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
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*Clarke Samuel*

A Third  
**DEFENSE**  
OF AN  
**ARGUMENT**

Made use of in a  
Letter to Mr *DODWEL*,  
to prove the Immateriality and Na-  
tural *Immortality* of the **SOUL**.

*In a Letter to the Author of the Reflexions  
on Mr Clarke's Second Defense, &c.*

*Arguments seldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when  
they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion.*  
*Mr Hobbs.*

We have as much Reason to be satisfied with our Notion of  
*Immaterial Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the  
Existence of the One, as well as the Other. For it being  
no more a Contradiction that *Thinking* should exist sepa-  
rate and independent from *Solidity*, than it is a Contradi-  
ction that *Solidity* should exist separate and independent  
from *Thinking*; they being Both but *Simple Ideas*, independ-  
ent one from another; And having as clear and distinct  
Ideas in us, of *Thinking*, as of *Solidity*; I know not  
why we may not as well allow a *Thinking thing without*  
*Solidity*, that is, *Immaterial*, to exist; as a *Solid thing*  
*without Thinking*, that is, *Matter*, to exist. *Mr Locks*  
*Essay. Book II. Ch. 23. § 32.*

4.

London, Printed by *W. B.* for *James Knapton*, at  
the *Crown* in *St Paul's Church-Yard*. 1708.



A Third

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT, &c.

S I R,

**I**N my last Reply I persuaded my self I had set the Question between us in so clear a Light, that there would have been no need of any new Debate, or of giving our Readers any further trouble in this Matter. But seeing you have found out a seemingly new *Distinction*, by which you still endeavour to evade the Force of the Argument; And, though your Evasion seems to Me indeed extremely slight, yet seeing you have thought fit to insist upon it in such a manner, as if you your self really believed there was some Strength and Weight in it; I shall endeavour to gratify the sincere Desire you profess to have of discovering the Truth, by showing briefly the weakness

and inconclusiveness of what you have advanced in your *Reflexions*.

In order to prove that *Thinking* cannot possibly be a Quality or Power of *Matter*; I said that all the Qualities or Powers, which either Are in Matter, whether they be known or unknown; or are vulgarly Ascribed to it; must of necessity be either

1<sup>st</sup>. Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed: Such as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. These are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of *the same Kind*, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the Material Subject. Which not being true of *Thinking*, 'tis manifest that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Sort*, inhering in a System of Matter.

Or 2<sup>dly</sup>. Qualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are usually ascribed, but being indeed Modes excited and residing in some other Subject: Such as are *Colours*, *Sounds*, and all those which are commonly called the Sensible Qualities of Matter. These do not exist at all in That Subject to which they are usually ascribed; but in some Other Subject. And This also not being applicable to *Thinking*, 'tis manifest therefore that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Kind*, in a Material Subject. Or

Or 3<sup>dly</sup>. Qualities, not really inhering in any Subject at all, but being mere Abstract Names, or external Denominations, to express certain complex Ideas framed in our Imagination ; or certain general, extrinſick, and relative Effects, produced upon particular Systems of Matter by foreign Agents ; or certain Dispositions of the particular Systems of Matter, requisite towards the producing of those Effects. Such as are *Magnetism*, *Electricity*, *Attraction*, *Reflexibility*, *Refrangibility*, and the like. These have no real existence by way of *proper inhering*, in Any Subject. Which likewise since it cannot be said of *Thinking*, 'tis manifest that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality in a Material System, of *this Kind* neither.

You grant that *Thinking*, for the Reasons I urged, cannot be a Power or Quality of any of These Kinds ; But you *Distinguish* upon the First Sort ; and allege,

*That* there are some Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed ; which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the *same kind*, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the Subject : And that therefore *Thinking*, though it be not an Aggregate of Powers of the *same Kind*, may yet nevertheless

vertheless be a Real Quality inhering in Matter.

Reflex. p.  
18 & 20.

*That Numerical Powers, or particular and Individual Modes, are such real inherent Qualities, residing in a System of Matter, without inhering distinctly in its several Parts; in contradistinction to Generical Powers, such as Magnitude and Motion, which you acknowledge to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the several Parts.*

pag. 14.

*That, for Instance, the Power of the Eye, to contribute to the Act of Seeing; the Power of a Clock, to show the hour of the Day;*

pag. 15.

*the Power of a Musical Instrument, to produce in us harmonious Sounds; the parti-*

pag. 15.

*cular Figures in Bodies, such as Roundness or Squareness; and particular or individual*

pag. 17,  
& 20.

*Modes of Motion, are such Numerical Powers, not at all resulting from any Powers of the same Kind inhering in the Parts of the System: And that Thinking therefore*

*in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the same Kind, may yet inhere in a System of Matter, as one of these Nu-*

pag. 21.

*merical or Individual Modes of some Generical Power.*

*That, upon this Supposition, of Thinking being a Numerical Mode of some Generical Power of Matter; it may be conceived, that as the Roundness of a Body, is not the*

pag. 19.

*Sun's*



*Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts; nor the Squarcness of a Body, the Sum of the Squarenesses of the Parts; nor the Power of a Musical Instrument to cause an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the same Kind in the parts singly considered; nor any particular Mode of Motion, the Sum of the same Modes of Motion in all the several Parts; So the Consciousness that inheres in a System of Matter, may yet not be the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.*

*That the Argument therefore drawn from Consciousness's not being made up of several Consciousnesses, concludes no more against the possibility of its residing in a System of Matter; than the like Argument would conclude against the possibility of the Existence of Roundness, or any other Numerical Mode, in a Body.*

*For Roundness no more consists of several Roundnesses, than Thinking or Consciousness does of several Consciousnesses.*

*And Roundness is as specifically different from other Figures of which it may be composed, as Consciousness is from a Circular Motion.*

*So that Sensation may be conceived to be in the Parts of an Animal's Body, just as Roundness is in the Parts that compose a Round Body: Each Part has as much of Sensation, singly considered; as each part of a*  
*Round*

*Round Body, has of Roundness : And when the Parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundness exists, by the Conjunction of parts.*

pag. 55. For Consciousness, being supposed to be a real Numerical Power, such as Roundness is ; may result from the Composition of different Qualities, as Roundness does from different Species of Figure : And is consequently a new Quality in the same Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all the component Qualities considered together.

pag. 56. Wherefore, though Consciousness be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be void of Consciousness ; yet it may result from such Qualities as singly considered are void of Consciousness ; In like manner as Roundness is a real Quality specifically different from other Qualities void of Roundness, and yet may be the result or Composition of such Qualities.

pag. 19,  
22 & 26. That Consciousness may be considered particularly, as an individual Mode or Species of Motion.

pag. 26. For, as nothing more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several particles not singly endued with Roundness ; so, upon this Supposition, nothing more needs go to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several particles not each  
endued

*endued with That Species of Motion called Thinking.*

This, if I understand you aright, is the Sum and full Strength of what you have urged in your *Reflexions*.

And to This, I answer as follows.

It is absolutely impossible and an evident Contradiction, that any Real Quality should truly and properly inhere in a System of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers or Qualities, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the System, and being always of the *same Kind* with the Whole that results from them. For, as the *Substance it self* of a System of Matter, is nothing but the Sum of its Parts, existing distinctly and independently from each other; and the Whole cannot but be of the *same Kind* with the Parts that constitute it: So no *Power* or *Quality of the Substance* can be any thing else, but the Sum or Aggregate of the Powers of the several Parts; and That Sum or Aggregate, without a Creation of Something out of Nothing, cannot but be of the *same Kind* with the Powers that constitute it. If the Parts of the Substance be *similar*, then the System it self is an *uniform* or *homogeneous* Substance: If the Parts be *dissimilar*, then the Substance is *diform* or *Heterogeneous*:

*heterogeneous* : But still always of the *same Kind* or *Kinds* with the Parts that compose it. In like manner, if the Powers of the several Parts of the System be *similar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *simple* and *uniform* Power : If the Powers of the several Parts be *dissimilar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *compound difform* Power : But still always necessarily of the *same Kind* or *Kinds* with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge *Thinking* to be a Power not composed of a Multitude of *Thinkings* ; and 'tis evident (as shall in the sequel be made fully appear) that no Powers void of *Thinking*, can be of the *same Kind* with the Power of *Thinking*, so as to be Parts of it, and that from a composition of Them the Power of *Thinking* may arise ; it follows that *Thinking* is not a Power made up at all of Parts, and consequently that it cannot reside in a Substance that consists of distinct and independent Parts, such as all Matter is confessed to be.

For the clear explication of which whole Argument, and to vindicate the Notion from all the Objections and pretended Instances you have brought to the contrary ; It is to be observed, that the Terms, *Kind*, and *Species*, and of *the same Kind* or *Species*, are very ambiguous Terms, and used in  
great

great Variety of Significations : Though among Men who seek Truth, and endeavour to express themselves with the greatest clearness they can, and are willing to understand each others meaning ; they do not often cause any considerable Mistakes.

For Example : 'Tis an evident Truth, that *All Circles of four foot Diameter*, are of *one and the same Kind or Species* ; and this is what the Logicians call *Species specialissima*. 'Tis true in another Sense, that *All Circles Whatever*, are of the *same Species* : In another Sense, that *All curvilinear Figures*, are of the *same Species* : In another, that *All plain Figures both streight-lined and curvilinear*, as opposed to solids, are of the *same Species* : And in another, that *All Figures whatsoever, whether plain or solid*, are of the *same Kind or Species* ; as contradistinguished from Motion or Thinking, or from any thing else of a totally different Kind. This is what they call the *Genus generalius*. And beyond This, it is neither *True*, nor *good Sense*, nor can it in any manner be said, that *Figure and Motion*, or *Figure and Colour*, or *Figure and Thought*, are of the *same Kind* ; Because there is nothing Common in their Idea's, by which they can be ranked or compared together ; save only as they are all comprehended perhaps under the mere Abstract Name of *Quality* in general.

In like manner ; *All Squares of two foot diameter* are *specifically* different from *All Squares of one foot diameter* ; but not in the same Sense, nor so much, as Both are from *Parallelograms* : And *All Parallelograms* differ *specifically* from *All Squares* ; but not so, as Both do from *Triangles* : And *All Triangles* differ *specifically* from *All quadrilateral Figures* ; but no so, as Both do from *Spheres* or *Cylinders* : And *Spheres* or *Cylinders* differ *specifically* from all *Streight-lined Figures* ; but not so, as They and All Other Figures differ from *Motion*, or from a *Tast* or a *Sound* ; or as *Figure* or *Motion* does from a *Thought*. Which makes it appear by the by, with what Truth and Sense you affirm, that *Roundness* is as *specifically* different from all other *Figures*, as *Consciousness* is from a *Circular Motion* ; That is, that a *Circle* differs from an *Ellipsis* (suppose) or from a *Parabola*, not only as much as it differs from a *Cube*, but even as much as it differs from the *Reason of a Man* : Or, as Logicians would express it, that the *Species specialior* differs as much from the *Species* next and immediately superiour to it, as it does from the *Genus generalissimum* ; and not only so, but as it does also from any thing that is not so much as included even in *That Genus*.

Again : *All light Blue Colours* differ *specifically* from *All Dark Blues* ; but not so,  
as

as Both do from *Yellow* or *Scarlet* : And *Scarlet* differs *specifically* from *Blue* ; but not so, as Both do from the *Sound of a Trumpet*.

Now to apply This to our present Question. When I affirm that every real Power or Quality inhering in a System of Matter, must of necessity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of *the same Kind* residing distinctly in the several Parts of that System ; 'tis manifest that by this Term, *of the same Kind*, is not to be understood the *Species specialissima*, but some of the *Species generaliores*. For Example : When I say the *Magnitude* of a *Cubic foot* of Gold, is the Sum or Aggregate of the *Magnitudes* of its parts ; I do not mean to say, that 'tis an Aggregate of *Cubic feet*, but of other *Magnitudes* which constitute a *Cubic foot*, and which are of *the same Kind* with it, in the Sense that *All Magnitudes* are of *the same Kind*, and may be parts one of another : But *Magnitude* and *Motion*, or *Magnitude* and *Figure*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind*, and cannot be parts one of another ; Neither can *Figure* or *Motion* be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

In like manner : When I say the Number *Twenty* is made up of Parts of *the same Kind* with the Whole ; 'tis evident I do not mean that it is made up of *Twenties*, but of Other *Numbers*, which are of *the same*

*same Kind* with it, in the Sense that *All Numbers* are of *the same Kind*, and may be parts one of another : But *Number* and *Sound*, or *Number* and *Colour*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind*, and cannot be Parts one of another ; Neither can *Number* or *Figure*, *Motion* or *Magnitude*, be a Piece of a *Thought*.

