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STRICTURES
ON THE
ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL;
IN WHICH THE
HYPOTHESIS

OF THE
REV. DR. WILLIAMS
IS INVESTIGATED.

BY WILLIAM PARRY.

Justitia originalis, non fuit impotentia absoluta peccandi, nec im-
peccantia simpliciter, sed POTENTIA NON PECCANDI.

TURRETTINUS.

Pontificii ut—Pelagianæ Scholæ dogmata sustineant, justitiam hanc
originalem non naturalem faciunt sed supernaturalem, non concreatam sed
adventitiam, non naturæ donum sed gratiæ.

FRID. SPANHEMIUS.



London:

PRINTED BY S. COUCHMAN, THROGMORTON-STREET;
AND SOLD BY T. CONDER, BUCKLESBURY; T. WILLIAMS,
STATIONERS-COURT; J. BURDITT, 60, AND
T. HAMILTON, 37, PATERNOSTER-ROW;
AND R. OGLE, HOLBORN.

1808.
[Price 2s. 6d.]

E R R A T A.

Page 30 line 21, for *doctrine* read *production*.

39 — 2, after *in*, add *one of*.

42 — 3, before *evil* read *natural*.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author of the following Tract was led, by his official duty, to state to the students in theology, under his care, his views of Dr. Williams' hypothesis on the origin of moral evil, soon after it first appeared. Those views were known to several of his highly esteemed friends and brethren in the ministry, who have for some years expressed a wish for their publication. In compliance with that desire, and with a hope that the discussion may be useful, he has extended his examination of the subject, to the form in which it is now submitted to the judgment and candour of the public.

WYMONDLEY-HOUSE,

Herts, Jan. 1, 1808.

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STRICTURES

STRICTURES
ON THE
ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL.

SECTION I.

*Introduction—Limitation of Human Knowledge—
Metaphysics—Quotations from Dr. Williams,
stating his Hypothesis.*

DISQUISITIONS, on subjects of a moral and religious nature, when confined within due bounds, and conducted in a proper manner, are productive of great and important advantages. Calm and impartial discussion, by exciting inquiry, and affording opportunity for the comparison of ideas and the examination of evidence, has, in many instances, eminently subserved the cause of truth. But, while this position is most fully admitted, in favour of free disquisition, on all topics, respecting which satisfactory evidence is attainable, it must be confessed, that, on some subjects, there are boundaries to human knowledge, which investigation cannot pass, concerning which speculation would be at least useless, and peremptory decision presumption.

In physics or natural philosophy, we should not applaud the wisdom, if we could commend the industry, of the man, who directed his labours and studies, to objects which could neither be made the subject of mathematical calculation, nor submitted to the test of experiment; and concerning which, all his reasonings must necessarily be fallible and indecisive, from the total want of data to conduct his inquiries. Many important and useful discoveries have been made, and more may still be made, respecting the phenomena of the natural world, yet there are questions, that curiosity might suggest, concerning the material universe, which philosophy cannot solve, and which learning and science will, probably, never attempt to discuss. Admitting, that the planetary worlds are inhabited, who will presume to ascertain the qualities, dispositions, talents, customs, and pursuits of their inhabitants? As far as a knowledge of the material system, may be subservient to purposes of utility, to the improvement of commerce, the intercourse of nations, and the diversified comforts of civilized life, it is attainable; but it may be observed, as a *general* truth, that where utility terminates, and useless curiosity commences, a boundary seems fixed to investigation, in the natural, as well as in the moral world.

If this be the case, in certain respects, as to our knowledge of the works of God, it is not surprising,

prising, that similar limitations should be placed, to our knowledge of the Divine conduct. Revelation was intended to answer the most important practical purposes : to direct us in the knowledge of God, to bring us into an acquaintance with the method of his mercy, through his son Jesus Christ, and, by the cordial reception of it, to lead us into a holy conformity of character to himself. But the word of God was not intended to gratify our curiosity, on questions of a speculative and metaphysical nature, which have no good practical tendency, nor to assign to us the reasons on which *his* conduct is founded, in the moral system of the universe. Its intention is to lead man to God, not to submit the Holy Governor of the world, to the judgment of his creatures.

If these observations are just, it becomes an important branch of human wisdom, to determine our inquiries in religion to those subjects, on which, from the light of nature or the evidence of Revelation, we may arrive at some certain, and indubitable conclusions ; and on others, respecting which it was not the Divine intention that we should be distinctly informed, to rest satisfied, with those limitations to our knowledge, which the benevolence, as well as the wisdom of the Deity, has prescribed.

If this acquiescence, in the limited circumstances under which we are placed, had been
 always

always exercised, the world would not have been amused with unprofitable speculations on indeterminate questions ; nor the attention of serious Christians perplexed, with attempts to settle, by the aid of metaphysical reasoning, certain points of theology, which the word of Revelation has left undecided and unexplained. Of this description the *Origin of Moral Evil* has been usually and justly considered, by those who have contemplated the subject with the most mature deliberation, connected with a just regard for the infallible authority of the Sacred Scriptures.

The sentiment now expressed, is not intended to convey any censure on the science of metaphysics, properly understood, and rightly directed. To that sublime science, improved, and matured, by some of the most able modern writers, we are indebted, for an enlarged, and correct knowledge, of the powers and operations of the human mind : and an intimate acquaintance with it, as freed from the ancient jargon of the schools, is, perhaps, the best means of cultivating, and improving the human intellect, of inuring it to habits of just and regular thinking, and of teaching it to distinguish, arrange, and define its ideas, with perspicuity and precision, on all the subjects which may occupy its attention. Metaphysics of this description, are nothing else, than the application of the powers of reasoning, in a clear, luminous, and orderly manner,

manner, to the subjects on which they are employed. But, this is very different, from that combination of artificial, and abstract forms of speculation, which darkens subjects by the use of inapplicable terms, and, instead of illustrating envelopes them in a cloud of obscure diction. To common minds this is unintelligible, and to the most improved, it only appears to give an air of profundity to that, which, without the encumbrance of Aristotelian forms, might have been rendered very easy and intelligible. Metaphysical speculations of this latter kind, are censurable, and deserve to be rejected, because they may equally deceive, those who indulge, and those who peruse them, by leading them to suppose, that they have made, or contemplated, sublime discoveries, when their attention has only been occupied on combinations of abstract terms, which convey, either *no* ideas, or such as are very *feeble, indistinct, and confused*. This is to darken counsel by words without knowledge.

It is not, however, by the aid of metaphysics, in any sense, that we can hope to determine, those questions of a moral and religious nature, on which the word of revelation is wisely silent. But those of the former kind, may assist us to reason correctly, on many of its discoveries; and enable us to detect, and demonstrate the fallacy, of such speculations as are inconsistent with them. The
reader

reader will not be surpris'd, therefore, if the subject of the following pages, should lead to some reasoning of a metaphysical nature.

The Origin of Moral Evil, it must be acknowledged, is a solemn and difficult subject. So great are the difficulties attending it, that those Metaphysicians and Divines, who have contemplated it, in the most serious and profound manner, have generally confessed, that they are insuperable, and that, probably, they will never be surmounted, in the present imperfect state of our existence. In carrying our speculations, concerning the Divine Conduct, in its admission, to a great extent, there is also, some danger of entering into statements, scarcely consistent with that holy reverence for the Deity, which, it ever becomes fallible and imperfect creatures to entertain and preserve. But, no real injury is likely to arise from a free examination of the subject, provided that reverence be still cultivated, and we are disposed to acquiesce, in those limitations to our knowledge, which are *insuperable*. The fondness which has often been discovered, for the discussion of this subject, may also, sometimes, render an examination of it proper, even by those who are convinced of its small practical utility, in order to refute the errors in some hypotheses which have been advanced, and to illustrate their pernicious consequences and tendency.

A con-

A conviction of this nature, has given rise to the following examination of Dr. Williams' scheme, to explain the *origin of moral evil*. In his notes on Dr. Doddridge's Lectures, and in those affixed to his sermon on Predestination, this scheme is detailed, as an important theological discovery, which professes, effectually to solve difficulties, that have baffled all preceding Divines, and writers on the subject. Justice to this pious, and very respectable author, requires, that his own statement of it should be subjected to the view of the reader. It is contained in the following extracts.

“ Evil, indeed, is *related* to good, but not as
 “ cause and effect. Though evil could not follow
 “ were there no infinite good, no creature, no
 “ will, no freedom, yet something else must be
 “ sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is
 “ generated and fostered, and which, morally con-
 “ sidered, is neither good nor evil. Therefore, we
 “ assert, that the *origin of moral evil* is to be found
 “ in the *union* of two principles, neither of which
 “ considered alone partakes of a *moral* character.
 “ These two principles are *Liberty* and *Passive*
 “ *Power*. Liberty, it is manifest, is morally nei-
 “ ther good nor bad, but is a mere natural instru-
 “ ment, if I may so speak, and may be termed a
 “ *natural good* of which God is the author and de-
 “ creer. On the contrary, *Passive Power* is a *na-*
 “ *tural*

“ *tural evil* of which God is not the author or de-
 “ creer, yet morally considered is not evil. But
 “ this term, being little understood, requires fur-
 “ ther explanation; at least it is incumbent on me
 “ to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not
 “ to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt
 “ it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no
 “ other word or phrase more appropriate. By
 “ ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of
 “ *unavoidable necessity* found in every creature, as
 “ such, in direct opposition to the self-existence,
 “ independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In
 “ other words, It is that *tendency* to nihility, phy-
 “ sically considered, and to defection, morally
 “ considered, which of *absolute necessity* belongs
 “ to every dependent or created nature. That
 “ there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it
 “ probable that any reasonable being will ever de-
 “ liberately controvert its existence. Now, it is
 “ demonstrable that this, from the definition, can-
 “ not be the object of divine decree, or of will;
 “ for it is stated to be of *absolute* or *unavoidable* ne-
 “ cessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God
 “ has decreed, or produces, any thing the exist-
 “ ence of which stands in *direct contrariety* to him-
 “ self. That it is not a *moral* evil is plain, for the
 “ *holiest* creatures are subjects of it—God alone
 “ is exempt.—Let it be further observed, that the
 “ First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whe-
 “ ther

“ ther decretively or efficiently, to *good only*; and
 “ of this character is even our being necessitated
 “ to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the ex-
 “ ercise of liberty, in itself innocent, *unites* with
 “ passive power, the offspring of this union is
 “ moral evil. This I am fully persuaded, is the
 “ true solution of the question, *Whence cometh*
 “ *moral evil?* If any person shall think proper
 “ candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary,
 “ due regard shall be paid to them.—It may be
 “ said, If the union of liberty with passive power
 “ be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest
 “ creatures in heaven are both free and the sub-
 “ jects of passive power, how is it that they do
 “ not sin? If both are united in the same per-
 “ son, does the one never terminate upon, or
 “ unite itself to the other? In answer to this in-
 “ quiry, we must distinguish between *having* the
 “ principle, and being under its influence with-
 “ out control. Though the spirits of the just,
 “ and holy angels, have in them the principle, as
 “ the condition of their created existence, yet it
 “ is counteracted by sovereign favour. They
 “ may say, as well as Paul, By the grace of God
 “ we are what we are. The object of divine
 “ support is the *disposition*, or the *seat* of moral
 “ action; this being made good, or pure, or
 “ holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually
 “ counteracts the influence of passive power.

“ The liberty and choice of a heavenly being,
 “ therefore, terminating on such a disposition no
 “ acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence, if
 “ we would know how this is consistent with the
 “ actual fall of beings who were once in this con-
 “ dition, we must attend to another important
 “ consideration; which is, that when God at any
 “ time deals in *mere equity* with a moral agent,
 “ without the counteracting influence of sovereign
 “ favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his
 “ liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his
 “ passive power. Hence the *certainty* of the fu-
 “ turation of moral evil, in all possible degrees
 “ and circumstances, without decretive efficiency
 “ in its production.—All *moral evil* and misery
 “ in the universe are the offspring of *liberty*, a
 “ natural good, terminating or acting upon, or
 “ united to *passive power*, a natural evil, not
 “ counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on
 “ the disposition, or the seat of the moral prin-
 “ ciple, which may be called analogically *the*
 “ *heart**.—Though every created nature, as it is
 “ the fruit of divine purpose and operation, is
 “ good, nevertheless every creature has a *ten-*
 “ *dency* to sink into its original *nibility*; or (if
 “ preserved to answer the purposes of a moral
 “ system and accountableness) it has an equal

* Sermon on Predestination, p. 42 to 46.

