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
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Dean *SHERLOCK*'s
CONSIDERATIONS,
Offered to the
Bishop of *BANGOR.*



(Price One Shilling.)

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SOME
CONSIDERATIONS ✓

Occasioned by a
POSTSCRIPT
FROM THE
RIGHT REVEREND
THE
Lord Bishop of *BANGOR*
TO THE
Dean of *Chichester*,
Offered to his LORDSHIP.

By THOMAS SHERLOCK, D.D.
Dean of *Chichester*, Master of the *Temple*,
and Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty. (2)

The SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN PEMBERTON, at the *Buck* and
Sun against St. *Dunstan's*-Church in *Fleetstreet*.
MDCCLXXVII.

(2)





SOME
CONSIDERATIONS

OCCASIONED BY

A POSTSCRIPT from the Right
Reverend the Lord Bishop of
BANGOR, &c.

My LORD,



Received the Favour of your
Lordship's *Postscript* ; and
though I should have been
better pleased to have heard
from your Lordship in any
other Way, yet I shall always
shew a Respect to your Commands in what-
ever Method you think fit to Communicate
A 3 them ;

them ; especially since I have learnt from your Lordship, what *Great Matters* must be *affected* by the Success of your Defense. I am glad, my Lord, your Views are so extended since the Preaching of your Sermon, and that you have now such great ones before you in the Defense of it. Your Lordship tells me, *that every one will see our Agreement more and more plainly every Day* ; and indeed I conceive some hopes of it, from observing how this great Point begins to clear up.

In other Matters the Agreement may be longer a coming , but I am so far from despairing of it, that I give your Lordship this Trouble, in order to promote it, by shewing your Lordship the Reasons why I cannot concur with you in some Doctrines advanced in this *Postscript* ; hoping that they may appear so clear to your Lordship, or be so clearly answer'd by your Lordship, that they may no longer divide us.

In what I have to say, I shall follow the Order and Method of the *Postscript* ; and the rather, that the World may observe the *Labyrinth* in this Case (if any there be) to be of your Lordship's Contrivance, and not of mine.

Your Lordship begins with Complaining,
 “ *That* any Suspicion of your having been
 “ the Author or Encourager of the former
 “ Let-

“ Letter to me (which you assure me you
 “ were not) should have carried me *mani-*
 “ *festly out of my Way*— from my own De-
 “ fense, to bring you and your future De-
 “ fense into my Debate.”

My Suspicions, my Lord, shall make no Part of the Controversy between your Lordship and me. Whatever they were in this Case, they came not into my Answer ; and 'tis only your Lordship's Suspicion, that they are chargeable with *carrying me manifestly out of my Way*.

I am at a Loss to know why your Lordship complains to me that *you were brought into the Debate*. Ask your Friend the Letter-writer the Reason ; 'twas he brought you in, and not I. His Charge was, That my Doctrine was the same with your Lordship's : Was I at Liberty to Answer him, or no ? If I was ; could it be done without considering your Lordship's Doctrine as well as my own ? Was it then going *out of the Way*, to examine the Doctrines which gave Occasion to the Debate, and were the main Subject of it ? As to your *future Defense*, my Lord, I brought it not *into the Debate*, nor was I *diverted by it from the Subject of my own Defense*. Whoever will but look into my Answer, may see, that I said nothing of your Lordship's *future Defense*, 'till I had gone through with my own, and the
 Debate

Debate was over. Your Lordship perhaps may judge that I was not able to defend my self; but you cannot but see that I was not *diverted* from it, to *bring you, or your future Defense into the Debate.*

Your Lordship complains farther in this Paragraph, of my Manner of Writing; and thanks me for directing you *in what Sense you are to understand your own Words.*

As to my Manner, my Lord, 'Tis the common Misfortune of those who have appeared in this Controversy, not to have given Satisfaction in their Manner of Writing: I am sorry 'tis mine; but this may be perhaps *Natura Vitium, non Animi*; Men
 3L 4 must write as they can, or else be silent.
 48 But I shall have Occasion to Resume this Subject before I take Leave of your Lordship, and shall therefore say no more of it here.

As for your Lordship's Thanks for my *Directions in what Sense you are to understand your own Words*; though I should be glad to merit your Lordship's Thanks for any Service I could do you; yet in this, my Lord, you have been bountiful beyond my Deserts. I will do my self the Honour to say, that I am not altogether such a Stranger to your Lordship's Manner of Writing, as not to be able to guess sometimes what is likely to afford you Matter of Complaint.

plaint. I foresaw this Occasion, and took all possible Care to prevent it. I will repeat my own Words, and leave the Reader to judge what Directions I gave your Lordship in this Matter. *I shall shew his Lordship's Opinion from the Sense which his Words SEEM TO ME to carry; not intending hereby to preclude his Lordship from any other Sense or Meaning, which he shall think fit to insist on.* I humbly hope, my Lord, that your Complaint of my Manner in general may be founded on a like Misapprehension of my Design; and that it may be rather my Misfortune than my Fault to be under your Displeasure.

Ans. P. 11.

The Observations which I offer'd upon your future Defense, are grounded upon your own Account of it; and I don't find by any Thing your Lordship has said, that I mistook your Meaning in it. And, pray my Lord, where is the Offence of telling your Lordship before-hand, what you must have been told after the Publication of the Answer; when you would have heard it less patiently? Your Lordship calls this immediately *an Happiness arising from the Delay of your Answer*: How happy your Lordship is in it I cannot tell; but I meant it as an Instance of that Fairness, with which I think all Controversy should be conducted. It would

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serve

serve the Purpose of an Adversary much better, if your Lordship wou'd be pleased to write a Book nothing to the Purpose ; but it would serve the Cause of Truth much worse. I have done you no Injury, my Lord, in telling you what the true Point of the Representation is ; you are still at Liberty to write upon any other Point, and call it too an Answer to the Representation, if you think it proper so to do. The Uneasiness your Lordship expresses at being told the true Point, shews how unwilling you are to come to it, how very loth to part with the noble Subject of Absolute Authority ; an Opinion which, I perceive, your Adversaries must hold, whether they will or no, in order to make way for your Lordship's future Victory and Triumph. This is so necessary, it seems, to your Lordship's Defense, that you cannot in your *Conscience and Judgment*, wholly part with it : Your Judgment I admire ; for 'tis much better for your Lordship to write against Absolute Authority, than against the Point I proposed to you from the Representation ; but that you shou'd find your self at all obliged in *Conscience* to believe the Representation, or those who drew it, to be Maintainers of Absolute Authority, must be ascribed, I presume, to the value you put on those *great Things* which depend on the *Vigor* of your Defence. But your Lordship,

ship, however, promises to regard my *Explications as far as is consistent with the declared Design and Honour of the Committee itself.*

My Design in those *Explications* was very plainly declared ; and yet I see your Lordship has mistaken it, and raised in your self and Readers a strange Idea of the Representation ; and have by my Help (as you imagine) found out, what otherwise *neither you nor the World could possibly have discover'd.* The Honour of the Discovery is your Lordship's own ; I had no hand in it, as I will shew your Lordship when I come to *Pag. 90.* of your Postscript, where your Lordship insults the Committee and me together, and makes us pay too dear in Conscience for *your* Mistake. In the mean time I am prepar'd to bear patiently all the Resentment which shall arise from the *Honour* your Lordship has for the Committee : And when you argue against my *Explications* from *this Topic* ; if I can find *how to distinguish that Part*, I shall be very ready in my Turn to *shew a particular Respect to it.*

We come now to the Merits of the Cause. ³²¹⁰
 And the first Thing I meet with is a *very great Mistake* charged upon my Representation of your Lordship's Sense. Your Lordship has been sparing in your Quotation, and the *very great Mistake* is laid upon very few Words.

You lay it upon me (says your Lordship, pag. 82.) that I write down the Magistrate's Power in all Cases. How does your Lordship prove this to be a Mistake? Why you affirm, Pag. 83, That one natural Consequence from the whole Tenor of your Sermon it self, is, That it is the true and proper Business of the Magistrate, to concern himself with the outward Practice of Virtue, and of every Thing which directly affects the Happiness of Society. And Pag. 85. The Mistake is charged again upon my representing you, as saying, That the Magistrate has no Obligation to reward the outward Practice of what is good for human Society, or to punish the Contrary.

As to the first Passage, my Lord, of writing down the Magistrate's Power in all Cases; if your Lordship had pleas'd to look but Five Lines farther, you wou'd have found those uneasy Words (*in all Cases*) fully explain'd and limited by these, *in all possible Cases of Religion whatever.*] To what Purpose then doth your Lordship say, that you maintain the Magistrate's Power in Civil Cases, when Cases of Religion only are under Debate? To say that your Lordship writes down the Magistrate's Power in all possible Cases of Religion, is so far from being my very great Mistake of your Lordship's Sense, that you are going to assert this Sense of your Doctrine your self, in the fullest Extent.

Extent. Your Lordship teaches in this *Postscript*, That the Laws of Christ are of that Nature, that the Magistrate not only ought not, but in Truth cannot encourage them by Temporal Sanctions: Nay, tho' he should attempt to add Temporal Sanctions to the Laws of the Gospel, yet your Lordship's Meaning seems to be, *Pag. 85. That it is no more adding Sanctions to Christ's Laws than to Mahomet's.* Is not this, my Lord, *writing down the Magistrate's Power in all Cases of Religion?* And why, my Lord, must the same Explication of your Doctrine, be a just and proper Defense of it in your Hands, and a *very great Mistake* and Reproach to you in mine? I beg, my Lord, that we may endeavour to understand one another in this Debate, and not make it necessary to trouble the World at every Turn with an Explication of the most obvious and plain Things.

