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
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THE
CONSTITUTION
OF
ENGLAND,
OR
AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
ENGLISH GOVERNMENT;

In which it is compared with the REPUBLICAN Form of
GOVERNMENT, and occasionally with the
other MONARCHIES in EUROPE.

By J. L. DE LOLME, Advocate,
CITIZEN OF GENEVA.

Ponderibus librata suis.—————

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
TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
WILLOUGHBY BERTIE,
EARL OF ABINGDON,
BARON NORREYS OF RYCOTE, &c.

THIS ACCOUNT
OF
THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY HIS LORDSHIP'S
MOST OBEDIENT HUMBLE SERVANT,

J. L. DE LOLME.



C O N T E N T S.


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THE
CONSTITUTION
OF
ENGLAND.

INTRODUCTION.

THE spirit of Philosophy which peculiarly distinguishes the present age, after having corrected a number of errors fatal to Society, seems now to be directed towards the principles of Society itself; and we see prejudices vanish, which are difficult to overcome, in proportion as it is dangerous to attack

them. (a) This rising freedom of sentiment, the necessary forerunner of political freedom, led me to imagine, that it would not be unacceptable to the Public, to be made acquainted with the principles of a Constitution, on which the eye of curiosity seems now to be universally turned; and which, though celebrated as a model of perfection, is yet but little known to its admirers.

I am aware, that it will be deemed presumptuous in a Man who has passed the greatest part of his life out of England, to attempt a delineation of the English Government; a system, which is supposed to be so complicated as not to be understood, or developed, but by those who have been

(a) As every popular notion, which may contribute to the support of an arbitrary Government, is at all times vigilantly protected by the whole strength of it, political prejudices are, last of all, if ever, shaken off by a Nation subjected to such a Government. A great change in this respect, however, has of late taken place in France, where opinions are now discussed, and tenets avowed, which, in the time of Lewis the fourteenth, would have appeared downright blasphemy: it is to this an allusion is made here.

initiated in the mysteries of it from their infancy.

But, though a foreigner in England, yet as a native of a free Country, I am no stranger to those circumstances which constitute or characterise liberty: even the great disproportion between the Republic of which I am a member and in which I formed my principles, and the British Empire, has perhaps only contributed to facilitate my political enquiries.

As the Mathematician, the better to discover the proportion he investigates, begins with freeing his *equation* from *coefficients*, or such other quantities as only perplex, without properly constituting it; so it may be advantageous to the investigator of the causes that produce the equilibrium of a Government, to have previously studied them, disengaged from the apparatus of fleets, armies, foreign trade, distant and extensive dominions, in a word, from all those brilliant circumstances which so greatly affect the external appearance of a powerful Society, but have no essential connection with the real principles of it.

4 THE CONSTITUTION

It is upon the passions of Mankind, that is, upon causes which are unalterable, that the action of the various parts of a State depends. The machine may vary as to its dimensions, but its movement and acting springs nevertheless remain intrinsically the same; and that time cannot in any shape be considered as lost, which has been spent in seeing them act and move in a narrower circle.

One other consideration I will suggest; which is, that the very circumstance of being a foreigner may of itself be attended, in this case, with a degree of advantage. The English themselves, (the observation cannot give them any offence) having their eyes open, as I may say, upon their liberty, from their first entrance into life, are perhaps too much familiarised with its enjoyment, to enquire, with real concern, into its causes. Having acquired practical notions of their government, long before they have meditated on it, and these notions being slowly and gradually imbibed, they at length behold it without any high degree of sensibility: and they seem to me, in this respect, to be like the recluse inhabitant

of a Palace, who is perhaps in the worst situation for attaining a complete idea of the whole, and never experienced the striking effect of its external structure and elevation; or, if you please, like a Man who, having always had a beautiful and extensive scene before his eyes, continues for ever to view it with indifference.

But a stranger, beholding at once the various parts of a Constitution displayed before him, which, at the same time that it carries liberty to its height, has guarded against inconveniences seemingly inevitable, beholding, in short, those things carried into execution, which he had ever regarded as more desirable than possible, he is struck with a kind of admiration: and it is necessary to be thus strongly affected by objects, to be enabled to reach the general principle which regulates them.

Not that I mean to insinuate, that I have penetrated with more acuteness into the Constitution of England than others; my only design in the above observations was to obviate an unfavorable, though natural prepossession; and if, either in treating of the causes which

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originally produced the English liberty, or of those by which it is still maintained, my observations should be found new or singular, I hope the English reader will not condemn them, but where they shall be found inconsistent with History, or with daily experience. Of my readers in general I also request, that they will not judge of the principles I shall lay down, but from their relation to those of human nature: a consideration which is almost the only one essential, and has been hitherto too much neglected by the Writers on the subject of Government.

C H A P.

C H A P. I.

*Causes of the liberty of the English Nation.—
Reasons of the difference between the
Government of England, and that of
France.*

WHEN the Romans, attacked on all sides by the Barbarians, were reduced to the necessity of defending the centre of their Empire, they abandoned Great Britain, as well as several other of their distant provinces. The Island, thus left to itself, became a prey to the Nations inhabiting the shores of the Baltic; who, having first destroyed the ancient inhabitants, and for a long time reciprocally annoyed each other, established several Sovereignties in the southern part of the Island, afterwards called England, which at length were united, under Egbert, into one Kingdom.

The successors of this Prince, denominated the Anglo-Saxon Princes, among whom

Alfred the Great and Edward the Confessor are particularly celebrated, reigned for about two hundred years : but, though our knowledge of the principal events of this early period of the English History is in some degree exact, yet we have but vague and uncertain accounts of the Government which those Nations introduced.

It appears to have had little more affinity with the present Constitution, than the general relation, common indeed to all the Governments established by the Northern Nations, that of having a King and a Body of Nobility ; and the ancient Saxon Government is “ left us “ in story (to use the expressions of Sir William Temple on the subject) but like so “ many antique, broken, or defaced pictures, “ which may still represent something of the “ customs and fashions of those ages, though “ little of the true lines, proportions, or “ resemblance.” (a)

It is at the era of the Conquest, that we are to look for the real foundation of the Eng-

(a) See his Introduction to the History of England.

lish Constitution. From that period, says Spelman, *novus seclorum nascitur ordo*; (a) William of Normandy, having defeated Harold, and made himself master of the Crown, subverted the ancient fabric of the Saxon Legislation: he exterminated, or expelled, the

(a) See Spelman, *Of Parliaments*.—It has been a favourite thesis with many Writers, to pretend that the Saxon Government was, at the time of the Conquest, by no means subverted; that William of Normandy legally acceded to the Throne, and consequently to the engagements, of the Saxon Kings; and much argument has in particular been employed with regard to the word *Conquest*, which, it was said, in the feudal sense only meant *acquisition*. These opinions have been particularly insisted upon in times of popular opposition; and indeed there was a far greater probability of success, in raising among the People the notions familiar to them of legal claims and precedents, than in arguing with them, from the no less rational, but less determinate, and somewhat dangerous doctrines, concerning the original rights of Mankind, and the lawfulness of at all times opposing force to an oppressive Government.

But if we consider, that the essence of a Government lies in the particular mode in which the public power (whatever may be its foundation, whether public opinion, or actual force) is distributed in a State; and that a total alteration in this respect was introduced into England by the Conquest, we shall not scruple to allow that a new Government was introduced. Nay, as almost the whole landed property in the Kingdom was at that time transferred to other hands, a new System of criminal Justice introduced,

former occupiers of lands, in order to distribute their possessions among his followers; and established the feudal system of Government, as better adapted to his situation, and indeed the only one of which he possessed a competent idea.

and even the language of the law altered, the revolution may be said to have been such as is not perhaps to be paralleled in the History of any other Country.

Some Saxon laws, favourable to the liberty of the people, were indeed again established under the successors of William; but modes of proceeding and particular laws are appendages, and not properly parts, of a Government; and when those laws were afterwards revived, or, to speak more exactly, adopted from the Saxon legislation, this was effected through a concurrence of circumstances peculiar to the Anglo-Norman Constitution. Satisfied, however, with the two authorities I have quoted above, I shall not dwell any longer on a discussion concerning the precise identity, or real difference, of two Governments, that is of two ideal systems, which, after all, only exist in the conceptions of Men. Nor do I wish to explode a doctrine, which, in the opinion of some persons, giving an additional sanction and dignity to the English Government, contributes to increase their love and respect for it. It will be sufficient for my purpose, if the Reader shall be pleased to grant that a material change was, at the time of the Conquest, effected in the Government then existing; and is, in consequence, disposed to admit the proofs that will presently be laid before him, of such change having paved the way for the establishment of the present English Constitution.

This sort of Government prevailed also in almost all the other parts of Europe. But, instead of being established by dint of arms and all at once, as in England, it had only been formed on the Continent, and particularly in France, through a long series of slow successive events; a difference of circumstances this, from which consequences were in time to arise, as important as they were at first difficult to be foreseen.

The German Nations who passed the Rhine to conquer Gaul, were in a great degree independent. Their Princes had no other title to their power, but their own valour and the free election of the People; and as these had acquired in their forests but contracted notions of sovereign authority, they followed a Chief, less in quality of Subjects, than as companions in conquest.

Besides, this conquest was not the irruption of a foreign army which only takes possession of fortified towns; it was the general invasion of a whole People, in search of new habitations. And as the number of the Conquerors bore a great proportion to that of

the conquered, who were at the same time enervated by long peace, the expedition was no sooner compleated than all danger was at an end; and, of course, their union also. After dividing among themselves what lands they thought proper to occupy, they separated; and though their tenure was at first precarious, yet, in this particular, they depended not on the King, but on the general assembly of the Nation. (*a*)

Under the Kings of *the first race*, the fiefs, by the mutual connivance of the Leaders, at first were annual; afterwards, held for life. Under the descendants of Charlemain, they became hereditary: (*b*) and when, at length, Hugh Capet effected his own election to the prejudice of Charles of Lorraine, intending to render the Crown, which in fact was a fief;

(*a*) The fiefs were originally called, *terræ jure beneficii concessæ*; and it was not till under Charles le Gros the term *fief* began to be in use.—See *Beneficium Gloss. de Du Cange*.

(*b*) *Apud Francos vero, sensim pedetentimque, jure hæreditario ad hæredes subinde transferunt feuda; quod labente sæculo nono incipit.* See *Feudum*—Du Cange.

hereditary in his own family, (a) he established the hereditaryship of fiefs as a general principle; and, from this epoch, authors date the complete establishment of the feudal system in France.

On the other hand, the Lords who gave their suffrages to Hugh Capet, forgot not the interest of their own ambition. They completed the breach of those feeble ties which subjected them to the royal authority, and became every where independent. They left the King no jurisdiction either over themselves, or their vassals; they reserved the right of waging war with each other; they even assumed the same privilege, in certain cases, with regard to the King himself. (b) If Hugh

(a) Hottoman has proved beyond a doubt, in his *Franco-gallia*, that under the two first races of Kings the Crown of France was elective. The Princes of the reigning family had nothing more in their favour, than the custom of chusing one of that house.

(b) The principal of these cases was when the King refused to appoint Judges to decide a difference between himself and one of his first Barons: the latter had then a right to take up arms against the King; and the subordinate Vassals were so dependent on their immediate Lords, that they were

Capet, therefore, by rendering the Crown hereditary, laid the foundation of the power of his family, and of the Crown itself, yet he added little to his own authority, and acquired scarcely any thing more than a nominal superiority over the number of Sovereigns who then swarmed in France. (*a*)

But the establishment of the feudal system was, in England, an immediate and sudden consequence of that conquest which introduced it. Besides, this conquest was made by a Prince who kept the greater part of his army in his own pay, and who was placed at the head of a People over whom he was

obliged to follow them against the Lord Paramount. St. Louis, though the power of the Crown was in his time much increased, was obliged to confirm both this privilege of the first Barons, and this obligation of their Vassals.

(*a*) “The Grandees of the Kingdom,” says Mezeray, “thought that Hugh Capet ought to put up with all their insults, because they had placed the Crown on his head: nay, so great was their licentiousness, that on his writing to Audebert, Viscount of Perigueux, ordering him to raise the siege he had laid to Tours, and asking him, by way of reproach, who had made him a Viscount? that Norman haughtily answered, *Not you, but those who made you a King.* [Non pas vous, mais ceux qui vous ont fait Roi.]”

an hereditary Sovereign : circumstances, which gave a totally different turn to the Government of that Kingdom.

Surrounded by a warlike, though a conquered Nation, William kept on foot a part of his army. The English, and after them the Normans themselves, having revolted, he crushed both ; and the new King of England, at the head of victorious troops, having to do with two nations at enmity with each other, lying under a reciprocal check, and equally subdued by a sense of their unfortunate resistance, found himself in the most favourable circumstances for becoming an absolute Monarch ; and his laws, thus promulgated in the midst, as it were, of thunder and lightning, imposed the yoke of despotism, both on the victors and the vanquished.

He divided England into sixty thousand two hundred and fifteen military fiefs, all held of the Crown ; the possessors of which were, on pain of forfeiture, to take up arms and repair to his standard on the first signal : he subjected not only the common people, but even the barons, to all the rigours of

the feudal Government. He even imposed on them his tyrannical forest laws. (a)

He assumed the prerogative of imposing taxes: he invested himself with the whole executive power of Government. But what was of the greatest consequence, he arrogated to himself the most extensive judicial power in the establishment of the Court which was called *Aula Regis*; a formidable Tribunal, which received appeals from all the Courts of the Barons; and decided in the last resort on the estates, honour, and lives, of the Barons themselves; and which, being wholly composed of the great officers of the Crown, removable at the King's pleasure, and having the King himself for President, held the first Nobleman in the Kingdom under the same controul as the meanest subject.

(a) He reserved to himself an exclusive privilege of killing game throughout all England, and enacted the severest penalties on all who should attempt it without his permission. The suppression, or rather mitigation, of these penalties, was one of the articles of the *Charta de Foresta*, which the Barons afterwards obtained by force of arms. *Nullus de cetero amittat vitam, vel membra, pro venatione nostrâ.* Ch. de Foresta, Art. 10.

Thus, while the Kingdom of France, in consequence of the slow and gradual formation of the feudal Government, found itself to be in the issue only a number of parts, simply placed by each other, and without any reciprocal adherence; the Kingdom of England, on the contrary, in consequence of the sudden and violent introduction of the same system, became a compound of parts united by the strongest ties; and the regal Authority, by the pressure of its immense weight, consolidated the whole into one compact indissoluble body.

It is to this difference in the original Constitution of France and England, that is, in the original power of their Kings, that we must attribute the difference, so little analogous to its cause, of their present Constitutions. It is this which furnishes the solution of a problem, which, I must confess, for a long time perplexed me; and explains the reason why, of two neighbouring Nations, situated almost under the same climate, and having one common origin, the one has attained the summit of liberty, the other has

gradually sunk under the most absolute Monarchy.

In France the royal Authority was indeed inconsiderable; but this circumstance by no means favoured general liberty. The Lords were every thing; and the bulk of the Nation were accounted nothing. All those wars which were made on the King, had not liberty for their object; for of this their Chiefs already enjoyed but too great a share: they were the mere effects of private ambition or caprice. The People did not engage in them as associates in the support of a cause common to all; they were dragged, blindfold and like slaves, to the standard of their Leaders. In the mean time, as the laws, by which their Masters were Vassals, had no relation to those by which they were themselves bound as subjects; the resistance, of which they were made the instruments, never produced any advantageous consequence in their favour; nor did it establish any principle of freedom that could in any case be applicable to them.

The inferior Nobles, who shared in the independence of the superior Nobility, added also the

effects of their own insolence to the despotism of so many Sovereigns; and the people, wearied out by their sufferings, and rendered desperate by oppression, at times attempted to revolt: but, being parcelled out into so many different States, they never could agree, either on the nature of their complaints, or the time of preferring them; the insurrections, which ought to have been general, were only successive and particular: in the mean time the Lords, uniting to avenge their common cause as Masters, fell with irresistible advantage on Men who were thus divided; the People were separately, and by dint of arms, brought back to their former yoke; and Liberty, that precious offspring which requires so many favourable circumstances to foster it, was every where stifled in its birth. (a)

At length, when by Conquests, by escheats, or by Treaties, the several provinces came to

(a) It may be seen in Mezeray, how the Flemings, during the great revolt which was caused, as he says, "by the inveterate hatred of the Nobles (les Gentils-hommes) against the people of Ghent," were crushed by the union of almost all the Nobility of France.—See *Mezeray, Reign of Charles VI.*

be *united* (a) to the extensive and continually increasing dominions of the Monarch, they became subjects of their new Master, already trained to obedience. The few privileges, which the Cities had been able to preserve, were little respected by a Sovereign who had himself entered into no engagement to

(a) The word *union* expresses in the French law, or History, the reduction of a Province to an immediate dependence on the Crown. The French Lawyers, who were at all times remarkably zealous for the aggrandisement of the Crown (a zeal which would not have been blameable, if it had been exerted only in the suppression of lawless Aristocracy) always contended, that when a province once came into the possession of the King, even any private dominion of his before he acceded to the Throne, it became *united* for ever: the *Ordonnance* of Moulins, in the year 1566, has since given a thorough sanction to these principles. The union of a province might be occasioned, first, by the case just mentioned, of the accession of the possessor of it to the Throne: thus at the accession of Henry IV. (the daughter of the late King being excluded by the Salic law) Navarre and Bearn were *united*. Secondly, by the felony of the possessor, when the King was able to enforce, by dint of arms, the judgment passed by the Judges he had appointed: thus the small Lordship of Rambouillet was seized upon by Hugh Capet, on which authors remark that it was the first dominion that was *united*; and the Dutchy of Normandy was afterwards taken in the same manner by Philip Augustus from John, King of England, condemned for the murder of Arthur Duke of Brittany. Thirdly, by the last will of the possessor:

that purpose; and, as the unions were made at different times, the King was always in a condition to overwhelm every new Province that accrued to him, with the weight of all those he already possessed.

As a farther consequence of this difference between the times of the *unions*, the several parts

Provence was united in this manner, under the reign of Lewis XI. Fourthly, by intermarriages: this was the case of the County of Champagne, under Philip the Fair; and of Brittany, under Francis I. Fifthly, by the failure of heirs of the blood, and sometimes of heirs male: thus Burgundy was seized upon by Lewis XI. after the death of Charles the Bold, Duke of that province. Lastly, by purchases: thus Philip of Valois purchased the Barony of Montpellier; Henry IV. the Marquisat of Saluces; and Lewis XIII. the Principality of Sedan, &c.

Thus those different Provinces, which, with others united after a like manner, now compose the French Monarchy, not only conferred on their respective Sovereigns different titles, but also differed from each other with respect to the laws which they followed, and still follow: the one are governed by the Roman law, and are called *Pays de Droit écrit*; the others follow particular customs, which in process of time were set down in writing, and are called *Pays de Droit Coutumier*. In those provinces the people had, at times, purchased privileges from their Princes, which in the different provinces were also different, according to the wants and temper of the Princes who granted them.

of the Kingdom could entertain no views of assisting each other. When the one reclaimed its privileges, the others, long since reduced to subjection, had already forgotten theirs. Besides, those privileges, by reason of the difference in the Governments under which the Provinces had formerly been held, were also almost every where different; the circumstances which happened in one place, bore of course little affinity to those which fell out in another; the spirit of union was lost, or rather had never existed; each province, restrained within its particular bounds, only served to enforce a general submission, and the same causes which had reduced that warlike, spirited Nation, to a yoke of subjection, concurred also to keep them under it.

Thus Liberty perished in France, because it wanted a favourable culture and proper situation. Planted, if I may so express myself, but just beneath the surface, it presently expanded, and sent forth some large shoots; but having taken no root, it was soon plucked up. In England, on the contrary, the seed

lying at a great depth, and being covered with an enormous weight, seemed at first to be smothered; but it vegetated with the greater force; it imbibed a more rich and abundant nourishment; its sap and juice became better assimilated, and it penetrated and filled up with its roots the whole body of the soil. It was the excessive power of the King which made England free, because it was this very excess that gave rise to the spirit of union, and of regulated resistance. Possessed of extensive demesnes, the King beheld himself independent; vested with the most formidable prerogatives, he crushed at pleasure the most powerful Barons in the Realm: it was only by close and numerous confederacies, therefore, that these could resist his tyranny; they even were compelled to associate the People in them, and really to interest them in the vindication of public Liberty.

Assembled with their Vassals in their great Halls, where they dispensed their hospitality, deprived of the amusements of more polished Nations, naturally inclined, besides, freely to expatiate on objects of which their hearts were

full, their conversation naturally turned on the injustice of the public impositions, on the tyranny of the judicial proceedings, and, above all, on the detested forest laws.

Destitute of an opportunity of cavilling about the meaning of laws of which the terms were precise, or rather disdaining the resource of Sophistry, they were naturally led to examine into the first principles of Society; they inquired into the foundations of human authority, and became convinced that Power, when its object is not the good of those who are subject to it, is nothing more than the *right of the strongest*, and may be repressed by the exertion of a similar right.

The different orders of the feudal Government, as established in England, being connected by tenures exactly similar, the same maxims which were laid down as true against the Lord paramount, in behalf of the Lord of an upper fief, were also to be admitted against the latter, in behalf of the owner of an inferior fief: the same maxims were applied to the possessor of a still lower fief: they descended to the freeman,

and to the peasant; and the spirit of liberty, after having circulated through the different branches of the feudal subordination, continued to flow through successive homogeneous channels; it forced to itself a passage into the remotest ramifications, and the principle of primeval equality every where diffused and *established* itself. A sacred principle, which neither injustice nor ambition can erase; which exists in every breast, and, to exert itself, requires only to be awakened among the numerous and oppressed classes of Mankind.

But when the Barons, whom their personal consequence had at first caused to be treated with caution and regard by the Sovereign, began to be no longer so, when the tyrannical laws of the Conqueror became still more tyrannically executed, the confederacy for which the general oppression had paved the way, instantly took place. The Lord, the Vassal, the inferior Vassal, all united. They even implored the assistance of the peasants and cottagers; and the haughty aversion, with which all over the Continent the Nobility repaid the industrious hands which fed them, was, in England, compelled to

yield to the pressing necessity of setting bounds to the Royal authority.

The People, on the other hand, knew that the cause they were called upon to defend, was a cause common to all; and they were sensible, besides, that they were the necessary supporters of it. Instructed by the example of their Leaders, they spoke and stipulated conditions for themselves: they insisted that, for the future, every individual should be intitled to the protection of the law; and thus those rights with which the Lords had strengthened themselves, in order to oppose the tyranny of the Crown, became a bulwark which was, in time, to restrain their own.

CHAPTER II.

A second advantage England had over France—it formed one undivided State.

IT was in the reign of Henry the First, about forty years after the Conquest, that we see the above causes begin to operate. This Prince, having ascended the Throne to the exclusion of his elder brother, was sensible that he

had no other means to maintain his power than by gaining the affection of his subjects; but, at the same time, he perceived that it must be the affection of the whole Nation: he, therefore, not only mitigated the rigour of the feudal laws in favour of the Lords, but also annexed as a condition to the Charter he granted, that the Lords should allow the same freedom to their respective Vassals. Care was even taken to abolish those laws of the Conqueror which lay heaviest on the lowest class of the People. (a)

(a) Amongst others, the law of the *Curfew*. It might be matter of curious discussion to inquire what the Anglo-Saxon Government would in process of time have become, and of course the Government of England be at this time, if the event of the Conquest never had taken place; which, by conferring, as has been explained above, an immense as well as unusual power on the Head of the feudal System, compelled the Nobility to contract a lasting and sincere union with the People. It is highly probable, that the English Government would at this day be the same as that which long prevailed in Scotland, where the King and Nobles engrossed, jointly, or by turns, the whole power in the State; the same as in Sweden, the same as in Denmark, Countries whence the Anglo-Saxons came.

Under Henry the Second, liberty took a farther stride; and the ancient *Tryal by jury*, a mode of procedure which is at present one of the most valuable parts of the English law, made again, though imperfectly, its appearance.

But these causes, which had operated but silently and slowly under the two Henrys, who were Princes in some degree just, and of great capacity, manifested themselves, at once, under the despotic reign of King John. The royal prerogative, and the forest laws, having been exerted by this Prince to a degree of excessive severity, he soon beheld a general confederacy formed against him: and here we must observe another circumstance, highly advantageous, as well as peculiar to England.

England was not, like France, an aggregation of a number of different sovereignties; it formed but one state, and acknowledged but one Master, one general title: the same laws, the same kind of dependence, consequently the same notions, the same interests, prevailed throughout the whole. The extre-

mities of the Kingdom, at all times, united to give a check to the exertions of an unjust power. From the river Tweed to Portsmouth, from Yarmouth to the Land's end, all was in motion: the agitation increased from the distance like the rolling waves of an extensive sea; and the Monarch, left to himself, and destitute of resources, saw himself attacked on all sides by an universal combination of his subjects.

No sooner was the standard set up against John, than his very courtiers forsook him. In this situation, finding no part of his kingdom less irritated against him than another, having no detached province which he could engage in his defence by promises of pardon, or of particular concessions, the trivial but never-failing resources of Government, he was compelled, with seven of his attendants, all that remained with him, to submit himself to the disposal of his subjects; and he signed at Runing Mead (*a*) the Charter of the Forest, together with the famous

(*a*) Anno 1215.

charter, which, from its superior and extensive importance, is denominated *Magna Charta*.

By the former, the most tyrannical part of the forest laws was abolished; and by the latter, the rigour of the feudal laws was greatly mitigated in favour of the Lords. But this Charter did not stop there; conditions were also stipulated in favour of the numerous body of the people who had united to obtain it, and who claimed, with sword in hand, a share in that security it was meant to establish. It was hence instituted by the Great Charter, that the same services which were remitted in favour of the Barons, should be in like manner remitted in favour of all their Vassals. This Charter established also an equality of weights and measures throughout England; it exempted the Merchants from arbitrary imposts, and gave them liberty to enter and depart the Kingdom at pleasure: it even extended to the lowest orders of the State, since it enacted, that the *Villain*, or Bondman, should not be subject to the forfeiture of his implements of tillage. Lastly,

by the twenty-ninth article of the same Charter, it was enacted, that no Subject should be exiled, or in any shape whatever molested, either in his person or effects, otherwise than by judgment of his peers, and according to the law of the land: (a) an article so important, that it may be said to comprehend the whole end and design of political societies; and from that moment the English would have been a free People, if there were not an immense distance between the making of laws, and the observing of them.

But though this Charter wanted most of those supports which were necessary to insure respect to it, though it did not secure to the poor and friendless any sure and legal methods of obtaining the execution of it, (provisions these which numberless transf-

(a) " Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, vel
 " diffidetur de libero tenemento suo, vel libertatibus, vel
 " liberis consuetudinibus suis; aut utlagetur, aut exuletur,
 " aut aliquo modo destruat: nec super eum ibimus, nec
 " super eum mittemus, nisi per legale iudicium parium
 " suorum, vel per legem terræ. Nulli vendemus, nulli ne-
 " gabimus, aut differemus, justitiam vel rectum." *Magna*
Charta, chap. xxix.

gressions alone could, in process of time, point out), yet it was a prodigious advance towards the establishment of public liberty. Instead of the general maxims respecting the rights of the People and the duties of the Prince, (maxims which ambition perpetually controverts, and sometimes even openly and absolutely denies,) here was substituted a written law, that is, a truth admitted by all parties, which no longer required the support of argument. The rights and privileges of the individual, as well in his person as in his property, were become settled axioms. The Great Charter, at first enacted with so much solemnity, and afterwards confirmed at the beginning of every succeeding reign, was, as it were, a general banner perpetually set up for the union of all classes of the People; and the foundation was laid, on which those equitable laws were to rise, which offer the same assistance to the poor and weak, as to the rich and powerful. (a)

(a) The reader, to be more fully convinced of the reality of the causes to which the liberty of England has been here ascribed, as well as of the truth of the observations made at the same time on the situation of France, needs only to compare the Great Charter, so extensive in its provisions,

Under the long reign of Henry the Third, the differences which arose between the King and the Nobles, rendered England a scene of confusion. Amidst the vicissitudes which the fortune of war produced in their mutual conflicts, the People became still more and more sensible of their importance, as did in consequence both the King and the Barons also. Alternately courted by both parties, they obtained a confirmation of Magna Charta, and even the addition of new privileges, by the statutes of Merton and of Marlebridge. But I hasten to reach the grand epoch of the

and in which the Barons stipulated in favour even of the Bondman, with the treaty concluded between Lewis the Eleventh, and several of the Princes and Peers of France, intitled *A Treaty made at St. Maur, between the Dukes of Normandy, Calabre, Bretagne, Bourbonnois, Auvergne, Nemours; the Counts of Charolois, Armagnac, and St. Pol, and other Princes of France, risen up in support of the public good, on the one part; and King Lewis the Eleventh, on the other, October 29, 1465.* In this Treaty, which was made in order to terminate a war which was called the war for the Public good, (*pro bono Publico*) no provision was made but concerning the particular power of a few Lords: not a word was inserted in favour of the people. This treaty may be seen at large in the *pieces justificatives* annexed to the *Mémoires de Philippe de Comines.*

reign of Edward the First; a Prince who, from his numerous and prudent laws, has been denominated the English Justinian.

Possessed of great natural talents, and succeeding a Prince whose weakness and injustice had rendered his reign unhappy, Edward was sensible that nothing but a strict administration of Justice could, on the one side, curb a Nobility whom the troubles of the preceding reign had rendered turbulent, and, on the other, appease and conciliate the people, by securing the property of individuals. To this end, he made jurisprudence the principal object of his attention; and so much did it improve under his care, that the mode of process became fixed and settled: Judge Hale goes even so far as to affirm, that the English laws arrived at once, & *quasi per saltum*, at perfection, and that there has been more improvement made in them during the *first* thirteen years of the reign of Edward, than all the ages since his time have done.

But what renders this æra particularly interesting, is, that it affords the first instance

of the admiffion of the Deputies of Towns and Boroughs into (a) Parliament.

Edward, continually engaged in wars either againft Scotland, or on the Continent, feeing moreover his demefnes confiderably diminished, was frequently reduced to the moft preffing neceffities. But though, in confequence of the fpirit of the times, he frequently indulged himfelf in particular acts of injuftice, he yet perceived that it was impoffible to extend a general oppreffion over a body of Nobles, and a People, who fo well knew how to unite in their own defence. In order to raife fubfidies therefore, he was obliged to employ a new method, and to endeavour to obtain through the confent of the People, what his Predeceffors had hitherto expected from their own power. The Sheriffs were ordered to invite the Towns and Boroughs of the different counties, to fend Deputies to Parliament; and it is from this æra

(a) I mean their legal origin; for the Earl of Leicefter, who had ufurped the power during part of the preceding reign, had called fuch Deputies up to Parliament before.

that we are to date the origin of the House of Commons. (*a*)

It must be confessed, however, that these Deputies of the People were not, at first, possessed of any considerable authority. They were far from enjoying those extensive prerogatives which, in these days, constitute the House of Commons a collateral part of the Government: they were in those times called up only to provide for the wants of the King, and approve of the resolutions taken by him and the assembly of the Lords. (*b*) But this was nevertheless a great point gained, to have obtained the right of uttering their complaints, assembled

(*a*) Anno 1295.

(*b*) The end mentioned in the Summons sent to the Lords, was, *de arduis negotiis regni tractaturi, & consilium impensuri*: the Summons sent to the Commons was, *ad faciendum & consentiendum*. The power enjoyed by the latter was even inferior to what they might have expected from the Summons sent to them: "In most of the ancient Statutes they are not so much as named; and in several, even when they are mentioned, they are distinguished as petitioners merely, the Assent of the Lords being expressed in contradistinction to the Request of the Commons." See on this Subject the Preface to the Collection of the Statutes at large, by Ruffhead, and the authorities quoted therein.

in a Body and in a legal way—to have acquired, instead of the dangerous resource of insurrections, a lawful means of influencing the motions of Government, and thenceforth to have become a part of it. Whatever disadvantage might attend the station at first allotted to them, this was soon to be compensated by the preponderance the people necessarily acquire, when they are enabled to act and move with method. (*a*)

And indeed this privilege, insignificant as it might then appear, presently manifested itself by the most considerable effects. In spite of his reluctance, and after many evasions unworthy of so great a King, Edward was obliged to confirm the Great Charter; he

(*a*) France had indeed also her Assemblies of the General Estates of the Kingdom; but then it was only the Deputies for the Towns within the particular domain of the Crown, that is for a very small part of the Nation, who, under the name of the *Third Estate*, were admitted in them; and it is easy to conceive that they acquired no great influence in an assembly of Sovereigns who gave the law to their Master. Hence, when those disappeared, the maxim became immediately established, *The will of the King is the will of the Law*. In old French, *Qui veut le Roy, si veut la Loy*.

even confirmed it eleven times in the course of his reign. It was moreover enacted, that whatever should be done contrary to it, should be null and void; that it should be read twice a year in all Cathedrals; and that the penalty of excommunication should be denounced against any one who should presume to violate it. (a)

At length, he converted into an established law a privilege of which the English had hitherto had only a precarious enjoyment; and, in the statute *de Tallagio non concedendo*, he decreed, that no tax should be laid, nor impost levied, without the joint consent of the Lords and Commons: (b) a most important Statute, which, in conjunction with Magna Charta, forms the basis of the English Constitution: if from the latter the English must date the origin of their

(a) Confirmationes Chartarum, cap. 2, 3, 4.

(b) "Nullum tallagium vel auxilium, per nos, vel hæredes nostros, in regno nostro ponatur seu levetur, sine voluntate & assensu Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Comitum, Baronum, Militum, Burgenfium & aliorum liberorum hom' de regno nostro." Stat. An. 24 Ed. I.

liberty, from the former they must date the establishment of it; and as the Great Charter was the bulwark that protected the freedom of individuals, so was the Statute in question the engine which protected the Charter itself, and by the help of which they were thenceforth to make legal Conquests over the authority of the Crown.

This is the period at which we must stop, in order to take a distant view, and contemplate the different prospect which the rest of Europe then presented.

The efficient causes of slavery were daily operating and gaining strength: the independence of the Nobles on the one hand, the ignorance and weakness of the people on the other, were still extreme: the feudal government continued to diffuse oppression and misery; and such was the disorder of it, that it even took away all hopes of amendment.

France, still bleeding from the extravagance of a Nobility incessantly engaged in groundless wars, either with each other, or

with the King, was still desolated by the tyranny of that same Nobility, haughtily jealous of their liberty, or rather of their anarchy. (a) The People, oppressed by those who ought to have guided and protected them, loaded with insults by those who existed by their labour, revolted on all sides. But their tumultuous insurrections could have no other object than that of giving vent to the anguish with which their hearts were replete. They had no thoughts of entering into a general combination; still less of changing the form of the Government, and laying a regular plan of public liberty.

Having never extended their views beyond the fields they cultivated, they had no conception of those different ranks and orders of

(a) Not contented with oppression, they added insult to it. "When the Gentility," says Mezeray, "pillaged and committed exactions on the peasantry, they called the poor sufferer, in derision, *Faques bonhomme* (Goodman James). This gave rise to a furious sedition, which was called the *Faquerie*. It began at Beauvais in the year 1357, extending itself into most of the Provinces of France, and was not appeased, but by the destruction of a part of those unhappy victims, thousands of whom were slaughtered."

Men, of those distinct and opposite privileges and prerogatives, which are all necessary ingredients of a free Constitution. Hitherto confined to the same round of rustic employments, they little thought of that complicated fabric, which the more informed themselves cannot but with difficulty comprehend, when, by a concurrence of favourable circumstances, the structure has at length been reared, and stands displayed to their view.

In their simplicity, they saw no other remedy for the National evils, than the general establishment of the regal power, that is, of the authority of one common untrouled Master; and longed for that time alone, which, while it gratified their revenge, would mitigate their sufferings, and reduce to the same level the oppressors and the oppressed.

The Nobility, on the other hand, bent solely on the enjoyment of a momentary independence, irrecoverably lost the affection of the only Men who might in time support them; and, equally regardless of the dictates of humanity and of prudence, they did not

perceive the gradual and continual advances of the royal authority which was soon to overwhelm them all. Already were Normandy, Anjou, Languedoc, and Touraine, united to the Crown: Dauphiny, Champagne, and part of Guyenne, were soon to follow: France was doomed at length to see the reign of Lewis the Eleventh; to see her general Estates first become usefess, and be finally laid aside.

It was the destiny of Spain also, to behold her several Kingdoms united under one Head: she was fated to be in time ruled by Ferdinand and Charles the Fifth. (a) And Germany, where

(a) Spain was originally divided into twelve Kingdoms, besides Principalities, which by Treaties, and especially by Conquests, were collected into three Kingdoms; those of Castille, Aragon, and Granada. Ferdinand the Fifth, King of Aragon, married Isabella, Queen of Castille: they made a joint Conquest of the Kingdom of Granada; and these three Kingdoms, thus united, descended, in 1516, to their grandson Charles, and formed the Spanish Monarchy. At this æra, the Kings of Spain began to be absolute; and the States of the Kingdoms of Castille and Leon, “assembled at Toledo, in the month of November 1539, were the last in which the three orders met, that is, the Grandees, the Ecclesiastics, and the Deputies of the Towns.” See *Ferrera’s general History of Spain*.

an elective Crown prevented the like *unions*, (a) was indeed to acquire a few free Cities; but her divided people were destined to remain subject to the arbitrary yoke of such of her different Sovereigns as should be able to maintain their power and independence. In a word, the feudal tyranny which overspread the Continent, did not compensate, by any preparation of distant advantages, the present calamities it caused; nor was it to leave behind it, as it disappeared, any thing but a more regular kind of Aristocracy, and Despotism.

But in England, the same feudal system, after having suddenly broken in like a flood, had

(a) The Kingdom of France, as it stood under Hugh Capet and his next Successors, may, with a great degree of exactness, be compared with the German Empire, as it exists at present, and also existed at that time: but the Imperial Crown of Germany having, through some circumstances, after which it would be useless to inquire here, continued elective, the German Emperors, though vested with more high-sounding prerogatives than even the Kings of France, laboured under very essential disadvantages: they could not pursue a plan of aggrandisement with the same steadiness as a line of hereditary Sovereigns usually do; and the right to elect them, enjoyed by the greater Princes of Germany, procured them a sufficient power to protect themselves, as well as the lesser Lords, against the power of the Crown.

Ministers of State. Under Henry the Fourth, they refused to grant subsidies before an answer had been given to their petitions. In a word, every event of any consequence was attended with an increase of the power of the Commons: an increase indeed but slow and gradual, but peaceably and legally effected, and the more fit to fix the attention of the people, and to coalesce with the ancient principles of the Constitution.

Under Henry the Fifth, the Nation was intirely taken up with its wars against France; and in the reign of Henry the Sixth, began the fatal contests between the houses of York and Lancafter. The noise of arms alone was now to be heard; during the silence of the laws already in being, no thought was had of enacting new ones; and for thirty years together, England presents one wide scene of slaughter and desolation.

At length, under Henry the Seventh, who by his intermarriage with the house of York united the pretensions of the two families, a general peace was re-established, and the prospect of happier days seemed to open on the

Nation. But the long and violent agitations, under which it had laboured, were to be followed by a long and painful recovery. Henry, mounting the throne with sword in hand, and in great measure as a Conqueror, had promises to fulfill, as well as injuries to revenge. In the mean time, the people, wearied out by the calamities they had undergone, and longing only for repose, abhorred even the idea of resistance; and the remains of the almost exterminated Nobility thus beheld themselves left defenceless, and abandoned to the mercy of the Sovereign.

The Commons, on the other hand, accustomed to act only a second part in public affairs, and finding themselves bereft of those who hitherto had been their Leaders, were more than ever afraid to form, of themselves, an opposition. Placed immediately, as well as the Lords, under the eye of the King, they beheld themselves exposed to the same dangers. Like them, therefore, they purchased their personal security at the expence of public liberty; so that, in reading the history of the two first Kings of the house

of Tudor, we imagine ourselves reading the relation given by Tacitus of Tiberius and the Roman Senate. (a)

The time, therefore, seemed to be arrived, at which England must submit, in its turn, to the fate of the other Nations of Europe. All those barriers which it had raised for the defence of its liberty, thus seemed only to have been able to postpone the inevitable victory of Power.

But the remembrance of their ancient laws, of that great Charter so often and so solemnly confirmed, was too deeply impressed on the minds of the English, to be effaced by transitory evils. Like a deep and extensive ocean, which preserves an equability of temperature amidst all the vicissitudes of seasons, England still retained those principles of liberty which were so universally diffused through all orders of the people, and these required only a proper opportunity to exert themselves.

England, besides, still continued to possess the immense advantage of being only one State.

(a) *Quantò quis illustrior, tantò magis falsi ac festinantes.*

Had it been, like France, divided into several distinct dominions, it would also have had several National assemblies; those assemblies, being convened at different times and places, for that and other obvious reasons, never could have acted in concert; and the power of withholding subsidies, a power so important when it is that of disabling the Sovereign and binding him down to inaction, would then have only been the destructive privilege of irritating a Master who would have easily found means to obtain supplies from other quarters.

The different Parliaments, or assemblies of these several States, having thenceforth no means of recommending themselves to their Sovereign but by their forwardness in complying with his demands, would have vied with one another in granting what it would not only have been fruitless, but even highly dangerous, to refuse. The King would not have failed soon to demand, as a tribute, a gift he must have been confident to obtain; and the outward form of consent would have been left to the people, only as an additional means of oppressing them without danger.

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To no other causes than the disadvantage of such a situation, are we to ascribe the low condition in which the deputies of the people to the Assembly called the General Estates of France (a) were always obliged to remain. Surrounded, as they were, by the particular Estates of those Provinces into which the kingdom had been formerly divided, they never were able to stipulate conditions with their Sovereign; and, instead of making their power of granting subsidies serve to gain them, in the end, a collateral share in legislation, they ever remained confined to the naked privilege, of the *most humble supplication and remonstrance*.

These Estates, however, as all the great Lords of France were admitted into them, began at length to appear dangerous; and, as the King could in the mean time do without their assistance, they were set aside. But most of the particular Estates of the Provinces are preserved to this day; some of those which, for temporary reasons, had been abolished, have been since restored; nay, so manageable have

(a) See the Note, p. 37.

popular Assemblies been found by regal authority, when it has to do with many, that this kind of Government is that which it has been found most expedient to assign to Corsica, and Corsica has been made *un Pays d'Etats*.

But the King of England continued, even in the time of the Tudors, to have but one Assembly before which he could lay his wants, and apply for relief. How great soever the increase of his power was, a single Parliament alone could furnish him with the means of exercising it; and whether it was that the members of this parliament entertained a deep sense of their advantages, or whether private interest exerted itself in aid of patriotism, they at all times vindicated the right of granting, or rather refusing, subsidies; and, amidst the general wreck of every thing they ought to have held dear, they at least clung obstinately to the plank which was destined to prove the instrument of their preservation. (a)

(a) As the fatal advantages which we have said to accrue to the Executive power, when it has to treat with distinct separate parts of the same Nation, result from the very nature

Under Edward the Sixth, the absurd tyrannical laws against High Treason, instituted under Henry the Eighth, his predecessor, were abolished. But this young and virtuous Prince having soon passed away, the blood-thirsty Mary astonished the world with cruelties, which nothing but the fanaticism of a part of her subjects could enable her to execute.

Under the long and brilliant reign of Elizabeth, England began to breathe anew;

of things, they will obtain at all times and places, and it may be laid down as an undoubted maxim, that a Sovereign who depends, with regard to supplies, on several assemblies, in fact depends upon none. An Agent for the American Colonies, in his examination before the House of Commons (A. 1766, p. 122) has even suggested in three words the whole substance of what I have endeavoured to prove on that subject, when he said, "The granting aids to the Crown is the only means the Americans have of RECOMMENDING THEMSELVES TO THEIR SOVEREIGN REIGN." Nothing, therefore, could be more fatal to English liberty (and to American liberty in the issue) than the adoption of the idea, cherished by the Americans, of having distinct independent Assemblies of their own, who should treat immediately with the King, and grant him subsidies, to the utter annihilation of the power of those ancient, and hitherto successful, assertors of general liberty, the British Parliament. A few more ideas will in a subsequent Chapter be offered to the Reader on this subject, which few persons seem to consider in its constitutional light.

and the Protestant religion, being seated once more on the throne, brought with it some more freedom and toleration.

The Star-Chamber, that effectual instrument of the tyranny of the two Henrys, continued indeed to subsist; the inquisitorial Tribunal of the High Commission was even instituted; and the yoke of arbitrary power lay still heavy on the subject. But the general affection of the people for a Queen, whose former misfortunes had created such a general concern, the imminent dangers which England escaped, and the extreme glory attending that reign, lessened the sense of such exertions of authority as would, in these days, appear the height of Tyranny, and served at that time to justify, as they still do to excuse, a Princess whose great talents, though not her principles of government, render her worthy of being ranked among the greatest Sovereigns.

Under the reign of the Stuarts, the Nation began to recover from its long lethargy. James the First, a Prince rather imprudent than tyrannical, drew back the veil which

had hitherto disguised so many usurpations, and made an ostentatious display of what his predecessors had been contented to enjoy.

He was incessantly asserting, that the authority of Kings was not to be controuled, any more than that of God himself. Like Him, they were omnipotent; and those privileges to which the people so clamorously laid claim, as their inheritance and birthright, were no more than an effect of the grace and toleration of his royal ancestors (*a*).

Those principles, hitherto only silently adopted in the Cabinet, and in the Courts of Justice, had maintained their ground in consequence of this very obscurity. Being now announced from the Throne, and resounded from the pulpit, they spread an universal alarm: Commerce, besides, with its attendant arts, and above all that of printing, diffused more salutary notions throughout all orders of the people; a new light began to rise upon the nation; and that spirit of opposition fre-

(*a*) See his Declaration made in Parliament, in the years 1610 and 1621.

quently displayed itself in this reign, to which the English Monarchs had not, for a long time past, been accustomed.

But the storm, which was only gathering in clouds during the reign of James, began to mutter under Charles the First, his successor; and the scene which opened to view, on the accession of that Prince, presented the most formidable aspect.