“ tendency

“ tendency to *defection*; and is preserved in
 “ either case only by a *sovereign favour*. This ten-
 “ dency alike to *nothing* and to *sin* is that PASSIVE
 “ POWER which constitutes the essential differ-
 “ ence between an absolute and a contingent be-
 “ ing, between *self-existence* and that which is
 “ *derived**.—The continued perfection of any
 “ creature must be owing to such continued acts
 “ of God as cannot be claimed in equity. For
 “ though no creature be *impelled* to sin, he is not
 “ sufficient of himself, without God’s immediate
 “ and gratuitous assistance, to preserve his happy
 “ state *one moment*. This tendency to defection,
 “ inseparable from a created nature, becomes
 “ the actual cause of sin only when employed by
 “ *liberty*, and *that* employed by equity. But
 “ sovereign favour alone, or direct supernatural
 “ influence, can counteract passive power, and
 “ thereby prevent the abuse of liberty, and pro-
 “ duce moral good†.—“ Adam was the subject
 “ of *passive power* and defectibility in his perfect
 “ state. This consists in that *tendency* to defection
 “ *physically* as to being, and *morally* as to well-
 “ being (when united to freedom) which is essen-
 “ tial to all contingent or absolutely dependent
 “ existence‡.—“ There are *assignable* reasons,

* Doddridge’s Works, Vol. iv. p. 388.

† Ibid, Vol. iv. p. 423.

‡ Ibid, Vol. v. p. 209.

“ why Adam, even in the state of original pro-
 “ bation, possessing the real grounds of accounta-
 “ bility, or moral obligation, if dealt with in *pure*
 “ *equity* would *certainly* fall*.”—“ Freedom ter-
 “ minating on a good disposition, *supported* by
 “ sovereignty, produces holy acts alone, such
 “ were those of Adam while he stood, such are
 “ the acts of holy angels, such are those of re-
 “ newed minds, and such are the acts proceeding
 “ from *divine freedom terminating on infinite holi-*
 “ *ness*. But a mind or disposition not supported
 “ by sovereignty, but left in *equity* to its native
 “ passive power, being now the subject, and free-
 “ dom terminating on it in that state, becomes
 “ *instantly* the seat of moral evil†.”

The substance of the above extracts, and of Dr. Williams' hypothesis, may be comprised in the four following particulars :

I. That a tendency to defection, both physical and moral, is of “ absolute necessity,” essential to all created existence.

II. That this tendency to defection, whether physical or moral, is “ *passive power*.”

III. That the certain consequence of leaving intelligent creatures to the exercise of liberty, in connection with passive power, is sin ; or that

* Doddridge's Works, Vol. v. p. 209,

† Ibid. p. 210.

liberty terminating upon passive power, is the true cause and origin of moral evil. And

IV. That it is pure equity in God, to leave intelligent and accountable creatures in these circumstances, under which, the "inevitable consequence" is, that their liberty will terminate on "their passive power," and produce actual sin. See the first of the above quotations, in the latter part. The truth and propriety of these positions, it will be necessary distinctly to examine.

SECTION II.

Of the tendency to defection, physical and moral, which is supposed to attach, by absolute necessity, to all created existence.

DR. WILLIAMS maintains, that "a tendency to defection," does "of absolute necessity, belong to every created and dependent nature." He explains this to be, a tendency to nihility, as to physical existence, and to "defection" or sin in moral existence. This position is laid down, in the first extract, as an axiom, or self-evident truth, which he supposes, no "reasonable being will ever deliberately controvert." It is not attempted to be proved, or supported by argument, but, as a self-evident proposition, is made
the

the foundation on which his whole hypothesis rests. If this proposition be true, it will bear the test of the most cool and rigid examination : and if, upon such examination, it be found not to be a truth, but to involve a fallacy, then the whole fabric of the hypothesis which rests upon it, must necessarily fall. To examine it fully, it will be proper to consider what is meant by a tendency to defection? Whether such a tendency essentially attaches to all created existence? And, if it does, whether this inseparable connection be the result of an absolute necessity? The first and second of these inquiries, may be considered in connection.

I. What is this tendency to defection, and does it essentially attach to all created existence? To prevent misconception, it may be fully admitted, that there is not, in any created being, a tendency to continued physical existence, separate from the sustaining energy of the Deity. "In him we live, and move, and exist." Physical existence has, in itself, a tendency to nihility. As no creature possesses, within itself, the cause of its own existence, so neither has it, within itself, any power or cause that can prolong its existence, independent of divine sustentation. As every created being is the production of divine power, so, in every moment of its existence, it is dependent on that power which created it, for
the

the continuance of its existence, and of all the physical properties or faculties which are attached to its nature. Some few divines have, indeed, supposed, that a positive act of almighty power is necessary to effect the annihilation of any being. But the sentiment involves a denial of the dependence of creatures upon their Creator, and supposes natural immortality to attach to creatures, independent of divine will. But, it is exclusively the property of him who is self-existent, to exist necessarily, and perpetually of himself. "He ONLY hath immortality and life;" and the continued existence of creatures must depend on his will. That Great Being who fills immensity, is intimately present with all created existence. If he were to withdraw his sustaining care from any of his creatures, they would instantly revert to their original nihility, for no cause of their prolonged existence would *then* remain; and consequently the continuance of their existence can only rationally be attributed to the operative-will and energy of Deity. On the *physical* defectibility of created existence, therefore, there is no controversy with Dr. Williams. But what does he mean by "a tendency to defection, *morally* considered, which of absolute necessity {belongs to every created nature?" Such a tendency, if it exists, can only belong to intelligent creatures: and his position is, that as physical existence tends

Query?

to nihilism, so intelligent existence tends to defect or depravity. But he has assigned *no* reasons to shew, why Deity should continue the physical existence, and not continue the moral purity of created intelligences; and the radical fallacy in this part of his statement lies in identifying *physical* and *moral* tendency, and in supposing that the same *species* of tendency, which, in the one case, would terminate in nihilism, must, in the other, terminate in depravity. But no two things can be more distinct; and the term tendency, when applied to *physical* existence, and when applied to *moral*, must stand for two different ideas.

The meaning of tendency in physics, is well known. Bodies tend to the centre of the earth, by the principle of gravitation. Small bodies, brought within the sphere of the attraction of cohesion, unite; and created beings, separate from the support of their Creator, tend to nihilism. But, when we speak of tendency, "morally considered," as residing in intelligent minds, we must mean something specifically different from each of these. Moral tendency, whether good or bad, in minds, must be the result of *ideas*. Some, indeed, have spoken of a moral bias, or tendency, in intelligent beings, antecedent to the existence of knowledge, or ideas of any kind. But the position does not appear to be susceptible

susceptible of a rational or intelligible explanation. If inclination, bias, or tendency exists in intelligent minds, previous to the existence of perceptions and ideas, it can be only a *physical* tendency, arising from the nature and construction of the mind itself, or resulting from its union with an organized system of impaired temperament. The latter is not supposable in the *first* instance, and therefore the consideration of it does not belong to the present question. To speak, therefore, of a tendency in intelligences to moral defection, antecedent to the rise of knowledge or ideas, is to apply the term in a *physical* sense, to a *spiritual* or *immaterial* subject, and consequently is inadmissible.

If a tendency exists in mind, it must be the effect of something which influences it; but, except in the case of immediate divine influence, which never tends to evil, we cannot, rationally, conceive of any thing that can influence mind, but something which that mind *apprehends*, that is, some perceptions or ideas, true or false. If a tendency, therefore, to moral defection existed in angelic beings as soon as they were created, or in Adam, from the moment of his creation, that tendency must arise from the influence of some improper views and motives in their minds. But it is not supposable that such improper views or motives could dwell in angels, or in man, as soon

as created; for at that moment they could have no ideas or knowledge but what was communicated to them by the Creator, the source of wisdom, purity, and truth. If, therefore, a tendency from the moment of their creation, to moral defection, be supposed to dwell in either, as *that tendency* must arise from false moral perceptions and ideas; and as they had *then* no ideas but what were immediately given them by the Creator, it follows, as a just and inevitable consequence, either that *no such* tendency did exist, or that God himself was the immediate and direct author of it, by giving them false views and conceptions of things. The latter is too absurd and blasphemous to be admitted, and therefore the former conclusion remains true.

It is readily granted, that intelligent and holy beings are ever dependent on the Author of all good, for the continuance both of their physical and moral powers: but this does not imply, as Dr. Williams supposes, that they had, in themselves, a tendency to moral defection, from the moment of their creation, the effect of which would be instant sin, unless prevented by super-added sovereign influence, which the Creator might in equity withhold. To illustrate this assertion, some further statement may be necessary, and it will be requisite to consider what constituted the holiness of angelic beings, and of
man,

man, at his first creation? The best idea we can form of the holiness of immaterial intelligences is, that of a capacity to understand the purity, spirituality, and authority of God, and such knowledge of his infinite and adorable perfections, as excited in them seraphic admiration, love, and obedience to his will. What constituted the first sin of the angels that fell, or by what means a deviation from perfect purity and rectitude first arose in them, we are not informed. These questions are amongst the *arcana* of the invisible world, and all attempts to solve them would be vain. But we may reasonably conclude that their original holiness consisted in a right knowledge of God, and the influence of it on them. We can form no idea of pure spiritual intelligences, destitute of thought and ideas. As soon as they began to exist, they must *exist in knowledge*, and as *that* emanated, with their essences, from the fountain of their being, it must resemble him. If, therefore, he supported them in their intelligent existence, we have no means to ascertain, that from the first moment of its commencement, it tended to moral defection. The assertion is altogether gratuitous; and the more natural, as well as just conclusion would be, that as angels were the production of a holy God, were created pure and *holy* intelligences, the tendency of their nature, if preserved in existence, would be to a

continuance in holiness. The moral defection of any such beings, when it took place, must be supposed, therefore, to arise from some causes *subsequent* to their creation, and not to result from an immoral tendency, essential to their formation.

In a similar manner, the holiness of man, at his creation, consisted in a right knowledge of his adorable Creator, which, in a mind free from moral corruption, and connected with a body of perfect and unimpaired temperament, must immediately have excited devout admiration, fervent love, and lively gratitude, to the all-bountiful Author of his existence. We can form no consistent view of the holiness of a human being, destitute of knowledge and ideas. Such a being might be physically pure or perfect, but it could not, in a religious sense, be *holy*, for this term implies right knowledge in the understanding, governing and directing all the exertions of the mind, in a pure manner towards God. The "image of God," therefore, in which man was created, means his moral and intellectual image; and, accordingly, it is represented, in the scriptures, as consisting in "knowledge, holiness, and truth." If then, as the Mosaic account informs us, Adam was *created* in the "image of God," a holy and perfect creature, formed and capacitated to enter upon a life of religion, the
fair,

fair, obvious, and unstrained conclusion is, that if his physical existence were preserved, the *natural tendency* of the holy state in which he was created, was *not* to "moral defection," but to continued holiness. For, being in the *image* of God, a Being of infinite purity and intelligence, he contained in himself, in the structure and perceptions of his mind, and in the habitudes and temperature of his body, no *internal tendency* to moral evil. If he had such a tendency, at the moment of his creation, it must have been given him by that Being who was the author of his existence, and of *all* its natural and essential *tendencies*, whether corporeal, intellectual, or moral. And if such a tendency had existed in him, at the moment he came out of the hands of his Creator, he could not have been said to be created in the *image* of God; for who will say of that great, infinite, and ever-adorable Being, that he has, in himself, a tendency to moral defection! The religious mind shudders at the thought, yet, let the attentive reader dwell on the idea, and examine whether an implication, horrible as this is, be not involved in the position which asserts, that man, who was created in the *image* of God, had, at his creation, a tendency to moral defection. Few minds, perhaps, are more devout than that of the author of the hypothesis here controverted; and he would, doubtless, reject the
 scheme

scheme with grief and abhorrence, if he saw that it involved such a consequence. Yet, how can this consequence be fairly avoided, when the scriptures assert, that man was *created* in the image of God; and this author asserts, that from the moment of his creation, he had a tendency to moral defection; that "Adam was the subject of passive power, and defectibility in his perfect state, and that if dealt with in *pure equity*, he would *certainly* fall." Either, therefore, man had no such tendency as he asserts, or *this* tendency must also be essential to that Being, *in whose image he was created*. It is far, very far from being pleasant, to be under the necessity of stating such an alternative. But let the esteemed and highly respected author weigh maturely, whether his hypothesis does not, *inevitably*, involve this dreadful consequence.

