

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ON THE

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IN A SERIES OF

LETTERS.

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1796.

THE

PUBLISHER's APPEAL

TO THE

CANDOUR AND JUSTICE OF THE NATION.

IT would ill become me to make any remarks on my examination before a committee of the Houſe of Commons, reſpecting the Author of "Thoughts on the Engliſh Government." My conduct on that occaſion could give no juſt offence to any party, and was ſpoken of in very favourable terms by Mr. Windham, Mr. Woodford his ſecretary, and ſeveral of their friends. As a mark of their eſteem, they promiſed me a pamphlet which Mr. Burke was then preparing for the preſs, and which he ſoon after put into my hands. On giving me the laſt ſheet, with his final corrections, "There," ſaid he, "that is *your own*—It is but a trivial thing—I do not know that it will *pay you for paper and printing*.—I muſt alſo do Mr. Burke the juſtice to acknowledge that

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he ſeemed to rejoice at my ſucceſs; and to ſhew his deſire of farther promoting it, gave me his "Thoughts on a Regicide Peace." I felt the full force of the favour, and chearfully took upon me the trouble of dancing backwards and forwards alternately between Author and Printer, three or four times a day for almoſt three months, to attend to ſuch a variety of alterations as can be conceived only by thoſe who are acquainted with the whims, the caprice and the eternal verſatility of genius. After an interval of ſix months, the publication having been for that time ſuſpended, and juſt at the moment that I expected to receive ſome little return for my fatiguing exertions, I was ſuddenly called upon by the Rev. Dr. King, with a ſort of meſſage from Mr. Burke, deſiring an account of the former work. I was really ſhocked at a demand ſo repugnant to all my ideas of that gentleman's character. I know he has not ſo ſhort a memory as to forget the terms on which he made me a preſent of the manuſcript. I had made no proviſion to ſettle for the profits of a voluntary gift, nor had I kept any account

of

of them. I muſt alſo aſſert, that in order to ſhew myſelf not inferior even to Mr. Burke in generoſity, I liberally ſupplied all his friends with copies of the work *gratis*, ſo that I believe, if an exact account had been kept, it would not appear that I lay under any very weighty obligation. Rouſed, however, by ſo ſtrange a demand, I called upon Mr. Windham's ſecretary to remonſtrate on the illiberality, injuſtice, and unreaſonableneſs of ſuch a claim for what I could not help conſidering as a preſent: he replied, "It is very true:—it was meant ſo:—but Mr. Burke has thought otherwiſe ſince."—I then called upon Mr. Nagle, the near relation and confidential friend of Mr. Burke, who had expreſſed no leſs ſurpriſe on hearing the matter firſt mentioned by Dr. King, and whoſe exact words were, "By heavens! Owen conceived the Pamphlet to be his *own*; and ſo did I."—If Mr. Burke's conceptions then ſhould run counter in this inſtance to the dictates of plain ſenſe, and to the ideas of his own neareſt and deareſt friends, I hope my character can never be injured by his unaccountable eccenticities. The man, who

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can write ſo beautiful a panegyric on royal bounty, would never ſurely incur the reproach of attempting to retract *his own* gifts, or even to ſtrip a poor bookſeller of the accidental profits of publiſhing an eſſay on munificence. He has alſo, I am perſuaded, too much dignity of ſentiment to be offended with my bringing forward the preſent work, on account of its interfering in any ſort with his *new* arguments againſt a Peace with a *Regicide Directory*. I am in fact promoting his own wiſhes to cut off *all intercourſe* with *Regicides*; and I rely upon his kind and diſintereſted recommendation of theſe *old Thoughts* on the ſubject, which are now preſented to the Public with the venerable marks, and ſilver honours of age.

October 19, 1796.

LETTER I.

On the Overtures of Peace.

MY DEAR SIR,

UNTIL the beginning of this session, notwithstanding many untoward appearances, I still flattered myself that I should have no other than domestick afflictions to cloud the evening of my life: but a state of things is threatened, which, whatever room private griefs may occupy, leaves a vast vacuity to be filled with publick sorrow.

If I estimate rightly, what is going to be suffered, from what is going to be done, it is from something the very reverse of philosophy, that we are to learn content. In the interval between the treaty of peace with Regicide, and it's inevitable consequences, we must owe our repose not to deep thinking, but to the absence of all thought. To enjoy life, we must forget every thing of what England has been, and of what we have been ourselves. England has been happy; and change is

a word of ill sound to happy ears. A great revolution is on the point of being accomplished. It is a revolution not in human affairs, but in man himself. The system of France aims at nothing short of this. If we are tired of being the men we were, and disgusted with the society in which we have lived, France offers her *regeneration*. By whatever humiliations we buy a blessing, I admit that the nature of the object purchased remains the same. On that supposition, the advances we have made to the Republick of Regicide, are made on a consistent plan. But if what she terms regeneration, is what we call death, then, instead of advancing, we should retreat, and fly from Jacobin remedies as from the most terrible of all diseases.

Observe at the outset, that I suppose a peace with Jacobinism, the submission to it's laws, and the adoption of it's whole scheme, to be so necessarily connected, that never, in sound logic, did the conclusion follow the premises with more certainty, than as I conceive it, in the course of Nature, that effect will be the result of this cause.

In one thing we are lucky. The regicide has received our advances with scorn. We have an enemy, to whose virtues we can owe nothing; but on this occasion we are infinitely obliged to

one of his vices. We owe more to his insolence than to our own precaution. The haughtiness by which the proud repel us, has this of good in it, that in making us keep our distance, they must keep their distance too. In the present case, the pride of the Regicide may be our safety. He has given time for our reason to operate; and for British dignity to recover from its surprise.

There is always an augury to be taken of what a peace is likely to be, from the preliminary steps that are made to bring it about. We may gather something from the time in which the first overtures are made; from the quarter whence they come; from the manner in which they are received. These discover the temper of the parties. If your enemy offers peace in the moment of success, it indicates that he is satisfied with something. It shews that there are limits to his ambition or his resentment. If he offers nothing under misfortune, it is probable, that it is more painful to him to abandon advantage than to endure calamity. If he rejects solicitation, and will not give even a nod to the suppliants for peace, until a change in the fortune of the war threatens him with ruin, then I think it evident, that he wishes nothing more than to disarm his adversary and to gain time. Afterwards a question arises, which of the

parties is likely to obtain the greater advantages, by the use of time and by continuing disarmed?

With these few, plain indications in our minds, it will not be improper to re-consider the conduct of the enemy together with our own, from the day that a question of peace has been in agitation. In considering this part of the question, I do not proceed on my own hypothesis. I suppose, for a moment, that this body of Regicide, calling itself a Republick, is a politick person, with whom something deserving the name of peace may be made. On that supposition, let us examine our own proceeding. Let us compute the profit it has brought, and the advantage that it is likely to bring hereafter. A peace too eagerly sought, is not always the sooner obtained; and when obtained, it never can be every thing we wish. The discovery of vehement wishes generally frustrates their attainment; and your adversary has gained a great advantage over you when he finds you impatient to conclude a treaty. There is in reserve, not only something of dignity, but a great deal of prudence too. A sort of courage belongs to negotiation as well as to operations of the field. A negotiator must seem willing to hazard all, if he wishes to secure any material point.

The

The Regicide was the first to declare war. We are the first to sue for peace. We have twice* solicited to be admitted to Jacobin embraces. Twice we have been repelled with cold disdain. It is true, that pride may reject a publick advance, whilst interest listens to a secret suggestion of advantage. The opportunity has been afforded. A gentleman has been sent on an errand, of which, from the motive of it, whatever the event might be, we never can be ashamed. Humanity cannot be degraded by humiliation. It is it's very character to submit to such things. There is a consanguinity between benevolence and humility. They are virtues of the same stock. Dignity is of as good a race; but it belongs to the family of Fortitude. In the spirit of that benevolence, we sent a gentleman to beseech the Directory of Regicides, not to be quite so prodigal as they had been of judicial murder. We solicited them to spare the lives of some unhappy persons of the first distinction, whose safety at other times could not have been an object of solicitation. They had quitted France on the faith of the declaration of the rights of citizens. They never had been in the service of the Regicides, nor at their

* Once in the Speech from the Throne; once by a message. What other direct advances have been made I have not heard; nor do I know of any.

hands had received any stipend. The very system and constitution of government that now prevails, was settled subsequent to their emigration. They were under the protection of Great Britain, and in his Majesty's pay and service. Not an hostile invasion, but the disasters of the sea had thrown them upon a shore, more barbarous and inhospitable than the inclement ocean under the most pitiless of its storms. Here was an opportunity to express a feeling for the miseries of war; and to open some sort of conversation, which, (after our public overtures had glutted their pride) at a cautious and jealous distance, might lead to something like an accommodation. What was the event? A strange uncouth thing, a theatrical figure of the opera, his head shaded with three coloured plumes, his body fantastically habited, strutted from the back scenes, and after a short speech, in the mock-heroic falsetto of stupid tragedy, delivered the gentleman who came to make the representation into the custody of a guard, with directions not to lose sight of him for a moment; and then ordered him to be sent from Paris in two hours.

Here it is impossible that a sentiment of tenderness should not strike athwart the sternness of politicks, and make us recal to painful memory, the difference between this insolent and bloody thea-

tre,

tre, and the temperate, natural majesty of a civilized court, where the afflicted family of Asgill did not in vain solicit the mercy of the highest in rank, and the most compassionate of the compassionate sex.

Whilst the fortune of the field was wholly with the Regicides, nothing was thought of but to follow where it led; and it led to every thing. Not so much as a talk of treaty. Laws were laid down with arrogance. The most moderate politician amongst them* was chosen as the organ, not so much for prescribing limits to their claims, as to mark what, for the present, they are content to leave to others. They made not laws, not Conventions, but late possession, but physical nature, and political convenience the sole foundation of their claims. The Rhine, the Mediterranean, and the ocean were the bounds which, for the time, they assigned to the empire of Regicide. In truth, with these limits, and their principle, they would not have left even the shadow of liberty or safety to any nation. This plan of empire was not taken up in the first intoxication of unexpected success. You must recollect, that it was projected just as the report has stated it, from the very first revolt of the faction against their Monarchy; and it has been uniformly pursued, as a standing maxim of national policy,

* Boissy d'Anglas.

policy, from that time to this. It is in the season of prosperity that men discover their real tempers, principles, and designs. This report, combined with their conduct, forms an infallible criterion of the views of this Republick.

The tide of success began to turn. We are to see how their minds have been affected with this change. Some impression it made on them undoubtedly. It produced some oblique notice of the submissions that were made by suppliant nations. The utmost they did, was to make some of those cold, formal, general professions of a love of peace which no power ever refused to make; because they mean little, and cost nothing. The first paper I have seen (the publication at Hamburgh) making a shew of that pacific disposition, discovered a rooted animosity, and incurable rancour, more than any of their military operations. They choose to suppose, that this war, on the part of England, is a war of Government, begun and carried on against the sense and interests of the people; thus sowing in their very overtures towards peace, the seeds of tumult and sedition; for they never have abandoned, and never will abandon, in peace, in war, in treaty, in any situation, or for one instant, their old steady maxim of separating the people from the Government.

We

We have since seen them take up the matter with great formality. On that occasion they discovered still more clearly the bottom of their character. The offers made to them by the message to Parliament was hinted at; but in an obscure and oblique manner as before. They accompanied their notice of the indications manifested on our side, with every kind of insolent and taunting reflexion. The Regicide Directory, on the day which, in their gipsy jargon, they call the 5th of Pluviôse, in return for our advances, charge us with eluding our declarations under "evasive formalities and frivolous pretexts." They proceed to charge us, and, as it should seem, our allies in the mass, with direct *perfidy*—and go so far as to say, that this perfidious character was nothing new to us. However, notwithstanding this our habitual perfidy, they will offer peace "on conditions *as* moderate"—as what? as reason and as equity require? No! as moderate "as are "suitable to their *national dignity*." Dignity, hitherto, has belonged to the mode of proceeding, not to the matter of a treaty. Never before has it been mentioned as the standard for rating the conditions of peace;—no, never by the most violent of conquerors. Indemnity is capable of some estimate; dignity has no standard. It is impossible to guess what acquisitions pride and ambition may think fit for their *dignity*. But lest any doubt

should remain on what they think for their dignity, the Regicides in the next paragraph tell us "that they will have no peace with their "enemies, until they have reduced them to a state "which will put them under an *impossibility* of "pursuing their unfortunate projects;" that is, in plain French or English, until they have accomplished our utter and irretrievable ruin. This is their *pacific* language, and it is their unalterable principle in whatever language they speak, or whatever steps they take, whether of real war, or of pretended pacification. They have never, to do them justice, been at much trouble in concealing their intentions. We were as obstinately resolved to think them not in earnest. I confess this sort of jests, whatever their urbanity may be, are not much to my taste.

To this obliging, conciliatory, and amicable communication, our sole answer, in effect, is this--"Citizen Regicides! whenever *you* find yourselves "in the humour, you may have a peace with *us*. "That is a point you may always command as se-"cure. We are constantly in attendance, and no-"thing you can do shall hinder us from the re-"newal of our supplications."

To those, who do not love to contemplate the fall of human greatness, I do not know a more

mortifying spectacle, than to see the assembled majesty of the crowned heads of Europe waiting as patient suitors in the anti-chamber of Regicides. They wait, it seems, until the sanguinary tyrant, *Rewbell*, shall have snorted away the fumes of the indigested blood of his Sovereign ;—then, when sunk on the down of usurped pomp, he shall have sufficiently indulged his meditations with what King he shall next glut his ravening maw, and he may condescend to signify that it is his pleasure to be awake, and ready to receive the proposals of his high and mighty clients for the terms on which he may respite the execution of the sentence he has passed upon them. Whatever may come of the object of all this suit and service, there seems to me a wonderful "alacrity in sinking." To submit to be so treated is to be humbled indeed. It is to sink many degrees below Zero in the descending scale of political degradation. I never knew dignity much.

Our proceeding, which has produced this return, appeared to me totally new, without being adapted to the new circumstances of affairs. I have called to my mind the speeches and messages in former times. I find nothing like these. Before this time, never was a ground of peace laid, as it were, in a parliamentary record, until it had been as good as concluded. This was a wise homage

paid to the discretion of the Crown. It was known how much any negotiation must suffer by having any thing in the train towards it prematurely disclosed.

I conceive that another circumstance in that transaction has been as little authorised by any example, and that it is as little prudent in itself; I mean the formal recognition of the French Republick. Without entering, for the present, into a question on the good faith manifested in that measure, or on it's general policy, I doubt, upon mere prudential considerations, whether it was perfectly adviseable. It is not within the rules of dexterous conduct to make an acknowledgment of a contested title in your enemy, before you are morally certain that your recognition will secure his friendship. Otherwise it is a measure worse than thrown away. It adds infinitely to the strength, and consequently to the demands of the adverse party. He has gained a fundamental point without an equivalent.

This sort of preliminary declarations, thrown out at random, and sown, as it were, broad cast, were never to be found in the mode of our proceeding with France and Spain, whilst the great Monarchies of France and Spain existed. I do not say, that a diplomatick measure ought to be, like a par-

a parliamentary or a judicial proceeding, according to strict precedent. I hope I am far from that pedantry: but this I know, that a great state ought to have some regard to it's antient maxims; especially where they indicate it's dignity; where they concur with the rules of prudence; and above all, where the circumstances of the time require that a spirit of innovation should be resisted, which leads to the humiliation of sovereign powers. It would be ridiculous to assert, that those powers have suffered nothing in their estimation. I admit, that the greater interests of state will for a moment supersede all other considerations: but if there was a rule that a sovereign never should let down his dignity without a sure payment to his interest, the dignity of Kings would be held high enough. At present, however, fashion governs in more serious things than furniture and dress. It looks as if sovereigns abroad were emulous in bidding against their estimation. It seems as if the pre-eminence of Regicide was acknowleged; and that Kings tacitly ranked themselves below their sacrilegious murderers, as natural magistrates and judges over them. It appears as if dignity were the prerogative of crime; and a temporising humiliation the proper part for venerable authority. If the vilest of mankind are resolved to be the most wicked, they lose all the baseness of their origin, and take their place above Kings. This example in foreign

reign Princes, I trust, will not spread. It is the concern of mankind, that the destruction of order should not be a claim to rank; that crimes should not be the only title to pre-eminence and honour.

If what I hear be true, the Ministers are not quite so much to be blamed, as their condition is to be lamented. I have been given to understand, that these proceedings are not in their origin properly theirs. It is said that there is a secret in the House of Commons. That Ministers act not according to the votes, but according to the dispositions, of the majority. I hear that the minority has long since spoken the general sense of the nation; and that to prevent those who compose it from having the open and avowed lead in that House, or perhaps in both Houses, it was necessary to pre-occupy their ground, and to take their propositions out of their mouths.

If the general disposition of the people be, as I hear it is, for an immediate peace with Regicide without so much as considering our publick and solemn engagements to the parties, or any enquiry into the terms, it is all over with us. It is strange, but it may be true, that as the danger from advances to Jacobinism is increased in my eyes and in yours, the fear of it is lessened in theirs. It seems, they act under the impression of other sort

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of terrors, which frighten them out of their first apprehensions: but it is fit they should recollect, that they who would make peace without a previous knowledge of the terms, make a surrender. They are conquered. They do not treat; they receive the law. Then the people of England are contented to seek in the kindness of a foreign systematick enemy combined with a dangerous faction at home, a security which they cannot find in their own patriotism and their own courage. They are willing trust to the sympathy of Regicides, the guarantee of the British Monarchy. Tney are content to rest their religion on the piety of atheists by establishment. They are satisfied to seek in the clemency of practised murderers the security of their lives. They are pleased to confide their property to the safeguard of those who are robbers by inclination, interest, habit, and system. If this be our deliberate mind, truly we deserve to lose, what we cannot long retain, the name of a nation.