The notions of religion, by a singular concurrence, united with the love of liberty; the same spirit which had made an attack on the established faith, was now directing itself to politics; the royal prerogatives were brought under the same examination that the doctrines of the Church of Rome had been; and as a superstitious religion had proved unable to support this test, so neither could an authority pretended to be unlimited be expected to bear it.

The Commons, on the other hand, were recovering from the astonishment into which the extinction of the power of the Nobles had, at first, thrown them. Taking a view

of the state of the Nation, and of their own, they became sensible of their whole strength; they determined to make use of it, and to repress a power which seemed, for so long a time, to have levelled every barrier. Finding among themselves men of the greatest capacity, they undertook that important task with method and by constitutional means; and Charles had thus to cope with a whole Nation put in motion and directed by an assembly of Statesmen.

And here we must observe how different were the effects produced in England, by the annihilation of the power of the Nobility, from those which the same event had produced in France.

In France, where, in consequence of the division of the People and of the exorbitant power of the Nobles, the people were accounted nothing—when the Nobles themselves were suppressed, the work was completed.

But in England, where the Nobles ever had vindicated the rights of the People equally with their own; in England, where the people had successively acquired most effectual means of

influencing the Government, and, above all, were undivided,—when the Nobles themselves were cast to the ground, the body of the people stood firm, and maintained the public liberty.

But the unfortunate Charles was totally ignorant of the dangers which surrounded him: seduced by the example of the other Sovereigns of Europe, he was not aware how different, in reality, his situation was from theirs: he had the imprudence to exert with rigour an authority which he had no ultimate resources to support: an union was at last effected in the nation; and he saw his enervated prerogatives dissipated with a breath (*a*). By the famous Act, called the

(*a*) It is here to be observed, that when, under Charles the First, the regal power was thus obliged to submit to the power of the People, Ireland, then scarcely civilised, only increased the necessities, and consequently the dependance, of the King; while Scotland, through the conjunction of some peculiar circumstances, had thrown off her obedience. And though those two States, even at present, bear no proportion to the compact body of the Kingdom of England, and seem never to have been able, by their union with it, to procure to the King any dangerous resources, yet the circumstances which took place in both at the time of the Revolution, or since, sufficiently prove that it was no un-

Petition of Right, and another posterior Act, to both which he assented, the compulsory loans and taxes disguised under the name of *Benevolences* were declared to be contrary to law; arbitrary imprisonments, and the exercise of the martial law, were abolished; the Court of High Commission, and the Star-Chamber, were suppressed (a); and the Constitution, freed from the apparatus of despotism with which the Tudors had obscured it, was restored to its antient lustre. Happy had been the People, if their Leaders, after having executed so noble a work, had contented themselves with the glory of being the benefactors of their country. Happy had been the King, if, obliged at

favourable circumstance to English liberty, that the great crisis of the reign of Charles the First, and the great advance which the Constitution was to make at that time, should precede the period at which the King of England might have been able to call in the assistance of two other Kingdoms.

(a) The Star-Chamber differed from all the other Tribunals in this: the latter were governed only by the common law, or immemorial custom, and Acts of Parliament; whereas the former often admitted for law the proclamations of the King in Council, and grounded its judgments upon them. The abolition of this Tribunal, therefore, was justly looked upon as a great victory over regal Authority.

length to submit, his submission had been sincere, and if he had become sufficiently sensible that the only resource he had left, was the affection of his subjects.

But Charles knew not how to survive the loss of a power he had conceived to be indisputable; he could not reconcile himself to limitations and restraints so injurious, according to his notions, to sovereign authority. His discourse and conduct betrayed his secret designs; distrust took possession of the nation; this some ambitious persons converted to their own views; and the storm, which seemed to have blown over, burst forth anew. The contending fanaticism of persecuting sects joined in the conflict between regal haughtiness and the ambition of individuals; the tempest blew from every point of the compass; the Constitution was rent asunder, and Charles exhibited in his fall an awful example to the Universe.

The Royal power being thus annihilated, the English made fruitless attempts to substitute a republican Government in its stead. "It was a curious spectacle," says Montesquieu,

“ to behold the vain efforts of the English to
“ establish among themselves a Democracy.”
Subjected, at first, to the power of the principal Leaders in the Long Parliament, they saw that power expire, only to pass, without bounds, into the hands of a Protector: they saw it afterwards parcelled out among the Chiefs of different bodies of troops; and shifting without end from one kind of subjection to another, they were at length convinced, that to attempt to establish liberty in a great Nation, by making the people interfere in the common business of Government, is of all attempts the most chimerical; that the authority *of all*, with which men are amused, is in reality no more than the authority of a few powerful individuals who divide the republic among them; and they at last rested in the bosom of the only Constitution which is fit for a great State and a free People; I mean that in which a chosen number deliberate, and a single person executes; but in which, at the same time, a general satisfaction is rendered, by the relation and arrangement of things—

a necessary condition of the duration of Government.

Charles the Second, therefore, was called over; and he experienced, on the part of the people, that enthusiasm of affection which usually attends the return from a long alienation. He could not however bring himself to forgive them the inexpressible crime of which he looked upon them to have been guilty. He saw with the deepest concern that they still entertained their former notions with regard to the nature of his prerogative; and, bent upon the recovery of the ancient powers of the Crown, he only waited for an opportunity to break those promises which had procured his restoration.

But the very eagerness of his measures frustrated their success; his dangerous alliances on the Continent, and the extravagant wars in which he involved England, joined to the frequent abuse he made of his authority, betrayed him. The eyes of the nation were soon opened, and they saw into his projects; when convinced at length that nothing but fixed and irresistible bounds can be an effectual

check on the views and efforts of Power, they resolved finally to take away those remnants of despotism which still made a part of the regal prerogative.

The military services due to the Crown, the remains of the ancient feudal tenures, had been already abolished: the laws against heretics were now repealed; the Statute for holding parliaments once at least in three years, was enacted; the *Habeas Corpus* Act, that barrier of the liberty of the Subject, was established; and, such was the patriotism of the parliaments, that it was under a King the most destitute of principle, that liberty received its most efficacious supports.

At length, on the death of Charles, began a reign which affords a most exemplary lesson both to Kings and people. James the Second, a prince of a more rigid disposition, though of a less comprehensive understanding, than his late brother, pursued still more openly the project which had already proved so fatal to his family: he would not see that the great alterations which had successively been effected in the Constitution

rendered the execution of it daily more and more impracticable: he imprudently suffered himself to be exasperated at a resistance he was in no condition to overcome; and, hurried away by a spirit of despotism and monkish zeal, he ran headlong against the rock which was to wreck his authority.

He not only used, in his declarations, the alarming expressions of Absolute Power, and Unlimited Obedience; he not only usurped to himself a right to dispense with the laws; but would have converted that destructive pretension to the destruction of those laws which were held most dear by the nation, and thus sought to abolish a religion for which they had suffered the greatest calamities, in order to establish on its ruins a religion which repeated Acts of the Legislature had proscribed; and proscribed, not because it tended to establish in England the doctrines of Transubstantiation and Purgatory, doctrines in themselves of no political moment, but because the unlimited power of the Sovereign had always been made one of its principal tenets.

To endeavour therefore to revive such a religion, was not only a violation of the laws, but was, by one enormous violation, to pave the way for others still more atrocious. Hence the English, seeing that their liberty was attacked even its first principles, had recourse to that remedy which reason and nature ever point out to the people, when he who ought to be the guardian of the laws becomes their destroyer: they withdrew the allegiance which they had sworn to James, and thought themselves absolved from their oath to a King, who himself disregarded the oath he had made to his people.

But, instead of a revolution like that which dethroned Charles the First, which was effected by a great effusion of blood, and threw the state into a general and terrible convulsion, the dethronement of James proved a matter of short and easy operation. In consequence of the progressive information of the people, and the certainty of the principles which now directed the Nation, the whole were unanimous. All the ties, by which the people were bound to the throne, were broken,

as it were by one single shock; and James, who, the moment before, was a Monarch surrounded by subjects, became at once a simple individual in the midst of the Nation.

That which contributes, above all, to distinguish this event as singular in the annals of Mankind, is the moderation, I may even say, the legality which accompanied it. As if to dethrone a King who sought to set himself above the Laws, had been a natural consequence, and provided for by the principles of Government, every thing remained in its place; the Nation assembled regularly to elect representatives; the Throne was declared vacant, and a new line of succession established.

Nor was this all; care was had to repair the breaches that had been made in the Constitution, as well as to prevent new ones; and advantage was taken of the rare opportunity of entering into an original and express compact between King and People.

An oath was required of the new King, more precise and determinate than had been taken by his predecessors, and it was conse-

crated as a perpetual formula of such oaths. (a) It was determined, that to impose taxes without the consent of Parliament, as well as to keep up a standing army in time of peace, are contrary to law. The power which the Crown had constantly claimed, of dispensing with the Laws, was abolished. It was enacted, that the subject, of whatever rank or degree, had a right to present petitions to the King. (b) Lastly, the key-stone was put to the arch, by the final establishment of the Liberty of the Press. (c)

The Revolution of 1689 is therefore the

(a) In the Act of Parliament, intitled *An Act for establishing the Coronation Oath*.

(b) The Lords and Commons, previous to the Coronation of King William and Queen Mary, had framed a Bill which contained a declaration of the rights which they claimed in behalf of the people, and was in consequence called the *Bill of Rights*. This Bill contained the Articles above, as well as some others, and having received afterwards the Royal assent, became an Act of Parliament, under the title of *An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and settling the Succession of the Crown*.—A. 1. William and Mary, Sec. 2. Cap. 2.

(c) The liberty of the press was, properly speaking, established only four years afterwards, in consequence of the refusal which the Parliament made at that time of continuing any longer the restrictions which had before been set upon it.

third grand æra in the history of the Constitution of England. *Magna Charta* had marked out the limits within which the Royal authority ought to be confined: a few outworks were raised in the reign of Edward the First; but it was at the Revolution that the circumvallation was completed.

It was at this æra, that the true principles of civil Society were fully established. By the expulsion of a King who had violated his oath, the doctrine of Resistance, the ultimate resource of an oppressed people, was confirmed beyond a doubt. By the exclusion given to a family hereditarily despotic, it was finally determined, that Nations are not the property of Kings. The principles of Passive Obedience, the Divine and indefeasible Right of Kings, in a word, the whole scaffolding of fatal, because false, notions, by which the Royal authority had till then been supported, fell to the ground; and in the room of it were substituted the more solid and durable foundations of the love of order, and a sense of the necessity of civil government among Mankind.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Legislative Power.

IN almost all the States of Europe, the will of the Prince holds the place of law; and custom has so confounded the matter of right with the matter of fact, that their Lawyers generally represent the legislative authority as essentially attached to the character of King; and the plenitude of his power seems to them necessarily to flow from the very definition of his title.

The English, placed in more favourable circumstances, have judged very differently; they could not believe that the destiny of mankind ought to depend on a play of words, and on scholastic subtilties; they have therefore annexed no other idea to the word *King*, or *Roy*, a word known also to their laws, than that which the Latins annexed to the word *Rex*, and the northern Nations to that of *Cyning*.

In limiting therefore the power of their King, they acted more consistently with the etymology of the word; they acted also more consistently with reason, in not leaving the laws to the disposal of him who is already invested with the public power of the State; that is, of him who, of all men, is most tempted to set himself above them.

The basis of the English Constitution, the capital principle on which all others depend, is that the Legislative power belongs to Parliament alone; that is, the power of establishing laws, and of abrogating, changing, or explaining them.

The constituent parts of Parliament are the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons.

The House of Commons, otherwise the Assembly of the Representatives of the Nation, is composed of the Deputies of the different Counties, each of which sends two; of the Deputies of certain Towns, of which London, including Westminster and Southwark, sends eight; other Towns, two or one; and of the Deputies of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, each of which sends two.

Lastly, since the Act of Union, Scotland sends forty-five Deputies, who, added to those just mentioned, make up the whole number of five hundred and fifty-eight. Those Deputies, though separately elected, do not solely represent the Town or County that sends them, as is the case with the Deputies of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, or of the Swiss Cantons; but, when they are once admitted, they represent the whole body of the Nation.

The qualifications required for being a Member of the House of Commons are, for representing a County, to be born a subject of Great Britain, and to be possessed of a landed estate of six hundred pounds a year, and of one of three hundred, for representing a Town, or Borough.

The qualifications required for being an elector in a County, are, to be possessed, in that County, of a Freehold of forty shillings a year. (a) With regard to electors.

(a) This Freehold must have been possessed by the elector one whole year at least before the time of the election, except it has devolved to him by inheritance, by marriage, by a last will, or by a promotion to an office.

in Towns or Boroughs, they must be Freemen of them; a word which now signifies certain qualifications expressed in the particular Charters.

When the King has determined to assemble a Parliament, he sends an order for that purpose to the Lord Chancellor; who, after receiving the same, sends a writ under the great seal of England to the Sheriff of every County, directing him to take the necessary steps for the election of Members for the County, and the Towns and Boroughs contained in it. Three days after the reception of the writ, the Sheriff must, in his turn, send his precept to the Magistrates of the Towns and Boroughs, to order them to make their election within eight days after the reception of the precept, giving four days notice of the same. And the Sheriff himself must proceed to the election for the County, not sooner than ten days after the receipt of the writ, nor later than sixteen.

The principal precautions taken by the law, to insure the freedom of elections, are, that

any Candidate, who after the date of the Writ, or even after the vacancy, shall have given entertainments to the electors of a place, or to any of them, in order to his being elected, shall be incapable of serving for that place in Parliament. That, if any person gives, or promises to give, any money, employment, or reward, to any voter, in order to influence his vote, he, as well as the voter himself, shall be condemned to pay a fine of five hundred pounds, and for ever disabled from voting and holding any office in any corporation; the faculty however being reserved to both, of procuring their indemnity for their own offence, by discovering some other offender of the same kind.

It has been moreover established, that no Lord of Parliament, or Lord Lieutenant of a County, has any right to interfere in the elections of members; that any officer of the excise, customs, &c. who shall presume to intermeddle in elections, by influencing any voter to give or withhold his vote, shall forfeit one hundred pounds, and be disabled to hold any office. Lastly, all soldiers quartered in a place where

an election is to be made, must move from it, at least one day before the election, to the distance of two miles or more, and return not till one day after the election is finished.

The House of Peers, or Lords, is composed of the Lords Spiritual, who are the Archbishops of Canterbury and of York, and the twenty-four Bishops ; of the Lords temporal, whatever may be their respective titles, such as Dukes, Marquisses, Earls, &c.

Lastly, the King is the third component part of Parliament ; it is even he alone who can convoke it ; and he only can dissolve, or prorogue it. The effect of a dissolution is, that from that moment the Parliament completely ceases to exist ; the commission given to the Members by their Constituents is at an end ; and whenever a new meeting of Parliament shall happen, they must be elected anew. A prorogation is an adjournment to a term appointed by the King ; till which the existence of Parliament is simply interrupted, and the function of the Deputies suspended.

When the Parliament meets, whether it be in virtue of a new summons, or whether, being composed of Members formerly elected, it meets again at the expiration of the term for which it was prorogued, the King goes to it in person, invested with the insignia of his dignity, and opens the session by laying before the Parliament the state of the public affairs, and inviting them to take them into consideration. This presence of the King, either real or represented, is absolutely requisite at a first meeting; it is that which gives life to the Legislative Bodies, and puts them in action.

The King, having concluded his declaration, withdraws. The Parliament, which then is legally intrusted with the care of the National concerns, enters upon its functions, and continues to exist till it is prorogued or dissolved. The House of Commons, and that of Peers, assemble separately; the former, under the presidency of the Lord Chancellor; the latter, under that of their Speaker: and both separately adjourn to such days as they respectively think proper to appoint.

As each of the two Houses has a negative on the propositions made by the other, and there is, consequently, no danger of their encroaching on each other's rights, nor any more on those of the King, who has likewise his negative upon them both, any question judged by them conducive to the public good, without exception, may be made the subject of their respective deliberations. Such are, for instance, new limitations or extensions to be given to the authority of the King; the establishing new laws, or making changes in those already in being. Lastly, the different kinds of public provisions, or establishments, the various abuses of administration, and their remedies, become, in every Session, the object of the attention of Parliament.

Here, however, an important observation must be made: all Bills for granting Money must have their beginning in the House of Commons: the Lords cannot take this object into their consideration but in consequence of a bill presented to them by the latter; and the Commons have at all times been so anxiously tenacious of this privilege, that they

never suffered the Lords even to make any change in the Money Bills which they have sent to them, but they must simply and solely either accept or reject them.

This excepted, every Member, in each House, may propose whatever question he thinks proper. If, after considering it, the matter is found to deserve attention, the person who has made the proposition, usually with some others adjoined to him, is desired to set it down in writing. If, after a more complete discussion, the proposition is carried in the affirmative, it is sent to the other House, that they may, in their turn, take it into consideration. If the latter reject the bill, it remains without any effect: if they agree to it, nothing remains wanting to its complete establishment, but the Royal assent.

When there is no business that requires immediate dispatch, the King usually waits till the end of the Session, or at least till a certain number of bills are ready for him, before he declares his Royal pleasure. When the time is come, the King goes to Parliament in the same state with which he opened it; and while

he is seated on the Throne, a Clerk, who has a list of the Bills, gives or refuses, as he reads, the Royal Assent.

When the Royal Assent is given to a public Bill, the Clerk says, *le Roy le veut*. If the bill be a private Bill, he says, *soit fait comme il est désiré*. If the bill has subsidies for its object, he says, *le Roy remercie ses loyaux Subjects, accepte leur b n volence, & aussi le veut*. Lastly, if the King does not think proper to assent to the Bill, the Clerk says, *le Roy s'avisera*; which is a mild way of giving a refusal.

It is indeed pretty singular, that the King of England should express himself in French in his Parliament. This custom was introduced at the Conquest, (a) and has been continued, like many other things of mere form, which subsist

(a) William the Conqueror added to the other changes he introduced, the abolition of the English language in all public, as well as judicial, transactions, and substituted to it the French that was spoke in his time: hence the number of old French words that are met with in the style of the English laws. It was only under Edward III. that the English language began to be re-established in the Courts of Justice.

for ages after the substance of them is intirely changed; and Judge Blackstone expresses himself on this subject, in the following words. “ A badge, it must be owned, (now the only
“ one remaining) of Conquest; and which one
“ would wish to see fall into total oblivion,
“ unless it be reserved as a solemn memento
“ to remind us that our liberties are mortal,
“ having once been destroyed by a foreign
“ force.”

When the King has declared his different intentions, he prorogues the Parliament. Those bills which he has rejected, remain without force: those to which he has assented, become the expression of the will of the highest power acknowledged in England: they have the same binding force as the *Edits enrégistrés* have in France, (a) and as the *Populiscita* had in ancient

(a) They call, in France, *Edits enrégistrés*, those Edicts of the King which have been registered in the Court of Parliament. The word Parliament does not however express in France, as it does in England, the Assembly of the Estates of the Kingdom. The French *Parlemens* are only Courts of Justice; that of Paris, which has the superintendance over all those established in the Provinces, was instituted in the same manner, and for the same purposes, as the

Rome: in a word, they are LAWS. And, though each of the constituent parts of the Parliament might, at first, have prevented the existence of those laws, the united will of all the three is now necessary to repeal them.

Aula Regis was afterwards in England, viz. for the administration of public Justice, and for deciding the differences between the King and his Barons: it was in consequence of the Judgements they passed, that the King proceeded to seize the dominions of the several Lords or Princes, and, when he was able to effect this, united them to the Crown. The *Parliament* of Paris, as do the other Courts of Law, ground its judgements upon the *Edits* or *Ordonnances* of the King, when it has once registered them: when those *Ordonnances* are looked upon as grievous to the Subject, the Parliament refuses to register them; but this they do not from any pretension they have to a share in the Legislative authority; they only object that they are not satisfied that the *Ordonnance* before them is really the will of the King, and then proceed to make remonstrances against it: sometimes the King defers to these; or, if he is resolved to put an end to all opposition, he comes in person into the *Parliament*, there holds what they call *un Lit de Justice*, declares that the *Ordonnance* before them is actually his will, and orders the proper Officers to register it.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Executive Power.

WHEN the Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, it ceases to exist; but its laws still continue to be in force: the King remains charged with the execution of them, and is supplied with the necessary power for that purpose.

But, whereas in his political capacity of one of the constituent parts of the Parliament, that is, with regard to the share allotted to him of the legislative authority, he is Sovereign, and only needs alledge his will, when he gives or refuses his assent to the bills presented to him; charged with public administration, he is no more than a Magistrate; and the laws, whether those that existed before him, or those to which, by his assent, he has given being, must direct his conduct, and bind him equally with his subjects.

The first prerogative of the King, in his capacity of Supreme Magistrate, has for its object the administration of Justice.

1°. He is the source of all judicial power in the State; he is the Chief of all the Tribunals, and the Judges are only his substitutes; every thing is transacted in his name; the Judgments must be with his Seal, and are executed by his Officers.

2°. By a fiction of the law, he is looked upon as the universal proprietor of the kingdom; he is in consequence deemed directly concerned in all offences: hence it is in his name that prosecutions are carried on in the Courts of law.

3°. He can pardon offences; that is, remit the punishment that has been awarded in consequence of his prosecution.

II. The second prerogative of the King is, to be the *fountain of honour*, that is, the distributor of titles and dignities: he creates the Peers of the realm, and disposes of the different offices, either in the Courts of law, or elsewhere.

III. The King is the superintendent of Commerce; he has the prerogative of regulating weights and measures; he alone can coin money, and can give a currency to foreign coin.

IV. He is the Supreme head of the Church. In this capacity, he appoints the Bishops, and the two Archbishops; and he alone can convene the Assembly of the Clergy. This assembly is formed, in England, on the model of the Parliament: the Bishops form the upper House; Deputies from the Dioceses, and of the several Chapters, form the lower House: the assent of the King is likewise necessary to the validity of their Acts, or Canons; and the King can prorogue, or dissolve, the Convocation.

V. He is, in right of his Crown, the Generalissimo of all sea or land forces whatever; he alone can levy troops, equip fleets, build fortresses, and fill all the posts in them.

VI. He is, with regard to foreign nations, the representative, and the depositary, of all the power and collective majesty of the

Nation; he sends and receives Ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the prerogative of declaring war, and of making peace, on whatever conditions he thinks proper.

VII. In fine, what seems to carry so many powers to the height, is its being a fundamental maxim, that THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG: which does not signify, however, that the King has not the power of doing ill; or, as it was pretended by certain persons in more ancient times, that every thing he did was lawful; but that he is above the reach of all Courts of law whatever, and that his person is sacred and inviolable.

C H A P. V.

The Boundaries which the Constitution has set to the Royal Prerogative.

I N reading the foregoing enumeration of the powers with which the laws of England have intrusted the King, we are at a loss to reconcile them with the idea of a Monarchy, which, we are told, is limited. The King not only unites in himself all the branches of the Executive power; he not only disposes, without controul, of the whole military power in the State; he is moreover, it seems, the Master of the Laws themselves, since he calls up, and dismisses, at his will, the Legislative Bodies. We find him therefore, at first sight, invested with all the prerogatives that ever were claimed by the most absolute Monarchs; and we are at a loss to find that liberty which the English seem so confident they possess.

But the Representatives of the people still have, and that is saying enough, they still have in their hands, now that the Constitution is fully established, the same powerful weapon which has enabled their ancestors to establish it. It is still from their liberality alone that the King can obtain subsidies; and in these days, when every thing is rated by pecuniary estimation—in these days, when gold is become the great moving spring of affairs, it may be safely affirmed, that he who depends on the will of others, with regard to so important an article, is, whatever his power may be in other respects, in a state of real dependance.

This is the case of the King of England. He has in that capacity, and without the grant of his people, scarcely any revenue: A few hereditary duties on the exportation of wool, which, since the establishment of manufactures, are become tacitly extinguished; a branch of the excise, which, under Charles the Second, was annexed to the Crown as an indemnification for the military services it gave up, and which, under George the First, has been fixed to seven thousand pounds; a duty of two

shillings on every ton of wine imported; the wrecks of ships, of which the owners remain unknown; whales and sturgeons thrown on the coast; swans swimming on public rivers, and a few other feudal relics, compose the whole appropriated revenue of the King, and are all that now remains of the ancient inheritance of the Crown.

The King of England, therefore, has the prerogative of commanding armies, and equipping fleets—but without the concurrence of his Parliament he cannot maintain them. He can bestow places and employments—but without his Parliament he cannot pay the Salaries attending on them. He can declare war—but without his Parliament it is impossible for him to carry it on. In a word, the Royal prerogative, destitute, as it is, of the power of imposing taxes, is like a vast body which cannot of itself accomplish its motions; or, if you will, it is like a ship compleatly equipped, but from which the Parliament can at pleasure draw off the water, and leave it a-ground; as also set it again afloat by granting subsidies.

And indeed we see, that since the establishment of this right of the Representatives of the people, to grant, or refuse, subsidies to the Crown, their other privileges have been continually increasing. Though they were not, in the beginning, admitted into Parliament, but upon the most disadvantageous terms, yet they soon found means, by joining petitions to their money bills, to intervene in the framing of the laws by which they were to be governed; and this method of proceeding, which at first was only tolerated by the King, they afterwards converted into a right, by declaring under Henry the Fourth, that they would not, thenceforward, come to any resolutions with regard to subsidies, before the King had given a precise answer to their petitions.

In subsequent times we see the Commons continually successful by the exertions of the same privilege, in their endeavours to lop off the despotic powers which still made a part of the regal prerogative: whenever abuses of power had taken place, which they were seriously determined to correct,

they made *grievances and supplies*, to use the expression of Sir Thomas Wentworth, *go hand in hand together*, which always produced the redress of them; and in general, when a bill, in consequence of its being judged by the Commons essential to the public welfare, has been joined by them to a money bill, it has seldom failed *to pass in that agreeable company.* (a)

(a) In relating this use, which the Commons have at times made of their power of granting, or refusing, subsidies, I only mean to shew the great efficiency of that power: which was the subject of this Chapter. The House of Lords have even found it necessary (which confirms what is said here) to form, as it were, a confederacy among themselves, for the security of their Legislative authority, against the use which the Commons might make of this power of taxation; and it has been made a standing order of their House, to reject any bill whatsoever, to which a money bill has been tacked.

C H A P T E R VI.

The same Subject continued.

BUT this force of the prerogative of the Commons, and the facility with which it may be exerted, however necessary they may have been for the first establishment of the Constitution, might prove too considerable at present, when it is requisite only to support it. There might be danger, that if the Parliament should ever exert their privilege to its full extent, the Prince, reduced to despair, might resort to fatal extremities; or that the Constitution, which subsists only by virtue of its equilibrium, might in the end be totally subverted.

Indeed this is a case which the prudence of Parliament has foreseen. They have, in this respect, imposed laws upon themselves, and without touching their prerogative itself they have moderated the exercise of it. A

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custom has for a long time prevailed, at the beginning of every reign, and in the kind of overflowing of affection which takes place between a King and his first Parliament, to grant the King a revenue for his life: a provision which, with respect to the great exertions of his power, does not abridge the influence of the Commons, but yet puts him in a condition to support the dignity of the Crown, and affords him, who is the first Magistrate in the Nation, that independance which the laws insure also to those Magistrates who are particularly intrusted with the administration of Justice. (a)

This conduct of the Parliament provides an admirable remedy for the accidental disorders of the State; for though, by the wise distri-

(a) The twelve Judges.—Their commissions, which in former times were often given them *durante bene placito*, now must always “be made *quamdiu se bene gefferint*, and their Salaries ascertained; but upon an address of both Houses it “may be lawful to remove them.”—Stat. 13 Wil. III. c. 2. In the first year of the reign of his present Majesty, it has been moreover enacted, that the commissions of the Judges shall continue in force notwithstanding the demise of the King; which has prevented their being dependant, with regard to their continuation in office, on the Heir apparent.

bution of the powers of Government, great usurpations are become in a manner impracticable, nevertheless it is impossible but that, in consequence of the silent, though continual, efforts of the Executive power to extend itself, abuses will at length slide in: but here the powers wisely kept in reserve by the Parliament, afford the means of curing them. At the end of each reign, the civil list, and consequently that kind of independence which it procured, are at an end. The successor finds a Throne, a Sceptre, and a Crown; but he does not find power, nor even dignity; and before a real possession of all these is given to him, the Parliament have it in their power to take a thorough review of the State, and to correct the several abuses that may have crept in during the preceding reign; and thus the Constitution may be brought back to its first principles.

England, therefore, by this means enjoys a very great advantage, and one that all free States have sought to procure for themselves; I mean that of a periodical reformation. But the expedients which Legislators have contrived for this purpose in other Countries,

have always, when attempted to be reduced into practice, been found to be productive of the most fatal consequences. The laws which were made at Rome, to restore that equality which is the essence of a Democratical Government, were always found impracticable; the attempt alone endangered the overthrow of the Republic: and the expedient, which the Florentines called *ripigliar il stato*, proved nowise happier in its consequences. This was because all those different remedies were destroyed beforehand, by the very evils they were meant to cure; and the greater the abuses were, the more impossible it was to correct them.

But the means of reformation, which the Parliament of England has taken care to reserve to itself, is the more effectual, as it goes less directly to its end. It does not oppose the usurpations of prerogative, as it were, in front; it does not encounter it in the middle of its course, and in the fullest flight of its exertion: but it goes in search of it to its source, and to the principle of its action. It does not endeavour forcibly to overthrow it; it only enervates its springs.

What increases still more the mildness of this remedy, is, that it is only to be applied to the usurpations themselves, and passes by, what would be far more formidable to encounter, the obstinacy and pride of the usurpers. Every thing is transacted with a new Sovereign, who, till then, has had no share in public affairs, and has taken no step which he may conceive himself obliged in honour to support. In fine, they do not wrest from him what the good of the State requires he should give up: it is he himself that makes the sacrifice.

All these observations are remarkably confirmed by the events that followed the reign of the two last Henrys. Every barrier that protected the people against the excursions of Power, had been broke through; the Parliament, in their terror, had even enacted, that proclamations, that is the will of the King, should have the force of laws (a): the Constitution seemed to be quite undone; yet, on the first opportunity afforded by a new reign,

(a) Stat. 31 Hen. VIII. Chap. 8.

liberty began to make again its appearance. (a) And when the Nation, at length recovered from its long supineness, had, at the accession of Charles the First, another opportunity of a change of Sovereign, that enormous mass of abuses, which had been accumulating, or gaining strength, during five successive reigns, was removed, and the ancient laws restored.

To which add, that this second reformation, which was so extensive in its effects, and might be called a new Creation of the Constitution, was accomplished without producing the least convulsion. Charles, as Edward had done in former times, (b) assented to every part of it; and whatever reluctance he might at first manifest, yet the Act called *the Petition of Right* (as well as that which afterwards completed the work) received the Royal sanction without bloodshed.

(a) The laws concerning Treason, passed under Henry the Eighth, which Judge Blackstone calls "an amazing heap of wild and new-fangled treasons," and the statute just mentioned, were repealed in the beginning of the reign of Edward VI.

(b) Or, which is equally in point, the Duke of Somerset his uncle, who was the Regent of the Kingdom, under the name of Protector.

It is true, great misfortunes followed ; but they were the effects of particular circumstances. During the time which preceded the reign of the Tudors, the nature and extent of regal authority having never been accurately defined, the exorbitant power of the Princes of that House had no difficulty in introducing prejudices of the most extravagant kind : those prejudices, having had a hundred and fifty years to take root, could not be shaken off but by a kind of general convulsion ; the agitation continued after the action, and was carried to excess by the religious quarrels which arose at that time.

CHAPTER VIII.

New Restrictions.

THE Commons, however, have not intirely relied on the advantages of the great prerogative with which the Constitution has intrusted them.

Though this prerogative is, in a manner, out of danger of an immediate attack, they have nevertheless shewn at all times the greatest jealousy on its account. They never suffer, as we have observed before, a money-bill to begin any where but with themselves; and any alteration, that may be made in it in the other House, is sure to be rejected. If the Commons had not most strictly reserved to themselves the exercise of this prerogative, on which their very existence depends, the whole might at length have slid into that Body which they had suffered to share in it equally with them. If any other persons, besides the Representatives of the People, had had a right to make an offer of the produce of the labour

of the people, the executive power would soon have forgot, that it only exists for the advantage of the public. (a)

(a) As the Crown has the undisputed prerogative of assenting to, and dissenting from, what bills it thinks proper, as well as of convening, proroguing, and dissolving, the Parliament, whenever it pleases; the latter have no assurance of having a regard paid to their Bills, or even of being allowed to assemble, but what may result from the need the Crown stands in of their assistance: the danger, in that respect, is even greater for the Commons than for the Lords, who enjoy a dignity which is hereditary, as well as inherent to their persons, and form a permanent Body in the State; whereas the Commons compleatly vanish, whenever a dissolution takes place: there is, therefore, no exaggeration in what has been said above, that their *very being* depends on their power of granting subsidies to the Crown.

Moved by these considerations, and, no doubt, by a sense of their duty towards their Constituents, to whom this right of taxation originally belongs, the House of Commons have at all times been very careful lest precedents should be established, which might, in the most distant manner, tend to weaken that right. Hence the warmth, I might say the resentment, with which they have always rejected even the amendments proposed by the Lords in their Money bills. The Lords however have not given up their pretension to make such amendments; and it is only by the vigilance and constant predetermination of the Commons to reject all alterations whatever made in their Money bills, without even examining them, that this pretension of the Lords is reduced to be an useless, and only dormant, claim. The first instance of a misunderstanding between the two Houses, on that account, was in the year 1671: and the reader may see at length, in Vol. I. of the *Debates of the House of Commons*, the reasons that were at that time alledged on both sides.

Besides, though this prerogative has of itself, we may say, an irresistible efficiency, the Parliament has neglected nothing that may add to it, or at least to the facility of its exercise; and though they have allowed the prerogatives of the Sovereign to remain undisputed, they have in several cases endeavoured to restrain the use he might make of them, by entering with him into divers express and solemn conventions for that purpose. (a)

Thus the King is indisputably invested with the exclusive right of assembling Parliaments; yet he must assemble one, at least once in three years; and this obligation on the King, which was, we find, insisted upon by the people in very early times, has been since confirmed by an Act passed in the sixteenth year of the reign of Charles the Second.

Moreover, as the most fatal consequences might ensue, if laws which might most

(a) Laws made to bind such Powers in a State, as have no superior Power by which they may be legally compelled to the execution of them, (for instance, the Crown as circumstanced in England) are nothing more than conventions, or treaties, made with the Body of the People.

materially affect public liberty, could be enacted in Parliaments abruptly and imperfectly summoned, it has been established, that the Writs for assembling a Parliament must be issued forty days at least before the first meeting of it. Upon the same principle it has also been enacted, that the King cannot abridge the term he has once fixed for a prorogation, except in the two following cases, viz. of a rebellion; or of imminent danger of a foreign invasion: in both which cases a fourteen days notice must be given. (*a*)

Again, the King is the head of the Church; but he can neither alter the established religion, nor call individuals to an account for their religious opinions. (*b*) He cannot even profess the religion which the Legislature has particularly forbidden; and the Prince who should profess it, is declared incapable of

(*a*) Stat. 30 Geo. II. c. 25.

(*b*) The Convocation, or assembly of the Clergy, of which the King is the head, can only regulate such affairs as are merely Ecclesiastical; they cannot touch the Laws, Customs, and Statutes, of the Kingdom.—Stat. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19.

inheriting, possessing, or enjoying, the Crown of these Kingdoms. (a)

The King is the first Magistrate; but he can make no change in the maxims and forms consecrated by law or custom: he cannot even influence, in any case whatever, the decision of causes between subject and subject; and James the First, assisting at the Trial of a cause, was reminded by the Judge, that he could deliver no opinion. (b) Lastly, though crimes are prosecuted in his name, he cannot refuse to lend it to any particular persons who have complaints to prefer.

The King has the privilege of coining money; but he cannot alter the standard.

The King has the power of pardoning offenders; but he cannot exempt them from

(a) A. I. Will. and M. Stat. 2. C. 2.

(b) These principles have since been made an express article of an Act of Parliament; the same which abolished the Star Chamber. “Be it likewise declared and enacted, by the authority of this present Parliament, That neither his Majesty, nor his Privy Council, have, or ought, to have, any jurisdiction, power, or authority, to examine or draw into question, determine or dispose of the lands, tenements, goods, or chattels, of any of the subjects of this Kingdom.”—Stat. A. 16. ch. i. cap. 10. § 10.

making a compensation to the parties injured. It is even established by law, that, in a case of murder, the widow, or next heir, shall have a right to prosecute the murderer; and the King's pardon, whether it preceded the Sentence passed in consequence of such prosecution, or whether it be granted after it, cannot have any effect. (a)

The King has the military power; but still, with respect to this, he is not absolute. It is true, in regard to the sea forces, as there is in them this inestimable advantage, that they cannot be turned against the liberty of the Nation, at the same time that they are the surest bulwark of the Island, the King may keep them as he thinks proper; and in this respect he lies only under the general restraint of applying to Parliament, to obtain the means of doing it. But in regard to land forces, as they may become an immediate weapon in the hands of Power for throwing down all the barriers of public liberty, the

(a) The method of prosecution mentioned here, is called an *Appeal*; it must be sued within a year and a day after the completion of the crime.

King cannot raise them without the consent of Parliament. The guards of Charles the Second were declared anti-constitutional; (a) and James's army was one of the causes of his being at length dethroned. (b)

In these times however, when it is become a custom with Princes to keep those numerous armies, that serve as a pretext, and means of oppressing the people, a State that would maintain its independence, is obliged, in great measure, to do the same. The Parliament has therefore thought proper to establish a standing body of troops, which amounts to about thirty thousand Men, of which the King has the command,

But this army is only established for one year; at the end of that term, it would be *ipso facto* disbanded; and as the question would not then be, whether the army shall be dissolved, but whether it shall be established anew, and as

(a) He had carried them to the number of four thousand Men.

(b) A new sanction has been given to the above restriction, in the sixth Article of the Bill of Rights: "A standing army, without the consent of Parliament, is against law."

if it had never existed, any one of the three branches of the legislature may, by its dissent, hinder its continuance.

Besides, the funds for the payment of this body of troops, are to be raised by taxes that never are established for more than one year; (a) and it becomes likewise necessary, at the end of that term, to establish them anew. (b) In a word, this instrument of defence, which the circumstances of modern times have caused to be judged necessary, being capable, on the other hand, of being applied to the most dangerous purposes, has been joined to the State by only a slender thread, the knot of which may be slipped on the first appearance of danger. (c)

But those laws which limit the King's authority, would not, of themselves, have

(a) The land tax, and malt tax.

(b) It is also necessary that the Parliament, when they renew the Act called the *Mutiny-Act*, should authorise the different Courts Martial to punish military offences, and desertion. It can therefore refuse the King even the necessary power of military discipline.

(c) To these laws, or rather conventions, between King and People, I shall add here the Oath which the King takes at his Coronation; a compact which, if it cannot have the same precision as the laws we have related above, yet in a

been sufficient. As they are, after all, only intellectual barriers, which it is possible that the King might not at all times respect; as the check which the Commons have on his proceedings, by a refusal of subsidies, affects too much the whole state, to be exerted on every particular abuse of power; and lastly, as even this means might, in some degree

manner comprehends them all, and has the further advantage of being declared with still more solemnity.

“ *The archbishop or bishop shall say,* Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same?—*The king or queen shall say,* I solemnly promise so to do.

“ *Archbishop or bishop.* Will you to your power cause law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?—*King or queen.* I will.

“ *Archbishop or bishop.* Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the protestant reformed religion established by the law? And will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?—*King or queen.* All this I promise to do.

“ *After this the king or queen, laying his or her hand upon the holy gospels, shall say,* The things which I have here before promised I will perform and keep: so help me God. *And then shall kiss the book.*”

be eluded, either by breaking the promises which procure subsidies, or by applying them to uses different from those for which they were appointed, the Constitution has besides supplied the Commons with a means of immediate opposition to the misconduct of Government, by giving them a right to impeach the Ministers.

It is true, the King himself cannot be arraigned before Judges; because, if there were any that could pass sentence upon him, it would be they, and not he, who must finally possess the executive power: but, on the other hand, the King cannot act without Ministers; it is therefore those Ministers, that is, those indispensable instruments, whom they attack.

If, for example, the public money has been employed in a manner contrary to the declared intention of those who granted it, an impeachment may be brought against those who had the management of it. If any abuse of power is committed, or, in general, any thing done contrary to the public weal, they profe-

cute those who have been either the instruments, or the advisers, of the measure. (*a*)

But who shall be the Judges to decide in such a cause? What Tribunal will flatter itself, that it can give an impartial decision, when it shall see presented at its bar the Government itself as the accused, and the Representatives of the People as the accusers?

It is before the House of Peers that the Law has directed the Commons to carry their accusation; that is, before Judges whose dignity, on the one hand, renders them independent; and who, on the other, have a great honour to support in that awful function where they have all the Nation for spectators of their conduct.

When the impeachment is brought to the Lords, they commonly order the person accused to be imprisoned. On the day appointed, the Deputies of the House of Commons, with

(*a*) It was upon these principles that the Commons, in the beginning of this century, impeached the Earl of Orford, who had advised the Treaty of Partition, and the Lord Chancellor Somers, who had affixed the great Seal to it.

the person impeached, make their appearance: the impeachment is read in his presence; Counsel are allowed him, as well as time, to prepare for his defence; and at the expiration of that term, the trial goes on from day to day with open doors, and every thing is communicated in print to the public.

But whatever advantage the law grants to the person impeached for his justification, it is from the intrinsic merits of his conduct that he must draw his arguments and proofs. It would be of no service to him, in order to justify a criminal conduct, to alledge the commands of the Sovereign; or, pleading guilty with respect to the measures imputed to him, to produce the Royal pardon. (*a*) It is against the Administration itself that the impeachment is carried on; it should therefore by no means interfere; the King

(*a*) This point in ancient times was far from being clearly settled. In the year 1678, the Commons having impeached the Earl of Danby, he pleaded the King's pardon in bar to that impeachment: great altercations ensued on that subject, which were terminated by the dissolution of that Parliament. It has been since enacted, (Stat. 12 and 13 W. III. c. 2.)

can neither stop nor suspend its course, but is forced to behold, as an inactive spectator, the discovery of the share which he may himself have had in the illegal proceedings of his servants, and to hear his own sentence in the condemnation of his Ministers.

An admirable expedient, this! which, by removing and punishing corrupt Ministers, affords an immediate remedy for the evils of the State, and strongly marks out the bounds within which Power ought to be confined; which takes away the scandal of guilt and authority united, and calms the people by a great and awful act of Justice; an expedient, in that respect especially, so highly useful, that it is to the want of the like, that Machiavel attributes the ruin of his Republic.

“ that no pardon under the great Seal can be pleaded in
 “ bar to an impeachment by the House of Commons.”

I once asked a Gentleman very learned in the laws of this Country, if the King could remit the punishment of a Man condemned in consequence of an impeachment of the House of Commons: he answered me, the Tories will tell you the King can, and the Whigs he cannot. But it is not perhaps very material that the question should be decided; the great public ends are attained when a corrupt Minister is removed with disgrace, and the whole System of his proceedings unveiled to the public eye.

But all these general precautions to secure the rights of the Parliament, that is, those of the Nation itself, against the efforts of the executive Power, would be vain, if the Members themselves remained exposed to them. Being unable openly to attack, with any safety to itself, the two legislative bodies, and, by a forcible exertion of its prerogatives, to make, as it were, a general assault, it would, by subdividing the same prerogatives, gain an entrance; and sometimes by interest, and at others by fear, guide the general will by influencing that of individuals.

But the laws which so effectually provide for the safety of the People, provide no less for that of the Members, whether of the House of Peers, or that of the Commons. There are not known in England, either those *Commissaries* who are always ready to find those guilty, whom the wantonness of ambition points out; nor those secret imprisonments, which are, in other Countries, the usual expedients of Government. The forms and maxims of the Courts of Justice are strictly prescribed; and every individual, having an invariable right to be judged according to Law, may obey without fear the

dictates of public virtue. In fine, what crowns all these precautions, is its being a fundamental maxim, “ That the freedom of Speech, and
 “ debates and proceedings in Parliament,
 “ ought not to be impeached or questioned
 “ in any Court or place out of Parlia-
 “ ment.”—Bill of Rights, Art. 9.

The legislators, on the other hand, have not forgot that interest, as well as fear, may impose silence on duty. To prevent its effects, it has been enacted, that all persons concerned in the management of any taxes created since 1692; commissioners of prizes, navy, victualling-office, &c. comptrollers of the army accompts; agents for regiments; the clerks in the different offices of the revenue; any persons that hold any new office under the Crown, created since 1705, or having a pension under the Crown, during pleasure, or for any term of years, are incapable of being elected Members. Besides, if any Member accepts an office under the Crown, except it be an Officer in the army or navy accepting a new commission, his seat becomes void; though such Member is capable of being re-elected.

Such are the precautions hitherto taken by the Legislators for preventing the undue influence of the great prerogative of disposing of rewards and places; precautions which have been successively taken, according as circumstances have shewn them to be necessary, and which are owing to causes powerful enough to produce the establishment of new ones, whenever circumstances shall point out the necessity of them. (*a*)

(*a*) Nothing can be a better proof of the efficacy of the causes that secure the liberty of the English, and which we shall have occasion to deduce and explain hereafter, than those victories which the Parliament from time to time gains over itself, and in which the Members, forgetting all the views of private ambition, only think of their interest as subjects.

Since this was first written, an excellent regulation has been made for the decision of controverted elections. Formerly the House decided them in a very summary manner, and the witnesses were not examined upon oath: but, by an Act passed this Session, the decision is now to be left to a Jury, or Committee, of fifteen Members, formed thus. Out of the Members present, who must not be less than one hundred, forty-nine are drawn by lot: out of these, each Candidate strikes off one alternately, till there remain only thirteen, who, with two others, named out of the whole House, one by each Candidate, are to form the Committee: in order to secure the necessary number of one hundred Members, all other business in the House is to be suspended, till the above operations are completed.

C H A P. VIII.

Of private Liberty, or the Liberty of Individuals.

WE have hitherto only treated of general liberty, that is, of the rights of the Nation as a Nation, and of its share in the Government. It now remains that we should treat particularly of a thing without which this general liberty, being absolutely frustrated in its object, would be only a matter of ostentation, and even could not long subsist: I mean the liberty of individuals.

