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
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



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*Rollin's Ant. Hist. Vol. IV.*

*to face the Title.*



*The DEATH of SOCRATES.*

*Published 20 June 1749 by J. & P. Knapton.*

THE  
ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

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| EGYPTIANS,<br>CARTHAGINIANS,<br>ASSYRIANS,<br>BABYLONIANS, |  | MEDES AND PERSIANS,<br>MACEDONIANS,<br>AND<br>GRECIANS. |
|--|--|---|

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INSCRIPTIONS AND BELLES-LETTRES.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

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VOL. IV.

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*THE NINTH EDITION.*

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
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## BOOK THE EIGHTH.

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THE  
ANCIENT HISTORY  
OF THE  
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

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### CHAP. I.

**T**HIS chapter contains thirteen years of the Peloponnesian war, to the nineteenth inclusively.

*SECT. I. The very short Reigns of Xerxes II. and Sogdianus. They are succeeded by Darius Nothus. He puts a stop to the Insurrection of Egypt, and that of Media. He bestows on Cyrus, his youngest Son, the supreme Command of all Asia Minor.*

<sup>a</sup> **A**RTAXERXES died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign. Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had seventeen others by his concubines, among whom was Sogdianus, (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias) Ochus and Arsites. <sup>b</sup> Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came infidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days; and was declared king in his stead.

<sup>a</sup> A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Ctes. c. xlvi—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

<sup>b</sup> A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

He was scarce on the throne, but he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of all his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to superintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the same day with her royal consort. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausoleum where the kings of Persia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of some difference with him in the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not stop here: not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on some trifling circumstance relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by such horrid murders. He suspected that his brothers harboured the like design; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. However Ochus, who saw through his design, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governors of the provinces, they being justly dissatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill conduct. They put the tiara on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the flight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest persons who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who getting him into his hands, caus-

ed

ed him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death. <sup>c</sup> This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals. One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal was then thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which the ashes were, by a wheel, turned perpetually round him, till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed six months and fifteen days.

<sup>d</sup> Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now saw himself possessed of the empire. As soon as he was well settled in it, he changed his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To distinguish him, historians add the epithet *Nobis*, signifying bastard. He reigned nineteen years.

Arsites, seeing in what manner Sogdianus had supplanted Xerxes, and had himself been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to serve the latter in the same manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's side, he openly revolted against him, and was assisted in it by Artyphius, son of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we shall always call Darius, sent Artasyrus, one of his generals, against Artyphius; and himself, at the head of another army, marched against Artsites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, defeated twice the general sent against him. But, engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himself was beat, and forced to surrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that resolution by queen Parysatis, Darius's sister and queen. She also was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the same mother as Darius: she was an intriguing artful woman, and the king her husband was governed by her on most occasions. The counsel she now gave was perfidious to the last degree.

<sup>c</sup> Val. Max. l. ix. c. 2. <sup>2</sup> Maccab. c. xiii. l. iii.

<sup>d</sup> A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

She advised him to exercise his clemency towards Artyphius, and show him kind usage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious servant with so much generosity, that he himself should meet, at least, with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he should have seized that prince, he might dispose of him and Artyphius as he pleased. Darius followed her counsel, which proved successful. Arsites being informed of the gentle usage which Artyphius met with, concluded that, as he was the king's brother, he should consequently meet with still more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and surrendered himself. Darius was very much inclined to save his life: but Parysatis, by inculcating to him, that he ought to punish this rebel to secure himself, at last prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was suffocated in ashes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent struggle with himself, before he could give orders for this sacrifice; having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put some other persons to death, which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterward disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

<sup>c</sup> One of the most dangerous commotions was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt, was his having raised a considerable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him, with a considerable army, the commission of governor of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found

<sup>c</sup> A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Ctes. c. li.

means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and, by dint of presents and promises, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who, by this desertion, was unable to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and accordingly met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels. But his death did not put an end to all troubles; <sup>f</sup> for Amorges his son, with the remainder of his army, still opposed Tissaphernes; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iafus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

<sup>g</sup> Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had, for many years, ingrossed all power, in the court of Persia; and we shall find by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. <sup>h</sup> We may know their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Dioclesian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freemen, who had gained the like ascendant over the Roman emperors. "Four or five persons," says he, "who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him: and as they only besiege him continually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their canal, and does nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is, that he bestows employments on those he ought to exclude from them; and, on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them.

<sup>f</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—567, 568.

<sup>g</sup> Ctes. c. lii.

<sup>h</sup> Vopis. in vit. Aurelian, Imper.



In a word, the best prince is often sold by these *men*, though he be ever so vigilant, and even suspicious of them." *Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it; \* an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over, and governed the rest. He had found Darius's weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he disposed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme authority which the favour of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

<sup>i</sup> But the greatest misfortune which happened in Darius's reign was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the same year with Pisuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. <sup>k</sup> The Egyptians, weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens where he had defended himself from the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were driven out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.

<sup>i</sup> Euseb. in Chron.

<sup>k</sup> Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73.

\* *Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos.* PLIN. ad Trajan.

After

After having established himself securely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted measures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilst Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however they were defeated and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke (till then easy enough) was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

<sup>1</sup> Darius's arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned six years (he possibly was killed in a battle) Herodotus observes, it was by the assistance of the Persians that Pausiris, his son, succeeded him in the throne. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.

<sup>m</sup> After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor: an important commission, by which he commanded all the provincial governors in that part of the empire.

I thought it necessary to anticipate times, and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Persia; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

<sup>1</sup> Herod. l. iii. c. 15.

<sup>m</sup> A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

SECT. II. *The Athenians make themselves Masters of the Island of Cythera. Expeditions of Brasidas into Thrace. He takes Amphipolis. Thucydides, the Historian, is banished. A Battle is fought near De-lium, where the Athenians are defeated.*

THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

**T**HE three or four campaigns, which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphaacteria, were distinguished by very considerable events.

<sup>a</sup> The Athenians under Nicas took the little island of Cythera, situated on the coast of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infested the whole country.

<sup>o</sup> Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they should oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity to rid themselves of the Helots, whom they expected to rise in rebellion, from the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with two thousand of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men, whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the Helots as had done the greatest service to the state, in the last campaigns, should enter their names in the public registers, in order for their being made free. Accordingly two thousand gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance in what manner an

<sup>a</sup> A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286.

<sup>o</sup> Ibid. p. 304, 311. Diod. l. xii. p. 117, 118.

umbrageous policy and power, when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the commission of the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself, and the authority of the gods, subservient to their dark designs.

They therefore sent seven hundred Helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprise. This general brought over several cities either by force or intelligence, and still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately dispatched a messenger to \* Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thasus, a little island of the Ægæan sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the place before Brasidas could seize it; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great credit in all that country, where he was possessed of some gold mines, made all the dispatch imaginable to get thither before him; and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did not expect succours so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have taken possession of it the next morning by day break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable dispatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ships, as because it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; especially as Brasidas discovered great modera-

\* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324.

• The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

tion and justice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the several nations that, at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath, in presence of the magistrates, to leave all those the enjoyment of their liberties who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity. "For," according to Brasidas, "a fraud cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonour on persons in high stations, than open violence; because the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I," said he, "should do a great disservice to my country, besides dishonouring it eternally, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys, of being just and faithful to its promises; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because it acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states." Upon such noble and equitable principles as these Brasidas always formed his conduct; believing, that the strongest bulwark of a nation is justice, moderation, integrity, and the firm persuasion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are not so base as to harbour a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

¶ The Athenians, under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. ¶ Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following testimony of him in Plato; that had the rest of the army

¶ Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319.

¶ Plat. in Lach. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

behaved

behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained so great a loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot; Alcibiades, who was on horseback, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a cauldron hung; so that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimstone, that lay in the cauldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart, to that part where it was lined with stakes and fascines, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned and the palisades burnt, the city was easily taken.

SECT. III. *A twelve Month's Truce is agreed upon between the two States. Cleon and Brasidas die. A Treaty of Peace for fifty Years concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.*

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE  
WAR.

THE losses and advantages on both sides were pretty equal; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expence, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce for a year was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas's conquests; to se-

\* A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333 Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

cure their cities and fortresses, and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that, by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do, if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of this accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He went still farther; and did not scruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Brasidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed, that they were far from being pleased with this conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. His great success in the expedition of Sphacteria had raised his credit infinitely with the people: he now was grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments as by the boldness and fire of his style and utterance. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms; of striking his thigh; and of running up and down the rostra whilst he was making his speech. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who were in public employments an ungodly licentiousness, and a contempt of decency;

\* Plut in vit. Nicia, p. 528.

a licentiousness and contempt which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs.

Thus two men, each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas. The former, because the war screened his vices and malversations; and the latter, because it added a new lustre to his virtues. And indeed it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time, made way for a new accommodation.

\* The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis; and Brasidas threw himself into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs: and imagining himself a great captain by his taking Sphacteria, he now fancied the same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he said, to take a view of the place, and till such time as all his forces should be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he doubted, in any manner, his success (for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him) but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly he encamped before Amphipolis; when viewing very lei-

\* Plut. in vit. Niciaë, p. 528.

\* A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422.

Thucyd. l. iii. p. 342—351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.



surely its situation, he fondly supposed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls; and all the gates of the city were kept shut, so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, to increase his temerity and the good opinion he had of himself: besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, despising an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but shut himself up, in a cowardly manner, in the city, went boldly from place to place, without precaution or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden before all his forces should be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the orders necessary. Accordingly he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and disabled, upon which his soldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a soldier, who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were universally broke and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and afterwards set up a trophy. After which all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas, in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours

every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him\* who had really been so; so that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

† A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly intimates the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding, in her presence, the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declared him superior to all other generals: "You are mistaken," says she, "my son was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than he." A mother's generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

‡ After this last engagement, in which the two persons who were the greatest obstacles to their peace, lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended in a manner on both sides. The Athenians, from the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, which had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being

† Diod. l. xii. p. 122.

‡ Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

\* Agnon the Athenian

able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country; and were besides dejected and terrified by their loss in the island, the greatest they had ever sustained. They also considered, that their country was depopulated by the garrison of Pylus and Cythera; that their slaves deserted; and they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as they accordingly were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering the prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desire a peace.

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were the chiefs of the two states. *viz.* Plistonax, king of Lacedæmonia, and Nicias, general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from banishment, to which he had been sentenced, on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat was ascribed several misfortunes which followed after it. He also was charged with having corrupted, by gifts, the priests of Delphos, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recal him from his exile. Plistonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid lest some unhappy accident should eclipse his glory; and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and that his country might possess the same happiness.

Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for twelve months, during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately de-

▪ Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. in Nic. p. 528, 529.

scious of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard, with the utmost demonstrations of joy, the chorusses of their tragedies sing, "May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!" And they remembered, with pleasure, him who said, "Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from it at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock."

<sup>b</sup>The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their rights and pretensions. At last, a peace was concluded and ratified for fifty years; one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. <sup>c</sup>But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECT. IV. *Alcibiades begins to appear. His Character. He opposes Nicias in every Thing, and breaks the Treaty he had concluded. The Banishment of Hyperbolus puts an End to the Ostracism.*

TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

<sup>d</sup>ALCIBIADES began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him for many years,

<sup>b</sup> A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421. Diod. l. xiii. p. 129.

<sup>c</sup> Thucyd. l. v. p. 358, 359.

<sup>d</sup> Plut. in Alcib. p. 192, 194.

and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition.

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philosopher, observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible pains in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And indeed Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers: the greatness of his extraction, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his personal talents, his exquisite beauty, and, still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and invested him with all these pretended advantages as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy; those salutary darts which strike to the very heart, and leave in it the strongest incitements to virtue and solid glory. But those very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the strong endeavours that were used to divert this young Athenian from a correspondence which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates's extraordinary merit; and could not resist the charms of his sweetly-insinuating eloquence, which, at that time, had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions, and even his reprimands, with wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses, as even to shed tears and abhor himself; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so ugly and odious a light did he expose the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himself.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headstrong, fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the discourses and advice of young people, soon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master, who was obliged to run after him as after a slave who had escaped. This vicissitude of flights and returns of virtuous resolutions, and relapses into vice, continued a long time; but still Socrates was not disgusted by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good and evil which always appeared in his conduct; the instructions which his master had given him, sometimes prevailing; and, at other times, the fire of his passions hurrying him, in a manner, against his own will, into things of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not pass uncensured. But some persons\* of great learning pretend, that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who henceforward will have a very great share in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

\* In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades, who, at that time, was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments, and had practised wrestling and other bodily

\* Plut. in Alcib. I.

\* Abbé Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations. *Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, Tom. iv. p. 372.

exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education, (a fault too common in the greatest men) since he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian, all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, and promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the rostra, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confess this, he paints, in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it. What, says Socrates, would Amestris (the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia) say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens meditating war against her son, and even intends to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and the most consummate experience; that he is able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleases; and, at the same time, that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution.

execution. But were she to hear that there are none of these circumstances, and that the person in question is not twenty years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, and no credit with the citizens or allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless, says Socrates, (directing himself to Alcibiades) is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act for the attainment of it. Socrates, being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had entire leisure to improve from them; as upwards of twenty years passed between this conversation, and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a convertible genius, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardour; and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite, so that people applied to him what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, "That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and, at the same time, as many poisons." 'It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but (if so bold an expression might be used) a compound of several men; either serious or gay; austere or affable; an imperious master, or a grovelling slave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men; ca-

*Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.* JUVENAL.



pable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.

<sup>g</sup> His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of a prodigious size, which had cost him threescore and ten minæ \*, or three thousand five hundred French livres. By this we find that a fondness for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail, which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said, that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. "This is the very thing I want," replied Alcibiades with a smile. "I would have the Athenians discourse about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying worse things of me."

<sup>h</sup> Among the various passions that were discovered in him, the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior, or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic; there was nothing however to which he was so fond of owing the credit and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great service.

<sup>i</sup> Alcibiades, with such a cast of mind as we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to traverse the treaty lately concluded between the two states; but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they di-

<sup>g</sup> Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.  
Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 196.  
Thucyd. l. v. p. 368—378.

<sup>h</sup> Το φιλονεικόν και το φιλοπρωτον.  
i A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420.  
Plut. in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

\* About 160l. sterling. The Attic mina was worth a hundred drachmas, and the drachma ten pence, French money.

rected themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the contrary, seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality among them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this; having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them, by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panacton to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades, observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to widen the difference; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the divisions. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity to those who addressed them; but  
that

that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, they (the people) would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they should take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them, that he would assist them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus restored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered, that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoke, but Alcibiades exclaims against them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witnesses to the speech they had made the night before; and desires the people not to believe or hear men who so imprudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and prevaricated so unaccountably, as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were seized, who, gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed

vailed so far, in that of next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them; but they returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Matinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

\* Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds: "No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in his design; however, it was a master-stroke, to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians." In my opinion, this is too soft a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, how successful soever it might have been, was, notwithstanding, horrid in itself, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

† There was in Athens a citizen, Hyperbolus by name, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed, at that time, all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his auda-

\* In Alcib. p. 198.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

city and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires; and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, was become very odious to them. One would have imagined, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one which consisted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were desirous of peace; the former endeavoured to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit was in impudence, in hopes of succeeding whichever of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himself was banished by (and put an end to) the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned, in being employed against a man of so base a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was therefore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.

SECT. V. *Alcibiades engages the Athenians in the War of Sicily.*

SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEETH YEARS OF THE  
WAR.

**I**PASS over several inconsiderable events, to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were especially excited by Alcibiades. This is the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war.

Alcibiades had gained a surprising ascendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qua-

<sup>m</sup> A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.

<sup>n</sup> Plut. in Alcib. p. 198—200. In Nic. p. 531.

lities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to that city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies\*, shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people with regard to him: "They hate Alcibiades," says he, "and yet cannot do without him." And, indeed the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole person; his eloquence, his bodily strength, joined to his courage and experience; in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to lessen and screen them under soft and favourable names; for they called them sports, polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good nature.

Timon the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and to see the greatest honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary he ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; "Courage, my son," says he, "thou dost right in push-

\* The Frogs, Act v. Scene 4.

ing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all these people." The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them that by living in peace, by supporting their fleet, by contenting themselves with the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not surpass the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. ° Some time after Pericles's death, the Leontines, being invaded by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgis, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his times. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Regium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles into banishment; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards, and upon pretence of sending, from time to time, arms

• Diod. l. xii. p 99.

and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the person who most inflamed this ardour was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with splendid hopes with which he himself was for ever filled or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus, looking upon Sicily not as the scope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and without enquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all conversations. The young men, in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops, and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded; on its good harbours, and flat shores towards Africa: for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were (like him) persuaded that they should make Sicily only their place of arms and their arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the Pillars of Hercules.

¶ It is related, that neither Socrates nor Methon the astronomer, believed that this enterprize would be successful; the former, being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion; and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.

¶ Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.



SECT. VI. *Account of the several People who inhabited Sicily.*

**B**EFORE I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the same manner.

It was first inhabited by the Lestrygonæ and the Cyclopes, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The most ancient after these were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria: these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Erix and \* Egesta, who all assumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers; and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about three hundred years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides's time, they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast and in the little islands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade: but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the Barbarians first settled in Sicily.

With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius Halicarnassus, was the

† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413

\* A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

\* It is called Segesta by the Romans.

third of the seventeenth Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having driven out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or barely Hybla, from Hyblon, a Sicilian king, by whose permission they settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. A hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinonta. Gela, built on a river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse, founded Agrigentum about a hundred and eight years after. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene, by Anaxilas tyrant of Regium, who was of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zancleans built the city of Himera; the Syracusans built Acre, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECT. VII. *The People of Egesta implore Aid of the Athenians. Nicias opposes, but to no Purpose, the War of Sicily. Alcibiades carries that Point. They both are appointed Generals with Lamachus.*

**A**THERNS was in the disposition above related when ambassadors were sent from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinunta, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent

\* A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—415. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 53.

to succour them. The Athenians who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to enquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expence of so great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been so artful, as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money; and of these they made a show when the Athenians arrived. The deputies returned with those of Egesta, who carried threescore talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the galleys which they demanded; and a promise of larger sums, which, they said, were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves the leisure to examine, and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made in the view of pleasing them, immediately granted the Egestans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus to command the fleet; with full power, not only to succour Egesta, and restore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city; but also to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in such a manner as might best suit the interests of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret; for, besides other motives which made him dread that command, he shunned it, because Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promised themselves greater success from this war, should they not resign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coldness and wisdom of Nicias.

Five days after, to hasten the execution of the decree, and make the necessary preparations, a second assembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair, proposed, and was still better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would ensue from it; thought himself obliged to speak with some vehemence against a project, the

<sup>a</sup> A. M. 3589: Ant. J. C. 415.

<sup>b</sup> Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415—428.

consequences

consequences of which he foresaw might be very fatal to the republic. He said, "That it was surprizing so important an affair should have been determined, the moment almost it was taken into deliberation: that without once enquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very lavish of their promises; and whose interest it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themselves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage," says he, "can accrue from thence to the republic: have we so few enemies at our doors, that we need go in search of others at a distance from us? Will you act wisely, to hazard your present possessions on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? To mediate new conquests before you have secured your ancient ones? To study nothing but the aggrandizing of your state, and quite neglect your own safety? Can you depend in any manner on a truce, which you yourselves know is very precarious; which you are sensible has been infringed more than once; and which the least defeat on our side may suddenly change into an open war? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been, and still continue disposed with regard to us. They detest our government as different from theirs; it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the empire of Greece; they consider our glory as their shame and confusion; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and it is they we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper time to make these reflections, (when after having divided our troops, and our arms will be employed elsewhere) and unable to resist them, we shall be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponnesus? We do but just begin to breathe, after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going to plunge ourselves into greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our arms into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to  
march

march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations who are still wavering, and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the succour of the inhabitants of Egesta, about whose welfare we ought to be very indifferent? And will it suit our interest, to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves receive? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide. As the inhabitants of Egesta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themselves from it as well as they can. Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise, from an ambitious or self-interested view; merely to make a vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to support his extravagance; be not guilty of so much imprudence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or to permit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An enterprise of so much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs." Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height; and lavished prodigious sums of money on horses, and equipages, and moveables; not to mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He disputed the prize in the Olympic games with seven sets of chariot horses, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition; there were some grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for conquering Sicily and Carthage (which he pretended to

to possess afterwards as his own) to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to suppose that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

“ This, says Alcibiades, is not the first time that merit has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy. That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, is, I will presume to say it, the honour of my country, and ought to gain me applause. The splendor in which I live; the great sums I expend, particularly in the public assemblies; besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens; and show, that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our present business. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice, but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the republic, in bringing over (in one day) to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is the chief strength of Peloponnesus? Make use, therefore, to aggrandize your empire, of Alcibiades's youth and folly (since his enemies give it that name) as well as of the wisdom and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon, and which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and cruel government of their princes, and still more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves; and are ready to open their gates to whomsoever shall offer to take off the yoke under which they have so long groaned. Though the citizens of Egesta in quality of your allies, should not have a right to your protection; yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to support them. Republics aggrandize themselves by succouring the oppressed, and not by living unactive. In the present state of your affairs, the only way to dispirit your enemies, and show  
that

that you are not afraid of them, will be, to harass one nation, to check the progress of another, to keep them all employed; and carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your ancestors raised it to the height in which we now see it. For the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprise in question? If it should be crowned with success, you will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not answer your expectations your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever you please. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make an incursion into our country; but, besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve the empire of the sea, in spite of them; a circumstance which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biased by Nicias's reasons. The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord between the young and old men, who can do nothing without one another; since it is wisdom and courage, counsel and execution, that give success to all enterprises: and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your advantage."

\* The Athenians, flattered and pleased with Alcibiades's speech, persisted in their first opinion. Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his; but at the same time did not dare to oppose Alcibiades any further. Nicias was naturally of a soft and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And, indeed the latter, on several occasions and at several times, had never failed to check the wild starts of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the people; whereas

\* Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 80a.

Nicias,

\*Nicias, both by acting and speaking in an easy, gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where, speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by starting a great number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expence of this expedition. He declared, that since they were resolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as might suit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formidable a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies: that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design: that besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea, they must have a great number of transports, to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country: that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Egesta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise: that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniencies and wants of the army; the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country pos-

\* Καθα περι αμβλει χαλιγω τω λογω πειρωμεν & αποσρεφειν τον δημον & κατχειν.



felled by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in less than four months time; a country, where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which so important a design required: that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and that he would not rely on caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

¶ Nicias had flattered himself, that this speech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops, and fit out as many galleys as they should judge necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens, and other places, with inexpressible activity.

SECT. VIII. *The Athenians prepare to set Sail. Sinister Omens. The Statues of Mercury are mutilated. Alcibiades is accused, and insists upon his being tried, but his Request is not granted. Triumphant Departure of the Fleet.*

<sup>2</sup> **W**HEN all things were ready for their departure, and they were preparing to sail, there happened several bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The \* women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral pro-

¶ Diod. l. xiii. p. 134.

\* A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

Thucyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

\* This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people. *And behold there sat women weeping for Tammuz.* Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, says *weeping for Adonis*; which is the same as Tammuz, the Hebrews called Adonis by that name.

cessions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed those statues with lamentations of that kind. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament would soon lose all its splendor, and wither \* away like a flower.

The general affliction was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was accused. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of some factious men, who harboured very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing much the like crime in the midst of their cups; and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine; with Alcibiades, who represented the high-priest, at their head. \* It highly concerns all those in exalted stations, to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call to mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions; that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments, and there take the strictest notice of their discourses, their diversions, and the most secret things transacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulge themselves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly as his character was so well known, people were persuaded he

\* Plut. in præc. de rep. p. 800.

\* The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.

very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuser was not afraid of telling his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare, that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive but their affection for Alcibiades; and that, should the least injury be done him, they would all leave the service; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment superseded. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried, in case he was guilty, and not be ruined in his absence; and to represent, that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due enquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

<sup>b</sup> They accordingly prepared to set sail, after having appointed Corcyra the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions, &c. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Pyræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends, or companions, with a joy overcast with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons that were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that it would be successful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of sol-

<sup>b</sup> Thucyd. p. 430—432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 185.

diers

diers and ships: but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprize so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, provided with the utmost care, and at the expence of particular persons as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furnished a hundred empty galleys, that is, threescore light ones, and forty to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachma, or ten pence (French) for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships gave the rowers\* of the first bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that were displayed univervally; every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest in the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice of the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage; any more than of their officers who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expence and splendor.

When the ships were laden and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow citizens a good voyage and success. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they strove to outfail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina.

\* They were called *Spanitai*. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet.

SECT. IX. *Syracuse is alarmed. The Athenian Fleet arrives in Sicily.*

ADVICE of this expedition coming to Syracuse from all quarters, it was thought so improbable, that at first nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations; and sent deputations to every part of the island, to ask assistance of some, and send succours to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country; reviewed all the soldiers and horses; examined the arms in the magazines; and settled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of a hundred and thirty-six ships, a hundred whereof belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were five thousand heavy-armed soldiers, two thousand two hundred of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* fifteen hundred of those who had estates, and seven hundred \* who had none, but were equally citizens; the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete; and four hundred of other countries; seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and cooks; with masons, carpenters, and their several tools; the whole followed by a hundred small vessels for the service, exclusive of merchant-ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together

<sup>c</sup> Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135, 136.

\* These were called *Ἰντις*.

for Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they sailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succour those of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themselves: but these answered, that they were determined to stand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to enquire whether the citizens of Egesta had got their money ready. Upon their return they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

<sup>d</sup> He did not fail, the instant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens; to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war; and to amplify the fatal consequences which might be expected from it: in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work, to crush if possible this ill-fated project. But as it was resolved, and he himself had accepted of the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly, that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence; and, by that means, to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which assure the success of great enterprises. The Athenians, on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; should have attacked them with vigour, and have spread an universal terror by a sudden and unexpected descent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion in the council of war, was, that they should sail

<sup>d</sup> Plut. in Nic. p. 532.

for Selinunta, which had been the first occasion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwise, to oblige them to furnish provisions for the sixty galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinunta, either by force of arms or some other way. He said, that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies; unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered, that it would be inglorious, after their sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and Barbarians, in order to divide them from the Syracusans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared further, that after seeing who were their friends and who their enemies, and strengthening themselves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinunta or Syracuse; in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Egesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprize, or prepare for their defence. He observed, that the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, and still in confusion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be masters of the open country, they should not be in want of any thing; but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to de-

clare for them: that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert and a near neighbour to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades: accordingly they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by surprize.

SECT. X. *Alcibiades is recalled. He flies, and is sentenced to die as an Outlaw. He retires to Sparta. Flexibility of his Genius and Disposition.*

THIS was the first and last exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accusation against him. For, from the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, upon the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkeſt deſigns, meditated nothing but ſatiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I ſay, taking advantage of his abſence, had proceeded in the affair with greater vigour than ever. All thoſe, againſt whom informations were lodged, were thrown into priſon, without ſo much as being ſuffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the moſt profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, ſays Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to puniſh the innocent, as to ſuffer the guilty to eſcape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he ſaw and knew one of the accused by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithſtanding this manifeſt perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Piſiſtratides made them apprehenſive of the like fate; and ſtrongly poſſeſſed with this fear they would not give ear to any thing.

At laſt they ſent out the \* ſhip of Salamin, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear

\* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

\* This was a ſacred veſſel appointed to fetch criminals.



of raising a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who sought after him. Being asked whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him: "I would not," says he, "rely on my mother, for fear lest she should inadvertently mistake a \* black bean for a white one." The galley of Salamin returned back without the commander, who was ashamed of his having suffered his prey to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying: "† That she had been appointed priestess, not to curse but to bless." Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, "I shall make them sensible," says he, "that I am alive."

‡ Much about this time Diagoras of Melia was prosecuted at Athens. He had settled himself in the latter city, where he taught atheism, and was brought to a trial for his doctrine. § Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised a reward of a talent to any man who should bring him dead or alive.

¶ About twenty years before, a like affair had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the begin-

‡ Joseph. contr. App. § Diod. l. xiii. p. 137. ¶ Diog. Laert. in Protag. Joseph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de nat. deor. n. 62.

\* The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

† Φασκισσα ευχών \* χαταρωσ σφρασαν γεγοθεναι.

ning of one of his books: "Whether the gods do or do not exist is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short, for the solution of so nice and difficult a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reason they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all persons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magistrates: after which they were burnt as infamous pieces, and the author was banished for ever from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms. I shall speak of him in another place.

<sup>1</sup> From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had possessed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always in this way of thinking; for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was no less esteemed and respected on that account: but in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence; the natural consequence of which is a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed all affairs solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, of a slow and fearful kind: he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes either by lying still and undertaking nothing, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting and deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardour and confidence the troops expressed at first; and, on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized, at the sight of so terrible an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was however obliged to raise the siege some days after, which brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. p. 453, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 533.

Catana, after having performed but one exploit, *viz.* the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by Barbarians, from which place, it is said, that Lais the courtesan, at that time very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.

\* In the mean time Alcibiades, having left Thurium, was arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised in the most solemn manner, that if they would consider him as their friend, he would perform greater services for their state than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and soon after his arrival in their city, he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming himself so easily to their way of living. Such people as saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse, heavy cakes which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth; could not persuade themselves, that a man, who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had used essences and perfumes; had worn the rich stuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and profusion of all things. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon-like, he could assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural in him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple, and unconstrained air. With some he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal, and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure made up his whole life: in Thrace, he was always on horseback or carous-

\* Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.



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I

# CITY OF SYRACUSE the Athenians



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ing; and when he resided with Tissaphanes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timea, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

#### SECT. XI. *Description of Syracuse.*

**A**S the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history; the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate, for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients; I judged it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which he will also find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities.

\* We are told, its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

<sup>1</sup> Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119.

\* *Urbem Syracusis elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cælique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent.* Cic. Verr. 7. n. 26.

<sup>m</sup> It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, viz. the Island, Acradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, viz. Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The ISLAND, situated to the south, was called Νῆσοϛ, (Nafos) signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge, <sup>n</sup> It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. This quarter or division of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it, master of the two ports which surround it. It was for this reason the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusans to inhabit the island.

<sup>o</sup> There was in this island a very famous spring, called Arethusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the spring or fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil :

*Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem —  
Sic tibi, cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,  
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam.*

VIRG. Eclog. 10.

Thy sacred succour, Arethusa, bring,  
To crown my labour: 'tis the last I sing, —

<sup>m</sup> A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strabo, l. vi. p. 269.

<sup>n</sup> Cic. Ver. 7. n. 97.

<sup>o</sup> Strab. l. vi. p. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. l. iii. c. 26.

So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,  
Unmix'd with briny seas securely glide.

DRYDEN.

ACHRADINA, situated entirely on the sea-side, towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

TYCHE, so called from the temple of Fortune, (*Τυχη*) which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated to the north of the city.

EPIPOLÆ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and, for that reason, of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended, it with a body of troops, against the attacks of the enemy. Euryelus was the pass or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the same hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after (under Dionysius the tyrant) that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and inclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called NEAPOLIS, that is, the new city which covered Tyche.

The river Anapis ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens or moors, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lyfimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle, called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius standing there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city.

† Plut. in Dionys. vit. p. 970.



Syracuse had two harbours, very near one another, and separated only by the isle, viz. the great harbour, and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the \*description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with buildings as parts of the city.

The greatest harbour was a little above † five thousand paces, or two leagues, in circumference. It had a gulph called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed, on one side, by the point of the island Ortygia; and, on the other, by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

SECT. XII. *Nicias, after some Engagements, besieges Syracuse. Lamachus is killed in a Battle. The City is reduced to the greatest Extremities.*

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

AT the end of the summer news was brought Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to attack him even in his camp; and asked, with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprize was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy, who waited for him with the greatest resolution; and would not fail to charge him the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march

\* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. l. cxxxvii, cxxxviii.

\* *Portus habet prope in ædificatione aspectuque urbis inclusos.* Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117.

† According to Strabo, it is eighty stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is corrupt. CLUVER. p. 167.

his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracufans, which was very numerous, upon the first advice they should have of their march, would come to blows, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and enable himself to seize, without opposition, upon an advantageous post, which a Syracufan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false piece of news to be given to the enemy, viz. that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracufans, on this promise, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition, and, in the evening, steered for Syracuse. They arrived, by day break, in the great harbour, landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy, finding themselves shamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuse: and, in the greatest rage, drew up in battle array, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracufans, who were unexperienced, and the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempest, whilst their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the season; and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracufans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracufans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia, to prevent its being plundered.

This

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself only had been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with design to return in the beginning of the next spring, and lay siege to the city. To do this they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, whom they supposed would join them the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the coast of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment, and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage but in conduct; that the enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders, (they were fifteen in number) from which confusion and disobedience are inseparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty; and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth

ninth and Lacedæmon, to renew the alliance, and, at the same time, to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recal their troops out of Sicily, or, at least, to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea shore where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

The ambassadors of Syracuse, being arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and, at the same time, they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and, at the same time, to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia, in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for, by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the

\* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plat. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138.

revenues of their lands: nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malecontents and partizans of Sparta.

Nicias had received some succours from Athens. It consisted of two hundred and fifty horsemen, whom the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horses in Sicily (the troops bringing only the furniture) and of thirty horse archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thousand French crowns\*. Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures: however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracufans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to their city; and knowing they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the hill of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching therefore down into the meadow, or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed seven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; and commanded them to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catania with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet

\* About 67,000l. sterling.

to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a staccado.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ; in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians three hundred horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added a hundred more, that with the two hundred and fifty sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily; made a body of six hundred and fifty horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus; situate on the sea side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity, as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation

travallation (northward) was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any farther progress in their work: or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracusan soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard; they detached three hundred chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from  
coming

coming out of it. Accordingly, the three hundred soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos, were pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day, a still more important work, and which would quite finish their inclosure of the city, viz. to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the besieged beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provision from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain before day-break; when throwing planks and beams into that part where the fen was only slimy, and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the passage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded



commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with six or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger and the presence of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition, rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber, lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans, having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea, viz. a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which  
were

were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters, vessels laden with provisions for the army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracufans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard in his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward, nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy, such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now (contrary to his natural disposition) confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance, upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECT. XIII. *The Syracusans resolve to capitulate, but Gylippus's Arrival changes the Face of Affairs. Nicias is forced by his Colleagues to engage in a Sea-fight, and is overcome. His Land forces are also defeated.*

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogius, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and in the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles, by name, arrived from Corinth, on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus, to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a \* fort in his way, marched in battle array directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he

\* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 485—489. Plut. in Nic. p. 585, 586. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138, 139.

\* Jeges.

prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracufans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surpris'd by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this propofal; and some of his soldiers bursting out a laughing, asked the herald, "Whether the prefence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city?" Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus storm'd the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it fail'd into the harbour. The besieg'd afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut (about the extremity of it) the single wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops, posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, march'd in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamp'd without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They rais'd the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchments.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the Cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straiten'd the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was, to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians,

by

by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracufans, and were the better able to observe the various motions of it; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet, and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from falling, and were masters of the field. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent twenty galleys against it; ordered them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Regium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Syracufans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with; and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat; because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his;  
and

and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; (because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory) he therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place, where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing; for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived, unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains, with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the cities of Sicily to solicit them to join him; and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen, and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged; and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 56. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.

“ Athenians : I have already informed you by several expreffes, of what passed here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and, having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are, in consequence, shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out for fear of their horse.

“ Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which, though very surprizing, is, however, but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened,

“ Our galleys leak every where, because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides,

we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

“With regard to the ships’ crews, they decrease sensibly every day; for as great numbers of them disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy’s horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy’s camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners, which were forced into the service, diminish daily; and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves balked, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains put others in their room, who are wholly unexperienced, and incapable of serving, and, by that means, have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs: and who are very sensible, that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and worse, and a fleet must inevitably be ruined.

“But the most unhappy circumstance is, that though I am generalissimo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For (Athenians) you are very sensible, that such is your disposition, that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whilst the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions (hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and your not taking the least care to send us any succour) join the Syracusans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.



“I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out otherwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you; which induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

“But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus; you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that our present troops are not sufficient; and, therefore, we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force, equal to the first, must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me; it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands on account of the service I have done you, in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

“To conclude; whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make, is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very beginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.”

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected.

expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys, and some money \*, about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him; during which the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

\* The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica early under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater dispatch. This post is about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be easy, till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all: for hitherto, the enemy retiring after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town: for, in the day time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and, in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer.

\* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. lib. vii. p. 494—496, & 502—504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140. \* 120 talents.

To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thousand slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

\* In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned, with as many men as he could raise in the whole island; and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprize. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. He observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it: that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition, and the situation of their city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea: that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity: that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land-forces in the night time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuse, which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time.

\* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

The Athenians, at this news, went on board also; and with twenty-five ships failed to fight the thirty-five Syracusan vessels, which were sailing out against them from the great harbour; and opposed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage, the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour (after having forced the Athenians) bulged furiously one against the other as they entered it in disorder; and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and a great number of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy on a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after raising one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, whilst the  
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latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously; whereas, after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the point of their swords, which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

<sup>y</sup> There afterwards was a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships which carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pullies and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two; the besiegers defending themselves with their harbour, and the enemies with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

<sup>z</sup> One circumstance, which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet, and other succours, sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they

<sup>y</sup> Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.

<sup>z</sup> Ibid. p. 509—513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140, 141.

joined

joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; nor to tack about after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias did not care to venture a second battle, saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment, should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, to eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occasion was the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans eighty.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging; and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired; and it was just the same with the land forces. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with safety, in case he should be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly: but having refreshed themselves in great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, they entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transport ships. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sail-yards of those ships, to which were fixed dolphins \* of lead, which being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

\* This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind; and he now is involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy

\* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. p. 141, 142.

\* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp; and with such an air as should fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thousand fighting men, and about three thousand archers, slingers and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant fight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing to increase daily?

Demosthenes having made an exact enquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time, as Nicias had done, who, having spread an universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war. Otherwise he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting battles never decisive; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expences.

Nicias



Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted, that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. "Such," said they, "are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and despised." This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to Demosthenes's opinion, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce with it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked, to no purpose, the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the day time undiscovered, he marched  
thither

thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Eurycelus, as before, unperceived by the sentinels; attack the first intrenchment, and storm it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise, they are stopped on a sudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter. This spreads an universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turn their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians fought for one another to no purpose; and from their often asking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because by their being together and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped straggled from one another up and down the fields and  
woods,

woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECT. XIV. *The Consternation with which the Athenians are seized. They again hazard a Sea-fight, and are defeated. They resolve to retire by Land. Being close pursued by the Syracusans, they surrender. Nicias and Demosthenes are sentenced to die, and executed. The Effect which the News of the Defeat of the Army produces in Athens.*

THE Athenian generals, after sustaining so great a loss, were in a prodigious dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing; and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise their blockade of Athens than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was sensible that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduc-

\* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 511—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Died. p. 142.

ed, and their resolution to leave Sicily (the report of which would certainly reach the enemy) should complete the ruin of their affairs; and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; and that otherwise they would be highly displeased: that as those who were to judge them had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well, as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

\* Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them

<sup>c</sup> Thucyd. l. vii. p. 521—548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. 142—161.

both by sea and land. Besides Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail (wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon) the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers; and who being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phænomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprises but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not set sail till three times nine days were past, (these are Thucydides's words) which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly, the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interposition of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed with seventy-six galleys against eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him:

him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracufans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulph called Dafcon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chace to the rest of the galleys, and run them against the shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their staccado, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they should have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side; and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the moor called Lyfimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracufans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off that ship.

Each side erected trophies: the Syracufans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians for their having driven part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracufans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea, so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour,

bour, which was about five hundred paces wide, with galleys placed crosswise, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. In this view they were determined to leave their old camp, and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules, and to intrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they should have saved. They intended to retire into Catana, in case they should be victorious: otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled a hundred and ten galleys (the others having lost their oars) with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight, as on shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather, to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought,  
was

was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but, when they attempted to break the chain of the rest to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near two hundred galleys came rushing on each side, in a narrow place, there must necessarily be a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance forward or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a shower of stones, which always did execution from what place soever they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships from the agitation of the sea, did not carry true, and by that means the greatest part of them did little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that whilst they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Further, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmost efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land armies, which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there ran to the walls; whilst the rest kneeling in the temples, were imploring heaven to give success to their citizens; all these  
saw



saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at every moment, and the several changes which happened; they discovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; whilst the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings; and meditating nothing but how they might best divert themselves

themselves after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules. To desire the Syracufans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy; and to attempt to draw them from their diversions, either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: "Tell Nicias not to retire till daylight; for the Syracufans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes." This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have time to prepare for their departure; and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catania, the whole army was in inexpressible consternation, to see such great numbers of men, either dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or else, dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit; and, when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, imprecations; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilst every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish,  
when

when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness; deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart, this great man, superior to all his evils, thought of nothing but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable (being still near forty thousand strong;) that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper; that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre.

centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army which despair alone might render invincible; and, the instant the Athenians presented the Syracufans battle, the latter retired; but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the vanguard, commanded by Nicias, came forward in good order; but above half the rearguard, with Demosthenes at their head, quitted from the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracufans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmost diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place inclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted, and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About six thousand soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias

Nicias arrived the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner. Nicias offered to pay the expences of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages, as they should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, however sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans advancing up to them, threw most of them into the stream; the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it, to quench their thirst. Here the greatest and most bloody havoc was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion; upon condition that Gylippus should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of his army. A great number were killed and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. <sup>d</sup> The Athenians seemed to have been displeas- ed with their general, for surrendering in this manner at discretion; and, for this reason, his name was omitted in a public monument on which was engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned with the arms taken from the prisoners the finest and largest trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made a kind of trophies of those trees, when crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons,

<sup>d</sup> Pausan. l. i. p. 56.

and

and cropping those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed, that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

\* This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and compassionate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides, prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant an \* ancient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who, in this war, had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal for harangues, and the instant he appeared a profound silence was made. "You here behold," says he, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the fatal effects of this war, by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot, indeed, forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing, to their country's welfare, a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature: but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart; nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But,

\* Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161.

\* Nicolaus.

however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction, than to the honour of my country; and I see it exposed to eternal infamy by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians, indeed, merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that could be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and revenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms, and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And, if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonoured our victory by an unheard-of cruelty? How! will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world: and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, had not found any in yours? Surely victories and triumph do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You doubtless have not forgot, that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians; and employed all his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me, than the sight of so horrid an injustice, committed by my countrymen and fellow citizens."

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially, as, when this venerable old man first ascended, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated, with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their

republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers: on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles's advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him (especially as he had taken them) in order for him to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and compassionate men could not forbear shedding tears for the tragical fate of two such illustrious personages; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made to prevent this war; and, on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greatest part of them were tempted to exclaim against Providence, in seeing that a man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, should be so ill rewarded by them, and meet with no other fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the mines (*prisons of Syracuse*) where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched, in the day-time, by the burning rays of the



the sun, or frozen, in the night, by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcasses of those who died of their wounds and sickness; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst, for their daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water, and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be sold as slaves (many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition) found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them; for they were soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides, the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer; and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favour by his verses.

† The news of the defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at first; and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation; and as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who, by their oracles, or supposed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as now, having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces of Peloponnesus. Cicero had reason to observe\*, speaking of the battles in

† Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

\* *Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur.*  
CIC. VERRIN. 7. n. 97.

the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk: and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.

The Athenians, however, did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, but resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building of ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expences, and established a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture; the alarm which they were in, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and docile to all advice that might promote its interest.

The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the ancient form of government was entirely changed by Lyfander.

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## CHAP. II.

SECT. I. *Consequences of the Defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. Revolt of the Allies. Alcibiades grows into great Power with Tissaphernes.*

THE defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse gave occasion for great movements throughout all Greece. The people, who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expences of a war which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of Athens, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for

‡ A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553.

that

that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture, for throwing off the yoke of dependance, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

<sup>b</sup> In effect the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand, that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabafus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. Those viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising the Lacedæmonians all the necessary expences for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province; and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides, with that powerful aid, to get into his hands, with more ease, a certain nobleman who had revolted, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Amorges the bastard of Pissuthna. Pharnabafus, at the same time, demanded ships to reduce the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians; who also prevented him from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the credit of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Chalcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt the Athenians resolved to take the \* thousand talents out of the trea-

<sup>b</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.

\* Three millions of livres.

fury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tiffaphernes, having joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Ialus, in which Amorges<sup>1</sup> had shut himself up, who was taken alive and sent into Persia. That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachma, or ten pence, a day to each soldier, observing, that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

<sup>2</sup> Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tiffaphernes, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors, should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found, that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, which was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia; without mentioning the islands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than re-established its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make further alterations in it, with which Tiffaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much, Agis,<sup>1</sup> who was already his enemy in effect of the injury he had done him, could not suffer the glory he acquired: for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said, that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 568.

<sup>2</sup> Idem. p. 561—571, 572—576.

<sup>3</sup> Idem. p. 577—579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 164, 165.

eye, and at length by their intrigues obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades, being secretly apprized of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard, that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.

<sup>m</sup> For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of credit and authority in the court of the Barbarian. For the Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the smooth address of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kind of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs. And indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those who feared and envied him most, enchanted, in a manner, by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him.

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and who, of all the Persians, hated the Greeks most, was so much taken with the complacency and insinuations of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them

ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persian into his views, which was conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured underhand to excite divisions amongst them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between those two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct that policy makes the ability of ministers consist; who from the recess of their cabinets, without noise or emotion, without any great expences, or setting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions amongst them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and how unable they believed themselves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, does it consist with justice to employ such methods in regard to people, against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? And it is lawful by secret corruptions to ensnare the fidelity of subjects,

and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if content with the vast and rich dominions, which Providence had given them, they had applied their good offices, power, and even treasures, to conciliate the neighbouring people with each other, to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades also on his side, who was extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear that the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.



SECT. II. *The Return of Alcibiades to Athens negotiated, upon Condition of establishing the aristocratical, in the Room of the democratical, Government. Tiffaphernes concludes a new Treaty with the Lacedaemonians.*

THE Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos, where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience; kept the rest in their duty<sup>o</sup>, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies, over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tiffaphernes, and the hundred and fifty Phœnician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades, who was well informed of all that passed amongst the Athenians, sent secretly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tiffaphernes, but of the king himself, upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of discharging themselves from part of the public impositions, because being the richest of the people, the burden lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed

\* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 579—587      \* Plut. in Alcib. p. 204—206.  
 themselves



themselves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design: after which they caused a report to be spread amongst the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, upon condition that Alcibiades was reinstated, and the popular government abolished. That proposal surpris'd the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and shocking in it, and even made them ardently desire the recal of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades affected an oligarchy no more than he did the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own re-establishment, had the boldness to oppose their resolutions, which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, so much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, who would persist in preferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies, than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility, than that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience, to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, as wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the

same faction, to propose the return of Alcibiades, the alliance of Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged amongst other reasons, the imprecations pronounced by the priests, and all the orders of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recal him. But Pisander, advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded, whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced: and as it was admitted there were none, he added, that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of re-establishing the democracy in time, as Pisander had promised; and they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicus should be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but did not care to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first, that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighbouring islands. Those demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas;

seas; which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conferences with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes without loss of time concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians; in which, what had displeased in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article, which yielded to Persia the countries in general, that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expences of the Lacedæmonian fleet, upon the foot, and in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia; after which they were to support it themselves; unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was further agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the eleventh year of Darius, and the twentieth of the Peloponnesian war.