Notwithstanding some attempts which have been made to the contrary, it is requisite to understand the account of the creation and fall of man, in the book of Genesis, in the most obvious and literal sense, because any other interpretation, by implicating the veracity of the inspired historian, would admit a principle, which tended to shake the authenticity and authority of the sacred scriptures. Agreeably, therefore, to that account, Adam must have *retained* the image of God, in which he was created, when he was placed

placed under the additional dispensation of Divine favour, which promised a continuance of life, and higher happiness than he was entitled to by the law of his creation, on condition of observing an easy positive precept, superadded to the general laws of moral obligation, with which he was previously acquainted. If he had not retained the image of God, when he was first placed in the garden of Eden, his circumstances, morally considered, would have been worse than they were at his creation; and the dispensation, which placed him under positive obligation, would have been an insult instead of a benefit. His fall, therefore, was not the consequence of an inevitable tendency to moral defection, essential to his nature as a creature, but must have been owing to some cause, *extraneous* of his own pure and holy nature, which, as yet, resembled his Creator. Such a cause might present temptation to his mind, and his mind, though pure, being not infallible, might be gradually led into some improper and false reasonings concerning the authority and commandments of his Creator, until, at length, he was seduced from his fidelity and obedience to God, and fell by voluntary transgression. Exactly in such a way as that which has been now hypothetically stated, the Mosaic account informs us Adam was led into sin, and not in consequence of an internal tendency

dency in the constitution of his nature, to moral defection. His mind was pure, and he possessed sufficient intellectual and *moral power*, to have resisted the temptation, if he had not been wanting to himself, and had not neglected to use and regard those means and motives, which ought to have influenced his conduct. Thus the first introduction of sin into our world is sufficiently accounted for. But this gives us no assistance in accounting for the first introduction of sin into the intelligent creation of God ; nor does it appear that we should be the better or wiser as to any practical purpose, if it were ever so satisfactorily explained. But, if Adam had not been endued with such purity of nature and *moral power*, as might have enabled him to repel temptation, he would not have been criminal. Equity required, that he should not be placed in circumstances, which would, inevitably, lead him into sin. His moral power, in the first constitution of things, must have been *adequate* to his duty, or he would have been treated *unjustly*. This statement does not imply, that, after accountable agents have voluntarily sinned, the measure of their duty is to be ascertained by the *degree* of their moral power. For this position would involve the absurdity, that, in proportion as a creature receded from the line of duty, the Divine authority receded from *him* ; and this would be the same as to assert, that

that in proportion as he increased in wickedness, he was at liberty to commit it, and freed from the obligations of Divine law. But no principle can be more false and dangerous; for sin does not dissolve the relation between a creature and his Creator, and consequently cannot abrogate the obligations arising from that relation. But, in the first instance, and previous to any transgression, duty and moral power must have been commensurate, because it would be highly irrational, absurd, and injurious to the honour of God, to suppose the *reverse* of this; that he originally formed and placed a moral and accountable creature, under obligations of duty, with which it was utterly *impossible* for him to comply. This position, however absurd and derogatory to the Divine honour as it is, appears to be obviously implied in Dr. Williams' hypothesis; for if, as he asserts, "a mind left in *equity* to its passive power, and freedom terminating on it in that state, becomes *instantly* the seat of moral evil:" then, if God had dealt with Adam in mere equity, he must, as an accountable creature, have been placed under moral obligations, with which it was so impossible for him to comply, that he must "instantly" have fallen into actual sin: and this it seems would have been EQUITY!—The fair and just consequence from the above reasoning, therefore, is, that neither at his first creation,

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nor at his subsequent entrance into paradise, was there, in the mind of Adam, any such principle as Dr. Williams supposes; any tendency, whatever name it may be called by, to moral defection.

That his whole hypothesis is founded upon a false principle, in assuming as a fact, that "a tendency to *defection*, morally considered," does necessarily attach to all created intelligences, may be further proved, by the following considerations. There is an *essential* difference between a tendency in creatures, to annihilation, and any *other tendencies*, which they may be supposed to have while in existence. Created existence is an effect, and to suppose it perpetuated, without the agency of its Creator, would be to suppose the continuance of the *effect*, without the continuance of the *cause*, to which alone it owes its being. But, when creatures were formed, whether material or immaterial, intelligent or not intelligent, the tendencies which they had, at their *first* creation, could be none other than those *primary and essential qualities* with which the Creator endued them. They *necessarily* owed their existence to his will; for no cause could produce them from non-existence, except his omnipotent volition. But nothing else, respecting them, was necessary, with an "absolute necessity." When brought into existence, whatever qualities,

qualities, properties, or tendencies they had, which entered into the constitution of their natures, must have been precisely such, and no other, than the wisdom and goodness of the Creator saw proper to give them: for no other cause than his will, appointment, and power, could *then* have influence on their nature. This reasoning applies generally to all created beings, to body and spirit, matter and mind. When, therefore, intelligent beings were created, whatever tendencies, inclinations, or dispositions they had, were *properties*, which the Author of their being attached to them. And amongst *these*, there could not be "a tendency, morally considered, to defection," without supposing, that *he gave* them *that* tendency. All tendencies are *qualities*, and those which *essentially* belonged to the diversified natures of creatures, were as much the work of the Creator, as the essences or substances to which they were attached. Creatures could not *be* without his will, and when he willed them *to be*, they could, at that moment, *be nothing but what he willed*,—unless there were some principle greater than Omnipotence, some "absolute necessity," or pre-existing fate, which controlled his operations. And this, as will be further shewn hereafter, the hypothesis implies. The sacred historian assures us, that when "God saw every thing he had made, behold it was very good."

But Dr. Williams says, "Passive power is a natural evil." Did the Creator *then* see this *natural evil*? And was it something which he could not prevent from attaching to *all* his works? His hypothesis amounts to this, for he asserts, that "of absolute necessity it belongs to every created nature;" that "the holiest creatures are subjects of it,—God alone is exempt." The truth of this assertion will now, in the

II. Second place be considered. It has been argued, with what success the reader must judge, that no such tendency to moral defection existed, as the hypothesis states. But supposing, without granting its existence, it may be clearly proved, that this could not be the result of an "absolute necessity;" and, that the supposed existence of such a necessity, in this case, involves absurd and injurious consequences. The author has not exactly defined what he means by "absolute necessity;" but as he uses the terms "unavoidable necessity," as of the same import, he appears to mean necessity with respect to God; so that he could not avoid the essential connection of this "passive power," or "tendency to defection," with the nature of all the intelligent creatures he formed. It is said, in the first extract before given, that it "cannot be the object of Divine decree or of will; for it is stated to be of *absolute or unavoidable* necessity: besides, it is absurd to
suppose

suppose that God has decreed, or produces any thing the existence of which stands in *direct contrariety* to himself." So then, according to Dr. Williams, "passive power" is something in *direct contrariety* to God, which exists by an *unavoidable* necessity, so that he could not prevent it. It becomes us to proceed with great seriousness, humility, and caution, when we speak of necessity with regard to the great and blessed God; and we ought to be very certain that our positions are founded on just and clear principles of reasoning, lest we "speak unadvisedly with our lips."

Absolute necessity must mean either that which exists necessarily and of itself, uncaused and unoriginated, or that which so essentially belongs to the nature and relations of things; that if the things themselves are supposed to exist, the properties essential to their nature and relations, must be supposed also to exist. Thus the proportions of mathematical numbers and quantities, exist by absolute necessity, and no volition could reverse them, because that would imply a mathematical or physical absurdity. Thus, likewise, the Divine nature exists by an absolute, or more correctly, a metaphysical necessity. But no such necessity can with truth be asserted concerning the Divine operations, except in those cases which would imply the existence of something incompatible with the natural or moral
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perfections of God, and would involve either a physical or a moral absurdity. Now it may be clearly proved, that in neither of these senses of the term, does a tendency to moral defection, absolutely and necessarily, belong to all created intelligences. The sense Dr. Williams intends seems to be that which belongs to the nature and relations of things; for he speaks of it, as "unavoidable in all created existence," and "not the object of Divine will or decree." But if this tendency essentially and necessarily belongs to all the productions of Divine wisdom and power, then the Divine volition could not make it otherwise, and the position amounts to this proposition, that it was *absolutely impossible* for the Divine Being, to create intelligent creatures, who should not, from the moment of their creation, have a tendency to moral defection. If this were *impossible* to that great and holy Being, the impossibility must be either *physical* or *moral*. Either such a doctrine must involve a *physical* absurdity or contradiction, which, therefore, was not a proper object of power: or it must involve a *moral* contradiction or absurdity, and, consequently, be inconsistent with the wisdom, justice, holiness, and goodness of God, and therefore such as, on that account, he would not choose to produce. But both these positions are evidently false.

For,

For, first, it involves no *physical* contradiction, to suppose that Almighty power should create an intelligent creature, who should not be liable to sin, but whose nature should be holy, and tend *only* to a continuance in rectitude and purity. Must not every impartial mind, capable of reasoning correctly, admit, that there is nothing in such a supposition which *Infinite power* was not able to accomplish, unless that power were controlled and limited, by an antecedent fate, which is absurd? The production, therefore, of such a creature, was not *physically impossible*. It was within the compass of Almighty power to have effected it. Even some of the positions of Dr. Williams imply, that it was so, for he allows, that "sovereign favour can counteract passive power," and might have prevented intelligent creatures from becoming actually sinful. He who could make them *holy*, *after* they were created, and *perpetuate* them in holiness, could have made them perfectly holy, and free from a contrary tendency, in the first instance: for it would be weak and puerile, to suppose *him*, by an after-thought to mend his own works, and by a second attempt to make them better than he was able to do at first.

Further, secondly, it was not a *moral* impossibility, for no considerations which can be alleged, could ever prove that it was *inconsistent* with
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the *moral* perfections of a Being, infinitely holy, perfect, and good, to create creatures who should have no *essential* tendency to moral defection, but who should be and continue holy. He could not be indisposed to form them in his own resemblance; and as this was not physically impracticable, or beyond his power, and was most agreeable to his own moral purity and communicative goodness, which can delight only in what is morally good and holy, so it may certainly be inferred, that such *was* the condition in which they were created. Reasoning, therefore, both from the natural and moral attributes of God, we may justly conclude, that created intelligences, as formed by a Being infinitely pure, and infinitely powerful, were, at their creation, perfectly holy, and had, in their nature, no necessary or essential tendency to the contrary. The *necessary, essential, moral* defectibility, of all created intelligent nature, is, therefore, an UNPROVED PRINCIPLE, and the whole hypothesis which is built upon it must necessarily fall. It involves a most false and inadmissible proposition, the existence of a metaphysical necessity, or antecedent fate, which limited and controlled the Divine operations.

It forms, therefore, a strong and insuperable objection to the whole of Dr. Williams' scheme, that it is altogether inexplicable, without the admission of such an all-controlling fate. For it
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is most evidently absurd to suppose, that an almighty Being was *unable*, or an infinitely good Being *unwilling*, to create holy creatures free from an internal tendency to moral defection. If, therefore, at the first moment of their creation, they were *not such*, it could only be owing to the influence of some cause, or principle, *extra Deum*, which counteracted the volitions of infinite goodness, and controlled the operations of infinite power. What could this be but an irresistible fate? And wherein does this notion of a tendency by absolute necessity to moral defection differ, *in effect*, from the old Manichean doctrine, of an evil principle, essentially existing?

Other consequences of the above tendency to moral defection, clearly evince, that so far is it from being the result of an "absolute necessity," it could not *essentially* attach to created intelligences. The *human* nature of our blessed Lord, was the production of Divine power. The angel announced to his virgin mother, "the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that *holy* thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God*." The celestial messenger thus emphatically pronounced, that the human nature of Christ would be holy; but if Dr.

* Luke i. 35.

Williams' hypothesis were true, his holy and perfect humanity must have had, and that of "absolute necessity," a tendency, morally considered, to defection! Extremes, sometimes, approach each other: Dr. Priestley asserted the peccability of Jesus Christ; and Dr. Williams' hypothesis implies a similar position. The implication is its refutation.

A further consequence of this hypothesis is, that it implies intelligent natures must have been *created in sin*. The assertion is thus proved. A tendency to moral defection would be itself *sinful*. A tendency in rational minds, as before shewn, can only be some disposition or inclination, arising from their own views and apprehensions; and, if this be an immoral tendency, must not those minds be already the seat of moral evil? What is a tendency to defection, morally considered? Is it not a tendency to depart from God; to forsake him; to disregard his authority; to seek happiness from other sources; and to run into every thing contrary to his purity, and the requisitions of his law? And can *such* a tendency exist for a moment in intelligent minds, unless they are already *impure* and *depraved*? If then, as the hypothesis asserts, a tendency to defection in a moral view, of absolute necessity belonged to them, from the commencement of their existence, they must have been created with depravity, or in a
depraved

depraved state. But the consequence is so dreadful, that it strongly evinces the entire falsehood of the scheme in which it is involved.

