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A

CRITICAL INQUIRY

INTO THE

OPINIONS and PRACTICE

OF THE

Ancient Philosophers,

CONCERNING THE

Nature of the SOUL and a FUTURE STATE,
And their Method of teaching by the
DOUBLE DOCTRINE.

In which are examin'd
The Notion of Mr. JACKSON and Dr. SYKES
concerning these Matters.

With a PREFACE
By the Author of the DIVINE LEGATION, &c.

by Mr Towne 1-6

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D.

PREFACE.

THE following Sheets, written by a Gentleman whose Modesty would not suffer him to put his Name to them, were communicated to me as they came from the Press. As I have bidden adieu to Controversy, I was not displeased to find an important Truth so well defended. In endeavouring as I did, in the *Divine Legation*, to expose the *vain Babblings* of the *Greek* Philosophy, I imagined I had effectually served the Interests of Revelation, and vindicated the Censures of the Propagators of it. The great Characteristic of our holy Faith is the Doctrine of *Life and Immortality*. Now there were two great Errors (explained in the *Divine Legation*, and defended in the following Treatise) in the *metaphysical* Speculations of the *Greek* Philosophers, *concerning the Nature of GOD, and of the* SOUL, which necessarily kept them from giving Credit to a Doctrine, highly probable in itself, and rendered so, even by themselves, from many moral Considerations perpetually preached up by them to the People. But it was their ill Fate to be determined, in their Opinions, rather by *metaphysical* than *moral* Arguments. Hence we see the Reason that, whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at, the

Philosophers or Philosophy of *Greece*, which is not seldom, they always do it in Terms of Contempt and Abhorrence. On this Account I was neither ashamed nor afraid to shew at large, that the Reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor did I think myself at all concerned to manage the Reputation of a Set of Men, who, on the first Appearance of *Christianity*, most virulently opposed it by all the Arts of Sophistry and Injustice: " And when, " by the Force of its superior Evidence, they " were at length driven into it, were no sooner " *in* than they began to deprave and corrupt it. " For, from their *profane and vain Babblings*, " *Tertullian* assures us, every Heresy took its " Birth. *Ipsi illi* SAPIENTIÆ PROFESSORES, " *de quorum ingeniis omnis hæresis animatur* [a]. " And, in another Place he gives us their *Ge-* " *nealogy*. *Ipsæ denique Hæreses à* PHILOSO- " PHIA *subornantur*. *Inde Æones & formæ* " *nescio quæ, & trinitas hominis apud* Valenti- " num: PLATONICUS *fuerat*. *Inde* Marci- " onis *Deus melior de tranquillitate, a* STOICIS " *venerat*; *& uti anima interire dicatur, ab* " EPICUREIS *observatur*: ET UT CARNIS " RESTITUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA OM- " NIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA SUMI- " TUR: *Et ubi materia cum Deo æquatur*,

[a] *Adv. Marc.* l. i. The Author of a Fragment *concerning the Philosophers* going under the Name of *Origen*, says the same thing: ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς [Αἱρετικοῖς] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλήνων σοφίας λαβόντα, ἐκ δογμάτων φιλοσοφουμένων, καὶ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ ἐπικεχειρημένων καὶ ἀστρολόγων ἐμβαινόντων.

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"ZENONIS *Disciplina est: Et ubi aliquid de* "*igneo Deo allegatur,* HERACLITUS *inter-* "*venit. Eædem Materiæ apud Hæreticos &* "*Philosophos volutantur; iidem retractatus im-* "*plicantur. Unde malum, & quare? & unde* "*homo, & quomodo?* & quod proximè Valen- "tinus proposuit, unde Deus? *Scilicet & de En-* "*thymesi, Ectromate inserunt* ARISTOTELEM, "*qui illis Dialecticam instituit, artificem stru-* "*endi & destruendi, versipellem in sententiis co-* "*actam, in conjecturis duram, in argumentis* "*operariam, contentione molestam, etiam sibi ipsi* "*omnia retractantem, nequid omnino tractaverit.* "*Hinc illæ fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabi-* "*les, & quæstiones infructuosæ &* SERMONES "SERPENTES VELUT CANCER, *a quibus nos* "*Apostolus refrænans*[b], *&c.* One would al- "most imagine, from these last Words, that "*Tertullian* had foreseen that *Aristotle* was to "be the Founder of the *School Divinity.*"

He observes, that the Heresy which *denies the Resurrection of the Body* arose out of the whole School of *Gentile* Philosophy. But he omits another, which we have shewn in the *Divine Legation* stood upon as wide a Bottom, namely, that which holds *the human Soul to be of the same Nature and Substance with God*; espoused, before his time, by the *Gnostics*; and afterwards, as we learn, by the following Words of St. *Austin*, by the *Manichæans* and *Priscillians:* "Priscillianistæ, quos in Hispania "Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum

[b] *De præsc. adv. Hæret.* p. 70. 71. Ed. Par. 1580.

" & Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectan-
" tur. Quamvis et ex aliis hæresibus in eas
" sordes tanquam in sentinam quandam horri-
" bili confusione confluxerint. Propter occul-
" tandas autem contaminationes & turpitudines
" suas habent in suis dogmatibus, & hæc ver-
" ba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli. *Hi*
" *animas dicunt ejusdem naturæ atque substan-*
" *tiæ, cujus est Deus* [c]."— Why the *Heathen* Philosophers of our times should be so much displeased to see their ancient Brethren shewn for Knaves in Practice and *Fools* in Theory, is is not difficult to conjecture: But why any Friend to Revelation should be offended at the Force and Fidelity of the Drawing, I confess I cannot yet see. For a stronger Proof of the Necessity of the Gospel of *Jesus Christ* would be hard to find than what I have there given, That the *Sages of Greece*, with whom all human Wisdom was supposed to be deposited, had philosophized themselves out of the most evident and useful Truth with which Mankind hath any Concern. And what more honourable Regard could be shewn to the Authority of the Sacred Writers, than to justify their Censure of the *Greek Philosophy*, which both Deists and Fanatics have concurred to represent as a Condemnation of human Learning in general!

But as we have often seen Writers deceived in their Representations of *Pagan Antiquity*; and while zealously busy in giving *such* as they

[c] *Aug. de Hæresibus.*

ima-

imagined favourable to *Christianity*, they have been all the time dis-serving it: Left I too should be suspected to have fallen into the same Delusion, I shall beg leave to shew, that it is just such a Representation of *Antiquity* as is given in the *Divine Legation* which can possibly be of Service to our holy Religion. And that, consequently, if what we have there given be the *true*, it does much Service to it.

" This will best appear by considering the " two usual Views Men have had, and the " consequent Methods they have pursued, in " bringing in *Pagan* Antiquity into the Scene.

" Their Design has been either to illustrate " the *Reasonableness*, or to shew the *Necessity* of " *Christianity*.

" If the *first*, their Way was to represent " Antiquity, as comprehending all the funda- " mental Truths, concerning God and the Soul, " which our holy Religion hath revealed. But " as greatly as this Representation was supposed " to serve their Purpose, the Infidels, we see, " have joined Issue with them; and from their " own *Fact*, have endeavoured to shew, with " much Plausibility of Reasoning, that there- " fore *Christianity* was not *necessary*: And this " very Advantage, *Tindal* (under Cover of a " Principle, which some modern Divines seemed " to afford him, of *Christianity's* being only a " Republication of the the Religion of Nature) " obtained against some Writers of great Name.

" If their Design was to shew the *Necessity* " of *Christianity*, they have then taken the other

" Course,

" Course, and (perhaps, out of a Sense of the
" former Mischief) run into the opposite Ex-
" treme; in representing Antiquity as quite
" ignorant of the first Principles of Religion,
" and moral Duty. Nay, not only that it knew
" nothing, but that nothing could be known:
" For that human Reason was too weak to
" to make Discoveries in these Matters. Con-
" sequently, that *there was never any such thing*
" *as natural Religion:* And what Glimmerings
" of Knowledge Men had of this kind, were
" only the dying Sparks of primitive Traditi-
" on. Here again the Infidels turned their own
" Artillery upon them, in order to dismount
" that boasted *Reasonableness* of *Christianity*, on
" which they had so much insisted: And in-
" deed what room was there left to judge of
" it, after human Reason had been represented
" as so weak and blind?

" Thus while they were contending for the
" *Reasonableness*, they destroyed the *Necessity*;
" and while they urged the *Necessity*, they risk-
" ed the *Reasonableness* of *Christianity*. And
" these Infidel Retortions had an almost irre-
" sistible Force on the Principles our Advo-
" cates seemed to go upon; namely, *that Chri-*
" *stianity was only a Republication of a primitive*
" *Religion.*

" It appears then, that the only View of
" Antiquity which gives solid Advantage to the
" *Christian* Cause, is such a one as shews na-
" tural Reason to be *clear* enough to perceive
" Truth, and the Necessity of its Deductions

" when

" when *proposed* and shewn; but not generally
" *strong* enough to *discover* it, and draw right
" Deductions from it. Just such a View we
" have given of Antiquity, as far as relates to
" the Point in question; which we presume to
" be the *true*, not only in that Point, but like-
" wise with regard to the State of natural Re-
" ligion in general: Where we find human
" Reason could penetrate very far into the es-
" sential Difference of Things; but wanting the
" true Principles of Religion, the Ancients nei-
" ther knew the Origin of Obligation, nor the
" Consequence of Obedience. *Revelation* has
" discovered those Principles, and we now
" wonder, that such Prodigies of Parts and
" Knowledge could commit the gross Absurdi-
" ties, that are to be found in their best Trea-
" tises of Morality. Which yet does not hin-
" der us from falling into a greater and worse
" Delusion. For having seen of late several ex-
" cellent Systems of Morals, under the Title of
" *The Principles of natural Religion*, that dis-
" claim the Aid of Revelation, we are apt to
" think them indeed the Discoveries of natural
" Reason; and so to regard their Excellencies
" as an Objection to the *Necessity* of any farther
" Light. The Pretence is plausible; but sure,
" there must be some Mistake at Bottom; and
" the great Difference in point of Perfection,
" between these *imaginary* Productions of Rea-
" son, and those *real* ones of the most learned
" Ancients, will increase our Suspicion. The
" Truth is, these modern System Writers had
" Aids,

" Aids, which as they do not acknowledge, ſo, " I will believe, they did not perceive. Theſe " Aids were the true Principles of Religion, " delivered by *Revelation:* Principles ſo clear " and evident, that they are now miſtaken to " be amongſt our firſt and ſimpleſt Ideas: But " thoſe who have ſtudied Antiquity, know the " Matter to be far otherwiſe."

For, to conclude with the remarkable Words of *Cicero*, " Nam neque tam eſt acris acies in " naturis hominum & ingeniis, ut res tantas " quiſquam, niſi monſtratas, poſſit videre: ne- " que tanta tamen in rebus obſcuritas, ut eas " non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, ſi modo " adſpexerit."

Notwithſtanding all that can be ſaid, much Clamour will ever attend Novelties, tho' never ſo ſtrongly proved, and tho' never ſo well directed. But Truth ſeldom thrives the worſe for unreaſonable Oppoſition: And it would ſeem not to be far from its Eſtabliſhment, when ſuch Writers as the following appear in it's Defence. I could wiſh indeed he had had an Adverſary more worthy him: However, he has made the beſt of a bad Reaſoner. The Nature of his Deſign has confined him rather to confute Mr. *Jackſon's* Sentiments, than to explain his own; yet he hath eſtabliſhed thoſe he undertook to defend with ſuch Extent of Learning, and Force of good Argument, that I dare become reſponſible for all he ſays; and am willing that thoſe of my Opinions here debated, may ſtand or fall by the Strength or Invalidity of this Defence.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE OPINIONS and PRACTICE OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, &c.

THE learned Mr. *Jackson*, in his two late Pamphlets, has undertaken to attack several Parts of the *Divine Legation* [a]. As to the Merit of the first Piece, we have the following Account of it in his own Words: "I "have opposed many Paradoxes of this Author "[Mr. *Warburton*] advanced and supported, as he "thought, with much Learning. All which I have "confuted within a few Pages, and shewn to be "nothing but bold Assertions, destitute of Evi-"dence and Truth; and that with all his Glare

[a] The first of these Pieces is intitled, *The Belief of a Future State proved to be a Fundamental Article of the Religion of the* Hebrews; *and the Doctrine of the Ancient Philosophers concerning a* Future State, *shewn to be consistent with* Reason, *and their Belief of it* demonstrated.

The second is called, *A Defence of a Book intitled, The Belief of a Future State proved to be a Fundamental Article of the* Hebrews, *&c.*

"and Pretences, he has not ſhewed a Taſte of real "Learning in any one of all the Points he has "treated of." Again; "I could eaſily ſhew (if "it was worth while) the Weakneſs and Abſurdity "of every other Notion advanced in our Re-"marker's Writings [b]."

A complete Victory indeed! not to leave *one ſingle Truth* in the two Volumes. What will become then of thoſe Points which are maintained by Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf, in common with his learned Adverſary? Are the very ſame Notions plain and clear Truths in his own Writings, and yet *bold Aſſertions, deſtitute of all Evidence*, when found in the *Divine Legation?* Or is the learned Writer ſo deſperately enamoured and fond of Controverſy, that, rather than ſpare his Adverſary, he will even anſwer and confute himſelf?

"I could (ſays he) eaſily ſhew the Weakneſs "and Abſurdity of every other Notion advanced "in our Remarker's Writings." But, alas! this is no Time to talk of *new Conqueſts*; it may better become the learned Gentleman to review what is already paſt. However, I ſhall make no Exception to what he here ſays; I do really believe that he could confute every Poſition in the two Volumes, in as effectual a Manner as he has done any ſingle Point that he has hitherto attacked.

In the following Sheets I ſhall treat this Gentleman with all the Decency and Reſpect which are due to his Character in the learned World: If I differ from him with Regard to ſome ancient Facts, 'tis only becauſe he ſeems, to me at leaſt, to differ from Antiquity itſelf; 'tis only becauſe I cannot prevail with myſelf to embrace an Hypotheſis, however confidently aſſerted, when I find

[b] Pag. 51. 59. of the ſecond Piece, or *Defence*.

it contrary to plain Fact and the clear Testimony *of* the best Writers.

CHAP. I.

That the Philosophers did not invariably profess their Belief of a future State; and this Inconstancy of Profession shewn to be a Proof that they did not really believe it.

IN his first Piece the learned Writer undertakes to *demonstrate* that the Philosophers believed a future State. 'Tis Pity but he had given us his Demonstration in a more regular and exact Form. He brings several Passages, (p. 94, 5, 6, 7.) in which, according to him, the ancient Sages profess their Belief of another Life. But the Circumstance which he principally insists upon, is, *that they were constant and uniform in this Profession.* This he asserts in more than one Place; p. 73. speaking of a future State, he says, "Surely it "is very unreasonable to charge Men with Infi-"delity in a Point, which they *constantly* and *inva-"riably* profess to believe." Again: "The Phi-"losophers did undoubtedly believe, as well as "*constantly* profess a future State of Happiness "and Misery," p. 75. And it is remarkable that all his Testimonies are brought to prove this very Point. He ushers them in with these Words: "I "shall therefore add, for the more full Satisfaction "of the Reader, a few other Passages besides "those before set down in these Papers, to shew "their (the Philosophers) *constant Profession and* "*Belief* of this most important Doctrine of Reli-"gion." p. 94.

Upon what then does the learned Writer build his Demonſtration? Why, upon the *conſtant* and *uniform* Profeſſion of the Philoſophers upon this Subject. Hence he infers their real Belief of another Life; hence he thinks it as unreaſonable to charge them with Infidelity in this Point, as the moſt ſincere Believers of *Chriſtianity* itſelf, p. 99.

Had he repreſented them as various and inconſtant in their teaching on this Head; this, I preſume, would have greatly weakened the Force of what he calls his *Demonſtration*. To give it therefore the moſt plauſible Appearance, to ſet it off in the beſt Colours, he roundly affirms, that they were *uniform* and *conſtant*, fix'd and *invariable* in their teaching on this Point. Here then I readily join Iſſue with him, and take upon me to aſſert, that this *conſtant* and *uniform* Profeſſion is all a mere Invention of his own, contrived only to ſerve an Hypotheſis; that it has no Foundation in Truth or Hiſtory; that, to uſe his own Words, "'tis a "bold Aſſertion, deſtitute of Evidence and "Truth."

Let us examine it with regard to the School of *Pythagoras*. The learned Writer has mention'd two of his Followers, as really believing a future State, *Empedocles* and *Epicharmus*, p. 91. It is not my Deſign to diſpute with him, whether they profeſſed this Notion: The only Queſtion will be, whether they were fixed and ſettled, *conſtant* and *invariable* in the Profeſſion of it. The learned Gentleman muſt ſay they were; but then he muſt ſay it at the Expence of Truth; in direct Contradiction to the Voice of Antiquity, which plainly and evidently ſpeaks againſt him. *Plutarch*, in his fifth Book *De Placitis*, gives the following Account of the Doctrine of *Empedocles*. *Empedocles* held Death to be a Separation of the fiery

fiery Substance from the other Parts, *and therefore supposed that Death was common to the Soul and Body* [c]. The same Charge is fixed on *Epicharmus*, in Terms too strong to be possibly evaded: "It is evident that *Epicurus* stole his Principles "from the Poets. As to that famous Tenet of "his, that *Death is nothing to us*, he borrow'd it "from *Epicharmus*, who says, I neither look "upon the Act of dying, nor the State that suc-"ceeds it, as of any Consequence and Importance "to me." [d] The very Language of *Epicurus* himself. *Teles*, another Follower of *Pythagoras*, speaks strongly to the same Purpose. He considers Death as the very End and Period of our Being; compares the State which succeeds it to that which precedes our Birth. He thus addresses himself to one grieved and afflicted for the Loss of a deceased Friend. "You complain (says he) "that your Friend will never exist more; but "remember that he had no Existence ten thou-"sand Years ago, that he did not live in the "time of the *Trojan* War, nor even in much "later Periods. This, it seems, does not move "you; all your Concern is, because he never "will subsist for the future [e]." How would *Epicurus* have accosted his Friend on the same Occasion? Why, in the very same Language,

[c] Ἐμπεδόκλης τὸν θάνατον γεγενῆσθαι διαχώρισμον τῶν πυρώδους, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνεστάθη. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. c. 25.

[d] Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος φωρᾶται τὰ κράτιστα τῶν δογμάτων παρὰ ποιητῶν ἀνηρπακώς.—τὸν δὲ θάνατον, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἐπίχαρμος αὐτῷ προσμεμήνυκεν, εἰπών, ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τεθνᾶναι οὐ μοὶ διαφέρει. Sextus Empiricus ad Grammaticos, sect. 273.

[e] Stobæus Mor. Ecl. c. 106.

Respice

Respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas
Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.
Hoc igitur nobis speculum natura futuri
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique nostram.
Lucretius.

So much for *Pythagoras* and his Followers. The learned Writer undertakes to *demonstrate* their Belief of another Life: And for this he appeals to their *constant* and *invariable* Professions on this Head. But, in Opposition to this, we have shewn that they were far from being uniform and consistent in what they taught on this Point. Having therefore overturned the very Foundation on which he builds, we need give our selves no farther Trouble; we may now leave his pretended Demonstration to shift for itself, to provide for its own Support as it best may.

Let us go next to *Aristotle* and his Disciples: And here the learned Writer gives us but one Testimony, and that from the Piece *De Mundo*. "*Aristotle* says, Justice is always the Attendant "of God, to punish those who depart from the "divine Laws: Whoever therefore will be bles-"sed and happy (hereafter) ought immediately in "the Beginning of his Life to be Partaker of "her," p. 96. But does not Mr. *Jackson* know that this very Piece has been discarded and set aside, by Men of the first Name in the learned World, as not really belonging to *Aristotle*? Have not the two *Scaligers*, *Is. Casaubon*, *Salmasius*, *Dan. Heinsius*, *Gassendi*, with several other Critics of the first Rank, long since endeavoured to prove that it is no Treatise of his? And if others have declared for the contrary Opinion, yet surely the Point is not yet determined in their Favour, nor is the Book in Dispute commonly received

ceived as the Work of *Aristotle*. He introduces it thus, "*Aristotle* says." Would not any one now imagine that he appeals to some real and undoubted Work of *Aristotle?* As his Argument rests on this single Authority, would not any one have presumed it should have been so circumstanced, that no reasonable Exception could lie against it?

With Regard then to *Aristotle*, where has he proved his *constant Profession* of another Life? So far from it, he has not hitherto proved that that he ever professed it.

And as he has not yet proved, so we may, without Presumption, venture to affirm that he never will prove the Point in Question. He must first set aside the Authority of *Aristotle* himself. The following Passages will prove this, and therefore may serve to shew that he pursues a desperate Adventure, whenever he engages in an Undertaking of this Kind. *Aristotle* proposes it as a Problem, "Whether any Man can be happy after Death?" And asks, "Whether this would not be strange-"ly absurd, according to his own System, which "supposes that Happiness consists in Operation[f]." He tells us too, "that it may fairly be "disputed, whether the Dead are capable of any "Good or Evil." He here speaks with some Diffidence and Distrust, with more than one would expect from a Writer, who firmly and *constantly* believed another Life. But he afterwards throws off all Caution and Reserve. [g] "Death

[f] Ἆρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 10.

Μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας, εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. c. 11.

[g] Divine Legation, vol. 1. p. 391.

"(says

" (ſays he) is of all things the moſt terrible; for " it is the final Period of Exiſtence, and beyond " that it appears that there is neither Good nor " Evil for the dead Man to dread or hope." Would we know what ſeveral of his Followers thought of this Point, *Stobæus* ſhall inform us. Now he tells us very plainly, " that they ſuppoſed " the Soul to be a mere Quality; that it would at " Death be reſolved εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, or ſunk into a " State of Non-exiſtence [h]."

Let us come to the Stoics. And they too, we ſhall find, have often proclaim'd their Diſbelief of another Life, in the moſt abſolute and ſtrong Terms. The following Teſtimonies will prove this beyond all Exception; and ſo may ſerve to inform us, that the learned Author has all along been impoſing a fanciful Hypotheſis, as contrary to the Evidence of all Antiquity, as it is to the Principles of the *Divine Legation*. *Quid hoc eſt, inquam; tam ſæpe mors experitur me? Faciat: at ego illam jam diu expertus ſum. Quando, inquis? Antequam naſcerer. Mors eſt non eſſe: id quale ſit, jam ſcio. Hoc erit poſt me, quod ante me fuit. Si quid in hac re tormenti fuit, neceſſe eſt et fuiſſe, ante quam prodiremus in lucem. Atqui nullam ſenſimus tunc vexationem. Nos quoque accendimur &*

[h] Εἰ δὲ ὡς δύναμις ὑποκειμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ ἁρμονία λύρας ἢ τελειότης προαφίσταται τοῦ σώματος, ἐν τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἡ ψυχὴ προφθείρεται μὲν ὐδαμῶς, ὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ κινήσεως πρόεισιν ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ἀφίσταται ἀχρόνως καὶ ἄνευ φθορᾶς, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἐστι, ἀθρόως, οἷον ἀστραπῆς, ἐλλαμπύσης, ——— ΗΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΕΤΙΚΟΙ ΔΟΞΗΣ ΠΡΟΕΙΣΤΗΚΑΣΙΝ. Phyſ. Ecl. p. 116.

Grotius was ſo far from ſuſpecting that *Ariſtotle* believed a future State, that he puts him on the ſame Foot with *Epicurus* himſelf in this Reſpect. Speaking of this Doctrine, he ſays, " Gentes vero nullam habebant ea de re divinam Revelati- " onem. *Epicurus et Ariſtotles nihil ejus credebant.* Epheſ. ii. 12.

extin-

extinguimur, medio illo tempore aliquid patimur. Utrumque vero alta ſecuritas eſt. In hoc enim, mi Lucili, niſi fallor, erramus, quod mortem judicamus ſequi, quum illa & præceſſerit, & ſecutura ſit. Quicquid ante nos fuit, mors eſt. Quid enim refert utrum non incipias an deſinas, cum utriuſque rei hic ſit effectus, non eſſe? Seneca Ep. 55.

Brevis morbus & præceps alterutrum faciet, aut extinguetur aut extinguet. Quid autem intereſt, non ſit, an non ſim? utroque finis dolendi eſt. Ep. 79.

Illud potius admone, nullum mali ſenſum ad eum, qui periit, pervenire: nam ſi pervenit, non periit. Nulla, inquam, res eum lædit qui nullus eſt. Vivit, ſi læditur. Ep. 100 [i]. Strange Language from theſe *conſtant*, theſe *invariable* Teachers of another Life. Innumerable Paſſages might be alledged from *Seneca*, *Epictetus*, *Antoninus*, equally pertinent and ſtrong with thoſe already cited. To tranſcribe all the Declarations of the Stoics againſt a future State, would be to tranſcribe all their Writings. As far as I can at preſent recollect, their Declarations againſt it are more numerous than thoſe for it.

What now becomes of the *conſtant* and *invariable* Profeſſion, ſo often repeated by the learned Author? And no Wonder he ſhould often repeat it; 'tis the very Ground and Foundation, on which he labours to erect his projected Demonſtration. But as to this Ground and Foundation, as he has not yet eſtabliſhed it, ſo we may be certain that he never can eſtabliſh it. Antiquity plainly declares againſt him; and, while the Teſtimonies above cited are allowed to be genuine

[i] He goes on thus, *Utrum putas illi male eſſe, quod nullus eſt, an quod eſt adhuc aliquis. Atqui nec ex eo poteſt ei tormentum eſſe, quod non eſt: quis enim nullius ſenſus eſt? Nec ex eo quod eſt: effugit enim maximum incommodum mortis, non eſſe.*

and authentic, the Inference is plain and undeniable, *that the Ancients were not fixed and ſettled, conſtant and uniform in their Profeſſions for another Life.*

But to proceed: Should we then allow Mr. *Jackſon* that all the Teſtimonies, produced by him, to ſhew that the Philoſophers did profeſs the Doctrine of a future State, are ſtrictly and properly to the Purpoſe; what would he gain by it? All he could collect from thence is, that they ſometimes declared for another Life. But then let it be remember'd that they ſometimes did likewiſe declare againſt it. The real Fact therefore is, that they were very fickle and unſteddy, very various and inconſiſtent in their Profeſſions, I do not mean in their Opinions, on this Head. This is a certain and undoubted Fact, but never mentioned by the learned Mr. *Jackſon*. I am not indeed ſurpriſed that he did not mention it: For, in whatever Light it is viewed, it will furniſh an unanſwerable Argument againſt his own Hypotheſis.