*SECT. III. The whole Authority of the Athenian Government having been vested in four hundred Persons, they abuse it tyrannically, and are deposed. Alcibiades is recalled. After various Accidents, and several considerable Victories, he returns in Triumph to Athens, and is appointed Generalissimo. He causes the great Mysteries to be celebrated, and departs with the Fleet.*

**P**ISANDER, at his return to Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out much forwarded, to which he put the last hand soon after. To give a form to this new government, he caused ten commissaries with absolute power to be appointed, who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people

Thucyd. l. viii. p. 590, 594. Plut. in Alcib. p. 105.

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an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein their first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or consequential penalty. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For this purpose five presidents were established, who nominated a hundred persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all four hundred, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and console them with a shadow of popular government, whilst they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the four hundred should call a council of five thousand citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done however, but by order of the four hundred. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost a hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the four hundred, armed with daggers, and attended by a hundred and twenty young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their appointments. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recal those who were banished, lest they should authorize the return of Alcibiades, whose uncontrollable spirit they apprehended, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or  
even

even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The four hundred, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos for the army's concurrence to it.

⁹ All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the sailors to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thraſylus and Thraſybulus were the principal, and in highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled and chosen generalissimo by the whole army, which desired to sail directly for the Piræus, to attack the tyrants: but he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tiffaphernes, and that as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor with all the power he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tiffaphernes, he now awed Tiffaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the four hundred arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alteration made at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion as every body else would have done, in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compli-

⁹ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 695—604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. p. 165.

ance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they failed thither at first, the enemy had made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the five thousand citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the four hundred, and to re-establish the senate.

\* Whilst this passed, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at \* Aspendus. Tisaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of a powerful aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However it was, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and to exhaust both parties, by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other reasons for his conduct.

\* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 604, 606. - \* A city of Pamphylia.

The return of the deputies without success, who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult increased exceedingly, when news was brought, that the enemy, after having beat the fleet, sent by the four hundred to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation upon this account. For neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were so considerable as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion, in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country: and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellepont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to take party, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by the slowness and protraction natural to them.

Athens without delay deposed the four hundred, as authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recal to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the island of Cos and Cnidos;

Thucyd. l. viii. p. 607—614. Plut. in Alcib. p. 206—210. Diod. p. 171, 172, & 175—177, & 189—192.

A. M. 8595. An. J. C. 409. and

and having learned that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailed to the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his eighteen vessels, at the time the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest, and pursued the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore; and, animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming, though Pharnabafus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken thirty of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes in his triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tissaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades's presenting himself very opportune, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis; to shelter himself by that injustice against the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards and fled to Clazomena, where, to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomena he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with twenty ships from Macedonia,



nia, and by Thrasylbulus with twenty more from Thafos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of fourscore and six, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there that Mindarus was at Cyzicum, with Parnabafus and his land army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprized of his approach. By good fortune for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprize so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only forty vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with twenty of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabafus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy,

enemy, besides the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, advised the Ephori of the blow they had received in terms to this effect: "The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do, nor what will become of us."

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy to the Athenians than consternation to the Spartans. "They dispatched ambassadors immediately to demand, that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those, who found their advantage in the troubles of the state prevented the good effects of that disposition. \* Cleophon, amongst others, the most reputed orator at that time, animated the people from the tribunal of harangues, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was an inconsiderable fellow, a musical instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently inrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians

\* Diod. l. iii. p. 177—179. \* Æsch. in Orat. de fals. legat.

puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the forerunners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to make use of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedonia, which had revolted from the Athenians, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabafus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect; "That Pharnabafus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience, depend upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; and that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabafus, who engaged for the safe conduct of their ambassadors to the great king." Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burnt, which were more than the others; the whole amounting to about two hundred ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the port, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in a body to meet

A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

him,

him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as victory itself descended from the skies: all around him passionately caressing, blessing, and crowning him in emulation of each other. Those who could not approach him, were never tired with contemplating him at a distance, whilst the old men showed him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their present felicity. "We could not have failed," said they, "of the conquest of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had referred all our affairs and forces to the disposal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarce possessed of the suburbs of our city; and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn in pieces by a horrid civil war. He notwithstanding has raised the republic from its ruins; and not content with having reinstated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or preserve it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders."

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them; well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in form. He appeared therefore; and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed to his ill fortune, and some demon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to  
conceive

conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians, transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the \* Eumolpides and Ceryces to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment by the glory of his recal, and to efface the remembrance of the anathemas themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilst all the Eumolpides and Ceryces were employed in revoking those imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say: "But for me, I have not cursed him, if he has done no evil to his country;" insinuating, by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and shining prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return. For it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated the feast in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the goddess's statue to wash it, from whence that feast was called Πλυντηρια, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which answers to the second of July<sup>2</sup>. This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness and protectress of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off, and remove him from her.

\* N. S.

\* The Eumolpides and Ceryces were two families at Athens, who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised those offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of heralds, Κηρυκες.

All

<sup>a</sup> All things having however succeeded according to his wish, and the hundred ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleufina, the feast had not been solemnized in all its pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea. The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in the beginning of the next volume.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and attract the blessings of the gods, and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land under the convoy of his troops, to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerably lessen the reputation of that king, and be a blot in his glory: or, if he should choose to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle, a battle grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witnesses of his valour and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to his taste, Alcibiades's principal design was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of statues, and profanation of mysteries, had given birth.

Having taken that resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpides and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted sentinels upon the hills, sent out runners at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and disposed the whole pomp with wonderful order, and pro-

<sup>a</sup> Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

found silence. Never was show, says Plutarch, more august, nor more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession, and religious expedition; in which even those, who envied the glory of Alcibiades, were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of a high priest, than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear, or disturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades reconducted the sacred troops to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valour and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible whilst he commanded them.

He acquired the affection of the poor, and the lower sort of people so much, that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, decrees, or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinents that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny, and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly, with a hundred ships, and steered for the island of Andros, that had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterprizes, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECT. IV. *The Lacedæmonians appoint Lysander Admiral. He becomes very powerful with young Cyrus, who commanded in Asia. He beats the Athenian Fleet near Ephesus, in the Absence of Alcibiades, who is deprived of the Command. Ten Generals are chosen in his Stead. Callicratidas succeeds Lysander.*

**T**HE Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, conceived that such an enemy made it necessary to oppose him with an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed in his favour, and well affected to Sparta; but otherwise in a very unhappy situation. For it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great commerce with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave the public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundations of that grandeur and magnificence, to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above sixteen years old at that time, being born after his father's accession

<sup>b</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. xi. p. 440—442. Plut. in Lysand. p. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. p. 192—197.



to the crown, in the seventeenth year of his reign. Paryfatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and had the entire ascendant of her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the supreme government of all the provinces of Asia Minor given him; a command that subjected all the provincial governors of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Paryfatis was, without doubt, to put the young prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother after the king's death; as we shall see he does to some effect. One of the principal instructions, given him by his father upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens; an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tiffaphernes, and the other governors of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other, in order to hold their power in such a balance, that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely; from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither in condition to form any enterprises against the Persian empire.

Upon Lyfander's being apprised, therefore, of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tiffaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians out of the sea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, whose measures he entirely gave into, and had been the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tiffaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy; and he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received five hundred talents\* for that purpose. Lyfander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of

\* Five hundred thousand crowns, about 112,500l. sterling.

complacency for the grandees, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which ~~behaviour~~ <sup>some</sup> people make the whole address and merit of a courtier consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a drachma \* per day, in order to debauch those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said, that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent † to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lyfander desired that an † obolus a day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted, and he gave them four oboli instead of three, which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lyfander ten thousand § daricks for that purpose; that is, a hundred thousand livres, or about five thousand pounds sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to the party where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tiffaphernes; but he would not hearken to them notwithstanding the satrap represented,

\* Ten pence.

† One thousand five hundred livres, about 112l. sterling.

‡ The drachma was six oboli, or ten pence French; each obolus being three halfpence; so that the four oboli were sixpence halfpenny a day, instead of five pence, or three oboli.

§ A darick is about a pistole.

that

that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

Though Lyfander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariners pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not however hazard a battle with them, particularly apprehending Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raise money, of which he was in want for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with exprefs orders not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make shew of his courage, and to brave Lyfander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lyfander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come on, till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the engagement became general on both sides. Lyfander gained the victory, and having taken fifteen of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, failed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lyfander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so that he retired without doing any thing.

Thraſybulus, at the same time, the most dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuse him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full assembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licence he had introduced; that he had given

<sup>c</sup> A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 506.

himself

himself up to the most \*notorious debauchees and drunkards, who, from common seamen were the only persons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leisure to enrich himself in the provinces, and to plunge himself there into intemperance and all other infamous excesses, to the disgrace of Athens, whilst his fleet was left neglected in the face of the enemy's.

Another article of accusation against him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an asylum and retreat for him; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconstant people, gave credit to these impeachments. The loss of the last battle, and his little success since his departure from Athens, instead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely sunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be said to have occasioned his ruin. For he was suspected of not desiring to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, because they were fully persuaded, that nothing he desired to do was impossible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades, that the rapidity of his conquests did not answer to that of their imaginations; not considering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treasurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp, to go in quest of what was necessary for the payment and subsistence of his troops. However it was, Alcibiades was deposed, and ten generals nominated in his stead; of which, when he received advice, he retired, in his galley, to some castles he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

† About this time died Plistonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned fourteen years. The latter made a fine answer

\* Diod. p. 196.

† Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean, debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades by catching a quail for him which he had let fly.

to one who asked, why it was not permitted to change any thing in the ancient customs of Sparta: “\* Because,” says he, “at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws.”

<sup>1</sup> Lyfander, who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependence of Sparta, that the governors of his choosing might be always at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, he caused such persons of the principal cities to come to Ephesus, as he knew to be the boldest, and most enterprising and ambitious. These he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honours, and raised to the first employments of the army, thereby rendering himself, says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lyfander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not hinder themselves from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleased with the facility and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealousy Lyfander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the com-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 442—444. Plut. in Lyfand. p. 433—436. Diod. p. 197, 198.

\* Οτι της νομιμας των ανδρων η της ανδρας των νομιμων κυριως ειναι δεη. Plut. in Apoph. p. 230.

mand, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition than the good of the public, he did him all the ill offices in his power. Of the ten thousand daricks, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble, and distressed him exceedingly. For he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the citizens, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

† In this urgent necessity a person having offered him fifty talents (that is to say, fifty thousand crowns) to obtain a favour he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, "I would accept them, were I in your place." "And so would I," replied the general, "were I in yours."

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lyfander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's general and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was less evil and dishonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of Barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation were indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his Offices, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals, of whom we speak. The one, says he, \* zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all fraud,

G 5

fraud,

† Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

\* *Sunt his alii multum dispares simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici; itemque alii, qui*  
quidam

fraud, piqued themselves upon their simplicity and candour, and do not believe, that it can ever consist with honour to lay snares, or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer for every thing, are not ashamed of the meanest actions and prostitutions, provided from those unworthy means they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas amongst the former, and Lyfander amongst the latter, to whom he gives two epithets not much to his honour, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him *very artful and very patient*, or rather *very complaisant*.

Callicratidas, however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told, that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered, that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a \* party of pleasure; to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest stranger's simplicity, which had so little the air of the world in it; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither a second time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loading those with curses and imprecations, who had first made their court to Barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore, that as soon as he returned to Sparta, he would use his utmost endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongst themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the Barbarians, and have no further occasion for

*quidvis perpetiantur cuius deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lyfandrum accepimus, nec traque Callicratidem. Offic. l. i. n. 109.*

\* The Greek says literally that he was drinking, *ωινει*. The Persians valued themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

their

their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced, of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor to apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECT. V. *Callicratidas is defeated by the Athenians near the Arginusæ. The Athenians pass Sentence of Death upon several of their Generals, for not having brought off the Bodies of those who had been slain in the Battle. Socrates alone has the Courage to oppose so unjust a Sentence.*

**C**ALLICRATIDAS, after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon seeing himself besieged by sea and land without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprise Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of a hundred and ten sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all who were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with forty galleys, and steered for the Arginusæ, islands situate between Cuma and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with fifty ships, and put to sea with a hundred and twenty sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasylus, who had each fifteen galleys. They were supported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lyfias and Arif-

<sup>s</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 444-452. Diod. l. xiii. p. 198, & 201, 217-222.



togenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasmidés and Pericles\*. The main body, consisting of near thirty galleys; amongst which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line, because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage, as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality; advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied, that he could not fly without shame, and that his death was of small importance to the republic. "Sparta," said he, "does not depend upon one man." He commanded the right wing, and Thrasonidas the Theban the left.

It was terrible to behold the sea covered with three hundred galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks joined battle before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long. When the signals were given, the two armies raised great shouts and began the fight. Callicratidas, who from the answer of the augurs expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of the ships, disabled others by breaking their oars and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling iron, he found it impossible to dis-

\* He was son of the great Pericles.

engage himself, and was furrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful slaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing, which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, from the important concern they were in, lest they should fall into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost twenty-five galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than seventy, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

<sup>b</sup> Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration amongst the Greeks.

<sup>c</sup> He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ, and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had through a mistaken sense of honour, failed in the essential duty of his function. For, says Plutarch, if (to use the comparison of \* Iphicrates) the light-armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valour, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those, whose safety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to answer the pilot, who advised him to retire, "Sparta does not depend upon one man." For though it be true, that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, *was no more than one man*, yet, commanding an army, all who obeyed his orders were collected in his person; and he, in whom so many thousands might be lost, *was no longer*

<sup>b</sup> Plut. in Lyfand. p. 436.

<sup>c</sup> Plut. in Pelop. p. 278.

\* He was a famous general of the Athenians.

one man. \* Cicero had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said, that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, and even lives, for their country, but who out of a false delicacy in point of glory would not hazard their reputation for it in the least; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those who advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, "That Sparta could fit out another fleet, if this were lost; but for himself, he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy."

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers, to return with about fifty galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilst they rowed on with the rest against Eteonicus, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a rude tempest came on suddenly and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occasion alarm and terror amongst the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land-army to Methymna, after having burnt the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the

\* *Inventi multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam, profundero pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minima quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante: ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multa que fecisset egregiè, vertit ad extremum omnia cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissa, aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Offic. l. i. n. 48.*

people were highly enraged, and laid the whole weight of their resentment upon those they believed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and their great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay their last duties to those who had fallen in battle; upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body; but however, the Pagans, in the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it, and the passion with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, seem to argue, that they had some confused notion of a resurrection which subsisted amongst all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not distinguish clearly upon it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantes and Philocles for colleagues. Eight days after which, two of them withdrew themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle; and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and people, wherein they excused themselves from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. That calumny was detestably vile, as done in abuse of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return not being able to prevail for the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons

sons offered themselves for their sureties; but it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, because of the night, and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known; besides which the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia unexpectedly coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits, and shaved, in proper places, who said, they were the kindred of those who had been slain in the battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the Senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people by their respective tribe should give their voices, and if the accused were found guilty, they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the \* goddesses. Some senators opposed this decree as unjust, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals, they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates (the celebrated philosopher) was the only one of the senators who stood firm, persisted obstinately in opposing a decree so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, showed, "That they had failed in nothing of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead bodies should be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he, who being charged with these orders, had neglected to put them in execution; but that he accused nobody; and that the tempest which came on unexpectedly at the very instant was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the accused from all guilt. He demanded, that a whole day should be allowed them to make their

\* Minerva.

defence,

defence, a favour not denied to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately. He represented, that they were not in the least obliged to precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious of the citizens were concerned; that it was in some measure attacking the gods to make \* men responsible for the winds and weather; that they could not, without the most flagrant ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of those who envied them; that if they did so, their unjust judgment would be followed with a sudden, but vain repentance, which would leave behind it the sharpest remorse, and cover them with eternal shame and infamy." The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons; but animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against eight of their generals; and six of them, who were present, were seized, in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. "Athenians," said he, "I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic; but I have one favour to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy." There was not one good citizen, that did not melt into tears at this discourse, so full of goodness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least resentment, or even complaint against his judges, but was solely intent (in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to pe-

\* *Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleri assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint?*  
 † Tacit. Annal. l. xiv. c. 3.

fish) upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The six generals were hardly executed, when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that sentence; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Callixenes, the orator, was put in prison, and refused to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned some time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to thirty tyrants, who treated them with the utmost rigour and cruelty.

\* The disposition of a people is very naturally imaged in this account; and Plato, upon the same event, draws in few words their character with much spirit and resemblance. The \* commonalty, says he, is an unconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason; which is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it.

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon those who pass for the wisest, and how few there are, who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger and disgrace. Though the justness of the generals cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least by the major part of it, as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all of them had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides and came over to the most notorious calumny, and crying injustice, that ever had being. An evident proof, that

\* Plut. in Axioch. p. 368, 369.

\* Δημιῶν ἀφικρόν, ἀχαριστῶν, ὠμόν, βασκατόν, ἀπαιδέυλον.

there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends the valour, that induces so many thousands of men every day to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Amongst all the judges, only one, truly worthy of his reputation, the great Socrates, in this general treason and perfidy, stood firm and immovable; and though he knew his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the accused, he thought them a just homage to oppressed innocence, and that it was \* unworthy an honest man to govern himself by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We see in this instance how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than three thousand citizens, who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euriptodemus and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

<sup>1</sup>The same year the battle of the Arginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily. I shall defer speaking of him till the ensuing volume, in which I shall treat the history of the tyrants of Syracuse at large.

SECT. VI. *Lysander commands the Lacedæmonian Fleet. Cyrus is recalled to Court by his Father. Lysander's celebrated Victory over the Athenians at Egospotamos.*

**A**FTER the defeat at the Arginusæ, the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the credit of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet should again be given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage, if their request

<sup>1</sup> A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

<sup>m</sup> A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 405. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 45. Plut. in Lys. l. ix. 436, 437. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

\* Οὐ γὰρ ἐφαινετο μοι σεμνὸν ἄλλῃ ματαιότητι συνεξέρχεται.

were.



were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral; the Lacedæmonians, to satisfy the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lyfander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect with all the authority of the supreme command.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and were of most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complacency for his friends, and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better with their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lyfander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles in point of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be determined by the convenience resulting from them. And for those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them; "For," said he, "where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it."

An expression ascribed to him, sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, "\* Children are amused with baubles, and men with oaths;" showing, by so professed a want of religion, that the gods were more inconsiderable with him.

\* The Greek text admits another sense, which is perhaps no less good. "Children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths." *Ἐκκελεῖ τῆς μὲν παιδᾶς ἀσμεγαλοῖς, τῆς αὐτᾶς ἀρχαῖς ἐξαπίπται.*

than his enemies. For he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares in so doing, that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

<sup>a</sup> Here ends the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. In this year, it was, that young Cyrus dazzled with the usual splendor of supreme authority, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered, by a remarkable action, the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy in the reigning house, nurtured under the shade of the throne amidst the submissions and prostrations of the courtiers, entertained long by the discourses of an ambitious mother who idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to affect the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigour. Two Persians of the royal family, his cousin-germans by their mother, his father Darius's sister, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremonial observed only to the kings of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son's as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honour was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him.

Cyrus before his departure sent for Lyfander to Sardis, and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of his fleet, promising him still more for the future. And with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him, he assured him, that though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers, and that rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 454.

would

would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat in judgment, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confided the government of his provinces to him, and conjured him with embraces not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority to the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

<sup>n</sup> After that prince's departure, Lyfander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampfacus. Torax, having marched thither with his land forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. <sup>o</sup> The place was carried by storm, and abandoned by Lyfander to the mercy of the soldiers. The Athenians, who followed him close, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum in the Chersonesus, with a hundred and fourscore galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampfacus, they immediately steered for Sestos, and after having taken in provisions, they stood away from thence, sailing along the coast to a place called \*Ægospotamos, where they halted over against the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampfacus. The Hellespont is not above two thousand paces broad in that place. The two armies, seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lyfander had another design in view. He commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders with profound silence. He ordered the land army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morrow, as soon as the sun was risen,

<sup>n</sup> Xenoph. Hellen l. ii. p. 455—458. <sup>o</sup> Plut. in Lyf. p. 497, & 440. idem in Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii, p. 225, 226.

\* The river of the goat.

the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lyfander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys, which he had sent out to observe them, were returned with advice, that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with an extreme contempt for an army, which fear, in their sense, prevented from showing themselves, and attempting any thing.

Whilst this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he represented, that they kept upon a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves at their own pleasure, whilst the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion, that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall upon them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the honour of it; but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening

according

according to custom with more insulting airs than the days before. Lyfander, as usual, detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, when they saw the Athenians landed, and to put up a brazen buckler at each ship's head as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put up in the ships heads and the admiral's galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forwards in good order. The land army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place, is about fifteen stadia\*, or three quarters of a league in breadth, which space was presently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived from shore, the enemy's fleet advance in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys; but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some were run to the sutlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in the generals, who not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the *Paralian*, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediate-

\* 1875 paces.

ly the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lyfander took three thousand prisoners, with all the generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampfacus, amidst the sound of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have achieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted seven and twenty years, and which, perhaps, without him, had been of much longer continuance. Lyfander immediately sent dispatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The three thousand prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lyfander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them from handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lyfander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him, what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, "Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges, but, as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we had done by you, if we had conquered." At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adamantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lyfander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw, as soon as possible, to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all such should be punished with death, as should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards applied himself in subverting the democratic, and all other forms of government throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called *harmostes*, and ten archons or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby, in some measure, secured to himself universal authority, and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece; putting none into power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECT. VII. *Athens, besieged by Lyfander, capitulates, and surrenders. Lyfander changes the Form of Government, and establishes thirty Commanders in it. He sends Gylippus before him to Sparta with all the Gold and Silver taken from the Enemy. Decree of Sparta upon the Use to be made of it. The Peloponnesian War ends in this Manner. Death of Darius Nothus.*

WHEN the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship, which arrived in the night at the Piræus, the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments, and death

<sup>p</sup> A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. in Lyfand. p. 440, 441.

itself.

itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to shut up all the ports, one only excepted; to repair the breaches in the walls; and mount guard, to prepare against a siege.

In effect Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lyfander soon after arrived at the Piræus with a hundred and fifty sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, reinstated all persons attainted by any decree, without speaking the least word of a capitulation, however, though many already died of famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Salafia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals, if they expected peace. The ephori had demanded, that twelve hundred paces of the wall on each side of the Piræus should be demolished: but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition, Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lyfander, he would know, whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent; no doubt with the view of reducing them, by famine, to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his return, he told them, that Lyfander had detained him all that time, and that at last he had been given to understand that he might apply to the Ephori. He was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When



they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city without hearkening any further to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they would never be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to all Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies, than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded under these conditions: "That the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, twelve only excepted; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recal their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them."

The deputies on their return were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who apprehended that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the success of their negotiation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lyfander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamin. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having continued during the space of twenty-seven years.

Lyfander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established thirty archons, or rather tyrants, over  
the

the city, put a good garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius *harmostes*, or governor. Agis dismissed his troops. Lyfander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta, with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold, given him by the cities, amounted to fifteen hundred talents, that is to say, fifteen hundred thousand crowns\*. Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of three hundred talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts, which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most distinguishing of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lyfander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to † banish all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it,

\* About 337,000l. sterling.

\* Απέδωκε πομπήν θάλασσαν τὸ ἀργύριον καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ὡσπερ κηρᾶς ἐπιβύβη-  
μας.

as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigour and prosperity. The Ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribè that money, and ordained that none should be current, except the usual pieces of iron. But Lysander's friends opposed this decree, and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred for further deliberation. There naturally seemed only two methods to be considered, which were, either to make the gold and silver species current, or to cry them down, and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their sense, reconciled both the others with great success: this was wisely to choose the mean betwixt the vicious extremes of too much rigour, and too much neglect. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person, in whose possession it should be found, should be immediately put to death.

A strange expedient, says Plutarch! As if Lysander had feared the species of gold and silver, and not the avarice they occasion; an avarice, less to be extinguished by prohibiting to particulars the possession of it, than inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the service of the public. For it was impossible, whilst that money was in honour and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs, which the city prized, and were so much concerned to have for its occasions; bad usages, authorised by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to particulars, than the vices of particulars to the public. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, continues Plutarch, in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of punish.

punishment as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and introduced themselves a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

¶ It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus, king of Persia, died, after a reign of nineteen years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Paryfatis, his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the First, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because born, as Cyrus was, after his father's accession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arfaces, his eldest son, by Paryfatis also, whom Plutarch called Arficas, and bequeathed only to Cyrus the provinces he had already.

¶ A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

BOOK THE NINTH.

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THE  
ANCIENT HISTORY  
OF THE  
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CONTINUED,  
DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF  
ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

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CHAP. I.

**T**HIS chapter contains the domestic troubles of the court of Persia; the death of Alcibiades; the re-establishment of the liberty of Athens; and Lyfander's secret designs to make himself king.

*SECT. I. Coronation of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Cyrus attempts to assassinate his Brother, and is sent into Asia Minor. Cruel Revenge of Statira, Wife of Artaxerxes, upon the Authors and Accomplices in the Murder of her Brother. Death of Alcibiades. His Character.*

**A**RSACES, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes, the same to whom the Greeks gave the surname of \*MNEMON, from his prodigious memory. <sup>b</sup> Being near his father's bed, when he was dying, he asked him, a few moments be-

<sup>a</sup> A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

<sup>b</sup> Athen. l. xii. p. 548.

\* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

fore he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. "It has been," replied he, "to do always what justice and religion required of me." Words of deep sense, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious, if preceded by their own example and conduct; without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

<sup>b</sup> Soon after Darius's death, the new king set out from his capital for the city of \*Pafargades, in order to his coronation, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided in war, in which the coronation was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince at his consecration took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus, before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that, he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. This might signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the sours of care and disquiet, and that if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties. It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, whose soul was all ambition, was in despair upon being for ever prevented from ascending a throne his mother had given him, and on seeing the

<sup>b</sup> Plut. in Artax. p. 1012.

\* A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great.

sceptre which he thought his right, transferred into the hands of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he took off his own, to put on the robe of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprized of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized, and condemned to die, when his mother Parysatis, almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, tied herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened her neck to his, and by her shrieks and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, was animated besides with the resentment of the check he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an almost unbounded power. Artaxerxes, upon this occasion, acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit \* the nourishing and enflaming, by extraordinary honours, the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far, as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great, as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

Artaxerxes had espoused Statira. Scarce had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. History has not a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary, for the reader's knowledge of the fact, to trace it from the beginning.

\* Ctes. c. li. lv.

\* *Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret.* TACIT. ANNAL. l. iv. c. 17.

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very great quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her, who was then called Arsaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestris, Arsaces's sister, one of the daughters of Darius and Paryfatis; in favour of which marriage Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the same time another sister in this family, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes, her brother, conceived a criminal passion for her, and, to gratify it, resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestris, whom he had espoused. Darius, having been informed of this project, by the force of presents and promises engaged Udiastes, Teriteuchmes's intimate friend and confidant, to prevent so black a design, by assassinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Amongst Teriteuchmes's guards was a son of Udiastes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of imprecations against him, and full of horror for so infamous and vile an action, seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes's son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was blockaded up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison, and delivered to Paryfatis, to do with them as that mother, exasperated to the last excess by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death, except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears and the most tender



and ardent solicitations of Arfaces ; whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius, his father, believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, causes Udiastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompence for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis, on her side, took her revenge on the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned, and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable, who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war, which that Spartan was to carry into Thrace. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time ; intending to treat those two great events in all the extent they deserve. It was without doubt with the same view, that Cyrus presented Lyfander a galley of two cubits in length, made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphos. Lyfander went soon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occasion Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with Lyfander, related by Xenophon, and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully. That young \* prince, who piqued himself more upon

\* *Narrat Socrates in eo libro Cyrum minorem, regem Persarum, præstantem ingenio atque imperii gloria, cum Lyfander Lacedæmonius vir summæ virtutis, venisset*

his integrity and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and to make him observe the various beauties of them. Lyfander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out, the height and projection of the trees, the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of fruits, planted with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours universally throughout the delightful scene. "Every thing charms and transports me in this place," said Lyfander, addressing himself to Cyrus; "but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person who drew the plan of the several parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition, and happiness of symmetry, which I cannot sufficiently admire." Cyrus infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, "It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and not only that, many of the trees which you see, were planted with my own hands."—"What," replied Lyfander, considering him from head to foot, "is it possible, with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees?"—"Does that surprize you?" said Cyrus, "I swear by the god \* Mithras, that when my

*venisset ad eum Sardes, eique que dona à sociis attulisset, et cæteris in rebus comem erga Lyfandrum atque humanum fuisse, et ei quemdam conseptum agrum diligenter consitum ostendisse. Cum autem admiraretur Lyfander et proceritates arborum, et directos in quincuncem ordines, et humum subactam atque puram, et suavitatem odorum qui efflarentur è floribus; tum eum dixisse, mirari se non modo diligentiam, sed etiam solertiam ejus, à quo essent illa dimensa atque descripta. Et ei Cyrum respondisse: Atque ego ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio, multe etiam istarum arborum mæa manu sunt satæ. Tum Lyfandrum intucutem ejus perpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Persicum multo auro multisque gemmis, dixisse: Recte verò, te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est. Cic. de Senec. n. 59.*

\* The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

health admits, I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exercise, rural labour, or some other toilsome employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself." Lyfander was amazed at this discourse, and pressing him by the hand; \* "Cyrus," said he, "you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune; because you unite it with virtue."

Alcibiades was at no small pains to discover the mystery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabafus, with design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprize Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance had infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the re-establishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partizans at Athens, that is to say, the thirty tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters, that they were inevitably ruined, if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabafus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, made pressing instances to him, to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied to their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town in Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine † Timandra. Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding and setting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames, sword in hand, the Barbarians were afraid to stay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon

\* Δικαιως, ω Κυρε ευδαιμονης αγαθος γαρ ων ευδαιμονεις. Which Cicero translates: *Beate vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna conjuncta est.*

† It was said that Lais the famous courtezan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it, as her present condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. \* It is not easy to say, whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country; for, with the one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it. In him distinguished valour was united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made, he was eloquent, of great ability in affairs, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory; but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure; nor was he so fond of pleasure as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abstract himself from it, according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like a Proteus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them all with as much ease and grace, as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according to occasions, the customs of countries, and his own interests, discover a heart void of principles, without either truth or justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he reduced every thing. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favoured them only as they served his purposes; and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing every thing to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His sallies for virtue were ill sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the instructions of that great philosopher,

\* *Cujus nescio utrum bona an vitia patriæ perniciosiora fuerint; illis enim sives suos decepit, his afflixit.* VAL. MAX. l. iii. c. 1.

who

who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious; but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand; but without connection and confidence. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according to his declaring for or against it. In fine, he was the author of an universal destructive war in Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse; much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependence upon himself; convinced, that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain. He never loved any one, himself being his sole motive; nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to amuse all men, and nobody confided in, or adhered to him. His sole view was to live with splendor, and to lord it universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of one only woman for the last honours rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus the philosopher, of whom more will be said elsewhere.

SECT. II. *The Thirty exercise the most horrid Cruelties at Athens. They put Theramenes, one of their Colleagues, to Death. Socrates takes his Defence upon himself. Thrasybulus attacks the Tyrants, makes himself Master of Athens, and restores its Liberty.*

<sup>a</sup> THE council of thirty, established at Athens by Lyfander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and to prevent seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, had armed three thousand of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence, became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

The two most considerable persons of the thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid, that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards, to advance

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. p. 462, & 479. Diod. l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin. l. v. c. 8, 10.

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who retained a love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so hard and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thraſybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatsoever, who should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lyſias, an orator of Syracuse, who had been banished by the thirty, \* raised five hundred soldiers at his own expence, and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thraſybulus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort of Atticā, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master. The thirty flew thither with their troops, and a battle sufficiently warm ensued. But as the soldiers on one side fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and neglect for the power of others, the success was not doubtful, but followed the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed upon the spot. And as the rest of the army were taking to flight, Thraſybulus cried out; “Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor, rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the thirty tyrants.” He continued with bidding them remember, that they had the same origin, country, laws,

\* *Quingentos milites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communitæ eloquentiæ misit.* JUSTIN. l. v. c. 9.

and

and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren, to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty themselves. This discourse had suitable effects. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than theirs.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the four hundred formerly chosen by Athens; again in the thirty; and now in the ten. And what augments our wonder is, that this passion for tyranny should possess so immediately republicans, born in the bosom of liberty, accustomed to an equality of condition on which it is founded, and principled from their earliest infancy in an abhorrence of all subjection and dependency. † There must be on the one side in power and authority some violent impulse to actuate in this manner so many persons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honour; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners natural to them; and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, to rule over them imperiously, to carry him on to the last extremes of oppression and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all laws, nature, and religion.

The thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lyfander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-established. But king Pausanias, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition, to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favour the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being

† *Vi dominationis convulsus.* TACIT.



present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thraſybulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was re-established upon its ancient foot; the laws restored to their pristine vigour, and magistrates elected with the usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thraſybulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good government.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that the Athenians had lately thrown off. Every house was in mourning; every family bewailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which licence and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. The people seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state to authorize such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thraſybulus rising above those sentiments, from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy, foresaw, that by giving in to the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken the republic by domestic divisions, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important services from the view itself of making amends for past misbehaviour.

Such a conduct after great troubles in a state has always seemed, with the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquillity.

tranquillity. \* Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. † Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and "that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day;" whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards "was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears," says he, "in the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces, that not an age ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain."

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is † persons in power to want a sense of honour, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment posterity will form of their conduct: for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the awe of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced

‡ Let. XV. of Card. Maz.

\* *In ædem Telluris convocati sumus; in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, jeci fundamentum pacis; Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum, Græcum etiam † verbum usurpavi, quod tum in sedandis discordiis usurpaveret civitas illa; atque omnem memoriam discordiarum oblivione sempiterna delendam censei.* PHILIP. l. i. n. i.

† Some believe that word was ἀμνηστία; but as it is not found in the historians who have treated this fact, it is more likely, that it was ἀμνηστιαστικόν, which has the same sense, and is used by them all.

‡ *Cetera principibus statem adesse unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contempta fama, contemni virtutes—Quo magis facordiam eorum irrideri libet, qui præsentia potentia credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas rependit.* TACIT. Annal. l. iv. c. 30, & 55.

silence

silence upon censure; but the more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be, after their deaths, of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be fixed to their memories. The power of the thirty was of a very short duration, their guilt immortal, which will be remembered with abhorrence throughout all ages, whilst their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious, and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians, who after having made themselves masters of Greece by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy, in regard to Athens, enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them; nor is there any resemblance in such behaviour of the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta; so much power has the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known: "The greatness and majesty of princes," says he, (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority) "can be supported only by humanity and justice with regard to their subjects; as on the contrary they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel and oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people."

SECT. III. *Lyfander abuses his Power in an extraordinary Manner. He is recalled to Sparta upon the Complaint of Pharnabafus.*

AS Lyfander had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits, which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch; so had he acquired a degree of power and authority, of which there was no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater

Plut. in Lyfand. p. 443—445.

than

than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and canticles in honour of him. The Samians ordained, by a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess should be called the *Feasts of Lyfander*. He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers) who emulated each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds; but diminishes their lustre when either forged or excessive.

This sort of vanity and ambition, had he stopped there, would have hurt only himself, by exposing him to envy and contempt; but a natural consequence of it was that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, and the ties of hospitality with him; and only the death of those he hated, could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being impossible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might, with equal propriety, have been engraved upon Lyfander's: That no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing whenever they prompted his designs; nor was he less cruel than revengeful; of which what he did at Miletus is a sufficient proof. Apprehending that those who were at the head of the people would escape him, he swore not to do them any hurt. Those unfortunates gave credit to his oath, and no sooner appeared in public, than they were put to the sword with his consent by the nobility, who killed them all, though no less than eight hundred. The number of those in the party of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in the other cities, is incredible;

for he did not only destroy to satiate his own resentments, but to serve, in all places, the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lyfander; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themselves no trouble to prevent its effects. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to be deaf to their just complaints, though authority is principally confided in them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was slow and drowsy, becomes immediately warm and officious; a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it: this appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabafus, weary of Lyfander's repeated injustices, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lyfander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabafus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of softening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired, that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating a satisfaction in his conduct. But Lyfander, says Plutarch, in such an application to Pharnabafus, forgot the \* proverb, *Set a thief to catch a thief*. The satrap, promised all he desired, and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lyfander's presence as he had asked of him, but prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and

\* The Greek proverb is *Cretan against Cretan*, from the people of Crete, who passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

form, he dexterously put that he had written in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him.

Lyfander departed well satisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the senate was assembled, and delivered Pharnabafus's letter to the Ephori. But he was strangely surpris'd when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the Ephori, that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence, to cover the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta, and to submit to the yoke of obeying; he, who till then had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinctions of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure the mortifying equality with the multitude, nor restrain himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities in his dependence, by the means of their governors and magistrates established by him, to whom they were also indebted for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any share in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time Lyfander, being apprized of the design of Thrafybulus, to re-establish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed, that Pausanias, from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, says Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lyfander's ambition.

## CHAP. II.

*Young Cyrus, with the Aid of the Grecian Troops, endeavours to dethrone his Brother Artaxerxes. He is killed in Battle. Famous Retreat of the Ten Thousand.*

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, abounding, otherwise, with excellent qualities, abandoned to his violent ambition, carry the war from far against his brother and sovereign, and go to attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life. We see him, I say, fall dead in the battle, at the feet of that brother, and terminate, by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him\*, destitute of all succour after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, horse, or archers, reduced to less than ten thousand men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported only by the warm desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of a million of men, traverse five or six hundred leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable passes, and arrive at last in their own country, through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduce them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges, and most experienced in the art of war, is the boldest and best-conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us it is described to the most minute circumstance by a historian, who was not only eye-witness of the facts he

\* *Post mortem Cyri, neque armis à tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi poterunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes per tanta itineris spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt.* JUSTIN, l. v. c. 11.

relates,

relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge it, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons, who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant in French, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phœnix, the governor of Achilles <sup>u</sup>, “That he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms.”

Μυθῶν τε ρητῆρ ἐμμεναι, πρηνκτῆρα τε ἐργῶν.

SECT. I. *Cyrus raises Troops secretly against his Brother Artaxerxes. Thirteen Thousand Greeks join him. He sets out for Sardis, and arrives in Babylonia after a March of six Months.*

\* **WE** have already said, that young Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus and Paryfatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Paryfatis, who doated upon this youngest son. He removed him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him. <sup>v</sup> He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the

<sup>u</sup> Iliad. x. ver. 443. <sup>x</sup> A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 440. Diad. l. xiv. p. 243—249, & 252. Justin. l. v. c. 14. Xenoph. de Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 243—248. <sup>v</sup> A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403.

king's



king's party and adhere to him. He gained also the hearts of the Barbarians under his government; familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of their general; these he formed, by various exercises, for the trade of war. He applied particularly in secret to raise, from several parts, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the Barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. " At the same time several cities in the provinces of Tissaphernes revolted from their obedience in favour of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret practices of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops openly; and to amuse the court the more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king, against that governor, demanding his protection and aid in the most submissive manner, Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed that all Cyrus's preparations regarded only Tissaphernes, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.

° Cyrus knew well how to improve the imprudent security and indolence of his brother, which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign he seemed to imitate the virtues of the first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore. For he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favour; when he passed sentence to punish, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents, it was with a gracious air, and such obliging circumstances, as infinitely exalted their value, and implied, that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his sub-

• A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

• Plut. in Artax. p. 1013.  
jects.

jects. To all these excellent qualities it had been very necessary for him to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They talked that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favours upon those that served him; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne, fired with ambition and valour for the support and augmentation of its glory.

‡ The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then twenty-three years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother; that he was better versed in philosophy and the knowledge of the Magi\*, and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses, a very meritorious quality amongst the Barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the opinion of those he wrote to. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince

‡ A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

\* By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos, his admiral, in all things, but without the least mention of Cyrus, or seeming, in any manner, privy to his design. They thought that precaution \* necessary for their justification with Artaxerxes, in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of a hundred thousand regular men of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenes the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. † The Barbarians had Persian generals, of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of thirty-five ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and of twenty-five commanded by Tamos the Egyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land army, coasting along the shore,

Cyrus had opened his design only to Clearchus of all the Greeks, foreseeing aright that the length and boldness of the enterprize could not fail of discouraging and disgusting the officers, as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenes, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus †, who received him very favourably, and gave him an employment in his army amongst the Greeks. He set out for Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given

† Xenoph. Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 252.

† Xenoph. l. ii. p. 294.

\* *Quærentus apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem. si vicisset, venia patrocinia, cum nihil adversus eum aperte decrevissent.* JUSTIN. l. v. c. 11.

out, that he should act against the Pisidians, who had infested his province by their incursions.

\* Tissaphernes, rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for so small an enterprise as against Pisidia, had set out post from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus was looked upon as the principal cause of this war; and all persons in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira, especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. "Where is now," said she to her, "that faith you have so often engaged for your son's behaviour? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes." The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other was already very great, and much enflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall see what consequences they have. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

† Cyrus advanced continually by great marches. What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, prepared to dispute this passage with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have made good against the greatest army.

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Greeks refused to march any farther, rightly suspecting that they were intended against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they

\* Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.

† Xenoph. l. i. p. 248-261.

had

had not entered into the service on that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and credit. He declared publicly, that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily, if they approved his measures; if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased the tumult, and made them easy, and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprised of every thing, made answer that he was going to attack \* Abrocomas his enemy, at twelve days march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were going, they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one † daric a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.

Some time after Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted, with part of their equipage, on board a merchant ship. Many were of opinion, that it was proper to send two galleys after them; which might be done with great ease, and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in the sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour ‡ was the most certain means to the attainment of affection, and that punishments, like

\* It is not said where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with three hundred thousand men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

† The daric was worth ten livres.

‡ *Beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit.* PLIN. in Traj.  
violent

violent remedies, ought never to be used but in extreme necessity, declared publicly that he would not suffer it to be said, that he had detained any one in his service by force; and added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands. An answer of so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect; and made even those his firm adherents, who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and apply. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavours are used to force them to do their duty against their will. \* They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honour, and that the glory of acquitting themselves of it out of choice be left in their power: to show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.

Cyrus soon after declared, that he marched against Artaxerxes. Upon which some murmuring was heard at first, but it soon gave place to the expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts that the king did not intend to come directly to battle, but had resolved to wait in the remote parts of Persia, till all his forces were assembled; and that to stop his enemies, he had ordered an intrenchment to be thrown up in the plains of Babylonia, with a fosse of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the space of twelve † parasangas or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fosse a way had been left

\* Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.

\* *Nescio an plus moribus conferat princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quam qui cogit.* PLIN. *ibid.*

*Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem.* LIV.

† The parasanga is a measure of ways peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly thirty stadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from twenty to sixty stadia. In the march of Cyrus's army, I suppose the parasanga only twenty stadia, or one league, for reasons I shall give hereafter.

of twenty feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, having reviewed it the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribafus, who determined him not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, against whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy.

SECT. II. *The Battle of Cunaxa. The Greeks are Victorious on their side, Artaxerxes on his. Cyrus is killed.*

\* THE place where the battle was fought, was called Cunaxa, about \* twenty-five leagues from Babylon. The army of Cyrus consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, a hundred thousand Barbarians, and twenty chariots armed with scythes. The enemy in horse and foot might amount to about twelve hundred thousand under four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including six thousand chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of three hundred thousand men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only a hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fosse, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with a few soldiers in their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, a horseman came in full speed, crying as he passed that the enemy approached in order of battle. Upon this, great confusion ensued, from the apprehension that they should not have

\* Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 263—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254. Plut. p. 1014—1017.

\* Five hundred stadia.

time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right a thousand Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenes, and the rest of the general officers to Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations were commanded by Ariæus, who had a thousand horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other Barbarians were posted. He had around him six hundred horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses with head and breast pieces. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner: the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. "What is it you say?" replied Cyrus. "At the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?" That wise and generous answer proves, that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary, always preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempt from it; lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of danger. The retiring of Cyrus had either ruined, or greatly weakened



weakened all these potent motives, by discouraging as well the officers as soldiers of his army. He thought, that being their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not appear. But about three of the clock a great dust like a white cloud arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overcast the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldier entirely (these were Egyptians). The rest of the light armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had six thousand horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerfes. Though he was in the centre he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus's army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. A hundred and fifty chariots, armed with scythes, were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and assant, so as to cut down, and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beat the enemies in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre where the king was posted, the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the space between the two armies, the nearest his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, spurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any further orders to give. He called out to him, that the sacrifices were favourable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend, what great effects a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, will have upon a day of action; and with what ardour a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surpris'd the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant above four or five hundred paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, softly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten the horse, and then moving all together, they sprung forwards upon the Barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled universally; except Tiffaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself victor. He perceived, that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his six hundred  
horse.

horse. He killed Artagerfes, who commanded the king's guards of fix thousand horse, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out, with his eyes sparkling with rage, *I see him*, and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to follow the runaways, which was an essential fault.

⁊ The battle then became a single combat, in some measure, between Artaxerxes and Cyrus, and the two brothers were seen transported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each others hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus, having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes; joined him, and killed his horse, which fell with him to the ground. He rose, and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, was only the more furious from the smart, and sprung forward, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who, running headlong, and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a flight of darts aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the instant all the rest discharged upon him. Cyrus fell dead: some say by the wound given him by the king; others affirm, that he was killed by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted, that he had given him the mortal stroke with a javelin, which entered his temple and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of his court, resolving not to survive so good a master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to choose his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as soon as he heard of his death.

⁊ Diod. l. xiv. p. 254.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Mefabebes, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river, passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus's camp, where he found the king, who was plundering it; but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what had passed elsewhere, believed each of them that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beat the troops he had fought and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king, that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour; and the Greeks on their side learned, that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice, the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about, and halted with the river on their backs, to prevent their being  
taken

for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Too much ardour is often prejudicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge. In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot that there is a wide difference between a general and a private foldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as it was consistent with a prince; as the head, not the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

I speak in this manner after the judges in the art of war, and would not choose to advance my own opinion upon things out of my sphere.

### SECT. III. *Eulogy of Cyrus.*

\* XENOPHON gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus, and that not upon the credit of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. He was, says he, in the opinion of all that were acquainted with him, after Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and had the most noble, and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were exalted in him by the nobleness of his air, an engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature, that conduce to recommend merit.

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia, and the neighbouring \* provinces, his chief care was to make the people sensible, that he had nothing so much at heart, as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the most minute of his

\* De Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 266, 267.

\* Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

promises;

promises; a quality very rare amongst princes, and which however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own, as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it double, and that he might live no longer (as he said himself) than whilst he surmounted his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It had been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence.) Nor was there ever prince, that people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives, and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all other sentiments, but those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was industrious to do good upon all occasions, to confer his favours with judgment and in season, and to show, that he thought himself rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not \*lavish, but distribute his favours. He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit than mere donations, and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favours upon valiant men, and governments and rewards were only bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit only; upon which depends not only the glory but the prosperity of governments. By that means he soon made virtue estimable, and the pursuit of men; and rendered vice contemptible and horrid. The provinces,

\* *Habebit finum facilem, non perloratum: ex quo multa exeant, nihil excidat.*  
SENEC. de vit beat. l. xxiii.

animated with a noble emulation to deserve, furnished him in a very short time with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind; who under a different government would have remained unknown, obscure, and useless.

