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
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ARISTOTLE'S  
TREATISE ON RHETORIC,  
LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,  
WITH COPIOUS NOTES.

AN ANALYSIS  
OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC,  
BY THOMAS HOBBS, OF MALMSBURY.

ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS ON  
ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

SECOND EDITION, THOROUGHLY CORRECTED, WITH ADDITIONS AND  
IMPROVEMENTS.



OXFORD  
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DOUG. H. B. R.  
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## TO THE READER.

IN this second edition, the translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric has been again carefully compared with the Greek, and revised and corrected throughout. Numerous explanatory and illustrative notes have also been added ; as well as a marginal analysis, which it is presumed will be found of much service to the reader.

The famous Thomas Hobbes' *Brief of the Art of Rhetorick*, "containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his three books on that subject," and forming the best summary of this noble science, has been again reprinted from the scarce edition published at London in 1681. A body of Analytical Questions, for self-examination, has also been appended.

With these improvements, the Publisher confidently hopes that the present volume will be found to contain, not only the most faithful version of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, but the best helps for the due understanding and retaining the sense thereof.

*Oxford, November, 1832.*





ARISTOTLE'S  
TREATISE ON RHETORIC.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

*That Rhetoric, like Logic, is conversant with no definite class of subjects; that it is useful; and that its business is not absolutely to persuade, but to recognise topics fitted to persuade.*

RHETORIC<sup>a</sup> is the counterpart of logic<sup>b</sup>; since both are conversant with subjects of such a nature as it is the business of all to have a certain knowledge of, and which belong to no distinct science. Wherefore all men in some way participate of both<sup>c</sup>; since all, to a certain extent, attempt, as well to sift, as to maintain an argument; as well to defend themselves, as to im-

1. Rhetoric corresponds to Logic.

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle appears to have contemplated a much greater variety of occasions for the exercise of his *ῥητορικὴ*, than we consider proper to that ill-defined art, or habit, or faculty, vaguely called *rhetoric*. In fact, according to him, any man who attempts to persuade another, under whatever circumstances, and with whatever object, may be said to exercise *ῥητορικὴ*.

<sup>b</sup> Muretus explains the passage as conveying a censure on Plato, who extolled logic, but compared rhetoric to cookery—*ὄψοποιητικῆ*. He therefore would have it convey this meaning, "Rhetoric is the counterpart, not of cookery, as Plato asserts, but of his own favourite science, dialectics." See also note *u*, p. 22.

<sup>c</sup> Sir P. Sidney, arguing that all arts are but attempts to methodise natural subjects, says, that "the rhetorician and logician, considering what in nature will soonest prove and persuade, thereon give artificial rules, which are still compressed within the circle of a question, according to the proposed matter." *Defense of Poetry*.

That we  
can reduce  
them to a  
system.

peach<sup>d</sup>. Now, of the multitude<sup>e</sup>, some do this at random; others, by reason of practice, from habit; but as it is possible either way, it is plain that the case will admit of our reducing these things to a system. For we are at liberty to speculate on the causes of the success, as well of those who from practice, as of those who on the spur of the moment, [attempt either to convince or to persuade]. And every one will be antecedently prepared to acknowledge that an undertaking of this description is the business of art<sup>f</sup>.

3. Strictures  
on previous  
systems.

Hitherto, however, such as have compiled systems of oratory have executed a very trifling part of it; for the means of making credible<sup>g</sup> alone come pro-

<sup>d</sup> Ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν, quæ *Logicians*; ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν, quæ *Rhetoricians*: so that the faculties which form the basis of each of these arts appear to be natural to every man. Zeno elegantly illustrated the distinction between the two by a simile taken from the hand. The close power of *Logic* he compared to the fist, or hand compressed; the diffuse power of *Rhetoric* to the palm, or hand open. Cicero, Orator.

<sup>e</sup> The vulgar can give reasons to a certain degree, and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. And what is this but NATURAL LOGIC? If therefore these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happen without a cause, this effect must of necessity be derived from certain principles. The question then is, *What these principles are*; for if these can once be investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by *rule* what others do by *hazard*; and in what we do, as much to excel the uninstructed reasoner, as a disciplined boxer surpasses an untaught rustic. Harris's Philosophical Arrang. ch. i.

<sup>f</sup> An effect is produced; sometimes indeed *accidentally*, and sometimes from the person's having been *habituated* to that which he attempts. Now if we can ascertain and methodise the causes of this his success, so as to ensure the success of subsequent attempts, we shall have constructed something similar to an art: for, in some points, chance and art are not unlike; whence the verse of Agatho;—

Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχην τέχνην.

See Eth. Nich. vi. 4.

<sup>g</sup> Πίστις.—If the translation of this word shall appear frequently to be vague and indeterminate, the reader is requested to observe that we have no equivalent expression in English; for it is conceived that "*proof*" (the usual translation) always implies something qualified to *convince* the understanding; whereas Aristotle designates by the word πίστις, *every thing which has a tendency to persuade the will*. It is not, however, meant to be denied that proof (*properly such*) frequently has, and always ought

perly within the sphere of the art, but other points are merely adscititious. On the subject of enthymems, however, which in point of fact is the very body of proof, these men say not a word; while on points foreign to the subject they busy themselves most mightily. Now the feeling of ill-will<sup>h</sup>, pity, and anger, and the like emotions of the mind, appertain not to the case, but refer to the judge; so that if, in regard to all judicial processes, matters were regulated as they now are in some states, (and more particularly in such as are well constituted,) these spokesmen would not have a word to say. And every one [approves the regulation], whether they think that the *law* should hold this language, or whether they avail themselves of the rule, and positively forbid to speak irrelevantly to the case; just as they do in the Areopagus, observing this usage properly enough. For it is not right that an orator should bias the judge by winning him on to anger, or pity, or jealousy; since it is equally absurd as though one were to make a ruler crooked which he is about to use<sup>i</sup>. It is further evident that the pleader's business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case; that it has, or has not happened. But as to the question whether it be important or trifling, just or unjust, whatever questions of

Neglect of the πίστις.

4. Hence undue appeals to the passions.

5.

6.

to have, a tendency to *persuade*; but, at the same time, it would be too much to say that it is the *only thing* which is qualified to do so. Vide Mitchell's Aristoph. vol. i; Pal. Diss. p. 72; *ibid.* p. 75.

<sup>h</sup> For a similar use of the word διαβολή, cf. Thucyd. lib. i, c. 127.—οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἠλπίζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.

<sup>i</sup> Κριτῆς τοῦ νόμου κἀνων. Aristotle employs the same metaphor in his Ethics:—τοῦ γὰρ ἀρίστου, ἀριστος καὶ ὁ κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς, ὁ μολύβδινος κανὼν πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν. Lib. v, c. 10. See Lucretius, iv, 516.—

Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima,

Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,

\* \* \* \* \*

Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc.

this nature the legislator has not determined; on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind *of himself*, and not take instructions on them from the parties at issue. It would then be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge. And this because, in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, than to get many<sup>1</sup>: and next to this, legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; [or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time;] while judicial decisions are made off hand; so that it is difficult for persons deciding under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient: and, what is most of all to the point, is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present circumstances, but about what is future and general; whereas the member of a popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite; and under their circumstances, feelings of partiality, and dislike, and personal expediency, will, in many instances, antecedently have been interwoven with the case; and to such a degree, that one is no longer able, adequately, to contemplate the truth, and that personal pleasure or pain throws a shade over the judgment. In regard, then, to other particulars, as I

7. Reasons why as little as possible should be left to the judge.

1st.

2nd.

3rd.

8. But

<sup>1</sup> As the young man can learn consequences (ὅτι) ere he discovers principles (δαίωτι, Eth. lib. i.) so can most men better judge of individual cases by δικαστική φρόνησις, than frame laws by νομοθετική φρόνησις (Eth. lib. vi). And this is proved by the universal bias of orators to individual cases founded on law. To borrow an illustration from the arts, we may say that as a person placed in the centre of a landscape has a fuller view of any individual object in it than the painter himself, but loses proportionately the general effect; so the judge can discern all the particulars of a given case, but cannot, as the legislator who contemplates at a distance, view so well the general bearings and effects of any law when united or contrasted with others. Cf. also the Ethics, lib. v, c. i.—ὀρθῶς μὲν νόμος ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς χεῖρον δὲ ὁ ἀπεισχειδιασμένος.

observed, it is right to leave the judge a discretion in as few as possible<sup>m</sup>: but questions of fact, whether it has or has not taken place, will or will not happen, does or does not exist; all such it is *necessary*<sup>n</sup> to abandon to the discretion of the judges; since it is not possible that the legislator ever should foresee them.

questions of fact, etc. must be left to him.

If these things be so, it is plain that they embrace in 9. their systems matters foreign to the subject, who give us explanations of the other points, as for instance—what the proem, and the narration, and the other divisions, ought severally to embrace: for in these treatises they busy themselves about nothing else, except how to render the judge of a certain disposition; while on the subject of those means of persuasion, recognised by art, they discover nothing; and yet this is the source whence an orator may become a good reasoner.

And it is for this reason that, notwithstanding the same system is conversant about deliberative and judicial cases, and although the business of the senate is more honourable, and embraces higher social interests, than that whose subject is merely the transactions of individuals; yet about the former they say not one word, while all undertake to frame systems of judicial pleading. And<sup>o</sup> they are not without a reason for this,

10. Reasons why men prefer judicial to deliberative oratory.

<sup>m</sup> Cf. Hooker, v, § 9, p. 36.

<sup>n</sup> It is not in the nature of things that any human legislator should determine on the infinite number of *possible* cases; or that he should not, with regard to some, be an unsafe guide to our decisions: for the last of these inconveniences we have a remedy in *ἐπιείκεια*; since equity is, as he subsequently describes it, τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένον ἔλλειμμα, and τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον.—lib. i, c. xiii, § 13. And again in the Ethics, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἧ ἑλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου, v, 10.

<sup>o</sup> This error is a consequence on the one mentioned before, § 3: from the disregard there noticed of the enthymem and *πίστις*, orators are naturally led to attach themselves to that branch of public speaking which requires enthymem least; and such is judicial pleading, inasmuch as the cause there rests mainly on *evidence*, properly so called, on the *ἀτίχναί πιστεῖς*. Aristotle himself gives as another reason for this preference, the greater ease of judicial oratory (vide lib. iii, c. xvii, § 10). And this he proves, first, because that which has been is plain to all, even to diviners; secondly, the orator having law for a premiss, the demonstration

since in deliberative speeches it is less worth while to state matters foreign to the subject, and a deliberative speech admits less of malicious sophistry than judicial pleading, but is more widely interesting; for here the judge [i. e. the senator] decides on questions which nearly interest himself, so that no more is necessary than to prove that the question stands just as he, the adviser, asserts. In judicial questions, however, this is not sufficient, but it is worth while to engage the hearer; for the decision is about a case which does not affect himself: so that the judges looking to their own gratification, and listening with a view to amusement, surrender themselves up to the pleaders; and, strictly speaking, do not fulfil the character of judges<sup>p</sup>. On which very account the law, in many places, as I before remarked, forbids the saying any thing irrelevant; but there [in deliberative assemblies] the judges are, of themselves, careful enough of this.

is easier. To these reasons may be added one which the master of Alexander would not willingly have allowed, namely, the loss of liberty to Greece, and the consequent loss of all interest in deliberative questions, to men whose future fates were totally out of their own power.

<sup>p</sup> A writer in the *Quarterly Review*, No. 26, after contrasting the perplexity of English law with the simplicity of Athenian jurisprudence, says, "This simplicity in the law made it the orator's business less to hunt for cases and precedents than to discriminate character; less to search for errors in a bill than for flaws or errors in a witness's life or testimony. And the prevalence of this practice may be inferred from a subsequent passage in this book (c. ix, § 38), where Isocrates is mentioned as an adept in the *comparison of characters*, "which," says Aristotle, "he used to do to further his *familiarity with judicial pleading*." To this we may subjoin the following remarks of Mitford on a speech of Alcibiades: "The multitude ordinarily composing an Athenian court of justice was so great, that the pleaders always addressed it as under the impulse of the same interests, and subject to the same feelings as the general assembly, and equally without responsibility. Impartiality was never supposed; the passions were always applied to; and it never failed to be contended between the parties, which could most persuade the jurors that their interest was implicated with his, and that by deciding in his favour they would be gainers." *Hist. of Greece*, vol. v, p. 94. So also Xenophon, in his *Athenian Republic*, c. i, § 13.—*ἐν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δίκαιου αὐτοῖς μέλει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς ξυμφέροντος.*

But as it is plain that an artificial system is conversant about the means of making credible, and, as this is a sort of *proof*, (because we are then most persuaded when we conceive that the point has been *proved*,) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymem, (and this, to speak generally, has the most sovereign effect of all the means of persuasion;) and the enthymem is a sort of syllogism; since too it is the province of logic to consider equally every sort of syllogism, whether of that art as a whole, or of some particular branch of it; then these points being admitted, it is evident that the man best able to consider the question, out of what sources and how the syllogism arises, will moreover be in the highest degree capable of employing enthymems; provided he make himself acquainted, besides his logic, with the kind of subjects about which enthymems are conversant, and what differences they exhibit as compared with the syllogism of logic. Because it belongs to the same faculty of the mind to recognise both truth and the semblance of truth; and more than this, mankind have a<sup>9</sup> tolerable natural tendency toward that which is true; and, in general, hit the truth; wherefore an aptness in conjecturing probabilities belongs to him who has a similar aptness in regard to truth. It is plain, then, that other rhetoricians embrace in their systems, points foreign to the subject, and what reasons they have for inclining to the subject of judicial pleading in preference to the other branches of rhetoric.

But rhetoric is *useful*, because truth and justice are in their nature stronger than their opposites; so that if decisions be made, not in conformity to the rule of propriety, it must have been that they have been got the better of, through fault of the advocates themselves: and this is deserving reprehension. Further-

11. Reasons why the logician will probably be the best rhetorician.

12. Utility of Rhetoric proved.

1st.

2nd.

<sup>9</sup> Πιφύκασιν ἰκανῶς, have naturally a considerable aptitude toward what is true.



more in the case of some people, not even if we had the most accurate scientific knowledge, would it be easy to persuade them were we to address them through the medium of that knowledge; for a scientific discourse, it is the privilege of education [to appreciate], and it is impossible that this [should extend to the multitude<sup>2</sup>]; but we must construct our means of persuasion, and our addresses through the medium of ordinary language; as in fact I stated in my Topics, "on the manner of communicating with the multitude."

- 3rd. Again, too, we ought to be able to persuade on opposite sides of a question; as also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism: not that we should practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is bad; but in order that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another makes an unfair use of these reasonings, we may be able to solve them<sup>3</sup>. Now, of all the other arts there is not one which embraces contraries in its conclusions; but logic and rhetoric alone do this; for they are both in *an equal degree*<sup>4</sup> conversant about contraries; not, however, that these contrary subjects present equal facilities: but the true and better side of the question is always *naturally* of a more easy inference, and has, generally speaking, a greater tendency to persuade. To illus-

<sup>2</sup> The communication of ideas requires a similitude of thought and language: the discourse of a philosopher would vibrate without effect on the ear of a peasant. Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 1, note 90.

<sup>3</sup> In the words of Falconbridge, let the orator resolve to

" ————— smack of observation;  
Which, though I will not practise to deceive,  
Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn."

<sup>4</sup> Riccobon remarks, that a person may at first be inclined to doubt the truth of the assertion that Rhetoric and Logic *alone* recognise contraries; seeing that music, for instance, recognises harmony and discord; grammar, the improprieties and the proprieties of language, etc. This doubt is however removed, he says, by the word *ἰσότης*, for these alone recognise with *equal propriety* each of the two contraries; whereas other arts apply more strictly to one than to another.

trate further the utility of rhetoric, it were absurd, if, while it is disgraceful for a man not to be able to assist himself by his person, it were not disgraceful to be unable to do this by his speech, which is more a peculiarity of man than the exercise of the body<sup>u</sup>. If, however, [any one should object<sup>x</sup>] that a person, unfairly availing himself of such powers of speaking, may be, in a very high degree, injurious; this is an objection which will lie in some degree against every good indiscriminately, except virtue; and with especial force against those which are most advantageous, as strength, health, wealth, and generalship. Because, employing these fairly, a person may be beneficial in points of the highest importance; and, by employing them unfairly, may be equally injurious.

13. Objection against the abuse of it answered.

That rhetoric, then, is conversant not with any one distinct class of subjects, but like logic [is of universal applicability], and that it is useful, is evident; as also that its business is not *absolute persuasion*<sup>y</sup>, but to con-

14. End and duty of Rhetoric.

<sup>u</sup> This is an *à minori* argument, to understand the full force of which we ought to bear in mind the great importance attached to the *δύναμις ἀγωνιστική* by the Greeks.

<sup>x</sup> Non tamen idcirco crimen liber omnis habebit :  
 Nil prodest quod non lædere possit idem.  
 Igne quid utilius ? Si quis tamen urere tecta  
 Comparat, audaces instruit igne manus.  
 Eripit interdum, modo dat medicina salutem,  
 Quæque juvans monstrat, quæque sit herba nocens.  
 Et latro, et cautus præcingitur ense viator :  
 Ille sed insidias, hic sibi portat opem.  
 Discitur innocuas ut agat facundia causas :  
 Protegit hæc sotes, immeritosque premit.

Ovid. Trist. lib. ii, l. 265.

<sup>y</sup> Having told us what we *may* expect from Rhetoric, he now tells us what we are *not* to expect from it. Persuasion, though the *end*, is not the *duty* of rhetoric : “ *Officium ejus facultatis videtur esse, dicere apposite ad persuadendum : Finis, persuadere dictione.*” (Cicero de Inv.) In the arts whose foundation is conjectural [*στοχαστικαὶ τέχναι*], among which we must class rhetoric, if the artist had done all that the case admitted, his duty was conceived to have been fulfilled, and he was entitled to commendation though he had entirely failed of success.

sider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it; just as is also the case in every other art: for neither is it the duty of medicine to render its patient *healthy*, but to bring him on as far as the case admits; for it is nevertheless very possible to treat properly even such as may be incapable of again partaking of health: and besides this [it is evident] that it belongs to the self-same art to observe both the real and seeming means of persuasion; just as it is incumbent on logic to consider syllogisms and apparent syllogisms. And this is the case, because the character of *sophist* does not consist in the faculty<sup>2</sup> [for the *logician* possesses this as well as he,] but in his fixed design [of abusing it<sup>3</sup>.] Here [in rhetoric], however,

Difference in Logic and Rhetoric as regards the name of the professors.

<sup>2</sup> That he is consistent in thus classifying characters according to their *moral principles*, will appear from his application of the appellation ἄλαζών by the same rule in the Ethics: Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. Ethics, iv, c. 7.

<sup>3</sup> In order more fully to illustrate the nature of rhetoric, Aristotle has considered it throughout this chapter as analogous to logic. Each, he says, is founded on a faculty naturally possessed by all men; each is useful, and applicable with equal propriety to any class of subjects whatever. Besides this, logic and rhetoric alone, of all arts, are *equally* conversant with opposite inferences; and of course with sound and specious arguments, (whether in the *form* of syllogism or enthymem). Now as logic and rhetoric are in their own nature indifferent to truth or falsehood, it must require an act of choice in either case to select the former or the latter, and the constant repetition of that choice will ultimately form a corresponding habit. Hence the *διαλεκτικός* may be considered as *δυνάμει σοφιστής*, and the *σοφιστής* as *δυνάμει διαλεκτικός*. But when logic is prostituted to the support of false propositions, by the bad principles (the *προαιρέσεις*) of its professors, it is branded with the name of *sophistry*, and the persons who so misapply it are called *sophists*: whereas, in the case of rhetoric, no such distinction in reference to the principles of its professors ever obtained; but the name of orator is enjoyed equally by all who are masters of the art, whether they exercise it fairly or not, *ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ῥήτωρ*. A reason for this distinction may perhaps be furnished from the nature of the subject-matter respectively. The subject-matter of logic is *ἀληθές*, which is uniform, absolute, and admits not of degrees. Hence the *sophistical logician* may fairly be supposed aware of the fallacy he uses, and is stigmatised accordingly. But the subject-matter of rhetoric being τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (v, § 11), οἱ πιθανόν, has many and various degrees, from the lowest

the one who is considered in reference simply to his knowledge of the art, as well as he who is considered in reference to his moral principles, is indiscriminately designated an orator. But in logic, a sophist is called so in reference to his moral principles; a logician, however, without reference to his principles, simply as regards the faculty he is master of.

However, commencing from this point, let us attempt <sup>15.</sup> to treat of the system both from what sources and in what manner we shall be able to attain the proposed objects; having then once more, as at the outset, defined what this art is, let us treat of what remains.

## CHAP. II.

*Definition of Rhetoric.*—Εἰκὸς:—Σημεῖον:—Τεκμήριον:—  
*their differences.*—*Example.*

LET us define rhetoric to be, “A faculty of considering all the possible means of persuasion on every subject;” for this is the business of no one of the other arts, each of which is fit enough to inform or persuade respecting its own subject; medicine, for instance, on what conduces to health or sickness; and geometry, on the subject of relations incidental to magnitudes; and arithmetic, on the subject of numbers; and in the same way the remaining arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, seems able to consider the means of persuasion on *any* given subject whatsoever. And hence I declare it to have for its province, as an art, no particular limited class of subjects. Now of the means of effecting persuasion, some originate in the art, others independently of it. By *inartificial* I mean

1. Definition of Rhetoric.

2. Two classes of πίστεις—ἐντεχνοί, ἄτεχνοί.

presumption up to moral certainty. Here then a fallacy is not so easily discoverable, even by the orator himself; and candour requires us not to brand as *moral* what after all may be merely *mental* imperfection in the speaker.

whatever are not furnished forth by our own means, but which are in existence already, as witnesses, torture, deeds, and all of this kind; by *artificial*, such as may be got up by means of the system, and by our own talents. So that as regards these, we have to *employ* the one class, to *discover* the other.

3. Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species<sup>b</sup>: some consist in the character of the speaker; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove, the point. [Persuasion is effected] by means of the *moral character*, when the speech shall have been spoken in such a way as to render the speaker worthy confidence: for we place confidence in the good to a wider extent, and with less hesitation, on *all* subjects generally; but on points where no real accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we even entirely confide in them. This feeling, however, should arise by means of *the speech*, and not by reason of its having been *preconceived* that the speaker is a certain kind of man. For it is not true, as some treatise-mongers lay down in their systems, of the probity of the speaker, that it contributes nothing to persuasion; but moral character nearly, I may say, carries with it the most sovereign efficacy in making credible<sup>c</sup>. [Persuasion is effected] through the medium of *the hearers*, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way; about which means of persuasion alone, I declare that the system-mongers of the present day busy

4. i. Character of the speaker.

5. ii. Feelings of the auditor.

<sup>b</sup> Πίστις διὰ τοῦ λόγου, or artificial, of three kinds, ἐν τῷ ἡθεῖ τοῦ λέγοντος—ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατῆς διαθεῖναι πίσος—ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.

<sup>c</sup> In so high estimation did Menander hold *the manner* of an address, that he attributed the whole effect to it; —τρόπος ἔσθ' ὁ πειθὼν τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος. And as Plutarch observes upon this line, καὶ τρόπος μὲν οὖν καὶ λόγος· ἢ ΤΡΟΨΟΣ ΔΙΑ' ΛΟΓΟΥ. De Audiend. Poet. t. i, Op. Mor. p. 125. edit. Wyttēb.

themselves. On the subject of these, however, some light will be afforded, when I speak on the subject of the passions.

Men give credit from the force of what is said, when out of the means of persuasion which attach to each subject, we evince the truth, or that which appears so.

6. iii. The speech itself.

Now as persuasion is effected by these means, it is plain that it will be the privilege of him who is able to draw inferences syllogistically, and to take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the virtues, and thirdly of the passions, both *what* each of the passions is, of *what nature* it is, and *from what causes* it is engendered, and how: so that the fact is, that rhetoric is, as it were, a kind of off-shoot of logic, and of that department of moral philosophy which it is fair to call the science of social life<sup>d</sup>. Whence rhetoric is invested with the costume<sup>e</sup> of that science, as well as its professors, partly from inexperience, partly arrogance, and in part from other human causes; because, as I stated at the outset, it is a sort of subordinate division of logic, and portraiture of it; neither of them being a science of any one definite subject, as to what may be its nature; but both

7. Rhetoric an off-shoot of Dialectics and Politics.

<sup>d</sup> Πολιτικῆ. For an explanation of this term—an enumeration of the various arts which he comprehends under it—and for an account of the estimation in which he holds it, see Ethics, lib. i, c. 2.

<sup>e</sup> Ὑποδύεται. So blind are men to this affectation of rhetoric and its professors, that he who, having had no occasion for the display of his persuasive powers, other than the ordinary course of affairs presents, would be accused of great arrogance were he to talk of having exercised *rhetoric*. Now Aristotle, so far from holding a person guilty of presumption for such an use of the term, would rather retort on the *accuser* the charge of ignorance of its true import. For with a view to invest their art, and of consequence themselves, with an air of dignity, the professors of rhetoric, said he, would have the world think (some of them, poor creatures, δὲ ἀπαιδευσίαν) that it was applicable *exclusively* to such cases as are of high concernment to society. This in part is true; rhetoric is παραφύεξ τῆς Πολιτείας: but, as Majoragius observes, “Virgulta magnam quidem cum arboribus quibus adnascuntur habent similitudinem, et rerum naturam redolent. Sed tamen multo sunt inferiora, neque tam uberes fructus ferunt.” So far prevalent is this notion to this very day, that we only apply this word by way of ridicule to persuasion on ordinary topics.

being certain faculties for furnishing ourselves with arguments. Now on the subject of the powers of the two, and their mutual relation, nearly enough has been said.

8. Subdi-  
vision of  
πίστικος, ἐν  
ἀντὶ τῶ  
λόγου: i.  
Enthymem,  
ii. Exam-  
ple.

With regard to means of persuading by proving, or appearing to prove your point, just as in logic one is induction, another syllogism, another apparent syllogism, so also is the case here in rhetoric; for its example is an induction, its enthymem a syllogism; and enthymem I call *rhetorical* syllogism; example, *rhetorical* induction. Now all orators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. So that if it be incumbent on you to prove with regard to any thing or person in *form* of syllogism or induction, it cannot but be (as is evident from Analytics) that each of these will be *essentially* the same as each of the former (enthymem and induction). And what the difference is between example and enthymem is plain from the Topics, where, on the subject of syllogism and induction, it has been stated before that, the proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases, is called in the other art, induction; in this, example. But when, certain points having been granted, there results, by virtue of these, something else over and above these, by virtue of their existence, either as generals or particulars; this process is, in that art, called syllogism; in this, enthymem<sup>f</sup>. Rhetoric, it is plain, enjoys each advantage; for [with respect to it] the case, in this treatise, is the same as in the *Methodica* has been stated of logic; the speeches of orators<sup>g</sup>, abounding, some in examples, others in enthymems; and orators themselves being in the same way, some fond of example, others of enthymem. Rea-

9. Exam-  
ple.

Definition  
of Syll-  
ogism.

10. Various  
styles of  
speaking.

<sup>f</sup> Or, each style of rhetoric has its peculiar advantage.

<sup>g</sup> ῥητορεία, the words of an orator, modelled according to rhetoric, whose object it is to *persuade*;—versus, λόγος the words of a logician, modelled according to logic, whose object it is to *convince*.

sonings, however, conducted through the medium of example, are not less calculated to persuade; but those of which enthymem is the characteristic are rather applauded<sup>h</sup>. But I will hereafter explain what is the cause of this, and how we are to use each species of proof: let us, *at present*, distinguish more clearly respecting these proofs themselves. Now forasmuch as that which carries persuasion with it, does so in reference to some one; and either is, immediately on being enunciated, actually of a nature to persuade, and enforce belief; or [has its effect] from its appearing to prove through the medium of such [as compose the former class]; and as no art considers particular cases; medicine for example, what is wholesome for the individuals, Socrates or Callias, but what is so for any person of such a constitution; for this question comes within the province of art, but *particulars* are infinite, and cannot be known: so neither will rhetoric consider probability in reference to particular individuals; what, for instance, is probable to Socrates or Callias, but that which is so to persons such as they are; just in the same way as logic, for that art does not draw conclusions indiscriminately from *any* subjects; for some things there are which appear probable even to a madman; [yet you never would dream of arguing about them;] but it supplies itself from subjects which require reasoning, as does rhetoric from subjects which are usual matters of deliberation. Its business then is respecting points about which we deliberate, and have no art specially conversant, and before auditors of such abilities as are not able to take a connected

11. Rhetoric considers the *πιθανόν* for a class, not an individual,

and draws its supplies from subjects of deliberation. 12. Audience held to be *ἀπλοί*.

<sup>h</sup> *Θορυβοῦνται*. Twining, in his notes on the Poetic, quoting a subsequent passage of this Treatise, in which this word again occurs (ii, 23,) translates it, "are applauded," and observes, that "the commentators strangely mistake the sense of this word here, and in lib. i, c. 2. They render it absurdly,—*vehementius percellunt*—*perturbant maxime*. Whether an audience be *pleased* or *displeased*, to any great degree, *noise* is equally the consequence; and the word *θορυβεῖν* is used, sometimes for the uproar of *approbation*, and sometimes for that of *dislike*."



view of reasonings, conducted through many stages, nor to deduce an argument from remote principles. Now we deliberate on subjects which appear to admit of having themselves in either of two ways: for on questions which cannot, under any circumstances, past, present, or future, be otherwise; on these, I say, no one deliberates, *at least not while he apprehends them to be such*<sup>1</sup>; for by such a deliberation nothing is gained. And you may draw your conclusions and inferences, sometimes from premises which you have arrived at by former syllogisms; and sometimes from propositions, not syllogistically deduced, but requiring such a process by reason of their not being probable at first sight; but of these processes, it is impossible that the former should not be hard to follow up, by reason of its prolixity (for your hearer<sup>k</sup> is supposed to be a man of merely ordinary understanding), and the latter defective in persuasive efficacy, by reason of its not being deduced out of principles either acknowledged, or probable; so that it is necessary that both the enthymem and example should be conversant about points which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise, (the example answering to induction, and the enthy-

13. Hence concluding  
ἐκ συλλελο-  
γισμένων  
πρότερον,  
being  
lengthy,  
and ἐξ  
ἀσυλλογί-  
στων μὲν  
δεομένων δὲ  
συλλογί-  
στων, being  
unadmitted  
—are to be  
avoided.

<sup>1</sup> A man under a mistaken idea of the nature of the subject may possibly deliberate on a question, the nature of which is fixed and necessary. Still, however, as long as he remains under this impression, the subject relatively to him is of a contingent nature.

<sup>k</sup> Cicero gives a similar caution:—“Hæc nostra oratio *multitudinis est auribus accommodanda*, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda quæ non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinantur.” De Orat. lib. ii. We may further prove that this precept has its foundation in nature, by quoting the words of a celebrated modern writer, who, at least in penetration and knowledge of mankind, had few superiors:—“The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense *quantum sufficit*; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House; throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; *they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface.*” Lord Chesterfield's Letters.


mem to syllogism,) and be deduced out of few, and frequently out of fewer intermediate propositions than the syllogism, in its original form, consisted of. For if any of these be known, it is not necessary to mention it; for the hearer of himself makes this addition. For example, in order to convey the information that Dorieus was conqueror in a contest where a chaplet is the prize; it suffices to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games: but as to the circumstance that, having conquered at Olympia, he got a chaplet, there is no necessity for adding it, because every one knows it.

But as the *necessary* premises out of which the syllogisms of rhetoric are formed are very few, (for the majority of questions about which decisions and consideration are exercised admit of being otherwise; because men deliberate and consider on the subjects of human conduct, and all conduct is of this contingent nature, nor is a single branch, I may say, of these subjects necessary,) and it cannot but be that you should deduce contingent conclusions from premises whose nature is such; and necessary ones, from necessary; (this is evident to us from the Analytics:) I say, since this is the case, it is plain that the premises out of which enthymems are deduced, will be some of them necessary, but the greatest part contingent: for enthymems are adduced from probabilities<sup>1</sup> (*εἰκότα*) and

14. Enthymems are deduced either from *εἰκότα* or *σημεῖα*.

<sup>1</sup> In despair of finding adequate English expressions for the words *εἰκός* and *σημεῖον*, I have acquiesced in the usual, but erroneous translation. At the risk of incurring the charge of prolixity, the following are given as the most popular ways of explaining this difficult subject. Dr. Whately considers this "a division of arguments according to the relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." The *εἰκός* (or *διότι* of Aristotle) he takes to be an a priori argument, which may be employed to *account* for the fact supposed granted. The *σημεῖον* (or *ὅτι* of Aristotle) and example, arguments which could not be so employed: vid. Rhetoric, p. 116. Others, again, maintain that the *σημεῖον* is an argument to prove past matters, the *εἰκός* to prove future. The majority of commentators, however, consider the *εἰκός* and *σημεῖον* as propositions in different matter: thus,—

signs (*σημεῖα*). And thus it follows of necessity, that, of these, each respectively is identified with each of



Another explanation, founded on three passages, the first in the *Analytics*; the second by Cicero (*de Inv. i*, 30.); the third in Quintilian, (*v*, c. ix, 10.) adopted by Majoragius, is as follows: The *σημεῖον* is some *sensible fact*, either attested by sense or reducible thereto, not a general truth; hence it will be the *minor* premiss in the enthymem, not the *major*, the *σημειώμενον*, or thing signified by it, being the conclusion, and as the latter is known solely through and by the former, there is always a real or supposed connection between them.

1st. The *thing signified* may be contained in the *sign which implies* not only that, but something more. The latter then, as regards the former, will stand in the ratio of a whole to its part; as individual or particular nature to common or generic: what is definite always containing or implying more than what is indefinite, (on which principle we are told in logic that the species is more of a whole than a genus). Hence it is defined, *ὡς τῶν καθεκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου*, and is called *ἀναγκαῖον* or *τεκμήριον*. "Hence Quintilian observing the conclusiveness of this argument denies the name of argument at all: "Non sunt argumenta, quia ubi illa sunt, quæstio non est;" an error resembling that made by certain modern philosophers, who deny the utility of logic because the premisses of a syllogism virtually imply the conclusion.

2nd. The *thing signified* may not be contained or implied in the *sign*. The latter being more vague and indefinite than the former; bearing to the thing signified the ratio of a part to the whole, as common or generic nature to individual or particular, *ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος*. This enthymem appears in the same mode as the first, scilicet, *Barbara*, but in the second figure, hence an illicit process of the minor term. Note, that as the *σημεῖον* is always the minor and the thing signified the conclusion, the relation here spoken of as *καθόλου*, and *κατὰ μέρος*, must be understood not of the logical relation in the syllogism between the major premiss and the conclusion, but of the relation between two things, one specific, the other general. Now in the *εἰκός* enthymem, on the contrary, the relation of *εἰκός* and the conclusion (*ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκός*) is the strict logical relation of universal to particular, or of a generic law to its application in an individual instance. The *εἰκός* therefore is the *major* premiss, not the *minor*.

We see that the universal major in the *σημεῖον* enthymem cannot be the

the former. For probability is what usually happens, not absolutely so, however, as some define it, but, at any rate, that which, in contingent matter, has itself so towards that with respect to which it is probable, as an universal to a particular<sup>m</sup>. But of the signs, one has

15. Definition of *εἰκός*.

16. Three

*σημεῖον* itself, because it is detached from any particular relation, and involves no particular deduction: nor yet is this major, though universal, an *εἰκός*, being *ἀπλῶς* and totally true, which is inconsistent with the very meaning of the word "probable."

Again, though the minor premiss of the *εἰκός* enthymem contains a simple matter of fact, it is not a *σημεῖον*, for to constitute a sign it must point to something else equally necessary with itself; a condition not fulfilled by the *εἰκός* enthymem conclusion. Still there is so much affinity between the minor premiss of the *εἰκός* enthymem, and the *ἀνώνυμον σημεῖον*, that by converting the major premiss, with the addition of the word "probably" to the copula, we shall change the *σημεῖον* into an *εἰκός* of low degree: e. g.

All who have a fever breathe hard.	Those who breathe hard <i>probably</i>
This man breathes hard.	have a fever.
This man has a fever.	This man breathes hard.
	This man <i>probably</i> has a fever.

And this affinity perhaps led Quintilian to confound Aristotle's *ἀνώνυμον σημεῖον* with his *εἰκός*. (lib. v, c. ix, § 8). It is this kind of "sign" and the argument deducible from it, which constitutes what, in criminal cases, is called circumstantial evidence.

Aristotle mentions another sort of *σημεῖον* (§ 18) which comes out a syllogism in the third figure, with an universal conclusion, and hence its error is an illicit process of the minor term. The principle on which this syllogism proceeds is an imperfect, precarious induction, and endeavours to deduce a general truth from a particular instance. The ratio, therefore, of the sign to the thing signified, is as one to all. This, it will be observed, is a new signification of the terms *καθόλου* and *καθ' ἕκαστον*, but one which they will obviously admit, and borne out by the example he adduces.

The above explanation has been given rather at length, because it is not generally so well known as the others, nor so easy to follow.

<sup>m</sup> The usual definition of *εἰκός* is considered by Aristotle as too vague; he limits it, therefore, to contingent matter, and would have it stand in such a relation to the conclusion to be drawn, as an universal to a particular. For instance, the Corinthians at Athens state as an *εἰκός*, that the Corcyraeans were addicted to piracy, their shunning alliances with other states, because those who would become pirates study secrecy; but this broad fact is, when compared with the single case of the Corcyraeans, as an universal to a particular, or as a whole to a part, pirates being one class only of the many who study secrecy as a veil to crime. It is moreover a case in *contingent matter*; for those who study secrecy, may or may not be addicted to piracy.

different  
sorts of ση-  
μεία.

the same ratio as a particular to an universal; the other, as an universal to a particular: and of these, the one which is necessarily conclusive, I call τεκμήριον; but the other, which is not necessary, has no name assigned to it in reference to its difference [as a species].

17. τεκμή-  
ριον.

Now by necessary propositions, I mean those out of which a syllogism is adduced; and hence this kind of signs is called τεκμήριον, for when they think it impossible to do away what has been stated, people then esteem that they adduce a τεκμήριον; the point having been evinced and *concluded*; for, according to the old

18. σημεῖα  
ἀνώνυμα.

language, τέκμαρ is the same as "*a boundary*." Again, there is one sign whose ratio is as that of a particular to an universal: thus, were one to assert, for instance, that "The wise are just; because Socrates was wise and just;" this then is a sign, but it may be done away, even supposing the premiss stated to be true; for it violates the rules of syllogism, as to the other<sup>n</sup>, when, for instance, a person alleges as a sign that a man is sick, his being in a fever; or says a woman has had a child, because she has milk; this is a necessary sign; which very one of the signs alone amounts to a τεκμήριον; since it alone, if the premiss be true, cannot be done away. The other sign is in the ratio of an universal to a particular; as if, for instance, one were to say it was a sign that a man has a fever, because he breathes thickly. But this, even granting the premiss be true, may be done away: for it is very possible that one who has not a fever should breathe thickly. Now what is probability, what sign, and what τεκμήριον, and in what they differ, has been explained:

<sup>n</sup> Τεκμήριον, the other species of σημεῖον: e. g. " Ut mihi Platonis illud, seu quis dixit alius, perelegans esse videatur; quem cum ex alto ignotas ad terras tempestas et in desertum littus detulisset, timentibus cæteris propter ignoracionem locorum, animadvertisse dicunt in arenâ geometricas formas quasdam esse descriptas; quas ut vidisset, exclamavisse ut bono essent animo; videre enim se hominum vestigia; quæ videlicet ille non ex agri consiturâ, quam cernebat, sed ex doctrinæ indiciiis interpretabatur." Cic. de Rep. c. xvii, p. 52.

but in the Analytics [these several gradations of proof] as well as the reasons why some are not correctly inferred, and others are, have been distinctly stated with greater clearness<sup>o</sup>. As to example, it has been stated that it is an induction, and induction on what kind of subjects; and its ratio is neither that of a part to a whole, nor of a whole to a part, nor of a whole to a whole: but example is in the ratio of a part to part<sup>p</sup>, of a similar case to a similar, when, both coming under the same genus, the one case happens to be better known than the other. For instance, you assert that Dionysius, in asking a guard, has views of setting up a tyranny, because Pisistratus before him, when designing this, began to ask for a body guard, and when he got it, established himself as tyrant; so too did Theogenes, at Megara. And all other persons who have acted in this way, and with whom your audience are acquainted, become examples against Dionysius, with respect to whom they do not yet know whether he be asking a guard with this intention: and all these cases come under the same general premiss<sup>q</sup>, that he who is laying schemes to set up a tyranny, asks a guard. Now then the points have been stated out of which the proofs which have an air of demonstration are adduced.

19. Example, or rhetorical induction.

<sup>p</sup> ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος.

<sup>o</sup> In the Analytics, he says, "the *εἰκὸς* is *πρότασις ἐνδοξος*, but the *σημεῖον* professes to be *πρότασις ἀποδευκτική*, whether necessary or probable. Now an enthymem (he continues) is an imperfect syllogism, consisting of *εἰκότα* and *σημεῖα*, and the latter are assumed in *three* ways, according to the number of the figures of syllogism (for Aristotle made only *three*), the first, second, and third of logic. In all these the *σημεῖον* is the *μέσον*, (i. e. the argumentum, or *minor* proposition), but the first alone is *ἄλυτον*." Analytic. Prior. lib. ii, c. xxix. Edit. Bipont.

<sup>p</sup> Not as a part to a whole, for that would be *σημεῖον*; nor as a whole to a part, for that would be *τεκμήριον*: nor as a whole to a whole, for that would be *ἐπαγωγή* (which, when perfect, reasons from a whole taken *individually* to the same taken *collectively*). Example therefore is in the ratio of a part to a part.

<sup>q</sup> By the *τὸ αὐτὸ γίνος* is understood a common circumstance and property of nature; by the *τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου*, the general proposition in reference to all such cases.

20. Two  
different  
sorts of en-  
thymem.

The difference of enthymems is considerable, and has remarkably escaped nearly every writer: it is, too, a difference the very same as exists between syllogisms in logic: for some enthymems there are of applicability equal to that of rhetoric itself, in the same way that in logic some syllogisms are; others, according to the extent of other arts and faculties, existing, some already, and others not yet comprised by rules. And hence those who employ them both escape the observation of their hearers, and if they handle them more than is right, pass out of their proper characters as mere orators.

21.  
1st. τόποι.

This however will become clearer, if stated more in detail. I call those forms of reasoning<sup>r</sup> properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which, I use the expression *places*; such are those which apply with equal advantage to questions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other subjects which differ in species. The *place* for instance, of greater and less; for there will not be a whit more advantage in deducing a syllogism or an enthymem from this place, on a question of justice or of natural philosophy, than on any other subject whatsoever; and yet there are questions specifically distinct. But I call *peculiar*, all those reasonings which arise out of propositions conversant with each species and genus of subjects; for instance, there are propositions on subjects of natural philosophy<sup>s</sup> out of which neither enthymem nor syllogism could be constructed respecting morals; and on this subject, again, there are others out of which will arise no reasoning respecting *natural* philosophy; this is also the case equally on every subject. Now the first mentioned reasonings the (τόποι) will render a man informed on no class of

2nd. εἶδη.

<sup>r</sup> Διαλεκτικῶς καὶ ῥητορικῶς, i. e. so exactly corresponding, in point of extent, to these arts, as to be applicable as often, and with as little limitation, as they are themselves.

<sup>s</sup> This appears evident enough; yet the whole system of judicial astrology and the planetary influences was nothing more than an attempt of the kind.

subjects, for they are about no distinct subject-matter: as to the other (*ἴδια*), the orator, in proportion as he makes the better<sup>t</sup> selection of propositions peculiar, will imperceptibly produce a science different from mere rhetoric or logic<sup>u</sup>; for, if he light on first principles, thenceforth, it will no longer be rhetoric or logic which is employing, but that science whose principles he embraces.

The greatest number of enthymems are constructed<sup>22</sup> out of these peculiar propositions, which are particular and limited; and from the universal ones, the less. Just then as I did in the Topics, so here must I make a distinction of the peculiar<sup>x</sup> *propositions* and places of enthymems, whence we are to deduce them. Now I mean by *εἶδη*, those propositions which are peculiar to the several kinds of rhetoric; by *τόποι*, those which are common alike to all. Let us then treat of the special<sup>εἶδη first discussed.</sup> propositions before the others. Let us, however, first ascertain the kinds of rhetoric itself; in order that having distinguished them as to their number, we may separately ascertain the elements of persuasion and propositions peculiar to each<sup>y</sup>.

<sup>t</sup> *Βελτίω*, i. e. *better*, quā the art in question is concerned;—though as regarded by the logician or rhetorician, they will be in fact *worse*, inasmuch as they tend to merge these faculties, whose characteristic is universal applicability, in that particular art from whence the *προτάσεις* happen to be deduced.

<sup>u</sup> We may here mention that *διαλεκτική* is not quite what we understand by logic, but seems rather to have been the faculty of *conversation*, which the ancients cultivated as a science, and of which logic was a species. “Zeno, the Eleatic, divided his dialectics into three parts: on consequences, *ἐρώτησις* and *ἐριστική*.” Whately’s Logic. Diog. Laert. in Platone, 52, § 87.

<sup>x</sup> He here designates, by the name *εἶδη*, those propositions of limited applicability which he had before called *ἴδια*; those, in fact, which he considers as contradistinguished from the *τόποι* or *general* arguments, which he tells us are applicable to a range of subjects as little limited as the subjects of rhetoric itself.

<sup>y</sup> Cf. lib. ii, c. 22, § 13: *στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό*: and lib. ii, c. 26, § 1: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον*.



## CHAP. III.

*He shews that there are three kinds of Rhetoric; what is the end of each; and on what subject we must provide ourselves with propositions.*

1. An oration presupposes three things: 1st. a speaker: 2nd. a subject: 3rd. a hearer.  
2. Hearers of three sorts.

3. Hence three kinds of rhetoric; Deliberative, Judicial, Epideictic.

Business.

4. Time

THE species of rhetoric are three in number, for of so many descriptions are the hearers of orations; because an oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom; and to him it is that the end of the speech has its reference; I mean to the hearer. The hearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge; and a judge either of things past or to come; one then acts as judge respecting what is yet to happen, as the member of a popular assembly; the other respecting what has already taken place, as the president of a court of justice; the other respecting the abilities of the orator, as the unconcerned hearer<sup>a</sup>. Thus, then, there will necessarily result three kinds of orations, the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative<sup>b</sup>. The business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly dissuasion; for invariably those who in their individual capacities simply advise, and those who publicly harangue, effect one of these objects. The business of judicial rhetoric is partly accusation, partly defence; for the litigants must of course do one or the other of these things. Of demonstrative the business is partly praise, partly blame. Moreover the time proper to each of these respectively is, to the deliberative orator, the *future*; for in exhorting or dissuading, he advises respecting things future<sup>c</sup>. The

<sup>a</sup> Both hearers are *interested*; but the *θεωρῶς* is a speculative, the *κρίτης* a practical, auditor.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Quarterly Review, July, 1822, No. liv, vol. 27, p. 391.

<sup>c</sup> "Passion may be as much excited by the orator's reasonings on a future event, as on one past; and indeed the future, *cæteris paribus*, pro-

time proper to a judicial pleader is the past; for it is ever on the subject of actions *already done*, that the one party accuses, and the other defends. To the demonstrative orator the *present* time is the most appropriate, for it is in reference to qualities actually possessed that all either praise or blame. Orators, however, do very frequently avail themselves of other times; as well by awakening a recollection of what has already happened, as by anticipating what is likely to happen. The end of each of these branches is different, and, as belonging to three subjects, is itself triple. 5. and end peculiar to each.

The object of the deliberative orator is the expedient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, advises you to adopt the better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice, of honour or disgrace, he adjoins by the way, in addition to these two. The object of the judicial pleader is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those other considerations. The object of those who praise and blame is honour and disgrace; and these also refer other considerations to these two.

But we may take as a sign that what I have stated is the particular object of each, the fact that there are times when they will not feel inclined even to raise a question about the other: the litigant, for example, will not always deny that the fact has taken place, or that it has *hurt* the other party; but he never, under any circumstances, would admit that he has been *guilty of injustice* toward him; for then would there be no need of a judicial decision. In the same way the de- 6. Proof of this from fact.

duces the greater effect on us, as that to which we are approaching, and what every moment gives us the added interest in, which it takes from the past. But then the past has the counterbalancing privilege of being susceptible of infinitely better testimony and evidence, from memory, present effects, etc.: memory, indeed, the great eye of the mind, unlike that of the body, sees all we have left behind, and nothing before it." Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*

liberative orator very often abandons the other considerations ; but as to the point that he is advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is useful, this will he never admit ; but it frequently happens that (on a question of invasion) they do not trouble themselves to make out that the subjugating a neighbouring people is not inconsistent with justice. Just so those who praise and blame do not consider whether the person's conduct has been advantageous or disadvantageous ; nay, they, in many instances, set it down on the score of praise, that, overlooking his own interests, he wrought some deed of honour : thus they praise Achilles, because he came to aid the cause of his comrade Patroclus, with full knowledge that himself was fated to die ; it being in his power, [by withholding that aid,] to live. To him, however, a death such as this was the more honourable prize : but to live would have been advantageous.

7. The orator in each class must have κοινὰ προτάσεις.

From what has been said, it is plain that the orator must first be in possession of propositions on the subject of each of these divisions, *separately* ; for the τεκμήρια, the probabilities and signs, are degrees of proof available to rhetoric *generally*. *It is necessary* because syllogism, in general, is made up of propositions, and the enthymem is a syllogism made up of the propositions which have been mentioned.

8. And as it cannot be that what is impossible should ever heretofore have been done or should ever be done hereafter, but what is possible, only : as again it cannot be that what has not happened, or that what is never about to happen, ever should, the one have been already done, the other be about to be done : it becomes necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator to have propositions on the subject of possibility and impossibility ; and on the questions, whether a fact has or has not happened, will or will not take place. And further, since all, as well in praising as in blaming, as well in exhorting as in dis-

suading, as well in accusing as in defending, attempt to evince not only the points I have mentioned, but likewise to prove respecting this good or bad, this honourable or dishonourable, this just or unjust, that it is, moreover, either great or small, whether speaking of the things independently, or comparing them respectively one with another: as this is the case, it is plain that it will be necessary to have propositions respecting the degrees of great and small, of greater and less, as well *general*, as *peculiar to each division*: what good, for instance, is greater or less, what deviation from justice, or what conformity to it; and so in the same way also respecting the other subjects. The points then have been stated, respecting which it will be absolutely necessary to get at propositions. We must, after this, make a distinction between each of these respectively; the questions, for instance, about which deliberation is conversant; those, too, about which demonstrative rhetoric is concerned; and, thirdly, those about which judicial.

## CHAP. IV.

*The Questions relative to which that Orator should be in possession of Propositions, who is about to advise on points of the highest concernment.*

FIRST, then, we must ascertain what kind of good or evil it is respecting which the deliberative orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about every kind, but about such as may or may not befall us<sup>a</sup>. Such however as either has or will have an existence of *necessity*; such, again, as its impossible should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any deliberation: neither,

1. The deliberative orator advises on subjects,

2. not necessary,

3. nor on

<sup>a</sup> This limitation was established in cap. ii, § 12. He develops this point more fully, Nich. Eth. iii, cap. 3.

all that are  
contingent;

but where  
we appre-  
hend a  
power of perform-  
ance.

4. Minute  
discussions  
here to be  
avoided, as  
not in the  
province of  
rhetoric,

5. which is  
made up of  
the analyti-  
cal and po-  
litical sci-  
ences;

in fact, is there about every one even of *contingent* subjects; for of goods which may or may not accrue<sup>b</sup>, some exist *naturally*, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is confined to subjects] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry on our views thus far, viz. till we shall ascertain whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not<sup>c</sup>.

Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to divide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter moreover into minute distinctions conformable to the standard of truth to the very utmost that the subject admits it; these enquiries it is not necessary, on the present occasion, to institute, by reason that they belong not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth<sup>d</sup>; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of logic<sup>e</sup>, and of that branch of

<sup>b</sup> *Τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ*. It may be well to remark of this expression, which has occurred so often already, and will much more frequently in the sequel, that it is Aristotle's usual appellative for things *contingent*, things *which may as well happen as not*. He has himself defined it thus—*λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον*. Anal. Pri. lib. i, c. 13. I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such a supposition.

<sup>c</sup> “*Inciditur omnis jam deliberatio si intelligitur non posse fieri, aut si necessitas affertur.*” Cicero de Orat. ii. For an account of things, *δυνατὰ ἡμῖν*, vid. lib. ii, c. 19.

<sup>d</sup> Such minute research, as it tends rather to bewilder, must of necessity be excluded from rhetoric, which is always supposed to address an audience of *ordinary abilities*; ὁ κριτῆς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς, cap. ii, § 13; whereas such distinctions could only be appreciated by the philosopher and man of education.

<sup>e</sup> The analytical science seems to have been the analysis of arguments.

the science of social life which recognizes the subject of morals; and it partly resembles logic, partly the declamations of the sophists: and in exact proportion as one shall attempt to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are *general faculties*, but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain *definite* subject-matter, and not of words alone.

6. and whoever treats it not as a faculty but a science, deviates from the art.

Let us, however, even on the present occasion, discuss

7.

such points as it is worth while to enlarge upon, and which still reserve the more full consideration for the science of social life: for nearly all the questions on which men deliberate, and on which the deliberative orator harangues, those at least of the highest concernment, are in number *five*<sup>f</sup>; and these are questions of *finance*, of *war and peace*, and again respecting the *safeguard of the territory*, and respecting *imports and exports*, and also respecting *legislature*.

Five occasions for the employment of deliberative oratory.

1st. *πόροι*.

2nd. *πολέμοι*.

3rd. *φυλακή*.

4th. *τροφή*.

5th. *νόμοι*.

8. i. *πόροι*.  
Finances.

So that it will be fitting that the orator, who is about to give his advice on the subject of the *finance* of the state, be acquainted with its revenues, both what and how great they may be; in order that, if any branch is overlooked, it may be added to the rest; and, if any be in default, it may be augmented. Moreover he

<sup>f</sup> All society supposes *law* (*νόμοι*); the first object of which is the *support* of its inhabitants internally (*τροφή*); and the second its *territory* externally (*φυλακή*); in maintaining which war (*πόλεμος*) must sometime or other be unavoidable, and to carry that on, fixed *revenues* (*πόροι*) are requisite. We may observe, then, a regular gradation in these five questions; though in his examination of them Aristotle proceeds analytically, and takes that which first presents itself in civilised society; namely, the ways and means. Xenophon also, in his *Memorabilia*, represents Socrates as using nearly the same five subjects and arrangement, when dissuading Glaucon, a young Athenian, from attempting politics too early. Perhaps Aristotle may have borrowed the hint from him. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. lib. iii, c. 6: and a translation of the whole passage in the posthumous works of Dr. Franklin, vol. v, p. 77. Lond. 1819. The reader will find an instance of *τροφή* practised by the piratical states of Greece, in Thucydides, lib. i, c. 5, and of *πόροι* in the first tax levied at Rome, when the militia were turned into a standing army, during the war with Veii. Livy, lib. iv.

should be acquainted with the whole expenditure of the state, that if any expense be superfluous it may be curtailed; if any too high, it may be reduced. For men become more wealthy, not only by adding to their capital stock, but by detracting from their expenses as well. These, however, are points which we must not only learn from our own experience as individuals; but, with a view to deliberation on these subjects, one ought to be qualified by a research into the discoveries made by other people.

9. ii. πόλε-  
μος και ει-  
ρήνη.  
War and  
peace.

Respecting questions of *war and peace*, the orator must needs be acquainted with the force of the state, how great it actually is already, and how great it admits of becoming; of what description also it is already, and what additions admit of being made to it. Moreover he should know both what wars the state has been engaged in, and how it has conducted them. This must he needs know, not in relation to his own state only, but as regards frontier states also; particularly in the case of those with whom there is a likelihood of being at war, in order that toward the more powerful, pacific measures may be held, and that in regard to the weaker, it may rest with his own state to make war or not. He should also be acquainted with the description of force which belongs to each state, whether it resemble or differ<sup>s</sup> from his own; for it is possible, even in this respect, to secure an advantage to yourself, or to have one taken by the enemy. In order to all which things, the orator must necessarily have considered with attention the wars, not of his own state only, but those also of others, what has been their issue; for it is natural that from similar causes similar results should accrue.

10. iii. φυλα- Moreover as regards the *safeguard of the territory*,

<sup>s</sup> See this point touched on by Pericles, Thucyd. i, 141, where he declares the Peloponnesians to be *πολεμῆν, μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευῆν, ἀδύνατοι.*

it should not escape his attention how that is preserved; but he must be acquainted as well with the numbers, as the nature of the garrisons, and with the positions of the strong holds: this it is impossible that one not acquainted with the country should know. But known it must be, in order that if any garrison be weak, it may be reinforced; if any be unnecessary, it may be done away, and the force may rather maintain positions strictly adapted to defence.

Again, on the subject of *provision*, the orator should know how great a consumption is sufficient to subsist the state, and of what kind that is which arises *at home*, and what is *imported*; and those nations whose exports there is need of, and those to whose markets he wants to import his home productions, in order that commercial treaties and agreements may be entered into with them. [All this should the orator be acquainted with], because it is absolutely necessary strictly to preserve your citizens from any ground of quarrel in two of their relations, viz. in respect to those physically their superiors<sup>h</sup>, and those who may be serviceable in afore-mentioned points.

Thus much then it is absolutely necessary that the deliberative orator should be able to consider, in order to the security of the state; neither is an attention to legislation the least essential; for in its legislative enactments stands the safety of the state. And thus it becomes requisite, both that he should know how many forms of government there are, and what system of things is expedient for each; and what things, as well peculiar to the government, as opposite to it, have a natural tendency to destroy it<sup>i</sup>. I talk of a government

<sup>h</sup> He gives hints, § 9, about what is necessary, ὁπῶς πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύεται.

<sup>i</sup> For a statement of the things, peculiar to democracy and oligarchy, which have a tendency to destroy them, see the speeches of Megabyzus and Darius, on the question of the constitution fittest for Persia, after the assassination of Smerdis, the Magian usurper. Herodot. iii, 81, 82. See also Eth. Nich. viii, 10.

κῆ. Safe-guard of the country.

11. iv. τροφή. Provision, i. e. imports and exports.

12. v. νόμοι. Legislation.



being destroyed by things *peculiar to itself*; because, with the exception of the most excellent form of government, every other, by being relaxed or strained too much, destroys itself. Thus a democracy, not only when relaxed, but even when overstrained, grows weaker, and thus will at last be brought an oligarchy. Just as hookedness or flatness of the nose, not only approach the mean in proportion as they relax from the excess, but also, when they become excessively hooked or flat, dispose the nostrils in such a way as no longer to resemble the nasal organ.

13. It is serviceable moreover with a view to *legislation*, to apprehend not only what constitution is expedient, by deriving your view from circumstances past, but to become acquainted also with the constitution of other states, and to what kind of constitutions what sort of measures are adapted. Thus it is plain, that accounts of travellers are of use with a view to legislation; for hence we are able to ascertain what the laws of other nations are; and with a view to debates on matters of state, the researches of those who write on human conduct are useful: all these points however form part, not of rhetoric, but of the science of social life.

The accounts given by travellers of foreign states are also useful.

So many then are the questions of highest concern, touching which the deliberative orator must be in possession of propositions. We will, however, again discuss the elements out of which it is proper to exhort and dissuade, as well on these as on other questions.

#### CHAP. V.

*The Objects at which Orators should aim in exhorting or dissuading.—What Happiness is; and whence its constituents are deduced.*

1. Happiness the

NEARLY every one individually, and all men in general, have some object, at which directing every aim, they

both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness<sup>a</sup> and its constituents. Let us then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it and of its opposites, exhortation or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, because we needs do the things which procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.

Let happiness then be defined to be good fortune in conjunction with virtue<sup>b</sup>,—or, independency of life—  
 or, the life which is most pleasant, accompanied by security,—or abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind allow either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If then happiness be such as I have described, its constituents must necessarily be—1st, noble birth<sup>c</sup>, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age; and moreover personal excellencies; as health, comeliness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character;—2nd, honour, good fortune;—3rd, virtue, and its constituents, prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own; for besides these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would

<sup>a</sup> The end of deliberation is τὰ συμφέροντα, of action εὐδαιμονία.

<sup>b</sup> The first of these is the opinion of the Socratic school; the second, of the Stoics; the third, of the Epicureans; the last, the popular one. See a similar description, Hooker, v, § 76, p. 413.

<sup>c</sup> Of these, the first enumerated as far as “character” inclusive, may be considered δυνάμεις: the two next, “honour and good fortune,” as τίμα: the last, namely, “virtue and its constituents,” as ἐπαινετὰ, according to the mode of philosophic division mentioned in the Ethics, lib. i, c. 12.

- life be most independent. Wherefore, let us ascertain what each of these advantages is.—Noble birth then is, in the case of a nation or state, their being aborigines<sup>d</sup>, or at least ancient possessors, and for their first leaders to have been illustrious, and indeed for many to have been born from among them illustrious on the score of things which men emulate. Considered in reference to individuals, noble birth is derivable from male or female ancestry, and legitimacy on both sides; and, just as in the case of a state, to have had the first of their line well known on the score of virtue, wealth, or any other valued quality; and for many of their kindred to have been illustrious, as well men as women, as well young as old:—we cannot be at a loss for the constituents of a good and numerous progeny. As referred to the commonwealth; a *good offspring* will be, youth who are numerous and accomplished. Accomplished in respect to personal excellence, as stature, comeliness, strength, ability in the games; and as to that of the mind, temperance and courage; these all, in their two divisions, are excellencies of the young.
5. External. 1st. High birth.  
i. National. In reference to individuals, a good and numerous offspring consists in your own children being numerous, and they, as well male as female, such as I have described. The excellence of females in regard to person, is beauty and stature; in regard to the mind, temperance, and fondness for employment, without meanness:—and we ought, as well individually as collectively, in respect both to men and women, to see that each of these qualities exists. Since all states among whom the regulations regarding women are bad (as is the case among the Lacedæmonians), enjoy scarcely the half of happiness.
- ii. Individual.  
6. Good offspring.  
i. Public.  
ii. Private.  
7. Wealth must be,
- The constituents of wealth are, plenty of money, the being master of lands and seats, with the possession

<sup>d</sup> It was the boast of the Athenians that they were *αὐτόχθονες*; and in reference to this Cicero says of their state, “*Quæ vetustate ea est, ut ipsa ex sese suos cives genuisse dicatur.*” Orat. pro L. Flacco.

moreover of personal property of live stock and slaves, such as are remarkable for number, stature, and comeliness; and all these should be secure, and respectable, and useful. The useful are of that description rather which are profitable; the respectable, which conduce to enjoyment. But by profitable I mean those out of which the rent arises; by those conducting to enjoyment, all out of which arises nothing (that's worth mentioning at least) beyond their mere use. The definition of security is the having possession there, and in such a manner, that the enjoyment of the property is one's own. The essentials of a *property* then exist, when the right of alienating is in one's hands: I understand by alienation either gift or sale. But, in a word, the being rich stands more in enjoyment than in possession; for the active employment and the use of such means is wealth.

i. ἀσφαλῆ.  
ii. ἐλευ-  
θέρια.  
iii. χρήσι-  
μα.

Goodness of character is the apprehension of mankind, that you are a worthy person, or in possession of something of such a kind that all men aim at it, or at least the generality, or the good, or the well-judging. Honour is an evidence of your having a character for beneficence; and those are honoured with justice, and in an eminent degree<sup>e</sup>, whose beneficence has already been exercised: not but that he, too, is honoured who simply has the power to benefit. Beneficence relates either to the safety, and the causes, whatever they are, of the existence of its object, or to his wealth, or to any other goods whose acquisition is not easy, whether it be so generally, or at that place or time. For many meet with honour in consequence of things apparently trifling; but then it is the manner or the time [of conferring the benefit] which is the reason. The constituent parts of honour are sacrifices,—monumental inscriptions, in metre or prose,—rewards,—consecrated

8. Good-  
ness of cha-  
racter.

9. Honour.

<sup>e</sup> Aristotle's οἱ εὐεργετηκότες may be found beautifully enumerated in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 44.

pieces of ground<sup>f</sup>,—precedence,—public burial,—statues,—pensions from the state; those received among barbarians are—prostration,—giving place<sup>g</sup>. The presents also usual among each people are, with them, respectively marks of honour; for a present is at once the gift of property, and a mark of honour. Wherefore it is that the avaricious are equally desirous of these, as the ambitious; because they convey to both that which they desire, since at once it is a property, the object which the avaricious desire, and includes honour, the object of the ambitious.

10. In-  
ternal.  
2nd. Health.

The excellencies of the body are health; and that in such a degree as for us to be exempt from sickness, while we have the free exercise of the body. For many are in a state of health, indeed, whom, like Herodicus<sup>h</sup>, no one would feel inclined to congratulate on the score of health, by reason of their depriving themselves of most, if not all, the enjoyments proper to man.

11. Beauty.

Comeliness is different according to the several ages. Now the comeliness of a youth, is the having a body useful in enduring toils, whether those of the course, or of personal exertion, himself being pleasant withal to look upon with a view to delight. On which account those who practise the pentathlum are most comely, inasmuch as they are formed for violent exertion, and swiftness as well. But the comeliness of one who has attained life's prime, is a person adapted to the fatigues of war, with an aspect to be looked upon with pleasure tempered by awe. That of the old consists in the body being capable of the fatigues which it needs must undergo, and exempt withal from pain, by reason that

<sup>f</sup> Instanced in the compliment paid to the memory of Brasidas at Amphipolis, Thucyd. v. Hooker, v, § 34, p. 133; and § 47, p. 179.

<sup>g</sup> Here perhaps we may mention a remarkable compliment paid to fallen valour by the civil law; a father of three sons was entitled to considerable immunities, which continued to him even after their death, if they had fallen in battle: "Hi enim qui pro Republicâ ceciderunt in perpetuum per gloriam vivere intelliguntur." Instit. lib. ii, tit. xxv, § 1. Hooker, ii, p. 293.

<sup>h</sup> Herodicus was a physician, B. C. 440.

it has none of the afflictions by which an old age is disfigured. Strength is the capability of moving another at will: you move another, of course, either by dragging, or shoving, or lifting, or crushing him; so that the man who is endowed with strength, is requisitely so for some, if not for all these purposes. Excellence of stature, is the exceeding the generality in height, substance, and breadth, in such a ratio as not, by reason of that excess, to render one's motions more tardy. Gymnastic excellence of person is made up of stature, strength, and speed; for the swift is also endued with strength: for he who is able to throw out his legs in a particular way, and move them rapidly, and in a forward direction, is fit for running; but he who can crush and grapple with an adversary, is fit for wrestling; while he who can send him forward by a blow, is the man for boxing: but if any be endued with the two latter qualifications, he is fit for a pancratiast; while he who has all three may contend in the pentathlon.

A good old age is an old age slow in approach, unattended by pain; for neither is it a good old age if one grows rapidly old; nor if he does so slowly, indeed, but painfully: this blessing, however, is of the number both of the excellencies of the body and of fortune. For one who is neither unmolested by sickness, nor endued with strength, will not be exempt from sufferings; and his days will be but few, and those not void of pain: nor without good fortune will he hold out at all. Indeed, independently both of strength and health there is means of long life; for many, without the excellencies of the body, are long-lived. But accuracy of statement on these subjects makes nothing to our present purpose.

In what number and excellence of friends consists is not doubtful, it having been distinctly stated, respecting a friend, that he is a friend who exerts himself to do for another whatever he esteems good for him,

solely for the other's sake. He to whom *many* are so affected, has numerous friends; he to whom *worthy* men, has excellent friends.

17. Good fortune.

Good fortune is the accession, and actual possession, either of all, of most, or the greatest of those goods of which chance is the cause. Now chance is the cause of some things about which there are arts conversant<sup>i</sup>; of many things, too, unrecognized by art; for instance, of whatever things nature is a cause; for it is possible that they should happen contrarily to nature: for art is a cause of health; nature, of comeliness and stature. In a word, those goods proceed from chance, about which envy is felt<sup>k</sup>. Chance is also a cause of those goods which baffle all calculation; when, for instance, one is handsome, the rest of whose brothers are ugly; or when every one else overlooked a treasure, and he found it; or if a weapon hit one's neighbour and not one's self; or if he alone, who used always to frequent a place, did not come there, while they who came then *only* were destroyed; for all such things appear to be pieces of good luck.

18. Virtue.

As to moral excellence, since that topic is most intimately connected with praise<sup>l</sup>, we must lay down distinctions respecting it when we treat of the subject of praise. It is then plain at what objects we ought to aim in exhorting, as likely to take place, or already in existence; and what in dissuading, for they are the contraries of these.

<sup>i</sup> On the affinity of art and chance, see Eth. Nich. vi, 4.—

Τέχνη τύχην ἰσπερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην. Agatho.

The affinity appears to consist in this, that arts very often owe their origin to chance; as the capital of the Corinthian pillar, for instance, from a basket of acanthus flowers; and painting from tracing a shadow on the wall. Compare also the Poetics, ch. vi, where he deduces poetry from the *αὐτοσχεδιάσματα* or extemporaneous effusions of its rude votaries.

<sup>k</sup> Cf. ch. x, § 12.

<sup>l</sup> The subject of Epideictic Rhetoric.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the Good and Expedient treated generally.*

SINCE the expedient is the object proposed to the deliberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means conducive to that end; as moreover these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct (now every thing expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions, on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general.

1. The deliberative orator advises on "the means," therefore he must know the *συνέρον*.

Let good, then, be defined to be, 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2. and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What every thing aims at<sup>a</sup>, or every thing which has perception, or which has intelligence; or every thing would aim at, were it possessed of intelligence. 4. Whatever intelligence would award to each. 5. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good. 6. That which being present, one is well disposed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages<sup>b</sup>; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. Whatever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; for either they may be consequent *simultaneously or subsequently*.—Knowledge, for instance, is a consequent on learning *subsequently*; life is so on health *simultaneously*. Again, things are productive in three ways<sup>c</sup>; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of

3. Consequences are twofold.

Things are productive in three ways.

<sup>a</sup> This principle, which he insists on even in his moral treatises, is peculiarly adapted for a test in rhetoric; where, if the subject be only reconciled to this standard of previous opinion, the end, persuasion, is forthwith answered.

<sup>b</sup> Hooker, v, § 65, p. 306.

<sup>c</sup> First, continuous; second, discrete; third, contingent.



health, or as food is so of health, or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.

4. Indisputable goods.

These things being laid down, it must be of course that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the non-possession of evil simultaneously; on the other the possession of good subsequently.

5. And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the greater
6. above the less. The virtues also must of course be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed<sup>d</sup>; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, must be distinctly treated.
7. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honourable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure; while, of things honourable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves ob-
8. jects of choice on their own account. So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good.—Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it we
9. choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that
10. sort; for they are excellencies of the soul;—and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are

<sup>d</sup> We may observe of Aristotle's several enumerations of εἶδη, that he usually refers a few instances of earliest occurrence to the respective definitions or axioms at the outset of the subject, by virtue of which they belong to the class to which he assigns them. Thus, in the enumeration of good here instituted, he refers to his general canons of good which have just been admitted; e. g. virtue may be classed among goods, by virtue of def. 5 and 7. It would be useful to pursue the comparison, if not through all the instances quoted, at least through the greater part of them; since it will at once serve the purpose of impressing on the memory his leading examples, and of helping us to a fuller acquaintance with his theory.

excellencies of the body, and productive of many things; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz. of pleasure and life:—Wealth; because it is an excellence of<sup>11.</sup> possession, and productive of many things. A friend<sup>12.</sup> and friendship; for a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. Honour, character; for they are pleasant, and productive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on account of which the subject is honoured. Ability, in speaking and act-<sup>14.</sup>ing; for all such powers are productive of good. Again,<sup>15.</sup> high genius, memory, readiness in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And life; for were no other good<sup>16.</sup> consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just, for it is a kind of general ad-<sup>17.</sup>vantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly.

But in the case of questionable goods, your reason-<sup>18. Disput-</sup>ings will be deduced from these formulæ,—that of<sup>19.</sup> which the contrary is an evil, is itself a good; as is that of which the contrary is expedient to an enemy: for example, if your being cowards be above all things expedient to your enemies, it is plain, that to the citizens your courage will be above all things beneficial. And, in a word, whatever be the things which the<sup>20.</sup> enemy desires and in which they rejoice, the contrary of those things appear beneficial; and hence was it well said;—

“ Priam surely would exult,” etc. *Il. ɳ, l. 255<sup>e</sup>.*

<sup>e</sup> See Otho's speech to the soldiers on Vitellius's usurpation after the murder of Galba:—*Si Vitellio et satellitibus ejus eligendi facultas detur, quem nobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur; quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam optabunt?* Tacit. Hist. i, 84.

And yet this case does not always hold, though it does generally; for there is no reason why the self-same things should not, at times, be expedient to two hostile parties; from which comes the saying that evils bring men together<sup>f</sup>, when the same thing happens to be injurious to both. That too is a good, which is not in excess<sup>g</sup>; but whatever exceeds what it ought, is an evil. And that on account of which much toil or expense has been bestowed, for already will it have appeared to be a good; and we already conceive of every such thing as of an *end*, and as an end of many efforts; but the end is a good; and on this principle rests the force of that appeal,

“ It were in accordance forsooth with Priam's heartiest prayer;”  
Il. β, l. 176.

and of this,

“ Base indeed is it to remain so long;” Il. β, l. 298.

and that of the proverb of

“ Breaking the pitcher at the very door.”  
Vide Erasmi Adagia II, i, 75.

23. That too of which many are desirous, and which appears to be disputed for; because that of which all are desirous, was laid down to be a good; the *generality*, however, have the appearance of being *all*. And that which is recommended; because no one recommends that which is not good<sup>h</sup>. And that which your enemies and the bad recommend; for all, as it were,

<sup>f</sup> So Shakspeare quotes the proverb, “ Misery makes a man acquainted with strange bedfellows.”

<sup>g</sup> A good which requires no qualification; e. g. moral truths.

<sup>h</sup> To desire evil as evil, and feel pleasure in it as such, is perfectly unnatural. Hence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, ch. i, ver. 32, sums up the iniquity of the Gentile world in this one word; that not only did they in person commit the enormities, but “ had pleasure in them that do them.”

already acknowledge it when even they do who are ill affected; for solely on account of its being plainly such will these acknowledge it<sup>l</sup>: and in exactly the same way they are held to be but paltry characters [and with these even their friends find fault, and all good men] with whom their enemy finds no fault: on which very principle the Corinthians conceived themselves to have been scandalized by Simonides introducing in his verses,

“ Troy finds no fault with the Corinthians<sup>k</sup>.”

