



THE FUNCTIONS OF SI AND QUI.

THE FUNCTIONS OF SI AND QUI

WITH

SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GERMAN THEORIES.

BY

GAVIN HAMILTON,

OF THE ELGIN ACADEMY.

Causam investigato in re admirabili, *si* poteris: *si* nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa.

JAMES GORDON, EDINBURGH.

HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., LONDON.

1862.


BIBLIOTHECA·BODLEIANA·
DOMI NUS ILLU
NA TIO MEA

TO

WILLIAM RAMSAY, ESQ.,

M.A. TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
PROFESSOR OF HUMANITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW;
AUTHOR OF "ROMAN ANTIQUITIES," "LATIN PROSODY;" EDITOR OF
"CICERO PRO CLUENTIO," ETC. ETC. ETC.

DEAR MR. RAMSAY,

I dedicate this volume to you, in remembrance of the happy hours I spent in the class-room, where from your eloquent lips I learned to love the literature of Rome; in glad and grateful acknowledgment of the generosity that cemented the acquaintance there commenced by the closer ties of genuine friendship; and in the hope that on that University, where so many illustrious Humanists have taught, the torch of learning transmitted from a long line of scholars to be taken up by you, may for many years continue to throw the lustre of its bright and mellow light.

Ever, DEAR MR. RAMSAY,

Most truly thine,

GAVIN HAMILTON.

PREFACE.

THE accusers of Strafford—like those practical men, who, overlooking reasons, look only to results, like those moralists who consider the means sanctified by the end, unlike algebraists, who do not combine homogeneous and heterogeneous quantities—bent on the condemnation, if not the conviction, of their foe, but blind to almost every other consideration, apprehensive that there was nothing in the nature of any of their charges to constitute high treason, resolved, as a last resource, according to the maxim—*juncta juvant*—to rely on the number of many. Though similes, it is said, seldom go straight on all fours, such, or something similar, is the line of argument adopted by the champions of classical learning in modern times. If no single reason is sufficient to stem the tide of modern innovation, to stop the incessant and imperious clamour for change, which threatens to shake the supremacy, if not the stability, of classical education, the sum of several arguments is supposed to be irresistible. *Ponderanda potius quam numeranda sunt argumenta.* An argument, if strong, can stand alone, and dispense altogether with aid from others. Instead of requiring to be supplemented by others, it summarily supersedes them, by swallowing them up, like Aaron's rod. A metropolitan advocate finds an argument for himself, though he is furnished with arguments as well as facts

by his country agent, who scarcely welcomes a victory when won by weapons other than his own. A wise judge, when he is tired of arguments, when it is time to sum up, *calculates* arguments rather than counts them. The winner will very often be found to be in a minority.

The study of the Latin language may very safely be left to lean on its logical character and structure. Latin is the most logical of all languages. Not more true is this fact, and much less strange is it, than the other and opposite fact, that the system at present adopted for its interpretation is the most illogical of all systems.

For the following reasons :—

1. The principle that the syntax should be secondary and subordinate to the sense, is violated by the system of interpretation in use.

2. The cause in the "essential-part" theory, and in the doctrine of the "predicate in the relative clause," is neither consistent nor commensurate with the effect.

3. No unity is shown to exist in the various usages of the subjunctive mood.

The author is aware that he exposes himself to the charge of presumption in impugning the authority of those whose opinions on the cardinal points in the grammatical economy have by general consent been long invested with the inviolability of an oracle, opinions believed to be as orthodox as they are old ; in assaulting the aristocracy of German scholarship, names of European repute—Forbiger, Grotefend, and Zumpt. But the aristocracy of intellect rests not on the same basis

as the aristocracy of birth or of blood, nor does it make pretensions so preposterous or so profane. It is said that a French Duchess said that Providence would hesitate before he condemned a person of quality. Livy, who likes to make the language of logic fall from the lips of ladies, represents Tanaquil as saying—*Qui sis, non unde natus sis, reputa.* The question no longer is, from what quarter on either side the argument comes, but what is the quality of the argument. No authority which is not based on reason and on truth, nor authority alone, unless resting on argument that admits of no answer, can now be accepted. It is not that hitherto authority has had the last word in every argument; there has been no argument at all. There has been nothing but bold assumption on the one side, and blind assent on the other. It is not that authority has had the casting vote in every decision, but there has been no discussion at all. To run in the old conventional ruts, to register and repeat what has been received from others, without asking or ascertaining the reason why, scarcely realizes the true ideal of intellectual culture.

No competent critic will dare to deny, no candid critic will desire to deny, that conspicuous service has been rendered to the cause of ancient letters, by the scholarship of modern Germany. The characteristic of her scholarship, however, is industry rather than intellect. Doubtless there are splendid exceptions. The Bœotians, when charged by their sharp-witted neighbours, the Athenians, with dulness, could check the reproach by citing the names of Pindar, Pelopidas, and

Epaminondas. Germany can cite a triumvirate not less distinguished in their own way and in their own walk. That great intellectual gladiator, who could wield at his will every weapon within the armoury of argument, was a German. The historian of the literature of Greece, who possessed in perfection the faculty of picturesque presentation, was a German. The historian of Rome, whose lofty, chivalrous, and truth-loving character, makes even his enormous learning to be forgotten, was a German. Few nations can claim such a triumvirate as that which contains the names of F. A. Wolf, K. O. Müller, and Barthold George Niebuhr. Their works were wanted, were in every way worthy of Germany, and have been warmly welcomed in Britain. The most conspicuous characteristic of each of these three scholars was originality. The opinions of each were his own, and not obtained from others. The intellectual configuration and constitution of each was so remarkable as to have ranked high in any country or in any age. Each was a sun and not a satellite. None shone with a borrowed light. Their reputation is so remarkable as still to be reflected in many of their countrymen, to whose influence, imputed and inherited rather than inherent, the extraordinary ascendancy of German authority in this country on all matters affecting the interpretation of antiquity, is in a large measure to be ascribed. The illusion and delusion derived from distance, doubtless too has had its determinating influence. Extremes meet. Poetry and prose concur in celebrating the charm of distance. No line is more famous than—

" 'Tis distance lends enchantment to the view."

No proverb is more frequent than—

"Far off fowls have fair feathers."

The deficiency and deterioration of native production, as some thought, had to be repaired by foreign countries more fertile and more favoured. Hence, our scholarship like our wine is imported. An ungenial clime can only be regarded as a misfortune, and entails neither blame nor shame. That our scholarship should be imported rather than indigenous, should be grafted from without instead of growing within, must be reckoned a fault, as well as regarded in the light of a misfortune. The slaveholder who prefers buying to breeding, can prefer the plea of gain. The politician who by bribes can buy supporters from the ranks of his enemies, can also prefer the plea of gain. In being relieved from the trouble of thinking, in resigning to Germany the right to reason, in submitting to the despotism of her dogmas, there is neither honour nor gain. The sooner there is a *release* from this long *lease* of intellectual subjugation the better. "To be weak is miserable;" to be governed by the weak is more miserable still. It would be more befitting the nation's dignity if it were to think for itself, to throw off the trammels of tradition, to take these celebrated but unhappy transcendental theories of Germany no longer on trust but on trial. To go to Germany for enlightenment in philology, theology, or philosophy, is to carry the love of novelty to an excessive length.

The inaccuracy of the German method of philosophizing may be inferred from its inconsistency in two great departments of human speculation. In theology

and philology the method is peculiarly perverse, exactly the reverse of what is right. In each it reverses the relative ascendancy of the two great principles exercised in the attainment of truth—reason and faith. In theology, where faith ought to have the supremacy, and reason ought to be subordinate, reason is supreme, and faith subordinate. The rationalists reject as articles of belief in religion whatever excludes or exceeds reason. Had they read, and reading remembered what Pico of Mirandola centuries ago wrote to Politian—" We strive to fathom by argument the unsearchable mysteries, which we ought to possess by love, and which, if we have not love, we discover to no purpose"—it never would have been necessary to prove that rationalism is irrational. In philology, on the other hand, where reason ought to be supreme and faith ought to be subordinate, faith is supreme and reason is subordinate. In this department of human knowledge nothing should be believed until it be submitted to the jurisdiction of reason, and unless it satisfy its dictates. The moral, however, to be drawn from German transcendental theories in general, and Grotefend's and Zumpt's in particular, relative respectively to *si* and the " essential-part" principle, is, it is better to believe than to reason.

Another inference deducible from the consideration of these theories is, it hitherto has been easier to believe them than to understand them. Voltaire said, " Whatever is obscure is not French." The converse is as true, whatever is clear is not German. The Germans carry their theory of the unintelligible so far, that Bacon and Newton would be too clear for their adoption. Their

principle of interpretation is to explain the *obscurum per obscurius.* Their obscurity does not arise from originality of thought. There is no natural or necessary connexion between originality and obscurity. All muddy streams are not deep; some clear streams are very far from being shallow. Usually, if not uniformly, an intelligent thinker will make himself intelligible. The power of correct perception usually involves the power of clear presentation. Style ought to reflect the mind and meaning of an author, as in a mirror. If it fail to do this, it cannot fail to throw a reflection of a different character on himself. The obscurity of the Germans does not arise so much from the height of their flight as from the haziness of the atmosphere. Nor are their thoughts so much deep as (to use a good Scotch word) *drumlie.* Mists and fogs rest on the shallows of the sea rather than on the deep. Their attempts at being original only end in their being obscure without being orthodox. They miss the real without reaching the ideal. They resemble the astronomer, who, instead of looking into the lake and seeing the stars, looked at the stars and fell into the lake. They have been hunting after truth in the regions of immensity, while all the time truth has been hiding herself in their own homes. To change the metaphor, by a prodigality of labour, they pile up pyramids of transcendental speculation, but, after all, they are but builders rather than architects. They accumulate loads of literary lumber, rather than acquire true learning. The verb *ædificare* might be predicated of them with greater propriety than *condere.* To the theories on

which they have lavished such enormous labour, there attaches often a fatal flaw. In the face of facts they are false. Resting on no firmer foundations than the fancies of their fabricators, they are found to be only castles in the air. A French wit, during the period posterior to the establishment of the British supremacy on the sea, and prior to the overthrow of Napoleon's supremacy by land, while German philosophy was in the ascendant, said, "England holds the empire of the sea, France holds the empire of the land, but Germans hold the empire of the air." Their imagination is not that faculty which "bodies forth unseen realities," but rather that which gives to "*airy* nothings a local habitation and a name."

They are imaginary rather than imaginative. They profess to "evolve theories from the depths of their own consciousness." Perhaps with less pomp of philosophic phrase, but with more truth, it may be said, they evolve theories out of the shallows of their own conceit.

The doctrine of the "predicate in the relative clause" has been discussed in connexion with the name of the late Dr. Carson, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, simply because his treatise on "Qui, Quae, Quod," contains the most complete and duly authenticated exposition of that doctrine, not certainly because its author is no longer living to defend it. Far be it from the writer to intimate, still farther be it from him to insinuate, that the repute of Dr. Carson was not as well deserved as it was widely diffused. It is said that the celebrated Dr. Parr, on visiting Edinburgh, was not satisfied till he had seen the writer of "Qui, Quae, Quod." The

learned Englishman who could pay a compliment as well as point a sarcasm, probably had the precedent of Sir William Temple before his eyes, who, when travelling in Holland, on his arrival at the Hague, introduced himself to De Witt by saying, "My only business, Sir, is to see the things most considerable in your country, and I should execute my design very imperfectly if I went away without seeing you." It is as illogical as it is illiberal for a controversialist to try to whitewash himself by blackening his antagonist. It is a poor tribute to pay to truth, in a contest for its triumph, to suspend the laws of courtesy and charity. There is no difficulty in deciding between what is due to reverence for the memory of the departed scholars whose opinions have been impugned in these pages, and what is due to the requirements of truth. The men were better than their opinions, and probably they were better scholars than logicians. The author knows he has not misrepresented them, he believes he has not misunderstood them. If, however, the pupils of Dr. Carson, or the friends of the late Professor Zumpt of Berlin in this country, think that these distinguished scholars have in any way been aggrieved, it is quite competent for them to repel the assault.

"Caedimus inque vicem præbemus crura sagittis."

If the author is in error on the hard themes he has treated, he will be grateful to any one for enlightenment. If his conclusions are correct, he will be glad to have been the means of guiding those members of his profession who are morally conscientious, and who desire to be intellectually competent.

The opinions at issue are old enough, if not orthodox. They have been tried by the test of time, but perhaps they have not been tried by the test of thought. Prescription pleads right of possession, immemorial usage and practice constitute validity of claim in law. It might be so, too, in philosophy and philology, if men sought truth with as much avidity as they seek titles to the possession of property.

Besides the great scholar with whose name this volume is inscribed, most grateful acknowledgments are due to Professor Geddes of the University of Aberdeen—a scholar who certainly does not require, and probably does not desire, any eulogium from the author, but who deserves the double distinction conveyed by the compliment of Horace—"Docte sermones *utriusque* linguæ"—for his cheering words vouchsafed during the prosecution of the argument against Grotefend's canon relative to the subjunctive. Nor will the author cease to cherish with feelings of genuine gratitude the encouragement he received, when almost amazed at his own audacity in assailing Zumpt—the *Ζεύς μέγας* of the classical Olympus, *ὅου κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον*—and distrustful of his own capacity to cope with the complicated questions that invest the consideration of incorporated subjunctive clauses, his argument, even though partially stated, was so favourably entertained by an intellect so subtle and sagacious as that of the Rev. John Hannah, D.C.L. Oxon.

THE ACADEMY, ELGIN, *November* 8, 1862.

PART I.

ON THE FUNCTIONS OF SI.

ALTHOUGH the resemblance both in the roots of single words and in the syntactical structure of sentences in the Greek and Latin tongues, can only arise from, and be accounted for by, the fact that they have a common origin—are shoots of the same primordial stem,

Facies non omnibus una,
Nec diversa tamen qualem decet esse sororum,—

and have been subjected to the same great law of logical development, still differences, many in number and momentous in their nature, may be noted. One difference is so obvious as to occur to the most ordinary observer. The Greeks use great licence, while the Romans restrain themselves within narrower limits in the construction of their sentences. Hence there are far fewer anomalies, irregularities, and exceptions in Latin than in the syntax of the Greeks. This circumstance renders the former far superior to the latter, as a logical instrument for disciplining and developing the mind of youth. Zumpt, the great German grammarian, seems to have overlooked this characteristic difference when he says (9th German edition, 2d English edition by Dr. Schmitz,

524), "the present and perfect subjunctive with *si* differ only slightly from the indicative, and their use cannot be fixed by grammatical rules."

It is language that gives rules to grammar, not grammar that gives rules to language. When the genius of a language has in course of time been developed by careful culture, it will supply rules, which have their root in reason, for the regulation of all its parts with consistent completeness, and not with arbitrary caprice for particular portions. Otherwise there would be a logical defect in the constitution of the language. There seems no reason, *à priori*, why the usage of *si* with the present and perfect subjunctive should be less determinate than its usage with the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive, or that there should be only a slight difference, as Zumpt alleges, between *si* with present subjunctive and present indicative. An examination of the actual practice of Latin writers on this point will prove the truth of this presumptive theory.

Even though the attempt were to prove a failure, and the conclusion arrived at were only a delusion—

> Ut desint vires tamen est laudanda voluntas
> Quem si non tenuit, magnis tamen excidit ausis—

still a claim might be laid to the credit, which Milton speaks of, as quoted by Lord Macaulay, when he says that "Error is only truth in the process of formation." There are few theories which do not contain some truth, and even one the very reverse of what is right, opposed to reason, and inconsistent with facts, may render some

service to truth by suggesting a counter theory, which shall combine the two indispensable conditions of satisfying the dictates of reason, and solving the apparent anomalies of facts.

The function of *si* in the grammatical economy is to introduce a hypothesis or supposition, and whatever the nature of the difference is that subsists between the indicative and subjunctive moods—a very great difference founded on a principle—the character of the supposition will be modified by that difference, according as the supposition is introduced by *si* with the indicative or subjunctive.

The following is the deliverance of Augustus Grotefend, another German scholar, who has treated the subject more fully and formally than Zumpt :—

"Since *si* represents only a supposition or conceived reality, one might expect beforehand that it would always govern the subjunctive. But this is not the case; for a supposition may be so stated as either to imply nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion, or, on the other hand, to convey with it some intimation that it is in his judgment possible, probable, etc. When *si* carries with it no such intimation, it governs the indicative; when it does convey any intimation of the kind, it governs the subjunctive."

This extract comprises the first words of the first elaborate excursus appended to Grotefend's *Materials for Translation into Latin*, and appeared in two English issues of that work, under the editorial superintendence of the late Mr. Kerchever Arnold, Fellow of

Trinity College, Cambridge. The original work, I believe, has had a large circulation in Germany, and I have no doubt the repute of its author is as well deserved as it is widely diffused. Perhaps, however, his scholarship and sagacity are not best illustrated by his investigations of the supposed functions subserved by *si* in the grammatical economy. By these he ought not to be judged. Epaminondas, when assailed by mean and malignant enemies, who, not able to rival him, were anxious to revile him, consented to admit the truth of their charges, if they would only engross on the minutes of his trial for the instruction of posterity, that he had humbled on the plains of Leuctra the pride of Sparta, and broken the prestige of her supremacy,—a foe whom no Theban before his time had dared to look in the face. Scipio, when arraigned on a charge of being bribed by an eastern king, silenced his accusers by the reply that the day was ill suited for litigation, for it was the anniversary of the day on which he had conquered Hannibal at Zama. An indulgent posterity remembers Bacon more for his discoveries in his closet than his decisions on the bench. Warton tells us that a certain person unnamed sought to please Lord Bolingbroke by ridiculing the avarice of Marlborough, but he was stopped by Bolingbroke, who said, "He was so great a man I forgot he had that vice." Bentley's reputation rests rather on his critique of the *Epistles of Phalaris* than his criticism of *Paradise Lost.*

Now that Mr. Kershever Arnold has paid the debt of nature as well as Mr. Grotefend, I am willing to pay a

tribute of respect to his memory as well. Capacity for scholarship as well as for science ; the possession of intellectual power projected on a large scale, disfigured neither by undue preponderance in one direction, nor deficient in due development in another ; the practised discipline of successful culture, must be conceded as preliminary postulates in any estimate of the mental calibre of a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. There is nothing in the vast voluminous series of Arnold's *School Classics*, on the whole, inconsistent with the character thus given of a member of this distinguished academic society. That particular part of Arnold's *Classical Series* which contains the extract quoted above, has reached the third edition, bearing on its title-page the name of the Rev. H. H. Arnold, as its translator from the German. The "excursus," after a lapse of twenty years, appears now in the same shape as it originally stood, and, so far as I am aware, has provoked hitherto from British scholars neither remonstrance nor remark. The opinions it advocates are, it would appear, as orthodox as they are old.

There are two circumstances connected with the enunciation of this rule regarding *si* which demand and deserve notice. The conclusion arrived at is stated without hesitation, limitation, qualification, or reserve. It must have been delivered originally by its author in the same happy frame of mind as that experienced by the celebrated Scottish Judge, who, when his compeers on the Bench, convened in solemn conclave, had long discussed, but were not likely soon to

decide, a nice point of law, rushed to their rescue, pronounced his judgment, and, rejoicing in the clearness of his mental vision, testified his gratitude by thanking Heaven "he never had a doot in his life." He must only have looked at one side of the question, and decreed ere he saw the other side. Doubtless, like King James, he found that easy; who, however, when he saw the other side, declared, "Faith, by my saul, I dinna ken which is richt."

2*d*, No reason is assigned for the rule. A deliverance on a point of such cardinal importance in the grammatical economy ought to have been accompanied by direct demonstration, or, at least, illustration of the principle on which it rests. The lawyer, indeed, delivers his decision with the precision of an oracle; but he appends to his decision no elaborate note in confirmation thereof. He may have adopted this course under the fear that, while his conclusion might be right, the reasons might be wrong. But still, the arbitrary and authoritative tone in which the enunciation of the conclusion itself is given, stands in striking contrast with the absence of any attempt at proof. The process is not only deferred for a season, but dispensed with altogether as a ceremony neither necessary nor desirable. A large draft is made on the credulity of the student. No wonder need be excited if it should be dishonoured. Indeed, wonder is rather excited that it should have circulated so long without either challenge or check, though indorsed with the name of a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

But it is right that Grotefend should be allowed to adduce his own demonstration or illustration in confirmation of his rule. "*Si*, with the indicative, leaves the reality of the supposition entirely out of the question, conveying no intimation whatever of its possibility or impossibility: it is only from the context that it can be determined whether the writer considered the supposition as a fact or real occurrence."

Grotefend here states that *si*, with the indicative, leaves the reality of the supposition entirely out of the question, and that it is only from the context that it can be determined whether the writer or speaker considers the supposition as a fact; but he debars us from the satisfaction, he deprives us of the opportunity of testing this point, by withholding reference to the authors from whom he cites cases in confirmation of his rule. It is rather hard to state that *si*, with the indicative, indicates nothing as to the reality of the supposition introduced by it, that this must be learned from the context; when, behold! no context is given. The first case he cites in confirmation of his dictum, divorced from its context, without any reference being given, is—"*Si* fato omnia fiunt, nil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus." However desirable, or even necessary, in some cases, the context may be for the exposition of a passage, fortunately it is not so here; indeed, the passage is self-interpreting. A man often carries his credentials in his countenance. No other introduction is needed. As the mind of man is often seen in his face, without any investigation of his previous conduct, so the meaning of a

sentence is often seen on its surface, without any investigation of the preceding context. With all due deference to Grotefend and his translator, the Rev. H. H. Arnold, *si* here (*si* fato omnia fiunt, etc.) *does* convey an intimation of the "possibility, the probability, or improbability," of the supposition introduced by it, and that too without the aid of the context. It is, however, a peculiar usage of *si* with the indicative. The author or speaker here assumes and asserts, for the sake of argument, that all things beforehand are fixed by fate, although he believes the reverse. He virtually says, "I will admit that all things are fixed and foreclosed by blind fate;" but then there follows, immediately and inevitably, the monstrous conclusion, inconsistent with the pursuits of practical life, that nothing can impress us with the necessity of being more cautious in our conduct. This is by no means an odd or obsolete mode of reasoning. It is a very old one, and as orthodox as it is old. It is used with very great effect in a very good book (like the best of all books, which says, "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good"), *Euclid's Elements*, in the proposition immediately following the one vulgarly known as the "Pons Asinorum," the Bridge of Asses. Ancient authors probably knew as much about fate and free-will as modern theologians; could draw with as much precision the boundary line between the one and the other; fix the point where the one ended and the other began. The contemplation of such themes, no doubt, would form an admirable mental gymnastic for philosophers and those practical men who had

nothing else to do. Milton appropriately enough represents a company of those fallen spirits who kept not their first estate in Pandemonium, thus engaged—

> Others apart sat on a hill retired,
> In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
> Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute,
> And found no end in wandering mazes lost.

There may have been fatalists in ancient times, just as there may be fatalists still; men who held or hold that free choice is fettered by the force of fate; that their course is shaped irrespectively of effort on their part. Let their theory be put to the test. Place them in a situation such that they find a shark behind and the shore before. Perhaps they would feel that their safety very much depended on personal and present exertion, and would be satisfied should the difficulty associated with fate and free-will find a practical solution in escape from danger.

The next case cited is "Scytharum legati ad Alexandrum, si deus es, inquiunt, tribuere mortalibus beneficia debes, non sua eripere; sin autem homo es, id quod es, semper esse te cogita."

Inasmuch as the assertion ("id quod es," what you really are) appended to the latter of the two suppositions, introduced by *si* with the indicative in this sentence, conveys, with all the distinctness and clearness of which language is capable, the opinion of the speaker, with regard to the nature of the supposition introduced,

Grotefend could only have construed this sentence in favour of his rule by the inference, that since *si* with the indicative in the former clause introduced a supposition inconsistent and incompatible with the supposition introduced by *si* with the indicative in the latter clause, no determinate intimation as to the speaker's opinion at all in any case could be drawn from *si* with the indicative. The former supposition, however, is another instance of indirect or negative demonstration. The ambassadors are quite willing to admit the truth of Alexander's vain-glorious, presumptuous, and preposterous assumption of divinity, provided he give proof of the possession of the beneficent character associated with divinity. But he could not. Instead of dispensing blessing and bounty to mankind with the beneficence of Deity, he had been personating the part of a despot and destroyer. The first supposition, as decidedly and distinctly as the second, intimates the "opinion" of the speakers on the point in question. The one intimates what Alexander *was*, the other what he *was not*.

