spiritual secret of the human being. And Albertus and Thomas are conscious of the fact that Aristotle has brought down to abstract conceptions something which the others had had in visions. And therefore they do not stand in the same relation to Aristotle as the present day philosopher-philologists, who have developed strange controversies over two conceptions which originate with Aristotle ; but as the writings of Aristotle have not survived complete, we find both these conceptions in them without having their connection—which is after all a fact which affords ground for different opinions in many learned disputes. We find *two ideas* in Aristotle. Aristotle sees in human nature something which brings together into a unity the vegetative principle, the animal principle, the lower human principle, then the higher human principle, that Aristotle calls the *nous*, and the Scholiasts call the intellect. But Aristotle differentiates between the *nous poieticos*, and the *nous patheticos*, between the active and the passive spirit of man. The expressions are no longer as descriptive as the Greek ; but one can say that Aristotle differentiates between the active under-

standing, the active spirit of man, and the passive. What does he mean? We do not understand what he means unless we revert to the origin of these concepts. Just like the other forces of the soul the two points of understanding are active in another metamorphosis in building up the human soul :—the understanding, in so far as it is actively engaged in building up the man, but still the understanding, not like the memory which comes to an end at a certain point and then liberates itself *as* memory—but working throughout life as understanding. That is the *nous poieticos* ; the factor which in Aristotle's sense, becoming individualized out of the universe, builds up the body. It is no other than the active, body-building soul of Plotinus. On the other hand that which liberates itself, existing only in order to receive the outer world, and to form the impressions of the outer world dialectically, is the *nous patheticos*—the passive intellect—the *intellectus possibilis*. These things, presented to us in Scholasticism in keen dialectics and in precise logic, refer back to the old heritage. And we cannot properly understand the working of the Schoolmen's souls without taking into consideration this intermixture of age-old traditions.

Because all this had such an influence on the souls of the Scholiasts, they were faced with the great question which one usually feels to be the real problem of Scholasticism. At a time when men still had a vision which produced such a thing as Platonism or a rationalized version of it such as Aristotelianism, at a time when the sense of

individuality had not yet reached its highest, these problems could not have existed ; for what we to-day call understanding, what we call intellect, which had its origin in the terminology of Scholasticism, is the product of the individual man. If we all think alike, it is only because we are all individually constituted alike, and because the understanding is bound up with the individual which is constituted alike in all men. It is true that in so far as we are different beings we think differently ; but that is a shade of difference with which logic as such is not concerned. Logical and dialectical thought is the product of the general human, but individually differentiated organization.

So man, feeling that he is an individual says to himself : in man arise the thoughts through which the outer world is inwardly represented ; and here the thoughts are put together which in turn are to give a picture of the world ; there, inside man, emerge on the one hand representations which are connected with individual things, with a particular book, let us say, or a particular man, for instance, Augustine. But then man arrives at the inner experiences, such as dreams, for which he cannot straightway find such an objective representation. The next step is the experience of pure chimæras, which he creates for himself, just as here the centaur and similar things were chimæras for Scholasticism. But, on the other hand, are the concepts and ideas which as a matter of fact reflect on to both sides : humanity, the lion-type, the wolf-type, etc. ; these are general concepts which the Schoolmen according

to ancient usage called the universals. Yes, as the situation for mankind was such as I described to you yesterday, as one rose, as it were, to these universals and perceived them to be the lowest border of the spiritual world which was being revealed through vision to mankind, these universals, humanity, animality, lionhood, etc., were simply the means whereby the spiritual world, the intelligible world, revealed itself, and simply the soul's experience of an emanation from the supernatural world.

In order to have this experience it was essential not to have acquired that feeling of individuality which afterward developed in the centuries I have named. This sense of individuality led one to say : we rise from the things of the senses up to that border where are the more or less abstract things, which are, however, still within our experience—the universals such as humanity, lionhood, etc. Scholasticism realized perfectly that one cannot simply say : these are pure conceptions, pure comprehensions of the external world :—rather, it became a problem for Scholasticism, with which it grappled. We have to create such general and universal conceptions out of our individuality. But when we look out upon the world, we do not have " humanity ", we have individual man, not " wolfhood ", but individual wolves. But, on the other hand, we cannot only see what we formulate as " wolfhood " and " lamb-hood " as it were in such a way as if at one time we have formulated the matter as " agnine " and at another as " lupine ", and as if " lambhood " and " wolfhood " were only a kind of composition and

the material which is in these connected ideas were the only reality : we cannot simply assume this ; for if we did we should have to assume this also :—If we caged a wolf and saw to it that for a certain period he ate nothing but lambs he is filled with nothing but lamb-matter ; but he doesn't become a lamb ; the matter doesn't affect it, he remains a wolf. " Wolfhood " therefore is after all not something which is thus merely brought into contact with the material, for materially the whole wolf is lamb, but he remains a wolf.

There is to-day everywhere a problem which people do not take seriously enough. It was a problem with which the soul in its greatest development grappled with all its fibre. And this problem stood in direct connection with the Church's interests. How this was we can picture to ourselves if we consider the following :—

Before Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas appeared with their special exposition of philosophy, there had already been people, like Roscelin, for example, who had put forward the theory, and believed it implicitly, that these general concepts, these universals are really nothing else but the comprehension of external individual objects ; they are really only words and names. And a Nominalism grew up which saw only words in general things, in universals. But Roscelin took Nominalism with dogmatic earnestness and applied it to the Trinity, saying : if something which is an association of ideas is only a word, then the Trinity is only a word, and the individuals are the sole reality—the Father,

Son and Holy Ghost ; then only the human understanding grasps these Three through a name. Mediæval Churchmen stretched such points to the ultimate conclusions ; the Church was compelled, at the Synod of Soissons, to declare this view of Roscelin partial polytheism and its teaching heretical. Thus one was in a certain difficult position towards Nominalism ; it was a dogmatic interest which was linked with a philosophic one.

To-day we no longer take, of course, such a situation as something vital. But in those days it was regarded as most vital, and Thomas and Albertus grappled with just this question of the relationship of the universals to individual things; for them it was the supreme problem. Fundamentally, everything else is only a consequence, that is, a consequence in so far as everything else has taken its colour from the attitude they adopted towards this problem. But this attitude was influenced by all the forces which I have described to you, all the forces which remained as tradition from the Areopagite, which remained from Plotinus, which had passed through the soul of Augustine, through Scotus Erigena and many others —all this influenced the manner of thought which was now first revealed in Albertus and then, on a wide-reaching philosophic basis, in Thomas. And one knew also that there were people then who looked up beyond concepts to the spiritual world, to the intellectual world, to that world of which Thomism speaks as of a reality, in which he sees the immaterial intellectual beings which he calls angels. These are not just abstractions, they are real beings, but with-

out bodies. It is these beings which Thomas puts in the tenth sphere. He looks upon the earth as encircled by the sphere of the Moon, of Mercury, of Venus, of the Sun, and so on, and so comes through the eighth and ninth spheres to the tenth, which was the Empyreum. He imagines all this pervaded by intelligences and the intelligences nearest are those which, as it were, let their lowest margins shine down upon the earth so that the human soul can get into touch with them.

But in this form in which I have just now expressed it, a form more inclined to Plotinism, this idea is not the result of pure individual feeling to which Scholasticism had just fought its way, but for Albertus and Thomas a *belief* remained that above abstract concepts there was up there a revelation of those abstract concepts. And the question faced them : What reality have, then, these abstract concepts ? Now Albertus as well as Thomas had an idea of the influence of the psychic-spiritual on the physical body and the subsequent self-reflection of the psychic-spiritual when its work on the physical body was sufficiently performed : they had an idea of all this. Also they had an idea of what man becomes in his own individual life, how he develops from year to year, from decade to decade precisely through the impressions he receives and digests from the external world. Thus the thought came that though, of course, we have the external world all round us, this world is a revelation of something super-worldly, something spiritual. And while we look at the world and turn our attention to the separate minerals, plants, and

animals, we surmise all the same that there lies behind them a revelation from higher spiritual worlds. And if we look at the natural world with logical analysis, with everything of which our soul makes us capable, with all the power of thought we possess, we arrive at those things which the spiritual world has implanted in the natural world. But then we must get clear on this point : we turn our eyes and all the other senses on to this world, and so are in definite relationship with the world. We then go away from it and retain, as it were, as a memory what we have absorbed from it. We look back once more into memory ; and then there first appears to us really the universal, the generality of things, such as humanity, and so on ; that appears to us first in the inner conceptual form. So that Albertus and Thomas say : if you look back, and if your soul reflects its experiences of the external world, then you have the universals preserved in it. Then you have universals. From all the human beings whom you have met, you form the concept of humanity. If you remembered only individual things you could, in any case, live only in earthly names. But as you do not live only in earthly names, you must experience the universals. There you have the *universalia post res*—the universals which live in the soul after the things have been experienced. While a man's soul concentrates on things, its contents are not the same as afterwards when it remembers them, when they are, as it were, reflected from inside, but rather he stands in a real relationship to the things. He experiences true spirituality of the things and

translates them only into the form of universals *post rem.*

Albertus and Thomas assume that at the moment when man through his power of thought stands in real relationship with his surroundings, that is, not only with what is " wolf " because the eye sees and the ear hears it, but because he can meditate on it and formulate the type " wolf ", at this moment he experiences something which, though invisible, *in* the objects, is comprehended in thought independently of the senses. He experiences the *universalia in rebus* —the universals *in* things.

Now the difference is not quite easy to define, because we usually think that what we have in the soul as a reflection is the same in the things. But it is not the same in the sense of Thomas Aquinas. That which man experiences as an idea in his soul and explains with his understanding, is the same thing with which he experiences the real, and the universal. So that according to their form, the universals in the things are different from those after them, which remain then in the soul : but inwardly they are the same. There you have one of the scholastic concepts which one does not generally put to the soul in all its subtlety. The universals *in* things and the universals *after* things are, as far as *content* is concerned the same, and differ only in *form.* But then we must not forget that that which is distributed and individualized in things points in its turn to what I described yesterday as being inherent in Plotinism, and called the actually intelligible world : there again the same contents which are *in* things and in the

human soul *after* things are, as far as content goes, alike, but different in form ; they are contained in *another* form, but of *similar* content. These are the *universalia ante res, before* things. These are the universals as contained in the divine mind, and in the mind of the divine servants—the angelic beings. Thus what was for a former age a direct spiritual-sensory-supersensory vision becomes a vision which was represented only in sense-images, because what one sees with the super-senses cannot, according to the Areopagite, be even given a name, if one wished to deal with it in its true form : one can only point to it and say : it is not anything such as external things are. Thus what was for the ancients vision and appeared as a reality of the spiritual world, became for Scholasticism something to be decided by all that acuteness of thought, all that suppleness and nice logic of which I have spoken to you to-day. *The problem which formerly was solved by vision, is brought down into the sphere of thought and of reason. That is the essence of Thomism, the essence of Albertinism, the essence of Scholasticism.* It realized, above all, that in its epoch, the sense of human individuality has reached its culmination. It sees, above all, all problems in their rational and logical form, in the form, in fact, in which the thinker must comprehend them. Scholasticism grapples chiefly with this form of world-problems, this form of thinking, and thus stands in the midst of the life of the Church, which I illumined for you yesterday and to-day in many ways, if only with a few rays of light. There is the belief of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries ; it is

to be attained with thinking, with the most subtle logic; on the other side, are the traditional *Church dogmas*, the *content of Faith.*

Let us take an example of how a thinker like Thomas Aquinas stands to both. Thomas Aquinas asks: Can one prove the existence of God by logic? Yes, one can. He gives a whole series of proofs. One, for instance, is when he says: We can at first gain knowledge only by approaching the *universalia in rebus*, by looking *into* things. We cannot —it is the personal experience of this age—we cannot enter into the spiritual world through vision. We can only enter the spiritual world by using our human powers if we saturate ourselves in things, and get out of them what we can call the *universalia in rebus.* Then we can draw our conclusions concerning the *universalia ante res.* So he says: We see the world in movement; one thing always gives motion to another, because it is itself in motion. So we go from one thing in motion to another, and from this to a third thing in motion. This cannot be continued indefinitely, for we must get to a prime mover. But if this were itself in motion, we should have to proceed to another mover. We must, therefore, in the end reach a stationary mover.

And here Thomas—and Albertus comes after all to the same conclusion—reaches the Aristotelian stationary mover, the *First Cause.* It is inherent in logical thinking to recognize God as a necessary First Being, as a necessary first stationary mover. For the Trinity there is no such path of thought which leads to it. It is handed down. With human

thought we can only reach the point of testing if the Trinity is contrary to sense. We find it is not, but we cannot prove it, we must believe it, we must accept it as a content, to which the unaided human intellect cannot rise.

This is the attitude of Scholasticism to the question which was then so important : How far can the unaided human intellect go ? And in the course of time it became involved in quite a special way with this deep problem. For, you see, other thinkers had gone before. They had assumed something apparently quite absurd, they had said : it is possible for something to be true theologically and false philosophically. One could say straight out : it is possible for things to be handed down as dogma, as, for instance, the Trinity ; yet if one ponders over the same question, one arrives at a contrary result. It is certainly possible for the reason to lead to other consequences than those to which the faith-content leads. And that was so, that was the other thing which faced Scholasticism—the doctrine of the *double truth*, and it is on this that the two thinkers Albertus and Thomas laid special stress, to bring faith and reason into harmony, to seek no contradiction between rational thought—at any rate, up to a certain point—and faith. In those days that was radicalism, for the majority of the leading Church authorities clung to the doctrine of the double truth, namely, that man must on one side think rationally, the content of his thought must be in one form, and faith could give it him in another form, and these two forms he had to keep.

I believe we can get a feeling of historical development if we consider the fact that people of so few centuries ago, as these are of whom we speak to-day, are wrapped up in such problems with their whole soul. For these things still reverberate in our time. We still live with these problems. How we do it, we shall discuss to-morrow. To-day I wanted to describe the essence of Thomism as it was in those days.

So it was, you perceive, that the main problem in front of Albertus and Thomas was this : *What is the relation of the content of human reason to that of human faith ?* How can that which the Church ordains for belief be, first, understood, and secondly, upheld against what contradicts it ? With this, people like Albertus and Thomas had much to do, for the movement I have described was not the only one in Europe ; there were all sorts of others. With the spread of Islam and the Arabs other creeds made themselves felt in Europe, and something of that creed which I yesterday called the Manichaean had remained all over the continent. But there was also, for instance, what we know as " Representation " through the doctrine of Averroës from the twelfth century, who said : The product of a man's pure intellect belongs, not specially to him, but to all humanity. Averroës says : We have not each a mind ; we each have a body, but not each a mind. A has his own body, but his mind is the same as B has and C has. We might say : Averroës sees mankind as with a single intellect, a single mind ; all individuals are merged in it. There they live, as it were,

with the head. When they die, the body is withdrawn from this universal mind. There is no immortality in the sense of individual continuation after death. What continues, is the universal mind, that which is common to all men.

For Thomas the problem was that he had to reckon with the *universality* of mind, but he had to take the point of view that the universal mind is not so closely united with the universal memory in separate beings, but rather during life with the active forces of the bodily organization ; and *so* united, forming such a unity, that everything working in man as the formative vegetable, and animal powers, as the power of memory, is attracted, as it were, during life by the universal mind and disposition. Thus Thomas imagines it, that man attracts the individual through the universal, and then draws into the spiritual world what his universal had attracted ; so that he takes it there with him. You perceive, there can be no pre-existence for Albertus Magnus and Thomas, though there can be an after-existence. This was, after all, the same for Aristotle, and in this respect Aristotelianism is also continued in these thinkers.

In this way the great logical questions of the universals join up with the questions which concern the world-destiny of each individual. And even if I were to describe to you the Cosmology of Thomas Aquinas and the natural history of Albertus, which is extraordinarily wide-reaching, over almost all provinces and in countless volumes, you would see everywhere the influence of what I called the general

logical nature of Albertinism and Thomism. And this logical nature consisted in this : with our reason —what was then called the Intellect—we cannot attain all heights ; up to a certain point we can reach everything through logical acumen and dialectic, but then we have to enter into the region of faith. Thus as I have described it, these two things stand face to face, without contradicting each other : *What we understand with our reason, and what is revealed through faith can exist side by side.*

What does this really entail ? I believe we can tackle this question from very different sides. What have we here before us historically as the essence of Albertinism and of Thomism ? It is really characteristic of Thomas, and important, that while he is straining reason to prove the existence of God, he has to add at the same time that one arrives at a picture of God as it was rightly represented in the Old Testament as Jahve. That is, when Thomas departs from the paths of reason open to the individual human soul, he arrives at that unified God whom the Old Testament calls the Jahve-God. If one wants to arrive at the *Christ*, one has to pass over to faith ; the individual spiritual experience of the human soul is not sufficient to attain to Him.

