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THE
MAY 1954

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T R E A T Y
O F
S E V I L L E,



A N D
The MEASURES that have been taken
for the Four Last YEARS,
IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED.

In a LETTER to a Friend.



J.

L O N D O N :

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S I R,

IN obedience to your Commands, I send you my Thoughts of the Treaty of Peace with *Spain*; and in order to form a better Judgment of it, have, at your desire, carefully review'd the Measures of our Court for four Years past; that is, from the time they knew of the Treaty of *Vienna*, and of the Projects concerted between the Emperor and *Spain* to the Prejudice of *Great Britain*. And though I have read not only the *Craftsmen* ordinary and extraordinary, but the *Short View*, and the *Observations examin'd*, and every thing else the Enemies of the Ministry, not to say of the Government, have written against them; yet I can say with the greatest truth, that I have found no reason to alter my Opinion, but still think the Measures that have been taken just and prudent, and every way becoming faithful and able Ministers, and that the Treaty they have produced with *Spain* does in all points answer what we had reason to expect from it.

That the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Measures concerted between the Contracting Powers tended to deprive us of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahone*, and to support, in violation of former Treaties, the *Ostend* Trade, are Points too well known to admit of any Doubt or Dispute. How the Treaty of *Vienna* came to be so suddenly struck up, is not very material to enquire; tho' I think it is plain enough, that it took its Rise from the Influence the Duke de *Ripperda* had upon the *Spanish* Councils, who from a *Dutchman* and a *Protestant*, became a zealous *Catholick* and *Spaniard*: and to shew the Sincerity of his Conversion, and merit the Favour of the Court, went with great forwardness into such Measures as would distress the two great *Protestant* Powers most, and were most likely to make a close Union between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*. But however that be, certain

it is, that *England's* not accepting the sole Mediation the *Spaniards* offer'd upon their Breach with *France* on sending back the *Infanta*, could not possibly be the Cause or Occasion of making the *Vienna-Treaty*. The Mediation was offer'd indeed, but it is manifest it was done only to save Appearances; for the Treaty was signed at *Vienna*, before they could know the Offer was declined; besides, the very Contents of the Treaty, are such as *England* could never be a Party to, since they strike at her most essential Interests, which is a Demonstration they neither were nor could be sincere in their Offer of the Mediation. But what puts it past all doubt, is, that this Treaty was a long time in agitation before the Mediation was offer'd, or any Resolution taken to send back the *Infanta*, *Ripperda's* full Powers for it having been signed in *November 1724*: Whereas the Resolution to send back the *Infanta* was not notified at *Madrid* till *March* following. And allowing six or seven Weeks for offering the sole Mediation to the King, and for receiving his Answer, his Majesty could not know of it till the beginning of *April*, nor could his Refusal of it be known at *Madrid* till towards the end of that Month; much less could the Court of *Madrid* transmit that Refusal to *Vienna* before the *Vienna-Treaty* was signed; for it was signed the 30th *April*; Whereas the King's declining the Offer of the sole Mediation, was not known at *Madrid* till the 24th; and the Court of *Madrid* had received notice in *March* that all the principal Articles were agreed. These are Facts may be certainly depended on, since, if they were false, it would be easy to refute them. And it is proper to observe, that this clandestine Treaty was negotiated in contradiction to an express Article of the *Quadruple Alliance*, appointing the Mediation of *England* and *France* for the adjusting the Differences between these two Courts.

Besides the Resolutions taken between these new Allies, with respect to *Gibraltar* and the *Ostend Company*; we were assured from the Throne, in very strong Terms, that some secret Articles were agreed on in favour of the *Protender*. We must have a very ill Opinion of the Prince then upon the Throne, whose Integrity and Honour I never yet heard called in question, to think he would tell his People he had such positive, repeated, undoubted Intelligences, if he really had not. Now if
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the King had such Intelligences, what Censures would not Ministers deserve, who should advise the discrediting or suppressing of them?

But to let this pass; *Gibraltar* and the Establishment of the *Ostend* Trade, are indisputably Points which the new Allies resolved to pursue with their united Force. That there was a secret Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and *Spain* for these Ends, can never be made a doubt of; when, besides so many other Proofs of it, we are assur'd, that the Duke *de Ripperda* did very seriously and positively affirm, both to the *British* and *Dutch* Ministers then at *Madrid*, that there was such a secret Treaty, and that two of the Articles were, That the *Emperor* should assist *Spain* to recover *Gibraltar*, and *Spain* the *Emperor* to support the *Ostend* Company; which is the best Authority an Ambassador could have for the Truth of such a Treaty, that Duke having been the chief, or, perhaps, sole Adviser, Projector, and Former of those pernicious Measures, and for these great Services made Duke and Prime Minister.

No body, I presume, will give the King's Minister, now Lord *Harrington*, the Lye; or suspect it is not true, that *Ripperda* told him so; or say, that *Ripperda* did not deserve to be credited in what he told him. That Minister's Character is too well establish'd, to want any Proof either of his Veracity or Ability: His Memorials alone, were there no other Proof, shew him to be a wise and able Minister, and every way equal to the Station he was in; and if we may believe our Accounts from *Madrid*, no Minister was ever in greater Esteem with them; which is a sure Proof of his acting always with great Honour and Integrity. And let it not be pretended there was no secret Alliance, because it is denied. They who remember the *Utrecht* Treaty, remember, I presume, the famous *Preliminaries* the *English* Ministers publish'd as the Foundation of a Treaty between the *Allies* and *France*. All Men of Sense were sure, there must have been some secret *Preliminaries* besides agreed on between us and the *French* Ministers; but how positively, how solemnly, how constantly was this denied? And it continued to be so, till they were, after the late King's Accession, found among the Papers of a Minister who had a chief Hand
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in that Treaty, which were seized by the King's Order. In short, Ministers who will do what they ought not, will deny it when 'tis done.

What now shall an *English* Ministry advise in this Case, after such Intelligence? Shall they consent to the giving up of *Gibraltar*, and to the Establishment of the *Ostend* Trade, or shall they not? As to the first of these Points, the Sense of the Nation is sufficiently known; and the Enemies of the Ministry in particular have shewn their Concern for keeping *Gibraltar*: They have affected to be in the greatest Alarms about it, and full of Fears lest it should be weakly defended, or basely betray'd; and nothing but a vigorous and successful Defence was able to convince them of the Groundlessness of their Jealousys, if indeed they are convinced. This Point therefore the Ministers must insist on, *Gibraltar* must on no Terms be given up. The *Ostend* Trade, indeed, these Gentlemen seem not so much concern'd about: They would persuade us 'tis more the Concern of the *Dutch* than ours. But their Attempts to prove this have not been very successful; for all who have any Knowledge in the *India* Trade, see that the *Ostenders* interfere with us directly in every profitable Branch of that Trade; and that it is not so with regard to the *Dutch*, whose greatest Advantages arise from their Spice Islands, which they are in a Condition, by their Strength in those Parts, to keep to themselves. And the Sense of our Merchants upon this Head, who must be allowed to be the best Judges in Matters of Trade, is well enough known. But, in truth, the great Objection I have to the *Ostend* Trade, is not merely as it is Trade; but, what I think of much greater Concern to *England*, as it is setting up a *new Naval Power* in *Europe*, and that at our door, as it were, and in our Channel. We suffer'd enough by the *Dunkirk* Squadrons in the two last Wars, not to be sensible what a Prejudice it would be to the *British* Commerce to have the like Squadrons always lying in wait for us at *Ostend*. But if *Ostend* were not so near, it is infinitely our Concern not to suffer a new naval Power to be set up, if we can possibly hinder it. If our Fleet is our Glory and our Strength, as we are perpetually told it is, especially by the Gentlemen of the other Side, I would ask, How it comes to be so? Is it not because we are superior at
Sea

