Dean *SHERLOCK*'s

CONSIDERATIONS,

Offered to the

Bishop of *BANGOR*.

(Price One Shilling.)

(7)

SOME CONSIDERATIONS

Occasioned by a

POSTSCRIPT

FROM THE

RIGHT REVEREND

THE

Lord Bishop of *BANGOR*

TO THE

Dean of *Chichester*,

Offered to his LORDSHIP.

By THOMAS SHERLOCK, D.D.
Dean of *Chichester*, Master of the *Temple*, and Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty.

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS

OCCASIONED BY

A POSTSCRIPT from the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of *BANGOR*, &c.

My LORD,

I Received the Favour of your Lordship's *Postscript*; and though I should have been better pleased to have heard from your Lordship in any other Way, yet I shall always shew a Respect to your Commands in whatever Method you think fit to Communicate

them; especially since I have learnt from your Lordship, what *Great Matters* must be *affected* by the Success of your Defense. I am glad, my Lord, your Views are so extended since the Preaching of your Sermon, and that you have now such great ones before you in the Defense of it. Your Lordship tells me, *that every one will see* our Agreement *more and more plainly every Day*; and indeed I conceive some hopes of it, from observing how this great Point begins to clear up.

In other Matters the Agreement may be longer a coming, but I am so far from despairing of it, that I give your Lordship this Trouble, in order to promote it, by shewing your Lordship the Reasons why I cannot concur with you in some Doctrines advanced in this *Postscript*; hoping that they may appear so clear to your Lordship, or be so clearly answer'd by your Lordship, that they may no longer divide us.

In what I have to say, I shall follow the Order and Method of the *Postscript*; and the rather, that the World may observe the *Labyrinth* in this Case (if any there be) to be of your Lordship's Contrivance, and not of mine.

Your Lordship begins with Complaining, " *That* any Suspicion of your having been " the Author or Encourager of the former

" Let-

" Letter to me (which you aſſure me you
" were not) ſhould have carried me *mani-*
" *feſtly out of my Way*— from my own De-
" fenſe, to bring you and your future De-
" fenſe into my Debate."

My Suſpicions, my Lord, ſhall make no Part of the Controverſy between your Lordſhip and me. Whatever they were in this Caſe, they came not into my Anſwer; and 'tis only your Lordſhip's Suſpicion, that they are chargeable with *carrying me manifeſtly out of my Way.*

I am at a Loſs to know why your Lordſhip complains to me that *you were brought into the Debate.* Ask your Friend the Letter-writer the Reaſon; 'twas he brought you in, and not I. His Charge was, That my Doctrine was the ſame with your Lordſhip's: Was I at Liberty to Anſwer him, or no? If I was; could it be done without conſidering your Lordſhip's Doctrine as well as my own? Was it then going *out of the Way*, to examine the Doctrines which gave Occaſion to the Debate, and were the main Subject of it? As to your *future Defenſe*, my Lord, I brought it not *into the Debate*, nor was I *diverted by it from the Subject of my own Defenſe.* Whoever will but look into my Anſwer, may ſee, that I ſaid nothing of your Lordſhip's *future Defenſe*, 'till I had gone through with my own, and the Debate

Debate was over. Your Lordſhip perhaps may judge that I was not able to defend my ſelf; but you cannot but ſee that I was not *diverted* from it, to *bring you*, or *your future Defenſe into the Debate.*

Your Lordſhip complains farther in this Paragraph, of my Manner of Writing; and thanks me for directing you *in what Senſe you are to underſtand your own Words.*

As to my Manner, my Lord, 'Tis the common Misfortune of thoſe who have appeared in this Controverſy, not to have given Satisfaction in their Manner of Writing: I am ſorry 'tis mine; but this may be perhaps *Naturæ Vitium, non Animi*; Men muſt write as they can, or elſe be ſilent. But I ſhall have Occaſion to Reſume this Subject before I take Leave of your Lordſhip, and ſhall therefore ſay no more of it here.

As for your Lordſhip's Thanks for my *Directions in what Senſe you are to underſtand your own Words*; though I ſhould be glad to merit your Lordſhip's Thanks for any Service I could do you; yet in this, my Lord, you have been bountiful beyond my Deſerts. I will do my ſelf the Honour to ſay, that I am not altogether ſuch a Stranger to your Lordſhip's Manner of Writing, as not to be able to gueſs ſometimes what is likely to afford you Matter of Complaint.

plaint. I foresaw this Occasion, and took all possible Care to prevent it. I will repeat my own Words, and leave the Reader to judge what Directions I gave your Lordship in this Matter. *I shall shew his Lordship's Opinion from the Sense which his Words SEEM TO ME to carry; not intending hereby to preclude his Lordship from any other Sense or Meaning, which he shall think fit to insist on.* Answ. P. 11. I humbly hope, my Lord, that your Complaint of my Manner in general may be founded on a like Misapprehension of my Design; and that it may be rather my Misfortune than my Fault to be under your Displeasure.

The Observations which I offer'd upon your future Defense, are grounded upon your own Account of it; and I don't find by any Thing your Lordship has said, that I mistook your Meaning in it. And, pray my Lord, where is the Offence of telling your Lordship before-hand, what you must have been told after the Publication of the Answer; when you would have heard it less patiently? Your Lordship calls this immediately *an Happiness arising from the Delay of your Answer:* How happy your Lordship is in it I cannot tell; but I meant it as an Instance of that Fairness, with which I think all Controversy should be conducted. It would

ſerve the Purpoſe of an Adverſary much bet ter, if your Lordſhip wou'd be pleaſed to write a Book nothing to the Purpoſe ; but it would ſerve the Cauſe of Truth much worſe. I have done you no Injury, my Lord, in telling you what the true Point of the Repreſentation is ; you are ſtill at Liberty to write upon any other Point, and call it too an Anſwer to the Repreſentation, if you think it proper ſo to do. The Uneaſineſs your Lordſhip expreſſes at being told the true Point, ſhews how unwilling you are to come to it, how very loth to part with the noble Subject of Abſolute Authority ; an Opinion which, I perceive, your Adverſaries muſt hold, whether they will or no, in order to make way for your Lordſhip's future Victory and Triumph. This is ſo neceſſary, it ſeems, to your Lordſhip's Defenſe, that you cannot in your *Conſcience and Judgment*, wholly part with it : Your Judgment I admire ; for 'tis much better for your Lordſhip to write againſt Abſolute Authority, than againſt the Point I propoſed to you from the Repreſentation ; but that you ſhou'd find your ſelf at all obliged in *Conſcience* to believe the Repreſentation, or thoſe who drew it, to be Maintainers of Abſolute Authority, muſt be aſcribed, I preſume, to the value you put on thoſe *great Things* which depend on the *Vigor* of your Defence. But your Lordſhip

ſhip, however, promiſes *to regard my Explications as far as is conſiſtent with the declared Deſign and Honour of the Committee itſelf.*

My Deſign in thoſe Explications was very plainly declared; and yet I ſee your Lordſhip has miſtaken it, and raiſed in your ſelf and Readers a ſtrange Idea of the Repreſentation; and have by my Help (as you imagine) found out, what otherwiſe *neither you nor the World could poſſibly have diſcover'd.* The Honour of the Diſcovery is your Lordſhip's own; I had no hand in it, as I will ſhew your Lordſhip when I come to *Pag.* 90. of your Poſtſcript, where your Lordſhip inſults the Committee and me together, and makes us pay too dear in Conſcience for *your* Miſtake. In the mean time I am prepar'd to bear patiently all the Reſentment which ſhall ariſe from the *Honour* your Lordſhip has for the Committee: And when you argue againſt my Explications from *this Topic*; if I can find *how to diſtinguiſh that Part*, I ſhall be very ready in my Turn *to ſhew a particular Reſpect to it.*

We come now to the Merits of the Cauſe. And the firſt Thing I meet with is a *very great Miſtake* charged upon my Repreſentation of your Lordſhip's Senſe. Your Lordſhip has been ſparing in your Quotation, and the *very great Miſtake* is laid upon very few Words.

You lay it upon me (ſays your Lordſhip, *pag.* 82.) *that I write down the Magiſtrate's Power in all Caſes.* How does your Lordſhip prove this to be a Miſtake? Why you affirm, *Pag.* 83. *That one natural Conſequence from the whole Tenor of your Sermon it ſelf, is, That it is the true and proper Buſineſs of the Magiſtate, to concern himſelf with the outward Practice of Virtue, and of every Thing which directly affects the Happineſs of Society.* And *Pag.* 85. The Miſtake is charged again upon my repreſenting you, as ſaying, *That the Magiſtrate has no Obligation to reward the outward Practice of what is good for human Society, or to puniſh the Contrary.*

As to the firſt Paſſage, my Lord, of *writing down the Magiſtrate's Power in all Caſes*; if your Lordſhip had pleas'd to look but Five Lines farther, you wou'd have found thoſe uneaſy Words (*in all Caſes*) fully explain'd and limited by theſe, *in all poſſible Caſes of Religion whatever.* To what Purpoſe then doth your Lordſhip ſay, that you maintain the Magiſtrate's Power in Civil Caſes, when Caſes of Religion only are under Debate? To ſay that your Lordſhip *writes down the Magiſtrate's Power in all poſſible Caſes of Religion*, is ſo far from being my *very great Miſtake* of your Lordſhip's Senſe, that you are going to aſſert this Senſe of your Doctrine your ſelf, in the fulleſt

Extent.

Extent. Your Lordſhip teaches in this *Poſtſcript*, That the Laws of Chriſt are of that Nature, that the Magiſtrate not only ought not, but in Truth cannot encourage them by Temporal Sanctions: Nay, tho' he ſhould attempt to add Temporal Sanctions to the Laws of the Goſpel, yet your Lordſhip's Meaning ſeems to be, *Pag.* 85. *That it is no more adding Sanctions to Chriſt's Laws than to Mahomet's.* Is not this, my Lord, *writing down the Magiſtrate's Power in all Caſes of Religion?* And why, my Lord, muſt the ſame Explication of your Doctrine, be a juſt and proper Defenſe of it in your Hands, and a *very great Miſtake* and Reproach to you in mine? I beg, my Lord, that we may endeavour to underſtand one another in this Debate, and not make it neceſſary to trouble the World at every Turn with an Explication of the moſt obvious and plain Things.

As to the other Paſſage, (*pag.* 24 of my *Anſwer*,) whether the Conſequences charged in it on your Lordſhip's Doctrine, were in your Thoughts or in your Heart (as you intimate they were not,) I have no where preſumed to ſay; and I will add for your Lordſhip's Satisfaction, that I verily believe had they been in your Thoughts, you wou'd have guarded better againſt 'em. But is it, my Lord, unfair in Debates of this Nature, to ſhew the Conſequences of a Doctrine which

the

the Writer had not in his Thoughts? Is there a better, or any other way to ſhew him, to his own Conviction, the Tendency of his Principles, than to ſet before him the Conſequences which are apt to follow from 'em; whether he was aware of them or not, when he taught the Doctrine; and which had he been aware of, perhaps he would not have advanced ſuch Principles? Pray then, my Lord, don't think ſo hardly of me, as to ſuppoſe, that I mean to Charge your Lordſhip with directly maintaining all the Conſequences which I think flow from your Principles: The Argument it ſelf ſuppoſes, that I often think otherwiſe; for when, to ſhew your Lordſhip why you ought to diſlike your Principle, I ſhew you ſuch or ſuch a Conſequence naturally proceeding from it; I ſuppoſe you not to like the Conſequence, otherwiſe it would be a poor Reaſon why you ſhou'd diſlike the Principle.