The next case cited by Grotefend in confirmation of his rule is unlike either of the two preceding ones. It bears, however, one striking resemblance to them. It subverts rather than supports the position for which it was cited. "Haec quoque pericula tanta si effugero, satisne tutum reditum putatis fore,"—"If I shall have been successful in escaping these terrible dangers too, do you think I shall be quite safe in returning?" The indicative here with *si* indicates that the speaker probably

will, or at least possibly may, escape the danger dreaded.

The last cited is the only one given in connexion with its context. (*Cic. Ros. Am.* l. 53.) The sentence is taken from the close of Cicero's speech in behalf of Sex. Roscius Amerinus. This personage, the son and heir of Roscius Senior, who had been proscribed by Sulla, and whose property, of the value of two hundred and fifty talents, had been bought by Chrysogonus for a small sum, was, at the instigation of the latter, arraigned on a charge of parricide. Cicero, in the peroration of his speech, having, with all the force of his peculiar rhetoric, depicted the horrors that accompanied the ascendency of the savage and sanguinary Sulla, tells the jurors before whom he pled, "Unum perfugium, judices, una spes reliqua est Sex. Roscio, eadem quae reipublicae, vestra pristina bonitas et misericordia—quae si manet, salvi etiam nunc esse possumus,"—"There is one refuge, one hope left for Sex. Roscius, the same as that of the state—your well-tried integrity and compassion; and if this remain, we may even now be safe." Such was the orator's confidence in the jurors before whom Sex. Roscius was tried. When he says, then: "*Si suscipitis* id, *si* idcirco *sedetis*," if ye undertake that, if ye sit in court for this purpose (ut proscriptorum liberi quavis ratione tollantur), "that the children of the proscribed may be despatched on any pretext whatever," he *does not*, as Grotefend would say, convey no intimation at all of the likelihood or non-likelihood of their constituting themselves into a court

to condemn the innocent offspring of the proscribed, but he assumes the likelihood of that result for a moment, that he may have a parting opportunity of warning them, "per deos immortales cavete ne nova et multo crudelior per vos proscriptio instaurata esse videatur,"—"By the ever-living gods, beware lest a new and much more sanguinary system seem to be introduced by you." Grotefend only in this last case ventures on something like a defence of the interpretation of this passage in his favour. He states, "If Cicero had said, 'Si vos id suscipiatis,' he would have conveyed a doubt of the justice and impartiality of the judges." So far from this being the case, in accordance with the true nature of that mood, the subjunctive would just have intimated that the likelihood of their constituting themselves into a court for the condemnation of the innocent was extremely improbable. Even if these four cases could have borne the construction placed on them by Grotefend, the basis would not have been broad enough to bear the superstructure he has ventured to build on them. His induction is as partial as his principle of interpretation is perverse.

But it is not Grotefend only among German scholars that holds opinions regarding the functions of *si* in the grammatical economy, the reverse of what are right. A greater than he is found in the person of Albertus Forbiger. The repute of this scholar is so remarkable in his own country, that his commentaries are reproduced word for word in this country, and his editions of the Classics form the basis of ours. An edition of

Lucretius, published lately in Glasgow, was a reprint of his. The edition of Virgil, issued in 1855 by the Messrs. Griffin, publishers to the University of Glasgow (under the superintendence of Mr. Bryce of the High School of Edinburgh), was based on the third edition of Forbiger.

In that work, on line 603, *Æneid*, book i.,—

> Di tibi si qua pios respectant numina, *si* quid
> Usquam justitia *est*, et mens sibi conscia recti
> Præmia digna ferant :

The following note, translated from the commentary of Forbiger, occurs :—"The other reading, *justitiæ*, would mean, 'If there is any justice on earth,' a doubt which would ill come from Æneas at the time when he had a most distinct evidence of its existence by Dido." The common reading may be the correct reading, but certainly not for the reason here assigned, since it conveys as much doubt as the one here rejected; that is, none at all. The supposition introduced by *si*, in the line quoted above, is hypothetical only in form. It excludes doubt with all the force of which emphasis is capable, by invoking the almost universal and unanimous belief of mankind in the existence of a divinity which recognises and rewards what is right, and by appealing to the testimony of conscience, echo of the voice of God within the breast of man. The following additional examples from the same poet furnish similar usages of *si* with the indicative, and illustrate its peculiar force :—

At tibi pro scelere, exclamat, pro talibus ausis
Di *si* qua *est* cœlo pietas, quæ talia curet,
Persolvant grates dignas, et præmia reddant
Debita : qui nati coram me cernere lethum
Fecisti et patrios fœdasti funere vultus.
Æneid, ii. 535.

But if, he exclaims, there is any sympathy in Heaven to take cognizance of such things, may the gods, in retaliation for your guilt, such daring enormities, mete out recompense fit, and pay to the full the price you deserve, who hast caused me to behold with mine own eyes the death of my son.

Does *si*, with the indicative here, according to Grotefend, "carry no intimation with respect to the speaker's opinion," or, according to Forbiger, imply "a doubt?"

Si bene quid de te *merui*, *fuit* aut tibi quidquam
Dulce meum, miserere domus labentis; et istam,
Oro, si quis adhuc precibus locus, exue mentem.
Æneid, iv. 317.

If I have any good claim on you, or if any charm of mine has pleased you, pity the falling fortunes of my house, and if there is still any room for prayers, forego that resolution of yours.

Whether Dido had any claim on Æneas or no, may be learned from Æneas' own admission at line 333 of this book:—

Ego te, quæ plurima fando
Enumerare vales, nunquam, regina, negabo
Promeritam.

O queen! I will never deny that you can establish your claim to the many services you reckon up in your speech.

What Dido herself thought on this point may be learned from line 375:

Ejectum, littore egentem Excepi, et regni demens in parte locavi: Amissam classem socios a morte reduxi.	I took you up a beggar, an outcast on my shore, and in my folly shared with you my crown. I recovered your missing fleet, and rescued your comrades from death.

Does "*si* quid de te *merui*," in the first of these quotations, explained and illustrated by the two following ones, "carry no intimation with respect to the speaker's opinion," or does it imply a doubt? He must be a bold man who says so—a German of the Germans—exciting the emotions produced by the spectacle of a hero struggling with an adverse fate.

O fortunatos nimium, sua *si* bona *norint*, Agricolas! quibus ipsa, procul discordibus armis Fundit humus facilem victum justissima tellus. *Si* non ingentem foribus domus alta superbis Mane salutantum totis *vomit* ædibus undam; At secura quies, et nescia fallere vita, Dives opum variarum. *Georgics*, ii. 459.	O happy swains, if they knew their own blessings, to whom far from the din of war, the earth in due abundance spontaneously yields her ready stores. If a stately mansion with lordly entrance does not discharge from its interior a stream of morning retainers, yet theirs is rest in perfect peace, and a life unknown to guile, rich in countless resources.

Few passages furnish fitter illustrations of the respective functions of *si* with the indicative and subjunctive moods than the passage here adduced. *Si*, with the indicative, introduces the hypothetical statement of an actual fact, with the subjunctive it introduces a hypothetical statement inconsistent with fact. In the former case, the supposition and the reality are one and the same thing; in the latter case, the supposition is the reverse of the reality. In "Sua si bona norint," *si* implies that husbandmen do not know the full value of their blessings. The famous line of Gray, "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise," finds no confirmation here. Their ignorance is *not* bliss, there could be no folly in being wise. "Si non vomit," in opposition to Grotefend, *does* "carry an intimation with respect to the speaker's opinion," and, in opposition to Forbiger, implies *no* "doubt."

Fortunati ambo! *si* quid mea carmina *possunt*,	Happy pair, if my lays possess any vitality, no lapse
Nulla dies unquam memori vos eximet ævo,	of time will ever efface you from the remembrance of
Dum domus Æneæ Capitoli immobile saxum	posterity, so long as the descendants of Æneas shall
Accolet, imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.	dwell on the everlasting munition of the Capitol, and
Æneid, ix. 446.	the founder of Rome exercise his rule.

When it is said that *si* with the indicative here, "*Si* quid mea carmina *possunt*" proclaims and proves Virgil's belief and firm assurance of the destined immortality of

his fame, it may be gainsaid on the ground that this interpretation is inconsistent with the reputed modesty of the poet. But surely if ever it was pardonable, if not praiseworthy, to cherish that "last infirmity of noble minds," it was surely pardonable on this occasion. Life was once granted by a Roman Emperor to a felon when implored by a fellow-man. It is only when he desires to perpetuate the fame of others that Virgil dares to predict his own. He knew well (a truth odd, yet still orthodox) that no man so far forgets himself as when he speaks of himself. It is not till the current of narrative, in this exquisite episode, in praise of two youthful warriors, fired by the chivalrous love of high adventure, has swelled into a torrent flood of impetuous song, into which the poet has poured all his tenderness and all his strength, and the music of its mighty sweep is still resounding in his ears, that he once, and once only, gives utterance to the conviction that his is a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεὶ—"a work which posterity will not willingly let die." Here is the heroism of humility. Self is secondary and subordinate to the subject of the poet.

Ovid, at the close of the *Metamorphoses*, reviewing the field he has traversed, employs *si* with the indicative in a manner more direct and decided still :—

Jamque opus exegi, quod nec Jovis ira nec ignis	And now I have completed a work which neither the
Nec poterit ferrum nec edax abolere vetustas.	wrath of Jove, nor lightning, nor the sword, nor
Quum volet, illa dies, quae nil nisi corporis hujus	the corrosive lapse of time will be able to destroy.

Jus habet, incerti spatium mihi finiat aevi :
Parte tamen meliore mei super alta perennis
Astra ferar, nomenque erit indelebile nostrum.
Quaque patet domitis Romana potentia terris,
Ore legar populi, perque omnia sæcula fama,
Si quid *habent* veri vatum praesagia, vivam.

Let that day, which has no power save over this body, terminate the span of this mortal life when it pleases ; yet, in virtue of my nobler part, I shall be borne aloft immortal above the stars, and leave an imperishable name. Wherever the power of Rome extends over the subjugated globe, I shall be eagerly read by the people, and if the predictions of poets contain any truth, through all ages I shall live on the lips of men.

If it be maintained that the poet, after the utterance of these proud prophetic words, in bringing to a close a work which, from the intellect exercised, and ingenuity expended on its execution, was evidently desired and designed to be his masterpiece, in laying the last stone on the monument destined to preserve and perpetuate his fame, "implied nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion" or "doubt," by using *si* with the indicative, then it must be admitted as universally true that language was given to "conceal, and not to reveal, the thoughts of men ;" that language must be interpreted according to the rule of contraries ; that Lady Mary Montague's proposal to erase "not" from the commandments was not at all necessary, seeing that *no* means *yes*.

Again, a similar usage occurs in Ovid's Autobiography, line 129 :—

Si quid hab*ent* igitur vatum præsagia veri
Protinus ut moriar non ero, terra, tuus.

If, therefore, the predictions of poets contain any truth, so soon as I die I will not become, O earth, thy prey.

The pointed character of this language precludes the possibility of either suspension of "opinion" or "doubt."

Again, *Amores*, book iii. Elegy 9, line 59 :—

Si tamen e nobis aliquid nisi nomen et umbra
Res*tat*, in Elysia valle Tibullus erit.

If, however, aught remains of us save a shadow and a name, Tibullus will live in the plains of Elysium.

Ovid was as ready to concede to a brother poet what he claimed for himself—an immortality of fame. So it is not true, as some one has alleged, that poets, like pikes, are the only specimens of their species that devour each other.

Further: Book i. of the *Tristium*, Elegy 2, line 97 :—

Si tamen acta deos numquam mortalia *fallunt*,
A culpa facinus scitis abesse mea.

If, however, the deeds of men never elude the gods, you know for a fact that crime does not attach to my fault.

And far away from his native city, with no other

arbiters to appeal to, he cites the gods as witnesses that he had done nothing to deserve his doom—banishment to the bleak shores of the Black Sea. Is it possible that *si* in "*si* mortalia nunquam deos *fallunt*" "implies nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion," or any "doubt?"

In the same book, and next Elegy, line 25, occurs the passage :—

Si licet exemplis in parvo grandibus uti,	If one may employ in humble themes great pre-
Haec facies Trojae, cum caperetur, erat.	cedents, such was the appearance of Troy when it was sacked.

With reference to this practice, Virgil, *Ec.* i. 25, says :—

Sic parvis componere magna solebam.	Thus I was wont to compare great things with small.

And a modern poet Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book vi. line 310 :—

"Such as (*to set forth*
Great things by small) if, nature's concord broke,
Among the constellations war were sprung.
Two planets rushing from aspect malign
Of fiercest opposition, in mid sky
Should combat and their jarring spheres confound."

Virgil and Milton altogether dispense, it will be observed, with the hypothetical particle *si*—if—in comparing great things with small; and hence it may be inferred

that Ovid by *si* with the indicative *did* "imply something with respect to the speaker's opinion," without any "doubt."

The next poet I cite is Catullus, than whom no Roman author conveys a more distinct impression to the reader's mind by force and felicity of expression.

Si tu oblitus es, at dii meminerunt, meminit Fides,
Quæ te ut pœniteat postmodo facti faciat tui.
Carmen 30.

If you have forgotten, yet the gods remember. Truth remembers, which will afterwards cause thee to feel remorse for thy deed.

The poet has been complaining of the broken vows of a friend. Does *si* here "carry no opinion with it with regard to the speaker's opinion," or imply any "doubt?"

Again, Carmen Nuptiale, line 18.

Puellae.

Hespere, qui cælo fertur crudelior ignis?
Qui natam possis complexu avellere matris,
Complexu matris retinentem avellere natam
Et juveni ardenti castam donare puellam.
Quid faciunt hostes capta crudelius urbe?

Maidens.

O star of even, what light in the sky is reputed to be more cruel than yours, since you can bear to tear a daughter from the embrace of her mother, a *reluctant* daughter from the embrace of her mother, and bestow a pure maiden on an impetuous youth? What greater outrage does the enemy perpetrate in the sack of a city?

Juvenes.	*Youths.*
At libet innuptis ficto te carpere quæstu.	Well, it pleases virgins to chide you with pretended
Quid tum, *si carpunt*, tacita quem mente requirunt ?	displeasure. What matters it then, if they chide you,
Hymen O Hymenæ, Hymen ades O Hymenæ.	whom secretly in their heart they desire ?

It may be within the limits of possibility to read the part of the maidens in this amoibean poem, and then assert that "si carpunt," in the response of the youths, "carries with it no intimation of the speaker's opinion," or that it implies "doubt." It may also be within the limits of possibility that a person at noon, under a blazing sun, should say, "There is no light;" but in that case there would be a defect in the eyesight rather than in the evidence.

Again, in the marriage song of Peleus and Thetis, line 131 :—

Sicci ne me patriis avectam, perfide, ab oris	Have you thus, O treacherous, treacherous Theseus,
Perfide, deserto liquisti in litore, Theseu ?	borne me away from my father's house, and left me
Siccine discedens neglecto numine divum	on this desolate shore ? Do you, departing thus, despise
Immemor ah devota domum perjuria portas ?	the will of Heaven ; and, alas ! forgetful of me, carry
Nullane res potuit crudelis flectere mentis	home broken oaths to your ruin ? Could no considera-
Consilium ? tibi nulla fuit clementia præsto,	tion bend your cruel determination ? hadst thou no

Inmite ut nostri vellet miserescere pectus?
Si tibi non cordi *fuerant* connubia nostra,
Saeva quod horrebas prisci præcepta parentis,
At tamen in vestras potuisti ducere sedes,
Quæ tibi jocundo famularer serva labore
Candida permulcens liquidis vestigia lymphis
Purpureaque tuum consternens veste cubile.

compassion, so that thy pitiless breast might have been disposed to commiserate me? If marriage with me had not been agreeable to you, because you dreaded the commands of your stern father, yet at least you could have taken me to your abode, who, as a slave, would have tended you with cheerful devotion, washing thy snowy feet with pure water, and covering thy couch with costly robes.

Had Grotefend ever read this passage, and reading had remembered it, he never would have written his rule on *si*. Ariadne, in "*si fuerant*," etc., "indicates her meaning" without any "doubt," in a manner not to be mistaken, and in a manner as memorable as Vanessa ever wrote to Dean Swift, or Eloisa to Abelard.

Again, Carmen 76, line 1:—

Siqua recordanti benefacta priora voluptas
Est homini, cum se cogitat esse pium,
Nec sanctam violasse fidem, nec foedere in ullo

If a man derives any pleasure from the remembrance of past deeds of mercy, when he reflects that he is dutiful, and has neither broken a sacred promise, nor in any

Divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines,	contract trifled with the majesty of Heaven, to deceive men,
Multa parata manent in longa ætate Catulle.	many blessings remain in store for thee, O Catullus, in thy old age.

The partiality of partisanship is so perverse and peculiar as to have passed into a proverb. Blind with bigotry, it sees only with one eye, but that eye is by no means "single." To this characteristic the partisanship of theory forms no exception. Facts which have their foundation in truth are so marshalled as to lead to a foregone conclusion, the scales of justice cease to be held with an impartial hand, the clear gaze of judicial vision is overcast by the mists of prejudice whenever the propounders or propagators of a false theory—intelligent and impartial on other points—begin to treat their favourite theme. A change as complete and conspicuous comes over their faculties, as in the case of a monomaniac, otherwise sound, when allusion is made to his cherished delusion. Few, however, even in support of a false but favourite theory, would venture to dispute the common connexion (here expressed by Catullus with *si* and the indicative—"*Si* qua recordanti benefacta voluptas *est* homini")—that the consciousness of good deeds is a source of solid satisfaction. So writers ancient, mediæval, and modern, sacred and profane, have thought and taught from the beginning of time. Here is the deliverance of Job on the point, one whose antiquity on all hands is admitted to be very great,—"When the

ear heard me, then it blessed me: Because I delivered the poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to help him. The blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me;"—and the myriad-minded Shakespere—

" The quality of mercy is not strained,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blessed,
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes."

According to the poet Gray the reward of the good is above all others:—

" What is grandeur? what is power?
Heavier toil, superior pain.
What the bright reward we gain?
The grateful memory of the good.
Sweet is the breath of vernal showers,
The bees collected treasure sweet,
Sweet music's melting fall, but sweeter far
The still small voice of gratitude."

If *si* with the indicative in the passage quoted above from Catullus, " indicates either nothing with regard to his opinion," on the pleasure derived from deeds of mercy, or implies any " doubt," one does not very clearly see how in either case he could consequently and confidently declare that the possession of a pleasant old age awaited him; or indeed draw any conclusion whatever.

At the 17th line of the same piece occurs the following passage:—

O di, *si* vestrum *est* misereri, aut *si* quibus unquam
Extremam jam ipsa morte *tulistis* opem,
Me miserum aspicite (et, si vitam puriter egi)
Eripite hanc pestem perniciemque mihi.

O ye gods, if it is your prerogative to pity, or if ever to any ye have rendered the last office in the very jaws of death, look with favour on me in my misfortune, and if I have spent a virtuous life, rescue me from this fiend and destroyer.

In these four lines there are no fewer than three instances of *si* with the indicative mood. From the intensity of the poet's feelings, at first sight it is not likely that he would either use any word "without indicating any opinion," or intimating "doubt."

As to the first instance,—

"O di *si* vestrum *est* misereri,"

there was no Baal among the Romans, requiring his votaries or victims to slash themselves with knives to propitiate his favour.

Moloch—"Horrid king besmeared with blood,
Of human sacrifice and parent's tears,"

had no place in the Roman Pantheon. The worship of Juggernaut was not the worship of Jove. Without any great strain of logic, or any great stretch of imagination, it may be admitted that Catullus here has indicated his "opinion" or belief in the compassion of the gods.

As to the second usage of *si* in this passage,—

"*Si* quibus *tulistis* opem," etc.,

Catullus, who was a fine Greek scholar, called "doctus," the learned, by Horace, *Sat.* ix. 19; Tibullus, lib. iii. vi. 41; Ovid, *Am.* iii. 9. 61; Martial, i. 62; must have been familiar with those passages in the *Iliad*, where the Grecian warriors were rescued by the direct intervention of the gods. Further evidence on this point—the firm belief of the intervention of the gods in imminent danger and death—is supplied by Horace, who, in the same ode, speaks of his own deliverance from death and that of his friend Mæcenas, Ode ii. 18 :—

"Te Jovis impio
Tutela Saturno refulgens
Eripuit, volucrisque fati
Tardavit alas."

Thee, the guardianship of Jove, shining in opposition to Saturn, rescued from his baleful influence, and stopped the wings of swift destiny.

Me truncus illapsus cerebro Sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum Dextra levasset, Mercurialium Custos virorum.	Me a tree falling on my head would have killed, had not Faunus by his right hand turned aside the stroke —guardian of poets.

As to the last usage of *si* in this passage,—

"Si vitam puriter egi,"

That it cannot be said that Catullus indicated "nothing" with respect to his opinion on this point, or that he had a doubt, is settled by the last line of the poem: "O dii

reddite me hoc pro pietate mea,"—" O, ye gods, grant me this in return for my devotion."

The last passage I quote from Catullus at this stage of the argument, is the short piece, No. 102 :—

Si quicquam tacito commissum est fido ab amico,	If aught at any time has been intrusted by a faithful friend to one who can keep a secret, whose truthfulness has been thoroughly tested, me also you will find initiated into their mysteries, and must believe to have become the very god of silence.
Cujus sit penitus nota fides animi,	
Meque esse invenies illorum jure sacratum,	
Corneli, et factum me esse puta Harpocratem.	

If Grotefend's view with regard to *si* with the indicative mood be correct, then Catullus must have thought that the best way to win the confidence of his friend, and become the depositary of his secret, was to cite a precedent for a similar act, but without intimating whether it was authentic or apocryphal. If, according to Forbiger, he had any " doubt" on the matter—the inviolability of a secret—then he must never have read or heard about his countryman, Mucius, who, rather than betray a secret to the enemy of his country, would have burned his hand till it was black as a coal.

But lest it be alleged that the poets are not competent judges of the point in dispute, inasmuch as they are partially restricted in the free use of speech by the requirements of metre, I cite the testimony of the great

masters of prose. And first of all Cicero, commonly regarded as the purest model of Latinity. Lest the passages cited should seem forced or far-fetched, the following five are taken from the speeches against Catiline, by far the shortest of Cicero's oratorial efforts:—

Etenim *is* summi viri et clarissimi cives Saturnini et Gracchorum et Flacci et superiorum complurium sanguine non modo se non *contaminarunt*, sed etiam honestarunt, certe mihi verendum non erat, ne quid hoc parricida civium interfecto invidiæ (mihi) in posteritatem redundaret.

i. 12.

For if the most exalted men and distinguished citizens not only did not stain themselves with the blood of Saturninus, the Gracchi, Flacci, and several others of a previous age, but even dignified themselves, assuredly I had no reason to fear lest by putting to death this murderer of fellow citizens, any odium should attach to me for the future.

The pointed and peculiar phraseology employed here —"si modo non contaminarunt, sed etiam honestarunt"—marking the two steps by which the orator rises in the scale of emphatic assertion, indicates, in a manner too manifest to be mistaken, that *si* with the indicative *does* "intimate something with respect to the speaker's opinion," without any "doubt." Cicero in another part of his works (*De Am.* c. 12) represents T. Gracchus aspiring to fill the throne of Tarquin. Brutus, over the bleeding body of Lucretia, swore that none who bore the hated name of Tarquin, nor any one else, should

ever reign at Rome. A second Brutus towards the close of the great drama of the Roman Republic, on the memorable Ides of March, showed that the stern sentiments of the early age of the Commonwealth had lost none of their strength by the length of time, and that the killing of a usurper was counted no murder.

Et *si* non minus nobis jucundi atque illustres sunt ii dies, quibus conservamur, quod salutis certa laetitia est, nascendi incerta conditio, et quod sine sensu nascimur, cum voluptate servamur; profecto, quoniam illum, qui hanc urbem condidit, ad deos immortales benevolentia famaque sustulimus, esse apud vos posterosque vestros in honore debebit is, qui eandem hanc urbem conditam amplificatamque servavit.

iii. 1.

And if those days, on which we are rescued from ruin are not less delightful to us and noteworthy than those on which we are born, because the joy of preservation is real, while the circumstances of birth are precarious, and because we are born without consciousness, while we are rescued with a sense of pleasure, assuredly since we have raised to the rank of the celestials him who founded this city, because of the renown of his good deeds, that man must be held in high consideration by you and your descendants, who hath rescued it from ruin after its foundation and extension.

Cicero having asserted that the joy of preservation is a realized joy, and the condition which birth determines is a precarious condition, it will scarcely be maintained that, in introducing by *si* with the indicative, a hypothetical comparison as to the relative pleasure derived from the contemplation of these two events, "nothing is intimated with respect to his own opinion regarding them,"—

> "This, once believed, 'twere logic misapplied
> To prove a consequence by none denied."

The next two passages are furnished by the same chapter. Orat. iii. cap. 12.

