

THE TRUE THEORY OF THE GREEK NEGATIVE Μή.

THE TRUE THEORY

OF

THE GREEK NEGATIVE Μή.

BY

GAVIN HAMILTON,

OF THE ELGIN ACADEMY,

AUTHOR OF "THE FUNCTIONS OF SI AND QUI," "THE TRUE THEORY OF THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE, OR THE LOGIC OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE."

Ἔχει ἡ Δίκη μέγα σθένος.

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TO

THE REV. R. PAYNE SMITH, D.D.,

CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH,

PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

My dear Dr Smith,

To you I dedicate this work, in admiration of your profound Biblical learning, in appreciation of your genuine interest in the logical exposition of the Greek and Latin languages, and in acknowledgment of a faithful friendship which has existed between us for many years.

With the strongest sentiments of consideration and regard,

Ever,

Most truly thine,

GAVIN HAMILTON.

INTRODUCTION.

WITHIN a date not very distant from the present day, in the British House of Commons,—where the opinions of the cultivated classes, if not of the masses, are faithfully represented,—the state of philological law, as well as social and ecclesiastical law, in England has been discussed with special reference to certain countries in Europe. The difference between these subjects is not greater than between the spirit in which they were discussed. When a Roman Pontiff presumed to portion out English territory into ecclesiastical hierarchies, the British Lion, with thunder in his throat, returned a response, which served at once as redress for the past and a remedy for the future. The same stubborn resistance was offered to Popish Rome which, in days of old, was offered to Pagan Rome. England, in a manner not to be mistaken, declined to be a vassal of the Vatican. When the Emperor of the French presumed to dictate to the Government of Queen Victoria the alteration of social law, the House of Commons, displeased at the affront offered, and still more displeased at the affront suffered, gave effective expression to its indignant voice, by a vote which drove from power

the most popular minister of modern times. But when the state of philological law in Britain, viewed relatively to Germany, came to be considered by the House, in the discussion on the Oxford University Bill, the insular independence, so conspicuous on the two occasions referred to above by a double portion of its presence, was on this occasion conspicuous only by its complete absence. A right honourable gentleman, himself more remarkable for perverse than patriotic feeling, his speech more remarkable for the length of its statements than the strength of its arguments, thus concluded with the crowning climax:—

"We had at least a right to expect that great works upon the ancient languages would be produced, and that great scholars would be educated at the Universities; but this was not the case: and not only did the Germans monopolize the fields which we had neglected, but it was notorious that they surpassed us in classical studies. All the most important editions of classical works were German: all the great modern commentators were Germans. The Germans were now our masters in every branch of philology, although this was not the case in the days of Bentley and Porson, who were the equals of any scholars in Europe of their own time."

To these allegations this answer must be made here,—

Pudet haèc opprobria nobis
Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli;—

for the apologetic admissions of the present Chancellor

of the Exchequer, the then member for the University of Oxford, were scarcely less damaging than the direct accusation of his antagonist.

On the Germans, when engaged on other subjects of speculation than Greek and Latin philology, other critics have not hesitated to comment in terms very different from those cited above. In a well-known work entitled "Nouvelles Etudes sur les Femmes Illustres et la Société du XVIII^{e} Siècle," it is thus that the illustrious French philosopher Cousin describes German philosophy:—

"Il nous reste à recueillir de tous nos écrits les éléments épars d'une Théodicée nouvelle, particulièrement fondée sur une psychologie exacte fecondée par une induction légitime avec le double dessein de défendre la grande foi du genre humain *contre la détestable philosophie que l'Allemagne, en ces derniers temps, a renvoyée a la France.*"—(P. viii.)

"The detestable German philosophy" is unquestionably strong language. The Frenchman, however, finds in a Scotchman a seconder, who uses language stronger still. In his "Journal," it is thus that the late Sir James Mackintosh writes:—

"I am endeavouring to understand this *accursed* German philosophy."

As the repute of Sir J. Mackintosh, though equally well deserved, is not so widely diffused as that of M. Cousin, it has been deemed desirable to cite Lord Macaulay's testimony to his fine judicial faculty:—

"All the little peculiar cadences of that voice, from which scholars and statesmen loved to receive the lessons of a serene and benevolent wisdom, are in our ears."—*Essays*, vol. ii. p. 53.

Nor do German physiologists emerge from the crucible of criticism with greater lustre than German psychologists. The conventional eminence of Dr Carus, of Dresden, may be inferred from the fact that he was physician to the late king of Saxony, and is a corresponding member of the Imperial Institute of France. He lately published a book entitled "*Symbolik der Menschlichen Gestalt.*" This book, like other German books, has found or forced its way into this country. Further, it had the fortune—a fortune which falls to the lot of few—to find a *chaperon* in one of the Quarterlies. But the Nemesis of retribution is soon in hot haste at its heels. Sir David Brewster,—whose critical temperament predisposes him to take theories on trial, before taking them on trust, and to try theories like trees, by their fruit,—falls in with the book. A few strokes from his strong arm are sufficient to shatter, and to scatter in shreds, the fair but flimsy fabric. It is thus, in a popular periodical, that he finally disposes of the theory of this book:—

"If the reader has followed us intelligently in these details, he cannot but have come to the conclusion that the *physiognomy of the human form is a daring and presumptuous speculation, without a single fact to support it;* and that, in its social relations and intellectual bearing, it is full of danger."

Thus, critics have been found, of sufficient capacity to refute their theories, and of sufficient courage to dispute the claims of the Germans to supremacy as psychologists and physiologists. And their claims to supremacy as philologists are not better founded. In proof of the truth of this proposition, the author has not deemed it necessary to press personalities into his service, although the practice has been sanctioned by the highest British authorities. It is thus that the late Sir William Hamilton speaks of an antagonist:—

"Lord Bacon says, of some one, he has only two small wants, he wants knowledge, and he wants lore. But, with the Archdeacon, we cannot well restrict his wants to two; for he lacks logic besides learning and lore, and a fourth, withal a worse defect, is to be added, but a defect which it is always painful to be forced to specify." Again, "But the Archdeacon of Lewes neither learns nor listens. He is not content to enjoy his ecclesiastical good fortune in humility and silent thankfulness; he will play the polemic, and thus expose to scorn, not merely himself, but also the church of which he is a dignitary."—*Discussions*, 2d Ed., pp. 508, 524.

Further, Lord Macaulay thus writes to another noble lord:—

Albany, Dec. 15, 1847.

"Dear Lord Mahon,—I know nothing of Giesler, but from the passage you have sent me, and if I am to form my opinion of him from that passage, I must pronounce him a dunce or something worse."

Since there is a large number of hard facts to be brought forward in the succeeding pages against the fanciful theories of the Germans, soft words easily enough may be employed in speaking of themselves. Harshness to an enemy is no homage to the hatred of an error. A good cause may soon become a bad one by using bad names. Truth requires neither a vindictive temper nor a vituperative tongue for her vindication. The spectacle of a philosopher or a philologer in a fury cannot minister to the edification of any one, and certainly cannot be entertaining to a wise or a good man. Although the propensity, in this country, to praise German philologists, has assumed the form of a passion rather than a fashion, and the right honourable gentleman cited above, advancing, with so much confidence, opinions which were accepted with no less complacency, in speaking of the Greek and Roman classics, made everybody a nobody but a German, nothing adverse to the Germans themselves will be advanced here, and their opinions only will be opposed, because they are opposed to truth. And if the circulation of these opinions, like the iron coin of Lycurgus in Sparta, had been confined to the country which produced them, no opposition to them would have been offered here. But since, like genuine gold, they are circulated here and everywhere, believed to be true, it must be stated that the only truth about them is that they are false. In many departments of human inquiry, after patient and protracted investi-

gation, often the only result reached is a preponderance of probability, but here there is all the certainty of positive proof. Of course, some *data* must be granted, on which the successive steps have to depend, some πού στῶ, or starting point, from which the mind, proceeding along the adamantine pathway of direct demonstration, at last reaches the terminus of truth. The preliminary postulate in the process of proof to be granted is, that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew more about Greek and Latin than the modern Germans. It is a much shorter, safer, and altogether more satisfactory way, to get Latin direct from Rome than by the devious, dubious, circuitous rout of Germany :—

> Juvat integros accedere fontes,
> Atque inde haurire.

Surely it is carrying the love of novelty too far to ask the student to go to Germany for philological spectacles when he has got eyes of his own.

In applying and adhering throughout to the course here advocated, the most rigid respect has been paid to *authority*, rightly understood, and rightly used. The argument of authority is delusive and dangerous, unless the authority itself is defensible by argument. That cannot be correctly called or considered authority which is attributed to those who are not careful to collect certified facts, and from them to draw general conclusions consistent with the laws of logic. In appealing from the modern Germans to the ancient

Greeks and Romans, the advantage of the argument from authority is gained, because their authority is defensible by argument. Reason clearly dictates that natives speak, write, and understand their own language better than foreigners. On all points, then, affecting the correct interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages the Greeks and Romans ought to be the arbiters in the court of appeal. That has been the uniform principle of procedure adopted by the author here and elsewhere. It being believed that it is right to reason before believing, since they who believe before reasoning have reason to repent after believing, a reason has always been given before asking the assent of scholars. But the reason has always been suggested and sanctioned by the ancients. No attempt has been made to set aside their authority. That, however, has been done hitherto both by British and German scholars:—

"Horace is most guilty of violating the general rule."—Carson, *Qui, Quae, Quod*, p. 29.

Cæsar and Sallust do the very same thing which is here imputed to Horace, and in doing so, they may seem to have violated an imaginary rule of grammarians, but they were only writing in exact accordance with the logical consistency so eminently characteristic of the Latin language. Again, the German Ernesti has not hesitated to tamper with the text of Cicero himself (*Off.* i. 24), and to write this note:—"Correxi *audeant* quod Latinitas postulat." This practice on the part of those who are in pos-

session of manuscripts is apt to excite uneasy feelings in the minds of those who are now anxious to have a correct text of the classics, and a consistent logical interpretation of it. But the effect of the German philological method, *i.e.*, "evolving theories from the depths of their own consciousness," is only fully seen in connexion with the subjunctive. According to them, at one time the subjunctive is used because "the clause is dependent," at another time because "it is indirect;" at one time because "the clause is indefinite," at another time because "it is potential;" at one time because "the predicate is in the relative clause," at another time because "the clause is an essential part of the entire statement;" at one time because "the clause contains a supposition, and not the statement of a fact," at another time because "the supposition carries with it some intimation that, in the speaker's judgment, it is probable."

Although the essential idea underlying the one form of the Latin* subjunctive is uniformly the same, not only do these representations bear not the most remote resemblance to it, but they bear no more resemblance to each other than to the angle of incidence or to the angle of polarization. Truth here, by its unity and simplicity demonstrates and defends itself. Error, on the other hand, by its multifarious and heterogeneous elements, exposes and explodes itself. Certain anonymous critics may

* See Appendix.

affect to believe these representations of the subjunctive, but they will have some difficulty in making booksellers and boys believe them.

Nor are the Germans greater in Greek. Not less error has forced or found its way into Britain in connexion with Latin than with Greek. And what disease or poison is to the body, that error is to the mind. According to Plato, in the *Protagoras*, as much time and thought ought to be expended on the detection of the one as the other, and the same solicitude shown in the purchase of mental as corporeal nutriment. Nor is the error of German theories on Greek, what Milton in his prose works calls opinion only in the process of formation. The course of investigation which they pursue is consistent from the commencement to the close. Starting on a false scent, every step they take, they only swerve farther from the straight path. Starting from the shifting slippery sands of supposition, instead of finding a footing on the firm foundation of fact, it is not strange that they should fail in reaching the terminus of truth. The German theory of the Greek negative Μή, when taken on trust, does admirably till taken on trial. The theory has a large balance in credit, but there is nothing, or next to nothing, when there is a demand to pay. This theory, created by the breath of fancy, circulated by the breath of credulity, when once stirred by the strong breeze of new thought, bursts like a bubble. The fair but flimsy fabric falls at the first assault.

It will be seen that, when the theory of the Germans relative to Μή is confronted with the constant practice of the classic writers of Greece, the one runs completely counter to the other. Of course, preference is here given to the latter over the former. It is assumed as a preliminary postulate in the process of proof, that the ancient Greeks knew more about Greek than the modern Germans. The authority of antiquity is here the right court of appeal. As it is in Latin, so it is in Greek. No attempt has been made by the author to supersede the authority of the Greeks, as the Germans have done, to "evolve a theory from the depths of his own consciousness," lest it might be found after all, that this was only evolving a theory from the shallows of conceit. There is no doubt that the German grammarians are multitudinous and unanimous, and it is commonly hazardous to oppose many having one voice. But respect has been paid here to their testimony, and not to the number of the witnesses,—

> Apud sapientes argumenta plus quam testes valent.
> Ponderanda sunt potius quam numeranda testimonia.