In matters of state, a constitutional competence to act, is in many cases the smallest part of the question. Without disputing (God forbid I should dispute) the sole competence of the King and the Parliament, each in it's province, to decide on war and peace, I venture to say, no war *can* be long carried on against the will of the people. This war, in particular, cannot be carried on unless they

they are enthusiastically in favour of it. Acquiescence will not do. There must be zeal. Universal zeal in such a cause, and at such a time as this is, cannot be looked for; neither is it necessary. A zeal in the larger part carries the force of the whole. Without this, no Government, certainly not our Government, is capable of a great war. None of the ancient regular Governments has wherewithal to fight abroad with a foreign foe, and at home to overcome repining, reluctance, and chicane. It must be some portentous thing, like Regicide France, that can exhibit such a prodigy. Yet even she, the mother of monsters, more prolific than the country of old called *Ferax monstrorum*, shews symptoms of being almost effete already; and she will be so, unless the fallow of a peace comes to recruit her fertility. But whatever may be represented concerning the meanness of the popular spirit, I, for one, do not think so desperately of the British nation. Our minds are light, but they are not evil. We are dreadfully open to delusion and to dejection; but we are capable of being animated and undeceived.

It cannot be concealed. We are a divided people. But in divisions, where a part is to be taken, we are to make a muster of our strength. I have often endeavoured to class those who, in any political view, are to be called the people. Without

Without doing ſomething of this ſort we muſt proceed abſurdly. We ſhould preſume as abſurdly, if we pretended to very great accuracy in our eſtimate. But I think, in the calculation I have made, the error cannot be very material. In England and Scotland, I compute that thoſe of adult age, not declining in life, of tolerable leiſure for ſuch diſcuſſions, and of ſome means of information, more or leſs, and who are above menial dependence, (or what virtually is ſuch) may amount to about four hundred thouſand. In this number I include the women that take a concern in thoſe tranſactions, who cannot exceed twenty thouſand. There is ſuch a thing as a natural repreſentative of the people. This body is that repreſentative; and on this body, more than on the legal conſtituent, the artificial repreſentative depends. This is the Britiſh publick; and it is a publick very numerous. The reſt, when feeble, are the objects of protection; when ſtrong, the means of force. They who affect to conſider that part of us in any other light, inſult while they cajole us; they do not want us for counſellors in deliberation, but to liſt us as ſoldiers for battle.

Of theſe four hundred thouſand political citizens, I look upon one fifth, or about eighty thouſand, to be pure Jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment; objects of eternal vigilance; and

when they break out, of legal conſtraint. On theſe, no reaſon, no argument, no example, no venerable authority, can have the ſlighteſt influence. They deſire a change; and they will have it if they can. If they cannot have it by Engliſh cabal, they will make no ſort of ſcruple of having it by the cabal of France, into which already they are virtually incorporated.

This minority is great and formidable. I do not know whether if I aimed at the total overthrow of a kingdom, I ſhould wiſh to be encumbered with a larger body of partizans. Theſe, by their ſpirit of intrigue, and by their reſtleſs agitating activity, are of a force far ſuperior to their numbers; and if times grew the leaſt critical, have the means of debauching or intimidating many of thoſe who are now found, as well as of adding to their force large bodies of the more paſſive part of the nation. This minority is numerous enough to make a mighty cry for peace, or for war, or for any object they are led vehemently to deſire. By paſſing from place to place with a velocity incredible, and diverſifying their character and deſcription, they are capable of mimicking the general voice. We muſt not always judge of the generality of the opinion by the noiſe of the acclamation.

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The majority, the other four fifths, is perfectly ſound; and of the beſt poſſible diſpoſitions to religion, to government, to the true and undivided intereſt of their country. Such men are naturally diſpoſed to peace. They who are in poſſeſſion of all they wiſh, are languid and improvident. With this fault, (and I admit it's exiſtence in all its extent) they would not endure to hear of a peace that led to the ruin of every thing for which peace is dear to them. However, the deſire of peace is eſſentially the weak ſide of all ſuch men. All men that are ruined, are ruined on the ſide of their natural propenſities. There they are unguarded. They do not ſuſpect that their deſtruction is attempted through their virtues. This their enemies are perfectly aware of—and accordingly they, the moſt turbulent of mankind, who never made a ſcruple to ſhake the tranquility of their country to its centre, raiſe a continual cry for peace with France. Peace with Regicide, and war with the reſt of the world, is their true motto. From the beginning, and even whilſt the French gave the blows, and we hardly oppoſed the *vis inertiæ* to their efforts, from that day to this hour, like importunate Guinea-fowls crying one note day and night, they have called for a Regicide peace.

In this they are, as I confeſs in all things they are, perfectly conſiſtent. They who wiſh to unite themſelves to your enemies, naturally deſire, that you ſhould diſarm yourſelf by a peace with theſe enemies. But it paſſes my conception, how they, who wiſh well to their country on it's ancient ſyſtem of laws and manners, come not to be doubly alarmed, when they find nothing but a clamor for peace, in the mouths of the men on earth the leaſt diſpoſed to it in their natural or in their habitual character.

I have a good opinion of the general abilities of the Jacobins: not that I ſuppoſe them better born than others; but ſtrong paſſions awake the faculties. They ſuffer not a particle of the man to be loſt. The ſpirit of enterpriſe gives them the full uſe of all their native energies. If I have reaſon to conceive that my enemy, who, as ſuch, muſt have an intereſt in my deſtruction, is alſo a perſon of diſcernment and ſagacity, then I muſt be quite ſure, that in a conteſt, the object he violently purſues, is the very thing by which my ruin is the moſt perfectly accompliſhed. Why do the Jacobins cry for peace? Becauſe they know, that this point gained, the reſt will follow of courſe. On our part why are all the rules of prudence, as ſure as the laws of material nature to be at this time reverſed? How comes it, that now

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for the firſt time, men think it right to be governed by the counſels of their enemies? Ought they not rather to tremble, when they are perſuaded to travel on the ſame road; and to tend to the ſame place of reſt?

The minority I ſpeak of, is not ſuſceptible of an impreſſion from the topics of argument, to be uſed to the larger part of the community. I therefore do not addreſs to them any part of what I have to ſay. The more forcibly I drive my arguments againſt their ſyſtem, ſo as to make an impreſſion where I wiſh to make it, the more ſtrongly I rivet them in their ſentiments. As for us, who compoſe the far larger, and what I call the far better part of the people; let me ſay, that we have not been quite fairly dealt with when called to this deliberation. The Jacobin minority have been abundantly ſupplied with ſtores and proviſions of all kinds towards their warfare. No ſort of argumentative materials, ſuited to their purpoſes, have been withheld. Falſe they are, unſound, ſophiſtical; but they are regular in their direction. They all bear one way; and they all go to the ſupport of the ſubſtantial merits of their cauſe. The others have not had the queſtion ſo much as fairly ſtated to them.

There has not been in this century, any foreign peace or war in it's origin, the fruit of popular deſire: except the war that was made with Spain in 1739. Sir Robert Walpole was forced into the war by the people who were inflamed to this meaſure by the moſt leading politicians, by the firſt orators, and the greateſt poets of the time. For that war, Pope ſung his dying notes. For that war, Johnſon in more energetic ſtrains, employed the voice of his early genius. For that war, Glover diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the way in which his muſe was the moſt natural and happy. The crowd readily followed the politicians in the cry for a war, which threatened little bloodſhed, and which promiſed victories that were attended with ſomething more ſolid than glory. A war with Spain was a war of plunder. In the preſent conflict with Regicide, Mr. Pitt has not had, nor will for ſome little time have, many prizes to hold out in the lottery of war, to tempt the lower part of our character. He can only maintain it by an appeal to the higher; and to thoſe, in whom that higher part is moſt predominant, he muſt look the moſt for his ſupport. Whilſt he holds out no inducements to the wiſe, nor bribes to the avaricious, he may be forced by a vulgar cry into a peace ten times more ruinous than the moſt diſaſtrous war. The weaker he is in the fund of motives which apply to our avarice, to our lazineſs,

and

and to our laſſitude, if he means to carry the war to any end at all, the ſtronger he ought to be in his addreſſes to our magnanimity and to our reaſon.

In ſtating that Walpole was driven by a popular clamour into a meaſure not to be juſtified, I do not mean wholly to excuſe his conduct. My time of obſervation did not exactly coincide with that event; but I read much of the controverſies then carried on. Several years after the conteſts of parties had ceaſed, the people were amuſed, and in a degree warmed with them. The events of that æra ſeemed then of magnitude, which the revolutions of our time have reduced to parochial importance; and the debates, which then ſhook the nation, now appear of no higher moment than a diſcuſſion in a veſtry. When I was very young, a general faſhion told me I was to admire ſome of the writings againſt that Miniſter; a little more maturity taught me as much to deſpiſe them. I obſerved one fault in his general proceeding. He never manfully put forward the entire ſtrength of his cauſe. He temporiſed; he managed; and adopting very nearly the ſentiments of his adverſaries, he oppoſed their inferences.—This, for a political commander, is the choice of a weak poſt. His adverſaries had the better of the argument, as he handled it, not as the reaſon and juſtice of his cauſe enabled him to manage it. I ſay this after having

having ſeen, and with ſome care examined, the original documents concerning certain important tranſactions of thoſe times. They perfectly ſatisfied me of the extreme injuſtice of that war, and of the falſehood of the colours, which to his own ruin, and guided by a miſtaken policy, he ſuffered to be daubed over that meaſure. Some years after, it was my fortune, to converſe with many of the principal actors againſt that Miniſter, and with thoſe, who principally excited that clamour. None of them, no not one, did in the leaſt defend the meaſure, or attempt to juſtify their conduct, which they as freely condemned as they would have done in commenting upon any proceeding in hiſtory, in which they were totally unconcerned. Thus it will be. They who ſtir up the people to improper deſires, whether of peace or war, will be condemned by themſelves. They who weakly yield to them will be condemned by hiſtory.

In my opinion, the preſent miniſtry are as far from doing full juſtice to their cauſe in this war, as Walpole was from doing juſtice to the peace which at that time he was willing to preſerve. They throw the light on one ſide only of their caſe; though it is impoſſible they ſhould not obſerve, that the other ſide which is kept in the ſhade, has it's importance too. They muſt know, that France is formidable, not only as ſhe is France, but

but as she is Jacobin France. They knew from the beginning that the Jacobin party was not confined to that country. They knew, they felt, the strong dispositions of the same faction in both countries to communicate and to co-operate. For some time past, these two points have been kept, and even industriously kept, out of sight. France is considered as merely a foreign Power; and the seditious English only as a domestick faction. The merits of the war with the former have been argued solely on political grounds. To prevent our being corrupted with the mischievous doctrines of the latter, matter and argument have been supplied abundantly, and even to surfeit on the excellency of our own government. But nothing has been done to make us feel in what manner the safety of that Government is connected with the principle and with the issue of this war. For any thing, which in the late discussion has appeared, the war is intirely collateral to the state of Jacobinism; as truly a foreign war to us and to all our home concerns, as the war with Spain in 1739, about Gard da Costas, the Madrid Convention, and the fable of Captain *Jenkins's* ears.

Some who are advocates at once for Government, and for peace with the enemies of all Government, have even gone the length of consider-

ing the proceedings in France, if at all they affect us, as rather advantageous to the cause of tranquillity and good order in this country. But I reserve my observations on this very extraordinary topic of argument to another occasion: it is now my business to point out to you, that whenever the adverse party has raised a cry for peace with the Regicide, the answer has been little more than this, "that the Administration wished for "such a peace, full as much as the Opposition; but "that the time was not convenient for making it." Whatever else has been said was much in the same spirit. Reasons of this kind never touched the substantial merits of the war. They where in the nature of dilatory pleas, exceptions of form, and previous questions. Accordingly all the arguments against a compliance with the popular desires, (urged on with all possible vehemence and earnestness by the Jacobins) have appeared flat and languid, feeble and evasive. They appeared to aim only at gaining time. They never entered into the peculiar and distinctive character of the war. They spoke neither to the understanding nor to the heart. Cold as ice themselves, they never could kindle in our breasts a spark of that zeal, which is necessary to a conflict with an adverse zeal; much less are they made to infuse into our minds, that stubborn persevering spirit, which alone is capable of bearing up against those vicissitudes of fortune, that will probably

probably occur, and those burthens which must be inevitably borne in a long war. I speak it emphatically, and with a desire that it should be marked, in a *long* war; because, without such a war, no experience has yet told us, that a dangerous power has ever been reduced to measure or to reason. I do not throw back my view to the Peloponnesian war of twenty-seven years; nor to two of the Punick wars, the first of twenty-four, the second of eighteen; nor to the more recent war concluded by the treaty of Westphalia, which continued, I think, for thirty. I go to what is but just fallen behind living memory, and immediately touches our own country. Let the portion of our history from the year 1689 to 1713 be brought before us. We shall find, that in all that period of twenty-four years, there were not above six that could be called an interval of peace; and this interval was in reality nothing more than a very active preparation for war. During that period, every one of the propositions of peace came from the enemy. The first, when they were accepted, at the peace of Ryswick. The second, where they were rejected at the congress at Gertrudenburgh. The last, when the war ended by the treaty of Utrecht. Even then, a very great part of the nation, and that which contained by far the most intelligent statesmen, was against the conclusion of the war. I do not enter into the

merits of that question as between the parties. I only state the existence of that opinion as a fact. I mention the length of the war as a proof, that though the countries which now compose the kingdom, for a part of the time were not united, and through all the time continued with a raw and ill cemented union, and though they were further split into parties as vehement, and more equally divided than now they are,and that we were possessed of far less abundant resources in all kinds than we now enjoy.—I mean to mark, that under all these disadvantages the English nation was then a great people; that we had then an high mind, and a constancy unconquerable; that we were then inspired with no flashy passions, but such as were durable as well as warm; such as corresponded to the great interests we had at stake. This force of character was inspired, as all such spirit must ever be, from above. Government gave the impulse. As well may we fancy that of itself the sea will swell, and without winds the billows will insult the adverse shore, as that the gross mass of the people will be moved and elevated without the influence of superior authority, or superior mind.

This impulse ought, in my opinion, to have been given in this war; and it ought to have been continued to it at every instant. It is made. if ever

war

war was made, to touch all the great springs of action in the human breast. It ought not to have been a war of apology. The minister had, in this conflict wherewithal to glory in success; to be consoled in adversity; to hold high his principle in all fortunes. If it were not given him to support the falling edifice, he ought to bury himself under the ruins of the civilized world. All the art of Greece, and all the pride and power of eastern Monarchs, never heaped upon their ashes so grand a monument.

There were days when his great mind was up to the crisis of the world he is called to act in. His manly eloquence was equal to the elevated wisdom of such sentiments. But the little have triumphed over the great; an unnatural, not an unusual victory. I am sure you cannot forget with how much uneasiness we heard in conversation, the language of more than one gentleman at the opening of this contest, " that he was willing to " try the war for a year or two, and if it did not " succeed, then to vote for peace." As if war was a matter of experiment! As if you could take it up or lay it down as an idle frolick! As if the dire goddess that presides over it, with her murderous spear in her hand, and her gorgon at her breast, was a coquette to be flirted with! We ought with reverence to approach that tremendous divinity,

divinity, that loves courage, but commands counsel. War never leaves a nation where it was found. The interval between that and peace is indeed "a very hideous dream, in which the ge-"nius and the mortal instruments are seriously at "work." It is never to be entered into without a mature deliberation; not a deliberation lengthened out into a perplexing indecision, but a deliberation leading to a sure and fixed judgment. When so taken up it is not to be abandoned without reason as valid, as fully, and as extensively considered; for peace may be made as unadvisedly as war. Nothing is so rash as fear; and the counsels of pusillanimity very rarely put off, whilst they are always sure to aggravate the evils they would fly from.

In that great war carried on against Louis the XIVth, for near eighteen years Government spared no pains to satisfy the people, that though they were to be animated by a desire of glory, glory was not their ultimate object: but that every thing dear to them, in religion, in law, in liberty, every thing which as freemen, as Englishmen, and as citizens of the great commonwealth of Christendom, they had at heart, was then at stake. Whether they did not exaggerate the danger I will not dispute. A danger, and no small danger, unquestionably there was; and that long and arduous war was pursued, upon at least as solid and manly

grounds,

grounds, as the peace was made which put an end to it. A danger to avert a danger—a present inconvenience and suffering to prevent a foreseen future, and a worse calamity—these are the motives that belong to an animal, who, in his constitution, is at once adventurous and provident; circumspect, and daring; whom his Creator has made, as the Poet says, "of large discourse, looking be-"fore and after." But never can a vehement and sustained spirit of fortitude be kindled in a people by a war of calculation. It has nothing that can keep the mind erect under the gusts of adversity. Even where men are willing, as sometimes they are, to barter their blood for lucre, to hazard their safety to gratify their avarice, that passion, like all the passions, must see it's objects distinct and near at hand. The passions are hungry and impatient. Speculative plunder; contingent spoil; future long adjourned uncertain booty; pillage which must enrich a late posterity, and which possibly may not reach to posterity at all; these, for any length of time, will never support a mercenary war. The people are in the right. The calculation of profit in all such wars is false. On balancing the account of such wars, ten thousand hogsheads of sugar are purchased at ten thousand times their price. The blood of man should never be shed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well shed for our family, for our friends, for our God, for

our country, for our kind. The rest is vanity; the rest is crime.

In the war of the Grand Alliance, most of these considerations voluntarily and naturally had their part. Some were pressed into the service. The political interest easily went in the track of the natural sentiment. In the reverse course the carriage does not follow freely. I am sure the natural feeling, as I have just said, is a far more predominant ingredient in this war, than in that of any other that ever was waged by this kingdom.