And that is a good which any who are practically wise, <sup>25.</sup> whether among men or women, have preferred; instanced in Minerva's choice of Ulysses; Theseus' of Helen; and the Goddesses' of Paris<sup>l</sup>; and Homer's of Achilles. In a word, all objects of determined choice <sup>26.</sup> are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends; and those which are possible—these are varied in two ways; such as <sup>27.</sup> may be done, and such as may *easily* be done<sup>m</sup>. Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time; for difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the

<sup>l</sup> Virgil therefore could not have praised Æneas more than when he makes Diomede say,—

—Stetimus tela aspera contra,

Contulimusque manus: experto credite, quantus

In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. *Æn.*

<sup>k</sup> Glaucus the Lycian, who was of Corinthian descent, assisted the Trojans, consequently Simonides meant to praise them; but from the known bias of this writer to “censure in disguise,” (of which another instance may be found, lib. iii, ch. 2) the Corinthians might very fairly suspect his purpose.

<sup>l</sup> Vid. ii, c. 23, § 12, sub fin. *περι' Αλεξάνδρου*, “ὄν αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν.”

<sup>m</sup> Vid. c. xii, § 1, *εἴτε ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ, μὴ λαθόντες, μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, κ. τ. λ.*

28. punishment either escapes notice or is trifling: and such actions as are peculiar; as no one has done; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater: and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family, and power. Things too which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else; for be they ever so trifling<sup>a</sup>, they in no less degree determine on putting them in execution: and
29. things easily brought about; for they are possible, inasmuch as they are easy: but things easily brought about, are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gratifies one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Every thing, too, which they whom we admire deliberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have experience; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things too which no bad man does; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favourable light<sup>o</sup>. And men
30. more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory; the avaricious, if it be money; and other characters in the same way.

On questions then of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence.

<sup>a</sup> So Horace. . . . . O! si angulus ille  
Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum!

<sup>o</sup> If seen through the deceitful medium of desire.

## CHAP. VII.

*On the subject of the greater Good, and the more expedient Measures.*

BUT as the advocates of opposite measures, while they in many instances allow both to be expedient, dispute nevertheless on the question which is the more so; we shall have next to speak of greater good, and what is in a higher degree expedient. Let excess, then, be defined to be, as much and yet more; the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised within the excess. Again, *greater and more*<sup>a</sup> are terms relative always to some particular *less* thing<sup>b</sup>: but *great* or *small*, *much* or *little*, have reference to the size of things *generally*. And that which is great exceeds; but that which is deficient is small; and of the terms much and little in the like manner.

Now as we call that good, which, independently, for its own sake, and not on account of any thing else, is an object of choice; that, too, which every thing desires; and which, if invested with intelligence and practical wisdom, every thing would choose; as also what is preservative or productive of, or on which such things are consequent; and as that, with a view to which we act, is the end; and as an end is that for whose sake every thing else is done: but that is good to a man's self which has these affections in reference to himself: this being the case, it must be that plurality is a greater good than one or a few, provided that one

<sup>a</sup> *Greater*, in reference to quantity *continuous*, or magnitude; *more*, in reference to quantity *discrete*, or multitude.

<sup>b</sup> The meaning of this passage appears to be this,—that while all terms designating quantity are relative, the grammatical degrees of comparison imply relation to certain objects then more immediately before us. Those who are puzzled by this doctrine of excess and defect, had better take Victorius's hint, and illustrate each remark by an example from numbers.

1. The greater good must be discussed.

2. Definition of the excess and the exceeded.

3. Different *σπουδαία* of the greater good.

- or those few be enumerated in conjunction with it<sup>c</sup>; for it then exceeds them, and the within comprised one
4. or few is exceeded. And if the greatest individual of one species, exceed the greatest individual of another, then also will the first species itself exceed the second<sup>d</sup>. And, *vice versa*, wherever one species exceeds another, the greatest individual of the exceeding, exceeds the greatest individuals of the exceeded species: for example, if the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman, then will also men, in general, be greater than women; and if men generally be greater than women, then will also the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman; for the excesses of species, and of the greatest individuals under them, have a common ratio<sup>e</sup>.
5. When one thing is a consequence of another, but that other thing is not a consequence of it; (now, things are consequent, recollect, either *simultaneously* or *subsequently*, or virtually;) *then is that of which the other is a consequence the greater good*; because the enjoyment of the consequent is inherent in the enjoyment of the other. Things are consequent simultaneously, as life on health; but it is not consequent on life: and subsequently, as knowledge on learning; virtually, as larceny on sacrilege; for the man who has committed
6. sacrilege would be ready also to steal. Things which exceed the same thing in a greater degree [than itself],

<sup>c</sup> This qualification is absolutely necessary to the truth of the position; for it may happen, if the plurality be not of things of the same species as the less number, that the less number is of higher value than the greater. *Five guineas* are "a greater good" than *two*, i. e. the greater number than the less, of things of the same species; yet it does not therefore follow that *five farthings* are better than *two guineas*, for there the less number is not, as in the first case it was, virtually enumerated in the greater. Compare *Ethics*, lib. i, c. vii, § 8.

<sup>d</sup> Or, as lord Bacon expresses it, "That kind is *altogether best*, whose *excellence or pre-eminence* is best."

<sup>e</sup> As is the excess of the male above the female sex, so is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman; and conversely, as is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman, so is the excess of the male above the female sex.

are greater<sup>f</sup>; for of necessity they exceed even the greater. Things productive of a greater good are 7. greater, for this would be by virtue of their being productive of something greater. That, too, the productive cause of which is greater, is likewise greater; for if that which is healthy, be preferable to, and a greater good than that which is pleasant; then also will health be superior to pleasure. As also that which, inde- 8. pendently of any thing, is preferable, is superior to that which is not preferable independently: thus strength is above things conducing to health; for the latter are not sought on their own account, while the former is, the which was assumed as a criterion of good. And should one object be an end, the other not 9. an end; for the one is for the sake of something else, the other, for its own sake; thus is exercise inferior to a good habit of body<sup>g</sup>. That too is a greater good 10. which in a less degree stands in need of any one or more things as accessions, for it is in a higher degree independent: now that is said less to need accessions, which needs such as either are fewer or more easily obtained. And whenever one thing does not exist, nor 11. can possibly be brought into existence independently of another, but that other can without it; then that which needs not the accession, is more independent, and thus shews itself to be a greater good. Again, if 12. one be a principle and the other not; and for the same reason if one be a cause, the other not; since without a cause or principle, existence or production is impos-

<sup>f</sup> E. g. Eight exceeds two by six, which is also greater than the original number two.

<sup>g</sup> Man's will hath two several kinds of operation, the one natural or necessary, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally all things which hurt; the other deliberate, when we *therefore* embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire. Thus *in itself* we desire health, physic only for health's sake; and in this sort special reason oftentimes causeth the will by choice to prefer one thing before another, etc. Hooker, v, § 48, p. 186.



sible<sup>h</sup>. And of goods both proceeding from principles, that is the greater good which arises from the higher principle; as also that is the greater good which originates in the higher of two causes. And, *vice versa*, that of two principles which is the principle of the greater good, is greater; and that of two causes which is the cause of the greater, is itself greater. It is evident then from what has been said, that it is possible for a thing to appear the greater both ways; for supposing this to be a principle, and the other not, it will appear the greater<sup>i</sup>; as also will it, supposing it not to be a principle<sup>k</sup> while the other is; because the end, and not the principle, was above stated to be the greater. Just like the saying of Leodamus in impeaching Callistratus, "that the man who devised the deed was worse than he who executed it; for had he not devised it, the other could not have executed it:" and conversely, against Chabrias, he argued that "the agent was worse than the deviser; for had there not been an agent, it would not have been realized in action, because people devised plots on this very account, that others may execute them." The more rare good is greater than the abundant<sup>l</sup>; thus gold is better than steel, notwithstanding that it is less useful; for the acquisition, by reason of its being more difficult, is greater. And in another view, the abundant is better than the rare, for the enjoyment of it exceeds that of the other;

13. The same object may be made to appear the greater good in different ways.

<sup>h</sup> ἀρχή is the beginning of a thing, αἴτιον the cause; the latter consequently is prior to the former. In a plant the seed is the ἀρχή, the vegetative power the αἴτιον.

<sup>i</sup> By the rule which states the principle to be superior to that which is not so.

<sup>k</sup> That is, supposing it to be an end; for, by a former rule, ends are superior to means: thus, by one rule the superiority is assigned to ends, and by another to principles. So that, whichever side you take, you will have something to allege.

<sup>l</sup> On this principle Aristotle argues in his Poetics for the superiority of the fable above the other five constituents of the drama, inferring its superior worth from its superiority *difficulty* and *rarity*. "Quæ rara, cara."

for the idea of *often* exceeds that of *seldom*; whence it is said, "Water<sup>m</sup> is the best of things:" and, in a 15. word, the more difficult is superior to the easier acquisition, for it is more rare. In another point of view, the easier is above the more difficult; for it has itself as we wish. That also is the greater good, the con- 16. trary of which is the greater evil; as is also that of which the deprivation is the greater loss. Virtue, too, is greater than what is not positive virtue, and vice than what is not positive vice; for the former severally are ends, the latter are not ends. Causes, the produc- 17. tions of which are more becoming or more disgraceful, are themselves of greater importance. Also of whatever things the excellencies and deficiencies are of greater importance, of them are also the productions of greater importance: since results stand to each other in the same ratio, as their several causes and principles; and, *vice versa*, causes and principles, in the ratio of their several results. Things, the excess of which is 18. preferable or more becoming, as *accuracy* of sight is preferable to that of smelling, for sight is preferable to smelling; and the being greatly attached to friends is more becoming than to be greatly attached to money<sup>n</sup>, so that attachment to friends is more becoming than fondness for money. And conversely, too, the excesses of better feelings are themselves better; and of the more becoming, themselves, more becoming: as, too, are those things of which the desires are better 19. or more becoming; for the greater desire is of the greater object: and, for the same reason, the desires

<sup>m</sup> Perrault, the French critic, misled possibly by this very passage, impotently ridiculed Pindar for the triteness of this idea: being ignorant that the poet alluded to the philosophy of Thales, who borrowed and taught the Phœnician doctrine, that water was the principle of all things. Vide Wharton on Pope, vol. i, p. 132.

<sup>n</sup> Τὸ φιλέταιρον εἶναι καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον; i. e. the being affected by these several feelings to such a degree, that they become a leading feature of the character: in which case, there is an *ὑπερόχη*, as it were, of the feelings.

- which fasten on the more excellent and becoming objects, are themselves more excellent and becoming.
20. Again, where the sciences are more grave or becoming, there the subject-matter also is more grave and becoming; for, as is the science, so is its truth; for each science takes cognisance of its peculiar truths: and analogous to this precedence of subjects is that also of the sciences, which recognise graver and more becoming
21. subjects, above the rest; for the same reasons. And that which men of practical wisdom, or every person, or the generality, or the majority, or the best of men have, or would have pronounced to be a greater good; that of course must be such, either absolutely, or so far at least as they decided conformably to their prudence. This, too, is a test available in common to the other questions about good; for their substance, quantity and quality, have themselves so as science and prudence may direct: on this subject however we have treated. For that has been defined to be good which every being, if fraught with prudence<sup>o</sup>, would choose; wherefore it is evident, that what prudence pronounces
22. good in a high degree is a greater good. Also that which belongs to the better men, either absolutely, or in respect of their being better; as courage is better than strength. Also what the better man would make the object of his choice, either absolutely or in respect of its being better; as, the suffering rather than the doing an injury, for this would he choose who is more
23. just. And that which conduces more to pleasure rather than what conduces less; because every being pursues pleasure, and is desirous of enjoying it for its own sake; now it is in reference to this, that the good and the end have been defined: that is said to conduce more to pleasure, which is conducive to it with less
24. alloy of pain, and for a greater length of time. That which is more becoming rather than what is less so;

<sup>o</sup> Whence it follows that prudence is competent to decide on the nature of good.

for the becoming either is that which tends to please, or is desirable on its own account. Whatever things 25. people prefer being the causes of to themselves or to their friends, those are greater goods; but whatever they would least wish, are greater evils. Things whose 26. duration is long, rather than those whose duration is short; and those which are more secure, rather than those which are less so: for there is an advantage in their enjoyment; of the former, in respect to time; of the latter, from their being at will: for the enjoyment of what is secure is more in their power whenever they wish. And as are the terms arising from conjugates 27. and similar inflections, so are the qualities they denote; for example, if *courageously* be an idea more noble and desirable than *temperately*, *courage* will also be something more noble than *temperance*, and the idea of a man's being courageous than of his being temperate. What every one chooses is better than what some do 28. not, as also is the choice of a majority better than that of a minority; for as that was supposed a good which all desire, so that is proportionately greater which is more desired. That, too, which litigants or foes, judges, or arbitrators selected by judges prefer, is better; for in one case the decision is equivalent to that of all mankind; and in the other, men of authority and information actually do pronounce. And some- 29. times good is greater in which all participate; for not to participate in it is a disgrace: while at others, that is which none, or which few share with you; for it is more rare. Things more commended, because more 30. becoming; and in the same way things are better to which belongs the greater honour, because honour is as a kind of estimate of worth. Those things again are more heinous on which are imposed the greater punishments. Again, what is greater than things con- 31. fessedly or apparently great, is itself superior in greatness. And the same objects, when separated into their several constituents, have an air of superior greatness,

for the excess of a plurality of objects is conspicuous. Whence the poet says that Meleager's wife persuaded him to rise up to the war by entering into detail:—

“ She paints the horrors of a conquer'd town,  
The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown,  
The matrons ravish'd, the whole race enslaved<sup>p</sup>.”

Iliad ix, 705.

Again, the condensing and accumulating of circumstances in the way Epicharmus used to do, is productive of effect, and that on the same principle as their separation; viz. because the condensing of them evinces great excess, and for the further reason, that it appears

32. a principle and a cause of great results. But as that is greater which is more rare and difficult, circumstances both of opportunity, and age, and place, and time, and strength, produce great effect. For an exploit beyond one's strength, and age, and equals, if achieved, or if under such circumstances, at such a place or time, will gain importance whether it be good, or honourable, or just, or the opposite. Whence originated the inscription of the Olympic victor, “*Formerly, indeed, with a rough basket<sup>q</sup> on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.*” [Simonides.] And on this proceeds that encomium of Iphicrates [who was the son of a shoemaker] on himself, when he said, “*From what beginnings have these things been*

33. *realised!*” That, too, which is innate is superior to what is adscititious, from its greater difficulty; where-

<sup>p</sup> Another striking instance of the effect produced by a detail of circumstances may be found in the Septem contra Thebas of Æschylus, 302, ed. Bl.—

οἰκτρὸν γὰρ πόνιν ὦδ'  
ὠγυγίαν αἰῖδι προΐάψαι, κ. τ. λ.

and in Burke's speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts, Works, vol. ii, p. 480: see also Sheridan's celebrated speech against Warren Hastings.

<sup>q</sup> ἄσιλλα is properly the yoke which was laid across the shoulder, from which the basket hung.

fore the poet says "*Of myself am I taught*."<sup>r</sup> And the 34.  
 greatest part of what is great; as Pericles said in his  
 funeral oration<sup>s</sup>, "*That the youth were swept from the  
 city, just as the spring, were it to be withdrawn from the  
 year.*" That, too, is more precious which is available 35.  
 in the greater need; as in old age, or sickness, for in-  
 stance. And of two means, that more immediately con-  
 ducting to the end. That whose qualities have direct  
 reference to one's self, than those which are general.  
 What is possible, rather than what is impossible; for  
 the one attaches to one's self, the other not. And  
 things which are comprised in the end<sup>t</sup> of life; for  
 things conducing to the end partake in a greater de-  
 gree of the nature of ends. Things having reference 36.  
 to truth rather than to opinion:—as a definition of  
 matter of opinion we may take what one, likely to es-  
 cape observation, would not choose to do: and on this  
 principle the receiving good would appear more de-  
 sirable than the doing it; since one would choose the  
 first even should it be unobserved; with respect how-  
 ever to the doing good, that it seems no one about to  
 be unnoticed would choose<sup>u</sup>. Those things, too, are 37.  
 better, of which men prefer the real possession to the  
 appearance; for they have a nearer reference to truth:  
 on which principle some argue that justice is a trifling  
 good, because it is better for it to appear, than merely  
 to exist<sup>x</sup>: in respect to health, however, this is not the

<sup>r</sup> Hom. Odyss. xxii, 347.

<sup>s</sup> Whether we suppose the *ἐπιτάφιον* to have been lost, or feel inclined to charge Aristotle with a *lapsus memoria*, so it is that the words are not attributed to Pericles in any work which has come down to us. The same illustration was used by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, to the deputies from the states of Greece, who implored his assistance. Herodotus, vii, 162.

<sup>t</sup> Τέλος, the end or object of life: *εὐδαιμονία* scilicet.

<sup>u</sup> A strikingly ostentatious principle of benevolence this: but it is one which an exact observance of human nature, even now that it has met the rebuke of divine wisdom, will perhaps too fully justify Aristotle in laying down.

<sup>x</sup> According to the argument of the sophist Thrasymachus. Plato. Rep. lib. i.

38. case. That which is conducive to the greater number of uses; as what conduces to life, to happy life, to pleasure, and to noble conduct; wherefore health and wealth appear the highest goods, for these include
39. every thing. That which is accompanied by less pain, and on which pleasure is attendant; for the good is more than merely single, since it is realised both in the positive pleasure, and in the absence of pain. And of two goods, that which, added to the same good, renders the
40. sum greater. That, too, whose presence does not escape us, rather than that which does<sup>y</sup>; for such approach reality: whence the being really rich will seem
41. a greater good than the appearance of being so. That, too, which is held dear, is a greater good:—whether, as in some cases, it be single; or, as in others, accompanied by more: on which account the punishment is not equal, in the case of putting out the eye of a person who has but one, and of one who has two eyes<sup>z</sup>; for there is, in the one case, a deprivation of the dearest object<sup>a</sup>.

The sources then from which, in exhortation and dissuasion, we must deduce our means of persuading, have nearly been enumerated.

<sup>y</sup> I have thus ventured to understand *ἡμᾶς* with *λανθάνει*; for it appears the simplest way of getting over the difficulty which is caused by the illustration, which would appear better adapted to one of the former *εἶδη* than to this.

<sup>z</sup> Zaleucus established among the Locrians the law of retaliation, “an eye for an eye.” But on one occasion a man with a single eye being threatened with blindness by his enemy, procured a clause to be added, denouncing the loss of both eyes to him who deprived another of his only one. Demosth. Cont. Timocr. p. 744.

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Parr, quoting the following passage from the Politics, “*δύο γὰρ εἰσὶν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τὸ τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν*,” remarks:—“I suspect that *ἀγαπητὸν* here means *more* than *carum*, it may be rendered *unicum*, atque adeo *carum*. Aristotle, in lib. i, c. 7, Rhetor. says of the eye, destroyed in him who had only one, *ἀγαπητὸν ἀφῆρηται*: see Hen. Stephens’s Thesaurus: but I should observe, that in the margin of Aristotle, *καὶ μόνον* are added, *perhaps*, as explanatory. Upon the word *ἀγαπητὸν* in SS. for *μονογέννη*, see Suidas and Hesychius in v. and the notes.” Spital. Sermon, notes, p. 39.

## CHAP. VIII.

*On Forms of Government;—what and how many they are;—and on the end of each.*

THE means of greatest and most paramount importance with a view to being able to persuade and give advice in a becoming style, is the having made one's self master of all the forms of government; and the having clearly distinguished their several practices, and legal principles, and interests: for all men are persuaded by what is advantageous; but that which is preservative of the constitution, is absolute expediency<sup>a</sup>. And further, the dictum of the authoritative power of the state, is itself authoritative. But the authorities are distinguished according to the forms of government under which they exist; for as many forms of government as there are, so many are the authorities.

Now there are four forms of government; democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. So that the authoritative and judicial functions will be merely one constituent of these, or the whole. Democracy is a form of government<sup>b</sup>, in which men apportion out the magistracies to themselves by lot. But an oligarchy, in which those only who, from the valuation of property, are entitled. Aristocracy, in which those bear magistracy who can conform to the constitutional plan of education. By such education I mean that established

1. Reasons why the deliberative orator must know governments.

i.

2.

ii.

3. Four forms.

4. Democracy.

Oligarchy.

Aristocracy.

<sup>a</sup> Τὸ σῶζον πολιτείαν appears with Aristotle to have been equivalent to abstract expediency; and he therefore cannot be charged with a violation of his own rule against entering into particulars on any subject as peculiar to rhetoric, because every question of expediency will ultimately be viewed in reference to the constitution under which the parties live: at any rate the question is treated merely in a popular way—*διηκριβῶται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*.

<sup>b</sup> In the Ethics (lib. viii, c. 10) democracy is not stated as a distinct form, but merely as a deviation (*παρέκβασις*) from timocracy, or *πολιτεία ἢ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων*.



by the law: for those who adhere to the principles of the law, are the men who, in an aristocracy, hold magistracies; and it must be that these should appear the best, whence this form of government took its name.

Monarchy. Monarchy is that form in which, conformably to its name, one man is supreme; and, of monarchies, those which are held by conformity to some limitations are kingdoms, but the unlimited are tyrannies<sup>c</sup>.

5. Ends of each government. Neither should the ends of the respective forms of government escape us; for men choose whatever conduces to the end. The end then of a democracy, is liberty; of an oligarchy, it is wealth; of an aristocracy, the institutions relating to education and the principles of the law; the end of a tyranny, is the protection of the tyrant's person<sup>d</sup>. It is evident then, if men fix their choice by reference to the end, that we must accurately distinguish the respective practices, laws, and interests of each form.

6. The speaker must know these constitutional forms in order to impress the hearers with a good-will towards him. But as means of persuasion originate not in argumentative oratory alone, but in such also as bears an impress of character; for it is from the speaker's appearing a man of certain character that we trust him; that is to say, if he appears an honest man, or well affected<sup>e</sup>, or both: as this is the case, it will be neces-

<sup>c</sup> Παρέκβασις βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι. Ibid.

<sup>d</sup> We find a remarkable proof of this in the account given by Herodotus of the anxiety of the Persians for the personal safety of Xerxes after the battle of Salamis;—*οὐκ οὕτω περὶ τῶν νεῶν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡς περὶ αὐτῷ Ξέρξῃ δειμαίνοντες*, viii, 99. A remarkable expression occurs in Sophocles from which the same inference may be drawn: Œdipus, asking Creon why the murder of Laius had not been more fully investigated, thus expresses himself:

Κακὸν δὲ ποῖον ἐμποδῶν, ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΑΔΟΣ

"Οὕτω πεσοῦσης, εἶργε τοῦτ' ἐξειδέναι;—Œdip. Tyrannus, 128.

Where we may observe, that not simply is the person of the tyrant spoken of, but the very government itself, as though it had fallen with him.

<sup>e</sup> It is required (lib. ii, c. 1) that he be further possessed of φρόνησις. Let it be remembered that these qualities must be evinced by the speech, and not simply be taken for granted from a previous knowledge of the man. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. i, p. 5.

sary for us to be masters of the character of each form of government; for the character which is peculiar to each, must needs be most available to persuasion in addressing each. These points, however, will be ascertained by means of the same information; for the character will manifestly be conformable to the choice; now the settled choice has reference to the end.

Thus then have the objects which we ought to aim at in exhorting and dissuading, as probable or actually in existence; the sources, too, out of which we must draw our means of proof on the subject of the expedient, and on the subject moreover of the character and legal principles belonging to the forms of government; and the means by which, and the manner how, we shall have facilities on such questions: all these points have been discussed, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion. For accuracy of detail on these points has been observed in the Politics.

#### CHAP. IX.

*On the subject of Virtue and Vice, the honourable and disgraceful;—Out of what considerations praise and blame are derived.*

LET us next speak of virtue and vice, and of the honourable and disgraceful; because these are the objects of the orator who praises or blames<sup>a</sup>; and because it will happen that, in speaking of these subjects, we shall at the same time throw light on the means by which we may ourselves be conceived to be of a certain turn of character, which was stated to be the *second* means of effecting belief; since we shall be able, by the applica-

1. The subjects of Epideictic oratory discussed.

<sup>a</sup> As praise is the proper reward of virtue, so are blame and disgrace proper to vice; in order that the world may be warned by the example of the one, and excited to emulate that of the other: ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινομένη, δένδρον ὡς, ἀίξεται.

tion of the same points, to render ourselves or others  
 2. deserving belief on the score of moral excellence. But as there frequently are instances, as well in sober earnest as without it, of praising not men or gods only, but even inanimate objects, and any animal whatever, as it may happen; we must here, in the same way as before, ascertain propositions on these subjects also. Let us then, so far as may serve for a specimen, discuss these subjects.

3. τὸ καλὸν defined in two ways.

That then is honourable, which, while it is an object of choice on its own account, is commendable also; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply because it is good. But if the honourable be this, virtue must necessarily be honourable; for, being good, it is commendable. And virtue, as it should seem, is a faculty tending to provide us with goods and preserve them to us; a faculty moreover capable of benefiting in many and important cases; of benefiting, in a word, every

4. Perfect virtue and its constituent parts are honourable.

5. object in every respect<sup>b</sup>. The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, placability, prudence, wisdom;  
 6. and it must needs be, that those virtues are the highest which are the most beneficial to others, if at least virtue be (as it was defined) a faculty capable of benefiting: on this account, men honour in the greatest degree the just and brave; for justice and courage are useful to them, the one in war, and the other in peace<sup>c</sup>. Next is liberality; for the liberal are profuse, and do not wrangle with people about money, the object which the

<sup>b</sup> Aristotle never omits an opportunity of inculcating this wholesome lesson, that the practice of virtue conduces to our true interest. Its necessity in bodies politic, as being eminently τὸ σώζον τὴν πολιτείαν, is thus stated in another of his works: "Ἔστι δ' οὐθεν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πράξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποῖον τίνα εἶναι, λέγω δὲ οἷον σπουδαῖον. Τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. Magn. Mor. lib. i, c. 1.

<sup>c</sup> In the Ethics he places liberality first;—φιλοῦνται σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Eth. Nich. iv, 1. Courage may be ranked first, because on occasions we may be disqualified from the exercise of other virtues if this be wanting.

rest of the world hanker after more than any thing. Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own, as 7. the law prescribes : injustice, however, is that habit by which some take the property of others in contraven- 8. tion to law. Courage, that by which men are ready to 8. achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger, conformably to the direction of and in subservience to law<sup>d</sup>: cowardice, however, is its contrary. But tem- 9. perance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law di- 10. rects; intemperance, however, is its contrary. But 10. liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters; stingi- 11. ness is its contrary. Magnanimity is that virtue which 11. is apt to confer important benefits; narrowness of soul is its opposite. Magnificence is the virtue which pro- 12. duces grandeur in expenditures :—again, narrowness of soul and meanness are opposed. Prudence however 13. is an intellectual<sup>e</sup> virtue, by conforming to which men have the faculty of actually determining on the subjects of the good and evil<sup>f</sup>, which has been mentioned as en- 14. tering into happiness.

Enough has been said on the subject of virtue and 14. vice in general, and of their constituent parts, to suit the present<sup>g</sup> occasion : respecting the other points, τὰ καλὰ 15. enumerat- ed.

<sup>d</sup> Consistently with the doctrine held in the Ethics, he does not admit every sort of daring to the praise of courage. For of some persons, whose daring is at first sight not inconsiderable, it is true, as Juvenal remarks—

Justa pericli

Si ratio est et honesta, timent pavidoque gelantur

Pectore, nec tremulis possunt insistere plantis :

Fortem animum præstant rebus, quas turpiter audent.

SAT. vi, 94.

<sup>e</sup> Alluding to the division made in the Ethics of virtues into those of the ἐπιθυμητικόν and λόγον ἔχον μέρος of the soul ; the former whereof is the subject of the *moral*, the latter of the *intellectual* virtues. Vid. Eth. i, 13.

<sup>f</sup> Ἡ μὲν φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ποιητέα ὄρους αὐτοῖς τιθεῖσα. Philo, p. 35, Allegor. ed. Par.

<sup>g</sup> Those who have not read the Ethics will be surprised to hear that the virtues which he here despatches in one section, should there occupy a book and a half. This popular discussion of them is, as far as it goes, conform-

- there is no difficulty in discerning what they are ; for it is plainly necessary both that the productives of virtue should be honourable (because they have reference to virtue), and also the fruits of virtue ; of which kind are
15. both the indications and actions of virtue ; but as the indications and all actions or sufferings of a good man are honourable, it will necessarily follow that all exploits of courage whatever, and all indications of courage, that all conduct, in a word, which has been marked with courage is honourable ; and so of things just and conforming to justice, so far at least as *actions* are concerned : (but as relates to *sufferings* this is not the case ; for in this single instance of all the virtues, does it occur that what is conformable to justice is not invariably honourable, but in the case of suffering punishment, that which is justly suffered is in a higher degree disgraceful than what is unjustly<sup>h</sup>;) and so like-
  16. wise in respect to the other virtues. Whatever actions have national distinctions as their reward are honourable, or whatever have such distinctions rather than money. Whatever things, among those which are objects of choice, one does, not for his own sake. And whatever things which abstractedly viewed are good, one has achieved for his country's sake, overlooking his own interest. Things good in their own nature ; things which are good, but not to one's self ; every thing of
  17. that kind being chosen on its own account. Whatever things admit of being realised to one when dead, rather than in his lifetime ; for that which appertains to one
17. Every thing free from the selfish principle is honourable.

able to the more philosophical view taken in the other treatise, except in respect to the criterion which is assigned of the comparative excellence of each virtue, viz. μέγιστας εἶναι ἀρετᾶς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμώτατας ; and that stated § 23—αἱ ἀπολαύστικαι ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ. Such a test, however inadequate to the views of the philosopher, is good enough for the orator, since it is one in which nine tenths of the world will acquiesce.

<sup>h</sup> The passage from πάθη to ἀδίκως must be considered as a note ; and the words κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας—ὡσαύτως, considered as the conclusion of the sentence preceding it.

in his life, rather carries the idea of its being for one's self. Whatever actions are for the sake of others; for 19. they are not so much for one's own sake. And as 20. many instances of successful management as occur where others are concerned, and where one's self is not; and this particularly respecting benefactors, for it then is just. Benefits, too, are honourable; for they attach not to one's self. And the contraries of all cases in which men feel a delicacy; for men are sensible of delicacy both in mentioning, or doing, or intending any thing disgraceful; just as Sappho has expressed in verse on the occasion of Alcæus' saying, "I would say something, but delicacy restrains me." "If thou entertainedst a desire of speaking things either good or honourable, and were not thy tongue teeming with the utterance of some evil; shame had not suffused thine eyes, but thou wouldest have spoken what was fit." Objects for which men are keenly anxious with- 21. out being affected by fear<sup>i</sup>, are honourable; for men are thus affected respecting goods which tend to reputation. Those virtues and their fruits are honourable 22. in a higher degree, which belong to subjects naturally more excellent<sup>k</sup>; as, for example, those of a man are higher than those of a woman. And those which are 23. of a nature to be enjoyed by *others*, rather than by *ourselves*; the principle on which the just and justice are honourable.

Thus, the taking vengeance on a foe rather than the 24. Re- being reconciled; both because to compensate is just, venge is ho- nerable.

<sup>i</sup> Victorius cites an anecdote of Themistocles, preserved by Cicero, as illustrative of this remark. "Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset: quærentibusque respondebat, *Miltiadis tropæis se e somno excitari.*" Tusc. iv, 19. It will be needless to remark, that "noble minds" alone can be sensible of this high excitement—*ἀγῶνία*. And Thucydides on hearing Herodotus read his History.

<sup>k</sup> The greatness and dignity of all manner of actions is measured by the worthiness of the subject from which they proceed, and of the object whereabout they are conversant. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. v, § 6, p. 23.

- and what is just is honourable<sup>1</sup>; and further, because it belongs to the courageous man never to be worsted.
25. Both victory and national distinction are of the number of things honourable; for they are desirable, though unattended by lucre, and evince more than ordinary virtue; and the memorials of one's name; and what partakes of these respective characters more decidedly, is also more decidedly honourable. Again, things which do not follow one in his life; and whatever honour is attendant on; that which presents features of vastness; that, too, is honourable in a higher degree which belongs to one's self *alone*, for it is longer re-
26. membered. And possessions unattended by profit, for they are more becoming a gentleman<sup>m</sup>; and whatever is peculiarly esteemed among each people, is honourable. Every badge of what is held commendable in each nation: at Lacedæmon<sup>n</sup>, for instance, it is honourable to wear long hair<sup>o</sup>, because it is the badge of a free

Badges are  
honourable.

<sup>1</sup> This is a striking instance of that species of sophistry by which our unenlightened reason reconciles us to the gratification of our worst passions; and we should learn from it to glory in that heavenly wisdom which has taught us "to do good to those who hate us, to pray for those who despitely use us and persecute us."

<sup>m</sup> Ἐλευθέρια, τὰ μὴ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν. See cap. v, § 7.

<sup>n</sup> This idea appears, in ancient times, to have been very prevalent; a singular instance of its influence is mentioned in Stobæus: "Παρ' Ἴνδοις ἴάν τις ἀποστειρηθῆ δανείου, ἢ παρακαταθήκης, οὐκ ἔστι κρίσις· ἀλλ' αὐτὸν αἰτιάται ὁ πιστεύσας. ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου πηρώσας χεῖρα ἢ ὄφθαλμὸν θανάτῳ ζημιῶται. τὸν δὲ μέγιστα ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ βασιλεὺς κελεύει κείρασθαι, ὡς ἐσχάτης οὔσης ταύτης ἀτιμίας. Parr, Spitt. Serm. p. 146.

<sup>o</sup> The Lacedæmonians used to wear their hair long, in commemoration of the victory obtained by Othryades and his two comrades over the three Argive champions, for the land at Thyrea. Herodot. i, 82. Or perhaps, being inconvenient to those engaged in servile occupations, length of hair might be considered as a badge of the more noble pursuits of the wearer. Collins has a fine allusion to this practice in the opening of his Ode to Liberty:—

Who shall awake the Spartan fife,  
And call in solemn sounds to life  
The youths, whose locks divinely spreading,  
*Like vernal hyacinths in sullen hue,*

man, since it is not easy for a man with long hair to do any servile work. And the not exercising any vulgar craft; for it belongs to a gentleman not to live in dependence on another<sup>p</sup>. And we must take for granted that qualities, akin to real ones, are actually identified with them, and this with a view as well to praise as to blame; for instance, taking the cautious man to be a cold-hearted designing fellow; or a simpleton to be a good kind of man; and the man who is dead to feeling, to be of a mild disposition: and in a word, we must make a selection, invariably on the most favourable side, out of the qualities concomitant on the character of each; making out the passionate and furious to be men void of all duplicity; and the self-willed to be magnificent and dignified: and such as are in excess, to be in the virtuous mean; the rash, for instance, to be brave; the profuse, liberal<sup>q</sup>; for it will both seem to be the case to the nine tenths of the world, and will afford room for deducing a piece of false reasoning out of the motives of the agent; for if one rush into danger where there is no necessity, much more should it seem that he will, where it is honourable<sup>r</sup>; and if a man be

28. We must regard apparent good qualities as real.

*At once the breath of fear and virtue shedding,  
Applauding Freedom lov'd of old to view ?*

Among the Franks, the privilege of wearing the hair long was peculiar to the princes and their descendants, the rest of the nation being obliged to shave the hinder part of the head. Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, c. xxxv, note 17, and Agathias quoted in *Heraldic Anomalies*, vol. i, p. 168.

<sup>p</sup> Aristotle, in his *Ethics*, makes this remark of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, observing, *πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ.* iv, 3.

<sup>q</sup> Horace recommends an innocent use of this sort of sophistry among friends, as a preservative of friendship—

Vellem in amicitia sic erraremus, et isti  
Errori virtus nomen posuisset honestum, etc.

\* \* \* \* \*

Opinor

Hæc res et jungit, junctos et servat amicos.

SAT. i, 3, 41.

<sup>r</sup> That is, under the direction of the law, *ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπερ-  
τικὸς τῷ νόμῳ.* § 7.



30. We must see in whose presence our commendation is held.

lavish on all who fall in his way, surely he will also be so on his friends; for to benefit *all* is an excess of virtue. We ought to consider also before whom our panegyric is pronounced; for, as Socrates used to remark, "It is no difficult thing to panegyricise Athenians in the presence of Athenians." We must also assert that what is valued by each auditory, is to be essentially valuable; what, for instance, either Scythians or Lacedæmonians or philosophers value: and, in short, to refer to the class of things really honourable, whatever *is held in esteem*; since by virtue of their being so esteemed, they appear to approximate closely that class.

31. Again, whatever is natural under such circumstances, for instance, if one's actions be worthy of his ancestors or his own former achievements; since the additional acquisition of glory tends to happiness, and is honourable. Likewise every action contrary to what is natural to one, so it be on one side of what is better and honourable; as when one in good fortune has been moderate, or magnanimous in adversity; or has become better and easier to be won over in proportion as he became greater. Of this nature was the appeal of Iphicrates, "From what beginnings to what have I attained!" And that of the Olympic conqueror, "Formerly bearing on my shoulders a rough basket," etc. And that of the epitaph by Simonides, "Though daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants<sup>3</sup>," etc.

32. We must show that the person praised has acted on principle.

But as commendation arises out of moral conduct, and it is a peculiar characteristic of the good man to act on principle<sup>4</sup>, we must endeavour to put the object

<sup>3</sup> The epitaph was on Archedice, daughter of Hippias, and wife of Oantides, tyrant of Lampsacus. See Thucyd. vi, 59.

<sup>4</sup> See Ethics, lib. ii, c. 4. Δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττη· πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὰ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη· and, in fact, unless the *καλὰ* be done under some restriction of principle, mode, and propriety, they lose their character, as Zonaras has, on another occasion, observed: "Ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ καλὸν ὅταν μὴ καλῶς γίνηται: in Can. Apost. 66, quoted in Hooker, at the end of book i.

of our commendation in the light of one who has acted on principle. Now his appearing to have acted so in many instances will be serviceable with a view to this; wherefore coincidences and fortuitous occurrences must be assumed as done on principle: and should many and like circumstances be alleged, it will appear to be a sign of virtue and principle. Now commendation is language exhibiting greatness in the case of virtue; we should therefore give this further proof of the actions of him we commend, that they are of this character. Encomium<sup>u</sup>, however, is of actions; (and circumstances concur to the enforcing persuasion, as excellence of birth and education; for it is probable that a person so brought up, will be of such a character;) and hence we pass encomia on those who have acted. And a man's actions are signs of his habit; since we commend even the man who has not acted, if we believe him to be of such a character. But felicitation (*μακαρισμός*), and congratulation (*εὐδαιμονισμός*), are synonymous the one to the other; but are not so to the other two: but felicitation comprehends them, just as happiness comprehends virtue.

Demonstrative and deliberative oratory have one point in common; for whatever you would suggest to a man in giving advice, that, by a change of the diction, becomes an encomium<sup>x</sup>. When, therefore, we know what a man ought to do, and what kind of person he should be, it is necessary, if we would state this in the form of advice, to transpose and change the senti-

33.  
*ἔπαινος*  
defined.

34.

35. Com-  
mon point  
of epideic-  
tic and de-  
liberative  
oratory.  
36.

<sup>u</sup> On the subject of *ἐγκώμιον* and *ἔπαινος*, see Eth. Nich. i, 12, where he is enquiring whether commendation or praise be more appropriate to happiness:—ὁ μὲν ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δὲ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν, καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.

<sup>x</sup> *Laudes nonnullæ a voluntate bona cum reverentia conjuncta profiscuntur, quæ sane laudum formula Principibus et Viris quibuscunque dignioribus debetur: Laudando præcipere: cum scilicet apud illos prædicando quales sint, humiliter moneas quales esse debeant.* Bacon's Essays, De Laude.

ment in its diction: for instance, suppose we are aware that we are not to think highly of goods obtained by chance, but of those obtained by our own means. Thus expressed the sentiment has the force of a *suggestion*; but thus, of *commendation*, "thinking highly, not of goods which were his by chance, but those obtained by his own means." So that, when you wish to commend, see what you would suggest in advising; and  
 37. when to advise, see what you would commend. But the diction will of necessity be reversed, when there has been submitted to change an idea which in one form is prohibitive, in another is not prohibitive.

38. Amplification to be used;

We must avail ourselves also of amplification in many cases: thus, if a man has done a thing alone, or first, or with few to share it, or even if it be a thing which he has done more than any other; these all are circumstances of honour. The topic also which is deducible from times and seasons; these are circumstances contrary to what is natural. Also if a man has often succeeded in the same thing; for this is a feature of greatness, and originates not in chance, but will appear to arise through his own means. Also if orations commendatory and exhorting to emulation have been founded and got up on his account; if also he be one on whom an encomium was first passed, as it was on Hippolochus; and the having a statue set up in the forum first occurred to Harmodius and Aristogiton: and in the same way we use amplification with opposite views; and should you not abound in topics bearing on your subject himself, you should set him in comparison with others; which Isocrates used to do from his familiarity with judicial pleading. You should compare the person of whom you speak, with men of character; for it is a feature of amplification, and honourable, if he be better than the good.

and comparison of character.

39. Amplification suits epideictic oratory.

Amplification falls in easily with demonstrative oratory; for its essence is the being above mediocrity. On which account we should make a comparison with

the generality of men, if we cannot with men of character; since the being above the average seems to indicate virtue. In a word, of all the formulæ common 40. to each branch of rhetoric, amplification best suits demonstrative; for the orator takes the actions for granted, and it thus remains only to invest them with greatness and beauty. Example<sup>y</sup>, however, suits deliberative; because we there decide, by arguing of the future from what has gone before. Enthymem, however, suits judicial; for by reason of its not being clear, the past most especially leaves room for assignment of reasons and demonstration. Example suits deliberative, enthymem judicial oratory.

Nearly all the sources out of which praise and blame 41. are deduced, and on what sort of things we ought to have an eye in praising and blaming, the means too by which encomia and reproaches are produced, are these: for being possessed of these points, their contraries are plain; for blame is deduced from the opposite sources.

<sup>y</sup> For the general principles upon which EXAMPLES influence us, and their peculiar adaptation to deliberative cases, see book ii, chap. 20. Meanwhile let us anticipate our author's discussion of the subject, and quote a few words of a modern writer to show how completely this vehicle of proof is adapted to the purposes of the orator, whose demonstrations should always be as little laboured as possible.—“ Our lives in this world are partly guided in rules, and partly directed by *examples*. To conclude out of general rules and axioms by discourse of wit our duties in every particular action, is both troublesome, and many times so full of difficulty, that it maketh deliberations hard and tedious to the wisest men. Whereupon we naturally all incline to observe examples, to mark what others have done before us, and, in favour of our own ease, rather to follow them, than to enter into a new consultation, if in regard of their virtue and wisdom we may but probably think they have waded without error. So that the willingness of men to be led by example of others, both discovereth and helpeth the imbecility of our judgment.” Hooker, *Ecc. Pol.* v, § 65, p. 307.

## CHAP. X.

*The number and nature of the Sources out of which the Orator must construct his reasonings in Accusation and Defence.*

1. Judicial oratory considered in three ways. It will be for me next to speak of the number and nature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and defence. Now we must ascertain three points; one, what and how many are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves are disposed; and the third, towards persons of what character and of what disposition they do so act.
2. i. The motives.  
ii. The disposition of the agents.  
iii. The persons injured.
3. Injustice defined. Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly be defined to be, the voluntary<sup>a</sup> commission of hurt in contravention of law. Now law is either general or peculiar. The *peculiar* law I call that, by whose written enactments men direct their polity: the *general*, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recognised among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. Men, therefore, do not every thing on fixed principle, which they do wittingly: but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on principle. Now, the principles by whose motion men deliberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention of law, are depravity
- Division of law.  
i. General.  
ii. Particular.
4. Two causes of injustice.  
i. Depravity.

<sup>a</sup> Rewards and punishments do always presuppose something *willingly* done well or ill; without which respect, though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt and not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, *which is the root of all his actions*, there groweth variety in the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: *Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done.* Hooker, i, § 9, p. 239.

and moral weakness<sup>b</sup>; for if any are depraved either in one or more respects, it is in reference to that point, on which they are so depraved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illiberal man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger; (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in danger;) the ambitious man, on the score of honour; the hasty man, by reason of anger; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing to his being mistaken on points of right and wrong; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other characters in the same way each [goes wrong] respecting his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward whom, men do commit injustice.

First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about injustice<sup>c</sup>: because it evidently should be considered by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbours, have an existence on the side of his adversary; and by the defendant again, what, and what number of these things do not so exist. Now all men do all things either of themselves, or not of themselves. The things

ii. Incontinence.

6. The motives of injustice proceed from

7. the motives of all human action.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. James, chap. i, 15.

<sup>c</sup> How complete an insight into the nature of man does this disquisition display; and how admirable a key is here afforded to all the operations of the human heart! This branch of knowledge has always been insisted on as essential to those employed in *judicial* investigations.—Thus, Bolingbroke, speaking of the education of lawyers, says, “They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reason of all laws,” etc. Stud. of Hist. p. 353: edit. 4to.

which they do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from necessity; and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion, or by nature. So that all things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it, de-

8. void of reason. Now the act of wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for any thing other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason, are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they necessarily do from seven causes; by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were superfluous. For, granting that it happens to young men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their *youth* that they act thus, but by motion
9. of anger and appetite: neither is it by motion either of wealth or poverty, simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on account of their neediness that it happens that they cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles; for they on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and
10. passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this particular character, principles of action the same in character are conse-

These are  
seven in  
number:

- i. Chance.
- ii. Compulsion.
- iii. Nature.
- iv. Custom.
- v. Will.
- vi. Anger.
- vii. Appetite.

quent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures; but on the intemperate, the contrary on these same subjects. For which reason we must wave distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider, on what conditions<sup>d</sup>, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained, (in the nature of things,) that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from *chance* which are of such kind that their cause is not definite<sup>e</sup>, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition of chance. All those things exist *naturally* whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate enquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, too, that chance is the cause of such results. All

11.

12.

i. Chance.

13.

ii. Nature.

14.

iii. Compulsion.

<sup>d</sup> He here first informs us that he shall not make his exclusion so rigid as he had above stated, but will admit *youth* and *age*, etc. to a particular consideration, as holding an important influence over character, though that influence ought philosophically to be referred to one of the seven above-mentioned principles; while every thing else which people choose to fix upon as a principle of conduct will, on examination, prove to be merely *secondary*, and to act *mediately* through one or other of the seven.

<sup>e</sup> Vid. chap. v, § 17.



- things originate in *compulsion*, which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves,
- iv. Habit. 15. contrary to their inclination and reason. In *habit* originates every thing which men do because they have
- v. Will. 16. often done it before. From *will* proceed whatever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realised in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on
- vi. Anger. 17. account of pleasure. Through the medium of *anger* and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflicting it, in order that he may be satiated<sup>f</sup>. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists, will therefore be plain in my
- vii. Appetite. 18. treatise of the passions. But all such things as appear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of *appetite*. But that which is familiar and has become habitual, is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant *naturally*, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to speak in one word comprehending the whole, every thing whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and involuntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily, will be either good or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And,

These motives are briefly comprehended in one word, pleasure.

<sup>f</sup> Revenge is a kind of wild justice. Bacon's Essays.

among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

We have therefore to ascertain the number of things pleasant<sup>s</sup> and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

19. What objects are pleasant, therefore, must be discussed.

## CHAP. XI.

### *What things are pleasant.*

LET it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be a thing of this nature, it is plain that whatever is productive of the disposition I have described, is pleasant; while every thing of a nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is painful.

1. Immediate motives of injustice considered. Definition of pleasure.  
2. Pain is *ἔρασις*.

Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in progress toward a state conformable to nature, should be pleasant; and that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature; and habits, because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it were; for, in a certain way, custom

3. A reversion to nature is pleasant.

<sup>s</sup> In all judicial questions a knowledge of the constituents of pleasure will be of essential service; for they all suppose some wrong done, and there is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the like. Bacon's Essays.

is like nature, because the idea of *frequency* is proximate to that of *always*; now nature belongs to the idea of *always*, custom to that of *often*. What is not compulsory, also, is pleasant; for compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of necessity are painful; and it has been truly remarked, "Every act of necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure, listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of things pleasant; for none of these has any thing to do with necessity. Every thing of which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for appetite is a desire of what is pleasant. Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason.

Irrational. I call all those irrational, which men desire, not from any conception which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind. And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and, in fact, objects of touch generally; the appetite of fragrant odours, too, as connected with smelling, and hearing, and sight.

Rational. Appetites attended by reason, are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion: for many things there are which they desire to behold, and possess, on hearsay and persuasion.

6. Hope and memory are pleasant. Now, as the being pleased stands in the perception of a certain affection, and as imagination is a kind of faint perception, there will attend on him who exercises either memory or hope, a kind of imagination of that which is the object of his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise memory or hope, certainly feel pleasure, since they have also a perception.

4. All freedom from constraint.

5. Appetites are pleasant.

Irrational.

Rational.

6. Hope and memory are pleasant.

So that every thing pleasant consists either in the perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for men exercise perception on present, memory on past, and hope on future objects. Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not only such as at the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honourable and good; and hence this saying, "But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when preserved, to remember his toils;" and this, "For after his sufferings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is gladdened at the recollection." But the reason of this is, that to be exempt from evil is pleasant<sup>a</sup>. And all objects are pleasant in hope, which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great degree; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem, "That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it drops;" for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems impracticable to his revenge; nor with those far their superiors in power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree. There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a certain pleasure: thus men possessed by fevers feel delight, amid their thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the hope of drinking yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing, writing, and composing something, ever about

<sup>a</sup> *Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,  
Alterius procul e terra spectare dolorem, etc.* Lucretius.

the object beloved ; because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of the object they love.

Criterion of love.

And this is in all cases a criterion of the commencement of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the *presence* of the object, but are enamoured also of

12. Sorrow.

it when *absent*, on memory ; wherefore, even when pain arises at absence, nay in the midst of mourning, and the very dirge of death, there yet arises within us a certain pleasure. For the pain is felt because the object is not present ; but the pleasure consists in remembering and seeing, as it were, both the person, and what he used to do, and the kind of character of which he was. Whence has it been said, and with probability enough, " Thus spake he, and excited within them

13. Revenge.

all a desire of lamentation." Also the avenging one's self is pleasant<sup>b</sup> ; for the getting of that is pleasant, the failing to get which is painful : now the angry do feel pain in an excessive degree if they be not avenged ;

14. Victory.

but in the hope of revenge they take pleasure. Again, to overcome is pleasant, not to the ambitious only, but even to all ; for there arises an imagination of superiority, for which all, either in a faint or more violent degree, have an appetite. But since to overcome is pleasant, it must follow of course, that amusements

15. Hence, amusements.

where there is field for rivalry, as those of music and disputations, are pleasant ; for it frequently occurs, in the course of these, that we overcome ; also chess, ball, dice, and draughts. Again, it is the same with respect to amusements where a lively interest is taken<sup>c</sup> ; for, of these, some become pleasant as accustomed to them ; others are pleasant at first ; for instance, hunting and every kind of sporting ; for where there is rivalry, there

<sup>b</sup> See book ii, chap. 2, § 1.

<sup>c</sup> If this rendering for the word *ἰσπουδασμένη* be not that which the Greek might first suggest, yet it is that which seems best to suit the context ; for sporting and hunting do not very well accord with our ideas of grave and serious amusements, though exercised as they were by the Greeks, as mere preparatives for the labours of military duty, they might justly deserve serious attention.

is also victory; on which principle the disputations of the bar and of the schools are pleasant to those who have become accustomed to them, and have abilities. Also honour and good character are most pleasant, by reason that an idea arises, that one is such as is the good man; and this in a greater degree should those people pronounce one such, who he thinks speak truth: such are those immediately about one, rather than those who are more removed; familiar friends, and acquaintances, and one's fellow citizens, rather than those who are at a distance; the present, rather than a future generation; a man of practical wisdom, rather than a mere ignoramus; many, than a few; for it is more likely that these I have mentioned will adhere to the truth, than that the opposite characters will: since one has no anxiety about the honour or the opinions of such as one greatly despises, children and animals for instance, not at least for the sake of such opinion itself; but if one is anxious about it, then it is on account of something else. A friend, too, ranks among things pleasant; for the affection of love is pleasant; since there is no lover of wine, who does not delight in wine: also the having affection felt toward one is pleasant; for there is in this case also an idea of one's being an excellent person, which all who have any sensibility to it are desirous of; now the having affection felt for you is the being beloved yourself, on your own account. Also the being held in admiration is pleasant, on the very account of being honoured by it. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant; since the flatterer is a seeming admirer and a seeming friend<sup>d</sup>. To continue the same course of action is also pleasant;

16. Honour and character.

17. Friends.

18. Being admired.

Flattery.

19. Habitual action.

<sup>d</sup> It may be interesting to compare the grounds on which Dr. Johnson considered flattery pleasant with these of Aristotle. The Doctor's words are, "Flattery pleases very generally. In the first place, the flatterer may think what he says to be true; but, in the second place, whether he thinks so or not, he certainly thinks those whom he flatters of consequence enough to be flattered." Boswell's Life, A. D. 1775, Æt. 66, p. 86, vol. iii.

20. Variety. for what is habitual was laid down to be pleasant. To vary is also pleasant; for change is an approach to what is natural: for sameness produces an excess of a stated habit; whence it has been said, "In every thing change is pleasant<sup>e</sup>." For on this principle, whatever occurs at intervals of time is pleasant, whether persons or things; for it is a variation of present objects; and at the same time that which occurs merely at intervals possesses the merit of rarity. Also learning and admiration, generally speaking, are pleasant; for under admiration exists a desire [to learn], so that what is admired is desired; and in the act of learning there is a settlement into a state conformable to nature. To benefit and to be benefited are also of the number of pleasant things; for to be benefited, is to get what people desire; but to benefit, is to possess and abound; things, the both of which men desire. And because a tendency to beneficence is pleasant<sup>f</sup>, it is also pleasant to a man to set his neighbour on his legs again, and to put a finish to that which was deficient in some particular. But as the acquisition of knowledge is pleasant, and the feeling admiration, and such things; that, too, must necessarily be pleasant which has been expressed in imitation, as in painting, sculpture, and poetry: also, every thing is pleasant which has been correctly imitated, although the original object, of which it is the imitation, may not in itself be pleasant; for one does not feel pleasure on that account; but there is an inference that "this means that:" and thus it happens that we learn something. Also sudden revolutions<sup>g</sup>,
21. Learning: admiration.
22. To do good: to receive good.
23. Imitation.
- Painting.  
Sculpture.  
Poetry.
24. Reverses.

<sup>e</sup> Eurip. Orest. 234.

<sup>f</sup> This principle of pleasure has been thus developed by Hooker: "As to love them of whom we receive good things is a duty, because they satisfy our desires in that which else we should want; so to love them *on whom we bestow* is nature, because *in them we behold the effects of our own virtue*."—Ecc. Pol. v, § 63, p. 285. See also what is said towards the end of this chapter, of the love borne towards whatever is in any sense, an *ἔργον* of own—as children, works of genius, etc.

<sup>g</sup> Ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, κ. τ. λ. Poet. 21. Twining explains it to be, "when," in a drama,

and the being saved from danger narrowly; for all these are cases exciting admiration. Again, since that is pleasant which is conformable to nature, and things which are akin are respectively conformable to nature, every thing like and akin, speaking generally, is pleasant; as man to man, horse to horse, and youth to youth. Whence also these proverbs originate: "Fellows in age, delight;" — "Whatever is similar;" — "Beasts recognise their species;" — "Birds of a feather flock together;" and every other saying of this sort. 25. Similarity and conformity to nature and ourselves.

But as every thing like and akin is delightful to it, and as every one stands to himself in this relation in a most special manner, all must be, more or less, lovers of themselves; for all these qualities do in a particular manner exist in reference to self. But as all are lovers of themselves, that necessarily which is their own must be pleasant to all; as, for instance, their sayings and productions. On which account men are in general fond of flatterers and lovers, and are ambitious and fond of children; for children are their own production<sup>h</sup>. It is also pleasant to put a finish to what is deficient<sup>i</sup>; for it became by that time one's own production. And as rule is the most pleasant of all things, 26. Power. the appearing to be wise is also pleasant; for knowledge is a principle of power; and wisdom is a know- Wisdom.

"the things that are doing have an effect the very reverse of which is expected from them." ii, 77.

<sup>h</sup> One passion is often productive of another: examples are without number; the sole difficulty is a proper choice. I begin with self-love, and the power it hath to generate love to children. Every man, beside making part of a greater system, like a comet, a planet, or satellite only, hath a less system of his own, in the centre of which he represents the sun, darting his fire and heat all around; especially upon his nearest connections: the connection between a man and his children, *fundamentally that of cause and effect*, becomes, by the addition of other circumstances, the completest that can be among individuals; and therefore self-love, the most vigorous of all passions, is readily expanded upon children. Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism, chap. ii, part 1, § 5.

<sup>i</sup> The completion of what has been left unfinished was before stated to be pleasant on another principle. See § 22.



- Censure. ledge of many subjects, and those commanding admiration. Moreover, as men in general are ambitious, the power of rebuking one's neighbour must needs be pleasant. Also the pausing on that province in which he appears to be best, when compared with his own powers in other respects; just as Euripides remarks, "And this he plies, allotting the greatest part of each day to it, in which, himself being compared with himself, he appears most excellent."
28. Dwelling on one's own excellencies. In a similar way, since amusement ranks among pleasant things, and as every relaxation and laughter is of the number, things ridiculous must therefore of course be pleasant, as well persons as expressions and productions. But on the subject of the ridiculous, a detailed discussion has been entered into in the Poetics<sup>k</sup>. Let thus much have been said on the subject of things pleasant; from the contraries of these things, what is painful will be evident. These, then, are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly.
29. Laughter.

## CHAP. XII.

*With what Dispositions men commit Injustice, in what instances, and towards whom.*

1. Πῶς ἔχοντες, or the agents of injustice, then act unjustly, when it seems possible that they shall escape detection. LET us now state with what dispositions men commit injustice, and towards whom they do so. As regards themselves then, it is when they think the thing is one possible to be done, and possible to themselves; and either that, in doing it, they shall escape detection, or, if they do not escape it, that they shall not suffer punishment, or that they shall indeed suffer a punishment, but that the damage thereby incurred will be less than the gain, either to themselves or those for

<sup>k</sup> In one of the books which has unfortunately been lost. His definition of it is, *αἰσχρὸν ἀνευ λυπηροῦ*.

whom they have a regard. Now the subject of things <sup>2.</sup> which appear *possible*, and those which appear *impossible*, will be explained in the sequel; for these are points applicable in common to all kinds of rhetoric<sup>a</sup>. Now as to their own advantages, those men think they are in the highest degree likely to commit injustice with impunity, who are of ability in speaking, and men <sup>The talent-</sup> of the world, and such as have experienced many a <sup>ed.</sup> forensic contest. If, too, they happen to have many <sup>The power-</sup> friends. If they be rich<sup>b</sup>. And more particularly do <sup>ful.</sup> they think they can get off, if they be themselves<sup>c</sup> possessed of the foretated qualities; and if they be not *themselves* so qualified, yet if they have friends, or supporters, or associates<sup>d</sup> of such talents, then also they think to get off; for these are the endowments, by aid of which men are able both to act, to escape detection, and avoid punishment<sup>e</sup>. Again, if they be friends, <sup>4. If likely</sup> either of the injured party, or of the judge; because <sup>to escape</sup> friends are off their guard against injustice, and are <sup>detection.</sup> moreover appeased before prosecuting their revenge. But the judges gratify their friends, and either altogether let them off, or amerce them in a trifle.

<sup>a</sup> They are, in fact, τόποι, ii, 19.

<sup>b</sup> He remarks, in his Politics, the general tendency to insubordination and obedience to laws observable in the rich and prosperous;—οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος, καὶ πλούτου, καὶ φίλων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται οὔτε ἐπίστανται. Polit. iv, c. 11. Upon the same principle Tacitus remarks, “Opes principibus infensas.” Ann. lib. xi, c. 1.

<sup>c</sup> In the Ethics, where, in speaking of Βούλευσις, he limits its sphere first and generally to things *possible*, he remarks—Δυνατὰ δὲ, ἃ δι’ ἡμῶν γένοιτο ἂν. τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι’ ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστὶν ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Eth. Nich. iii, 3.

<sup>d</sup> The Thessalian Menon, in Xenophon, courted the friendship of men in power with this view: φίλος τ’ ἐβούλετο εἶναι τοῖς μέγιστον δυναμένοισι, ἵνα ἀδικῶν μὴ διδοίη δίκην. Anab. lib. ii, c. 6. vid. infra.

<sup>e</sup> The vast assistance to be derived from friends and supporters by those who are under accusation, may be illustrated by the following strong expressions of Augustus, who said, “Cunctari se, ne, si superesset, eriperet legibus reum; sin deesset, destituere, ac prædamnare amicum videretur.” Sueton.

5. Such as the opposites to the charge, etc.

People likely to escape detection, are those the very opposite in character to the charge ; as, a man of personal inbecillity, on a charge of assault ; or one poor and deformed, on a charge of adultery. Again, circumstances exceedingly palpable, and in the eyes of all the world ; for these are unobserved, by reason that

6. no one would think of them at all. Acts, too, of such enormity and such a character that no one would presume ; for in regard to these also men are off their guard : for it is against crimes which are ordinary, as it is against bodily infirmity of an usual kind, that men set themselves on their guard ; but as to cases in which

7. no one yet has been afflicted, no one is cautious. Also those people are open to attack, to whom no one is an enemy, or to whom many are ; for in the one case the aggressors think to escape detection from their not being on their guard ; and on the other, they escape from its not seeming likely that they would make an attempt on people ever on their guard, and from their having ever at hand the plea, that they never could have been so mad as to attempt it. Those again are likely

8. Such as have means of concealment.

to act unjustly, who have at hand means of concealing or changing property, places to hide, or any easy means of disposing of it. All those persons, too, who, if they do not escape, having nevertheless means of setting aside the sentence, or of tedious delay, or of corrupting the judges ; and who, if the fine be imposed, can yet set aside its payment, or put it off a length of time, or who, from their neediness, have nothing to lose.

9. Where there is great gain.

All, too, who have the gain clearly in view, or great, or close at hand ; while the loss is trifling, indistinct, and at a distance. Also any one to whom the punishment is not adequate to the advantage ; of which kind

10. Where the punishment is only opprobrium.

a tyranny seems to be. All, again, in whose case the commission of injustice is an act of gain, while the punishment is mere opprobrium. So, on the contrary, are they whose unjust acts lead to a kind of credit, (as if it should happen for one, in their commission to avenge

a father or mother, as was the case of Zeno,) while the punishment leads merely to fine, banishment, or something of that kind; for both descriptions of persons act unjustly; however, they are not the same in character, but the very opposite. Persons, too, who have often escaped notice, or who have not been punished. People who have often met with ill success; for these, like persons engaged in warlike operations, are of a disposition to renew the contest. Every one also to whom the pleasant is immediate, while the painful is subsequent; or if the object be gain, while the loss is subsequent; for all incontinent persons are thus affected: now incontinence is conversant about all objects whatsoever which men desire<sup>f</sup>. And on the contrary, persons are wont to act unjustly in cases where the painful or loss is immediate, but the pleasant and expedient is subsequent, and slow in presenting itself; for continent persons, and such as have rather more practical wisdom, pursue objects of this kind. Wherever, too, a person may appear to have acted by chance, by necessity, natural bent, or habit; and, in a word, to be guilty of *error*, not of *injustice*. Also in whatever cases it may happen that one would meet with equity. Again, whatever persons are in want: now men are in want two ways; for either they want necessities, like the poor; or something in excess, just as the rich  $\epsilon$ . People, too, of exceedingly good character, or such as are utterly destitute of character; the first, on the principle that they shall not appear the culprits; the last, that they shall not be a whit worse off as to character.

11. The undetected.

The unlucky.

12. Where the pleasure is immediate.

13. Or sometimes when remote.

14. Where another motive will be attributed.

15. Men in want.  
i. Who want necessities.  
ii. Who want superfluities.

16. Men of good character.

<sup>f</sup> Although *incontinence*, properly so called, is excited by a limited description of objects, yet there is a feeling analogous to, and, in the vague language of the world, synonymous with it, which may be excited by any objects whatsoever;—*ὑποληπτέον μόνον ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆ ἀκολασίας. Περὶ δὲ θυμὸν, καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν.* Eth. Nich. vii, 4. This is another of the many instances, in which Aristotle supposes the rhetorician to take a popular view of his subject.

<sup>ε</sup> *Exilis domus est ubi non et multa supersunt.* Hor. Ep. lib. i, 6, 45.

- Men of bad character. Thus affected in themselves, then, it is that men attack their neighbours.
17. The persons exposed to injustice are: such as have the desired object. But they act unjustly against persons, and on account of objects, of the following descriptions. Persons who possess things which themselves are in need of, be it for necessaries, for superfluity, or for sensual enjoyment: people who are at a distance, and those who are near; for the means of getting at the one are quick, and the vengeance of the others is slow; as on
18. The distant. The near. 19. those, for instance, who plunder Carthaginians<sup>h</sup>: and men who are not cautious, nor apt to be on their guard, but are of a disposition to repose confidence; for it is easy enough to elude all such. Also towards such as are of an indolent turn; for to prosecute is the part of a man who is strenuous. Against such also as
- The indolent. Those who have a high sense of honour. 20. have a delicate sense of honour; for these are not apt to squabble about gain: and again, those who have been wronged by many already, yet without their prosecuting; as though these were, in the words of the proverb, "a prey to very Mysians<sup>i</sup>." Both against
21. The wronged. The unharmed. those who never yet have been wronged, and those who frequently have been, men are wont to act unjustly; both being off their guard, the first under the idea that they never shall be wronged, the last as though they should not be wronged any more: also
22. Those in disgrace. against those who have had imputations thrown on their characters, or who are open to it; for such people, from a fear of the judges, do not take on themselves to effect persuasion, neither, in fact are they able; of which class are all who are disliked and envied. Men act unjustly also towards those against
23. Such as

<sup>h</sup> This may have been a proverbial expression for designating any attack on a remote object; since, considered in reference to Greece under the then imperfect state of navigation, Carthage was an object not easily got at.

<sup>i</sup> The Mysians were so effeminate and unwarlike, that their neighbours made encroachments on their territory with impunity, so that they became proverbial through Greece.

whom they have any pretext, on the part either of their ancestors, themselves, or friends, that they have wrought ill, or intended it, either against themselves, or their ancestors, or those for whom they have a regard; for, as the proverb goes, "Malice wants only an excuse." Against friends<sup>k</sup> and against enemies are acts of injustice committed; for against the first it is easy<sup>l</sup>, against the others pleasant: also against those who are friendless, and those who are not of ability in speaking or acting; because these either do not at all attempt to prosecute, or are reconciled, or bring nothing to the point: also against those whom it will not pay to be waiting in watch for the sentence of court, or the payment of the fine; for instance, foreigners and mechanics; for people under these circumstances are reconciled for a trifle, and are easily hushed. People, too, who themselves have been guilty of injustice in many instances, or in cases of the very character under which they now are wronged; because it appears to approximate in some degree to non-commission of injustice, when a person shall have been wronged in a particular, in which he is himself wont to be guilty; it is, I mean, as if one were insolently to assault the per-

offer a pretext.

24. Friends. Enemies.

The friendless.

Those who are not eloquent nor active.

25. Those who cannot afford to wait.

26. The unjust.

<sup>k</sup> Some traits in the character of the Thessalian Menon, as given by Xenophon, will serve to illustrate Aristotle's catalogue of these objects of villainy. Of Menon it was remarked, τοῖς μὲν ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΩΝ κτήμασιν οὐκ ἐπεβούλευε—χαλεπὸν γὰρ ᾤετο εἶναι τὰ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΛΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΩΝ λαμβάνειν—τὰ δὲ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΩΝ μόνος ᾤετο εἶδέναι ὅτι ῥᾶστον ἌΦΥΛΑΚΤΑ λαμβάνειν. Καὶ ὅσους μὲν ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ἐπιώρκους καὶ ἀδίκους, ὡς εὖ ὠπλισμένους ἐφοβεῖτο· τοῖς δ' ὁσίοις καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀσκοῦσιν ὡς ἀνάνδροις ἐπειρᾶτο χρῆσθαι. Anab. lib. ii, c. 6.

<sup>l</sup> Upon this principle the remark of Demonax was grounded—Εἰ λάσσω κακὰ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐχθροὺς δεδιότες φυλάσσονται· τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀνεωγμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ γίνονται σφαλεροὶ καὶ εὐεπιβούλευτοι. Nor did this escape the penetration of that keen observer of human nature, Tacitus: Quibus deerat inimicus, per amicos oppressi. Hist. i, 3. Pomponium Flaccum, veterem stipendiis, et arctâ cum rege amicitia, eo accommodatiorem ad fallendum, ob id maxime Mœsiæ præfecit. Ann. ii, 66. To this purpose, too, is the maxim of P. Syrus. Mage cavenda est amicorum invidia, quam insidiæ hostium. See also Proverbs, iii, 29.

- son of a man who is himself in the habit of being inso-
27. lent. Those also get injured who have wrought ill, or who possessed, or do now possess an inclination to do so, or who are about to do so; for the act involves what is pleasant and honourable; and it appears to
28. approximate to non-commission of injury: those, too, in injuring whom, a man gratifies his friends, those he admires or loves, on whom he is in dependence, or, in a word, all at whose control he lives, and at whose hands it happens he will meet with equitable consideration. Men also wrong those with whom they have ground of quarrel, and have been previously at variance, as Calippus did in the case about Dion; for acts of this nature seem to approximate to a non-commission of injustice: and those who are on the eve of being injured by others, should we not do so ourselves; since this admits no longer any deliberation; just as Ænesidemus is said to have sent presents of cups<sup>m</sup> to Gelon after he had reduced some state, because he had gotten the start, himself being on the eve of attempting it. Injurers attack those, also, by injuring whom they will be enabled to do many acts of justice, as though they could easily amend their error; just as Jason the Thessalian said, "that in some particulars one must needs act with injustice, in order to his being able to do many deeds of justice<sup>n</sup>:" again they attack people in those particulars, in regard to
29. Our enemies.
30. Those just on the point of being injured by others.
31. Those whom they can compensate.
32. Men injure where the articles

<sup>m</sup> The amusement of the *κότταβος* had become so popular at the Grecian banquets, that persons who practised it with superior dexterity were presented with rewards, *κοτταβεία*, supposed by some commentators to have been a sort of cups or vessels peculiarly adapted to the purposes of the game. See Meursius de Ludis Vet. Græc. p. 28, v. *Κοτταβισμός*. Vid. Athenæ, fol. 666, ubi de Cottabo. Critias ibid. :

*Κότταβος ἐκ Σικελῆς ἐστὶ χθονός, ἐκπρεπὲς ἔργον·  
"Ὁν σκοπὸν ἐς λαταγῶν τόξα καθιστάμεθα.*

See Victorius, and also Barnes's note on Frag. 105, in his edition of Anacreon.

<sup>n</sup> Thus, too, the Jesuits contended that "evil might be done in order to produce good."

which, all or most persons usually act wrong; because here they think to meet with fellow feeling: in regard also to particulars easy to conceal, of which nature are articles quickly consumed, victuals for instance; or articles admitting a ready change, either in shape, colour, or composition; or which it is easy to put out of sight in a variety of places; of which sort are articles easily portable, and hidden in small places; articles also the like to which, or some undistinguishable from them, have previously been in the possession of the individuals who thus violate justice. Men injure, moreover, in regard to such particulars, as the injured parties have a delicacy in mentioning; thus in assaults on females intimately connected, or on themselves, or on their children: in all cases, too, in regard to which the prosecuting party would appear litigious; of this nature are trifling things, and those in which people sympathise and forgive.

are easy to conceal.  
33.

34. Portable.

35. Difficult to be identified.

Where the party injured feels a delicacy in alluding to the subject.

Where it looks litigious to demand justice.

The dispositions then under which, the objects for whose sake, and the person towards whom, men act unjustly, and why they do so, are nearly these which I have stated.



### CHAP. XIII.

#### *Of Acts of Injustice, and Matters of Equity.*

COMMENCING from this point, let me mark in detail all acts which conform to, or which violate justice. Now right and wrong have been defined in reference to two kinds of law, and in a twofold way also in regard to those persons to whom they refer<sup>a</sup>. Law<sup>b</sup>, now, I un-

1. All injuries offend against either:  
2. i. The particular  
ii. The general law.

<sup>a</sup> Vid. Eth. Nich. v, 7.

<sup>b</sup> The description of Law given by Demosthenes is, perhaps, the most perfect and satisfactory that can either be found or conceived: Οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον βούλονται, καὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦσι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν εὐρεθῆ κοινὸν τοῦτο πρόσταγμα ἀπεδείχθη, πᾶσιν ἴσον καὶ



derstand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar, to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that law universal, which is conformable merely to dictates of nature; for there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong<sup>c</sup>, which, in a certain degree, all intuitively divine, even should no intercourse with each other, nor any compact have existed<sup>d</sup>; which sentiment the Antigone of Sophocles enters uttering, that it was just, namely to bury Polynices, though denounced, since this by nature was a deed of justice: "For by no means is it for this or the next day merely that this maxim is in force, but for ever; nor is there any one who knows from whom it proceeded<sup>e</sup>. And as Empedocles says on the subject of not slaying that which has life: for this maxim is not right here, and wrong there, "but a principle of law to all, it is extended uninterruptedly throughout

ὁμοιον. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ νόμος, ᾧ πάντα προσήκει πείθεσθαι, διὰ πολλά, καὶ μάλισθ', ὅτι πᾶς ἐστὶ νόμος εὔρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον Θεῶν, δόγμα δ' ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων, πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή· καθ' ἣν πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει. The design and object of LAWS is to ascertain what is just, honourable, and expedient; and when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for various reasons, all are under an obligation to obey, but especially because all law is the invention and gift of Heaven, the sentiment of wise men, the correction of every offence, and the general compact of the state; to live in conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society. Orat. i, contr. Aristogit. Notes on Blackstone.

<sup>c</sup> This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original. Blackstone, Comment. Introduct. § 2, p. 41.

<sup>d</sup> See the subject of natural law admirably illustrated in the first book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, § 8, 9.