After it has been seen what is the character of German theories on the Latin subjunctive, and that it is often a characteristic of the Germans to believe before reasoning, and, as in the case of immature logicians, the faculty of imagination is developed on a larger scale than the faculty of ratiocination, it is not

at all strange that they should have conceived that μή essentially involves "a hypothesis," or something "indefinite," or "abstract." But it is somewhat strange that this theory should have been believed in Britain by such men as the Oxford lexicographers, *Liddell* and *Scott*, who have exhibited all the industry of copyists or compilers, with all the intellect of independent thinkers, and by such a man as J. W. Donaldson, of Cambridge, to whose imperial intellect nothing was more foreign than to follow or to borrow. Perhaps, also, it is somewhat strange that it has not long ere this been discovered what μή essentially involves. The author does not presume to play the part of the philosopher in assigning any reason for the phenomenon. Like a plain practical man, he only deals with the result. That a language, whose successful study has been associated with the equally solid and splendid triumphs of Richard Bentley and Richard Porson, and whose study by English clergymen not long ago was stimulated and rewarded with a seat in the House of Lords, should have had the constantly occurring μή left unexplained, or erroneously explained, only furnishes one out of many certain and conspicuous proofs, that fact is often far more striking than fiction. He was assuredly a wise man who recommended a friend, bent on visiting the Antipodes, "to read now and then a romance to keep the fancy *under*." The opinion of modern Germany and Britain relative to μή seems all the more remarkable from the circumstance, that the practice of such

Greek Fathers as Clement of Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzene completely coincides with the practice of the Greeks themselves. The same remark applies to the Scholiasts on Æschylus and Thucydides. It is amusing to see Dr Arnold (Thucyd. v. 110), in his own mild way, attempting to put the Scholiast right. Dr Arnold was at once morally and intellectually great, but he did not understand Greek so well as the Scholiast.

As to the distinction drawn by the Germans between μή as "subjective," and οὐ as "objective," the author quite concurs that it is new, but he demurs to its being considered true. Whether or not the discovery of this distinction in metaphysics constitutes a great epoch in that science does not require to be discussed or determined here. Its introduction into the domain of Greek has done about as much for that language as the "Vortices" of Descartes have done for physics, or the "Monads" of Leibnitz for metaphysics. The value of "subjective" and "objective," as applied to μή and οὐ, could not, perhaps, be better stated than in the words of the Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, contained in a communication with the author: —"The grammarians here try to help us with their nostrum of 'subjective' and 'objective,' but to little purpose. Here a theory is really wanted."

Nothing is farther from the desire, nothing more foreign to the design of the author, than to deny or to decry the services of the Germans in some departments of classical literature. He trusts that he feels

the full force of the sacred obligation laid on all, to render to every man his due. He has only contradicted and condemned German theories, when they are contradicted and condemned by the constant practice of the ancient Greeks and Romans. The application of the German theory of μή to the Œdipus Rex of Sophocles, for instance, serves only to mystify the meaning of the text, to stultify its author, and to mar the matchless beauty of the proudest monument of Athenian tragic genius. When a similar application is made to the masterpiece of Demosthenes—Περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου—the chief offence chargeable in the indictment by his antagonist is resolved into an "hypothesis." What would be thought of the skill of a modern lawyer who, in drawing up an indictment, should represent the commission of a notorious crime as a mere "fancy"? It would have been better for the reputation of the German grammarians if they had learned the difference drawn between a fact and a fancy in a court of justice. The logical exposition of the Greek and Latin languages is clearly enough not the *forte* of the Germans. Whenever there is a number of apparently discordant phenomena, yet capable of being located by the discovery of a principle, there is as much probability of finding such a principle in German grammars as there is of finding timber on the top of Teneriffe. There are, however, several editions of the classics by Germans, which it is a delight, as well as a duty to commend in high terms, such as Lachmann's *Lucretius*, Ritschl's *Plautus*, O. Müller's *Festus and*

Varro. The historical work of Mommsen rises far above the rank of respectability, and the reader resigns himself without reluctance to the guidance of one who handles his high subject with all the power of a master. And as for the all-accomplished Niebuhr, one of the most original of observers, so far above the ordinary specimens of his countrymen, of what country is that man who would not wish him to have been his compatriot?

In him there met such and so many qualities that, adjusted in their exercise by the balance of a perfect proportion, they raised him to the high rank of moral and intellectual greatness. That meanness and malignity, by which small minds only are marked and measured, could find no place in his noble nature. Like our own John Locke and Thomas Arnold, who loved truth with all the freshness and fervour of a maiden ardour, he will continue to challenge the veneration of men. While to have adjusted the relation between fact and fiction in the early annals of Rome by a critical temperament free from timidity on the one hand, and temerity on the other, and by the pure force of an imperial intellect to have turned the tide of human thought in a new direction, will always be regarded by scholars as a triumph no less solid than splendid.

It is now time to turn to the critics, and to report progress. Critics, like all other men, are comprised in two classes. The good, who do their duty, and the bad, who do not. The latter class, so far as the

author is concerned, has diminished in a manner equally rapid and remarkable. To the very few who deemed it consistent with their duty and dignity to play the part of quibblers and triflers in misrepresenting the author's second work as they had done his first, the only retaliation he offers is a reply in the form of a fresh instalment of truth. He would also beg to suggest that they who misrepresent what they review, do not review what they misrepresent.

Special reference is made here to one critique, the effect of which will not be what its author was inclined to expect. Reference would not have been made to it at all but for the opportunity it offers of proving how vain it is for any one to try to explain the difficulties of the Greek and Latin languages whose learning is limited to lexicons, and whose logic is based on the logic of German grammar. The reviewer of the *Scotsman* imagined that the author had incorrectly interpreted a passage from Nepos. A critic possessed of judicial equity and discrimination would have pronounced at once that the question was not whether a single word was incorrectly interpreted, but whether the entire passage illustrated and demonstrated the true theory of the subjunctive, for which only it was originally cited. And even if the single word had been incorrectly interpreted, what was that to the thousands correctly interpreted? But, after all, the reviewer is discomfited on the incidental, irrelevant, immaterial issue he has raised. He says, "In aedem Minervae, quae *χαλκίοικος* vocatur, confugit,"

is translated by Mr Hamilton, "He found an asylum in the temple of Minerva, the brazen one, as it is called," instead of "Minerva of the brazen house, as she is called." This is the crowning charge in a long article, which, from its commencement to its close, is a wilful violation of the command, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." But the Nemesis of retribution follows fast on his footsteps. He who attempts to murder his neighbour's reputation only commits suicide with his own. The borrowed spectacles to which the reviewer has recourse do not lend clearness to his sight. The borrowed bladders with which he tries to swim only make him sink. Unable himself to launch out into the sea of philological speculation, by leaning on *Liddell* and *Scott*, he only makes his shipwreck more signal. Turning to *Liddell* and *Scott*, he is told that in Greek writers χαλκίοικος is applied to Minerva. But Nepos, like Livy, wrote Latin, not Greek. Livy in this, as in many other matters affecting the correct interpretation of the Latin language, summarily settles the point at issue, for he expressly states that it was the temple that was made of brass:—

Aetoli circa *chalciaecum* (Minervae est *templum aeneum*) congregati caeduntur.—Lib. xxxv. 36.

Of course, the classical reviewer of the *Scotsman* is as great a stranger to the extant books of Livy as those whose loss is so greatly deplored by all true scholars. Events, philosophers say, repeat themselves. Homer, who, according to some accounts, was

a native of Athens, did not think his pictures of human nature perfect without Thersites. His representative is still found in the modern Athens, who, unable to refute, can only revile. One would think that if a man had no strength to reveal, he would, at least, have the prudence or the pride to conceal his chagrin. One would think that a man of ordinary prudence would have known that anonymous misrepresentation could avail nothing against the authenticated attestations of the highest academical authorities in the United Kingdom. But it is here, as in all cases of folly and crime that stain the page of human history. Passion is more powerful than prudence. It is still as orthodox as it was of old:—

Quod homines volunt, id plerumque credunt—

i.e., the wish is father of the thought. The reviewer wished certain doctrines to be false, then believed it, and at last, contrary to reason, justice, honour, tried in vain to make others believe the same thing. Knowing as little about the history of opinion as the history of Livy, he knew not that it is as vain to try to stop the course of truth as it is to stop the course of time. There are two policies, adopted by different men according to their different dispositions, to oppose truth. The one is to try to strangle it by violence, the other to starve it by neglect. Though the one, however, is the reverse of the other, they both resemble each other in their results. They are both overcome by what they attempt to oppose.

But it is time to report progress. Another Edinburgh critic, on the first of the two occasions referred to above, contrived in a little paragraph to compress a large amount of real spite, and pretended contempt. It was once intended to cite it entire, to contrast it with the critic's subsequent change of sentiment. However, since that change is for the better, and the author thinks so well of him as to believe that he is ashamed of his former exhibition, he forbears. The critic made much capital of fancied "presumption." He was horrified at the "presumption" of the author in differing from the "most distinguished scholars." He forgot, however, that the new opinions advanced were only the old orthodox opinions of such scholars as Cicero, Livy, and Cæsar, perhaps *not undistinguished.* But Time, the great teacher that always tells the truth, erelong wrought a change equally certain and conspicuous on the critic. On the second occasion referred to above, believing that the charge of "presumption" had lost its force and point as a weapon of offence, he does not press it into the service. He has at last learned that, in the discussion and determination of doubtful and difficult questions, the quality of arguments, and not the quarter whence they come, is to be considered. The author would be ashamed to quote anything in his own praise from the second critique; but, for the sake of progress, he will append the request, "Let us have more of his doctrine."

As for the Aristarchus of the *Athenæum*, while English courtesy did not allow him to revile when he

could not refute, yet the form in which he presented the result of his reasoning suggests the element of Irish rather than English logic,—"It is a pity that he should have spent so much strength in refuting Zumpt, Madvig, Carson, and Parr." A plain Scotchman reasons thus:—"In most countries it is customary to remove the rubbish of an old building before beginning to build a new one." Most people require to be convinced of the error of one theory before they require to have another. Time, however, produces the same effect on the English critic as on the Scotch. After a fresh instalment of truth has been presented to this Aristarchus, he concludes his critique thus:—"As Mr Hamilton's theory requires to be ventilated, he has done good service by entering it for the plate." This was written during the week of the last Derby. While it is always right to repair a wrong by confession and compensation, from whatever cause committed, it is fully as well, when sagacity sees what is right at first sight, and candour confesses it. The classical critic in the *London Review* combines these conditions of a competent critic. He is not known to the author; but he shows that he has studied the Latin language so successfully as to have seen its difficulties.

"There are many scholars who ascribe the difficulty of Latin, as compared with Greek, not to an inherent difference of grammar, but to the errors of modern systems, and would put Latin on a footing which should enable students to gain that thorough know-

ledge of it which has hitherto been limited to such men as Erasmus, who, by the way, was more acquainted with the classical writers than with what is termed the logic of Latin grammar."

It now only remains to give the opinions of one or two University professors, who are interested in the progress of classical science. The following is a communication from a Scottish professor:—

"Though myself brought up in the theory you combat, and accustomed to regard the indicative as the mood expressing fact, and the subjunctive as that expressing, in some shape or other, conception, I have always felt that there are many cases of subjunctive mood which cannot be brought under this formula without much thrusting and pegging to get them into the groove. I am, therefore, open to conviction, and perhaps I shall meet my classes next session, having sloughed my old grammatical skin, and equipped with a new and truer theory."

The author begs to commend the following to the consideration of the classical reviewer of the *Scotsman*, who, at least, will have the discernment to see that he has done a foolish thing, if he has not the conscience to feel that he has done a bad and base thing in bearing false witness against his neighbour. It is thus that Mr Hepworth Thompson, the Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, the able editor of *Archer Butler*, one of the Royal Commissioners for Public Schools lately appointed under Lord Palmerston's administration, writes to the author:—

"By liberating the province of grammar from these intruders—technical terms—you will have done a good work, and scholars who have not committed themselves to a theory will be grateful to you."

And even those who have, if good men, will gladly use the glorious words of the illustrious Locke:—

"Whatever I write, as soon as I discover it not to be *truth*, my hand shall be forwardest to throw it in the fire."

GAVIN HAMILTON.

THE ACADEMY, ELGIN,
25*th November* 1865.

ERRATA.

P.	5,	line	4,	*for* ὀϱᾶς	*read* ὀϱᾷς
„	6,	„	9,	„ Ὅς	„ Ὃς
„	13,	„	18,	„ μολών	„ μολών,
„	15,	„	29,	„ πέιθων	„ πείθων
„	18,	„	9,	„ ὀὺς	„ οὕς
„	18,	„	13,	„ I shall have given in my account, *read* he...his account.	
„	19,	„	3,	„ οὕς	„ οὕς
„	20,	„	4,	„ μελλόντα	„ μέλλοντα
„	23,	„	27,	„ ἀνδϱὸς	„ ἀνδϱός
„	29,	„	15,	„ αἐὶ	„ ἀεὶ
„	30,	„	24,	„ Κλεάϱχος	„ Κλέαϱχος
„	32,	„	5,	„ the	„ these
„	42,	„	4,	„ ομοίως	„ ὁμοίως
„	43,	„	2,	„ αὖτὸν	„ αὐτὸν
„	43,	„	3,	„ οὕτῳ	„ οὕτω
„	59,	„	17,	„ makes	„ make
„	64,	„	18,	„ ῥπάντα ᾶον	„ πάντα ῥᾷον
„	72,	„	10,	„ τοτ'	„ τότ'

THE TRUE THEORY OF THE GREEK NEGATIVE Μή.

NOTHING is more natural for many, if not most, minds, that by close and constant thinking have made some particular province of speculation all their own, than to exaggerate its difficulty and importance, by looking at it through the magnifying glass of egotism. Lest this mistake should be made here, the author deems it desirable to describe the nature and importance of the present investigation in language other than his own. Professor W. Y. Sellar, of the University of Edinburgh, who, besides having been a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, has taught in three of the four Universities of Scotland, thus speaks of the subject in question:—"*It is most difficult to enunciate a precise theory which would absolutely fit all phases of the usage of* οὐ *and* μή."