It cannot, in the least, invalidate the force of the above arguments, that, in the metaphysics of Dr. Williams, the tendency to moral defection is represented as *privative*. Mental tendencies cannot be of *this* description; for resulting, as argued in the beginning of this section, from ideas, perceptions, or views which influence the mind, or apprehensive faculty, they must have a *real* existence, and be directed to some objects, or they cannot exist at all. Who can form a clear or consistent conception of a tendency that does not *really exist*, and that is directed to nothing? By whatever name, therefore, "a tendency to defection, morally considered," be called, whether positive or privative, it must either be *real*, or *not real*. If it be a *real* tendency, and have *real* effects, then the hypothesis, which asserts its *essential* connection with all created intelligent existence, lies open to *all* the force of the preceding arguments, and is attended with *all* the absurdities above charged upon it. And, if it be *not real*, but a mere privation or negation, then it is *nothing*, and nothing has no properties, and can produce no effects. If this will not accord with *recondite* metaphysics, it will accord with what is unspeakably more valuable, plain, sound reason,

and common sense, unbewildered in the inexplicable labyrinth of occult qualities.—Here, in point of argument, the matter might be *rested*, but the subject is too important not to be viewed with attention in other aspects,

SECTION III.

Of Passive Power, and Liberty terminating upon it.

PREVIOUS to an examination of the equity of leaving accountable beings to the combined influence of the *supposed* principle of defection, called *passive power*, in connection with liberty, it may be useful to consider the *propriety of this*; and of some other phraseology, adopted in support of this hypothesis.

In a sense different from that of Dr. Williams, the phrase “passive power,” was used by Mr. Locke, who employed it incautiously, to signify a capacity of being changed, or acted upon, by some agent, as gold is melted by the action of fire*. But, after the judicious observations of Dr. Reid†, on the impropriety of the phrase as

* Locke's *Essay on the Understanding*, Book II. chap. 21.

§ 2.

† Reid's *Essay on the active powers of man*, chap. 3.

used by Locke, it might have been supposed, that no subsequent writer would have adopted it in any sense. Every author has, however, an undoubted right to express his thoughts in those terms which he thinks most appropriate and descriptive of the ideas which he intends to convey. But other persons have an equal right to examine the propriety of phraseology, and, if they deem it to be equivocal or absurd, to point out its improprieties. Completely isolating, therefore, this singular phrase, "*passive power*," from its author or adopter, let it be here examined with freedom.

On the meaning of the term "power," there has been much metaphysical debate* ; but its general import is, ability to produce some effect; and the idea attached to it, by universal consent, is of an *active* nature. Thus, our idea of omnipotent power, is that of ability to give effect to the volitions of the infinite mind. Power, in mechanics, means, the adaptation of certain mechanical instruments to the production of mechanical effects. Power in man, is either intellectual, which is ability to direct and employ his mind on certain ideas, or, corporeal and muscular, which is ability to move himself, or other bodies, by the mechanical force of his limbs, un-

* Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XI. p. 520. Reid's Essay, chap. 1 to 5.

der the direction of the volitions of his mind. In every case, where power is used with propriety, *activity* of some kind is implied. The term *passive*, is the reverse of this, and implies, that the thing to which it is applied, is the *subject of action*, from some cause or agent which possesses power. In the phrase "passive power," therefore, two terms are united, which reciprocally supersede and destroy each other. For, if respecting any thing, you admit the idea of *power*, or ability to produce some effect, you deny, or take away from the subject, the idea of its being *passive*, in that respect in which you attribute to it the possession of *power*. And, if you assert of any thing that it is *passive*, you withdraw from that thing the idea of *power*, in that view in which you assert it to be *passive*. The union of the words passive power, therefore, is the union of terms which destroy each other, or imply a *contradiction*, and the phrase is absurd. Power may be great, small, created, uncreated, physical, moral, intellectual, mechanical, chymical, or almost any thing but *passive*. This it can in no case be, unless its nature were utterly changed, and then it would be no longer power. To speak of *passive power*, is to speak of "powerless power*;" and is like speaking of a round square, a cubical sphere, a black white, or a white black. It may remind a

* This epithet Dr. Reid applies to it.

person

person of a circumstance, which is said to have occurred in ^{one of} Captain Cook's Voyages. When the ship's company supposed they had discovered a point of land, upon a nearer approach to the object, they found that they were mistaken, and to record their deception, they gave to the place the name of "POINT-NO-POINT." So passive power, if the terms mean any thing, seems to be the power of having no power at all.—The reader will pardon this momentary effort, to relieve the tædium of metaphysical disquisition.

Other phraseology, used in support of this hypothesis, is extraordinary, and exceptionable on various grounds, as in the following passages. " Evil is related to good, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated."—" When the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, *unites* with passive power, the offspring of this union is moral evil*." The same figurative language occurs again: " Here it may be asked, which of these two, freedom or passive power, has the greatest proportion of concern in the production of sin? *Each* of them is *essentially* necessary to the effect: but as *freedom* is an evil in no sense *per se*, and *passive power* is a natural (though not a moral) evil *per se*, it should seem, that the hateful pro-

* See the first extract in the Introduction.

" geny,

“ geny, *sin*, claims the *latter* for its *more immediate* parent*.” Can the adoption of such allusions assist us to any thing like clear ideas, on this solemn subject? Or, is there any more propriety than delicacy, in such representations? But, dropping the figure, let the thing intended by it be examined. This seems to be more intelligibly expressed in the following passage: “ We
 “ assert, that the *origin of moral* evil is to be found
 “ in the union of two principles, neither of which,
 “ considered alone, partakes of a *moral* charac-
 “ ter. These two principles are *liberty* and *pas-*
 “ *sive power*. Liberty, it is manifest, is morally
 “ neither good nor bad, and may be termed a
 “ *natural good*, of which God is the author and
 “ decreer. On the contrary, passive power is a
 “ *natural evil*, of which God is not the author
 “ or decreer, yet, morally considered, is not
 “ evil†.”

Here it is asserted, that neither liberty nor passive power have in them, distinctly considered, a moral quality; that the former is a *natural good*, and the latter a *natural evil*; and that the union of these two principles produces *moral* evil. Admitting the phraseology, and supposing, but not granting, the existence of the *latter* princi-

* Notes on Doddridge, Vol. V. page 210.

† See the first extract.

ple, it does not appear, that the consequence deduced, from the supposed union of these principles, is a just, or logical inference. It might be rationally argued, that the effect of the combination of two principles of opposite qualities, would be a production partaking of the nature of *both*, that is, something in which there would be a portion of natural good, and a portion of natural evil. But the hypothesis states the result to be something *specifically different from each of the producing principles, and not partaking of the nature of either*. For it asserts, that liberty, which is a *natural good*, terminating upon passive power, which is a *natural evil*, produces *moral evil*. Who does not see that the consequence does not rationally follow?—It might well “ be asked, which “ of these two has the greatest concern in the “ production of sin?” If they previously existed in equal quantities, it might reasonably be inferred, that the union of an *equal* quantity of *natural good*, with an *equal* quantity of *natural evil*, would neutralize *both*; and that the effect would be not a *moral*, but a *natural* production, neither good nor evil, but a *non-descript* between both. If the quantity of natural evil exceeded that of natural good, the consequence would be, the neutralization of a portion of evil, equal to the portion of good combined, leaving a residuum of natural evil, on which no effect had taken place. But, if

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liberty were stronger than passive power, or the quantity of natural good exceeded the quantity of =
 = natural evil, the consequence of their union would be re-
 versed, and the residuum would be, an indefinite portion of natural good. But still it remains to-
 tally *unexplained*, how the union of *natural good* and *natural evil*, should produce *moral evil*; and its *origin*, even on the principles of this hypo-
 thesis, continues enveloped in impenetrable ob-
 scurity. It has not shewn the *modus*, by which mo-
 ral evil was produced out of things so *specifically*
 different from it, as natural good and natural evil
 are, and which are allowed, in themselves, to have
 "no moral quality."

The above reasoning will probably be admit-
 ted to be correct and just, *on the terms* adopted by
 Dr. Williams; and if it does not of itself refute
 the hypothesis, it sufficiently evinces the impro-
 priety of the language used in its support, and its
 inadequacy to give a rational and consistent expli-
 cation of the thing intended.

Not less exceptionable is the phrase, "The
 "liberty or choice of a heavenly being *termina-*
 "ting on a holy *disposition*, no acts but such as
 "are holy can ensue*." How can the liberty or
 choice of a moral agent, *terminate* upon the *dis-*
position of that agent? Improprieties of language

* See the latter part of the first extract in the Introduction.

on important and religious subjects, when they convey false, or inaccurate ideas, ought to be pointed out, and the present is an instance of this nature. The exercise of liberty, or an act of choice, may terminate on the *object*, or *thing chosen* by an agent, but this cannot be his own disposition; for, in the case stated, that of a "heavenly being," this was said to have been made previously "holy, by sovereign favour." The idea intended might, perhaps, be, that the liberty, or choice of a heavenly being, exercised in connection with a holy disposition, could produce none but holy volitions or actions. But the language used, instead of conveying this idea, presents the strange and incoherent image of the choice of a heavenly being, terminating on his own disposition. The like objection might be strongly urged against the not less strange expression, "Divine freedom *terminating* on infinite holiness."

Equally improper is the similar phrase, often used in stating this hypothesis, "Liberty *terminating* upon passive power," even supposing the latter to exist. It is very extraordinary, that this form of expression should so frequently recur, seeing it is not authorized by any English writer of classical reputation*. Agreeably, both to its

* See Johnson's and Bailey's Dictionaries.

etymology, and general acceptation, "to terminate" is to limit, to set bounds, to finish, to end. A journey terminates at the place of rest; life terminates in death; the motion of a moving body terminates at the point, where the resistance overcomes the propelling force; and the desires of the mind after a state of indecision, terminate upon the object or thing chosen. But what can be meant by the *termination* of Liberty? Its action, or its extinction? Liberty, whatever be the precise idea entertained under *that* term, must be supposed to be exercised by an intelligent mind. "Passive power," is explained to mean a "tendency" in all created minds "to defection morally considered." And liberty "*terminating upon*" this "*tendency*," is asserted really to *produce* this "defection," or actual depravity. Here again, the action of mind is supposed to terminate upon the same mind, or some *natural* property of that mind; and the consequence of that termination, is said to be a *moral* change or deterioration of the mind itself. Does this language convey any thing like a clear and luminous statement of the subject, or assist to understand it? What new system of metaphysics must be admitted, to sanction the use of such obscure diction, as tends to confound the established forms of speech, and meaning of terms? The eagle-eye may bear to look steadfastly on
streams

streams of light, poured refulgent from the fount of day, but what extraordinary powers of discernment are requisite, to see distinctly in the midst of darkness? And, in the opinion of many, there is in the above phrases, "No light, but rather darkness, visible."

Those who acknowledge the importance of precision of idea in the discussion of religious subjects, and of perspicuity and purity of language in treating them, and who are duly apprized of the influence, which examples, found in popular religious books, may have in forming the style of those who are to be public instructors, will, probably, not deem the above remarks inappropriate, or superfluous. As the phraseology, which is the subject of them, is annexed to a work of extensive circulation, it was the more necessary to suggest them for the reasons now assigned, as well as on account of their application to the hypothesis under examination.

That hypothesis, it has been endeavoured to be shewn in the preceding pages, is founded upon a mistaken and indefensible principle; is inconsistent with just views of the nature and operations of the human mind, replete with consequences incompatible with the perfections and *supremacy* of God; and communicated in language which will not bear distinct and close examination. Under the subsequent section, it will
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be proper to consider it further, in a most serious and important light, the aspect which it bears with relation to the equity and righteousness of the Divine government.

SECTION IV.

On the equity of leaving rational and accountable Creatures, to the combined influence of liberty and passive power.