If the war made to prevent the union of two crowns upon one head was a just war, this, which is made to prevent the tearing all crowns from all heads which ought to wear them, and with the crowns to smite off the sacred heads themselves, this is a just war.

If a war to prevent Louis the XIVth from imposing his religion was just, a war to prevent the murderers of Louis the XVIth from imposing their irreligion upon us is just; a war to prevent the operation of a system, which makes life without dignity, and death without hope, is a just war.

If to preserve political independence and civil freedom to nations, was a just ground of war;

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a war to preserve national independence, property, liberty, life, and honour, from certain universal havock, is a war just, necessary, manly, pious; and we are bound to persevere in it by every principle, divine and human, as long as the system which menaces them all, and all equally, has an existence in the world.

You, who have looked at this matter with as fair and impartial an eye as can be united with a feeling heart, you will not think it an hardy assertion, when I affirm, that it were far better to be conquered by any other nation, than to have this faction for a neighbour. Before I felt myself authorised to say this, I considered the state of all the countries in Europe for these last three hundred years, which have been obliged to submit to a foreign law. In most of those I found the condition of the annexed countries even better, certainly not worse, than the lot of those which were the patrimony of the conqueror. They wanted some blessings-----but they were free from many very great evils. They were rich and tranquil. Such was Artois, Flanders, Lorrain, Alsatia, under the old Government of France. Such was Silesia under the King of Prussia. They who are to live in the vicinity of France, are to prepare to live in perpetual conspiracies and seditions; and to end at last, in being conquered, if not to

her dominion, to her resemblance. But when we talk of conquest by other nations, it is only to put a case. This is the only power in Europe by which it is *possible* we should be conquered. To live under the continual dread of such immeasureable evils is itself a grievous calamity. To live without the dread of them, is to turn the danger into the disaster. The influence of such a France is equal to a war; it's example, more wasting than an hostile irruption. The hostility with any other state is separable and accidental; this state, by the very condition of it's existence, by it's very essential constitution, is in a state of hostility with us, and with all civilized people.

A Government of the nature of that set up at our very door has never been hitherto seen, or even imagined in Europe. What our relation to it will be cannot be judged by other relations. It is a serious thing to have a connexion with a people, who live only under positive, arbitrary, and changeable institutions; and those not perfected nor supplied, nor explained by any common acknowledged rule of moral science. I remember that in one of my last conversations with the late Lord Camden, we were struck much in the same manner with the abolition in France of the law, as a science of methodized and artificial equity. France, since her Revolution, is under the sway of

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a sect, whose leaders have deliberately, at one stroke, demolished the whole body of that jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with other civilized countries. In that jurisprudence were contained the elements and principles of the law of nations, the great ligament of mankind. With the law they have of course destroyed all seminaries in which jurisprudence was taught, as well as all the corporations established for its conservation. I have not heard of any country, whether in Europe or Asia, or even in Africa on this side of Mount Atlas, which is wholly without some such colleges and such corporations, except France. No man, in a public or private concern, can divine by what rule or principle her judgments are to be directed; nor is there to be found a Professor in any University, or a Practitioner in any Court, who will hazard an opinion of what is or is not law in France, in any case whatever. They have not only annulled all their old treaties; but they have renounced the law of nations from whence treaties have their force. With a fixed design they have outlawed themselves, and to their power outlawed all other nations. Instead of the religion and the law by which they were in a great and politick communion with the Christian world, they have constructed their Republick on three basis, all fundamentally opposite to those on which the communities of Europe are built. It's

foundation

foundation is laid in Regicide; in Jacobinism; and in Atheism; and it has joined to those principles, a body of systematick manners which secures their operation.

If I am asked how I would be understood in the use of those terms, Regicide, Jacobinism, Atheism, and a system of correspondent manners and their establishment, I will tell you.

I call a commonwealth *Regicide*, which lays it down as a fixed law of nature, and a fundamental right of man, that all government, not being a democracy, is an usurpation *. That all Kings, as such, are usurpers; and for being Kings, may and ought to be put to death, with their wives, families, and adherents. The commonwealth which acts uniformly upon those principles, and which after abolishing every festival of religion, chooses the most flagrant act of a murderous Regicide treason for a feast of eternal commemoration, and which

* Nothing could be more solemn than their promulgation of this principle as a preamble to the destructive code of their famous articles for the decomposition of society into whatever country they should enter. " La Convention Nationale, après avoir entendu le rapport de ses Comités de Finances, de la guerre, & diplomatique réunis, fidelle *au principe de souveraineté du peuple qui ne lui permet pas de reconnoître aucune institution qui y porte atteinte*," *&c. &c.* Décret sur le Rapport de Cambon. Dec. 18, 1792.

forces

forces all her people to observe it.---*This I call Regicide by establishment.*

Jacobinism is the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against it's property. When private men form themselves into associations for the purpose of destroying the pre-existing laws and institutions of their country; when they secure to themselves an army by dividing amongst the people of no property, the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when a state recognizes those acts; when it does not make confiscations for crimes, but makes crimes for confiscations; when it has it's principal strength, and all it's resources in such a violation of property; when it stands chiefly upon such a violation; massacring by judgments, or otherwise, those who make any struggle for their old legal government, and their legal, hereditary, or acquired possessions, I call this *Jacobinism by establishment.*

I call it *Atheism by establishment,* when any State, as such, shall not acknowledge the existence of God as a moral Governor of the World; when it shall offer to Him no religious or moral worship; —when it shall abolish the Christian religion by a regular decree;—when it shall persecute with a cold, unrelenting, steady cruelty, by every mode of confiscation, imprisonment, exile, and death,

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all its ministers ;—when it shall generally shut up or pull down churches ; when the few buildings which remain of this kind shall be opened only for the purpose of making a profane apotheosis of monsters, whose vices and crimes have no parallel amongst men, and whom all other men consider as objects of general detestation, and the severest animadversion of law. When, in the place of that religion of social benevolence, and of individual self-denial, in mockery of all religion, they institute impious, blasphemous, indecent theatric rites in honor of their vitiated, perverted reason, and erect altars to the personification of their own corrupted and bloody Republick ;----when schools and seminaries are erected at public expence to poison mankind, from generation to generation, with the horrible maxims of this impiety, I call this *Atheism by establishment*.

When to these establishments of Regicide, of Jacobinism, and of Atheism, you add the *correspondent system of manners*, no doubt can be left on the mind of a thinking man, concerning their determined hostility to the human race. Manners are of more importance than laws. In a great measure the laws depend upon them. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners are what vex or sooth, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like

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that of the air we breath in. They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy them. Of this the new French Legislators were aware; therefore, with the same method, and under the same authority, they settled a system of manners, the most licentious, prostitute, and abandoned, and at the same time the most coarse, rude, savage, and ferocious. Nothing in the Revolution, no, not to a phrase or a gesture, not to the fashion of a hat or a shoe, was left to accident. All was the result of design; all was matter of institution. No mechanical means could be devised in favour of this incredible system of wickedness and vice, that has not been employed. The noblest passions, the love of glory, the love of country, were debauched into means of it's preservation and it's propagation. All sorts of shews and exhibitions calculated to inflame and vitiate the imagination, and pervert the moral sense, have been contrived. They have sometimes brought forth five or six hundred drunken women, calling at the bar of the Assembly for the blood of their own children, as being royalists or constitutionals. Sometimes they have got a body of wretches, calling themselves fathers, to demand the murder of their sons; boasting that Rome had but one Brutus, but that they could shew five hundred. There were instances, in

which

which they inverted, and retaliated the impiety, and produced sons, who called for the execution of their parents. The foundation of their Republick is founded in moral paradoxes. Their patriotism is always prodigy. All those instances to be found in history, whether real or fabulous, of a doubtful publick spirit, at which morality is perplexed, reason is staggered, and from which a frighted nature recoils, are their chosen, and almost sole examples for the instruction of their youth.

The whole drift of their institution is contrary to that of the wise Legislators of all countries, who aimed at improving instincts into morals, and at grafting the virtues on the stock of the natural affections. They, on the contrary, have omitted no pains to eradicate every benevolent and noble propensity in the mind of men. In their culture it is a rule always to graft virtues on vices. They think every thing unworthy of the name of publick virtue, unless it indicates violence on the private. All their new institutions, (and with them every thing is new) strike at the root of our social nature. Other Legislators, knowing that marriage is the origin of all relations, and consequently the first element of all duties, have endeavoured by every art to make it sacred. The Christian Religion, by confining it to the pairs, and by rendering that relation indissoluble, has, by these two things, done more towards

the peace, happiness, settlement, and civilization of the world, than by any other part in this whole scheme of Divine Wisdom. The direct contrary course was taken in the Synagogue of Antichrist, I mean in that forge and manufactory of all evil, the sect which predominated in the Constituent Assembly of 1789. Those monsters employed the same, or greater industry, to desecrate and degrade that State, which other Legislators have used to render it holy and honourable. By a strange, uncalled for declaration, they pronounced, that marriage was no better than a common, civil contract. It was one of their ordinary tricks, to put their sentiments into the mouths of certain personated characters, which they theatrically exhibited at the bar of what ought to be a serious Assembly. One of these was brought out in the figure of a prostitute, whom they called by the affected name of " a mother without being a wife." This creature they made to call for a repeal of the incapacities, which in civilized States are put upon bastards. The prostitutes of the Assembly gave to this their puppet the sanction of their greater impudence. In consequence of the principles laid down, and the manners authorised, bastards were not long after put on the footing of the issue of lawful unions. Proceeding in the fpirit of the first authors of their constitution, they went the full length of the principle, and gave a

licence to divorce at the mere pleasure of either party, and at four day's notice. With them the matrimonial connexion was brought into so degraded a state of concubinage, that, I believe, none of the wretches in London, who keep warehouses of infamy, would give out one of their victims to private custody on so short and insolent a tenure. There was indeed a kind of profligate equity in thus giving to women the same licentious power. The reason they assigned was as infamous as the act, declaring that women had been too long under the tyranny of parents and of husbands. It is not necessary to observe upon the horrible consequences of taking one half of the species wholly out of the guardianship and protection of the other.

The practice of divorce, though in some countries permitted, has been discouraged in all. In the East, polygamy and divorce are in discredit; and the manners correct the laws. In Rome, were divorce was allowed, some hundreds of years had passed, without a single example of that kind. Of this circumstance they were pleased to take notice, as an inducement to adopt their regulation: holding out an hope, that the permission would as rarely be made use of. They knew the contrary to be true; and they had taken good care, that the laws should be well seconded by the manners. Their law of divorce, like all their laws, had not for it's object

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the relief of domestick uneasiness, but the total corruption of all morals, the total disconnection of social life.

It is a matter of curiosity to observe the operation of this encouragement to disorder. I have before me the Paris paper, correspondent to the usual register of births, marriages, and deaths. Divorce, happily, is no regular head of registry amongst civilized nations. With the Jacobins it is remarkable, that divorce is not only a regular head but it has the post of honour. It occupies the first place in the list. In the three first months of the year 1793, the number of divorces amounted to 562. The marriages were 1785 ; so that the proportion of divorces to marriages was not much less than one to three. A thing unexampled, I believe, amongst mankind. I caused an enquiry to be made at Doctor's Commons, concerning the number of divorces ; and found that all the divorces, (which except by special act of Parliament, are separations, and not proper divorces) did not amount for all England, and in an hundred years, to much more than one fifth of those that passed, in the single city of Paris, in three months. I followed up the enquiry through several of the subsequent months until I was tired, and found the proportions still the same. By this we may take our estimate of the havock that has been made

through all the relations of life. With the Jacobins of France, vague intercourse is without reproach; marriage is reduced to the vilest concubinage; children are encouraged to cut the throats of their parents; mothers are taught that tenderness is no part of their character; and to demonstrate their attatchment to their party, that they ought to make no scruple to rake wtih their bloody hands in the bowels of those who came from their own.

To all this let us join the practice of *cannibalism*, with which, in the proper terms, and with the greatest truth, their several factions accuse each other. By cannibalism, I mean their devouring, as a nutriment of their ferocity, some part of the bodies of those they have murdered; their drinking the blood of their victims, and forcing the victims themselves to drink the blood of their kindred slaughtered before their faces. By cannibalism, I mean also to signify their nameless, unmanly and abominable insults on the bodies of those they slaughter.

As to those whom they suffer to die a natural death, they do not suffer them to enjoy the last consolations of mankind, or those rights of sepulture, which indicate hope, and which meer nature has taught to mankind in all countries. to soothe the

afflictions,

afflictions, and to cover the infirmity of moral condition. They disgrace men in the entry into life; they vitiate and enslave them through the whole course of it; and they deprive them of all comfort at the conclusion of their dishonoured and depraved existence. Endeavouring to persuade the people that they are no better than beasts; the whole body of their institution tends to make them beasts of prey furious and savage. For this purpose the active part of them is disciplined into a ferocity which has no parallel. To this ferocity there is joined not one of the rude, unfashioned virtues, which accompany the vices, where the whole are left to grow up together in the rankness of uncultivated nature. But nothing is left to nature in their systems.

The same discipline which hardens their hearts relaxes their morals. Whilst courts of justice were thrust out by revolutionary tribunals, and silent churches were only the funeral monuments of departed religion, no fewer than ten theatres were kept open at publick expence. At one time I have reckoned fourteen of their advertisements of publick diversion. Among the gaunt, haggard forms of famine and nakedness, amidst the yells of murder, the tears of affliction, and the cries of despair, the song, the dance, the mimick scene, the buffoon laughter, went on as regularly

as in the gay hour of festive peace. I have it from good authority, that under the scaffold of judicial murder, and the gaping planks that poured down blood on the spectators, the space was hired out for a shew of dancing dogs. I think, without conceit, we made the very same remark on reading some of their pieces, which being written for other purposes, let us into a view of their social life. It struck us that the habits of Paris had no resemblance to the finished virtues, or to the polished vice, and elegant, though not blameless luxury, of the capital of a great empire. Their society was more like that of a den of outlaws upon a doubtful frontier: of a lewd tavern for the revels and debauches of banditti, assassins, bravos, smugglers, and their more desperate paramours, mixed with bombastick players, the refuse and rejected offal of strolling theatres, puffing out ill-sorted verses about virtue, mixed with the licentious and blasphemous songs, proper to their brutal and hardened course of life. This system of manners in itself is at war with all orderly and moral society, and is in it's neighbourhood unsafe. If great bodies of that kind were any where established in a bordering territory, we should have a right to demand of their Governments the suppression of such a nuisance. What are we to do if the Government and the whole community is of the same description?

The

The operation of dangerous and delusive first principles obliges us to have recourse to the true ones. In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We lay too mueh weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interest of men as guarantees of their engagements. The interests frequently tear to pieces the engagements; and the passions trample upon both. Entirely to trust to either is to disregard our own safety, or not to know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse, holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.

As to war, if it be the means of wrong and violence, it is the sole means of justice amongst nations.

Nothing

Nothing can banish it from the world. They who say otherwise, intending to impose upon us, do not impose upon themselves. But it is one of the greatest objects of human wisdom to mitigate those evils which we cannot remove. The conformity and analogy of which I speak, incapable, like every thing else, of preserving perfect trust and tranquillity among men, has a strong tendency to facilitate accommodation, and to produce a generous oblivion of the rancour of their quarrels. With this similitude, peace is more of peace, and war is less of war. I will go further. There have been periods of time in which communities, apparently in peace with each other, have been more perfectly separated than, in later times, many nations in Europe have been in the course of long and bloody wars. The cause must be sought in the similitude in Europe of religion, laws, and manners. At bottom, these are all the same. The writers on public law have often called this *aggregate* of nations a Commonwealth. They had reason. It is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law; with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and œconomy of every country in Europe have been

derived from the ſame ſources. They were drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic cuſtumary; from the feudal inſtitutions which muſt be conſidered as an emanation from thoſe cuſtoms; and the whole has been improved and digeſted into ſyſtem and diſcipline by the Roman law. From hence aroſe the ſeveral orders, with or without a Monarch, which are called States in every country; the ſtrong traces of which, where Monarchy predominated, were never wholly extinguiſhed or merged in deſpotiſm. In the few places where Monarchy was caſt off, the ſpirit of European Monarchy was ſtill left. Thoſe countries ſtill continued countries of States, that is, of claſſes, orders, and diſtinctions, ſuch as had before ſubſiſted, or nearly ſo. Indeed the force and form of the inſtitution called States, continued in greater perfection in thoſe republican countries than under Monarchies. From all thoſe ſources aroſe a ſyſtem of manners and of education which was nearly ſimilar in all countries, and which ſoftened, blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole. There was little difference in the form of their Univerſities for the education of their youth, whether with regard to faculties, to ſciences, or to that erudition which is uſed to impart, with liberal morals, a kind of elegance to the mind. From this reſemblance in the modes of intercourſe, and in the whole form and faſhion of life, no citizen of Europe could

be altogether an exile in any part of it. There nothing more than a pleaſing variety to recreate and inſtruct the mind; to enrich the imagination; and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or reſided for health, pleaſure, buſineſs or neceſſity, from his own country, he never felt himſelf quite abroad. My friend, Mr. Wyld, the late profeſſor of law in Edinburgh, a young man of infinite promiſe, and whoſe loſs at this time is ineſtimable, has beautifully applied two lines of Ovid to this unity and diverſity in Europe, before the curſe of the French Revolution had fallen upon us all.

——— " Facies non omnibus una;
" Nec diverſa tamen; qualem decet eſſe ſororum.