Further, Professor Lushington, who, upwards of twenty years ago, was chosen to succeed Sandford in the chair of Greek, at Glasgow, says,—

"*I am not disposed to maintain that the usage of* οὐ *and* μή *has ever yet been treated with a perfectly exhaustive analysis of their peculiarities.*"

Still further, the Regius Professor of Greek at

Cambridge, to whom repeated reference has already been made, in a communication with the author, uses these direct and decided terms :—

"The grammarians here try to help us with their *nostrum* of '*subjective and objective :*' *but to little purpose. Here a theory is really wanted.*"

There can be no mistake about the meaning of these distinguished authorities. In the conduct of a case or an argument, it is of great consequence to have good evidence from good witnesses. According to the evidence just cited, the difference between οὐ and μή has not as yet been sufficiently or satisfactorily defined. What is the current, if not correct, opinion relative to these particles, in Germany and Britain, may be ascertained from the following extracts :—

"There are various ways of expressing the difference between οὐ and μή :

"Thus, οὐ is an absolute expression of negative facts, that is, of external non-existence. It denies the existence of a thing in the external world, independently of any impression or conception in the mind as to its existence or non-existence : μή is an expression of negative impressions, a negative view without any reference to the actual existence or non-existence of the thing denied ; it expresses that in the belief, wish, intention of the subject, the thing spoken of has not existed, does not, or will not exist. Thus, οὔκ ἐστι τοῦτο (this is not), refers to the actual state of things in the external world ; δοκεῖ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι, refers to the negative impression,—I think *it is not ;*

οὐ, again, is a physical, μή a mental negation; οὐ denies a thing objectively, μή subjectively. Again, οὐ conveys an *independent and immediate* negation,—he is *not* good: μή, a negation depending on a supposition,—*I do not think* that he is good. The force of οὐ is complete in the sentence in which it stands; μή always points out of the sentence to a preceding supposition, either actually expressed in some other sentence or implied in the context."

The net of speculation is spread so wide here, that one would think that the truth might have been caught by accident at least. This definition, or rather description, contains so many distinctions, that if it had contained the truth, it would have almost contained everything. Distinctions, however, are to be weighed rather than counted, and valued accordingly. The grammar, from which the above extract is made, bears on the title-page that it is chiefly from the German of Kühner. The presence of the German element in it is certainly sufficiently certain and conspicuous. Its coincidence with the part in italics of the next extract, is striking enough:—

"The Greek language has two negative adverbs, οὐ and μή, the general difference between which is, that οὐ expresses an *objective* or absolute negation, while μή expresses only a *subjective* or relative negation, as οὐκ ἔχω, I have not, absolutely; μὴ ἔχω, I think I have not,—it is my *subjective* or personal opinion that I have not. This negative is added to a participle or

infinitive, because they are mostly = to a conditional clause with εἰ, as ὁ μὴ καμών, he who does not exert himself; or if any one does not exert himself; τὸ μὴ γῆμαι κακόν, not to marry is an evil, or if a man does not marry, it is an evil."—*Greek Grammar*, Schmitz, pp. 155, 156.

It is clear enough that the introduction of the terms "objective and subjective" from the domain of metaphysics into that of philology, is due to the Germans: and with what result may be seen by a reference to the opinion of the Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, quoted above. As to the supposition that a "condition" is necessarily involved in such a clause as ὁ μὴ καμών, it will be proved in due course, that this is a complete misconception.

The next quotation, from a book entitled "Clyde's Greek Syntax," full of German phraseology, and written in the full belief of the supremacy of German scholarship, presents a view of μή equally erroneous:—

"Οὐ and μή differ from each other, as do the indicative and subjunctive moods: οὐ belonging to the mood of fact, μή to the mood of conception."—P. 92.

If consideration had been given to the fact, that an unfulfilled condition in the past is habitually expressed in Greek by means of the imperfect or aorist indicative, such a supposition as that now quoted would probably never have been either conceived in Germany or believed in Britain. Such a distinction between the indicative and subjunctive

moods in Greek is as ill founded as that drawn till lately between these same moods in Latin.

Further, in the same treatise, page 93, on the sentence, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς σφαλερόν ἐστι τό, ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις, ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, the following comment is made,— "The contingency in ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις is obvious: it means *not particular things which*, but such things as." It will be seen, in due course, that μή denies "*particular*" things with all the absoluteness of which language is capable.

It is somewhat remarkable that in a work so well known and so widely used as *Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon*, one so creditable to British scholarship, in which all the industry of a copyist or compiler is combined with all the intellect of an independent thinker, the German view of μή should have been so implicitly adopted:—

"Μή expresses subjectively, that one *thinks* that a thing is *not*; οὐ, objectively, that it is *not*.... 2. It is used after the final conjunctions ἵνα, ὡς, ὅπως, ὥστε, because these are in their nature *contingent*."— Article Μή.

It will be seen in due course, that ὥστε with μή denies absolutely, without any "contingency," qualification, or reserve, whatever. The same surprise may naturally be felt at the same opinions being held by the late lamented Donaldson, to whose imperial intellect in speculation nothing was more foreign than to follow or to borrow. In the *Complete Greek Grammar*, pp. 213, 214, it is stated that,—

Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is = "the supposition that it has not come to pass." Participle: μὴ δρῶν, "if he abstains from doing."

Οὐ is used after relatives, when the antecedent is definite, because in this case there is an affirmation; but μή follows the relative when the antecedent is indefinite, because in this case there is an hypothesis. Thus,—

"Ος μὴ ποιεῖ ταῦτα = ὁ μὴ ποιῶν ταῦτα = Si quis non haec facit."

It will be seen, in course of this investigation, after due deliberation on the practice of the Greek writers, that the prevailing idea present to their minds, in writing such a clause as the one just quoted, was very different from indefiniteness or hypothesis.

The last extract illustrative of the British belief relative to μή will be taken from the treatise of the late Sir D. K. Sandford, entitled *Homeric and Attic Greek*:—

"When μή is found with adjectives or participles, these involve a condition."—P. 95.

From the above extracts it is quite clear that there can be no doubt as to what are the current opinions regarding μή as a negative particle among the highest authorities in Britain and Germany. There can be no less doubt, that when these opinions are confronted with those held by the ancient Greeks themselves, they are quite contrary to each other. Preference is here given to the ancients over the moderns. It is assumed as a preliminary postulate in the process

of proof, that the ancient Greeks knew more about Greek than modern Germans do.

The first citation is made from Thucydides:—

Ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασα αὐξηθῆναι, or, in the language of Livy,—

"Graecia adhuc sedes suas ita mutabat et novas quaerebat, ut quiescendo non cresceret."

i.e., Greece was still in a migratory condition, and in quest of new settlements, so that it did not develop its resources by remaining at rest.—Lib. 1, 12.

Here, in ὥστε μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, a negation is made by μή with ὥστε, but there is no contingency whatever, as *Liddell and Scott* would have it, according to the quotation given above: ὥστε is *consequent* on what goes before, but it cannot be said with any regard to correct thought or speech, that it is "contingent" thereon. A negative statement, definite in respect of time, place, and circumstance, is made without the slightest limitation, qualification, or reserve. What the Greeks desired and designed to convey by μή in this and the following citations will be fully explained at a subsequent stage of this argument. What is to be proved at present is, that the Greeks themselves give no warrant whatever for the current belief relative to μή.

The following sentences from Xenophon present the same facts with the same irresistible and irreversible inference deducible from them as the sentence above taken from Thucydides:—

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κατέστησε τὸ στράτευμα, ὥστε καλῶς ἔχειν ὁρᾶσθαι

πάντῃ φάλαγγα πυκνήν, τῶν δὲ ὁπλων μηδένα καταφανῆ εἶναι, ἐκάλεσε τοὺς ἀγγέλους.

i.e., But when he (Clearchus) had drawn up the army in such a way that it was in a favourable position for being seen on every side to be a close compact mass of infantry, while not one of the unarmed men was visible, he summoned the messengers of the Persian king.—*Anab.*, lib. II 3, 3.

Here, in ὥστε τῶν ὁπλων μηδένα καταφανῆ εἶναι, a negation is introduced by ὥστε with μή, not "contingently," according to *Liddell and Scott*, but absolutely, nor is there any "conception," according to the Germans and others, but an actual fact stated, without any condition, qualification, or reserve whatever.

Καὶ ἐνετύγχανον τάφροις καὶ αὐλῶσιν ὕδατος πλήρεσιν, ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι διαβάινειν ἄνευ γεφυρῶν.

i.e., And they fell in with ditches and canals full of water, *so that they were not able to cross without bridges.*—*Id.* 10.

Here, also, in ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι διαβάινειν, there is a negation made by μή, but there is neither "contingency," according to the Oxford lexicographers, nor "conception," according to the German grammarians, but an actual fact absolutely expressed.

Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἔχοντες τοσούτους πόρους πρὸς τὸ ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν, καὶ τούτων μηδένα ἡμῖν ἐπικίνδυνον, ἔπειτα ἐκ τούτων πάντων τοῦτον ἂν τὸν τρόπον ἐξελοίμεθα, ὃς μόνος μὲν πρὸς θεῶν ἀσεβής, μόνος δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αἰσχρός;

i.e., How then, with such means of warfare against

you, and yet not one of these dangerous to ourselves, could we next out of all these select this one, which on the one hand is alone impious before the gods, and on the other is base in the sight of men?—*Id.* 5, 20.

Here, again, in *καὶ τούτων μηδένα ἡμῖν ἐπικίνδυνον*, there is a negation with *μή*, but there is neither "contingency" nor "conception," but the statement of a simple fact.

Τοῖς οὖν θεοῖς χάρις, ὅτι οὐ σὺν πολλῇ ῥώμῃ ἀλλὰ σὺν ὀλίγοις ἦλθον, ὥστε βλάψαι μὲν μὴ μεγάλα, δηλῶσαι δὲ ὧν δεόμεθα.

i.e., To the gods then thanks are due, because the foe came not in great numbers, but with few; so that they did not do us great harm, but showed in what we are deficient.—*Id.* iii. 3, 14.

Here, also, in *ὥστε βλάψαι μὴ μεγάλα*, there is a negation introduced by *ὥστε* with *μή*, but neither is there "contingency" nor "conception," but the unconditional statement of an actual fact.

The remaining sentence from the *Anabasis* is:—

Καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὴ ἀπορία ἦν. Ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ὄξη ην ὑπερύψηλα, ἔνθεν δὲ ὁ ποταμὸς τοσοῦτος τὸ βάθος, ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν πειρωμένοις τοῦ βάθους.

And in this place there was much perplexity. For on the one side there were hills of excessive height, and on the other, the river was such in depth, that *not* even the spears with which they sounded it stood above the surface of the water.—*Id.* 5, 7.

Here, precisely as in the preceding examples, in *ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν*, the statement of an actual fact is introduced by *μηδέ*; but while there is thus

a negation, there is not the slightest trace of "contingency" or "conception."

As the first proof of μή introducing an absolute negation with a finite verb, in opposition to the opinion of the Oxford lexicographers, that there is something essentially "contingent" involved in the usage of that particle, was taken from the historian of the Peloponnesian wars, so also is the last:—

Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι.

i.e., And the following is no inconsiderable proof of my statement, that, in consequence of its migrations, Greece did not equally increase in other parts.—Lib. 1, 11.

Here (as in all the other instances cited above), in Ἑλλάδα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, there is not the faintest trace either of "contingency" or "conception." These sentences, which might have been increased to an almost indefinite extent, will be sufficient to show, that the form of expression thus illustrated is not casual or partial, but habitual, and that the *essential characteristic* of μή which is common to all its combinations, is entirely independent of "contingency" or "conception," which is merely, in some cases, an *accidental circumstance.*

It is now time to examine μή when conjoined with a participle or adjective. It will be seen, when the examination is made, that the current opinion relative to this combination in Germany and Britain is equally erroneous with the case already considered.

The same process of proof is adopted. The opinion of the modern Germans is confronted and contrasted with the opinion of the ancient Greeks. The two opinions will be found to be directly contrary to each other. Preference is here given to the Greeks over the Germans. Surely the Greeks knew how to use their own speech.

It is thus that the German Kühner attempts to distinguish between *οὐ* and *μή*, when joined to a participle or an objective :—

"Οὐ is used when a participle or adjective is denied directly without reference to any supposition, or changed by the addition of the negative into its contrary, *e.g.*, *τὰ οὐ καλὰ βουλεύματα* = turpia consilia. 2. Μή, on the other hand, is used when the participle or adjective can be resolved into a conditional clause, expressing a supposed case; as,

Ὁ *μὴ πιστεύων* = Si quis non credat.—Vol. ii. p. 402.

And Donaldson, quoted above as the representative of British scholars, has written :—

Ὁ *μὴ ποιῶν ταῦτα* = Si quis non facit haec."

According to the Germans, it would appear that it is a peculiarity of *οὐ* as contradistinguished from *μή*, that "it changes the adjective into its contrary." This usage, however, is as common to *μή* as *οὐ*, and equally correct. Μὴ *καλά* is as good Greek as *οὐ καλά*. This the Greek Fathers even understood and exemplified :—

Πόθος δ' ὄρεξις ἢ καλῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶν
Ἔρως δὲ θερμὸς δυσκάθεκτός τε πόθος.

—Gregory Nazianzene (*Carm.* ii. 34, 150, 151).

But, as already remarked oftener than once, the best test in this as in every other case, is to cite the practice of the Greek classics. The sentences which occur in the *Œdipus Rex* of Sophocles are of themselves sufficient to show that the statement, "*μή* is used when the participle can be resolved into a conditional clause, expressing a supposed case,"—rests on no better basis than the sands of supposition. It is not built on the firm foundation of fact; hence, it is easy to see what must be the fate of such a fabric.