IF the views given in the former sections are just, it is unnecessary to inquire more *distinctly*, whether moral evil arose at first from the union of passive power with liberty. If, as has been argued, the former of these, or “the tendency to defection morally considered,” does *not essentially* belong to created intelligences, the question, whether the supposed union of liberty with it, be the *true and original* source of sin, is superseded. It is, nevertheless, of great importance to examine, whether, as the hypothesis maintains, it would be consistent with EQUITY, and the righteousness of the Divine character, to create and leave rational and accountable creatures under such circumstances, that the tendency to defection, in connection with liberty, would “certainly” occasion their immediate lapse into sin.

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It cannot be doubted, but that the object Dr. Williams had in view, was to vindicate the Divine Righteousness by the hypothesis he has adopted; and it is evident, that he was influenced by the most pure and excellent motives, in its formation. Its tendency, however, when closely examined, appears to be very different from the intentions of its respected author. The present is a most important and interesting branch of the subject, and deserves to be considered with all that seriousness and impartiality, which should be exercised in the examination of every subject, in which the Divine honour is intimately concerned. Dr. Williams' hypothesis states it to be perfectly equitable or just in God, to leave intelligent creatures under circumstances in which, their becoming actually sinful, would be the "certain" consequence of liberty united with passive power. It will here be requisite to recall to view some of his own positions.

" What God *owes* to an accountable being, as
 " such, is *intellect, will, freedom* from impulse (or
 " decreative, positive causation) to sin, and *objects*
 " *suitable* to his wants, exhibited to his choice;
 " in short, a *capacity* for enjoying the chief good,
 " and sufficient moral (*or objective*) *means* for that
 " end. The *exercise* of *equity* is the giving to all
 " their *due*; hence the being, or continuance in
 " being, of an accountable creature, *is not* a point
 " of

“ of *equity*, because this cannot be called the crea-
 “ ture’s *due* from the Creator; but to give him
 “ precisely *neither more nor less* than is sufficient
 “ to constitute his grounds of accountability, or
 “ moral agency, is to deal with him in *pure*
 “ *equity*. There are assignable reasons why Adam,
 “ even in the state of original probation, posses-
 “ sing the *real grounds* of accountability, or moral
 “ obligation, if dealt with in *pure equity*, would
 “ *certainly fall*. *Superadded sovereignty*, indeed,
 “ which is a right to do every thing not unequita-
 “ ble, might have prevented his fall, as it has
 “ prevented the fall of angels; but this was not
 “ the case*.—A mind or disposition not *supported*
 “ by sovereignty, but left in *equity* to its native
 “ passive power, being the *subject*, and freedom
 “ terminating on it in that state, becomes *instantly*
 “ *the seat of moral evil*.—The holy angels who
 “ are absolutely dependent on the thrice holy
 “ Jehovah, owe the continuance of holy acts to a
 “ sovereign communication of antecedent holy
 “ influence to secure a holy disposition. A sus-
 “ pension of such influence would leave them in
 “ the state of their proper passive power; and
 “ this towards a moral agent is to deal with him
 “ in *mere equity*. The exercise of equity termi-

* Notes on Doddridge’s Works, Vol. V. p. 209.

† Ibid, p. 210.

“ nated

" nated on Adam ; but equity did not *constitute*
 " him morally bad ; it only left him to his passive
 " power : liberty, however, acting on this latter,
 " *produced moral evil**. When God at any time
 " deals in *mere equity* with a moral agent, without
 " the counteracting influence of sovereign favour,
 " the *inevitable consequence* is, that his liberty or
 " free choice *will terminate* on his passive pow-
 " er†." Consequently, as said above, it " be-
 " comes *instantly* the seat of moral evil."

From these passages it appears Dr. Williams maintains, that liberty, acting with that tendency to defection which he calls passive power, and supposes essential to created existence, produces sin ; that *mere equity* cannot prevent this consequence, though sovereign favour might ; that it is *pure justice* in God to withhold that further assistance which is requisite, to the creature's preservation in moral purity ; and that the consequence of withholding it, will certainly and inevitably be his falling into sin. The truth of these positions must be examined. It becomes us, undoubtedly, to be very much on our guard, when arguing on the equity and justice of the Divine conduct, separate from the direct light and evidence of the Holy Scriptures. " The ways of God are in the deep, " past finding out : " and though his conduct is

* Notes on Doddridge's Works, Vol. V. page 210, 211.

† Notes to the Sermon on Predestination, p. 45.

ever consistent with principles of invariable rectitude, justice, and truth, yet the reasons on which it is founded, may, in many instances, be deep and secret in the Divine mind, undiscovered by Revelation, and undiscoverable by our most profound researches. " Clouds and darkness are round about him, though righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne*." In no case is this sentiment more evidently true, than respecting the permission of moral evil. But without presuming to explain the reasons or method of the Divine conduct with respect to its introduction, no hesitation need be felt in asserting, that the above positions in the hypothesis, give a harsh and unwarrantable view of the Divine character; that to deal with rational creatures in the manner it supposes, would be so far from pure *equity*, that it would be the height of *injustice*; that it affords no relief in accounting for the origin of moral evil; and that it does *in effect* make God the author of sin. These assertions it is necessary to support.

I. This hypothesis gives a harsh and unwarrantable view of the Divine character. Is it consistent with the representations which the Scriptures give of the blessed God, to suppose him to deal with his creatures in the scanty and parsimo-

* Psalm xcvi. 2.

nious manner stated in the first of the above quotations? giving them at their creation: *just so much* as might make them *accountable*, intellect, will, freedom from impulse to sin, and moral means, though he well knew those means would and must prove ineffectual? Of what use would that *intellect* be if it must err; and of what avail was the *will*, if from its fatal connection with passive power, it must become sinful when left to its influence? Could this be equity? It will be shewn hereafter, that if intelligent beings had been created at first in such circumstances, they would not have possessed the "real grounds of accountability." But it may here be asked with propriety, Where is the warrant from Revelation, for so harsh a feature of that great Being who "is good to all, and whose tender mercies are over all his works? What part of the sacred volume will authorize the supposition, that he *might* have made rational creatures merely such as would render them accountable, give them "*neither more nor less*" than would be barely sufficient to this end, and endue them with nothing that would make them *good* and *holy*, and place them in circumstances in which they would "certainly fall," well knowing that this would be the case as soon as they began to act at all? Or on what principles, if this be supposed, can it be called "pure equity?" Can one passage from the word

of truth, or one plea from found reason be adduced, to prove that this would have been *equitable*? It is not wonderful, that no *arguments* are advanced to establish the position, that it stands as an *unsupported* assertion, for no reasonings or considerations could support it. How different is such a narrow and parsimonious view, from that given by the Sacred Scriptures of the state in which God actually created man? “God made man upright*.”—“In the image of God created he him†.” And is there not real and positive goodness and holiness in that Being, after whose image he was made? The Scriptures assert, that man was at first created in a *conformity* to that pure Being, that this was the *original* state and constitution of his nature, the *moral condition* in which God *made* him, and not any thing superadded afterwards by sovereign favour, beyond what was equitably due to his accountability. The Hebrew term‡ in Ecclesiastes signifies, that the state in which he was made was pure, straight, perfect, and contained no *obliquity*, no inherent tendency to defection. The word frequently occurs, as descriptive of the righteous and holy. It is used for the uprightness of Job||, for that of the righteous whose happiness in death is desirable§,

* Eccles. vii. 29.

|| Job i. 1.

† Gen. i. 27.

§ Numb. xxiii. 10.

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for

for "uprightness of heart*," and for the uprightness of God himself†. This upright state, which, as the Scriptures represent, belonged to the *original constitution* of human nature, must have been conformed to some rule or standard, and this standard was not passive power, or an essential tendency to defection, but the rectitude and holiness of that perfect Being, in whose image, morally considered, man was created. Is not the representation, therefore, which states that he might, *in equity*, have been created in far different circumstances, very harsh, mistaken, and unjustifiable?

Its harshness and impropriety will further appear, by considering what *must* have been the *consequence*, respecting the *whole intelligent creation*, if God, when he first formed it, and "when the "morning stars sang together, and all the sons of "God shouted for joy," *had* acted towards them *all*, in the way which the hypothesis asserts to be "pure equity." It is painful to pursue this idea, for it will lead to the conclusion, that the harmonious songs of the first inhabitants of heaven, rejoicing in the goodness which brought them into existence, must immediately have been exchanged for the howlings of despair. If, according to the hypothesis, they had been "left in equity," to

* Deut. ix. 5.

† Psalm xxv. 8.

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“ the tendency to defection morally considered,” which it asserts to belong essentially to all created intelligent existence, they must, on the very first day of their creation, have all been transformed into devils. Strong as this assertion may seem, it is the just and *natural consequence*, which arises from the positions expressed in the above quotations. For if “ a mind left *in equity* to its native “ passive power, and freedom terminating on it “ in that state, becomes *instantly* the seat of *moral* “ evil,” then if God had, “ in equity,” left all the celestial intelligences, at the moment he formed them, to this “ passive power,” they would *instantly*, as soon as they began to think and will at all, have become—EVIL BEINGS, to avoid the repetition of the coarser, but more appropriate appellation. And, according to the hypothesis, if God, in his conduct to his creatures, had been guided by “ mere equity,” he could have produced none but what would have become “ the seat of “ moral evil” as soon as they were created. What must be thought of a scheme, which, when traced to its *fair, just, and inevitable* consequences, implies the dreadful position, that the great Being, who is the source of all excellence, purity, and bliss, and who is holy in all his works, if he had acted in “ mere equity,” could have been the creator of none but such *evil Beings*. Surely, the respected author of the scheme could not
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have weighed, maturely, the consequences which it involves.

It may be further argued, that if it be *equity* to act as the hypothesis states, then the Divine Being would have been *perfectly justifiable*, if he *had* acted in such a manner towards *all* rational creatures. Equitable conduct, and justifiable conduct, are convertible terms. To act therefore in "pure equity," is always justifiable: and if a case could be supposed, which is not to be *vindicated*, then it could not be *just* or equitable. The consequence of viewing the argument in this light is, that if the Divine Being had acted towards all created intelligences on the ground which the hypothesis calls "equity," and which would have been justifiable, and therefore right, there would not have been one good or holy intelligent *creature* in the universe; and all the productions of infinite power, and all the rational beings which emanated from infinite intelligence, through the vast extent of created existence, would have been, without exception, productions of *wicked creatures*, and emanations of intelligence, which, though they might have the intellect of angels, would have the dispositions and depravity of fallen ones.

It will not avail to reply to this argument, that sovereign power could, and did interpose to prevent the fall of the far greater part of created

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ted intelligences. Admitting this to have been the fact, still it would have been justifiable and right, *according to the hypothesis*, for the Divine Being not to have interposed for such a purpose, but to have proceeded in the manner above stated. He *might* have left them *all* to the influence of " passive power" and liberty, if such a procedure would have been " pure equity:" and then the consequence unavoidably follows, that on the *ground of equity* alone the great Creator could have produced only an universe of diabolical intelligences, and would have acted in a right, just, and equitable manner if he had so done!! Considering also, further, that sin is, and ever *must* be productive of misery, this consequence would be tantamount to an assertion, that it would have been *equitable* and right for a being of infinite *purity* to produce no creatures but what should become "*instantly*" sinful, and for a being of infinite goodness and power, to have produced no state of created existence, but what would have been attended with *inevitable* misery!!! There is scarcely an end to the absurd consequences which might be fairly and justly inferred from the statement in that part of the hypothesis which was quoted near the beginning of this section. The mention of them is ready to hurt the feelings of a religious mind; and this circumstance proves, that such a state of things as the hypothesis calls " pure equity,"

“ equity,” could not be equitable; for the *true equity* of the Divine conduct, examined in its just consequences, can never wear a *harsh* or *unjustifiable* appearance. So far, however, would the condition of existence, which the hypothesis asserts to be “ pure equity,” be from deserving *that* appellation, that

2. It would be the height of injustice. “ Equity” is justly defined, “ giving to all their due:” and it is readily granted, that “ no creature, “ merely as such, has any claim on God.” But it is an obvious dictate of reason, that when he first made *accountable* creatures, it was *due* to their *accountability*, that they should not be placed in circumstances which would *inevitably* lead them into sin. If they were accountable to him as a moral governor, they must, at their first creation, have been endued with *moral power*, sufficient to enable them to obey; and their ability and obligations, as before argued, must *then* have been commensurate. Equity required, that their condition should not be such as to render their fall and sin certain and *unavoidable*; for to punish them, in that case, would be manifest *injustice*. And if the circumstances of their existence were such as inevitably led them into sin, they were not dealt with “ in equity,” but most unjustly.