This Cauſe of Complaint being then removed, it remains only to be conſider'd, whether the Conſequences charged on your Lordſhip's Doctrine do really belong to it or no.

Your Lordſhip's having affirmed, that to add Temporal Sanctions to *Religion, conſidered as Virtue and Charity, under the Belief of a Supreme Governor and Judge, is to act Contrary to the Intereſts of true Religion,*

Religion, as it is plainly oppoſite to the Maxims upon which Chriſt founded his Kingdom; gave me Occaſion to ſay, *pag.* 23, 24. " Does not the Practice of Virtue and " Charity take in every Thing that af- " fects the Happineſs and Well-being of " Mankind in this World? And is this no " Concern of the Magiſtrate's? Becauſe Vir- " tue and Charity, and the contrary Vices " ſhall be rewarded and puniſhed hereafter, " Muſt the World be torn in Pieces in " the mean while without Remedy? And " will it be ſufficient for the Magiſtrate to " ſay, when he is called upon to puniſh " the Offences againſt Virtue and Charity; " This is Religion; theſe are Laws of " Chriſt; he has annex'd Rewards and " Puniſhments to them hereafter, and I will " have nothing to do with them"?

How now does your Lordſhip ſhew the great Miſtake of this? Why, by giving up, I think, all that you have been contending for, by ſhewing the World that Part of your Sermon was ſpent in Condemning a Practice, which now, it ſeems, no Man can practiſe; which 'tis abſolutely impoſſible any one ſhould. Your Lordſhip now teaches, that ſince the Laws of Chriſt require an *outward Practice, conducted by the inward Sincerity of Belief, and the Motives of Religion*;

and

and the Magiſtrate cannot judge of the inward Sincerity and Motives: All he can do is to add Sanctions to the outward Practice, conſidered as affecting Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will: And you add, pag. 85. *It is no more adding Sanctions to Chriſt's Laws than to* Mahomet's. *This ſame outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory, or any Worldly Motive, is ſo far from being Chriſt's Law, that it is diſown'd by him in the Goſpel; and yet it is the Law of Man, as it is the ſame material Action uſeful to Society. But it is Religion and Chriſt's Law ſolely, as it is practiſed upon a Principle of Religion, and a Senſe of Duty. And the Magiſtrate in adding Sanctions to it, does not add Sanctions to a Law of Chriſt, but to a Law of Men.*

If this be the Caſe, that 'tis impoſſible in the Nature of the Thing, that Temporal Sanctions ſhou'd be added to the Laws of Chriſt, what Occaſion was there for your Lordſhip to tell the World, how contrary it is to the Intereſts of true Religion to add 'em? 'Tis altogether as reaſonable to exhort Men not to Fly, as not to add Rewards and Puniſhments to the Laws of Chriſt, if it be as impoſſible to add Rewards and Puniſhments to the Laws of Chriſt, as it is to Fly. This is the Poſition

your Lordſhip is now advancing; you diſtinguiſh between Virtue and Charity as required by Chriſt, and as it can be required by the Magiſtrate. Tho' both ſhou'd require 'em in the ſame Words; and tho' the Magiſtrate ſhould declare it to be his Intention to promote Obedience to the ſame Law, yet the ſame Law wou'd not be one but two; 'tis Chriſt's Law in the Goſpel, but if it gets into the Statute-Book, 'tis as much *Mahomet's Law as Chriſt's Law.* And thus your Lordſhip having proved that Temporal Sanctions *cannot* be added to the Laws of Chriſt, has proved at the ſame Time that the Sermon which was preached to ſhew that they *ought* not to be added, has no Meaning at all. To what Purpoſe does your Lordſhip argue from the Nature of Chriſt's Kingdom, of his Rewards and Puniſhments, from his being *ſole* King and *ſole Judge*, againſt the Uſe of Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments? Was all this to ſhew how unlawful it is to do a Thing, which, it ſeems no body can do? Whoever compares the Principles laid down in the Poſtſcript, in order to the Defenſe of your Sermon, with the Doctrines taught in the Sermon it ſelf, will be apt to conclude, that the Principles are of later date than the Doctrines; for no body can think that your Lordſhip ſpeaks in the Sermon, as one who taught

that Temporal Sanctions *could not* be added to the Laws of the Gospel.

If this Principle holds, the Magistrate may put all the Laws of Christ into his Code, and yet be no Encourager of Religion; for they cease to be Laws of Religion as soon as they come there. By the same Reason, the Magistrate can no more discourage Religion, than he can encourage it; for if the Nature of Religion be such, as not to be within Reach of Temporal Sanctions, the Consequence is, that 'tis no more in the Magistrate's Power to hurt it, than 'tis to cherish it; he can no more oppress it, than he can advance it: And if so, I hope your Lordship will never more complain of Civil Sanctions, as *contrary to the Interest of true Religion, or as opposite to the Maxims of Christ*; but will give us leave to enjoy the Security we think we have from the Laws; and then perhaps the World may soon see that Agreement in this Matter, which your Lordship foretells.

I observe, that your Lordship throughout this Argument calls an Action a Law —— *Because the same Action is a Law of Christ*, Pag. 82. —— *This same good Action -- is not a Law of Christ, or Edict of his Kingdom*, Pag. 84. and elsewhere. I always understood a Law to be a Rule of Action, and

and not the Action it ſelf; but 'tis not for nothing that your Lordſhip has choſen to ſpeak in this Manner. When you found it neceſſary to make the ſame Law, as enacted by Chriſt, and as encouraged by the Magiſtrate, two different Laws; 'twas time to leave the old Way of calling a Law the Rule of Action; for that one Law ſhou'd make two different Rules of Action, *i. e.* that it ſhou'd be the ſame Rule, and not the ſame Rule, was too Knotty a Point to be explained. But your Lordſhip found that the Law being the ſame, yet there was a difference often in the Obedience paid to it, with Regard to the Magiſtrate, and the Obedience required by God: Upon this Difference your Lordſhip diſtinguiſhes the Law into two; and then indeed it was neceſſary to call the Action the Law, for it could be no longer a Rule. You could not, my Lord, be accurate in your Language, if you wou'd humour your Principle. There is a Reaſon and Philoſophy, even in Language, which ſome Doctrines cannot bear; as your Lordſhip will find, when you endeavour to juſtify your Expreſſion, or to ſupport your Doctrine without it.

This Principle being intended for the Ground-Work of your Lordſhip's Anſwer to one Main Article of the Repreſentation, I beg that I may have leave to examine it, without incurring the Imputation of ſo much

Arrogance, as the ſetting up to be your Lordſhip's *Director* implies.

The Doctrine is thus ſet down by your Lordſhip, *Page* 83. *I think it is plain,—— that the very ſame individual outward Action, whether practis'd upon the meaneſt Principle of Human Life, or upon the beſt, is equally the Object of the Magiſtrate's Care, as it equally affects Society; but that this ſame good Action, or outward Practice of Virtue is not Religion, not a Law of Chriſt, nor an Edict of his Kingdom, any otherwiſe than as it is practis'd upon a Principle of Religion, and upon the inward ſincere Belief of a Judgment to come. Of this the Magiſtrate is not a Judge. His Sanctions therefore, conſider'd as a Magiſtrate, are no more than the Sanctions of Human and Social Laws.*

To make this clear, your Lordſhip gives the Inſtance of *Charity*, and ſuppoſes it to be encouraged by the Civil Magiſtrate; upon which Suppoſition you argue thus: *This, I ſay, is only annexing Sanctions to an outward Practice, good and beneficial to Human Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will. It is no more adding Sanctions to Chriſt's Laws than to* Mahomet's. *This ſame outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory, or any Worldly Motive, is ſo far from being Chriſt's Law, that it is particularly diſown'd by him in the Goſpel:*

Gospel: And yet it is the Law of Men, as it is the same Material Action, useful to Society. But it is Religion and Christ's Law solely, as 'tis practis'd upon a Principle of Religion, and a Sense of Duty. And the Magistrate, in adding Sanctions to it, does not add Sanctions to a Law of Christ, but to a Law of Men.

These Passages contain your Lordship's Reasoning on this Point: I shall speak but briefly to it now, expecting a fuller Account of this Principle in your intended Answer. And,

First, It is not true, that outward Actions, as they affect Society only, are the Matter of Human Laws.

Secondly, This Account given by your Lordship, divests the Civil Magistrate and his Laws of all Moral Rectitude.

When your Lordship speaks of the *very same individual outward Action*, as practis'd upon the best, or the meanest Principle of Life; I suppose, you do not intend the same *Numerical* Action, (as the Words import;) for the same Numerical Action cannot be consider'd as proceeding from the best and the worst Disposition; for it cannot proceed from both: I suppose therefore, your Lordship means outward Actions materially

rially the ſame with the outward Actions required by the Laws of Chriſt ; and theſe, you ſay, are the only proper Matter of Human Laws, without any Regard to the inward Principle or Diſpoſition from which they ariſe.