<sup>e</sup> Thus Lord Hale says of the common law of England, "The original of the common law is as undiscoverable as the head of the Nile." Hist. Com. Law, 55.

the spacious firmament, and boundless light." And as Alcidas remarks in the Messeniatic oration.

As to the persons also in reference to whom right 3. and wrong have been defined, a twofold distinction has been made<sup>f</sup>; for that which we ought to do and to leave undone, exists in reference either to the commu- Injustice against the community. nity, or to an individual member of it. And hence we may, as regards acts of justice, and the contrary, violate justice or adhere to it in two ways; for we may do so in reference either to an individual, or to the community: for the man who is guilty of adultery, or of an as- Injustice against the individual. sult, injures some *individual*; but he who will not bear arms injures the *community*.

Now as all acts of violating justice have been distin- 4. guished, and as some of them are against the community, and others against one or more individual members of it, let me, after reverting to what the suffering injustice is, explain the rest. Now to be injured, is to 5. suffer injustice at the hands of a willing agent; for 6. commission of injustice has been previously defined to be a voluntary act. As however it is necessary that the person injured should be hurt, and involuntarily hurt. Now what *hurt* is will be evident from what has gone before; for things good and evil have been distinctly spoken of above, and voluntary acts also; namely, that they are all things done knowingly. So 7. that all grounds for complaint must exist, necessarily in reference either to the community, or to individual interests; the agent being either unconscious, or unwilling, or willing and conscious; and [in the last] of these cases, acting either on deliberate choice, or on the impulse of passion. Now I shall treat on the sub- 8.

<sup>f</sup> " Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species,—*private wrongs* and *public wrongs*. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are therefrom frequently termed civil injuries. The latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community," etc. Blackstone's Commentaries, b. iii, c. 1.

ject of anger in my discussion of the passions ; but it has been above explained under what circumstances, and with what dispositions men act on deliberate principle.

9. We must know the definition of the various acts of injustice.

But as people, while they acknowledge their having acted in such a way, very frequently will not acknowledge the designation in the indictment, or the view of the case on which the indictment turns: a man will avow, for example, his having taken a thing, but not his having *stolen* it; that he struck the first blow, but yet did not *insult*; that he cohabited, but did not *commit adultery*, with the woman in question; or that he stole, but was not guilty of *sacrilege*, for it was not consecrated property; or that he did till beyond his boundary, but encroached not upon *public* land; or conversed with the enemy, but was yet not guilty of *treason*: it will, for these reasons, be necessary to lay down definitions on these matters; as to what essentially constitutes *theft*, *insult*, and *adultery*; in order that, if we wish to show that they really do or do not exist, we may be able to set the right of the case in a true light. Now all these questions, as to a matter being unjust and criminal, or not unjust, do in fact constitute the ground of enquiry; for the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done; and this sort of terms marks, over and above the matter of fact, the principle also of the agent; the terms, assault and felony, for instance; for because a man has struck another, he will not under all circumstances have assaulted him, but if he has done so with a view to something, as with a view to treat him with disrespect, or to his own gratification: neither, supposing a man has taken privily, has he been guilty, in every case, of larceny; but if he took it to the injury of another, or in order to appropriate it to himself, then indeed he has been guilty of larceny. The case too is similar respecting other terms designating crimes to what has been remarked respecting these.



But as there were two species of things right and wrong; for one was of written prescript, the other of unwritten law; now those on the subject of which the laws speak a written language have been treated of; and of those arising from unwritten law there are two kinds. And these are, the one class which is always in proportion to the excess of vice or virtue of the agent, on which are consequent either censures and praises, or deprivation of rank and marks of distinction and public grants; thus, for instance, the being grateful to a benefactor, and the repaying with kindness one who has been kind to yourself, and the having an inclination to aid one's friends, and whatever other duties are of this kind: the other class, are the supplement of the peculiar and written law of states; for the equitable should seem to be somewhat just. And equity is that idea of justice, which contravenes the written law. And this contradiction happens, partly indeed *against* the will, and partly *with* the will of the legislator: it then happens against his will, when the question may have escaped his notice; but, with his will, whenever he has it not in his power accurately to make distinc-

The unwritten law is twofold;

12. i. καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας.

ii. τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα, or equity.

13.

ε ἘΠΙΔΙΟΡΘΩΜΑ νόμον, ᾧ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. Ethics, v, 10. "The correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient." Grotius de *Æquitate*, § 3.

h We see in contracts, and other dealings which daily pass between man and man, that, to the utter undoing of some, many things by strictness of law may be done, which EQUITY and HONEST MEANING forbiddeth. Not that the LAW is unjust, but imperfect; nor equity against, but above the law, binding men's consciences in things which the law cannot reach unto. Will any man say that the virtue of private equity is opposite and repugnant to that law, the silence whereof it supplieth in all such private dealing? No more is public equity against the law of public affairs; albeit, the one permit unto some, in special considerations, that which the other, agreeably with general rules of justice, doth in general sort forbid. For, sith all good laws are the voices of right reason, which is the instrument wherewith God will have the world guided, and impossible it is that right should withstand right; it must follow that principles and rules of justice, be they never so generally uttered, do no less effectually intend, than if they did plainly express, an exception of all particulars, wherein their literal practice might any way prejudice equity. Hooker, b. v, § 9, p. 35.

- tions, but it is necessary that he pronounce universally, though the case be not so absolutely without exceptions, but *generally* only. Thus also in respect to all cases about which, by reason of their infinitude, it is not easy to make distinctions; such, with regard to wounding with steel, are the distinctions as to the size and nature of the instrument, for an axe would fail one
14. in the enumeration. Be it then that the case admits not such distinctions, yet if one must needs enact a law respecting it, he cannot do otherwise than speak in *general* terms<sup>i</sup>; so that one who has so much as a ring on his finger, and lifts up his hand and strikes you, does by the *letter* of the written law stand guilty, and acts unjustly; but in *real truth* he does not act unjustly<sup>k</sup>; and this is the equity of the case. Now if equity be what it has been stated to be, it will be evident what kind of things are equitable, and what not so; also what kind of persons are not equitable. Since in whatever cases one is bound to have a fellow-feeling,
15. Equity consists in fellow-feeling.
16. these all are cases of equity. Again, equity is the not esteeming faults and crimes of equal guilt, nor accidents, and faults. Now *accidents* are whatever things happen against all calculation, and proceed not from criminal principle; and *faults* are whatever things do not happen against calculation, nor proceed from criminal principle; but *crimes* are whatever things, not falling out contrary to calculation, proceed from criminal principle; for the things which are done through desire, proceed from criminal principle. Equity also is the having a sympathy for human failings; and the having an eye, not to the *law*, but to the *lawgiver*; and
17. In sympathy.

<sup>i</sup> Αἴτιον δ', ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς· περὶ ἐνίων δὲ οὐχ οἷον τὸ ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Arist. Ethics, v, 10. Compare the whole chapter with what is said above.

<sup>k</sup> Not without singular wisdom, therefore, it hath been provided, that as the *ordinary* course of common affairs is disposed of by *general* laws, so likewise men's *rarer incident* necessities and utilities should be with *special* equity considered. Hooker, b. v, c. 9, p. 35.

not to the *language*, but to the *intention* of the law-giver<sup>1</sup>. And not to the *conduct*, but to the *principles* of the agent; not to his conduct in *one particular*, but to its *whole tenor*. Not what kind of person he has been in this instance, but what he has always shown himself, or generally at least. The having, too, a remembrance of the good one has received, rather than of the ill; of the good one has received, rather than what one has done; though injured, to endure it patiently; to prefer a decision by argument, rather than by recourse to action: a wish to proceed to arbitration, rather than to judicial decision, for the arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to what is law; and in order to this it was that arbitration was introduced, in order, namely, that equity might prevail. So far then for our distinctions on the subject of what is equitable.

18. In looking to the motive more than the act.

19. Willingness to arbitrate.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Of the Degrees of Guilt.*

THOSE acts of injustice are greater in degree, which proceed from the greater principle of injustice<sup>a</sup>; and on this account the most trifling are the greatest; as the charge which Callistratus laid against Melenopus, that he had defrauded the builders of the temple in his accounts, to the amount of three half farthings of consecrated property; but in the case of justice, things are more or less *just* in a contrary ratio<sup>b</sup>. Now these

1. Greater offences are those arising from greater principle.

<sup>1</sup> Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted, "that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity," was held after long debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit. Blackstone, Comment. Introd. § 2, p. 61. For a variety of such cases, see Rhet. ad Herennium, lib. i, c. ii, etc.

<sup>a</sup> See Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 44, at note 188. Measure of Guilt, vol. viii, p. 98.

<sup>b</sup> So much for the standard of *injustice*; for it is evident that any man

- criteria arise from the actions virtually exceeding; for he who stole three half farthings of consecrated money would cheat one in any thing. The degree of an act of injustice is decided then, sometimes on *this* principle, at others on that of the *harm done*. Those also are very flagrant, for which no punishment is an equivalent, but of which every one falls short; as also that which there is no means of healing; for such a case is difficult and impracticable: also where the injured party can get no redress in court; for the evil is without cure, because chastisement and a judicial sentence are a cure. If the party suffering, and who was wronged, hath grievously injured himself<sup>c</sup>; for then the man who did the wrong deserves punishment in a still greater degree; just as Sophocles said when pleading in behalf of Euctemon, who, on being insolently assaulted, slew himself; "that he would price the deed at no less cost than the sufferer had prized himself at." Crimes, too, of which the present criminal has alone been guilty, or he first, or very few besides. Also the being frequently guilty of the same enormity. Any thing too on account of which new prohibitory and penal statutes have been sought out, and introduced; as at Argos they punish any one on whose account a law may have been enacted, and those on account of whom the prison was erected. That act of injustice also is greater, which is of a more brutal character. That too which proceeds more immediately from malice aforethought. That too which, as they hear of, people are affected by *dread*, rather than *compassion*. And the rhetorical expedients for exaggeration are as
2. Where the penalty is not equivalent.
3. Where the injured party hath wronged himself in consequence.
4. Where the offending was the first.
5. The more brutal.

who is sufficiently depraved to cheat you for a farthing, would not scruple to do so for a larger sum. But in the contrary habit of the mind, a contrary ratio holds, in the case of conforming to rules of justice—*τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ἐλάχιστα*; for a man may be very honest in minor transactions, who would not scruple to cheat you if a greater temptation were thrown in his way.

<sup>c</sup> As in the case of Lucretia: her killing herself was an aggravation of the guilt of Tarquin.

follows;—" he hath swept away or overleaped many principles of justice," as oaths, the plighting of his hand, pledges of fidelity, and marriage contracts; for there is an excess by the ratio of many crimes. And its being on the very spot where criminals receive punishment; which they do who bear false witness; for where would he not be ready to act wrong, if at least he does so even in the judgment hall<sup>d</sup>? Those deeds too on which shame is most especially felt. Also if the party has injured him at whose hands he has been benefited: for he is guilty in more than one way, both in that he does him *wrong*, and in that he did not *good* to him. Also the man who has violated the unwritten principles of right; for it belongs to a man of superior excellence to be just unconstrainedly: now what is of written prescript is done of necessity, but not so what is unwritten. Taking it in another way, it is a feature of aggravation if it be in violation of *written* law; for you may say, the man who is unjust in matters where is room for apprehending punishment, and on which loss attends, surely would be likely to be unjust in respect of matters on which no loss is consequent. Thus, then, the greater and less degrees of injustice have been treated of.

6. Those done on the place of punishment.

7. Violation of the unwritten

and written law.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Respecting Proofs originating independently of Art.*

It comes next to the subject just treated of, for me to run over the proofs which are called inartificial; because these are peculiar to judicial oratory<sup>a</sup>. And they

1. ἀτεχνοί πιστεῖς.

2. Five in number.

<sup>d</sup> Among the aggravations of *affrays* by the law of England one is, "Where a respect for the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the king's court, and the like." Blackstone, b. iv, c. 11, § 5.

<sup>a</sup> He here apologises for his violation of the proposed arrangement, in treating of the ἀτέχνη πιστεῖς, before he has fully despatched the ἐντέχνη.



are *five* in number, viz. laws, witnesses, deeds, torture, oaths.

3. i. Laws. First, then, let me speak of *Laws*, in what way an orator, in exhorting or dissuading, and in accusing or defending, is to turn them to his purpose. Because it is plain, that if the written law be opposed to his case, he must avail himself of the universal law, and of topics of equity, as more absolutely just: and he must argue
4. Arguments for the orator to whom the written law is opposed.
5. that, really "to act to the best of his judgment<sup>b</sup>," is to
6. decline an implicit adherence to written prescript: he must insist, moreover, that equity remains for ever, and varies not at any time, neither does the universal law, for this is in conformity to nature; but that the *written* law does frequently vary: whence it was said in the *Antigone* of Sophocles; for she is defending herself because she acted in opposition to the law of Creon, but not in opposition to the universal law<sup>c</sup>, "for these are not of this or of the next day merely, but ever exist; their prescript would I, not for the sake of any one,
7. ———." He must insist, also, that justice is something substantially true and expedient, but not so that mere seeming of justice, so that neither is the written law, for it does not the duty of law. And that the judge is, as it were, an assay-master, that he may distinguish between counterfeit and real ideas of justice.
8. And that it is the part of a better man to employ and abide by the unwritten law than the written. He
9. should also observe, if the law which stands in his way

In fact, the former class of *πίστεις* are so *nearly* confined to judicial, that their introduction, though a little out of place, as an appendix to the subject of judicial rhetoric, is very appropriate. Not, however, but that *πίστεις* of this class may be available in deliberative oratory; and indeed Aristotle himself seems to hint as much in using the words *προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα* (expressions peculiar to deliberation), as well as *κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον*, § 3.

<sup>b</sup> The judges were bound by oath, first, to an adherence to the laws, and in cases unrecognised by law, to exercise their best judgment, (*γνώμη ἢ ἀρίστη*): this, as Aristotle here observes, left grounds for the appeal of an orator.

<sup>c</sup> Already quoted in chap. 13, § 2.

be at variance with any approved law, or be itself at variance with itself; thus sometimes one law directs that whatever men shall have covenanted should be valid; another forbids that they should covenant any thing contrary to the law. Observe, also, whether it <sup>10.</sup>

be equivocal, so that you may wrest it to your purpose, and discover to which construction either justice or expediency will best adjust itself; then let him avail himself of that law. And if the circumstances under <sup>11.</sup>

which the law was enacted be no longer remaining<sup>d</sup>, but the law itself is remaining, he should endeavour to make this clear, and battle against it on this ground.

But should the written law be in favour of his case, the orator then must state that "the best of one's judgment" is inserted, not for the sake of a judge's deciding contrary to the law, but in order that, if he <sup>12. Arguments for him on whose side is the written law.</sup>

be ignorant of what the law directs, he may not forswear himself. He should insist also, that no one chooses good in the abstract, but what is so to himself; and that there is no difference between a law not enacted and one not put in force. And he should observe that, in other arts, it advantages not for one to indulge himself in such over-wisdom; as, for example, in respect of a physician; for there the errors of his physician do not so greatly hurt a man, as the habituating himself to disobey him who has the direction of his health. And that the seeking to be wiser than the law, is the very thing which in well-approved laws is prohibited. And on the subject of *laws* let such be our distinctions.

But to the subject of *Witnesses*: witnesses are two- <sup>13. 2nd. On witnesses, which are twofold. i. παλαιοί.</sup> fold, some ancient, others modern<sup>e</sup>, and of these some are partners in the risk, others are uninvolved in it. I mean by *ancient* witnesses, both poets and all other

<sup>d</sup> Vide the arguments adduced in favour of Catholic emancipation.

<sup>e</sup> Πρόσφατοι seems to imply vivâ voce witnesses, those from whom oral testimony may be gained, and perhaps for that reason applied to signify modern in general.

ii. πρόσφατοι.

illustrious persons whose decisions are open to the world; as, for example, the Athenians employed Homer as their witness in the matter of Salamis; and the people of Tenedos but recently employed Periander the Corinthian, against the people of Sigæum; Cleophon, also, employed the Elegies of Solon against Critias, saying, that the family of old time was a dissolute one, for Solon would never otherwise have said, "Go, bid my Critias, with his yellow locks, to listen to his father." Such, then, are the witnesses on the subject

14. Witnesses of the future are soothsayers. Proverbs are witnesses.

of the past. But, respecting the future, we have also soothsayers; thus Themistocles insisted that they were to engage by sea, alleging the expression the wooden wall<sup>f</sup>. Moreover, proverbs also are testimonies, according to what has been stated above<sup>g</sup>; as, if one were going to advise another not to make an old man his friend, the proverb testifies to that point, "Never benefit an old man;" also as to the taking off the children whose parents one has slain, "Foolish is he who having slain the father shall leave the son behind<sup>h</sup>."

15. Modern witnesses partake of the risk,

Modern witnesses are all those people of note who have passed an opinion on any point; for these their opinions are useful to those who are debating on the same questions; as Eubulus, for instance, in the trial against Chares, availed himself of that saying of Plato, in reference to Archibius, that "the avowal of being wicked has gained ground in the city." Also those who participate the risk, should they appear to falsify. Witnesses, however, of this class, prove merely such points as these; whether the fact has or has not

16. and only testify to the fact.

<sup>f</sup> See Herodotus, Polymnia, 143.

<sup>g</sup> That is, according to his declaration that any known decisions of illustrious persons might be of service in proof. Now proverbs have the advantage of being universally known, and are acquiesced in by all as the decisions of men of prudence at least. Vater explains the passage differently: vid. Animadv.

<sup>h</sup> Vid. Herodot. i, 155. Cyrus is apprehensive of constant annoyance if he should not enslave the Lydians:—ὁμοίως γὰρ μοι νῦν γε φαίνομαι πεποιημένοι, ὡς εἴ τις πατέρα ἀποκτείνας, τῶν παιδῶν αὐτοῦ φείσαιο.

taken place; whether it be in existence or not; but as to the further question of its *character*, they are not at all witnesses; on the questions for instance, whether a thing be just or unjust, expedient or prejudicial. But witnesses who are at a distance<sup>i</sup> are very credible, even touching questions of this nature. But ancient witnesses are of supreme credibility<sup>k</sup>, because they are beyond the reach of corruption. But in reference to testimony the following may be adduced as confirmations of proof, by the orator, namely, who has no witnesses: it should be insisted that the judge ought to decide from probabilities, and that this is the spirit of his oath, "to the best of his judgment." Let him also say that it is impossible to lead probability astray on the score of money; and that probability never is detected bearing false testimony. But it must be urged by him who *has* witnesses, against him who has them not, that neither is probability amenable to trial; and that there would be no need at all of offering testimony, if it were enough to consider matters on the ground of reasonings only. And testimony is partly in reference to one's self, partly in reference to the adversary; partly to fact, partly to moral character. In-  
 17. Most ancient and most credible.  
 Arguments for him who has no witnesses:  
 and for him who has.  
 18. Testimony is either for one's self or the adversary.  
 19. Whatever else we allege on the subject of witnesses, as to their being friendly, inimical, or indif-

<sup>i</sup> By the *οἱ ἀπωθεν* he should seem to imply both *οἱ παλαιοὶ*, and *οἱ ἐκτὸς πρόσφατοι*: the first removed by time, the last by their being unconcerned in the present question, which may be considered in one sense as a distance in point of interest at least.

<sup>k</sup> *Τὸ ἐκ ποδῶν οὐτ' ἀντιπίπτει καὶ τετίμηται ἀφθόνως.* Gregor. Naz. ἐν Στιχ. Hooker, vol. ii, p. 26.

ferent, of good character, or bad, or neither particularly, and whatever other distinctions of this kind there happen to be, must be alleged from the same places out of which we adduce enthymems.

20. But on the subject of *Deeds*, pleading is useful so far  
 3rd. Deeds. as regards enhancing or depreciating their authority, or showing them to be valid, or void; in showing, if they exist on your own side, that they are deserving credit and valid; if, however, they be on your adversary's side, in showing the contrary. Now in order to set them out as deserving credit or undeserving it, there is no difference from the process respecting witnesses. For of whatever characters those who have subscribed, or had the custody<sup>1</sup> of the deeds happen to be, of the same authority will the deeds themselves also be. When, however, the deeds are acknowledged to have been made, we must, in case they be on our side, aggrandize their authority; for a deed is law, private and particular<sup>m</sup>. And deeds do not make valid the law, but the law makes valid those deeds which are conformable to law. And, in short, the law is itself a sort of deed; so that whoever casts discredit on, or  
 22. does away deeds, does away, in fact, with law. Moreover the greater part of the bargains of men, and their voluntary transactions, are carried on by means of deeds: so that if these become invalid, the intercourse

21. To be treated as witnesses. Arguments for him who has them on his side.

<sup>1</sup> Thus it is one of the arguments in favour of the validity of the prophecies of our Saviour's coming, that they are contained in books of which the Jews, who are the enemies of Christianity, had the custody. See Horne's Sermon on "The case of the Jews."

<sup>m</sup> LAW is essentially distinguished from deeds or private compacts, in that it is a *rule*; "for a compact is a promise proceeding *from* us, law is a command directed *to* us. The language of a compact is, 'I will, or will not, do this;' that of a law is, 'Thou shalt, or shalt not, do it.' It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising any thing at all." Blackstone, Comment. Introd. § 2, p. 45.

of mankind with each other is subverted. And it is easy enough to discover what other topics are adapted to the purpose. But should the deeds be *opposed* to you, and on the side of your adversary, these arguments will be to your purpose:—first, those with which one would contend against a law which made against him; for it is absurd if we think we are not bound to obey the laws, unless well enacted, and if the legislators have been guilty of mistaking their point, but yet hold it necessary to abide by mere deeds. Next to argue that the judge is an arbiter of what is just, that he ought therefore to regard, not the matter of the deed, but something partaking more of justice. And that it is not possible to alter what is just, either by fraud or force; for it has an existence in the nature of things<sup>a</sup>: deeds, however, are made both by persons who are imposed on, and those who are compelled to make them. Observe, moreover, whether it be in opposition to any written law, or any universal principle of right, and to the principles of justice and honour; whether again it be opposed to other later or earlier deeds; for either the later are valid, and the earlier invalid; or the earlier are correct, and the later have been obtained by stratagem; urging whichever of these cases may happen to suit the purpose. Have an eye moreover to the matter of expediency, whether the deed stand in any respect in the way of the judges, and every other such consideration, for these may also be easily discovered.

*Torture* is a kind of evidence, and appears to carry with it absolute credibility, because a kind of constraint is applied. Now, it is not at all difficult respecting to discern those considerations which the cause admits of, and to set them forth; out of which, should the torture be on our side, it is possible to enhance its value, by insisting that of all evidence this alone is true.

23. Arguments for him who has them not on his side.

24.

25.

26.

4th. Torture a kind of evidence.

When on our side.

<sup>a</sup> Vid. Ethics.

When  
against us.

Should it be, however, opposed to us, and on the side of our adversary, one may do away with the very truth, by declaiming against every sort of torture; for that men, when constrained, speak falsehood no less than truth, and will persist in not speaking the truth; and will easily falsify, as being likely the sooner to get off<sup>o</sup>: and one ought to have it in his power to allege, over and above all these considerations, some actual instances, which the judges are acquainted with, besides topics such as I have described.

27.  
5th. Oaths;  
a four-fold  
division  
made.

On the subject of *oaths* we may make a four-fold division; for a party either tenders an oath, and accepts it; or he does neither; or he does the one, and not the other; that is, he either tenders, but does not accept it; or accepts, but does not tender it<sup>p</sup>. Moreover, it may happen in a different way from this still, supposing the oath to have been previously taken by this or that party.

28. i. When  
the orator  
refuses to  
tender the  
oath.

1. Now, an advocate does *not tender* an oath on the ground that men easily forswear themselves; and because the other party will take it, and never repay; but that he is of opinion that the judges, if his adversary does not take the oath, will give a verdict against him: that he esteems the risk which depends on the judges the preferable one, for in them he reposes confidence, but in his adversary, none.

29. ii. When  
he refuses  
to accept it.

2. But an advocate *declines accepting* it on the ground of its being an oath for a pecuniary object;

<sup>o</sup> The Pandects (lib. xlviii, tit. xviii) contain the sentiments of the most eminent civilians on the subject of torture. They confine it to slaves; and Ulpian acknowledges, that "Res est fragilis, et periculosa, et quæ veritatem fallert."

<sup>p</sup> However strangely this wrangling for the administration of oaths may sound, at the present day, when they are uniformly insisted on, yet in the early periods of our own history the evidence for accused persons against the king could not be examined on oath,—nor till the reign of Anne could any one accused of felony produce witnesses on oath. Edin. Review, No. lxxxix, Art. 3, p. 79, 80. It was not till so late as the reign of Anne, that the English courts were authorised to administer an oath to persons called by a prisoner on his defence.

and because, if he were a worthless fellow, he would forswear himself without more ado; since it were better surely to be a villain for some object, rather than for none; for if he but take the oath, he will gain his cause, if he decline taking it, he will not. Thus, then, his not taking it will be from virtuous motives, not from fear of forswearing himself; here, too, the saying of Xenophanes is in point, viz. that this sort of appeal, made by an impious man to a pious, is not fair, but is just such an one, as if a robust fellow were to challenge an infirm man, either to strike him, or to get beaten himself.

3. If, however, he *accepts* it, the advocate alleges <sup>30.</sup> that he feels confidence in himself, but none in his ad- <sup>iii. When</sup> <sup>he accepts</sup> <sup>it.</sup> versary. Let him also declare, inverting the saying of Xenophanes, that it is fair enough if the impious man tenders the oath, and the pious man takes it; also, that it is surely a strange thing that a man should be unwilling *himself* to take an oath, in a question about which he calls on the judges to give their verdict on oath.

4. If, however, he *tenders* the oath, let him insist <sup>31.</sup> that a willingness to intrust the question to the gods <sup>iv. When</sup> <sup>he tenders</sup> <sup>it.</sup> is a matter of piety; and that his adversary need call on no other judges, since he throws the decision of the case into his own hands; and that an unwillingness to take an oath, in a question about which he calls upon other people to swear, is absurd.

Now, as it is thus plain how we are to speak in re- <sup>32. Argu-</sup> <sup>ments for</sup> <sup>the same</sup> <sup>taken con-</sup> <sup>jointly.</sup> ference to each [of the four *simple* cases], it will also be plain how we are to speak when taking them con-jointly; supposing, for instance, either that yourself are willing to *take* the oath, but *not to tender* it; or, if you *tender* it, but are *not willing* to *take* it; or if you are inclined *both* to *take* it *and* to *tender* it; or to do *neither*; for these cases must be made up of those above mentioned, so that our reasonings must also be made up of those above stated.



Arguments  
if any pre-  
vious oath  
has been  
taken.

But if a former oath, and that contradictory of your present, has been taken by yourself, you have to make out that it is not *perjury*; for injustice is essentially *voluntary*, and perjury is injustice; but that which is done under constraint, or deceit, is *involuntary*, [and therefore not unjust.] Here then we may introduce the saying about perjury, viz. "that it is a thing not of the tongue, but of the mind." If, however, an oath of this description shall have been taken by your adversary, declare "that he who abides not by what he has sworn to, subverts every thing which is established; for this is the reason that judges administer the law only on oath:" exclaim, too, "that these men are calling on you, judges, to abide by those oaths, by virtue of taking which you give your verdict; and do they not themselves abide by them?" And whatever else one may allege in way of amplification. So much, then, for the subject of proof not originated by art.

33. Perjury.

ARISTOTLE'S  
TREATISE ON RHETORIC.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

*The necessity of investing the Judge with a favourable feeling.*

THE materials, then, from which we must exhort and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those [which we have discussed]: for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymems deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in view the coming to a decision (for in deliberative oratory, the *assembly* arrive at decisions; and the sentence of a *court of justice* is *ipso facto* a decision); it is necessary to look not only to your speech in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, particularly in deliberative <sup>a</sup> cases; and, next to these, in judicial; as well

1. Discussion of the  
πίστις ἐν  
τῷ ἡθελ τοῦ  
λέγοντος.

<sup>a</sup> Those subjects about which deliberative oratory is concerned, least of all admit any thing like absolute certainty, for we can only form conjectures of what will be from what has been; and Aristotle has already told us, "that men lend a readier and more implicit belief to the good on all questions whatsoever; but on those whose nature precludes our arriving

that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character, as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be *himself* of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations: but the disposing the *auditor* in a certain way, in judicial cases; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being likely to accrue, as of being likely to prove really a good; while by one who is indifferent and reluctant, the opposite view is taken.

5. Three  
requisites  
for the ora-  
tor's gain-  
ing belief.  
i. φρόνησις.  
ii. ἀρετή.  
iii. εὐνοία.

Now, there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; for so many in number are the qualities on account of which we lend our credit, independently of proof adduced; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and the having our interests at heart<sup>b</sup>; (for men are fallacious in what they allege or advise by reason, either of all, or some, of these causes; for either, from want of ability, they do not rightly apprehend the question; or, rightly apprehending it, from their depravity, they do not tell you what they think; or, being men both of ability and moral excellence, they have

at certainty, but compels us to remain in doubt, we rely *entirely* on them." book i, chap. ii, § 4.

<sup>b</sup> See Pericles's defence of himself, Thucyd. ii, 60; and above, book i, chap. viii, § 6.

not your interests at heart, on which account it is possible they should not give you the best advice, though fully knowing what is best;) and besides these there is no other: it follows therefore, of course, that the speaker who appears to possess *all* these qualities, is considered by his audience as deserving credit<sup>c</sup>. Now, the means by which men may appear virtuous and prudent, are to be derived from what has been laid down on the subject of the virtues; for it is by help of the very same things, that an orator may invest himself, and any one else, in a certain character. The subject of feeling an interest, and of friendliness, must be discussed in my treatise of the passions, commencing henceforth. Passions<sup>d</sup> however are, all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions: for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them. But it will be fitting to divide what I have to say, respecting each, into three considerations; to consider, respecting anger for example, how those who are susceptible of anger are affected; with whom they usually are angry; and on what occasions. For, granted that we be in possession of one, or even two of these points, and not of them all, it will be impossible for us to kindle anger in the breast; and in the case of the rest of the passions in a similar way. In the same way, then, as on the subjects treated of above I have separately drawn up the several propositions, so let me do in respect of these also, and make my distinctions according to the manner specified.

7. The two first discussed before.

8. The latter to be known by the emotions, which must therefore be considered.

9. The discussion is divided into three heads in every instance.

i.  
ii.  
iii.

<sup>c</sup> A celebrated scholar of the present day, after having described the eloquence of Mr. Fox, as remarkably characterised by *πίστις ἠθικὴ*, proceeds thus—“Hac de causa, quos audienti mihi motus adhibere voluit, illi semper in animo oratoris impressi et inusti esse videbantur.” Parr’s Pref. to Bellenden, p. 12, edit. 1787.

<sup>d</sup> The definition, given more briefly in the Ethics, is “*οἷς ἐπεταί ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.*” Eth. Nich. ii, 5.

## CHAP. II.

*Persons against whom Anger is felt, and by whom, and why.*

1. Anger defined. LET anger be defined<sup>a</sup> to be "a desire accompanied by pain of a revenge which presents itself, on account of an apparent slight from persons acting toward one's self, or some of one's friends, unbecomingly." Now, if
2. Anger is felt against the individual, not the species. anger be this, it must be that he who is affected by anger, is so affected invariably towards some *individual* (for instance, towards Cleon), but not towards *man-kind*<sup>b</sup>, generally: and this, because the individual has already wrought some indignity, either on himself or some of his friends, or intends doing so. It must be also that there is a sort of pleasure consequent on all anger, arising out of the hope of avenging one's self<sup>c</sup>; for the idea of attaining what one desires is pleasant; and no one is desirous of objects which appear impracticable to him; and he who is under the affection of anger is desirous of objects which appear practicable to him. Wherefore it has been happily remarked of anger that it is,
- Is attended with pleasure.

"Far, far too dear to every mortal breast,  
Sweet to the soul, as honey to the taste<sup>d</sup>."

3. We feel anger on account of a supposed slight. Because a sort of pleasure is consequent on it, as well on this account, as because men linger in thought on compassing revenge. Now the phantasy which then arises excites a pleasure within us, as do the phantasies of dreams. But as a slight is the operation of an opinion conceived of an object which appears not worth

<sup>a</sup> Ὁρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. Eth. Nich.

<sup>b</sup> Compare lib. i, c. xi, § 9, οὐδείς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>c</sup> Compare book i, chap. xi, § 13; and also book i, chap. x, § 17. This is expressed in the Ethics, lib. iii, c. viii, Καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί.

<sup>d</sup> Pope's translation of Homer.

consideration (for we esteem things absolutely bad, and those which are good, and what conduces to them, to be worth some consideration; that however which is mere nothing, or absolutely trivial, we conceive worth none). There are three species of slight, contempt, vexatiousness, and contumely: for he who manifests contempt is guilty of a slight, since men contemn whatever they think worth nothing, and what is worth nothing, they slight. Again, he who is vexatious appears to contemn, for *vexatiousness* is a thwarting another's wishes, not that any thing may accrue to the person himself who so impedes, but in order that something may not accrue to that other. Since, then, he slights not with a view to any advantage to himself, it is plain that he conceives you can neither hurt him, (for, if he did, he would be afraid, and would not be guilty of slight,) nor can benefit him in any respect worth mentioning, since he would otherwise hold you in consideration, in order to become your friend<sup>e</sup>. He, too, who acts *contumeliously* manifests slight; for *contumely* is the doing and saying those things about which the person who is the subject of this treatment, has feelings of delicacy, not with a view that any thing should accrue to himself, other than what arises to him in the act, but in order that he may be gratified; for they who requite an injury, do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. Now the cause of the pleasure felt by those who act contumeliously, is that, by injuring, they conceive themselves to be more decidedly superior: on which account young men and the rich are given to contumely, for in manifesting the contumely,

Three species of *ὀλιγωρία*.  
 i. *καταφρόνησις*.  
 ii. *ἐπηρησμός*.  
 iii. *ὑβρις*.

<sup>e</sup> It is an essential feature of vexatiousness, and in fact of every species of slight, that there is a total absence of any selfish motive on the part of him who offers it; the appearance of any such motive having actuated him, would be a salvo to the pride of him who is made the subject of such treatment; but to be exposed to an opinion that one is utterly beneath consideration (*δόξα περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον*), is a reflection to which no person, actuated by the common feelings of our nature, ever can submit.

they conceive themselves superior. To contumely belongs the withholding of respect; but he who withholds respect, manifests slight; for that which is of no value, is held in no consideration, either good or bad. On which principle Achilles, in his anger, says, "He hath withheld from me respect, for he hath seized and possesses my prize himself, having taken it from me." And again, "Like some unregarded vagabond;" as though he were, on this account, affected by anger.

7. Now people think it becoming that they should be looked up to by their inferiors, whether in birth, power, or moral excellence, or generally speaking, in whatever respect one may happen to be much superior: thus the rich man thinks to be looked up to by the poor, in regard to money; also the man who has a faculty of speaking, by him who is destitute of it, in the case of speaking; and he who thinks himself worthy to bear office, by him who deserves to be subject to rule. Whence it has been said

"Beware! for dreadful is the wrath of kings:"

and in another place,

"'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last:"

for they feel indignant by reason of their superiority.

8. Moreover [men think it becoming that they should be looked up to] by those at whose hands they think they ought to receive good; and these are such as they have benefited, or continue to benefit, whether in their own persons, or as instruments of any one, and whom any of their relatives have benefited, or wish, or did wish to benefit.

9. With what feelings, and how situated, men are angry.

1. From hence it is by this time manifest both under what affections as regards themselves, and with what objects, and for what reasons, men feel anger. For as regards themselves, it is when they happen to be aggrieved, since he who is aggrieved is anxious for something. Now a man [will feel thus aggrieved,] as well

on any person's clashing with him in regard to any object, *directly*; when he is thirsty, for example, in regard to drinking: as also should they *not directly* clash, yet will he appear to do the same thing; and if a person thwarts, or does not cooperate with one, and if a person annoys one in any respect, when thus circumstanced, one feels anger against all these. On which <sup>10.</sup> account people who are ill, in poverty, love, thirst, in a word, who are under desire, and fail of success, these all are fretful and irritable, and particularly with those who slight their present condition: the sick man, for example, is annoyed by those who slight him in regard to his disease; the poor man too, with those who do so in regard to his poverty; and the warrior, in regard to war; the lover, in regard to love; and in other cases similarly, for each one has the way paved to the feeling anger in each case, by the passion which exists in his mind. Again, a man is nettled should he happen to be <sup>11.</sup> expecting the very opposite of what results; for that pains one more deeply which falls out very unexpectedly; just in the same ratio as that which is very unexpected delights, should it be what one wishes for. On which account seasons, times, dispositions, and ages, which class of them are readily excited to anger, and when, and how, will be plain from this which I have said; also it will be plain that they are then excited with greater readiness, when more immediately influenced by these circumstances. As then regards the persons themselves, under these dispositions it is that they are readily excited to anger.

2. But people feel anger towards those who laugh at them excessively, and gibe, and scoff at them, for these treat them with contumely; with such also as hurt them in all particulars, of such a nature as are tokens of contumely: these of course must be such as neither are in requital for any thing, or beneficial to those who are the agents<sup>f</sup>; for this is enough to make it appear

<sup>12.</sup> Towards whom men feel anger.

<sup>f</sup> Here also Aristotle maintains the absolute exclusion of any thing like



13. to be an act solely of contumely: towards those also who underrate and despise what themselves take a warm interest in; thus all those who are fond of philosophy, are angry if any one undervalues philosophy; so, too, they who embrace the notion of an universal idea<sup>g</sup>, are nettled if a person despises the doctrine;
14. and as regards other things in a similar manner. But all this will be felt much more keenly, if these persons suspect that the qualities so underrated do not really belong to them, or not completely, or not firmly, or that they do not *appear* to belong to them; since, if they conceive themselves to be very strong in the points on which they happen to be rallied, they do not regard it<sup>h</sup>, and anger is felt towards friends, in a greater degree
15. than towards such as are not friends; because people conceive it to be more fitting to receive good at their
16. hands than not: also towards those who have been in the habit of honouring or bestowing consideration on them, if, on the contrary, they do not keep on the same terms with them; because people conceive themselves despised by them, for otherwise they would do as before. Towards those also who do not requite a kind-
17. ness, or who do not return an equivalent, towards those also who thwart them, if they be inferiors; for these all appear to despise them, the latter as though they were their inferiors, the former as though [the
18. kindness had been received] from inferiors. Men feel it also in a greater degree towards persons of no account, should they slight them; for anger is supposed to arise from a slight, and to exist towards persons whose conduct misbecame them; now it becomes in-
19. feriors to make no manifestation of slight. Towards

self-interest as characteristic of this species of *ὀλιγωρία*. See note on the last chapter.

<sup>g</sup> Alluding to Plato's doctrine of ideas, which Aristotle himself so warmly controverted. See Eth. Nich. i, 6.

<sup>h</sup> See chap. iv, § 14, where he says, we are fond of those who praise us on points where we esteem ourselves weak.

friends, anger is felt if they do not or speak not well; and still more so if they do the contrary; also if they should not perceive us to be in want, just as the Plexippus<sup>i</sup> of Antipho was angry with Meleager; for not to perceive this is a token of slight, since in regard to those for whom we feel deference, this does not escape our notice: towards those also it is felt who exult in their misfortunes; and, in a word, towards such as are in good spirits amid their misfortunes; for this marks either a foe, or one who manifests slight: towards those also who do not care if they give us pain; wherefore, men feel anger towards those who announce evil tidings<sup>k</sup>. Against those also is anger felt who either readily listen to, or scrutinise our failings; for they resemble persons who slight us, or who are our enemies; since a friend sympathises with one, and all men, as their peculiar failings are scrutinised, feel pain. Moreover men feel anger towards those who slight them in the presence of five descriptions of persons, viz. in the presence of those whom they emulate, whom they admire, by whom they are desirous of being admired, in whose presence they are alive to delicacy of feeling, and before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them; if before these any one should slight them, they feel anger more sensibly: with those also do men feel angry who slight them in such respects, as it is disgraceful for them not to stand up in defence of; in regard to parents, for instance, or children, wives, or persons in subjection: with those, too, who make no return of favours; for the slight then is contrary to what is becoming: and with those who play off sarcasms upon them when seriously engaged; for sarcasm has an air of contempt: also with those who benefit others, if they do not also benefit them; since this also carries

22. Towards those who slight them before persons of five descriptions.  
 i. Whom they emulate.  
 ii. Whom they admire.  
 iii. By whom they wish to be admired.  
 iv. Before whom they are sensible of delicate feelings.  
 v. Before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them.

23.

24.

25.

<sup>i</sup> Plexippus was a brother of Althæa, Meleager's mother, and a character in a play of Antipho's, now lost.

<sup>k</sup> And the first bringer of unwelcome news  
 Hath but a losing office. Shakspeare.

- an air of contempt, the not thinking them worthy what all are worthy of. Also the letting a man escape our memory is a thing very apt to provoke anger; for example, the nearly forgetting even his name, since forgetfulness seems to be an indication of slight; because forgetfulness arises from disregard, and disregard is a kind of slight. Now, it has been told you against whom men feel anger, and under what dispositions, and why<sup>1</sup>. It evidently will be needful for an orator to work up his audience by his speech, into such a frame of mind as that under which men are prone to anger, and his adversary, too, as being obnoxious to that on account of which men feel anger, and as being such an one as people feel anger against.

## CHAP. III.

*The Persons susceptible of Placability, also those towards whom, and the occasions on which it is felt.*

1. As the feeling anger is the opposite of being appeased, and anger itself of placability, we must ascertain with what dispositions men are placable, towards whom they are thus affected, and by what means they are appeased. Let placability, then, be defined to be "a subsiding and appeasment of anger<sup>a</sup>." Now, if men feel anger towards those who slight them, and if slight be voluntary, it is plain that they are placable in regard to those who do no such thing, or who either do so, or appear to do so, involuntarily: towards those also who wish the contrary of what they do; and those who behave in the same way toward themselves also, for no

2. Placability defined.

3. Towards whom men are placable.

<sup>1</sup> Vide this chapter, § 3.

<sup>a</sup> This passion, different from all the others, supposes the previous existence of another in the mind, the emotions of which it may be said to allay more properly, than to be itself an emotion. Rochefoucault, Maxim 328.

one seems likely himself to be guilty of slight towards himself. Men are thus disposed also towards such as 5. The re-  
 acknowledge and repent of their guilt; for taking their pentant.  
 feeling of pain for what they have done as a punishment, they are appeased:—there is proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more violently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards such as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from our wrath<sup>b</sup>; the reason of which is, that the denial of what is evident is a sort of impudence, and impudence is slight and contempt: therefore we are not alive to sense of shame, in regard to those whom we despise very much. Men are thus 6. The hum-  
 disposed also towards those who humble themselves be- ble.  
 fore them<sup>c</sup>, and do not contradict their imputations; for they appear to acknowledge themselves inferior; but inferiors fear us, and no one who fears is guilty of slight. But the fact that anger ceases towards such as humble themselves, even dogs evince by their not biting those who sit as suppliants. Placability is also 7. Those  
 felt towards such as are earnestly attentive, where they who are at-  
 are themselves attentive; for they think themselves re- tentive to  
 garded with attention, and not despised: towards such us.  
 as [*subsequently* to their manifesting slight] have grati- 8.  
 fied us in more important points, and with those who implore us, and deprecate our anger; for these are more humble: towards those also, who are not given 9.  
 to contumely, nor to jeering one; and who do not manifest slight towards any one, or towards those alone who are not good men, and not towards such as we ourselves are. In a word, we should consider the sub- 10.  
 ject of placability, from the opposite of the doctrine of anger. Once more, it is felt towards those whom men Whom we  
 fear, or have a delicacy toward; for so long as they are fear.  
 thus affected, they are not influenced by anger; since

<sup>b</sup> “A soft answer turneth away wrath.”

<sup>c</sup> See the instance of Ahab's humiliation of himself, (1 Kings xxi, 27,) and that of the Ninevites, (Jonah iii, 5, etc.), to which we may add David.

it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time.

11. Towards the angry. Again, people either do not feel anger at all, or feel it in a less degree, towards those who have themselves acted under the influences of anger; for these appear to have acted, not from any motive of slight; for no one who is angry with you slights you; since slight is unattended by pain, anger, however, is so attended. Thus are they also disposed towards such as regard them with respect.

In what situations men are apt to be placable, and how affected.

It is evident, also, that men are placable, when in a frame of mind contrary to the feeling of anger; thus in amusements, in mirth, in festivity, amid rejoicings, or a course of success and of gratification, or, in a word, when in a state of freedom from pain, and amid chastened pleasure, and virtuous hope. Those, too, who have suffered some time to elapse, and are not fresh from the influence of anger; for time makes anger cease<sup>d</sup>. Also vengeance previously taken on one object allays the anger felt against another, even if he be more violent. For which reason, Philocrates, when some one asked him "how it was, as the populace were enraged with him, that he did not make his defence," very justly said, "I will not do it yet."—"But when will you?"—"I will do it, when I see some one else criminated." For people, after they have exhausted their anger on some other object, become placable; which happened in the case of Ergophilus; for the populace, though more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet acquitted him, because, on the day before, they had condemned Callisthenes to death. Men are thus disposed if they have convicted the object, and if he have suffered a greater ill than they, with all their anger, would have themselves in-

13. When vengeance has been taken.

<sup>d</sup> Cleon was aware of this when he exclaimed against a second hearing of the Mitylenæans;—*Θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν χρόνου διατριβὴν ἐμποησάντων, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἡδικηκότων μᾶλλον. ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρῳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπιέρχεται.* Thucyd. iii, 38.

flicted; for they think they have gotten, as it were, their revenge. Again, if they are aware that they are themselves unjust, and suffer deservedly<sup>e</sup>; because 15. anger is not felt at what is just; for in that case men no longer conceive themselves sufferers contrary to what is becoming; but anger was defined to be such a feeling. On which account we should preface punishment with a sort of lecture; for thus even slaves feel less indignant at being punished. Moreover they are thus disposed, if they conceive that the sufferer will not perceive that he is punished by *them*, and in return for what *they* have suffered; for anger is felt against individuals: and this is plain from the definition. Hence is it said in the poem with great propriety, "Go, say 'twas Ulysses, subverter of cities," etc.; as though the hero had not been revenged, unless Polyphemus perceived both by whom<sup>f</sup>, and in return for what<sup>g</sup>, he suffered. So that men are not angry with any who are no longer sensible; neither any longer with those who are dead<sup>h</sup>, as being persons who have

16. When the object is insensible.

<sup>e</sup> Well illustrated in Richard the First's pardon of Bertrand de Gourdon, on his death-bed:—"Wretch," said the King, "what have I ever done to you to oblige you to seek my life?" "What have you done to me?" coolly replied the prisoner: "you killed, with your own hands, my father and my two brothers; and you intended to have hanged myself," etc. Richard, struck with the reasonableness of this reply, and humbled by the near approach of death, ordered Gourdon to be set at liberty, and a sum of money to be given to him. Hume.

<sup>f</sup> Thus Gloucester, in Henry VI,

Down, down to hell, and say—I sent thee thither, etc.

<sup>g</sup> Again, in the Æneid, the hero tells Turnus,

Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas  
Immolat.

<sup>h</sup> Πᾶσα δυσμένεια τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ συναπορίθεται. Synes. Quoted in Hooker, v, § 7, vol. ii, p. 26. Compare Byron's tragedy of the Two Foscari, act. v, last scene:

BARBARIGO (to Loredano).—What art thou writing,  
With such an earnest brow, upon thy tablets?

LOREDANO (pointing to the Doge's body)—That he has paid me.\*

\* "L' ha pagata." An historical fact; see History of Venice, by P. Darus, p. 411, vol. ii.

endured the extremity of suffering; nor with those who will not be susceptible of pain, nor feel the punishment inflicted, a point of which those affected by anger are desirous. On which account the poet, wishing to restrain Achilles from his anger against Hector now that he is dead, aptly says, "In his madness he is vexing a senseless clod." It is evident that arguments must be deduced from the topics here furnished, by those who would appease their audience; by working up the *hearers* themselves into feelings such as I have described; and those with whom they are enraged, either as objects of fear, or as deserving reverence, or as persons who have benefited them, or as having been involuntary agents, or as now exceedingly pained at what they have done.

17. How we are to appease the audience.

#### CHAP. IV.

##### *The Characters towards whom men entertain friendly feelings, or hatred; and the reasons why.*

1. LET US discuss the characters towards whom men bear friendly feelings, and hatred, and the reasons why they do so; setting out with a definition of friendliness and the act of cherishing this feeling. Let the bearing friendly feeling, then, be defined to be "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it. And a friend is he who entertains and meets a return of this feeling<sup>a</sup>. And those people consider themselves friends who consider themselves to stand thus affected towards each other.

2 Definition of friendliness.

3. Towards whom we feel it.

These considerations being laid down, of necessity it must be, that one who participates in another's joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves

<sup>a</sup> Thus the feeling discussed in the Ethics is called *εὐνοια ἐν ἀντιπεποιθόσι μὴ λαμβάνουσα*. Eth. Nich. viii, 2.

him, not from any other motive, but simply for his sake, is his friend. For every one, when that happens which he wishes, rejoices; but when the contrary happens, all are grieved. So that the pain and pleasure men feel are an indication of their wishes. Those, too, <sup>4.</sup> are friends, to whom the same things are become by this time good, and the same evil; those, too, who are friends and foes to the same persons, for these must necessarily desire similar objects. So that he who wishes for another what he does for himself, appears to be a friend to that other. Men love also those who <sup>5</sup> have benefited either themselves, or those for whom <sup>Benefac-</sup> they have a regard; whether in important particulars, or with readiness<sup>b</sup>, and for their own sakes, or those whom they deem willing to benefit them. Again, <sup>6.</sup> people love the friends of their friends, and such as cherish friendly feelings towards those for whom they do themselves; likewise those who are loved by such as are beloved by themselves; those also who are ene- <sup>7.</sup> mies to the same people, and who hate those whom they hate themselves, and those who are hated by those who also are hated by themselves; for to all these the same objects seem good as to themselves; so that they wish for things which are good to them, both which were laid down to be characteristic of a friend. Moreover men love those who benefit them in regard <sup>8.</sup> to money matters, and the security of life; on which account people honour the liberal and brave. They <sup>9.</sup> love also the just, of which character they esteem those <sup>The brave and liberal.</sup> who do not live at the cost of others, such are all who are supported by their bodily labour, and of these are husbandmen, and among the rest handicraftsmen in <sup>Husband-</sup> particular. They love also the temperate, for they <sup>men.</sup> are not unjust; and those who are disengaged from <sup>10.</sup> business, for the same reason. We love also those of <sup>11.</sup> whom we wish to become the friends, should they ap-

<sup>b</sup> Bis dat, qui cito dat.



- pear to desire it also. Of this sort are those who are good in respect to moral excellence, and men of approved character, either among all men, or among the best men, or those who are held in admiration by ourselves, or who themselves admire us. Again, we love those who are pleasant companions for passing time, or spending a day with; of this description are the good tempered, and such as are not fond of chiding those who err, and are not quarrelsome or contentious<sup>c</sup>. For all people of this sort are fond of dispute; but such as are fond of dispute give us the idea of desiring the opposite of what we do. Also those who have a happy turn in passing and taking a joke; for both seem bent on the same things as their neighbours, being able both to endure being rallied and neatly rallying others<sup>d</sup>. Men love also those who praise their good qualities, and particularly such as they apprehend not to belong to them: also those who are neat in their appearance, their dress, and their whole manner of living. Also those who do not reproach them with errors, nor their own benefits; for both these descriptions of people have an air of reproving them. People admire also those who forget old grievances; and who do not treasure up grounds of quarrel, but are easily reconciled; because of whatever disposition they show themselves towards others, people naturally think they will prove to be of towards themselves also: as also those who do not talk scandal, nor inform themselves of the ills either of their neighbours or themselves, but of their good points only; for this is the
12. Companions, etc.
- 13.
- 14.
15. Those neat in dress.
- 16.
17. The forgiving.
- 18.

<sup>c</sup> The character given by Clarendon of Sir Edward Herbert (afterwards Earl of Montgomery), one of the favourites of James I, seems to answer to Aristotle's description of a person likely to conciliate friendship:—"He pretended to no other qualifications than to understand horses and dogs very well; which his master loved him the better for, (being at his first coming to England very jealous of those who had the reputation of great parts,) and to be believed *honest and generous*, which made him many friends, and left him no enemy." Clarendon's History, vol. i, p. 59.

<sup>d</sup> See Eth. Nich. iv, 8.

conduct of a good man. We are friendly disposed also 19.  
 towards those who are not at cross purposes with us  
 when angry, or seriously engaged; for all such people  
 are fond of dispute: towards those also who comport  
 themselves seriously towards us; thus, for instance,  
 those who admire us, or consider us worthy men, and  
 take a pleasure in our society, and who are thus af- 20.  
 fected in regard particularly to points about which  
 ourselves are desirous to be admired, or to appear ex-  
 cellent or agreeable: as also towards our equals, and 21.  
 those who have the same objects in view, supposing  
 they do not clash with us<sup>e</sup>, and that their livelihood  
 arise not from the same profession, for thus arises an  
 instance of the proverb, "Potter hates potter<sup>f</sup>." We 22. Those  
 stand thus affected towards those also who are de- who imitate  
 sirable of the same objects with ourselves, and which us.  
 it is possible for us to participate in as well as them;  
 otherwise, the same collision takes place in this case: 23.  
 towards those also, in regard to whom men have them-  
 selves in such a way as, while they do not hold them  
 cheap, not to feel shame on mere matters of opinion.  
 With this feeling do people regard those also in re- 24.  
 spect to whom they feel shame about matters really  
 shameful: and those before whom they are studious  
 to stand approved, and by whom they wish to be emu-  
 lated, yet without being envied, all these men either  
 love as friends, or wish to become their friends; also 25.  
 those with whom they would cooperate toward some  
 good, were it not that greater ills are likely thereby  
 to befall themselves: and such as regard with friendly 26. Such as  
 love the  
 dead.

<sup>e</sup> So long as we are *imitated* at a respectful distance:

Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem

Quod te imitari aveo:

Lucretius, iii, 5.

our pride is *flattered*; but when this imitation has been so successfully continued as to resemble *competition*, our envy is quickly awakened. To this point Rochefoucault well observes,—“Those who endeavour to *imitate* us we like much better than those who endeavour to *equal* us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of envy.” Maxims, No. 113.

<sup>f</sup> Two of a trade can ne'er agree.

- feeling, the absent equally with the present; on which account all love those who manifest this disposition in regard to the dead. Also men entirely love those who are particularly zealous for their friends and never abandon them; for eminently beyond all the good, people love those who are good *as friends*. They also love those who do not dissemble towards them; of this class are such as mention their own failings; for it has been said already, that before friends we feel no shame about mere matters of opinion; if, then, he who is so ashamed has not the feelings of a friend, the man who is without such shame bears a resemblance to one who has friendly feelings. Also we love those who do not inspire us with fear, and before whom we feel confidence; for no one loves a person whom he fears<sup>ε</sup>. But the species of friendship are companionship, intimacy, relationship, and the like. And the efficient causes of friendship are gratuitous benefits, the rendering a service unsolicited, and the not disclosing it after it has been rendered; for thus done the favour appears to be solely for the sake of your friend himself, and from no other motive.
27. The sincere.
28. Three sorts of friendship.
29. Causes of friendship:
30. The subject of hatred, however, and of bearing it, may, it is plain, be considered by taking the contraries. But the efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny.
- and of hatred.
31. Six points of comparison between anger and hatred.
1. Now anger arises out of something which has reference to ourselves; hatred, however, even independently of any thing having reference to ourselves, since if we conceive a person to be of a certain description, we bear hatred towards him. 2. And our anger invariably has reference to *individual* objects, as to Callias<sup>h</sup> or Socrates; but hatred may be borne even to

<sup>ε</sup> There is no fear in love; but perfect *love* casteth out *fear*. 1 John, iv, 18.

<sup>h</sup> Callias is attacked by Lucian in his dialogue, entitled *Τιμῶν ἢ Μισάνθρωπος*, where Mercury, taxing Plutus with not going to those who deserve riches, says, *Ἀριστείδην καταλιπὼν Ἴππονίκῳ καὶ Καλλίᾳ προσήεις*. p. 232, *Scrip. Græc.*; and several times in Aristophanes.

*whole classes*; for every one hates the character of a thief and an informer. 3. Again, the one feeling is to be remedied by time; the other is incurable. 4. Also the first is a desire of inflicting *pain* on its object, the last of doing him deadly *harm*; for the angry man wishes to be felt<sup>i</sup>, to him who bears hatred this matters not; and all things which give pain may be felt; but what does harm in the highest degree, is least capable of being felt, for instance, injustice and folly, for the presence of vice does not at all pain [him to whom it is present]. 5. And anger is attended by pain, hatred is not; for he who is affected by anger is pained, but he who is affected by hatred is not. 6. The former, too, had many ills befallen the object of his anger, might be inclined to pity him; the latter would not, in any case; for the former wishes the object of his anger to suffer in his turn, the latter desires the extinction of the object of his hate<sup>k</sup>. Out of these heads, then, it is plain that the orator may both prove those to be friends and enemies who really are such, and render such, those who are not, and may do away the assertions of people on the subject, and may draw over those who hesitate whether an act was done from motives of anger or hatred, to whatsoever side he may fix on.

32. These heads the orator is to use.

<sup>i</sup> So chap. iii, § 16. It was remarked that a man who is affected by anger does not consider that he has his revenge, unless the object perceive both at whose hands, and in return for what, he suffers. From this, as from many other of its distinctive characteristics, ANGER will be confessed to be a more generous passion than HATRED. To this purpose Lord Bacon well remarks, that "Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh: this is the more generous; for the delight seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent; but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth in the dark." Essays: Of Revenge.

<sup>k</sup> Quem oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius ap. Cic. de Off.

## CHAP. V.

*The nature of Fear, and the objects which excite it, and the dispositions under which men are afraid.*

1. Fear defined.

THE sort of things which men fear, and the persons whom, and under what affections as regards themselves, will thus become plain. Now, let fear be defined to be "A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us." People do not fear every evil<sup>a</sup>; for example, a man does not fear lest he shall become unjust or stupid; but people fear all those evils whose effect is either a considerable degree of pain, or destruction, and these, provided they be not far removed, but give one the idea of being close at hand, so as to be on the eve of happening<sup>b</sup>; for they do not fear that which is very far off: for all know that they shall die; but since the event is not near, they pay no attention to it.

2. Objects which occasion it.

If then fear be this, it must follow that all those things are to be feared which appear to possess great power either of destroying, or of hurting, in points whose tendency is toward considerable pain. On which account even the symptoms of such things are alarming, for the evil appears to be at hand; since this in fact is danger, viz. "the approach of what excites fear."

3. Danger.

Of this description, however, are both the hatred and the anger of those who have it in their power to do us any harm<sup>c</sup>; for it is evident that they have both the

<sup>a</sup> It is essential to that evil which is the object of fear, that it seem qualified to destroy or inflict pain. It must be in fact such an evil as anger would inflict, rather than which hatred would.

<sup>b</sup> This is the description of evil against which the brave man must arm himself, or, in the language of the Ethics, ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα. Eth. Nich. iii, 6.

<sup>c</sup> Compare c. 19, § 19. See Dr. Johnson's motives for suppressing some of Savage's remarks on the great: "What was the result of Mr. S.'s

will and the power, so that they are not far from doing it. Also injustice, possessed of power; for [it is evident that it does not want inclination to do harm] since it is from settled inclination that the unjust man is unjust. Also insulted virtue, invested with power; for it is evident that, invariably, when it is insulted, it determines on a requital, and now it has the power of exacting one. The fear also of those who have the power of doing us any harm, is itself an object to be dreaded; for any one, in such circumstances, will of course be prepared against us.

But as men in general are depraved, and may be prevailed on by gain, and are timid amid dangers; it is, generally speaking, a fearful thing to be at the disposal of another. So that accomplices in any deed of guilt are to be feared, lest either they should denounce you, or abandon you to trial. Also those who have the power to act unjustly, are always objects of fear to such as may be attacked by injustice; for, in nine cases out of ten, a man when he has the power, perpetrates the injustice. Also those who have been wronged<sup>d</sup>, or who conceive themselves to have been wronged; for they are ever on the watch for an opportunity [of retaliating]. Also those who have wronged others<sup>e</sup>, if possessed of power, are to be feared, from their apprehension of being retaliated on; for cases of this kind were laid down to be such as to excite alarm. Those, too,

enquiry, though he was not accustomed to conceal his discoveries, it may not be entirely safe to relate, *because* the persons whose characters he criticised *are powerful*; AND POWER AND RESENTMENT ARE SELDOM STRANGERS," etc. *Life of Savage*, p. 336.

<sup>d</sup> "It is too common for those who have unjustly suffered pain, to inflict it likewise in their turn with the same injustice, and to imagine that they have a right to treat others as they have themselves been treated." *Ibid.* p. 339.

<sup>e</sup> If the maxim of Tacitus be true—"Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem læseris;" then surely Aristotle's position, that they are *to be feared*, will follow as a corollary from it:—

Quem metuunt oderunt,

Quem oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius apud Cic. de Offic.

who are rivals for the same objects, and which it is not possible should accrue to both, for people are ever at variance with those towards whom they stand on this footing. Those who are objects of fear to our superiors, are also objects of fear to ourselves; for much more will they be able to injure us, than our superiors:

10. and for the same reason [we needs must fear those] whom our superiors fear<sup>f</sup>. Men dread those also who have already annihilated persons superior to themselves: and those who have attacked their inferiors; for, either they are *already* deserving fear, or they will
11. become so by being aggrandised in power. And among those who have been wronged, or are enemies, or opponents, it is not the passionate, and those who speak their minds freely, who are to be dreaded; but the mild, the dissembling, and the insidious; for they give us to doubt, whether they be not close upon us, so that they are never clearly known to be too far off to reach us.

The mild and dissembling, etc.: more to be feared than the hasty.

12. Greatest objects of terror.

But all those circumstances which excite fear, have a still greater tendency to do so, in respect of which should a man have committed a mistake, it is not possible for him to recover himself, but which either are impracticable altogether, or which cannot be corrected by himself, but by his enemies only: as have those also which we have no means, or no easy means, of averting. So that, to speak generally, all those things are to be feared, which, happening or being likely to happen in the case of others, excite compassion. The circumstances then of fear, and which men are alarmed at, those at least of greatest importance, are, as I may say, nearly those which I have enumerated: and now let

Fear and pity closely allied.

<sup>f</sup> Victorius, wishing to show that this is not "a distinction without a difference," remarks, that by *φοβερόν*, the term used in the former case, we are to understand persons *evidently* possessed of that which all the world knows to be dreadful: whereas, in the latter case, Aristotle alludes to persons, whose power not being quite so manifest, we fear only because we see those people fear it, whose means of resistance are superior to our own.

me state under what dispositions, as regards themselves, men are susceptible of fear.

Now, if fear be attended by an apprehension of suffering some *destructive* evil, it is plain that none of those who consider that they shall not suffer any thing, is subject to fear; and that no one is subject to it, in regard to those things which he does not consider that he shall suffer; nor in regard to those persons at whose hands he does not apprehend any thing; nor at a time when he is without apprehensions. It must follow, therefore, that those are subject to fear, who apprehend they shall suffer something, and this in regard to the persons at whose hands, and the things which, and at the times when, they so apprehend. But neither <sup>13.</sup> are those who are, and who think themselves to be in the midst of great good fortune, at all apprehensive of suffering any thing, (on which account they are contumelious, contemptuous, and rash; but it is wealth, strength, number of friends, power, which renders men of this temper,) nor those who think that already they have suffered the sum of all that is horrible<sup>g</sup>, and whose feelings have been chilled with respect to what awaits them, just as those who have been already beaten on the rack; but [in order to the existence of fear] there must needs arise some hope of safety, about which men feel the painful anxiety<sup>h</sup>; and this is a

<sup>g</sup> ————— Fuisset ;  
 Quem metui moritura?      Æn. iv, 603.

<sup>h</sup> Thus Seneca;—“ Desines timere, si sperare desieris.” “I have often thought, that after a man has taken the resolution to kill himself, it is not courage in him to do any thing, however desperate, because he has nothing to fear. When a man, either from fear, or pride, or conscience, or whatever motive, has resolved to kill himself; when once the resolution is taken, he has nothing to fear. He may then go and take the king of Prussia by the nose at the head of his army. He cannot fear the rack who is resolved to kill himself. When Eustace Budgell was walking down to the Thames, determined to drown himself, he might if he pleased, without any apprehension of danger, have turned aside and first set fire to St. James’s palace.”—



proof of it, that fear makes men deliberate; and yet no one deliberates about that which is utterly hopeless.

15. So that, when it shall better serve our cause that the audience be affected by fear, we must set them off as persons liable to suffer, inasmuch as others of greater power have suffered, and also to show that their equals are or have been exposed to sufferings; and this, at the hands of persons from whom they would not have apprehended it, and such things, and at times when they would not have apprehended it.

16. Confidence defined.

But since on the subject of fear, it is plain what it is; and on the subject of things exciting fear, and also with what dispositions men experience it; from this it will be plain both what confidence is, and on what points men are confident, and with what dispositions; for both confidence itself is the opposite of fear, and what inspires it is the opposite of what excites fear; so that it is the hope of things conducive to safety, accompanied by an idea that they are near; and of things to be feared, that they either do not exist, or are at a distance.

17. Circumstances that create confidence.

But these are circumstances inspiring confidence; to have danger afar off, and that in which we may confide, near: also means of recovering from, or of averting loss, whether these be numerous, or valuable, or both: again, should we never have been injured, nor have ourselves injured others; also, if we have no rival at all; or should those we have, be devoid of power; or, supposing they have power, should they be our friends; or should they have benefited us, or have been themselves benefited by us: or should those, to whom the same things are an object as to ourselves, be more numerous than those to whom they are not, or more powerful, or both at once.

Boswell's Johnson, A. D. 1773; Æt. 64. Satan, in his address to the sun, says,—

So farewell hope, and with hope farewell *fear*,  
Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost. Par. Lost, lib. iv, 108.

But, as regards themselves, people feel confidence when thus affected: should they conceive themselves to have been often successful, and this without having suffered; or should they often have fallen into danger, and have escaped<sup>1</sup>: for there are two ways in which men become dead to apprehension, either from never having experienced, or from being possessed of resources against calamity; just as, in the case of danger by sea, both those who never experienced a storm feel confidence as to the result, and those who from their experience possess resources against it. Men feel it also, when the case does not alarm their equals, nor their inferiors, nor those to whom they conceive themselves superior; but they conceive thus of those whom, either *absolutely* in their own persons, or, *virtually* in the persons of their superiors or of their equals, they have overcome. And again, if they conceive there belong to themselves, in greater number and degree, those things in which, when they have the advantage, men are objects of fear; and these are, store of wealth, and strength in respect to retainers, and friends, and territory, and warlike preparation, either *all together*, or the *most important* of them. Also, if they have not wronged any one, or not many, or not any of such a character as men are apprehensive of. And, in a word, if their account stands well with heaven, as well in other respects, as in what regards omens and ora-

18. Persons who feel confidence. The successful.

19.

20. The rich, etc.

The innocent.

21.

<sup>1</sup> It is on this topic that Æneas rests his consolation to his distressed followers.

O socii, (neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum,)  
 O passi graviores; dabit Deus his quoque finem.  
 Vos et Scyllæam rabiem penitusque sonantes  
 Adcestis scopulos: vos et Cyclopia saxa  
 Experti. Æn. i, 198.

So Lord Byron in the Giaour:

Though far and near the bullets hiss,  
 I've scap'd a bloodier hour than this.

cles<sup>k</sup>: because anger is a thing which inspires confidence; and the being free from the commission of injustice, while you are wronged yourself, is productive of anger; and the deity is supposed to aid such as have been wronged. [Once more, people feel confidence] when, being the first aggressors, they think they can suffer nothing, or shall not, or shall succeed at last. And of the subject of what inspires confidence and fear, we have spoken.

22. Such as think themselves secure.

#### CHAP. VI.

*Touching what points men are alive to, or insensible to, Delicacy of Feeling; towards whom; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.*

1. THE points about which men feel delicate, or are insensible to such feelings, and towards whom, and with what dispositions, will be manifest from what follows. Now, let sense of shame be defined to be "a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of character." And impudence to be, "a sort of neglect and callousness about these points."
2. Definition of shame; of impudence. Now, if the sensibility defined be actually sensibility to shame, it must follow that a man is affected by it, on the occurrence of evils of a kind which appear to be disgraceful, either to himself, or those for whom he has a regard: and such are all results of depravity whatsoever; for example, the casting away one's shield, or the turning to flight, for this proceeds from cowardice;
3. The occasions when shame is felt. Cowardice.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle is here giving us the reasons why the two last-mentioned descriptions of persons are confident: those who never injured any, because it is natural to them to feel anger, which is in itself a source of confidence; and those who are well with heaven, from their reliance on the protection of the gods. The last case is beautifully exemplified in the confidence felt by Nicias in Sicily.

and the withholding *a deposit*<sup>1</sup> from a person, for it is the result of injustice. And that cohabitation with 4. those with whom we ought not or where, or when we ought not, [is a source of shame;] for it is the result of Intemper-  
 intemperance: as is also the deriving gain from paltry, <sup>5.</sup> mean, or impracticable sources, as from the poor, for Meanness.  
 instance, or from the dead; whence also the proverb, “to pillage even from the dead:” for it is the result of a sordid hankering after lucre, and of meanness. It is 6. also a source of shame for a person, who has the means, not to contribute his aid in money matters, or to do so in a minor degree; and for one to be assisted by those in less easy circumstances than himself; and for one to 7. borrow himself, when his friend appears to be asking a loan; and to ask a further loan, when he would recal a former; and the recalling a former loan when he asks another; and the praising a thing to such a degree as to seem to ask for it; and the persisting no less, though often foiled; for these are all indications of meanness. And the praising a person in his presence 8. Adula-  
 is a token of adulation; and the praising a man’s good tion.  
 points, while you slur over his failings; or, when one is grieved, the exhibiting grief in an inordinate degree, and whatever other conduct is of a similar kind, [is a source of shame,] because it manifests adulation. [It 9. is also shameful] not to sustain toils which those who are advanced in years, or who live delicately, or who are of higher rank, or, in a word, which they sustain whose strength is inferior to your own; because all these are indications of effeminacy: and so it is to be 10. benefited by another, and that frequently; or, to reproach a person with his obligations to you; for they are all indications of a mean and abject spirit. Again, 11. Vanity.

<sup>1</sup> Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia vates:  
 Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret  
 Depositum retinere, etc. Juv. xiii, 139.

See the account of the deposit left by a Milesian with Glaucus the son of Epiccydes. Herodot. vi, 86.

- to talk about one's self, and to be one's own trumpeter; and to assert that to be one's own which belongs to another; for these are indications of arrogance. In the same way, too, in the several other instances of moral depravity, both their results, their indications, and the like attendant circumstances are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful, and make one
12. ashamed. And to the afore-mentioned we may add, the non-participation in those creditable qualities which either every body, or all our equals, or the greatest part of them, partake of. By equals I mean, fellow countrymen, citizens, those of the same age, relations; in a word, those with whom we are on an equality; for, [when a thing is so general] the non-participation in it begins to be disgraceful; for instance, the not having been educated<sup>m</sup>, at least in a certain degree, and so in the case of other deficiencies; but the disgrace of all these things becomes much greater, should they appear to be wanting by *our own* fault; for thus, they are more properly the result of depravity should one be himself the cause of what has attached to him, or does
13. now, or is likely so to attach. Again, men are sensible to feelings of shame, when they are suffering, have suffered, or are about to suffer any thing of such a nature, as tends to loss of respect, and disgrace: and these are all services consisting in the lending one's self either personally, or in any shameful action where there is an idea of suffering insult: and whatever administers to intemperance, whether it be voluntary, or not: and submission to violence, if involuntary; for such submission, without defending one's self, proceeds from an

<sup>m</sup> It was by a somewhat similar consideration that Dr. Johnson refuted the argument of those who opposed the education of the poor on the ground of its raising their ideas above their sphere of life. "If," said he, "a few only are educated, it is a distinction, and those few may be proud; if it be general, it ceases to be a distinction, and, of course, to be a ground of pride. And the contrary will be the result; for instead of its being ground of *pride* that a man has been educated, it will be matter of *shame* if he has not." Boswell's Life.

unmanly character, and from cowardice. These then, and the like to these, are the things about which men are sensible of shame.

But as the sense of shame is an idea entertained of loss of character; and of this loss, in itself alone, without reference to its consequences; and as no one regards the opinion, except for the sake of those who hold it; it must follow that a man is thus sensible in regard to those for whom he has an esteem. But he will have an esteem for those who admire him, and whom he does himself admire, and by whom he wishes to be admired, and in regard to whom he feels emulation, and whose opinion he does not hold cheap. Now, people wish to be admired by, and do themselves admire, all those who possess any of those goods which are valued; or from whom they happen to be very much in want of getting something of which they have the disposal; for instance, those who are in love. But people have their emulation excited, in reference to their equals; and they hold in consideration the prudent<sup>n</sup>, as being men who adhere to truth; of this description are men of education, and such as are advanced in years. Also actions done in the eyes of the world and in public [excite our shame], and hence the proverb, that "Shame dwells in the eyes." On this account, people are more sensible of shame before those with whom they are always likely to be present, and those who fix their attention on them, for both these are instances of being before the eyes of persons:—again, they are sensible of it before those who are not open to charges on the same points; for their sentiments, it is evident, are the opposite of their own: before those also who do not make allowances for such as appear to be faulty; for errors which a man com-

14. Persons in whose presence men feel shame.

Whom they esteem.  
15.

16. Admire.

17. Their equals.

18. Those with whom they must live.

19. The innocent.

<sup>n</sup> Οἱ φρόνιμοι, more properly, *men of the world*. Such a character Cicero seems to have had in view, according to Victorius, when he says, "qui est versatus in rebus, vel usu, quem ætas denique affert, vel auditione et cogitatione, quæ studio et diligentia præcurrit ætatem." Cic. de Orat. ii, 30.

mits *himself*, these he is said not to take amiss in his neighbours; so that he evidently will take amiss such as he does *not* commit himself: and before those who are fond of divulging what they know to the world; for whether a man does not think one's conduct faulty, or does not divulge it, makes no difference. But persons likely to divulge [what they know to one's discredit] are such as have been injured, from their being anxiously on the watch to retaliate; and those who are slanderers *generally*; for if they speak ill even of those who are not culpable, much more will they of those who are: as are also those who are on the look out for the errors of their neighbours, for instance, jesters, and the poets of the old comedy; for these are in some sense slanderers, and fond of divulging. Again, [men are sensible of shame] before those with whom they never met with a repulse; for they are disposed towards them as admirers. On which account men have a sense of shame, even towards those who ask any thing for the first time, as having never yet forfeited their good opinion in any points. And of this description are both those who have *lately* sought to be our friends, for they have observed our excellent qualities; and hence, the reply of Euripides to the Syracusans is a good one<sup>o</sup>; and, of our *old acquaintances*, those who know no ill of us. And men are sensible of shame not only about the things themselves which have been mentioned as delicate points, but even about the indications of them; for instance, not only about licentious conduct, but also about all indications of it; not only in doing what is disgraceful, but even in mentioning it<sup>p</sup>. And in the same way

<sup>o</sup> It appears that Euripides had been sent to Sicily as ambassador, but finding the Syracusans inclined to reject his proposals for a peace, he told them, "that they surely ought to have some respect for a people who held them in such high consideration, particularly as this was their first request."