At the very commencement of the play, these words are found,—

Πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει
Ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων.
Ἀγὼ δικαιῶν μὴ παρ' ἀγγέλων, τέκνα,
Ἄλλων ἀκούειν, αὐτὸς ὧδ' ἐλήλυθα,
Ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους καλούμενος.

i.e., And the city is at one and the same time filled with clouds of incense and songs of supplication and lamentation, which, O children, *I, not deeming* it right to hear from other messengers, have come hither in person, I who am known to all as the illustrious Œdipus.—4–8.

Here, in *δικαιῶν μή*, is it possible to resolve the "particle into a conditional clause, expressing a supposed case"? Of course, there is but one answer possible. The case is not a "supposed" one, but one actually realized, with all the concurrent circumstances of personage, place, and time specified in the most distinct and definite manner conceivable.

A little farther on, in the same play, the following words are found:—

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀργοῖς τοῦτ' ἐπραξάμην,
ἔπεμψα γὰρ, Κρέοντος εἰπόντος, διπλοῦς
πομπούς, πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.

i. e., But not even this did I leave unperformed; for, at the instigation of Creon, I despatched two messengers in quest of him; and long ago he has excited surprise by *not being present.*—*Id.*, 287.

Here, again, the idea of "resolving μὴ παρών into a conditional clause, expressing a supposed case," cannot for a moment be entertained. Μὴ παρών does not, according to Kühner and Donaldson, mean *si non adsit*, but describes the veritable Tiresias, *who is not present.* Still further on in the play, the following words occur, more fatal than the last quotation to the theory in question, if that were possible:—

Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μολών
ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους ἔπαυσά νιν.—397.

According to Kühner and Donaldson, ὁ μηδὲν εἰδώς = Si quis nil sciat, *i. e.*, "merely a supposed case." Sophocles, however, who may be presumed to have known how to write his own language, did not employ the words indefinitely, but applied them to the most conspicuous character in the drama, to Œdipus himself, in the clearest and most certain manner conceivable.

Again:

οὐκ εἶ σύ τ' οἴκους, σύ τε, Κρέων, κατὰ στέγας,
καὶ μὴ τὸ μηδὲν ἄλγος εἰς μέγ' οἴσετε;

i.e., Will not you and Creon repair to your respective homes, and not swell this trifling grief to a great one?—637.

Jocasta here speaks, trying to reconcile her husband and brothers.

The τὸ μηδὲν ἄλγος was not a supposed case, but actual grief, such as it was, estranging the two chiefs of the state.

Further:

Œdipus.—Πῶς εἶπας; οὐ γὰρ Πόλυβος ἐξέφυσέ με;

i.e., How have you said so? was not Polybus my sire?

Messenger.—Οὐ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν τοῦδε τἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἴσον.

i.e., Not a whit more than I, but equally.

Œdipus.—Καὶ πῶς ὁ φύσας ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί;

i.e., And how is my father on an equality with a nobody?—1019.

Here, the τῷ μηδενί is not a "supposed case," but a real man, a messenger from the court of King Polybus, speaking face to face with Œdipus.

There remains yet another passage to be cited from this play, containing the same fact, and conveying the same impression, as the preceding ones:—

τί γὰρ ἔδει μ' ὁρᾶν,
ὅτῳ γ' ὁρῶντι μηδὲν ἦν ἰδεῖν γλυκύ.

i.e., For what need was there that I should look on the light, to whom, at least when looking, there was nothing pleasant to see?—1334.

The μηδέν here was not a "supposed" case, but the daily burden which Œdipus had to bear.

As Sophocles, like our own Dryden, had the

faculty of reasoning in verse developed in a remarkable manner, and, knowing the weight of words, could use them easily and well, a few more sentences illustrative of *μή*, may be cited from the other play bearing the name of Œdipus:—

Οιδιπους.—ἆρ' ἄν τις αὐτῷ πομπὸς ἐξ ὑμῶν μόλοι;

i.e., Could then any one of you go as a messenger to him?

Ξενος.—ὡς πρός τι λέξων, ἢ καταρτύσων μολεῖν;

i.e., As if to speak to some point, or to prepare to come?

Οιδιπους.—ὡς ἄν, προσαρκῶν σμικρά, κερδάνῃ μέγα.

i.e., That by offering a small service, he might derive much in return.

Ξενος.—καὶ τίς πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος ἄρκεσις;

i.e., And what aid can come from a man *who does not see?*—Œd., *Col.* 73.

Here, in *ἀνδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος*, as in the preceding play, the reference to Œdipus is direct and decided; the case is actual, and not "conceived," for the blind man stands before the eyes of his interlocutor; and the negation is made absolutely and independently, and yet by *μή*.

In the next illustrative instance, *μή* is again found with its appropriate accompaniment, a participle; but instead of a "supposed case" or a "conception" being found therein, Œdipus is found describing his own position himself:—

ἀλλ' οἶδα γάρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πέιθων, ἴθι
ἡμᾶς δ' ἔα ζῆν ἐνθάδ'.

i.e., But begone, for I am aware that I don't succeed in persuading you of this, and let me live here.—797.

In the following lines, the entire absence of anything at all approaching to the idea of a "supposed case" or "conception," is at once apparent:—

ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ τήνδε τὴν ἐς τάσδε μοι
τέρψιν παρ' ἄλλου μηδενὸς πεφασμένην.

i.e., For I am aware that this delight with respect to my daughters has been shown by *no one else.*—1121.

The next extract is exactly similar:—

Τί δ' ἔστι τέκνον Αἰγέως; δίδασκέ με
ὡς μὴ εἰδότ' αὐτὸν μηδὲν ὧν σὺ πυνθάνει.

i.e., But what is it, son of Ægeus? tell me, since I *know nothing* whereof you inquire.—1155.

Before closing the consideration of μή, in conjunction with a participle or adjective, a few additional illustrative instances may be cited from the great prose writers of Greece:—

Ἐμὲ δὲ ἆρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν, πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος;

i.e., Don't you think, then, that I, who inure myself to endure whatever befalls the body, bear all things more easily than you, who *don't* practise such a course?—Xen., *Mem.*, lib. i. 6, 7.

Here, in σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος, there can neither be a "supposed case" nor "conception," for Socrates is conversing with his friend Antiphon face to face, and contrasts his habitual course of conduct with his own.

The next passage, from the historian Thucydides, is equally conclusive and decisive:—

Πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, καὶ προσέτι μηδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι διὰ τὸ ὑφ' ἡμῶν πολλαῖς ναυσὶν ἀεὶ ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἄξιον ἄν τι δρᾷεν;

i. e., How then shall men accustomed to agriculture and not to navigation, and who, besides, *will not even be permitted* to practise, from being always blockaded by us with many ships, perform any praiseworthy deed?—Lib. i. 142.

This extract, as all scholars will recollect, is taken from the memorable speech of Pericles, in which he advocated that policy whose adoption by his countrymen led to the Peloponnesian war. The two great parties referred to throughout the speech are, of course, the Athenians and Spartans. The reference to the latter, in γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, is obvious at once. In the employment of these words, Pericles gives emphatic expression to a fact of which, from personal observation, he was cognizant; and, by appending προσέτι with μηδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι, he introduces something still stronger, but assuredly not in the shape of a "supposed case," nor yet a "conception."

The two last illustrative instances of μή conjoined with a participle, to be cited here, are supplied by the orators, Demosthenes and Æschines. They are so inconsistent and incompatible with the German theory, that they could not have more completely disposed of that theory, though they had been con-

structed by these authors expressly and exclusively for that purpose. The passage from Demosthenes is as follows:—

Τὸ δὲ *μὴ προσγράψαντα* "*ἐπειδὰν τὰς εὐθύνας δῷ*," *στεφανοῦν, καὶ ἀνειπεῖν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τὸν στέφανον κελεῦσαι, κοινωνεῖν μὲν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς πεπολιτευμένοις, εἴτε ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ τῆς ἀναῤῥήσεως τῆς ἐν τούτοις, εἴτε καὶ μή, ἔτι μέντοι καὶ τοὺς νόμους δεικτέον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, καθ' οὓς ταῦτα γράφειν ἐξῆν τούτῳ.*

i.e., But the question as to him, who, having recommended my coronation, and the proclamation of the crown in the theatre, failed to append this clause, "When I shall have given in my account," I consider this to be closely connected with the question about my whole public career, whether I am worthy of the crown, and its public proclamation among these citizens, or not; and, further, I suppose it is incumbent on me to point out the laws, in accordance with which the defendant was empowered to bring in this bill.—Dem., *De Cor.* 23, D.

The question here is, what is the meaning of *μὴ προσγράψαντα*; whether it states a fact, or only implies a "conception," introduced in the shape of a "supposed case," contingent on certain conditions; and since *προσγράψαντα* is a participle in concord with some substantive or other, the question is, whether he is an indefinite, imaginary individual, or a historical personage, whose existence is established on the surest and most satisfactory evidence. So far is the person in question from being an imaginary or

indefinite individual, that he is identical with him who is indicated by the demonstrative *τούτῳ* itself at the close of the sentence quoted above,—*καθ' οὕς ταῦτα γεγράφειν ἐξῆν τούτῳ.* And, since *οὗτος*, like the Latin *iste* in forensic addresses, means the defendant, and as Ctesiphon in this trial was the defendant, therefore Ctesiphon—a name, next to the two orators themselves, the most conspicuous in this celebrated case—is indicated by *μὴ προσγράψαντα.* Positive proof of the identity is furnished by a reference to the speech of Æschines:—

Ὁ ῥήτωρ γέγραφε τὸν ὑπεύθυνον στεφανοῦν, *μὴ προσθεὶς ἐπειδὰν δῷ λόγον καὶ εὐθύνας.*—*Or. κατα* Κτης. 58, § 31.

Here Æschines states the same fact in almost the same language as Demosthenes. In *μὴ προσθείς* there is an exact equivalent to the *μὴ προσγράψαντα* of his rival; *i.e.*, there is a denial of an actual fact—not a "supposed case" or "conception"—of Ctesiphon having appended the additional clause, "When I shall have given in an account."

In the next extract there will be given, in one and the same sentence, one instance of *μή* used conditionally, and another of *μή* used unconditionally; of *μή* introducing on the one hand "a supposed case," and on the other, an actual fact. The extract is taken from the *Υποθεσις*, or Argumentum, prefixed to the Prometheus Vinctus of Æschylus. The writer of it, whoever he may have been, whether ancient scholiast or grammarian, knew Greek better than the modern Germans:—

Θρασυστομοῦντι δὲ Προμηθεῖ κατὰ Διός, ὡς ἐκπεσεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑφ' οὗ τέξεται παιδός, καὶ ἄλλα βλάσφημα λέγοντι, παραγίγνεται Ἑρμῆς, Διὸς πέμψαντος, ἀπειλῶν αὐτῷ κεραυνόν, εἰ μὴ τὰ μελλόντα συμβήσεσθαι τῷ Διὶ εἴπῃ· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον βροντὴ καταῤῥαγεῖσα αὐτὸν ἀφανίζει.

i.e., "But while Prometheus is insolently vaunting against Jupiter, that he shall be driven from his throne by a son he is destined to beget, and while he is uttering other maledictions, Mercury appears on the stage beside him, at the instance of Jove, threatening to blast him with a bolt, unless he distinctly state what was about to befall Jupiter; and on *declining* to make any disclosure, the thunder-clap having burst removes him out of sight."

It would be difficult to find a single sentence in Greek, which, in the course of two consecutive clauses, would present better illustrative instances of μή. In the first clause μή is found in such a combination, that with perfect propriety it might be described as introducing a "supposed case," or a "conception," or a "contingency," εἰ μὴ εἴπῃ, *i.e.*, *unless he disclose.* But, in the very next clause, μὴ βουλόμενον, μή introduces the statement of an absolute fact, with all the concurrent circumstances of person, place, and time, and without any qualification, condition, or reserve whatever. It is thus quite clear, that according to the habitual practice of the Greeks, not partially or accidentally, μή is used to introduce a fact, or a conception indifferently, according to circumstances. The "conception" is not an essential condition of μή, but only an

accidental circumstance connected with it. It is impossible that the presence of a "conception" can produce μή, since the habitual absence of a "conception" does not prevent the occurrence of μή.

The next combination of μή to be considered, is its combination with the relative. What the current opinions relative to this combination in Germany and Britain are, may be fairly seen from the two following extracts. The first extract is from a work, to which reference has already been made, teeming with the phraseology peculiar to Germany, and written in the full belief of German infallibility:—

"Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς σφαλερόν ἐστι τό, ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις, ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ πράττειν. The *contingency* in ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις, is obvious; it means *not particular things* which, but such things as."—Clyde's *Greek Syntax*, p. 93.

The next extract is taken from a work well-known and widely circulated in the public schools and universities of the United Kingdom. It has passed through eight editions at least, probably many more, so that there has been ample time allowed to detect and correct the error it contains:—

"Μή is used in relative sentences, whenever the negative does not *directly* and *simply* deny an assertion with respect to some *particular mentioned* person or thing. Hence, relative sentences, take μή, whenever they might be resolved into a sentence with 'if,' or describe only a *supposed case;* not *particular individuals*, but individuals of a *class*."—Arnold, *Gr. P. Comp.*, p. 85.

Having now seen what the opinions of the modern Germans and their followers on this particular combination are, it only remains to be seen what are the opinions and practice of the ancient Greeks. The first witness that is to be called, is Sophocles, who has already appeared in court, and done good service to truth by his excellent evidence:—

τίς τοῦδε γ' ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερος ;
ᾧ μὴ ξένων ἔξεστι μήτ' ἀστῶν τινὰ
δόμοις δέχεσθαι, μηδὲ προσφωνεῖν τινά,
ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων.

i. e., Who is more wretched than this man? *i.e.* (I, Œdipus), whom none of his friends or fellow-citizens are allowed to admit into their homes, or to address, but all are enjoined to cast forth.—Œd., *Rex.* 815.