But Dr. Williams’ hypothesis *does* represent men and angels as being, by their creation, un-

der circumstances which would, if they were dealt with "in mere equity," inevitably bring them into moral defection, ruin, and punishment. This is proved by the three following passages in the quotations above given. "There are assignable reasons why Adam, even in the state of original probation, if dealt with in pure equity, would certainly fall." Those reasons are *assigned* by the next two sentences. "When God at any time deals in *mere equity* with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the *inevitable consequence* is, that his liberty or free choice *will* terminate on his passive power."—"A mind or disposition not supported by sovereignty, but left in *equity* to its native passive power, being the *subject*, and liberty terminating on it in that state becomes *instantly the seat of moral evil*." According to these sentiments, then, it is "equity" in God to leave moral agents to the influence of this passive power and liberty; when so left, the *inevitable consequence* is, that liberty *will* terminate on it, and when so terminating, the mind becomes "instantly" the seat of moral evil: and these seem to be the "assignable reasons why Adam, if dealt with in *mere equity*, would certainly fall." The above assertion, therefore, is *fully* supported, that this hypothesis, as given in the words of the author, *does* represent both an-

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gels and man, as being created in circumstances which would, if they were dealt with in "pure equity," inevitably lead them into sin, ruin, and misery. Accordingly, this sentiment has been explicitly avowed by some who adopted the hypothesis, and maintained, that if God "deal with the creature on the ground of pure and absolute justice, and leave him to the tendencies of finite existence, HE WILL SIN*." But if the condition of all created and finite existence were as stated in these extracts, it may be most satisfactorily proved, that such a constitution of things would be most *unequitable and unrighteous*.

JUSTICE is ever essential to the Divine character. The holy legislator and judge of all, must be conceived of as appreciating, with infinite precision, the conduct of all his accountable creatures; weighing, in the balance of his infinite knowledge and rectitude, every circumstance respecting them; administering punishment in most exact and righteous proportion, to the nature, circumstances, and degree of the offence; and never inflicting one grain of suffering, beyond what is justly due, to the demerit of the offender. But on what grounds at all of equity or justice, could punishment, in *any* degree be administered, where

* Discourse on the Divine glory in the permission of sin, p. 22. See the Note A at the end of these Strictures.

sin was altogether the *necessary*, and *unavoidable* effect of the condition in which creatures were formed? If they were dealt with on the ground of *personal* conduct (and such must have been the case with angels and man, under the law of their creation) they could not be liable to punishment, but in proportion to their voluntary guilt and transgression. But if the condition of created existence be such, that the first exercise of liberty in either must, from its connection with "the tendency to defection," *necessarily*, or *inevitably*, be an act of *sin*, then they could not be *accountable* for the consequences, or justly chargeable with *voluntary guilt*. That connection with the supposed principle of defection which made their first act sinful, would render liberty utterly nugatory, for there could then be no moral freedom even at their first formation. It was, according to the hypothesis, only a freedom *to fall*, unattended with any strength *to stand*. The mind might *choose*, but connected with an essential principle of defection, it must *necessarily* have chosen what was sinful, and have "*instantly* become the seat of moral evil;" consequently, in the estimation of impartial justice, it could not be charged with criminality or voluntary guilt. Absolute and uncontrollable necessity, over which the volitions and power of the mind could have *no* influence, would *supersede* *accountability*. No *just* grounds
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of it would *then* remain. It cannot, **therefore**, consistently with reason, be supposed, that the great Being to whom justice is *essential*, would, in that case, punish creatures for what the *original* condition of their existence gave them *no* power to avoid. Here then the argument draws to a point. The accountability of intelligent creatures must, in the first instance, have been attended with sufficient moral power to avoid sin. The hypothesis denies the existence of this moral power *at that period*, and asserts it to be equity to **create and leave them destitute of it**; that “equity could not assist them,” and might leave them **in circumstances under which sin would be inevitable**. Either, therefore, the hypothesis is *false*, or the condition of created intelligences was **such as to absolve them from all accountability, and moral obligation**. The *latter* alternative, on every just principle of reason and revelation is utterly *inadmissible*, and therefore the *former* is the **proper conclusion which results from the argument**. To maintain, therefore, as the hypothesis does, that it was just in God to create accountable creatures in such circumstances, that they would “certainly fall,” unless supported by sovereign supernatural influence; and to assert, that it was justice or “pure equity” in God to withhold *that* assistance, without which their fall was *inevitable*, is to maintain a most *false* and *unproved* principle, derogatory

tory to the Divine honour, and dangerous in its moral tendency.

Another view of this subject will confirm the same conclusion. Every creature, through every moment of its duration, is dependent on Divine sustentation for the continuance of its *physical* existence, with all the intellectual and *moral* powers attached to it. Angels were created holy; man was made upright in the image of God. But where is the *justice* of representing the Deity as continuing the physical existence of creatures, and withholding that moral and special assistance without which they must inevitably, and "certainly fall?" The hypothesis asserts that, "in equity," this might have been the case; and to the supposition that this was the *fact*, as to some of them, it attributes the origin of moral evil. It is, therefore, one of the strongest, and most insuperable objections to the whole scheme, that it represents sin as the inevitable consequence of created existence, unless prevented by such aid, as the Creator was not in equity obliged to grant; and represents him as giving and continuing *physical* existence to moral agents, in the *first instance*, unattended with such moral purity and power, as would have been sufficient to enable them to avoid sin. But if they would certainly fall, without extraordinary and supernatural aid, could it be *justice* or *equity* to withhold it in the first instance?

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Or can it be righteous and equitable in that case to punish them as moral and accountable creatures? Would not their annihilation be better than their existence, if, upon the absence of such aid, they must necessarily and certainly fall into sin, and sin be productive of punishment and incalculable misery? If the condition of created existence be, "of absolute necessity," such as renders sin *unavoidable*, without sovereign assistance, which it were just and equitable to withhold, would it not have been better not to form rational creatures at all? And might not such unhappy beings consider their creation as an act of injustice, and their existence itself as a curse and not a blessing? These, indeed, are things which it is by no means desirable to say, but an hypothesis, in which they are so plainly involved, renders it a painful duty to say them, in order to point out its consequences.

Who, it might be asked, that is possessed of a common understanding, would accept of existence on the condition which the hypothesis asserts is, "of absolute necessity" attached to it? That he should be the subject of passive power, or a tendency to moral defection, which, when united with liberty, would produce sin and eternal misery, unless prevented by sovereign favour, which the Creator is under no obligation to bestow, though the withholding of it would be followed

followed with certain and endless destruction? Where is the reasonable being who (if the case could be proposed to him *a priori*) would accept of existence and *accountability* upon *such* terms? And what an impartial and reasonable being would not accept, we may be assured, a God of infinite power, justice, and goodness, would not bestow. The state of things, therefore, which Dr. Williams calls "pure equity," could not be the condition of created intelligent existence, and this part of the hypothesis is as unfounded and destitute of a solid basis as the former.

3. If, however, it were as certainly true as it appears to be false, it would afford *no relief* to the difficulties respecting the *origin* of moral evil. For, in addition to what has been already advanced, it is obvious, that if this scheme were adopted, and it were taken for granted, as it maintains, that a tendency to defection, morally considered, is so essential to all intelligent created existence, that the Divine Being could not prevent it, nor create a rational creature free from it; and that though he is able to counteract it, justice or equity did not require him to do this, still the question returns in all its force, Why was not the actual existence of moral evil prevented? The hypothesis allows, that the great author of all natural and moral good, could have prevented the entrance of sin, by the influence
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of his supernatural and gracious assistance, and asserts, "that sovereignty could counteract passive power." With reverence then it may be asked, Why has he not done it? Why did not sovereign favour benevolently interpose to prevent the direful effects of that fatal tendency to moral defec- tion, which is asserted to be connected by "abso- lute necessity," with all created intelligences? Here Dr. Williams' scheme utterly leaves us, in- volved in *all* the original difficulties concerning the entrance of sin into the world, without the smallest relief, besides the numerous inconsisten- cies with which it is chargeable, in other respects. It may be added, finally,

4. That this scheme does *virtually*, though *not intentionally*, make God the author of sin. For if *all* rational agents must, from the union of liberty with "passive power," certainly fall, unless that special and gracious assistance, which is not due in equity, should interpose to prevent; if God foreknew that this would, and must cer- tainly be the case, and yet determined to create millions of intelligent beings to whom he would not afford that assistance which was *essential* to the existence and preservation of their moral purity, is he not then the real author of their immoral state and conduct? And wherein does this differ, *in effect*, from creating them in sin?

Upon a review of the argument, therefore,

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there appear to be strong reasons for considering the whole of Dr. Williams' hypothesis, to account for the origin of moral evil, as highly objectionable, and worthy of rejection; because it is founded on a false principle, which identifies physical and moral tendency; is incompatible with the nature and phenomena of mind; involves the existence of an antecedent fate, or absolute necessity, which controlled the Divine operations; is inconsistent with the natural and moral perfections of God, and the scriptural account of the state in which man was created; is expressed in obscure and inapplicable language; and is so far from agreeing with *equity*, that, when taken together, it represents the Divine Being, as having, at first, created intelligent and accountable creatures, with just such powers as would enable them to sin, but with none which would enable them to avoid it*.

From what has been already suggested, it will not be expected, by the judicious reader, that any attempt should be here made to substitute another hypothesis, in the room of that which, like all that have preceded it from other writers, fails to give a satisfactory account of the origin of moral evil. It is rather the object of the present strictures, to impress a conviction, by no means novel, but which has been entertained by some of the wisest and best of men, who have adorned the

* See note C at the end.

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church and world, that every attempt of this kind is vain and nugatory : that it was not the design of the wise and righteous Governor of the universe, to explain *this* subject to his fallen creatures, in the present state : that as such an explanation is no where given in the word of Revelation, it cannot be derived from any other source : that it becomes them, therefore, feeble, erring, and sinful as they are, not to arraign the wisdom, or dispute the justice of his procedures, but to rest satisfied with those limitations to their knowledge, which were not placed without a benevolent regard to their welfare and comfort, while they assert the prerogatives, and evince the incomprehensibility of God : and that it is a matter of infinitely greater moment, to embrace, and act under the influence of those gracious discoveries of Revelation, which were intended to be the means of delivering us from the pollution and bondage, and, ultimately, from all the consequences of moral evil, than to perplex ourselves, or others, concerning the mode of its introduction.

That a large portion of moral evil exists in the universe, and that it could not take place in a system which is the work of a Being of infinite power, equity, and goodness, without, in some sense, the permission of its author, are facts indubitable. And, probably, those who, in a pro-

per spirit, may reflect most deeply on the subject, and view it attentively, in all its bearings and consequences, will be disposed to acquiesce in the general statement, that a Being of infinite power, holiness, and goodness, ever acts worthy of himself, or consistently with his adorable moral perfections; but that we are not at present competent to explain all the parts of the moral system, or to judge, in many cases, of the reasons and motives which influenced the Divine conduct, as we, certainly, are not in a situation to comprehend the *whole* of it. Such a view of this solemn and profound subject, may satisfy a humble and believing mind, and the most sceptical cannot go further.

He “doeth great things and unsearchable, marvellous things without number* : he giveth not account of any ~~of any~~ of his matters†. How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out‡!” On many other topics, besides that of the origin of moral evil, which are rather matters of curiosity, than of practical importance and utility, Revelation has preserved a holy silence. Let us not then attempt to be wise above what is written, but preserve, on such points of speculative curiosity, that suspension of opinion, and that acquiescence in the circumscribed limits to our inquiries, which the pre-

* Job v. 9. † Chap. xxxiii. 13. ‡ Rom. xi. 33.

ceding hints recommend respecting the origin of evil. On all subjects which are not branches of natural science, and concerning which no *certain* knowledge could be derived but from God himself, it would be undoubtedly proper to terminate our investigations, where the word he has given us terminates its information. To investigate and ascertain its communications; to believe, and follow its declarations, and the just conclusions deducible from them, are most important parts of duty. But let us stop, where the light of Revelation does not precede to guide our steps, lest we stray into the regions of fancy, and are bewildered in the wanderings of our own imaginations. Let us be content to have *no* opinion, where Revelation will not furnish us with one, and acknowledge our ignorance of things unrevealed, respecting the Divine conduct, or the future and invisible world, rather than attempt to form conjectures on subjects, concerning which infinite wisdom has not deemed it expedient that knowledge should be communicated.