Now in the arguments which Scholasticism had to face (the spirit of the age demanded it), in these theories of the double truth—that a thing could be theologically true and philosophically false—there still lay something deeper ; something which perhaps could not be seen in an age in which everywhere rationalism and logic were the pursuit of

mankind. And it was the following : that those who spoke of this double truth were not of the opinion that what is theologically revealed and what is to be reached by reason *are* ultimately two things, but *for the time being* they are two truths, and that man arrives at these two truths because he has to the innermost part of his soul, shared in the faith. In the background of the soul up to the time of Albertus and Thomas flows, as it were, this question : Have we not assumed original sin in our thought, in what we see as reason in ourselves ? Is it not just because reason has fallen from its spirituality that it deceives us with counterfeit truth for the real truth ? If Christ enters our reason, or something else which it transforms and develops further, then only is it brought into harmony with that truth which is the content of faith.

The *sinfulness of the reason* was, in a way, responsible for the thinkers before Albertus and Thomas speaking of two truths. They wanted to take the doctrine of original sin and redemption through Christ seriously. But they had not the thinking power and the logic for it, though they were serious about it. They put the question to themselves : *How does Christ redeem in us the truth of the reason which contradicts revealed spiritual truth ?* How do we become Christians through and through ? For our reason is already vitiated through original sin, and therefore it contradicts the pure truth of faith.

And now appeared Albertus and Thomas, and to them it appeared first of all wrong that if we steep ourselves purely logically in the *universalia in rebus*,

and if we take to ourselves the reality in things, we should launch forth in sinfulness over the world. It is impossible that the ordinary reason should be sinful. In this scholastic question lies really the question of Christology. *And the question Scholasticism could not answer was : How does Christ enter into human thought* ? How is human thought permeated with Christ ? How does Christ lead human thought up into those spheres where it can coalesce with spiritual faith-content ? These things were the real driving force in the souls of the Schoolmen. Therefore it is before all things important, although Scholasticism possessed the most perfect logical technique not to take the results, but to look through the answer to the question ; that we ignore the achievements of the men of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and look at the large problems which were then propounded. They were not yet far enough to be able to apply the redemption of man from original sin to human thought. Therefore Albertus and Thomas had to deny reason the right to mount the steps which would have enabled them to enter into the spiritual world itself. And Scholasticism left behind it the question : *How can human thought develop itself upward to a view of the spiritual world ?* The most important outcome of Scholasticism is even a question, and is not its existing content. It is the question : How does one carry Christology into thought ? *How is thought made Christ-like?* At the moment when Thomas Aquinas died in 1274 this question, historically speaking, confronted the world. Up to that moment he had been able to get only as far as this

question. What is to become of it, one can for the time being only indicate by saying: man penetrates up to a certain point into the spiritual nature of things, but after that point comes faith. And the two must not contradict each other ; they must be in harmony. But the ordinary reason cannot of its own accord comprehend the content of the highest things, as, for example, the Trinity, the incarnation of the Christ in the man Jesus, etc. Reason can comprehend only as much as to say : the world could have been created in Time, but it could also have existed from eternity. But revelation says it has been created in Time, and if you ask Reason again you find the grounds for thinking that the creation in Time is the rational and the wiser answer.

Thus the Scholiast takes his place for all the ages. More than one thinks, there survives to-day in Science, in the whole public life of the present what Scholasticism has left to us, although it is in a particular form. How alive Scholasticism really is still in our souls, and what attitude man to-day must adopt towards it, of this we shall speak to-morrow.

## III

## THOMISM IN THE PRESENT DAY

YESTERDAY I endeavoured at the conclusion of our consideration of Scholasticism to point out how in a current of thought the most important things are the *problems* which presented themselves in a quite definite way to the human soul, and which, when you think of it, really all culminated in the desire to know : How does man attain the knowledge which is essential to his life, and how does this knowledge join up with that which at the time governed the dispositions of men in a social aspect ? How does the knowledge which can be won join up with the contents of faith of the Christian Church in the West ? The militant Scholiasts had to deal first of all with *human individuality* which, as we have seen, emerged more and more, but which was no longer in a position to carry the experience of knowledge up to the point of real, concrete, spirit-content, as it still flickered in the course of time from what survived of Neoplatonism, of the Areopagite, of Scotus Erigena. I have also pointed out that the impulses set in motion by Scholasticism still continued in a

certain way. They continued, so that one can say : The problems themselves are great, and the manner in which they were propounded (we saw this yesterday) had great influence for a long time. And, in point of fact—and this is to be precisely the subject of to-day's study—the influence of what was then the greatest problem—the relationship of men to sensory and spiritual reality—is still felt, even if in quite a different form, even if it is not always obvious, and even if it takes to-day a form entirely contrary to Scholasticism. Its influence still lives. It is still all there to a large extent in the spiritual activities of to-day, but distinctly altered by the work of important people in the meantime on the European trend of human development in the philosophical sphere. We see at once, if we go from Thomas Aquinas to the Franciscan monk who originated probably in Ireland and at the beginning of the fourteenth century taught at Paris and Cologne, Duns Scotus, we see at once, when we get to him, how the problem has, so to speak, become too large even for all the wonderful, intensive thought-technique which survived from the age of the real mastership in thought-technique —the age of Scholasticism. The question that again faced Duns Scotus was as follows : *How does the psychic part of man live in the physical organism of man ?* Thomas Aquinas' view was still—as I explained yesterday—that he considered the psychic as working itself into the physical. When through conception and birth man enters upon the physical existence, he is equipped by means of his physical inheritance only with the vegetative powers, with all the mineral

powers and with those of physical comprehension ; but that without pre-existence the real intellect, the active intellect, that which Aristotle called the " *nous poieticos* " enters into man. But, as Thomas sees it, this *nous poieticos* absorbs as it were all the psychic element, the vegetative-psychic and the animal-psychic and imposes itself on the corporeality in order to transpose that in its entirety—and then to combine living for ever with what it had won, from the human body, into which it had itself entered, though without pre-existence, from eternal heights. Duns Scotus cannot believe that such an absorption of the whole dynamic system of the human being takes place through the active understanding. He can only imagine that the human bodily make-up exists as something complete ; that the vegetative and animal principles remain through the whole of life in a certain independence, and are thrown off with death, and that really only the *spiritual principle*, the *intellectus agens*, enters into immortality. Equally little can he imagine the idea which Thomas Aquinas toyed with : the permeation of the whole body with the human-psychic-spiritual element. Scotus can imagine it as little as his pupil William of Occam, who died at Munich in the fourteenth century, the chief thing about him being that he returned to Nominalism. For Scotus the human understanding had become something abstract, something which no longer represented the spiritual world, but as being won by reflection, by observation of the senses. He could no longer imagine that Reality was the product only of the universals,

of ideas. He fell back again into Nominalism, and returned to the view that what establishes itself in man as ideas, as general conceptions, is conceived only out of the physical world around him, and that it is really only something which lives in the human spirit—I might say—for the sake of a convenient comprehension of existence—as Name, as words. In short, he returned again to Nominalism.

That is really a significant fact, for we see : Nominalism, as for instance Roscelin expounds it—and in his case the Trinity itself broke in pieces on account of his Nominalism—is interrupted only by the intensive thought activity of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others, and then Europe soon relapses again into the Nominalism which is really the incapacity of human individuality, ever struggling to rise higher and higher to comprehend as a spiritual reality something which is present in its spirit in the form of *ideas ;* so to comprehend it as something which lives *in man* and in a certain way also *in things.* Ideas, from being realities, become again Names, merely empty abstractions.

You see the difficulties which European thought encountered in greater and greater degree when it opened up the quest of knowledge. For in the long run we human beings *must* acquire knowledge through *ideas*—at any rate, in the first stages of knowledge we are bound to make use of ideas. The big question must always crop up again : *How do ideas enable us to attain reality ?* But, substantially, an answer becomes impossible if ideas appear to us merely as names without reality. And these ideas,

which in Ancient Greece, or, at any rate, in initiated Greece were the final demonstration, coming down from above, of a *real spirit world*, these ideas became ever more and more abstract for the European consciousness. And this process of becoming abstract, of ideas becoming words, we see perpetually increasing as we follow further the development of Western thought. Individuals stand out later, and for example Leibnitz, who actually does not touch upon the question whether ideas lead to knowledge. He is still in possession of a traditional point of view and ascribes everything to individual world-monads, which are really spiritual. Leibnitz towers over the others because he has the courage to expound the world as spiritual. Yes, the world is spiritual ; it consists of a multitude of spiritual beings. But I might say that that particular thing which in a former age, with, it is true, a more distinctive knowledge not yet illuminated by such a logic as Scholasticism had, that moreover which meant in such an age *differentiated spiritual individuals*, was for Leibnitz a series of graduated spiritual points, the *monads*. Individuality is saved, but only in the form of the monads, in the form, as it were, of a spiritual, indivisible, elemental point. If we exclude Leibnitz, we see in the whole West an intensive struggle for certainty concerning the origins of existence, but at the same time an incapacity everywhere really to solve the Nominalism problem.

This is particularly met with in the thinker who is rightly placed at the beginning of the new philosophy, in the thinker Descartes, who lived

at the opening or in the first half of the seventeenth century. We learn everywhere in the history of philosophy the basis of Cartesian philosophy in the sentence : *Cogito ergo sum* ; *I think, therefore I am.* There is something of Augustine's effort in this sentence. For Augustine struggles out of that doubt of which I have spoken in the first lecture, when he says : I can doubt everything, but the fact of doubt remains and I live all the same while I doubt. I can doubt the existence of concrete things round me, I can doubt the existence of God, of clouds and stars, but not the existence of the doubt in me. I cannot doubt what goes on in my soul. There is something certain, a certain starting point to get hold of. Descartes takes up this thought again—I think, therefore I am. In such things one is, of course, exposed to grave misunderstandings, if one has to set something simple against something historically recognized. But it is necessary. Descartes and many of his followers—and in this respect he had innumerable followers—considers the idea : if I have a thought-content in any consciousness, if I think, I cannot get over the fact that I do think. Therefore I am, therefore my existence is assured through my thinking. My roots are, so to speak, in the world-existence, as I have assured my existence through my thought. So modern philosophy really begins as Intellectualism, as Rationalism, as something which wants to use thought as its instrument, and to this extent is only the echo of Scholasticism, which had taken the turning towards Intellectualism so energetically.

Two things we observe about Descartes. First, there is necessarily the simple objection : Is my existence really established by the fact that I think ? All sleep proves the contrary. We know every morning when we awake that we must have existed from the evening before to the morning, but we have not been thinking. So the sentence : I think, therefore I am—cogito ergo sum—is in this simple way disproved. This simple fact, which is, I might say, a kind of Columbus' egg, must be set against this famous sentence which found an uncommon amount of success. That is one thing to say about Descartes. The other is the question : What is the real objective of all his philosophic effort ? It is no longer directed towards a view of life, or receiving a cosmic secret for the consciousness, it is really turned towards something entirely intellectualistic and concerned with thought. It is directed to the question : How do I gain certainty ? How do I overcome doubt ? How do I find out that things exist and that I myself exist ? It is no longer a material question, a question concerned with the continual results of observing the world, it is a question rather that concerns the certainty of knowledge. This question arises out of the Nominalism of the Schoolmen, which only Albertus and Thomas suppressed for a certain time, but which after them appeared again. And so these people can only give a name to what is hidden in their souls in order to find somewhere in them a point from which they can make for themselves, not a picture or conception of the world, but the certainty that not everything is deception and untruth ;

that when one looks out upon the world one sees a reality and when one looks inward upon the soul one also sees a reality. In all this is clearly noticeable what I pointed to yesterday in conclusion, namely, that human individuality has arrived at intellectualism, but has not yet felt the Christ-problem. The Christ-problem occurs for Augustine because he still looks at the whole of humanity. Christ begins to dawn in the human soul, to dawn, I might say, on the Christian Mystics of the Middle Ages ; but he does not dawn clearly on those who sought to find him by that thought which is so necessary to individuality—or by what this thought would produce. This process of thought as it comes forth from the human soul in its original condition is such that it rejects precisely what ought to have been the Christian idea for the innermost part of man ; it rejects the transformation, the inner metamorphosis ; it refuses to take the attitude towards the life of knowledge in which one would say : yes, I think and I think first of all concerning myself and the world. But this kind of thought is still very undeveloped. This thought is, as it were, the kind that exists after the Fall. It must rise above itself. It must be transformed and be raised into a higher sphere. As a matter of fact, this necessity has only once clearly flashed up in one great thinker, and that is in Spinoza, follower of Descartes. Spinoza really did make a deep impression on people like Herder and Goethe with good reason. For Spinoza, although he is still completely buried apparently in the intellectualism which survived or had survived in another form from

the Scholiasts, still understands this intellectualism in such a way that man can finally come to the truth—which for Spinoza is ultimately a kind of intuition—by transforming the intellectual, inner, thinking, soul-life, not by being content with everyday life or the ordinary scientific life. And so Spinoza reaches the point of saying to himself : *This thought replenishes itself with spiritual content through the development of thought itself.* The spiritual world, which we learned to know in Plotinism, yields again, as it were, to thought, if this thought tends to run counter to the spirit. *Spirit replenishes thought as intuition.* And I consider it is very interesting that this is what Spinoza says : If we survey the existence of the world, how it continues to develop in its highest substance, in spirit, how we then receive this spirit in the soul by raising ourselves by thought to intuition, by being so intellectualistic that we can prove things as surely as mathematics, but in the proof develop ourselves at the same time and continue to rise so that the spirit can come to meet us, if we can rise to this height, then, from this angle of vision we can comprehend the historic process of what lies behind the evolution of mankind. And it is remarkable that the following sentence stands out from the writings of the Jew Spinoza : The highest revelation of divine substance is given in Christ. In Christ intuition has become Theophany, the incarnation of God, and the voice of Christ is therefore in truth the voice of God and the path to salvation. In other words, the Jew Spinoza comes to the conclusion that man can so develop himself by his intellectualism, that the

spirit comes down to him. If he is then in a position to apply himself to the mystery of Golgotha, then the filling with the spirit becomes not only intuition, that is, the appearance of the spirit through thought, but intuition changes into Theophany, into the appearance of God Himself. Man is on the spiritual path to God. One might say that Spinoza was not reticent about what he suddenly realized, as this expression shows. But it fills what he had thus discovered from the evolution of humanity with a kind of tune, a kind of undercurrent of sound, it completes his *Ethics*.

And once more it is taken up by a sensitive human being. We can realize that for somebody who could also certainly read between the lines of this *Ethics* who could sense in his own heart the heart that lives in this *Ethics*, in short, that for Goethe this book of Spinoza's became the standard. These things should not be looked at so purely abstractly, as is usually done in the history of philosophy. They should be viewed from the human standpoint, and we must look at the spark of Spinozism which entered Goethe's soul. But actually what can be read between Spinoza's lines did not become a dominating force. What became important was the incapacity to get away from Nominalism. And Nominalism next becomes such that one might say : Man gets ever more and more entangled in the thought : I live in something which the outer world cannot comprehend, a something which cannot leave me to sink into the outer world and take upon itself something of its nature. And so it is that this feeling, that one

is so isolated, that one cannot get away from oneself and receive something from the outer world, is already to be found in Locke in the seventeenth century. Locke's formula was : That which we observe as colours, as tones in the outer world is no longer something which leads us to reality ; it is only the effect of the outer world on our senses ; it is something in which we ourselves are wrapped also, in our own subjectivity. That is one side of the question.

The other side is seen in such minds as that of Francis Bacon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where Nominalism becomes such a penetrating philosophy that it leads him to say : one must do away with man's false belief in a reality which is, in point of fact, only a name. We have reality only when we look out upon the world of the senses, which alone supply realities through empiric knowledge. By the side of these, those realities on which Albertus and Thomas have built up their theory of rational knowledge play no longer a really scientific part. In Bacon the spiritual world has, so to speak, evaporated into something which can no longer well up from man's inmost heart with the certainty and safety of a science. The spiritual world becomes the subject of faith, which is not to be touched by what is called knowledge and learning. On the contrary, knowledge is to be won only by external observation and by experiment, which is, after all, only a more spiritual kind of external observation.

And so it goes on till Hume, in the eighteenth century, for whom the connection between cause and

effect becomes something which lives only in human subjectivity, which men attribute to things from a sort of external habit. We see that Nominalism, the heir of Scholasticism, weighs down humanity like a mountain. What is primarily the most important sign of this development?

The most important sign is surely this, that Scholasticism stands there with its hard logic, that it arises at a time when the sum of reason is to be divided off from the sum of truth concerning the spiritual world. The Scholiast's problem was, on the one hand, to examine this sum of truth concerning the spiritual world, which, of course, was handed down to him through the faith and revelation of the Church. On the other hand, he had to examine the possible results of man's own human knowledge. The point of view of the Scholiasts overlooked at first the change of front which the course of time and nothing else had made necessary. When Thomas and Albertus had to develop their philosophies, there was as yet no scientific view of the world. There had been no Galileo, Giordano Bruno, Copernicus or Kepler ; the forces of human understanding had not yet been directed to external nature. At that time there was no cause for controversy between what the human reason can discover from the depth of the soul and what can be learned from the outer empiric sense-world. The question was only between the results of rational thought and the spiritual truths as handed down by the Church to men who could no longer raise themselves through individual development to this wisdom in its reality, but who saw it in

the form handed down by the Church simply as tradition, as Scripture, etc. Does not the question now really arise : What is the relation between the rationalism, as developed by Albertus and Thomas in their theory of knowledge, and the teaching of the natural scientific view of the world ? We may say that from now on the struggle was indecisive up to the eighteenth century.

