A

CHARACTER

OF

KING *CHARLES* THE SECOND:

AND

POLITICAL, MORAL *and* MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS *and* REFLECTIONS.

By *GEORGE SAVILE*, MARQUIS of HALIFAX.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE *following* CHARACTER *of* King CHARLES *the* Second, *with the* Political, Moral *and* Miſcellaneous THOUGHTS *and* REFLECTIONS *were written by* GEORGE SAVILE *Marquis of* HALIFAX, *and were taken from his original Manuſcripts, in the Poſſeſſion of his Grand-daughter* DOROTHY Counteſs *of* BURLINGTON.

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A CHARACTER OF KING *CHARLES* II.

I. *Of his* Religion.

A Character differeth from a Picture only in this, every Part of it muſt be like, but it is not neceſſary that every Feature ſhould be comprehended in it as in a Picture, only ſome of the moſt remarkable.

This Prince at his firſt entrance into the World had Adverſity for his Introducer, which is generally thought to be no ill one, but in his caſe it proved ſo, and laid the foundation of moſt of thoſe Misfortunes

or Errors, that were the cauſes of the great Objections made to him.

The firſt Effect it had was in relation to his *Religion.*

The ill-bred familiarity of the *Scotch* Divines had given him a diſtaſte of that part of the Proteſtant Religion. He was left then to the little Remnant of the *Church of England* in the *Fauxbourg St. Germain*; which made ſuch a kind of figure, as might eaſily be turn'd in ſuch a manner as to make him loſe his veneration for it. In a refined Country where Religion appeared in Pomp and Splendor, the outward appearance of ſuch unfaſhionable Men was made an Argument againſt their Religion; and a young Prince not averſe to rallery, was the more ſuſceptible of a contempt for it.

The Company he kept, the Men in his Pleaſures, and the Arguments

of

of State that he ſhould not appear too much a Proteſtant, whilſt he expected Aſſiſtance from a Popiſh Prince; all theſe, together with a habit encouraged by an Application to his Pleaſures, did ſo looſen and untie him from his firſt Impreſſions, that I take it for granted, after the firſt Year or two, he was no more a Proteſtant. If you ask me what he was, my anſwer muſt be, that he was of the Religion of a young Prince in his warm Blood, whoſe Enquiries were more applied to find Arguments againſt believing, than to lay any ſettled Foundations for acknowledging Providence, Myſteries, *&c.* A General Creed, and no very long one, may be preſumed to be the utmoſt Religion of one, whoſe Age and Inclination could not well ſpare any Thoughts that did not tend to his Pleaſures.

In this kind of Indifference or Unthinkingneſs, which is too natural in the beginnings of Life to be heavily cenſured, I will ſuppoſe he might paſs ſome conſiderable part of his Youth. I muſt preſume too that no Occaſions were loſt, during that Time, to inſinuate every thing to bend him towards Popery. Great Art without intermiſſion, againſt Youth and Eaſineſs, which are ſeldom upon their guard, muſt have its Effect. A Man is to be admired if he reſiſteth, and therefore cannot reaſonably be blamed if he yieldeth to them. *When* the critical Minute was, I'll not undertake to determine; but certainly the inward Conviction doth generally precede the outward Declarations: At what diſtances, dependeth upon Mens ſeveral Complexions and Circumſtances; no ſtated Period can be fixed.

It

It will be ſaid that he had not Religion enough to have *Conviction*; that is a vulgar Error. Conviction indeed is not a proper word but where a Man is convinced by Reaſon; but in the common acceptation, it is applied to thoſe who cannot tell why they are ſo: If Men can be at leaſt as poſitive in a Miſtake as when they are in the right; they may be as clearly convinced when they do not know why, as when they do.

I muſt preſume that no Man of the King's Age, and his Methods of Life, could poſſibly give a good reaſon for changing the Religion in which he was born, let it be what it will. But our Paſſions are much oftener convinced than our Reaſon. He had but little Reading, and that tending to his Pleaſures more than to his Inſtruction. In the Library of a young Prince, the ſolemn

Folios are not much rumpled, Books of a lighter Digeſtion have the Dog's Ears.

Some pretend to be very preciſe in the time of his Reconciling; The Cardinal *de Retz*, *&c.* I will not enter into it minutely, but whenever it was, it is obſervable that the Government of *France* did not think it adviſeable to diſcover it openly; upon which ſuch obvious Reflections may be made, that I will not mention them.

Such a Secret can never be put into a place which is ſo cloſely ſtopt, that there ſhall be no Chinks. Whiſpers went about, particular Men had Intimations: *Cromwell* had his Advertiſements in other things, and this was as well worth his paying for. There was enough ſaid of it to ſtartle a great many, though not univerſally diffuſed; So much, that if the Government here, had not crumbled of

itſelf,

itſelf, his Right alone, with that and other clogs upon it, would hardly have thrown it down. I conclude that when he came into *England* he was as certainly a *Roman Catholick*, as that he was a Man of Pleaſure; both very conſiſtent by viſible Experience.

It is impertinent to give Reaſons for Mens changing their Religion. None can give them but themſelves, as every Man has quite a different way of arguing: A thing which may very well be accounted for. They are differing kinds of Wit, to be quick to find a *Fault*, and to be capable to find out a *Truth*: There muſt be induſtry in the laſt; the firſt requires only a lively heat, that catcheth hold of the *weak* ſide of any thing, but to chooſe the *ſtrong* one is another Talent. The reaſon why Men of Wit are often the lazieſt in their En-

quiries is, that their heat carrieth their Thoughts ſo faſt, that they are apt to be tired, and they faint in the drudgery of a continued Application. Have not Men of great Wit in all times permitted their Underſtandings to give way to their firſt Impreſſions? It taketh off from the Diminution when a Man doth not *mind* a thing; and the King had then other Buſineſs: The inferior part of the Man was then in Poſſeſſion, and the Faculties of the Brain, as to ſerious and painful Enquiries, were laid aſleep at leaſt, tho' not extinguiſhed. Careleſs Men are moſt ſubject to Superſtition. Thoſe who do not ſtudy Reaſon enough to make it their Guide, have more Unevenneſs: As they have Neglects, ſo they have Starts and Frights; Dreams will ſerve the turn; Omens and Sickneſſes have violent and ſudden Effects upon them.

them. Nor is the ſtrength of an Argument ſo effectual from its intrinſick Force, as by its being well ſuited to the Temper of the Party.

The *genteel part* of the *Catholick* Religion might tempt a Prince that had more of the fine Gentleman than his governing Capacity required: and the exerciſe of *Indulgence* to *Sinners* being more frequent in it, than of *inflicting Penance*, might be ſome recommendation. Miſtreſſes of that Faith are ſtronger Specificks in this caſe, than any that are in Phyſick.

The *Roman Catholicks* complained of his Breach of Promiſe to them very early. * There were broad peepings out, Glimpſes ſo often repeated, that to diſcerning Eyes it was flaring: In the very firſt Year there were ſuch Suſpicions as produced melancholy ſhakings of the Head, which were very

* Upon the Words of his Declaration.

very ſignificant. His unwillingneſs to *marry* a *Proteſtant* was remarkable, though both the Catholick and the Chriſtian Crown would have adopted her. Very early in his Youth, when any *German* Princeſs was propoſed, he put off the diſcourſe with Rallery. A thouſand little Circumſtances were a kind of accumulative Evidence, which in theſe Caſes may be admitted.

Men that were earneſt Proteſtants were under the ſharpneſs of his Diſpleaſure, expreſſed by Rallery, as well as by other ways. Men near him have made Diſcoveries from ſudden breakings out in Diſcourſe, *&c.* which ſhewed there was a Root. It was not the leaſt skilful part of his concealing himſelf, to make the World think he leaned towards an Indifference in Religion.

He

He had Sicknesses *before* his Death, in which he did not trouble any Protestant Divines; those who saw him *upon his Death-bed*, saw a great deal.

As to his writing those * Papers, he might do it. Though neither his Temper nor Education made him very fit to be an Author, yet in this case, (a known Topick, so very often repeated) he might write it all himself, and yet not one word of it his own. That Church's Argument doth so agree with Men unwilling to take pains, the Temptation of putting an End to all the trouble of enquiring is so great, that it must be very strong reason that can resist: The King had only his meer natural Faculties, without any Acquisitions to improve them; so that it is no wonder,

* Two Papers in Defence of the *Roman Catholick* Religion, found in this King's strong Box, in his own hand, and published by King *James* II. afterwards.

wonder, if an Argument which gave ſuch *Eaſe* and *Relief* to his Mind, made ſuch an Impreſſion, that with thinking often of it, (as Men are apt to do of every thing they like) he might, by the Effect chiefly of his Memory, put together a few Lines with his own Hand, without any help at the time; in which there was nothing extraordinary, but that one ſo little inclined to write at all, ſhould prevail with himſelf to do it with the Solemnity of a Caſuiſt.

II. *His* Dissimulation.

ONE great Objection made to him was the concealing himſelf, and diſguiſing his Thoughts. In this there ought a Latitude to be given; it is a Defect not to have it at

at all, and a Fault to have it too much. Human Nature will not allow the Mean: like all other things, as ſoon as ever Men get to do them well, they cannot eaſily hold from doing them too much. 'Tis the caſe even in the leaſt things, as ſinging, *&c.*

In *France*, he was to diſſemble Injuries and Neglects, from one reaſon; in *England* he was to diſſemble too, though for other Cauſes; A King upon the *Throne* hath as great Temptations (though of another kind) to diſſemble, as a King in *Exile.* The King of *France* might have his Times of Diſſembling as much with him, as he could have to do it with the King of *France:* So he was in a *School.*

No King can be ſo little inclined to diſſemble but he muſt needs learn

it

it from his *Subjects*, who every Day give him ſuch Leſſons of it. Diſſimulation is like moſt other Qualities, it hath two Sides; it is neceſſary, and yet it is dangerous too. To have none at all layeth a Man open to Contempt, to have too much expoſeth him to Suſpicion, which is only the leſs diſhonourable Inconvenience. If a Man doth not take very great Precautions, he is never ſo much ſhewed as when he endeavoureth to hide himſelf. One Man cannot take more pains to hide himſelf, than another will do to ſee into him, eſpecially in the Caſe of Kings.

It is none of the exalted Faculties of the Mind, ſince there are Chamber-Maids will do it better than any Prince in Chriſtendom. Men given to diſſembling are like Rooks at play, they will cheat for Shillings; they

they are ſo uſed to it. The vulgar Definition of Diſſembling is downright Lying; that kind of it which is leſs ill-bred cometh pretty near it. Only Princes and Perſons of Honour muſt have gentler Words given to their Faults, than the nature of them may in themſelves deſerve.

Princes diſſemble with too many, not to have it diſcovered; no wonder then that He carried it ſo far that it was diſcovered. Men compared Notes, and got Evidence; ſo that thoſe whoſe Morality would give them leave, took it for an Excuſe for ſerving him ill. Thoſe who knew his Face, fixed their Eyes there; and thought it of more Importance to ſee, than to hear what he ſaid. His Face was as little a Blab as moſt Mens, yet though it could not be called a prattling Face, it would ſometimes tell Tales to a good Obſerver.

ſerver. When he thought fit to be angry, he had a very peeviſh Memory; there was hardly a Blot that eſcaped him. At the ſame time that this ſhewed the Strength of his Diſſimulation, it gave warning too; it fitted his preſent Purpoſe, but it made a Diſcovery that put Men more upon their Guard againſt him. Only Self-flattery furniſheth perpetual Arguments to truſt again: The comfortable Opinion Men have of themſelves keepeth up Human Society, which would be more than half deſtroyed without it.

III. *His* Amours, Mistresses, *&c.*

IT may be ſaid that his Inclinations to Love were the Effects of Health, and a good Conſtitution, with as little mixture of the *Seraphick*

raphick part as ever Man had: And though from that Foundation Men often raiſe their Paſſions; I am apt to think his ſtayed as much as any Man's ever did in the *lower Region.* This made him like eaſy Miſtreſſes: They were generally reſigned to him while he was abroad, with an implied Bargain. Heroick refined Lovers place a good deal of their Pleaſure in the Difficulty, both for the vanity of Conqueſt, and as a better earneſt of their Kindneſs.

After he was reſtored, Miſtreſſes were recommended to him; which is no ſmall matter in a *Court*, and not unworthy the Thoughts even of a *Party.* A Miſtreſs either dexterous in herſelf, or well-inſtructed by thoſe that are ſo, may be very uſeful to her Friends, not only in the immediate Hours of her Miniſtry, but by

her Influences and Insinuations at other times. It was resolved generally by others, whom he should have in his Arms, as well as whom he should have in his Councils. Of a Man who was so capable of choosing, he chose as seldom as any Man that ever lived.

He had more properly, at least in the beginning of his Time, a good Stomach to his Mistresses, than any great Passion for them. His taking them from others was never learnt in a Romance; and indeed fitter for a Philosopher than a Knight-Errant. His Patience for their Frailties shewed him no exact Lover. It is a Heresy according to a true Lover's Creed, ever to forgive an Infidelity, or the Appearance of it. Love of Ease will not do it, where the *Heart* is much engaged; but where mere *Nature* is the Motive,

it

it is poſſible for a Man to think righter than the common opinion, and to argue, that a Rival taketh away nothing but the Heart, and leaveth all the reſt.

In his latter Times he had no *Love*, but inſenſible Engagements that made it harder than moſt might apprehend to untie them. The *Politicks* might have their part; a Secret, a Commiſſion, a Confidence in critical Things, though it doth not give a Leaſe for a preciſe term of Years, yet there may be Difficulties in diſmiſſing them; there may be no Love all the while; perhaps the contrary.

He was ſaid to be as little conſtant as they were thought to be. Though he had no Love, he muſt have ſome Appetite, or elſe he could not keep them for meer eaſe, or for the Love of ſauntring; Miſtreſſes are frequently apt to be uneaſy;

they are in all Reſpects craving Creatures; ſo that though the taſte of thoſe Joys might be flattened, yet a Man who loved Pleaſure ſo as to be very unwilling to part with it, might (with the Aſſiſtance of his *Fancy*, which doth not grow old ſo faſt) reſerve ſome ſupplemental Entertainments, that might make their perſonal Service be ſtill of uſe to him. The Definition of Pleaſure, is *what pleaſeth*, and if that which grave Men may call a corrupted Fancy, ſhall adminſter any Remedies for putting off mourning for the loſs of Youth, who ſhall blame it?

The *young* Men ſeldom apply their cenſure to theſe Matters; and the *elder* have an Intereſt to be gentle towards a Miſtake, that ſeemeth to make ſome kind of amends for their Decays.

He

He had Wit enough to *ſuſpect*, and he had Wit enough too *not to care*: The Ladies got a great deal more than would have been allowed to be an equal bargain in *Chancery*, for what they did for it; but neither the manner, nor the meaſure of Pleaſure is to be judged by others.

Little Inducements at firſt grew into ſtrong Reaſons by degrees. Men who do not conſider Circumſtances, but judge at a diſtance, by a general way of arguing, conclude if a Miſtreſs in ſome Caſes is not immediately turned off, it muſt needs be that the Gallant is incurably ſubjected. This will by no means hold in private Men, much leſs in Princes, who are under more Entanglements, from which they cannot ſo eaſily looſen themſelves.

His Miſtreſſes were as different in their Humours, as they were in their

Looks. They gave Matter of very different Reflections. The laſt * eſpecially was quite out of the Definition of an ordinary Miſtreſs; the Cauſes and the Manner of her being firſt introduced were very different. A very peculiar Diſtinction was ſpoken of, ſome extraordinary Solemnities that might dignify, though not ſanctify her Function. Her Chamber was the true Cabinet Council. The King did always by his Councils, as he did ſometimes by his Meals; he ſat down out of form with the *Queen*, but he ſupped *below Stairs*. To have the Secrets of a King, who happens to have too many, is to have a King in Chains: He muſt not only, not part with her, but he muſt in his own Defence diſſemble his diſlike: The leſs kindneſs he hath, the more he muſt ſhew:

* The Dutcheſs of *Portſmouth*.

ſhew: There is great difference between being *muffled*, and being *tied*: He was the firſt, not the laſt. If he had quarelled at ſome times, beſides other Advantages, this Miſtreſs had a powerful *Second*; (one may ſuppoſe a kind of a *Guarantee*) this to a Man that loved his *Eaſe*, though his *Age* had not helped, was ſufficient.

The thing called *Sauntering*, is a ſtronger Temptation to Princes than it is to others. The being galled with Importunities, purſued from one Room to another with asking Faces; the diſmal Sound of unreaſonable Complaints, and ill-grounded Pretences; the Deformity of Fraud ill-diſguiſed; all theſe would make any Man run away from them; and I uſed to think it was the Motive for making him walk ſo faſt. So it was more properly taking Sanctuary. To get into a Room, where

all Buſineſs was to ſtay at the Door, excepting ſuch as he was diſpoſed to admit, might be very acceptable to a younger Man than he was, and leſs given to his Eaſe. He ſlumbered after Dinner, had the noiſe of the Company to divert him, without their Solicitations to importune him. In theſe Hours where he was more unguarded, no doubt the cunning Men of the Court took their times to make their Obſervations, and there is as little doubt but he made his upon them too: Where Men had Chinks he would ſee through them as ſoon as any Man about him. There was much more real Buſineſs done there in his Politick, than there was in his perſonal Capacity, *Stans pede in uno*; and there was the *French part* of *the Government*, which was not the leaſt.

In

In ſhort, without endeavouring to find more Arguments, he was *uſed* to it. Men do not care to put off a Habit, nor do often ſucceed when they go about it. His was not an *unthinkingneſs*; he did not perhaps think ſo much of his Subjects as they might wiſh; but he was far from being wanting to think of himſelf.

IV. *His* CONDUCT *to his* MINISTERS.

HE lived with his Miniſters as he did with his Miſtreſſes; he uſed them, but he was not in love with them. He ſhewed his Judgment in this, that he cannot properly be ſaid ever to have had a *Favourite*, though ſome might look ſo at a diſtance. The preſent uſe he might have of them, made him throw Fa-

vours

vours upon them, which might lead the lookers on into that miſtake; but he tied himſelf no more to them, than they did to him, which implied a ſufficient Liberty on either ſide.

Perhaps he made *dear Purchaſes*: If he ſeldom gave profuſely, but where he expected ſome unreaſonable thing, great Rewards were material Evidences againſt thoſe who received them.

He was *free of acceſs* to them, which was a very gaining Quality. He had at leaſt as good a Memory for the Faults of his Miniſters as for their Services; and whenever they fell, the whole Inventory came out; there was not a ſlip omitted.

That ſome of his Miniſters ſeemed to have a *Superiority*, did not ſpring from his Reſignation to them, but to his Eaſe. He choſe rather to be *eclipſed* than to be *troubled*.

His

His Brother was a Minister, and he had his Jealousies of him. At the same time that he raised him, he was not displeased to have him lessened. The cunning Observers found this out, and at the same time that he reigned in the Cabinet, he was very familiarly used at the private Supper.

A Minister turned off is like a Lady's Waiting-Woman, that knoweth all her Washes, and hath a shrewd guess at her Strayings: So there is danger in turning them off, as well as in keeping them.

He had back Stairs to convey *Informations* to him, as well as for other Uses; and though such Informations are sometimes dangerous, (especially to a Prince that will not take the pains necessary to digest them) yet in the main, that humour of *hearing every body against any body*,

body, kept thoſe about him in more awe, than they would have been without it. I do not believe that ever he truſted any Man, or any ſet of Men ſo entirely, as not to have ſome Secrets, in which they had *no ſhare:* As this might make him leſs well ſerved, ſo in ſome degree it might make him the leſs impoſed upon.

You may reckon under this Article his *Female Miniſtry*; for though he had Miniſters of the Council, Miniſters of the Cabinet, and Miniſters of the Ruelle; the Ruelle was often the *laſt Appeal.* Thoſe who were not well there, were uſed becauſe they were *neceſſary* at the time, not becauſe they were *liked*; ſo that their Tenure was a little uncertain. His Miniſters were to adminiſter Buſineſs to him as Doctors do Phyſick, wrap it up in ſomething to make it *leſs unpleaſant*; ſome skilful Digreſſions

were

were ſo far from being Impertinent, that they could not many times fix him to a fair Audience without them. His *averſion to Formality* made him diſlike a *ſerious Diſcourſe*, if very long, except it was mixed with ſomething to *entertain* him. Some even of the graver ſort too, uſed to carry this very far, and rather than fail, uſe the coarſeſt kind of youthful talk.

In general, he was upon pretty *even Terms* with his Miniſters, and could as eaſily bear *their* being *hanged* as ſome of them could *his* being *abuſed*.

V. *Of his* WIT *and* CONVERSATION.

HIS Wit conſiſted chiefly in the *Quickneſs* of his *Apprehenſion*. His Apprehenſion made him *find Faults*,

Faults, and that led him to ſhort Sayings upon them, not always equal, but often very good.

By his being abroad, he contracted a Habit of converſing familiarly, which added to his natural Genius, made him very *apt to talk*; perhaps more than a very nice judgment would approve.

He was apter to make *broad Alluſions* upon any thing that gave the leaſt occaſion, than was altogether ſuitable with the very Good-breeding he ſhewed in moſt other things. The Company he kept whilſt abroad, had ſo uſed him to that ſort of Dialect, that he was ſo far from thinking it a Fault or an Indecency, that he made it a matter of Rallery upon thoſe who could not prevail upon themſelves to join in it. As a Man who hath a good Stomach loveth generally to talk of Meat, ſo in the

vigour

vigour of his Age, he began that ſtyle, which by degrees grew ſo natural to him, that after he ceaſed to do it out of Pleaſure, he continued to do it out of Cuſtom. The Hypocriſy of the former Times inclined Men to think they could not ſhew too great an Averſion to it, and that helped to encourage this unbounded liberty of Talking, without the Reſtraints of Decency which were before obſerved. In his more familiar Converſations with the Ladies, even they muſt be paſſive, if they would not enter into it. How far Sounds as well as Objects may have their Effects to raiſe Inclination, might be an Argument to him to uſe that Style; or whether uſing Liberty at its full ſtretch, was not the general Inducement without any particular Motives to it.

The

The manner of that time of *telling Stories*, had drawn him into it; being commended at firſt for the Faculty of telling a Tale well, he might inſenſibly be betrayed to exerciſe it too often. Stories are dangerous in this, that the beſt expoſe a Man moſt, by being oftneſt repeated. It might paſs for an Evidence for the Moderns againſt the Ancients, that it is now wholly left off by all that have any pretence to be diſtinguiſhed by their good Senſe.

He had the Improvements of *Wine*, &c. which made him *pleaſant* and *eaſy in Company*; where he bore his part, and was acceptable even to thoſe who had no other Deſign than to be merry with him.

The Thing called *Wit*, a Prince may taſte, but it is dangerous for him to take too much of it; it hath Allurements which by refining his Thoughts,

Thoughts, take off from their *dignity*, in applying them leſs to the governing part. There is a Charm in Wit, which a Prince muſt reſiſt: and that to him was no eaſy matter; it was conteſting with Nature upon Terms of Diſadvantage.

His Wit was not ſo ill-natured as to put Men out of countenance. In the caſe of a King eſpecially, it is more allowable to ſpeak ſharply *of* them, than *to* them.

His Wit was not acquired by *Reading*; that which he had above his original Stock by Nature, was from Company, in which he was very capable to obſerve. He could not ſo properly be ſaid to have a Wit very much raiſed, as a plain, gaining, well-bred, recommending kind of Wit.

But of all Men that ever *liked* thoſe who *had Wit*, he could the

beſt *endure* thoſe who had *none.* This leaneth more towards a Satire than a Compliment, in this reſpect, that he could not only ſuffer Impertinence, but at ſometimes ſeemed to be pleaſed with it.

He encouraged ſome to talk a good deal more with him, than one would have expected from a Man of ſo good a Taſte: He ſhould rather have order'd his Attorney-General to proſecute them for a Miſdemeanour, in uſing Common-ſenſe ſo ſcurvily in his Preſence. However, if this was a Fault, it is arrogant for any of his Subjects to object to it, ſince it would look like defying ſuch a piece of Indulgence. He muſt in ſome degree looſen the Strength of his Wit, by his Condeſcenſion to talk with Men ſo very unequal to him. Wit muſt be uſed to ſome *Equality*, which

may

may give it Exercise, or else it is apt either to languish, or to grow a little vulgar, by reigning amongst Men of a lower Size, where there is no Awe to keep a Man upon his *guard*.

It fell out rather by Accident than Choice, that his Mistresses were such as did not care that Wit of the best kind should have the Precedence in their Apartments. Sharp and strong Wit will not always be so held in by Good-manners, as not to be a little troublesome in a *Ruelle*. But wherever Impertinence hath Wit enough left to be thankful for being well used, it will not only be admitted, but kindly received; such Charms every thing hath that setteth us off by Comparison.

His *Affability* was a Part, and perhaps not the least, of his Wit.

It is a Quality that muſt not always ſpring from the Heart, Mens Pride, as well as their Weakneſs, maketh them ready to be deceived by it: They are more ready to believe it a Homage paid to their Merit, than a Bait thrown out to deceive them. *Princes* have a particular Advantage.

There was at firſt as much of Art as Nature in his Affability, but by Habit it became Natural. It is an Error of the better hand, but the *Univerſality* taketh away a good deal of the Force of it. A Man that hath had a kind Look ſeconded with engaging Words, whilſt he is chewing the Pleaſure, if another in his Sight ſhould be juſt received as kindly, that Equality would preſently alter the Reliſh: The Pride of Mankind will have Diſtinction; till at laſt it cometh to Smile for

Smile,

Smile, meaning nothing of either Side; without any kind of Effect; mere Drawing-room Compliments; the *Bow* alone would be better without them. He was under ſome Diſadvantages of this kind, that grew ſtill in proportion as it came by Time to be more known, that there was leſs Signification in thoſe Things than at firſt was thought.

The Familiarity of his Wit muſt needs have the Effect of *leſſening* the *Diſtance* fit to be kept to him. The Freedom uſed to him whilſt abroad, was retained by thoſe who uſed it longer than either they ought to have kept it, or he have ſuffered it, and others by their Example learned to uſe the ſame. A King of *Spain* that will ſay nothing but *Tiendro cuydado*, will, to the generality, preſerve more Reſpect;

an Engine that will ſpeak but ſometimes, at the ſame time that it will draw the Raillery of the Few who judge well, it will create Reſpect in the ill-judging Generality. Formality is ſufficiently revenged upon the World for being ſo unreaſonably laughed at; it is deſtroyed it is true, but it hath the ſpiteful Satisfaction of ſeeing every thing deſtroyed with it.

His fine Gentlemanſhip did him no Good, encouraged in it by being too much applauded.

His Wit was better ſuited to his Condition *before* he was reſtored than *afterwards*. The Wit of a Gentleman, and that of a crowned Head, ought to be different things. As there is a *Crown Law*, there is a *Crown Wit* too. To uſe it with Reſerve is very good, and very rare. There is a Dignity in doing things

ſeldom,

ſeldom, even without any other Circumſtance. Where Wit will run continually, the Spring is apt to fail; ſo that it groweth vulgar, and the more it is practiſed, the more it is debaſed.

He was ſo good at finding out other Mens weak Sides, that it made him leſs intent to cure his own: That generally happeneth. It may be called a treacherous Talent, for it betrayeth a Man to forget to judge himſelf, by being ſo eager to cenſure others: This doth ſo miſguide Men the firſt Part of their Lives, that the Habit of it is not eaſily recovered, when the greater Ripeneſs of their Judgment inclineth them to look more into themſelves than into other Men.

Men love to ſee themſelves in the falſe Looking-glaſs of other Mens Failings. It maketh a Man think

well of himſelf at the time, and by ſending his Thoughts abroad to get Food for Laughing, they are leſs at leiſure to ſee Faults at home. Men chooſe rather to make the War in another Country, than to keep all well at home.

VI. *His* Talents, Temper, Habits, &c.

HE had a *Mechanical Head*, which appeared in his Inclination to Shipping and Fortification, &c. This would make one conclude, that his Thoughts would naturally have been more fixed to Buſineſs, if his Pleaſures had not drawn them away from it.

He had a very good *Memory*, though he would not always make equal good Uſe of it. So that if he had

had accuſtomed himſelf to direct his Faculties to his Buſineſs, I ſee no Reaſon why he might not have been a good deal Maſter of it. His Chain of *Memory* was longer than his Chain of *Thought*; the firſt could bear any Burden, the other was tired by being carried on too long; it was fit to ride a Heat, but it had not Wind enough for a long Courſe.

A very great Memory often forgetteth how much Time is loſt by repeating things of no Uſe. It was one Reaſon of his talking ſo much; ſince a great Memory will always have ſomething to ſay, and will be diſcharging itſelf, whether in or out of Seaſon, if a good Judgment doth not go along with it, to make it ſtop and turn. One might ſay of his Memory, that it was a *Beauté Journaliere:* Sometimes he would make

make ſhrewd Applications, *&c.* at others he would bring things out of it, that never deſerved to be laid in it.

He grew by Age into a pretty exact *Diſtribution* of his *Hours*, both for his Buſineſs, Pleaſures, and the Exerciſe for his Health, of which he took as much care as could poſſibly conſiſt with ſome Liberties he was reſolved to indulge in himſelf. He walked by his Watch, and when he pulled it out to look upon it, skilful Men would make haſte with what they had to ſay to him.

He was often retained in his *perſonal* againſt his *politick* Capacity. He would ſpeak upon thoſe Occaſions moſt dexterouſly againſt himſelf; *Charles Stuart* would be bribed againſt the *King*; and in the Diſtinction, he leaned more to his natural Self, than his Character would allow.

allow. He would not ſuffer himſelf to be ſo much fettered by his Character as was convenient; he was ſtill ſtarting out of it, the Power of Nature was too ſtrong for the Dignity of his Calling, which generally yielded as often as there was a conteſt.

It was not the beſt uſe he made of his *Back-ſtairs* to admit Men to bribe him againſt himſelf, to procure a Defalcation, help a lame Accountant to get off, or ſide with the Farmers againſt the Improvement of the Revenue. The King was made the Inſtrument to defraud the Crown, which is ſomewhat extraordinary.

That which might tempt him to it probably was, his finding that thoſe about him ſo often took Money upon thoſe Occaſions; ſo that he thought he might do well at leaſt

to

to be a Partner. He did not take the Money to *hoard* it; there were thoſe at Court who watched thoſe Times, as the *Spaniards* do for the coming in of the *Plate Fleet*. The Beggars of both Sexes helped to empty his Cabinet, and to leave room in them for a new lading upon the next Occaſion. Theſe Negotiators played double with him too, when it was for their purpoſe ſo to do. He *knew it*, and *went on* ſtill; ſo he gained his preſent end, at the time, he was leſs ſolicitous to enquire into the Conſequences.

He could not properly be ſaid to be either *covetous* or *liberal*; his deſire to get was not with an Intention to be rich; and his ſpending was rather an Eaſineſs in letting Money go, than any premeditated Thought for the Diſtribution of it. He would do as much to throw off the bur-

den

den of a preſent Importunity, as he would to relieve a want.