Convinced of the justice of such sentiments, it has not been without regret that many, who have long entertained a high respect for the character and writings of Dr. Williams, have observed, that, besides the hypothesis discussed above, many other *peculiarities* of opinion, on topics which Revelation has left undecided, are given in the
 notes

notes on Dr. Doddridge's works. To publish his opinions, however peculiar, in the form of a treatise, is what every gentleman has an undoubted right to do. But, to make the new edition of the works of an author of established reputation, the vehicle of their communication has appeared, in the opinion of many, an unnecessary departure from that line of propriety, which has the sanction of established custom. Their opinion would, perhaps, have been just, if the notes had been confined to the most important subjects; but their surprise and regret were increased, to find that a very large proportion of them is employed on *singularities* of opinion which do not affect the great and important doctrines of Christianity. This remark applies to what is said of "hypothetical and decretive necessity; of hypothetical and decretive tendencies; of innate ideas*; of the soul having "a greater *affinity* to divine influence than the body has;" of the distinction of the Divine will into "*decretive* and *rectoral*"; of the *invisibilty* of the glorified body of Christ; of the *possibility* of its being now present with us, without being *visible* or *palpable*; of the bodies of angels not *gross* or *palpable*; of the *invisibilty* of the bodies of the faints after the resurrection; of the *invisibilty, im-*

* See note B at the end.

“ *palpability, and different materiality of the world, after the last conflagration**,” &c.—of *all which* we, certainly, do not read any thing in the New Testament.

The cause of evangelical truth, that truth which alone can soothe the heart in the hour of sorrow, elevate the soul to God, and calm it in the view of death; and which it is infinitely desirable to see extended in its true knowledge and sanctifying effects, to all our fellow-creatures, is not to be promoted, by uniting it with opinions and speculations of a dubious, fanciful, and uninteresting nature. Let us take heed, therefore, that we do not obscure, or conceal the sacred shrine of divine truth, by piling around it the wood, hay, and stubble of our own inventions.

The Christianity of the New Testament, the doctrine of the cross, which is “ the power of God unto salvation, to every one that believeth,” is beautiful, simple, grand, majestic, sublime, worthy of God, illustrative of all his adorable moral perfections, suited to the circumstances of his fallen creatures, divinely attractive and purifying to those who truly behold it, and founded upon evidence which infidelity can never shake. Let us not think to defend it, by fencing it round

* Doddridge's Works, Vol. IV. 311, 335, 338, 368. Vol. V. 236, 240, 352, 353.

with

with webs of metaphysical subtlety; or suppose that it is to be improved by occult distinctions, and abstruse hypotheses, on points which it was not designed to teach. But, adhering to that pattern of simplicity, purity, truth, and zeal which is exhibited in the spirit and writings of the apostles, let us be animated to diffuse its genuine knowledge, and promote its holy influence, as it was taught by them, free from human additions.

Those holy men, when they went forth, "endued with power from on high," to testify the gospel of the grace of God, did not blend the truth they had received with the philosophy of Plato, or the metaphysics of Aristotle, but boldly and affectionately declared facts and doctrines of infinite importance; and bore their explicit testimony against the practice of debasing the gospel, by any adventitious mixtures, whether derived from the ceremonials and dogmas of the Synagogue, or from the schools of Greece. By a faithful declaration of the guilt and danger in which men are involved through sin, by a lively exhibition of the love of God, in the gift of his Son for the redemption of sinners; by the proclamation of pardon and hope, through his atonement and death, to all who believed in him; and by affording miraculous proofs of the infallible truth and infinite importance of the things they declared, the apostles of Christ, undismayed by
difficulties,

difficulties, and unappalled by dangers, strenuously fought to enlighten a dark and polluted world; to recover men from ignorance, superstition, idolatry, and vice, to the knowledge and love of God, the enjoyment of peace, and the practice of universal holiness, under the animating hope of a blessed immortality. And through the concurrence and grace of that Divine Saviour, by whom they were commissioned, and by whose spirit they were supported and guided, their ardent and generous efforts were rendered eminently successful. In the various countries they visited, and amongst men of all descriptions and characters, the triumphs of the cross attended and crowned their labours. The votaries of superstition, the sensualized slaves of voluptuousness, the tenacious and haughty adherents of the philosophic sects, the civilized and polished Greeks, and rough and untaught Barbarians, under the ministry of Apostles, were induced to forsake their stupid idolatries, their debasing and abominable vices, their pride of human wisdom, and their ferocious and brutal practices, to become the humble, pure, meek, and holy followers of the Redeemer. Convinced of sin, alarmed with danger, agonized with remorse, and trembling on the verge of despair, they were led to behold, by the eye of faith and repentance, a crucified Saviour exhibited in the preaching of the Apostles; and,

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believing,

believing, they rejoiced to find pardon and peace, hope and deliverance through him. From the dreams of a gross and impure mythology, they turned to contemplate, with rapt admiration, the glories of the God of love: and deeply felt the renovating, consolatory, and elevating influence of that astonishing truth, which declared, that “ he so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not *perish*, but have everlasting life.” From the polluted abyss of depravity, and the degrading thralldom of sin, multitudes, by means of the gospel, were thus called, converted to God, became new creatures in Christ Jesus, and were made meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light. And thus the doctrine of the cross, though it was to the carnal Jews a stumbling-block, and to some of the Greeks, foolishness, was the power of God, and the wisdom of God, to the salvation of every one that believed. The nearer, therefore, we keep to the example of the Apostles, the more we may hope to be instrumental in promoting the like most important, desirable, and beneficial effects.

Christianity, it should never be forgotten, may be debased in many different ways, not only by departing from its grand, and infinitely important truths, or by blending its pure, simple, and spiritual worship with human ceremonies and superstitions,

stitutions, but also by metaphysical refinements on its doctrines themselves, or by attempts to ingraft upon them curious, speculative, or abstruse opinions, which have no support or countenance from the plain language of the New Testament, or any just critical deductions from it. To attempt the improvement of Christianity by such means, is to hold up a feeble taper to illuminate the meridian sun. How different are all such speculations, from the perspicuous, solemn, impressive, and dignified manner, in which the Apostles spoke of divine truth! And how different are their *effects* likely to be! In what light must such attempts appear, to men of improved education, and enlarged scientific knowledge, whose hearts are not influenced by the gospel, or who may unhappily have imbibed peculiar prejudices against it? Will not they esteem such things to be, at best, but grave trifles; and, instead of increasing the respectability of religion, will not their tendency be to strengthen the prejudices of some against Christianity, rather than dispose them to give it that serious, extensive, and impartial examination, which its truth and infinite importance demand? The corruptions and superstitions of the Roman church, gave rise to modern infidelity; and all attempts to refine upon the Christianity of the New Testament, in proportion as they depart from the *simplicity* of the gospel,

tend to its prejudice. It is a circumstance worthy therefore of the very serious attention of all who have to speak of religion, whether from the pulpit or the press, that more injury has probably been done to the genuine and important doctrines of the gospel, by the weak and indefensible things advanced by some of its friends, than by all the arguments of its enemies. The true way to support it, is to adhere to the apostolic plan of teaching it, and to “beware lest any man spoil us through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ*.”

If the discussion in the preceding pages should tend to impress any with the importance of these practical views, they will not have been written in vain. Differences of opinion on matters of minor importance in Revelation, and on others where it is silent, will probably always remain during the imperfect state of the church upon earth. But while we are careful not to suffer these to impair our regard to the essential truths, or holy influence of Christianity, it is a consolatory and animating thought, to which the religious mind may turn with pleasure from the pages of controversial debate, that there is a pure, perfect, and immortal state approaching, in which all

* Col. ii. 8.

“ who

“ who love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity,” freed from the errors, imperfections, and sorrows of humanity, will cordially unite in admiring and praising him, who is the great fountain of truth, righteousness, and purity, even respecting those subjects on which their views might differ in the present world. From the attributes of God, from the intimations and promises of his word, and from the perfection of that blessed state, which is the great object of the christian hope, we may reasonably infer, that what we know not now, we shall know hereafter; that there the *moral system* of the universe will be clearly unfolded, to the admiring view of angels and glorified saints; that what was dark will be cleared, what was obscure will be plain, what was difficult will be easy, and, that what was inexplicable to human researches, either in the original constitution of things, or in the dispensations of Providence to the church and world, with all that was mysterious in the Divine conduct respecting individuals, will be rendered intelligible and obvious, and will appear to accord, in infinite precision and grandeur, with all the glorious moral perfections of God. Then it will be evident, that in all the emanations of being, from the unoriginated and eternal source of existence, and in all his dispensations towards every part of the immense universe he has formed, the Great Jehovah has ever acted

acted in a manner consistent with infinite wisdom, un sullied purity, immutable righteousness, goodness, and truth ; and that the whole process of his government, from its commencement to the consummation of all things, has tended, by the most admirable, wise, and illustrious methods, to display to all the intelligent creation, the unspeakable evil of sin, the infinite importance of moral purity, and the glory of his boundless perfections. A higher, a grander, a more sublime end than the display of his own glory, in the formation and government of the universe, cannot be conceived. It includes every subordinate end, worthy a Being of perfect wisdom, rectitude, and benevolence, and is comprehensive of all that is great and admirable in natural, and all that is beautiful, amiable, excellent, and holy in moral perfection. And when the vast plan of Infinite Intelligence shall be fully developed, to the admiration of the heavenly world, “ the multitude which no man could number redeemed to God, out of every kindred, “ and tongue, and people, and nation,” however they might have been distinguished upon earth, will harmoniously join, with the most devout affection and ineffable delight, in celebrating the wisdom, righteousness, power, and grace of God, displayed in the works of creation, the operations of providence, and the wonders of redeeming love, and with unwearied ardour will “ sing
“ the

“ the fong of Mofes, and the fong of the Lamb,
“ faying, Great and marvellous are thy works
“ Lord God Almighty, juft and true are thy
“ ways, thou King of faints.”

A work fo sweet, a theme fo high,
Demands, and crowns Eternity.

DODDRIDGE. Hymn lxxi.

NOTES.

NOTES.

Note A. page 59.

“HE will sin.”—In the discourse from which this quotation is made, a peculiar view of sin, connected with Dr. Williams’ Hypothesis, is given. It is stated to be a “*privation, a negation,*” and an “*infinite evil.*” Combining these two views, it would follow, that sin is an *infinite negation*. But it would be difficult in moral science, to make out a consistent statement of “*infinite negatives;*” or to shew what valuable practical purposes are to be answered, by applying the doctrine of *privations* and *negations* from the old logic to *this* subject. That some injurious consequences might arise from it, is but too obvious.—In ancient and modern languages *negative* terms are used to convey *positive* ideas, and *positive* terms to express *negative* ideas. The *nature* of sin, therefore, is not to be inferred from the *negative* or *positive* form of the words used to denote it in the Scriptures.—It is a circumstance also rather fatal to the view of sin as a mere “*negation,*” that in the first instance on record, the transgression was the *positive* act, eating the forbidden fruit, and the obedience required would have been the *negative*, *not* eating of the tree of knowledge, &c.—But as there may be a doubt, whether the same views are still entertained by the very worthy and highly esteemed author of “the Discourse on the Divine Glory, &c.” it does not seem requisite to pursue the subject further here.

Note

Note B. referred to page 70.

The note on "innate ideas" is peculiarly recondite. One ray of truth beams in it, that the addition of finites cannot constitute positive infinity; but in other parts it speaks of a "notion which presides over sensations and "reflections," and of some ideas as "*more innate*" than others. Innate ideas were those which, before the days of Mr. Locke, were supposed to be in the mind from its original formation, not attained by the use of its faculties, and common to the whole species. They have generally been given up by succeeding writers. See Doddridge's Definition, Locke's Essay, chap. ii. § 1, 5, &c. and Ency. Brit. vol. xi. page 483. But Dr. Williams' note (Doddridge's Works, vol. iv. page 311.) asserts that "the only idea we can have of infinity from "sensation or reflection is that of a *finite ever-growing* ; "and that if our notion of God have not a *more innate* "origin than this, it concerns us to know whether we "have any notion of him at all but what is *idolatrous*." Yet it is afterwards stated in the same note, that "every "man may, if it be not his *own fault*, have that idea of "God's *absolute existence*" (which it seems must be innate), "as implied in the consistent *belief* of the true "God." How can these things be? That which is *innate* is *connate*, or born in and with a man. But a just idea of the Divine existence cannot be of *this kind*; and if it were, it would be useless, because it would be what no man could *distinctly state*: and if every idea of God which is not *innate* be *idolatrous*, will not all men be found idolaters? For who could ascertain for himself, or communicate to others, an "innate idea" of the Divine existence?—It is not correctly true, that "the
M "only

“ only idea we can have of infinity from sensation or reflection, is that of a finite ever-growing.” Ideas from sensation are those received by the medium of the senses ; and from the word of Revelation, we may learn by the sense of seeing, or the sense of hearing, that a Being whose perfections are positively infinite, does exist : by divine teaching also the mind may be justly impressed with the solemn importance of this most interesting truth. But an idea received into the mind by the organ of vision, or by the organ of hearing, is an idea from *sensation* ; and if no correct idea of God could be received by the senses, it would be in vain that we are taught any thing in the Sacred Scriptures concerning him, for they are addressed to men as capable of receiving ideas by reading or hearing them. Dr. Williams’ note, while it contends, “ that our notion of positive infinity, or of God, is innate,” admits that, “ a mind properly disposed, may, by a *just comparison* of ideas, attain to a certainty that there is a God.” But is not the “ comparison of ideas” performed by *reflection* upon them ? And how is this statement consistent with the former, that the true idea of God is innate, and unattainable by sensation and reflection ? If the reader, versed in pneumatology and divinity, will carefully examine the note here referred to, he will probably be of opinion, that the source of the obscurity which runs through it, lies in the want of distinguishing, between an impressive conviction of the all-important fact, that a Being *positively infinite exists*, and having an *adequate* idea of *positive infinity*. The former is *essential* to the true knowledge of God, the latter exceeds the powers of the highest created intelligence. *Job xi. 7. Mat. xi. 27.*

Note

Note C. page 66.