Never did any one know how to oblige with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with more engaging behaviour. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms, or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their several tastes or occasions; and used to say, that the brightest ornament, and most exalted riches of a prince, consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. In effect, says Xenophon, to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so admirable in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring, than receiving obligations; in this, I find Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he derives from his rank; the other from himself and his intrinsic merit.

By these extraordinary qualities he acquired the universal esteem and affection as well of the Greeks as Barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of such as had most credit at the court; because they were all convinced, that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain that young Cyrus did not want great virtues and a superior merit; but I am surprised that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are proper to excite our admiration of him, without saying the  
least

least word of his defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition, that was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands against his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an historian, whose chief duty it is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterprize of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or imputation against it? but with the Pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue.

SECT. IV. *The King is for compelling the Greeks to deliver up their Arms. They resolve to die rather than surrender themselves. A Treaty is made with them. Tissaphernes takes upon him to conduct them back to their own Country. He treacherously seizes Clearchus and four other Generals, who were all put to Death.*

THE Greeks having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the Barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him as victors, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they answered with an haughty air, that they talked a strange language to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them if he could; but that they would die before they would part with them: that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour; \* but if he imagined to reduce them into slavery as conquered, he might know, they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to loose their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them, that if they continued in the place where

\* Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257.

\* *Sin ut villis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum.* TACIT, Annal. l. iv. c. 46.

they



they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms, but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, and were asked by the heralds what answer they should report. Peace in continuing here, or war in marching, replied Clearchus, without explaining himself farther; from the view of keeping the king always in suspense and uncertainty.

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Persians more considerable than himself, who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return into Ionia; that, if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

The same night, Miltocytes the Thracian, who commanded forty horse, and about three hundred foot of his own country, went and surrendered himself to the king; the rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they swore alliance with him; and the Barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their swords, and the Barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think it proper to return by the same rout they came, because, having found nothing for their subsistence the last seventeen days of their march, they must have suffered much more, had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first; in order to evade the king's pursuit, which they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in  
with

with advice, that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to judge, that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day, before sun-rising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them, that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed, purposely, an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and, at the same time, to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most showy of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose; he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back this answer to their master, returned immediately; which showed, that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said, they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which, Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother, and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers, out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king, to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country; being convinced, that neither themselves nor their cities would ever be unmindful of that favour: that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know

for what cause they had taken arms against him; and advised them to make the king such an answer, as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. "We call the gods to witness," replied Clearchus, "that we did not lift ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprize you. And when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country, provided he does not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to make a good defence; and shall not be ungrateful in regard to those who render us any service." Tissaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they said, and return with his answer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks some anxiety: he, however, arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controversy, he had at length obtained the king's grace for them: for; that it had been represented to the king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with impunity into their country, who had been so insolent to come thither to make war upon him. "In fine," said he, "you may now assure yourselves of not finding any obstacle to your return, and of being supplied with provisions or suffered to buy them; and you may judge, that you are to pass without committing any disorders in your march, and that you are to take only what is necessary; provided you are not furnished with it." These conditions were sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which Tissaphernes withdrew to dispose his affairs; promising to return as soon as they would admit, in order to go back with them into his government.

The

The Greeks waited for him above twenty days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers, and other relations, as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past; so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them cause of uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, "What do we here any longer? Are we not sensible, that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here till he reassembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece, to divulge our own glory and his shame." Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty; that they should remain without a conductor in a country where nobody would supply them with provisions; that Ariæus would abandon them; and that even their friends would become their enemies; that he did not know, but there might be other rivers to pass, and that, though the Euphrates were the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed. That if it were necessary to come to a battle they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy, that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. "Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men?"

Tissaphernes, however, arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government, and they set forwards all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the Barbarians, and the Greeks sepa-

rately, at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust amongst them. Besides which, there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, which augmented their aversion for each other. After three days march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is a hundred feet high, twenty broad, and twenty leagues\* in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant, at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues, in two days, and came to the river Tygris, after having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. They then passed the † Tygris upon a bridge of twenty-seven boats, near Sitacum, a very great and populous city. After four days march, they arrived at another city, very powerful also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came, after a march of six days, to a place called the Lands of Paryfatis, the revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert on the side of the Tygris, which they had on the left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the Greeks and Barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tissaphernes. He began with observing upon the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. "Can a man," said he,

\* Twenty parasangas.

† The march of the Greeks and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tygris, abounds, in the text of Xenophon, with very great obscurities, to explain which fully require a long dissertation. My plan does not admit me to enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than me.

“conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease? How would he shun the wrath of the gods, the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?” He added afterwards many things to prove, that the Greeks were obliged, by their own interest, to continue faithful to him, and that, by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tiffaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating, at the same time, that some persons had done him bad offices with him. “If you will bring your officers hither,” said he, “I will show you those who have wronged you in their representations.” He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever.

The next day Clearchus proposed, in the assembly, to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tiffaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which, they had already differed several times with each other. Some objected that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tiffaphernes, and that it did not consist with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a Barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon what he had moved, till it was agreed that the four other commanders, with twenty captains, and about two hundred soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tiffaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenes, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized, and the others put to the sword. Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus, with the other generals was sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck

struck off. Xenophon describes, with sufficient extent, the characters of those officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprizes. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence, and he retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and severe; his language rough; his punishments instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without a severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops\* esteemed his valour and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his humour, and did not love to serve under him. In a word, says Xenophon, the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue. We may say of him, with Tacitus, that by an excess of severity he made, what had otherwise been well done by him, unamiable; *b Cupidine severitatis in his etiam, quæ rite faceret, acerbis.*

Proxenes was of Bœotia. From his infancy he aspired at great things, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Gorgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into Cyrus's service with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He had been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave and disciplined men, and it had been only necessary to be beloved. He was more apprehensive of being in his

*b* Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

\* *Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed moderant.* TACIT. Histor. l. ii. c. 68.  
soldiers

foldiers displeasure, than his foldiers in his. He thought it fufficient for a commander to praise good actions, without punishing bad ones; for which reason he was beloved by the worthy; but thofe of a different character abused his facility. He died at thirty years of age.

\* Could the two great perfons, we have here drawn after Xenophon, have been moulded into one, fomething perfect might have been made of them; retrenching their feveral defects, and retaining only their virtues: but it rarely happens that the fame man †, as Tacitus fays of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumftances, fometimes with gentlenefs, and fometimes with feverity, without leffening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Theffalian, avaricious and ambitious, but ambitious only from the motive of avarice, purfuing honour and eftimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendship of the great, and of perfons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injuftice and oppreffion with impunity. To obtain his ends, all means with him were virtue; falfehood, fraud, perjury; whilft fincerity, and integrity of heart, flood in his fcheme for weaknefs and ftupidity. He loved nobody; and, if he profefled friendship, it was only to deceive. As others made their glory confift in religion, probity, and honour, he valued himfelf upon injuftice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by falfe reports, whifpering, and calumny; and that of the foldiery by licence and impunity. In fine, he endeavoured to render himfelf terrible by the mifchief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured thofe to whom he did none.

It was in my thoughts to have retrenched thefe characters, which interrupt the thread of the hiftory, but

\* *Egregium principatus temperamentum, fi, demptis utriusque vitiis folæ virtutes miferentur.* TACIT. Hiftor. l. ii. c. 5.

† *Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis feverus et comis—nec illi, quod eft rariffimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut feveritas amorem, deminuit.* TACIT. in Agric. c. ix.





as they are a lively image of the manners of men, which in all times are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

SECT. V. *Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks from the Province of Babylon to Trebisond.*

THE generals of the Greeks having been seized, and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in the highest consternation. They were five or six hundred leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers and enemy nations, without any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the last importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that, however small their number, they would render themselves formidable if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms; and that it was necessary, above all things, to nominate generals immediately, because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which a hundred officers were present, and Xenophon, being desired to speak, deduced the reasons at large, he had at first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice commanders were appointed. They were Timasion for Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleonor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenes.

Before the break of day, they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon amongst the rest. "Fellow soldiers," said he; "the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable; but we must not sink under our misfortunes, and, if

<sup>c</sup> Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. iii. & iv.



having neither hole nor ring  
K 5



our mistortunes, and, if  
Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. 1, iii. & iv.

we

we cannot conquer, let us choose rather to punish gloriously, than to fall into the hands of Barbarians, who would inflict upon us the greatest miseries. Let us all to mind the glorious battles of Plataea, Thermopye, Salamin, and the many others wherein our ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and hereby rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we possess, of acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any happiness, but what consists with liberty. Those gods, the avengers of perjury, and witnesses of the enemy's treason will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud, and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle, and combat for us. For the rest, fellow soldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which must be our hope, and will make us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should believe, if it were your opinion, that, for the making a more ready and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only what is absolutely necessary in our march." All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages; such of them as had too much equipage giving it others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed; but otherwise to open themselves a passage sword in hand through the enemy. They began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chirisophus the Lacedæmonian had the van guard; two of the oldest captains the right and left; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear as the youngest officers. The first day was rude; because, having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely

harassed by a detachment sent against them : but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They chose two hundred men out of the Rhodians in the army, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the other made use of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of fifty men upon the horses intended for the baggage, and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself with harassing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter observing the difficulty of retreating in a hollow square in the face of an enemy, from the unevenness of ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of six hundred chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and subdivided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according to occasion. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder ; and when they opened, they fell into the void space in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occasion of attack, they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable, nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tigris. As its depth would not permit them to repass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carducian mountains, because there was no other way, and the prisoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tygris at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain those de-  
files

files before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day; which was done accordingly. Chirifophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missive weapons, besides his ordinary corps; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to drive them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion, that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay, and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had suffered; in comparison with which, all they had undergone in Persia was trivial.

They found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, two hundred feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who defended the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their armpits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, against which the weight of their

their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where some soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence, and valour, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army however passed the river at length without much loss.

They marched afterwards with less interruption; passed the source of the Tygris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia; which was governed by Tiribafus, a satrap much beloved by the king, and had the honour to help him to \* mount on horseback when at the court: he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition that they should commit no ravages in their march; which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribafus kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience; and they learnt from a prisoner, that Tiribafus had a design to attack the Greeks at a pass of the mountains, in a defile, through which they must necessarily march. They prevented him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their middles.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind which blew in their faces, and prevented respiration; so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed to abate. They marched, on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides thirty soldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow, when many of them from the excess of hunger, followed with langour or fainting, continued lying upon the ground, through weakness and

\* The French translator of Xenophon says, he held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback, without considering that the ancients used none.

want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy still pursued them, of whom many, overtaken by the night, remained on the way without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, that had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil it was good to wear something black before their eyes; and against the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving in a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighbouring villages to recover and repose after their fatigues. The houses were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there sheep, cows, goats, poultry; with wheat, barley, and pulse; and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house, where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even showed him where he had concealed some wine; besides which he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in the snow; without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phafus, which is about a hundred feet in breadth. Two days after they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible  
to



to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to give it the same day. Xenophon, who had observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed the sending of a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the Barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They crossed the country of the Chalybes, who are the most valiant of all the Barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After twelve or fifteen days march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Tecqua, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time; which made Xenophon imagine that the van guard was attacked, and go with all haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of *the sea! the sea!* was heard distinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gaiety; and when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army, crying out together, *the sea! the sea!* whilst they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and other arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis, one of which was higher than the rest, and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle,  
but

but by files; because the soldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in some places was easy, and in others difficult to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army marched according to it. The heavy-armed troops amounted to fourscore files, each consisting of about a hundred men, with eighteen hundred light armed soldiers, divided in three bodies; one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain, and encamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which put them into great consternation. For the soldiers finding abundance of beehives in that place, and eating the honey, they were taken with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with raving fits; so that those, who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest, either furiously mad, or dying. The earth was strewed with their bodies as after a defeat; however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same hour it had taken them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition people are after taking a violent medicine.

Two days after the army arrived near Trebisond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situate upon the Euxine or Black Sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain a happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, the pancratium; the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECT. VI. *The Greeks, after having undergone excessive Fatigues, and surmounted many Dangers, arrive upon the Sea-coast opposite to Byzantium. They pass the Strait, and engage in the Service of Seuthes, Prince of Thrace. Xenophon afterwards repasses the Sea, advances to Pergamus, and joins Thimbron, General of the Lacedæmonians, who marches against Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus.*

AFTER having offered sacrifices to the several divinities, and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece. They concluded upon going thither by sea, and for that purpose Chirisophus offered to go to Anaxibius, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, to obtain ships of him. He set out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels, besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighbouring people.

As Chirisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land; because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army, and those, which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay ten days at \* Cerasus, where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to eight thousand six hundred men, out of about ten thousand; the rest having died in their retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

\* Xenoph. I. iii.

\* This city of Cerasus became famous from the cherry trees, which Lucullus first brought into Italy, and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

In

In the small time the Greeks continued in these parts, several divisions arose, as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with some of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army. But his wisdom and moderation put a stop to those disorders; having made the soldiers sensible that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding amongst themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships. This seemed the best expedient, and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid, as soon as they were out of the Euxine Sea; and that their retreat was universally celebrated; and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority, whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible of the honour of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed the highest sense of gratitude for an offer so much to his honour, he represented, that, to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general; the Spartan state at that time actually ruling Greece, and in consideration of that choice would be disposed

disposed to support them. This reason was not relished, and they objected to it, that they were far from intending a servile dependence upon Sparta, or to submit to regulate their enterprizes by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself sincerely, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by sacrifice, upon the offer they made him, they had manifested their will by evident signs, from whence it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was surprizing to see the impression which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious, and who besides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately, and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirifophus though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose amongst the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities, by which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one half of the army, and could not see Xenophon an Athenian in authority without pain. Different measures were proposed; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themselves into three bodies, of which the Achaians and Archadians, that is, the Peloponnesians, were the principal, amounting to four thousand five hundred heavy-armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chirifophus commanded another part of about fourteen hundred men, besides seven hundred light-armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost the same in number, of which three hundred were light-armed soldiers, with about forty horse, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of \* Heraclea, to whom they had sent to demand them, set out before the rest to make some booty, and made a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirifophus,

\* A city of Pontus.

who



who was sick, marched by land; but without quitting the coast. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in ill measures, not without loss, from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all reunited again, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysepolis in Caledonia, facing Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea, which separates the two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves once for all, when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justness of their revenge, but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it. "After your plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had four hundred galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury, a revenue of a thousand talents, and was in possession of all the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia, of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield to their power, and submit to their sway. And do you hope, who are but a handful of men, without generals, provisions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes, who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you have attempted to dethrone; can you hope, I say, in such a condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a much greater of our own, which must draw upon us inevitable ruin." He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

\* From thence he led them to Salmydessus, to serve

\* Xenoph. l. vii.

Seuthes,

Seuthes, prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to his re-establishment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He had made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops; but when they had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give them the pay agreed upon. Xenophon reproached him exceedingly with this breach of faith; imputing his perfidy to his minister Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money, at the expence of justice, faith, and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs and the security of a state. But that treacherous minister who looked upon honour, probity, and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, had no thoughts, in consequence, but of enriching himself by any means whatsoever, and robbed his master first with impunity, and all his subjects along with him. "However," continued Xenophon, "every wise man, especially in authority and command, ought to regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the most precious treasure he can possess; and as an assured resource, and an infallible support in all the events that can happen." Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner with regard to the troops as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian: but avarice had extinguished all sense of honour in him.

Whilst the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; that Thimbron had already embarked with the troops and promised a darick a month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer, and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation

mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampfacus with the army, which amounted at that time to almost six thousand men. From thence he advanced to Pergamus, a city in the province of Troas. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife, and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great liberalities amongst the soldiers, and to make them a satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabafus.

<sup>f</sup> Such was the event of Cyrus's expedition. Xenophon reckons from the first setting out of that prince's army from the city of Ephesus to their arrival where the battle was fought, five hundred and thirty parasangas or leagues, and fourscore and thirteen days march; <sup>g</sup> and in their return from the place of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black Sea, six hundred and twenty parasangas or leagues, and a hundred and twenty days march. And adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was eleven hundred and fifty <sup>\*</sup> five parasangas or leagues, <sup>h</sup> and two hundred and fifteen days march; and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of rest, was fifteen months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almost six parasangas <sup>†</sup> or leagues in going, and only five in their return.

<sup>f</sup> Xenoph. de Exped. l. ii. p. 276.      <sup>g</sup> Ibid. Cyr. l. iii. p. 355.

<sup>h</sup> Xenoph. l. vii. p. 427.

<sup>\*</sup> I add, *five*, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

<sup>†</sup> The parasanga is a measure of the ways peculiar to the Persians, and consists of three stadia. The stadium is the same with the Greeks, and contains, according to the most received opinion, one hundred and twenty-five geometrical paces; twenty of which in consequence are required to the common French league. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which the parasanga is a league and a half.

I observe



return. It was natural, that Cyrus, who desired to surprize his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the ten thousand Greeks has always passed amongst the judges in the art of war, as I have already observed, for a perfect model in its kind, and never had a parallel. Indeed no enterprize could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more success. Ten thousand men, five or six hundred leagues from their own country; who had lost their generals and best officers; and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of them, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers, to which they were every moment exposed; passes of rivers, of mountains, and defiles; open attacks; secret ambuscades from the people upon their route; famine, almost inevitably in vast and desert regions; and above all the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but in reality had orders to destroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was sensible how much the return of those Greeks into their country would cover him with disgrace, and decry the majesty of the empire in the sense of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately, than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve the sovereignty of his

I observe here a great difficulty. In this calculation we find, the ordinary days marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than a hundred thousand men, would have been one day with another nine leagues, during so long a time; which according to the judges in military affairs is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other measures of ways of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they still do amongst us.

estates.

estates. Those ten thousand men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. <sup>k</sup> Anthony long after, when pursued by the Parthians almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, *O the retreat of the ten thousand!*

And it was the good success of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the sole merit of the grand monarch; but that as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power were only pride and ostentation. It was this prejudice, more universal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprises of the Greeks of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction.

SECT. VII. *Consequences of Cyrus's Death in the Court of Artaxerxes. Cruelty and Jealousy of Parysatis. Statira poisoned.*

**I** RETURN to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa in the court of Artaxerxes. As he believed that he killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious in his life, he desired that all the world should think the same; and it was wounding him in the most tender part to dispute that honour, or endeavour to divide it with him. The Carian soldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being

<sup>k</sup> Plut. in Ant. p. 937. Ωμυρην.

<sup>l</sup> Plut. in Artax. p. 1018—1021.

informed

informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause him to be delivered to Paryfatis, who had sworn the destruction of all those that had any share in the death of her son. Animated by her barbarous revenge, she commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days; then after they had torn out his eyes, to pour molten brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel misery; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates also, having boasted in an entertainment, where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that sottish and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to suffer the punishment of the \* troughs, one of the most cruel that was ever invented, and after having languished in torment during seventeen days, died at last slowly in exquisite misery.

There only remained for the final execution of her project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch Meabates, who, by his master's order, had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of in his conduct, Paryfatis laid this snare for him. She was a woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, prevented his desires, did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took especial care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute ascendant over her son.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed

\* See the description of this torture, as before given in a former Volume.

playing at dice with him for a thousand daricks\*, to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for a eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Me-fabates, for he was not one of the excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flea him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three † cross bars, and to stretch his skin at large before his eyes upon two stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother, But without giving herself any further trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, “Really you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepid wretch of a eunuch, when I, who lost a thousand good daricks, and paid them down upon the spot, do not say a word, and am satisfied.”

All these cruelties seem to be only essays and preparations for a greater crime Paryfatis meditated. She had retained at heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly, that her credit with the king her son was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas, that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, the best security of credit with him. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved

\* The darick was worth ten livres.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

to rid herself, whatever it cost her, of so formidable a rival.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with her daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of sincere friendship and real confidence. The two queens appearing, therefore to have forgot their former suspicions and differences, lived well together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them knew how much the friendships and caresses of the court were to be relied upon, especially amongst the women, they were neither of them deceived in the other; and the same fears always subsisting, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis, one day when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an extremely exquisite bird, that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and, having quitted the table, died in the most horrible convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty, and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest enquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the question; when Gygis, one of Parysatis's women and confidants, confessed the whole. She had caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison, so that Parysatis, having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner the Persians punished poisoners, which is thus: they lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another till they are entirely crushed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, where she demanded to retire, and told her, that he would never set his foot within it while she was there.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

SECT. I. *The Grecian Cities of Ionia implore aid of the Lacedæmonians against Artaxerxes. Rare Prudence of a Lady continued in her Husband's Government after his Death. Agesilaus elected King of Sparta. His Character.*

THE cities of Ionia, that had taken party with Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians, as the deliverers of Greece, for their support in the possession of the liberty they enjoyed, and to prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already said that Thimbron was sent thither, to whose troops Xenophon had joined his, after their return from Persia. Thimbron was soon recalled upon some discontent, and had for his successor Dercyllidas, surnamed Sisyphus, from his industry in finding resources, and his capacity in inventing machines of war. He took upon him the command of the army at Ephesus. When he arrived there, he was apprized, that there was a difference between the two satraps, who commanded in the country.

The provinces of the Persian monarchy, of which several, situate at the extremity of the empire, required too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords, commonly called satraps. They had each of them, in their government, an almost sovereign authority, and were, properly speaking, not unlike the viceroys we see in our days in some neighbouring states. They were supplied with a number of troops sufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, disposed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raise troops, to treat with neighbouring states, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word, to do every thing necessary to the good

▪ Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 479—487.

▪ A. M. 3605. Art. J. C. 399.

order and tranquillity of their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they served the same master, and it was their duty to concur to the same ends, nevertheless each being more affected with the particular advantage of his own province, than the general good of the empire, they often differed among themselves; formed opposite designs, refused aid to their colleagues in necessity, and sometimes even acted entirely against them. The remoteness of the court, and the absence of the prince, gave room for these dissensions; and perhaps a secret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude or prevent conspiracies, which too good an understanding amongst the governors might have excited.

Dercyllidas, having heard, therefore, that Tiffaphernes and Pharnabafus were at variance, made a truce with the former, that he might not have them both upon his hands at the same time, entered Pharnabafus's province, and advanced as far as Æolia.

Zenis, the Dardanian, had governed that province under the satrap's authority; and as, after his death, it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabafus with troops and presents, and told him, that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great services, she desired him not to deprive her of her husband's reward; that she would serve him with the same zeal and fidelity; and that, if she failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herself with all the judgment and ability that could have been expected from the most consummate person in the arts of ruling. To the ordinary tributes which her husband had paid, she added presents of an extraordinary magnificence; and when Pharnabafus came into her province, she entertained him more splendidly than any of the other governors. She was not contented with the conservation of the cities committed to her care, she made new conquests, and took \* Lariffa, Amixita, and Colona.

\* From the Lydians and Pisidians.

Hence

Hence we may observe, that prudence, good sense, and courage, are of all sexes. She was present in all expeditions in a chariot, and in person decreed rewards and punishments. None of the neighbouring provinces had a finer army than hers, in which she had a great number of Greek soldiers in her pay. She even attended Pharnabafus in all his enterprises, and was of no common support to him. So that the satrap, who knew all the value of so extraordinary a merit, did more honour to this lady, than to all the other governors. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with such a distinction as might have excited jealousy, if the modesty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing, in a manner, a veil over all her perfections, which softened their lustre, and let them only appear to be the objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her son-in-law, stung with the reproach of suffering a woman to command in his place, and abusing the entire confidence she reposed in him, which gave him access to her at all times, strangled her with her son. After her death he seized two fortresses, wherein she had secured her treasures; the other cities declared against him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortresses of Æolia, either voluntarily or by force, surrendered to him, and Midias was deprived of the possessions he had so unjustly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general, having granted Pharnabafus a truce, took up his winter quarters in Bithynia, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

° The next year, being continued in the command, he marched into Thrace, and arrived at the Chersonesus. He knew that the deputies of the country had been at Sparta, to represent the necessity of fortifying the isthmus with a good wall against the frequent incursions of the Barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of the lands. Having measured the space, which is more than a league in breadth, he distributed the work amongst

• A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398. Xenoph. p. 487, 488.



the soldiers, and the wall was finished in the autumn of the same year. Within this space were inclosed eleven cities, several ports, and a great number of arable lands and plantations, with pasture of all kinds. The work being finished, he returned into Asia, after having reviewed the cities and found them all in good condition.

¶ Conon, the Athenian; after losing the battle of Ægospotamos, having condemned himself to a voluntary banishment, continued in the isle of Cyprus with king Evagoras, not only for the safety of his person, but in expectation of a change in affairs; like one, says Plutarch, who waits the return of the tide before he embarks. He had always in view the re-establishment of the Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound; and full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favourable to him, perpetually meditated the means to raise it from its ruins, and restore it to its ancient splendor.

This Athenian general, knowing the success of his views, had occasion for a powerful support, wrote to Artaxerxes to explain his project to him, and ordered the person who carried his letter, to apply himself to Ctesias, who would give it to the king. It was accordingly delivered to that physician, who, it is said, though he did not approve the contents of it, added to what Conon had wrote, "That he desired the king would send Ctesias to him, being a person very capable of his service, especially in maritime affairs." ¶ Pharnabafus, in concert with Conon, was gone to court to complain against the conduct of Tissaphernes, as too much in favour of the Lacedæmonians. Upon the warm instances of Pharnabafus, the king ordered five hundred talents\* to be paid him for the equipment of a fleet, with instructions to give Conon the command of it. He sent Ctesias into Greece, who, after having visited Cnidos, his native country, went to Sparta.

¶ Plut. in Artax. p. 1021.

¶ Diod. l. xiv. p. 267. Justin, l. vi. c. 1.

\* 500,000 crowns, or about 112,500*l.* sterling.

This Ctesias was at first in the service of Cyrus, whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was made use of to dress the wounds Artaxerxes had received, of which he acquitted himself so well, that the king retained him in his service, and made him his first physician. He passed several years in his service in that quality. Whilst he was there, the Greeks, upon all their occasions at the court, applied themselves to him, as Conon did on this. His long residence in Persia, and at the court, had given him the necessary time and means for his information in the history of the country, which he wrote in three-and-twenty books. The first contained the history of the Assyrians and Babylonians, from Ninus and Semiramis, down to Cyrus. The other seventeen treated of the Persian affairs, from the beginning of Cyrus's reign to the third year of the XCVth Olympiad, which agrees with the three hundred and ninety-eighth before JESUS CHRIST. He wrote also a history of India. Photius had given us several extracts of both these histories, which are all that remain of Ctesias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs sometimes also from Xenophon. He was in no great estimation with the ancients, who speak of him as of a very vain man, whose veracity is not to be relied on, and who has inserted fables, and sometimes even lies, in his history.

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, though secretly each other's enemies, had, upon the king's orders, united their troops to oppose the enterprises of Dercyllidas, who had marched into Caria. They had reduced him to post himself so disadvantageously, that he must inevitably have perished, had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabazus was of this opinion: but Tissaphernes apprehended the valour of the Greeks, who had been of

\* Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. in Artax. [p. 1014—1017—1020. Diod. l. xiv. p. 278. Aristot. de Hist. anim. l. viii. c. 28. Phot. Cod. lxxii.

\* A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 379. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. 489, 490. Diod. l. xiv. p. 267.

Cyrus's army, which he had experienced, and to whom he conceived all others resembled, proposed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded that the Grecian cities should continue free, and Tissaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon should retire, they made a truce, till the answers of their respective masters could be known.

<sup>t</sup> Whilst these things passed in Asia, the Lacedæmonians resolved to chastise the insolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponnesian war, prevented their disputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pretence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had insulted their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could have taken their city Olympia, which had no works, but contented himself with plundering the suburbs, and the places for the exercises, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were suffered to retain the superintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honour than those that disputed it with them.

<sup>u</sup> Agis in his return fell sick, and died upon arriving at Sparta. Almost divine honours were paid to his memory, and after the expiration of some days, according to the custom, Leotychides and Agesilaus, the one son and the other brother of the deceased, disputed the crown. The latter maintained, that his competitor was not the son of Agis, and supported his assertion by the confession of the queen herself, who knew best, and who had often, as well as her husband, acknowledged as much. In effect, there was a current report, that she had him by Alcibiades<sup>x</sup>, as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a

<sup>t</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 486, 493. Diod. l. xiv. p. 292.

<sup>u</sup> Xenoph. p. 493. Plut. in Lys. p. 445. In Agesil. p. 597.

<sup>x</sup> Athen. l. xii. p. 534.

present of a thousand \* daricks. Agis protested the contrary at his death. Leotychides having thrown himself at his feet, all bathed in tears, he could not refuse the grace he implored of him, and owned him for his son before all that were present.

Most of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Agesilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a person for their king who had been educated amongst them, and passed like them through all the rigour of the Spartan education, supported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that advised Sparta to beware of a *lame reign*, was urged against him. Lyfander only made a jest of it, and turned its sense against Leotychides himself; endeavouring to prove, that, as a bastard, he was the lame king the oracle intended to caution them against. Agesilaus, as well by his own great qualities as the powerful support of Lyfander, carried it against his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Agesilaus, who seemed to be destined to pass his life as a private person, was educated like other children in the Spartan discipline, which was a very rough manner of life, and full of laborious exercise, but † taught youth obedience perfectly well. The law dispensed with this education only to such children, as were designed for the throne. Agesilaus therefore had this in peculiar, that he did not arrive at commanding, till he had first learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta he best knew how to make his subjects love and esteem him ‡, because that prince, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed him for commanding and the so-

\* 1000 pistoles.

† Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta, *the tamer of men*, δαμνισιμδροτον, as that of the Grecian cities, which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the most active and vigorous, and at the same time the most obedient to the laws, of all mankind, ως μαλιστα δια των εθων της πολιτας τοις νομοις πειθόμενης η χειροθεις ποιωσαν.

‡ Το Φυσει ηγεμονικω η βασιλικω προσκλήσασμενη απο της αγωγης το δημοτικον η φιλανθρωπον.

vereignty, had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is surprising that Sparta, a city so renowned in point of education and policy, should conceive it proper to abate any thing of its severity and discipline in favour of the princes who were to reign; they having most need of being early habituated to the yoke of obedience, in order to their being better qualified to command.

\* Plutarch observes, that from his infancy Agefilas was remarkable for uniting qualities in himself, which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of spirit, a vehemence, an invincible resolution in appearance, an ardent passion for being first and surpassing all others, with a gentleness, submission, and docility, that complied at a single word, and made him infinitely sensible of the lightest reprimand, so that every thing might be obtained of him from the motives of honour, but nothing by fear or violence.

He was lame, but that defect was covered by the gracefulness of his person, and still more by the gaiety with which he supported and rallied it first himself. It may even be said, that the infirmity of his body set his valour and passion for glory in a stronger light; there being no labour nor enterprise, however difficult, that he would refuse upon account of that inconvenience.

† Praise, without an air of truth and sincerity, was so far from giving him pleasure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as such, but when it came from the mouths of those, who upon other occasions had represented his failings to him with freedom. He would never suffer during his life that his picture should be drawn, and even in dying, expressly forbid any image to be made of him, either in colours or relieve. ‡ His reason was that his great actions, if he had done any, would supply the place of monuments; without which all the statues in the world would do him no manner of honour. We only know, that he

\* In Agefil. p. 596.

† Plut. in Moral. p. 55.

‡ Ibid. p. 191.

was of small stature, which the Spartans did not affect in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms, that the Ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of him we speak of, for having espoused a very little woman: “\* For,” said they, “she will give us poppets instead of kings.”

It has been remarked, that Agefilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favour of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honoured and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends when they committed faults. He would even support them when they were in the wrong<sup>b</sup>, and upon such occasions looked upon the zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. And in proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge in recommendation of a friend; the words are: “If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but however it be, acquit him.”

It is understanding the rights and privileges of friendship very ill, to be capable of rendering it in this manner the accomplice of crimes, and the protectress of bad actions. It is the fundamental law of friendship, says Cicero, never to ask of, or grant any thing to, friends, that does not consist with justice and honour: *\* Hæc prima lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*

Agefilaus was so delicate in this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no occasion of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great credit, and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The Ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine

<sup>a</sup> Plut. in Agefil. p. 598.    <sup>b</sup> Ibid. p. 603.    <sup>c</sup> De amicit. n. 40.

\* Οὐ γὰρ βασιλεὺς, ἴφασαν, ἀμύνει ἄλλῃ βασιλείδιᾳ γενναίᾳ.

upon him; alleging as their sole reason\*, that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himself alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be possessed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put into possession of the whole estate of his brother Agis, of which Leotychides was deprived as a bastard. But seeing the relations of that prince, on the side of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, he divided the whole inheritance with them, and by that act of generosity acquired great reputation, and the good will of all the world, instead of the envy and hatred he might have drawn upon himself by the inheritance. These sort of sacrifices are glorious, though rare, and can never be sufficiently esteemed.

Never was king of Sparta so powerful as Agesilaus, and it was only, as Xenophon says, by obeying his country, in every thing, that he acquired so great an authority; which seems a kind of paradox, thus explained by Plutarch. The greatest power was vested at that time in the Ephori and senate. The office of the Ephori subsisted only one year; they were instituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to serve as a barrier against it, as we have observed elsewhere. For this reason, the kings of Sparta, from their establishment had always retained a kind of hereditary aversion for them, and continually opposed their measures. Agesilaus took a quite contrary method. Instead of being perpetually at war with them, and clashing upon all occasions with their measures, he made it his business to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmost deference and regard, never entered upon the least enterprise without having first communicated it to them, and upon their summons quitted every thing, and repaired to the senate with the utmost promptitude and resignation: whenever he sat upon his throne to administer justice, if the Ephori entered, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. By all these instances of respect, he seemed to add new dig-

\* ΟΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΟΙΝΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ, ΚΛΙΣΤΑΙ.

nity to their office, whilst in reality he augmented his own power, without its being observed, and added to the sovereignty a grandeur the more solid and permanent, as it was the effect of the people's good will and esteem for him. The greatest of the Roman emperors, as Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, were convinced, that the utmost a prince could do, to honour and exalt the principal magistrates, was only adding to his own power, and strengthening his authority, which neither should, nor can be founded in any thing but justice.

Such was Agesilaus, of whom much will be said hereafter, and with whose character it was therefore necessary to begin.

SECT. II. *Agesilaus sets out for Asia. Lyfander falls out with him, and returns to Sparta. His ambitious Designs to alter the Succession to the Throne.*

<sup>d</sup> **A**GESILAUS had scarce ascended the throne when accounts came from Asia, that the king of Persia was fitting out a great fleet, with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of their empire at sea. Conon's letters, seconded by the remonstrances of Pharnabafus, who had in concert represented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta, as formidable, had made a strong impression upon that prince. From that time he had it seriously in his thoughts to humble that proud republic, by raising up its rival, and by that means re-establishing the ancient balance between them, which could alone assure his safety, by keeping them perpetually employed against each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces against him.

Lyfander, who desired to be sent into Asia, in order to re-establish his creatures and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, strongly disposed Agesilaus to take upon himself the charge of the war, and to prevent the Barbarian

<sup>d</sup> A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 495, 496. Ibid. de Agesil. p. 652. Plut. in Agesil. p. 598, & in Lyfand. p. 446.  
king



king, by attacking him remote from Greece, before he should have finished his preparations. The republic having made this proposal to him, he could not refuse it, and charged himself with the expedition against Artaxerxes, upon condition that thirty Spartan captains should be granted him, to assist him and compose his council, with two thousand new citizens to be chosen out of the helots who had been lately made freemen, and six thousand troops of the allies, which was immediately resolved. Lysander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only upon account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendship between him and Agesilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as the honour which had been lately conferred upon him of being elected generalissimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, and whom the whole power of Persia was not able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inspired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in their forces, and a supreme contempt for the Barbarians. In this disposition of the people, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would reproach them, to neglect so favourable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to those Barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violences with which they were continually oppressing them. They had already attempted this by their generals Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavours having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Agesilaus. He promised them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Persians, or to employ them so effectually, as should leave them neither leisure nor inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views, and thought of nothing less than attacking Artaxerxes in Persia itself.

When he arrived at Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent to demand what reasons had induced his coming into Asia, and why he had taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to re-

establish them in their ancient liberty. \* The satrap, who was not yet prepared, preferred art to force, and assured him that his master would give the Grecian cities of Asia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hostility till the return of the couriers. Agesilaus agreed, and the truce was sworn on both sides. Tissaphernes, who laid no great stress upon an oath, took the advantage of this delay to assemble troops on all sides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprized of it, but however kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of state, the breach of faith can have but a very short and precarious success; whereas a reputation established upon inviolable fidelity in the observance of engagements, which the perfidy itself of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will establish a credit and confidence, equally useful and glorious. In effect, Xenophon remarks, that this religious observation of treaties gained him the universal esteem and opinion of the cities; whilst the different conduct of Tissaphernes entirely lost him their favour.

† Agesilaus made use of this interval in acquiring an exact knowledge of the state of the cities, and in making suitable regulations. He found great disorder every where, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor aristocratical, as Lyfander had established it. ‡ The people of the country had no communication with Agesilaus, nor had ever known him; for which reason they made no court to him, conceiving, that he had the title of general for form sake only, and that the whole power was really vested in Lyfander. As no governor had ever done so much good to his friends, or hurt to his enemies, it is not wonderful that he was so much beloved by the one and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; whilst Agesilaus remained almost alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king,

\* Xenoph. p. 496, & 652.

† A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 395.

‡ Plut. in Agefil. p. 599, 600. In Lyfand. p. 446, 447.

extremely

extremely sensible and delicate in what regarded his authority; though otherwise not jealous of any one's merit, but on the contrary, much inclined to distinguish it with his favour. He did not dissemble his disgust. He paid no regard to Lyfander's recommendation, and ceased to employ him himself. Lyfander presently perceived this alteration in regard to him. He discontinued his applications for his friends to the king, desired them not to visit him any more, nor attach themselves to him, but to address themselves directly to the king, and to cultivate the favour of those, who in the present times had power to serve and advance their creatures. The greatest part of them gave over importuning him with their affairs, but did not cease to pay their court to him. On the contrary, they were only more assiduous than ever about his person, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly assisted at all his exercises. Lyfander, naturally vain, and long accustomed to the homage and submission that attended absolute power, did not take sufficient care to remove the busy crowd from his person, that continually made their addresses to him with more application than ever.

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew still more and more offensive to Agesilaus, and seemed as if intended to insult him. He resented it so highly, that having given the most considerable commands and best governments to private officers, he appointed Lyfander commissary of the stores, and distributor of provisions; and afterwards to insult and deride the Ionians, he told them, "that they might now go and consult his master butcher."

Lyfander thought it then incumbent upon him to speak and to come to an explanation with him. Their conversation was brief and laconic. "Certainly, my lord," said Lyfander, "you very well know how to depress your friends." "Yes, when they would set themselves above me; but when they are studious of my dignity, I know also how to let them share in it." "But perhaps, my lord," replied Lyfander, "I have been injured by false reports, and things I never did have been  
imputed

imputed to me. I must beg therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you would give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and most of serving you effectually."

The effect of this conversation was the lieutenantcy of the Hellespont, which Agesilaus gave him. In this employment he retained all his resentment, without however neglecting any part of his duty, or of what conduced to the success of affairs. Some small time after he returned to Sparta without any marks of honour and distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and with the hope of making him perfectly sensible of it.

It must be allowed that Lyfander's conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, much unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried too far his sensibility and delicacy in point of honour, and that he was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, whom secret animadversions, attended with openness of heart and expressions of kindness, might have reclaimed to his duty. But as shining as Lyfander's merit, and as considerable as the services he had rendered Agesilaus might be, they could not all of them give him a right, not only to an equality with his king and general, but to the superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to making the other insignificant. He ought to have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself, and to exceed the bounds of just subordination.

<sup>h</sup> Upon his return to Sparta he had it seriously in his thoughts to execute a project, which he had many years revolved in his mind. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lyfander had attained to that high degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to see with pain a city, whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of princes, to whom he

<sup>a</sup> Plut. in Lyfand. p. 447, 448. Diod. l. xiv, p. 244, 245.

gave

gave place neither in valour nor birth; for he descended, as well as themselves, from Hercules. He therefore sought means to deprive those two houses of the sole succession to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclides, and even, according to some, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himself, that if his design took effect, no Spartan could be capable of disputing that honour with him, and that he should have the preference to all others.

This ambitious project of Lyfander shows, that the greatest captains are often those from whom a republic has most to apprehend. Those haughty valiant spirits, accustomed to absolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftiness of mind, always to be dreaded in a free state. Sparta, in giving Lyfander unlimited power, and leaving it for so many years in his hands, did not sufficiently consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide to persons of superior merit and abilities; employments of supreme authority, which naturally exposes them to the temptation of rendering themselves independent, and absolute masters of power. Lyfander was not proof against it, and practised secretly to open himself a way to the throne.

The undertaking was bold, and required long preparations. He thought it impossible to succeed without first making use of the fear of the divinity, and the terrors of superstition, to amaze and subdue the citizens into a more easy disposition to receive what he wanted to have them understand; for he knew that at Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the least importance was determined, without the oracle's being previously consulted. He tempted with great presents the priests and priestesses of Delpos, Dodona, and Ammon; though ineffectually at that time; and the latter even sent ambassadors to Sparta, to accuse him of impiety and sacrilege; but he extricated himself from that bad affair by his credit and address.

It was necessary to set other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that she was with child by Apollo, had been delivered some years before

before of a son, to whom the name of Silenus, was given, and the greatest persons of that nation had disputed the honour of nursing and educating him. Lyfander, taking this wonderful birth for the commencement, and in a manner the foundation of the piece he meditated, supplied the rest himself, by employing a good number of persons, and those not inconsiderable, to disperse, by way of prologue to the performance, the miraculous birth of this infant; whereby, no affectation appearing in them, people were disposed to believe it. This being done, they brought certain discourses from Delphos to Sparta, which were industriously spread abroad every where, that the priests of the temple had in their custody some books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, and of which it was not permitted, either for them or any other persons whatsoever, to have any knowledge; and that only a son of Apollo, who was to come in process of time, after having given undoubted proofs of his birth to those who had the books in their keeping, was to take and carry them away.

All this being well premised, Silenus was to present himself to the priests, and demand those oracles as the son of Apollo; and the priests, who were in the secret, as actors well prepared and fully instructed in their parts, were on their side to make the most exact and circumstantial enquiry into every thing, not without affecting great difficulty, and asking endless questions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as absolutely convinced, that this Silenus was the real son of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which, this son of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the presence of all the world; and particularly that for which the whole contrivance had been cooked up. The sense of this was, "That it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future but the most worthy of their citizens." Lyfander in consequence was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Helicarnassus, a celebrated

brated rhetorician, had composed a very eloquent discourse for him upon this subject, which he had got by heart.

Silenus grew up, and repaired to Greece in order to play his part, when Lyfander had the mortification to see his piece miscarry, by the timidity and desertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and disappeared at the very instant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a great while, it was transacted with so much secrecy to the time it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lyfander. How it came to light after his death we shall soon relate, but must at present return to Tiffaphernes.

SECT. III. *Expeditions of Agefilaus in Asia. Disgrace and Death of Tiffaphernes. Sparta gives Agefilaus the command of its Armies by Sea and Land. He deposes Pisander to command the Fleet. Interview of Agefilaus and Pharnabazus.*

**W**HEN Tiffaphernes had received the troops assigned him by the king, and drawn together all his forces, he sent to command Agefilaus to retire out of Asia, and declared war against him in case of refusal. His officers were all alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppose the great army of the Persian king. For himself, he heard Tiffaphernes's heralds with a gay and easy countenance, and bade them tell their master, that he was under a very great obligation to him *for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Persia and the friends of Greece.* He promised himself great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding disgrace for him, that ten thousand Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, should have passed through the heart of Asia to the Grecian Sea, and beat the king of Persia as often as he appeared against them; and that he, who commanded the Lace-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 497—502. Idem, de Agefil. p. 632—656. Plut. in Agefil. p. 600.

dæmonians, whose empire extended all over Greece by sea and land, should not execute some exploit worthy of glory and remembrance.

At first, therefore, to revenge the perfidy of Tiffaphernes by a just and allowable deceit, he made a feint of marching his army into Caria, the residence of that satrap; and as soon as the Barbarian had caused his troops to march that way, he turned short and fell upon Phrygia, where he took many towns, and amassed immense treasures, which he distributed amongst the officers and soldiers: letting his friends see, says Plutarch, that to break a treaty, and violate an oath, is to despise the gods themselves; and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the stratagems of war, is not only just and glorious, but a sensible delight, attended with the greatest advantages.

The spring being come, he assembled all his forces at Ephesus; and to exercise his soldiers, he proposed prizes both for the horse and foot. This small inducement set every thing in motion. The place for exercises was perpetually full of all kinds of troops, and the city of Ephesus seemed only a palæstra, and a school of war. The whole market-place was filled with horses and arms, and the shops with different kinds of military equipage. Agesilaus was seen returning from the exercises, followed by a crowd of officers and soldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were going to deposit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of all the world. For, says Xenophon, where piety and discipline are seen to flourish, the best hopes must be conceived.

To give his soldiers new valour from the contempt of their enemies, he made use of this contrivance. He ordered the commissaries, who had charge of the booty, to strip the prisoners and expose them to sale. There were abundance of buyers for their habits; but for themselves, their bodies were so soft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the shade, that they laughed at them, as of neither service nor value. Agesilaus took this occasion to approach  
and



and say to his soldiers, pointing to the men, "see there against whom you fight;" and showing them their rich spoils, "and there for what you fight."

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, who had not forgot the first stratagem he had used in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a second time, made his troops march directly for Caria; not doubting, but at this time, Agesilaus would turn his arms that way; the rather, because it was natural for him, as he wanted cavalry, to endeavour to make a rough and difficult country the seat of action, which might render the horse of an enemy useless and unserviceable. But he deceived himself: Agesilaus entered Lydia and approached Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened thither with his horse, with intent to relieve the place. Agesilaus knowing that his infantry had not had time to arrive, thought proper to take the advantage of so favourable an opportunity to give him battle, before he had reassembled all his troops. He drew up his army in two lines; the first he formed of his squadrons, whose intervals he filled up with platoons of the light-armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge, whilst he followed with the second line, composed of his heavy-armed infantry. The Barbarians did not sustain the first shock, but took to their heels immediately. The Greeks pursued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great slaughter, and a still greater booty.

\* After this battle the troops of Agesilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Persians, and at the same time had the satisfaction to see that prince inflict an exemplary punishment upon Tissaphernes, who was a very wicked man, and the most dangerous enemy of the Greeks. <sup>1</sup> The king had already received abundance of complaints against his conduct. Upon this occasion he was accused of treason, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Parysatis, always actuated by her hatred and

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. p. 501, & 657. Plut. in Artax. p. 1022. & in Agesil. p. 601.

<sup>1</sup> Diod. l. xiv. p. 299. Polyæn. Stratag. l. vii.

revenge against those who had any share in the death of her son Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tissaphernes, by aggravating with all her power the charges against him; for she had been entirely restored to favour by the king her son.