As to theſe various and contradictory Accounts; they muſt either be charged to the Ficklenefs and Inconſtancy of Opinion in the ancient Sages; or to the Practice of the double Doctrine. If the learned Author imputes them to the firſt, he muſt allow that the Philoſophers were very wavering and unſettled, with regard to their Notions of another Life: He muſt hold that they often rejected, as well as that they often maintained this Doctrine; in ſhort, he muſt no longer tell us, That they *conſtantly* and *invariably* declared for it. And yet he undertakes to *demonſtrate* their Belief of a future State. But how can he do this, when his own Doctrine will oblige him to acknowledge, that they had no fixed

and

and ſettled Principles in this particular? All he can pretend to demonſtrate, is, that they ſometimes did believe it: But then, by the very ſame Arguments, his Adverſaries will be enabled to demonſtrate, in their Turn, that they ſometimes did not believe it.

But perhaps he may have Recourſe to the double Doctrine, in order to clear the Philoſophers from this Charge. Here then I deſire to know, whether the Paſſages above cited make part of the popular and external, or of the ſecret and internal Doctrine. He will undoubtedly give them to the ſecond [k]; and yet this very Conceſſion will of itſelf be ſufficient and effectual to overturn every thing he himſelf has ſaid, with regard to this Doctrine.

The ſecret Doctrine, he tells us, affects only the Circumſtances, and not the Reality of a future State; it excludes the popular and fabulous Accounts, but then it goes no farther; it does not remove and diſcard all future Rewards and Puniſhments whatſoever. Now the preſent Paſſages ſtrike much deeper; they repreſent Death as the very End and Extinction of our Being; they exclude every poſſible Mode and Notion of future Rewards and Puniſhments. The *Pythagoreans*, we ſee, give us the very Doctrine of *Epicurus*; and did *Epicurus* reject only the vulgar and poetical Accounts of another Life? Does not *Ariſtotle* ſtrike at the very Eſſence and Being of a future State, when he tells us, "that Death is the ultimate Period of our Being"? And the Stoics

k 'Tis allowed on all Hands, that the public Doctrine did inculcate future Rewards and Puniſhments; but it is evident that theſe Paſſages exclude them in the moſt clear and open Manner.

ſurely expreſs themſelves in as full a Manner as any of the reſt[1].

What ſhall we do then with theſe various and contradictory Accounts of the old Philoſophers? If they are ſuppoſed to deliver their real Sentiments in every Paſſage, it will be impoſſible to demonſtrate their Belief of another Life. In this Caſe it is evident that they could have no fixed and ſettled Principle, with regard to this Article. If they are ſaid to practiſe the double Doctrine, this will effectually overthrow every thing Mr. *Jackſon* has advanced on that Head.

How unlucky, then, was our Author, when he fixed on theſe Profeſſions, to prove that the Philoſophers believed another Life! He pretends, indeed, but we have confuted the Pretenſion, that they never varied in their Doctrine on this Point; that they always taught a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. The Teſtimonies abovementioned diſprove this, and ſo fully overthrow what he fondly calls his *Demonſtration.*

But we have done more; we have ſhewn that the very Principle, on which he builds, is entirely deſtructive of his own Scheme. He builds on the Profeſſions of the ancient Sages: Now theſe, when taken in their full Extent, will either prove, that they had no fixed and ſettled Principles, with regard to another Life; or, on Suppoſition that they had ſuch Principles, will ſhew that the ſecret

[1] *Nos quoque accendimur & extinguimur, medio illo tempore aliquid patimur. Utrunque vero alta ſecuritas eſt.——Brevis morbus aut extinguetur aut extinguet: in utroque finis dolendi eſt.—Admone nullum mali ſenſum ad eum qui periit pervenire.* Will any one pretend that theſe Expreſſions relate only to the common and popular Accounts of a future State? If they have any Meaning, they ſtrictly and properly exclude all future Rewards and Puniſhments whatſoever.

and

and internal Doctrine did really exclude all future Rewards and Punishments. And if the secret Doctrine did really and actually exclude all future Rewards and Punishments, it will not surely be denied that the Philosophers themselves did disbelieve them.

Again, as the Philosophers were thus various and inconsistent in their Declarations on this Head; this will furnish Matter for another Observation. If they firmly believed another Life, whence, let me ask, comes it, that they so often disclaim and disavow it? what Motive could they have to deny it, contrary to the real Sense and Conviction of their own Minds? I would not suggest that they always spoke their real Thoughts. I know very well that they held it lawful to lie, and deceive the People for the public Good. But this Principle could not operate in the present Case. As to the Notion of another Life, they deemed it to be of the utmost Use and Importance to Society [m]. Why then, I ask once more, *did they so often declare against it?* they must do this contrary to the Sense and Persuasion of their own Minds; they must do it, without any View to the public Good; they must indeed do it out of pure Wantonness, a Conduct, which one would not willingly ascribe to a set of serious and thinking Men; in a Matter which themselves held to be of the utmost Consequence. And yet Mr. *Jackson* must ascribe it to them, if he still insists that they

[m] *Diogenes Laertius* carries the Matter so far, as to say that *Plato* himself taught this Doctrine chiefly for its Utility and Use. l. iii. § 79, 80.

Ut aliqua in vitâ formido improbis esset posita, apud Inferos ejusmodi quædam illi antiqui supplicia improbis *constituta esse voluerunt:* Quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. *Cicero Orat.* iv. *in Catilin.*

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entertained a firm and conſtant Perſuaſion of another Life.

But to conclude this Article: If this Matter is to be tried by the common Rules of Logic; if no new Laws of judging are to be eſtabliſhed in Mr. *Jackſon*'s Favour; theſe oppoſite and contrary Profeſſions of the ancient Sages will be plain Proofs that they did not believe a future State. In this, I ſay no more than what is contained in that general Rule, which the Critics give us, to fix and determine the Meaning of Authors, when they ſpeak variouſly on the ſame Subject. *Quotieſcunque ſcriptor quiſpiam loquetur ex ſententia & conſuetudine vulgo recepta, non eſt ſemper putandus cum vulgo ſentire; præſertim ſi periculoſum ſit diſſenſum eâ in re teſtari; aut ambiguæ ſint locutiones*; ac ſi ab eâ ſententiâ *aut uſitatis formulis aliquando manifeſte recedat, tum vero* ex animi ſententia *loqui cenſendus erit.* Le Clerc, Ars Critica, vol. iii. p. 56. If this be a good Rule, the Profeſſions of the Philoſophers againſt a future State, will be ſtronger Proofs that they did not believe it, than their Declarations on the other Side will be that they did believe it; the firſt indeed will be ſufficient to ſhew that they did not believe it. So far therefore as we may judge by their Profeſſions, we have Reaſon to think that they did not hold this Notion; and yet, on the Strength of theſe very Profeſſions, the learned Gentleman undertakes to *demonſtrate* that they did hold it.

In the foregoing Chapter I have brought ſcarce any of the Teſtimonies cited by the Author of the *Divine Legation:* And that, to ſhew he did not collect the Paſſages he has quoted with Pains and Difficulty; to ſhew too, that the Profeſſions of the Philoſophers againſt a future State are far more

more numerous than the learned Writer I have to do with ſeems to have imagined.

So much for his general Demonſtration: Let us now deſcend to the particular Account of future Happineſs, which he gives us as really believed by the ancient Sages.

CHAP. II.

The State of future Happineſs, which Mr. Jackſon *gives us as believed by the Philoſophers.—That it has no Relation to the preſent Argument.—That this was the popular and external, not, as he ſuppoſes, the ſecret and eſoteric Notion of a future State.—That it was not really and actually believed by the Philoſophers themſelves.*

WHAT then is the Doctrine of future Rewards, which he gives us as really entertained by the old Philoſophers? Why, he tells us, their Notion was, "that the Souls of virtuous and "godly Men, after Death, reſided in ſome lumi-"nous Orb, which was the Manſion of their Hap-"pineſs, and where they enjoyed the Society of "celeſtial Beings and other holy Perſons who "had lived on Earth; and, by divine Knowledge, "Faith, and Virtue, were united to and had "Communion with God, and were bleſſed with "the Beatific Viſion of the divine Perfections." *Defence*, p. 8.

This is indeed a very fine and pompous Account of a State of future Happineſs; but then let it be remembered that this State of future Happineſs was

was to be enjoyed *in Heaven*; that *Heaven* is aſſign'd as the Region of all this future Bliſs and Glory: There needs no Pains to prove this; the learned Author himſelf, I dare ſay, will not deny it. He ſpeaks of *luminous Orbs*, *celeſtial Beings*, *beatific Viſion*.

I will throw together a few Paſſages of Antiquity, which may ſerve to give a more full and perfect Account of this future State; and at the ſame time ſhew that it is nothing to the Purpoſe of our preſent Queſtion.

Cicero ſpeaks much of this State; but then he ſpeaks of it as belonging only to Perſons of peculiar Excellence and Worth; to Men of ſingular and uncommon Merit. He ſpeaks "of certain "Seats in Heaven, which were aſſigned all thoſe, "who ſhould greatly diſtinguiſh themſelves in the "Service of their Country." Again, He gives it only to thoſe, *qui præſtantibus ingeniis* in vita humana *divina ſtudia* coluerunt. And, in another Place, *magnis & præſtantibus viris*[n]. *Lucan*, ſpeaking of theſe Abodes, ſays,

Quodque patet terras inter lunæque meatus
Semidei manes habitant, *quos ignea virtus*
Innocuos, vitæ patientes Ætheris imi
Fecit, & æternos animam collegit in ignes. L. ix.

To the Teſtimonies of *Cicero* and *Lucan*, I will next add that of *Joſephus*. *Titus*, in a Speech to his Soldiers, ſpeaks of this future Happineſs; but then he confines it to Heroes and Dæmons. "Who does not know (ſays he) that the Souls "of thoſe brave Men, who die in Battle, will be

[n] Omnibus qui patriam conſervarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum eſſe in cœlo definitum locum, ubi beati ævo ſempiterno fruantur. *Somn. Scip.* 3. 5. 7.

raiſed

" raiſed and exalted to the Regions of the pureſt " Æther, and there be ſtationed amongſt the " Stars? and that they themſelves will become " *Heroes* and *Dæmons* [o]?"

Seneca too mentions this future Happineſs; but then he mentions it in ſuch a Manner as plainly ſhews that he thought it peculiar to the Souls abovementioned. Speaking of one, whom he ſuppoſes to be raiſed and advanced to this very State, he ſays, *ad excelſa* ſublatus, *inter felices currit animas, accipitque illum cœtus ſacer, Scipiones Catoneſque*[p].—*Parens tuus, Martia, illic nepotem ſuum, quanquam illic omnibus omne cognatum eſt, applicat ſibi, nova luce gaudentem, &* vicinorum ſyderum *meatus docet.* I ſaid that he confined theſe Regions to the Souls abovementioned; and this is evident from the *Scipio's* and the *Cato's*, to whom he here gives it; it is evident too from the Confeſſion of *Lipſius* himſelf, who ſays, *Cordum loquentem inducit mortuum, & inter* Heroas [q].

Once more; *Cicero*, in his firſt *Tuſculan*, is very expreſs for this Diſtinction: He tells us, " That the *Caſci*, or old Inhabitants of *Italy*, did " not conceive Death to be a State of mere Ex- " tinction; they ſuppoſed it to be a Change or " Migration from one Life to another. They " thought that *Perſons of great and eminent* " *Qualifications would be raiſed and exalted* " *into Heaven*; while all the reſt were left " to grovel in theſe lower Regions." Amongſt thoſe to be thus exalted, he reckons *Romulus*,

o Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἐν παρατάξει ψυχὰς, σιδήρῳ σαρκῶν ἀπολυθείσας τὸ καθαρώτατον στοιχεῖον αἰθὴρ ξενοδόχων ἄστροις ἐγκαθιδρύει; δαίμονες δ' ἀγαθοὶ, καὶ ἥρωες εὐμενεῖς, ἰδίοις ἐκγόνοις ἐμφανίζονται. De Bello Jud. l. vi. 1.

p Ad Martiam, cap. ult.

q Phyſiol. Stoicorum, l. iii. Differ. 11.

 Hercules,

Hercules, *Bacchus*, the Sons of *Tyndarus* [r], &c. — We here again ſee that theſe Manſions of Bliſs and Immortality in *Heaven* were given only to Perſons of illuſtrious and uncommon Worth: The Liſt of Worthies juſt recited, proves this beyond all Exception. As for the reſt of Mankind, *i. e.* the Bulk of the Species, they were to be excluded hence and confined to the World below.

'Tis evident that theſe Paſſages relate to a State of future Happineſs in *Heaven*; but then 'tis equally evident that they do not conclude the Souls of good Men in general; that they confine theſe Seats of Bliſs and Glory to a few choice and ſelect Spirits; to ſuch as had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their public Services, or ſome way greatly contributed to the Advantages of human Life. To thoſe, according to *Cicero*, *qui patriam conſervarint*, *auxerint*, *adjuverint*; to *Romulus*, *Hercules*, and other Worthies of the ſame Claſs. *Lucan*, ſpeaking of theſe Seats, ſays, *Semidei manes* habitant; *Joſephus* declares in very expreſs and direct Terms, that theſe Regions were inhabited by *Dæmons* and *Heroes*. And, I preſume, we need not remark, that *the Bulk of good Men*, that virtuous and godly Souls *in general* are not to be ranked amongſt theſe.

[r] Itaque unum illud erat inſitum priſcis illis, quos *Caſcos* appellat Ennius, eſſe in morte ſenſum, neque exceſſu vitæ ſic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret.——Mortem non interitum eſſe omnia tollentem atque delentem, ſed quamdam quaſi migrationem commutationemque vitæ: quæ in *claris viris & fœminis dux in cœlum ſoleret eſſe*, *in cæteris humi retineretur*, *& permaneret tamen*. Ex hoc & noſtrorum opinione *Romulus in cœlo cum Dis agit ævom*,—& apud Græcos, indeque perlapſus ad nos, & uſque ad Oceanum, *Hercules* tantus & tam præſens habetur deus. Hinc *Liber* deus, Semele natus, eademque famæ celebritate *Tyndaridæ fratres*, *&c. Tuſc.* i. 12.

All

All I aim to prove, is, that the State of Happineſs, here deſcribed, was not to be ſhared by good Men in common; that it was confined to Souls of extraordinary and uncommon Worth. And if this be ſo, what becomes of Mr. *Jackſon*'s Argument? When the Author of the *Divine Legation* affirms, that the Philoſophers diſbelieved a State of future Happineſs, he means ſuch a State as was to include the Body of good Men; in which every virtuous and righteous Man was to be rewarded. The Queſtion then is, whether the Philoſophers held a future State of Rewards for good Men *in general*; and the learned Writer decides upon it, by ſending us to a State that belongs only to *the very Flower of this Order*. The Point is, whether *all* good Men were to be happy; and he, to ſupport the Affirmative, refers us to a State, that was not to be the Portion of *good Men in common*; but only of *a ſmall and ſelect Number*.

2dly, He very gravely affirms, that this was the ſecret and eſoteric Notion, in reſpect to future Happineſs. He may, if he pleaſes, believe this; but why ſhould he be ſo unreaſonable, as to expect that his Readers ſhould believe it too? Does not *Titus*, in the Paſſage juſt recited, mention this State of future Happineſs? But then he ſpeaks of it in the moſt public and open Manner; in a Speech addreſs'd to the Body of his Army. And would he upon this Occaſion have fetch'd his Arguments from the *ſecret* and *hidden* Doctrines of the Schools? Would he have inſiſted upon ſuch Topics, as the Bulk of his Audience had never before heard of? I may ſay, upon ſuch Topics, as, by Mr. *Jackſon*'s own Account, they were not capable of *receiving* and underſtanding:

for this is the very Character and Deſcription which he himſelf gives of the *ſecret Doctrine*.

Again; *Plato* ſays, "That Rewards ought to "be decreed to all who behave well in War; "that thoſe, who die in the Service of their "Country, ſhould be treated with particular "Marks of Honour and Reſpect; that, after "Death, they ſhould be conſidered as Dæmons "and Demi-Gods; as Guardians of Mankind, "who were to ſuperintend and preſide over this "lower World." And he afterwards ſubjoins, "That every one, who arrived at any exalted "and uncommon Pitch of Virtue, ſhould be in-"titled to the ſame Honour[s]."

He here tells us, that brave Men, and, indeed, all Men of ſingular Worth and Merit were to be raiſed and erected into *Dæmons:* there can then be no Queſtion but that he here ſpeaks of the State of future Happineſs in *Heaven*. But does he deliver this as a private and eſoteric Doctrine? The very End and Purpoſe of his Writing will not ſuffer us to believe this. His Deſign was to make Men uſeful Members of Society; to ſpur and incite them to acts of Heroiſm and uncom-

[s] Τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας, ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἆρ' ἃ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρύσου γένους εἶναι; πάντων γε μάλιστα. Ἀλλ' ἃ πειρόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ; ἐπειδάν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα,

Οἱ μὲν, δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν,
Ἐσθλοὶ, ἀλεξικακοὶ, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.

πειρόμεθα μὲν οὖν. διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ, πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι, καί τινι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ἢ ἀνεξηγηταί. τί δ' ἃ μέλλομεν; καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον, ὡς δαιμόνων, οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν τε καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας· ταῦτα δὲ ταύτῃ νομιοῦμεν, ὅταν τὶς γήρᾳ ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσι. De Rep. l. 5.

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mon Virtue. And how could his Doctrine be ſuppoſed to do this, unleſs it was taught and preached up to the World at large? And if it was taught and preached up to the World at large, the Inference is certainly juſt, that it was a public, and not a private Doctrine.

This too appears from the following Paſſage of *Cicero*. "It may be eaſily underſtood, that the "Reaſon, why moſt Cities proſecuted the Me-"mory of their valiant Men with divine Ho-"nours, was to ſpur up their Citizens to Virtue, "that every the moſt deſerving of them might "encounter Dangers with the greater Willingneſs "for the Sake of his Country. This was the "very Inducement the *Athenians* had to deify "*Erectheus* and his Daughters[t]."

We are here told of the Conſecration of dead Men, and the Reaſon of it. And does not this very Reaſon neceſſarily ſuggeſt that this muſt have been a public Notion? For what Impreſſion could it be ſuppoſed to make on the Body of the People? how could it be ſuppoſed to work them up to gallant and heroic Actions, if, like the *ſecret Doctrines* of the Schools, it was all the time abſolutely unknown to them?

Laſtly, we find that the Body of the People was really and actually poſſeſs'd of this very Doctrine. *Cicero* himſelf gives this Account of the *Caſci*, or the rude and barbarous Inhabitants of old *Italy*. "They did not, it ſeems, conſider "Death as the End and Deſtruction of their Be-

[t] *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 94. Atque adeo in pleriſque civitatibus intelligi poteſt, *acuendæ virtutis gratiâ*, quo libentius reipublicæ cauſa periculum adiret optimus quiſque, virorum fortium memoriam honore Deorum immortalium conſecratam: ob eam enim ipſam cauſam Erectheus Athenis filiæque ejus in numero Deorum ſunt. *Nat. Deor.* l. iii. 19.

"ing,

" ing, but as a Change and Migration to another " Life. They thought that Men of great and ſin- " gular Qualifications, that Perſons famous and " excellent in their Generations, would be raiſed " and exalted into Heaven; while all the reſt " were left to grovel in the World below." But now is not this here repreſented as a popular and common Notion? We are told that the very loweſt of the People were actually in Poſſeſſion of it. Now if this be true, as it certainly is, what poſſible Ground can there be for what the learned Writer ſo often repeats and aſſerts, *viz.* that this was a *ſecret* and *hidden* Doctrine, imparted by the Philoſophers to their Diſciples only, and carefully concealed from the Body of the People?

3dly, Let us now ſee whether the Philoſophers believed any thing of this State of future Happineſs. That we may be the better able to judge of this, let us attend to their own Account of it. They give it only to Perſons of illuſtrious and ſignal Worth; they talk much of *the Society and Aſſembly of the Gods*. And who, pray, after all, were theſe Gods? Why, certain Sons of Men, who, for their eminent Services to their Fellow-Creatures, were ſaid to be erected into a kind of Deities. *Plato* tells us, " That they were to be- " come Dæmons; that they were to receive di- " vine Honours; and exerciſe a Providence over " this lower World." *Cicero* too, in a Fragment of his preſerved by St. *Auſtin*, inſiſts much on the Divinity of *Romulus*, and brings a particular Argument to maintain and defend it[v]. And when he

[v] Magis eſt in Romulo admirandum, quod cæteri, qui Dii ex hominibus facti eſſe dicuntur, minus eruditis hominum ſæculis fuerunt, ut fingendi proclivior eſſet ratio, cum imperiti failce ad credendum impellerentur. Romuli autem ætatem minus his

he designed to consecrate his Daughter, he speaks in this Manner, " That as the Wisdom of the " Ancients had consecrated and deified many ex- " cellent Persons of both Sexes, whose Temples " were then remaining, the Progeny of *Cadmus*, " of *Amphitryon*, of *Tyndarus*; so he would per- " form the same Honour to *Tullia*, who, if any " Creature ever deserved it, was of all the most " worthy of it: I will do it therefore, says he, " and consecrate thee, thou best and most learned " of Women, *now admitted into the Assembly of the* " *Gods*, to the Regard and Veneration of all " Mortals[x]." These learned Ancients speak of the State of Happiness in Heaven; and what do they say of it? Why, a few excellent Persons are to be admitted to the *Society and Assembly of the Gods*. But then did the Philosophers themselves believe any thing of this *Society and Assembly of the Gods*, of which they have said so much? The very elegant and polite Writer of the History of the Life of *Cicero* says, " But it was not *Cicero*'s " real thought, after all, to exalt his Daughter into " a Deity; he knew it to be absurd, as he often " declares, to pay divine Honours to dead Mor- " tals; and tells us how their very Publicans had " decided that Question in *Bœotia*; for when the " Lands of the *immortal Gods* were excepted out " of their Lease, *by the Law of the Censors*, they " denied, *that any one could be deemed an immortal* " *God, who had once been a Man; and so made* " *the Lands of* Amphiaraus *and* Trophonius *pay* " *the same Taxes with the rest*. Yet in a political " View he sometimes recommends the Worship

his sexcentis jam inveteratis Literis, atque Doctrinis, omnique illo antiquo ex inculta hominum vita errore sublato fuisse cernimus. *De Civ. Dei*, l. xxii. 6.

[x] History of the Life of *M. Tullius Cicero*, vol. ii. p. 189.

" of

"of those Sons of Men, whom their eminent "Services to Mankind had advanced to the Rank "of inferior Gods[y]." *Sigonius* declares the same; whose Words are so very much to our Purpose, that I cannot forbear inserting them. "I do not "know (says he) but those learned Men are in "the right, who think that several excellent and "brave Persons have been consecrated and deified, "in order to incite Men to Acts of Heroism, "and that they may encounter Dangers with "more Readiness in the Service of their Coun-"try." And he adds, "That several Persons "were consecrated in Old *Greece* with this very "View[z]." And however this false *Cicero* may fail in other Points, there can be no Question, but that he here copies the true and real Sentiments of *Cicero* himself; who, in one of the Passages above cited, declares, that these Deifications were made, *acuendæ virtutis gratiâ*, quo libentius *reipublicæ causa* periculum adiret optimus quisque.

The Sum then of our Argument is this: The Philosophers mention a State of future Happiness in Heaven; they say, that some few excellent Persons shall be admitted into *the Society and Assembly of the Gods*. But then this *Society and Assembly of the Gods* was all a pure Fable and Fiction of their own. As therefore they believed nothing

[y] Ibid. p. 190.

[z] Atque haud scio an rectè senserint viri doctissimi, quorum ea fuit opinio, viros *claros & fortes idcirco deorum immortalium honore consecratos*, ut incitaretur virtus acrius, & acuerentur vehementius ad obeunda pericula, qui patriæ amore studioque tenebantur.—Quod optime agnovit & diutissime retinuit, omnium literarum præclara custos & altrix Græcia, quæ multos habet virtutis gratia factos ex hominibus Deos, quorum alios fatentur novos; alios multis jam sæculis receptos in cœlum, consecratosque contendunt. *De Consolatione*.

of

of the *Society and Assembly* into which these excellent Persons were to be admitted, 'tis impossible that they should believe any thing of the *Admission itself.*

Again; it is remarkable, the learned Gentleman every where allows that the Stories of the *Elysian* Fields were considered as mere Fictions; and here I cannot for the Life of me conceive, what it is which induces him to think that the State of future Happiness in Heaven was not viewed in the very same Light. For, let me ask him, whence does he conclude that the Philosophers believed nothing of *Elysium?* Is it because it made part of the popular and external Doctrine? Because 'tis sometimes mentioned as an Engine of Policy, contrived only for the Sake of Government? And does he think we will not say the same for the State of future Happiness in Heaven? Have we not indeed proved from History and real Fact, that this was the very Case of the last Doctrine?—But, perhaps, he may infer their Disbelief of *Elysium* from another Circumstance; from the *Fables* and *Histories* with which it is intermixed, and which, 'tis notorious and allowed on all hands, were not believed by the Philosophers themselves. For as to the *Judges of Hell, the Society and Assembly of the Gods* in the infernal Regions; these were considered by all Men of Sense as merely political, as invented only to keep the People in Order. But, pray, now does not this very Reason equally conclude against their Belief of the State of future Happiness in Heaven? The *Society* and *Assembly of the Gods*; their *Banquets, Entertainments*[a] and *Marriages*, are

[a] Illa autem Deorum vita, sive Apotheosis, gemino capite præcipuè continebatur: *Convictu Jovis, & Deæ alicujus conjugio.*

are the principal Circumſtances we find recorded of this State. But were not theſe as groſs and rank Fables, as any that were feigned of the *Elyſian Fields?* With regard then to the Philoſophers, we have proved their Diſbelief of this State of Happineſs in Heaven, on the very ſame Principles, and in the very ſame Manner 'tis uſual to prove their Diſbelief of *Elyſium:* Which the learned Writer, I am perſuaded, had ſaved us the Trouble of doing, had he not been unluckily miſled by the Ambiguity of Terms. *Elyſium*, in whatever Senſe you take it, is confeſſedly a fabulous and imaginary Place. But *Heaven*, in the Chriſtian Syſtem, being a Reality, the good Man did not reflect that, in the Pagan Theology; its Exiſtence was as viſionary as that of *Elyſium* itſelf; and the very ſame in *Greece* and *Italy*, as *Odin*'s *Hall* amongſt the Northern Nations.