Private Liberty, according to the division of the English Lawyers, consists, first, of the right of *Property*, that is, of the right of enjoying exclusively the gifts of fortune, and all the various fruits of one's industry. Secondly, of the right of *Personal Security*. Thirdly, of the *Loco-motive Faculty*, taking the word in its more confined sense.

Each of these rights, say again the English Lawyers, is inherent in the person of every

Englishman ; they are to him as an inheritance, and he cannot be deprived of them, but by virtue of a sentence passed according to the laws of the land. And, indeed, this right of inheritance being expressed in English by one word, (*birth-right*) the same as that which expresses the King's title to the Crown, it has, in times of oppression, been often opposed to him as a right, doubtless of a less extent, but of a sanction equal to that of his own.

One of the principal effects of the right of Property is, that the King can take from his subjects no part of what they possess : he must wait till they themselves grant it him ; and this right, which, as we have seen before, is, by its consequences, the bulwark that protects all the others, has moreover the immediate effect of preventing one of the chief causes of oppression.

In regard to the attempts, to which the right of property might be exposed from one individual to another, I believe I shall have said every thing, when I have observed, that there is no Man in England who can oppose the irresistible power of the Laws ;—that, as

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the Judges cannot be deprived of their employments but on an accusation by Parliament, the effect of interest with the Sovereign, or with those who approach his person, cannot possibly influence their decisions;—that, as the Judges themselves have no power to pass sentence, till the matter of fact has been settled by men nominated, we may almost say, at the common choice of the parties, all private views, and consequently all respect of persons, are banished from the Courts of Justice. However, that nothing may be wanting which may serve to throw light on the subject I have undertaken to treat, I shall relate, in general, what is the law in Civil matters, that has taken place in England.

When the Pandects were found at Amalphi, the Clergy, who were the only Men that were able to understand them, did not neglect that opportunity of increasing the influence they had already obtained, and caused them to be received in the greatest part of Europe. England, which was destined to have a Constitution so different from that of other States, was to be farther distinguished by its rejecting the Roman Laws.

Under William the Conqueror, and his immediate successors, a multitude of foreign Ecclesiastics flocked to the Court of England. Their influence over the mind of the Sovereign, which might in other States be considered as a matter of little importance, was not so in a Country where, the Sovereign being all-powerful, to obtain influence over him, was to obtain power itself. The English Nobility saw, with the greatest jealousy, Men of a condition so different from their own, vested with a power to the attacks of which they were immediately exposed; and thought that they would carry that power to the height, if they were ever to adopt a system of laws which those same Men sought to introduce, and of which they would necessarily become both the depositaries and interpreters.

It happened, therefore, by a somewhat singular concurrence of circumstances, that to the Roman laws brought over to England by Monks, the idea of Ecclesiastical power became associated; just as to the Religion of the same Monks, afterwards favoured by Kings who endeavoured to establish a despotic govern-

ment, became associated the idea of Despotism. The Nobility, at all times, rejected them, even with a degree of ill humour; (a) and the usurper Stephen, whose interest it was to conciliate their affections, went so far as to prohibit the study of those laws.

The general disposition of things establishing, as we have seen, a great communication between the Nobility and the People, the aversion to the Roman laws gradually spread itself far and wide; and those laws, whose wisdom in many cases, and particularly their extensiveness, ought naturally to have procured them a reception when the English laws were as yet but in their infancy, experienced the most steady opposition from the Lawyers; and as those who sought to introduce them, frequently renewed their attempts,

(a) The Nobility, under the reign of Richard II. declared in the French of those times, “ Pur ce que le roialme d’Engleterre n’ étoit devant ces heures, ne al’ entent du Roy
 “ notre Seignior, & Seigniors du Parlement, unques ne
 “ fera rulé ne governé par la ley civil.” viz. Inasmuch as the Kingdom of England was not before this time, nor according to the intent of the King our Lord, and Lords of Parliament, ever shall be, ruled nor governed by the civil law.—*In Rich. Parlamento Westmonasterii, Feb. 3, Anno 2.*

there at length arose a kind of general resolution amongst the Laity, to confine them to Universities and Monasteries. (a)

This opposition was carried so far, that Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King's bench, and afterwards Chancellor, under Henry VI. wrote a Book intitled *de Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, in which he proposes to demonstrate the superiority of the English laws over the Civil; and, that nothing might be wanting on this subject, he gives them the advantage of a superior antiquity, and traces their origin to a period much anterior to the foundation of Rome.

(a) I might shew, if it belonged to my subject, that the liberty of thinking in religious matters, which has at all times remarkably prevailed in England, is owing to the same causes as its political liberty: both are owing to this, that the same men, whose interest it is in other Countries that the people should be influenced by prejudices either political or religious, have been in England forced to unite with and inform them. I shall here take occasion to observe, in answer to the reproach made to the English, by President Henault, in his much-esteemed Chronological History of France, that the frequent changes of religion, which have taken place in England, do not argue any servile disposition in the people; they only prove the equilibrium between the then existing Sects: there was none but what might become the prevailing one, whenever the Sovereign thought proper to declare for it; and it was not England, as people think at first sight, it was its Government which changed its religion.

This spirit has been even preserved to much more modern times ; and when we peruse the many paragraphs that Judge Hale has written in his History of the Common Law, to prove, that in the few cases in which the Civil Law is admitted in England, it can have no power by virtue of any deference due to the orders of Justinian, (a truth, which had certainly no need of proof) we plainly see that this Chief Justice, who was also a very great Lawyer, had, in this respect, retained somewhat of the heat of party.

Even at present the English Lawyers attribute the liberty they enjoy, and of which other Nations are not possessed, to their having rejected, while those Nations have admitted, the Roman law ; which is mistaking the effect for the cause. It is not because the English have rejected the Roman law that they are free ; but it is because they were free, or, at least, because they had amongst them those causes which were, in process of time, to make them so, that they have been able to reject the Roman Laws. But, in truth, if they had admitted them, the same causes that

enabled them to reject the whole, would have likewise enabled them to reject those parts of them which did not suit them; and they would have seen, that it is very possible to receive the decisions of the Civil law on the subject of the *servitutes urbanae & rusticae*, without adopting its principles with respect to the power of the Emperors. (a)

Of this the Republic of Holland would afford a proof, if there were not the still more striking one, of the Emperor of Germany, who, though in the opinion of his People he is the successor to the very Throne of the *Cæsars*, has not by a great deal so much power as a King of England; and the reading the several treaties which deprive him of the power of nominating the principal officers of the Empire, sufficiently shews, that a spirit of unlimited submission to Monarchical power is no necessary consequence of the admission of the Civil Law.

The Laws, therefore, that have taken place in England, are what they call the *Unwritten*

(a) What particularly frightens the English Lawyers, is L. 1. Lib. 1. Tit. 4. Dig.—*Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem.*

Law, also termed the *Common Law*, and the *Statute Law*.

The *Unwritten Law* is thus called, not because it is only transmitted by tradition from generation to generation; but because it is not founded on any known act of the Legislature. It derives its force from immemorial custom; and, for the most part, derives its origin from Acts of Parliament posterior to the Conquest, particularly those anterior to the time of Richard the First, the originals of which are lost.

The principal objects settled by the Common Law, are, the rules of descent, the different methods of acquiring property, the various forms required for rendering contracts valid; in all which points it differs from the Civil Law. Thus, by the Common Law, lands descend to the eldest son, to the exclusion of all his brothers and sisters; whereas, by the Civil Law, they are equally divided between all the children: by the Common Law, property is transferred by *writing*; but by the Civil Law, *tradition* is moreover necessary, &c.

The source from which the decisions of the Common Law are drawn, is what is called *præteritorum memoria eventorum*, and is found in the collection of judgments that have passed from time immemorial, and which, as well as the proceedings relative to them, are carefully preserved under the title of *Records*. In order that the principles established by this series of judgments may be known, extracts of them are published under the name of *Reports*; and these reports reach, by a regular series, as far back as the reign of Edward the Second, inclusively.

Besides this collection, which is pretty voluminous, there are also some ancient Authors of great authority among the Lawyers; as *Glanvil*, who wrote under the reign of Henry the Second; *Bracton*, who wrote under Henry the Third; *Fleta*, and *Littleton*. Among more modern Authors, is Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of the King's bench under James the First, who has written four books of Institutes, and is at present the Oracle of the Common Law.

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The Common Law moreover comprehends some particular customs, which are fragments of the ancient Saxon laws, escaped from the disaster of the Conquest; as that called *Gavel-kind*, in the County of Kent, by which lands are divided equally between the Sons; and that called *Borough English*, by which, in some particular districts, lands descend to the youngest Son.

The Civil Law is also comprehended under the head of Unwritten Law, because it is of force only so far as it has been received by immemorial custom. It is followed in the Ecclesiastical Courts, in the Courts of Admiralty, and in the Courts of the two Universities; but it is there nothing more than *lex sub lege graviore*; and these different Courts must conform themselves to the Acts of Parliament, and to the sense given to them by the Courts of Common Law, and are also subjected to their controul.

Lastly, the Written Law is the collection of the various Acts of Parliament, the originals of which are carefully preserved, especially since the reign of Edward the Third.

Without entering into the distinctions made by the Lawyers with respect to them, such as *public* and *private* Acts, *declaratory* Acts, or such as are made to extend or restrain the Common Law, it will be sufficient to observe, that, being the result of the united wills of the Three Constituent parts of the Legislature, they, in all cases, supersede both the Common Law and former Statutes; and the Judges must take cognisance of them, and decide in conformity to them, even though they had not been alledged by the parties. (a)

(a) Unless they be private Acts.

CHAPTER IX.

Of Criminal Justice.

WE are now to treat of an article, which, though it does not in England, and indeed should not in any State, make part of the powers which are properly Constitutional, that is, of the reciprocal rights by means of which the Powers that concur to form the Government are made to balance each other, yet essentially interests the security of Individuals, and, in the issue, the Constitution itself; I mean, Criminal Justice. But, previous to an exposition of the laws of England on this head, it is necessary to direct the Reader's attention to certain considerations.

When a Nation entrusts the power of the State to a certain number of persons, or to one, it is with a view to two points: the one, to repel more effectually foreign attacks; the other, to maintain domestic tranquillity.

To accomplish the former, each individual surrenders a share of his property, and sometimes, to a certain degree, even of his liberty : but, though the power of those who happen to be the Heads of the State may thereby be rendered very considerable, yet it cannot be said, that liberty is, after all, in any high degree endangered ; because, should ever the Executive turn against the Nation a strength which ought to be employed solely for its defence, that Nation, if it were really free, by which I mean, unrestrained by political prejudices, would be at no loss for providing the means of its security.

With regard to the latter object, that is, the maintenance of domestic tranquillity, every individual must, exclusive of new renunciations of his natural liberty, moreover surrender, which is a matter of far more dangerous consequence, a part of his personal security.

The Legislative power, being, from the nature of human affairs, placed in the alternative, either of exposing individuals to dangers which it is able, on the other hand, extremely to diminish, or of delivering up

the State to the boundless calamities of violence and anarchy, finds itself compelled to reduce all its members within reach of the arm of the public Power; and, by withdrawing in such case the benefit of the Social strength, to leave them exposed, bare and defenceless, to the exertion of the comparatively immense power of the Executors of the laws.

Nor is this all; for, instead of that powerful re-action which the public authority ought in the former case to experience, here it must find none; and the law is obliged to proscribe even the attempt of resistance. It is therefore in regulating so dangerous a power, and in guarding lest it should deviate from the real end of its institution, that legislation ought to exhaust all its efforts.

But here it is of great importance to observe, that the more powers a Nation has reserved to itself, and the more it limits the authority of the Executors of the laws, the more industriously ought its precautions to be multiplied.

In a State where, from a series of events, the will of the Prince has at length attained

to hold the place of law, he spreads an universal oppression, arbitrary and unresisted; even complaint is dumb; and the individual, undistinguishable by him, finds a kind of safety in his own insignificance. With respect to the few who surround him, as they are at the same time the instruments of his greatness, they have nothing to dread but his momentary caprices; a danger this, against which, if there prevails a certain mildness of manners, they are in a great measure secured.

But in a State where the Ministers of the laws meet with obstacles at every step, even their strongest passions are continually put in motion; and that portion of public authority, deposited with them to be the instrument of national tranquillity, easily becomes a most formidable weapon.

Let us begin with the most favourable supposition, and imagine a Prince whose intentions are in every case thoroughly upright; let us even suppose, that he never lends an ear to the suggestions of those whose interest it is to deceive him: nevertheless, he will be subject to error; and that error, which I will

farther allow to proceed solely from his attachment to the public welfare, yet may very possibly happen to prompt him to act as if his views were directly opposite.

When opportunities shall offer (and many such will occur) of procuring a public advantage by overleaping restraints, confident in the uprightness of his intentions, and being naturally not very earnest to discover the distant consequences of actions in which, from his very virtue, he feels a kind of complacency, he will not perceive, that in aiming at a momentary advantage he strikes at the laws themselves, on which the safety of the Nation rests; and that those acts, so laudable when we only consider the motive of them, make a breach, at which tyranny will one day enter.

Yet farther, he will not even understand the complaints that will be made against him. To insist upon them will appear to him in the last degree injurious: pride, when perhaps he is least aware of it, will enter the lists; what he began with calmness, he will prosecute with warmth; and if the laws shall not have taken every possible precaution, he

may think he is acting a very honest part, while he treats as enemies of the State, Men whose only crime will be that of being more informed than himself; or of being in a better situation for judging of the results of measures.

But it were mightily to exalt human nature, to think that this case of a Prince who never aims at augmenting his power, may in any shape be expected frequently to occur. Experience, on the contrary, evinces, that the happiest dispositions are not proof against the allurements of power, which has no charms, but as it leads on to new advances: authority endures not the very idea of restraint; nor does it cease to struggle till it has compleatly freed itself.

Openly to level every barrier, at once to assume the absolute Master, are, as we said before, fruitless tasks; but it is here to be remembered, that those powers of the people which are reserved as a check upon the Sovereign, can only be effectual so far as they are brought into action by private individuals: sometimes a citizen, by the force and perfe-

verance of his complaints, opens the eyes of the Nation; at others, some member of the Legislature proposes a law for the removal of some public abuse: these, therefore, will be the persons against whom the Prince will direct all his efforts. (a)

And he will the more assuredly do so, as, from the error so usual among rulers, he will think that the opposition he meets with, however general, does in fact wholly depend but on one or two leaders; and amidst the calculations he will make, both on the smallness of the obstacle which offers to his view, and on the decisive nature of the single blow he thinks he needs to strike, he will be urged on by the despair of ambition on the point of being baffled, and by the most violent of all hatreds, that which was preceded by contempt.

In that case which I am still considering, of a really free Nation, the Sovereign must be very careful that military violence does not make

(a) By the word Prince, I mean those who under whatever appellation, and in whatever Government it may be, are at the head of public affairs.

the smallest part of his plan: a breach of the social compact like this, added to the horror of the expedient, would infallibly endanger his whole authority. But, on the other hand, as he has resolved to succeed, he will, in defect of other resources, try the utmost extent of the legal powers which the Constitution has intrusted with him; and, if the laws have not in a manner provided for every possible case, he will avail himself of the imperfect precautions themselves that have been taken, as a cover to his tyrannical proceedings; he will pursue steadily his particular object, while his professions breathe nothing but the general welfare, and destroy the assertors of the laws, under the shelter of the forms contrived for their security. (a)

This is not all; independantly of the immediate mischief he may do, if the Legisla-

(a) If there were any person who charged me with calumniating human Nature, for it is it alone I am accusing here, I would desire him to cast his eyes on the History of a Lewis XI. of a Richelieu, and, above all, on that of England before the Revolution: he would see the arts and activity of Government increase, in proportion as it gradually lost its means of oppression.

ture do not interpose in time, the blows will reach the Constitution itself; and the consternation becoming general amongst the People, each individual will find himself enslaved in a State which yet may still exhibit all the common appearances of liberty.

Not only, therefore, the safety of the individual, but that of the Nation itself, requires the utmost precautions in the establishment of that necessary, but formidable, prerogative of dispensing punishments. The first to be taken, even without which it is impossible to avoid the dangers above suggested, is, that it never be left to the disposal, nor, if it be possible, exposed to the influence, of the Man who is the depositary of the public power.

The next indispensable precaution is, that neither shall this power be vested in the Legislative Body; and this precaution, so necessary alike under every mode of Government, becomes doubly so, when but a small part of the Nation has a share in the Legislative power.

If the judicial authority were lodged in the legislative part of the People, not only the

vast inconvenience must ensue of its thus becoming independant, but also that worst of political evils, the suppression of the sole circumstance that can well identify that part of the Nation with the whole, that is to say, a common subjection to the rules which they themselves prescribe. The Legislative Body, which could not, without ruin to itself, establish, openly and by direct laws, distinctions in favour of its Members, would raise them by its judgments; and the People, in electing representatives, would give themselves Masters.

The judicial power ought therefore absolutely to reside in a subordinate and dependant body; dependant, not in its particular acts, with regard to which it ought to be a sanctuary, but in its rules and in its forms, which the legislative authority must prescribe. How is this body to be composed? In this respect farther precautions must be taken.

In a State where the Prince is absolute Master, numerous Bodies of Judges are most convenient, inasmuch as they restrain, in a considerable degree, that respect of persons which is one inevitable attendant on that

mode of Government. Besides, these bodies, whatever their prerogatives may be, being at bottom in a state of the greatest weakness, have no other means of acquiring the respect of the people than their integrity, and their constancy in observing certain rules and forms: nay, these circumstances united, in some degree overawe the Sovereign himself, and discourage the thoughts he might entertain of making them the tools of his caprices. (a)

But, in an effectually limited Monarchy, that is, where the Prince is understood to be, and in fact is, subject to the laws, great Bodies of Judicature would be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, which requires that all powers in the State should be as much

(a) This is meant to allude to the French *Parlemens*, and particularly that of Paris, the head of all the others, which forms such a considerable Body as to have been once summoned as a fourth Order to the General Estates of the Kingdom. The weight of that Body, increased by the circumstance of the Members holding their places for life, has constantly been attended with the advantage just mentioned, of placing them above being overawed by private individuals in the administration either of civil or criminal Justice: it has even rendered them so difficult to be managed by the Court, that the Ministers have been at times obliged to appoint particular

confined as the end of their institution can allow; not to add, that in the vicissitudes incident to such a State, they might exert a very dangerous influence.

Besides, that awe which is naturally inspired by such Bodies, and is so useful when it is necessary to strengthen the feebleness of the laws, would not only be superfluous in a State where the whole power of the Nation is on their side, but would moreover have the mischievous tendency to introduce another sort of fear than that which men must be taught to entertain. Those mighty Tribunals, I am willing to suppose, would preserve, in all situations of affairs, that integrity which distinguishes them in States of a different Constitution; they never

Judges, or *Commissaires*, to try such Men as they had resolved to ruin.

These, however, are only local advantages, and relative to the nature of the French Government, which is an uncontrolled Monarchy, with considerable remains of Aristocracy. But in a free State, such a powerful Body of Men, vested with the power of deciding on the life, honour, and property, of the Citizens, would, as will be presently shown, be productive of very dangerous political consequences; and the more so, if such Judges had, as is the case all over the world except in the British dominions, the power of deciding both upon the matter of law, and the matter of fact.

would inquire after the influence, still less the political sentiments, of those whose fate they were called to decide; but these advantages not being founded in the necessity of things, and the power of such Judges seeming to exempt them from being so very virtuous, men would be in danger of taking up the fatal opinion, that the simple exact observance of the laws is not the only task of prudence: the Citizen called upon to defend, in the sphere where fortune has placed him, his own rights, and those of the Nation itself, would dread the consequences of even a lawful conduct; and, though encouraged by the law, might desert himself when he came to behold its Ministers.

In the assembly of those who sit as his Judges, the Citizen might possibly descry no enemies; but neither would he see any man whom a similitude of circumstances might engage to take a concern in his fate: and their rank, especially when joined with their numbers, would appear to him, to lift them above that which overawes injustice, where the law has been unable to secure any other check, I mean the reproaches of the Public.

And these his fears would be considerably heightened, if, by an admission of the Jurisprudence received among certain Nations, he beheld those Tribunals, already so formidable, wrap themselves up in mystery, and be made, as it were, inaccessible. (*a*)

He could not think, without dismay, of those vast prisons within which he is one day perhaps to be immured;—of those proceedings, unknown to him, which he must go through;—of that total seclusion from the society

(*a*) An allusion is made here to the secrecy with which the proceedings in the administration of criminal Justice are to be carried on according to the rules of the civil law, which in that respect are adopted over all Europe. As soon as the prisoner is committed, he is debarred of the sight of every body till he has gone through his several examinations. One or two Judges are appointed to examine him, with a Clerk to take his answers in writing, and he stands alone before them in some private room in the prison. The witnesses are to be examined apart, and he is not admitted to see them till their evidence is closed: they are then *confronted* together before all the Judges, to the end that the witnesses may see if the prisoner is really the Man they meant in giving their respective evidences; and that the prisoner may object to such of them as he shall think proper: this done, the depositions of such witnesses as are adjudged upon trial to be exceptionable, are set aside: the depositions of the others are to be laid before the Judges, as well as the answers of the prisoner, who has

of other Men;—or of those long and secret examinations in which, abandoned wholly to himself, he will have nothing but a passive defence to oppose to the artfully varied questions of Men whose intentions he shall at least suspect, and in which his spirit, broken down by solitude, shall receive no support, either from the counsels of his friends, or from the looks of those who shall offer up vows for his deliverance.

The security of the individual, and the consciousness of that security, being then

been previously called upon to confirm or deny them in their presence; and a copy of the whole is delivered to him, that he may, with the assistance of a Counsel which is now granted him, prepare for his justification. The Judges are, as has been said before, to decide both upon the matter of law and the matter of fact, as well as upon all incidents that may arise during the course of the proceedings, such as admitting witnesses to be heard in behalf of the prisoner, &c.

This mode of criminal Judicature may be useful as to the bare discovering of truth, a thing which I do not propose to discuss here; but, at the same time, a prisoner is so completely delivered up into the hands of the Judges, who even can detain him almost at pleasure by multiplying or delaying his examinations, that, wherever it is adopted, Men are as much afraid of being accused, as of being guilty, and grow very cautious how they interfere in public matters. We shall see presently how the Trial by Jury, peculiar to the English Nation, is admirably adapted to the nature of a free State.

equally essential to the enjoyment of liberty, and necessary for the preservation of it, these two points must never be left out of sight in the establishment of a judicial power; and I conceive that they necessarily lead to the following maxims,

In the first place I shall remind the reader of what has been laid down above, that the judicial authority ought never to reside in an independant Body; still less in him who is already the trustee of the Executive power.

Secondly, the party accused ought to be provided with every possible means of defence. Above all things, the whole proceedings ought to be public. The Courts, and all their different forms, must be such as to inspire respect, but never terror; and the cases ought to be so accurately ascertained, the limits so clearly marked, as that neither the Executive power, nor the Judges, may ever hope to transgress them with impunity.

Lastly, since we must absolutely pay a price for the advantage of living in society, not only by relinquishing a part of our natural liberty, which, in a wisely framed Government,

a wise Man will do without reluctance ; but also by the alarming surrender of some degree of even our personal security ; in a word, since all judicial power is an evil, though a necessary one, no care should be omitted to reduce as far as possible the dangers of it.

And as there is indeed a period at which the prudence of Man must stop,—at which the safety of the individual must be given up, and the law is to resign him over to the judgment of a few persons, that is, to speak plainly, to a decision in some sense arbitrary, it is necessary that this same law should narrow as far as possible this sphere of peril, and so order matters, that when the subject shall happen to be summoned to the decision of his fate by the fallible conscience of a few of his fellow creatures, he may always find in them advocates, and never adversaries.

CHAPTER X.

The same Subject continued.

AFTER having offered to the reader, in the preceding Chapter, such general considerations as I thought necessary, in order to convey a juster idea of the spirit of the criminal Judicature in England, and of the advantages peculiar to it, I now proceed to exhibit the particulars.

When a person is charged with a crime, the Magistrate, who is called in England *a Justice of the Peace*, issues a warrant to apprehend him; but this warrant can be no more than an order for bringing the party before him: he must then hear him, and take down in writing his answers, together with the different informations. If it appears on this examination, either that the crime laid to the charge of the person who is brought before the Justice, was not committed, or that there is no just ground to suspect him of it, he

must be fet absolutely at liberty : if the contrary results from the examination, the party accused must give bail for his appearance to answer to the charge, unless in capital cases ; for then he must, for safer custody, be really committed to prison, in order to take his trial at the next Sessions.

But this precaution of requiring the examination of an accused person, previous to his imprisonment, is not the only care which the law has taken in his behalf ; it has farther ordained, that the accusation against him should be again discussed before he can be exposed to the danger of a trial. At every session the Sheriff appoints what is called the *Grand Jury*. This Assembly must be composed of more than twelve Men, and less than twenty-four ; and is always formed out of the most considerable persons in the County. Its function is to examine the evidence that has been given in support of every charge : if twelve of those persons do not concur in the opinion that an accusation is well grounded, the party is immediately discharged ; if, on the contrary, twelve of the grand Jury find

the proofs sufficient, the prisoner is said to be indicted, and is detained in order to go through the remaining proceedings.

On the day appointed for his Trial, the prisoner is brought to the bar of the Court, where the Judge, after causing the bill of indictment to be read in his presence, must ask him how he will be tried: to which the prisoner answers, *by God and my Country*; by which he is understood to claim to be tried by a Jury, and to have all the judicial means of defence to which the law intitles him. The Sheriff then appoints what is called the Petty Jury: this must be composed of twelve Men, chosen of the County where the crime was committed, and possessed of a landed income of ten pounds by the year: their declaration finally decides on the truth or falshood of the accusation.

As the fate of the prisoner thus intirely depends on the Men who compose this Jury, Justice requires that he should have a share in the choice of them; and this he has through the extensive right which the law has granted him, of challenging, or objecting to, such of them as he may think exceptionable.

These challenges are of two kinds. The first, which is called the challenge to the *array*, has for its object to have the whole pannel set aside: it is proposed by the prisoner when he thinks that the Sheriff who formed the pannel is not indifferent in the cause; for instance, if he thinks he has an interest in the prosecution, that he is related to the prosecutor, or in general to the party who pretends to be injured.

The second kind of challenges are called, to the Polls, (*in capita*): they are exceptions proposed against the Jurors, severally, and are reduced to four heads by Sir Edward Coke. That which he calls *propter honoris respectum*, may be proposed against a Lord impannelled on a jury; or he might challenge himself. That *propter defectum* takes place when a Juror is legally incapable of serving that office, as, if he was an alien; if he had not an estate sufficient to qualify him, &c. That *propter delictum* has for its object to set aside any Juror convicted of such crime or misdemeanor as renders him infamous, as felony, perjury, &c. That *propter affectum* is pro-

posed against a Juror who has an interest in the conviction of the prisoner: he, for instance, who has an action depending between him and the prisoner; he who is of kin to the prosecutor, or his counsellor, attorney, or of the same society or corporation with him, &c. (a)

In fine, in order to relieve even the imagination of the prisoner, the law allows him, independantly of the several challenges above mentioned, to challenge peremptorily, that is to say, without shewing any cause, twenty Jurors successively. (b)

When at length the Jury is formed, and they have taken their oath, the indictment is opened, and the prosecutor produces the proofs of his accusation. But, unlike to the rules of the Civil law, the witnesses deliver their evidence in the presence

(a) When the prisoner is an alien, one half of the Jurors must also be aliens: a Jury thus formed is called a *Jury de medietate linguæ*.

(b) When those several challenges reduce too much the number of Jurors on the pannel, which is forty-eight, new ones are named on a writ of the Judge, who are named the *Tales*, from those words of the writ, *decem or octo tales*.

of the prisoner: the latter may put questions to them; he may also produce witnesses in his behalf, and have them examined upon oath. Lastly, he is allowed to have a Counsellor to assist him, not only in the discussion of any point of law which may be complicated with the fact, but also in the investigation of the fact itself; and who points out to him the questions he ought to ask, or even asks them for him. (*a*)

Such are the precautions which the law has devised for cases of common prosecutions; but in those for High treason, and for misprision of treason, that is to say, for a conspiracy against the life of the King, or against the State, and for a concealment of it, (*b*) accusations which suppose a heat of party and powerful accusers, the law has provided for the accused party farther safeguards.

(*a*) This last article however is not established by law, except in cases of treason; it is done only through custom, and the indulgence of the Judges.

(*b*) The penalty of a misprision of treason is, the forfeiture of all goods, and imprisonment for life.

First, no person can be questioned for any treason, except a direct attempt on the life of the King, after three years elapsed since the offence. 2°. The accused party may, independantly of his other legal grounds of challenging, *peremptorily* challenge thirty-five Jurors. 3°. He may have two Counsel to assist him through the whole course of the proceedings. 4°. That his witnesses may not be kept away, the Judges must grant him the same compulsive process to bring them in, which they issue to compel the evidences against him. 5°. A copy of his indictment must be delivered to him ten days at least before the trial, in presence of two witnesses, and at the expence of five shillings; which copy must contain all the facts laid to his charge, the names, professions, and abodes, of the Jurors who are to be on the pannel, and of all the witnesses who are intended to be produced against him. (*a*)

(*a*) Stat. 7 Wil. III. c. 3. and 7 Ann. c. 21. The latter was to be in force only after the death of the late Pretender.

When, either in cases of high treason, or of inferior crimes, the prosecutor and the prisoner have closed their evidence, and the witnesses have answered to the respective questions both of the Bench, and of the Jurors, one of the Judges makes a speech, in which he sums up the facts which have been advanced on both sides. He points out to the Jury what more precisely constitutes the hinge of the question before them; and he gives them his opinion, both with regard to the evidences that have been given, and to the point of law which is to guide them in their decision. This done, the Jury withdraw into an adjoining room, where they must remain without eating and drinking, and without fire, till they have agreed unanimously among themselves, unless the Court give a permission to the contrary. Their declaration or verdict (*verdictum*) must (unless they choose to give a special verdict) pronounce expressly, either that the prisoner is guilty, or that he is not guilty, of the fact laid to his charge. Lastly, the fundamental maxim of this mode of proceeding, is, that the Jury must be unanimous.

And as the main object of this institution of the Trial by a Jury is to guard accused persons against all decisions whatsoever by Men invested with any permanent official authority, (a) it is not only a settled principle, that the opinion which the Judge delivers has no weight but such as the Jury choose to give it; but, besides, their verdict must comprehend the whole matter in trial, and decide as well upon the fact, as upon the point of law that may arise out of it: in other words, they must pronounce both on the commission of a certain fact, and on the reason which makes such fact to be contrary to law. (b)

(a) "Laws," as *Junius* says extremely well, "are intended, not to trust to what Men will do, but to guard against what they may do."

(b) Unless they choose to give a *Special* verdict.—"When the Jury," says Coke, "doubt of the law, and intend to do that which is just, they find the *special* matter, and the entry is, *Et super totâ materiâ petunt discretionem Justiciariorum.*" Inst. iv. p. 41.—These words of Coke, we may observe here, confirm beyond a doubt the power of the Jury to determine on the whole matter in trial: a power which in all constitutional views is necessary; and the more so, since a prisoner cannot in England challenge the Judge, as he can under the Civil law, and for the same causes as he can a witness.

This is even so essential a point, that a bill of indictment must expressly be grounded upon those two objects. Thus, an indictment for treason must charge, that the alledged facts were committed with a treasonable intent (*proditorie*). An indictment for murder must express, that the fact has been committed with *malice prepense*, or aforethought. An indictment for robbery must charge, that the things were taken with an intention to rob, (*animo furandi*) &c. &c. (a)

Juries are even so uncontrollable in their verdict,—so apprehensive has the Constitution been, lest precautions to restrain them in the exercise of their function, however specious in the beginning, might in the issue be converted to the very destruction of the ends of that institution, that it is a repeated principle, that

(a) The principle that a Jury is to decide both on the fact, and the *criminality* of it, is so well understood, that if a verdict were so framed as only to have for its object the bare existence of the fact laid to the charge of the prisoner, no punishment could be awarded by the Judge in consequence of it. Thus, in the prosecution of Woodfall, for printing Junius's letter to the King, the Jury brought in the following verdict, *guilty of printing and publishing, only*; the consequence of which was the discharge of the prisoner.

a Juror, in delivering his opinion, is to have no other rule but his opinion itself; that is to say, no other rule than the belief which results to his mind from the facts alledged on both sides, from their probability, from the credibility of the witnesses, and even from all such circumstances as he may have a private knowledge of. Lord Chief Justice Hale expresses himself on this subject, in the following terms, in his History of the Common Law of England.—Chap. 12. § 11.

“ In this recess of the Jury, they are to
“ consider their evidence; to weigh the credi-
“ bility of the witnesses, and the force and
“ efficacy of their testimonies; wherein (as I
“ before said) they are not precisely bound to
“ the rules of the Civil law, viz. to have
“ two witnesses to prove every fact, unless it
“ be in cases of treason, nor to reject one
“ witness because he is single, or always to
“ believe two witnesses if the probability of
“ the fact does upon other circumstances
“ reasonably encounter them; for the Trial
“ is not here simply by witnesses, but *by*
“ *Jury*: nay, it may so fall out, that a Jury

“ upon their own knowledge may know a
 “ thing to be false that a witness swore
 “ to be true, or may know a witness to be
 “ incompetent or incredible, though nothing
 “ be objected against him,—and may give their
 “ verdict accordingly.” (a)

If the verdict pronounces, *not guilty*, the prisoner is set at liberty, and cannot, on any pretence, be tried again for the same offence. If the verdict declares him *guilty*, then, and not till then, the Judge enters upon his function as a Judge, and pronounces the punishment which the law appoints. (b) But, even in this

(a) The same principles and forms are observed in civil matters; only peremptory challenges are not allowed.

(b) When the party accused is one of the Lords temporal, he likewise enjoys the universal privilege of being judged by his Peers; though the Trial then differs in several respects. In the first place, as to the number of the Jurors: all the Peers are to perform the function of such, and they must be summoned at least twenty days before-hand. II. When the Trial takes place during the session, it is said to be in the *High Court of Parliament*; and the Peers officiate at once as Jurors and Judges; when the Parliament is not sitting, the Trial is said to be in the Court of the *High Steward of England*; an office which is not usually in being, but is revived on those occasions; and the High Steward performs the office of Judge. III. In either of these cases, unanimity is not required; and the majority, which must consist of twelve persons at least, is to decide.

case, he is not to judge according to his own discretion only; he must strictly adhere to the letter of the law; no constructive extension can be admitted; and however criminal a fact might in itself be, it would pass unpunished if it were found not to be positively comprehended in some one of the cases provided for by the law. The evils that may arise from the impunity of a crime, that is, an evil which a new law may instantly stop, has not by the English laws been considered as of magnitude sufficient to be put in comparison with the danger of breaking through a barrier on which so mightily depends the safety of the individual. (a)

To all these precautions taken by the law for the safety of the Subject, one circum-

(a) I shall give here an instance of the scruple with which the English Judges proceed upon occasions of this kind. Sir *Henry Ferrers* having been arrested by virtue of a warrant, in which he was termed a *Knight*, though he was a Baronet, Nightingale his servant took his part, and killed the Officer; but it was decided, that as the Warrant “ was an ill Warrant, the killing an Officer in executing that Warrant, cannot be murder, because no good Warrant: wherefore he “ was found not guilty of the murder and manslaughter.”— See *Croke’s Rep. P. III. p. 371.*

stance must be added, which indeed would alone justify the partiality of the English Lawyers to their laws in preference to the Civil Law; I mean the absolute rejection they have made of the torture. (a) Without repeating here what has been said on this subject by the admirable Author of the *Treatise on Crimes and Punishments*, I shall only observe, that the torture, in itself so horrible an expedient, would, more especially in a free State, be attended with the most fatal consequences. It was absolutely necessary to preclude, by rejecting it, all attempts to make the pursuit of guilt an instrument of vengeance against the innocent. Even the convicted criminal must be spared, and a practice at all rates exploded, which might so easily be made an instrument of endless vexation and persecution. (b)

(a) Coke says (Inst. III. p. 35.) that when John Holland, Duke of Exeter, and William de la Poole, Duke of Suffolk, renewed, under Henry VI. the attempts made to introduce the Civil law, they exhibited the torture as a *beginning thereof*. The instrument was called the Duke of Exeter's daughter.

(b) Judge Foster relates, from Whitlock, that the Bishop of London having said to Felton, who had assassinated the

For the further prevention of abuses, it is an invariable usage, that the trial be public. The prisoner neither makes his appearance, nor pleads, but in places where every body may have free entrance; and the witnesses when they give their evidence, the Judge when he delivers his opinion, the Jury when they give their verdict, are all under the public eye. Lastly, the Judge cannot change either the place or the kind of punishment prescribed by legal sentence; and a Sheriff who should take away the life of a Man in a manner different from that which the law prescribes, would be prosecuted as guilty of murder. (a)

Duke of Buckingham, "If you will not confess, you *must* go to the Rack;" the Man replied, "If it must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of the torture; Bishop Laud perhaps, or any Lord at this Board."
 "Sound sense, (adds Foster) in the mouth of an Enthusiast and a Ruffian!"

Laud having proposed the Rack, the matter was shortly debated at the Board, and it ended in a reference to the Judges, who unanimously resolved, that the Rack could not be legally used.

(a) And if any other person but the Sheriff, even the Judge himself, were to cause death to be inflicted upon a Man though convicted, it would be deemed an homicide.— See Blackstone, L. iv. ch. 14.

In a word, the Constitution of England being a free Constitution, demanded from that circumstance alone, (as I should already have but too often repeated, if so fundamental a truth could be too often urged) extraordinary precautions to guard against the dangers which unavoidably attend the Power of inflicting punishments; and it is particularly when considered in this light, that the Trial by Jury proves an admirable institution.

By means of it, the Judicial authority is not only placed out of the hands of the Man who is vested with the Executive authority:—it is even out of the hands of the Judge himself. Not only, he who is trusted with the public power cannot exert it, till he has as it were received the permission to that purpose, of those who are set apart to administer the laws; but these are also restrained in a manner exactly alike, and cannot make the law speak, but when, in their turn, they have likewise received permission.

And those persons to whom the law has delegated exclusively the prerogative of deciding that a punishment is to be inflicted,—

those Men without whose declaration the Executive and the Judicial powers are both thus bound down to inaction, do not form among themselves a permanent Body, who may have had time to study how their power can serve to promote their private views; they are Men selected at once from among the people, who perhaps never were before called to the exercise of such a function, nor foresee that they ever shall be called to it again,

As the extensive right of challenging effectually baffles, on the one hand, the secret practices of such as in the face of so many discouragements might still persist in making the judicial power subservient to their own views, and on the other excludes all personal resentments, the sole affection which remains to influence the integrity of those who alone are intitled to put the public power into action, during the short period of their authority, is, that their own fate as subjects, is essentially connected with that of the Man whose doom they are going to decide.

In fine, such is the happy nature of this institution, that the Judicial power, a power so formidable in itself, which is to dispose without finding any resistance, of the property, honour, and life of individuals, and which, whatever precautions may be taken to restrain it, must in a great degree remain arbitrary, may be said in England, to exist,—to accomplish every intended end,—and to be in the hands of nobody. (*a*)

In all these observations on the advantages of the English criminal laws, I have only considered it as connected with the Constitution, which is a free one; and it is in this view alone that I have compared it with the Jurisprudence received in other States. Yet, abstractedly from the weighty constitutional considerations which I have suggested, I think there are still other interesting grounds of

(*a*) The consequence of this Institution is, that no Man in England ever meets the Man of whom he may say, “That Man has a power to decide on my death or life.” If we could for a moment forget the blessings of that Institution, we ought at least to admire the ingenuity of it.

pre-eminence on the side of the laws of England.

They do not permit, that a Man should be made to run the risque of a trial, but upon the declaration of twelve persons at least, (the Grand Jury). Whether he be in prison, or on his Trial, they never for an instant refuse free access to those who have either advice, or comfort, to give him: they even allow him to summon all who may have any thing to say in his favour. Lastly, what is of very great importance, the witnesses against him must deliver their testimony in his presence; he may cross-examine them; and, by one unexpected question, confound a whole system of calumny: indulgences these all, denied by the laws of other Countries.

Hence, though an accused person may indeed be exposed to have his fate decided by persons (the Petty Jury) who possess not, perhaps, all that sagacity which in some delicate cases it is particularly advantageous to meet with in a Judge, yet this inconvenience is amply compensated by the extensive means of defence with which the law, as we have

seen, has provided him. If a Juryman does not possess that expertness which is the result of long practice, yet neither does he bring to judgment that hardness of heart which is, more or less, also, a consequence of it; and bearing about him the principles, let me say, the unimpaired instinct of humanity, he trembles while he exercises the awful office to which he finds himself called; and in doubtful cases always decides for mercy.

It is to be farther observed, that in the usual course of things, the Juries pay great regard to the opinions delivered by the Judges: that in those cases where they are clear as to the fact, yet find themselves perplexed with regard to the degree of guilt connected with it, they leave it, as has been said before, to be ascertained by the discretion of the Judge, by returning what is called a *Special Verdict*: that whenever circumstances seem to alleviate the guilt of a person against whom nevertheless the proof has been positive, they temper their verdict by recommending him to the mercy of the King; which seldom fails to produce at least a mitigation of the

punishment: that, though a Man, once acquitted, can never, under any pretence whatsoever, be again brought into peril for the same offence, yet a new Trial would be granted, if he had been found guilty upon proofs strongly suspected of being false (Blackst. L. iv. c. 27.). Lastly, what distinguishes the laws of England from those of other countries in a very honourable manner, is, that as the torture is unknown to them, so neither do they know any more grievous punishment than the simple deprivation of life.

All these circumstances have combined to introduce such a mildness into the exercise of criminal Justice, that the Trial by Jury is that point of their liberty to which the people of England are most thoroughly and universally wedded; and the only complaint I have ever heard uttered against it, has been by Men, who, more sensible of the necessity of public order, than alive to the feelings of humanity, think that too many offenders escape with impunity.

CHAPTER XI.

The Subject concluded.—Laws relative to Imprisonments.

BUT what compleats the sense of independence, which the laws of England procure to every individual, (a sense which is the noblest advantage attendant on liberty) is the greatness of their precautions upon the delicate point of Imprisonment.

In the first place, by allowing, in most cases, of enlargement upon bail, and by prescribing, on that article, express rules for the Judges to follow, they have removed all pretexts which circumstances might afford of depriving a man of his liberty.

But it is against the Executive power that the Legislature has, above all, directed its efforts: nor has it been but by slow degrees, that it has been enabled to wrest from it a branch of power which enabled it to deprive the people of their Leaders, as well as to intimidate those who might be tempted to

assume the function; and which, having thus all the efficacy of more odious means without the dangers of them, was the most formidable weapon for attacking public liberty.

The methods originally pointed out by the laws of England for the enlargement of a person unjustly imprisoned, were the writs of *mainprize*, *de odio & atia*, and *de homine replegiando*. Those writs, which could not be refused, were an order to the Sheriff of the County in which a person had been confined, to inquire into the causes of his confinement; and, according to the circumstances of his case, either to discharge him purely and simply, or upon bail.

But the most usual method, and which even, by being most general and certain, has tacitly abolished all the others, is the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, so called because it begins with the words *Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum*. This writ, being a writ of high prerogative, must issue from the Court of King's Bench: its effects extended equally over every County; and the King by it required, or was understood to require, the person who held one

of his subjects in custody, to carry him before the Judge, with the date of the confinement, and the cause of it, in order to discharge him, or continue to detain him, according as the Judge shall decree.

But this writ, which might be a resource in cases of violent imprisonment effected by individuals, or granted at their request, was a weak one indeed, or rather was no resource at all, against the prerogative of the Prince; especially under the reigns of the Tudors, and in the beginning of those of the Stuarts. And even, in the first years of Charles the First, the Judges of the King's Bench, who in consequence of the spirit of the times, and of their holding their places *durante bene placito*, were constantly devoted to the Court, declared, "that they could not, upon an "*habeas corpus*, either bail or deliver a prisoner, though committed without any cause assigned, in case he was committed by the special command of the King, or by the Lords of the Privy Council."

Those principles, and the mode of procedure which resulted from them, attracted the

attention of Parliament; and in the Act called the Petition of Right, passed in the third year of the reign of Charles the First, it was enacted, that no person should be held in custody, in consequence of such imprisonments.

But the Judges knew how to evade the intention of this Act: they indeed did not refuse to discharge a Man imprisoned without a cause; but they used so much delay in the examination of those causes, that they obtained the full effect of an open denial of Justice.

The Legislature again interposed, and in the Act passed in the sixteenth year of the reign of Charles the First, the same in which the Star-Chamber was suppressed, it was enacted, that “ if any person be committed
“ by the King himself in person, or by his
“ Privy Council, or by any of the members
“ thereof, he shall have granted unto him,
“ without any delay upon any pretence what-
“ soever, a writ of *Habeas Corpus*; and that
“ the Judge shall thereupon, within three
“ Court days after the return is made, exa-

“ mine and determine the legality of such
“ imprisonment.”

This Act seemed to preclude every possibility of future evasion: yet it was evaded still; and by the connivance of the Judges, the person who detained the prisoner could, without danger, wait for a second, and a third writ, called an *Alias* and a *Pluries*, before he produced him.

All these different artifices gave at length birth to the famous Act of *Habeas Corpus*, passed in the thirtieth year of the reign of Charles the Second, which in England is considered as a second great Charter, and has definitively suppressed all the resources of oppression. (a)

The principal articles of this act are, To fix the different terms allowed for bringing a prisoner: those terms are proportioned to the distance; and none can in any case exceed twenty days.

(a) The real title of the Act is, *An Act for better securing the Subject, and for prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas.*

2. That, the Officer and Keeper neglecting to make due returns, or not delivering to the prisoner, or his agent, within six hours after demand, a copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the custody of the prisoner from one to another, without sufficient reason or authority, (specified in the act) shall for the first offence forfeit one hundred pounds, and for the second, two hundred, to the party grieved, and be disabled to hold his office.

3. No person, once delivered by *Habeas Corpus*, shall be recommitted for the same offence, on penalty of five hundred pounds.