When once the Averſion to bear Uneaſineſs taketh place in a Man's Mind, it doth ſo check all the Paſſions, that they are dampt into a kind of Indifference; they grow faint and languiſhing, and come to be ſubordinate to that fundamental Maxim, of not purchaſing any thing at the price of a Difficulty. This made that he had as little Eagerneſs to oblige, as he had to hurt Men; the Motive of his giving Bounties was rather to make Men leſs uneaſy to him, than more eaſy to themſelves; and yet no ill-nature all this while. He would ſlide from an asking Face, and could gueſs very well. It was throwing a Man off from his Shoulders, that leaned upon them with his whole weight; ſo that the Party was not glader to receive, than he was

to

to give. It was a kind of implied bargain; though Men ſeldom kept it, being ſo apt to forget the advantage they had received, that they would preſume the King would as little remember the good he had done them, ſo as to make it an Argument againſt their next Requeſt.

This Principle of making the *love* of *Eaſe* exerciſe an entire Sovereignty in his Thoughts, would have been leſs cenſured in a private Man, than might be in a Prince. The Conſequence of it to the Publick changeth the Nature of that Quality, or elſe a Philoſopher in his private Capacity might ſay a great deal to juſtify it. The truth is, a King is to be ſuch a diſtinct Creature from a Man, that their Thoughts are to be put in quite a differing Shape, and it is ſuch a diſquieting task to reconcile them, that

that Princes might rather expect to be lamented than to be envied, for being in a Station that expoſeth them, if they do not do more to anſwer Mens Expectations than human Nature will allow.

That Men have the leſs Eaſe for their loving it ſo much, is ſo far from a wonder, that it is a natural Conſequence, eſpecially in the caſe of a Prince. Eaſe is ſeldom got without ſome pains, but it is yet ſeldomer kept without them. He thought giving would make Men more eaſy to him, whereas he might have known it would certainly make them more troubleſome.

When Men receive Benefits from Princes, they attribute leſs to his Generoſity than to their own Deſerts; ſo that in their own Opinion, their Merit cannot be bounded; by that miſtaken Rule, it can as little be

be ſatisfied. They would take it for a diminution to have it circumſcribed. Merit hath a Thirſt upon it that can never be quenched by golden Showers. It is not only ſtill ready, but greedy to receive more. This King *Charles* found in as many Inſtances as any Prince that ever reigned, becauſe the Eaſineſs of Acceſs introducing the good Succeſs of their firſt Requeſt, they were the more encouraged to repeat thoſe Importunities, which had been more effectually ſtopt in the Beginning by a ſhort and reſolute Denial. But his Nature did not diſpoſe him to that Method, it directed him rather to put off the troubleſome Minute for the time, and that being his Inclination, he did not care to ſtruggle with it.

I am of an Opinion, in which I am every Day more confirmed by Ob-

Obſervation, that Gratitude is one of thoſe things that cannot be bought. It muſt be born with Men, or elſe all the Obligations in the World will not create it. An outward Shew may be made to ſatisfy Decency, and to prevent Reproach; but a real Senſe of a kind thing is a Gift of Nature, and never was, nor can be acquired.

The Love of Eaſe is an Opiate, it is pleaſing for the time, quieteth the Spirits, but it hath its Effects that ſeldom fail to be moſt fatal. The immoderate Love of Eaſe maketh a Man's Mind pay a paſſive Obedience to any thing that happeneth: It reduceth the Thoughts from having *Deſire* to be *content*.

It muſt be allowed he had a little Over-balance on the well-natured Side, not Vigour enough to be earneſt to do a kind Thing,

much leſs to do a harſh one; but if a hard thing was done to another Man, he did not eat his Supper the worſe for it. It was rather a Deadneſs than Severity of Nature, whether it proceeded from a Diſſipation of Spirits, or by the Habit of Living in which he was engaged.

If a King ſhould be born with more Tenderneſs than might ſuit with his Office, he would in time be hardned. The Faults of his Subjects make Severity ſo neceſſary, that by the frequent Occaſions given to uſe it, it comes to be habitual, and by degrees the Reſiſtance that Nature made at firſt groweth fainter, till at laſt it is in a manner quite extinguiſhed.

In ſhort, this Prince might more properly be ſaid to have *Gifts* than *Virtues*, as Affability, Eaſineſs of Living,

Living, Inclinations to give, and to forgive: Qualities that flowed from his Nature rather than from his Virtue.

He had not more Application to any thing than the Preſervation of his *Health*; it had an intire Preference to any thing elſe in his Thoughts, and he might be ſaid without Aggravation to ſtudy that, with as little Intermiſſion as any Man in the World. He underſtood it very well, only in this he failed, that he thought it was more reconcilable with his *Pleaſures*, than it really was. It is natural to have ſuch a Mind to reconcile theſe, that 'tis the eaſier for any Man that goeth about it, to be guilty of that Miſtake.

This made him overdo in point of Nouriſhment, the better to furniſh to thoſe Entertainments; and then

he thought by great *Exercise* to make Amends, and to prevent the ill Effects of his Blood being too much raised. The Success he had in this Method, whilst he had Youth and Vigour to support him in it, encouraged him to continue it longer than Nature allowed. Age stealeth so insensibly upon us, that we do not think of suiting our way of Reasoning to the several Stages of Life; so insensibly that not being able to pitch upon any *precise Time*, when we cease to be young, we either flatter ourselves that we always continue to be so, or at least forget how much we are mistaken in it.

VII. Con-

VII. CONCLUSION.

AFTER all this, when ſome rough Strokes of the Pencil have made ſeveral Parts of the Picture look a little hard, it is a Juſtice that would be due to every Man, much more to a Prince, to make ſome Amends, and to reconcile Men as much as may be to it by the laſt finiſhing.

He had as good a Claim to a kind Interpretation as moſt Men. Firſt as a *Prince:* living and dead, generous and well-bred Men will be gentle to them; next as an *unfortunate Prince* in the beginning of his Time, and a *gentle* one in the reſt.

A Prince neither ſharpened by his Misfortunes whilſt Abroad, nor by his Power when reſtored, is ſuch a ſhining Character, that it

is a Reproach not to be ſo dazzled with it, as not to be able to ſee a Fault in its full Light. It would be a Scandal in this Caſe to have an exact Memory. And if all who are akin to his Vices, ſhould mourn for him, never Prince would be better attended to his Grave. He is under the Protection of common Frailty, that muſt engage Men for their own ſakes not to be too ſevere, where they themſelves have ſo much to anſwer.

What therefore an angry Philoſopher would call *Lewdneſs*, let frailer Men call a Warmth and Sweetneſs of the Blood, that would not be confined in the communicating itſelf; an over-flowing of Good-nature, of which he had ſuch a Stream, that it would not be reſtrained within the Banks of a crabbed and unſociable Virtue.

If

If he had ſometimes leſs *Firmneſs* than might have been wiſhed; let the kindeſt Reaſon be given, and if that ſhould be wanting, the beſt Excuſe. I would aſſign the Cauſe of it to be his loving at any rate to be *eaſy*, and his deſerving the more to be indulged in it, by his deſiring that every body elſe ſhould be ſo.

If he ſometimes let a *Servant fall*, let it be examined whether he did not *weigh* ſo much upon his Maſter, as to give him a fair Excuſe. That *Yieldingneſs*, whatever Foundations it might lay to the Diſadvantage of Poſterity, was a Specifick to preſerve us in Peace for his own Time. If he loved too much to lie upon his own Down-bed of Eaſe, his Subjects had the Pleaſure, during his Reign, of lolling and ſtretching upon theirs. As a Sword is ſooner broken upon a

Feather-bed than upon a Table, ſo his Pliantneſs broke the blow of a preſent Miſchief much better than a more immediate Reſiſtance would perhaps have done.

Ruin ſaw this, and therefore removed him firſt to make way for further Overturnings.

If *he diſſembled*; let us remember, firſt, that he was a King, and that Diſſimulation is a Jewel of the Crown; next, that it is very hard for a Man not to do ſometimes too much of that, which he concludeth neceſſary for him to practice. Men ſhould conſider, that as there would be no falſe Dice, if there were no true ones, ſo if Diſſembling is grown univerſal, it ceaſeth to be foul play, having an implied Allowance by the general Practice. He that was ſo often forced to diſſemble in his own Defence, might the better have the privilege ſome-

ſometimes to be the Aggreſſor, and to deal with Men at their own Weapon.

Subjects are apt to be as arbitrary in their *Cenſure*, as the moſt aſſuming Kings can be in their Power. If there might be matter for Objections, there is not leſs reaſon for Excuſes; The Defects laid to his Charge, are ſuch as may claim Indulgence from Mankind.

Should no body throw a Stone at his Faults but thoſe who are free from them, there would be but a ſlender Shower.

What private Man will throw Stones at him becauſe he *loved?* Or what Prince, becauſe he *diſſembled?*

If he either *truſted*, or *forgave* his *Enemies*, or in ſome Caſes *neglected* his *Friends*, more than could in Strictneſs be allowed; let not thoſe Errors be ſo arraigned as take away the

the Privilege that ſeemeth to be due to Princely Frailties. If Princes are under the Misfortune of being accuſed to govern ill, their Subjects have the leſs right to fall hard upon them, ſince they generally ſo little deſerve to be governed well.

The truth is, the Calling of a King, with all its glittering, hath ſuch an unreaſonable weight upon it, that they may rather expect to be lamented, than to be envied; for being ſet upon a Pinacle, where they are expoſed to Cenſure, if they do not do more to anſwer Mens Expectations, than corrupted Nature will allow.

It is but Juſtice therefore to this Prince, to give all due Softenings to the leſs ſhining Parts of his Life; to offer Flowers and Leaves to hide, inſtead of uſing Aggravations to expoſe them.

Let

Let his Royal Aſhes than lie ſoft upon him, and cover him from harſh and unkind Cenſures; which though they ſhould not be unjuſt, can never clear themſelves from being indecent.

Political,

Political, Moral and Miſcellaneous

Thoughts *and* Reflections,

By the Marquis of HALIFAX.

POLITICAL THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS.

Of Fundamentals.

EVERY Party, when they find a Maxim for their turn, they presently call it a Fundamental, they think they nail it with a Peg of Iron, whereas in truth they only tie it with a wisp of Straw.

The word soundeth so well that the Impropriety of it hath been the less observed. But as weighty as the word appeareth, no Feather hath been more blown about in the World than this word, *Fundamental.*

It is one of those Mistakes that at sometimes may be of use, but it is a Mistake still. Funda-

Fundamental is uſed as Men uſe their Friends; commend them when they have need of them, and when they fall out, find a hundred Objections to them.

Fundamental is a Pedeſtal that Men ſet every thing upon that they would not have broken. It is a Nail every body would uſe to fix that which is good for them: for all Men would have that Principle to be immoveable, that ſerves their uſe at the time.

Every thing that is created is Mortal, *ergo* all Fundamentals of human Creation will die.

A true Fundamental muſt be like the Foundation of a Houſe; if it is undermined the whole Houſe falleth.

The Fundamentals in Divinity have been changed in ſeveral Ages of the World.

They

They have made no difficulty in the ſeveral Councils, to deſtroy and excommunicate Men for aſſerting Things that at other Times were called Fundamentals.

Philoſophy, Aſtronomy, *&c.* have changed their Fundamentals as the Men of Art no doubt called them at the time. Motion of the Earth, *&c.*

Even in Morality one may more properly ſay, There *ſhould be* Fundamentals allowed, than that there *are* any which in Strictneſs can be maintained.

However this is the leaſt uncertain Foundation: Fundamental is leſs improperly applied here than any where elſe.

Wiſe and good Men will in all Ages ſtick to ſome Fundamentals, look upon them as ſacred, and preſerve an inviolable Reſpect for them;

but Mankind in general make Morality a more malleable thing than it ought to be.

There is then no certain Fundamental but in *Nature*, and yet *there* are Objections too. It is a Fundamental in Nature that the Son ſhould not kill the Father, and yet the Senate of *Venice* gave a Reward to a Son who brought in his Father's Head, according to a Proclamation.

Salus Populi is an unwritten Law, yet that doth not hinder but that it is ſometimes very viſible; and as often as it is ſo, it ſuperſedeth all other Laws which are ſubordinate Things compared.

The great Puniſhments upon Self-murder, are Arguments that it was rather a tempting Sin to be diſcouraged than an unnatural Act.

It

It is a Fundamental that where a Man intendeth no hurt he ſhould receive none, yet Manſlaughter, &c. are Caſes of Mercy.

That a Boy under Ten ſhall not ſuffer Death, yet where *Malitia ſupplet ætatem*, otherwiſe.

That there were Witches----much ſhaken of late.

That the King is not to be deceived in his Grant----The practical Fundamental the contrary.

That what is given to God cannot be alienated. Yet in practice it is, Treaties, &c. and even by the Church itſelf, when they get a better bargain by it.

I can make no other Definition of a true Fundamental than this: *viz.* That whatever a Man hath a deſire to do or to hinder, if he hath unconteſted and irreſiſtable Power to

effect it, that he will certainly do it.

If he thinketh he hath that Power, though he hath it not, he will certainly go about it.

Some would define a Fundamental to be the ſettling the Laws of Nature and common Equity in ſuch a ſort as that they may be well adminiſtered: even in this caſe there can be nothing *fixed*, but it muſt *vary* for the Good of the whole.

A Conſtitution cannot make itſelf; ſome body made it, not at once but at ſeveral times. It is alterable; and by that draweth nearer Perfection; and without ſuiting itſelf to differing Times and Circumſtances, it could not live. Its Life is prolonged by changing ſeaſonably the ſeveral Parts of it at ſeveral times.

The Reverence that is given to a Fundamental, in a general unintelligible

gible Notion, would be much better applyed to that *Supremacy or Power* which is ſet up in every Nation in differing Shapes, that altereth the Conſtitution as often as the Good of the People requireth it.

Neither *King* nor *People* would now like juſt the *original Conſtitution*, without any varyings.

If Kings are only anſwerable to God, that doth not ſecure them even in this World; ſince if God upon the Appeal thinketh fit not to ſtay, he maketh the People his Inſtruments.

I am perſwaded that where ever any ſingle Man had Power to do himſelf right upon a *deceitful Truſtee*, he would do it. That Thought well digeſted would go a great way towards the diſcouraging Invaſions upon Rights, *&c.*

I lay down then as a Fundamental, 1ſt, that in every Conſtitution there is *ſome Power* which neither will nor ought to be bounded.

2. That the King's Prerogative ſhould be as *plain* a thing as the People's Obedience.

3. That a Power which may by parity of Reaſon deſtroy the whole Laws, can never be reſerved by the Laws.

4. That in all limited Governments it muſt give the Governor Power to *hurt*, but it can never be ſo interpreted as to give him Power to *deſtroy*, for then in effect it would ceaſe to be a limited Government.

5. That Severity be rare and great; for as *Tacitus* ſayeth of *Nero*, "Frequent Puniſhments made the People call even his Juſtice Cruelty."

6. That it is neceſſary to make the Inſtruments of Power eaſy; for

Power

Power is hard enough to be digeſted by thoſe under it at the beſt.

7. That the People are never ſo perfectly backed, but that they will kick and fling if not ſtroked at ſeaſonable times.

8. That a Prince muſt think if he loſeth his People he can never regain them.

It is both wiſe and ſafe to think ſo.

9. That Kings aſſuming Prerogative teach the People to do ſo too.

10. That Perogative is a Truſt.

11. That they are not the *King*'s Laws, nor the *Parliament*'s Laws, but the *Laws of England*, in which after they have paſſed by the Legiſlative Power, the People have the *Property*, and the King the *Executive* part.

12. That no Abilities ſhould qualify a noted Knave to be employed in Buſineſs. A Knave can

by none of his Dexterities make amends for the Scandal he bringeth upon the Crown.

13. That thoſe who will not be bound by the *Laws*, rely upon *Crimes:* a third way was never found in the World to ſecure any Government.

14. That a Seaman be a Seaman; a Cabinet-Counſellor a Man of Buſineſs; an Officer, an Officer.

15. In corrupted Governments the Place is given for the ſake of the Man; in good ones the Man is choſen for the ſake of the Place.

16. That Crowds at Court are made up of ſuch as would deceive: The *real Worſhippers* are few.

17. That *Salus Populi* is the greateſt of all Fundamentals, yet not altogether an immoveable one. It is a Fundamental for a Ship to ride at Anchor when it is in Port, but if

a Storm cometh the Cable muſt be cut.

18. *Property* is not a fundamental Right in one Senſe, becauſe in the beginning of the World there was none, ſo that Property itſelf was an Innovation introduced by Laws.

Property is only ſecured by truſting it in the beſt Hands, and thoſe are generally choſen who are leaſt likely to deceive; but if they ſhould, they have a legal Authority to abuſe as well as uſe the Power with which they are truſted, and there is no Fundamental can ſtand in their way, or be allowed as an Exception to the Authority that was veſted in them.

19. *Magna Charta* would fain be made to paſs for a Fundamental; and Sir *Edward Coke* would have it, that the Grand Charter was for the

moſt

moſt part declaratory of the principal Grounds of the fundamental Laws of *England.*

If that referreth to the Common Law, it muſt be made out that every thing in *Magna Charta* is always and at all times neceſſary in itſelf to be kept, or elſe the denying a ſubſequent Parliament the Right of repealing any Law doth by conſequence deny the preceding Parliament the Right of making it. But they are fain to ſay it was only a declarative Law, which is very hard to be proved. Yet ſuppoſe it, you muſt either make the Common Law ſo ſtated a thing that all Men know it before-hand, or elſe univerſally acquieſce in it whenever it is alledged, from the Affinity it hath to the Law of Nature. Now I would fain know whether the Common Law is capable of being defined, and whether

it

it doth not hover in the Clouds like the Prerogative, and bolteth out like Lightening to be made uſe of for ſome particular Occaſion? If ſo, the Government of the World is left to a thing that cannot be defined; and if it cannot be defined, you know not what it is; ſo that the ſupream Appeal is, we know not what. We ſubmit to God Almighty though he is incomprehenſible, and yet He hath ſet down His Methods; but for this World, there can be no Government without a ſtated Rule, and a Supream Power not to be controled neither by the Dead nor the Living.

The Laws under the Protection of the King govern in the ordinary Adminiſtration; the extraordinary Power is in Acts of Parliament, from whence there can be no Appeal but to the ſame Power at another time.

To

To ſay a Power is Supream, and not Arbitrary, is not Senſe. It is acknowledg'd Supream, and therefore, *&c.*

If the Common Law is Supream, then thoſe are ſo who judge what is the Common Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge ſo, there is an end of the Controverſy; there is no *Fundamental*; for the Parliament may judge as they pleaſe, that is, they have the Authority, but they may judge againſt Right, their Power is good, though their Act is ill; no good Man will outwardly reſiſt the one, or inwardly approve the other.

There is then no other Fundamental, but that *every Supream Power muſt be Arbitrary.*

Fundamental is a Word uſed by the Laity, as the Word Sacred is by the Clergy, to fix every thing to them-

themſelves they have a mind to keep; that nobody elſe may touch it.

Of Princes.

A PRINCE who will not undergo the Difficulty of Underſtanding, muſt undergo the Danger of Truſting.

A wiſe Prince may gain ſuch an Influence, that his Countenance would be the laſt Appeal. Where it is not ſo in ſome degree, his Authority is precarious.

A Prince muſt keep up the Power of his Countenance, which is not the leaſt of his Prerogatives.

The Conſcience, as well as the Prerogative of a King, muſt be reſtrained or looſened as is beſt for his People.

It

It may without Scandal be made of ſtretching Leather, but it muſt be drawn by a ſteady Hand.

A King that lets Interceſſion prevail, will not be long worſhipped.

A Prince uſed to War getteth a military Logick that is not very well ſuited to the Civil Adminiſtration.

If he maketh War ſucceſsfully, he groweth into a Demi-God; if without Succeſs, the World throweth him as much below Humanity as they had before ſet him above it.

A Hero muſt be ſometimes allowed to make bold Strokes, without being fettered by ſtrict Reaſon.

He is to have ſome generous Irregularities in his Reaſoning, or elſe he will not be a good Thing of his Kind.

PRINCES (*their Rewards of Servants.*)

WHEN a Prince giveth any Man a very extravagant Reward, it looketh as if it was rather for an ill thing than a good one.

Both the Giver and Receiver are out of countenance where they are ill ſuited, and ill applyed.

Serving Princes will make Men proud at firſt, and humble at laſt.

Reſolving to ſerve well, and at the ſame time reſolving to pleaſe, is generally reſolving to do what is not to be done.

A Man that will ſerve well muſt often rule the Maſter ſo hard that it will hurt him.

It is thought an unſociable Quality in a Court to do ones Duty better than other Men.

Nothing

Nothing is leſs forgiven than ſetting Patterns Men have no mind to follow.

Men are ſo unwilling to diſpleaſe a Prince, that it is as dangerous to inform him right, as to ſerve him wrong.

Where Men get by pleaſing, and loſe by ſerving, the choice is ſo eaſy that no body can miſs it.

PRINCES, *their Secrets.*

MEN are ſo proud of Princes Secrets, that they will not ſee the danger of them.

When a Prince truſteth a Man with a dangerous Secret, he would not be ſorry to hear the Bell toll for him.

Love

Love of the Subjects to a PRINCE.

THE Heart of the Subjects yieldeth but a lean Crop where it is not cultivated by a wise Prince.

The Good-will of the Governed will be starved, if it is not fed by the good Conduct of the Governors.

Suffering for PRINCES.

THOSE who merit because they suffered, are so very angry with those that made them suffer, that though their Services may deserve Employment, their Temper rendereth them unfit for it.

Of Ministers.

THE World dealeth with Miniſters of State as they do with ill Fidlers, ready to kick them down Stairs for playing ill, though few of the Fault-finders underſtand their Muſick enough to be good Judges.

A Miniſter who undertaketh to make his Maſter very great, if he faileth, is ruin'd for his folly; if he ſucceedeth, he is feared for his Skill.

A good Stateſman may ſometimes miſtake as much by being too humble as by being too proud: He muſt take upon him in order to do his Duty, and not in order to the ſetting himſelf out.

A Miniſter is not to plead the King's Command for ſuch things as he may in juſtice be ſuppoſed to have directed.

It

It is dangerous to ſerve where the Maſter hath the Privilege not to be blamed.

It is hard for a Prince to eſteem the Parts of a Miniſter without either envying or fearing them; and leſs dangerous for a Miniſter to ſhew all the Weakneſs than all the Strength of his Underſtanding.

There are ſo many things neceſſary to make up a good Miniſter, that no wonder there are ſo few of them in the World.

There is hardly a raſher thing, than for a Man to venture to be a good Miniſter.

A Miniſter of State muſt have a Spirit of liberal Oeconomy, not a reſtrained Frugality.

He muſt enlarge his Family-Soul, and ſuit it to the bigger Compaſs of a Kingdom.

A Prince ſhould be asked, why he *will* do a thing, but not why he *hath* done it.

If the Boys were to chooſe a School-maſter, it ſhould be one that would not whip them; the ſame thing if the Courtiers were to chooſe a Miniſter.

They would have a great many Play-days, no Rods, and leave to rob Orchards. ---- The Parallel will hold.

Wicked MINISTERS.

A Cunning Miniſter will engage his Maſter to begin with a ſmall wrong Step, which will inſenſibly engage him in a great one.

A Man that hath the Patience to go by Steps, may deceive one much wiſer than himſelf.

State-

State-buſineſs is a cruel Trade; Good-nature is a Bungler in it.

Inſtruments of State-Ministers.

MEN in Buſineſs are in as much danger from thoſe that work under them, as from thoſe that work againſt them.

When the Inſtruments bend under the Weight of their Buſineſs, it is like a weak-legg'd Horſe that brings his Rider down with him.

As when they are too weak they let a Man fall, ſo when they are too ſtrong they throw him off.

If Men of Buſineſs did not forget how apt their Tools are to break or fail, they would ſhut up Shop.

They muſt uſe things called *Men* under them, who will ſpoil the beſt

Scheme that can be drawn by Human Underſtanding.

Tools that are blunt cannot cut at all, and thoſe that are ſharp are apt to cut in the wrong place.

Great difference between a good Tool and a good Workman.

When the Tools will be Workmen they cut their own Fingers, and every body's elſe.

Of the PEOPLE.

THERE is more Strength in *Union* than in *Number*; witneſs the People that in all Ages have been ſcurvily uſed, becauſe they could ſo ſeldom agree to do themſelves Right.

The more the weaker, may be as good a Proverb as, The more the merrier.

A People can no more ſtand without Government, than a Child can go without Leading-Strings: as old and as big as a Nation is, it can't go by itſelf, and muſt be led. The *Numbers* that make its Strength, are at the ſame time the Cauſe of its Weakneſs and Incapacity of Acting.

Men have ſo *diſcovered themſelves* to *one another*, that Union is become a mere Word, in reality impracticable.

They truſt, or ſuſpect, not upon Reaſon but ill-grounded Fame; they would be at eaſe, ſaved, protected, *&c.* and give nothing for it.

The lower Sort of Men muſt be indulged the Conſolation of finding fault with thoſe above them; without that, they would be ſo melancholy, that it would be dangerous, conſidering their Numbers.

They are too many to be told of their Miſtakes, and for that Reaſon they are never to be cured of them.

The Body of the People are generally either ſo dead that they cannot move, or ſo mad that they cannot be reclaimed: to be neither all in a Flame, nor quite cold, requireth more Reaſon than great Numbers can ever attain.

The People can ſeldom agree to move together againſt a Government, but they can to ſit ſtill and let it be undone.

Thoſe that will be Martyrs for the People, muſt expect to be repayed only by their *Vanity*, or their *Virtue*.

A Man that will head the Mob is like a Bull let looſe, tyed about with Squibs and Crackers.

He muſt be half mad that goeth about it, yet at ſometimes ſhall be too hard for all the wiſe Men in a Kingdom:

Kingdom: For though good Senſe ſpeaketh againſt Madneſs, yet it is out of Countenance whenever it meets it.

It would be a greater Reproach to the People that their *Favour* is ſhort-liv'd, if their *Malice* was not ſo too.

The Thoughts of the People have no regular Motion, they come out by Starts.

There is an accumulative Cruelty in a number of Men, though none in particular are ill-natured.

The angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the bloodieſt Noiſes in the World.

Of Government.

AN exact Adminiſtration, and good choice of proper Inſtruments doth inſenſibly make the Government

vernment in a manner abſolute without aſſuming it.

The beſt Definition of the beſt Government is, that it hath no Inconveniences but ſuch as are ſupportable; but Inconveniences there muſt be.

The Intereſt of the Governors and the Governed is in reality the ſame, but by Miſtakes on both Sides it is generally very differing. He who is a Courtier by Trade, and the Country Gentleman who will be popular, right or wrong, help to keep up this unreaſonable Diſtinction.

There are as many apt to be angry at being well, as at being ill governed. For moſt Men to be well governed muſt be ſcurvily uſed.

As Mankind is made, the keeping it in order is an ill-natured Office.

It is like a great Galley where the Officers muſt be whipping with little

In-

Intermiſſion, if they will do their Duty.

It is in a diſorderly Government as in a River, the lighteſt Things ſwim at the top.

A Nation is beſt to be judged by the Government it is under at the time. Mankind is moulded to good or ill, according as the Power over it is well or ill directed. A Nation is a Maſs of Dough, it is the Government that kneadeth it into Form.

Where Learning and Trade flouriſh in a Nation, they produce ſo much Knowledge, and That ſo much Equality among Men, that the Greatneſs of Dependencies is loſt, but the Nation in general will be the better for it: For if the Government be wiſe, it is the more eaſily governed; if not, the bad Government is the more eaſily overturned, by Mens being more united againſt it than when

they

they depended upon great Men; who might ſooner be gained over and weakend by being divided.

There is more reaſon for allowing *Luxury* in a Military Government than in another; the perpetual Exerciſe of War not only excuſeth but recommendeth the Entertainments in the Winter. In another it groweth into a Habit of uninterrupted Expences and idle Follies, and the Conſequences of them to a Nation become irrecoverable.

CLERGY.

IF the Clergy did not live like temporal Men, all the Power of Princes could not bring them under the temporal Juriſdiction.

They

They who may be ſaid to be of God Almighty's Houſhold, ſhould ſhew by their Lives that he hath a well diſciplined Family.

The Clergy in this Senſe, of Divine Inſtitution; that God hath made Mankind ſo weak that it muſt be deceived.

RELIGION.

IT is a ſtrange thing that the way to ſave Mens Souls ſhould be ſuch a cunning Trade, as to require a skilful Maſter.

The time ſpent in praying to God, might be better employed in deſerving well from him.

Men think praying the eaſier Task of the two, and therefore chooſe it.

The People would not believe in God at all, if they were not permitted to believe wrong in him.

The

The ſeveral Sorts of Religion in the World are little more than ſo many ſpiritual Monopolies.

If their Intereſts could be reconciled, their Opinions would be ſo too.

Men pretend to ſerve God Almighty who doth not need it, but make uſe of him becauſe they need him.

Factions are like Pirates that ſet out falſe Colours, when they come near a Booty Religion is put under Deck.

Moſt Mens Anger about Religion is as if two Men ſhould quarrel for a Lady, they neither of them care for.

Of Prerogative, Power *and* Liberty.

A Prerogative that tendeth to the Diſſolution of all Laws muſt be void in itſelf, *felo de ſe*; for a Prerogative is a Law. The reaſon of any Law is, that no Man's Will ſhould be a Law.

The King is the Life of the Law, and cannot have a Prerogative that is mortal to it.

The Law is to have a Soul in it, or it is a dead thing. The King is by his Sovereign Power to add Warmth and Vigour to the meaning of the Law. We are by no means to imagine there is ſuch an Antipathy between them, that the Prerogative, like a Baſilisk, is to kill the Law, whenever it looks upon it.

The Prince hath very rarely uſe of his Prerogative, but hath con-

ſtantly

ſtantly a great Advantage by the Laws.

They attribute to the Pope indeed, that all the Laws of the Church are in his Breaſt; but then he hath the Holy Ghoſt for his learned Counſel, *&c.*

The People's Obedience muſt be *plain*, and without *Evaſions*. The Prince's Prerogative ſhould be ſo too.

King *Charles the Firſt* made this Anſwer to the Petition of Right, (to the Obſervation whereof he held himſelf obliged in Conſcience, as well as of his Prerogative.) "That the "People's Liberties ſtrengthen the "King's Prerogative, and the King's "Prerogative is to defend the Peo-"ple's Liberties."

That Prince's Declarations allow the Original of Government to come from

from the People. Prerogative never yet pretended to repealing.

The firſt ground of Prerogative was to enable the Prince to do *good*, not to do *every thing*.

If the ground of a King's deſire of Power be his aſſurance of himſelf that he will do no hurt by it; is it not an Argument for Subjects to deſire to *keep* that which they will never *abuſe?*

It muſt not be ſuch a Prerogative as giveth the Government the Rickets; all the Nouriſhment to go to the upper part, and the lower ſtarved.