Outward material Actions conſider'd meerly in themſelves, have nothing in 'em to denominate 'em either Good or Bad ; and therefore ſo conſider'd, they cannot be Matter of any Law. Your Lordſhip is ſenſible of this ; and therefore having diſcarded with reſpect to the Civil Laws, the Principles of Morality, and the Goſpel, by which Actions are diſtinguiſh'd ; you introduce the *Good of Society*, as the *ſole* Principle of diſtinguiſhing Material Actions in the Eye of the Civil Law. Allowing this for the preſent, yet it will not ſerve your Lordſhip's Purpoſe, to ſhew, that the Magiſtrate is concern'd with outward Actions only, without Regard to the inward Principle. For I ask, upon what the Enquiry is founded in Criminal Caſes, whether the Thing was done *animo proditorio*, or no ? If this be a proper Enquiry, it muſt terminate in judging of the Man's Diſpoſition, and the Motives upon which he acted ; and if ſo, outward Actions are not the ſole Matter of Civil Laws, tho' we ſhou'd allow the Good of Society to be the only Good they regard. *In maleficiis Volun-*

Voluntatem ſpectari non Exitum, is a Maxim of the *Roman* Law, and, I believe, of every Civil Law in the World; and if this *Voluntas* (Intention) be the Chief Thing regarded by the Law in ſuch Caſes, how comes your Lordſhip to teach, that outward Actions, without Regard to the Intention, are the only Object of the Magiſtrate's Care? There is nothing better known in our own Law, than the Difference between Murder and Manſlaughter: The outward Action is the ſame in both Caſes; the Publick Good is equally affected in both Caſes by the loſs of a Subject; and it may happen to be more affected in the Caſe of Manſlaughter than of Murder, by the loſs of a more uſeful and valuable Subject in this Caſe than in the other. Whence then does the Difference ariſe? Why even from that very Thing which your Lordſhip ſays the Law can take no Notice of, the Intention and Motives of the Action. For this Reaſon, Indictments charge the Criminal not only with the outward Action, but with *Malice*, with acting by *the Inſtigation of the Devil*, and *not having the Fear of God before his Eyes*. Strange Language for a Court to uſe, that has no Right, nay, no Poſſibility of enquiring after the *Malice*, no Pretence to examine whether the Man had the fear of God or not before his Eyes. Why ſhould

not

not every Criminal plead in ſuch Circumſtances, that he is *Coram non Judice*, and vouch your Lordſhip's Authority to juſtify his Plea? 'Tis true, that inward Motives are not ſubject to the Magiſtrate's Power, but as they are manifeſted by outward Actions: But then 'tis ſo far from being true, that outward Actions, as they affect Society, are the only Matter of the Law, the only Object of the Magiſtrate's Care; that indeed the outward Action is rarely conſider'd but as an Indication of the inward Diſpoſition; and upon the Diſpoſition ſo manifeſted, the Judgment is form'd. In Trials for Treaſon, the *Overt-Act*, *i. e.* the outward Action, is not the principal Treaſon, but the Proof of it; and pray, my Lord, what is that Treaſon which is diſtinct from the *Overt-Act*, and which yet is made manifeſt by it? Conſider the Caſe of the betrothed Damſel, in *Deut.* xxii. If ſhe lies with a Man in the City, both Man and Woman die; if in the Field, the Man only dies; the Reaſon is, becauſe in the City ſhe muſt be ſuppoſed conſenting, ſince Help was near if ſhe had called; in the Field ſhe might call and have no Help: But the Man in both Caſes muſt be wickedly diſpoſed. Is it the outward Action in this Caſe, that is the Matter of the Law, or the Magiſtrate's ſole Care? For this Law, though given by

God, was executed by Men, who were appointed Judges of it; and therefore this was a Civil Law; and we ſee in it the Wiſdom of God directing the Civil Magiſtrate how to judge of the Internal Diſpoſition by the External Action.

But if your Lordſhip will ſtill affirm, that the Magiſtrate can in no Caſe judge of the Inward Diſpoſition from which Outward Actions proceed; you muſt maintain, that Outward Actions, with their Circumſtances, can in no Caſe make manifeſt the Inward Diſpoſition; for if they can manifeſt it, then the Magiſtrate has a plain way to judge of it; and if they cannot, then 'tis impoſſible, in any Caſe, for any Man to judge of the Diſpoſition of another: Which if your Lordſhip will maintain, I will not ſay, as I did in another Inſtance, that *you will fight without an Adverſary*; but I believe you will fight (always excepting your good Friend the *Letter-Writer*) without a Second. When our Saviour ſays, *By their Fruits you ſhall know them*; When his Apoſtle ſays, *I will ſhew you my Faith by my Works*; What do they mean? Are they talking of Impoſſibilities all the while; and teaching us to learn from External Actions, what External Actions can never ſhew? In every Caſe of Murder, the Magiſtrate, in his Court, gives

Judgment upon the Intention of the Offender: And I hope your Lordſhip will not ſay, that as often as a Man is accuſed of Murder, ſo often the Magiſtrate invades the Prerogative of God, and ſets up to be a Diſcerner of Hearts. This is a very plain Caſe, my Lord, and to be determin'd by Senſe and Experience: And let the World judge, whether there is ſuch a Thing as knowing the Difference between an honeſt well-meaning Man, and a Criminal: And I only deſire, that every Man who thinks himſelf a Judge in this Caſe, wou'd allow the Magiſtrate to have as much Underſtanding as himſelf, and to be as capable of judging as he is.

The Truth of the Matter, I conceive, lies here. Nothing can be the Matter of a Civil Law, which the Civil Magiſtrate cannot judge of: The Civil Magiſtrate cannot judge of Internal Motives and Diſpoſitions, but by the Means of External Actions: And therefore the Motions of the Heart, before they break out into Action, are exempted from his Juriſdiction. And farther, Outward Actions, and their Circumſtances, being the only Indications of the Inward, which the Magiſtrate has to judge by; as long as the Outward Actions are ſuch as they ought to be, ſuppoſing the Intention right; he has no Concern to enquire

quire whether the Intention be otherwiſe: And therefore if Men act as if they were honeſt, he has no Reaſon to look any farther. Now all this amounts to ſaying, that the Magiſtrate ought not to judge of the Internal Diſpoſition, where there are no Indications from which he can judge, or not ſufficient: But it will never prove, that the Magiſtrate has nothing to do with Internal Diſpoſitions; becauſe where there are ſufficient Indications to judge by, the Reaſon limiting his Power ceaſes. The Caſe of the Magiſtrate is, in many reſpects, like that of a Phyſician, who can ſee nothing but the outward Symptoms of a Diſtemper; but yet 'tis his Buſineſs to judge by them, what inward Part is affected, and how. He cannot ſee the Inwards; but ſhou'd any one ſay, that the outward Appearances are the Sole Objects of the Phyſician's Care, he would not get much Credit by his Account of the Profeſſion. Redneſs and Paleneſs, as they are mere outward Appearances, fall under the Care of ſuch Gentlemen as deal in Beauty-Waſhes; but they are conſider'd by Phyſicians, as Effects leading to a Diſcovery of the inward Evil, which to remove is their proper Care and Buſineſs. In like manner, the Magiſtrate ſees only the External Action; but ſhou'd he confine his Judgment to that only, he wou'd dwindle

into a mere State-Mountebank, and his Laws wou'd be mere Beauty-Waſhes, intended only to make People look well, whether they are in Health or no: And therefore all Magiſtrates, that I ever read or heard of, do conſider External Actions, not merely as ſuch, but as Symptoms and Indications of the internal Diſpoſition. And ſince all the World evidently makes this Uſe of outward Actions; why the Magiſtrate only muſt be neceſſarily blind, and obliged to have leſs Underſtanding than any of his Subjects, (when in Reaſon he ought to have more) is a Secret, which thoſe who have dealt in Politicks hitherto, have not been able to diſcover.

The Thing which ſeems to me to have carried your Lordſhip into this Notion, is your conſidering the Magiſtrate, as annexing poſitive Rewards to Good Actions; which is rarely the Caſe; and the very Attempt to do it, would be in moſt Caſes abſurd and ridiculous. The Civil Magiſtrate encourages Virtue, even as it is beneficial to Society, by puniſhing Offences againſt it; he encourages Sobriety, by puniſhing Drunkenneſs; Religion and Piety, by puniſhing Irreligion and Prophaneneſs; Obedience to his Laws, by puniſhing Diſobedience. If Men do well, the Magiſtrate looks upon 'em as doing their Duty, in virtue

tue of the Obligations they are under, and not as having a Right to be paid by him for their Goodneſs or Religion. And tho' Men who by a Courſe of well doing, arrive to a Reputation of Virtue, are often called out and diſtinguiſhed by the Favour of the Magiſtrate; yet ſuch Favour is beſtowed freely, and is the Effect of the Governor's Judgment and Beneficence, and not the Execution of a poſitive Law which has aſcertained no Reward. And therefore your Friend the Letter-Writer, in asking the Queſtion, whether the Magiſtrate may ſay, (by a Law to that Purpoſe) *Whoſoever loves the Lord, as Chriſt has required, ſhall have a Thouſand Pounds*; has ſhewn that he is very capable of writing a Book upon a Subject he does not underſtand. Whether it was this Qualification that recommended him to your Lordſhip for a proper Second in this preſent Diſpute, is more than I can affirm; but if it was, your Lordſhip has made a happy Choice.

The Reward which thoſe that do well, entitle themſelves to from the Civil Magiſtrate, is Peace, Protection, and Impunity; all which they forfeit as ſoon as they do ill: And therefore when your Lordſhip ſpeaks of the Magiſtrate's rewarding particular good Actions by a particular Reward, you argue from a Caſe that has little Foundation in Fact or

Reaſon. Did you ever hear of a Man that was put upon his Tryal in order to be rewarded for his Sobriety or Chaſtity? No, my Lord, the Courts of Juſtice have nothing to do with a Man till he has offended, or is ſuppoſed to have offended againſt ſome Law. And this is the Reaſon why the Magiſtrate does not enquire into the Motives of good Actions, becauſe he is not obliged to make particular Enquiry after good Actions themſelves; they carry their own Reward with them, they ſecure to the Doers of them the Protection of the Government, from which none are or ought to be excluded, but thoſe who do ill. St. *Paul* exhorts, 1 *Tim.* Ch. 2. *That Supplications, Prayers, Interceſſions, and giving of Thanks, be made for Kings, and for all that are in Authority:* Not that we may get an 100 *l.* a-piece for our Godlineſs and Honeſty; but *that we may lead a quiet and peaceable Life in all Godlineſs and Honeſty.* Peace and Quiet are the proper and natural Rewards which attend on the Subjects Obedience: For the natural Right to a Place at Court is, I aſſure your Lordſhip, a very new Notion. Were the Caſe to be what your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that Men were to claim for their good Actions particular Rewards; the Magiſtrate wou'd as neceſſarily be to enquire into the Motives of good Actions, as he now enquires into the Motives of evil ones. For why ſhould the Magiſtrate diſtinguiſh in an Offender's Caſe by the

Intention

tention which attended the Action; and not diſtinguiſh in like Manner upon Actions ſeemingly good? Does not the Intention equally affect both Caſes; and is it not poſſible to know it ſometimes in one as well as the other? Why then, my Lord, ſhou'd it be conſider'd in one, and not in the other? Were the Magiſtrate to pay a Thouſand Pounds for a good Action, he would conſider whether it was good or no: Unleſs your Lordſhip thinks that in ſuch a Caſe he ought to make no difference between Virtue and the Pretences to it, between ſincere Obedience and Hypocriſy.

The Authority of Scripture appeal'd to by your Lordſhip muſt be conſider'd. You cite *Romans* 13th, and tell us that the Sanctions of the *Roman* Magiſtrate there *deſcribed by St. Paul*, are not the Sanctions of Chriſt's Laws. And what then my Lord? The Magiſtrate, you ſay, who *knew nothing of Chriſt*, who *was an Enemy to the Edicts and Laws of Chriſt's Kingdom*, did not add Sanctions to Chriſt's Laws. Will it follow from hence, that the Magiſtrate who does know him, who *loves his Laws and Edicts*, cannot add Sanctions to 'em? If not, to what Purpoſe is this Inſtance brought? But, my Lord, St. *Paul* requires Obedience to ſome Laws alſo relating to Government, in the 13th to the *Romans*. They too were the *Roman* Governor's

vernor's Laws; are they then become Laws of Chriſt or not? If you ſay not; you muſt affirm, that the Laws enjoined by St. *Paul*, are not Laws of Chriſt: If you ſay they are, then the Magiſtrate's Laws may be the Laws of Chriſt, and by Parity of Reaſon Chriſt's Laws may be the Magiſtrate's Laws.