4. Every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he require it in the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to bail; unless the King's witnesses cannot be produced at that time; and if acquitted, or if not indicted and tried in the second term or session, he shall be discharged of his imprisonment for such imputed offence.

5. Any of the twelve Judges, or the Lord Chancellor, who shall deny a writ of *Habeas Corpus*, on sight of the warrant, or on oath that the same is refused, shall forfeit severally to the party grieved five hundred pounds.

6. No inhabitant of England (except persons contracting, or convicts praying to be transported) shall be sent prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or any place beyond the Seas, within or without the King's dominions; on pain that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and assistants, shall forfeit to the party grieved a sum not less than five hundred pounds, to be recovered with treble costs; shall be disabled to bear any office of trust or profit; shall incur the penalties of *præmunire* (the imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of all goods, and rents of lands during life); and shall be incapable of the King's pardon.

B O O K II.

C H A P T E R I.

Some Advantages peculiar to the English Constitution. 1. The Unity of the Executive Power.

WE have seen, in former Chapters, the resources of the different parts of the English Government for balancing each other, and how their reciprocal actions and reactions produce the freedom of the Constitution, which is no more than an equilibrium between the ruling powers of a State. I now propose to shew, that the particular nature and functions of these same constituent parts of the Government, which give it so different an appearance from that of other free States, are moreover attended with peculiar and very

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great advantages, which have not hitherto been sufficiently observed.

The first peculiarity of the English Government, as a free Government, is its having a King,—its having thrown into one place the whole mass, if I may use the expression, of the Executive power, and having invariably and for ever fixed it there. By this very circumstance, also, has the *depositum* of it been rendered sacred and inexpugnable; by making one great, very great, Man in the State, has an effectual check been put to the pretensions of those who otherwise would strive to become such; and disorders have been prevented, which, in all Republics, ever brought on the ruin of liberty; and, before it was lost, obstructed the enjoyment of it.

If we cast our eyes on all the States that ever were free, we shall see that the People in them, ever turning their jealousy, as it was natural, against the Executive power, but never thinking of the means of limiting it that have been so happily fallen upon in England, (a)

(a) The rendering that power dependant on the people for its supplies.—See on this subject Chapter VI. B. I.

have never employed any other expedient besides that obvious one, of trusting it to magistrates they appointed annually ; which was in great measure to keep to themselves the management of it. Whence it resulted, that the People, who, whatever may be the frame of the Government, always possess, after all, the reality of power, uniting thus in themselves with this reality of power the actual exercise of it, in form as well as in fact, constituted the whole State. In order therefore legally to disturb the whole State, nothing more was requisite than to put in motion a certain number of individuals.

In a State which is small and poor, an arrangement of this kind is not attended with any great inconveniences, as every individual is taken up with the care of providing for his own subsistence ; as great objects of ambition are wanting, and as evils cannot, in such a State, ever become much complicated. In a State that strives for aggrandisement, the difficulties and danger attending the pursuit of such a plan, inspire a general spirit of caution, and every individual makes a sober use of his rights as a Citizen.

But when, at last, those exterior motives come to cease, and the passions, and even the virtues, which they excited, become thus reduced to a state of inaction, the People turn their eyes back towards the interior of the Republic; and every individual, in seeking then to concern himself in all affairs, seeks for new objects that may restore him to that state of exertion, which habit, he finds, has rendered necessary to him, and to exercise a power which, small as it is, yet flatters his vanity.

As the preceding events must have given an influence to a certain number of Citizens, they avail themselves of the general disposition of the people, to promote their private views; the legislative power is thenceforth continually in motion; and as it is ill informed and falsely directed, almost every exertion of it is attended with some injury either to the laws, or the State.

This is not all; as those who compose the general Assemblies cannot, in consequence of their numbers, entertain any hopes of gratifying their private ambition, or, in general,

their private passions, they at least seek to gratify their political caprices, and they accumulate the honours and dignities of the State on some favourite whom the public voice happens to raise at that time.

But, as in such a State there can be, from the irregularity of the movements, no such thing as a settled course of measures, it happens that Men never can exactly tell the present state of public affairs. The power thus given away is already grown very great, before those by whom it was given even suspect it; and he himself who enjoys that power, does not know its full extent: but then, on the first opportunity that offers, he suddenly pierces through the cloud which hid the summit from him, and at once seats himself upon it. The people, on the other hand, no sooner recover sight of him than they see their favourite become their Master; and discover the evil, only to find that it is past remedy.

As this power, thus surreptitiously acquired, is destitute of the support both of the law, and of the ancient course of things, and is even but indifferently respected by those who

have subjected themselves to it, it cannot be maintained but by abusing it. The people at last succeed in forming somewhere a centre of union; they agree in the choice of a Leader; this Leader in his turn rises; in his turn also he betrays his engagements; power produces its wonted effects, and the protector becomes a Tyrant.

This is not all; the same causes which have given a Master to the State, give it two, give it three. All those rival powers endeavour to swallow up each other; the State becomes a scene of quarrels and endless broils, and is in a continual convulsion.

If amidst such disorders the people retained their freedom, the evil must indeed be very great, to take away all the advantages of it; but they are slaves, and yet have not what in other Countries makes amends for servitude, I mean tranquillity.

In order to prove all these things, if proofs were deemed necessary, I would only refer the reader to what every one knows of Pisistratus and Megacles, of Marius and Sylla, of Cæsar and Pompey. However, I cannot avoid

translating a part of the speech which a Citizen of Florence addressed once to the Senate: the reader will find in it a kind of abridged story of all Republics; at least of those which, by the share allowed to the people in the Government, deserved that name; and which, besides, have attained a certain degree of extent and power.

“ And that nothing human may be perpetual and stable, it is the will of Heaven, that in all States whatsoever, there should arise certain destructive families, who are the bane and ruin of them. Of this our Republic can afford as many and more deplorable examples than any other, as it owes its misfortunes not only to one, but to several of such families. We had at first the *Buondelmonti* and the *Huberti*. We had afterwards the *Donati* and the *Cerchi*; and at present, (shameful and ridiculous conduct!) we are waging war among ourselves for the *Ricci* and the *Albizzi*.”

“ When in former times the Ghibelins were suppressed, every one expected that the Guelfs, being then satisfied, would have

“ chosen to live in tranquillity; yet, but a
“ little time had elapsed, when they again
“ divided themselves into the factions of the
“ *Whites* and the *Blacks*. When the Whites
“ were suppressed, new parties arose, and new
“ troubles followed. Sometimes, battles were
“ fought in favour of the Exiles; and at
“ others, quarrels broke out between the No-
“ bility and the People. And, as if resolved
“ to give away to others what we ourselves
“ neither knew, nor would peaceably enjoy,
“ we committed the care of our liberty,
“ sometimes to King Robert, and at others
“ to his brother, and at length to the Duke
“ of Athens; never settling nor resting in
“ any kind of Government, as not knowing
“ either how to enjoy liberty, or support
“ servitude.” (a)

The English Constitution has prevented the possibility of misfortunes of this kind. Not only, by diminishing the power, or rather the actual exercise of the power, of the peo-

(a) See the History of Florence, by Machiavel, L. III.

ple, (a) and making them share in the Legislature only by their representatives, the irresistible violence has been avoided of those numerous and general Assemblies, which, on whatever side they throw their weight, bear down every thing. Besides, as the power of the people, when they have any power and know how to use it, is at all times really formidable, the Constitution has set a counterpoise to it; and the Royal authority is this counterpoise.

In order to render it equal to such a task, the Constitution has, in the first place, conferred on the King, as we have seen before, the exclusive prerogative of calling and dismissing the legislative Bodies, and of putting a negative on their resolutions.

Secondly, it has also placed on the side of the King the whole Executive power in the Nation.

(a) We shall see in the sequel, that this diminution of the exercise of the power of the people, has been attended with a great increase of their liberty.

Lastly, in order to effect still nearer an equilibrium, the Constitution has invested the Man whom it has made the sole Head of the State, with all the personal privileges, all the pomp, all the majesty, of which human dignities are capable. In the language of the law, the King is Sovereign Lord, and the people are his subjects;—he is universal proprietor of the whole Kingdom;—he bestows all the dignities and places;—and he is not to be addressed but with the expressions and outward ceremony of almost oriental humility. Besides, his person is sacred and inviolable; and any attempt whatsoever against it, is, in the eye of the law, a crime equal to that of an attack against the whole State.

In a word, since to have too exactly completed the equilibrium between the power of the People, and that of the Crown, would have been to sacrifice the end to the means, that is, to have endangered liberty with a view to strengthen the Government, the deficiency which ought to remain on the side of the latter, has at least been in appearance made up, by conferring on the King all that

fort of strength that may result from the opinion and reverence of the people; and amidst the agitations which are the unavoidable attendants of liberty, the Royal power, like an anchor which resists both by its weight and the depth of its hold, insures a salutary steadiness to the vessel of the State.

The greatness of the prerogative of the King, by its thus procuring a great degree of stability to the State in general, has much lessened the possibility of the evils we have described before; it has even totally prevented them, by rendering it impossible for any Citizen ever to rise to any dangerous greatness.

And to begin with an advantage by which the people easily suffer themselves to be influenced, I mean that of birth, it is impossible for it ever to produce in England effects in any degree dangerous: for though there are Lords who, besides their wealth, may also boast of an illustrious descent, yet that advantage, being exposed to a continual comparison with the splendor of the Throne, dwindles almost to nothing; and in the gradation universally received of dignities and titles, that

of Sovereign Prince . and King places him who is invested with it, out of all degree of proportion.

The ceremonial of the Court of England is even formed upon that principle; those persons who are related to the King, have the title of Princes of the blood, and, in that quality, an undisputed pre-eminence over all other persons. (a) Nay, the first Men in the Nation think it an honourable distinction to themselves to hold the different menial offices in his Household. If we therefore were to set aside the extensive and real power of the King, as well as the numerous means he possesses of satisfying the ambition and hopes of individuals, and were to consider only the Majesty of his title, and that strength, founded on public opinion, which results from it, we should find that advantage so considerable, that to attempt to enter into a competition with it, with the bare advantage of high birth,

(a) This, by Stat. of the 3d of Hen. VIII. extends to the sons, grandsons, brothers, uncles, and nephews, of the reigning King.

which itself has no other foundation than public opinion, and that too in a very subordinate degree, would be an attempt compleatly extravagant.

If this difference is so great as to be thoroughly submitted to, even by those persons whose situation might incline them to disown it, much more does it influence the minds of the people. And if, notwithstanding the value which every Englishman ought to put upon himself as a Man, and a free Man, there were any whose eyes are so tender as to be dazzled by the appearance and the arms of a Lord, they would be totally blinded when they came to turn them towards Royal Majesty.

The only Man therefore, who, to those who are unacquainted with the Government of England, might appear in a condition to put the Government in danger, would be a Man who, by the greatness of his abilities, and public services, had acquired in a high degree the love of the people, and obtained a great influence in the House of Commons.

But how great soever this enthusiasm of the public may be, barren applause is the only fruit which he whom they favour can expect from it. He can hope neither for a Dictatorship, nor a Consulship, nor in general for any power under the shelter of which he may at once safely unmask that ambition with which we might suppose him to have been actuated; or, if we suppose him to have been hitherto free from any, grow insensibly corrupt. The only door which the Constitution leaves open to his ambition, of whatever kind it may be, is a place in the administration during the pleasure of the King. If, by the continuance of his services, and the preservation of his influence, he becomes able to aim still higher, the only door which again opens to him, is that of the House of Lords.

But this advance of the favourite of the people towards the establishment of his greatness, is at the same time a great step towards the loss of that power which might render him formidable.

In the first place, the people seeing that he is become much less dependant on their

favour, begin, from that very moment, to lessen their attachment to him. Seeing him moreover distinguished by privileges which are the object of their jealousy, I mean their political jealousy, and member of a body, whose interests are frequently opposite to theirs, they immediately conclude, that this great and new dignity cannot have been acquired but through a secret agreement to betray them. Their favourite, thus suddenly transformed, is going, they entertain no doubt, to adopt a conduct intirely opposite to that which hitherto has been the cause of his advancement and high reputation, and in the compass of a few hours, compleatly renounce those principles which he has so long and so loudly professed. In this certainly the people are mistaken; but yet they would not be wrong, if they feared that a zeal hitherto so warm, so constant, I will even add, so sincere, when it concurred with his private interest, would, by being thenceforth often in opposition to it, be gradually much abated.

Nor is this all; the favourite of the people does not, even find in his new-acquired dig-

nity, all the increase of greatness and eclat, that might at first be imagined.

Hitherto he was, it is true, only a private individual; but then he was the object in which the whole Nation interested themselves; his actions and discourses were set forth in all the public prints; and he every where met with applause and acclamation.

All these tokens of public favour are, I know, sometimes acquired very lightly; but they never last long, whatever people may say, unless real services are performed. Now, the title of Benefactor of the Nation, when deserved, and universally bestowed, is certainly a very fine title, and which does nowise require the assistance of outward pomp to set it off. Besides, though he was only a Member of the inferior body of the Legislature, we must observe, he was the first; and the word *first* is always a word of very great moment.

But now that he is made a Lord, all his greatness, which hitherto was indeterminate, becomes defined.—By granting him privileges esta-

blished and fixed by known laws, that uncertainty is taken from his lustre which is so precious in those things which depend on imagination; and his price falls, just because it is ascertained.

Besides, he is a Lord; but then there are several Men who possess but small abilities, and few estimable qualifications, who also are Lords: his lot is, nevertheless, to sit among them: the law places him exactly on the same level with them; and all that is real in his greatness, is thus lost in a crowd of dignities, hereditary and conventional.

And these are not the only losses which the favourite of the people has to suffer. Independantly of those great changes which he descries at a distance, he feels around him alterations no less visible, and still more painful.

Seated formerly in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, his talents and continual success had soon raised him above the level of his fellow Members; and, carried on by the vivacity and warmth of the public favour, those who might have been tempted to set up as

his competitors, were reduced to silence, or even became his supporters.

Admitted now into an Assembly of persons invested with a perpetual and hereditary title, he finds Men hitherto his superiors,—Men who see with a jealous eye the superior talents of the *homo novus*; and who are firmly resolved, that after having been the leading Man in the House of Commons, he shall not be the first in theirs.

In a word, the successes of the favourite of the people were brilliant, and even formidable; but the Constitution, in the very reward it prepares for him, makes him find a kind of Ostracism. His advances were sudden, and his course rapid; he was, if you please, like a torrent ready to bear down every thing before it; but then this torrent is compelled, by the general arrangement of things, finally to throw itself into a vast reservoir, where it mingles, and loses its direction and force.

I know it may be said, that, in order to avoid the fatal step which is to deprive him of so many advantages, the favourite of the people ought to refuse the new dignity which is offered to him, and wait for more important

successes from his eloquence in the House of Commons, and his influence over the people.

But those who give him this counsel, have not sufficiently examined it. Without doubt, there are Men in England, who in their present pursuit of a project which they think essential to the public good, would be capable of refusing for a while a place which would deprive their virtue of opportunities of exerting itself, or might more or less endanger it. But woe to him who would persist in such a refusal, with any pernicious design! and who, in a Government where liberty is established on so solid and extensive a basis, would make the people believe that their fate depends on the persevering virtue of a single Citizen. His ambitious views, being at last discovered, (nor could it be long before they were so) his obstinate resolution to move out of the ordinary course of things, would indicate aims, on his part, of such an extraordinary nature, that all Men whatever, who have any regard for their Country, would instantly rise up from all parts to oppose him; and he must fall, overwhelmed with so much

ridicule, that it would be better for him to fall from the Tarpeian rock. (a)

In fine, even though we were to suppose, that the new Lord might, after his exaltation, have preserved all his interest with the people, or, what would be no less difficult, that any Lord whatever could, by dint of his wealth and high birth, rival the splendor of the Crown itself, all these advantages, how great soever we may suppose them, as they would not be able of themselves to confer on him the least executive authority, must for ever remain mere showy unsubstantial advantages. Finding all the active powers in the State confined in that very seat of power, which we suppose him inclined to attack,

(a) The Reader will perhaps object, that no Man in England can possibly entertain such views as those I have supposed here: this is precisely what I intended to prove. The essential advantage of the English Government above all those that have been called *free*, and which in fact were but apparently so, is, that no person in England can entertain so much as a thought of his ever rising to the level of the Power charged with the execution of the Laws. All Men in the State, whatever may be their rank, wealth, or influence, are thoroughly convinced, that they shall (in reality as well as in name) continue for ever to be *Subjects*; and are thus compelled really to love, to defend, and to promote those laws which secure the liberty of the Subject. This observation will be more amply insisted upon afterwards.

and there secured by the most formidable provisions, his influence must always evaporate in ineffectual words; and after having advanced himself, as we suppose, to the very foot of the Throne, finding no branch of independant power which he might appropriate to himself, and thus give at last a reality to his political importance, he would soon see it, however great it might have at first appeared, decline and die away.

God forbid, however, that I should mean that the people of England are so fatally tied down to inaction, by the nature of their Government, that they cannot, in times of oppression, find means of appointing a Leader. No; I only meant to say, that the laws of England open no door to those accumulations of power, which have been the ruin of so many Republics: that they offer to the ambitious no possible means of taking advantage of the inadvertence, or even the gratitude, of the People, to make themselves their Tyrants: and that the public power, of which the King has been made the exclusive depositary, must remain unshaken in his hands, as long as things continue to keep in their legal order, which, it may be observed,

is a most strong inducement to him constantly to endeavour to maintain it. (a)

(a) There are several events, in the English History, which put in a very strong light this idea of the stability which the power of a Crown can give to a State.

The first is the facility with which the great Duke of Marlborough, and his party at home, were removed from their several employments. Hannibal, in circumstances nearly similar, had continued the war, against the will of the Senate of Carthage: Cæsar had done the same in Gaul; and when at last his commission was expressly required from him, he marched his army to Rome, and established a military despotism. But the Duke, though surrounded, as well as those Generals, by a victorious army, and by Allies in conjunction with whom he had carried on such a successful war, did not even hesitate to deliver up his commission. He knew that all his soldiers were insuperably prepossessed in favour of that Power against which he must have revolted: he knew that the same prepossessions were deeply rooted in the minds of the whole Nation, and that every thing among them concurred to support that same Power: he knew that the very nature of the claims he must then have set up, would instantly have made all his Officers and Captains turn themselves against him, and, in short, that in an enterprize of that nature, the arm of the sea he had to repass, was the smallest of the obstacles he would have to encounter.

The other event I shall mention here, is that of the Revolution of 1689. If the splendour and long established power of a Crown had not beforehand prevented the people from accustoming themselves to fix their eyes on some particular Citizens, and in general had not prevented all Men in the State from attaining any considerable degree of power and greatness, the expulsion of James might have been followed by events similar to those which took place at Rome after the death of Cæsar.

C H A P T E R II.

The Subject concluded.—The Executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE.

ONE other great advantage, and which one would not at first expect, in this *unity* of the public power in England,—in this union, and, if I may so express myself, in this coacervation, of all the branches of the Executive authority, is the greater facility it affords of restraining it.

In those States where the execution of the laws is intrusted to several different hands, and to each with different titles and prerogatives, such division, and the changeableness of measures which must be the consequence of it, constantly hide the true cause of the evils of the State; and in the endless fluctuation of things, no political principles have time to settle among the people, and public misfortunes happen, without ever leaving behind them any useful lesson.

Sometimes military Tribunes, and at others, Consuls, bear an absolute sway;—sometimes Patricians usurp every thing, and at others, those who then are called Nobles; (a)—sometimes the people are oppressed by Decemvirs, and at others, by Dictators.

Tyranny, in such States, does not always beat down the fences that are set around it; but it leaps over them. When men think it confined to one place, it starts up again in another;—it does not mock the efforts of the People because it is invincible, but because it is unknown;—seized by the arm of a Hercules, it escapes with the changes of a Proteus.

But the indivisibility of the Public power in England, has constantly kept the views and efforts of the People directed to one and the same object; and the permanence of that Power

(a) The capacity of being admitted to all places of public trust, at last gained by the Plebeians, having rendered vain the old distinction between them and the Patricians, a coalition was then effected between the great Plebeians, or Commoners, who got into those places, and the ancient Patricians: thence a new Class of Men arose, who were called *Nobiles* and *Nobilitas*. These are the words by which Livy, after that period, constantly distinguishes those Men and families who were at the head of the State.

has also given a permanence and a regularity to the precautions they have taken to restrain it.

Constantly turned towards that ancient fortress, the Royal power, they have made it, for seven centuries, the object of their fear; with a watchful jealousy they have considered all its parts—they have observed all its outlets—they have even pierced the earth to explore its secret avenues, and subterraneous works.


United in their views by the greatness of the danger, they regularly formed their attacks. They established their works, first at a distance; then brought them successively nearer: and, in short, raised none but what served afterwards as a foundation or support to others.

After Magna Charta was established, forty successive confirmations strengthened it. The Act called *the Petition of Right*, and that passed in the sixteenth year of Charles the First, afterwards followed: some years after, the *Habeas Corpus* Act was established; and the Bill of Rights made at length its appearance. In fine, whatever the circumstances may have been, they

always had, in their efforts, that inestimable advantage of knowing with certainty the general seat of the evils they had to defend themselves against; and each calamity, each particular eruption, by its pointing out some weak place, has ever gained a new bulwark to liberty.

To say all in three words, the Executive power in England is formidable; but then it is for ever the same: its resources are vast, but their nature is at length known: it has been made the indivisible and unalienable attribute of one person alone; but then all others, of whatever rank or degree, become really interested to confine it. (a)

(a) This last advantage of the greatness and indivisibility of the Executive power, viz. the obligation it lays upon the greatest Men in the State, sincerely to unite in a common cause with the people, will be more amply discussed hereafter, when a more particular comparison between the English Government and the Republican form, shall be offered to the Reader.



C H A P. III.

A second Peculiarity.—The Division of the Legislative Power.

THE second peculiarity which England, as an undivided State and a free State, exhibits in its Constitution, is the division of its Legislature. But, in order to make the reader more sensible of the advantages of this division, it is necessary to desire him to attend to the following considerations.

It is, without doubt, absolutely necessary, for securing the Constitution of a State, to restrain the Executive power; but it is still more necessary to restrain the Legislative. What the former can only do by successive steps (I mean subvert the laws) and through a longer or shorter train of enterprizes, the latter does in a moment. As its will alone can give being to the laws, its will alone can also annihilate them: and, if I may be permitted the expression,—the Legislative power can

change the Constitution, as God created the light.

In order therefore to insure stability to the Constitution of a State, it is indispensably necessary to restrain the Legislative authority. But here we must observe a difference between the Legislative and the Executive powers: the latter may be confined, and even is the more easily so, when undivided: the Legislative, on the contrary, in order to its being restrained, should absolutely be divided. For, whatever laws it may make for restraining itself, they never can be, relatively to it, any thing more than simple resolutions:—as those bars which it might erect to stop its own motions, must then be within it, and rest upon it, they can be no bars. In a word, the same kind of impossibility is found, to fix the Legislative power, when it is *one*, which Archimedes objected against his moving the Earth.

And such a division of the Legislature not only renders it possible for it to be restrained, since each of those parts, into which it is divided, can then serve as a bar to the mo-

tions of the others; but it even makes it to be actually restrained. If it has been divided into two parts, it is probable that they will not in all cases unite, either for *doing*, or for *undoing*:—if it has been divided into three parts, the chance that no changes will be made, is thereby greatly increased.

Nay more; as a kind of point of honour will naturally take place between those different parts of the Legislature, they will thus be led to make to each other only such propositions as will at least be plausible; and all very prejudicial changes will thus be prevented, as it were, before their birth.

If the Legislative and Executive powers differ so greatly with regard to the necessity of their being divided in order to their being restrained, they differ no less with regard to the other consequences arising from such division.

The division of the Executive power necessarily introduces actual oppositions, even violent ones, between the different parts into which it has been divided; and that part which in the issue succeeds to absorb, and

unite in itself, all the others, immediately sets itself above the laws. But those oppositions which take place, and which the public good requires should take place, between the different parts of the Legislature, never are any thing more than oppositions between contrary opinions and intentions; all is transacted in the regions of the understanding; and the only contention that arises is wholly carried on with those inoffensive weapons, assents and dissents, *ayes* and *noes*.

Besides, when one of those parts of the Legislature is so successful as to engage the others to adopt its proposition, the result is, that a law takes place which has in it a great probability of being good:—when it comes to be defeated, and sees its proposition fall, the worst that can result from it is, that a law is not made at that time; and the loss which the State suffers thereby, reaches no farther than the temporary setting aside of some more or less useful speculation.

In a word, the result of a division of the Executive power, is either a more or less speedy establishment of *the right of the strongest*, or

a continued state of war : (a)—that of a division of the Legislative power, is either truth, or general tranquillity.

The following maxim will therefore be admitted. That the laws of a State may be permanent, it is requisite that the Legislative power should be divided :—that they may have weight, and continue in force, it is necessary that the Executive power should be *one*.

If the reader conceived any doubt as to the truth of the above observations, he need only cast his eyes on the history of the proceedings of the English Legislature down to our times, to find a proof of them. He would be surpris'd to see how little variation there has been in the laws of this country, especially in the whole course of the last century, though, it is most important to observe, the

(a) Every one knows the frequent hostilities that took place between the Roman Senate and the Tribunes. In Sweden there have been continual contentions between the King and the Senate, in which they have overpowered each other, by turns. And in England, when the Executive power became double, by the King allowing the Parliament to have a perpetual and independant existence, a civil war immediately followed.

Legislature has been, as it were, in a continual state of action, and, no dispassionate Man will deny, has continually promoted the public good. Nay, if we except the Act passed under William III. by which it had been enacted, that Parliaments should sit no longer than three years, and which was repealed by a subsequent Act, under George I. which allowed them to sit for seven years, we shall not find that any law, which can really be called Constitutional, and which has been enacted since the Restoration, has been changed afterwards.

Now, if we compare such a constancy with the continual subversions of the legislations of some ancient Republics, with the imprudence of some of the laws passed in their assemblies, (*a*) and with the still greater inconsiderateness with which they sometimes repealed the most salutary laws, as it were, the day after they had been enacted,—if we call to mind the extraordinary means to which the

(*a*) The Athenians, among other laws, had enacted one to forbid applying a certain part of the public revenues to any other use, but to the expences of the Theatres and public Shows.

Legislature of those Republics, at times sensible how its very power was prejudicial to the State, was obliged to have recourse, in order, if possible, to tie its own hands, (*a*) we shall remain convinced of the great advantages which attend the constitution of the English Legislature. (*b*)

Nor has this division of the English Legislature been attended (which is indeed a very fortunate circumstance) by any actual division of the Nation: each constituent part of it possesses strength sufficient to insure respect to its resolutions, yet no real division has been

(*a*) In some ancient Republics, when the Legislature wished to render a certain law permanent, and at the same time mistrusted their own future wisdom, they added a clause to it, which made it death to propose the revocation of it. Those who afterwards thought such revocation necessary to the public welfare, relying on the mercy of the People, appeared in the public Assembly with a halter about their necks.

(*b*) We shall see in the sequel, that the true cause of the equability and wisdom of the operations of the English Legislature, is the opposition that happily takes place between the different views and interests of the several bodies that compose it; a consideration this, without which all political inquiries are no more than airy speculations, and which is the only one that can lead to any useful practical conclusions.

made of the forces of the State. Only, a greater proportional share of all that may attract the reverence of the people, has been allotted to those parts of the Legislature, which could not possess their confidence, but in a less degree than the others; and the inequalities in point of real strength between them, have been made up by the magic of dignity.

Thus the King, who alone forms one part of the Legislature, has on his side the majesty of the kingly title: the two Houses are, in appearance, no more than Councils intirely dependant on him; they are bound to follow his person; they only meet, as it seems, to advise him; and never address him but in the most solemn, and respectful manner. (a)

(a) It is for want of having duly considered this subject, that Mr. Rousseau exclaims, somewhere, against those who, when they speak of the General Estates of France, “dare call the people, the *third* Estate.” At Rome, where all the order we mention here was inverted;—where the *fascēs* were laid down at the feet of the People;—and where the Tribunes, whose function, like that of the King of England, was to oppose the establishment of new laws, were only a subordinate kind of Magistracy, many disorders followed. In Sweden, and in Scotland, (before the union) faults of another kind prevailed: in the former kingdom, for instance, an overgrown body of two thousand Nobles frequently over-ruled both King and People.

But as the Nobles, who form the second order of the Legislature, bear, both in point of real weight and numbers, no proportion to the body of the People, they have received as a compensation, the advantage of personal honours, and of an hereditary title. (*a*)

Besides, the established ceremonial gives to their Assembly a great pre-eminence over that of the Representatives of the People. They are the *upper* House, and these are the *lower* House. They are in a more especial manner considered as the King's Council, and it is in the place where they assemble that his Throne is placed.

When the King comes to the Parliament, the Commons are sent for, and make their appearance at the bar of the House of Lords. It is moreover before the Lords, as before their Judges, that the Commons bring their impeachments. When, after passing a bill in their own House, they send it to the Lords,

(*a*) The Lords have, among other personal privileges, that of being free from arrest in civil matters; they may demand an audience from the King; when they sit in judgment, they do not give their verdict upon their oath, but upon their honour, &c.

to desire their concurrence, they always order a number of their own Members to accompany it; (*a*) whereas the Lords send down their bills to them, only by some of the Assistants of their House. (*b*) When the nature of the alterations which one of the two Houses desires to make in a bill sent to it by the other, renders a conference between them necessary, the Deputies of the Commons, to the Committee which is then formed of Members of both Houses, are to remain uncovered. Lastly, those bills which (in which ever of the two Houses they have originated) have been agreed to by both, must be deposited in the House of Lords, there to remain till the Royal pleasure is known.

Besides, the Lords are Members of the Legislature by virtue of a right inherent to their per-

(*a*) The Speaker of the House of Lords must come down from his woolpack to receive the bills which the Members of the Commons bring to their House.

(*b*) The twelve Judges, and the Masters of Chancery. There is also a ceremonial established with regard to the manner, and marks of respect, with which those two of them, who are sent with a bill to the Commons, are to deliver it.

sons, and they are supposed to sit in Parliament on their own account, and for the support of their own interests. In consequence of this they have the privilege of giving their votes by *proxies*; (a) and, when any of them dissent from the resolutions of their House, they may enter a protest against them, containing the reasons of their dissent. In a word, this part of the Legislature, being destined frequently to balance the power of the people, what it could not receive in real strength, it has received in outward splendor and greatness; so that, when it cannot resist by its weight, it overawes by its bulk.

In fine, as those various prerogatives by which the component parts of the Legislature are thus made to balance each other, are all intimately connected with the State, and flourish and fade away according to the vicissitudes of public prosperity and adversity, whatever particular oppositions may take place among those parts, there never can arise any, when

(a) The Commons have not that privilege, because they are themselves *proxies* for the People.—See Coke's Inst. iv. p. 41.

the general welfare is really in question. And when, to resolve the doubts that may arise in political speculations of this kind, we cast our eyes on the debates of the two Houses for a long succession of years, and see the nature of the laws which have been proposed, both those which have passed, and those which have been rejected, as well as of the arguments that have been urged on both sides, we shall remain convinced of the goodness of the principles on which the English Legislature is formed.

CHAPTER IV.

A third Advantage peculiar to the English Government. The Power of proposing Laws, lodged in the Hands of the People.

A Third circumstance which I propose to show to be peculiar to the English Government, is the manner in which the offices of the three component parts of the Legislature have been divided among them, and regulated.

If the Reader will be pleased to observe, he will find, that in most of the ancient free States, the share of the People in the business of Legislation, was to approve, or reject, the propositions which were made to them, and to give the final sanction to the laws. The function of those persons, or in general those Bodies, who were intrusted with the Executive power, was to prepare and frame the Laws, and then to propose them to the People: and, in a word, they possessed that

branch of the Legislative power which may be called the *initiative*, that is, the prerogative of putting that power in action. (a)

This *initiative*, or exclusive right of proposing, in Legislative assemblies, exclusively attributed to the Magistrates, is indeed very useful, and perhaps even necessary, in States of a republican form, for giving a permanence to the laws, as well as for preventing the

(a) This power of previously considering and approving such laws as were afterwards to be propounded to the People, was, in the first times of the Roman Republic, constantly exercised by the Senate: laws were made, *Populi jussu, ex auctoritate Senatûs*. Even in cases of elections, the previous approbation, and *auctoritas* of the Senate, with regard to those persons who were offered to the suffrages of the People, was required. *Tum enim non gerebat is magistratum qui ceperat, si Patres auctores non erant facti.* Cic. pr. Plancio, 3.

At Venice the Senate also exercises a power of the same kind, with regard to the *Grand Council*, or Assembly of the Nobles. In the canton of Bern, all propositions must be discussed in the *little Council*, which is composed of twenty-seven Members, before they are laid before the Council of the *two hundred*, in whom resides the sovereignty of the whole Canton. And in Geneva, the law is, “that nothing shall be treated in the *General Council*, or Assembly of the Citizens, which has not been previously treated and approved in the Council of the *two hundred*; and that nothing shall be treated in the *two hundred*, which has not been previously treated and approved in the Council of the *twenty-five*.”

disorders and struggles for power, we have mentioned before; but upon examination we shall find this expedient attended with inconveniences no less than the evils it is meant to remedy.

Those Magistrates, or Bodies, at first indeed apply frequently to the Legislature for obtaining such branches of power as they dare not of themselves assume, or for removing such obstacles to their growing authority as they do not yet think it safe for them peremptorily to set aside. But when their authority has at last gained a sufficient degree of extent and stability, as farther manifestations of the will of the Legislative power could then only create obstructions to the exercise of it, they begin to consider this Legislative power as an enemy whom they must take great care never to rouse. They consequently convene the Assembly as seldom as they can. When they do it, they carefully avoid proposing any thing favourable to public liberty. Soon they even intirely cease to convene the Assembly at all; and the People, after thus losing the power of legally asserting their

rights, are exposed to that which is the highest degree of political ruin, the loss of even the remembrance of them, unless some indirect means are found, by which they may from time to time give life to their dormant privileges: means which may be found, and succeed pretty well in small States, where provisions can more easily be made to answer their intended ends; but in States of any considerable extent, have always been found, in the event, to give rise to disorders of the same kind with those which were at first intended to be prevented.

But as the capital principle of the English Constitution totally differs from that which forms the basis of Republican Governments, so is it capable of procuring to the people advantages that are found unattainable in the latter. It is the people in England, or at least those who represent them, who possess the *initiative* in Legislation; that is to say, who perform the office of framing laws and proposing them. And among the many circumstances in the English Government, which would appear intirely new to the

Politicians of antiquity, that of seeing the person intrusted with the Executive power bear that share in Legislation which they looked upon as being necessarily the lot of the people, and the people that which they thought the indispensable office of its Magistrates, would not certainly be the least subject of their surprise.

I foresee that it will be objected, that the King of England, having the power of dissolving, and even of not calling Parliaments, thus enjoys a prerogative which in fact is the same as that which I have just now represented as being so dangerous.

To this I answer, that all circumstances ought to be combined together. Doubtless, if the Crown had been under no kind of dependance whatever on the people, it would long since have exempted itself from calling their Representatives together; and that Assembly, like the National Assemblies of several other Kingdoms, would now have no existence but in History.

But, as we have seen above, the necessities of the State, and the wants of the Sovereign

himself, put him under a necessity of having frequently recourse to his Parliament; and then the difference may be seen between the prerogative of not calling an Assembly, when powerful causes nevertheless render such measure necessary, and the exclusive right, when an Assembly is convened, of *proposing* laws to it.

In the latter case, though a Prince, let us even suppose, in order to save appearances, might condescend to mention any thing besides his own wants, it would be at most to propose the sacrifice of some branch of his prerogative upon which he set no value, or to reform such abuses as his inclination did not lead him to imitate; but he would be very careful of touching any points which might materially affect his authority.

Besides, as all his concessions would be made, or appear to be made, of his own motion, and would in some measure seem to spring from the activity of his zeal for the public welfare, all that he might offer, though in fact ever so inconsiderable, would be represented by him as grants of the most important

nature, and for which he would expect the utmost gratitude. Lastly, it would also be his province to lay restrictions and exceptions to laws thus proposed by him; it would also be he who would provide the words to express them, and it would not be reasonable to expect that he would give himself any great trouble to avoid all ambiguity. (a)

But the Parliament of England is not, as we said before, bound down to wait passively and in silence for such laws as the Executive power may condescend to propose to them. At the opening of every Session, they of themselves take into their hands the great book of the State; they open all the pages of it, and examine every article.

(a) In the beginning of the existence of the House of Commons, bills were presented to the King under the form of *Petitions*. Those to which the King assented, were registered among the rolls of Parliament, with his answer to them; and at the end of each Parliament, the Judges formed them into Statutes. Several abuses having crept into that method of proceeding, it was ordained, that the Judges should in future make the Statute before the end of every Session. Lastly, as even that became, in process of time, insufficient, the present method of framing bills was established; that is to say, both Houses now frame the Statutes in the very form and words in which they are to stand when they have received the Royal assent.

When they have discovered abuses, they proceed to inquire into their causes:—when these abuses arise from an open disregard of the laws, they endeavour to strengthen them; when they proceed from the insufficiency of the laws, they remedy the evil by additional provisions. (a)

(a) No popular Assembly ever enjoyed the privilege of starting, canvassing, and proposing new matter to such a degree as the English Commons. In France, when their General Estates were allowed to sit, their *remonstrances* were little regarded, and the particular Estates of the Provinces dare now hardly present any. In Sweden, the power of proposing new subjects was lately lodged in an Assembly, called the *Secret Committee*, composed of Nobles, and a few of the Clergy; and is now possessed by the King. In Scotland, until the *Union*, all propositions laid before the Parliament, were made by the persons called the *Lords of the Articles*. With regard to Ireland, all bills must be prepared by the King in his Privy Council, and are to be laid before their Parliament by the Lord Lieutenant, for their assent or dissent: only, they are allowed to discuss, among them, what they call *heads of a bill*, which the Lord Lieutenant is afterwards desired to transmit to the King, who selects out of them what clauses he thinks proper, or sets the whole aside; and is not expected to give, at any time, any precise answer to them. And in republican Governments, Magistrates never are at rest till they have intirely secured to themselves the important privilege of *proposing*; nor does this follow merely from their ambition; it is also a consequence of the situation they are in, from the principles of that mode of Government.

Nor do they proceed with less regularity and freedom, in regard to that important object, subsidies. They are to be the sole judges of the quantity of them, as well as of the ways and means of raising them; and they need not come to any resolution, with regard to them, till they see the safety of the Subject completely provided for. In a word, the making of laws is not, in such an arrangement of things, a *gratuitous* contract, and in which the people are to take what is given them, and as it is given them:—it is a contract in which they *buy* and *pay*, and in which they themselves settle the different conditions, and furnish the words to express them.

The English Parliament have given a still greater extent to their advantages on so important a subject. They have not only secured to themselves a right of proposing laws and remedies, but they have also prevailed on the Executive power to renounce all claim to do the same. It is even a constant rule, that neither the King, nor his Privy Council, can make any amendments to the bills preferred by the two Houses;

but the King is merely to accept or reject them: a provision this, which, if we pay a little attention to the subject, we shall find to have been also necessary for compleatly securing the freedom and regularity of their deliberations. (*a*)

I confess indeed, that it seems very natural, in the modelling of a State, to intrust this very important office of framing laws, to those persons who may be supposed to have before acquired experience and wisdom in the

(*a*) The King indeed at times sends messages to either House; and nobody, I think, can wish that no means of intercourse should exist between him and his Parliament: but those messages are always expressed in very general words; they are only made to desire the House to take certain subjects into their consideration; no particular articles or clauses are expressed; the Commons are not to declare, at any settled time, any solemn acceptance or rejection of the proposition made by the King; and, in short, the House follows the same mode of proceeding, with respect to such messages, as they usually do with regard to petitions presented by private individuals. Some Member makes a motion upon the subject expressed in the King's message; a bill is framed in the usual way; it may be dropt at every stage of it; and it never is the proposal of the Crown, but the motions of some of their own Members, which the House discuss, and finally accept or reject.

management of public affairs. But events have unfortunately demonstrated, that public employments, and power, improve the understanding of Men in a less degree than they pervert their views; and it has been found in the issue, that the effect of a regulation, which, at first sight, seems so perfectly consonant with prudence, is to confine the People to act a mere passive and defensive part in Legislation, and to deliver them up to the continual enterprises of those who, at the same time that they are under the greatest temptations to deceive them, possess the most powerful means of doing it.

If we cast our eyes on the History of the ancient Governments, in those times when the persons intrusted with the Executive power were still in a state of dependance on the Legislature, and consequently frequently obliged to have recourse to it, we shall see almost continual instances of selfish and insidious laws proposed by them to the Assemblies of the people.

And those Men, in whose wisdom the law had at first placed so much confidence, be-

came, in the issue, so lost to all sense of shame and duty, that when arguments were found to be no longer sufficient, they had recourse to force; the legislative Assemblies became so many fields of battle, and their power, a real calamity.

I know very well, however, that there are other important circumstances besides those I have just mentioned, which would prevent disorders of this kind from taking place in England. (a) But, on the other hand, let us call to mind, that the person who is invested with the Executive authority, unites in himself the whole public majesty and power. Let us represent to ourselves the great and sole Magistrate of the Nation, pressing the acceptance of those laws which he had proposed, with a vehemence suited to the usual importance of his designs, with the warmth of Monarchical pride, which must meet with no refusal,

(a) I particularly mean here, the circumstance of the People having intirely delegated their power to Representatives: the consequences of which Institution will be discussed in the next Chapter.

and exerting for that purpose all his immense resources.

It was therefore a matter of indispensable necessity, that things should be settled in England in the manner that they are. As the moving springs of the Executive power are, in the hands of the King, a kind of sacred *depositum*, so are those of the Legislative power in the hands of the two Houses: the King must abstain from touching them, in the same manner as all the subjects of the kingdom are bound religiously to submit to his prerogatives: when he sits in Parliament, he has left, we may say, his executive power without doors, and can only assent or dissent. If the Crown had been allowed to take an active part in the business of making laws, it would soon have rendered useless the other branches of the Legislature.

CHAPTER V.

In which an Inquiry is made, Whether it would be an Advantage to public Liberty, that the Laws should be enacted by the Votes of the People at large.

BUT, it will be said, whatever may be the wisdom of the English Laws, how great soever their precautions may be, with regard to the safety of the individual, the People, as they do not expressly enact them, cannot be looked upon as a free People. The Author of the *Social Contract* carries this opinion even farther: he asserts, that, “ though
“ the people of England think they are free,
“ they are much mistaken; they are so only
“ during the election of Members of Par-
“ liament: as soon as these are elected, the
“ People are slaves—they are nothing.” (a)

(a) See Mr. Rousseau's *Social Contract*, chap. xv.

Before I answer this objection, I shall observe, that the word *Liberty* is one of those which have been most misunderstood or misapplied.

Thus, at Rome, where that class of Citizens who were really the Masters of the State, were sensible that a lawful regular authority, once trusted to a single Ruler, would put an end to their tyranny, they taught the People to believe, that, provided those who exercised a military power over them, and overwhelmed them with insults and misery, went by the names of *Consules*, *Dictatores*, *Patricii*, *Nobiles*, in a word, by any other appellation than the horrid one of *Rex*, they were free; and that such a valuable situation must be preserved at the price of every calamity.

In the same manner, certain Writers of the present age, misled by their inconsiderate admiration of the Governments of ancient times, and perhaps also by their desire of presenting striking contrasts to what they call the degenerate manners of our modern times, have cried up the governments of Sparta and Rome, as the only ones fit for us to imitate. In

their opinions, the only proper employment of a free Citizen, is, *to be either incessantly assembled in the forum, or preparing for war.*—To be *valiant, inured to hardships, inflamed with an ardent love of one's Country*; which is, after all, nothing more than an ardent desire of injuring all Mankind for the sake of the Society of which we are Members, *and with an ardent love of glory*, which is likewise nothing more than an ardent desire of committing slaughter in order to make afterwards a boast of it, have appeared to those writers to be the only social qualifications worthy of our esteem, and of the encouragement of law-givers. (a) And while, in order to support such opinions, they have used a profusion of exaggerated expressions without any distinct meaning, and perpetually repeated, but without defining them, the words *daftardlinefs, corruption, greatnefs of foul, and virtue*, they never once thought of telling us the only thing that was worth our knowing, which is, whether Men were happy under those

(a) I have used the above expressions in the same sense in which they were used in the ancient Commonwealths, and they still are by most of the Writers who describe their Governments.

Governments which they so much exhorted us to imitate.

And while they thus misapprehended the only rational design of civil societies, they mistook no less the true end of the particular institutions by which they were to be regulated. They were satisfied when they saw the few who really governed every thing in the State, at times perform the illusory ceremony of assembling the body of the People, that they might appear to consult them: and the mere giving of votes, under any disadvantage in the manner of giving them, and how much soever the law might be afterwards neglected that was thus pretended to have been made in common, has appeared to them to be Liberty.

But those Writers are in the right; a Man who contributes by his vote to the passing of a law, has himself made the law; in obeying it, he obeys himself; he therefore is free. A play on words, and nothing more. The individual who has voted in a popular legislative Assembly, has not made the law that has passed in it; he has

only contributed, or seemed to contribute, towards enacting it, for his thousandth, or even ten thousandth, share: he has had no opportunity of making his objections to the proposed law, or of canvassing it, or of proposing restrictions to it; and he has only been allowed to express his assent or dissent. When a law passes agreeably to his vote, it is not as a consequence of this his vote that his will happens to take place; it is because a number of other Men have accidentally thrown themselves on the same side with him:—when a law contrary to his intentions is enacted, he must nevertheless submit to it.

This is not all; for though we should suppose, that to give a vote is the essential constituent of liberty, yet such liberty could only be said to last for a single moment, after which it becomes necessary to trust intirely to the discretion of other persons, that is, according to this doctrine, to be no longer free. It becomes necessary, for instance, for the Citizen who has given his vote, to rely on the honesty of those who collect the suffrages: and more

than once have false declarations been made of them.

The Citizen must also trust to other persons for the execution of those things which have been resolved upon in common; and when the Assembly shall have separated, and he finds himself alone, in the presence of the Men who are invested with the public power, of the Consuls, for instance, or of the Dictator, he will have but little security for the continuance of his liberty, if he has only that of having contributed by his suffrage towards enacting a law which they are determined to neglect.