The whole body of this new ſcheme of manners in ſupport of the new ſcheme of politicks, I conſider as a ſtrong and deciſive proof of determined ambition aud ſyſtematick hoſtility. I defy the moſt refining ingenuity to invent any other cauſe for the total departure of the Jacobin Republick from every one of the ideas and uſages, religious, legal, moral, or ſocial, of this civilized world, and to tear herſelf from it's communion with ſuch ſtudied violence, but from a formed reſolution of keeping no terms with that world. It has not been, as has been falſely and inſidiouſly repreſented, that theſe miſcreants had only broke with their old Government.

vernment. They made a ſchiſm with the whole univerſe, and that ſchiſm extended to almoſt every thing great and ſmall. For one, I wiſh, ſince it is gone thus far, that the breach had been ſo compleat, as to make all intercourſe impracticable; but partly by accident, partly by deſign, partly from the reſiſtance of the matter, enough is left to preſerve intercourſe, whilſt amity is deſtroyed or corrupted in its principle.

This violent breach of the community of Europe, we muſt conclude to have been made, (even if they had not expreſsly declared it over and over again) either to force mankind into an adoption of their ſyſtem, or to live in perpetual enmity with a community the moſt potent we have ever known. Can any perſon imagine, that in offering to mankind this deſperate alternative, there is no indication of a hoſtile mind, becauſe men are ſuppoſed to have a right to act without coercion in their own territories? As to the right of men to act any where according to their pleaſure, without any moral tie, no ſuch right exiſts. Men are never in a ſtate of *total* independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature; nor is it conceivable how any man can purſue a conſiderable courſe of action without its having ſome effect upon others; or, of courſe, without producing ſome degree of reſponſibility for his conduct. The *ſitu-*

ations in which men relatively ſtand produce the rules and principles of that reſponſibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting it.

Diſtance of place does not extinguiſh the duties or the rights of men; but it often renders their exerciſe impracticable. The ſame circumſtance of diſtance renders the noxious effects of an evil ſyſtem in any community leſs pernicious. But there are ſituations where this difficulty does not occur; and in which, therefore, theſe duties are obligatory, and theſe rights are to be aſſerted. It has ever been the method of publick juriſts to draw the analogies on which they form the law of nations, from the principles of law which prevail in civil community. Civil laws are not all of them merely poſitive. Thoſe which are rather concluſions of legal reaſon, than matters of ſtatutable proviſion, belong to univerſal equity, and are univerſally applicable. Almoſt the whole prætorian law is ſuch. There is a *Law of Neighbourhood* which does not leave a man perfect maſter on his own ground. When a neighbour ſees a *new erection*, in the nature of a nuiſance, ſet up at his door, he has a right to repreſent it to the judge; who, on his part, has a right to order the work to be ſtaid; or if eſtabliſhed, to be removed. On this head, the parent law is expreſs and clear; and has made many wiſe proviſions, which, without deſtroying, regulate and

reſtrain

reſtrain the right of *ownerſhip*, by the right of *vicinage*. No *innovation* is permitted that may redound, even ſecondarily, to the prejudice of a neighbour. The whole doctrine of that important head of pretorian law, "*De novi operis nunciatione*," is founded on the principle, that no *new* uſe ſhould be made of a man's private liberty of operating upon his private property, from whence a detriment may be juſtly apprehended by his neighbour. This law of denunciation is proſpective. It is to anticipate what is called *damnum infectum*, or *damnum nondum factum*, that is a damage juſtly apprehended but not actually done. Even before it is clearly known, whether the innovation be damageable or not, the judge is competent to iſſue a prohibition to innovate, until the point can be determined. This prompt interference is grounded on principles favourable to both parties. It is preventive of miſcheif difficult to be repaired, and of ill blood difficult to be ſoftened. The rule of law, therefore, which comes before the evil, is amongſt the very beſt parts of equity, and juſtifies the promptneſs of the remedy; becauſe, as it is well obſerved, *Res damni infecti celeritatem deſiderat, & periculoſa eſt dilatio*. This right of denunciation does not hold, when things continue, however inconveniently to the neighbourhood, according to the *antient* mode. For there is a ſort of preſumption againſt novelty, drawn out of a deep conſideration

ration of human nature and human affairs; and the maxim of juriſprudence is well laid down, *Vetuſtas pro lege ſemper habetur.*

Such is the law of civil vicinity. Now where there is no conſtituted judge, as between independent ſtates there is not, the vicinage itſelf is the natural judge. It is, preventively, the aſſertor of it's own rights; or remedially, their avenger. Neighbours are preſumed to take cognizance of each other's acts. "*Vicini, vicinorum facta preſumuntur ſcire.*" This principle, which, like the reſt, is as true of nations, as of men, has beſtowed on the grand vicinage of Europe, a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuiſance. Of the importance of that innovation, and the miſcheif of that nuiſance, they are, to be ſure, bound to judge not litigiouſly: but it is in their competence to judge. What in civil ſociety is a ground of action, in politic ſociety is a ground of war. But the exerciſe of that competent juriſdiction is a matter of moral prudence. As ſuits in civil ſociety, ſo war in the political, is ever a matter of great deliberation. It is not this or that particular proceeding picked out here and there, as a ſubject of quarrel, that will do. There muſt be an aggregate of miſchief. There muſt be marks of deliberation; there muſt be traces

traces of deſign. There muſt be indications of malice; there muſt be tokens of ambition. There muſt be force in the body where they exiſt, there muſt be energy in the mind. When all theſe circumſtances combine, or the important parts of them, the duty of the vicinity calls for the exerciſe of it's competence; and the rules of prudence do not reſtrain, but demand it.

In deſcribing the nuiſance erected by ſo peſtilential a manufactory, by conſtructing ſo infamous a brothel, by digging a night cellar for ſuch thieves, murderers, and houſebreakers, as never infeſted the world, I am ſo far from aggravating, that I have fallen infinitely ſhort of the evil. No man who has attended to the particulars of what has been done in France, and combined them with the principles there aſſerted, can poſſibly doubt it. When I compare with this great cauſe of nations, the trifling points of honour, the ſtill more contemptible points of intereſt, the light ceremonies, the undefinable punctilios, the diſputes about precedency, the lowering or the hoiſting of a ſail, the dealing in a hundred or two of wild cat-ſkins on the other ſide of the Globe, which have often kindled up the flames of war between nations, I ſtand aſtoniſhed at thoſe perſons, who do not feel a reſentment, not more natural than politick, at the attrocious inſults that this monſtrous compound

pound offers to the dignity of every nation, and who are not alarmed with what it threatens to their ſafety.

I have therefore been decidedly of opinion, that the vicinage of Europe had not only a right, but an indiſpenſible duty, and an exigent intereſt, to denunciate this new work before it had produced the danger we have ſo ſorely felt, and which we ſhall long feel. The example of what is done by France is too important not to have a vaſt and extenſive influence; and that example backed with it's power, muſt bear with great force on thoſe who are near it; eſpecially on thoſe who ſhall recognize the pretended Republick on the principle upon which it now ſtands. It is not an old ſtructure which you have found as it is, and are not to diſpute of the original end and deſign with which it had been ſo faſhioned. It is a recent wrong, and can plead no preſcription. It violates the rights upon which not only the community of France, but thoſe on which all communities are founded. The principles on which they proceed are *general* principles, and are as true in England as in any other country. They who recognize the authority of theſe Regicides and robbers upon principle, juſtify their acts; and eſtabliſh them as precidents. It is a queſtion not between France and England. It is a queſtion between property and force.

force. The property claims. Its claim has been allowed: but it ſeems that we are to reject the property, and to take part with the force. The property of the nation is the nation. Thoſe who maſſacre, plunder, and expel the body of the proprietary, are murderers and robbers. They are no Republick, nor can be treated with as ſuch. The State, in it's eſſence, muſt be moral and juſt; and it may be ſo, though a tyrant or uſurper may be accidentally at the head of it. This is a thing to be lamented: but this notwithſtanding, the body of the commonwealth may remain in all it's integrity and be perfectly ſound in it's compoſition. The preſent caſe is different. It is not a revolution in government. It is a deſtruction and decompoſition of the whole ſociety, which never can be made of right, nor without terrible conſequences to all about it, both in the act and in the example. This pretended Republic is founded in crimes, and exiſts by wrong and robbery; and wrong and robbery, far from a title to any thing, is war with mankind. To be at peace with robbery is to be an accomplice with it.

A body politick is not a geographical idea. They who proceed as if it were ſuch, I truſt, do not underſtand what they do. Locality does not conſtitute a body politick. Had Cade and his gang got poſſeſſion of London, they would not have

been the Lord-Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council. The body politick of France exiſted in the majeſty of it's throne; in the dignity of it's nobility; in the honour of its gentry; in the ſanctity of its clergy; in the reverence of it's magiſtracy; in the weight and conſideration due to it's landed property, in the reſpect due to it's moveable ſubſtance repreſented by the corporations of the kingdom in all countries. All theſe particular *moleculæ* united, form the great maſs of what is truly the body politick. They are ſo many depoſits and receptacles of juſtice; becauſe they can only exiſt by juſtice. Nation is a moral eſſence, not a geographical arrangement, or a denomination of the nomenclator. France though out of her territorial poſſeſſion, exiſts; becauſe the ſole poſſible claimant, I mean the proprietary, and the government to which the proprietary adheres, exiſts and claims. God forbid, that if you were expelled from your houſe by ruffians and aſſaſſins, that I ſhould call the material walls, doors and windows of ————, the ancient and honourable family of ————. Am I to transfer to the intruders, who not content to turn you out naked to the world, would rob you of your very name, all the eſteem and reſpect I owe to you?

To illuſtrate my opinions on this ſubject, let us ſuppoſe a caſe, which after what has happened, we cannot

cannot think abſolutely impoſſible, though the augury is to be abominated, and the events deprecated with our moſt ardent prayers---Let us ſuppoſe that our gracious ſovereign was ſacrilegiouſly murdered; his exemplary queen, at the head of the matronage of this land, murdered in the ſame manner, together with thoſe Princeſſes whoſe beauty and modeſt elegance are the ornaments of the country, and who are the leaders and patterns of the ingenious youth of their ſex;---that theſe were put to a cruel and ignominious death, with hundreds of others, mothers and daughters, of the firſt diſtinction;---that the Prince of Wales and Duke of York, the hope and pride of the nation, with all their brethren, were forced to fly from the knives of aſſaſſins---that the whole body of our excellent Clergy were either maſſacred or robbed of all, and tranſported---the Chriſtian Religion, in all it's denominations, forbidden and perſecuted; the law totally, fundamentally, and in all it's parts deſtroyed---the judges put to death by revolutionary tribunals---the Peers and Commons robbed to the laſt acre of their eſtates; maſſacred if they ſtaid, obliged to ſeek life in flight, in exile and in beggary---that the whole landed property ſhould ſhare the very ſame fate---that every military and naval officer of honour and rank, almoſt to a man, ſhould be in the ſame deſcription of confiſcation and exile---that the principal merchants and ban-

kers ſhould be drawn out, as from an hen-coop, for ſlaughter, and the citizens of our greateſt and moſt flouriſhing cities, when the hand and the machinery of the hangman was not found ſufficient, were collected in the ſquares, and maſſacred by thouſands with cannon---if three hundred thouſand others were in a ſituation worſe than death, in noiſome and peſtilential priſons; in ſuch a caſe, is it in the faction of robbers I am to look for my country? Would this be the England that I, and even ſtrangers, admired, honoured, loved, and cheriſhed? Would not the exiles of England alone be my Government and my fellow citizens? Would not their places of refuge be my temporary country? Would not all my duties and all my affections be there and there only? Should I conſider myſelf as a traitor to my country, and deſerving of death, if I knocked at the door and heart of every Potentate in Chriſtendom to ſuccour my friends, and to avenge them on their enemies? Could I, in any way, ſhew myſelf more a patriot? What ſhould I think of thoſe Potentates who inſulted their ſuffering brethren; who treated them as vagrants, and could find no allies, no friends, but in Regicide murderers and robbers? What ought I to think and feel, if being geographers inſtead of Kings, they recognized the deſolated cities, the waſted fields, and the rivers polluted with blood, of this geometrical meaſurement, as the honourable

member

member of Europe, called England? In that condition, what ſhould we think of Sweden, Denmark, or Holland, or whatever power afforded us a churliſh and treacherous hoſpitality, if they ſhould invite us to join the ſtandard of our King, our Laws, and our Religion, if they ſhould give us a direct promiſe of protection,---if after all this, taking advantage of our deplorable ſituation, which left us no choice, they were to treat us as the loweſt and vileſt of all mercenaries? If they were to ſend us far from the aid of our King, and our ſuffering Country, to ſquander us away in the moſt peſtilential climates, for a venal enlargement of their own territories, for the purpoſe of trucking them when obtained with our murderers? If in that miſerable ſervice we were not to be conſidered either as Engliſh, or as Swedes, or Dutch, or Danes, but as outcaſts of the human race? Whilſt we were fighting thoſe battles of their intereſt, and as their ſoldiers, how ſhould we feel if we were to be excluded from all their cartels? How muſt we feel, if the pride and flower of the Engliſh Nobility and Gentry, who might eſcape the peſtilential clime, and the devouring ſword, ſhould, if taken priſoners, be delivered over as rebel ſubjects, to be condemned as rebels, as traitors, as the vileſt of all criminals, by tribunals formed of Maroon negroe ſlaves, covered over with the blood of their maſters, who were made free, and organiſed into

judges,

judges, for their robberies and murders? What ſhould we feel under this inhuman, inſulting, and barbarous protection of Swedes and Hollanders? Should we not obteſt Heaven, and whatever juſtice there is yet on earth? Oppreſſion makes wiſe men mad; but the diſtemper is ſtill the madneſs of the wiſe, which is better than the ſobriety of fools. Her cry is the voice of ſacred miſery, exalted, not into wild raving, but into the ſanctified phrenſy of inſpiration and prophecy---in that bitterneſs of ſoul, in that indignation of ſuffering virtue, in that exaltation of deſpair, would not perſecuted Engliſh Loyalty cry out, with an awful warning voice, and denounce the deſtruction that waits on Monarchs, who conſider fidelity to them as the moſt degrading of all vices; who ſuffer it to be puniſhed as the moſt abominable of all crimes; and who have no reſpect but for rebels traitors, Regicides, and furious negro ſlaves, whoſe crimes have broke their chains? Would not this warm language of high indignation have more of ſound reaſon in it, more of real affection, more of true attachment, than all the lullabies of flatterers, who would huſh Monarchs to ſleep in the arms of death? Let them be well convinced, that if ever this example ſhould prevail in its whole extent, it will have its full operation. Whilſt Kings ſtand firm on their baſe, though under that baſe there is a ſure-wrought mine, their levees will never want to

ſwell

ſwell them a ſingle perſon of thoſe who are attached to their fortune, and not to their perſons or cauſe. Hereafter none will ſupport a tottering throne. Some will fly, for fear of being cruſhed under the ruin; ſome will join in making it. They will ſeek in the preſervation of Royalty, fame, and power, and wealth, and the homage of Kings---with *Reubel*, with *Carnot*, and *Rovelliere*, rather than ſuffer exile and beggary with the Condés, or the Broglios, the Caſtries, the D'Avrais, the Serrents, the Cazalés, and the long line of loyal ſuffering Patriot Nobles, or to be butchered with the victims of the laws, the De Sezes, the d'Eſprememonils, and the Malſherbes.

Theſe examples are the ſchool of mankind, and they will learn at no other. This war, therefore, is not a war for Louis the Eighteenth, or for the property, virtue, fidelity of France; but for George the Third, Francis the Second, and for all the property, honour, virtue and religion of England, of Germany, and all nations.

But, ſay ſome, you force opinion. You can never extirpate opinion without extirpating a whole nation. Nay, by purſuing it, you only increaſe its partizans. Opinions are things out of human juriſdiction. I have formerly heard this from the mouths of great men, with more ſurprize than ſatisfaction.

ſatisfaction. They alledged as a proof of their doctrine, the wars of Charles the Fifth, and ſome of his ſucceſſors, againſt the Reformation.

It is ſo common, though ſo unreaſonable, it is hardly worth remarking, that no perſons purſue more fiercely with criminal proceſs, and with every kind of coercion, the publication of opinions contrary to their own, than thoſe do, who claim in this reſpect the moſt unbounded latitude to themſelves. If it were not for this inconſiſtency, then war againſt opinions might be juſtified as all others, more or leſs, according to the reaſon of the caſe: for the caſe judged on by moral prudence, and not by any univerſal abſtract principle of right, is to guide government in this delicate point.

As to the mere matter of extirpation of all kinds of opinions, whether right or wrong, without the extirpation of a people, it is a thing ſo very common, that would be clouded and obſcured rather than illuſtrated by examples. Every revolution in the predominant opinion made by the force of domeſtic legal government, by the force of any uſurpation, by the force of any conqueſt, is a proof to the contrary;---and there is no nation which has not experienced thoſe changes. Inſtances enough may be furniſhed of people who have enthuſiaſtically, and with force, propagated thoſe opinions,

which

which ſome time before they reſiſted with their blood. Rarely have ever great changes in opinion taken place without the application of force, more or leſs. Like every thing elſe in human life and human affairs, it is not univerſally true, that a perſecution of opinions leſſens or increaſes the number of their votaries. In finding where it may or may not have gathered theſe effects, the ſagacity of Government ſhines or is diſgraced, as well as in the time, the manner, the choice of the opinions on which it ought to uſe or forbear the ſword of domeſtick or of foreign juſtice. But it is a falſe maxim, that opinions ought to be indifferent to us, either as men or as a State. Opinion is the rudder of human action; and as the opinion is wiſe or fooliſh, vicious or moral, the cauſe of action is noxious or ſalutary. It has even been the great primary object of ſpeculative and doctrinal philoſophy to regulate opinion. It is the great object of political philoſophy to promote that which is ſound; and to extirpate what is miſchievous, and which directly tends to render men bad citizens in the community, and miſchievous neighbours out of it. Opinions are of infinite conſequence. They make the manners—in fact, they make the laws: they make the Lagiſlator. They are, therefore, of all things, thoſe to which provident Government ought to look moſt to in their beginnings. After a time they may look to them in vain. When,

therefore, I am told that a war is a war of opinions, I am told that it is the moſt important of all wars.