Is there any Difference in this Caſe, between the Laws of God and of Chriſt? The *Roman* Governor's Laws were not Laws of Chriſt, conſider'd under the Formality of Chriſt's Laws; but many of 'em were Laws of God: Unleſs your Lordſhip will affirm, that the Moral Law is not the Law of God; or that the *Roman* Magiſtrate encouraged no Part of the Moral Law by his Sanctions: For if he did, the Difficulty returns upon your Lordſhip, and you muſt ſhew that the Moral Laws encouraged by the Civil Magiſtrate, are not the Laws of God, any more than the Laws of Chriſt, when attended with Temporal Sanctions, are in your Lordſhip's Opinion the Laws of Chriſt.

The Inſtance your Lordſhip make uſe of to illuſtrate your Doctrine, is, in my Opinion, a very unhappy one. Charity in the limited Senſe of it, as it ſignifies relieving the Wants of others, is the Inſtance; and you were directed to it, you ſay, becauſe I had mention'd it: I don't remember I did, any otherwiſe than by repeating your Words;

Words: However, I am ſure the Account which follows of Charity is entirely your own; I lay no Claim to any part of it. Your Lordſhip ſays, *The outward Action of diſtributing Money, or Neceſſaries, which may ſupply the Wants of others, let it be upon what Principle it will, goes under the General Name of Charity.* Indeed, my Lord, this is great News; I never before heard that giving Money upon what Motive ſoever was Charity: I never thought that bribing Poor Electors in Corporations was Charity (tho' the Money ſo given may ſupply their Wants,) in any Senſe, either Moral, Civil, or Chriſtian. Beſides, what can this Inſtance ſignify to your Purpoſe? You were to produce an Inſtance of a Law of Chriſt encouraged by the Magiſtrate; and to ſhew how it ceaſed to be the Law of Chriſt: In order to this, you ſo define Charity, that 'tis no longer a Law of Chriſt, and then you ſuppoſe the Magiſtrate to encourage it; and, as if the Buſineſs was done, you ſay, Look ye now, is this a Law of Chriſt? No, my Lord, barely giving Money is no Law of Chriſt, whether encouraged by the Magiſtrate or no: And therefore 'tis not the Magiſtrate's encouraging of it, that makes it ceaſe to be a Law of Chriſt. So that this Inſtance is begging the Queſtion; you firſt ſuppoſe the Magiſtrate

to encourage a Law, which is not a Law of Chriſt, and then you prove that the Law ſo encourag'd is not a Law of Chriſt.

Soon after, your Lordſhip ſays, —— *This ſame outward Practice, when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory, or any Worldly Motive, is not a Law of Chriſt: And yet it is the Law of Men, as it is the ſame material Action uſeful to Society.* This, my Lord, to my Apprehenſion, amounts to ſaying, that the ſame Action (ſo your Lordſhip ſpeaks) is and is not the Law of Men. What was you to prove, my Lord? Why, that the ſame Law as enacted by Chriſt, and as enacted by Men makes two different Laws: Your Lordſhip then muſt ſpeak of the ſame Law; what is it then which you deny to be the Law of Chriſt? Why, *Charity*, you ſay, *proceeding from Vain-glory*: Of this you ſay, (for your Argument requires you to ſpeak of the ſame Law) *It is a Law of Men*, i. e. Charity proceeding from Vain-glory is a Law of Men; and yet you add, *as it is the ſame Material Action*, i. e. not conſider'd as proceeding from Vain-glory, it is the Law of Men. And what now does all this amount to? If Human Laws ſhou'd encourage a ſort of Charity which the Goſpel has not encouraged; then, it ſeems, theſe two Cha-

rities wou'd not be the ſame. And what then ?

But if your Lordſhip means (as I ſuppoſe you did) that the ſame outward Action, which the Law of Chriſt requires as the Effect of inward Motives, may alſo be required by the Magiſtrate, 'tis very true: But ſtill the Inſtance is not to the Purpoſe, unleſs it be Charity to buy a good Bargain, to give ſo much Money for ſo much Honour, *&c.* which is juſt ſuch Charity as Men go to Market with every Day. The Reaſon, my Lord, why the outward Act in this Caſe wou'd not be Charity, is not becauſe the Laws of Chriſt cannot be encouraged by the Civil Power; but becauſe in the Nature of the Thing there is a difference between giving and ſelling. To give freely, is Charity; to give upon View of Honour, *&c.* is Merchandize; and ſo it wou'd be, my Lord, were there no ſuch Law as the Law of Chriſt in the World. How this Inſtance then ſhews, that the Laws of Chriſt cannot be encouraged by the Magiſtrate, is hard to be conceived, ſince the Caſe would be the ſame had the Goſpel never been publiſhed.

But do you not ſee, my Lord, that this Inſtance is in it ſelf improper ? You propoſe the Reward of Charity in the general Terms of Honour or Advantage; let the Advantage then be ſpecified, be it Ten, or (as your Friend

has put it in another Caſe) a Thouſand Pounds; What wou'd the Conſequence be? Why ſuch a Law wou'd neceſſarily fall into Stock-Jobbers Hands; and as the Government paid well or ill, ſo Charity wou'd be ſometimes near Par, ſometimes much below it: And if your Lordſhip wou'd allow it to be Charity to give all a Man is worth, every Man wou'd ſoon be worth all which the Law propoſes as a Reward; for if he was worth leſs than the Reward of the Law; why ſhou'd he not part with all, to be worth more, even as much as the Reward of the Law amounts to? In all Events the Government wou'd have a hard Bargain; no body, for the Sake of the Reward, wou'd give all the Reward was Worth; ſo that the Publick would loſe in every Inſtance.

Your Lordſhip may do with this Argument as you think fit. I have but one thing to beg of you, that I may not, for having mention'd Stock-Jobbers (as once before I unhappily mention'd Locks and Bolts) be repreſented as a mere Broker the next Time your Lordſhip or your Second ſet Pen to Paper.

2*dly*, This Account given by your Lordſhip, diveſts the Civil Magiſtrate and his Laws of all Moral Rectitude.

What

What your Lordſhip teaches (the Words have been already produced) amounts to this: "That the Magiſtrate, in the Execu-" tion of his Laws, concerns himſelf only " with *outward Material* Actions, without " any View or Regard to inward Motives " and Principles.

Now outward material Actions, without Regard to inward Motives, have neither Virtue nor Vice in 'em; and therefore he who looks no farther than to the outward Action only, has no Reſpect to Morality; and this, in your Lordſhip's Account, is the Magiſtrate's Caſe. The mere outward Action is ſo perfectly void of Virtue or Vice, that the ſame Action may be either, as it proceeds from different Motives. He that cuts your Throat with a Deſign to Murder you, is a Villain; he that does it with an intent to lance a Tumour, and to ſave your Life, does a Work of Friendſhip and Charity: Not but that in both Caſes the outward Effect may be the ſame, and a Life loſt; for many a Man dies under ſuch an Operation: What now muſt the Magiſtrate do? Shall the Villain and the Friend both be hang'd, or both rewarded? For he who judges only of outward Material Actions, without regarding inward Motives, muſt deal alike with both; and cannot conſider the Morality of the Action in one Caſe, or the

the other. In this Inſtance then there is no room for Reaſon, Equity, or Juſtice, without taking in thoſe Conſiderations which your Lordſhip has expreſly excluded. I know your Lordſhip calls the outward Action *a good Action, and the outward Practice of Virtue*, Pag. 84. but for what Reaſon you call it ſo, your Lordſhip only knows; for if any Thing be certain, this is, that there is no outward Practice of Virtue independent of inward Motives and Principles. Man is a Moral Agent, in conſequence of the Reaſon and Underſtanding given him by God; and as ſuch only, he is ſubject to Laws, and has therefore a Right to be govern'd by Laws of Reaſon: Unleſs it may be ſuppoſed that Men, in conſequence of their Reaſon, are ſubject to Laws which have no Reaſon in them. We are told in Holy Writ, that *he who Rules over Men muſt be juſt*; becauſe their being capable of Juſtice, is the only Reaſon that makes 'em ſubject to Rule. But a Law regarding outward Actions only, is no Rule of Juſtice or Reaſon; and therefore cannot be a proper Direction for a Moral Agent, nor a proper Law for Men. But, as your Lordſhip has ſtated the Caſe, the Civil Law commands only outward Actions, not regarding inward Motives; the Magiſtrate judges of ſuch only: And ſince no Man is bound by a Law to more than the

Law

Law and Lawgiver require, the Subject is likewiſe bound to outward Actions only; which having in them nothing to denominate 'em Moral, 'tis evident that neither Law nor Magiſtrate in commanding, nor Subjects in obeying, have any Views or Ties to Morality.

Your Lordſhip rightly obſerves, that the outward Action may be attended with Effects beneficial to Society, though with reſpect to the Agent there be nothing to denominate it good; (as in the Caſe of Charity upon Motives of Vain-glory, as ſtated in the Poſtſcript.) This Aptneſs in the Action to ſerve the Publick Good, gives it a due Perfection, with reſpect to the Magiſtrate, as your Lordſhip teaches. For this Action, you ſay, is the Law of Men; this the Magiſtrate ought to encourage, and to look no farther. If this be ſo, 'tis evident that the Civil Law reſpects only a *relative* Goodneſs in Human Actions, with regard to the *Publick*; but has no Concern for the *Real* or *Moral* Goodneſs of any Action. And this indeed comes up to the Doctrine of the Sermon, that no Temporal Rewards or Puniſhments ought to attend upon Religion conſider'd as *Virtue and Charity:* For Virtue and Charity are not the meer Effect of an outward Action; which Effect being the only Conſideration before the Magiſtrate in

the

the dispensing Rewards and Punishments, 'tis plain they can never be applied to Virtue and Charity. But I put it to you, my Lord, to consider, whether the Magistrate ought to reward an Action which he knows to proceed from Envy, Malice, Lust, or any other inordinate Affection, because it happens to serve some good Purpose of the Publick? If he ought not, then 'tis plain, that whenever he does, he is mistaken; but if he ought, 'tis as plain that he ought to reward and encourage Vice, if he can make it useful to Society. Chuse which you will, the one is inconsistent with your Doctrine, the other with the Sense and Reason of Mankind. For if the Magistrate does what he ought not, when he rewards an Action evil in it self, how beneficial soever it may be to Society; the Consequence is, that 'tis his proper Business, and shou'd be his Care to encourage real Virtue; and then I hope the Laws of Christ may come under his Protection. But if you allow him to reward an Action evil in it self, whenever it proves, or can be made useful to the Publick; your Lordship's Divinity will outdo *Machiavel*'s Politicks, and justify such Practices as I'm persuaded you hate and abhor.