What then is Liberty? Liberty, I would answer, as far as it is possible for it to exist in a Society of Beings whose interests are almost perpetually opposed to each other, consists in this, that every Man, while he respects the persons of others, and allows them quietly to enjoy the produce of their industry, be certain himself likewise to enjoy the produce of his own industry; and that his person be also secure. But to contribute by one's suffrage to produce those advantages to

the Community,—to have a share in establishing that order, that general arrangement of things, by the means of which an individual, lost as it were in the croud, is effectually protected,—to lay down the rules to be observed by those who, being invested with a considerable power, are charged with the defence of individuals,—and to provide, that they never should transgress them,—these are functions, are acts, of Government, but by no means constituent parts of Liberty.

To express the whole in two words: to concur by one's suffrage in enacting laws, is to enjoy a share, whatever it may be, of Power.—To live in a state where the laws are equal for all, and sure to be executed, (whatever are the means by which these advantages are attained) is to be free.

Be it so: we grant, that to give one's suffrage is not liberty itself, but only a means of procuring it; and a means which may degenerate into mere form: we grant also, that it is possible that other expedients might be found for that purpose, and that, for a Man to decide that a State with whose Government and interior Administration he is unacquainted, is a State in

which the People *are slaves, are nothing*, merely because the *Comitia* of ancient Rome are no longer to be met with in it, is indeed a very precipitate decision. But still we must continue to think that liberty would be much more compleat, if the People at large were expressly called upon to give their opinion concerning the particular provisions by which it is to be secured; and that the English laws, for instance, if they were made by the suffrages of all, would be wiser, more equitable, and above all, more likely to be executed. To this objection, as it is, at least, specious, I shall endeavour to give an answer.

If, in the first formation of a civil Society, the only care to be taken was that of establishing, once for all, what every individual owes to others, and to the State—if those who are intrusted to procure the execution of these things, had neither any ambition, nor any other private passions, which such an employment might put in motion, and furnish the means of gratifying; in a word, if, looking upon their function as a mere task of duty, they never were tempted to deviate from the intentions

of those who appointed them; I confess, that in such a case, there might be no inconvenience that every individual should be invited to have a small share in the government of the community of which he is a member: or rather, I ought to say, that in such a Society, and among such Beings, there would be no occasion for any Government at all.

But experience teaches us, that many more precautions, indeed, are necessary to oblige Men to be just towards each other; nay, the very first expedients that may be expected to conduce to such an end, supply the most fruitful source of the evils which are proposed to be prevented. Those laws which were to be equal for all, are soon warped to the private convenience of those who have been made the administrators of them:—instituted at first for the protection of all, they soon are made only to defend the usurpations of a few; and the People continuing to respect them, while those, to the guardianship of whom they were intrusted, make little account of them, they at length have no other effect but that of supplying the want of real strength,

in those few who contrive to place themselves at the head of the community, and of rendering regular and free from danger the tyranny of the smaller number over the greater.

To remedy, therefore, evils which thus have a tendency to result from the very nature of things,—to oblige those who are in a manner the Masters of the law, to conform themselves to it,—to render ineffectual the silent, powerful, and ever active conspiracy of those who govern; requires a degree of knowledge, and a spirit of perseverance, which must not be expected from the multitude.

The greatest part of those who compose this multitude, taken up with the care of providing for their subsistence, have neither sufficient leisure, nor even, in consequence of their imperfect education, the degree of information requisite, for functions of this kind. Nature, besides, who is sparing of her gifts, has bestowed upon only a few Men an understanding capable of the complicated researches of Legislation; and, as a sick Man trusts to his Physician, and a Client to his Lawyer, so the greatest number of the Citizens must

trust to those who have more abilities than themselves for the execution of things which, at the same time that they so materially concern them, require so many qualifications to perform them with any degree of sufficiency.

To these considerations, of themselves so material, another must be added, which is, if possible, of still more weight. This is, that the multitude, in consequence of their very being a multitude, are incapable of coming to any mature resolution.

Those who compose a popular Assembly, are not actuated, in the course of their deliberations, by any clear and precise view of any present and personal interest. As they see themselves lost, as it were, in the croud of those who are called upon to exercise the same function with themselves,—as they know that their particular votes will make no change in the public resolution, and that, to whatever side they may incline, the general result will nevertheless be the same, they do not undertake to inquire how far the things proposed to them agree with the whole of the laws

already in being, or with the present circumstances of the State, because Men will not enter upon a laborious task, when they know that it will not answer any purpose.

It is, however, with dispositions of this kind, and each relying on all, that the Assembly forms itself. But as very few among them have previously considered the subjects on which they are called to determine, very few of them carry along with them any opinion, or inclination, or at least any inclination of their own, and to which they are resolved to adhere. As however it is necessary at last to come to some resolution, the major part of them are determined by reasons which they would blush to admit of on much less serious occasions. An unusual spectacle, a change of the ordinary place of the Assembly, a commotion, a rumour, are, amidst the general indecision, the *sufficiens ratio* of the determination of the greatest part; (a) and

(a) Every one knows of how much importance it was in the Roman commonwealth to assemble the People, rather in one place than another. In order to change intirely the nature of their resolutions, it was often sufficient to hide from them, or let them see, the Capitol.

from the assemblage of those separate wills thus formed hastily and without reflection, a general will results, which is also void of reflection.

If, amidst these disadvantages, the Assembly were left to themselves, and no body had an interest to lead them into error, the evil, though very great, would not, however, be extreme; because such an assembly, never being called but to determine upon an affirmative or a negative, that is, never having but two cases to choose between, there would be an equal chance for their choosing either; and it might be hoped, that at every other turn they would take the right side.

But the association of those who share either in the exercise of the public Power, or in its advantages, do not thus allow themselves to sit down in inaction. They wake, while the People sleep. Intirely taken up with the thoughts of their own power, they live but to increase it. Deeply versed in the management of public business, they see at once all the pos-

fible consequences of measures. And as they have the exclusive disposal of the springs of Government, they give rise, at their pleasure, to every incident that may influence the minds of a multitude who are not on their guard, and who wait for some event that may finally determine them.

It is they who convene the Assembly, and dissolve it; it is they who propose to it, and harangue it. Ever active in turning to their advantage every circumstance that happens, they equally avail themselves of the tractableness of the People, during public calamities, and its heedlessness, in times of prosperity. When things take a different turn from what they expected, they dismiss the Assembly. By presenting to it many propositions at once, and which are to be approved in the lump, they hide what is destined to promote their private views, or give a colour to it by joining it with things which they know will take hold of the minds of the People. (a) By pre-

(a) It was thus the Senate, at Rome, attributed to itself the power of laying taxes. They promised, in the time of the war against the Veientes, to give a pay to such

senting, in their speeches, arguments and facts which Men have no time to examine, they lead the people into gross, and yet decisive errors ; and the common-places of rhetoric, supported by their personal influence, ever enable them to draw to their side the majority of votes.

On the other hand, the few, (for there are, after all, some) who, having meditated on the proposed subject, see the consequences of the decisive step which is just going to be taken, being lost in the croud, cannot make their feeble voices to be heard in the midst of the universal noise and confusion. They have it no more in their power to stop the general motion, than a Man in the midst of an army on a march, has it in his power to avoid marching. In the mean time, the

Citizens as would insist ; and to that end they established a tribute. The people, solely taken up with the idea of not going to war at their own expence, were transported with so much joy, that they crowded at the door of the Senate, and laying hold of the hands of the Senators, called them their Fathers.—*Nil unquam acceptum à plebe tanto gaudio traditur : concursum itaque ad Curiam esse, prehensatasque exeuntium manus, Patres vere appellatos, &c.* See Tit. Liv. L. iv.

People give their suffrages; a majority appears in favour of the proposal; it is finally proclaimed as the general will of all; and it is at bottom nothing more than the effect of the artifices of a few designing Men who are exulting among themselves. (a)

(a) I might confirm all these things by numberless instances from ancient History; but, if I am allowed, in this case, to draw examples from my own Country, & *celebrare domestica facta*, I shall relate facts which will be no less to the purpose. In Geneva, in the year 1707, a law was enacted, that a General Assembly of the People should be held every five years, to treat of the affairs of the Republic; but the Magistrates, who dreaded these Assemblies, soon obtained from the Citizens themselves the repeal of the law; and the first resolution of the People, in the first of those periodical Assemblies (in the year 1712) was to abolish them for ever. The profound secrecy with which the Magistrates prepared their proposal to the Citizens on that subject, and the sudden manner in which the latter, when assembled, were acquainted with it, and made to give their votes upon it, have indeed accounted but imperfectly for this strange determination of the People; and the consternation which seized the whole Assembly, when the result of the suffrages was proclaimed, has confirmed many in the opinion, that some unfair means had been used. The whole transaction has been kept secret to this day; but the common opinion on this subject, which has been adopted by Mr. Rousseau in his *Lettres de la Montagne*, is this: the Magistrates, it is said, had privately instructed the Secretaries in whose ears the Citizens were to *whisper* their suffrages: when a Citi-

In a word, those who are acquainted with Republican Governments, and in general, who know the manner in which affairs are transacted in numerous Assemblies, will not scruple to affirm, that the few who are united together, who take an active part in public

zen said, *approbation*, he was understood to approve the proposal of the Magistrates; when he said, *rejection*, he was understood to reject the *periodical Assemblies*.

In the year 1738, the Citizens enacted at once into laws a small Code of forty-four Articles, by one single line of which they bound themselves for ever to elect the four *Syndics* (the Chiefs of the Council of the twenty-five) out of the same Council, whereas they were before free in their choice. They at that time suffered also the word *approved* to be slipped into the law mentioned in the Note (a) p. 208, which was transcribed from a former Code; the consequence of which was to render the Magistrates the absolute masters of the Legislature.

The Citizens had thus been successively stripped of all their *political* rights, and had little more left to them than the pleasure of being called a *Sovereign Assembly*, when they met (which idea, it must be confessed, preserved among them a spirit of resistance which it would have been dangerous for the Magistrates to provoke too far) and the power of at least *refusing* to elect the four *Syndics*. Upon this privilege the Citizens have, a few years ago, made their last stand: and a singular conjunction of circumstances having happened at the same time, to raise and preserve among them, during three years, an uncommon spirit of union and perseverance; they have in the issue succeeded in a great measure to repair the injuries which they had been made to do to themselves for these last two hundred years and more.

affairs, and whose station makes them conspicuous, have such an advantage over the many who turn their eyes towards them, and are without union among themselves, that, even with a middling degree of skill, they can at all times direct, at their pleasure, the general resolutions;—that, as a consequence of the very nature of things, there is no proposal, however absurd, to which a numerous assembly of Men may not be brought to assent;—and that laws would be wiser, and more likely to procure the advantage of all, if they were to be made by drawing lots, or casting dice, than by the suffrages of a multitude.

CHAPTER VI.

Advantages that accrue to the People from appointing Representatives.

HOW then shall the People remedy the disadvantages that necessarily attend their situation? How shall they resist the phalanx of those who have engrossed to themselves all the honours, dignities, and power, in the State?

It will be by employing for their defence the same means with which their adversaries carry on their attacks.—It will be by using the same weapons as they do, the same order, the same kind of discipline.

They are a small number, and consequently easily united;—a small number must therefore be opposed to them, that a like union may also be obtained. It is because they are a small number that they can deliberate on every

occurrence, and never come to any resolutions but such as are maturely weighed—it is because they are few that they can have forms which continually serve them for general standards to resort to, approved maxims to which they invariably adhere, and plans which they never lose sight of. Here therefore, I repeat it, oppose to them a small number, and you will obtain the like advantages.

Besides, those who govern, as a farther consequence of their being few, have a more considerable share, consequently feel a deeper concern, in the success, whatever it may be, of their enterprizes. As they usually profess a contempt for their adversaries, and are at all times acting an offensive part against them, they impose on themselves an obligation of conquering. They, in short, who are all alive from the most powerful incentives, and aim at gaining new advantages, have to do with a multitude, who, wanting only to preserve what they already possess, are unavoidably liable to long intervals of inactivity and supineness. But the People, by appointing Representatives, immediately gain to their

cause that advantageous activity which they before stood in need of to put them on a par with their adversaries; and those passions are excited in their defenders, by which they themselves cannot possibly be actuated.

Exclusively charged with the care of public liberty, the Representatives of the People will be animated by a sense of the greatness of the concerns with which they are intrusted. Distinguished from the bulk of the Nation, and forming among themselves a separate Assembly, they will assert the rights of which they have been made the Guardians, with all that warmth which the *esprit de corps* is used to inspire. (a) Placed on an elevated theatre, they will endeavour to render themselves still more conspicuous; and the art and ambitious activity of those who govern, will now be encountered by the vivacity and perseverance of opponents actuated by the love of glory.

Lastly, as the Representatives of the People will naturally be selected from among those

(a) If it had not been for an incentive of this kind, the English Commons would not have vindicated their right of taxation with so much vigilance as they have done, against all enterprizes, often perhaps involuntary, of the Lords.

Citizens who are most favoured by fortune, and will have consequently much to preserve, they will, even in the midst of quiet times, keep a watchful eye on the motions of Power. As the advantages they possess will naturally create a kind of rivalry between them and those who govern, the jealousy which they will conceive against the latter, will give them an exquisite degree of sensibility on every increase of their authority. Like those Machines which discover the operations of Nature, while they are yet imperceptible to our senses, they will warn the People of those things, which of themselves they never see but when it is too late; and their greater proportional share, whether of real riches, or of those which lie in the opinions of Men, will make them, if I may so express myself, the barometers that will discover, in their first beginning, every tendency to a change in the Constitution. (a)

(a) All the above reasoning essentially requires, that the Representatives of the People should be completely united in interest with the People. We shall soon see that this union really obtains in the English Constitution, and may be called the master-piece of it.

C H A P. VII.

The Subject continued.—The Advantages that accrue to the People from their appointing Representatives, are very inconsiderable, unless they also intirely delegate their Legislative Authority to them.

THE observations made in the preceding Chapter are so obvious, that the People themselves, in popular Governments, have always been sensible of the truth of them, and never thought it possible to remedy, by themselves alone, the disadvantages necessarily attending their situation. Whenever the oppressions of their Magistrates have forced them to resort to some uncommon exertion of their legal powers, they have immediately put themselves under the direction of those few Men who had been instrumental in informing and encouraging them; and when the nature of the circumstances has required any degree of firmness and perseverance in their conduct, they never have been able to attain

the end they proposed to themselves, but by the means of the most implicit deference to those Leaders whom they had thus appointed.

But as those Leaders, thus hastily chosen, are easily intimidated by the continual display which is made before them of the terrors of Power,—as that unlimited confidence which the People now repose in them, only takes place when public liberty is in the utmost danger, and cannot be kept up but by an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, and in which those who govern seldom allow themselves to be caught more than once, the People have constantly sought to avail themselves of the short intervals of superiority which the chance of events had given them, for rendering durable those advantages which they knew would, of themselves, be but transitory, and for getting some persons appointed whose peculiar office it should be to protect them, and whom the Constitution should thenceforwards recognize. It is thus that the People of Lacedæmon obtained their Ephori, and those of Rome their Tribunes.

We grant this, it will be said; but the Roman People never allowed their Tribunes

to conclude any thing definitively; they, on the contrary, reserved to themselves the right of *ratifying* (a) any resolutions they should take. But this, I answer, was the very circumstance that rendered the institution of those Tribunes totally ineffectual in the event. The People thus wanting to interfere with their own opinion, in the resolutions of those on whom, in their wisdom, they had determined intirely to rely, and endeavouring to settle with one hundred thousand votes, things which would have been settled equally well by the votes of their advisers, defeated in the issue every beneficial end of their former provisions; and while they meant to preserve an appearance of their sovereignty, (a chimerical appearance indeed! since it was under the direction of others that they intended to vote) they fell back into all those inconveniences which we have before mentioned.

The Senators, the Consuls, the Dictators, and the other Great Men in the Republic, whom the people were prudent enough to

(a) See Rousseau's Social Contract.

fear, and simple enough to believe, continued still to mix with them, and play off their political artifices. They still continued to make speeches to them: (a) they still availed themselves of their privilege of changing at will the place and form of the public meetings. When they did not find it possible to direct the resolutions of the Assemblies, they pretended that the omens were not favourable, and under this pretext, or others of the same kind, they dissolved them. (b) And the

(a) Valerius Maximus relates, that the Tribunes of the People having offered to propose some regulations in regard to the price of corn, in a time of great scarcity, Scipio Nafica over-ruled the Assembly merely by saying, " Silence, " Romans; I know better than you what is expedient for " the Republick. Which words were no sooner heard " by the People, than they shewed by a silence full of " veneration, that they were more affected by his authority, " than by the necessity of providing for their own subsist- " ence."—*Tacete, quæso, Quirites. Plus enim ego quam vos quid reipublicæ expediat intelligo. Quâ voce auditâ, omnes pleno venerationis silentio, majorem ejus autoritatis, quam alimentorum suorum curam egerunt.*

(b) *Quid enim majus est? si de jure Augurum quærimus, says Tully, who himself was an Augur, and a Senator into the bargain, quàm posse a summis imperiis & summis potestatibus Comitatus & Concilia, vel instituta dimittere, vel habita rescindere? Quid gravius, quam rem susceptam dirimi, si unus Augur ALIUM (id est, alium diem) dixerit?—See De Legib. Lib. II. §. 12.*

Tribunes, when they had at length been able to effect an union among themselves, were thus obliged to submit to the mortification of seeing those projects which they had pursued with infinite labour, and even through the greatest dangers, irrecoverably defeated by the most despicable artifices.

When, at other times, they saw that a confederacy was carried on with an uncommon warmth against them, and despaired of succeeding by employing expedients of this kind, or were afraid of diminishing their efficacy by a too frequent use of them, they betook themselves to other stratagems. They then conferred on the Consuls, by the means of a short form of words for the occasion, (a) an absolute power over the lives of the Citizens; or, even, appointed a Dictator. The People, at the sight of the State masquerade which was thus displayed before them, were sure to sink into a state of consternation; and the Tribunes, however clearly they might see through the

(a) *Videat Consul ne quid detrimenti Respublica capiat.*

artifice, trembled also in their turn, when they thus beheld themselves left without defenders. (a)

At other times, they brought false accusations against the Tribunes before the Assembly itself; or, by privately flandering them to the people, they totally deprived them of their confidence. It was through artifices of this kind that the People were brought to behold, without concern, the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, the only Roman that was a real patriot; the only one who truly loved the People.—It was also in this same manner that Caius, who was not deterred, by his brother's fate, from pursuing the same plan of conduct, was in the end so intirely forsaken by the people, that nobody could be found among them who would even lend him a horse to fly from the fury of

(a) "The Tribunes of the People," says Livy, who was a great admirer of the Aristocratical power, "and the People themselves, durst neither lift up their eyes, nor even mutter, in the presence of the Dictator." *Nec adversus Dictatoriam vim, aut Tribuni plebis, aut ipsa Plebs, attollere oculos, aut hiscere, audebant.*—See Tit. Liv. L. vi. §. 16.

the Nobles; and he was at last compelled to lay violent hands upon himself, while he invoked the wrath of the Gods on his unfaithful fellow Citizens.

At other times, they raised divisions among the People. Most formidable combinations manifested themselves, on a sudden, at the eve of important transactions; and all moderate Men avoided attending Assemblies, where they saw that all was to be tumult and confusion.

In fine, that nothing might be wanting to the insolence with which they treated the Assemblies of the People, they sometimes falsified the declarations of the number of the votes;—they even once went so far as to carry off the urns into which the Citizens were to throw their suffrages. (*a*)

(*a*) The Reader, with respect to all the above observations, may see *Plutarch's Lives*, particularly the Lives of the two *Gracchi*. I must add, that I have avoided drawing any instance from those Assemblies, in which one half of the people were made to arm themselves against the other. I have only alluded here to those times which immediately either preceded or followed the third Punic war, that is, of those which are commonly called the *best period* of the Republic.

 CHAPTER VIII.

The Subject concluded.—Effects that have resulted, in the English Government, from the People's Power being compleatly delegated to their Representatives.

BUT when the People have intirely trusted their power to a moderate number of persons, affairs immediately take a far different turn. Those who govern are from that moment obliged to leave off all those stratagems which had hitherto insured their success. Instead of those Assemblies which they affected to despise, and were perpetually comparing to storms, or to the current of the *Euripus*, (a) and in regard to

(a) Tully makes no end of his similes on this subject. *Quod enim fretum, quem Euripum, tot motus, tantas & tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum, quantas perturbationes & quantos æstus habet ratio Comitiorum?* See Orat. pro Murænâ.—*Concio*, says he in another place, *quæ ex imperitissimis constat*, &c. De Amicitia. §. 25.

which they, consequently, thought themselves at liberty to pass over the rules of Justice, they now find that they have to deal with Men, who are their equals in point of education and knowledge, and their inferiors only in point of rank and form. They, in consequence, soon find it necessary to adopt quite different methods; and, above all, become very careful not to talk to them any more about the sacred chickens, the *white* or *black* days, and the Sibylline books.—As they see their new adversaries expect to have a proper regard paid to them, that single circumstance inspires them with it:—as they see them act in a regular manner, observe constant rules, in a word, to proceed with *form*, they come to look upon them with respect, from the very same reason which makes them themselves to be revered by the people.

The Representatives of the People, on the other hand, do not fail soon to procure for themselves every advantage that may enable them effectually to exert the powers with which they have been intrusted, and to adopt every rule of proceeding that may make their resolutions to be truly the result of reflection and deliberation.

Thus it was that in England the Representatives of the People, soon after their first establishment, were formed into a separate Assembly:—they afterwards obtained the liberty of appointing a President:—soon after, they insisted upon their being consulted on the last form of the Acts to which they had given rise:—lastly, they insisted on thenceforth framing them themselves.

In order to prevent any possibility of surprise in the course of their proceedings, it is a settled rule with them, that every proposition, or bill, must be read three times, at different prefixed days, before it can receive a final sanction: and, before each reading of the bill, as well as at its first introduction, an express resolution must be taken to continue it under consideration. If the bill be rejected, in any one of those several operations, it must be dropped, and cannot be proposed again during the same Session. (*a*)

(*a*) It is moreover a settled rule in the House of Commons, that no Member is to speak more than once in the same day. When the number and nature of the clauses of a Bill require

The Commons have been, above all, jealous of the freedom of speech in their assembly. They have expressly stipulated, as we mentioned above, that none of their words or speeches should be questioned in any place out of their House. In fine, in order to keep their deliberations free from every kind of influence, they have not allowed their President to give his vote, or even his opinion:—they moreover have settled it as a rule, not only that the King could not send to them any express proposals about laws, or other subjects; but even that his name should never be mentioned in their deliberations. (a)

that it should be discussed in a freer manner, a Committee is appointed for that purpose, who are to make their report afterwards to the House. When the subject is of importance, this Committee is formed of the whole House, which still continues to sit in the same place, but in a less solemn manner, and under another President who is called the chairman of the Committee. In order to form the House again, the mace is replaced on the Table, and the Speaker goes again into his chair.

(a) If any person were to mention in his speech, what the King *wishes to be, would be glad to see, &c.* he would be immediately called to order for attempting to influence the debate.

But the circumstance which, of all others, constitutes the superior excellence of a Government in which the People only act through Representatives, that is, by means of an assembly formed of a moderate number of persons, and in which every Member has it in his power to propose new subjects, and to argue and canvass the questions that arise, is that such a Constitution is the only one that is capable of the immense advantage, and of which I do not know if I have been able to convey an adequate idea to my readers when I mentioned it before, (a) I mean, that of putting into the hands of the People the moving springs of the Legislative authority.

In a Constitution where the People at large exercise the function of enacting the Laws, as it is only to those persons upon whom the Citizens are accustomed to turn their eyes, (that is, to the very Men who govern) that the Assembly have either time, or inclination, to listen, they acquire, at length, as has constantly been the case in all Republics, the exclusive

(a) See Chap. iv. of this Book.

right of proposing, if they please, when they please, in what manner they please. A prerogative this, of such extent, that it would suffice to put an Assembly formed of Men of the greatest parts, at the mercy of a few dunces, and renders compleatly illusory the boasted power of the People. Nay more, as this prerogative is thus placed in the very hands of the adversaries of the People, it forces the People to remain exposed to their attacks, in a condition perpetually passive, and takes from them the only legal means with which they might effectually defeat their usurpations.

To express the whole in few words. A *representative* Constitution places the remedy in the hands of those who feel the disorder; but a *popular* Constitution places the remedy in the hands of those who cause the disorder; and it is necessarily productive, in the event, of the misfortune,—of the political calamity, of trusting the means and the care of repressing Power, to the Men who have the enjoyment of power.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

A farther Disadvantage of Republican Governments.—The People are necessarily betrayed by those in whom they trust.

BUT those general Assemblies of a People who were made to determine upon things which they neither understood nor examined,—that general confusion in which the Ambitious could at all times hide their artifices, and carry on their schemes with safety, were not the only evils attending the ancient Commonwealths. There was a more secret defect, and a defect that struck immediately at the very vitals of it, inherent in that kind of Government.

It was impossible for the people ever to have faithful defenders. Neither those whom they had expressly chosen, nor those whom some personal advantages enabled to govern the Assemblies, (for the only use, I must

repeat it, which the People ever make of their power, is to give it away, or allow it to be taken from them) could possibly be united to them by any common feeling of the same concerns. Their influence placing them, in a great measure, upon a level with those who were invested with the executive power, they cared little to restrain oppressions out of the reach of which they saw themselves placed. Nay, they feared lest they should thereby lessen a power which they knew was one day to be their own;—if they had not even already an actual share in it. (*a*)

Thus, at Rome, the only end which the Tribunes ever pursued with any degree of earnestness and perseverance, was to procure to the People, that is, to themselves, an admission into all the different dignities in the Republick. After having obtained a law

(*a*) How could it be expected, that Men who entertained views of being Prætors, would endeavour to restrain the power of the Prætors,—that Men who aimed at being one day Consuls, would wish to limit the power of the Consuls,—that Men whom their interest with the People made sure of getting into the Senate, would seriously endeavour to confine the authority of the Senate?

for admitting the Plebeians to the Consulship, they procured for them the liberty of intermarrying with the Patricians. They afterwards got them admitted to the Dictatorship, to the office of military Tribune, to the Censorship:—in a word, the only use they made of the power of the People, was to increase prerogatives which they called the prerogatives of all, but which they, and their friends, alone, were ever likely to enjoy.

But we do not find, that they ever employed the power of the People in things really beneficial to the People. We do not find, that they ever set bounds to the terrible power of its Magistrates;—that they ever repressed that class of Citizens who knew how to make their crimes to be respected;—in a word, that they ever endeavoured, on the one hand, to regulate, and on the other, to strengthen, the judicial power: precautions these, without which men might struggle to the end of the world without ever attaining liberty. (*a*)

(*a*) Without such precautions, laws must always be, as Mr. Pope expresses it,

“ Still for the strong too weak, the weak too strong.”

And indeed the judicial power, that sure *criterion* of the goodness of a Government, was always, at Rome, a mere instrument of tyranny. The Consuls were, at all times, invested with an absolute power over the lives of the Citizens. The Dictators possessed the same right: so did the Prætors, the Tribunes of the People, the judicial Commissioners named by the Senate, and so, of consequence, did the Senate itself; and the fact of the three hundred and seventy deserters whom it commanded to be thrown down, at one time, as Livy relates, from the Tarpeian rock, sufficiently shews that they well knew how to exert it upon occasion.

It even may be said, that, at Rome, the power of life and death, or rather the right of killing, was annexed to every kind of authority whatever, even to that which results from mere influence, or wealth; and the only consequence of the murder of the Gracchi, which was accompanied by those of three hundred, and afterwards of four thousand, unarmed Citizens, whom the Nobles *knocked on the head*, was to engage the Senate to erect a

Temple to *Concord*. The *Lex Porcia de tergo civium*, which has been so much celebrated, was attended with no other effect but that of more compleatly securing against the danger of a retaliation, such Consuls, Prætors, Quæstors, &c. as, like Verres, caused the inferiour Citizens of Rome to be scourged with rods, and put to death upon crosses, through mere caprice and cruelty. (*a*)

In fine, nothing can more compleatly shew to what degree the Tribunes had forsaken the interests of the People, whom they were appointed to defend, than that they had allowed

(*a*) If we turn our eyes to Lacedæmon, we shall see, from several instances of the justice of the Ephori, that matters were little better ordered there. And in Athens itself, which is the only one of the ancient Commonwealths in which the people seem to have enjoyed any degree of real liberty, we see the Magistrates proceed nearly in the same manner as they now do among the Turks: and I think no other proof needs be given of this than the story of the Barber in the Piræus, who having spread about the Town the news of the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, which he had heard from a stranger who had stopped at his shop, was put to the torture, by the command of the Archons, because he could not tell the name of his author.—See *Plut. Life of Nicias*.

the Senate to invest itself with the power of taxation: they even suffered them to assume to themselves the power, not only of dispensing with the laws, but also of abrogating them. (a)

In a word, as a necessary consequence of the *communicability* of power, a circumstance essentially inherent in the republican form of government, it is impossible for it ever to be restrained within certain rules. Those who are in a condition to controul or repress it, from that very circumstance, become its defenders. Though they may have risen, as we may suppose, from the humblest stations, and which seemed

(a) There are frequent instances of the Consuls taking away from the Capitol the tables of the laws passed under their predecessors. Nor was this, as we might at first be tempted to believe, an act of violence which success alone could justify; it was a consequence of the acknowledged power enjoyed by the Senate, *cujus erat gravissimum judicium de jure legum*, as we may see in several places in Tully. Nay, the Augurs themselves, as Tully informs us, enjoyed that privilege. "If laws have not been laid before the people, in the legal form, they (the Augurs) may suppress them; as was done with respect to the *Lex Tertia*, by the decree of the College, and to the *leges Liviae*, by the advice of Philip, who was Consul and Augur." *Legem, si non jure rogata est, tollere possunt; ut Tertiam, decreto Collegii; ut Livias, consilio Philippi, Consulibus & Auguris.*—See de Legib. Lib. ii. §. 12.

totally to preclude them from all ambitious views, they have no sooner reached a certain degree of eminence, than they begin to aim higher. Their endeavours had at first no other object, as they professed, and perhaps with truth, than to see the laws executed: their only view at present is to set themselves above them; and seeing themselves raised to the level of a class of Men who possess all the power, and enjoy all the advantages in the State, they make haste to join themselves to them. (a)

(a) Which always proves a very easy thing. It is in Commonwealths the particular care of that class of Men who are at the head of the State, to keep a watchful eye over the People, in order to draw over to their own party any Man who happens to acquire a considerable influence among them; and this they are (and indeed must be) the more attentive to do, in proportion as the nature of the Government is more democratical.

The Constitution of Rome had even made express provisions on that subject. Not only the Censors could at once remove any Citizen into what Tribe they pleased, and even into the Senate, (and we may easily believe, that they made a political use of this their privilege) but it was also a settled rule, that all persons who had been promoted to any public office by the People, such as the Consulship, the Ædileship, or Tribuneship, became, *ipso facto*, members of the Senate.—See Middleton's *Dissertation on the Roman Senate*.

Personal power and independence on the laws, being, in such States, the immediate consequence of the favour of the People, they are under an unavoidable necessity of being betrayed. Corrupting, as it were, every thing they touch, they cannot show a preference to any Man, but they thereby attack his virtue; they cannot raise him, without immediately losing him, and weakening their own cause:— nay more, they thereby inspire him with views directly opposite to their own, and send him to join and increase the number of their enemies.

Thus, at Rome, after the feeble barrier, which excluded the people from offices of power and dignity, had been thrown down, the great Plebeians, whom the votes of the People began to raise to those offices, were immediately received into the Senate, as has been just now observed. And their families, from that period, formed, in conjunction with the ancient Patrician families, a new combination of men, (a) which was composed of no

(a) See the Note (a) page 192.

particular class of Citizens, but of all those in general who had had power enough to gain admittance into it; so that, from that period, only a single overgrown head was to be seen in the Republic; which being formed of all those who had either wealth or influence of any kind, and disposing at will of the laws and the power of the people, (a) soon lost all regard to moderation and decency.

Every Constitution, therefore, whatever may be its form, which does not provide for inconveniences of the kind mentioned above, is a Constitution essentially imperfect. It is in Man himself that the source of the evils to be remedied, lies; general precautions therefore can alone prevent them. If it be a fatal error intirely to rely on the justice and equity of those who govern, it is an error no less fatal to imagine, that while virtue and moderation are the constant companions of those who oppose the abuses of Power, all

(a) It was a great misfortune for the people of Rome, whatever may have been said to the contrary by the Writers on this subject, that the distinction between the Patricians and the Plebeians was ever abolished; though, to say the truth, this was an event which could not be prevented.

ambition, all love of dominion are confined to the other party.

Though wise Men sometimes may, seduced by the power of names, and in the heat of political contentions, deviate from what ought to be their real end, they nevertheless know, that it is not against the *Appii*, the *Coruncanii*, and the *Cetbegi*, but against all those who can influence the execution of the laws, that precautions ought to be taken;—that it is not the Consul, the Prætor, the Archon, the Minister, the King, whom we ought to dread, nor the Tribune, or the Representative of the people, on whom we are implicitly to rely; but that all those persons, without distinction, ought to be the objects of our jealousy, who, by any methods, and under any names whatsoever, have acquired the means of turning against each individual the collective strength of all, and have so ordered things around them, that whoever attempts to resist them, is sure to find himself engaged alone against a thousand.

CHAPTER X.

Fundamental difference between the English Government and the Governments just described.—In England all Executive Authority is placed out of the hands of those in whom the People put their confidence.—Usefulness of the Power of the Crown.

IN what manner, therefore, has the English Constitution contrived to find a remedy for political evils which, from the very nature of Men and things, seem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige those persons, to whom the People have given up their power, to make them effectual and lasting returns of gratitude?—those who enjoy an exclusive authority, to seek the advantage of all?—those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones? It has been by subjecting them themselves to those laws; and, for that purpose, by excluding them from any share in the execution of them.

Thus, the Parliament can establish as numerous a standing army as it pleases;—but immediately another Power comes forward, which takes the absolute command of it— which fills all the posts in it, and directs its motions at its pleasure.—The Parliament may lay new taxes;—but immediately another Power seizes upon the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arising from the disposal of it. The Parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the safety of the Subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprices and passions of other Men, which they will have gratified, when they shall have overthrown the columns of liberty.

And the English Constitution has not only excluded from any share in the Execution of the laws those in whom the People trust for the enacting of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same pernicious influence on their deliberations, the hope of ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one single, indivisible prerogative;—it has been made for ever the unalienable attribute of one person, marked out and ascertained beforehand by most solemn laws and long-established custom; and all the active forces in the State have been left at his disposal.

In order to secure still more this prerogative against all possibility of attempts from individuals, it has been farther heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people. The power of conferring and taking away places and employments has also been added to it, and ambition itself has thus been interested in its support.

A share in the Legislative power has also been given to the Man to whom this prerogative has been delegated: a passive share indeed, and the only one that can, with safety to the State, be trusted to him, but by the means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his constitutional authority.

Laſtly, he is the only ſelf-exiſting and independent Power in the State. The Generals, or the Miniſters of State, are ſo only by the continuance of his will and pleaſure: he would even diſmiſs the Parliament itſelf, if ever he ſaw them begin to entertain dangerous deſigns; and he needs only ſay one word to diſperſe and annihilate every power in the State that might threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives theſe; but with regard to which we ſhall be inclined to lay aſide our apprehenſions, if we reflect, on the one hand, on the great privileges of the people by which they have been counterbalanced, and on the other hand, on the happy conſequences that reſult from their being thus united together.

From this unity, and, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, this total ſequeſtration, of the Executive authority, this advantageous conſequence, in the firſt place, follows, which has been obſerved in a preceding Chapter, that the attention of the whole Nation is directed to one and the ſame object. The People, beſides, enjoy this moſt eſſential advantage, which they would

vainly endeavour to obtain under the Government of many,—they can give their confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themselves; they can appoint Trustees, without at the same time giving themselves Masters.

Those Men to whom the People have delegated the Power of framing the Laws, are thereby made sure to feel the whole weight of them.—They can increase the prerogatives of the Executive power, but they cannot invest themselves with it:—they cannot direct its motions; they only can unbind its hands.

They are made to derive their importance, nay they are indebted for their existence, to the need in which that Power stands of their assistance; and they know that they would no sooner have betrayed the trust of the People, and completed the treacherous work, but they would see themselves dissolved, spurned, as instruments now spent and become worthless.

This same disposition of things also prevents, in England, that essential defect, in-

herent in the Government of many, which has been described in the preceding Chapter.

In that sort of Government, the cause of the People, as has been observed, is continually deserted and betrayed. The arbitrary prerogatives of the governing Powers are at all times either openly or secretly favoured, not only by those in whose possession they are; not only by those who have reason to hope that they shall some time share in the exercise of them; but also by the whole croud of those Men who, in consequence of the natural disposition of Mankind to over-rate their own fortune, fondly imagine, either that they shall one day enjoy some branch of this governing authority, or that they are even already, in some way or other, associated to it.

But as this authority has been made, in England, the indivisible, unalienable attribute of one alone, all other persons in the State are, *ipso facto*, interested to confine it within its due bounds.—Liberty is thus made the common cause of all;—the laws that secure it are supported by Men of every rank and order; and the Habeas Corpus Act, for in-

stance, is as zealously defended by the first Nobleman in the Kingdom, as by the meanest Subject.

Even the Minister himself, in consequence of this *inalienability* of the Executive authority, is equally interested with his fellow Citizens, to maintain the laws on which public liberty is founded. He knows, in the midst of his plans for enjoying or retaining his authority, that a Court-intrigue, or a caprice, may at every instant confound him with the multitude; and the rancour of a Successor long kept out, send him to linger in the same jail which his temporary passions might tempt him to prepare for others.

In consequence of this disposition of things, Great Men are therefore made to join in a common cause with the People for restraining the excesses of the Governing Power; and, what is no less essential to the public welfare, they are also, from this same cause, compelled to restrain the excess of their own private power or influence; and a general spirit of justice thus diffuses itself throughout all parts of the State.

The wealthy Commoner, the Representative of the People, the potent Peer, always having before their eyes the view of a formidable Power, of a Power from the attempts of which they have only the shield of the laws to protect them, and which would, in the issue, retaliate an hundred fold upon them their smallest acts of violence, are compelled, both to wish only for equitable laws, and to observe them with a scrupulous exactness.

Let the People dread, therefore, (it is necessary to the preservation of their liberty) but let them never intirely cease to love, the Throne, that sole and indivisible seat of all the active powers in the State.

Let them know that it is that, which, by lending an immense strength to the arm of Justice, has enabled her to bring to account as well the most powerful, as the meanest offender;—which has suppressed, and, if I may so express myself, weeded out all those tyrannies, sometimes confederated with, and sometimes adverse to, each other, which incessantly tend to grow up in the middle of civil societies, and are the more terrible, in proportion as they feel themselves to be less firmly established.

Let them know that it is that, which, by making all honours and places depend on the will of one Man, has confined within private walls those projects, the pursuit of which, in former times, shook the foundations of whole States,—has changed into intrigues the conflicts, the outrages of ambition; and that those contentions which, in the present times, afford them only matter of amusement, are the Volcanos which set in flames the ancient Commonwealths.

That it is that, which, leaving to the rich no other security for his palace, than what the peasant has for his cottage, has united his cause to that of the latter;—the cause of the powerful to that of the helpless;—the cause of the Man of extensive influence and connections, to that of him who is without friends.

It is the Throne above all, it is this jealous Power, that makes the People sure that its Representatives never will be any thing more than its Representatives; and it is the ever-subsisting Carthage which vouches to it for the duration of their virtue.

C H A P. XI.

*The Powers which the People themselves exercise.—
The Election of Members of Parliament.*

THE English Constitution having intimately connected the fate of the Men to whom the People trust their power, with that of the people themselves, really seems, by that caution alone, to have procured the latter a compleat security.

However, as the vicissitude of human affairs may, in process of time, realize events which at first had appeared most improbable, it might happen that the Ministers of the Executive power, notwithstanding the interest they themselves have in the preservation of public liberty, and in spite of the precautions expressly taken in order to prevent the effect of their influence, should, at length, employ such efficacious means as might bring about a surrender of some of the laws upon which this

public liberty is founded. And though we should suppose, that such a danger would really be chimerical, it might at least happen, that, conniving at a vicious administration, and being over liberal of the produce of the labours of the people, the Representatives of the People might make them suffer many of the evils which attend worse forms of Government.

Lastly, as their duty does not consist only in preserving their constituents against the calamities of an arbitrary Government, but moreover in procuring them the best administration possible, it might happen that they would manifest, in this respect, an indifference which would, in its consequences, amount to a real calamity.

It was therefore necessary, that the Constitution should furnish a remedy for all the above cases: now, it is in the right of electing Members that this remedy lies.

When the time is come at which the commission which the people had given to their delegates expires, they again assemble in their several Towns or Counties: on these

occasions they have it in their power to elect again those of their representatives whose former conduct they approve, and to reject those who have contributed to give rise to their complaints. A simple remedy this, and which only requiring, in its application, a knowledge of matters of fact, is intirely within the reach of the abilities of the People; but a remedy, at the same time, which is the most effectual that could be applied; for, as the evils complained of arise merely from the peculiar dispositions of a certain number of individuals, to set aside those individuals, is to pluck up the evil by the roots.

But I perceive, that in order to make the reader sensible of the advantages that may accrue to the people of England, from their right of election, there is another of their rights, of which it is absolutely necessary that I should first give an account.

CHAPTER XII.

The Subject continued.—Liberty of the Press.

AS the evils that may be complained of in a State do not always arise merely from the defect of the laws, but also from the non-execution of them, a non-execution too, which is oftentimes such that it is impossible to subject it to any express punishment, or even to ascertain it by any previous definition, Men, in several states, have been led to seek for an expedient that might supply the unavoidable deficiency of legislative provisions, and begin to act, as it were, from the point at which the latter begin to fail. I mean here to speak of the Censorial power: a power which may produce very great effects; but the exercise of which (contrary to that of the legislative power) must be left to the People.

As the proposed end of Legislation is not, according to what has been observed above,

to have the particular intentions of individuals, upon every case, known and complied with, but solely to have what is most conducive to the public good on the occasions that arise, found out and established, it is not an essential requisite, that, in legislative operations, every individual should be called upon to deliver his opinion: and since this expedient, which at first sight appears so natural, of seeking out, by the advice of all, that which concerns all, is found liable, when carried into practice, to the greatest inconveniences, we must not hesitate to lay it aside intirely. But as it is the opinion of individuals, alone, which constitutes the check of a censorial power, this power cannot possibly produce its intended effect, any farther than this public opinion is made known and declared: the sentiments of the people are the only thing in question here; and it is of consequence necessary, that the people should speak for themselves, and manifest those sentiments. A particular Court of Censure therefore essentially frustrates its intended purpose; —it is attended, besides, with very great inconveniences.

As the use of such a Court is to determine upon those cases, only, which lie out of the province of the laws, it cannot be tied down to any precise regulations. As a farther consequence of the nature of its functions, it cannot even be subjected to any constitutional check; and it presents continually to the eye, the view of a power intirely arbitrary, and which, in its different exertions, may affect, in the most cruel manner, the peace and happiness of individuals. (a) It is attended,

(a) M. de Montesquieu, and M. Rousseau, and indeed all the Writers I have met with on this subject, bestow vast encomiums on the Censorial Tribunal that had been instituted at Rome;—they have not been aware that this power of Censure, lodged in the hands of peculiar Magistrates, with other discretionary powers annexed to it, was no other than a piece of State-craft, like those described in the preceding Chapters; and had been contrived by the Senate as an additional means of securing its authority.—Sir Thomas More has also adopted similar opinions on this subject; and he is so far from allowing the people to canvass the actions of their Rulers, that in his System of Polity, which he calls *An Account of Utopia* (the happy Region,—ευ and τοπος) he makes it death for individuals to talk about the conduct of Government.

I feel a kind of pleasure, I must confess, to observe, on this occasion, that though I have been called by some an advocate for Power, I have carried my ideas of Liberty farther than many Writers who have mentioned that word with much enthusiasm.

besides, with this very pernicious consequence, that, by dictating to the people their judgments of Men or measures, it takes from them that freedom of thinking, which is the noblest privilege, as well as the firmest prop, of Liberty.

We may therefore look upon it as a farther proof of the soundness of the principles on which the English constitution is founded, that it has allotted to the people themselves the province of openly canvassing and arraigning the conduct of those who are invested with any branch of public authority; and that it has thus delivered into the hands of the People at large, the exercise of the Censorial power. Every subject in England has not only a right to present petitions, to the King, or the Houses of Parliament; but he has a right also to lay his complaints and observations before the Public, by the means of an open press. A formidable right this, to those who rule Mankind; and which, continually dispelling the cloud of majesty by which they are surrounded, brings them to a level with the rest

of Mankind, and strikes at the very being of their authority.

And indeed this privilege is that which has been obtained by the People, with the greatest difficulty, and latest in point of time, at the expence of the Executive power. Freedom was in every other respect already established, when the English were still, with regard to the public expression of their sentiments, under a yoke that may be called despotic. History abounds with instances of the severity of the Court of Star-Chamber, against those who presumed to write on political subjects. It had fixed the number of printers and printing-presses; and appointed a *Licensor*, without whose approbation no book could be published. Besides, as this Tribunal decided matters by its own single authority, and without the intervention of a Jury, it was always ready to find those persons guilty, whom the Court was pleased to look upon as such; nor was it indeed without ground that Chief Justice Coke, whose notions of liberty were somewhat tainted with the prejudices of the times in which he lived,

concluded the elogiums he has bestowed on this Court, with saying, that “ the right institution “ and orders thereof being observed, it doth “ keep all England in quiet.”

After the Court of Star-Chamber had been abolished, the Long Parliament, whose conduct and assumed power were little better qualified to bear a scrutiny, revived the regulations against the freedom of the press. Charles the Second, and after him James the Second, procured farther renewals of them. These latter Acts having expired in the year 1692, were, at this æra, although posterior to the Revolution, continued for two years longer ; so that it was not till the year 1694, that, in consequence of the Parliament’s refusal to continue the prohibitions any longer, the freedom of the press, (a privilege which the Executive power could not, it seemed, prevail upon itself to yield up to the people) was finally established.