And here we find something very remarkable. When we look back into the thirteenth century and see Albertus and Thomas leading humanity across the frontiers of rational knowledge as contrasted with faith and revelation, we see how they show step by step that revelation yields only to a certain part of rational human knowledge, and remains outside this knowledge, an eternal riddle. We can count these riddles—the Incarnation—the filling with the Spirit at the Sacraments, etc.—which lie on the further side of human knowledge. As they see it, man stands on one side, surrounded as it were by the boundaries of knowledge, and unable to look into the spiritual world. This is the situation in the thirteenth century. And now let us take a look at the nineteenth century. We see a remarkable fact : in the seventies, at a famous conference of Natural Scientists at Leipzig, Dubois-Raymond gave his impressive address on the boundaries of Nature-Knowledge and soon afterwards on the seven world-riddles.

What has the problem now become ? There is man, here is the boundary of knowledge ; but beyond the boundary lies the material world, the atoms, everything of which Dubois-Raymond says : We do

not know what this is that moves in space as material. And on this side lies that which is evolved in the human soul. Even if, compared with the imposing work which shines as Scholasticism from the Middle Ages, this contribution of Dubois-Raymond, which we find in the seventies is a trifle, still it is the real antithesis : there the search for the riddles of the spiritual world, here the search for the riddles of the material world ; here the dividing line between human beings and atoms, there between human beings and angels and God. We must examine this gap of time if we want to see all this that crops up as a consequence, immediate or remote, of Scholasticism. From this Scholasticism the Kantian philosophy comes into being, as something important at best for the history of the period. This philosophy, influenced by Hume, still has to-day a hold on philosophers, since after its partial decline, the Germans raised the cry in the sixties, " Back to Kant ! " And from that time an uncountable number of books on Kant have been published, and independent Kantians like Volkelt, Cohen, etc.—one could mention a whole host—have appeared.

To-day we can, of course, give only a sketch of Kant ; we need only point out what is important in him for us. I do not think that anyone who really studies Kant can find him other than as I have tried to depict him in my small paper *Truth and Science.* At the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies of the eighteenth century Kant's problem is not the content-problem of world-philosophy in full force, not something which might have appeared for

him in definite forms, images, concepts, and ideas concerning objects, but rather his problem is the formal knowledge-question : *How do we gain certainty concerning anything in the outer world, concerning the existence of anything ?* Kant is more worried about certainty of knowledge than about any content of knowledge. One feels this surely in his *Critic*. Read his "*Critic of Pure Reason*", his "*Critic of Practical Reason*", and see how, after the chapter on Space and Time, which is in a sense classic, you come to the categories, enumerated entirely pedantically, only, we may say, to give the whole a certain completeness. In truth the presentation of this "*Critic of Pure Reason*" has not the fluency of someone writing sentence on sentence with his heart's blood.

For Kant the question of what is the relation of what we call concepts, of what is in fact, the whole content of knowledge to an external reality, is much more important than this content of knowledge itself. The content he pieces together, as it were, from everything philosophic which he has inherited. He makes schemes and systems. But everywhere the question crops up : How does one get certainty, the kind of certainty which one gets in mathematics ? And he gets such certainty in a manner which actually is nothing else than Nominalism, changed, it is true, and unusually concealed and disguised—a Nominalism which is stretched to include the forms of material nature, space and time, as well as universal ideas. He says : that particular thing which we develop in our soul as the content of knowledge has nothing really to do with anything we derive from

things. We merely make it cover things. We derive the whole form of our knowledge from ourselves. If we say event A is related to event B by the principle of causation, this principle is only in ourselves. We make it cover A and B, the two experiences.

We apply causality to things. In other words, paradoxical though it sounds—though it is paradoxical only historically in face of the vast following of Kant's philosophy—we shall have to say : Kant seeks the principle of certainty by denying that we derive the content of our knowledge from things and assuming that we derive it from ourselves and then apply it to things. This means—and here is the paradox—we have truth, because we make it ourselves, we have subjective truth, because we produce it ourselves. And it is we who instil truth into things. There you have the final consequence of Nominalism. Scholasticism strove with universals, with the question : What form of existence do the ideas we have in ourselves, have in the outer world ? It could not arrive at a real solution of the problem which would have been completely satisfactory. Kant says : All right. Ideas are merely names. We form them only in ourselves but we see them as names to cover things ; whereby they become reality. They may not be reality by a long way, but I push the " name " on to the experience and make it reality, for experience must be such as I ordain by applying to it a " name ".

Thus Kantianism is in a certain way the expansion of Nominalism, in a certain way the extremest point and in a certain way the extreme collapse of Western

philosophy, the complete bankruptcy of man in regard to his search for truth, despair that one can in any way learn truth from things. Hence the saying : Truth can exist only in things if we ourselves instil it into them. Kant has destroyed all objectivity and all man's possibility of getting down to the truth in things. He has destroyed all possible knowledge, all possible search for truth, for truth cannot exist only subjectively.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a consequence of Scholasticism, because it could not acquiesce in the other side, where there appeared another boundary to be crossed. Just because there emerged the age of Natural Science, to which Scholasticism did not adapt itself, Kantianism came on the scene, which ended really as subjectivity, and then from subjectivity in which it extinguished all knowledge, sprouted the so-called Postulates—*Freedom*, *Immortality*, and the *Idea of God*. We are *meant* to do the good, to obey the categoric imperative, and so we *must* be able to. That is, we must be free, but as we live here in the physical body, we cannot be. We do not attain perfection so that we may carry out the categoric imperative, till we are clear of the body. Therefore there must be immortality. But even then we cannot realize it as human beings. Everything we are concerned with in the world, if we do what we ought to, can be regulated only by a Godhead. Therefore there must be a Godhead. Three postulates of faith, whose source in Reality it is impossible to know—such is the extent of Kant's certainty, according to his own saying : I had to

annihilate knowledge in order to make room for faith. And Kant now does not make room for faith-content in the sense of Thomas Aquinas, for a traditional faith-content, but for an abstract one : Freedom, Immortality, and the Idea of God ; for a faith-content brought forth from the human individual dictating truth, that is, the appearance of it.

So Kant becomes the fulfiller of Nominalism. He is the philosopher who really denies man everything he could have which would enable him to get down to any kind of Reality. This accounts for the rapid reaction against Kant which for example, Fichte, and then Schelling, and then Hegel produced, and other thinkers of the nineteenth century. You need only look at Fichte and see how he was necessarily urged on to an experience of the soul that became more intensive and, one might say, ever more and more mystical in order to escape from Kantianism. Fichte could not even believe that Kant could have meant what is contained in the Kantian *Critics*. He believed at the beginning, with a certain philosophic naïveté that he drew only the final conclusion of the Kantian philosophy. His idea was that if you did not draw the " final conclusions ", you would have to believe that this philosophy had been pieced together by a most amazing chance, certainly not by a thoughtful human brain. All this is apart from the movement in Western civilization caused by the growth of Natural Science, which enters upon the scene as a reaction in the middle of the nineteenth century. This movement takes no count at all of Philosophy and therefore degenerated in many

thinkers into gross materialism. And so we see how the philosophic development goes on, unfolding itself into the last third of the nineteenth century. We see this philosophic effort coming completely to nothing and we see then how the attempt came about, from every possibility which one could find in Kantianism and similar philosophies, to understand something of what is actually real in the world. Goethe's general view of life which would have been so important, had it been understood, was completely lost for the nineteenth century, except among those whose leanings were toward Schelling, Hegel and Fichte. For in this philosophy of Goethe's lay the beginning of what Thomism *must become*, if its attitude towards Natural Science were changed, for he rises to the heights of modern civilization, and is, indeed, a real force in the current of development.

Thomas could get no further than the abstract affirmation that the psychic-spiritual really has its effect on every activity of the human organism. He expressed it thus : Everything, even the vegetative activities, which exists in the human body is directed by the psychic and must be acknowledged by the psychic. Goethe makes the first step in the change of attitude in his *Theory of Colour*, which in consequence is not in the least understood ; in his *Morphology*, in his *Theory of Plants and Animals*. We shall, however, not have a complete fulfilment of Goethe's ideas till we have a spiritual science which can of itself provide an explanation of the facts of Natural Science.

A few weeks ago I tried here to show how our

spiritual science is seeking to range itself as a corrective side by side with Natural Science—let us say with regard to the theory of the heart. The mechanico-materialistic view has likened the heart to a pump, which drives the blood through the human body. It is the opposite; the blood circulation is living—Embryology can prove it, if it wishes—and the heart is set in action by the movement of the blood. The heart is the instrument by which the blood-activity ultimately asserts itself, by which it is absorbed into the whole human individuality. The activity of the heart is a result of blood-activity, not vice-versa. And so, as was shown here in detail in a *Course for Doctors* we can show with regard to each organ of the body, how the realization of man as a spirit-being really explains his material element. We can in a way make real the thing that appeared dimly in abstract form to Thomism, when it said: The spiritual-psychic permeates all the physical body. That becomes concrete, real knowledge. The Thomistic philosophy, which in the thirteenth century still had an abstract form, by rekindling itself from Goethe continues to live on in our day as Spiritual Science.

Ladies and gentlemen, if I may interpose here a personal experience, it is as follows: it is meant merely as an illustration. When at the end of the eighties I spoke in the "Wiener Goethe-Verein" on the subject "Goethe as the Father of a New Aesthetic", there was in the audience a very learned Cistercian. I can speak about this address, for it has appeared in a new edition. I explained how one had

to take Goethe's presentation of Art, and then this Father Wilhelm Neumann, the Cistercian, who was also Professor of Theology at Vienna University, made this curious remark : " The germ of this address, which you have given us to-day, lies already in Thomas Aquinas ! " It was an extraordinarily interesting experience for me to hear from Father Wilhelm Neumann that he found in Thomas something like a germ of what was said then concerning Goethe's views on Aesthetics ; he was, of course, highly trained in Thomism, because it was after the appearance of Neo-Thomism within the Catholic clergy. One must put it thus : The appearance of things when seen in accordance with truth is quite different from the appearance when seen under the influence of a powerless nominalistic philosophy which to a large extent harks back to Kant and the modern physiology based on him. And in the same way you would find several things, if you studied Spiritual Science. Read in my *Riddles of the Soul* which came out many years ago, how I there attempted as the result of thirty years' study, to divide human existence into three parts, and how I tried to show there, how one part of the physical human body is connected with the thought and sense organization ; how the rhythmic system, all that pertains to the breathing and the heart activity, is connected with the system of sensation, and how the chemical changes are connected with the volition system : the attempt is made, throughout, to recover the spiritual-psychic as creative force. That is, the change of front towards Natural Science is seri-

ously made. *After* the age of Natural Science I try to penetrate into the realm of *natural* existence, just as *before* the age of Scholasticism, of Thomism—we have seen it in the Areopagite and in Plotinus—human knowledge was used to penetrate into the *spiritual* realm. The Christ-principle is dealt with seriously after the change of front—as it would have been, had one said : human thought can change, so that it really can press upwards, if it discards the inherited limitation of knowledge and develops through pure non-sensory thought upward to the spiritual world. What we see as Nature can be penetrated as the veil of natural existence. One presses on beyond the limit of knowledge, which a dualism believed it necessary to set up, as the Schoolmen set up the limit on the other side—one penetrates into this material world and discovers that this is in fact the spiritual world, that behind the veil of Nature there are in truth not material atoms, but spiritual beings. This shows you how progressive thought deals with a continued development of Thomism in the Middle Ages. Turn to the most important abstract psychological thoughts of Albertus and Thomas. There, it is true, they do not go so far as to say concerning the physical body, how the spirit or the soul react on the heart, on the spleen, on the liver, etc., but they point out already that the whole human body must be considered to have originated from the spiritual-psychic. The continuation of this thought is the task of really tracing the spiritual-psychic into each separate part of the physical organization. Philosophy has not done this, nor Natural Science : it can

only be done by a Spiritual Science, which does not hesitate to bring into our time thoughts, such as those of the high Scholiasts which are looked upon as great thoughts in the evolution of humanity, and apply them to all the contributions of our time in Natural Science. It necessitates, it is true, if the matter is to have a scientific basis, a divorce from Kantianism.

This divorce from Kantianism I have attempted first in my small book *Truth and Science*, years ago, in the eighties, in my *Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung*, and then again in my *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*. Quite shortly and without consideration for the fact that things, when they are cursorily presented appear difficult, I should like to put before you the basic ideas to be found in these books. They start from the thought that truth cannot directly be found, at any rate in the observed world which is spread round about us. We see in a way how Nominalism infects the human soul, how it can assume the false conclusions of Kantianism, but how Kant certainly did not see the point with which these books seriously deal. This is, that a study of the visible world, if undertaken quite objectively and thoroughly leads to the knowledge that this world is not a whole. This world emerges as something which is real only through us. What, then, caused the difficulty of Nominalism? What gave rise to the whole of Kantianism? This, the visible world is taken and observed and then we spread over it the world of ideas through the soul-life. Now there we have the view, that this idea-world is to reproduce external observations. But the idea-world is *in* us.

What has it to do with what is outside? Kant could answer this question only thus: By spreading the idea-world over the visible world, we *make* truth.

But it is not so. It is like this. If we consider the process of observation with an unprejudicial mind, it is incomplete, it is nowhere self-contained. I tried hard to prove this in my book *Truth and Science*, and afterwards in *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*. As we have been placed in the world, as we are born into it, we *split* the world in two. The fact is that we have the world-content, as it were, here with us. Since we come into the world as human beings, we divide the world-content into observation, which appears to us from outside, and the idea-world which appears to us from the inner soul. Anyone who regards this division as an absolute one, who simply says: there is the world, here am I —such a one cannot cross at all with his idea-world to the external world. The matter is this: I look at the visible world, it is everywhere incomplete. Something is wanting everywhere. I myself have with my whole existence arisen out of the world, to which the visible world also belongs. Then I look into myself, and what I see thus is just what is lacking in the visible world. I have to join together through my own self, since I have entered the world, what has been separated into two branches. I gain reality by working for it. Through the fact that I was born arises the appearance that what is really one is divided into two branches, outward perception and idea world. By the fact that I am alive and grow, I unite the two currents of reality. I work myself up



to reality by my acquiring knowledge. I should never have become conscious if I had never, through my entry into the world, separated the idea-world off from the outer world of perception. But I should never find the bridge to the world, if I did not bring the idea-world, which I have separated off, into unity again with that which, without it, is no reality.

Kant seeks reality only in *outer perception* and does not see that the other half of this reality is *in* us. The idea-world which we have in us, we have first torn from external reality. Nominalism is now at an end, for now we do not spread Space and Time and ideas, which are only " Nomina " over our external perception, but we return to it in our knowledge what we took from it on entering into our earth existence.

Thus is revealed to us the relation of man to the spiritual world in a purely philosophical form. And he who reads my *Philosophy of Spiritual Freedom*, which rests entirely on the basis of this knowledge-theory of the nature of reality, of this transference of life into reality through human knowledge, he who takes up this basis, which is expressed already in the title of *Truth and Science*, that real science unites perceptions and the idea-world and sees in this union not only an ideal but a real process ; he who can see something of a world-process in this union of the perception and idea-worlds—is in a position to overthrow Kantianism. He is also in a position to solve the problem which we saw opening up in the course of Western civilization, which produced Nominalism

and in the thirteenth century threw out several scholastic lights but which finally stood powerless before the division into perception and idea-world.

Now one approaches this problem of individuality on ethical ground, and hence my *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* has become the philosophy of reality. Since the acquisition of knowledge is not merely a formal act, but a *reality-process*, ethical, moral behaviour appears as an effluence of that which the individual experiences in a real process through moral fantasy as Intuition ; and there results, as set forth in the second part of my *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*, the *Ethical Individualism*, which in fact is built upon the Christ-impulse in man, though this is not expressed in the book. It is built upon the spiritual activity man wins for himself by changing ordinary thinking into what I called " *pure thinking* ", which rises to the spiritual world and there produces the stimulus to moral behaviour. The reason for this is that the impulse of love, which is otherwise bound to the physical man, becomes spiritualized, and becaus the moral ideals are borrowed from the spiritu world through the moral phantasy, they express themselves in all their force and become the force of spiritual love. Therefore the Philistine-Principle of Kant had to be resisted. Duty ! thou exalted name, that knowest nothing of flattery, but demandest strict obedience—against this Philistine-Principle, against which Schiller had already revolted, the *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* had to set the " *transformed Ego* "which has developed up into the spheres of spirituality and up there begins to *love* virtue, and

therefore practises virtue, because it loves it of its own individuality.