Your Lordship builds upon a Notion too common among some modern Writers, That 'tis the Magistrate's Office to take Care of the

Publick

Publick Good only. Whether this Definition or Description be perfect, it matters not to enquire; since, I believe, you will hardly find one of any Reputation, who has made that Use of it which your Lordship and your Friend have made. They consider Religion as that which chiefly affects the Publick Good, and is consequently a necessary Part of the Magistrate's Care; but now, it seems, material Actions only affect the Publick Good, and the Magistrate has nothing to do with Religion. This Opinion is so new, that *Grotius* tells us, all the Writers of any Note upon this Subject were of a different Mind: *Omnes denique qui de Re-publica aliquid lectu dignum Scripsere, hoc jus in Sacra non partem tantum summi imperij, sed etiam potissimam atque præcipuam vocant.* And 'tis worth your Lordship's observing, with how much Care the Heathen Moralists laid the Foundation of Civil Society in the Principles of Religion, aud a due Regard to the Honour of God; and what Pains some Christian Politicians have taken to make Religion, and a Regard to the Honour of God, unnecessary to the Being or Well-being of Civil Government. As if no Account were to be made of those many Passages in Scripture, which threaten an irreligious Nation with Destruction; with giving them up into the Hands of their

Enemies, and making them become the Scorn of the Earth. If theſe are not vain Words, then ſurely the Magiſtrate is concerned, even as he tenders the Good of the Publick, to guard the Honour of God and Religion againſt the Inſults of Prophane Mockers; and ought to look upon a Man who labours to propagate Impiety, and a Contempt of Things Sacred, as a worſe Enemy to the State, than the poor Rogue who robs on the Highway. But if Religion has no Influence on the Publick Happineſs, farewel the Bible, for that has taught quite another Doctrine. If your Lordſhip would conſult the Sacred Hiſtory, rather than the Imaginary State of Nature, of which our late Syſtematical Politicians are ſo full, you would ſee Reaſon perhaps to alter your Mind. I wiſh your Lordſhip, when you next ſit down to take Care of the World, and to form Principles of Government for all Nations and Kindreds, and People; inſtead of conſidering the State of a Fairy World, would permit *Noah*, the Second Father of Mankind, to attend at your Council-Board; and would ask him how he inſtructed his Sons in the Duty of Government: You might reaſonably ſuppoſe him to anſwer in this Manner; " To my Sons, I ſaid, You ſee, " my Sons, how wonderfully we have " been ſaved from the Univerſal Ruin: The

" Great

" Great Creator will aſſuredly Re-people the
" Earth again; and you ſhall become Heads
" of many Nations. Remember then, and
" teach your Children after you to know,
" what your Eyes have beheld of the Ter-
" rors of the Lord. You have been Wit-
" neſſes of a World once deſtroyed for
" Impiety; let it therefore, as you value
" your own and your Poſterities Good, be
" your firſt Care to guard and ſecure the
" Honour that is due to God; and, by
" puniſhing the firſt Approaches to Impiety,
" to prevent the ſpreading of the Conta-
" gion; for fear the World ſhould once
" more grow ripe for the Divine Vengeance.
" This your Reaſon wou'd teach you to do,
" tho' you had not had the Exampe of a
" Deluge to warn you: 'Tis the Glory of
" Man that he is a reaſonable Creature; 'tis
" the Glory of Reaſon to know and to
" adore the Creator. Remember then, that
" when you govern Men, The Laws of
" Reaſon are the Golden Rule, and by
" that Rule the firſt Regard is to be paid
" to the Honour of God. This will prove
" a Bleſſing and Security to you, and to the
" Nations yet unborn".

What think you, my Lord? Does the old Patriarch talk Senſe? Had he Reaſon to know that Publick Good was concerned in

the Religion of the People? If he had, I truſt you may ſee a juſt Foundation for the Magiſtrate's Care of Religion: But if the World's being once deſtroyed for Impiety, will not prove that the Publick Good is concerned in the Maintenance of Piety, and the Honour of God, I muſt be content to ſit down in deſpair of ever finding the Truth.

But let Publick Good, or any Thing elſe that your Lordſhip ſhall like better, be the Object of the Magiſtrate's Care; yet whilſt you maintain, that Material Actions only are required, you muſt exclude Morality from the Law: For ſay, that the Magiſtrate requires Actions *Good* for the Publick; yet ſtill the Effect that any Action has, is of no Conſideration as to the Morality of the Action, but as it had a Place in the Intention of the Agent. But your Lordſhip cannot allow the Magiſtrate to enquire, whether the Subject *intended* the Publick Good, or any Thing elſe, by his material Action; for the Reaſons againſt examining the Intention, are equally ſtrong in all Caſes, and therefore the Magiſtrate has no Judgment of the Goodneſs or Badneſs of his Subjects, but only of the Conſequences of their Actions to the Publick. And if this be indeed the Caſe of all Civil Laws, as your Lordſhip repreſents it to be, that they look to outward

Actions

Actions only, without any Concern for the Morality of the Action, the *Roman* Emperor, who made his Horſe Conſul, was certainly in the right; for ſuch a Conſul, and ſuch a Law, ought always to go together.

But what is this Publick Good? Is the Magiſtrate ſubject to the Rules of Reaſon and Morality, in making Laws for Publick Good, or is he not? If he is not, and your Lordſhip will tell us ſo, the Controverſy will be brought to an Iſſue, and the World may be left to be Judge between us. If he is, then 'tis plain that the Rules of Reaſon, and Morality (which are Laws of God) are ſuperior to the Conſiderations of Publick Good, ſince Publick Good is ſubject to be regulated by 'em; and conſequently the Laws for promoting Publick Good, muſt be Laws of Reaſon and Morality, and take in more than mere External Actions: Unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew us how a Law, requiring only External Actions, without any regard to inward Motives, is agreeable to Reaſon and Morality. And whenever your Lordſhip is able to ſhew this, I promiſe you to ſpend the Remainder of my Life, as your Friend tells me I have ſpent what is paſt, *in minding* ſomething elſe than *ſtrict Reaſoning*.

I come

I come now, my Lord, to the Argument, by which you prove the Service done the Magiſtrate in your Sermon. *P.* 82, 83. I read thus : *One natural Conſequence from the whole Tenor of my Sermon it ſelf, is, That it is the true and proper Buſineſs of the Magiſtrate, to concern himſelf with the Outward Practice of Virtue*, &c. I was never ſo puzzled with *a Natural Conſequence* in my Life ; and had been to this Day at a Loſs, but that I found my ſelf ſomething relieved at *p.* 85. where your Lordſhip is upon the ſame Thought again, and thus expreſs it——— *I maintain the very contrary* ; viz. *that Chriſt has annexed no Rewards to that Outward Practice to which alone Civil Authority can reach* ; *but to Outward Practice, conducted by Inward Sincerity of Belief, and the Motives of Religion.* The Natural Conſequence, if I take your Meaning, lies here : *Chriſt has annexed no Rewards to that Outward Practice to which alone Civil Authority can reach* ; therefore Civil Authority ought to annex Rewards to that Outward Practice. I wiſh ſtill I don't miſtake ; for Conſequence I can ſee none. For ſuppoſe, my Lord, that Chriſt did therefore annex no Rewards to that Practice, becauſe 'tis capable of none ; will it follow *naturally*, that the

the Magiſtrate therefore ought to annex 'em? If Chriſt had a good Reaſon not to do it; is it a Natural Conſequence to infer, that the Magiſtrate muſt have a good Reaſon to do it? Yet this is the Caſe; that *Outward Practice, to which alone*, you ſay, *Civil Authority can reach*, is incapable of Reward, becauſe deſtitute of Morality: The True Conſequence of which is, That as Chriſt *did* add no Rewards, *&c.* ſo the Magiſtrate *ought* to add none. 'Tis equally true, that Chriſt has added no Rewards to Internal Principles; for if Men act contrary to 'em, they will not be the better for having them: Will you allow me then to infer, by *natural Conſequence*, that ſince Chriſt has annex'd no Rewards to mere Internal Principles, therefore Somebody elſe muſt add 'em? But there is another Thing which hurts the Conſequence: For the *Outward Practice which Civil Authority reaches*, is no Practice of Virtue, as has been already proved; and then the Tenor of the Sermon can never ſhew, (nor indeed is there any Pretence in it to ſhew,) that the Magiſtrate ought to concern himſelf with the *Outward Practice of Virtue*, which your Lordſhip affirms it does.

Having now ſaid all that I think proper to trouble your Lordſhip with at this time,

time, upon this Important Subject of *Outward Actions*; I beg Leave to lay before your Lordship a Passage out of a Sermon, which I publish'd about Eleven Years ago; not being so vain as to suppose that it can, or ought to be any Direction to your Lordship: But I do it, my Lord, imploring your Protection; and with no other Design in the World, than to keep it out of the Hands of your *Second*; that I may not have a Letter sent me once a Month, to shew my Agreement with your Lordship.

The Passage is this. ——*Serm.* Jan. 31. 170¾. *p.* 7. " Of Obedience there are two " Parts; the External, and Internal. The " External consists in the Outward Conformity of our Actions to the Rules and " Principles of Virtue; the Internal, in " the Sincerity and Purity of the Heart. " The Government of the World is not " concern'd in the Internal Part; for if " Men act as if they were Honest, the " Peace and Outward Order of the World " will be secured, tho' their Hearts are perverse: And therefore the Judgment of " this, God, as he alone is able for it, has " reserved to himself. The External Part " of Obedience is that, in the due Performance of which, the Beauty and Order of the World consists; and there-

" fore this is the proper Care of the Gover-
" nors of the World. The ſame holds in
" Religion, which is the Service of God:
" There are Duties which none are con-
" cerned in, but God and our own Souls;
" ſuch as Faith, Repentance, and the like,
" the Virtue of which is internal, of the
" Heart. But God requires likewiſe an ex-
" ternal and viſible Worſhip from us, in
" which, outward Order and Decency
" are *required*, but not *determined*; and
" therefore muſt be left to their Juriſdiction
" to whom we are anſwerable for our
" outward Behaviour in all Things". If this Paſſage can be of any Uſe to your Lordſhip, 'tis entirely at your Service; if not, I hope you'll pardon the Concern I have expreſs'd for my own Quiet, in making it Part of my Addreſs to YOUR SELF. You, my Lord, are happy in many Seconds. I expect no body to do my Buſineſs for me, and therefore wou'd not have it grow too faſt upon my Hands.

In the next Place, I am to thank your Lordſhip for *returning* my Syllogiſm again, *P.* 86. I wiſh you had return'd it fairly as you receiv'd it, that it might have been own'd; but now you muſt needs take it home again, for 'tis as much *Mahomet*'s Syllogiſm as mine.

Thus it runs: *Temporal Punishments, you affirm, are not proper to enforce the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom:*

But many of the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom, as to the Matter of 'em, (for so only we can mean) are Laws of Reason, and of great Importance to Society.