Sed quoniam earum rerum, quas ego gessi, non eadem est fortuna atque conditio, quae illorum, qui externa bella gesserunt, quod mihi vivendum est, cum iis, quos vici ac subegi, illi hostes aut interfectos aut oppressos reliquerunt, vestrum est, Quirites, *si* caeteris recte facta sua *prosunt*, mihi mea ne quando obsint providere.

But since the nature and character of those affairs which I have administered are not the same as of those who have conducted foreign wars, because I must live with those whom I have conquered and subdued: (while) they have left behind them their foe either slain or overthrown, it is your part, Romans, if all other men's services prove advantageous to them, to take measures, lest mine at any time should prove a source of harm to me.

Is it possible, or even probable, that Cicero, after having thus contrasted the condition of other men with his own, the career of consuls and pro-consuls in the distant dependencies of the East, whose course of conquest was completed without being embittered either by the envy of private enmity, or embarrassed by the combinations of public faction, should introduce a hypothesis, as to whether the deeds of such men proved of any avail to them, "without intimating any opinion at all" as to such a probability, or that he should hint any hesitation or "doubt" on the matter? The belief "that their services did naturally profit all other men," gave point to the request that his countrymen "should see that his services proved no stumbling-block to him."

Illud perficiam profecto, Quirites, ut ea, quae gessi in consulatu, privatus tuear atque ornem; ut, *si* qua *est* invidia in conservanda republica suscepta, laedat invidos, mihi valeat ad gloriam.	That result, O Romans, I will assuredly realize—to sustain and dignify that character, which I bore in my consulship; so that if any odium has been incurred in the salvation of the state, it may injure those with whom it has originated, it may redound to my renown.

There is scarcely a page in these orations against Catiline in which Cicero does not declare that he had incurred odium and prejudice, because of the policy he had pursued against the conspirators. And in the last

sentence but one before that just quoted with *si*, he says unconditionally, "Qui se pro salute vestra obtulerint *invidiae* periculis que omnibus;" so that it can scarcely be said with any probability or propriety that, in saying, "*Si* qua *est* invidia in conservanda republica suscepta," he intimated "nothing with respect to his opinion," or entertained any "doubt."

Cicero knew that no government could be carried on without incurring the odium of its opponents. He now felt the full force of that fact from personal experience, and by employing a hypothesis in form, he did not give to it the least emphatic and effective expression. That great law of action and reaction, as true in morals as in mechanics, so uniform and universal in its operation, which Herodotus would have ascribed to the gods' jealousy of men, to Fortune raising her favourite, like the wrestler his antagonist, only that his fall might be the more signal and the more swift, was about to exhibit Cicero as a most conspicuous example of its power. The rapidity of the rush of popular feeling in one direction was not more remarkable than the rapidity of the recoil in the other. Already the straws were beginning to drift before the wind; already the deliverer of his country could discern, looming in the haze of the political horizon, the signs of that storm which was destined to drive him in dishonour from Rome.

The last passage to be adduced from Cicero is Orat. iv. in Cat., cap. i.:—

Nam neque turpis mors For neither can a dishon-

forti viro accidere potest neque immatura consulari, nec misera sapienti.

ourable death fall to the lot of a brave man, nor a premature one to a consul, nor an unhappy one to a wise man.

There is no *si* here; but in reference to this passage, Cicero in another speech (Phil. ii. cap. 46) says :—

Etenim *si* abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo *negavi* posse mortem immaturam esse consulari, quanto verius nunc negabo seni.

For if almost twenty years ago, in this very temple, I declared that death could not happen prematurely to me when consul, with how much more truth shall I make that statement now in my old age.

There is need here neither of lengthened demonstration nor illustration. By comparing the two passages, it will be seen that the substance of the statements contained in them is the same; and whether Cicero, before making the latter, had refreshed his recollection by referring to the speech containing the former, or relied solely on the remembrance of its original delivery, in neither case can it be said, with probability or propriety, that, in introducing the supposition with *si*, he intimated "nothing as to his own opinion," or implied any "doubt" on the point.

The last author from whom it is deemed necessary or desirable to select a series of passages subversive of the deliverances of Grotefend and Forbiger, relative to *si*, is

Livy. Since the historian of Patavium is not less luminous in his language than voluminous in his writings, I shall limit myself to the first book of his history. In his Preface he says :—

Et, *si* cui populo licere *oportuit* consecrare origines suas, et ad deos referre auctores; ea belli gloria est populo Romano, ut, quum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanæ patiantur aequo animo, quam imperium patiuntur.

And if any people ought to be allowed to represent their origin as divine, and attribute it to the agency of the gods, the Romans are that people; for such is the military renown they have acquired, that, while they represent Mars in preference to all others as their father, and the father of their founder Romulus, the nations of the earth admit this claim as meekly as they submit to the supremacy of their rule.

Nothing is more notorious in nations or individuals than pride of birth or belief in blood. The opinion, whether orthodox or no (Gibbon, the historian of the "Decline and Fall," defends it on profound philosophical principles; while the farmer, on agricultural principles, considers that in this case, as in others, the older the seed the worse the crop), is old enough. The origin of the opinion is lost in obscurity. Its operation is visible from the time that Prince Ascanius ruled in Alba Longa

to the time of Prince Albert. Livy, in saying hypothetically, "if any people ought to be allowed to represent their origin as divine," that people was the Romans, was magnifying the greatness of his theme, and gratifying the national pride of his countrymen, and stated as plainly in prose, though hypothetically, as Virgil did in verse, when, in the national poem of the *Æneid*, to exalt the glory of the Julian line, he represented it as sprung in direct descent from Iulus, grandson of the goddess Venus.

Tum, lituo in laevam manum translato, dextra in caput Numæ imposita, precatus est ita, "Jupiter, pater, *si est fas* hunc Numam Pompilium, cujus ego caput teneo, regem Romæ esse; uti tu signa nobis certa ad clarassis inter eos fines, quos feci."

Chapter 18.

Then, having shifted his staff to his left hand, and having laid his right on the head of Numa, the soothsayer thus prayed: "O, Father Jove, if it is thy will that Numa Pompilius here, whose head I hold, should be king at Rome, grant, I pray, clear intimations within those boundaries which I have marked."

Livy, at the commencement of the chapter from which this extract is taken, having stated that the repute of Numa for piety was great, in the middle of the chapter having stated that Numa was raised to the throne by the unanimous (omnes ad unum) voice of the Senators, and at its close, that the omens for which the soothsayer had prayed were sent, could scarcely, by

putting these words, "*Si* fas *est* hunc Numam regem ipse Romæ," into the mouth of the soothsayer, have meant that the speaker intimated "nothing with respect to his own opinion," whether it was the will of Heaven that Numa should be King at Rome or no, or that he had any "doubt" on the subject. Doubt in the priest would not have been becoming after the decision of the people.

Ibi infit Albanus, "Injurias, et non redditas res ex fœdere, quæ repetitæ sint, et ego regem nostrum Cluilium, causam hujusce esse belli, audiisse videor: nec te dubito, Tulle, eadem præ te ferre. Sed, *si* vera potius, quam dictu speciosa, dicenda *sunt*, cupido imperii duos cognatos vicinosque populos ad arma stimulat."

Chapter 23.

Then the Alban commences the interview: "Methinks I have heard that our king Cluilius alleged that wrongs, and the non-redress of wrongs, which was demanded, was the cause of this war; and I don't question, O Tullus, that you make the same allegation. But if it is incumbent to tell the truth rather than to make plausible insinuations, the desire of dominion drives two kindred and victorious states to war."

Whether the speaker, in introducing the hypothesis, "if the truth must be told," indicated "nothing as to his own opinion," or intimated any "doubt," I shall express no opinion, but follow the example of the Bible

Society, leaving the "truth," without note or comment, to tell its own tale.

Tuum est, inquit, Servi, *si* vir *es* regnum; non eorum, qui alienis manibus pessimum facinus fecere. *Chapter* 41.	The throne is thine, O Servius, if you are a man; not theirs, who, by others' hands, have perpetrated an infamous deed.

The circumstances under which these words were delivered were these:—Tarquinius Priscus, the fifth King of Rome, had, at the instigation of the sons of Ancus Marcius, whose successor he had been appointed (while they were disappointed), fallen by the hands of an assassin. His surviving consort, a second Semiramis, with a genius for government like that of Catharine de Medici, or Catharine of Russia, resolved that the throne to which she had raised her husband should remain in the possession of her son (in-law). This being the second time she had engaged in the game of king-making, it is not at all likely that she would show herself less remarkable for the readiness and richness of her resources, or perform her part less to perfection than she had done on the occasion of her first attempt. The success with which Tarquinius Priscus had filled the throne of Romulus, justified her sagacity in stimulating him to aspire to the loftiest summit of earthly ambition. While Servius was still a boy, she saw that the "boy was father of the man," and predicted that one day he would prove the protector of that family into which he had been adopted. Now that his character had been tried by the best test

of all—the test of time—is it likely that Tanaquil would have urged Servius to gather up in his grasp the fallen reins of government, and guide the chariot of the State to its goal, if she had "no opinion" as to his being a man ("*si* vir *es*"), or had any doubt on the subject? Scarcely. The sequel showed her sagacity. Servius was not only the greatest of Roman sovereigns, but also the greatest of Roman statesmen.

Romani, *si* unquam ante alias ullo in bello *fuit*, quod primum diis immortalibus gratias ageretis, deinde vestrae ipsorum virtuti, hesternum id prœlium fuit. *Chapter* 28.

Romans! if ever before on any other occasion, in any war, there was reason why you should first of all give thanks to the immortal gods, and then to your own valour, it was the battle of yesterday.

The connexion between the conditional and consequent clauses of this proposition is so close, the conclusion of the latter depends so much on the belief of the condition contained in the former, that if it be said that "*si* unquam fuit" intimates "nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion," then it may be said that the premises in a process of reasoning may be dispensed with altogether, as not at all necessary to the conclusion to be drawn. In the 12th chapter of this book, Livy, in relating the war between the Romans and the Sabines, represents the former as rallying after their rout, and at last repelling the latter (Restitere Romani tanquam coelesti voce jussi), in reliance on their own valour, and

the assistance of the immortal gods; so that there is neither indecision nor doubt involved in the supposition introduced by *si* here—"*Si* unquam *fuit* quod gratias ageretis."

The following passage from an eloquent modern writer illustrates the one quoted above :—"France might truly mourn over his grave, and weep as she had never wept before for citizen or for king; for *if* ever she *had* a sovereign to whom her wellbeing was dear, and who lived and laboured to promote it—*if* ever she had a sovereign on her throne that was every inch a Frenchman—*if* ever a king of France incarnated that love of glory and gaiety by which Frenchmen are distinguished —*it was* Henry IV."

Examples of usages of *si* subversive of the theories of Grotefend and Forbiger are almost endless. To enumerate them would be to exhaust the patience without exhausting the subject. It is hoped that the point at issue has been already determined by evidence sufficient in amount and satisfactory in character. To make, however, assurance doubly sure, the two following passages are cited from different authors, which could not have been more conclusive and decisive, though they had been composed expressly and exclusively to refute the theories of Grotefend and Forbiger. The first is from Nepos, *Hannibal,* cap. i :—

Si verum *est,* quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes vir-	If it is true, which no one questions, that the Roman people surpassed all other

tute superavit, non est infitiandum, Hannibalem tanto praestitisse caeteros imperatores prudentia, quanto populus Romanus antecedat fortitudine cæteras nationes.

nations in valour, it cannot be denied that Hannibal by so much excelled all other generals, by how much the Roman people excels all other nations.

The second passage is from Tacitus, *Agricola*, chapter 46 :—

Si quis piorum manibus locus, *si*, ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore *extinguuntur* magnae animæ, placide quiescas, nosque domum tuam, ab infirmo desiderio et muliebribus lamentis ad contemplationem virtutum tuarum voces, quas neque lugeri neque plangi fas est.

If there is any (resting) place for the shades of the blessed; if, according to the opinion of the wise, the souls of the great are not annihilated with the body, may you rest in peace, and call us, thy family, away from idle regret and womanish lamentations to the contemplation of thy good qualities, which ought neither to be mourned nor bewailed.

These two passages have both the common characteristic, that while the authors employ *si* with the indicative to indicate their belief in the truth of the supposition introduced by that conjunction, they append an additional assertion to that effect, unaccompanied by any condition or qualification whatever. If Dr. Johnson had been

conducting such an argument, and had not succeeded in satisfying or silencing his opponent, he would have said, "I am bound, Sir, to find you a reason; I am not bound to find you an understanding." That Grotefend and Forbiger should carefully have studied the different usages of *si*, should have given to the world these theories as the result of their investigations, and that their errors should have been so long in being detected and corrected, would, to borrow an illustration from the subject itself, have been almost an impossibility in supposition, had it not been a reality in fact.

The first and fundamental condition of reasoning is that the same meaning be attached by both sides to the terms under dispute. The meaning attached hitherto in this argument to the term "opinion," is the ordinary, obvious, and perhaps orthodox one, viz., a belief grounded and founded on fact. According to that definition, it is hoped, by the united force of demonstration and illustration, that the conclusion has been reached, that *si* with the indicative *does*—the very reverse of what Grotefend represents—*intimate* something with respect to the speaker's opinion, and very often, in opposition to the tenet of Forbiger, implies no "doubt" at all. But it may be said, the German critic, Grotefend, would not have been bound by the definition given above. Difference of definition makes all the difference in the world. Nothing is more natural, and indeed necessary, than that two antagonists in an argument, starting from the same point, should arrive at different conclusions, and yet each be right according to the sense he attached to the term from which he started.

The Rev. Sidney Smith was once charged by a clerical brother with want of piety. The reverend defender replied by retorting the charge on the reverend accuser. To the accuser the defence of abuses that had existed from time immemorial seemed to be the true test of piety ; while to the defender the true test of piety seemed to be the destruction of these abuses. To each, therefore, according to his notion of piety, by the most legitimate and logical deduction, the other appeared to have led a most ungodly life. Perhaps Grotefend may have used the term opinion in the philosophical rather than in the popular sense (though neither his translator nor editor seems to have thought so, as they attach neither note nor comment to that effect), that is to say, in the metaphysical or transcendental sense. Some might think that if two senses are capable of being attached to the same rule, neither can be common sense, and that a preceptor propounding a rule to his pupils, susceptible of two interpretations, pursues a course, if not so perilous, at least as preposterous, as a physician giving a dubious prescription to his patient, or a general issuing a dubious order to his cavalry charging the enemy. Such a conclusion would be too hasty and too harsh. Account must be taken of the peculiarities incident to German forms of thought, and allowance must be made for the loss one language almost invariably and inevitably sustains in process of transmutation into another.

Anxious that Grotefend should have full justice done to him, that he should have the benefit of the metaphysical interpretation of the term "opinion," I am quite

willing to consider his rule relative to *si* and the indicative with this modification. And lest misrepresentation of an opponent—an error of a wicked heart; a contingency not less impossible in the conduct of an argument, than misapprehension of the meaning of an opponent; an error of a weak head—should occur, I will endeavour to give an exposition of Grotefend's canon from a continental point of view, and one such as would satisfy a scholar familiar with all the forms of modern metaphysical German speculation, following the example of a well-known debater, who stated his antagonist's arguments so strongly, that his own supporters entertained grave apprehensions that he would not be able to answer them.

When Grotefend says that the indicative with *si* "implies nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion," his meaning may be, that the indicative expresses something, the truth of which is considered as not dependent on the writer's wish, desire, opinion—opinion being taken here by Grotefend in the sense of the Platonic δόξα as opposed to ἐπιστήμη—or on any hypothetical supposition, but is absolute, objective, not subjective. The sense here attached to "opinion" is a favourite one with the Germans, who are accustomed to ring changes on absolute and finite, objective and subjective, just as Plato rang changes on δόξα and οὐσια.

In the wide world of thought over which the empire of the human understanding extends, and on which it expends the energy of its imperial power, there are many subjects of inquiry which, bearing but a remote refer-

ence to questions of practical import, become the peculiar province and property of the speculative theorist. Among these subjects the science of metaphysics holds a conspicuous place, and from no nation in modern times has it recruited a larger number of devotees than from the ranks of the Germanic states. The metaphysical element seems essential not only to their enjoyment but even to their existence. To assume the shape of a Platonic Proteus, to engage in a tilt with aërial abstractions, to construct theories so conveniently elastic as to include everything, and so etherial as to exclude anything, according to the exigency of the occasion, seems to be a pastime peculiarly agreeable to the Teutonic mind. The exercise appears to be so exciting and exhilarating as to be indulged in to an indefinite extent, and yet rarely to end in exhaustion. The writer may or may not fascinate his reader, certainly he never seems to fatigue himself. But, after all, however brilliant his triumphs may be, at best they are but barren and brief. Too much occupied with his exercise he overlooks its end. Hence the favourite theory is in fashion for a time; but, like all other fashions, it passes away. The hero of the hour succeeds only till he is succeeded by another. The business of one generation appears to be to blow bubbles, the business of another to burst them. The history of German metaphysical speculation is the history of a succession of systems. What was regarded yesterday as an article of metaphysical faith, reposing on the firmest foundation, is discarded to-day as the acme of absurdity.

But whatever may be the relative value of metaphysics, and whatever may be the real value of philological criticism, it may very fairly be questioned whether either becomes better by union with the other. The maxim that union is strength, like many other plausible maxims, is but partially true. The reverse—that union is the source of weakness—is often far from being false. Perhaps most readers would like their metaphysics and philology served up separately, to make the mixture for themselves with their own measure, to determine the relative proportion of the two elements, to fix the preponderance of the one ingredient over the other, according to their own personal predilections. A frog once having found its way into a pail containing milk and water, evidently mistaking it for a pond, the owner requested that in future the two elements should be brought to him in separate vessels.

The practice of writing Latin notes in elucidation of Latin texts, long prevalent in Germany, has been proscribed in this country, on the plain principle, that the medium through which the explanation is given should be more simple and clear than the thing explained. If the objection is well founded, whatever may be the comparative difficulty of Latin and metaphysics as a study, it applies with still greater force to the practice of employing metaphysical rules in the elucidation of Latin, since the study of Latin commonly closes ere the study of metaphysics commences. Whatever amount of truth German metaphysical theories in general may contain, and Grotefend's theory in particular regarding *si*, yet when

their practical value is tested by application to the solution of difficulties in classical authors, their only use seems to be to pervert the meaning of the text, and perplex the mind of its reader. If English scholars, instead of writing for Englishmen, will persist in importing metaphysical commentaries from Germany, they ought, after the manner of the Delphin editor, to append a simplified version, from which the metaphysical element has been eliminated, in the ordinary language of mortals. The separation would present a conspicuous illustration of the old orthodox proverb, that the half is often better than the whole. The half, in this case, would clearly be the better half.

But it is time to consider the canon of Grotefend from a metaphysical point of view. Let it be understood that when he says that "*si* with the indicative implies nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion," that his meaning may be "that the indicative expresses something, the truth of which is considered as not dependent on the writer's wish, desire, opinion, or on any hypothetical supposition, but is absolute, objective, not subjective."

Let one or two specimens of *si* with the indicative be selected, to see whether the rule from this point of view is true. The first taken—the forerunner of many followers—is from Catullus, xiv. 8 :—

Quod *si*, UT SUSPICOR, hoc novum ac repertum	But if, as I apprehend, Sulla, the philologist, pre-
Munus *dat* tibi Sulla litterator,	sents thee with this original and highly ingenious

Non est mi male, sed bene ac beate,
Quod non dispereunt tui labores.

offering (ironically, a bundle of bad poetry), I don't regret, but rather rejoice, that thy exertions (at the bar) find their full and fitting recompense.

Can it be said that *si* with the indicative here expresses "something, the truth of which is independent of the speaker's wish, desire, opinion," when, in the very next breath he adds, "ut suspicor," or that it is "absolute, objective, not subjective"?

The next passage is taken from Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. iii. El. 5. 23.

Si tamen interea quid in his ego perditus oris
Quod te credibile est quaerere, quæris, agam:
Spe trahor exigua, quam tu mihi demere noli
Tristia leniri numina posse dei.

If, however, in the meantime, you ask what I, a ruined wretch, am about in this quarter of the world, a thing it is likely you should inquire, I am lured by the slender hope, of which don't deprive me, that the offended majesty of the god may be appeased.

This passage bears the same characteristic as the first —a *subjective* clause expressing the writer's *opinion*— which shows that, not satisfied with the simple hypothetical clause, he employs a second supplementary clause, so that his meaning cannot be mistaken. These two passages are as well fitted to test Grotefend's canon

in the philosophical sense as the numerous passages already cited are fitted to test it in the popular sense. The canon, by a change of interpretation, has only escaped one test to encounter another equally formidable and equally fatal to its truth.

The real solution of the matter is found in the fact that there are two distinct usages of *si* with the indicative, and Grotefend's error has arisen from his failure to discover this distinction.

The following passage, which has been already quoted, furnishes a most conspicuous, though not a more certain, proof of the existence of the first of those usages than many of the passages already adduced in the first part of this treatise :—

"*Si* verum *est*, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit," etc.—Nepos, *Hannibal*, chap. i. Here a fact, which no one is disposed to doubt, dispute, or deny, is made the subject of a supposition. It is therefore quite clear that the hypothetical form of expression is adopted for the sake of *rhetorical* effect, and does not constitute a *real* hypothesis at all. The first part of the proposition is thrown into a hypothetical form, only that the conclusion contained in the latter part of it may be more readily admitted. Indeed, *si* here and in similar passages might be rendered with perfect propriety, "so sure as;" "just as true as" is quite absolute, objective, expresses a fact, the truth of which is not dependent on the writer's wish, desire, opinion, or any hypothetical supposition whatever. This supposition, which ought to be called a *rhetorical* supposition,

stands in direct opposition to the canon of Grotefend, when taken according to the interpretation which language bears in the usage of ordinary life.

The nature of the second usage of *si* with the indicative is discovered from the passage in Catullus, quoted above, xiv. 8.

> Quod *si, ut suspicor*, hoc novum ac repertum
> Munus dat tibi Sulla litterator, etc.

In this and the other passage quoted along with it, so similar in structure and sentiment as almost to be the same—

> *Si* tamen interea, quid in his ego perditus oris,
> *Quod te credebile* est quaerere, *quaeris*, agam,—
> Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. iii. El. 5. 22,

the character of the supposition introduced by *si* with the indicative, instead of being left to be inferred by the student from a consideration of the conditional and consequent clauses, as is commonly the case with instances, though not so conspicuous, yet still not less certain, is defined in a supplementary subjective clause by the writer himself in a manner too marked to be mistaken. From the fact that there is a second clause, in which the speaker or writer qualifies and modifies the conditional clause, it is quite clear that the supposition contained in it is a *real* and not a rhetorical supposition; is *not* "absolute," "objective," but *subjective*, and hence stands in direct opposition to Grotefend's canon, even when its language is interpreted in the light of modern metaphysical German speculation.

The arguments hitherto adduced against the theory

of Grotefend relative to the function of *si* with the indicative mood, have been drawn from the actual usage of that conjunction, as determined by an extensive process of induction. An additional argument against this theory may be derived from the distinction which the German philologist draws between *si* with the indicative, and *si* with the subjunctive mood. He says :— "A supposition may be so stated as either to imply nothing with respect to the speaker's opinion, or, on the other hand, to carry with it some intimation that it is, in his judgment, possible or probable. *When* si *carries with it no such intimation, it governs the indicative; when it does carry any intimation of the kind, it governs the subjunctive.*" The distinction here drawn between the usage of *si* with the indicative and *si* with the subjunctive mood is directly opposed to the common —and what few scholars perhaps would be disposed to dispute as the correct—distinction between these two moods; the former the mood of fact, the latter the mood of conception. Since facts are stated in the indicative mood, and feelings or conceptions are stated in the subjunctive mood, one would naturally suppose, according to the doctrine of probabilities, that an author or speaker, when he wished to intimate his own belief in a conditional clause, would indicate that belief by the indicative mood. If the proposition that the indicative mood is the mood of fact is true, then *the conclusion that an author or speaker indicates his belief in the reality of a conditional clause when he employs the indicative mood, follows as a corollary from that pro-*

position. This corollary, directly opposed to the canon of Grotefend, furnishes the first theoretical argument in this treatise against it; is as fatal to its truth as any already advanced, when its language is interpreted by the usage of ordinary life; and falls to be introduced here, in passing, to the consideration of Zumpt's declaration (ninth German edition, second English edition, by Dr. Schmitz, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh), that the present and perfect subjunctive *differ only slightly* from the indicative, *and their use cannot be fixed by grammatical rules;*" for the principle involved in it is hostile alike to the theories of both of these grammarians relative to the usage of *si* with the indicative and *si* with the subjunctive. According to Zumpt, there is *but a slight* difference between *si* with the present indicative and present subjunctive, *and their usage cannot be fixed by grammatical rules.* According to Grotefend, there is a most significant distinction between these two moods with *si*, for the one (the indicative) *expresses no opinion;* the other (the subjunctive) *does express an opinion.* Whether the term "opinion" is to be taken in its popular sense or in the philosophical sense, (yet little was gained by shifting the ground of defence against the assault; for one or two simple cases showed that—

> "Safety consists not in escape
> From dangers in a frightful shape;
> An earthquake may be bid to spare
> The man that 's strangled with a hair;")

or whether the relation between the two moods, as affected by *si*, is just the reverse of what is here represented to be the case, is not now the question, for one thing is clear, that the strongest opposition is meant to be marked between them.