<sup>p</sup> Quod factu factum est, idem est et dictu turpe.

Ὁὐ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔσθ' ἂ μηδὲ ἐρῶν καλόν. Sophoc. Œd. Tyr. 1409.

they are sensible of shame, not only before those who have been mentioned, but before those also who will be likely to disclose their conduct to them, as for instance, their servants or their friends. In brief, however, people are not at all sensible of shame before those whose opinions, in regard to their justness, they hold cheap; for no one feels shame before children and brutes: nor do men feel it about the same points when before acquaintances, as before strangers; but when before acquaintances they feel it on points *really* shameful<sup>a</sup>; but before strangers on matters merely sanctioned by custom.

As regards themselves, men would be likely to be sensible of shame under these dispositions; first, if there should really exist any so affected towards themselves, as I described those to be, in regard to whom they feel shame. And these were either those whom they hold in admiration, or by whom themselves are held in admiration, or by whom they are desirous of being admired, or of whom they are petitioning something which they will not be likely to get, if not men of character. And if these be either actual spectators, (just as, on the question of the allotment of Samos to colonists, Cydias introduced in his harangue to the *ecclesia*; for he put it to the Athenians to imagine that the Greeks were standing round as *actual spectators*, and not as mere *future hearers*, of the decree which they might pass); or should persons of this description be near, or be likely *soon* to be aware of their conduct: and on this account persons in misfortune, do not wish even to be seen by those who once deemed them happy; for they who thus deem of us are admirers. And when they have attached to them what throws discredit on the conduct and the actions, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or any others with

Servants.  
23.

24. How  
affected  
men feel  
shame.

When the  
world is  
looking on.

25. When  
discredit  
may attach.

<sup>a</sup> He told us above (chap. iv, § 23), that those people were usually regarded as friends "before whom we feel no delicacy on matters of mere opinion, though far from disregarding their opinions."



whom in any way they are closely connected; and, in one word, all in whose behalf they are sensible of shame; and these are the above-mentioned, and those who stand in any relation to them, whose tutors or advisers they have been<sup>r</sup>. And if there be others, their equals, with whom they are at rivalry; for, from a feeling of shame, on account of persons of this description, men both do and leave undone very many things. Again, when people are likely to be seen, and openly to be engaged before those who are privy [to their disgrace], they become in a higher degree susceptible of shame. And hence the poet Antiphon, just as he was going to be beaten on the rack by Dionysius, observing those who were about to be executed with him muffling themselves up as they went through the gate, said, "Why do you muffle yourselves up;—is it lest any of these present should see you to-morrow?"

26. With their equals.

27. When openly disgraced.

Thus much then on the subject of the sense of shame; but of insensibility to it, we shall evidently know enough from the contraries.

#### CHAP. VII.

*Those towards whom people feel Gratitude; on what occasions; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.*

1. THE persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and the occasions on which, and with what dispositions on

<sup>r</sup> The Stoics had observed this feeling of carrying our views onward to posthumous glory; and found the love of glory the most difficult of all passions to eradicate:—*διὸ καὶ ἔσχατος λέγεται τῶν παθῶν χιτῶν ἢ φιλοδοξία, διότι τῶν ἄλλων πολλακίς δι' αὐτήν ἀποδυσμένων αὐτὴ προσίσχεται τῇ ψυχῇ*. Simplicius in Comm. ad Epicteti, cap. 48. Tacitus, in speaking of the great love of fame manifested by Helvidius Priscus, justifies him, by observing that *Etiam sapientibus cupido gloriæ novissima eruitur*. Hist. iv, 6. A mode of expression which strongly brings to our recollection the passage in Milton's *Lycidas*,

Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise,  
That last infirmity of noble mind. *Lycid.* 70.

their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous benevolence. Now, let gratuitous benevolence<sup>s</sup> be “that conformably to which, he who has the power is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for any thing, nor in order that any thing may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object.” But it becomes great should it be conferred on one who is in extreme want<sup>t</sup>, or if the boon be great and difficult of attainment, or at a crisis of a certain description, or if the giver has bestowed it *alone*, or *first*, or in a *greater* degree than any other. Wants are however our de-<sup>3.</sup>sires of these; such particularly as are attended by pain on failing of their objects; and of this description are our lusts, as for instance, love. Again, such as arise in the suffering of the body, and in danger; for both the man who is exposed to danger, and who suffers pain, is anxious for something. On which account, those who stand by us in poverty and banishment, should they confer even trifling benefits, will yet have gratified us by reason of the greatness of our need, and the circumstances of the time; take the instance of him who gave but a mat [to a beggar] in the Lycæum. It is necessary, then, that our obligation have<sup>4.</sup> reference, if possible, by all means to some case of this sort, but if not, to some one of equal or greater need. So that, as it is evident both when, and in what cases, an act of free benevolence takes place, and how the parties are affected, it is plain that out of these principles we must get up our speech, showing that, as regards the one party, they were or are exposed to pain, or want of this description, and as regards the other, that in such their want they assisted them by administering some boon of this description.

2. Definition of χάρις.

<sup>s</sup> This chapter presents considerable difficulty from the double meaning of which the word χάρις is capable. See Schrader's Note, Animadv.

<sup>t</sup> Hence the value of the aid sent by the Athenians to the Lacedæmonians, when the Helots had possessed themselves of Ithome.

5. How the orator must invest the audience with grateful feelings, or otherwise.

And it is also evident, by recurring to what topics we may do away the obligation, and make our audience insensible of grateful feelings<sup>u</sup>; for either we may urge that they are or were assisting them for their own sakes, and this was supposed not to be free benevolence; or are doing so just because it fell out by chance, or because they were compelled to do so; or that they paid back a debt, but did not bestow a gift, and this as well as if the party was conscious of his having been so indebted, as if he was not; because there is in both cases the idea of a *quid pro quo*; so that neither on this view of the case will any gratitude be felt. We should also examine the point under all the predicaments; for free benevolence stands in this, either that that particular thing was given, or in such quantity, or of such a quality, or as to the time when, or the place where, it was given. And we may adduce it as a sign to suit this purpose, if the parties in question have refused a less favour; and if they have conferred on an enemy either the same favour, or an equal one, or a greater; for then it will be evident that they did it not for our sakes. Or, if he wittingly has given something paltry<sup>x</sup>; for no one acknowledges that he stands in need of what is paltry.

And now have my sentiments respecting benevolence, and the want of it, been explained.

<sup>u</sup> The ease with which impressions of gratitude might be effaced, appears to have been fully conceived by that French statesman, who said, when he granted a favour, "*J'ai fait dix mécontents, et un ingrat.*"

<sup>x</sup> Horace sneers at this kind of liberality.

— Quo more pyris vesci Calaber jubet hospes,  
 Tu me fecisti locupletem.—Vescere sodes.—  
 Jam satis est.—At tu quantum vis tolle.—Benigne.—  
 Non invisā feres pueris munuscula parvis.—  
 Tam teneor dono, quam si dimittar onustus.—  
 Ut libet: hæc porcis hodie comedenda relinquis."

Ep. lib. i, 7, 14.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of Pity.*

LET us explain the circumstances which excite pity; 1. and the persons whom men pity; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions. Now let pity be defined to be<sup>a</sup>, “a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying<sup>b</sup>, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure<sup>c</sup>, or that some one connected with him will; and this when it appears near: for it evidently is necessary that a person likely to feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of *such a description* as has been stated in the definition, or one similar to it, or nearly equivalent to it<sup>d</sup>. On which account neither do those who are absolutely lost, feel pity; for

2. Definition of pity.

3. Persons who feel pity,

<sup>a</sup> Grief for the calamity of another is *PITY*; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore it is called also *compassion*, and, in the phrase of the present time, a *fellow-feeling*: and therefore, for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those men hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. Hobbes's *Leviathan*. See Rochefoucault's *Maxims*, No. 342, where the above is quoted in the note.

<sup>b</sup> The evil in the case of pity is of the same character as was stated to be object of fear. In fact, whatever when befalling another excites *pity*, in one's own case excites *fear*. Vid. chap. v, § 12.

<sup>c</sup> It is on this principle that, in the *Poetics*, describing the character best adapted to the purposes of tragedy, and in whose sufferings we shall be most likely to take an interest, he excludes an absolutely vicious character;—*ἀτραγυφτότατον γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι πάντων οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ οὔτε γὰρ φιλόανθρωπον, οὔτε ἐλεεινόν, οὔτε φοβερόν ἐστι.* And a little after he gives the reason of this:—*ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον*, § 25.

<sup>d</sup> Perhaps the whole germ of Aristotle's doctrine on this subject may be traced, however briefly expressed, in the celebrated sentence of Terence, “*Homo sum; humani nihil à me alienum puto.*”

these think they shall no longer be exposed to suffering, for their sufferings are past; nor those who esteem themselves excessively happy, but these wax insolent; for evidently, if they esteem every good to be realised to them, they also esteem their lot to be incapable of suffering any evil; since this also enters into the number of goods. But of this description, viz. such as to think they may yet suffer evil, are both who already have suffered and escaped<sup>e</sup>; and those advanced in years, as well by reason of their prudence, as of their experience: and the weak; and those who are rather timid; and men of education, for these calculate life's contingencies aright; and those to whom belong parents<sup>f</sup>, or children, or wives, for these attach to one's self, and are liable to suffer the above-mentioned evils. Those do not feel pity who are under the excitements of courage, for instance, under anger or confidence; for these feelings little calculate the future: nor do those feel pity who are under insolent dispositions<sup>g</sup>; for these persons also calculate little of suffering any thing: but those who are of the mean temperament between these are susceptible of pity: and those again are not susceptible of it who are vehemently affected by fear; for such as are horror-struck do not feel pity<sup>h</sup>, by reason of its being akin to an evil which comes home to themselves. Also people are susceptible of pity, should

6. and do not feel pity.

<sup>e</sup> So Dido, "Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco."

<sup>f</sup> Exemplified in Priam's appeal to Achilles:

Μνησαί πατρός σεΐο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,  
Τηλίκου, ὡσπερ ἔγων, κ. τ. λ. Π. xxiv, 486.

<sup>g</sup> Sophocles, Œd. Tyr. 873:—ὑβρις φυτεύει τύραννον. With the same view of human nature Aristotle, when he says that persons affected by pleasure are disposed to placability, qualified his expression by the exclusion of wanton insolence;—οἱ ἐν ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ, καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ· cap. iii, § 12.

<sup>h</sup> Lear, Act v, sc. iii:

This judgment of the heavens, which makes us tremble,  
Touches us not with pity.

they esteem some persons to be good; for he who esteems no one to be such<sup>i</sup>, will think every one deserving of evil. And in a word, every one, when he is so affected as to call to his recollection the fact, that evils of such a character have befallen either him or his, or to apprehend that they may befall either him or his. And now it has been stated with what dispositions men feel pity.

The circumstances which excite their pity will be evident from the definition: for whatever things, of the number of those which cause pain and anguish, have a tendency to destroy, are all such as to cause pity: again, every thing whose tendency is utter abolition; also all those evils which involve the quality of greatness, and of which chance is the cause<sup>k</sup>. But the evils whose characteristic is great anguish and destruction, are as follows: death, assaults, personal injuries, and age, and sickness, and want of food. And the evils of which chance is the cause, are, absolute want, or fewness of friends, (on which account even the being torn from friends and familiars is a circumstance to be pitied,) ugliness, infirmity, deformity, and the circumstance that some evil befalls one from a source whence it were becoming for some good to have arisen; and the frequent occurrence of a similar thing: and the accession of some good, when one has already passed his sufferings; as for example, the gifts of the king were sent down to Diopithes after he was dead<sup>l</sup>; and the fact either that no good has accrued, or of there being no enjoyment of it when it has arrived. These, then,

8. Circumstances which excite pity.

9.

10.

11

<sup>i</sup> Thus the old, from their experience of the depravity of man, are less susceptible of pity than the young, whose inexperience judges well of human nature. See chapters xii and xiii.

<sup>k</sup> For chance in a great measure excludes the idea of the person's deserving the evil he suffers.

<sup>l</sup> In the last act of *The Gamester* there is a fine illustration of this; where Beverley hears of his succession to the inheritance just as he has drunk poison.

and the like, are the circumstances on account of which men feel pity.

12. Persons to be pitied.

But people are sensible of pity toward their acquaintances, if they be not of extremely close connection, but about such they feel just as they do about themselves when on the eve of suffering: and on this account Amasis<sup>m</sup>, as they say, did not shed a tear over his *son* when he was being led to execution, but he did over his *friend* who was asking an alms; for this was a circumstance to call for pity; the other, to excite horror. For horror is distinct from pity, and has a tendency to expel pity from the breast, and is frequently available to produce a contrary effect<sup>n</sup>. Still

Horror is distinct from pity.

13. men feel pity while the evil is yet approaching. And they feel it towards their equals, whether in age, in temper, in habits, in rank, or in family; for in all these relations, the evil is seen with greater clearness as possible to befall also one's self. For we must here also assume generally, that whatever people *fear* in their own case, that they *pity* as happening in the case of others. But as the disasters which excite pity always appear to be close at hand, while, as to those removed at the distance of ten thousand years, men neither in the expectation of them, if *future*, nor in the remembrance of them, if *past*, are sensible of pity at all, or at least not in an equal degree; this being the case, it must follow that those characters which are got up with the aid of gesture, and voice, and dress, and of

<sup>m</sup> Perhaps Aristotle quoted from memory; and it is not improbable that he may have been mistaken as to the person to whom he attributes this conduct, since Herodotus relates the story, not of Amasis, but of his son Psammenitus; who remarks, in perfect accordance with the principles of the philosopher, τὰ μὲν οἰκίηια—μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν, Herod. iii, 14. See the conduct of Gelimer, the Vandal king of Africa, who burst into laughter at his interview with Belisarius after the loss of his kingdom and liberty. Gibbon, Dec. and Fall, chap. 41, note 31.

<sup>n</sup> On this principle is founded one of his criteria of excess of criminality, viz. if the recital of its effects produce fear instead of pity;—ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον, ἢ ἐλεοῦσι, μεῖζον, lib. i, c. xiv, § 5.

acting, generally have the greater effect in producing pity°. For thus, by setting the evil before our eyes, as either being on the eve of taking place, or as having happened, men make it appear to be close at hand. Likewise things which have just taken place, or quickly 15. about to do so, have on this very account a greater tendency to excite pity. Also the indications and actions 16. of persons; for instance, the garments<sup>p</sup> of those who have suffered, and other things of that sort. And the expressions of those under suffering, for instance, of those already in act of dying. And especially is it a circumstance to move pity, that while in these crises the persons have borne themselves virtuously<sup>q</sup>. For all these circumstances produce pity in a higher degree from its appearing *near*; also, the fact of the person's being *unworthy*, and his disaster appearing in view before our eyes.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of Indignation.*

To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at undeserved *misfortune*, is opposed in a certain way the feel- 1. Indig- nation op- posed to pity.

° Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀψέως γίνεσθαι, Poet. § 27. See a very pleasant paper of Addison's on this subject, Spectator, No. 42. "We know the effect of the skull and black hangings in *The Fair Penitent*, the scaffold in *Venice Preserved*, the tomb in *Romeo and Juliet*," etc. Twining.

<sup>p</sup> Witness the effect of Antony's display of the robe of Cæsar stained with his blood. Julius Cæsar.

<sup>q</sup> Illustrated in the effect produced by Polyxena's resignation and anxiety to preserve, even in death, the decorum of female delicacy:—

ἡ δὲ καὶ θνήσκουσ', ὄμωσ  
πολλὴν πρόνοιαν εἶχεν εὐσχήμωσ πεσεῖν,  
κρύπτουσ', ἃ κρύπτειν ὄμματ' ἀρσένων χρεῶν.

Eurip. *Hecuba*, 563.



Definition  
of it.

ing pain at undeserved *good fortune*, and it originates in the same disposition; and these feelings are both

2. those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathise with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate; for whatever happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute even of the gods<sup>a</sup>. It should

3. Envy  
opposed to  
pity.

seem, too, that envy stands opposed to pity in the same way, as *appearing* to be akin to, and in fact the same thing as, indignation; and yet it *really* is distinct.

Definition  
of it.

For envy is also a pain causing agitation, *it* also is felt at good fortune, not, however, at the good fortune of the *undeserving* [only], but of equals and fellows<sup>b</sup>. The feeling, however, in all cases equally [of envy and of indignation], must exist [in the breasts of those affected by it], not because any difference will be likely to accrue to themselves, but on account of their neighbour, solely as regards himself. For no longer will the one feeling be envy, and the other indignation, but fear, should the pain and agitation exist on this account, viz. because some evil will probably result to *themselves* from the good fortune of the other.

4. Opposite  
feelings are  
consequent  
on these  
emotions.

But it is plain that opposite feelings will be consequent on these passions: for he who feels *pain* at those who are *undeservedly* unfortunate, will feel *pleasure*, or at least be *unaffected* by pain, at those who are unfor-

<sup>a</sup> Thus Herodotus attributes the turn in the fortunes of Cræsus to his having incurred the divine indignation:—Μετὰ Σόλωνα οίχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἐωῦτόν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον. Herodotus, i, 34.

<sup>b</sup> The envious and indignant have this in common, viz. the good fortune of their neighbour, as the object of their respective passions; and the absence of any apprehension as to the degree in which their own circumstances may be affected by such good fortune; for the moment they begin to calculate the probability of any detriment arising to themselves therefrom, the feeling, ceasing to be any longer envy or indignation, will have become fear.

fortunate *under different circumstances*<sup>c</sup>: for instance, no good man would feel pain about parricides and murderers when they meet with punishment; since we *ought* to feel joy at such occurrences; and so in the case of those who are deservedly fortunate; for both are instances of justice, and cause the good man to rejoice, since it must be that he has a hope that what has been realised to his equal, will be realised also to himself, and these are all feelings of the same disposition; and their opposites, of the opposite dispositions. Since the same man who exults in misfortune<sup>d</sup> is also envious; for any who feels pain at the accession and acquisition of any good, that person necessarily must rejoice when that good is in act of being withdrawn and lost. On which account these feelings are all of them obstacles to pity; but, among themselves, they differ for the foregoing reasons, so that all are alike available with a view to render a thing not an object of pity.

5. Both are useful to repress pity.

On the subject of indignation, then, let us first state who the persons are with whom men feel indignant, the occasions on which, and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions; then, after these, of other points. But the subject will be plain from what has already been said; for if indignation be a feeling pain on a man's appearing to be *undeservedly* fortunate, it will be evident in the first place that it is not possible

6. Persons who excite indignation.

<sup>c</sup> That is, *deservedly*.

<sup>d</sup> 'Επιχαιρεκακία, or, in the language of the "Ethica Magna," χαιρεκακία, is one of the extremes between which νέμεσις is said to exist: the other extreme is φθονερία, an aptitude to feelings of envy. Speaking of the "great power and force" of the Greek language, a late translator of the Agamemnon of Æschylus remarks, that "One word would sometimes require for its translation a whole sentence of modern language; as, for instance, 'Επιχαιρεκακία, a disposition to feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others; which makes a sentence, and constitutes a maxim in Rochefoucault, "Il y a toujours dans le malheur d'autrui quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas;" and adds in a note, that Lord Bacon (Essays) has beautifully touched on this disposition: "There is a natural malignity; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others." Preface to Symmon's translation of the Agamemnon.

8. Not such as have moral advantages, but those of fortune. to feel indignation in the case of *every* good. For there is no one who, if another be just, or brave, or shall make acquisitions of virtue, will feel indignation at that other; for neither is pity felt at the contraries of these qualities<sup>e</sup>: but it is about wealth and power and the like possessions [that people feel indignant], and in a word, about all those things of which the good are deserving, and such as are *naturally* possessed of advantages; as, for example, of high birth, of beauty,
9. and advantages of that description. But as what is ancient seems, in a certain sense, akin to what is natural, it must follow, that men are indignant, in a greater degree, at those who possess the very same good, if they be *recently* possessed of it, and are by its means in good circumstances, [than with those who have long possessed it]. For those who have recently become rich give greater pain than those who have long been rich, and by right of birth. And, in the same way, persons in office, and men of power, and possessed of numerous friends, and of good children, and any good of this description; and likewise if, through the instrumentality of these, there should accrue to them any further good: here, too, those of recent wealth, who by means of their wealth get into office, give greater pain than those who have been wealthy of old. And in a similar manner in the case of the others. But the reason of this is, that while the one sort appear to possess what is *their own*, the others do not; for that which appears ever to have held this rank, seems to involve an idea of truth; insomuch that the others seem to possess what does not belong to them. And as, of the goods, each does not become any one who
10. They seem to possess what they have no right to.
11. Such as have any good incongruously.

<sup>e</sup> Pity is not felt at the *absence* of these qualities from any one, because they cannot be absent without being deservedly so; and it is essential to pity that its object be *undeservedly* exposed to that inconvenience which he suffers; on the other hand, indignation cannot be felt at their *presence*, because it is the distinguishing feature of moral advantages that they cannot be possessed, without being deserved.

may accidentally present himself, but there is a certain proportion and idea of adaptation; for example, splendour in respect of armour, is not adapted to a man whose virtue is justice, but to him who possesses courage; and splendid marriage feasts are not adapted to those of recent wealth, but to those of high birth: therefore if any one, though he may be a good man, meet with a possession which is not adapted to him, we should feel indignant; as also with an inferior who disputes with his superior; and particularly if he does so on the very points in which he is inferior. Whence also this was remarked by Homer: "He missed engaging with Ajax the son of Telamon; for Jupiter was *indignant* because he was fain to engage a hero his superior<sup>f</sup>." But, if it be not on the *same* grounds, we

Such as compare two objects which admit not of comparison.

feel indignant if an inferior challenge a superior, even on any grounds; for instance, if a musician were to dispute with a just man, for justice is superior to music. The persons then with whom, and the reasons why men feel indignant will be evident from this; for they are these or others of the same description.

As regards themselves, men have a tendency to indignation, if they deserve and have acquired the highest goods; for the circumstance of those not their equals being thought worthy of equal advantages, is not just. Next, they feel it, if they chance to be good and excellent persons; for they both judge aright, and hate what is unjust. Again, if they be ambitious and desirous of certain objects, and especially should they be ambitious about those things which others who are undeserving obtain. And those, in a word, who think themselves worthy those things, of which they do not esteem *others* worthy, are apt to feel indignant at those others, and about those very objects. On which account slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition, are not liable to feelings of indignation, since

12. Men likely to feel indignation.

13.

14. The ambitious.

15.

<sup>f</sup> The remark is made of Cebriones, II. ii, v, 542; where, however, the second line quoted by Aristotle does not occur.

16. On what occasions men feel indignant.

there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. And from this it is evident on what occasions of misfortunes, or ill luck, or failure of success, persons ought to rejoice, or at least to be unaffected by pain; for, from what has been stated, the contraries will be evident. So that should the speech have wrought up the judges into this disposition, and should it have shown that those who claim to be pitied, and that the circumstances under which they claim it, are undeserving pity, and really deserving not to gain it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Envy.*

1. Envy. **IT** is plain also on what occasions, with whom, and with what dispositions men feel envy, if in truth envy be "a sort of pain at apparent good fortune, touching the above-mentioned goods<sup>a</sup>, in the case of equals, not in order that any thing may happen to one's self, and simply on account of their [being thus fortunate]:" for those who have, or seem to have equals, will be the
2. people to be envious. I mean by equals, those who are like in circumstances of birth, connections, age, habits, character, and property. They, too, will be envious who fall but little short of possessing all<sup>b</sup>: hence those who are carrying on mighty projects, and those who are prosperous, are envious; for they think that
- Men likely to feel envy are: those within a little of the summit.

<sup>a</sup> See § 7 and 8 of the last chapter, where he excludes moral excellence from the number of the goods which excite indignation; and in justification of their exclusion *in that place* it may be observed, that the simple fact of their being possessed is proof of their being deserved. And their exclusion from the subjects of *envy* may be justified by the consideration that the envious will, in general, esteem moral excellence scarcely worth troubling themselves about.

<sup>b</sup> See the parable of the ewe lamb, addressed by Nathan to David.

every one is carrying off what belongs to them. Again, <sup>3.</sup> those who are remarkably esteemed on any account, and particularly on account of their wisdom or happiness. And those who are ambitious are more given <sup>The ambitious.</sup> to envy than those who are devoid of ambition. And those who make a show of wisdom, for they are am- <sup>The wise.</sup> bitious on the score of wisdom. And, in a word, those who in any respect are ambitious of glory are given to envy in that respect. And the narrow-minded; for, <sup>The narrow-minded.</sup> to them, every thing appears of consequence.

The goods respecting which men feel envy have been told you; for all those things whatsoever, about which men are eager for praise, and ambitious, whether they be productions or acquisitions, and respecting which they are desirous of renown, and all cases of good luck; about all these nearly is envy felt; and particularly about such of them as the individuals are themselves desirous of, or think they ought themselves to possess, or those things in the possession of which they are themselves superior, or deficient in a trifling degree.

Again, it is evident with whom men are envious; for <sup>5. Men likely to be envied.</sup> this has been already stated in connection [with what has gone before]; since men envy those who come near them in time, and place, and age, and character; <sup>Equals.</sup> whence the saying, "kindred too is conscious of envy<sup>c</sup>." Men also envy those with whom they are at rivalry; <sup>Rivals.</sup> for they are rivals of those above-mentioned; but of those who existed ten thousand years back, or who may live ten thousand years hence, or who are already dead, of these no one is the rival; nor again of those who live at the Pillars of Hercules<sup>d</sup>; nor of those of

<sup>c</sup> This apophthegm should seem to justify the caution of Cleobulus,—  
Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος τίνα δεῖ μάλιστα φυλάττεσθαι;  
εἶπεν, τῶν μὲν φίλων τὸν φθόνον, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. Sto-  
bæus.

<sup>d</sup> Πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ ποδῶν, φθόνος οὐδεὶς φύεται. Philo. Hooker, v, § 2,  
p. 26.

whom, in the opinions either of themselves or of others, they are greatly the inferiors; nor again of those to whom they conceive themselves to be in a great degree superior; with the like indifference do they regard those [at all engaged] in pursuits of this description.

6. And as men are affected by ambition in regard to rivals, and competitors, and all, in a word, who are eager after the same objects, it must follow that they envy these in an especial manner; whence the saying, "potter *envies* potter." And those who either succeed with *difficulty*, or do not succeed at all, envy those who succeed *quickly*. Again, they envy those whose acquisitions and success are a reproach to themselves, and these are those who are near them, or their equals; for it becomes evident that they do themselves fail of success through their own fault, so that this, 9. galling them, produces envy. And those who either possess or have acquired that which it would become themselves to possess, or which themselves had at one time acquired; at least the old, on this account, envy 10. the young. And those who have been at considerable expense on an object, envy those who have expended 11. little on the same object. But it is evident both with whom, and on what occasions, and with what dispositions people of this sort feel pleasure; for they will be delighted, having in the contrary circumstances that very temper, the which being without, they are pained. So that if the judges themselves shall have been wrought up into this disposition, while those who lay claim to our pity or to the acquisition of some good, are such as have been described, it is evident that they will not obtain pity at the hands of those on whom they depend for it.

7. The successful.

8. Those whose success is a tacit reproach to us.

The orator by exciting envy will remove pity.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of Emulation.*

HENCE likewise it will be evident both with what dis-  
 positions, and in regard to what objects, and of whom,  
 persons are emulous. Because if emulation be "a sort  
 of pain at the apparent<sup>a</sup> presence of goods which are  
 held in honour, and which admit of one's gaining them  
 himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt,  
 not because they are present to *another*, but because  
 they are *not likewise* present to one's self," (on which  
 very account emulation is a virtuous feeling, and be-  
 longs to virtuous people, whereas envy is a depraved  
 feeling, and belongs to persons who are depraved: for  
 the one, by motion of his emulation, sets himself to  
 acquire the good; while the other, by motion of his  
 envy, sets himself to cause the dispossession of his  
 neighbour). It must be, then, that persons who deem  
 themselves worthy of goods which they do not possess,  
 are apt to feel emulation; since no one arrogates to  
 himself that which appears impossible: and hence the  
 young, and the high-spirited are thus affected; and  
 also those to whom belong goods of such a description  
 as to be worth the attention of men in repute; these  
 are wealth, number of friends, office, and whatever  
 other goods are of this kind; for men feel emulous of  
 such goods; as though, because they properly belong  
 to such as are men of virtuous dispositions, it were  
 matter of absolute right that themselves should be vir-  
 tuous. Again, those are emulous whom others esteem  
 worthy of such goods: and those again whose ances-

1. Emula-  
tion.Its Defini-  
tion.It is a vir-  
tuous emo-  
tion.Persons  
likely to  
feel emula-  
tion.The young  
and high-  
spirited.2. Those  
whom  
others es-  
teem.

<sup>a</sup> The merely *apparent* presence of this description of goods is sufficient to excite emulation. The character of the goods which this passion has as its object is entirely different from that which excites envy and indignation.



3. Whose ancestry or relations are worthy.

tors, or relations, or intimate friends, or whose tribe or city is held in esteem about any point, such persons are apt to feel emulation on that point; for they think they belong properly to them, and that themselves are worthy of them.

4. Things which are objects of emulation. Virtues.

But if those goods are matter of emulation which are held in esteem, it must of course follow that the *virtues* are of this description; and whatever things have a tendency to aid and benefit others; since people honour *virtuous* people, and those who *benefit* them: likewise that all goods whatsoever, the enjoyment of which accrues to one's neighbours, are of this sort; for instance, wealth, and beauty, rather than health.

Goods.

Wealth, etc.

5. Persons who are objects of emulation.

And it will also be evident who the persons are who are objects of emulation; since they who possess these, and the like goods, become objects of emulation; these goods are such as have been mentioned, for example, courage, wisdom, sovereignty; for those who are sovereigns have a power of benefiting many. Generals, orators, all, in fact, who have abilities this way [are objects of emulation]. And those whom many wish to resemble, or who have many acquaintances, or many friends. Or those whom many admire, or whom they do themselves admire. And those on whom are pronounced the praises and encomia of poets and panegyrists<sup>b</sup>. Persons, however, of a contrary description, men despise; for contempt is the contrary of emulation; and the despising of the being emulous. And it must be that persons so affected as to emulate certain persons, or to be themselves objects of emulation, are apt to feel contempt for those things and persons who possess evils the contraries of those goods which are

6. All whom men wish to resemble.

7. Or admire.

Contempt is the contrary to emulation.

<sup>b</sup> This description of orators were justly said to be *λογογράφοι*, (*λόγους γραφείν*;) indeed it appears from the third book, that epideictic orations in general were intended rather for *perusal* than *recitation*. Speaking of the style of epideictic orators, he remarks, τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις, lib. iii, cap. xii, § 6.

the objects of emulation. On which account men frequently despise the fortunate, when their good fortune is unconnected with those goods which are held in esteem.

Of the means, then, by which the passions are excited in the breast, and are allayed, one of the sources<sup>c</sup> out of which means of persuasion arise, of these we now have treated.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the Passions and Habits of the Young*<sup>a</sup>.

LET us next go over in detail the dispositions<sup>b</sup> of men; considering of what kind of a turn they are, in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes. I call anger, lust, and the like, by the name *passions*; a subject of which we have treated above. By the name *habits*, I designate virtues and vices: and of these we have treated above, both as to the points on which men form deliberate choice, and that to which they give birth in action. And the *ages* are youth, prime, and old age. By *fortune* I mean, high birth, and

1. Characters of mankind.

2. Vary in their i. Passions.

ii. Habits.

iii. Ages.

iv. Fortunes.

<sup>c</sup> Viz. *πίστις παθητική*, the third branch of *πίστις ἐντέχνη*. See book i, chap. ii, § 3, 4, 5.

<sup>a</sup> This discussion of the dispositions of persons, under a few of the most striking circumstances of life, was promised in the first book (chap. x, § 11).

<sup>b</sup> "The word *ἥθη*, taken in its utmost extent, includes *every thing* that is *habitual* and *characteristic*; but it is often used in a limited sense, for the *habitual temper* or *disposition*." Twining. Probably "*humour*," in the sense in which it has been defined by Ben Jonson, comes nearer to *ἥθος* than any word in our language:—

When some one peculiar quality  
Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw  
All his affects, his spirits, and his powers,  
In their confusions, all to run one way,  
This may be truly said to be a *humour*.

Every Man out of his Humour; where see Whalley's note.

wealth, and abilities, and their opposites; and, in one word, good and bad fortune.

3. Character of the young. Ardent. Now the young are in their dispositions prone to desire, and of a character to effect what they desire. And they are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned, and in these they are incontinent.
- Inconstant. But they are prone to change, and fastidious in the objects of their desires. And they desire with earnestness, but speedily cease to desire; for their wishes are keen, without being durable; just like the hunger and thirst of the sick.
- Irritable. And they are passionate and irritable, and of a temperament to follow the impulse. And they cannot overcome their anger; for by reason of their ambition they do not endure a slight, but become indignant, and fancy themselves injured: and they are ambitious indeed of honour, but more so of victory;
- Ambitious. 6. for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority. And of both these are they desirous in a higher degree than of gain; but least of all are they desirous of gain<sup>b</sup>, by reason of their having never yet experienced want; just according to the proverbial saying of Pittacus to Amphiaras<sup>c</sup>. And they do not view things in a bad light, but in a good, by reason of their never having yet been witnesses of much depravity.
7. Sanguine. And they are credulous, from their never having yet been much imposed on. And they are sanguine in their expectations; for like those who are affected by wine, so the young are warmed by their nature; and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses. Their life, too, for the most part, is one of hope; for hope is of that which is yet to be, while memory is of that which is passed: but to the young that which is yet to be, is long; but that
8. Credulous. Their life is one of hope.

<sup>b</sup> Power pleases the violent and proud: wealth delights the placid and timorous. Youth therefore flies at power, and age grovels after riches. Johnson's *Journey to the Hebrides*, p. 344.

<sup>c</sup> It is not known what this saying of Pittacus was.

which has passed, is short; for in the early days of life they think they remember nothing, while they hope for every thing; and they are easily imposed on, for the reason which has been stated; because they soon cherish expectation. And they are brave rather to an excess; for they are irritable and sanguine, qualities, the one whereof cancels fear, and the other inspires courage; for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid, the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage. And they are bashful; for they do not as yet conceive the honourable to be any thing distinct, but they have been educated only under the established usage of the state. And they are high-minded; for they have not as yet been humbled by the course of life, but are unexperienced in peremptory circumstances: again, high-mindedness is the deeming one's self worthy of much; and this belongs to persons of sanguine expectations. And they prefer succeeding in an honourable sense than in points of expediency; for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations<sup>d</sup>; and calculation is of the expedient, moral excellence, however, of that which is honourable. Again, they are fond of friends and companions rather than of their other compeers in age, by reason of their delighting in social intercourse, and of their not yet deciding on any thing in reference to what is expedient; so that they do not decide on their friends [upon that principle]. And all their errors are on the side of excess and too great earnestness, in contravention of Chilo's rule; for *the young* carry every thing to an excess; for their friendships are in excess, their hatreds are in excess, and they do every thing else with the same degree of earnestness; they think also that they know every thing, and firmly asseverate that they do; for this is the cause of their pushing

9. Rash.

10. Bashful.

11. High-spirited.

12. With a sense of honour.

13. Social.

14. Their errors are on the side of excess.

<sup>d</sup> Λογισμὸς is that one of the seven causes of human action which least affects the young. They usually act from θυμὸς or ἐπιθυμία.

15. Their insults are mischievous not malicious. Prone to pity.

every thing to an excess. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of wantonness, and not of malice. They are likewise prone to pity, from their conceiving every one to be good, and more worthy than in fact he is<sup>e</sup>; for they measure others by the standard of their own guiltlessness; so that they conceive them to be suffering what they do not deserve. And they are fond of mirth, on which account they are also of a facetious turn<sup>f</sup>; for facetiousness is chastened forwardness of manner.

16. Are gracefully facetious.

Such, then, is the disposition of the young.

### CHAP. XIII.

#### *Of the Passions and Habits of those advanced in Life.*

1. Character of the old.

BUT those who are advanced in life, and who have passed their prime, are of dispositions in most points the very opposite of these. Since by reason of their having lived many years, and having been deceived in a greater number of instances, and having mistaken, by reason, too, that the majority of human affairs are but worthless, they neither positively asseverate any thing, and they err in every thing more on the side of defect

2. than they ought. And they always “suppose,” but never “know” certainly; and, questioning every thing,

The old are doubtful.

<sup>e</sup> Vide note *b*, chap. xiii, p. 158.

<sup>f</sup> *Εὐτράπελοι*. I know no word in our language of similar moral signification in which the metaphorical allusion to *Τρέπω*, the *turn*, or easy adaptation of manner is preserved, unless indeed Minshew be correct in his etymology of *Buxome*, which, according to him, is derived from the German word *booghsacm*, i. FLEXILIS, and refers to the article *pliant* for further explanation. If this etymology be true, then Milton's expression, *buxom*, *blythe*, and *debonnaire*, though applied rather to female than manly grace, will convey a notion of what is here intended by Aristotle. But see Minshew, p. 106, edit. 1627. In the *Ethics*, b. 4, he compares *εὐτραπελία* to gracefulness of person; which, in conformity with the notions of most ancient writers, he seems to think only discoverable in *motion*, not in *rest*. Compare also “*Crito*, or a Dialogue on Beauty.”

they always subjoin a "*perhaps*," or a "*possibly*." And they talk of every thing in this undecisive tone, asserting nothing decisively. And they are apt to view things in an unfavourable light; for a disposition thus to view things, is the judging of every thing on the worse side. Moreover they are apt to be suspicious from distrust, and they are distrustful from their experience. And on this account they neither love nor hate with great earnestness; but, conformably to the remark of Bias, they both love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love. And they are pusillanimous, from their having been humbled by the course of life; for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast, but to things only which conduce to support of life. And they are illiberal; for property is one of the necessaries; and they are at the same time aware, from their experience, of the difficulty of its acquisition, and of the ease with which it is lost. And they are timid and apprehensive of every thing; for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young; for they have been chilled by years, but the young are warm in their temperament; so that their age has paved the way to timidity; for fear is a certain kind of chill. And they are attached to life, and particularly at its last closing day, from the circumstance that desire is of some object which is absent, and that men more especially desire that of which they stand in need. And they have self-love more than is fitting; for this too is a kind of littleness of spirit. And they live in a greater degree than they ought by the standard of expediency, and not of what is honourable, by reason of their self-love: for what is expedient is good *relatively*, to one's self; but what is honourable is good *absolutely*. And they are insensible to shame, rather than liable to be affected by it; for on account of their not holding equally in esteem the honourable and the expedient, they despise appearances. Again, they are not easily inspired with hope, on account of their experience; for the majority

Indecisive.

3. View things on the dark side.

Suspicious.

4.

Cautious.

5. Cowardly.

6. Illiberal.

7. Timid.

8. Tenacious of life.

9. Selfish.

10. Despise appearances.

11. Desponding.

of things are but paltry; wherefore the generality turn out inferior to the expectation; and once more on account of their timidity [they are apt to despond]. And they live more in memory than in hope; for the remnant of life is brief, but what has passed is considerable; and *hope* indeed is of what is to come; whereas memory is of things gone by: the very reason this, of their garrulity; for they never cease talking of that which has taken place, since they are delighted in awakening the recollections of things. And their anger is keen, but faint. And their desires have, some, abandoned them, the others are faint; so that neither are they liable to the influence of desire, nor apt to act in conformity to it, but with a view to gain; on which account men of this age appear to be naturally temperate, for both their desires have relaxed, and they are enslaved to gain. And they live more by calculation<sup>a</sup> than by moral feeling; for calculation is of expediency, but moral feeling is of virtue. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of malice, not of wanton insolence. The old have moreover a tendency to pity, but not on the same principle with the young; for the latter are thus disposed from their love of human nature, the former from their imbecility; since they consider the endurance of every calamity at hand to them, and this was laid down as a principle of pity<sup>b</sup>. Whence they are querulous, and neither facetious, nor

12. Their life is one of memory.

13. Weak in anger, but keen.

Live from calculation.

14. Err on the side of malice.

15. Are apt to pity,

from weakness.

Querulous.

<sup>a</sup> Their principles of action are the very contraries of those which principally influence the young; *ἔθος* and *λογισμὸς* being the usual springs of action in the man of advanced life.

<sup>b</sup> The two leading principles of pity were stated to be, *a conviction that the sufferer is undeserving what he suffers*, and that you consider *yourself liable to be placed in similar circumstances*. It was on the former of these principles that the young were stated to be apt to pity; because they take a favourable view of human nature. The old are equally liable to be affected by that passion, but it is on the latter principle; for though they view human nature in an unfavourable light, yet have they so strong a sense of their own liability to suffering, that they are led to commiserate others. Compare chap. viii, § 7; and chap. xii, § 15.

fond of mirth; for querulousness is the very reverse of fondness for mirth.

Such, then, are the dispositions of the young, and of those in advanced life<sup>c</sup>. So that, as all welcome an address worded to their own disposition, and a speaker who resembles themselves, it is clear by employing his oration in what way the orator will appear of this description, as regards himself and what he says.

16. How the orator must use these characters.

#### CHAP. XIV.

##### *Of the Dispositions of Persons in their mature Age.*

THOSE who are in their prime will, it is evident, be in a mean in point of disposition between these, subtracting the excesses of each: being neither rash in too great a degree, (for rashness is of this description, i. e. *in excess*,) nor too much given to fear, but keeping themselves right in respect to both. Neither placing confidence in all, nor distrusting all, but judging rather in conformity to the truth. Neither living with a view solely to what is honourable, nor with a view only to expediency, but with a respect to both. And conformed neither to penurious parsimony, nor to extravagance, but to what is fitting. With the same equality do they carry themselves also in respect to anger and to desire. And they are of a tempering coolness joined with spirit, and are spirited not without temperate coolness: for in the young and in elderly persons these qualities are separated; since the young are spirited, and of an intemperate rashness, while elderly persons are of a chastened spirit, and timid. And thus, in a word, whatever advantages youth and age

1. Character of the matured.

They are moderate.

2.

3.

Are spirited with coolness.

<sup>c</sup> In the Rambler, No. 196, the change of sentiments usual as men advance from youth to age is beautifully traced; and the whole paper affords a striking illustration of the subject treated in this and the preceding chapter.



have divided between them, the middle age possesses both; and in whatever respects they are either in excess or defect, in all these it holds a mean and what is fitting.

4. Prime of life for the body and mind.

But the body is in its prime from the age of thirty to five and thirty; and the mind about the age of forty-nine. Let thus much, then, have been said respecting youth, and old and mature age, and the dispositions which they severally are of.

## CHAP. XV.

### *The characteristic Dispositions of Persons of high birth.*

1. Character of men of high birth.

BUT let us treat of the goods of fortune next in order, so many of them at least as influence the dispositions of men in any particular way.

2. Ambitious.

Now it is the disposition of high birth, that its possessor is more ambitious than others; for all, when any possession is realised to them, are wont to accumulate upon it. But high birth is nobility of ancestry; and it is apt to indulge in contempt even of those who are as good as its own ancestors; because distinctions, in proportion as they are more remote, rather than recent, are held in greater esteem, and afford a ready plea for arrogance.

Contemptuous.

3. Distinction between the noble and generous.

But, *noble*, is an appellation referring to excellence of birth; whereas, *generous* refers to one's not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestry;] which, generally speaking, is not the case with the noble, but the majority of them are ordinary persons. For there is a kind of richness of produce in the generations of man, just as there is in that which arises from the land; and at times, should the stock be good, there arise in a family at intervals extraordinary persons; and afterwards it again relaxes. And a family of brilliant talent

The generations of man compared to the soil.

run wild into dispositions bordering on madness<sup>d</sup>; as in the instances of the descendants of Alcibiades, and Dionysius the elder: and one of sedate wisdom, into stupidity and dullness; as in the instances of the descendants of Cimon, and Pericles, and Socrates.

## CHAP. XVI.

*The Dispositions consequent on Wealth.*

ANY one, without any great penetration, may distinguish the dispositions consequent on wealth; for [its possessors] are insolent and overbearing, from being tainted in a certain way by the getting of their wealth. For they are affected as though they possessed every good; since wealth is a sort of standard of the worth of other things; whence every thing seems to be purchasable by it. And they are affectedly delicate and purse-proud; they are thus delicate on account of their luxurious lives, and the display they make of their prosperity. They are purse-proud, and violate the rules of good breeding<sup>a</sup>, from the circumstance that every one is wont to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by him, and because they think that

1. Character of the wealthy.

Insolent.

2.

Fastidious.

Purse-proud.

Presuming.

<sup>d</sup> *Μανικώτερα*. In connection with this word it should be borne in mind, that the Greeks were accustomed to consider every kind of enthusiastic impetuosity as a species of *madness*. See Twining on the Poetics, note 140.

<sup>a</sup> *Σόλοικοι*, the inhabitants of Soli in Cilicia, whose corruptions of the Greek language became proverbial. The word was used also to designate those who were guilty of impropriety in *conduct*, as well as in *expression*. Massinger, in enumerating some instances of ill breeding, uses the expression.

He ne'er observed you  
To twirl a dish about, you did not like of,  
All being pleasing to you; or to take  
A say of venison or stale fowl by your nose,  
Which is a *solecism* at another's table, etc.

Unnatural Combat, Act iii, sc. 1.

See too Ben Jonson's *Fox*, vol. iii, p. 275.

others are emulous of that, of which they are themselves. But at the same time they are thus affected reasonably enough; for many are they who need the aid of men of property. Whence, too, that remark of Simonides addressed to the wife of Hiero respecting the wealthy and the wise; for when she asked him, "whether it were better to have been born wealthy or wise," he replied, "wealthy; for," he said, "he used to see the wise hanging on at the doors of the wealthy."

3. Arrogant of place and power.

And [it is a characteristic of the rich] that they esteem themselves worthy of being in office; for they consider themselves possessed of that on account of which they are entitled to be in office. And, in a word, the disposition of the rich is that of a fool amid prosperity.

4. Difference between the newly rich and those who have been so from of old.

However, the dispositions of those who are but lately rich, and of those who have been so from of old, are different; inasmuch as those who have recently become rich<sup>b</sup> have all these faults in a greater and a worse degree; for the having recently become rich is as it were an inexpertness in wealth. And they are guilty of offences, not of a malicious nature, but such as are either offences of contumely or intemperance; for instance, in the case of assault or adultery.

<sup>b</sup> It is on this principle that Clytemnestra congratulates Cassandra on being the slave of an ancient family, rather than one recently advanced in the world:—

*ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσποτῶν πολλή χάρις·  
οἱ δ', οὐποτ' ἐλπίσαντες, ἤμησαν καλῶς,  
ᾧμοι τε δούλους πάντα, καὶ παρὰ στάθμην.*

*Æsch. Agam. 1010.*

Vide illustrations in Simmons's Translation, p. 97. See Johnson's Life of Savage, p. 338, vol. vii, edit. 1823, of his works; Examples, etc. See *Æsch. Prom. Vinct.* 35.

*ἅπας δὲ τραχύς, ὅστις ἄν νέον κρατῇ.*

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of the Dispositions of Men in Power, and of the Fortunate.*

AND in the same way on the subject of power, the most striking almost of its dispositions are evident; for of these power has some in common with wealth, and others which are better. For men in power are more ambitious and more manly in their dispositions than the wealthy; from their aiming at all duties whatsoever, which from their power they have the means of discharging. And they are less given to trifling, because, from a necessity of looking carefully to their power, they are constrained to a diligent attention. And they comport themselves with a dignity which is conciliatory rather than repulsive; for their claims for dignity render them more conspicuous; on which account, they bear themselves moderately: but conciliatory dignity, is a softened and graceful sedateness. And, if they do transgress the bounds of right, it is not in small points, but in those which are of importance, that they are guilty.

But good fortune, according to its constituents, is of the disposition of the states which have been described; since those which appear to be the greatest instances of good fortune resolve themselves ultimately into these states: and, besides these, to the excellence of one's progeny, and to personal advantages. But men are usually more overbearing and inconsiderate in consequence of prosperity. But one disposition, and that most excellent, is a concomitant of good fortune, viz. that the fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.

1. Character of men in power resembles the rich; but they are more ambitious, more manly.

2.  
3. Less trifling.

4. Are dignified.

5. Character of the fortunate.

6. Overbearing.

Yet religious.

The subject, then, of the dispositions as they conform to age and to fortune has been discussed; for from the opposites of my remarks the opposite subjects will be evident; the subject, for example, of the disposition of a poor, or unfortunate person, or of one out of power.

CHAP. XVIII.

*That there are some Topics common to all the species of Oratory.*

1. That there are certain  
κοινὰ εἶδη.

BUT since the use of persuasive orations has a reference to the forming a decision (since on questions which we are acquainted with, and have decided on, there is no further need of an oration); and as this is their use, whether addressing his speech to a single individual, the speaker endeavours to exhort or dissuade (which they do who admonish or persuade; since that *individual* is in no less degree a *judge*; because the person [be he who he may], whomsoever we want to persuade is, once for all, a judge); and also if one be speaking against an adversary, or on any supposed question, it has equally [a reference to decision]; (for one needs must employ a speech, and sweep away objections against which, as against an adversary, he directs his address); this is just as much the case in demonstrative oratory (since the speech commends itself to the listener just as though to a judge). But he alone is *strictly* a judge, who decides on the questions at issue in civil<sup>a</sup> controversies: since both forensic questions, and those on which men deliberate, are agitated as to how they stand. But of dispositions, as they are affected by the constitutions of states, we have spoken above. So that the means will now have been distinctly unfolded, both how, and by the use of what things, we may render our addresses ethical.

<sup>a</sup> Under the word πολιτικός, he seems, according to Victorius, to embrace judicial as well as deliberative questions.

But as there was, in each species of orations, a certain distinct end proposed; and as respecting all of them some ideas and propositions have been ascertained, out of which the deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial orators deduce their means of persuading; and as, in addition to these, the means by which it is possible for us to render our speeches ethical, have been developed; it merely remains, that we go over in detail the topics which are common to the three species of oratory<sup>b</sup>: for it is necessary that every orator should connect with his speech the topics of possibility or impossibility; and for some it will be necessary to attempt to show that certain things will take place, and for others that they have taken place. And again, the topic of greatness is common to all oratory; for every orator, whether he exhort or dissuade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, avails himself of amplification and diminution.

3. They are four in number.  
 i. The possible or impossible.  
 4. ii. Whether the fact has or has not taken place.  
 iii. Whether it will or will not.  
 5. iv. The great and small.

Let us also, after these points have been explained, attempt to treat of enthymems in general (if we are in possession of any thing on the subject) and of examples; in order that by subjoining what remains we may make good our original proposal.

But of these common topics, amplification is most congenial to demonstrative oratory, as has been remarked; possibility, as relating to the past, to judicial<sup>c</sup>; since on what *has been* its decision is made; but possibility, as relating to the future, is most congenial to deliberative.

<sup>b</sup> We may, if we please, consider this as the *ἀπόδοσις* of the sentence; and all the previous clauses as so many distinct parentheses; as the author of the Analysis has done, p. 101.

<sup>c</sup> This discussion of possibility was promised in the course of what he said on judicial oratory, book i, chap. xii, § 2.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of Things Possible and Impossible.*

1. First of the possible and impossible. **FIRST**, then, let us speak of things possible and those which are impossible. If then it be possible that one contrary should exist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible; for instance, if it be possible for a man to be convalescent, it also is possible for him to be sick; for the effective power of contraries, inasmuch as they are contraries, is the same. If, of two similar things, the one be possible, the other which is similar will be possible also. If the more difficult be possible, so will also that which is easier. And if it be possible for a thing to be produced in a state of excellence or beauty, it also is possible for it to be produced under general circumstances; for it is more difficult for a building to be made beautiful, than simply a building. And in whatever case the commencement is possible, the fulfilment also is possible<sup>a</sup>: for of things which are impossible, none either take place or begin to do so; for instance, it neither *is* the case, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, neither will it ever *begin* to be so. Also, wherever the fulfilment is possible, so is the commencement; since every thing proceeds from a beginning. And if the subsequent in being or production be possible, so also is the antecedent: if, for example, it be possible that a man should be produced, so also is it that a child should, since it is antecedent in its production: again, if it be possible for a child, so is it also for a man to be produced; on the principle that the former is a commencement. Things likewise are possible, of which
2. The like.
3. The more difficult.
4. The more excellent.
5. The beginning.
- The end.
6. The subsequent.
7. Things

<sup>a</sup> Thus it is argued, that if all may receive the ἀρχή of regeneration, baptism; all may receive its τέλος, salvation. Baptism is expressly called by St. Basil, ἀρχὴ μοι ζωῆς τὸ βάπτισμα. De Spir. Sanct. c. 10.

there is a natural love or desire; for no one loves what is impossible, neither desires it, for the most part at least. Also, any thing which is the subject of an art or science, is possible both to exist and to be produced. Likewise any thing whatsoever, the principle of whose production resides in those whom we can compel or persuade; such are those whose superiors, or lords, or friends we are. And wherever the *parts* are possible, so also is the *whole*. Wherever again the *whole* is possible, so also are the *parts*, generally speaking: for if the latchet, the forepart, and the upperleather of the shoe admit of being brought into being, so also do the shoes themselves: and if the shoes, then also the latchet, the forepart, and upperleather<sup>b</sup>; also, if the genus be of the number of things possible, so also will be the species; and if the species, so also the genus: for example, if a vessel can be produced, so can a trireme; and if a trireme, so can a vessel. And if, of things which have a natural relation to each other, the one be possible, so is also the other; as if the double be possible, so also is the half; and if the half, so also is the double. And if a thing admits of being brought into being without art or preparation, *à fortiori* it will admit of it by the help of art and attention. On which principle too it has been remarked by Agatho, "Yes, truly, in some things you must fare just as fortune goes; other things there are which attach to us by necessity and *art*." Also, if any thing be possible to persons who are worse, or our inferiors, or less prudent, much more will it also be possible to their opposites; just as Isocrates said, that "it would be strange if Euthynus learnt it, and he were not able to find it out."

With regard, however, to things impossible, it is

which we love.

8. Subjects of art or science.

9.

10. Where the parts are possible, so is the whole.

11. If the genus, then the species; and vice versa, etc.

12.

13. If without art, then with art.

14. If inferiors can do it, then can superiors.

15. Things

<sup>b</sup> The admirers of Sterne will do well, on reading this passage, to borrow a hint from him, and consult the learned Albertus Rubenius upon it, or at least some one of the many great authorities mentioned chap. 19, vol. vi, of Tristram Shandy.



impossible  
are the op-  
posite.

16. Second-  
ly, a thing  
has taken  
place.

17. When  
its subse-  
quent has  
happened.

18. If the  
agent was  
willing.

19. And  
under the  
influence of  
anger or  
desire.

20. If he  
was on the  
eve of doing  
it, etc.

plain that they result from the contraries of the above-mentioned principles.

Questions as to the actual occurrence of any thing, are to be viewed under the following considerations. For, in the first place, if that which had a less natural tendency to occur, has occurred; then may that have occurred which had a greater tendency. And if that which is wont to take place subsequently, has taken place, that also has taken place which usually does primarily: if, for instance, a man has forgotten, then also must he at some time have learnt that [of which he is now forgetful]. Also, if a man was able and willing, he achieved the deed; for all men when, being willing, they have power, proceed to act; for there is nothing in their way. If, moreover, a man was willing and had no external impediment. If, again, the act was possible, and he was under the influence of anger<sup>c</sup>. And if it was possible, and he [the person in question] was influenced by lust; for, generally speaking, men, if they have the power, execute that of which they are desirous; the bad from weakness of principle; and the virtuous because they desire objects compatible with virtue. Also, if a man was on the point of bringing the thing into action and of doing it; since the probability is, that he who was *on the eve* of acting, did moreover really act. Also, if all those things have taken place which naturally occur, either as preparatory to, or on account of the occurrence in question; as for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if he attempted it, he has also achieved it. And if all those things which naturally occur subsequently, and that on account of which the deed is done have taken place, then has also the prior to them and that which is the cause taken place: if, for instance, it has thundered, it has also lightened; and if he acted, he also attempted. Of all this number there are some

<sup>c</sup> Compare chap. v, § 3, 4.

thus subsequent of *necessity*; others however merely *generally*.

With regard, however, to the non-occurrence of things, the considerations applicable will be plain from the contraries of those above stated.

Also with regard to what will happen, matters will become evident from the same considerations; for that which is within the power and the wishes of any one will take place. Also things which are subjects of lust, anger, and reasonings, accompanied by power<sup>d</sup>. On this account, too, if persons be on the onset or on the eve of doing any thing, it will be done; for, generally speaking, things which are on the point of taking place occur, rather than those which are not. Also, if all those things have preceded which naturally occur before; for instance, if it lowers, there is a probability that it will rain. Also, if that has happened which is on account of the thing in question, it is probable that that will also happen; for instance, if there be a foundation, it is probable that there will also be a house.

The subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, also of the degrees of greater and less, and of things great and small in general, is clear to us from what has been said. For, in the discussion of deliberative oratory, the doctrine of the greatness of *goods* has been stated, and respecting the greater and less *in the abstract*. So that as with respect to each class of speeches the proposed end is a good; (for instance, the expedient,—the honourable,—and the just); it is evident that by every orator, his means of amplification are to be arrived at through the medium of these. But to institute, besides this, a further enquiry into the subject of greatness and of excess in the abstract, is to talk idly; since particular cases are more completely applicable to use than mere generalities.

<sup>d</sup> Fulmen est ubi cum potestate habitat iracundia. Publius Syrus.

22. Things which have not happened are to be inferred from the opposite. Thirdly, what will happen are subjects of the passions.

24. If the antecedents have happened.

25.

26. Fourthly, of the great and small.

27.

On the subject, then, of what is possible and impossible,—and whether the fact *has* or *has not* occurred, —*will* or *will not* occur, and moreover on the subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, let thus much have been said.

## CHAP. XX.

*Of Examples ;—how many species there are of them, in what manner, and when we are to employ them.*

1. Example discussed. IT remains that I treat of the means of effecting persuasion which are *common* to every class of subjects, since I have already treated of such as are *peculiar*. And these *common* means of persuasion are two in species, example and enthymem: for the sentiment is part of an enthymem. Let us then first treat of example; for the example is correspondent to induction; and induction is a principle.
2. A species of induction. But of examples there are two species; for one species of example is the quoting real matters of fact which have actually taken place; another is the fabricating them yourself: and of this method, one species is illustration, the other fable; like those of Æsop and the African legends. Again<sup>a</sup>, example is somewhat of this description, as if one were to assert that the state ought to set itself in order against the king, and not to allow him to make himself master of Egypt; and this, because aforetime Darius passed not into Greece, before that he had seized that country; but when he had seized it, he passed across; so that the present king, should he seize Egypt, will pass over; on which account he is not to be permitted.
3. This latter is subdivided into  
i. παραβολή.  
ii. λόγος.  
Example.
4. Illustration. Illustration is of the nature of Socrates's discourses: for instance, were one to say that it is not fitting that

<sup>a</sup> He here applies the generic term to the species first mentioned, viz. the citing actual matters of fact.

magistrates chosen by lot should be in office; for it is just the same thing as though one were to pick out wrestlers by lot; not taking such as are able to contend, but those on whom the lot may fall: or as though men were to draw lots for that person of the crew whom it might befit to take the helm; as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art.

But fable is such as that of Stesichorus in opposition <sup>5. Fable.</sup> to Phalaris, and that of Æsop in behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the citizens of Himera had chosen Phalaris<sup>b</sup> general with absolute powers, and were on the eve of assigning him a body guard, after other things which he said, related to them a *fable*: "That a horse was sole master of a meadow; but that on a stag's coming in and spoiling the pasture, in his wish to be avenged of the stag, he asked some man whether he should be able, in conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris."

And Æsop, when pleading at Samos in behalf of a <sup>6.</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Bentley seems to suspect this story as applying to Phalaris, "because," says he, "Conon, a writer in Julius Cæsar's time, gives us the very same narrative; but, instead of Phalaris, he says it was Gelon that Stesichorus spoke of. And the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon; for Gelon was in great favour and esteem with the Himeræans." Conon, Narrat. 42. Bentr. in Phalaris, p. 38.

demagogue who was tried for his life, said, "That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, 'Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains.' But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public money."

7. Fables are suited to the deliberative orator:

But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and possess this advantage; that to hit upon *facts* which have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard to *fables* it is comparatively easy. For an orator ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical turn of mind<sup>c</sup>. Cases, then, in the shape of fables are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past<sup>d</sup>.

8. being easy.

<sup>c</sup> He again remarks on the facility here ascribed to minds of a philosophical turn, when, in speaking of metaphors, he remarks, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ δέχουσι θεωρεῖν, εὐστόχου, lib. iii, cap. xi, § 5.

<sup>d</sup> This is the principle on which he has all along recommended *example* as more peculiarly available to the views of the deliberative orator. At the end of his illustrations of the subject of demonstrative rhetoric, after stating amplification to be more proper to it than either of the other common means of persuasion, he says, τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν, lib. i, cap. ix, § 40. Neither, says he, (cap. iv, § 8), ought the orator to

It will, moreover, be right for one who has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive proofs; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech will be produced by them: but one who possesses [enthymems] should employ them like evidence, putting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in *at the end*, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on him who puts them *first* of citing many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.

9. He who has not enthymems will use examples as proofs, and put them first. He who has enthymems uses examples as testimonies, and puts them last.

The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to be used, has been stated.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Of Moral Sentiments,—what they are, and of how many species,—how they are to be employed,—and what advantages they possess.*

ON the subject of the use of maxims, after it has been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily become clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.

1. Maxim, γνώμη.

Now the maxim is an assertion and yet not respecting *particulars*, as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but on some *general* subject; neither is it on *every* general subject<sup>a</sup>, as, that what is straight is opposed

2. Its definition.

rely on the result of his own observation, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ιστορικῶν εἶναι, πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλίην.

<sup>a</sup> Having told you that maxims are certain general propositions, he

Conclusions of most enthymems are maxims.

to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning *nearly* [confined] to this description of subjects, both the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away, become maxims<sup>b</sup>. Take an instance: "A man who is in his sound mind never ought to educate his children so as to be too highly skilled<sup>c</sup>." Now this is a maxim: but if the reason, and the cause why he should not do so, be added, the whole [conjointly] will become an enthymem; thus, "——— for besides the indolence which they contract, they will attach to themselves the bitter jealousy of the citizens." Again, this: "There is not a man who in every respect is happy<sup>d</sup>:" and the following: "There is not one of all mankind who is free<sup>e</sup>," are maxims: and the last becomes an enthymem, if added to the following proposition, "——— for either he is the slave of money or of fortune."

3. Maxims are of four kinds.

If, then, the maxim be what it has been described, there will necessarily be four kinds of maxims: for

cautions you against supposing that every general proposition deserves this appellation. For example, mathematical truths are asserted in propositions, general enough it is true, which however do not come up to the notion which Aristotle would have you form of the *γνώμη*. I hardly know whether it be allowable to attempt an explanation of Aristotle from a popular comedy; but those readers who remember the School for Scandal, may probably derive some illustration of this subject from the '*sentiments*' there put in the mouth of *Joseph Surface*; e. g. "The heart that is conscious of its own integrity, is ever slow to credit another's treachery." Act iv, scene 3.

<sup>b</sup> In other words, the maxim is to the enthymem what propositions are to syllogisms. Not to every enthymem does the *γνώμη* hold this relation, but to such only as are conversant with "the actions and passions of common life." Aristotle has not ventured to tell us that *all* enthymems relate to these subjects; he says only that "nearly" all of them are so conversant; *περὶ τοιούτων ἐστὶ σχεδόν*.

<sup>c</sup> Euripides, *Medea*, 294.

<sup>d</sup> From a lost drama of Euripides, entitled *Sthenobæa*.

<sup>e</sup> Euripides, *Hecuba*, 864.

either they will be *with* the annexed reason, or *without* it. Now the maxims which need proof are all such as assert any thing which contravenes received opinion, or is doubtful; but those which state nothing contrary to people's notions [do well enough] without the addition of proof. And of these last it cannot but be that some will need no proof<sup>f</sup>, from their having been *previously known*; as, "The best thing for a man, as it seems to me at least, is health;"—because to nine tenths of mankind this seems to be the case: and that others *simultaneously with their being uttered become evident* to such as turn their attention to them; as, "There is no lover who does not always love." And again, of those which have proof subjoined, some are a part of an enthymem, just as, "A man who is in his sound mind never ought," etc. Others are essentially enthymems, and not part of an enthymem; the which obtain more than any other species. And these are all those in which the reason for what is asserted appears wrought in, as in this maxim: "Being yourself a mortal, do not cherish immortal wrath:"—for the assertion that, "one ought not always to cherish wrath," is a maxim; that, however, which is added, viz. "because you are a mortal," states the reason why. Similar to which is the following: "It is fitting that a mortal conceive mortal notions, not that a being destined to death should think of what is immortal<sup>g</sup>."

From what has been said it has then become evident, as well how many the species of maxims are, as also to

4. i. μετ' ἐπιλόγου.  
ii. ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου.

6. Those μετ' ἐπιλόγου are either, 1st. part of an enthymem; or 2nd. Enthymematic.

These last are most approved.

7. Maxims not evident must have

<sup>f</sup> I have ventured thus to render ἐπιλογος; for that such is Aristotle's meaning, is evident from his having himself used ἀπόδειξις, at the beginning of the section, to denote the same thing.

<sup>g</sup> So also says Horace:—

Quid æternis minorem  
Consiliis animum fatigas?

Od. ii, 11, 11.

A notion, by the way, which Aristotle controverts elsewhere, Nich. Eth. x, 7.



the reason  
prefixed or  
subjoined.

8. With  
conciseness.

9. Maxims  
suit the old.

what kind of subjects they are severally adapted. For on subjects which may be questioned, or contravene received opinions, the orator must not use those without the reason annexed; but let him either, *prefixing* the reason, use the conclusion as a maxim, thus—"For my part, as then it neither is good to be exposed to envy, nor to be indolent, I assert that it is not good to be educated;" or, stating this [which here is the conclusion] first, *subjoin* that which was prefixed<sup>h</sup>. Observing that on subjects which do not contravene received opinions, but are doubtful, that he annex the reason why as concisely as possible. And on subjects such as these the apophthegms of the Lacedæmonians are very suitable, and sayings which have an air of mystery; as if one were to apply that which Stesichorus said before the Locrians, "that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cigalas should sing upon the ground<sup>i</sup>." The employment of maxims becomes him who is rather advanced in life; and particularly as respects subjects about which each happens to be well informed<sup>k</sup>. Since for one not so advanced in age to sport maxims is bad taste, just as it is for him to have recourse to fables: and the use of them on subjects about which one is ignorant is silly, and argues a want of education. There is a sufficient sign of the truth of this; for the boors of the country are of all other people most fond of hammering out maxims, and set them forth with  
10. great volubility. Also the stating generally a maxim which is, in fact, not general, is most especially befitting in appeals to the feelings, and in the act of

<sup>h</sup> To state the rule in the words of Hobbes, it is this—"A sentence not manifest ought to be either inferred or confirmed; *inferred*, (as in the text,) *confirmed* thus,—*A wise man will not have his children over-learned*, (prefixing what, in the former disposition, had been put last,) *seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens*," (and *subjoining* what before had been *prefixed*.)

<sup>i</sup> Meaning, lest their country should be so utterly devastated as that not a tree would remain for a cigala to sit upon.

<sup>k</sup> A young man ought not to use maxims.

exciting indignation; and then either at the beginning, or after the proof. Again, it is proper to avail one's self of maxims which are current and common, if they be of any service; for from their being common they appear to be correct, as though every one acknowledged their truth<sup>1</sup>: this one, for instance, (if the orator be exhorting persons to face the hazard, though they have not sacrificed,) "One omen there is which is best, to defend one's country;"—or to face it, though they be few in number,—"Mars is common;" and to cut off the children of their foes, what though they have done no injury,—"He is a fool who, after slaying the father, still spares the child<sup>m</sup>."

11. Common ones are useful.

Some old sayings too are maxims; for example, the expression, "Next neighbour to an Athenian." It is also proper to quote maxims which even contravene the current sayings, (I mean by current sayings such as this, "Know thyself;" or this, "Too much of one thing is good for nothing;") whenever your moral character may be likely to show itself to greater advantage, or the thing spoken is said in an impassioned manner. The speaking in an impassioned manner is, as if one in a passion were to assert, "that it was a falsehood that one ought to know himself; at least, this man, had he known himself, would never have claimed to be your general<sup>n</sup>." The moral character appears better [when we contradict a maxim] thus, "it does not become men,

12. Old sayings.

13. It is good to contravene a common maxim.

<sup>1</sup> On the principle,—Vox populi est vox Dei.

<sup>m</sup> So thought Lee's Hero, Cæsar Borgia, for he tells Machiavel in the tragedy,

'Tis not my way to lop, for then the tree  
May sprout again; but root him, and he lies  
Never to bluster. Act. v, sc. 2.

<sup>n</sup> The words probably of some panegyrist of Iphicrates, who, in the warmth of declamation, must have produced a very great effect by contradicting a maxim so generally received, and which bore an authority more than human, (εὐαὐτοδιδασκάλου γινώσκει σὲαυτὸν,) while at the same time he placed the merit of the general in a most striking light. For the original obscurity of Iphicrates, see book i, chap. vii, § 32.

as some assert, to love as though they were about to hate, but to hate as though they were about to love."

14. And we ought to give a manifestation of our moral principle by means of the diction we employ, otherwise to subjoin the reason; for instance, either stating the sentence thus, "we ought to love, not as they tell us, but as though always about to love, for the other is the part of an insidious man:" or thus, "the common maxim does not please me; for it is the duty of the true friend at least to love as though he were always about to love." "Nor again [does this please me], that we ought to carry nothing to excess; since 'tis our duty to hate the wicked at least to the very extreme."

15. Maxims aid a speech.  
i. From gratifying the vanity of the audience.

They contribute, too, a considerable aid to our orations: first owing to the vanity of the audience; for they feel a pleasure if one speaking generally, happens to hit upon ideas which they hold on any particular point. My meaning, however, will be plain in this way, as also the manner in which we ought to catch at them; for the maxim, as has been stated, is an assertion universally, and men feel delighted when that is asserted universally, which they happen previously to have taken up as their opinion upon particulars. If, for instance, a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would hail the man who should say, "nothing is more annoying than dwelling near people," or, "nothing is more silly than to beget children."

16. ii. They give the speech an air of character.

So that we should form a guess, some how or other, as to the opinions which our audience happen to have taken up with; then to speak on these subjects generally conformably to them. This one advantage the application of maxims must needs possess, and another superior to it; for it gives our orations an air of character. But those orations bear an impress of character in which the principle is manifest. And all maxims produce this effect by reason of the speaker's asserting universally on things which are the objects of deliberate choice: so that should the maxims be good, they

make the speaker also to appear a man of worthy character.

Such, then, be our discussion on the subject of the maxim, of its nature, its species, the manner in which it is to be employed, and the advantages which it possesses.

## CHAP. XXII.

*Of Enthymems.*

LET us speak generally of enthymems, in what way we ought to seek for them, and afterwards of the topics, (*τόποι*), for the nature of the two is respectively different<sup>a</sup>.

It has been stated before, that the enthymem is a kind of syllogism, also in what way it is a syllogism, and in what respect it differs from the syllogisms of logic; for we should make our conclusions without taking up our assumptions either many stages back, or all of them together: the one process from its length is obscure; the other, from its stating what is plain, is waste of words.

And this is the reason why men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than men of high acquirements, as the poet<sup>b</sup> says, "that the unlearned speak more in unison with the feelings of the mob;" for the latter address them in common and general points, the former, from the store of their information, in a manner which comes home to them. So that we are not to found our address on *any* thing which may seem to the purpose, but on certain definite points; such, for example, as seem right to the judges,

<sup>a</sup> See the argument founded on the distinction between them, chap. xxvi, § 1.

<sup>b</sup> Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 989.

- or those whose opinions they acknowledge; and the reason for this is, that it will appear to be the case either to all or most of them: moreover we should draw our conclusions not only from necessary, but also from contingent premises<sup>c</sup>.
- iii. Our conclusions must be drawn both necessarily and contingently. First, then, you ought to be aware that it is necessary, respecting every subject on which you have to speak and to draw conclusions, whether it be through the medium of the rhetorical syllogism<sup>d</sup>, or of any other whatsoever, to be masters either of all or some of the facts inherent in it: for having none of them, you will not be able to draw your inferences from any thing<sup>e</sup>. My meaning is this: how shall we be able to give advice to the Athenians, whether they ought to go to war, without being informed what their forces are, whether naval or military, or both; and these in how great numbers; also what are their resources; or their allies and enemies; and yet further, what former wars they have waged, and in what manner, and other points of this description: or how to eulogise them, unless we be informed of the sea-fight at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the exploits achieved by them in behalf of the Heraclidæ, or some other such points; for it is on the real or apparent honourable traits attaching to each object that all orators found their panegyrics.
4. We must know the facts of the case in every species of oratory. 7. And in the same way it is on their opposites that they ground their reprehension, always looking out for any thing of that nature which either attaches, or appears to attach, to the subject; suppose [the case of a censure passed on the Athenians] because they subjected the Greeks to themselves, and reduced to a state of servitude the people of Ægina and Potidæa, who were
5. Deliberative.
6. Epideictic.

<sup>c</sup> We should allege not *τεκμήρια* alone, but *εἰκότα* as well.

<sup>d</sup> Πολιτικός συλλογισμός means the syllogism peculiar to rhetoric. Victor. vid. *Animadv.*

<sup>e</sup> Aristotle has himself given an outline of the kind of information which ought to be possessed with a view to speaking on five of the most important questions of deliberative oratory, book i, chap. 4.

their allies against the barbarian, and bore off the prize of highest worth<sup>f</sup>; and every other transaction of this nature, and whatever other such error may attach to them.