As to the other Passage, (*pag. 24 of my Answer,*) whether the Consequences charged in it on your Lordship's Doctrine, were in your Thoughts or in your Heart (as you intimate they were not,) I have no where presumed to say; and I will add for your Lordship's Satisfaction, that I verily believe had they been in your Thoughts, you wou'd have guarded better against 'em. + But is it, *3 L 40* my Lord, unfair in Debates of this Nature, to shew the Consequences of a Doctrine which
the

the Writer had not in his Thoughts? Is there a better, or any other way to shew him, to his own Conviction, the Tendency of his Principles, than to set before him the Consequences which are apt to follow from 'em; whether he was aware of them or not, when he taught the Doctrine; and which had he been aware of, perhaps he would not have advanced such Principles? Pray then, my Lord, don't think so hardly of me, as to suppose, that I mean to Charge your Lordship with directly maintaining all the Consequences which I think flow from your Principles: The Argument it self supposes, that I often think otherwise; for when, to shew your Lordship why you ought to dislike your Principle, I shew you such or such a Consequence naturally proceeding from it; I suppose you not to like the Consequence, otherwise it would be a poor Reason why you shou'd dislike the Principle.]

This Cause of Complaint being then removed, it remains only to be consider'd, ³²¹²[whether the Consequences charged on your Lordship's Doctrine do really belong to it or no.

³²¹³ Your Lordship's having affirmed, that to ⁴⁴add Temporal Sanctions to *Religion, considered as Virtue and Charity, under the Belief of a Supreme Governor and Judge, is to act Contrary to the Interests of true Religion,*

Religion, as it is plainly opposite to the Maxims upon which Christ founded his Kingdom; gave me Occasion to say, pag. 23, 24. “ Does not the Practice of Virtue and
 “ Charity take in every Thing that af-
 “ fects the Happiness and Well-being of
 “ Mankind in this World? And is this no
 “ Concern of the Magistrate’s? Because Vir-
 “ tue and Charity, and the contrary Vices
 “ shall be rewarded and punished hereafter,
 “ Must the World be torn in Pieces in
 “ the mean while without Remedy? And
 “ will it be sufficient for the Magistrate to
 “ say, when he is called upon to punish
 “ the Offences against Virtue and Charity;
 “ This is Religion; these are Laws of
 “ Christ; he has annex’d Rewards and
 “ Punishments to them hereafter, and I will
 “ have nothing to do with them”?

How now does your Lordship^{3 L 14} shew the great Mistake of this? Why, by giving up, I think, all that you have been contending for, by shewing the World that Part of your Sermon was spent in Condemning a Practice, which now, it seems, no Man can practise; which ’tis absolutely impossible any one should. Your Lordship now teaches, that^{3 L 15} since the Laws of Christ require an *outward Practice, conducted by the inward Sincerity of Belief, and the Motives of Religion;*
 and

3215 and the Magistrate cannot judge of the inward Sincerity and Motives : All he can do is to add Sanctions to the outward Practice, considered as affecting Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will : And you add, pag. 85. *It is no more adding Sanctions to Christ's Laws than to Mahomet's. This same outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain glory, or any Worldly Motive, is so far from being Christ's Law, that it is disown'd by him in the Gospel ; and yet it is the Law of Man, as it is the same material Action useful to Society. But it is Religion and Christ's Law solely, as it is practis'd upon a Principle of Religion, and a Sense of Duty. And the Magistrate in adding Sanctions to it, does not add Sanctions to a Law of Christ, but to a Law of Men.*

If this be the Case, that 'tis impossible in the Nature of the Thing, that Temporal Sanctions shou'd be added to the Laws of Christ, what Occasion was there for your Lordship to tell the World, how contrary it is to the Interests of true Religion to add 'em ? 'Tis altogether as reasonable to exhort Men not to Fly, as not to add Rewards and Punishments to the Laws of Christ, if it be as impossible to add Rewards and Punishments to the Laws of Christ, as it is to Fly. This is the Position

* your Lordship is now advancing; you distinguish between Virtue and Charity as required by Christ, and as it can be required by the Magistrate. Tho' both shou'd require 'em in the same Words; and tho' the Magistrate should declare it to be his Intention to promote Obedience to the same Law, yet the same Law wou'd not be one but two; 'tis Christ's Law in the Gospel, but if it gets into the Statute-Book, 'tis as much *Mahomet's Law as Christ's Law.* And thus your Lordship having proved that Temporal Sanctions cannot be added to the Laws of Christ, has proved at the same Time that the Sermon which was preached to shew that they ought not to be added, has no Meaning at all. To what Purpose does your Lordship argue from the Nature of Christ's Kingdom, of his Rewards and Punishments, from his being *sole King and sole Judge*, against the Use of Temporal Rewards and Punishments? Was all this to shew how unlawful it is to do a Thing, which, it seems no body can do? Whoever compares the Principles laid down in the Postscript, in order to the Defense of your Sermon, with the Doctrines taught in the Sermon it self, will be apt to conclude, that the Principles are of later date than the Doctrines; for no body can think that your Lordship speaks in the Sermon, as one who taught

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that

that Temporal Sanctions *could not* be added to the Laws of the Gospel.

32¹⁶ If this Principle holds, the Magistrate may put all the Laws of Christ into his Code, and yet be no Encourager of Religion; for they cease to be Laws of Religion as soon as they come there. By the same Reason, the Magistrate can no more discourage Religion, than he can encourage it; for if the Nature of Religion be such, as not to be within Reach of Temporal Sanctions, the Consequence is, that 'tis no more in the Magistrate's Power to hurt it, than 'tis to cherish it; he can no more oppress it, than he can advance it: And if so, I hope your Lordship will never more complain of Civil Sanctions, as *contrary to the Interest of true Religion, or as opposite to the Maxims of Christ*; but will give us leave to enjoy the Security we think we have from the Laws; and then perhaps the World may soon see that Agreement in this Matter, which your Lordship foretells.

32⁶ I observe, that your Lordship throughout this Argument calls an Action a Law — *Because the same Action is a Law of Christ, Pag. 82. — This same good Action — is not a Law of Christ, or Edict of his Kingdom, Pag. 84. and elsewhere. I always understood a Law to be a Rule of Action,*
and

and not the Action it self; but 'tis not^{3 L 51} for nothing that your Lordship has chosen to speak in this Manner. When you found it necessary to make the same Law, as enacted by Christ, and as encouraged by the Magistrate, two different Laws; 'twas time to leave the old Way of calling a Law the Rule of Action; for that one Law^{28,9} shou'd make two different Rules of Action, *i. e.* that it shou'd be the same Rule, and not the same Rule, was too Knotty a Point to be explained. But your Lordship found that the Law being the same, yet there was a difference often in the Obedience paid to it, with Regard to the Magistrate, and the Obedience required by God: Upon this Difference your Lordship distinguishes the Law into two; and then indeed it was necessary to call the Action the Law, for it could be no longer a Rule. You could not, my Lord, be ac-^{3 L 28,30}curate in your Language, if you wou'd humour your Principle. There is a Reason and Philosophy, even in Language, which some Doctrines cannot bear; as your Lordship will find, when you endeavour to justify your Expression, or to support your Doctrine without it.

This Principle being intended for the Ground-Work of your Lordship's Answer to one Main Article of the Representation, I beg that I may have leave to examine it, without incurring the Imputation of so much

Arrogance, as the setting up to be your Lordship's *Director* implies.

The Doctrine is thus set down by your Lordship, Page 83. *I think it is plain, — that the very same individual outward Action, whether practis'd upon the meanest Principle of Human Life, or upon the best, is equally the Object of the Magistrate's Care, as it equally affects Society; but that this same good Action, or outward Practice of Virtue is not Religion, not a Law of Christ, nor an Edict of his Kingdom, any otherwise than as it is practis'd upon a Principle of Religion, and upon the inward sincere Belief of a Judgment to come. Of this the Magistrate is not a Judge. His Sanctions therefore, consider'd as a Magistrate, are no more than the Sanctions of Human and Social Laws.*

To make this clear, your Lordship gives the Instance of Charity, and supposes it to be encouraged by the Civil Magistrate; upon which Supposition you argue thus: *This, I say, is only annexing Sanctions to an outward Practice, good and beneficial to Human Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will. It is no more adding Sanctions to Christ's Laws than to Mahomet's. This same outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory, or any Worldly Motive, is so far from being Christ's Law, that it is particularly disown'd by him in the Gospel:*

Gospel: And yet it is the Law of Men, as it is the same Material Action, useful to Society. But it is Religion and Christ's Law solely, as 'tis practis'd upon a Principle of Religion, and a Sense of Duty. And the Magistrate, in adding Sanctions to it, does not add Sanctions to a Law of Christ, but to a Law of Men.

These Passages contain your Lordship's Reasoning on this Point; I shall speak but briefly to it now, expecting a fuller Account of this Principle in your intended Answer. And,

First, It is not true, that outward Actions, as they affect Society only, are the Matter of Human Laws.

Secondly, This Account given by your Lordship, divests the Civil Magistrate and his Laws of all Moral Rectitude. 3 L 312.