Sea to any other Power? But how long shall we be able to maintain our Superiority, if new naval Powers are suffer'd to arise? Is not all Strength comparative, and will not the greatest Power of any Nation become mere Weakness, if it becomes easy for the neighbouring Powers, by an Union of their Fleets, to be greatly superior to it? The *British* Fleet can no longer be considerable, than while it is greater than any that can easily be combined against it; but that it is impossible it should long be, if the *Emperor* can ever have a naval Strength. This therefore is the great Objection I have to the *Ostend* Trade, as it lays a Foundation of a new naval Power, which, if not check'd betimes, no body can tell what it may grow to in a few Years.

That these are not vain Fears, you may see by what has already happen'd in the Northern Seas. What a mighty Naval Force has there sprung up in a few Years, from very small Beginnings, under the Vigour and Management of the late *Czar*? What a Terror did this spread in the *Baltick*? What Trouble and Expence has *England* been at to prevent the fatal Effects such naval Armaments would otherwise have had? Were the Northern Crowns able to cope with such a Force? Would not *Sweden*, if not assisted by *England*, have been forced to submit to *Russia*, and receive Law from that Crown, through an absolute Impossibility of making head against it? And had that been the Case, what could *Denmark* have done? Would not the *Muscovite* have had the Command of the *Sound*, as well as of the *Baltick*? Would not the *Baltick* Trade from that Time have been precarious, and absolutely at the mercy of that Court to impose what Duties, and lay us under what Restraints and Prohibitions they pleased? But that is not all; when once Masters of the *Sound*, and of Ports that are open all the Year, or the greatest Part of it, we should soon have seen them riding triumphant in the Ocean, ready to join the *Emperor*, or *Spain*, or any other Power at variance with us. That Crown was for many Years courting an Alliance with the *Emperor*, and of late Years has done it with *Spain*, and furnish'd the last with Ships and Stores.

Now if we have been in so much danger from so remote a Power, growing of a sudden strong at Sea,
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and been at so great charge and trouble to prevent the natural and fatal Consequences of it ; what may we not justly apprehend, if a second Naval Power, and that so near our own Ports, should be suffer'd to arise ? But if this be so, then *Gibraltar* and the *Ostend* Trade, which make the Substance of the *Vienna-Treatys*, are *English* Points: and indeed I never heard any body besides ourselves was ever concerned about the first of them ; the Dominions of *Hanover* in particular have no manner of Interest and Concern in either of them. But if these are *English* Points, (and they are partly so with respect to *France*,) what shall an *English* Ministry do ? give them up, they must not ; why then they must defend them ; but how ? shall they wait till the Blow is struck, or endeavour to ward it off, and provide against it ? Certainly provide against it ; but which way ? Shall they alone enter into a War with the *Emperor* and *Spain*, or strengthen the Kingdom by Alliances ? The Mobb, for ought I know, will say, *alone* ; but that Spirit of *Quixotism* is, I believe, worn out of the understanding part of the Nation, and every Man that can think, must be convinced by the two last Wars, that *England* alone is not a Match for all the World. I take for granted, therefore, it will be allowed me, they should make Alliances.

But if that be granted, who are they, they should ally with, but *France* and *Holland* ? What Power but the House of *Bourbon* is the proper Ally against the House of *Austria* ? *Holland* indeed is a natural Ally of *England* ; but *Holland* remembers too well, how they were used at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and in the Measures preceding it, and suffer'd too much by their Attachment and Fidelity to *England* in the last War, to be very forward to engage in a new one for our sakes. When the *Emperor* had prevailed with himself, for a little present advantage, to desert his old Friends, and enter into such an Alliance with *Spain*, 'twas natural, 'twas necessary for *England* to ally with *France* ; it was what any Ministers in this situation must have done ; and had they not done it, they who complain of their declining the Mediation offer'd by *Spain*, would have made much louder Complaints had they declined an Alliance with *France*. For what would probably have been the Consequence

if they had? Would *Holland* have ventured to enter into an Alliance with us, unsupported by *France*? Does not the Difficulty we found in prevailing with them to accede, plainly shew they would not? Much less could we have hoped for the Accession of *Sweden*, which if they had not been with us, must, in submission to the Power of the *Muscovite*, have joined with them against us? And in the mean time, what turn would *France* have taken? Can we be sure they would have stood neuter? Is it not more likely they would by valuable Offers have been tempted to accede to the Treaty of *Vienna*; than it was that the *Emperor* should fall into so close an Union with *Spain*? And can any body tell what might have been the Consequence of a League, in which the three great *Roman Catholic* Powers of *Europe* were united? Would not the *Protestant* Religion in that case have been in the utmost danger? But suppose *France* had stood neuter, would that to any good *Englishman* be a desirable Situation of Affairs, to see *France* reap all the Advantages of a profound Peace, and draw to themselves all the Trade of the World, while the other *European* Powers were wasting one another by a destructive War, which when once begun, no body can see the end of. An Alliance therefore with *France* was necessary, and not only necessary, but extremely advantageous; it carried that weight with it, as to procure the Accession of *Holland*, and in conjunction with other Measures, to give Encouragement to our Friends in *Sweden*, who without our Help saw themselves upon the Brink of Ruin, either by submitting to the *Muscovite*, or by daring to oppose them.

Well, when these Alliances were made, was it adviseable to go gaily into a War immediately, or to take the most proper Measures to prevent it? They who know well the State of the Nation, the Load of the publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new Taxes, and the Expence of a War, will readily be of opinion, a War should if possible be prevented; and were we not under these particular Circumstances, no honest and wise Minister will be forward to draw a Nation, especially a trading one, into a War, the Issues of which must always be uncertain, more particularly under a Confederacy: witness the last, which no Man living could have suspected would end in the infamous manner it did, after such a

Train of Successes as exceeded our most sanguine Hopes. But if another War should be as successful as the last, which, all things consider'd, is morally impossible, yet if it lasts any time, what an infinite hurt it is to Trade, this Nation has severely felt; a Hurt in many respects perhaps never to be repaired. For while we are at War with Nations with whom we had a beneficial Commerce, we don't only lose that Commerce during the War, but some Branches of it perhaps for ever. For during this Interruption of Commerce, the Nations with whom we are at War, will distress us in Trade, all they can, they will set up Manufactures of their own, and turn other Branches of Trade into a new Channel; and how can this Damage be retrieved? Will a People once entered with Success upon a Manufacture, quit it upon laying down their Arms? Or can a Stream of Trade, when turned into another Current be easily brought back? These Considerations make it very plain, that a trading Nation should avoid a War, if possible.