Thus we have a real world-content instead of something which remained for Kant merely a faith-content. For Kant the acquisition of knowledge is something formal, for the *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* it is something real. It is a real process. And therefore the higher morality is linked to a reality—but a reality to which the " Wertphilosophen " like Windelband and Rickert do not attain at all, because they do not see how what is morally valuable is implanted in the world. Naturally those people who do not regard the process of knowledge as a real process, also fail to provide an anchorage for morality in the world, and arrive, in short, at no kind of Reality-Philosophy. The philosophical basic principles of what we call here Spiritual Science have really been drawn from the whole course of Western philosophical development. I have to-day tried really to show you how that Cistercian Father was not altogether wrong, and in what way the attempt lies before us to reconcile the realistic elements of Scholasticism with this age of Natural Science through a Spiritual Science, how we laid stress on the *transformation* of the human soul and with the real installation of the Christ-impulse into it, even in the thought-life. The life of knowledge is made into a real factor in world-evolution and the scene of its fulfilment is the human consciousness alone—as I explained in my book, *Goethe's Philosophy*. But this, which is thus fulfilled is at the same time a world-process, it is an occurrence in the world, and it is this

occurrence that brings the world, and us within it, forward. So the problem of knowledge takes on quite another form. Now our experience becomes a factor of spiritual-psychic development in ourselves. Just as magnetism functions on the shape of iron filings, so there functions on us that which is reflected in us as knowledge; it functions at the same time as our *form-principle*, and we grow to realize the immortal, the eternal in ourselves, and the problem of knowledge ceases to be merely formal. This problem used always, borrowing from Kantianism, to be put in such a way that one said : How does man come to see a reproduction of the external world in this inner world? But knowledge is not in the least there for the purpose of reproducing the external world, but to develop us, and such reproduction of the external world is a secondary process.

In the external world we suffer a combination in a secondary process of what we have divided into two by the fact of our birth, and with the modern problem of knowledge it is exactly as when a man has wheat or other products of the field and examines the food value of the wheat in order to study the nature of the principle of growth. Certainly one can become a food-analyst, but what function there is in wheat from the ear to the root, and still further, cannot be known through the chemistry of food values. That investigates only something which follows the continuous growth which is inherent in the plant.

So there is a similar growth of spiritual life in us, which strengthens us, and has something to do with

our nature, just like the development of the plant from the root through the stem, through the leaf to the bloom and the fruit, and thence again to the seed and the root. And just as the fact that we eat it must not affect the explanation of the nature of plant growth, so also the question of the knowledge-value of the growth-impulse we have in us may not be the basis of a theory of knowledge ; rather it must be clear that what we call in external life knowledge is a secondary result of the work of ideas in our human nature. Here we come to the reality of that which is ideal ; it works in us. The false Nominalism and Kantianism arose only because the problem of knowledge was put in the same way as the problem of the nature of wheat would be from the point of view of bio-chemistry.

Thus we can say : when you once realize what Thomism can be in our time, how it springs up from its most important achievement in the Middle Ages, then you see it springing up in its twentieth century shape in Spiritual Science, then it re-appears as Spiritual Science. And so a light is already thrown on the question : How does it look now if one comes and says : We must go back to Thomas Aquinas, he must be studied, possibly with a few critical comments, as he wrote in the thirteenth century. We see what it means sincerely and honestly to take our place in the chain of development which started with Scholasticism, and also what it means to put ourselves back into the thirteenth century, and to overlook everything that has happened since then in the course of European civilization. This is, after all,

what has really happened as a result of the Papal Encyclical of 1879, which enjoins the Catholic clergy to regard the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as the official one of the Catholic Church. I will not here discuss the question : Where is Thomism ? for one would have to discuss, ladies and gentlemen, the question : Is the rose which I have before me, best seen if I take no notice of the bloom, and only dig into the earth, to look at the roots, and overlook the fact that from this root something is already sprung— or if I look at everything which is sprung from this root ?

Well, ladies and gentlemen, you can answer that for yourselves. We experience all that which is of value among us as a renewal of Thomism, as it was in the thirteenth century, by the side of all that which contributes honestly to the development of Western Europe. We may ask : Where is Thomism to be found to-day ? One need only put the question : What was Thomas Aquinas' attitude to the Revelation-content ? He sought a relationship with it. Our need is to adapt ourselves to the revelation-content of Nature. Here we cannot rest on dogma. Here the dogma of experience, as I wrote already in the eighties of last century, must be surmounted, just as on the other side must the dogma of revelation. We must, in fact, revert to the spiritual-psychic content of man, to the idea-world which contains the transformed Christ-principle, in order again to find the spiritual world through the Christ in us, that is, in our idea-world. Are we then to rest content to leave the idea-world on the standpoint of the Fall ?

Is the idea-world of the Redemption to have no part? In the thirteenth century the Christian principle of redemption could not be found in the idea-world; and therefore the idea-world was set off against the world of revelation. The advance of mankind in the future must be, not only to find the principle of redemption for the external world, but also for human reason. The unredeemed human reason alone could not raise itself into the spiritual world. The redeemed human reason which has the real relationship with Christ, this forces itself upward into the spiritual world; and this process is the Christianity of the twentieth century,—a Christianity strong enough to enter into the innermost recesses of human thinking and human soul-life.

This is no Pantheism, this is none of those things for being which it is to-day calumniated. This is the most serious Christianity, and perhaps you can see from this study of Thomas Aquinas' philosophy, even if in certain respects it was bound to digress into the realm of the abstract, how seriously Spiritual Science concerns itself with the problems of the West, how Spiritual Science always will stand on the ground of the Present, and how it can stand on no other, whatever else can be brought against it.

These remarks have been made to demonstrate that a climax of European spiritual evolution took place in the thirteenth century with High Scholasticism, and that the present age has every reason to study this climax, that there is a vast amount to be learnt from such a study, especially with regard to what we must call in the highest sense the deepening

of our idea-life ; so that we may leave all Nominalism behind, so that we may find again the ideas that are permeated with Christ, the Christianity which leads to the spiritual Being, from whom man is after all descended ; for if man is quite honest and open with himself, nothing else can satisfy him but the consciousness of his spiritual origin.

# *PART TWO*

# COMMENTARY ON SOME PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF THOMAS AQUINAS BY DR. ROMAN BOOS

## PREFACE TO PART TWO

THE following passages from the writings of Thomas Aquinas are not meant as "evidence", or to "support" Dr. Steiner's addresses. The force that lives in the spiritually and historically powerful argument of these addresses makes external support superfluous.

These passages—with my comments—are meant only as a kind of "environment". I once spoke on the subject "From Thomas Aquinas to Rudolf Steiner" in a room at Cologne where mediæval paintings and woodcarvings were exhibited. I felt these works of Art were living helpers and several listeners felt the same. Such a "contemporary environment" can perhaps help some readers to feel more strongly the objective trend of the three foregoing addresses in all its importance.

And then, why should one not set by the side of all the books on Thomas Aquinas, learned and unlearned, thick and thin, on the market to-day, which necessarily destroy the form of his thoughts, a small selection of translations from the text, which are meant to be at the same time less and more; examples how the hand of Thomas Aquinas chiselled

the stone of dead logical thought into living speaking sculpture.

If one is not content to marvel only at the results of Thomas' thinking, but notices also how he had the power to take his thoughts " in his hand " and form them like an artist, only then does one see the immortality of this mind shining through the transience of his works. And then every man who is really conscious of the present time will recognize as an innermost event in his spiritual life, the spiritually and historically powerful motif—from Thomas Aquinas to Rudolf Steiner—with which the three preceding addresses are permeated.

DR. ROMAN BOOS.

# I

## THOMAS AND PLATONISM

IN the first address of Rudolf Steiner's, he dwells on that moment in the history of spiritual development at which Thomas begins his life-work. The most recent movement of the time, Arabianized Aristotelianism, which " no longer contained anything of Plotinism " questioned every result of Christian thought, such as the basic concept of Augustine —of whom Thomas says that he is imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists—among them, that conception of " Humanity as a Whole " which was a dim reflection of the old clairvoyant vision. By the " modern " thought imbued with this Arabianism—which had broken down the bridges behind it to the spiritual world of the clairvoyant visionaries but had thrown no new bridges in front of it to the discovery of individualism on earth—by man alone, therefore, and his struggle for knowledge now become abstract, the question had to be answered from the Christian spirit-life :—What is our relationship to a world of which all we know is from conceptions which can come only from ourselves and our individuality? [pp. 40, 41.]

Let us choose a part of the " Prologue " to a work by Dionysius the Areopagite, whose historical importance is made clear in the second Address [p. 54]. It is one of many proofs in his works of his split from a Platonism which was out of date, and whose position he regarded as untenable against the new Aristotelianism.

## Commentary on the Book of Dionysius " Concerning the Divine Names

### *Prologue*

. . . . It must be pointed out that Dionysius employs an obscure style in all his writings ; not because he knows no better, but on purpose, in order to protect the holy and divine doctrines from the mockery of unbelievers.

The difficulty of understanding these writings arises from several causes.

First, because Dionysius uses the style and expressions of the Platonists, to which the moderns are not accustomed. The Platonists, in their love of referring everything that is composite and material back to simple and abstract principles, set up separate species of things. They spoke of " man apart from matter ", and the same of the horse and other species of nature. They said, for instance, that this particular physically visible man is not the same as " man " ; but that he is called " man " because

he has a part of that separated species " man ". It follows then that a something is found in the individual physical man, which does not belong to the general human species, namely, the individual substance, and other things ; but in the separated species " man " there is nothing which does not belong to the human species. Therefore the separate man was called " man *per se* ", because he had in himself nothing which is not a part of humanity ; and also " man in the original sense ", in so far as " being man " is carried over from separate man after the manner of participation to physical men. Thus we can also say that the separate man is above individual man, and that he is the " being man " of all physical humanity, in so far as human nature is ascribed purely to the separate man, and from him is carried over to physical humanity.

The Platonists applied such abstractions not only in their discussions on the latest species, but also to the widest range of things, such as the Good, the One, the Existing. They propounded namely a First One, which is the quintessence of Goodness and of Oneness and of Existence, and which we call God ; and imagined that all other beings are called " good " or " one " or " existing " through derivation from that First One. Therefore they named that First One the Self-Good, or the Intrinsically-Good or the First-Good, or the Super-Good, and also the goodness of all goodness, or the Being-Good, or the Quintessential Substance,

in the same sense as was explained in the case of the separate man.

But this thought-technique of the Platonists does not harmonize with faith and truth in proportion as it is extended to the species which are separated from Nature ; respecting what they said, however, concerning the *First Principle* their view is very true and in harmony with Christian belief. Therefore Dionysius calls God at different times the Self-Good, the Super-Good, the First-Good, or the Goodness of every Good ; and similarly he calls Him the Super-Life, the Super-Substance, and Arch-divine Godhead, which means the Original Divinity, since the name divinity is also received after a certain participation by certain creatures—the heavenly Hierarchies.

The second difficulty in Dionysius' form of expression comes from the fact that he uses mostly irrefutable arguments in arranging his sentences and often compresses them into few words or even into a single one.

The third difficulty is that he also often heaps word on word which might at first appear superfluous, but which reveal themselves to those who ponder them seriously enough as containing a great depth.

The process involved in the consciousness of Europeans becoming individualized is expressed in the rejection of Plotinism with its special forms separated from matter. Agreement with Plotinism in what it

has to say on the subject of " The First Principle " and of the divine world of pure spirits divorced from all things of the senses is developed into a marvellous edifice of logical technique in the Commentaries on the thirteen chapters of the book *Concerning the Divine Names.* In this technique, applied to the visions of the Dyonistic writings is stamped out the other pole of spiritual and historical change in consciousness : " The problem, which formerly was solved by vision, is brought down into the sphere of thought " [p. 69]. The sentences with which Thomas closes the Commentary seem like a raising of the eyes from an impoverished consciousness which has gone from the security of vision to the loneliness of thought, from the departed riches of the spirit worlds of Plotinism and of Dionysius and Erigena :—

> And after the explanations concerning the expressions of St. Dionysius, whose intelligence is far in advance of ours, we demand to be corrected in anything wrong we have said. But if we have said aught well, thanks are due to the giver of all good, the triune God, who lives and rules throughout all ages. Amen.

## II

## MAN AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD

In the second address [p. 65] Rudolf Steiner shows how the most supreme problem, the " relationship of the universals to individual things ", can only be understood if we realize its connexion with the tradition, founded by the Areopagite, Plotinus, Augustine and Erigena, of the reality of an " intellectual world " permeated by " immaterial intellectual beings". This background of spiritual history showing the struggle over the problem of the universal forms of being and knowing is made wonderfully clear in the quoted Commentary, especially in the 4th Chapter (on the Good, on Light, on the Beautiful, on Love, on Transports, and on Zeal) in the seventh section of which the question is examined : " What are the movements of Angels and of souls ? " Thomas develops not only a knowledge-theory, but also a knowledge-Eurythmy, which, when one has once been caught up in its fanciful play, gleam also through the most abstract, theoretical thought-processes of the " Summa Theologica " or the Commentary on Aristotle. This movement playing on the understanding makes not only clear but also

capable of experience how the controversy over the universals is for Thomas a problem of drawing the line between the " intellectual world " of the " immaterial, intellectual beings ", which let their lowest margins, as it were, shine down so that the human soul can experience them, and the kingdom of the human soul, bound to matter, and assigned to the "straight" understanding [p. 66]. (The universals, which in the intellectual world are circular and curve-movements, become visible to human thinking only in straight-lined projections.) There is, unfortunately no space to dwell on this knowledge-Eurythmy, with its effects of Gothic window tracery.

Instead we shall give you an exposition of the " intellectual world ", in which Thomas sees the immaterial intellectual beings, which he calls the Angels [p. 65]. This has an important historical significance, because in it purely earthly-logical concepts of the understanding are built up to contain the knowledge of a world the contents of which were formerly revealed to supernatural vision. As evidence of this really " Gothic " strife, a few passages are given from the " Compendium Theologiae ", which Thomas wrote for his fellow-monk Reginald.

> It belongs to divine goodness that it bestows its own likeness on creatures . . . to complete divine goodness it is fitting now not only that God is in himself good but that he leads back the other beings to goodness. God therefore imparts both qualities to the creature, that it should be in itself good and that one should lead

the other to the good. Thus he brings creatures to the good the one through the other. The first are necessarily the higher creatures : for that which receives from a creator the likeness of form and creative power is more perfect than the other which receives the likeness of form, but not the creative power. Just as the moon receives the sun's light more completely—because it not only receives but itself gives light—than the shadowed bodies, which receive but give no light. Thus God guides the lower creatures through the higher . . . (Chap. 124).

Because the intellectual creatures are placed over the others, it is obvious that the latter are guided by God through the former. And since among the intellectual creatures some are placed over others, the lower are guided by God through the higher. Thus it comes about that man, who has the lowest position in the order of Nature among the intellectual substances, is led through higher spirits, who because they bring divine messages to man, are therefore called Angeli, that is, Messengers. And also among the Angels the lower are governed by the higher according to the circumstance that among them various Hierarchies, that is, sacred dignities, and among the separate Hierarchies various ranks, are distinguished (Chap. 125).

And because every operation of an intellectual substance as such proceeds from the intellect, the variety of the operation, among the intellectual substances, the variety of behaviour,

and the variety of rank, must be considered as resting on various types of intelligence. But the more sublime and serene the intellect is the higher and more universal is the reason which it perceives for its functionings. We speak of " higher " because the higher intellect has more universal intelligible species.

The first manner of using the intellect which intellectual substances attain derives from the fact that they have a share, in the first Cause itself, namely, in God, of the functional reasons, and consequently of its works, since God ordains the smaller activities through his reasons. And this is characteristic of the *First Hierarchy*, which is divided into three Orders, according to the three types of being, through which every active art shows itself : first the End, which excludes the reasons of the works ; secondly, the reasons of the works, in so far as they exist in the Artist's spirit ; and thirdly, the adapting of the works to the effects. Now it behoves the highest Order, in the highest good itself, which is the ultimate object of things, to be instructed in the effects ; therefore they are called " Seraphim ", from the warmth of love, for they glow at the same time, or burn : and the object of love is the good. It behoves the second Order to contemplate the effects of God's acts in his own intelligible reasons, in so far as they are in God ; wherefore they are called " Cherubim ", after the fullness of knowledge. It behoves the third Order in God himself to consider how creatures share the

intelligible reasons as applied to the effects, wherefore they are called " Thrones ", from having God in themselves.

The second manner of using the intellect consists in considering the reasons of the effects, so far as they lie in universal causes ; and this is characteristic of the *Second Hierarchy*, which is also divided into three Orders according to the three types of being, which belong to the universal causes, preferably if they function according to the intellect. Of these it behoves the first to pre-ordain what is to be performed, wherefore among the active artists the highest arts are those that are thus pre-arranged, and these are called the architectonic arts ; and so the first Order of this Hierarchy are named " Dominations ", for it becomes the lord to organize and ordain. The second type of the universal reasons is a Something, which gives the first urge to the work, and so has the first place in carrying it out ; and therefore the second Order of this Hierarchy is called " Principalities ", according to Gregory, or " Virtues " according to Dionysius, so that they may be known as " Virtues ", because the first step of a performance or operation is the most virtuous. The third, which is found in the universal causes, is something which overcomes the difficulties of performance, wherefore the third Order of this Hierarchy is that of the " Powers " whose office is to overpower everything which could stand in the way of the execution of the

divine command, and for this reason we ascribe to them also the task of restraining daemons.