Upon the Whole; could the learned Author prove that they believed a future State thus circumſtanced, yet I would not adviſe him to triumph too ſoon, leſt his Adverſaries ſhould reply that it is nothing to the Purpoſe, as it was not ſuppoſed to include the Body of good Men. If we add to this, that this Notion was merely popular and external; that it never was entertained by the Philoſophers themſelves; we ſhall, I dare ſay, hear no more of it; at leaſt in way of Oppoſition to the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*.

jugio. Sic apud Horatium, l. iv. od. 8. Herculis Divinitas inde ſtatuitur, quod, *Jovis intereſt optatis epulis impiger Hercules*. Idemque, ut notum eſt, Heben, juventutis Deam accepit in conjugem. *Ruæus in Virgil. Ecl.* iv. Dearum *connubio* & Deorum *convivio* dii efficiuntur. *Servius in Æneid.* i.

Tu mihi quodcunque hoc regni, tu ſceptra, Jovemque
Concilias; tu das *epulis accumbere Divûm*. *Æneid.* i.

Nec Deus hunc *menſâ*, Dea nec dignata *cubili* eſt. *Ec.* iv.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

That Mr. Jackſon, *in his firſt Piece, gives the Re-union of the Soul with God, as the only Notion of future Happineſs entertained by the old Philoſophers. His Account of it examined and confuted. That this Re-union and the State of Happineſs in Heaven, were conceived by the Ancients to be very different and diſtinct things.*

SO much for the State of future Happineſs in Heaven. And here I cannot but take Notice that the learned Writer himſelf gives a very different Account of this Matter in his firſt Pamphlet. He there tells us, " That the Re-union of the " Soul, or its Return to God, was conceived to " be the peculiar Recompence and Reward of " good Men after Death; he gives this as the " *only Notion* of future Happineſs, really believed " by the Philoſophers themſelves." Since then he lays ſo much Streſs on this Re-union, it may not be amiſs to conſider what he has advanced on this Head. He every where repreſents it as a State of the moſt *abſolute and perfect Happineſs* [b]. This would be very much to his Purpoſe, could he prove it. I do indeed find that he aſſerts it again and again; but alas! all theſe Aſſertions will not amount to one Proof. However, in Support of this Notion, he refers us to *Jamblichus*, p. 89, 90. This is the ſole Authority produced by him; and this, unluckily, in the preſent Caſe turns out to be no Authority at all. Does not

[b] Page 71.

Mr. *Jackſon* know that the Argument of the *Divine Legation* relates to the Sentiments of thoſe Philoſophers, who lived before our Saviour? "Such was the general Doctrine on this Point, "before the coming of Chriſtianity. But then "thoſe Philoſophers, who held out againſt its "Truth, new modelled both their Philoſophy "and Religion, making their Philoſophy more "religious, and their Religion more philoſophi-"cal: Of which we have given ſeveral occaſional "Inſtances in the Courſe of this Work. So "amongſt the many Improvements of *Paganiſm*, "the ſoftening this Doctrine was one; the mo-"dern *Platoniſts* confining the Notion *of the* "*Soul's being part of the divine Subſtance*, to thoſe "of Brutes. *Every irrational Power*, ſays Por-"phyry, *is reſolved into the Life of the Whole.* "And it is remarkable that then, and not till "then, the Philoſophers really began to believe "the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and "Puniſhments." (*Divine Legation*, vol. i. p.430.) When the Queſtion is thus plainly confined to the Period before our Saviour, why are we referred to *Jamblichus*, who lived ſo long after it? This ſurely looks like Diſtreſs. For why this *poaching* in *unlicenſed Authors*, if the Gentleman could have ſtarted his Game like a fair Sportſman? But let him anſwer directly to this plain Queſtion; were the Doctrines of the Philoſophers the ſame, in the Days of *Jamblichus*, as in the times before our Saviour?—Were the Notions of the human Soul the ſame in theſe two Periods? It is certain that he muſt anſwer in the Negative; and what clearer Proof can there be than this, that the Teſtimony of *Jamblichus* is of no Force in the preſent Queſtion?

It may be ſaid that I conſider the Re-union of the Soul, and the State of Happineſs in Heaven, as different and diſtinct things; whereas the learned Writer I have to do with, all along ſuppoſes that they were one and the ſame State. —I believe he does; however, I chuſe rather to follow the Ancients, who always conſidered them as very ſeparate and diſtinct things, than this great Modern, who hath been pleaſed to mix and confound them. *Seneca* ſays, *Magnus animus deo pareat, & quicquid lex univerſi jubet ſine cunctatione patiatur; aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius, tranquillius* inter divina manſurus, *aut certe ſine ullo futurus incommodo.* Naturæ ſuæ remiſcebitur & revertetur in totum *. It will not be denied that the firſt Part relates to the State of Happineſs *in Heaven*, and the ſecond to the Refuſion of the Soul. But then are they not plainly and directly oppoſed to each other? muſt they not therefore have been conſidered as very ſeparate and diſtinct States?

The ſame Author, in another Place, confirms the ſame thing: He ſpeaks of the Bliſs and Happineſs of Heaven, but then he ſpeaks of it, as previous to the Refuſion of the Soul [c]. *Nos quoque* felices animæ & æterna ſortitæ, *cum deo viſum erit iſta iterum moliri, labentibus cunctis, & ipſi parva ruinæ ingentis acceſſio,* in antiqua elementa vertemur; or, as *Lipſius* on the Place ſays, ſhall be reſolved into *the univerſal Soul* [d]. There can ſurely be no Queſtion but theſe were thought to be different and diſtinct States, as the one was ſuppoſed both oppoſite to, and prior to the other. The Reunion was to begin at the very Time, when the State of Happineſs in Heaven was conceived to end.

* Epiſt. 72.

[c] Cap. ul. ad Martiam.

[d] Animæ igitur tunc omnes iterum ad mundi animam, i. e. ad Jovem——reſolvuntur. *Phyſiol. Stoicor. l.* iii. *c.* 11.

Again;

Again; Mr. *Jackſon* gives the Re-union to the Souls of good Men in general: But I have proved that the State of Happineſs *in Heaven* was reſerved only for Men of great and exalted Merit; for thoſe, whoſe eminent Services to Mankind had raiſed and advanced them above the reſt of their Fellow-Creatures.

Having eſtabliſhed this Difference, let us now ſee how it affects our preſent Queſtion. The learned Author, in his *firſt* Piece, ſends us to the Re-union, as *the only Notion* of future Rewards, really entertained by the old Philoſophers. In the *ſecond* he refers us to a State of Bliſs and Happineſs *in Heaven*, as the *only Doctrine* really believed by them. Did he then conceive theſe to be one and the ſame State? If he did; he may probably, by this time, be convinced that he was miſtaken.

Did he conceive them to be ſeparate and diſtinct States? If he did, the Doctrine of his firſt and ſecond Pieces, are directly oppoſite and contradictory to each other. In the firſt, the Philoſophers ſuppoſed all future Happineſs to conſiſt barely in the Re-union of the Soul. In the ſecond, they believed a State of Happineſs in Heaven, diſtinct from this Re-union.

Let us juſt recapitulate the real State of the Queſtion: The learned Writer pretends to give us the *only* Notion of future Happineſs actually believed and entertained by the Philoſophers themſelves. By this Means he brings the Diſpute between us into a narrow Compaſs: For in this Caſe, what have we to do, but to conſider this very Doctrine; to examine into the real State of it; and as it does not appear from hence that the Philoſophers believed a State of future Happineſs, it follows of Courſe, from his own Principles, that we

we have hitherto no Proof, that they believed any future Rewards whatſoever.

CHAP. IV.

That the Philoſophers did not believe a future State of Puniſhments.

LET us come now to that Part of the Queſtion, which relates to their Belief of future Puniſhments. And here I ſhall confine myſelf to one ſingle Argument: It has been indeed before mentioned in the *Divine Legation*; and, from its being yet unanſwered, I ſhall not ſcruple to affirm, that 'tis effectual, and deciſive of the Point in Queſtion. It is grounded on a Paſſage of *Cicero*, where he declares, *that the common and popular Accounts of another Life were the only Foundation and Support of future Puniſhments.* Now it is allowed, even by Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf, that the Ancients did not believe theſe common and popular Accounts: And therefore, with his Leave, I would conclude, *upon the Authority of* Cicero, that they believed no future Puniſhments whatſoever.

But let us review the Paſſage: It is taken from the Oration for *Cluentius*. *Nam nunc quidem, quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? Niſi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ut exiſtimemus illum apud Inferos impiorum ſupplicia perferre, &c. Quæ ſi falſa ſunt,* ID QUOD OMNES INTELLIGUNT, *quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter ſenſum doloris?* Our Argument ſuppoſes that theſe common Stories were the only Foundation and Support of future

ture Punifhments. And does not *Cicero* himfelf fuppofe the fame? "If thefe (fays he) are falfe, "as all Men fee they are, what has Death de-"prived him of befides *a Senfe* of Pain?" Does not this Reafoning evidently fuppofe that there was a neceffary Connexion between thefe popular Fables, and the Doctrine of future Punifhments? If then a future State was not believed under thefe Reprefentations, is it not manifeft that it could not be believed at all?

And here let me afk, what has the learned Writer faid to this Argument of the *Divine Legation?* Why, not one Syllable. But will not every Reader reflect on what he fhould have faid? He may perhaps tell us, that it was too trivial to deferve his Notice; but he muft excufe me, if I afcribe his Silence to a very different Caufe. This is not his ufual Way of managing Objections, whenever he but dreams he can anfwer to the Purpofe.

But, to refume our Argument: The learned Author allows that the Ancients did not believe the vulgar and poetical Accounts of future Punifhments; and I afk no more to prove *that they believed no future Punifhments at all.*

The Queftion then is, whether the Ancients had any Notion of future Punifhments, not founded on the Fables of the Populace; whether they had any Conception of feparate and diftinct Punifhments, in which the Stories of *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*, had nothing to do. The Author of the *Divine Legation*, in Support of the Negative, brought the Paffage from *Cicero* abovementioned; I will here point out fome other Teftimonies, in which the very fame thing has been maintained and afferted by other Writers of Antiquity. *Cogita nullis defunctum malis affici. Illa, quæ nobis*

Inferos faciunt terribiles, fabula est. Nullas imminere mortis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amnem, nec tribunalia, nullos in illa reos libertate tam laxa, nullos iterum tyrannos. Mors omnium dolorum solutio est & finis. Ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt[e].

The Dead, we see, were subject to no Pain and Misery; and why? because the vulgar Accounts of another Life were fabulous and false. Is it not evident from hence, that these were the only Foundation and Support of future Punishments? Otherwise why might not the Dead be subject to Pain and Misery, tho' these Stories were false and groundless?

[f] *Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: Multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingeniis certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer Infernus, & perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua*

——— ingens Janitor orci,
Ossa super recubans antro semesa cruento,
Æternum latrans, exangues terreat umbras.

Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit alius metus, æque enim timor ne apud Inferos sint, quam ne nusquam. He here mentions the poetical and fabulous Accounts of another Life; if these were false, the Consequence, you see, was that there could be no future Punishments at all. *Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse,* nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant.

Again: *Non sum tam ineptus ut Epicuream cantilenam hoc loco persequar, & dicam, vanos esse Inferorum metus, nec Ixionem rota volvi, nec saxum*

[e] Seneca ad Martiam, c. 19.
[f] Seneca Ep. 83.

 humero

humero Sisyphi trudi in adversum, nec ullius viscera & renasci posse quotidie, & carpi. Nemo tam puer est ut Cerberum timeat, &c.—*Mors nos aut consumit, aut exuit. Emissis meliora restant, onere detracto: Consumptis nihil restat, bona pariter malaque submota sunt* [g].

If there was no *Cerberus*, the Soul must either be extinguished, or raised to a State of Happiness. But why so, if there were future Punishments in Store, which did not derive their Credit and Authority from the common Fables?

Cicero, in his first *Tusculan*, undertakes to confute the Doctrine, *which makes Death an Evil.* But then, in this Confutation, he confines himself to two Points; the Notion of infernal Torments, and the Mortality of the Soul. The last, he tells us, is a State of Non-existence, and not attended with any positive and real Misery; *and the first was a pure Fiction.* Hence he infers that Death was no Evil. What a ridiculous and absurd Inference had this been, if there had been any Notion of positive and real Punishments besides those taught the Populace? *Tusc.* i. c. 5, 6, 7, 8.

My Reasoning stands thus: As *Cicero*, in this very Book, undertakes to answer all the Arguments, which could be brought to prove that Death is a real Evil; it was his Business to open and explain the several Circumstances, which were supposed to make Death an Evil. Now it is remarkable that he confines himself to the Doctrine of infernal Torments, and the Mortality of the Soul. Hence I conclude that he knew of no single Circumstance besides, that could make Death terrible or frightful to Mankind.

But tho' he has only disproved the common and popular Accounts of future Punishments, he

g Seneca, Ep. 24.

yet

yet ventures to affirm, that Death could not be a State of Misery and Sorrow. *Quid, hoc dasne aut manere animos post mortem, aut morte ipsa interire? A. Do vero*; quod si maneant, beatos esse concedo; *sin intereant, non esse miseros, quoniam ne sunt quidem.* c. 11.

The learned Doctor *Davies* confirms what I have here said, that all future Punishments are rejected in the Passage just cited. And, upon the Place, he observes, *ita argumentati sunt Ethnici, quod Poetarum dicta de pœnis apud Inferos pro nugis habuerint, They rejected all future Punishments.* And what was the Reason of this? The learned Critic tells us, it was *because they disbelieved the poetical and fabulous Accounts of another World.*

I will next give a Testimony, as I find it cited in the *Divine Legation*, tho' not immediately to the Purpose of my present Argument; for this, like many other Passages there quoted, may serve to illustrate and support more than one Part of that incomparable Work. 'Tis brought from *Epictetus*, who, speaking of Death, says, "But "whither do you go? No where to your Hurt: "You return from whence you came: To a friend-"ly Consociation with your kindred Elements: "What there was of the Nature of Fire in your "Composition, returns to the Element of Fire; "what there was of Earth, to Earth; what of "Air, to Air; and of Water, to Water. *There "is neither Hell, Acheron, Cocytus*, or *Pyriphlege-"thon.*" Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 292.

"Upon Death you go no where to your Hurt: "And why? because there is no Hell, Acheron, "Cocytus, or Pyriphlegethon." If therefore these were removed, all future Punishments were supposed to be removed with them.

The ſame thing is confirmed by thoſe celebrated Lines of *Ovid*,

O Genus attonitum ſtolidæ formidine mortis,
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, & nomina vana timetis,
Materiem vatum, falſique pericula mundi?
Morte carent animæ, ſemperque, priore relictâ
Sede, novis domibus vivunt, habitantque receptæ.
Met. L. xv.

'Tis the Deſign and Purpoſe of *Pythagoras*, who here ſpeaks, to teach Men to deſpiſe the Terrors of Death; and he thinks it ſufficient for this Purpoſe, to arm them againſt the Fears of *Styx*, *Acheron*, *&c.* A plain Proof, he had no Conception of any future Puniſhments beſides the popular ones.

Here then I could wiſh Mr. *Jackſon* would reflect that his Argument is levelled at the learned Ancients above mentioned, as well as at the Author of the *Divine Legation*. For what has Mr. *Warburton* done more than repeated the Inference, which they had before made? Now if this Reaſoning be juſt and logical in their Writings; how happens it to commence at once ridiculous and abſurd, when transferred into the *Divine Legation?* Has he or his Books ſo malignant an Influence as to poiſon and blaſt every thing, which comes within their Reach?

But, whatever the Ancients themſelves ſay, Mr. *Jackſon* inſiſts that they had a Notion of future Puniſhments ſeparate and diſtinct from thoſe taught the Populace. If this was the true and real Sentiment of Antiquity, whence comes it, that it eſcaped the Notice of the learned Writers above cited? They give us the common Fables as the *ſingle*, the *only* Support of future Puniſhments. They muſt therefore have been entire Strangers to the

the Doctrine, which the learned Writer would obtrude upon us as their own. Wherever therefore he got this Notion, we may be certain that he had it not from Antiquity: And if he did not draw it from thence, we need not be ſolicitous how he came by it.

But to cloſe this Article: What has been ſaid is, I think, ſufficient to confute all the learned Gentleman has advanced on this Head; and that by the moſt effectual and deciſive way of Confutation, the plain and neceſſary Conſequences of his own Principles. He allows that the Ancients did not believe the *common and popular* Doctrine of future Puniſhments; and I have ſhewn, *upon their own Authority*, that they had *no other* to believe. With his Permiſſion therefore, I would conclude that they believed no future Puniſhments at all.

CHAP. V.

That the Stoics *did not believe a future State.*

IT would take up more time than all the Oppoſition to this part of the *Divine Legation* deſerves, to examine the various and particular Opinions of all the Philoſophers with Regard to a future State: I will therefore confine myſelf to that Sect, which was the moſt famed for the Study of Logic and Morality of any in the ancient World; I need not ſay that I mean the *Stoics*. And here I ſhall proceed in the following Order. I will firſt conſider the Teſtimonies alledged by the learned Writer, to prove that the *Stoics* did believe another Life.—I will next ſhew, from his own Principles, that they neither did nor could believe it.

In

In his Teſtimonies Mr. *Jackſon* inſiſts much upon the Notion of a general Renovation; he gives it as a clear and certain Proof, that the *Stoics* really believed a future State. To this Purpoſe he urges the following Words of *Chryſippus*. "It was the Opinion of the *Stoics*, that it was by "no Means impoſſible (*i. e.* that it was proba-"ble) that, after Death and ſome determined Pe-"riods of time, we ſhall be reſtored again to the "ſame State in which we now are."

Again: "After the general Conflagration, the "*Stoics* believed a new State of things would fol-"low, and a Reſtoration of all things (Men, A-"nimals, *&c.*) which had exiſted before to a new "State of Life and Being. This made ſome "Chriſtian Writers think that the Opinion of the "*Stoics* was not much different from the Chriſtian "Doctrine of the Reſurrection."

Before we enter upon this Argument, it will be neceſſary to ſay ſomething of thoſe Changes and Revolutions of Nature, ſo often mention'd by the *Stoics*. They held then that the preſent Frame of Things would ſubſiſt for a certain Period of time; at the Concluſion of which it was to be diſſolved and conſumed by a general Conflagration. But, after the Deſtruction of the preſent World, another was to riſe up in its Stead; this was to remain for a fixed and ſtated time, was after that to be diſſolved, and ſucceeded by a new one. Thus a Series of Worlds were to revolve in a regular and ſucceſſive Order; the Duration of each was limited to a certain Age, beyond which it could not paſs. The preſent Queſtion is confined to the next Revolution, or that new World, which, after the Diſſolution of the preſent, was to be reared up and erected in its Stead. Mr. *Jackſon* preſents us with this new

State

State of things, in order to confirm and eſtabliſh his Opinion, that the *Stoics* believed the Doctrine of another Life; as if this Doctrine was plainly and neceſſarily contained in the Notion of the general Renovation. I, for my part, can find, in this Renovation, no Strokes, no Reſemblance of the religious Doctrine of a future State. Firſt,

Antiquity gives us two very different Accounts of this Matter. We are ſometimes told that this new World was to be ſtocked and repleniſh'd *with the very ſame Men*, who had before lived in this. But then there are Writers, who endeavour to perſuade us, that the Inhabitants of this new World were to be as freſh and new as the World itſelf; that they were not the ſelf ſame Perſons, who had lived before in this, but others, who were to reſemble them in a very particular and exact Manner. We need not ſtay to determine which of theſe Accounts is moſt authentic; for whichever Way the Queſtion is decided, whichever of the two Opinions is allowed this learned Writer to make his beſt of, we ſhall be enabled effectually to overthrow every thing he has advanced on this Head. Firſt, there are Authors who tell us, that the Inhabitants of the old World were not to be reſtored at the general Renovation; but that the new Scene was to be filled and occupied by a new Race of Men. " The *Stoics* " ſuppoſe theſe Revolutions not only with regard " to Mankind, but even the Gods and immortal " Beings. For after the general Conflagration, " which has happen'd an infinite Number of " times in paſt Ages, and will happen as often " hereafter, the ſame Face and Order of things, " from the Beginning to the End, has been, " and ever will be preſerved. Now the *Stoics*, " endeavouring to remove this Abſurdity, ſay

" that

"that the Persons, who are to live in these "future Revolutions, will bear the most near "and strict Resemblance to those who lived in "the preceding ones. It was not the same *So-* "*crates*, who was to appear and rise again, but "some one exactly like him,—he was not to "marry the same *Xantippe*, but one, who was "to resemble her most exactly in all her good "Qualities; he was not to be accused by the "same Sycophants *Anytus* and *Melitus*, but by "others of the very same Stamp and Cha- "racter [h]."

Stoicis tamen non eadem quæ nunc sunt *renascitura*, *sed illis* similia tantum (*non* eundem, *verbi gratia*, Socratem, *sed huic* & virtute & fortuna geminum) *videtur potius placuisse* [i].

If now we admit this Opinion, which assigns this new World to different Men; the learned Writer will never be able to prove from hence, that the *Stoics* believed another Life, or that they held a future State, in which Men were to be rewarded, and punished in Proportion to the Merit and Demerit of their Actions in the present Life. For the Doctrine of a future State supposes that *the self same Persons* are to appear again in the next World; but the *Stoics* assign this new World to *different Per-*

[h] Στωϊκῶν οἱ πλείους ὁ μόνον τὴν τῶν θνητῶν περίοδον τοιαύτην εἶναι φασὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς θεῶν· μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἐκπύρωσιν ἀπειράκις γενομένην, καὶ ἀπειράκις ἐσομένην, ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους πάντων γέγονέ τε καὶ ἔσται· πειρώμεοι μέντοι θεραπεύειν πῶς τὰς ἀπεμφάσεις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως, ἀπαραλλάκτους φασὶν ἔσεσθαι κατὰ περίοδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων περιόδων πάντας· ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης πάλιν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀπαραλλακτός τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων ἀπαράλλακτον τὴν Ξανθίππην, καὶ κατηγορηθησόμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαραλλάκτων Ἀνύτου καὶ Μελίτου. Origenes contra Celsum, l. iv. Ed. Spen.

[i] Annotationes D' Acerianæ in Mar. Antonin. l. x. c. 31.

sons.

ſons. They ſtrike therefore at the very Eſſence and Foundation of another Life; they cut off all Poſſibility of Rewards and Puniſhments, as they do not introduce the *ſame Perſons* into this new State. So much for the Diverſity of Perſons. But let us now ſuppoſe that the very ſame Perſons were to revive and appear again; and then let us ſee whether this might be conſidered as a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. When we ſpeak of ſuch a State, we mean a State, which is to rectify the Diſorders, and correct the Inequalities of the preſent Life; where good Men are to be happy, and the wicked miſerable. But was this the Caſe in theſe future Revolutions? The very contrary. The Righteous were to ſuffer, and the Wicked to flouriſh and triumph, juſt as they do on this Side the Grave. Thus, "*Socrates* was "at the next general Revolution to live again in "the very ſame Circumſtances,—to be born of the "ſame Parents, to be educated in the ſame City, "to apply himſelf to the ſame Studies, and to "undergo the ſame matrimonial Diſcipline. He "was to be accuſed by the ſame Sycophants; con-"demned by the ſame Judges, and then to ſubmit "to the ſame Fate [k]."

This general Reſtoration is deſcribed by *Nemeſius* in much the ſame Manner. He ſays, "that "at a certain Period the World would be de-"ſtroyed: That it would be afterwards reſtored,

[k] Origenes contra Celſum, l. v. p. 244, 5. Φασὶ τῇ ἑξῆς περιόδῳ τοιαῦτα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ Σωκράτην πάλιν Σωφρονίσκου υἱὸν καὶ Ἀθηναῖον ἔσεσθαι.——Καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλιτος ἀναφήσονται, πάλιν Σωκράτους κατήγοροι, καὶ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ καταδικάσεται τὸν Σωκράτην.—And he adds, that *Phalaris* and *Alexander* were to riſe again at this general Renovation, and to exerciſe the very ſame Acts of Tyranny and Cruelty, as they had done before.

" that all things would happen in the very ſame
" Order as they had done before: That *Socrates*
" and *Plato*, and every one elſe, would be again
" called into Being, live with the very ſame
" Friends and Citizens, and in every Particular
" meet with the ſame Adventures: That this
" Reſtitution was not to be made once only, but
" often; that it was to be repeated at certain Pe-
" riods, without End, and to all Eternity: That
" the Face of things would be no ways diverſified
" and changed, not even with regard to the moſt
" particular and minute Circumſtance. Some (he
" ſays) pretend that the Chriſtians borrowed their
" Notion of another Life from this Doctrine:
" But (he adds) *they are groſsly* miſtaken. For the
" Scriptures teach that the Dead will be *once* re-
" ſtored to Life; and not that this will be re-
" peated at certain Periods[1]."

And *Tatian* gives much the ſame Account:
" We muſt reject the Doctrine of *Zeno*, which
" teaches, that, after the general Conflagration,
" the ſame Men will appear again, and be in-
" gaged in the ſame Actions.—*Anytus* and *Meli-*
" *tus* will again accuſe the Innocent; *Buſiris* will

[1] Cap. 38. Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου.—Ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γενόμενον ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι· ἔσεσθαι πάλιν Σωκράτην, καὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειριεῖσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν, καὶ κώμην, καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι· γίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τοῦ παντὸς οὐχ ἅπαξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις. μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποκαθίστασθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς τοὺς μὴ ὑποκειμένους τῇ φθορᾷ ταύτῃ παρακολουθήσαντας μιᾷ περιόδῳ γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτης πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἑξῆς περιόδοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ξένον ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τὰ γενόμενα πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὡσαύτως ἀπαραλλάκτως ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων. καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν, φασί τινες τοὺς χριστιανοὺς τὴν ἀνάστασιν φανταζεσθαι πολὺ πλανηθέντες· εἰς ἅπαξ γὰρ τὰ τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ οὐ κατὰ περίοδον ἔσεσθαι, τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δοξάζει λόγια.