When your Lordship speaks of the *very same individual outward Action*, as practis'd upon the best, or the meanest Principle of Life; I suppose, you do not intend the same *Numerical Action*, (as the Words import;) for the same *Numerical Action* cannot be consider'd as proceeding from the best and the worst Disposition; for it cannot proceed from both: I suppose therefore, your Lordship means outward Actions materially

rially the same with the outward Actions required by the Laws of Christ ; and these, you say, are the only proper Matter of Human Laws, without any Regard to the inward Principle or Disposition from which they arise. 7

Outward material Actions consider'd meerly in themselves, have nothing in 'em to denominate 'em either Good or Bad ; and therefore so consider'd, they cannot be Matter of any Law. Your Lordship is sensible of this ; and therefore having discarded with respect to the Civil Laws, the Principles of Morality, and the Gospel, by which Actions are distinguish'd ; you introduce the *Good of Society*, as the *sole* Principle of distinguishing Material Actions in the Eye of the Civil Law. Allowing this for the present, yet it will not serve your Lordship's Purpose, to shew, that the Magistrate is concern'd with outward Actions only, without Regard to the inward Principle. For I ask, upon what the Enquiry is founded in Criminal Cases, whether the Thing was done *animo proditorio*, or no ? If this be a proper Enquiry, it must terminate in judging of the Man's Disposition, and the Motives upon which he acted ; and if so, outward Actions are not the sole Matter of Civil Laws, tho' we shou'd allow the Good of Society to be the only Good they regard. *In maleficiis*
Volun-

Voluntatem spectari non Exitum, is a Maxim of the Roman Law, and, I believe, of every Civil Law in the World; and if this *Voluntas* (Intention) be the Chief Thing regarded by the Law in such Cases, how comes your³ Lordship to teach, that outward Actions, without Regard to the Intention, are the only Object of the Magistrate's Care? There is nothing better known in our own Law, than the Difference between Murder and Manslaughter: The outward Action is the same in both Cases; the Publick Good is equally affected in both Cases by the loss of a Subject; and it may happen to be more affected in the Case of Manslaughter than of Murder, by the loss of a more useful and valuable Subject in this Case than in the other. Whence then does the Difference arise? Why even from that very Thing which your Lordship says the Law can take no Notice of, the Intention and Motives of the Action. For this Reason, Indictments charge the Criminal not only with the outward Action, but with *Malice*, with acting by *the Instigation of the Devil*, and *not having the Fear of God before his Eyes*. Strange Language for a Court to use, that has no Right, nay, no Possibility of enquiring after the *Malice*, no Pretence to examine whether the Man had the fear of God or not before his Eyes. Why should not

not every Criminal plead in such Circumstances, that he is *Coram non Judice*, and vouch your Lordship's Authority to justify his Plea? 'Tis true, that inward Motives are not subject to the Magistrate's Power, but as they are manifested by outward Actions: But then 'tis so far from being true, that outward Actions, as they affect Society, are the only Matter of the Law, the only Object of the Magistrate's Care; that indeed the outward Action is rarely consider'd but as an Indication of the inward Disposition; and upon the Disposition so manifested, the Judgment is form'd. In Trials for Treason, the *Overt-Act*, *i. e.* the outward Action, is not the principal Treason, but the Proof of it; and pray, my Lord, what is that Treason which is distinct from the *Overt-Act*, and which yet is made manifest by it? Consider the Case of the betrothed Damsel, in *Deut. xxii.* If she lies with a Man in the City, both Man and Woman die; if in the Field, the Man only dies; the Reason is, because in the City she must be supposed consenting, since Help was near if she had called; in the Field she might call and have no Help: But the Man in both Cases must be wickedly disposed. Is it the outward Action in this Case, that is the Matter of the Law, or the Magistrate's sole Care? For this Law, though given by
 3 God,

Judgment upon the Intention of the Offender : And I hope your Lordship will not say, that as often as a Man is accused of Murder, so often the Magistrate invades the Prerogative of God, and sets up to be a Discerner of Hearts. This is a very plain Case, my Lord, and to be determin'd by Sense and Experience : And let the World judge, whether there is such a Thing as knowing the Difference between an honest well-meaning Man, and a Criminal : And I only desire, that every Man who thinks himself a Judge in this Case, wou'd allow the Magistrate to have as much Understanding as himself, and to be as capable of judging as he is.

^{3 L 35} The Truth of the Matter, I conceive, ^{3 L 25} lies here. Nothing can be the Matter of a Civil Law, which the Civil Magistrate cannot judge of : The Civil Magistrate cannot judge of Internal Motives and Dispositions, but by the Means of External Actions : And therefore the Motions of the Heart, before they break out into Action, are exempted from his Jurisdiction. And farther, Outward Actions, and their Circumstances, being the only Indications of the Inward, which the Magistrate has to judge by ; as long as the Outward Actions are such as they ought to be, supposing the Intention right ; he has no Concern to enquire

quire whether the Intention be otherwise :
 And therefore if Men act as if they were
 honest, he has no Reason to look any far-
 ther.] Now all this amounts to saying, that
 the Magistrate ought not to judge of the
 Internal Disposition, where there are no In-
 dications from which he can judge, or not
 sufficient. * But it will never prove, that the
 Magistrate has nothing to do with Internal
 Dispositions ; because where there are suffi-³⁴⁵
 cient Indications to judge by, the Reason
 limiting his Power ceases. The Case of the
 Magistrate is, in many respects, like that of
 a Physician, who can see nothing but the
 outward Symptoms of a Distemper ; but
 yet 'tis his Business to judge by them, what
 inward Part is affected, and how. He can-
 not see the Inwards ; but shou'd any one
 say, that the outward Appearances are the
 Sole Objects of the Physician's Care, he
 would not get much Credit by his Ac-
 count of the Profession. Redness and Pale-
 ness, as they are mere outward Appearances,
 fall under the Care of such Gentlemen as
 deal in Beauty-Washes ; but they are con-
 sider'd by Physicians, as Effects leading to
 a Discovery of the inward Evil, which to
 remove is their proper Care and Business.
 In like manner, the Magistrate sees only the
 External Action ; but shou'd he confine his
 Judgment to that only, he wou'd dwindle
 D 2 into

3L35¹⁰² into a mere State-Mountebank, and his Laws wou'd be mere Beauty-Washes, intended only to make People look well, whether they are in Health or no: And therefore all Magistrates, that I ever read or heard of, do consider External Actions, not merely as such, but as Symptoms and Indications of the internal Disposition. And since all the World evidently makes this.

3L102 Use of outward Actions; why the Magistrate only must be necessarily blind, and obliged to have less Understanding than any of his Subjects, (when in Reason he ought to have more) is a Secret, which those who have dealt in Politicks hitherto, have not been able to discover.

3L37 The Thing which seems to me to have carried your Lordship into this Notion; is your considering the Magistrate, as annex-
 3L76 ing positive Rewards to Good Actions;
 3L38 which is rarely the Case; and the very
 3L60 Attempt to do it, would be in most Cases
 3L absurd and ridiculous.] *The Civil Magi-
 389 strate encourages Virtue, even as it is bene-
 767 ficial to Society, by punishing Offences
 against it; he encourages Sobriety, by pu-
 nishing Drunkenness; Religion and Piety,
 by punishing Irreligion and Prophaneness;
 Obedience to his Laws, by punishing Dis-
 obedience. * If Men do well, the Magistrate
 looks upon 'em as doing their Duty, in vir-
 tue

tue of the Obligations they are under, and not as having a Right to be paid by him for their Goodness or Religion.] And tho' Men who by a Course of well doing, arrive to a Reputation of Virtue, are often called out and distinguished by the Favour of the Magistrate; yet such Favour is bestowed freely, and is the Effect of the Governor's Judgment and Beneficence, and not the Execution of a positive Law which has ascertained no Reward. And therefore your Friend the Letter-Writer, in asking the Question, whether the Magistrate may say, (by a Law to that Purpose) *Whosoever loves the Lord, as Christ has required, shall have a Thousand Pounds*; has shewn that he is very capable of writing a Book upon a Subject he does not understand. Whether it was this Qualification that recommended him to your Lordship for a proper Second in this present Dispute, is more than I can affirm; but if it was, your Lordship has made a happy Choice.

The Reward which those that do well, entitle themselves to from the Civil Magistrate, is Peace, Protection; and Impunity; all which they forfeit as soon as they do ill: And therefore when your Lordship speaks of the Magistrate's rewarding particular good Actions by a particular Reward, you argue from a Case that has little Foundation in Fact or

Rea-

Reason.] Did you ever hear of a Man that was put upon his Tryal in order to be rewarded for his Sobriety or Chastity? No, my Lord, the Courts of Justice have nothing to do with a Man till he has offended, or is supposed to have offended against some Law. And this is the Reason why the Magistrate does not enquire into the Motives of good Actions, because he is not obliged to make particular Enquiry after good Actions themselves; they carry their own Reward with them; they secure to the Doers of them the Protection of the Government, from which none are or ought to be excluded, but those who do ill. St. Paul exhorts, *1 Tim. Ch. 2. That Supplications, Prayers, Intercessions, and giving of Thanks, be made for Kings, and for all that are in Authority*: Not that we may get an 100 l. a-piece for our Godliness and Honesty; but *that we may lead a quiet and peaceable Life in all Godliness and Honesty*. Peace and Quiet are the proper and natural Rewards which attend on the Subjects Obedience: For the natural Right to a Place at Court is, I assure your Lordship, a very new Notion. Were the Case to be what your Lordship supposes, that Men were to claim for their good Actions particular Rewards; the Magistrate wou'd as necessarily be to enquire into the Motives of good Actions, as he now enquires into the Motives of evil ones. For why should the Magistrate distinguish in an Offender's Case by the Intention

tention which attended the Action ; and not distinguish in like Manner upon Actions seemingly good ? Does not the Intention equally affect both Cases ; and is it not possible to know it sometimes in one as well as the other ? Why then, my Lord, shou'd it be consider'd in one, and not in the other ? Were the Magistrate to pay a Thousand Pounds for a good Action, he would consider whether it was good or no : Unless your Lordship thinks that in such a Case he ought to make no difference between Virtue and the Pretences to it, between sincere Obedience and Hypocrisy.

The Authority of Scripture appeal'd to by your Lordship must be consider'd. You cite *Romans 13th*, and tell us that the Sanctions of the *Roman* Magistrate there described by *St. Paul*, are not the Sanctions of Christ's Laws. And what then my Lord ? The Magistrate, you say, who *knew nothing of Christ*, who *was an Enemy to the Edicts and Laws of Christ's Kingdom*, did not add Sanctions to Christ's Laws. Will it follow from hence, that the Magistrate who does know him, who *loves his Laws, and Edicts*, cannot add Sanctions to 'em ? If not, to what Purpose is this Instance brought ? But, my Lord, *St. Paul* requires Obedience to some Laws also relating to Government, in the 13th to the *Romans*. They too were the *Roman Governor's*

vernor's Laws; are they then become Laws of Christ or not? If you say not; you must affirm, that the Laws enjoined by *St. Paul*, are not Laws of Christ: If you say they are, then the Magistrate's Laws may be the Laws of Christ, and by Parity of Reason Christ's Laws may be the Magistrate's Laws.