Therefore, according to you, for the Temporal Magistrate to enforce by Temporal Punishments, &c.

The first Proposition, as it is mine, is as fit to support any Thing else, as the Conclusion drawn from it. Did I not expresly say in the Sermon it self (and not afterwards when I found there was Occasion for it) *That it ought to be remembred, that the Arguments from the Nature of Religion, and of Christ's Spiritual Kingdom, against the Use of Temporal Punishments, are conclusive only as to the Ministers of that Kingdom, and cannot extend to the Civil Magistrate?*

I find, my Lord, you are resolved not to remember this; and therefore you charge me in the Consequence with extending the Arguments to the Civil Magistrate, which I had expresly said, ought not *to be so extended.*

Is this, my Lord, *a good Manner of Writing*, and fair Usage of an Adversary? I am sorry the Cause wants such Supports;

more

more ſorry that your Lordſhip ſhould condeſcend to uſe ſuch.

Your Lordſhip has been ſo kind in this ſhort *Poſtſcript*, to give me an Inſtance how you wou'd defend my Doctrine, if I wou'd be content to let it paſs for the ſame with your own: In Confidence of the like Favour I'll propoſe an Objection to you, of which in *that Caſe* I ſhou'd be very apprehenſive.

Suppoſe then, that I had, upon the publiſhing your Lordſhip's Sermon, profeſſed myſelf to be in your Sentiments; and had maintain'd, that the Argument from the Spiritual Nature of Chriſt's Kingdom, or Chriſt's Miniſters, (which you pleaſe) did entirely exclude the Magiſtrate from adding the Sanctions of this World to the Laws of Chriſt: Suppoſe ſomebody had ſent me a Letter to ſhew *my Inconſiſtency* with my ſelf, and had proved it thus: " You ſay now, Mr. Dean, " that the Argument drawn from the Spi- " ritual Nature of Chriſt's Kingdom ex- " cludes the Magiſtrate from adding Sancti- " ons to the Laws of Chriſt: But how " comes this Doctrine to pleaſe you now, " which diſpleas'd you in 1712? You had " then an Occaſion to conſider this Argu- " ment, and your Thoughts are in Print; " and tho' you allow the Argument to be " good againſt the Church's Pretenſion to " Temporal Power, yet you expreſly in

"the plaineſt Words, reject the Argument "with reſpect to the Civil Magiſtrate. See "your own Words: *It ought always to be* "*remembred*, &c. Had any body elſe after "this expreſs Declaration, charged the Do-"ctrine, as excluding the Magiſtrate's Power "in all Caſes of Religion, you wou'd have "had Reaſon to have reſented the Injury; "what then muſt we think, now we ſee you "are doing this Thing your ſelf? The Argu-"ment was the ſame in 1712 as in 1717. The "Views perhaps are altered".—— Tell me, my Lord, how I might anſwer this Charge; Tell me, I ſay, or elſe quit your own. Or if you think both may ſtand together, e'en part with your Man of *Weight and Abilities*, and ſpeak the ſame plain *Engliſh* with your Friend, and tell me, once for all, *my Sermon is Nonſenſe*.

But this is not all. In the ſecond Propoſition, your Lordſhip has rejected your own Words which I made uſe of, (*The Laws of Chriſt are almoſt all*) and changed 'em into theſe, (*many of the Laws*, &c.) Your Lordſhip does not uſe to be diſpleaſed at any Thing of your own, how then come you to reject your own Words now? Was the former Expreſſion leſs to your Purpoſe than the latter? No, but your Lordſhip had found in the Letter a very poor Cavil at my Syllogiſm

founded

founded on your Lordſhip's Words which I had uſed; and your Lordſhip changed the Terms to countenance your Friend's learned Obſervation, who found out that the Minor Propoſition of my Syllogiſm was particular, and the Concluſion general. And now, my Lord, (ſince we muſt come to Boys Play) let us conſider whether the Minor be particular or no. Pray what did your Lordſhip mean by ſaying, *They* (the Laws of Chriſt) *are almoſt all Appeals to the Will of God, to his Nature known by the common Reaſon of Mankind*? I underſtood you to mean, that the Moral Law was the main of the Goſpel; and that your Lordſhip by thoſe Words *(almoſt all)* did not intend to deny of any Moral Law, that it is a Law of Chriſt, but only to avoid affirming, that every Law of Chriſt is a Moral Law: Your Propoſition then is certainly equivalent to this, *The Laws of Chriſt comprehend all Moral Laws.* If you diſallow this, be pleaſed to tell us what Moral Law is not a Law of the Goſpel? If you do allow it, pray put it into the Place of your own Words as they ſtand in my Propoſition, and then conſult with your Friend whether it be general or particular: And if you find it to be general, the Conſequence will be good, without asking leave of your Lordſhip or your Second. Remember, on another Occaſion how Angry your Lordſhip was, that your own Senſe

was

was not repreſented in your own Words; and yet how readily did your Lordſhip ſupport a Cavil, for which there had been no ground, if I had not uſed your own Words? for I aſſure your Lordſhip, I choſe them not, as being moſt proper, but only as being yours. And I hope your Lordſhip will inſtruct your Seconds better, than to fall foul on your own Propoſitions, whenever they meet them in an Adverſaries Book.

But the weightieſt Matter is yet behind. In drawing up your Syllogiſm, you have affirmed, that *the Laws of Chriſt are, as to the Matter of 'em only, Laws of Reaſon.* And this you affirm in my Name, as well as in your own, for you add (*ſo only WE can mean*;) I do aſſure your Lordſhip, I never did mean ſo in my Life, nor ever will. I ſee what your Lordſhip intends; you had been told, that if the Magiſtrate cou'd not add Sanctions to the Laws of Chriſt, he cou'd not add them to the Laws of Reaſon and Morality; it ſeems you do not like this Conſequence; and therefore to enable him to add Sanctions to the Moral Law, you now affirm, that Moral Laws are not the ſame with Chriſt's Laws, but only *as to the Matter*, *i. e.* they are the ſame with Chriſt's Laws, juſt as you teach Civil Laws may be the ſame, that is, in ſuch a manner, that

that they are as much *Mahomet's Laws as Christ's Laws.*

But pray consider, Are not the Laws of Nature and Reason, Laws of God? And does not God require inward Obedience as well as Christ? Does not Reason teach us to act upon Principles of Religion in Expectation of a future Judgment? How then are the Laws of Reason the same with the Laws of Christ, as to Matter only, when both require the same Internal and External Obedience? This Account not only destroys Natural Religion, by making it a Law of External Actions only (which have no Morality in them) but it undermines Reveal'd Religion also; which is built upon the Principles of Natural Religion, and cannot stand without 'em. *On these two Commandments* (both of 'em Moral Laws) says our Lord, *hang all the Law and the Prophets.* The Moral Precepts are antecedent to Revelation; and such Laws they are, from which the Precepts of the Law, and the Prophets, and the Gospel, are deduced: But can the pure Laws of the Gospel, which require inward Obedience, be deduced from a Law requiring only an outward material Obedience, not regarding inward Motives, and which, in your Lordship's Opinion, are as nearly allied to the Laws of *Mahomet*, as of Christ?

As

As ſeverely as I've been rebuked for one Syllogiſm, I'll venture upon another, and leave it to your Lordſhip's Conſideration.

The Laws of Reaſon, and the Moral Laws of God, are the ſame.

But (your Lordſhip affirms) the Laws of Chriſt are the ſame as to the Matter only with the Laws of Reaſon.

Therefore, the Laws of Chriſt are the ſame as to the Matter only with the Laws of God.

Will you hold the Concluſion, my Lord, or will you part with the Premiſes? And ſince *ſomething* you muſt part with, if you will not be offended at me, I wiſh you once more the happier Choice: And ſo proceed to what remains in your *Poſtſcript*.

At pag. 87. your Lordſhip ſays, *I think I ſee plainly that a Perſon may maintain the Maxims or Motives of this World to be contrary to thoſe Motives upon which Chriſt's Religion was founded by himſelf, who beſt knew what was contrary to its Intereſts; without maintaining, either that Worldly Motives always deſtroy all true Religion, or that it is impious and wicked (as your Words are,* pag. 26.) *in any to apply 'em, in thoſe Points I truly intended in my Sermon: —— And I think this as plain, as it is, that I may maintain immenſe Riches to be in their Tendency Contrary to VIRTUE, without*

without ſuppoſing, either that they always actually deſtroy it; or that 'tis impious and wicked for a Man to leave a great Eſtate to his Son. If I wou'd Anſwer this according to the Example ſet by your Friend, and approved by your Lordſhip, I ſhou'd tell you that the Secret is now out; and that all this Buſtle is with a View to leave a great Eſtate to your Son.——But, my Lord, I know better how to take than to return ſuch Uſage; and ſhall only ſay, that I cou'd leaſt of all have expected from a Friend of your Lordſhip's. The Point your Lordſhip now will maintain, if I take you right, is, That the Motives of this World, particularly the Sanctions of Human Laws, are contrary to the Motives of the World to come. And, That to apply them in the Caſe, and on Account of true Religion, is to act contrary to its Intereſts, to do what tends to its Deſtruction.

If ſo, my Lord, I deſire to know, *First*, Whether that Supremacy which is inſeparable from the Imperial Crown of this Realm, does not carry in it a Power of applying, and a Truſt obliging to the Application of the Sanctions of Human Laws, in the Caſe and on Account of True Religion? *Secondly*, Whether any one ought to be inveſted with a Power of doing, or may receive a Truſt obliging him to do, what is contrary to the

Interests of true Religion, and tends to the Destruction of it?

This is indeed a *Main Point*; in the Resolution of which, the *Civil Power*, as well as Religion, is greatly concerned. And, if you will uniformly maintain, what you have, first, in your Sermon, and now in this your *P.S.* affirmed, you will so justify one Charge in the Representation, as will also abundantly justify *that Person, who*, as your Lordship has heard, *was thereby determined to enter into*, and be zealous for *the Condemnation of what you had Preached.* And you will save him, at least, the Trouble of contending with you.

As to the other Point relating to Christ's Authority, your Lordship esteems my Concessions a *Reward worthy of all your Labour*; but if the Concessions be not the Effect of your Labour, I don't see how it can be the Reward of it. But your Lordship is so fond of the Noble Subject of Absolute Authority, that the World must be told, that 'tis owing to your Labours, that there is a Man who disclaims it. Well then; I am, I must be your Convert; will you now be content with my Concessions, and let the Subject rest, since we are agreed in it? Not for the World: What, quit Absolute Authority! *Conscience and Judgment* require the Contrary; Nay, the *Honour of the Committee too*;

the

the Majority of which, you ſay, *are not ſo blind, as not to ſee that They and I are as diſtant from one another in our Sentiments, and the Grounds on which they are built, as they and you can poſſibly be ſuppoſed to be.* i. e. Tho' I have diſclaim'd Abſolute Authority, yet ſtill you are reſolved the Majority of the Committee ſhall hold it; and for no other Reaſon that I can ſee, but becauſe your Lordſhip finds it neceſſary to write againſt it. But pray, my Lord, how do you diſcover this great Diſagreement in Sentiments, between me and the Majority of the Committee? Is it, that we agreed in the ſame Repreſentation? Or what elſe is it that has entitled your Lordſhip to judge of our Sentiments and inward Motives, and to exerciſe that Power as a private Man, of which all the Powers in the World, (as you teach us) are utterly incapable.