In what then does this liberty of the press precisely consist? Is it a liberty left to every one to publish any thing that comes into his head ; to calumniate, to blacken, whom

he pleases? No! the same laws that protect the person and the property of the individual, have also secured his reputation; and they decree against libels, when really so, punishments of the same kind as are established in other Countries. But, on the other hand, they do not allow, as in other States, that a Man should be deemed guilty of a crime for merely publishing something in print; and they appoint a punishment only against him who has printed things that are criminal, and who is declared guilty of so doing by twelve of his equals, appointed to determine upon his case, with the precautions we have before described.

The liberty of the press, as established in England, consists therefore, (to define it more precisely) in this, that neither the Courts of Justice, nor any other Judges whatever, are authorised to take any previous notice of writings intended for the press; but are confined to those which are actually printed; and must, in these cases, proceed by the Trial by Jury.

It is even the latter circumstance which more particularly constitutes the freedom of

the prefs. If the Magistrates, though confined, in their proceedings, to cases of criminal publications, were to be the sole Judges of the criminal nature of the things published, it might easily, happen that, with regard to a point, which, like this, so highly excites the jealousy of the governing Powers, they would exert themselves with so much spirit and perseverance, that they might, at length, succeed in compleatly striking off all the heads of the hydra.

But whether the authority of the Judges be exerted at the motion of a private individual, or whether it be at the instance of the Government itself, their sole office is to declare the punishment established by the law;—it is to the Jury alone that it belongs to determine on the matter of law, as well as on the matter of fact; that is, to determine, not only whether the writing which is the subject of the charge, has really been composed by the Man charged with having done it, and whether it be really meant of the person named in the indictment; but also, whether its contents are criminal.

And though the law in England does not allow a Man, prosecuted for having published a libel, to offer to support by evidence the truth of the facts contained in it, (a mode of proceeding which would be attended with most mischievous consequences, and is every where proscribed) yet, (a) as the indictment is to express that the facts are *false, malicious, &c.* and the Jury, at the same time, are sole masters of their verdict, that is, may ground it upon what considerations they please, it is very probable that they would acquit the accused party, if the facts asserted in the writing before them, were matter of undoubted truth, and of a general evil tendency.

And this would still more likely be the case, if the conduct of the Government itself was arraigned; because, besides this conviction which we suppose in the Jury, of the certainty of the facts, they would also be deter-

(a) In actions for damages between individuals, the case, if I mistake not, is different, and the defendant is allowed to produce evidence of the facts asserted by him.

mined by their sense of a principle generally admitted in England, and which, in a late celebrated cause, has been strongly insisted upon, viz. That, "though to speak ill of individuals was deserving of reprehension, yet, the public acts of Government ought to lie open to public examination, and that it was a service done to the State, to canvass them freely." (a)

And indeed this extreme security, with which every man in England is enabled to communicate his sentiments to the Public, and the general concern which matters relative to the Government are always sure to create, has wonderfully multiplied all kinds of public papers. Besides those which, being published at the end of every year, month, or week, present to the reader a recapitulation of every thing interesting that may have been done or said during their respective pe-

(a) See Serjeant Glynn's Speech for Woodfall in the prosecution against the latter, by the Attorney-General, for publishing Junius's letter to the King.

riods, there are several others which, making their appearance every day, or every other day, communicate to the public the several measures taken by the Government, as well as the different important causes, whether civil or criminal, that occur in the Courts of Justice; and sketches from the speeches, either of the Advocates, or the Judges, concerned in the decision of them. During the time the Parliament continues sitting, the votes, or resolutions, of the House of Commons, are daily published by authority; and the most interesting speeches in both Houses, are taken down in short-hand, and communicated to the Public, in print.

Lastly, the private anecdotes in the Metropolis, and the Country, concur also towards filling the collection; and as the several public papers circulate, or are transcribed into others, in the different Country Towns, and even find their way into the villages, where every Man, down to the labourer, peruses them with a sort of eagerness, every individual becomes acquainted with the State of the Nation, from one end to the other; and by these means the

general intercourse is such, that the three Kingdoms seem as if they were one single Town.

And it is this public notoriety of all things, that constitutes the supplemental power, or check, which, we have said above, is so useful in order to remedy the unavoidable insufficiency of the laws, and keep within their respective bounds, all those persons who enjoy any share of public power.

As they are thereby made sensible, that all their actions are exposed to the public view, they dare not venture upon those acts of partiality, those secret connivances at the iniquities of particular persons, or those vexatious practices, which the Man in office is too apt to be guilty of, when, exercising his office, at a distance from the public eye, and, as it were, in a corner, he is satisfied that, provided he be cautious, he may dispense with being just. Whatever may be the kind of abuse in which persons in power may, in such a state of things, be tempted to indulge themselves, they are convinced, that their irregularities will be immediately divulged. The Juryman knows that his verdict, the Judge,

that his direction to the Jury, will presently be given out to the Public: and there is no Man in office, but who finds himself compelled, in almost every instance, to choose between his duty, and a surrender of all his former reputation.

It will, I am aware, be thought that I speak in too high terms, of the effects produced by public papers. I confess indeed, that all the pieces contained in them are not patterns of good reasoning, or the truest Attic wit; but, on the other hand, it never happens that a subject in which the laws, or in general the public welfare, are really concerned, fails to call forth some able writer, who, under one form or another, communicates to the public his observations and complaints. I shall add here, that, though an upright Man, who may labour, for a while, under a strong popular prejudice, may, encouraged by the consciousness of his innocence, endure with patience the severest imputations, a guilty Man, hearing nothing in the reproaches of the public, but what he knows to be true, and already upbraids himself with, is very far

from enjoying any such comfort; and that, when a man's own conscience takes part against him, the most despicable weapon is sufficient to wound him to the quick. (a)

Even those persons, whose greatness seems most to set them above the reach of public censure, are not those who least feel its effects. They have need of the suffrages of that vulgar whom they affect to despise, and who are, after all, the dispensers of that glory, which is the real object of their ambitious cares. Though all have not as much sincerity as Alexander, they have equal reason to exclaim, *ô People! what toils do we not undergo, in order to gain your applause!*

(a) I shall take this occasion to observe, that the liberty of the press is so far from being injurious to the reputation of individuals, (as some persons have complained) that it is, on the contrary, its surest guard. When there exists no means of communication with the Public, every one is exposed, without defence, to the secret shafts of malignity and envy. The Man in office loses his reputation, the Merchant his credit, the private individual his character, without so much as knowing, either who are his enemies, or which way they carry on their attacks. But when there is a free press, an innocent Man immediately brings the matter into open day, and crushes his adversaries, at once, by a challenge given to all, to lay before the public the grounds of their several imputations.

I confess, that in a State where the People dare not speak their sentiments, but with a view to please the ears of their rulers, it is possible that either the Prince, or those to whom he has trusted his authority, may sometimes mistake the nature of the public sentiments, or that, for want of that affection, of which they are refused all public marks, they may rest contented with inspiring terror, and make themselves amends, in beholding the overawed multitude smother their complaints.

But when the laws give a full scope to the people for the expression of their sentiments, those who govern cannot conceal from themselves the disagreeable truths which resound from all sides. They are obliged to put up even with ridicule; and the most silly jests are not always those which give them the least uneasiness. Like the lion in the fable, they must bear the blows of those enemies whom they despise the most; and they are, at length, stopped short in their career, and compelled to give up those unjust pursuits which they find to draw upon them, instead of that admiration which is the proposed end and

reward of their labours, nothing but mortification and disgust.

In short, whoever considers what it is that constitutes the moving principle of what we call great affairs, and the invincible sensibility of Man to the opinion of his fellow creatures, will not hesitate to affirm that, if it were possible for the liberty of the press to exist in a despotic government, and (what is not less difficult) for it to exist without changing the constitution, this liberty of the press would alone form a counterpoise to the power of the Prince. If, for example, in an empire of the East, a sanctuary could be found, which, rendered respectable by the ancient religion of the people, might insure safety to those who should bring thither their observations of any kind; and that, from thence, printed papers should issue, which, under a certain seal, might be equally respected, and which, in their daily appearance, should examine, and freely discuss, the conduct of the Cadis, the Bashaws, the Vizir, the Divan, and the Sultan himself,—that would introduce immediately some degree of liberty.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Subject continued.

ANOTHER effect, and a very considerable one, of the liberty of the press, is, that it enables the People effectually to exert those means which the Constitution has bestowed on them, of influencing the motions of the Government.

It has been observed before, how it came to be a matter of impossibility for any large number of Men, when obliged to act in a body, and upon the spot, to take any well-weighed resolution. But this inconvenience, the inevitable consequence of their situation, does in no wise argue a personal inferiority in them with respect to the few who, from some accidental advantages, are enabled to influence their determinations. It is not Fortune, it is Nature, that has made the essential differences between Men; and whatever appellation a small number of persons,

who speak without sufficient reflection, may affix to the general body of their fellow-creatures, the whole difference between the Statesman, and many a Man from among what they call the dregs of the People, often lies in the rough outside of the latter; a disguise which may fall off on the first occasion, and more than once has it happened, that from the middle of a multitude in appearance contemptible, there have been seen to rise at once Viriatuses, or Spartacuses.

Time, and a more favourable situation, (to repeat it once more) are therefore the only things wanting to the People; and the freedom of the press affords the remedy to these disadvantages. Through its assistance every individual may, at his leisure and in retirement, inform himself of every thing that relates to the questions on which he is to take a resolution. Through its assistance, a whole Nation, as it were holds a Council, and deliberates; slowly indeed, (for a Nation cannot be informed like an assembly of Judges) but after a regular manner, and with certainty.—Through its assistance, all matters of fact are, at length, made

clear; and, by means of the conflict of the different answers and replies, nothing at last remains, but the sound part of the arguments. (a)

Hence, though good Men may not think themselves obliged to concur implicitly in the tumultuary resolutions of a People whom

(a) This right of publicly discussing political subjects, is alone a great advantage to a People who enjoy it; and if the Citizens of Geneva, for instance, have preserved their liberty better than the People have been able to do in the other Commonwealths of Switzerland, it is, I think, owing to the extensive right they possess, of making public remonstrances to their Magistrates. To these remonstrances the Magistrates, for instance the Council of *Twenty-five*, to which they are usually made, are obliged to give an answer. If this answer does not satisfy the remonstrating Citizens, they take time, perhaps two or three weeks, to make a reply to it, which must also be answered; and the number of Citizens who go up with each new remonstrance, increases, according as they are thought to have reason on their side: thus, the remonstrances, which were made some years ago, on account of the sentence against the celebrated *M. Rousseau*, and were delivered at first by only forty Citizens, were afterwards often accompanied by about nine hundred.—This circumstance, together with the ceremony with which those remonstrances, (or *Representations*, as they more commonly call them) are delivered, has rendered them a great check on the conduct of the Magistrates: they even have been still more useful to the Citizens of Geneva, as a preventive, than as a remedy; and nothing is more likely to deter the Magistrates from taking a step of any kind, than the idea that it will give rise to a *Representation*.

Orators take pains to agitate; yet on the other hand, when this same People, left to itself, perseveres in opinions which have for a long time been discussed in public writings, and from which, (it is essential to add) all errors concerning facts have been removed, such perseverance appears to me a very respectable decision; and it is then, though only then, that we may safely say,—“the voice of the
“ People is the voice of God.”

How, therefore, can the people of England *act*, when, having formed opinions which may really be called their own, they think they have just cause to complain against the Administration? It is, as has been said above, by the means of the right they have of electing their Representatives; and the same method of general intercourse that has informed them with regard to the objects of their complaints, will enable them likewise to apply the remedy to them.

Through this means they are acquainted with the nature of the subjects that have been deliberated upon in the Assembly of their Representatives;—they are informed by whom the different motions were made,—by whom

they were supported; and the manner after which the suffrages are delivered, is such, that they always can know the names of those who would vote constantly for the advancement of pernicious measures.

And the People not only know the particular dispositions of every Member of the House of Commons; but the general notoriety of all things gives them also a knowledge of the political sentiments of the greatest part of those whom their situation in life renders fit to fill a place in that House. And availing themselves of the several vacancies that happen, and still more of the opportunity of a general election, they purify either successively, or at once, the Legislative Assembly; and without any commotion, or danger to the State, they effect a material reformation in the views of the Government.

I am aware that some persons will doubt of these patriotic and systematic views, which I attribute to the People of England, and will object to me the disorders that sometimes happen at Elections. But this reproach, which, by the way, comes with but little propriety

from Writers who would have the People transact every thing in their own persons, this reproach, I say, though true to a certain degree, is not however so much so, as it is thought by certain persons who have taken only a superficial survey of the state of things.

Without doubt, in a Constitution in which all important causes of uneasiness are so effectually prevented, it is impossible but that the people will have long intervals of inattention. Called upon, on a sudden, from that state of inactivity, to elect Representatives, they have not examined, beforehand, the merits of those who ask them their votes; and the latter have not had, amidst the general tranquillity, any opportunity to make themselves known to them.

The Elector, persuaded, at the same time, that the person whom he will elect, will be equally interested with him in the support of public liberty, does not enter into laborious disquisitions, and from which he sees he may exempt himself. Obligated, however, to give the preference to some body, he forms his choice on motives which would not be ex-

cusable, if it were not that some motives are necessary to make a choice, and that, at this instant, he is not influenced by any other: and indeed it must be confessed, that, in the ordinary course of things, and with Electors of a certain rank in life, that Candidate who happens to give the best entertainment, has a great chance to get the better of his competitors.

But if the measures of Government, and the reception of those measures in Parliament, by means of a too-complying House of Commons, should ever be such as to spread a serious alarm among the People, those same causes which have concurred to establish public liberty, would, no doubt, operate again, and likewise concur in its support. A general combination would then be formed, both of those Members of Parliament who have remained true to the public cause, and of persons of every order among the People. Public meetings, in such circumstances, would be appointed; general subscriptions would be entered into, to support the expences, whatever they might be, of such

a necessary opposition; and all private and unworthy purposes being suppressed by the sense of the National danger, the choice of the Electors would then be wholly determined by the consideration of the public spirit of the Candidates, and the tokens given by them of such spirit.

Thus were those Parliaments formed, which suppressed arbitrary taxes and imprisonments. Thus was it, that, under Charles the Second, the People, when recovered from that enthusiasm of affection with which they received a King so long persecuted, at last returned to him no Parliaments but such as were composed of a majority of Men attached to public liberty. Thus it was, that, persevering in a conduct which the circumstances of the times rendered necessary, the People baffled the arts of the Government; and Charles dissolved three successive Parliaments, without any other effect but that of having those same Men re-chosen, and set again in opposition to him, of whom he hoped he had rid himself for ever.

Nor was James the Second happier in his attempts than Charles had been. This Prince soon experienced that his Parliament was actuated by the same spirit as those which had opposed the designs of his late brother; and having suffered himself to be led into measures of violence, instead of being better taught, by the discovery he made of their sentiments, his reign terminated by that catastrophe with which every one is acquainted.

Indeed, if we combine the right enjoyed by the People of England, of electing their Representatives, with the whole of the English Government, we shall become continually more sensible of the great effects that may result from that right. All Men in the State are, as has been before observed, really interested in the support of public liberty;—nothing but temporary motives, and such as are peculiar to themselves, can possibly induce the Members of the House of Commons to connive at measures destructive of that liberty; the People, therefore, under such circumstances, need only change those Members, in order effectually to reform the conduct of

that House: and it may safely be pronounced beforehand, that a House of Commons composed of a new set of persons, will, from that circumstance alone, be in the interests of the People.

Hence, though the complaints of the People do not always meet with a speedy and immediate redress (a celerity which would be the symptom of a fatal unsteadiness in the Constitution, and would sooner or later bring on its ruin) yet, when we attentively consider the nature and the resources of this Constitution, we shall not think it too bold an assertion to say, that it is impossible but that complaints in which the People persevere, that is, to repeat it once more, well-grounded complaints, will sooner or later be redressed.



CHAPTER XIV.

Right of Resistance.

BUT all those privileges of the People, considered in themselves, are but feeble defences against the real strength of those who govern. All those provisions, all those reciprocal Rights, necessarily suppose that things remain in their legal and settled course:— What would therefore be the resource of the People, if ever the Prince, suddenly freeing himself from all restraint, and throwing himself, as it were, out of the Constitution, should no longer respect either the person or the property of the subject, and should either make no account of his conventions with his Parliament, or attempt to force it implicitly to submit to his will? It would be resistance.

Without entering here into the discussion of a doctrine which would lead us to inquire into the first principles of civil Government, consequently engage us in a long disquisition, and with regard to which, besides, persons free from prejudices agree pretty much in

their opinions, I shall only observe here, (and it will be sufficient for my purpose) that the question has been decided in favour of this doctrine by the Laws of England, and that resistance is looked upon by them as the ultimate and lawful resource against the violences of Power.

It was resistance that gave birth to the great Charter, that lasting foundation of English Liberty; and the excesses of a Power established by force, were also repressed by force. (a) It has been by the same means that, at different times, the people have procured the confirmation of it. Lastly, it has also been the resistance to a King who made no account of his own engagements, that has, in the issue, placed on the Throne the family which is now in possession of it.

(a) Lord Lyttelton says extremely well in his *Persian Letters*, "If the privileges of the People of England be concessions from the Crown, is not the power of the Crown itself, a concession from the People?" It might also be said with equal truth, and somewhat more in point to the subject of this Chapter,—If the privileges of the People were an incroachment on the power of Kings, the power itself of Kings was, at first, an incroachment (no matter whether effected by surprise) on the natural liberty of the People.

This is not all; that resource which, till then, had only been an act of force, opposed to other acts of force, was, at that æra, recognized by the Law itself. The Lords and Commons, solemnly assembled, declared that “ King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, by breaking the original contract between King and People, and having violated the fundamental laws, and withdrawn himself, has abdicated the Government; and that the Throne is thereby vacant.” (a)

And lest those principles to which the Revolution thus gave a sanction, should, in process of time, become mere *arcana* of State, exclusively appropriated and known to a certain class of Subjects, the same Act we have just mentioned, expressly insured to individuals the right of publicly preferring complaints against the abuses of Government; and, moreover, of being provided with

(a) The Bill of Rights has since given a new sanction to all these principles.

arms for their own defence.—Judge Blackstone expresses himself in the following terms, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. (B. I. ch. i. p. 140.)

“ And lastly, to vindicate those rights,
“ when actually violated or attacked, the
“ subjects of England are entitled, in the
“ first place, to the regular administration
“ and free course of justice in the Courts
“ of law; next, to the right of petitioning
“ the King and Parliament for redress of
“ grievances; and, lastly, to the right of
“ having and using arms for self-preservation
“ and defence.”

Lastly, this right of opposing violence, in whatever shape, and from whatever quarter, it may come, is so generally acknowledged, that the Courts of law have sometimes grounded their judgments upon it. I shall relate on this head a fact which is somewhat remarkable.

A Constable, being out of his precinct, arrested a woman whose name was *Anne De-kins*; one *Tooly* took her part, and in the heat of the fray, killed the assistant of the

Constable. Being prosecuted for murder, he alledged in his defence, that the illegality of the imprisonment was a sufficient provocation to make the homicide *excusable*, and intitle him to the benefit of his Clergy. The Jury having settled the matter of fact, left the *criminality* of it to be decided by the Judge, by returning a *special verdict*. The cause was adjourned to the King's Bench, and thence again to Serjeants' Inn, for the opinion of the twelve Judges. Here follows the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Holt, in giving judgment.

“ If one be imprisoned upon an unlawful
“ authority, it is a sufficient provocation
“ to all people, out of compassion, much
“ more so when it is done under colour of
“ justice; and when the liberty of the sub-
“ ject is invaded, it is a provocation to all
“ the subjects of England.—A Man ought
“ to be concerned for *Magna Charta* and
“ the laws; and if any one against law im-
“ prison a Man, he is an offender against
“ *Magna Charta*.” After some debate, oc-
casioned chiefly by Tooley's appearing not to

have known that the Constable was out of his precinct, seven of the Judges were of opinion, that the prisoner was guilty of Manslaughter, and he was admitted to the benefit of Clergy. (a)

But it is with respect to this right of a final resistance, that the advantage of a free press appears in a most conspicuous light. As the most important rights of the People, without the prospect of a resistance which over-awes those who should attempt to violate them, are mere shadows; so this right of *resisting*, itself, is but vain, when there exists no means of general concert between the different parts of the People.

Private individuals, unknown to each other, are forced to bear in silence those injuries in which they do not see other people take a concern. Left to their own individual strength, they tremble before the formidable and ever-ready power of those who govern; and as the latter well know, nay, are apt to over-rate

(a) See Reports of Cases argued, debated, and adjudged, in *Banco Regiæ*, in the time of the late Queen Anne.

the advantages of their own situation, they think they may venture upon any thing.

But when they see that all their actions are exposed to public view,—that in consequence of the celerity with which all things are communicated, the whole Nation forms, as it were, one continued *irritable* body, no part of which can be touched without exciting an universal *tremor*; they become sensible that the cause of each individual is really the cause of all, and that to attack the lowest among the People, is to attack the whole People.

Here also we must remark the error of those who, as they make the liberty of the People to consist in their power, so make their power consist in their action.

When the People are often called to act in their own persons, it is impossible for them to acquire any exact knowledge of the state of things. The event of one day effaces the notions which they had begun to adopt on the preceding day; and amidst the continual change of things, no settled principle, and above all, no plans of union, have time to be established among them.—You wish to have

the People love and defend their laws and liberty; leave them, therefore, the necessary time to know what laws and liberty are, and to agree in their opinion concerning them:— you wish an union, a *coalition*, which cannot be obtained but by a slow and peaceable *process*; forbear therefore continually to shake the vessel.

Nay farther, it is a contradiction, that the People should *act*, and at the same time retain any real power. Have they, for instance, been forced by the weight of public oppressions to throw off the restraints of the law, from which they no longer received protection, they presently find themselves become subject, at once, to the command of a few Leaders, who are the more absolute in proportion as the nature of their power is less clearly ascertained: nay, perhaps they must even submit to the toils of war, and to military discipline.

If it be in the common and legal course of things that the People are called to move, each individual is obliged, for the success of the measures in which he is then made to

take a concern, to join himself to some party: nor can this party be without a Head. The Citizens thus grow divided among themselves, and contract the pernicious habit of submitting to Leaders. They are, at length, no more than the clients of a certain number of Patrons; and the latter, soon becoming able to command the arms of the Citizens as they at first governed their votes, make little account of a People, with one part of which they know how to curb the other.

But when the moving springs of Government are placed entirely out of the body of the People, their action is thereby disengaged from all that could render it complicated, or hide it from the eye. As the People thenceforward consider things speculatively, and are, if I am allowed the expression, only spectators of the game, they acquire just notions of things; and as these notions, amidst the general quiet, get ground and spread themselves far and wide, they at length entertain, on the subject of their liberty, but one opinion.

Forming thus, as it were, one body, the People, at every moment, has it in its power

to strike the decisive blow which is to level every thing. Like those mechanical powers, the greatest efficiency of which exists at the instant which precedes their entering into action, it has an immense force, just because it does not yet exert any; and in this state of stillness, but of attention, consists its true *momentum*.

With regard to those who (whether from personal privileges, or by virtue of a commission from the People) are intrusted with the active part of Government, as they, in the mean while, see themselves exposed to public view, and observed as from a distance by Men free from the spirit of party, and who place in them but a conditional trust, they are afraid of exciting a commotion which, though it would not be the destruction of all power, yet would surely and immediately prove the destruction of their own. And if we might suppose that, through an extraordinary conjunction of circumstances, they should resolve among themselves upon the sacrifice of the laws on which public liberty is founded, they would no sooner lift up their

eyes towards that extensive Assembly which views them with a watchful attention, than they would find their public virtue return upon them, and would make haste to resume that plan of conduct out of the limits of which they can expect nothing but ruin and perdition.

In short, as the body of the People cannot act without either subjecting themselves to some Power, or effecting a general destruction, the only part they can take in a Government with advantage to themselves, is not to interfere, but to influence;—to be able to act, and not to act.

The power of the People is not when they strike, but when they keep in awe: it is when they can overthrow every thing, that they never need to move; and Manlius included all in four words, when he said to the People of Rome, *Ostendite bellum, pacem habebitis.*

CHAPTER XIV.

Proofs, drawn from Facts, of the Truth of the Principles laid down in the present Work.—

1. *The peculiar Manner in which Revolutions have always been concluded in England.*

IT may not be sufficient to have proved by arguments the advantages of the English Constitution: it will perhaps be asked, whether the effects correspond to the theory? To this question (which I confess is extremely proper) my answer is ready; it is the same which was once made, I believe by a Lacedemonian, *Come and see.*

If we peruse the English History, we shall be particularly struck with one circumstance to be observed in it, and which distinguishes most advantageously the English Government from all other free governments: I mean the manner in which Revolutions and public commotions have always been terminated in England.

If we read with some attention the History of other free States, we shall see the public dissensions that have taken place in them, to have constantly been terminated by settlements in which the interests only of *a few* were really provided for; while the grievances of *the many* were hardly, if at all, attended to. In England the very reverse has happened, and we see Revolutions always to have been terminated by extensive and elaborate provisions for securing the general liberty.

The History of the ancient Grecian Commonwealths, but above all, of the Roman Republic, of which more compleat monuments have been left us, afford striking proofs of the former part of this observation.

What was, for instance, the consequence of that great Revolution by which the Kings were driven from Rome, and in which the Senate and Patricians acted as the advisers and Leaders of the People? The consequence was, as we find in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Livy, that the Senators immediately claimed to themselves all those powers, lately so much complained of by themselves, which

the Kings had exercised. The execution of their future decrees was entrusted to two Magistrates taken from their own body, and entirely dependant on them, whom they called *Consuls*; and who were made to carry about them all the ensigns of power which had formerly attended the Kings. Only, care was taken that the axes and *fascēs*, the symbols of the power of life and death over the Citizens, which the Senate then claimed to itself, should not be carried before both Consuls at once, but only before one at a time, for fear of doubling the terror of the People. (a)

Nor was this all: the Senators drew over to themselves those Men who had the most interest at that time among the People, and admitted them as Members into their own Body; (b) and indeed this was a precaution which they could not prudently avoid taking. But the interests of the Great Men in the Republic being thus settled, the Revolution

(a) “ Omnia jura (*Regum*) omnia insignia, primi Consules tenuere; id modò cautum est ne si ambo fascēs haberent, duplicatus terror videretur.”—*Tit. Liv.* L. ii. §. 1.

(b) These new Senators were called *conscripti*: hence the name of *Patres Conscripti*, afterwards indiscriminately given to the whole Senate.—*Tit. Liv.* *ibid.*

ended. The new Senators, as well as the old, took care not to lessen, by making provisions for the liberty of the People, a power which was now become their own. Nay, they presently stretched this power beyond its former tone; and the punishments which the Consul inflicted in a military manner on a number of those who still adhered to the former mode of Government, and upon his own children, taught the People what they had to expect for the future, if they presumed to oppose the power of those whom they had thus unwarily made their Masters.

Among the oppressive laws, or usages, which the Senate, after the expulsion of the Kings, had permitted to continue, those which were most complained of by the People, were those by which the Citizens who could not pay their debts with the interest, (which at Rome was enormous) at the appointed time, became slaves to their Creditors, and were delivered over to them bound with cords: hence the word *Nexi*, by which that kind of Slaves were denominated. The cruelties exercised by the Creditors on those unfortunate Men, whom the private calamities caused

by the frequent wars in which Rome was engaged, rendered very numerous, at last roused the body of the People: they abandoned both the City, and their inhuman fellow Citizens, and retreated to the other side of the River *Anio*.

But this second Revolution, like the former, only procured the advancement of particular persons. A new office was created, called the Tribuneship. Those whom the People had placed at their head, when they left the City, were raised to it. Their duty, it was agreed, was for the future to protect the Citizens; and they were invested with a certain number of prerogatives for that purpose. This Institution, it must however be confessed, would have, in the issue, proved very beneficial to the People, at least for a long course of time, if certain precautions had been taken with respect to it, which would have much lessened the future personal importance of the new Tribunes: (a) but these precautions the latter did not think proper to suggest; and with

(a) Their number ought to have been much greater; and they never ought to have accepted the power left to each of them, of stopping by his single opposition the proceedings of all the rest.

regard to those abuses themselves, which had at first given rise to the complaints of the People, no farther mention was made of them. (a)

As the Senate and Patricians, in the early ages of the Commonwealth, kept very closely united together, the Tribunes, with all their personal privileges, were not able, however, during the first times after their creation, to gain an admittance either to the Consulship, or into the Senate, and thereby to separate their condition any farther from that of the People. This situation of theirs, in which it was to be wished they might always have been kept, produced at first very good effects, and caused their conduct to answer in a great measure the expectations of the People. The Tribunes complained loudly of the exorbitancy of the powers possessed by the Senate and Consuls; and here we must observe that the power exercised by the latter over the lives of the Citizens, never had been yet subjected, (which will perhaps surprize the Reader) to any known laws, though sixty years had al-

(a) A number of seditions were afterwards raised upon the same account.

ready elapsed since the expulsion of the Kings. The Tribunes therefore insisted, that laws should be made which the Consuls should thenceforwards be bound to follow; and that they should no longer be left, in the exercise of their power over the lives of the Citizens, to their own caprice and wantonness. (a)

Equitable as these demands were, the Senate and Patricians opposed them with great warmth, and either by naming Dictators, or calling in the assistance of the Priests, or by other means, they defeated for nine years together, all the endeavours of the Tribunes. However, as the latter were at that time in earnest, the Senate was at last obliged to comply; and the *Lex Terentilla* was passed, by which it was enacted that a general Code of Laws should be made.—These beginnings seemed to promise great success to the cause of the People: but, unfortunately for them, the Senate found means to have it agreed, that the office of Tribune should be set aside during all the time that the Code should be framing; they

(a) “ Quod Populus in se jus dederit, eo Consulem usurum; non ipsos libidinem ac licentiam suam pro lege habituros.”—*Tit. Liv.* L. iii. §. 9.

moreover obtained, that the ten Men, called Decemvirs, to whom the charge of composing that Code was to be given, should be taken from the body of the Patricians; the same causes, therefore, produced again the same effects; and the power of the Senate and Consuls was left in the Code, or Laws of the twelve Tables, as undefined as before. As to the laws above mentioned, concerning debtors, which never had ceased to be bitterly complained of by the People, and with regard to which some satisfaction ought, in common justice, to have been given them, they were confirmed, and a new terror added to them from the manner in which they were worded.

The true motive of the Senate, when they thus trusted the framing of the new laws to a new kind of Magistrates, called Decemvirs, was that, by suspending the ancient office of Consul, they might have a pretence for suspending also the office of Tribune, and thereby rid themselves of the People, during the time that the important business of framing the Code should be carrying on: they even, in order the better to secure that point, placed the whole power in

the Republic, in the hands of these new Magistrates. But the Senate and Patricians experienced then, in their turn, the danger of entrusting Men with an uncontrouled authority. As they themselves had formerly betrayed the trust which the People had placed in them, so, on this occasion, the Decemvirs also deceived them. They retained, by their own private authority, the unlimited power that had been conferred on them; and at last exercised it on the Patricians as well as the Plebeians. Both parties therefore united against them, and the Decemvirs were expelled from the City.

The former dignities of the Republic were restored, and with them the office of Tribune. Those from among the People who had been most instrumental in destroying the power of the Decemvirs, were, as it was natural, raised to the Tribuneship; and they entered upon their offices possessed of a prodigious degree of popularity. The Senate and the Patricians were, at the same time, sunk extremely low in consequence of the long tyranny which had just expired; and those two circumstances united, afforded the Tri-

bunes but too easy an opportunity of making the present Revolution end as the former ones had done, and converting it to the advancement of their own power. They got new personal privileges to be added to those which they already possessed; and moreover procured a law to be enacted, by which it was ordained, that the resolutions taken by the *Comitia Tributa* (an Assembly in which the Tribunes were admitted to propose new laws) should be binding upon the whole Commonwealth:—by which they at once raised to themselves an *imperium in imperio*, and acquired, as Livy expresses it, a most active weapon. (a)

From that time great commotions arose in the Republic, which, like all those before them, ended in promoting the power of a few. Proposals for easing the People of their debts, for dividing with some equality amongst the Citizens the lands which were taken from the enemy, and for lowering the rate of the interest of money, were frequently made by the Tribunes. And indeed all these were excellent regulations to propose; but unfor-

(a) *Acerrimum telum.*

unately for the People, the proposals of them were only pretences made use of by the Tribunes for promoting schemes of a fatal, though somewhat remote, tendency to public liberty. Their real aims were at the Consulship, at the Priesthood, and other offices of Executive power, which they were intended to controul, and not to share. To these views they continually made the cause of the People subservient:—I shall relate, among other instances, the manner in which they procured to themselves an admittance to the office of Consul.

Having, during several years, seized every opportunity of making speeches to the People on that subject, and even excited seditions in order to overcome the opposition of the Senate, they at last availed themselves of the circumstance of an *interregnum* (a time, during which there were no other Magistrates in the Republic besides themselves) and proposed to the Tribes, whom they had assembled, to enact the three following laws:—the first for settling the rate of interest of money; the second for ordaining that no Citizen should be possessed of more than five hundred acres of land; and the third, for providing that

one of the two Consuls should be taken from the body of the Plebeians. But on this occasion it evidently appeared, says Livy, which of the laws in agitation were most agreeable to the People, and which, to those who proposed them: for the Tribes accepted the laws concerning the interest of money, and the lands; but as to that concerning the Plebeian Consulship, they rejected it: and both the former articles would from that moment have been settled, if the Tribunes had not declared, that the Tribes were called either to accept, or reject, all their three proposals at once. (a) Great commotions ensued thereupon, for a whole year; but at last the Tribunes, by their perseverance in insisting that the Tribes should vote on their three *rogations*, jointly, obtained their ends, and overcame both the opposition of the Senate, and the reluctance of the People.

(a) “ Ab Tribunis, velut per interregnum, concilio Plebis
“ habito, apparuit quæ ex promulgatis Plebi, quæ latoribus,
“ gratiora essent; nam de fœnore atque agro rogationes
“ jubebant, de plebeio Consulatu antiquabant; & perfecta
“ utraque res esset, ni Tribuni se in omnia simul consulere
“ Plebem dixissent.”—*Tit. Liv. L. iv. §. 39.*

In the same manner did the Tribunes get themselves rendered capable of filling all other places of executive power, and public trust, in the Republic. But after all their views of that kind were accomplished, the Republic did not for all this enjoy more quiet; nor was the interest of the People better attended to. New struggles then arose for actual admission into those places; for procuring them to relations, or friends; for governments of provinces, and commands of armies. A few Tribunes, indeed, did at times apply themselves earnestly, out of real virtue and philanthropy, to remedy the grievances of the People; but both their fellow Tribunes, as we may see in History, and the whole body of those Men upon whom the People had, at different times, bestowed Consulships, Ædileships, Censorships, and other dignities without number, united together with the utmost vehemence against them; and the real Patriots, such as Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, and Fulvius, constantly perished in the attempt.

I have been somewhat explicit on the effects produced by the different Revolutions that have happened in the Roman Republic,

because its History is much known to us, and we have, either in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or Livy, considerable monuments of the more ancient part of it. But the History of the Grecian Commonwealths would also have supplied us with a number of facts to the same purpose. The Revolution, for instance, by which the *Pisistratidæ* were driven out of Athens—that by which the *Four hundred*, and afterwards the *Thirty*, were established, as well as that by which the latter were in their turn expelled, all ended in securing the power of *a few*.—The Republic of Syracuse, that of Corcyra, of which Thucydides has left us a pretty full account, and that of Florence, of which Machiavel has written the History, also present us a series of public commotions, ended by treaties, in which, as in the Roman Republic, the grievances of the People, though ever so loudly complained of in the beginning by those who acted as their defenders, were, in the issue, most carelessly attended to, or even totally disregarded. (*a*)

(*a*) The Revolutions which have formerly happened in France, have all ended like those above mentioned: of this a remarkable instance may be seen in the Note (*a*) page 32. of

But if we turn our eyes towards the English History, scenes of a quite different kind will offer themselves to our view; and we shall find, on the contrary, that Revolutions in England have always been terminated by making such provisions, and only such, as all orders of the People were really and indiscriminately to enjoy.

Most extraordinary facts, these! and which, from all the other circumstances that accompanied them, we see, all along, to have been owing to the impossibility (a point that has been so much insisted upon in former Chapters) in which those who possessed the confidence of the People, were, of transferring to themselves any branch of the Executive authority, and thus separating their own condition from that of the rest of the People.

Without mentioning the compacts which were made with the first Kings of the Norman line, let us only cast our eyes on *Magna*

this Work. The same things are also to be observed in the History of Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Scotland, &c. but I have avoided mentioning States of a Monarchical form, till some observations are made, which the Reader will find in the XVIIth Chapter.

Charta, which is still the foundation of English liberty. A number of circumstances, which have been described in the former part of this work, concurred at that time to strengthen the Regal power to such a degree, that no Men in the State could entertain a hope of succeeding in any other view than that of setting bounds to it. How great was the union which thence arose among all orders of the People!—what extent, what caution, do we see in the provisions made by that Great Charter! All the objects for which Men naturally wish to live in a state of Society, were settled in its thirty-eight Articles. The judicial authority was regulated. The person and property of the individual were secured. The safety of the Merchant and Stranger was provided for. The higher class of Citizens gave up a number of oppressive privileges which they had long since accustomed themselves to look upon as their undoubted rights. (a) Nay, the implements

(a) All possessors of lands took the engagement to establish in behalf of their Tenants and Vassals (*erga suos*) the same liberties which they demanded from the King.—*Mag. Char. Cap. xxxviii.*

of tillage of the *Bondman*, or Slave, were also secured to him; and for the first time perhaps in the annals of the World, a civil war was terminated by making stipulations in favour of those unfortunate Men to whom the avarice and lust of dominion inherent in human Nature, continued, over the greatest part of the Earth, to deny the common rights of Mankind.

Under Henry the Third great disturbances arose; and they were all terminated by solemn confirmations given to the Great Charter. Under Edward I. Edward II. Edward III. and Richard II. those who were entrusted with the care of the interests of the People, lost no opportunity that offered, of strengthening still farther that foundation of public liberty; of taking all such precautions as might render the Great Charter still more effectual in the event.—They had not ceased to be convinced that their cause was the same with that of all the rest of the People.

Henry of Lancaster having laid claim to the Crown, the Commons received the law from the Victorious. They settled the Crown

upon him, by the name of Henry the Fourth ; and added to the Act of Settlement, provisions which the Reader may see in the second Volume of the *Parliamentary History* of England. Struck with the wisdom of the conditions demanded by the Commons, the Authors of the Book just mentioned, observe, perhaps with some simplicity, that the Commons of England *were no fools at that time*. They ought rather to have said,—The Commons of England were happy enough to form among themselves an Assembly in which every one could propose what matters he pleased, and freely discuss them:—they had no possibility left of converting, either these advantages, or in general the confidence which the People had placed in them, to any private views of their own : they therefore, without loss of time, endeavoured to stipulate useful conditions with that Power by which they saw themselves at every instant exposed, to be dissolved and dispersed ; and industriously applied themselves to insure the safety of the whole People, as it was the only means they had of procuring their own.

In the long contentions which took place between the Houses of York and Lancaster, the Commons remained spectators of disorders which, in those times, it was not in their power to prevent: they successively acknowledged the title of the victorious parties; but whether under Edward the Fourth, under Richard the Third, or Henry the Seventh by whom those quarrels were terminated, they continually availed themselves of the importance of the services which they were able to perform to the new established Sovereign, for obtaining effectual conditions in favour of the whole body of the People.

At the accession of James the First, which, as it placed a new Family on the Throne of England, may be considered as a kind of Revolution, no demands were made by the Men who were at the head of the Nation, but in favour of general liberty.

After the accession of Charles the First, discontents of a very serious nature began to take place; and they were terminated, in the first instance, by the Act called the *Petition of Right*, which is still looked upon as

a most precise and accurate delineation of the rights of the People. (*a*)

At the Restoration of Charles the Second, the Constitution being re-established upon its former principles, the former consequences produced by it, began again to take place; and we see at that æra, and indeed during the whole course of that Reign, a continued series of precautions taken for securing the general liberty.

Lastly, the great event which took place in the year 1689, affords a striking confirmation of the truth of the observation made in this Chapter. At this æra the political wonder again appeared—of a Revolution terminated by a series of public Acts, in which

(*a*) The disorders which took place in the latter part of the reign of that Prince, are indeed a compleat contradiction of the assertion which is the subject of the present Chapter; but they, at the same time, are a no less convincing confirmation of the truth of the principles laid down in the course of this Work. The above-mentioned disorders took rise from that day in which Charles the First gave up the power of dissolving his Parliament; that is, from the day in which the Members of that Assembly acquired an independent, personal, lasting authority, which they soon began to turn against the People who had raised them to it.

no interests but those of the People at large, were considered and provided for; no clause, even the most indirect, was inserted, either to gratify the present ambition, or favour the future views, of those who were personally concerned in bringing those Acts to a conclusion. Indeed, if any thing is capable of conveying to us an adequate idea of the soundness, as well as peculiarity, of the principles on which the English Government is founded, it is the attentive perusal of the System of public Compacts to which the Revolution of the year 1689 gave rise,—of the Bill of Rights with all its different clauses, and the several Acts which under two subsequent Reigns, till the accession of the House of Hanover, were made in order to strengthen it.

C H A P T E R X V I .

Second Difference.—The Manner after which the Laws for the Liberty of the Subject are executed in England.

THE second difference which I spoke of, between the English Government, and that of other free States, concerns the important object of the execution of the Laws. On this article, also, we shall find the advantage to lie on the side of the English Government; and if we make a comparison between the History of those States, and that of England, it will lead us to the following observation, viz. That, though in other free States the laws concerning the liberty of the Citizens were imperfect, yet, the execution of them was still more defective. In England, on the contrary, the laws for the security of the Subject, are not only very extensive in their provisions, but the manner in which they are executed, carries these advantages still

farther; and English Subjects enjoy no less liberty from the spirit both of justice and mildness, by which all branches of the Government are influenced, than from the accuracy of the laws themselves.

The Roman Commonwealth will here again supply us with examples to prove the former part of the above assertion. When I said, in the foregoing Chapter, that, in times of public commotion, no provisions were made for the body of the People, I meant no provisions that were likely to prove effectual in the event. When the People were roused to a certain degree, or when their concurrence was necessary to carry into effect certain resolutions, or measures, that were particularly interesting to the Men in power, the latter could not, with any prudence, openly profess a contempt for the political wishes of the People; and some declarations expressed in general words, in favour of public liberty, were indeed added to the laws that were enacted on those occasions. But these declarations, and the principles which they tended to establish, were afterwards even openly disregarded in practice.

Thus, when the People were made to vote, about a year after the expulsion of the Kings, that the Regal Government never should be again established in Rome, and that those who should endeavour to restore it, should be devoted to the Gods, an article was added, which, in general terms, confirmed to the Citizens the right they had before enjoyed under the Kings, of appealing to the People from the sentences of death passed upon them. No punishment (which will surprize the Reader) was decreed against those who should violate this law; and indeed the Consuls, as we may see in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, concerned themselves but little about the appeals of the Citizens, and in the more than military exercise of their functions, sported with rights which they ought to have respected, however imperfectly and loosely secured.

An article to the same purport with the above, was afterwards also added to the laws of the Twelve Tables; but the Decemvirs, to whom the execution of those laws was at first committed, behaved exactly in the same manner, and even worse than the Consuls had done before them; and after they were

expelled, (a) the Magistrates who succeeded them, appear to have been as little tender of the lives of the Citizens. I shall, among many instances, relate one which will shew upon what slight grounds the Citizens were exposed to have their lives taken away.—Spurius Mælius being accused of endeavouring to make himself King, was summoned by the Master of the Horse, to appear before the Dictator, in order to clear himself of this somewhat extraordinary imputation. Spurius took refuge among the People; the Master of the Horse pursued him, and killed him on the spot. The multitude having thereupon expressed a great indignation, the Dictator had them called to his Tribunal, and declared that Spurius had been lawfully put to death, even though he might be innocent of the crime laid to his charge, for his refusing to appear before

(a) At the expulsion of the Decemvirs, a law was also enacted, that no Magistrate should be created from whom an appeal could not be made to the People (*Magistratus sine provocatione*—Tit. Liv. L. III. §. 55) by which the People meant to abolish the Dictatorship: but, from the fact which will just now be related, and which happened about ten years afterwards, we see that this law was not better observed than all the others had been.

the Dictator, when summoned to do so by the Master of the Horse. (a)

About one hundred and forty years after the times we mention, the law concerning the appeals to the People, was enacted for the third time. But we do not see that it was better observed afterwards, than it had been before: and we not only find it frequently violated by the different Magistrates of the Republic; but the Senate also, notwithstanding this law, at times made formidable examples of the Citizens. Of this we have an instance in the three hundred soldiers who had pillaged the Town of Rhegium. The Senate, of its own authority, ordered them all to be put to death. In vain did the Tribune Flavius remonstrate against so severe an exertion of public justice on Roman Citizens; the Senate, says Valerius Maximus, nevertheless persisted in its resolution. (b)

(a) “ Tumultuantem deinde multitudinem, incertâ existimatione facti, ad concionem vocari iussit, & *Mælium jure cæsum* pronunciavit, *etiamsi regni crimine insons fuerit; qui vocatus à Magistro equitum, ad Dictatorem non venisset.*”—Tit. Liv. L. IV. §. 15.