When decisions so widely different as those just quoted above are given on points of cardinal importance in the grammatical economy, it seems desirable that some other deliverance should be given, combining the two conditions of compliance with the law of logical development, and consistency with the usual, if not uniform, practice of the best Latin writers.

The function of si *in the grammatical economy is to introduce a supposition or hypothesis; and whatever the nature of the difference is that subsists between the indicative and subjunctive moods—all the difference that lies between a fact and a conception—the nature of the supposition will be modified by that difference, according as the supposition is introduced by* si *with the indicative or by* si *with the subjunctive.*" From this inference, based on a law of logical development, there flows and follows the rule, *that* si *is used with the indicative mood, when the author or speaker desires to indicate his belief in the truth or probability of the conditional clause introduced by that conjunction; and, on the other hand, that* si *is used with the present subjunctive when the author or speaker desires to intimate that the reality of the supposition thereby introduced is improbable.*

Before proceeding to cite cases in confirmation of

this rule, it is deemed desirable to enumerate here a series of examples, which seem exceptions to it, with the design that specimens of all the usages of *si* with the present indicative may be exhibited consistently and consecutively, and that examples of a *real* hypothesis introduced by *si* with the present indicative, may be immediately followed by examples of a real hypothesis, introduced by *si* with the present subjunctive, without the intervention of any apparently irrelevant cases, so that the broad distinction, based on a principle, between the usages of *si* with these two moods, may be clearly ascertained and conclusively established.

It has already been remarked that the failure to observe the essential distinction between a rhetorical and a real hypothesis has been the chief cause of the difference of opinion that has prevailed with regard to the functions of *si*, and has been the source of all the misunderstanding and mystery with which the subject has been surrounded.

Of the rhetorical hypothesis, there are two classes: the affirmative and negative. A proposition containing an affirmative rhetorical hypothesis, consists of two clauses—the conditional and consequent. The epithet *rhetorical* is here given to intimate that the clause which it is designed to designate and describe is hypothetical merely in *form;* that to such a clause the writer or speaker desires and designs to attach no doubt or uncertainty whatever; that it is *actually*, though not *apparently* unconditional; that in the peculiar phraseology of the German metaphysicians, it is objective and

absolute; that the writer or speaker believes it to contain an unquestionable truth; that like an axiom in morals or in mathematics, it is calculated to claim and command universal assent; and that the first part of the proposition has been thrown into a hypothetical form, only that the conclusion contained in the latter part of the proposition may be more readily admitted. Of the rhetorical hypothesis thus described, the following cases from different authors are selected as specimens :—

Quod *si* gubernator præcipua laude *fertur*, qui navem ex hieme marique scopuloso servat, cur non singularis ejus existimetur prudentia, qui ex tot tamque gravibus procellis civilibus ad incolumitatem pervenit?

Nepos, *Att.* 10.

But if the pilot is commended in extraordinary terms, who rescues his ship from the storm and rocky deep, why ought not the remarkable sagacity of the man to be held in high esteem, who out of so many great commotions in the state hath attained a safe position?

Quod *si* hoc *apparet* in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant: (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur;) deinde ut requirant atque appetant, ad quas se applicent ejusdem generis animantes;

But if this characteristic is manifest in the case of the brute creation, among fishes, birds, among tame animals, animals at large and wild beasts, that first of all they love themselves (for that feeling is engendered equally with every living crea-

idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani: quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cujus animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus?

Cicero, *Laelius*, 21.

ture); and in the next place, that they seek and desire animals of the same class (with themselves) to which they may attach themselves, and they do so with a sort of longing and resemblance to human passion; how much more natural is that in the case of man, who both loves himself and seeks after another whose mind he may so blend with his own, as almost to make one out of two?

Quæ quum ita sint, petimus a vobis, judices, *si* qua non modo humana, verum etiam divina in tantis ingeniis commendatio *debet* esse, ut eum, qui vos, qui vestros imperatores, qui populi Romani res gestas semper ornavit, in vestram accipiatis fidem.

Cicero, *Pro Archia*, 12.

Since this is the case, I request of you, jurors, if in the case of such talents praise is due not only from men, but also from the gods, that you take this man under your protection, who has been an honour to you, to your commanders, and has celebrated the achievements of the Roman people.

Vos, o clarissima mundi
Lumina, labentem cœlo quæ
ducitis annum;

O! brightest lights of the world, Bacchus and fostering Ceres, ye, who lead the

Liber et alma Ceres, vestro *si* munere tellus
Chaoniam pingui glandem *mutavit* arista,
Poculaque inventis Acheloia *miscuit* uvis.
Adsitis.
Virgil, *Georg.* i. 7.

gliding year through the firmament, if by your beneficence the earth exchanged the acorn of Epirus for the ripe ear of corn, and mixed the water of Achelous with the newly discovered grape, be present propitious.

Jupiter omnipotens, si nondum exosus ad unum
Trojanos; *si* quid pietas antiqua labores
Respicit humanos, da flammam evadere classi
Nunc, pater, et tenues Teucrum res eripe letho.
Virgil, *Æn.* v. 687.

All powerful Jove, if you do not yet hate all the Trojans to a man, if thy ancient compassion pays any regard to the woes of men, grant, O Jove, that the fleet may escape the fire, and rescue the downcast condition of the Trojans from destruction.

Atque ita, "*Si* precibus," dixerunt, "numina justis
Victa *remollescunt, si flectitur* ira deorum:
Dic, Themi, qua generis damnum reparabile nostri
Arte sit, et mersis fer opem, mitissima, rebus."
Ovid, *Met.* i. 377.

And thus they spoke, "If the powers above, moved by holy prayers, begin to relent; if the anger of the gods is averted by such means, tell us, O goddess of justice, in what way the loss done to our race may be repaired, and most benignly bring help to us in our misfortune."

Si quid adhuc *habeo* facti,
cur Hercules uxor
Credar, conjugii mors mea
pignus erit.
Ovid, *Her.* ix. 149.

If up to this time I have done anything, why I should be accounted the wife of Hercules; my death (also) will be a pledge of wedlock.

Si quicquam cupido optantique *obtigit* unquam
Insperanti, hoc est gratum animo proprie.
Quare hoc est gratum nobis quoque carius auro,
Quod te restituis, Lesbia, mi cupido.
Catullus, *Car.* 107.

If ever the object of a wish eagerly entertained and expressed, falling unexpectedly to the lot of a man, has proved peculiarly grateful to his mind; so the restoration of Lesbia to my fond regard, is welcome to me, even dearer than gold.

The negative rhetorical hypothesis introduced by *si* with the indicative, now requires to be noticed. It so far resembles the affirmative case illustrated above, that, no doubt, uncertainty or ambiguity is associated with it, and it is adopted by the writer or speaker merely for the sake of rhetorical effect. The hypothesis is very often introduced in an affirmative form, but the hypothesis never coincides with what is really the fact, or what the writer or speaker believes to be true. If the hypothesis is apparently affirmative, it contains an assertion virtually negative; if the hypothesis is apparently negative, it contains an assertion virtually affirmative. But while the enunciation of the conditional proposition is sometimes negative, sometimes affirmative, its proof is uniformly negative. The successive

steps of the demonstration are not given by the writer or speaker. They are merely implied by the writer, and left to be inferred by the reader. The writer or speaker assumes, for the sake of argument, that such and such is true, but this temporary assumption, when carried out to its legitimate and logical consequences, either involves some preposterous paradox, or some result peculiarly inconvenient to the opponent of the speaker, against which there is no alternative but an assent to the reverse of the original assumption. The process is by no means original, and it is as orthodox as it is old. It, as has already been remarked at a previous stage of this argument, is employed by an early Greek writer on geometry, whose "Elements" are still the text-book in our public schools. The first two instances illustrative of the negative rhetorical hypothesis given below, are furnished by Grotefend, who cited them for a very different purpose :—

Si fato omnia *fiunt*, nihil nos admonere potest ut cautiores simus.	If all things are fixed by fate, nothing can warn us to be more careful in our conduct.
Scytharum legati ad Alexandrum, *si* deus *es*, inquiunt, tribuere mortalibus beneficia debes, non sua eripere.	The ambassadors of the Scythians say to Alexander, If you are a god (as you allege, but we don't believe), you are bound to bestow blessings on mankind, not to plunder them of their possessions.

Sic agam. *Si* quid venale *habuit.* Heius, *si* id, quanti, æstimabat, tanti *vendidit:* desino quærere cur emeris.
Cicero, *in Verrem,* Act ii. lib. iv. cap. 5.

I will treat on these terms. If Heius had any article for sale, if he sold it for so much as he considered its value: I desist asking why you made the purchase.

Immo ego Sardois videar tibi amarior herbis,
Horridior rusco, projecta vilior alga:
Si mihi non hæc lux toto jam longior anno *est.*
Virgil, *Ec.* vii. 39.

Nay, may I seem to thee more bitter than Sardonic blades of grass, rougher than butchers'-broom, more worthless than the prostrate seaweed, if this day is not already longer to me than the entire year.

Nil igitur referam, nisi me peccasse; sed illo
Præmia peccato nulla petita mihi:
Stultitiamque meum crimen debere vocari,
Nomina si factis reddere vera velis.
Quæ *si* non ita *sunt:* alium quo longius absim
Quaere, suburbana hic sit mihi terra locus.
Ovid, *Tristium,* iii. El. vi. 33.

I will relate nothing, therefore, save that I sinned: but in that sin no gain was sought by me; and that my offence ought rather to be called a folly, if you are disposed to give correct names to actions. And if this is not the case (he believes and maintains that it is), search for some other place where I may be farther away, so that this place may (seem to) be in the neighbourhood of Rome.

The *si* non, in the two last examples, has nothing in common with such sentences as "si mens non laeva fuisset," etc.

It is now high time to demonstrate and illustrate the rule, that *si is used with the present indicative in a real hypothesis, when an author or speaker desires to indicate his belief in the truth or probability of the conditional clause introduced by that conjunction; and, on the other hand, that* si *used with the present subjunctive in an equally real hypothesis when an author or speaker designs to intimate that the hypothesis thereby introduced is improbable or uncertain*—which has been laid down in opposition to the declaration of Zumpt, "that the present and perfect subjunctive differ only slightly from the indicative, and their use cannot be fixed by grammatical rules." From the mere fact that the indicative and subjunctive moods have separate names assigned to them, one would naturally infer, *à priori*, that each has a separate function to fulfil in the grammatical economy, and that their respective functions would be as distinct and manifest when coupled with conjunctions as in any other collocation. This inference is most clearly confirmed by the actual usage of a considerable number of conjunctions. There is a great difference between *ut, dum, antequam, quod, quin,* when used with the indicative, and when used with the subjunctive mood. According to analogy, the same difference ought to be maintained between *si* with the indicative and subjunctive as between the other conjunctions just enumerated, when used with these two moods. If

there is a distinction with a difference in the one case, why should there be a distinction without a difference in the other? If *si* with the present subjunctive is only slightly different from the present indicative, then the existence of the former with *si* in a system of Latin syntax is only a superfluous lump of lumber to encumber the language without enriching it. But let the language speak for itself. It gives forth no uncertain sound. Indeed, it scarcely requires an interpreter at all. So true is it, that language itself, if only placed in a position to speak, gives laws to grammar, and more skilfully and successfully than grammar can give laws to language. The two following passages, taken from the same author, and placed in juxtaposition, prove in a manner too marked to be mistaken, the real radical difference between *si* with the present subjunctive, and *si* with the present indicative. The first of them has already been adduced in opposition to the theory of Grotefend relative to *si*:—

Si verum *est*, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus gentes virtute superarit, non infitiandum est, etc.

Cor. Nepos, *Han.*, cap. i.

If it is true, which no one questions, that the Roman people surpassed all other nations in valour, it is not to be denied, etc.

Si per se virtus sine fortuna ponderanda *sit*, dubito, an hunc primum omnium ponam. Illud sine dubio: neminem huic prefero fide, constantia, magnitu-

If valour must be weighed by itself, without respect to fortune, I doubt whether I should not place this man before all others. This I don't hesitate to affirm: I

dine animi, in patriam amore.	place no man before him in point of honour, firmness,
Id., *Thras.*, cap. i.	magnanimity, and patriotism.

In the first of these passages the writer introduces an hypothesis by means of *si* with the indicative mood (*si* verum est), about which there can be no doubt (quod nemo dubitat), then there follows the consequent clause, in an absolute, emphatic, peremptory shape (non infitiandum est, etc.), "it must not be denied," etc. In the second passage an hypothesis is introduced by means of *si* with the present subjunctive (*si* per se virtus sine fortuna ponderanda *sit*), but the consequent clause (dubito an hunc primum omnium ponam) does not, as in the preceding passage, assume an absolute, emphatic, peremptory shape, but one more allied to doubt than decision (dubito an hunc primum omnium ponam); for although this form of expression implies an inclination towards the affirmative side of a question, it hints in a half sort of way hesitation. That this interpretation is correct, is clear from what the author adds (illud sine dubio : neminem huic prefero fide, etc.) Nepos had doubts himself, or at least he knew well others would have them, as to whether "valour could be estimated properly, without taking into account the influence of fortune on the battlefield in deciding the issue of the day." The sentiments of the Romans and the Greeks on this point are well known. Out of many passages equally pertinent, the two following may be taken :—

Sed profecto *fortuna* in omni re *dominatur;* ea res cunctas ex lubidine magis quam ex vero celebrat obscuratque—Sallust, *Cat.* 8. *Μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπὴ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλον ἡ τύχη παρὰ πάντ' εσται τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα*—Demost., *Olynth.* ii. So much for the declaration, "that there is but a slight difference between *si* with the present subjunctive and *si* with the present indicative."

As to the other declaration by Zumpt, "that the usage of *si* with the present subjunctive and present indicative cannot be fixed by grammatical rules," the silent yet eloquent testimony of the two following passages, also already cited in opposition to the theory of Grotefend on the same subject, may be taken :—

Quod *si, ut suspicor*, hoc
novum ac repertum
Munus *dat* tibi Sulla litterator
Non est mi male, sed bene ac beate,
Quod non despereunt tui labores.
Catullus, *Carm.* xiv. 8.

But if, as I apprehend, Sulla the philologist presents thee with this original and highly ingenious article (ironically—a bundle of bad poetry)—I don't regret but rather rejoice that thy exertions (at the bar) meet with their full and fitting recompense.

Si tamen interea, quid in his ego perditus oris
(*Quod te credibile est quaerere*) *quæris*, agam :
Spe trahor exigua, quam tu mihi demere noli,

If, however, in the meantime, you ask what I, a ruined wretch, am about, in this quarter of the globe, (because it is likely that you should ask), I am lured by

Tristia leniri numina posse dei.
Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. iii. El. v. 23.

the slender hope, of which don't you deprive me, that the offended majesty of the god may be appeased.

Each of these sentences possesses this characteristic in common, that there is an additional clause appended to the conditional clause, explanatory of that clause, so that its nature is not left to be inferred, as in the great majority of cases, from the consequent clause and the general scope of the immediate context. This explanatory clause is to the effect, that the conditional clause preceding it contains an hypothesis which, in the opinion of the writer, is extremely probable. Surely never did fountain flow more naturally from its source, than the rule which has been laid down above, that *si* is used with the present indicative in a real hypothesis, when an author or speaker desires to indicate his belief in the truth or probability of the conditional clause introduced by that conjunction. The following passages, selected from a great variety of writers in prose and verse, furnish equally *certain*, though perhaps not so clear or conspicuous proofs as the two passages just quoted, of the truth of this rule.

Tanaquil, wife of Tarquinius Priscus, fifth king of Rome, and mother-in-law of Servius Tullius, who had just seen lying before his eyes the body of his dying father-in-law, addresses him thus :—

Si tua re subita consilia If your wits are paralyzed

torpent, at tua mea sequere.
Livy, lib. i. 41.

by the suddenness of the conjuncture, do you at least follow the guidance of mine.

Faciam vero, Laeli, præsertim *si* utrique vestrum ut dicis, gratum futurum *est*.
Cicero, *Cato Major*, 2.

I will do it indeed, O Laelius, especially if it is likely to prove agreeable to you, as you say.

Quid mirum igitur in senibus, *si* infirmi sunt aliquando, quum id ne adolescentes effugere possint?
id., 11.

What wonder is there, therefore, in the case of old men, if they are weak at some time or other, since not even young men are able to escape this liability?

O præclarum munus aetatis, *si* quidem id *aufert* a nobis, quod est in adolescentia vitiosissimum.
Cicero, *Cato Major*, 12.

O excellent gift of age, if indeed it takes that away from us, which is most faulty in youth.

Quare *si* principes Græciæ *vultis* esse, castris est vobis utendum, non palæstra.
Nepos, *Ep.* 5.

Wherefore, if ye wish to be the leaders of Greece, you must cultivate the exercises of the camp, not those of the gymnasium.

Quæ cum ita sint, Catilina, dubitas, *si* emori aequo animo non *potes*, abire in aliquas terras, et vitam istam, multis suppliciis justis debitisque ereptam, fu-

Since this is the case, do you hesitate, O Catiline, if you are unable to meet death with unruffled feelings, to go away into some land or other, and to con-

gæ solitudinique mandare ?
Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 8.

sign that life of yours, rescued from so many righteous and merited punishments, to flight and seclusion ?

Ac *si* mihi inimico, ut prædicas, tuo conflare *vis* invidiam, recta perge in exsilium.
Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 9.

And if, as you declare, you wish to excite prejudice against me your enemy, proceed straightway into banishment.

Sed *si* quis est invidiæ metus num est vehementius severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia quam inertiæ ac nequitiæ pertimescenda est?
Cicero, *id.* 11.

But if there is any apprehension of odium, whether is the odium arising from firmness and decision more to be dreaded, than the odium of indecision and worthlessness ?

Nae illi vehementer errant, si illam meam pristinam lenitatem sperant futuram.
Cicero, *in Cat.* ii. 3.

Assuredly they blunder egregiously if they hope that my former forbearance is likely to be lasting.

Mea lenitas adhuc *si* cui solutior visa *est,* hoc expectavit, ut id, quod latebat, erumperet.
Cicero, *id.* 12.

If my forbearance hitherto has appeared to any one excessive, it waited for this result, that what was latent might come to light.

Proinde aut exeant aut quiescant aut, *si* et in urbe et in eadem mente perma-

For this reason let them either quit or be quiet, or if they both remain in the

nent, ea quæ merentur, exspectent.

Cicero, *id.* 5.

city and continue to be of the same mind, let them expect what they deserve.

Hosce ego non tam milites acres, quam infitiatores lentos esse arbitror. Qui homines primum *si* stare non *possunt*, corruant: sed ita, ut non modo civitas, sed ne vicini quidem proximi sentiant.

Cicero, *id.* 10.

These (conspirators) I account not so much brave soldiers, as slow payers. And, first, if they cannot stand, let them go down; but in such a way that not only the state may not perceive it, but not even their nearest neighbours.

Vir meus hinc ieras, vir non meus inde redisti
Sim reducis conjunx, sicut euntis eram!
Si te nobilitas generosaque nomina *tangunt*,
En ego Minoo nata, Thoante feror.

Ovid, *Hypsipyle*, 113.

You left this place, my husband; you have not returned as yet from that place, my husband. May I be your wife on your return, as I was your wife at your departure. If high birth and noble names affect you, lo I am reported to be the daughter of Thoas, son of Minos.

Non ego sum Phthias, magnisve oriunda Mycenis,
Nec steterunt in te virque paterque meus.
Si *pudet* uxoris; non nupta, sed hospita dicar.

I am not a native of Phthia, or sprung from illustrious Mycenæ, nor did my father or mother depend on you. If you are ashamed of me as your wife, I will be

Dum tua sit Dido, quodlibet esse feret.
Ovid, *Dido*, 165.

called not your wife, but hostess.

At tu, cura mei *si* te pia *tangit*, Oreste,
Injice non timidas in tua jura manus.
An, si quis rapiat stabulis armenta reclusis,
Arma feras? rapta conjuge lentus eris?
Ovid, *Hermione*, 15.

But do you, O Orestes, if fond regard for me influences you, lay no hesitating hands on your rights. If any one breaking into your stalls were to carry off your oxen, would you take up arms? Will you be indifferent at the seizure of your wife?

Plurima sunt, Fuscine, et fama digna sinistra
Et nitidis maculam haesuram figentia rebus,
Quæ monstrant ipsi pueris traduntque parentes.
Si damnosa senem *juvat* alea, ludit et heres
Bullatus parvoque eadem movet arma fritillo.
Juvenal, *Sat.* xiv. 1.

There are very many things, O Fuscinus, both deserving of a bad name, and fixing a stain likely to stick on fair objects, which parents themselves both teach and transmit to their children. If vicious gaming amuses an old man, the youthful heir plays too, and shakes the same dice in his little box.

Or as Dryden puts it:—

If gaming does an aged sire entice,
Then my young master swiftly learns the vice,
And shakes in hanging sleeves the little box and dice.

Maxima debetur puero reverentia, *si* quid	The greatest respect is due to a child; if you purpose
Turpe para*s*, ne tu pueri contempseris annos,	any base act, don't disregard the years of your
Sed peccaturo obstet tibi filius infans.	child, but let your speechless son check you when
Juvenal, *id.* 47..	likely to do evil.

The next and last example cited in confirmation of his rule, is taken from the Latin grammar of Professor Madvig of Copenhagen (second edition, translated by Woods, 332).

Si deus mundum crea*vit*,	If God has made the universe, he upholds it also.
Conservat etiam.	

The construction of this sentence is exceedingly simple. Its syntax and sentiment are equally intelligible: "If, as is extremely probable, God is the creator of the universe, then it naturally follows that he is its upholder also." It may be illustrated by the words of him who spake as never man spake:—"Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?" The learned professor gives no reference to a context from which its meaning may be derived, but only the following rule of his own (evolved no doubt from the depths of his own consciousness,) of which the sentence is intended to be an instance and illustration: "It is to be particularly noticed, that in expressing a condition both propositions (both the leading proposition which is qualified, and the subordinate which expresses the qualification) are put in the indicative, if the conditional relation (that a

thing is or is not, in case another thing is or is not) is expressed simply without any further accessory meaning." The rule itself is perhaps more intricate than the sentence it is intended to elucidate, and stands in the same relation to it as the definition—not opaque—does to the word "transparent." Grotefend and Zumpt may not be infallible, but they are always intelligible.

The nature of a real hypothesis introduced by *si* with the subjunctive mood, as contradistinguished from an equally real hypothesis introduced by *si* with the indicative mood, will be clearly apprehended from the following examples, taken, as in the preceding case, from a great variety of writers, who flourished in the golden age of Roman literature. The rule by which Roman writers seem to have been regulated in this usage of *si* may thus be stated: Si *is used by the present subjunctive in a real hypothesis, when the writer or speaker desires to convey the impression that the truth of the hypothesis is improbable, or that the issue contained in it is uncertain.*

Facturusne operae pretium sim, si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim, nec satis scio, nec *si sciam*, dicere ausim.

T. Livii, *Prefatio.*

Whether I would be likely to realize a reward for my labours, if I should write a full history of the Roman people, I neither know with sufficient accuracy, nor even if I were to know would I venture to express my opinion.

Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni,
Carthago, Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe
Quam Juno fertur terris magis omnibus unam,
Posthabita coluisse Samo: hic illius arma
Hic currus fuit; hoc regnum Dea gentibus esse,
Si qua fata *sinant*, jam tum tenditque fovetque,
Progeniem sed enim Trojano a sanguine duci
Audierat, Tyrias olim quae verteret arces.
Virgil, *Æn.* i. 12.

There was an ancient city, possessed by Tyrian settlers, called Carthage, situated at a great distance, opposite to Italy and the mouth of the Tiber, which Juno in a special manner is said to have favoured more than all other lands, even to the exclusion of Samos; here were her arms and chariot. Even at that time the goddess was anxious, and cherished the hope that this place might become the seat of empire, if by any means the fates would permit, for she had heard that a race was being derived from Trojan blood, which one day would overthrow the towers of Carthage.

Æneas scopulum interea conscendit, et omnem
Prospectum late pelago petit, Anthea *si* quem
Jactatum vento *videat*, Phrygiasque biremes. . .