As a Prince is in danger who calleth a ſtronger than himſelf to his Aſſiſtance; ſo when Prerogative uſeth *Neceſſity* for an Argument, it calleth in a ſtronger thing than itſelf. The ſame Reaſon may overturn it. Neceſſity too is ſo plain a thing, that every body ſees it, ſo that the Ma-

giſtrate hath no great privilege in being the Judge of it. Neceſſity therefore is a dangerous Argument for Princes, ſince (wherever it is real) it conſtitutes every Man a Magiſtrate, and gives as great a Power of diſpenſing to every private Man, as a Prince can claim.

It is not ſo proper to ſay that *Prerogative* juſtifieth *Force*, as that *Force* ſupporteth *Prerogative*. They have not been ſuch conſtant Friends, but that they have had terrible *Fallings* out.

All Powers are of God; and between *Permiſſion* and *Appointment*, well conſidered, there is no real difference.

In a limited Monarchy, Prerogative and Liberty are as jealous of one another as any two neighbouring States can be of their reſpective Incroachments.

They

They ought not to part for ſmall Bickerings, and muſt bear little Jealouſies without breaking for them.

Power is ſo apt to be inſolent, and Liberty to be ſaucy, that they are very ſeldom upon good Terms.

They are both ſo quarrelſome that they will not eaſily enter into a fair Treaty. For indeed it is hard to bring them together; they ever quarrel at a diſtance.

Power and Liberty are reſpectively managed in the World in a manner not ſuitable to their Value and Dignity.

They are both ſo abuſed that it juſtifieth the Satires that are generally made upon them. And

They are ſo in Poſſeſſion of being miſapplied, that inſtead of cenſuring their being abuſed, it is more reaſonable to wonder whenever they are *not* ſo.

They are perpetually wreſtling, and have had their Turns when they have been thrown, to have their Bones broken by it.

If they were not both apt to be out of Breath, there would be no living.

If Prerogative will urge Reaſon to ſupport it, it muſt bear Reaſon when it reſiſteth it.

It is a Diminution inſtead of a Glory, to be above treating upon equal Terms with Reaſon.

If the People were deſigned to be the ſole Property of the ſupream Magiſtrate, ſure God would have made them of a differing and ſub-ordinate Species; as he hath the Beaſts, that by the Inferiority of their Nature they might the better ſub-mit to the Dominion of Mankind.

If none were to have Liberty but thoſe who underſtand what it is, there

there would not be many freed Men in the World.

When the People contend for their Liberty, they ſeldom get any thing by their Victory but new Maſters.

Liberty can neither be got, nor kept, but by ſo much Care, that Mankind generally are unwilling to give the Price for it. And therefore, in the Conteſt between Eaſe and Liberty, the firſt hath generally prevailed.

Of LAWS.

LAWS are generally not underſtood by three Sorts of Perſons, *viz.* by thoſe that make them, by thoſe that execute them, and by thoſe that ſuffer, if they break them.

Men ſeldom underſtand any Laws but thoſe they *feel.*

Precepts, like Fomentations, muſt be rubbed into us; and with a rough Hand too.

If the Laws could ſpeak for themſelves, they would complain of the Lawyers in the firſt Place.

There is more Learning now required to explain a Law made, than went to the making it.

The Law hath ſo many Contradictions, and Varyings from itſelf, that the Law may not improperly be called a Law-breaker.

It is become too changeable a thing to be defined: it is made little leſs a *Myſtery* than the *Goſpel.*

The Clergy and the Lawyers, like the Free-Maſons, may be ſuppoſed to take an Oath not to tell the Secret.

The Men of Law have a Biaſs to their calling in the Interpretations they make of the Law.

Of

Of Parliaments.

THE Parliaments are ſo altered from their original Conſtitution, that between the Court and the Country, the Houſe, inſtead of being united, is like Troops of a contrary Party facing one another, and watching their Advantage.

Even the well-meaning Men who have good Senſe too, have their Difficulties in an Aſſembly; what they offer honeſtly for a good End, will be skilfully improved for an ill one.

It is ſtrange that a groſs Miſtake ſhould live a Minute in an Aſſembly; one would expect that it ſhould be immediately ſtifled by their diſcerning Faculties. But Practice convinceth that a Miſtake is no where better entertained.

In Parliaments, Men wrangle in behalf of Liberty, that do as little care for it, as they deſerve it.

Where the People in Parliament give a good deal of Money in exchange for any thing from the Crown, a wiſe Prince can hardly have an ill bargain. The preſent Gift begetteth more; it is a Politick kind of Generation; and whenever a Parliament does not bring forth, it is the Unskilfulneſs of the Government, that is the cauſe of the Miſcarriage.

Parliaments would bind and limit one another, and enact that ſuch and ſuch things ſhall not be made *Precedents*. There is not a word of Senſe in this Language, which yet is to be underſtood the Senſe of the Nation, and is printed as ſolemnly as if it was Senſe.

Of

Of Parties.

THE beſt Party is but a kind of a Conſpiracy againſt the reſt of the Nation. They put every body elſe out of their Protection. Like the *Jews* to the *Gentiles*, all others are the Offscowrings of the World.

Men value themſelves upon their Principles, ſo as to neglect Practice, Abilities, Induſtry, *&c.*

Party cutteth off one half of the World from the other, ſo that the mutual Improvement of Mens Underſtanding by converſing, *&c.* is loſt, and Men are half undone, when they loſe the advantage of knowing what their Enemies think of them.

It is like Faith without Works; They take it for a Diſpenſation from all

all other Duties, which is the worſt kind of *diſpenſing Power*.

It groweth to be the Maſter Thought; the Eagerneſs againſt one another at home, being a nearer Object, extinguiſheth that which we ought to have againſt our foreign Enemies; and few Mens Underſtandings can get above overvaluing the Danger that is neareſt, in compariſon of that more remote.

It turneth all Thought into talking inſtead of doing. Men get a habit of being unuſeful to the Publick by turning in a Circle of Wrangling and Railing, which they cannot get out of: And it may be remarked, that a *ſpeculative* Coxcomb is not only unuſeful, but miſchievous: A *practical* Coxcomb under diſcipline may be made uſe of.

It

It maketh a Man thruſt his Underſtanding into a Corner, and confine it till by degrees he deſtroys it.

Party is generally an Effect of Wantonneſs, Peace, and Plenty, which beget Humour, Pride, *&c.* and that is called Zeal and publick Spirit.

They forget inſenſibly that there is any body in the World but themſelves, by keeping no other Company; ſo they miſcalculate cruelly. And thus Parties miſtake their Strength by the ſame reaſon that private Men overvalue themſelves; for we by finding fault with others, build up a partial Eſteem of ourſelves upon the Foundation of their Miſtakes: So Men in Parties find faults with thoſe in the Adminiſtration, not without reaſon, but forget that they would be expoſed to the ſame Objections, and perhaps greater,

if

if it was their Adverſary's turn to have the fault-finding part.

There are Men who ſhine in a Faction, and make a Figure by Oppoſition, who would ſtand in a worſe light, if they had the Preferments they ſtruggle for.

It looketh ſo like *Courage* (but nothing that is like is the ſame) to go to the *Extream*, that Men are carried away with it, and blown up out of their Senſes by the wind of popular Applauſe.

That which looketh *bold* is a great Object that the People can diſcern; But that which is *wiſe* is not ſo eaſily ſeen: It is one part of it that it is not ſeen, but at the *End* of a Deſign. Thoſe who are diſpoſed to be wiſe too late, are apt to be valiant too early.

Moſt

Moſt Men enter into a Party raſhly, and retreat from it as ſhamefully. As they encourage one another at firſt, ſo they betray one another at laſt: And becauſe every Qualification is capable of being corrupted by the Exceſs, they fall upon the extream, to fix mutual Reproaches upon one another.

Party is little leſs than an Inquiſition, where Men are under ſuch a Diſcipline in carrying on the common Cauſe, as leaves no Liberty of private Opinion.

It is hard to produce an Inſtance where a Party did ever ſucceed againſt a Government, except they had a good handle given them.

No original Party ever prevailed in a turn; it brought up *ſomething elſe*, but the firſt Projectors were thrown off.

If there are two Parties, a Man ought to adhere to that which he disliketh least, though in the whole he doth not approve it: For whilst he doth not list himself in one or the other Party, he is looked upon as such a Straggler, that he is fallen upon by both. Therefore a Man under such a Misfortune of Singularity, is neither to provoke the World, nor disquiet himself, by taking any particular Station.

It becometh him to live in the Shade, and keep his Mistakes from giving Offence; but if they are his Opinions, he cannot put them off as he doth his Cloaths. Happy those who are convinced so as to be of the general Opinions.

Ignorance maketh most Men go into a Party, and Shame keepeth them from getting out of it.

More

More Men hurt others, they do not know why, than for any reaſon.

If there was any Party entirely compoſed of honeſt Men, it would certainly prevail; but both the honeſt Men and the Knaves reſolve to turn one another off when the Buſineſs is done.

They by turns defame all *England*, ſo nobody can be employed that hath not been branded: There are few Things ſo criminal as a Place.

Of Courts.

THE Court may be ſaid to be a Company of well-bred faſhionable Beggars.

At Court, if a Man hath too much Pride to be a Creature, he had better ſtay at home: A Man who

who will rise at Court must begin, by creeping upon All-four: A Place at Court, like a Place in Heaven, is to be got by being much upon *one's Knees.*

There are hardly two Creatures of a more differing Species than the same Man, when he is pretending to a Place, and when he is in Possession of it.

Mens Industry is spent in receiving the Rents of a Place, there is little left for discharging the Duty of it.

Some Places have such a corrupting Influence upon the Man, that it is a supernatural thing to resist it.

Some Places lye so fair to entertain Corruption, that it looketh like renouncing a due Perquisite, not to go into it.

If

If a getting Fool would keep out of Buſineſs, he would grow richer in a Court than a Man of Senſe.

One would wonder that in a Court where there is ſo little Kindneſs, there ſhould be ſo much *whiſpering*.

Men muſt brag of kind Letters from Court, at the ſame time that they do not believe one Word of them.

Men at Court think ſo much of their own Cunning, that they forget other Mens.

After a Revolution, You ſee the *ſame Men* in the Drawing-room, and within a Week the ſame *Flatterers*.

Of Punishment.

WHEREVER a Government knows *when* to *ſhow* the Rod, it will not often be put to *uſe* it. But between the want of Skill, and the want of Honeſty, Faults generally either eſcape Puniſhment, or are mended to no Purpoſe.

Men are not hang'd for ſtealing Horſes, but that Horſes may not be ſtolen.

Wherever a Knave is not puniſhed, an honeſt Man is laugh'd at.

A Cheat to the Publick is thought infamous, and yet to accuſe him is not thought an honourable part. What a Parodox! 'Tis an ill Method, to make the Aggravation of the Crime a Security againſt the Puniſhment; ſo that the Danger is not to *rob*, but not to *rob enough*.

Treaſon

Treaſon muſt not be *inlayed Work* of *ſeveral Pieces*, it muſt be an entire Piece of itſelf. *Accumulative* in that caſe is a murdering Word, that carrieth Injuſtice, and no Senſe in it.

An *Inference*, though never ſo rational, ſhould go no farther than to juſtify a *Suſpicion*, not ſo far as to inflict a *Puniſhment*. Nothing is ſo apt to break with Stretching, as an *Inference*; and nothing ſo ridiculous, as to ſee how Fools will abuſe one.

MORAL THOUGHTS.
AND
REFLECTIONS.

Of the WORLD.

IT is from the Shortneſs of Thought, that Men imagine there is any great Variety in the World.

Time hath thrown a Vail upon the Faults of former Ages, or elſe we ſhould ſee the ſame Deformities we condemn in the preſent Times.

When a Man looketh upon the Rules that are made, he will think there can be no Faults in the World; and when he looketh upon the Faults, there are ſo many he will be tempted to think there are no Rules.

They

They are not to be reconciled, otherwiſe than by concluding that which is called *Frailty* is the incurable *Nature* of Mankind.

A Man that underſtandeth the World muſt be weary of it; and a Man who doth not, for that Reaſon ought not to be pleaſed with it.

The Uncertainty of what is to come, is ſuch a dark Cloud, that neither Reaſon nor Religion can quite break through it; and the Condition of Mankind is to be weary of what we do know, and afraid of what we do not.

The World is beholden to *generous Miſtakes* for the greateſt Part of the Good that is done in it.

Our *Vices* and *Virtues* couple with one another, and get Children that reſemble both their Parents.

If a Man can hardly inquire into a Thing he undervalueth, how

can a Man of good Senſe take pains to underſtand the World?

To underſtand the World, and to like it, are two things not eaſily to be reconciled.

That which is called an *Able Man* is a great Over-valuer of the World, and all that belongeth to it.

All that can be ſaid of him is, that he maketh the beſt of the General Miſtake.

It is the Fools and the Knaves that make the Wheels of the World turn. *They* are *the World*; thoſe few who have Senſe or Honeſty ſneak up and down ſingle, but never go in Herds.

To be too much *troubled* is a worſe way of over-valuing the World than the being too much *pleaſed*.

A Man that ſteps aſide from the World, and hath leiſure to obſerve it without Intereſt or Deſign, thinks all

all Mankind as mad as they think him, for not agreeing with them in their Miſtakes.

Of Ambition.

THE ſerious Folly of wiſe Men in *over-valuing the World*, is as contemptible as any thing they think fit to cenſure.

The firſt Miſtake belonging to Buſineſs is the going into it.

Men make it ſuch a Point of Honour to be fit for Buſineſs, that they forget to examine whether Buſineſs is fit for a Man of Senſe.

There is Reaſon to think the moſt celebrated Philoſophers would have been Bunglers at Buſineſs; but the Reaſon is becauſe they deſpiſed it.

It is not a Reproach but a Compliment to Learning, to ſay, that

Great Scholars are leſs fit for Buſineſs; ſince the truth is, Buſineſs is ſo much a lower thing than Learning, that a Man uſed to the laſt cannot eaſily bring his Stomach down to the firſt.

The Government of the World is a great thing; but it is a very coarſe one too, compared with the Fineneſs of Speculative Knowledge.

The Dependance of a great Man upon a greater, is a Subjection that lower Men cannot eaſily comprehend.

Ambition hath no Mean, it is either upon *all four* or upon *Tiptoes.*

Nothing can be humbler than Ambition, when it is ſo diſpoſed.

Popularity is a Crime from the Moment it is ſought; it is only a Virtue where Men have it whether they will or no.

It

It is generally an Appeal to the People from the Sentence given by Men of Senſe againſt them.

It is ſtepping very low to get very high.

Men by Habit make irregular Stretches of Power, without diſcerning the Conſequence and Extent of them.

Eagerneſs is apt to overlook Conſequences, it is loth to be ſtopt in its Career; for when Men are in great haſte, they ſee only in a ſtraight Line.

Of CUNNING *and* KNAVERY.

CUNNING is ſo apt to grow into Knavery, that an honeſt Man will avoid the Temptation of it. But Men in this Age are half bribed by the Ambition of circumventing

venting, without any other encouragements. So proud of the Character of being *able* Men, that they do not care to have their Dexterity confined.

In this Age, when it is ſaid of a Man, He knows *how to live*, it may be imply'd he is not very honeſt.

An honeſt Man muſt loſe ſo many Occaſions of Getting, that the World will hardly allow him the Character of an Able one.

There is however more *Wit* requiſite to be an honeſt Man, than there is to be a Knave.

The moſt neceſſary thing in the World, and yet the leaſt uſual, is to reflect that thoſe we deal with, may know how to be as arrant Knaves as ourſelves.

The Eagerneſs of a Knave maketh him often as catchable, as Ignorance maketh a Fool.

No

No Man is ſo much a Fool as not to have Wit enough ſometimes to be a Knave; nor any ſo cunning a Knave, as not to have the Weakneſs ſometimes to play the Fool.

The Mixture of Fool and Knave, maketh up the parti-coloured Creatures that make all the Buſtle in the World.

There is not ſo pleaſant a Quarry, as a Knave taken in a Net of his own making.

A Knave leaneth ſometimes *ſo hard* upon his Impudence, that it breaketh and lets him fall.

Knavery is in ſuch *perpetual Motion*, that it hath not always Leiſure to look to its own Steps; 'tis like ſliding upon Scates, no Motion ſo ſmooth or ſwift, but none gives ſo terrible a *Fall.*

A Knave loveth *Self* ſo heartily, that he is apt to overſtrain it: by never

never thinking he can get enough, he gets ſo much leſs. His Thought is like Wine that fretteth with too much fermenting.

The Knaves in every Government are a kind of Corporation; and though they fall out with one another, like all Beaſts of Prey, yet upon occaſion they unite to ſupport the common Cauſe.

It cannot be ſaid to be ſuch a Corporation as the Bank of *England*, but they are a numerous and formidable Body, ſcarce to be reſiſted; but the Point is, they can never rely upon one another.

Knaves go chain'd to one another like Slaves in the Gallies, and cannot eaſily untie themſelves from their Company. Their Promiſes and Honour indeed do not hinder them, but other intangling Circumſtances keep 'em from breaking looſe.

If

If Knaves had not foolish Memories, they would never trust one another so often as they do.

Present Interest, like present Love, maketh all other Friendship look cold to it, but it faileth in the holding.

When one Knave betrayeth another, the one is not to be blamed, nor the other to be pitied.

When they complain of one another as if they were honest Men, they ought to be laugh'd at as if they were Fools.

There are some Cunning-men who yet can scarce be called Rational Creatures; yet they are often more successful than Men of Sense, because those they have to deal with are upon a looser Guard; and their Simplicity maketh their Knavery unsuspected.

There

There is no ſuch thing as a venial Sin againſt Morality, no ſuch thing as a ſmall Knavery: He that carries a ſmall Crime eaſily, will carry it on when it grows to be an Ox. But the little Knaves are the greater of the two, becauſe they have leſs the Excuſe of Temptation.

Knavery is ſo humble, and Merit ſo proud, that the latter is thrown down becauſe it cannot ſtoop.

Of Folly *and* Fools.

THERE are five Orders of Fools, as of Building: 1. The Blockhead, 2. Coxcomb. 3. Vain Blockhead, 4. Grave Coxcomb, and 5. The Half-witted Fellow; this laſt is of the Compoſite Order.

The Follies of grave Men have the Precedence of all others, a ridiculous

culous Dignity, that gives them a Right to be laughed at in the firſt place.

As the maſculine Wit is the ſtrongeſt, ſo the maſculine Impertinence is the greateſt.

The Conſequence of a Half-Wit is a Half-Will, there is not Strength enough in the Thought to carry it to the End.

A Fool is naturally recommended to our Kindneſs by ſetting us off by the Compariſon. Men are grateful to Fools for giving them the Pleaſure of contemning them.

But Folly hath a long Tail that is not ſeen at firſt: for every ſingle Folly hath a Root, out of which more are ready to ſprout; and a Fool hath ſo unlimited a Power of miſtaking, that a Man of Senſe can never comprehend to what degree it may extend.

There

There are ſome Fools ſo low, that they are preferred when they are laught at. Their being named putteth them in the Liſt of Men, which is more than belongeth to them.

One ſhould no more laugh at a contemptible Fool, than at a dead Fly.

The Diſſimulation of a Fool ſhould come within the Statute of Stabbing. It giveth no Warning.

A Fool will be rude from the Moment he is allowed to be familiar; he can make no other uſe of Freedom than to be unmannerly.

Weak Men are apt to be *cruel*, becauſe they ſtick at nothing that may repair the ill Effect of their Miſtakes.

Folly is often more cruel in the Conſequence, than Malice can be in the Intent.

Many

Many a Man is murthered by the well-meant Miſtakes of his unthinking Friends.

A weak Friend, if he will be kind, ought to go no farther than Wiſhes; if he proffereth either to ſay, or to do, it is dangerous.

A Man had as good go to Bed to a Razor, as to be intimate with a fooliſh Friend.

Miſtaken Kindneſs is little leſs dangerous than premeditated Malice.

A Man hath not the Relief of being angry at the Blows of a miſtaken Friend.

A buſy Fool is fitter to be ſhut up than a downright Madman.

A Man that hath only Wit enough not to do Hurt, committeth a Sin if he aimeth at doing Good.

His paſſive Underſtanding muſt not pretend to be active.

It is a Sin againſt Nature for ſuch a Man to be meddling.

It is hard to find a Blockhead ſo wiſe as to be upon the Defenſive; he will be ſallying, and then he is ſure to be ill uſed.

If a dull Fool can make a Vow and keep it, never to ſpeak his own Senſe, or do his own Buſineſs, he may paſs a great while for a rational Creature.

A Blockhead is as ridiculous when he talketh, as a Gooſe is when it flieth.

The grating a Gridiron is not a worſe Noiſe, than the jingling of Words is to a Man of Senſe.

It is Ill-manners to ſilence a Fool, and Cruelty to let him go on.

Moſt Men make little other uſe of their Speech than to give evidence againſt their own Underſtanding.

A great Talker may be a Man of Senſe, but he cannot be one, who will venture to rely upon him.

There is ſo much Danger in Talking, that a Man ſtrictly wiſe can hardly be called a ſociable Creature.

The great Expence of Words is laid out in *ſetting ourſelves out*, or *deceiving* others; to *convince* them requireth but a few.

Many Words are always either ſuſpicious or ridiculous.

A Fool hath no Dialogue within himſelf, the firſt Thought carrieth him without the Reply of a ſecond.

A Fool will admire or like nothing that he underſtands, a Man of Senſe nothing but what he underſtands.

Wiſe Men gain, and poor Men live, by the Superfluities of Fools.

Till Follies become ruinous, the World is better with than it would be without them.

A Fool is angry that he is the Food of a Knave, forgetting that it is the End of his Creation.

Of HOPE.

HOPE is a kind Cheat; in the Minute of our Diſappointment we are angry, but upon the whole matter there is no Pleaſure without it.

It is ſo much a pleaſanter thing than Truth to the greateſt Part o the World, that it hath all thei Kindneſs, the other only hath thei Reſpect.

Hope is generally a wrong Guide though it is very good Company b the way. It bruſheth through Hedg

an

and Ditch till it cometh to a great Leap, and there it is apt to fall and break its Bones.

It would be well if Hopes carried Men only to the top of the Hill, without throwing them afterwards down the Precipice.

The Hopes of a Fool are blind Guides, thoſe of a Man of Senſe doubt often of their Way.

Men ſhould do with their Hopes as they do with tame Fowl, cut their Wings that they may not fly over the Wall.

A *hoping* Fool hath ſuch terrible Falls, that his Brains are turned, though not cured by them.

The *Hopes* of a Fool are Bullets he throws into the Air, that fall down again and break his Skull.

There can be no entire Diſappointment to a wiſe Man, becauſe he maketh it a Cauſe of ſucceeding

another time. A Fool is ſo unreaſonably raiſed by his *Hopes*, that he is half dead by a Diſappointment: his miſtaken Fancy draweth him ſo high, that when he falleth, he is ſure to break his Bones.

Of ANGER.

ANGER is a better Sign of the Heart than of the Head; it is a breaking out of the Diſeaſe of Honeſty. Juſt Anger may be as dangerous as it could be if there was no Provocation to it; for a Knave is not ſo nice a Caſuiſt but that he will ruin, if he can, any Man that blameth him.

Where Ill-nature is not predominant, Anger will be ſhort-breathed, it cannot hold out a long Courſe. Hatred can be tired and cloyed as well

well as Love: for our Spirits, like our Limbs, are tired with being long in one Posture.

There is a Dignity in Good-sense that is offended and defaced by Anger.

Anger is never without an Argument, but seldom with a good one.

Anger raiseth Invention but it overheateth the Oven.

Anger, like Drink, raiseth a great deal of unmannerly Wit.

True Wit must come by Drops; Anger throweth it out in a Stream, and then it is not likely to be of the best kind.

Ill Language punisheth Anger by drawing a Contempt upon it.

Of Apologies.

IT is a dangerous Task to anſwer Objections, becauſe they are helped by the Malice of Mankind.

A bold Accuſation doth at firſt draw ſuch a general Attention, that it gets the World on its ſide.

To a Man who hath a mind to find a Fault, an Excuſe generally giveth farther hold.

Explaining is generally half confeſſing.

Innocence hath a very ſhort Style.

When a Jealouſy of any kind is once raiſed, it is as often provoked as cured by any Arguments, let them be never ſo reaſonable.

When Lazineſs letteth things alone, it is a Diſeaſe; but when Skill doth it, it is a Vertue.

Malice

Malice may help a Fool to aggravate, but there muſt be *Skill* to know how to extenuate.

To leſſen an Object that at the firſt Sight giveth Offence, requireth a dexterous Hand: There muſt be Strength as well as Skill to take off the Weight of the firſt Impreſſion.

When a Man is very unfortunate, it looketh like a ſaucy thing in him to juſtify himſelf.

A Man muſt ſtoop ſometimes to his ill Star, but he muſt never lie down to it.

The Vindications Men make of themſelves to *Poſterity* would hardly be ſupported by Good-Senſe, if they were not of ſome Advantage to their own Families.

The defending an ill Thing is more criminal than the doing it, becauſe it wanteth the Excuſe of its not being premeditated.

An

An Advocate for Injuſtice is like a Bawd that is worſe than her Client who committeth the Sin.

There is hardly any Man ſo ſtrict as not to vary a little from Truth when he is to make an Excuſe.

Not telling all the Truth is hiding it, and that is comforting or abetting a Lye.

A long Vindication is ſeldom a skilful one.

Long doth at leaſt imply *Doubtful* in ſuch a Caſe.

A Fool ſhould avoid the making an Excuſe, as much as the committing a Fault; for a Fool's Excuſe is always a ſecond Fault: and whenever he will undertake either to hide or mend a thing, he proclaimeth and ſpoileth it.

Of

Of Malice *and* Envy.

MALICE is a greater Magnifying-Glaſs than Kindneſs.

Malice is of a low Stature, but it hath very long Arms. It often reacheth into the next World, Death itſelf is not a Bar to it.

Malice, like Luſt, when it is at the Height, doth not know Shame.

If it did not ſometimes cut itſelf with its own Edge, it would deſtroy the World.

Malice can miſtake by being *keen* as well as by being *dull*.

When Malice groweth *critical*, it loſeth its Credit.

It muſt go under the Diſguiſe of Plainneſs, or elſe it is expoſed.

Anger may have ſome Excuſe for being blind, but Malice none: for Malice hath time to look before it.

When

When Malice is overgrown, it cometh to be the higheſt degree of Impertinence. For that reaſon, it muſt not be fed and pampered, which is apt to make it play the fool. But where it is wiſe and ſteady, there is no Precaution, that can be quite Proof againſt it.

Ill-will is ſeldom cured on a ſudden, it muſt go off by degrees, by inſenſible Tranſpiration.

Malice may be ſometimes out of Breath, Envy never. A Man may make Peace with Hatred, but never with Envy.

No Paſſion is better heard by our will, than that of Envy: No Paſſion is admitted to have Audience with leſs Exception.

Envy taketh the Shape of *Flattery*, and that maketh Men hug it ſo cloſe, that they cannot part with it.

The

The ſure way to be commended is to get into a Condition of being pitied. For Envy will not give its leave to commend a Man, till he is miſerable.

A Man is undone, when Envy will not vouchſafe to look upon him.

Yet after all, Envy doth Virtue as much good as hurt, by provoking it to appear. Nay, it forcibly draweth out, and inviteth Virtue, by giving it a Mind to be revenged of it.

Of VANITY.

THE World is nothing but Vanity cut out into ſeveral Shapes.

Men often *miſtake* themſelves, but they never *forget* themſelves.

A Man muſt not ſo entirely fall out with Vanity, as not to take its Aſſiſtance in the doing great Things.

Vanity is like ſome Men who are very uſeful, if they are kept under; and elſe not to be endured.

A little Vanity may be allowed in a Man's Train, but it muſt not ſit down at Table with him.

Without ſome Share of it, Mens Talents would be buried like Ore in a Mine unwrought.

Men would be leſs eager to gain Knowledge, if they did not hope to ſet themſelves out by it.

It ſheweth the Narrowneſs of our Nature, that a Man that intendeth any one thing extreamly, hath not Thought enough left for any thing elſe.

Our Pride maketh us over-value our Stock of Thought, ſo as to trade much

much beyond what it is able to make good.

Many aſpire to learn what they can never comprehend, as others pretend to teach what they themſelves do not know.

The Vanity of teaching often tempteth a Man to forget he is a Blockhead.

Self-conceit driveth away the ſuſpecting how ſcurvily others think of us.

Vanity cannot be a Friend to Truth, becauſe it is reſtrained by it; and Vanity is ſo impatiently deſirous of ſhewing itſelf, that it cannot bear the being croſſed.

There is a Degree of Vanity that recommendeth; if it goeth further, it expoſeth.

So much as to ſtir the Blood to do commendable Things, but not

ſo

ſo much as to poſſeſs the Brain, and turn it round.

There are as many that are blown up by the Wind of Vanity, as are carried away by the Stream of Intereſt.

Every body hath not Wit enough to Act out of Intereſt, but every body hath little enough to do it out of Vanity.

Some Mens Heads are as eaſily blown away as their Hats.

If the commending others well, did not recommend ourſelves, there would be few Panegyricks.

Mens Vanity will often diſpoſe them to be commended into very troubleſome Employments.

The deſiring to be remember'd when we are dead, is to ſo little purpoſe, that it is fit Men ſhould, as they generally are, be diſappointed in it. Nevertheleſs, the deſire of leaving

ing a good Name behind us is ſo honourable to ourſelves, and ſo uſeful to the World, that good Senſe muſt not be heard againſt it.

Heraldry is one of thoſe fooliſh Things that may yet be too much deſpiſed.

The Contempt of Scutcheons is as much a Diſeaſe in this Age, as the over-valuing them was in former Times.

There is a good Uſe to be made of the moſt contemptible Things, and an ill one of thoſe that are the moſt valuable.

Of Money.

IF Men conſidered how many Things there are that Riches cannot buy, they would not be ſo fond of them.

The Things to be bought with Money, are ſuch as leaſt deſerve the giving a Price for them.

Wit and Money are ſo apt to be abuſed, that Men generally make a ſhift to be the worſe for them.

Money in a Fool's Hand expoſeth him worſe than a pyed Coat.

Money hath too great a Preference given to it by States, as well as by particular Men.

Men are more the Sinews of War than Money.

The third part of an Army muſt be deſtroyed, before a good one can be made out of it.

They who are of opinion that Money will do every thing, may very well be ſuſpected to do every thing for Money.

Falſe

False LEARNING.

A Little Learning *misleadeth*, and a great deal often *stupifieth* the Understanding.

Great Reading without applying it, is like Corn *heaped* that is not *stirred*, it groweth musty.

A learned Coxcomb dyeth his Mistakes in so much a deeper Colour: A wrong kind of Learning serveth only to embroider his Errors.

A Man that hath read without Judgment, is like a Gun charged with Goose-shot, let loose upon the Company.