The language of Sophocles in this extract is so express and explicit as to exclude the entrance of doubt into any candid mind, either as to its syntax or its sense. The words illustrative of the point at issue are,—

Τοῦδε γ' ἀνδρός, ὃν μὴ ἔξεστι δέχεσθαι τινά.

In the antecedent clause there is an individual indicated by name, the speaker, Œdipus; and in the relative clause, where the same individual is represented, the predication is made without any condition, qualification, or reserve whatever, that no one is permitted to admit him into his house. Hence, the canon propounded by the Germans, and adopted by the two British grammarians quoted above, who

have followed so faithfully in their footsteps,—"Μή is used in relative senses, whenever the negative does not *directly* and *simply* deny an assertion with respect to some *particular* person or thing mentioned," —is directly contradicted by Sophocles. No such canon was known to Sophocles or his countrymen. Had such a law been submitted for their acceptance by any grammatical legislator, they would have assuredly moved that the word "not" should be omitted. When the canon is applied to the passage just quoted, it only mystifies its meaning, and stultifies the poet. According to it, Œdipus the outcast, Œdipus the expounder of the riddle of the Sphinx, Œdipus the king of Thebes, loses his personal identity. If a theory, like a tree, is to be tested by its fruits, one more deleterious could scarcely be conceived. It not only prevents good, but produces positive mischief. A theory which produces such results cannot be true. Fortunately, it can be proved that the facts are against it. In reply to this a German might say, "So much the worse for the facts." But to this it is replied here, that theories are only means to an end—the mastery of a language. Philological theories are made for the Greek language, not the Greek language for philological theories. Germans might say, and their faithful followers, that, in τοῦδε γ' ἀνδρὸς, ὃν μὴ ἔξεστι δέχεσθαι τινά, the "contingency is obvious" in a transcendental sense, but it is not so according to Sophocles and common sense. To a German it may be true subjectively, but it is

not true objectively. To a man who has a bee in his bonnet, it may be true, subjectively, that the city bells are always ringing, but it is not true objectively. To the Highland laird of olden times, who never retired at night without reeling, it may have been true, subjectively, that the house also was reeling, but it was not true, objectively, to others in their sound and sober senses.

While the preceding passage from Sophocles is as direct as could be desired, yet a single sentence could scarcely constitute a basis sufficiently broad on which to build a sweeping generalization. So many sentences, however, of a similar character are to be found in Sophocles, as to show that this form of expression was not partial or accidental, but habitual and essential. In the other play, itself bearing also the name of Œdipus, there are no fewer than three separate instances of a relative with *μή* referring to a definite antecedent in a manner not to be mistaken. The first here cited is:—

Οἰδίπους. ἐδεξάμην
δῶρον, ὃ μήποτ', ἐγὼ ταλακάρδιος
ἐπωφέλησα πόλεος ἐξελέσθαι.

i.e., I received a gift which I, wretch that I am, ought *never* to have taken from the state.—Œd., *Col.* 540.

The gift to which Œdipus here refers, is, of course, his own mother, whom he unwittingly wedded. It would be almost impossible to conceive a reference more direct and distinct. To say, as the Germans

and their faithful followers say, that ὅ means not a particular gift, but "one of a class," not only robs the passage of its appropriate point and force, but nullifies one particular fact, to which the poet desired and designed to give especial prominence throughout the play, a fact which contributed the true tragic element, which was peculiarly fitted to excite in the mind of the spectator the combined emotions of pity and horror.

The next two extracts occur within a few lines of each other, containing usages equally clear and conclusive with those cited above. The first is,—

Antigone.—Ὅτῳ μήτ' Ἄρης,
μήτε πόντος ἀντέκυρσεν,
ἄσκοποι δὲ πλάκες ἔμαρψαν
ἐν ἀφανεῖ τινι μόρῳ φερόμεναι.

i.e., But him, whom neither Mars nor Neptune met, the unseen Pluto seized, bearing him away by a sort of secret destiny.—Œd., *Col.* 1679.

In ὅτῳ μήτ' Ἄρης ἀντέκυρσεν, Antigone refers not "to one of a class," but to a *particular* person, her own father, who had neither fallen on the field of battle, nor perished by shipwreck.

The remaining extract is:—

Antigone.—πόθος καὶ κακῶν ἄρ' ἦν τις.
καὶ γὰρ ὃ μηδαμὰ δὴ φίλον, ἦν φίλον.

i. e., There was then a sort of desire of misfortunes even. For indeed, what was by no means dear, was dear.—*Id.* 1697.

In ὃ μηδαμὰ δὴ φίλον, Antigone directly and dis-

tinctly refers to the discovery of her father's marriage with his mother, which, though painful, yet, inasmuch as he had been "sinned against rather than sinning," through filial affection became an object of fond commiseration.

The practice of the prose writers of Greece, with reference to this particular combination of μή, is precisely the same as the practice of the poets. The prince of Grecian philosophers wrote with reference to the point in question, just as the prince of Grecian tragic poets. And it cannot be said that Plato used μή for οὐ from the constraints of metre. The coincidence that is found between Sophocles and Plato, perfect and complete, proves that the single consideration which guided them in composition, was the logical law of accuracy in thought. The first passage is taken from the well-known dialogue, the Phædo:—

Ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον, οἳ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες, καὶ οἱ μή.

i. e., When the dead have arrived at the place, to which the demon conducts each, in the first place those, who have lived virtuously and piously, and *those who have not*, submit themselves to trial.—113, D.

The company here described is just composed of two classes. The one class is specially designated οἱ καλῶς βιώσαντες, the good; the other is described as the opposite of these, οἱ μή, the bad. It was not

necessary or desirable to name them, if it had been possible to number them. Plato, however, assigns them the common characteristic of being the opposite of the good. This is a pretty *definite* description.

The next illustrative instance from Plato is as follows:—

Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μή;

i. e., What then? shall we say that love belongs to subjects that may be discussed with propriety, or to those that may *not*?—*Phædrus*, 263, C.

As, in the preceding passage, Plato divided men into two classes, the good and the bad, so in the present, he divides things in general into two classes, those that may be discussed with propriety, τῶν ἀμφισβιτησίμων, and those that may *not*, τῶν μή.

Plato, of course, did not deem it desirable to name the different things which belonged to this class, but he implied that they had the common characteristic of not being fit for discussion. This is a pretty *definite* description.

One other sentence may be adduced, illustrative of μή in combination with a relative clause. It is taken from Xenophon, who is so fond of minute, circumstantial, and matter-of-fact descriptions:—

Ἔτι δὲ ἀμφὶ δείλην ἔδοξαν πολεμιόυς ὁρᾶν ἱππέας. Καὶ τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων οἳ μὴ ἔτυχον ἐν ταῖς τάξεσιν ὄντες, εἰς τὰς τάξεις ἔθεον.

i. e., But while it was still about sunset, they thought they saw the cavalry of the enemy. And

such of the Greeks as happened *not* to be in order, ran to their ranks.—*An.* II., 2, 14.

As in the immediately preceding extracts, so here again, a comparison, or rather contrast, is instituted or implied between the two component parts of a collective whole. In the case of a military company, when the approach of an enemy was expected or suspected, every other distinction would be forgotten, save the all-important one between armed and unarmed soldiers. In a well-disciplined army, like that of the Greeks, under Xenophon and Chirisophus, where order was the rule and disorder the exception, those described as *οἱ ἐν ταῖς τάξεσι μὴ ὄντες*, were certainly described *definitely*. It was necessary to describe definitely the condition of the soldiers, but not to give their names.

Only one other combination of *μή* requires to be cited, before demonstrating what was the essential idea associated by the Greeks with any combination of *μή* whatever. This combination is with the article and infinitive used as a substantive. It is commonly, though not correctly, supposed that this combination occurs only in the statement of abstract and general propositions. In the following illustrative instances, it will be seen that the negative predication is made with immediate reference to particular subjects. The first instance is taken from Thucydides :—

Οὐ *μὴν οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἴρηκε, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ Ἕλληνάς πω, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντίπαλον ἐς ἓν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι.*

i. e., Nor, again, does he (*i. e.*, Homer), speak of

barbarians; because not even were the Hellenes, as it appears to me, up to this time distinguished by one common term in opposition to that.—Lib. 1, 3.

Here, in *τὸ μηδὲ Ἕλληνας ἀποκεκρίσθαι*, a negative predication is made by *μηδέ*, with respect to a particular subject, and that, too, without the slightest trace of a "supposed case" or a "conception."

The next sentence, and some others in succession, are taken from Xenophon:—

Ἡγούμενος δὲ καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μέν, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι, πιόνας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν μηδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον, ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.

i.e. And believing that contempt of the enemy could instil some vigour in fighting, he commanded the heralds to sell naked the barbarians that had been taken by the robbers. The soldiers accordingly observing that they were white, in consequence of *never* having their clothes put off, and that they were fat and incapable of labour, in consequence of being always on carriages, believed that war would be different in *no* respect, than if it were necessary to fight with women.—*Agesil.* 25.

Here, in *τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι*, as in the preceding passage, a negative predication is made by *μηδέ* with respect to a particular subject, and that, too, without the slightest appearance of anything at all like a

"supposed case," or a "conception." In this same sentence, as will have been observed, the negative particle occurs again. In the second line after the first occurrence, the following words are found:—

ἐνόμισαν μηδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον.

Here the German grammarians and their faithful followers would say, that the negation is referred to the minds of the soldiers, *i.e.*, it is a *subjective* usage of the negative μή. But no such explanation is possible in the first case. As a matter of fact, the Ephesians were "white," because they were "*not in the habit of stripping themselves*" for gymnastic exercises. And yet the same form of the negative is found as in the second case.

The "*subjective*" form of the negative is found in

Λευκοὺς διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι,

although the form of the clause is *objective*, *i.e.*, a present result patent to the eyes of all, from a cause operating in past time, is expressed absolutely by the narrator. There is no allusion to something in the future, which might or might not take place.

The next illustrative instance is taken from the *Anabasis*:—

Κλεάρχος δὲ τότε μὲν μικρὸν ἐξέφυγε τοῦ μὴ καταπετρωθῆναι.

i.e., And Clearchus was then, indeed, within a little of being stoned to death.—Lib. I. 3, 2.

Here a negation by μή is made with respect to a particular subject.

In τοῦ μὴ καταπετρωθῆναι there is nothing at all approaching in appearance to the statement of an

abstract or general proposition. To Clearchus it certainly was personal and particular. Nor, according to the interpretation of common sense, is there anything at all approaching in appearance to a "supposed case" or a "conception," whatever may appear to be the case in a "transcendental" sense.

The next sentence is taken from the *Memorabilia*:—

Ἐμοὶ δὲ τί αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἑτέρους μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ ἐμοῦ μήτε γνῶναι μήτε ποιῆσαι.

i. e., But what disgrace is there to me in the fact that others are *not* able either to judge or act justly regarding me.—Lib. IV., 8, 9.

Socrates does not here say that some men are not able to judge and act fairly towards others, but that certain men were not able to do so toward himself. His accusers were notorious enough,—Anytus, Lycon, Melitus. Since the words just quoted were uttered by the great Athenian sage, shortly ere he took the cup from his weeping gaoler, it can scarcely be said in any sense, with any regard to accurate thought or speech, that this is a "supposed case" or a "conception," save perhaps in a transcendental sense, which it is to be hoped will not become common in England at least, in the interpretation of Greek and Roman mind.

The last passage to be adduced in refutation of the German theory relative to the negative μή, is taken from Sophocles, who has already supplied so much evidence on the subject, equally clear and conclusive.

It is from the *Œdipus Coloneus*:—

Οἰδιπους.—ὦ παῖδε, κλύετον τῶνδε προσχώρων ξένων;
Ἀντιγονη.—ἠκούσαμέν τε, χὤ τι δεῖ πρόσταασσε δρᾶν.
Οἰδιπους.—ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐχ ὁδωτά· λείπομαι γὰρ ἐν
τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι, μήθ' ὁρᾶν, δυοῖν κακοῖν.

i.e., *Œdipus.*—My two daughters, do ye hear the strangers of the place?

Antigone.—We have both heard, and do you tell us what we ought to do.

Œdipus.—As for me indeed, I cannot go: for I fail, in having *neither* strength *nor* sight,—two misfortunes.—Œd., *Col.* 495.

Œdipus does not here make any (general) statement relative to the failing sight and strength of old men, but when desired to walk, he tells his daughter that he cannot, because he is both blind and weak. In μήθ' ὁρᾶν, the German "subjective" interpretation is scarcely admissible, "I think I cannot see," for he had torn out his eyes with his own hands, and in the very first line of the play, he asks his daughter to tell him "where he is," for he was *actually*, *objectively* blind. But surely there is no longer need of argument on this part of the subject. Such sentences as those adduced above in ample abundance from the classsic writers of Greece, the Germans seem never to have seen. Had they remembered such sentences in the course of their reading, and, remembering, had reasoned on them, a very different theory from what they have "evolved from the depths of their own consciousness," would unquestionably have been the result.