Here I muſt not be told that this would lead to eternal war and perſecution. It would certainly, if we argued like metaphyſicians run mad, who do not correct prudence, the queen of virtues, to be any virtue at all,—and would either throw the bridle on the neck of headlong Nature, or tie it up for ever to the poſt. No ſophiſtry—no chicane here. Government is not to refine men out of innocent and moral liberty by forced inferences, drawn by a torturing logic; or to ſuffer them to go down hill the highway that leads directly to every crime and every vice.

Without entering much into the compariſon of the two caſes, (that of this war and that of Charles the Fifth againſt the reformation) which holds very ill, I ſhall only beg leave to remark, that theological opinions as ſuch, whether ſound or erroneous, do not go directly to the well being of ſocial, of civil, or of politick ſociety. But as long as opinion is the very ground and pillar of Government, and the main ſpring of human action, there are opinions which directly affect theſe very things. An opinion, that it is a man's duty to take from me my goods, and to kill me if I reſiſt him. An opinion that he has a right, at his will,

to

to pull down the Government by which I am protected in that life and property, and to place it in the hands of the enemies of both. Theſe it is very extraordinary to hear compared to the theological dogmas concerning grace and juſtification—and the nature and eſſence of the ſacrament and other pious opinions on the one ſide or on the other—which left human ſociety altogether, or nearly, as it was. They did not preach vices or crimes. The parties diſputed on the beſt means of promoting virtue, religion and morals. Whether any collateral points relative to theſe queſtions or other circumſtances of a more political nature mingled with them, might or might not juſtify a war, is a matter of hiſtorical criticiſm, with which, at this day, we are little concerned. But in the caſe before us, I muſt declare, that the doctrine and diſcipline of this ſect is one of the moſt alarming circumſtances relating to it, and the attempt to compare them with the opinions of ſchool theologicians, is a thing in itſelf highly alarming. I know that when men poſſeſs the beſt principles, the paſſions lead them to act in oppoſition to them. But when the moral principles are formed ſyſtematically to play into the hand of the paſſions; when that which is to correct vice and to reſtrain violence, is by an infernal doctrine, daringly avowed, carefully propagated, enthuſiaſtically held, and practically followed, I ſhall think myſelf treated like a child, when I hear this compared to a controverſy

in the ſchools. When I ſee a great country, with all its reſources, poſſeſſed by this ſect, and turned to its purpoſes, I muſt be worſe than a child to conceive it a thing indifferent to me. When this great country is ſo near me, and otherwiſe ſo ſituated, that except through its territory, I can hardly have a communication with any other, the ſtate of moral and political opinion, and moral and political diſcipline in that country, becomes of ſtill greater importance to me. When robbers, aſſaſſins, and rebels, are not only debauched, but endoctrinated regularly, by a courſe of inverted education, into murder, inſurrection, and the violation of all property, I hold, that this, inſtead of excuſing, or palliating their offences, inſpires a peculiar venom into every evil act they do; and that all ſuch univerſities of crimes, and all ſuch profeſſors of robbery, are in a perpetual ſtate of hoſtility with mankind.

Let me now ſay a word upon another topic, and on the caſe put to illuſtrate it, that is, on the indifference with which we ought to regard the plan of Government, and the ſcheme of morals that prevail in a State, in any queſtion of peace and war with it. In ſupport of this doctrine, they cite the caſe of Algiers as a ſtrong one—with an hint, that is the ſtronger caſe. I ſhould take no notice of this ſort of inducement, if I had found it only where firſt it was. I do not want reſpect for thoſe from whom

whom I firſt heard it-- but having no controverſy at preſent with them, I only think it not amiſs to reſt on it a little, as I find it adopted with much more of the ſame kind, by ſeveral of thoſe on whom ſuch reaſoning before made no apparent impreſſion. I was however miſtaken; they were not rejected, but only ſtored and laid by for an occaſion---*condo et compono quæ mox depromere poſſim.* If it had no force to prevent us from ſubmitting to this neceſſary war, it furniſhes no better ground for our making an unneceſſary and ruinous peace To this Algerian parallel, however, I have to ſay, that arguments of analogy in law are of great weight. Of courſe, in a diſcuſſion of the juſtice of the war I attend to them, provided they are analogies of principle, and not of mere practice. But when they are only arguments of analogy *ad hominem*, they only ſerve to confute and ſilence an adverſary, who has acted in ſuch a manner, and on ſuch principles; but to a perſon who doubts the propriety of the action and the motive which is made the ground of the analogy, it can neither ſhame or perplex him. This analogical argument would lead us a good way. The fact is, we ourſelves, with a little corn, others more directly, pay a *tribute* to the Republick of Algiers. Is it meant to reconcile us to the payment of a *tribute* to the French Republick? That this, with other things more ruinous, will be demanded hereafter, I little doubt; but for the preſent, this

will

will not be avowed---though our minds are to be gradually prepared for it.

In truth the arguments from this caſe is worth little even to thoſe who approve the buying an Algerine forbearance of piracy. There are many things which men do not approve, that they muſt do to avoid a greater evil. To argue from thence, that they are to act in the ſame manner in all caſes, is turning neceſſity into a law. Upon what is matter of prudence, the argument concludes the contrary way. Becauſe we have done one humiliating act, we ought, with infinite caution, to admit more acts of the ſame nature, leſt humiliation ſhould become our habitual ſtate. Matters of prudence are under the dominion of circumſtances, and not of logical analogies. It is ſo abſurd to take it otherwiſe. In the mouths of the weak and ignorant, it makes me laugh; in the mouths of men of learning and talents, it makes me ſick. I, for one do more than doubt the policy of this kind of convention with Algiers.

On thoſe who think as I do, the argument can make no ſort of impreſſion. I know ſomething of the Conſtitution and compoſition of this very extraordinary Republick. It has a Conſtitution, I admit, ſimilar to the preſent tumultuous military tyranny of France, by which an handful of obſcure ruffians,

domineer

domineer over a fertile country, and a brave people. For the compoſition, too, I admit, the Algerine community reſembles that of France; being the very ſcum, ſcandal, diſgrace, and peſt of the Turkiſh Aſia. The grand Seignior, to diſburthen the country, ſuffers the Dey to recruit, in his dominions, the corps of Janiſſaries, or Aſaphs which form the Directory, or Council of Elders of the African Republick, one and indviſible. But notwithſtanding this reſemblance, which I allow, I never ſhall ſo far injure the Janiſarian Republick of Algiers, as to put it in compariſon for every ſort of crime, turpitude, and oppreſſion with the Jacobin Republick of Paris. There is no queſtion with me to which of the two I ſhould chooſe to be a neighbour or a ſubject. But ſituated as I am, I am in no danger of becoming to Algiers either the one or the other. It is not ſo in my relation to the atheiſtical fanaticks of France. Have the Gentlemen who borrowed this happy parallel, no idea of the different conduct to be held with regard to the very ſame evil at an immenſe diſtance, and when it is at your door? when its power is enormous, as when it is comparatively as feeble as its diſtance is remote? and when there is a barrier of language and uſages, which prevents your being corrupted through certain old correſpondences and habitudes, which cannot for a long time be ſo wholly taken away, as not to make many

of

of your people ſuſceptible of contagion from horrible novelties that are introduced into every thing elſe? I can contemplate, without horror, a royal or a national tyger on the borders of Pegu. I can look at him, with an eaſy curioſity, as priſoner within bars in the menagerie of the Tower. But if, by Habeas Corpus, or otherwiſe, he was to come into the Lobby of the Houſe of Commons, whilſt your door was open, any of you would be more ſtout than wiſe, who would not gladly make his eſcape out of the back windows. This Ambaſſador from Bengal, would diſperſe you ſooner than a diſſolution by Royal Prerogative. I certainly ſhould dread more from a wild cat in my bedchamber, than from all the lions that roar in the deſerts behind Algiers. But in this parallel it is the cat that is at a diſtance, and the lions and tygers that are in our anti-chambers and our lobbies. Algiers is not near; Algiers is not powerful; Algiers is not our neighbour; Algiers is not infectious. Algiers, whatever it may be, is not an old creation; and we have good data to calculate all the miſchief to be expected from it. When I find Algiers transferred to Calais, I will tell you what I think of that point. In the mean time, the caſe quoted from the Algerine reports, will not apply as authority. We ſhall put it out of court; and ſo far as that goes, let the council for the Jacobin peace take nothing by their motion.

When

When we voted as we did, we were providing for dangers that were direct, home, preſſing, and not remote, contingent, uncertain, and formed upon looſe analogies. The whole tenor of conduct of France, not one or two doubtful or detached acts or expreſſions. To us it appeared, that the whole body of its diſcipline, comprehending the form of the State, and the ſcheme of opinion and manners, were adopted both as means and ends; as means, to eſtabliſh univerſal empire; and as ends to fix the ſame ſyſtem in every place to which their empire or their influence could extend. It was againſt this ſyſtem that you and I voted for war. It is with this ſyſtem that I ſhall for ever deprecate a relation of peace and amity.

Various perſons may concur in the ſame meaſure on various grounds. They may be various, without being contrary to, or excluſive of, each other. I thought the inſolent unprovoked aggreſſion of the Regicide upon our Ally of Holland a good ground of war; I think his manifeſt attempt to overturn the balance of Europe a good ground of war; as a good ground of war I conſider his declaration of war on his Majeſty and his kingdom. But though I have taken all theſe to my aid, I conſider them as nothing more than as a ſort of evidence to indicate the treaſonable mind within. It was not for their

former declaration of war, nor for any ſpecific act of hoſtility that I primarily wiſhed to reſiſt them, or to perſevere in my reſiſtance. It was becauſe the faction in France had aſſumed a form, had adopted a body of principles and maxims, and had regularly and ſyſtematically acted on them, by which ſhe virtually had put herſelf in a poſture which was in itſelf a declaration of war againſt mankind.

It is fit that the people ſhould know when the queſtion is concerning peace and amity, the true nature, habits, diſpoſitions, and views of the party with whom they are to cultivate friendſhip. It is of leſs importance to you, what is the character of your enemy, than what are the habits and diſpoſitions of your friend. The relation of enemy to enemy is ſimple. Enemies aim by force at each other's deſtruction. They are always, therefore, in a ſtate of defiance and diſtruſt; but the character of a friend is a ſerious matter. With a friend, the very nature of the relation muſt take off the guard. The people of England have felt their enemies, it is fit that they ſhould know their friends.

Before our opinions are quoted againſt ourſelves, it is proper that, from our ſerious deliberation they may be worth quoting. It is without reaſon we

praiſe

praiſe the wiſdom of our conſtitution, in putting under the diſcretion of the Crown, the aweful truſt of war and peace, if the Miniſters of the Crown virtually return it again into our hands. It was placed there as a ſacred depoſit, to ſecure us againſt popular raſhneſs in plunging into wars, and againſt the effects of popular diſmay, diſguſt, or luſſitude in getting out of them as imprudently as we might firſt engage in them. To have no other meaſure in judging of thoſe great objects than our momentary opinions and deſires, is to throw us back upon that very democracy which, in this part, our conſtitution was formed to avoid.

It is no excuſe at all for a miniſter, who at our deſire, takes a meaſure contrary to our ſafety, that it is our own act. He who does not ſtay the hand of a ſuicide is guilty of murder. To be inſtructed, is not to be degraded or enſlaved. Information is an advantage to us, and we have a right to demand it. He that is bound to act in the dark cannot be ſaid to act freely. When it appears evident to our governors, that our deſires and our intereſts are at variance, they ought not to gratify the former at the expence of the latter. Stateſmen are placed on an eminence, that they may have a larger horizon than we can poſſibly command. They have a whole before them, which we can contemplate only in the parts, and without the

relations. Miniſters are not only our natural rulers, but our natural guides. Reaſon clearly and manfully delivered, has in itſelf a mighty force: but reaſon in the mouth of legal authority, is, I may fairly ſay, irreſiſtible.

I admit that reaſon of ſtate will not, in many circumſtances permit the diſcloſure of the true ground of a public proceeding. In that caſe ſilence is manly and it is wiſe. It is fair to call for truſt when the principle of reaſon itſelf ſuſpends its public uſe. I take the diſtinction to be this. The ground of a particular meaſure, making a part of a plan, it is rarely proper to divulge. All the broader grounds of policy on which the general plan is to be adopted, ought as rarely to be concealed. They who have not the whole cauſe before them, call them politicians, call them people, call them what you will, are no judges. The difficulties of the caſe as well as its fair ſide, ought to be preſented. This ought to be done: and it is all that can be done. When we have our true ſituation diſtinctly preſented to us, if we reſolve with a blind and headlong violence, to reſiſt the admonitions of our friends, and to caſt ourſelves into the hands of our potent and irreconcileable foes, then, and not till then, the miniſters ſtand acquitted before God and man, for whatever may come.

Lamenting

Lamenting as I do, that the matter has not had ſo full and free a diſcuſſion as it requires, I mean to omit none of the points which ſeem to me neceſſary for conſideration, previous to an arrangement which is for ever to decide the form and the fate of Europe, In the courſe, therefore, of what I ſhall have the honour to addreſs to you, I propoſe the following queſtions to your ſerious thoughts. 1. Whether the preſent ſyſtem, which ſtands for a Government in France, be ſuch as in peace and war affects the neighbouring States in a manner different from the internal Government that formerly prevailed in that country? 2. Whether that ſyſtem, ſuppoſing it's views hoſtile to other nations, poſſeſſes any means of being hurtful to them peculiar to itſelf? 3. Whether there has been lately ſuch a change in France, as to alter the nature of it's ſyſtem or it's effect upon other Powers? 4. Whether any public declarations or engagements exiſt, on the part of the allied Powers, which ſtand in the way of a treaty of peace, which ſuppoſes the right and confirms the power of the Regicide faction in France? 5. What the ſtate of the other Powers of Europe will be with reſpect to each other, and their colonies, on the concluſion of a Regicide Peace? 6. Whether we are driven to the abſolute neceſſity of making that kind of peace?

Theſe

Theſe heads of enquiry will enable us to make the application of the ſeveral matters of fact and topics of argument, that occur in this vaſt diſcuſſion, to certain fixed principles. I do not mean to confine myſelf to the order in which they ſtand. I ſhall diſcuſs them in ſuch a manner as ſhall appear to me the beſt adapted for ſhewing their mutual bearings and relations. Here then I cloſe the public matter of my Letter; but before I have done, let me ſay one word in apology for myſelf.

In wiſhing this nominal peace not to be precipitated, I am ſure no man living is leſs diſpoſed to blame the preſent Miniſtry than I am. Some of my oldeſt friends, (and I wiſh I could ſay it of more of them,) make a part in that Miniſtry. There are ſome indeed, "whom my dim eyes in vain explore." In my mind, a greater calamity could not have fallen on the publick than their excluſion. But I drive away that, with other melancholy thoughts. As to the diſtinguiſhed perſons to whom my friends who remain, are joined, if benefits, nobly and generouſly conferred, ought to procure good wiſhes, they are entitled to my beſt vows; and they have them all. They have adminiſtered to me the only conſolation I am capable of receiving, which is to know that no individual will ſuffer by my

thirty

thirty years ſervice to the public. If things ſhould give us the comparative happineſs of a ſtruggle, I ſhall be found, I was going to ſay, fighting, (that would be fooliſh) but dying by the ſide of Mr. Pitt. I muſt add, that if any thing defenſive in our domeſtic ſyſtem can poſſibly ſave us from the diſaſters of a Regicide peace, he is the man to ſave us. If the finances in ſuch a caſe can be repaired, he is the man to repair them. If I ſhould lament any of his acts, it is only when they appear to me to have no reſemblance to acts of his. But let him not have a confidence in himſelf, which no human abilities can warrant. His abilities are fully equal (and that is to ſay much for any man) to thoſe that are oppoſed to him. But if we look to him as our ſecurity againſt the conſequences of a Regicide Peace, let us be aſſured, that a Regicide Peace and a Conſtitutional Miniſtry are terms that will not agree. With a Regicide Peace the King cannot long have a Miniſter to ſerve him, nor the Miniſter a King to ſerve. If the Great Diſpoſer, in reward of the royal and the private virtues of our Sovereign, ſhould call him from the calamitous ſpectacles, which will attend a ſtate of amity with Regicide, his ſucceſſor will ſurely ſee them, unleſs the ſame Providence greatly anticipates the courſe of nature. Thinking thus, (and not as I conceive on light grounds) I dare not flatter the reigning ſovereign, nor any Miniſter he has

has or can have, nor his Succeſſor Apparent, nor any of thoſe who may be called to ſerve him, with what appears to me a falſe ſtate of their ſituation. We cannot have them and that Peace together.

I do not forget that there had been a conſiderable difference between me and the great man at the head of Miniſtry in an early ſtage of theſe diſcuſſions. Under this circumſtance, his ſeconding his Majeſty's generoſity to me ſhines with the brighter luſtre. But I am ſure there was a period in which we agreed better in the danger of a Jacobin exiſtence in France. At one time, he and all Europe ſeemed to feel it. But why am not I converted with ſo many great Powers, and ſo many great Miniſters? It is becauſe I am old and ſlow.--- I am in this year, 1796, only where all the powers of Europe were in 1792. I cannot move with this proceſſion of the Equinoxes, which is preparing for us the return of ſome very old, I am afraid no golden æra, or the commencement of ſome new æra that muſt be denominated from ſome new metal. In this criſis I muſt hold my tongue, or I muſt ſpeak with freedom. For the few days I have to linger here, I am removed from the buſy ſcene of the world; and not more in fact than in diſpoſition, retired from all it's affairs, and all its pleaſures. But I hold myſelf to be ſtill reſponſible for every thing I have done in the Houſe, and in the World.