Again ; When I say *Roundness* or *Globosity* or any other *Figure* of a *Body*, must needs be the Sum of *Qualities of the same Kind* inhering in the several Parts ; 'tis plain I do not mean to affirm, that *Globosity* is made up of *Globosities*, any more than the *Number Twenty* is made up of *Twenties*, or the *Motion of a Cubic foot* of *Matter* made up of the *Motions of Cubic feet* ; but that a *whole Round Figure* must necessarily be made up of *Pieces of Roundness*, which are all of the *same Kind* with it ; just as the *Numbers*, which are Parts of *Twenty*, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole* ; and the *Motions* of the *Particles* of a *Cubic foot* of *Matter*, which are Parts of the *Motion* of the *Whole*, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole Motion*. But *Figure*, and whatever is *not Figure*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind* ; Neither can any thing that is *void of Figure*, be part of any *Figure* whatsoever ; nor any thing that is *void of Curvity* in particular, be part of a *round circumference* ; nor any thing that is *void of that*  
particular



*particular degree of Curvity* which makes a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be part of the *circumference of That Circle*; nor any thing that is *void of Thinking*, be a Part or Constituent of a *Thought*.

From hence it clearly appears, that your Distinction of *Generical* and *Numerical* Powers, is of no Service to your Cause. For those Powers which you call *Numerical*, must as necessarily be Aggregates of Powers of *the same Kind*, as those which you call *Generical*. It is as evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, [its *Superficial Figure*,] is the Sum of the *Convex Surfaces* of its outward Parts; and its *Solid Figure*, the Sum of all its *Solid Parts taken together*, considered like so many *concentrick Shells* or any other Figures which can be constituent Parts of the Solid Content of a *Globe*; as it is that the *Motion* of a *Globe*, is the Sum of the *Motions* of its Parts. And the *convex outsides* of its outward parts, and the *concentrick Roundnesses* of its inward parts, are as much of *the same Kind* with the *Whole Roundness* or the *Whole Globosity*, of which they are pieces; as the several distinct *Motions* or *Magnitudes* of its Parts, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole Motion* or *Magnitude* which they constitute. For why is not a *Semicircle* or the *Arch of a Quadrant*, of the *same kind* with the *Circumference* of a *Circle*; and *concentric round Figures*, or  
any

any other *Figures* which can be *constituent* Parts of the Solid Content of a Globe, of *the same Kind* with the Figure of the Globe ; as much as the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of *half a foot cube* of Matter, is of the *same kind* with the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of the *Whole foot cube* ?

In reality, no other Powers but *Numerical* Powers, can properly in the present Question come under Consideration at all. For *Generical* Powers, considered as such, are nothing but Universals, having no being but in the Imagination considering and comparing several Particulars. In the Individuals themselves, wherein alone Powers really exist, they are not *General* ; They are only made *General* by the considering and comparing together of Particulars ; Which Comparison has no Existence but in the Idea ; And consequently *General* or *Generical Powers*, having no real Existence in things without us, have really neither Parts nor Whole, nor can properly come at all under Consideration in the present Question. 'Tis not *Motion* or *Figure* in *general*, that is made up of Motions and Figures ; but 'tis the *individual Numerical Motion* or *Figure* of a Body, that is made up of the Motions or Figures of its Parts. The *Numerical Mode of Motion* of the Whole ; is always the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Motion* of the Parts : The *Numerical*

*merical Mode of Superficial Figure* of the Whole ; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Figure* of the *Outsides* of its *Superficial Parts* : And the *Numerical Mode of Solid Figure* of the Whole ; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of all the *Parts* taken together. In like manner, if *Thinking* could inhere in a System of *Matter*, it would not be *Thinking* in *general*, but always some particular *Numerical Thought*, that would be the result of the *Thinkings* of the *several Parts*.

If you will reply, that by *Generical Powers*, you do not mean *General Powers*, or *Universals*, which have no real Existence ; (though when you reckon *Figure* among your *Generical Powers*, in opposition to any *particular Figure*, as *Roundness* ; your words cannot easily bear any other than this absurd Sense ;) If, I say, you will reply, that by *Generical Powers* you do not mean *General Powers*, but only such *Sorts* of *particular Powers*, as *Are Sums* or *Aggregates* of *Powers* of the *same kind*, in opposition to such other *particular Powers* or *Qualities*, as *Are not Sums* or *Aggregates* of *Powers* of the *same Kind* : I answer, that there is no such *Distinction* in *Nature* ; But All *Powers* or *Qualities* whatever, that inhere in *Systems* of *Matter*, whether they be such as you instance in for *Generical*, or such as you instance in for *Numerical*

C Powers ;

Powers; are equally and alike Sums or Aggregates of Powers of *the same Kind*. For if by this Term, of *the same Kind* or *Species*, you understand the *Species specialissima*; in that Sense neither the One sort of Qualities, nor the Other, nor any Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts of *the same Kind*: It being no more true, that the *Magnitude* or *Motion* (which you call the *Generical* Qualities) of a *foot cube* of Matter, are made up of *cubic feet Magnitudes* or *cubic feet Motions*; than it is true that the *Roundness* (which you call the *Numerical* Quality) of a *Globe*, is made up of the *Like Roundnesses*. But if by the Term, of *the same Kind*, be understood (as common Sense requires, and as I before explained,) the *Species generalior*; then both the One sort of Qualities, and the Other, and All Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts of *the same Kind*: It being equally true and evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, (the *Numerical* Quality,) is, as to its *Surface*, made up of *Pieces of Surfaces spherically and concentrically convex*; and, as to its *Solid Content*, made up of *concentrick Round Figures* or of *Shells spherically and concentrically convex*; which, being Pieces of the whole Spherical Surface, or of the whole spherical solid Content, are respectively of *the same Kind* with it: as that the *Magnitude* of a *foot cube* of Matter,

Matter, (the *Generical Quality*,) is made up of *Inches cube*, or of any other *Magnitudes*, which, being Pieces of a foot cube, are of the same Kind with it.

When therefore you say; *If Powers of* pag. 19. *the same Kind be understood Generically, then you Do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing else but the Sums of Powers of the same Kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body, [the Magnitude and Motion you should more properly have instanced in,] consist of the Figures and Motions [the Magnitudes and Motions] of the Parts: But if the Terms, Powers of the same kind, be taken Numerically, (that is, as Powers really exist,) then there are Powers inhering in Systems of Matter, that are not the Sums of Powers of the same kind; As, the Roundness of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts: Your Distinction is evidently very groundless. Because in the same Sense that the Roundness of a Body is not the Sum of the Like Roundnesses of the Parts, (for of Other Roundnesses, as of innumerable concentrick Roundnesses, and of the convex outsides of its minute external particles, it may be and always is the Sum:) In the same Sense (I say,) that the Roundness of a Body is not the Sum of the [Like] Roundnesses of the Parts; in that same Sense it is true also, that neither does the Magnitude nor Motion of a Body consist of the*

[Like] *Magnitudes nor Motions of the Parts.* And on the contrary : In the same Sense that it is true, that the *Magnitude and Motion of a Body* does consist of [not the same, but the *Different*] *Magnitudes and Motions of the Parts* ; in that same Sense it is true likewise, that the *Numerical Round Figure of a Body*, that is, the *Round Figure of its Surface*, is the Sum of the *Roundnesses*, that is, of the *round or convex outsides*, of its *superficial parts* ; and its *Solid Figure*, is the Sum of all its *Solid Parts* taken together, which (as I before said) may be considered as so many *concentrick Shells* or any other *Figures* that can be *constituent parts* of the *Solid Content* of a *Globe*.

pag. 20.

And when you say ; It is a *Contradiction* to make *Consciousness* the *Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts*, as it is a *Contradiction* to make *Roundness* to consist in the *Roundnesses of the Parts* ; Though you would readily grant, that, was *Consciousness* a generical *Power* like *Figure and Motion*, it would be likewise the *Sum and Result* of the *Consciousnesses of the several Parts* ; and so there would be as many *distinct Consciousnesses*, as there are *Particles of Matter*, of which the *System* consists ; which you do allow to be very *absurd* : And again ; If *humane Consciousness* be a *Mode of some generical Power in Matter*, it must not be the *Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts* : And ; Did *Consciousness*

pag. 21.

pag. 56.

*sciousness answer to Figure and Motion, [the generical Powers;] That would likewise consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts : And again ; Consciousness may result from such* pag. 56.  
*Qualities, as singly considered are void of Consciousness ; in like manner as Roundness is a real Quality specifically different from other Qualities void of Roundness, and yet may be the Result or Composition of such Qualities : And ; Nor is Consciousness a Power which* pag. 59.  
*answers to Figure and Motion, [the generical Powers,] which you agree consist only in the Figures and Motions of the Parts ; but it agrees or answers to [Numerical] Modes of Figure and Motion : All this, is only amusing your Reader with insignificant Words. For 1<sup>st</sup>, Consciousness, (as I shall hereafter have occasion more particularly to observe) is truly a more generical Power, than either Figure or Motion. For Figure contains under it, nothing but the Modes of Figure ; and Motion, nothing but the Modes of Motion : But Consciousness, comprehending under it all the Modes of Thinking, contains in it self the Ideas of all the Modes of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion, and infinite Other Ideas besides. Consciousness therefore being a generical Power, not like, but infinitely more so, than Figure and Motion ; must be (according to* pag. 20.  
*your own Confession) the Sum and Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts ;*  
*and*

and so there would be as many distinct Conscionsnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the System consists; which you do allow to be very absurd. But 2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine Conscionsness to be, not a Generical, but a Numerical Power or Quality, such as Roundness is; and see what will follow from thence. It cannot be conceived that Conscionsness in general is a Numerical Power, any more than Figure in general, or Roundness in general. But, as the individual Roundness of a Globe, is a Numerical Quality of that individual Globe; so you can only say that the individual Conscionsness, which I find in my self at any particular moment of Time, is a Numerical Mode of some Power inhering in that System of Matter which constitutes my Brain. Now as the individual Roundness of a Globe, is not indeed made up of a Number of the Like whole Roundnesses; (even as the Number a Hundred, is not made up of Hundreds; nor the Magnitude of a foot Cube, made up of feet Cube; nor any Whole whatever, made up of a Number of the like Wholes;) but yet must needs be made up of such Figures, as are Parts of Roundness, nay Parts endued with that particular numerical degree of Curvity or Roundness; and cannot be made up of straight Lines, nor of any Figures which are not Pieces of Roundness, or not Pieces



*ces* endued with that *particular determinate degree of Curvity or Roundness*: So the *individual Consciousness* that I find in my self at any particular moment of Time, (supposing it to be a Quality inhering in a System of Matter,) must be made up, though not indeed of a Number of the *very same Consciousnesses*, yet of such Powers as are as much of *the same Kind* with that *Numerical Consciousness*, as *Arches of Circles* are of *the same kind* with the whole *circular Circumference*; or *pieces of Surfaces spherically and concentrically convex*, are of the *same kind* with the whole *Spherical Surface* composed of them all: That is, it must be made up of *Different Consciousnesses* indeed, but still *Consciousnesses* only, and not *Motions* or *Figures* or any thing else; any more than the *Roundness of a Circle* can be made up of *straight Lines*, or of *Colours*, or *Sounds*, or any thing else besides *Pieces of circular Roundness*; or than the *Surface of a Sphere*, can be made up of any thing else than *little Surfaces having every one of them the very same spherical and concentric convexity*; or than an *Extended or Solid Substance*, can be made up of any other Ingredients, than such as are *Themselves Pieces of Extended or Solid Substance*. 'Tis by no means true, which you affirm, that *Roundness* is pag. 55, *a new Quality, of a different Kind or Species* 56. *from all the component Qualities considered toge-*

together ; or that it *maybe* the Result or Com-  
 position of Qualities void of Roundness ;  
 Since it cannot be affirmed of any part of  
 the Arch of a Circle, that it is wholly void  
 of Circularity ; as a straight Line is : And  
 in like manner, 'tis by no means possible,  
 pag. 56. that Consciousness may result from such Qua-  
 lities, as singly considered are void of [all  
 kind of] Consciousness ; as Motion or Figure  
 is. Nay further : Every Part of the Cir-  
 cumference of a Circle, is not only *not*  
*wholly void of Roundness*, but has really *as*  
*much Roundness or Curvity* (as much in  
 Degree, though not so much of it in Quan-  
 tity,) as the whole Circle it self has ; For  
 the same Reason as one Circle has *as much*  
*Roundness*, as twenty ; or one inch cube of  
 boiling Water, *as much Heat* [in Degree]  
 as twenty ; or one foot square of a white Sur-  
 face, *as much Whiteness* as twenty : And  
 therefore Consciousness in like manner, if it  
 was a Quality answering to, or that could  
 be compared with, the Roundness of a  
 Circle ; must consist of Parts, every one of  
 which would have *as much Consciousness* [in  
 Degree] as the Whole.