3rd Q^{ty} Is there any Difference in this Case, between the Laws of God and of Christ? The *Roman* Governor's Laws were not Laws of Christ, consider'd under the Formality of Christ's Laws; but many of 'em were Laws of God: Unless your Lordship will affirm, that the Moral Law is not the Law of God; or that the *Roman* Magistrate encouraged no Part of the Moral Law by his Sanctions: For if he did, the Difficulty returns upon your Lordship, and you must shew that the Moral Laws encouraged by the Civil Magistrate, are not the Laws of God, any more than the Laws of Christ, when attended with Temporal Sanctions, are in your Lordship's Opinion the Laws of Christ.

The Instance your Lordship make use of to illustrate your Doctrine, is, in my Opinion, a very unhappy one. Charity in the limited Sense of it, as it signifies relieving the Wants of others, is the Instance; and you were directed to it, you say, because I had mention'd it: I don't remember I did, any otherwise than by repeating your Words;

Words: However, I am sure the Account which follows of Charity is entirely your own; I lay no Claim to any part of it. Your Lordship says, *The outward Action of distributing Money, or Necessaries, which may supply the Wants of others, let it be upon what Principle it will, goes under the General Name of Charity.* Indeed, my Lord,^{3 L⁵¹} this is great News; I never before heard that giving Money upon what Motive soever was Charity: I never thought that bribing Poor Electors in Corporations was Charity (tho' the Money so given may supply their Wants,) in any Sense, either Moral, Civil, or Christian. Besides, what can this Instance signify to your Purpose? You were to produce an Instance of a Law of Christ encouraged by the Magistrate; and to shew how it ceased to be the Law of Christ: In order to this, you so define Charity, that 'tis no longer a Law of Christ, and then you suppose the Magistrate to encourage it; and, as if the Business was done, you say,^{3 L⁵²} Look ye now, is this a Law of Christ? No, my Lord, barely giving Money is no Law of Christ, whether encouraged by the Magistrate or no: And therefore 'tis not the Magistrate's encouraging of it, that makes it cease to be a Law of Christ. So that this Instance is begging the Question; you first suppose the Magistrate

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to encourage a Law, which is not a Law of Christ, and then you prove that the Law so encourag'd is not a Law of Christ.

Soon after, your Lordship says, — *This same outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory, or any Worldly Motive, is not a Law of Christ: And yet it is the Law of Men, as it is the same material Action useful to Society.* This, my Lord, to my Apprehension, amounts to saying, that the same Action (so your Lordship speaks) is and is not the Law of Men. What was you to prove, my Lord? Why, that the same Law as enacted by Christ, and as enacted by Men makes two different Laws: Your Lordship then must speak of the same Law; what is it then which you deny to be the Law of Christ? Why, *Charity*, you say, *proceeding from Vain-glory*: Of this you say, (for your Argument requires you to speak of the same Law) *It is a Law of Men*, i. e. *Charity proceeding from Vain-glory is a Law of Men*; and yet you add, *as it is the same Material Action*, i. e. not consider'd as proceeding from Vain-glory, it is the Law of Men. And what now does all this amount to? If Human Laws shou'd encourage a sort of Charity which the Gospel has not encouraged; then, it seems, these two Charities

rities wou'd not be the same. And what then ?

But if your Lordship means (as I suppose you did) that the same outward Action, which the Law of Christ requires as the Effect of inward Motives, may also be required by the Magistrate, 'tis very true : But still the Instance is not to the Purpose, unless it be Charity to buy a good Bargain, to give so much Money for so much Honour, &c. which is just such Charity as Men go to Market with every Day. * The Reason, my³ Lord, why the outward Act in this Case wou'd not be Charity, is not because the Laws of Christ cannot be encouraged by the Civil Power ; but because in the Nature of the Thing there is a difference between giving and selling.] To give freely, is Charity ; to give upon View of Honour, &c. is Merchandize ; and so it wou'd be, my Lord, were there no such Law as the Law of Christ in the World. How this Instance then shews, that the Laws of Christ cannot be encouraged by the Magistrate, is hard to be conceived, since the Case would be the same had the Gospel never been published.

But do you not see, my Lord, that this Instance is in it self improper ? You propose the Reward of Charity in the general Terms of Honour or Advantage ; let the Advantage then be specified, be it Ten, or (as your Friend

has put it in another Case) a Thousand Pounds; What wou'd the Consequence be?
 3251 Why such a Law wou'd necessarily fall into Stock-Jobbers Hands; and as the Government paid well or ill, so Charity wou'd be sometimes near Par, sometimes much below it: And if your Lordship wou'd allow it to be Charity to give all a Man is worth, every Man wou'd soon be worth all which the Law proposes as a Reward; for if he was worth less than the Reward of the Law; why shou'd he not part with all, to be worth more, even as much as the Reward of the Law amounts to? In all Events the Government wou'd have a hard Bargain; no body, for the Sake of the Reward, wou'd give all the Reward was Worth; so that the Publick would lose in every Instance.

Your Lordship may do with this Argument as you think fit. I have but one thing to beg of you, that I may not, for having mention'd Stock-Jobbers (as once before I unhappily mention'd Locks and Bolts) be represented as a mere Broker the next Time your Lordship or your Second set Pen to Paper.

3254 2dly, This Account given by your Lordship, divests the Civil Magistrate and his Laws of all Moral Rectitude.

What

What your Lordship teaches (the Words ³²⁵⁴ have been already produced) amounts to this : " That the Magistrate, in the Execu-
 " tion of his Laws, concerns himself only
 " with *outward Material* Actions, without
 " any View or Regard to inward Motives
 " and Principles.

Now outward material Actions, without Regard to inward Motives, have neither Virtue nor Vice in 'em ; and therefore he who looks no farther than to the outward Action only, has no Respect to Morality ; and this, in your Lordship's Account, is the Magistrate's Case. The mere outward Action is so perfectly void of Virtue or Vice, that the same Action may be either, as it proceeds from different Motives. He that cuts your Throat with a Design to Murder you, is a Villain ; he that does it with an intent to lance a Tumour, and to save your Life, does a Work of Friendship and Charity : Not but that in both Cases the outward Effect may be the same, and a Life lost ; for many a Man dies under such an Operation : What now must the Magistrate do ? Shall the Villain and the Friend both be hang'd, or both rewarded ? For he who judges only of outward Material Actions, without regarding inward Motives, must deal alike with both ; and cannot consider the Morality of the Action in one Case, or the

the other. In this Instance then there is not room for Reason, Equity, or Justice, without taking in those Considerations which your Lordship has expressly excluded. I know your Lordship calls the outward Action *a good Action, and the outward Practice of Virtue*, Pag. 84. but for what Reason you call it so, your Lordship only knows; for if any Thing be certain, this is, that there is no outward Practice of Virtue independent of inward Motives and Principles. Man is a Moral Agent, in consequence of the Reason and Understanding given him by God; and as such only, he is subject to Laws, and has therefore a Right to be govern'd by Laws of Reason: Unless it may be supposed that Men, in consequence of their Reason, are subject to Laws which have no Reason in them. We are told in Holy Writ, that *he who Rules over Men must be just*; because their being capable of Justice, is the only Reason that makes 'em subject to Rule. But a Law regarding outward Actions only, is no Rule of Justice or Reason; and therefore cannot be a proper Direction for a Moral Agent, nor a proper Law for Men. But, as your Lordship has stated the Case, the Civil Law commands only outward Actions, not regarding inward Motives; the Magistrate judges of such only: And since no Man is bound by a Law to more than the
Law

Law and Lawgiver require, the Subject is likewise bound to outward Actions only; which having in them nothing to denominate 'em Moral, 'tis evident that neither Law nor Magistrate in commanding, nor Subjects in obeying, have any Views or Ties to Morality.

Your Lordship rightly observes, that the outward Action may be attended with Effects beneficial to Society, though with respect to the Agent there be nothing to denominate it good; (as in the Case of Charity ³²⁵¹ upon Motives of Vain-glory, as stated in the Postscript.) This Aptness in the Action ³²⁵⁵ to serve the Publick Good, gives it a due Perfection, with respect to the Magistrate, ⁶ as your Lordship teaches. ¹⁰³ For this Action, you say, is the Law of Men; this the Magistrate ought to encourage, and to look no farther. If this be so, 'tis evident that the Civil Law respects only a *relative* Goodness in Human Actions, with regard to the *Publick*; but has no Concern for the *Real* or *Moral* Goodness of any Action. And this indeed comes up to the Doctrine of the Sermon, that no Temporal Rewards or Punishments ought to attend upon Religion consider'd as *Virtue and Charity*: For Virtue and Charity are not the meer Effect of an outward Action; which Effect being the only Consideration before the Magistrate in the

the dispensing Rewards and Punishments, 'tis plain they can never be applied to Virtue and Charity. But I put it to you, my Lord, to consider, whether the Magistrate ought to reward an Action which he knows to proceed from Envy, Malice, Lust, or any other inordinate Affection, because it happens to serve some good Purpose of the Publick? If he ought not, then 'tis plain, that whenever he does, he is mistaken; but if he ought, 'tis as plain that he ought to reward and encourage Vice, if he can make it useful to Society. Chuse which you will, the one is inconsistent with your Doctrine, the other with the Sense and Reason of Mankind. For if the Magistrate does what he ought not, when he rewards an Action evil in it self, how beneficial soever it may be to Society; the Consequence is, that 'tis his proper Business, and shou'd be his Care to encourage real Virtue; and then I hope the Laws of Christ may come under his Protection. But if you allow him to reward an Action evil in it self, whenever it proves, or can be made useful to the Publick; your Lordship's Divinity will outdo *Machiavel's* Politicks, and justify such Practices as I'm persuaded you hate and abhor.