It was a subject of debate between the popish and protestant divines after the reformation, whether man's original righteousness were essential to the perfection of his nature, and *concreated* with it ; or whether it were a *supernatural* gift, and *superadded* subsequent to his creation. The catholics affirmed the *latter*, and the reformers the *former* view of the subject. The opinions of men are not of authoritative weight in religion, but the following extracts may gratify some readers, and enable them to judge what affinity that controversy bears to the present. Turretine, speaking of the image of God in which man was created, says,

“ Ad eam pertinet rectitudo, et integritas, seu dotes
 “ homini collatæ, quæ nomine *Justitiæ originalis* exprimi
 “ solent, quia fuit homini *concreata*, et ab origine illi col-
 “ lata est, quæ complectitur, tum sapientiam in mente,
 “ sanctitatem in voluntate, et rectitudinem in affecti-
 “ bus, et talem harmoniam inter omnes ejus facultates
 “ dicit, ut membra affectibus, affectus voluntati, volun-
 “ tas rationi, ratio Legi divinæ obsequerentur, et sic
 “ homo rectus et integer absque peccato existeret, sed
 “ tamen in statu semper mutabili. Reclamant Socini-
 “ ani, qui, ut faciliùs peccati originalis veritatem et
 “ naturam evertant, non modò nolunt agnoscere Justi-
 “ tiam hanc pertinere ad Dei imaginem, sed absolutè
 “ negant hominem in tali justitia esse conditum: vide
 “ Socinum Prælect. c. 3. Nos verò hominem cum
 “ justitia ista fuisse *creatum*, et in ea præcipuam imagi-
 “ nis partem consistere censemus.” Turretini Opera,
 Tom I. page 513.

On the question, “ An *Justitia originalis* fuerit *naturalis* an *supernaturalis* ?” the following passages occur :

M 2

“ Pontificii

“ Pontificii volunt Justitiam originalem esse donum
 “ *supernaturale*, quod ad nativas hominis integri dotes
 “ et vires *superadditum* fuerit. Cur autem ista statuant,
 “ causam Bellarminus exponit de gratia primi hominis
 “ c. 5 et 6. quòd in homine naturaliter pugna fuerit
 “ inter carnem et spiritum, rationem et appetitum, ex
 “ qua fluere morbus et languor quidam naturæ, qui ex
 “ *conditione materiæ* oriretur; ideo Deum justitiam ori-
 “ ginalem tanquam *frænum aureum* addidisse, quod co-
 “ hiberet illam pugnam, et instar pretiosæ *vestis*, quæ
 “ nuditatem ipsius teget, et *medicamenti*, quod sana-
 “ ret illum languorem.—Orthodoxi verò, licet non
 “ diffiteantur justitiam istam supernaturalem posse dici
 “ ratione status corrupti, nec esse naturalem constitu-
 “ tivè, aut consecutivè; Tamen naturalem bene dici
 “ censent *originaliter*, et *perfectivè*, ratione status inte-
 “ gri, quia illi *concreata* est, et ita *necessaria* ad hominis
 “ integri perfectionem, ut sine ea talis esse non potu-
 “ issent.

“ Si justitia originalis fuit supernaturalis, ergo natu-
 “ ralis Adamo fuit privatio justitiæ, et illa omnia,
 “ quæ necesse est ut subjecto capaci adsint, a quo jus-
 “ titia abest, ignorantia putà, inclinatio ad vitia, con-
 “ cupiscentia carnis, rebellio partis inferioris adversus
 “ superiorem, et alia idgenus, quæ Bellar: vocat *mor-
 “ bos et languores naturæ*. At hoc dici non potest, quin
 “ eidem adscribantur, qui est author naturæ, qui ideo
 “ censeatur author peccati. Nam quod Bellarminus
 “ regerit, concupiscentiam, quæ nunc est poena pec-
 “ cati, tunc tantùm fuisse languorem et morbum na-
 “ turæ, qui non sit ex Deo, sed ex *conditione materiæ*,
 “ ut faber ferrarius rubiginis author non est, quam
 “ factus ab ipso gladius contrahit non solvit nodum.
 “ Nam 1. Gratis supponitur datum fuisse languorem et
 “ morbum

“ morbum in natura sana. 2. Morbum illum non fuisse
 “ peccatum ; cùm tamen certum sit concupiscentiam
 “ illam et præcipitem ad vitia inclinationem, pugnare
 “ cum Lege Dei, et causam esse multorum peccato-
 “ rum, atque adeò non posse non esse peccatum. 3.
 “ Comparatio fabri ferrarii non huc pertinet, quia ru-
 “ bigo sequitur materiam ferri, quam faber *non fecit*,
 “ sed invenit. At Deus *ipsam hominis materiam condidit*
 “ *et quidem talem*, ut vult Bellarminus quam sequeretur
 “ necessariò talis ἀλαξία et rebellio, unde ut fuit author
 “ *talis materiae*, debet author *illius defectus*, qui necessariò
 “ *eam sequitur* ; atque ita sapientissimo δημουργω, vel
 “ imperitia impingetur, vel impotentia, quòd concu-
 “ piscentiæ labem, ex conditione materiae necessariò
 “ emergentem, totamque illam carnis adversus spiri-
 “ tum ἀλαξίαν, vel *non præviderit*, vel *amovere non potue-*
 “ *rit*, quin nobilissimum opus invaderet, quod utrumque
 “ ex æquo impium et blasphemum.—Quamvis justi-
 “ tia originalis rectè dici possit *gratia*, seu *donum gratui-*
 “ *tum*, atque adeò indebitum à parte Dei, *quemadmo-*
 “ *dum et natura ipsa*, quæ ab ipso creata est ; non sequi-
 “ tur propterea esse *supernaturalem*, vel *indebitam* ad per-
 “ fectionem naturæ integræ, quia licèt nihil debuerit
 “ Deus homini, posito tamen quòd voluit creare homi-
 “ nem ad imaginem suam, debuit illum *creare justum et*
 “ *sanctum.*” Ibid. p. 518, 519, 521.

The learned Frederick Spanheim the younger, ex-
 pressed his views of the same subject, in the following
 passage: “ Pontificii, qui, ut portentoso suo dogmati de
 “ statu *purae naturæ* primi hominis patrocinentur, in quo
 “ scil. gratiæ expers, concupiscentiæ motibus, petulan-
 “ tiæ carnis adversus spiritum lascivientis, morbis, lan-
 “ guoribus ipsi adeò morti ex materiae suæ conditione
 “ obnoxius fuerit ; ut contendant *naturalia* primi ho-
 “ minis,

“ minis integra etiamnum et illibata ad nos derivari ;
 “ adeoque et concupiscentiam è peccatorum censu ex-
 “ pungant, et possibilitatem implendæ legis et *αδιαφορίας*
 “ arbitrii, aliaque Pelagianæ Scholæ dogmata susti-
 “ neant, justitiam hanc *originalem non naturalem* faciunt
 “ sed *supernaturalem*, non *concreatam* sed *adventitiam*, non
 “ *naturæ* donum sed *gratiæ*, concessamque divinitus ut
 “ carnis adversus Spiritum ferocientis frænum et remi-
 “ dium naturæ languentis. In quo à Pelagianis diver-
 “ tunt Romanenses, quod illi hominem tum ante tum
 “ post lapsum eodem omnino loco haberent, hi quoad
 “ *naturalia* solummodo, illi *nihil* omnino lapsu interver-
 “ sum vellent, hi *supernaturalia* tantùm. Quo quidem
 “ dogmate nihil crudius. Peccatur primò *falsissima hypo-*
 “ *thesi*, quasi naturales fuerint primo homini vel pugna
 “ carnis et spiritus, vel fœdi concupiscentiæ motus, vel
 “ natura languescens et vitiò suo *ad corruptionem ver-*
 “ *gens*, quibusque frænum accedere necesse fuerit. Quæ
 “ quam sint in bonitatem, justitiam et sapientiam Con-
 “ ditoris, in ejusdem gloriam hoc opificio manifestan-
 “ dam contumeliosa, imò iis omnibus Scripturæ locis
 “ adversa, quibus et homo *conditus bonus, justus, sanctus,*
 “ *rectus*, Gen i. 31. Eccles. vii. 19. Eph. iv. 24.”
 Spanhemii Opera Fol. Tom III. 1253.

“ Imago hæc, etiam quoad *integritatem et immortali-*
 “ *tatem*, fuit homini primò *naturalis* ; non ut instar *freni*
 “ ad cohibendam *concupiscentiam* homini, in statu *puræ*
 “ *naturæ* creato, superaddita sit per Divinam gratiam,
 “ sicut volunt *Papistæ*. Fuit enim homo *integer* crea-
 “ tus ; et *concupiscentia* cohibenda est peccatum, Rom.
 “ vii. 7. nec creatura rationalis in statu puræ naturæ
 “ fingi potest, quo nec bona nec mala ipsa sit.” Marckii
 Theologiæ Medulla, p. 196.

“ Therefore

“ Therefore we must consider him (man) at first, as
 “ made upright, so that there was not the least tincture,
 “ or taint of sin in his nature, or any *disposition* or *incli-*
 “ *nation* to it ; but all the powers and faculties of the
 “ soul were disposed to answer the ends of its creation,
 “ and thereby to glorify God.”—“ And inasmuch as
 “ he was indispensably obliged to yield obedience to
 “ this law, and the consequence of violating it would
 “ be his ruin, God, as a *just* and gracious Sovereign,
 “ gave him *ability* to fulfil it ; so that he might not,
 “ without his own fault, by a necessity of nature, rebel
 “ against him, and so plunge himself into inevitable
 “ misery.” Ridgley, vol. i. p. 291. Ed. of 1731.

“ *God created man in his own image.* Gen. i. 27.
 “ He did not first make man, and then put his image
 “ upon him ; but created him *in* his image, it was *con-*
 “ *created* with him.” Dr. Guyse, on the original state
 of man in the Berry-Street Sermons, vol. i. p. 159.—
 The just inference from these sentiments is, that man
 could not have been placed in the situation, which Dr.
 Williams’ hypothesis calls “ pure equity,” unless the
 Creator had undone his own work, and Adam had been
 deprived of the Divine image in which he was created.
 —The sentiments of protestant divines on the subject
 may be further seen by consulting the subjoined refer-
 ences.

A Reveti Opera Fol. Tom I. p. 17, 18.

Parei Opera Fol. Tom I. p. 53.

Calvini Opera, Tom I. p. 12.

Zanchii Opera, Tom III. p. 702. Ed. 1613.

Davenantii Prælect. cap. xiv. p. 271—274.

Amesii Medulla, p. 60.

Tractatus

- Tractatus Whitakeri de peccato originali, cap. vii.
p. 25.
Wollebii Compend. Theolg. p. 38.
Owen on the Spirit, p. 76.
Bp. Bull's Works, Vol. IV. p. 1189, &c.
Quick's Synodicon, Vol. I. p. 8.
Leland's Answer to Tindal, Vol. II. cap. xiv. p.
477.
Patrick's Com. on Gen. i. 26.
Declaration of the Faith and Order of congregational
Churches, made at the Savoy in 1658, p. 16.

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Printed by S. Couchman, Throgmorton-Street.