And in the same way those orators who accuse and defend, construct their accusations and defences on a view of existing circumstances<sup>g</sup>: there is no difference<sup>8.</sup> in your pursuing this process, whether it be respecting Athenians or Lacedæmonians, men or gods. For in advising Achilles, or in praising or blaming him, in accusing and defending him, we must assume the traits which attach, or appear to attach, to his character; in order that from among their number we may, in so praising or blaming him, allege whatever things honourable or base attach to him; and in accusing or defending him, whatever things just or unjust; and in advising him, whatever is beneficial or injurious. And<sup>9.</sup> in a similar manner respecting any business whatsoever; as, respecting justice, the question whether it be expedient [must be discussed] on the ground of what appertains to justice or expediency. So that as all<sup>10.</sup> men appear thus to construct their proofs, whether they draw their inferences with greater accuracy or remissness, (for they do not make their assumptions out of every subject, but from those circumstances which are inherent in each question,) and by reason that it is manifestly impossible otherwise to prove; it is evident, then, that it is necessary, as I said in the Topics, to be in possession of certain select propositions on points which may occur, and are most convenient: and [it is evident] that the orator should conduct his enquiry respecting questions which arise on the sudden in the

11. The orator must seize the peculiar points.

<sup>f</sup> Herodotus, viii, 93.

<sup>g</sup> Having illustrated his meaning by two examples, taken respectively from subjects of deliberative and demonstrative rhetoric, he concludes with a third from the subjects recognised by judicial; it being his great object to keep awake in the memory of the reader the original grand division of questions.

same manner, not turning his view aside to indefinite points, but to the actual points of the case which the oration is concerning; and embracing in his sketch the greatest number he is able, and those coming the nearest to the point; for in proportion as he is master of the greater number of the things inherent in the case, by so much the easier will it be to effect proof; and in proportion as these are the nearer to the point, in the very same proportion will they be more peculiar, and

12. less vague. By *vague* I mean, the praising Achilles because he is a man, and one of the deified heroes, and made war against Troy; for these are points attaching to a thousand others beside: so that such an orator no more praises Achilles than he does Diomed. But by *peculiar* I mean, those which befall no one else than to Achilles, for instance, the slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans; and Cynus, who, being himself invulnerable, prevented all the forces from landing; and that he joined the expedition the youngest, and without being bound by an oath; and whatever other topics are of this description. One element of enthymems, then, is that of *selection*; and this is the first which partakes of the nature of topics.

The topic  
of selection.

13. And now let us state the elements of enthymems; (but by *place*<sup>h</sup> and *element* of an enthymem I mean the same thing). First, however, let us treat of those points concerning which it is necessary first to speak. For of enthymems there are two species; the one species are *confirmative*, that such is or is not the fact; and the other *refutative*: and they differ just as, in
14. Two  
sorts of en-  
thymems:  
δικτικά.  
ἑλεκτικά.
15. logic, the syllogism and the elenchus differ. And the confirmative enthymem is the deducing a conclusion from acknowledged premises; the refutative, however, is the deducing an inference which is not admitted.

<sup>h</sup> Cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, *locos* nosse debemus: sic enim appellatæ sunt hæ quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. Cicero, Topic. cap. ii.

Now the general arguments nearly on each class of 16. subjects necessary and useful to be known are in our possession; for propositions have been selected on each [branch of rhetoric]; so that the topics out of which one must allege his enthymems, whether on questions of good or evil, just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, select points moreover respecting the dispositions, the passions, and the habits, having been collected above, are likewise actually before us.

But let us, in a different manner, further make as- 17. sumptions respecting all the classes of rhetoric, and putting a mark on them severally as we proceed, state both the refutative and confirmative elements, as well as those of apparent enthymems, which, however, are not really enthymems, for neither in truth are they [the elements of actual] syllogisms. When these points have been elucidated, we shall discuss the subject of starting objections to enthymems, and the means of their solution, from what sources we ought to adduce them.

### CHAP. XXIII.

#### *Elements of Enthymems.*

THERE is one element of confirmative enthymems, de- 1. i. Ele-  
rivable from *contraries*; for we should consider, whe- ment, that  
ther the contrary quality be inherent in the contrary of contra-  
subject; doing away the argument [grounded thereon] ries.  
if it be not inherent; and if it be inherent, founding  
one thereon ourselves: for example, the argument that  
“*Temperance is good, because intemperance is inju-  
rious:*” or, as it is in the Messeniatic<sup>a</sup> oration, “*If war  
be the cause of our present troubles, of course we shall*

<sup>a</sup> An oration spoken by Alcidas in behalf of the Messenians, referred to above, i, 13, § 3. See the Sophism. *Hudibras*, P. ii, c. ii, § 123.



put ourselves right again with the return of peace." And, "If in truth it be not just to be angry with those who *unwillingly* do us harm; neither, if one *on compulsion* shall do good to any one, is it his duty to be grateful to him." And, "If to speak falsely is among men available to persuade; there is no anomaly in supposing, on the contrary, that many things which are true fail of being believed."

2. ii. Of conjugate inflections.

Another is derivable from conjugate *inflections*<sup>b</sup>; for the qualities must either be inherent consistently, or not at all; for example, the argument, that "the just is not in every case a good, for then also would that which is *justly* be well; now it is not, however, desirable *to die justly*<sup>c</sup>."

3. iii. From relatives.

Another from *relatives*; for if to one party attach the idea of his having *acted* honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having *suffered* [honourably, etc.]. Also, if to *command* be just, so also is the having *executed* [the command]; for example, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon<sup>d</sup>, said of the revenues, "If it be not base for you to *put them up for sale*, neither is it for us to *purchase* them." And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the *patient*, so will it also be on that of the *agent*; and if on that of the *agent*, then also on that of the *patient*. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning<sup>e</sup>: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a sufferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which account we should view the question sepa-

<sup>b</sup> See book i, 7, § 27. Hobbes calls this *cognomination*, or *affinity of words*.

<sup>c</sup> See book i, 9, § 15.

<sup>d</sup> Cicero illustrates this "*place*" by a similar example: "*Nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, nec Hermacreonti quidem turpe est conducere.*" De Inven. lib. i.

<sup>e</sup> Upon this fallacy the reasoning of Cleon was grounded in the debate about the Mitylenæans; and Dioclotus, in his reply, uniformly strives at exposing it, while he urges, that however they might merit death, the Athenians were not the people who should inflict it. Thucyd. lib. iii.

rately, — whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facts in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonise; just as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectus, “Did no man hate thy mother?” In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately; and when Alphesibœa asks how, taking her up, he says, “That she indeed deserved death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer.” And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the person who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.

Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less<sup>f</sup>; for instance: “If not even the *gods* know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men;” for it is to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would *more naturally* possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would *less naturally* possess it, it is not inherent.

4. iv. From comparison in three ways.  
i. à fortiori.

And the argument, that “he assaults his neighbours, who even does so to his father;” is derived from the element, if *the less* probability exist, so also does *the greater*; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, whether that it is or is not the fact.

ii. à minori.

And again, *by parity of reasoning*, when it is said, “And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CENEUS who has lost his noble offspring?” and the argument, “If indeed The-

5. iii. By parity of reasoning.

<sup>f</sup> The argument à fortiori.

seus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;" and, "If Tyndarus' sons did not act unjustly, neither did Paris;" and this, "Suppose Hector did slay Patroclus, Paris slew Achilles;" and this, "If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers;" and, "If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;" and that, "If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece."

6. v. From respect of time.

Another element arises from the consideration of *time* <sup>g</sup>, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Harmodius, "that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it?—Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them." And, on another occasion, in reference to the Thebans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, "if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, because he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through <sup>h</sup>."

7. vi. From retorting assertions

Another element is deduced from assertions made

<sup>g</sup> Under this head he considers both *Time* generally, and also *Opportunity* (*καιρός*), which, however, have been thus distinguished—Χρόνος ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ καιρός, καὶ Καιρός, ἐν ᾧ χρόνος οὐ πολὺς. Hippocrates, in Præcept. 61. Καιρός again has been described as ὁ προσφύνης καὶ ἀρμόδιος ἐκάστῳ χρόνος.

<sup>h</sup> A striking instance of appeal to this topic occurs in Macbeth, act i. *Lady Macbeth*. ————— then you were a man ;

————— Nor time, nor place,

Did then adhere, and yet you would make both :

They have made themselves, and that their fitness now

Does unmake you.

See also Thucyd. book i, 140 ; ii, 6. Demosthenes frequently employs this topic, as in Olynth. iii, *τίνα χρόνον, ἢ τίνα καιρόν, ὧ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ παρόντος βέλτω ζητεῖτε*. The force of the appeal thus made cannot be better illustrated than by the frequency of its employment.

respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, "Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates?" You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aristides, to allege this; but it ought always to tend directly to the discredit of him who lays the impeachment; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.

Another place is from *definitions*<sup>i</sup>; as, "that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the existence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence<sup>k</sup>." And, as Iphicrates said, "that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not attach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton before they had achieved some noble exploit." And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, "At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aris-

on your adversary.

8. vii. From definition.

<sup>i</sup> In addition to the instances of recourse to this topic quoted in the text, we may mention that of expediency in the speech of the Platæans (Thucydides, iii, 56); and one used by Alcibiades in his speech at Sparta, vi, 89, *πάν τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι, δῆμος ὀνομασται, κ. τ. λ.*

<sup>k</sup> One of the arguments used by Socrates to prove his belief in the existence of gods; for if, as was granted, he held the existence of his attending spirit (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*), then necessarily must it either be itself a god, or at least a divine production. See Plato, *Apolog. Socr.*

togiton, than yours are<sup>1</sup>." And, as was said in that speech about Paris, "All will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person." And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, "because," said he, "it is a disgrace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated *ill*." For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascertained the question.

9. viii.

From the number of meanings of the term.  
10. ix. From the division.

Another element is deducible from the *number of senses* in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word *rightly*. Another from taking the *different bearings* of the case; as, "If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege."

11. x. From induction.

Another from *induction*, as may be illustrated from the oration respecting Peparthus, to establish that women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when undertaking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thesaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, "If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who overturn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection."

<sup>1</sup> See the concluding chapter of Tacitus's Life of Agricola.

And, as Alcidamas asserted, that "all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calumniator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenæans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedæmonians, who of all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedæmonians, while by those of Lycurgus; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity."

Another element of enthymems is derivable from a *former decision* of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority; or the wise, either all, or most of them; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide, (as for instance those on whom they depend;) or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a father, or teacher, [happen so to have decided]. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixidemides, "whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixidemides?" Or as Sappho insisted, "that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been so] they would themselves have died;" or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, "Yet," said he, "our companion at least held no such thing," meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question secondly at Delphi,—whether he [Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were

12. xi. From former decisions.

disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote<sup>m</sup>, that "she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so." And of Paris, "whom the goddesses preferred<sup>n</sup>;" and of Evagoras, as Isocrates says, that must needs be virtuous, "since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras."

13. xii.  
From the  
enumera-  
tion of  
parts.

Another element arises from *an enumeration of parts*; as in the *Topica*, "what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description." And an instance occurs in the *Socrates of Theodectes*: "Toward what temple hath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured?"

14. xiii.  
From the  
conse-  
quents.

Another consists in, Since, in the generality of instances it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is *consequent* whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic<sup>o</sup>, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other [universal means of proof], as they have been stated, consists the system of Calippus.

<sup>m</sup> "Ἐγραψεν, because demonstrative orations were seldom composed for delivery, but rather, as we should say, for the closet, book iii, c. 12, § 6, ἡ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις. See note chap. xi, § 7.

<sup>n</sup> See book i, chap. vi, § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two instances.

<sup>o</sup> It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so fallacious, that we may say with Ovid,

—————careat successibus opto  
Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

Phyllis Demoph.

Another occurs, when we want to exhort or dissuade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the forementioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries: for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker; because, said she, "If on the one hand you speak what is just, *men* will hate you; if what is unjust, the *gods*." [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, "if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men<sup>p</sup>." And this is equivalent to the proverb "*of buying dirt as well as salt.*" And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.

15. xiv.  
From the  
dilemma.

Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.

16. xv.  
From the  
different  
motives of  
mankind.

Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that "if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children." And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, "Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue,

17. xvi.  
From  
analogy.

<sup>p</sup> See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, *Phœnissæ*, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: "If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it." Acts v, 38, 39.



and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?"

18. xvii.  
From the  
similarity  
of conse-  
quents.

Another arises out of the argument, that if the result be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that "they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist." And generally assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration]: "Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one's self to philosophy." And this, "that the giving earth and water is the being slaves." And "that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined." Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.

19. xviii.  
From the  
inconsist-  
ency of  
men.

Another may be deduced from the circumstance, that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for instance, this appeal:—"If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight?" For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.

20. xix.  
From as-  
suming a  
possible  
end as the  
real one.

Another element which may be resorted to is, the assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, "To many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may receive the more

<sup>4</sup> From an Oration by Lysias.

conspicuous calamities<sup>r</sup>." And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: "Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager's valour." And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, "that Diomedes chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior." For it is very possible that he did so on this account.

Another, common both to the judicial and deliberative orators, is the consideration of the motives which stimulate or retard men, and the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them; or if the loss be less than the object proposed<sup>s</sup>. And it is upon these considerations that orators *exhort*, and on their opposites that they *dissuade*; moreover they both *defend* and *accuse* upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their *defences* on those which are used to *dissuade*, and their *accusations* on those used to *exhort*<sup>t</sup>. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.

Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbable, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men

21. xx.  
From considering the motives.

22. xxi.  
From that which is incredible yet true.

<sup>r</sup> Evertère domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles.

<sup>s</sup> Πράγμα: by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor.

<sup>t</sup> That is to say, those very same faculties which the deliberative orator would employ in *exhorting* a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under *accusation*, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, *vice versa*, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be employed to *dissuade* from its attempt, might be alleged in *defence* of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable.

apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true<sup>u</sup>; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pitthos, said in his impeachment of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, "The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;" and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. "Nay, the olive lees require oil," and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil."

23. Refuta-  
tive ele-  
ment.  
i. From  
consider-  
ations of  
contradic-  
tions.

Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct<sup>x</sup>, sayings, and the like. And this independently, respecting your adversary, as "He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants];" or independently respecting yourself, "He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;" or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, "This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of you."

24. ii. From  
explana-  
tion.

Another, applicable to those who have been calumniated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain

<sup>u</sup> The argument may be formally stated thus: Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, therefore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completely slurred over.

<sup>x</sup> Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, "quod aut prius se injuste condemnassent; aut postea tantos honores non recte tribuissent." Aur. Victor. de viris illis.

woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connection with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which caused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax<sup>25</sup> why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.

Another is derived from the cause, if that be in existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leodamas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, "that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence in him, while his hatred toward the democracy remained inscribed in public."

Another is, the observing whether the thing respecting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did, or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one voluntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. This, however, involves a fallacy; for in many cases it becomes clear [only] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was before unknown.

Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connection; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea<sup>γ</sup> or not, "if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice."

<sup>γ</sup> Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata a Græcis, Matuta habetur a nostris? Cicero, Tusc. i, 12.

28. vi.  
From errors  
before com-  
mitted.

Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the *Medea* of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming; for, respecting the sending away her children, *Medea was* in fault: she, however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one], she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.

29. vii.  
From the  
equivoca-  
tion of the  
term.

Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles says, "*Steel* in truth you are, and bear the name." And as they are wont to say in their praises of the gods<sup>z</sup>; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, "rash in counsel," (*Θρασύβουλος*); and Herodicus told Thrasy-machus, "You are always rash in fight, (*Θρασύμαχος*); and Polus, "You always are a colt," (*Πῶλος*); and Draco the legislator, that "his laws were not those of a man, but of a *dragon*<sup>a</sup>; for they were harsh." And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, "The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly<sup>b</sup>." And as Charemon says, "Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities<sup>c</sup> awaiting him."

30. Reasons  
why refuta-  
tive enthy-

Refutative enthymems, however, are more in repute than the confirmative; by reason of the refutative en-

<sup>z</sup> Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in *punning* on their respective appellations as often as the case admitted it.

<sup>a</sup> In this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author's meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others.

<sup>b</sup> Folly, in Greek *ἀφροσύνη*. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of *Ἀφροδίτη* to suit his purpose. However, there are no liberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the *Troades*, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, "Begun in Folly, closed in Tears." Giaour.

<sup>c</sup> Πένθηα.

enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together ; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect<sup>d</sup>, which are of such a description that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial ; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure<sup>e</sup>, in having of themselves anticipated it ; and [next to these may we class] all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated.

mems are more in repute than confirmative.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*Elements of Apparent Enthymems.*

JUST as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so ; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may *appear* to be ; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.

1. Fallacious enthymems.

But the elements of these apparent enthymems are, 2. one derivable from the diction : and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all : thus, " So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily therefore, so and so is." And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly ; for this kind

2. 1st. From the diction of two kinds.  
i. Asserting a conclusion not inferred.

<sup>d</sup> *Θορυβοῦνται* : respecting this word, see a note book i, chap. 2.

<sup>e</sup> For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see b. i, 11, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facilitated, and our admiration excited ; and § 27 on the principle that τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker.

ii. Ambiguous terms, etc.

of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated] "the result of the style of the diction;" but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, "that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people." For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that "the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;" for of all rites, the *mysteries* are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, "O blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess." Or the arguing, that "it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog in the house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable." And the assertion, that Mercury is "communicative" above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called "common." And the stating that *λόγος*, *speech*, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of *λόγος*, *esteem*, not of wealth: for the words (*λόγου ἄξιον*) are not used in a single sense.

3. 2nd. From division and composition.

Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting conjointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that "he knew there was a galley in the Piræus<sup>a</sup>," for he knew each [separate fact of his

<sup>a</sup> An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking con-

assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, "that he knows the verse<sup>b</sup>;" for the verse is the same thing. Again, the saying that "as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious." Thus enunciated, it is adapted to *refutation*; but thus it is *confirmative*; "for two evils do not constitute one good," etc. But the whole topic is replete with fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants<sup>c</sup>;" for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the *Orestes* of Theodectes, from distinct cases, "It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father. Now, are not these the very things that have been done?" for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained "by *whom* [she should be put to death]."

Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration<sup>d</sup>: and this occurs when, without having shown that [the prisoner] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the *accused* employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the *accuser* who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem;

4.  
3rd. From  
exaggera-  
tion.

*jointly* what is true only separately: Euthydemus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Piræus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Piræus, i. e. he being in the Piræus.

<sup>b</sup> Of this nature was the sneering recommendation of a *Dictionary* as a *book of general information*.

<sup>c</sup> The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty *distinct tyrannies*, whereas he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which happened to be shared between thirty different individuals.

<sup>d</sup> This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction, *real* or *material* fallacies.



for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.

4th. From a σημεῖον. 5. Another is the argument drawn from a sign<sup>e</sup>, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, "Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus." And if one were to say, "Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;" for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.

5th. From the accidents of a thing. 6. Another is the arguing from an accidental circumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates<sup>f</sup> said about mice, that "they lent their aid by gnawing through the [enemy's] bowstrings." Or supposing one to declare, "that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:" he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.

6th. From asserting that as a logical property which is not. 7. Another arises from establishing the consequent; as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended] that "he is of a noble spirit; because, despising the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself;" for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed; he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, "Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;" because adulterers are persons of such habits<sup>g</sup>. Similar to this is also the argument, that "the poor, because they dance and sing in the tem-

<sup>e</sup> Meaning of course the *specific* σημεῖον, for no fallacy can result from the τεκμήριον, vid. book i, chap. ii, § 16. This fallacy he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ ἐλέγχου.

<sup>f</sup> This Polycrates was one of the Sophists; he was mentioned above, (§ 3). The circumstance respecting the mice is recorded by Herodotus, ii, 141.

<sup>g</sup> The fallacy in this instance arises from taking the simple converse of a universal affirmative proposition; as also in the instance cited § 5.

ples; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]” For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.

Another arises from stating as a cause that which in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having happened “simultaneously,” or “after;” for men do assume that what occurs “*subsequently*,” [occurs] “*by means of*” [that which preceded,] and more especially those engaged in state affairs; just as Demades [insinuated] “that the administration of Demosthenes was the cause of all their misfortunes; because a war happened *after* it.”

7th. From asserting that as a cause which is not a cause.

Another, from the omission of the “when” and “manner how;” for instance, the argument “that Paris carried off Helen justly; because free choice had been given her by her father<sup>h</sup>;” for very possibly it was not [granted] for a continuance, but at first merely; because so far only was she at her father’s disposal. Or if any one were to say, “that the striking free men was an insult: because under all circumstances this is not the case, but when one begins the violence.”

9. 8th. From the omission of particulars.

Again, as in the disputations of the Sophists, there arises an apparent syllogism from stating things absolutely or not absolutely, but conditionally; as [it is contended] in logic, that “what is a nonentity, does exist; because a nonentity *exists* as a nonentity;” and that “what is unknown is known, for it is *known* to be unknown<sup>i</sup>;” just so in rhetoric also, we have an apparent enthymem from what is not *absolutely* probable, but *conditionally* probable. This, however, is not uni-

10. 9th. From arguing.

<sup>h</sup> See Euripides, Iphig. in Aul. 66.

<sup>i</sup> See the epigram, which, alluding to Socrates’s declaration, “that he knew nothing,” concludes thus,

Hoc aliquid nihil est, hoc nihil est aliquid.

versally the case; as in truth Agatho remarks, "Perhaps some one will be inclined to assert this to be probable, that many improbabilities will befall men:" for that which is contrary to probability does occur; so that even what is contrary to probability is probable<sup>k</sup>; this, however, is not the case *absolutely*; but just as in sophistical disputations, it is the omission of the circumstances of extent, relation, and place, which produces the imposition; so also here [in rhetoric], it results from the things being probable not absolutely, 11. but conditionally probable. The system of Corax is constructed upon this topic: for supposing your client, without being open to the charge, as for instance, being infirm, should be under a charge for an assault, [you have grounds for your defence,] because the case is not probable: and if he be open to the charge, from his being, for example, a powerful man, [still you may defend him] on the ground that it is not likely, because it was sure to seem to be likely<sup>l</sup>. And so also respecting all other cases, for he needs must be either open to the imputation or not. Both cases then appear to be likely; but the one is likely [*absolutely*,] the other *not absolutely*, but so as has been explained. And this is [the secret] "of making the worse, the better side<sup>m</sup>." And hence mankind were justly indignant at the annunciation of Protagoras<sup>n</sup>; for it is an imposition, and not the real, but an apparent probability, and has a

Sophistry of  
Protagoras.

<sup>k</sup> Compare the words of Sir Philip Sidney, that "*a wonder is no wonder in a wonderful subject.*"

<sup>l</sup> Compare lib. i, cap. xii, § 5, τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερωῖ, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>m</sup> There were some persons who charged Socrates with doing this, and thence concluded that he was a person dangerous to the state—ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, ἀνὴρ σοφός, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆν πάντα ἀναζητηκός, ΚΑ'Ι Τ'ΟΝ ἠΤΤΩ Λ'ΟΓ'ΟΝ ΚΡΕ'ΙΤΤΩ ΠΟ'ΙΩΝ. Plato Apol. Socr. § 2. Compare also the Dialogue of the two λόγοι, in the Clouds of Aristophanes.

<sup>n</sup> Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Ceius, Hippias Eleus, aliique multi docere se profitebantur arrogantibus sane verbis, *quemadmodum causa inferior, ita enim loquebantur, dicendo fieri superior posset.* Cicero, Brut. c. viii. Τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, i, i, § 12.

place in no art except rhetoric, and the art of disputation. And now the subject of enthymems, as well real as apparent, has been discussed.

## CHAP. XXV.

*The Solution of Arguments.*

IT follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging one's self from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an objection<sup>a</sup>. Now as to the meeting them with counter arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics), are started in four ways: 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4. or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the *same* source, I mean that, supposing the enthymem were respecting love, "that it was a good feeling;" there would be a twofold objection; for it [might be started] asserting *generally* that "every want is bad:" or *particularly*, that "the proverbial expression *Caunian loves*<sup>b</sup>, would not have arisen had there not been some wicked loves." Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a *contrary* fact; as, if the enthymem was this, "The good man benefits all his friends;" [and the objection,] "But the bad man

1. Solution of arguments two ways. Contradictory arguments. Objections.

3. Objections are fourfold.

4. i. From the same source.

i. Generally.  
ii. Particularly.

5. 2nd. From a contrary.

<sup>a</sup> Ἀντισυλλογισμὸς is a syllogism, whose conclusion is contradictory of that adduced by your opponent: ἐνστασις is the showing that his reasonings are fallacious either in matter or form.

<sup>b</sup> Alluding to the loves of Byblis and her brother Caunus. See Ovid. *Metaph.* ix, 453.

6. 3rd. does not hurt all his." And on the ground of *similar*  
From a si- cases<sup>c</sup>; if the argument be, "Those who have been  
milar case. treated ill always hate;" [the objection,] that "those  
who have been treated well do not always love<sup>d</sup>." And  
7. 4th. again, the decisions of men of celebrity; thus, suppose  
From points one brought forward the argument, that "we ought to  
decided. have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, be-  
cause they err ignorantly<sup>e</sup>:" this objection [may be  
started,] that "Pittacus is not therefore entitled to  
praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have  
imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the  
error while intoxicated."
8. Reason- But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived from  
ings derived four sources, and these four are probability, example,  
from four proof positive (τεκμήριον), and signs; and as the reason-  
sources: ings drawn from what is usual, or appears to be so,  
i. Pro- are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by in-  
bability. ference from similarity of circumstances, whether in  
ii. Exam- one or more instances, (when the speaker embracing  
ple. what is general, then infers particulars,) exist by virtue  
iii. Τεκμή- of example; while those again which are inferred from  
ριον. what is necessary and fact, are founded on proof posi-  
iv. ση- tive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or  
μειον. does not hold good, whether universally or particularly,  
result from signs, [it being remembered] that prob-  
ability is not what *always*, but what *usually* occurs; it  
is plain that it is, *in every case*, possible to get rid of  
reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The  
9. Solution of εἰκδς sometimes fallacious: the solution is, however, [sometimes] apparent, and not  
10. and is always real; for the objector does not do it away on  
the ground of its not being *probable*, but on that of its

<sup>c</sup> Or to use the English phrase, "by parity of reasoning."

<sup>d</sup> Victorius remarks, that "however at first sight this instance would seem to be one of *ἐνστασις ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου*, it is not inapplicable to the present case, inasmuch as the injured stand to the injurers in a relation *similar* to that in which the *benefited* stand to their *benefactors*."

<sup>e</sup> The question how far *ἀγνώων* may be considered a free agent, is discussed in the Nicomachæan Ethics, lib. iii, cap. i, 5; and Hooker, book i.

not being *necessary*<sup>f</sup>. Wherefore it always happens, that the defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser constructs his proof by means of probabilities (the task of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the *probability* of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, *is invariably* open to an objection; (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs *alone*, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, "that he will decide to the best of his judgment;" wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of *proof positive*, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the *probability*; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be probable in a higher degree; (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and preeminently so, if in both these particulars;) for if in the majority of instances, it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Analytics that every sign is illogical.

The same method of solution applies to reasonings grounded on example as to those on probabilities; if we have a single instance in contravention, it has

of more service to defendant than plaintiff.

11.

12. Specific signs are refutable.

13. Solution of examples.

<sup>f</sup> The orator must therefore show on which side the *greater* probability lies. "There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, "against a plenum, and objections against a vacuum; yet one of them must be right." Whately.

been answered <sup>g</sup>, [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

14. τεκμήρια irrefutable, except by assailing the premises.

But proofs positive (τεκμήρια), and the reasonings grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is clear to us from the Analytics: it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case <sup>h</sup>; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Of Amplification and Extenuation.*

1. Amplification and its opposite not τόποι, but enthymems.

AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not *elements* of enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same thing,) since the element and the topic is that under which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification and extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or falls under either of the other denominations. And these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.

<sup>g</sup> That is to say, by a λύσις φαινομένη.

<sup>h</sup> As we cannot object to the *form* of the reasoning, our only resource is to attack the *matter*: to deny the premises.

Neither, again, are the topics which are available to solution of enthymems, at all different in species from those employed in their construction: for it is evident that he effects solution who either proves [something contrary], or states an objection, and they establish a counter proof of the contrary; thus, "If one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not;" or "if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymems to show that it is, or is not the case.

3. Enthymems of refutation and confirmation are the same in kind.

But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion from which it will appear that no legitimate inference has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has assumed some false proposition.

4. Objection is not an enthymem. Definition of *ἐνστροφίς*.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and 5. maxims, and enthymems<sup>i</sup>, and, in a word, all the means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution<sup>k</sup>. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement<sup>l</sup>.

<sup>i</sup> In taking leave of a series of terms which have occurred hitherto so frequently, we may as well remark that examples, maxims, enthymems, etc. denote the particular modification of the proof, or the shape in which it is served up, *without reference to its degree of validity*: while probability, signs, *τεκμήρια*, etc. refer to its degree of validity, *without regard to the shape or manner* in which the proof is conveyed.

<sup>k</sup> Having now despatched, the first and most important of the three grand divisions of his work, viz. the subject of *πίστις*, it only remains to discuss the remaining two, *λίξις* and *τάξις*. In fact, having told the speaker *what* he is to say, he has now only to tell *how* he is to say it.

<sup>l</sup> The subjects of *πίστις*, *λίξις*, and *τάξις*, it will be recollected, constitute the *widest and most general* arrangement of his work. See book iii, chap. i, § 1.



ARISTOTLE'S  
TREATISE ON RHETORIC.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

*Of the Parts of Rhetoric.*

1. Three  
points in a  
speech.  
πίστις.  
λέξις.  
τάξις.  
The two last  
to be treat-  
ed.

As there are three points which ought to be handled respecting a speech; one, as to the sources out of which will arise means of persuasion; a second, respecting the *style*; a third, how we ought to *arrange* the *parts* of a speech. On the subject of the means of persuasion much has been said, as well as to how many the sources are out of which [they arise,] namely, that they are three; also, what is the nature of these sources, and why they are no more: for all those who decide, are persuaded either by being themselves impressed in a certain way, or from conceiving the speakers to be men of a certain character, or from the matter of fact having been proved<sup>a</sup>.

It has been stated also with respect to enthymems, whence we are to furnish ourselves with them; for [of those sources,] some are elementary propositions, *peculiar* [to the several branches of rhetoric;] others are places [of *universal* applicability]. It follows that we treat of the subject of style; for the mere being in possession of what one ought to say is not enough; but it is moreover necessary that we deliver it as we ought;

<sup>a</sup> See book i, chap. ii, § 3.

[and the doing this] contributes much to your speech's appearing to be of a certain character.

Now that by which its nature is first, was, conformably to nature, investigated the first; viz. whence these things derive their persuasive efficacy: next to this, was the disposition of them in the speaking: and thirdly, [arose an enquiry] of the greatest consequence, but which never yet has been handled, on the subject of delivery; for it was introduced into tragedy and the public recitations at a *late* period, since at first<sup>b</sup> the poets used themselves to sustain the dialogue<sup>c</sup> in their tragedies. It is therefore plain that some such power exists in relation to rhetoric, as well as to poetry; which [as connected with the latter art] Glauco the Teian, and some others, have treated of. And it depends on the voice, as to how we ought to manage it in reference to each several passion; when, for instance, we should employ a loud, when a low, and when a moderate pitch of voice; and on the manner in which we should employ its tones, viz. the acute, the grave, and the intermediate; and on certain rhythms in reference to each: for the points, in reference to which they conduct their enquiries, are three, viz. the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm. Now these proficients bear away nearly all the prizes in the disputations; and as in the other contests<sup>d</sup> the actors now produce a greater effect than the poets, so likewise do they in civil causes, owing to the depravity

3. *ὑπόκρισις* not yet handled.

4. It consists in three things.  
*μέγεθος.*  
*ἄρμονία.*  
*ῥυθμός.*

<sup>b</sup> That the two departments of author and actor were united in the same person, is asserted also by Horace, *Art. Poet.* 277, and by Plutarch, *ἑθεάσαντο τὸν θεῖον αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον, ὡσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς.*

<sup>c</sup> That *ὑποκριτής* came to designate an actor from the circumstance of his sustaining the dialogue with the chorus, may be evinced by reference to the etymology of the word. Its successive meanings have been clearly traced in the *Quarterly Review*: "*ὑποκριτής, Qui respondet, ab ὑποκρίνεσθαι, respondere, Homer, Herodot. Histrion, quia primo tragœdiæ statu histrio Choro respondebat. Suidas, ὁ ὑποκρινόμενος τῷ χορῷ. Simulator, quia histriones fictas partes tuebantur.*" No. xlv, Art. 2, p. 326.

<sup>d</sup> Those for the prize in the tragic games.

5. No art  
yet com-  
piled on it.

of states. There is not yet however any system compiled respecting these points, (since even the subject of style was brought forward at a late period,) and, if rightly conceived of, it appears an ornament adapted to vulgar tastes<sup>e</sup>; but as the whole subject of rhetoric has reference to opinion, we should pay attention to it, not as to a subject of absolute propriety, but as one of necessity; for as to mere matter of justice, we ought not to enquire further on the subject of speeches than so as to avoid giving pain, at the same time that we do not delight; for the rule of right is, that the contest be carried on by means of the facts themselves; so that, except the proof, all the rest is superfluous<sup>f</sup>; but it is notwithstanding, as has been stated, a point of great moment, in consequence of the weak judgment of the

Its influ-  
ence is  
great.

6. auditor. The subject of style, however, has some necessary though trifling claim on our attention in every system; for the expressing one's self in this or that way makes some difference with a view to exhibiting the subject clearly, not however to so great a degree [as is generally supposed]: all these points are however mere idea, and have a reference to the auditor; wherefore it is that no one teaches geometry in such a style.

This art, then, be it introduced when it may<sup>g</sup>, will

<sup>e</sup> Φορτικόν. It appears from Twining's excellent illustrations of the meaning of this word, that it is used to imply any thing *extravagant, violent, overcharged, outré*:—as applied to persons, it means *troublesome, tiresome, etc.* or *insolent, overbearing, etc.* synonymously with *ἀνελεύθερος, βάνανος, popular, low, vulgar, illiberal, etc.* Athenæus, in speaking of the rejection of Hippoclides, one of the suitors of Agarista, daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, attributes it to the disgust conceived by her father at him, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησάμενον, (see Herodot. vi, 129). Aristotle himself classes the φορτικοὶ with the βωμολόχοι, (Eth. Nich. iv, 8,) and with the οἱ πολλοὶ, (ibid. i, 5). It is in fact, (to adopt an expression of Pope's,) any thing *levelled to please the populace.*

<sup>f</sup> B. i, c. 1, § 10. οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ, πλὴν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

<sup>g</sup> Ὑπόκρισις: for he clearly foresees that from its obvious importance it must eventually become an adjunct of rhetoric, as it has already become of dramatic exhibitions.

produce the same effect as that of acting. And some 7. to a small extent have already made an effort to treat of it; Thrasymachus, for instance, on *the excitement of compassion*. Again, the being qualified for delivery is a gift of nature, and rather without the province of art; the subject of style, however, is clearly reducible to an art. Wherefore rewards are bestowed in turn on those who are proficient in this, just as there are on those rhetoricians [who claim] on the ground of delivery; for written orations influence more by means of their style than through the sentiment.

Now the poets, as was natural, began to make a stir 8. Poets first used recitation and delivery with success. upon the subject at first; for words are imitations, and the voice, of all our parts, is the most imitative<sup>b</sup>; on which account also these arts were constructed, both that of recitation, and of acting, and of others too. But as the poets, though what they said was very frivolous, appeared to acquire their reputation by means of their style; on this account the first style [of rhetoric] was formed on that of poetry, witness the style of Gorgias; and even at the present time the majority of ignorant people fancy that such orators speak most delightfully: this however is not the case, but the style of poetry and that of prose is distinct, and the result shows it; for not even the writers of tragedy themselves any longer employ the same turn of diction, but just as 9. Hence early rhetoricians adopted the florid poetical style. they have passed from trochaic to iambic metre<sup>i</sup>, because the latter is most like prose of all the other metres; so have they also relinquished all those terms which are foreign to the style of conversation, with which however the early writers used to embellish [their works], and which even at the present day are employed by

<sup>b</sup> So that of course the poet, whose business was imitation, would immediately put in requisition these two most obvious sources of it.

<sup>i</sup> The trochaic metre occurs frequently in the plays of Æschylus, the most ancient of the tragedians extant, particularly in the *Persæ*; as also in those of Euripides, especially in the *Phœnissæ* and *Orestes*; but in those of Sophocles, rarely, if ever.

those who write in heroic metre; wherefore it is ridiculous to imitate the tragedians, who in their own case no longer employ that turn of diction.

10. So that it is evident that we need not discuss with minuteness all points soever which it is possible to treat of under the head of style, but so many only as belong to such an art as we are speaking of: the other part of the subject has been spoken of in my treatise on Poetry.

## CHAP. II.

### *On Excellence of Style as made up of single Words.*

1. Excellence of style defined to be the τὸ σαφές.

LET this then have been discussed: and let excellence of style be defined to consist in its being clear; (a sign of this is this, that the diction, unless it make the sentiment clear, will not effect its purpose<sup>a</sup>;) and neither low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but in good taste; for the style of poetry indeed is not low, yet it is not becoming in prose.

2. Words that are κύρια produce perspicuity.

Of nouns and verbs<sup>b</sup> those which are in general use produce the effect of clearness: to prevent its being low, and to give it ornament, there are other nouns

<sup>a</sup> "Perspicuity consists in the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man. It is this that gives them an easy entrance; and it is with delight that men hearken to those whom they easily understand; whereas what is obscurely said, dying as it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what he said, or was afraid to have it understood." Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study*, vol. iv, p. 601.

<sup>b</sup> As Aristotle proceeds henceforth to a complete analysis of the subject of style, he first considers it in reference to the *single words* of which it is made up (*ἡξ ὧν συνέστηκε*, § 5), which occupies him to the end of the fourth chapter. He then considers it as made up of *whole sentences*; the means of investing these with *dignity*, of *adapting* them to the subject, of constructing them to please the *ear*, and as addressed to the *intellect*; and concludes with enumerating their several *elegancies*. First, then, he considers the *beauties* of style as depending on *single words*.

which have been mentioned in the Poetics, for a departure [from ordinary acceptations] causes it to appear more dignified; for men are affected in respect of style in the very same way as they are towards foreigners and citizens. On which account you should give your phrase a foreign<sup>c</sup> air; for men are admirers of things out of the way, and what is an object of admiration is pleasant<sup>d</sup>. Now in the case of metrical compositions, there are many things which produce this effect and *there* are very becoming, because both the subject and the person stand more apart [from ordinary life]; in prose, however, these helps are much fewer, for the subject is less exalted: since even in that art were a slave, or a mere youth, or [any one, in fact, in speaking] of mere trifles to express himself in terms of studied ornament, it would be rather unbecoming; but here too [as in poetry] the rule of good taste is, that your style be lowered or raised according to the subject. On which account we must escape observation in doing this, and not appear to speak in a studied manner, but naturally, for the one is of a tendency to persuade, the other is the very reverse<sup>e</sup>; because people put themselves on their guard, as though against one who has a design upon them, just as they would against adulterated wine. [Let your style then be such] as was the case with the voice of Theodorus as compared with that of the other actors<sup>f</sup>; for it ap-

3. To elevate style we must use *ξένα*, etc.

4. We must conceal our art.

<sup>c</sup> Should the epithet *foreign*, as applied to a quality of style, not be immediately apprehended, it may be well to recollect that it means the excellence opposed to the fault which we designate *homeliness*.

<sup>d</sup> This was asserted book i, chap. 11, § 23, 24.

<sup>e</sup> *Ubi cunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videtur.* Quintil. Instit. x, 3. *Artis est celare artem.*

<sup>f</sup> Harris seems to have had this passage in view when he wrote the following: " 'Tis in writing as in acting; the best writers are like our late admired Garrick. And how did that able genius employ his art? Not by a vain *ostentation* of any *one* of his powers, but by a *latent* use of them *all* in such an exhibition of nature, that, while we were present in a theatre, and only beholding an actor, we could not help thinking ourselves in Denmark with Hamlet, or in Bosworth Field with Richard." Philolog. Inq. P. ii, c. 4.

peared to be that of the character which was speaking, 5. theirs however were foreign from the character. And the deceit is neatly passed off if one frame his nomenclature upon a selection from ordinary conversation; the thing which Euripides<sup>g</sup> does, and first gave the hint of.

Words to be but sparingly employed.

As however nouns and verbs are [the materials] of which the speech is made up, and as nouns admit so many species as have been examined in the Poetics, out of the number of these we must employ but sparingly, and in very few places, *exotic*<sup>h</sup> and *compound* words, and those *newly coined*; where they may be employed I will state hereafter<sup>i</sup>: the reason [of the restriction] has been mentioned, viz. because they remove your style [from that of common life] more than is consistent with good taste. Words however of *ordinary* use, and in their *original acceptations*<sup>k</sup>, and *metaphors*, are alone available in the style of prose: a proof [that

6. Words κύρια, οικεία, μεταφοραί, proper for prose.

<sup>g</sup> In this practice, Euripides stands remarkably opposed to his predecessor Æschylus.

<sup>h</sup> Γλῶττα: "any word that belongs either to another language, or another dialect of the same language, and that is not naturalised by *common* and *popular use*." Twining.

<sup>i</sup> In the seventh chapter he says, that they may be used with effect when you would assume the language of high excitement: see § 11.

<sup>k</sup> Κύρια are words in *general use*, opposed to γλῶτται, outlandish expressions. Οικεία, words in their *primary* and literal acceptations, opposed to μεταφοραί, words *transferred* from their *primary* meaning to some *analogous* meaning. Many words are κύρια which yet are not οικεία. In fact, of the three divisions the οικεία are *necessarily the fewest*; since the *proper* and original designations of *individual* objects cannot extend to a number sufficiently great to answer all the purposes of language; the resources of which must therefore be augmented by metaphorical transfer. Even these words in time become so naturalised by common use as no longer to have any thing "of the *effect* of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like *proper terms*" (οικεία), "they suggest directly to his mind, *without the intervention of any image*, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them." Philos. of Rhet. vol. i, p. 185, 186. From those sounds which we hear on small or on coarse occasions, we do not easily receive strong impressions, or delightful images; and words to which we are nearly strangers [terms of art, etc.], whenever they occur, draw that attention on themselves which they should transmit to things. Johnson's Life of Dryden, vol. vi, p. 395, edit. 1823. Vid. the whole passage.

this is the fact, is] that these are the only words which *all* persons employ; for every body carries on conversation by means of *metaphors*, and words in their *primary sense*, and those of *ordinary use*. Thus it is plain that, if one should have constructed his style well, it will be both of a foreign character, and that [the art of the orator] may still elude observation, and [the style itself will have the advantage of clearness; this however was laid down to be the perfection of rhetorical language. But of all nouns, those which are *equivocal* suit the purposes of the sophist, for by their help he effects his fallacies, while *synonyms* are of use to the poet; I mean these which are both synonyms and of common usage, as *πορεύεσθαι* and *βαδίζειν*, for these two are both of common usage and synonymous to each other.

7. Equivocal words suit the sophist, synonyms the poet.

The nature then of each of these varieties, and how many species of metaphor there are, and also that this ornament is of the greatest effect, as well in poetry as prose, has been explained, (as I have observed above,) in the *Poetics*. In prose<sup>1</sup> however we should bestow the greater attention on them, in proportion as an oration has to be made up of fewer adjuncts than a metrical composition. Moreover the metaphor possesses in an especial manner [the beauties of] clearness and sweetness, with an air of being foreign<sup>m</sup>; and it is not possible to derive it from any other person<sup>n</sup>.

8. Metaphors. Rules for.

<sup>1</sup> Πρῶτα μὲν οὖν μεταφοραῖς χρηστέον· αὐται γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ ἡδονὴν συμβάλλονται τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ μέγεθος, — μὴ μεντοι πυκναῖς. Demetr.

<sup>m</sup> “As to metaphorical expression, that is a great excellence in style, when it is used with propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one;—conveys the meaning more luminously, and generally with a perception of delight.” Boswell’s Johnson, *Æt.* 68.

<sup>n</sup> Aristotle seems to subjoin this as the crowning praise of metaphor; for he has already told us that, that is a good the principle of which centres in ourselves; so also, in the *Topica*, he lays down that ὁ μὴ ἔστι παρ’ ἄλλον πορίσασθαι as a *greater good* ἢ ὃ ἔστι παρ’ ἄλλον. In the third book of the *Nicomachæan Ethics* he employs a similar topic of praise: ὁ παρ’ ἑτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν, μηδὲ μαθεῖν. See also book i, c. 7, § 33, of the present treatise.



9. i. Must  
be κατ'  
ἀναλογίαν.

You must however apply, in the case both of epithets and metaphors, such as are appropriate; and this will depend on their being constructed on principles of analogy, otherwise they will be sure to appear in bad taste; because contraries show themselves to be such, particularly when set by each other. But you must consider, as a purple garment becomes a youth, what is equally so to an old man; since the same garment does not become [both].

10. ii. From  
a better  
class if to  
embellish:  
from a  
lower if to  
debase.

And if you wish to embellish your subject, see you deduce your metaphor from such things coming under the same class as are better; and if to cry it down, from such as are worse: I mean, as the cases are opposed and come under the same genus, that the saying, for example, of a beggar, that "he *prays*," and of one who is praying, that "he *begs*," (both being species of asking,) is to do the thing which has been mentioned; just as Iphicrates called Callias "a mere *collector* to the goddess, and not a *bearer of the torch*." He however replied, "that he must needs be uninitiated himself, or he would not call him a *collector*, but a *bearer of the torch*." For these are both services connected with the goddess; the one however is respectable, while the other is held in no repute. And some one [speaks of the courtiers of Dionysius as] *Dionysian parasites*; they however call themselves *artificers*°. And these expressions are both metaphors; the one of persons who would depreciate, the other the contrary.

° Διονυσοκόλακας. This term, by which the tribe of flatterers seem to have been exposed to ridicule on the stage (κόλακες τοῦ Διονυσίου), was ingeniously enough borrowed from the name of the patron of the theatre, Διώνυσος; they however thought proper to exchange one theatrical appellation for another more respectable, and dignified themselves by the name τεχνίται. This, as well as the corresponding Latin term, *artifices*, seems to have been commonly applied to actors, musicians, etc. See Keuchen, note on Corn. Nep. vita Chabriæ, c. i. By the way, this sort of metaphorical embellishment appears not to be unusual in the present day, if it be true (as we are told) that the important personage who directs the culinary operations in great families be entitled *the artist*.

Even robbers, now-a-day, call themselves *purveyors*<sup>p</sup>. On which principle we may say of a man who “*has acted unjustly*,” that he “*is in error* ;” and of one who “*is in error*,” that he “*has acted unjustly*.” Again, of one who has *stolen*, both that has *taken*, [in way of diminution ;] and that has *ravaged*, [in exaggeration<sup>q</sup>]. But the saying, as the *Telephus of Euripides* does, “that he *lords it o’er* the oars, and landing in Mysia,” etc. is out of taste ; for the expression, “*lording it over*,” is above the dignity of the subject ; [the rhetorical artifice] then, is not palmed off<sup>r</sup>. There will also be a fault in the syllables, unless they are significant of a grateful sound ; for instance, Dionysius, surnamed Chalcous<sup>s</sup>, in his elegies, calls poetry, “*the clangor of Calliope*,” because both are vocal sounds ; the metaphor, however, is a paltry one, and couched in uncouth expressions<sup>t</sup>.

11. iii. The euphony must be attended to.

Again, our metaphors should *not be far-fetched* ; but we should make the transfer, on the principle of assigning names out of the number of kindred objects, and such as are the same in species, to objects which are unnamed, of which however it is clear, simultaneously with their being uttered, that they are akin ; as in that approved enigma,

12. iv. Must not be far-fetched.

“ A man I once beheld, [and wondering view’d,]  
Who, on another, brass with fire had *glued* :”

TWINING.

for the operation is undesignated by any name<sup>x</sup>, and

<sup>p</sup> Compare Thucyd. b. i, *sub init.*

<sup>q</sup> See book i, chap. 13, § 9, 10.

<sup>r</sup> Is too glaring, is seen through.

<sup>s</sup> Were it not that Plutarch attributes this surname of Dionysius (“the Brazen”) to a suggestion of his for employing brass currency at Athens, the specimen here quoted might lead us to suppose that he derived the appellation from some characteristic harshness of style.

<sup>t</sup> “*Ἀσημος φωνή*, vox quæ vel formâ vel significatione turpis est. Ern. Lex. Tec.

<sup>u</sup> This enigma is ingenious, and means *the operation of cupping*, performed in ancient days by a machine of brass. Philolog. Inq. P. ii, c. 10.

<sup>x</sup> “ Metaphor took its rise from the poverty of language. Men, not

both are species of attaching; wherefore the writer called the application of the cupping instrument, a *gluing*. And, generally speaking, it is possible out of neatly constructed *enigmas* to extract excellent *metaphors*: because it is on the principles of metaphor that men construct enigmas; so that it is evident, that [if the enigma be a good one] the metaphor has been properly borrowed.

13. v. They must be borrowed from beautiful objects. Beauty of words consists in the sound. The idea. The application.

The transfer also should be made from objects which are *beautiful*; beauty however of words consists, as Licymnius observes, in the sound or in the idea conveyed; as does also their inelegance. And there is moreover a third<sup>y</sup>, which does away the sophistical doctrine; since it is not the fact, as Bryso argues, "that no one speaks inelegantly, if indeed the using one expression instead of another, carries with it the same meaning:" for this is a fallacy; because some words are nearer in their ordinary acceptations, more assimilated, and have more peculiar force of setting the object before the eyes than others. And what is more, one word represents the object under different circumstances from another; so that we may even on this principle lay it down, that one word has more or less of beauty and inelegance than another: for although both words, [at the same time,] express [properties which are] beautiful, as well as such as are inelegant; yet they either express them not *qua* they are beautiful, or not *qua* they are inelegant; or granting they do, yet they express them, the one in a greater, the other in a less degree. But we are to deduce our metaphors from these sources;—from such as are beautiful either in sound, in meaning, or [in the image they present] to the sight, or any other sense. And there

finding upon every occasion words ready made for their ideas, were compelled to have recourse to words *analogous*, and transfer them from their *original* meaning, to the meaning *then* required." Philolog. Inq. P. ii, c. 10.

<sup>y</sup> We may perhaps term this third beauty of words, *delicacy in their application*.

is a difference, in the saying, for instance, “the *rosy-fingered* Aurora;” rather than the “*purple-fingered*,” or, what is still worse, “the *crimson-fingered*.”

Also in the case of *epithets*, it is very possible to derive one’s epithets from a degrading or disgraceful view of the case; for instance, “the murderer of his mother<sup>2</sup>,” and we may derive them from a view on the better side; as, “the avenger of his father.” And Simonides<sup>a</sup>, when the victor in a race by mules offered him a trifling present, was not disposed to write, as though feeling hurt at writing on *demi-asses*; when, however, he offered a sufficient present, he composed the poem—

14. Epithets to be used in the same way.

Hail! *Daughters of the generous Horse,*  
That skims, like wind, along the course, etc.

HARRIS.

and yet they were daughters of asses as well. Again, it is possible to express the self-same thing diminutively. And it is the employment of diminutives which renders both good and evil less; just as Aristophanes jests in “The Babylonians;” using, instead of gold, “a tiny piece of gold;” instead of “a garment,” “a little garment;” instead of “reproach,” “puny reproach;” and instead of “sickness,” “slight indisposition.” We ought, however, to be careful, and always keep to the mean in both cases.

15. ὑποκορισμός.

<sup>2</sup> Nominibus mollire licet mala; *fusca* vocetur  
*Nigrior* Illyrica cui *pice* sanguis erit, etc.

Ovid. Ar. Am. l. ii.

<sup>a</sup> See Bentley on Phalaris, p. 156. Zancleans and Messenians.

## CHAP. III.

*On Frigidity of Style.*

1. Four causes of a frigid style.  
i. Compound words.

FRIGIDITY<sup>a</sup>, as dependent on the style, consists in four points. In the use of compound words; like Lycophron<sup>b</sup>, where he says, "the many-faced heaven," and "the mighty-topped earth," and "the narrow-pathed shore." And as Gorgias used the expression, "a beggarly-mused flatterer," and "the strictly-bound-by-oath, and fully-sworn men." Or like Alcidamas, [who talks of] "the soul replete with anger, and the visage waxing fire-coloured." Again, "he supposed their zeal would be completion-working;" and "he settled a completion-working persuasiveness of speech;" and "the azure-hued level of the main." For all these expressions, by reason of their being compounded, appear poetical<sup>c</sup>.

2. ii. Use of foreign words.

This, then, is one cause: also the employment of foreign idioms is one; as when Lycophron calls Xerxes, "prodigious hero," and Sciron, "baneful man<sup>d</sup>;" or Alcidamas, when he says, "gambollings in poetry,"

<sup>a</sup> Having in the last chapter discussed the *beauties* of style as dependent on single words, he now proceeds to consider its *defects*, as they arise from the single words employed: see note on chap. ii, § 2.

<sup>b</sup> This Lycophron was a sophist, and is not to be confounded with the poet who flourished under Ptolemy Philadelphus.

<sup>c</sup> Take the following specimen: "To so vast a height did the *never-too-much-to-be-extolled* reputation of this eximious man." etc. Sir Thomas Urquhart's Jewel. See also "The Rejected Addresses;" Art. "Address of the Editors of the Morning Post."

<sup>d</sup> The expression in the original alludes to Sinnis, a famous robber, whose peculiar method of torture it was to bind his victims to the boughs of trees forcibly bent together, and suddenly loosened, so that the violence of their reflex tore the limbs from their bodies. However *α Σίννις ἀνὴρ* was probably not more elegant in Greek, than the expression "a Turpin" is considered in English.

and "nature's improbity;" and "whetted by unrestrained rage of soul."

A third description of frigidity consists in the employment of epithets either too long, out of place, or too frequent; for in poetry, indeed, it is becoming enough to say "white milk;" in prose, however, it is rather bad taste. Some also, should there be a superabundance of them, betray [the rhetorician's art], and make it evident that the whole is a mere made-up thing: this, however, you may occasionally avail yourself of, since it produces a departure from the ordinary style, and renders the diction foreign. Yet ought we to aim at the mean; for [the too free indulgence in the licence] does more harm than the speaking carelessly; for the one has no beauty, the other has [*positive*] fault. Hence it is that the writings of Alcidas appear frigid; for he employs epithets *not as the seasoning, but as the food*, with such profusion does he scatter them, and those both too long, and where the meaning is self-evident: thus, he does not say the sweat, but "the moist sweat\*:" nor to the Isthmian games, but "to Isthmus' full assemblage:" nor does he speak of laws; but of "the laws, the sovereigns of states:" nor, of the race; but of "the soul's rapid impulse:" nor of a museum; but of "taking nature's museum with you:" and of "rueful care of the soul." Nor does he speak of favour; but of "the fabricator of a whole people's favour:" and of "a dispenser of the pleasure of his audience." [He would not tell you] of branches; but "amid the branches of the wood did he conceal it:" nor, that he covered his person; but "the nakedness of his person:" and of "desire the counter-rival of the soul:" (for this is at once a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry:) and of "such an ill-omen'd excess of improbity." Hence those who ex-

3. iii. Epithets too long, too frequent, or out of place.

\* Victorius thinks that Boccaccio, in his Decameron, has employed too profusely this poetical ornament. Comment. in Demet. Phal.

press themselves with this poetic air, produce by their want of taste both the ridiculous and the frigid, and from their loquacious prosing, become deficient in clearness; for whenever one unnecessarily obtrudes any thing on an auditor who already apprehends him, putting an end to all perspicuity, he produces obscurity.

Compound words suited to Dithyrambic poetry; exotic to epic; metaphors to the drama.

4. iv. Improper metaphors.

People, however, do employ compounds, when the subject is without a proper appellative, and the composition is easily effected: for instance "*pastime*;" but if it occur frequently, it is decidedly poetical. Wherefore a style characterised by compounds, is most available to the Dithyrambic poets; for such words are sonorous: exotic words are most useful to epic poets<sup>f</sup>; for they have something dignified and superb: metaphor however to iambic verse; for [dramatists] now employ it, as has been already stated.

Moreover, fourthly, frigidity originates in metaphor; for there are even metaphors which are unbecoming: some, from their being ridiculous<sup>g</sup>; for the writers of comedy employ metaphor: others, from their being too dignified, and having too great an air of tragedy<sup>h</sup>; and should they be far-fetched, they become indistinct; like Gorgias, [when he talks of] things as *wan*, and [again] as *ruddy*. "You have *sown* in shame, and *reaped* in ruin;" for this has too much the air of poetry. And as Alcidamas, [who calls] "philosophy the *rampart* of the laws:" and "the *Odyssey* a beautiful *mirror*

<sup>f</sup> May we not instance Milton's *Hebraisms*?

<sup>g</sup> A striking instance of this occurs in two well known lines, in which Winter is said,

"To *glaze* the lakes, and *bridle* up the floods,  
And *perriwig* with *wool* the *bald-pate* woods."

<sup>h</sup> Such was the language of the poet who, describing the footmen's flambeaux at the end of an opera, sung or said,

Now *blaz'd* a *thousand flaming suns*, and bade  
Grim night retire.—

of human life<sup>1</sup>." Again, "introducing no such gambling in poetry:" since all these expressions, for the reasons above-mentioned, are destitute of persuasive efficacy. But what Gorgias said on a swallow, when in its flight it had mewed on him, was in the best style of tragedy; for he exclaimed, "Oh! fie *Philomela*;" for to a bird, indeed, the act was not unbecoming, to a young lady, however, it would have been. So that he reproached her neatly enough, speaking of her as what she *had* been, not as what she then *was*.

## CHAP. IV.

*Of Simile.*

THE simile, too, is in fact metaphor; for the difference is trifling: for when [the poet] says of Achilles, "*Like* a lion he leaped on them," it is a simile; but when he says, "A very lion he leaped on them," it is a metaphor: for since both are brave, [the poet], making the transfer, has spoken of Achilles as a lion. The simile is useful too in prose, though seldom, since it carries with it the air of poetry. And you must introduce them just as you would metaphors; for they are metaphors differing in that particular which has been stated<sup>2</sup>.

The following are similes; viz. that which Androtion employed against Idrieus, that "he was like puppies loosed from their chain;" for they rushing at people bite them, and Idrieus, too, now that he was dis-

1. Simile :  
how it dif-  
fers from  
a metaphor.

2. Is useful  
in prose.

3. In-  
stances of  
similes.

<sup>1</sup> However correct Mr. Harris's taste may be in considering this an elegant metaphor, it seems extraordinary that he should quote the passage thus: "According to Aristotle, the *Odyssey* of Homer was *elegantly* called by Alcidas, *καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κατόπτρον*, etc." *Philolog.* Inq. P. ii, c. 10. Surely Aristotle does not consider this as an *elegant* metaphor.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the insertion of the particle denoting similitude, ὅς λέων, instead of λέων ἐπόρουσεν.



charged, was a dangerous person. Again, as Theodamas, in a *simile*, compared Archidamus to Euxenus, without his knowledge of geometry; on the principles of similar ratios: for [*conversely*] Euxenus would be Archidamus, had [the latter] a knowledge of geometry. Also the instance which occurs in the *Politeia* of Plato, that those who spoil the dead are like young dogs, "which bite the stone, without touching the person who throws it." Also the [*simile*] which he employed against the populace, "that it was like a pilot, strong indeed, but rather deaf." And of the metres of poets, "they are like those in the prime of youth who are without beauty;" for the latter having lost their freshness, and the former their numerical arrangement, are no longer like the same thing. Also the simile of Pericles against the Samians, [who said] "they were like young children, who indeed accept the sop, but still cry:" and against the Bœotians, that "they were like holm-oaks; for these holm-oaks are cut down by their own means<sup>b</sup>, as were also the Bœotians, in their contests with each other." And what Demosthenes used before the populace, that "it is like those who are sea-sick when on board." So, too, Democritus likened the orators to nurses, "who, swallowing the sop themselves, besmear the infants with spittle." And in the same way Antisthenes likened Cephisidotus the slim to frankincense, for "in its *consumption* it spreads universal delight."

<sup>b</sup> Victorius's conjecture as to the means whereby these trees destroy themselves appears rather forced. May there not be some allusion to the *original* of the lately discovered fable of Phædrus; in which the trees, having been made to dispute about providing a handle for the woodman's axe, after seeing the fatal use he makes of the present, acknowledge that they deserve that destruction which they had provided for themselves? The Latin fabulist himself seems to think that his master, Æsop, had carried matters too far in making trees speak, since he deems it necessary to apologise:

"Calumniari si quis autem voluerit,  
Quod arbores loquantur," etc.

Phæd. Prol. lib. i.

[*Thus the simile is metaphor*], for it is free to you to enunciate all these both as metaphors and as similes. So that it is plain that as many as, when enunciated *as metaphors*, are approved, will also become similes; and [*vice versâ*] *the similes*, when *without* the note [of similitude], will become metaphors. But the metaphor, which is constructed on the principle of similar ratios, ought always to admit of paying back [the borrowed term<sup>c</sup>]; as also in other cases, and in that of [metaphor], from species to species: for instance, if a cup be called "the *shield* of Bacchus," it is also proper to call a shield "the *cup* of Mars." Of these materials, then, is a discourse made up.

4. Metaphors must admit of paying back the borrowed term.

## CHAP. V.

*On the Necessity of speaking the Language with Purity.*

BUT purity in speaking your language<sup>a</sup> is the foundation of all style; and this depends on five particulars. First, on the connective particles<sup>b</sup>, whether one pay them back or not, just as they are of a nature to precede or follow, and as each requires; thus, *although* and *on my part*, require *yet* and *on his part* [to follow them. And it is necessary to make a return of the one to the other while it is yet recollected, and not to suspend them at too great intervals: neither should we

1. Purity of style depends on five points.  
2. i. On the connective particles.

<sup>c</sup> A metaphor is said *ἀνταποδίδοσθαι*, when it may be *inverted*: for instance, just as you would call a pilot, "the ruler of his vessel;" so may you call a ruler, "the pilot of the state." Ern. Lex.

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle having in the last three chapters given us the necessary information respecting the *materials* of style, its single words, proceeds now to treat of the *arrangement* of those materials in whole sentences.

<sup>b</sup> One is surprised to find another great critic of antiquity declaring it unnecessary to be very particular in this respect:—*χρηὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς συνδέσμους μὴ μάλα ἀνταποδίδοσθαι ἀκριβῶς, οἷον τῷ μὲν, τὸ δὲ.* Demet. Phal. περὶ ἐρμηνείας, § 53.

[insert another] connective before making a return to the connective which already has a claim on us; for in very few instances is this appropriate. "But I, after he spoke to me, for Cleon came up beseeching me and putting it to me, went, taking them along with me:" for in these words many connectives are thrown in before the first connective has been paid back; and if the interval between the words "*I*" and "*went*" be great, a want of clearness takes place. One source then of correctness originates in the connectives. And a second, in the expressing yourself in the appropriate terms, and not in generals<sup>c</sup>. A third, in terms which are not ambiguous: this, however, only when you do not deliberately choose the opposite; the very thing which they do, who, whilst they have nothing to say, yet affect to say something marvellous; for such persons, in their invention of somewhat to say, give vent to these terms, just as Empedocles did. For the circumlocution by its length imposes on people, and the auditors are affected in the very self same way as the populace in transactions with soothsayers; for when they utter their ambiguities, they yield assent as they go on; [as in the famous oracle], "Cræsus having crossed the Halys will overthrow a mighty empire." And it is because the chance of mistake is less, that soothsayers express themselves *in generals* on their subject: for in "even and odd<sup>d</sup>" he will more frequently be right who cries [only *generally*] either "*even*" or "*odd*," than one who would [*specify*] the exact number; and so one who predicts simply that a thing will happen, than he who would subjoin *when*<sup>e</sup>. On which account the soothsayers never add the further distinc-

3. ii. In using terms distinct, and not vague.  
4. iii. In terms not ambiguous.

<sup>c</sup> By τῶν περιέχουσιν is meant, not *circumlocutions*, but the use of a general instead of a particular term, as ἐρυθρὸς in the place of φοῖνιξ, which of course much weakens the idea.

<sup>d</sup> Ludere par impar. Hor. Sat. lib. ii, 3, 248.

<sup>e</sup> Hence the distinguishing superiority of the prophecies of our Saviour's coming; for in them not the simple fact alone, but the very period at which it should occur was specified.

tion of "*when*." All these errors then are similar; so that, unless it be with a view to some such end, they are to be avoided.

The fourth essential is the preserving the distinction which Protagoras marked out between the genders of nouns, viz. masculine, feminine, and neuter; for it will be necessary to make these correspond correctly. Thus, "She, having come and having conversed, departed."

5. iv. In the proper genders.

The fifth consists in correctly quoting the plural, dual, and singular numbers. "They, coming up, commenced beating me."

6. v. In the proper numbers.

In a word, the written style ought to be easily read and understood; and in these requisites it is the same [as that of recitation]; the very qualities however these which numerous connectives do not possess: neither the compositions which it is not easy to point, as those of Heraclitus. For the pointing of Heraclitus' works is quite a task, from its being far from clear whether words refer to those which precede or those which follow them<sup>f</sup>. For example, in the beginning of his work, "Of reason existing always men are ignorant:" for it is not clear to which branch of the sentence we should point off the "always."

Four general rules.  
i. Style ought to be easy to read and to understand.

ii. It must not depend on the punctuation.

This moreover produces a solecism; the failure in paying back the idea, if, [in the case of two words,] you do not bring each under an expression adapted to both<sup>g</sup>: for example, to the words "colour or sound," the expression "seeing" has not a common reference;

iii. In an expression of more than one word we must use a verb applicable to all.

<sup>f</sup> We can no where find a more striking instance of the want of clearness to which a neglect of these cautions gives rise, than in book ii, chap. 18, of the worthy Stagyrite's own work.

<sup>g</sup> Or, to take his own illustration, in speaking of *the objects of different senses*, be careful not to annex a verb which denotes the operation of *one sense alone*. This is well exposed in the Spectator:—"I have known a hero compared to a thunderbolt, a lion, and the sea; all and each of them proper metaphors for impetuosity, courage, or force. But by bad management it hath so happened, that the thunderbolt hath overflowed its banks; the lion hath been darted through the skies; and the billows have rolled out of the Libyan desert." No. 595.

iv. There must be no long parentheses.

whereas the expression "perceiving" has. Again, sentences become indistinct, if, delaying to thrust in many intermediate remarks, you do not put first and state [what naturally comes first]. For example, "For I intended, after I had conversed with him on this and that subject, and so on, to depart:" not, [stating it naturally thus,] "For I intended to depart;" and afterwards introducing, "after I had conversed on this and that, and so on."

## CHAP. VI.

### *On Elevation of Style.*

1. Elevation produced by seven expedients.

i. Using the definition in place of the noun.

The reverse produces abruptness.

2. ii. Avoiding either, if out of taste.

3. iii. Illustration by metaphor and epithets.

4. iv. By using the plural for the singular.

5. v. Assigning to each word a distinct particle.

6. vi. Using connectives, but

THE following expedients contribute to elevation of the style, viz.—the employing the definition instead of the noun; saying, for instance, not "a circle," but "a plane superficies, whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre." The reverse, however, viz. the use of the noun instead of the definition, contributes to abruptness.

Again, [the avoiding either,] if it be indelicate or unbecoming; i. e. using the noun, if the indelicacy be in the definition; or the definition, if it be in the noun.

Also, the illustration of the subject by metaphor and epithets, guarding, however, against what savours of poetry. And the putting what is but single as many, the thing which the poets do: though the haven be but one, yet they tell you of "Grecian havens;"—and, "the letters' many-opening folds<sup>a</sup>."

Also, the not bringing all your words under a common particle, but assigning to each its own: "*This* woman, *this* my wife." And the expressing yourself with a connective; but if abruptly, without a connective indeed, though not unconnectedly; for instance,

<sup>a</sup> Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 727.

“ Having departed and having spoken to him;” or, if abruptly without them.  
 “ having departed, I spoke to him.”

The precept of Antimachus, too, is of service, viz. 7. vii. By negative qualities,<sup>b</sup> the drawing your expressions from absent qualities<sup>b</sup>, which he does in celebrating the hill Teumessus, [commencing], “ There is a certain little hill visited by the winds<sup>c</sup> ;” for thus the subject is carried on to infinity. And this expedient holds good alike in the case of qualities which are good, and such as are bad<sup>d</sup>, just as the subject has them not, in whichever way it may be of service. Hence the poets deduce their expressions<sup>e</sup>, the “ stringless” and the “ lyreless melody;” for they build their epithets on privatives. And this expedient is also approved in analogical metaphors; for instance, the saying of “ a trumpet,” that it is a “ lyreless harmony.”

<sup>b</sup> How much may be made of a mere summary of negations, will readily be acknowledged by those who have read Rochester’s poem on *Nothing*; and another in Latin on the same subject (if subject it may be called), by Passerat, a poet and critic of the sixteenth century, in France. This last is usually subjoined to Johnson’s Life of Rochester.

<sup>c</sup> These words, it will be observed, do not in themselves afford an instance of the precept here recommended; but, as it appears that the work of Antimachus was well known, they were probably intended as a hint at a passage in which an illustration was to be found. Of Aristotle’s quotations in general, it may be remarked that, however naturally we might expect to meet with beautiful passages, in illustration of the several beauties of style which he successively discusses, they present but a series of allusions (now obscure and scarcely intelligible), to passages which were easily accessible to his audience, but which have been lost to us amid the general wreck of ancient literature. See Victorius’s remark, cap. iii, § 3.

<sup>d</sup> Whether in praising or blaming.

<sup>e</sup> It should be remembered that these *negative* epithets are very common to the Greek poets. Victorius points out many instances: as, *κῶμον ἀναυλότατον*, Eurip. Phœn. 818; *Θίασον ἀβάκχευτον*, Orest. 319; *μηνυτῆρος ἀφθειγκτου*, Æsch. Eumen. 245; *ἀπτεροῖς πωτήμασιν*, *ibid.* 250, etc. There is a fine instance of this *negative* mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah, li, 21.—“ Thou drunken, but not with wine.” Twining.

## CHAP. VII.

*Of the becoming in Style.*

1. What constitutes good taste in style is, that it be παθητική, ἠθική: and both suitably to the subject-matter.

2.

3. παθητική renders the audience sympathetic.

6. ἠθική renders the speech appropriate to the audience.

STYLE will possess the quality of being in good taste, if it be expressive at once of feeling and character, and in proportion to<sup>a</sup> the subject-matter. This proportion, however, is preserved, provided the style be neither careless on questions of dignity, nor dignified on such as are mean: neither to a mean word let ornament be superadded; otherwise it appears mere burlesque; as Cleophon uses to do; for he has expressed some things equally ridiculously, as though he were to say, "*August fig-tree.*"

But [the style] expressive of feeling, supposing the case be one of assault, is the style of a man in a passion; if, however, it be one of loathsomeness and impiety, the expressing yourself with disgust and painful caution; if, however, the case demand praise, with exultation; if pity, with submission; and so on in the other cases. And a style which is appropriate, moreover, invests the subject with persuasive efficacy. For the mind is cheated into a persuasion, that the orator is speaking with sincerity, because, under such circumstances, men stand affected in *that* manner. So that people suppose things to be even as the speaker states them, what though, in reality, they are not: and the hearer has a kindred feeling with the orator, who expresses himself feelingly, even should he say nothing to the purpose; availing themselves of which, many bear down their hearers in the storm of passion.

But moreover, this mode of showing by means of signs is expressive of character; because, on every condition and habit of life, is consequent a language

<sup>a</sup> Might we borrow an expression from the language of the painter, we should say, "*in proper KEEPING with.*"

sued to it. I use the expression condition, in reference to the stage of life; as youth, manhood, or age; and [to the sex], as man, or woman; and [to nation], as Lacedæmonian, or Thessalian. [I mean] by habits, 7. those conformably to which one is of a certain character in life; for it is not according to every habit that the life assumes a certain character: if then one express himself in the language appropriate to the habit, he will produce the effect of being characteristic; for a rustic and a man of education, will express themselves neither in the same words, nor in the same manner. And the auditors are affected, in some way, by that feeling of which the declaimers avail themselves, till it nauseates; [putting it to their audience thus], “who knows not?”—“all men know it.” For the auditor acknowledges with a kind of confusion, that he participates [in that information] which all the rest of the world possess. The employment of them opportunely, 8. General rules. or inopportunely, is, however, a consideration common to every species [of ornament]; but for every excess 9. We must correct ourselves as it were. [in them], there is that corrective which is in the mouth of every body; for, of yourself, you should append a reproof on yourself; for it appears in reality [an ornament], at least since the use of it does not escape the notice of the speaker himself. Further, the speaker is 10. We must occasionally neglect the rules of art. not at once to employ every thing which is proportionate; for thus the hearer has the deceit passed off on him. I mean that, if the terms be harsh, he is not to employ a harsh tone and expression of countenance, and the other peculiarities [of harshness]: if this caution be not observed, [our artifices] severally appear what they really are. But if he employ some and not others, without observation he produces the same effect. Still, if expressions of softness be uttered harshly, and such as are harsh with softness, they become divested of efficacy to persuade. But compound words, and a 11. We must not use compound words ex-

plurality of epithets, and foreign idioms, are appropriate chiefly to one who speaks under the excitement of some



cept when  
excited.

passion;—for with one, [for instance,] who is affected by anger, we have a fellow-feeling in his calling his wrongs “heaven-measuring,” or “prodigious:” they are so, too, when one is already master of his audience, and has wrought them up to enthusiasm, either by panegyric or invective, by [the excitement] of anger or friendly feeling; the which Isocrates does in “The Panegyric,” near the conclusion; “—the record and remembrance;” and, “men who had the spirit—.” For the speaker, in a transport of enthusiasm, gives utterance to expressions such as these; so that the audience also, being forsooth similarly affected themselves, readily welcome them. Wherefore they are adapted to poetry; for poetry is the language of enthusiasm.

It is, then, either in this way [that we are to employ poetical expressions], or *in irony*; as Gorgias was in the habit of doing; and [as Socrates does] in the Phædrus [of Plato].