Meanwhile Æneas ascends a cliff, and takes a view of the sea far and wide, if perhaps he might descry any one, Antheus, for instance, tossed by the tem-

Navem in conspectu nullam prospicit.
Virgil, *id.* 180.

pest, and the Phrygian galleys.

Quos quidem ego, *si* ullo modo fieri *possit*, non tam ulcisci studeo quam sanare sibi ipsos, placare rei publicae.
Cicero, *in Cat.* ii. 8.

On whom, indeed, I do not so much desire to be avenged, as if it were in any way practicable, to restore for their own benefit, and reconcile to the state.

Cicero is here speaking of the enemies of the state, and finds the question of secondary punishments, and the reformation of criminals, as hard as modern statesmen and philanthropists do.

In hujusmodi certamine ac proelio nonne, etiam *si* hominum studia *deficiant*, dii ipsi immortales cogent ab his praeclarissimis virtutibus tot et tanta vitia superari ?
Cicero, *id.* 11.

In a contest and battle of this kind, even if the zeal of men were to fail, will not the immortal gods themselves compel so many and enormous vices to be overborne by these most excellent virtues ?

Si quoties peccant homines, sua falmina *mittat*
Juppiter ; exiguo tempore inermis erit.
Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. ii. 33.

If, as often as men sin, Jove were to hurl his bolts, he would soon be defenceless.

Nullus in hac terra, *recitem si* carmina, cujus
Intellecturis auribus utar, adest.
Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. iii. El. 14.

There is no one at hand in the land, if I were to rehearse my poems, whose intelligent ears I could command.

Nulli se dicit mulier mea nubere malle
Quam mihi, non *si* Juppiter ipse *petat*.
Catullus, *Car.* 70.

My wife declares that she desires to marry no one in preference to myself, not even if Jove himself were to court her.

Si Comini arbitrio populari cana senectus
Spurcata impuris moribus *intereat*,
Non equidem dubito quin primum inimica bonorum
Lingua exsecta avido sit data vulturio.
Catullus, *Car.* 108.

If, Cominius, thy hoary head, defiled by a wicked life, were sacrificed to the popular will, I don't doubt but that thy tongue, the enemy of the good, would first be cut out and given to the greedy vulture.

The next and last passage cited in confirmation of this rule, besides containing a clause with *si* and the present subjunctive, contains also a clause with *si* and the present indicative, in which the usual distinction between these two moods with this conjunction is marked by a directness of demonstration derived from proximity of position, which shows that the distinction was ever present to the Roman mind; that it was the result

of design, and not of accident; and that the Romans, in drawing it wrote by rule and not at random:

O Dea, *si* prima repetens ab origine *pergam*,
Et *vacet*, annales nostrorum audire laborum,
Ante diem clauso componet Vesper Olympo.
Nos Troja antiqua (*si* vestras forte per aures
Trojæ nomen *iit*) diversa per æquora vectos,
Forte sua Libycis tempestas appulit oris.
Virgil, *Æn.* i. 372.

O goddess! if I were to begin tracing it back from the very commencement, and you had leisure to hear the account of our toils, the star of even would lay the day to rest in the closed firmament. A storm, by its own peculiar chance, hath driven us from ancient Troy (if perhaps the name of Troy (as is extremely probable) hath come across your ears) to the shores of Libya.

From the examples cited above, first, of *si* with the indicative, and then of *si* with the subjunctive, it will be seen that the rule regulating its usage with these two moods is as determinate as any other rule in the grammatical economy. The establishment of this rule furnishes a sufficient confirmation of the truth of the theory propounded at the commencement of this chapter, that when the genius of a language has, in course of time, been subjected to careful culture and the silent influence of the great law of logical development, it will find utterance for every form of thought peculiar to the human understanding, and furnish rules, which have

their root in reason, for the regulation of all its parts with consistent completeness, and not with arbitrary caprice for particular portions.

Zumpt, in his survey of Latin Syntax, was cautious when he should have been bold, and Grotefend was bold when he should have been cautious. Zumpt failed to avail himself of the laws that lay within his reach, while Grotefend went beyond the limits of the ordinary and orthodox laws of language, and made a law to himself. The issue he raised was a false one—whether an opinion was expressed by *si* with the indicative, or *si* with the subjunctive. The truth is, an opinion is expressed by both of these words with *si*. By *si* with the indicative an author or speaker indicates his belief that something or other probably *is;* by *si* with the present subjunctive an author or speaker intimates his belief that something or other probably *is not*. The fabric he reared, like many others reared by fancy, may subjectively have been a fair one, but objectively it is virtually false, inasmuch as it is the reverse of what fact represents as the relation subsisting between the indicative and subjunctive moods. But even if his canon had been true either in the popular or philosophical sense—which it is not—it would have been found wanting in the first condition essential for the successful conduct of an argument.

"Omnis de aliqua re disputatio, quae ratione instituitur, a definitione proficisci debet, ut intelligatur quid sit id, de quo disputetur."

The result of the preceding investigations is presented in the scheme subjoined.

(1.) *Si* with the present indicative introduces an affirmative *rhetorical* hypothesis, *i.e.*, an hypothesis merely in *form*, actually though not apparently unconditional. The first part of the proposition is conditional, only that the consequent clause may be more readily admitted.

Fortunati ambo! *si* quid mea carmina *possunt*,
Nulla dies unquam memori vos eximet aevo.
Virgil, *Æn.* ix. 446.

(2.) A negative *rhetorical* hypothesis, in which there is a momentary assumption of the truth of what the writer or speaker knows to be false.

Quae *si* non ita *sunt*, alium, quo longius absim,
Quaere locum. . . .
Ovid, *Tristium*, lib. iii. El. 6. 33.

(3.) A *real* hypothesis—very probable.

Si damnosa senem *juvat* alea, ludit et heres.
Juv. *Sat.* xiv. 4.

(4.) *Si* with present subjunctive introduces a *real* hypothesis — very improbable or uncertain.

Si quoties peccant homines, sua fulmina *mittat*
Juppiter, exiguo tempore inermis erit.
Ovid, *Tristium*, ii. 33.

There are several other usages of *si* with the subjunctive reserved for discussion in the next chapter, which is specially devoted to the consideration of the general character of that mood.

This is not the first time that a scheme containing the

usages of *si* has been drawn up. The following one appears in Arnold's well-known *Latin Prose Composition*:

(1.) Possibility without the expression of uncertainty—
Si quid habet, dat.
(2.) Uncertainty with the prospect of decision—
Si quid habeam, dabo.
(3.) Uncertainty without any such subordinate idea—
Si quid haberet, daret.
(4.) Impossibility, or the belief that the thing is not so—
Si quid habuisset, dedisset.

But this scheme did not appear for the first time in Arnold's *Manual*. It originally appeared in Buttmann's *Mittlere Grammatik*, § 139 (p. 394, Lachmann's Edition, 1833), has been imported into England, and incorporated in Arnold's work under the "Appropriation Clause" Act,—a clause apparently as well known to rhetoricians as to politicians.

The examples here cited in opposition to the great German grammarians are to be regarded as specimens rather than selections of the usual, if not uniform, practice of Latin writers in the employment of *si* with the indicative and subjunctive moods. They are taken from a very ordinary range of reading. The great stock from which they are drawn stands without any appearance of perceptible diminution. Any student who desires or requires to pursue the investigation to a fuller result will find examples, equally striking and equally strong, multiplied to an almost indefinite extent. Enough has been cited here; and enough, it is said, is as good as a

feast. It is not desirable to proceed beyond that point, where satiety and surfeit supervene on satisfaction, to pass beyond that limit where the writer begins to trespass on the indulgence of the reader, and run the risk of lengthening the illustration without in any way strengthening the demonstration. The distinction of the grammarians, whose authority has been impugned quite as much as the difficulty of the theme, has led to the prolongation of this copious dissertation. Indeed, it is almost necessary to quote the words of Lord Macaulay, when putting down Mr. Croker, who had set up as a classical critic in his edition of Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, "We are ashamed to detain our readers with this fourth form learning." It is now time to approach the consideration of certain complex themes which lie at the very core of Latin syntax, which, rising to a higher rank in the range of philological speculation, require for their treatment a more subtle process of induction, which have never yet attracted that close scrutiny which their own innate importance deserves, and the highest interests of classical learning in this country imperiously demand.

PART II.

ON THE FUNCTIONS OF QUI.

PERHAPS there are few subjects within the whole range of Latin literature which have formed the theme of controversy more frequent or more fierce than the subject of the subjunctive mood. A long line of scholars, foreign and native—German, English, and Scotch—with names of more or less note, with very various ability, but probably with a considerable resemblance in result, figures in the fray. What free-will has been among metaphysicians, what the squaring of the circle has been to mathematicians, what the philosopher's stone has been among chemists, what the theory of perpetual motion has been to natural philosophers, what the north-west passage has been among navigators, that the subjunctive mood has been among philologists. It would be as idle in the historian to chronicle the details of the controversy, as it would be impossible to hold the balance between the belligerents. "Quot sententiae, tot scriptores." Although the labour of critics, whose name is legion, has been expended with a prodigal liberality, but little light has been shed on the law that regulates the usage of the subjunctive.

The origin of the law seems, like the origin of the Nile, to be lost in obscurity, and its operation to be capricious rather than consistent. No doubt, every critic who has coped with the subject has discovered a solvent satisfactory to himself, but unfortunately there is no critic on whom every other critic has fixed as having found a theory second only to his own, in which case there would be no difficulty in telling which is the true one. Indeed, so far is this from being the fact, that instead of commending, scarcely one critic can be found comprehending the theory of another. This is no extravagant statement made for the sake of rhetorical effect. It is neither an exaggerated nor an extenuated, but an exact representation of the case. Dr. Carson, who has written a work treating expressly and exclusively of the subjunctive mood, and is commonly regarded as the most orthodox authority on the subject in this country, thus writes in his preface :—"It is perhaps to this excessive love of generalizing that we ought to attribute their *failure* and the *consequent and unavoidable difficulty which they have experienced in convincing each other of the accuracy of their systems.*"

Professor Maclure of Aberdeen, who has written a work treating expressly and exclusively of the potential and subjunctive moods, puts it more strongly (Appendix) :—"The opinion I had formed, after a careful perusal of Mr. Greenlaw's first work, as to the inutility of his theory for the purpose of the practical teacher, and also of its insufficiency, if fairly applied, to account

for numerous indisputable facts appertaining to the subject, has been confirmed by examining his recent publication. I admit that very possibly the deficiency is on my side; and that if I possessed the acuteness of mind necessary to understand the theory, I should both be convinced of its truth, and enabled readily to apply it myself, and to teach others to do the same. But I trust I may be allowed to say, without incurring the charge of arrogance, that a book, *which a mature mind*, even though of very ordinary powers of discernment, *has failed to comprehend*, is not the best adapted for conveying instruction to young persons." The statement of the learned Professor cannot fail to excite universal sympathy. To try to teach young boys what mature men have failed to learn, might seem to certain enthusiasts "a delightful task" in contemplation, but probably in practice it would prove both disagreeable and difficult. And if this were the result in the case of an English theory, what would be the "task" of teaching a German transcendental theory? Compared with such a task, the tread-mill would be but a mild form of torture, and the rack almost a recreation and a relief. Many theories relative to the subjunctive, if not like a celebrated measure of reform, which, destined never to become law, was characterized by a political opponent, with rare felicity of phrase, as "too clever by a half," are assuredly too clumsy and complicated by a half. Such theories, sticking on the philological stocks, only become laughing-stocks to minister to the mirth of men.

The Germans, in their attempts to frame theories to account for the facts which they find in Latin syntax, have proceeded on a false principle, and pursued a wrong method. *They fit facts to their preconceived subjective theories, instead of founding their theories on facts.* Nor is even the credit of originality, such as it is, due to them. In the construction of their theories there is a decided dash of Irish texture. The receipt of the Irishman for the manufacture of brass cannon is well known : "Make a large round hole, and then put brass around it." German philologists take what may be considered the nearest approach to the impalpable "round hole" or "airy nothing," and then construct their theories thereon. When the facts do not fit, they have recourse to the consolatory and compensating resource of the Frenchman, who, when placed in a similar dilemma, retorted, "So much the worse for the facts." Discovery, doubtless, has been their destination, but, disdaining to steer onward under the strong, steady light of reason, or anything so common-place and tame as experience or observation, misled by the fitful and distorted gleams of an erratic fancy, they have diverged far from their course, and drifted in an opposite direction. Originality in the interpretation and exposition of the mind of antiquity, does not so much lie in *the apprehension of new principles as in the new application of old principles.* The Latin language itself will supply all that is necessary, or even desirable, for its own exposition. The principles by which the Roman writers were guided in the erection of their system of

syntax, will be found quite sufficient for its explanation. There is no need for the discovery of new principles. Such a demand would be a needless demand. Even if the demand were answered, it would be a gratuitous waste of ingenuity. The principles which already exist need only to be apprehended, and when once apprehended, they are easily applied. To them all cases apparently anomalous may be referred, and by them all cases apparently antagonistic may be reconciled. The application and apprehension of a few broad principles will tend to simplify the process of classification, and tend to reduce the number of rules. The rules which are at present in force are more numerous than needful, and the more they are multiplied the more the minds of youth are mystified. What benefit, beyond bewilderment, unfortunate boys are likely to derive from these unhappy rules,—rules without reasons, without any natural affinity between each other, with exceptions without end,—it is hard to divine. Surely, in the name of humanity, reason ought to be called in, and, by a more dignified distribution of labour, relieve memory from this degrading drudgery. The simpler any system of syntax is, the stronger and more stable it will be. In these days, when the classics no longer enjoy a monopoly of study, when the imperious and incessant demands of modern innovation encroach on their domains, an improved system of Latin syntax will be found only in abbreviation and simplification. These are the principles on which the following critical disquisition is based :—

(1.) *That in every rule the syntax should be subordinate to the sense.*

(2.) *That no rule which is not necessary should be added to the number in use.*

(3.) *That the usages of the subjunctive mood should be united by a common affinity.*

In the *Grammar of the Latin Language*, by C. G. Zumpt, Ph.D., Professor in the University, and Member of the Royal Academy, Berlin, translated from the ninth edition of the original, by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph.D., F.R.S.E., Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, in almost the very middle of the chapter on the subjunctive mood, the following proposition is stated:— [545.] "The subjunctive mood is used with clauses inserted in the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, when they are to express the thoughts or words of the person spoken of, *or when they form an essential part of the statement implied in the accusative with the infinitive.*" It is only to that part of this proposition which is in italics that exception is to be taken here. The entire proposition, however, is given, lest the latter part of it might seem to suffer damage by being divorced from its immediate context. In transcribing that part of the proposition selected for criticism in connexion with its context, the same justice is done to it which is done by an honest gardener, who, in transplanting a tree or shrub, takes a considerable quantity of the surrounding mould along with it, so that it may have a fair chance for its life. The author

is as sincerely anxious to do justice both to Professor Zumpt and his translator, as the editor of the *Times* was scrupulously anxious to do justice, on a certain occasion, to his correspondent—a well-known public personage, whose education had been neglected in his youth, and whose style of orthography consequently was somewhat antiquated—when he printed in the course of a controversy his communications to the leading journal not only *verbatim* but *literatim*, lest it might be said that his letters had been garbled. In the process of translation from the German, no mistake as to the meaning of the original can have been made, since the translator, Dr. Schmitz, is himself a German. Nor can the meaning of Professor Zumpt be marred by the medium of an English version, since, in his *History of Rome*, shortly published after the Latin grammar, Dr. Schmitz has written the English language with all the elegance and ease of a vernacular, without ever having made the slightest slip to betray the hand of a foreigner. Moreover, the translator himself, in the very first words of his Preface, says (second edition, with numerous additions and corrections by the author) :—"When the honourable task of preparing a translation of the ninth edition of Professor Zumpt's *Latin Grammar* had been entrusted to me by the publishers, the author himself most willingly consented to co-operate with me in endeavouring to present his work to the English public in as perfect a form as possible." All misrepresentation, misapprehension, and mistake here being then clearly impossible, it only remains to

quote the examples cited by the learned Professor in confirmation and illustration of his rule :—

Mos est Athenis lau*dari* in concione *eos*, qui sint in proeliis interfecti.—Cic., *Orat.* 44.

Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum coelum suspeximus, coelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam *esse*, aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, *quo haec regantur.*—Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 2.

The relative clauses in these two sentences following the accusative and infinitive, together with the relative clauses following a preceding clause with the subjunctive mood, cited as illustrative and confirmative of Zumpt's rule immediately succeeding this one—to be considered shortly—may be called incorporated clauses. These two classes of clauses, together with the clauses commonly called those " containing the predicate in the relative clause," are regulated by a law whose operation is the most subtle and most secret of any in the Latin language. Of twelve grammars and treatises on Latin syntax now lying before the author, there is not one containing rules for the regulation of these three cases, much less rules with reasons annexed. It is certainly somewhat remarkable that, in the standard foreign grammars of Professors Madvig and Zumpt, there should be no reference to the doctrine of the "predicate in the relative clause." They seem either to have been ignorant of it, or to have ignored it. On this principle of the " predicate in the relative clause," if it deserves so dignified a designation, the treatise of Dr. Carson is based, who, however, on the other hand, takes

no notice of incorporated clauses. But while it is remarkable that Zumpt, Madvig, and Carson—peers in the pantheon of intellect—dii majores gentium—should have respectively omitted parts not only valuable, but vital in the grammatical economy, it is not at all remarkable that the "dii minores gentium," the grammarians who follow and who borrow, who multiply books without increasing knowledge, should have rendered these parts "conspicuous by their absence." It would be extravagant to expect that those who merely copy the excellencies of their predecessors, without correcting their errors, should supply their defects. These writers, however, render a service to the science of Latin syntax, indirect indeed, yet not at all inconsiderable. Like those editors who write notes, which smart boys despise, and even dull boys can dispense with, they leave difficult subjects conspicuous by an absence of exegesis.

The author is well aware that he labours under a presumptive disadvantage when he encounters in argument an antagonist of the European repute of Professor Zumpt—

"Infelix puer atque impar congressus Achilli."

The question, however, is not the quarter whence the argument comes on either side, but what the quality of the argument is. In this case, as in many others, a temperate statement of facts will be better than any elaborate argument. The case is so good that the advocate may almost be dispensed with altogether. Indeed, the learned Professor himself furnishes the materials for his own refutation. It would be a piece of

gratuitous nonsense, as well as violence, to slay an antagonist in argument when he commits suicide himself.

It will only be necessary to quote the Professor against the Professor, to cite a quotation in a previous edition of his grammar, in proof that his interpretation of the passage—"Mos est Athenis laudari in concione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti"—is false. It is alleged that "sint interfecti" is in the subjunctive mood, because it "forms an essential part of the statement implied in the accusative, with the infinitive 'eos laudari.'" Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the rule were true, there would be the greatest difficulty in its application, in translating English, for instance, into Latin to illustrate it; since what might seem to one boy, on plausible grounds, to be an "essential part of a statement," and therefore require the subjunctive, might, on equally plausible grounds, seem to another boy *not* to be an "essential part of the statement," and therefore require the indicative. A rule which rests on a basis so capricious is certainly somewhat suspicious. The Romans, who were a very practical and sensible people, regulated their speech, written and spoken, by a rule more simple, definite, and determinate than this. The theory of this rule fails to satisfy the first condition of a theory. It does not fit to the facts. Perhaps the Germans may say with the Frenchman, "So much the worse for the facts." The author is inclined to take his stand on the facts. He believes that the facts stand in the same relation to this German theory, that the Book

of Psalms did to the discourse of the young Scotch divine, who, on telling a senior professional brother that he could not find a psalm to suit his discourse, was told by him in turn that probably the fault lay with his discourse.

The exposition of the sentence, "Mos est Athenis laudari in concione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti," cited in confirmation and illustration of the "essential part" theory of Zumpt, lies in the exposition of that much used but little understood word "indefinite." There is nothing which has ever been imported into the domain of the grammatical economy so impalpable and indeterminate as the word indefinite, scarcely even excepting a German transcendental theory itself. With whatever truth the celebrated saying, whose paternity has been sometimes ascribed to the simple-minded Goldsmith, sometimes to the sarcastic and sharp-witted Talleyrand—that language was given to conceal the thoughts of men,—may be predicated of men in general, it may be said, with perfect propriety, that the word "indefinite" has been coined and circulated to conceal the meaning of grammarians. When the long list in that vocabulary, voluminous and vast, which contains the terms descriptive of the different functions of the subjunctive mood, has been enumerated and exhausted, without explaining the meaning of some intricate passage, how often is the word "indefinite" dragged in to do duty, and do it decisively? Even in the present case, had not Zumpt, whose authority is infallible with that large majority, who discharge the duty

of thinking for themselves by deputy, introduced his "essential part" theory, the theory of the indefinite would have been pressed into the service. It would have been said that "eos" indicates an indefinite class, and consequently its relative *qui* is subjoined with the subjunctive mood,—interfecti sint. And this sage and sapient solution would have been accepted as sufficient and satisfactory. Those who fight and fall on the field of battle for their country, whose patriotism has been praised in the orations of Pericles, and perpetuated in the odes of Pindar, and in that dirge of the illustrious dead—

> "How sleep the brave who sink to rest,
> By all their country's wishes blest;
> Where honour comes, a pilgrim gray,
> To bless the turf that wraps their clay,"—

are not an indefinite class. When, instead of a particular individual, the relative is made to represent any person or persons whatever, then the relative has an indefinite reference, and is rightly represented as indefinite. But there is no such reference here.

There is room for the development of, or rather reason positively and peremptorily requires, a new theory in connexion with the indefinite usage of *qui*. There is one, to the construction of which, so far from there being anything *a priori* adverse in the nature and fitness of things, there are many things directly the reverse. It is founded on the great doctrine of analogy. It fits a multitude of facts, otherwise anomalous, in a

simple and satisfactory manner, without any superfluity or ambiguity whatever. It was acknowledged and acted upon by the Romans in the reading and writing of their language. It is this: *Qui is not only used indefinitely with respect to persons, but also to places and periods.* The relative *qui* with the subjunctive mood in the clause "qui sint in proeliis interfecti," constitutes a generalized formula, which comprises all patriots who have fallen *at any place* or *any period.* Of this presumptive theory let Zumpt himself, who has propounded the "essential part" theory to account for "qui sint interfecti," supply the practical proof. In the fifth edition of his Grammar by Kenrick, page 343,—

"'Twas thine own genius gave the fatal blow,
And helped to plant the wound that laid thee low,"—

the following passage occurs:—

"Imperavit Alexander Lysippo, ut eorum equitum, *qui apud Granicum ceciderant,* faceret statuas."

Here a precise place—*qui apud Granicum ceciderant*—is *definitely specified,* consequently the indicative mood is used. Zumpt, with a numerous host of facts to manage, but no fixed principle sufficiently simple and strong to marshal them, resembles a boy with a badly bound book, who, in arranging one part, only succeeds in deranging another.

The learned professor is not a whit more fortunate with the other passage he has quoted in support of his "essential part" theory.

" Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum coelum suspeximus, coelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur."—Cic., *De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 2.

That Professor Zumpt, under the direction of a natural critical faculty, certainly not ordinary, developed by close and constant contact with the master minds of antiquity, to a degree extraordinary even among Germans, should have so misinterpreted the force of the two clauses mainly concerned in this passage, from a blind regard to this pet theory of his, can only be accounted for and arise from the fact, that the paternal partiality for the progeny of the brain is not less remarkable than the paternal partiality for the progeny of the body. The meaning of the sentence has been offered up as a sacrifice to this child of his brain, or rather of his fancy. The sacrifice is by far too great. The rule is not greater than the language. Rules were made for language, not language for rules. The great object to be secured in any system of interpretation is the reflection of the mind and meaning of the writer. This is the primary and paramount consideration, and to it every other consideration must be secondary and subordinate.

There is no peculiar virtue in a clause with the accusative and infinitive, to cause the relative following to be subjoined with the subjunctive mood. This notion can only have arisen from the fact that the accusative with the infinitive after such words as *fertur*, *censet*, *fama*, *est*, etc., is followed by *qui* with the subjunctive mood, where the subjunctive is used, not because it

contains an essential part of a proposition, but because it contains a report of a speech, or a representation of an opinion which is *not* the writer's own. Many sentences which might seem to suit the conditions of this arbitrary and imaginary rule, are to be referred to the rule regulating the introduction of indirect speech which has been thus described. The following sentence, taken from Professor Jacobs' *Latin Reader*, edited by Donaldson, p. 28 :—

"Non statim legenti persuasum sit, omnia *quae* ab optimis scriptoribus *scripta sint*, utique esse perfecta"—combines the conditions required to illustrate the "essential part" theory; but the incorporated clause, "quae scripta sint," contains a subjunctive, not because it contains the essential part of a proposition, but because it contains "the essential part" of an opinion which the writer represents as not his own, and repudiates.