But if our Ministers must endeavour that, how is it to be done? Must not the Powers allied make the necessary Preparations by a proper Repartition among themselves, to let the Enemy see, they are in a Condition to defend themselves, if attacked, and to put it out of their power to attack them, if they can? This Part therefore *England* and their Allies took; and as *England* was more particularly concerned in this Quarrel, besides a Squadron for the Coast of *Spain*, to protect our Trade, to be at hand to succour *Gibraltar*, and to intercept the Treasure expected from the *West-Indies*, they thought proper to send one for the *Baltick*, and one for the *West-Indies*, both which produced the Effect expected from them, though not equally soon, or with equal Success. The Squadron sent to the *Baltick* was absolutely necessary to enable our Friends in *Sweden* to declare for us. The *Czarina* at that time had a great Fleet, and as she was in Peace with *Sweden*, demanded the free use of their Ports: and had that Demand been granted, farewell *Sweden*; from that time it had been a Province to *Russia*, and the whole *Baltick* Trade had been at the mercy of the *Muscovite*. But how could *Sweden*, reduced as it is, refuse that Demand, unless

unless a *British* Squadron had been ready on their Coast? And even with that it was a most difficult Point, and a long Work, to induce them to an Accession; for besides the Terrors they were under from the Czarina, the Duke of *Holstein*, who was the Creature of that Court, has another sort of Interest in *Sweden*, than the *Pretender* has in *England*: and these laid all the Obstructions possible in the way to intimidate our Friends, and hinder the Accession. In the mean time, those who had formerly ravaged the *Swedish* Coasts in the most cruel manner, did not think it safe for them to stir out of their own Ports, while a *British* Squadron lay ready to observe them: which shewed all the other Powers that border on the *Baltick*, how little they had to fear from the Naval Force of *Russia*, if they had that of *Great Britain* on their Side; and by the Turn things have since taken, these Equipments are now become unnecessary; the Death of the Czarina has put an end to the Consternation the *Swedes* were in, and greatly broken the Duke of *Holstein's* Interest.

Indeed the Enemies of the Ministry seem to be themselves sensible, that the sending at this time a Squadron to the *Baltick* was a prudent and necessary Measure; for in all their Invectives for three Years past, I have observed a strange Silence in them upon this head. And they would have been as little clamorous with respect to the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*, could they be equitable enough to judge of things, by the Reason of them, and with a due regard to what was most adviseable at the time that Step was taken. Money, we all know, is the Sinew of War, and that without it no great Enterprize can be entered on with any Prospect of Success. The Ministers very well knew the low Condition the *Spanish* Finances were in at the time of the *Vienna-Treaty*, that neither the Troops nor the Civil List were paid, and that they borrowed Money at very high Interest; at the same time they were by their Treaty obliged to make great Remittances to the *Emperor*: If therefore we could hinder the Return of the Galleons, it would be impossible for them to begin a War so soon as they intended. With this View a Squadron was sent, and the Galleons were block'd up accordingly. From this

Success the Ministers had reason to hope the Eyes of *Spain* would be open'd, and that they would see how absurd it was to enter into such Measures with the *Emperor*, not only to let the *Emperor* into the *West-India* Trade upon the most advantageous Terms, which themselves but a little before had violently opposed at *Cambray*, but to give him such vast Subsidies to no purpose in the world; in appearance indeed to help the *Spaniards* to recover *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*; but it was appearance only, for the *Emperor* did in fact contribute nothing towards it; and had he done his utmost, it could have been only by making a Diversion, which, though it might have proved troublesome and expensive to us, would have helped little to the Recovery of *Gibraltar*; which, while we have a Superiority at Sea, can't, humanly speaking, ever be taken. But even this Diversion the *Emperor* could not make for want of Money, and Money he must want, till the *Galleons* return. But had he attempted a Diversion, what could he hope to do, when he was sure to find a warm Reception from the Measures *France* and *Holland* had entred into in the King's Defence?

This being the Case, it was, in my humble Opinion, highly probable, that the *Spaniards*, being disappointed in their first Heat, and having Time to cool, would grow sick of their Treaty with the *Emperor*, and feel how prejudicial it was to their national Interest. But tho' their Disappointment had not this Effect, they were made sensible they must either expect no Money from the *Indies*, or come to some Terms with the *Hannover* Allies. And this produc'd the *Preliminaries*, which suspended a War, though it did not immediately produce a Peace. Some People indeed find fault with the sending this Squadron, not because they did so much, but because they did not do more, since we lost so many Men by it, and received so much Damage in our Ships. But as to this last, such Events in such Expeditions, if they continue long, are unavoidable; and if we suffer'd, sure we are our Enemies, by being so long block'd up, suffer'd a great deal more. As to the Orders by which the Hands of our Admirals were tied up from beginning Hostilities, such Orders were absolutely necessary, in virtue of what I
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have already said. The Business of *England* was to prevent the new Allies from being able to begin a War, not to begin a War ourselves, which was to be avoided if possible: and these Orders answer'd both those Purposes. Indeed they were, *mutatis mutandis*, the same that were given in King WILLIAM'S Time, that Great and Wise Prince, when a Squadron was sent to the *West-Indies*, upon the Death of the late King of *Spain*, with the same Design, to prevent the Return of the Galleons, that the new King whom *France* had set on the *Spanish* Throne, might not be able to begin, or to carry on with Vigour, a War against the Powers then in Alliance with *England*. And whoever considers whose the Effects are that the Galleons are loaded with, will see they were wise and just Orders: That the Business of the Squadron was not to plunder our own Merchants, or those of our Allies; but to prevent the Treasure on board from coming into the King of *Spain's* hands, till they were by a Treaty tied up from hurting us. These were the Ends of the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies* in King William's time, and of that sent now, and the Orders the same, only with this Difference, that the latter Squadron was stationed so as to block up the Galleons effectually in Port, whereas in King William's time they endeavoured to intercept them when at Sea; in which they miscarried, and that Miscarriage, I presume, produced that Difference in the Orders given now.

Thus far then we have cleared our way; it was right and necessary to make Alliances, and particularly with *France*. It was right and perfectly well judged to send Squadrons to the *Baltick* and the *West-Indies*, and so were the Orders given them. The first procured the Accession of *Sweden*, and the other prevented a War breaking out, so soon as was intended; and tho' it did not immediately produce a Peace, it paved the way to it. *Spain* indeed resented this Step, to a high degree, and in their Anger laid siege to *Gibraltar*, for it was the effect of Anger and mere Passion; and so far from being the Result of wise Councils, that all the Generals of the Troops, if our Accounts be true, declared against it, as an impracticable Attempt, except the General who was to command the Siege,

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who was probably in his Judgment as much against it as the rest : And that it was a rash Attempt, the Success sufficiently shew'd ; so that after four or five Months it was discontinued, and a Set of Preliminary Articles were agreed upon, which there was all the Reason in the World to think would have been immediately ratify'd. And so they were at the *Imperial* Court, where cooler Councils prevail'd. The *Emperor* saw nothing was to be done without Money, and that it was vain to hope for the Return of the Galleons, without which he could expect none, till Preliminaries were submitted to. But at the *Spanish* Court Resentment got the better of Reason ; many Cavils and Quibbles were started to elude the Preliminaries, and by this means they continued long unratify'd by that King. And here were laid the first Seeds of Division between the new Allies. *Spain* was disgusted with the *Imperial* Court, because they had ratify'd the Preliminaries, without first having their Consent : And the Effect of this was, that *Spain* began to listen to the *Hanover* Allies, the Preliminaries were ratify'd by them, by which an End was agreed to be put to all Hostilities ; and soon after a Congress was open'd, in which the Project of a Provisional Treaty was drawn ; and tho' neither of the two Courts immediately accepted it, yet neither did either refuse it. Things continued in suspense still, in appearance, and in the opinion of the World, from the Ill-humour *Spain* was in on account of our Refusal to part with *Gibraltar*, but in reality upon Differences with the *Emperor* ; which by degrees operated in such a manner, that at last each of them declared they were at liberty to treat with us independent of the other. And in this Case, his Majesty preferring the Interest of *England* to all other Considerations, chose to treat with *Spain* rather than the *Emperor* ; which, however it be now censur'd, had he done otherwise, nobody can be so blind as not to see what invidious Constructions would have been put upon it.