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Rhythm.*

1. The style  
must have  
rhythm, but  
not metre.

THE modelling of the diction should, however, be neither metrical nor without rhythm<sup>a</sup>: for the first has no persuasive efficacy (since it appears to have been got up), and at the same time it also draws off [the attention]; for it causes one to fix his attention on the similarities of cadence, when they will recur again; just in the way that little children anticipate the cryer; (for when he demands, —“Whom does this freedman choose as his patron?”— [they exclaim], “Cleon:”) that, however, which is without rhythm, has no measure. The diction ought, however, to be measured,

<sup>a</sup> In pursuance of that systematic plan which we have remarked that Aristotle has adopted in considering the subject of style, he proceeds here to treat of it as addressed to the ear.

yet without metre; for what is destitute of measure is displeasing and indistinct. But by number all things are measured; and in modelling the diction, the number is rhythm<sup>b</sup>, of which the metres are certain divisions<sup>c</sup>. Hence the sentence should possess rhythm, 3. though not metre; for then it will become verse; and its very rhythm should be without preciseness. This, however, will be the case if, up to a certain point, it be preserved.

But of the rhythms, the heroic is stately, and not adapted to conversation, and deficient in varied cadence; the iambic, however, is the very style of the multitude; whence it is that persons in conversation give utterance to iambic lines, most of all metres. But [in a speech] there should be a degree of stateliness and departure from [the ordinary phrase]. Yet the trochaic metre is too tripping<sup>d</sup>; and all tetrameters show it; for tetrameters are a kind of dancing rhythm<sup>e</sup>. But the pæan remains, which orators, commencing with Thrasymachus, began to employ; they were not, however, able to explain what it was. Yet the pæan is the third, and comes next to those [rhythms] which have been mentioned; for it is as *three to two*. But of

4. Rhythms of various kinds.

Heroic.  
Iambic.

Trochaic.

Pæan.

Ratios of the rhythms.

<sup>b</sup> "Rhythm differs from *metre*, inasmuch as rhythm is proportion applied to any motion whatever; *metre* is proportion, applied to the motion of words spoken." Harris. "The *rhythm* of a dactyl and anapæst is the same; the *metre* is different. The distinction is similar to that of permutations and combinations in arithmetic." Seale, *Analysis of Greek Metres*. *Metre*, in short, cannot exist independently of *articulate sounds*; while rhythm may be heard in any proportionate succession of sounds; as in the ringing of hammers on an anvil, or the flapping of the wings of a bird.

<sup>c</sup> *Metre* is distinctly stated, in the *Poetic*, to be a species of rhythm. Harris also says, "All *metre* is rhythm, yet all rhythm is not *metre*." *Philolog. Inq.* P. ii, c. 2.

<sup>d</sup> Twining illustrates it by the following line:—

"Jolly mortals, fill your glasses; noble deeds are done by wine."

<sup>e</sup> Κορδακικώτερος—namby-pamby: κόρδαξ was a species of immodest lascivious dance.

the former [rhythms, the ratio is] of the one, [the heroic,] as *one* to *one*; of the others, [the iambic and trochaic,] as *two* to *one*<sup>f</sup>. But next to these ratios ranks that of whole and half<sup>g</sup>; and this is the pæan. The others then are to be abandoned for the reasons stated, and because they are resolvable into verse: the pæan is, however, to be retained; since out of that only rhythm, of all which have been mentioned, it is not possible to construct any metre; so that [in employing it] most of all rhythms, an orator will elude detection<sup>h</sup>.

5. The pæan is to be retained.

At present, indeed, the orators employ one pæan, [as well in concluding] as on opening; the conclusion, however, ought to differ from the opening [of a speech]. And there are two species of pæans, opposed to each other; whereof the one is adapted to the opening,

6. Two sorts of pæan.

<sup>f</sup> As the Greeks considered a *long* syllable as equivalent to two times, and a *short* only to one, two short syllables were of course equivalent to one long; so that, in either of the feet of which heroic metre is composed, a ratio of equality exists; (for instance, in the dactyl,  $\bar{\cdot} : \cdot\cdot : 2 : 1$  and  $1$ ; or, in the spondee,  $\bar{\cdot} : \bar{\cdot} : 2 : 2$ .) The same observation will explain the ratio of the iambus, ( $\cdot\bar{\cdot} : 1 : 2$ ), and the trochee, ( $\bar{\cdot} : \cdot : 2 : 1$ .) Now the pæan ( $\cdot\cdot\bar{\cdot} : 3 : 2$ ), holds a mean ratio between that of the heroic metre on the one hand, and that of the iambic and trochaic respectively on the other; the ratio of the former being merely that of equality, while the ratio of the latter was too much in excess.

<sup>g</sup> Ἡμιόλιος—sesquiduplex—a whole and half besides;—“Necesse—partem pedis aut æqualem esse alteri parti; aut altero tanto, aut sesqui esse majorem. Ita fit *æqualis*, dactylus; *duplex*, iambus; *sesquiple*x, pæon.”—Cicero, Orat. c. 56.

<sup>h</sup> Though the illustrations already given have been perhaps too prolix, I cannot forbear transcribing the following passage from Harris, in illustration of the whole subject:—“The rhythm of the heroic foot is one to one, which constitutes, in music, what we call *common time*; and in musical vibration, what we call the *unison*. The rhythm of the iambic is one to two, which constitutes, in music, what we call *triple time*; and, in musical vibration, what we call *the octave*. The rhythm next to these, is that of two to three, or else its equivalent, three to two; a rhythm compounded of the two former times united; and which constitutes, in musical vibration, what we call *the fifth*. 'Twas here then they discovered *the foot* they wanted; that *foot* which, being neither the heroic nor the iambic, was yet so far connected with them, as to contain virtually within itself the *rhythms* of them both.”—Philolog. Inq. P. ii, c. 2.

(just, in fact, as they employ it;) this is that one of which the long syllable is first, and the three short ones at the end, [as in the word] *Δαλῳγενῆς*, and *Χρῳσοκομῳ*. The other, however, contrariwise, is that whereof the three short syllables are first, and the long at the end, [as in the conclusion of the line]—

Μετῳ δῳ γῳν ὑδατῳ τῳ ὠκεανὸν ἠφῳνῖσῳ νυξ.

Afterwards night obscured both earth, and water, and ocean.

This [pæan] makes a good conclusion; whereas the short syllable, owing to its being incomplete, renders the sentence mutilated. But it is right to break off with a long syllable, for your conclusion to be clearly marked, not by means of the *amanuensis*, nor merely by annotations on the margin, but by means of the *rhythm*.

That, then, the diction should be conformable to rhythm, and not deficient in it, the particular rhythms too which will render it so conformable, and these under what arrangement, have been stated.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Style continuous and its opposite<sup>a</sup>.*

THE style must needs be either *continuous*, and united by means of connectives, just like the protracted odes of the dithyrambic poets<sup>b</sup>; or *reflex*, and like the antistrophic odes of the old poets.

1. Style is of two sorts, *εἰρομένη*, *κατεστραμμένη*.

<sup>a</sup> Style is here considered as addressed to the intellect of the auditor.

<sup>b</sup> *Λέξις εἰρομένη*, in which the sentence has no other unity than that which copulatives give it, nor any other measure than the completion of the sense, and the necessity of taking breath; or, as Cicero in few words so admirably describes it, “*illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens*.” This Aristotle compares to what he calls the *ἀναβολαί* in dithyrambic poetry; meaning, I think, evidently the long, irregular, protracted odes of the more modern dithyrambic poets: for the word *ἀναβολή*, here,

2. i. εἰρομέ-  
νη, or unin-  
terrupted.

Definition  
of it.

Now the *continuous* style is the old style, as "This is the exposition of the historical research of Herodotus, of Thurium<sup>c</sup>," etc. For formerly indeed every one employed it, but now very few. I call that continuous, which in itself has no termination, should not the circumstance under narration have been terminated. But it is unpleasant, from its being indefinite; for all like to descry the end. Wherefore it is that racers pant and faint away *just at the turn*; for before, while they have the goal in view before them, they do not tire. The continuous style, then, is this.

3. Reflex  
style in  
periods,

is pleasing.

Easily re-  
membered.

But the *reflex* is that which consists of periods. I call a period a form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance. A diction of this description is pleasing, and easily conveys information: now it is *pleasing* from its being the opposite of that which is indefinite<sup>d</sup>; and because the hearer all along supposes that he is securing something, from the circumstance that something is constantly finished off for him; but the not foreseeing nor despatching any thing is unpleasant: and it *easily conveys information*, because it is

does not, I believe, signify *exordium*, *proœmium*, as usually understood, but was, probably, the name by which ὠδαὶ μακρὰι καὶ πολυειδέεις were distinguished," etc.—Twining, note 17.

<sup>c</sup> Herodotus, though a native of Halicarnassus, went latterly as a colonist to Thurium.

<sup>d</sup> "— While other sentences are indefinite, and (like a geometrical right line) may be produced indefinitely, the *period* (like a circular line) is always circumscribed, returns and terminates at a given point. In other words, while other sentences, by the help of common copulatives, have a sort of boundless effusion, the constituent parts of a period have a sort of reflex union, in which union the sentence is so far complete, as neither to require, nor even to admit a further extension. Readers find a pleasure in this grateful circuit, which leads them so agreeably to an acquisition of knowledge." Harris, *Philolog. Inq.* P. ii, c. 4. He quotes the commencement of his own *Hermes* and *Philosophical Arrangements*, with the opening of Cicero's *Offices*, Demosthenes' *Oration concerning the Crown*, and that of the *Panegyric* by Isocrates, (whom he calls the father of periods,) as instances of periodical style.

easily remembered; this, however, is the case, because the diction which consists of periods has number, which of all things is most easily recollected. And hence every one remembers verse better than prose; for it has numbers by which it is measured. The period ought also to be terminated with the sense, and not to be interrupted like this verse of Sophocles,—

4. The period must finish with the sense.

“This is Calydon, land of the territory of Pelops<sup>e</sup>.”

For by dividing it is possible to understand the contrary [of the fact], as in the case of the instance cited, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period either *consists of clauses*, or is *simple*. But the period consisting of clauses is a mode of speech perfect and distinct, and easily pronounced at a breath; not, however, at the point of division, like the fore-mentioned period, but altogether. And a clause is one subdivision of it. By a *simple* period, I mean one consisting of a single clause.

5. A period is either in clauses or simple.

But neither the clauses nor the periods ought to be either curtailed or prolix; for their brevity often causes the hearer to feel a hitch; since it needs must be, if while he is yet [in thought] hastening onward, that limit of termination which he conceives within himself happens to be thrown back by the speaker's ceasing, that a kind of hitch, as it were, occurs, owing to the impulse backward. Those, however, which are prolix cause the hearer to be left behind; just as they who make the turn too far on the outside of the goal, for they don't keep up with those walking with them<sup>f</sup>; and in a similar way, periods which are prolix grow into an oration, and are something like a desultory ode<sup>g</sup>. So that that occurs which Democritus, the Chian, joked

6. They must not be curtailed.

Nor prolix.

<sup>e</sup> This line is found quoted by Lucian, as taken from a drama of Euripides, no longer extant, entitled Meleager.

<sup>f</sup> Probably an English serjeant would have illustrated this by a column wheeling into line.

<sup>g</sup> See the note on § 1 of this chapter.

Melanippides about, viz. that he produced desultory odes instead of antistrophes. "A man in framing a nuisance for others, frames one for himself; and long tedious odes are the greatest nuisance to him who produces them<sup>h</sup>;" for it is appropriate enough to hold such language as this respecting the framers of prolix clauses. But those which are brief in their clauses do not, in fact, become periods; therefore they draw on the hearer by fits and starts.

7. Style of periods is either διηρημένη or ἀντικειμένη.

Of style which consists of periods, one species is merely divided [by disjunctives], another has an antithesis. Simply *divided*, as, "I have often felt surprised at those who convened the general assemblies *and*<sup>i</sup> established the gymnastic contests." The style, however, which *has antithesis*, is that in which, in each clause, either there is one contrary put in conjunction with another, or the same is linked in connection with contraries: as, "They benefited both, as well those who *remained behind*, as those *who joined the expedition*; since they made acquisitions for the latter *more* than they possessed at home; while to they former they abandoned, in what remained at home, a full *competence*." The ideas set in opposition are,—staying behind,—joining the expedition; competence,—more. [And in this sentence]: "So that both to those who *wanted money*, and to those who *desired to enjoy it*," etc. Here *enjoyment* stands opposed to *acquisition*. And again: "It happens frequently in these cases, that while the *prudent fail*, the *simple succeed*."—"Forthwith, indeed, they claimed the prize of highest valour, and *not long after* they gained the sovereignty of the sea."—"That he *sailed*, indeed, through the *main land*, and *marched* across the *sea*; *joining with* a bridge the Hellespont, while *he channelled* through mount Athos." Again: "That, citizens though they were *by*

<sup>h</sup> A neat parody this on Hesiod, Opp. et D. v. 263.

<sup>i</sup> "In hoc loco τὸ καὶ non tam copulandi, quam discernendi vim habet." Ernest. Lex. Tech.

*birth*, they were yet deprived by law of their franchise in the *city*.”—“ While some of them *miserably perished*, others were *disgracefully preserved*.” Again: “ That *privately*, indeed, he employed barbarian slaves; while *in public* he allowed many of the allies to be in slavery:”—“ Either they would *possess* it while alive, or *leave it* <sup>8.</sup> *behind* when dead.” Again, the expression which some one made use of against Pitholaus and Lycophron in the court: “ They *sold* you, indeed, when they were at home; but when they were come to us, they were themselves *bought*.”—For all these [antitheses] produce the fore-mentioned effect.

And a style of this description is pleasing, because contraries are most easily apprehended, and, when set by each other's side, they become still more easy of apprehension: and because they bear a resemblance to a reasoning process; for the *elenchus* is an inference of contraries. Such, then, is *antithesis*:—but an *equi-* <sup>9. Equi-</sup> *poise* occurs if the clauses be equal; and *alliteration*, if <sup>poise,</sup> *παρίσῳσις.* <sup>Allitera-</sup> *παρομοίω-* <sup>tion,</sup> *σις.* if each of the clauses have its extremities similar: and [this similarity] it needs must have either at the beginning or ending; and the beginning always has original words [similar<sup>k</sup>]; but the ending, either last syllables [which are similar,] or inflections of the same word, or the same word itself. [Instances of alliteration] at the beginning, are as follow<sup>l</sup>:

<sup>k</sup> If you would produce alliteration at the *commencement* of a clause, you must employ words which, *in their original form and previously to any inflection*, are similar; since in that situation, a similarity will fail of striking you which depends merely on one or two syllables at the *end* of the words, such as may be found to exist, in a greater or lesser degree, between *all* nouns of the same declension, etc. (e. g. Latin nouns of the third declension ending in *o*); at the *conclusion*, however, of a clause, a weaker and less striking similarity will suffice. Compare his *first* example with those following the words *ἐπι τελευτῆς*.

<sup>l</sup> As no English words occur to me which will at once exemplify the alliteration, and prove a literal translation of the Greek, I have set down the original words as I find them. They have been given in Latin thus,—*AGRum accepit ÆGRum ab ipso*.



'ΑΓΡὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν 'ΑΡΓὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ,  
For he received from him land untill'd.

Δωρητοί τ' 'ΕΠΕλοντο, παράρρητοί τ' 'ΕΠΕεσσιν,  
By presents pleased, by words appeased.

And at the ending, thus:

'Ὡθήσαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοΚΕΝΑΙ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγοΝΕΝΑΙ.  
They thought that he was the father, but that there was a  
cause for it.

'Ἐν πλείσταις φρονΤΙΣΙ, καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπΙΣΙ.  
Anxiety at the highest, hope at the lowest.

Inflections of the same word,—“What! give him a  
*brazen* statue who did not deserve a *brass* farthing?”  
The same word,—“In his life you spoke *ill* of him,  
and now after his death you write *ill*.” And on a single  
syllable,—“What *ill* would you have suffered, if you  
had witnessed an indolent man?”

Same words  
may have  
antithesis,  
equipoise,  
and rhyme  
at once.

10. False  
antitheses.

And it is possible for the same words to possess, at  
the same time, all these; and for the same example to  
be both an antithesis, equipoised, and having rhyme.  
But the heads of periods have nearly been enumerated  
in my Rhetoric to Theodectes. Also there are false  
antitheses, such as Epicharmus was in the habit of  
making: as, “Once was I in their [country]; once was  
I among them.”

## CHAP. X.

### *Whence are quoted the Elegancies and approved Beauties of Style.*

1. Elegan-  
cies and ap-  
proved  
beauties of  
style.

BUT as a detail of these subjects has been given, we  
must state whence the elegancies and approved beau-  
ties [of style] are derived. Now the power of inventing  
them belongs, either to the man of high natural genius,  
or to one of talent chastened by discipline; but to ex-

hibit the sources of them is the business of this system; wherefore, let us treat of, and fully enumerate them.

And let this be our fundamental principle: for the receiving information with ease, is naturally pleasing to all<sup>a</sup>; and nouns are significant of something; so that all those nouns whatsoever which produce knowledge in the mind, are most pleasing. Now, the foreign expressions are unintelligible; and words of common use we already understand. But the metaphor in the highest degree produces this effect [of giving pleasure]; for when the poet calls old age "stubble," he produces in us a knowledge and information by means of a common genus<sup>b</sup>; for both are past their prime. Now, the similes of the poets also produce the same effect; on which account, should they be neatly managed, an elegance strikes you. For the simile, as has been remarked before<sup>c</sup>, is metaphor with the difference of the addition [of a particle denoting similitude]; on which account it is less pleasing, because more at length: and it does not assert that "this is that;" the mind therefore does not at all require it<sup>d</sup>.

It cannot but be, then, both that the style and the arguments which render the act of information rapid, are elegant; on which account, neither are *superficial* arguments held in approbation; (for, by superficial, I mean such as are obvious to every one, and which require no search;) nor those which, when stated, are

<sup>a</sup> See this principle of pleasure stated in book i, c. 11, § 23. Again (book ii, c. 24, § 30) refutative enthymems are preferred to confirmative on the same principle,—*διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν ΜΙΚΡΩ*.

<sup>b</sup> "By the genus; that is, where the common quality which constitutes the likeness immediately occurs," etc. Twining. This metaphor, according to the distinction of the Poetic, would be called *ἀπ' εἰδοῦς ἐπὶ εἶδος*—from one species of things decayed to another.

<sup>c</sup> In the fourth chapter of this book.

<sup>d</sup> For the mind, hurrying on to obtain further information respecting the object in question, without pausing to ascertain what it is like or equal to, desires only to know what it really is. See chap. 4, § 1.

not understood<sup>e</sup>: but all those whatsoever which are apprehended, either simultaneously with their being uttered, (supposing even that no *previous* knowledge of them existed,) or by which the intellect is a little left behind; for there accrues, as it were, a piece of information; in the two former cases, however, none.

5. The expression must be antithetical.

As far, then, as respects *the meaning* of what is said, reasonings of this description are approved; but as to *the expression*, if they be worded (in figure) *antithetically*<sup>f</sup>; as, “deeming the common *peace* of the rest, a very *war* to their individual interests:” here “war” is opposed to “peace;” and (in single words) if they possess metaphor, and this neither far-fetched, for it will be difficult to view it in connection; nor superficial, for it produces no effect: and, moreover, if they place the object before your eyes; for it needs must be, that one sees more clearly what is actually in the course of being done, than what is *about* to be. We ought then to aim at three things, metaphor, antithesis, and personification<sup>g</sup>.

Three things to be aimed at: metaphor, antithesis, personification.

7. Metaphors are fourfold: analogical ones the best.

But of metaphor, which is fourfold<sup>h</sup>, that species is in the highest degree approved which is constructed on similar ratios; just as Pericles said, “that the youth which had perished in the war, had so vanished from

<sup>e</sup> The case with these two descriptions of argument is the same as with the *γλῶτται* and *κύρια ὀνόματα* respectively. With this passage compare book ii, c. 24,<sup>3</sup> § 30.

<sup>f</sup> The consideration of *ἀστρεία* having been ranged under the heads of their *διάνοια* and *λέξεις*, he proceeds here to subdivide his discussion of *λέξεις*, in reference to its whole sentences, (i. e. its *figure*, *σχῆμα*), or its single words, (i. e. what is usually called *trope*).

<sup>g</sup> From the variety of words by which *ἐνέργεια* has been rendered, “personification” has been selected, as approaching the nearest to the correspondent expression, *πρὸ ὁμμάτων*. The effect is produced by representing inanimate objects as the agents in any thing: thus, “*pontem indignatus Araxes*.” See the next chapter.

<sup>h</sup> A metaphorical word is a word transferred from its proper sense, either from *genus* to *species*, or from *species* to *genus*, or from *one species* to *another*, or in the way of *analogy*. Post. xxi, transl. by Twining. See chap. 2, § 14, seq.

the city, as if one were to take *the spring from the year*<sup>1</sup>." And Leptines, speaking of the Lacedæmonians, "that he would do all in his power to prevent Greece from being deprived of *an eye*." And Cephisodotus, when Chares was eager to present the accounts about the Olynthiac war, grew nettled, and said, "Now that he has got the populace *with their necks in a halter*, he is endeavouring to present his accounts." Again, when he once was exhorting the Athenians, as they were going for provisions, to go to Eubœa for them, he said, "the decree of Miltiades should *go forth to the expedition*." And Iphicrates, when the Athenians had made a league with Epidaurus and the neighbourhood of the coast, was indignant, and exclaimed that, "of themselves they had cut off the very *provision of the war*." And Pitholaus called [the state yacht] Various instances of approved metaphors. Paralus, "the *mace of the populace*;" and Sestus, "the *corn-chest of the Piræus*." And Pericles bade them away with Ægina, "the *eye-sore of the Piræus*." And Mærocles said, "that he was no more a knave than the other," naming some good sort of man; "since that person indeed played the rogue at the rate of *thirty per cent.* himself however merely at *ten per cent. usury*<sup>k</sup>." And that iambic verse of Anaxandrides on his daughters, who were long in getting married: "The virgins have forfeited the nuptial *recognizance*<sup>l</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> See book i, 7, § 34. Herodotus puts a similar expression in the mouth of Gelon, book vii, 162.

<sup>k</sup> The highest rate of interest (τόκος) permitted among the Greeks appears to have been one third of the principal (ἐπίτριτος); the lowest rate which was usual was one tenth merely of the principal (ἐπιδέκατος): so that Mærocles was less a villain than this ἐπιτεκής, in the same ratio in which *ten per cent.* was less usurious than *three and thirty*. The metaphor, however, is stated by some as resulting from the comparison of the ratio of character to the ratio of usury; and by others, from the application of the general word, πονηρεύεσθαι, to the transactions of usurers in particular. It will be observed, that in translating ἐπίτριτος, the round numbers have been taken.

<sup>l</sup> Addison, too, classes certain of his fair readers (though certainly differently circumstanced from the daughters of Anaxandrides) under the

And that saying of Polyuctus about one Speusippus, who was struck by apoplexy, "that he was unable to keep quiet, bound as he was by fortune in a complete *pillory* of a disease." Cephisodotus, too, used to call the triremes, "painted *corn-mills*:" as did the Cynic Diogenes the taverns, "the *public tables*<sup>m</sup> of Athens." Æsion, too, used the expression, "*pouring* out the city into Sicily," (for this is metaphorical, and sets the object before the eyes,) "so that all Greece *exclaimed*;" and this too is in a certain way a metaphor, and personifies. And as Cephisodotus bade them be on their guard, "lest they rendered their very popular assemblies, so many *rows*;" just as Isocrates, also, [used the expression] of persons "making a *row* in the general convention." And as in the funeral speech [of Lycias], "there was reason for Greece to shear her locks over the grave of those who fell at Salamis, since her liberty had been buried jointly with their valour:" for had he said that "there was reason she should weep, her liberty having been buried with them;" it would indeed have been a metaphor, and have given personification; but the words, "their valour," "her liberty," convey a kind of antithesis. And, as Iphicrates said, "The *path* of my arguments is through the midst of the actions of Chares:" the metaphor here is on similar ratios, and the expression, "through the midst," produces personification. Also the saying, "that he challenged dangers to be *his allies* against dangers," is both a personification and a metaphor. And Lycoleon, pleading for Chabrias, said, "[What, not pardon him] out of a respect for the *suppliancy*<sup>n</sup> of his brazen

metaphorical appellation of "*demurrers*," borrowed from the English legal nomenclature. See Spectator, No. 89.

<sup>m</sup> *Φειδίτια*, the public tables of Lacedæmon, remarkable for their plainness and frugality: so that, in saying that the only *φειδίτια* of Athens were its taverns, Diogenes conveyed a most bitter sarcasm against the manners of its citizens.

<sup>n</sup> Chabrias seems to have been the first who ordered his troops to assume a kneeling position in receiving the charge of an enemy: at the time when

statue:" for in the then crisis it was a metaphor, but not always; but the personification [was perpetual]: for pending his trial the statue acts as suppliant, the inanimate as an animated object,—“ that memento of the exploits of the state.” Again, “ *Making it their study*, by every means, to think meanly;” [this is metaphorical,] since study is with a view to advance [not to diminish]. And, the expression that “ God has kindled the intellect *as a light* in the soul;” for both in a certain sense illuminate.—“ For we put no period to our wars, but put them off;” since both putting off, and a peace of this description, are alike things of the future. And again, the declaring “ that a truce was a *trophy* more splendid than those won in war; since the latter was the result of a trivial occurrence or a single accident, the former were the result of the whole tenour of the war;” for both [agree in being] indications of victory. And, that “ states pay a *heavy punishment* to the censure of mankind;” for *punishment* is a sort of hurt consonant to justice°.

Thus, then, it has been stated that the elegancies result from metaphor constructed on similar ratios, and from personification.

he adopted this manœuvre, he headed some Athenian troops auxiliary to the Bœotians, and completely succeeded in repulsing the forces of Agesilaus. This improvement in tactics seems to have been so favourably received, that statues were decreed him to be erected in the attitude of kneeling. Ὁ δὲ Χαβρίας πολλῶν αὐτῷ πεπραγμένων κατὰ πόλεμον, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐσημνεύετο τῷ στρατηγήματι, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου δοθείσας αὐτῷ καθίστανεν ἐχούσας τούτο τὸ σχῆμα. Diodorus Siculus, 15.

° We cannot forbear adding to this long catalogue the metaphor used by Herodotus, in speaking of the scheme for the defence of Peloponnesus, at the time of the Persian invasion, by throwing a wall across the Isthmus: his words are, that even many *cloaks* of walls would be insufficient;—εἰ καὶ πολλοὶ τευχέων ΚΙΘΩΝΕΣ ἦσαν ἐλληλαμένοι, κ. τ. λ. Book vii, c. 139.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of Personification.*

1. Personification represents the object as animated.

BUT it must be stated what we mean by the expression, "setting forth to the eyes," and in doing what this effect results. I mean, then, that those expres-

2. sions which represent the object as in action, do all of them produce the setting before the eyes: for instance, the saying of "a good man," that he is "a cube<sup>a</sup>," is a metaphor; for both are perfect; but this does not personify: whereas the speaking of one as "having his prime yet blooming," is a personification. And this, "—but you just as a thing let loose," is a personification. And [in the line] "Then the Greeks springing forth with their feet<sup>b</sup>;—" the expression, "springing," is both a personification and a metaphor, for it expresses rapidity. Again, as Homer has in many places employed it, the putting inanimate things as animate, by means of a metaphor; and in all from their producing personification, they are approved; as in these instances<sup>c</sup>:

3. Metaphors produce it.

"Back to the plain still roll'd the *shameless* stone."

Again,

"The arrow *flew*." And, "*Eager* to wing its way."

And,

"Deep fix'd in earth, *eager* their blood to drain."

And,

"Right through his breast th' *impetuous* weapon sped."

For in all these instances, the objects, from their being animated, appear personified; for the expressions,

<sup>a</sup> See the expression, Eth. Nich. book i, c. 10.

<sup>b</sup> See Eurip. Iph. in Aul. 80.

<sup>c</sup> These passages severally stand as follows: (1.) Od. xi, 597. (2.) Il. xiii, 587. (3.) Il. iv, 126. (4.) Il. xi, 573. (5.) Il. xv, 542.

*shamelessness*, and *eagerness*, and the rest, are personifications. These, however, has he appended by means of the metaphor from analogy: for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is he who is insensible of shame, to the object in regard to which he is so insensible. He does this, <sup>4. And similes.</sup> too, in his approved similes, in the case of inanimate objects; as,

“The waves behind impel the waves before,  
Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore <sup>d.</sup>”

for he produces every thing in life and action. But personification is an imitation [of nature <sup>e.</sup>].

But it is fitting to draw your metaphors, as has <sup>5. Metaphors to produce it must be appropriate, yet not obvious.</sup> been stated, from terms which are appropriate and not obvious; just as in philosophy, also, it is the privilege of one who conjectures happily, to discern the point of similitude <sup>f.</sup>; as when Archytas observes, “that an arbitrator and an altar are the same,” since to both does the party who has been wronged fly for refuge. Or if one were to say, “that an anchor and a pot-hanger were the same;” for both are somewhat the same, but they differ in the circumstance of suspending from above and below. Again, the expression, “the states have been *levelled*,” is the same in objects widely differing, equality both in power and in superficialities.

Also the greatest number of elegancies arise from <sup>6. They deceive the hearers agreeably.</sup> metaphor, and from additionally deceiving the hearer <sup>g.</sup>; for the point becomes more clear that he has learnt

<sup>d</sup> Pope's translation, Il. xiii, (of the original,) line 799.

<sup>e</sup> And, if an imitation, necessarily pleasing. See this principle of pleasure stated, book i, c. 11, § 23.

<sup>f</sup> In speaking of the *fable*, he attributed this faculty of catching such features of resemblance as, *without immediately striking, are yet appropriate* (οἰκεια μὴ φάνερα), to those of a philosophic turn of mind:—τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾶόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. Lib. ii, cap. 20, § 7.

<sup>g</sup> Besides the ornament of metaphor, by leading the hearer, throughout the sentence, to expect something very different from what you really mean, and undeceiving him *only* by the last word; e. g. “Quid hinc abest nisi res—et virtus!” Cic. de Orat. ii, 70. Here you expect a pane-



something, from the meaning being the opposite [of what it was supposed], and the mind seems to say, "How true is this! I however was wrong." And the elegancies of proverbial expressions arise from one's meaning not what he says; for instance, the words of Stesichorus, that "the grasshoppers shall chirp on the ground<sup>h</sup>." Also ideas neatly put enigmatically, are for the same reason pleasing; for there is an acquisition of knowledge, and a metaphor is introduced. Again, that embellishment which Theodorus calls, "saying out-of-the-way things;" this, however, occurs when the sentiment is paradoxical, and (as he has it) does not square with previous opinion<sup>i</sup>; just on the same principle as in jokes, words submitted to a slight change. An effect which those jests also produce, which depend on the change of a letter, for they deceive [the hearer's anticipation]: it happens also in metre; for it terminates not in the way in which the hearer supposed; thus,

ἔστειχε δ' ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμετρα!!

He proceeded wearing under his feet—*chilblains*<sup>k</sup>.

Whereas the hearer was imagining that "*sandals*," (πέδιλα), would be the word<sup>l</sup>. This, however, as soon as it is uttered, ought to be clear. But these changes

gyric; the last word converts the whole into reproach. Of this description, too, are the following lines of Pope:—

"Here thou, great Anna! whom three realms obey,  
Dost sometimes counsel take, and sometimes—*tea!*"

Rape of the Lock, iii, 7.

The precept may be further illustrated by Porson's insidious commendation of Blackmore's poetry:—"He will be read when Homer and Milton are forgotten,—but not till then."

<sup>h</sup> Already quoted, ii, 21, § 8.

<sup>i</sup> Probably the English word *humour* would best designate this quaintness of Theodorus.

<sup>k</sup> See note 1, at p. 88, of Carrington's translation of Aristophanes' *Plutus*; where a similar surprise arises from the use of ἐπινεες instead of ἐκρίνηες.

<sup>l</sup> This is sometimes aptly enough termed *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*, *huffing the expectation*.

Paradoxes.

Jests  
which are  
παρ' ὑπό-  
νοϊαν.

of a letter cause the speaker to say, not what the word expresses, but what its inversion signifies: as in the jest of Theodorus, on Nicon the lyrist, "Thee did a Thracian —" (Θράττη); for what he pretends to say is, "It annoys (Θράττει) you<sup>m</sup>," and deceives the audience; wherefore to one who has caught it, the joke is pleasing; since if one is not aware that he is a Thracian, it will not appear to be a beauty. Again, the expression, 7. Puns. you wish him *περσαι* [i. e. either *to side with Persia—to ruin him*]. Both meanings, however, should be in point, and so also in the case of the elegancies; thus the saying, "The *sovereignty* (ἀρχή) of the sea, was not the beginning (ἀρχή) of evils to the Athenians; since it was a gain to them." Or, as Isocrates says, "that its *sovereignty* (ἀρχή) was to the city a *beginning* (ἀρχή) of evils." For in either acceptance, that is stated which one did not imagine he would say; and that it is true, is acknowledged. For to assert that a *beginning* is a *beginning*, shows no great wisdom; but he repeats [the word ἀρχή], not in this sense, but differently; and he does not repeat the same ἀρχή which he first said, but in a different sense. And in all these cases, if one in- 8. troduce the term appropriately under an equivocation or metaphor, then there is wit; for instance, there is no *bearing Baring*<sup>n</sup>: here the speaker denies the correspondence of signification, but appropriately enough, if [the person alluded to] be disagreeable." Again,

<sup>m</sup> Nicon, it seems, was the son of a Thracian slave; and Theodorus, conveniently mistaking the word Θράττη for Θράττει, takes an opportunity of taunting him with his low birth. Θράττω, probably contracted from τράττω. vid. Blomfield in Æschyl. Prom. Vinc. 649. There are on record two excellent replies to taunts of this nature; one made by Mnestheus, son of Iphicrates, who declared that he esteemed his mother above his father,—“Nam Pater, quantum in se fuit, Thracem me genuit: contra ea, mater Atheniensem;” (Corn. Nep. Iphic. 3;) where it should be observed, that Rutgersius, for *contra ea mater*, proposes to read *cum Thraca mater*. The other is attributed to Timotheus, who having the condition of his mother as a Thracian slave thrown out against him as a reproach, replied, “But to her I owe it that I am Conon’s son.” Athenæus, lib. xii.

<sup>n</sup> So, too, the Latins, *Lepidus non lepidus*.

“ You cannot become more a stranger [*ξένος*], than becomes you as a guest [*ξένος*],” or not in a greater degree than you ought, which is the same; and “ it becomes not a stranger [*ξένος*] always to be a guest [*ξένος*].” For the meanings here also are different. The same, too, is that commended saying of Anaxandrides, “ It is honourable to *die* before doing aught worthy *death* ;” for it is the same as saying, “ It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy to suffer death ;” or, It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy [the punishment] of death ; *or*, when he has not committed acts worthy 9. that punishment.” Now the form of the diction of these sentences is the same; but in proportion as [the idea] happens to be enunciated in fewer words and with antithesis, in the same proportion is it more approved. And the reason is, that the information becomes by means of the *antithesis*, fuller; by means of *brevity*, more rapid. Such sentiments ought always to have either some one of whom they are said, or happiness of expression (if what you say [would appear] earnest, and not mere idle remark); for it is possible to have one of those qualities without the other: for instance, “ You ought to die without having committed an error ;” [the *sentiment* is just enough], but [the *expression*] is not elegant: “ A deserving man should marry a deserving woman ;” but this is not elegant<sup>o</sup>; but if it possess both qualities at the same time, as “ It is worthy a man to die while he is not worthy of suffering death.” But in proportion as a sentence possesses the greater number of these ornaments, in the same proportion does it appear more elegant; if, for instance, the words be metaphors, and metaphors of such a species<sup>p</sup>, and if there be antithesis, and equipoise of clauses, and if it have personification.

<sup>o</sup> As far as the *expression* is concerned, this instance seems to possess the necessary elegance; but it is deficient in the second requisite, viz. τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται.

<sup>p</sup> The metaphor constructed on similar ratios (κατ' ἀναλογίαν) is here alluded to: see chap. 10, § 7.

10. There should be some person to whom they must apply.

Similes also, as has been uniformly stated in the foregoing, are in some way approved metaphors; for they always are expressed in two terms, like the analogical metaphor; thus, "the *shield*," we say, "is the *cup of Mars*;" the bow, "a stringless lyre." Thus, then, persons express the metaphor not unaccompanied; whereas the calling a bow, "a lyre;" or a shield "a cup," is without accompanying explanation<sup>9</sup>. And on this principle men construct their similes; for instance, that of a flute-player to an ape, and of a near-sighted person to a sputtering lamp; for both contract themselves. But the excellence will exist when there is a metaphor; for you may represent by a simile the shield as "the cup of Mars," and a ruin as "the rags of a house:" and the saying of Niceratus, that, "he was himself a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys," as Thrasymachus drew the simile when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a contest of rhapsodists<sup>r</sup>, with his hair long and disordered, and his person still neglected. In which points, if they be not neatly managed, the poets most frequently get hissed off, even should they in other respects stand high. I mean when the poet replies [to his particle of similitude thus], "Like parsley he has crooked legs."—"Like Philamon on the bench, struggling with the ball" [or, with Corycus]. And all such expressions are similes; but that similes are metaphors has frequently been stated.

*Proverbs* also are metaphors from species to species: <sup>14. And proverbs also.</sup>

<sup>9</sup> In the Poetic, he says that, in the case of the analogical metaphor, "sometimes the *proper* term is also introduced, *besides* its *relative* term;" and this, with a view to guard the metaphor from any incidental harshness or obscurity: with such an adjunct, the metaphor ceases to be *ἀπλοῦς*: e. g. *φιάλη Ἄρειος*—thus expressed, the metaphor is *οὐχ ἀπλοῦς*; but if stated simply *φιάλη*, it is *ἀπλοῦς*. See Twining, notes 184, 189, on the Poetic.

<sup>r</sup> With a view to elucidate the simile of Thrasymachus, it has been conjectured that the story of Philoctetes might have been the subject of this rhapsodical declamation.

thus if any one, as though likely to experience a benefit, should himself introduce a measure and afterwards suffer loss from it, then one exclaims, "As the Carpathian fetched the hare<sup>1</sup>!" for both parties have experienced the thing in point. Now the sources whence these elegancies are deduced, and the cause why [they are pleasing], has nearly been told you.

15. So too are hyperboles.

Again, *hyperboles* which are recognised are metaphors; as that about a person with a black eye: "You would have thought him a basket of mulberries;" for the part beneath the eye is somewhat suffused with blood: but this is greatly forced. But the [simile with the expression of similitude] *just as, so and so*, is hyperbole, differing merely in the diction. "*Like* Philammon on the bench struggling with the ball," [becomes hyperbole thus;] "You would have thought he was Philammon struggling with the ball." "*Like* parsley he has crooked legs," [thus arranged becomes an hyperbole;] "I thought not that he had legs, but 16. parsley stalks, so crooked were they." But hyperboles suit with the temperament of the young, for they evince a vehemence of temper; (on which account the angry most frequently utter them; [thus Achilles in his wrath exclaims,]

Tho' bribes were heap'd on bribes, in numbers more  
Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore,  
\* \* \* \* \*  
Atrides' daughter never shall be led,  
An ill-match'd consort to Achilles' bed;  
Like golden Venus though she charm'd the heart,  
Or vied with Pallas in the works of art<sup>t</sup>.

POPE.

<sup>1</sup> The island of Carpathus being destitute of hares, one of the inhabitants brought over some of these animals, which proved so fatally prolific as to consume all the crops in the island; and the Carpathians became more anxious to extirpate them than they had ever been for their introduction.

<sup>t</sup> Iliad, ix, 385—388.

The Attic rhetoricians, too, particularly employ this figure;) on which account for a man in advanced life to utter them is bad taste.

## CHAP. XII.

*That a distinct Style is appropriate to each Species of Rhetoric.*

NEITHER ought it to escape us, that to each kind of rhetoric is adapted a peculiar style; for neither are the style which is adapted to writing, and that of disputation the same, nor the style of deliberative and that of judicial rhetoric. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both [the first and the second]: for the one consists in knowing the purity of language; the other in the not being obliged to sit mute, if one wish to communicate any thing to others; the very predicament in which they who know not how to write are placed. But the style of writing is the most precise: that of disputation partakes more of declamation; and of it there are two species, the one conveys the impress of character, the other of feeling. And hence actors choose this description of drama, and the poets this sort [of actors]. But poets fit for perusal are carried about with us, like Chœremon, for he is as nicely finished as a rhetorician; and, of the Dithyrambic poets, Licymnius.

1. Different styles are suitable to each sort of oratory.

2. The written style is most precise; that of disputation most declamatory, and is of two kinds, ἡθικὴ, παθητικὴ.

Thus also, on comparing speeches together, those adapted to writing appear jejune when delivered at disputations; while those of the declaimers, excellent as they were when delivered, seem mere common-place in the closet; and the reason is, that in disputation [these things] are appropriate enough. On which account, compositions framed for declamation, inasmuch as, when abridged of their declamation, they do not produce their effect, appear ridiculous: thus, the omis-

Declamatory compositions when read appear ridiculous.

sion of connectives, and frequent repetitions, in a written style are justly exploded; yet in the style of disputation even the rhetoricians employ them, for they

3. are adapted to declamation. Yet it is necessary in repeating the same thing to vary the expression; which indeed opens a way, as it were, to declamation: [e. g.] "This is he who robbed you; this is he who defrauded you; this is he who at last endeavoured to betray you." Just as Philemon the actor used to do in the "Gerontomania" of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak; and in the opening scene of the "Devotees" [in the recurrence of] the word *I*. For if one does not give these passages with declamation, it becomes [a case in point with the proverb]

4. "Stiff as one carrying a beam." And so also where connectives are wanting, "I came, I met, I besought him;" for you needs must give it with declamation, and not, as though simply saying one thing, enunciate it with the same manner and tone. There is, moreover, a certain peculiarity which omissions of connectives possess; for it strikes one that, in an equal length of time, many things have been stated; for the connective makes many, one; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many. It possesses, then, amplification; "I came, I conversed with, I besought," being many,—"he seems to overlook all I have said, all I now say." Homer is desirous of producing this effect in the lines:

"Three ships with *Nireus* sought the Trojan shore,  
*Nireus*, whom Aglæe to Charopus bore,  
*Nireus*, in faultless shape<sup>a</sup>," etc. POPE.

For of whom a great deal is said, that man must needs be spoken of *frequently*; and therefore if one be spoken of frequently, it appears that *a great deal* has been said of him. So that the poet mentioning him only once, by help of this sophism amplifies the character,

<sup>a</sup> Iliad, ii, 671.

and has excited a recollection of him, though he nowhere subsequently mentions him.

Now the deliberative style is exactly like sketching; for in proportion as the crowd is larger, the view is taken from a greater distance; on which account, in the one as well as in the other, productions of an exquisite finish are superfluous, and look worse than others. But the judicial is a thing of greater nicety: and in a still higher degree where it is before a single judge; for least of all is this within the reach of rhetorical artifice; since the peculiar points of the case are more easily concentrated to the view, and what is merely external; and the heat of disputation is out of the question, so that the decision is fair and clear. And on this account the same speakers are not approved in all these kinds; but where there is most of declamation, there least of all is accuracy: this, however, is the case where power of voice is requisite, and particularly if a considerable power.

5. Deliberative style like sketching, and not accurate.

Judicial style more precise.

The demonstrative style, however, is most adapted to writing; for its purpose is perusal: second to it [in this adaptation] is the judicial.

Epidictic style more suited to writing.

The judicial next.

But to draw any further distinctions on the subject of style, that it ought to be pleasing and magnificent, is superfluous: for why should it be such rather than temperate and liberal, or if there be any other moral virtue? For that the foregoing rules will cause it to be pleasing is manifest, if indeed excellence of style has been correctly defined:—for with a view to what must it be, [according to our definition,] “*clear and not mean, but in good taste?*” For should it become prosing, it is no longer clear, neither if it should be too concise. But it is plain that the mean is appropriate. And the foregoing precepts will cause its being pleasing, should the ordinary expressions have been judiciously blended with the foreign, and should rhythm [not be wanting], and the persuasive influence resulting from good taste.

6. Conclusion of the second division, scil. λήξις.



The subject of *style* has then been treated <sup>n</sup>, as well generally, respecting all the species of rhetoric, as particularly, respecting each. But it yet remains to treat of *arrangement*.

### CHAP. XIII.

#### *Of the Parts of a Speech.*

1. Two parts of a speech.

2. Statement. Proof.

3. Divisions made by other writers censured.

THE parts of a speech are two; for it is necessary to *state* the case about which it is, and to *prove* it. Wherefore for one, after stating, not to prove it, or to proceed to prove it without a previous statement, is out of the question: for whoever proves, proves something; and he who makes a previous statement, makes such statement with a view to subsequently proving it. And of these parts, the one is the statement, the other the proof; just as though <sup>a</sup> one were to make a division into problem and demonstration. But the divisions which they now usually make are ridiculous; for narration is a kind of peculiarity to judicial speeches alone; for how can there, in demonstrative and deliberative speeches, be any narration such as they speak of, or any reply, confutation of an adversary, or any peroration of points selected for display of character?

But exordium, contrast of argument, and recapitulation <sup>b</sup>, do then only occur in deliberative speeches when

<sup>n</sup> Thus ends the second branch of the grand division of the work;—*πίστις*—*λέξις*—*τάξις*. See the last note on book ii.

<sup>a</sup> That is, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the statement corresponds to their *problem*, the proof to their *demonstration*. It will readily be observed that *πίστις* is here used in a sense different from that which it has hitherto preserved.

<sup>b</sup> Est et illud repetendi genus quod semel proposita iterat et dividit:—

Iphitus et Pelias mecum; quorum Iphitus ævo  
Jam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi.

Æneid, ii, 435.

ἘΠΙΛΟΓΗ dicitur Græcè, nostri *regressionem* vocant.

Quintil. ix, 3, 36—*apud Ern. Lex. Techn.*

an altercation happens; for, considered as accusation and defence, they frequently [admit these branches], but not in their character of a piece of advice. But the peroration, moreover, is not an essential of every judicial; for instance, if the speech be a short one, or the case easy to be remembered. For it is usual to detract only from what is prolix. The *necessary* divisions, then, are the statement and the proof<sup>c</sup>.

Peroration not always necessary.

The essential divisions then are these; but the greatest number are, exordium, statement, proof, peroration. The confutation of an adversary belongs to the proof; and the contrast of arguments is an amplification of one's own, so as to be a kind of branch of the proof; for one who does this proves something: but not so either exordium or peroration; but [the latter] refreshes the recollection.

4. Enumeration of certain of them.

But should one draw distinctions with regard to these, that will be the case which the followers of Theodorus used to do, there will be a narration distinct from post-narration, and præ-narration, together with refutation, and post-refutation. But the writer should affix a title only after marking out a distinct species and difference<sup>d</sup>, otherwise it becomes mere emptiness and trifling; just like Licymnius, who in his treatise gives the titles, irruption—digression—ramifications, etc.

5. No further distinctions to be drawn.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of the Exordium.*

Now the exordium is the commencement of the speech; which in poetry is the prologue, and in the perform-

1. The exordium resembles the

<sup>c</sup> It should be carefully borne in mind, that Aristotle admits only these two branches as *essential* to every speech. His reasons for superadding exordium and peroration will be developed in the sequel.

<sup>d</sup> Without such a restraint, a rhetorician may go on *ad infinitum* drawing distinctions where no difference exists.

prologue  
and the  
prelude.

ances on the pipe, the prelude : for these are all commencements, and, as it were, an opening of the way for what is to succeed.

Proœmium  
of epideictic  
oratory re-  
sembles the  
prelude,  
and con-  
nected with  
the piece by  
the ἐνδοσι-  
μον.

The prelude, then, corresponds to the exordium of demonstrative speeches ; for the performers on the pipe, using as a prelude any piece whatever which they are able to execute with skill, connect the whole by an inserted passage : and so in demonstrative speeches ought we to write ; for the speaker ought, after stating whatever he lists<sup>a</sup>, straightway to employ the insertion, and link it [to the body of the speech.] Which indeed all do, having as their model the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates : for there exists no very near connection between Helen and the artifices of sophists<sup>b</sup>. At the same time, if the exordium be out of the way of the subject, there is this advantage, that the whole speech is not of one uniform character. But the exordia of demonstrative speeches are derived from *praise*,

As the  
Helen of  
Isocrates.

2. The ex-  
ordium may  
be derived  
from either  
of the three  
sorts of  
oratory.

or from *blame*, (like Gorgias in the Olympic oration,—“ Men worthy, O Greeks, of admiration among many ;” for he is *eulogizing* those who instituted the general assemblies : Isocrates, however, *blames* them, “ because they distinguish by prizes the excellencies of person, while for those who are wise they propose no reward ;”) and thirdly, from suggesting advice ; for instance, “ —because it is fitting to honour the good,” on that account [the orator] himself also speaks the praises of Aristides, or such characters as neither enjoy reputation, nor are worthless, but as many as, though they be excellent persons, are obscure ; just as was Paris, the son of Priam : for thus the orator conveys advice. Again [we may borrow demonstrative exordia] from those proper to judicial rhetoric, i. e. from appeals to the auditor, in case the speech be respecting any thing revolting to opinion, or difficult, or already

<sup>a</sup> There is, in demonstrative rhetoric, no limitation as to the source whence the exordium is to be derived.

<sup>b</sup> In a reprehension of which this exordium is employed.

noised abroad among many, so as to obtain his pardon: as Chœrilus begins, "Now after every thing has become public."

The exordia, then, of demonstrative rhetoric arise from these sources,—from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, and appeals to the hearers. The inserted connective clauses may be either foreign or appropriate to the subject.

With regard to the exordia of judicial rhetoric, we must assume that they are equivalent to the opening scenes of dramas, and the exordia of epic poems; for the commencement of dithyrambic poetry resembles demonstrative exordia,—“on account of thee, thy gifts, thy spoils.” But in the drama, and in epic poetry, the commencement is an intimation of the subject, that the hearer may foresee what the story is about, and that his mind may not be in suspense; for whatever is indeterminate bewilders us. He then who puts, as it were, into the hand the beginning of the clue, causes him who holds it to follow on the story. On this account we have,—

“Sing, muse, the wrath,” etc.

“The man, O muse, resound,” etc.

“This too declare; from Asia’s coasts afar,  
How upon Europe burst the mighty war.”

And the tragedians give some insight into the plot of the drama, if not forthwith, as Euripides does, yet they give it somewhere at least in the opening scene; just as also does Sophocles;—“Polybus was my father<sup>c</sup>!” And comedy in the same way. The most necessary business of the exordium, and this is peculiar to it, is to throw some light on the end for the sake of which the speech is made. For which very reason, if this be evident, and the case a brief one, we need not employ an exordium. The other species which speakers em-

5. The exordium of judicial oratory resembles the prologue of a play.

6. It must therefore declare the object of the speech.

7. Other exordia are

<sup>c</sup> *Edipus Tyr.* 774.

an antidote to weariness.  
 i. *ἰατρῆματα*.  
 Refutation of calumny or its opposite relates to the speaker and adversary. Different use of it when plaintiff or defendant.

ii. *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ*,  
 excitement of the hearer; attracting his attention, or the reverse.

8. All these points however are ex-

ploy are correctives, and general<sup>d</sup>: these are, however, deduced from 1. the speaker himself; 2. his hearer; 3. the subject; 4. and from the adversary. Every thing whatsoever which refers to the doing away or the casting an aspersion of character, has a relation to one's self or the adversary. But these things are not done exactly in the same way: for by one speaking on a defence, whatever tends to aspersion of character should be put first; but by one who is laying an accusation, in his peroration. And the reason why is not indistinct; for it is necessary that one who is making a defence, when he is about to introduce himself, should sweep away every stumbling-block; so that the prepossession against you must first be removed: by him, however, who raises the unfavourable impression, let it be raised in winding up, in order that the judges may the rather recollect it.

The correctives, however, which refer to the hearer, are drawn out of conciliating his good will, and inflaming him with anger, and occasionally from attracting his attention, or the reverse; for it is not at all times convenient to render him attentive, for which reason many endeavour to induce them to laughter. But all these will conduce to tractability [on the judge's part], if one wishes it, as does also the showing one's self a person of character; for to such do people the rather give heed. But men are attentive to objects of importance, of a peculiar description, or deserving admiration, or pleasing. Hence we ought to throw in a hint that the speech is concerning subjects of this nature. But if you would have them not attentive, hint that the matter is trifling, concerns them not, or is disgusting. But it ought not to escape our observation, that the whole of this is foreign to the subject; for

<sup>d</sup> *ἰατρῆματα*, a sort of antidotes to *ennui* and listlessness of the auditory, which are literally so general (*κοινὰ*) as not only to be unlimited to the exordia of either branch of rhetoric, but as to admit of being introduced at will into any part of the speech. See § 9.

they are addressed to a hearer of sorry taste, and one who lends an ear to points foreign to the subject; for if the hearer be not of this character, there is no need of an exordium, except so far as to state the matter summarily, that, like a body, it may have a head.

Again, the business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary; for the audience relax their attention any where rather than at the beginning. For which reason it is ridiculous to range this head at the beginning, when more particularly every one is at the summit of attention. So that, whenever it is convenient, we may use the formulary, "Lend me your whole attention, for the question does not affect me any more than yourselves;" and this one,—“for I will relate to you a thing so strange, so wonderful, as you never yet heard.” But this is just what Prodicus says he used to do,—“whenever the audience happen to nod, to insert, by the bye, a display of his penteconta-drachmial demonstration<sup>e</sup>.” But that these things are referred to the hearer not in his proper capacity as such, is evident; for all create unfavourable impressions or do them away in their exordia: as, “O king, I confess indeed, that not with haste,” etc.<sup>f</sup>: and again, “Why such long preludes<sup>g</sup>.”

They, too, employ exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause any where than on the case itself. On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles.

But the means out of which we must conciliate have been stated, and each other point of that nature:

<sup>e</sup> Prodicus professed to teach a mode of reasoning with universal success in all descriptions of cases: the premium on initiation being fifty drachms, he called it Πεντηκοντάδραχμον. Plato in Cratyl.

<sup>f</sup> Sophocles, Antig. 223.

<sup>g</sup> Euripides, Iph. in Taur. 1162.

<sup>h</sup> See book ii, chap. 1, § 5.

A compliment to be paid to the audience.

and, as it is well remarked by the poet, "Grant that I may reach the Phœacians a friend and object of their compassion;" we ought, therefore, to aim at these two objects. And in demonstrative orations, you should cause the hearer to suppose that he is praised simultaneously with the subject, either in his own person or his family, or in his maxims of conduct, or at least somehow or other. For true it is, as Socrates remarks, that "To praise Athenians before an Athenian audience is no difficult thing, however it may be in the presence of Lacedæmonians<sup>1</sup>."

Exordia of deliberative oratory wanted only in four cases.

- i. On account of the speaker.
- ii. On account of the adversary.
- iii. To impress the hearer with the value of the case.
- iv. For the sake of embellishment.

But the exordia of deliberative rhetoric are derived from those of judicial: but this species has them naturally least of all the three; for indeed the audience are aware of the subject; and the case needs no exordium except 1. on account of the speaker himself; 2. or his opponents; or 3. if the audience conceive of the importance of the matter otherwise than he could wish, thinking it either too serious or too trifling: with a view to which objects respectively there is a necessity for either exciting or doing away a prejudice, or for amplification or diminution. On account of these things there is need of exordium; 4. or otherwise for the sake of ornament; since without it a speech appears hastily got up. Of this sort was the panegyric of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any thing like the prelude display of gesture and attitude in the Gymnasium, he begins forthwith,—“O Elis, city blest by fortune!”

<sup>1</sup> This sentiment has been already quoted, book i, chap. 9, § 30, in illustration of the rule *Σκοπεῖν παρ' οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος*. The remark of Socrates may be found in Plato's *Menexenus*, but differently expressed.

## CHAP. XV.

*Topics for removing Imputations to your Prejudice.*

TOUCHING the subject of an imputation cast upon you, one means of removing it will be the recurring to those topics, by means of which one might do away any surmises prejudicial to him; for it matters not whether they be entertained in consequence of the allegations of any one or not. So that this topic is universally applicable.

1. Topics to refute aspersions.  
i. Removing unfavourable impressions.

Another mode is, the confronting it like a point under litigation, [arguing] either that it is not the case, or is not hurtful, or not to the particular individual; or that it is not of such importance, or not unjust, or not considerable, or not disgraceful, or of no consequence; for in points of this description the question originates: just as Iphicrates argued against Nausicrates; for he pleaded, that he did what the prosecutor alleged, and indeed hurt him, but yet did not act unjustly. Or confessedly acting unjustly he may offer some equivalent: e. g. though hurtful, yet was it honourable; though painful, yet was it beneficial; by some other such expedient.

2. ii. Contradicting the point.

Another method is, the arguing that the action is merely a fault, or an error<sup>a</sup>, or that it was necessary; such as the plea of Socrates, "that he trembled, not as the calumniator alleged, that he might *appear* an old man, but *of necessity*; since his eighty years of age did not overtake him of his own choice." And you may attempt a commutation of motives; e. g. "that he did not wish to hurt, but to do this or that, and not what the accuser insinuated; but that it so happened that

3. iii. By extenuation and excuse.

<sup>a</sup> For the distinctions between ἀμαρτήματα and ἀνυχήματα, see book i, chap. 15, § 16.



hurt was sustained. But that it were fair enough to hate him, had he acted purposely with a view to this taking place."

4. iv. By re-  
crimination  
of the ac-  
cuser.

Another mode is, the considering whether the prosecutor has either now or formerly, in his own person, or in that of his connections, been involved in the charge.

5. v. By  
comparison  
with others.

Another, whether others, whom they themselves acknowledge not liable to the imputation, be also comprehended; for instance, if he acknowledge an adulterer to be exempt from the charge, surely then also is

6. vi. By  
ascertaining  
whether the  
accuser has  
been proved  
a calumnia-  
tor before.

this or that person. Another consists in ascertaining whether he has cast any false imputations on others; or whether, like the party in the present case, any other has calumniated persons, or whether, without direct imputation, any ever were suspected who have yet ap-

7. vii. By  
raising a  
counter  
prejudice.

peared innocent. Another, in raising a counter prejudice against the calumniator; for it is absurd, if, while the man is himself void of credit, his words obtain it.

8. viii. If  
the affair  
has been al-  
ready decid-  
ed.

Another, in enquiring whether a decision has been already made; just as Euripides did in reply to Hygiænon, who, in an action of *Antidosis*, accused him as being an impious person, in as much as exhorting to perjury he wrote,—“The tongue hath sworn, but the mind is unsworn<sup>b</sup>; for Euripides argued, “that by bringing into court the decisions of the Dionysiac contest he acted unjustly; for there he had given, or would give an account, should he wish to impeach him.” Another, in impeaching calumny itself, as to how great an evil it is; and this because it produces decisions foreign to the point, and that it relies not on the strength of its case.

9. ix. By  
declaiming  
against ca-  
lumny it-  
self.

x. Citing  
the pre-  
sumptive  
signs: a to-  
pic useful to  
both.

But the citing presumptive signs is a topic common to both parties: thus, in the *Teucer*, Ulysses insinuates that “he is of kin to Priam; for [his mother] Hesione was Priam’s sister.” He, however, replies on the ground that, “Telamon, his father, was the enemy of Priam, and that he did not denounce the spies.”

<sup>b</sup> Hippolytus, 612.

Another, peculiar to an accuser, is, for one after bestowing short praise to censure at great length, putting forward great virtues briefly, or very many [which are not relevant], then to censure in one point which bears home upon the case. Such methods are the most crafty and malignant; for they attempt injury by means of one's virtues, by blending them with a man's failings.

10. xi. Praising a little to blame much. This suits the accuser.

But it is a resource common to the calumniator and one who meets a calumny, that, as it is possible for the same action to have been done from many motives, by the calumniator, indeed, facts should be taken in a bad sense, as he makes his selection of motives on the worse side; while by the respondent it should be made on the better. Take, for instance, the fact that Diomedes chose Ulysses: one will say it was, "because he conceived Ulysses to be the bravest;" the other, that "it was not, but because he alone could not become a rival, such a poltroon was he."

xii. By assuming the motives which suit your purpose.

Thus much, then, on the subject of imputations.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of the Narration.*

IN demonstrative speeches the narration is not given in continuity, but in scattered portions; for one must go over the actions out of which the speech arises: for a speech is a kind of compound, having one portion, indeed, independent of art, [since the speaker is not at all the cause of the actions themselves,) and another portion originating in art; and this last is either the showing that it is fact should it be incredible, or such either in character or degree, or in showing all these points at once. Owing to this, there are times when one ought not to narrate every fact successively; because this mode of exposition is difficult to remember. From some, then, establish the character for courage,

1. The narration in epideictic oratory is not continuous but disjointed.

2.

from others for wisdom, and from others for justice. The one style of narration is too simple; the other has the grace of variety, and is not so void of elegance.

3. But you have only to awaken the recollection of facts well known; on which account, many subjects will stand in no need of narration: supposing, for instance, you would praise Achilles, because all are acquainted with his actions; but you must employ them at once. But in praising Critias, an orator must narrate; for not many are acquainted with his exploits.

4. In judicial, the narration must make the subject clear,

But now people tell us, ridiculously enough, that the narration should be rapid. And yet I would say, as did one to a baker, who enquired "whether he should knead his bread hard or soft,"—"What," said he, "is it then impossible to knead it properly?" And so here [in rhetoric a mean is to be observed]. For one should not narrate at too great length, just as he should not make too long an exordium, nor state his proofs [too fully]. For neither in this case does propriety consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a mean betwixt both: and this is the stating just so much as will make the matter clear, or as will cause one to conceive that it has taken place, or that the party has inflicted hurt, or committed injustice, or that the case is of that importance which the speaker wishes to establish; and to the opposite party the opposite points will avail. And an orator should narrate, by the bye, such incidents as conduce to his own excellence: thus, "I all along used to instruct them in what was just, bidding them not to abandon their children,"—or, to the villainy of the other party;— "—but he replied to me, that wherever he might be he should have other children." Which, Herodotus says, was the reply of the Egyptians on their revolting<sup>a</sup>. Or whatever is pleasing to the judges.

5. and bias the audience in favour of the orator.

6. The defendant's

In the case of a defendant, the matter will be more

<sup>a</sup> See Herodotus, ii, 30.

brief; the points for dispute being, either that it has not taken place, or is not hurtful, or not unjust, or not of such importance. So that on acknowledged points he need not pause, unless they conduce in some degree to the objects suggested; e. g. if the fact be acknowledged, but its injustice disputed. Moreover, you should mention as already done those things which, in the course of being done, failed of producing pity or horror. The story of Alcinous is an instance, which is despatched to Penelope in sixty verses. And as Phäylus does in *the circle*, and the opening scene of the *Æneus*. The narration should also convey a notion of the character: this will be secured, if we know what gives rise to the moral character. One source is the manifestation of deliberate choice; and of what kind is moral character we ascertain from knowing of what kind this is; and of what kind the deliberate choice is, from being acquainted with its proposed end. Hence the doctrines of mathematics have no display of character, for neither have they deliberate choice; and this for that they have not the influence of motive<sup>b</sup>: but the Socratic discourses [have this display], for they treat concerning subjects of this kind. But those things convey a notion of character, which is consequent upon the several characters<sup>c</sup>; e. g. "Whilst saying this he began to hasten off;" for this manifests a hardness and rusticity of character. And be cautious not to speak coldly as from the understanding merely, as orators do now-a-days, but as though from the deliberate choice<sup>d</sup>. "I, for I wished and deliberately preferred this; and if I profit nothing by it, then it is the more honourable:" for the one is characteristic of a

narration is brief;

7.

8. and conveys an impress of character.  
i. By manifesting moral purpose.

9.  
ii. By narration of the concomitant circumstances.  
iii. By speaking with feeling.

<sup>b</sup> See the next chapter, § 8.

<sup>c</sup> Using, in fact, the *σημείον* of the *action* as an evidence of the *thought*, or taking the result of the feeling for the feeling itself; as Pericles does when alluding to the morose looks of the Lacedæmonians, a process which, though ingenious, yet often leads to a fallacy.

<sup>d</sup> Which is *will* regulated by the *understanding*. See Nich. Eth. book iii, chap. 2, 3, etc.

prudent<sup>e</sup>, the other of a good man: since [the proposed end] of the prudent consists in pursuing the expedient; of a good man, in pursuing what is honourable. And should any circumstance be incredible, you must subjoin the reason; as Sophocles does. He furnishes an example in the *Antigone*, that she mourned more for her brother than for a husband or children; for these, if lost, might again be hers.

“ But father now and mother both being lost,  
A *brother's* name can ne'er be hail'd again<sup>f</sup>.”

But if you should have no reason to offer, then avow “ that you are well aware that you speak what exceeds belief, but that such is your nature:” for the world discredit a man's doing any thing voluntarily, except what is expedient.

10. Let the  
narration be  
*παθητική*.

Again, draw your remarks out of those things which are indicative of the passions; narrating both their attendant circumstances, and those which the audience know, and which attach peculiarly either to the speaker himself or his adversary:—“ He, having scowled at me, departed.” And as *Æschines* said of *Cratylus*, “ that

<sup>e</sup> That is, the prudent speak from the dictates of the *understanding* solely, the good on the impulse of *deliberate choice*.

<sup>f</sup> Sophocles, *Antigone*, 911. See the speech of the wife of *Intaphernes* to *Darius*, on asking the life of a *brother* in preference to those of her *husband* or *children*:—*Ὁ βασιλεῦ, ἀνὴρ μὲν μοι ἂν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀποβάλοιμι πατὴρ δὲ καὶ μητὴρ οὐκ ἔτι μεῦ ζώντων, ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο.* Herodotus, *Thalia*, cap. 119. See the reply of *Robert Duke of Normandy* to *William Rufus*, justifying himself for allowing him to get water during the siege at *Mont St. Michael*:—“ How am I to blame? should I have suffered our brother to die of thirst, what other have we if we had lost him?” Lord *Lytton*, vol. i, p. 111. Compare the words of *Edward I.* on hearing at the same time of the death of his father and infant son, “ that the death of a *son* was a loss which he might hope to repair; the death of a *father* was a loss irreparable.” *Hume*. And the lines quoted in “the *Antiquary*,” vol. iii, chap. 11:—

He turned him right and round again,  
Said, Scorn na at my mither;  
Light loves I may get mony a ane,  
But minnie ne'er anither.

whistling and snapping his fingers—:" for they have a tendency to persuade: therefore these things which they know, become indices of that which they do not know. Such instances one may get in abundance out of Homer:—"Thus Penelope spoke, and the old woman covered her face with her hands<sup>g</sup>:" for those who are beginning to shed tears cover their eyes. And forth-<sup>and ἠθικῆ.</sup> with insinuate yourself as a person of a certain character, in order that they may look upon you as one of such a description, and your adversary [as the reverse]: but beware of observation as you do it. And that it is easy to effect this we may observe in those who report any thing to us; for respecting the communication (of which as yet we know nothing), we still catch a kind of guess<sup>h</sup>. But the narration must be carried on in different parts, and, in some instances, even at the commencement.

But in deliberative speeches narration occurs least of all, because no one narrates respecting what is yet to be: if, however, there should be any narration, it will be respecting things which have already happened, that the recollection of them having been awakened, the judges may determine better on the future; the orator either reprehending or praising them: but he is not then performing the functions proper to him as an adviser. If, however, the thing narrated be incredible, see you promise to state a reason for it immediately<sup>i</sup>, and to submit it to whom they please: like the Jocasta of Carcinus in his *Œdipus*, who always keeps promising when he who was seeking out her son enquires of her: and the Hæmon of Sophocles<sup>k</sup>.

11. Narration least used in deliberative oratory.

<sup>g</sup> *Odyssey*, book xix, 361.

<sup>h</sup> See the *Trachiniæ* of Sophocles, verse 869, where part of the Chorus conjecture, from the dejected looks of the nurse as she approaches, that some calamity is about to be announced.

<sup>i</sup> An instance of this occurs in the statement of finance which Pericles laid before the Athenians, to substantiate the hopes which he had held out to them. *Thucyd.* ii, 13.

<sup>k</sup> See the *Antigone*, 635, etc.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of the Proof.*

1. Proof in judicial oratory : four points. **PROOF** should be demonstrative ; and the points of dispute being four, you must demonstrate by producing proof respecting the particular point at issue : thus, if the adversary question *the fact*, you must at the trial produce proof of this point above the rest ; should it be that he did *no harm*, then of that point ; and so should he urge that the action is not of the *importance* supposed, or that it was done *justly* : [and it must be done in the latter cases] exactly in the same way as if the enquiry were respecting the matter of fact. And let it not escape us that in this single enquiry, it must needs be that one party is guilty<sup>a</sup> : for it is not ignorance which is to blame, as though any were to dispute on a point of justice. So that, in this enquiry, the circumstance should be employed ; but not in the other [three].

In epideictic the proof is made by amplification.

But, in demonstrative rhetoric, amplification, for the most part, will constitute the proof, because the facts are honourable and useful ; for the actions should be taken on credit<sup>b</sup>, since, even on these subjects, a speaker on very rare occasions does adduce proof, if either the action be passing belief, or if another have the credit of it<sup>c</sup>.

4. In deliberative we must observe the fallacies of the adver-

But, in deliberative speeches, the orator may either contend that the circumstances will not take place, or that what he directs will indeed take place, but that it is not just, or not beneficial, or not in such a degree.

<sup>a</sup> He states the same doctrine in the Nich. Eth. v, 2 :—*οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γιγνέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρὸν ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν, κ. τ. λ.*

<sup>b</sup> "For the facts are taken for granted ; so that it only remains to invest them with grandeur." Book i, chap. 9, § 40.

<sup>c</sup> Victorius notices the use of the phrase *αἰτίαν ἔχειν* in a good sense.

And it will be well for him to observe whether any falsehood appears in the extraneous observations of his adversary; for these appear as so many convincing proofs, that he is false in the case of the other more important statements.

And example is best adapted to deliberative rhetoric; while enthymem is more peculiar to judicial<sup>d</sup>. For the former is relative to the future; so that out of what has been heretofore, we needs must adduce examples: the latter respects what is or is not matter of fact, to which belong more especially demonstration and necessity; for the circumstances of the past involve a necessity. The speaker ought not, however, to bring forward his enthymems in a continued series, but to blend them by the way; should he not do this, they prove an injury one to the other, for there is some limit on the score of quantity too:—"Oh friend, since you have spoken *just so much* as a prudent man would<sup>e</sup>;" but the poet does not say, *of such a quality*. Neither should you seek after enthymems on every subject; otherwise you will be doing the very thing which some philosophers do, who infer syllogistically conclusions in themselves better known, and more readily commanding belief, than the premises out of which they deduce them. And when you would excite any passion, do not employ an enthymem; for either it will expel the passion, or the enthymem will be uttered to no purpose; for the emotions which happen at the same time expel each other, and either cancel or render one or the other feeble. Neither when one aims at speaking

sary, for these are a part of our proof.

5. Example best suited to it.

6. How enthymems are to be used. Not in a series.

7. Nor on all subjects.

8. Nor to excite any emotions or passions.

<sup>d</sup> He asserts this, and assigns the reason, at the end of his consideration of demonstrative rhetoric, book i, c. 9, § 40.

<sup>e</sup> The words of Menelaus to Pisistratus, the son of Nestor. *Odyssey*, lib. iv, 204. The force of the illustration here seems to be this: the poet, no less than the philosopher, thought it no small praise *to know when to stop*; so that, without allusion to the prudence of what had been said, (to the category of *quality*, *ποιότηρα*,) he commends him merely on the score of its due *quantity*.



with the effect of character, ought he at all to aim at the same time at enthymem; for demonstration possesses neither an air of character, nor deliberate choice.

9. But maxims may be used in the proof and narration.

But a speaker should employ maxims alike in narration and in proof; for it has an expression of character:—"Yes; I delivered it, even knowing that *one ought never to repose implicit confidence.*" And if one speak with a view to excite passion:—"And injured though I be, yet I do not repent; for the gain, indeed, is on his side, but justice on mine."

10. Reasons why deliberative is more difficult than judicial oratory.

And deliberative is more difficult than judicial rhetoric, and probably enough,—because it respects the future; whereas, in the latter, the question is respecting the past, which has already become matter of absolute science, even to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan used to say; for he did not exercise his art of divination respecting things yet to be, but respecting those which had already happened indeed, but which were obscure: again, in judicial questions, there is the law as the basis of reasonings; but for one who has something wherewith to begin, it is easier to discover means of proof. Neither has [deliberative rhetoric] many opportunities of digression; none, for instance, in reference to an adversary, or respecting one's self, or in order to excite passion<sup>f</sup>; but it possesses these opportunities least of all the three branches, unless it depart from its proper province. If, then, you are at a loss, you should do what the rhetoricians at Athens do, and particularly Isocrates; for in the course of deliberative speaking he accuses the Lacedæmonians, for instance, in the panegyric, and Chares in the speech about the

i. It is on the future.

ii. Judicial oratory has law for a basis.

iii. The deliberative orator cannot digress so easily.

11. alliance. But in demonstrative speaking, you should

<sup>f</sup> Now, according to the early part of this work, all this is done easily enough in judicial cases, since there the judge has no personal interest, and easily resigns himself to the speaker; but in deliberative rhetoric, every one addressed is supposed, more or less, to have an interest in the question at issue, and is therefore more jealous of the speaker's artifice. Book i, c. 1, § 10.

insert praise in the speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does, for he all along keeps introducing something. And that saying of Gorgias, "That he never failed of something to say," is nothing more nor less than this: for if he be speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Æacus, then his goddess mother, and so, too, valour in the abstract; or he does something or another in this strain.

Now the language of one who possesses proof, should be both fraught with the impress of character, and fitted to convey the proof. But if you possess not enthymems, let it convey an impression of your character; and the show of goodness more befits a virtuous man, than accuracy of speech.

12. If you have enthymems speak ἠθικῶς and ἀποδεικτικῶς. If not, only ἠθικῶς.

But of enthymems the *refutative* are more approved than the *confirmative*<sup>g</sup>: because in the case of as many as produce *reductio ad absurdum*, it is more plain that a conclusion has really been arrived at; for opposites, when set by each other, are more clearly recognised.

13. Refutative enthymems better than confirmative.

Touching reasonings directed against the adversary, they are not in any thing different in species; but it belongs to the province of proof to do away his arguments, some by starting an objection, others by contrary inference<sup>h</sup>. And the speaker who begins, ought, both in deliberative and judicial rhetoric, first to state his own proofs; and subsequently to meet objections by doing them away, or by treating them with contempt beforehand. But should the points objected to be many, first he must confront these objections, as did Callistratus in the Messeniæ assembly; for previously having swept away what his adversaries would be likely to allege in this way, he then spoke on his own part. But the last speaker should speak first what makes against the adversary's speech, doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences; and particularly should

14. Mode of replying to our adversary.

The first speaker must give his proofs and anticipate objections.