(b) Val. Max. L. II. C. 7.—This Author does not mention the precise number of those who were put to death on this occasion; he only says that they were executed fifty

All these laws for securing the lives of the Citizens, had hitherto been enacted without any mention being made of a punishment against those who should violate them. At last the celebrated *Lex Porcia* was passed, which subjected to banishment those who should cause a Roman Citizen to be scourged and put to death. From a number of instances posterior to that law, we see that it was not better observed than those before it had been: Caius Gracchus, therefore, caused the *Lex Sempronia* to be enacted, by which a new sanction was given to it. But this law did not secure his own life, and that of his friends, better than the *Lex Porcia* had done that of his brother, and those who had supported him: indeed, all the events which took place about those times, rendered it manifest that the evil was such as was beyond the power of any laws to cure.—I shall here

at a time, in different successive days: but other Authors make the number of them amount to four thousand. Livy speaks of an whole Legion.—*Legio Campana quæ Rhegium occupaverat, obsessa, deditione factâ securi percussa est.*—Tit. Liv. L. xv. *Epit.*—I have followed here Polybius, who says that only three hundred were taken and brought to Rome.

mention a fact which affords a remarkable instance of the wantonness with which the Roman Magistrates had accustomed themselves to take away the lives of the Citizens. A Citizen, named Memmius, having put up for the Consulship, and publickly canvassing for the same, in opposition to a Man whom the Tribune Saturninus supported, the latter caused him to be apprehended, and made him expire under blows in the public Forum. The Tribune even carried his insolence so far, as Cicero informs us, as to give to this act of cruelty, transacted in the presence of the whole People assembled, the outward form of a lawful act of public Justice. (a)

(a) The fatal forms of words (*cruciatús carmina*) used by the Roman Magistrates, when they ordered a Man to be put to death, resounded (says Tully, in his speech *pro Rabirio*) in the Assembly of the People, in which the Censors had forbidden the common Executioner ever to appear. *I Liētor, colliga manus. Caput obnubito. Arbori infelici suspendito.* —Memmius being a considerable Citizen, as we may conclude from his canvassing with success for the Consulship, all the great Men in the Republic took the alarm at the atrocious action of the Tribune: the Senate, the next day, issued out its solemn Mandate to the Consuls, to provide that the Republic should receive no detriment; and the Tribune was killed in a pitched battle that was fought at the foot of the Capitole.

Nor were the Roman Magistrates satisfied with committing acts of injustice in their political capacity, and for the support of the power of that Body of which they made a part. Avarice and private rapine were at last added to political ambition. The Provinces were first oppressed and plundered. The calamity, in process of time, reached Italy itself, and the centre of the Republic; till at last the *Lex Calpurnia de repetundis* was enacted to put a stop to it. By this law, an action was given to the Citizens and Allies for the recovery of the money extorted from them by Magistrates, or Men in power; and the *Lex Junia* afterwards added the penalty of banishment, to the obligation of making restitution.

But here another kind of disorder arose. The Judges proved as corrupt, as the Magistrates had been oppressive. They equally betrayed, in their own province, the cause of the Republic with which they had been intrusted; and chose rather to share in the plunder of the Consuls, the Prætors, and the Proconsuls, than put the laws in force against them.

New expedients were, therefore, resorted to, in order to remedy this new evil. Laws were made for judging and punishing the Judges themselves; and above all, continual changes were made in the manner of composing their Assemblies. But the malady lay too deep for common legal provisions to remedy. The guilty Judges employed the same resources in order to avoid conviction, that the guilty Magistrates had done; and those changes at which we are amazed, which were made in the constitution of the judiciary Bodies, (a) instead of obviating the corrup-

(a) The Judges, (over the Assembly of whom the Prætor usually presided) were taken from the body of the Senate, till some years after the last Punic War; when the *Lex Semproniana*, proposed by Caius S. Gracchus, enacted, that they should in future be taken from the Equestrian Order. The Consul Cæpio procured afterwards a law to be enacted, by which the Judges were to be taken from both Orders, equally. The *Lex Servilia* soon after put the Equestrian Order, again in possession of the *Judgments*; and the *Lex Livia* restored them intirely to the Senate.—The *Lex Plautia* enacted afterwards, that the Judges should be taken from the three Orders; the Senatorian, Equestrian, and Plebeian. The *Lex Cornelia*, framed by the Dictator Sylla, enacted again that the Judges should be intirely taken from the body of the Senate. The *Lex Aurelia* ordered anew, that they should be taken from the three Orders. Pompey made afterwards a change in their number, which he fixed at seventy five, and in the manner of electing them. And lastly, Cæsar intirely restored the *Judgments* to the Order of the Senate.

tion of the Judges, only transferred to other Men the profit arising from becoming guilty of it. The complaint was already grown general, in the times of the Gracchi, that no Man who had money to give, could be brought to punishment. (a) Cicero says, that in his time, the same opinion was become settled and universally received; (b) and his Speeches are replete with his lamentations on what he calls the *levity*, and the *infamy*, of the public Judgements.

Nor was the impunity of corrupt Judges, the only evil under which the Republic laboured. Commotions of the whole Empire at last took place. The horrid vexations, and afterwards the acquittal, of Aquilius, Proconsul of Syria, and of some others who had been guilty of the same crimes, drove the Provinces of Asia to desperation: and it was then, that that terrible war of Mithridates arose, which was ushered in by the death of eighty thousand Romans, massacred in one day, in all the Cities of Asia. (c)

(a) App. de Bell. Civ. (b) Act. in Verr. I. §. 1.

(c) Appian.

The Laws and public Judgments not only thus failed of the end for which they had been established: they even became, at last, new means of oppression added to those which already existed. Citizens possessed of wealth, persons obnoxious to particular Bodies, or the few Magistrates who attempted to stem the torrent of the general corruption, were accused and condemned; while Piso, of whom Cicero, in his speech against him, relates things which make the Reader shudder with horror, and Verres, who had been guilty of enormities of the same kind, escaped unpunished.

Hence a war arose still more formidable than the former, and the dangers of which we wonder that Rome was able to surmount. The greatest part of the Italians revolted at once, exasperated by the tyranny of the public Judgements; and we find in Cicero, who informs us of the cause of this revolt, which was called the *Social war*, a very expressive account both of the unfortunate condition of the Republic, and of the perversion that had been made of the methods taken to remedy it.—“ An hundred and ten years are not

yet elapsed (says he) since the law for the recovery of money extorted by Magistrates was first propounded by the Tribune Calpurnius Piso. A number of other laws to the same effect, continually more and more severe, have followed it: but so many persons have been accused, so many condemned,—so formidable a war has been excited in Italy by the terror of the public Judgements,—and when the laws and Judgements have been suspended, such an oppression and plunder of our Allies has prevailed, that we may truly say, that it is not by our own strength, but by the weakness of others, that we continue to exist.” (a)

I have entered into these particulars with regard to the Roman Commonwealth, because the facts on which they are grounded, are remarkable of themselves, and yet no just conclusion could be drawn from them, unless a series of them were presented to the Reader. Nor are we to account for these facts, by the luxury which prevailed in the latter ages of the Republic, by the corruption of the manners of the Citizens, their

(a) See Cic. de Off. L. II. §. 75.

degeneracy from their ancient principles, and such-like loose general phrases, which may perhaps be useful to express the manner itself in which the evil became manifested, but by no means account for the causes of it.

The above disorders arose from the very nature of the Government of the Republic ;— of a Government in which the Executive and Supreme Power being made to centre in the Body of those in whom the People had once placed their confidence, there remained no other effectual Power in the State that might render it necessary for them to keep within bounds of justice and decency. And, in the mean time, as the People, who were intended as a check over that Body, continually gave a share in this same Executive authority, to those whom they intrusted with the care of their interests, they increased the evils they complained of, as it were, at every attempt they made to remedy them; and instead of raising up Opponents to those who were become the enemies of their liberty, as it was their intention to do, continually supplied them with new Associates.

From this situation of affairs, flowed as an unavoidable consequence, that continual desertion of the cause of the People, which even in time of Revolutions, when the passions of the People themselves were roused, and they were in a great degree united, manifested itself in so remarkable a manner. We may trace the symptoms of the great political defect here mentioned, in the earliest ages of the Commonwealth, as well as in the last stage of its duration. In Rome, while small and poor, it rendered vain whatever rights or power the People possessed, and blasted all their endeavours to defend their liberty, in the same manner as in the more splendid ages of the Commonwealth, it rendered the most salutary regulations utterly fruitless, and even instrumental to the ambition and avarice of a few. The prodigious fortune of the Republic, in short, did not create the disorder, it only gave full scope to it.

But if we turn our view towards the History of the English Nation, we shall see how, from a Government in which the above defects did not exist, different consequences

have followed:—how cordially all ranks of Men have always united together to lay under proper restraints this Executive power, which they knew could never be their own. In times of public Revolutions, the greatest care, as we have before observed, was made use of to ascertain the limits of that Power; and after peace had been restored to the State, those who remained at the head of the Nation, manifested an unwearied jealousy in maintaining those advantages which the united efforts of all had obtained.

Thus it was made one of the Articles of Magna Charta, that the Executive Power should not touch the person of the Subject, but in consequence of a judgment passed upon him by his peers: and so great was afterwards the general union in maintaining this law, that the *Trial by Jury*, that admirable mode of proceeding which so effectually secures the Subject against all the invasions of Power, even (what seemed so difficult to attain) against those which might be made under the sanction of Judicial authority, has been preserved to this day. It has even been

preserved in all its original purity, though the same has been successively suffered to decay, and then to be lost, in the other countries of Europe, where it was known for a while. (a) Nay, though this privilege of being tried by one's peers, was at first a privilege of Conquerors and Masters, exclusively appropriated to those parts of Nations which had originally invaded and subdued the rest by arms, it has in England been successively extended to every Order of the People.

(a) The Trial by Jury was in use among the Normans long before they came over to England; but it is now utterly lost in that Province. It even began very early to degenerate there from its first institution: we see in *Hale's History of the Common Law of England*, that the unanimity among Jurymen was not required in Normandy for making a verdict, a good verdict; but when Jurymen dissented, a number of them was taken out, and others added in their stead, till an unanimity was procured.—In Sweden, where, according to the opinion of the Learned in that Country, the *Trial by Jury* had its first origin, only some forms of that Institution are now preserved in remote parts of the Country, where sets of Jurymen are established for life, and have a salary accordingly. See *Robinson's State of Sweden*.—And in Scotland, the vicinity of England has not been able to preserve to the Trial by Jury its genuine ancient form: the unanimity among Jurymen is not required there, as I have been told, to form a Verdict; but the majority is decisive.

And not only the person, but also the property of the individual, has been secured against all arbitrary attempts from the Executive power; the latter has been successively restrained from touching any part of the property of the Subject, even under pretence of the necessities of the State, but by the free assent of the Representatives of the People. Nay, so true and persevering has been the zeal of these Representatives in asserting on that account the interests of the Nation, from which they could not separate their own, that this privilege of taxing themselves, which was in the beginning grounded on a most precarious tenure, and only a mode of governing adopted by the Sovereign for the sake of his own convenience, has become, in time, a settled right of the People, which the Sovereign has found it at last necessary solemnly and repeatedly to acknowledge.

Nay more, the Representatives of the People have applied this Right of *Taxation* to a still nobler use than the mere preservation of property: they have, in process of time,

succeeded in converting it into a regular and constitutional means of influencing the motions of the Executive Power.—By means of this Right, they have gained the advantage of being constantly called to concur in the measures of the Sovereign; of having the greatest attention shewn by him to their requests; as well as the highest regard paid to any engagements that he enters into with them. Thus has it become at last the peculiar happiness of English Subjects (to whatever other People, either ancient or modern, we compare them) to enjoy a share in the Government of their Country, by electing Representatives, who, by reason of the peculiar circumstances they are in, and the extensive rights they possess, are both *willing* faithfully to serve those who have appointed them, and *able* to do it.

And indeed the Commons have not rested satisfied with establishing, once for all, the provisions for the liberty of the People which have been just mentioned. They have afterwards made the preservation of them, the

first object of their cares, (*a*) and taken every opportunity of giving new life to them.

Thus, under Charles the First, attacks of a most alarming nature having been made on the privilege of the People to grant free supplies to the Crown, the Commons vindicated, without loss of time, that great right of the Nation, the Constitutional bulwark of all others; and hastened to oppugn, in their beginning, every precedent of a practice that must in the end have produced the utter ruin of public liberty.

They even extended their care to abuses of every kind. The judicial authority, for instance, which the Executive Power had imperceptibly assumed to itself, both with respect to the person and property of the individual, was abrogated by the Act which abolished the Court of Star-Chamber; and the Crown was brought back to its true Constitutional office, viz. the countenancing, and supporting with its strength, the execution of the Laws.

(*a*) The first operation of the Commons, at the beginning of a Session, is to appoint four grand Committees. One is a Committee of Religion, another of Grievances, another of Courts of Justice, and another of Trade: they are to be standing Committees during the whole Session.

The subsequent endeavours of the Legislature have carried even to a still greater extent the above privileges of the People: they have moreover succeeded in restraining the Crown from any attempt to seize and confine, even for the shortest time, the person of the Subject; unless it be in the cases ascertained by the Law, of which the Judges of it are to decide.

Nor has this extensive unexampled freedom, at the expence of the Executive Power, been made, as we might be inclinable to think, the exclusive appropriated privilege of the great and powerful. It is to be enjoyed alike by all ranks of Subjects: nay, it was the injury done to a common Citizen that gave existence to the Act which has completed the securing of this interesting branch of public liberty. “The oppression of an obscure individual,” says Judge Blackstone, “gave rise to the famous *Habeas Corpus* Act:” Junius has quoted this observation of the Judge; and the same is well worth being repeated a third time, for the just idea it conveys of that readiness of all Orders of Men to unite in defence of common liberty,

which is a characteristic circumstance in the English Government. (*a*)

And this general union, in favour of public liberty, has not been confined to framing laws for its security. It has operated with no less vigour in bringing to punishment such as have ventured to infringe them; and the Sovereign has constantly found it necessary to give up the violators of those laws, even when his own servants, to the Justice of their Country.

Thus we find, so early as the reign of Edward the First, Judges who were convicted of having committed exactions in the exercise of their offices, to have been condemned by a sentence of Parliament. (*b*) From the immense fines which were laid upon them, and which

(*a*) The individual here alluded to was one Francis Jenks, who having made a motion at Guildhall, in the year 1676, to petition the King for a new Parliament, was examined before the Privy Council, and afterwards committed to the Gatehouse, where he was kept about two months by the delays made by the several Judges to whom he applied, in granting him a *Habeas Corpus*.—See the *State Tryals*, Vol. vii. Anno 1676.

(*b*) Sir Ralph de Hengham, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, was fined 7000 marks; Sir Thomas Wayland, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, had his whole estate forfeited; and Sir Adam de Stratton, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, fined 34000 marks.

it seems they were in condition to pay, we may indeed conclude that, in those early ages of the Constitution, the remedy was applied late to the disorder; but yet it was applied at last.

Under Richard the Second, examples of the same kind were renewed. Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, who had been Lord Chancellor of the kingdom, the Duke of Ireland, and the Archbishop of York, having abused their power by carrying on schemes subversive of public liberty, were declared guilty of High treason; and a number of Judges who, in their judicial capacity, had made themselves their instruments, were involved in the same condemnation. (*a*)

(*a*) The most conspicuous among these Judges were Sir Robert Belknap, and Sir Robert Tresilian, Chief Justice of the King's Bench. The latter had drawn up a string of questions calculated to confer a despotic authority on the Crown, or rather on the Ministers above named, who had found the means of rendering themselves intire Masters of the person of the King. These questions Sir Robert Tresilian proposed to the Judges, who had been summoned for that purpose, and they gave their opinions in favour of them. One of these opinions of the Judges, among others, tended to no less than to annihilate, at one stroke, all the rights of the Commons, by taking from them that important privilege mentioned before, of starting what subjects of debate they think

Under the reign of Henry the Eighth, Sir Thomas Empson, and Edmund Dudley, who had been the promoters of the exactions committed under the preceding reign, fell victims to the zeal of the Commons for vindicating the cause of the People. Under King James the First, Lord Chancellor Bacon experienced, that neither his high dignity, nor great personal qualifications, could screen him from having the severest censure passed upon him for the corrupt practices of which he had suffered himself to become guilty. And under Charles the First, the Judges having attempted to imitate the example of the Judges under Richard the Second, by delivering opinions subversive of the rights of the People, found the same spirit of watchfulness in the Commons, as had proved the ruin of the former. Lord Finch, Keeper of the Great Seal, was obliged

proper, and freely discussing the same:—the Commons were to be restrained, under pain of being punished as traitors, from proceeding upon any articles besides those limited to them by the King. All those who had had a hand in the above declarations of the Judges, were attainted of high treason. Some were hanged; among them was Sir Robert Tresilian; and the others were only banished, at the intercession of the Bishops.—See the Parl. History of England. Vol. I.

to fly beyond Sea. The Judges Davenport and Crawley were imprisoned; and Judge Berkley was seized while sitting upon the Bench, as we find in Rushworth.

In the reign of Charles the Second, we again find fresh instances of the vigilance of the Commons. Sir William Scroggs, Lord Chief Justice of the King's-Bench, Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Sir Thomas Jones, one of the Judges of the King's-Bench, and Sir Richard Weston, one of the Barons of the Exchequer, were impeached by the Commons, for partialities shewn by them in the administration of justice; and Judge Scroggs, against whom some positive charges were well proved, was removed from his employments.

The several examples offered here to the Reader, have been taken from several different periods of the English History, in order to shew that neither the influence, nor the dignity, of the infractors of the laws, even when they have been the nearest Servants of the Crown, have ever been able to check the zeal of the Commons in asserting the rights

of the People. Other examples might perhaps be related to the same purpose ; though the number of those to be met with, will, upon enquiry, be found the smaller as the danger of infringing the laws has always been indubitable.

So much regularity has even, (from all the circumstances above mentioned) been introduced into the operations of the Executive Power in England,—such an exact Justice have the People been accustomed, in consequence, to expect from that quarter, that even the Sovereign, for his having once suffered himself personally to violate the safety of the subject, did not escape severe censure. The attack made by order of Charles the Second, on the person of Sir John Coventry, filled the Nation with astonishment ; and this violent gratification of private passion, on the part of the Sovereign (a piece of self-indulgence with regard to inferiors, which whole classes of individuals in certain Countries almost think that they have a right to) excited a general fermentation. “ This event (says Bishop Burnet) put the House of

Commons in a furious uproar....It gave great advantages to all those who opposed the Court; and the names of the *Court* and *Country* party, which till now had seemed to be forgotten, were again revived." (a)

These are the limitations that have been set, in the English Government, on the operations of the Executive Power: limitations to which we find nothing comparable in any other free States, antient or modern; and which are owing, as we have seen, to that very circumstance which seemed to prevent the possibility of them, I mean the greatness of that Power; the effect of which has been, in the event, to unite upon the same object, the views and efforts of all Orders of the People.

From this circumstance, that is, the peculiar strength and stability of the Executive Power in England, another most advantageous consequence has followed (which has been before observed, and which it is not improper

(a) See Burnet's History, Vol. I. Anno 1669.—An Act of Parliament was made on this occasion, for giving a farther extent to the provisions before made for the personal security of the Subject; which is still called the *Coventry Act*.

to mention again here, as this Chapter is intended to confirm the principles laid down in the former ones) I mean the lasting continuance of this same general union among all ranks of Men, and the spirit of mutual justice which thereby continues to be diffused throughout all orders of Subjects.

Though surrounded by the many boundaries that were just now described, the Crown, we must observe, has preserved its Prerogative undivided. It still possesses its whole effective strength, and is only tied by its own engagements, and the consideration of what it owes to its dearest interests.

The great, or wealthy Men in the Nation, who, assisted by the body of the People, have succeeded in reducing the exercise of its authority within such well defined limits, can have no expectation that it will continue to confine itself to these, any longer than they themselves continue, by the justice of their own conduct, to deserve that support of the People which alone can make them appear respectable in the eyes of the Sovereign,—no probable hopes that the Crown will continue

to observe those laws by which their wealth, dignity, and liberty, are protected, any longer than they themselves also continue to observe them.

Nay more, all those claims of their rights which they continue to make against the Crown, are encouragements which they give to the rest of the People to assert their own rights against them. Their constant opposition to all arbitrary proceedings of that Power, is a continual declaration they make against any acts of oppression, which the superior advantages they enjoy, might intice them to commit on their inferior fellow subjects.—Nor was that severe censure, for instance, which they concurred in passing on an unguarded violent action of their Sovereign, only a restraint put on the personal actions of future English Kings. No, it was a much more extensive provision for the securing of public liberty,—it was a solemn engagement entered into by all the powerful Men in the State to the whole body of the People, scrupulously to respect the person of the lowest among them.

And indeed the constant tenour of the conduct even of the two Houses of Parliament, shews us that the above observations are not matters of mere speculation. From the earliest times we see the Members of the House of Commons to have been very cautious not to assume any distinction that might alienate from them the affections of the rest of the People. (a) Whenever those privileges which were necessary to them for the discharge of their trust have proved burdensome to the Community, they have retrenched them. And those of their Members who have applied either these privileges, or in general that influence which they derived from their situation, to any oppressive purposes, they themselves have endeavoured to bring to punishment.

Thus, we see in the reign of James the First, Sir Giles Mompeffon, a Member of

(a) In all cases of public offences, down to a simple breach of the peace, the Members of the House of Commons have no privilege whatever above the rest of the People: they may be committed to prison by any Justice of the peace; and are dealt with afterwards in the same manner as any other Subjects. With regard to civil matters, their only privilege is to be free from Arrests during the time of a Session, and forty days before, and forty days after; but they may be sued, by process against their goods, for any just debt during that time.

the House of Commons, having been guilty of Monopolies, and other acts of great oppression on the People, was not only expelled, but impeached and prosecuted with the greatest warmth by the House, and finally condemned by the Lords to be publicly degraded from his rank of a Knight, held for ever an infamous person, and imprisoned during life.

In the same reign, Sir John Bennet, Member of the House of Commons, having been found to have been guilty of several corrupt practices, in his capacity of Judge of the *Prerogative* Court of Canterbury, such as taking exorbitant fees, and the like, was expelled the House, and prosecuted for those offences.

In the year 1641, Mr. Henry Benson, Member for Knareborough, having been detected in selling protections, experienced likewise the indignation of the House, and was expelled.

In fine, in order as it were to make it completely notorious, that neither the condition of Representative of the People, nor even any degree of influence in their House, could excuse any one of them from strictly ob-

erving the rules of Justice, the Commons did on one occasion pass the most severe censure they had power to inflict, upon their Speaker himself, for his having, in a single instance, attempted to convert the discharge of his duty as Speaker, into a means of private emolument.—Sir John Trevor, Speaker of the House of Commons, having, in the sixth year of the reign of King William, received a thousand guineas from the City of London, “ as a gratuity for the trouble he had taken with regard to the passing of the *Orphan Bill*,” was voted guilty of a High crime and misdemeanour, and expelled the House. Even the inconsiderable sum of twenty guineas which Mr. Hungerford, also a Member, had been weak enough to accept on the same score, was looked upon as deserving the notice of the House; and he was likewise expelled. (a)

(a) Other examples of the attention of the House of Commons to the conduct of their Members, might be produced, either before, or after, that which is mentioned here. The Reader may, for instance, see the relation of their proceedings in the affair of the *South Sea Company* Scheme; and a few years after, in that of the *Charitable Corporation*; a fraudulent scheme particularly oppressive to the poor, for which several Members were expelled.

If we turn our view towards the House of Lords, we shall find that they also have constantly taken care, that their peculiar privileges should not prove impediments to the common justice which is due to the rest of the People. (a) They have constantly agreed to every just proposal that has been made to them on that subject by the Commons. And indeed, if we consider the numerous and oppressive privileges claimed by the *Nobles* in most other Countries, and the vehement spirit with which they are commonly asserted, we shall think it no small praise to the body of the Nobility in England (and also to the nature of that Government of which they make a part) that it has been by their free consent that their privileges have been confined to what they now are; that is to say, to no more, in general, than what is necessary to the accom-

(a) In case of a public offence, or even a simple breach of the peace, a Peer may be committed, till he finds bail, by any Justice of the peace: and Peers are to be tried by the common course of law, for all offences under felony. With regard to civil matters, they are at all times free from *arrests*; but execution may be had against their effects, in the same manner as against those of other Subjects.

plishment of the end and constitutional design of that House.

In the exercise of their Judicial authority with regard to civil matters, the Lords have manifested a spirit of equity nowise inferior to that which they have shewn in their Legislative capacity. They have, in the discharge of that function, (which of all others is so liable to create temptations) shewn an uncorruptness really superior to what any judicial Assembly in any other Nation can boast. Nor do I think that I expose myself to the danger of being contradicted, when I say that the conduct of the House of Lords, in their civil judicial capacity, has constantly been such as has kept them above the reach of even suspicion or slander.

Even that privilege which they enjoy, of exclusively trying their own Members in case of any accusation that may affect their life (a privilege which we might at first sight think repugnant to the idea of a regular Government, and even alarming to the rest of the People) has constantly been made use

of by the Lords to do justice to their fellow Subjects ; and if we cast our eyes either on the collection of the *State Trials*, or on the History of England, we shall find very few examples, if any, of a Peer, really guilty of the offence laid to his charge, that has derived any advantage from his not being tried by a Jury of *Commoners*.

Nor has this just and moderate conduct of the two Houses of Parliament in the exercise of their powers (a moderation so unlike what has been related of the conduct of the powerful Men in the Roman Republic) been the only happy consequence of that salutary jealousy which those two Bodies entertain of the power of the Crown. This same motive has also engaged them to exert their utmost endeavours to put the Courts of Justice under proper restraints : a point so essential to public liberty.

They have, from the earliest times, preferred complaints against the influence of the Crown over those Courts ; and at last procured Laws to be enacted in order to

to prevent it: all which measures were strong declarations, it is essential to observe, that no Subjects were to think themselves exempt from submitting to the uniform course of the Law. And the severe examples which they have concurred to make on those Judges who had rendered themselves the instruments of the passions of the Sovereign, or of the views of his Ministers, are also awful warnings to the Judges who have succeeded them, never to attempt to deviate in favour of any, the most powerful, individuals, from that strait line of Justice, which the joint Wisdom of the three branches of the Legislature, has marked out to them.

This singular situation of the English Judges relatively to the three Constituent Powers of the State, (and also the formidable support which they are certain to receive from them as long as they continue to be the faithful Ministers of Justice) has at last created such an impartiality in the distribution of public Justice in England, has introduced into the Courts of Law the practice of such a thorough disregard of either the influence or wealth of the contending Parties, and procured

to every individual, both such an easy access to these Courts, and such a certainty of redress, as are not to be paralleled in any other Government.—Philip de Comines, so long as three hundred years ago, commended in strong terms the exactness with which Justice is done in England to all ranks of Subjects ; (a) and the impartiality with which the same is administered in these days, will, with still more reason, create the surprize of every Stranger who has an opportunity of observing the customs of this Country. (b)

(a) See page 39 of this Work.

(b) A little after I came to England for the first time (if the Reader will give me leave to make mention of myself in this case) a prosecution was commenced in a Court of Justice against a Prince very nearly related to the Crown ; and a Noble Lord was also, much about that time, engaged in a law-suit for the property of considerable mines of lead in Yorkshire. I could not but observe, that in both these cases a decision was given against the two most powerful parties ; though I wondered but little at this, because I had before heard much of the impartiality of the law proceedings in England, and was prepared to see instances of that kind. But what I was much surpris'd at, I confess, was that nobody appeared to be in the least so, not even at the strictness with which the ordinary course of the law had, particularly in the former case, been adhered to,—and that those proceedings which I was dispos'd to consider as great instances of Justice, to the production of which some circum-

Indeed, to such a degree of impartiality has the administration of public Justice been brought in England, that it is saying nothing beyond the exact truth, to affirm that any violation of the laws, though perpetrated by Men of the most extensive influence, nay, though committed by the special direction of the very first Servants of the Crown, will be publicly and compleatly redressed. And the very lowest of subjects will obtain such redress, if he has but spirit enough to stand forth, and appeal to the laws of his Country.—Most extraordinary circumstances these! which those who know the difficulty that there is in establishing just laws among Mankind, and in providing afterwards for their due execution, only find credible because they are matters of fact, and can only begin to account for when they look up to the constitution of the Government itself; that is to say, when they consider the circumstances in which the

stances peculiar to the times, at least some uncommon virtue or spirit on the part of the Judges, must have more or less co-operated, were looked upon by all those whom I heard speak about it, as being nothing more than the common and expected course of things. This circumstance became a strong inducement to me to inquire into the nature of a Government by which such effects were produced.

Executive Power, or the Crown, is placed with relation to the two Bodies that concur with it to form the Legislature,—the circumstances in which those two Assemblies are placed with relation to the Crown, and to each other,—and the situation in which all the THREE find themselves with respect to the whole Body of the People. (*a*)

(*a*) The assertion made above with respect to the impartiality with which Justice is, in all cases, administered in England, not being of a nature to be proved by alledging single facts, I have entered into no particulars on that account. However, I have subjoined here two cases which, I think, cannot but appear remarkable to the Reader.

The first is the case of the prosecution commenced in the year 1763, by some Journeymen Printers, against the King's Messengers, for apprehending and imprisoning them for a short time, by virtue of a *General Warrant* from the Secretaries of State; and that which was afterwards carried on by another private individual, against one of the Secretaries themselves.—In these actions, all the ordinary forms of proceeding used in cases of actions between private Subjects, were strictly adhered to; and both the Secretary of State, and the Messengers, were, in the end, condemned. Yet, which I desire the Reader to observe, from all the circumstances that accompanied this affair, it is difficult to propose a case in which Ministers could, of themselves, be under greater temptations to exert an undue influence to hinder the ordinary course of Justice. Nor were the Acts for which those Ministers were condemned, Acts of evident oppression, which nobody could be found to justify. They had done

In fine, a very remarkable circumstance in the English Government, (and which alone evinces something peculiar and excellent in its Nature) is that spirit of extreme mildness with

nothing but follow a practice of which they found several precedents established in their Offices; and their case, if I am well informed, was such, that most individuals, under similar circumstances, would have thought themselves authorised to have acted as they had done.

The second case I propose to relate, affords a singular instance of the confidence with which all Subjects in England claim what they think their just rights; and of the certainty with which the remedies of the law are in all cases open to them. The fact I mean, is the Arrest executed in the reign of Queen Anne, in the year 1708, on the person of the Russian Ambassador, by taking him out of his Coach for the sum of fifty pounds.—And the consequences that followed this fact are still more remarkable. The Czar resented this affront very highly, and demanded that the Sheriff of Middlesex, and all others concerned in the Arrest, should be punished with instant death. “But the Queen,” (to the amazement of that despotic Court, says Judge Blackstone, from whom I borrow this fact) “the Queen directed the Secretary of State to inform him, that she could inflict no punishment upon any, the meanest, of Her Subjects, unless warranted by the law of the land.”—An Act was afterwards passed to free from arrests the persons of foreign Ministers, and such of their Servants as they have delivered a list of, to the Secretaries of State. A copy of this Act, elegantly engrossed and illuminated, continues Judge Blackstone, was sent to Moscow; and an Ambassador extraordinary commissioned to deliver it.

which criminal Justice is administered in England: a point with regard to which England differs from that of all other Countries in the World.

When we consider the punishments in use in the other States of Europe, we wonder how Men can be brought to treat their fellow-creatures with so much cruelty; and the bare consideration of those punishments would sufficiently convince us (supposing we did not know the fact from other circumstances) that the Men in those States who frame the laws, and preside over their execution, have little apprehension, that either they, or their friends, will ever fall victims to those laws which they thus rashly establish.

In the Roman Republic, circumstances of the same nature with those just mentioned, were also productive of the greatest defects in the kind of criminal Justice which took place in it. That class of Citizens who were at the head of the Republic, and who knew how mutually to excuse each other from any too severe laws, or practice, not only allowed themselves great

liberties, as we have seen, in disposing of the lives of the inferior Citizens; but had also introduced into the exercise of the illegal powers they assumed to themselves in that respect, a great degree of cruelty. (a)

Nor were things more happily conducted in the Grecian Republics. From their Democratical nature, and the frequent Revolutions to which they were subject, we naturally expect to see that authority to have been used with mildness, which those who enjoyed it must have known to have been but precarious; yet, such were the effects of the violence attending those very Revolutions, that a spirit both of great irregularity and cruelty had taken place among the Greeks, in the exercise of the power of inflicting punishments. The very harsh laws of *Draco* are well known, of which it was said, that they were not written with

(a) The common manner in which the Senate ordered Citizens to be put to death, was by throwing them headlong from the top of the Tarpeian Rock. The Consuls, or other particular Magistrates, sometimes caused Citizens to expire upon a cross; or, which was a much more common case, ordered them to be scourged to death, with their heads fastened between the two branches of a fork; which they called *cervicem furcæ inferere*.

ink, but with blood. The severe laws of the Twelve Tables among the Romans, were in great part brought over from Greece. And it was an opinion commonly received in Rome, that the cruelties practised by the Magistrates on the Citizens, were only imitations of the examples which the Greeks had given them. (a)

In fine, the use of Torture, that method of administering Justice in which folly may be said to be added to cruelty, had been adopted by the Greeks, in consequence of the same causes which had concurred to produce the irregularity of their criminal Justice. And the same practice continues, in these days, to prevail on the Continent of Europe, in consequence of that general arrangement of things which creates there such a carelessness about remedying the abuses of public Authority.

(a) Cæsar expressly reproaches the Greeks with this fact, in his speech in favour of the accomplices of Catiline, which Sallust has transmitted to us.—*Sed eodem illo tempore, Græciæ morem imitati, (Majores nostri) verberibus animadvertabant in civeis, de condemnatis ultimum supplicium sumptum.*

But the nature of that same Government which has procured to the People of England all the advantages we have before described, has, with still more reason, freed them from the most oppressive abuses which prevail in other Countries.

That wantonness in disposing of the dearest rights of Mankind, those insults upon human Nature, of which the frame of the Governments established in other States, unavoidably becomes more or less productive, are entirely banished from a Nation which has the happiness of having its interests committed to the care of Men who continue to be themselves exposed to the pressure of those laws which they concur in making, and of every tyrannic practice which they suffer to be introduced,—by Men whom the advantages which they possess above the rest of the People, render only more exposed to the abuses they are appointed to prevent,—only more alive, to the dangers against which it is their duty to defend the Community.

Hence we see the use of Torture to have been, from the earliest times, utterly unknown in England. And all attempts to introduce

it, whatever might be the power of those who made them, or the circumstances in which they renewed their endeavours, have been strenuously opposed, and defeated. (*a*)

Hence also arose that remarkable forbearance in the English Laws, to use any cruel severity in the punishments which experience shewed it was necessary for the preservation of Society to establish: and the utmost vengeance of those laws, even against the most enormous Offenders, never extends beyond the simple deprivation of life. (*b*)

(*a*) The Reader may on this subject see again the Note (*a*) page 154 of this Work, where the opposition is mentioned, that was made to the Earl of Suffolk, and the Duke of Exeter, when they attempted to introduce the practice of Torture: this even was one of the causes for which the latter was afterwards impeached.—The Reader is also referred to the Note (*b*) of the same page, in which the solemn declaration is related which the Judges gave against the practice of Torture, in the case of Felton, who had assassinated the Duke of Buckingham.

(*b*) A very singular instance occurs in the History of the year 1605, of the care of the English Legislature not to suffer precedents of cruel practices to be introduced. During the time that those concerned in the Gun-powder plot were under sentence of death, a motion was made in the House of Commons to petition the King, that the execution might be staid, in order to consider of some extraordinary punishment to be inflicted upon them; but this motion was rejected. A proposal of the same kind was also made in the House of

Nay, so anxious has the English Legislature been to establish mercy, even to convicted Offenders, as a fundamental principle of the Government of England, that they made it an express article of that great public Compact which was framed at the important æra of the Revolution, that “no cruel and
 “unusual punishments should be used.” (*a*)—
 They even endeavoured, by adding a clause for that purpose to the Oath which Kings were thenceforwards to take at their Coronation, as it were to render it an everlasting obligation of English Kings, to make Justice to be “executed with mercy.” (*b*)

Lords, where it was dropped.—See the Parliamentary History of England, Vol. V. Anno 1605.

(*a*) See the Bill of Rights, Art. x.—“Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

(*b*) Those same dispositions of the English Legislature, which have led them to take such precautions in favour even of convicted offenders, have still more engaged them to make provisions in favour of such persons as are only suspected and accused of having committed offences of any kind. Hence the zeal with which they have availed themselves of every important occasion, such, for instance, as that of the Revolution, to procure new confirmations to be given to the institution of the Trial by Jury, to the laws on imprisonments, and in general to that extraordinary system of criminal Jurisprudence, of which a description has been given in the first part of this Work, to which I refer the Reader.

CHAPTER XVII.

A more inward View of the English Government than has hitherto been offered to the Reader.—Total difference between the English Monarchy, as a Monarchy, and all those with which we are acquainted.

THE Doctrine constantly maintained in this Work (and which has, I think, been sufficiently supported by facts and comparisons drawn from the History of other Countries) is, that the remarkable liberty enjoyed by the English Nation, is essentially owing to the impossibility under which their Leaders, or in general all Men of power among them, are placed, of invading and transferring to themselves any branch of the Executive authority; which authority is exclusively vested, and firmly secured, in the Crown. Hence the anxious care with which those Men continue to watch the exercise of that authority. Hence their perseverance in observing every kind of engagement which

themselves may have entered into with the rest of the People.

But here a consideration of a most important kind presents itself.—How comes the Crown, in England, thus constantly to preserve to itself (as we see it does) the whole Executive authority in the State; and moreover to inspire the great Men in the Nation with that conduct so advantageous to public Liberty, which we mention here. All these are effects which we do not find, upon examination, that the power of *Crowns* has hitherto been in any shape able to produce in other Countries.

In all States of a Monarchical form, we indeed see that those Men whom their wealth, or their personal power of any kind, have raised above the rest of the People, have formed combinations among themselves to oppose the power of the Monarch. But their views, we must observe, in forming those combinations, were not by any means to set general and impartial limitations to the Sovereign authority. They endeavoured to render themselves intirely independent of that authority; or even utterly to annihilate it, according to circumstances.

Thus we see that in all the States of antient Greece, the Kings were at last destroyed and exterminated. The same events happened in Italy, where in remote times there existed for a while several kingdoms, as we learn both from the antient Historians, and the Poets. And in Rome, we even know the manner in which such a revolution was brought about.

In more modern times, we see the numerous Monarchical Sovereignties which had been raised in Italy on the ruins of the Roman Empire, to have been successively destroyed by powerful factions; and circumstances of much the same nature have at different times taken place in the Kingdoms established in the other parts of Europe.

In Sweden, Denmark, and Poland, for instance, we find that the *Nobles* have commonly reduced their Sovereigns to the condition of simple Presidents over their Assemblies,—of mere ostensible Heads of the Government.

In Germany, and in France, Countries where the Monarchs being possessed of considerable demesnes, were better able to maintain

their power than the Princes just mentioned, the Nobles waged war against them sometimes singly, and sometimes jointly ; and events similar to these have successively happened in Scotland, Spain, and the modern Kingdoms of Italy.

In fine, it has only been by means of standing forces that the Sovereigns of most of the Kingdoms we have mentioned, have been able in a course of time to assert the prerogatives of their Crown. And it is only by continuing to keep up such forces, that, like the Eastern Monarchs, and indeed like all the Monarchs that ever existed, they continue to be able to support their authority.

How therefore can the Crown of England, without the assistance of any armed force, maintain, as it does, its numerous prerogatives ? how can it, under such circumstances, preserve to itself the whole Executive power in the State ? For here we must observe, the Crown in England does not derive any support from what regular forces it has at its disposal ; and if we doubted this fact, we need only look to the astonishing

subjection in which the military is kept to the civil power, to become convinced that an English King is not in the least indebted to his army for the preservation of his authority.

If we could suppose that the armies of the Kings of Spain, or of France, for instance, were, through some very extraordinary circumstance, all to vanish in one night, the power of those Sovereigns, we must not doubt, would, ere six months, be reduced to a mere shadow. They would immediately see their prerogatives (however formidable they may be at present) invaded and dismembered: (*a*) and supposing that regular Governments continued to exist, they would be reduced to have little more influence in them, than the Doges of Venice, or of Genoa, possess in the Governments of those Republics. (*b*)

How therefore, to repeat the question once more, which is one of the most interesting

(*a*) As was the case in the several Kingdoms into which the Spanish Monarchy was formerly divided; and, in not very remote times, in France itself.

(*b*) Or than the Kings of Sweden were allowed to enjoy, before the last Revolution in that Country.

that can occur in politics, how can the Crown in England, without the assistance of any armed force, avoid those dangers to which all other Sovereigns are exposed?

How can it, without any such force, accomplish even incomparably greater works than those Sovereigns, with their powerful armies, are, we find, in a condition to perform? —How can it bear that universal effort (unknown in other Monarchies) which, we have seen, is continually and openly exerted against it? How can it even continue to resist it so powerfully as to preclude all individuals whatever from ever entertaining any views besides those of setting just and general limitations to the exercise of its authority? How can it enforce the laws upon all Subjects, indifferently, without injury or danger to itself? How can it, in fine, impress the minds of all the great Men in the State with such a lasting jealousy of its power, as to necessitate them, even in the exercise of their undoubted rights and privileges, to continue to court and deserve the affection of the rest of the People?

Those great Men, I shall answer, who even

in quiet times prove so formidable to other Monarchs, are in England divided into two Assemblies; and such, it is necessary to add, are the principles upon which this division is made, that from it results, as a necessary consequence, the solidity and indivisibility of the power of the Crown.

The Reader may perceive that I have led him, in the course of this Work, much beyond the line within which Writers on the subject of Government have confined themselves; or rather, that I have followed a track intirely different from that which those Writers have taken. But as the observation just made on the stability of the power of the Crown in England, and the cause of it, is new in its kind, so do the principles from which its truth is to be demonstrated, totally differ from what is commonly looked upon as the foundation of the science of Politics. To lay those principles here before the Reader, in a manner completely satisfactory to him, would lead us into philosophical discussions on what really constitutes the basis of Governments and Power amongst Mankind, both extremely long, and in a

great measure foreign to the subject of this Book. I shall therefore content myself with proving the above observations by facts; which is more, after all, than political Writers usually undertake to do with regard to their Speculations.

As I chiefly proposed to shew how the extensive liberty the English enjoy, is the result of the peculiar frame of their Government, and occasionally to compare the same with the Republican form, I had even at first intended to confine myself to that circumstance which both constitutes the essential difference between those two forms of Government, and is the immediate cause of English liberty, I mean the having placed all the executive authority in the State out of the hands of those in whom the People trust. With regard to the remote cause of that same liberty, that is to say, the stability of the power of the Crown by which this executive authority is so secured, I should perhaps have been silent, had I not found it absolutely necessary to mention it here, in order to obviate the objections which the more reflecting part of my Readers might

otherwise have made both to several of the observations before offered to them, and to a few others which are soon to follow.

Besides, I shall confess here, I have been several times under apprehensions, in the course of this Work, lest the generality of my Readers, misled by the similarity of names, should put a too extensive construction upon what I said with regard to the usefulness of the power of the Crown in England;—lest they should think, for instance, that I attributed the superior advantages of the English mode of Government over the Republican form, merely to its approaching nearer to the nature of the Monarchies established in the other parts of Europe, and that I looked upon every kind of Monarchy, as being in itself preferable to a Republican Government. An opinion, which I do not by any means or in any degree entertain. I have too much affection, or, if you please, prepossession, in favour of that form of Government under which I was born; and as I am sensible of its defects, so do I know how to set a full value upon the advantages by which it compensates for them.

I therefore have, as it were, made haste to avail myself of the first opportunity of explaining my meaning on this subject,—of indicating that the power of the Crown in England stands upon foundations intirely different from those on which the same Power rests in other Countries,—and of engaging the Reader to observe (which for the present will suffice) that as the English Monarchy differs in its nature from every other, so all that is said here of its advantages, is peculiar and confined to it.

But to come to the proofs of the solidity accruing to the power of the Crown in England, from the co-existence of the two Assemblies which concur to form the English Parliament, I shall first point out to the Reader several open Acts of those two Houses, by which they have by turns effectually defeated the attacks of each other upon its prerogatives.

Without looking farther back for examples than the reign of Charles the Second, we see that the House of Commons had, in that reign, begun to adopt the method of adding (or tacking, as it is commonly expressed) such bills as they wanted more particularly to have passed, to their money bills. This forcible use they

made of their undoubted privilege of granting subsidies, would, if suffered to grow into common practice, have totally destroyed the æquilibrium that ought to subsist between them and the Crown. But the Lords took upon themselves the task of maintaining that æquilibrium: they complained with great warmth of the several precedents that were made of the practice we mention: they insisted that Bills should be framed "in the old and decent way of Parliament;" and at last have made it a standing order of the House, to reject, upon the sight of them, all bills tacked to money bills.

Again, about the thirty first year of the same reign, a strong party prevailed in the House of Commons; and their efforts were not intirely confined, if we may credit the Historians of those times, to serving their Constituents faithfully, and providing for the welfare of the State. Among other bills which they proposed in their House, they carried one to exclude from the Crown the immediate Heir to it: an affair this, of a very high nature, and with regard to which it may well be questioned whether the legislative Assemblies have a right to form a resolution, without the exprefs and declared

concurrence of the body of the People. But both the Crown and the Nation were delivered from the danger of establishing such a precedent, by the intervention of the Lords; who threw out the bill on the first reading.

In the reign of King William the Third, a few years after the Revolution, attacks upon the Crown came from another quarter. A strong party was formed in the House of Lords; and as we may see in Bishop Burnet's History of his own times, they entertained very deep designs. One of their views, among others, was to abridge the prerogative of the Crown of calling Parliaments, and judging of the proper times of doing it. (*a*) They accordingly framed and carried in their House a bill for ascertaining the fitting of Parliament every year; but the bill, after it had passed in their House, was rejected by the Commons. (*b*)

(*a*) They, besides, proposed to have all money-bills stopped in their House, till they had procured the right of taxing, themselves, their own estates; and to have a Committee of Lords and Commons appointed to confer together concerning the State of the Nation; "which Committee," says Bishop Burnet, "would soon have grown to have been a Council of State, that would have brought all affairs under their inspection, and never had been proposed but when the Nation was ready to break into civil wars."—See Burnet's History, Anno 1693.

(*b*) Nov. 28, 1693.

Again, we find, a little after the accession of King George the First, an attempt was also made by a party in the House of Lords, to wrest from the Crown a prerogative which is one of its finest flowers; and is, besides, the only check it has on the dangerous views which that House (which may stop both money-bills and all other bills) might be brought to entertain; I mean the right of adding new members to it, and judging of the times when it may be necessary to do so. A bill was accordingly presented, and carried, in the House of Lords, for limiting the members of that House to a fixed number, beyond which it should not be increased: but after great pains taken to insure the success of this bill, it was at last rejected by the House of Commons.