From the same Principles may easily be  
 shown the Absurdity of all the rest that  
 you have advanced, upon your favorite  
 Instance of ROUNDNESS.

You

You say that the Argument drawn from Consciousness's not being made up of several Consciousnesses, concludes no more against the possibility of Its residing in a System of Matter ; than the like Argument would conclude against the possibility of the *Existence of Roundness in Body ; which no more consists of several Roundnesses, than Thinking or Consciousness does of several Consciousnesses ; and is as specifically different from other Figures, as Consciousness is from a circular Motion.* But I think I have shown, that the Instances are not alike ; and that *Roundness* does not consist of Qualities so different from *Roundness*, as you suppose *Consciousness* to be made up of Qualities different from *Consciousness* ; that is, that the *Roundness of the whole Circumference of a Circle*, is not so specifically different from the *Convexity of the little Arches*, of which it consists ; or the *Roundness of a whole Globe*, from the *little spherically and concentrically convex pieces of Surfaces*, of which it is composed ; as *Consciousness* is from a *circular Motion*, or from *Motion in a Square* or any *Motion at all* or any other thing whatever that is wholly void of *Consciousness*. For *Roundness* can consist of nothing but *Pieces of Roundness*, that differ from it specifically only in the very lowest Sense of the word *specifically* ; or rather they do not differ from it at all specifically ;

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but in *Magnitude* only, as the *Part* from the *Whole* ; it being hardly good Sense, to say that the *Number Twenty* differs *specifically* from the *Number Ten* ; or that 360 degrees, or 60 degrees, differ *specifically* from 20 degrees or from 20 seconds, or from any other part of *One and the Same Arch* ; Every part of which, has necessarily (as I before said) just as much Roundness or Curvity [in Degree,] as the *whole Arch* or *whole Circle* it self has : But *Thinking*, if it be made up of Qualities *utterly void of Thought*, as *Motions*, *Figures*, and the like ; must consist of Qualities *generically* different from it self, in the highest Sense of the word *generically* ; they being under no common *genus*, and having no similitude, nothing common one with another in their Ideas ; and consequently cannot with any Sense be compared at all one with another, or be compounded one of another ; any more than *Circles and streight lines*, or *Colours* and *Sounds*, *Numbers* and *Tasts*, *Figures* and *Motions*, or any things whose Ideas have nothing common or alike betwixt them.

pag. 26.

Again : You allege in behalf of *Roundness* as well as *Thinking*, that 'tis so far from being as certain as an *Arithmetical Demonstration*, that such a particular Power is a *Whole bigger than all its Parts* ; that 'tis an *Arithmetical Demonstration*, that such a particular Power as *Roundness* is, is but just equal

*qual to all the Parts of which that Roundness consists. For what more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles not singly endued with Roundness? And — what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles not each endued with — Thinking?* But here also your Comparison is nothing to the Purpose. For, when you ask, *what more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles not singly endued with Roundness?* if by *not singly endued with Roundness*, you mean *not singly endued with* [the same whole] *Roundness*; then your Assertion is no more than this, that the *Parts of Roundness* are not a Number of the same *Wholes*; or that the several *Pieces of the Circumference of a Circle*, are not so many *Whole* [Same] *Circumferences*: And then I answer, neither would the *Parts of Thinking* (if it inhered in a System of Matter) be so many *Whole* [the Same] *Thoughts*. But if you mean, that a Round Figure is a Composition of particles *not singly endued with* [any Part of] *Roundness*, [any Curvity] *at all*; then your assertion is directly false: And such a *Roundness*, would be a *Whole* bigger than *all its Parts*; just as I said *Consciousness* would be, if it was made up of *Motions* or any other *Qualities void of Consciousness*. If you imagined *Thinking* to be made up of

innumerable different *Consciousnesses*, as the *Roundness of the Circumference of a Circle* is made up of innumerable *convex Arches*, which are *Pieces of Roundness*; then indeed, and then only, your Comparison would be good: But to suppose *Thinking* made up of Powers *utterly void of Consciousness*, is like supposing the *Circumference of a Circle* to be made up of *straight lines utterly void of convexity*; (or rather like supposing it to be made up of *Sounds or Colours*, or whatever else can be imagined even still more remote from the Idea of *Roundness* :) And This is evidently making a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*, that is, containing something different from, something over and above, something more than All its Parts taken together; nay, such a Whole, the Sum of whose parts neither make up the Whole it self, nor any Part of it: Which is a plain Contradiction. It is evident, that no *Whole* can possibly differ from *All its Parts* in any thing else, but only in the Abstract Name, the mere external Denomination of its being a *Whole*; which is nothing at all in the Thing it self, but merely a manner of Conception, a Conjunction of Ideas in the Imagination of the Person that beholds or thinks upon it. *Thinking*, if it was the Quality of a System of Matter, that is, the *Sum or Whole* of the Powers of its Parts; must differ from the  
distinct

distinct Powers of those Parts, no otherwise than as the Idea of the Roundness of a *Circle* differs from the Idea of the Roundness of *two Semicircles* (or of *four Quadrants*) *joyned together*; or as the Idea of *Twice Six*, differs from the Idea of the Number *Twelve*. If therefore *Thinking* was, as you suppose, a Composition or Result of several Powers; and those Powers such, as were *Themselves utterly void of Consciousness*; *Thinking* would be either a *mere outward Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Substance it self; just as a *Dozen* is only a mere Name, and nothing at all differing really in the thing it self from *Twelve Units*; Which is what you will not affirm: Or else it must unavoidably be a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*; that is, containing *All its Parts*, and *Thinking* besides: Just as the *Curve Circumference of a Circle* would contain *more of curvity* in it than *All its Parts taken together*, if it could be composed of Lines that had none of them singly any *Curvity at all*; or a *Cube* would be *bigger than All its Parts*, if it were made up of Parts that had none of them singly any *Magnitude at all*.

[If upon this you will forsake your first Instance, and, seeking still for new Similitudes, allege that a *Square Figure* (suppose) may consist of Parts, that are none of them singly endued with any thing like *Squareness*:

ness : I answer, that the *Squareness* of the Figure of a Body, is a mere *external Denomination*, a mere *relative comparing together* in the Imagination the *Bounds of a Surface*, the *Situation of four straight lines with respect one to another* ; and has not properly any real Existence in Things themselves, so as *Consciousness* is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Substance. The like may be said concerning all other Qualities, whose Essence consists merely in the *relative comparing the situation* or other *Respects of the Parts of a Body one towards another* : Such kind of Qualities having really no *proper Numerical Existence*, save only in the Idea. And Roundness it self, being considered in the same manner, might *this way likewise* afford a just Answer to your Argument drawn from thence.]

p. 8. 32.

Lastly, You affirm that *Sensation is in the Parts of an Animal*, as *Roundness is in the Parts which compose a Round Body*: Each Part has as much of *Sensation*, singly considered, as each part of a Round Body has of *Roundness* ; And when the Parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole *Roundness* exists, by the *Conjunction of Parts*. But from what has been already said, I presume it is evident enough, that *Senseless Figure* or *Motion* cannot be so a Part of *Sensation* or a Piece of a Thought, as a *Semicircle* or *Quadrant* is a Piece of a Circle.



*Circle.* To affirm that it can; *viz.* that Figure or Motion *wholly void of Sense*, can be *so* a Part of Sensation; is plainly (as I have before shown) the very same Thing, as if you should affirm that a Line *wholly void of Curvity*, could be *so* a piece of the Circumference of a Circle, as the Arch of a Quadrant is; or that something that has no Solidity and no Extension, might yet be a Constituent Part of an *Extended* and of a *Solid Substance*.

I have shown that no part of the Circumference of a Circle, is wholly void of Roundness. If therefore Sensation is (according to your Assertion) *in the Parts of an Animal, as Roundness is in the Parts that compose a Round Body; and each part has as much of Sensation, singly considered, as each part of a Round Body has of Roundness;* It will follow, not (as you intended) that Sensation can arise from a Conjunction of Particles *utterly void of Sense;* (for the circumference of a Circle cannot be made by a Conjunction of Lines, or the Superficies of a Sphere by a Conjunction of Surfaces, *utterly void of Curvity:*) but, on the contrary, it will follow that *some degree of Sensation* is really in every part of the Animal, singly considered; as *some degree of Curvity* is necessarily in every part of the circumference of a Circle, or of the Surface of a Sphere. And so you run unavoidably into that

pag. 20. that confessedly *absurd* Notion, that there are *as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Thinking System consists.*

I am afraid our Readers are sufficiently tired with *ROUNDNESS*. The other Instances you allege, to prove that a Quality or Power inhering in a System of Matter, needs not be the Result of Powers or Qualities of *the same Kind*, residing in the Parts of the System ; are still less to your purpose. For it is very evident concerning Those and All other possible Instances, that they never are nor can be any thing else, but the Sums of Powers or Qualities of *the same particular uniform Kind* with the Whole, when that Whole is *Simple and Homogeneous* ; or of *the same General Kind* with it, when it is *Complex and Heterogeneous*. Which since you acknowledge cannot be the Case of *Thinking*, it will follow that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality residing in a System of Matter.

The *Power of a Clock* to show the Hour of the Day, is not indeed a Result from the *like individual Powers* residing in the several Parts ; any more than the Number *a Thousand*, is the Result of a Composition of *Thousands* ; or *Any Whole*, a Composition of a Multitude of *the Same Wholes* : But, as the Number *a Thousand* is the Sum  
of

of a great many *Numbers*, but cannot with any Sense be imagined to be a Composition of *Sounds* or *Colours*; so the *Numerical Power of a Clock*, being it self nothing but *Motion* and *Figure*, cannot be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but such as are themselves singly of the same Kind, in the manner before explained; namely, *Motions* and *Figures*. And in like manner my present *Numerical Consciousness*, if it were at all a Quality inhering in a System of Matter; though it need not indeed be the Sum of a Multitude of the like individual *Thoughts*, inhering in the several distinct Parts of the System; yet it must be the Sum of *Such Powers* in the Parts, as would themselves singly be of the same Kind, namely *Consciousnesses* or *Thoughts*: It being equally, and for the very same reason, impossible that my *Consciousness* should be the Result of such Powers in the Parts of my Brain, as are *toto genere* different from *Thinking*, and have nothing in their Ideas common with it or alike to it; (such as are *Figure* and *Motion*, and all other Powers which are void of *Consciousness*;) as that the fore-mentioned Number *a Thousand*, should be a Composition of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or of any thing else but *Numbers*.

The Power of a Musical Instrument to produce Harmonious Sounds, is not indeed a Result from the like individual Powers residing in the several Parts of the Instrument ; any more than the Circumference of a Circle is made up of a Number of the like whole Circumferences : But, as the Circumference of a Circle is the Sum of a Multitude of convex Arches of like Curvity, but cannot be an Aggregate of Straight Lines or of Cubic Bodies or of Arches of unlike Curvity ; So the Harmony produced by a Musical Instrument, being it self, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing but Sound ; and, in the Instrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, nothing but a Motion of Parts ; cannot be the Result or Composition of any other Powers, but what are themselves singly of the same kind in the several Subjects respectively ; namely, in the Mind that perceives them, Sounds likewise ; and, in the Instrument it self, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, Motion of the Parts. And in like manner Consciousness, if it were a Power inhering in a System of Matter, could not be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but some sorts of Consciousness ; for the very same reason as the Circumference of a Circle cannot (as was before said) be an

Aggre-

Aggregate of *straight Lines*, or of *Cubic Bodies*; nor an *Harmonious Sound* a Composition of *Colours*, or of any thing else beside *Sounds*.