But to make sure Work, to prevent being longer trifled with, and to cut off all unnecessary Delays, his Majesty at the same time thought proper to fit out a considerable Squadron, which was joined by another of the *Dutch* ; which vigorous Measure succeeded so well, that with-

out stirring from our own Ports, it had all the Effect proposed by it; it kept the *Spaniards* in awe, and their Ships at home, which otherwise there was some reason to apprehend would have been sent upon some secret Expedition to the *West-Indies*; but they did not dare to leave their own Coast naked and defenceless, while they knew there was so strong a Squadron in the Channel ready to sail upon the first Orders: And sail undoubtedly they would; had not the Treaty, which was quickened by this vigorous Proceedure, been in such forwardness before the end of the Summer, as to give the King the greatest Assurance it could not miscarry. The Negotiations were indeed slow, but they were unavoidably so, by reason of the very great Distance between *London* and *Seville*, which makes it a Work of six Weeks or more for a Courier to go from one place to the other, and return; but the Success of the Treaty was not the less sure, for being slow, which at length was signed by *England, France* and *Spain*, 29 *October*, and a little after by the Minister of the *States*, and has since been ratified by all of them.

These are the Measures which have been taken by *England* in defence of their Rights and Possessions, which were intended to be forcibly wrested from them by the Treaty of *Vienna*; in the Representation of which, I have exaggerated nothing in favour of the Ministry, nor extenuated any thing, except in what relates to the Conduct of the *Spanish* Court since the signing of the Preliminaries, which Decency would not permit me to set in so full a Light as I might have done, they being now become our Friends and good Allies; tho' what I could say on this head, would not a little tend to the Justification of the Ministry.

But if this be a true Representation of Things, what is there our Ministers have any need to be ashamed of? Instead of Censure and Invective, I am humbly of opinion, great Praise and Thanks is due to them for having extricated us so happily, and without a War, from the Difficulties the *Vienna-Treaty*, and some other Incidents previous to it, had involved us in. There never was, so far as I can judge, a nicer Juncture of Affairs, or that required more Care in Ministers, greater Discernment, or a closer Attention; nor were there ever any,

any, who discharged all these Parts better for the Honour of the King, and the true Interest of their Country. Great Thanks, in my poor Judgment, are due to them, for not suffering the Nation to be drawn into a War, by the importunate Clamours of those who called so loud for it. They wisely consider'd, that a War, if possible, was to be avoided, in the Situation Affairs were in, from Circumstances that would have been peculiar to it; a War, in which we might suffer much, but could not ourselves tell what to wish for. We knew not what it was we could either do ourselves, or wish were done by our Allies; and whoever considers things coolly, must needs be of the same Opinion. For example, could we wish *France* should recover in *Flanders* what was at so vast an Expence of Men and Money taken from them in the last War? Could we wish them to extend their Conquests on the *Rhine*, where the Circles bordering upon it are already all Weakness, and utterly unable to defend themselves? The *Pirenees* have put a stop to their Progress on the side of *Spain*, what then is it we would have them do? And this may serve for an Answer, Why did *France* do nothing to assist us, when the *Spaniards* had begun a War by the attack of *Gibraltar*? Was this the Part of a good Ally? Does not this look as if they either thought they were not obliged to it by the *Hanover-Treaty*, which is defensive only; or that they have not kept their Faith with us? To all which I must say, these are groundless Surmizes; *France* never thought we were the Aggressors, and were ready to fulfil all Engagements; they offer'd voluntarily to make it *Casus Fœderis*, and their Troops were in perfect good Condition for Service. But we declined it; and as long as the *Emperor* lay quiet, and began no Hostilities, we were willing *France* should do so too, to prevent the kindling of a general War in *Europe*, which must infallibly have been the Consequence, had *France* in any part enter'd upon Action.

But to go on, as *France* could have done nothing that would have been of service to us by open Hostilities, while unattack'd on the part of the *Emperor*, so I would ask, What is it we could wish to do ourselves? Can we distress a Nation greatly in Trade who have none, none in comparison with ourselves? And therefore had we all the Success we could wish of that sort, it is impossible

fible we should not be the Losers, since we have a hundred trading Vessels where they have one ; and therefore in this part of the War, we must lose much more than we can get, since there is no room for Reprisals from an Enemy who have nothing to be taken from them. Shall we make a Piratick War, and burn their Coasts? This may indeed ruin a great many miserable People, at a great Expence on our part, but without being at all nearer to the End of the War, or to a good Peace. But we might try our Force in the *West-Indies* ; we might so : but have we not been taught by fresh Experience, that the *Spanish* Seas are the Ruin of our Men, and the Destruction of our Ships? And if we could succeed on that side, I believe it will by the most knowing be allowed, that it is more for the Interest of *England* to have these Countries in the hands of the *Spaniards*, than our own. In short, we want no Conquests ourselves, nor are there any we can wish to be made by our Allies. To what purpose then to go to war, if it can be possibly avoided?

All this our Ministers wisely foresaw, and therefore honestly, as well as wisely, have preserved us from a War. I say, *honestly* ; for whatever their Enemies may in the Spirit of Calumny insinuate of their Corruption, nothing is more against the private Interests of Ministers than Peace. War is their Harvest, as we were told in innumerable Libels, towards the latter end of the last War, when a wise, and able, and faithful Ministry were to be worried and run down, for pursuing vigorously a just and necessary War ; with the same Candour and Justice, and partly by the same Men as the present Ministers are insulted by, for endeavouring to prevent a War. But Calumny and Envy are Ambidexters, and they can equally attack each side of a Contradiction. Are you for a War? You destroy the Nation for your own private Gains. Are you for Peace? 'Tis sacrificing the Honour of the Nation to self-interested Views. But all such Charges ought to be treated as mere Calumny, till particular Facts are alledged, and Corruption proved ; but no such Fact in all the Measures taken by the Ministers either has or can be proved : For if it could, we may be very sure we should long since have heard of it. As free as their Adversaries have been in throwing out Scandal, with a Licentiousness as has no Example, yet
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they never have insinuated, that I know of, that our Ministers were Pensioners to any foreign Powers ; on the contrary, they have intimated, tho' with as little Truth, that they have given Pensions rather than receiv'd any ; to shew them weak Men, and unequal to their Business. But Men who have serv'd the Publick in one considerable Station or other for more than twenty Years, and have discharged their Trusts with such Abilities, as has procur'd them the Esteem and Favour both of the Princes they serv'd, and of their Fellow-Subjects ; and not only so, but have been in great Reputation with foreign Courts for their Integrity and Ability, and all the other good Qualities that enter into the Composition of a Great Minister ; such Men will not, in the Judgment of impartial Men, be thought weak, or wicked Ministers.