If I have indeed given ſuch an Account of the Repreſentation as your Lordſhip ſays I have, you had Reaſon to think that the Majority of the Committee and I were of different Sentiments. Your Lordſhip *wonders to find your ſelf ridiculed* (as you are pleaſed to call it) *for ſuppoſing that the Committee meant to ſupport their Charge, by what they quoted out of your Sermon; and for not imagining that they made ſeveral Citations from thence, profeſſedly to*

ſupport it, without any ſuch View or Deſign. (How my Lord!) *profeſſedly to ſupport it without any ſuch View* of ſupporting; I hope your Lordſhip don't always mean by *no Views*, ſuch as are conſiſtent with doing the very thing denied profeſſedly: *Becauſe*, (your Lordſhip adds,) *I think this a much harder Reflection upon their Repreſentation than upon me: And I ought to have begg'd Pardon of them, if I had once admitted ſuch a Thought, 'till I had it in publick under the Hand of one of Themſelves.* Well then; you have it under my Hand, and in Publick too, that *the Committee meant* not *to ſupport their Charge, by what they quoted out of your Sermon*; and, *that they made ſeveral Citations from thence profeſſedly to ſupport it, without any ſuch View or Deſign.*

And now, my Lord, I muſt beg to know where *this Publick Declaration under my Hand* may be found; for I do aſſure you I am an utter Stranger to it. I find, indeed, in my Anſwer, pag. 56. theſe Words: *The Repreſentation has produced out of his Lordſhip's Sermon, ſome Paſſages, where* (in which) *the Doctrines which are conceived to ſubvert the Government of the Church, and thoſe* (Doctrines) *relating to Abſolute Authority, are mixed together: The Committee fix their Charge on the fomer* (Doctrines)

ctrines,) *his Lordſhip will Anſwer to the latter: And no doubt the World about us will improve by the Controverſy.*

But this cannot be what your Lordſhip means; for here is nothing to *ridicule* your Lordſhip; nothing to juſtify your intimating, that the Committee quoted Paſſages out of your Sermon, without meaning to ſupport their Charge by 'em. What I have ſaid, amounts to this, That the Paſſages produced in the Repreſentation, do (ſome at leaſt) contain the Doctrines againſt Abſolute Authority, and thoſe againſt all Authority, mix'd together; that they were ſo blended, that one cou'd not fairly be produced without the other: And therefore, I ſay, *The Committee added, to prevent Miſtakes, ſhort Obſervations of their own, which were intended to point to the Thing they found fault with.* How does this reflect upon the Honour of the Committee? Or juſtify your Lordſhip in ſuppoſing a *declared* Deſign in the Committee, different from their *Secret* and *Real* Deſign? Your Lordſhip has expreſs'd ſuch a Senſe of this Injury done to the Committee, that I cannot but hope, that when you find it to have riſen from your ſelf only, you will do, what you have profeſsd you ought to do in ſuch a Caſe, *beg their Pardon.*

Your

Your Lordſhip has had no better Fortune in your Secret Hiſtory, than in your Diſcocovery of this Secret Deſign of the Committee. Your Lordſhip, *pag.* 87. repreſents me *as the moſt inflexible in making this a Matter Perſonal upon you by Name.* I do aſſure your Lordſhip there was ſo little Room for any one to be inflexible in this Point, that I don't remember there was any Difference in Opinion about it: There was ſome Debate whether the Sermon ſhou'd be mention'd; but whether your Lordſhip by Name ſhou'd be mention'd, was never diſputed: The Biſhops and Clergy, thoſe of the Upper and Lower-Houſe were, to the beſt of my Knowledge, unanimous in their Judgment, that your Lordſhip by Name, and your Doctrines in your own Words, ſhou'd be in the Repreſentation.

The next Piece of Secret Hiſtory (for ſo I muſt call it) is to be met with, *pag.* 91, 92. Your Lordſhip has found Hiſtory, and, it ſeems, I muſt find Application; for *I leave the Application of this* (you ſay) *to your ſelf.* Your Lordſhip mentions this Hiſtory as *founded* on a Declaration, and tells me, that I *muſt remember it.* Indeed I do not, nor have I met with the Declaration referr'd to: But be it true or falſe, in Obedience to your Lordſhip I will apply it. And thus I reaſon upon the Caſe: If what

was

was then designed was right, neither your Lordship nor I must complain; if it was wrong, it will not follow, that because something was wrong relating to Convocation Twenty Years ago, therefore nothing done in Convocation can be right now: So that under either View your Lordship's History is nothing to the purpose: Unless your Lordship too has sometimes a *Secret Purpose*, which you do not care to own. But after all your Complaints, you own *pag.* 87. that I acted according *to the Trust reposed in me*: This Declaration, my Lord, is worth all *my Labour*; and now your Lordship and I have rewarded each other to mutual Satisfaction: But then, *pag.* 92. you declare *you will never suffer upon any Account in the World any such Trust to be reposed in you.* How, my Lord! have you not the same Trust reposed in you? What is the Trust of a Clergyman, that is not the Trust of a Bishop? What of a Member of the Lower-House, which is not also of a Member of the Upper? Your Lordship, I suppose, can Explain this, and when you do, I shall be ready to examine it.

In the mean Time, I must not forget the good Words your Lordship has bestowed on me. *Pag.* 86. *you promise neither to make Merry with the Manner, nor the Matter of my Arguments; but whatever you think of both, to treat 'em as coming from a Person of great*

great Abilities and Weight. Can you do this, my Lord, *whatever you think of the Arguments?* I ſee your Lordſhip's Reſpect for me is juſt what you have deſcrib'd Civil Obedience to be, an *outward Material Action* independent of *inward Motives* and Principles. By this Rule, I ſuppoſe, I am to underſtand what your Lordſhip ſays, *Pag.* 91. That you are pleaſed to think that ſo *able and ſo learned a Man* is engaged with you in this Controverſy. 'Tis fair however, my Lord, to give the World Notice that they are not to conclude what you *think* of an Adverſary, by the good Words or good Uſage he has from you. For my own Part, I am ſo apt to ſpeak as I think, that I cannot engage to return your Lordſhip *ſuch* Civilities: And in truth, when I firſt read theſe good Words in the *Poſtſcript*, I was in pain for my ſelf; for a Compliment from your Lordſhip, is like a warning of a Clock, you are ſure to *ſtrike* ſoon after. And accordingly, at *Pag.* 90. This Man of *Weight and Abilities* is ſet forth; there he is at full Length, a Contriver of *Labyrinths to lead the Reader in backwards and forwards, till he has loſt Sight of every Thing that can lead him out again:* In a word, one who has defended his Sermon in ſuch a manner, as will ſerve *to defend any Sermon in the World*, Pag. 91. This, my Lord, is plain ſpeaking; and I'll

give you back the Compliments into the Bargain, if you will but make good this part of the Character. I am not ſo uneaſy under it, as to call with any great Eagerneſs upon your Lordſhip to undertake it. Do as you pleaſe; but this I promiſe, that whenever your Lordſhip will venture loſing your ſelf in *this Labyrinth*, I will certainly be at Leiſure to ſhew you the way out again. And if you think, that the Letter to which the *Poſtſcript* is joined, has done the Work to your Hands; if your Lordſhip will make it your own, by declaring that you'll juſtify and ſtand to the Doctrines and Conſequences of it; if you will put but a little of your Reputation upon this Iſſue; though I had as live teach Children to Read, as Anſwer his Letter; yet for your Lordſhip's Sake, I may be tempted to ſubmit even to this Employment.

'Tis an happy Talent, to be able to give a Reader the very worſt Idea of an Adverſary, and ſuch Impreſſions as the roughest Language cou'd not convey; and at the ſame time to poſſeſs him with an Opinion of the Writer's Meekneſs, Charity, and Benevolence! To open his Mind by great Profeſſions of Candor; and, when 'tis prepar'd, to ſlide in ſuch a Character, as wou'd not be receiv'd from an angry Pen! The Smiles, the Compliments, the good Wiſhes

of ſuch an Adverſary, are very *precious Balms*; but ſuch they are, as always *break the Head.*

I ſhall leave this to your Lordſhip's Conſideration; adding only the *Roman* Hiſtorian's Reflexion upon the Conduct of *Domitian*—— *Et quo contentius abuteretur patientiâ hominum, nunquam triſtiorem Sententiam ſine præfatione Clementiæ pronuntiavit: ut non aliud jam certius atrocis Exitus Signum eſſet, quam Principij Lenitas.*

Sueton. in Vitâ Dom.

As to my *own Manner*, which your Lordſhip complains of; tho' I ſhall always think my ſelf at Liberty to Examine an Argument, as it deſerves to be examined; yet will I never willingly offend againſt the Rules of Decency, with reſpect either to your Epiſcopal, or Perſonal Character: Of the firſt, your Lordſhip knows no Ill can be ſaid; of the other, I often have ſaid Good.

But the Thing that now ſurprizes me, is, That your Lordſhip ſhould think it proper, on any Account, to add a *Poſtſcript* to ſuch a Letter. I have no Complaint againſt your Friend; He has a *Natural Right* to be like himſelf, and to write like himſelf: And therefore when he tells me roundly, that *my Sermon*, without his Comment, is *Nonſenſe*; I am under no Concern to anſwer him;

him; but am willing to leave it to the World to judge, whether this be Want of Sense in him, or in me.