He is only well furnished with Materials to expose himself, and to mortify those he liveth with.

The reading of the greatest Scholars, if put into a Limbeck,

might be diſtilled into a ſmall quantity of *Eſſence.*

The Reading of moſt Men, is like a Wardrobe of old Cloaths that are ſeldom uſed.

Weak Men are the worſe for the good Senſe they read in Books, becauſe it furniſheth them only with more Matter to miſtake.

Of Company.

MEN that cannot entertain themſelves want ſomebody, though they care for nobody.

An impertinent Fellow is never in the right, but in his being weary of *himſelf.*

By that time Men are fit for Company, they ſee the Objections to it.

The

The Company of a Fool is dangerous as well as tedious.

It is flattering ſome Men to endure them.

Preſent Puniſhment attendeth the Fault.

A *following* Wit will be welcome in moſt Companies ; A *leading* one lieth too heavy for Envy to bear.

Out-doing is ſo near reproaching, that it will generally be thought very ill Company.

Any thing that ſhineth doth in ſome meaſure tarniſh every thing that ſtandeth next to it.

Keeping much Company generally endeth in playing the Fool or the Knave with them.

Of Friendship.

FRIENDSHIP cometh oftener by Chance than by Choice, which maketh it generally ſo uncertain.

It is a Miſtake to ſay a Friend can be bought.

A Man may buy a good Turn, but he cannot buy the Heart that doth it.

Friendſhip cannot live with Ceremony, nor without Civility.

There muſt be a nice Diet obſerved to keep Friendſhip from falling ſick; nay, there is more Skill neceſſary to keep a Friend, than there is to reclaim an Enemy.

Thoſe Friends who are above Intereſt are ſeldom above Jealouſy.

It is a Misfortune for a Man not to have a Friend in the World, but for

for that reaſon he ſhall have no Enemy.

In the Commerce of the World, Men ſtruggle little leſs with their Friends, than they do with their Enemies.

Eſteem ought to be the ground of *Kindneſs*, and yet there are no Friends that ſeldomer meet.

Kindneſs is apt to be as *afraid* of Eſteem, as that is to be *aſhamed* of Kindneſs.

Our Kindneſs is greateſt to thoſe that will do what we would have them, in which our Eſteem cannot always go along.

Miſcellaneous Thoughts

AND

REFLECTIONS.

Of Advice and Correction.

THE Rule *of doing as we would be done by*, is never leſs obſerved than it is in telling others their Faults. But Men intend more to ſhew others that they are free from the Fault, than to diſſuade them from committing it.

They are ſo pleaſed with the prudent Shape of an Adviſer, that it raiſeth the value they have of themſelves, whilſt they are about it.

Certainly, to give Advice to a Friend, either asked or unasked, is ſo far from a Fault, that it is a Duty; but if a Man love to give Advice, it

it is a ſure ſign that he himſelf wanteth it.

A Man whilſt he is adviſing putteth his Underſtanding upon Tiptoes, and is unwilling to bring it down again.

A weak Man had rather *be thought* to know, than *know*, and that maketh him ſo impatient to be told of a Miſtake.

He who will not be the better for other Mens Faults, hath no cure left for his own.

But he that can probe himſelf to cure his own Faults, will ſeldom need either the Surgery of his Friends or of his Enemies.

Of Alterations.

IN a corrupted Age the putting the World in order would breed Confuſion.

A rooted Diſeaſe muſt be *ſtroaked away*, rather than *kicked away*.

As

As ſoon as Men have Underſtanding enough to find a Fault, they have enough to ſee the danger of mending it.

Deſiring to have any thing mended, is venturing to have it ſpoiled: To know when to let Things alone, is a high pitch of good Senſe. But a Fool hath an Eagerneſs, like a Monkey in a Glaſs Shop, to break every thing in the handling.

Curing and *Mending* are generally meer Words of Art not to be relied upon. They are ſet out in Bills, but the *Mountebanks* only get by them.

Baſhfulneſs. GREAT Baſhfulneſs is oftener an Effect of Pride than of Modeſty.

Modeſty is oftner miſtaken than any other Virtue.

Boldneſs. WISE Venturing is the moſt commendable Part of human Prudence.

It

It is the upper Story of Prudence, whereas perpetual Caution is a kind of under-ground Wiſdom that doth not care to ſee the Light.

It is beſt for great Men to ſhoot over, and for leſſer Men to ſhoot ſhort.

MEN who borrow their Opinions can never repay their Debts. *Borrowers of Opinions.*

They are Beggars by Nature, and can therefore never get a Stock to grow rich upon.

A Man who hath not a diſtinguiſhing Head, is ſafeſt by not minding what any body ſayeth.

He had better truſt to his own Opinion, than ſpoil another Man's for want of apprehending it.

IT is ſome kind of Scandal not to bear with the Faults of an honeſt Man. *Candour.*

It is not loving Honeſty enough to allow it diſtinguiſhing Privileges.

There

There are ſome decent Faults which may pretend to be in the lower Rank of Virtues; and ſurely where Honour or Gratitude are the Motives, Cenſure muſt be a good deal ſilenced.

Of Caution and Suſpicion.

MEN muſt be ſaved in this World by their Want of Faith.

A Man that getteth Care into his Thoughts, cannot properly be ſaid to trade without a Stock.

Care and right Thought will produce Crops all the Year without ſtaying for the Seaſons.

A Man is to go about his own Buſineſs as if he had not a Friend in the World to help him in it.

He that relieth upon himſelf will be oppreſſed by others with Offers of their Service.

All are apt to ſhrink from thoſe that lean upon them.

If Men would think how often their own Words are thrown at their Heads, they would leſs often let them go out of their Mouths.

Mens Words are Bullets that their Enemies take up and make uſe of againſt them.

A Man watches himſelf beſt when others watch him too.

It is as neceſſary for us to ſuppreſs our Reaſon when it offendeth, as our Miſtakes when they expoſe us.

In an unreaſonable Age, a Man's Reaſon let looſe would undo him.

A wiſe Man will do with his Reaſon as a Miſer doth with his Money, hoard it, but be very ſparing in the Expence of it.

A Man that ſhould call every thing by its right Name, would hardly paſs the Streets without being knock'd down as a common Enemy.

A Man cannot be more in the Wrong than to own without Diſtinction the being in the Right.

When a Man is very kind or very angry, there is no ſure Guard but Silence upon that Subject.

A Man's Underſtanding is eaſily ſhoved out of its Place by warm Thoughts of any kind.

We are not ſo much Maſters of our Heat as to have enough to warm our Thoughts, and not ſo much as to ſet them on fire.

A great Enemy is a great Object that inviteth Precaution, which maketh him leſs dangerous than a mean one.

An old Man concludeth from his knowing Mankind, that they know him too, and that maketh him very wary.

On the other hand, it muſt be allowed, that a Man's being deceived

by

by Knaves hath often this ill Effect, that it maketh him too jealous of honeſt Men.

The Mind, like the Body, is ſubject to be hurt by every thing it taketh for a Remedy.

There are ſome ſuch very great Foreſeers, that they grow into the Vanity of pretending to ſee where nothing is to be ſeen.

He that will ſee at too great a diſtance, will ſometimes miſtake a Buſh for a Horſe: The Proſpect of a wiſe Man will be bounded.

A Man may ſo overdo it in looking too far before him, that he may ſtumble the more for it.

And, to conclude, He that leaveth nothing to Chance will do few things ill, but he will do very few things.

Suſpicion is rather a Virtue than a Fault, as long as it doth like a Dog that *watcheth*, and doth *not bite*.

A wiſe Man, in truſting another, muſt not rely upon his *Promiſe* againſt his *Nature*.

Early Suſpicion is often an Injury, and late Suſpicion is always a Folly.

A wiſe Man will keep his Suſpicions muzzled, but he will keep them awake.

There can no Rules be given to Suſpicion, no more than to Love.

Suſpicion taketh Root, and beareth Fruit, from the moment it is planted.

Suſpicion ſeldom wanteth Food to keep it up in Health and Vigour. It feedeth upon every thing it ſeeth, and is not curious in its Diet.

Suſpicion doth not grow up to an Injury till it breaketh out.

When our Suſpicion of another Man is once diſcovered by him, there ought to be an end of all further Commerce.

He

He that is never ſuſpected, is either very much eſteemed, or very much deſpiſed.

A Man's *Intereſt* is not a ſufficient Ground to ſuſpect him, if his *Nature* doth not concur in it.

A weak Man hath leſs Suſpicion than a wiſe one, but when he hath it, he is leſs eaſily cured.

The Remedies as often increaſe the Diſeaſe, as they do allay it; and a Fool valueth himſelf upon ſuſpecting at a venture.

MANY Men *ſwallow* the being cheated, but no Man could ever endure to *chew* it. *Cheats.*

Few Men would be deceived, if their Conceit of themſelves did not help the Skill of thoſe that go about it.

COMPLAINING is a Contempt upon ones ſelf: *Complaint*

It is an ill Sign both of a Man's Head and of his Heart.

A Man throweth himſelf down whilſt he complaineth; and when a Man throweth himſelf down, no body careth to take him up again.

Content. CONTENT layeth Pleaſure, nay Virtue, in a Slumber, with few and faint Intermiſſions.

It is to the Mind, like Moſs to a Tree, it bindeth it up ſo as to ſtop its Growth.

Converts. THE Impudence of a Bawd is Modeſty, compared with that of a Convert.

A Convert hath ſo much to do to gain Credit, that a Man is to think well before he changeth.

Deſires. MEN generally ſtate their Wants by their Fancy, and not by their Reaſon.

The poor young Children are whipt and beaten by the old ones, who are much more inexcuſably impertinent.

Not

Not having things, is a more proper Expreſſion for a Man of Senſe than his wanting them.

Where Senſe is wanting, every thing is wanting.

A Man of Senſe can hardly want, but for his Friends and Children that have none.

Moſt Men let their Wiſhes run away with them.

They have no mind to ſtop them in their Career, the Motion is ſo pleaſing.

To deſire what belongeth to another Man is Miſpriſion of Robbery.

Men are commanded not to covet, becauſe when they do they are very apt to take.

A DIFFICULTY raiſeth the Spirits of a great Man, he hath a mind to wreſtle with it, and give it a Fall. *Difficulty.*

A Man's Mind muſt be very low, if the Difficulty doth not make a part of his Pleaſure.

The Pride of Compaſſing may more than compare with the Pleaſure of Enjoying.

Diſſembling. NOTHING ſo ridiculous as a falſe Philoſopher, and nothing ſo rare as a true one.

Men take more pains to hide than to mend themſelves.

Dreams. MENS Pride, as well as their Weakneſs, diſpoſeth them to rely upon Dreams, from their thinking themſelves of ſuch Importance as to have Warning of what is to befal them.

The Enquiry into a Dream is another Dream.

Drunkenneſs. IT is a piece of Arrogance to dare to be drunk, becauſe a Man ſheweth himſelf without a Vail.

THE

THE beſt way to ſuppoſe what may come, is to remember what is paſt. *Experience.*

The beſt Qualification of a Prophet is to have a good Memory.

Experience maketh more Prophets than Revelation.

The Knowledge that is got without Pains, is kept without Pleaſure.

The Struggling for Knowledge hath a Pleaſure in it like that of Wreſtling with a fine Woman.

EXTREMITY is always ill, that which is good cannot live a Moment with it. *Extremes.*

Any body that is Fool enough will be ſafe in the World, and any body that can be Knave enough will be rich in it.

The generality of the World falleth into an inſufficient *Mean* that expoſeth them more than an *Extreme* on either Side.

Faculties of the Mind.

THOUGH Memory and Invention are not upon good Terms, yet when the firſt is loaded, the other is ſtifled.

The Memory hath Claws by which it holdeth faſt; but it hath no Wings, like the Invention, to enable it to fly.

Some Mens Memory is like a Box, where a Man ſhould mingle his Jewels with his old Shoes.

There ought to be a great Difference between the Memory and the Stomach; the laſt is to admit every thing, the former ſhould have the Faculty of Rejecting.

It is a nice Mean between letting the Thought languiſh for want of Exerciſe, and tiring it by giving it too much.

A Man may dwell ſo long upon a Thought, that it may take him Priſoner.

The

The hardeſt thing in the World is to give the Thoughts due Liberty, and yet retain them in due Diſcipline.

They are Libertines that are apt to abuſe Freedom, and do not well know how to bear Reſtraint.

A Man that excels in any one thing has a kind of arbitrary Power over all that hear him upon that Subject, and no Man's Life is too ſhort to know any one thing perfectly.

The modern Wit is rather to ſet Men out, than to make them of any Uſe.

Some Men have acted Courage who had it not; but no Man can act Wit, if Nature doth not teach him his Part. True Wit is always revenged upon any falſe Pretender that meddleth with it.

Wit is the only thing that Men are willing to think they can ever have enough of.

There is a happy Pitch of Ignorance that a Man of Senſe might pray for.

A Man that hath true Wit will have Honour too, not only to adorn, but to ſupport it.

Families. THE building up a Family is a Manufacture very little above the building a Houſe of Cards.

Time and Accidents are ſure to furniſh a Blaſt to blow it down.

No Houſe wanteth new Tiling ſo often as a Family wants Repairing.

The Deſire of having Children is as much the Effect of Vanity as of Good-nature.

We think our Children a Part of ourſelves, though as they grow up they might very well undeceive us.

Men

Men love their Children, not becauſe they are promiſing Plants, but becauſe they are theirs.

They cannot diſcredit the Plant, without diſparaging the Soil out of which it came.

Pride in this, as in many other things, is often miſtaken for Love.

As Children make a Man poor in one Senſe, ſo in another they inforce Care, and that begetteth Riches.

Love is preſently out of Breath when it is to go up Hill, from the Children to the Parents.

'TIS good to have Men in Awe, *Fear*, but dangerous to have them afraid of us.

The Mean is ſo nice, that the hitting upon it is oftner the Effect of Chance than of Skill.

A Degree of Fear ſharpeneth, the Exceſs of it ſtupifieth.

It

It is as ſcandalous not to fear at ſome times, as it can be to be afraid at others.

Flattery. FOLLY begets Want, and Want Flattery; ſo that Flattery, with all its Wit, is the Grandchild of Folly.

Were it not for Bunglers in the manner of doing it, hardly any Man would ever find out he was laughed at.

And yet, generally ſpeaking, a Trowel is a more effectual Inſtrument than a Pencil for Flattery.

Men generally do ſo love the Taſte of Flattery, their Stomach can never be overcharged with it.

There is a Right Reverend Flattery that hath the Precedence of all other Kinds of it.

This Mitred Flattery is of all others the moſt exalted. It ever groweth in proportion, and keepeth pace with Power. There is a noble

Stroke

Stroke of it in the Articles ſent to Princeſs *Mary* from *Henry* VIII. " Such is his Majeſty's *Gracious and* " *Divine Nature* --- ſhewing Mercy " to ſuch as *repentantly cry and call* " for the ſame."

FORGETTING is oftner an Aggravation than an Excuſe. *Forgetfulneſs.*

The Memory will ſeldom be unmannerly but where it is unkind.

THERE needeth little Care to *poliſh* the Underſtanding; if true Means were uſed to *ſtrengthen* it, it will poliſh itſelf. *Good-manners.*

Good-manners is ſuch a Part of Good-ſenſe, that they cannot be divided; but that which a Fool calleth Good-breeding is the moſt unmannerly thing in the World.

Right Good-manners require ſo much Senſe, that there is hardly any ſuch thing in the World.

GOOD-

Good-nature. GOOD-NATURE is rather acted than practiſed in the World.

Good-nature to others is an inſeparable Part of Juſtice.

Good-will. GOOD-WILL, like Grace, floweth where it liſteth.

Men mean ſo very well to themſelves, that they forget to mean well to any body elſe.

Heat. GOOD-SENSE will allow of ſome intermitting Fevers, but then the Fit muſt be ſhort.

Honeſty. HE that can be quite indifferent when he ſeeth another Man injured, hath a lukewarm Honeſty that a wiſe Man will not depend upon.

He that is not concerned when he ſeeth an ill thing done to another, will not be very eager to do a good one himſelf.

THERE

THERE is ſo much Wit ne- *Hypocriſy.*
ceſſary to make a skilful Hypocrite, that the Faculty is fallen amongſt Bunglers, who make it ridiculous.

AN Injury may more properly *Injuries.*
be ſaid to be poſtponed, than to be forgiven.

The Memory of it is never ſo ſubdued, but that it hath always Life in it.

The Memory of an Enemy admitteth no decay but Age.

Could we know what Men are moſt apt to remember, we might know what they are moſt apt to do.

It is a general Fault that we diſlike Men only for the Injuries they do to us, and not for thoſe they do to Mankind. Yet it will be hard to give a good Reaſon why a Man who hath done a deliberate Injury to one, will not do it to another.

The

The Memory and the Conſcience never did, nor never will agree about forgiving Injuries.

Nature is Second to the Memory, and Religion to the Conſcience.

When the Seconds fight, the latter is generally diſarmed.

Integrity. A MAN in a corrupted Age muſt make a Secret of his Integrity, or elſe he will be looked upon as a common Enemy.

He muſt engage his Friends not to ſpeak of it; for he ſetteth himſelf for a Mark to be ill uſed.

Juſtice. AS far as keeping diſtance is a ſign of Reſpect, Mankind hath a great deal for Juſtice.

They make up in Ceremony what they want in Good-will to it.

Where the Generality are Offenders, Juſtice cometh to be Cruelty.

TO

TO Love, and to be in Love with any thing, are Things as differing, as good Senſe and Impertinence. *To Love, and be in Love different.*

When we once go beyond bare liking, we are in danger of parting with Good-Senſe; and it is not eaſy for Good-Senſe to get ſo far as liking.

WHEN by habit a Man cometh to have a bargaining Soul, its Wings are cut, ſo that it can never ſoar. *Lucre.*

It bindeth Reaſon an Apprentice to Gain, and inſtead of a Director, maketh it a Drudge.

THE being kind to a Lyar, is abetting a Treaſon againſt Mankind. *Lying.*

A Man is to inform the firſt Magiſtrate, that he may be clap'd up.

Lies are embroidered with Promiſes and Excuſes.

A known Lyar ſhould be outlawed in a well ordered Government.

A Man that renounceth Truth, runneth away from his trial in the World.

The uſe of Talking is almoſt loſt in the World by the habit of Lying.

A Man that doth not tell all the Truth, ought to be hanged for a Clipper.

Half the Truth is often as arrant a Lye, as can be made.

It is the more dexterous, but not the leſs criminal kind of Lying.

Names. NAMES to Men of Senſe are no more than Fig-leaves; to the generality they are thick Coverings that hide the Nature of Things from them.

Fools turn Good-Senſe upon its Head, they take Names for Things, and Things only for Names.

Partiality. IT is a general Miſtake to think the Men we like are good for every thing,

thing, and thoſe we do not, good for nothing.

A MAN who is Maſter of Patience, is Maſter of every thing elſe. *Patience.*

He that can tell how to bear in the right Place, is Maſter of every body he dealeth with.

POSITIVE is the Perfection of Coxcomb, he is then come to his full Growth. *Poſitiveneſs.*

IT ſheweth Mens Nature, that when they are pampered in any kind, they are very apt to play jadiſh Tricks. *Proſperity.*

One of the Tricks of any Creature that is wanton, is to kick what is next them.

EVERY thing that doth us good is ſo apt to do us hurt too, that it is a ſtrong Argument for Men to be quiet. *Quiet.*

If Men would think more, they would act leſs.

The greateſt Part of the Buſineſs of the World, is the Effect of not thinking.

Reaſon and Paſſion.

MOST Men put their Reaſon out to Service to their Will.

The Maſter and the Man are perpetually falling out.

A third Man will hazard a beating, if he goes about to part them.

Nothing hath an uglier Look to us than Reaſon, when it is not of our ſide.

We quarrel ſo often with it, that it maketh us afraid to come near it.

A Man that doth not uſe his Reaſon, is a tame Beaſt; a Man that abuſes it, is a wild one.

IT

IT is a ſelf-flattering Contradiction, that wiſe Men deſpiſe the Opinion of Fools, and yet are proud of having their Eſteem. *Reputation.*

SELF-LOVE rightly defined, is far from being a Fault. *Self-love.*

A Man that loveth himſelf right, will do every thing elſe right.

A MAN who doth not think he is puniſhed when he is blamed, is too much hardened to be ever reformed. *Shame.*

The Court of Shame hath of late loſt much of its Juriſdiction. It ought by right both to judge in the firſt Inſtance, and to exclude all Appeals from it.

Shame is a Diſeaſe of the laſt Age, this ſeemeth to be cured of it.

SINGULARITY may be good Senſe at home, but it muſt not go much abroad. *Singularity.*

It is a Commendation to be that which a crowd of miſtaken Fools call Singular.

There can hardly be a ſeverer thing ſaid to a Man in this Age, than that he is like the reſt of the World.

Slander. SLANDER would not ſtick, if it had not always ſomething to lay hold of.

A Man who can allow himſelf the Liberty to ſlander, hath the World too much at his Mercy.

But the Man that deſpiſeth Slander deſerveth it.

Speakers in Publick. SPEAKERS in Publick ſhould take more Pains to hold in their Invention than to raiſe it.

Invention is apt to make ſuch Sallies, that it cannot ſecure its Retreat.

He

He that will not make a Blot, will be pretty ſure in his time to give a Stroke.

A patient Hearer is a ſure Speaker.

Men are angry when others do not hear them, yet they have more Reaſon to be afraid when they do.

MISPENDING a Man's time is a kind of *ſelf-homicide*, it is making Life to be of no uſe. *Time the loſs of it.*

TRUTH is not only ſtifled by Ignorance, but concealed out of Caution or Intereſt; ſo if it had not a Root of Immortality, it muſt have been long ſince extinguiſhed. *Truth.*

THE moſt uſeful Part of Wiſdom is for a Man to give a good gueſs, what others think of him. *Wiſdom.*

It is a dangerous thing to gueſs partially, and a melancholy thing to gueſs right.

Nothing

Nothing would more contribute to make a Man wiſe, than to have always an Enemy in his view.

A wiſe Man may have more Enemies than a weak one, but he will not ſo much feel the weight of them. Indeed the being wiſe doth either make Men our Friends, or diſcourage them from being our Enemies.

Wiſdom is only a comparative Quality, it will not bear a ſingle Definition.

Youth. A MAN hath too little Heat, or Wit, or Courage, if he hath not ſometimes more than he ſhould.

Juſt enough of a good thing is always too little.

Long Life giveth more Marks to ſhoot at, and therefore old Men are leſs well thought of, than thoſe who have not been ſo long upon the Stage.

Other

Other Mens Memories retain the ill, whilſt the good Things done by an old Man, eaſily ſlip out of them.

Old Men have in ſome degree their Repriſals upon younger, by making nicer Obſervations upom them, by virtue of their Experience.

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In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

SIR,

IT was with no ordinary Degree of Pleaſure that I formerly uſed to converſe with you, on philoſophical and theological Subjects. Your good Senſe, good Nature, and Candour; your extenſive Erudition, and more extenſive Charity, render you a moſt agreeable and inſtructive Companion. But this is a Bleſſing I have a long time been deprived of, by my Removal to a Place, at too great a Diſtance from you. However, I think, this Miſfortune may in ſome meaſure be compenſated, by your favouring me with your Thoughts, in a

friendly Epiſtle, on the *two* forementioned Subjects, which may be comprized in *one*, viz. *Moral Philoſophy*. You ſee, Sir, how deſirous I am to propagate that Intimacy ſo long ſince contracted, by thus introducing it, in this public Way; nor can you but remember, that you were wont to conclude our amicable Debates with the following, or like, Sentence: " *Well, I have Charity for the* " *Sincere, and Well-meaning, of all the various* " *Denominations of fallible Men, and for you in* " *particular; but don't take it amiſs if I freely tell* " *you, I think you are an honeſt Infidel.*" Now, tho' I profeſs I never took it ill at your Hands, yet, I aſſure you, it gave me Concern, to find myſelf thus ſtigmatized; and at the ſame time, in Conſcience, obliged to differ from my moſt valuable Friends; and particularly from yourſelf, of whoſe Parts and Integrity, I had Reaſon to have the higheſt Eſteem. However, it was attended with one happy Conſequence, *viz.* It put me on a ſerious Re-examination of the Motives to my entertaining thoſe exploded Sentiments, and the Juſtneſs of thoſe Reaſonings upon which they were grounded. Much about the time I was deprived of your Converſation, I was in the midſt of thoſe my Reſearches, and, not having *you* any longer to have recourſe to, I applied myſelf, in the moſt impartial and unprejudiced Manner, to the reading ſuch Chriſtian Writers as had obtained the greateſt Reputation, both for ſound Judgment and nervous Reaſoning. But, after all, not having found

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whereon to reſt the Sole of my Foot, as a conſiſtent Chriſtian, and an honeſt Man, in the ſame Perſon, I could think of no better Expedient, than to return to you, for a Solution of thoſe weighty Objections, which appear inſolvable to me.

Before I proceed to anſwer the repeated Calls and Invitations of ſuch of your Chriſtian Brethren, as have moſt Reaſon to be confident of the Goodneſs of their Cauſe, by freely producing to public Conſideration thoſe ſtrong Objections, as they (by way of *Contempt)* are pleaſed to call them; I beg leave to lay before you my Complaint againſt ſome of them, for very injurious Treatment of their Adverſaries; of whom I may ſay, and, ſurely, with your Approbation, they are too poſitive and angry to do Service to any Cauſe; even that of the Heathens they affect ſo much to deſpiſe. That there is ſuch a thing as true Religion, how differently ſoever Men may think concerning it, I no more doubt of, than I do of my own Exiſtence; but the Gentlemen I refer to are very poſitive it conſiſts, ſome, in one Set of Opinions; and ſome, in another; and all are unanimous, (which very rarely happens where Unanimity is requiſite) in ſuppoſing that Integrity of Heart, and Regularity of Life, in thoſe who diſſent from them, will leave them ſtill ſhort of a well-grounded Hope of Salvation, while they continue to queſtion, whether certain ſpeculative Truths, and uninveſtigable

Points

Points of Faith, (which they are pleaſed to call Fundamentals) may not be Matters of Indifference. And in the too vigorous Exerciſe of this their Zeal without Knowledge, they have not been aſhamed, in the Face of the World, to make the groſſeſt Imputations to, and raiſe ſuch Calumnies againſt, the Deiſts, as are not only groundleſs, but apparently ſtupid and ridiculous. Thus, among many that might be produced, the celebrated Dr. *Waterland*, in his ſecond Charge to —— has this remarkable Sentence: " *What Atheiſm chiefly aims* " *at is, to ſit looſe from preſent Reſtraints and fu-* " *ture Reckonings; and theſe two Purpoſes may be* " *competently ſerved by Deiſm, which is a more re-* " *fined Kind of Atheiſm.*" Aſtoniſhing Aſſertion! ſince, if what Atheiſm chiefly aims at, be to ſit looſe from preſent Reſtraints, and future Reckonings; then a ſincere Belief of the Exiſtence of a God, and of an impartial Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments, in another World, and a Practice that naturally reſults from, and is conſonant to ſuch Belief, and which ſtrictly and properly is true Deiſm, this, ſurely, is the grand Barrier, the principal Obſtruction, to the obtaining the chief Aims and Purpoſes of Atheiſm; and conſequently, the true Deiſt, who has a ſteady Belief of the Exiſtence of a God, and of his being accountable to him for his Actions, is, by ſuch Belief, brought under all thoſe Reſtraints, and expects that future Reckoning, which naturally flows from it. And as certainly as a Deiſt believes the Exiſtence of a God,

God, and the conſequent Obligations he is under, to practiſe the Duties neceſſarily ariſing from the Relations he ſtands in to him; ſo certainly he believes, all the preſent Reſtraints from Sin, and from violating the Laws of his Maker, his Reaſon and Nature, which he finds himſelf under, to be greatly reaſonable; and conſequently will, with the higheſt Pleaſure, make it the great Buſineſs of his Life to keep himſelf from breaking thro' Reſtraints, which he thus perceives the Equity and Reaſonableneſs of. Deiſm therefore is ſo far from being a more *refined Kind* of Atheiſm, nay from having the leaſt remote Relation thereto, as to be juſt as diametrically oppoſite to it, as the very believing is to the abſolute Diſbelief of the Exiſtence of a God! Deiſm, properly ſo called, whatever ill Uſage it may have met with, is no other than the Religion eſſential to Man, the true, original Religion of Reaſon and Nature; ſuch as was believed and practiſed by SOCRATES, and others of old, who were as great Ornaments, and did as much Honour, to human Nature, as any Chriſtians ever did; nor is it poſſible for true Religion to be otherwiſe, whilſt God who formed our Faculties, and in their Meaſure adjuſted them to it, continues to be immutable, and Man continues to be a rational Being.

And it is in Deiſm, properly ſo called, that our more diſcerning and rational Divines have conſtantly placed the alone Excellency, and true Glory,

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of the Chriſtian Inſtitution. " *The Religion of the* " *Goſpel is the true, original Religion of Reaſon and* " *Nature,*" ſays Dr. *Sherlock.* And in another Part of the ſame Sermon, *viz.* that preached before the Society for propagating the Goſpel in foreign Parts, he ſays, " *Since then the Doctrine of* " *Repentance, with which the Goſpel ſet out in the* " *World, had reference to the Law of Reaſon and* " *Nature,*" (as he had excellently ſhewn before that it had) " *againſt which Men had every where* " *offended; and ſince Repentance infers the Neceſ-* " *ſity of a future Reformation, and a Return to* " *that Duty and Obedience from which by Tranſ-* " *greſſion we are fallen; the Conſequence is mani-* " *feſtly this, That the Goſpel was a Republication of* " *the Law of Nature, and its Precepts declarative* " *of that original Religion which was as old as the* " *Creation.*" And in Page 21, he ingenuouſly owns, " *It is true alſo, that there are ſome Inſtitu-* " *tions in the Goſpel, which in their own Nature* " *are no conſtituent Parts of Religion.*" And with great Submiſſion I will venture to add, that the ſame may be ſaid, for aught that appears to the contrary, of ſome *Doctrines* of the Goſpel; which Doctrines, together with the Inſtitutions referred to, may be ſaid to conſtitute *pure Chriſtianity*, by way of Contradiſtinction to *pure natural Religion.* Mr. *Chandler*, in his Dedication to a Sermon preached in the *Old Jury*, Page 8, ſays, " *If na-* " *tural Religion is not Part of the Religion of* Chriſt, " *'tis ſcarce worth while to enquire at all what his*

" *Religion*

"*Religion is.*" From whence it ſeems very natural to infer, that the other Parts of the Religion of *Chriſt* are ſcarce worth any thing at all of our Notice. So excellent and glorious a Part of the Chriſtian Inſtitution, then is true Deiſm, or pure natural Religion, as adopted into, and propoſed to be incorporated with it. Now what I have cited from thoſe judicious Divines, which ſo directly prove the Abſurdity of Dr. *Waterland*'s extravagant Aſſertion, I beg leave to add, that notwithſtanding all the abſurd and bitter things, that have been falſly laid to its Charge, by the Doctor and others, Deiſm is all in the Chriſtian Inſtitution, that can poſſibly approve itſelf to the true, genuine Reaſon of Man. Every thing in the Goſpel, enjoined on its Profeſſors to be believed, as a rational Doctrine, or practiſed as a natural Duty, relating to God, our Neighbour, or ourſelves, is a conſtituent, an eſſential Part of Deiſm, or of true, that is, natural Religion. Now the ſingle Queſtion here, between Chriſtians and Deiſts, I conceive to be this, namely, Whether the Belief of natural Doctrines, and the Practice of natural Duties, are all that is ſtrictly neceſſary, with regard to the divine Approbation; and conſequently, human Happineſs, both preſent and eternal? To the Solution of theſe momentous Points, the ſerious Conſideration of the following Propoſitions may have no inconſiderable Tendency.