But to leave no Insinuation unexamined, what reason have they to charge the Ministers with supplying their want of Skill and Ability in negotiating by Bribes and Pensions to Ministers in foreign Courts, and meanly getting by Money Points which more able Ministers would have carry'd without Expence, as well as without Difficulty, by the force of their superior Genius, and Dexterity in treating ? Is there the least proof of this ? Can any Instance be given for so heavy a Charge ? Why their Proof is this ; Great Sums of Money have been given by Parliament without account, and under the notion of Secret Service ; but this, tho' a very popular Point to declaim upon, is no manner of proof of the Charge, and is a very high Reflection upon the Prince himself, as well as his Ministers, while it supposes him to ask for extraordinary Supplies, without knowing himself how they are apply'd. How ignorant must a Prince be, who can suffer great Sums to be expended by his Order and Authority, without knowing what Use they are put to ? or we must suppose something worse of him, if by his Knowledge and Order these Moneys are expended not for his own Service and that of his People, but to cover and supply the Defects of weak and wicked Ministers. This is all the Ground I could ever hear of for so false a Charge ; for this, Ministers are represented as under a Necessity of having recourse to these Methods, to extricate us out of the Difficulties their own ill Management has thrown us into: most ridiculous Inference ! A Man is a very sorry Politician, and knows little of
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Affairs, who does not know, that in some Junctures, under the apprehension of approaching Wars, and in forming Confederacies for defence against them, when several lesser Powers are to be brought into an Union with you, there is great occasion for very considerable Sums, which may be applied to the greatest Advantage, and yet in the nature of things, the Applications of them must be secret, or it will be impossible the Services can be performed.

However plausible the Arguments may be against such Supplies, the Substance of the whole Dispute will lie in a very short Compass. When there is a good Understanding between Prince and People; when the People have Confidence in him, that he is wise and good, and has at heart the Interest and Welfare of his Subjects; they will take his Word, they will give him what he asks for extraordinary Occasions, and the Money will be expended to procure the good Ends it is given for, and the Nation will receive the Benefits intended by it. But when it happens to be otherwise between Prince and People; when the People have a Diffidence of the Prince; when they think him corrupt and weak, and that he either neglects their Interest, or has some private one of his own to serve, and that the Money will not be applied to the good Purposes for which it was asked; when that is the Case, they will withhold their Hand. And if their Suspicions are just, and well founded, they are in the right: But if the Jealousies of that sort are groundless, and they have not just Cause to distrust the Prince, what will be the Consequence? If they will not give the Money that is asked, the good Designs the Prince had in view cannot be executed: And if, for want of that, either a dangerous War can't be prevented, or the necessary Alliances can't be made, upon whom will the Mischief of these wrong Measures fall? who will feel most the Weight of it, the Prince or the People? The People most certainly; 'tis their Estates must furnish the Taxes which will be wanted for the Nation's Defence; 'tis their Trade will suffer by an unequal War.

But, God be thanked, that is not our Case. The good Understanding between the King and his People is such, that they act in Concert, in perfect Harmony and Confidence. The People are sure the King will

not ask for Money for Secret Service, that is not intended to be so applied, and that he will not suffer it to be so applied wantonly and unnecessarily. And it's a great Satisfaction to think this is true, not only of his present Majesty, but of the late King also, and of all the Princes who have filled the Throne since the Happy Revolution. They have all been heartily in the Interest of their People, and by the Steadiness of their Conduct in this respect, and their constant Regard to the Properties and Liberties of their Subjects, have shewn they looked on their Power as a *Trust*, and that they are made for their People, and not their People for them. Such a Succession of wise and good Princes cannot be shewn in the History of this, or perhaps of any other Nation.

But to return : At the very Times the extraordinary Supplies of Money have been asked, the then Situation of Affairs shew'd plainly enough in the gross what Purposes they were intended for. This the very Opposers knew as well as others, and could not but see the Demand was proper and necessary, tho' the particular Applications were not fit to be inquir'd into, or discover'd ; and I think we may say, we feel the happy Effects of them. For as great a Sum as these Moneys may amount to, and all other extraordinary Supplies for these last three Years, they who will look into the annual Estimates of the last War, will find a vast Difference in the Expence between engaging in a War, and the preventing one, by a safe and honourable Peace. And such, I take the liberty to say, I think that to be which has been concluded with *Spain* at *Seville*. It answers all our Purposes, all we could expect from a Treaty, and removes all the Grievances which we before complained of : the whole of which is reducible to these two Points ; their Violations of former Treaties with respect to our Commerce, and with respect to our Possessions. But both these Points are now secured, as far as it can be done by Treaties, by reinforcing and re-establishing all former Treaties in as ample manner as if they had been inserted in the present Treaty at full length. Commerce consequently is restored to the same foot in all respects that it was upon before the late unhappy Differences. If therefore our *Spanish* Trade was upon a good foot before, and we had

had reason to be satisfy'd with the Treaties it stood upon ; it is upon a good foot now, 'tis re-establish'd upon the very same Treaties. And 'tis the same with respect to our Possessions. If *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca* were sufficiently secured to us by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, they are so still ; since that Treaty is as fully re-established in that Point as in any other ; and whatever Title we had before to those Places, we have the same acknowledged still. No, say some, possibly not ; because the Treaty of 1721, is also re-establish'd by this new Treaty, as well as that of *Utrecht*, and in this Point of *Gibraltar* derogates from it. But this is a very surprizing Assertion, to come from Persons who not only do not know there is any such thing in the Treaty of 1721, but who do know certainly there is not ; for that Treaty is in Print, and these Gentlemen would take it very ill, to have it thought they talk of Treaties they never read. But if this Treaty of 1721, does not derogate from that of *Utrecht*, then the *Utrecht*-Treaty subsists still in all the Force it ever had.

But this is not all : By the second Article the contracting Powers engage to guarantee reciprocally *the Kingdoms, Places, and Dominions under their Obedience, in what Parts of the World soever situate. Dominions under their Obedience, Terres sous leur obeissance*, is as strong an Expression as can well be used, since it carries more in it than bare *Possession*, and implies a Right. And it is worth observing to you, that the *Dutch*, in their Act of Accession to this Treaty, were so little apprehensive of any latent Design, or dormant Claim of the *Spaniards* in the Word *Possessions* not being here made use of, that in the reciting Part of this Article, they have added it : Which plainly shews, in what Sense they understood the Guaranty here stipulated.