But these Things stand in another Light, as they come into the World Approved and Recommended by your Lordship. Look, my Lord, and see with what Candor he represents me, as having no Concern but for the Goods and Revenues of the Church; *p.* 38. I had compared Negative Discouragements to Locks and Bolts, to shew that both are intended merely for Security; but neither the one are supposed to make People honest, nor the other to make them profess a Religion they cannot approve. What says your Friend to this? Why he finds my *Secret* out; That I mean nothing by the *Church*, but the *Goods and Revenues of the Church.* Try this Reasoning, my Lord, upon the Parable of the Talents, *Mat.* 25. Our Saviour compares the Kingdom of Heaven to a Man taking a Journey; who left to his Servants, some One Talent, some more: At his Return he accounts with 'em, and those who had made most of their Talents, are most rewarded: Would you advise your Friend to say, Oh! here is the Secret of the Gospel come out: 'Tis all turning the Penny; and He is the Best Christian, who makes most Interest of his Money? Or shou'd he say so without your

Advice, wou'd your Lordſhip add a *Poſtſcript* to the Comment, and lend the Authority of your Great Name, to ſpread it far and wide in the World? But why ſhould I ask your Lordſhip, whether you would do, what I have already ſeen you do? Nay more, my Lord, you ſet the Example your ſelf. Dr. *Snape* had ſaid, *That the Deſirable Work* (of the Reformation) *was not compleated, till the Earthly Rulers, being themſelves Converted, Eſtabliſh'd and Confirm'd it by Temporal Sanctions:* Your Lordſhip replies upon him; *A Sentence, Sir, which if it be duly conſider'd, muſt be very ſhocking to every Chriſtian Mind; unleſs the Deſirable Thing in Chriſt's Kingdom be Riches and Power. All who have not forgot the very Name of Jeſus Chriſt, and ALL his Words relating to this Subject, muſt know what to think of it.* What Tragedies are here! And yet I believe no Chriſtian, except your ſelf, ſaw any ſuch Meaning in the Doctor's Words: Nay, 'tis impoſſible this ſhou'd be his Meaning, for the Caſe was in Fact otherwiſe. The Reformation carried off both Power and Riches from the Church; and where-ever it prevail'd, this was one conſtant Effect of it; for which Reaſon the Worldly-minded Churchmen were, and are ſtill againſt it. Pray, my Lord, what Acceſſion of Riches and Power

was

was made to your Lordſhip's Biſhoprick at the *Reformation*, or to any other? How could you then, my Lord, underſtand the Words in this Senſe? Did you never read the Preamble to Queen *Elizabeth*'s Act of Uniformity in the *Common-Prayer-Book?* I will Tranſcribe it for your Uſe, to ſhew you what was the *deſirable* Work compleated by the Earthly Rulers. "Whereas at the "Death of our late Sovereign Lord King "*Edward* the Sixth, there remained one "uniform Order of Common Service, and "Prayer, and of the Adminiſtration of Sa-"craments, Rites and Ceremonies, in the "Church of *England*, which was ſet forth "in one Book, entituled, *The Book of* "*Common-Prayer, and Adminiſtration of* "*Sacraments*, and other Rites and Ceremo-"nies in the Church of *England*, Autho-"rized by Act of Parliament holden in the "Fifth and Sixth Years of our ſaid late So-"vereign Lord King *Edward* the Sixth; "entituled, *an Act for the Uniformity of* "*Common-Prayer, and Adminiſtration of Sa-*"*craments*; the which was repealed and "taken away by Act of Parliament, in the "Firſt Year of the Reign of our late Sove-"reign Lady Queen *Mary*, to the *great* "*Decay of the due Honour of God, and Diſ-*"*comfort to the Profeſſors of the Truth of* "*Chriſt's Religion.*" Do you yet perceive,

my Lord, what was the *desirable Work* that was begun under *Edward* VI., that *decay'd* under Queen *Mary*, and was compleated under Queen *Elizabeth*? The Professors of the Truth were comforted or discomforted, as the *Honour of God revived or decay'd* by the Encouragement of Earthly Powers. But now the very Mention of this desirable Work, is Handle enough to represent all whom your Lordship likes not, as meer Worldlings. But why must all suffer thus? Why must I? ——Had I ever encouraged any body to abuse the whole Clergy of the Nation, in order to exalt my own Character, and to make way for my Friend to call upon all Men of *Station* and *Fortune*, to do *Honour* and Service to so *generous a Patriot* of the Publick, and so *faithful a Steward* of the Gospel; had I, upon Pretence of exhorting others to Submission, under the hard Terms of *not tasting the Beneficence* of the Government in a distinguishing Manner, shewn how uneasily I bore the want of Preferment my self; your Lordship would have had some Colour to think me not a little concerned for the Riches and Glories of this World. ——But I believe your Lordship is not unwilling that I shou'd say no more on this Subject.

But give me leave, my Lord, to observe to you, how you aggravate this Charge on the

the Doctor. After having loaded him with your own very *unjust Comment* on his Words, you add, *I will say no more now of it, but that it is worthy of him, who contends professedly for making Religion a Civil Test; for debasing the most Sacred Thing in the World, into a Political Tool, and an Engine of State.* Who this Sentence is *worthy of*, I cannot tell; but sure I am, 'tis very *unworthy* of your Lordship. This, my Lord, is a Censure not only on the Doctor, but upon the common Sense and Reason of Mankind, upon all Times, and all Nations of the World: For pray consider, Is not Religion the Test in every Case where an Oath is required? And name, my Lord, the Time, or People who have not used it. The Old Testament, and the New, afford us Examples and Precepts to justify the Practice; so do all the Histories extant, of all Times and People. And do you think, my Lord, that the great Secret was reserved for your Discovery; and that the World after so many Ages were to be untaught by your Lordship, what they had ever practised upon the Principles both of Natural and Revealed Religion? There is not a Cause, be it never so trivial, tried in *Westminster-Hall*, but Religion is made a Civil Test; and is it right, my Lord, to require this Test of a Man's Honesty, before he is admitted an Evidence in a Five Shilling Cause;

Cauſe ; and is it impious to require it, when he is admitted to a Place of Truſt in the Government, and has, in part, the Lives or Fortunes of the Nation committed to his Fidelity ? Is it reaſonable to require this Teſt of a Witneſs before the Property in an Horſe ſhall be put upon his Evidence ; and is it abſurd and infamous to require ſome Security, when the Preſervation of the Eſtabliſh'd Church is the Point in Queſtion ? Religion, my Lord, is therefore the propereſt, the only proper Teſt of a Man's Honeſty, becauſe it is the moſt *Sacred Thing in the World* ; and yet this, with your Lordſhip, is a Reaſon why it never ſhou'd be a Teſt :- Take away this, that Religion is a Sacred Thing, and then going to a Play wou'd be as good a Teſt as going to Church ; and a Bow to a Judge might qualify a Witneſs, as well as his Appeal to God by Oath. But I ſee, my Lord, the Cauſe is to be maintained at any Rate ; and that the Controverſy is to be managed by appealing to the Paſſions, or even the Follies of Mankind.

Before I take my leave, I deſire to ask your Lordſhip, whether you will be anſwerable for your Friend's Defenſe of your Doctrine ? He has enter'd himſelf *your Second*, and you have own'd him by your *Poſtſcript* ; will you ſtand to his Plea in your Behalf, and juſtify his Aſſertions ? If you ſhou'd, there

there will be worſe Work upon your Hands than ever I imagined. See how he defends that Paſſage in your Sermon, —— *If any Man upon Earth have a Right to add to the Sanctions of his Laws*, &c. *they are ſo far Kings in his ſtead*, &c.

The Charge upon this Paſſage, is, That you condemn all Magiſtrates who add Sanctions to Chriſt's Laws. To prove that you do condemn 'em, it has been inſiſted on, that your Words amount to ſaying, that all who add Sanctions do uſurp the Dominion of Chriſt and dethrone him. So that the main and only Point is, whether you condemn the Magiſtrate or no, for adding Sanctions: The Proof lies upon this, Whether you charge him with uſurping the Dominion of Chriſt or no, when he does add them. And what ſays your Friend to this? Why he was ſo full of this *dethroning* that he loſt Sight of the main Point, and therefore to clear your Lordſhip from no body knows what, he affirms that your Words do not amount to a Charge of *dethroning* Chriſt: for, as he learnedly expreſſes himſelf, *if they dethrone Chriſt, then Chriſt is totally exempted from ALL Power: But his Lordſhip's Propoſition directly aſſerts* ſome *Power to Chriſt ſtill*, Pag. 25. And this he proves from thoſe material Words, *ſo far*. He allows then, my Lord, that you do affirm, that

Chriſt is *ſo far* (tho' not totally) diveſted of Power; which is juſt as if a Lawyer on a Trial for Treaſon, ſhould plead, that his Client invaded one Kingdom, that of *Ireland* for Inſtance, but did not totally diveſt the King of *all* Power, for he left him *Great Britain* ſtill. If you allow this Defenſe, then we ſay, To diveſt Chriſt of any of his Power, is impious: But your Lordſhip allows, that the Magiſtrate in adding Sanctions to his Laws does ſo far, (tho' not totally) diveſt him. And thus your *Second* has juſtified that hard Word *impious*, which ſo much diſpleaſed you.

Again, your Friend labours much about Laws of Reaſon and Chriſt, (upon which Subject he is always unhappy) to ſhew that there are ſome which the Magiſtrate's Power cannot reach, becauſe he cannot judge in inviſible Caſes: But then he puts the Queſtion to himſelf, *pag.* 32. *But in Caſes where it is viſible that Men break the Laws of Chriſt, can the Magiſtrate interpoſe?* If it affects not the State, he is of Opinion he cannot. But now for the Reaſon: Why truly the Magiſtrate muſt not judge in *viſible* Caſes, becauſe he cannot judge in *inviſible* ones; or in his own Words, *For what Sanctions can any Man have a Right to add, to make a Chriſtian love his Neighbour, who can never know whether a Man complies*

or

or not ? How happy are you, my Lord, in a Second !

The Authority of the Magiſtrate to enforce Obedience to the plain Laws of Religion, was the main Point your Friend had to ſpeak to. I had diſtinguiſhed between the Points in which Men differ, and thoſe in which their Reaſon will not permit them to differ ; and aſſerted the Magiſtrate's Right to add the Sanctions of this World, to make Men do what the Light of their own Minds teach them they ought to do ; and that with reſpect to Religion, as well as Civil Obedience ; ſince *the Magiſtrate being the Vicegerent of God, it is his Duty to maintain the Honour of God and Religion.* This was ſo plainly ſtated, that your Friend could not avoid ſeeing it, tho' he had nothing to ſay to it. See, my Lord, how he deſerts the Cauſe, *pag.* 5. *When you'll explain what you mean by Vicegerent in this Caſe, I'll conſider your Aſſertion.*

Thus, my Lord, he twice walk'd up to the Point ; and for no Reaſon, that I can ſee, but to ſhew his Baſhfulneſs, and twice to run away from it. I wonder he thought it neceſſary to write, before he had any thing to ſay to the Purpoſe. But now you ſee his Difficulty, my Lord, I doubt not but your great Skill in the 13th of the *Romans*, will enable you (for I don't intend) to in-

ſtruct

ſtruct him what is meant by the Magiſtrate's being Διάκονος Θεοῦ, (*the Miniſter of God*,) and having, as ſuch, a Power to reward thoſe who do well, and to execute Wrath on Evil-doers.

And now, my Lord, if you like ſuch a *Second*, yet (I muſt own to you) I do not like ſuch a *Correſpondent* : Nor can I imagine, what tempted your Lordſhip to put him to this Employment ; unleſs you choſe a Second, in the Humility of your Heart, as the *Roman* Conſul did the Companion of his Triumphs ;

—— —— *Sibi Conſul*
Ne placeat, Curru SERVUS *portatur eodem.*

I have nothing more to trouble your Lordſhip with at preſent, but to aſſure you that I am, in all Offices of Chriſtian Friendſhip,

Your LORDSHIP'*s*

Obedient Servant,

THO. SHERLOCK.