The third manner of using the intellect consists in studying the reasons of the effects in the effects themselves. And this is the property of the *Third Hierarchy*, which is placed just above us human beings, who are forced to receive our knowledge of the effects from the effects themselves. This Hierarchy also contains three Orders, of which the lowest are called "Angels", because they bring to man as a message whatever pertains to their guidance ; wherefore they are also called the guardian-angels of men. Above them is the Order of " Archangels ", who bring to men as a message whatever surpasses the human reason, such as the mysteries of faith. The highest Order of this Hierarchy is called, according to Gregory, " Virtues ", because they perform works which surpass Nature, thus substantiating the message which comes to us as super-rational ; wherefore miracle-working is attributed to the " Virtues ". But according to Dionysius the highest Order of this Hierarchy is named " Principalities ", so that they may be known as Princes who stand at the head of separate peoples, the Angels known as guides of individual men, and the Archangels as the Spirits who bring to individual men as a message whatever concerns the common welfare.

And because a lower power performs its work in virtue of a higher, the lower rank carries out the requirements of the upper, in so far as it

derives its virtue for the work from the upper ; and the higher ranks have the qualities of the lower, but in a greater degree. For this reason everything in them is, as it were, communal ; but they receive their particular names in accordance with the functions of each order. The lowest Order has reserved to it the common name, as it functions by virtue of all the others. And because it is the business of the higher Orders to act on the lower, and the intellectual function is one of instruction or teaching, it is said of the higher angels, in so far as they instruct the lower, that they purify these, illumine and perfect them. Purify, in so far as they abolish nescience ; illumine, in so far as they strengthen with their light the intellects of the lower Angels, so that they can comprehend higher things ; and perfect, since they lead the lower Angels to the perfection of higher knowledge. For these three things belong to the acquisition of knowledge, as Dionysius says. But thereby is nothing lessened that enables all Angels, even the lowest, from looking upon the divine Essence. For when each of the holy Spirits looks upon God according to his own essence, one sees him more perfectly than another,—as can be understood from what has been said. And by how much more perfect a cause is seen to be by so much richer are seen to be its effects. The higher Angels in God thus instruct the lower in the divine effects, which they recognize first, but not in the Divine

Essence itself, which all look upon without mediation (Chap. 126).

The subtle thought which is employed in constructing this faultless logical column has provided in this treatise an example of what Rudolf Steiner calls "the highest flowering of logical judgment", the "highest flowering of logical technique" [p. 51]. This "Gothic" thought-technique illustrates—looking into the past—that "it remained an article of faith with Thomas, that in higher regions was to be found the revelation of these abstract concepts", for to *look* into an "open Heaven" did not require such Gothic arches. But looking into the future, there is revealed in this tremendous struggle of thought the urge of the question—reached but not solved by Scholasticism—"How can human thought develop itself upward to a vision of the spiritual world? . . . How can thought be made Christian? . . ." [p. 76.]

## III

## MAN AND THE MATERIAL WORLD

As man is bound up with " the spiritual world ", " the intellectual world " above him, in which Thomas sees the " immaterial intellectual beings ", so he raises himself from below out of the " world of the natural kingdoms ", in which human power of thought can find " those things which the spiritual world has implanted in the natural world " [p. 67]. This " implanting " occurs according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception not as a filling, as it might be, of some ready-waiting vessels, but as creative action.

Original matter Thomas does not think of as a vessel—not even as in the least useful for anything—but as " maxime imperfectum "—as, if one can so put it—perfect imperfection, as " maxime in potentia ", i.e., only in the condition of greatest potentiality. Every smallest degree of reality, of " actus ", of " forma ", must be *imparted* first from outside, from the spiritual world, and every " being real ", every " actus ", must ultimately originate in the " actus purus ", the perfect reality, God. Between the poles of " original matter ", the absolute

bare " potentiality ", and God, the " actus purus ", lies the whole material and spiritual world ; the one at the potential, the other at the actual pole, but in such a way that the light of the " actus " reaches to the nethermost, and the shadow of the " potentia " reaches to the topmost.

As an example of the struggle of Scholastic thought concerning the knowledge of " what has been imparted to the natural Kingdoms from the spiritual world ", let us translate a few passages from the Quaestio of Thomas " Concerning Spiritual Creatures ".

> . . . The more perfect a form is, the more it prevails over the bodily matter, which can be seen by considering the various degrees of forms. The form of the *Elements* (earth, water, air or fire) has no other activity than what is derived from the active and passive qualities which are the conditions of bodily material. The form of *mineral body* has a certain activity which exceeds the active and passive qualities, and which is connected with this special form through the influence of a heavenly body : as when the magnet attracts the iron, and the sapphire heals abscesses. Beyond that, however, the *vegetable soul* has an activity, which subserves in fact the active and passive organic qualities ; and over and above the range of these qualities, it develops still another function, peculiar to it, by causing nourishment and growth up to its set objective, and other similar things. The

*sensitive soul* has furthermore an activity up to which the active and passive qualities in us may reach ; what happens is that they are employed in compounding an organ through which such an activity is performed, such as seeing, hearing, desire, and so on. But the most perfect of the forms, namely, the *human soul*, which is the goal of all natural forms, has an activity which completely surpasses matter, and which functions through no bodily organ, namely, the power of intelligence. And since the existence of anything corresponds to its activity, the existence of the human soul must necessarily far surpass bodily matter, and cannot be quite contained by it, even if they are in some manner in contact with each other. Now in so far as the human soul exceeds the existence of the material body, and is in a position of independence of material support, it is a *spiritual substance ;* but in so far as it is in contact with matter, and communicates to it its own " esse ", it is a *body-form* it is touched by bodily matter for the reason that the highest of the lower Order is always in contact with the lowest of the higher Order, as Dionysius makes clear in Chapter VII, *Concerning the Divine Names*. Thus the *human soul*, the lowest in the Orders of spiritual substances, can communicate its " being " to the *hvman body*,—which is also the worthiest, to the end that soul and body become one, as do form and matter.

According to Aristotelian doctrine, however,

which Thomas never tires of defending against the Platonists, man is not something composed of these variously graduated forms. But the " most noble form " among all forms that have a material background, the " anima humana " has also the most exquisite " operatio ", with a power that includes all other functions.

> It is shown in the active and operative powers, that the higher a power is, the more accomplishments it has, and this not in a composite way, but as separate unities ; wherefore the more perfect form effects everything through a unity which lower forms do through a plurality. If, for instance, the *form of the soulless body* provides the " being " and the " being body ", and the *vegetable form* provides not only this but in addition life, and the *anima sensitiva* all this and in addition the power of reacting to feelings, the *rational soul* provides all this also, and over and above it the quality of being rational. . . . In the embryo the less perfect form disappears when the more perfect one appears. And if in the embryo there is at first only the vegetable soul, this soul is removed, when the embryo has attained greater perfection, as being the less perfect form, and the more perfect follows, which is at the same time the vegetable and " receptive " soul ; and when this goes, there follows the last and most perfect, namely, the " *rational soul* ". . . .

Originally, in Adam and Eve, the "anima rationalis" or "humana" was, according to Thomistic doctrine, blessed with "original justice", which gave it the power to keep the material body intact against the laws of matter, free from sickness and death. Since the Fall the body has been exposed to the material processes of "generatio" and "corruptio"—of becoming and disintegrating. But since every movement on earth—including that of growth and disintegration—is caused by the "heavenly bodies", man has been exposed in his body since then not only to the progressive movement impulses, which are thought, as impulses of growth, to proceed from the sun, but also to all destruction-impulses, which proceed from the retrograde movements of Mars. And from the body the intellect and the will can be clouded through the passions.

The heavenly body has according to Aristotle and Thomas a quite immaterial existence ; although it is present in the kingdom of matter as pure movement. It is material, not in the sense of "being" material, but in the sense of position. All its powers, specially that of light, are supermaterial, but moving and causing motion in matter. It is itself therefore indestructible, but the movements to which it gives rise in the Kingdom of matter can cause destruction.

In the Commentary on Aristotle's writing *Concerning Heaven and the World*, Thomas writes :

> The heavenly bodies are active, but not passive ; therefore they touch, but are not touched.

> Therefore also the tangible bodily qualities are not present in the heavenly bodies, as they are in the lower bodies, but in a more conspicuous manner, namely, in the *active cause :* for there is no cold or warm, wet or dry, but the power which produces such results.

For this reason the heavenly bodies can penetrate each other and all material substances. For they are not conceived as being " in heaven ", but—in the sense of the Ptolemaic System—as interpenetrating spheres, which all have the Earth as a common central point, and are so different in their individual movements that each of the seven Planet spheres preserves its own speed and its own forward and backward motion.

The eighth sphere, that of the fixed stars, revolves most worthily, the ninth and tenth, those of the Chrystal and shining heaven are, like God—the Prime unmoved Mover—motionless. In the lap of these all-embracing Spheres, spins the world.

The relationship of the heavenly bodies to the separate stars is such that

> . . . the Stars have no movement of their own, but are carried with the movements of the spheres, in which they are implanted ; not as if they were of a different nature, such as an iron nail embedded in a wooden wheel, but behaving as an entity of the same nature, in such way that the star is a nobler part of the sphere itself, in which the light and the operative power are

united. . . . All are round the central point, the Earth. . . .

These spheres are packed with the immaterial intellectual Beings, and serve them, with their " virtutes ",—principally with light—as instruments for their work on Earth.

But man ranges over the realm of matter in which the heavenly bodies carry out their works, with his " anima humana ", which is not only the highest body form, but also the lowest spiritual being, and ascends into the spiritual world above [vide infra. p 135 *et seq*].

Human knowledge is at the same time the highest activity of which an earthbound substance is capable, and also the lowest kind of intellectual activity, compared with the vision that belongs to the Hierarchies. From this standpoint of the " anima humana " follows with iron logic, carried into the most exact details, the construction of the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge.

## IV

## MAN AS A LEARNING BEING

AFTER explaining that there are no German verbal forms equivalent in meaning to the noun " Reason ", which correspond to the Latin intelligere, intellectualis, intelligens, and intelligibilis, etc., and that therefore he has retained the Latin words, he proceeds :

In a Chapter of the *Summa Theologica*, " Concerning the gift of Intellect "—that is, concerning the strengthening of the normal human reason up to the point of vision (through the gift of the Holy Ghost) Thomas clearly defines the place in which man stands as a learning being.

> The word " intellectus " contains in itself a certain inner perception : for " intelligere " means at the same time " to read inwardly ". And this is quite clear if one considers the difference between intellect and sense : for perception by the senses is occupied (note the passive form !) with external sensible qualities ; but perception by the intellect penetrates (note the active

form !) to the essence of things. For the object of the intellects is : *what* something is, as Aristotle puts it in the third book *Concerning the Soul.*

But that which is hidden internally is of manifold kinds, that to which man's perception must penetrate, so to say, to the inner side. For under the accidental qualities lies hid the real nature of the thing ; behind the words lies their meaning ; under similarities and figures lies the truth which is represented—for intelligible things are, as it were, internal, compared with the things that are perceived by the senses, which are thus externally perceived—and in causes lie hid the effects and *vice versa.* Therefore the word " inward reading " (intellectus) can be used in respect of all this.

Since man's acquisition of knowledge begins from the senses, that is, from outside, it is clear that the stronger the light of the intellect is, the deeper it can penetrate into the innermost things. But the natural light of our intellects is of limited power ; and therefore it can advance only to a certain limit. In order to penetrate further, in order to gain knowledge of something which cannot be gained by the natural light, man requires a supernatural light. And this supernatural light given to man, is called " The gift of the Intellect ". (*Summa Theologica*, II, 2. Quaestio VIII. Art. 1.)

The central question for Thomas, " What reality have these abstract conceptions ? " which man thus

" reads inwardly ", leads to the very heart of Thomism [p. 67-69].

Since things are the creations of God—as a house would be the creation of the architect, if he had also shaped all the building material from complete formlessness—their nature, their " substance ", is implanted in them—as " *universalia in rebus* "—and can be " read inwardly " in them by men through the " natural light "—the light of understanding ; and they can become the possession of the soul as " *universalia post res* ". But beforehand the nature of things rested in God, who saw it in self-reading through the " *lumen gloriae* ", the light of glory (the whole and each part in one glance, so that the difference between universal and special form as yet did not exist). At the time of transition of the plan of creation to the realm of the middle light, of the " *lumen gratiae* " of the Light of Grace, that was poured on to the Hierarchies there arises the division into " morning knowledge " and " evening knowledge ", of which the former proceeds from the universal to the particular, and the latter goes backwards from the particular to the universal.

Thus the quality " intelligere " is attributed to :—

(1) God in the light of glory, of " doxa ", of essential revelation.

(2) The Angels, in the light of grace, of " gratia ", because God " has created in the angelic intelligence everything he has created in the nature of separate things ", as " *universalia ante res* ", and

(3) Men, who must laboriously collect their

knowledge of separate things in " Natural Light " —since the loss of Paradise.

But just as not only an eye but also a legible book is necessary for outward reading, so also inward reading can only take place if something " readable " (intelligible), something knowable is visible, that is, a spiritual substance illuminated by one of the three kinds of knowledge light.

And a third condition of achieving knowledge in reality, is that the " Eye of inward reading "—the " intellectus ", is not too weak to grasp the fullness of the splendour which emanates from a spiritual substance.

> A thing is capable of being understood, in so far as it is in a condition of actuality. Therefore God, who is pure actuality with no admixture of potentiality, is above all things capable of being understood. But what is supremely capable of being understood is not so by any intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible over the intellect. As the sun, which is visible in the highest degree, cannot be seen by the bat, because of the excess of its light.

As Faust says to the sunrise : " It rises ! and blinded I turn away my eyes, pierced by pain ". By " excess of light ", says Faust :

" So let the sun stay behind me ", " we live by the coloured reflection ".

And Thomas says :—

> So far we may say that we see everything in God and judge everything according to Him, just as we know and judge everything by participation in His light. For the natural light of reason is also a certain participation in the divine light; as one may also say that we see and judge everything physical in the sun, that is, through the sun's light. . . .
>
> But as it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun in order to see something physically, so it is not necessary, in order to see something with the intellect, that the essence of God be seen. (S. Theol. I. Quaestio XII, Art. XI).

The light of reason, the natural light innate in man, is participation in the divine light—like the " coloured reflection " from the " excess of flame " of the sun. This " intellectualism " of Thomas—often criticized—is the deepest well of his mighty thought-power. As thinker he knows himself also to be God-protected—attached to heaven by the thread of light. His thought is full of the attitude of prayer.

And the consummation of this attitude in his thought are Thomas' proofs of the existence of God. They do not overstep the realm of the " lumen naturale ", but push thought to the very source of this light [pp. 69, 70].

> . . . our natural knowledge proceeds from the senses. Wherefore our natural knowledge can reach as far as the point to which the senses

> can lead it. But our intellect cannot stretch beyond the realm of the senses so as to behold the divine Essence ; for creatures that are dependent on the senses are the productions of God, which do not equal the virtue of their cause. Therefore the whole virtue of God cannot be known from the knowledge of the sense world, and accordingly also His essence cannot be seen. But since effects depend upon cause, we can be brought by them to know if He exists, and to know of Him what attributes He necessarily has is the First Cause of All, which transcends all. (*Summa Theologica*, I. Quaestio XII, Art. XII.)

This is just the personal experience of this age—we cannot penetrate by vision into the spiritual world [p. 70].

> . . . and God in His Essence cannot be seen in vision by the pure man, unless he be separated from this mortal life. For the reason that the manner of acquiring the knowledge *follows* the manner of existence of the being concerned. But as long as we are in this life, our soul has its existence in corporeal matter, and therefore it gains knowledge naturally of nothing which has not its form in matter, or which cannot be known through matter. . . .

But this modesty in the sphere of earthly thinking is not a lack of will-power. As the gold heavens of early Christian art disappeared behind the blue

curtain, there grew out of humanity the heaven-assaulting Gothic. And as Plotinism dried up, there arose the " gothic " thought-technique of High Scholasticism.

The " Sun behind " is only a temporary condition. In the transfigured body we shall one day see God in His Essence.

> As man's highest bliss consists in his most sublime activity, mainly in the operation of the intellect, either man would never attain this bliss, or it would consist of something other than God, if the created Intellects were never to behold the Essence of God—which is contradictory to faith. For in that which is the origin of his existence lies the final completion of the rational creature ; and a thing is so far complete as it attains to its origin. But it contradicts Reason also. In man there is natural desire to know the cause when he sees the effect, and from this arises wonder in men. If the intellect of the rational creature were not to reach the first cause of things, this desire of nature would have to remain in vain. Therefore it must be unconditionally granted that the Blessed behold God's Essence.

This " natural desire for the origin ", is the primary urge of Scholasticism, comparable with the plant-like heavenward urge of Gothic art. As in early Gothic there was no remission of tenseness, so Thomas never allows a " piousness "—of whatever

kind—the power to dispense the intellect from activity.