" again

" again ſacrifice Strangers, and *Hercules* will un-
" dergo his former Labours [m]."

And what was all this but a Revival of the old Scene, a bare Repetition of the former Life without any the leaſt Difference in the moſt particular and minute Circumſtance? The Identity of the Perſon will not therefore contribute much to ſupport the Conformity which is here ſuppoſed between the Stoical Doctrine of a general Renovation, and the common Notion of a future State. If it be the ſelf ſame *Socrates*, who is to appear and riſe again; let it be remember'd that he is to marry the ſelf ſame *Xantippe*, to be arraigned by the ſame Sycophants, and to be condemned by the ſame Judges. No Glympſe or Shadow of any Retribution: Happineſs and Miſery are to be diſpenſed in the ſame unequal Meaſure as they are at preſent.

The very Paſſage produced by Mr. *Jackſon* from *Chryſippus*, in Support of his own Notion, will of itſelf prove this. " It was the Opinion of " the *Stoics*, that after Death and ſome deter-" mined Periods of Time, *we ſhall be again re-" ſtored to the State, in which we now are.*" Had I ſearched all Antiquity for a Paſſage to eſtabliſh and confirm the Doctrine I am here maintaining, I could not have found one more pertinent, and deciſive of the Point I would ſupport, than this, which the learned Writer brings with a profeſſed Deſign to confute and overthrow it; " We ſhall " be reſtored again to the State in which we now " are." And can a Reſtoration to a State *like the preſent* be compared to the common Doctrine of

[m] Tatiani Oratio ad Græcos, l. v. Τὸν γὰρ Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίσασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ καταγορεῖν, Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ξενοκτονεῖν, καὶ Ἡρακλέα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀθλεῖν, παραιτητέον.

another Life? Are a State of *Retribution*, and a State destitute of Rewards and Punishments, one and the same thing?

Again; with regard to these several Renovations, whether of the *Stoics* or other Sects, we may observe that they were all purely *physical and fatal*; and therefore what Force can they have in the present Question, which is confined to a State of Retribution, that is allowed to be *free and moral? Origen*[n], speaking of the Followers of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, says, "They affirm that "at certain fixed and stated Periods, the Stars will "return to the same Order and Position which "they had before; and that then the Face and "Appearance of things upon Earth will be just "the same, as when the heavenly Bodies were "before in this Situation. When therefore the "Stars return to the same Places, in which they "were situated in the times of *Socrates*, the necessary Consequence is that *Socrates* shall undergo "the same Sufferings, be accused by the same "Persons, and condemned by the same Court of "Justice." *Servius* confirms the same; he explains the Opinion of the Philosophers in this manner. "At the Conclusion of the *great Year*, "the Stars will return to the very same Points, "from which they originally moved; and then "are to revolve again in the same Order. *And if* "*the Stars revolve in the same Order, all things, that*

[n] Τῶν γὰρ ἀστέρων κατά τινας περιόδους τεταγμένας τὰς αὐτὰς σχηματισμὰς καὶ σχέσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους λαμβανόντων, πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ὁμοίως ἔχειν τοῖς ὅτε τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς σχίσεως τῶν ἀστέρων περιεῖχεν ὁ κόσμος. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, τῶν ἀστέρων ἐκ μακρᾶς περιόδου ἐλθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν σχέσιν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὁποῖαν εἶχον ἐπὶ Σωκράτους, πάλιν Σωκράτη γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ παθεῖν κατηγορούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς. Contra Celsum, lib. v.

"*have*

" *have been, must be again repeated. For all things* " *depend intirely on the Motion of the Stars* [o]."

It is remarkable that *Servius* speaks of the Philosophers in general, and does not confine himself to any one Sect. But *Nemesius* gives this very Doctrine to the *Stoics* in the most direct and express Terms. " The *Stoics*, says he, assert that when " the Planets shall return to the very same Points " in the Heavens, in which they were originally " placed, when the World was made; a general " Conflagration will arise and consume all things. " But then the World will be restored again to its " former State; and, *since the Stars are to move in* " *the very same Order as they did before*, every " Transaction and Event of the preceding State, " will be again repeated in the very same Manner. *Plato* and *Socrates* will live again in the " same Country, converse with the same Citizens " and Friends, *&c.* [p] "

If then the learned Writer could prove that the very *same* Men were to be restored at the general Renovation; that they were to be happy and miserable in *Proportion* to the Merit and Demerit of their former Lives; he would be still on the wrong Side the Post: For as all this would

[o] Dixit etiam finitis sæculis omnia revocari, quod & philosophi ita colligunt; quod, exacto magno anno, omnia sydera in ortus suos redeunt; & rursus referuntur eodem motu. Si igitur idem est syderum motus, omnia quæ fuerunt, habebunt reiterationem. Nam universa ex astrorum motu pendent. *Virgil. Eclog.* iv.

[p] Οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοί φασιν ἀποκαθισταμένης τὰς πλανήτας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον καί τε μῆκος καὶ πλάτος, ἔνθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὁ κόσμος συνέστη, ἐν ἑξῆς χρόνων περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ὅλων ἀπεργάζεσθαι· καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπάρχης εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθίστασθαι. ΤΩΝ ΑΣΤΕΡΩΝ ΟΜΟΙΩΣ ΠΑΛΙΝ ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΩΝ, ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γενόμενον ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι. And then follows the Passage above cited. *Nemesius de Fato*, c. xxxviii.

have

have been aſcribed to pure *Neceſſity and Fate*, it would be quite wide of the preſent Queſtion.

Again: Not content to demonſtrate that the Philoſophers believed another Life, he affirms too in his Title Page, that their Doctrine of it was CONSISTENT WITH REASON. In his ſecond Piece he repeats the ſame, and tells us [q], "That he has "ſhewn at large the REASONABLENESS of their "Doctrine on this Head." But if their Notion of a future State was ſuch as he here gives it, upon the Authority of *Chryſippus*, its *Reaſonableneſs*, I preſume, may fairly be diſputed. Is it *reaſonable* that the Sufferings of the Righteous, and the Proſperity of the Wicked ſhould be again repeated in another Life? Is it *reaſonable* that Happineſs and Miſery ſhould for ever be diſpenſed with the ſame Inequalities as they are now? For that they were *for ever* to be diſpenſed in the ſame Manner, was the clear and unqueſtioned Doctrine of the *Stoics*. Thus *Numenius* informs us, "that theſe Revolu-"tions were to ſucceed each other in a *perpetual* "*and endleſs Circle* [r].

But as the *Reaſonableneſs* of their Doctrine is ſo much inſiſted on by this learned Gentleman, I muſt beg leave to mention another Circumſtance, which ſeems to me intirely deſtructive both of his Reaſon and theirs. Obſerve then in what Manner they introduce Men into this new Scene. *Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recuſarent, niſi* oblitos reduceret. *Seneca Ep.* 36.

Strange Preparative for a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments! they were, you ſee, to

[q] Page 58.

[r] Τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ΕΞ ΑΙΔΙΟΥ γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. *Euſebius. Præp. Evang.* l. xv. c. 19. And *Nemeſius* told us, in very plain and direct Terms, that theſe Revolutions were to continue to all Eternity.

be

be ſtript of all Memory and Senſe of their preceding Lives; they were to be dragged into Exiſtence, under a perfect Ignorance and Oblivion of all that had hitherto happened to them; they were not ſo much as to know that they had exiſted before. In this Situation, it was impoſſible for them to conſider their State and Condition in this new World, whatever it was, as the Reward and Puniſhment of their Actions in the preceding State: And what Judge ever thought of keeping the Objects of his Tribunal perpetually ignorant of their Sentence? Whether the learned Writer reflected upon this Circumſtance, when he talked of the *Reaſonableneſs* of the Philoſophers' future State, I won't pretend to ſay: Or whether he conſidered that the very EPICUREANS themſelves would go Snacks in his Compliment, is as little worth deciding. Yet we muſt do Juſtice to this illuſtrious Sect: For they too held it poſſible that the ſame Men after Death might appear again; that they might again be brought into Being in ſome diſtant Age. But then, as they were to be diveſted of all Senſe and Memory of their former Lives, they did not look upon themſelves as at all intereſted and concerned in the State and Condition of this future Life.

Nec ſi materiam noſtram conlegerit ætas
Poſt obitum, rurſumque redegerit ut ſita nunc eſt,
Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ,
PERTINEAT QUIDQUAM TAMEN AD NOS ID QUOQUE FACTUM,
INTERRUPTA SEMEL CUM SIT REPETENTIA NOSTRA. *Lucretius.*

And ſhould we ſay that they held the very ſame Renovations with the *Stoics* themſelves, we have the Authority of St. *Jerom* to juſtify us in this Point [s]. And

[s] Nec putemus ſigna atque prodigia, & multa quæ arbitrio Dei

And now the learned Author, with the beſt Grace in the World, proceeds. "This made "ſome Chriſtian Writers think that the Opi-"nion of the *Stoics* was not much different "from the Chriſtian Doctrine of the Reſurrec-"tion." And for this we are referred to *Clemens* of *Alexandria* and *Nemeſius*. As for *Clemens*, that he was, upon all Occaſions, (as was the common Failing of his time) fond of finding out ſome Reſemblance between the Doctrine of the Scriptures and the Pagan Syſtem; that he was ever ready to ſtrain and warp things, in order to give the better Colour to this imaginary Likeneſs, is an evident Fact, and known to all, who are the leaſt converſant in the Writings of this great Man. Thus *Plato*, if we may believe him, ſtole his Notion of the Ideal World from Chap. xxii. of the Book of *Geneſis*. (*Strom.* v. p. 583.) Now, after ſuch a Diſcovery, we ſhall hardly be ſurpriſed to find him comparing the future Revolutions of the *Stoics* to the Scripture Doctrine of a future State. All we ſhall be ſurpriſed at, is, that he ſhould at this time of day be cited to prove, not only againſt the Primitive Writers abovementioned, but even againſt *Chryſippus* himſelf, that this Renovation was conſidered as a State of future Rewards and Puniſhments. And, what increaſes the Surpriſe, is, that the learned Mr. *Jackſon* could not but know, that this very Paſſage had been objected to *Clemens* on this Score; that he had hence been charged with ſuppoſing a Likeneſs between the Doctrines of Philoſophy and the Goſpel, without the leaſt Foundation in Truth and real Fact [t].

Dei nova in mundo fiunt, in prioribus ſæculis eſſe jam facta, *& locum invenire Epicurum, qui aſſerit per innumerabiles periodos eadem & iiſdem in locis, & per eoſdem fieri.* Alioquin & Judas crebro prodidit, & Chriſtus ſæpe paſſus eſt pro nobis, *&c. In Eccleſiaſt.* c. i.

[t] Le Clerc's Epiſtolæ Criticæ, p. 14.

The

The Authority of *Clemens* will then, I fear, add very little Weight to this other Side of the Question. The Cause must surely be near expiring, or the learned Gentleman would never have had Recourse to such discredited Evidence.

For Proof of this he appeals too to *Nemesius de Fato*, c. xxxviii. Would not any one now imagine that *Nemesius*, or some *Christian Writer* had declared in this Place, " that this Opinion of the " *Stoics* was not much different from the Scripture Doctrine of a future State? " But *Nemesius* is so far from affirming this, that he affirms the direct contrary, that is, he asserts the very thing I contend for, *that the two Doctrines were very different*.

He does indeed say, that *some* imagined the Scripture Doctrine to be borrowed from this Principle of the *Stoics*; but then he does not say with Mr. *Jackson* that these were *Christian Writers*. And if it was an Infidel Objection, 'tis nothing to the Purpose of our present Argument. However he does say, in direct Contradiction to Mr. *Jackson*, that they who talked in this manner, *were grossly mistaken*. But I have already given the whole Passage from *Nemesius*; and if the Reader can find any thing in it, in Favour of the Doctrine I am here opposing, I shall readily take upon *myself* the Shame of having endeavoured to support my Point by a Testimony, that makes directly against it.

As to this Notion of future Renovations, whether borrowed from the *Stoics* or other Sects, 'tis certain that it infected the Christian Church in the first Ages. St. *Jerom* charges it on *Origen*. *Origeni tuo licet tractare* μετεμψύχωσιν, *innumerabiles mundos introducere, & rationabiles creaturas aliis atque aliis vestire corporibus*; Christumque

 dicere

dicere ſæpe paſſum, & ſæpius paſſurum [v]. There cannot, I think, be a more clear and convincing Proof, that theſe general Reſtorations were very different from the Scripture Doctrine of another Life: How horridly muſt we pervert and miſrepreſent Scripture, before we can make it give any Countenance to the execrable Doctrine I have here mentioned?

And here, again, we ſee, as Mr. *Warburton* obſerves, the fatal Effects of too cloſe an Attachment to the Pagan Syſtems; how groſsly it led Men to pervert and corrupt the Goſpel in the early Ages.

It is, I find, after all, the Opinion of ſome learned Men, that theſe ſeveral Revolutions, which make ſo much Noiſe in Antiquity, do really bear a ſtrong Reſemblance to the Scripture Doctrine of another Life. Mr. *Jortin*, in his late very rational *Diſcourſes*, ſeems to have conſidered them in this Light. He ſpeaks of them as a *Reſtitution to a happier State*; *a Reſtitution of things to their ancient Beauty and Perfections*, p. 102, 3. But in what did this *Perfection*, *Beauty*, and *Happineſs* conſiſt [x]? The material World was to be framed in the very ſame manner as it now is. If the moral World was to be reſtored to its ancient Beauty and Perfection, in this it had no Advantage over the preſent State. The firſt Ages were indeed to be diſtinguiſhed by the Purity and Simplicity of their Manners, much in the ſame Manner, as the firſt Inhabitants of this World were ſaid to have been before them. But then it was ſuppoſed that they would ſoon ſink into the ſame De-

[v] Apologia ad Ruffinum.

[x] Ita relinqui nihil præter ignem, a quo rurſum animante ac Deo renovatio mundi fieret, *atque idem ornatus* oriretur. *Cicero, de Nat. Deorum*, l. ii. c. 46.

pravity

pravity and Corruption, which ſo much prevails in the preſent State of things [y].

This Sameneſs of the ſeveral ſucceeding Worlds was held likewiſe by *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. " At " certain fixed and ſtated times, every thing which " had before appeared, was to revive and riſe " again; but nothing new, abſolutely new, was " ever to be [z]."

Plutarch confirms the ſame, " That at the ge- " neral Reſtoration there would be the very ſame " Appearance of Things and Perſons; the ſame " Men were to be ingaged in the ſame Scenes of " Life, to diſcharge their ſeveral Offices in the " ſame manner, and to ſhare the ſame Fortune, " without the leaſt Viciſſitude or Change [a]."

Celſus too declares, " That ſeveral Worlds were " to ſucceed each other in a regular and fixed Or- " der; that, at certain Periods, there would al- " ways be the ſame State and Condition of things " in this new World [b]." This is the true State of the Affair, and let Divines make the beſt of it; but without forgetting, that there is ſomething due to Truth and Scripture, as well as to Syſtem.

But to return to the Queſtion, having ſhewn the Weakneſs and Inſufficiency of all Mr. *Jackſon*

[y] Omne animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inſcius ſcelerum, & melioribus auſpiciis natus. Sed illis quoque Innocentia non durabit, niſi dum novi ſint; cito nequitia ſurrepit. *Seneca, Nat. Quæſt.* l. iii.

[z] Ὅτι καλὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γινόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίνεσθαι, ΝΕΟΝ Δ' ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΕΣΤΙ. Porphyrius de vita Pythagoræ

[a] Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπεισδαὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀφίκησθαι αἰτία, τὰ αὐτα καὶ ὡσαύτως οἱ αὐτοὶ γινόμενοι πράξομεν, ἔτω δὲ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τά γε ἑξῆς καλὰ τὴν ἑξῆς αἰτίαν γενήσεσθαι καὶ πραχθήσεσθαι, καὶ παν θ' ὅσα κεῖται, καλὰ μίαν τὴν ὅλην περίοδον καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν ὅλων ὡσαύτως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι. Plutarch de Fato.

[b] Ὁμοία ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν θνητῶν περίοδος, καὶ καλὰ τὰς τεταγμένας ἀνακυκλήσεις ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ καὶ γεγονέναι, καὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι ἐν τῇ τῶν θνητῶν περιόδῳ. Origen. cont. Celſ. l. iv.

has advanced with regard to this general Renovation.

Let us now proceed to his other Teſtimonies. That from *Chryſippus* is immediately followed by this from *Arius Didymus*. "Their (the *Stoics*) "Notion was, that the Soul was generated and "corruptible, but did not immediately periſh "when it departed out of the Body, but con-"tinued to exiſt for a certain term of Duration. "That the Souls of good Men exiſted till the ge-"neral Conflagation and Diſſolution of the Uni-"verſe; but thoſe of the wicked continued only "to a certain Period." p. 97, 8.

Never ſure were two Paſſages joined together ſo inconſiſtent with and utterly deſtructive of each other. Yet are they produced by this learned Man to prove that the *Stoics* believed a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. The firſt refers us to the general Renovation for theſe Rewards and Puniſhments; but the ſecond plainly tells us, that the Souls of good Men would be extinct and loſt long before this Period; and that the Souls of the Wicked would periſh even before them. For whom then were theſe future Rewards and Puniſhments reſerved? For Mr. *Jackſon's Defence* of the ancient Philoſophers. It was done like a Workman to tell us, the *Stoics* ſaid that Men ſhould be puniſhed and rewarded at the general Revolution; and then, in Confirmation of it, to give us another Paſſage, which ſays that they will ceaſe to exiſt before that Period?

His other Teſtimony runs thus: *Eſſe inferos Zeno Stoicus docuit, & ſedes piorum ab impiis eſſe diſcretas; & illos quidem quietas & delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere pœnas in tenebroſis locis atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis.* This Paſſage evidently relates to the *popular* Account of a fu-

a future State; and therefore it is impoſſible to know with what View it is here brought, unleſs it be to confute the Paſſage from *Chryſippus* cited above. *Chryſippus*, if we allow Mr. *Jackſon's* Interpretation, ſays that theſe Puniſhments and Rewards were not to begin till after the general Conflagration: But *Zeno* as plainly tells us that they were to be over, and intirely ceaſe at this very Period; for this was the Caſe of the infernal Torments, and the Happineſs of *Elyſium:* But few indeed of the Righteous would then be found in *Elyſium*, as their Continuance there was limited to a thouſand Years. But that the infernal Regions themſelves were to be deſtroyed at the general Conflagration, we have the expreſs Teſtimony of *Seneca*, who ſays, in *Hercules Oetæus*,

Jam jam legibus obrutis
Mundo cum veniet dies,
Cœli regia concidet,
Certos atque obitus trahet,
Atque omnes pariter Deos
Perdet mors aliqua, & Chaos.]
Diſcedet via Tartari,
Stratis ut pateat polis.
Pontum, Sydera, Tartara,
Regna unus capiet tria.

The learned Writer will pardon me, if I ſay that this laſt Teſtimony of *Zeno* is inconſiſtent with the ſecond as well as with the firſt Paſſage. In the ſecond, he plainly ſuppoſes that the Souls of the Wicked *will not ſubſiſt till the general Conflagration:* In the third, he as plainly ſuppoſes that *they will.* It never was imagined that the Puniſhments of *Tartarus* would end before this time.

So much for the firſt Point; or the Teſtimonies brought by Mr. *Jackſon* to prove that the

Stoics believed another Life. There needs, we ſee, no great Pains to anſwer and confute them; they are indeed choſen in ſo ſingular a manner, as even to anſwer and confute themſelves. But had they been ever ſo conſiſtent, what would he have gained by them? All they would prove, is, that the *Stoics* ſometimes declared for another Life; and who ever denied this? But then let it be remember'd, that they did often declare againſt it. Let the learned Writer take in this Conſideration, and then ſhew how the Profeſſions of the *Stoics* make any thing in Favour of his pretended Demonſtration.

2*dly*, I am now to prove from a Principle, which we both allow to be truly *Stoical*, that this Sect neither did nor could believe a future State. The Principle is this; that the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, was to be *reſolved* into the divine Nature, or God. This I conceive to be deſtructive of all future Rewards and Puniſhments. The learned Writer conſiders it in a very different Light. He every where repreſents it as a State of the moſt abſolute and perfect Bliſs; gives it as the *eſoteric* Doctrine, or *only* Notion of future Happineſs really entertained by the ancient Sages. If then we ſhew, that the Senſe he puts upon the Principle is a mere Novel Refinement unknown to Antiquity, there is an End of him and his Argument.

Let us attend to his own Words. " They (the " Philoſophers) taught that the human Soul was " congenial with the Soul of the World, and that " the Happineſs of it after Death conſiſted in its " Return to and intimate Union with the divine " Nature or God, from whom it was derived: " On the other hand, that the Miſery of it con- " ſiſted in being excluded from this Union with " God, *&c. &c.* All agreed, that as Happineſs " conſiſted

" consisted in the Improvement of the intelligent " or rational Soul in divine Knowledge and Vir- " tue, so in the future State the Soul, they con- " stantly believed, was rendered more perfect in " Knowledge and Virtue, by its Union and Com- " munion with the divine Substance, or Deity. " This was a rational and exalted Notion of a " future State, and very agreeable to the Doctrine " of it taught by Revelation. This was the eso- " teric Doctrine of the Philosophers concerning a " future State [c]." In his second Piece he says, " that the Souls of the Virtuous were to be united " to God by *divine Knowledge*, *Faith*, *and Virtue*; " were to have *Communion* with him; and were to " to be blessed with the beatific Vision of the di- " vine Perfections." p. 8. Thus, we see, he every where gives us this Refusion as a State of the most perfect and complete Happiness. He talks much of *Communion* with God, *beatific Vision*, and so forth. This is indeed the Language of our modern Mystics; and the ingenious Mr. *W. Law* has retailed a System of the rankest *Spinozism* under these fine Words; but the following Observations will perhaps shew that it is not very nearly allied to that of the old *Stoics*. As to this Refusion, first, It was not supposed to be peculiar to the human Soul. The *Stoics* held that their inferior Gods would all share the same Fate. " *Chry-* " *sippus* and *Cleanthes*, when they filled the Hea- " vens, the Earth, the Air, and Sea with Gods, " held that none of these was immortal and in- " corruptible but *Jupiter*. They held that all the " rest were to be absorbed and consumed into him. " He therefore must destroy others, which implies " the same Imperfection, as if he was to be de- " stroyed himself. For as it is a Mark of Imper-

[c] *The Belief of a future State*, &c. p. 72.

" fection

" fection to perish by being dissolved into another " Being, so it is an Imperfection for a Being to " be nourished and supported by the Dissolution of " others into it. And this is not, like many other " Absurdities charged upon them, a mere Conse- " quence of their own Principles, but a Doctrine " openly proclaimed and asserted by them, in " their Books concerning the Gods, Providence, " Fate, and Nature; where they say that the Gods " were generated and will be destroyed by Fire, " *as if they would be melted*, like Substances of " Wax or Lead [d]."

Again: " *Chrysippus* in his first Book on Provi- " dence, affirms, That *Jupiter* will *increase and be* " *inlarged*, till he has *absorbed all things* into him- " self. For since Death consists in the Departure " of the Soul from the Body, and the Soul of the " World never does depart, but is *augmented* con- " tinually till *every thing is consumed into it*; we " cannot say that the Soul dies [e]."

Here we see with what Purpose and Design the Gods and other Substances were to be dissolved

[d] Plutarch adver. Stoicos, p. 1075. Ed. Xyl.—Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδὲ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός· εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους· ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ τὸ φθείρειν προσεῖναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι μὴ ἐπιεικέστερον· ἀσθενείᾳ γάρ τινι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἕτερον φθείρεται, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς ἑαυτὸ φθειρομένοις τρεφόμενον σώζεται· ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πόλλα τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, καὶ προνοίας εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι, διαῤῥήδην λέγουσι τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρινοὺς ἢ κατλιτερινοὺς ὄντας.

[e] Plutarch de Stoicorum Repug. p. 1052.——Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία φησὶν αὔξεσθαι, μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μίν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς, μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον.

into

into the *Anima Mundi*, or ſupreme God of this Sect. It was only in order to nouriſh and ſupport it, to recruit its Loſſes, and to prevent it from conſuming and waſting into nothing.

Antoninus gives much the ſame Account of this Refuſion; the human Soul was indeed to be *changed* by it: But then this Change was *purely phyſical*. It was not wrought with any *moral* Purpoſe and Deſign, but was only to ſupport the Order and Harmony of the Univerſe. We have already ſeen that the Gods themſelves were to be diſſolved, *like ſo many Pieces of Wax or Lead*, into the *Anima Mundi* for this very Purpoſe; why therefore might not the human Soul? But to come to *Antoninus*, "I conſiſt (ſays he) of Form "and Matter, or of Soul and Body. As neither "of theſe Parts was made out of nothing, ſo nei- "ther of them will be annihilated or reduced to "nothing. Every Part of me therefore will by a "Change be reſolved into another, and ſo on in "*infinitum*[f]."

"Conſider that in a ſhort time you will ceaſe "to be; all things which ſubſiſt now, muſt be "changed, altered, and deſtroyed, *that they may* "*ſerve for the Production of others*[g]."