But the Enemies of the Ministry, not content with cavilling at the Omission of this Word, and to justify farther their Suspicions, have not been ashamed to insinuate, that there is a Secret Article behind, by which they have obliged themselves to give up *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* at the End of three Years. An Insinuation not only false, but entirely without grounds ; and being so, in a Matter of this Consequence, extremely wicked.

wicked. For in Scandals of so flagrant a nature, 'tis a poor Excuse, to say they are not the Authors of it, while they do all they can to spread the Poison thro' the Nation, and create Uneasiness. But that such a Surmise is entirely groundless, is both evident from the Nature of the thing, and from the plain and open Declaration in Parliament of a Great Minister, that *he knew of no such secret Article*; which yet, were there any such, he could not but know, from the Station he is in: A Minister of an establish'd Reputation, and a Character *untainted*, and very unlike some of those by whom this Treaty is attack'd.

But admitting that sufficient Care is taken by the Treaty to secure us our Trade, and a quiet Possession of *Gibraltar* for the time to come, what Satisfaction is there for what is past? What Recompence to our Merchants for the many Depredations in the *West-Indies* and in *Europe*? I answer, All that the Nature of the thing will admit of. It is stipulated, That *Spain* shall forthwith cause Reparation to be made for the Damages that have been suffer'd in these Parts of the World from the Time prescribed by the Preliminaries for the Cessation of Hostilities; and as to what relates to the *West-Indies*, from the Time that the Notification of them was receiv'd in those Parts; and that his Catholick Majesty shall publish the most rigorous Prohibitions for preventing for the future the like Violences. And as to Captures and Depredations before that time, it is agreed, That Commissaries shall be nominated, with sufficient Powers to examine into the Complaints brought before them, and to give to the injured Party all just Satisfaction: which I presume will be allowed the only possible Way for redressing Grievances of this sort. If a better Way had been practis'd in any former Times, or could have been suggested now, there is no Reason to think it would have been overlooked. But if all the Care be taken for Satisfaction that the Nature of the Case will admit of, there can be no room to find fault with the Treaty on this account; we have all we can desire. As to the particular Cavils rais'd against this Article, as to the Place where the Commissaries are to meet, and the Time they are confin'd to, and that there is no Explication what is meant by *illicite Trade*; they are all

extremely trifling in themselves, and have already received in Print very full Answers.

The Writer of the *Observations examined* tells us indeed, That a better and more effectual Method might have been taken in favour of our Merchants; and for proof of this Assertion, sends us to *Cromwell's Treaty* with the *Dutch* in 1654. But why don't they tell us, what were the Circumstances of Affairs, when *Cromwell* made that Treaty? Why don't they tell us, how many Sea-Engagements there had been between the *English* and *Dutch* in the two preceeding Years? in which the latter suffered so much, that their People were every where in Mutinys for Peace. Is there any Parallel between the Condition of Affairs now, and then? Have we, by a long train of Successes against *Spain*, acquir'd the Right of Conquerors, to prescribe what Terms we please? And if that were the case, is *Madrid* as near to *London* as the *Hague*, that the same Dispatch might be given to the Conqueror's Demands? Or can Losses sustained in Parts so remote as the *West-Indies*, and the Complaints of so many Merchants on both sides, be possibly ascertained and adjust-ed in three Months? The Pretensions of the *English* on the *Dutch* were, the chief of them, of a very old date, and their Demands were settled and declared to the *Dutch* long before the Treaty made by *Oliver*; who by that means found most of the Articles prepared to his hand. Thus you see the Case of *Cromwell's Treaty* is in all respects very wide of the present; and I must still be of opinion, that our Ministers in the Treaty of *Seville*, have taken the best Method they could to procure Satisfaction to our Merchants, notwithstanding this Objection.

But it is to be feared, nothing will be coming to us upon the Ballance, because it is stipulated in the same Article, That the same Commissaries shall likewise discuss and decide the Pretensions of his Catholick Majesty for the Restitution of the Ships taken by the *English* Fleet in 1718, in virtue of the Treaty of 1721. But our Merchants need not be afraid of the Ballance on the foot of this Account; for by that Treaty the Ships were to be restored in the State they were then in, that is, after they had been rotting three Years in Harbour; or if any had been sold, the Money

ney they were sold for. In fact they were then so damaged, that they who were sent for them, in pursuance of the Treaty, did not think them worth taking away. But let the Ballance at the Foot of the Account be what it will, can any thing be more just, than that the Pretensions of *Spain*, in virtue of former Treaties, should be referred to the Commissaries, as well as those of *England*? Can any sensible *Englishman* be so ridiculously partial, as to expect all Articles in Treaties in his favour shall be re-establish'd, and not those in favour of the other Side? Has not the King of *Spain* as good a Right to insist on his Claims, founded on former Treaties, as the King of *England* has? Or can we expect, that in forming a Treaty made to prevent a War, the contracting Powers should not treat upon an equal foot? Had this Treaty been preceded by a vigorous War, which in the Prosecution of it had turned greatly to the Advantage of one Side, and had reduced the other to a necessity of Peace upon any Terms, in that case the Conqueror will be allowed to treat upon what foot he pleases; he will alter, or annul, or add to the Articles of former Treaties as he thinks fit, for his own and his People's Interest; and the other Parties must submit. But the case is widely different here, where all we have to claim is to be put into the state we were in before our late Differences, and there is no pretence without extreme Partiality and Insolence to demand more. Which, by the way, shews the Fallacy of comparing the present Treaty with that of *Utrecht*; and one may justly be pronounced safe and honourable, while the other can't be remember'd without great abhorrence; since those who were at that time the chief Ministers, had it fully in their power to have gain'd much better Terms both for us and our Allies. And were this a proper Place for it, it were easy to shew, that all the Misunderstandings which have happened between *England* and *Spain* since the Treaty of *Utrecht*, are owing to the Injustice done to the Emperor by that Treaty; which instead of a solid Peace between Him and *Spain*, ended in a bare Neutrality, that in the Nature of things could not be expected to last long, as in fact we all know it did not: For in 1717 the *Spaniards* attack'd *Sardinia*; and had they reduced that Island, as they expected, they would the same Campaign have fallen

fallen on *Sicily*. But the Siege of *Cagliari* spending the Summer, *Sicily* was reserved to be the Work of another Year. The late King, to preserve, if possible, the Neutrality in those Seas, and prevent the kindling a new War, sent a strong Squadron into the *Mediterranean*; but the two Fleets meeting near *Syracuse*, instead of any Accommodation, a warm Battle ensued, in which the *English* took and destroy'd great part of the *Spanish* Fleet. The succeeding Steps from hence to the *Vienna-Treaty*, are too fresh in Memory to need repeating.

But to return from this Digression, which I have been led into by the Comparisons that have been made between the present Treaty, and that of *Utrecht*, to the disadvantage of the former: I say, we have by this Treaty all we have a Right to demand, and all we want. A Confirmation of former Treaties, and Satisfaction promised for Damages, which, in Violation of them, our Merchants have sustain'd. And this ought, and, I doubt not, will satisfy all but those whose Business it is not to be satisfied, till they can by a domestic Treaty obtain, not for their Country, but themselves, such Articles as I am persuaded they never will.