For Thomas the act of thought leads always upward, never to a lying-down to rest. His praying has nothing to do with beds and cushions.

> . . . God is not called incomprehensible because He has some quality which is not seen ; but because it is not seen so perfectly as it can be. . . .
>
> . . . What is perfectly known, is comprehended, and that which is known as deeply as it can be, is perfectly known. Thus, if something, which is capable of being known by empiric science, is held by one opinion, which originates from some reason of probability, that thing is not comprehended. If, for instance, someone knows by demonstration the proposition that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right angles, he comprehends it. But if someone assumes the opinion on the score of probability, because the learned say so, or the majority, he does not comprehend it, because he does not attain to that complete manner of knowing it, in which it is capable of being known. But no created intellect can reach up to knowing the divine Essence, in that perfect manner in which it is capable of being known. . . . For there is no limit to the knowledge of God. No created intellect can have a limitless knowledge of God. Now, a created intellect knows the Divine Essence more or less perfectly in pro-

> portion as it is fathomed by a greater or less Light of Glory. (S. Theol. Q. XII. Art. VII.)

The deepest work-impulse of Thomas is to limit as far as possible the share of tradition—based on outer authority and therefore probability—in the faith-content of the Church, in favour of what can be gained "per demonstrationem." He wanted to lead with the Gothic technique of his concept-temple those concepts " which can come only from ourselves and our individuality " far into the kingdom of faith-contents [pp. 41, 42.] To open up faith-content to the *understanding*—also in order to defend it against unbelievers—was the " main problem in front of Albertus and Thomas " [p. 72.]

This use of the intellect in the " natural light " supplies therefore on the one hand, weapons for the fight of the " Ecclesia militans "—and from this point of view Thomas writes his " Summa contra Gentiles " (against the "Heathen"—i.e., the Arabs) —on the other hand, it supplies foundations, on which the " Ecclesia Triumphans " can be built up —which is the object of the *Summa Theologica.*

For through grace—after death or even beforehand, through a miracle (as in the case of Moses or Paul)—the natural light can receive a lifting-up to the power of vision.

> When something is raised to a degree which transcends its nature, it must be given a disposition which is above its nature. If, for ininstance, air is to receive the form of fire, it

must be disposed to this form by means of a certain faculty. But when a created intellect beholds God in His Essence, God's Essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Wherefore a supernatural disposition must be added to it, so as to raise it to such sublimity. For as the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient to see God's Essence, it is necessary that by Divine Grace a power of intelligence should be added to it. For this reason we call the increase of the power of intelligence the " illumination " of the intellect ; and this is the illumination of which it is said in the Apocalypse xxi, 28, that " the light of God will illumine them ", namely, the society of the Blessed who see God. (*Summa Theologica*, 1. Quaestio XII, Art. V.)

Of those who behold God in His Essence, one will behold Him more perfectly than another . . . because the intellect of one will have more power or ability to see God than that of the other. The capacity to see God, however, does not belong to the created intellect according to its nature, but through Glory and Light. . . . Therefore the intellect which has a greater share of glory and light will see God more perfectly ; and he will have this greater share who has more of Charity, for where there is more charity there is more desire, and desire makes him who desires in some manner apt and prepared for the reception of the objects desired. Whoever therefore shall have more Charity will

see God more perfectly, and be more blessed. (*Summa Theologica*, I. Quaestio XII. Art. VI.)

But the inner drama of the Aristotelian-Thomasian doctrine of knowledge not only runs along an abstract line of development from the less perfect to the more perfect, but already assigns its quite special and distinguishing share to the lower steps of learning.

> According to the Platonists' supposition (that the soul carries all knowledge in itself but has forgotten it on account of its conjunction with the body, that all learning is a remembering and that the turning towards the world of the senses is mere imperfection) the soul is not united to the body for its betterment, for because of this union it is less intelligent than when separate, but this union is solely for the betterment of the body, which is against reason, for matter exists for the sake of form, not *vice versa*.
>
> But one might object that if a thing is always ordained towards betterment (and the direct turning towards the intelligible is a better kind of intellectual activity than the turning towards phantasms) God might have arranged the nature of the soul in such a manner as to make the nobler kind of intellectual activity come naturally to it and so that it would not have to be united to the body for the purpose.
>
> It must be noted that even if the application of the intellect to higher things is more perfect

than its application to physical images, still, the former mode was less perfect, if one considers how it would have been possible to the soul ; which is made clear in the following thoughts : In every intellectual substance intellectual power exists through the influence of the Divine Light. This is in its first principle one and simple but divided and diversified in proportion as creatures are further removed from the Source, as is the case with lines which radiate from a central point. Thus it follows that God knows all things through His one Essence. And if the higher intellectual substances exercise their intellects through more than form, still it is through less numerous and more universal forms (than the lower substances) owing to the efficacy of the intellectual virtue that is in them. But in the lower substances there are forms, less universal and less efficacious in comprehending, in proportion to their disparity in intellectual virtue from the higher. Now if the lower substances had the forms in that degree of universality in which the higher have them, they would not gain through these forms a perfect knowledge of things, because they cannot develop such an intellectual power, but only a general and confused knowledge. This applies correspondingly to men. For those furnished with weaker intellects do not gain a complete knowledge through the universal concepts of the more intelligent, unless the details are specially explained to them. It

> is obvious that among the intellectual substances according to the arrangement of Nature, human souls are the lowest. But the perfection of the whole demands that there should be different grades in the world. Thus if God had so arranged human souls that they understood in the same manner as the separate substances can, they would not be capable of a complete knowledge, but in general a confused one. But that they might have a complete proportionate knowledge of things, human souls are so made that they are united with bodies and thus gain a proportionate knowledge from physical things, just as uneducated people can be taught only through concrete examples. Wherefore it is clear that it is for the soul's good to be bound to the body, and to understand by turning to phantasms.

Thus the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge leads from *God*, who comprehends everything in *one* intellectual act, through the *separate substances*, which need ever weaker " universals ", to *man*, who must study the universals from below, by releasing the phantasms from things through the senses, and from these the species through the " active intellect ", and from the species the universal conceptions through the " possible intellect ". With these by thought, not by vision, he builds up his temple of knowledge through the kingdom of the spirits, to heaven.

As a background to the magnificent summary of

Thomas' doctrine of knowledge in the second of Rudolf Steiner's Addresses [pp. 59 *et seq.*], we will translate the short chapters of the *Compendium Theologiae*, in which Thomas gave his brother Reginald in compressed completeness the quintessence of his doctrine.

*Chapter* 78.—*That Man's Intellectual Substance is the lowest of the Species.*

As it is not the property of things to stretch into eternity, there must be among the intellectual substances not only a highest which reaches nearest to God, but also a lowest, which is nearest bodily matter. And this can be seen in the following manner : Intellectual activity is the faculty of man above the other animals ; for it is clear that man reviews the universals, the qualities of things and immaterial things, all of which are comprehended only through intelligence. Now it is impossible that this intellectual activity is carried out by means of a bodily organ, as seeing is through the eye. For every instrument of cognitive power must necessarily itself be void of that kind of matter which is known through it, as the pupil of the eye by nature is void of the colours. For the colours are known by reason of the fact that the species of the colours are taken up in the pupil ; but that which takes up must be void of what is taken up. But the intellect is in a position to learn with regard to all physical nature. Thus if it were to acquire knowledge through a bodily

organ, this organ would have to be void of all physical nature—which is impossible.

Further : every cognitive instrument is itself known in the manner according to which the species of the object known lies in it ; for this is for it the principle of knowledge. But the intellect knows things immaterially, even those which in their own nature are material, because it withdraws the universal form from the material conditions which create the separation. It is therefore impossible that the species of the thing known is in the intellect materially ; and it is not received in a bodily organ, for every bodily organ is material.

Equally is it plain that the sense is weakened and destroyed by exaggerated sense-qualities—as the hearing is by loud sounds and the sight by blinding light ; and this happens because the harmony of the organ is destroyed. But the intellect is rather strengthened through the exaggeration of the intelligible qualities, for whoever uses his intellect for higher things is able to understand the others not less well, but better. Thus if man is discovered as an intellectual being and his process of knowing does not take place through a bodily organ there must necessarily be some kind of incorporeal substance through which man comprehends.

For anything that can itself be active without body does not depend on the body according to its substance ; and all powers and forms which cannot exist without body can also have no

effectiveness without body. Thus warmth does not engender warmth by itself but a body engenders warmth by means of warmth.

This incorporeal substance therefore through which man comprehends is the lowest in the order of intellectual substances and that which stands next to matter.

## *Chapter 79.—Of the Difference of the Intellect and of the Mode of its Activity*

Since the intellectual Being is higher than the sensual, as the Intellect is higher than the senses, and since the lower by nature imitates as much as possible the higher, so bodies that are subject to growth and decay imitate to a certain extent the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, it must be presumed that the sensory qualities in their way resemble the intellectual ; and thus we can in some manner acquire knowledge of the intellectual from the likeness to it of the sensual. Now in the sensory we find a " highest " as it were, namely actuality, or form, and a " lowest " potentiality, or matter, and a " middle ", namely, that which is composed of matter and form. Similarly we must differentiate in the intellectual Being ; for the highest intellectual, God, is pure actuality, the other intellectual substances have something of actuality and something of potentiality according to their intellectual nature ; but the lowest intellectual substance by which man uses his intellect, is in

the intellectual realm only in the condition of potentiality. This strengthens the idea that originally man was made intellectual only as a potentiality, and subsequently by degrees was brought to actuality. Wherefore the intellectual substance of man is called the " intellectus possibilis ", or potential intellect.

### *Chapter* 80.—*That Man's Intellectus Possibilis evolves the Intellectual Forms from Sensory Things*

Now since, as already stated, the higher an intellectual substance is, the more universal are its intellectual forms, it follows that the human intellect, which we called " possibilis ", has, among the other intellectual substances, less universal forms ; and here is the reason why it evolves the intellectual forms from sensory things.

This can also throw light on another consideration. The form must be proportionate to that which is to be comprehended through it. Therefore, as the human intellectus possibilis among all intellectual substances lies nearest to bodily matter, its intellectual forms must also necessarily be nearest to material things.

### *Chapter* 81.—*That Man needs the Powers of the Senses for Intellectual Activity*

It is to be remarked that the forms in bodily things are composed of separate particles and are material, but in the Intellect they are universal

and immaterial, which the mode of our intellectual activity establishes, for we use our intellects "universally" and "immaterially". But this mode must necessarily correspond with the intellectual form and species, by means of which our intellects act. Therefore, since we go from one extreme to another only by way of a mean, forms proceed from bodily things to the intellect through certain media. Of this kind are the sense-powers, which comprehend the forms of material things apart from matter—we see, for instance, the particular form of the stone with the eye but not its matter—and on the other hand they comprehend the forms of things in a particular way—for the senses only comprehend the differentiated particles. Senses therefore, were necessary to man for intellectual activity ; and this is confirmed by the fact that if anyone is bereft of one sense, he loses also the knowledge which is dependent on that sense, like a man born blind, who can have no knowledge of colours.

*Chapter* 82.—*That it is necessary to assume an "Intellectus Agens"*

It becomes clear, therefore, that knowledge concerning things is not caused in our intellect through a participation in some kind of actual intellectual forms, that exist in and for themselves, or through their influence, as the Platonists and others who followed them, supposed.

Rather the intellect extracts this knowledge from physical things through the mediation of the senses. But because, as already stated, the forms of things are particularized in the sense-powers, they are comprehensible not according to reality, but only to potentiality. For the intellect works only universally. Now something which is in the potential state can be transferred to that of actuality only by means of some active agent. There must therefore exist an " agent ", which makes the particularized forms which lie in the sense-powers comprehensible in reality. But the " intellectus possibilis " cannot bring this about : for it is itself more in a state of potentiality with respect to the comprehending qualities, than active in them. Another intellect must therefore be postulated, which makes particularized forms which are comprehensible in potentiality comprehensible in reality, as light causes potentially visible colours to be actually visible. And we call this the " *Intellectus Agens* "—which we need not postulate, if the forms of things were comprehensible in reality, as the Platonists assumed.

. . . The " *intellectus possibilis* " is receptive of the comprehensible particularized forms . . . the " *intellectus agens* " makes them actually comprehensible.

*Chapter* 83.—*That the Human Soul is Indestructible*

" In this way the great logical questions of the

universals join up with the questions which concern the world-destiny of each individual," says Rudolf Steiner [p. 73] : How this chapter 83 joins up with the preceding chapter !

> In accordance with what has been said, the intellect, with which man comprehends must be indestructible. Every Being is active in proportion to its nature. But the intellect has an activity independent of the body, as has been shown—from which it follows that it is active of its own accord. Therefore it is a substance which subsists by itself. But it was shown above that the intellectual substances are indestructible. Thus man's intellect is also indestructible.
>
> Moreover, the real basis of growth and decay is matter, and a thing is therefore as far removed from decay as it is from matter. Things composed of matter and form are intrinsically destructible ; material forms are destructible through that which is bound up with them and not through themselves ; but the immaterial forms which transcend the measure of matter are definitely indestructible. The intellect is by its nature exalted above matter, which is shown by its function : for we comprehend nothing through something else, without separating it from matter. Thus the intellect is, in accordance with its nature, indestructible.

This confutes also Averroës, who supposed " there is no immortality in the sense of an individual con-

tinuance after death ". In the connection of problems as shown by Rudolf Steiner, Thomas in the subsequent chapters of the *Compendium Theologiae* collects together all the principal arguments of his powerful battery against the Arabic antagonism to individuality, by proving " that there is not one intellectus possibilis only among all men " (Chapter 84) ; " that the intellectus agens in all men is not a single one " (Chapter 85) ; but " that the intellectus possibilis and the intellectus agens are founded in the essence of the individual soul ". (Chapter 86.)

### *The Fight against Averroës*

For the fight against the denial of the individual by the Arab doctor and philosopher, Averroes (1126-1198), Thomas filled an arsenal with marvellously made and sharpened logical weapons. From this armoury let us take one argument—with which Thomas closes the terrific 73rd chapter of the Second Book of the *Summa contra Gentiles.*

Averroës' standpoint is : " Each of us has his own body, but not his own understanding ".

Thomas replies :—

> If the intellectus possibilis is translated, through its having taken up a particularized form, into a condition of real intellectual activity, it can remain real of its own accord, as Aristotle says in the third book *Of the Soul.* Therefore it is in our power to reconsider something of which we have once acquired know-

ledge, if we only wish it, without being impeded on account of the phantasms—i.e., through a failure to receive these " images " by means of the senses. For we have the power to form such images, which are proportionate to the desired consideration, unless there is some impediment on the part of the organ in question ; as in the case of imbeciles and those who cannot keep awake, for they have not the free use of imagination and memory. Thus Aristotle says in the Eighth Book of the *Physics* that the man who already has the endurance to acquire knowledge, if he is in a condition to be *able* to undertake contemplation, need not be translated from this condition into that of *real* contemplation by means of an external mover, apart from overcoming an impediment, but that he can, if he wills it, pass to the act of contemplation himself. But if the comprehensible particularized forms of all sciences lie in the intellectus possibilis (N.B.—which one must assume if one regards it, like Averroes, as One and Everlasting), the rôle of the phantasms with respect to the intellectus possibilis must always be of such a kind as the case with the man who has already mastered a science, and in consequence can formulate considerations of which without such images he would be incapable (N.B.—by calling them up out of his memory). But since man employs intellectual activity through the intellectus possibilis in so far as this is through particularized forms, translated into the condition of *real*

> intellectual activity, every man *could*, if he but wished, command the knowledge of *all* sciences. But this is obviously not so, for then no one would require a teacher in order to learn a science. It follows therefore that the intellectus possibilis is not One and Everlasting.

The " doctor angelicus ", the greatest theological teacher in Christian history throws his personal destiny—his spiritual profession of *teaching*—in the scales against Arabism. For Thomas wanted not to contradict Averroës only, but to smash him (as Dr. Carl Unger said in the last lecture of his life in the Goetheanum).* He fought with the whole force of his being for " the acceptance of the Word through the power of the Son ", (Unger). The acquisition of knowledge—to which the teacher should guide—is for Thomas not a breaking into a treasure-cave, where the " knowledge of all sciences " lies ready for him who knows the " Open, Sesame " ! but a nursing of spiritual seed, which is scattered in the earth, and must be tended with hard work, " in the sweat of his brow ". Thomas takes his metaphors from the realm of plant-life and light in order to make clear the relationship of the teacher to the seed in the pupils' souls ; as for example in the chapter on " The Teacher " in the great treatise on " Truth ".

There pre-exist in us seeds of knowledge, as

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> the first conceptions, as it were, of the intellect, which are at once recognized in the light of the " intellectus agens ", through the medium of the particularized forms which are derived from the memory qualities. . . . Every principle is included in these universal principles. Now if the mind is led out of this universal knowledge, so that it recognizes the particularized parts actually, which had hitherto been recognized only potentially, and, as it were, in general, then one says of someone that he acquires knowledge.