Lib. x. § 1. he ſpeaks of God or the Univerſal Soul, "as containing all things that are diſſolved "into him, *in order that others of the ſame kind* "*may again be generated out of him*[h]."

f Ἐξ αἰτιώδους καὶ ὑλικοῦ συνέστηκα· οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεται· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπέστη· οἰκεῖον καταταχθήσεται πᾶν μέρος ἐμοῦ καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς μέρος τι τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο εἰς ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ κόσμου μεταβαλεῖ, καὶ οὕτω εἰς ἄπειρον. l. 5. 13.

g Ὅτι, μετ' ὀλίγον, οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ ἔσῃ· ἅπαντα γὰρ μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τρέπεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἵνα ἑτέρα ἐφεξῆς γενήται. l. 12. 21.

h L. 10. 1. Πάντα περιέχοντος [θεοῦ] καὶ περιλαμβάνοντος διαλυόμενα εἰς γένεσιν ἑτέρων ὁμοίων.

He

He tells us too " that the World is to be " perpetually renewed by these Revolutions and " Changes; that some Things must die *that others* " *may arise out of them* [i]."

As to the Consequence and Effect of this Change it is very clearly described by him in another Place [k]. " The things thus changed do not re- " ceive any Prejudice or Hurt by it; and as to " those which are produced by this Change, they " have no Benefit or Advantage from it." It could not therefore be a Translation to a State of Happiness or Misery; or be consider'd with any moral View. It is indeed evident that Souls were sent into the *Anima Mundi*, barely to furnish it with Materials; purely to supply what might be wanting for the Production of new Beings. *Plutarch* tells us, " that it was to be *nourished* and " *supported* by the Dissolution of other Beings " into it," that " it would *augment* continually " till all things were consumed into it." And does not *Antoninus* say the same? He tells us, " that " all things were dissolved into God, that others " of the same Nature might again be generated " out of him [k]."

Having thus explained the Nature and End, the Purpose and Design of this Re-union of the Soul with the universal Substance; I may surely presume so far upon the Privilege of common Sense as to take it for granted that this Re-fusion

[i] 7. 25.

[k] Οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν τοῖς ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένοις· ὡς οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὑφισαμένοις. l. 4. 42.

[l] Habent aliquid Stoici Dogmati Pythagorico affine, quod ex *animarum materiâ quasi conflatâ & recoctâ novas procudi & produci statuunt*. Verum hac ratione non magis animæ quam corpori Immortalitatem asserunt; non minus *animæ* quam *corpori corruptionem* & *mortalitatem* adscribunt. *Gataker* on *Antoninus*, l. iv. § 21.

will

will no longer be considered as a *State of perfect and complete Happiness*. Will any Man pretend that there is the least Conformity between this Reunion and the Scripture Doctrine of future Happiness? That there is any Trace or Footstep of the *beatific Vision*; the *Communion with God*; which the learned Mr. *Jackson* pretends to discover in it? In short, will any one but himself say, that "this was a rational and exalted Notion of a "future State?"

2*dly*, Who, but would imagine from his Description, that this Refusion was conceived to be a Privilege peculiar to the Righteous and Innocent? That it was reserved for *them only*, as a Reward for their Integrity and Virtue? But Antiquity gives us a very different Account of this Matter; it tells us, that this Refusion was given to the Souls of the Good and Bad without Distinction. *Numenius*, speaking of some *Stoics*, declares "that, ac-"cording to them, the Soul of the Universe "would be eternal, but that *all others* would upon "Death be blended and mixed with it[x]."

"Every Body (says *Antoninus*) will be lost and "buried in the universal Substance. *Every Soul* "will be absorbed and sunk into the universal Na-"ture[y]," or God. Here this Refusion is given promiscuously to the Souls of the Good and Bad. This single Consideration may serve to inform us that it was not looked on as a State of Rewards and Happiness.—But what becomes now of future Punishments? Mr. *Jackson* makes them consist in an Exclusion from the Union with the divine Nature. But it appears that the old *Stoics* did not

[x] Eusebius Præpar. Evan. l. xv. c. 20. Ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τοῦ ὅλου, ἀΐδιον. ΤΑΣ ΔΕ ΛΟΙΠΑΣ ΣΥΜΜΙΓΝΥΣΘΑΙ ΕΠΙ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗ ΕΙΣ ΕΚΕΙΝΗΝ.

[y] Πᾶν τὸ ἔνυλον ἐναφανίζεται τάχιστα τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ· καὶ πᾶν αἴτιον εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων λόγον τάχιστα ἀναλαμβάνεται. l. vii. § 10.

 hold

hold any ſuch Excluſion; that they admitted the Souls of the Good and Bad indifferently to this Union; and therefore, according to *him*, they could not believe any future Puniſhments. I ſhall here ſpend a Word or two more on another Circumſtance, which ſeems to bear hard on the Opinion maintained by the learned Writer. It is this; the Soul, after its Separation from the Body, was immediately to return to the divine Nature. *Numenius* ſays, it would be re-united to God *upon Death*. *Antoninus* declares, "it would be reſumed "into the univerſal Nature τάχιϛα, or immediate-"ly." I take this to be a conſiderable Objection to the Hypotheſis I am here examining. For, if the Refuſion was immediate upon the Separation of Soul and Body; what Room or Poſſibility, according to Mr. *Jackſon*, for future Puniſhments?

It may be ſaid, that, to compliment their *wiſe Man*, they taught that his Soul would hold out till the general Conflagration. "By this, ſays Mr. "*Warburton*, we ſhall ſee they meant juſt nothing "when we come to ſpeak of their Opinion con-"cerning the Nature and Duplicity of the Soul." [2] But, not to inſiſt on this, this very Objection would be no light Confirmation of the Notion I am here eſtabliſhing. The Stoics taught that the Soul of their *wiſe Man* was to ſubſiſt till the general Conflagration. But then it was not to rejoin the divine Nature till this Period; it was in the mean time to exiſt ſeparate and diſtinct from it. Now this will of itſelf overthrow every thing, which the learned Gentleman has advanced on this Point. For, had this Refuſion been conſidered as a State of the higheſt Perfection, would the *Stoics* have excluded their *wiſe Man* from it till the End of the World; while the Bulk of Mankind were ad-

[2] *Divine Legation*, vol. i. third Edition, p. 391.

mitted

mitted to it, immediately upon the Diſſolution of the Body? Had the Excluſion from it been conſidered as a State of Puniſhment, would they have ſentenced and condemned their *wiſe Man* to it for ſo long a Period?

But thirdly, we meet with very plain and open Deſcriptions of the State and Condition of the Soul after its Return to God. But to what do they amount? Why, to no very high Degree of Happineſs and Perfection: All the Advantage they give the Soul, is, that it ſhould be exempt from Pain and Miſery; and it was to be exempt from Pain and Miſery, only becauſe it was deprived of Perception, and had loſt its ſeparate and diſtinct Exiſtence.

The *Stoics*, I ſay, did not conſider this Reunion, as a State of perfect and complete Happineſs. And this may appear from the cold and lifeleſs Manner, in which they deliver themſelves on this Head. *Reverti eo unde veneris*, quid grave eſt [a]?

Epictetus, ſpeaking of Death, ſays, "But whither do you go? *No where to your Hurt*; you "return from whence you came, to a friendly Con"ſociation with your kindred Elements; what there "was of the Nature of Fire in your Compoſition, "returns to the Element of Fire; what there was "of Earth, to Earth; what of Air, to Air; and "Water, to Water. There is neither *Hell*, *Ache*"*ron*, *Cocytus*, or *Pyriphlegethon* [b]." *Magnus animus Deo pareat, & quicquid Lex Univerſi jubet, ſine cunctatione patiatur. Aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius tranquilliuſque inter divina manſurus, aut* certe ſine ullo futurus incommodo, *naturæ ſuæ remiſcebitur & revertetur in totum* [c].

[a] Seneca de Tranquillitate, c. xi.
[b] *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 392.
[c] *Seneca*, Ep. 72.

In the two firſt Paſſages the Notion of this Refuſion, is, we ſee, ſtated in a very different Light, from that in which it is repreſented by the learned Gentleman, whoſe Sentiments I am here conſidering. All that can be collected from them, is, that the Soul, after its Refuſion, will not be attended with any painful and uneaſy Circumſtance; that it will not be ſubject to any actual and real Miſery: The very Language which they uſe, when they deſcribe Death as a State of Extinction and Non-exiſtence [d]. But that it will enjoy the leaſt Degree of poſitive and real Happineſs, is more than can be deduced from theſe Paſſages.

The third Citation ſeems to ſpeak more fully to our Purpoſe: "The Soul, after its Separation "from the Body, will either be exalted to a State "of Happineſs; or, without any troubleſome "Circumſtance attending it, will rejoin the Sub-"ſtance, from which it was originally taken." This Re-union could not be conſidered as a State of poſitive and real Happineſs, becauſe it is clearly and directly oppoſed to ſuch a State.

It was indeed a common Saying, "The Soul "after Death will either be happy or not be at "all." *Mors nos aut conſumit, aut emittit. Emiſſis meliora reſtant.* And is not the Paſſage I am here examining of the very ſame Nature; and if it be of the ſame Nature, muſt not the Refuſion here mentioned anſwer to that Part in the other Paſſage [e], in which the Soul is ſaid to be no more?

But what was to be the State and Condition of the Soul after its Reſolution into the divine Being? Why, he ſays *ſine ullo futurus eſt* Incommodo. The very Deſcription, which he gives of Death,

[d] Mors nullum habet *incommodum*, eſſe enim debet aliquid, cujus ſit *incommodum*. *Seneca*.

[e] *Seneca*.

when

when he conſiders it as a State of mere Extinction.[f] *Mors nullum habet* Incommodum. *Eſſe enim debet aliquid, cujus ſit* Incommodum. To tell us then that this Refuſion was conſidered as a State of abſolute and perfect Happineſs, is in Effect to tell us that the Ancients knew nothing of their own Doctrine; for they are ſo far from repreſenting it in this Light, that they in direct and expreſs Terms oppoſe it to this very State.

4thly, All then the Soul could gain by this Refuſion, was that it would be exempt from Pain and Miſery: And this only becauſe it was deprived of Perception, by its retaining no longer a ſeparate and diſtinct Exiſtence. The following Paſſages will not ſuffer us to doubt, but this was the very Caſe. *Quod ſi tanta Cupiditas longioris ævi te tenet, cogita nihil eorum, quæ ab oculis abeunt, & in rerum naturam, ex qua prodierunt & mox proceſſura ſunt, reconduntur, conſumi*; deſinunt iſta, non pereunt. *Et mors, quam pertimeſcimus & recuſamus*, intermittit vitam, non eripit. *Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recuſarent, niſi oblitos reduceret.* It is evident that he here ſpeaks of the State and Condition of Men, after they rejoin and are reſolved into the univerſal Nature. And his Deſcription may ſuffice to ſhew, that, in the Opinion of the old *Stoics*, they were now deprived of all Perception, that they were ſuppoſed to loſe their peculiar and diſtinct Exiſtence. *Deſinunt* iſta, non *pereunt*. Mors *intermittit vitam, non eripit.*

They were to riſe again after the general Reſtoration; but in the mean time, Life and all the Faculties of it were to be intirely ſuſpended. *Antoninus*, ſpeaking of Men departed out of this Life, ſays, " they will be no more for a very long

[f] *Seneca*, Ep. 34.

" Period."

" Period [g]." They were to be no more till the general Renovation. Muſt they not therefore till then be ſuppoſed to be deprived of all Senſe and diſtinct Exiſtence?

In another Place [h], ſpeaking on a certain Suppoſition, he declares " that the Souls of the Dead, " after they had remained for ſome time in the " Air, would be abſorbed by the divine Subſtance, " and there be *changed*, *melted*, and *burnt*." *Plutarch* applies theſe very Expreſſions to the inferior [illegible]s; but then he evidently ſuppoſes, as will be [illegible] hereafter, that their ſeparate and diſtinct Exiſtences would be quite ſunk and loſt by the Reſolution here mentioned. This will be proved on the Authority of *Cudworth*; but it is indeed plain from the very Words of *Plutarch*, who ſays, " that the ſeveral Beings, which return to the uni- " verſal Soul, were to be *melted* and *diſſolved into* " *it*, *like ſo many Subſtances of Wax and Lead*.

Cleanthes himſelf, as we are informed by *Stobæus* [i], ſaid " that all things were made out of " one, and would be again reſolved into one." But if all things were to become one, what room for ſeparate Perception, or diſtinct Exiſtence? That the Soul was to be thus changed and reſolved with the reſt, will not be denied. " You have as yet " exiſted as a Part (or have had a particular Sub- " ſiſtence) you will afterwards be abſorbed and loſt " in the Subſtance, which produced you; or you " will be reſumed into the divine Nature, or the " ſpermatic Reaſons." The Soul was no longer to ſubſiſt as a Part, or to retain a diſtinct Ex-

g Ὅυτως γὰρ συνεχῶς θεάσῃ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, καπνὸν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν· μάλιστα ἐὰν συμμνημονεύσῃς, ὅτι τὸ ἅπαξ μεταβαλὸν οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ. l. x. 31.

h Μεταβάλλουσι, καὶ ΧΕΟΝΤΑΙ, καὶ ἐξάπλουται, εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι. l. iv. 21.

i Eclog. Phyſ. c. xx.

iſtence,

istence, because it would be resumed into the universal Nature. Is not the *Refusion* here plainly opposed to a separate and distinct Existence[k]?

So much for this *Refusion*. What must we think now of the Doctrine that would obtrude it upon us as a State of absolute and perfect Happiness? What Appearance, let me once more ask, that the Souls of good Men were to be united to the *Anima Mundi*, by divine *Knowledge*, *Faith*, and *Virtue*? What Mark or Trace of the *beatific Vision*? We have shewn that the End and Purpose of this Refusion was *merely physical*; that it was designed only to repair the Losses and Decays of the universal Soul; that Gods, Men, and all other Substances were to be resolved into it with this only View. Besides, this Refusion was given to the Souls of the Good and Bad without Distinction. It was clearly and directly opposed to a State of future Happiness, it was described so as plainly to exclude all personal and distinct Existence.

Strange and extravagant as this Notion may appear to Mr. *Jackson*, it is confirmed by Writers, whose Rank and Distinction in the learned World, may at least serve to skreen them, from his Insults and Contempt. The learned *Cudworth* speaks of this Refusion, as destroying the personal and distinct Existence of those Beings, who were supposed to rejoin the universal Nature. "The Stoical "Pagans maintained, that all their other Gods, "save *Jupiter* alone, were not only Γεγονότες, but "also Φθαρησόμενοι, such as should be as well cor-"rupted as they were generated, and this so also, *as* "*that their very Personalities should be utterly abo-*"*lished and annihilated:* All the Stoical Gods

[k] ΈΝΥΠΕΣΤΗΣ, ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ· ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣΗ ΤΩ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΝΤΙ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν καθ' μεταβολήν. Antoninus, l. iv. 14.

"in

" in the Conflagration being as it were *melted and* " *confounded into one*[l]." Even the Gods themselves were to lose their separate and distinct Existence, after their Return to the universal Soul; they were to be *melted down into it*; the very Phrase applied by *Antoninus* to the human Soul.

Accessere ad eundem de refusione animarum errorem etiam Stoici, quatenus existimantes animari mundum suo illo Igne, quem dixerunt Jovem, censuerunt nostras animas particulas ex illo deductas, & in eundem cito tardeve reduci, aut reducendas certe esse in generali conflagratione, quâ in unum Jovem universa reconflabuntur[m].

The learned *Le Clerc*, who was far from being prejudiced in Favour of the Argument I am here maintaining, speaks fully to our Purpose. He would vindicate *Euripides* from the Charge of holding the Soul to be mortal: He owns that his Author did assert the Re-union of the Soul; but then he insists that this Re-union, according to some Philosophers, did not destroy its personal Existence. However, with regard to the *Stoics*, he very frankly and readily acknowledges that it did destroy it[n].

Dr. *Burnet*, the learned Master of the *Charter-house*, charges the *Stoics* home with this Sentiment: He indeed, and rightly, extends the same Charge to other Sects; declares that in their Systems all things were considered as so many several Emana-

[l] Intellectual System, first Edition, p. 425.

[m] Gassendi Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, p. 551.

[n] Quoi qu'il en soit, dire que les ames vont dans l'Æther, ou, si l'on veut, *à Dieu*, ne signifie pas qu'elles perdent leur Existence separée, comme une goutte d'Eau sa pert dans l'ocean, lors qu'elle y est jettée; & rien ne nous oblige de croire qu' Euripede a été precisement *dans les mêmes Idées, que les Stoiciens ont suivies depuis*. Bibliothéque Choisie, vol. vi. p. 247.

tions

tions from the Deity; from whom they were supposed to be taken, and into whom they were again to be resolved; but, as he strongly expresses it, *sine omni distinctione individuorum* [o].

It is with singular Pleasure that I find this Notion of the Refusion confirmed by the worthy and learned Mr. *Jortin*, in his judicious Discourses concerning the Truth of the Christian Religion. "Some, who in Words acknowledge the "Immortality of the Soul, seem in reality to have "taken it away, by imagining that the Soul was "a Part of the Soul of the World, of the Deity, "and that, upon its Separation from the Body, it "was re-united to it." p. 247. He mentions the Refusion as destructive of a future State: And this is all I quote him for.

I have, I hope, by this time sufficiently made good the Point I undertook to prove: Mr. *Jackson* lays it down as an unquestioned Truth, (and in this I entirely agree with him) that the Souls of good Men were to be resolved into the divine Nature. The Merits of the Dispute between us lie therefore within a narrow Compass; the Souls of good Men must be rewarded in and by this Refusion, or they cannot be rewarded at all. I have shewn that the *Stoics* (and my Argument is confined to them) did not consider this as a State of Retribution and Reward. I have therefore, so far as I am now concerned, effectually confuted his Hypothesis.

And here it is remarkable, that this Notion is destructive of future Punishments, in the very Sense, in which Mr. *Jackson* contends for them.

[o] *Archæol. Phil.* c. vii. Speaking of things before their Appearance in this World, and after their Departure out of it, he says, *habebant semper suum modum* subsistendi in divina natura, licet sine omni distinctione individuorum.

He

He makes them consist in an Exclusion of the wicked from the divine Nature. But we have shewn, that the old *Stoics* did, in Reality, suppose no such Exclusion, but that the Souls of the Good and Bad were to be admitted indifferently to this Refusion.

CHAP. VI.

That the Philosophers believed the Soul to be of the very same Nature and Substance with God himself. That this Notion of the Soul was inconsistent with the Belief of a future State. These two Points proved on the Authority of the primitive Writers of the Christian Church.

I Shall open this Chapter with the following Passage from the learned Writer, whose Sentiments I am here examining. Speaking of Mr. *Warburton*, he says, "I desire he will try his Talents against any thing I have wrote, and that "he will let the Public see whether he understands "*the Scriptures, and the primitive Writers of the* "*Christian Church*, any better than he does *Plato* "and *Virgil*; for had he understood the *former*, "he would not have said that the Philosophers "neither did nor *could believe* a future State of "Rewards and Punishments [c]."

But why is he invited to *try his Talents?* This was never his Motive in Writing. And if it was, he would chuse a very different kind of Men to write against. He contents himself to demonstrate that the Philosophers did not believe a future State: And willingly leaves it to Mr. *Jackson* to persist

[c] Mr. *Jackson's* Defence, p. 52.

in

in affirming that the *Sacred* and *Primitive* Writers did not believe a *Trinity*.

However, we now find that the Aſſertion, which gives ſo much Offence to the learned Writer, is, *that the Philoſophers could not believe, or that their Notion of the Soul was inconſiſtent with the Belief of a future State.* And here we are told, that, had not Mr. *Warburton* been an utter Stranger to the primitive Writers of the Chriſtian Church, he never could have fallen into ſo groſs and palpable a Blunder. Now, after all, ſhould it turn out that ſeveral of theſe ſpeak for him; that they charge the Philoſophers with the very ſame Notion, in reſpect to the human Soul; that they arraign this Notion of the Soul as inconſiſtent with the Belief of a future State; if this, I ſay, ſhould appear to be the Caſe; what muſt we think of the learned Gentleman, who thus inſults his Adverſary with his Ignorance of eccleſiaſtical Antiquity; and ſends him to theſe very Authors, for a full Confutation of all he has advanced on this Head? That this however was the real Fact, I ſhall now undertake to prove, how certain ſoever to incur the Cenſure and Contempt of this wonderfully learned Man.

The firſt Abſurdity charged upon theſe ancient Sages, by the Author of the *Divine Legation*, is, that they maintained the Soul to be really and actually a part of God; that they believed it to be of the very ſame Nature and Subſtance with God himſelf. This has been repreſented as a fanciful and idle Notion; as unſupported by every thing but a Fondneſs to weaken and deſtroy the Credit of the old Philoſophers. But groundleſs and chimerical as this Notion may appear to Mr. *Jackſon*, it is countenanced and avowed by thoſe very Writers, to whoſe Authority he here refers us. *Tertullian* charges *Plato* with

with holding the Divinity of the Soul in so very plain and strong Terms, as to leave no room for Cavil and Dispute. *Primo quidem oblivionis capacem animam non cedam*, quia tantam illi concessit divinitatem, ut Deo adæquetur [d]. *Arnobius*, ridiculing the Folly and Extravagance of this same Notion, says, *Nunquam, inquam, crederent typho & arrogantia sublevati*, prima esse se numina, & æqualia principis dignitati [e]. St. *Jerom* confirms the same in respect to the Followers of *Pythagoras*. Juxta Pythagoricorum dogmata, *qui hominem exæquant Deo, & de ejus dicunt esse substantia* [f]. St. *Austin* charges them home with the same Sentiments, *Cedant & illi quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, veruntamen* ejusdem naturæ, *cujus ille est, animos nostros esse putaverunt; ita non eos movit tanta* mutabilitas animæ, quam Dei naturæ tribuere nefas est [g]. Thus far these learned Fathers;

[d] De Anima, c. xxiv.

[e] Adver. Gentes, l. ii.

[f] Ctesiphon. adver. Pelagianos.

[g] *De Civ. Dei*. 8. 5. I had designed to close this Head with the Citations abovementioned; but as the learned Writer insults us with the Authority of the Fathers, I must beg leave to recommend to his Notice, the following Passages of St. *Austin*. *Ergo & Jovem, ut Deus sit, & maximè, ut rex Deorum, non alium possunt existimare quam Mundum, ut in diis cæteris secundum istos suis partibus regnet. In hanc sententiam etiam quosdam versus Valerii Sorani exponit Varro, in eo libro, quem seorsum ab istis de cultu Deorum scripsit. Qui versus hi sunt,*

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse, Deusque,
Progenitor Genitrixque Deûm, Deus unus & omnis.

Exponuntur autem in eodem libro, ita ut eum marem existimarent, qui semen emitteret, fœminam quæ acciperet, Jovemque esse Mundum, *& eum omnia semina ex se emittere, & in se recipere*; qua causa, inquit, scripsit Soranus, Jupiter Progenitor Genitrixque. Nec *minus cum causa unum & idem esse omnia*. (De C. D. 9. 7.) And do not these last Words give us the very Language of *Spinoza?*

Again:

Fathers; and what has the Author of the *Divine Legation* ſaid more than they?

Now this prepares us for the chief Point which I propoſe to eſtabliſh on the Authority of the primitive Writers of the Chriſtian Church; and that is, *that the Philoſophers could not believe a future State.* When I ſay that the Philoſophers *could not believe a future State*, I mean conſiſtently with their Notions of the human Soul. This, I know, has been treated as a ſtrange Paradox.—What! could the Philoſophers hold the Immortality of the Soul, and yet reject a future State? Nay, what is moſt extraordinary, were they obliged to deny the laſt, barely becauſe they believed the firſt? This is indeed the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and, what is more, 'tis the Doctrine of thoſe very primitive Writers, to whom the learned Gentleman ſo gravely ſends us for Information on this Head. And ſince they charge the Philoſophers with giving the Soul the very ſame Nature and Subſtance with God himſelf; with making it immortal in the ſame Senſe with

Again: Attendant;—Si Mundi animus Deus eſt, eique animo Mundus ut corpus eſt, ut ſit unum animal conſtans ex animo & corpore; atque iſte Deus eſt ſinus quidam naturæ, in ſeipſo continens omnia, ut ex ipſius anima, qua vivificatur tota iſta moles vitæ atque animæ cunctorum viventium, pro cujuſque naſcentis ſorte ſumantur, nihil omnino remanere poſſe, *quod non ſit pars Dei. Quod ſi ita eſt, quis non videat quanta impietas & irreligioſitas conſequatur. Ut quod calcaverit quiſque, partem Dei calcet, & in omni animante occidendo pars Dei trucidetur.* Again: — De ipſo rationali animante, i. e. homine, quid infelicius credi poteſt, quam *Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? Jam vero partes Dei fieri laſcivas, iniquas, impias atque omnino damnabiles*, quis ferre poſſit niſi qui prorſus inſaniat? Poſtremo, quid iraſcitur iis, a quibus non colitur, cum a *ſuis partibus* non colatur. (*De C. D.* iv. 12, 13.)

him;

him [h]; or, which is the ſame, aſſigning it a Neceſſary and Self-exiſtence; what Wonder that they ſhould accuſe this Doctrine of the Soul, as inconſiſtent with the Belief of a future State? But to come to the Fact I am engaged to ſupport; ſome of the Fathers, I ſay, agree with the Author of the *Divine Legation* in this Notion. *Juſtin Martyr*, ſpeaking of the Philoſophers, ſays, "Some of them, holding the Soul to be *incorporeal* and *immortal*, did not conceive that they "ſhould be puniſhed for their wicked and immoral Actions; *for that a Subſtance, which was "not corporeal, muſt of Courſe be incapable of ſuffering, and a Subſtance, which was immortal, "muſt be independent of God* [i]."

Again: "The Soul cannot properly be ſtyled "*immortal*, for if it be immortal, 'tis evident that "it muſt likewiſe be *uncreated*." And ſoon after he adds, "Now if our Souls were *uncreated*, "they would not ſin, nor abound with Folly, "nor be ſubject to Fear, *&c. nor would they voluntarily migrate into the Bodies of other Animals, as Dogs, Serpents*, &c. *and they could "not be compelled to do this, contrary to their own "Inclination, as they are uncreated. For one uncreated Being is equal to and the ſame with another; nor is one ſuperior to the other either in*

[h] Vultis homines iſtum typhum, ſuperciliumque deponere, qui Deum vobis adſciſcitis Patrem, & *cum eo contenditis immortalitatem habere vos unam.* Arnobius adver. Gentes, l. ii.

[i] Dialogus cum Tryph. p. 139. Ed. Thirlb.

Ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτε κακόν τι δράσαντες ἡγοῦνται δώσειν δίκην, ἀπαθὲς γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτι, ἀθανάτου αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης, δέονταί τι τοῦ θεοῦ ἔτι.

"*Dignity*

"*Dignity or Power*[k]." His Reaſoning runs thus, If the Soul be immortal, it muſt be uncreated; if it be uncreated, it will be equal to God; and therefore incapable of ever ſuffering.

Arnobius, ſpeaking of this Doctrine of the Immortality, declares that it gave too much Encouragement to all Sorts of Wickedneſs and Licentiouſneſs: that there would be nothing to reſtrain Men from Vice, as they muſt be perſuaded, from the very Nature of the Soul, that it was ſecure from all Puniſhment. *Non denique omnia ſuis Cupiditatibus largiatur, quæ libido impotens juſſerit, impunitatis præterea etiam libertate munita? Quid enim prohibebit, quo minus hæc faciat?* Metus ſupernæ poteſtatis, judiciumque divinum? Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit perſuaſum, tam ſe eſſe immortalem, quam ipſum Deum primum? Nec ab eo judicari quicquam de ſe poſſe; cum ſit una Immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis poſſit æqualitate vexari[l].

Again: He threatens the Pagans with the Puniſhment of another Life, and bids them not flatter themſelves with the Hopes of eſcaping it, *becauſe their Souls were immortal. Neque illud obrepat, aut ſpe vobis aeria blandiatur, quod a Sciolis nonnullis, & plurimum ſibi arrogantibus dicitur; Deo eſſe ſe natos*, nec fati obnoxios legibus, p. 86.

The famous Paſſage in *Syneſius* may be very

k Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀθάναλοι χρὴ λέγειν αὐτήν· ὅτι εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, καὶ ἀγένητος δηλαδή.

Ἐπεὶ εἰ ἀγένητοι ἦσαν, ὅτ' ἂν ἐξημάρτανον, ὅτε ἀφροσύνης ἀνάπλεω ἦσαν, οὐδὲ δεῖλαι καὶ θρασεῖαι πάλιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκεῖναί ποτε εἰς σύας ἐχώρεν, καὶ ὄφεις, καὶ κύνας, οὐδὲ μὴν ἀναγκάζεσθαι αὐτὰς θέμις, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀγένητοι· τὸ γὰρ ἀγένητον τῷ ἀγενήτῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστι, ἴσον, καὶ ταὐτὸν, καὶ ὅτε δυνάμει, ὅτε τιμῇ προκριθείη ἂν θατέρου τὸ ἕτερον. 147, 8, 9. 50.

l See *Divine Legation*, vol. I. p. 423.—*Arnob. Adver. Gent.* l. ii.

 "perti-

pertinently applied to the present Case. " *I can* " *never prevail with myself to think that the Soul* " *was made after the Body.* I will never affirm " that the World, and all its Parts will be one "Day destroyed. *I conceive that the Resur-* " *rection contains some very holy and profound My-* " *stery*; *I am far from thinking with the vulgar* " on this Point [m]." This learned Ancient could not prevail with himself to embrace the Scripture Doctrine of another Life; and this, because he believed that the Soul existed before the Body, or was immortal in a proper and strict Sense. Yet, for all this, the learned Modern tells us, " That " the Pagan Notion of a future State was very " agreeable to the Doctrine taught by Revela- " tion [n]." True it is, that *Synesius* could not discover it. He was so far from thinking the two Notions nearly allied, that he consider'd them as plainly opposite and repugnant to each other. But what then? This is not the first Discovery, by a many, which Mr. *Jackson* has made of the Opinions of Antiquity, in Spite of all itself could say to the contrary. Tho' Cavilers may still make it a Question, whether the *Old* or the *New Platonist* was the ablest Judge of this Point; for, as they assert Facts directly contrary to each other, 'tis impossible that both of them should be in the right.

Let us just recollect what has been here said. Mr. *Warburton* tells us, that the Ancients held a Principle inconsistent with the Doctrine of a future State. Mr. *Jackson* undertakes to be their Advocate; contemns all Objections as slight and trivial; imputes them to the mere Ignorance and Blunders of his Adversary, and, in Support of his own Notion, thinks proper to appeal to primitive

[m] Epistle cv.

[n] The Belief of a future State, &c.

Antiquity.

Antiquity. But what has been the Iſſue of this Appeal? Why this; the primitive Writers give all the Sanction and Authority that Words are capable of giving, to the very Doctrine they are brought to cenſure and oppoſe; thoſe Parts of the *Divine Legation* which ſeem moſt doubtful and exceptionable, have received the cleareſt and fulleſt Confirmation from theſe very Writers. Whatever it was therefore that led Mr. *Warburton* into this Opinion, it could not be his Ignorance of, or want of Reverence for eccleſiaſtical Antiquity; and the Reader, I hope, will be ſoon ſenſible that it could not be his Ignorance of the Pagan Syſtems. But here I muſt deſire him to recollect the real State of the Queſtion; which does not turn on the *Truth* or *Falſhood* of what the primitive Writers have ſaid, but on the ſingle Fact, *whether they have ſaid it or no.* If the Reader will be ſo kind as to take this Obſervation along with him, and apply it to the Paſſages above cited, I need be in no Pain for the Judgment he will paſs on this Part of the Controverſy.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Spinoziſm of the old Philoſophers.

MR. *Jackſon*, ſpeaking of his Adverſary, ſays, "So he has nothing to charge the "Philoſophers with, as the ground of their pre-"tended Unbelief of this Doctrine, (a future State) "but only their Philoſophy, which he calls me-"taphyſical Whimſies concerning God and the "Soul, *merely becauſe he does not underſtand it*[o]." I meet with nothing here but hard Words: Which,

[o] Mr. *Jackſon*'s Defence, p. 7, 8.

for want of a better Name, one may call, *Mr. Jackſon's Logic*. One of the Whimſies charged upon the Philoſophers by Mr. *Warburton*, is, that they maintained the *Soul* to be ſtrictly and properly *a Part of God*. I do not find that his learned Adverſary undertakes to confute the ſeveral Arguments alledged by him, in Support of this Charge: And with good Reaſon; for there can, I think, be no Queſtion, but that this Principle, impious and deteſtable as it is, was really held by the ancient Sages.

To confirm this, I ſhall not go thro' the Opinions of the ſeveral Sects, but content myſelf with a few Remarks on one or two of the greateſt Importance; we have already ſeen what the Fathers thought of this Matter; and what follows will not only ſerve to vindicate the Author of the *Divine Legation*, but *the Fathers themſelves*, who, we now ſee, are equally involved with him in this Charge.

We find that the Works given to *Hermes* abound with the moſt groſs and rank Spinoziſm [p]: "The "Soul is not *cut off* from the divine Subſtance, "but is, as it were, a *Diffuſion* or *Extenſion* of "him." I ſhall tranſcribe another Paſſage as I find it in *Cudworth*, wherein God is ſaid to be all things, not only *actual* but *poſſible*. "For what ſhall I "praiſe thee? becauſe I am my own as having "ſomething proper and diſtinct from Thee? "Thou art whatſoever I am; thou art whatſoever "I do or ſay; for thou art all things, and there "is nothing which thou art not. Thou art that "which is made, and thou art that which is not "made [q]." In the ſame Place, before things were

[p] Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἐστιν ἀπεστερημένος τῆς οὐσιότητος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπλωμένος καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς.

[q] *Intellectual Syſtem*, p. 347. 1ſt Ed. This too is the Language of the famous *Aſclepian* Dialogue. *Nonne hoc dixi omnia unum*

were made, God is ſaid to *contain and hide them within himſelf:* When they are made, he is ſaid *to reveal and manifeſt them from himſelf.*

Here then I appeal to every Reader, whether it be poſſible for Teſtimonies to be more explicite and preciſe than theſe: I am ſure this Notion is not expreſs'd by any modern Spinoziſt in more plain, poſitive, and direct Terms than it is here. Let it be remembered too that theſe Books, according to *Jamblichus* [r], ſpeak the *Language of the Philoſophers*; and then, I think, it cannot be denied but that Spinoziſm muſt be ranked amongſt the Principles of the old *Grecian* Sages, and, from thence, plainly transfuſed into the following Lines, without loſing any thing of its Force or Energy.

Quicquid eſt hoc, omnia animat, format, alit, auget, creat,
SEPELIT RECIPITQUE *in ſeſe omnia, omniumque idem eſt Pater:*
Indidemque eademque oriuntur de integro, atque eodem occidunt [s].

We are told here that all things will be lodged and buried in God, or the univerſal Subſtance; and that they will afterwards emerge and riſe out of it again. The very Language of the Books of *Hermes*,—there God is ſaid to *hide* things within himſelf, and here, *Sepelit recipitque in ſeſe omnia.* If then the Books of *Hermes* are ſuppoſed to con-

unum eſſe, & unum omnia; utpote quia in Creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creaſſet omnia. Nec immerito unus eſt dictus omnia, cujus membra ſunt omnia.

Idcirco non erant, quando nata non erant, ſed in eo jam tunc erant, unde naſci habuerunt. *Apuleius*, p. 582. 594. *Ed. Par.*

r De Myſteriis.

s De Divin. l. i. c. 57.

 tain

tain the rankeſt Spinoziſm [t], and one of the more ſenſible Writers againſt the *Divine Legation* readily allows that they do contain it, it will be difficult to ſhew that the Doctrine of theſe Verſes is orthodox and innocent in this Point.

When *Cicero* has given us the Lines above-cited, he immediately ſubjoins, *Quid eſt* igitur, *quum domus ſit omnium una, quumque animi hominum* ſemper fuerint, futurique ſint, *cur ii, quid ex quoque eveniat, & quid quamque rem ſignificat, perſpicere non poſſint?* He here declares that the Soul was ſtrictly and properly eternal; and he declares it to be ſtrictly and properly ſo, in Conſequence of the Doctrine laid down in theſe Verſes. What then was this Doctrine? Why, that the Soul was taken originally from God. And if it was declared to be eternal *a parte ante*, in Conſequence of this, we may be certain that it was underſtood to be taken from God in the moſt exact and proper Senſe.

But to come to particulars, I will begin with *Empedocles*, a Follower of *Pythagoras*. We all know that, according to his Syſtem, the active Principle, which was to produce and frame all things, was called *Union or Friendſhip*. But then *Ariſtotle* tells us that this Principle was *paſſive* as well as *active*; he tells us [v], "That it was

[t] Bott's *Anſwer to the Divine Legation*, p. 227.—Deum eſſe, aliquo modo, omnia, multoties & multifariam innuunt Platonici; & per *Emanationes vel Irradiationes ſui* mundum produxiſſe. Crediderunt veteres cujuſcunque ordinis, quantum mihi conſtat, *ex nihilo nihil fieri*, neque aliquid in nihilum reverti poſſe.—*quaſi ante mundum ortum*, aut poſt ultimam abolitionem, *non eſſent prorſus nihil rerum eſſentiæ, ſed haberent ſemper ſuum modum ſubſiſtendi in natura Divina, licet ſine omni Diſtinctione Individuorum.* Burnet. Archæol. Phil. c. vii.

[v] Ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν· αὐτὴ δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γὰρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. Metaphyſ. l. xii. c. 10.

to

"to unite and join things together, and was itself "part of the things thus united and joined." Now is not this in Effect telling us, that the *same Principle* was both *Cause* and *Effect?* Must not then *Empedocles* take away all Distinction between the Creator and the Creature? Must he not identify the Maker and the thing made; in the very same manner with Spinoza himself?

The following Passage will furnish some very plain and conclusive Proofs, in Support of this Charge against the Philosophers. *Pythagoras qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnium intentum & commeantem, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi & lacerari Deum. Et cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret, tum Dei partem esse miseram, quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus*[x]. It is hardly in the Power of Language to speak in a more accurate and precise manner. *Non vidit distractione humanorum animorum* discerpi & lacerari Deum. How could the Deity be supposed to be *mangled* and *torn* by the Discerption of the human Soul, if the Soul was not held to be a Particle or Portion of him in the most rigorous and strict Sense? *Et cum miseri animi essent,—tum Dei partem esse miseram.* How absurd and ridiculous must this Objection have appeared, if the Soul had been called a Portion of the Deity, only in a metaphorical and figurative Sense, as created by him? *Cur autem quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus?* Here a divine Attribute is ascribed to the human Soul, in Consequence of the Opinion, which declares it to be a Part of God.

We will go now to *Plato* and his Followers. *Plutarch* explains their Doctrine in the following

[x] Cicero de N. D. l. i. c 11.

manner.

manner [y]. "The Soul is not so much the *Work* "and *Production* of God, as a *Part* of him;—nor "is it made *by* him, but *from* him, and *out* of "him." Let us attend to the first Part.—"The "Soul is not so much the *Work* and *Production* of "God, as a *Part* of him." If it was called a Part of God only in a figurative or popular Sense, why might it not have been considered as the *mere Work and Production of God?* Nay, how could it have been considered otherwise? For figurative Expression relates not to the *Nature of Things*, but only to the *Mode of conveying our Ideas.* When therefore it is called a *Part* of God, and, on that very Account, opposed to the *Works* and *Productions* of God, what Way have we to understand the Phrase but as strictly literal? —— Let us come now to the second Part: "It was not made *by* "him, but *from* him, and *out* of "him." Is not God here represented as the *material Cause*, *out* of which the Soul is formed? And does not this necessarily imply that the human Soul was really and properly a Part of God?

Philo, a Man all over *Platonized*, speaking of the Excellence and Perfections of the human Soul, declares that it could not have possessed these great Talents, "unless it had "been a Portion of the divine Soul; but such "a Portion as could not be *separated* and *divided* "from it. For no Part of the divine Nature is "*cut off by Division*, but is only *diffused* and *ex*-"*tended.* Wherefore the Soul, *sharing the Per*-"*fections of the divine Nature*, launches out into "the Universe, and does not confine itself with-"in any Bounds." Let us attend to this Passage:

[y] Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ—ἔκ ἔργον ἐςὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ κ̀ μέρος—κ̀ Ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' Ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, κ̀ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν. Platonicæ Quæstiones, Ed. Xyl. p. 1001.

"But

"But such a Portion, as could not be *separated* "and *divided* from it[z]." Why does he talk of *Separation* and *Division*, but to imply that the Soul was really and properly a Part of God? "It "was not *cut* off from, but was only an *Extension* "of the divine Substance." Does not this Language suppose it to be *a Part* of God? It is indeed the very Language of the Books of *Hermes*; and these, I think, are allowed to contain the rankest Spinozism. Lastly, the Soul is said to *share* the divine Perfections, in Consequence of this very Doctrine.

Plotinus tells us[a], "that our Soul is of *the* "*same Species* with the Soul of the Universe. That "if we view it, as it is in itself, stript and divested "of every thing foreign to it, we shall find that "it equally deserves our *Veneration* and *Esteem*."

Alcinous says, "the Souls of Men and the U-"niverse do both partake of the *same Mission*[b]."

Stobæus, speaking of *Numenius*, *Plotinus*, and *Porphyrius*, explains their Doctrine of the Soul, and then adds, "according to this Opinion the Soul

[z] Εἰ μὴ τῆς θείας καὶ εὐδαίμονος ψυχῆς ἐκείνης ἀπόσπασμα ἦν ὃ διαίρετον· τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ' ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται· διὸ μεμοιραμένος τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ τελειότητος, &c. Quod det. poti. insid. soleat, p. 172.

[a] Enn. I. i. c. 12. ΌΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον ὃ ἦν ψυχή. *Le Clerc*, speaking of the *Platonists*, says, *Ils ont aussi souvent des Expressions* peu exactes, *comme quand* Plotin *dit que nos ames sont de la même espece que l'ame du monde, qui est seulement leur* sœur ainée. *C'est confondre* la Créature avec le Créateur, *& ouvrir la porte à l'Idolatrie.* Bibliotheque Choisie, tome iii. p. 94. What this learned Critic means by *peu exacte*, amounts to no more than their Notions do not agree with his: Tho' the Words insinuate that they did not express their own meaning with Precision; which (whatever he might think) was not the Case.

[b] *Stanley*'s Lives of the Philosophers, p. 190. 1st Ed.

" does not really differ from the Mind, the Gods, " and the celeſtial Natures [c]."

Another of the Followers of *Plato* declared, " that the Soul *had the ſame Subſtance* with " God [d]."

It appears from theſe Paſſages that the Soul was ſuppoſed to be of the very ſame Nature and Subſtance with God himſelf. It muſt therefore either have been conceived to be a Part of him, or a ſeparate and diſtinct Subſtance, equal to him. But Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf inſiſts *that they did not hold any ſeparate and diſtinct Subſtance to be equal with God* [e]; and therefore, by his Leave, I would conclude, that they believed the Soul to be a Part of him.

The Reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee this Reaſoning confirm'd by almoſt as able a Judge of Antiquity, as Mr. *Jackſon*. *Intelliges rurſus quo ſenſu Plato voluerit, diſcere nihil aliud eſſe, quam reminiſci; nempe quatenus anima mundi eſt omniſcia, & quælibet ejus particula*, tanquam homogenea, ejuſdemque conditionis cum tota, omniſcia ſimiliter eſt: *Tametſi quo momento demergitur in Corpus, obfuſcetur & quaſi lethæum bibens poculum, obliviſcatur omnia, variè deinceps per ſenſus excitanda, & in memoriam revocanda* [f]: To the Teſtimony of *Gaſſendi*, I ſhall juſt add that of *Sigonius*, ſpeaking of ſome old Philoſophers, he ſays, *Quorum opinio conſtans fuit*,

[c] Phyſ. Ec. p. 108. Κατὰ δὴ ταύτην καὶ καὶ ΘΕΩΝ καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ διέκεκοχε ΚΑΤΑ ΓΕ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΗΝ ΟΥΣΙΑΝ.

[d] Theodorus Aſinæus, inter Platonicos non obſcurus Philoſophus, animam humanam Deo ipſi ΟΜΟΟΥΣΙΟΝ eſſe voluit. *Gale's Preface to Jamblichus de Myſteriis.*

[e] Page 8. of his *Defence*.

[f] Gaſſendus in l. x. Diogenis Laertii, p. 551.

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demitti animos e cœlo, divinæque mentis eos esse non solum munus, sed etiam partem *præcipuam ac* propriam. "The Soul is not only a Gift of God, "but even a Part of him." If the last part of the Sentence be not understood in the most literal and strict Sense, the former Part can be understood in no Sense at all: For it is evident that the Soul may very properly be said to be *only a Gift* of God, if it be *not* really and properly *a Part* of him. I need not say that I take the Passage, just recited, from the Piece going under the Title of *Consolation*, which we commonly see in the Collection of *Cicero*'s Writings.

These Passages are surely very much to the Purpose, if any thing can be to the Purpose that is urged against a favourite Hypothesis. It would be endless to run through the several Arguments and Authorities, that might be produced in Favour of the Doctrine here supported. But enough surely has been said in Answer to the Little, the *Nothing*, I may say, that has hitherto been brought against this Part of the *Divine Legation*. For what, after all, has Mr. *Jackson* given us on this Point? Has he fairly examined any single Reason or Testimony alledged by his learned Adversary? No, not one, all he gives is the Ribaldry of ill Language. He charges Mr. *Warburton* with giving this Account of the old Philosophy, *merely because he did not understand it*. But what will the learned Gentleman say to *Aristotle*, *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and the other numerous Authorities abovementioned? Will he say that they too were all *pure Smatterers in Learning? That they were not versed in the Schools of the ancient Philosophers of* Greece *and* Italy? That they charged the old Systems with these Principles, purely because *they did not understand them?*

CHAP. VIII.

That the Doctrine of another Life was delivered in the Mysteries in the most fabulous and gross Manner.

LET us proceed:—The learned Author in the next Passage says, "And yet he allows that "these Philosophers constantly professed their Be- "lief of this Doctrine, as well as the Legislators "did; and they had the same Instructions con- "cerning God and the Soul in the Mysteries, as "the Legislators had, who there learned the Truth "of this Doctrine and believed it; *and which was* "*no other than a more rational Explication of it* "*divested of Fable, than that which was taught* "*to the People*[E]". He *falsifies* the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; which says, *that the Legislators* TAUGHT *the truth of this Doctrine in the Mysteries*, not that *they* LEARNED *it there*. But I shall concern myself only with the last Words. Therefore pray, Sir, where are your Authorities to prove this very extraordinary Fact? You do indeed pronounce "*that the Doctrine of another* "*Life, as delivered in the Mysteries, was divested* "*of all Fable.*" But, Sir, the Confidence of your Assertion will not supply the Modesty of your Evidence, which is silent upon this Head. Why did you conceal from your Reader, that the *Divine Legation* tells us that the Ancients have given a very different Account of this Matter? Or have you really forgot it? Give me leave then to refresh your Memory. *Plato*, speaking of those who established the Mysteries, declares "that "they were excellent Persons,—that they there "taught that all who died before Initiation,

[E] Mr. *Jackson's* Defence, p. 8. 9.

"*would*

" *would descend into the infernal Regions, and there* " *be condemned to grovel in Filth and Mire.* But " that all who had been initiated, would, upon " their Arrival at the same Place, be translated to " the Habitations of the Gods [h]."

When *Antisthenes* was initiated, the Priest told him " that all who were admitted to the Myste- " ries, would be intitled to great Happiness in " the *infernal Regions* [i]. Thus, Sir, in direct Contradiction to what you maintain, some of the best Writers of Antiquity assure us, that the Doctrine of another Life was delivered in the Mysteries *in the most popular and gross Sense*; they were so far from refining on the common Ideas, that they give us those very Ideas as the whole of the Matter. The Reader will make a proper Reflection on a Fact thus roundly asserted, contrary to the clear and express Evidence of the Ancients themselves.

CHAP. IX.

That the Refinements of the Philosophers on the common Notion of a future State, went much farther than the learned Writer imagines.—The Metempsychosis of Pythagoras *explained, and shewn to be destructive of all future Rewards and Punishments.*

" SUpposing, says this learned Man, that the " Philosophers, in their Explanations, *re-* " *fined* upon this Doctrine, which was both rea- " sonable in itself, and taught in the Mysteries

[h] In Phædone.

[i] Diogenes Laertius, l. vi, Μυούμενός ποτε τὰ Ὀρφικὰ, τοῦ ἱερέως εἰπόντος ὅτι οἱ ταῦτα μυούμενοι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ΕΝ ΑΔΟΥ μετέσχουσι, τί οὖν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀποθνήσκεις;

[k] Defence, p. 9.

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"by Priests who were also Philosophers, would "would any Writer but this Author draw such a "weak and absurd Inference, as that they neither "did nor could believe it?" What is the *Refinement* here meant? Why, that they had stript the Doctrine of another Life of the common Fables of *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*. In this Case, says Mr. *Jackson*, "Would any Writer but such an "Author, draw such a weak and absurd Inference, "&c." Why, yes, Sir; the same *Inference* has been drawn by other Writers. I have shewn as plainly as Words and *Fact* can do it, that the *Inference*, with respect to future Punishments, was made by *Cicero* and *Ovid*, *Seneca* and *Epictetus*; and will you prove from *Reason* that it could not be made? Or will you *insultingly* tell us, that none but *such Authors* could have made it? It is indeed happy for Mr. *Warburton* that so many learned Ancients must incur your Censure before it reaches him, or he had been in a sad Pickle. However it must needs be a Reflection on his *Wit*, if not on his Judgment, and a Proof of his *Dullness*, if not of his Ignorance, that he represents ancient Facts just as he finds them, without one Dram of *Invention*, or systematical Imbelishment.

But as the learned Gentleman talks of *Refinements*, I will beg leave to give another Instance, which, in my Opinion, bears hard upon the Notion he is here maintaining: I mean the *physical* and natural Metempsychosis; this excludes all *moral* Purpose and Design, all future Rewards and Punishments, in the strict and proper Meaning of those Terms. The common and popular Opinion was, that the Soul, after its Departure from the *present*, would successively pass into *other*, Bodies; this Migration was purely moral; it [1] was consi-

[1] Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 377.

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dered as a State of future Retribution. "The "Coward was to be thrust ignominiously into the "Body of a Woman; the Murderer imprisoned "within the Fur of a Savage; the lascivious con-"demned to animate a Boar or Sow." And this, as *Timæus* says, ποτὶ κόλασιν, *by way of Punishment*, for the Demerit of their preceding Lives. But then this *moral* Purpose and Design was distinguished and explained away in the secret Doctrine on this Subject. A Metempsychosis was taught which could not be considered in this Light. *Aristotle*, speaking of some old Philosophers, says, "They only attempt to explain the "Nature of the Soul, but state and define nothing "with regard to the Body, in which it is to be "lodged, as if it was possible, *according to the* "*Fables of* Pythagoras, that Souls should pass in-"differently into all kind of Bodies, or that every "Soul might descend into every Body without "*Distinction*[m]." Now is not this directly contrary to the Notion given us by *Timæus*? according to him, the Soul was to pass into other Bodies ποτὶ κόλασιν, *by way of Punishment:* And, for this Purpose, proper and peculiar Bodies were assigned it, such as were best suited to punish and torture the Soul itself; but, according to this other account of the *Pythagoric* Doctrine, Souls were to pass into all Bodies without *Distinction*; every Soul might pass into every Body.

Diogenes Laertius confirms the same. In his Life of *Pythagoras* he tells us, "that he was re-"ported to be the first who taught the Migration "of the Soul, from one Body to another by a *Phy-*

[m] Οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τοῦ δεξομένου σώματος οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΙΚΟΥΣ ΜΥΘΟΥΣ, ΤΗΝ ΤΥΧΟΥΣΑΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΤΥΧΟΝ ΕΝΔΥΕΣΘΑΙ ΣΩΜΑ. De anima, l. iii.