The *Power of the Eye* to See, is nothing else but such a Power, as is in the *Object*. pag. 14, 16 & 17.  
*Glasses* of Telescopes, of *Transmitting* and *Refracting* Rays of Light, so as to paint the Image of the *Object* in the bottom of the *Eye*. And This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Powers of the same *Kind*, namely Powers of *Transmitting* and *Refracting* of Rays, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the *Eye* or of the *Glass*. Every Part of the *Eye*, *Transmits* and *Refracts* Rays; and those Rays paint several Parts of the Image: And the *Whole Image*, differs no otherwise from *all its Parts*; nor That which you call the *Numerical Power of the whole Eye*, from the *single Powers of all its Parts*; than the Idea of a *Dozen* differs from the Idea of *Twelve Units*: Which, if it be as great a Difference, as is between the Idea of *Consciousness* and the Idea of a *Circular* or *any other Motion*, pag. 25. I will confess I have lost my Understanding.

But there is still a further peculiar unhappiness in your choosing to instance in the *Power of the Eye* to contribute to the Act of seeing, as a *Numerical Power* of a Sy-

tag. 14. *stem of Matter, that does not inhere in the Parts of that System ; and in your affirming, that upon dividing or varying the least part of the Eye, the Power of contributing towards the Act of Vision is entirely at an End.* For so far is this from being true, (excepting only *accidentally* upon account of the Softness and Fluidity of the Matter of the Eye.) that on the contrary, not only *every Part* of the Eye (as I now said) *Transmits and Refracts* Rays, in order to paint at the bottom the several Parts of the Image of the Object ; (and the Power of the *Whole Eye*, is nothing more than the *Sum* of those *Transmissions* and *Refractions*;) but moreover even *every Part* of the Eye has the same Power as the *Whole*, (differing only in *Degree*,) of painting at the bottom the *Whole Image* of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Object-Glass of a Telescope, or any Pièce of it that retains the polish on both Surfaces, will represent distinctly the Whole Object, only with less Brightness and Luminousness than the whole Glass would do ; So each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Object : And, if half of the Eye, or almost the Whole Eye be covered, so that you look only through a Pin-hole placed on the right side or on the left side or upon the middle of the Pupil ;

pil; still the whole Object is seen distinctly, even by that very small part of the Eye; And consequently the Power of the Eye is the same both in the *Whole*, and in *every Part*.

And the same that has been said concerning these several Instances you chose to insist upon, may with very little variation be said likewise concerning all other Powers whatsoever, that do or can reside in any System of Matter; The right explication of the nature of which Powers, shows even your own Instances to be so many unanswerable Arguments against the Assertion you brought them to support.

This, I presume, may be sufficient to prove against you in the *general*, that Every Power or Quality residing in any System of Matter, must of Necessity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the *same Kind*, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the System: And consequently, that Whatever Power is not an Aggregate of such Powers; as you confess *Consciousness* or *Thinking* is not; cannot be at all a Power or Quality of Matter.

Not without some unwillingness you seem at last to determin in *particular* what  
Sort

Sort of Generical Power in Matter, you imagine *Thinking* to be a Numerical Mode of. You suppose *Consciousness* to be a Mode of Motion: You speak of *Thought* as a Species of Motion: And you conceive it a proper Expression, to mention a certain Species of Motion, called *Thinking*.

You desire indeed it may not be imputed to you as your Opinion, since you only take the Liberty to Suppose it. But This will not serve you for an Evasion, when the Absurdity of the Notion is proved upon you. For you declare it as your positive Opinion, that *Human Consciousness or Thinking is a Mode of Some Generical Power in Matter*. What that Generical Power is, you will not positively determine; But you Suppose it to be *Motion*. Now I presume you Suppose That which you judge the most probable, and which you think will best serve your purpose in explaining the Nature of *Thinking*. I shall prove presently, that Nothing can be more absurd, than to Suppose *Thinking* to be a *Mode of Motion*. The same Arguments will prove no less strongly, that it is not possible for *Thinking* to be a *Mode of Figure*, or of any other *known* Property of Matter; And also that it is not possible for it to be a *Mode of any unknown Power of Matter*, which in the general is  
void



*void of Thinking*; Because every *unknown* Power which is *void of Thinking*, is as different from *Thinking*, as *Motion* it self is, or *Figure*, or any other *known* Power; for the same reason that a *Smell* or a *Taste*, or any other *known* or *unknown* Quality which is *not a Colour*, must of Necessity be as different from *Blue* or *Scarlet*, as *the Sound of a Trumpet* is. When therefore I have shown the Absurdity of your *Supposition*, that *Thinking* is a *Mode* pag. 19. of *Motion*; I shall likewise have shown the Absurdity of your *declared Opinion*, that *Human Consciousness* or *Thinking* is a *Mode* pag. 22. of *Some Generical Power in Matter*.

Now to prove the Absurdity of Supposing *Consciousness* to be a *Mode of Motion*, I offer the following Arguments.

I. Every *Mode* of any *Power* or *Quality*, is nothing else but *That Power* or *Quality* of which it is a *Mode*, understood with some particular Limitation; that is to say, 'tis nothing but a *particular Instance* of that *general Power* or *Quality*; nothing but the *general Power* or *Quality*, considered under this or that *particular Modification*. *Blue* and *Red*, and all other *Modes* of *Colour*, are nothing but several particular *Colours*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Colour*. *Acute* and *Grave*, and all other

ther *Modes* of *Sound*, are nothing but several particular *Sounds* ; and can contain nothing in their *Idea*, beyond the *Genus* of *Sound*. *Circular* and *Triangular*, and all other *Modes* of *Figure*, are nothing but several particular *Figures* ; and can contain nothing in their *Idea*, beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. In like manner All *Modes* of *Motion*, are nothing else but merely particular *Motions* ; and cannot contain any thing in their *Idea*, beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*. Now if *Simple Ideas* be the Foundation of all our Knowledge ; and *clear and distinct Perception* of the *Agreement or Disagreement* of those *Ideas*, be the best and greatest *Criterion* of Truth, that our Faculties inable us to attain to ; then it is as evident as any Truth in the World, that *Consciousness* cannot possibly be a *Mode of Motion*. For I have as *clear and distinct a Perception*, that the *Idea* of *Consciousness* contains something in it besides and beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*, as I have that it contains something in it beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. The *Idea* of *Consciousness* is as totally and *generically* different from the *Idea* of a *Circular Motion* or an *Elliptical Motion* or any other *Mode of Motion* whatsoever, as it is from the *Idea* of a *Circle* or a *Cube* or any other *Mode of Figure* whatsoever.

whatsoever. I have therefore exactly the same *intuitive certainty*, that *Consciousness* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*, as I have that a *Circle* or a *Cube* is not a *Thought*, or that an *Acute Sound* is not a *Purple Colour*, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whose Idea is the remotest and most different from it, that can be imagined. To suppose *Consciousness* to be a *Mode of Motion*, is really a greater Absurdity, (if possible) than it would be to suppose *Roundness* to be a Property of a *Square*; Because the Idea of *Local Motion* and the Idea of *Thinking*, having *no common Genus*, nothing wherein they agree or can be compared together; are evidently *more different* one from another, than the Ideas of *any two plain Figures* can be, which have a *common Genus*. And your Question, *What more goes to the Pow.* pag. 26. *er of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles not each indued with That Species of Motion called Thinking?* is truly more ridiculous, than if a Man should ask, *What more goes to the making up of a Scarlet Colour, than the Conjunction of several particles not each indued with That Species of Sound, called Scarlet?* Because no two Sensible Qualities are in their Ideas so different one from another, as the Idea of *Consciousness* is from the Idea of *Local Motion*.

Book IV. *Local Motion* can have no other effect  
 ch. 10. § upon any System of Matter, than only  
 16. producing in it a different *juxta-position*  
 of Parts. To which to ascribe Thinking,  
 Mr *Lock* himself, who had no prejudice  
 against the Possibility of Matter's Think-  
 ing, acknowledges it is very Absurd. To  
*suppose*, saith he, *the Eternal thinking Be-*  
*ing* [or any finite thinking Being] *to be no-*  
*thing else but a Composition of Particles of*  
*Matter, each whereof is incogitative; is to*  
*ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of*  
*that Eternal Being* [or the Wisdom and  
 Knowledge and all the Powers of the Fi-  
 nite thinking Being] *only to the juxta-posi-*  
*tion of Parts. Than which, nothing can*  
*be more absurd. For unthinking Particles*  
*of Matter, however put together, can have*  
*nothing thereby added to them, but a new*  
*relation of Position, which 'tis impossible*  
*should give Thought and Knowledge to them.*

2. If *Thinking* was any *Mode* or *Species*  
 of *Motion*, it would follow that *All Motion*  
 would be some *degree* or *kind* of *Think-*  
*ing*. For *Motion*, in the thing Moved,  
 excepting only the difference of *degrees* of  
 its *Swiftnes*s or *Slownes*s, is a *Similar*  
*Quality*, and has no variety in it: All its  
 different *Determinations*, or those which  
 you call its *Modes* and *Species*, being *nothing*  
*really* in the *Body it self* that is moved;
 but

but *mere Abstract Notions* or *external Denominations*, conceived *only in our Imagination*. For, moving with one Determination, or with another; from North to South, or from South to North; is *merely* relative, and not really a different thing in the Body moved; that one of those Motions should be *Consciousness*, the other not. In like manner *Circular Motion*, or *Motion in any other Figure*, is not any thing really and truly inhering in the Body it self, different from Motion in a *straight Line*. For the Determination of any Body that *moves in a Circle*, is nothing else, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to *move in a certain straight Line*; and, at another given Point of Time, to *move in another straight Line*; and so on: so that there is no such thing as a *circular Motion* of any particle of Matter, coexistent at once; but all Motion is, strictly and properly speaking, a similar and uniform Quality, *viz.* a Body's *Going on* according to its Determination; Which Determination is always in a straight Line; and causes the Body to go on actually in a straight Line, where it meets with no Resistance; and where it meets with Resistance by Intervals, there to go on into new straight Lines successively, into which it is diverted by such

Resistance ; and, where it meets with continual Resistance, there to go on in a Curve Line, into which it is continually diverted : And every such *curvilinear Motion*, whether *circular* or of *any other Species whatever*, is but the Idea of a Number of Successive Motions of a Body, never existent together ; a pure *Ens Rationis*, or Operation of the Mind ; which considering Past Motion and Future, and recollecting *the Whole* by the Memory and Fancy, calls *That Whole* sometimes by one Denomination and sometimes by another. How then can any of those *Modes of Motion* be the *Efficient* of *Thought*, or (according to your Supposition) be themselves *Thought* ; when they are evidently nothing but the *Effect and Product* of it, *viz.* Ideas framed merely by the Imagination and Memory ?

See Bishop of Norwich's Sermon on Immortality of the Soul, pag. 9. And Dr Bentley's Sermon II at Boyle's Lecture, pag. 55.

And the same that has been said concerning the *Modes of Motion* of a *single Body*, may easily be applied to the *Modes of Motion* of *any Number of Bodies*, in any *System* or *Composition* whatsoever. It being very evident, that if the *Progression* of *One Particle* of Matter *directly in a Streight Line*, be not *Consciousness* or *Thought* ; the like *Progression* of *Twenty Particles* at the same time *in Streight Lines*, cannot be *Consciousness* neither : The Po-  
sition

sition of those Lines with respect one to another, which determines the particular *Mode of Motion* of the whole System, being merely *imaginary, relative, and comparative*; a figment only in the Mind or Imagination, and not any thing really existing in the Bodies themselves, at any one and the same Moment of Time.

In like manner the *Impulse* also, or *Beating of one particle of Matter against another*, is a thing similar and in all Cases alike; differing in nothing, but in the *Degrees* or Quantity of the Force: And therefore must always and in all Cases, if ever in Any Case at all, be some *Degree of Thought*. From whence it would follow, that there must be as many several incoherent *Consciousnesses*, as there are Particles of the Brain or Spirits or of any other Matter in any System, that ever dash one against another: Which is what you are not willing to affirm.