As Tissaphernes had a great authority in Asia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it necessary to take suitable precautions in seizing so powerful an officer, who might have proved a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithraustes with that important commission, and gave him two letters at the same time. The first was for Tissaphernes, and contained the king's orders in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requisite. The second was addressed to Ariæus, governor of Larissa; by which the king commanded him to assist Tithraustes with his council, and all his forces, in seizing Tissaphernes. He lost no time, and sent to desire Tissaphernes would come to him, that they might confer together upon the operations of the ensuing campaign. Tissaphernes, who suspected nothing, went to him with only a guard of three hundred men. Whilst he was in a bath, without sabre or other arms, he was seized, and put into the hands of Tithraustes, who caused his head to be struck off, and sent it immediately to Persia. The king gave it to Parysatis; an agreeable present to a princess of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes seems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that satrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honour as empty names; who made a jest of the most sacred oaths, and believed the whole ability and policy of a statesman consisted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocrisy, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

Tithraustes had a third writing from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tissaphernes. <sup>m</sup> After having executed his commission, he sent great presents to Agisilaus, to in-

<sup>m</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii, p. 501. Plut. in Agesil. p. 601.

duce him to enter more readily into his views and interests; and ordered him to be told, that the cause of the war being removed, and the author of all differences put to death, nothing opposed an accommodation; that the king of Persia consented, that the cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, paying him the customary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops, and return into Greece. Agesilaus replied, that he could conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleased with enriching his soldiers than himself; that the Greeks besides thought it more glorious and honourable to take spoils from their enemies, than to accept their presents. However, as he was not unwilling to give Tithraustes the satisfaction of removing out of his province, and of expressing his gratitude to him for having punished the common enemy of the Greeks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabafus. Tithraustes had himself proposed that expedition to him, and paid him thirty talents for the charges of his journey.

Upon his march, he received a letter from the magistrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and power to depute whom he thought fit in his stead. By these new powers he saw himself absolute commander of all the troops in that state in Asia both by sea and land. This resolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the same head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the service might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conspire to the same end. Sparta till then had never done the honour to any of their generals, to confide to him at the same time the command of the armies by sea and land. So that all the world agreed, that he was the greatest personage of his time, and best sustained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The first thing he did was to establish Pisander his lieutenant in the fleet; in which he seemed to have committed a considerable fault; because having about him

many older and more experienced captains, without regard to the service of the public, to do honour to an ally, and to please his wife, who was Pisander's sister, he intrusted him with the command of the fleet; that employment being much above his abilities, though he was not without his merit.

This is the common temptation of persons in power, who believe they possess it only for themselves and their families; as if the advantage of relation to them were a sufficient title and qualification for posts which require great abilities. They do not reflect, that they not only expose the affairs of a state to ruin by their private views, but sacrifice besides the interests of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by successes it were inconsistent to expect from instruments so ill chosen.

Agésilas continued with his army in Phrygia, upon the lands of Pharnabafus's government, where he lived in the abundance of all things, and amassed great sums of money. From thence advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotis, who passionately desired his amity, from the sense of his faith in the observance of treaties, and his other virtues. The same motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the service of Pharnabafus, and go over to Agésilas, to whom, from his revolt, he had rendered great services; for he had a great body of troops, and was very brave. This officer, having entered Phrygia, had laid waste the whole country under Pharnabafus, who never dared to appear in the field against him, nor even rely upon his fortresses: but carrying away whatever was most valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates at length, taking with him some Spartan troops, with Herippidas, (the chief of the council of thirty, sent, by the republic, to Agésilas the second year) watched him one day so closely, and attack-

<sup>2</sup> A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 507

7510.

ed him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. But Herippidas, injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable comptroller, was for bringing the booty that had been sunk to an account; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken, and by visiting their tents, and searching them with an unseasonable exactitude and severity, affronted Spithridates to such a degree, that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.

It is said that in this whole expedition nothing so sensibly affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates. For, besides his being very sorry for the loss of so good an officer, and such good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice: a vice equally dishonourable to himself and his country; and of which he had taken pains to avoid the slightest suspicion during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but he knew, at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, that by being carried too far, degenerate into minuteness and petulancy, and which, through an extreme affectation of virtue, becomes a real and dangerous vice.

Some time after, Pharnabafus, who saw his country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negociated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first, with his friends, at the place agreed on, and sat down, in expectation of Pharnabafus, upon the turf, under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabafus arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground, of exceeding softness from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colours, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting simply upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride

<sup>o</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Grec. l. iv. p. 510—512. Plut. in Agesil. p. 602.

was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity.

After reciprocal salutations, Pharnabafus spoke to this effect: That he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surpris'd at their coming to attack him in his government; burning the towns, cutting down the trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it was the custom with the Greeks, who made profession of honour and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest, but pathetic air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered, cast down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: "Lord Pharnabafus, you are not ignorant, that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are become his enemies, we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt him by what we act against you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the yoke of bondage, and prefer being called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our arms, our ships, our persons to the last man of us, are only here to defend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is the most precious and desirable."

Pharnabafus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new comer, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then tak-

ing him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, "That it were the pleasure of the gods, lord Pharnabafus, with fuch noble sentiments, that you were rather our friend than our enemy." He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could fubfift elfewhere.

SECT. IV. *League againft the Lacedæmonians. Agesilaus, recalled by the Ephori to defend his County, obeys directly. Lysander's Death. Victory of the Lacedæmonians near Nemea. Their Fleet beaten by Conon at Cnidos. Battle gained by the Lacedæmonians at Coronæ.*

AGESILAUS had been two years at the head of the army, and had already made the moft remote provinces of Asia tremble at his name, and refound with the fame of his great wifdom, difinterestednefs, moderation, intrepid valour in the greateft dangers, and invincible patience in fupporting the rudeft fatigues. Of fo many thoufand foldiers under his command, not one was worfe provided, or lay harder, than himfelf. He was fo indifferent as to heat or cold, that he feemed formed\* only to fupport the moft rigorous feafons, and fuch as it pleased God to fend: which are Plutarch's exprefs words.

The moft agreeable of all fights to the Greeks fettled in Asia, was to fee the lieutenants of the great king, his fatraps, and other great lords, who were formerly fo haughty and untractable, foften their note in the prefence of a man meanly clad, and at his fingle word, however fhort and laconic, change their language and conduct, and, in a manner, transform themfelves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were fent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increafed every day by the troops of the Barbarians that came to join him.

† A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Plut. in Agefil. p. 603, 604. Xenoph. in Agefil. p. 657.

\* ὡς περ μόνος εἰς χεῖρας τὰς ὑπὸ θεῶν κεκράμεναις ἀραις περιβύς.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquillity in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty, under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but without even banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear for his own person and the tranquillity he enjoyed in Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

<sup>a</sup> Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus's designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money, to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion defections against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first to their tutors, and afterwards to their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities in their dependence, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable.

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into his measures: the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmo-

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 502—507. Plut. in Lyfand. p. 449—451.



nians who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans, at the same time, sent deputies to the Athenians to implore their aid, and that they would enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens, in refusing to join its enemies, when they endeavoured its final destruction. They represented to them the favourable opportunity that offered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece. That all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt. That the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up at the sound of their arms, and that the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with all his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasylbulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money, when he undertook the re-establishment of the Athenian liberty, seconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians, on their side, took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself at sun-rise. The letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pausanias received this bad news on his way; but, however, continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to consider upon a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce, to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct, and, refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight, and retired to Tegeum, where

where he passed the remainder of his life under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lyfander's poverty, having been discovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government, and which made their court to him, in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his house.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor Lyfander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to allying into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honour. For at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late; but also for those who married amiss: and those especially were reckoned of this number, who instead of allying into houses of virtue, and with their own relations, had no motive but wealth and lucre in marriage. An admirable law, and highly tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood *and manners* seldom fails to alter and efface.

It must be owned, that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the lust of gain is very rare, and well worthy of admiration; but in Lyfander it was attended with great defects, which entirely obscure its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which he despised himself, though he rendered it estimable to his country, and thereby occasioned its ruin, what opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed,  
well

well read in men, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government, and what is commonly called policy, but who regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legal methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear, for the advancement of his friends, and the augmenting of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the corrupting of priests, and forging of oracles to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne?

When Agesilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Persia, the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch has transmitted to us. “<sup>s</sup> Agesilaus to the Ephori, greeting. We have reduced part of Asia, put the Barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia; but as you order me to return, I am not far behind *this* letter, and should prevent it if possible. I received the command not for myself, but my country and its allies. I know that a general does not deserve, or possess that name really, but as he submits to the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magistrates.”

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded; and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed his citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the Ephori, renounces the most soothing hopes, and the

<sup>r</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Idem in Agesil. p. 657. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603. 604.

<sup>s</sup> Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 212.

most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, "That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws."

On his departure he said, "that thirty thousand of the king's archers drove him out of Asia;" alluding in those words to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, thirty thousand of which pieces of money had been dispersed in Greece, to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

Agefilaus in quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him four thousand men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Megabyzus the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition into Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death to consecrate it to the goddess.

"In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raised an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to king Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said, the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger as it removed from its source; or to a swarm of bees, which it is easy to burn in their hive, but disperse themselves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their stings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capitol; which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field, and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where a rude battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agefilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and to give them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.

<sup>c</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. v. p. 359.

<sup>d</sup> Xenoph. p. 514—517.

\* When the approach of Agefilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians who remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king, might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only fifty of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent to him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition; which he did accordingly.

† About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cnidos, a city of Caria. That of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agefilaus's brother-in-law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabafus and Conon the Athenian. The latter, observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined for want of the necessary expences; that the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point he was so infinitely superior to them; that is, in riches; and that for want of remitting the sums his service required to his generals, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoke to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

\* Plut. in Agefil. p. 605. † Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 518.  
Diod. l. xiv. p. 302. Justin. l. vi. c. 2 & 3.

It was composed of more than fourscore and ten galleys, to which the enemy's was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea fight near Ægospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate, by a glorious victory, the disgrace of his former defeat. \* He had this advantage, that in the battle he was going to give, the Persians would be at the whole expence, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would redound to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Pisander had also strong motives to show his valour upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother-in-law; and to justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In effect, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took fifty galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidos. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta; several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle, the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfall.

† Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both those republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece without opposition, fell from their authority only by their enormous abuse of it.

† Isocrat. in Orat. Ariop. p. 278—280.

\* *Eo speciosus quod ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium sed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ.* JUSTIN.

The Athenians succeeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta having gained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and the taking of their city, might have improved in their measures from the double experience of the past; as well in regard to what had befallen themselves, as from the recent example of their rival; but the most affecting examples and events seldom or ever occasion a people to change their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before; and so experienced the same destiny again.

To warn the Athenians against this misfortune, Isocrates puts them in mind of the past, and of the times wherein they were successful in every thing. "You imagine," says he, "that provided with a numerous fleet, absolute masters at sea, and supported by powerful allies, always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repose and tranquillity the fruits of your victories: for my part, indulge me to speak with truth and freedom, I think quite otherwise. The cause of my apprehension is, my having observed, that the decline of the greatest republics has always been at the time they believed themselves most powerful, and that their very security has prepared the precipice into which they have fallen. The reason of this is evident. Prosperity and adversity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The first is attended with vain glory, pride, and insolence, which dazzle the mind; and inspire rash and extravagant measures: on the contrary, the companions of adversity, are modesty, self diffidence and circumspection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to amend from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to desire for a city; as that which appears unhappy, is an almost certain path to prosperity; and the other, so flattering and splendid, generally leads on to the greatest misfortunes." The blow which the Lacedæmonians received

received at the battle of Cnidos is a mournful proof of what he says.

<sup>a</sup> Agesilaus was in Bœotia, and upon the point of giving battle when this bad news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers<sup>b</sup>. The two armies, almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, when they drew up in battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle in his time, and may be believed, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight, and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties having learned, that their left wing had been very severely handled and fled, returned immediately; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans, and to wrest the victory out of their hands, and the Thebans to follow their left wing, which was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he would have let the Thebans pass on, and had charged them after in the rear; but carried away by the ardour of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by pure force. In which, says Xenophon, he showed more valour than prudence.

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good or-

<sup>a</sup> Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid, Xenoph. Hist. in Græc. p. 518—520. & in Agesil. p. 659, 660. der.



der. The engagement was sharp and bloody on all sides, but particularly where Agesilaus fought at the head of the fifty young Spartans sent him by the city. The valour and emulation of those young men were of great service to Agesilaus, and may be said to have saved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardour, and exposed themselves foremost in all dangers for the safety of his person. They could not however prevent his receiving several wounds through his armour from pikes and swords. Notwithstanding, after an exceeding warm dispute, they brought him off alive from the enemy, and making their bodies a rampart for him, sacrificed a great number of Thebans to his defence; many of those young men were also left upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were forced to have recourse to what they had at first rejected. They opened their phalanx to let them pass; which when they had done, as they marched afterwards in more disorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them nor put them to flight. Those brave Thebans made their retreat continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elate with the success of the battle, wherein on their side they had always remained invincible.

Agesilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had lost, would not retire to his tent, till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had seen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva Itoniensis, which was not very distant from the field of battle, and asked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even sent them a guard to escort them in safety wherever they thought fit.

The next morning Agesilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have the courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themselves with flowers,

ers, and the music of the army to play, whilst a trophy was erected and adorned in honour of his victory. At the same instant the enemy sent heralds to demand his permission to bury their dead; which he granted, with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused himself to be carried to Delphos, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia to the god, which amounted to a hundred talents\*. These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their successes in arms; declaring, by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted for their victories to their protection.

SECT. V. *Agefilaus returns victorious to Sparta. He always retains his Simplicity and ancient Manners. Conon rebuilds the Walls of Athens. A Peace, shameful to the Greeks, concluded by Antalcides the Lacedaemonian.*

**A**FTER the festival, Agefilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most real joy, and beheld him with admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners, and the constant frugality and temperance of his life. At his return from foreign countries, where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasures entirely prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the Barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, baths, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so shining a reputation, and the universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more

\* Plut. in Agefil. p. 606.

\* A hundred thousand crowns, or, about 22,500l. sterling.

inviolable attachment to the customs of his country; convinced, that he was only king, to be the brighter example of those virtues to others.

⁴ He made greatness consist in virtue only. Hearing the Great King (so the kings of Persia used to call themselves) spoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled; \* "I cannot conceive," said he, "wherein he is greater than me, unless he be more virtuous."

There were at Sparta some citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taste of Greece, made their merit and glory consist in keeping a great number of horses for the race. He persuaded his sister Cynisca to dispute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to show the Greeks, that those victories on which they set so high a value, were not the effects of valour and bravery, but of riches and expence. She was the first of her sex who shared in this honour. He had not the same opinion of the exercises, which contributed to render the body more robust, and inure it to labour and fatigue; and to place them in greater estimation, would often honour them with his presence.

Some time after Lyfander's death, he discovered the conspiracy formed by that captain against the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner: upon some affairs, which related to the government, it was necessary to consult Lyfander's papers, and Agefilaus went to his house for that purpose. In running them over, he fell upon the sheets, which contained at large the harangue of Cleon, for the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surprised at perusing it, he gave over his search, and went away abruptly, to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them see what manner of man Lyfander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lacratidas, a wife and prudent person, and president of the Ephori, interposed, by telling him, that it was highly improper to

⁴ Plut. de sui laud. p. 555.

\* Plut. in Agefil. p. 606.

\* Τὸ δ' ἔργον γὰρ μείζον ἐκείνου, ἢ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερον.

raise Lyfander from the dead; on the contrary, that it was neceffary to bury his harangue in the fame grave with him, as of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was compofed, and the force of perfuafion that univerfally prevailed in it, againft which it might prove no eafy matter to refift. Agefilaus was of the fame opinion, and the piece was configned to filence and oblivion, as the beft ufe that could be made of it.

<sup>f</sup> As his credit was very high in the city, he caufed Telutias, his brother by his mother's fide, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It were to be wifhed that hiftory, to juftify this choice, had mentioned any other qualities in that commander, than his nearnefs of blood to the king.

Agefilaus foon after fet out with his land-army to be-fiege Corinth, and took the long walls as they were called, whilft his brother Telutias attacked it by fea. He did feveral other exploits againft the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which always argue indeed the valour and experience of the general, but are neither very important nor decifive, and which we thought, for that reason, might be omitted.

<sup>g</sup> At the fame time Pharnabafus and Conon, having made themfelves mafters at fea, ravaged the whole coaft of Laconia. That fatrap, returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very confiderable fums for the re-eftablifhment of Athens. Conon victorious, and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with univerfal applaufe. The fad profpect of a city formerly fo flourifhing, and at that time reduced to fo melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than he felt joy in feeing his beloved country again, after fo many years abfence. He loft no time, but fell immediately to work, employing, befides mafons and the ufual artizans, the foldiers, mariners, citizens, allies, in a word, all who were well inclined to Athens; Providence decreeing that this city, formerly deftroyed by the Perfians, fhould be re-

<sup>f</sup> Plut. in Agefil. p. 606.    <sup>g</sup> A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 393. Xenoph. Hift. Græc. l. iv. p. 534—537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 393. Juftin. l. vi. c. 5. built

built by their own hands, and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them. What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had those for its allies, which had formerly been its most violent enemies, and for enemies, those with whom before it had contracted the most strict and most confirmed union. Conon, seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendor, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. <sup>h</sup> After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb, that is to say, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens, without exception, were invited.

<sup>i</sup> Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. It looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, its ancient rival and almost continual enemy, as its own ruin, which made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon its restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they dispatched Antalcides to Tiribafus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was, to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money, which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, and to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribafus his master could desire. Without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, he stipulated only, that all the islands and other cities, should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia; for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought.

<sup>h</sup> Athen. l. i. p. 3.

<sup>i</sup> Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. in Agesil. p. 608.

It is true he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcides, who being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all manner of means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation of Agesilaus.

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribafus, and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. All of them were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interests of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenian, to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew without concluding any thing.

Tiribafus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians, without an express order for that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them underhand with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court, to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to put the last hand to it. Tiribafus also laid before him the Lacedæmonians accusation of Conon. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have written that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful whether he did not escape from prison, or suffer, as has been said.

Whilst this treaty was negotiating, several actions little considerable passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time, that Evagoras extended his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat.

<sup>k</sup> Tiribafus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependent on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king further reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomena, and left those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such people as came into it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said it was Sparta itself proposed these conditions.

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against their will to comply with it, except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions, which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money amongst the several estates; invincible in arms, and to the sword, but not to the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens differed from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon

<sup>k</sup> A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387. Xenoph. l. v. p. 548—551.

the Athenian <sup>1</sup> under Artaxerxes Longimanus above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians, imposes what conditions it pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with long vessels in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chalidonian islands, that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphilia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are; but they are not the same men, or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recal those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the East. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them; but of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcilable hatred for the Persians; which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. <sup>m</sup> It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or

<sup>1</sup> Diod. l. xii. p. 74, 75.

<sup>m</sup> Isoc. in Panegy. p. 143.



Teucer of \* Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger of Phœnicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with Barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, of whose education great care was taken. He was distinguished amongst the youth by the beauty of his aspect, the vigour of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners †, which are the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy to those that governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity, and integrity, reassured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince escaping his pursuit retired, to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurper, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his appli-

\* This Teucer was of Salamin, a little island near Athens, celebrated for the famous battle under Xerxes.

† *Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor. Cic.*

cation to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon, the Athenian general, after his defeat at Ægospotamos, took refuge with him; <sup>p</sup> not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. <sup>q</sup> Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.

Evagoras and Conon, with the great design of subverting, or at least reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption; which his great services and zeal for that republic had deserved. <sup>r</sup> The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little by his credit with the king of Persia to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. <sup>s</sup> The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.

<sup>p</sup> A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393—395.

<sup>q</sup> A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399. <sup>r</sup> A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

<sup>s</sup> A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

† The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them.

“ Evagoras, on his side, extended his conquests from city to city, endeavouring to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island’s falling into the hands of an enemy, so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly however against Evagoras.

\* Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is true, the succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were little considerable, as they also were the two following years. During all that time it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: † but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.

The army by land, commanded by Orontes his son-in-law, consisted of three hundred thousand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tirabafus, a Persian of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos, his son-in-law, commander under him. Evagoras, on his side, assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful in comparison with the formidable preparation of the Persians. He had a fleet of only fourscore and ten galleys, and

† Pausan. l. i. p. 5.

“ Diod. l. xiv. p. 311.

\* A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 390. Isocrat. in Paneg. p. 135, 136.

† A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. l. xv. p. 328—333.

his army scarce amounted to twenty thousand men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine amongst the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys, which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras, with his land forces, attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army, which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return he found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus, except Salamin, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were, but he could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribafus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, among other things, of forming designs against

the king, and strengthened his accusation from his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by the force of presents, promises, and a complacency of manners not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose, and that it was necessary to prevent a conspiracy ready to break out. He dispatched orders immediately to Orontes, to seize Tiribafus, and send him to court in chains, which was instantly put in execution. Tiribafus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes, in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribafus, quitted the service and refused to obey him, was afraid affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. <sup>2</sup> He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoke to underhand; the negociation was resumed, the offers made at first by the latter were accepted, and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty, for his death is dated in the year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with a happiness and tranquillity never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles, his eldest son, succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse, entitled Evagoras, composed by Isocrates, to inspire the young king with the desire of treading in the steps of his father, and from which I

<sup>2</sup> A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to speak further of them in the ensuing volume.

*Eulogy and Character of Evagoras.*

<sup>a</sup> Though Evagoras was only king of a little state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king, convinced that not the extent of provinces, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, constitute great princes. He does in effect point out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of the blood royal, and that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not fancy, that it could be supposed as every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to its success, the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions; a great fund of genius, an easy conception, a lively and instant penetration, which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment, that immediately resolved what it was necessary to act; qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application; and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a \* considerable part of his time in instructing himself, in reflecting, meditating, and consulting the judgment and merit of others.

<sup>a</sup> Isocrat. in Evag.

\* ΕΝ ΤΩ ΖΗΤΕΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΦΡΟΝΤΙΖΕΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΒΑΛΕΝΕΘΑΙ, ΤΟΥ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΕΝ.

When

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs, principally consists. He had, no doubt, prepared himself for that science by the study of history, which gives a kind of anticipation of it, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in themselves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered him attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or hurting it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign each his proper post, to bestow authority according to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others; but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, escaped his enquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank in authority, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone: I mean a wonderful docility and attention to the sense of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great qualities, he did not seem to have occasion for recourse to the counsel of others, and nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise persons he had placed about him in his court; instead of which, pride and presumption, the latent poisons of sovereign power, incline the greatest part of those who arrive at thrones, either to ask no counsel at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon discovering the excellent in every form of government and private condition of life, he proposed the uniting of all their high qualities and great advantages in himself; affable and popular as in a republican

lican state; grave and serious as in the councils of the aged and the senate; steady and decisive as monarchy after mature deliberation; a profound politician, by the extent and rectitude of his views; an accomplished warrior, from intrepid valour in battle directed by a wise moderation; a good father, a good relation, a good friend, and what crowns all his praise \* in every circumstance of his character, always great, and always himself.

He supported his dignity and rank, not with an air of pride and haughtiness, but by a serenity of aspect, and a mild and easy majesty, resulting from innate virtue, and the evidence of a good conscience. He won the hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatness of soul, to which they could not refuse their esteem and admiration.

But what was most royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his subjects, neighbours, and even enemies, was his sincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather detestation, for all disguises, falsehood, and fraud. A single word on his side had as much regard paid to it as the most sacred oath; and it was universally known, that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the least circumstance whatsoever.

It was by all these excellent qualities, that he effectually reformed the city of Salamin, and entirely changed the face of its affairs in a very short time. He found it gross, savage, and barbarous, without any taste either for learning, commerce, or arms. What cannot a prince do who loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himself great and powerful only to render them happy; and knows how to set a just value upon, and do honour to, their labours, industry, and merit of every kind? He had not been many years upon the throne before arts, sciences, commerce, navigation, and military discipline, were seen to flourish at Salamin; insomuch that that city did not give place to the most opulent of Greece.

\* *Τυρηνικός δὲ τῶν πρὸς ταῖς διαφέρειν.*



Ifocrates often repeats, that in the praises he gives Evagoras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls short of truth. To what can we attribute a reign so wise, so just, so moderate, so constantly employed in rendering his subjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras, before he came to govern, seems to me to have contributed very much to it. The being born a prince, and the having never experienced any other condition but that of master and sovereign, are, in my opinion, great obstacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high station. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependent life the yoke of an absolute and despotic power. He had seen himself exposed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger for his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told upon his ascending the throne, what was said to a great \*emperor, “† You have not always been what you now are. Adversity has prepared you to make a good use of power. You have lived long amongst us, and like us. You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourself, and known by experience how virtue and innocence have been treated.” What he had personally suffered, what he had feared for himself or others, what he had seen unjust or unreasonable in the conduct of his predecessors, had opened his eyes, and taught him all his duty. It sufficed to tell him, what the emperor Galba told Piso, when he adopted him his associate in the empire, “‡ Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes, when you were a private man. You have only to consult the judgment you then passed upon them, and to act conformably to it, for your instruction in the art of reigning well.”

\* Trajan.

† *Quam utile est ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse! Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita scis, et expertus es.* PLIN. in Panegy.

‡ *Utilissimus quidam ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris.* TACIT. Hist. l. i. c. 16.

Trial

## TRIAL OF TIRIBASUS.

We have already said, that Tiribafus, having been accused by Orontes of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father-in-law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere fufpicion, conceived he had no other means for his fecurity than an open revolt. He was very well beloved by the foldiers, and all the officers of the fleet were particularly at his devotion. Without lofs of time he fent deputies to Achoris king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him againft the king of Perfia. On another fide, he foli-cited the Lacedæmonians warmly to come into that league, with affurances of making them mafters of all Greece, and of eftablifhing univerfally their form of government; at which they had long feemed to afpire. They hearkened favourably to thefe propofals, and embraced with joy this occafion of taking arms againft Artaxerxes; the rather, becaufe the peace they had concluded with him, by which they had given up the Greeks of Afia, had covered them with fhame, and filled them with remorse.

As foon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of Cyprus\*, he thought of concluding alfo the affair of Tiribafus. He was fo juft as to appoint for that purpofe three commiffioners, who were great lords of Perfia of diftinguifhed probity, and of the higheft reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination, and a hearing on both fides. For fo confiderable a crime, as that of having confpired againft the king's perfon, no other proofs were produced than the letter of Orontes; that is to fay, of a declared enemy, ftudious to fupplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his credit at court, that the affair would not have been

\* Diodorus refers the decifion of this affair, till after the war with the Cadufians, of which we fhall foon fpeak; this feems very improbable.

discussed in the usual forms, and that upon the memorial sent by him, the accused would have been condemned without further examination. But that was not the custom with the Persians. By an ancient established regulation, to which amongst other privileges they had a right by birth, no person was ever to be condemned, without being first heard and confronted with his accusers. This was granted to Tiribafus, who answered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the treaty itself concluded by Orontes was his apology; as it was absolutely the same that prince had proposed to him, except a condition, which would have done honour to his master. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty he had made them sign sufficiently explained, whether his own, or the king's interests were his motives for it. He did not deny his credit in the army; but apprehended, it had not been long a crime to be beloved by the officers and soldiers; and concluded his defence, in representing the long services he had rendered the king with inviolable fidelity; and especially his good fortune in having formerly saved his life, when he was hunting, and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commissioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribafus innocent. The king restored him to his former favour, and justly enraged at the black design of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A single example of this kind against informers convicted of falsehood, would forever shut the door against calumny. How many innocents have been destroyed for want of observing this rule, which even the Pagans considered as the basis of all justice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity!

SECT. VII. *The Expedition of Artaxerxes against the Cadusians. History of Datames the Carian.*

WHEN Artaxerxes had determined the Cyprian war, he entered upon another against the Cadusians, who, it is probable had revolted, and refused

\* Plat. in Artax. p. 1023, 1024.

to pay the customary tribute; for authors say nothing as to the occasion of this war. Those people inhabited part of the mountains, situate between the Euxine and Caspian seas in the north of Media. The soil is there so ungrateful, and so little proper for cultivation, that no corn is sowed upon it. The people subsist almost entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon dangers and fatigues as nothing; and for that reason made excellent soldiers. The king marched against them in person at the head of an army of three hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. Tiribafus was with him in this expedition.

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country, when his army suffered greatly by famine. The troops could find nothing to subsist upon, and it was impossible to bring provisions from other places, the ways being difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their carriage beasts; which soon became so scarce, that an ass's head was valued at sixty drachmas\*, and was very hard to be got at that price. The king's table itself began to fall short, and only a few horses remained, the rest having been entirely consumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribafus contrived a stratagem which saved the king and army. The Cadusians had two kings who were encamped separately with their troops. Tiribafus, who took care to be informed of all that passed, had been apprized, that there was some misunderstanding between them, and that their jealousy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they ought to have done. After having communicated his design to Artaxerxes, he went himself to one of the kings, and dispatched his son to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had sent ambassadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and advised him to lose no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the conditions of it might be the more advantageous; promif-

\* Thirty livres.

ing to assist them with their whole credit. The fraud succeeded. The \* Pagans thought it no crime to use it with enemies. Ambassadors set out from both parties with Tiribafus and his son in their company.

As this double negociation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribafus; and his enemies taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin him in the king's opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him, to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince! Whilst this passed, arrived Tiribafus on his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribafus became more powerful than ever in his master's favour, and returned with him.

The king's behaviour in this march was much admired. Neither the gold with which he was covered, his purple robes, nor the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth six-and-thirty millions of livres †; prevented his having an equal share in the whole fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen with his quiver at his back, and his shield on his arm, to dismount from his horse, and march foremost in those rugged and difficult countries. The soldiers observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so light, that they seemed rather to fly than walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent and well-planted, which was the more surprising as the whole country about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and excessive cold, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without excepting the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers not being able to resolve to

\* *Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?* VIRGIL.

† Twelve thousand talents.

fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an ax, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself; after which the troops spared none, cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to their passing the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value great persons generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must confess Artaxerxes's generosity in making this sacrifice, which argued a very laudable goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distresses and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprize a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account, and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humour with the grandees of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him. For fear in a suspicious prince is a very destructive and bloody passion; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

\* One of the principal officers that perished in this expedition against the Cadusians was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province inclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datames succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, does not prefer Amilcar and Hannibal to him amongst the Barbarians. It appears from his history of it, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valour, and ability, in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to resolve in the heat of action, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions; in a word, in every thing that regards military

\* Corn. Nep. in vit. Datamis,

knowledge.

knowledge. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, than a noble theatre, and more exalted occasions; and perhaps an historian to have given a more extensive narration of his exploits. For Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them but in a very succinct manner.

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governor of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent on him at first to try the methods of lenity and reconciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he had laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force; though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavoured to make it the more sensible by the pleasure of a surprize. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made great marches, to prevent its being known from rumour before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of a very tall stature, of a haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as he was in effect. For himself, in the gross habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, he led Thyus upon the left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the toils. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it, but nobody was so much surprized and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given

Artaxerxes

Artaxerxes great and just alarm, and he did not expect to have seen him so soon in his hands. So sudden and successful an execution gave him a higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To express his sense of it, he gave him an equal share in the command of the army, destined against Egypt, with Pharnabafus and Tithraustes, the two principal persons in the state, and even appointed him general in chief, when he recalled Pharnabafus.

When he was upon the point of setting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly against Aspis, who had made the country revolt, which he commanded in the neighbourhood of Cappadocia. The commission was little important for an officer who had been appointed general, and besides very dangerous, because it was necessary to go in quest of the enemy into a very remote country. The king soon perceived his error, and countermanded him: but Datames had set out directly with a handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence, without a great number of troops, was all that was necessary to surprize and vanquish the enemy. It happened according to his expectation, and the couriers dispatched by the king, met Aspis in chains on the road to Susa.

Nothing was talked of at the court but Datames. It was not known which to admire most, his ready obedience, his wife and enterprising bravery, or his extraordinary success. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in secret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of interests, and a competition in their pretensions, they united together against a superior merit which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conspired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and succeeded but too well. As they besieged him perpetually; and he was not upon his guard against persons who appeared so well affected to his service, they inspired him with jealousy and suspicion to the prejudice of the most zealous and faithful of his officers.



An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the highest posts at court, apprized him of what passed, and of the conspiracy which had been formed against him, and had already sunk his credit considerably with the king. \* He represented to him, that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, should take a bad turn, he would find himself exposed to great dangers: that it was the custom with kings to attribute good successes to themselves and their auspicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, for which they were responsible at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater risk, as all that were about the king's person, and had any ascendant over him, were his declared enemies, and had sworn his destruction.

Upon this advice, Datames resolved to quit the king's service, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity he owed him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles of Magnesia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, seized Paphlagonia, which joined it, allied himself secretly with Ariobarzanes, raised troops, took possession of fortresses, and put good garrisons in them. He received advice, that the Pisidians were arming against him. He did not wait their coming on, but made his army march thither under the command of his youngest son, who had the misfortune to be killed in a battle. However lively his affliction might be upon that occasion, he concealed his death, lest the bad news should discourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his first care was to take possession of an advantageous post. † Mithrobarzanes, his father-in-law, who commanded the horse, believing his son entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames, without concern

† Diod. I. xv. p. 399.

\* *Docet eum magno fore in periculo, siquid, illo imperante, in Aegypto adversi accidisset. Namque eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos fortunæ suæ; quo facile fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum ductu res malè gestæ nuncientur. Illum hoc majore fore in discrimine, quòd, quibus rex maxime obediatur, eos habeat inimicissimos.* CORN. NIT.

or emotion, caused a rumour to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a feint concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops into a disposition for charging the enemy in two different attacks. The stratagem had all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king, the actions we have related being only against governors, with whom he might have particular differences, which we have observed before was common enough. His own eldest son, called Scifinas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole designs to the king. Artaxerxes was highly apprehensive of the consequence. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise, without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always answered the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia of almost two hundred thousand men, of which twenty thousand were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's; so that he had no resource but in himself, the valour of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen. For in that consisted his chief excellence; never captain having better known how to take his advantages and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His post, as I have observed, was infinitely superior to that of the enemy. He had pitched upon a situation, where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made they could come to blows with them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in number  
would

would have been absolutely useless to them. Autophradates well knew, that according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture: but he observed at the same time, that it was much to his dishonour, with so numerous an army to make choice of a retreat, or to continue any longer in inaction before a handful of enemies. He therefore gave the signal. The first attack was rude; but the troops of Autophradates soon gave way and were entirely routed. The victor pursued them for some time with great slaughter. There were only a thousand men killed on the side of Datames.

Several battles, or rather skirmishes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; because, perfectly knowing the country, and succeeding especially in the stratagems of war, he always posted himself advantageously, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themselves without loss. Autophradates seeing all his endeavours ineffectual, and his supplies entirely exhausted, and despairing of ever being able to subject by force so artful and valiant an enemy, ~~entreated an accommodation~~, and proposed to him the being restored to the king's favour upon honourable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little security for him in such a choice, because princes are seldom reconciled in earnest with a subject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they see themselves in some sort obliged to submit. However, as only despair had hurried them into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart the sentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he accepted the offers with joy, which would put an end to the violent condition his misfortune had engaged him in, and afforded him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the service of the prince to whom they were due. He promised to send deputies to the king; upon which ensued a cessation of arms, and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection he formerly professed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by the force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery; means unworthy every man of honour, and how much more so of a prince! He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favourable opportunity, when he was alone, and stabbed him with his sword, before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus \* fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship, who had always thought it his honour to observe the most inviolable fidelity, in regard to those with whom he had any engagements. Happy, had he always piqued himself also upon being as faithful a subject as he was a true friend; and if he had not, in the latter part of his life, sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities, by the ill use he made of them; which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor † any other pretext could sufficiently authorize.

I am surpris'd that, comparable as he was to the greatest persons of antiquity, he has remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions

\* *Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidia ceperat, simulata captus est amicitia.* CORN. NEP.

† This doctrine of Mr. Rollin's may do very well in France, where implicit obedience to the grand monarch is the law of the land; but it has too much of that exploded absurdity, passive obedience (founded in an erroneous acceptation of religion) to be admitted in a free nation; where, by the maxims of the law, and the constitution of the government, the subject in many instances is dispensed from his obedience, and may defend himself (even in arms) against his prince, viz. in cases of life and liberty.

and exploits are however worthy of being preserved in history. For it is in such small bodies of troops as those of Datames, that the whole soul is exerted, in which the highest prudence is shown, in which chance has no share, and the abilities of a general appear in in their full light.

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CHAP. IV.

*History of Socrates abridged.*

AS the death of Socrates is one of the most considerable events of antiquity, I thought it incumbent on me to treat that subject with all the extent it deserves. In this view I shall premise some things which are necessary to the reader's having a just idea of this prince of the philosophers.

Two authors will supply me principally with what I have to say upon this subject, Plato and Xenophon, both disciples of Socrates. It is to them posterity is indebted for many of his discourses (\* that philosopher having left nothing in writing) and for an ample account of all the circumstances of his condemnation and death. Plato was an eye-witness of the whole, and relates, in his Apology, the manner of Socrates's accusation and defence; in his Criton, his refusal to make his escape out of prison; in his Phædon, his admirable discourse upon the Immortality of the Soul, which was immediately followed by his death. Xenophon was absent at that time, and upon his return, after the expedition of young Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes; so that he wrote his Apology of Socrates only upon the report of others, but his actions and discourses, in his four books of memorable things, he repeats from his own knowledge. Diogenes Laertius has given us the life of Socrates, but in a very dry and abridged manner.

\* *Socrates, cujus ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, literam nullam reliquit.* Cic. de Orat. l. iii. n. 57.

SECT. I. *Birth of Socrates. He applies at first to Sculpture; then to the Study of the Sciences: his wonderful Progress in them. His Taste for moral Philosophy. His Manner of living, and Sufferings from the Ill-humour of his Wife.*

**S**OCRATES was born at Athens in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad. His father Sophroniscus was a sculptor, and his mother Phanarete a midwife. Hence we may observe, that meanness of birth is no obstacle to true merit, in which alone solid glory and real nobility consist. It appears from the comparisons Socrates often used in his discourses, that he was neither ashamed of his father's or mother's profession. <sup>e</sup> He was surpris'd that a sculptor should employ his whole attention to mould an insensible stone into the likeness of a man, and that a man should take so little pains not to resemble an insensible stone. <sup>g</sup> He would often say, that he exercised the function of a midwife with regard to the mind, in making it bring forth all its thoughts, which was indeed the peculiar talent of Socrates. He treated subjects in so simple, natural, and pure an order, that he made those with whom he disputed say what he would, and find an answer themselves to all the questions he propos'd to them. He at first learned his father's trade, in which he made himself very expert. <sup>h</sup> In the time of Pausanias, there was a Mercury and the Graces to be seen at Athens of his workmanship; and it is to be presumed these statues would not have found place amongst those of the greatest masters in the art, if they had not been thought worthy of it.

<sup>i</sup> Criton is reported to have taken him out of his father's shop, from the admiration of his fine genius, and the opinion that it was inconsistent for a young man, capable of the greatest things, to continue perpetually employ'd upon stone with a chisel in his hand. He

<sup>e</sup> A. M. 3533. Ant. J. C. 471. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 100.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. p. 110.

<sup>g</sup> Paus. l. ix. p. 596.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. in Theatet. p. 149, &c.

<sup>i</sup> Diog. p. 101.

was the disciple of Archelaus, who conceived a great affection for him. Archelaus had been pupil to Anaxagoras, a very celebrated philosopher. His first study was physics, the works of nature, and the movement of the heavens, stars, and planets; according to the custom of those times, wherein only that part of philosophy was known, and Xenophon<sup>k</sup> assures us of his being very learned in it. But \* after having found by his own experience, how difficult, abstruse, intricate, and at the same time how little useful that kind of learning was to the generality of mankind, he was the first, according to Cicero, who conceived the thought of bringing down philosophy from heaven to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses; humanizing it, to use that expression, and rendering it more familiar, more useful in common life, more within the reach of man's capacity, and applying it solely to what might make them more rational, just, and virtuous. <sup>1</sup> He found there was a kind of folly in devoting the whole vivacity of his mind, and employing all his time in enquiries merely curious, involved in impenetrable darkness, and absolutely incapable of contributing to human happiness; whilst he neglected to inform himself in the ordinary duties of life, and in learning what is conformable, or opposite, to piety, justice, and probity: in what fortitude, temperance, and wisdom consist; what is the end of all government, what the rules of it, and what qualities are necessary for commanding and ruling well. We shall see in the sequel the use he made of this study.

It was so far from preventing him to discharge the duties of a good citizen, that it was the means of mak-

<sup>k</sup> Lib. iv. Memorab. b. 710.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 710.

\* *Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quaerere. Cic. Tusc. Quaest. l. v. n. 10.*

*Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus à rebus occultis; et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerant, avocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse; ut de virtutibus et vitis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret; caelestia autem vel procul esse à nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre. Cic. Acad. Quaest. l. i. n. 15.*

ing him the more observant of them. He bore arms, as did all the people of Athens; but with more pure and elevated motives. He made many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valour and fortitude. He was seen, towards the end of his life, giving in the senate, of which he was a member, the most shining proofs of his zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest present dangers.

He had accustomed himself early to a sober, severe, laborious life; without which it seldom happens, that men are capable of discharging the greatest part of the duties of good citizens. It is difficult to carry the contempt of riches and the love of poverty farther than he did. <sup>m</sup> He looked upon it as a divine perfection to be in want of nothing; and believed, the less we are contented with, the nearer we approach to the Divinity. \* Seeing the pomp and show displayed by luxury in certain ceremonies, and the infinite quantity of gold and silver employed in them: "How many things," said he, congratulating himself on his condition, "do I not want." *Quantis non egeo!*

<sup>n</sup> His father left him fourscore minæ, that is to say, four thousand livres, which he lent to one of his friends who had occasion for that sum. But the affairs of that friend having taken an ill turn, he lost the whole, and suffered that misfortune with such indifference and tranquillity, that he did not so much as complain of it. <sup>o</sup> We find in Xenophon's *Œconomics*, that his whole estate amounted to no more than five minæ, or two hundred and fifty livres. The richest persons of Athens were his friends, who could never prevail upon him to accept any share of their wealth. When he was in want of any thing, he was not ashamed to declare it: "† If I

<sup>m</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 731.

<sup>n</sup> Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 640. <sup>o</sup> Xenoph. Œcon. p. 822.

\* *Socrates in pompa, cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur: Quam multa non disidero; inquit!* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v.

† *Socrates amicis audientibus: Emissem, inquit, pallium, si nummos haberem. Neminem poposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit— Post hoc quisquis properaveret, sero dat; jam Socrati defuit.* SENEC. de Benef. l. vii. c. 24.



had money," said he one day in an assembly of his friends, "I should buy me a cloak." He did not address himself to any body in particular, but contented himself with that general information. His disciples contended for the honour of making him this small present; which was being too slow, says Seneca; their own observation ought to have prevented both the want and the demand.

He generously refused the offers and presents of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, who was desirous of having him at his court; adding, "that he could not go to a man who could give him more than it was in his power to return." Another philosopher does not approve this answer. "Was it making a prince a small return," says Seneca, "to undeceive him in his false ideas of grandeur and magnificence; to inspire him with a contempt for riches; to show him the right use of them; to instruct him in the great art of reigning; in a word, to teach him how to live and how to die? But," continues Seneca, "the true reason which prevented his going to the court of that prince, was, that he did not think it consistent for him to seek a voluntary servitude, whose liberty a free city could not suffer him to enjoy." *Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is cujus libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit*<sup>p</sup>.

<sup>q</sup> The peculiar austerity of his life did not render him gloomy and morose, as was common enough with the philosophers of those times. <sup>r</sup> In company and conversation he was always gay and facetious, and the sole joy and spirit of the entertainment. Though he was very poor, he piqued himself upon the neatness of his person and house, and could not suffer the ridiculous affectation of Antisthenes, who always wore dirty and ragged clothes. He told him once, that through the holes in his cloak, and the rest of his tatters, abundance of vanity might be discerned.

One of the most distinguishing qualities of Socrates

<sup>p</sup> Senec. de Benef. l. v. c. 6.

<sup>q</sup> Xenoph. in conviv.

<sup>r</sup> Ælian. l. iv. c. 11. & l. ix. c. 35.

was a tranquillity of soul, that no accident, no loss, no injury, no ill treatment, could ever alter. Some have believed, that he was by nature hasty and passionate, and that the moderation to which he attained was the effect of his reflections and endeavours to subdue and correct himself; which would still add to his merit. \* Seneca tells us, that he had desired his friends to apprise him whenever they saw him ready to fall into a passion, and that he had given them that privilege over him, which he took himself with them. \* Indeed the best time to call in aid against rage and anger, that have so violent and sudden a power over us, is when we are yet ourselves, and in cool blood. At the first signal, the least animadversion, he either softened his tone, or was silent. Finding himself in great emotion against a slave, "I would beat you," says he, "if I were not angry: *Cæderem te, nisi irasceter.* Having received a box on the ear, he contented himself with only saying, with a smile, " 'Tis a misfortune not to know when to put on an helmet."

Without going out of his own house, he found enough to exercise his patience in all its extent. Xantippe, his wife, put it to the severest proofs by her capricious, passionate, violent disposition. It seems, before he took her for his companion, that he was not ignorant of her character; and he says himself in Xenophon<sup>x</sup>, that he had expressly chosen her, from the conviction that if he should be capable of bearing her insults, there would be nobody, though ever so difficult to endure, with whom he could not live. Never was woman of so violent and fantastical a spirit, and so bad a temper. There was no kind of abuse, or injurious treatment, which he had not to experience from her. She would sometimes be transported with such an excess of rage, as to tear off his cloak in the open street; and even one day, after having vented all the reproaches her fury

\* Senec. de Ira, l. iii. c. 15.

† Ibid. l. i. c. 15.

▪ Ibid. l. iii. c. 11.

\* Xenoph. in conviv. p. 876.

‡ Diog. in Socrat. p. 112.

\* *Contra potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum conspicimus, et nostri sumus, advocemus.*

could suggest, she emptied a pot upon his head; at which he only laughed, and said, "That so much thunder must needs produce a shower."

<sup>2</sup> Some ancient authors write, that Socrates married a second wife, named Myrta, who was the grand-daughter of Aristides the Just, and that he suffered exceedingly from them both, who were continually quarrelling with each other, and never agreed, but in loading him with reproaches, and doing him all the offence they could invent. They pretend, that during the Peloponnesian war, after the pestilence had swept off great part of the Athenians, a decree was made, whereby, to retrieve the sooner the ruins of the republic, each citizen was permitted to have two wives at the same time, and that Socrates took the benefit of this new law. Those authors found this circumstance solely upon a passage in a treatise on nobility, ascribed to Aristotle. But, besides that, according to Plutarch himself, Panetius, a very grave author, has fully refuted this opinion, neither Plato nor Xenophon, who were well acquainted with all that related to their master, say any thing of this second marriage of Socrates; and on another side, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus, who have treated at large all the particulars of the Peloponnesian war, are alike silent in regard to the pretended decree of Athens, which permitted bigamy. We may see in the first volumes of the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, a dissertation of Monsieur Hardion's upon this subject, wherein he demonstrates, that the second marriage of Socrates, and the decree upon bigamy, are supposititious facts.

SECT. II. *Of the Daemon, or familiar Spirit of Socrates.*

OUR knowledge of Socrates would be defective if we knew nothing of the genius, which, he said, had assisted him with its counsel and protection in the

<sup>2</sup> Plut. in Aristid. p. 335. Athen. l. xiii. p. 555. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 105.

greatest part of his actions. It is not agreed amongst authors, what this genius was, commonly called *The Daemon of Socrates*, from the Greek word *Δαίμωνιον*, that signifies something of a divine nature, conceived as a secret voice, a sign, or such an inspiration as diviners are supposed to have had: this genius diverted him from the execution of his designs when they have been prejudicial to him, without ever inducing him to act any thing: <sup>a</sup> *Esse divinum quoddam, quod Socrates dæmonium appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti.* Plutarch, in his treatise intituled, *Of the Genius of Socrates*, repeats the different sentiments of the ancients upon the existence and nature of this genius. <sup>b</sup> I shall confine myself to that of them, which seems the most natural and reasonable, though he does not lay much stress upon it.