But the part of this Treaty which these Gentlemen pretend to take most offence at, and to be in great Apprehensions from, that the Peace will not be lasting, is what relates to securing to *Don Carlos* the Succession stipulated for him by the Quadruple Alliance, which Alliance is confirm'd anew in this Treaty, as being one of those which were in being between the two Nations before the Year 1725. All these Treatys are re-established; we had no right to pick and choose; and to say, this Treaty shall be still in force, but that shall not; all former Treatys are equally renewed, and this among the rest. They therefore who find fault with this Part of the Treaty, if there be indeed a Fault, must lay it on the Ministers who advised the Quadruple Alliance; but the present Ministry want not to take refuge in this Excuse: That Part of the Quadruple-Alliance, which settles the Succession of *Don Carlos* to *Tuscany* and *Parma*, was a wise Provision to prevent a War, which would infallibly have broken out upon the Demise of those Princes, and to hinder these Parts of *Italy* from coming into the same hands that are already possessed of *Naples* and the *Milanese*. It will always be necessary, in order to preserve the Ballance of Power, and our own Interest in the *Mediterranean* Trade, to keep *Italy* from falling under the Dominion of one Master; and therefore this Part of this Treaty needs no Excuse, which is, in this Point, but a Copy

of the Quadruple Alliance, only with this Variation, that six thousand *Spaniards* are to garrison the Places named in the Treaty, to be paid by *Spain*, instead of six thousand *Swiss*, to be paid by the contracting Powers, *England, France,* and *Spain* equally: which was a very necessary Variation to secure the Points intended to be provided for by that Alliance, as the Event has plainly shewn. For it is now twelve Years since the Quadruple Alliance was made, by which six thousand *Swiss* Troops were forthwith to garrison those Places. And yet after so many Years nothing has been done towards putting this part of the Treaty in Execution; no one of the six thousand *Swiss* has ever yet been sent; and the Succession of these Dominions continues as much exposed in this Respect, as it did before the Quadruple Alliance was made. *Spain* therefore had great Reason to insist on this Variation: And had the Ministry advis'd the King to break off the Treaty, rather than agree to it, I suppose we should then have heard loud Complaints of the Ministers, as rejecting for a trifling dispute, the most useful Alliance *England* can have, and throwing the Nation into a destructive War, thro' an unpardonable want of Judgment, or to serve their own wicked Ends. This Variation puts these Gentlemen in great pain, if you will believe them, for the Duration of the Peace, which they fear will be very short-liv'd; and so far as Invectives and Calumny can prevail, they will do all they can to make it so.

But what great ground is there for these Apprehensions? Is not the *Emperor* a Party to the Quadruple Alliance? Is not himself Guarantee of that Succession? Will not the sending *Spanish* instead of neutral Troops, secure the Succession more effectually? What then is there the *Emperor* should be offended at, supposing him sincerely desirous, that what he has agreed to in the Quadruple Alliance should take Effect? And these Gentlemen, I hope, have too much Respect for his Imperial Majesty, to entertain any Suspicion to the contrary. Do they suppose the *Emperor* has a greater Regard and Tenderness for the Princes, whom *Don Carlos* is to succeed, than *France* or *Spain*? and that he will oppose this Variation, as not sufficiently respectful to them? but what Pretence can there be for this? And if there were, is it imaginable the *Emperor* would involve himself, and all *Europe*, in a War for a mere Punctilio? Perhaps not, they say, but these Places are acknowledg'd to be Fiefs of the Empire, and the Right of Feudality will be injur'd by this Variation. But first, I must observe, this Right is so far from being a clear, indisputable Right, that this very Treaty
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of the Quadruple Alliance is its best Foundation; it is here for Peace sake allow'd by the Contracting Powers: But how does the Variation in the *Seville-Treaty* prejudice this Right? Whatever *Don Carlos* was to do by the Quadruple-Alliance in acknowledgment of this Right, is to be done still. Every Point stipulated in relation to this Affair in the Quadruple-Alliance, except this single Variation of *Swiss-Troops* into *Spanish*, is confirmed in this; which by the way is a full Answer to those who are in pain for the Port of *Legborne*, and our Trade there. It is stipulated, in the Quadruple-Alliance, that *Legborne* shall remain a free Port; but that is not repeated in this. Therefore, say they, the Ministers have not been so careful of our Trade in this Treaty, as the Ministers who made that. What can be trifling, if this be not? If that Treaty is confirmed by this in all Points, except the Variation mention'd, then this Clause is confirm'd equally with the rest, that the Port of *Legborne* shall remain free as it was before.

Will the Emperor then venture a War rather than consent to this? I believe not. He is too wise a Prince not to see the Consequence a Resentment carried so far, might be attended with: He can't have forgot to whose Arms he owes the Acquisitions he got by the last War; much less can he forget to whom he is obliged for *Sicily*: And therefore I can never believe he will suffer himself to be drawn into a War against so many and so great Powers, without a better reason for it. What he may lose by such a Quarrel, compared with what he might hope to get, is so vastly disproportioned, that as I am not apprehensive of any such Event myself, so I can't bring myself to believe, that any body else is so in earnest. But if he should, shall we be in as ill a State then, as we should be, had we not a Peace with *Spain*? If we are engaged in a War with the *Emperor* and *Spain*, one of whom has the Sword, and the other the Money, we should be three against two: but now, if a War should ensue, we shall be four against one; in one case we shall have the Treasures of *Spain* with us, against a Power whose want of Money must needs be without resource, unless lent him by ourselves; whereas in the other, those Treasures would be employed against us. In one case the War would be so extensive, as to take in both Worlds, and put us to an infinite Expence in the *West-Indies*: In the other it would probably be confined to *Italy*, where it is impossible head can be long made against all the naval Strength of *Europe*. Let me add, what makes a very material Difference, that in this Case we shall be *Accessaries* only, whereas in the o-

ther we must have been *Principals*. But if the War should be kindled also in the *Empire*, our Allies would, in my humble Opinion, be very soon able to extinguish it. They who remember the two last Wars, know how little the *Emperor* and *Imperial* Army were able to do, notwithstanding the Assistance of such powerful Allies as they then had. Can it then be imagined the Emperor will easily enter into a War against four such Powers as are now allied; and that when the *Imperial* Court are under continual Alarms of a War from another Quarter? If *Hungary* should be invaded by the *Turks*, the *Emperor* will have Work enough on his hands, without provoking the Christian Powers, who are willing to live in Peace and Friendship with him. I can't therefore apprehend the Emperor will begin a War with us, or that if he shou'd, we need be in any great pain for the event of it. It can by no means be so dangerous, of so great an Extent, or so Expensive, and consequently so Destructive, as a War with the *Emperor* and *Spain* together, which is effectually prevented by this Treaty.

But I must say a word more about the Port of *Legborne*. The Gentlemen I am opposing, pretend it will make our *Italian* Trade precarious, by suffering it to be garrison'd by *Spanish* Troops. In answer to which, I would humbly ask, if they really think that Trade would be more precarious by that Port's being in the hands of *Don Carlos*, than in those of the Emperor? If it would not, as I am persuaded they will allow, then our *Mediterranean* Trade is at least as safe in this Case as it would be in the other; and then the Fears started on this Head are without foundation.