Your Lordship builds upon a Notion too common among some modern Writers, 'That 'tis the Magistrate's Office to take Care of the Publick

Publick Good only. Whether this Definition or Description be perfect, it matters not to enquire ; since, I believe, you will hardly find one of any Reputation, who has made that Use of it which your Lordship and your Friend have made. They consider Religion as that which chiefly affects the Publick Good, and is consequently a necessary Part of the Magistrate's Care ;] but now, it seems, material Actions only affect the Publick Good, and the Magistrate has nothing to do with Religion. This Opinion is so new, that *Grotius* tells us, all the Writers of any Note upon this Subject were of a different Mind : *Omnes denique qui de Re-publica aliquid lectu dignum Scripsere, hoc jus in Sacra non partem tantum summi imperij, sed etiam potissimam atque precipuam vocant.* And 'tis worth your Lordship's observing, with how much Care the Heathen Moralists laid the Foundation of Civil Society in the Principles of Religion, and a due Regard to the Honour of God ;] and what Pains some Christian Politicians have taken to make Religion,] and a Regard to the Honour of God, unnecessary to the Being or Well-being of Civil Government.] As if no Account were to be made of those many Passages in Scripture, which threaten an irreligious Nation with Destruction ; with giving them up into the Hands of their

F Enemies,

Enemies, and making them become the Scorn
 of the Earth. If these are not vain Words,
 then surely the Magistrate is concerned, even
 as he tenders the Good of the Publick, to
 guard the Honour of God and Religion a-
 gainst the Insults of Prophane Mockers ;
 325 and ought to look upon a Man who labours
 to propagate Impiety, and a Contempt of
 Things Sacred, as a worse Enemy to the
 State, than the poor Rogue who robs on
 the Highway.] But if Religion has no In-
 fluence on the Publick Happiness, farewell
 the Bible, for that has taught quite another
 326 Doctrine. If your Lordship would consult
 the Sacred History, rather than the Imagi-
 nary State of Nature, of which our late
 Systematical Politicians are so full, you
 would see Reason perhaps to alter your Mind.
 I wish your Lordship, when you next sit
 down to take Care of the World, and to form
 Principles of Government for all Nations
 and Kindreds, and People ; instead of con-
 sidering the State of a Fairy World, would
 permit *Noah*; the Second Father of Man-
 kind, to attend at your Council-Board ; and
 would ask him how he instructed his Sons
 in the Duty of Government : You might
 reasonably suppose him to answer in this
 Manner ; “ To my Sons, I said, You see,
 “ my Sons, how wonderfully we have
 “ been saved from the Universal Ruin : The
 “ Great

“ Great Creator will assuredly Re-people the
 “ Earth again ; and you shall become Heads
 “ of many Nations. Remember then, and
 “ teach your Children after you to know,
 “ what your Eyes have beheld of the Ter-
 “ rors of the Lord. You have been Wit-
 “ nesses of a World once destroyed for
 “ Impiety ; let it therefore, as you value
 “ your own and your Posterities Good, be
 “ your first Care to guard and secure the
 “ Honour that is due to God ; and, by
 “ punishing the first Approaches to Impiety,
 “ to prevent the spreading of the Conta-
 “ gion ; for fear the World should once
 “ more grow ripe for the Divine Vengeance.
 “ This your Reason wou’d teach you to do,
 “ tho’ you had not had the Exampe of a
 “ Deluge to warn you : ’Tis the Glory of
 “ Man that he is a reasonable Creature ; ’tis
 “ the Glory of Reason to know and to
 “ adore the Creator. Remember then, that
 “ when you govern Men, The Laws of
 “ Reason are the Golden Rule, and by
 “ that Rule the first Regard is to be paid
 “ to the Honour of God. This will prove
 “ a Blessing and Security to you, and to the
 “ Nations yet unborn”.

What think you, my Lord ? Does the old
 Patriarch talk Sense ? Had he Reason to
 know that Publick Good was concerned in

the Religion of the People? If he had, I trust you may see a just Foundation for the Magistrate's Care of Religion: But if the World's being once destroyed for Impiety, will not prove that the Publick Good is concerned in the Maintenance of Piety, and the Honour of God, I must be content to sit down in despair of ever finding the Truth.

3261 But let Publick Good, or any Thing else that your Lordship shall like better, be the Object of the Magistrate's Care; yet whilst you maintain, that Material Actions only are required, you must exclude Morality from the Law: For say, that the Magistrate requires Actions *Good* for the Publick; yet still the Effect that any Action has, is of no Consideration as to the Morality of the Action, but as it had a Place in the Intention of the Agent. But your Lordship cannot allow the Magistrate to enquire, whether the Subject *intended* the Publick Good, or any Thing else, by his material Action; for the Reasons against examining the Intention, are equally strong in all Cases, and therefore the Magistrate has no Judgment of the Goodness or Badness of his Subjects, but only of the Consequences of their Actions to the Publick.] And if this be indeed the Case of all Civil Laws, as your Lordship represents it to be, that they look to outward
 Actions

Actions only, without any Concern for the Morality of the Action, the *Roman Em-^g62* peror, who made his Horse Consul, was certainly in the right; for such a Consul, and such a Law, ought always to go together.

But what is this Publick Good? Is the Magistrate subject to the Rules of Reason and Morality, in making Laws for Publick Good, or is he not? If he is not, and your Lordship will tell us so, the Controversy will be brought to an Issue, and the World may be left to be Judge between us. If he is, then 'tis plain that the Rules of Reason, and Morality (which are Laws of God) are superior to the Considerations of Publick Good, since Publick Good is subject to be regulated by 'em; and consequently the Laws for promoting Publick Good, must be Laws of Reason and Morality, and take in more than mere External Actions: Unless your Lordship can shew us how a Law, requiring only External Actions, without any regard to inward Motives, is agreeable to Reason and Morality. And whenever your Lordship is able to shew this, I promise you to spend the Remainder of my Life, as your Friend tells me I have spent what is past, *in minding something else than strict Reasoning.*

I come

I come now, my Lord, to the Argument, by which you prove the Service done the Magistrate in your Sermon. P. 82, 83. I read thus : *One natural Consequence from the whole Tenor of my Sermon it self, is, That it is the true and proper Business of the Magistrate, to concern himself with the Outward Practice of Virtue, &c.* I was never so puzzled with a *Natural Consequence* in my Life ; and had been to this Day at a Loss, but that I found my self something relieved at p. 85. where your Lordship is upon the same Thought again, and thus expresses it—— *I maintain the very contrary ; viz. that Christ has annexed no Rewards to that Outward Practice to which alone Civil Authority can reach ; but to Outward Practice, conducted by Inward Sincerity of Belief, and the Motives of Religion.* The *Natural Consequence*, if I take your Meaning, lies here : *Christ has annexed no Rewards to that Outward Practice to which alone Civil Authority can reach ; therefore Civil Authority ought to annex Rewards to that Outward Practice.* I wish still I don't mistake ; for *Consequence* I can see none. For suppose, my Lord, that Christ did therefore annex no Rewards to that Practice, because 'tis capable of none ; will it follow *naturally*, that
the

the Magistrate therefore ought to annex 'em? If Christ had a good Reason not to do it; is it a Natural Consequence to infer, that the Magistrate must have a good Reason to do it? Yet this is the Case; that *Outward Practice, to which alone, you say, Civil Authority can reach*, is incapable of Reward, because destitute of Morality: The True Consequence of which is, That as Christ *did* add no Rewards, &c. so the Magistrate *ought* to add none. 'Tis equally true, that Christ has added no Rewards to Internal Principles; for if Men act contrary to 'em, they will not be the better for having them: Will you allow me then to infer, by *natural Consequence*, that since Christ has annex'd no Rewards to mere Internal Principles, therefore Somebody else must add 'em? But there is another Thing which hurts the Consequence: For the *Outward Practice, which Civil Authority reaches*, is no Practice of Virtue, as has been already proved; and then the Tenor of the Sermon can never shew, (nor indeed is there any Pretence in it to shew,) that the Magistrate ought to concern himself with the *Outward Practice of Virtue*, which your Lordship affirms it does.

Having now said all that I think proper to trouble your Lordship with at this time,

time, upon this Important Subject of *Outward Actions* ; I beg Leave to lay before your Lordship a Passage out of a Sermon, which I publish'd about Eleven Years ago ; not being so vain as to suppose that it can, or ought to be any Direction to your Lordship : But I do it, my Lord, imploring your Protection ; and with no other Design in the World, than to keep it out of the Hands of your *Second* ; that I may not have a Letter sent me once a Month, to shew my Agreement with your Lordship.

The Passage is this. — *Serm.* Jan. 31. 1704. p. 7. “ Of Obedience there are two
 “ Parts ; the External, and Internal. The
 “ External consists in the Outward Confor-
 “ mity of our Actions to the Rules and
 “ Principles of Virtue ; the Internal, in
 “ the Sincerity and Purity of the Heart.
 “ The Government of the World is not
 “ concern'd in the Internal Part ; for if
 “ Men act as if they were Honest, the
 “ Peace and Outward Order of the World
 “ will be secured, tho' their Hearts are per-
 “ verse : And therefore the Judgment of
 “ this, God, as he alone is able for it, has
 “ reserved to himself. The External Part
 “ of Obedience is that, in the due Per-
 “ formance of which, the Beauty and Or-
 “ der of the World consists ; and there-
 “ fore

“ fore this is the proper Care of the Gover-
 “ nors of the World. The same holds in
 “ Religion, which is the Service of God:
 “ There are Duties which none are con-
 “ cerned in, but God and our own Souls ;
 “ such as Faith, Repentance, and the like,
 “ the Virtue of which is internal, of the
 “ Heart. But God requires likewise an ex-
 “ ternal and visible Worship from us, in
 “ which, outward Order and Decency
 “ are *required*, but not *determined* ; and
 “ therefore must be left to their Jurisdiction
 “ to whom we are answerable for our
 “ outward Behaviour in all Things”. If
 this Passage can be of any Use to your
 Lordship, 'tis entirely at your Service ; if
 not, I hope you'll pardon the Concern I have
 express'd for my own Quiet, in making it
 Part of my Address to YOUR SELF.
 You, my Lord, are happy in many Seconds.
 I expect no body to do my Business for me,
 and therefore wou'd not have it grow too fast
 upon my Hands.

In the next Place, I am to thank your³ *264*
 Lordship for *returning* my Syllogism again,
 P. 86. I wish you had return'd it fairly as you
 receiv'd it, that it might have been own'd ;
 but now you must needs take it home again,
 for 'tis as much *Mabomet's* Syllogism as
 mine.

G

Thus

^ Thus it runs : *Temporal Punishments, you affirm, are not proper to enforce the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom :*

But many of the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom, as to the Matter of 'em, (for so only we can mean) are Laws of Reason, and of great Importance to Society.