3. If *Consciousness* were a *Mode* or *Species of Motion*; then *Motion* would be the *more generical* Power; containing *Thinking* under it, as (in the Language of Logicians) the *Genus* does the *Species*. But on the contrary 'tis evident (as I before observed) that *Thinking* (though simple and not compounded of Parts,) is, in the Sense we are now speaking of, a  
Power

Power infinitely *more generical* than either *Motion* or *Figure* or any other *Power of Matter* ; and consequently cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of any of them. There are as many *Ideas of Figure*, as there are *Figures* ; and as many *Ideas of Motion*, as there are *Modes of Motion* ; and as many *Ideas of other things*, as there are *other things* in the World, that can be *thought upon* : And all these *Ideas*, are *Modes* and *Sorts* or *Kinds of Thinking*. Now if *Thinking* is a *Power* more various, more extensive, more *generical*, than *Motion* ; 'tis manifest it cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*, as *Roundness* is a *Mode* or *Species* of *Figure*. If *Thinking* is a *Power more generical*, than *Figure* or *Motion* or any other *Power of Matter* ; if it is a *Power* as universal, as all things taken together, that can be thought upon ; 'tis certainly a *generical Power* in the *highest degree* ; And consequently, (if it be at all a *Power of Matter*,) it will oblige you to run into the *Absurdity* you declare you would avoid. For, by your own Confession, you would grant readily, that, was *Consciousness* a *generical Power like Figure and Motion*, (like *Figure* and *Motion* it is not, but infinitely *more generical* than either of them,) it would be likewise the *Sum and Result* of the *Consciousnesses*



*nesses of the several Parts ; and so there would be as many distinct Conscionsnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the System consists ; Which you do allow to be very Absurd.*

As *Figure* is the *Genus* of all the *Species* of *Figures*, so the *Idea* of *Figure* is the *Genus* of all the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Figures* : And so the *Idea* of *Motion*, is the *Genus* of all the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Motions* ; and the *Idea* of *Colour*, is the *Genus* of the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Colours* ; and the *Idea* of *Sound*, is the *Genus* of the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Sounds* ; and the *Idea* of an *Animal*, is the *Genus* of the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Animals*. The *General Ideas* of *Figure*, *Motion*, *Colour*, *Sound*, *Animal*, &c, are *generic Powers* of the *Mind* ; And *Thinking* is the *Genus generalius* of all those *Powers*. With what *Sense* then can it be said to be one of the *lower Species*, or a *Numerical Mode* of One of those *Powers* ?

4. If it was the *Motion* of the parts of a *Corporeal System*, on which its *Thinking* depends ; all the *Thoughts* There, must be unavoidably *accidental* and *limited* ; because each one of the *Particles*, that by *Motion* cause *Thought*, being in it self without any *Thought*, cannot regulate its own *Motions* ; much less be regulated by the  
Thoughts

*Thought of the Whole ; since that Thought of the Whole, is not the Cause of Motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the Consequence of it : Whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away : So that such a thinking Being, would be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Matter ; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the same thing : Not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge, that must depend on the Motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than That before-mentioned ; since, let this thinking System be All or a Part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle ; or the Whole know the Motion of every particular ; and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion. This Argument, is Mr Locks own Words, (Book IV. ch. 1c. Sect. 17.) to which I cannot but suppose you will give some Deference.*

5. If

5. If *Thinking* was a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*; then in like manner as it is a proper Expression to say, that *Circularity* is one *Species* of *Figure*, and *Squareness* a second, and *Cubicalness* a third, and *Ellipticalness* a fourth; so it would be proper also to say, that *Circular Motion* is one *Species* of *Motion*, and *Motion in a Square* a second, and *Motion in an Ellipsis* a third, and *Thinking* or *Consciousness* a fourth; and, I appeal to the common Sense of all Mankind, whether I may not add with exactly the same reason, that a *Tree* is a fifth, and a *Syllogism* a sixth, and *Personality* a seventh, &c.

[If to this you will reply, that you do not mean as you say, that any *particular Motion* is it self *Thought*, but that *Thought* may be the *Result* of some *particular Motion*; I answer in the words of Mr *Hobbs*, that \* no *Result* of *Motion* can ever be any thing else but *mere Motion* still: (With a different *Juxta-position* of parts perhaps; of which before, pag. 42.) And consequently all the fore-going Arguments hold equally good, against one *Notion* as against the other.]

\* *Motus*  
nihil gene-  
rat præter  
*Motum.*  
*Leviat. c.*

Some of these Absurdities are so very gross, and yet such obvious Consequences of your *Notion*, that it can hardly be  
G imagined

imagined you should have overlooked them. And indeed you do at last endeavour to obviate them in a *very effectual manner* ; In such a manner, by which you may, whenever you please, answer all the Arguments upon any Question in the World ; and remove out of your way, not only any *Demonstration*, but even *Intuitive Knowledge* it self. You tell me, that I imagine *Consciousness to be Something else than what you contend it is* ;

pag. 59. That *the Term Consciousness stands with You, in another Sense than with Me* :

pag. 60. That with You, it signifies a *Numerical Power, answering to Roundness in a Body, or to a Motion peculiar to a System of Matter* ; but that with Me, *it relates to a Chimera or Idea of my own framing.*

Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr Lock ; (Book 4. ch. 1. Sect. 4.) *A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls White and Round, are the very Ideas they are ; and that they are not other Ideas, which he calls Red or Square.*

I think I know infallibly, as soon as ever I have it in my Mind, that the Idea I call *Consciousness, Perception or Thinking*, is the very Idea it is ; and that it is not another Idea, which I call *circular Motion, or Elliptical Motion, or Motion in a Square,*

*Square*, or the *Motion of a Watch* or of any other *Machine*. And I appeal to what every Man finds in his own Mind; whether my Account of *Consciousness*, or yours which makes it to be merely a *Mode of Motion*, be the more *Chimerical* Idea.

Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor described. When any Dispute is carried so far, as to terminate in questioning the *Idea it self*; there is nothing then left, but to appeal to the Idea which every Man has in his own Mind. If I affirm that this Paper is *White*, and you will contend that it is *Red*; we cannot confute one another by Arguments, but must appeal to the Judgment of the World. If a Man will tell me, that by *Scarlet-Colour* he does not mean That *Chimerical* Idea which I frame in my own Mind and call by that Name; but that He means thereby, only a certain *Numerical Mode of Sound*; I know not how he can be confuted, but by appealing to every Mans own Ideas. The *Idea of Consciousness* which I have in my Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think I clearly and distinctly perceive to be altogether as different from the *Idea of any possible Numerical Mode of Figure or Motion*, as my Idea of *Scarlet-colour* is different from my Idea of the *Sound of a Trumpet*. If any other

G 2

Person

Person thinks his Idea of *Consciousness*, to be the same with his Idea of a *circular Motion* or of any *other numerical Mode of Motion* ; I conceive there is nothing more to be done, but to permit him to have the pleasure of continuing to think so, as long as he pleases.

The Sum is This. I affirm that *Thinking*, cannot possibly be a mere *Mode of Motion* ; because the Idea of *Thinking* and the Idea of *Motion* or *any of its Modes*, have not the least likeness or affinity between them. This, you say, proves nothing ; because My Idea of *Thinking*, is a mere Chimera ; but Your Idea of it, is the same as your Idea of some *Numerical Mode of Motion*. I reply ; If this proves nothing, then neither can any Argument in the World ever prove any thing. For, Suppose the thing in dispute be, whether a *Square* is a *Circle*, or whether *Blueness* is a *Taste* : I contend this cannot possibly be, because my Idea of a *Square* includes in it nothing of that *Roundness* which is my Idea of a *Circle* ; and my Idea of *Blueness* includes in it nothing like *That Sensation*, which is my Idea of a *Taste*. May not another Person answer, that This proves nothing ? because my Idea of a *Square*, or of *Blueness*, is a mere Chimera ; but His Idea of a *Square*, is the same

same as his Idea of a *round Figure*; and his Idea of *Blueness*, the same as his Idea of some certain *Taste*.

To Conclude. In reviewing this whole Matter, I can hardly persuade my self, but that you have mistaken your own Argument. Some ingenious Persons in the present Age have indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the immediate exercise of his Omnipotence, may make Matter Think; notwithstanding it be impossible that *Thinking* should result naturally, from any Composition or Division of the original Properties of Matter. I suppose they meant, that to Matter disposed in a certain Manner, and put into some particular Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could *Superadd* the Power of *Thinking*. I think the Argument drawn from the Divisibility of Matter, proves that Matter is not a Subject capable of such a *Superaddition*: And if it be not; then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for the making out an Impossibility, is not *magnifying* but *destroying* the Power of God; as indeed all contradictory Apprehensions concerning any of his Perfections, are really and in event destructive of our whole Notion of God; and have no other Effect, than to give profane Men an occasion of scoffing at Religion. How-  
ever,

ever, that Assertion had the appearance (tho' a very false one) of being founded in a certain modest apprehension concerning the Inconceivable Extent of the Divine Power. But that any *Mode of Motion* should be (not a previous disposition or qualification, towards capacitating Matter for the Addition of such a Power; but that it should be) *Thinking it self*; when all the Matter supposed to be in that Motion, is acknowledged otherwise to be *void of Thought*: This is such an Extravagant Absurdity, as may justly cause wonder how it should ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man; especially in an Age, wherein Philosophical Knowledge has received so considerable Improvements.

Having thus particularly answered the Argument wherein you placed your main Strength; It remains that I take notice of some Incidents in your *Reflexions*, wherein I think you have either greatly misrepresented Me, or given very disadvantageous Representations of your own Philosophy.

In the Question, *Whether a System of Matter can have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Consciousness superadded*



to it, or flowing from any Modification of that System ; you said, you understood by a Power of Thinking, only *Actual Thinking*, and not a *Capacity of Thinking*.

I replied, there was no need of making any such Distinction ; because my Argument was of equal force, in whatever since the Term *Consciousness* was understood ; whether to signify the *Capacity of Thinking*, or *Actual Thinking*, or the Reflex Act of being *Conscious that I Think*.

Upon this, you make a long Expostulation, *what occasion I had for contending* <sup>pag. 5:</sup> *with you about the Sense you fixed to the Terms*. I did not contend much about it : But the *Occasion* of saying what I did, was, because in all Questions, the greater Latitude of signification the Terms may be allowed to be understood in, without making any Alteration in the Strength of the Proof ; the clearer and stronger such Proof always is ; and the less perplexity, or room for quibbling, remains in the Question it self.

You ask ; *Have you not understood me* <sup>pag. 5:</sup> *in a Sense that answered all the Ends and Purposes of my Argument ?* My Argument was indeed conclusive in the Sense you understood me in : But I had no reason to approve of your confining me to that Sense only, when the Argument was equally

qually conclusive in any other Sense the Reader might happen to understand the Terms in.

pag. 6.

You say, you *have taken but the same Liberty I allow to every other Reader.* But, if I mistake not, there is some Difference between allowing the Reader to take the Term *Consciousness* in which of the Three forementioned Senses he pleases; and allowing You to confine it to One of those Senses, exclusive of the others.

I affirmed that *the Reader needs not trouble himself with the Nicety of Distinction between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the Reflex Act of Thinking; but may understand Consciousness indifferently in all or any of these Significations.*

pag. 6.

This Sentence, you think, *contains one of the nicest distinctions that ever you met with; being as much as to say, that the Reader need not understand Consciousness indifferently in any of the before-mentioned significations, and yet may understand it indifferently in any of these Significations.* But Where is the *Niceness* (the *Ridiculousness* I suppose you mean) of saying that the Reader *may* take a Word in a Sense, which yet he is not under a *necessity* of taking it in, but *may* likewise take it in some Other Sense if he pleases?

You

You add : *For you cannot See, but that* pag. 6.  
*whoever understands Consciousness in any*  
*One of those Significations, must use that*  
*nicety of Distinction I complain of, whether*  
*he will or no ; For by Restraining Consci-*  
*ousness to any One of those Significations,*  
*he necessarily distinguishes That One from the*  
*other two : And that therefore you must needs*  
*own, you cannot See the least reason I had*  
*to blame you for a needless Distinction,*  
*when I allow you to understand Consciousness*  
*indifferently in three Significations, one of*  
*which you did assign as your meaning or*  
*Idea of that word. But, if you please to*  
*look once again, I suppose you will be*  
*able to See, that there is no absolute Ne-*  
*cessity for him that understands Consci-*  
*ousness in any One of those fore-mentioned Sig-*  
*nifications, to Restrain it to That One Sig-*  
*nification ; as you desired to do.*

Lastly, you allege that *the whole Dis-* pag. 8 &c  
*pute turns upon the present Distinction of* 9.  
*the Significations of the word Consci-*  
*ousness ; And to prove that it does so, you*  
*cite a Sentence out of my Letter to Mr*  
*Dodwell, wherein the word Conscious can-*  
*not be understood in any other Sense,*  
*than to signify actual Thinking. 'Tis true ;*  
*in that Sentence the word was so used ;*  
*And in the very same Sentence it was*  
*also used Otherwise. Now because in*  

H
that

that passage which you made *the Occasion* of our present Debate, I once used the word in such a manner, as that the Nature of the Thing accidentally confined it to that Signification ; though in the more emphatical part of the very same Sentence, it was used in a larger Sense ; Does this prove that *the whole Dispute* now turns upon any Distinction of the Signification of that Word ? You might as well have said, it proves the remotest thing in the World from our present Question. The Sentence it self was This : 'Tis plain, unless Matter were essentially Conscious, — no System of it in any possible Composition or Division can be an Individual Conscious Being. My meaning was, that unless Matter were essentially Conscious, that is, unless it were essentially indued with *actual Thinking* ; it might be proved from its Divisibility, that no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, could ever be an individual Conscious Being, that is, could ever either *actually Think* or attain a *Capacity of Thinking*. How does it follow now from hence, that because in the former part of this Sentence, the word *Conscious* happens to signify only *actual Thinking* ; therefore in the Question, [Whether *Consciousness* can inhere in a System of Matter.] the word

Con-

*Consciousness* may not be understood at large, to signify either *actual Thinking* or a *Capacity of Thinking*? Between which, after all, there is no great Difference at the bottom.