To pre-exist is understood by Thomas not—as by the Platonists—that " original concepts " are incorporated in man already before birth, so that his knowledge is a recollection of something pre-natal, but in the sense that before the process of acquiring knowledge begins there is created in us by God a seed of light, a seed of functional power, a " lumen creatum " and this is educated or brought out in the knowledge-acquiring process.

That every soul harbours in itself its own seed of light, which is brought to life by the " Teacher ", is the thesis that is upheld against Arabism.

But Thomas overthrows Averroes not only on his own ground—that of the teacher—but also on that of the " medicus ", the medical doctor, by an intensely fruitful combination of the problems of teaching and healing. In it he appears to be a forerunner of the splendid revival of Healing which in our day the greatest teacher of intellectual activity, Rudolf Steiner, perfected by the " strengthening of thought-

power ". (Cf. Chapter I. " True Knowledge of Human Nature as the Basis of Medical Art ", in the book *Foundations for an Extension of the Art of Healing according to Spiritual Science Knowledge.*) Rudolf Steiner overthrows the materialistic remains of the Arab treasure-hunt that lie underneath the weak-minded modern empiricism. (One digs for the treasures of knowledge to-day in " Handbooks ".)

> . . . . Learning is produced in the pupil by the teacher, not like heat in wood by the fire, but like health in the invalid by the doctor. . . . (Treatise *Of Spiritual Creatures.* Art IX. in conjunction with a polemic against Averroës).
>
> In healing, the doctor is the helper of Nature, the chief agent, since he strengthens Nature and adds medicines which Nature uses like instruments in healing.
>
> Just as a man can be healed in two ways—first through the sole agency of Nature, and secondly, by Nature together with a small dose of medicine —so there are also two ways of acquiring knowledge : first, when the seed of reason implanted by Nature in one comes of its own accord to the knowledge of something previously unknown, one speaks of " invention " ; and secondly, when the implanted reason is given doses by someone outside, one speaks of " learning " . . . . And one says also that one man teaches another if he explains to him by signs the forward steps which the reason implanted in him enables him to take. As one says of a doctor, that he produces health

> in the invalid in the realm of Nature, so one says also of a man that he produces learning in another in the realm of his implanted reason. And this is called " teaching ". And in this sense one can say that a man teaches another and is his teacher. But the light of this reason, through which these primary concepts are known is given us by God (is the " intellectus possibilis ") ; as also a likeness to uncreated wisdom (to " sophia " as the likeness of which on earth the " intellectus possibilis " gleams in the human soul). Now since no human teaching can have any effectiveness in us, but for the power of this light, it is quite certain that it is God alone who originally implants learning in us, just as Nature originally produces the healing power in us.

In this " Doctrine of Teaching ", in opposition to Arabism, Thomas opens up for a man a Holy of Holies, where he is in direct communion with the Creator : he fights " for the reception of the word through the power of the Son " (Unger) ; in each individual God speaks as " Verbum cordis ", the heart's word. There is no space to reproduce the " Word-doctrine " of Thomas, as it developed especially in the " Tractatus de verba ". Here only a few sentences are set out, in which shines that atmosphere of light, which is the greatest contribution—so often misunderstood—of Thomas to the history of Western spiritual thought.

> . . . . As one says of the doctor, he makes

health, although he works from outside and Nature alone from the inside, so one says also of a man that he teaches truth, if he only enunciates it from outside, but inside it is God who teaches.

. . . . The words of the teacher, either heard or read, in the education of knowledge in the intellect, play the rôle of things which are outside the soul. . . .

. . . . Conclusions are reached with certainty if they are referable to the primary concepts. Hence what someone knows with certainty comes from the inwardly created light of reason, through which God speaks in us, and not from man, who teaches from the outside. . . .

. . . . The teacher does not produce truth in the pupil, but knowledge of the truth. For the subjects which are taught are true before they are known : because truth does not depend on our knowledge of it, but on the essence of things. . . .

. . . if one says : nothing can form the mind of man but God, it applies to its highest form, without which it would be formless, whatever other forms it might have. But this is that form by which the mind is turned to the WORD, and inheres in it.

Thus, intelligent man is " turned to the WORD " through his highest form. From the philosophy of learning and teaching which he developed in the war against Arabism, Thomas passes on to the question : " How is thought made Christ-like ? " [p. 76.]

But he finds no answer to this question for the man who lives in the earthly body, but only for the man to whom—after the day of Judgment—through God's grace the earthly body, transfigured into the spirit body, will be restored [*vide infra* p. 180].

*Rudolf Steiner* has given the answer in our time : Anthroposophy, in which created man through the evolution of creative thought is joined with uncreated Wisdom—sapientia increata—that is the *Anthropos* with the *Sophia*.

# V

## THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE HUMAN BODY

" THOMAS could get no further than the abstract affirmation that the psychic-spiritual really has its effect on every activity of the human organism." [p. 96]

This " abstract affirmation " is—as emerges from the trend of the three addresses—in no sense to be taken as a toying with concepts invalidated by the " pale cast of thought ". The whole drama which surges in the background of scholastic thought, lives in this " abstrahere ", this " abstracting ", in this upbuilding of the scholastic-gothic cathedral. In this mighty building there is this abstracting, from the bottom to the top ; first, from the material things of the world, the " phantasmata ", the sensory images, through the activity of the senses; then from these images, the " species ", the special concepts, through the " intellectus agens ", and finally, the " universalia ", the general concepts, through the " intellectus possibilis ". But this " abstracting " from below upwards, through which man draws into his thought as it unfolds itself " post res ", what before

lay " in rebus ", is to serve the purpose of fitting the created human reason into the spirit forms, through which the Creator's power which works " ante res ", acts from the top downwards.

The innermost impulse of this " abstract affirmation " applied to the ideal transfiguration of the human body (which is found by Thomas to be a vision of the future real transfiguration of the risen body) appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas in the passage which Rudolf Steiner analyses as the dramatic climax : when the problems of creation, of human knowledge and of human individuality concentrate, as it were, in a knot. It is clearest in the answer to the question : Why one human soul differs from another.

> Since the soul as such (i.e. when abstracted from the body) is not composed of matter and form, the differentiation of one soul from another could only be *formal*, if they were differentiated only according to their existence as pure soul. But a *formal* differentiation involves a division of the species ; (i.e. men would not then all belong to the same class, but each would be a species in himself, which Thomas grants to the Angels, but not to men). But the division according to mere number within one and the same species arises out of the *material* difference. And the soul cannot have this material difference from Nature, out of which it is created, but from matter *in* which it is created. Thus, we can presume the existence of many human souls,

> which are different within the same species according to their number, if they are united to bodies from their own beginning, (i.e. if they have not a pre-existence in the Kingdom of Nature, out of which they are created) so that their differentiation originates from union with the body as the material principle, even if their differentiation originates from God as the effective principle. (Quaestion *Of the Might of God.* III. 10.)

In the chapter " Reincarnation of the Spirit and Destiny" of the book *Theosophy*, Rudolf Steiner carries on with compelling logic this Thomistic thought : " . . . . The man who rightly ponders over the essence of biography, comes to see that spiritually *every man is a species in himself.*" This means " secundam naturam ex qua fit ", according to the pre-existing individual "nature" which after previous incarnations enters on birth, the individual human being is a species of his own. The " materia in qua fit ", the bodily material, is no longer the " principle of individuation " though it may retain its full significance as the object, on which the spiritual individual, in accordance with his destiny, works.

But this Thomistic train of thought is a necessary preliminary, from the point of view of spiritual history, to the spiritual individualism of Rudolf Steiner. The second of the foregoing quotations comes from the midst of the fight against Averroës. The " material individualism "—if one may call it so —of Thomas is a fortress built of earthly stone as a

protection of human individuality against the doctrine of Averroës, who snuffs out the intellectus possibilis and individuality in a universal spirit. Man acquires—according to Thomas—his individual nature precisely by living in this earthly body, from which state (as one then pre-existing) God will after the day of Judgment vouch him eternal life in a transfigured body through the Grace promised by Christ [p. 180].

Each human body is, in the sense of Thomas, the concrete tool, by which God—if one may put it so—takes up the material with one hand from the realm of Nature, by Him created, and into which with the other hand, he impresses the anima humana through the first act of creation of each separate man. The so-called "Creatinism"—the doctrine that every soul at birth is created by God absolutely anew—is the inevitable consequence of a thought-system which through "abstract affirmation" would allow heaven to triumph *completely* over the earth in man, without having the disposal even of the powers of the human Ego, which have been acquired with difficulty through centuries, during which the Ego had to find and assert itself without God or spirit in the universe of material reality, suppressed by Nominalism with its feeble abstractions.

The whole force of "abstract affirmation", which lives in Thomas' effort to find a knowledge of the body, is an expression of the will: to get an insight into the working of God's "right hand", which by the preparation of the body of the newly-created human soul ordains the conditions of its

individual form, and therewith the conditions of its earthly and heavenly destiny.

### *God as Perfect Creator of the Imperfect*

The effect pre-exists according to its power in the effective cause. To pre-exist in the power of the *effective* cause, does not mean, however, to pre-exist in a less perfect, but in a more perfect mode ; even if pre-existence in the potentiality of the *material* cause is pre-existence in a less perfect mode, because matter as such is imperfect, whereas an " agent " as such is perfect. Now, since God is the first effective Cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a still more eminent degree. And Dionysius touches this thought when he says of God, in the book *Of Divine Names* : " . . . . He is certainly not *this* thing ; but He is *all* things, being the Cause of all." (*S. Theol. I.* 4. *II.*)

### *Of the Creation of the Body of the First Man*

Since God is perfect in His works, He gave perfection to all creatures after their kind. . . . He Himself is perfect by reason of the fact that He prepossesses all things in Himself : not in the manner of something composed of different elements, but simply and solely, as Dionysius says : that is, in the manner in which different effects pre-exist in their causes, according to

their single power. Thus, to the Angels He communicates His perfection in the knowledge of all natural things in divine forms, a perfection which is received by man after an inferior manner : for man has not the knowledge of all natural things. For he is to a certain extent composed of all things ; from the type of spiritual substance he has the rational soul. From his likeness to the heavenly bodies he has the differentiation from the opposites by virtue of the extreme balance of his constitution. The elements, however, are substantial in him, and indeed in such wise that the higher elements predominate according to power, namely Fire and Air, since life is passed agreeably divided between warmth, the quality of Fire, and moisture, that of Air ; but the lower elements prevail in him according to substance. For in no other way could there be a balance of the mixture, unless the lower elements, with their smaller power, outweighed the higher in man in quantity. And there is this justification, that the body of man is made from a clod of earth, for earth mixed with water is called a clod. Therefore, also, man is called a " small world " because all creatures of the world are somehow found in him.

Man's body had to be created out of the matter of the four elements, so that man might be in agreement with the lower bodies—standing half-way between the spiritual and material substances.

If Fire and Air, which are greater in effective power, were to predominate also in quantity in the composition of the human body, they would attract the other elements completely to themselves, and there could be no balance which in man's composition is necessary for the excellence of the sense of touch which is the basis of the other senses : for the organ of each sense may not have anything in reality contradictory, which the sense can test, but only in potentiality, *either* in such a manner that it is altogether free of every kind of this contradiction, as the pupil lacks colour, in order to be " in potentia ", towards all colours—which, however, was not possible with the sense of touch, since it consists of just those elements whose qualities it experiences—*or else* so that the organ might hold the middle place between the opposites, as is necessarily the case with touch. For the middle is " in potentia " to the extremes. . . .

All natural things are created by divine art, and are therefore equally God's work. But every master endeavours to give his work the best form, not simply for itself, but with an eye to his general purpose. And if this form necessitates leaving something out, that does not worry the master : as a master who prepares a saw for cutting, makes it of steel, so that it is fit to cut ; it does not occur to him to make it of glass, which is a more beautiful material, because such beauty would be an obstacle to its purpose. So God constructed every natural thing, also not

simply for itself, but according to His arrangement for its particular purpose, as Aristotle says. . . .

. . . . The primary purpose of the human body is the rational soul and its accomplishments. For the matter is there for the sake of the form, and the tools are there for the sake of the efficiency of the worker. I say, therefore, that God has given the human body the best combination in the sense of fitting it to this form and these accomplishments. And if something is found to be lacking in the construction of the human body, it must be remembered that such a defect follows from the necessary arrangement of matter with regard to that which the body requires, so that there may be the right relationship of the body to the soul and its accomplishments.

. . . . The sense of touch, the basis of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other creature that has a soul ; and for this purpose man had to receive the most temperate constitution. And man also exceeds the other creatures in the inner powers of the senses. (N.B.—The doctrine of the four inner senses—the social sense, imaginative power, capacity to reason, and the sense of memory, cannot be discussed shortly.) But from a certain necessity it appears that man falls short of the animals in some outer senses ; thus, among all creatures with souls man has the worst sense of smell ; for man had necessarily to have the largest

brain among all in proportion to his body, so that the accomplishments of the inner sensory powers could develop more freely, which he needs for the achievements of the intellect—and also so that the coolness of the brain might moderate the warmth of the heart, which again must be large in man on account of his more erect posture. The size of the brain is an obstacle to the smell because of its moisture, for the sense of smell is dependent on dryness. And similarly the reason can be given why certain animals have a keener sight and a finer hearing than man—because of the retardation of these senses which is necessarily postulated in man through the complete balance of his constitution. The same reason can be adduced for certain animals being speedier than man, since an immoderate speed is contrary to the balance of his constitution.

. . . . Horns and claws, the weapons of certain animals, the thickness of the hide, of hair or feathers, which serve animals as covering, show the preponderance of earthly elements, which are contrary to the balance and delicacy of man's composition ; and therefore they were not adapted to him. But instead he has reason and hands, wherewith he can arm himself with weapons and protection and other requirements of life in endless variety. So that Aristotle calls the hand " the organ of organs "—which, however, really applies still more to the power of reasoning, which is open to countless ideas, and

gives him an illimitable capacity to make tools.

. . . . The erect posture was given man for four reasons : *First*, because man was given the senses not only to provide himself with the necessaries of life, like the other animals with souls, but also to appreciate. So while the other animals rejoice in the senses only in so far as they are concerned with nutriment and reproduction, man alone rejoices in the beauty of things as such. And because the senses live pre-eminently in the countenance, the other animals have bent their eyes to the ground, in order to search for food and find nourishment—but man has raised up his countenance in order to be able to appreciate freely material things on every side, heavenly as well as earthly, through the senses and especially through that of sight, which is the noblest and reveals the greatest number of varieties in things, so that he may reap the intelligible truth from all. *Secondly*, so that the inner senses might be more free for their accomplishments, by reason of the fact that the brain in which they are perfected is not depressed but raised above all other parts of the body. *Thirdly*, because man, if he were bent down, would have to use his hands as fore-feet, which would destroy their fitness for carrying out manifold works. *Fourthly*, because, if he were in this position, he would have to seize his food with his mouth ; and for this he would have to have a prominent snout, and hard thick lips

and a hard tongue, as one sees in animals in order not to be injured by things. But such a construction would completely prevent speech, the peculiar work of the understanding.

Although man has an erect posture, still he is the furtherest removed from plants. For man has raised his upper part, his head, towards the upper part of the world, and his lower part is towards the lower part of the world, and is therefore arranged the best in accordance with the total arrangement. But plants have their upper part towards the lower part of the world (for the roots correspond to the mouth). Animals behave in a middle manner : for the upper part of an animal is that through which it takes in nourishment, and the lower part that through which it rejects waste. (*S. Theol.* Quaestio 91, from several articles.)

. . . it was ordained that the woman should be formed from a rib of the man. *First*, as a sign that there should be a union of a special kind between man and woman ; for woman is to be neither the lord over man—otherwise she would have been formed from his head—nor looked down upon by man as his slave—otherwise she would have been formed from his feet. *Secondly*, because of the Sacrament : for the Sacraments, namely, blood and water, out of which the Church (the Bride of Christ) has been erected, flowed from the side of Christ as he fell asleep on the Cross. (*S. Theol.* I. Quaestio 92. Art. III.)

## *From Thomas' Teaching concerning the Heart*

Thomas' teaching concerning the heart is the heart of Thomism. In the heart intellectual activity comes to an end : in the " verbum cordis ", in the heart's word, each thought takes a definite shape. From the heart every movement of the body, and therefore also speech, the formation of the " verbum oris ", the mouth's word, originates. The rhythm of the pulse-beat follows the laws of the heavenly movements : but disturbances of the rhythm come from passions that rise in the earthly body. In the heart given to God passions are purified into virtues : as, for instance, the burning red of anger becomes the illuminant red of charity. Here is translated a passage from Thomas' *Commentary on the Treatise of Aristotle " On the Soul "*, which shows how through " abstract affirmation " Thomas attempts so to " intellectualize " the form and movement of the heart, that all the manifold facets can combine with the imaginative and conceptual image already there.