Therefore, according to you, for the Temporal Magistrate to enforce by Temporal Punishments, &c.

The first Proposition, as it is mine, is as fit to support any Thing else, as the Conclusion drawn from it.] ^Did I not expressly say ³²⁶ in the Sermon it self (and not afterwards when I found there was Occasion for it) *That it ought to be remembred, that the Arguments from the Nature of Religion, and of Christ's Spiritual Kingdom, against the Use of Temporal Punishments, are conclusive only as to the Ministers of that Kingdom, and cannot extend to the Civil Magistrate ?*

I find, my Lord, you are resolv'd not to remember this ; and therefore you charge me in the Consequence with extending the Arguments to the Civil Magistrate, which I had expressly said, ought not to be so extended.

^ Is this, my Lord, *a good Manner of Writing, and fair Usage of an Adversary ?* I am sorry the Cause wants such Supports ;
more

more sorry that your Lordship should condescend to use such.

Your Lordship has been so kind in this short *Postscript*, to give me an Instance how you wou'd defend my Doctrine, if I wou'd be content to let it pass for the same with your own : In Confidence of the like Favour I'll propose an Objection to you, of which in *that Case* I shou'd be very apprehensive.

Suppose then, that I had, upon the publishing your Lordship's Sermon, professed myself to be in your Sentiments; and had maintain'd, that the Argument from the Spiritual Nature of Christ's Kingdom, or Christ's Ministers, (which you please) did entirely exclude the Magistrate from adding the Sanctions of this World to the Laws of Christ : Suppose somebody had sent me a Letter to shew *my Inconsistency* with my self, and had proved it thus : " You say now, Mr. Dean, " that the Argument drawn from the Spiritual Nature of Christ's Kingdom excludes the Magistrate from adding Sanctions to the Laws of Christ : But how " comes this Doctrine to please you now, " which displeas'd you in 1712 ?] You had " then an Occasion to consider this Argument, and your Thoughts are in Print ; " and tho' you allow the Argument to be " good against the Church's Pretension to " Temporal Power, yet you expressly in
 G 2 the

“ the plainest Words, reject the Argument
 “ with respect to the Civil Magistrate. * See
 “ your own Words: *It ought always to be*
 “ *remembred, &c.* Had any body else after
 “ this express Declaration, charged the Do-
 “ ctrine, as excluding the Magistrate’s Power
 “ in all Cases of Religion, you wou’d have
 “ had Reason to have resentted the Injury ;
 “ what then must we think, now we see you
 “ are doing this Thing your self ? The Argu-
 “ ment was the same in 1712 as in 1717. The
 “ Views perhaps are altered”.—— Tell me,
 my Lord, how I might answer this Charge ;
 Tell me, I say, or else quit your own.] Or
 if you think both may stand together, e’en
 part with your Man of *Weight and Abilities*,
 and speak the same plain *English* with your
 Friend, and tell me, once for all, *my Sermon*
is Nonsense. 2 L93.

3 L69 But this is not all. In the second Proposi-
 tion, your Lordship has rejected your own
 Words which I made use of, (*The Laws of*
Christ are almost all) and changed ’em into
 these, (*many of the Laws, &c.*) Your Lord-
 ship does not use to be displeas’d at any Thing
 of your own, how then come you to reject
 your own Words now ? Was the former Ex-
 pression less to your Purpose than the latter ?
 No, but your Lordship had found in the
 Letter a very poor Cavil at my Syllogism
 founded

founded on your Lordship's Words which I had used ; and your Lordship changed the Terms to countenance your Friend's learned Observation, who found out that the Minor Proposition of my Syllogism was particular, and the Conclusion general. And now, my Lord, (since we must come to Boys Play) let us consider whether the Minor be particular or no. Pray what did your Lordship mean by saying, *They (the Laws of Christ) are almost all Appeals to the Will of God, to his Nature known by the common Reason of Mankind?* I understood you to mean, that the Moral Law was the main of the Gospel ; and that your Lordship by those Words (*almost all*) did not intend to deny of any Moral Law, that it is a Law of Christ, but only to avoid affirming, that every Law of Christ is a Moral Law : Your Proposition then is certainly equivalent to this, *The Laws of Christ comprehend all Moral Laws.* If you disallow this, be pleased to tell us what Moral Law is not a Law of the Gospel ? If you do allow it, pray put it into the Place of your own Words as they stand in my Proposition, and then consult with your Friend whether it be general or particular : And if you find it to be general, the Consequence will be good, without asking leave of your Lordship or your Second. Remember, on another Occasion how Angry your Lordship was, that your own Sense was

was not represented in your own Words ; and yet how readily did your Lordship support a Cavil, for which there had been no ground, if I had not used your own Words ? for I assure your Lordship, I chose them not, as being most proper, but only as being yours. And I hope your Lordship will instruct your Seconds better, than to fall foul on your own Propositions, whenever they meet them in an Adversaries Book.

But the weightiest Matter is yet behind. In drawing up your Syllogism, you have affirmed, that *the Laws of Christ are, as to the Matter of 'em only, Laws of Reason.* And this you affirm in my Name, as well as in your own, for you add (*so only W E can mean ;*) I do assure your Lordship, I never did mean so in my Life, nor ever will. I see what your Lordship intends ; you had been told, that if the Magistrate cou'd not add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ, he cou'd not add them to the Laws of Reason and Morality ; it seems you do not like this Consequence ; and therefore to enable him to add Sanctions to the Moral Law, you now affirm, that Moral Laws are not the same with Christ's Laws, but only *as to the Matter, i. e.* they are the same with Christ's Laws, just as you teach Civil Laws may be the same, that is, in such a manner, that

that they are as much *Makomet's Laws* as *Christ's Laws*.

But pray consider, Are not the Laws of ³⁷¹ Nature and Reason, Laws of God? And does not God require inward Obedience as ^{346,7.} well as Christ? Does not Reason teach us ^{n .8.} to act upon Principles of Religion in Expectation of a future Judgment? How then are the Laws of Reason the same with the Laws of Christ, as to Matter only, when both require the same Internal and External Obedience? This Account not only destroys Natural Religion, by making it a Law of External Actions only (which have no Morality in them) but it undermines Reveal'd Religion also; which is built upon the Principles of Natural Religion, and cannot stand without 'em. *On these two Commandments* (both of 'em Moral Laws) says our Lord, *hang all the Law and the Prophets*. The Moral Precepts are antecedent to Revelation; and such Laws they are, from which the Precepts of the Law, and the Prophets, and the Gospel, are deduced; But can the pure Laws of the Gospel, which require inward Obedience, be deduced from a Law requiring only an outward material Obedience, not regarding inward Motives, and which, in your Lordship's Opinion, are as nearly allied to the Laws of *Makomet*, as of Christ?

As

3272 As severely as I've been rebuked for one Syllogism, I'll venture upon another, and leave it to your Lordship's Consideration.

The Laws of Reason, and the Moral Laws of God, are the same.

But (your Lordship affirms) the Laws of Christ are the same as to the Matter only with the Laws of Reason.

Therefore, the Laws of Christ are the same as to the Matter only with the Laws of God.

Will you hold the Conclusion, my Lord, or will you part with the Premises? And since *something* you must part with, if you will not be offended at me, I wish you once more the happier Choice: And so proceed to what remains in your *Postscript*.

At pag. 87. your Lordship says, *I think I see plainly that a Person may maintain the*
 3276 *Maxims or Motives of this World to be contrary to those Motives upon which Christ's Religion was founded by himself, who best knew what was contrary to its Interests; without maintaining, either that Worldly Motives always destroy all true Religion, or that it is impious and wicked (as your Words are, pag. 26.) in any to apply 'em, in those Points I truly intended in my Sermon: — And I think this as plain, as it is, that I may maintain immense Riches to be in their Tendency Contrary to VIRTUE,*
without

without supposing, either that they always actually destroy it ; or that 'tis impious and wicked for a Man to leave a great Estate to his Son. If I wou'd Answer this according to the Example set by your Friend, and approved by your Lordship, I shou'd^{3L3,4} tell you that the Secret is now out ; and that all this Bustle is with a View to leave a great Estate to your Son.—But, my^{3L74,5} Lord, I know better how to take than to return such Usage ; and shall only say, that I cou'd least of all have expected from a Friend of your Lordship's. The Point your Lordship now will maintain, if I take you right, is, That^{*} the Motives of this World,^{3L76} particularly the Sanctions of Human Laws, are contrary to the Motives of the World to come. And, That to apply them in the Case, and on Account of true Religion, is to act contrary to its Interests, to do what tends to its Destruction.

If so, my Lord, I desire to know, *First,*
^{*}Whether that Supremacy which is inseparable from the Imperial Crown of this Realm, does not carry in it a Power of applying, and a Trust obliging to the Application of the Sanctions of Human Laws, in the Case^{3L77} and on Account of True Religion ?^{*}*Secondly,*^{3L78}
 Whether any one ought to be invested with a Power of doing, or may receive a Trust obliging him to do, what is contrary to the
 H . . . Intetests

Interests of true Religion, and tends to the Destruction of it?

This is indeed a *Main Point*; in the Resolution of which, the *Civil Power*, as well as Religion, is greatly concerned. And, if you will uniformly maintain, what you have, first, in your Sermon, and now in this your *P.S.* affirmed, you will so justify one Charge in the Representation, as will also abundantly justify *that Person, who, as your Lordship has heard, was thereby determined to enter into, and be zealous for the Condemnation of what you had Preached.* And you will save him, at least, the Trouble of contending with you.