We know that the divinity has a clear and unerring knowledge of futurity: that man cannot penetrate into its darkness but by uncertain and confused conjectures: that those who succeed best in that research, are such, who by a more exact and studied comparison of the different causes capable of influencing future events, distinguish with greater force and perspicuity, what will be the result and issue of the conflict of those different causes in conducing to the success or miscarriage of an effect or enterprise. This foresight and discernment has something of divine in it, exalts us above the rest of mankind, approaches us to the divinity, and makes us participate, in some measure, in his counsels and designs, by giving us an insight and prescience, to a certain degree, of what he has ordained concerning the future. Socrates had a just and piercing judgment, joined with the most exquisite prudence. He might call this judgment and prudence *Δαίμωνιον*, *something divine*, using indeed a kind of equivocality in the expression, without attributing to himself, however, the merit of his wisdom in conjecturing upon the future. The Abbe Fraguier comes very near the same opinion in

<sup>a</sup> Cic. de Divin. l. i. n. 122.

<sup>b</sup> Page 580.

the dissertation he has left us upon this subject in the <sup>c</sup>Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres.

<sup>d</sup>The effect, or rather function of this genius, was to stop and prevent his acting, without ever inducing him to act. He received also the same impulse, when his friends were going to engage in any bad affair, and communicated it to him; and several instances are related, wherein they found themselves very unfortunate from not having believed him. Now what other signification can be given to this, than that it implies, under mysterious terms, a mind which, by its own lights, and the knowledge of mankind, has attained a sort of insight into futurity? And if Socrates had not intended to lessen in his own person the merit of an unerring judgment, by attributing it to a kind of instinct, if at bottom he had desired any thing to be understood, besides the general aid of the divine wisdom, which speaks in every man by the voice of reason, would he have escaped, says Xenophon<sup>e</sup>, the censure of arrogance and falsehood?

<sup>f</sup> God has always prevented me from speaking to you, says he to Alcibiades, whilst the weakness of your age would have rendered my discourses ineffectual to you. But I conceive I may now enter into dispute with you, as an ambitious young man, for whom the laws open a way to the dignities of the republic. Is it not visible here that prudence prevented Socrates from treating Alcibiades seriously, at a time when grave and severe conversation would have given him a disgust, of which, perhaps, he might never have got the better? <sup>g</sup>And when, in his dialogue upon the commonwealth, Socrates ascribes his avoiding public business to inspiration from above, does he mean any thing more than what he says in his Apology, that a just and good man, who intermeddles with the government in a corrupt state, is not long without perishing? If <sup>h</sup>when he appears before the judges who were to condemn him,

<sup>e</sup> Tom. IV. p. 368.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. in Theag. p. 128.

<sup>c</sup> Memorab. l. i. p. 708.

<sup>f</sup> Plat. in Alcib. p. 150.

<sup>g</sup> Lib. vi. de Rep. p. 496. Apolog. Soc. p. 31, 32.

<sup>h</sup> Apolog. Soc. p. 40.

that

that divine voice is not heard to prevent him, as it was upon dangerous occasions, the reason is, that he did not deem it a misfortune for him to die, especially at his age, and in his circumstances. Every body knows what his prognostication had been long before, upon the unfortunate expedition of Sicily. He attributed it to his dæmon, and declared it to be the inspiration of that spirit. A wise man, who sees an affair ill concerted, and conducted with passion, may easily prophesy upon the event of it, without the aid of a dæmon's inspiration.

It must be allowed, however, that the opinion which gives men genii and angels to direct and guard them, was not unknown, even to the pagans. <sup>i</sup> Plutarch cites the verses of Menander, in which that poet expressly says, "That every man at his birth has a good genius given him, which attends him during the whole course of his life as a guide and director.

Ἀπαντὶ δαιμόνων ἀνδρὶ συμπαραστάσει  
 Εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τε βίῃ  
 Ἀγαθός.

It may be believed, with probability enough, that the dæmon of Socrates, which has been so differently spoken of, and thereby made it a question, whether it was a good or bad angel, was no more than the force and rectitude of his judgment, which acting according to the rules of prudence, and with the aid of a long experience, supported by wise reflections, made him foresee the events of those things, upon which he was either consulted, or deliberated himself.

I conceive, at the same time, that he was not sorry the people should believe him inspired, or that he knew futurity by any effect of the divinity whatsoever. That opinion might exalt him very much in the sense of the Athenians, and gave him an authority, of which the greatest \* persons of the pagan world were very fond,  
 and

<sup>i</sup> De anim. tranquil. p. 474.

\* Lycurgus and Solon had recourse to the authority of oracles to advance their credit. Zeleucus pretended, that his laws had been dictated to him by Minerva. Numa Pompilius boasted his conferences with  
 the

and which they endeavoured to acquire by secret communications, and pretended conferences, with some divinity: but it drew the jealousy of many of the citizens upon him.

SECT. III. *Socrates declared the wisest of Mankind by the Oracle of Delphos.*

\* THIS declaration of the oracle, so advantageous in appearance for Socrates, did not a little contribute to the enflaming envy, and stirring up of enemies against him, as he tells us himself in his Apology, wherein he recounts the occasion, and true sense of that oracle.

Chærephon, a zealous disciple of Socrates, happening to be at Delphos, demanded of the oracle, whether there was a wiser man than Socrates in the world: the priestess replied there was none. This answer puzzled Socrates extremely, who could scarce comprehend the sense of it. For on the one side, he well knew, says he of himself, that there was neither much nor little wisdom in him; and on the other, he could not suspect the oracle of falsehood, the divinity being incapable of telling a lie. He therefore considered it attentively, and took great pains to penetrate the sense of it. At first he applied himself to a powerful citizen; a statesman, and a great politician, who passed for one of the wisest men of the city, and who was himself as much convinced of his own merit as any body. He found by his conversation that he knew nothing, and insinuated as much to himself in terms sufficiently intelligible; which made him extremely odious to that citizen, and all who were present. He did the same by several others of the same profession; and all the fruit of his enquiry was, to draw upon himself a greater number of enemies. From the statesman he addressed himself to the poets, whom he found still fuller of self-esteem, but really more void

\* Plat. in Apolog. p. 21, 22.

the goddess Egeria. The first Scipio Africanus made the people believe that the gods gave him secret counsels. Even Sertorius's hind had something divine in it.

of knowledge and wisdom. He pursued his enquiries to the artizans, and could not meet with one, who, because he succeeded in his own art did not believe himself very capable, and fully informed in all that was great besides; which presumption was the almost universal failing of the Athenians. As they had naturally abundance of wit, they pretended to be knowing in every thing, and believed themselves capable of pronouncing upon all things. His enquiries amongst strangers were not more successful.

Socrates, afterwards entering into and comparing himself with all those he had questioned\*, discovered that the difference between him and them was, that they all believed they knew what they did not know, and that for his part, he sincerely professed his ignorance. From thence he concluded, that only God is truly wise, and that the true meaning of the oracle was to signify, that all human wisdom was no great matter, or, to speak more properly, was nothing at all. And as to the oracle's naming me, it no doubt did so, says he, by way of setting me up for an example, as if it intended to declare to all men, The wisest amongst you is he, who knows, like Socrates, that there is no real wisdom in him.

*SECT. IV. Socrates devotes himself entirely to the Instruction of the Youth of Athens. Affection of his Disciples for him. The admirable Principles with which he inspires them either for Government or Religion.*

**A**FTER having related some particularities in the life of Socrates, it is time to proceed to that in which his character principally and peculiarly consisted; I mean the pains he took to instruct mankind, and particularly informing the youth of Athens.

\* *Socrates in omnibus fere sermonibus sic disputat, ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat, nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare cæteris, quod illi, quæ nesciant, scire se putent; ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat; ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una omnis sapientia, non arbitrari se scire quod nesciat.* — *Ca. c. Acad. Quest. l. i. n. 15, 16.*



<sup>1</sup> He seemed, says Libanius, the common father of the republic, so attentive was he to the happiness and advantage of his whole country. But as it is very difficult to correct the aged, and to make people change principles, who revere the errors in which they have grown grey, he devoted his labours principally to the instruction of youth, in order to sow the seeds of virtue in a soil more fit to produce the fruits of it.

<sup>m</sup> He had no open school, like the rest of the philosophers, nor set times for his lessons. He had no benches prepared, nor even mounted a professor's chair. He was the philosopher of all times and seasons. He taught in all places, and upon all occasions; in walking, conversation, at meals, in the army, and in the midst of the camp, in the public assemblies of the senate or people, in prison itself, and when he drank the poison he philosophised, says Plutarch, and instructed mankind. And from thence the same judicious author takes occasion to establish a great principle in point of government, which Seneca \* before him had placed in all its light. To be a public man, says he, it is not necessary to be actually in office, to wear the robe of judge and magistrate, and to sit in the highest tribunals for the administration of justice. Many do this, who, though honoured with the fine names of orators, prætors, and senators, if they want the merit of those characters, ought to be regarded as private persons, and often confounded with the lowest and vilest of the populace. But whoever knows to give wise counsel to those who consult him, to animate the citizens to virtue, and to in-

<sup>1</sup> In Apol. Socrat. p. 641.

<sup>m</sup> Plut. an seni fit. ger. resp. p. 796.

\* *Habet ubi se etiam in privato late explicet magnus animus—Ita delituerit (vix ille) ut ubicunque otium suum absconderit, prodesse velit et singulis et universis, ingenio, voce, consilio. Nec enim is solus reip. prodest, qui candidatos extrahit, et tuetur reos, et de pace belloque censet, sed qui juventutem exhortatur, qui in tanta honorum præceptorum inopia virtute instruit animos, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes prensat ac retrahit, et si nihil aliud certe moratur, in privato publicum negotium agit. An ille plus præstat, qui inter peregrinos et cives, aut urbanus prætor adæstantibus adfessoris verba pronunciat; quam qui docet, quid sit justitia, quid pietas, quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid deorum intellectus, quam gratuitum bonum sit conscientia?* SENEC. de tranquill. anim. c. iii.

spire them with sentiments of probity, equity, generosity and love of their country; that is, says Plutarch, the true magistrate and ruler, in whatever condition of place he be.

Such was Socrates. The services he did the state, by the instructions he gave their youth, and the disciples he formed, are inexpressibly great. Never had master a greater number, or so illustrious. Plato, though alone, were worth a multitude. <sup>a</sup> Upon the point of death he blessed and thanked God for three things; that he had endued him with a rational soul, that he was born a Greek and not a Barbarian, and that he had placed his birth in the lifetime of Socrates. Xenophon <sup>o</sup> had the same advantage. It is said, that one day Socrates met him in the street, and stopping him with his staff, asked him whether he knew where provisions were sold? It was not difficult to answer this question. But Socrates having demanded in what place men learned virtue, and seeing this second question put him to a stand: "If you desire to know it," continued the philosopher, "follow me, and you shall be informed." Which he did immediately, and was afterwards the first who collected and published his master's discourses.

<sup>p</sup> Aristippus, upon a conversation with Ichomachus, in which he had introduced some strokes of Socrates's doctrine, conceived so ardent a passion to become his disciple, that he grew lean and wan in effect of it, till he could go the fountain-head, and imbibe his fill of a philosophy, that taught the knowledge and cure of evil.

What is reported of Euclid the Megarian, explains still better how high the passion of Socrates's disciples ran, to receive the benefit of his instructions <sup>q</sup>. There was at that time an open war between Athens and Megara, which was carried on with so much animosity, that the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath to lay waste the territory of Megara twice a year, and prohibited the Megarians to set foot in Attica upon

<sup>a</sup> Plut. in Mario, p. 433.

<sup>o</sup> Diog. in Xenoph. p. 120.

<sup>p</sup> Plut. de Curios. p. 516.

<sup>q</sup> Plut. in Peric. p. 168.

pain of death. This decree could not extinguish nor suspend the zeal of Euclid. He left his city in the evening in the disguise of a woman, with a veil upon his head, and came to the house of Socrates in the night, where he continued till the approach of day, when he returned in the same manner he came.

The ardour of the young Athenians to follow him was incredible. They left father and mother, and renounced all parties of pleasure, to attach themselves to him, and to hear his discourses. We may judge of this in the example of Alcibiades, the most ardent and fiery of all the Athenians. The philosopher however never spared him, and was always ready to calm the sallies of his passions, and to rebuke his pride, which was his great disease. I have before related some instances of this temper of his. One day when Alcibiades was boasting of his wealth, and the great estates in his possession (which generally blow up the pride of young people of quality) he carried him to a geographical map, and asked him to find Attica. It was so small it could scarce be discerned upon that draught; he found it, however, though with some difficulty: but upon being desired to point out his own estate there; "It is too small," says he, "to be distinguished in so little a space."—"See then," replied Socrates, "how much you are affected about an imperceptible point of land." This reasoning might have been urged much farther still: for what was Attica, compared to all Greece, Greece to Europe, Europe to the whole world, and the world itself to the vast extent of the infinite orbs which surround it? What an insect, what a nothing, is the most powerful prince of the earth in the midst of this abyss of bodies and immense spaces, and how much of it does he occupy!

The young people of Athens, dazzled with the glory of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, and full of a wild ambition, after having received for some time the lessons of the sophists, who promised to make them very great politicians, conceived themselves capable of

\* Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. vi. c. 20.

\* Ælian. l. iii. c. 28.

every thing, and aspired at the highest employments. One of these, named Glauco, had taken it so strongly into his head, to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, though not twenty years old, that none of his family or friends were able to divert him from a design so little consistent with his age and capacity. Socrates, who had an affection for him upon account of Plato his brother, was the only person that could prevail upon him to change his resolution.

Meeting him one day, he accosted him so happily with discourse, that he engaged him to give him the hearing. "You are desirous then to govern the republic," said he to him. "True," replied Glauco. "You cannot have a more noble design," answered Socrates, "for, if you succeed, you will have it in your power to serve your friends effectually, to aggrandize your family, and to extend the confines of your country. You will make yourself known not only to Athens, but throughout all Greece, and perhaps your renown, like that of Themistocles, may spread abroad amongst the barbarous nations. In short, wherever you are, you will attract the respect and admiration of the whole world."

So smooth and insinuating a prelude was extremely pleasing to the young man, who was taken by his blind side. He staid willingly, gave no occasion to press him on that account, and the conversation continued. "Since you desire to be esteemed and honoured, no doubt your view is to be useful to the public?"—"Certainly."—"Tell me then, I beg you, in the name of the gods, what is the first service you propose to render the state?" As Glauco seemed at a loss, and meditated upon what he should answer: "I presume," continues Socrates, "it to enrich it, that is to say, to augment its revenues."—"My very thought."—"You are well versed then undoubtedly in the revenues of the state, and know perfectly to what they may amount, you have not failed to make them your particular study,

\* Xenoph. memorab. l. iii. p. 772—774.

in order that if a fund should happen to fail by any unforeseen accident, you might be able to supply the deficiency by another."—"I protest," replied Glauco, "that never entered into my thoughts,"—"At least you will tell me to what the expences of the republic amount; for you must know the importance of retrenching such as are superfluous."—"I own I am as little informed in this point as the other."—"You must therefore refer your design of enriching the state till another time; for it is impossible you should do it, whilst you are unacquainted with its revenue and expences."

"But," said Glauco, "there is still another means which you have not mentioned: a state may be enriched by the ruin of its enemies."—"You are in the right," replied Socrates, "but that depends upon its being the strongest; otherwise it incurs the danger of losing what it has: for which reason, he who talks of engaging in a war, ought to know the forces on both sides; that if he finds his own party strongest, he may boldly advise the war; and, if weakest, dissuade the people from undertaking it. Now, do you know the strength of our republic, and that of our enemies by sea and land? Have you a state of them in writing? Be so kind as to let me see it."—"I have it not at present," said Glauco.—"I see then," said Socrates, "that we shall not presently enter into a war, if you are charged with the government; for you have abundance of enquiries to make, and much pains to go through, before you will resolve upon it."

He ran over, in this manner, several other articles no less important, with which Glauco appeared equally unacquainted; till he brought him to confess, how ridiculous those people were, who have the rashness to intrude into government, without any other preparation for the service of the public, than that of a high esteem for themselves, and an immoderate ambition of rising to the first places and dignities. "Have a care," said he to him, "lest a too warm desire  
of

of honours should deceive you into pursuits that may cover you with shame, by setting your incapacity and slender abilities in full light."

Glauco improved from the wise admonitions of Socrates, and took time to inform himself in private, before he ventured to appear in public. This is a lesson for all ages, and may be very useful to persons in all stations and conditions of life.

"Socrates did not urge his friends to enter early into public employments; but first to take pains for the attainment of the knowledge necessary to their success in them. "A man must be very simple," said he, "to believe that the mechanic arts are not to be acquired without the help of proper masters, and that the knowledge requisite in governing states, which is the highest degree of human prudence, demands no previous labour and application." His great care in regard to those who aspired at public employments, was to form their manners upon the solid principles of probity and justice; and especially to inspire them with a sincere love of their country, with the most ardent passion for the public good, and a high idea of the power and goodness of the gods: because, without these qualities, all other abilities serve only to render men more wicked, and more capable of doing evil. Xenophon has transmitted to us a conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, upon Providence, which is one of the finest passages to be found in the writings of the ancients.

"Did you never reflect within yourself," says Socrates to Euthydemus, "how much care the gods have taken to bestow upon man all that is necessary to his nature?"—"Never, I assure you," replied he. "You see," continued Socrates, "how necessary light is, and how precious that gift of the gods ought to appear to us."—"Without it," added Euthydemus, "we should be like the blind, and all nature as if it were not, or were dead: but because we have occasion for suspense and relaxation, they have also given us the night for

\* Xenoph. memorab. l. iv. p. 800.

\* Idem, p. 792.

our repose.”—“ You are in the right, and for this we ought to render them continual praises and thanksgiving. They have ordained that the sun, that bright and luminous star, should preside over the day to distinguish its different parts, and that its light should not only serve to discover the wonders of nature, but to dispense universal light and heat; and at the same time they have commanded the moon and stars to illuminate the night, of itself dark and obscure. Is there any thing more admirable than this variety and vicissitude of day and night, of light and darkness, of labour and rest; and all this for the convenience and good of man?” Socrates enumerates in like manner the infinite advantages we receive from fire and water in the occasions of life; and continuing to observe upon the wonderful attention of Providence in all that regards us. “ What say you,” pursued he, “ upon the sun’s return after winter to revisit us, and that as the fruits of one season wither and decay, he ripens new ones to succeed them? That having rendered man this service, he retires, lest he should incommode him by excess of heat; and then, after having removed to a certain point, which he could not pass without putting us in danger of perishing with cold, that he returns in the same track to resume his place in those parts of the heavens, where his presence is most beneficial to us? And because we could neither support the cold nor heat, if we were to pass in an instant from the one to the other, do you not admire, that whilst this star approaches and removes so slowly, the two extremities arrive by almost insensible degrees? \* Is it possible not to discover, in this disposition of the seasons of the year, a providence and goodness, not only attentive to our necessities, but even our delights and enjoyments?”

“ All these things,” said Euthydemus, “ make me doubt whether the gods have any other employment

\* Ωρας αρμοτισσας προς τωτο παρεχειν, ει ημιν ε μορον ων διομεθα πολλα ε παντα παρσπισαζοντι, αλλα ε εις ευφρονημεθα.

than to shower down their gifts and graces upon mankind. There is one point, however, that puts me to a stand, which is, that the brute animals partake of all these blessings as well as ourselves."—"Yes," replied Socrates, "but do you but observe, that all these animals subsist only for man's service? The strongest and most vigorous of them he subjects at his will, he makes them tame and gentle, and uses them successfully in his wars, his labours, and the other occasions of life."

"What if we consider man in himself." Here Socrates examines the diversity of the senses, by the ministry of which man enjoys all that is best and most excellent in nature; the vivacity of his wit, and the force of his reason, which exalt him infinitely above all other animals; the wonderful gift of speech, by the means of which we communicate our thoughts reciprocally, publish our laws, and govern states.

"From all this," says Socrates, "it is easy to discern that there are gods, and that they have man in their particular care, though he cannot discover them by his senses. Do we perceive the thunder, whilst it strikes through all things which oppose it? Do we distinguish the winds, whilst they are tearing up all before them in our view? Our soul itself, with which we are so intimate, which moves and acts us, is it visible, can we behold it? It is the same with regard to the gods, of whom none are visible in the distribution of their favours. The GREAT GOD himself," (these words are remarkable, and demonstrate that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God, the author of all being, and superior to all others, who were only the ministers of his will) "this Great God, who has formed the universe, and supports the stupendous work, whose every part is finished with the utmost goodness and harmony; he who preserves them perpetually in immortal vigour, and causes them to obey him with a never-failing punctuality, and a rapidity not to be followed by our imagination; this makes God himself sufficiently visible by the endless wonders of which he is author;



but continues always invisible in himself. Let us not then refuse to believe even what we do not see, and let us supply the defects of our corporeal eyes, by using those of the soul; but especially let us learn to render the just homage of respect and veneration to the divinity, whose will it seems to be, that we should have no other perception of him than by his effects in our favour. Now this adoration, this homage, consists in pleasing him, and we can only please him in doing his will."

¶ In this manner Socrates instructed youth; these are the principles and sentiments he inspired into them; on the one side, a perfect submission to the laws and magistrates, in which he made justice consist: on the other, a profound regard for the divinity, which constitutes religion. In things surpassing our understanding, he advises us to consult the gods; and as they impart themselves only to those that please them, he recommends above all things the making of them propitious by a wise regularity of conduct. " \* The gods are wise," says he, "and it depends upon them either to grant what we ask, or to give us directly the reverse of it." He cites an excellent prayer from an anonymous poet: "Great God, give us, we beseech thee, those good things of which we stand in need, whether we crave them or not; and remove from us all those which may be hurtful to us, though we implore them of you." The vulgar imagined that there are things which the gods observe, and others of which they take no notice: but Socrates taught that the gods observe all our actions and words; that they penetrate into our most secret thoughts, are present in all our deliberations, and that they inspire us in all our actions.

¶ Xenoph. Memorab. l. iv. p. 803, & 805.

\* Ἐπι θεοῖς ἔστιν, ἕδμαι ὡς εἰ καὶ δίδουσι κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εὐχόμενον τυχεῖαν, καὶ παλαιὰ τῆτιν. Plut. Alcib. l. ii. p. 148.



SECT.

SECT. V. *Socrates applies himself to discredit the Sophists in the Opinion of the young Athenians. What is to be understood of the ironical Character ascribed to him.*

SOCRATES found it necessary to prejudice the young people against a bad taste, which had prevailed for some time in Greece. A sect of assuming men arose, who ranking themselves as the first sages of Greece, were entirely the reverse in their conduct. For instead of being infinitely remote from all avarice and ambition, like Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and the others who made a study of wisdom their principal occupation, these men were ambitious and covetous, entered into the intrigues and affairs of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge\*. <sup>z</sup> They were called sophists, and wandered from city to city. They caused themselves to be cried up as oracles, and walked about attended by crowds of disciples, who, through a kind of enchantment, abandoned the embraces of their parents to follow these proud teachers, whom they paid a great price for their instruction. There was nothing these masters did not profess: theology, physics, ethics, arithmetic, astronomy, grammar, music, poetry, rhetoric, and history. They knew every thing, and could teach every thing. Their greatest supposed skill lay in philosophy and eloquence. Most of them, like Gorgias, valued themselves upon giving immediate answers to all questions that could be proposed to them. Their young disciples acquired nothing from their precepts but a silly esteem for themselves, and an universal contempt for every body else; so that not a scholar quitted these schools, but was more impertinent than when he first entered them.

It was necessary to decry the false eloquence and bad logic of these proud teachers in the sense of the young Athenians. To attack them in front, and dispute with

\* Plat. in Apolog, p. 19, 20.

f. \* Sic enim appellantur hi, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophantur. Cic. in Lucul. n. 129.

them in a direct manner by a continued discourse, was what Socrates could well have done, for he possessed in an extreme degree the talents of speaking and reasoning; but this was no means to succeed against great haranguers, whose sole aim was to dazzle their auditors with a vain glitter and rapid flow of words. He therefore took another course, and \* employing the turns and address of irony, which he knew how to apply with wonderful art and delicacy, he chose to conceal, under the appearance of simplicity and the affectation of ignorance, all the beauty and great force of his genius. Nature, which had given him so fine a soul, seemed to have formed his outside expressly for supporting the ironic character. He was very ugly, and besides that, † had something very blockish and stupid in his physiognomy. The whole air of his person, which had nothing but what was very common and very poor in it, perfectly corresponded with that of his countenance.

When ‡ he happened into the company of some one of the sophists, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, asked simple questions in a plain manner, and, as if he had been incapable of expressing himself otherwise, made use of trivial comparisons, and allusions taken from the meanest employments. The sophist heard him with a scornful attention, and instead of giving him a precise answer, fell into his common places, and talked a great deal without saying any thing to the purpose. Socrates, after having praised (not to enrage) his adversary, intreated him to adapt himself to his weakness, and to descend so low as him, by fa-

\* *Socrates in ironia dissimulantiaque longè omnibus lepore atque humanitate præstitit.* Cic. l. ii. de Orat. n. 270.

† *Zopyrus physiognomon—stupidum esse Socratem dixit et bardum.* Cic. de Fat. n. 10.

‡ *Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est illa dissimulatione, quam Græci εἰρωνείαν vocant.* Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. iv. n. 15.

*Sed et illum quem nominavi (Gorgiam) et externos sophistas, ut è Platone intelligi potest, lusus videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum differebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondisset, si quid videretur, diceret.* Cic. de Finib. l. ii. n. 2.

tisfying his questions in a few words; because neither his wit nor his memory were capable of comprehending or retaining so many fine and exalted notions, and that all his knowledge was confined to question and answer.

This passed in a numerous assembly, and the scientific person could not recede. When Socrates had once got him out of his intrenchment, by obliging him to answer his questions succinctly; he carried him on from one to another to the most absurd consequences; and after having reduced him either to contradict himself or be silent, he complained that the learned man would not vouchsafe to instruct him. The young people, however, perceived the incapacity of their master, and changed their admiration for him into contempt. Thus the name of sophist became odious and ridiculous.

It is easy to judge, that men of the sophist's character, of which I have now spoken, who were in high credit with the great, who lorded it amongst the youth of Athens, and had been long celebrated for their wit and learning, could not be attacked with impunity; and the rather, because they had been taken in the two most sensible points, their fame, and their interest. <sup>a</sup> Socrates, for having endeavoured to unmask their vices, and discredit their false eloquence, experienced, from these corrupt and haughty men, all that could be feared or expected from the most malignant envy, and the most envenomed hatred; to which it is now time to proceed.

*SECT. VI. Socrates is accused of holding bad Opinions in regard to the Gods, and of corrupting the Athenian Youth. He defends himself without Art or Fear. He is condemned to die.*

<sup>b</sup> **SOCRATES** was accused a little before the first year of the 95th Olympiad, soon after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants out of Athens, in the sixty-ninth year of his life; but the prosecution had been projected long before. The oracle of Delphos, which

<sup>a</sup> Plat. in Apolog. p. 23.

<sup>b</sup> A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

had declared him the wisest of mankind; the contempt into which he had brought the doctrine and morals of the sophists of his time, who were then in high reputation; the liberty with which he attacked all vice; the singular attachment of his disciples for his person and maxims, had all concurred in alienating people against him, and had drawn abundance of envy upon him.

His enemies having sworn his destruction, and perceiving the difficulty of the attempt, prepared the way for it at a distance, and at first attacked him in the dark, and by obscure and secret methods. It is said, that to sound the people's disposition in regard to Socrates, and to try whether it would ever be safe to cite him before the judges, they engaged Aristophanes to bring him into the theatre in a comedy, wherein the first seeds of the accusation meditated against him were sown. It is not certain whether Aristophanes was suborned by Anytus, and the rest of Socrates's enemies, to compose that satirical piece against him. It is very likely, that the declared contempt of Socrates for all comedies in general, and for those of Aristophanes in particular, whilst he professed an extraordinary esteem for the tragedies of Euripides, might be the poet's true motive for taking his revenge of the philosopher. However, it were, Aristophanes, to the disgrace of poetry, lent his pen to the malice of Socrates's enemies, or his own resentment, and employed his whole genius and capacity to depreciate the best and most excellent man that ever the pagan world produced.

He composed a piece called *The Clouds*, wherein he introduced the philosopher, perched in a basket, and hoisted up amidst the air and clouds, from whence he vents maxims, or rather the most ridiculous subtleties. A very aged debtor, who desires to escape the close pursuits of his creditors, comes to him to be taught the art of tricking them at law; to prove by unanswerable reasons that he owes them nothing; and, in a word, of a very bad, to make a very good cause. But finding himself incapable of any improvements from the sub-

• Ælian. l. ii. c. 13. Plat. in. Apolog. Socrat. p. 19.

time lessons of his new master, he brings his son to him in his stead. This young man soon after quits his learned school so well instructed, that at their first meeting he beats his father, and proves to him by subtle, but invincible arguments, that he has reason for treating him in that manner. In every scene where Socrates appears, the poet makes him utter a thousand impertinencies, and as many impieties against the gods; and in particular against Jupiter. He makes him talk like a man of the greatest vanity and opinion of himself; with an equal contempt for all others, who, out of a criminal curiosity, is for penetrating what passes in the heavens, and for diving into the abysses of the earth; who boasts of having always the means to make injustice triumph; and who is not contented with keeping those secrets for his own use, but teaches them to others, and thereby corrupts youth. All this is attended with a refined raillery, and a salt, which could not fail of pleasing a people of so quick and delicate a taste as the Athenians, who were besides naturally invidious to all transcendent merit. They were so much charmed with it, that without waiting the conclusion of the representation, they ordered the name of Aristophanes to be set down above those of all his competitors.

Socrates, who had been informed that he was to be acted in the theatre, went thither upon the day to see the comedy, contrary to his custom; for it was not common for him to go to those assemblies, unless when some new tragedy of Euripides was to be performed, who was his intimate friend, and whose pieces he esteemed, upon account of the solid principles of morality he took care to intersperse in them. It was however observed, that he had not patience to wait the conclusion of one of them, wherein the actor had begun with a dangerous maxim, and went out immediately, without considering the injury his withdrawing might do his friend's reputation. He never went to comedies, unless when Alcibiades and Critias forced him thither against his will, offended at the unbounded licence which reigned in them, and incapable of seeing the re-

putation of his fellow citizens publicly torn in pieces. He was present at this without the least emotion, and without expressing any discontent; and some strangers being in pain to know who the Socrates<sup>d</sup> intended by the play was, he rose up from his seat and showed himself during the whole representation. He told those who were near him, and were amazed at his indifference and patience, that he imagined himself at a great entertainment, where he was agreeably laughed at, and that it was necessary to let raillery pass.

There is no appearance, as I have already observed, that Aristophanes, though he was not Socrates's friend, had entered into the black conspiracy of his enemies, and had any thought of occasioning his destruction. It is more probable that a poet, who diverted the public at the expence of the principal magistrates and most celebrated generals, was also willing to make them laugh at the expence of a philosopher. All the guilt was on the side of those who envied him, and his enemies, who were in hopes of making great use of the representation of this comedy against him. The artifice was indeed profound, and conceived with skill. In acting a man upon the stage, he is only represented on his bad, weak, or ambiguous sides. That view of him is followed with ridicule, ridicule accustoms people to the contempt of his person, and contempt proceeds to injustice. For the world are naturally bold in insulting, abusing, and injuring a man, when once he becomes the object of their general contempt.

These were the first blows struck at him, and served as an assay and trial of the great affair meditated against him. It lay dormant a long while, and did not break out in twenty years afterwards. The troubles of the republic might well occasion that long delay: for it was in that interval the enterprize against Sicily happened, the event of which was so unfortunate, that Athens was besieged and taken by Lyfander, who changed its form of government, and established the

<sup>d</sup> Plut. de educ. liber. p. 10.

thirty tyrants, that were not expelled till a very small time before the affair we speak of.

<sup>e</sup> Melitus then appeared as accuser, and entered a process in form against Socrates. His accusation consisted of two heads. The first was, that he did not admit the gods acknowledged by the republic, and introduced new divinities: the second, that he corrupted the youth of Athens; and concluded with inferring, that sentence of death ought to pass against him.

Never had accusation so little probability, pretext, or foundation as this. It was now forty years that Socrates had made it his profession to instruct the Athenian youth. He had advanced no opinions in secret, and in the dark. His lessons were given publicly, and in the view of great numbers of auditors. He had always observed the same conduct, and taught the same principles. What then could be Melitus's motive for this accusation, after such a length of time? How came his zeal for the public good, after having been languid and drowsy for so many years, to awake on a sudden, and become so violent? Is it pardonable, for so warm and worthy a citizen as Melitus would appear, to have continued mute and inactive, whilst any one corrupted the whole youth of that city, by instilling seditious maxims into them, and by inspiring them with a disgust and contempt for the established government? For he who does not prevent an evil, when it is in his power, is equally criminal with him that commits it.

<sup>f</sup> Libanius speaks thus in a declamation of his, called the Apology of Socrates. But, continues he, though Melitus, whether out of distraction, indifference, or real avocation of his affairs, never thought for so many years of entering an accusation against Socrates; how came it to pass, that in a city like Athens, which abounded with wise magistrates, and, what is more, with bold informers, so public a conspiracy as that imputed to Socrates, should escape the eyes of those, whom either the love of their country, or invidious malignity,

<sup>e</sup> A. M. 3603. Ant. J. 401.

<sup>f</sup> Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 645—648.



render so vigilant and attentive? Nothing was ever less feasible, or more void of all probability.

§ As soon as the conspiracy broke out, the friends of Socrates prepared for his defence. Lyfias, the most able orator of his time, brought him an elaborate discourse of his composing; wherein he had set forth the reasons and measures of Socrates in all their light, and interspersed the whole with tender and pathetic strokes, <sup>h</sup> capable of moving the most obdurate hearts. Socrates read it with pleasure, and approved it very much; but as it was more conformable to the rules of rhetoric than the sentiments and fortitude of a philosopher, he told him frankly, that it did not suit him. Upon which Lyfias, having asked how it was possible to be well done, and at the same time not suit him; in the same manner, said he, using according to his custom a vulgar comparison, that an excellent workman might bring me magnificent apparel, or shoes embroidered with gold, to which nothing would be wanting *on his part*, but which however would not fit me. He persisted therefore inflexibly in the resolution, not to demean himself by begging suffrages in the low abject manner common at that time. He employed neither artifice nor the glitter of eloquence. He had no recourse either to sollicitation or entreaty. He brought neither his wife nor children to incline the judges in his favour by their sighs and tears. Nevertheless, \* though he firmly refused to make use of any voice but his own in his defence, and to appear before his judges in the submissive posture of a suppliant, he did not behave in that manner out of pride, or contempt of the tribunal. It was from a noble and intrepid assurance, resulting from greatness of soul, and the consciousness of his truth and innocence. So that his defence had nothing timorous or weak in it. His discourse was bold, manly; generous, without passion, without

§ Cicer. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 233.

<sup>h</sup> Quint. l. xi. c. i.

\* *His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quaesivit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit; adhibuitque liberam contumaciam à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbia.* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i.

emotion,

emotion, full of the noble liberty of a philosopher, with no other ornament but that of truth, and brightened universally with the character and language of innocence. Plato, who was present, transcribed it afterwards, and, without any additions, composed from it the work, which he calls *The Apology of Socrates*; one of the most consummate master-pieces of antiquity. I shall here make an extract from it.

<sup>1</sup> Upon the day assigned, the proceeding commenced in the usual forms: the parties appeared before the judges, and Melitus spoke. The worse his cause, and the less provided it was with proofs, the more occasion he had for address and art to cover its weakness. He omitted nothing that might render the adverse party odious; and instead of reasons, which could not but fail him, he substituted the delusive shine of a lively and pompous eloquence. Socrates, in observing that he could not tell what impression the discourse of his accusers might make upon the judges, owns, that for his part, he scarce knew himself, they had given such artful colouring and likelihood to their arguments, though there was not the least word of truth in all they had advanced.

<sup>2</sup> I have already said that their accusation consisted of two heads. The first regards religion. Socrates enquires, out of an impious curiosity, into what passes in the heavens, and in the bowels of the earth. He denies the gods adored by his country. He endeavours to introduce a new worship, and, if he may be believed, an unknown god inspires him in all his actions. To make short, he believes there are no gods.

The second head relates to the interest and government of the state. Socrates corrupts the youth by instilling bad sentiments concerning the divinity into them, by teaching them a contempt of the laws, and the order established in the republic; by declaring openly

<sup>1</sup> Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. Xenoph. in Apolog. Socrat. & in Memor.

<sup>2</sup> Plat. in Apolog. p. 24.

against the choice of the magistrates by \* lot; by exclaiming against the public assemblies, where he is never seen to appear; by teaching the art of making the worst of causes good; by attaching the youth to himself out of a spirit of pride and ambition, under the pretence of instructing them; and by proving to children, that they may abuse their parents with impunity. He glories in a pretended oracle, and believes himself the wisest of mankind. He taxes all others with folly, and condemns without reserve all their maxims and actions; constituting himself, by his own authority, the general censor and reformer of the state. Notwithstanding which the effects of his lessons may be seen in the persons of Critias and Alcibiades, his most intimate friends, who have done great mischiefs to their country, and have been the most wicked of citizens, and the most abandoned of men.

This concluded with recommending to the judges, to be very much upon their guard against the dazzling eloquence of Socrates, and to suspect extremely the insinuating and artificial turns of address, which he would employ to deceive them.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates began his discourse with this point, and declared that he would speak to the judges as it was his custom to talk in his common conversation, that is to say, with much simplicity, and no art.

<sup>m</sup> He then proceeds to particulars. Upon what foundation can it be alleged, that he does not acknowledge the gods of the republic; he, who has been often seen to sacrifice in his own house, and in the temples? Can it be doubted whether he uses divination or not, whilst it is made a crime in him to report, that he received counsels from a certain divinity, and thence con-

<sup>1</sup> Plat. p. 17.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. p. 27. Xenoph. p. 703.

\* Socrates in reality did not approve this manner of electing the magistrates. He observed, that when a pilot, a musician, or an architect is wanted, nobody is willing to take him at a venture; though the faults of these people are far from being of the great importance of those errors, which are committed in the administration of the republic. XENOPH. Memorab. l. i, p. 712.

cluded that he aims at introducing new deities? But in this he innovates nothing more than others, who, putting their faith in divination, observe the flight of birds, consult the entrails of victims, and remark even words and accidental encounters: different means, which the gods employ to give mankind a foreknowledge of the future. Old or new, it is still evident that Socrates acknowledges divinities, by the confession of even Melitus himself, who in his information avers that he believes *dæmons*, that is to say, subaltern spirits, the offspring of the gods. Now every man who believes the offspring of the gods, believes the gods.

“As to what relates to the impious enquiries into natural things imputed to him; without despising or condemning those who apply themselves to the study of physics, he declares, that as for him, he had entirely devoted himself to what concerns moral virtue, the conduct of life, and the rules of government, as to a knowledge infinitely more useful than any other; and he calls upon all those who have been hearers, to come forth and belie him if he does not say what is true.

“I am accused of corrupting the youth, and of instilling dangerous maxims into them, as well in regard to the worship of the gods, as the rules of government. You know, Athenians, that I never made it my profession to teach, nor can envy, however violent against me, reproach me with having ever sold my instructions. I have an undeniable evidence for me in this respect, which is my poverty. Always equally ready to communicate my thoughts either to the rich or poor, and to give them entire leisure to question or answer me, I lend myself to every one who is desirous of becoming virtuous; and if, amongst those who hear me, there are any who prove either good or bad, neither the virtues of the one, nor the vices of the other, to which I have not contributed, are to be ascribed to me. My whole employment is to persuade the young and old against too much love for the body, for riches, and all other

“Xenoph. p. 710.”

precarious things, of whatsoever nature they be, and against too little regard for the soul, which ought to be the object of their affection: for I incessantly urge to you, that virtue does not proceed from riches, but on the contrary riches from virtue; and that all the other goods of human life, as well public as private, have their source in the same principle.

“ If to speak in this manner be to corrupt youth, I confess, Athenians, that I am guilty, and deserve to be punished. If what I say be not true, it is most easy to convict me of my falsehood. I see here a great number of my disciples; they have only to appear. But, perhaps, the reserve and consideration for a master, who has instructed them, will prevent them from declaring against me: at least their fathers, brothers, and uncles cannot, as good relations and good citizens, dispense with their not standing forth to demand vengeance against the corrupter of their sons, brothers, and nephews. But these are the persons who take upon them my defence, and interest themselves in the success of my cause.

“ Pass on me what sentence you please, Athenians; but I can neither repent nor change my conduct. I must not abandon or suspend a function, which God himself has imposed on me. Now he has charged me with the care of instructing my fellow citizens. If after having faithfully kept all the posts, wherein I was placed by our generals at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, the fear of death should at this time make me abandon that in which the Divine Providence has placed me, by commanding me to pass my life in the study of philosophy for the instruction of myself and others; this would be a most criminal desertion indeed, and make me highly worthy of being cited before this tribunal, as an impious man who does not believe the gods. Should you resolve to acquit me for the future, I should not hesitate to make answer, Athenians, I honour and love you, but I shall choose rather to obey

• Plat. p. 28, 29. "

\* God than you, and to my latest breath shall never renounce my philosophy, nor cease to exhort and reprove you according to my custom, by telling each of you, when you come in my way, *My † good friend, and citizen of the most famous city in the world for wisdom and valour, are you not ashamed to have no other thoughts than that of amassing wealth, and of acquiring glory, credit, and dignities, whilst you neglect the treasures of prudence, truth, and wisdom, and take no pains in rendering your soul as good and perfect as it is capable of being?*

“ P I am reproached with abject fear and meanness of spirit, for being so busy in imparting my advice to every one in private, and for having always avoided to be present in your assemblies to give my counsels to my country. I think I have sufficiently proved my courage and fortitude both in the field, where I have borne arms with you, and in the senate, when I alone opposed the unjust sentence you pronounced against the ten captains, who had not taken up and interred the bodies of those who were killed or drowned in the sea fight near the island Arginusæ; and when, upon more than one occasion, I opposed the violent and cruel orders of the thirty tyrants. What is it then that has prevented me from appearing in your assemblies? It is that dæmon, that voice divine, which you have so often heard me mention, and Miletus has taken so much pains to ridicule. That spirit has attached itself to me from my infancy: it is a voice, which I never hear, but when it would prevent me from persisting in something I have resolved, for it never exhorts me to undertake any thing. It is the same being, that has always opposed me, when I would have intermeddled in the affairs of the republic; and that with the greatest reason; for I should have been amongst the dead long ago, had I been concerned in the measures of the

P Plat. p. 31.

\* Πεισομαχι τῷ Θεῷ μάλλον ἢ ὑμῖν.

† The Greek signifies, *O best of men, ω ἀριστε αἰδρωγ;* which was an obliging manner of accosting.

state,

state, without effecting any thing to the advantage of myself, or our country. Do not take it ill, I beseech you, if I speak my thoughts without disguise, and with truth and freedom. Every man who would generously oppose a whole people, either amongst us or elsewhere, and who inflexibly applies himself to prevent the violation of the laws, and the practice of iniquity in a government, will never do so long with impunity. It is absolutely necessary for him, who would contend for justice, if he has any thoughts of living, to remain in a private station, and never to have any share in public affairs.

“<sup>a</sup> For the rest, Athenians, if, in the extreme danger I now am, I do not imitate the behaviour of those, who upon less emergencies have implored and supplicated their judges with tears, and have brought forth their children, relations, and friends, it is not through pride and obstinacy, or any contempt for you, but solely for your honour, and for that of the whole city. You should know, that there are amongst our citizens, those who do not regard death as an evil, and who give that name only to injustice and infamy. At my age, and with the reputation, true or false, which I have, would it be consistent for me, after all the lessons I have given upon the contempt of death, to be afraid of it myself, and to belie in my last action all the principles and sentiments of my past life.

“ But without speaking of my fame, which I should extremely injure by such a conduct, I do not think it allowable to entreat a judge, nor to be absolved by supplications: he ought to be persuaded and convinced. The judge does not sit upon the bench to show favour by violating the laws, but to do justice in conforming to them. He does not swear to discharge with impunity whom he pleases; but to do justice where it is due. We ought not therefore to accustom you to perjury, nor you to suffer yourselves to be accustomed to it; for in so doing, both the ~~one~~ and the

<sup>a</sup> Plat. p. 34, 35.

either of us equally injure justice and religion, and both are criminals.

“Do not, therefore, expect from me, Athenians, that I should have recourse amongst you to means which I believe neither honest nor lawful; especially upon this occasion, wherein I am accused of impiety by Melitus. For, if I should influence you by my prayers, and thereby induce you to violate your oaths, it would be undeniably evident, that I teach you not to believe in the gods; and even in defending and justifying myself, should furnish my adversaries with arms against me, and prove that I believe no divinity. But I am very far from such bad thoughts. I am more convinced of the existence of God than my accusers, and so convinced, that I abandon myself to God and you, that you may judge of me as you shall deem best for yourselves and me.”

Socrates \* pronounced this discourse with a firm and intrepid tone. His air, his action, his visage, expressed nothing of the accused: he seemed the master of his judges, from the assurance and greatness of soul with which he spoke, without, however losing any thing of the modesty natural to him. So noble and majestic a deportment displeas'd and gave offence. It is common for judges †, who look upon themselves as the absolute dispensers of life and death to such as are before them, to expect, out of a secret tendency of mind, that they should appear in their presence with humble submission and respectful awe: an homage which they think due to their supreme authority.

This was what happened now. Melitus, however, had not at first the fifth part of the voices. We have reason to suppose that the judges assembled upon this occasion might amount to five hundred, without reckoning the president. The law condemn'd the accuser to pay a fine

\* Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicium. Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231.

† Dicitur juxta legem sibi tantis securitatem; cumque jus suum intelligat, tacitus reverentiam postulat. QUINT. l. iv. c. i.



of a thousand drachmas \*, if he had not the fifth part of the suffrages. This law had been wisely established, to check the boldness and impudence of calumniators. Melitus had been obliged to pay this fine, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him, and presented themselves also as the accusers of Socrates. Their credit drew over a great number of voices, and there were two hundred and fourscore against Socrates, and, in consequence, only two hundred and twenty for him. He wanted no more than thirty-one † to have been acquitted; for he would then have had two hundred and fifty-one, which would have been the majority.

By this first sentence the judges only declared Socrates guilty, without decreeing him any ‡ penalty. For when the law did not determine the punishment, and when a crime against the state was not in question (in which manner I conceive Cicero's terms, *fraus capitalis*, may be understood) the person found guilty had a right to choose the penalty he thought he deserved. Upon his answer the judges deliberated a second time, and afterwards passed their final sentence. Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into banishment, imprisonment, or a fine. He replied generously, that he would choose neither of those punishments, because that would be to acknowledge himself guilty. "Athenians," said he, "to keep you no longer in suspense, as you oblige me to sentence myself according to what I deserve, I condemn myself for having passed my life in instructing yourselves and your children; for having neglected with that view my domestic affairs, and all public employments, and dignities; for having devoted myself entirely to the service

\* 500 livres.

† The text varies in Plato; it says, thirty-three or thirty, whence it is probably defective.