By comparing the second sentence which Zumpt has quoted in support of his "essential part" theory—"Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum coelum suspeximus, coelumque contemplati sumus, *quam esse aliquod* numen præstantissimae mentis, *quo haec regantur*"—with the sentence quoted above from the *Latin Reader* of Professor Jacobs, it will be observed that in each there is the common characteristic of an incorporated clause with *qui* and the subjunctive mood; in the one there is, "omnia *quæ* ab optimis scriptoribus *scripta sint*, utique perfecta esse;" in the other, "*esse* aliquod numen præstantissimae mentis, quo haec *regantur*;" but while each clause has a subjunctive, it

cannot be for the same reason, for in the first the opinion expressed by the subjunctive is not entertained by the writer; in the second, on the other hand, the opinion expressed is entertained by the writer.

It is quite clear, then, that the incorporated clause—quo haec regantur—is no more an instance of indirect speech than it is an illustration of the "essential part" theory. Even allowing for a moment that it is consistent with the common practice of the best Latin authors, that a writer or speaker employing the first person should use the subjunctive mood for the expression of an opinion which he entertains and indorses by the most explicit admission, how can the clause in question, and the one in the sentence, "Mos est Athenis, laudari in concione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti," be regarded as examples of one and the same rule? for in this clause with the subjunctive, there is no expression of any doctrinal opinion whatever, but merely the conclusion of a simple statement relative to a national institution.

But it can be shown what the clause, "quo haec regantur," is an instance of as well as what it is not an instance of. Many things can only be described by negatives. This clause is not one of them. The probable or possible reasons for the removal or resolution of the difficulty attaching to the clause, "quo haec regantur," having been eliminated by a negative process, the greater room will remain for the real reason, showing what that is of which the clause in question is a positive illustration.

The key to the right understanding of this passage, both in the theological and philological sense, lies in the word "*aliquod.*" Cicero, though a countryman of those to whom the Epistle to the Romans was addressed, long ere St. Paul on Mar's Hill had told the men of Athens that he whose altar bore the inscription, "to the unknown God," dwelt in temples not made with hands, and had come to Rome to tell it once more, had played his part in the great drama of human affairs, and passed away. Cicero, having no light from heaven, was left to the dim teaching of the light of nature and the unaided efforts of reason to form his conception of the Supreme. That conception, in the circumstances, could neither be correct nor complete. It, however, was as creditable to him, being a heathen, as the following, though composed by a Christian :—

"Father of all, in every age,
In every clime adored,
By saint, by savage, and by sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord."

Cicero, in the passage under consideration, adduces the argument so well known to writers and readers of Christian evidences,—derived from the order, harmony, and beauty everywhere conspicuous in the universe,—in proof of the existence of a God. He expresses his belief in a manner that excludes the slightest doubt in the existence of a great presiding Providence, but not in such a manner as to exclude doubt with regard to his attributes, nature, and name. Cicero, in employing

aliquod as an epithet to *numen,* employs the most indefinite of all indefinite words in the Latin language. Every small boy who has been learning Latin for three weeks, knows that *aliquis* means "some one or other." Its relative *quo,* which represents it in the clause—quo haec regantur—and is subjoined to the subjunctive, reflects its indefinite character by that connexion, that mood being rightly required by the rule which regulates the usage of indefinites. A more certain and conspicuous instance of an indefinite requiring the subjunctive mood, probably could not be found within the entire range of Roman literature.

The bond of affinity, which has led to the classification of the two sentences subjected to these critical strictures, according to Zumpt, is the accusative with the infinitive. That is merely the accident, not the constituent of the sentences. An accidental and adventitious circumstance has been mistaken for their essential and distinctive characteristic. A relative clause containing an essential part of a statement, though preceded by an accusative and infinitive, is not necessarily joined with the subjunctive mood, and *aliquis* is joined with the subjunctive mood, though not preceded by the accusative and infinitive. In the first of the two following sentences from Cicero—the great master and model of Latinity—there is a relative clause containing an essential part of a statement with the indicative mood, though preceded by the accusative and infinitive, so that the *presence* of this condition does *not produce* the subjunctive mood ; in the second sentence

there is an *aliquis* with the subjunctive mood, though not preceded by an accusative with the infinitive, so that the *absence* of this condition does *not prevent* the occurrence of the subjunctive mood.

Ex *quo* intelligendum est, *eos, qui haec rebus nomina posuerunt, sensisse hoc idem.*—Cic., *Tusc.* lib. iii. 5.

Sit igitur *aliquis, qui* nihil mali *habeat,* nullum a fortuna vulnus acceperit.—Cic., *Tusc.* lib. i. 35.

Such sentences might be multiplied to an extent, that the end of the reader's patience would be reached ere the end of the examples.

The next and last rule of Zumpt to be subjected to comment here is to the following effect (547) :—

Clauses introduced into a proposition which is expressed by the subjunctive, are likewise in the subjunctive when they are to be considered as an essential part of the leading proposition, being included in the purpose, request, precept, or command of another person, or (with *si*) in the supposed circumstances, *e.g.*,

Rex imperavit, ut, quae bello opus essent, pararentur.

Eo simus animo, ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum.—Cic., *Tusc.* 1, *in fin.*

Memoria erat tanta (Hortensius) quantam in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut, quae secum commentatus esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, quibus cogitavisset.—Cic., *Brut.* 88.

The first sentence quoted here—Rex imperavit, ut, quae bello opus essent, pararentur—is a most accurate and

appropriate illustration of the latter part of this rule. Its incorporated subjunctive clause certainly is included in the command of another. But surely there was no need to attach to this new, and, as will shortly be proved, by no means necessary rule, as an appendix, the specification "clauses included in the command of another." Such clauses are referred to the rule that regulates indirect speech. But these bear not the most remote relation to the second and third sentences cited in support of this new rule. And the second and third sentences are bound to each other by no nearer or more natural affinity than they are to the first sentence. Here then are three sentences connected to each other by no affinity more natural or more near than that of simple succession,—a relationship for which they are indebted to the printer. And they are intended to illustrate a new rule. If this view of them be true, the new rule cannot be true. It is proposed to reverse the relation of the second and third sentences. As the second sentence involves the consideration of the question of the predicate in the relative clause—a question as subtle to the full as the question of incorporated clauses—requiring very elaborate treatment, it will yield the priority of treatment to the third :—

Memoria erat tanta (Hortensius) quantam in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut, quae secum *commentatus esset*, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, *quibus cogitavisset*. —Cic., *Brut.* 88.

This sentence contains what has been called in this

treatise an incorporated subjunctive clause. Sentences of this description are very numerous in Cicero, perhaps more so than in any other Latin author. There are not many pages of his works which do not contain one such sentence; there are many which contain several. Any system of syntax making any pretension to completeness of treatment ought to contain a rule or rationale relative to such sentences. Most grammarians, however, ignore the subject altogether. The two foreign names of greatest note that adopt the rule of Zumpt on his simple authority, are those of Madvig and Kruger; and in this country the names of Professor Key, of London, and Dr. Kennedy, the Head Master of Shrewsbury School, may be placed in the same category. It is worthy of note that three of those four scholars copy the same example—that under consideration, "Memoria erat tanta (Hortensius) ut;" and one would have thought that, if these scholars had really apprehended a principle underlying this rule, they would have been able readily to apply it and adduce examples for themselves. The doctrine of the divine right of German grammarians—like the once divine right of kings—to exact unreasoning obedience from their followers, it seems is still rampant.

The unlimited ascendancy of mere German authority without reason has been followed by the unconditional abdication of British reason within the domain of philology. It is difficult to believe, or even conceive, how any authority which was not based on reason and truth could ever have been either established or extended.

However this state of things may have originated, or however it may have been tolerated, it does not seem consistent with the free spirit of critical inquiry characteristic of the present age, that it should be perpetuated.

There seems no reason, but rather the reverse, why the *rationale* of the various rules that regulate the usage of the subjunctive mood, should not be given in the same method as the *rationale* of rules in arithmetic and algebra has been given respectively by the late Professor Thomson of Glasgow College and Bishop Colenso. In our systems of Latin syntax, instead of finding problems dependent on and developed from each other, accompanied by scientific solutions, we only find a series of postulates, connected like words in a vocabulary by the bare law of succession.

According to Zumpt and his followers, in the sentence —"Memoria erat tanta (Hortensius) quantam in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut, *quae* secum *commentatus esset*, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, quibus *cogitavisset*" —"quæ commentatus esset" and "quibus cogitavisset" are dependent on "ut redderet." There is here a result—a subjunctive mood—which is to be accounted for, and which requires its reason to be assigned. The argument of the learned grammarians, if there is any argument at all, amounts to this—Post hoc ergo propter hoc. This may be a very learned argument. It remains to be seen whether it is as logical as it is learned. Whether or no Kruger had any misgivings as to "dependence on 'ut redderet'" being a sufficient and satisfactory reason

for the mood in "quæ commentatus esset," and "quibus cogitavisset," he resolved to take another and additional ground to make the basis of his argument better by making it broader. He proceeds on the convenient and comfortable, if not always cogent maxim, "juncta juvant." Upon the same principle, a claimant to an estate, with two pleas, each by itself defective, might persuade himself, and try to persuade others, that when added together they amounted to one good valid plea. This might or might not be good law; it certainly would be very bad logic. Kruger says, in reference to the sentence under consideration, "By the subjunctive, the relative clause is more thoroughly incorporated with the other sentence as part of the whole thought." There is a twofold delusion here. In the first place, the sentence does not assume at all a didactic shape, containing a "thought," or reflection, or sentiment, or belief, but contains a simple statement of a fact by Cicero; in the second place, the relative with the subjunctive does not make the connexion of the clauses concerned a whit more close than the indicative would have done had the sense required that mood. In the sentence, "Ejus exercitus non tantus fuit, quantum senatus expectavit," no one will deny that the connexion of the latter clause with the former is very close; but no boy on the third form, who did not either despise or defy the rod, would ever think of substituting the subjunctive for the indicative mood, to make that connexion closer.

The force of *ut* in "ut, quæ secum commentatus esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, quibus cogita-

visset," expends itself on "redderet," and extends neither to "quæ commentatus esset," nor to "quibus cogitavisset." It might with as much probability and propriety be affirmed that a cannon ball, after rebounding from an opposing body, would proceed in the same line on which it had originally been propelled. The adventitious character of Zumpt's mode of interpretation will be apparent whenever the sentence is translated as its writer desired and designed. Cicero's meaning is, "whatever thoughts Hortensius had (*at any period*) entertained, these, without having committed them to writing, he rendered in the same words in which he had conceived them." In the comments on Zumpt's rule immediately preceding the one under review, the use of the term "indefinite" was extended from persons to places. This extension is not more warranted by the law of analogy, than wanted for the true exposition of many passages in Roman literature. The extension in the present passage may be carried still farther—from places to periods. There is a specific reference made to a particular individual, Hortensius; but there is no precise *period* or *place* at which the acts specified are predicated of him. For such indeterminate and indefinite predications, the subjunctive mood is the most appropriate organ. It is not at all necessary that there should be a preceding clause with "ut" and the subjunctive mood, when a predication indeterminate as to place and period is made with the mood appropriate to it.

Cicero, *De Orat.* iii. 16.—Socrates, quam se cunque in partem *dedisset*, omnium facile fuit princeps.

Livy, i. 32.—Id ubi *dixisset*, hastam in fines eorum emittebat.

The interpretation of the sentence, "Memoria erat tanta (Hortensius) quantum in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut, quae secum commentatus esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, quibus cogitavisset," as given above, is corroborated by a crowd of cases from almost every writer of the Latin language. The peculiar and proper usage of the subjunctive brought out by this interpretation, as has been seen from the cases just quoted, "quam se cunque in partem dedisset," and "ubi dixisset," is entirely independent and irrespective of any preceding clause with the subjunctive mood. The subjunctive is employed because the description is generic, rather than specific, because the predication is made *without respect to a particular person or place*, and *without restriction to one single period*. Such is the nature of the predication contained in the following incorporated subjunctive clauses, which are believed by Zumpt, and, on the mere authority of his name, are believed by others, to depend on a preceding subjunctive clause with "ut."

Solent hoc boni imperatores facere, quum proelium committunt, ut in eo loco, *quo* fugam hostium fore *arbitrentur*, militis collocent, in quos, si qui ex facie fugerint, de improviso incidant.—Cicero, *pro Sex. Ros. Amer.* 52.

Quis hoc fuit ulla in Scythia tyrannus, ut eos, *quos* luctu *afficeret*, lugere non sineret?—Cicero, *in L. C. Pisonem*, viii. 3.

Cum enim versuram facere publice necesse esset, neque ejus conditionem aequam haberent, semper se interposuit, atque ita, ut neque usuram unquam ab iis acceperit, neque longius *quam dictum esset*, eos debere passus sit.—Nepos, *Atticus*, 2.

Utebatur autem intime Q. Hortensio, qui iis temporibus principatum eloquentiae tenebat, ut intelligi non posset, uter eum plus diligeret Cicero, an Hortensius; et id, quod erat difficillimum, efficiebat, ut inter *quos* tantae laudis *esset* (no particular period is specified, for the predication comprehends their entire career at the bar) aemulatio nulla intercederet obtrectatio essetque talium virorum copula.—Nepos, *Atticus*, v.

Atque omnium primum, ad cursum lunae, in duodecim menses describit annum; quem (quia tricenos dies singulis mensibus luna non explet, desuntque dies solido anno, qui solstitiali circumagitur orbe) intercalaribus mensibus interponendis, ita dispensavit, ut quarto et vigesimo anno (*every* twenty-fourth year) ad metam eandem solis, *unde orsi essent*, plenis annorum omnium spatiis, dies congruerent.—Livy, lib. i. c. 19.

There is a very remarkable coincidence between the incorporated subjunctive clause just quoted and the following one from Cæsar.

In the one, the recurring revolution of the heavenly bodies is indicated; in the other, the recurring action of the tides, and both most forcibly and most fitly by the subjunctive mood.

Erant ejusmodi fere situs oppidorum, ut posita in extremis linguis promontoriisque, neque pedibus aditum

haberent, quum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod bis semper accidit horarum XII. spatio: neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis *afflictarentur*. —Cæsar, *De Bello Gal.* lib. iii. 12.

Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta, ut nostri etiam *qui* vulneribus confecti *procubuissent* (at any period during the battle), scutis innixi, proelium redintegrarent.—Cæsar, *De Bello Gal.* lib. ii. 27.

Pythagerae philosophi tanta fuit apud discipulos auctoritas, ut, *quae* ab eo *audivissent* (any day whatever) ea in dubitationem adducere non auderent.—Professor Jacob's *Latin Reader*, p. 18, Course ii.

The remaining sentence which Zumpt has adduced in support of his rule relative to incorporated subjunctive clauses is, "Eo simus animo, ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a deo immortali, vel a natura constitutum."—Cic. *Tusc.* 1 *in fin.* As Kruger has vouchsafed a special defence of the "essential-part" theory in connexion with the sentence "memoria erat tanta (Hortensus)," etc., so Zumpt performs a similar service in connexion with this sentence. This is often a dangerous process, for very often the defence is worse than the original offence. Hence the old lawyer warned his young friend to be careful in giving a reason for his decision; for the decision might be right, even while his reason was wrong. Professor Key, under a salutary fear of disregarding this sage advice, while expressing his belief (1178 and 1225, Grammar, second edition) in the "essential-part" theory relative to the accusative and infinitive, not only vouchsafes no defence of that

theory in connexion with an illustrative example, but safely cites no example of the theory at all.

It is fair to state Zumpt's special defence in his own words: "Note.—In the first of these examples the conviction required is this: nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum, and not merely nihil in malis duco. The clause beginning with 'quod,' therefore, is part of the conviction, and is therefore expressed by the subjunctive, like the other."

It is neither necessary nor desirable to say that "nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum" is bad Latin, for any opinion of Zumpt ought always to be criticised with respect, and never condemned without regret. Without saying, therefore, that Zumpt's Latin is bad Latin, it is much more pleasant to say that a sentence from Cicero, constructed on an opposite principle, is good Latin. Surely it is natural and reasonable to believe that Cicero knew how to write his own language. The sentence is taken from the *Cato Major*, chap. ii.

Qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi petunt, iis *nihil* potest malum videri, *quod* naturae necessitas *afferat.*

Cicero says: *nihil* potest malum videri, *quod* naturae necessitas *afferat.* Zumpt says: *nihil* in malis duco, *quod* a deo *est constitutum.*

Cicero and Zumpt have been placed in juxtaposition. Let Cicero and Cicero now be placed in juxtaposition:—

Eo simus animo, ut *nihil* in malis ducamus, *quod sit* vel a deo, vel a natura *constitutum.*—*Tusc.* i. *in fin.*,

as quoted by Zumpt, in support of his "essential-part" theory. Qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi petunt, iis *nihil* potest malum videri, *quod* naturae necessitas *afferat.*—*Cato Major*, chap. ii.

The sentences "ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod sit a natura constitutum," and "nihil potest malum videri, quod naturae necessitas afferat," are so similar in sentiment, structure, and syntax as to be almost considered the same. In the latter sentence there is no clause with "ut" and the subjunctive mood preceding "nihil potest malum videri," as in the former sentence, where "ut ducamus" precedes "quod sit a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum," and yet "quod" is subjoined to the subjunctive "afferat." Hence the legitimate and logical deduction is drawn, "quod sit a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum;" is entirely independent of "ut ducamus." The *presence* of "ut ducamus" is *not necessary to produce* the result "quod sit a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum," *because its absence*, or the absence of a similar clause, *does not prevent* a similar result in the case of "quod afferat."

Thus each of the three pillars, on which Zumpt has proposed to prop up his "essential-part" theory, has been separately and successively pulled down, and the whole fabric of his transcendental workmanship, with all its "parts," however "essential," must simultaneously fall to the ground. He has tried to construct an "essential-part" theory, but, unfortunately, it lacks one essential part. It contains no proof of its own truth.

The examples he has selected and cited, not only, when combined, do not constitute proof, but do not even contribute one essential particle of proof. The quantities, in the language of Algebra, are not homogeneous, but heterogeneous and incongruous. They do not coalesce.

In this case it is not true that, "juncta juvant." The only consistent principle on which the classification is based, is that of contrast. The first example contains a most certain and conspicuous instance of indirect speech. The second example contains a most certain and conspicuous instance of indefinite predication. The third example contains a most certain and conspicuous instance of what is commonly considered the "predicate in the relative clause." The exact specific quality of each of these sentences has been overlooked, and an adventitious circumstance has been obtruded in its place. The only characteristic common to all the examples is the conjunction "ut." It is just within the limits of possibility that some person might be found with so much time on his hands, and so little wisdom in his head, as to collect all the clauses in the English language, beginning with the conjunction "that." It is scarcely, however, within the limits of probability, that any person possessing the most moderate sense of the fitness of things, should say that such a prodigy of human industry had been expending his energy in the illustration of an important principle.

The conjunction "ut" has just as much connexion with the incorporated subjunctive clauses in the sen-

tences which have been subjected to review, as Tenterden steeple has with Goodwin sands, or the bearing of three names had with Jacobinism, according to the learned and logical judge who cited in proof of the truth of this theory, on the one side, the names of Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, John Horne Tooke, John Philpot Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald Wolf Tone; and on the other side, with the most perfect judicial equity, the names of William Pitt, John Scott, William Windham, Samuel Horsley, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke.

Zumpt's theories may be true subjectively; but in the face of facts, objectively they are false. In the same way, a man with a bee in his head might persuade himself that the bell of the city clock was ringing a merry peal, while all the time it was motionless and mute. A German theoretic Cuvier might argue plausibly that the cat and the rat ought to be classed in the same category, but in practice they would not do well together. German theories do very well till they are tried by the test of practice. A German philosopher eloquent in the praise of his transcendental theory of perfectability, which could even tame tigers, became silent when a practical Englishman expressed a wish to see him in a cage with his new pupil. The coat of a transcendental tailor, working on the most approved abstract principles, might be fine in its cut, and superfine in its cloth, and yet after all not fit its wearer. The best test of a good coat is that it should fit its wearer, that there should be nothing wanted, nothing wasted.

German theories do not stand this test. In the classic language of the West, there is too much of them " by a long chalk."

Nothing could have been more unfortunate than Zumpt's selection of the sentence, " Eo simus animo, ut nihil in malis ducamus quod sit vel a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum," as an instance and illustration of incorporated subjunctive dependence. Even his obedient and obsequious followers, by its omission, seem rather to have accepted it than to have approved of it. While Madvig and Kruger abroad, and Kennedy and Key at home, approve and appropriate the sentence, " memoria erat tanta (Hortensius)," etc., as an instance and illustration of incorporated subjunctive dependence, they take no notice at all of the sentence, " Eo simus animo ut nihil in malis ducamus," etc. What these scholars considered or called this sentence an instance and illustration of, they have not condescended or chosen to say. It has been proved above that it does not contain an instance of incorporated subjunctive dependence. A more certain and conspicuous example of what is commonly considered " the predicate in the relative clause" could not probably be chosen. A more appropriate text for a disquisition on that subject could not be found. Since it has been made by Zumpt a *pretext* for a theory on incorporated subjunctive dependence, it is here made a *text* for the consideration of the doctrine of the " predicate in the relative clause." Lest the extent of the doubt and difficulty which have hitherto enveloped this subject should seem to be either exaggerated or ex-

tenuated, the author prefers to express it in language other than his own. Fortunately he has at his command the opinion of one who probably has had more experience than most modern scholars in the composition and correction of Latin prose. In a correspondence with the author on the sentence under review, Professor William Duguid Geddes of the University of Aberdeen says, "There is a very subtle principle involved here; one which has never, so far as I am aware, been properly expounded in words, though it has been felt and acted up to by Latinists, both ancient and modern, in practice;" or, in other words, "causa latet, vis est notissima."

This principle seems to be equally indelible and indefinable. Its existence is attested by the best of all evidence—its own presence in almost every page of Cicero. Its essence, however, hitherto, has seemed so ethereal as to be able easily to elude explanation. But it must not be allowed to evade the scrutiny of those who are charged with the interpretation and exposition of the mind of antiquity. The riddle must be read. It is high time to make an attempt to discover the origin of that law, to whose operation it is obedient, to distinguish its accidents from its constituents, to define its exact specific quality, to fix the floating element, and find for it a "local habitation and a name." There must be a solution for the removal or resolution of the difficulty. If it is not necessary to discover a new principle, it is desirable to recover an old principle, and restore it to what is its right ascendancy, and what ought to be

its recognised ascendancy. The Romans were a people eminently sensible and essentially practical. It is neither natural nor reasonable to suppose that they would—not accidentally or incidentally, but advisedly and habitually —adopt a form of speech without being able, if desired or required, to assign a sufficient and satisfactory reason for its adoption. Since certain results of a very striking and subtle character are found in the syntax of the Latin language, surely there must be reasons from which these results arise, and for which these reasons are sufficient to account. It would seem that the principle concerned has been too profound to be expressed; but perhaps it can be shown that it is too powerful to be repressed. Language, when left to itself, is much better fitted than a transcendental grammarian, to give laws for its government. All that it requires is an interpreter. By comparing one form of expression with another, by collating one passage with another, and by contrasting the practice of ancient Latinists with modern Latinists, the true theory may be discovered. By this process a principle may be evolved broad enough to embrace all ordinary cases, strong enough to explain anomalous exceptions, and plain enough to be expressed in words.

The principle at issue is aptly and amply illustrated by the subjoined series of examples :—

Nulla est enim natio, quam pertimescamus; nullus rex, qui bellum populo Romano facere possit.—Cicero, *in Cat.*, cap. v., Oratio ii.

Nihil erat, quod non ipse obiret, occurreret, vigilaret, laboraret.—Cicero, *in Cat.* cap. vii. Oratio iii.

Servus est *nemo,* qui modo tolerabili conditione sit servitutis, *qui non* audaciam civium *perhorrescat, qui non* haec stare *cupiat, qui non* quantum audet et quantum potest, *conferat* ad communem salutem voluntatis. —Cicero, *in Cat.* cap. viii. Oratio iv.

A similar specimen, with the same characteristics and constituents may be selected from Catullus, who was in poetry what Cicero was in prose, who, as a cunning workman in words among the Romans, had no forerunner and no follower, and of whom Cicero, had he been called or chosen himself to write his epitaph, would have written Nil tetigit quod non ornaret :—

> At mihi *nullus erat,* neque hic neque illic,
> Fractum qui veteris pedem grabati
> In collo sibi collocare posset.—*Carmen* 10.