Now that it has been proved that the German theory relative to the negative μή runs counter to the common practice of the best writers of Greece, it may be assumed that it is not true. The first indispensable condition of a true theory is, that it should fit the facts. The immediate and inevitable consequence of this theory, as has just been seen, is to mystify the meaning of the Greek text, and to stultify its author. Such a theory, from the necessary nature of things, cannot be true. Such a theory would be dear at any price. Such a theory is worse than useless. And such a theory is essentially German. It is German in its origin, German in its essence, German in its characteristics, German in its tendencies. According to the genuine transcendental phrase, it must have been "evolved from the depth of the consciousness" of its inventor. In the plain, stern language of truth, however, it has only been evolved from the shallows of conceit. Such a theory was not the result of close and constant comparison of the manifold combinations of Grecian speech. There is no other method of evolving a general principle out of a multitude of individual instances. There is no royal road to Greek any more than to geometry.

It is quite impossible to form a correct conception of μή as a negative, apart from μή as a prohibitive. The word being the same in either case, the rational *à priori* inference would be, that there is a very close natural affinity subsisting between these two usages.

And so this will be found to be the case. The two usages are certainly different and distinct, but as certainly they are not diverse. The idea underlying each of them is essentially the same. That the idea of an essential unity between μή as a *prohibitive*, and μή as a negative, has never up to this time been entertained, is proved by the fact of the existence of the German theory, which has just been disposed of. If μή as a *prohibitive* had been considered in common with μή as a negative, that theory would neither have been conceived in Germany nor believed in Britain. That the Germans should never have thought of the essential unity here indicated for the first time, is not at all strange. Among German philologists the faculty of imagination is developed on a larger scale than the faculty of ratiocination. However necessary and desirable the former of these two faculties may be in a novelist or a poet, the latter faculty is what is specially required in a man of science. It is only by proceeding along the path-way of observation and induction that the man of science can ever reach the terminus of truth. But the Germans, instead of treading the firm ground of fact, at once soar on the wing of fancy into the air. Although, however, their speculations are very full of air, they have very little light in them. It is not wonderful then that the Germans, delighting in fancies rather than dealing with facts, should have failed to see the connexion between μή as a *prohibitive* and μή as a negative. But it is wonderful that this fanciful

theory should have ever found a footing in Britain, where the memory of Richard Bentley and Richard Porson is still cherished. These truly great critics taught that foreign theories were to be taken on trial, rather than on trust, and that theories, like trees, are best tested by their fruits.

But it is now time to illustrate *μή* as a direct *prohibitive.*

Μή is used as a direct prohibitive either with the imperative present, or the aorist subjunctive, according to circumstances; *e. g.*,

Μὴ *ψευδομαρτύρει*, *i. e.*, Do not continue to bear false witness.

Μὴ *ψευδομαρτυρήσῃς*, *i. e.*, Do not commence bearing false witness.

Μή is used in the second place, as an indirect prohibitive, dependent on a preceding verb:—

Ὁ *νόμος ἡμᾶς κελεύει μὴ ψευδομαρτυρεῖν.*

i. e., The law commands us not to bear false witness.

A third usage cognate to the two just given, may here be appended.

Μή as a conjunction is used to introduce a consequence dreaded or deprecated; *e. g.*,

Ὁ *ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ δείδει μὴ ὁ παῖς ψευδομαρτυρῇ*,

i. e., The good man is afraid lest his son should bear false witness.

In all these illustrative examples, there is a common characteristic. Something is either positively forbidden, or a consequence is dreaded. False

testimony is *forbidden*, because it is both bad and base.

It is not deemed necessary or desirable here to cite at any length passages from the Greek writers in proof or illustration of these usages. They are known to every one, who knows anything at all about Greek. One passage only may be cited from the logical Sophocles, who, within the short compass of four lines, gives three instances in illustration: one of each kind:—

νῦν δ' ἐγὼ μέγ' αὖ φρονῶ,
καὶ σοὶ προφωνῶ τόνδε μὴ θάπτειν, ὅπως
μὴ τόνδε θάπτων αὐτὸς ἐς ταφὰς πέσῃς.
Χορος,—Μενέλαε, μὴ γνώμας ὑποστήσας σοφάς,
εἶτ' αὐτὸς ἐν θανοῦσιν ὑβριστὴς γένῃ.

—*Ajax*, 1088.

First of all, here is the direct *prohibitive*—μὴ ὑβριστὴς γένῃ, *i. e.*, *don't* become insolent.

II. Then there is the indirect—σοὶ προφωνῶ μὴ θάπτειν, *i. e.*, I charge thee *not* to bury.

III. Lastly, there is the deprecated consequence—μὴ αὐτὸς πέσῃς, *i. e.*, lest you fall yourself.

In these three clauses, following in close succession, the meaning of μή is indicated by Sophocles in a manner not to be mistaken. In each there is the certain and conspicuous characteristic of an act being forbidden as wrong, or a consequence deprecated as unfortunate. But there is in none of them any thing at all approaching in appearance to a "supposed case," or "one of a class," or "a sub-

jective conception." Or if there is, it can only be in a "transcendental" sense, evolved from the "depths of German consciousness," or from the height of German ethereal fancy. There is nothing of the kind according to common sense, whatever there may be in a transcendental sense.

These usages of *μή prohibitive* are exceedingly simple. They furnish, however, the key which, fitting all the wards of *μή*, unlocks its hidden intricacies. The Germans, indulging in their aerial flights of fancy, were too far away to see the close connexion between *μή prohibitive* and *μή negative;* and, failing in this, failed to find the necessary solvent. So soon as this instrument of investigation is applied to sentences containing *μή* as a *negative*, the secret meaning will soon surrender itself. Even without it, by means of the passages cited at the commencement of this treatise, it was possible to show that the German theory was not the Greek theory. Without it, by means of these sentences, it was possible to show what was *not* the true theory. With it, in connexion with these same sentences, it will be easy to show what is the true theory. It will be remembered that the first passage cited was taken from the great historian of the Peloponnesian war, to the following effect:—

Ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασα αὐξηθῆναι.—i. 12.

i. e., Greece was still in a migratory condition, and in quest of new settlements, so that it did not

develop its resources by remaining at rest; or, in the language of Livy:—

Græcia adhuc sedes suas ita mutabat et novas quaerebat, ut quiescendo non cresceret.

If Thucydides had written thus:—

"If Greece had *not* at last remained at rest, her resources would never have been developed."

Or, by making a general proposition:—

"If communities do not remain at rest, they will never develop their resources;"

—then, of course, he would have introduced the hypothetical member in both propositions by εἰ μή, in which case it might be affirmed with perfect propriety, both of speech and thought, that there was a "supposed case," a "condition," and that therefore μή denied "contingently." But Thucydides hath made no such proposition here. He states a simple fact, absolutely, unconditionally, without any limitation, qualification, or reserve whatever. And this he does by means of μή:—

ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασα αὐξηθῆναι.

i. e., So that Greece did not develop its resources by remaining at rest.

If there be any truth in the representations of the Germans, if they have succeeded in finding the key which fits all the wards of μή, and unlocks its hidden intricacies, then it indisputably follows that the great historian of the Peloponnesian war makes here a great blunder. For not one of the conditions which they represent as essential to μή is here to be found.

Instead of these conditions being found, their contraries only are found. But while, according to the Germans, some sentences with μή, when compared with other sentences with μή, present nothing but contradictions, the same sentences, according to Thucydides and the other Greeks, when compared with each other, present nothing but coincidences, and constitute one whole, consistent and complete. By following the Germans we get chaos instead of cosmos, by following the Greeks we get cosmos instead of chaos. The sentence of Thucydides under review has nothing in common with the German mode of interpretation, but it has much in common with the prohibitive use of μή, illustrated at length above. It is known to everybody who knows anything at all about Greek, that μή, and not οὐ, is always used in *prohibitive* clauses with the imperative, subjunctive, and infinitive. And the reason why this should be so will soon appear. Μή, in combination with all these moods forbids something or other, which is bad, or is to be avoided as adverse. Μή, therefore, inasmuch as it is a stronger negative than οὐ, is employed in preference to οὐ as a *prohibitive*. And it still retains, what has never hitherto been known, as decidedly, though not so directly, *the same peculiar force when negative* as *when prohibitive*. This will now be proved by the best of all evidence, the evidence of the Greeks themselves. Thucydides, by employing μή as a negative and not οὐ in ὥστε μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, implies that the Greeks, by *roaming about*

and not remaining at rest in a fixed settlement, did not do what they ought to have done and might have done. The very words themselves imply as much. But if there could be any doubt or difference of opinion on the subject, all dispute would be ended by the words of the immediate context :—

στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο.

i. e., Seditions arose in the cities, as is commonly the case.

But so soon as there is a change in the character and habits of the people, there is a corresponding change for the better in their condition.

μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμπε, etc.

i. e., And Greece, after a long time, having with difficulty enjoyed a settled peace, began to send out colonies, etc.

And at the commencement of the very next chapter a contrast of the two conditions is expressly drawn :—

Δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης.

i. e., But when Greece was becoming more powerful, and acquiring the possession of money still *more than before.*

The truth of the common proverb, that " A rolling stone gathers no moss," was as striking in the time of Thucydides as it is now.

The following sentence, also from the same historian, resembles the foregoing one in every respect.

The coincidence in syntax and sentiment is complete. It also has been cited already in confirmation of the fact, that *μή* introduces the statement of a fact by a finite verb, unconditionally, absolutely, without any qualification, limitation, or exception whatever. And as in the preceding case, *μή* is employed in contradistinction to *οὐ*, for the simple and sufficient reason that something or other is condemned by considerations of policy or justice, which might have been and ought to have been otherwise. The sentence is,—

Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέμῳ ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ' Ἀθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι, ὡς βέβαιον ὄν, ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτι ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν.

i.e., And this which follows is no inconsiderable proof of my statement, *that, in consequence of its migrations*, Greece *did not equally develop its resources in other parts.* For of such as by war or sedition were driven forth from the rest of Greece, the most powerful retired to Athens, as to a place of security; and becoming at once citizens from a very remote period, rendered the city still greater in population. —Lib. i. 11.

Here, a sharp distinction is drawn between the policy of the inhabitants of Attica and the other states of Greece. The contrast is all in favour of the former. Their policy is singled out for special commendation, while that of the latter is condemned.

And this emphatic form of condemnatory statement finds appropriate expression in the employment of the negative *μή*:—

Διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ομοίως αὐξηθῆναι.

Μή is not employed with more propriety in prohibiting the commission of a bad or impolitic act, than in reproving the omission of it. Μή is not employed with more propriety in the general prohibition:—

Μὴ *πόλεις μετανιστάσθωσαν,*

than in the particular reproof:—

Ἑλλὰς *οὕτω μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασα αὐξηθῆναι.*

The coincidence in these two passages from Thucydides extends not only to the syntax and sentiment, but also to the very language. A coincidence so complete is the best of all evidence for establishing the theory here propounded. And that this emphatic form of expression is not exceptional, casual, or occasional, but general and essential, may be proved by an additional case, still stronger than the preceding, if that were possible, and found without travelling beyond the bounds of the first book of the Peloponnesian war.

Ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ γράμματα, ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν, πολλῷ τότε μᾶλλον ἤρτο, καὶ οὐκέτι ἠδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστηκότι τρόπῳ βιοτεύειν, ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυσαντίου ἐξήει, καὶ διὰ τῆς Θράκης πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε καὶ Περσικὴν παρετίθετο, καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἠδύνατο,

ἀλλ᾽ ἔργοις βραχέσι προὐδήλου ἃ τῇ γνώμῃ μειζόνως ἐσέπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτῳ χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι.

i. e., After the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, although he was even before held in high repute on account of his strategy at Platæa, was then much more elated, and was no longer able to live in the customary style, but went forth from Byzantium clad in Median robes, and in his march through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard; and he caused a Persian table to be laid for him, and was not capable of concealing his purpose, but by trifling acts he prematurely revealed what he purposed to perform at a future date on a larger scale. Furthermore, he made himself difficult of access, and showed such a violent temper towards all alike, *that no one was able to approach him.*—Lib. i. 130.

The historian here, in describing the character of Pausanias in general, and his conduct on several occasions in particular, descends to great minuteness of detail. His dress, diet, and demeanour, are commented on in turn, not in terms of commendation, but censure. The long list of acts of extravagance and arrogance is closed by the crowning climax:—

ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι.

Of course, it is neither necessary nor desirable to state here that it is in connexion with μηδένα that the statement of a fact is made unconditionally,

absolutely, without any condition, exception, qualification, or limitation whatever. This is manifest at first sight. It is equally so, when the sentence is presented in the language of Livy:—

Pausanias immodicæ suæ in omnes pariter iræ ita indulgebat, *ut nullus* ad eum adire posset.

What is to be noted here is, that Thucydides, by the introduction of μή in the clause,

ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι,

desired and designed to convey a strong censure of Pausanias, in repelling his countrymen from him by his intemperate anger.

Μή, as a simple negative in this clause, has precisely the same force that it has as a prohibitive. This is implied as decidedly though perhaps not expressed so directly. In the one case, μή forbids an act before it is done, because it is wrong. In the other case, μή condemns an act after it is done, for the very same reason.

These sentences taken from Thucydides, as specimens rather than selections, conclusive and decisive though they be on the point in question, are not more so than the following taken from Xenophon. They too have already been cited in proof of the fact, that μή, with a finite verb, introduces the statement of a fact absolutely and unconditionally. They are now adduced again to show the reason why:— that no other usage of μή is more logically consistent with the primary and proper function of that particle in the language of the Greeks. The first of these sentences is:—

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κατέστησε τὸ στράτευμα ὥστε καλῶς ἐχειν ὁρᾶσθαι πάντῃ φάλαγγα πυκνήν, τῶν δὲ ἀόπλων μηδένα καταφανῆ εἶναι.

i.e., But when he (Clearchus) had marshalled the army in such a way that it was in a favourable position for being seen on all sides to be a close compact mass of infantry, while not one of the unarmed men was visible, he summoned the messengers of the Persian king.—*An.*, lib. ii. 3. 3.