‡ *Primis sententiis stabant tantum judices damnarent an absolverent. Erat autem Athenis, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ estimatio. Ex sententia, cum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi estimationem commeruisse se maxime confiteretur. Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 232.*

of

of my country, in labouring incessantly to render my fellow-citizens virtuous. I condemn myself, I say, to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the expence of the republic for the rest of my life." \* This last answer so † much offended the judges, that they condemned him to drink the hemlock, a punishment very much in use amongst them.

† This sentence did not shake the constancy of Socrates in the least. "I am going," said he, addressing himself to his judges with a noble tranquillity, "to suffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the first moment of my birth; but my accusers will suffer no less from infamy and injustice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect from me, that to extricate myself out of your hands, I should have employed, according to the custom, flattery, and pathetic expressions, and the timorous and creeping behaviour of a suppliant? But in trials, as well as war, an honest man ought not to use all sorts of means for the preservation of his life. It is equally dishonourable both in the one and the other, to ransom it only by prayers and tears, and all those other abject methods, you see every day practised by people in my present condition."

Apollodorus, who was one of his friends and disciples, having advanced to him to express his grief for his dying innocent: "What," replied he with a smile, "would you have had me die guilty?"

‡ Plutarch, to show, that only our weakest part, the body, is in the power of man; but that there is

\* Plat. p. 29.

‡ De Anim. Tranquil. p. 475.

† It appears in Plato, that after this discourse, Socrates, without doubt to remove from him all imputation of pride and contumacy, modestly offered to pay a fine proportionate to his indigence, that is to say, one mina (fifty livres) and that at the instances of his friends, who had bound themselves for him, he rose in his offer to thirty minæ. PLAT. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 38. But Xenophon positively asserts the contrary, p. 705. This difference may be reconciled, perhaps, by supposing that Socrates refused at first to make any offer, and that he suffered himself at length to be overcome by the earnest solicitations of his friends.

‡ Cujus responsa sic iudices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent. CIC. l. i. de Orat. n. 233.

another infinitely more noble part of us entirely superior to their threats, and inaccessible to their inflictions, cites these admirable words of Socrates which are more applicable to his judges than his accusers, "Anytus and Melitus may kill me, but they cannot hurt me." As if he had said, in the language of the Pagans, Fortune may deprive me of my goods, my health, and my life; but I have a treasure within me, of which no violence can deprive me, I mean virtue, innocence, fortitude, and greatness of mind.

This great man\*, fully convinced of the principle he had so often inculcated to his disciples, that guilt is the only evil a wise man ought to fear, chose rather to be deprived of some years, which he might have to live, than to forfeit in an instant the glory of his whole past life, in dishonouring himself for ever by the shameful behaviour he was advised to observe with his judges. Seeing that his own times had but a slight knowledge of him, he referred himself from it to the judgment of posterity, and by the generous sacrifice of a very advanced life, acquired and assured to himself the esteem and admiration of all succeeding ages.

SECT. VII. *Socrates refuses to escape out of Prison.*

*He passes the last Day of his Life in discoursing with his Friends upon the Immortality of the Soul. He drinks the Poison. Punishment of his Accusers. Honours paid to his Memory.*

**A**FTER the sentence had been passed upon him, † Socrates with the same intrepid aspect with which he had held the tyrants in awe, went forward

\* *Maluit vir sapientissimus quod superesset ex vita sibi perire, quam quod præterisset: et quando ab hominibus sui temporis parum intelligebatur, posterorum e judiciis reservavit, brevis detrimenta jam ultimo senectutis ævum seculorum omnium consecutus. QUINT. l. i. c. 1.*

† *Socrates eodem illa vultu, quo aliquando solus triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegerat, carcerem intravit, ignominiam ipse loco destructurus. Neque enim paterat carcer videri, in qua Socrates erat. SENECA. de Consol. ad Helviam. c. xiii.*

*Socrates carcerem intrando purgavit, omnique hæresionem curia re idet. Id. de vit. beat. c. xxvii.*

towards

towards the prison, which lost that name, says Seneca, when he entered it, and became the residence of virtue and probity. His friends followed him thither, and continued to visit him during thirty days, which passed between his condemnation and death. The cause of that long delay was, the Athenians sent every year a ship to the isle of Delos, to offer certain sacrifices; and it was prohibited to put any person to death in the city, from the time the priest of Apollo had crowned the poop of this vessel, as a signal of its departure, till the same vessel should return. So that sentence having been passed upon Socrates the day after that ceremony began, it was necessary to defer the execution of it for thirty days, during the continuance of this voyage.

In this long interval death had sufficient opportunity to present itself before his eyes in all its terrors, and to put his constancy to the proof, not only by the severe rigour of a dungeon, and the irons upon his legs; but by the continual prospect and cruel expectation of an event, of which nature is always abhorrent. In this sad condition he did not cease to enjoy that profound tranquillity of mind, which his friends had always admired in him. He entertained them with the same temper he had always expressed, and Crito observes, that the evening before his death, he slept as peaceably as at any other time. He composed also a hymn, in honour of Apollo and Diana, and turned one of Æsop's fables into verse.

The day before, or the same day that the ship was to arrive from Delos, the return of which was to be followed by the death of Socrates, Crito, his intimate friend, came to him early in the morning to let him know that bad news, and at the same time that it depended only upon himself to quit the prison; that the gaoler was gained; that he would find the doors open, and offered him a safe retreat in Thessaly. Socrates laughed at this proposal, and asked him, "whether he knew any place out of Attica, where people did not die?" Crito urged the thing very seriously; and pressed

<sup>c</sup> Plat. in Criton.

him

him to take the advantage of so precious an opportunity, adding arguments upon arguments to induce his consent, and to engage him to resolve upon his escape. Without mentioning the inconsolable grief he should suffer for the death of such a friend, how should he support the reproaches of an infinity of people, who would believe that it was in his power to have saved him, but that he would not sacrifice a small part of his wealth for that purpose? Can the people ever be persuaded that so wise a man as Socrates would not quit his prison, when he might do it with all possible security? Perhaps he might fear to expose his friends, or to occasion the loss of their fortunes, or even of their lives or liberty. Ought there to be any thing more dear and precious to them than the preservation of Socrates? Even strangers themselves dispute that honour with them; many of whom have come expressly with considerable sums of money to purchase his escape; and declare, that they should think themselves highly honoured to receive him amongst them, and to supply him abundantly with all he should have occasion for. Ought he to abandon himself to enemies, who have occasioned his being condemned unjustly, and can he think it allowable to betray his own cause? Is it not essential to his goodness and justice to spare his fellow-citizens the guilt of innocent blood? But if all these motives cannot alter him, and he is not concerned in regard to himself, can he be insensible to the interests of his children? In what a condition does he leave them? And can he forget the father, to remember only the philosopher?

Socrates, after having heard him with attention, praised his zeal, and expressed his gratitude; but before he could give into his opinion, was for examining whether it was just for him to depart out of prison without the consent of the Athenians. The question therefore here, is to know whether a man condemned to die, though unjustly, can without a crime escape from justice and the laws? I do not know, whether, even amongst us, there are not many persons to be found who believe that this may be made a question.

Socrates begins with removing every thing foreign to the subject, and comes immediately to the bottom of the affair. "I should certainly rejoice extremely, most dear Crito, that you could persuade me to quit this place, but cannot resolve to do so, without being first persuaded. We ought not to be in pain upon what the people say, but for what the sole Judge of all that is just or unjust shall pronounce upon us, and that alone is truth. All the considerations you have alleged, as to money, reputation, family, prove nothing, unless you show me, that what you propose is just and lawful. It is a received and constant principle with us, that all injustice is shameful and fatal to him who commits it, whatever men may say, or whatever good or evil may be consequential of it. We have always reasoned from this principle even to our latest days, and have never departed in the least from it. Would it be possible, dear Crito, that at our age our most serious discourses should resemble those of infants, who say yes and no almost in the same breath, and have nothing of fixed and determinate?" At each proposition he waited Crito's answer and assent.

"Let us therefore resume our principles, and endeavour to make use of them at this time. It has always been a maxim with us, that it is never allowable upon any pretence whatsoever to commit injustice, not even in regard to those who injure us, nor to return evil for evil, and that when we have once engaged our word, we are bound to keep it inviolably; no interest being capable to dispense with it. Now, if at the time I should be ready to make my escape, the laws and republic should present themselves in a body before me, what could I answer to the following questions which they might put to me? What are you going to do, Socrates? To fly from justice in this manner, is it aught else but ruining entirely the laws and the republic? Do you believe, that a state subsists, after justice is not only no longer in force in it, but is even corrupted, subverted, and trod under foot by particulars? But, say I, the republic has done me injustice, and has sentenced

tenced me wrongfully. Have you forgot, the laws would reply that you are under an agreement with us to submit your private judgment to the republic? You were at liberty, if our government and constitutions did not suit you, to retire and settle yourself elsewhere: but a residence of seventy years in our city, sufficiently denotes, that our plan has not displeased you, and that you have complied with it from an entire knowledge and experience of it, and out of choice. . . In effect you owe all you are, and all you possess, to it: birth, nurture, education, and establishment; for all these proceed from the tuition and protection of the republic. Do you believe yourself free to break through engagements with her, which you have confirmed by more than one oath? . . . Though she should intend to destroy you, can you render her evil for evil, and injury for injury? . . . Have you a right to act in that manner with your father and mother; and do you not know, that your country is more considerable, and more worthy of respect, before God and man, than either father or mother, or all the relations in the world together; that your country is to be honoured and revered, to be complied with in her excesses, and to be treated with tenderness and kindness, even in her most violent proceedings? . . . In a word, that she is either to be reclaimed by wise counsels and respectful remonstrances, or to be obeyed in her commands, and suffered without murmuring in all she shall decree? As for your children, Socrates, your friends will render them all the services in your power; at least the Divine Providence will not be wanting to them. Resign yourself therefore to our reasons, and take the counsel of those who have given you birth, nurture, and education. Set not so high a value upon your children, your life, or any thing in the world as justice; so shall it come to pass, that when you appear before the tribunal of Pluto, you will not be at a loss to defend yourself in the presence of your judges. But if you demean yourself otherwise, we shall continue your enemies as long as you live, without ever affording you relaxation or repose;

pose; and when you are dead, our sisters, the laws in the regions below, will be as little favourable to you; knowing that you have been guilty of using your utmost endeavours to destroy us."

Socrates observed to Crito, that he seemed to have a perfect sense of all he had said; and that the force of his reasons had made so strong and irresistible an impression upon his mind, that they entirely engrossed him, and left him neither thoughts, nor words to object. Crito agreeing in effect that he had nothing to reply, continued silent, and withdrew with his friend. "At length the fatal ship returned to Athens, which was in a manner the signal for the death of Socrates. The next day all his friends, except Plato, who was sick, repaired to the prison early in the morning. The gaoler desired them to wait a little, because the eleven magistrates (who had the direction of the prisons) were at that time signifying to the prisoner, that he was to die the same day. Presently after they entered, and found Socrates, whose \* chains had been taken off, sitting by Xantippe his wife, who held one of his children in her arms. As soon as she perceived them, setting up great cries, sobbing, and tearing her face and hair, she made the prison resound with her complaints, "O my dear Socrates, your friends are come to see you this day for the last time!" He desired that she might be taken away, and she was immediately carried home.

Socrates passed the rest of the day with his friends, and discoursed with them with his usual cheerfulness and tranquillity. The subject of conversation was the most important, and best adapted to the present conjuncture, that is to say, the immortality of the soul. What gave occasion to this discourse, was a question introduced in a manner by chance, whether a true philosopher ought not to desire and take pains to die? This proposition, taken too literally, implied an opinion,

\* Plat. in Phæd. p. 59, &c.

\* At Athens, as soon as sentence was pronounced upon a criminal, he was unbound, and considered as the victim of death; whom it was no longer lawful to keep in chains.



that a philosopher might kill himself. Socrates shows that nothing is more unjust than this notion, and that man, appertaining to God, who formed and placed him with his own hand in the post he possesses, cannot abandon it without his permission, nor depart from life without his order. What is it then that can induce a philosopher to entertain this love for death? It can be only the hope of that happiness which he expects in another life; and that hope can be founded only upon the opinion of the soul's immortality.

Socrates employed the last day of his life in entertaining his friends upon this great and important subject, from which conversation Plato's admirable dialogue, intitled *The Phædon*, is wholly taken. He explains to his friends all the arguments for believing the soul immortal, and refutes all the objections against it, which are very near the same as are made at this day. This treatise is too long for me to attempt an abstract of it.

\* Before he answers any of these objections, he deplores a misfortune common enough amongst men, who, in consequence of hearing ignorant persons, who contradict and doubt every thing, dispute, and believe there is nothing certain. "Is it not a great misfortune, dear Phædon, that having reasons which are true, certain, and very easy to be understood, there should, however be those in the world, who are not at all affected with them, from their having heard those frivolous disputes, wherein all things appear sometimes true and sometimes false. These unjust and unreasonable men; instead of blaming themselves for these doubts, or charging the narrowness of their sense with them, from ascribing the defect to the reasons themselves, proceed at length to a detestation of them; and believe themselves more knowing and judicious than all others, because they imagine they are the only persons, who comprehend, that there is nothing true or certain in the nature of things."

Socrates demonstrates the injustice of this proceeding. He observes, that of two things equally uncertain, it

\* Plut. p. 90, 91.

confists with wisdom to choose that which is most advantageous with least hazard. "If what I advance," says he, "upon the immortality of the soul, proves true, it is good to believe it; and if, after my death, it proves false, I shall always have the advantage from it, to have been less sensible here of the evils which generally attend human life." This reasoning\* of Socrates (which, *we are to suppose*, can be only real and true in the mouth of a Christian) is very remarkable. If what I say is true, I gain all things, whilst I hazard very little; and if false I lose nothing; on the contrary, I am still a great gainer.

Socrates does not confine himself to the mere speculation of this great truth, that the soul is immortal; he draws useful and necessary conclusions from it for the conduct of life; in explaining what the hope of a happy eternity demands from man, that it be not frustrated, and that instead of attaining the rewards prepared for the good, they do not experience the punishments allotted for the wicked. The philosopher here sets forth these great truths, which a constant tradition, though very much obscured by fiction and fable, had always preserved amongst the Pagans. The last judgment of the righteous and wicked; the eternal punishments to which great criminals are condemned; a place of peace and joy without end for the souls that retain their purity and innocence, or which, during this life, have expiated their offences by repentance and satisfaction; and an intermediate state, in which they purify themselves, for a certain time, from less considerable crimes, that have not been atoned for during this life.

γ "My friends, there is still one thing, which it is very just to believe; if the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to

γ Plat. p. 107.

\* Monsieur Pascal has expatiated upon this reasoning in his seventh article, and deduced from it a demonstration of infinite force.

follow,

follow, I mean eternity; and the least neglect in this point may be attended with endless consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers in it, by being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices; but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for it but in becoming very good and very wise; for it carries nothing away with it, but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are commonly the consequences of the education it has received, and the causes of eternal happiness or misery.

"<sup>2</sup> When the dead are arrived at the fatal rendezvous of departed souls, whither their \*dæmon conducts them, they are all judged. Those, who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable upon account of the greatness of their crimes, who from deliberate will have committed sacrileges and murders, and other such great offences, the fatal destiny that passes judgment upon them, hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But those who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon; who have committed violences in the transports of rage against their father and mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented, these suffer the same punishment, and in the same place with the last; but for a time only, till by their prayers and supplications they have obtained pardon from those they have injured.

"<sup>3</sup> But for those who have passed through life with

<sup>2</sup> Plat. p. 113, 114.

\* Dæmon is a Greek word, which signifies spirit, genius, and with us, angel.

and of

peculiar

peculiar sanctity of manners, delivered from their base earthly abodes as from a prison, they are received on high in a pure region, which they inhabit; and as philosophy has sufficiently purified them, they live \* without their bodies through all eternity in a series of joys and delights it is not easy to describe, and which the shortness of my time will not permit me to explain more at large.

“What I have said will suffice, I conceive, to prove that we ought to endeavour strenuously, throughout our whole lives, to acquire virtue and wisdom: for you see how great a reward, and how high a hope is proposed to us. And though the immortality of the soul were dubious, instead of appearing a certainty as it does, every wise man ought to assure himself, that it is well worth his trouble to risk his belief of it in this manner. And indeed can there be a more glorious hazard? We ought to enchant ourselves with this blessed hope; for which reason I have lengthened this discourse so much.”

Cicero expresses these noble sentiments of Socrates with his usual delicacy. † Almost at the very moment that he held the deadly draught in his hand, he talked in such a manner, as showed that he looked upon death not as a violence done to him, but as a means bestowed upon him of ascending to heaven. He declared, that upon departing out of this life, two ways are open to us; the one leads to the place of eternal misery, such souls as have sullied themselves here below in shameful pleasures and criminal actions; the other conducts

\* The resurrection of the body was unknown to the Pagans.

† *Cum penè in manu jam mortiferam illud teneret poculum, locutus est, ut non ad mortem trudi verùm in cælum videret ascendere. Itæ enim censebat, ut que dissuuit: duas esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore excedentium. Nam, qui se humanis vitis contaminassent, et se totos vitiis, dedissent quibus contracti velut domesticis vitis atque flagitiis se inquinassent, iis decem quatuordecim iter esse, sed suum à cæcitate deorum: qui autem se integros castosque servassent, quibusque fuisset minima eam corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper secessassent, essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos, à quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Cic. Tusc. Quest. l. i. n. 71, 72.*

those to the happy mansions of the gods, who have retained their purity upon earth, and have led in human bodies a life almost divine.

\* When Socrates had done speaking, Crito desired him to give him and the rest of his friends his last instructions in regard to his children, and other affairs, that by executing them, they might have the consolation of doing him some pleasure. "I shall recommend nothing to you this day," replied Socrates, "more than I have always done, which is to take care of yourselves. You cannot do yourselves a greater service, nor do me and my family a greater pleasure." Crito having asked him afterwards in what manner he thought fit to be buried: "As you please," said Socrates, "if you can lay hold of me, and I not escape out of your hands." At the same time looking upon his friends with a smile: "I can never persuade Crito that Socrates is he who converses with you, and disposes the several parts of his discourse; for he always imagines that I am what he is going to see dead in a little while. He confounds me with my carcase, and therefore asks me how I would be interred." In finishing these words he rose up and went to bathe himself in a chamber adjoining. After he came out of the bath, his children were brought to him, for he had three, two very little, and the other grown up. He spoke to them for some time, gave his orders to the women who took care of them, and then dismissed them. Being returned into his chamber he laid him down upon his bed.

The servant of the Eleven entered at the same instant, and having informed him, that the time for drinking the hemlock was come (which was at sunset) the servant was so much affected with sorrow, that he turned his back and fell a weeping. "See," said Socrates, "the good heart of this man! Since my imprisonment he has often come to see me, and to converse with me. He is more worthy than all his fellows. How heartily the poor man weeps for me."

This is a remarkable example, and might teach those in an office of this kind how they ought to behave to all prisoners, but more especially to persons of merit, when they are so unhappy as to fall into their hands. The fatal cup was brought. Socrates asked what it was necessary for him to do. "Nothing more," replied the servant, "than, as soon as you have drank off the draught, to walk about till you find your legs grow weary, and afterwards lie down upon your bed." He took the cup without any emotion or change in his colour or countenance, and regarding the man with a steady and assured look, "Well," said he, "what say you of this drink; may one make a libation out of it?" Upon being told that there was only enough for one dose: "At least," continued he, "we may say our prayers to the gods, as it is our duty; and implore them to make our exit from this world, and our last stage happy; which is what I most ardently beg of them." After having spoken these words he kept silence for some time, and then drank off the whole draught with an amazing tranquillity, and a serenity of aspect not to be expressed or conceived.

Till then his friends with great violence to themselves had refrained from tears, but after he had drank the potion, they were no longer their own masters, and wept abundantly. Apollodorus, who had been in tears during almost the whole conversation, began then to raise great cries, and to lament with such excessive grief, as pierced the hearts of all who were present. Socrates alone remained unmoved, and even reproved his friends, though with his usual mildness and good nature. "What are you doing?" said he to them, "I admire at you. Ah! what is become of your virtue? Was it not for this I sent away the women, that they might not fall into these weaknesses? For I have always heard say, that we ought to die peaceably, and blessing the gods. Be at ease, I beg you, and show more constancy and resolution." These words filled them with confusion, and obliged them to restrain their tears.

In the mean time he kept walking to and fro, and when he found his legs grow weary, he laid down upon his bed, as he had been directed.

The poison then operated more and more. When Socrates found it began to gain upon the heart, uncovering his face, which had been covered without doubt to prevent any thing from disturbing him in his last moments, "Crito," said he, which were his last words, "we owe a cock to Æsculapius; discharge that vow for me, and pray don't forget it;" soon after which he breathed his last. Crito went to his body, and closed his mouth and eyes. Such was the end of Socrates: in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, and the seventieth of his age. Cicero\* says, he could never read the description of his death in Plato without tears.

Plato, and the rest of Socrates's disciples, apprehending the rage of his accusers was not satiated by that victim, retired to Mægara to the house of Euechid; where they staid till the storm blew over. Euripides, however, to reproach the Athenians with the horrible crime they had committed, in condemning the best of men to die upon such slight grounds, composed his tragedy, called *Palamedes*, in which, under the name of that hero, who was also destroyed by a black calumination, he deplored the misfortune of his friend. When the actor came to repeat this verse,

*You doom the justest of the Greeks to perish;*

the whole theatre, remembering Socrates in so distinct an image of him, melted into tears, and a decree passed to prohibit speaking any more of him in public. Some believe Euripides was dead before Socrates, and reject this circumstance.

However it were, the people of Athens did not open their eyes till some time after the death of Socrates. Their hatred being satisfied, their prejudices expired, and time having given them opportunity for reflection, the notorious injustice of the sentence appeared in all

\* *Quid dicam de Socrate, cujus morti illacrymari soleo Platonem egens?* De nat. Deot. l. iii. n. 82.

its horrors. Nothing was heard throughout the city but discourses in favour of Socrates. The academy, the Lycæum, private houses, public walks, and market places, seemed still to re-echo the sound of his loved voice. Here, said they, he formed our youth, and taught our children to love their country, and to honour their parents. In this place he gave us his admirable lessons, and sometimes made us seasonable reproaches, to engage us more warmly in the pursuit of virtue. Alas! how have we rewarded him for such important services? Athens was in universal mourning and consternation. The schools were shut up, and all exercises suspended. The accusers were called to account for the innocent blood they had caused to be shed. Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest banished. Plutarch observes, that all those, who had any share in this black calumny, were in such abomination amongst the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, nor go into the same bath with them; and had the place cleansed where they had bathed, lest they should be polluted by touching it; which drove them into such despair, that many of them killed themselves.

<sup>h</sup>The Athenians, not contented with having punished his accusers, caused a statue of brass to be erected to him, of the workmanship of the celebrated Lysippus, and placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city. Their respect and gratitude rose even to a religious veneration; they dedicated a chapel to him, as to a hero and a demi-god, which they called *Σωκρατείον*, that is to say, *the chapel of Socrates*.

SECT. VIII. *Reflections upon the Sentence passed upon Socrates by the Athenians, and upon Socrates himself.*

WE must be very much surpris'd, when on the one side we consider the extreme delicacy of the people of Athens, as to what regards the worship of the gods, which ran so high as to occasion their con-

<sup>h</sup> Diog. p. 116.

demning



demning the most eminent persons upon the simple suspicion of their failing in respect for them; and on the other, when we see the exceeding toleration, to call it no worse, with which the same people hear comedies every day, in which all the gods are turned into ridicule, in a manner capable of inspiring the highest contempt for them. All Aristophanes's pieces abound with pleasantries, or rather buffooneries, of this kind; and if it is true that this poet did not know what it was to spare the greatest men of the republic, it may be said also as justly, he was still less favourable to the gods.

Such were the daily entertainments in the theatre, which the people of Athens not only heard without pain, but with such joy, pleasure, and applause, that they rewarded the poet with public honours, who diverted them so agreeably. What was there in Socrates that came near this excessive licence? Never did any person of the pagan world speak of the divinity, or of the adoration due to him, in so pure, so noble, and so respectful a manner. He did not declare against the gods publicly received and honoured by a religion more ancient than the city, he only avoided imputing to them the crimes and infamous actions, which the popular credulity ascribed to them, and which were only proper to depreciate and decry them in the sense of the people. He did not blame the sacrifices, festivals, nor the other ceremonies of religion; he only taught, that all that pomp and outward show could not be agreeable to the gods without uprightness of intention and purity of heart.

This wise, this illumined, this religious man, however, with all his veneration and noble sentiments in regard to the divinity, is condemned as an impious person by the suffrages of almost a whole people, without his accusers being able to instance one single avowed fact, or to produce any proof with the least appearance of probability.

From whence could so evident, so universal, and so determinate a contradiction arise amongst the Athenians? A people, abounding in other respects with wit, taste, and knowledge, must without doubt have had their

their reasons, at least in appearance, for a conduct so different, and sentiments so opposite, to their general character. May we not say that the Athenians considered their gods in a double light? They confined their real religion to the public, solemn, and hereditary worship, as they had received it from their ancestors, as it was established by the laws of the state, had been practised from immemorial time, and especially confirmed by the oracles, augurs, offerings, and sacrifices. It is by this standard they regulated their piety; against which they could not suffer the least attempt whatsoever: it was of this worship alone they were jealous; it was for these ancient ceremonies they were such ardent zealots; and they believed, though without foundation, that Socrates was an enemy to them. But there was another kind of religion founded upon fable, poetical fictions, popular opinions, and foreign customs; for this they were little concerned, and abandoned it entirely to the poets, to the representations of the theatre, and common conversation.

What grossness did they not attribute to Juno and Venus? No citizen would have been satisfied, that his wife or daughters should have resembled those goddesses. Timotheus, the famous musician, having represented Diana upon the stage of Athens, transported with folly, fury, and rage, one of the spectators conceived he could not make a greater imprecation against him, than to wish his daughter might become the likeness of that divinity. It is better, says Plutarch, to believe there are no gods, than to imagine them of this kind: open and declared impiety being less profane, if we may be allowed to say so, than so gross and absurd a superstition.

However it be, the sentence of which we have related the circumstances, will, through all ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, that all the splendor of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwise so justly renowned, can never obliterate, and shows, at the same time, what is to be expected from a people, gentle, humane, and beneficent at bottom, for such the Athenians

<sup>c</sup> Plut. de Superstit. p. 170.

really were, but warm, proud, haughty, inconstant, wavering with every wind, and every impression. It is therefore with reason, that their assemblies have been compared to a tempestuous sea; as that element, like the people, though calm and peaceable of itself, is subject to be frequently agitated by a violence not its own.

As to Socrates, it must be allowed that the pagan world never produced any thing so great and perfect. When we observe to what a height he carries the sublimity of his sentiments, not only in respect to moral virtue, temperance, sobriety, patience in adversity, the love of poverty, and the forgiveness of wrongs; but what is far more considerable, in regard to the Divinity, his unity, omnipotence, creation of the world, and providence in the government of it: the immortality of the soul, its ultimate end and eternal destiny; the rewards of the good, and the punishment of the wicked; when we consider this train of sublime knowledge, we ask our reason, whether it is a pagan who thinks and speaks in this manner, and can scarce persuade ourselves, that from so dark and obscure a fund as paganism should shine forth such living and such glorious rays of light.

It is true, his reputation was not without alloy, and it has been affirmed, that the purity of his manners did not answer those of his sentiments. <sup>d</sup>This question has been discussed among the learned, but my plan will not admit me to treat it in its extent. The reader may see Abbe Fraguier's dissertation in defence of Socrates, against the reproaches made him on account of his conduct. The negative argument he makes use of in his justification seems a very strong one. He observes, that neither Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Clouds, which is entirely against Socrates, nor his vile accusers in his trial, have advanced one word that tends to impeach the purity of his manners: and it is not probable, that such violent enemies as those would have neglected one of the most likely methods to dis-

<sup>d</sup> Memoires de l'Academie des Inscrip. Tom. IV. p. 37<sup>e</sup>.

credit him in the opinion of his judges, if there had been any foundation or appearance for the use of it.

I confess, however, that certain principles of Plato, his disciple, held by him in common with his master, upon the nudity of the combatants in the public games, from which, at the same time, he did not exclude the fair sex, and the behaviour of Socrates himself, who wrestled naked, man to man, with Alcibiades, give us no great idea of that philosopher's delicacy in point of modesty and bashfulness. <sup>e</sup> What shall we say of his visit to Theodota, a woman of Athens, of indifferent reputation, only to assure himself with his own eyes of her extraordinary beauty, which was much talked of, and of the precepts he gave her for the attraction of admirers, and the retaining them in her snares? Do such lessons consist much with a philosopher? I pass over many other things in silence.

I am the less surpris'd after this, that several of the fathers have censur'd him in regard to purity of manners, and that they have thought fit to apply to him, as well as to his disciple Plato, what St. Paul<sup>f</sup> says of the philosophers; that God, by a just judgment, has abandoned them to a reprobate sense, and to the most shameful lusts for their punishment; in that having clearly known there was but one true God, they had not honoured him as they ought, by publicly avowing their belief, and were not ashamed to associate him with an innumerable multitude of divinities, ridiculous and infamous even in their own opinions.

And in this, properly speaking, consists the crime of Socrates, who was not guilty in the eyes of the Athenians, but gave occasion for his being justly condemn'd by the eternal truth. It had illuminated his soul with the most pure and sublime lights, of which the pagan world was capable; for we are not ignorant, that all knowledge of God, even natural, cannot come but from himself alone. He held admirable principles with relation to the divinity. He agreeably rallied the

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. l. iii. p. 783—786.

<sup>f</sup> Rom. ch. i. ver. 17—22.

fables upon which the ridiculous mysteries of his age were founded. He often spoke, and in the most exalted terms, of the existence of one only God, eternal, invincible, creator of the universe, supreme director and arbiter of all events, avenger of crimes, and rewarder of virtues: but he \* did not dare to give a public testimony of these great truths. He perfectly discerned the false and the ridiculous of the pagan system, and nevertheless, as Seneca says of the wise man, and acted himself, he observed exactly all the customs and ceremonies, not as agreeable to the gods, but as enjoined by the laws. He † acknowledged at bottom one only divinity, and worshipped, with the people, that multitude of infamous idols, which ancient superstition had heaped up during a long succession of ages. He held peculiar opinions in the schools, but followed the multitude in the temples. As a philosopher, he despised and detested the idols in secret; as a citizen of Athens and a senator, he paid them in public the same adoration with others; by so much the more to be condemned, says St. Augustin, as that worship, which was only external and dissembled, seemed to the people to be the effect of sincerity and conviction.

And it cannot be said that Socrates altered his conduct at the end of his life, or that he then expressed a greater zeal for truth. In his defence before the people, he declared, that he had always received and honoured the same gods as the Athenians; and the last order he gave before he expired, was to sacrifice, in his name, a cock to Æsculapius. Behold then this prince of the philosophers declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of mankind, who, notwithstanding his internal conviction of one only divinity, dies in the bosom of idolatry,

\* *Quæ omnia (ait Seneca) sapiens servabit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata—Omnem isum ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longo superstitione congeffit, sic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quam ad rem, pertinere—Sed iste, quem philosophia quasi liberum facerat, tamen, quia illustris senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat adorabat—eo damnabilis, quo illa quæ mendaciter agebat, sic ageret, ut cum populus veraciter agere existimaret. S. AUGUST. de civit. Dei. l. vi. c. 10.*

† *Eorum sapientes, quos philosophos vocant, scholas habebant dissentientes, et templa communia. Id. lib. de ver. rel. c. 1.*

and with the profession of adoring all the gods of the pagan theology. Socrates is the more inexcusable in this, that declaring himself a man expressly appointed by heaven to bear witness to the truth, he fails in the most essential duty of the glorious commission he ascribes to himself. For if there be any truth in religion, that we ought more particularly to avow, it is that which regards the unity of the Godhead, and the vanity of idol worship. In this his courage had been well placed; nor would it have been any great difficulty to Socrates, determined, besides, as he was, to die. But, says \* St. Augustin, these philosophers were not designed by God to enlighten the world, nor to bring men over from the impious worship of false deities to the holy religion of the true God.

We cannot deny Socrates to have been the hero of the pagan world in regard to moral virtues. But to judge rightly of him, let us draw a parallel between this supposed hero and the martyrs of Christianity, who often were young children and tender virgins, and yet were not afraid to shed the last drop of their blood, to defend and confirm the same truths which Socrates knew, without daring to assert in public: I mean, the unity of God, and the vanity of idols. Let us also compare the so much-boasted death of this prince of philosophers with that of our holy bishops, who have done the Christian religion so much honour by their sublimity of genius, the extent of their knowledge, and the beauty and excellence of their writings; a saint Cyprian, a saint Augustin, and so many others who were all seen to die in the bosom of humility, fully convinced of their unworthiness and nothingness, penetrated with a lively fear of the judgments of God, and expecting their salvation from his sole goodness and condescending mercy. Philosophy inspires no such sentiments; they could proceed only from the grace of the Mediator, which, *we are taught to believe*, Socrates did not deserve to know.

\* *Non sic ista nati erant, ut populorum suorum opinionem ad verum cultum veri Dei à simulacrorum superstitione atque ab hujus mundi vanitate converterent.*  
S. AUGUST. lib. de ver. rel. c. 2.

## BOOK THE TENTH.

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THE  
A N C I E N T H I S T O R Y  
OF THE  
P E R S I A N S A N D G R E C I A N S.

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*Manners and Customs of the Greeks.*

**T**HE most essential part of history, and which it concerns the reader most to know, is that which explains the character and manners as well of the people in general, as of the great persons in particular of whom it treats; and this may be said to be in some sort the soul of history, of which the facts are only the body. I have endeavoured, as occasion offered, to paint in their true colours the most illustrious personages of Greece; it remains for me to show the genius and character of the people themselves. I shall confine myself to those of Lacedæmon and Athens, who always held the first rank amongst the Greeks, and shall reduce what I have to say upon this subject to three heads; their political government, war, and religion.

Sigonius, Meursius, Potter, and several others, who have written upon the Grecian antiquities, supply me with great lights, and are of equal use to me in the matters it remains for me to treat.

CHAP.

## CHAP. I.

*Of political Government.*

THERE are three principal forms of government : *Monarchy*, in which a single person reigns ; *Aristocracy*, in which the eldest and wisest govern ; and *Democracy*, in which the supreme authority is lodged in the hands of the people. The most celebrated writers of antiquity, as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, give the preference to the first kind, as including the most advantages with the fewest inconveniencies. But all agree, and it cannot be too often inculcated, that the end of all government, and the duty in every one in authority, in whatsoever manner it be, is to use his utmost endeavours to render those under his command happy and just, by obtaining for them on the one side safety and tranquillity, with the advantages and conveniencies of life ; and on the other, all the means and helps that may contribute to making them virtuous. As the pilot's end, says Cicero\*, is to steer his vessel happily into its port, the physician's to preserve or restore health, the general's of an army to obtain victory, so a prince, and every man who governs others, ought to make the utility of the governed his view and motive, and to remember, that the supreme rule of all just government is the good of the public, *Salus populi suprema lex esto*. He adds, that the greatest and most noble function in the world is to be the author of the happiness of mankind.

Plato, in a hundred places, esteems as nothing the most shining qualities and actions of those who govern, if they do not tend to promote the two great ends I have mentioned, the virtue and happiness of the people ;

\* Cic. de leg. l. iii. n. 8.

\* *Tenes-ne igitur, moderatorem illum reip. quo referre velimus omnia?—Ut gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori reip. beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit. Hujus enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo.* Ad. Attic. l. viii. Epist. 10.



and he refutes at large, in the first <sup>b</sup> book of his Republic, one Thrasymachus, who advanced, that subjects were born for the prince, and not the prince for his subjects; and that whatever promoted the interests of the prince and commonwealth, ought to be deemed just and lawful.

In the distinctions which have been made upon the several forms of government, it has been agreed, That would be the most perfect which should unite in itself, by a happy mixture of institutions, all the advantages, and exclude all the inconveniencies, of the rest; and almost all the ancients have believed <sup>c</sup>, that the Lacedæmonian government came nearest to this idea of perfection.

### ARTICLE I.

#### *Of the Government of Sparta.*

**F**ROM the time that the Heraclides had re-entered Peloponnesus, Sparta was governed by two kings, who were always of the same two families, descended from Hercules by two different branches, as I have observed elsewhere. Whether from pride, or the abuse of despotic power on the side of the kings, or the desire of independence, and an immoderate love of liberty on that of the people, Sparta, in its beginnings, was always involved in commotions and revolts; which would infallibly have occasioned its ruin, as had happened at Argos and Messene, two neighbouring cities, equally powerful with itself, if the wise foresight of Lycurgus had not prevented fatal consequences by the reformation he made in the state. I have related it at large <sup>d</sup> in the life of that legislator, and shall only touch here upon what regards the government.

SECT. I. *Abridged Idea of the Spartan Government.*  
*Entire Submission to the Laws in a Manner the Soul of it.*

**L**YCURGUS restored order and peace in Sparta by the establishment of the senate. It consisted of twenty-eight senators, and the two kings presided in it.

<sup>b</sup> Page 328—343.

<sup>c</sup> Polyb. l. vi. p. 458, 459.

<sup>d</sup> Vol. II.

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This august counsel, formed out of the wisest and most experienced men in the nation, served as a counterpoise to the two other authorities, that of the kings, and that of the people; and whenever the one was for overbearing the other, the senate interposed, by joining the weakest, and thereby held the balance between both. At length, to prevent this body itself from abusing its power, which was very great, a kind of curb was annexed to it, by the nomination of five Ephori, who were elected out of the people, whose office lasted only one year, and who had authority, not only over the senators, but the kings themselves.

The power of the kings was extremely limited, especially in the city, and in time of peace. In war they had the command of the fleets and armies, and at that time greater authority. \* However, they had even then a kind of inspectors and commissioners assigned them, who served as a necessary council, and were generally chosen for that office, from their being out of favour with them, in order that there should be no connivance on their side, and the republic be the better served. There was almost continually some secret misunderstanding between the two kings; whether it proceeded from a natural jealousy between the two branches, or was the effect of the Spartan policy, to which their too great union might have given umbrage.

The Ephori had a greater authority at Sparta, than the Tribunes of the Roman people. They presided in the election of the magistrates, and could call them to an account for their administration. Their power extended even to the persons of their kings, and of the princes of the blood royal, whom they had a right to imprison, which they actually used in regard to Pausanias. When they sat upon their seats in the tribunal, they did not rise up when the kings entered, which was a mark of respect paid them by all the other magistrates, and seems to imply a kind of superiority in the Ephori from their representing the people; and it is observed

\* Arist. de rep. l. i. p. 331.

of Agesilaus<sup>f</sup>, that when he was seated upon his throne to dispense justice, and the Ephori came in, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. It is very probable, that, before him, it was not usual for the kings to behave in that manner, Plutarch relating this behaviour of Agesilaus as peculiar to him.

All public business was proposed and examined in the senate, and resolutions passed accordingly in the same place. But the decrees of the senate were not of force, unless ratified by the people.

There must have been exceeding wisdom in the laws established by Lycurgus for the government of Sparta, because, as long as they were exactly observed, no commotions or seditions of the people were ever known in the city, no change in the form of government was ever proposed, no private person usurped authority by violence, or made himself tyrant; the people never thought of depriving the two families, in which it had always been, of the sovereignty, nor did any of the kings ever attempt to assume more power than the laws admitted. <sup>g</sup>This reflection, which both Xenophon and Polybius make, shows the idea they had of the wisdom of Lycurgus, in point of his policy, and the opinion we ought to have of it. In effect, no other city of Greece had this advantage, and all of them experienced many changes and vicissitudes, for want of the like laws to perpetuate their form of government.

The reason of this constancy and stability of the Lacedæmonians in their government and conduct is, that in Sparta the laws governed absolutely, and with sovereign authority; whereas the greatest part of the other Grecian cities, abandoned to the caprice of private men, to despotic power, to an arbitrary and irregular sway, experienced the truth of Plato's saying<sup>h</sup>, That the city is miserable, where the magistrates command the laws, and not the laws the magistrates.

<sup>f</sup> Plat. in Agesil. p. 597.  
Polyb. l. vi, p. 456.

<sup>g</sup> Xenoph. in Agesil. p. 651.  
<sup>h</sup> Plut. l. iv. de leg. p. 715.

The example of Argos and Messene, which I have already related, would alone suffice to show how just and true that reflection is. <sup>b</sup> After their return from the Trojan war, the Greeks, distinguished by the name of Dorians, established themselves in three cities of Peloponnesus, Lacedæmon, Argos, and Messene; and swore alliance, and protection of each other. These three cities, governed alike by monarchical power, had the same advantages; except in the fertility of the lands where they were situated, in which the two latter carried it extremely. Argos and Messene however did not long preserve their superiority. The haughtiness of the kings, and the disobedience of the people, occasioned their fall from the flourishing condition in which they had been at first; and their example proved, says Plutarch after Plato, that it was the peculiar favour of the gods, which gave the Spartans such a man as Lycurgus, capable of prescribing so wise and reasonable a plan of government.

To support it without change, particular care was taken to educate the youth according to the laws and manners of the country, in order that they might become a second nature in them, by being early ingrafted into them, and confirmed by long habitude. The hard and sober manner in which they were brought up, inspired them during the rest of their lives with a natural taste for frugality and temperance, that distinguished them from all other people, and wonderfully adapted them to support the fatigues of war. <sup>i</sup> Plato observes, that this salutary custom had banished from Sparta, and all the territory in its dependence, drunkenness, debauchery, and all their consequential disorders; infomuch that it was a crime punishable by law to drink wine to excess even in the Bacchanalia, which every where else were days of licence, whereon whole cities gave themselves up to the last excesses.

They also accustomed the children from their earliest infancy to an entire submission to the laws, magistrates,

<sup>b</sup> Plat. l. iii. de leg. p. 683—685. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 43.

<sup>i</sup> Plat. l. i. de leg. p. 637.

and all in authority; and \* their education, properly speaking, was no more than an apprenticeship of obedience. It was for this reason Agefilaus advised Xenophon to send his children to Sparta, as to an excellent school †, where they might learn the greatest and most noble of all sciences, *to obey and to command*, for the one naturally leads on to the other. It was not only the mean, the poor, and the ordinary citizens, who were subjected in this manner to the laws, but the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, and even kings; and they did not distinguish themselves from the others in any thing but a more exact obedience; convinced that such behaviour was the surest means to their being obeyed and respected themselves by their inferiors.

† Hence came the so much-celebrated answers of Demaratus. Xerxes could not comprehend how the Lacedæmonians, who had no master to controul them, should be capable to confront dangers and death. "They are free and independent of all men," replied Demaratus, "but the law is above them and commands them, and that law ordains that they must conquer or die." † Upon another occasion, when somebody expressed their surprize, that being king he should suffer himself to be banished: "It is," says he, "because at Sparta the laws are stronger than the kings."

\* This appears evidently in the ready obedience of Agefilaus to the orders of the Ephori, when recalled by them to the support of his country; a delicate occasion for a king and a conqueror; but to him it seemed more ‡ glorious to obey his country and the laws, than to command numerous armies, or even to conquer Asia.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146. † Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 230.

‡ Idem. in Agefil. p. 603, 604.

\* Ὡς ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἐστὶν ἐπιμελὴς τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. PLAT. in Lycurg. 58.

† Μαθησομένους τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ καλλίστον, ἀρχίσθαι ἢ ἀρχεῖν. PLUT. in Agefil. p. 606.

‡ Multo gloriosius duxit, si institutis patriæ paruisset, quam si bello superasset Asiam. CORN. NEP. in Agefil. c. iv.

SECT. II. *Love of Poverty instituted at Sparta.*

**T**O this entire submission to the laws of the state, Lycurgus added another principle of government no less admirable, which was to remove from Sparta all luxury, profusion, and magnificence; to decry riches absolutely, to make poverty honourable, and at the same time necessary, by substituting a species of iron money to gold and silver coin, which till then had been current. I have explained elsewhere the measures that were used to make so difficult an undertaking succeed, and shall confine myself here to examining what judgment should be passed on it, as it affects a government.

The poverty to which Lycurgus reduced Sparta, and which seemed to prohibit all conquest, and to deprive it of all means to augment its force and grandeur, was well adapted to rendering it powerful and flourishing. Such a constitution of government, which till then had no example, nor has since been imitated by any state, argues a great fund of prudence and policy in a legislator; and the medium conceived afterwards under Lyfander, in continuing individuals in their poverty, and restoring to the public the use of gold and silver coin, was it not a wise amendment of what was too strained and excessive in that law of Lycurgus of which we are speaking?

It seems, if we consult only the common views of human prudence, that it is just to reason in this manner; but the event, which is an infallible evidence and arbiter in this place, obliges me to be of a quite different opinion. Whilst Sparta remained poor, and persisted in the contempt of gold and silver, which continued for several ages, she was powerful and glorious, and the commencement of her decline may be dated from the time when she began to break through the severe prohibition of Lycurgus against the use of gold and silver money.

The education which he instituted for the young Lacedæmonians, the hard and sober life which he recommended

mended with so much care the painful and violent exercises of the body prescribed by him, the abstraction from all other application and employment; in a word, all his laws and institutions show, that his view was to form a people of soldiers, solely devoted to arms and military functions. I do not pretend to justify absolutely this scheme, which had its great inconveniences, and I have expressed my thoughts of it elsewhere. But admitting it good, we must confess that legislator showed great wisdom in the means he took for its execution.

The almost inevitable danger of a people solely trained up for war, who have always their arms in their hands, and what is most to be feared, is injustice, violence, ambition, the desire of increasing their power, of taking advantage of their neighbours' weakness, of oppressing them by force, of invading their lands under false pretexts, which the lust of dominion never fails to suggest, and of extending their bounds as far as possible, all vices and extremes, which are horrid in private persons, and the ordinary commerce of life, but which men have thought fit to applaud as grandeur and glory in the persons of princes and conquerors.

The great care of Lycurgus was to defend his people against this dangerous temptation. Without mentioning the other means he made use of, he employed two which could not fail of producing their effect. The \* first was to prohibit all navigation and war at sea to his citizens. The situation of his city, and the fear lest commerce, the usual source of luxury and depravation, should corrupt the purity of the Spartan manners, might have a share in this decree. But his principal motive was to put it out of his citizens power to project conquests, which a people, shut up within the narrow bounds of a peninsula, could not carry very far, without being masters at sea.

The second means, still more efficacious, was to forbid all use of gold or silver money, and to introduce a species of iron coin in its stead, which was of great

\* *Ἀπειργίῳ δὲ αὐτοῖς ναυταῖς ἵνας ἔ ναυμαχίῃ.* PLUT. in institut. Lacon. p. 239.

weight and small value, and could only be current at home. How with such money should foreign troops be raised and paid, fleets fitted out, and numerous armies kept up either by land or sea?

So that the design of Lycurgus, in rendering his city warlike, and putting arms into their hands, was not, as Polybius observes, and Plutarch after him, to make them illustrious conquerors, who might carry war into remote regions, and subject great numbers of people. His sole end was, that, shut up within the extent of the lands and dominion left them by their ancestors, they should have no thoughts, but of maintaining themselves in peace, and defending themselves successfully against such of their neighbours as should have the rashness to invade them; and for this they had occasion for neither gold nor silver, finding in their own country, and still more in their sober and temperate manner of life, all that was sufficient for the support of their armies, when they did not quit their own, or the lands of their neighbours.