As a specimen of a modern prose Latinist, the first sentence of Dr. Johnson's famous epitaph on Goldsmith, in Poet's Corner, Westminster Abbey, may be selected :—

> OLIVARII GOLDSMITH
> POETAE, PHYSICI, HISTORICI,
> CUI NULLUM FERE SCRIBENDI GENUS
> NON TETIGIT
> NULLUM QUOD TETIGIT NON ORNAVIT.

The sentences taken from Cicero are specimens rather

than selections. Any one who knows Cicero even superficially knows well that such sentences, instead of having to be culled out singly, may be collected in shoals. They are taken from the four Catilinarian orations, which, when added together, do not equal in extent many single speeches of Cicero. They have been taken from a compass so confined, lest they might seem forced or far-fetched. They may be divided into two classes. The first class of sentences contains only one negative, in the indicative clause. The second class contains negatives in both clauses—both in the indicative and subjunctive moods. The second negative is merely an accident, not a constituent of the sentence. The exact specific quality common to both classes is independent of the second negative. The first class shows that Zumpt, when attempting to establish an "essential part" theory on the sentence from Cicero—"Eo simus animo ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod a deo immortali sit constitutum"—by saying that "quod sit constitutum" was an essential part of the leading proposition, "ut nihil in malis ducamus," he removed the latter part of the sentence from the former, and resolved "et" into "nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum,"—not so much wrote at random and in opposition to a rule which Cicero considered himself bound to obey, but sacrificed the sense and spirit of the orator to a fictitious theory of his own. The second class only shows that Dr. Johnson did not take Cicero as his model. The positions of Zumpt and Johnson are not at all parallel. Zumpt, as an expounder of Cicero, was bound to explain his meaning. Johnson,

as an original composer, master of his own meaning, under no obligation to copy any model, could mould it as he pleased.

The sentences quoted above are re-arranged according to the distinction which has been drawn between single and double negatives, with the interpretation given in English. When once it is seen what the sense of a sentence is, it is very easy to see what its syntax must be :—

Nulla est enim natio, *quam pertimescamus; nullus* rex, *qui* bellum populo Romano facere *possit.*—Cicero, Or. ii. *in Cat.* cap. v.

For there is no nation that we greatly fear; *i.e.*, no nation exists which *combines at the same time the condition* of being able to make the Romans greatly afraid of it; there is no king who can make war (successfully) against the Roman people; *i.e.*, no king exists, who *combines at the same time the condition* of being able to make war successfully against the Roman people.

At mihi nullus erat neque hic neque illic,
Fractum qui veteris pedem grabati

But I had no one neither here nor there (in the province) who could place, *i.e.*, combined at the same time

In collo sibi collocare posset.—Catullus, *Carmen* 10.	the condition of being able to place on his (litter-carrier's) neck the broken foot of an old palanquin.
Nihil erat, quod non ipse obiret, occurreret, vigilaret, laboraret.—Cicero, *in Cat.*, Or. iii. cap. 7.	There was nothing which he did not himself undergo, encounter, execute by night, endeavour to obtain, *i.e.*, no danger or difficulty existed, *unless* it had been encountered by himself.
Servus est *nemo*, qui modo tolerabili conditione sit servitutis, *qui non* audaciam civium *perhorrescat;* qui non haec stare cupiat; *qui* non quantum audet et quantum potest, *conferat* ad communem salutem voluntatis.—Cicero, *in Cat.*, Or. iv. cap. 8.	There is no slave, provided only the circumstances of his servile condition are comfortable, who does not shudder, *i.e., unless he shudders* at the daring of citizens; who does not desire, *i.e., unless he desires* the present form of government to continue; who does not contribute, *i.e., unless he contributes* as much good will as he dares and is able to the public safety.
Nullum quod tetigit non ornavit.—*Johnson.*	Literally, nothing which he touched, he did not adorn.

There is another arrangement of which the words admit:—

Nullum tetigit, quod non ornavit.	He touched nothing (the impalpable abstraction known as such, which can only be seen by winking), and this he adorned.

It will have been seen from the sentences quoted from Cicero, so similar as virtually to be the same, that Cicero would have written these words thus :—

Nullum tetigit, quod non ornaret.	He did not touch anything which he did not adorn, *i.e.*, he did not handle any theme in writing *un*less he adorned it.

It seems hard to believe that the hand which transformed the Messiah of Pope into the antique with an elegance and grace not unworthy of Tibullus or Catullus, should have traced the fifth line of the epitaph on Oliver Goldsmith. The "fine Roman hand" seems to have become paralysed and to have lost its cunning. Of the right hand there is no trace, and the left hand seems to have taken its place. There seems no reason, but rather the reverse, why Dr. Johnson should not have handled the one subject with as much spirit and skill as the other. The amount of his acquirements and the extent of his attainments might be limited by time or by taste, but assuredly not by talent. With an intellect colossal rather in the scale of its projection, than classical in the harmony and symmetry of its parts, quick in the discovery of real analogies, however remote, and quick in

the apprehension and application of general principles, restrained from all foolish flights of fancy by the presiding action of a strong natural sagacity, there were few difficulties within the range of human speculation which did not give way before its giant grasp. There was no principle involved within the construction of a Ciceronian period so subtle as to elude his comprehension, or too subtle to be exemplified by him in practice. But the palm of scholarship was not won or worn for superiority in any such exercise. The most exalted conception of erudite excellence was a man making lines like a machine making threads.

The revolution of public sentiment is often rapid, and often not less remarkable than rapid. The relative value of Latin verse and prose composition is nearly reversed. A more moderate and accurate estimate of the value of Latin versification has been formed in recent times. By few now would it be regarded as the sole test of Latin scholarship. And if a single test were taken, by few would it be regarded as the surest and most satisfactory. One of the most hopeful educational tendencies of the times is, that this change has taken place among the most intellectual of English scholars. On this point there exists the recorded opinion of one truly great English scholar, one of European repute, who, as men would say, has perished before his time, in the full prime and plenitude of his intellectual manhood, but not before he penetrated into provinces of human speculation, where no pioneer ever led the way, and not until he threw on themes untouched before the lustre of a strong and steady light. In the preface to his Latin

grammar the late lamented Dr. Donaldson of Trinity College, Cambridge, says, "At the commemoration of our three-hundredth anniversary in 1850, one of the most distinguished scholars in this country, the present Bishop of London, not forgetful of the royal foundation in which his great abilities received their earliest development, instituted a gold medal here for the encouragement of Latin prose composition, *which, as he justly remarked,* is much *neglected in England.*" Again, in the Varronianus, "examiners at the universities, and bishops at their ordinations, have publicly complained that they very rarely meet with a young man who can write tolerably good Latin prose. And among our amateur scholars, while some cannot write a page without inaccuracy, there are certainly not many whose Latin style will bear a comparison with that of Ernesti, Rhunken, Garatoni, F. A. Wolf, and Wyttenbach. It is required that the competitor should be familiar with what Porson, Elmsley, and Herman have written on the text of Euripides, but it is not implied that he must have studied the notes of Drakenborch on Livy, or the miscellaneous observations of Gronovius. I should rejoice if among the contemplated reforms of our Universities, we could revive the discipline of our divinity schools, strenuously refusing the honours of the highest faculty to all who cannot maintain a disputation in precise and accurate Latinity." At no period was Latin prose more neglected in England than in the age of Dr. Johnson, neither before nor afterwards. Personally, as an original composer, the same defence may be made for him which was made for Milton, with the fine sense

and in the brilliant style of Macaulay. "The book itself will not add much to the fame of Milton. It is like all his Latin works well written, though not exactly in the style of the prize essays of Oxford and Cambridge. There is no elaborate imitation of classical antiquity, no scrupulous purity, none of the ceremonial cleanness which characterizes the diction of our academical pharisees. The author does not attempt to polish and brighten his composition into the Ciceronian gloss and brilliancy. He does not, in short, sacrifice sense and spirit to pedantic refinements. The nature of his subject compelled him to use many words—

'That would have made Quintilian stare and gasp.'

But he writes with as much ease and freedom as if Latin were his mother tongue; and where he is least happy, his failure seems to arise from the carelessness of a native, and not from the ignorance of a foreigner. We may apply to him what Denham, with great felicity, says of Cowley, 'He wears the garb, but not the clothes of the ancients.'"

It is not the original composition of Zumpt that is the subject of these strictures. Besides the grammar by which his name is so well and widely known, he has made very various additions, in the shape of editions and disquisitions, to classical literature. No scholar at all competent and candid will hesitate to admit that these additions are real acquisitions. In these he may have merited much more than the modified praise which Macaulay has bestowed on Milton in reference to the

style of his Latin works. In these he may have written the Latin language, like Erasmus and Muretus, with all the elegance and ease of a vernacular. In these, disdaining to borrow, and declining to follow, drawing the true metallic ore from the deep virgin mine of invention, casting it in his own mould, he may have left on it the durable impress of his individuality and intellectual independence. But however much to be admired and desired is the faculty of invention in original composition, it is neither desired nor required in translation or exposition. That which is required in an expositor is not the faculty of invention, but the faculty of interpretation. The expositor is not responsible for the doctrine of his author, but he is responsible for his meaning. He has to discover his author's meaning, by discovering, not inventing, the principles on which he constructs his sentences. The meaning must be given without addition, alteration, or amendment. There are few, perhaps, so presumptuous as to presume to amend Cicero by alteration; but Zumpt, by failing to apprehend the principle on which he has constructed a peculiar class of sentences, has missed the meaning and marred the beauty of one of the most striking in their number. It has been already seen above that Catullus wrote—

> At mihi *nullus* erat, neque hic neque illic,
> Fractum *qui* veteris pedem grabati
> In collo collocare sibi posset.

And Cicero wrote—

> *Nulla* est enim natio, *quam pertimescamus*—
> *Nullus* rex, *qui* bello populo Romano facere *possit.*

And most conclusively of all—

Qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi petunt, iis *nihil* potest videri malum, *quod* naturae necessitas *afferat.*

Zumpt, therefore, in ascribing "Nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum," affiliates on Cicero what the great master of Roman eloquence would have repudiated as bad, barbarous, and bastard Latin. Cicero, according to his uniform practice, would of course have written Nihil in malis duco, quod a deo sit constitutum.

The meaning of Zumpt's Latin is this :—

Nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum.	I consider nothing (the impalpable abstraction known by that name) as one among evils, and it has been appointed by God.

The meaning of Cicero's Latin is :—

Nihil in malis duco, *quod* a deo *sit* constitutum.	I do not consider anything in the light of an evil which has been appointed by God, *i.e.*, I don't think anything exists as an evil which combines the *condition* of being appointed by God.

The difference between these two interpretations is striking and significant. But it is not more striking and significant than the difference that subsists between the indicative and subjunctive moods. That difference is a

difference not of degree but of nature. It is not an artificial distinction without an actual difference. Men might call the indicative the subjunctive, and the subjunctive the indicative, but the relation would remain the same. They stand to each other as fact and conception, existence and non-existence, certainty and non-certainty, *absolute predication*, and *conditional limitation*. Reason recognises and ratifies the difference in every language that has been subjected to the action of careful and constant culture and the great law of logical development. Reason requires the difference in every language that has not been subjected to adequate culture and development.

The sentence "Nihil in malis duco, quod a deo est constitutum," though commonly considered classical, and accepted as such with the most confiding and complacent credulity, has about as much claim to that ancient ancestry as an upper or nether mill-stone manufactured by a modern or mediæval mason, has to be regarded as a marble masterpiece by Phidias or Proxiteles. The sentence is equally faulty and false in its syntax and in its sentiment. The sense of Cicero has been sacrificed to a theoretical power, which never either had influence or existence save in the imagination of its inventor. The opposition that has been offered to it here has not been dictated by the carping spirit of a fastidious and pedantic purism, but demanded by the righteous requirements of reason. The dispute is not about words but things. It is not the form of thought that is concerned, but the thought itself. The issue raised is not

as to the formal enunciation of the proposition, but to the substance of the proposition itself. The question, in fine, is, whether sense or nonsense shall gain the ascendant.

The two canons of Zumpt which have been the subject of these lengthened strictures, are neither founded on fact nor rooted in reason. Indeed it has been shown that one of the first conditions of their success is the sacrifice of the sense of those sentences to which they are supposed to be applicable. Moreover, the facts and phenomena which they are supposed to explain can be accounted for on principles much more simple and satisfactory.

Like rotten timber on a landscape, fit neither for ornament nor use, these rules mar by their presence the symmetry of a system of syntax, which, despite the blunders it contains, has nevertheless done distinguished service to the cause of ancient letters.

These rules are :—

[545.] "The subjunctive is used in propositions which are introduced into others, when they form an essential part of the statement implied in the accusative with the infinitive."

Mos est Athenis laudari in concione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti.—Cic., *Orat.* 44.

Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum coelum suspeximus, coelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur.—Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 2.

[547.] "Clauses introduced into a proposition which is expressed by the subjunctive, are likewise in the subjunctive, when they are to be considered as an essential part of the leading proposition, being included in the purpose, request, precept, or command of another person, or with (*si*) in the supposed circumstances; *e.g.*, Rex imperavit, ut, quae bello opus essent, pararentur."

Eo simus animo, ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a deo immortali, vel a natura constitutum.—Cic., *Tusc.* i. *in fin.*

Memoria erat (Hortensius) quantum in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut, quae secum commentatus esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet, quibus cogitavisset. —Cic., *Brut.* 88.

There is a certain class of sentences which contain a negative and a relative clause, and yet this relative is joined with the indicative. The class is such in number and in nature as to deserve especial notice here. This class is often confounded with the class described and defined above; and inasmuch as Cicero in the one case uses the indicative, and in the other case uses the subjunctive, the inference has been drawn that Cicero wrote at random, and not by rule. Cicero never wrote with more rigid adherence to rule, and in more rigid accordance with the requirements of reason, than when he used the indicative with the one class of sentences, and the subjunctive with the other. No one who can distinguish between an accident and the constituent of a sentence, between an adventitious circumstance and

an essential characteristic, will fail to distinguish between these two classes of sentences. So soon as the exact specific quality of each is seen, so soon will it be seen that there is only a superficial semblance of reality, but no real resemblance. The only connexion between them is that of contrast. Not only is there a distinction, but a real difference. The one class is not only different from the other, but even discordant. The following sentences from Cicero present specimens of a negative followed by a relative clause with the indicative :—

Nemo justus esse potest, qui dolorem, qui exilium, qui egestatem timet.—*Off.* ii. 11.

Nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectae perfecto functus est munere.—*Tusc.* lib. i. 45.

Nemo potest non beatissimus esse, cui nihil deest.—*Parad.* iv. 7.

In every one of these sentences the relative clause contains a definition or description, but not a *condition*, and is consequently coupled with the indicative. Instead of the relative clause and its verb, which do not constitute the essential characteristic of the sentence, the participle might be substituted without doing substantial injustice to the meaning. Hence the entire sentence consists virtually of a main clause with an absolute negative. The indicative mood is the right mood in the right place in such a case. The negation is precisely parallel to the Greek *ου*, and does not extend beyond its own clause.

Nemo justus esse potest, dolorem, exilium, egestatem, timens.

Nemo parum diu vixit, virtutis perfectae perfecto functus munere.

Nemo potest non beatissimus esse, nihil carens.

How different, or rather discordant, is the class of sentences represented by such as the following :—

Nihil in malis ducimus, quod sit vel a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum.—Cic., *Tusc.* i. *in fin.*

Qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi petunt, iis nihil potest esse videri malum, quod naturae necessitas afferat.—Cic., *Cato Major*, ii.

Nulla est enim natio, quam pertimescamus.—Cic., *in Cat.* Orat. ii. cap. 5.

Nullus rex, qui bellum populo Romano facere possit. —*Id.*

Nullum tetigit quod non ornaret (improved reading of Goldsmith's epitaph).

The essential characteristic of these sentences, their exact specific quality, consists in the combination of two co-ordinate clauses, the one of which is the complement of the other. The first is absolute, and consequently coupled with the indicative ; the second contains a condition, and consequently is coupled with the subjunctive. The relative clause does not, as in the preceding class of sentences, contain a description or definition, but only a condition. In this case the subjunctive mood is the right mood in the right place. The relative and its verb constituting the essential

characteristic of the sentence could not be converted into the participle, without the beauty of the sentence being utterly marred, and the peculiar meaning missed. It is quite true a condition is sometimes expressed by a participle, but that is with the ablative absolute, which is, of course, wholly inadmissible here. The negative, inasmuch as it is followed by a subjective condition, has its influence extended beyond its own clause, and presents an analogous parallel to the usage of the Greek particle μη.

The usage of a condition expressed by the subjunctive preceded by a negative and the indicative, is not restricted to the relative. The two following passages from writers of the golden age of Roman literature—one from Cæsar, one from Virgil—have been spared mutilation by copyists and commentators—those literary Goths and Vandals, who, in their wanton assaults on its noble language, have oftener than once wrought the destruction of Rome :—

His rebus adducti, *non prius* Viridovicem, reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt, *quam* ab his *concessum sit*, arma uti capiant, et ad castra contendant.—*De Bel. Gal.* iii. 18.

Nec prius absistit, quam septem ingentia victor
Corpora *fundat* humi, et numerum cum navibus *aequet*.
Æn. i. 192.

It has been already remarked that Zumpt was either ignorant of or ignored the doctrine of the "predicate in the relative clause." Of course, it would have fallen

to be considered in connexion with the sentence, "Eo simus animo ut nihil in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a deo immortali vel a natura constitutum." The late Dr. Carson, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, would have referred this sentence to Rule ii. p. 42, in his famous treatise on "Qui, Quae, Quod." "The relative *qui*, when it refers to an interrogative, negative, indefinite, requires the subjunctive. This rule, like the preceding, takes effect only when the relative clause expresses the predicate of the sentence." This rule has nothing in common with Zumpt's rule, of which the sentence last quoted is cited as a confirmatory example. Both rules are different—both, therefore, cannot be right. Zumpt's rule has been fully discussed, and finally disposed of. It is now time to examine Carson's with equal care and at equal length.

The consideration of the "predicate" in the relative clause has been connected here with the name of Dr. Carson, because such extreme prominence has been given to that doctrine by him, that his treatise seems to have been expressly composed for its establishment and extension.

The same doctrine is most unquestionably taught in Dr. Melvin's "Latin Exercises,"—a work which has had a large circulation, especially in the north of Scotland; but though the exercises are the genuine and authentic product of Dr. Melvin's mind, the "Notes and Dissertations," in which the doctrine of the predicate is taught, are, as stated in the title-page, the product of Peter Calder, M.A. It would be altogether unwarrantable to

make the predicate the subject of criticism in connexion with the name of Dr. Melvin. The only genuine, authentic work, issuing from the press under his eye and bearing the impress of his name, which the author has seen, is a Latin Grammar. In that work prosody rather than syntax is in the ascendant. The inflexions and terminations of the Latin language, rather than the principles of its syntax, the forms of words rather than the forms of thought, are the subject of disquisition. It is much to be regretted that one, who had himself so much of the stern simplicity of the old Roman, who, according to the testimony of those who knew him best, possessed the faculty of clear intellectual vision, developed in high perfection, who laboured so devotedly in the cause of ancient learning, and, to the latest day of a long life, loved it with the freshness and fervour of a maiden ardour, should not have given to the world, in a genuine and authentic form, the results of his matured reflections and convictions on the doctrine of the predicate and the doctrine of the incorporated subjunctive clause.

To the treatise entitled "Qui, Quae, Quod," no disadvantages attach, arising either from the precarious transmission of the doctrines it contains, or from imperfect editorial supervision, or from posthumous publication. Of the condition in which, and the circumstances under which, it was given to the world, it is most satisfactory to take the testimony of its author himself. "Almost the whole has been written anew: the doctrines formerly laid down have been carefully re-

considered; additional passages, which were regarded as subversive of the rules, or furnishing conclusive evidence of their uncertainty, have been quoted without reserve; and such explanations of them proposed as may satisfy or lessen the doubts of the most scrupulous."—*Pref.*, Second Edition.

The tone of this statement will "satisfy the most scrupulous" as to the completeness of Dr. Carson's assurance in his own conclusions, but it will not "satisfy the most scrupulous" as to the cogency of his argument.

But let Dr. Carson state his own argument, and make application of it:—

"Let a few sentences as simple as possible, be selected or formed by the teacher, such as *Est qui amet, there is some one or other who loves,* no boy of ordinary capacity will find much difficulty in understanding that the affirmation, or thing affirmed, concerning some person (aliquis) is, that *he loves.* Now the words that convey this assertion are the relative and its verb; or, more shortly, these constitute the relative clause. The relative clause, accordingly, forms or contains the predicate of this sentence. Again, if it be said, *miser est, qui amat,* Plaut., *Pers.* ii. 1, 10, *he who loves is miserable,* it is affirmed that some one is miserable; *est miser,* therefore, as containing the assertion, is the predicate; and if the question be asked, who is miserable? the obvious answer, *he who loves,* affords the *subject* concerning which the affirmation is made."—*Qui, Quae, Quod,* p. 14. In reference to the first of these two sentences, *est qui*

amet, it is stated that the affirmation made in it is, *he loves;* that the words that convey this assertion are the relative and its verb; and that the relative clause, accordingly, contains the predicate. In reference to the second sentence, *miser est qui amat*, it is stated that "it is affirmed that some one is miserable; *est miser*, therefore, as containing the assertion, is the predicate." In the one sentence, *qui amet*, constitutes the predicate; in the other sentence, *est miser*, constitutes the predicate, *i.e.*, in the one case the predicate is found with the subjunctive mood, in the other case it is found with the indicative mood. How can predication in the clause, *est qui amet*, produce the subjunctive mood, since predication in the clause, *miser est*, permits the indicative mood? But it may be said that it is only predication with *qui* that requires the subjunctive mood. This objection is easily overruled by the obvious answer, that there can be no peculiarity about *qui* requiring the subjunctive in such sentences, since *qui* is merely a pronoun equal to *et is*, the latter of which words is the nominative to *est* in the clause, *miser est*, where the predicate is admitted to be. Predication being thus common to the two moods, what is their difference? In this case they seem to be interchangeable. But the license would be contrary to all analogy and all usage. It has been seen that there is a broad and fundamental distinction between *si* with the indicative mood and *si* with the subjunctive mood, and that generally the distinction drawn between the two moods is the distinction drawn between fact and conception, between an authen-

tic act and allegation, between certainty and uncertainty, between truth and falsehood, between absolute assertion and conditional limitation.

Predication proper, mere predication, seems rather to be the peculiar property of the indicative mood. The indicative mood, as its name implies, is the mood of declaration or predication.

The doctrine of "the predicate in the relative clause," seems to be the fundamental article of faith, and the key-stone of the system in the treatise entitled "Qui, Quae, Quod." Its presence is represented as the invariable concomitant, and the essential condition of the subjunctive mood after "sum, reperio, invenio, habeo, adsum, desum, venio."

It is stated "*qui* commonly requires the subjunctive after *est, sunt, fuerunt,* when these and other portions of the verb *esse* denote existence merely, and are followed by no other predicate than the relative clause."—Page 2.

"Now it must be observed that neither this, nor any sentence constructed in a similar manner, falls under our rule, which, as it is distinctly stated, applies to such sentences only as have the relative clause for their predicate."—Page 14.

"The reader who has sufficiently adverted to the principles of the preceding rules, and the observations by which we have endeavoured to guard them, will hardly need to be told, that here also the relative clause must of necessity exhibit the predicate of the sentence."—Page 50.

" This rule, like all the preceding, exacts the indispensable condition that the relative clause should be the predicate, not the subject."—Page 62.

And, lastly, " Hi sunt qui vitia tradunt, et alio aliunde transferunt ; pessimum genus hominum videbatur, qui verba gestarent : sunt quidam qui vitia gestant."—Sen., *Ep.* 123, 7. In this sentence various particulars besides *sunt quidam* attract notice. Why, it may be asked, is *sunt qui* not followed by *tradant?* Because the relative clause is not the predicate, but forms a part of the subject of the sentence."—Page 10.

Here it is stated that " *sunt qui* is only not followed by *tradant,* because the relative clause is not the predicate," *i.e.* to say, the presence of the predicate in the relative clause is not the concomitant and condition only, but the whole and sole cause of the subjunctive mood.

Let that be granted which has been sought so incessantly and importunately. Supposing that the predicate is the cause of the subjunctive mood in a certain class of sentences, is that cause a sufficient and satisfactory cause ? It has been laid down as a fundamental principle in this treatise, that a common affinity should be apparent in the different usages of the subjunctive mood. In accordance with this principle it is asked what is the connexion between " the predicate in the relative clause" requiring the subjunctive mood, and the employment of the subjunctive mood in reported or indirect speech ? The Romans themselves, whose practice on the point at

issue ought to be conclusive and decisive, seem to have been guided by a very obvious principle—the principle of drawing a distinction between things that *are* and things that are *not*. It is a tenet in certain systems of German metaphysics that being and not being are convertible terms. This tenet had no place in Roman philosophy, or at least in Roman practice. The following usages of the subjunctive mood, though different, are not discordant. The actual affinity is very apparent.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood in reporting the speech or opinion of another, because it was *not* his own and might *not* be true.