In fine, the several attempts which a majority in the House of Commons have in their turn made to restrain, farther than it now is, the influence of the Crown arising from the distribution of preferments and other advantages, have been checked by the House of Lords; and all place-bills have, from the



beginning of this Century, constantly miscarried in that House.

Nor have those two powerful Assemblies only succeeded thus in warding off the open attacks of each other, on the power of the Crown. Their co-existence, and the principles upon which they are severally framed, have been productive of another effect much more extensive, though at first less attended to, I mean the preventing even the making of such attacks; and in times too, when the Crown was of itself incapable of defending its authority. The views of each of those two Houses, destroying, upon those occasions, the opposite views of the other; like those positive and negative equal quantities, (if I am allowed the comparison) which destroy each other on the opposite sides of an equation.

Of this we have several remarkable examples, as for instance, when the Sovereign has been a minor. If we examine the History of other Nations, we shall find that that event has constantly been attended with open invasions of the Royal authority, or even complete and settled divisions of it. In England, on

the contrary, whether we look at the reign of Richard the Second, of Henry the Sixth, or of Edward the Sixth, we shall see that the Royal authority has been quietly exercised by the Councils that were appointed to assist those Princes; and when they came of age, the same was delivered to them undiminished.

But nothing so remarkable can be alledged on this subject, as the manner in which those two Houses have acted upon those occasions when, the Crown being without any present possessor, it lay in their power, both to settle it on what person they pleased, and to divide and distribute its prerogatives as they might have thought proper. Circumstances of this kind have never failed in other Kingdoms to bring on a division of the Executive authority of the Crown, or even of the State itself. In Sweden, for instance, (to speak of that Kingdom which has borne the greatest outward resemblance to that of England) when Queen Christina was put under a necessity of abdicating the Crown, and it was transferred to the Prince who stood next to her in the line of Succession, the Executive authority in

the State was immediately divided, and either distributed among the Nobles, or assigned to the Senate, in which the Nobles alone could be admitted; and the new King was only to be a President over it.

After the death of Charles the Twelfth, who died without male heirs, the disposal of the Crown (the power of which Charles the Eleventh had found means to render again absolute) returned to the States, and was settled on the Princess Ulrica, and the Prince her Husband. But the Senate, as in the former instance, assumed to itself the authority which had lately belonged to the Crown. The power of assembling the States, of making war and peace, and treaties with foreign powers, the disposal of places, the administration of the public revenue, the command of the army and of the fleet, were vested in that Body. Their number was to consist of sixteen members. The majority of votes was to be decisive upon all occasions. The only privilege of the new King, was to have his vote reckon for two: and if on any occasions he should refuse to attend their meetings, the business was nevertheless

to be done as effectually and definitively without him.

But in England the Revolution of the year 1689 was terminated in a manner totally different. Indeed, those prerogatives destructive of public liberty, which the late King had assumed, were retrenched from the Crown; and thus far the two Houses agreed. But as to proceeding to any dismembering or transposing of the authority of the Crown, no proposal was even made about it. Those prerogatives which were taken from the Crown, were annihilated and made to cease to exist in the State; and all the Executive authority that was thought necessary to be continued in the Government, was, as before, left undivided in the Crown. (*a*)

In the same manner was the whole authority of the Crown transferred afterwards to

(*a*) This remarkable circumstance of the power of the Crown in England being constantly preserved undivided, whatever Revolutions may have arisen, throws a farther light on the observation before made, on the advantageous manner to public liberty in which Revolutions have always been terminated in England. In other limited Monarchies, the Men who were at the head of the Nation, finding it in their power, upon those occasions, to assume to themselves the exercise of the Sovereign authority,

the Princess who succeeded King William the Third, and who had no other claim to it, but what was conferred on her by Par-

constantly did so; and as constantly left that authority in the same undefined extent as before; just as we have seen that it always happened in the ancient Commonwealths, and from the very same reasons. But in England, each Member in each House of Parliament seeing, on the occasions we mention, that the Executive authority must, in the issue, fall somewhere undivided, and continue so; and that neither personal advantages of any kind, nor the power of any faction, but the law alone, could thenceforwards be a restraint upon its actions, seriously applied themselves to frame with care those laws on which their own liberty was afterwards to depend; and to limit that Power which they saw they could neither transfer to themselves and their party, nor render themselves independent of.

It will not be improper to add here, as a farther proof of the indivisibility of the power of the Crown (which has been above said to result from the peculiar frame of the English Parliament) that no part of the Executive authority of the King is vested in his Privy Council, as we have seen it was in the Senate of Sweden: all centers in the Sovereign; the votes of the Members are not even counted, if I am well informed: and in fact the constant style of the Law, is the King *in* Council, and not the King *and* Council. A proviso is indeed sometimes added to some Bills, that certain acts mentioned in them are to be transacted by the King in Council; but this is only a precaution taken in the view that the most important affairs of a great Nation may be transacted with proper solemnity; and to prevent, for instance, all objections that might, in process of time, be drawn from the uncertainty, whether the King has assented, or not, to certain particular transactions.

liament. And in the same manner, again, it was settled, a long time before hand, on the Princes of Hanover who have since succeeded her. (*a*)

Nay, one most extraordinary fact, and to which I desire the Reader to give his attention,—Notwithstanding all the Revolutions we mention, and though Parliament has sat every year since the beginning of this century, though they have constantly enjoyed the most unlimited freedom, both as to the subjects and the manner of their deliberations, and numberless proposals have in consequence been made, yet, such has been the efficiency of each House in destroying, preventing, or qualifying, the views of the other, that the Crown has not been obliged during all that time to make use, even once, of its negative voice; and the last Bill, rejected by a King of Eng-

(*a*) If the Reader wanted a farther confirmation as to the peculiarity of the conduct of the English Parliament, in preserving the authority of the Crown undivided, though the latter lay, as it were, at their disposal, he need only compare the Acts by which they settled it on the House of Hanover, with that framed for the same purpose by the Scotch Parliament, a few years before the Union. By this Act the power of the Crown in Scotland was to be dismembered, much in the same manner, as we have seen it has been in Sweden.—See *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. iii.

land, has been that rejected by King William the Third, in the year 1692, for Triennial Parliaments. (a)

(a) He assented a few years afterwards to that Bill, after several amendments had been made in it.

The observation above made on the constant tenour of the proceedings of the English Parliament, with relation to the Crown, is rendered still more remarkable when we consider the events which have of late years taken place in France; and when we see the late King to have at last taken a most serious alarm at the proceedings of his Parliament of Paris, (an Assembly which is far from having the same importance in the Kingdom of France, as the English Parliament has in England) and to have in the end applied to his army in order to disperse it. And though the present King has thought proper to re-establish that Parliament, a measure which was highly prudent in the beginning of his reign, yet, every precaution has at the same time been taken to render it dumb for ever.

To these observations on the security of the power of the Crown, another of great importance is to be added, which is also founded upon facts, and which Theory would equally justify: this is, that the Crown cannot depend upon the security we mention, any longer than it continues to fulfill its engagements with the Parliament, and with the Nation: of this the misfortunes of Charles the First, and the Revolution of the year 1689, are convincing as well as awful proofs. And in general the imminent dangers and perplexities in which the Kings of England have constantly involved themselves whenever they have attempted to step beyond the limits of the law, manifestly show, that all that can be said of the greatness and security of their power is to be understood, not of the capricious power of the Man, but of the lawful authority of the Head of the State.

And this peculiar security of the Executive authority of the Crown in England, has not only freed the State from those disturbances to which other Monarchies were unavoidably exposed before the use of standing armies, and enabled it to produce all those advantageous effects to public liberty which we have mentioned in the course of this Work: but this same security has also procured to England, considered as a free State, other advantages which would really have been totally unattainable in the free States before mentioned, whatever public virtue we might even suppose to have belonged to those who acted in them as the Leaders of the People.

The one is the extraordinary freedom which the People of England enjoy at the expence of the governing authority. In the Roman Commonwealth, for instance, we see the Senate to have been vested with a number of powers totally destructive of the liberty of the Citizens; and the continuance of those powers, was, no doubt, in a great measure owing to the treacherous remissness of those Men in whom the People trusted for repressing them, or even to their determined reso-

lution not to abridge those prerogatives. Yet, if we attentively consider the constant situation of affairs in that Republic, we shall find, that, though we might suppose those persons to have been ever so truly attached to the cause of the People, it would not really have been possible for them to procure to the People an intire security. The right enjoyed by the Senate, of suddenly naming a Dictator with a power unrestrained by any law, or of investing the Consuls with an authority of much the same kind, and the power it assumed of making at times formidable examples of arbitrary Justice, were resources of which the Republic could not, perhaps, with any safety have been totally deprived; and though these were for the most part used to destroy the just liberty of the People, yet they were also very often the means of preserving the Commonwealth.

Upon the same principle we should possibly find that the *Ostracism*, that arbitrary method of banishing Citizens, was a necessary resource in the Republic of Athens. A Venetian Noble would perhaps also confess, that however terrible the State-Inquisition

established in his Republic may be, even to the Nobles themselves, yet, it would not be prudent intirely to abolish it. And we do not know but a Minister in France, though we might suppose him ever so virtuous and moderate a Man, would say the same thing with regard to the secret imprisonments, the *lettres de cachet*, and other arbitrary deviations from the settled course of law, which often take place in that Kingdom, and in the other Monarchies of Europe. No doubt, if he was the Man we suppose, he would confess that the expedients we mention have in numberless instances been most horribly prostituted to gratify the wantonness and private revenge of Ministers, and of those who had any interest with them; but still perhaps he would continue to give it as his opinion, that the Crown, notwithstanding its apparently immense strength, cannot avoid recurring at times to expedients of that kind; much less could it publicly and absolutely renounce them.

It is therefore a most advantageous circumstance in the English Government, that its security renders all expedients like those,

unnecessary; and that the Representatives of the People have not only been constantly willing to promote the public liberty, but that the general situation of affairs has also enabled them to carry their precautions so far as they have done. And indeed, when we consider what prerogatives the Crown, in England, has sincerely renounced,—that in consequence of the independence conferred on the Judges and the method of *Trial by Jury*, it is deprived of all means of influencing the settled course of the law both in civil and criminal matters, that it has renounced all power of seizing the property of individuals, and even of restraining in any manner whatsoever and for the shortest time, the liberty of their persons, we do not know what we ought most to admire, whether the public virtue of those who have deprived the supreme Executive Power of all those dangerous prerogatives, or the nature of that same Power, which has enabled it to give them up without ruin to itself,—whether the happy frame of the English Government which makes those in whom the People trust, continue so faithful in the dis-

charge of their duty, or the solidity of that same Government, which really can afford to leave to the People such an extensive degree of liberty.

Again, the Liberty of the press, that great advantage enjoyed by the English Nation, does not exist in any other Monarchies of Europe, however well established they may at first seem to be; and it might even be demonstrated that it cannot exist in them. The most watchful eye, we see, is constantly kept in those Monarchies upon every kind of publication; and a jealous attention is paid even to the loose and insignificant speeches of individuals. Much unnecessary trouble (we may be apt at first to think) is taken upon this subject: but yet if we consider how uniform is the conduct of all those Governments, how constant and unremitting their care in those respects, we shall be convinced, without looking farther, that there must be some necessity for their precautions.

In Republican States, for reasons which are at the bottom the same as in the beforementioned Governments, the People are also kept

under the greatest restraints by those who are at the head of those States. In the Roman Commonwealth, for instance, the liberty of writing was curbed by the severest laws: (a) with regard to the freedom of speech, things were but little better, as we may conclude from several facts, and many instances may even be produced of the dread with which the Citizens, upon certain occasions, communicated their political opinions to the Consuls or to the Senate. In the Venetian Republic, the press is most strictly watched; nay, forbearance to speak, in any manner whatsoever, on the conduct of the Government, is the fundamental maxim which they inculcate to the People throughout their dominions. (b)

(a) The Law of the Twelve Tables had established the punishment of death against the author of a Libel: nor was it by a *Tryal by Jury* that it was to be determined what was to be called a Libel. SI QUIS CARMEN OCCENTASSIT, ACTITASSIT, CONDIDISSIT, QUOD ALTERI FLAGITIUM FAXIT, CAPITAL ESTO.

(b) Of this I have myself seen a proof somewhat singular, which I beg leave of the Reader to relate. Being, in the year 1768, at Bergamo, the first Town of the Venetian State as you come into it from the State of Milan, I took a walk in the evening in the neighbourhood of the Town; and wanting to know the name of several places which I saw at a distance, I stopped a young Country-

With respect therefore to this point, it may again be looked upon as a most advantageous circumstance in the English Government, that those who have been at the head of the People, have not only been constantly disposed to procure the liberty of the People, but also that they have found it possible for them to do so; and that the stability of the Government has admitted of that extensive freedom of speaking and writing which the People of England enjoy. A most advantageous pri-

man to ask him information. Finding him to be a sensible young Man, I entered into some farther conversation with him; and as he had himself a great inclination to see Venice, he asked me, whether I proposed to go there? I answered, that I did: on which he immediately warned me when I was at Venice not to speak of the Prince (*del Principe*) an appellation assumed by the Venetian Government, in order, as I suppose, to convey to the People a greater idea of their union among themselves. As I wanted to hear him talk farther on the subject, I pretended to be intirely ignorant in that respect, and asked for what reason I must not speak of the Prince? But he (after the manner of the common People in Italy, who, when strongly affected by any thing, rather choose to express themselves by some vehement gesture, than by words) ran the edge of his hand, with great quickness, along his neck, meaning thereby to express, that being strangled or having one's throat cut, was the instant consequence of taking such a liberty.

vilege, this; which affording to every Man a means of laying his complaints before the Public, procures him almost a certainty of redress against any act of oppression that he may have been exposed to: and which leaving, moreover, to every Subject the right to give his opinion on all public matters, and by thus influencing the sentiments of the Nation, to influence those of the Legislature itself (which is sooner or later obliged to pay a deference to them) procures to him a sort of Legislative authority of a much more efficacious and beneficial nature than any formal right he might enjoy of voting by a mere *yea* or *nay*, upon general propositions suddenly offered to him, and which he could have neither a share in framing, nor any opportunity of objecting to and modifying.

A privilege which, by raising in the People a continual sense of their own security, and affording them undoubted proofs that the Government, whatever may be its form, is ultimately destined only to insure the happiness of those who submit to it, is both one

of the greatest advantages of Freedom, and its surest characteristic. The kind of security as to their persons and possessions, which Subjects who are totally deprived of that privilege, enjoy at particular times, under other Governments, may at most intitle them to look upon themselves as the well-administered property of Masters who rightly understand their own interests: but it is the right of canvassing without fear the conduct of those who are placed at their head, which constitutes a free Nation. (*a*)

In fine, what completes all those advantages which result from the security of the supreme Executive authority in England, is the nature of the means by which that security is obtained. Means which are totally different from those by which the same advantage is so incompletely procured, and so dearly paid for, in other Mo-

(*a*) If we consider the great advantages to public liberty which result from the institution of the Trial by Jury, and from the Liberty of the press, we shall find England to be in reality a much more Democratical State than any other we are acquainted with. The Judicial power, and the Censorial power, are vested in the People.

narchies ; and which have equally preserved the English from the two opposite calamities of anarchy dignified with the name of liberty, and total political slavery dignified with the name of public tranquillity.

It is from a happy general arrangement of things, that the Power which governs in England, derives that advantageous solidity which procures to the People both so great a degree of security, and so extensive a degree of freedom. It is from the Nation itself that it receives the force with which it governs the Nation. Its resources are affection, and not terror ; consent, and not violence ; and it continues to reign by the voluntary passions of those who are subject to it.

CHAPTER XVIII.

How far the examples of Nations that have lost their liberty, are applicable to England.

ALL Governments having in themselves, say those who have written upon that subject, the principle of their destruction (a principle inherent in those very causes to which they owed their prosperity) the advantages of the Government of England cannot, according to those Writers, exempt it from that hidden fault which is secretly working its ruin; and M. de Montesquieu, pronouncing at the same time, both concerning the effect, and the cause, says, that “the Constitution of England will lose its liberty,—will perish. Have not Rome, Lacedæmon, and Carthage, perished? It will perish when the Legislative power shall have become more corrupt than the Executive.”

Though I do not by any means pretend that any human establishment can escape the

fate to which we see every thing in Nature subject, nor am so far prejudiced by the sense I entertain of the great advantages of the English Government, as to reckon among them that of eternity, I will however observe here in general, that as it differs by its structure and resources from all those with which History makes us acquainted, so it cannot be said to be liable to the same dangers. To judge of the one from the other, is to judge by analogy, where no analogy is to be found; and my respect for the Author I have quoted will not hinder me from saying, that his opinion has not the same weight with me on this occasion that it has on many others.

Having neglected, as indeed all systematic Writers upon Politicks have done, attentively to examine into the real nature of Governments, of Power, and of Liberty, among Mankind, the principles he lays down are not always so clear, or even so just, as we might have expected from a Man of so real a genius. When he speaks of England, for instance, his observations are much too general; and though he had frequent oppor-

tunities of conversing with Men who had been personally concerned in the public affairs of this Country, and had been an eye-witness of the operations of the English Government, he rather tells us, when he attempts to describe it, what he conjectured, than what he saw.

The examples he cites, and the causes of dissolution which he assigns, particularly confirm this observation. The Government of Rome, to speak of that which, having gradually, and as it were of itself, fallen into ruin, may afford matter for exact reasoning, had no relation to that of England. The Roman People were not, in the latter ages of the Commonwealth, a People of Citizens, but of Conquerors. Rome was not a State, but the head of a State. By the immensity of its conquests, it came at last only to be in a manner an accessory part of its own Empire. Its power became so great, that after having conferred it, it was at length no longer able to resume it: and from that moment it became itself subject to it, from the same reason that the Provinces themselves were so.

The fall of Rome, therefore, was an event peculiar to its situation; and the change of manners which accelerated that fall, had but in an effect which it could not have had but in that same situation. Men who had drawn to themselves all the riches of the World, could no longer content themselves with the supper of Fabricius, and the cottage of Cincinnatus. The People, who were masters of all the corn of Sicily and Africa, were no longer obliged to plunder their neighbours for theirs. All possible Enemies, besides, being exterminated, Rome, whose power was military, was no longer an army; and that was the moment of her corruption: if, indeed, we ought to give that name to what was the inevitable consequence of the nature of things.

In a word, Rome was destined to lose her Liberty when she lost her Empire; and she was destined to lose her Empire, whenever she should begin to enjoy it.

But England forms a Society founded upon principles absolutely different. All liberty, and power, are not accumulated, as it were, in one point, so as to leave, every where

else, only slavery and misery; consequently only feeds of division, and secret animosity. From the one end of the Island to the other the same laws, the same place, and the same interests prevail: the whole Nation besides, equally concurs in the formation of the Government: no part, therefore, has cause to fear that the other parts will suddenly supply the necessary forces to destroy its liberty; and the whole have, of course, no occasion for those ferocious kinds of virtue which are indispensably necessary to those who, from the situation in which they have brought themselves, are continually exposed to such dangers.

The situation of the People of England, therefore, essentially differs from that of the People of Rome. The mode of the English Government does not differ less from that of the Roman Republic; and the great advantages it has over the latter for preserving the liberty of the People from ruin, have been described at length in the course of this Work.

Thus, for instance, the total ruin of the Roman Republic was principally brought about

by the exorbitant power to which several of its Citizens were successively enabled to rise. In the latter age of the Commonwealth, those Citizens went so far as to divide among themselves the dominions of the Republic, in much the same manner as they might have done lands of their own. And to them, others in a short time succeeded, who not only did the same, but who even proceeded to that degree of tyrannical insolence, as to make cessions to each other, by express and formal compacts, of the lives of thousands of their fellow-Citizens. But the great and constant authority, and weight of the Crown, in England, prevents, in their very beginning, as we have seen, all misfortunes of this kind; and the Reader may recollect what has been said before on that subject.

At last the ruin of the Republic, as every body knows, was completed. One of those powerful Citizens we mention, in process of time found means to exterminate all his competitors: he immediately assumed to himself the whole power in the State; and established for ever after an arbitrary Monarchy. But such a

sudden and violent establishment of a Monarchical power, with all the fatal consequences that would result from such an event, are calamities which cannot take place in England: that same kind of power, we see, is already in being; it is ascertained by fixed laws, and established upon regular and well-known foundations.

Nor is there any danger that that power may, by the means of those legal prerogatives it already possesses, insensibly assume others, and at last suddenly make itself absolute. The important privilege of granting to the Crown its necessary supplies, we have before observed, is vested in the Nation: and how extensive soever the prerogatives of a King of England may be, it constantly lies in the power of his People either to grant, or deny him, the means of exercising them.

This right possessed by the People of England, constitutes the great difference between them, and all the other Nations that live under Monarchical Governments. It likewise gives them a great advantage over such as are formed into Republican States, and confers on

them a means of influencing the conduct of the Government, not only more effectual, but also (which is more in point to the subject of this Chapter) incomparably more lasting and secure, than those reserved to the People in the States we mention.

In those States, the political rights which usually fall to the share of the People, are those of voting in general Assemblies, either when laws are to be enacted, or Magistrates to be elected. But as the advantages arising from those general rights of giving votes, never are very clearly ascertained by the People, so neither are the consequences attending particular forms or modes of giving those votes, generally and compleatly understood by them. They, in consequence, never entertain any strong and constant preference for one method rather than another; and it hence always proves but too easy a thing in Republican States, either by insidious proposals made at particular times to the People, or by well-contrived precedents, or other means, first, to reduce their political privileges to mere ceremonies and forms, and at last, intirely to abolish them.

Thus, in the Roman Republic, the mode which was constantly in use for about one hundred and fifty years, of dividing the Citizens into *Centuriæ* when they gave their votes, reduced the right of the greatest part of them, during that time, to little more than a shadow. After the mode of dividing them by Tribes had been introduced by the Tribunes, the bulk of the Citizens indeed were not, when it was used, under so great a disadvantage as before; but yet the great privileges exercised by the Magistrates in all the public Assemblies, the power they assumed of moving the Citizens out of one Tribe into another, and a number of other circumstances, continued to render the rights of the Citizens more and more ineffectual; and in fact we do not find that when those rights were at last intirely taken from them, they have expressed any great degree of discontent.

In Sweden (the former Government of which partook much of the Republican form) the right allotted to the People in the Government, was that of sending Deputies to the States of the Kingdom, who were to give their votes on the resolutions that were to

be taken in that Assembly. But the privilege of the People of sending such Deputies was, in the first place, greatly diminished by several essential disadvantages under which those Deputies were placed with respect to the Body, or *Order*, of the Nobles. This same privilege of the People was farther lessened by depriving their Deputies of the right of freely laying their different proposals before the States, for their assent, or dissent, and attributing the exclusive right of framing such proposals, to a private Assembly which was called the *Secret Committee*. Again, the right allowed to the Order of the Nobles, of having a number of Members in this Secret Committee double to that of all the other Orders taken together, rendered the rights of the People still more ineffectual. At the last Revolution those rights have been in a manner taken from them; and they do not seem to have made any great efforts to preserve them. (*a*)

(*a*) I might have produced examples without number, of Republican States in which the People have been brought, at one time or other, to assent to the total loss of their poli-

But the situation of affairs in England is totally different from that which we have just described. The political rights of the People are inseparably connected with the right of Property,—with a right which it is as difficult to invalidate by artifice, as dangerous to attack by force, and which we see that the most arbitrary Kings, in the fullest career of their power, never have offered to violate but with the greatest precautions. A King of England, who would enslave his People, must begin with doing, for his first act, what all other Kings reserve for the last; and he cannot attempt to deprive his Subjects of their political privileges, without declaring war against the whole Nation at the same time, and attacking every individual at once in his most permanent and best understood interest.

And the means possessed by the People of England, of influencing the conduct of the Government, is not only in a manner secure against any danger of being taken from them: it is moreover attended with another advantage of the

tical privileges. In the Venetian Republic, for instance, the right, now exclusively vested in a certain number of families, of enacting laws, and electing the Doge and other Magistrates, was originally vested in the whole People.

greatest importance ; which is that of conferring naturally, and as it were necessarily, on those to whom they trust the care of their interests, the great privilege we have before described, of debating among themselves whatever questions they think conducive to the good of their Constituents, and of framing whatever bills they think proper, and in what terms they chuse. An essential privilege this, which gives them a most effectual means of providing for the safety of all the other rights of the People, and enables them to check in their beginning all attempts of practices that might be dangerous to public liberty, and even to procure those to be abolished that have already in any manner whatsoever been brought into use.

How long soever the People may have remained in a State of supineness as to their most valuable interests, whatever may have been the neglect and even the errors of their Representatives, the instant the latter come either to see those errors, or to have a sense of their duty, they begin, by means of the privilege we mention, effectually to repair the losses of public liberty ; they inform both themselves

and the body of the People with respect to the main and essential object of their interests; they take the necessary precautions for preventing those abuses of which they complain from being continued, and others of the same kind from being established; and the governing Power (whatever dangerous advantages it may at first sight appear to possess) is thus constantly, either confined, or brought back, to its ancient limits. (*a*)

And I shall take this opportunity to make the Reader observe, in general, how the different parts of the English Government mutually assist and support each other. It is because the whole Executive authority in the State is vested in the Crown, that the People may without danger commit the care of their liberty to Representatives:—it is because they share in the Government only through those Representatives, that they are enabled to possess the great advantage of framing and

(*a*) The Reader may remember that among the Acts of which the Parliament obtained the abolition in the beginning of the reign of Edward VI. that Act was comprised which had enacted, that the Proclamations of the Crown should have the force of Law. The Parliament who had passed that Act, seemed to have done at that time, what the Danish Nation did a century afterwards.

proposing new laws:—but for this purpose, it is again absolutely necessary that the *Crown*, that is to say, a *Veto* of extraordinary power, should exist in the State.

It is, on the other hand, because the balance of the People is placed in the right of granting to the Crown its necessary supplies, that the latter may, without danger, be intrusted with the great authority we mention; and that the right, for instance, which is vested in it of judging of the proper time for calling and dissolving Parliaments (a right absolutely necessary to its preservation) may exist without producing, *ipso facto*, the ruin of public Liberty. The finest Government upon Earth, or rather the only one that has hitherto been founded upon principles truly consonant with human Nature, was in danger of total destruction when Bartholomew Columbus was on his passage to England, to teach Henry the Seventh the way to Mexico and Peru. (*a*)

(*a*) As affairs are situated in England, the dissolution of a Parliament, on the part of the Crown, is no more than an appeal either to the People themselves, or to another Parliament.

As a conclusion of this subject (which might open a field for speculations without end) I shall observe an advantage peculiar to the English Government, and which, more than any other we could mention, must contribute to its duration. All the political passions of Mankind, if we attend to it, are satisfied and provided for in the English Government; and whether we look at the Monarchical, or the Aristocratical, or the Democratical part of it, we find all those powers already settled in it in a regular manner, which have an unavoidable tendency to arise, at one time or other, in all human Societies.

If we could, for an instant, suppose that the English form of Government, instead of having been the effect of a lucky concurrence of fortunate circumstances, had been established from a settled plan by a Man who had discovered, beforehand and by reasoning, all those advantages resulting from it which we now perceive from experience, and had undertaken to point them out to other Men capable of judging of what he told them, the following is, no doubt, the manner in which he would have spoken to them.

Nothing is more chimerical, he would have said, than a state of either total equality, or total Liberty amongst Mankind. In all societies of Men, some Power will necessarily arise. This power, after gradually becoming confined to a smaller number of persons, will, by a like necessity, at last fall into the hands of a single Leader; and those two effects (of which you may see constant examples in History) flowing from the ambition of one part of Mankind, and the various affections and passions of the other, are absolutely unavoidable.

Let us, therefore, admit this evil at once, since it is impossible to avoid it. Let us, of ourselves, establish a Chief among us, since we must, some time or other, submit to one: we shall by this means effectually prevent the conflicts that would arise among the competitors for that station. But let us, above all, establish him single; lest, after successively raising himself on the ruins of his Rivals, he should establish himself, whether we will or not, and through a train of the most pernicious combinations.

Let us even give him every thing we can possibly give without endangering our security. Let us call him our Sovereign ; let us make him consider the State as being his own patrimony ; let us grant him, in short, such personal privileges as none of us can ever hope to rival him in, and we shall see what we were at first inclined to consider as a great evil, to be in reality a source of advantages to the community,—we shall be the better able to set bounds to that Power which we shall have thus fixed and ascertained in one place ; we shall have the more interested him whom we shall have put in possession of so many advantages, in the faithful discharge of his duty ; and we shall have thus procured for each of us, a powerful protector at home, and for the whole Community, a defender against foreign enemies superior to all possible temptation of betraying his Country.

You may also have observed, he would continue, that in all States, there naturally arises around the person, or persons, who are invested with the public power, a class of Men who, without having any actual share

in that power, yet partake of its lustre : who, pretending to be distinguished from the rest of the Community, do, from that very circumstance, become distinguished from them: and this distinction, though only matter of opinion, and at first thus surreptitiously obtained, yet, becomes at last the source of unavoidable and very grievous effects.

Let us therefore regulate this evil which we cannot intirely prevent. Let us establish this class of Men who would otherwise grow up among us without our knowledge, and gradually acquire the most pernicious privileges : let us grant them distinctions that are visible and clearly ascertained : their nature and extent will, by this means, be the better understood, and they will of course be much less likely to become dangerous. By this means also, we shall preclude all other persons from the hopes of usurping them. As to pretend to distinctions can thenceforward be no longer a title to obtain them, every one who shall not be expressly included in their number, must continue to confess himself one of the People ; and just as we said before, let us

chuse ourselves one Master that we may not have fifty, so let us again say on this occasion, let us establish three hundred Lords, that we may not have ten thousand Nobles.

Besides, our pride will better reconcile itself to a superiority which it will no longer think of disputing. Nay, as they will themselves see us to be beforehand in acknowledging it, they will think themselves under no necessity of being insolent to furnish us a proof of it. Secure of their privileges, all violent measures on their part for maintaining, and at last perhaps extending them, will be prevented: they will never combine together with any degree of vehemence, but when they really have cause to think themselves in danger; and by having made them indisputably great Men, we shall have a chance of often seeing them behave like modest and virtuous Citizens.

In fine, by being united in a regular Assembly, they will form an intermediate Body in the State, that is to say, a very useful part of the Government.

It is also necessary, our Lawgiver would farther add, that we should have an influence upon the Government; it is necessary for our security: it is no less necessary for the security of the Government itself. But experience must have taught you, at the same time, that a great body of men cannot act, without being, though they are not aware of it, the instruments of the designs of a small number of persons; and that the power of the People is never any thing but the power of a few Leaders, who (though it may be impossible to tell, when, or how) have found means to secure to themselves the direction of its exercise.

Let us, therefore, be also beforehand with this other inconvenience. Let us effect openly what would, otherwise, take place in secret. Let us intrust our power, before it be taken from us by address. Those whom we shall expressly have made the depositaries of it, being freed from any anxious care about supporting themselves, will have no object but to render it useful. They will stand in awe of us the more, because they will know that they have not

imposed upon us; and instead of a small number of Leaders who would imagine they derive their whole importance from their own dexterity, we shall have clearly ascertained Representatives, who will be accountable to us for the evils of the State.

But above all, by forming our Government of a small number of persons, we shall prevent any disorder that may take place in it, from ever becoming dangerously extensive. Nay more, we shall render it capable of inestimable combinations and resources, which would be utterly impossible in that Government of all, which never can be any thing but uproar and confusion.

In short, by expressly divesting ourselves of a power of which we should, at best, have had only an apparent enjoyment, we shall be intitled to make conditions for ourselves: we will insist that our liberty be augmented; we will, above all, reserve to ourselves the right of watching and censuring that administration which will have been established only by our own consent. We shall the better see its defects, because we shall be only its Spectators: we

shall correct them the better, because we shall be independent of it. (a)

The English Constitution being founded upon such principles as those we have just described, no true comparison can be made between it, and the Government of any other States; and since it evidently insures, not only the liberty, but the general satisfaction in all respects, of those who are subject to it, in a much greater degree than any other Government ever did, this consideration alone affords sufficient ground to conclude without looking farther, that it is also much more likely to be preserved from ruin.

And indeed we may observe the remarkable manner in which it has been maintained in the midst of such general commotions as seemed unavoidably to prepare its

(a) He might have added, as we will not seek to counter-act nature, but rather to follow it, we shall be able to procure ourselves a mild Legislation. Let us not be without cause afraid of the power of one Man: we shall have no need either of a Tarpeian rock, or of a Counsel of *the Ten*. Having expressly allowed to the People a liberty to enquire into the conduct of Government, and to endeavour to correct it, we shall need neither State-prisons, nor secret Informers.

destruction. It rose again, we see, after the wars between Henry the Third and his Barons; after the usurpation of Henry the Fourth; and after the long and bloody quarrels between the Houses of York and Lancaster. Nay, though totally destroyed in appearance after the fall of Charles the First, and though the greatest efforts had been made to raise another form of Government in its stead, yet, no sooner was Charles the Second called over, than the English Constitution was re-established upon all its ancient foundations.

However, as what has not happened at one time, may happen at another, future Revolutions (events which no form of Government can totally prevent) may perhaps end in a different manner from that in which past ones have been terminated. New Combinations may possibly take place among the then ruling Powers in the State, of such a nature as to prevent the Constitution, when peace is afterwards restored to the Nation, from settling again upon its ancient and genuine foundations; and it would certainly be a very bold assertion to decide that both the

outward form, and the true spirit of the English Government, would again be preserved from destruction, if the same dangers to which they have in former times been exposed, should again happen to take place.

Nay, such fatal changes as those we mention, may be introduced in quiet times, or at least, by means in appearance constitutional. Advantages, for instance, may be taken by particular factions, either of the feeble temper, or of the misconduct, of some future King. Temporary prepossessions of the People may be made use of, to make them concur in doing what will prove afterwards the ruin of their own liberty. Plans of apparent improvement in the Constitution, forwarded by Men who shall proceed without a due knowledge of the true principles and foundations of Government, may produce effects quite contrary to those which they intended, and in reality prepare its ruin. (*a*) The Crown, on the other

(*a*) Instead of looking for the principles of Politics in their true source, that is to say, in the nature of the affections of Mankind, and of those secret ties by which they are united together in a state of Society, Men have treated that science in the same manner as they did natural Philosophy in the times of Aristotle, continually recurring to occult causes and principles, from which no useful consequence could be drawn. Thus, in order to ground particular assertions,

hand, may, by the acquisition of foreign dominions, acquire a fatal independency on the People: and if, without entering into any farther particulars on this subject, I were required to point out the principal events which would, if they were ever to happen, prove immediately the ruin of the English Government, I would answer, the English Government will be no more, either when the Crown shall become independent on the Nation for its supplies, or when the Representatives of the People shall begin to share in the Executive authority. (a)

they have much used the word Constitution, in a personal sense, *the Constitution loves, the Constitution forbids*, and the like. At other times, they have had recourse to *Luxury*, in order to explain certain events; and at others, to a still more occult cause, which they have called *corruption*: and abundance of comparisons, drawn from the human Body, have been also used for the same purposes. Nor is it only the obscurity of the writings of Politicians, and the impossibility of applying their speculative Doctrines to any practical use, that proves that some peculiar and uncommon difficulties attend the investigation of political truths; the singular perplexity which Men in general, even the ablest, labour under, when they attempt to discuss abstract questions in politics, also justifies this observation, and proves that the true first principles of this Science, whatever they are, lie deep in both the human heart and understanding.

(a) And if at any time, any dangerous changes were to take place in the English Constitution, the pernicious tendency of which the People were not able at first to discover, restrictions on the Liberty of the Press, and on the Power of Juries, will give them the first information.

CHAPTER XIX.

Conclusion.—A few words on the nature of the Divisions that take place in England.

I Shall conclude this Work with a few observations on the total freedom from violence with which the political debates and contentions in England are conducted and terminated, in order both to give a farther proof of the soundness of the principles on which the English Government is founded, and to confute, in general, the opinion of foreign Writers, or Politicians who, misled by the apparent heat with which those debates are sometimes carried on, and the rumours to which they give occasion, look upon England as a perpetual scene of civil broils and dissensions.

In fact, if we consider, in the first place, the constant tenour of the conduct of the Parliament, we shall see that whatever different plans the several Orders that compose it, may at times pursue, and whatever use they may,

in consequence, make of their privileges, they never go, with regard to each other, beyond the terms, not only of decency, but even of that general good understanding which ought to prevail among them.

Thus the King, though he preserves the style of his Dignity, never addresses the two Houses, but in terms of regard and affection; and if at any time he chuses to refuse their Bills, he only says that he will consider of them; which is certainly a gentler expression than the word *Veto*.

The two Houses, on their part, though very jealous, each within their own walls, of the freedom of Speech, are, on the other hand, extremely careful that that liberty shall never break out into unguarded expressions with regard to the person of the King. It is even a constant rule among them never to mention him when they mean to blame the administration; and those things which they may chuse to censure, even in the Speeches made by the King in person, and which are plainly his own acts, are never considered but

as the faults of his Ministers, or in general of those who have advised him.

The two Houses are also equally attentive to prevent any act contrary to that respect which they mutually owe to one another. The examples of their differences with each other, are very rare, and were only mere misunderstandings. Nay, in order to prevent all subject of altercation, the custom is, that when one of the two Houses refuses to consent to a Bill presented by the other, no formal declaration is made of such refusal; and the House whose Bill is rejected, learns its fate only from their hearing no more of it, or by what the Members may be told as private persons.

In each House, the Members take care, even in the heat of debate, never to go beyond certain bounds in their manner of speaking of each other; and if they were to offend in that respect, they would certainly incur the censure of the House. And as reason has taught Mankind to refrain, in their wars, from all injuries to each other that have no tendency to promote the object

of their contentions, so a kind of Law of Nations (if I may so express myself) has been introduced among the persons who form the Parliament, and interest themselves in the debates: they have discovered that they may very well be of opposite parties, without hating and persecuting one another. Coming fresh from debates carried on even with considerable warmth, they meet without reluctance in the ordinary intercourse of life; and suspending all hostilities, they hold every place out of Parliament, to be neutral ground.

With regard to the generality of the People, as they never are called upon to come to a final decision with respect to any public measures, or expressly to concur in supporting them, they preserve themselves still more free from party spirit than their Representatives themselves sometimes are. Considering, as we have observed, the affairs of Government as only matter of speculation, they never have occasion to engage in any vehement contests among themselves on that account. Much less do they allow themselves to take an active and violent part in the differences of particular factions, or the quarrels of private indi-

viduals. And those family feuds, those party animosities, those victories and consequent outrages of alternately successful factions, in short, all those inconveniences which in so many other States have constantly been the attendants of liberty, and which Authors tell us we must submit to as the price of it, are things totally unknown in England.

But are not the English perpetually making complaints against the Administration? and do they not speak and write as if they were continually exposed to grievances of every kind?

Undoubtedly, I answer, in a Society of Beings subject to error, dissatisfactions, from one quarter or other, will necessarily arise; and in a free Society, they will be openly manifested by complaints. Besides, as in England every Man is permitted to give his opinion upon all subjects, and as to watch over the Administration, and to complain of grievances, is the proper duty of the Representatives of the People; complaints must necessarily be heard in such a Government, and even more frequently, and upon more subjects, than in any other.

But those complaints, let it be remembered, are not, in England, the cries of oppression forced at last to break its silence. They do not suppose hearts deeply wounded. Nay, I will go farther, they do not even suppose very determinate sentiments; and they are often nothing more than the first vent which Men give to their new, and yet unsettled conceptions.

The agitation of men's minds is not therefore in England what it would be in other States; it is not the symptom of a profound and general discontent, and the forerunner of violent commotions. Foreseen, regulated, even hoped for by the Constitution, it animates all the parts of the State, and is to be considered only as the beneficial vicissitude of the seasons. The Power which governs, being dependant on the Nation, but possessing at the same time the general affection of the People, is often thwarted, but never endangered. Like a vigorous Tree which stretches its branches far and wide, the slightest breath puts it in motion; but it acquires and exerts at every instant a new

degree of force, and resists the Winds, both by the strength and elasticity of its fibres, and the depth of its roots.

In a word, whatever Revolutions may at times happen among the persons who conduct the public affairs in England, they never occasion the shortest cessation of the power of the Laws, nor the smallest diminution of the security of individuals. A Man who should have incurred the enmity of the most powerful Men in the State—what do I say?—though he had, like another *Vatinius*, drawn upon himself the united detestation of all parties, he might, under the protection of the Laws, and by keeping within the bounds prescribed by them, continue to set both his enemies and the whole Nation at defiance.

The limits prescribed to this Book do not allow us to enter into any farther particulars on the subject we are treating here; but if we were to make an inquiry into the influence which the English Government has on the manners and customs of the People of England, perhaps we should find, that instead of inspiring them with any disposition

to disorder or anarchy, it produces on them a quite contrary effect. As they see the highest Powers in the State constantly submit to the Laws, and they receive, themselves, such a certain protection from those laws, whenever they appeal to them, it is impossible but they must insensibly contract a deep-rooted attachment and respect for them, which can at no time cease to have some influence on their actions. And in fact, we see that even the lower class of the People, in England, notwithstanding the apparent excesses into which they are sometimes hurried, possess a spirit of justice and order, superior to what is to be observed in the same rank of Men in other Countries. The extraordinary indulgence which is shewn to accused persons of every degree, is not attended with any of those pernicious consequences which we might at first be apt to fear from it. And it is perhaps to the nature of the English Government itself (however remote the cause may seem) and to the spirit of Justice it continually and insensibly diffuses throughout all orders of the People, that we are to attribute the singular

advantage possessed by the English Nation, of employing an incomparably milder mode of administering criminal Justice than any other Nation, and at the same time of affording perhaps fewer instances of violence or cruelty.

Another consequence which we might observe here, as flowing also from the principles of the English Government, is the moderate behaviour of all those who are invested with any branch of public authority. And if we look at the conduct of all public Officers in England, from the Minister of State, or the Judge, down to the lowest officers of Justice, we find a spirit of forbearance and lenity prevailing in England among all persons in power, which cannot but create the greatest surprise in those who have visited other Countries.

One circumstance more I shall observe here, as peculiar to England, which is the constant attention of the Legislature in providing for the interests and welfare of the People, and the indulgence shewn by them to their very prejudices. Advantages these, which are no doubt the consequence of the general spirit

which animates the whole English Government, but are also particularly owing to that circumstance peculiar to it, of having lodged the active part of Legislation in the hands of the Representatives of the Nation; and committed the care of alleviating the grievances of the People to persons who either feel them, or see them nearly, and whose surest path to advancement and glory is to be active in finding remedies for them.

Not that I mean, however, that no abuses take place in the English Government, and that all possible good laws are made in it, but that there is a constant tendency in it both to correct the one, and improve the other, And that all the laws that are in being, are certainly executed, whenever appealed to, is what I look upon as the characteristic and undisputed advantage of the English Constitution. A Constitution the more likely to produce all the effects we have mentioned, and to procure in general the happiness of the People, in that it has taken Mankind as they are, and has not endeavoured to prevent every thing, but to regulate every thing. I shall

add, the more difficult to discover, as its form was complicated, while its principles were natural and simple. Hence it is that the Politicians of Antiquity, sensible of the inconveniences of the Governments they had opportunities of knowing, wished for the establishment of such a Government, without much hopes of ever seeing it effected: (*a*) nay, Tacitus, the best Judge of them all, considered it as a project intirely chimerical. (*b*) Nor was it because he had not thought of it, had not reflected on it, that he was of this opinion. He had sought for such a Government, had had a glimpse of it, and yet continued to pronounce it impracticable.

Let us not therefore ascribe to the confined views of Man, to his imperfect sagacity, the discovery of this important secret.

(*a*) “ Statuo esse optimè constitutam Republicanam quæ
 “ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, & populari,
 “ modicè confusa.”—Cic. *fragm.*

(*b*) “ Cunctas Nationes & Urbes, Populus, aut Priores,
 “ aut Singuli, regunt. Delecta ex his & constituta Rei-
 “ publicæ forma, laudari facilius, quàm evenire; vel si
 “ evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.”—Tac. Ann. L. iv.

The world might have grown old, generations might have succeeded generations, still seeking it in vain. It has been by a fortunate conjunction of circumstances, I will add, by the assistance of a favourable situation, that Liberty has at last been able to erect herself a Temple.

Invoked by every Nation, but of too delicate a nature, as it should seem, to subsist in Societies formed of such imperfect beings as Mankind, she shewed, and but just shewed, herself, to the ingenious Nations of antiquity that inhabited the south of Europe. They were constantly mistaken in the form of the worship they paid to her: as they continually aimed at extending dominion and conquest over other Nations, they were also no less mistaken in the spirit of that worship: and though they continued for ages to pay their devotions to her, she still continued, with regard to them, to be the *unknown* Goddess.

Excluded, since that time, from those places to which she had seemed to give a preference, driven to the extremity of the Western World,

banished even out of the Continent, she has taken refuge in the Atlantic Ocean. It is there, that, freed from the danger of external disturbance, and assisted by a happy pre-arrangement of things, she has been able fully to display the form that suited her; and she has found six centuries to have been necessary to the completion of her Work.

Being sheltered, as it were, within a Citadel, she there reigns over a Nation which is the more intitled to her favours as it endeavours to extend her Empire, and carries with it, to every part of its dominions, the blessings of industry and equality. Fenced in on every side, to use the expressions of Chamberlayne, with a wide and deep ditch, the sea, guarded with strong outworks, its ships of war, and defended by the courage of its Seamen, it preserves that important secret, that sacred fire so difficult to be kindled; and which if it were once extinguished, would perhaps never be lighted again. When the World shall have again been laid waste by Conquerors, it will still con-

tinue to shew Mankind not only the principle that ought to unite them, but what is of no less importance, the form under which they ought to be united. And the Philosopher, when he happens to reflect on what is constantly the fate of civil Societies amongst Men, and observes with concern the numerous and powerful causes which seem, as it were, unavoidably to conduct them all to a State of incurable political Slavery, takes comfort in seeing that Liberty has at last disclosed her secret to Mankind, and secured an Asylum to herself.

T H E E N D.