Upon the whole ; why you should be displeas'd with me for allowing the Terms of the Question to be understood in the greatest Latitude, and for endeavouring to prove more than you expected, *viz.* that no System of Matter could either have *actual Thinking*, or so much as any *Capacity of Thinking* ; I could not imagine. And why you made such a Stir about a Distinction, which did and still does appear to me to be very needless ; I could conceive no other Cause, but only that you might *perplex* the Question.

Thus I have given you the *Reason*, you *Demand'd*, of my *Conduct* in this Matter : pag. 8.  
I do not *Demand* of *You*, but leave it to your Discretion, to choose whether you will give any *Reason* of *yours*, or no : For, (if you will give me leave to use your own Expression) I cannot assign a pag. 8.  
*good one for you.*

You ask ; *If the Soul or Principle of* pag. 23.  
*Thinking be Undivided, how can it think*  
*successively, divide, abstract, combine or*  
H 2 *ampliate,*

*ampliate, retain or revive Impressions in the Memory ? and how can it be capable, partly or wholly to forget any thing ?* And the *Corporeity* of the Soul, you think, is further proved experimentally, from our being *tired with contemplating*, as much as with *singing and dancing* ; from the *Reaction of our Thoughts* or of our *Ideas and Words*, mutually exciting each other ; and from the *Forgetfulness of Children and Old People*, upon any *cause that discomposes the Organ*.

To this I answer. The Reason why the Soul or Principle of Thinking, though it self *Undivided* ; yet thinks successively, divides, abstracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impressions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets Things ; is because *The Whole Soul* thinks successively, divides, abstracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impressions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets things : And none of these Phænomena can be explained by the various Acts of the *various Parts of a Bodily Organ* alone.

Our being *tired with Contemplation* ; the mutual *Reaction of our Ideas and Words* ; our *Forgetfulness* that follows upon certain *Defects or Discomposures* of the Brain, &c ; do not prove that the *Soul it self* is a *Bodily Organ* ; but only that it *Acts upon*, and is *Acted upon by*, Bodily Organs ;

gans ; and is assisted by them, as Instruments in its Operations. Experience shows us, that the *Sight* is bettered by good Telescopes, and the *Hearing* by Instruments of conveying Sounds ; but not that those Instruments therefore *Hear* or *See* : That all *Sensation* is bettered by good Organs of Sense ; but not that the Organs themselves are *Sensible* : That *Imagination* and *Memory* depend on the Brain ; But not that the Brain *imagines* or *remembers*. The Organs of the Senses are entirely distinct from one another ; But the Thing which perceives by those different Organs, is One and the Same Thing ; one Thinking Being, which every Man calls *Himself*. And this One Thinking Being, has not some Powers in some Parts, and other Powers in other Parts ; some Actions in some Parts, and other Actions in other Parts ; But all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole ; and All its Actions, are the Actions of the Whole. The Whole Thinking Substance, Sees both the Whole Object, and every Part of it ; The same Whole Substance Hears every Sound, Smells every Odour, Tasts every Sapour, and Feels every thing that Touches any Part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought ; is the Imagination, Will, and Thought,  
of

of that Whole Thinking Substance, which I call *I my self*. And if this One Substance (which we usually stile the *Soul* or *Mind*) has no Parts, that can *Act* separately ; it may as well be conceived to have none, that can *Exist* separately ; and so, to be absolutely *Indivisible*.

I alleged that it is *Absurd* to annex *Consciousness* to so flux a Substance as the *Brain* or *Spirits* ; because if such a Substance could be the *Seat* of that *Consciousness*, by which a *Man* not only remembers things done many years since, but also is *Conscious* that He himself, the same individual Being, was the *Doer* of them ; it would follow that *Consciousness* could be transferred from one Subject to another ; that is, that a *Quality* could subsist without inhering in any Subject at all ; which all rational Men allow to be impossible. To this, you reply ; that in order to retain the *Consciousness* of an *Action*, it is necessary to revive the *Idea* of it, before any considerable *Flux* of *Particles* ; and by reviving the *Idea* of that *Action*, I imprint afresh the *Consciousness* of having done that *Action* ; by which the *Brain* has as lively an *Impression* of *Consciousness*, (though it be not entirely composed of the same *Particles*,) as it had the day after it did the *Action*, or as it has of a *Triangle* or any other

pag. 28,  
& 29.



*new Idea not before imprinted on it. Consciousness of having done that Action, is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into View our Ideas, before they are quite worn out ; which Idea continues in me not only the memory of the Action it self, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then, a recollection of a past Action ; it may hereby be conceived, that a man may be conscious of things done by him, though he has not one particle of Matter the same that he had at the doing of those things ; without Consciousnesses being transferr'd from one Subject to another, in any absurd Sense of those Words. And again : If Matter can know at this Instant, that it* pag. 58. *Thinks ; you can see no reason why it may not remember to morrow what it thinks of to day, though some Particles will be then wanting which it has at present : And if it can remember at all ; then the Memory of things may be continued even after we have lost all the particles of Matter that we had at the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating or imprinting afresh our Ideas before they are quite lost or worn out. But the Fallacy of this Reply, is very evident. For to affirm that new Matter perpetually added to a fleeting System, may by repeated impressions and recollections of Ideas, participate and have communi-*  
*cated*

cated to it a *Memory* of what was formerly done by the *Whole System* ; is not explaining or proving, but begging the Question, by assuming an *impossible* Hypothesis. But supposing it were *possible*, that the *Memory* in general of such or such an Action's having been done, might be preserved in the Manner you suppose ; yet it is a manifest Contradiction, that the *Consciousness* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, should continue in me after my whole Substance is changed ; unless *Consciousness* could be transferred from one Subject to another, in the absurdest Sense of those Words. For to suppose that One Substance should be *Conscious* of an Action's having been done by It self, which really was not done by It, but by Another Substance ; is as plainly supposing an Individual Quality to be transferred from One Subject to another, in the most absurd Sense ; as 'tis plain that *Consciousness* is a *real individual Quality*, and different from bare *general Memory*.

If therefore you will answer, (which is the only possible seeming Evasion in this Case,) that That which we call *Consciousness*, is not a *fixed individual numerical Quality*, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a solid Body ; but a *fleeting transferrible Mode*

*Mode or Power*, like the Roundness or the Mode of Motion of Circles upon the Face of a running Stream ; And that the *Person* may still be the same, by a continued Superaddition of the *like Consciousness* ; notwithstanding the *Whole Substance* be changed : Then I say, you make *Individual Personality* to be a mere *external imaginary Denomination*, and nothing at all in reality : Just as a *Ship* is called the *same Ship*, after the *Whole Substance* is changed by frequent Repairs ; or a *River* is called the *same River*, though the *Water* of it be every day new. The *Name* of the *Ship*, is the same ; but the *Ship it self*, is not at all the same : And the continued *Name* of the *River*, signifies *Water* running in the same *Channel*, but not at all the *same Water*. So if a *Man* at forty years of Age, has nothing of the same *Substance* in him, neither material nor immaterial, that he had at twenty ; he may be called the *same Person*, by a mere *external imaginary denomination* ; in such a Sense as a *Statue* may be called the *same Statue*, after its whole *Substance* has been changed by piece-meal ; But he cannot be *really and truly* the *same Person*, unless the *same individual numerical Consciousness* can be transferred from one *Subject* to another. For, the continued Addition or exciting

I of

of a *like Consciousness* in the new acquired parts, after the manner you suppose ; is nothing but a Deception and Delusion, under the Form of Memory ; a making the Man to seem to himself to be Conscious of having done That, which really was not done by Him, but by Another. And such a Consciousness in a Man, whose Substance is wholly changed, can no more make it Just and Equitable for such a Man to be punished for an Action done by another Substance ; than the Addition of the like Consciousness (by the Power of God) to Two or more new-Created Men ; or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motion of the Spirits in the Brain of each of them respectively ; could make them All to be One and the same individual Person, at the same time that they remain several and distinct Persons ; or make it just and reasonable for all and every one of them to be punished for one and the same individual Action, done by One only, or perhaps by None of them at all.

Mr *Lock* himself, in the very place where he contends that *Consciousness* makes the *same individual Person*, notwithstanding that the *Whole Substance* he supposed to be changed ; acknowledges expressly,

( *Book*

(*Book II. ch. 27. Sect. 13.*) that such a continuation of the *same Consciousness* in a fleeting Substance, would be a *representing That to the Mind to have been, which really never was*; a *representing to One intellectual Substance as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent*; a *representation without reality of Matter of Fact, as several representations in Dreams are*; a *Transferring by a fatal Error from One to Another, That Consciousness which draws Reward or Punishment with it*; a *making Two [or Two Hundred] Thinking Substances, to be but One [Individual] Person*; And leaves it to be considered, how far this may be an *Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting Animal Spirits.*

To say here, that Gods *Justice and Goodness* will not permit him to put any such inevitable *Deceit* upon Men; is nothing to the Purpose. For if it be but *naturally possible* for him to do That, which, upon Supposition of the Truth of your Notion, will be a *plain Contradiction*; this is a certain Demonstration that your Notion is False. And I think it is a *Contradiction plain enough*, to say that Gods impressing permanently upon 1000 Mens Minds, after the manner of the representation of a Dream, the like Consciousness

with that which I find in my own Mind ; would make every One of them to be, not Persons *like* me, but the *same Individual Person* with my self. According to such Reasoning as this, Accidents need not have any necessary Dependence on their Substance : And the same individual Substance may as well be conceived to exist in a thousand places at once, under like Accidents ; as the same *Individuating* Accidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thousand different Substances at once. By which same Subtilty, (as Believing *too much* and *too little*, have commonly the Luck to meet together, like things moving two contrary ways in the same Circle,) all the Absurdities in the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation* may easily be reconciled.

pag. 57.

You deny that we have any *Consciousness* at all, that we continue the *same Individual Being* at different times. If so ; it can be to no great purpose for us to dispute about Any Thing : For, before you receive my Reply, you may happen possibly to be entirely changed into another Substance ; and, the next time you write, may deny that you have any *Consciousness* at all, that you continue the *same Individual Being* who wrote this Remarkable Sentence. But to the Assertion, I answer :

answer : Either Conscioufness proves a Man to be the same Individual Being at different times ; Or else it is a mere Deceit and Delusion ; and by being added in like manner to other Substances, might (as I said) make an Hundred other Men with equal justice liable to the same punishment with himself for any One Individual Action done by Him. But of this more, when I come to speak of the usefulness and importance of the present Argument to the Ends and Purposes of Religion.

You affirmed, that *The Matter, of which* <sup>pag. 29.</sup> *an Egg consists, doth entirely constitute the young One ; and that the Action of Sensation began under a particular disposition of the Parts by Motion : To this I answered ; that so far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Disposition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or entirely constitutes the young One ; that (according to the best Discoveries by Microscopes and in Anatomy) it does not constitute it at all, not so much as the Body of it ; but only serves it for Nourishment and Growth.*

You reply : *If by our Eyes we can perceive* <sup>pag. 31.</sup> *the organized Body of the Animal to be Part of the Matter of the Egg ; no Microscopical Observation can destroy such Matter of Fact, and*

and ~~make~~ *make us See Nothing, where we do See Something.* Now I am very sorry, Sir, to find you in a serious and important Question descend to so extremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For, This is exactly the same thing, as if you should say, that *by your Eyes* you can perceive an inclosed Worm to be *Part of the Matter* of the Nut it feeds on; or that *by your Eyes* you can perceive a Man to be *Part of the Matter* of the House he dwells in.