Now, says Polybius, this plan once admitted, it must be allowed, that there is nothing more wise nor more happily conceived than the institutions of Lycurgus, for the maintaining a people in the possession of their liberty, and to secure to them the enjoyment of peace and tranquillity. In effect, let us imagine a little republic, like that of Sparta, of which all the citizens are inured to labour, accustomed to live on a little, warlike, courageous, intrepid; and that the fundamental principle of this small republic, is to do no wrong to any one, nor to disturb its neighbours, nor invade their lands or interests, but, on the contrary, to declare in favour of the oppressed against the injustice and violence of oppressors; is it not certain, that such a republic, surrounded by a great number of states of equal extent, would be generally respected by all the neighbouring people, would become the supreme arbiter of all their quarrels, and exercise an empire over them, by so much the more glorious and lasting, as it would be

• Polyb: l. vi, p. 491. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 59.



voluntary, and founded solely in the opinion those neighbours would have of its virtue, justice, and valour? - P This was the end Lycurgus proposed to himself. Convinced that the happiness of a city, like that of a private person, depends upon virtue, and upon being well within itself, he regulated Sparta so as it might always suffice to its own happiness, and act upon principles of wisdom and equity. From thence arose that universal esteem of the neighbouring people and even of strangers for the Lacedæmonians, who asked of them neither money, ships, nor troops; but only that they would lend them a Spartan to command their armies; and when they had obtained their request, they paid him entire obedience, with every kind of honour and respect. In this manner the Sicilians obeyed Gylippus, the Chalcidians Brasidas, and all the Greeks of Asia, Lyfander, Callicratidas, and Agefilaus; \* regarding the city of Sparta as a model for all others, in the arts of living and governing.

The epocha of the declension of Sparta begins with the open violation of Lycurgus's laws. I do not pretend that they had always been exactly observed till that time, which was far from the case; but the spirit and genius of those laws had almost always prevailed with the majority of the persons who governed. No sooner had the ambition of reigning over all Greece inspired them with the design of having naval armies and foreign troops, and that money was necessary for the support of those forces, Sparta, forgetting her ancient maxims, saw herself reduced to have recourse to the Barbarians, which till then she had detested, and basely to make her court to the kings of Persia, whom she had formerly vanquished with so much glory; and that only to draw from them some aids of money and troops against their own brethren, that is to say, against people born and settled in Greece like themselves. Thus had they the imprudence and misfortune to recal with

» Plut. p. 58.

\* Προς συμπασαν την των Σπαρτιατων πολιν ωσπερ παιδα γυγον η διδασκαλον ευσημιον βιω η τειραχμοιης πολιτειας αποβλιποτις.

gold and silver into Sparta, all the vices and crimes which the iron money banished; and to prepare the way for the changes which ensued, and were the cause of their ruin. And this infinitely exalts the wisdom of Lycurgus, in having foreseen, at such a distance what might strike at the happiness of his citizens, and provided salutary remedies against it in the form of government he established at Sparta. Another legislator, who had preceded him several ages, has a right to share this glory with him.

SECT. III. *Laws established by Minos in Crete the Model of those of Sparta.*

ALL the world knows that Lycurgus had formed the plan of most of his laws upon the model of those observed in the island of Crete, where he passed a considerable time for the better studying of them. It is proper I should give some idea of them here, having forgot to do it in the place where it would have been more natural; that is, when I spoke for the first time of Lycurgus and his institutions.

Minos, whom fable calls the son of Jupiter, was the author of these laws. He lived about a hundred years before the Trojan war. He was a powerful, wise, and gentle prince, and still more estimable for his moral virtues than his military abilities. After having conquered the island of Crete, and several others in its neighbourhood, he applied himself to strengthen by wise laws the new state, of which he had possessed himself by force of arms. The end which he proposed in the establishment of these laws, was to render his subjects happy by making them virtuous. He banished idleness and voluptuousness from his states, and with them, luxury and vicious pleasures, the fruitful sources of all vice. Well knowing, that liberty was justly regarded as the most precious and greatest good, and that it cannot subsist without a perfect union of the people, he endeavoured to establish a kind of

\* A. M. 2720. Ant. J. C. 128.

\* Strab. l. x. p. 480.

equality

equality amongst them; which is the tie and basis of it, and very proper to remove all envy, jealousy, hatred, and dissension. He did not undertake to make any new divisions of lands, nor to prohibit the use of gold and silver. He applied himself to the uniting of his subjects by other ties, which seemed to him neither less firm nor less reasonable.

He decreed, that the children should be all brought up and educated together by troops and bands; in order that they might learn early the same principles and maxims. Their life was hard and sober. They were accustomed to be satisfied with little, to suffer heat and cold, to walk over steep and rugged places, to skirmish with each other in small parties, to suffer courageously the blows they received, and to exercise themselves in a kind of dance, in which they carried arms in their hands, and which was afterwards called the Pyrrhic; in order, says Strabo, that even to their diversions, every thing might breathe, and form them for war. They were also made to learn certain airs of music, but of a manly, martial kind.

\* They were not taught either to ride, or to wear heavy armour; but in return, they were made to excel in drawing the bow, which was their most usual exercise. Crete is not a flat even country, nor fit for breeding of horses, as is that of the Theffalians, who passed for the best cavalry in Greece; but a rough, broken country, full of shelves and high lands, where heavy-armed troops could not exercise themselves in the horse-race. But as to archery and light-armed soldiers, fit to execute the devices and stratagems of war, the Cretans pretended to hold the foremost rank.

Minos thought proper to establish in Crete a community of tables and meals. Besides several other great advantages which he found in this institution, as the introducing a kind of equality in his dominions, the rich and poor having the same diet, the accustoming his subjects to a frugal and sober life, the cementing friendship and unity between them by the usual gaiety and

\* Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 623.

familiarity of the table, he had also in view the custom of war, in which the soldiers are obliged to eat together. "It was the public that supplied the expences of these tables. Out of the revenues of the state a part was applied to the uses of religion, and the salaries of the magistrates, and the rest allotted for the public meals. So that the women, children, and men of all ages, were fed at the cost, and in the name of the republic. In this Aristotle gives the preference to the meals of Crete before those of Sparta, wherein private persons were obliged to furnish their proportion, and without it were not admitted into the assemblies; which was to exclude the poor.

\* After eating, the old men discoursed upon the affairs of the state. The conversation turned generally upon the history of the country, upon the actions and virtues of the great men of it, who had distinguished themselves either by their valour in war, or their wisdom in peace; and the youth, who were present at these entertainments, were exhorted to propose those great persons to themselves as their models, for the forming of their manners, and the regulation of their conduct.

† Minos, as well as Lycurgus, is reproached with having no other view in his laws than war; which is a very great fault in a legislator. It is true, this appears to have been his principal attention, because he was convinced that the repose, liberty, and riches of his subjects, were under the protection, and in a manner under the guard of arms and military knowledge; the conquered being deprived of all those advantages by the victor. But he ordained, that war should be only made for the sake of peace; and his laws are far from being confined to that sole object.

Amongst the Cretans, the cultivation of the mind was not entirely neglected, and care was taken to give the youth some tincture of learning. The works of † Homer, of much later date than the laws of Minos, were not unknown amongst them, though they set small va-

‡ Arist. de rep. l. ii. c. 10.

\* Athen. l. iv. p. 643.

† Plat. de leg. li. p. 626.

\* Ibid. l. ii. p. 680.

lue upon, and made little use of foreign poets. <sup>a</sup> They were very curious in such knowledge as is proper to form the manners; and, what is no small praise, they piqued themselves upon thinking much and speaking little. <sup>b</sup> The poet Epimenides, who made a voyage to Athens in the time of Solon, and was in great estimation there, was of Crete, and by some placed in the number of the seven sages.

One of Minos's institutions, which Plato <sup>c</sup> admires the most, was to inspire early into the youth a high respect for the maxims, customs, and laws of the state, and not to suffer them to dispute or call in question the wisdom of their institution; but to consider them not as prescribed and imposed by men, but as emanations of the divinity himself. Accordingly he had industriously apprized the people, that Jupiter himself had dictated them to him. He had the same attention in regard to the magistrates and aged persons, whom he recommended to honour in a peculiar manner; and in order that nothing might prevent the respect due to them, he ordained, that if any defects were observed in them, they should never be mentioned in the presence of the youth: a wise precaution, and which would be very becoming in the ordinary practice of life.

The government of Crete was at first monarchical, of which Minos has left a perfect model to all ages. According to him, as a most great and excellent <sup>\*</sup> man observes, the king can do every thing over the people, but the laws every thing over him. He has an absolute power to do good, and his hands are tied up from doing evil. The laws intrust the people in his hands as the most sacred of deposits, upon condition that he shall be their common father. The same laws require, that a single man by his wisdom and moderation shall constitute the felicity of an infinite number of subjects; and not that the subjects, by their misery and abject

<sup>a</sup> Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 641.

<sup>b</sup> Plut. in Solon. p. 84.

<sup>c</sup> De leg. l. i. p. 634.

<sup>\*</sup> Monsieur de Fénelon, archbishop of Cambray.

slavery, shall be substituted to gratify the pride and low passions of a single man. According to him, the king ought to be abroad the defender of his country at the head of armies, and at home the judge of his people, to render them good, wise, and happy. It is not for himself that the gods have made him king, and he is only so for the service of his people. He owes them his whole time, care, and affection; and is worthy of the throne, only as he forgets, and devotes himself to the public good. <sup>d</sup> Such is the idea Minos had of the sovereignty, of which he was a living image in his own person, and which Hesiod has perfectly expressed in two words, by calling that prince, "the most royal of mortal kings," βασιλευτατον θυτων βασιληων; that is to say, that he possessed in a supreme degree all royal virtues, and was a king in all things.

<sup>e</sup> It appears, that the authority of king was of no long duration, and that it gave place to a republican government, as Minos had intended. The senate, composed of thirty senators, formed the public council. In that assembly the public affairs were examined, and resolutions taken; but they were of no force, till the people had given them their approbation, and confirmed them by their suffrages. The magistrates, to the number of ten, established for maintaining good order in the state, and therefore called \* *Cosmi*, held the two other bodies of the state in respect, and were the balance between them. In time of war the same persons commanded the army. They were chosen by lot, but only out of certain families. Their office was for life, and they were not accountable to any for their administration. Out of this company the senators were elected.

The Cretans made the slaves and mercenaries cultivate their lands, who were obliged to pay them a certain annual sum. They were called *Periaci*, apparently from their being people in the neighbourhood, whom Minos had subjected. As they inhabited an island, and consequently a country separate from all others, the

<sup>d</sup> Plat. in Min. p. 320.

<sup>e</sup> Arist. de rep. l. ii. c. 10.

\* κοσμοι, ορδο.

Cretans had not so much to fear from these vassals as the Lacedæmonians from the Helots, who often joined the neighbouring people against them. <sup>f</sup> A custom anciently established in Crete, from whence it was adopted by the Romans, gives us reason to believe, that the vassals who manured the lands, were treated with great goodness and favour. In the feasts of Mercury, the masters waited on their slaves at table, and did them the same offices as they received from them the rest of the year; precious remains and traces of the primitive world, in which all men were equal, that seemed to inform the masters, that their servants were of the same condition with themselves, and that to treat them with cruelty or pride, was to renounce humanity.

<sup>g</sup> As a prince cannot do every thing alone, and is obliged to associate co-operators with himself, for whose conduct he is accountable, Minos charged his brother Rhadamanthus with a share in the administration of justice in the capital city; which is the most essential and indispensable function of sovereignty. He knew his probity, disinterestedness, ability, and constancy, and had taken pains to form him for so important an office. Another minister had the care of the rest of the cities, who made a circuit three times a year, to examine whether the laws established by the prince were duly observed, and the inferior magistrates and officers religiously acquitted themselves of their duty.

Crete, under so wise a government changed its aspect entirely, and seemed to have become the abode of virtue, probity, and justice; as we may judge, from what fable tells us of the honour Jupiter did these three brothers, in making them the judges of the other world; for every body knows, that fable is founded upon real history, though disguised under agreeable emblems and allegories, adapted to recommend truth by the ornaments of fancy.

<sup>h</sup> It was, according to fabulous tradition, a law established from all times, that men in departing out of this

<sup>f</sup> Athen. l. xiv. p. 639.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. in Min. p. 320.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. in Gorg. p. 523—526. In Axioch. p. 371.

life should be judged, in order to their receiving the reward or punishment due to their good or evil actions. In the reign of Saturn, and in the first years of that of Jupiter, this judgment was pronounced at the instant preceding death, which left room for very flagrant injustices. Princes, who had been cruel and tyrannical, appearing before their judges in all the pomp and splendor of their power, and producing witnesses to depose in their favour; because, as they were still alive, they dreaded their anger; the judges, dazzled with this vain show, and deceived by such false evidence, declared these princes innocent, and dismissed them with permission to enter into the happy abodes of the just. The same may be said in regard to the rich; but for the poor and helpless, calumny and malice pursued them even to this last tribunal, and found means to have them domed for ever as criminals.

Fable adds, that, upon reiterated complaints and warm remonstrances made to Jupiter upon this account, he changed the form of these trials. The time for them was fixed to be the very moment after death. Rhadamanthus and Æacus, both sons of Jove, were appointed judges; the first for the Asiatics, the other for the Europeans; and Minos over them to decide supremely in cases of doubt and obscurity. Their tribunal is situated in a place called *The Field of Truth*, because neither falsehood nor calumny can approach it. The greatest prince must appear there, as soon as he has resigned his last breath, deprived of all his grandeur, reduced to his naked self, without defence or protection, silent and trembling for his own doom, after having made the whole world tremble for theirs. If he be found guilty of crimes, which are of a nature to be expiated, he is confined in Tartarus for a certain time only, and with assurance of being released, as soon as he shall be sufficiently purified. But if his crimes are unpardonable, such as injustice, perjury, and the oppression of his people, he is cast into the same Tartarus, there to suffer eternal miseries. The just, on the contrary, of whatsoever condition they are, are conducted



ducted into the blessed abodes of peace and joy, to partake of a felicity which shall have no end.

Who does not see that the poets, under the cover of these fictions, ingenious indeed, but little to the honour of the gods, intended to give us the model of an accomplished prince, whose first care is to render justice to his people; and to image the extraordinary happiness Crete enjoyed under the wise government of Minos? This happiness did not expire with him. <sup>i</sup> The laws he established, subsisted in all their vigour even in Plato's time; that is to say, more than nine hundred years after. <sup>k</sup> And they were considered as the effect of his long <sup>\*</sup> conversations for many years with Jupiter, who had condescended to become his teacher, to enter into a † familiarity with him as with a friend, and to form him in the great art of reigning with a secret complacency, as a favourite disciple and a tenderly-beloved son. It is in this manner Plato explains these words of Homer: <sup>l</sup> Διος μεγαλη ο αριστης; the most exalted praise, according to him, that can be given to a mortal, and which that poet ascribes only to Minos.

Notwithstanding so shining and solid a merit, the theatres of Athens resounded with nothing so much as imprecations against the memory of Minos; and Socrates, in the dialogue of Plato I have already often cited, observes upon, and gives the reason for them: but first he makes a reflection well worthy of being weighed. "When either the praise or dispraise of great men is in question, it is infinitely proper," says he, "to treat them with circumspection and wisdom; because upon that depends the idea men form to themselves of virtue and vice, and the distinction they ought to make between the good and bad. For," adds he, "God conceives a just indignation, when a person is

<sup>i</sup> Plat. in Min. p. 321.

<sup>k</sup> Idem. p. 319.

<sup>l</sup> Odyss. T. ver. 179.

<sup>\*</sup> *Et Jovis arcanis Minos admissus.* HORAT.

† This poetical fiction is perhaps taken from the holy scriptures, which say of Moses: "And the Lord spake unto Moses, face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend." *Exod. xxxiii. 11.*

blamed who resembles himself; and on the contrary another praised, who is the reverse of him. We must not believe that nothing is sacred but brass and marble; (he speaks of the statues that were worshipped :) the just man is the most sacred, and the wicked the most detestable, of all beings in this world."

After this reflection, Socrates observes, that the source and cause of the Athenians hatred of Minos was the unjust and cruel tribute he imposed upon them, in obliging them to send him, every nine years, seven young men and as many maids, to be devoured by the Minotaur; and he could not avoid reproaching that prince, with having drawn upon himself the abhorrence of a city like Athens abounding with learned men, and of having sharpened the tongues of the poets against him, a dangerous and formidable race of men, from the poisoned shafts they never fail to let fly against their enemies.

It appears from what I have repeated, that Plato imputes to Minos the imposition of that cruel tribute. Apollodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch seem to be of the same opinion. \* Monsieur the Abbe Banier alleges and proves, that they are mistaken, and confound the first Minos, of whom we speak, with a second his grandson, who reigned after him in Crete, and to avenge the death of his son Androgeus killed in Attica, declared war against the Athenians, and imposed that tribute, to which Theseus put an end by killing the Minotaur. It would indeed be difficult to reconcile so inhuman and barbarous a conduct with what all antiquity relates of the goodness, lenity, and equity of Minos, and the magnificent praises it bestows upon the polity and institutions of Crete.

It is true the Cretans degenerated very much from their ancient reputation, which at length they absolutely lost by an entire change of their manners, becoming avaricious, and self-interested to a degree of thinking that no gain was base, enemies of labour and regularity of life, professed liars and knaves; so that

\* Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscip. Tom. III.

to *Cretise* became a proverb amongst the Greeks, implying to lie and to deceive. Every body knows that \* St. Paul cites against them as truth the testimony of one of their ancient poets, (it is believed of Epimenides) who paints them in colours much to their dishonour; but this change of manners, in whatever time it might arrive, does not at all affect the probity of the ancient Cretans, nor the glory of Minos their king.

<sup>m</sup> The most certain proof of that legislator's wisdom, as Plato observes, is the solid and lasting happiness, which was the effect of the sole imitation of his laws by Sparta. Lycurgus had regulated the government of that city upon the plan and idea of that of Crete, and it subsisted in an uniform manner for many ages, without experiencing the vicissitudes and revolutions so common in all the other states of Greece.

## ARTICLE II.

### *Of the Government of Athens.*

**T**HE government of Athens was neither so permanent and so uniform as that of Sparta, but suffered various alterations, according to the diversity of times and conjunctures. Athens, after having long been governed by kings, and afterwards by archons, assumed entire liberty, which gave place however for some years to the tyrannic power of the Pisistratides, but was soon after re-established, and subsisted with splendor till the defeat in Sicily, and the taking of the city by the Lacedæmonians. These subjected them to the Thirty Tyrants, whose authority was not of long duration, and gave place again to liberty, which continued amidst various events during a long series of years, till the Roman power had subdued Greece and reduced it into a province.

I shall consider in this place only the popular government, and shall examine in particular five or six

<sup>m</sup> Plat. p. 320.

\* *Κρητες οντι δ' ος τις, κακοι δ' ος, γαστρις κοψαι.* "The Cretans are always liars, evil bellies, flow bellies." *Titus* i. 12.

heads:

heads : the foundation of the government according to Solon's establishment, the different parts of which the republic consisted, the council or senate of the five hundred, the assemblies of the people, the different tribunals for the administration of justice, the revenues or finances of the republic. I shall be obliged to be more extensive upon what regards the government of Athens, than I have been upon that of Sparta, because the latter is almost sufficiently known, from what has been said of it in the life of Lycurgus<sup>n</sup>.

SECT. I. *Foundation of the Government of Athens according to Solon's Plan.*

◦ **SOLON** was not the first who established the popular government at Athens. Theseus long before him had traced out the plan, and began the execution of it. After having united the twelve towns into one city, he divided the inhabitants into three bodies; that of the nobility, to whom the superintendance in religious affairs, and all offices were confided; the labourers or husbandmen; and the artificans. He had proposed the establishment of a kind of equality between the three orders. For if the nobles were considerable by their honours and dignities, the husbandmen had the advantage of their utility to the public, and the necessity there was for their labours; and the artificans had the superiority to both the other bodies in their number. Athens, to speak properly, did not become a popular state, till the establishment of the nine Archons, whose authority continued only for one year, whereas before it was for ten; and it was not till many years after, that Solon, by the wisdom of his laws, instituted and confirmed this form of government.

‡ Solon's great principle was to establish as much as possible a kind of equality amongst his citizens, which he regarded with reason as the foundation and essential point of liberty. He resolved therefore to leave the public employments in the hands of the rich, as

<sup>n</sup> Vol. II.    ◦ Plut, in Theseus. p. 10, 11.    † Plut, in Solon. p. 87.

they had been till then, but to give the poor also some share in the government, from which they were excluded. For this reason he made an estimation of what each individual was worth. Those who were found to have an annual revenue of five hundred measures, as well in grain as liquid things, were placed in the first class, and called the *Pentacosomedimni*, that is, those who had a revenue of five hundred measures. The second class was composed of such as had three hundred, and could maintain a horse for war; these were called *horsemen* or *knights*. Those who had only two hundred, were in the third class, and were called \* *Zugitæ*. Out of these three classes only the magistrates and commanders were chosen. All the other citizens, who were below these three classes, and had less revenues, were comprised under the name of *Theti*, hirelings, or workmen labouring with their hands. Solon did not permit them to hold any office, and granted them only the right of giving their suffrages in the assemblies and trials of the people, which at first seemed a very slight privilege, but at length was found to be a very great advantage, as will appear in the sequel. I do not know whether Solon foresaw it, but he used to say<sup>a</sup>, that the people were never more obedient and submissive, than when they possessed neither too much nor too little liberty: which comes very near Galba's expression<sup>r</sup>, when to incline Piso to treat the Roman people with goodness and lenity, he desires him to remember, † that he was going to command men who were incapable of bearing either entire liberty or absolute subjection.

\* The people of Athens, being become more haughty after their victories over the Persians, pretended to have a right to share in all the public offices and the magistra-

<sup>a</sup> Ibid. p. 110.    <sup>r</sup> Tacit. Hist. l. x. c. 16.    \* Plat. in Aristid. p. 332.

\* It is believed they were so called from their being ranked between the knights and the *Theti*; as in the galleys, those who rowed in the middle were termed *Zugitæ*; their place was between the *Thalamitæ* and *Thranitæ*.

† *Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem.*

cy; and Aristides, to prevent the disorders which too tenacious opposition might have occasioned, thought proper to give way to them in this point. † It appears however from a passage in Xenophon, that the people contented themselves with the offices from whence some profit arose, and left those, which related more particularly to the government of the state, in the hands of the rich.

‡ The citizens of the three first classes paid every year a certain sum of money, to be laid up in the public treasury; the first a \* talent, the knights half a talent, and the Zugitæ ten † minæ.

As the proportion of revenue determined the order of the classes, as their revenues augmented, the people were allowed to rise to a superior class.

If \* Plutarch may be believed, Solon formed two councils, which were a kind of double limitation to fix and temper the assemblies of the people. The first was the Areopagus: but it was much more ancient than his institutions, and he only reformed it, and gave it new lustre by augmenting its power. The second was the council of the four hundred, that is, a hundred of each tribe; for Cecrops, the first king of the Athenians, had divided the people into four tribes. Clisthenes long after him changed that order, and established ten. It was in this council of the four hundred, all affairs were considered before they were proposed to the assembly of the people, as we shall soon explain.

I do not mention here another division of the people into three parties or factions, which till the time of Pisistratus were a continual source of troubles and seditions. One of these three parties was formed out of those who inhabited the high lands, and favoured popular government; the other out of those who lived in the plains, and they were for oligarchy; and the third out of the people upon the coast, and these held the mean between both.

† Xenoph. de rep. Athen. p. 691.

‡ Pollux. l. viii. c. 10.

\* In Solon. p. 88.

• One thousand French crowns.

† Five hundred

It is necessary, for the better understanding what we have now said, to enter into a more particular account of the Athenian people.

SECT. II. *Of the Inhabitants of Athens.*

THERE were three sorts of inhabitants of Athens: citizens, strangers, and servants. In the account taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the 96th Olympiad, their number amounted to twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and \* forty thousand servants. The number of citizens was almost the same in the time of Cecrops, and less under Pericles.

1. *Of the Citizens.*

A citizen could only be such by birth or adoption. To be a natural denizen of Athens, it was necessary to be born of a father and mother both free, and Athenians. <sup>2</sup> We have seen that Pericles restored this law to all its force, which had not been exactly observed, and which he himself some small time after infringed. The people could confer the freedom of the city upon strangers; and those, whom they had so adopted, enjoyed almost the same rights and privileges as the natural citizens. The quality of citizen of Athens was sometimes granted in honour and gratitude to those who had rendered great services to the state; as to Hippocrates; and even kings have sometimes canvassed that title for themselves and their children. Evagoras, king of Cyprus, thought it much to his honour.

When the young men attained the age of twenty, they were inrolled upon the list of citizens, after having taken an oath; and it was only in virtue of that public and solemn act, that they became members of the state. The form of this oath is exceedingly remarkable, which Stobæus and <sup>2</sup> Pollux have preserved in the following words: "I will never dishonour the

<sup>1</sup> A. M. 3690. Ant. J. C. 314. Athen. l. vi. p. 272.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III. <sup>2</sup> Pollux. l. viii. c. 9.

\* The text says, *μυριαδας τεσσαρακοντα*, four hundred thousand, which is a manifest error.

profession of arms, nor save my life by a shameful flight. I will fight to my last breath for the religion and civil interests of the state, in concert with the other citizens; and alone, if occasion be. I will not bring my country into a worse condition than I found it, but will use my utmost endeavours to make it more happy and flourishing. I will always submit myself to the laws and magistrates, and to all that shall be ordained by the common consent of the people. If any one shall violate, or make void the laws, I will not disguise or conceal such an attempt, but will oppose it either alone or in conjunction with my fellow-citizens; and I will constantly adhere to the religion of my forefathers. To all which I call to witness Agraulis, Enyalus, Mars, and Jupiter." I leave the reader to his own reflections upon this august ceremony, well adapted to inspire the love of their country into the hearts of the young citizens.

The whole people at first had been divided into four tribes, and afterwards into ten. Each tribe was subdivided into several parts, which were called *Δημοί*, *Pagi*. It was by these two titles the citizens were described in the public acts. *Melitus, e tribu Cecropide, e pago Pitthenfi.*

## 2. *Of the Strangers.*

I call those by that name, who being of a foreign country, came to settle at Athens, or in Attica, whether for the sake of commerce, or the exercising any trade. They were termed *μετοικοί*, *inquilini*. They had no share in the government, nor votes in the assembly of the people, and could not be admitted into any office. They put themselves under the protection of some citizen, as we find from a passage of \* Terence, and upon that account were obliged to render him certain duties and services, as the clients did at Rome to their patrons. They were held to observe all the laws of the republic, and to conform entirely to all its customs.

\* *Thais patri se commendavit in clientelam et fidem: Nobis dedit sese.* Eunu-  
ch. Act. v. Scen. ult.

They



They paid a yearly tribute to the state of twelve\* drachmas, and in default of payment were made slaves, and exposed to sale. <sup>b</sup> Xenocrates, the celebrated, but poor philosopher, was very near experiencing this misfortune, and was carried to prison; but Lycurgus, the orator, having paid the tax, released him from the farmers of the public revenues; a kind of men who, in all times, have been very little sensible to merit, with the exception of an exceeding few of their number. That philosopher, meeting some time after the sons of his deliverer, told them, "I pay your father the favour he has done me with usury, for all the world praises him upon my account."

### 3. *Of the Servants.*

There were two kinds of them. The one, who were free, and not able to get their bread by their work, were obliged by the bad state of their affairs to go into service, and their condition was easy, and not laborious. The service of the other was forced and unavoidable; these were slaves, who had either been taken prisoners in war, or bought of such as trafficked publicly in them. Part of their master's estate consisted in them, who disposed absolutely of them, but generally treated them with great humanity. <sup>c</sup> Demosthenes observes, in one of his harangues, that the condition of servants was infinitely more gentle at Athens than any where else. There was in that city an asylum and place of refuge for slaves, where the bones of Theseus had been interred, and that asylum subsisted in Plutarch's time. How glorious was it for Theseus, that his tomb should do that twelve hundred years after his death, which he had done himself during his life, and continue the protector of the oppressed, as he had been.

<sup>d</sup> When the slaves were treated with too much rigour and inhumanity, they had their action against their masters, who were obliged to sell them to others, if the fact was sufficiently proved. <sup>e</sup> They could ransom

<sup>b</sup> Plut. in Flamin. p. 375. p. 166.

<sup>c</sup> Plaut. in Casin.

<sup>e</sup> Philip. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Plut. de superst.

\* Six livres.

themselves

themselves even against their masters' consent, when they had laid up money enough for that purpose. For out of what they got by their labour, after having paid a certain proportion to their masters, they kept the remainder for themselves, and made a stock of it at their own disposal. Private persons, when they were satisfied with their services, often gave these slaves their liberty; and the same grace was always granted them by the public, when the necessity of the times obliged the state to arm and list them for the war among the citizens.

The humane and equitable usage, with which the Athenians treated their servants and slaves, was an effect of the good temper natural to that people, and very remote from the austere and cruel severity of the Lacedæmonians in regard to their Helots, which often brought their republic to the very brink of destruction. † Plutarch, with great reason, condemns this rigour. He thinks it proper to habituate one's self always to mercy, even with regard to beasts, were it only, says he, to learn by that means to treat men well, and for the sake of habituating humanity and benevolence. He relates upon this occasion a very singular fact, and very proper to explain the character of the Athenians. After having finished the temple called *Hecatonpedon*, they set all the beasts of burden at liberty, that had been employed in the work, and assigned them fat pasturages as consecrated animals. And it was said, that one of these beasts having come to offer itself at the work, and put itself at the head of those that drew the carriages to the citadel, walking foremost as if to exhort and encourage them, the Athenians ordained by a decree, that the creature would be maintained at the public expence till its death.

### SECT. III. *Of the Council or Senate of Five Hundred.*

**I**N consequence of Solon's institutions, the people of Athens had a great share and authority in the government. Appeals might be brought to their tribunal in all causes; they had a right to cancel the old laws, and

† Plut. in Catone, p. 338, 339.

establish new ones; in a word, all important affairs, whether relating to war or peace, were decided in their assemblies. In order to their determinations being made with more wisdom and maturity, Solon had instituted a council, composed of four hundred senators, a hundred out of each tribe, which were then four in number; they prepared and digested the affairs which were to be laid before the people, as we shall soon explain more at large. Clithenes, about a hundred years after Solon, having increased the number of tribes to ten, augmented also that of the senators to five hundred; each tribe supplying fifty. This was called the council, or senate, of the Five Hundred. They received their stipend out of the public treasury.

They were chosen by lot, in which they made use of black and white beans, which were mingled and shaken in an urn, and each tribe gave in the names of those who aspired to that trust, and had the revenue assigned by the laws to qualify them for it. None could be admitted under the age of thirty. After enquiry made into the manners and conduct of the candidate, he was made to take an oath, whereby he engaged to give at all times the best counsel he could to the people of Athens, and never to depart in the least from the tenor of the laws.

This senate assembled every day, except upon the days appointed for festivals. Each tribe in its turn furnished those who were to preside in it, called \* *Prytanes*, and this rank was decided by lot. This presidency continued thirty-five days, which being reckoned ten times, amounts to the number of days, except four, of the lunar year followed at Athens. This time of the presidency, or prytanism, was divided into five weeks with regard to the five tens of the *Prytanes*, who were to preside in them, and every week seven of these ten *Prytanes*, drawn by lot, presided, each their day, and were denominated Προεδροι, that is to say, *Presidents*. He, † who was so for the day, presided in the assembly of the senators and in that of the people. He was

\* Ησπραντες.

† He was called Επισατης.

charged

charged with the public seal, as also with the keys of the citadel and treasury.

The senators, before they assembled, offered a sacrifice to Jupiter and Minerva, under the additional appellation of *goddeſs of good counſel*\*, to demand the prudence and underſtanding neceſſary in wiſe deliberations. The preſident propoſed the buſineſs, which was to be conſidered in the aſſembly. Every one gave his opinion in his turn, and always ſtanding. After a queſtion had been ſettled, it was drawn up in writing, and read with a loud voice. Each ſenator then gave his vote by ſcrutiny, in putting a bean into the urn. If the number of the white beans carried it, the queſtion paſſed, otherwiſe it was rejected. This ſort of decree was called *Ψηφισμα*, or *Προβουλευμα*, as much as to ſay preparatory reſolution. It was afterwards laid before the aſſembly of the people, where, if it was received and approved, it had the force of a law; if not, its authority ſubſiſted only one year. This ſhows with what wiſdom Solon eſta bliſhed this council, to inform and direct the people, to fix their inconfancy, to prevent their temerity, and to aſſiſt their deliberations with a prudence and maturity not to be expected in a confuſed and tumultuous aſſembly, compoſed of a great number of citizens, moſt of them without education, capacity, or much zeal for the public good. The reciprocal dependency and natural intercourſe of the two bodies of the ſtate, which were obliged to lend each other their authority, and remained equally without force when without union and a good underſtanding, were beſides a method judiciously contrived for ſupporting a wiſe balance between the two bodies; the people not being able to inſtitute any thing without its being firſt propoſed and approved by the ſenate, nor the ſenate to paſs any decree into a law till it had been ratified by the people.

We may judge of the importance of this council by the matters which were treated in it; the ſame, without any exception, as were laid before the people; wars, taxes, maritime affairs, treaties of peace, alliances,

\* Βελαιος, βελαια.

in a word, whatever related to government; without mentioning the account which they obliged the magistrates to give on quitting their offices, and their frequent decisions and judgments upon the most serious and important affairs.

SECT. IV. *Of the Areopagus.*

THIS council took its name from the place where it assembled, called \* *the quarter, or hill of Mars*, because, according to some, Mars had been cited thither in judgment for a murder committed by him. It was believed to be as ancient as the nation. Cicero and Plutarch attribute the institution of it to Solon; but he only re-established it, by giving it more lustre and authority than it had had till then, and for that reason was looked upon as its founder. The number of the senators of the Areopagus was not fixed; at certain times they amounted to two or three hundred. Solon thought proper, that only those who had borne the office of archon should be honoured with that dignity.

This senate had the care of seeing the laws duly observed, of inspecting the manners of the people, and especially of judging in criminal cases. They held their sittings in an open place, and during the night. The former very probably to avoid being under the same roof with the criminals, and not to defile themselves by such a commerce with them; the latter, that they might not be softened by the sight of the guilty, and might judge according to justice and the laws. It was for the same reason the orators were not permitted to use their exordium or peroration, nor allowed to excite the passions, and were obliged to confine themselves solely to the subject matter of their cause. The severity of their judgments was exceedingly dreaded, particularly in regard to murder, and they were highly attentive to inspire their citizens with horror for that crime. They † con-

\* *Αρειος παγος.*

† *Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cum damnaverunt puerum oculos coturnicum eruentem; aliud judicasse, quam id signum esse perniciosissima mentis, multisque malo futuræ si adolevisset.* QUINTIL. l. v. c. 9.

demned a child to be put to death for making it his pastime to put out the eyes of quails; conceiving this sanguinary inclination, as the mark of a very wicked disposition, which might one day prove fatal to many, if he were suffered to grow up with impunity.

The affairs of religion, as blasphemies against the gods, contempt of sacred mysteries, different species of impiety, and the introduction of new ceremonies and new divinities, were also brought before this tribunal. \* We read in Justin Martyr, that Plato, who in his travels in Egypt had acquired great lights concerning the unity of God, when he returned to Athens, took great care to dissemble and conceal his sentiments, for fear of being obliged to appear and give an account of them before the Areopagitæ; and we know that St. Paul was traduced before them, as teaching a new doctrine †, and endeavouring to introduce new gods.

These judges were in great reputation for their probity, equity, and prudence, and generally respected. Cicero, in writing to his friend Atticus, upon the fortitude, constancy, and wise severity of the Roman senate, thinks he makes a great encomium upon it, in comparing it with the Areopagus. ‡ *Senatus, Ἀρεοῦ πάγῳ, nil constantius, nil severius, nil fortius.* Cicero must have conceived a very advantageous idea of it, to speak of it as he does in the first book of his Offices. \* He compares the famous battle of Salamin, in which Themistocles had so great a part, with the establishment of the Areopagus, which he ascribes to Solon; and makes no scruple to prefer, or at least to equal the legislator's service to that for which Athens was obliged to the

\* Cohort. ad Græc.

† Acts xvii. 18—20.

‡ Ad Attic. l. i. Ep. 13.

\* *Quamvis Themistocles jure laudetur, et sit ejus nomen, quam Solonis, illustrius, citeturque Salamis clarissimæ testis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitis; non minus præclarum hoc, quam illud, judicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati: hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc majorum instituta servantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum juverit: at ille adjuvit Themistoclem. Est enim bellum gestum consilio Senatus ejus, qui a Solone erat constitutus. Offic. l. i. n. 75.*

general of its army. "For in reality," says he, "that victory was useful to the republic only for once, but the Areopagus will be so throughout all ages; as by the wisdom of that tribunal, the laws and ancient customs of the Athenian state are preserved. Themistocles did no service to the Areopagus, but the Areopagus abundantly contributed to the victory of Themistocles; because the republic was at that time directed by the wise counsels of that august senate."

It appears from this passage of Cicero, that the Areopagus had a great share in the government, and I do not doubt but it is consulted upon important affairs. Cicero here perhaps may have confounded the council of the Areopagus with that of the Five Hundred. It is certain, however, that the Areopagitæ were extremely active in the public affairs.

Pericles, who could never enter the Areopagus, because chance having always been against him, he had not passed through any of the employments necessary to his admission, attempted to weaken its authority, and attained his point: which is a great blot in his reputation.

#### SECT. V. *Of the Magistrates.*

**O**F these a great number were established for different functions. I shall speak only of the Archons, who are the most known. I have observed elsewhere that they succeeded the kings, and that their authority at first continued during life. It was at length limited to ten years, and reduced at last only to one. When Solon was commissioned to reform the government, he found them upon this foot, and to the number of nine. He did not abolish their office, but he very much diminished their power.

The first of these nine magistrates was called THE ARCHON, by way of eminence, and the year denominated from him: \* *Under such an Archon such a battle*

\* From whence he was also called *Ἐπωνύμιος*.

*was fought.* The second was called **THE KING**, which was the remains and footsteps of the authority to which they had succeeded. The third was **THE POLEMARCH**, who at first commanded the armies, and always retained the name, though he had not the same authority, of which he had so long preserved some part. For we have seen, in speaking of the battle of Marathon, that the polemarch had a right to vote in the council of war, as well as the ten generals then in command. The six other archons were called by the common name, **THESMOTHETÆ**, which implies that they had a particular superintendence over the laws, in order to their being duly observed. These nine archons had each of them a peculiar province, and were judges in certain affairs allotted to their cognizance. I do not think it necessary to enter into the particulars of their duty, nor into those of many other employments and offices, established for the administration of justice, for the levying of taxes and tributes, for the preservation of good order in the city, for supplying it with provisions, in a word, for every thing relating to commerce and civil society.

#### SECT. VI. *Of the Assemblies of the People.*

**T**HESE were of two sorts, the one ordinary and fixed to certain days, and for these there was no kind of summons; the other extraordinary, according to the different occasions that arose, and the people were informed of it by express proclamation.

The place for the assembly was not fixed. Sometimes it was the public market-place, sometimes a part of the city near the citadel, called **Πρυτανεία**, and sometimes the theatre of Bacchus.

The Prytanes generally assembled the people. Some days before the assembly papers were fixed up, wherein the business to be considered was set down.

All the citizens, poor as well as rich, had a right to give their suffrages. They were liable to a penalty, who failed of being present at the assembly, or who came



too late; and to induce their punctual attendance, a reward was annexed to it, at first of an obolus, which was the sixth part of a drachma, then of three oboli, which made about five pence French.

The assembly always began with sacrifices and prayers, in order for the obtaining from the gods the knowledge and understanding necessary to wise deliberations, and they never failed to add the most terrible imprecations against such as should wilfully advise any thing contrary to the public good.

The president proposed the affair upon which they were to deliberate. If it had been examined in the senate, and drawn up there as a question, it was read; after which those who would speak were invited to ascend the tribunal, that they might be the better heard by the people, and inform them in the matter proposed. The oldest general spoke first, and then the rest according to their seniority: when the orators had done speaking, and concluded that it was necessary to approve or reject the decree of the senate, the people proceeded to vote, and the most common method of doing it was by holding up their hands, to denote their approbation; which was called *χειροδοσειν*. The assembly was sometime adjourned till another day, because it was too late for the number of those who lifted up their hands to be distinguished, and the plurality decided. After a resolution had been formed in this manner it was reduced to writing, and read by an officer to the people with a loud voice, who confirmed it again by holding up their hands as before; after which the decree had the force of a law. And this was called *ψηφισμα*, from the Greek word *ψηφος*, which signifies a pebble or small stone, because they were sometimes used in giving suffrages by scrutiny.

All the great affairs of the republic were discussed in these assemblies. It was in them new laws were proposed and old ones amended; the religion and worship of the gods examined; magistrates, generals, and officers created; their behaviour and conduct enquired into; peace or war concluded; deputies and ambassadors appointed;

treaties

treaties and alliances ratified; freedom of the city granted; rewards and honours decreed for those who had distinguished themselves in war, or rendered great services to the republic; and punishments ordained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated the laws of the state, and were banished by ostracism. In fine, justice was administered, and judgment passed there, upon the most important affairs. We see, from this account, which is, however, very imperfect, how far the people's power extended; and with what truth it may be said, that the government of Athens, though qualified with aristocracy, and the authority of the elders, was, by its constitution, democratical and popular.

I shall take occasion to observe in the sequel, of what weight the talent of eloquence is in such a republic; and in what manner orators ought to be considered in it. It is not easy to conceive, how they could make themselves heard in so numerous an assembly, and where such a multitude of auditors were present. We may judge how great that was, from what has been said of it in two instances. The first relates to ostracism, and the other to the adoption of a stranger for a citizen. On each of these occasions, it was necessary that no less than six thousand citizens should be present in the assembly.

I reserve for another place the reflections, which naturally arise from what I have already related, and what it remains for me to say further upon the government of Athens.

#### SECT. VII. *Of Trials.*

**T**HERE were different tribunals, according to the difference of the affairs to be adjudged, but appeals might be brought to the people from all decrees of other judges, and this it was that rendered their power so great and considerable. \* All the allies, when they had any cause to try, were obliged to repair to Athens; where they often remained a considerable time, without being able to obtain audience, from the multiplicity of affairs to be adjudged. This law had

\* Xenoph. de Rep. Athen. p. 664.

been

been imposed upon them, in order to render them more dependent upon the people, and more submissive to their authority; instead of which, had they sent commissioners to the places, they would have been the sole persons, to whom the allies would have made their court and paid their homage.

The parties pleaded their causes either in person, or employed advocates to do it for them. The time allowed for the hearing was generally fixed, and a water clock, called in Greek κλεψυδρα, regulated its duration. The decree was passed by plurality of voices; and when the suffrages were equal, the judges inclined to the side of mercy, and acquitted the accused. It is remarkable that a friend was not obliged to give evidence against a friend.

All the citizens, even the poorest, and such as had no estates, were admitted into the number of the judges, provided they had attained the age of thirty, and were known to be persons of good morals. Whilst they sat in judgment, they held in their hands a kind of sceptre, which was the mark of their dignity, and laid it down when they withdrew.

The judges' salary was different at different times. They had at first only an obolus a day, and afterwards three, where their fee remained fixed. It was but a small matter in itself, but became in time a very great charge to the public, and exhausted the treasury without much enriching particulars. We may judge of this from what is related in Aristophanes's comedy of *The Wasps*, wherein that poet ridicules the passion of the Athenians for trying causes, and their eager desire for the gain arising from it, which protracted and multiplied suits to infinity.

In this comedy, a young Athenian, who was to act the part I have mentioned, of turning the judges and trials of Athens into ridicule, from a state of the revenues paid into the public treasury, finds their amount to be two thousand talents\*. He then examines how much of that sum falls to the share of the judges, with

\* About 280,000l. sterling.

whom

whom Athens was overrun, at three oboli a head per day. This appears to be annually, including all of them, only a hundred and fifty talents\*. The calculation is easy. The judges were paid only ten months in the year, the other two being employed in festivals, when all proceedings at law were prohibited. Now three oboli a day paid to six thousand men, make fifteen talents a month, and in consequence one hundred and fifty in ten months. According to this calculation, the most assiduous judge gained only seventy-five livres (about three guineas) a year. "What then becomes of the remainder of the two thousand talents?" cries the young Athenian. "What," replies his father, who was one of the judges, "it goes to those—but let us not expose the shame of Athens; let us always be for the people." The young Athenian goes on to explain that the remainder went to such as robbed the public treasury; to the orators, who incessantly flattered the people; and to those who were employed in the government and army. I have extracted this remark from the works of Father Brumoi the Jesuit, with which I shall make very free when I come to speak of public shows and dramatic representations.

#### SECT. VIII. *Of the Amphictyons.* †

**T**HE famous council of the Amphictyons is introduced here, though not particular to the Athenians, but common to all Greece, because it is often mentioned in the Grecian history, and I do not know whether I shall have a more natural occasion to speak of it.

The assembly of the Amphictyons was, in a manner, the holding of a general assembly of the states of Greece. The establishment of it is attributed to Amphictyon, king of Athens and son of Deucalion, who gave them his name. His principal view in the institution of this council, was to unite, in the sacred band of amity, the several people of Greece admitted into it, and to oblige

\* About 7,000 sterling.

them,

them, by that union, to undertake the defence of each other, and be mutually vigilant for the happiness and tranquillity of their country. The Amphictyons were also created to be the protectors of the oracle of Delphos, and the guardians of the prodigious riches of that temple; and also to adjudge the differences which might arise between the Delphians, and those who came to consult the oracle. This council was held at Thermopolæ, and sometimes at Delphos itself. It assembled regularly twice a year, in the spring and autumn, and more frequently when affairs required.

The number of people of cities which had a right to sit in this assembly is not precisely known, and varied, without doubt, at different times. When the Lacedæmonians, in order to pass in it what decrees they thought fit, were for excluding the Theffalians, Argives, and Thebans, <sup>b</sup> Themistocles, in the speech he made to the Amphictyons to prevent that design from taking effect, seems to insinuate, that there were only one-and-thirty cities at that time which had this right.

Each city sent two deputies, and, in consequence, had two votes in the council, and that without distinction, or the more powerful having any prerogative of honour or pre-eminence over the inferior states in regard to the suffrages; the liberty upon which these people valued themselves, requiring that every thing should be equal amongst them.

The Amphictyons had full power to discuss and determine finally in all differences which might arise between the Amphictyonic cities, and to fine the culpable in such manner as they thought fit. They could employ not only the rigour of the laws in the execution of their decrees, but even raise troops, if it were necessary, to compel such as rebelled to submit to them. The three sacred wars undertaken by their order, of which I have spoken elsewhere, are an evident proof of this power.

Before they were installed into this body, they took a very remarkable oath, of which \*Æschines has preserv-

<sup>b</sup> Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

\* Æschin. in Orat. περι πασαπρεσβειας.

ed the form ; it runs to this effect : “ I swear that I will never destroy any of the cities honoured with the right of sitting in the Amphictyonic council, nor turn their running waters out of their course either in times of war or peace: if any people shall make such an attempt, I hereby engage to carry the war into their country, to demolish their cities, towns, and villages, and to treat them in all things as the most cruel enemies. \* Moreover, if, at any time, any person shall dare to be so impious to steal and take away any of the rich offerings, preserved in the temple of Apollo at Delphos, or abet any others in committing that crime, either by aiding or only counselling him therein, I will use my feet, hands, voice, in a word, all my powers and faculties, to avenge such sacrilege.” That oath was attended with the most terrible imprecations and execrations. “ That if any one infringes any thing contained in the oath I have now taken, whether private person, city, or people, may that person, city, or people, be deemed accursed; and in that acceptation, experience the whole vengeance of Apollo, Latona, Diana, and Minerva the foreknower. May their country produce none of the fruits of the earth, and their women, instead of generating children resembling their fathers, bring forth nothing but monsters : may their animals share in the same curse. May those sacrilegious men lose all suits at law; may they be conquered in war, have their houses demolished, and be themselves and their children put to the sword.” I am not astonished, that after such terrible engagements, the holy war, undertaken by the order of the Amphictyons, should be carried on with so much ardour and fury. The religion of an oath was of great force with the ancients; and how much more regard ought to be had to it in the Christian world, which professes to believe, that the violation of it shall be punished with eternal torments; and yet how many are there amongst us, who make a trifle of breaking through the most solemn oaths?