I. Every

I. Every Duty, that indiſpenſibly obliges a Man to the Performance of it, muſt be founded on ſome apparent natural Reaſon; for unleſs there be ſuch a Reaſon for the Belief of a Propoſition, or performing an Action, whence ariſes the Obligation to either?

II. The Reaſon on which the Obligation to the Diſcharge of a Duty is founded, neceſſarily reſults from the Relation the Perſon to perform it ſtands in to the Party to whom it is to be performed.

III. If the Reaſon of a Duty ariſeth from the Relation ſubſiſting between the Parties concerned, then 'tis obvious, every ſuch Duty has its Foundation in the Nature of Things.

IV. Whatſoever elſe goes under the Denomination of Duty, cannot really be ſuch; but muſt have, by ſome unwarrantable Means or other, that Name (in ſtrict Reaſon unalienable) ſacrilegiouſly imputed to it. For were it really what it is pretended to be, *viz.* a Duty, it muſt, according to the preceding Propoſition, have its Foundation in the Nature of Things; and as certainly as it is not therein founded, the Obſervation of it as a Duty, in order to ſecure the Favour of God, and eternal Salvation, ſeems to be unneceſſary, and mere Superſtition.

V. Natural

V. Natural Duties only are capable of being perceived by us to be Duties; these having their Foundation in Nature, and the Reason of Things themselves, are, in a Degree proportionable to our respective Faculties, to be traced out by us; but whatever has not its Foundation there, and is but authoritatively asserted to be a Duty, can never possibly be perceived by us to be so, and must necessarily be derived from Superstition or Enthusiasm.

VI. That adorable Being! who in infinite Wisdom created us with reasoning Powers and Faculties, very limited and confined, will, in Justice, require of us a Conduct, but proportionate to the Abilities of Perception and Action that we have, and not according to what we have not.

So that now, if from the due Consideration of the above Propositions, it should be thought sufficiently to appear, that those Duties only are necessary to be believed and practised by us, the Reasons of which we perceive to be founded in Nature; and the Discharge of which, in the best Manner we can, is intimately connected with our Happiness, and the Approbation of him, whose Favour is better than Life; then it will follow, That if any thing else is enjoined as a Duty, in any, even in the Christian Institution, it cannot be necessary to be observed, in order to eternal Salvation. And as every Doctrine or Precept of

the Gofpel, that has its Foundation difcernable in Nature, is an effential and conftituent Part of the Religion of Nature, or Deifm; fo Deifm is all, in the Chriftian Inftitution, that can poffibly approve itfelf, to the true, genuine Reafon of Man. Let then the *Waterlands*, the *Warburtons*, and the *Stebbings* of the Age, if not for the fake of Modefty, yet for the fake of the high Character they affume as *Embaffadors* of CHRIST, no longer fubftitute Scurrility, and Sophiftry, in the room of Reafon and Argument; but if they muft be writing againft the Deifts, let them do it, by fairly denying their real Principles, and openly avowing, and defending the contrary to them. What Honour they would reflect by this honeft Procedure, on the Religion they profefs, will obviouffly appear, by confidering a few fundamental Principles of the Deifts, the oppofite to which, it will then fall to their Lot to maintain.

I. There is a God; that is, a neceffarily-exifting, felf-fufficient, and an infinitely perfect *Being*, who is, in and of himfelf, infinitely happy.

II. Infinite Happinefs, confidered as effential to the Deity, appears to be the Refult of the Contemplation of his own effential Perfections, and a pure Confciouffnefs of an invariable Conformity in Affection and Action, to Truth.

III. Truth, abftractedly confidered, has a neceffary

ceſſary Exiſtence in Nature, independent of, and, in the Order of our Conceptions, prior to, the Will of any Being whatever.

IV. To us, the only conceivable Motive the ſupreme Being could have to create us, and every other Species of intelligent Beings, was that of communicating Happineſs to us, and them.

V. Rational and intelligent Creatures are capable of being in their Meaſure happy, as God is happy, but only, as in their Meaſure they are pure, as He is pure: Or, in other Words, as they conſcientiouſly conform themſelves to the Law of Truth, and diſcharge the Obligations of Reaſon.

VI. As, by our very Frame and Conſtitution, we are rendered incapable of Perfection, ſo the kind Author of our Beings, who could not make us but to be happy, will graciouſly accept a ſincere Deſire, and Endeavour, to know and do what is right, and Penitence and Amendment, in all thoſe Inſtances in which it appears to us we have done otherwiſe; this being the neareſt Approach to Perfection, that, in our preſent State, we are capable of.

VII. To aſpire after rational Happineſs, the ſame in Kind with that of the Deity, by an humble Imitation of him, in all his imitable moral Perfections,

Perfections, is the only End of all true Religion. He therefore who really believes the Being of a God; that he is poſſeſſed of every poſſible Perfection; that he is neceſſarily happy in the Conſciouſneſs of the Perfection of his Being, and the abſolute Rectitude of his whole Nature; that believes likewiſe there is Truth in oppoſition to Falſhood, that it has a neceſſary Exiſtence in Nature, and who in his Meaſure regards it too, in the Whole of his Conduct, and thereby aſpires to aſſimilate himſelf to the Deity in Rectitude and in Bliſs, that is, aims by being pure as God is pure, to become happy as he is happy; is a truly religious Man, a proper Object of Divine Complacence, a promiſing Candidate for Heaven, and the refined, intellectual Joys of that unknown, tho' certain and immortal, State of Exiſtence.

Having propoſed this equitable Method, for thoſe Gentlemen I have complained of, to regard in their dealing with the Deiſt, I ſhall enter upon what I intended, namely, the propoſing to you my Difficulties with regard to Chriſtianity, in order to obtain Satisfaction; by making my Objections to thoſe Doctrines that lie out of the reach of our Reaſon, to determine of their Truth or Falſehood; and thoſe Inſtitutions, which are confeſſedly no conſtituent Parts of Religion. As I apprehend it to be the proper Buſineſs of the Underſtanding, to be chiefly imployed in the great Affairs of Religion, becauſe this is the only rational

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Means of obtaining the ſole End of Being, *viz.* Happineſs; ſo in my Exerciſes of this kind I have deemed it my Duty to endeavour to acquire, and therefore have paid a ſteady Regard to, Truth; and whether upon an impartial Examination, I thought I found it among Friends, or Strangers, learned, or illiterate, whether agreeable, or contrary to the Notions I have been educated in, I have treated it with equal Deference and readily embraced it. But as I am not more certain of the Truth of any Propoſition than this, *viz.* I am fallible, and therefore may err; ſo I chuſe not only to review my Sentiments myſelf, but alſo to call in to my Aſſiſtance a Friend, whoſe Ability and Integrity I am thoroughly ſatisfied of. I have above obſerved, that formerly when I heard you apply the Name, Infidel, to me, it gave me ſome Uneaſineſs; but upon a repeated Enquiry into the Reaſons of that Uneaſineſs, I am far from finding there were any juſt ones for it; ſo that I venture to tell you, I think my preſent Sentiments may very properly be ſtiled Deiſm, as *that* imports the Religion of Things, and not of unmeaning, or many meaning Words; of the Heart, but not of the Book. It is not nominal, but real, Deiſm I now intend; and by which, Sir, I would fain be underſtood to mean, that Religion, which conſiſts of only ſuch Doctrines and Precepts as appear to have their Foundation in Reaſon and Nature. And tho' it is ſaid by ſome, that Chriſtianity is grounded on natural Religion, and is an Improvement of it; yet, after

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all that has been ſaid to exemplify it, or that has been offered in Proof of it, I cannot poſſibly conceive how an entire and perfect Structure (which is the Caſe of natural Religion) can only be a Foundation for a perfect Structure; or how a perfect Religon can be improved; or what is eſſential to Man, can be but of ſmall Importance to him, in Compariſon of what is ſuperadded, and to which his Underſtanding is inadequate. To come to the Point, I think the grand Foundation of the Difference betwixt the Deiſts, and the Religious of all other Perſuaſions, is, whether any Doctrine, or Precept, that has not its Foundation apparently in Reaſon and Nature, can be of the Eſſence of Religion, and with Propriety be ſaid to be a religious Doctrine or Precept. With regard to this Queſtion, Chriſtians may be put in two Claſſes; *viz.* Firſt, Thoſe who maintain, that Doctrines and Practices, which have no Foundation in Reaſon or Nature, may be of the Eſſence of Religion; and, ſecondly, thoſe who maintain, that Doctrines and Practices, which do not apparently appear to be founded in Nature and Reaſon, may yet, notwithſtanding, be of the Eſſence of Religion. Thoſe in the firſt Claſs, who maintain that Doctrines and Practices, may be of the Eſſence of Religion, tho' not founded in Nature and Reaſon, ſeem to be drawn into it, from a miſtaken Notion of the divine Sovereignty; which they imagine will be properly exerciſed by the Deity, in doing and commanding what is repugnant to all his other Perfections. *Ziglovius*, a *Dutch* Author, has

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on this Principle affirmed, "*That God may, if he* "*pleaſe, out of the vaſt Sovereignty of his Will,* "*command all that Wickedneſs which he has for-* "*bidden, and make it our Duty; and alſo for-* "*bid all that Holineſs which he hath commanded,* "*and make it become Sin to us.*" This is to repreſent that adorable Being, who is infinitely perfect, as being perfectly capricious; and ſtupidly endeavouring to raiſe the Glory of one of God's Attributes, on the Ruin of the reſt. Thoſe Chriſtians of the ſecond Claſs ſo far agree with the Deiſts, as to own that God, who is infinite in Knowledge, and can never know things to be otherwiſe than they are in themſelves, cannot poſſibly conſider, nor conſtitute any Doctrine or Precept, to be of the Eſſence of Religion, which is not ſo in itſelf, as not being founded in Truth and Reaſon. The Law and Religion of Reaſon and Nature, they readily acknowledge, as neceſſarily contain in them every thing really and truly religious, as the Whole its Parts; and as neceſſarily exclude every thing of a different nature from them, as it is naturally different. But then they argue, that as the Religion of Nature, thus abſolutely conſidered and in its full Extent, is only known to God, if he ſhould be pleaſed to make a ſupernatural Revelation of ſuch Parts of that Law to us, which our unaſſiſted Reaſon could never have diſcovered; ſuch a Revelation ought to be gratefully received, and readily acknowledged. And tho' no Doctrine, that has not its Foundation in Reaſon and Nature, can be a truly religi-

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ous Doctrine; yet Doctrines that have ſuch a Foundation (though that does not appear) may if God pleaſes, be communicated to us, either by himſelf immediately, or mediately by his Agents, without any Reflection on, or Repugnancy to, any one of his Attributes. And this, ſay they, is the Caſe of all the ſpeculative, metaphyſical, and ſublime Doctrines contained in the Scriptures, which collectively compoſe the Chriſtian Faith; theſe are ſo many Revelations of the Law of Nature, which unaſſiſted Reaſon could not diſcover; and though they remain incomprehenſible, and lie out of the Reach of Reaſon, yet when that which is imperfect ſhall be done away, and Faith is turned into Viſion, they will then appear to us to be founded in Truth and Reaſon.

From the Caſe thus fairly ſtated, I think, it appears, that the Difference betwixt thoſe rational Chriſtians and the Deiſts, will, without any farther Trouble, be adjuſted, when this Propoſition (which Chriſtians lay down for a certain Truth) *viz.* That the Collection of Writings commonly called the Scriptures are of divine Inſpiration, and a Revelation from God to Mankind, be plainly, and clearly, made appear to be ſo. Seeing then, it is only ſeemingly, and but in Appearance, the Deiſt and the more rational ſort of Chriſtians diſpute, whether Doctrines that in themſelves are truly religious, muſt as ſuch, neceſſarily have their Foundation in Reaſon and Nature; the real

Queſtion

Queſtion between them is reſolved into this, *viz.* Whether thoſe Scripture Doctrines that cannot be perceived, by Reaſon, to have their Foundation in the Reaſon and Nature of Things are, notwithſtanding, certainly thus founded; and ought to be allowed to be ſo, only becauſe they are contained in the Scripture. Now the Reſolution of this material Queſtion altogether depends upon the Proof that is to be made by Chriſtians, that the Scriptures are a divine (*) Revelation, and the very Word of God. For if that Point be proved the Controverſy at once is at an end; there being no true Deiſt, that will heſitate a Moment to allow,

(*) By divine Revelation, and the very Word of God, is not meant any Light, Information, or Inſtruction Men may have attained to, touching a Deity, their Duty to him, *&c.* from the Conſideration of the natural World, and in the due Exerciſe of their natural Powers, (as the inviſible Things of God are clearly perceived by his Works, being underſtood by the Things that are made); but ſuch Light, Information, or Inſtruction as has been communicated to Men, in and by ſome immediate, particular, and ſpecial Interpoſition of the Deity, for that Purpoſe; this is, properly ſpeaking, divine Revelation, and the very Word of God. Nevertheleſs, as all moral or religious Principles, that are founded in Reaſon, are worthy of God, and agreeable to him; ſo theſe, in a very looſe and improper Senſe, may be called divine Revelation, what way ſoever we attain to the Knowledge of them: And therefore, not to contend about Words, let it be admitted to call ſuch Principles divine Revelation, only let it be remembered, that all ſuch Principles have an equal Title to be called a divine Revelation, uſing the Terms in the ſame Senſe, whatever Writing or Book they may be contained in.

that what God ſaith is Truth, becauſe he knows all things, and therefore cannot err himſelf, nor will he deceive, or impoſe upon us. In order then to a proper Determination of this momentous Affair, the Reaſons, upon which the Belief of the divine Original of the Scriptures is built, are to be produced, by the Chriſtians on one Side, in all their Weight; and to be examined, by the Deiſts on the other, with that Impartiality, and Indifference to every Opinion, as ſuch; which alone can properly denominate them Lovers of Truth.

But alas! alas! here we have a ſurpriſing Inſtance of the want of Unanimity among Chriſtians, where it ſeems to be ſo peculiarly requiſite, that without it, they muſt not only expect to fail of convincing the Deiſts of the Truth of their Cauſe, but alſo render it a doubtful Point whether they are rationally convinced of the Truth of it themſelves. For if we begin with the Roman Catholics, who have vaſtly the Advantage in point of Numbers, and plainly aſk them, How know you the Scriptures (which with them includes the Apocryphal Books) to be the Word of God? they anſwer, By the Teſtimony of the Church, and aſſure us we cannot be certain of it, by any other Argument. This Anſwer of the Catholics to the Queſtion propoſed, is ſo wide of the Purpoſe, to ſatisfy an honeſt Enquirer, of the Reality of the Inſpiration and Infallibility of the Scriptures, that it ſatisfies him, he is only to expect,

fallible,

fallible, human Teſtimony in Proof of it. The Weakneſs, and Abſurdity of this Method of Proof, has been ſo fully ſhewn, by ſome eminent Proteſtants, as to render it perfectly needleſs, for Deiſts, to make any Repetition of what is ſo generally known and approved. It will therefore be proper to proceed to the Examination of ſome of the principal Anſwers vouchſafed us by Proteſtants; I ſay, by Proteſtants, becauſe tho' they would ſeem to agree in that general Propoſition, *viz.* The Scriptures are known to be the Word of God by themſelves, in Oppoſition to the Papiſts, who ſay they are known to be ſo only by the Teſtimony of the Church; yet they really differ as widely one from another, as from the Papiſts; not only in laying the Foundation, but in their reſpective Superſtructures built upon it. One maintaining, that they are known to be the Word of God by themſelves, to thoſe only whoſe Eyes the Spirit of God is pleaſed in a diſtinguiſhing manner to open, to perceive the certain Characters of divine Truth in them. Another maintaining, that they are to be known, and will manifeſtly appear, to be the Word of God by themſelves, upon an honeſt Inveſtigation of mere natural Reaſon, to any Man who ſhall impartially exerciſe it about them.

Mr. *Pemble*, in his Treatiſe of Grace and Faith, ſays, " *We know the Scriptures are the Word of* " *God by themſelves, the Spirit of God opening our*

" *Eyes*

" *Eyes to ſee thoſe natural and lively Characters of* " *divine Truth, which are imprinted on thoſe ſacred* " *Volumes. But how* (he aſks a little after) *doth* " *the Holy Ghoſt reveal unto us the Truth of Scrip-* " *ture?*" (he anſwers) " *By removing thoſe Im-* " *pediments that hinder, and by beſtowing thoſe* " *Graces, Illumination and Sanctification, that make* " *us capable of this Knowledge.*" To animadvert upon the particular manner of knowing the Scriptures to be the Word of God by themſelves, or by knowing them to be ſo, by ſomething beſides themſelves, as it is beſide my preſent Buſineſs, I ſhall omit it, and only conſider the Propoſition in its obvious and direct Meaning. To this Propoſition then, we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God by themſelves, as an Anſwer of a Party of Proteſtants to the Queſtion above, (*viz.* How know you the Scriptures to be the Word of God?) the Roman Catholics in their Turn reply, that Scripture is delivered to moſt Proteſtants by Tranſlations, and they depend upon the Skill of fallible Men, who may err, and of whom it is certain that ſome of them have erred, becauſe their Tranſlations are contrary: So that according to the Papiſts, if the Scriptures were primarily and in themſelves the Word of God, yet it does not follow that the tranſlated Scriptures of Proteſtants are ſuch; as but one of the many Tranſlations can be right; and which of them all is that one, cannot certainly be determined; becauſe the Scriptures may have undergone, with all other Alterations,

terations, the Alterations which Language is unavoidably liable to; and consequently, the Scriptures of Protestants cannot be known to be the Word of God by themselves. But admitting that this Objection of the Papists is of no Weight, and that the Scriptures have been truly translated from the Languages they were originally written in; yet, as they have passed through the Hands of many Transcribers in those Languages, who had it in their Power greatly to corrupt them, and we cannot be certain but they were so corrupted; it follows, the Scriptures in these latter Ages, cannot possibly be proved to be the Word of God by themselves. And that this Argument may be extended to its utmost Bounds, let it be admitted, that the Scriptures have not sustained any Injury by Transcribers; the Question will return, How are they to be known to be the Word of God by themselves? Is it by their own Testimony, concerning themselves? or by the Reasonableness, and apparent Truth, of each, and all the Doctrines and Precepts contained in them? As to the first, *viz.* their own Testimony concerning themselves, this alone cannot be a proper Ground of Credence; seeing this is as positively affirmed of itself, by every other traditionary Revelation throughout the World. Besides, their own Testimony cannot yield a proper Ground of Conviction to an unbiassed Enquirer, because those Enquirers are not previously convinced of the actual Inspiration, and absolute Infallibility of the several

veral Authors of the Scriptures; this Point indeed once gained, they might certainly know the Scriptures to be the Word of God by themſelves; for an infallible Teſtimony of an inſpired Author in the Caſe, would effectually extinguiſh all future Doubt concerning it. But this Aſſurance of the Infallibility and Inſpiration of the ſeveral Authors of thoſe Books called the *Bible*, is the very Point in Queſtion, and required to be proved; and of which its own Teſtimony concerning itſelf can be no proper Evidence. As to the ſecond kind of Proofs, *viz.* The Reaſonableneſs and apparent Truth of each of its Doctrines and Precepts reſpectively, this is not ſo much as pretended by thoſe Proteſtants whoſe Anſwer we are now particularly conſidering; for they propoſe not to ſee the Character of divine Truth in the Scripture, by any other Means, than that of having their Eyes ſupernaturally opened for that purpoſe; theſe Gentlemen being too much of a piece to expect Proof in any other way. Mere Morality and the bare Exerciſe of our natural Powers in Matters of Religion, they eſteem altogether ineffectual with regard to Salvation; and things beyond Morality, and out of the Verge of human Reaſon, they are ſo well aſſured are not to be acquired by Reaſon, that they aſcribe the Acquiſition of them, wholly, to the Operation of the Holy Ghoſt. And as the Operation of the Holy Ghoſt, and the Teſtimony grounded upon it, is merely arbitrary, and extends no farther than to him whom it operates upon;

on; ſo it cannot poſſibly be enquired into, nor be a Ground of Conviction to another.

So that this Method of proving the Scriptures to be the very Word of God by themſelves, *viz.* by reaſoning upon the Subject Matter contained in them, falls to the Lot of the rational Divines, the Friends of Liberty, and free Debate; who own with the Reverend Mr. *Chandler*, "*That the* "*Religion of Chriſt muſt be underſtood before it can* "*or ought to be believed; and that it muſt be prov-* "*ed to be a conſiſtent and rational Religion, before* "*Men can be under any Obligation to receive it.*" I ſhall chearfully and carefully attend to what they have to offer in Defence of their Hypotheſis, and allow their Arguments all their real Weight. The Reverend Mr. *Chillingworth*, who was perhaps the greateſt public Defender the Proteſtants ever had to boaſt of, in p. 53 of his *Religion of Proteſtants a ſafe Way to Salvation*, has a Sentence well worth regarding. This great Man interrogates his Adverſaries thus, "*If Scripture cannot be the Judge* "*of any Controverſy, how ſhall that touching the* "*Church and the Notes of it be determined?* "*And if it be the ſole Judge of this one, why may it* "*not of others? why not of all? thoſe only excepted,* "*wherein the Scripture itſelf is the Subject of the* "*Queſtion, which cannot be determined but by natural* "*Reaſon, the only Principle beſides Scripture which* "*is common to Chriſtians.*" So that the Principle of the natural Blindneſs of the human Underſtanding, and the abſolute Neceſſity of its being ſupernatu-

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rally illuminated, in order to perceive the Characters of divine Truth in the Scriptures, is wholly excluded, and natural Reason is affirmed to be the Judge in those Controversies, where the Scripture itself is the Subject of them. According to this great Man then, the Scriptures will appear to be the Word of God to every Man, who, in the best manner he can, does exercise his Reason, in the Perusal of them. If then the great Controversy, in which the divine Authority of Scripture is the Subject, cannot be determined but by natural Reason, and natural Reason can determine as it is here supposed; if it determines in its Favour, it must be, because all the Parts of it are not only proper Subjects of its Examination, but likewise appear when examined to be apparently reasonable. But Matters supernatural are incapable of an Examination by natural Reason; and therefore, are incapable of being apparently reasonable, or being approved of as such by our reasoning Faculties. And if there are such supernatural Matters in the Scriptures, as I presume must be admitted, these cannot be pronounced by Reason (the allowed Judge in the Case) to be at all the Word and Revelation of God. Where natural Reason is Judge, it appears to be, if not impossible, at least highly improbable, that it should determine rightly concerning the Truth or Falseness of supernatural Matters. And upon the closest Inspection into this grand Affair, I am for the present pretty well convinced that not only the

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great *Chillingworth*, but our diſtinguiſhed Moderns, among the rational Divines, with all their Refinement, are equally gravelled with their Predeceſſors, when they come to the Diſcuſſion of this unmanageable Point, *viz.* that the Scriptures are known to be the Word and Revelation of God, upon an honeſt Inveſtigation of mere natural Reaſon, to any Man who ſhall impartially exerciſe it about them. For can a thing be but what it is, and yet be more than what it is at the ſame time? can a Man have but the Underſtanding of a Man, and yet diſcern that which is quite out of the Reach of the human intellectual Faculties to perceive? which muſt be the Caſe, if Man can by his Reaſon diſcern the Truth of a Propoſition, that is above his Reaſon, or be rationally convinced of the Truth of what lies quite out of the Reach of his reaſoning Faculty to form any Judgment at all about. And tho' ſome of our Divines have added to the Evidence ariſing from the internal Characters of the Scriptures, the external Evidences of Prophecies and Miracles, in order to prove the Scriptures to be a divine Revelation, and the Word of God; yet theſe external Evidences fall greatly ſhort of giving proper Proof in the preſent Caſe; for were all the Prophecies that have ever been given forth by Jews, Sibils, Chriſtians, or others; and all the Miracles that have ever been wrought, taken into the Account, and conſidered either ſeparately, or collectively, they would fall ſhort of proving all the following Points; namely, that all

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thoſe Books, which conſtitute that Collection of Tracts, commonly called the Bible, were written by the Perſons reſpectively whoſe Names they bear; that the Deity immediately dictated to, and impreſſed upon, the Mind of each Writer, the Subject Matter contained therein, effectually reſtraining each one from mixing his own Conceptions, with what had been thus dictated to him; and that theſe Books have been faithfully tranſmitted from their reſpective original Copies down to us, without any Corruption, Alteration, Addition, or Diminution; and if Prophecy and Miracles fall ſhort of proving theſe Points, which moſt certainly they do; then conſequently, they fall equally ſhort of proving the Scriptures to be a divine Revelation, and the very Word of God. Nevertheleſs, as to all thoſe intelligible Parts of Scripture, which approve themſelves to the human Underſtanding, by obviouſly appearing to have their Foundation in Reaſon and Nature, tho' a Deiſt cannot admit them to be immediately revealed in a miraculous and ſupernatural Manner, to the reſpective Perſons by whom they are exhibited to the World; becauſe it does not appear to him that they have been proved to be ſo, and becauſe they are to be diſcovered to be what they are by the human Underſtanding, in the ordinary and natural Uſe of its Faculties; yet he readily admits that they are worthy and valuable Truths, and willingly pays to them all that Veneration and Regard, which is ſuitable to the Dignity and

Importance

Importance of the ſeveral Subjects they relate to. And as to all the myſterious and unintelligible Parts of Scripture, they are the ſame as if they were not, as to any good Purpoſe that can be ſerved by them; for as St. *Paul* has juſtly obſerved, *If the Trumpet gives an uncertain Sound, who ſhall prepare himſelf for the Battle?* St. *Paul*'s reaſoning, 1 *Cor.* cap. xiv. on the Subject of ſpeaking in an unknown Tongue, is certainly juſt, and worthy to be conſidered; and the Caſe is the ſame with regard to unintelligible Propoſitions. There are, it may be ſaid (ſaith the Apoſtle Verſes 10, 11.) *So many kind of Voices in the World, and none of them are without Signification. Therefore, if I know not the Meaning of the Voice, I ſhall be to him that ſpeaketh a Barbarian; and he that ſpeaketh ſhall be a Barbarian unto me.* So that according to St. *Paul*, were the Deity to give forth myſterious, and unintelligible Propoſitions to his Creatures, he would be a Barbarian to them; and they would be Barbarians unto him; but, ſurely, the Deity will not be ſuch a Trifler, and therefore the Suppoſition is not to be admitted; and conſequently an unintelligible Propoſition gives a clearer and ſtronger Proof that ſuch a Propoſition is not of divine Authority, than any external Evidence can poſſibly give that it is. So that thoſe Gentlemen who undertake to prove the Scriptures to be the very Word of God by the Scriptures themſelves, if they will effectually anſwer the real End of this toilſom Enterprize, are to demonſtrate

monſtrate that thoſe Parts of Scripture objected to by the Deiſts, as unintelligible, now they are revealed in the Bible (whatever they may have been before) are on a level with natural Reaſon, and are approvable by it; for otherwiſe, how apparently ridiculous muſt it be to ſay, that they are revealed to, and lent in aid of Reaſon, and likewiſe that they are to be judged of by it; which Point, if I am not miſtaken, has been found to be an inſuperable Difficulty to them. However, let the Matter be brought to a fair Tryal.

Theſe, Sir, you know are the weighty Points which for many Years paſt have been conteſted by the biblical Believers, and Rationaliſts; and to which Side Truth inclines, I muſt own, ſeems to me at preſent no difficult Matter to determine. Many of the Former, it muſt be acknowledged to their Praiſe, have not uſed the circumſtantial Advantages they were incidentally in the Poſſeſſion of, to favour their Cauſe, but have reſted it upon the ſingle Foot of Reaſon and Argument; and being put upon this Foot, the rational Free-thinkers have readily engaged; the Conſequence of which has been, that not only the different Schemes entire, but alſo in all their material Parts, have been diſtinctly placed, and viewed in all their different Points of Light. And by this Means, a true Judgment may have been more eaſily formed than before, by Men of all Degrees that were diſpoſed to judge for themſelves, on which Side

Truth

Truth (the only valuable End of all our theological Enquiries) lies. And tho' many great Men on the traditionary Side have displayed their Abilities, and have acquitted themselves honourably; yet a Man of your Peneration and Integrity, may possibly have perceived, that since all enthusiastical Superiority, and superstitious Deference has been disclaimed by them, they, even they, are reduced to the hard Fate of capitulating, or else retreating under the Covert of idle Distinctions and mysterious Darkness. Fairly producing, and chearfully submitting to your Examination, the Reasons why I think this to be the Case, was one of the two principal Motives to my presenting you with this Epistle; well knowing that if I failed in my Endeavour, you, who I think are, as far as any Man can be, a rational Christian, would shew me in the very Spirit of Religion, wherein I did so. Nothing then, I think, can have a more probable Tendency to furnish me with an Opportunity occassonally to offer you my Reasons why Truth beams forth on the Rationalists, than attending to the Arguments of some rational Divine, who has been generally applauded for distinguishing himself in some important recent Controversy, as much for the Cogency of his Reasoning and fair Dealing, as for the Eloquence and Order of his Writings.

The Controversy between the ingenious moral Philosopher, who answered the *Trial of the Witnesses*,

neſſes, and the learned Author of that *Trial*, as it affects but a Part or ſingle Doctrine of Chriſtianity may not be ſo proper to ſelect our Chriſtian Advocate from, as that introduced by the Author of *Chriſtianity not founded on Argument*; becauſe the Latter is general, and affects the whole Cauſe. And as many have taken in hand to anſwer the Tract I referred to, thereby to remove from Chriſtianity thoſe Difficulties which, according to that Performance, it may ſeem to be incumbered with; ſo I have ſingled out Dr. *Benſon* from the reſt to be the Chriſtian's Champion, becauſe by his cultivating the Dialogue Stile in his Diſcuſſions, he has rendered himſelf more popular, and by his being very copious, may be thought to carry the Weight, and Strength, of all the reſt. This Gentleman has ſo ſtrenuouſly oppoſed, in ſome Parts of his Book, his enthuſiaſtic Brethren, and their Scheme of Chriſtianity, which has been exhibited to the World, by the Author of *Chriſtianity not founded on Argument*, as to render his own Principles a Subject of Diſpute; and has effectually anſwered that Author's real Deſign (ſuppoſing him to have been a Deiſt) by his frequently falling full into the Scheme of the true Deiſts, and tacitly, at leaſt, acknowledging that all they contend againſt in Chriſtianity, is indefeaſible on the foot of Reaſon.