> Aristotle says that the prime mover in the organism must be of such a kind that in him must be both origin and end of the movement, as in a sort of circulation between a convex and a concave form, of which one is the result, but the other also the origin. For the concave appears as a reality, but the convex as an origin of the movement. By virtue of its concavity the heart is compressed, but by virtue of its convexity

it expands. And because origin and end are contained in it, and the origin of every kind of movement must all the same be unmoved —as the arm remains still when the hand is moved, and the shoulder, when the arm is moved, and as every movement arises from some sort of non-movement—so there must be something at rest in the organ of movement, the heart, in so far as the heart is the origin of movement, but causing movement in something else, in so far as the movement attains its object in it. And these two, namely, the stationary and the moved are different in their behaviour, though inseparable according to their basis and their size. And that the heart must be at the same time origin and end of the movement, and consequently at the same time stationary and in motion is explained by the fact that every movement in a soul-endowed creature consists of thrust and pull. The thrust is that which gives motion, the origin of it, because that which thrusts something pushes it away from itself. In the pull is also that which gives motion, the objective of the movement, because the puller draws the pulled to itself. And therefore the first organ of the local movement must, in a soul-endowed being, be arranged at the same time as origin and objective of the movement. And there must be a stationary part in it, yet it must all the same be capable of starting movement; as in a circular movement. For a rotating body does not change its position as a whole

except relatively, because its centre and its axis remain stationary and stay as far as the whole and its basis are concerned in the same spot. Its parts, however, change their position not only relatively but basically. Thus it is in every movement of the heart. For the heart remains fast in the same place in the body, but moves in the sense of expanding and contracting, in order to produce the movements of thrust and pull. In one way therefore it is moving, and in another stationary.

With all this it must be carefully noted that the heart is not presented as a pump for the *blood.* Scholasticism has as yet no conception of the circulation of the blood. The movements of the heart's thrust and pull are rather regarded as a perpetually available supply, from which the soul when it desires to institute some definite thrust or pull in the body, transmits the necessary movement-action by means of the warmth that moves freely in the body, and the inner life-spirit, to the organ concerned.

### *Noble and Ignoble Bodily Qualities*

The teaching of " the foundation of the senses ", the sense of touch, is very closely connected with the teaching concerning the heart. We differentiate between hard and soft, warm and cold, dry and moist, etc., not (like colours and sounds) through an organ which is itself without the qualities it perceives, but through our body which is provided with these

qualities—but which has in the origin of the heart and lungs a general balance, and this enables it from " the golden mean ", to differentiate the extremes. The real organ of touch is, according to Thomas, the heart and lung region ; the flesh is only a medium of touch—like the " transparent " in vision and the atmosphere in hearing. From the formation of this medium, through which we are connected with the elements—particularly, as " earth-clods ", with the heavy elements—deductions can be drawn concerning the " nobility " of individual man.

In the *Commentary* on the 19th chapter of Aristotle's work on the sensibility of the senses (with respect to the treatment of the sense of smell) Thomas writes :

> Man has the most reliable sense of touch among all soul-endowed creatures, if in other senses he falls behind certain animals. Because of this he is the cleverest. And among the race of men we find from the quality of the sense of touch, and not of any other sense, that some people are endowed with talents and others not. For those people whose flesh is hard and who have in consequence a poor sense of touch are mentally ill-equipped ; but those whose flesh is soft and whose sense of touch is consequently good, are mentally well-equipped. And the other beings endowed with souls have also harder flesh than man. To this it might be objected that the capacity of the spirit corresponds more with the excellence of sight than

with that of touch, because sight is the more spiritual sense and reveals more numerous and more diverse sides of the senses. But against this must be said that for two reasons the excellence of the spirit corresponds with the excellence of the sense of touch : first, touch is the foundation of all the other senses ; for the sense is obviously distributed throughout the whole body, and what is an instrument of every other sense is the instrument of touch. And touch is that by which anything is characterized as material. It follows from this that if someone has a better sense of touch, he has a more sensitive nature, and in consequence a better intellect ; for excellence of the sense means a disposition to excellence of intellect. But from the fact that a man hears or sees better it does not follow that he plainly has more acute senses, or has a more sensitive nature, except in a particular respect.

The other reason is that the excellence of the touch-sense follows the excellence of the whole constitution or of the balance. For since the instrument of touch cannot be free from the class of touchable qualities, because it is composed of the elements, it must thereby be " in potentia " to the extremes, so that it keeps the mean between them. Good composition of the body results in nobility of soul, because every form is proportioned to its matter. And from this follows that men with good sense of touch are of nobler soul and acuter mind.

Touch is " Tactus ", tact ! " Tact " as a psycho-physical quality is for Thomas the basis of man's sense-nature, on which through the functioning of the intellectus agens and the intellectus possibilis he builds up the gothic cathedral of scholastic wisdom. How thoroughly " kneaded " the clod of earth is apportioned by God to each soul at birth—as delicate or coarse flesh—from this Thomas Aquinas, the scion of generations of highest nobility, the cousin of the Emperor Frederic II of Hohenstaufen, recognizes the " nobility of the soul " in each man.

But this bodily delicacy is already a foretaste on earth of the quality of that spirit body which the blessed souls will receive after the day of Judgment, through the transfiguration of earthly bodies put off for a time at death :

> Because the Blessed soul will be noble and virtuous in the highest degree, in tune with the primeval principle of the world, the body united with it by God's disposition will be substantial in the noblest way, so that the soul can keep it completely in its control, wherefore it will be delicate and spiritual as a breath. It will also be distinguished by the noblest quality, the glory of clarity. And thanks to the virtue of the soul, this body will be incapable of being deflected from its construction by any agent ; i.e. it will be impervious to all suffering. And because it will be completely obedient to the soul, as the tool is to the person who moves it, this body will be mobile. Transfigured bodies

> will therefore possess the four following characteristics : subtilitas, claritas, impassibilitas et agilitas. . . . (*Compendium Theologiæ.* Chap. 169.)

A comparison of this " Anatomy " of transfigured bodies with Thomas' doctrine of the Hierarchies [p. 66 *et seq.*] shows that the transfigured body will resemble the Holy Ghost in spiritual *substance*, the first Hierarchy in the *quality of light*, the second in *power*, and the third in *mobility*. It will be " sicut Deus " and will have assumed the characteristics of pure Spirits.

### *From Thomas' Teaching concerning the Passions*

But because substance, quality, virtue and mobility do not " in via ", on the earthly Pilgrim's road, have the perfection they will have " in patria ", in the Fatherland, the path to heaven must be fought for on earth by spiritual building as a guide to the soul's growth. In order to get at least an idea of the mighty edifice which in the second part of the *Summa Theologica* brings the whole medley of human passions under the influence of the virtues, some chapters from his Teaching concerning them are appended in conclusion. They make clear how Thomas throws the bridge from his knowledge of the body to the spirit world by means of " abstract affirmation ".

### *Of Fear*

> . . . in the passions of the soul the formal

element is the movement of the power of desire itself, whereas the material element is the bodily metabolism ; and both stand in a definite relationship with each other. Therefore the bodily change begins after the likeness and standard of the desire-movement. Now *Fear* brings with it a certain contraction of the soul's desire-movement. The basis of it is that Fear arises from imagining a threatening Evil, which can with difficulty be driven away. . . . But that something can with difficulty be driven away comes from the inadequacy of strength. . . . The more inadequate the strength is, the less far can it reach. And so there results from the imagination itself, which produces Fear, a certain contraction in the desire ; as we see in the dying, that nature withdraws into the inside on account of the insufficiency of strength, and as we see in the case of a community, that the citizens, when they are afraid, retire from the outer quarters of the town and concentrate as much as possible in the centre. And similarly with these contractions, which take place in the desires of the soul, there appears also in the body a contraction of warmth and life-spirits into the interior.

. . . but, as Aristotle says . . . even if in one who is afraid the life-spirits are withdrawn from the outer organs to the inner, still the movement of the spirits in one who is afraid and one who is *angry* is not identical. For in an angry man on account of the warmth the subtlety of the life-

spirits which arise from the desire for revenge, an inner movement takes place from the lower to the upper organs, whereby warmth and the spirits are collected round the heart. Hence it follows that the angry become skilful and bold to attack. But in the fearful, on account of the increased cold which arises from the imagined lack of strength, the spirits move from the upper to the lower organs, and so warmth and the spirits of life are not only not increased round the heart, but rather flee from it. Therefore the fearful do not proceed promptly to attack, but run away.

The man or animal that is always *suffering*, seeks every means to be rid of the trouble which causes him pain. Thus we see suffering animals belabouring themselves with mouth or horns. But the greatest help for everything, among animals, is warmth and the life-spirit ; and therefore Nature in pain collects them into the inside, in order to use them in fending off the harmful. For this reason Aristotle says . . . that air is provided for the spirit and the warmth which are collected in the interior, through the voice ; and therefore sufferers can scarcely suppress cries of pain. But in the fearful the movement is from the heart to the lower organs, and so Fear prevents the production of the voice, which takes place by the emission of the life-spirit upwards through the mouth. Hence Fear induces dumbness as well as trembling. . . .

Danger of death works not only contrary to

the soul's desires, but also contrary to Nature, wherefore in this kind of Fear there is not only a contraction of desire but also of the body's nature. The soul-endowed creature, when in imagining death, it withdraws the warmth inside behaves exactly as if it were in reality confronted with death ; and therefore those who are a prey to the fear of death become pale. . . . But the evil which *shame* fears is not contrary to Nature, but only to spiritual desire, wherefore there follows a certain contraction in proportion to the spiritual desire, but not in proportion to bodily nature ; and the soul keeps itself free from the movement of the life-spirits and the warmth, as if it were itself contracted, which results in their diffusion into the outer members. Hence those who are ashamed blush.

. . . the result of Fear is a contraction from the outer into the inner organs ; wherefore the outer organs become cold. This gives rise to *trembling*, which is caused by the inadequacy of the strength which holds the limbs together. But such an inadequacy is chiefly the result of a lack of warmth, which is the instrument by which the soul produces movements, as Aristotle says.

. . . because with Fear the warmth leaves the heart, going from the upper to the lower organs, the fearful tremble most in the heart and in the limbs, which have a connection with the breast where the heart lies. Therefore also the fearful tremble in voice particularly, because of the

proximity of the windpipe to the heart ; the lower lip also trembles and the whole lower jaw because of their connection with the heart. From this comes also the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and hands tremble . . . but possibly also because these limbs are more flexible ; which applies equally to the knees.

In the category of bodily tools Fear as such is always of such a kind that it prevents the outer accomplishment on account of the lack of warmth, which through Fear occurs in the outer limbs. But in the sphere of the soul Fear, if it is moderate and does not confuse the reason too strongly, helps to produce good by causing a certain anxiousness and leads man to reflect and act more carefully. Nevertheless, if Fear so increases that it confuses the reason, it hinders accomplishment also in the province of the soul. (*Summa Theologica*, II. 1. Quaestio 44, from different sections.)

## *Of Anger*

If we consider the nature of the genus—i.e., the nature of each man as a soul-endowed being, concupiscence is more natural to him than Anger, because by reason of a common Nature man has a certain tendency to desire what serves to maintain the life of his kind or of the individual. But if we consider human nature in the domain of the species, namely in so far as man

is a rational being, then anger is more natural to him than desire, because anger is closer to reason than lust. . . . If, finally, we consider the nature of one definite individual in accordance with his own temperament, then Anger is more natural than lust, because from a natural tendency to get angry, which comes from this temperament, Anger is much more easily let loose than lust or any other passion. For man is liable to be angry in proportion as his temperament is choleric. But among all juices, choler is the quickest roused, it—after all—resembles Fire; and so one who is liable to Anger because of his natural temperament, is quicker to become angry than one who is inclined to concupiscence is to become lustful. . . .

. . . In the sphere of bodily temperament it is natural for man, according to his kind (as rational being), not to have any excess, either of Anger, or any other passion, because of the proper admixture of his temperament. But animals, since they are far removed from this temperate quality, and are extremes in one direction or another, are correspondingly addicted by Nature to excess of one or another passion, as the lion to boldness, the dog to anger, the hare to fear and others similarly. But in the domain of reason both anger and control are natural to man, since reason in one sense induces anger, by making the cause for it conscious, or in another sense assuages it, in so far as the angry man does not entirely obey the

command of reason. . . . (*Summa Theologica*, I., 1. Quaestio 46, 5.)

. . . . the bodily metabolism stands in a definite relationship to the rousing of desire. . . . Every desire strives more strongly towards its opposite, if it happens to be present [p. 123]. The rousing of anger, however, is caused by an inflicted insult, as well as by stubborn opposition, and thus the desire seeks to the utmost to retaliate for the insult by revenge. Hence the violence and impetuosity of irate movement. And because the movement does not occur in the manner of a retirement, corresponding with cold, but rather in the manner of an advance, corresponding with warmth, it causes in consequence a certain glow of the blood and life-spirits round the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. For this reason, on account of the great Turmoil in the heart, which Anger implies, certain signs appear in the outer limbs of those who are angry. Thus Gregory says : " The heart inflamed by the pricks of Anger twitches, the body trembles, the tongue is tied, the face becomes hot, the eyes wild, and friends are no longer recognized ; the angry man shouts with his mouth, but knows not what he says."

. . . . Love is felt differently. . . . True, when a man experiences through insult a diminution of a beloved excellence, Love is felt more strongly ; and the heart is more passionately stirred to banish whatever attacks the beloved object, as if the flame of love grew and became

stronger through Anger. Nevertheless the glow following the warmth of love is different from that of Anger ; for the warmth of love is characterized by a certain sweetness and mildness ; it extends to include the beloved possession, and so is assimilated to the warmth of the air and the blood. Wherefore those of sanguine temperament are more inclined towards Love ; and it is also said that the liver, in which a certain blood-production takes place, urges one towards Love. The heat of Anger, on the other hand, is filled with a bitterness and desire to devour, because it urges one to punish what opposes it ; and therefore it is assimilated to the heat of Fire and Choler.

. . . . As a large fire quickly goes out after the fuel is consumed, so Anger by its very violence, comes soon to an end.

. . . although the reason makes use of no bodily organ for its own ends, bodily disturbances must nevertheless impede the rational judgment, because it is dependent for its functioning on the powers of the senses, whose activity is limited by bodily disturbance, as is seen in drunkenness or sleep. Now Anger produces a disturbance chiefly in the region of the heart, so that it is transmitted also to the outer limbs, and for this reason Anger of all the passions interferes most visibly with the judgment of reason.

. . . one says of someone seized with sudden anger, that he is open, not because it is clear

> to him what to do, but because he acts openly without seeking any secrecy. This comes partly from the interference with the reason, which cannot differentiate what is to be hidden and what revealed, and cannot think sufficiently for the cunning required for concealment. But partly it comes also from the breadth of heart which is a quality of magnanimity and this is caused by Anger. Therefore Aristotle also says of a man with large soul, in his *Ethics*, that he is an open hater and an open lover, and that he speaks and acts frankly. But concupiscence one calls underground and insidious, because for the most part the desired object of delight savours to a certain extent of disgracefulness and voluptuousness, and herein man prefers to remain unseen. But in those concerns which belong to manliness and excellence, man seeks to be frank. (*Summa Theologica*, II, 1. Quaestio 48, several sections.)

Anger, like every other passion, according to Thomistic philosophy, is introduced into the Soul, not by reason of the Soul's own spiritual nature, but by reason of its being tied to the body—i.e., from outside, in so far as the whole, composed of soul and body, undergoes the passion. In the Paradisal condition of " justitia originalis ", the body was completely subject to the soul, whose lower powers, from which the passions rise, were subject to reason, and the reason to God. Through the Fall this condition of " original justice " was lost. Christ, who had no

" passions " in the sense of Thomas' doctrine of the passions, because, for instance, his " Anger " was entirely the effluence of the Divine Will, and his "Love" entirely the "actio" of the presence of the Divine Spirit, has through his " Passion " opened up the way for man from out of the chains of the " passiones ". With the simple stress and the endless complexity of a Gothic cathedral, Thomas, in his doctrine of Virtue, with its base the Cross of the " passio Christi ", raises man towards heaven out of the fetters of their " passiones "—towards that condition of the future transfiguration, where the new body will be " impassibilis ", freed from the fetters of passion. [p. 180.]

But Rudolf Steiner states that " in the 13th century the Christian principle of Redemption could not be found in the idea-world". [p. 108.]

Rudolf Steiner's *Anthroposophy*, the *spiritual Goetheanum* answers the question : " *Where* does Thomism dwell in the present day?" In the spirit of the Risen Christ, who in the form of a mighty wooden statue appears in the double-domed chamber of the Goetheanum, Rudolf Steiner in the last of his three Addresses could say : " The *redeemed* human reason, which has the real relationship with Christ, *this* forces itself upward into the spiritual world ; and this process is the Christianity of the 20th century,—a Christianity strong enough to enter into the innermost recesses of human thinking and human soul-life." [p. 108.]

After seven centuries the Thomistic contribution to knowledge of the human intellect crucified in the

body, towering up from the Gothic ground-plan of the Cross, gives way to the contribution of Rudolf Steiner, envisioning the body and releasing and awaking the soul, a contribution whose " Goetheanic " plan is related to the Gothic Cross, as Easter is to Good Friday.