15. The last speaker must refute the adversary's argu-

<sup>g</sup> See book ii, chap. 23, § 30.

<sup>h</sup> Compare book ii, chap. 25, § 1, 2.

ments, and  
draw oppo-  
site infer-  
ences.

The reason  
why.

his arguments have been well received. For just as one's mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast; in the same way neither does it favourably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer's mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his own case:—

“ The fame o' th' Goddesses I'll first defend,—

\* \* \* \* \*

For Juno and ———<sup>1</sup>.”

In this she first lays hold of the most silly point.—Thus much, then, of proof.

16. Cha-  
racter of the  
speaker best  
conveyed by  
introducing  
a third per-  
son.

But as to the effect of character, since the saying some things respecting one's self, either is invidious, or involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; and respecting another, either slander or rusticity;—it behoves one to introduce another as speaking: the thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting Philip, and in the Antidosis; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying, in an iambic line respecting his daughter, “ There is not any thing which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath;” and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, “ I regard not the wealth of Gyges;” and as Sophocles introduces Hæmon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking.

<sup>1</sup> See the Troades of Euripides, 969, where Hecuba, replying to the defence made by Helen, lays hold of that part of it which seemed to insinuate that the three goddesses had been instrumental to her abandonment of her husband;—a point which, it will readily be perceived, was ΕΥΕ-ΑΕΦΚΤΟΝ.

But it is necessary sometimes to alter the *form* of our enthymems, and to make them into maxims<sup>k</sup>: for example, "It behoves men of sense to come to reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will they be the greatest gainers." But, in enthymematic *form*, it is thus: "If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful."

17. Enthymems are occasionally to be altered into maxims.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of Interrogation and Ridicule.*

BUT respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time for employing it when an admission has been made in such a way, that a single further question being put, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lampon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] the protectress; and on his saying, "That it was not possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it,"—he asked "Whether he knew himself?" when he said he did, [Pericles subjoined,] "And how do you know who are uninitiated?"

1. Interrogation. When to be employed.  
i. When an absurdity will result.

Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by enquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate further respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked "Whether he asserted the being of any demon?" When he allowed that he had, Socrates asked, "Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or something of divine nature?" And when he allowed it, "Is there, then," said he, "one who

2. ii. When your conclusion will be established by it.

<sup>k</sup> See book ii, chap. 21, § 2.

thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves?"

3. iii. When the opponent must contradict himself.

Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to general opinion.

4. iv. When we reduce our opponent to sophistical answers.

Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself of the question otherwise than by a sophistical answer: for if he answer in this way, *that it is, and is not, or partly is, and partly is not*,—or, *one way it is, another way is not*; the hearers hoot him off, being at a loss for his meaning.

Caution as to interrogations.

Under any other circumstances do not attempt interrogation; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear to have been overcome: since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer. On which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems.

5. How to answer an equivocal question.

i. By distinction.  
ii. By anticipation.

But one must give his answers to equivocal questions with a distinction<sup>a</sup>, and not concisely; and to what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can put the next succeeding question, or draw the inference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, if his question produce that conclusion, you are to assign the cause: as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, "Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred," acknowledged that it had.—"But how," rejoined the other, "seemed it not to you to be wrong?" He said it did. "Did you not, then, do that which was wrong?" "Yes, forsooth," replied he, "for I had no better alternative." And as

6. iii. By explanation.

<sup>a</sup> See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,— "What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or not?" Matt. xxii, 17—22.

the Lacedæmonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, "Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly," said they did. "Then," retorted the other, "did you not enact the same things as they?" And when he acknowledged that he had, "Would not you also," asked the other, "justly perish?" "No, indeed," said he, "for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment." Wherefore one ought not after the conclusion to put a further question, nor to put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the truth lies abundantly on our side. No question to be put after the conclusion.

But with respect to *Ridicule*, inasmuch as it seems to possess a kind of use in disputation<sup>b</sup>, and as "one ought," says Gorgias, "to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness," making the remark justly enough,—it has been stated in the Poetic<sup>c</sup> how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another. 7. Ridicule, how to be used.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of the Peroration.*

THE peroration is composed of four things:—of getting the hearer favourable to one's self, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extension; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection. 1. Peroration consists of four things.  
i.  
ii.  
iii.  
iv.

<sup>b</sup> "Ridiculum acri

Fortius et melius plerumque secat res." HOR. Sat. i, 10, 14.

<sup>c</sup> See book i, chap. 11, § 29.

i. We must incline the hearers favourably.

For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them, [the audience,] or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up persons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence as good.

2. ii. We must amplify and diminish.

Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the increase of bodies is from substances previously existing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth.

3. iii. We must excite the hearers.

Next to this, the facts being clear both as to their nature and degree, it follows that we excite the hearer to passion; such as are, pity, terror, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, and contentiousness: the elements of these also have been stated above.

4. iv. We must awaken the memory.

So that it merely remains to awaken a recollection of what has been before stated. And this we are to do here, in the way in which some erroneous teachers say we should in the *exordium*: for in order that the facts may be readily perceived, they bid us state them frequently. Now there [in the *exordium*] indeed we ought to state the case at full, in order that it may not be unknown to the hearer upon what the trial turns; here, however, [in the *peroration*,] merely the means by which it has been proved, and that summarily.

5. The *peroration* must assert that the orator has proved his point. He must compare his

The commencement of the *peroration* will be, that one has made good what he undertook; so that it will be to be stated, as well what one has adduced, as for what reasons. And it is expressed either by means of a juxtaposition with the adversary's statements; and draw the comparison either between every point what-

soever, which both have stated relative to the same thing; or else not by a direct opposition. “He, indeed, on this subject said so and so; but I so and so, and for such reasons.” Or, by a kind of bantering: thus, “He said so and so, and I so and so.” And, “What would he do, had he proved this, and not the other point!” Or by interrogation:—“What has not been fully proved on my side?” or, “What has this man established?” Either in this way, then, must the speaker conclude, or he must, in natural order, so state his reasoning as it was originally stated; and, again, if he pleases, he may state distinctly that of the adversary’s speech. And, for the close, the style without connectives is becoming, in order that it may be a peroration, not an oration<sup>a</sup>: I have spoken,—you have heard,—the case is in your hands,—pronounce your decision<sup>b</sup>.

arguments with those of his opponent, either ironically,

or by interrogation.

6. The disjointed style is suitable to the peroration.

<sup>a</sup> See the conclusion of Lysias’ oration against Eratosthenes.

<sup>b</sup> It cannot fail of being observed how neatly Aristotle employs this his concluding chapter, as at once an illustration of the subject and a farewell to the reader.





A BRIEF  
OF THE  
ART OF RHETORICK;

CONTAINING IN SUBSTANCE ALL THAT ARISTOTLE HATH  
WRITTEN IN HIS THREE BOOKS ON THAT SUBJECT.

BY  
THOMAS HOBBS,  
OF MALMSBURY.

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A BRIEF  
OF THE  
ART OF RHETORICK.

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BOOK I.

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CHAP. I.

*That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving  
the Passions of the Judge; but chiefly in Proofs.  
And that this Art is Profitable.*

WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to *accuse* and *excuse*: some by *chance*; but some by *method*. This *method* may be discovered: and to discover *Method* is all one with teaching an *Art*. If this *Art* consisted in *Criminations* only, and the skill to stir up the Judges, *Anger*, *Envy*, *Fear*, *Pity*, or other *affections*; a *Rhetorician* in well ordered Commonwealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to shew, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: 'Tis *so*: or *not so*. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, 'tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the Ruler he means to use.

It consisteth therefore chiefly in *Proofs*; which are *Inferences*: and all *Inferences* being *Syllogismes*, a Lo-

*gician*, if he would observe the difference between a plain *Syllogisme*, and an *Enthymeme*, (which is a *Rhetoricall Syllogisme*;) would make the best *Rhetorician*. For all *Syllogismes* and *Inferences* belong properly to *Logick*; whether they infer truth or probability: and because without this *Art* it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long *Scientificall proofs*, drawn from the *principles* through many *Syllogismes*; and therefore had need to be instructed by the *Rhetoricall*, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the vertue of well expressing the mind.

## CHAP. II.

### *The Definition of Rhetorick.*

RHETORICK, is that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to win belief in the hearer.

Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as *Witnesses*, *Evidences*, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.

The belief that proceeds from our Invention, comes partly from the *behaviour* of the *speaker*; partly from the *passions* of the *hearer*: but especially from the *proofs* of what we alledge.

*Proofs* are, in *Rhetorick*, either *Examples*, or *Enthymemes*, as in *Logick*, *Inductions*, or *Syllogismes*. For an *Example* is a short *Induction*, and an *Enthymeme* a

short *Syllogisme*; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of publick business needlessly<sup>a</sup>.

CHAP. III.

*Of the several kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of Rhetorick.*

IN all *Orations*, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also.

If he hear only, that's one kind of *Oration*, and is called *Demonstrative*.

If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, there's another kind of *Oration*, and is called *Deliberative*.

If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of *Oration*, called *Judicial*.

So there are three kinds of *Orations*; *Demonstrative*, *Judicial*, *Deliberative*.

To which belong their proper times. To the *Demonstrative*, the *Present*; To the *Judicial*, the *Past*; and to the *Deliberative*, the *time to come*.

And their proper Offices. To the *Deliberative*, *Exhortation* and *Dehortation*. To the *Judicial*, *Accusation* and *Defence*. And to the *Demonstrative*, *Praising* and *Dispraising*.

And their proper ends. To the *Deliberative*, to Prove a thing *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. To the *Judicial*, *Just*, or *Unjust*. To the *Demonstrative*, *Honourable*, or *Dishonourable*.

The *Principles* of *Rhetorick* out of which *Enthymemes* are to be drawn; are the *common Opinions* that

<sup>a</sup> And it might be added, in order to gratify the pride of the auditor by leaving it to him to supply the deficiency.

men have concerning *Profitable*, and *Unprofitable*; *Just*, and *Unjust*; *Honourable*, and *Dishonourable*; which are the points in the several kinds of *Oration*s questionable. For as in *Logick*, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the *Principles* must be all *infallible Truths*: so in *Rhetorick* the *Principles* must be *common Opinions*, such as the Judge is already possessed with: because the end of *Rhetorick* is victory; which consists in having gotten *Belief*.

And because nothing is *Profitable*, *Unprofitable*, *Just*, *Unjust*, *Honourable*, or *Dishonourable*, but what has been *done*, or is *to be done*; and nothing is *to be done*, that is not *possible*: and because there be degrees of *Profitable*, *Unprofitable*, *Just*, *Unjust*, *Honourable*, and *Dishonourable*; an Orator must be ready in other *Principles*; namely, of what is *done* and *not done*; *possible* and *not possible*; *to come* and *not to come*; and what is *Greater*, and what is *Lesser*; both in general, and particularly applied to the thing in question; as what is *more* and *less*, generally; and what is *more profitable*, and *less profitable*, etc. particularly.

#### CHAP. IV.

*Of the Subject of Deliberatives; and the Abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of Business of State.*

IN *Deliberatives* there are to be considered the *Subject*, wherein, and the *Ends* whereto the Orator exhorteth, or from which he dehortheth.

The *Subject* is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to *Rhetorick*, but for the most part to the *Politicks*; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.

1. *Of levying of Money.* To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before-hand

the revenue of the State, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth; and also how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a man's own experience, partly by relations, and accounts in writing.

2. *Of Peace and War.* Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be: and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and relations at home; and partly by the sight of wars, and of their events abroad.

3. *Of the Safeguard of the Country.* Wherein he only is able to give counsell, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.

4. *Of Provision.* Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.

5. *Of making Laws.* To which is necessary so much *Political, or Civil Philosophy*, as to know what are the several kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several Governments in times past, by *History*; and partly by observing the Government of the times present in several Nations, by *Travel*.

So that to him that will speak in a Councill of State, there is necessary this; *History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions* in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to *export* or *import*.



## CHAP. V.

*Of the Ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.*

AN Orator in *Exhorting* always propoundeth *Felicity*, or some part of *Felicity* to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in *Dehortation* the contrary.

By *Felicity*, is meant commonly, *Prosperity with vertue*, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

1. *Nobility*. Which to a State or Nation is, *to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation*. And to a private man, *to have been descended lawfully of a Family, which hath yielded most antiently, and in most number, men known to the World for vertue, riches, or any thing in general estimation*.

2. *Many and good Children*. Which is also publick and private. *Publick*, when there is much youth in the State endued with vertue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance). *Private*, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The vertues commonly respected in Women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Houswifery, without Sordidness.

3. *Riches*. Which is, *Money, Cattel, Lands, Household-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them*.

4. *Glory*. Which is, *the reputation of Vertue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire*.

5. *Honour*. Which is, *the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute*

*somewhat, not easily had, to another mans safety, or riches. The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of Places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publick Pensions, Adorations, Presents.*

6. *Health.* Which is *the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.*

7. *Beauty.* Which is to different Ages different. To *Youth, strength of body, and sweetness of aspect. To Full Men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To Old Men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.*

8. *Strength.* Which is *the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.*

9. *Stature.* Which is then *just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion.*

10. *Good old Age.* Which is, *that which comes late, and with the least trouble.*

11. *Many and good Friends.* Which is, *to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good.*

12. *Prosperity.* Which is, *to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.*

13. *Vertue.* Which is then to be defined, when we speak of *Praise.*

These are the grounds from whence we *exhort.*

*Dehortation* is from the contraries of these.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil.*

IN *Deliberatives*, the *Principles*, or *Elements* from whence we draw our *Proofs*, are *common Opinions* concerning *Good* and *Evil*. And these *Principles* are either *Absolute*, or *Comparative*. And those that are *Absolute*, are either *Disputable*, or *Indisputable*.

The *Indisputable Principles* are such as these :

*Good*, is that which we love for it self.

And that, for which we love somewhat else.

And that which all things desire.

And that to every man which his reason dictates.

And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.

And that which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of these.

And that which preserves any of these.

And that which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the *Good*, and reject the *Evil*, is *Good*.

And to take the greater *Good*, rather than the less ; and the lesser *Evil*, rather than the greater.

Further, all Vertues are *Good*.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautiful.

And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence ; and other like Habits.

And Health, Beauty, Strength, etc.

And Riches.

And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or do ; also Towardliness, Will, and the like.

And whatsoever Art, or Science.

And Life.

And whatsoever is Just.

The *Disputable Principles* are such as follow :

That is *Good*, whose contrary is *Evil*.

And whose contrary is *Good* for our Enemies.

And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.

And of which there cannot be too much.

And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.

And that which many desire.

And that which is praised.

And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise.

And what good we prefer.

And what we do advise.

And that which is possible, is *Good* (to undertake).

And that which is easie.

And that which depends on our own Will.

And that which is proper for us to do.

And what no man else can do.

And whatsoever is Extraordinary.

And what is suitable.

And that which wants a little of being at an end.

And what we hope to master.

And what we are fit for.

And what evil men do not.

And what we love to do.

## CHAP. VII.

*Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil, comparatively.*

THE *Colours* of *Good comparatively* depend partly upon the following Definitions of *Comparatives*.

1. *More, is so much, and somewhat besides.*

2. *Less*, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.

3. *Greater* and *more in number* are laid only *Comparatively* to *Less*, and *Fewer in number*.

4. *Great* and *Little*, *Many* and *Few*, are taken *Comparatively* to the *Most of the same kind*. So that *Great* and *Many*, is that which *exceeds*; *Little* and *Few*, is that which is *exceeded by the Most of the same kind*.

Partly from the precedent Definitions of *Good absolutely*.

*Common Opinions concerning Good  
Comparatively, then, are these.*

*Greater Good* is *Many*, than fewer, or one of those many.

And *Greater* is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind. And *greater* is that *Good* than another good, whose kind is *greater* than another's kind.

And *Greater* is that from which another *Good follows*; than the *Good* which follows.

And of two which exceed a third, *Greater* is that which exceeds it most.

And that which causes the *greater Good*.

And that which proceeds from a *greater Good*.

And *Greater* is that which is chosen for it self, than that which is chosen from somewhat else.

And the end *Greater* than that which is not the end.

And that which less needs other things, than that which more.

And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another.

And the Beginning, than not the Beginning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a *greater Good*, or *Evil*, than that which is not the Beginning; and the End, than that which is not the End; One may argue from this *Colour* both ways: as *Leodamas* against *Chabrias*, would have the Actor more to

blame than the Advisor; and against *Callistratus*,  
the Advisor more than the Actor.]

And the Cause, than not the Cause.

And that which hath a *greater* Beginning or Cause.

And the Beginning, or Cause of a *greater Good or Evil*.

And that which is Scarce, *greater* than that which is Plentiful; because harder to get.

And that which is Plentiful, than that which is Scarce; because oftener in Use.

And that which is easie, than that which is hard.

And that whose Contrary is *greater*.

And that whose Want is *greater*.

And Vertue than not Vertue, a *greater Good*. Vice, than not Vice, a *greater Evil*.

And *greater Good*, or *Evil* is that, the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful.

And the effects of *greater* Vertues, or Vices.

And the Excess whereof is more tolerable, a *greater Good*.

And those things which may with more honour be desired.

And the desire of better things.

And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And that which wise men prefer.

And that which is in better men.

And that which better men chuse.

And that which is more, than that which is less delightful.

And that which is more, than that which is less honourable.

And that which we would have for our selves and Friends, a *greater Good*; and the contrary a *greater Evil*.

And that which is Lasting, than that which is not Lasting.

And that which is Firm, than that which is not Firm.

And what many desire, than what few.

And what the Adversary, or Judge confesseth to be *greater*, is *greater*.

And Common than not Common.

And not Common than Common.

And what is more Laudable.

And that which is more Honoured, a *greater Good*.

And that which is more Punished, a *greater Evil*.

And both *Good* and *Evil* divided than undivided, appear *greater*.

And Compounded than Simple, appear *greater*.

And that which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantageous, *greater* than otherwise.

And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto.

And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less.

And that which is nearest to the end designed.

And that which is *Good* or *Evil* to ones self, than that which is simply so.

And possible, than not possible.

And that which comes toward the end of our Life.

And that which we do really, than that which we do for show.

And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be.

And that which is good for more purposes, is the *greater Good*.

And that which serves us in great necessity.

And that which is joyned with less trouble.

And that which is joyned with more delight.

And of the two, that which added to a third, makes the whole the greater.

And that which having, we are more sensible of.

And in every thing, that which we most esteem.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the several Kinds of Governments.*

BECAUSE *Hortation* and *Dehortation* concern the Commonwealth, and are drawn from the *Elements* of *Good* and *Evil*; as we have spoken of them already in the *Abstract*, so we must speak of them also in the *Concrete*; that is, of what is *Good* or *Evil* to each sort of Commonwealth in special.

The *Government* of a Commonwealth, is either *Democracy*, or *Aristocracy*, or *Oligarchy*, or *Monarchy*.

*Democracy* is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.

*Aristocracy* is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Laws prescribe for best.

*Oligarchy* is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.

*Monarchy* is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which *Government*, if he limit by Law, is called *Kingdom*; if by his own will, *Tyranny*.

The end of *Democracy*, or the Peoples Government, is *Liberty*.

The end of *Oligarchy*, is the riches of those that govern.

The end of *Aristocracy* is *good Laws*, and *good ordering of the City*.

The end of *Monarchy*, or *Kings*, is *the safety of the People*, and *conservation of his own Authority*.

*Good* therefore, in each sort of *Government* is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because *belief* is not gotten only by *proofs*, but also from *manners*; the *manners* of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade, or diswade in matter of State.



Their *manners* may be known by their *designs*; and their *designs* by their *ends*; and their *ends* by what we see them take *pleasure* in. But of this more accurately in the *Politicks*.

CHAP. IX.

*Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.*

IN a *Demonstrative Oration*, the subject whereof is *Praise*, or *Dispraise*; the *proofs* are to be drawn from the *Elements* of *Honourable* and *Dishonourable*.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting *belief*; which is from the *manners* of the Speaker. For *Praise*, whether it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same *Principles*. Which are these:

*Honourable*, is that, which we love for it self, and is withal laudable.

And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good.

And Vertue.

*Vertue* is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.

The kinds of it are these;

1. *Justice*; which is a *Vertue* whereby every man obtains what by Law is his.

2. *Fortitude*; which is a *Vertue* by which a man carries himself *Honourably*, and according to the Laws, in time of danger.

3. *Temperance*; which is a *Vertue* whereby a man Governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law.

4. *Liberality*; which is a *Vertue*, by which we benefit others in matter of money.

5. *Magnanimity*; which is a *Vertue*, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.

6. *Magnificence*; which is a *Vertue*, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.

7. *Prudence*; which is an *Intellectual Vertue*, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any *Good* leading to *Felicity*.

And *Honourable*, are the Causes, and effects of things *Honourable*.

And the Works of *Vertue*.

And the signs of *Vertue*.

And those actions, the reward whereof is *Honour*.

And the reward whereof is rather *Honour*, than Money.

And that which we do not for our own sakes.

And what we do for our Countries good, neglecting our own.

And those things are *Honourable*, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.

And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living.

And what we do for other men, especially for Benefactors.

And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Adversary.

And of the more *Honourable* and better men, the *Vertues* are more *Honourable*.

And more *Honourable* are the *vertues* that tend to other mens benefit, than those which tend to ones own.

And *Honourable* are those things which are Just.

And Revenge is *Honourable*.

And Victory.

And *Honour*.

And Monuments.

And those things which happen not to the living.

And things that excel.

And what none can do but we.  
 And possessions we reap no profit by.  
 And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places.

And the signs of praise.

And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanick.

And that which seems *Honourable*; Namely such as follow.

Vices confining upon Vertue.

And the extreams of Vertues.

And what the Auditors think *Honourable*.

And that which is in estimation.

And that which is done according to custom.

Besides, in a *Demonstrative Oration*, the Orator must shew, that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly, and willingly.

And he does so, who does the same often.

*Praise*, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a *Vertue*, *Action*, or *Work*.

But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular proof.

*To Magnify* and *to Praise*, differ in themselves, as *Felicity* and *Vertue*. For *Praise* declares a mans *Vertue*; and *Magnifying* declares his *Felicity*.

*Praise* is a kind of inverted *Precept*. For to say, *Do it because 'tis good*, is a *Precept*. But to say, *He is good because he did it*, is *Praise*.

An Orator in *Praising* must also use the forms of *Amplification*; such as these:

He was the first that did it.

The only man that did it.

The special man that did it.

He did it with disadvantage of time.

He did it with little help.

He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions.

Further, he that will *praise* a Man, must compare

him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.

And *Amplification* is more proper to a *Demonstrative Oration*, than to any other. For here the Actions are confessed; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster.

## CHAP. X.

*Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.*

IN a *Judicial Oration*, which consists in *Accusation* and *Defence*, the thing to be proved is, that *Injury* has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three:

1. The causes that move to *Injury*.
2. The Persons apt to do *Injury*.
3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer *Injury*.

An *Injury* is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law.

*Voluntary* is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion.

The causes of *Voluntary* Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition, or not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by *Chance*, by *Compulsion*, or by *Natural necessity*.

Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by *Custom*, or upon *Premeditation*, or in *Anger*, or out of *Intemperance*.

By *Chance* are said to be done those things whereof

neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor always, nor most commonly after the same manner.

*By Nature* are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly, and always, or for the most part after the same manner.

*By Compulsion* are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.

*By Custom* those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.

*Upon Premeditation* are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

*In Anger* are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose to Revenge.

*Out of Intemperance* are said to be done those things which are delightful.

In sum, every *Voluntary* Action tends either to *Profit* or *Pleasure*.

The *Colours* of *Profitable* are already set down.

The *Colours* of that which is *Pleasing* follow next.

#### CHAP. XI.

##### *Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure.*

*PLEASURE* is a sudden and sensible motion of the Soul, towards that which is Natural.

*Grief* is the Contrary.

*Pleasant* therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion.

And to return to ones own Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not violent.

*Unpleasant* are those things, which proceed from Necessity, as Cares, Study, Contentions. The contrary whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour and Care: also, Play, Rest, Sleep, are *Pleasant*.

*Pleasant* also is that, to which we have an appetite.

Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual; as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Reason.

And those things we remember, whether they pleased, or displeased, than when they were present.

And the things we hope for.

And Anger.

And to be in Love.

And Revenge.

And Victory. Therefore.

Also contentious Games; as Tables, Chess, Dice, Tennis, etc.

And Hunting.

And Suits in Law.

And Honour and Reputation amongst men in Honour and Reputation.

And to Love.

And to be Beloved and Respected.

And to be Admired.

And to be Flattered.

And a Flatterer: (for he seems both to love and admire.)

And the same thing often.

And Change, or Variety.

And what we return to afresh.

And to learn.

And to admire.

And to do Good.

And to receive Good.

And to help up again one that's fallen.

And to finish that which is unperfect.

And Imitation.

And therefore the Art of Painting.  
 And the Art of Carving Images.  
 And the Art of Poetry.  
 And Pictures and Statues.  
 And other Mens Dangers, so they be near.  
 And to have escaped hardly.  
 And things of a kind *please* one another.  
 And every one himself.  
 And one's own *pleases* him.  
 And to bear Sway.  
 And to be thought Wise.  
 And to dwell upon that which he is good at.  
 And ridiculous Actions, Sayings and Persons.

#### CHAP. XII.

*Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that do it: or Common Opinions concerning the Aptitude of Persons to do Injury.*

OF the Causes which move to *Injury*, namely, *Profit* and *Pleasure*, has been already spoken, *Chap.* 6, 7, 11.

It follows next to speak of the *Persons*, that are apt to *do Injury*.

The *Doers of Injury* are,

Such as think they can do it.

And such as think to be undiscovered when they have done it.

And such as think, though they be discovered, they shall not be called in question for it.

And such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their *Mulct* will be less than their *Gain*, which either themselves or their *Friends* receive by the *Injury*.

*Able to do Injury* are,

Such as are Eloquent.

And such as are practised in Business.

And such as have skill in Process.

And such as have many Friends.

And Rich Men.

And such as have Rich Friends; or Rich Servants;  
or Rich Partners.

*Undiscovered when they have done it, are,*

Such as are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused: as Feeble Men, Slaughter: Poor, and not Beautiful Men, Adultery.

And such as one would think could not chuse but be discovered.

And such as do *Injuries*, whereof there hath been no Example.

And such as have none, or many enemies.

And such as can easily conceal what they do.

And such as have some body to transfer the fault upon.

*They that do Injury openly, are,*

Such whose friends have been *Injured*.

And such as have the Judges for friends.

And such as can escape their Tryal at Law.

And such as can put off their Tryal.

And such as can corrupt the Judges.

And such as can avoid the payment of their Fine.

And such as can defer the payment.

And such as cannot pay at all.

And such as by the *Injury* get manifestly, much, and presently; when the Fine is uncertain, little, and to come.

And such as get by the *Injury*, money; by the penalty, shame only.

And such on the Contrary, as get honour by the *Injury*, and suffer the mulct of money, only, or banishment, or the like.

And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered.

And such as have often attempted in vain.



And such as consider present pleasure, more than pain to come; and so intemperate men are apt to do *Injury*.

And such as consider pleasure to come, more than present pain; and so temperate men are apt to do *Injury*.

And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or Custom; and by Error, rather than by Injustice.

And such as have means to get pardon.

And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Un-necessaries, as rich men.

And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.

#### CHAP. XIII.

*Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that suffer, and from the Matter of the Injury.*

OF those that do *Injury*, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken.

Now of the persons that suffer, and of the *Matter* wherein they suffer, the *common Opinions* are these:

*Persons* obnoxious to *Injury* are,

Such as have the things that we want, either as necessary, or as delightful.

And such as are far from us.

And such as are at hand.

And such as are unwary, and credulous.

And such as are lazy.

And such as are modest.

And such as have swallowed many *Injuries*.

And such as have *Injured* often before.

And such as never before.

And such as are in our danger.

And such as are ill beloved generally.

And such as are envied.

And our Friends.

And our Enemies.

And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or action.

And such as shall be losers by going to Law: as Strangers, and Workmen.

And such as have done the *Injuries* they suffer.

And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.

And such as, by doing them an *Injury*, we shall gratify our friends or superiours.

And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse.

And such as another would do the *Injury* to, if we should not.

And such as by *Injuring*, we get greater means of doing good.

The *Matters* wherein men are obnoxious to *Injury* are,

Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly.

And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.

And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered.

And those things wherein prosecution of *Injury*, may be thought a love of contention.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Of those Things which are necessary to be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.*

WHEN the fact is evident, the next Inquiry is, whether it be *Just*, or *Unjust*.

For the Definition of *Just* and *Unjust*, we must know what *Law* is: that is, what the *Law of Nature*, what the *Law of Nations*; what the *Law Civil*, what *written Law*, and what *unwritten Law* is: and what *Persons*, that is, what a *publick Person*, or the *City* is; and what a *private Person*, or *Citizen* is.

*Unjust* in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the *Law of Nature*.

*Unjust* in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together, is that which is contrary to the *Law common to those Nations*.

*Unjust* only in one Common-wealth, is that which is contrary to the *Law Civil*, or Law of that Common-wealth.

He that is accused to have done any thing against the *Publick*, or a *private Person*, is accused to do it either *ignorantly*, or *unwillingly*, or *in anger*, or *upon premeditation*.

And because the Defendant does many times confess the *fact*, but deny the *unjustice*; as that he *took*, but did not *steal*; and *did*, but not *adultery*; it is necessary to know the Definitions of *Theft*, *Adultery*, and all other crimes.

What facts are contrary to the *written Laws*, may be known by the *Laws themselves*.

Besides *written Laws*, whatsoever is *Just*, proceeds from *Equity* or *Goodness*.

From *Goodness* proceeds that which we are praised, or honoured for.

From *Equity* proceed those actions, which though

the *written Law* command not, yet being interpreted reasonably, and supplied, seems to require at our hands.

Actions of *Equity* are such as these,

Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.

To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind.

And not to consider the *Law* so much, as the *Law-makers mind*; and not the *Words* so much, as the *meaning* of the *Law*<sup>a</sup>.

And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer *is*, but what he *has been* always, or for the most part.

And to remember better the Good received, than the Ill.

And to endure injuries patiently.

And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, than of the Sword.

And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, rather than of a Judge.

#### CHAP. XV.

*Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively.*

*COMMON Opinions* concerning *Injuries comparatively*, are such as these:

Greater is the *Injury* which proceed from greater Iniquity.

And from which proceedeth greater damage.

And of which there is no revenge.

<sup>a</sup> For, as the Quarterly Reviewer but too justly remarks, "To violate the spirit by obeying the letter, is often the painful duty of the judge; to make the letter conform to the spirit, is the privilege of the legislator;" and (he might have added) of the *arbitrator*, whose standard is equity. See Quarterly Review, vol. xxvii, p. 133.

And for which there is no remedy.

And by occasion of which, he that hath received the *Injury*, hath done some mischief to himself.

He does the greater *Injury*, that does it first, or alone, or with few.

And he that does it often.

Greater *Injury* is that, against which Laws and Penalties were first made.

And that which is more brutal, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.

And that which is done upon more premeditation.

And by which more Laws are broken.

And which is done in the place of Execution.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the *Injury*.

And which is committed against well deservers.

And which is committed against the *unwritten Law*; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.

And which is committed against the *written Law*; because he that will do *Injury*, neglecting the penalty set down in the *written Law*, is much more likely to transgress the *unwritten Law*, where there is no penalty at all.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Proofs Inartificial.*

OF *Artificial Proofs* we have already spoken.

*Inartificial Proofs*, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

1. *Laws*. And those are *Civil*, or *written Law*: the *Law or Custom of Nations*: and the *universal Law of Nature*.

2. *Witness*. And those are such as concern *Matter*; and such as concern *Manners*. Also, they be *ancient*, or *present*.

3. *Evidences*, or Writings.

4. *Question*, or Torture.

5. *Oaths*. And those be either *given*, or *taken*, or both, or neither.

For *Laws*, we use them thus :

When the *written Law* makes against us, we appeal to the *Law of Nature*, alledging,

That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.

That the *Law of Nature* is immutable; the *written Law* mutable.

That the *written Law* is but seeming justice; the *Law of Nature* very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.

That the Judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Justice.

That they are better men that obey *unwritten*, than *written Laws*.

That the *Law* against us does contradict some other *Law*. And when the *Law* has a double interpretation, that is, the true one, which makes for us.

And that the cause of the *Law* being abolished, the *Law* is no more of Validity.

But when the *written Law* makes for us, and *Equity* for the Adversary, we must alledge,

That a man may use *Equity*, not as a liberty to judge against the *Law*; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the *Law*.

That men seek not *Equity* because 'tis good simply, but because good for them.

That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the *Law*.

That as in other Arts, and namely in *Physick*, fallacies are pernicious; so in a Common-wealth 'tis pernicious to use pretexts against the *Law*.

And that in Common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the *Laws*, is prohibited.

For *Witnesses*, we must use them thus :

When we have them not, we must stand for *Presumptions*, and say,

That in *Equity* sentence ought to be given according to the most probability.

That *Presumptions* are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed.

That they cannot lye.

When we have *Witnesses*, against him that has them not, we must say,

That *Presumptions*, if they be false, cannot be punished.

That if *Presumptions* were enough, *Witnesses* were superfluous.

For *Writings*, when they favour us, we must say,

That *Writings* are private and particular *Laws*; and he that takes away the use of *Evidences*, abolisheth the Law.

That since *Contracts* and *Negotiations* pass by *Writings*, he that bars their use, dissolves humane Society.

Against them, if they favour the Adversary, we may say,

That since *Laws* do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less *Writings*.

And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is *just*, than what is in the *Writing*.

That *Writings* may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.

That the *Writing* is repugnant to some *Law*, *Civil*, or *Natural*; or to *Justice*; or to *Honesty*.

That 'tis repugnant to some other *Writing* before, or after.

That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.)

For the *Torture*, if the giving of it make for us, we must say,

That 'tis the only testimony that is certain.

But if it make for the Adversary, we may say,

That men inforced by *Torture*, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.

That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.

For *Oaths*; he that will not put his Adversary to his *Oath*, may alledge,

That he makes no scruple to be *forsworn*.

That by *swearing*, he will carry the cause; which *not swearing*, he must lose.

That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, than of the Adversary.

He that refuseth to *take the Oath*, may say,

That the matter is not worth so much.

That if he had been an evil man, he had *sworn*, and carryed his cause.

That to try it by *swearing* for a religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combate.

He that is willing to *take the Oath*, may pretend,

That he had rather trust himself, than his Adversary; and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to *give*, and for a religious man to *take the Oath*.

That 'tis his duty to *take the Oath*, since he has required to have *sworn Judges*.

He that *offers the Oath* may pretend,

That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.

That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.

That 'twere absurd for him *not to swear*, that has required the *Judges to be sworn*.

And of these are to be compounded the Forms we are to use, when we would *give*, and *not take the Oath*; or *take*, and *not give*; or *both give and take*; or *neither give nor take*.

But if one have *sworn* contrary to a former *Oath*, he may pretend,



That he was forced.

That he was deceived, and that neither of these is *Perjury*, since *Perjury* is voluntary.

But if the Adversary do so, he may say,

That he that stands not to what he hath *sworn*, subverteth humane Society.

And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be *sworn*, that judge our cause; when we will not stand to that we *swear* ourselves.

And so much for *Proofs inartificial*.

A BRIEF  
OF THE  
ART OF RHETORICK.

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BOOK II.

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CHAP. I.

*The Introduction.*

OF *Belief* proceeding from our *Invention*, that part which consisteth in *Proof*, is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the *manners* of the *Speaker*; the other from the *passions* of the *Hearer*.

The *Principles*, *Colours*, or *Common Opinions* upon which a mans *belief* is grounded concerning the *manners* of him that *speaks*, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning *Vertue*, book i, chap. 9, partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the *Passions*. For a man is *believed* either for his *Prudence*, or for his *Probity*, which are *Vertues*; or for *Good Will*: of which among the *Passions*.

The *Principles concerning Belief*, arising from the *Passion* of the *Hearer*, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several *Passions* in order.

In every one of which three things are to be considered:

1. First, *how* men are affected.
2. Secondly, *towards whom*.
3. Thirdly, *for what*.

## CHAP. II.

*Of Anger.*

*ANGER* is desire of Revenge, joyned with grief for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be *neglected*.

The object of *Anger* is always some particular, or individual thing.

In *Anger* there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.

To *Neglect*, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.

1. *Contempt*.
2. *Crossing*.
3. *Contumely*.

*Contempt*, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.

*Crossing* is the hinderance of another mans will without design to profit himself.

*Contumely*, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.

The *common Opinions* concerning *Anger* are therefore such as follow:

They are easily *Angry* that think they are neglected.

That think they excell others; as the Rich with the Poor; the Noble with the Obscure, etc.

And such as think they deserve well.

And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are *angry* with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.

And such as having expected good, find evil.

Those that men are *angry* with, are,  
Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.

And such as shew any kind of *Contumely*, towards them.

And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein.

And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends.

And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.

And such as requite not our courtesie.

And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiours.

And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.

And such as give not eare to our intreaty.

And such as are joyful, or calm in our distress.

And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.

And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.

And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire; of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence; and of those that reverence us.

And such as should help us, and neglect it.

And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.

And such as forget us, or our Names.

An *Orator* therefore must so frame his *Judge* or *Auditor* by his *Oration*; as to make him apt to *Anger*: and then make his *Adversary* appear such as men use to be *angry withal*.

## CHAP. III.

*Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.*

**RECONCILIATION** is the appeasing of Anger.

Those to whom men are easily reconciled, are,

Such as have not offended out of neglect.

And such as have done it against their will.

And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.

And such as have done as much to themselves.

And such as confess and repent.

And such as are humbled.

And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.

And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now hurt.

And such as sue to them for any thing.

And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.

And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withal.

And such as they fear or reverence.

And such as reverence them.

And such as have offended their Anger.

*Reconcilable* are,

Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said before to be easily angry.

And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.

And such as have given their anger time.

Men lay down their Anger for these Causes.

Because they have gotten the Victory.

Because the Offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict.

Because they have been revenged of another.

Because they think they suffer justly.

And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.

And because the Offender is dead.

Whosoever therefore would *assuage* the anger of his *Auditor*, must make himself appear such, as men use to be *reconciled* unto: and beget in his *Auditor* such opinions, as make him *reconcilable*.

#### CHAP. IV.

##### *Of Love and Friends.*

To *Love*, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.

A *Friend* is he that *loves*, and he that is *beloved*.

*Friends* one to another, are they that naturally *love* one another.

A *Friend* therefore is he,  
That rejoyceth at anothers Good.  
And that grieves at his hurt.

And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good, or hurt.

And that is *Enemy* or *Friend* to the same man.

We *love* them,

That have done good to us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season.

That are our *Friends* *Friends*.

That are our *Enemies* *Enemies*.

That are *Liberal*.

That are *Valiant*.

That are *Just*.

And that we would have *love* us.

And good *Companions*.

And such as can abide *Jests*.

And such as break *Jests*.

And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.

And such as are neat.

And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.

And such as quickly forget injuries.

And such as least observe our Errors.

And such as are not of ill Tongue.

And those that are ignorant of our Vices.

And such as cross us not when we are busie, or angry.

And such as are officious towards us.

And those that are like us.

And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.

And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.

And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the World, rather than their own Consciences condemns.

And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.

And such as we would have honour us, and not envie, but imitate us.

And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.

And such as continue their *Friendship* to the dead.

And such as speak their mind.

And such as are not terrible.

And such as we may rely on.

The several kinds of *Friendship*, are *Society*, *Familiarity*, *Consanguinity*, *Affinity*, etc.

The things that beget *Love*, are,

The bestowing	}	<i>Gratis.</i>
of <i>Benefits</i> ,		<i>Unasked.</i>
		<i>Privately.</i>

## CHAP. V.

*Of Enmity and Hatred.*

THE *Colours*, or *Common Opinions* concerning *Hatred* are to be taken from the *contrary* of those, which concern Love and Friendship.

*Hatred* differs from Anger in this,

That Anger regards only what is done to ones self; but *Hatred* not.

And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other universals also.

And in this, that Anger is curable, *Hatred* not.

And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, *Hatred* the damage of ones Adversary.

That with Anger there is always joyned Grief; with *Hatred* not always.

That Anger may at length be satiated, but *Hatred* never.

Hence it *appears* how the Judge or Auditor may be made *Friend* or *Enemy* to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear *Friend* or *Enemy* to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear *Enemies* to him.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of Fear.*

*FEAR* is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy.

*Danger* is the nearness of the evil feared.

The things to be *feared*, are,



Such as have power to hurt.

And the signs of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men.

And Injustice joyned with Power.

And Valour provoked, joyned with Power.

And the fear of powerful men.

The men that are to be *feared*, are,

Such as know our Faults.

And such as can do us Injury.

And such as think they are injured by us.

And such as have done us Injury.

And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.

And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are.

And such as have destroyed greater men than we are.

And such as use to invade their inferiours.

And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be *feared* than those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be *feared*, are,

Such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.

And such as admit either none, or not easie help.

And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.

They that *fear not*, are,

Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.

And therefore men *fear* little in prosperity.

And men *fear* little that think they have suffered already.

An Orator therefore that would put *Fear* into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffered from those, and at those times they least thought.

## CHAP. VII.

*Of Assurance.*

ASSURANCE is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.

The things therefore that beget *Assurance* are,  
The remoteness of those things that are to be feared,  
and the nearness of their contraries.

And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.

And neither to have done; nor received Injury.

And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.

And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.

*Assured, or Confident, are,*

They that have oft escaped danger.

And they to whom most things have succeeded well.

And they that see their Equals, or inferiours not afraid.

And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, etc.

And such as have done others no wrong.

And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty.

And such as think they will speed well that are gone before.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of Shame.*

SHAME is a perturbation of the Mind arising from the apprehension of Evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a mans own, or his friends reputation.

The things therefore which men are *ashamed* of are those Actions which proceed from Vice, as,

To throw away ones Arms; to run away; signs of Cowardliness.

To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.

To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intemperance.

To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signs of Wretchedness.

To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his vices; signs of Flattery.

To be unable to indure such labours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he; signs of Effeminacy.

To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him; signs of Pusillanimity.

To speak and promise much of ones self more than is due; signs of Arrogance.

To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be *ashamed of*.

And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be employed in his base Actions.

In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed; there is *shame* in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.

The men before whom we are *ashamed*, are such as we respect; namely,

Those that admire us.

And those whom we desire should admire us.

And those whom we admire.

Those that contend with us for Honour.

Those whose opinion we contemn not.

And therefore men are most *ashamed* in the presence,

Of old and well bred men.

Of those we are always to live with.

Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.

Of those that do not easily pardon.

And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.

And of those before whom we have had always good success.

And of those who never asked any thing of us before.

And of such as desire our Friendship.

And of our familiars, that know none of our crimes.

And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.

But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are *not ashamed*.

Therefore we are *ashamed* also in the presence,

Of those whom we reverence.

And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolks actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful.

And of their Rivals.

And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.

The *Common Opinions* concerning *Impudence* are taken from the contrary of these.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of Grace, or Favour.*

*GRACE* is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or to do service to a man in need; not for his own but for his cause to whom he does it.

Great *Grace* is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are conferred, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that confers the *favour* is the only, or the first man that did it.

*Need*, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired.

*Grace* therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.

Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a *Grace*, or *Favour*, must shew that he needeth it to whom it was done.

*Grace* it is not,

Which is done by Chance.

Nor which is done by Necessity.

Nor which has been Requited.

Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.

Nor that which is a Trifle.

Nor that which is Nought, if the Giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may go over the Prædicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a *Grace* for being *This*, or for being *so Much*, or for being *Such*, or for being *Now*, etc.

## CHAP. X.

*Of Pity, or Compassion.*

**PITY** is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself, or his.

And because it appertains to *Pity*, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most *compassionate*,

Who have passed through Misery.

And old Men.

And weak men.

And timorous Men.

And learned Men.

And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.

And such as think there be honest Men.

And that they are less *compassionate*,

Who are in great despair.

Who are in great prosperity.

And they that are angry; for they consider not.

And they that are very confident; for they also consider not.

And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.

And they that are astonished with fear.

And they that think no Man honest.

The things to be *pitied* are,

Such as grieve, and withal hurt.

Such as destroy.

And Calamities of fortune, if they be great; as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, etc.

And evil that arrives where good is expected.

And after extream evil, a little good.

And through a Mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be *pitied* are,

Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.

And such as be of our own years.

Such as are like us in manners.

Such as are of the same, or like stock.

And our equals in dignity.

Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.

And those that have the words or actions of them in the present misery.

#### CHAP. XI.

##### *Of Indignation.*

OPPOSITE in a manner to *Pity* in good Men, is *Indignation*, which is grief for the prosperity of a Man unworthy.

With *Indignation* there is always joyed a joy for the prosperity of a Man worthy, as *Pity* is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.

In wicked Men the opposite of *Pity* is,

*Envy*; as also the companions thereof *delight in the harm of others*, which the Greeks in one word have called *ἐπικαιρεκακία*. But of these in the next Chapter.

Men conceive *Indignation* against others, not for their vertues, as Justice, etc.

For these make Men worthy; and in *Indignation* we think Men unworthy.

But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble Men, and handsome Men are worthy of.

And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater *Indignation* against new than

antient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. But the antient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.

And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant *Achilles* were bestowed on the most eloquent *Ulysses*.

And for the comparison of the inferiour is the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more valiant; or whether absolutely superiour, as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man.

Apt to *Indignation* are,

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.

And they that are good.

And they that are ambitious.

And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.

Least apt to *Indignation* are,

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.

Who they are that Rejoyce, or Grieve not, at the adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.

Whosoever therefore would turn away the *Compassion* of the Judge, he must make him apt to *Indignation*; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evil which happens to him.



## CHAP. XII.

*Of Envy.*

*ENVY* is grief, for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as our selves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.

They are apt to *Envy*,

That are within a little of the highest.

And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.

And such as would be thought wise.

And such as catch at glory in every action.

And Men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.

The things which Men *Envy* in others are,

Such as bring Glory.

And goods of Fortune.

And such things as we desire for our selves.

And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.

Obnoxious to *Envy* are,

Men of our own time, of our own Countrey, of our own age, and competitors of our Glory.

And therefore,

Those whom we strive with for honour.

And those that covet the same things that we do.

And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.

And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.

And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed Men *envy* the young and lusty.

And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be *envy'd* by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other Mens hurt.

He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves *Pity*, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to *Envy*; and make his Adversary appear such, as above described, to be subject to the *Envy* of others.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of Emulation.*

**EMULATION** is grief arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also.

No Man therefore *Emulates* another in things whereof himself is not capable.

Apt to *Emulate* are,

Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have.

And Young and Magnanimous Men.

And such as already possess the goods for which Men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.

And those that are esteemed worthy by others.

And those whose Ancestors, Kindred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do *Emulate* others for that good.

Objects of *Emulation* are, for things; Vertues.

And things whereby we may profit others.

And things whereby we may please others.

For Persons,

They that possess such things.

And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.

And they whose praises flie abroad,  
The contrary of *Emulation* is *Contempt*.

And they that *Emulate* such as have the goods aforementioned, *Contemn* such as have them not: and thence it is, that Men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which Men honour, are nevertheless *Contemned*.

#### CHAP. XIV.

##### *Of the Manners of Youth.*

OF *Passions* we have already spoken.

We are next to speak of *Manners*.

*Manners* are distinguished by *Passions*, *Habits*, *Ages*, and *Fortunes*.

What kind of *Manners* proceed from *Passions*, and from *Vertues* and *Vices* (which are *Habits*,) hath been already shewed.

There remains to be spoken of the *Manners*, that are peculiar to several *Ages* and *Fortunes*.

The *Ages* are *Youth*, *Middle-Age*, *Old-Age*.

And first of *Youth*.

*Young Men* are,  
Violent in their desires.

Prompt to execute their desires.

Incontinent.

Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.

Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.

Apt to anger, and in their anger violent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.

Lovers of Honour and of Victory more than Money, as having not been yet in Want.

Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.

Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other *Ages* have by Wine; *Youth* being a kind of natural drunkenness. Besides, hope is of the time to come, whereof *Youth* hath much, but of the time past little.

Credulous, because not yet often deceived.

Easily deceived, because full of hope.

Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.

Bashful, because they estimate the Honour of Action by the precepts of the Law.

Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life.

And lovers of Honour more than Profit, because they live more by Custom than by Reason; and by Reason we acquire Profit, but Vertue by Custom.

Lovers of their Friends and Companions.

Apt to err in the excess, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of *Chilon*, *Ne quid nimis*; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.

Doers of Injury rather for contumely than for Damage.

Mercifull, because measuring others by their own innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.

And lovers of Mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.

*Jesting* is witty Contumely.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of the Manners of Old Men.*

THE *Manners of Old Men* are in a manner the contraries of those of *Youth*.

They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently than is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps, and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.

They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.

And suspicious through Incredulity, and incredulous by reason of their Experience.

They love and hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.

Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.

And covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.

And timorous, as having been cooled by years.

And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.

And lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.

And seek Profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.

And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.

And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.

And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof *Old Men* have good store.

And are full of Talk, because they delight in their Memory.

And Vehement in their anger: but not stout enough to execute it.

They have weak, or no desires; and thence seem Temperate.

They are slaves to Gain.

And live more by reason than Custom; because reason leads to Profit, as Custom to that which is Honourable.

And do Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.

And are mercifull by Compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in *Young Men*, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evil.

And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from Evil, because of their Infirmity.

Seeing then that every Man loves such Men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own *Manners*; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whether *Young* or *Old*.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of the Manners of Middle-aged Men.*

THE *Manners of Middle-aged Men*, are between those of *Youth*, and *Old Men*, and therefore,

They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.

They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.

They seek not only what is Honourable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.

They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigal; but in the mean.

They are neither easily Angry; nor yet Stupid: but between both.

They are Valiant, and withal Temperate.

And in general, whatsoever is divided in *Youth*, and *Old Men*, is compounded in *Middle-age*.

And whereof the Excess, or Defect is in *Youth* or *Old Men*; the Mediocrity is in those of the *Middle-age*.

*Middle-age* for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and fortieth, or thereabouts.

#### CHAP. XVII.

##### *Of the Manners of the Nobility.*

OF *Manners* that proceed from the several *Ages* we have already spoken.

We are next to speak of those that rise from several *Fortunes*.

The *Manners* of the *Nobility* are,

To be Ambitious.

To undervalue their Ancestors Equals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more precious for their Antiquity.

*Nobility* is the vertue of a Stock.

And *Generosity*, is not to degenerate from the vertue of his stock.

For as in Plants; so in the Races of Men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point: and change, *viz.* Subtil wits into madness; and staid wits into stupidity and blockishness.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of the Manners of the Rich.*

*RICH* Men are Contumelious and Proud. This they have from their *Riches*. For seeing every thing may be had for Money, having Money, they think they have all that is good.

And Effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their Lust.

And Boasters of their Wealth: and speak in high terms foolishly. For Men willingly talk of what they love and admire; and think others affect the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of Men submit to the *Rich*.

And think themselves worthy to command, having that by which Men attain command.

And in general, they have the *Manners* of Fortunate Fools.

They do Injury, with intentions not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.

There is a difference between *New* and *Antient Riches*: for they that are *newly* come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for *New Riches* are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of *Riches*.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.*

THE *Manners* of Men in *Power*, are the same, or better than those of the Rich.

They have a greater sense of Honour than the Rich; and their *Manners* are more Manly.



They are more Industrious than the Rich : for *Power* is sustained by Industry.

They are Grave, but without Austerity: for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the *Greeks* call *σεμνότης*.

When they do Injuries, they do great ones.

The *Manners of Men that prosper*, are compounded of the *Manners of the Nobility*, the *Rich* and those that are in *Power*, for to some of these all *Prosperity* appertains.

*Prosperity* in Children, and goods of the Body, make Men desire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.

Men that *Prosper* have this ill, to be more proud, and inconsiderate than others.

And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their Industry.

The *Manners of Poor Men*, *Obscure Men*, *Men without Power*, and *Men in Adversity*, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been said.

## CHAP. XX.

*Common Places or Principles concerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past, and Future. Also of Great and Little.*

WE have hitherto set down such *Principles* as are peculiar to several kinds of *Orations*.

Now we are to speak of such *Places* as are *Common* to them all; as these, *Possible*, *Done*, or *Past*, *Future*, *Great*, *Small*.

*Possible* is that,

The Contrary whereof is Possible.

And the like whereof is Possible.

And then which some harder thing is Possible.

And the beginning whereof is Possible.

And the end whereof is Possible.

And the usual consequent whereof is Possible.

And whatsoever we desire.

And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compell or perswade.

And part whereof is Possible.

And part of the whole that is Possible.

And the General if a Particular.

And a Particular if the General.

And of Relatives, if one, the other.

And that which without Art and Industry is *Possible*, is much more so with Art and Industry.

And that which is *Possible* to worse, weaker, and unskilfuller Men, is much more so to better, stronger, and more skilful.

The *Principles* concerning *Impossible* are the Contraries of these.

That *Has been done*,

Then which a harder thing has been done.

And the consequent whereof has been done.

And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindered.

And that which was Possible, to him in his Anger.

And that which he longed to do.

And that which was before upon the point of doing.

And whose antecedent has been done; or that, for which it uses to be done.

And if that, for whose cause we do this, then this.

The *Principles* concerning *Not done* are the Contraries of these.

That *Shall be done*,

Which some Man can, and means to do.

And which some Man can, and desires to do.

And which is in the way, and upon the point to be done.

And the antecedents whereof are past.

And the Motive whereof is past.

Of *Great* and *Small*, *More* and *Less*, see chap. vii, book 1.

#### CHAP. XXI.

##### *Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.*

OF the *Principles* both general and special from whence *Proofs* are to be drawn, has been already spoken.

Now follow the *Proofs* themselves which are *Examples* or *Enthymemes*.

An *Example* is either an Example properly so called (as some Action past:) or a *Similitude* (which is called a *Parable*:) or a *Fable* (which contains some Action feigned.)

An *Example* properly so called, is this; *Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued Ægypt. Xerxes also conquered Ægypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Ægypt.*

A *Similitude*, or *Parable*, is such as followeth: *They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Champions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the Urne.*

A *Fable* is in this manner. *The Horse desiring to drive out the Stag from his common pasture, took a Man to assist him, and having received into his mouth a Bridle, and a Rider upon his Back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himera, having (in hope to be revenged of your Enemies) given unto Phalaris Sovereign Authority, that is to say, taken a Bridle into your Mouths; if you shall also give him*

*a Guard to his Person, that is, let him get up upon your Backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.*

To find out *Examples*, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.

But to find *Fables* and *Similitudes*, is easier ; because by conversing in *Philosophy*, a Man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.

*Examples*, *Similitudes*, and *Fables*, where *Enthymemes* are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an *Oration* for *Inductions* ; otherwise are to be alledged after *Enthymemes* for *Testimonies*.

CHAP. XXII.

*Of a Sentence.*

A *SENTENCE* is an universal Proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions or Passions of the common life. As,

*A wise Man will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.*

And is to an *Enthymeme* in *Rhetorick*, as any *Proposition* is to a *Syllogisme* in *Logick*.

And therefore a *Sentence*, if the reason be rendered, becomes a *Conclusion*, and both together make an *Enthymeme*.

As for Example.

*To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that's wise will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.*

Of *Sentences* there be four sorts.

For they either require *Proofs*, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.

Such as are manifest, are either so, as soon as they are uttered ; as,

*Health is a great good.*

Or as soon as they are considered; as,

*Men used to hate whom they have hurt.*

Such as are not manifest; are either Conclusions of *Enthymemes*; as

*He that's wise will not suffer his Children, etc.*

Or else are *Enthymematical*; that is, have in themselves the force of an *Enthymeme*; as

*Mortal Men ought not to carry Immortal Anger.*

A *Sentence* not Manifest, ought to be either *Inferred*, or *Confirmed*.

*Inferred* thus:

*'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by ones fellow Citizens. A wise Man therefore will not have his Children over-learned.*

*Confirmed* thus:

*A wise Man will not have his Children over-learned, seeing too much Learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.*

If a reason be added to a manifest *Sentence* let it be short.

*Sentences* become not every Man; but only old Men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young Man speak *Sentences*, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant Man speak *Sentences*, is absurd.

*Sentences* generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denyed, when any laudable custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.

The commodities of *Sentences*, are two.

One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a Man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.

Another is, that *Sentences* do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be es-

teemed good *Sentences*, he shall be esteemed a good Man; and if evil, an evil Man.

Thus much of *Sentences*, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Of the Invention of Enthymemes.*

SEEING an *Enthymeme* differs from a *Logical Syllogisme*, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote *Principles*; the *Places* of it, from whence a Man may argue ought to be certain, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a *Syllogisme Rhetorical*, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the *Athenians* in the question, whether they are to make War or no, must know what their Revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at *Salamis*, *Marathon*, etc. It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak *ex tempore*, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.

*Proper*, I call those things which are least common to others; as, he that will praise *Achilles*, is not to declare such things as are common both to him, and *Diomedes*; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the *Trojans*; but such things as are proper only to *Achilles*; as that he killed *Hector* and *Cygnus*; went to the War young, and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one general *Place*, from that which is proper.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.*

FORASMUCH as *Enthymemes* either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either *Ostensive*; or such as bring a Man to some *impossibility*; we will first set down the *Places of Enthymemes Ostensive*.

An *Ostensive Enthymeme* is, wherein a Man concludes the question from somewhat granted.

That *Enthymeme* which brings a Man to an *impossibility*, is an *Enthymeme* wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly *impossible*.

All *Places* have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of *Good, Evil, Just, Unjust, Honourable* and *Dishonourable*: namely, they have been set down as applyed to *Particular* Subjects, or in *Concrete*.

Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the *Abstract* or *Universal*.

The first *Place* then let be from *Contraries*, which in the *Concrete* or Particulars is exemplified thus. *If Intemperance be hurtful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtful; neither is Temperance profitable.*

Another *Place* may be from *Cognomination* or affinity of words: as in this Particular. *If what is Just be Good; then what is justly is well: but justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.*

A third from *Relatives*; as, *This Man has justly done, therefore the other has justly suffered.* But this *Place* sometimes deceives, for a man may suffer *justly*, yet not from *him*.

A fourth from *Comparison*, three ways.

From the *Great to the Less*: as, *He has stricken his Father; and therefore this Man.*

From the *Less to the Greater*: as, *The Gods know not all things; much less Man.*

From *Equality*: as, *If Captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a Victory; why should Sophisters?*

Another from the *Time*: as *Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your Country with my Army, before I had ayded you against the Phœcæans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you.*

A sixth from *what the Adversary says of himself*: as, *Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a Bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What (says he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?*

This *Place* would be ridiculous, where the *Defendant* were not in much more estimation than the *Accuser*.

A seventh from the *Definition*; as that of *Socrates; a Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.*

An eighth from the *distinction of an ambiguous word*.

A ninth from *Division*: as, *If all Men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.*

A tenth from *Induction*: as, *At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, etc. And therefore every where.*

An eleventh from *Authority*, or precedent sentence; as that of *Sappho*, that *Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.*

A twelfth from the *Consequence*: as, *'Tis not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.*



A thirteenth from *two contrary Consequences*; as, *'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease Men: If he speak falsely, he shall displease God.*

Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, *If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth you shall please Men; therefore by all means be an Orator.*

A Fourteenth from the *quality that Men have to praise one thing, and approve another*: as, *We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all Men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no Liberty: but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will approve.*

A Fifteenth from *Proportion*: as, *seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?*

A Sixteenth from the *similitude of Consequents*: as, *He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.*

A Seventeenth from *that, that Men change their mind*: as, *If when we were in Banishment, we fought to recover our Country, why should we not fight now to retain it?*

An Eighteenth from *a fained end*: as, *that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another; but as one that would partake less of the Glory.*

A Nineteenth from the *Cause*; as if he would infer he did it from this, *that he had Cause to do it.*

A Twentieth from *that which is Incredible, but True*: as, *that Laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt Water, may need salting.*

## CHAP. XXV.

*Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.*

LET the first *Place* be from *inspection of Times, Actions, or Words*, either of the *Adversary*, or of the *Speaker*, or *both*. Of the *Adversary*; as, *He says, he loves the People, and yet he was in the Conspiracy of the Thirty*. Of the *Speaker*; as, *He says, I am contentious, and yet I never began Suit*. Of *both*; as, *He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Money*.

A *Second* from *shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss*, and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused; as, *The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen embracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she embraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation*.

A *Third*, from *rendring of the cause*; as, *Leodamas*, to whom it was objected, that he had, under the *Thirty Tyrants*, defaced the *Inscription* (which the *People* had set up in a *Pillar*) of his *Ignominy*; answered, *He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants, by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred*.

A *Fourth* from *better Counsel*; as, *He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this*. But this *Place* deceives, when the *better Counsel* comes to mind after the *Fact*.

A *Fifth*, from *Incompatibility of the things to be done*; as, *They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddess, they ought not to Mourn; and if they thought her a Mortal, they ought not to Sacrifice*.

A Sixth (which is proper to *Judicial Orations*) from an *Inference of Error*; as, *If he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it*<sup>a</sup>.

*Enthymemes* that lead to *Impossibility*, please more than *Ostensive*: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Auditor.

Of all *Enthymemes*, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the Speaker.

#### CHAP. XXVI.

##### *Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.*

OF *seeming Enthymemes*, one Place may be from the *Form of speaking*; as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his Conclusion, as if it followed necessarily, though it do not.

A Second from an *ambiguous word*.

A Third from *that which is true divided, to that which is false joyned*; as that of *Orestes*, *It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death, and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother*. Or from *that which is true joyned, to that which is false divided*; as, *one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful*.

A Fourth from *Amplification of the Crime*. For neither is the *Defendant* likely to have committed the

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle mentions a *seventh* element, derivable from puns upon words. This however our analyst entirely overlooks; from the consideration probably that it could contribute but little to the argumentative strength of an oration; or because it may be applied no less to *confirmation* than to *refutation*.

*Crime* he *amplifies*; nor does the *Accuser* seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.

A Fifth from *signs*; as, when a Man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.

A Sixth from *that which comes by chance*, as if from this, that the Tyranny of *Hipparchus* came to be overthrown from the love of *Aristogeiton* to *Harmodius*, a Man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boys were profitable.

A Seventh from *the Consequence*, as *Banishment is to be desired, because a banished Man has choice of places to dwell in.*

An Eighth from *making that the cause which is not*; as, *In Demosthenes his Government, the War began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Peloponnesian War began the Plague, therefore Pericles that perswaded that War, did ill.*

A Ninth from *the Omission of some circumstance*, as, *Helen did what was lawful, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Fathers consent to choose her own Husband*; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.

A Tenth, from *that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply*; as, *'Tis probable, he foresaw, that if he did it, he should be suspected; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.*

From this *Place* one may infer both ways that *he did it not*. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought *he did it not*, again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought *he did it not*, for this, that *he knew he should be suspected.*

Upon this *Place* was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in *Protagoras*, of making the better cause seem the worse; and the worse the better.

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Of the Ways to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.*

AN *Argument* is answered by an opposite *Syllogisme*, or by an *Objection*.

The *Places* of opposite *Syllogismes* are the same with the *Places* of *Syllogismes*, or *Enthymemes*: for a *Rhetorical Syllogisme* is an *Enthymeme*.

The *Places* of *Objections* are four.

First, from *the same*, as, To the *Adversary* that proves love to be good by an *Enthymeme*, may be *objected*, that *no want is good, and yet Love is want*; or particularly thus: *The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good*.

The Second from *Contraries*: as, if the *Adversary* say, *A good Man does good to his friends*, an *Objection* might be made, that then *an evil Man will do also evil to his friends*.

The Third from *Similitude*: as thus, if the *Adversary* say, all Men that are injured, do hate those that have injured them, it may be *objected*, that then, *all Men that had received Benefits should love their Benefactors*, that is to say, be grateful.

The Fourth from the *authority of famous men*; as when a Man shall say, that drunken Men ought to be pardoned those Acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the *Objection* may be, that *Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such Acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkenness*.

And forasmuch as all *Enthymemes* are drawn from *Probability*, or *Example*, or from a *Sign Fallible*, or from a *Sign Infallible*: an *Enthymeme* from *Probability* may be confuted *really*, by shewing that for the

most part it falls out otherwise; but *apparently* or *sophistically*, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judge thinks the *Probability* not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon.

[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the Fact proved *probable*, conceives it as *true*. For the Understanding has no Object but *Truth*. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an *Instance* to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it *true*, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it *false*, and consequently not so much as *probable*. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both *probable* and *false*: and he that says a thing is *probable*, the meaning is, he thinks it *true*, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]

An *Enthymeme* from a *fallible sign*, is answered, by shewing the *sign to be fallible*.

An *Enthymeme* from an *Example*, is answered, as an *Enthymeme* from *Probability*; really, by shewing more *Examples* to the contrary; *apparently*, if he bring *Examples* enough to make it seem *not necessary*.

If the *Adversary* have more *Examples* than we, we must make appear that they are not applicable to the Case.

An *Enthymeme* from an *infallible sign*, if the Proposition be *true*, is unanswerable.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which Arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the Matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.*

THE first, that *Amplification* and *Extenuation* are not *Common Places*, appears by this, that *Amplification*, and *Extenuation* do prove a fact to be *great*, or *little*; and are therefore *Enthymemes*, to be drawn from *Common Places*, and therefore are not the *Places* themselves.

The second, that *Enthymemes*, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.

The third, that an *Objection* is no *Enthymeme*, is apparent by this, that an *Objection* is no more but an *Opinion*, *Example*, or other *Instance*, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.

Thus much of *Examples*, *Sentences*, *Enthymemes*, and generally of all things that belong to *Argumentation*; from what *Places* they may be drawn, or answered.

There remains *Elocution*, and *Disposition* to be spoken of in the next Book.

A BRIEF  
OF THE  
ART OF RHETORICK.

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BOOK III.

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CHAP. I.

*Of the Original of Elocution and Pronuntiation.*

THREE things being necessary to an *Oration*, namely, *Proof*, *Elocution* and *Disposition*; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.

As for *Action*, or *Pronuntiation*, so much as is necessary for an *Orator*, may be fetcht out of the *Book* of the *Art of Poetry*, in which we have treated of the *Action* of the *Stage*.

For *Tragedians* were the first that invented such *Action*, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the *magnitude*, *tone*, and *measure* of the *Voice*; a thing less subject to *Art*, than is either *Proof*, or *Elocution*.

And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for *Poetry*.

But *Oratorical Action* has not been hitherto reduced to *Art*.

And *Orators* in the beginning, when they saw that the *Poets* in barren and feigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had pro-



ceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a *Stile*, by imitation of them, approaching to *Verse*, and made choice of words.

But when the *Poets* changed their *Stile*, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the *Orators* did the same, and lighted at last upon words, and a Government of the Voice and Measures proper to themselves.

Seeing therefore *Pronuntiation*, or *Action* are in some degree necessary also for an *Orator*, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the *Art of Poetry*.

[In the mean time this may be one general rule. If the *Words*, *Tone*, *Greatness* of the Voice, *Gesture* of the Body and Countenance, seem to proceed all from one Passion, then 'tis well pronounced. Otherwise not.

For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the Speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the Speaker, so the mind of the Hearer always.]

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the Choice of Words and Epithets.*

THE Vertues of a *Word* are two; the first, that it be *perspicuous*; the second, that it be *decent*; that is, neither *above*, nor *below* the thing signified; or, neither too humble, nor too fine.

*Perspicuous* are all *Words* that be *Proper*.

*Fine Words* are those, that are *borrowed*, or *Translated* from other significations; of which in the *Art of Poetry*.

The reason why *borrowed Words* please, is this. Men are affected with *Words*, as they are with *Men*, admiring in both that which is *Forraign* and *New*.

To make a *Poem* graceful, many things help; but few an *Oration*.

For to a *Poet* it sufficeth with what *Words* he can set out his *Poem*: but an *Orator* must not only do that: but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas *belief* is the scope of his *Oration*.

The *Words* that an *Orator* ought to use are of three sorts. *Proper*; such as are *Received*; and *Metaphors*.

*Words* taken from Forraign Languages, *Words* compounded, and *Words* new coyned, are seldom to be used.

*Synonimaes* belong to *Poets*, and *Equivocal Words* to *Sophisters*.

An *Orator*, if he use *Proper Words*, and *Received*, and good *Metaphors*, shall both make his *Oration beautiful*, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak *perspicuously*. For in a *Metaphor* alone there is *Perspicuity*, *Novity*, and *Sweetness*.

Concerning *Metaphors* the Rules are these.

1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his *Metaphor* from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a *Crime*, an *Error*. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his *Metaphor* from somewhat worse, as, calling *Error*, *Crime*.

2. A *Metaphor* ought not to be so far fetcht, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.

3. A *Metaphor* ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the *Poets* do that choose rather to say, *Rosy-fingered*; than *Red-fingered Aurora*.

In like manner the Rule of *Epithets* is,

That he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace should use those of the worse: as *Simonides* being to Write an *Ode* in honour of the Victory gotten in a Course by certain *Mules*, being not well paid, called them by their name

[Ἡμισίονους] that signifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, stiles them *the Sons of swift-footed Coursers*.

### CHAP. III.

#### *Of the Things that make an Oration Flat.*

THE things that make an *Oration flat* or *insipide*, are four.

1. *Words Compounded*; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and seldom used.]

2. *Forraign Words*. As for Example, such as are newly derived from the Latine; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are Forraign in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.

3. *Long, impertinent, and often Epithets*.

4. *Metaphors, indecent, and obscure*. *Obscure* they are, when they are far fetcht. *Indecent* when they are *ridiculous*, as in *Comedies*; or *too grave*, as in *Tragedies*.

### CHAP. IV.

#### *Of a Similitude.*

A *SIMILITUDE* differs from a *Metaphor* only by such *Particles of Comparison* as these, *As*; *Even as*; *So*; *Even so, etc.*

A *Similitude* therefore is a *Metaphor dilated*; and a *Metaphor* is a *Similitude Contracted* into one Word.

A *Similitude* does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis *Poetical*.

An Example of a *Similitude*, is this of *Pericles*; that said in his Oration, *that the Bæotians were like to so many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another*.

## CHAP. V.

*Of the Purity of Language.*

FOUR things are necessary to make Language Pure.

1. The *right rendring* of those *Particles* which some antecedent *Particle* does require: as to a *Not only*, a *Not also*; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.

2. *The use of proper Words*, rather than *Circumlocutions*, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.

3. That there be nothing of *double construction*, unless there be cause to do it of purpose. As the *Prophets* (of the Heathen) who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their *Prophesies*; which is easier maintained in *generals*, than in *particulars*. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be *even* or *odd*, than *how many*; and that a thing *will be*, than *what it will be*.

4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.

In Summ; a Man's Language ought to be easie for another to read, pronounce, and point.

Besides, to divers *Antecedents*, let divers *Relatives*, or one common to them all, be correspondent: as, *He saw the Colour*; *He heard the Sound*; or *He perceived both Colour and Sound*; but by no means, *He heard or saw both*.

Lastly, that which is to be interposed by *Parenthesis*, let it be done quickly: as, *I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and this purpose) afterward to be gone*. For to put it off thus: *I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose*, is vitious.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.*

A MAN shall add *Amplitude*, or *Dignity* to his Language, but by such means as these.

1. By changing the *Name* with the *Definition*, as occasion shall serve. As when the *Name* shall be indecent, by using the *Definition*; or *Contrary*.
2. By *Metaphors*.
3. By using the *plural* number for the *singular*.
4. By *privative Epithets*.

## CHAP. VII.

*Of the Convenience or Decency of Elocution.*

*ELOCUTIONS* are made *Decent*,

1. By speaking *feelingly*; that is, with such *Passion* as is fit for the matter he is in; as *Angerly* in matter of *Injury*.
2. By speaking as becomes the *Person* of the *Speaker*; as for a *Gentleman* to speak *eruditely*.
3. By speaking *proportionably* to the matter; as of *great affairs* to speak in a *high*; and of *mean*, in a *low* *Stile*.
4. By abstaining from *Compounded*, and from *Outlandish words*; unless a Man speak *passionately*, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or *Ironically*.

It confers also to perswasion very much, to use these ordinary Forms of speaking, *All men know*; 'Tis confessed by all; *No Man will deny*, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprized with the fear to be esteemed the only Ignorant Man.

'Tis good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the *Pronunciation* and *Countenance* that to such a word belongs: that the *Disproportion* between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a Man has said too much, it will shew well to correct himself: for he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says.

[But in this a Man must have a care not to be too precise in shewing of this Consideration. For the ostentation of Carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required.]

CHAP. VIII<sup>a</sup>.*Of two Sorts of Stiles.*

THERE be two sorts of Stiles.

The one *continued* or to be *comprehended at once*; the other *divided*, or *distinguished* by Periods.

The first sort was in use with antient Writers: but is now out of date.

An Example of this *Stile* is in the History of *Herodotus*; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole History.

In the other kind of *Stile*, that is distinguished by Periods; a *Period* is such a part as is perfect in it self, and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.

This later kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appears finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he fore-sees no end, and

<sup>a</sup> Hobbes has overlooked Aristotle's 8th chapter "on Rhythm."

has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence (which is the cause that Verses be easily remembered;) the other not.

Every Sentence ought to end with the *period*, and nothing to be interposed.

*Period* is either *simple*, or *divided* into Parts.

*Simple* is that which is *Indivisible*; as, *I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.*

A *Period divided*, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient, for respiration, but also *Parts*. As, *I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions*: where in these words, *I wonder you are not afraid of their ends*, is one *Colon*, or *Part*; and in these, *Seeing you imitate their actions*, another: and both together make the *Period*.

The *parts*, or *members*, and *periods* of speech ought neither to be *too long*, nor *too short*.

*Too long* are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.

*Too short* are they, that end before he expects it.

Those that be *too long*, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usual end of the Walk, and thereby out-goes him that walks with him.

They that be *too short*, make the Hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.

A *period* that is *divided* into parts, is either *divided only*; or has also an *Opposition* of the *Parts* one to another.

*Divided only* is such as this: *This the Senate knows; the Consul sees; and yet the Man lives.*

A *Period* with *Opposition of Parts*, called also *Antithesis*, and the parts *Antitheta*, is when *contrary parts* are put together; or also joyned by a third.

*Contrary parts* are put together, as here, *The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.*

*Antitheta* are therefore acceptable; because not only the *parts* appear the better for the *opposition*; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of *Enthymeme*, which leads to *Impossibility*.

*Parts*, or *Members* of a *Period*, are said to be *equal*, when they have altogether, or almost equal Number of *Syllables*.

*Parts*, or *Members* of a *Period*, are said to be *like*, when they *begin*, or *end* alike: and the more *Similitudes*, and the greater *equality* there is of *Syllables*, the more graceful is the *Period*.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of those Things that grace an Oration, and make it delightful.*

FORASMUCH as there is nothing more delightful to a Man, than to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those *Words* are most *grateful* to the Ear, that make a Man seem to see before his Eyes the things signified.