Dr. *Benſon* having (in Page 82) roundly aſſerted, without Heſitation or Reſtriction, that the ra-

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tional and examining Believer, when he has proved all things, holds faſt that which is good, and what is good, in all Caſes of Importance, may readily be diſtinguiſhed from what is evil; I beg leave to offer the following things to Conſideration, which being natural Inferences from the above Poſtulatum, call for a particular Regard. 1. That Matters of Faith, ſuch I mean as are peculiar to Chriſtianity, in Contradiſtinction to ſuch as are evidently eſſential to natural Religion, are ſo far from admitting a ready, that in their very Nature they are incapable of admitting any, Diſtinction at all, to any mere human Underſtanding, concerning what is right, or wrong, good, or evil in them; becauſe were their Truth and Goodneſs thus perceivable, they would plainly appear to be Parts of natural Religion; and were the Contrary thus perceivable, then they would as plainly appear to be no Parts of true Religion at all. 2. Therefore, according to Dr. *Benſon*'s own Definition of Caſes of Importance, Matters of mere Chriſtian Faith cannot be reckoned as belonging to them; becauſe he expreſly ſays what is good, in all Caſes of Importance, may readily be diſtinguiſhed from what is Evil. 3. As in mere Matters of Morality only, Reaſon can readily diſtinguiſh what is morally good from what is morally evil; ſo mere Matters of Morality only can, according to Dr. *Benſon*, be Caſes of Importance; that is, with regard to the Favour of God and eternal Salvation. Here, ſurely, it ought to be

preſumed

presumed that Dr. *Benson* wrote what he judged to be Truth, else his Integrity is arraigned, and consequently, that he really thinks those Cases only to be of Importance, in which he says Good and Evil may readily be distinguished; and in which we are tied up in the Issue (not by an arbitrary Injunction implicitly to believe; but) by the Force of Truth, by the Reason of Things, or by Argument and Evidence. And if Dr. *Benson* does really think as above, then I shall venture to infer, that he and the assuming Free-thinker are brought to shake Hands; and notwithstanding they seem to differ, yet in all Cases of Importance they entertain the same Sentiments. But, perhaps, I shall be told that I have been too hasty in drawing my Conclusion; for tho' what Dr. *Benson* has said as above, when considered alone (and apart from the manifest Design of his Book) affords in Appearance some Ground for it; yet he afterwards explains himself, and exhibits his real Sentiments, by making it his Business to prove that Reason is not the only Guide in important Points of Faith; and to shew the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion. Well, it is Truth and not Conquest I am in Pursuit of; and therefore, If Dr. *Benson* can make it appear, by Reason, that Reason is not the only Guide in the Case under Consideration, and is only to be used in Subordination to some superior, directive Principle in the human System, tho' he would hereby greatly contradict himself; yet that shall be no Bar to my Conviction; I shall readily

submit

ſubmit to the Force of his Argument, and thank him for helping me on in my way.

Dr. *Benſon* ſays, of a large Citation he had juſt made from the Book he attempted to anſwer, he apprehended that the " *Author had in this, as well* " *as many other Particulars, miſrepreſented the ra-* " *tional Divines. He has indeed inſinuated, p.* 4. " *that the rational Divines look upon Reaſon as the* " *only Guide in Matters of Religion. So again, p.* " 40, *and* 56, *as if they held that a Man might at-* " *tain to the Belief of revealed Truths, by the Strength* " *of his natural Faculties; and ſo in other Places.* " *Whereas the rational Divines themſelves would* " *ſay, that Reaſon is not the only Guide in Matters* " *of Religion, but that Reaſon and Scripture are* " *both to be regarded; and that without the Scrip-* " *tures Reaſon or Mens natural Faculties would never* " *have found out many things that are revealed in the Bible,*" p. 90, 91. 'Tis true indeed they never could; and the great thing at which many ſerious and inquiſitive Men boggle, is, that now they are revealed (as it is called) they are no more to be underſtood, or judged of by the human Powers, than they were before to be found out by them; and conſequently (according to Dr. *Benſon*) cannot be Matters of Importance; and how ſuch things can with Propriety be ſaid to be revealed, they think ſtands very much in need of a Revelation to explain. Methinks it ſhould be thought, by the Advocates of this Species of Revelation, to be the proper Buſineſs of its Vindicators, either to

ſhew how things can with Propriety be ſaid to be revealed to the human Race, of which Man has no Faculty capable of forming an adequate Idea or Judgment; or elſe that the Opinion of our having no Faculty equal to the Truths revealed, is a vulgar Error, and that though Reaſon is unequal to ſuch a Taſk, yet there is in Man a Principle beſides, and ſuperiour to his Reaſon or Underſtanding, by which the things revealed are to be conceived and judged of. In ſhort, to talk of a Revelation of certain things, to certain Beings, whoſe uppermoſt Faculty is incapable of underderſtanding them, is an apparent Abſurdity and Contradiction. And likewiſe to talk of a Revelation of things to Men in Aid of Reaſon, which tho' eaſily underſtood, yet Reaſon cannot diſcover any proper uſe can be made of them, is alike abſurd and contradictory. That God will judge the World in Righteouſneſs, and deal with every one according as he ſhall render himſelf the proper Object of divine Clemency, or Reſentment, is a Doctrine which obviouſly appears to have its Foundation in Reaſon and Nature; and moderate Underſtandings can eaſily diſcover its Uſefulneſs, as it naturally tends to engage Men to act right, and to reclaim them when they have acted otherwiſe; and therefore is not to be conſidered as ſupernatural, nor ſuperrational. But that God will judge the World by *Jeſus Chriſt*, does not appear to have its Foundation in Reaſon and Nature; as there does not appear to the human Underſtand-

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ing any Principle, any Premiſes from which this Concluſion may be fairly drawn, *viz.* that God will judge the World by a Subſtitute; much leſs that he will do it by *Jeſus Chriſt*. And as God will judge the World in Righteouſneſs; ſo it appears to human Reaſon to be quite indifferent, and of no Conſequence, to the Creature who he is judged by, whether by the ſupreme Deity immediately, or by a Subſtitute; and if by a Subſtitute, then whether by *Jeſus Chriſt*, or any other Agent. I ſay, it muſt be a Matter of Indifference to the Creature, who ſhall be his immediate Judge, provided Righteouſneſs be the Rule of that Judgment; becauſe his Sentence will be the ſame. And if Reaſon cannot make any Improvement of this revealed Doctrine, *viz.* That *Jeſus Chriſt* will judge the World, which, ſurely, it cannot; then how can it be ſaid with either Propriety or Truth that it was given in Aid of it? And if the Knowledge of this Truth (admitting it to be a Truth) *viz.* That *Jeſus Chriſt* will judge the World, be of no more Conſequence to Mankind in general, than the Knowledge of this Truth, *viz.* there is a burning Mountain in the Kingdom of *Naples*, is to the People of *England* in particular; then this is a juſt Objection againſt the Divinity of this Doctrine; becauſe it is greatly improbable, that God ſhould ſpecially interpoſe, to acquaint the World with this, or any other Truth, the Knowledge of which Mankind would do altogether as well without.

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But tho' the Author before referred to, has intimated that the rational Divines hold a Man may attain to the Belief of revealed Truths, by the Strength of his natural Faculties, Dr. *Benſon* inſinuates they hold no ſuch Doctrine; and at the ſame time informs us what it is, in this important Affair, they do hold; namely, "That as human "Reaſon is greatly limited and imperfect, and "has been exceedingly perverted and abuſed, Re-"velation came in aid of it; and is a glorious ad-"ditional Talent, for which they who have the "Benefit of it are accountable, but not thoſe who "have no Opportunity of coming acquainted "with it." That human Reaſon is greatly limited and imperfect, is a Tenet held by all rational Men as well as by all rational Divines; all ſuch being very ſenſible, that the Deity alone is poſſeſſed of unlimited and perfect Reaſon. That Reaſon has by ſome Men been greatly perverted and abuſed, will be readily granted; but that it has been univerſally ſo, will not be readily admitted. If human Reaſon be greatly limited and imperfect, then muſt it not be fair and equitable to expect that human Conduct at beſt will be proportionably ſo? And if God acts conſonant to the moſt perfect Reaſon, then will he not do it in theſe Inſtances, as well as in others, *viz.* overlook thoſe leſſer Miſcarriages in his Creatures that are the natural Offſpring of human Weakneſs; and pardon ſuch greater Offenders, as render themſelves the proper Objects of Mercy, by their Peni-

tence

tence and Amendment? That human Reaſon is greatly limited and imperfect, is a Propoſition which is readily ſubſcribed to, on all hands; but what Purpoſes this limited Faculty was intended to ſerve, and is actually capable of, are Points, in which Men greatly differ. The Free-thinker conceives that human Reaſon, or that Principle of Diſcernment which takes place in Man, and makes a Part of the human Conſtitution, was intended by the Author of our Beings to diſcover, and to aſcertain, the Truth of the following Propoſitions:

I. That the firſt Cauſe of all things is a Being, not only of the moſt boundleſs Power, but alſo of the moſt unlimited and perfect Reaſon or Underſtanding.

II. That in Nature there is the right and wrong of every Caſe that can poſſibly exiſt, or reſult from the infinitely various Poſitions and Modifications of either ſimple, or complex Ideas, Propoſitions, or things, at leaſt, of all thoſe Caſes that right and wrong can poſſibly be relative to.

III. It may fairly be preſumed, that infinite Reaſon is alone capable of diſtinguiſhing unnerringly, betwixt Right and Wrong, in all, and every of that infinite variety of Caſes, that ever has, does, or can poſſibly exiſt.

IV.

IV. How far each Individual of the human Species can, or may in Reaſon and Equity be expected to go, in conformity to the immutable Laws of Rectitude, in Judgment and in Practice, is probably only known to God; and as we cannot know, ſo we ought not to preſume to determine concerning it.

V. How deficient ſoever we are in the Knowledge of Nature, of each others intellectual Abilities and moral Conduct, much more of the abſtract Nature and Perfections of God; yet we are in general as certain as we are of the Exiſtence of ſuch a Being, that he is poſſeſſed of every poſſible Perfection; and will not, in any the leaſt Inſtance, deviate in his Conduct from perfect Rectitude.

VI. Therefore, God will require a Perfection of Conduct (if I may expreſs it thus) from his imperfect Creatures, but in Proportion to the Perfection of their Reaſon; for to produce a Rectitude of Manners more perfect or conformable to Truth, than they have Reaſon or Underſtanding to direct them to, is impoſſible.

VII. To govern our Conduct by our Reaſon is our Duty, and is all that God requires of us; and to neglect to regulate our Conduct by our Reaſon, in that Proportion which God has been pleaſed to diſpenſe it to us, is criminal, or blame-worthy.

VIII. As there is no Individual of our Species, but has been more or leſs guilty, of deviating from the Rule preſcribed him by his Reaſon, either the whole Species are unpardonably guilty before God, or elſe Repentance and Reformation are the Means of Reconciliation with him, and of reſtoring us to his Favour.

IX. That Repentance and Reformation are the natural Means of reconciling us to God, when we are conſcious of our having offended him, is manifeſt from their being invariably recommended to us by our Reaſon, on all ſuch Occaſions, as the Means proper for effecting it; for were the Caſe otherwiſe, they could not be dictated to us by Reaſon as Means to that End; becauſe had they not a natural Tendency to anſwer the End, they would be unfit for our Uſe, on account of their Inſignificancy; and to make uſe of inſignificant Means, is a prepoſterous and unwarrantable Conduct; and to ſuppoſe what is propoſterous and unwarrantable can be the Dictate of Reaſon, is abſurd and a direct Contradiction.

X. Therefore, to repent of what upon a cool Review of our Conduct appears to be criminal, and to reform it, is a Dictate of our Reaſon, is what God the Author of our Beings requires of us, in order for us to do on our Part what he knows to be neceſſary to our Happineſs.

XI. If God requires, and directs us by Reason and Conscience, to perform what he knows is necessary to our Happiness; he will certainly do on his Part what he knows is necessary to that End, *viz.* forgive us our Sins, and reinstate us in his Favour. And if so, then,

XII. All other Means that either have, are, or may be deem'd necessary, and made use of, as such, by Jews, Pagans, Christians, Mahometans, or others, are unnatural, and foreign to the Purpose; and consequently, are superfluous, and downright Superstition.

The discovering and ascertaining the Truth of these Propositions, is a Purpose, among others, which the Deist thinks human Reason, in its present imperfect State, was intended to serve, and that it is actually capable of it; but then this Creed in all its Articles is what Divines will by no Means subscribe to, because they think this is more than human Reason is sufficient for. Thus Divines think that tho' Penitence and Amendment are the only natural Means of Reconciliation betwixt an offending Creature, and its offended Creator, and is all that the Creature can do towards it; yet it is insufficient to answer this Purpose; and that they, by and through the Microscope of Revelation, have discovered other Means which are both necessary and effectual to answer that End; which other Means are supplemental to those exhibited by

Reason,

Reaſon, or elſe excluſive of it: Namely, that a perfectly innocent Being, of the higheſt Order among intelligent Natures, ſhould perſonate the Offender, and ſuffer in his Place and ſtead, in order to take down the Wrath and Reſentment of the Deity againſt the Criminal, and diſpoſe God to ſhew mercy to him. However, ſuch a Conduct as this, *viz.* that the Sufferings of the Innocent ſhould diſpoſe an intelligent Being to ſhew Mercy to the Guilty, the Deiſt conceives to be both unnatural and improper; and therefore, muſt be the Produce either of Weakneſs, or Wickedneſs; neither of which can be aſcribed to God without Blaſphemy; that is, without blaſting the natural or moral Character of the Deity. That the Sufferings of an innocent Perſon, whether voluntarily, or from Neceſſity, ſhould diſpoſe a Being who is abſolutely independant, and ſelf-ſufficient, and of the moſt perfect Intelligence (and thereby is out of the Reach of all Temptation to act wrong, nor can he do it unwillingly) to ſhew Mercy to the Guilty, is altogether as abſurd, and as repugnant to Reaſon in Morals, as it is in things natural that a Creature ſhould create or give Being to itſelf. It has always been eſteemed, by judicious Men, to be a Matter of the greateſt Importance to Religion to have worthy and proper Notions of a Deity; whereas the common Notion of Sacrifices, as generally received by Jews and Heathens, and of Redemption among Chriſtians, ſeems to repreſent the Deity in a diſagreeable

Light, as implacable, revengeful, *&c.* and as acting contrary to the Sentiments Men have of Wisdom and Goodness, which must necessarily do great Disservice to true Religion. And tho' the Doctrine of God's being reconciled to sinful Men, through the Pain and Misery *Jesus Christ* underwent, may be considered to be supernatural and superrational; yet it cannot possibly appear to the human Understanding to be a supernatural and a superrational Truth; and therefore, the Free-thinker finds himself obliged, as he would act consonant to his own intelligent Nature, and as he is satisfied God always acts agreeably to the primary and most perfect Law of Nature, not to give Credit to it. This then, in my Opinion, is a weighty Objection against the Divinity of such Doctrines as are superrational and supernatural; because they cannot possibly appear to the human Understanding to be supernatural and superrational Truths.

Besides what is given in aid of Reason, is in its Sense and Meaning so very loose and indeterminate, as that of Necessity it must be an uncertain, and thereby an unsafe Guide to Mankind. For tho' both rational and enthusiastic Divines, do all agree to maintain the Necessity of Revelation, and make Use of this common Argument, that as human Reason is greatly limited and imperfect, and has been exceedingly perverted and abused; so Revelation came in aid of it; yet, seeing the Interpretations

tations of the ſeveral Parts of it are ſo abundantly various and contradictory, and among the various Interpretations of any Part (be it ever ſo certain and important a Truth in itſelf) one only can be the right of the Caſe, the Queſtion is, what Aid can ſuch an obſcure Revelation afford to imperfect human Reaſon in general, and particularly to the Reaſon of thoſe, who honeſtly adhere to any one of the wrong Interpretations, as the only right one, towards advancing it to its ſuppoſed primitive Purity and Perfection? To ſuppoſe any particular Propoſition, neceſſary in the general to be believed in, whilſt we are incapable of underſtanding what is particularly meant by it; is by Words to pretend we are to believe ſomething, which at the ſame time we confeſs to be nothing; that is, it is as if it was not, with regard to any particular rational Conceptions we can have about it. To ſuppoſe we are able, and conſequently, ought to fix its proper determinate Senſe, to each of the difficult Parts of Revelation, or to ſuppoſe that Revelation is plain, and eaſily to be underſtood, and its true Senſe eaſily to be aſcertained in all Points of Importance; is to ſuppoſe the Revelation to be, not a ſuperrational, but a rational one; which would be reducing the rational Divines, to the Neceſſity of looking again upon Reaſon, as the only Guide in Matters of Religion; and conſequently to acquit the Author above referred to of the Charge brought againſt him, by their Repreſentative Dr. *Benſon*, *viz.* of miſrepreſenting

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them. To ſuppoſe we are not able to fix to any difficult Part of Revelation its real determinate Senſe, and yet to ſuppoſe it to have been given by way of ſupernatural Aid to our natural Faculties, and that thoſe very difficult Parts of Revelation are collectively a glorious additional Talent, for which they who have the Benefit of it are accountable, is to ſuppoſe that to be ſent in Aid of Reaſon, which is incapable of affording it any Aſſiſtance; it is to ſuppoſe us to be poſſeſſed of an additional Talent, that cannot at all increaſe our original Stock; and laſtly, 'tis to ſuppoſe us accountable for the Benefit of what we cannot at all be benefited by. But as things are uſually put in a clearer light by giving an Example of the kind, let it be admitted, that the Chriſtian Revelation exhibits to us this Doctrine, namely, that God is diſtinguiſhable into three diſtinct Parts or Somewhats, each of which is characterized by a diſtinct Name, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; and all of them in Conjunction by the Term Trinity; the Queſtion is, what natural or moral Improvement does this Exhibition bring with it to Mankind? and the Anſwer, I think, is evident, *viz.* none at all. It affords no natural Improvement to the Mind, becauſe the Mind has no proper Idea of what is ſeemingly exhibited by it, *viz.* That the Deity is diſtinguiſhable into three Somewhats. Were this Propoſition exhibited to us, by a divine Revelation, *viz.* That there are four ſecondary Planets moving round the Planet *Jupiter*, this

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might be ſome low Degree of Improvement to a Mind that had no other way to attain to the Knowledge of this Propoſition; becauſe, as here is ſomething propoſed to the Mind, of which it has a proper Conception, ſo by this means it is informed of a Truth, which otherwiſe it would have been ignorant of. Whereas that the Deity is diſtinguiſhable into three Somewhats, as the Mind cannot poſſibly conceive, or have any proper Idea what this Diſtinguiſhment is; ſo it cannot poſſibly receive any Information from it, nor any natural Improvement by it. Nor can Man receive any moral Improvement from the above Doctrine of God's being diſtinguiſhable into three diſtinct Parts, or Somewhats, as aforeſaid. For as our Relation to, Dependance upon, and our Obligations to, the Deity, and all juſt and reaſonable Expectations from him, are the very ſame, whether the Deity be diſtinguiſhable into three Somewhats, or not; and whether Man has received any Information concerning it, or not; ſo Man cannot receive any moral Improvement by it; that is, it does not lead him to a greater, or higher, Degree of Rectitude, of Affection and Action, than otherwiſe he would attain. And as the aforeſaid Doctrine cannot be introductive of any natural or moral Improvement to Man; ſo neither can he form any Judgment of the Truth, or Falſhood; of the Good, or Evil of it. Not of its Truth, or Falſhood; becauſe he is altogether ignorant of the Subject, of which it is here ſuppoſed that Truth

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or Falſhood is one or other of them relative to. Not of its Good or Evil; becauſe Man cannot poſſibly diſcover that it is Good in itſelf, and Good for us, that God is diſtinguiſhable as aforeſaid; and that it would be Evil in itſelf, and Evil to us, were the Deity abſolutely a ſimple uncompounded Being. And as this is the Caſe of the Doctrine referred to, ſo I apprehend it to be the ſame with all Doctrines that are properly ſpeaking ſupernatural and ſuperrational; they neither furniſh the Mind with uſeful and venerable Truths, nor introduce greater Rectitude of Affection and Action. And this, Sir, is to me a weighty Objection againſt the Divinity of ſuch Doctrines, and is a Difficulty inſolvable to me.

The human Species being accountable, neceſſarily ſuppoſes them to be free Beings, and, as ſuch, to be at liberty either to exerciſe and cultivate, or to neglect and abuſe their Reaſon; but that all our Species ſhould exceedingly pervert and abuſe it, is unaccountable, and paſt Belief; and were it the Caſe I ſhould be tempted to think it unavoidable, and therefore innocent. That there have been ſome in all Ages who have cultivated and improved their Reaſon, and thereby have rendered themſelves approvable to God; and others who have perverted and abuſed their Reaſon, and thereby have rendered themſelves diſpleaſing to him, and puniſhable by him, ſeems to be the Truth of the Caſe, from the general View Experience

rience gives us of this Matter. But then, that the Perverſion and Abuſe of Reaſon, has been much leſſened ſince Revelation came in aid of it, is thought by ſome to be a Point not quite ſo clear, as to be admitted without Examination. Thoſe who ſo much value themſelves upon their being poſſeſſed of this glorious additional Talent, it does not appear from their Tempers and Actions, from which alone we can form a Judgment concerning them, that they have been ſo much aided in the right uſe of their natural Reaſon, and leſſening the Perverſion and Abuſe of it, as might well be expected from the pompous Repreſentation, and high Character that has been given of it. The learned Dr. *Stillingfleet* ſays, in his *Irenicum*, " *If Pride* " *and Uncharitableneſs, if Diviſions and Strife, if* " *Wrath and Envy, if Animoſity and Contentions,* " *were but the Marks of true Chriſtians,* Diogenes " *need never light his Lamp at Noon to find out* " *ſuch among us; but if a Spirit of Meekneſs and* " *Condeſcenſion, if ſtooping to the Weakneſſes and* " *Infirmities of one-another, if Purſuit after Peace* " *when it flies from us, be the indiſpenſible Duties* " *and characteriſtical Notes of Chriſtians, it may* " *poſſibly prove a difficult Inqueſt to find out ſuch* " *among the Crowds of thoſe who ſhelter themſelves* " *under that glorious Name.*" Whoever takes a View of the Chriſtian World, and beholds the abominable Wickedneſs that has rode in triumph through it, as well in paſt as preſent Times; and obſerves how the Chriſtian Religion

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and what is called the Chriſtian Revelation have been made a Cover, and a Pretext to the moſt baſe and vile Deſigns, will ſee the Juſtneſs of that melancholy Reflection made by this great Man; and that if Revelation came in aid of Reaſon, then there very much needs another Revelation to be given in aid of both. And tho' Chriſtians are apt to boaſt of the great Benefit that has accrued to Mankind by the Promulgation of the Chriſtian Revelation; yet it is much to be queſtioned, whether the poor *Americans* have not too much Reaſon to conſider the coming of Chriſtians and the Chriſtian Religion among them, to have been the greateſt Evil or Curſe that ever befel them; and that not only on account of the Millions of People among them, who have fallen a Sacrifice to Chriſtian Piety and Zeal; but alſo, on account of that Perfidiouſneſs and Baſeneſs, and that much greater Degeneracy of Affection and Action that has taken place and prevailed among them ſince the Introduction of Chriſtianity; and that Miſery and Slavery they have been brought into, and which is likely to be rendered perpetual, by the illuminated and improved Diſciples of *Jeſus Chriſt* becoming their Maſters.

Here, perhaps, it may not be improper to enquire more particularly what is the proper Buſineſs of Reaſon, or what is its natural Province in the great Affair of Religion. And in order to arrive at ſome good Degree of Satisfaction concerning it,

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to accompany Dr. *Benſon* through his ſubſequent Account of it, which he thus introduces: " *As* " *to Reaſon indeed, they*" (that is, the rational Divines) " *cannot allow themſelves to blaſpheme, or* " *ſpeak evil of it; becauſe they look upon it as the* " *Candle of the Lord within them, that Gift of God,* " *whereby they are rendered wiſer than the Fowls of* " *the Air, or the Beaſts of the Field.*" This Sentence, I apprehend, is intended to inform us, that Reaſon is that Gift of God which renders us, conſidered as Animals, ſuperior to the reſt of the Animal Creation, in things relating to Animal Life; and conſidered as Rationals, as the Candle of the Lord within us, by whoſe Light we are, or may be, enabled to diſcover him, who is the Fountain of Light, that kindled it in us, and the Paths that lead to his Favour. And if ſo, then to be ſure they are in the right not to ſpeak Evil of it; tho' it is but too notorious, that in their warm Vindications of ſpeculative Chriſtianity, they are oft egregiouſly guilty of what, we are told by Dr. *Benſon*, they do not coolly allow themſelves in. Dr. *Benſon*, I preſume, will hardly exclude Dr. *Manton* from the number of rational Divines, who I ſhall therefore produce as a melancholy Inſtance (tho' I believe inconſiderately) of blaſpheming and ſpeaking evil of Reaſon, by greatly depreciating it. The Doctor, having attempted to ſhew the ſuperlative Excellency of Faith, and that Reaſon has a juſt Title to its proper, that is, a ſecondary Regard, provided it keeps its Place, by being

ſubordinate to Faith, proceeds, "*It*" (that is, Faith) "*informs us that the Heathens had never* "*Light enough for Salvation. Their Charity is too* "*large, who think that the Heathens may be taught* "*enough by thoſe natural Apoſtles Sun, Moon, and* "*Stars. Certainly they are blind in the Work of* "*Redemption ſince they are blind to the Work of* "*Creation. Tho' God has not left himſelf without* "*Witneſs*, Acts xiv. 17. *That is, ſuch as may* "*lead them to God their Creator; yet not to lead* "*them to God the Redeemer. There is enough given* "*to the Heathens for Conviction; but not for Con-* "*verſion; therefore, all thoſe that God would call* "*to himſelf he gave them a higher Light, even the* "*Revelation of the Word. Tho' Nature tells us* "*there is a God; yet what he is, and how to be* "*worſhipped, and how he came to be diſpleaſed* "*with the World, and how he came to be reconcil-* "*ed, of all this it telleth us nothing. Nature finds* "*itſelf depraved, but it knows not the Remedy* "*and Cure.*" Now tho' Dr. *Benſon* and a thouſand other rational Divines may not carry their Veneration for Faith to ſo great a heighth; yet the Inſtance I have exhibited, and the Difference betwixt the Doctor's Opinion and that of other rational Divines, touching the State of Heathens, will ſufficiently juſtify me in making the two following Inferences:

I. That we cannot be too cautious of thinking diminutively of Reaſon, or of exchanging the cer-

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tain great Advantages we derive from its natural and clear Illuminations, for thoſe we may be tempted to expect from ſome other, tho' of a ſuppoſed ſupernatural, yet of an obviouſly indiſtinct and convulſive Glare; for would not ſuch an incautious Procedure be a Caſe analogous to that of the Traveller, who was betrayed into a dangerous Ditch by an *Ignis Fatuus*, whoſe Guidance he inadvertently choſe to follow, before that of the Lamp which he carried in his Hand.

II. How little reaſon we have to expect a rational and ſatisfactory Information what it is we are required to underſtand the Goſpel to be; or to believe with regard to the Number, or the proper and diſtinct Matter of its peculiar Doctrines; whilſt Divines themſelves appear to know ſo little of, and to differ ſo widely about it.

But other Divines may do as they pleaſe, Dr. *Benſon* ſeemed determined (in the next Sentence that in Order occurs to be conſidered) to do Juſtice to Reaſon, whatever he may do when he changes Sides, and it becomes his immediate Buſineſs to treat of, and do honour to Faith. Reaſon, at preſent, is the Idol he chuſes to bow down to; *It is*, ſaith he, *the inſeparable, as well as the peculiar, Glory of every inteliigent Being*. And if ſo, then it muſt be a ſufficient Guide to every intelligent Being in all momentous Affairs; ſeeing it does but what is congruous to its Nature, in directing

recting to ſuch a Conduct, as will terminate in his Glory; and it muſt be perfectly repugnant to its Nature, to lead him to any thing inglorious to him. So that an intelligent Being can only render himſelf inglorious, by acting without conſulting his Reaſon, or contrary to its Dictates when conſulted; and therefore, as it is the inſeparable and peculiar Glory of, ſo it is evidently deſign'd for a conſtant and ready Guide to, every intelligent Creature. And as there may be a Variety of intelligent Creatures, of whom the Underſtanding or reaſoning Faculty, proper to each Species, has its determinate Extent and Limitation aſſigned it, by the wiſe Director of the whole rational Community; ſo it is manifeſtly natural to conclude, that every Individual ought to aſpire towards the Perfection of his Nature, by cultivating his own Underſtanding to the utmoſt, and bounding it by nothing but that peculiar Extent and Limitation of it, which is fixed to his reſpective Species. And that it reflects no Diſhonour on the general Reaſon of any particular Species, nor on the Underſtanding of any Individual of it, when it is found unable to give a Solution to Difficulties inſuperable to it, under the reſpective Limitations fixed to the Species of which the Enquirer is a Member. However, Dr. *Benſon* has, in behalf of his Reverend Brethren the rational Divines, made a Conceſſion at once, to the rational Freethinker, of all that he has ever contended for; namely, that Reaſon is firſt, the Glory; ſecondly,

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an inſeparable Glory; and thirdly, the peculiar Glory, of every intelligent Being. Firſt, if Reaſon be the Glory of an intelligent Being, it is ſo becauſe it is that by which alone he is capable of juſtly arranging his Ideas, and perceiving their Agreement or Diſagreement, and thereby of diſtinguiſhing betwixt Truth and Falſhood, Good and Evil, in all thoſe things in which his Duty and Happineſs are concerned; and conſequently, whatever Knowledge is uſeful in theſe Reſpects, it is only to be obtained by the due Uſe of his Reaſon or Underſtanding. Secondly, if Reaſon be a Glory inſeparable from an intelligent Being, it could never, at any time, by any Means, much leſs by the Tranſgreſſion of any one Individual of the Species, have been ſeparated from the whole human Race, without ſinking the Property of Intelligence to the Species (which is not pretended) becauſe while any one continues an intelligent Being, he muſt continue to be poſſeſſed of every Property eſſential to Intelligence; and Reaſon being ſo ſpecifically eſſential to it (in that higher Senſe in which Dr. *Benſon* uſes the Term *Intelligence)* that a Being void of Reaſon cannot, with any Propriety, be denominated intelligent. And therefore, a Being void of Reaſon, that is, void of a Capacity of Ratiocination, which will enable him to perceive the Connection or Repugnancy of his own Ideas, when under a proper Arrangement, and to draw juſt and natural Concluſions from their proper Premiſſes; ſuch a Being cannot be account-

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able for the Uſe or Abuſe of a Faculty which he has not; nor will God expect the Performance of Duties, proper to intelligent Beings, at ſuch a one's Hands. Thirdly, if Reaſon be the peculiar Glory of every intelligent Being, then it muſt be the peculiar Glory of the firſt great Principle of Life and Intelligence. Aud hence it evidently follows, that if Reaſon be the peculiar Glory of the Creator, then it muſt be the peculiar Glory of the Creature, in the reſpective proportionate Degree in which he poſſeſſed it; and that nothing which he is, or can be poſſeſſed of beſides, can, abſtractedly conſidered, be equal, much leſs of ſuperior Glory to him.