I called *Gravitation* the *Effect* of the *continued and regular Operation of some Other Being on Matter.* You replied; that *it does not appear, but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God, and is now left to it self to act by those original Powers.* To this I answered; that a *Law or Power, that is to say, a mere abstract Name, or complex Notion, which is no real Being; cannot impel a Stone, and cause it to begin to Move.* You reply again; that you *deny not the necessity of a Being impelling another, in order to cause that Mode of Motion called Gravitation:* That you suppose it to be caused by the *Impulse of Other Bodies:* And, to speak your own Opinion, it seems *Matter of Fact* to You, that the *external Figure and inter-*  
*nal*



nal configuration of the Parts of Matter, are those Powers in Matter, by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies. I did imagine, Sir, when I expressed myself with such brevity in my first Answer, you had been so well acquainted with Natural Philosophy, as not to be ignorant that it has been demonstrated even Mathematically, that Gravitation cannot arise from the configuration and texture of the parts of Matter, and from the circumambient impelling Bodies; because, if it did, it would not be proportionable to the Quantity of Matter or the Solid Content of all Bodies, without any regard to their Superficial Proportion; as we find by Experience it is; seeing all Bodies, of all Textures, and all configurations of Parts, and all varieties of superficial Proportion; [a Bullet, or a Feather, or a piece of Leaf-Gold, or a Sheet of Paper;] descend in *Vacuo* with equal Swiftmess. And if *Material Impulse*, be not the Cause of Gravity; then some Being that is *not Material*, (for *Laws* or *Powers* are nothing but mere empty Words,) must of necessity be allowed to be the Cause of it. But it seems you are, notwithstanding the Force even of Demonstration it self, still of Opinion that

Gravitation

See the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton's *Principia* throughout; and the *Quæries* at the End of the Latin Edition of his *Opticks*.

- pag. 37. Gravitation is *purely owing* to the outward Figure and inward configuration of the parts of Matter, and the impulse of circumambient Bodies. For, drop a pound of Lead, in the Form of a Bullet, from the top of a Tower; and it descends in a very quick space to the ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it broad with a Hammer; and its Tendency downward decreases: Vary the configuration of its Parts by Fire; and it will ascend, instead of descending. Certainly the Reader cannot but be greatly surprized, to meet with such Philosophy as This, in our present Age. For, what has All This to do with Gravitation? or with the Cause of Bodies Tending downward? Has a Pound of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a greater Tendency downward, than under any other Form; because the Air making less Resistance to it when in that Form, suffers it to fall more swiftly? Or when it is beaten out into a *thin Plate*, which is still of a Pound-weight; does its Tendency downward decrease, because the Air making greater Resistance to it when under that new Form its Superficies is enlarged, suffers it now to fall but slowly? You might by the same Philosophy, and exactly with the same Truth, affirm that a *Hundred-pound-weight*, so long as you support

support it with your Hands, has lost its *Tendency downward*, because it does not descend; But, I presume, Experience will easily convince you of the contrary. In like manner; when *Lead* being evaporated by Fire, *ascends* in the Air *instead of descending*, because it is carried upward by the Motion of the Air, which ascends being rarefied with Heat; is therefore its *Tendency downwards decreased*? You might exactly with the same reason have affirmed that a *Pound of Lead* in one *Scale of a Balance*, loses its *Tendency downwards*; whenever a greater Weight in the opposite Scale, forces it to *ascend instead of descending*. The Truth, is plainly This: As a *Pound of Wood*, during the time of its ascending from the Bottom of a Pail of Water towards the Top, is as much a *Pound-weight* added to the weight of the whole Water, as a *Pound of Lead* is, that lies still at the Bottom; and consequently the *Tendency* of the *Wood downwards*, is always the very same, whether it be *ascending* in Water, or *descending* in the Air; So your *Bullet*, whether it falls swiftly in the form of a *Bullet*, or slowly in the form of a *thin Plate*, or falls not at all while it is *supported in your Hand*, or on the contrary *ascends* in the form of *Fume*, (in which case, *It is in the Air*, exactly  
K what

what *Wood* is in the *Water*;) still its *Tendency downward*, that is, its *Gravitation*, continues always the same, without any the least *decrease* or *increase*: Which is the direct *Contradictory* to your *Affertion*. As in *Vacuo* all *Bodies*, of all *Figures*, and all *Textures* whatsoever, actually descend with equal *Swiftnes*; so in the open *Air*, and every where else, their *Tendency downwards*, that is, their *Gravitation*, whether they ascend or descend, whether they fall *swiftly* or *slowly*, or not at all, continues always *invariably* the same; and cannot be *increased* or *decreased* by any change whatsoever, of their *external Figure*, or of the *internal configuration of their Parts*, or of the *circumambient impelling Bodies*. *Gravitation* therefore cannot possibly arise from the *external Figure*, nor *internal configuration of the Parts of Matter*, nor from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; since by no alteration of Any or All of these things, can the *Gravitation* of any *Body* be in the least *increased* or *diminished*; And consequently *Gravitation* is quite another thing, than you seem to have at all thought of, when you *spoke your Opinion* about what *seemed Matter of Fact* to you, and talked of the *Decrease* of a *Bullets Tendency downward*, upon the variation of its *Figure*.

p. 16. 35.

[Whoever

[Whoever will explain *Gravity*, which by Experience is always proportionable to the *Solid Content* of Bodies; must assign such a Cause, as can act upon Bodies in proportion to their *Solid Content*, without any regard to their *Superficial* Proportion; that is to say, such a Cause, as can reach and pénétrate to the very Center of every solid particle of Matter: Which I suppose you will hardly affirm your *circumambient Bodies*, how subtle soever, are capable of doing.]

And not content to have erred so very grossly, in the first Foundation of all Natural Philosophy; you could not forbear professing further, that you *have often* pag. 37. *Admired that Gravitation should be esteemed a matter of such Difficulty among Philosophers*; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an Effect of Matter *in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another*, that you wonder every Body should not see it. I suppose the rest of the World will no less *Admire at You*, for imagining that by so slight an *Admiration* you could at once set aside all the Propositions in that most excellent Book before-mentioned; wherein it is made appear by strictly Mathematical Demonstrations, drawn from the Laws of Motion now agreed on by Mathematicians

*Principia  
Philosophiæ  
Mathematicæ*

and established by Experiments, and from the Phænomena of the Heavenly Bodies ; that the present Operations of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot possibly be Mechanical Effects of *Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another.*

Not much unlike to This, was Mr *Hobbs's* fancying that he had confuted all the Propositions in *Euclid*, by *Admiring* at *Euclid's* Definitions of Lines and Surfaces : And all Men ever since, that understand the first Elements of Geometry, have *Admired* at *Him* for fancying so.

pag. 38 & 39. But that which follows, is still the most wonderful of all. You say: *Whether you take Mr Clarke right or no, the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton* (in the Preface to his *Principia*,) *is of Opinion, that " several " Phænomena of Nature may depend on " certain Forces or Powers, whereby from " Causes yet Undiscovered, the Particles of " Bodies are mutually impelled against each " other, — or recede and are driven from " one another : Which Forces or Powers " being yet unknown, the Philosophers hitherto have attempted Nature in vain.* Now to insinuate to your Reader by such a Citation, that This Great Man is of your Opinion in the present Question ; when on the contrary, the very Sentence you cite,

cite, was spoken by him (as appears from the words immediately preceding those you have cited,) not concerning *Gravitation*, but concerning *Other* more particular Phænomena of Nature, in *express Contradistinction* to those of *Gravitation*; and when in that whole Book, from one End to the other, he is professedly confuting and showing the absolute Impossibility of your Notion of *Gravitation*; and when he has \* elsewhere in *express words de-* \* *Optic.*  
*clared, that by the Terms, Forces and* *pag. 322.*  
*Powers, he does not mean (as You did by Powers originally placcd in Matter by God) to signify the Efficient Cause of certain determinate Motions of Matter, but only to express the Action it self by which the Effect is regularly produced, without determining the immediate Agent or Cause of that Action: After all this, I say, to insinuate to your Reader by the citation of a piece of a single Sentence, that That Great Man is of your Opinion; is (to use your own Expressions once more,) *pag. 8.*  
 such a *Conduct*, as the World may justly *demand a Reason of* from your self; for *I cannot assign a good one for you.**

Lastly: As you declare it to be your Opinion, that *Gravitation* is caused by *Material Impulse*; so you think it Impossible, that it should be owing to any *Im-*  
*material*

*material Cause* : And you believe it to be *as intelligible, that Matter might act without Impulse, by Powers placed in it by God; as that an Immaterial Being should move Matter, without being able to impell it by Contact.*

This Belief of yours is founded wholly upon the Supposition, that there is nothing in the World but *Tangible Substance* ; Which Opinion you give no Reason for ; and therefore it is a *mere Prejudice*. But further : I presume you will hardly deny, but *God himself is an Immaterial Being* ; and that *He can move Matter, though he does not impell it by Contact*. Other *Immaterial Beings* therefore, though they do not *impell Matter by Contact*, yet it does not from thence follow that they cannot move it at all ; Because from *God's moving it*, it is manifest that there are other ways of moving it, besides that of *impelling by Contact*. But *Powers or Laws*, are not real Beings ; They are nothing but mere Words, or Notions ; and can neither act in any Sense, nor move Matter either with Contact or without it. I conceive an ordinary Reader may be able to discern the Difference, between affirming that an *Immaterial Substance*, a real Being, though not hard and solid, may move Matter ; and affirm-



affirming that a *Law* or *Power*, a mere Word or Term of Art, which is really No Thing, and has not truly any Being or Existence, save only in the Imagination, can cause Matter to move.

Upon the Whole ; All that you have advanced in these Sections about *Gravitation*, is such marvellous Reasoning, to be made use of in the present Age, after so many great Discoveries, founded upon Experience, and even Mathematical Demonstration ; that though *I* have no cause at all to be displeas'd with you, for arguing in such a manner ; yet I believe your Readers cannot but think you might very well have forborn going out of your Way, to give so very disadvantageous a Representation of your own Philosophy.

I have been the longer upon this Head, because the true Theory of *Gravitation*, as it has been made out by that excellent Person whom you just now so unfortunately cited, does in its obvious and necessary Consequences, more entirely subvert the very Foundations of all possible Hypotheses, wherewith *Materialists* would undertake to explain the Phænomena of Nature *Mechanically* by the mere Powers of Matter and Motion ; than any Discovery in natural and experimental Philosophy,

Philosophy, that has ever yet been made in Any Age : Showing the *Matter* of the Universe to take up almost an infinitely small and inconsiderable part of that Space, which you suppose to be filled with it ; bearing in truth far less Proportion to it, than a Tennis-Ball does to the Body of the Earth : And consequently, that the great Phænomena of Nature cannot possibly depend upon any *Mechanical Powers* of Matter and Motion, but must be produced by the Force and Action of some higher Principle : And so leading us even with Mathematical Certainty, to *Immaterial Powers* ; and finally to the Author of all Power, the *Great Creator and Governour of the World.*

See Sir  
Isaac New-  
tons Op-  
tics. pag.  
314 &  
346. Lat.  
Edit.

I affirmed, that *there are many Demonstrations, even in abstract Mathematicks themselves, which no Man who understands them, can in the least doubt of the Certainty of ; which yet are attended with difficult Consequences, that cannot be perfectly cleared : As for instance, those concerning the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, and the Eternity and Immensity of God.* In Answer to this, you say that *if there are any such Demonstrations, from whence any Contradictions or Absurdities follow in our way of conceiving things ;*

&c.

*Éc.* And again : *Absurdities and Contradictions, Éc.* And again : *Absurdity, Contradiction, or Disagreement of Ideas ; Éc.*

And again : You require me to prove that any *Absurdity or Contradiction* follows either from the infinite Divisibility of Matter, or from the Eternity or Immensity of God, in our way of conceiving ; and if I cannot, I have no ground, you say, from those Instances, to put Human Nature in such a State of *Scepticism and Absurdity*. Now, by all the Rules of Answering, (to use your own Expression ;) you ought not to have changed my Words, *Difficult Consequences that cannot be perfectly cleared ;* into *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas* : Because *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, are things just as different from *Difficult Consequences of Demonstrated Truths, which cannot be perfectly cleared ;* as *Light* is from *Darkness*. *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, are things already perfectly cleared ; that is, things proved with perfect clearness, to be False and Impossible : But *Difficulties* that cannot be perfectly cleared, may attend things either possibly or certainly True. *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, do with as perfect clearness prove a thing to be False ; as a positive Demonstration proves

a thing to be *True*: And therefore it is absolutely impossible, that they can Both be applied to the same thing; even just as impossible, as that the same thing should at the same time be both *true* and *false*. But *Difficult Consequences that cannot perfectly be cleared*, may be, and very often are, found to attend Things which are Demonstrated to be *True*. The Reason is; because *Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared*, do not (like *Absurdities and Contradictions*) arise from a *Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas*, but barely from the *Defect or Imperfectness of the Ideas themselves*. Our Reason is able to apprehend clearly the Demonstration of the Certainty of the Existence of some Things, where the *Imagination* is not able to comprehend the Ideas of the Things themselves. This is plainly the Case of the *infinite Divisibility of Quantity*, of *Infinity and Eternity* in general, of the *Actions of Immaterial Substances upon Matter*, and of many other Things. Here therefore I have just Cause (if I may use your own Expression once again) to demand a Reason of your Conduct; and to complain that you have greatly departed from that Fairness, for which your former Papers were justly commended.

pag. 2.