The aim of Clearchus on the occasion here indicated was to reveal to the enemy what was strong in his army, and to conceal what was weak. If either from ignorance or indolence, the want of skill or the want of care, he had revealed what he ought to have concealed, or had concealed what he ought to have revealed, he would have failed in the duty of a good captain. Of the two aims which Clearchus sought to attain, the one which here requires explanation thus finds expression in Greek,

Μηδεὶς τῶν ἀόπλων καταφανὴς ἔστω.

Μή, of course, is here employed in forbidding the commission of what is wrong or *impolitic*. It intimates the dread of Clearchus, lest any of his men should appear unarmed; a circumstance which might prove dangerous to him in the country of an enemy at once powerful and perfidious. So empathic is μή, that it here passes into the clause which intimates the result *desired* by Clearchus, but it still points to the opposite result so much *dreaded* by him. The language of Xenophon is virtually equivalent to,

Clearchus suos ita instruxit, ut omnes esse armati viderentur.

i.e., Clearchus marshalled his men in such a way that they all appeared to be ready for action.

But every vestige of the conflicting emotions by which Clearchus was alternately actuated, has vanished like a vision. Those only can the Greek language adequately express.

The next sentence from Xenophon is contained in the same book and chapter:—

Καὶ ἐνετύγχανον τάφροις καὶ αὐλῶσιν πλήρεσιν ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι διαβαίνειν ἄνευ γεφυρῶν.

i.e., And they came upon ditches and canals full of water, so that they could not cross without bridges. —*Id.* 10.

The Greeks now, besides being harassed by an enemy hanging on their rear, had their old dangers and difficulties aggravated by the addition of new ones on their front. They had now to face ditches and canals impassable but by bridges. Their engineers being neither numerous nor efficient, they were ill fitted to cope with and conquer these formidable obstacles. Under these peculiar circumstances Xenophon might well have said:—

μὴ ἐντυγχάνωμεν τάφροις καὶ αὐλῶσιν πλήρεσιν ὕδατος.

The dreaded danger would have been fitly deprecated by μή. But it would not have been more fitly deprecated than it is actually deplored by μή in Xenophon's own words:—

ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι διαβαίνειν ἄνευ γεφυρῶν.

The next passage from Xenophon is contained in the third book of the *Anabasis*,—

Καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὴ ἀπορία ἦν. Ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ὄρη ὑπερύψηλα, ἔνθεν δὲ ὁ ποταμὸς τοσοῦτος τὸ βάθος ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν πειρωμένοις τοῦ βάθους.

i.e., And in this place great perplexity ensued. For on the one side there were hills of excessive height, and on the other the river was such in depth that *not* even the spears with which they sounded it stood above the surface of the water.—iii. 5, 7.

This passage resembles, in several respects, the one explained above. Xenophon does not trust to indirect implication on his part, and to inference on the part of his reader, for the conveyance of a correct and complete impression regarding the condition and feelings of the Greeks. He expressly intimates, that there was "great perplexity." And this arose, in a great measure, as in the preceding case, from the occurrence of obstacles to obstruct their march, in the shape of water. There they had to encounter impassable ditches and canals. Here they have to encounter in turn a river of great depth. The possible occurrence of so formidable an obstacle would naturally be dreaded and deprecated by the Greeks. In its actual occurrence they had now to *deplore* what they had formerly dreaded and deprecated. This feeling is characteristically and correctly expressed by μή :—

ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν.

It will be interesting and instructive to apply

the German theory to the explication of this clause. According to it, "it was not actually and absolutely true that the spears did not appear above the surface of the water" when the process of sounding was going on, "but only subjectively, in the opinion of the explorers." What would the decided, practical, business-like Xenophon have done, who was in the habit of pommeling his soldiers when they did or said a foolish thing, if those sent to sound the river had returned telling him "that the spears were not actually and absolutely covered by the water, but only subjectively, in their opinion?"

The last passage to be cited here, furnishing an illustrative instance of *μή* introducing the statement of a fact, absolutely and unconditionally by means of a finite verb, is from the same chapter as the last.

Τοῖς οὖν θεοῖς χάρις, ὅτι οὐ σὺν πολλῇ ῥώμῃ ἀλλὰ σὺν ὀλίγοις ἦλθον, ὥστε βλάψαι μὲν μὴ μεγάλα, δηλῶσαι δὲ ὧν δεόμεθα.

i. e., To the gods then thanks are due, because the foe came not in great force, but with few; so that they did not do us great harm, but showed in what we are defective.—*Id.* iii. 3, 14.

The clause in this sentence which requires explanation is precisely parallel to the one first quoted from Xenophon. They may be placed together:—

τῶν δὲ ἀόπλων μηδένα καταφανῆ εἶναι.
ὥστε βλάψαι μὲν μὴ μέγαλα.

Each presents a result exactly as desired by the Greeks, but in a form *deprecating* the opposite result.

The sentiments of the Greeks on this occasion might naturally be expressed thus:—

Μὴ ἡμᾶς βλάψωσι μεγάλα οἱ πολέμιοι.

Μή, of course, is characteristically and correctly employed here as a *prohibitive*, but not more so than when Xenophon wrote:—

ὥστε βλάψαι μὲν μὴ μεγάλα,

where μή is used as a *negative*, and introduces the absolute statement of an actual fact. The language of Xenophon is substantially equal to,—

Hostes cum copiis tam exiguis venerunt, ut nobis nihil injuriæ inferrent.

But the force and beauty peculiar to the Greek have disappeared in the process of translation.

It will next be seen that Μή has the same peculiar force, when combined with participles or adjectives, that it has when combined with finite verbs. The following illustrative instances, like those in the preceding series, were cited at the commencement of this argument, in proof of the fact that the doctrine of the Germans, represented by Kühner, and adopted by Donaldson, was quite untenable. The words of Kühner are,—

Μή is used when the participle or adjective can be resolved into a conditional clause, expressing a supposed case; as,

Ὁ μὴ πιστεύων = Si quis non credat.—Vol. ii. p. 402.

The words of Donaldson are,—

Ὁ μὴ ποιῶν ταῦτα = Si quis non facit haec.

These, on the other hand, are the words of Sophocles,—

Πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει,
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων.
Ἀγὼ δικαιῶν μὴ παρ' ἀγγέλων, τέκνα,
ἄλλων ἀκούειν αὐτὸς ὧδ' ἐλήλυθα,
ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους καλούμενος.

i.e., And the city is at one and the same time filled with clouds of incense and hymns of supplication and lamentation, which, my children, I, *not* deeming it right to hear from other messengers, have come hither in person, I who am known to all as the illustrious Œdipus.—*Œd. Rex*, 4–8.

When once these witnesses have been confronted in court—when once the preliminary postulate has been conceded, that Sophocles knew how to use his own tongue, then the most able and adroit advocate in the world cannot arrest judgment against the Germans, and those who have followed them. They have clearly no case. Sophocles, in putting these words—

ἀγὼ δικαιῶν μὴ παρ' ἀγγέλων, τέκνα,
ἄλλων ἀκούειν αὐτὸς ὧδ' ἐλήλυθα—

into the mouth of Œdipus, has put it out of the power of any one to maintain that μή combined with a participle essentially involves "a supposed case," or a "hypothesis." The idea of such a thing in this passage is simply impossible. If it had not been impossible, it would have been intolerable; for it would only tend to mystify the passage, stultify the poet, and mar the matchless beauty of the proudest monument of Athenian tragic genius. So

far as metre is concerned, οὐ might have been written by Sophocles, instead of μή. It was not, therefore, without reason that he wrote μή. Sophocles, by employing the latter in preference to the former, intimated, in a manner not to be mistaken, that Œdipus adopted one course of conduct as right, and condemned its opposite as wrong. In a crisis of the state, instead of hearing from others in his own house, he stepped forth to use his own eyes, and, in the exercise of a paternal government, to meet and mingle with his subjects, whom he affectionately calls his children. This course of conduct was right. Its opposite—to remain at home, and hear from others—was wrong. This is correctly and characteristically implied by μή, in ἀγὼ δικαιῶν μή, etc.

This is just what was seen in the foregoing series of sentences, and will be seen more fully in those that are to follow.

A few lines further on in the play, Œdipus again appears on the stage, and in his accustomed and appropriate character of interpreter. Not more correctly and completely did Œdipus solve the riddle of the Sphinx, than he now resolves the mystery of μή. So well does he weigh the force of words, that language in his hands becomes an instrument fitted to reveal, and not to conceal, the expression of human thought. Œdipus thus speaks :—

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀργοῖς τοῦτ' ἐπραξάμην,
ἔπεμψα γάρ, Κρέοντος εἰπόντος, διπλοῦς
πομποῦς, πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.

i.e., But not even this did I leave unperformed; for, at the instigation of Creon, I despatched two messengers in quest of him; and long ago he has excited surprise *by not being present.—Id.*, 287.

The language of Œdipus here is exceedingly clear. It will appear still more clear, however, when contrasted with the German explanation of μή.

"Μή is an expression of negative impression, a negative view without any reference to the actual existence or non-existence of the thing denied; it expresses that, in the belief, wish, intention of the subject, the thing spoken of has not existed, does not, or will not exist. Μή is a mental negation, denying a thing subjectively. Again, μή conveys a negation depending on a supposition,—*I do not think* he is present. Μή always points out of the sentence to a preceding supposition, either actually expressed in some other sentence, or implied in the context."

Whatever may have been the desire and design of the German Kühner in employing this language, when once it has been applied to the passage here—μὴ παῤῥών—its effect is only to conceal the expression of thought. The darkness with which this explanation invests the subject is as deep and dense as Cimmerian darkness itself. There is no ray of reason to irradiate the dismal gloom. Nor is the density of the atmosphere greater than the barrenness of the soil. The student is entitled to expect bread, but he only gets a stone. After almost breaking his teeth in trying to crack the philological nut,

he finds it only full of emptiness. But what the modern mystic German has withheld, that Œdipus, the old Greek, as orthodox as he is old, has vouchsafed to bestow. His is a genuine explanation of the enigma, not like that of the German, who explains the *obscurum per obscurius.* It is thus that Œdipus elucidates the mystery of μή. Like all other kings, who like to be obeyed, Œdipus is naturally angry when he is disobeyed. He had sent messenger after messenger to Tiresias, but that oracular personage, though hearing, did not heed. Tiresias had thus done what he ought *not* to have done. The feelings of Œdipus, consequent on this conduct, find fit and forcible expression in the line,—

πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.

Œdipus in these words explains the enigma of μή. In every usage it intimates, either that something is denounced as wrong, or deplored as a misfortune. According to the German mode of interpretation, although Œdipus had been chiding Tiresias for not being present at the council, μή expresses a negative view, without any reference to the actual existence or non-existence of "the absence of Tiresias;" and, moreover, "that he was not actually absent, but only, in the opinion of Œdipus, subjectively." It is neither necessary nor desirable to say more. After all, the best way to refute such arguments is to state them: then they refute themselves.

In the following passage, old Œdipus does not render less service than in the foregoing one:—

Καὶ πῶς ὁ φύσας ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί;

i. e., And how is my father on an equality with a nobody?—*Œd. Rex*, 1019.

It will be remembered that, when this passage was cited at an earlier stage of the treatise, it was seen from the context that τῷ μηδενί was no "supposed case," but a veritable man, a messenger from the court of King Polybus, speaking face to face with Œdipus. Μηδείς is not here equal to the Latin *nequis*, but to *nullus*. The latter is actually found as a substantive, "a nobody," in Livy:—Concitati, aut honori, aut quaestui, illis estis; et quia in concordia ordinum *nullos* se usquam esse vident, malae rei se, quam nullius, turbarum ac seditionum, duces esse volunt.—Lib. iii. 68.

Here, the contemptuous epithet of *nullos*—*i. e.*, "nobodies"—is applied by a proud patrician to the tribunes of the plebeians. To this usage of *nullus* the usage of μηδείς, in the line quoted above, is precisely parallel. That usage is completely fatal to an argument circulated at present in this country, in favour of the belief that μή is confined to cases of conception only. It is stated in Clyde's *Greek Syntax*, said to be used as a text-book in the Universities of Scotland, that "μηδέν is the Greek word for nothing, because it expresses mere nonentity, a conception of the mind." That is the argument in substance, though not in the exact words, for quotation is made from memory. Now, if it be true, as alleged, that the neuter μηδέν is so used because it represents "nonentity," only a "conception," then it

follows that the masculine μηδείς will represent only an imaginary individual. But μηδείς, in the line just quoted, and others about to follow, represents a real person; therefore, whatever is true of μηδείς is also true of μηδέν. The simple truth is, that the Greeks used οὐδέν or μηδέν, according to the nature of the idea to be expressed, in the same way that they used οὐ or μή. Μηδέν or μηδείς is used when it is desired or designed to convey censure or contempt. The following additional passages from the logical Sophocles remove the subject from the region of conjecture to that of certainty :—

οὐ γὰρ ἠξίου τοὺς μηδένας.

i. e., For he did not deem the nobodies worthy of the distinction.—*Ajax*, 1114.

Here, again, the τοὺς μηδένας are not *nequos*, but *nullos*. Nor are they imaginary, indefinite individuals, but real, actual, personal beings, the Atridæ themselves. Teucer speaks of them so contemptuously because of their conduct toward his brother Ajax. Moreover, in the *Œd. Col.*, Theseus, altercating with Œdipus, says,—

ἔδοξας εἶναι κἄμ' ἴσον τῷ μηδενί.

i. e., And you thought that I, too, was on an equality with a nobody.—918.