Dr. *Benſon*, having admirably repreſented the excellent glory of Reaſon with Regard to intelligent Natures in general, proceedeth to conſider it in a more contracted View, and only as relative to Man: "*Which*," (that is, Reaſon) "*was not* "*deſigned, like our Cloaths, to be put on and off at* "*pleaſure; but was intended for conſtant and per-* "*petual Uſe; and which we ought to make uſe of,* "*not only in the Affairs of this Life, but much more* "*in religious Affairs, which are of the higheſt Im-* "*portance.*" But alas! tho' it be a melancholy, it is a moſt certain Truth, that tho' Reaſon was not deſigned, like our Cloaths, to be put on and off at pleaſure, yet ſome there are, and among theſe too many Divines, who are of ſo ſanguine and fiery a Temper, that, as Labourers in the Summer

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throw off their Cloaths the better to perform the Taſk aſſign'd them, they caſt off their Reaſon, e'er they can ſet themſelves at Liberty, and qualify themſelves to perform the Work they chuſe, of reproaching, vilifying, and otherwiſe uſing ill their innocent Neighbours, for not blindly ſubmitting to their Dictates. And others again are of ſo cold a Turn, as not to be content with ſuch Cloathing as the Author of our Beings hath kindly provided for Ornament and Uſe, *viz.* their Reaſon; but will needs veil themſelves with Enthuſiaſm and Superſtition; which Dreſs being quite unatural, is ſuperfluous, improper, and deforming. But more melancholy it is to conſider, and more ſurpriſing to ſee ſome of our great polemical Writers among the rational Divines, caſt off their Reaſon, and aſſume it again at Pleaſure; play faſt and looſe, and, in a Senſe not the moſt commendable, become all Things to all Men, that ſo they may be ſure to anſwer their own private diſguiſed Ends by ſome. Chriſtianity ſhall be modelled into any Shape, as the Exigency of the Caſe ſhall require. It ſhall be either a Reſtoration or Republication of the original Religion of Reaſon and Nature; or that together with a new ſuperadded Revelation; or it ſhall be the peculiar Doctrines and poſitive Precepts which conſtitute the new Revelation, ſeparate from, and excluſive of, natural Religion; ſometimes one, ſometimes the other, and as ſoon again it ſhall be neither ſeparately, but both in conjunction. So that you ſcarce

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ever know in what certain determined Sense to understand the Terms as used by them, *viz.* Religion, Christianity, the Gospel, true Piety, saving Faith, *&c.* And therefore, tho' you come to the Reading of what they exhibit to the World with raised Expectations, and Desires of being informed what the pure and simple Revelation or Gospel of Christ is, in order to determine by your Reason whether it has a Right to the Character it assumes; after you have, at the Expence of much time, and great Pains and Patience, traced them through their artful Perambulations, you either leave off with your Understanding much in the State as when you began; or else have Reason with the wise Man to complain, *He that increaseth Knowledge increaseth Sorrow*; since by your Search and Reading all you have added to your former Stock of Knowledge is only Enthusiasm, or, perhaps, which is still worse, the Priest-craft of the Writer.

As to Dr. *Benson*, of whom I am willing to hope the best, by supposing what may appear exceptionable in his Performance was owing to Inattention, or, perhaps, to a kind of pious Zeal to serve the Common Cause; I say, as to Dr. *Benson*, it must be acknowledged, that he has paid his Compliments to Reason in an extraordinary manner, by attributing that to it, which, perhaps, is out of its Power to effect; yet, nevertheless, he has not been without his Backslidings; for when he has quitted the Charge of Reason, and has made

Faith

Faith the Subject of his Care, then he changes his Station, and moves gently into the front Rank of the military Church ; and there, amidst its most distinguished Heroes, labours as conspicuously as any, in reducing Reason to an abject slavish Subjection to Faith ; and this involves his Subject in Confusion and Contradiction. Dr. *Benson*, p. 151, asserts, " *The more the Works of Creation* " *and Providence are searched into and understood,* " *the more they confirm the Truth of the Christian* " *Revelation ; and add such Supports and Evidences* " *as could hardly be expected or believed.*" Human Reason is the only Faculty, and all that is in Man, by which he can, through his Senses, search into and understand the Works of Creation and Providence ; and as all the Evidence or Proof arising from these, with regard to other things, is not by any kind of Testimony conveyed from them to the Mind by the Senses, but only by its drawing just Conclusions from them as their proper Premises ; so if Man, in the due Exercise of this Faculty, that is, by a careful Inspection into the Works of Creation and Providence, can draw such just Conclusions from them, as give proper Proof of the Truth and Divinity of the Doctrines of the Trinity, the Hypostatic Union, and all such other supernatural and superrational Doctrines and Precepts as constitute the Christian Religion, properly so called ; that is, when contradistinguished from pure simple natural Religion ; then it can work Wonders indeed ; to which I may add the

Doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation, the Truth and Divinity of which, ſurely, is as proveable from the Works of Creation and Providence, as the others. If human Reaſon is ſufficient for theſe things, then what is it not ſufficient for? Dr. *Benſon* ſays, this is what could hardly be expected or believed; and I think I may venture to ſay farther, that it is paſt all Belief. However, let it be applied to the Doctrine of the *Hypoſtatic Union*. That two diſtinct intelligent Natures, the one human, the other divine, conſtitute only one individual Perſon in *Jeſus Chriſt*; and that this appears to be a divine Truth, by a fair Deduction from the Works of Creation and Providence, is the Queſtion before us. This, I fear, is ſo far from appearing to be the Caſe, that the contrary Concluſion is rather deducible from thoſe Premiſes. According to all the Knowledge we have hitherto obtained, by a careful Inſpection into the Works of Creation and Providence, touching intelligent Beings, it ſeems to appear, that one diſtinct intelligent Nature conſtitutes one diſtinct Perſon, agreeably to the Idea which is conſtantly annexed to the Term, Perſon; and two diſtinct intelligent Natures, however they may be united in Counſel, Deſign, Place of Reſidence, or otherwiſe, conſtitute, not one only, but two diſtinct individual Perſons; and therefore, according to Dr. *Butler*, to argue by Analogy, two diſtinct intelligent Natures, the one human, the other divine, who in their united and ſocial Capacity are characteriſed by the Terms *Jeſus Chriſt*,

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muſt conſtitute two diſtinct individual Perſons; ſo that, I am apprehenſive, Dr. *Benſon* has aſcribed to reaſon what is not in its Power to effect. But tho' Dr. *Benſon* has been ſo over-generous to aſcribe to Reaſon the Ability of diſcovering, in the Works of Creation and Providence, proper Evidence to prove the Truth and Divinity of the Chriſtian Revelation; yet at other times he ſeems, at leaſt, to admit no ſuch thing, but repreſents Chriſtianity as a Matter of pure Revelation.

By pure Revelation, ſurely, muſt be meant, that the Goſpel is of ſuch a nature as to be quite out of Reaſon's Province to form any Judgment about it, much leſs in the Uſe of it to diſcover in the Works of Creation and Providence ſuch Evidences as give proper Proof of its Truth and Divinity; and therefore Dr. *Benſon* commends St. *Paul* for not exerciſing his Reaſon or human Learning in the Promulgation of it. In p. 223, he ſays, "*As the Goſpel was a Matter of pure Revelation,* "*St.* Paul *was in the right of it not to mix his hu-* "*man Learning with it; but faithfully to preach the* "*Goſpel in that Purity and Simplicity in which he had* "*received it from Chriſt.*" Here it ſhould ſeem the Goſpel is of ſo peculiar a nature, that natural Phiſophy or human Learning cannot be exerciſed about it, without corrupting and defiling it; and therefore, it cannot be capable of drawing Concluſions from any Quarter, much leſs from the Works of Creation and Providence to ſupport

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and maintain it. But admitting Dr. *Benſon*, in this his Zeal for the Goſpel, has, as it were, gone beyond himſelf, and has carried the Matter too far; and that, notwithſtanding what he has here ſaid, Reaſon is capable of drawing ſuch Concluſions from the Works of Creation and Providence in favour of Chriſtianity, as aforeſaid; then St. *Paul*'s not uſing it to anſwer that Purpoſe, muſt render him not commendable, but on the contrary, greatly blameable. When St. *Paul* went from Place to Place, preaching the Goſpel at *Theſſalonica*, at *Berea*, and elſewhere, nothing could have been more proper, nor was better adapted to anſwer the Purpoſe of his Miniſtry, *viz.* the working the Conviction and Converſion of his Hearers, than for him to have exemplified his human Wiſdom and Skill in Natural Philoſophy, by drawing thoſe Concluſions, and thereby producing thoſe Evidences from the Works of Creation and Providence as proved the Truth and Divinity of what he exhibited to his reſpective Audiences: I ſay, nothing could have been more proper than this, becauſe, as it would have been in ſome meaſure an Appeal to the Underſtandings of his Hearers, with reſpect to the Truth of what he delivered to them, againſt which an Objection from the Quarter of Reaſon could ſcarcely have lain; ſo it would have been a ſolid Foundation for the Faith of his Converts to have reſted upon. St. *Paul*, therefore, ſeems to have been quite in the wrong not to have produced to his attentive Audience, on ſuch pro-

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per Occaſions, thoſe immoveable Supports of the Chriſtian Religion, which it is capable of being furniſhed with from the Works of Creation and Providence; becauſe theſe would have been inconteſtible Evidences of its Truth to them, it would at once have anſwered all their reaſonable Expectations, and probably have induced their Aſſent. Thus to have founded Revelation in Nature, and exhibited to Mankind the Supports upon which it permanently reſts, by the Inſtrumentability of human Literature, under the Direction of human Reaſon, would have been, not barely to have aſſerted, or propoſed to confirm it by mere Power; but beyond all Contradiction have proved it to be fixed upon a Rock, againſt which all Objections brought from Reaſon would have been daſhed and diſſipated, like the impotent Waves of a turbulent Sea. Beſides, this would have been dealing with Mankind ſuitable to their intelligent Natures, it would have been an Appeal to their Underſtandings, requiring their Aſſent in a proper way, and binding them with the Cords of a Man; whereas to have demanded their Aſſent authoritatively, or to have extorted by Menaces and Threatnings (*He that believeth not ſhall be damned*) or by Acts of Power, by ſubverting the ſettled Laws of Nature, ſtriking the Mind with Wonder and Aſtoniſhment, and thereby affecting the Paſſions; this was not dealing with Men, as Men, but rather like Horſes and Aſſes that have no Underſtanding capable of rational Conviction, whoſe Mouths muſt be held

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with Bit and Bridle, muſt be guided and reſtrained by Acts of Power only.

Again, Dr. *Benſon* ſays, p. 27, " *Are not theſe* " *moral Virtues (which are the principal things in* " *Chriſtianity) the very things which all true Phi-* " *loſophy has ever attempted to recommend. Could* " *any thing be more worthy of God than giving Men* " *ſuch a Revelation; when Men had confeſſedly cor-* " *rupted themſelves, and that to ſuch a Degree, that* " *not only Reaſon or the Light of Nature was alto-* " *gether unlikely to reſtore true Piety; but even that* " *Light itſelf (as* Tully *expreſly acknowledges) did* " *no where appear? Does not ſuch a Revelation* " *highly conduce to the Happineſs of Mankind, if* " *Virtue be their Dignity, Perfection and Happi-* " *neſs, as it undoubtedly is?*" But in p. 134 he quotes, from the Author he was anſwering, the following Words, [When Chriſtianity appeared, it was an enquiring Age.] To which he anſwers, " *Suppoſe we allow it, as we readily do, what then?* " *what could he infer from that?*" To which I reply, Tho' we may not know what that Author would infer, yet it is very eaſy to ſee what he could not, *viz.* he could not infer that Men had corrupted themſelves to ſuch a degree, that Reaſon or the Light of Nature did no where appear. He proceeds, " *The Goſpel ſpread in that enquiring* " *Age, when* (as he aſſerts) *Reaſon was in the higheſt* " *Requeſt and Reputation, and ſpread with moſt amaz-* " *ing Swiftneſs. This, one would think, was one great*

" *Proof*

" *Proof of its Reaſonableneſs and Excellence, con-*
" *ſidering the Means and Methods that were taken*
" *to ſpread it, which were all fair and equitable, be-*
" *ing an Appeal to the Reaſon and Underſtandings*
" *of Men.*" Dr. *Benſon* particularly ſubjoins,
" *But ſome Authors can argue any way.*" This, indeed is an obvious Truth, of which, it happens, we need not go far for an Inſtance. In that Dr. *Benſon* has averred, that the Goſpel is a Matter of pure Revelation; and alſo that the principal things in Chriſtianity, are the very things which all true Philoſophy has ever attempted to recommend. Again, he informs us, that the World was in that profound Darkneſs when Chriſtianity firſt made its Appearance in it, that Reaſon, or the Light of Nature did no where appear; and yet, he informs us, it every where ſhone forth in that remarkable happy Age, with ſuch Reſplendency and Luſtre that Reaſon was in the higheſt Requeſt and Reputation. Good God! is ſuch Confuſion poſſible? Thus roundly to aſſert both Sides of a Contradiction, is, it muſt be owned, an Indication of an Author's Capacity for arguing any way; but then it ſeems, at the ſame time, to be ſtrangely expoſing both his Character and his Cauſe to very ſcurvy Conſequences. And, I think, I may with the greateſt Juſtice obſerve, that Dr. *Benſon*, can differ from no true Deiſt, without differing from himſelf at the ſame time; and directly contradicting in one Part of his ſmooth Dialogue, what he lays down for a certain Poſtulatum in another. And

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by ſo doing (with Concern I ſpeak it) 'tis undeniable, this Chriſtian Advocate does but too much copy after thoſe culpable Apologiſts for Chriſtianity, who, like him, in Words condemn, what in the ſelf-ſame Performances, in the face of the World, they are not aſhamed to practiſe, namely, uſe their Reaſon as their Cloaths, put it on and off at pleaſure.

Dr. *Benſon* proceeds, " *But* (Reaſon) *was in-* " *tended for conſtant and perpetual Uſe.*" And would to God we did conſtantly regard, and perpetually concur in ſo benign an Intention. He continues: " *And which we ought to make uſe of,* " *not only in the Affairs of this Life, but much more* " *in religious Affairs, which are of the higheſt Im-* " *portance.*" But, ſurely, thoſe Gentlemen cannot without bluſhing aſſert, that Reaſon was intended for conſtant and perpetual Uſe, who maintain that ſome of thoſe religious Affairs, that are of the higheſt Importance to us, are even yet Matters of pure Revelation. For whatever Foundation they may poſſibly have in the abſtract Reaſon of things, yet as they are out of the Reach of human Reaſon, and therefore are incommunicable to it, ſo Reaſon muſt be perpetually uſeleſs with regard to them. And tho' it might reaſonably be expected that whatever is given in Aid of Reaſon, ſhould henceforward become familiar to, and be the proper Object of the thus aſſiſted human Underſtanding; yet, alas! it appears, in the Conclu-

ſion,

ſion, to be no ſuch Matter; but on the contrary, when they are ſtript of all impoſed Colourings, and artificial Diſguiſes, they are found to be ſo inveloped in Clouds and thick Darkneſs, as to ſtand (after all the explanatory Pother made about them) abſolutely unrevealed, in the midſt of Revelation. Perhaps it may be objected, that tho' the enthuſiaſtic may, the rational Divines have no need to bluſh on this account, ſeeing they have undertaken to prove the Chriſtian Doctrines reaſonable; and that it is for this reaſon the Epithet, *rational*, is appropriated to them, in Contradiſtinction to ſuch as maintain the Chriſtian Doctrines to be above Reaſon, and meer Matters of Faith: I anſwer, it muſt indeed be owned that many have undertook it, but no one, at leaſt that I have yet met with, has made good his Undertaking. To inſtance in Dr. *Benſon*, who, in his turn, has likewiſe attempted it, (ſee p. 21) but, I apprehend, with no better Succeſs than thoſe who have gone before him. For after a magnificent Introduction of Doctrines proper and peculiar (not to Revelation, but) to natural Religion, he ſlides in ſome that are peculiarly Chriſtian; which, ſurely, are never the more reaſonable in themſelves, nor are they proved to be ſo, by being placed among thoſe that are. However, they are put in, having the Chance of paſſing in the Crowd for ſuch; tho' whether they are, or not, will beſt appear by an impartial Conſideration and Trial of them. Dr. *Benſon* draws his In-

troduction composed of moral Doctrines towards a Conclusion with this Sentence, " *That he* (*viz.* " God) *created Man in his own Image* ;" and then instantly shifts the Scene, and proceeds, —— " *And* " *that when Mankind degenerated into Ignorance,* " *Idolatry, and Vice, he sent among them his only* " *begotten, and most well beloved Son.*" And after relating the End of his coming into the World, his exemplary Behaviour, Sufferings and Death, and that he was remarkably rewarded, he proceeds to inform us, That, " *as by him God made the World* ; " *so by him he now governs all things, and that he* " *will at last by him raise the Dead* ; *and then asks,* " *Are not all these things highly reasonable ?*" as if the bare Relation was a Demonstration, and there is not a single Difficulty now remaining ; whereas the Sum total of his Proof amounts to no more than this, that he has mixed and compounded his supernatural and superrational Doctrines with natural Religion, and then attributes that to the whole, which for any thing that appears, is proper and peculiar to a Part only ; and thus he would seem to carry his Point, *viz.* prove the Christian Doctrines to be all reasonable. And this leads me to put those Questions, *viz.* Where is the Man, the Christian, the Believer, who durst, on Principles of pure Reason, attempt, so as to convince the Understanding of another Man, that an unoriginated, uncompounded, immaterial and pure Spirit, should, like one of the derived, compounded, material human Species, have a Son ? that he

should

ſhould be a begotten Son? that he ſhould be his only begotten Son? What we are determinately to underſtand by the Terms *begotten* and *only begotten*, as applied by finite Creatures to an infinitely perfect Mind; which Creatures, when they apply thoſe Terms to themſelves, they uſe them to ſignify a Species of Action of their own, ſo groſly ſenſual, as to be impoſſible literally to relate or be applicable to a Being purely immaterial? Why God who is infinitely happy, and all-ſufficient in himſelf, and therefore ſeems to have no Inducement on his own account, ſhould beget a Son? Why it ſhould be deemed requiſite for God to beget a Son on our account; that by him God might become placable and merciful to us, when Placability or a Diſpoſition to ſhew Mercy to the proper Objects of Mercy is his very Nature? I ſay, where is the Man, the Chriſtian, the Believer that can ſo much as diſcern himſelf, much more convincingly communicate to another, the Reaſons that conſtitute the Truth of theſe Doctrines? And which are abſolutely neceſſary to be done by him who indeed proves the Truth of them not authoritatively, but by Arguments drawn from Reaſon. And if there be no ſuch Perſon, then I cannot but infer firſt, that theſe Doctrines are not reaſonable; or, at leaſt, cannot be proved to be ſo, which comes to the ſame in the preſent Caſe. Secondly, That thoſe Divines who fondly diſtinguiſh themſelves by the ſonorous Appellative, *rational*, have much more Reaſon than others to bluſh, becauſe they publicly maintain and defend unintelligible Propo-

ſitions,

ſitions, and fain would paſs them upon the World as rational, without ſo much as attempting to ſhew or prove them to be ſuch; which is the very thing the Character they aſſume of being rational Divines obliges them to make good. Thirdly, That as Dr. *Benſon*, after he had juſt related the Doctrines referred to, contented himſelf with barely aſking, Are not theſe things highly reaſonable? without proving them to be ſo, which was his Point, he, too much like his Predeceſſors, left his Work juſt as he found it. It muſt be acknowledged indeed that Dr. *Benſon* does not deſiſt from his unequal Undertaking unbecoming a Man of Breeding, but takes his leave, for the preſent, of his diſappointed Reader, and moſt ſtubborn Subject, with a very handſome Apology, perhaps, as good as could be made upon the Occaſion. "*I* "*forbear enlarging*" (ſays he) "*for fear I ſhould* "*ſeem tedious, and therefore haſten to the Precept*; "*which muſt be acknowledged to be in all reſpects* "*moſt excellent, every way worthy of God, and* "*ſuited to recover fallen Man to Virtue and Hap-* "*pineſs.*" The Author, Dr. *Benſon* undertook to anſwer, attempted to prove that Chriſtianity is not founded on Reaſon or Argument; and Dr. *Benſon*, as his Anſwerer, took upon him to prove that Chriſtianity is founded on Reaſon or Argument; but when ſome of thoſe Doctrines that are peculiarly Chriſtian were brought upon the Carpet, and it became the Doctor's preſent Buſineſs to ſhew or prove them to be all reaſonable, that being the profeſſed Deſign of his Book, he then (after juſt relating them)

them) only puts the Queſtion, Are not all theſe things highly reaſonable? and there he ſtops with this Excuſe, He forbore to enlarge, for fear he ſhould ſeem tedious; when his not enlarging made his Book, with regard to the profeſt primary Deſign of it, to be all Waſte-Paper, and a moſt unreaſonable Taxation on the Time and Patience, and on the Pockets of his Readers. Dr. *Benſon*, ſurely, is of a tender Conſtitution, and his Paſſions are quickly to be alarmed; he forbore to enlarge, for fear he ſhould ſeem tedious. When the Doctor faced the Enemy, and it came to his turn to charge them home, his Heart failed him, the coming to a cloſe Engagement ſeemed a Taſk too mighty and hazardous for him, and might be of fatal Conſequence; and this, probably, was the true Ground of the Panic he fell into, and which hurried him on to make his Eſcape, with all poſſible Speed, he haſtened to the Precepts. The very manner of his Expreſſion here implies ſomewhat of Surpriſe and Confuſion, and a Conſciouſneſs of having propoſed to wade beyond his Depth. His Conduct exactly reſembles that of a Man who, timely obſerving himſelf on a ſudden and unexpectedly gotten into a Place of Danger, delays not to haſten from it, to a Place of known Security; he haſtened to the Precepts: What Precepts? why the moral Precepts, and here he is certainly ſafe; and I am naturally ſo delighted with the Safety of others, that I cannot help congratulating him on his having again recovered ſound Ground. Now Dr. *Benſon*'s

Buſineſs

Buſineſs is (as the Margin informs us) to prove the moral Precepts of the New Teſtament reaſonable. Here his way is all plain, and his Path ſtrait before him; and, indeed, the Work is done to his Hand, for were not the Precepts referred to reaſonable, they would not come under the Denomination of moral Precepts. Here Dr. *Benſon* dares be bold, and affirms of the moral Precepts, that they are moſt excellent; whereas with reſpect to the Doctrines of Chriſtianity he dares not venture farther, after juſt giving a Relation of them, than aſking the Queſtion, Are not all theſe highly reaſonable? The moral Precepts, it muſt be acknowledged, are in all Reſpects moſt excellent; every way worthy of God, and ſuited to recover fallen Man to Virtue and Happineſs; whether held forth in the Old Teſtament, or the New; in paſt, or preſent times; whether in this Part of the World, or any other. Dr. *Benſon*, in page 26, has carried the Compliment to moral Virtues or Precepts ſtill higher, and ſays they are the principal things in Chriſtianity; which is likewiſe, I think, a very extraordinary, tho' a very juſt Compliment to his Antagoniſts, the Deiſts; whoſe Religion conſiſts entirely in, and is compoſed ſolely of, moral Virtues, that is, the Belief of evident moral Doctrines, and the Practice of moral Duties, and ſeems not a little to depreciate Chriſtianity itſelf; becauſe if moral Virtues are the principal things in Chriſtianity, then they have a juſt Title to our higheſt Regard, and all other things in Chriſtianity (which

(which other Things are all that is Chriſtianity properly ſo called) can have at beſt a Claim but to a ſecondary and ſubordinate Regard. And here it is to be obſerved, that Dr. *Benſon*, in order to render Chriſtianity amiable, decks her with the graceful Ornament of moral Precepts or Virtues, which are but borrowed Ware; and then he becomes the Trumpeter of her Praiſe. Moral Virtues, it is true, are moſt excellent; but what then? moral Virtues have not Chriſtianity for their Parent, but are the neat Produce and the genuine Offspring of Reaſon and Nature, and were equally excellent and valuable before Chriſtianity took place, and ever was, and will be the ſame whether Chriſtianity ever had been or not. How propoſterous muſt it therefore be for Dr. *Benſon* to lugg moral Virtues into the Caſe, when the Author he undertook to anſwer did not pretend to prove that moral Virtues, but only that Chriſtianity is not founded on Reaſon or Argument; moral Virtues being as diſtinct from Chriſtianity, as Chriſtianity is from Mahometaniſm. The Author referred to, did not pretend to prove that this Precept, *viz. Render to all their Due*, is not founded on Argument; but only that Chriſtianity properly ſo called, that is, when contradiſtinguiſhed from natural Religion, is not thus founded. This then is the Sum total of Dr. *Benſon*'s bulky Anſwer; he gives to, and takes from Reaſon as he pleaſes. When he is preſſed in Argument, and the Caſe requires that he ſhould prove his Point, he forbears

bears to enlarge, for fear he ſhould ſeem tedious; and he puts upon his Cuſtomers borrowed Wares; that is, he puts upon his Readers, moral Precepts, or natural Religion, as Chriſtianity, properly ſo called, and reaſons from it as if it were ſuch.

Perhaps you will ſay, this is carrying the Matter too far, and much beyond what Dr. *Benſon* intended. If this ſhould be the Caſe, I am not blameable, and he muſt thank himſelf for drawing me into Errors; for if I have carried the Argument no farther than it will naturally bear; if I have only attended it where it has apparently gone, then I have only done Juſtice to the Subject; and whether I have, or no, I leave to your candid Conſideration. However, I think Dr. *Benſon* muſt be allowed to be ſomewhat perplexed and confuſed in his Account of the Goſpel. Suppoſe from among the undetermined and indefinite Number of Doctrines offered by him, as a Revelation from God, in the Scripture for me to aſſent to, I ſingle out this one, *viz.* That God has a begotten Son; I would aſk Dr. *Benſon*, How ſhall I know whether this Doctrine be a divine Revelation or not? Why, ſays he, you are to try it. But I aſk, What Principle I am poſſeſſed of capable of guiding me aright in a Matter of ſuch Importance? He anſwers, Your Reaſon. By our Reaſon we are to judge of the Nature and Evidence of what is propoſed to us, under the Notion of a divine Revelation. Well then, I may ſafely depend on my

Reaſon

Reaſon to guide me aright in this Caſe, may I not? Surprizing! no ſuch Matter, Reaſon after all is by no means ſingly to be confided in; it is not the only Guide in Matters of Religion; but Reaſon and Scriptures are both to be regarded. Surely this Method of vindicating the divine Authority of all the Parts of Scripture ſeverally, and the ſame ſeveral Parts conjunctively, as a particular and ſpecial Revelation from God, cannot in Reaſon be expected ſhould be attended with the propoſed Effect, namely, the Conviction of the Deiſts of its Truth, by fair Reaſoning; becauſe this, as I conceive, is a fair or plain Contradiction. But tho' I differ from Dr. *Benſon* here, where he does not agree with himſelf; yet I have the Pleaſure of agreeing with him elſewhere, *viz.* when he is pleaſed to aſſert the Rights and Abilities of Reaſon, and conſiſtently to prove and maintain them, as in the following Sentences: " *By our Reaſon we* " *are to make Trial of what is offered to us as a* " *Revelation from God; otherwiſe, how ſhould we* " *diſtinguiſh between the Koran of* Mahomet, *and* " *the Bible? By our Reaſon we are to judge of the* " *Nature and Evidence of what is propoſed to us* " *under the Notion of a divine Revelation; that we* " *may carefully diſtinguiſh the true Revelation from* " *all pretended and falſe ones. In the Uſe of our* " *Reaſon or Underſtanding we are to ſtudy that Re-* " *velation, and find out the Scope and Connection,* " *and the Meaning of the Words and Sentences, that* " *we may know what is revealed, or what it con-*

 " *tains.*

" *tains. For where there is no Idea, there can be*
" *no Assent; because that would be assenting to no-*
" *thing; and assenting to nothing, is exactly the*
" *same thing as not assenting at all. Our Assent can*
" *reach no farther than our Ideas of what we are to*
" *receive; nor properly rise higher than the Proofs*
" *or Evidences upon which we are to yield our As-*
" *sent.*" This, Sir, according to Dr. *Benson*, is the Part that Reason is to act in the great Affair of Religion, so far as Revelation is concerned in the Matter; with respect to which, Reason has a plain and a certain Rule to go by. For whatever upon a fair Trial appears to be cognizable by, consonant to, and is founded in Reason and Nature, all such things Reason pronounces to be Truths, and if you please, divine Truths, (using the Term *divine* in the loose improper Sense admitted above) but if upon enquiry it appears to be above, or repugnant to Reason, or not founded therein, then Reason pronounces it not divine. And this is the Test all Revelations must be brought to, and be tried by, whether the Koran of *Mahomet*, or the Bible of Christians; in order carefully to distinguish true Revelation from all pretended and false ones. If the Koran is to be judged by this Standard, then all such Doctrines and Duties contained therein (supposing there are such) as plainly appear to be cognizable by, consonant to, and are founded in Reason and Nature, these, Reason pronounces to be a divine Revelation and the Word of God, using the Terms in the

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looſe improper Senſe before mentioned; and all ſuch Doctrines, Precepts, and Parts of the Koran as, upon a fair Trial, appear to be either not cognizable by, or repugnant to, or not founded in Reaſon and Nature, theſe it pronounces not divine. The Caſe is the ſame of the Bible of Chriſtians, and all other Revelations when brought to the Bar, and are tried by the Standard of human Reaſon. The ſame Part Reaſon is to act in finding out the Senſe to be fixed upon any Revelation; and in adjudging of the Weight of the Evidence upon which it is ſuppoſed to be grounded. No arbitrary Determination is to be admitted, but every thing is to be approved, or rejected, according as it plainly appears to be grounded upon, or conſonant to Reaſon or the contrary. And in theſe Caſes Reaſon is not in part, but the ſole Judge. If I examine the Koran, and try if it be of divine Revelation, would it not be greatly abſurd to ſay that Reaſon is not the only Guide, the only Judge; but Reaſon and the Koran are both to be regarded. And would it not be equally as abſurd with reſpect to the Bible to ſay, that it muſt be equally regarded with Reaſon, when the Bible itſelf is the very thing to be tried, and upon which Judgment is to be given. Surely, this Sentence, *viz. Reaſon is not the only Guide in Matters of Religion; and that Reaſon and Scripture are both to be regarded*; was introduced to ſave Appearances, or, poſſibly, it may have been conſidered as a decent Retreat into Myſtery and Darkneſs, whither Reaſon cannot follow.