If

If the raweſt Tyro in politicks has been influenced by the authority of my grey hairs, and led by any thing in my ſpeeches, or my writings, to enter into this war, he has a right to call upon me to know why I have changed my opinions, or why, when thoſe I voted with, have adopted better notions, I perſevere in exploded errour?

When I ſeem not to acquieſce in the acts of thoſe I reſpect in every degree ſhort of ſuperſtition, I am obliged to give my reaſons fully. I cannot ſet my authority againſt their authority, But to reaſon is not to revolt againſt authority. Reaſon and authority do not move in the ſame parallel. That reaſon is an *amicus curiæ* who ſpeaks *de plano*, not *pro tribunali*; who makes an uſeful ſuggeſtion to the Court, without queſtioning its juriſdiction. Whilſt he acknowledges its competence, he promotes its efficiency.

LETTER II.

On the Genius and Character of the French Revolution as it regards other Nations.

MY DEAR SIR,

I Cloſed my firſt Letter with ſerious matter; and I hope it has employed your thoughts. The ſyſtem of peace muſt have a reference to the ſyſtem of the war. On that ground, I muſt therefore again recal your mind to our original opinions, which time and events have not taught me to vary.

My ideas and my principles led me, in this conteſt, to encounter France, not as a State, but as a Faction. The vaſt territorial extent of that country, it's immenſe population, it's riches of production, it's riches of commerce and convention—the whole aggregate maſs of what, in ordinary caſes, conſtitutes the force of a State, to me were but objects of ſecondary conſideration. They might be balanced; and they have

been often more than balanced. Great as theſe things are, they are not what make the faction formidable. It is the faction that makes them truly dreadful. That faction is the evil ſpirit that poſſeſſes the body of France; that informs it as a ſoul; that ſtamps upon its ambition, and upon all its purſuits, a characteriſtick mark, which ſtrongly diſtinguiſhes them from the ſame general paſſions, and the ſame general views, in other men and in other communities. It is that ſpirit which inſpires into them, a new, a pernicious, a deſolating activity. Conſtituted as France was ten years ago, it was not in that France to ſhake, to ſhatter, and to overwhelm Europe in the manner that we behold. A ſure deſtruction impends over thoſe infatuated Princes, who, in the conflict with this new and overheard-of power, proceeds as if they were engaged in a war that bore a reſemblance to their former conteſts; or that they can make peace in the ſpirit of their former arrangements of pacification. Here the beaten path is the very reverſe of the ſafe road.

As to me, I was always ſteadily of opinion, that this diſorder was not in its nature intermittent. I conceived that the conteſt once begun, could not be laid down again, to be reſumed at our diſcretion; but that our

firſt

firſt ſtruggle with this evil would alſo be our laſt. I never thought we could make peace with this ſyſtem; becauſe it was not for the ſake of an object we purſued in rivalry with each other, but with the ſyſtem itſelf that we were at war. As I underſtood the matter, we were at war not with it's conduct, but with it's exiſtence; convinced that it's exiſtence and it's hoſtility were the ſame.

The faction is not local or territorial. It is a general evil. Where it leaſt appears in action, it is ſtill full of life. In it's ſleep it recruits it's ſtrength, and prepares it's exertion. It's ſpirit lies deep in the corruptions of our common nature. The ſocial order which reſtrains it, feeds it. It exiſts in every country in Europe; and among all orders of men in every country, who look up to France as to a common head. The centre is there. The circumference is the world of Europe, wherever the race of Europe may be ſettled. Every where elſe the faction is militant; in France it is triumphant. In France is the bank of depoſit, and the bank of circulation, of all the pernicious principles that are forming in every State. It will be a folly ſcarcely deſerving of pity, and too miſchievous for contempt, to think of reſtraining it in any other country whilſt it is predominant there. War, inſtead of being

being the cauſe of it's force, has ſuſpended it's operation. It has given a reprieve, at leaſt, to the Chriſtian World.

The true nature of a Jacobin war, in the beginning, was, by moſt of the Chriſtian Powers, felt, acknowledged, and even in the moſt preciſe manner declared. In the joint manifeſto publiſhed by the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, on the 4th of Auguſt, 1792, it is expreſſed in the cleareſt terms, and on principles which could not fail, if they had adhered to them, of claſſing thoſe monarchs with the firſt benefactors of mankind. This manifeſto was publiſhed, as they themſelves expreſs it, " to " lay open to the preſent generation, as well as " to poſterity, their motives, their intentions, " and the *diſintereſtedneſs* of their perſonal views; " taking up arms for the purpoſe of preſerving " ſocial and political order amongſt all civilized " nations, and to ſecure to *each* ſtate it's reli- " gion, happineſs, independence, territories, " and real conſtitution."---" On this ground, " they hoped that all Empires, and all States, " ought to be unanimous; and becoming the " firm guardians of the happineſs of mankind, " they cannot fail to unite their efforts to reſcue " a numerous nation from it's own fury, to pre- " ſerve Europe from the return of barbariſm,

" and

" and the Univerſe from the ſubverſion and " anarchy with which it was threatened." The whole of that noble performance ought to be read at the firſt meeting of any Congreſs, which aſſemble for the purpoſe of pacification. In that piece " theſe Powers expreſsly renounce all views " of perſonal aggrandizement," and confine themſelves to objects worthy of ſo generous, ſo heroic, and ſo perfectly wiſe and politick an enterpriſe. It was to the principles of this confederation and to no other, that we wiſhed our Sovereign and our Country to accede, as a part of the commonwealth of Europe.

As long as theſe powers flattered themſelves that the means of force would produce the effect of force, they acted on thoſe declarations: but when their menances failed of ſucceſs, their efforts took a new direction. It did not appear to them that virtue and heroiſm ought to be purchaſed by millions of rix-dollars. It is a dreadful truth, but it is a truth that cannot be concealed. In ability, in dexterity, in the diſtinctneſs of their views, the Jacobins are our ſuperiours. They ſaw the thing right from the very beginning. Whatever were the firſt motives to the war among politicians, they ſaw that it is in it's ſpirit, and for it's objects, a *civil war*; and as ſuch they purſued it. It is a war between the partizans

of

of the antient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe againſt a ſect of fanatical and ambitious atheiſts which mean to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a ſect aiming at univerſal empire, and beginning with the conqueſt of France. The leaders of that ſect ſecured the *centre of Europe*; and that ſecured, they knew, that whatever might be the event of battles and ſieges, their *cauſe* was victorious. Whether it's territory had a little more or a little leſs peeled from it's ſurface, or whether an iſland or two was detached from it's commerce, to them was of little moment. The conqueſt of France was a glorious acquiſition. That once well laid as a baſis of empire, opportunities never could be wanting to regain or to replace what had been loſt, and dreadfully to avenge themſelves on the faction of their adverſaries.

They ſaw it was a *civil war*. It was their buſineſs to perſuade their adverſaries that it ought to be a *foreign* war. The Jacobins every where ſet up a cry againſt the new cruſade; and they intrigued with effect in the cabinet, in the field, and in every private ſociety in Europe. Their taſk was not difficult. The condition of Princes, and ſometimes of firſt Miniſters too, is to be pitied. The creatures of the deſk, and the

the creatures of favour, had no reliſh for the principles of the manifeſtoes. They promiſed no governments, no regiments, no revenues from whence emoluments might ariſe, by perquiſite or by grant. In truth, the tribe of vulgar politicians are the loweſt of our ſpecies. There is no trade ſo vile and mechanical as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are out of themſelves in any courſe of conduct recommended only by conſcience and glory. A large, liberal, and proſpective view of the intereſts of States paſſes with them for romance; and the principles that recommended it for the wanderings of a diſordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their ſenſes. The jeſters and buffoons ſhame them out of every thing grand and elevated. Littleneſs in object and in means, to them appears ſoundneſs and ſobriety. They think there is nothing worth purſuit, but that which they can handle; which they can meaſure with a two-foot rule; which they can tell upon ten fingers.

Without their principles, perhaps without any principles at all, they played the game of the Jacobins. There was a beaten road before them. The Powers of Europe were armed; France had always appeared dangerous; the

war was eaſily diverted from France as a faction, to France as a ſtate. The Princes were eaſily taught to ſlide back into their old habitual courſe of politicks. They were eaſily led to conſider the flames that were conſuming France, not as a warning to protect their own buildings, (which were without any party wall, and linked by a contignation into the edifice of France,) as an happy occaſion for the pillaging the goods, and for carrying off the materials of their neighbour's houſe. Their provident fears were changed into avaricious hopes. They carried on their new deſigns without ſeeming to abandon the principles of their old policy. They pretended to ſeek, or they flattered themſelves that they ſought, in the acceſſion of new fortreſſes, and new territories, a *defenſive* ſecurity. But the ſecurity wanted was againſt a kind of power, which was not dangerous in its fortreſſes nor in it's territories, but in it's ſpirit and it's principles. They aimed, or pretended to aim, at *defending* themſelves againſt a danger, from which there can be no ſecurity in any *defenſive* plan. If armies and fortreſſes were a defence againſt Jacobiniſm, Louis the Sixteenth would this day reign a powerful monarch over an happy people.

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This error obliged them, even in their offenſive operations, to adopt a plan of war, againſt the ſucceſs of which there was ſomething little ſhort of mathematical demonſtration. They refuſed to take any ſtep which might ſtrike at the heart of affairs. They ſeemed unwilling to wound the enemy in any vital part. They acted through the whole, as if they really wiſhed the conſervation of the Jacobin power; as what might be more favourable than the lawful Government to the attainment of the petty objects they looked for. They always kept on the circumference; and the wider and remoter the circle was, the more eagerly they choſe as their ſphere of action. The plan they purſued, in it's nature demanded great length of time. In it's execution they who went the neareſt way to work were obliged to cover an incredible extent of country. It left to the enemy every means of deſtroying this extended line of weakneſs. Ill ſucceſs in any part was ſure to defeat the effect of the whole. This is true of Auſtria. It is ſtill more true of England. On this falſe plan, even good fortune, by further weakening the victor, put him but the further off from his object.

As long as there was any appearance of ſucceſs, the ſpirit of aggrandizement, and conſe-

quently the ſpirit of mutual jealouſy ſeized upon all the coaleſced Powers. Some ſought an acceſſion of territory at the expence of France, ſome at the expence of each other, ſome at the expence of third parties; and when the viciſſitude of diſaſter took it's turn, they found common diſtreſs a treacherous bond of faith and friendſhip.

The greateſt ſkill conducting the greateſt military apparatus has been employed; but it has been worſe than uſeleſsly employed, through the falſe policy of the war. The operations of the field ſuffered by the errors of the Cabinet. If the ſame ſpirit continues when peace is made, the peace will fix and perpetuate all the errors of the war; becauſe it will be made upon the ſame falſe principle. What has been loſt in the field, in the field may be regained. An arrangement of peace in it's nature is a permanent ſettlement; it is the effect of counſel and deliberation, and not of fortuitous events. If built upon ſome baſis totally and fundamentally erroneous, it can only be retrieved by ſome of thoſe unforeſeen diſpoſitions, which the all-wiſe but myſterious Governor of the World, ſometimes interpoſes, to ſnatch nations from ruin. It would not be a pious error, but a mad and impious preſumption

tion for any one to truſt in an unknown order of diſpenſations, in defiance of the rules of prudence, which are formed upon the known march of the ordinary providence of God. It was not of that ſort of war that I was amongſt the leaſt conſiderable, but amongſt the moſt zealous adviſers; and it is not by the ſort of peace now talked of that I wiſh it concluded.

It would be to no great purpoſe to enter into the particular errours of the war. The whole has been but one errour. It was but nominally a war of alliance. As the allies purſued it there was nothing to hold an alliance together. There could be no tie of *honour*, in a ſociety for pillage. There could be no tie in a common *intereſt* where the object did not offer ſuch a diviſion amongſt the parties, as could be equalized. The partition of Poland offered an object of ſpoil in which the parties *might* agree. They were circumjacent; and each might take a portion convenient to his own territory. They might diſpute about the value; but the contiguity to each of the demandants always furniſhed the means of an adjuſtment. Though hereafter the world will have cauſe to rue this iniquitous meaſure, for the moment there was wherewithal in the object to preſerve peace amongſt confederates in wrong. But in

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the ſpoil of France, it was obvious that this ſcheme did not afford the ſame facilities for accommodation. What might ſatisfy the Houſe of Auſtria in her Flemiſh frontier afforded no equivalent to tempt the cupidity of the King of Pruſſia. What might be deſired by Great Britain in the Weſt-Indies, could be coldly and remotely, if at all, felt as an intereſt at Vienna; and it would be felt as ſomething worſe than a negative intereſt at Madrid. Auſtria, long poſſeſſed with unwiſe and dangerous deſigns on Italy, could not be very much in earneſt about the conſervation of the old patrimony of the Houſe of Savoy: and Sardinia, who owed to an Italian force all her means of ſhutting out France from Italy, of which ſhe has been ſuppoſed to hold the key, would not purchaſe the means of ſtrength upon one ſide by yielding it on the other. She would not readily give the poſſeſſion of Novara for the hope of Savoy. No continental Power was willing to loſe any of it's continental objects for the encreaſe of the naval power of Great Britain; and Great Britain would not give up any of the objects ſhe ſought for as the means of an encreaſe to her naval power, to further their aggrandizement. There was no method of equalizing their ſeveral pretenſions. They are things incommenſurable. The moment this war came to be conſidered as

a war

a war merely of profit, the actual circumſtances are ſuch, that it never could become really a war of alliance. Nor can the peace be a peace of alliance, until things are put upon their right bottom.

I don't find it denied, that when a treaty is entered into for peace, a demand will be made on the Regicides to ſurrender their conqueſts on the Continent. Will they, in the preſent ſtate of the war, make that ſurrender without an equivalent? This continental ceſſion muſt be made in favour of that party in the alliance, that has ſuffered loſſes. That party has nothing to furniſh towards an equivalent. What equivalent, for inſtance, has Holland to offer, who has loſt her all? What equivalent can come from the Emperor, every part of whoſe territories contiguous to France, is already within the pale of the Regicide dominion? What equivalent has Sardinia to offer for Savoy and for Nice? What has ſhe taken from the faction of France? She has loſt much; and ſhe has gained nothing. What equivalent has Spain to give? Alas! ſhe has already paid for her own ranſom the fund of equivalent, and a dreadful equivalent it is, to England and to herſelf. But I put Spain out of the queſtion. She is a province of the Jacobin Empire. She is in a ſhocking di-

lemma.

lemma. In effect and ſubſtance, her Crown is a fief of Regicide——Whence then can the compenſation be demanded, but from that power which alone has made ſome conqueſts? That power is England. Will the Allies then give away their ancient patrimony, that England may keep Iſlands in the Weſt Indies? They can never protract the war in good earneſt for that object. Nor can they act in concert with us, in our refuſal to grant any thing towards their redemption. In that caſe we are thus ſituated—Either we muſt give Europe, bound hand and foot to France; or we muſt quit the Weſt Indies without any one object, great or ſmall, towards indemnity and ſecurity. If we look to the Eaſt, our moſt decided conqueſts (ſome of them the moſt important) are there. I look at the taking poſſeſſion of the Cape of Good Hope to be the ſecuring a poſt of great moment: it is a meaſure which does infinite honour to thoſe who planned it, and to thoſe who executed that enterprize. I ſpeak of it always as *comparatively* good; as good as any thing in this ſcheme of war, which repels us from an , and employs all our forces, where nothing can be finally deciſive. It is evident, that if we keep our eaſtern conqueſts, we keep them at the expence of Holland, our ally; the immediate

cauſe

cauſe of the war, the nation whom we had undertaken to protect, and not of the Republic which it was our buſineſs to deſtroy. If we return the African and the Aſiatic conqueſts, we put them into the hands of a nominal State, (to that Holland is reduced) unable to retain them; and which will virtually leave them under the direction of France. If we withhold them, Holland declines ſtill more as a State: and ſhe loſes that carriage and that means of keeping up the ſmall degree of naval power ſhe holds; for which policy, and not for any commercial gain, ſhe maintains the Cape, or any ſettlement beyond it. It that caſe, reſentment, faction, and even neceſſity will throw her more and more into the power of the new miſchievous Republic. But on the probable ſtate of Holland, I ſhall ſay more, when I come to talk over with you the ſtate in which any ſort of Jacobin peace will leave all Europe.

So far as to the Eaſt-Indies.

As to the Weſt-Indies, indeed as to either, if we look for matter of exchange in order to ranſome Europe, it is eaſy to ſhew that we have taken a terrible round-about road. I cannot conceive, even if, for the ſake of holding conqueſts there, we ſhould refuſe to redeem Hol-

land, and the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the hither Germany, that Spain, merely as ſhe is Spain, (and forgetting that the Regicide Ambaſſador governs at Madrid) will ſee with perfect ſatisfaction, Great Britain ſole miſtreſs of the Iſles. In truth it appears to me, that, when we come to balance our account, we ſhall find in the propoſed peace only the pure, ſimple, and unendowed charms of Jacobin amity. We ſhall have the ſatisfaction of knowing, that no blood or treaſure has been ſpared by the allies for ſupport of the Regicide ſyſtem. They will reflect at leiſure on one great truth, that it was ten times more eaſy totally to deſtroy the ſyſtem itſelf, than when eſtabliſhed, it would be to reduce its power—and that this Republic, moſt formidable abroad, was, of all things, the weakeſt at home. That her frontier was terrible—her interior feeble—that it was matter of choice to attack her where ſhe is invincible; and to ſpare her where ſhe was ready to diſſolve by her own internal diſorders. They will reflect, that their plan was good neither for offence nor defence.

My dear Friend, I hold it impoſſible that theſe conſiderations ſhould have eſcaped the Stateſman on both ſides of the water, and on both ſides of the Houſe of Commons. How a queſtion

queſtion of peace can be diſcuſſed without having them in view, I cannot imagine. If you or others ſee a way out of theſe difficulties I am happy. I ſee indeed a fund from whence equivalents will be propoſed. I ſee it. But I cannot juſt now touch it. It is a queſtion of high moment. It opens another Iliad of woes to Europe.