"*sical*

"*ſical Neceſſity*[n]." And to the ſame Purpoſe *Servius* ſpeaks of a Tranſmigration, which was ſuppoſed to be made only *propter Fati Neceſſitatem*[o]. *Seneca*, ſpeaking of this Notion of *Pythagoras*, ſeems to ſuppoſe the Migration of the Soul to be as *purely phyſical* and *neceſſary*, as the Motion of the heavenly Bodies. *Non credis, inquit, animas in alia corpora atque alia deſcribi? Et migrationem eſſe quam dicimus eſſe mortem? Non credis in his Pecudibus ferifve aut aqua merſis illum quondam hominis animum morari? Non credis nihil perire in hoc mundo, ſed mutare regionem?* Nec tantum cœleſtia per certos circuitus verti, ſed animalia quoque per vices ire, & animos per orbem agi. (Ep. 109.) Does he not put the ſeveral Revolutions of the Soul on the ſame Foot with thoſe of the heavenly Bodies? And was not the Motion of the laſt ſuppoſed to be purely natural?

I will cloſe this Head with thoſe famous Lines of *Ovid*,

O Genus attonitum ſtolidæ formidine mortis!
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, & nomina vana timetis,
Materiem vatum, falſique pericula mundi?
Corpora ſive rogus flamma, ſeu tabe vetuſtas
Abſtulerit, mala poſſe pati non ulla putetis.
Morte carent animæ, ſemperque, priore relicta
Sede, novis domibus vivunt habitantque receptæ[p].

Theſe Words are here given to *Pythagoras* himſelf; it is certain that they contain his Notion; and it is equally certain that the Tranſmigration

[n] Πρῶτον δέ φασι τοῦτον ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώοις. L. viii. § 14.

[o] *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 387.

[p] Metamor. l. xv.

here

here deſcribed was barely *phyſical and neceſſary*. This appears from the Purpoſe for which theſe Verſes were introduced; and that was *Seriem* evolvere *Fati* [q].

2*dly*. It is ſo far from being conſider'd in a *moral* View, that it is directly oppoſed to the common Doctrine of another Life. It will be to no Purpoſe to reply, that it ſtrikes only at the poetical and fabulous Accounts of future Puniſhments: If it deſtroys theſe, *we have proved* that it muſt, of courſe, deſtroy all future Puniſhments whatſoever.

We ſee then, the *Refinements* of the Philoſophers went much further than the learned Writer ſeems willing to allow; they went indeed ſo far as to deſtroy the proper Notion of a future State.

Let us now go to the DOUBLE DOCTRINE. Whether the Philoſophers did actually practiſe it, Mr. *Jackſon* may, if he pleaſes, diſpute: But after what has been ſaid of their Notions concerning the human Soul, it will hardly be denied but that they really wanted it. For we ſee that they held Principles, which would have been very dangerous and hurtful to Society, if they had been publiſh'd and divulged to the World at large. We know too from their own Profeſſions, from their great Regard and Tenderneſs for the Intereſts of Society, that they never would impart theſe Notions to the Vulgar. When therefore they were obliged to

[q] ——*Juvat ire per alta*
Aſtra; juvat, terris & inerti ſede relictis,
Nube vehi; validique humeris inſiſtere Atlantis:
Palanteſque animos paſſim, ac rationis egentes
Deſpectare procul, trepidoſque obitumque timentes
Sic exhortari; SERIEMQUE EVOLVERE FATI:

And then follow the Lines I have juſt quoted.

ſpeak on theſe Points, what was left for them, but *to profeſs one thing, while they believed another?*

And, on the other Side, if they actually ſaid one thing when they thought another; if they practiſed the *double Doctrine* in that Extent, in which it is charged upon them by the Author of the *Divine Legation*, we may be certain that they entertained ſome very hurtful and pernicious Notions. Why elſe were they ſo ſtudious to cover and conceal them from the Body of the People?

CHAP. X.

Mr. Jackſon's *Notion of the Double Doctrine examined.—His Objections to the* Divine Legation, *on this Point, explained and confuted.*

LET us firſt examine what Mr. *Jackſon*'s Notion of the double Doctrine is; and here let him be heard in his own Words. "The Exoteric "and Eſoteric Philoſophy had only a Reference "to the Difference of the vulgar and political "from the philoſophical Notions of the future "State, and not at all to the Reality and Belief "of it, which was always believed in different "ways of Explication by the Learned and Un-"learned; by the Poets and Philoſophers, as well "as by the common People," p. 93.

Having ſaid that the Philoſophers taught the common and fabulous Doctrine of a future State, he adds, "as they themſelves had more rational "Notions concerning a future State, they taught "their Diſciples a different Doctrine about the "Soul, and the Happineſs and Miſery of the "State

" State after Death. This was called the eſoteric " or ſecret Doctrine, in Diſtinction to the exoteric, " or public and vulgar Opinion," p. 71.

" They taught that the human Soul was con- " genial with the Soul of the World; and that " the Happineſs of it after Death conſiſted in " its Return to and intimate Union with God, " from whom it was derived; on the other hand " that the Miſery of it conſiſted in being excluded " from the Union with God, and having no Com- " munication with him." He expreſſes himſelf to the ſame Purpoſe, p. 89, 90, and tells us, " that " after Death the Wicked and Ungodly were to " be for ever miſerable, by being ſeparated and " alienated from the bleſſed Communion and Fel- " lowſhip of the immortal Gods.".

In his ſecond Piece he tells us, " that the Souls " of virtuous Men were to reſide in ſome luminous " Orb, were to enjoy the Society of celeſtial Beings; " were to be united with and have Communion " with God; were to be bleſſed with the beatific " Viſion of the divine Perfections. That the Souls " of wicked and ungodly Men after Death were " baniſhed from the Communion both of God " and all holy Perſons; were aſſociated with evil " Dæmons, and condemned to a State of Miſery " and Puniſhment. Theſe were the Doctrines " concerning God and the Soul, which were " taught in the Myſteries, and were the eſoteric " Doctrines of the old Philoſophers." p. 8.

In the laſt Paſſage the learned Writer undertakes to give us the ſecret or eſoteric Doctrine with regard to future Puniſhments; " The wick- " ed, it ſeems, were to be baniſhed from the So- " ciety and Aſſembly of the Gods." This was, according to him, the Subſtance of that Doctrine. But does he then think that this Excluſion from

the Seats and Aſſemblies of the Gods was a *ſecret* and *hidden* Notion? *Cicero*, ſpeaking of the old *Caſci*, ſays, " they did not look upon Death as a " State of Non-exiſtence, they conſidered it only as " a Change of one Life for another. They thought " that Perſons of great and ſingular Accompliſh- " ments would be raiſed and exalted into Hea- " ven, *while all the reſt were fixed and confined* " *to theſe lower Regions*." We are here told, that the Bulk of Mankind was to be baniſhed and excluded from the Society and Aſſembly of the Gods. We are told too that this was the general and received Notion of the old *Caſci*. Was then this barbarous and illiterate People actually poſſeſſed of this Opinion? If ſo, the Inference is certain, that this was a *popular* and exoteric, not a *private* and ſecret Doctrine.

But what is ſtill worſe, this will, when examined, be found to be no Doctrine of future Puniſhments at all. We are told in the Paſſage juſt recited, that all but Men of great and eminent Endowments, were to be excluded from the Aſſembly of the Gods. And if ſo, the Body of good Men muſt be excluded too. Now what plainer Proof can there be that this was not conſidered as a State of Puniſhment? For ſurely moſt good Men were not ſentenced and condemned to a State of future Puniſhments promiſcuouſly with the wicked.

2*dly*. Another thing advanced in the laſt Citation, is, *that the ſecret Doctrines of the Schools of Philoſophy and Myſteries of Religion, are one and the ſame thing*. I meet indeed with a very different Account of this matter in the *Divine Legation*. But different as that Account is, 'tis confirmed by what Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf has, in the Heat of Oppoſition, advanced on this Head.

The Myſteries, he tells us, taught "that the "wicked and ungodly ſhould be for ever miſe-"rable." But what ſay the Philoſophers? did they too embrace this Notion of *eternal Puniſhments? Cicero*, ſpeaking of the Souls of the wicked, after their Departure from the Body, ſays, *Corporibus elapſi circum terram ipſam volutantur, nec hunc in locum* [*Cœlum*] *niſi multis exagitati ſeculis, revertuntur*[r]. And Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf ſpeaks of the *Stoics* as believing that *the Souls of good Men would exiſt till the general Conflagration, but that thoſe of the wicked would continue only to a certain Period*[s].

He will therefore ſuffer me, if not on Mr. *Warburton*'s, yet on his own Authority, to diſtinguiſh between the hidden Doctrines of the Schools of Philoſophy, and thoſe of the Myſteries of Religion. He himſelf tells us, that the Myſtagogues taught the Eternity of future Puniſhments. But did the Philoſophers teach the ſame? I have proved by very clear and full Authorities that they did not.

So far on Mr. *Jackſon*'s own Notion; on the Suppoſition that the hidden Doctrines of the Schools included the Belief of future Puniſhments. In this very Caſe the hidden Doctrines of the Schools and the Myſteries of Religion, would be very ſeparate and diſtinct things; as ſeparate and diſtinct as the Doctrines, which teach *temporal* and *eternal* Puniſhments.

I have often wondered that the learned Writer ſhould repreſent the Ancients as actually believing *eternal* Puniſhments. If this was their firm and real Perſuaſion, the Doctrine of temporary Puniſhments muſt be conſidered as merely political and civil. Now it is highly improbable or incre-

[r] Somn. Scip. c. ix.

[s] *The Belief of a future State*, &c. p. 98.

dible

dible rather, that this ſhould be the Caſe. Mr. *Jackſon* allows that the public Doctrine was contrived for the Sake of the Populace; that it was cloathed with all thoſe Terrors and Fictions, which were moſt likely to ſtrike their Imaginations. And what more effectual for this Purpoſe, than the *eternal Duration of* future Puniſhments? Can we conceive that they would have ſtript the popular Doctrine of this Circumſtance, had they thought it to be ſtrictly and really true? The learned Gentleman muſt therefore pardon me, if I cannot agree with him, that they really and actually believed *eternal*, and yet preached up only *temporary* Puniſhments.

3dly. Mr. *Jackſon* himſelf furniſhes another unanſwerable Argument to prove, that the ſecret Doctrines of the Philoſophers, and the Myſteries of Religion, were not one and the ſame thing. The *eſoteric Philoſophy*, according to him, taught a State of future Rewards and Puniſhments; but diveſted of thoſe Fables and fictitious Circumſtances with which this Doctrine was delivered to the People. Did it ſo? Why then we may be certain it did not teach the ſame Notion of another Life with the *Myſteries*. For will any one ſay that the Notion of another Life, as delivered in the Myſteries, was ſtript of theſe Fables? Mr. *Jackſon* has indeed ſaid it. But then he oppoſes his own Authority to the Teſtimonies of *Plato* and *Diogenes Laertius*. And what Adverſary could wiſh him in a worſe Caſe?

And here it may not be unpleaſant to obſerve, how the Scene is now changed. The learned Writer tells us, that the *external* Doctrine taught future Rewards and Puniſhments in the moſt *popular and groſs Senſe*. This is, it ſeems, the diſtinguiſhing Mark and Character of that Doctrine. But has it

not

not been ſhewn that the *Myſteries* taught another Life, *after the very ſame Manner*? It will therefore unavoidably follow from his own Deſcription of the popular or external Doctrine, that this was the very Doctrine of the Myſteries.

What then, after all, has this formidable Writer proved? What mighty Feats or Wonders has he wrought, to juſtify ſo much Haughtineſs and Contempt? As for his own Hypotheſis, there is nothing in *Antiquity*, *Reaſon*, or the *Nature of things* to countenance and uphold it. With regard to *Antiquity*, it is not only unſupported by proper Evidence, but contrary to the plain and direct Teſtimony of *Cicero* himſelf: Mr. *Jackſon* gives us that for a *Secret*, which *Cicero* plainly ſhews to have been a *public* and external Doctrine. And what is more unlucky ſtill, this, when examined, proves to have been *no* Doctrine of future Puniſhments. Nor is his Hypotheſis grounded on Probability of *Reaſon*; it ſuppoſes the future Puniſhments taught and preached up to the Populace to have been *barely temporary*, while thoſe confined to the Schools of Philoſophy were *eternal:* A Poſition, which the very Nature and Deſign of the *double Doctrine* will not ſuffer us to admit. Again; he ſets out with a Diſtinction between the *philoſophical* and *vulgar* Notion of a future State. But when he ſends us to the Myſteries for the *firſt*, he muſt ſuppoſe them both to be the ſame. Strange Inconſiſtencies! firſt to diſtinguiſh between the two Doctrines, and then immediately to conſider them as one; firſt to make their Difference conſiſt *in the particular Fables* annexed to the one, and then to aſſign theſe very Fables to both Doctrines.

There is ſomething as groſs and flagrant in what he ſays with reſpect to a State of future Happineſs.

pineſs. In his firſt Piece the ſecret Doctrine places it in the *Refuſion into the divine Nature*, p. 71. But in the ſecond he ſpeaks another Language; "The Souls of good Men were to reſide in ſome "luminous Orb; to enjoy the Society of celeſtial "Beings, &c." p. 8. Now is it not a little inconſiſtent to give two ſuch oppoſite and contrary Accounts of this *ſecret Doctrine?* I ſay, oppoſite and contrary Accounts; for that theſe here mentioned, were conceived by the Ancients to be very different and diſtinct States, has been already proved. In this Caſe, the ſecret Doctrine would have been as different from *itſelf*, as the learned Author ſuppoſes it to have been from the public and external Doctrine.

But, not to inſiſt ſtrictly on this Contradiction, let him give us which he pleaſes as the *ſecret Doctrine*. If he ſends us to the *Refuſion of the Soul*, I muſt beg leave to remind him, that he has not proved, that this was conſidered as a State of Rewards: That therefore it does not appear that the ſecret Doctrine included the Belief of future Happineſs. We have indeed only examined this Notion with regard to one Sect; and then it was conſidered as equivalent to a State of Non-exiſtence. If he refers us to the *State of Happineſs in Heaven*; I reply, this is nothing to the Purpoſe of our preſent Argument, as it was not ſuppoſed to include the Body of good Men.

But, after all, what is moſt unlucky, this was not a *private*, but a *public* Doctrine; it was taught openly in order to incite Men to Acts of heroic and uncommon Bravery. And as to the Philoſophers, we have ſhewn, upon their own Authority, that they made it their Buſineſs to preach it up to the World at large.

But

But to convince Mr. *Jackſon* that this was a *public* Doctrine, I ſhall now offer an Authority, which, I dare ſay, he will not diſpute: I mean his own. For he himſelf, in direct Oppoſition to his whole Syſtem, aſſerts the very thing. " In the " *Egyptian vulgar* and *political* Theology alſo, " the human Soul was taught to be immortal, " and to ſubſiſt after Death; and thoſe which " were pure and religious were believed *to reſide* " *amongſt the Gods*; and wicked Souls were be- " lieved to paſs through various Degrees of Pu- " niſhment by a Tranſmigration, &c." p. 70.

Having examined the Merit of his own Hypotheſis, let us now ſee what he objects to the Author of the *Divine Legation.*

" Our Remarker's Explication alſo of the eſo- " teric and exoteric Philoſophy is all a mere Blunder, " *owing to his not being able to diſtinguiſh between a* " *Propoſition of a Subject, and the Explanation of it.* " The Terms Exoteric and Eſoteric, with reſpect " to the Doctrine of a future State, had no Rela- " tion to the Doctrine, or Subject itſelf, which " was taught and profeſſed equally amongſt the " Philoſophers, and amongſt the vulgar. But " the Philoſophers explained it in a different man- " ner in their political and popular Diſcourſes, " from what they did in their Lectures to their " Diſciples; the firſt was the exoteric Way, the " ſecond was the eſoteric. *And this was the Caſe* " *in reſpect of Theology in general:* And this is all " the Myſtery of Exoterics and Eſoterics, which " our Remarker has made ſo much work about; " and infers from it moſt abſurdly that the Philo- " ſophers, tho' they profeſſed and taught, did not " believe a future State of Rewards and Puniſh- " ment *."

* *Mr. Jackſon's* Defence, *&c.* p. 54.

 " Our

" Our Remarker's Explication is all a mere " Blunder." I could wish the learned Writer had expressed himself with more Civility: Not for the Sake of Mr. *Warburton*. For how, alas! can any thing of this kind be supposed to affect him? But with regard to his own Character as a Writer. For, after all, what is it that he objects to the Author of the *Divine Legation?* Why, it seems, that, out of *pure Ignorance and Blunder*, he has given two contrary Propositions to the two Doctrines? And has not Mr. *Jackson* himself done the same? It appears from his own Citations, that the one taught *temporary*, the other *eternal* Punishments. If so, must they not proceed upon contrary Propositions? As certainly as *temporal* and *eternal* are not one and the same thing. If then the giving two contrary Propositions to the two Doctrines, was so egregious a Blunder, it will fall as heavy on the learned Mr. *Jackson* as on the Author of the *Divine Legation*. He does indeed assign to each Doctrine a different Proposition from Mr. *Warburton*: But still he assigns contrary Propositions to the two Doctrines. Why then all this ill Language? If not to shew his Talent at *Billingsgate*, it must be to disguise his Theft, in the following Accounts he gives of the Mysteries. And such Writers seldom rob but they abuse.

" And this was the Case with respect to Theo- " logy in general." Would any one now imagine that the learned Mr. *Jackson* himself had shewn, in these very Treatises, that this *was not the Case in respect of Theology in general*; that the vulgar and philosophical Theology did really and actually proceed upon contrary Propositions? And yet, if he has proved any thing he has proved this.

The

" The grand Design of all the ancient *Phœnician*, " *Egyptian*, and *Chaldæan* Mysteries, seems origi- " nally to have been to discover to those, who " were initiated in them, *that the Gods, whom* " *the vulgar worshipped, were no other than dead* " *Men:—And to teach that the true Object of* " *Adoration was the one supreme God and Author* " *of Nature*[t]."

He here tells us, *that the Gods, whom the vulgar worshipped, were no other than dead Men.*— In another Place he says, the Populace were " taught " that the Gods they worshipped had " once lived amongst Men." This was the *vulgar* Theology.

But the more knowing and inlighten'd Pagans were taught, that the one supreme God was the true Object of Adoration.

If now the *vulgar* were taught that deceased Mortals were the proper Objects of Adoration; must not their Theology have been contrary and opposite to that which taught that the one supreme God was the proper Object of Adoration? Will the learned Writer insist that these were only *different Explanations of the same Notion?* He must first prove that the one true, and the many false Gods, were one and the same Object.

Again: " The *Egyptian* Priests indeed had " more Sense than to believe there was any real " Divinity in their Symbolic Images or sacred " Animals; but then they let the People go on " in their gross and senseless Superstition, and en- " couraged it by their own Practice and Example. " They made and consecrated their Gods for " them; and pretended by Amulets, Divinations, " and magical Charms, to animate the Images

[t] *The Belief of a Future State*, &c. p. 89.
[v] Page 69.

" with *Genii* and *Dæmons*, and to confine them " to their Symbols, and make them propitious " to the Worſhippers of them." p. 109.

And here again, how eaſy is it to turn his own ſmall Arms upon him? " The Prieſts pretend to " animate the Images with *Genii* and *Dæmons*," and yet, " they have too much Senſe to imagine " that there was any real Divinity in theſe very " Images," If ſo, is it not neceſſary to ſuppoſe that they *profeſſed* one thing when they *thought* another; or, that the two Doctrines were, in this Caſe grounded upon Principles, directly oppoſite and repugnant to each other? Will the learned Gentleman ſay, that the Notion which *aſſerted*, and that which *denied* the *Divinity* of the Images, did contain only one and the ſame Propoſition?

CHAP. XI.

Doctor Sykes's *main Objection to the Double Doctrine, as explained in the* Divine Legation, *conſidered and confuted.*

BUT as this is a Matter of Importance in the preſent Controverſy, we will add a Word or two more before we diſmiſs it. The Writers againſt the *Divine Legation* ſeem all to concur in one Point; they urge and inſiſt that the two Doctrines were only Explanations of the ſame Notion; and that they did not go upon oppoſite and repugnant Principles. Mr. *Jackſon* alone is the *Drawcanſir* of the Cauſe: And, as he is in the Humour, ſometimes *confirms* this Point againſt his Adverſary, and ſometimes *confutes* it againſt himſelf.

ſelf. It may therefore be worth while to dwell a little longer on this Article. And I do it with the greater Pleaſure, as the learned Dr. *Sykes* has given us a long Diſcourſe on this very Subject. We have his main and principal Objection in the following Words. WHAT PROOF NOW CAN BE PRODUCED, — THAT IN THE TWOFOLD DOCTRINE, THEY (the Philoſophers) *actually ſaid one thing and believed another*. WHAT INSTANCE IS, OR CAN BE PRODUCED OF THIS FACT [x]? Here then we join Iſſue; if ſuch an Inſtance CAN be produced, the Doctor, I am perſuaded, according to his own Reaſoning, will allow the Miſtake to lie on his Side. If it *cannot* I readily give up the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation* as chimerical and groundleſs.

For it does indeed charge both *Legiſlators* and Philoſophers with this Practice. Now it were eaſy to produce ſeveral Inſtances with regard to the *firſt* which every reaſonable Man muſt allow to be deciſive. But at preſent I will confine myſelf to one only. As to *their Laws*, they are ſo far from repreſenting them as the mere Suggeſtions of human Policy and Wiſdom [y], that they every where aſſert their divine Origin; *they impute them to the Invention of the Gods*. Here then let the learned Doctor tell us, did they themſelves believe this to be the real Fact? did they ſuppoſe that their Laws were dictated and framed by ſome Deity? Or was this, after all, a pure Fiction and Contrivance of their own? He muſt ſay ſay that it was a Fable of

[x] Dr. *Sykes*'s Examination, p. 124.

[y] Mr. *Warburton* had ſaid that the old Law-givers "pretended an extraordinary Revelation from ſome God." To this, the Doctor replies; "that many of the Heathen Legiſlators "*did this*, is certain." *Sykes*'s Examination, p. 61.

their

their own Invention. And therefore it is certain, by his own Confeſſion, that the Ancients in this Caſe *did ſay one thing, when they believed another.*

Let us come to the Philoſophers. The learned Gentleman affirms, that they never *teach one thing and think another.* Pray, what then was *Pythagoras* doing, when he gave out that he had deſcended into the infernal Regions; that he had viſited the Seats and Abodes of departed Souls; that he had ſeen with his own Eyes the Tortures and Puniſhments inflicted on the Wicked [z]? Muſt he not in this Caſe have employed the very Fiction, which the *Divine Legation* aſcribes to the double Doctrine? And that *he ſaid one thing and believed another.*

I will now proceed to another Inſtance in the ſame Sect. The common Doctrine taught that the Souls of Men were doomed to paſs into other Bodies, as a Puniſhment for their Sins in this Life. The Philoſophers themſelves ſometimes inculcate this Notion; but then they ſometimes give a very different Account of the Doctrine; Souls are to migrate into other Bodies, by a mere *phyſical* and *natural* Neceſſity, and not by way of Puniſhment. Here then are two contrary Notions of a future State; the one ſuppoſes a moral Purpoſe and Deſign; the other gives all to *pure Neceſſity.* Muſt not theſe Doctrines be founded on oppoſite and repugnant Principles? Muſt not the Philoſophers, when they preach up the popular Notion, *ſay one thing and believe another?*

With regard to theſe two Migrations, it may perhaps be ſaid (for what is there that hath not been *ſaid*, and what is there that hath been *proved*

[z] *Diogenes Laertius*, l. viii. or his Life by *Porphyry* or *Jamblichus.*

on

on the Occaſion) how do we know which was the popular and external, which the ſecret and internal Doctrine? But ſurely the very Nature of the Doctrines is ſufficient to point out this Diſtinction. The *phyſical* Migration was of no real Uſe and Service to Society, nay, was entirely deſtructive of it, and ſo could be only taught becauſe it was really and actually believed. The *moral* Migration was ſo eminently uſeful to the State, that the Philoſophers would not have ſcrupled to teach it, tho' they had diſbelieved it. And that this was the real Caſe, we have the expreſs Teſtimony of *Timæus Locrus*, who mentions this laſt as an Opinion that was cultivated *merely on the Score of its Utility* [a].

And that the *phyſical* Migration was a Secret and hidden Doctrine, is evident from the manner, in which it is introduced by *Ovid*.

Et quoniam Deus ora movet, ſequar ora moventem
Rite Deum, Delphoſque meos, ipſumque recludam
Æthera, & Auguſtæ reſerabo oracula mentis.
Magna, nec ingeniis eveſtigata priorum,
Quæque diu latuere, *canam*, &c. Metam. l. 15.

We will go to the *Stoics* for a fourth Inſtance. As to the *Refuſion* of the Soul, we have ſhewn that they ſuppoſed it to be a State of mere Inſenſibility. It is however allowed on all hands that this was the *ſecret* Doctrine with regard to a future State. If ſo, muſt not the private have been directly oppoſite and repugnant to the public Teaching? The one mentions a future State with Rewards and Puniſhments; the other a future State without them. Do we not again meet with con-

[a] Divine Legation, p. 377.

 trary

trary Propoſitions? Was it poſſible for the Philoſophers, in this Caſe, *not to ſay one thing and think another?*

Again: We have ſhewn in the foregoing Sheets, that the Ancients ſometimes make the Soul *God*; but it is likewiſe obvious that they ſometimes urge and inſiſt that the Soul is *not God*. Here then are two different Doctrines on the very ſame Subject; and is it not evident that they muſt of Courſe proceed on contrary Propoſitions? For the Fact, on which I build this Argument, I appeal to the following Paſſages of *Cicero*. *Mens cujuſque is eſt quiſque; non ea figura quæ digito demonſtrari poteſt.* Deum *te igitur ſcito eſſe; ſiquidem* Deus *eſt qui viget, qui ſentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit & moderatur, & movet id corpus, cui præpoſitus eſt, quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus*[b].

In his firſt *Tuſculan* he ſpeaks another Language, *Ergo animus (qui, ut ego dico,* divinus) *eſt, ut Euripides dicere* audet, Deus[c].

Do not the two Paſſages relate to the very ſame Subject? does not the laſt cenſure and arraign the Doctrine of the firſt? does not the one plainly aſſert, and the other as plainly deny the Divinity of the human Soul? Had I not therefore Reaſon to ſay, that the two Doctrines muſt neceſſarily go upon contrary Propoſitions? or, in other Words, that *Cicero* in this Caſe, muſt have ſaid one thing and thought another?

I will now beg leave to inforce an Argument of Mr. *Warburton*'s, which the learned Dr. *Sykes* has not vouchſafed to anſwer, or even to mention.