However,

However, if Dr. *Benſon* or any other Divine, whether rational, irrational, or enthuſiaſtic will be pleaſed to come fairly and fully into this Queſtion, and ſhew plainly and diſtinctly what Part it is which Scripture is to bear, in diſtinguiſhing and judging of religious and revealed Matters, I aſſure you, Sir, it ſhall carefully and candidly be conſidered.

In the mean time, I will apply Dr. *Benſon*'s Reaſoning in favour of Reaſon, and the Uſe of it in religious and revealed Matters to the Chriſtian Doctrine mentioned above, *viz.* that God has a begotten Son. And after the cloſeſt Application I am capable of, I neither have, nor can form any Idea of the Deity's begetting a Son; what then is the Conſequence, why according to Dr. *Benſon*, and I beg leave to add the Nature of the thing alſo, I muſt diſbelieve and reject it. For, as he judiciouſly argues, our Aſſent can reach no farther than our Ideas of what we are to receive; nor properly ariſe higher than the Proofs or Evidences upon which we are to yield our Aſſent. This Doctrine then of God's having a begotten Son, being out of the Reach of our diſcerning Faculty, and not having any Evidence or Proof from Reaſon or Nature to ſupport it, cannot be the Object of our Faith, upon the Principles before laid down; ſeeing whatever Proofs or Evidences may be brought from Scripture, they are all inſignificant in the preſent Argument, as the divine Authority of the

Scriptures

Scriptures themſelves are here allowed to depend ſolely upon the internal Excellency and apparent Truth and Reaſonableneſs of its Doctrines, in all doctrinal Matters. But for Argument ſake, let it be admitted, that the ſupreme Deity, an abſolutely pure Spirit, did beget a Son; and then I am ſtill equally at a loſs for a Reaſon or Reaſons which ſhould reſtrain the Deity from begetting more Sons than one. If God begat one Son, then why not an infinite Race of infinite Beings? If the begetting of one Son was the Effect of an eſſential Propenſity in the divine Nature, that Propenſity could not be deſtroyed nor diminiſhed by a ſingle Gratification or Exertion of it, but muſt continue to exiſt in God in all its infinite Force, and to be equally as eſſential to him after the begetting of one Son, or many Sons as before; and therefore, its being exhibited to us in, and by the Chriſtian Revelation that God has one, and only one begotten Son, furniſhes an Argument, in Reaſon, againſt his having any begotten Son at all. If it ſhould be ſaid, that we can have no diſtinct Idea of God's begetting a Son; and therefore, we can draw no certain Concluſions from it; this is granted, except it obviouſly carries with it an Abſurdity or Contradiction, which may be the preſent Caſe. If then I have no Idea of a Doctrine which owes its Riſe to the Chriſtian Revelation, and it is agreed that where there is no Idea, there can be no Aſſent; were I to declare my Aſſent to it, as the Gentlemen do, who pique themſelves on the

Character

Character of Rational Divines, upon what Principles could I do it? Principles of real Religion, Reason and Truth? Certainly whatever Principles it could be upon, it could not possibly be upon these; for the Dr. to affirm then, That "by our "Reason we are to make a Tryal of what is of-"fered to us as a Revelation from God.—— By "our Reason we are to judge of the Nature and "Evidence of what is proposed to us under the "Notion of a divine Revelation, *&c.*" is evidently all Parade and Flourish, seeing they embrace and vindicate not only this, but many other Doctrines of the Christian Revelation, which, upon the fairest Trial of Reason possible, we find we can form no rational Idea or Conception about. To what End would these Gentlemen propose the Study of those dark Parts of Revelation? For when we have found out the Scope, and Connection, the literal and grammatical Meaning of the Words, such as what is meant by the Term *begetting*, when applied to human Generation, what End have we then answered? Do we then know certainly what is meant by the Words thus exhibited? that is, have we any proper distinct Idea of God's having a begotten Son? Most certainly nothing less, as is demonstrable from the Perplexity Christians have been in concerning it, from the first Appearance of Christianity to this time; the Learned and the Illiterate, the Teacher and the Taught alike. What those bad Consequences

quences are which the ſtudying thoſe unſearchable Parts of Revelation has been the Parent of, thoſe who are at all acquainted with Church-Hiſtory cannot be Strangers to. And this, according to my Conception of things, carries with it the Weight and Force of an Argument againſt the Divinity of ſuch Doctrines and Parts of Revelation, or what is exhibited to the World as ſuch; they cannot poſſibly anſwer any good End, and they not only may, but alſo conſtantly have anſwered very bad Purpoſes to Mankind. For as thoſe Doctrines have been perpetually the occaſion of Contention among Chriſtians; ſo they have been productive of Slanderings, Reproaches, and much Evil-ſpeaking; of Excommunications, Baniſhments, and all kind of Perſecutions; and indeed of almoſt every evil Word and Work. And how then is it to be conceived, that the Father of Lights and the Fountain of Goodneſs ſhould exhibit that to his Creatures, which can only be ſubſervient to their Hurt? If indeed we regulate our Studies by the genuine Preſcriptions of Reaſon, we can only make choice of ſuch Subjects as are probably cognizable by our Reaſon, and worthy of our rational Nature. For then, as we ſhall not ſtudy what is irrational on the one hand, becauſe it is both beneath and deſtructive of the Dignity of our rational Nature, and the End for which it was conferred on us, *viz.* rational Happineſs; ſo we ſhall not ſtudy what is ſuperrational on the other hand, becauſe it would be idle and inſignificant, as the Knowledge of the

thing

thing ſtudied is, in the Nature of it, abſolutely unattainable. The Study of the former therefore can properly be contended for, only by the Libertine and Senſualiſt; the latter by the Viſionary and Enthuſiaſt.

Dr. *Benſon* having rationally declared, that by our Reaſon we are to make Trial of what is offered to us as a Revelation from God, he judiciouſly puts the Queſtion, otherwiſe how ſhall we diſtinguiſh between the Koran of *Mahomet* and the Bible. And granting, as the Deiſt readily does, that by our Reaſon we are to diſtinguiſh between one traditionary Revelation and another in the general; I aſk, unleſs there be ſome one Revelation in particular to be produced, that is conſonant to Reaſon in all its Parts, and which alone can lay a Foundation for ſuch Compariſon, muſt we not by our Reaſon likewiſe diſtinguiſh between the varying, incoherent and unintelligible Parts of each (ſuppoſing there are ſuch Parts, and Parts that are otherwiſe) and particularly that which is the received one in the Country in which God has appointed us our Reſidence? Certainly if by our Reaſon we are to make trial of what is offered to us as a Revelation from God; then we are more eſpecially obliged to make trial by our Reaſon of all the Parts and Branches of that Revelation which is particularly and directly offered to us as ſuch. Vaſt Numbers both of Chriſtians and Mahometans have no Opportunity of making a Compariſon, and

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thereby of diſtinguiſhing between the Koran and the Bible; who are, notwithſtanding, capable of cloſely and judicially examining either of theſe with which they are particularly concerned, whether it be the Koran, or the Bible. We can readily ſuppoſe that a Mahometan (notwithſtanding his peculiar Prejudices ariſing from Education, Prepoſſeſſion, Superſtition, and conſtant Converſation with Perſons bigotted to, and intereſted in the Prevalence and Proſperity of the received Revelation of his own Country) ought, as a rational Being, to reaſon with himſelf in this, or ſome ſuch like Soliloquy.

The Koran is recommended to me by Prieſts, Friends and Relations, and is univerſally eſteemed by my Country-men all around me to be an immediate Revelation from God, by our holy Prophet *Mahomet*. God, I am fully ſatisfied, is a Being that is infinitely perfect in himſelf, and is the Source of all that Order, Wiſdom, and Perfection that every where appear in his Works; nothing therefore that is obviouſly weak, confuſed, and imperfect can be a Revelation from him to us his reaſonable Creatures; and if he certainly requires me to believe the Inſpiration of the Koran, then he as certainly requires it only as I am rationally convinced of it, upon the cloſeſt Examination. It is to him I owe that I am made a reaſonable Creature, and to him I am indebted for that ſpecific Difference made betwixt the Species to which I

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belong and all other animal Beings upon this Globe; and by this diſtinguiſhing Principle, *viz.* my Underſtanding or Reaſon, I am informed it is my indiſpenſible Duty to be always cultivating my rational Nature, by all poſſible Means, till I arrive as near Perfection as my preſent imperfect State will admit. And if God has indeed vouchſafed to give a ſupernatural Revelation of his Will to Men, by any Individual of them, then it muſt needs be moſt admirably cultivated to anſwer this End, *viz.* the perfecting human Nature; and therefore, will be readily diſtinguiſhed from all pretended and falſe Revelations that are intended to anſwer other Purpoſes, by appearing to be in all its Parts every way worthy of God as its Parent, and well adapted to anſwer the forementioned End. All the Parts of it muſt, and will be ſuch as my Underſtanding devoid of Prejudice, Prepoſſeſſion and baſe Views, will be not only capable of perceiving, but will naturally aſſent to. A Directory for my Conduct given of God, and which comes immediately from him, ſurely, if but duly conſulted and attended to, muſt be a Means of Improvement in Wiſdom, Purity, and every worthy Quality which is an Ornament to a rational Being. For as on the one hand, it can have nothing in it correſpondent to human Frailty, Weakneſs, or Folly; ſo on the other hand, it muſt be as remote from that Confuſion of Ideas and Ambiguity of Expreſſion which human Compoſitions at leaſt are liable to. That infinite Being who gave Exiſtence

to

to the Power of Conception in the human Mind, and curiouſly modelled the Organs of Speech in the human Body, muſt naturally be ſuppoſed to expreſs his own moſt clear and perfect Conceptions with all that Perſpicuity and Sublimity which is natural or ſuitable to a divine Production. Perfect Rectitude will no more fail ſuitably to preſcribe, exactly to expreſs, and nicely to apply, than perfect Intelligence to diſcern the moſt natural and proper Means to accompliſh an End. And therefore, as certain as a Being of perfect Rectitude has given a Revelation; ſo certain it is that not any thing in that Revelation can be found, upon a ſtrict Enquiry, to remain unrevealed; that is, not underſtood by ſuch an Enquirer; eſpecially this cannot be the Caſe to Men of Learning, Penetration, Diligence and Integrity. To ſuppoſe what is thus enquired into, may yet remain unrevealed; carries with it ſuch a high Reflection, either upon the natural, or moral Character of the Deity, as implies a want of Ability or Inclination to inform his Creatures of what he directly propoſed to inform them of; which Conduct would be greatly improper. How then can I eſteem the Koran in the whole to be a divine Revelation, when I find in it many Matters, which not only I myſelf cannot underſtand, at leaſt in any Senſe reconcileable with the undoubted Reaſon, Propriety and Truth of Things; but our greateſt and moſt learned Doctors are evidently equally ignorant of, as appears from their explaining them in direct contrary

trary Senſes. And as this appears to me to be the Caſe, ſo I cannot avoid drawing the following Concluſions from it, *viz.*

If my Reaſon was intended by the Deity to be informed and improved by a Revelation from him, then theſe Parts of the Koran having no ſuch Tendency, can be no Part of a true, a divine Revelation. If my Reaſon was intended for conſtant and perpetual Uſe, eſpecially in religious Affairs, which are of the higheſt Importance, as certainly it muſt appear to be, if I conſider myſelf under the Character of a rational Creature; then a real Revelation from God muſt actually reveal, open, or explain to my Reaſon and Underſtanding all the ſeveral Subjects, Matters or Parts which collectively compoſe it; ſeeing my Underſtanding is the only Power or Principle in me which can be any way uſeful to me in enquiring into, and diſcovering the Particulars revealed; but thoſe Parts of the Koran are of ſuch a nature as to render my Underſtanding altogether uſeleſs to me with regard to them; therefore, they can be no Parts of a true, a divine, Revelation. If by my Reaſon I am to make Trial of what is offered to me as a Revelation from God, as I certainly muſt; then thoſe Parts of the Koran which I can form no definitive Judgment of, or if I could, yet not without pronouncing them weak and unworthy of the Deity, ſuch Parts cannot poſſibly be a Revelation from him. If by my Reaſon I am to make Trial of what is offered to me

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as a Revelation from God, and yet on a fair and unprejudiced Trial I do not reject every thing as divine Revelation which appears to be either out of Reason's Power to form any Judgment of, or to be actually incongruous with it; then I plainly defeat the very End for which I am to make such a Trial, and must, consequently, become obnoxious to the divine Resentment on that Account. I am therefore, I plainly perceive, to esteem those Parts of the Koran only to be a divine Revelation, and admit them as such, which on the most impartial Trial I find to be worthy of God, agreeable to his known Perfections, and to the Reason, Truth, and Property of things.

A conscientious Mahometan reasoning with himself in some such manner as this, concerning the immediate Inspiration of the Koran in general, and of the unintelligible and absurd Parts of it in particular, is what there are but few Christians but would admit to be a truly rational, proper, and commendable Conduct. And every one sees the natural Consequence of such an impartial Behaviour, and unprejudiced Trial of the Koran by Reason. Such a Man would retain a Veneration for those Parts of the Koran only, that stood the Test of Reason, and would reject, as well what was to him absolutely unintelligible, as what was evidently absurd and ridiculous. And the Nature and Propriety of Things would, surely, be allowed by Christians to be a proper Standard for a Mahometan

metan to frame the Decisions of his Reason, and form a Judgment upon the Koran by; and he would of himself be allowed to be capable of clearly perceiving by his own Understanding what is proper for him, and what he ought to do under such Circumstances. Reason, in the present Case, would be the Man's only Guide in Matters of Religion and divine Revelation; nor, surely, would any orthodox Christian object against such a Conduct in a Mahometan; much less would he say, that the Mahometan's Scripture, *viz.* the Koran ought to have been regarded by him, in forming his Judgment upon the Koran as aforesaid. And should an orthodox Mahometan object against such a Procedure as mentioned above, and say, that Reason is not the only Guide in Matters of Religion, but that Reason and the Koran are both to be regarded; and that without the Koran Mens natural Faculties could never have found out many things that are revealed in their Scriptures; and yet at the same time should maintain, that by our Reason we are to make Trial of what is offered to us as a Revelation from God, whether in the Koran or elsewhere, such a Mahometan would, no doubt, be universally condemned by Christians as guilty of a Conduct most notoriously inconsistent and preposterous. Now Mahometans and Christians, as Creatures of the same Species, and as intelligent rational Beings are on a level, they stand in the same relation to God, are alike his Offspring, and the Objects of his Care and Protection; they have

have a Principle of Diſcernment, and a Rule of Judgment which is common to all; why then ſhould it be ſuppoſed that a Revelation which is peculiarly in the Poſſeſſion of one, ſhould be examined and judged of by any other Principle than what is in the Poſſeſſion of, and is a common Standard of Truth to all? or why ſhould either Part fondly ſuppoſe their heavenly Father who regards them as his ſenſitive Creatures, ſo as to render their preſent Exiſtence upon the whole a Bleſſing to them, wherever the Place of their Reſidence be, whether here or there upon this Earth; I ſay, why ſhould either Party fondly ſuppoſe their common Parent would partially furniſh one with, and arbitrarily deny the other the Knowledge of ſuch ſuppoſed ſupernatural Truths which they reſpectively boaſt of, as the peculiar Signatures of Regard to them, and their greater Intereſt in another World, if the Knowledge of any ſuch Matters was in Reality of Importance to one, or the other? If either, or both of theſe Parties ſhould ſay, that the particular Revelation each one is in the Poſſeſſion of, was kindly intended to be a general Benefit, and for the greateſt Good of all; then what ſubſtantial Reaſon can there be aſſigned why that kind Hand of Providence which gave it forth, and has put it into the Poſſeſſion of ſome, does not alike exert itſelf, and put it alike into the Hands of all, that ſo all may ſhare in thoſe Benefits which were thus kindly intended for them.

If it were a proper Object of the Hopes of Men conſidered as Men, methinks, it ſhould as reaſonably, and ought as much, to be hoped for by all, as by a few of us: for the ſame Service it would be of to ſome, it would certainly be of to others, to all. If it were indeed neceſſary to the Salvation of ſome, methinks it ſhould be equally neceſſary with regard to the Salvation of all; for muſt not the ſame Reaſon that conſtitutes its Neceſſity to one, as a Man, be equally forcible with regard to another, as ſuch? And if a ſupernatural Revelation from God, on account of its being either neceſſary to our eternal Salvation, or only of conſiderable Service to us with regard to it, be reaſonably to be hoped for by all; would that God who is no Reſpecter of Perſons with-hold that from ſome, which he knew might reaſonably (and therefore ought to) be hoped for by all? Would an infinitely wiſe and good God diſappoint the reaſonable Hopes and Expectations of any of his reaſonable Creatures? Certainly one would think one might be bold to affirm, he would not. If (ſays Mr. *Chubb*) one Man ſhould meet two Men upon the Road, carrying each of them a heavy Burden, who were equally wearied with their Journey, were both at the ſame Diſtance from their Home, and who were in all reſpects equally the Objects of his Pity; and if he ſhould aſſiſt one, and leave the other to wreſtle with his Difficulties, when it was equally in his Power, and as eaſy for him to aſſiſt them both, this would be an Inſtance of great

Partiality

Partiality, and an Indication, that it was not true Goodneſs, but ſome other Motive, which excited to the Action. The Application is eaſy.

Really theſe Objections, and others of the like Kind, are ſuch Obſtructions to my Belief of a partial Revelation from a God of univerſal Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power, as none of the Arguments I have yet ſeen offered in Support of it, have been able to remove. And Dr. *Benſon* is ſo far from attempting to remove them, that his Manner of Phraſeology directly implies them. " *And there-* " *fore* WE *may hope for a Revelation from him:* " We, who, as a Species of Beings, are diſtinguiſhed from all other Species, whether Fowls of the Air, or Beaſts of the Field, by a Principle of Reaſon and Underſtanding, which renders us capable of diſcerning the Difference between Good and Evil, Truth and Falſhood; and diſcovering the Exiſtence of a God poſſeſt of all poſſible Perfections: We of this Species may, as ſuch (alike and in common) hope for a Revelation from him. But alas, whatever Foundation there might be in Reaſon for the common Hopes of Mankind concerning ſuch an univerſal Revelation, the rational Divines can allow the true Revelation to be the Privilege of but a few! for though the admitting, that there is a Foundation in Reaſon for our univerſal Hope of receiving a ſupernatural Revelation from God (concerning his Will with regard to us)

is absolutely inconsistent with a Revelation's being partially given to but a Handful of us, whilst the Hopes and Expectations of all the rest, which were equally just and reasonable with theirs who have it, be miserably defeated; the Dr. has no Reason to fear the Odium of Singularity; his rational Brethren find themselves in the same Dilemma with himself; either they must allow that a Revelation ought to have been given to all Mankind, in Consequence of the Universality of their Hope of a Revelation from him, who implanted these Hopes in them, "*and therefore we may,* "*that is, it is fit and reasonable that we should,* "*hope for a Revelation from him*;" or else they must run counter to that known Maxim, the Truth of which is attested both by Reason and Scripture, that "*God is no Respecter of Persons.*" But in order to avoid, as much as may be, their being directly chargeable with maintaining either separately, they would seem to assert and defend them both.

In the Rev. Mr. *Balguy*'s second Letter to a Deist, we have, I apprehend, a very apposite Instance of this. "*Provision, on many Accounts,* "says he, *was wanting for Transgressors and Sin-* "*ners; the whole Species was tainted, and every* "*Individual guilty, in some Degree or other. In* "*this common Exigence, this universal Distress, does* "*it any ways reflect on the Author of the Gospel, to*

"*suppose*

" *ſuppoſe him, among other Reliefs, opening Men's*
" *Minds, enlightning their Underſtandings, and pre-*
" *paring them for the Reception of their eternal*
" *Duty?*" No, ſurely; but in this common Exigence, this univerſal Diſtreſs, where the whole Species was tainted, and every Individual guilty, dares this Author pretend, that the Author of the Goſpel has thereby provided a common Help, an univerſal Aſſiſtance; a Reſource as common and univerſal as the Exigence and Diſtreſs? If not, what Reflections muſt he deſerve, for ſo artfully expreſſing himſelf, as to inſinuate to his Reader, that this was the Caſe? When, upon mentioning the common Exigence, and univerſal Diſtreſs of the whole Species, he immediately aſks, If it any way reflects on the Author of the Goſpel, to ſuppoſe him, among other Reliefs, opening Men's Minds, enlightning their Underſtandings, and preparing them for the Reception of their eternal Duty? If he ſhould deny that he intended to inſinuate, by this, that the Author of the Goſpel propos'd to open all Men's Minds, and enlighten all Men's Underſtandings, by it, though he ſays the whole Species was tainted, and every Individual guilty; the Exigence common, and the Diſtreſs univerſal; why had he not fairly expreſſed his Meaning, and honeſtly added, the expletive Term, *ſome*, where it was ſo neceſſary to have been uſed, in order to convey to his Readers a juſt Idea of his Intention? Was it not done deſignedly, for

fear

fear of leaving juſt Room for Reflection ſomewhere, that this explanatory Term was omitted? The Sentence, with but this ſmall Addition, changes Complexion prodigiouſly: In this common Exigence, this univerſal Diſtreſs, does it any way reflect on the Author of the Goſpel, to ſuppoſe him among other Reliefs, opening *ſome* Men's Minds, enlightning *ſome* Men's Underſtandings, *&c.* To this Queſtion I think I might fairly anſwer, with Impunity both from God and good Men, Yes, I think it does. I think ſuch a partial and arbitrary Procedure would carry in it a Reflection on him of unaccountable Caprice, and that he muſt either want the Will or the Power requiſite to confer the ſame Favours on the reſt. A general Mind can have no Intereſt oppoſite to the general Good. By what Arguments then are we to be induced to think he had? which muſt undeniably ſeem to be the Caſe, if Thouſands of Years after the Commencement of this univerſally deplorable Condition of the Species, and the removal of numberleſs Millions from this, to the other World; from a probationary, to an eternal State; he ſhould at laſt ſend a ſpecial Meſſenger only to the Relief of a few, and with a Commiſſion to open but ſome Men's Minds, and to enlighten only ſome Men's Underſtandings; when the Exigence was, and had been ſo long common, and the Diſtreſs was confeſſedly univerſal. Was the Diſtreſs univerſal, and not the neceſſary Aſſiſtance? Does this appear

to

to be a Conduct worthy of God, from any of the Attributes of the Divine Nature? Does the unfathomable Goodneſs, the infinite Wiſdom of God, or even the generally miſtaken Attribute of infinite Juſtice, in the leaſt tend to ſupport this indigeſted Opinion? Certainly, I think, not; but exactly the reverſe; as might, I conceive, be eaſily ſhewn by a particular Conſideration of each, and an Application of them to the Subject before us. What! all need a ſupernatural Revelation, and but ſome have it! Would he who created us but to communicate Happineſs to us, refuſe the neceſſary Means of it to ſome, for no other Reaſon but unreaſonable Will? and from the ſame prepoſterous Motive confer it on others? Does ſuch a Repreſentation of the divine Conduct conſiſt with the Notion of Paternal Benevolence in infinite Perfection, and that unlimited and impartial Regard to the Happineſs of all his rational Offspring, that muſt be ſuppoſed from the Conſideration of this Attribute to reſide in the Deity?

If it ſhould be here replied, that it was not abſolutely neceſſary to the Happineſs of all; I aſk, How then does it appear, that all were in the ſame common Exigence? One ſhould be ready to imagine, that if a ſupernatural Revelation were neceſſary to be exhibited to ſome only, thoſe for whom it was neceſſary had loſt Sight of the Law of Nature in a much greater Degree, and they

were

were a Set of Wretches almoſt infinitely more abandon'd to an immoral, profligate and licentious Courſe of Life, than thoſe who ſtood not in that Neceſſity of it, which is doing an Honour to the Heathen World, that I preſume was altogether undeſigned them, by thoſe who thus accidentally reflect it upon them. Mr. *Balguy* proceeds ——

" *If they had in ſome Meaſure loſt ſight of the Law*
" *of Nature, could it be amiſs to ſet it before them in*
" *ſuch a Light as was moſt agreeable to their Con-*
" *dition? or even to add ſuch Precepts as might*
" *conduce to their Recovery and Growth in Vir-*
" *tue?*"

If they had in ſome meaſure loſt Sight of the Law of Nature, *&c.* They, Who? The whole diſtreſſed Species, every guilty Individual? would one not naturally be led to imagine ſo? If theſe are all comprehended in the Term *they*, it could not be amiſs, it is readily acknowledged, to ſet it before them, agreeable to their Condition: And if it could not be amiſs to ſet it before them all in a Light agreeable to their Condition, and the Goſpel only could exhibit it in this Light to them, why was it not by the Goſpel ſo ſet before them? If it was not amiſs to do it, one is ready to think it ſhould be proper to be done; and if it was, in the Nature and Fitneſs of things, proper to be done, it certainly would have been done, becauſe the Reaſon and Fitneſs of Things is the Rule by which the

Deity

Deity invariably governs all his Actions. If therefore it was proper to be done with regard to ſome, it was proper to be done with regard to all; but it has not been done to all, therefore I conclude it has not been done to any, in the way contended for, namely, a ſupernatural Revelation.

To conclude, The Deiſts on their own Principles can readily allow the Chriſtians, That whatever in *Benſon*, or *Balguy*, *Derham* or *Ray*, *Locke* or *Newton*, *Clarke* or *Addiſon*, or in any or all the Writers of the Scriptures, both the old Teſtament and the New, is founded diſcernably in Truth, and apparently ſupported by Reaſon; has a natural Tendency to promote Purity of Heart and Rectitude of Manners; or, in ſhort, Virtue here, and Happineſs hereafter, is right. Whatever has a manifeſt contrary Tendency is as certainly wrong: And whatever is in itſelf abſtruſe, ambiguous, and tends only to amuſe and puzzle; wherever found, how warmly ſoever inculcated, or by whomſoever recommended, as of Importance, is no Part of, nor has any Relation to, the Religion eſſential to Man.

This then is, as it were, the Religion of the Deiſt in Miniature, or a conciſe Summary of Deiſm; and ſuch only as regulate their Converſations accordingly, are properly true Deiſts; for theſe not only profeſs Reaſon was intended for, but ſhew

by

by the Regularity of their Conduct that to them it indeed is of, conſtant and perpetual Uſe. And they would beg leave to inſiſt upon it with the rational Divines as a Piece of common Juſtice, they as Men have a Right to lay claim to, that they would join the moral Doctrines ſingly to the moral Precepts; and when they have thus connected them as they naturally are, and they have thoroughly purged them of all Additions, and Mixtures of Unintelligibles; that they would call this, and only this, Deiſm; and the Man who governs his whole Conduct accordingly, that is, who in his Meaſure ſo believes, and ſo behaves, a true Deiſt. Every moral Doctrine, 'tis obvious, relates to ſome moral Precept, and every moral Precept neceſſarily relates to the rational Powers of Perception and Volition, in the human Compoſition; and thoſe Powers and Faculties of the human Mind, relate to all the various Beings ſuch Precepts reſpect; which Beings, may all be reduced to three general Claſſes, God, our Fellow-Creatures, and ourſelves; ſo that every Precept, which the human Underſtanding perceives to be founded in Truth and Nature, it perceives it to be ſo, becauſe it perceives it to reſult from the Relation ſubſiſting between itſelf, and ſome one or other of thoſe ſeveral Beings; which, to it, alone conſtitutes its Obligation to diſcharge it, as natural, fit, and reaſonable. Every thing therefore, contained either in the Bible or in any of the numerous Commen-

taries

taries on any Part or Parts thereof, or in any of the Writings of any, or all, the great Men among the Moderns or Antients, Philoſophers or Divines, whether Matter of Belief or Practice, concerning either God, our Fellow Creatures, or ourſelves; that is, or can be, a proper Object of, and is really and apparently ſupported by Reaſon; and is thereby proved to have its Foundation in Truth and Nature; is (call it whatever elſe you pleaſe) an eſſential Part of Deiſm, or the true original Religion of Reaſon and Nature. And then, if nothing, that is (or can be made appear to be) ſupported by Reaſon, in Chriſtianity, or traditional Revelation, but muſt as ſuch, at the ſame time, neceſſarily appear to be a Part of Deiſm, original Revelation, or the Conſtitution or Nature; then there is nothing in Chriſtianity or traditional Revelation, but what is not, or cannot be ſupported by Reaſon, that ſtands oppoſed to Deiſm, or on his Principles can be oppoſed by a true Deiſt.

If then Deiſm takes in every Doctrine and every Precept that is either diſcernably right, good, or true, and excludes only Doctrines that are either abſolutely unintelligible, or evidently wrong, evil, or falſe; and ſuch Precepts only as are confeſſedly no conſtituent Parts of true Religion; and Chriſtianity takes in unintelligible Doctrines and Precepts that are no conſtituent

Parts of true Religion; I would leave it with every Man who hath Reaſon to direct him, and an immortal Soul to be made happy or miſerable in a future State, as he ſhall act a reaſonable or an unreaſonable Part in this: To judge which of the two is the Religion moſt agreeable to the divine, or ſuitable to, and worthy of the human Nature? And whether that Religion which is reaſonable, right, and fit, and only ſo throughout, and of a piece in all its Parts; or that, which is in part to be underſtood, and in Part is unintelligible, in Part only is diſcernably right; and is in Part, for ought we do, or can know to the contrary, wrong, be in its own Nature moſt eligible, and conſequently to be embraced by him, as he is a reaſonable, a free, and an accountable Creature?

And now, perhaps, it may be thought high time for me to forbear enlarging. Whether I have ſucceeded in my main Deſign, by giving a juſt and true Repreſentation of Deiſm, and have vindicated it from the groundleſs Calumnies it has been loaded with, or not, I chearfully ſubmit to your candid Examination and Judgment, who I am well aſſured will determine according to the Dictates of ſober Reaſon. As to Dr. *Benſon*'s Anſwer to *Chriſtianity not founded on Argument*, I flatter myſelf you will admit that I have clearly ſhewn it to be far from a complete one. And as I have obſerved to you, that I conceive my preſent

Sentiments

Sentiments may properly enough be characterized by the Term *Deiſm*, and that I aknowledge my ſelf to diſſent from the current and generally received Opinions of the Times, and from the Tenets I was educated in, and have ſhewn you the Grounds upon which I have acted in ſo doing; yet, notwithſtanding, if you, or any other judicious Chriſtian can, and will be pleaſed, in the Spirit of Meekneſs, to ſhew me that hereby I have departed from the Principles of Reaſon, Truth and Soberneſs; I aſſure you, Sir, I am fully determined, like the ever memorable Mr. *Chillingworth*, to take the Shame of another Change. In the mean time I beg leave to add, that I am, with all due Reſpect,

Worthy Sir,

Your much obliged,

Humble Servant,

A MORAL PHILOSOPHER.