There is, I think, but one Thing more in the Treaty I need take any notice of; and you will wonder, when I name it, how it is possible it should give Offence, or be made a Pretence for any Uneasiness. It is in the same Article, and in the same Words which I have already mention'd, by which the contracting Powers promise to guarantee reciprocally *their Dominions, in what Parts of the World soever situate*. This offends, because it takes in the Dominions of *Hanover*. Would one think it possible *Englishmen* should have so little Honour, that they can be willing to stand by as unconcern'd Spectators, and see the King's *German* Dominions invaded and involv'd in all the Calamities of a War, merely because they are the King's Dominions, and suffer upon a Quarrel purely *English*, entirely so with respect to *Hanover*, which has no Interest in our Disputes with the *Emperor* or *Spain* one way or other; and
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if they feel the Miseries of a War, it is for no other Reason, but because they have the same Prince for their Governour with us; the King of *England* is *their* Elector. What then can be more just, than that *England* should join in their Defence? 'Tis so manifest a Piece of Justice this, that no body can pretend to be against it, but by pretending what is notoriously untrue, That whatever they may happen to suffer, is not upon our account, or for any Dispute between *England* and the *Emperor*, but on some other which we have nothing to do with. But before these Gentlemen should expect to be believ'd, they should frankly declare their Readiness to give those Countries Assistance and Support, whenever it is plain they are in danger of suffering for our sakes. But that is a Declaration I don't hear they have yet made: Nor indeed is it to be expected that that Part of them should, who are known to be in another Interest, and make no Secret of declaring it. But it might be expected from the Patriots who have join'd them, who pretend great Respect for the King, and would be thought to be very hearty in his Interest, however angry they may be with his Ministers. But they have the Happiness to serve a Prince who is too discerning not to see through such Pretences. The Behaviour of these Patriots plainly shews they mean not the Service of the King, but themselves; else they could not prevail on themselves to act so infamous a Part, to act against all the Rules of Decency and Equity, against good Manners as well as good Sense, perpetually arraigning all the Measures of the Government as weak and foolish, and charging all upon One, as if he really were All. They charge him not only with Corruption in Things properly in his Department, though his whole Management of it shews the Iniquity of such a Charge, but every Thing else they think fit to dislike in every other Part of the Administration; than which nothing can be more senseless. On him are laid all the imaginary Faults they pretend to see in the *Seville-Treaty*, and the Negotiations preceding it, tho' they know, can't but know, that has been the Province of another Minister: A Minister whose Virtue and Integrity, whose Capacity for Business, and Knowledge of foreign Affairs, make him greatly esteem'd, both at Home and Abroad by all who have the Honour to converse with him; a Minister who has always had the Interest of his Country, and particularly of its Trade and Commerce at Heart, and who has in particular given all along the utmost Attention to the late Negotiations, and conducted them with the greatest Care and Prudence to bring them

to a happy issue, which he has the Satisfaction to find he has done in the Opinion of all candid and impartial Judges. But had there been any false Steps in these Proceedings, how unjust, how barbarous is it to charge them on one, on whom they most certainly know they are not chargeable?

But this is not all ; they impute to him, without scruple, Papers which they could not know he did write, and which I verily believe they know he did not ; for they shew, upon occasion, they have very good Intelligence. Thus to make him his own Panegyrist, they will have him to be the Writer of those just and judicious OBSERVATIONS which have been published *on the late Treaty*, and insult him for it without measure. This Liberty the Writers of *The Short View*, and of *The Observations examined*, have both taken ; a Liberty which nothing, I presume, can justify without Knowledge, and very probably against it. But this is comparatively tolerable. They go so low as to insinuate that some of the vilest Libels against him are written by himself, to have a Pretence from thence for restraining the Liberty of the Press. But can any Thing be more infamous than such a Conduct ? first to asperse a Person in a very high Station with the most horrid Calumnies, and then make him himself the Author, and that in order to suppress a Liberty, which it is well known he has never attempted : Tho' I believe there is no sober Man doubts but there is a Difference, a very material one, between *Liberty* and *Licentiousness*, and that the latter ought to be restrained, could a Way be found for it, without hurting *Liberty*, which it must be confessed it is hard to do. And they that think otherwise, seem not to know either Human Nature, or the Nature of Government, or the History of the World, by which they would find the Ruin of Free Governments has been owing to nothing more than to the degenerating of *Liberty* into *Licentiousness*. 'Tis this has turn'd Commonwealths into Tyrannies, as might be shewn in many Instances. But I have no Intention to pursue this Subject. But sure I am, if *Licentiousness* ever reigned, with respect to Things both Sacred and Civil, it does so now : And as to Insults upon Ministers, as such Liberties were never before taken, so were they never born with more Patience and Unconcernedness.

But what is the Reason of this monstrous Conduct towards him ? Is it that they think him a weak inconsiderable Man, an ignorant, unable, or unfaithful Minister ? Nothing less : Their very Insults shew they think quite otherwise. His Crime is his Capacity, and his Fidelity to the
Prince

Prince he serves. In short, they think him the Head of the Ministry, and that if they can demolish him, his Ruin will draw that of the others after it, and then they hope there will be room for them. Did they really think him a contemptible Minister, a Man not fit to be at the Head of Affairs, the Removal of him would be of Service to the other Ministers, and they would stand the firmer for it; which would by no means answer the Purpose of these angry Gentlemen. They attack him with so much Rage, not because they think him the weakest and the worst, but because they have the contrary Idea of him; and from hence alone it is that all their Artillery is so constantly, and with so much Rage, pointed at him; but hitherto in vain, and to the great Offence of all fair and unprejudic'd Men, who would not bear to have the meanest of their Fellow-Subjects condemned upon general Charges, while nothing is proved, or so much as attempted to be proved: Much less can they be pleased to see a Minister in a high Post daily libelled and calumniated in the most outrageous manner by a Faction who are not able to bring a single Instance in all his Conduct to support their Charge. But the Consciousness of his own Integrity, his inviolable Fidelity to his Prince, his great Capacity for Business, and extensive Knowledge of Affairs; his natural and masterly Eloquence; his singular Humanity and Good-nature, which makes him always averse to hard or unkind Offices, always ready to do good ones; these, and a thousand other good Qualities, by the Esteem and Love they have procured him with those whose Judgment he ought to have any Value for, support him with the greatest Chearfulness under the vilest and falsest Calumnies, and give him Courage to persevere with the greatest Steadiness in the Service of his King and Country, and to trample with Contempt on the impotent Rage and Malice of those who seem to have no other Business but to defame and blacken him.

But to leave this Digression, which a just Indignation has led me into, and return to the Guaranty of his Majesty's *Dominions wheresoever situate*, I'm persuaded the Wisdom of the Nation will scorn so mean, so dishonourable a Part, as to desert a Nation in distress on our account, and will follow an *English* Cause wherever it is attacked, and make the Sufferings of *Hanover* their own, if the Resentments, raised by our Dispute with the Emperor, should fall on them. This is just, this is reasonable; this no *Englishman*, no Man of Honour can be against.

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I have now, I think, gone through every thing that has the Colour of an Objection against either the Treaty or the Measures previous to it, and it is high time to relieve you. If what I have written gives you Satisfaction, I shall be extremely glad, there being no body I should be more unwilling to differ with in my Sentiments on publick Affairs: But if I should not be so happy, you will accept it as the private, but impartial Sense of,

S I R,

Your Most Obedient Humble Servant,

A. B.

F I N I S.