Such is the time propoſed for making *a common political peace*, to which no one circumſtance is propitious. As to the grand principle of the peace, it is left, as if by common conſent, wholly out of the queſtion.

It ſeems to me, as if the two parties, who have long divided and diſtracted this kingdom, without abandoning their animoſities, had come to an agreement in their ſentiments. It looks as if they concurred in the eſtabliſhment of Jacobiniſm in France, and in the neceſſity, if not in the advantage, of admitting it as a ſociable and natural member in the republic of Chriſtendom. So far, and no farther, they are agreed amongſt themſelves. Our domeſtic peace remains where it was; and we ſeek to make amends for this domeſtic diſtraction, by giving (as far as it is in our power to give it) peace and eſtabliſhment to our enemies. In this

peace to our foe, we are taught to look, it ſeems, for the term of all our own evils.

Viewing things in this light, I have frequently ſunk into a degree of deſpondency and dejection hardly to be deſcribed: yet out of the profoundeſt depths of this deſpair, an impulſe which I have in vain endeavoured to reſiſt, has urged me to raiſe one feeble cry againſt this unfortunate coalition which is formed at home, in order to make a coalition with France, ſubverſive of the whole ancient order of the world. No diſaſter of war, no calamity of ſeaſon could ever ſtrike me with half the horror which I felt from what is introduced to us by this junction of parties, under the ſoothing name of peace. We are apt to ſpeak of a low and puſillanimous ſpirit as the ordinary cauſe by which dubious wars terminate in humiliating treaties. It is here the direct contrary. I am perfectly aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of character, at the intrepidity of mind, the firmneſs of nerve, in thoſe who are able with deliberation to face the perils of Jacobin fraternity.

This fraternity is indeed ſo terrible in it's nature, and in it's manifeſt conſequences, that there is no way of quieting our apprehenſions about it, but by totally putting it out of ſight,

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by ſubſtituting for it, through a ſort of periphraſis, ſomething of an ambiguous quality, and deſcribing ſuch a connection under the terms of "*the uſual relations of peace and amity:*" By this means the propoſed fraternity is huſtled in the crowd of thoſe treaties, which imply no change in the public law of Europe, and which do not upon ſyſtem affect the interior condition of nations. It is confounded with thoſe conventions in which matters of diſpute among ſovereign powers are compromiſed, by the taking off a duty more or leſs, by the ſurrender of a frontier town, or a diſputed diſtrict on the one ſide or the other; by pactions in which the pretenſions of families are ſettled, (as by a conveyancer, making family ſubſtitutions and ſucceſſions) without any alteration in the laws, manners, religion, privileges and cuſtoms of the cities or territories which are the ſubject of ſuch arrangements.

All this body of old conventions, compoſing the vaſt and voluminous collection called the *corps diplomatique*, forms the code or ſtatute law, as the methodized reaſonings of the great publiciſts and juriſts form the digeſt and juriſprudence of the Chriſtian world. In theſe treaſures are to be found the *uſual* relations of peace and amity in civilized Europe; and there the relations

relations of ancient France were to be found amongſt the reſt.

The preſent ſyſtem in France is not the ancient France. It is not the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary means. It is not a new power of an old kind. It is a new power of a new ſpecies. When ſuch a queſtionable ſhape is to be admitted for the firſt time into the brotherhood of Chriſtendom, it is not a matter of idle curioſity to conſider how far it is in it's nature alliable with the reſt, or whether "the relations of peace and amity" with this new State are likely to be of the ſame nature with the *uſual* relations of the States of Europe.

The Revolution in France had the relation of France to other nations as one of it's principal objects. The changes made by that Revolution were not the better to accommodate her to the old and uſual relations, but to produce new ones. The Revolution was made, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a neighbour, but a miſtreſs; not to make her more obſervant of laws, but to put her in a condition to impoſe them. To make France truly formidable it was neceſſary that France ſhould be new modelled. They who

who have not followed the train of the late proceedings, have been led by deceitful repreſentations (which deceit made a part in the plan) to conceive that this totally new model of a ſtate, in which nothing eſcaped a change, was made with a view to its internal relations only.

In the Revolution of France two ſorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to its purſuits; the philoſophers and the politicians. They took different ways, but they met in the ſame end. The philoſophers had one predominant object, which they purſued with a fanatical fury, that is, the utter extirpation of religion. To that every queſtion of empire was ſubordinate. They had rather domineer in a pariſh of Atheiſts, than rule over a Chriſtian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly ſubſervient to their proſelytizing ſpirit, in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himſelf.

They who have made but ſuperficial ſtudies in the natural hiſtory of the human mind, have been taught to look on religious opinions as the only cauſe of enthuſiaſtic zeal, and ſectarian propagation. But there is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very ſame effect. The ſocial nature of man impels him to propagate his principles,

ciples, as much as phyſical impulſes urge him to propagate his kind. The paſſions give zeal and vehemence. The underſtanding beſtows deſign and ſyſtem. The whole man moves under the diſcipline of his opinions. Religion is among the moſt powerful cauſes of enthuſiaſm. When any thing concerning it becomes an object of much meditation, it cannot be indifferent to the mind. They who do not love religion, hate it. The rebels to God perfectly abhor the Author of their being. They hate him "with all their "heart, with all their mind, with all their ſoul, "and with all their ſtrength." He never preſents himſelf to their thoughts, but to menace and alarm them. They cannot ſtrike the Sun out of Heaven, but they are able to raiſe a moldering ſmoke that obſcures him from their own eyes. Not being able to revenge themſelves on God, they have a delight in vicariouſly defacing, degrading, torturing, and tearing in pieces his image in man. Let no one judge of them by what he has conceived of them, when they were not incorporated, and had no lead. They were then only paſſengers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and without being aware of it, partook of its influence. In that ſituation, at worſt their nature was left free to counterwork their principles. They deſpaired

ſpaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They conſideder them as a reſerved privilege for the choſen few. But when the poſſibility of dominion; lead, and propagation preſented themſelves, and that the ambition, which before had ſo often made them hypocrites, might rather gain than loſe by a daring avowal of their ſentiments, then the nature of this infernal ſpirit, which has "evil for its good," appeared in its full perfection. Nothing, indeed, but the poſſeſſion of ſome power can, with any certainty, diſcover what at the bottom is the true character of any man. Without reading the ſpeeches of Verginaux, Français of Nantz, Iſnard, and ſome others of that ſort, it would not be eaſy to conceive the paſſion, rancour, and malice of their tongues and hearts. They worked themſelves up to a perfect phrenzy againſt religion and all its profeſſors. They tore the deputation of the Clergy to pieces by their infuriated declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their maſſacres. This fanatical atheiſm left out, we omit the principal feature in the French Revolution, and a principal conſideration with regard to the effects to be expected from a peace with it.

The other ſort of men were the politicians. To them who had little or not at all reflected on

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the ſubject, religion was in itſelf no object of love or hatred. They diſbelieved it, and that was all. Neutral with regard to that object, they took the ſide which, in the preſent ſtate of things, might beſt anſwer their purpoſes. They ſoon found that they could not do without the philoſophers; and the philoſophers ſoon made them ſenſible, that the deſtruction of religion was to ſupply them with means of conqueſt firſt at home, and then abroad. The philoſophers were the active internal agitators, and ſupplied the ſpirit and principles: the ſecond gave the general direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the compoſition, ſometimes the other. The only difference between them was in the neceſſity of concealing the general deſign for a time, and in dealing with foreign nations; the fanaticks going ſtraight forward and openly, the politicians by the ſurer mode of zig-zag. In the courſe of events, this, among other cauſes, produced fierce and bloody contentions between them. But at the bottom they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and ſubſtantially in all the means of promoting theſe ends.

Without queſtion, to bring about the unexampled event of the French Revolution, the concurrence of a very great number of views

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and paſſions was neceſſary. In that ſtupendous work, no one principle by which the human mind may have it's faculties at once invigorated and depraved, was left unemployed: but I can ſpeak it to a certainty, and ſupport it by undoubted proofs, that the ruling principle of thoſe who acted in the Revolution *as ſtateſmen*, had the exterior aggrandizement of France as their ultimate end in the moſt minute part of the interior changes that were made. We, who of late years, have been drawn from an attention to foreign affairs by the importance of our domeſtic diſcuſſions, cannot eaſily form a conception of the general eagerneſs of the French nation, previous to it's revolution, upon that ſubject. I am convinced that the foreign ſpeculators in France, under the old Government, were twenty to one of the ſame deſcription in England; and few of that deſcription there were, who did not emulouſly ſet forward the Revolution. The whole official ſyſtem, particularly in the diplomatic part, the regulars, the irregulars, down to the clerks in office (a corps, without all compariſon, more numerous than the ſame deſcription amongſt us) co-operated in it. All the intriguers in foreign politicks, all the ſpies, all the intelligencers, actually or late in function, all the candidates for that ſort of employment, acted ſolely upon that principle.

On that ſyſtem of aggrandizement there was but one mind: but two violent factions aroſe about the means. The firſt wiſhed France, diverted from the politicks of the Continent, to attend ſolely to her marine, to feed it by an encreaſe of commerce, and thereby to overpower England on her own element. They contended, that if England were diſabled, the Powers on the Continent would fall into their proper ſubordination; that it was England which deranged the whole continental ſyſtem of Europe. The others, who were by far the more numerous, though not the moſt outwardly prevalent at Court, conſidered this plan as contrary to her genius, her ſituation, and her natural means. They agreed as to the ultimate object, the reduction of the Britiſh power; but they conſidered an aſcendancy on the Continent as a neceſſary preliminary to that undertaking. They argued, that the proceedings of England herſelf had proved the ſoundneſs of this policy. That her greateſt and ableſt Stateſmen had not conſidered the ſupport of a continental balance againſt France as a deviation from the principle of her naval power, but as one of the moſt effectual modes of carrying it into effect. That ſuch had been her policy ſince the Revolution; during which period the naval ſtrength of Great Britain had

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gone on encreaſing in the direct ratio of her interference in the politicks of the continent. With much ſtronger reaſon ought the politicks of France to take the ſame direction: as well for purſuing objects which her ſituation would dictate to her, if England had no exiſtence, as for counteracting the politicks of that nation; to France continental politicks are primary; they are only of ſecondary conſideration to England.

What is truly aſtoniſhing, the partizans of thoſe two oppoſite ſyſtems were at once prevalent, and at once employed, and in the very ſame tranſactions, the one oſtenſibly, the other ſecretly, during the latter part of the reign of Lewis XV. Nor was there one Court in which an Ambaſſador reſided on the part of the Miniſters, in which another as a ſpy on him did not alſo reſide on the part of the King. They who purſued the ſcheme for keeping peace on the continent, and particularly with Auſtria, acting officially and publickly, the other faction counteracting and oppoſing them. Theſe private agents were continually going from their function to the Baſtille, from the Baſtille to employment, and to intereſt or favour again. An inextricable cabal was formed, ſome of perſons of rank, others of ſubordinates. But by this means

means the corps of politicians was augmented in number, and the whole formed a body of active, adventuring, ambitious, diſcontented people, deſpiſing the regular Miniſtry, deſpiſing the Courts at which they were employed, deſpiſing the Courts which employed them.

The unfortunate Lewis the Sixteenth* was not the firſt cauſe of the evil by which he ſuffered. He came to it, as to a ſort of inheritance, by the falſe politicks of his immediate predeceſ-

* It may be right to do juſtice to Lewis XVI. He did what he could to deſtroy the double diplomacy of France: He had all the ſecret correſpondence burnt, except one piece, which was called, *Conjectures raiſonnées ſur la Situation de la France dans le Syſteme Politique de l'Europe;* a work executed by M. Favier, under the direction of Count Broglie. A ſingle copy of this was ſaid to have been found in the Cabinet of Lewis XVI. It was publiſhed with ſome ſubſequent ſtate papers of Vergennes, Turgot, and others, as, "A new Benefit of the Revolution;" and the advertiſement to the publication ends with the following words: "*Il ſera facile de ſe convaincre, qu'* Y COMPRIS MEME LA REVOLUTION, *en grande partie,* ON TROUVE DANS CES MEMOIRES ET SES CONJECTURES LE GERME DE TOUT CE QU'ARRIVA AUJOURD'HUI, *& qu'on ne peut ans les avoir lus, être bien au fait des intérêts, & même des vues actuelles des diverſes puiſſances de l'Europe.*" The book is entitled, *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les regnes de Louis* XV. *& Louis* XVI. It is altogether very curious, and worth reading.

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ſor. This ſyſtem of dark and perplexed intrigue had come to it's perfection before he came to the throne: and even then the Revolution ſtrongly operated in all it's cauſes.

There was no point on which the diſcontented diplomatic politicians ſo bitterly arraigned their Cabinet, as for the decay of the French influence in all others. From quarrelling with the Court, they began to complain of Monarchy itſelf; as a ſyſtem of Government too variable for any regular plan of national aggrandizement. They obſerved, that in that ſort of regimen too much depended on the perſonal character of the Prince; that the viciſſitudes produced by the ſucceſſion of Princes of a different character, and even the viciſſitudes produced in the ſame man, by the different views and inclinations belonging to youth, manhood, and age, diſturbed and diſtracted the policy of a country, made by nature for extenſive empire, or what was ſtill more to their taſte, for that ſort of general over-ruling influence which prepared empire or ſupplied the place of it. They had continually in their hands the obſervations of *Machiavel* on *Livy*. They had *Monteſquieu's Grandeur & Décadence des Romains* as a manual; and they compared with mortification the ſyſtematic proceedings of a Roman ſenate with the

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fluctuations of a Monarchy. They obſerved, the very ſmall additions of territory which all the power of France, actuated by all the ambition of France, had acquired in two centuries. The Romans had frequently acquired more in a ſingle year. They ſeverely and in every part of it criticiſed the reign of Louis the XIVth, whoſe irregular and defultory ambition had more provoked than endangered Europe. Indeed, they who will be at the pains of ſeriouſly conſidering the hiſtory of that period will ſee, that thoſe French politicians had ſome reaſon. They who will not take the trouble of reviewing it through all it's wars and all it's negociations, will conſult the ſhort but judicious criticiſm of the Marquis de Montalambert on that ſubject. It may be read ſeparately from his ingenious ſyſtem of fortification and military defence, on the practical merit of which I am unable to form a judgment.

The diplomatic politicians of whom I ſpeak, and who formed by far the majority in that claſs, made diſadvantageous compariſons even between their more legal and formaliſing Monarchy, and the monarchies of other ſtates, as a ſyſtem of power and influence. They obſerved, that France not only loſt ground herſelf, but through the languor and unſteadineſs of her purſuits,

ſuits, and from her aiming through commerce at naval force which ſhe never could attain, three great powers, each of them (as military ſtates) capable of balancing her, had grown up on the continent. Ruſſia and Pruſſia had been created almoſt within memory; and Auſtria, though not a new power, and even curtailed in territory, was by the very colliſion in which ſhe loſt that territory, greatly improved in her military diſcipline and force: and that during the reign of Maria Thereſa the interior œconomy of the country was made more to correſpond with the ſupport of great armies than formerly it had been. As to Pruſſia, a merely military power, they obſerved that one war had enriched her with as conſiderable a conqueſt as France had acquired in centuries. Ruſſia had broken the Turkiſh power by which Auſtria might be, as formerly ſhe had been, balanced in favour of France. They felt it with pain, that the two northern powers of Sweden and Denmark were in general under the ſway of Ruſſia; or that at beſt, France kept up a very doubtful conflict, with many fluctuations of fortune, and at an enormous expence in Sweden. In Holland, the French party ſeemed, if not extinguiſhed, at leaſt utterly obſcured, and kept under by a Stadtholder, ſometimes leaning for ſupport on Great Britain, ſometimes

on Pruſſia, ſometimes on both, never on France. Even the ſpreading of the Bourbon family had become merely a family accommodation; and had little effect on the national politicks. This alliance, they ſaid, extinguiſhed Spain by deſtroying all it's energy, without adding any thing to the real power of France in the acceſſion of the forces of it's great rival. In Italy, the ſame family accommodation, the ſame national inſignificance were equally viſible. What cure for the radical weakneſs of the French Monarchy, to which all the means which wit could deviſe, or nature and fortune could beſtow, towards univerſal empire, was not of force to give life, or vigour, or conſiſtency,—but in a republick? Out the word came; and it never went back.

Whether they reaſoned right or wrong, or that there was ſome mixture of right and wrong in their reaſoning, I am ſure, that in this manner they felt and reaſoned. The different effects of a great military and ambitious republick, and of a monarchy of the ſame deſcription was conſtantly in their mouths. The principle was ready to operate when opportunities ſhould offer, which few of them indeed foreſaw in the extent in which they were afterwards preſented; but theſe opportunities, in ſome degree or other, they all ardently wiſhed for.

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When I was in Paris in 1773, the treaty of 1756 between Auſtria and France was deplored as a national calamity; becauſe it united France in friendſhip with a Power, at whoſe expence alone they could hope any continental aggrandizement. When the firſt partition of Poland was made, in which France had no ſhare, and which had farther aggrandized every one of the three Powers of which they were moſt jealous, I found them in a perfect phrenzy of rage and indignation: Not that they were hurt at the ſhocking and uncoloured violence and injuſtice of that partition, but at the debility, improvidence, and want of activity in their Government, in not preventing it as a means of aggrandizement to their rivals, or in not contriving, by exchanges of ſome kind or other, to obtain their ſhare of advantage from that robbery.