As to the other Point relating to Christ's Authority, your Lordship esteems my Concessions a *Reward worthy of all your Labour*; but if the Concessions be not the Effect of your Labour, I don't see how it can be the Reward of it. But your Lordship is so fond of the Noble Subject of Absolute Authority, that the World must be told, that 'tis owing to your Labours, that there is a Man who disclaims it. Well then; I am, I must be your Convert; will you now be content with my Concessions, and let the Subject rest, since we are agreed in it? Not for the World: What, quit Absolute Authority! *Conscience and Judgment* require the Contrary; Nay, the *Honour of the Committee too;*
the

the Majority of which, you say, are not so blind, as not to see that They and I are as distant from one another in our Sentiments, and the Grounds on which they are built, as they and you can possibly be supposed to be. i. e. Tho' I have disclaim'd Absolute Authority, yet still you are resolv'd the Majority of the Committee shall hold it; and for no other Reason that I can see, but because your Lordship finds it necessary to write against it. But pray, my Lord, how do you discover this great Disagreement in Sentiments, between me and the Majority of the Committee? Is it, that we agreed in the same Representation? Or what else is it that has entitled your Lordship to judge of our Sentiments and inward Motives, and to exercise that Power as a private Man, of which all the Powers in the World, (as you teach us) are utterly incapable.

*If I have indeed given such an Account of the Representation as your Lordship says I have, you had Reason to think that the Majority of the Committee and I were of different Sentiments. Your Lordship ^{won-3283} *ders to find your self ridiculed (as you are pleased to call it) for supposing that the Committee meant to support their Charge, by what they quoted out of your Sermon; and for not imagining that they made several Citations from thence, professedly to**

support it, without any such View or Design. (How my Lord!) professedly to support it without any such View of supporting; I hope your Lordship don't always mean by no Views, such as are consistent with doing the very thing denied professedly: Because, (your Lordship adds,) I think this a much harder Reflection upon their Representation than upon me: And I ought to have begg'd Pardon of them, if I had once admitted such a Thought, 'till I had it in publick under the Hand of one of Themselves. Well then; you have it under my Hand, and in Publick too, that the Committee meant not to support their Charge, by what they quoted out of your Sermon; and, that they made several Citations from thence professedly to support it, without any such View or Design.

And now, my Lord, I must beg to know where this Publick Declaration under my Hand may be found; for I do assure you I am an utter Stranger to it. I find, indeed, in my Answer, pag. 56. these Words: The Representation has produced out of his Lordship's Sermon, some Passages, where (in which) the Doctrines which are conceived to subvert the Government of the Church, and those (Doctrines) relating to Absolute Authority, are mixed together: The Committee fix their Charge on the former (Doctrines)

ctrines,) *his Lordship will Answer to the latter: And no doubt the World about us will improve by the Controversy.*

But this cannot be what your Lordship means; for here is nothing to *ridicule* your Lordship; nothing to justify your intimating, that the Committee quoted Passages out of your Sermon, without meaning to support their Charge by 'em. What I have said, amounts to this, That the Passages produced in the Representation, do (some at least) contain the Doctrines against Absolute Authority, and those against all Authority, mix'd together; that they were so blended, that one cou'd not fairly be produced without the other: And therefore, I say, *The Committee added, to prevent Mistakes, short Observations of their own, which were intended to point to the Thing they found fault with.* How does this reflect upon the Honour of the Committee? Or justify your Lordship in supposing a *declared* Design in the Committee, different from their *Secret* and *Real* Design? Your Lordship has express'd such a Sense of this Injury done to the Committee, that I cannot but hope, that when you find it to have risen from your self only, you will do, what you have professd you ought to do in such a Case, *beg, their Pardon.*

Your

Your Lordship has had no better Fortune in your Secret History, than in your Discovery of this Secret Design of the Committee. Your Lordship, *pag. 87.* represents me *as the most inflexible in making this a Matter Personal upon you by Name.* I do assure your Lordship there was so little Room for any one to be inflexible in this Point, that I don't remember there was any Difference in Opinion about it: There was some Debate whether the Sermon shou'd be mention'd; but whether your Lordship by Name shou'd be mention'd, was never disputed: The Bishops and Clergy, those of the Upper and Lower-House were, to the best of my Knowledge, unanimous in their Judgment, that your Lordship by Name, and your Doctrines in your own Words, shou'd be in the Representation.

The next Piece of Secret History (for so I must call it) is to be met with, *pag. 91, 92.* Your Lordship has found History, and, it seems, I must find Application; for *I leave the Application of this (you say.) to your self.* Your Lordship mentions this History as *founded* on a Declaration, and tells me, that *I must remember it.* Indeed I do not, nor have I met with the Declaration refer'd to: But be it true or false, in Obedience to your Lordship I will apply it. And thus I reason upon the Case: If what
was

was then designed was right, neither your Lordship nor I must complain ; if it was wrong, it will not follow, that because something was wrong relating to Convocation Twenty Years ago, therefore nothing done in Convocation can be right now : So that under either View your Lordship's History is nothing to the purpose : Unless your Lordship too has sometimes a *Secret Purpose*, which you do not care to own. But after all your Complaints, you own *pag. 87.* that I acted according to *the Trust reposed in me* : This Declaration, my Lord, is worth all *my Labour* ; and now your Lordship and I have rewarded each other to mutual Satisfaction : But then, *pag. 92.* you declare *you will never suffer upon any Account in the World any such Trust to be reposed in you.* How, my Lord ! have you not the same Trust reposed in you ? What is the Trust of a Clergyman, that is not the Trust of a Bishop ? What of a Member of the Lower-House, which is not also of a Member of the Upper ? Your Lordship, I suppose, can Explain this, and when you do, I shall be ready to examine it.

In the mean Time, I must not forget the good Words your Lordship has bestowed on me. *Pag. 86.* *you promise neither to make Merry with the Manner, nor the Matter of my Arguments ; but whatever you think of both, to treat 'em as coming from a Person of*
great

great Abilities and Weight. Can you do this, my Lord, *whatever you think of the Arguments?* I see your Lordship's Respect for me is just what you have describ'd Civil Obedience to be, an *outward Material Action* independent of *inward Motives* and Principles. By this Rule, I suppose, I am to understand what your Lordship says, *Pag. 91.* That you are pleas'd to think that *so able and so learned a Man* is engag'd with you in this Controversy. 'Tis fair however, my Lord, to give the World Notice that they are not to conclude what you *think* of an Adversary, by the good Words or good Usage he has from you. For my own Part, I am so apt to speak as I think, that I cannot engage to return your Lordship *such* Civilities: And in truth, when I first read these good Words in the *Postscript*, I was in pain for my self; for a Compliment from your Lordship, is like a warning of a Clock, you are sure to *strike* soon after. And accordingly, at *Pag. 90.* This Man of *Weight and Abilities* is set forth; there he is at full Length, a Contriver of *Labyrinths* to lead the Reader *in backwards and forwards, till he has lost Sight of every Thing that can lead him out again:* In a word, one who has defended his Sermon in such a manner, as will serve to defend any Sermon in the World, *Pag. 91.* This, my Lord, is plain speaking; and I'll
 2 give

give you back the Compliments into the Bargain, if you will but make good this part of the Character. I am not so uneasy under it, as to call with any great Eagerness upon your Lordship to undertake it. Do as you please ; but this I promise, that whenever your Lordship will venture losing your self in *this Labyrinth*, I will certainly be at Leisure to shew you the way out again. And if you think, that the Letter to which the *Postscript* is joined, has done the Work to your Hands ; if your Lordship will make it your own, by declaring that you'll justify^{3 L89} and stand to the Doctrines and Consequences of it ; if you will put but a little of your Reputation upon this Issue ; though I had^{3 L9} as live teach Children to Read, as Answer his Letter ; yet for your Lordship's Sake, I may be tempted to submit even to this Employment.

'Tis an happy Talent, to be able to give^g a Reader the very worst Idea of an Adversary, and such Impressions as the roughest Language cou'd not convey ; and at the same time to possess him with an Opinion of the Writer's Meekness, Charity, and Benevolence ! To open his Mind by great Professions of Candor ; and, when 'tis prepar'd, to slide in such a Character, as wou'd not be receiv'd from an angry Pen ! The Smiles, the Compliments, the good Wishes
I of

of such an Adversary, are very *precious Balms* ; but such they are, as always *break the Head*.

I shall leave this to your Lordship's Consideration ; adding only the *Roman Historian's* Reflexion upon the Conduct of *Domitian*—— *Et quo contentius abuteretur patientiâ hominum, nunquam tristiore Sententiam sine præfatione Clementiæ pronuntiavit : ut non aliud jam certius atrocis Exitus Signum esset, quam Principij Lenitas.*

328

Sueton. in Vita Dom.

As to my *own Manner*, which your Lordship complains of ; tho' I shall always think my self at Liberty to Examine an Argument, as it deserves to be examined ; yet will I never willingly offend against the Rules of Decency, with respect either to your Episcopal, or Personal Character : Of the first, your Lordship knows no Ill can be said ; of the other, I often have said Good.

But the Thing that now surprizes me, is, That your Lordship should think it proper, on any Account, to add a *Postscript* to such a Letter. I have no Complaint against your Friend ; He has a *Natural Right* to be like himself, and to write like himself : And therefore when he tells me roundly, that *my Sermon*, without his Comment, is *Nonsense* ; I am under no Concern to answer him ;

him ; but am willing to leave it to the World to judge , whether this be Want of Sense in him, or in me.