The

The authority of the Amphictyons had always been of great weight in Greece, but it began to decline exceedingly from the moment they condescended to admit Philip of Macedon into their body. For that prince, enjoying by this means all their right and privileges, soon knew how to set himself above all law, and to abuse his power so far, as to preside by proxy both in this illustrious assembly, and in the Pythian games; of which games the Amphictyons were judges and Agonothetæ, in virtue of their office. This Demosthenes reproaches him with in his third Philippick; "When he does not deign," says he, "to honour us with his presence, he sends HIS SLAVES to preside over us." An odious, but emphatical term, and in the spirit of the Grecian liberty, by which the Athenian orator images the base and abject subjection of the greatest lords in Philip's court.

If the reader desires a further knowledge of what relates to the Amphictyons, the dissertations of Monsieur Valois<sup>c</sup> may be consulted, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, wherein this subject is treated with great extent and erudition.

#### SECT. IX. *Of the Revenues of Athens.*

THE revenues\*, according to the passage of Aristophanes which I have cited above, and in consequence as they stood in the time of the Peloponnesian war, amounted to two thousand talents, that is to say, to six millions of livres. They were generally reduced to four species.

1. The first relates to the revenues arising from agriculture, the sale of woods, the produce of mines, and other funds of a like nature, appertaining to the public. Amongst these may be included the duties upon the import and export of merchandise, and the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the city, as well natives as strangers.

The history of Athens often mentions the silver mines of Laurium, which was a mountain situate between the

<sup>c</sup> Vol. III.

\* Τέλι.

Piræum and Cape Sunium; and those of Thrace, from whence many persons extracted immense riches.

\* Xenophon, in a treatise wherein he states this matter at large, demonstrates, how much the public might gain by industriously working these mines, from the example of the many persons they had enriched. <sup>d</sup> Hipponicus let his mines, and six hundred slaves, to an undertaker, who paid him an † obolus a day for each slave, clear of all charges, which amounted in the whole to a mina, about two pounds five shillings. Nicias, who was killed in Sicily, farmed out his mines, and a thousand slaves in the same manner, and with the same profit in proportion to that number.

2. The second species of revenue were the contributions paid the Athenians by the allies for the common expences of the war. At first, under Aristides, they amounted to only four hundred and sixty talents‡. Pericles augmented them almost a third, and raised them to six hundred, and some time after they were run up to thirteen hundred. Taxes, which in the beginning were moderate and necessary, became thus in a little time excessive and exorbitant, notwithstanding all the protestations made the allies, and the most solemn engagements to the contrary.

3. A third sort of revenue was the extraordinary capitation taxes, levied upon the inhabitants of the country, as well natives as strangers, in pressing occasions and emergencies of the state.

4. The fines laid upon persons by the judges for different misdemeanors, were applied to the uses of the public, and laid up in the treasury; except the tenth part of them, which was consecrated to Minerva, and a fiftieth to the other divinities.

The most natural and legal application of these different revenues of the republic, was in paying the troops both by sea and land, building and fitting out

<sup>d</sup> Pag. 925.

\* *De ration, redituum.*

† Six oboli made a drachma, one hundred drachmas a mina, and sixty mina a talent.

‡ A talent was worth a thousand crowns.

fleets,



fleets, keeping up and repairing the public buildings, temples, walls, ports, and citadels. But the greatest part of them, especially after Pericles's time, was misapplied to unnecessary uses, and often consumed in frivolous expences; games, feasts and shows, which cost immense sums, and were of no manner of utility to the state.

SECT. X. *Of the Education of the Youth.*

**I** PLACE this article under the head of government, because all celebrated legislators have with reason believed, that the education of youth was an essential part of it.

The exercises that served for the forming of either the bodies or minds of the young Athenians (and as much may be said of almost all the people of Greece) were dancing, music, hunting, fencing, riding, polite learning, and philosophy. It may be observed that I speak generally, and treat very slightly these several articles.

1. *Dancing. Music.*

Dancing is one of the exercises of the body, cultivated by the Greeks with great attention. It made a part of what the ancients called *the Gymnastic*, divided according to \*Plato, into two kinds, *the Orchestric*, which takes its name from the dance, and *the Palæstric* †, so called from a Greek word which signifies *wrestling*. The exercises of the latter kind principally conducted to form the body for the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and the other uses of society.

Dancing had another end, and taught such rules of motion as were most proper to render the shape free and easy; to give the body a just proportion, and the whole person an unconstrained, noble, and graceful air; in a word, an external politeness, if we may be allowed to use that expression, which never fails to prejudice people in favour of those who have been formed to it early.

\* Ὀρχεῖσθαι. Saltare.

† Πάλη.

Music

Music was cultivated with no less application and success. The ancients ascribed wonderful effects to it. They believed it very proper to calm the passions, soften the manners, and even humanize people naturally savage and barbarous. ° Polybius, a grave and serious historian, who is certainly worthy of belief, attributes the extreme difference between the two people of Arcadia, the one infinitely beloved and esteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to strangers, and piety to the gods; the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion: Polybius, I say, ascribes this difference to the study of music, (I mean, says he, the true and noble music) industriously cultivated by the one, and absolutely neglected by the other people.

After this it is not surprising, that the Greeks considered music as an essential part in the education of youth. \* Socrates himself, in a very advanced age, was not ashamed to learn to play upon musical instruments. Themistocles, however otherwise esteemed † was thought to be wanting in point of merit, because at an entertainment he could not touch the lyre like the rest of the company. ‡ An ignorance in this respect was deemed a defect of education; on the contrary, a capacity in it did honour to the greatest men. § Epaminondas was praised for dancing, and playing well upon the flute. We may observe in this place the different tastes and genius of nations. The Romans were far from having the same opinion with the Greeks in regard to music and dancing, and set no value upon them. It is very likely, the wisest and most knowing amongst the latter, did not apply to them with any

° Polyb. p. 288—291.

\* Socrates, jam senex institui lyra non erubescbat. QUINTIL. l. i. c. 10.

† Themistocles, cum in epulis recusasset lyram, habitus est indoctior. CIC. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.

‡ Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus—discabantque id omnes; nec qui nesciebat, satis excultus doctrina putabatur. Ibid.

§ In Epaminondæ virtutibus commemoratum est saltasse eum commode, scienterque tibiis cantasse Scilicet non eadem omnibus honesta sunt atque turpia, sed omnia majorum institutis judicantur. CORN. NÆP. in præfat. vit Epam.

great industry; and Philip's expression to his son Alexander, who had shown too much skill in music at a feast, induces me to be of this opinion: "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to sing so well."

For the rest this esteem for dancing and music had its foundation. Both the one and the other were employed in the most august feasts and ceremonies of religion, to express their acknowledgment to the gods with the greater force and dignity, for the favours they had vouchsafed to confer upon them. They had generally the greatest share in their feasts and entertainments, which seldom or ever began or ended without some odes being sung in honour of the victors in the Olympic games, and on other the like occasions. They had a part also in war; and we know that the Lacedæmonians marched to battle dancing, and to the sound of flutes. <sup>f</sup> Plato, the most grave philosopher of antiquity, considered both these arts, not as simple amusements, but as they had a great share in the ceremonies of religion, and military exercises. Hence we see him very intent, in his books of laws, to prescribe rules upon dancing and music, and to keep them within the bounds of utility and decorum.

They did not continue long within these restrictions. The licence of the Grecian stage, on which dancing was in the highest vogue, and in a manner prostituted to buffoons and the most contemptible people, who made no other use of it, than to suggest or support the most vicious passions; this licence, I say, soon corrupted an art, which might have been of some advantage, had it been regulated by Plato's opinion. Music had a like destiny; and perhaps the corruption of this did not a little contribute to the depraving and perverting of dancing. Voluptuousness and sensual pleasure were the sole arbiters consulted in the uses made of both, and the theatre became a school of every kind of vice.

<sup>g</sup> Plutarch, in lamenting that the art of dancing was so much fallen from the merit which rendered it estimable to the great men of antiquity, does not omit to

<sup>f</sup> De leg. l. vii.

<sup>g</sup> Sympos. l. ix. qu. 15. p. 748.

Observe, that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a soft effeminate music, with which it was ill united, and which had taken place of the ancient poetry and music, that had something noble, majestic, and even religious and heavenly in them. He adds, that being made subservient to low taste and sensuality, by their aid, it exercised a kind of tyrannical power in the theatres, which were become the public schools of criminal passions and gross vices, wherein no regard was had to reason.

The reader, without my observing upon it to him, will make the application of this passage of Plutarch to the sort of music which engrosses our theatres at this day, and which, by its effeminate and wanton airs, has given the last wound to the little manly force and virtue that remained among us. Quintilian describes the music of his times in these terms: <sup>h</sup> *Quæ nunc in scenis effeminata, et impudicis modis fracta, non ex parte minima, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit.*

## 2. Of the other Exercises of the Body.

The young Athenians, and in general all the Greeks, were very intent upon forming themselves to all the exercises of the body, and to go through their lessons regularly with the masters of the Palæstræ. They called the places allotted for these exercises Palæstra, or Gymnasia; which answers very near to our academies. Plato, in his books of laws, after having shown of what importance it was in war to cultivate the hands and feet, adds <sup>i</sup> that far from banishing from a well regulated republic the profession of the Athletæ, on the contrary, prizes ought to be proposed for all exercises, that conduce to the improvement of military virtue; such are those which render the body more active, and fitter for the race; more hard, robust, and supple, more capable of supporting great fatigues, and effecting great enterprizes. We must remember, that there was no Athenian, who ought not to have been capable of handling the oar in the largest galleys. The citi-

<sup>h</sup> Quintil. l. i. c. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Lib. viii. de leg. p. 832, 833.

zens themselves did this office, which was not left to slaves and criminals as in these days. They were all destined to the trade of war, and often obliged to wear arms of iron from head to foot of a great weight. For this reason Plato, and all the ancients, looked upon the exercises of the body as highly useful, and even absolutely necessary to the good of the public, and therefore this philosopher excludes only those from them, which are incapable of service in war.

<sup>k</sup> There were also masters, who taught the youth to ride, and to handle their arms or fence; and others whose business it was to instruct them in all that was necessary to be known, in order to excel in the military art, and become good commanders. The whole science of the latter consisted in what the ancients called the *Tactic*, that is to say, the art of drawing up troops in battle, and of making military evolutions. That science was useful, but did not suffice. <sup>l</sup> Xenophon shows its defect, in producing a young man lately come from such a school, in which he imagined he had learnt every thing, though in reality he had only acquired a foolish esteem for himself, attended with perfect ignorance. He gives him, by the mouth of Socrates, admirable precepts upon the business of a soldier, and very proper to form an excellent officer.

Hunting was also considered by the ancients as a fit exercise for forming youth to the stratagems and fatigues of war. It is for this reason Xenophon, who was no less a great general than a great philosopher, <sup>m</sup> did not think it below him to write a treatise expressly upon hunting, in which he descends to the lowest particular; and observes upon the considerable advantages consequential of it, from being inured to suffer hunger, thirst, heat, cold, without being discouraged either by the length of the course, the difficulty of the cliffs and thickets, through which it is often necessary to press, or the small success of the long and painful fatigues, which they often undergo to no purpose. He

<sup>k</sup> Plut. in Lachete, p. 181.

<sup>l</sup> Memorab. l. iii. p. 761, &c.

<sup>m</sup> De venatione.

adds,

adds, that this innocent pleasure removes others equally shameful and criminal; and that a wise and moderate man would not however abandon himself so much to it as to neglect the care of his domestic affairs. "The same author, in the *Cyropædia*, frequently praises hunting, which he looks upon as a real exercise of war, and shows, in the example of his young hero, the good use that may be made of it.

### 3. *Of the Exercise of the Mind.*

Athens, to speak properly, was the school and abode of polite learning, arts, and sciences. The study of poetry, eloquence, philosophy, and mathematics, was in great vogue there, and much cultivated by the youth.

The young people were sent first to learn grammar under masters, who taught them regularly, and upon proper principles, their own language; by which they attained a knowledge of its whole beauty, energy, number, and cadence. "Hence proceeded the universal fine taste of Athens, where, as history informs us, a simple herb-woman distinguished Theophrastus to be a stranger, from the affectation of a single word in expressing himself. And from the same cause the orators were greatly apprehensive of letting fall the least injudicious expression, for fear of offending so refined and delicate an audience. It was very common for the young people to get the tragedies represented upon the stage by heart. We have seen, that after the defeat of the Athenians, before Syracuse, many of them, who had been taken prisoners and made slaves, softened their slavery by reciting the works of Euripides to their masters, who, extremely delighted with hearing such sublime verses, treated them from thenceforth with kindness and humanity. The compositions of the other poets had no doubt the same effect, and Plutarch tells us, that Alcibiades, when very young, having entered a school in which there was not a Homer,

<sup>n</sup> *Cyrop.* l. i. p. 5, 6, & l. ii. p. 59, 60.

• *Cic. in Brut.* n. 172. *Quintil.* l. viii. c. 1. *Plut. in Peric.* p. 156.

gave the master a box on the ear as an ignorant fellow, <sup>p</sup> and one who dishonoured his profession.

As for eloquence, it is no wonder that it was particularly studied at Athens. It was that opened the way to the highest offices, reigned absolute in the assemblies, decided the most important affairs of the state, and gave an almost unlimited power to those who had the talent of speaking in an eminent degree.

This therefore was the great employment of the young citizens of Athens, especially of those who aspired to the highest employments. To the study of rhetoric they annexed that of philosophy: I comprise under the latter, all the sciences which are either parts of, or relate to it. The persons, known to antiquity under the name of sophist, had acquired a great reputation at Athens, especially in the time of Socrates. These teachers, who were as presumptuous as avaricious, set themselves up for universal scholars. Their whole art lay in philosophy and eloquence, both of which they corrupted by the false taste and wrong principles they instilled into their disciples. I have observed in the life of Socrates, that philosopher's endeavours and success in discrediting them.

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## C H A P. II.

### OF WAR.

SECT. I. *People of Greece in all Times very warlike, especially the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.*

**N**O people of antiquity (I except the Romans) could dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war Greece signalized her valour in battle, and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of the captains she sent thither. This expedition was however, properly speaking, no more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits,

<sup>p</sup> In Altib. p. 194.

by which she distinguished herself there, were only her first essays, and apprenticeship in the art of war.

There were in Greece at that time several small republics, neighbours to one another by their situation, but extremely remote in their customs, laws, characters, and particularly in their interests. This difference of manners and interests was a continual source and occasion of divisions amongst them. Every city, little satisfied with its own dominion, was studious to aggrandize itself at the expence of its next neighbours, according as they lay most commodious for it. Hence all these little states, either out of ambition, and to extend their conquests, or the necessity of a just defence, were always under arms, and by that continual exercise of war, formed in the universal people a martial spirit, and an intrepidity of courage which made them invincible in the field; as appeared in the sequel, when the whole united forces of the East came to invade Greece, and made her sensible what she was, and of what capable.

Two cities distinguished themselves above the rest, and held indisputably the first rank; these were Sparta and Athens: in consequence of which those cities, either successively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themselves through a long series of time in a power, which the sole superiority of merit, universally acknowledged by all the other states, had acquired them. This merit consisted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue; of which they had given the most glorious proofs in the war against the Persians. Thebes disputed this honour with them for some years, by surprising actions of valour, which had something of prodigy in them; but this was but a short-lived blaze, which, after having shone out with exceeding splendor, soon disappeared, and left that city in its original obscurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections as to what relates to war, and we shall join them together, in order to be the better able to distinguish their characters, as well in what they resemble, as in what they differ from, each other.



SECT. II. *Origin and Cause of the Valour and military Virtue by which the Lacedaemonians and Athenians always distinguished themselves.*

ALL the laws of Sparta, and institutions of Lycurgus, seem to have no other object than war, and tended solely to the making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises were prohibited amongst them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, trades, even husbandry itself, had no share in their applications, and seemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy no other taste was instilled into them but for arms; and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully well adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to ~~thirst~~ with little meat and drink, to suffer heat and cold, to exercise continually hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds so as to vent neither complaint nor groan; these were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them one day to support all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from the most early years, respect for the magistrates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws, from which no age nor condition was exempt, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which is in a manner the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises.

Now one of these laws was to conquer or die, and never to surrender to the enemy. Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was an illustrious example of this, and his intrepid valour, extolled in all ages with the highest applauses, and proposed as a model to all posterity, had given the same spirit to the nation, and traced them out the plan they were to follow. The disgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to such as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the observance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable.

violable. The mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with their arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Can we be surprised, after this, that a small body of such soldiers, with such principles, should put an innumerable army of Barbarians to a stand?

The Athenians were not bred up so roughly as the people of Sparta, but had no less valour. The taste of the two people was quite different in regard to education and employment; but they attained the same end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to use their arms, and were no more than soldiers; but amongst the Athenians (and we must say as much of the other people of Greece) arts, trades, husbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honour, and thought no disgrace to any one. These occupations were no obstacles to the valour and knowledge necessary in war; they disqualified none for rising to the greatest commands and the first dignities of the republic. Plutarch observes, that Solon, seeing the territory of Attica was barren, applied himself to turning the industry of his citizens upon arts, trades and commerce, in order to supply his country thereby, with what it wanted on the side of fertility. This taste became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself among the people, but without lessening in the least their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distinguished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the Barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians contained itself within due bounds, were another strong incentive to the Athenians, who every day made new efforts to excel themselves, and sustain their reputation.

The rewards and honours granted to those who had distinguished themselves in battle; the monuments erected in memory of the citizens who had died in the defence of their country, the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies, to render their names immortal; all conspired infinitely to eternize the valour of both nations, and particularly of the Athenians, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indispensable necessity to them.

† Athens had a law by which it was ordained, that those who had been maimed in war, should be maintained at the expence of the public. The same grace was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as the children of such as had fallen in battle and left their families poor and not in a condition to subsist themselves. The republic, like a good mother, generously took them into her care, and with great regard to them supplied all the duties, and procured all the relief, they could have expected from those whose loss they deplored.

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Plataea, where the army of the Barbarians, commanded by Mardonius, consisted of no less than three hundred thousand men, and the united forces of the Greeks of only one hundred and eight thousand two hundred men, there were in the latter only ten thousand Lacedæmonians, of which one half were Spartans, that is to say inhabitants of Sparta, and eight thousand Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him seven Helots, which made in all thirty-five thousand men; but they were scarce ever reckoned as soldiers.

† Plut. in Solon. p. 96. Ibid. in Menex. p. 248, 249. Diog. Laert. in Solon. p. 37.

This shining merit in point of martial valour, generally acknowledged by the other states and people, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealousy; as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very much superior to them in number, were in pain to see themselves subjected to their orders, and murmured against it in secret. Agefilæus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army, and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by a herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, and so on, through the other trades, should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agefilæus then smiling, "You see," said he, "how many more soldiers Sparta furnishes than all the rest of the allies together;" thereby intimating, that to be a good soldier, it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artizan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it, as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agefilæus spoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favour of the Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those, whom he was for having considered only as simple artizans, had well demonstrated in the glorious victories they had obtained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely soldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

SECT. III. *Different Kind of Troops of which the Armies of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were composed.*

THE armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of troops: citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were sometimes marked in the hand, to distinguish them from the slaves, who

who had that character impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, that in allusion to this double manner of marking, it is said in the Revelations, that all were obliged "to receive the mark of the beast in their right hand, or in their foreheads;" and that St. Paul says of himself, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."

The citizens of Lacedæmonia were of two sorts, either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In Lyeurgus's time the Spartans amounted to nine thousand, and the others to thirty thousand. This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only eight thousand Spartan. The latter were the flower of the nation, and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for three or four hundred, besieged by the Athenians in the small island of Sphaëteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked how many Spartans there were in the army; he answered, "as many as are necessary to repulse the enemy." They served the state at their own expence, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics were composed of the *Allies*, who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were styled *Mercenaries*.

The Spartans never marched without Helots, and we have seen that in the battle of Plataea every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed, nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms

\* Rev. xiii. 16.

† Gal. vi. 17.

into

into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their masters harsh treatment of them, and who in consequence had every thing to fear from them in battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field as light-armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavy-armed and carried great bucklers, lances, half-pikes, and scymitars. The other were light-armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings as a first line to shoot their arrows, and fling their javelins and stones at the enemy, and when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their volleys.

\* Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner. There were seven regiments, of four companies each, without including the Squirites, to the number of six hundred; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak further. The company consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of a hundred and twenty-eight men, and was subdivided into four platoons, each of thirty-two men. So that a regiment amounted to five hundred and twelve men, and the seven made together three thousand five hundred fourscore and four. Each platoon had four men in front, and eight in depth, for that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers might change according to occasion.

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. † They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called *Sciros*, from whence these troops were denominated *Scirites*, or *Squirites*. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, and this was their post by right.

Cavalry was still more rare amongst the Athenians; the situation of Attica, broken with abundance of

\* Thucyd. l. v. p. 590.

† Ibid.

mountains,

mountains, was the cause of this. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than three hundred horse; but increased afterwards to twelve hundred; a small body for so powerful a republic.

I have already observed, that amongst the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback.

—*Corparo saltu*

*Subjiciunt in equos.*—Æn. l. xi. ver. 287.

And with a leap sit steady on the horse.

Sometimes the horse, broke early to that kind of manage, would stoop down before, to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease;

*Inde inclinatus collum, submissus et armos  
De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga  
Cruribus.* Sil. Ital. de equo Cælii Equ. Rom.

Those, whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horseback; in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused fine stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body\*.

I am surpris'd that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not distinguish that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a like service in respect to the cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprized. He wrote two treatises upon this subject; one of which re-

\* *Ἀναβουλευς μη διοµενους.* This word *Ἀναβουλευς*, signifies a servant, who helped his master to mount on horseback.

gards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to understand and break them; to which he adds the exercise of the squadron; both well worth the reading of all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the art military in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the trade of war.

I have wondered, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration of the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid upon all occasions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these insinuations might give some people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I shall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," says he, "wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of not forming any enterprize, without first endeavouring to render the divinity favourable and propitious, let him reflect, that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and obscure conjunctures, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages, and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's motions, can take no other council than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They unfold the future to whomsoever they please, on the inspection of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by visions or in dreams. Now we may presume that the gods are more inclined to illuminate the minds of such as consult them not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable."

It became this great man to give the most important of instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom he addresses the treatise we mention, and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.



SECT. IV. *Of maritime Affairs, Fleets, and naval Forces.*

**I**F the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in respect to cavalry, they carried it infinitely against them in naval affairs, and we have seen their abilities that way make them masters at sea, and give them a great superiority to all the other states of Greece. As this subject is very necessary to the understanding many passages in this history, I shall treat it more extensively than other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship were the prow or head, the poop or stern, and the middle, called in Latin *carina*, the hulk or waist.

The **P**ROW was the part in the front of the waist or belly of the ship; it was generally adorned with paintings and different sculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak, called *rostrum*, lay lower, and level with the water: it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, covered at the point with brass, and sometimes with iron. The Greeks termed it *ἰμβόλον*.

The other end of the ship, opposite to the prow, was called the **P**OOB. There the pilot sat and held the helm, which was a longer and larger oar than the rest.

The **W**AIST was the hollow of the vessel, or the hold.

The ships were of two kinds. The one was rowed with oars, which were ships of war, the other carried sails, and were vessels of burden, intended for commerce and transports. Both of them sometimes made use of oars and sails together, but that very rarely. The ships of war are also very often called long ships by authors, and by that name distinguished from vessels of burden.

The long ships were further divided into two species; those which were called *actuariæ naves*, and were very light vessels, like our brigantines; and those called only long ships. The first were usually termed *open ships*,

because they had no decks. Of these light vessels there were some larger than ordinary, of which some had twenty, some thirty, and others forty oars, half on one side and half on the other, all on the same line.

The long ships, which were used in war, were of two sorts. Some had only one rank of oars on each side; the others two, three, four, five, or a greater number, to forty; but these last were rather for show than use.

The long ships of one rank of oars were called *aphracti*; that is to say, uncovered, and had no decks: this distinguished them from the *cataphracti*, which had decks. They had only small pieces to stand on, at the head and stern, in the time of action.

The ships most commonly used in the battles of the ancients, were those which carried from three to five ranks or benches of oars, and were called *triremes* and *quinqueremes*.

It is a great question, and has given occasion for abundance of learned dissertations, how these benches of oars were disposed. Some will have it, that they were placed at length, like the ranks of oars in the modern galleys. Others maintain, that the ranges of the biremes, triremes, quinqueremes, and so on to the number of forty in some vessels, were one above another. To support this last opinion, innumerable passages are cited from ancient authors, which seem to leave no manner of doubt in it, and are considerably corroborated by the column of Trajan, which represents these ranks one above another. Father Montfaucon, however, avers, that all the persons of greatest skill in naval affairs, whom he had consulted, declared, that the thing conceived in that manner, seemed to them utterly impossible. But such a way of reasoning is a weak proof against the experience of so many ages, confirmed by so many authors. It is true, that in admitting these ranks of oars to be disposed perpendicularly one above another, it is not easy to comprehend how they could be worked; but in the biremes and triremes of the column of Trajan, the lower ranks are placed obliquely, and, as it were, rising by degrees.

In

In ancient times the ships with several ranks of oars were not known: they made use of long ships, in which the rowers, of whatever number they were, worked all upon the same line. <sup>a</sup> Such was the fleet which the Greeks sent against Troy. It was composed of twelve hundred sail, of which the galleys of Bœotia had each a hundred and twenty men, and those of Philoctetes fifty; and this no doubt intends the greatest and smallest vessels. Their galleys had no decks, but were built like common boats; which is still practised, says Thucydides, by the pirates, to prevent their being so soon discovered at a distance.

<sup>b</sup> The Corinthians are said to have been the first who changed the form of ships, and, instead of simple galleys, made vessels with three ranks, in order to add, by the multiplicity of oars, to the swiftness and impetuosity of their motion. Their city, advantageously situated between two seas, lay well for commerce, and served as a staple for merchandize. From their example, the inhabitants of Corcyra, and the tyrants of Sicily, equipped also many galleys of three benches, a little before the war against the Persians. It was about the same time the Athenians, at the warm instances of Themistocles, who foresaw the war which soon broke out, built ships of the same form, the whole deck not being yet in use; and from thenceforth they applied themselves to naval affairs with incredible ardour and success.

The beak of the prow (*rostrum*) was that part of the vessel of which most use was made in sea-fights. <sup>c</sup> Ariston of Corinth persuaded the Syracusans, when their city was besieged by the Athenians, to make their prows lower and shorter; which advice gained them the victory. For the prows of the Athenian vessels being very high and very weak, their beaks struck only the parts above water, and for that reason did little damage to the enemy's ships; whereas the Syracusans, whose prows were strong and low, and their beaks level with the water, at a single blow often sunk the triremes of the Athenians.

<sup>a</sup> Thucyd. l. i. p. 8.    <sup>b</sup> Thucyd. l. i. p. 10.    <sup>c</sup> Diod. l. xiii. p. 141.

Two sorts of people served on board these galleys. The one were employed in steering and working the ship, who were the rowers, *remiges*, and the mariners, *nautæ*. The rest were soldiers intended for the fight, and are meant in Greek by the word *επιεταται*. This distinction was not understood in the early times, when the same persons rowed, fought, and did all the necessary work of the ship; which was also not wholly disused in later days. For <sup>4</sup>Thucydides, in describing the arrival of the Athenian fleet at the small island of Sphacteria, observes, that only the rowers of the lowest bench remained in the ships, and that the rest went on shore with their arms.

1. The condition of the rowers was very hard and laborious. I have already said, that the rowers, as well as mariners, were all citizens and freemen, and not slaves or strangers as in these days. The rowers were distinguished by their several stages. The lower rank were called *Thalamitæ*, the middle *Zugitæ*, and the highest *Thranitæ*. Thucydides remarks, that the latter had greater pay than the rest, because they worked with longer and heavier oars than those of the lower benches. \* It seems that the crew, in order to act in concert, and with better effect, were sometimes guided by the singing of a man, and sometimes by the sound of an instrument; and this grateful harmony served not only to regulate the motion of their oars, but to diminish and soothe the pains of their labour.

It is a question amongst the learned, whether there was a man to every oar in these great ships, or several, as in the galleys of these days. What Thucydides observes on the pay of the *Thranitæ*, seems to imply that they worked single. For if others had shared the work with them, wherefore had they greater pay given them than those who managed an oar alone, as the latter had as much, and perhaps more, of the labour than they?

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. l. iv. p. 275.

\* *Musica natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos facilius labores veluti muneri nobis dedisse. Siquidem et remiges cantus hortatur; nec solum in iis operibus, in quibus plurimum conatus præeunte aliqua jucunda voce conspirat, sed etiam singulorum fatigatio quamlibet se rudi modulatione solatur.* QUINTIL. l. i. c. 10.

Father Montfaucon believes, that in the vessels of five ranks there might be several men to one oar.

He who took care of the whole crew, and commanded the vessel, was called *naulerus*, and was the principal officer. The second was the pilot, *gabernator*; his place was in the poop, where he held the helm in his hand, and steered the vessel. His skill consisted in knowing the coasts, ports, rocks, shoals, and especially the winds and stars; for before the invention of the compass, the pilot had nothing to direct him during the night but the stars.

2. The soldiers, who fought in the ships, were armed almost in the same manner with the land forces. \* The Athenians, at the battle of Salamin, had a hundred and fourscore vessels, and in each of them eighteen fighting men, four of whom were archers, and the rest heavy-armed troops. The officer who commanded these soldiers was called *νηποταρχος*, and the commander of the whole fleet *ναυαρχος*, or *στρατηγος*.

We cannot exactly say the number of soldiers, mariners, and rowers, that served on board each ship; but it generally amounted to two hundred, more or less, as appears from Herodotus's estimate of the Persian fleet in the time of Xerxes, and in other places where he mentions that of the Greeks. I mean here the great vessels, the triremes, which were the species most in use.

The pay of those who served in these ships varied very much at different times. When young Cyrus arrived in Asia<sup>f</sup>, it was only three oboli, which was half a drachma, or fivepence; and the \* treaty between the Persians and Lacedæmonians was concluded upon this foot; which gives reason to believe, that the usual pay was three oboli. Cyrus, at Lyfander's request, added a fourth, which made sixpence halfpenny a day. † It was often raised to a whole drachma, about ten-pence

\* Plut. in Themist. p. 119.

<sup>f</sup> Xenoph. Hist. li. p. 441.

† Thucyd. I. vi. p. 431.

\* This treaty stipulated, that the Persian, should pay thirty mines a month for each ship, which was half a talent; the whole amounted to three oboli a day for every man that served on board.

French. In the fleet fitted out against Sicily the Athenians gave a drachma a day to the troops. The sum of sixty talents<sup>h\*</sup>, which the people of Egesta advanced the Athenians monthly for the maintaining of sixty ships, shows that the pay of each vessel for a month amounted to a talent, that is to say, to three thousand livres; which supposes, that each ship's company consisted of two hundred men, each of whom received a drachma or ten-pence a day. As the officers' pay was higher, the republic perhaps either furnished the overplus, or it was deducted out of the total of the sum advanced for a vessel, by abating something in the pay of the private men.

The same may be said of the land troops as has been said of the seamen, except that the horse had double their pay. It appears that the ordinary pay of the foot was three oboli a day, and that it was augmented according to times and occasions. <sup>i</sup>Thimbron, the Lacedæmonian, when he marched against Tissaphernes, promised a darick a month to each soldier, two to a captain, and four to the colonels. Now a darick a month is four oboli a day. Young Cyrus, to animate his troops, whom a too long march had discouraged, instead of one darick, promised one and a half to each soldier, which amounted to a drachma, or ten-pence French a day.

It may be asked how the Lacedæmonians, whose iron coin, the only specie current amongst them, would go no where else, could maintain armies by sea and land, and where they found money for their subsistence. It is not to be doubted, but they raised it, as the Athenians did, by contributions from their allies, and still more from the cities to which they gave liberty and protection, or from those they had conquered from their enemies. Their second fund for paying their fleet and armies was the aids they drew from the king of Persia, as we have seen on several occasions.

<sup>h</sup> Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415.

<sup>i</sup> Xenoph. Expedit. Cyr. l. vii.

\* About. 8400l. sterling.

SECT. V. *Peculiar Character of the Athenians.*

PLUTARCH furnishes us with almost all the matter upon this head. Every body knows how well he succeeds in copying nature in his portraits, and how proper a person he was to trace the character of a people, whose genius and manners he had studied with so profound an attention.

“ \* I. \* The people of Athens,” says Plutarch, “ were easily provoked to anger, and as easily induced to resume their sentiments of benevolence and compassion.” History supplies us with an infinitude of examples of this kind. The sentence of death passed against the inhabitants of Mytilene, and revoked the next day: the condemnation of the ten generals, and that of Socrates, both followed with an immediate repentance and the most lively grief.

“ II. † They were better pleased with penetrating, and almost guessing an affair of themselves, than to give themselves leisure to be informed in it thoroughly, and in all its extent.”

Nothing is more surprising than this circumstance in their character, which it is very hard to conceive, and seems almost incredible. Artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, mariners, are generally a dull, heavy kind of people, and very gross in their conceptions; but the people of Athens were of a quite different turn. They had naturally an amazing penetration, vivacity, and even delicacy of wit.

I have already mentioned what happened to Theophrastus. ‡ He was cheapening something of an old woman at Athens that sold herbs: “ No, Mr. Stranger,” said she, “ you shall have it for no less.” He was strangely surpris’d to see himself treated as a stranger,

\* Plut. in præcept. reip. ger. p. 793.

\* ὁ δὲ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ευκλειῆτος ἐστὶ πρὸς ὀργήν, ευμείλιτος πρὸς εὐερίαν.

† Μαλλον ὀξείως υπονοεῖν, ἢ διδάσκεισθαι καθ’ ἡσυχίαν βυθισμένοις.

‡ Cum Theophrastus percontaretur ex anieula quadam, quanti aliquid venderet, et respondisset illa, atque addidisset: hospes, non pote minoris; tulit molestè, se non effugere hospitis speciem, cum ætatem ageret Athenis, optimeque loqueretur. Cic. de Clar. Orat. n. 12.

who

who had passed almost his whole life at Athens, and who piqued himself upon excelling all others in the elegance of his language. It was, however, from that she knew he was not of her country. We have said, that the Athenian soldiers knew the fine passages of Euripides by heart. These artificers and soldiers, from assisting at the public deliberations, were besides versed in the affairs of state, and understood every thing at half a word. We may judge of this from the orations of Demosthenes, whose style we know is ardent, brief, and concise.

“III. \* As they naturally inclined to relieve persons of a low condition and mean circumstances, so were they fond of conversations seasoned with pleasantry, and proper to make people laugh.”

<sup>1</sup> They assisted persons of a mean condition, because from such they had nothing to apprehend in regard to their liberty, and saw in them the characters of equality and resemblance with themselves. They loved pleasantry, and shewed in that they were men; but men abounding with humanity and indulgence, who understood raillery, who were not prone to take offence, nor over delicate in point of the respect to be paid them. One day, when the assembly was fully formed, and the people had already taken their places and sat down, Cleon, after having made them wait his coming a great while, appeared at last with a wreath of flowers upon his head, and desired the people to adjourn their deliberations to the next day. “For to-day,” said he, “I have business. I have been sacrificing to the gods, and am to entertain some strangers, my friends, at supper.” The Athenians, setting up a laugh, rose and broke up the assembly. At Carthage such a pleasantry would have cost any man his life, that had presumed to vent it, and to take such a liberty with a † proud, haughty, jealous, morose people, of a genius

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. de Athen. Rep. p. 691.

\* Ωσπερ των ανδρων τοις αδοξοις κ̄ ταπεινοις βοηθει προθυμοτερος, υτως των λογων τας παιγνιωδεις κ̄ γελοιωδεις ασπαζειται κ̄ προτιμα.

† Πικρον, σκυθρωπον, προς παιδιαν κ̄ χαριν ανηδυτον κ̄ σκληρον.



averse to complacency, and less inclined to humour. Upon another occasion the orator Stratocles, having informed the people of a victory, and in consequence caused sacrifices to be offered, three days after news came of the defeat of the army. As the people expressed their discontent and resentment upon the false information, he asked them, “of what they had to complain, and what harm he had done them, in making them pass three days more agreeably than they would else have done?”

“IV. \* They were pleased with hearing themselves praised, and could not bear to be railed at, or criticised. The least acquaintance with Aristophanes and Demosthenes will shew, with what address and effect they employed praises and criticism with regard to the people of Athens.

<sup>m</sup> When the republic enjoyed peace and tranquillity, says the same Plutarch in another place, the Athenian people diverted themselves with the orators who flattered them: but in important affairs, and emergencies of the state, they became serious, and gave the preference to those, whose custom it had been to oppose their unjust desires; such as Pericles, Phocion, and Demosthenes.

“V. † They kept those who governed them in awe, and shewed their humanity even to their enemies.”

The people of Athens made good use of the talents of those who distinguished themselves by their eloquence and prudence; but they were full of suspicion, and kept themselves always on their guard against their superiority of genius and ability: they took pleasure in restraining their courage, and lessening their glory and reputation. This may be judged from the ostracism, which was instituted only as a curb on those, whose merit and popularity ran too high, and which spared

<sup>m</sup> Plut. in Phocian, p. 746.

\* Τοις μιν επαινησιν αυτον μαλιστα χαιρει, τοις δε σκωπισιν ηκιστα δυσχεραίνει.

† Φθόςος εστιν αχρι των αρχοντων, ειτα φιλανθρωπιος αχρι των πολεμιων.

neither



neither the greatest nor the most worthy persons. The hatred of tyranny and tyrants, which was in a manner innate in the Athenians, made them extremely jealous and apprehensive for their liberty, with regard to those who governed.

As to what relates to their enemies, they did not treat them with rigour; they did not make an insolent use of victory, nor exercise any cruelty towards the vanquished. The amnesty decreed after the tyranny of the Thirty, shows that they could forget the injuries which had been done them.

To these different characteristics which Plutarch unites in the same passage of his works, some others may be added, extracted principally from the same author.

“ VI. It was from this \* fund of humanity and benevolence, of which I have now spoken, and which was natural to the Athenians, that they were so attentive to the rules of politeness, and so delicate in point of just behaviour; qualities one would not expect to find among the common people. ” In the war against Philip of Macedon, having intercepted one of his couriers, they read all the letters he carried, except that of Olympias his wife, which they returned sealed up and unopened, out of regard to conjugal love and secrecy, the rights of which are sacred, and ought to be respected even amongst enemies. The same Athenians having decreed, that a strict search should be made after the presents distributed by Harpalus amongst the orators, would not suffer the house of Callicles, who was lately married, to be visited, out of respect for his bride, not long brought home. Such behaviour is not very common, and upon like occasions people do not stand much upon forms and politeness.

“ VII. The taste of the Athenians for all arts and sciences is too well known to require dwelling long upon it in this place. Besides which, I shall have occasion to speak of it with some extent elsewhere. But

\* Plut. in Demetr. p. 898.

\* Πατριον αυτοις η συμφυλον ην το φιλανθρωπον. In Pelop. p. 280.

we cannot see without admiration a people composed for the most part, as I have said before, of artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, and mariners, carry delicacy of taste in every kind to so high a degree of perfection, which seems the peculiar attribute of a more exalted condition and a noble education.

“ VIII. It is no less wonderful, that this people\* should have such great views, and rose so high in their pretensions. In the war Alcibiades made them undertake, filled with vast projects and unbounded hopes, they did not confine themselves to the taking of Syracuse, or the conquest of Sicily, but had already added Italy, Peloponnesus, Lybia, the Carthaginian states, and the empire of the sea to the Pillars of Hercules. Their enterprise failed, but they had formed it; and the taking of Syracuse, which seemed no great difficulty, might have enabled them to put it in execution.

“ IX. The same people, so great, and, one may say, so haughty in their projects, had nothing of that character in other respects. In what regarded the expence of the table, dress, furniture, private buildings, and, in a word, private life, they were frugal, simple, modest, and poor; but sumptuous and magnificent in all things public, and capable of doing honour to the state. Their victories, conquests, wealth, and continual communication with the people of Asia Minor, introduced neither luxury, gluttony, pomp, nor vain profusion among them. ° Xenophon observes, that a citizen could not be distinguished from a slave by his dress. The richest inhabitants, and the most famous generals, were not ashamed to go to market themselves.

It was very glorious for Athens to have produced and formed so many excellent persons in the arts of war and government; in philosophy, eloquence, poesy, painting, sculpture, and architecture: of having furnished alone more great men in every kind than any other city of the world; if perhaps we except Rome,

\* De Rep. Athen. p. 693.

\* Μέγτε φρονεῖ μεγάλων πραγμάτων. PLUT.

which

which \* had imbibed learning and arts from her, and knew how to apply her lessons to the best advantage; of having been in some sort the school, and tutor of almost the whole universe; of having served, and still continuing to serve, as the model for nations, which pique themselves most upon the excellency of taste; in a word, of having taught the language, and prescribed the laws of all that regards the talents and productions of the mind. The part of this history, wherein I shall treat the sciences and learned men, that rendered Greece illustrious, with the arts also, and those who excelled in them, will set this in a clear light.

“ X. I shall conclude this description of the Athenians with one more attribute, which cannot be denied them, and appears evidently in all their actions and enterprises; and that is, their ardent love of liberty. This was their darling passion and great principle of policy. We see them, from the commencement of the war with the Persians, sacrifice every thing to the liberty of Greece. They abandoned, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city, and houses, and removed to their ships, in order to fight the common enemy, whose view was to enslave them. What could be more glorious for Athens, than, when all the allies were trembling at the vast offers made her by the king of Persia, to answer his ambassador by the mouth of P Aristides, that all the gold and silver in the world was not capable of tempting them to sell their own, or the liberty of Greece? It was from such generous sentiments that the Athenians not only became the bulwark of Greece, but preserved the rest of Europe, and all the western world, from the invasion of the Persians.

These great qualities were mingled with great defects, often the very reverse of them, such as we may

P Plut. in Aristid. p. 324.

\* *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes  
Intulit agresti Latio.*

HORAT. Epist. I. l. 2.

Greece taken, took her savage victors hearts,  
And polish'd rustic Latium with her arts.

T 2

imagine

imagine in a fluctuating, light, inconstant, capricious people, as the Athenians.

SECT. VI. *Common Character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.*

I CANNOT refuse giving a place here to what Mr. Bossuet says upon the character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The passage is long, but will not appear so, and includes all that is wanting to a perfect knowledge of the genius of both those people.

Amongst all the republics of which Greece was composed, Athens and Lacedæmon were undoubtedly the principal. No people could have more wit than the Athenians, nor more solid sense than the Lacedæmonians. Athens affected pleasure; the Lacedæmonian way of life was hard and laborious. Both loved glory and liberty; but the liberty of Athens tended to licence; and controlled by severe laws at Lacedæmon, the more restrained it was at home, the more ardent it was to extend itself in rule abroad. Athens was also for reigning, but upon another principle, in which interest had a share with glory. Her citizens excelled in the art of navigation, and the sovereignty at sea had enriched her. To continue in the sole possession of all commerce, there was nothing she would not have subjected to her power; and her riches, which inspired this passion, supplied her with the means of gratifying it. On the contrary, at Lacedæmon money was in contempt. As all the laws tended to make the latter a military republic, the glory of arms was the sole object that engrossed her citizens. From thence she naturally affected dominion: and the more she was above interest, the more she abandoned herself to ambition.

Lacedæmon, from her regular life, was steady and determinate in her maxims and measures. Athens was more lively and active, and the people too much masters. Their laws and philosophy had indeed the most happy effects upon such exquisite natural parts as theirs,

theirs, but reason alone was not capable of keeping them within due bounds. \* A wise Athenian, who knew admirably the genius of his country, informs us, that fear was necessary to those too ardent and free spirits; and that it was impossible to govern them, after the victory at Salamin had removed their fears of the Persians.

Two things then ruined them, the glory of their great actions, and the supposed security of their present condition. The magistrates were no longer heard, and as Persia was afflicted with excessive slavery, so Athens, says Plato, experienced all the evils of excessive liberty.

Those two great republics, so contrary in their manners and conduct, interfered with each other in the design they had each formed of subjecting all Greece; so that they were always enemies, more from the contrariety of their interests, than the incompatibility of their humours.

The Grecian cities were against submitting to the dominion of either the one or the other; for, besides the desire of preserving their liberty, they found the empire of those two republics too grievous to bear. That of the Lacedæmonians was severe. That people were observed to have something almost brutal in their character. † A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers too haughty, austere, and imperious in power: besides which they could never expect to live in peace under the influence of a city, which being formed for war, could not support itself, but by continuing perpetually in arms. ‡ So that the Lacedæmonians were capable of attaining to command, and all the world were afraid they should do so.

\* The Athenians were naturally obliging and agreeable. Nothing was more delightful to behold than their city, in which feasts and games were perpetual, where wit, liberty, and the various passions of men

\* Plat. l. iii. de Leg.

† Xenoph. de Rep. Lacœ.

‡ Aristot. Polit. l. i. p. 4.

\* Plat, de Rep. l, viii.

daily exhibited new objects: but the inequality of their conduct disgusted their allies, and was still more insupportable to their own subjects. It was impossible for them not to experience the extravagance and caprice of a flattered people, that is to say, according to Plato, something more dangerous than the same excesses in a prince vitiated by flattery.

These two cities did not permit Greece to continue in repose. We have seen the Peloponnesian and other wars, which were always occasioned, or fomented, by the jealousy of Lacedæmon and Athens. But the same jealousies which involved Greece in troubles, supported it in some measure, and prevented its falling into the dependance of either the one or the other of those republics.

The Persians soon perceived this condition of Greece, and accordingly the whole mystery of their politics consisted in keeping up those jealousies, and fomenting those divisions. Lacedæmon, which was the most ambitious, was the first that gave them occasion to enter into the quarrels of the Greeks. They engaged in them from the sole view of making themselves masters of the whole nation; and industrious to weaken the Greeks by their own arms, they waited only the opportunity to crush them all together. <sup>1</sup> The states of Greece in their wars already regarded only the king of Persia, whom they called the Great King, or *the king*, by way of eminence, as if they had already been of the number of his subjects. But it was impossible that the ancient spirit of Greece should not revive, when they were upon the point of falling into slavery, and the hands of the Barbarians.

The petty kings of Greece undertook to oppose this great king, and to ruin his empire. <sup>2</sup> With a small army, but bred in the discipline we have related, Agesilaus king of Sparta, made the Persians tremble in Asia Minor, and showed it was not impossible to subvert their power. The divisions of Greece alone put a stop

<sup>1</sup> Plat. l. 3. de leg. Isocrat. Panegy.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. l. 3.

to his conquests. The famous retreat of the ten thousand, who after the death of young Cyrus, made their way in a hostile manner through the whole Persian empire, and returned into their own country; that action, I say, demonstrated to Greece more than ever, that their soldiery was invincible, and superior to all opposers; and that only their domestic divisions could subject them to an enemy too weak to resist their united force.


We shall see in the series of this history, by what methods Philip king of Macedon, taking advantage of these divisions, came at length, between address and force, to make himself little less than the sovereign of Greece, and to oblige the whole nation to march under his colours against the common enemy. What he had only planned, his son Alexander brought to perfection; and showed the wondering world, how much ability and valour avail against the most numerous armies and the most formidable preparations.

END OF VOL. IV.













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