And you can still the more hardly be excused in this Matter; because you  
knew

knew I had before expressed my self very particularly and fully concerning the same Thing, in a Book which you your self cite upon another occasion in the very next Page to That wherein you accuse me so wrongfully. My Words were These: (*Demonstrat. of the Being and Attrib. of God, p. 20.*) “ Since in all Questions concerning the Nature and Perfections of God, “ or concerning any Thing to which the “ Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joyned; “ though we can indeed demonstrate certain Propositions to be true; yet it is “ impossible for us to comprehend or “ frame any adæquate or complete Ideas “ of the Manner How the things so demonstrated, can Be: Therefore when “ once any Proposition is clearly demonstrated to be True; it ought not “ to disturb us, that there be perhaps “ perplexing Objections on the other “ side, which for want of adæquate “ Ideas of the Manner of the Existence “ of the Things demonstrated, are not “ easy to be answered. Indeed, were “ it possible there should be any Proposition, which could equally be *Demonstrated* on both sides of the Question, “ or which could on both sides be *reduced to imply a Contradiction*, [*as Some have too inconsiderately asserted;*] This “ it

“ it must be confessed, would alter the  
 “ Case ; Upon this absurd Suppositi-  
 “ on, all Difference of True and False,  
 “ all Thinking and Reasoning, and the  
 “ Use of all our Faculties, would be  
 “ entirely at an End. But when to De-  
 “ monstration on the one side, there are  
 “ opposed on the other, only Objections  
 “ raised from our Want of having adæ-  
 “ quate Ideas of the Things themselves ;  
 “ this ought not to be esteemed a Real  
 “ Difficulty. 'Tis positively and clearly  
 “ Demonstrable, that Something has  
 “ been *from Eternity*: All the Objections  
 “ therefore raised against the *Eternity* of  
 “ any thing, grounded merely on our  
 “ Want of having an adæquate Idea of  
 “ *Eternity* ; ought to be lookt upon as  
 “ of no real Solidity. Thus in other  
 “ the like Instances : 'Tis Demonstrable,  
 “ for Example, that Something must be  
 “ actually *Infinite* : All the Metaphysical  
 “ Difficulties therefore, which arise usual-  
 “ ly from applying the Measures and  
 “ Relations of Things Finite to what  
 “ is Infinite ; and from supposing *Fi-*  
 “ *nites* to be [Aliquot] Parts of *Infinite*,  
 “ when indeed they are not properly  
 “ so, but only as Mathematical Points  
 “ to Quantity, which have no Propor-  
 “ tion at all ; [and from imagining all  
*Infinites*

*Infinities* to be *Equal*, when in things disparate they manifestly are not so ; an *infinite Line*, being not only *not equal to*, but *infinitely less* than an *infinite Surface* ; and an *infinite Surface*, than *Space infinite in all Dimensions* ;] ought to be “ esteemed vain and of no Force. “ Again ; 'Tis in like manner Demon- “ strable, that Quantity, is infinitely Di- “ visible : All the Objections therefore “ raised [by supposing the *Sums Total of all Infinities* to be *equal*, when in disparate Parts they manifestly are not so ; and] by comparing the imaginary *Equality or Inequality of the Number of the* “ Parts of Unequal Quantities, whose “ Parts have really *no Number at all*, “ they all having Parts *without Number* ; “ ought to be look'd upon as weak and “ altogether Inconclusive : &c.

Concerning the *Questions*, Whether Immaterial Substances be extended or not ; *and* Whether, upon Supposition of their being extended, they may not nevertheless be of such a Nature, as not to consist of Parts which (like the Parts of Matter) are themselves every one of them complete distinct Beings, separable, and wholly independent of each other : *Also*, Whether from the Immateriality of  
the

the Souls of Brutes, it follows that they must of necessity be put into an eternal State of Rewards and Punishments : Concerning these Questions, I say, I have nothing further to add ; but only that I think All you have advanced upon these Heads in your *Reflections*, hath been already clearly obviated in my former Papers ; To which therefore I refer the Reader, who, I fear, is already too much tired with Repetitions.

pag. 46 & 61. In the last place, you challenge me to show that my Argument is of *any Use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion*. That it is of the *Greatest Use*, will I suppose easily be granted ; if it be evident that the Notion I am arguing against, is utterly destructive of Religion. And in what respects it is so, I shall give you an Instance or two to consider of ; and so conclude.

1<sup>st</sup> then ; If the *Mind* of Man, were nothing but a certain *System of Matter* ; and *Thinking*, nothing but a certain *Mode of Motion* in that System : It would follow, that, since every *Determination of Motion* depends *necessarily* upon the *Impulse* that causes it, therefore every *Thought* in a Man's Mind must likewise be

† ne-



† *necessary*, and depending wholly upon external Causes ; And there could be no such thing in Us, as *Liberty*, or a Power of *Self-determination*. Now what *Ends and Purposes of Religion*, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of serving, needs no long and nice Consideration.

† See above ; pag<sup>s</sup> 47 & 48.

2dly. If *Thinking*, in a *Man*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or of *any other Quality of Matter* ; it will be but too natural a Consequence, to conceive that it may be only the same thing in all *Other Rational Beings* likewise ; and even in *God* himself. And what a *Notion of God* This would give us, is not difficult to imagine. A Friend of yours has given us a very broad hint, whither This tends ; when he tells us that \* *the greatest Freedom or Liberty we can conceive to belong to ANY BEING*, is such as he there largely explains to be *No Liberty at all*, but *Absolute Necessity*, such as the *Motion of a Watch or Clock* is determined by.

\* *Essay concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions, the evidence whereof depends upon Human Testimony.*  
pag. 47.

3dly, If the *Soul*, be nothing but a *System of Matter* ; and *Thinking*, nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or of *some other Power of Matter* ; the *Doctrine of the Resurrection*, (as I before observed, pag. 66 &c.) will be inconceivable and incredible ; and the *Justice of future Rewards*

and

and Punishments, impossible to be made out. The Notion of the Souls *Immateriality*, evidently facilitates the Belief of a *Resurrection* and of a future Retribution, By securing a Principle of *Personal Individuality*, upon which the Justice of all Reward or Punishment is entirely founded: But if *Thinking* be in reality nothing but a *Power* or *Mode*, which inhering in a loose and fleeting System of Matter, perishes utterly at the Dissolution of the Body; then the restoring the Power of *Thinking* to the same Body *at the Resurrection*, will not be a Raising again of the *same Individual Person*; but it will be as truly a *Creation* of a *new Person*, as the Addition of the like Power of *Thinking* to a new Body *Now*, would be the *Creation* of a *new Man*. For, as God's superadding *Now* to a new parcel of Matter, the like *Consciousness* with what I at this time find in my self, would not make that new parcel of Matter to be the *same individual Person with me*, but only *another Person Like me*; so his superadding That *Consciousness* at the *Resurrection*, to the same particles of Dust, of which my Body was formerly composed; will not be a *Restoration* of the *same Person*, but a *Creation* of a *new one* like me. For, the sameness of the  
senseless

senseless Particles of Dust, 'tis evident from the flux nature of the Substance of our Bodies, is not that which *Now* makes me to be the same Person; and therefore cannot be that, which will, *Then* make me to be so. If my present *Consciousness*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* in the fleeting particles of my Brain or Spirits; this *Consciousness* will be as utterly destroyed at the Dissolution of my Body, as if the very Substance of my Body was annihilated: And it would be just as possible for the *same Individual Person* to be created again, after an *absolute Annihilation*; as to be restored again, after such a *Dissolution*. But now, if the *same Person*, after *Annihilation*, could, by restoring of the same *Consciousness*, be created again; he might as possibly be created again, by addition of the same *Consciousness* to new Matter, even before annihilation of the first: From whence it would follow, that Two, or two Hundred, several Persons, might All, by a Superaddition of the like *Consciousness*, be *one and the same individual Person*, at the same time that they remain *several and distinct Persons*: It being as easy for God to add *my Consciousness* to the new formed Matter of One or of one Hundred Bodies at

this *present Time*, as to the Dust of my present Body at the *Time of the Resurrection*. And no Reason can be given, why it would not be as just at any time, to punish for my Faults a new created Man, to who *my Consciousness* is by the Power of God superadded ; as to punish That Person, who at the *Resurrection* shall by the same Power be new made out of the Dust of my Body, with the same *Consciousness* superadded : It being allowed that *Then*, as well as *Now*, 'tis not the Sameness of the particles of Dust, that makes the *same Person*. But if it was ; yet That would make no difference in this Matter : For, the Particles of Dust, which in the course of twenty years have successively been part of the Substance of my Body, are enough in Quantity to form several Bodies : And if the Addition of a like *Consciousness* with what I now find in my self, to One of those Bodies at the Resurrection, will make *It* to be the same *Individual Person* with *Me* ; the Addition of the like *Consciousness* to Twenty of them, would consequently make every one of them to be (not Persons *like Me*, but) the same *Individual Person* with *Me*, and with *each other* likewise. Which is the greatest Absurdity in the World : An  
Absurdity

Absurdity equal (as I before said) to that of *Transubstantiation*. This inexplicable Confusion, wherewith your Doctrine perplexes the Notion of *Personal Identity*, upon which Identity the Justice of all Reward and Punishment manifestly depends; makes the *Resurrection*, in Your way of arguing, to be inconceivable and impossible; And consequently your Doctrine, (which supposes the Body to be the Whole Man,) is destructive of Religion; leaving no room for Reward or Punishment, but in the present Life only; and consequently giving Men liberty to do every thing for their present Pleasure or Advantage, that can be done with a good Colour, and without being obnoxious to human Laws: Which is the greatest Mischief that can possibly befall Mankind. But if the Soul be, as We believe, a *permanent indivisible Immaterial Substance*, then all these Difficulties vanish of Themselves.

It is here to be observed, that all the Absurd Consequences which I have now (in considering of what Use my Argument is to *Religion*) shown to follow from your Doctrine, with respect to the *Resurrection*; do equally follow from it (as has been before proved) even *without respect to the Resurrection*.

For as it is Absurd to suppose, (which you must do in your Scheme,) that at *the Resurrection* the *same individual Person* can be restored ; merely by the Addition of a *like Consciousness* with that which utterly perished at the Dissolution of the Body, to the Dust of the same Body when recollected again : As this, I say, is plainly Absurd ; because in the same manner twenty other Men formed out of the same Dust, (of which there is quantity enough belonging to every Person that has lived any Number of Years,) may also by an Addition of the like Consciousness become every one of them *That One Same Individual Person*, at the same Time that they remain so many several and distinct Persons : So, without regard to any future Resurrection, there is the very same Absurdity in supposing (as you do,) that a Man *at this present Time*, though he has none of the same Substance belonging to him, may yet, merely by a like Modification of the Motion of his Spirits, continue to be *the same Individual Person* he was twenty years since ; There is, I say, the very same Absurdity in this Supposition, as in the former ; because there is no difference between supposing that any Number of new Bodies at the Resurrection *coexistently*, or any Number of different

ferent Men now living *contemporarily*, or any Number of different Bodies *succeeding* one another in one continued Form by a perpetual uninterrupted Flux of Particles, (which is the thing you contend for;) can be *One and the same Individual Person*, merely by a *like* Modification of the Figures and Motions of their Parts respectively, without having any thing at all *the same* in them.

To the *Propositions* I laid down at the Conclusion of my former Reply, you have objected nothing, but what (I think) is already clearly answered in the foregoing Pages.

F I N I S.

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E R R A T A.

<i>Pag.</i>	<i>lin.</i>		<i>read.</i>
8	1	_____	<i>when</i>
12	9	_____	<i>not so</i>
55	8	_____	<i>Sense</i>

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