But these Things stand in another Light, as they come into the World Approved and Recommended by your Lordship. Look, my Lord, and see with what Candor he represents me, as having no Concern but for the Goods and Revenues of the Church ; p. 38. I had compared Negative Discouragements to Locks and Bolts, to shew that both are intended merely for Security ; but neither the one are supposed to make People honest , nor the other to make them profess a Religion they cannot approve. What says your Friend to this ? Why he finds my *Secret* out ; That I mean nothing by the *Church*, but the *Goods and Revenues of the Church*. Try this Reasoning, my Lord, up-3 ^{L84} on the Parable of the Talents , *Mat. 25*. Our Saviour compares the Kingdom of Heaven to a Man taking a Journey ; who left to his Servants, some One Talent, some more : At his Return he accounts with 'em, and those who had made most of their Talents, are most rewarded : Would you advise your Friend to say, Oh ! here is the Secret of the Gospel come out : 'Tis all turning the Penny ; and He is the Best Christian, who makes most Interest of his Money ? Or shou'd he say so without your

Advice, wou'd your Lordship add a *Post-script* to the Comment, and lend the Authority of your Great Name, to spread it far and wide in the World? But why should I ask your Lordship, whether you would do; what I have already seen you do? Nay more, my Lord, you set the Example
 3284 your self. Dr. *Snape* had said, *That the Desirable Work (of the Reformation) was not compleated, till the Earthly Rulers, being themselves Converted, Establish'd and Confirm'd it by Temporal Sanctions*: Your Lordship replies upon him; *A Sentence, Sir, which if it be duly consider'd, must be very shocking to every Christian Mind; unless the Desirable Thing in Christ's Kingdom be Riches and Power. All who have not forgot the very Name of Jesus Christ, and ALL his Words relating to this Subject, must know what to think of it.* What Tragedies are here! And yet I believe no Christian, except your self, saw any such Meaning in the Doctor's Words: Nay, 'tis impossible this shou'd be his Meaning, for
 3285 the Case was in Fact otherwise. The Reformation carried off both Power and Riches from the Church; and where-ever it prevail'd, this was one constant Effect of it; for which Reason the Worldly-minded Churchmen were, and are still against it. Pray, my Lord, what Accession of Riches and Power
 was

was made to your Lordship's Bishoprick at the *Reformation*, or to any other? How could you then, my Lord, understand the Words in this Sense? Did you never read³ *Les* the Preamble to Queen *Elizabeth's* Act of Uniformity in the *Common-Prayer-Book*? I will Transcribe it for your Use, to shew you what was the *desirable* Work compleated by the Earthly Rulers. "Whereas at the
 " Death of our late Sovereign Lord King
 " *Edward* the Sixth, there remained one
 " uniform Order of Common Service, and
 " Prayer, and of the Administration of Sa-
 " craments, Rites and Ceremonies, in the
 " Church of *England*, which was set forth
 " in one Book, entituled, *The Book of*
 " *Common-Prayer, and Administration of*
 " *Sacraments*, and other Rites and Ceremo-
 " nies in the Church of *England*, Autho-
 " rized by Act of Parliament holden in the
 " Fifth and Sixth Years of our said late So-
 " vereign Lord King *Edward* the Sixth;
 " entituled, *an Act for the Uniformity of*
 " *Common-Prayer, and Administration of Sa-*
 " *craments*; the which was repealed and
 " taken away by Act of Parliament, in the
 " First Year of the Reign of our late Sove-
 " reign Lady Queen *Mary*, to the great
 " Decay of the due Honour of God, and Dis-
 " comfort to the Professors of the Truth of
 " *Christ's Religion.*" Do you yet perceive,
 } my

my Lord, what was the *desirable Work* that was begun under *Edward VI.*, that *decay'd* under *Queen Mary*, and was compleated under *Queen Elizabeth*? The Professors of the Truth were comforted or discomforted, as the *Honour of God revived or decay'd* by the Encouragement of Earthly Powers. But now the very Mention of this desirable Work, is Handle enough to represent all whom your Lordship likes not, as meer Worldlings. But why must all suffer thus? Why must I? — Had I ever encouraged any body to abuse the whole Clergy of the Nation, in order to exalt my own Character, and to make way for my Friend to call upon all Men of *Station and Fortune*, to do *Honour and Service* to so *generous a Patriot* of the Publick, and so *faithful a Steward* of the Gospel; had I, upon Pre-
 fence of exhorting others to Submission, under the hard Terms of *not tasting the Beneficence* of the Government in a distinguishing Manner, shewn how uneasily I bore the want of Preferment my self; your Lordship would have had some Colour to think me not a little concerned for the Riches and Glories of this World. — But I believe your Lordship is not unwilling that I shou'd say no more on this Subject.

But give me leave, my Lord, to observe to you, how you aggravate this Charge on the
 the

the Doctor. After having loaded him with your own very *unjust Comment* on his Words, you add, *I will say no more now of it, but that it is worthy of him, who contends professedly for making Religion a Civil Test; for debasing the most Sacred Thing in the World, into a Political Tool, and an Engine of State.* Who this Sentence is *worthy of*, I cannot tell; but sure I am, 'tis very *unworthy* of your Lordship. This, my Lord, is a Censure not only on the Doctor, but upon the common Sense and Reason of Mankind, upon all Times, and all Nations of the World: For pray consider, Is not Religion the Test in every Case where an Oath is required? And name, my Lord, the Time, or People who have not used it. The Old Testament, and the New, afford us Examples and Precepts to justify the Practice; so do all the Histories extant, of all Times and People. And do you think, my Lord, that the great Secret was reserved for your Discovery; and that the World after so many Ages were to be untaught by your Lordship, what they had ever practised upon the Principles both of Natural and Revealed Religion? There is not a Cause, be it never so trivial, tried in *Westminster-Hall*, but Religion is made a Civil Test; and is it right, my Lord, to require this Test of a Man's Honesty, before he is admitted an Evidence in a Five Shilling Cause;

Cause ; and is it impious to require it, when he is admitted to a Place of Trust in the Government, and has, in part, the Lives or Fortunes of the Nation committed to his Fidelity ? Is it reasonable to require this Test of a Witness] before the Property in an Horse shall be put upon his Evidence ; and is it absurd and infamous to require some Security, when the Preservation of the Establish'd Church is the Point in Question?] Religion, my Lord, is therefore the properest, the only proper Test of a Man's Honesty, because it is the most *Sacred Thing in the World* ; and yet this, with your Lordship, is a Reason why it never shou'd be a Test : Take away this, that Religion is a Sacred Thing, and then going to a Play wou'd be as good a Test as going to Church ; and a Bow to a Judge might qualify a Witness, as well as
 3287 his Appeal to God by Oath. But I see, my Lord, the Cause is to be maintained at any Rate ; and that the Controversy is to be managed by appealing to the Passions, or even the Follies of Mankind.

Before I take my leave, I desire to ask your Lordship, whether you will be answerable for your Friend's Defense of your Doctrine ? He has enter'd himself *your Second*, and you have own'd him by your *Postscript* ; will you stand to his Plea in your Behalf, and justify his Assertions ? If you shou'd,
 there

there will be worfe Work upon your Hands than ever I imagined. See how he defends³ *289, 90* that Passage in your Sermon, — *If any Man upon Earth have a Right to add to the Sanctions of his Laws, &c. they are so far Kings in his stead, &c.*

The Charge upon this Passage, is, That you condemn all Magistrates who add Sanctions to Christ's Laws. To prove that you do condemn 'em, it has been insisted on, that your Words amount to saying, that all who add Sanctions do usurp the Dominion of Christ and dethrone him. So that the main and only Point is, whether you condemn the Magistrate or no, for adding Sanctions: The Proof lies upon this, Whether you charge him with usurping the Dominion of Christ or no, when he does add them. And what says your Friend to this? Why he was so full of this *dethroning* that he lost Sight of the main Point, and therefore to clear your Lordship from no body knows what, he affirms that your Words do not amount to a Charge of *dethroning* Christ: for, as he learnedly expresses himself, *if they dethrone Christ, then Christ is totally exempted from ALL Power: But his Lordship's Proposition directly asserts some Power to Christ still, Pag. 25.* And this he proves from those material Words, *so far.* He allows then, my Lord, that you do affirm, that

Christ is *so far* (tho' not totally) divested of Power; which is just as if a Lawyer on a Trial for Treason, should plead, that his Client invaded one Kingdom, that of *Ireland* for Instance, but did not totally divest the King of *all* Power, for he left him *Great Britain* still. If you allow this Defense, then we say, To divest Christ of any of his Power, is impious: But your Lordship allows, that the Magistrate in adding Sanctions to his Laws does so far, (tho' not totally) divest him. And thus your *Second* has justified that hard Word *impious*, which so much displeased you.

- 329/ Again, your Friend labours much about
 325 Laws of Reason and Christ, (upon which Subject he is always unhappy) to shew that there are some which the Magistrate's Power cannot reach, because he cannot judge in invisible Cases: But then he puts the Question to himself, *pag. 32. But in Cases where it is visible that Men break the Laws of Christ, can the Magistrate interpose?*
 329/ If it affects not the State, he is of Opinion he cannot. But now for the Reason: Why truly the Magistrate must not judge in *visible* Cases, because he cannot judge in *invisible* ones; or in his own Words, *For what Sanctions can any Man have a Right to add, to make a Christian love his Neighbour, who can never know whether a Man complies*
 or

or not? How happy are you, my Lord, in a Second!

* The Authority of the Magistrate to enforce Obedience to the plain Laws of Religion, was the main Point your Friend had to speak to. I had distinguished between the Points in which Men differ, and those in which their Reason will not permit them to differ; and asserted the Magistrate's Right to add the Sanctions of this World, to make Men do what the Light of their own Minds teach them they ought to do; and that with respect to Religion, as well as Civil Obedience; since *the Magistrate being the Vicegerent of God, it is his Duty to maintain the Honour of God and Religion.* This was so plainly stated, that your Friend could not avoid seeing it, tho' he had nothing to say to it. See, my Lord, how he deserts the Cause, pag. 5. *When you'll explain what you mean by Vicegerent in this Case, I'll consider your Assertion.*

Thus, my Lord, he twice walk'd up to the Point; and for no Reason, that I can see, but to shew his Bashfulness, and twice to run away from it. I wonder he thought it necessary to write, before he had any thing to say to the Purpose. But now you see his Difficulty, my Lord, I doubt not but your great Skill in the 13th of the *Romans*, will enable you (for I don't intend) to instruct

3294 Instruct him what is meant by the Magistrate's being *Διάνοι & Θεός,* [the Minister of God,) and having, as such, a Power to reward those who do well, and to execute Wrath on Evil-doers.]

And now, my Lord, if you like such a
 3296 Second, yet (I must own to you) I do
 329 not like such a Correspondent: Nor can I
 329 imagine, what tempted your Lordship to
 (324 put him to this Employment; unless you
 3295 chose a Second, in the Humility of your
 Heart, as the Roman Consul did the Companion of his Triumphs;

— — — Sibi Consul
Ne placeat, Curru SERVUS portatur eodem.)

I have nothing more to trouble your Lordship with at present, but to assure you that I am, in all Offices of Christian Friendship,

Your LORDSHIP'S

Obedient Servant,

THO. SHERLOCK,