In that, or nearly in that ſtate of things and of opinions, came the Auſtrian match which promiſed to draw the knot, as afterwards in effect it did, ſtill more cloſely between the old rival houſes. This added exceedingly to their hatred aud contempt of their monarchy. It was for this reaſon that the late glorious Queen, who on all accounts was formed to produce general love and admiration, and whoſe life was as mild and beneficent as her

death was beyond example great and heroic, became ſo very ſoon and ſo very much the object of an implàcable rancour, never to be extinguiſhed but in her blood. When I wrote my letter in anſwer to M. de Menonville, in the beginning of January, 1791, I had good reaſon for thinking that this deſcription of revolutioniſts did not ſo early nor ſo ſteadily point their murderous deſigns at the martyr King as at the Royal Heroine. It was accident, and the momentary depreſſion of that part of the faction, that gave to the huſband the happy priority in death.

From this their reſtleſs deſire of an over-ruling influence, they bent a very great part of their deſigns and efforts to revive the old French, which was a democratic party in Holland, and to make a revolution there. They were happy at the troubles which the ſingular imprudence of Joſeph the Second had ſtirred up in the Auſtrian Netherlands. They rejoiced, when they ſaw him irritate his ſubjects, profeſs philoſophy, ſend away the Dutch garriſons, and diſmantle his fortifications. As to Holland, they never forgave either the King or the Miniſtry, for ſuffering that object, which they juſtly looked on as principal in their deſign of reducing the power of England, to eſcape out of their hands.

hands. This was the true ſecret of the commercial treaty, made, on their part, againſt all the old rules and principles of commerce, with a view of diverting the Engliſh nation, by an attention to profit, from an attention to the progreſs of France in it's deſigns upon that Republic. The ſyſtem of the œconomiſts, which led to the general opening of commerce, facilitated that treaty, but did not produce it. They were in deſpair when they found that the object, to which they had ſacrificed their manufactures, was loſt to their ambition. Above all, this eager deſire of raiſing France from the condition into which ſhe had fallen, as they conceived, from her monarchical imbecility, had been the main ſpring of their precedent interference in that unhappy American quarrel, the bad effects of which to this nation have not, as yet, fully diſcloſed themſelves.

Theſe ſentiments had been long lurking in their breaſts, though their views were only diſcovered now and then, in heat and as by eſcapes; but on this occaſion they exploded ſuddenly. They were profeſſed with oſtentation, and propagated with zeal. Theſe ſentiments were not produced, as ſome think, by their American alliance. The American alliance was produced by their republican principles and republican policy.

policy. This new relation undoubtedly did much. The diſcourſes and cabals that it produced, the intercourſe that it eſtabliſhed, and above all, the example, which made it ſeem practicable to eſtabliſh a Republick in a great extent of country, finiſhed the work, and gave to that part of the Revolutionary faction a degree of ſtrength which required other energies than the late King poſſeſſed, to reſiſt, or even to reſtrain. It ſpread every where; but it was no where more prevalent than in the heart of the Court. The palace of Verſailles, by its language, ſeemed a forum of democracy. To point out to moſt of thoſe politicians, from theſe diſpoſitions and movements, what has ſince happened, the fall of their own Monarchy, of their own Laws, of their own Religion, would have been to furniſh a motive the more for puſhing forward a ſyſtem on which they conſidered all theſe things as incumbrances.

When I contemplate the ſcheme on which France is formed, and when I compare it with theſe ſyſtems, with which it is, and ever muſt be in conflict, theſe things which ſeem as defects in her polity, are the very things which make me tremble. The States of the Chriſtian World have grown up to their preſent magnitude in a great length of time, and by a great variety of accidents. They have been improved to what

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we ſee them with greater or leſs degrees of felicity and ſkill. Not one of them has been formed upon a regular plan, or with any unity of deſign. As their Conſtitutions are not ſyſtematical, they have not been directed to any peculiar end, eminently diſtinguiſhed, and ſuperſeding every other. The objects which they embrace are of the greateſt poſſible variety, and have become in a manner infinite. In all theſe old countries the ſtate has been made to the people, and not the people conformed to the ſtate. Every ſtate has purſued, not only every ſort of ſocial advantage, but it has cultivated the welfare of every individual. His wants, his wiſhes, even his taſtes have been conſulted. This comprehenſive ſcheme, virtually produced a degree of perſonal liberty in forms the moſt adverſe to it. That was found, under monarchies ſtiled abſolute, in a degree unknown to the ancient commonwealths. From hence the powers of all our modern ſtates, meet in all their movements, with ſome obſtruction. It is therefore no wonder, that when theſe ſtates are to be conſidered as machines to operate for ſome one great end, that this diſſipated and balanced force is not eaſily concentred, or made to bear upon one point.

The Britiſh State is, without queſtion, that which purſues the greateſt variety of ends, and

and is the leaſt diſpoſed to ſacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole. It aims at taking in the whole circle of human deſires, and ſecuring for them their fair enjoyment. Our legiſlature has been ever cloſely connected, in it's moſt efficient part, with individual feeling and individual intereſt. Perſonal liberty, the moſt lively of theſe feelings and the moſt important of theſe intereſts, which in other European countries has rather ariſen from the ſyſtem of manners and the habitudes of life, than from the laws of the ſtate, (in which it flouriſhed more from neglect than attention) in England, has been a direct object of Government.

Fortunately, the great riches of this kingdom, ariſing from a variety of cauſes, and the diſpoſition of the people, which is as great to ſpend as to accumulate, has eaſily afforded a diſpoſeable ſurplus that gives a mighty momentum to the ſtate. This difficulty, with theſe advantages to overcome it, has called forth the talents of the Engliſh financiers, who, by the ſurplus of induſtry poured out by prodigality, has outdone every thing which has been accompliſhed in other nations. The preſent Miniſter has outdone his predeceſſors; and as a Miniſter of revenue, is far above my power of praiſe. But ſtill there are caſes in which England feels more than ſeveral others, (though they

all feel) the perplexity of an immenſe body of balanced advantages, and of individual demands, and of ſome irregularity in the whole maſs.

France differs eſſentially from all thoſe Governments which are formed without ſyſtem, which exiſt by habit, and which are confuſed with the multitude, and with the complexity of their purſuits. What now ſtands as Government in France is ſtruck out at a heat. The deſign is wicked, immoral, impious, oppreſſive; but it is ſpirited and daring: it is ſyſtematick; it is ſimple in it's principle; it has unity and conſiſtency in perfection. In that country entirely to cut off a branch of commerce, to extinguiſh a manufacture, to deſtroy the circulation of money, to violate credit, to ſuſpend the courſe of agriculture, even to burn a city, or to lay waſte a province of their own, does not coſt them a moment's anxiety. To them, the will, the wiſh, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals is as nothing. Individuality is left out of their ſcheme of Government. The ſtate is all in all. Every thing is referred to the production of force; afterwards every thing is truſted to the uſe of it. It is military in it's principle, in it's maxims, in it's ſpirit, and in all it's movements. The ſtate has dominion and conqueſt for it's ſole objects; dominion over minds by proſelytiſm, over bodies by arms.

Thus conſtituted with an immenſe body of natural means, which are leſſened in their amount only to be encreaſed in their effect, France has ſince the accompliſhment of the Revolution, a complete unity in it's direction. It has deſtroyed every reſource of the State, which depends upon opinion and the good-will of individuals. The riches of convention diſappear. The advantages of nature in ſome conſiderable meaſure remain; the command over them is complete and abſolute. We go about aſking when aſſignats will expire, and laugh at the laſt price of them; but what ſignifies the fate of theſe tickets of deſpotiſm? The deſpotiſm will find deſpotick means of ſupply. They have found the ſhort cut to the productions of Nature, while others in purſuit of them, are obliged to wind th rough the labyrinth of artificial ſociety. They ſeize upon the fruit of the labour; they ſeize upon the labourer himſelf. The natural means of France are ſtill great. They are very materially leſſened, I admit; but the power over them is increaſed. Were France but half of what it is in population, in compactneſs, in applicability of it's force, ſituated as it is, and being what it is, it would be too ſtrong for moſt of the States of Europe, conſtituted as they are, and proceeding as they proceed. Would it be wiſe to eſtimate what the world of Europe, as well as the world of Aſia, had to dread from Jinghiz Khan, upon a contemplation

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of the reſources of the cold and barren ſpot in the remoteſt Tartary, from whence firſt iſſued that ſcourge of the human race? Ought we to judge from the exciſe and ſtamp duties of the rocks, or from the paper circulation of the ſands of Arabia, the power by which Mahomet and his tribes laid hold at once on the two moſt powerful Empires of the world; beat one of them totally to the ground, broke to pieces the other, and, in not much longer ſpace of time than I have lived, overturned governments, laws, manners, religion, and extended an empire from the Indus to the Pyrennees.

Material reſources never have ſupplied, nor ever can ſupply the want of unity in deſign and conſtancy in purſuit. But unity in deſign, and perſeverance, and boldneſs in purſuit, have never wanted reſources, and never will. We have not conſidered as we ought the dreadful energy of a State, in which the property has nothing to do with the Government. Reflect, my dear Sir, reflect again and again on a Government, in which the property is in ſubjection, and where nothing rules but the minds of deſperate men. The condition of a commonwealth not governed by its property was a combination of things, which the learned and ingenious ſpeculator Harrington, who has toſſed about ſociety into all forms, never could imagine to be poſſible. We have ſeen it; the world has felt

it; and if the world will ſhut their eyes to this ſtate of things, they will feel it more. The Rulers there have found their reſources in crimes. The diſcovery is dreadful, the mine exhauſtleſs. They have every thing to gain, and they have nothing to loſe. They have a boundleſs inheritance in hope; and there is no medium for them, betwixt the higheſt elevation, and death with infamy. Never can thoſe, who from the miſerable ſervitude of the deſk have been raiſed to Empire, again ſubmit to the bondage of a ſtarving bureau, or the profit of copying muſic, or writing plaidoyers by the ſheet. It has made me often ſmile in bitterneſs, when I heard talk of an indemnity to ſuch men, provided they returned to their allegiance.

From all this, what is my inference? It is, that this new ſyſtem of robbery in France, cannot be rendered ſafe by any art or any means. That it *muſt* be deſtroyed, or that it will deſtroy all Europe.—That by ſome means or other the force oppoſed to her ſhould be made to bear, in a contrary direction, ſome analogy and reſemblance to the force and ſpirit ſhe employs.

The unhappy Lewis XVI. was a man of the beſt intentions that probably ever reigned. He was by no means deficient in talents. He had a moſt laudable deſire to ſupply by general reading, and

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even by the acquiſition of elemental knowledge, an education in all points originally defective; but nobody told him (and it was no wonder he ſhould not himſelf divine it) that the world of which he read, and the world in which he lived, were no longer the ſame. Deſirous of doing every thing for the beſt, fearful of cabal, diſtruſting his own judgment, he ſought his Miniſters of all kinds upon public teſtimony. But as Courts are the field for caballers, the public is the theatre for mountebanks and impoſtors. The cure for both thoſe evils is in the diſcernment of the Prince. But an accurate and penetrating diſcernment is what in a young Prince could not be looked for.

His conduct in it's principle was not unwiſe; but like moſt other of his well-meant deſigns, it failed in his hands. It failed partly from mere ill fortune, to which ſpeculators are rarely pleaſed to aſſign that very large ſhare to which ſhe is juſtly entitled in all human affairs. The failure, perhaps, in part was owing to his ſuffering his ſyſtem to be vitiated and diſturbed by thoſe intrigues, which it is, humanly ſpeaking, impoſſible wholly to prevent in Courts, or indeed under any form of Government. However, with theſe aberrations, he gave himſelf over to a ſucceſſion of the ſtateſman of publick opinion. In other things he thought that he might be a King on the terms of his predeceſſors. He

flattered

flattered himſelf, as moſt men in his ſituation will, that he might conſult his eaſe without danger to his ſafety. It is not at all wonderful that both he and his Miniſters, giving way abundantly in other reſpects to innovation, ſhould take up in policy with the tradition of their monarchy. Under his anceſtors the Monarchy had ſubſiſted, and even been ſtrengthened by the generation or ſupport of Republicks. Firſt, the Swiſs Republicks grew under the guardianſhip of the French Monarchy. The Dutch Republicks were hatched and cheriſhed under the ſame incubation. Afterwards, a republican conſtitution was under it's influence eſtabliſhed in the empire againſt the pretenſions of it's Chief. Even whilſt the Monarchy of France, by a ſeries of wars and negotiations, and laſtly by the treaties of Weſtphalia, had obtained the eſtabliſhment of the Proteſtants in Germany as a law of the Empire, the ſame Monarchy under Louis the XIIIth, had force enough to deſtroy the republican ſyſtem of the Proteſtants at home.

Louis the XVIth was a diligent reader of hiſtory. But the very lamp of prudence blinded him. The guide of human life led him aſtray. A ſilent revolution in the moral world preceded the political, and prepared it. It became of more importance than ever what examples were given, and what meaſures were adopted. Their cauſes no longer

longer lurked in the receſſes of cabinets, or in the private conſpiracies of the factious. They were no longer to be controlled by the force and influence of the grandees, who formerly had been able to ſtir up troubles by their diſcontents, and to quiet them by their corruption. The chain of ſubordination, even in cabal and ſedition, was broken in its moſt important links. It was no longer the great and the populace. Other intereſts were formed, other dependencies, other connexions, other communications. The middle claſs had ſwelled far beyond its former proportions. Like whatever is the moſt effectively rich and great in ſociety, that became the ſeat of all the active politicks; and the preponderating weight to decide on them. There were all the energies by which fortune is acquired; there the conſequence of their ſucceſs. There were all the talents which aſſert their pretenſions, and are impatient of the place which ſettled ſociety preſcribes to them. Theſe deſcriptions had got between the great and the populace; and the influence on the lower claſſes was with them. The ſpirit of ambition had taken poſſeſſion of this claſs as violently as ever it had done of any other. They felt the importance of this ſituation. The correſpondence of the monied and the mercantile world, the literary intercourſe of academies; but, above all, the preſs, of which they had in a manner, entire poſſeſſion,

made

made a kind of electrick communication every where. The preſs, in reality, has made every Government, in its ſpirit, democratick. Without it the great, the firſt movements could not, perhaps, have been given. But the ſpirit of ambition, now for the firſt time connected with the ſpirit of ſpeculation, was not to be reſtrained at will. There was no longer any means of arreſting a principle in its courſe. When Louis the XVIth. under the influence of the enemies to Monarchy, meant to found but one Republick, he ſet up two. When he meant to take away half the crown of his neighbour, he loſt the whole of his own. Louis the XVIth could not countenance a new Republick: yet between that dangerous lodgment for an enemy, which he had erected, and his throne, he had the whole Atlantick for a ditch. He had for an outwork the Engliſh nation itſelf, friendly to liberty, adverſe to that mode of it. He was ſurrounded by a rampart of Monarchies, moſt of them allied to him, and generally under his influence. Yet even thus ſecured, a Republic erected under his auſpices, and dependent on his power, became fatal to his throne. The very money which he had lent to ſupport this Republick, by a good faith, which to him operated as perfidy, was punctually paid to his enemies, and became a reſource in the hands of his aſſaſſins.

With

With this example before their eyes, does any Adminiſtration in England, does any Adminiſtration in Auſtria really flatter itſelf, that it can creſt, not on the remote ſhores of the Atlantick, but in their view, in their vicinity, in abſolute contact with one of them, not a commercial but a martial Republick—a Republick not of ſimple huſbandmen or fiſhermen, but of intriguers, and of warriors—a Republick of a character the moſt reſtleſs, the moſt enterprizing, the moſt impious, the moſt fierce and bloody, the moſt hypocritical and perfidious that ever has been ſeen, or indeed that can be conceived to exiſt, without their own certain ruin?

Such is the Republick to which we are going to give a place in civilized fellowſhip. The Republick, which with joint conſent we are going to eſtabliſh in the center of Europe, in a poſt that overlooks and commands every other State, and which eminently confronts and menaces this kingdom.

You cannot fail to obſerve, that I ſpeak as if theſe powers were actually conſenting, and not compelled by events to the eſtabliſhment of this faction in France. The words have not eſcaped me. You will hereafter naturally expect that I ſhould make them good. But whether in adopting this meaſure

ſure we are madly active, or weakly paſſive, or puſillanimouſly panick ſtruck, the effects will be the ſame. You may call this faction, which has ſurprized the monarchy and expelled the proprietary, perſecuted religion and trampled upon law,—you may call this France if you pleaſe: but of the ancient France nothing remains but it's dangerous and central geography, it's iron frontier, it's ſpirit of ambition, it's audacity of enterpriſe, it's perplexing intrigue. Theſe and theſe alone remain; and they remain heightened in their principle and augmented in their means. All the old correctives, whether of virtue or of weakneſs, which exiſted in the old Monarchy, are gone. No ſingle corrective is to be found in the whole body of the new inſtitutions. How ſhould ſuch a thing be found there, when every thing has been choſen with care and ſelection to forward all thoſe ambitious deſigns and diſpoſitions, not to controul them? The whole is a body of ways and means for the ſupply of dominion, without one heterogeneous particle in it.

Here I ſuffer you to breathe, and leave to your meditation what has occurred to me on the genius and character of the French Revolution. From having this before us, we may be better able to judge on the firſt queſtion I propoſed, that is, How far nations, called foreign, are likely to be affected with the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed within that territory? I meant

I mean to proceed next on the queſtion of her facilities, from the internal ſtate of other nations, and particularly of this, for obtaining her ends: but I ought to be aware, that my notions are controverted.—I mean, therefore, in my next letter, to take notice of what, in that way, has been recommended to me as the moſt deſerving of notice. In the examination of thoſe pieces, I ſhall have occaſion to diſcuſs ſome others of the topics I have recommended to your attention.

This diſcuſſion, my Friend, will be long. But the matter is ſerious; and if ever the fate of the world could be truly ſaid to depend in a particular meaſure, it is upon this peace. For the preſent, farewell.


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