And therefore *Forraign Words* are unpleasant, because *Obscure*; and *Plain Words*, because *too Manifest*, making us learn nothing new: but *Metaphors* please; for they beget in us by the *Genus*, or some *common* thing to that with another, a kind of *Science*: as when an *Old Man* is called *Stubble*; a Man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to *Stubble*, and to *Old Men*.

That which a *Metaphor* does, a *Similitude* does the same; but with less *grace*, because with more *proximity*.

Such *Enthymemes* are the most *graceful*, which neither are presently very *Manifest*, nor yet very hard to



be understood<sup>a</sup>, but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.

The things that make a speech *graceful*, are these; *Antitheta*, *Metaphors*, and *Animation*.

Of *Antitheta* and *Antithesis* hath been spoken in the precedent Chapter.

Of *Metaphors* the most *graceful* is that which is drawn from *Proportion*.

[*Aristotle* (in the 12 Chapter of his *Poetry*) defines a *Metaphor* to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the *General* to the *Particular*. 2. From the *Particular* to the *General*. 3. From one *Particular* to another. 4. From *Proportion*.]

A *Metaphor* from *Proportion* is such as this, *A State without Youth, is a Year without a Spring*.

*Animation* is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes; as he that said, *The Athenians poured out their City into Sicily*, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest *grace* of an *Oration*.

If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both *Metaphor*, and this *Animation*, and also *Antithesis*, it cannot choose but be very *graceful*.

That an *Oration* is *graced by Metaphor, Animation* and *Antithesis*, hath been said: but how 'tis *graced*, is to be said in the next Chapter.

#### CHAP. X.

*In what Manner an Oration is graced by the Things aforesaid.*

'Tis *graced by Animation*, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the Sword is said to *devour*.

<sup>a</sup> ἐπιπόλαια and ἀγνούμενα.

Such *Metaphors* as these come into a Mans mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more *grace* hath the *Metaphor*.

A *Metaphor* without *Animation*, adds *grace* then, when the Hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.

Also *Paradoxes* are *graceful*, so Men inwardly do believe them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a Mans expectation.

And *Paragrams*; that is, allusions of words are graceful, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with *Antithesis*: for by these means the ambiguity is taken away.

And the more of these; namely, *Metaphor*, *Animation*, *Antithesis*, *Equality of Members*, a Period hath, the more graceful it is.

*Similitudes* grace an *Oration*, when they contain also a *Metaphor*.

And *Proverbs* are graceful, because they are *Metaphors*, or Translations of words from one *species* to another.

And *Hyberboles*, because they also are *Metaphors*: but they are youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that are angry; and for that cause are not comely in Old Men.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of the Difference between the Stile to be used in Writing,  
and the Stile to be used in Pleading.*

THE *Stile* that should be *Read* ought to be more exact and accurate.

But the *Stile* of a *Pleader* ought to be suited to Action and Pronuntiation.

*Orations* of them that *Plead*, pass away with the hearing.

But those that are *Written*, Men carry about them, and are considered at leasure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.

*Written Orations* appear flat in *Pleading*.

And *Orations* made for the *Barr*, when the Action is away, appear in *Reading* insipide.

In *Written Orations* Repetition is justly condemned.

But in *Pleadings*, by the help of Action, and by some change in the *Pleader*, Repetition becomes Amplification.

In *Written Orations* Disjunctives do ill; as, *I came, I found him, I asked him*: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by Action.

But in *Pleadings* 'tis Amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.

Of *Pleadings*, that which is *Judicial* ought to be more accurate, than that which is *before the people*.

And an *Oration to the people* ought to be more accommodate to Action, than a *Judicial*.

And of *Judicial Orations*, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to *few* Judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to *many*. As in a *Picture*, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the Colours be

fine: so in *Oration*s, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his *Oration* to be elegant.

Therefore *Demonstrative Oration*s are most proper for *Writing*, the end whereof is to *Read*.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the Parts of an Oration, and their Order.*

THE necessary *Parts* of an *Oration* are but two; *Proposition*s, and *Proof*; which are as it were the *Probleme*, and *Demonstration*.

The *Proposition* is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be *proved*.

And *Proof* is the *Demonstration* of the Matter *propounded*.

To these necessary *parts*, are sometimes added two other, the *Proeme* and the *Epilogue*, neither of which are any *Proof*.

So that in some there be four *parts* of an *Oration*; the *Proeme*, the *Proposition*, or (as the others call it) the *Narration*, the *Proofs*, (which contain *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, *Amplification*, and *Diminution*,) and the *Epilogue*.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Of the Proeme.*

THE *Proeme* is the beginning of an *Oration*, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.

In some kinds of *Oration*s it resembles the *Prelude* of *Musicians*, who first play what they list, and afterwards the Tune they intended.

In other kinds it resembles the *Prologue* of a *Play*, that contains the Argument.

*Proemes* of the first sort, are most proper for *De-*

*monstrative Orations*; in which a Man is free to fore-tell, or not, what points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not: because when a Man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, *Digression* will seem *Variety*: but if he have ingaged himself, *Variety* will be accounted *Digression*.

In *Demonstratives* the matter of the *Proeme* consisteth in the *Praise* or *Dispraise* of some *Law* or *Custom*, or in *Exhortation*, or *Dehortation*; or something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.

*Proemes* of the second kind are most proper for *Judicial Orations*. For as the *Prologue* in a *Dramatick*, and the *Exordium* in an *Epique* Poem, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poem: so in a *Judicial Oration* the *Orator* ought to exhibit a Model of his *Oration*, that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended, and for want of fore-sight, err or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a *Proeme*, is drawn from one of these four; From the *Speaker*, From the *Adversary*, From the *Hearer*, or from the *Matter*.

From the *Speaker* and *Adversary* are drawn into *Proemes* such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.

To the *Defendant* 'tis necessary in the *Proeme* to answer to the accusations of his *Adversary*; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his *Oration*.

But to the *Plaintife* 'tis better to cast his Criminations all into the *Epilogue*, that the Judge may the more easily remember them.

From the *Hearer* and from the *Matter* are drawn into the *Proeme* such things as serve to make the *Hearer* favourable, or angry; attentive, or not attentive, as need shall require.

And *Hearers* use to be attentive to *persons* that are reputed *good*; to things that are of *great Consequence*, or that *concern themselves*, or that are *strange*, or that *delight*.

But to make the *Hearer* attentive, is not the part of the *Proeme* only, but of any other part of the *Oration*, and rather of any other part, than of the *Proeme*. For the *Hearer* is every where more remiss than in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the *Orator* must make appear both the *probity* of his own *person*, and that the *matter* in hand is of *great Consequence*; or that it concerns the *Hearer*; or that it is *new*; or that it is *delightful*.

He that will have the *Hearer* attentive to him, but not to the *Cause*, must on the other side make it seem that the *matter* is a *trifle*, without relation to the *Hearer*, *common*, and *tedious*.

That the *Hearer* may be favourable to the *Speaker*, one of two things is required; that he *love* him, or that he *pity* him.

In *Demonstrative Orations*, he that *praises* shall have the *Hearer* favourable if he think himself, or his own manners, or course of life, or any thing he loves, comprehended in the same *praise*.

On the contrary, he that *dispraises*, shall be heard favourably, if the *Hearer* find his *Enemies*, or *their courses*, or any thing he *hates*, involved in the same *dispraise*.

The *Proeme* of a *Deliberative Oration* is taken from the same things, from which are taken the *Proemes* of *Judicial Orations*. For the matter of a *Deliberative Oration* needeth not that natural *Proeme*, by which is shewn what we are to speak of; for that is already known: the *Proeme* in these, being made only for the *Speakers*, or *Adversaries* sake; or to make the *Matter* appear *great*, or *little*, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the *persons* of the *Plaintif* or *Defendant*; or from the *Hearer*, or from the *Matter*, as in *Orations Judicial*.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Places of Crimination, and Purgation.*

1. ONE is from the *removal of ill Opinion* in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.

2. Another from this, That the thing done is *not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.*

3. A third from the *Recompence*, as, *I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.*

4. A fourth from the *Excuse*; as, *It was Errour, Mischance, or Constraint.*

5. A fifth from the *Intention*: as, *One thing was done, another meant.*

6. A sixth from the *Comprehension of the Accuser*; as, *What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father, Kinsman, or Friend.*

7. From the *Comprehension of those that are in Reputation*; as, *What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good Men.*

8. From *Comparison* with such as have been *falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.*

9. From *Recrimination*; as, *The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.*

10. From that *the Judgment belongs to another Place, or Time*; as, *I have already answered, or am to answer else-where to this Matter.*

11. From *Crimination of the Crimination*; as, *It serves only to pervert Judgment.*

12. A twelfth, which is common both to *Crimination and Purgation*, and is taken from *some sign*; as *Teucer is not to be believed, because his Mother was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's Enemy.*

13. A thirteenth, proper to *Crimination* only, from *praise and dispraise mixt*: as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, coming both to *Crimination* and *Purgation*, is taken from the *interpretation of the fact*: for he that *purgeth* himself *interpreteth the fact* always in the best sense; and he that *Criminates*, always in the worst; as when *Ulysses* said, *Diomedes chose him for his Companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit*: but his *Adversary* said, *He chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honour*.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of the Narration.*

THE *Narration* is not always continued and of one Piece; but sometimes, as in *Demonstratives*, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole *Oration*.

For there being in a *Narration* something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, which the *Orator* inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the *Narration* of them where he best may. As for Example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a *Narration* of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his Wisdom; whereby your *Oration* shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary always that the *Narration* be short. The true *measure* of it must be taken from the *matter* that is to be laid open.

In the *Narration*, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self, and blameable in



ones Adversary: *As, I advised him but he would take no Counsel.*

In *Narrations*, a Man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as *Ulysses* and *Homer*, relating his Travels to *Alcinous*, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers Books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his Wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The *Narration* ought also to be in such words as argue the *Manners*; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, *setting his Arms a kenbold, he answered*, etc. by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.

In an *Oration* a Man does better to shew his affection than his Judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, *I like this*; than to say, *This is better*. For by the one you would seem *wise*, by the other *good*. But *Favour* follows *Goodness*; whereas *Wisdom* procures *Envy*.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did *Antigone*. For when she had said, *She loved her brother better than her Husband or Children*; she added, *for Husband and Children I may have more; but another Brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead*. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; *I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such*. For 'tis not easily believed, that any Man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.

Besides in a *Narration*, not only the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his *Narration* a Man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A *Narration* may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.

In *Deliberative Orations*; that is, where soever the question is of things to come; a *Narration*, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that Men may *deliberate* better of the future: But that is not as *Narration*, but *Proof*; for 'tis *Example*.

There may also be *Narration* in *Deliberatives* in that part where *Crimination* and *Praise* come in: But that part is not *Deliberative*, but *Demonstrative*.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.*

*PROOFS* are to be applied to something controverted.

The Controversie in *Judicial Oration* is, *Whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Just, or no.*

In a question of *Fact*, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the *Fact* is no excuse) and therefore the *Fact* is chiefly to be insisted on.

In *Demonstratives*, the *Fact* for the most part is supposed: but the *honour* and *profit* of the *Fact* are to be *proved*.

In *Deliberatives*, the question is, *Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great: or whether it be just; or whether it be profitable.*

Besides the application of the *Proof* to the question, a Man ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a sign he does the same in the Cause.

The *Proofs* themselves are either *Examples*, or *Enthymemes*.

A *Deliberative Oration*, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather *Examples*, than *Enthymemes*.

But a *Judicial Oration*, being of things past, which

have a necessity in them, and may be concluded *sylogistically*, requireth rather *Enthymemes*.

*Enthymemes* ought not to come too thick together, for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a Man to endeavour to *prove* every thing by *Enthymeme*, least like some *Philosophers*, he collect what is *known*, from what is *less known*.

Nor ought a Man to use *Enthymemes*, when he would move the Hearer to some affection: For seeing divers Motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the *Enthymeme*, or the *affection* that he would move.

For the same reason, a Man ought not to use *Enthymemes* when he would express *Manners*.

But whether he would move *affection*, or insinuate his *Manners*, he may withal use *Sentences*.

A *Deliberative Oration* is more difficult than a *Judicial*, because 'tis of the *future*, whereas a *Judicial* is of that which is *past*, and that consequently may be known; and because it has *principles*, namely the *Law*; and it is easier to *prove* from *principles*, than without.

Besides, a *Deliberative Oration* wants those helps of *turning to the Adversary*; of *speaking of himself*; of *raising passion*.

He therefore that wants matter in a *Deliberative Oration*, let him bring in some *person* to *praise* or *dispraise*.

And in *Demonstratives* he that has nothing to say in *commendation* or *discommendation* of the *principal party*, let him *praise* or *dispraise* some body else, as his *Father*, or *Kinsman*, or the very *vertues* or *vices* themselves.

He that wants not *Proofs*, let him not only *prove* strongly, but also insinuate his *Manners*: but he that has no *Proof*, let him nevertheless insinuate his *Manners*. For a *good Man* is as acceptable, as an exact *Oration*.

Of *Proofs*, those that *lead to an absurdity*, please better than those that are *direct* or *ostensive*; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, *Truth* and *Falsity*, the force of the *Syllogisme* does the better appear.

*Confutation* is also a part of *Proof*.

And he that speaks first, puts it after his own *Proofs*, unless the Controversie contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own *Oration*, by removing the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the *Man*, and his *Oration*, that is damned before hand.

If a Man desire his *Manners* should appear well, (least speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtreaction; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous,) let him introduce another person.

Last of all, least he cloy his Hearer with *Enthymemes*, let him vary them sometimes with *Sentences*; but such as have the same force. As here is an *Enthymeme*. *If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is entire.* And this is a *Sentence* of equal force to it. *Wise Men make peace, while their Fortune is entire.*

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Interrogations, Answers, and Jests.*

THE times wherein 'tis fit to ask ones Adversary a *question* are chiefly four.

1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by *Interrogation* draw him to confess the other.

2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of it self, and the other likely to be fetched out by a *question*; then the *Interrogation* will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferred, without adding that Proposition which is manifest.

3. The third, when a Man would make appear that his Adversary does contradict himself.

4. The fourth, when a Man would take from his Adversary such shifts as these, *In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.*

Out of these Cases 'tis not fit to *interrogate*. For he whose *question* succeeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal *questions* a Man ought to *answer* fully, and not to be too brief.

To *Interrogations* which we fore-see tend to draw from us an *Answer*, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our *Answer*, presently give an *Answer* to the objection which is implied in the *Question*.

And where the *Question* exacteth an *Answer* that concludeth against us, we must together with our *Answer* presently *distinguish*.

*Jests* are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by *Jests*.

The several kinds of *Jests* are set down in the *Art of Poetry*.

Whereof one kind is *Ironia*, and tends to please ones self.

The other is *Scurrility*, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness; the former may become a Man of good breeding.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of the Peroration.*

THE *Peroration* must consist of one of these four things.

*Inclining* the Judge to *favour* yourself, or to *disfavour* your Adversary. For then, when all has been said respecting the cause, is the best season to *praise*, or *dispraise* the Parties.

Of *Amplification* or *Diminution*. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to shew *how great*, or *how little* that good or evil is.

Or in *moving* the Judge to *Anger*, *Love*, or other *Passion*. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to *excite* the Judge.

Or of *Repetition*, that the Judge may remember what has been said.

*Repetition* consisteth in the *matter*, and the *manner*. For the *Orator* must shew, that he has performed *what* he promised in the beginning of his *Oration*, and *how*: namely, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

THE END.



**ANALYTICAL**

**QUESTIONS**

**ON**

**ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.**



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## QUESTIONS

ON

## ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

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CHAP. I. & II.

**H**OW many parts of Rhetoric are there ?

On which of these parts, *πίστις*, *λίξις*, or *τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, does Aristotle lay the greatest stress ?

Of which of these parts do the two first books treat ?

Has each species of oration *προτάσις* peculiar to itself ?

Give the Greek specific term for the *ἴδιαι προτάσις*.

Are there *προτάσις* common to all the species of oration ?

Give the specific word in Greek for the *προτάσις κείναι*.

Does the first book treat of the *εἶδη* or *τόποι* ?

In which book does he treat of the *τόποι* ?

With what view is the *πίστις ἠθικὴ* and *διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν* previously introduced ?

Do you consider that these belong peculiarly to the species *δικαιικῶν* and *συμβουλευτικῶν* of orations ?

With what view has Aristotle previously introduced the *τὰς ἡλίκιας* and *τύχας* of men ?

Has he treated of these in reference to all the species of oration ?

How many subaltern genera of the *πίστις διὰ τοῦ λόγου* are there ?

Into how many species is the artificial genus subdivided?

When is persuasion effected by τῷ ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος?

Should the persuasion effected by this species arise from any previous opinion entertained of the speaker?

When is persuasion effected διὰ τῶν ακροατῶν?

When is it effected ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ?

Of the πίστις διὰ τοῦ δεικνύσαι, (or the argument,) how many species are there?

Which is most persuasive, the παράδειγμα or ἐνθύμημα?

Does Rhetoric furnish any instrument of persuasion, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύσαι, besides these?

From what matter necessary, contingent, or impossible, are enthymemes drawn?

Am I to understand that the enthymem is drawn from the εἶκος and σημείον?

Can an orator syllogize from premises previously inferred?

Is there any objection to this process?

What is the objection to premises not previously inferred?

If a particular proposition is inferred from an universal, is it an εἶκος or σημείον?

Of the σημείον how many kinds are there?

You say that one is anonymous, because it has no logical difference to fix the species; mention the logical difference, which, when added to the other σημείον fixes the species τεκμήριον?

Are both these species equally forcible?

What is a παράδειγμα?

Which is of most service in induction, the τεκμήριον or παράδειγμα?

Is the τεκμήριον used in induction?

## CHAPTER III.

How many species of orations are there ?

From what premises does Aristotle infer the three species of oration ?

Is the judge of things past a judicial orator or public speaker ?

Does the *θωρὸς* judge merely of the power of an oration or exercise the functions of a judicial orator ?

Which species of oration is inferred from the *ἐκκλησιαστής* ?

Which is inferred from the *δικαστής* and *θωρὸς* ?

Is it the business of the judicial orator to dissuade and praise ?

What are the *τὰ τέλη* of the three species of oration ?

Must a deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator be in possession of *προτάσεις* on the subjects of each of these species ?

If an orator wished to prove the injustice of Alcibiades's banishment in a judicial court, would the premises of his syllogism be *εἶδη* of the judicial species, if drawn from the *τὰ τέλη* honour and turpitude ?

Must a syllogism in the judicial species always be composed of *εἶδη*, or will it ever admit of *τόποι* ?

When the orator is arguing on the possibility of a fact, are his *προτάσεις* the *εἶδη* or *τόποι* ?

## CHAPTER IV.

How many chapters are devoted to the *εἶδος συμβουλευτικὸν* ?

Does Aristotle make any distinction between the sub-

jects of deliberation, and the things from which we deliberate, viz. στοιχῆα and εἶδη?

Throughout the following treatise does not Aristotle premise στοιχῆα (vide chap. vi. 1.) from which the εἶδη and τόποι, &c. are deduced?

In the εἶδος συμβουλευτικῶν are not some the στοιχῆα and εἶδη of happiness and its divisions? (chap. v.)

Are not others the στοιχῆα and εἶδη of the τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and συμφέροντος simply affirmed concerning a subject of deliberation? (chap. vi.)

Are the στοιχῆα and εἶδη ever comparatively affirmed concerning a measure, whether it be better and more useful? (chap. vii.)

With what view does Aristotle treat of different forms of government and their τὰ τέλη in this treatise?

Could the orator be possessed of προτάσεις on a deliberative subject without a knowledge of different forms of government and the institutions of the same?

Are the things concerning which orators deliberate in necessary, impossible, or contingent matter?

To what kind of things is deliberation principally confined?

Am I then to understand, that men deliberate on such things as it is possible for them to accomplish, and which depend not on chance for existence?

How many subjects of deliberation does Aristotle enumerate?

In debates on finance, war and peace, internal defence, exports and imports, what should the orator be accurately acquainted with?

Is the knowledge of legislation of importance to a deliberative orator?

In what does Aristotle place the safety of a state?

## CHAP. V.

What is the great object of human pursuit ?

How many definitions of happiness does Aristotle give ?

Which definition was adopted by the Stoics ?

Which by the Epicurean and Peripatetic schools ?

Can you enumerate any of the *τὰ μίση* of happiness ?

Distinguish the *τὰ μίση* into the *τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ*, or internal goods, and into *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ*, or external goods ?

Can you confirm the enumeration of the internal goods by the second definition of happiness, and that of the external goods in a measure, by the third definition ?

Define numerous and worthy progeny, nobility, and good old age.

Does honour arise ever from the reputation of conferring benefits ?

Why does Aristotle omit to treat of the virtues under the deliberative species of orations ?

## CHAP. VI.

What is the object proposed to the deliberative orator ?

Does he deliberate on the means conducive to the end, or the end itself ?

How many definitions of good does Aristotle enumerate as *στοιχεῖα* ?

How many *εἴδη* are there in this chapter deduced from the *στοιχεῖα* ?

Are the *στοιχεῖα* of good ever definitions of good ?

Give definitions of good assumed by the reasons of choice, appetite, intellect, and disposition to contentment.

Can you infer from the above premises that the acquisition of good, and the exemption from evil, are goods?

Prove them to be goods by some of the definitions of good.

Goods τὰ ἡμολογούμενα can be proved by the above definitions, but in disputed cases, (ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμοις) what is the easiest method of proving a thing to be a good?

Can you prove legislation to be a good because anarchy is an evil?

Can you prove happiness to be a good by the reason of choice?

Can you prove pleasure and social intercourse to be goods by the reason of appetite?

Can you prove the moral virtues to be goods by the reason of intellect?

Are the consequences to the exemption from evil and acquisition of good, immediate or remote?

Does Aristotle imply the utility of the virtues when he says that they are effective of good?

How does he prove such specific virtues as temperance, fortitude, &c. to be goods?

Do you consider, on reviewing this chapter, that persuasion can be effected by other προτάσεις than simple προτάσεις assumed from the end of the ἕδος συμβουλευτικόν?

## CHAP. VII.

How many definitions of good did you enumerate in the preceding chapter?\*

Repeat these four definitions.

Mention the *στοιχίαι* premised by Aristotle in this chapter, from which he deduces the *εἶδη* *περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ συμφέροντος.*

Do I understand you to say that the definition of “excess, and the thing exceeded,” is premised as the *στοιχίαι*?

Define the *τὸ τέλος.*

Is a plurality of goods greater than one, or a fewer goods, by the reason of numerical excess?

Would this *εἶδος* be fallacious, if the one, or the fewer were not co-enumerated with the plurality? Vide Annotations, vii. 3.

If an orator were to say, that beauty, strength, and riches, were a greater good than virtue, would his assumption, according to Aristotle, be correct?

Why would it not?

Have the excesses of genera and species any analogy?

Could an orator prove *εἰάν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μέγιστοῦ ὑπερέχει, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν,* that if justice is a greater good than bravery, Aristides excelled Themistocles?

How many *εἶδη* does Aristotle enumerate in this chapter?

Can an orator prove one thing to be a greater good than another by the reason of its being the *τὸ τέλος*?

\* The four first may be considered as definitions of the *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,* the others descriptions of the *τοῦ συμφέροντος.*



Is happiness, therefore, a greater good than virtue ?

Could he prove from the definition of the τοῦ αγαθοῦ and συμφέροντος, that virtue is a greater good than happiness, διὰ τὸ μείζονος αγαθοῦ ποιητικὴν εἶναι ?

How would he prove one principle (ἀρχή) to be greater than another ?\*

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### CHAP. VIII.

With what view has Aristotle treated in the former chapters of Εὐδαιμονία and the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον ?

Why was it essential that he should treat of the εὐδαιμονία first ? (vide chap. v. 2.)

Is it by προτάσεις on the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον that the ἐκκλησιαστὴς persuades his audience ?

Can you give a reason why the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον have a peculiar relation to εὐδαιμονία as the σκόπος of human pursuit ? (chap. viii. 2.)

Why does Aristotle assign so much importance to a knowledge of the τὰ τέλη τῶν πολιτιῶν ? (chap. viii. 5.)

Why does he consider a knowledge of the ἦθη of each πολιτιῶν essential ? (chap. viii. 6.)

Explain how the speaker will become invested with moral character, by a perfect knowledge of the ἦθη without any previous opinion having been entertained of him. (chap. viii. 6.)

Enumerate the τὰ τέλη πολιτιῶν.

Are the τὰ τέλη the *subjects* of deliberation, or measures which have a reference to the τὰ τέλη ?

\* The reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief of the Art of Rhetoric, for a distinct enumeration of the τόποι throughout this treatise.

## CHAP. IX.

Give the definitions of the τὸ καλὸν and τὸ αἰσχρὸν, honour and turpitude.

Are these definitions premised as the στοιχεῖα from which the εἶδη of demonstrative oratory are deduced?

If the τὸ καλὸν be that which you have defined, does it follow that virtue and its species are honourable?

Give the definitions of virtue.

If virtue is a δύναμις εὐεργετική, which of the species of virtue do you consider the greatest?

Would you consider δικαιοσύνη a greater virtue than πραότης.

Can you prove this assumption by the τόπος, τὰ μίζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφίροντος ποιητικὰ, μίζω; (vide chap. vii. 7.)

Give the definitions of the species of virtue, as these are στοιχεῖα from which εἶδη in demonstrative oratory are deduced.

Have demonstrative and deliberative oratory any points in common? (vide chap. ix. 35.)

Have the demonstrative and judicial any points in common? (chap. ix. 38.)

What is the difference between ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον?

On what principle must we shew a man to have acted to be worthy of praise? (vide chap. viii. 32.)

Is coincidence of circumstances admissible as an indication of the προαιρέσις?

Which are the best indications of a man's habits?

To which of the species of oration are amplification and extenuation peculiarly adapted?

Is the παρὰδειγμα adapted to one species more than another?

Why do you consider it more adapted to the deliberative?

To which species is the enthymem most adapted?

### CHAP. X.

In considering the nature of the sources from which the *εἶδη* of judicial orations are deduced, what are the three questions which Aristotle proposes to consider?

Define the *τὸ ἀδικεῖν*.

Do you conceive, generally speaking, that whatever men do *εἰδότες* they do *ἐκόντες*?

Does the *προαίρεσις* characterize all actions which men do *ἐκόντες*?

Does the *προαίρεσις* characterize all actions which men do *εἰδότες*?

Mention the causes of actions which men do *προαιρεόμενοι* and *παρὰ τὸν νόμον*.

Must the accuser consider the *τίμην, καὶ πόσων ἔσται*, or the inducement to exist in his adversary?

What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do not *δι' αὐτοὺς*?

Of this class of actions which men do not *δι' αὐτοὺς*, but *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, what are the specific causes which Aristotle mentions?

What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do *δι' αὐτοὺς*?

Into how many species does Aristotle divide the *ἄρεταις*?

Mention the logical differences, which, when added

to the genus ἄρεται, give the species βούλησις, ἐργή, and ἐπιθυμία?

Enumerate the seven causes of actions.

Can the ἡλικίαι and ἔξεις be called the true causes of human actions?

Have they their consequences which when added to the true causes give additional weight to the argument?

Why does Aristotle omit to treat of the ἡλικίαι and ἔξεις under the judicial species?

Does Aristotle infer, from the definitions of the seven causes of human actions, the ends of the agents? (chap. x. 12, 13, 14, et seq.)

From which of the seven causes of actions does he infer the ends of those actions which men do δι' αὐτούς?

When Aristotle says, that all such things as men do δι' αὐτούς are real or apparent goods, why does he make the distinction of "real" and "apparent?"

Am I then to understand that all things which men do willingly, and consequently all things which they do unjustly, are really or apparently good, and really or apparently pleasant, and that these are the ὡς ἔνικα ἀδικούσι?

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## CHAP. XI.

With what view has Aristotle introduced the συμφίρον in the judicial species of oration, when he had previously considered it as the τὸ τέλος of the deliberative? (chap. x. 19.)

Do I understand you to say, that he introduces it because it is the end of human action?

You have before stated that the *εὐδαιμονία* was the *σκοπός* of human pursuit, and now state that the *συμφέρον* and *ἀγαθόν* are the *τὸ τέλος* of actions; explain the meaning of the words *σκοπός* and *τέλος*.

Give the definition of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*.

How would you infer the definition of the *ἡδύ* and *λυπηρόν*?

Are these definitions the *στοιχίαι* from which Aristotle deduces the *εἶδη* in this chapter?\*

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## CHAP. XII.

What division does Aristotle make and premise of the *πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι*?

What are the three subdivisions of the *ὅταν αἰωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν*?

Why does Aristotle refer the discussion of the *δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι* to the second book of Rhetoric?

Explain why the second part of the division, viz. *ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν* should belong more especially to the judicial species, when the *δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι* is considered as a *τόπος*.

Enumerate the threefold subdivision of the *ὅταν αἰωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν*?

To what things do those persons trust who rely on the punishment being less than the gain, if detected? (third member of the subdivision.)

\* The reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief of the Art of Rhetoric, for an enumeration of the *τόποι* throughout this treatise.

Enumerate the things to which those persons trust who hope to escape punishment if detected: (second member of the subdivision.)

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CHAP. XIII.

Why should right and wrong be defined in reference to two kinds of law?

Why is the two-fold distinction of persons (*πρὸς οὓς*) in reference to whom right and wrong is defined, necessary? (3.)

How many species of law does Aristotle enumerate?

What is the subdivision of the *νόμος ἴδιος*? (2.)

What do you understand by the *νόμος κοινός*?

Give the definition of *το ἀδικεῖσθαι*.

From whence does Aristotle infer this definition? (chap. x. 3.)

What is the threefold division which Aristotle makes of *ἐγκλήματα*, or accusation?

Why does Aristotle decline treating of the *ἐγκλήματα διὰ πάθος* in this chapter?

In what kind of cases do men, *generally* and *specifically* speaking, manifest the *προαίρεσις* in action? (chap. x. 4.)

Is it necessary for an accuser to lay great stress on the *προαίρεσις*?

Under what circumstances, or with what dispositions, do men act by deliberative choice? (chap. xii. 1.)

Do you consider that the depravity and injustice of an act is manifested by the *προαίρεσις* of the agent?

- Are they a *σημῖον* or *τεκμήριον* of deliberate choice ?
- Is the *προαίρεσις* a *σημῖον* or *τεκμήριον* of depravity and injustice ?
- How many distinctions of right and wrong (*δικαία* καὶ *ἀγαθὰ*) are there ?
- Why is this twofold distinction made ?
- Into how many species does Aristotle divide the subaltern genus *ἄγγραφα* ?
- Can you give a reason why the species "remarkably virtuous and vicious," (*τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν*, &c.) is not included in the written law ?
- When Solon was asked why he had not enacted a special law against parricide, what was his answer ?
- Does not this answer give the reason why *ἀδικα* of this species are not included in the written law *ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν* ?
- Mention some virtues, which as falling under the species *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν*, &c. are not noticed in written laws ?
- Is it because they are so universally acknowledged and required, that they are not noticed in written laws ?
- What is the second species of *τὰ δικαία* and *ἄδικα* ?
- What is the cause of this defect in the written law of states ?
- Give the definition of equity.

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#### CHAP. XIV.

- What is the standard by which the degrees in criminality may be ascertained ?
- With what view does Aristotle infer *εἶδη, ὅσα ἂν ἢ ἀπὸ*

μειζονος ἀδικίας? (vide chap. ix. 39, with respect to the αὐξήσις, and Book ii. 26.)

What kind of injuries are comparatively the more severely felt?

You stated in reply to questions in the first book, (chap. x.) that κακία generally, and ἀκρασία specifically, were the causes of acts of injustice characterized by the προαίρεσις, how then would you ascertain the comparative enormity of ἀδικήματα? (vide Annotationes Schrader.)

Are ἀδικήματα of this description estimated by the hurt done, or the προαίρεσις of the agent? (xii. 5.)

If the hurt done be irremediable, is the act of injustice capable of being amplified?

Will the definition of ἀδικήματα depend on the πρόνοια of the agent? (vide Annotationes xiv. 5.)

Am I then to understand that ἀδικήματα which are irremediable, incapable of being adequately punished, of being revenged, which are done frequently, and ἐκ προνοίας, may be considered μειζονα?

## CHAP. XV.

How many distinctions of the πίστις ἄτηχται are there?

Into how many species is the distinction νόμοι subdivided?

Into how many subaltern genera is the distinction μάγτηρις (chap. xv. 13.) divided?

Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus παλαιοὶ μάγτηρις subdivided?

What kind of persons and things constitute the lowest



species to the subaltern species, (*περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων*) of the *μάρτυρες παλαιοί*? (vide chap. xv. 13, 14.)

What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (*περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰσομένων*) of the *μάρτυρες παλαιοί*? (chap. xv. 14.)

Is the lowest species to the subaltern species (*περὶ μὲν τῶν γνομένων*), viz. poets and illustrious men, most adapted to the judicial species of oration?

Is the lowest species to the subaltern species, (*περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἰσομένων*) viz. soothsayers, oracles, and proverbs, equally serviceable in the deliberative as in the judicial species of oration?

Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus *μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι* divided? (chap. xv. 13.)

What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (*οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου*) of the *μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι*? (chap. xv. 15, last line.)

What kind of persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (*οἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς κινδύνου*) of the *μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι*? (chap. xv. 15. first line.)

Which of the two lowest species (viz. the *οἱ γιάρμοι*, and *οἱ ἀν δόξῳσι ψεύδεσθαι*, or viva voce evidence,) is most entitled to credit?

Aristotle has hitherto treated of the different kinds of *μάρτυρες*, and he then proceeds to consider the manner in which their credit is to be amplified and extenuated by the orator; if the orator then has no witnesses to support his case, by what arguments must he diminish the credit of testimony? (chap. xv. 17.)

To what circumstances does testimony speak? (18.)

Is the impeachment of the veracity of a witness, by an enthymem (*ἐξ εἰκότων*) a solid objection to his testimony?

Am I then to understand, that if the orator has no testimony to adduce he must,

1st. Insist on the propriety of the judge deciding,  
*γνώμη τῆ ἀρίστη.* (vide Book I. chap. xv. 5, 12, 17. Book II. chap. xxv. 10.)

2nd. That *ἕκστα* are better than witnesses, as they are never open to corruption.

3rd. That *ἕκστα* are never convicted of falsehood?

If the orator has witnesses to support his case, by what arguments should he corroborate their testimony, and extenuate the *ἕκστα*?

What two precepts does Aristotle give with respect to the extenuation and amplification of the *συνθήκαι* and *βάσανοι*?

What is the fourfold division with respect to oaths?

## GENERAL QUESTIONS

ON THE

### JUDICIAL SPECIES OF ORATION.

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IN treating of the judicial species of oration what does Aristotle propose that the orator should first consider in his accusation?

If the question be simply whether his adversary has committed an injury, the orator must prove,—what? (chap. x. 2.)

If an act of injustice has been committed, but that act of injustice has not been defined by the written law, under which species of law must he prove his case? (chap. xiii. 14. xv. 4.)

Am I then to understand, that in inquiring whether his adversary has committed an act of injustice, the orator's first business is to prove that he has acted for some end; secondly, that he was a likely person to commit it; and thirdly, that the object injured was a person likely to be injured?

Are these the three general points which he must prove against his adversary?

What is the specific point he must prove against his adversary?

Why is the general question, Whether the adversary

has committed an act of injustice, (chap. x. xi. xii.) and the specific question, Whether he has acted unjustly, (chap. xiii.) distinguished? (vide chap. x. 7.)

To prove that his adversary has acted unjustly against the state, or a private individual, what must the orator urge against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 7.)

If the act is clearly done by a voluntary agent, on what principle must the orator prove his adversary to have acted? (chap. xiii. 7.)

If the act is clearly done by deliberative choice, what is the next question an orator must prove against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 9.)

To prove simply that his adversary has acted unjustly, how many specific questions arise for the orator's consideration?

Are they not three?

1st. Whether he has violated the written law? (chap. xiii. 9.)

2nd. If he has not violated the written law, whether he has acted with depravity so excessive as not to be defined by the written law? (chap. xiii. 12.)

3rd. Whether he has acted in violation of equity? (chap. xiii. 12, 13.)

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## QUESTIONS

ON

## ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

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### BOOK II.

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#### CHAP. I.

**YOU** stated in reply to questions in the first book, that Aristotle had made three distinctions of *πίστις*, viz. *διὰ τοῦ ἤθους, διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, διὰ τῶν λόγων*: which of these three distinctions has he already treated of, and which is he now proceeding to discuss?

What is the end of Rhetoric, or the object which an orator in speaking has always in view? (vide Annotations, chap. i. 2.)

How does the investment of oneself with moral character effect persuasion in the auditor? (vide Schrader's note, 1, 3.)

Must the qualifications by which the speaker invests himself with moral character, be perceived from the speech as existing in him, (vide Book I. chap. ii. 4.) or known to have existed in him before?

From the three distinctions of *πίστις* what do you infer to be the three great accomplishments of a perfect orator?

Do I understand you to say, proof by enthymem, investment of himself with moral character, and the excitement of the passions in his auditors?

What are the three causes of a speaker's effecting persuasion through moral character?

If a speaker appears to be a man capable of imparting benefits to the state, does he effect persuasion through moral character, by his virtue? (vide chap. ix. 4. definition of virtue.)

When Demosthenes in the oration for the crown makes use of the following words:

Ἄλλ' ὡς ἴοικεν, ἐκείνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη οὐ μόνον εὐνοῦν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρα ἐκάλε, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀρθῶς τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐπραττεν ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ταῦτ' εἰδὼς μὴδ' ἐξητακῶς πόρρωθεν ἐπιμελῶς, οὐτ' εἰ εὐνοῦς ἦν οὐτ' εἰ πλούσιος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἠμελλεν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν εἴσασθαι οὐδ' ὑμῖν ἔξειν συμβουλεύειν. ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγὼ, καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς, ἅ μου δυοῖν ἕνεκ' ἀκούσατε προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, ἐνὸς μὲν, ἵν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμενος τὰ δέονθ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς, ἐτέρου δέ, ὅτι μικρὸν ἀναλώσαντες χρόνον πολλὰ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς πάσης πολιτείας ἔσσοθ' ἐμπειρότεροι, —

to which distinction of *πίστις* does he recur, and through which of the causes *φρόνησις*, *ἀρετὴ*, *οὐκ εὐνοία*, does he endeavour to effect persuasion?

## CHAP. II.

What are the three questions which Aristotle proposes for consideration in treating of the passions? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)

With what view was this threefold division necessary?

Is it possible to obtain *τίποι* calculated for the excitement of the passions without a knowledge of these three questions proposed by Aristotle? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)

Give the definition of anger.

Is this definition proposed as a *στοιχείον* from which the *τίποι* are afterwards inferred?

Does not Aristotle explain this definition by two propositions, viz.

1st. Anger is against *some individual* on account of contempt to oneself or friends.

2nd. Pain is not so much the consequent of anger as a certain pleasure?

Explain the reference which these two explanatory propositions have to the definition of anger.

To what cause do you attribute the sensation of pain in anger?

To what causes (which are two) do you attribute the sensation of pleasure in anger?

Can you give any other reasons why pleasure should be a consequent? (Book I. chap. x. 17, 18. chap. xi. 10, 12, 13.)

Could you infer a reason from the definition of *ἡδονή* in the first book?



Is the *ἡ ὄργη* a generic or specific term ?

Under what generic term do you class the *ἡ ὄργη* ?

What is the object of anger ?

What is the cause of anger ?

How many species of the *ὀλιγωρία* are there ?

Does not Aristotle prove that the *καταφρόνησις* is a species of *ὀλιγωρία* from the definition of *ὀλιγωρία* ?

Do you consider the *ἐπηρεασμὸς* to be a distinct species of *ὀλιγωρία* ?

Explain how Aristotle from its own definition proves the *ἐπηρεασμὸς* to be a distinct species of *ὀλιγωρία*.

Is slight attended with a certain pleasure ?

You have before stated in reply to questions in the former book, that all actions done by men *ἐκόντες* are *ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα* : can you shew that if the *ὀλιγωρία* be a voluntary act, it must be consequently *ἡδύ ἢ φαινόμενον ἡδύ* ?

Why should it not be *ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* ? (Book I. chap. x. 18.)

To what cause do you attribute the pleasure which the *ὀβριζῶν* feels ?

How then are men affected when they feel anger ?

With what kind of persons do they feel angry ?

What are the causes of this passion ?

What is it incumbent on the orator to prove, to excite anger against his adversary ?

What kind of person must he prove his adversary to be, to merit anger ?

When Æschines uses the following arguments in his oration against Chesiphon, does he endeavour to excite anger against Demosthenes ? and by which of the causes *ὀλιγωρία*, or its species, does he endeavour to excite it against his adversary ?

Διύτερον δὲ καὶ πολὺ τούτου μῖζον ἀδίκημα ἠδίκησιν, ὅτι τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος καὶ μετήνευκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, τὴν κοιωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχαις συνθέμιος· καὶ τηλικαύτην αὐτὸς αὐτῷ δυναστίαν κατισκιάσιν, ὥστ' ἤδη παριῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα πρσιβύουσιν μὲν ἔφη ὅποι αὖν αὐτῷ δοκῆ, καὶ μὴ ὑμεῖς ἐκπίμπητι, εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῷ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντίποι, καταδουλούμενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ συνθίζων μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιλέγειν διαδικασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῷ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατηγίον· πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεποιθῆναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγίου. μισθοφορῶν δ' ἐν τῷ ξηρικῷ κεναῖς χώραις, καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ χρήματα κλέπτων, καὶ τοὺς μυρίους ξένους ἐμισθώσας Ἀμφισσιῦσι πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ σχετλιάζοντος ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἑμοῦ, προσίμιξι Φίρων ἀναρπασθέντων τῶν ξένων τὸν κίνδυνον ἀπαρασκέυω τῇ πόλει. τί γὰρ αὖν οἴσθε Φιλίππον ἐν τοῖς τότε καιροῖς εὔξασθαι; οὐ χωρὶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν χωρὶς δ' ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους διαγωνίσασθαι, ἀθύμους δὲ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας λαβεῖν τηλικαύτης πληγῆς γεννημένης; καὶ τηλικούτων κακῶν αἴτιος γεννημένος Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ δίκην δίδωκεν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ καὶ χρυσῷ στιφᾶνω στιφανωθήσεται ἀγανακτιῦ· οὐδ' ἰκανόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν κηρύττισθαι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον ἀναρρήθησεται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ἀγανακτιῦ. οὕτως, ὡς οἴσθε, ποτηρὰ φύσις μεγάλης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβομένη δημοσίας ἀπεργάζεται συμφορὰς.

### CHAP. III.

As the ἡ πράξις is the contrary to the ἡ ἀρετή, and the τόποι are therefore inferred *ratione contrariorum*, it will be unnecessary to propose many questions on this chapter.

What is the definition of the ἡ πράξις?

You stated in reply to a former question, that pain

and pleasure were consequent to the τὰ πάθη and σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις, (chap. iv.) but are they both consequent to the ἡ πρᾶξις, and which is the σημεῖον of the βούλησις in this passion?

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CHAP. IV.

What is the definition of the τὰ φιλῶν?

Can you infer from this definition that a friend is perceived from the indications of the ἡ βούλησις?

What are the σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις? (3.)

How many species of the ἡ φίλια are there? (28.)

What are the causes which give occasion to the ἡ φίλια?

What is the difference between the ἡ ἔργη and the ἡ ἔχθρα?

How many differences does Aristotle enumerate?

How many, and what are the causes of the ἡ ἔχθρα which Aristotle enumerates? (30.)

You have stated that the ἡ ἔργη is felt on account of the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species; but if a man is habitually addicted to the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species, are our sentiments those of the ἡ ἔργη or ἡ ἔχθρα?

Do anger and hatred ever differ with respect to the objects against whom they are felt? (xxx. line 3, 4.)

Can you class both these passions under the genus ἀρέξεις ἄλογοι?

Does the sensation of the ἡ λύπη accompany the ἔχθρα? (xxx. line 10.)

Which of the two passions the *ἡ ἔργη* and the *ἡ ἔχθρα* does Aristotle consider as incurable?

You stated in a former chapter that the *ἡ τιμωρία* was the object of the *ἡ ἔργη*, what is the object of the *ἡ ἔχθρα*? (xxx. line 6.)

What kind of person will an orator describe his adversary to be, when he endeavours to excite feelings of hatred against him in his auditors?

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## CHAP. V.

Give the definition of the *ὁ φόβος*.

Does it follow from this definition that all the *τὰ κακὰ* are the objects of the *ὁ φόβος*?

What kind of evils then excite the *ὁ φόβος*?

Is it absolutely necessary for the sensation of the *ὁ φόβος* that the evil should be close at hand?

Can you mention any circumstances, or characters in life, which excite the *ὁ φόβος* in others? (vii. et seq.)

What is the reason that men are not afraid of such evils as death?

Am I to understand that some hope of safety is essential in the sensation of the *ὁ φόβος*? (xiv.)

Is deliberation also essential in the sensation of the *ὁ φόβος*?

If the *τὰ κακὰ* be of such a description as to annihilate all hope of safety, and prevent all deliberation in the sufferer, what is the *τὸ πᾶθος* which under such circumstances is felt?

In what chief respects do the sensations of the *ὁ φόβος* and *τὸ δεινὸν* differ?

Do I understand you to say, "In the feeling of hope, and anxiety, and excitement of deliberation, which accompany the one, but are annihilated in the other?"

Do they differ also in any other remarkable respect? (chap. v. 12, line 4. chap. viii. 13, line 4.)

Do I understand you to say, "In the sensation of the *ὁ ἔλιος* if the *τὰ κακὰ* were to happen to others and not to ourselves?"

Is this difference discoverable in the case of Amasis?

Give the definition of the *τὸ θαρραῖν*.

What is the two-fold division which Aristotle makes of the men who feel the *τὸ θάρσος*? (xviii.)

What illustration does Aristotle give in support of this distinction?

To which of the three species of oration do you consider appeals to the *ὁ φόβος* most peculiar?

Give me a reason why you consider them most peculiar to the *εἶδος συμβουλευτικὸν*, (confer Book I. chap. iii. 4. with the definition of the *ὁ φόβος*.)

In which of the three species do you consider appeals to the *ἡ ὀργή*, *ὁ φθόνος*, and *ὁ ἔλιος*, most likely to occur?

Does Aristotle approve of such appeals to the *ὁ δικαστής*? (Book i. chap. i. 5.)

## CHAP. VI.

Give the definition of the *αἰσχύνη*.

Do only acts of depravity, or do the *σημεῖα* of such specific vices as illiberality, flattery, &c. ever excite the *ἡ αἰσχύνη*?

Give me a *σημεῖον* of the *ἡ κολακεία*?

## CHAP. VII.

Give the definition of the *ἡ χάρις*.

Has this word two distinct significations? (vide Schrader Annotations.)

Which of these two significations is expressive of the *τὸ πάθος*?

With what view does Aristotle explain the *ἡ χάρις* as implying gratuitous benevolence?

Is it for the purpose of shewing how it may be amplified?

What division of the *αἰ ἀρεταίαι* does Aristotle make in this chapter? (iii.)

To which division do you consider such *ἐπιθυμίας* as hunger and thirst belong?

Is it necessary that the party benefited must be *ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει* to constitute the *ἡ χάρις*?

Is it necessary that the party benefiting should assist the other *ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει*?

## CHAP. VIII.

Give the definition of the  $\delta$  ἔλιος.

What kind of persons are most sensible of the  $\delta$  ἔλιος?

What reason does Aristotle give that the  $\sigma\acute{\iota}$  παντελῶς ἀπο-  
λωλότες do not feel the  $\delta$  ἔλιος?

Why do not the  $\sigma\acute{\iota}$  ὑπερδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι feel the  $\delta$  ἔλιος?

What reason does Aristotle give that the  $\sigma\acute{\iota}$  ὄντες ἐν ὀργῇ,  
ἢ θάρρει do not feel the  $\delta$  ἔλιος? (vi.)

Can you give another reason, drawn from the defini-  
tion of the  $\eta$  ὀργη and  $\delta$  ἔλιος?

Can you class the  $\eta$  ὀργη and  $\delta$  ἔλιος under the genus  
ἄρεξαις ἄλογοι?

What kind of persons do men pity?

Give me a reason why you except the  $\sigma\phi\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon\alpha$  ἰγγύς ὡσει  
οἰκισότητι.

In what respects do the  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$  δεινὸν and  $\delta$  ἔλιος differ? (xii.)

Can you give a reason why certain characters, when  
represented on the stage, excite pity?

## CHAP. IX.

What passion is directly opposed to the  $\delta$  ἔλιος?

Can you class the  $\eta$  νέμεσις and  $\delta$  ἔλιος under the same  
genus of the  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$  πάθη?

What is the logical difference which when added to

the generic term, gives the specific terms ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλιος? (i. line 4.)

Does not Aristotle define the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ φθόνος by a comparison of each with the ὁ ἔλιος?

Do you consider the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλιος to proceed from the same virtuous dispositions? (ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἠθους.)

If they did not proceed from the same virtuous dispositions, could they be classed under the same genus of the τὰ πάθη?

Is the ὁ φθόνος opposed in a measure only, or does it differ entirely from the ὁ ἔλιος?

In what respects do they agree, and in what differ?

Can you infer that the opposite feelings are consequent to these passions?

What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ φθόνος?

What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ ἔλιος?

Do you consider that the ὁ φθόνος and ἡ νέμεσις dispossess us of pity?

What kind of person must the orator shew his adversary to be, when he wishes to excite indignation against him in his auditor?

Can you infer from its definition that the ἡ νέμεσις is felt at the virtues? (viii.)

You have stated that the ἡ νέμεσις and the ὁ ἔλιος are directly opposed to each other, and are under the same genus; can you infer therefore, that if the ἡ νέμεσις is not felt at the virtues, the ὁ ἔλιος is not felt at the vices of others?



## CHAP. X.

Give the definition of the *ὀφθόνος*.

What are the three distinct parts in this definition, which should be distinguished, to obtain a clear understanding of the *τόποι*?

When Aristotle says that such persons are likely to feel envy as have equals, from which part of the definition does he infer this *τόπος*?

What kind of a person must an orator represent his adversary to be when he wishes to excite the *ὀφθόνος* in the judge?

## CHAP. XI.

Give the definition of the *ὀζήλος*.

Does the *ὀζήλος* differ from the *ὀφθόνος*?

In what respects do they differ?

Can the *ὀζήλος* be felt at the vices of others?

To what genus of the *τὰ πάθη* does the *ὀζήλος* belong?  
(i. line 5.)

Is the *ἡ καταφρόνησις* opposed only, or is it the contrary to the *ὀζήλος*?

## CHAP. XII.

Why is it necessary that an orator should consider the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes ?

Does Aristotle use the expression  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  as implying only a certain disposition peculiar to men at a certain time of life, or as implying the  $\alpha\iota \epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\iota\varsigma$ , or the virtues and vices ?

Are the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  the effects, or are they only consequent to the  $\alpha\iota \eta\lambda\iota\kappa\iota\alpha\iota$  and  $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\alpha\iota$  of men ?

You have stated that the orator should consider the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c.; under which of the three distinctions of  $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$  would you place this part of Rhetoric ? (vide Riccobon in cap. xii. hujus libri.)

Do you consider that, when Aristotle treats of the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ ,  $\alpha\iota \epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\iota\varsigma$ , and  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$ , he considers them to have a relation to the three species of oration ?

You stated in reply to a question in the former book, that the  $\alpha\iota \eta\lambda\iota\kappa\iota\alpha\iota$  and  $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\alpha\iota$  of men were not the true causes of actions, but when added to the true causes, give additional weight to an argument in judicial inquiry, (vide Book I. chap. x.) do you consider that the orator should adapt his oration to the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c. in the demonstrative and judicial species ?

What, generally speaking, are the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  consequent to youth and old age ?

What are the  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \eta\theta\eta$  consequent to the middle aged ?

Why does Aristotle treat of the *τὰ ἕθνη* of the young and old before those of the middle aged?

What, generally speaking, are the *τὰ ἕθνη* of the noble, the rich, and the powerful?\*

### CHAP. XVIII.

What reason does Aristotle adduce in this chapter for his treating of the *τὰ ἕθνη*?

Did Aristotle treat of any *ἕθνη* in the first book of Rhetoric?

Why did he treat of the *τὰ ἕθνη κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας* in the first book?

Of the *τόποι περὶ δυνατῶν καὶ ἀδυνάτων* do you consider the *τὸ γεγονός* and *τὸ ἐσόμενον* both equally applicable to the judicial and deliberative species of orations?

### CHAP. XIX.

The reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief for an exposition of the *τόποι* in this chapter.

\* For a distinct enumeration of the *τὰ ἕθνη* as far as the seventeenth chapter, the reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief, as a distinct exposition would swell these questions to an unnecessary length.

## CHAP. XX.

Are the *παράδειγμα* and *επιτύμημα* common to all the species of oration?

As Aristotle says that the *παράδειγμα* is like induction, explain in what points they resemble, and in what they differ. (vide Riccobon in cap. xx. hujus libri.)

How many distinctions of the *παράδειγμα* are there?

Into how many species is the *τὸ αὐτὸν ποιῆν*, or matter invented by the orator, subdivided?

Explain what is meant by the species *παραβολή*?

When Cicero, in his oration against Catiline, says,—  
 “Quod si ex tanto latrocinio iste unus tolletur; videbimur fortasse ad breve quoddam tempus cura et metu esse relevati; periculum autem residebit, et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque visceribus reipublicæ. Ut sæpe homines ægri morbo gravi cum æstu febrique jactantur, si aquam gelidam biberint, primo relevare videntur; deinde multo gravius vehementiusque afflicantur; sic hic morbus, qui est in republica, relevatus istius pœna vehementius, civibus reliquis ingravescet;” is this a *παραβολή* or *λόγος*?

When Agrippa Menenius says, “Tempore, quo in homine, non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentiebant, sed singulis membris suum cuique consilium, suus sermo fuerat, indignatas reliquas partes, sua cura, suo labore ac ministerio ventri omnia quæri: ventrem, in medio quietum, nihil aliud, quam datis voluptatibus frui; conspirasse inde, ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent. Hac ira, dum

ventrem fame domare vellent, ipsa una membra totumque corpus ad extremam tabem venisse. Inde apparuisse, ventris quoque haud segne ministerium esse : nec magis ali, quam alere eum, reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc, quo vivimus vigemusque, divisum pariter in venas maturum, confecto cibo, sanguinem. Is this a *παραβολή* or *λόγος* ?

Which of the two distinctions of the *παράδειγμα* do you consider most persuasive in deliberative oratory ?

If the orator has not enthymems at command, how does Aristotle recommend him to use the *παράδειγμα* ?

But if the orator has both enthymems and examples at command, which does he recommend should be placed before the other ?

In the passage quoted from Cicero does he follow Aristotle's precept or not ?

Why is the *παράδειγμα* and its species, when placed before the enthymems, little adapted to a speech ?

What advantage is gained by placing the *παράδειγμα* after the enthymem ?

In placing the *παράδειγμα* after the enthymem will one be a sufficient proof, or are several requisite ?

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## CHAP. XXI.

Give the definition of the *ἡ γνῶμη*.

Are the conclusions of enthymems ever *γνώμηαι* ?

How many subaltern genera of the *ἡ γνῶμη* are there ?

Into how many species is the subaltern genus ἄνω ἐπιλόγου subdivided?

Into how many species is the other subaltern genus μετ' ἐπιλόγου subdivided?

Explain what kind of γνώμαι those are which require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.

Explain what kind of γνώμαι those are which require the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.

You have stated that each subaltern genus is subdivided into two species; would you be correct in saying that the

1st. Species of the subaltern genus (ἄνω ἐπιλόγου) require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they were understood before uttered; and that the

2nd. Species of the same subaltern genus require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they are understood as soon as uttered; and that the

3rd. Species of the subaltern genus (μετ' ἐπιλόγου) are parts of enthymems; and that the

4th. Species of the same subaltern genus are essentially enthymems, and have the ἐπίλογος as it were inserted in them?

What division does Aristotle make with respect to the use of γνώμαι? (i.)

On dubious and incredible subjects, which of the above species does Aristotle recommend to be used?

On subjects not altogether incredible, but obscure, which of the above species does he recommend to be used? (vi. αἱ δ' ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μὲν.)

We now come to the third\* use of γνώμαι (τίσιν ἀρμοστέι):

\* Aristotle has treated of the τίσιν ἀρμοστέι first, in violation of his proposed arrangement in the beginning of the chapter.

is the use of *γνώμαι* equally suited to all ages and conditions of persons ?

· Ought *γνώμαι* not universally true to be indiscriminately used in every part of a speech ?

· In what occasions then should *γνώμαι* of this description only be used, and ought they to have the *ἐπίλογος* ?

· Are *γνώμαι* which are generally admitted to be true admissible in every part of a speech ?

· Are the *γνώμαι* which contravene current sayings (*παρὰ τὰ διημοσιευμέναις*) equally admissible in every part of a speech ?

· On what occasions then is it fit that they should be used ? (xiii.)

How will the *τὸ ἥθος* be made to appear *βέλτιον* ?

Do I understand you to say “by being manifested in the diction, or by annexing the reason for the received opinion ?”

· What advantages does the use of *γνώμαι* contribute to the orator ?

· When the orator wishes to give his speech an air of moral character by the use of *γνώμαι*, what principle must he manifest ?

· In the following quotation from Demosthenes *περὶ τοῦ Στιφάνου* is there a *γνώμη* ?

Ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ ταῦτα προΐντο τοὺς καταφεύγοντας ἐφ' ἑαυτούς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας καὶ τιμῆς ἤθελον τοῖς δεινοῖς αὐτοὺς δίδόναι, ἐρῶς καὶ καλῶς βουλευόμενοι. πέρασ μὲν γὰρ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θάνατος, καὶ ἐν οἰκίσκῳ τις αὐτὸν καθύρξας τηρῆ· διὲ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγχειρεῖν μὲν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῖς καλοῖς, τὴν ἀγαθὴν προβαλλομένους ἐλπίδα, φέρειν δ' ὅτι ἀνὸς θεὸς δίδῃ γενναίως.

To which species does it belong, and why does it not require the annexation of the *ἐπίλογος* ?

## CHAP. XXII. XXIII. XXIV.

The reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief on the subject of these chapters.

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## CHAP. XXV. XXVI.

You stated in reply to a question in the first book, that the *πίστις διὰ τοῦ δεικνυθαι*, &c. were divided into two species, *ἐπιθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα*: what subdivision does Aristotle make of the *ἐπιθύμημα* in the second book? (Book II. chap. xxii. 14.)

How many modes of the *ἡ λύσις*, or solution of arguments are there?

Explain the different methods of starting an objection.

How is an *εἰκὸς* solvable?

How is a *παράδειγμα* solvable?

How is a *τεκμήριον* solvable?

How is a *σημῖον* solvable?

What reason does Aristotle give for not considering the *τὸ αὐξάνει καὶ μειοῦν* as *τόποι ἐπιθυμηματος*?

How is a solution of them effected?





**QUESTIONS**  
ON  
**ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.**

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**BOOK III.**

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**CHAP. I.**

**WHAT** importance does Aristotle ascribe to the *λίξεις* in rhetoric?

Does he ascribe any importance to the *ὑπόκρισις*?

In what does he consider it to consist? (iv.)

But why does he treat only of the *λίξεις* when he ascribes importance to the *ὑπόκρισις*? (vi. and vii.)

Does he make any distinction between the style of poetry and orations?

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**CHAP. II.**

Define the *λίξιως ἀρετή*, or excellence of style.

It seems that Aristotle in this definition notes two

things as conducive to the *λίξεως ἀρετὴ* viz. τὸ σαφὴ εἶναι and *πρέπουσαι* ; how are these attained in style ? (ii. iii. and iv.)

Why does Aristotle object to the too frequent use of *γλώτταις* or exotic words, *πεποιήμενοις* or newly coined words, and *δίπλοις* or compound words ?

Is the orator obliged to confine himself to the use of the *κύρια* or words in common use, or is he at liberty to use the other species occasionally ?

What advantage does the use of the *κύρια* contribute to style ?

What advantage does the use of the *γλώτταις*, &c. contribute to style when sparingly used ?

When Aristotle says that in the use of ornament we should seek to escape observation, and avoid a studied manner, what would be the consequence of the neglect of this twofold precept ? (iv.)

Does Aristotle lay great stress on the proper use of appropriate metaphors in an oration ?

For the selection of metaphors what precepts does Aristotle give ? (ix. xii. xiii.)

From what sources then are appropriate metaphors deduced ? (xiii.)

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### CHAP. III.

What nouns does Aristotle mention as contributing to a frigid style ?

When do epithets render an oration frigid ?

Is the too frequent use of appropriate epithets approved by Aristotle?

When do you conceive a metaphor and epithet unbecoming? (chap. ii. 9.)

#### CHAP. IV.

In what respect does the *εἰκὼν* differ from the *μεταφορὰ*?

Why does Aristotle caution the orator against the too frequent use of the *εἰκὼν*?

Can the *μεταφορὰ* be enunciated as the *εἰκὼν*, and the *εἰκὼν* as *μεταφορὰ*?

How would you change a *μεταφορὰ* to an *εἰκὼν*?

On what principle must the *εἰκὼν* be constructed to be appropriate?

#### CHAP. V.

In what does excellence of style (*λίξεως ἀρετὴ*) consist?

On what does purity of style (*τὸ ἰλληνίζειν*) depend?

Do I understand you to say the first consists in the proper use of words, and the latter in their clear and proper arrangement?

Why does Aristotle distinguish the *τὸ ἰλληνίζειν*, (chap. v.) the *ἄγκος*, (chap. vi.) and the *τὸ πρέπον*, (chap. vii.) from the *τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λίξεως*? (chap. viii.)

Do I understand you to say, because the first are es-

sential to style, or by which it becomes calculated to effect persuasion, and the latter only accidental to style, or contributing to give it elegance and beauty ?

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CHAP. VI.

How is elevation of style (*ὁ ὄγκος*) attained ?

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CHAP. VII.

When will the *τὸ πρέπον*, or becoming in style, be attained ?

You say that the *τὸ πρέπον* in style will be attained, if it be passionate, expressive of moral character, and suited to the subject ; what do you mean by the *τὸ ἥθος λέξεως* ? (vide *Annotationes vii. 6. Vater.*)

When Aristotle treats of the *τὸ ἥθος* in style, do you consider the *τὸ ἥθος λέξεως* as belonging to the *ἐν τῷ ἠθῆι τοῦ λέγοντος*, one of the distinctions of *πίστις* in the first book ?

In treating of the *πίστις ἠθικῆ* in the second book, and again in this book, on the subject of style, explain the threefold manner in which Aristotle has treated of this distinction of *πίστις*. (vide *Riccobon in Lib. II. cap. i. p. 153. and Lib. III. cap. vii. p. 246.*)

When Aristotle says the style is becoming when adapted to the ἔξις, what meaning do you attach to the word ἔξις?

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CHAP. VIII.

What precepts does Aristotle give on the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως?

How many species of the ἰ ρυθμὸς does Aristotle mention?

Of these, which is the only one, out of which it is impossible to construct any metre, and therefore appropriate?

Which of the two species of Pæans is most proper for the commencement and the conclusion of a speech?

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CHAP. IX.

Define the λέξις εἰρημένη and κατεστραμμένη.

How many species of the περίοδος are there?

In treating of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως what division does Aristotle make?

How many distinctions of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως are there ?

Which of these is the most proper for orations ?

How many species of the περίοδος are there ?

What do you mean by a περίοδος ἀφελής ?

Of the περίοδος which consists of clauses, what subdistinction does Aristotle make ? (7. 9.)

What is meant by the περίστωσις and παρομοίωσις ?

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## CHAP. X.

Does the invention of the ἀστυία and εὐδοκιμοῦντα of style belong to rhetoric ?

What reason can you give from the first book of rhetoric that they do not ? (Book I. chap. ii.)

Which do you consider are the most approved ἀστυία and εὐδοκιμοῦντα of style ?

Why are the simile and metaphor most approved ?

Can you infer from Aristotle's general inference that "those beauties and elegancies of style are most approved which are the quickest in communicating information," any particular rule for the selection of ἐνθυμήματα or arguments ?

In treating of such ἀστυία as metaphor, simile, enthymem, and antithesis, why has Aristotle treated of

antithesis as belonging to the τὸ σχῆμα τῆν λέξεως, and the others κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου? (chap. ii. 6. ix. 7.)

Enumerate the ἀστυῖα with which the orator should seek to grace his speech.

## CHAP. XI.

How does metaphor differ from personification?

You have stated that such metaphors are most approved as are not too obvious; how will an orator avoid this fault in the selection of his metaphors, and at the same time render them more approved? (vi.)

When will a sentence be more elegant?

Do I understand you to say in proportion as it contains a greater number of these ornaments?

Are hyperboles and proverbs ever metaphors?

Do these contribute to the elegance of a sentence?

Does the use of hyperbole become the young as well as the old?\*

\* However ready we may be to acknowledge the wonderful acuteness and subtlety of Aristotle's mind, in unfolding the whole art of rhetoric, his judgment of true wit, from the samples afforded in this chapter, convinces us, that he was a more profound philosopher than agreeable companion. We have therefore, perhaps prudently, refrained from noticing the witty applications of metaphor and hyperbole, which he has made, as some general questions on the λέξεις will be subsequently introduced.



## CHAP. XII.

What distinction of style does Aristotle first make when he wishes to ascertain the kind of style most adapted to each species of oration ?

How many species of the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ are there ?

To which species of oration are the λέξις ἠθικὴ and παθητικὴ most adapted ?

Which of the two species of oration, the judicial or deliberative, require the greatest accuracy of style ?

Does the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ suit the demonstrative species ?

Is nicety and precision essential in the judicial species, and what is the objection to too great nicety and precision in the deliberative species ?

## GENERAL QUESTIONS

ON THE

## SECOND PART OF RHETORIC.

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**I**N treating of the *λίξις* does Aristotle propose to consider first its nature and the matter of which it is formed?

In doing this does he not consider,

1st. The matter of which it is composed as words ;

2nd. Its forms—of which one is the essential or modification of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of effecting persuasion ; and another, which is the accidental, or the figure, or modification of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of pleasing the ear ;

3rd. Of the *ἁστυόν*, or introduction of metaphor, apothegm, and wit ?

Aristotle has hitherto treated of the nature of style and its modifications ; what does he secondly, and lastly propose to consider ?

## CHAP. XIII.

Enumerate the *τὰ μέρη* of orations.

Why does Aristotle object to more than the *πρόθεσις* and *πίστις*?

How many and what are the *τὰ μέρη* which Aristotle treats of?

Why has he treated of them when he set out with objecting to them?

To which of the species of oration is the *διήγησις* peculiar?

Does the deliberative species always require as many parts as the judicial? and which are the parts which it does not require?

When does it require the *προσίμιον* (xiv. 11.) *ἀντιπαροβολή*, and *ἐπίνοδος*?

Is the *ἐπίλογος* always necessary in the judicial species?

Of how many parts will a judicial oration delivered by an accuser be composed?

Under which of these parts is the *τὰ πρὸς ἀντιδικόν* or refutation, and the *ἀντιπαροβολή* or contrast of arguments, included when the oration is delivered by an accused?

Why should they not be included in the *προσίμιον* or *ἐπίλογος*? (4.)

## CHAP. XIV.

Give the definition of *προσίμιον*?

From what sources are the *προσίμια* in the demonstrative species drawn? (2.)

What ought to be the chief object of a judicial *προσίμιον*? (6.)

From what sources are judicial *προσίμια* drawn?

Who is most likely to draw the matter of his *προσίμιον* *ἐκ τοῦ λέγοντος*—the accuser or accused?

Turn to the oration against Verres. (Act. Sec. Lib. iii.) and tell me from which of the sources Cicero's exordium is drawn.

In which of the parts of a judicial oration, delivered by an accused, would the orator be most likely to have recourse to the *πίστις ἐν τῷ ἦθει τοῦ λέγοντος*?

Are they admissible in all parts?

In which part of the oration does the accuser introduce the *τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν*?

What is the objection to their being mentioned in the *προσίμιον*?

In which part of the oration does the accused reply to the *τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν*?

What is the orator's object when his *προσίμιον* is drawn *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ*? (7.)

Does the deliberative species always require the *προσίμιον*?

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## CHAP. XV.

The reader is referred to Hobbes's Brief for the *τόποι* on this chapter.

## CHAP. XVI.

What kind of *διήγησις* does Aristotle prefer in the demonstrative species of oration?

May the proof and amplification be blended in this species? (vide Riccobon in cap. xvi. hujus libri.)

What is the objection to a continuous *διήγησις* (*ἰφιζῆς*) in this species?

In a judicial oration should the *διήγησις* be *ἰφιζῆς* or *κατὰ μέρος*?

What matter does the accuser naturally relate in his *διήγησις*? (iv. line 6.)

How does the *διήγησις* of an accused differ from an accuser's?

What relation is there between the *διήγησις* and the *πίστις*? \*

\* Quoniam narratio est rerum explicatio, et quædam quasi sedes ac fundamentum constituendæ fidei, ea sunt in ea servanda maxime, quæ etiam in reliquis dicendi partibus, quæ partim sunt necessaria, partim assumpta ad ornandum.

Nam ut dilucide probabiliterque narremus, necessarium est; sed assumimus etiam suavitatem. Probabilis autem narratio erit, si personis, si temporibus, si locis ea, quæ narrabuntur, contentient; si cuiusque facti et eventus causa ponetur, si testata dici videbuntur, si cum hominum opinione, auctoritate, si cum lege, cum more, cum religione conjuncta, si probitas narrantis significabitur, si antiquitas, si memoria, si orationis veritas, et vitæ fides. Suavis autem narratio est, quæ habet admirationes, exitus inopinatos, interpositos motus animorum, colloquia personarum, dolores, iracundias, metus, lætities, cupiditates. Cicero. de Orator. Partit.

On what points should an accused refrain from dwelling, and when should both the accuser and the accused dilate on circumstances in the *διήγησις*? (8.)

Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with moral character, and to adapt his *διήγησις* to the *πίστις*, in order that the one may support the other?

Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with moral character, (7.) and ought he to do this at the commencement of his *διήγησις*? (10.)

Does the deliberative species of orations require a *διήγησις*?

When is a *διήγησις* used in this species?

When it is used has it any resemblance to the *παράδειγμα*?

## CHAP. XVII.

What are the four questions for proof in an accuser's oration?

Has the *διήγησις* previously prepared the judge?

Can you repeat the division which Aristotle made of *ἑγκλήματα* in the first book (chap. xiii. 7.) and

reconcile it with the questions to be proved by an accused as stated in this chapter, viz.

either ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν  
 or ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαβεν  
 or ὅτι οὐ τόσονδι, ἢ ὅτι δικάτως ?

Suppose the accuser charges the accused with a deliberative injury, what cause will he assign for the action done ? (Book I. chap. 10.)

Supposed the accused is compelled by weight of testimony to acknowledge the commission of the act and hurt done, but denies the *προαίρεσις*: if he proved that the act was done *μὴ δι' αὐτόν* or *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*,—would it be a refutation of the accuser ?\* (vide Book I. chap. x. 6.)

Suppose the accused acknowledges the act to have been done, and that act to have been hurtful, but denies the *προαίρεσις*, on which points will he dwell in the refutation ?

What do you mean by refutation,† and is the refutation in a measure different from proof ?

\* Aut jure factum, depellendi aut ulsciscendi doloris gratia, aut pietatis, aut pudicitiae, aut religionis, aut patriæ nomine, aut denique necessitate, inscitia, casu. Nam quæ motu animi et perturbatione facta sine ratione sunt, ea defensionem contra crimen, in legitimis judiciis, non habent, in liberis disceptationibus habere possunt. Cic. Orat. Partit.

† Ea quæ ad fidem faciendam pertinent in confirmationem et reprehensionem dividuntur. In confirmando nostra probare volumus; in reprehendendo redarguere contraria. Quoniam igitur omne quod in controversiam venit, id aut sit, necne sit, aut quid sit, aut quale sit, quæritur, primo conjectura, in altero definitio, in tertia ratio. Cic. Orat. Partit.

What chiefly constitutes proof in the demonstrative species? (3.)

What species of the *πίστις διὰ τοῦ δίκαιου* is mostly used in the deliberative?

Do you recollect any precepts which Aristotle gives on the use of enthymems as proofs?

Why should they not be used when the orator seeks to excite the passions?

Why should they not be used *ἰσχυρῶς*, or in a continued series?

To which of the three distinctions of *πίστις* in the first book, and to which species does Aristotle reduce the *τὰ πρὸς ἀντίδικον*?

How is the refutation effected by enthymem? (Book II. chap. xxv. 1.)

Ought not an accuser to notice the objections which the accused is likely to bring forward before he states his own?

Why should he not, and when is a violation of this order unobjectionable?

Ought the accused to refute his adversary before introducing his own proofs?

What reason can you assign for this order in the proof?

Are *γνώμαι* admissible as proofs, and which species is the best? (Vide Book II. chap. xxi.)



## CHAP. XVIII.

Can you mention any cases in which the orator may interrogate with success ?

Is the *ἐρώτησις* prudent on every question, and when is it not ?

What answer is the best to an equivocal *ἐρώτησις* ?

What distinction does Aristotle make between *εἰρωνία* and *βαμολοχία* ?

## CHAP. XIX.

What does the orator propose to do in the *ἐπίλογος* ?

Why should an accuser prefer the *ἐπίλογος* to the other parts of the oration, for exciting the passions and prejudices of his audience against his adversary ?

Which part of the oration of an accused is opposed to the *ἐπίλογος* of an accuser ?

In what kind of judicial cases will the *ἀνάμνησις* be used instead of *τὰ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατῆν καταστήσαι* ?

Will every case admit of the excitement of the passions in the *ἐπίλογος* ?

What kind of cases require the excitement of anger, hatred, and pity?

Is it necessary to the excitement of anger in the ἐπίλογος, that the orator should shew in the πίστις that his adversary has acted with the ὀλιγαρχία and its species?

Why is it?

Do I understand you to say because these are the στοιχεῖα out of which anger is excited? (vide Book II. chap. ii.)


Why does the conciliation of the hearer in the ἐπίλογος naturally follow the πίστις?

Why does amplification and extenuation naturally follow the τὸ κατασκευάσαι ἐν τὸν ἀκρατῆν?

Should the ἀνάμνησις be long or brief?







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