" Socrates accusatus est, quod *corrumperet* juventutem, et novas superstitiones *induceret*."—Quintil., iv. 4.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to intimate what was *not* the real reason of an action, and the indicative mood to indicate what was the real reason.

" Pugiles in jactandis coestibus ingemiscunt, non quod *doleant*, sed quia profundenda voce omne corpus intenditur."—Cic., *Tusc.* ii. 23.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to intimate an act mentally conceived but *not* actually completed.

" *Non* tamen eripuere se hosti : haerens in terga Romanus, *prius quam* fores portarum *objicerentur*, velut agmine uno irrumpit."—Livy, i. 19.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to

intimate that a person did *not exist* fulfilling certain improbable conditions.

" Quis genus Æneadum, quis Trojae *nesciat* urbem,
Virtutesque, virosque, aut tanti incendia belli ?"
Vir., *Æn.* i. 565.

" Quis enim rem tam veterem pro certo *affirmet ?* "
Livy, i. 3.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to intimate that a result had *not* been realized—one altogether repudiated.

" Neque tam timidus fui ut, qui in maximis turbinibus ac fluctibus reipublicae navem gubernassem, salvam que in portu collocassem, frontis tuae nubeculam aut collegae tui contaminatum spiritum *pertimescerem.*"—Cic., *in Pis.* ix.

In another form equally emphatic.

" Tantum autem *abest* ab eo, ut malummors *sit,* quod tibi dudum videbatur, ut verear, ne homini nihil sit non malum aliud certe, sed nihil bonum aliud potius, si quidem vel dii ipsi vel cum diis futuri sumus."—Cic., *Tusc.* i. 31.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to intimate that a result was almost but *not* altogether realized.

" Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit; quibus angustiis ipse Cæsar a Venetis prematur, docet; *neque longius abesse quin* proxima nocte, Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum *ducat,* et ad

Caesarem, auxilii ferendi causa, *proficiscatur.*"—Caes., *De Bel. Gal.* iii. 19.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood to intimate a purpose, because that purpose *might never* be effected.

" Ex his delecti Delphos deliberatum missi sunt, qui *consulerent* Apollinem."—Nep., *Mil.* i.

Roman writers employed the pluperfect subjunctive with *si* (a negative rhetorical hypothesis) to intimate that the supposition could *not* be a reality.

" Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Trojam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, *si*, Lycomedem apud quem educatus erat, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem, audire *voluisset.*"—Cic., *Lael.* xx.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood with *quasi*, to intimate a condition *not* consistent with reality.

Cujus sermone ita tam cupide fruebar, *quasi* jam *divinarem* id, quod evenit, illo extincto fore, unde discerem, neminen.—Cic., *Cat. Maj.* iv.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood with tanquam, to intimate a conception *not* consistent with reality.

Meliora ac plura reponit
Persicus orborum lautissimus, et merito jam
Suspectus, tanquam ipse suas *incenderit* aedes.
Juv., *Sat.* iii. 220.

Roman writers employed the subjunctive mood with *utinam*, to intimate a wish which could not be realized :—

> Aspice vultus
> Ecce meos, *utinam*que oculos in pectora *posses*
> Inserere, et patrias intus deprendere curas !
> Ovid, *Met.* ii. 92.

What connexion has the "predicate in the relative clause" with all these sentences, or indeed with any one of them ? This is a question which all believers in this doctrine are bound to answer. Admitting that "the predicate is in the relative clause," why should this circumstance require the subjunctive ? Tradition tells us that the learned and logical Leibnitz, who divides with Newton the glory of the discovery of the differential calculus, had a correspondent—a lady—who was not satisfied with the "wherefore" on any disputed point, but required the "why" of the wherefore as well. This lady must have been an Aristotle or Sir William Hamilton in logic, compared with the propounder of the doctrine of the "predicate in the relative clause." If the common opinion—that the "predicate in the relative clause" in a certain class of sentences is the concomitant and cause of the subjunctive mood—be correct, then this usage of the subjunctive must be shown to be connected and consistent with the other usages of the subjunctive. These usages have been shown to be closely connected and consistent with each other. They are different, but not discordant.

In the sentences quoted above, the negative implied in the subjunctive mood is so obvious as to occur to the most ordinary observer. In the following usages the presence of the negative is not patent, but latent.

1. Comparatives with the subjunctive mood :—

Ferocior oratio visa est, quam *quae* habenda apud regem *esset.*—Livy, xxxi. 18.

Major sum quam *cui possit* fortuna nocere.—Ovid, *Met.* vi. 195.

Here, in the clauses—*Ferocior*, quam *quae* habenda apud regem *esset ; Major* quam *cui possit* fortuna nocere—the subjunctive mood represents results which are *not* realized.

2. "Dignus," with the subjunctive mood :—

Perhaps the marvellous mechanism of that most expressive instrument—the subjunctive mood—is not so beautifully and delicately illustrated by any usage, out of so many, as by its usage with the word "dignus." This word is the same in meaning and etymology as the Greek word *αξιος*. Its primary, and perhaps proper, signification is "worth as much." It very often implies "deserving" a distinction which is either never obtained, or may never be obtained. The former is its import, in the following well-known passage from Xenophon :—

Κῦρος μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀνὴρ ὢν Περσῶν τῶν μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον γενομένων βασιλικώτατός τε καὶ

ἄρχειν ἀξιώτατος, ὡς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται τῶν Κύρου δοκούντων ἐν πείρᾳ γενέσθαι.—Anab., lib. i. c. ix. 1.

The declaration of the historian is, that Cyrus deserved to rule as a king. In anticipation of victory, he had already been saluted king by his admiring followers. *Προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτόν* is the statement made by Xenophon, in a passage preceding the one quoted above. It was his fate, however, to fall on the field of battle. *Ἀξιώτατος ἄρχειν*, a Roman writer would have accurately and adequately rendered by "dignus qui regnaret,"—a happier and more honourable destiny than that described in the words relative to one who had reigned "Capax imperii nisi imperasset."

Dignus with *qui* and the subjunctive is used by Virgil in similar circumstances, with signal propriety and beauty :—

Primus init bellum Tyrrhenis asper ab oris
Contemptor divorum, Mezentius, agminaque armat.
Filius huic juxta Lausus, quo pulchrior alter,
Non fuit, excepto Laurentis corpore Turni.
Lausus equum domitor, debellatorque ferarum.
Ducit Agyllina nequicquam ex urbe secutos
Mille viros : *dignus* patriis *qui* laetior *esset*,
Imperiis, et *cui* pater haud Mezentius *esset*.

Æn., vii. 647.

The subjunctives in the two last lines imply, in a manner too manifest to be mistaken, that Lausus had *not* either the father or the fate he deserved.

3. Qui with the subjunctive implying a *partial* negative.

"When the sentence introduced by the relative contains the reason of what precedes, the verb is put in the subjunctive. The connexion between such sentences may also be expressed by 'because' or 'since,' instead of the relative."—Zumpt [564].

Alexander, quum in Sigeo ad Achillis tumulum adstitisset, O fortunate, inquit, adolescens, qui tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris.—Cic., *ad Fam.* vii. 30.

Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander. From all accounts it would appear he had his pupil well up in Greek, and was more successful in inspiring him with a love of Homer, than the tutor of Lord Byron was in inspiring him with a love of Horace. Lord Byron could never remember with delight when a man, what he had read with disgust when a boy. The scenes of the *Iliad* were recalled by Alexander with feelings as fresh and as fond as when they were first read. Alexander's admiration of Homer arose from his acquaintance with him. He must have known that passage in the first book of the *Iliad*, where Achilles is called the "most miserable of men :"—

> Νῦν δ' ἅμα τ' ὠκύμορος καὶ ὀϊζυρὸς περὶ πάντων
> Ἔπλεο, τῷ σε κακῇ, αἶσῃ, τέκον ἐν μεγαροισι.
>
> Line 417.

And that well-known passage in the *Odyssey* :—

Extol not death to me, illustrious chief,
For rather would I toil on earth for hire,
The bonded servant of some needy swain,
Than rule supreme o'er all the shadowy host.
xi. 487.

Alexander's accurate knowledge of the condition of Achilles indicated by these two passages, and the general nature of the subjunctive mood, are inconsistent with the meaning of "since," or "inasmuch," usually attached to the relative in the sentence,—"O fortunate, inquit, adolescens, *qui* tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem *inveneris*."

Its true force is, "in so far as." This interpretation satisfies both the syntax and the sense. Alexander does not say that Achilles was absolutely and altogether happy, but "only in so far as he had found in Homer the herald of his valour."

4. *Unus* with *qui* and subjunctive mood :—

The last usage of the subjunctive mood to be noted is with the word *unus*. Perhaps no single word is better fitted to show what really lies at the root of the "predicate in the relative clause" than *unus*, meaning "one only," followed by the relative and the subjunctive. Its usage, when contrasted with the usage of its corresponding ordinal primus, is very remarkable :—

"*Una* est, quae *reparet*, seque ipsa *reseminet* ales.
Assyrii Phoenica vocant; non fruge nec herbis
Sed turis lacrymis et succo vivit amomi."
Ovid, *Met.* xv. 319.

There is one bird, and one only, which combines the condition of "renewing and reproducing" itself. All others are excluded. The peculiar condition attaching to the phoenix, and the exclusion of all other birds, account for the subjunctive mood.

The usage of the ordinal of *unus—primus*—is very different, and the usage of the two words is different, simply because their meaning is discordant. Since *primus* implies neither negation nor condition, it consequently is used absolutely with the indicative mood, and not followed by *qui* with the subjunctive mood. "To express the first person who did a thing, the Romans did not use a relative sentence, but made *primus* agree with the nominative of the principal verb."—Arnold's *L. P. Composition*, 54.

The following sentence taken from the "Notes on Melvin's Latin Exercises," furnishes a fine illustration of *primus* in connexion with the doctrine of "the predicate in the relative clause."

"Incolarum Siciliae de quibus quidquam ad Graecorum aures pervenerat, primi fuerunt Cyclopes et Laestrigones."—P. 32.

If ever a sentence had its predicate in the relative clause, it is this sentence. It is not "the Cyclops and the Laestrigons were the first inhabitants of Sicily," but "the first of whom anything had reached the ears of the Greeks." It is quite clear that mere predication with the relative does not produce the subjunctive. *It is the nature of the* predication, *and not predication itself*

that regulates the mood. If the predication is of an absolute nature, it requires the indicative mood; if the predication is of a negative or conditional character, it requires the subjunctive mood.

Almost all the sentences adduced by Dr. Carson illustrative of the doctrine of " the predicate in the relative clause," contain either a negative or an indefinite. The nature of a conditional negative which requires the subjunctive, as contradistinguished from an absolute negative which requires the indicative, has been fully explained in connexion with the " essential part theory" of Zumpt. The nature of indefinite predication may be seen by an examination of the expression, " sunt qui dicant." If Cicero deemed it desirable to employ the subjunctive mood in the sentence, " est aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur," after an indefinite antecedent, surely there is still greater reason to use the subjunctive mood in the form of expression, " sunt qui dicant," where there is no antecedent at all. *The function of* qui *in the grammatical economy is to represent its antecedent, to receive its character, and in return to reflect it.* At one time a Roman writer, when his knowledge of facts enables him, or his inclination disposes him, may employ the relative with the indicative mood to make an absolute and specific predication; at another time, from choice or constraint, he may employ the relative with the subjunctive mood, to make a conditional or indefinite predication.

The difference between a definite predication with the relative and indicative, and an indefinite predication

with the relative and subjunctive, is clearly marked by the two following sentences from Cæsar. They are from the same chapter. The one is immediately followed by the other. In the one sentence several nations not known or named by Cæsar, are described by the relative with the subjunctive mood; in the other sentence, certain nations both known and named by him, are described by the relative with the indicative mood. Probably the discovery of the great doctrine of "the predicate in the relative clause," had not dawned on the mind of Julius, mighty though it was.

"His rebus gestis, omni Gallia pacata, tanta hujus belli ad Barbaros opinio perlata est, ut ab nationibus *quae* trans Rhenum *incolerent*, mitterentur legati ad Caesarem, qui se obsides daturos, imperata facturos, pollicerentur.

"Ipse, in Carnutes, Andes, Turones, *quae* civitates propinquae his locis *erant*, ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hyberna deductis, in Italiam profectus est."—*De Bel. Gal.* iii. 36.

But the true value of the doctrine of "the predicate in the relative clause," cannot be fully apprehended and appreciated, till once it is applied to those sentences in which neither a negative nor an indefinite is to be found. The only sentence of those quoted by Dr. Carson, in illustration and confirmation of his theory, whose context the author has discovered, is the following one from Tacitus:—

There was one Bebius Massa present, who knew him, (one) of the governors of Africa, and even at that time fatally pernicious to every worthy character.—*Qui, Quae, Quod,* p. 41.

Aderat, qui nosceret, Bebius Massa, e procuratoribus Africae, jam tum optimo cuique exitiosus.

It is quite manifest that this sentence is mutilated, because it is meaningless. The conclusion is not consistent with the commencement. The conclusion contains a declaration that Bebius Massa was " a great villain" at that time, *i.e.*, when he was present on some occasion or other. But surely mere presence, without participation or perpetration, could never of itself constitute that deep criminality, which the historian by the succeeding description desired and designed to brand with his condemnation. The first word, *namque*, in the context of Tacitus, is omitted in the extract of Dr. Carson. This conjunction, of all others, implies the closest connexion between what precedes it and what succeeds it. It throws much light on the clause most closely concerned here, " qui nosceret," which succeeds it. But its full force cannot be felt till the clause which precedes it is produced. This being done, the sentence stands thus,—"Nec multo post Piso interficitur: namque aderat, qui nosceret, Bebius Massa, e procuratoribus Africae, jam tunc optimo cuique exitiosus." Taking Dr. Carson's translation of " aderat qui nosceret Bebius Massa,"—" there was one Bebius Massa present who knew him,"—

in connexion with the preceding clause just adduced from Tacitus, "nec multo post Piso interficitur," it would seem that the presence of Bebius Massa was merely the proof of the murder of Piso. The presence, however, of this individual, proved a great deal more, as will be seen from the translation of the entire context:—

Sed ubi Festo consternatio vulgi, centurionis supplicium veraque et falsa more famae in majus innotuere, equites in necem Pisonis mittit. Illi raptim vecti, obscuro adhuc coeptae lucis domum proconsulis inrumpunt districtis gladiis, et magna pars Pisonis ignari, quod Poenos auxiliares Maurosque in eam caedem delegerat. Haud procul cubiculo obvium forte servum, quisnam et ubi Piso esset, interrogavere. Servus egregio mendacio se Pisonem esse respondit: ac statim obtruncatur. Nec multo post Piso interficitur; namque aderat qui nosceret, Bebius Massa e procuratoribus Africae, jam tunc optimo cuique exitiosus et inter causas malorum quae mox tulimus saepius rediturus.—Tac., *Hist.* lib. iv. 50.

"But when the dismay of the populace, the capital punishment of the centurion, the true and false circumstances, as is commonly the case with rumour, were exaggerated to Festus, he despatches a body of horsemen to assassinate Piso. These riding at a rapid pace, in the still dim twilight of the dawning day, rush with drawn swords into the dwelling of the pro-consul—a large number of them even strangers to Piso—since he had chosen for that deed of blood a body guard of Carthaginians and Moors. At no great distance from his chamber, meet-

ing a slave by chance, they asked who and where was Piso. The slave, with a notorious lie on his lips, replied that he was Piso, and is butchered on the spot. Not long afterwards Piso also is slain, for Bebius was at hand ready *to recognise* him, one of the governors of Africa, even at that time the deadly enemy of every worthy man, and destined again and again to become the recurring cause of the woes we soon were to suffer."

The murderers, in mistaking the slave for his master, had missed their victim. To preclude the possibility of a similar mistake, Bebius Massa was ready on the spot to point out to the pursuers their prey, "namque aderat qui nosceret." The language of Tacitus implies not that Piso was slain because Bebius Massa was present to identify his dead body, but—"interficitur namque aderat qui nosceret Bebius"—Bebius' presence was essential to the perpetration of the murder, to the identification of the living man. This interpretation accounts for the application of the succeeding epithet to Bebius, "jam tunc optimo cuique exitiosus." Moreover, the very position of *aderat* followed immediately by *qui nosceret*, proves that *qui* introduces a purpose. This purpose constituted his crime. It was his first crime, the forerunner of many more to follow, as Tacitus states, "et in causas malorum quae mox tulimus *saepius* rediturus."

There is no scarcity of similar sentences. Nor need they be taken from sources whose authenticity or genuineness can be disputed, such as described by Dr. Carson—*Qui, Quae, Quod*, p. 22. "Nor ought it to excite much surprise if, notwithstanding the deference we

are generally disposed to pay to the authority of manuscripts, it may be thought justifiable in a few instances to doubt their testimony. Many of them, it is well ascertained, must have been copied from one faulty original. That a few passages in these circumstances should appear to militate against the rule, cannot appear wonderful. But it is not by examples of such questionable authority, nor so inconsiderable in number, that it can be shaken or overthrown. It is supported by an incalculable preponderance of evidence in its favour; and as the preceding remarks sufficiently demonstrate, it is founded not on accident or caprice, *but on the most indispensable of all the laws of language, the necessity of making its expressions a clear and unambiguous vehicle of thought.*"

The two following additional sentences are not "examples of questionable authority," but furnished by Dr. Carson himself. They are contiguous to the sentence taken from Tacitus.

It is much more satisfactory to make a selection of examples from the supporters of the theory, since they are thus not able to take exception to them as not combining all the conditions of their rule.

The meaning of the sentences is very clear, even though there is no context, nor any more definite reference given where it may be found, save the name of the author. Indeed, it is only when the rule, which is stated to be "framed not on caprice or accident, but on the most indispensable of all the laws of language, the necessity of making its expressions a clear and unam-

biguous vehicle of thought," is applied, that the meaning of the sentences becomes mystified. When there is neither negative nor indefinite, the first condition of this rule having its conditions complied with is, that the sense of the writer must be sacrificed.

And not long after a doe came up, which presented its dugs to the infant.	Nec mullo post cerva aderat, *quae* ubera parvulo *offerret.*—Just. *Qui, Quae, Quod,* p. 41.

The sense is, "the doe came up *to present* its dugs to the infant."

There is a person ready at hand, who denies that anything (maintains that nothing) can be perceived by the senses.	Praesto est, *qui neget,* rem ullam percipi posse sensibus.--Cic. *Id.*, p. 41.

The sense is, and the syntax corresponds—

"There is a person at hand *ready to deny* that anything can be perceived by the senses."

The sacrifice of the sense to the syntax is no doubt a costly sacrifice. The theory of the predicate, however, is so beautiful, its supporters seem to think, that the price paid is not too high. They seem to think that the language is not greater than the theory; that the language was made for the theory. But what if, after all, the sacrifice has been made in vain, and the first condition of the rule has not been complied with! What if, in that fine passage in Tacitus, as is the case with his peculiar style, where more is

suggested than is said, where the great master of dramatic accessories, and picturesque scenic presentation, sketches only the outline of the picture, and leaves the completion to the imagination, the meaning has been mistaken, and yet "the predicate is not in the relative clause." Taking the definition of predicate and subject as given by Watts, and adopted by Carson (*Qui, Quae, Quod*, p. 13), "The predicate is that which is affirmed of the subject; the subject of a proposition is that concerning which anything is affirmed or denied," in the sentence from Tacitus which has been analysed: "Bebius Massa qui nosceret aderat;" translated thus: "Bebius Massa, who knew him, was present," Bebius Massa *qui nosceret*, is the subject, and *aderat* is the predicate. This is a sentence cited in confirmation and illustration of a rule by Dr. Carson, who thus himself states its conditions (p. 13, Obs. 2): —"In order that the rule may hold, the relative clause must necessarily express what is affirmed respecting the nominative to *est* or *sunt*; or, *logically*, the relative clause must contain the predicate, not the subject of the sentence." The relative clause in Dr. Carson's own sentence does not contain the predicate; where, then, is the logic? Even if the predicate were always in the relative clause, and the subjunctive mood employed, where would the *logic* be? For what connexion is there between "the predicate in the relative clause" and reported speech? The exclamation of Madame Roland is well known—"O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!" With not less truth may it be said,

O Logic, what fallacies, perpetrated despite thy dictates, have been consecrated by thy name! The scholars who have imported logic to defend the doctrine of the "predicate," resemble the Irish during the old war with the English, who laid up their corn in a *church*, under the superstitious belief that the sanctity of the place would render it safe. The invocation of logic in defence of the "predicate" is a homage to intellect analogous to the maxim of Rochefoucauld—"Hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue." Frequently as these famous words, "a delusion, a mockery, and a snare" —ascribed to the late Lord Denman—have been applied, never have they found fitter application than when now applied to the doctrine of "the predicate in the relative clause." The original propounder of this theory, whoever he may have been, was certainly not the wisest of men, but he must have looked wiser than all other men, to make so many strong men believe in a fiction, and bow down with their intellect before an idol of the imagination.

Never was name applied with a more rigid regard to the nature of its import, than was the name of Rome. Rome was emphatically and essentially the city of "strength." The character of her citizens seems to have conformed to the configuration of her surrounding situation. The rocky rampart of the seven hills, under the shadow of whose broad shield the city securely lay, seemed at once the guardian genius of the place, and the significant symbol of its strength. The aristocracy of nations could have had no more appropriate attend-

ant than the aristocracy of nature. Once, indeed, at a critical crisis in her chequered history, under the sore pressure of a terrible calamity, with the prospect almost of annihilation, it was proposed to transfer the seat of government from Rome to the neighbouring town of Veii. The timid counsel was wisely overruled, and one more worthy of her origin and destiny obtained the ascendant. Rome would almost sooner have ceased to exist than cease to be true to herself. Never did her valour and her virtues shine with a brighter light than in the dark day of her trial and of her affliction. It was only by such discipline that that rare capacity for enterprise and endurance was engendered which enabled her, secure in self-reliance, at last to bid defiance to her foes. Camillus, equal to the emergency, whose character was cast in the true Roman mould, of that rare temper and nerve with which nature endues her heroes, animated by a spirit which rose with the storm that raged around, with the feelings of a patriot and the sagacity of a statesman, fully aware of the advantages attaching to natural situation, and fully alive to the charms of ancient association, succeeded in teaching his countrymen never to despair of the republic—in teaching them that with tribes as with trees there is a time when it is not safe to transplant them—to try their fortune on the banks of the Tiber, and under the base of the Capitol. Had it been otherwise, how different might have been the history of the human race. From that city there have emanated separately and successively three empires, which have exercised a deep

and durable influence in moulding the destinies of men. The first empire was a material and military organization. It grew with a giant's growth, till it almost grasped within its wide embrace the territories and tribes that extended from the Grampians to the Ganges. That empire, after having fulfilled the great function of its existence and extension—the fusion of the nations of the earth into one for the reception of the Christian faith—has passed away. Another empire has emanated from Rome, which has the seat of its supremacy in the hearts of men—the Romish faith. Of its vitality no one, who has read the famous description of the traveller from New Zealand "taking his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's," requires to be told. There is still a third empire which has emanated from Rome, more excellent and more enduring than either of these—the empire of the Latin literature and the Latin language. That language has indeed long ceased to be a spoken language. But it is not a dead language. From it, as from a fountain ever full, fresh, and flowing, the foremost minds in every age have drawn the sap and strength of their intellectual sinews. It gave life to other languages, but not at the expense of its own existence. Mother of most of the modern languages, it furnishes its masterpieces, venerable indeed with the sanctity of years, but still vigorous with the spirit of youth, as the fittest and finest models for imitation,—models incapable of improvement, and models inaccessible to change.

By its example, it still continues to infuse into the body of the English language the essence of its concentrated energy, without any indications of becoming either exhausted or effete. As the most logical of all languages, it has special claims on the attention of Englishmen. Englishmen are or ought to be its best interpreters. There is no nation which, in so many respects, resembles the ancient Romans, as the English. On each language is graven the genius of its people. Not less clearly was the genius of its people originally graven on the Latin language, than is the genius of its people graven on the English language. Let nothing, then, be added, let nothing be taken away, in presenting to Englishmen the noble language and the noble literature of Rome. Let the simple energy and majesty of the Latin language be reflected in the clear light of common sense; let not the beauty of its marvellous mechanism be marred by a perverse system of interpretation; and let its meaning no longer be mistaken through the dense mist of German metaphysics.

> Sed nos immensum spatiis confecimus aequor
> Et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.

FINIS.

EDINBURGH: T. CONSTABLE,
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN, AND TO THE UNIVERSITY.