[b] Somn. Scip. c. viii.
[c] Tuſc. i. c. 26.

But

But how light ſoever he may make of it, the Public may poſſibly be of Opinion, that it did not deſerve to be treated with ſo much Neglect. However let the *Divine Legation* ſpeak for itſelf. "We have ſeen the Philoſophers of every Sect, "one while ſpeaking directly for, and another "while as directly againſt a future State of Re-"wards and Puniſhments, without intimating "the leaſt Change in their Principles, or mak-"ing the leaſt Heſitation in their Profeſſions; "ſo that either we muſt hold them guilty of the "moſt groſs and viſible Contradictions, which "their Characters will not ſuffer us to conceive "of them; or elſe admit the Explanation given "above of the *double Doctrine*, and the diffe-"rent Methods of the exoteric and eſoteric Diſ-"cipline[d]".

The Doctor will not charge theſe *various Profeſſions* to the Fickleneſs and Inconſtancy of the old Philoſophers. His Reverence and Regard for the Men will not ſuffer him to do this; beſides, this would intirely defeat his own Scheme, as he undertakes to prove that the Philoſophers believed a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments[e].

He muſt then have Recourſe to the *double Doctrine*. And here I would know what he will do with thoſe Paſſages in which the Philoſophers profeſs their Diſbelief of another Life. They muſt either make part of the public or the private Doctrine. Will he aſſign them to the *firſt*? No; They contradict the very Purpoſe and Deſign of this Doctrine; as it uſed conſtantly to recommend and inforce the Notion of a future State. And yet if he gives them to the private Doctrine, he him-

[d] *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 403.

[e] See his *Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

ſelf overturns his whole Argument; he himſelf gives a Proof that the Philoſophers *actually ſaid one thing and believed another.* For it is obſervable, that theſe Paſſages ſtrike at the very Eſſence and Foundation of a future State; they do not only explode the common and popular Accounts; they not only diſcard the Fables of *Elyſium*, *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus:* They evidently go much further, they exclude *every poſſible Mode and Notion of another Life* [f]. If therefore he gives theſe to the private Doctrine, he muſt ſuppoſe that this Doctrine excludes the Belief of another Life; he muſt therefore ſuppoſe that it goes on a contrary Propoſition, to what he himſelf calls the public Doctrine; or, in other Words, he muſt confeſs that there are ſeveral Inſtances, in which the Philoſophers *actually ſaid one thing and believed another.*—And yet he has challenged all the World to produce one ſuch Inſtance; he has himſelf employed about eighty Pages, to prove that no ſuch Inſtance can poſſibly be produced.

I have ever thought that theſe Paſſages, with others of the ſame Import, are clear Proofs that the two Doctrines did really go upon *contrary Propoſitions*; that they were not mere Explanations of the *ſame Notion.* The Gentlemen on the other Side allow, that the public Doctrine ſuppoſes the Reality of another Life; and will they ſay the ſame of theſe Paſſages? If not, why do they inſiſt that the two Doctrines are barely an Explanation of one and the ſame Notion?

[f] *Epicharmus* repreſents Death as a State, in which he could have no poſſible Intereſt or Concern.——*Ariſtotle* ſays "that "it is the final Period of Exiſtence, *and that there is neither* "*Good nor Evil for the dead Man to dread or hope.*" And as to the *Stoics*, their Language is, *Nullis defunctum malis adfici. Mors omnium dolorum & ſolutio eſt & finis.* Seneca ad Mar. c. xix.

But

But what have Dr. *Sykes* and Mr. *Jackson* replied to this? And here I am sorry to acquaint the Reader, that they have acted with more Art and Finess, than one would expect from Men whose *Minds were open to Conviction.* They all along argue on a Supposition that the Ancients have only disclaimed the common and fabulous Accounts of another Life; they take not the least Notice of those Passages, in which they deny the very Being and Reality of the Life itself. Strange, that these zealous Advocates for *Sincerity*, should act in so very disingenuous a Manner! But common *Answerers*, like common Women, do every Day those things which good Manners will not suffer us to call by the right Name.

The following Instance of SYNESIUS will, I apprehend, add great Light and Strength to our general Argument on this Head. As to his Philosophy, he was a determined *Platonist*, however it might be candied over by a Bishoprick: And adhered so closely to his System, that, in Consequence of it, he gave up some of the most clear and evident Articles of the Christian Faith. He did indeed set the Authority of *Plato* far above that of the inspired Penmen; he believed the Pre-existence of the Soul with the first, and therefore could not believe the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection with the latter. But let him be heard[g] in his own Words

g Epistle 105. Χαλεπόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ λίαν ἀδύνατον, εἰς ψυχὴν τὰ δι' ἐπιστήμης εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἐλθόντα δόγματα σαλευθῆναι· οἶσθα δ' ὅτι πολλὰ φιλοσοφία τοῖς θρυλλουμένοις τούτοις ἀντιδιατάττεται δόγμασιν. ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν. τὸν κόσμον δ' φήσω καί τ' ἄλλα μέρη συνδιαφθείρεσθαι· τὴν καθωμιλημένην ἀνάστασιν ἱερόν τι καὶ ἀπόρρητον ἥγημαι, καὶ πολλῷ δέω ταῖς τοῦ πλήθους ὑπολήψεσιν ὁμολογῆσαι· νοῦς ἂν φιλόσοφος ἐπόπτης ὢν τἀληθοῦς συγχώρει τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι· ἀνάλογον γὰρ

 ἐστι

Words. " It is difficult, if not impoſſible, to " change and alter Opinions, which are fixed " in the Mind by the cleareſt and brighteſt Evi- " dence. You know that Philoſophy contains " many things oppoſite and contrary to the com- " mon and received Notions. I can never prevail " with myſelf to think that the Soul did not exiſt " before the Body. I will never affirm that the " World and its ſeveral Parts will be one Day de- " ſtroyed. As to the Reſurrection, I believe that " it contains ſome very venerable and holy My- " ſtery. I am far from acquieſcing in the common " Doctrine. However, *Philoſophy, when it has at-* " *tained the Truth, allows the Uſe of Lies and* " *Fictions.* For Light anſwers to Truth, and the " Eye to the People; the Eye would receive too " great a Quantity of Light to its own Prejudice " and Hurt. As Darkneſs is moſt proper and " commodious for thoſe who have weak Eyes; *ſo* " *I hold that Lies and Fictions are uſeful to the Peo-* " *ple*, and that Truth would be hurtful to thoſe, " who are not able to bear its Light and Splendour. " If the Laws of the Church will diſpenſe with this, " I ſhall be ready to accept of the Biſhopric; partly " philoſophizing by myſelf at home, partly talk- " ing abroad in the common Train, and preach- " ing up the general and received Fables."

It cannot ſurely be doubted, but that this Inſtance comes up to the very Point in Queſtion; that it exactly anſwers the Purpoſe for which it is produced. It is brought to prove that it was the

ἐστι φῶς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ὄμμα πρὸς λήμην· καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς κακὸν ἀπολαύσειεν ἀπλήστου φωτός. ἢ τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσι τὸ σκότος ὠφελιμώτερον, ταύτῃ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄφελος εἶναι τίθεμαι δήμῳ, καὶ βλαβερὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῖς οὐκ ἰσχύουσιν ἐνατενίσαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνάργειαν· εἰ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἱερωσύνης συγχωροῦσιν ἐμοὶ κἀμοί, δυναίμην ἱεράσθαι, τὰ μὲν οἴκοι φιλοσόφων, τὰ δ' ἔξω φιλομυθῶν.

Cuſtom

Cuſtom of the Ancients *to ſay one thing when they believed another*. And was not this the very Caſe of *Syneſius?* He does not ſcruple to acknowledge that he did not believe the *Creation of the Soul, the Deſtruction of the World, and the Doctrine of the Reſurrection.* But no matter for that; *Philoſophy allows the Uſe of Lies and Fictions*; he will think by himſelf at home, *and in public preach up theſe very Fables.* Was it not then neceſſary for him to *profeſs one thing and think another?*

It may be ſaid, we have ſhuffled in a Chriſtian Biſhop on the Doctor for a Pagan Philoſopher. But this Biſhop went into the Church a *Platoniſt*, and *Platoniſt* he continued when he was there, as extravagant and abſurd, as any he had left behind him. But be he what he will, it matters little, while he tells us what *Philoſophy* was; where he ſays, that *it would allow the Uſe of Lies and Fictions in this Caſe*; and is not this telling us in Effect, that Philoſophy allows all with which it is charged by the Author of the *Divine Legation?* If it would ſuffer him to preach up the Creation of the Soul, the Deſtruction of the World, the Doctrine of the Reſurrection, while he believed them to be mere Fables, it is evident that it would diſpenſe with his *ſaying one thing when he believed another.*

Petavius, in his Note on this Paſſage of *Syneſius*, ſays, "*eleganter hanc* διπλόην, *et varietatem* "*exprimit Cicero*, ii. *de fin.* Quod ſi vultum, *ait*, "tibi, ſi inceſſum fingeres quo gravior viderere, non "eſſes tui ſimilis; verba tu fingas, et *ea dicas quæ* "*non ſentias*, aut etiam ut veſtitum, ſic ſententiam "habeas aliam domeſticam, aliam forenſem, ut in "fronte oſtentatio ſit, intus veritas occultetur, vi-"de, quæſo, rectumne ſit."

But to cloſe with an Inſtance above all Exception, even from this Doctor's own Writings; nay,

nay, from that very Treatiſe in which he has exerted all his Strength and Learning to prove that no ſuch Inſtance can poſſibly be produced. With regard to *Plato* he ſays,[a] "Let him ſpeak for the "*popular Opinions* at ſome Times, and even laugh "at them at other times, all that will follow is, that "*Plato diſbelieved the popular Opinions of the Gods*; "not that he diſbelieved the Being of a God: "And ſo in the other Caſe, ſuppoſing that he "did not believe the *popular Opinions* of a future "State of Rewards and Puniſhments, that there "were three Judges in *Hades*, *&c.* it will not "follow that he did not believe a future State of "real proper Rewards and Puniſhments." Did he then ſpeak ſometimes for the *popular Opinions of the Gods*, or inſiſt on the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Æſculapius*, *&c.* and yet at theſe very Times *diſbelieve theſe opinions or this Divinity?* Here then is a plain Inſtance that *he ſaid one Thing and thought another*. Should you, Sir, preach up the Divinity of a deceaſed Mortal; ſhould you, for inſtance, in *China*, maintain that their *Fo* was really and actually a God; might you not be fairly charged with ſaying one thing and thinking another? and yet how would your Caſe differ from that of *Plato*, teaching the Divinity of *Æſculapius*, *Hercules*, *&c?*

"All that will follow is, that *Plato* diſbelieved "the popular Opinions of the Gods, not that he "diſbelieved the Being of a God." But what is this to the purpoſe; or how does it confute what Mr. *Warburton* has advanced on this Point? Has he any where ſaid that *Plato* diſbelieved the Being of a God, merely becauſe he laughed at the popular Divinities? And yet the Argument of his learned Adverſary receives all the little Force it has from that very Suppoſition. The Doctor might believe the Being of a God, at the very Time

a. P. 127.

Time he preached up the Divinity of *Fo*; but would this prove that he did not ſay one thing and think another, when he inſiſted that *Fo* was truly and properly a God?

And here, let it be obſerved once for all, that when we ſay the Philoſophers diſbelieved the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Romulus*, *&c.* we do not bring this to prove that they did not believe the Being of a God; we only bring it to ſhew that they thought one thing, and ſpoke another, with reſpect to the national Gods. And muſt not this neceſſarily be the Caſe, if they aſſerted that theſe laſt were Gods, while they believed nothing of the matter? It will be to no purpoſe to reply, that they believed the Being of a God; if you would clear them from the preſent Charge, you muſt ſhew that they believed the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Romulus*, *&c.*

I am at a loſs to conceive what clearer Proof can be required that the external and internal Doctrines were founded upon Propoſitions oppoſite and contrary to each other. It is agreed, that the Philoſophers did inculcate the Worſhip of the true God, to their intimate and ſelect Friends: It is agreed too, that, when they addreſſed themſelves to the Populace, they taught and enforced the Worſhip of dead Men. Do they not therefore preach up one Object of Adoration to their Friends, and *another* to the People? And if the public and private Doctrines relate to theſe different Objects, muſt they not neceſſarily go upon contrary Propoſitions?

I cannot ſee what the learned Doctor will reply to this, unleſs he ſays that the Philoſophers did really inculcate the Worſhip of the true God, under the Names of *Hercules*, *Romulus*, *&c.* Upon this Suppoſition, the two Doctrines would indeed contain only one and the ſame Propoſition. But the

Suppoſition is falſe and groundleſs; we are as certain as Hiſtory and Fact can make us, that the Philoſophers, in their public teaching, endeavoured to advance theſe dead Men into real Deities; that they did not ſcruple to declare them to be true and proper Gods. This appears from the Paſſage of *Cicero* cited, p. 22, 23. *Magis eſt in Romulo admirandum, quod cæteri qui Dii ex hominibus facti eſſe dicuntur, minus eruditis hominum ſæculis fuerunt, ut fingendi proclivior eſſet ratio, cum imperiti ad credendum facile impellerentur. Romuli autem ætatem minus his ſexcentis jam inveteratis literis, atque doctrinis, omnique illo antiquo ex inculta hominum vita errore ſublato fuiſſe cernimus.* It is the whole Purpoſe of this Augument to aſſert and prove that *Romulus* was really and actually become a God. The Circumſtances of the Time and Age, in which his Divinity was admitted, confine the Argument to him only.

Again, "Quod autem *ex hominum genere conſe-* "*cratos*, ſicut Herculem et cæteros coli lex ju- "bet, indicat omnium quidem animos immorta- "les eſſe; fortium bonorumque divinos." *Cicero de legg.* ii. 12. Does not this Paſſage clearly ſuggeſt, that *Hercules*, *&c.* were now erected into ſo many actual and real Gods? Is it poſſible to inculcate the Worſhip of dead Men in more plain and ſtrong Terms?

"And ſo in the other Caſe, ſuppoſing that he "did not believe the *popular Opinions* of a future "State, it will not follow that he did not believe "a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments." What Dependence the Doctrine of a future State had on the common Fables, has been conſidered already: I mean, (for my Argument confined me to that ſingle Point) ſo far as regards future Puniſhments, That the Antients could not believe the firſt

the firſt and yet ~~maintain~~ reject the laſt, has been proved upon their own Authority. If the Doctor inſiſts on the contrary, all he has to do, is to ſhew that *Cicero* and *Ovid*, *Seneca* and *Epictetus* knew nothing of the Matter; for, if they were right, the clear and inevitable Conſequence is, that he muſt be wrong.

2*dly*. Why is he ſo induſtrious to ſtifle and ſuppreſs the Evidence againſt him? He all along ſuppoſes that the Teſtimonies alledged on the other Side, reject only what he calls the popular Opinions of a future State: But moſt of them go much deeper[k]. "Death is the final Period of "Exiſtence; beyond that there is neither Good "nor Evil for the dead Man to dread or hope." *Brevis morbus aut extinguet, aut extinguetur. In utroque finis dolendi eſt.—Admone nullum mali ſenſum ad eum, qui periit, pervenire.*—Is the Scope and Tenour of theſe Paſſages conſiſtent with the Belief of any future Rewards or Puniſhments whatſoever? If it be not, it is plain the eſoteric Doctrine (for no Man ſurely will give theſe Paſſages to the exoteric) did really and effectually exclude the very Poſſibility of all future Happineſs and Miſery; the plain and neceſſary Conſequence of which, is, that the learned Writer, in his Treatiſe on the *double Doctrine*, has all along been labouring to maintain an Hypotheſis againſt Fact and plain Teſtimony.

But, before we conclude, it may be neceſſary to conſider this Objection more at large, as the learned Writer often repeats it with an Air of uncommon Triumph and Complacency. He aſks,

[k] Theſe Paſſages have been already quoted from *Ariſtotle* and *Seneca*.

If

If the Philoſophers diſbelieved the popular Divinities, and yet really believed the Being of a God; why might they not reject the popular Opinions of a future State, and at the ſame time hold a future State of real Rewards and Puniſhments? "Now as they who did not believe *Hercules* and "*Æſculapius* to be Gods, did not for that Rea-"ſon disbelieve the Exiſtence of a governing "Mind; ſo they that did not believe *Æacus* or "*Minos* to be Judges of Hell, did not for that "Reaſon diſbelieve all future Rewards and Pu-"niſhments." *Sykes*'s *Examination*, p. 98, 9. This is well put; and looks like Reaſon; which is more than we can ſay of any thing in Mr. *Jackſon*. However, on Examination it will be found to have nothing in it; the two Caſes being widely different.

Firſt. When we explained their Doctrine of the Soul, we ſhew'd that they held a Principle inconſiſtent with the Belief of a future State. But will the learned Doctor undertake to point out any particular Notion or Sentiment of theirs, which cannot be reconciled to the Belief of a God?

2*dly*. At the very time that they condemn and arraign the popular Divinities, they declare for the Being of a God. Thus *Varro* ſays, "that *Her*-"*cules* and *Æſculapius*, *Caſtor* and *Pollux* were "not Gods:" But he ſays too, "they only ſeem "to have a right Notion of God, who conceive "him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all "things by his Wiſdom [1]." But was this the Caſe

[1] Quæ ſunt autem illa, quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? Hæc, inquit, non eſſe deos Herculem, Æſculapium, Caſtorem, Pollucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, & humanâ conditione dececerint.— But this ſame *Varro* ſays, Quod hi ſoli ei videantur animadvertiſſe, quid eſſet Deus, qui credi-

Caſe with regard to *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*? When they diſclaim theſe, do they ever ſubſtitute, in their room any future Puniſhments, ſeparate and diſtinct from ~~them~~ those, in the infernal Regions? Will the learned Writer pretend they did? One would hardly believe him ſo adventrous but for ſome weak Efforts he makes, which look that Way.

3*dly*, As to the popular Stories of ~~e~~ internal Torments, they give us theſe as the *only Foundation and Support* of future Puniſhments. If therefore they explode theſe, they muſt of courſe explode all future Puniſhments whatſoever; and (what would we have more?) they tell us, that they did ſo. But was this the Caſe with regard to their popular Divinities? Do they ever repreſent theſe laſt as the *only Reaſon*, the *ſingle Ground*, on which they could believe the Being of a Deity? The learned Writer will not ſay they do. Why then does he give theſe as Caſes exactly parallel?

Laſtly, We have brought ſeveral Paſſages, in which the Philoſophers diſclaim all future Rewards and Puniſhments whatſoever. But has the learned Author brought any in which they deny the Being of a God? No; all he ſhews is that they ſometimes diſcard the popular Divinities, or reject the common Polytheiſm. What is there therefore that can excuſe a candid Writer for repreſenting theſe as parallel and like Caſes? When he produces as plain Proofs of their Denial of the Being of a God as I have, of their Denial of a future State, it may be pertinent to conſider how far this will affect our preſent Argument. But I predict, that this, and his *Openneſs to Conviction* will come together.

crediderunt eum eſſe animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem. *Auguſtin de Civ. Dei*, l. iv. 27. 31.

I have now paſſed through the ſeveral Articles, which I propoſed to debate with theſe learned Writers. If I have any where miſtaken their Meaning for want of Attention, (I am ſure I have no where miſrepreſented it by Deſign) I ſhall be ready, upon Conviction, to make them all the Amends and Satisfaction, that they themſelves can require. I fixed upon the particular Points here debated, becauſe I thought the true ſtating them might be of Service to the Cauſe of Chriſtianity. For if the *Philoſophers* ran into theſe extravagant and abſurd Notions concerning the *Soul and a future State*; if their favourite Doctrine, on theſe very important Points, was ſo flagitious and deſtructive of all Morality, that they did not dare to impart it to the People; this will ſurely vindicate all St. *Paul* has ſaid of them, and at the ſame time will ſerve to demonſtrate the Uſefulneſs and Neceſſity of the Chriſtian Revelation. "It is "a very ſtrong Proof of the *Neceſſity* of the Goſ-"pel of *Jeſus*, that the Sages of *Greece*, with "whom all the Wiſdom of the World was ſup-"poſed to be depoſited, had *philoſophized* them-"ſelves out of one of the moſt evident and uſe-"ful Truths with which Mankind is concerned. "Nor need we ſeek any other Juſtification of the "Severity with which the holy Apoſtles always "ſpeak of the Philoſophers or Philoſophy of "*Greece*, than this, the ſhewing it was directed "againſt theſe pernicious Principles; and not, "as both *Deiſts* and *Fanatics* have concurred to "repreſent it, a Condemnation of human Learn-"ing in general." *Mr.* Warburton's *Remarks*, part i. pag. 91.

F I N I S.

ADDENDA et ERRATA.

P. 5. the Paſſage from *Teles* runs thus: ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ἔσται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν μυρίοσὸν ἔτος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῷ Τρωϊκῷ, οὐδὲ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς προπάππους σου. σὺ δ' ὅτι μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἄχθῃ, ὅτι ἢ εἰς ὕστερον οὐκ ἔσαι, δυσχερανεῖς. What he here ſays, is, that it would be as abſurd to complain, that any one does not ſubſiſt after Death, as that he did not exiſt before his Birth; as if we were no more intereſted in the State which ſucceeds our Death, than in that which precedes our Birth. An *Epicurean* in *Cicero* delivers himſelf to the ſame Purpoſe: *Mortem contemnit, qua qui affecti ſunt, in eadem cauſa ſunt, qua antequam nati.* De Fin. l. i.

P. 6. *l.* 16. I paſs on to *Ariſtotle*, becauſe it is not my Deſign to examine the Doctrine of *Plato* on this Point.

P. 7. *l.* 11. *dele* that.

P. 8. *l.* 6. *after* Point *put an Interrogation.*

P. 9. *l.* 10. *read, in utroque finis, &c.*

P. 10. *l.* 24. *dele* the.

P. 14. *l.* 25. *after theſe Words,* they did not believe it, *add,* For was not the Notion of a future State the common and eſtabliſhed Doctrine? and do not the Philoſophers, in the Paſſages above cited, reject and diſclaim it? Now this Rule ſays, that we are to look for a ſtrict Declaration of their real Sentiments, whenever they ſpeak againſt the general and received Opinions.

P. 18. *l.* 12. *for* conclude *read* include.

P. 27. *l.* 5. this Paſſage is taken from Mr. *J's* firſt Pamphlet, p. 71.

P. 29 *l.* 13, 14, 15. *read*, ſine ullo futurus incommodo, *naturæ ſuæ remiſcebitur*, *&c.*

P. 30. *l.* 34, 35. *read*, Examine into the real State of it?

P. 33. *l.* 5, 6. *mors omnium dolorum ſolutio eſt & finis, ultra quam mala noſtra non exeunt.*

P. 35. *l.* 11, 12. *read*, pro nugis habuerint. *l.* 33. *for* no where *read* no whither.

P. 38. theſe two Paſſages are taken from Mr. *J's* Pamphlet, p. 97, 98.

P. 40. *note* [h]. this Paſſage is taken from p. 208, 9.

P. 43. *note* [m]. *for* l. 5. *read* ſ. 5.

P. 47. *note* [s]. this Teſtimony is deſigned for Mr. *J's ſole Uſe*; 'tis hoped he will receive it with proper Deference and Reſpect, as it comes from one of thoſe very Writers, to whom he ſends us for Information on this Point.

P. 56. *after l.* 4. *add*, that this is a plain and neceſſary Conſequence, I appeal to a Writer, who will not be charged with Prejudice and Partiality in favour of the Argument of the *Divine Legation*. "It was a ſtrange Notion, indeed, when "one conſiders, that human Souls do much *Evil* here; that they are *ignorant*; that they "are *miſerable*; which cannot ſurely be ſaid of "God. How are they to be detruded into "Swine, or any Animal, by way of *Puniſhment?* Is a Part of *God*, capable of being "*puniſhed?* and capable of deſerving this by "Miſdemeanors? or how muſt one Part of God "puniſh another Part of Him?" *Sykes's Connexion of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, *p.* 394. Let it be obſerved, that I only cite this Authority to

to ſhew, that this Notion of the Soul was inconſiſtent with the Doctrine of a future State; and not to prove, that the Philoſophers really diſbelieved another Life.

P. 57. To explain this Reaſoning of *Juſtin Martyr*, we may obſerve, that when he here ſpeaks of the *Immortality* of the Soul, he underſtands this Term in the proper and ſtrict Senſe, as including an eternal Exiſtence *a parte ante*, as well as *a parte poſt*; and that it was conſidered by the Antients in this Light, *vid.* the late excellent Editor of *Hierocles in Aur. Car. p.* 137. and *Cudworth*, *p.* 38.

P. 58. the Paſſage of *Syneſius* is quoted at length, p. 92.

P. 64. *in the Citation from* Plutarch, *read* ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

P. 66. *l.* 2. *add*, "as to its Nature and Subſtance."

P. 69. *note* [3]. *for* μυημένας *read* μυημένης.

P. 70. *l.* 1. *dele* would.

P. 71. the whole Paſſage from *Timæus* may be ſeen *Div. Leg.* vol. i. p. 377, 8.

P. 73. *after l.* 12. *add*, Beſides, it was the Purpoſe of *Pythagoras*, in theſe Lines, to prove that Death was no Evil; and to do this, he muſt neceſſarily prove, that Death is not attended with any future Puniſhments whatſoever. If therefore his Argument does not exclude all poſſible Puniſhments, as well as thoſe of the infernal Regions, it does not come up to the Point for which it is produced.

P. 75. *l.* 31. for, *in the laſt Paſſage*, read *in the two laſt Paſſages.*

P. 76. *l.* 10. after *baniſhed* add "*from Heaven.*" *Vid.* the Paſſage from *Cicero*, p. 18.

P. 81. *l.* 12. *add*, The Vulgar, by his own Account, were taught, that the Souls of good Men were

were to *reside amongst the Gods*. And does he not therefore in effect tell us, that this Exaltation to the Seats and Assemblies of the Gods, was a public and open Doctrine?

P. 83. *l.* 13. *Vid.* Mr. *J.* p. 69.

P. 86. *l.* 15. *read*, Is it not necessary to imagine that he said one thing and believed another?