The coincidence of contemptuous comparison in these passages is complete. Nor will it appear to be less in the case of μηδέν itself. The historian Herodotus has just the same ideas relative to μή and its compounds as the poet Sophocles. One or two

illustrative specimens from the celebrated interview between Solon the Athenian, and Crœsus the Lydian king, may suffice:—

Κροῖσος δὲ σπερχθείς, εἶπε. "Ὦ ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρη εὐδαιμονίη οὕτω τοι ἀπέῤῥιπται ἐς τὸ μηδέν."—*Clio*, 32.

Here, τὸ μηδέν does not mean "nonentity," but a level still lower than that of two porters, Cleobis and Biton. Such a position Crœsus despised, when held by another, and dreaded to descend to himself. Therefore, such a position is accurately and adequately described by a compound of μή. The notion that τὸ μηδέν is the Greek word for "nothing," because it represents a mere "nonentity," only a "conception," is most probably a German importation into this country. The notion bears strong internal resemblance of being an importation, rather than an indigenous product. The Germans, or their followers, have fancied this doctrine to be a fact; it is a fact, however, that it is only a fancy. Herodotus furnishes another passage still more fatal to its pretensions:—

Ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἑρμότιμος τάδε. "Ὦ πάντων ἀνδρῶν ἤδη μάλιστα ἀπ' ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων τὸν βίον κτησάμενε, τί σὲ ἐγὼ κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν τις ἐργάσατο, ἢ σε, ἢ τῶν σῶν τινα, ὅτι με ἀντ' ἀνδρὸς ἐποίησας τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι."—*Urania*, viii. 106.

It will be seen at once that τὸ μηδέν here means a eunuch. But not even a German surely would venture to maintain that a eunuch is a "nonentity," a mere "conception." Therefore, τὸ μηδὲν is not a "nonentity," a mere "conception."—Q. E. D.

Two other passages may be cited, one from Sophocles, one from Euripides, in which τὸ μηδέν, or τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, is equivalent to the greatest evil. In which case nothing could be more accurate or more adequate than the employment of μή.

τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῷ θανεῖν ἴσον λέγω.—Eurip., *Troad.* 631.

Χορος

Ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν,
ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μη—
δὲν ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ.—*Œd. Rex*, 1186.

In all these illustrative instances the peculiar force of μή is abundantly evident. With the logical consistency peculiar to the Greek language, the very same power which is possessed by μή as a prohibitive is still retained by μή as a negative. Less directly, indeed it may be, but assuredly not less decidedly. Something is either denounced as wrong or contemptible, or deplored as unfortunate. The latter idea is brought out with great beauty in the following passages:—

καὶ τίς πρὸς ανδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος ἄρκεσις;

i.e., And what help can come from a man who does *not* see?—*Œd. Col.*, 73.

When this line was quoted before, it was proved that μὴ βλέποντος was not a "supposed case," nor an equivalent to, *si quis non videat*, but that the reference to Œdipus was immediate and inevitable. The German method of interpretation would be, "Œdipus was not actually blind, but only subjectively so, in the opinion of the interlocutor." This is the tran-

scendental sense of the passage. Suffice it to say, that this sense is not consistent with common sense; for it consists with fact, that Œdipus had torn out his eyes with his own hands, and his interlocutor was looking him in the face. Μὴ βλέποντος implies that the fact of Œdipus being blind could not be denied nor disputed, but was to be deeply deplored. The sight of a blind old man was one that could only excite feelings of commiseration and compassion in the minds of spectators. Thus, Œdipus, though blind, again throws great light on the language of the Greeks.

Another passage in the *Œd. Rex*, resembling the above in every respect, confirms the interpretation just given:—

> Πόλιν μέν, εἰ καὶ μὴ βλέπεις, φρονεῖς δ' ὅμως,
> οἵᾳ νόσῳ ξύνεστιν.

i.e., Even though you do *not* see, yet, notwithstanding, you understand how greatly the city is distressed.—302.

Œdipus is here addressing Tiresias. The angry altercation, which afterwards ensued between these two, had not yet begun. Œdipus, therefore, in his address, employs terms of respect, and not of reproach. Μὴ βλέπεις implies, on the part of Œdipus, an expression of sympathy with the soothsayer on his loss of sight. And such a peculiar power of expression is possessed by the language of Sophocles alone.

Such a mode of expression is neither partial nor

casual, but essential and habitual. It is not confined to one writer, but common to all. The three following illustrative instances, occurring in close succession, are furnished by Xenophon, every one of which refers to the same subject, so familiar was the idea to his mind. The first instance is:—

Χειρίσοφος μὲν οὖν καὶ ὅσοι ἠδυνήθησαν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐνταῦθα ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. Τῶν δ' ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι διατελέσαι τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνυκτέρευσαν ἄσιτοι καὶ ἄνευ πυρός. Καὶ ἐνταῦθά τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπώλοντο.

i.e., Chirisophus accordingly, and as many of the army as were able, encamped in that place; but of the other soldiers, such as were *not* able to complete the march spent the night without food and fire. And there some of the soldiers perished.

The admission and application of the German theory to the travels of the Ten Thousand, makes sad havoc of history. Xenophon, who was an eye-witness, with all the specific detail of time, place, and circumstance, distinctly states as an actual fact, that certain soldiers were *not* able to complete their march. The Germans, on the other hand, say "if any were not able to complete their march," which might or might not be the case. Further, the Germans say "the soldiers were not actually unable to complete their march, but only subjectively so, in their opinion." The death of the soldiers from fatigue, want of fire, and want of food, disposes of this point, if it really deserves discussion. Surely the Germans would not maintain that "they did not die, but only subjectively, in their opinion."

The application of what has been already advanced in this treatise, with regard to μή, to the passage in question, brings out the meaning, if not in a transcendental sense, in a manner consistent with common sense. It was the desire of Xenophon to draw a sharp distinction between the condition of two companies of soldiers, between those who were able, and those who were not able, to reach their destination. And since the condition of the latter differed from that of the former in being disastrous, by the employment of μή rather than οὐ, in μὴ δυνάμενοι διατελέσαι τὴν ὁδόν, he deplores their unfortunate doom. In a foreign country far from home, Xenophon might naturally apprehend the death of soldiers from famine or fatigue. Such a disaster dreaded as a probable contingency, would be described in Greek by μή, and thereby deprecated. After its actual occurrence, the disaster is deplored with equal propriety by the employment of μή in οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι, etc.

The second of the three illustrative passages referred to above, is found in the very next book of the Anabasis. This passage presents two clauses in close contiguity, in one of which μή is employed to deplore a present misfortune, in the other to deprecate a prospective misfortune still greater:—

Ἀνὴρ κατελείπετο διὰ τὸ μηκέτι δυνασθαι πορεύεσθαι.

Here, first of all, μή is found in connexion with a historical fact, to which Xenophon himself was an eye-witness. And the peculiarity in the employment of μή rather than οὐ, lies in this, that it not

only states a fact, but expresses regret at the nature of the fact. It was an unfortunate event for the soldier himself in particular, and the army in general, that he was *not* able to continue the march. Xenophon exhibits the same solicitude about the safety of a single soldier, that he did in the case of the entire army, as seen above. This is seen still more clearly from a consideration of the succeeding clause:—

ἠνάγκασα δὲ σὲ τοῦτον ἄγειν, ὡς μὴ ἀπόλοιτο.—Lib. V., 8, 8.

Lest a single life should be sacrificed, the strong soldier was compelled to conduct his weak and weary comrade. Μή, of course, is employed to deprecate this dreaded contingency. But it is not so employed with greater propriety than in the preceding clause, where it is employed to deplore a present misfortune. Thus the ancient Greeks, and the ancient scholiasts, combine in employing *μή* to state a fact absolutely, unconditionally, in countless cases, where there is not the slightest trace of "a supposed case," a "conception," a "condition," or a "contingency." For Xenophon has written, within a line or two, *διὰ τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι*, as well as *ὡς μὴ απόλοιτο.*

And the ancient scholiast, as quoted already, wrote,—*μὴ βουλόμενον Προμηθέα*, as well as *εἰ μὴ τὰ μελλόντα συμβήσεσθαι τῷ Διὶ εἴπῃ*; and surely the ancient Greeks knew more about Greek than the modern Germans.

The remaining passage, in which *μή* introduces

a fact to be deplored, and expresses Xenophon's commiseration of the condition of his troops, is almost immediately contiguous to the one last quoted from him:—

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ χειμῶνός γε ὄντος, οἷον λέγεις, σίτου δὲ ἐπιλελοιπότος, οἴνου δὲ μηδ' ὀσφραίνεσθαι, παρόν, ὑπὸ δὲ πόνων πολλῶν ἀπαγορευόντων, πολεμίων δὲ ἑπομένων.—*Id.* 8, 3.

Here the historian, while referring to several sources of peril and privation that harassed and embarrassed the soldiers in the line of march, singles out as a subject for special regret the fact that they had *not* been permitted to smell even the juice of the grape. Μηδέ, of course, implies emphatically that that circumstance was greatly deplored.

The two following passages, one from Aristophanes, the other from Xenophon, are precisely parallel in point of syntax and sentiment, and completely corroborate the instances given above of μή introduced to deplore the absence of the necessaries of life. The line from the often wise as well as witty Aristophanes is well known, and is as follows:—

πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἐστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα.

Here the position and condition of the poor man are brought out with great beauty and force by the comprehensive expression μηδὲν ἔχοντα, which is peculiar to the Greek tongue. It implies that he has *nothing*, yet he deserves to have *something*. Such is the force of μηδέν.

The other illustrative example from Xenophon furnishes a fine specimen of an "undesigned" coincidence. It is to the following effect:—

Τοὺς μὲν οἶμαι μὴ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν, πένητας. τοὺς δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν, πλουσίους.—Xen., *Mem.* iv. 2, 37.

The πένης, indeed, is not so poor as the πτωχός so well defined by Aristophanes, but yet his condition, when contrasted with that of the πλουσίοι, in not having supplies sufficient to meet equitable demands, is not what it deserves to be, and is therefore fitly and fully deplored by the employment of μή. Of course, πένης, in Greek, is to πτωχός, what *pauper* in Latin is to *egenus*.

Now that the employment of μή in connexion with a participle or adjective, to deplore something or other unfortunate, has perhaps been sufficiently illustrated,—a few instances of μή, in the same combination, when employed to denounce what is wrong or impolitic, may be given from the great prose writers of Greece. No better illustrations could be given than those cited at the commencement of this treatise, for the simple purpose of proving, in opposition to the late Dr Donaldson and the Germans, that μή was constantly found in connexion with the precise statement of matters of fact. The two passages from the philosopher Plato were:—

Ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον, οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες, καὶ οἱ μή.—*Phædo*, 113, D.

The last clause contains what concerns the present argument. The fact that a class is comprehended by καὶ οἱ μή, has *nothing* whatever to do with the employment of μή here. This explanation, also till lately current in connexion with the Latin subjunctive,

is a complete misconception. It is the *character* of the class, and not the class itself, that is concerned with μή. The employment of μή intimates, in a manner which must not be mistaken, that a certain class have done *evil*, and therefore what they ought *not* to have done.

The passage from the Phædrus is:—

Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μή.—*Phæd.* 263, C.

As there are bad men whose conduct is correctly described by the use of μή, so there are things whose nature is also correctly described by the use of μή. These are things which not only cannot be discussed with due regard to decorum, but cannot even be named.

The next passage is from the moralist Xenophon:—

Ἐμὲ δὲ ἆρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν, ῥᾴδιον εἶναι φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος;—Xen., *Mem.*, *Lib.* i. 6, 7.

Socrates is here conversing with Antiphon, whose character is contrasted with his own. Socrates, as every one knows, was eminent for temperance, self-denial, and physical endurance. The habits of Antiphon, it would seem, were the very reverse. Socrates could not commend a character so contrary to his own, and by the employment of μή, in describing it, thereby condemns it.

The first illustrative instance of μή in combination with a participle was given in connexion with a passage where the application of the German theory

has only the effect of marring the matchless beauty of the proudest monument of Athenian tragic genius. The last instance is given in connexion with another passage, where the application of the same theory has only the same effect on the most solid and splendid monument of Athenian eloquence. The passage is as follows :—

Τὸ δὲ μὴ προσγράψαντα "ἐπειδὰν τὰς εὐθύνας δῷ," στεφανοῦν, καὶ ἀνειπεῖν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τὸν στέφανον κελεῦσαι, κοινωνεῖν μὲν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς πεπολιτευμένοις, εἴτε ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ τῆς ἀναῤῥήσεως τῆς ἐν τούτοις εἴτε καὶ μή, etc.

i.e., But the question as to him who recommended my coronation, and the proclamation of the crown in the theatre, *without* having appended this clause, "When he shall have given in his account,"—I consider this to be closely connected with the question about my whole public career, whether I am worthy of the crown, and its public proclamation among these citizens, or not, etc.—Dem., *De Cor.* 23, D.

When this sentence was cited before, to prove that μή in conjunction with προσγράψαντα introduced the statement of a fact, in opposition to Dr Donaldson, who maintained that μή in such a combination involved the idea of a "hypothesis," or, according to the Germans, "a supposed case," a "conception," it was found that, so far was this from being the case, μὴ προσγράψαντα was no other than the defendant in that most celebrated forensic trial. The application of the German theory certainly puts parties in a

position more curious than creditable, or, rather, the position is scarcely credible at all. Fancy the defendant Ctesiphon becoming, under the transcendental method of interpretation, a "hypothesis" or "myth"!! Of course, the true explanation of μὴ προσγράψαντα is simply this. Ctesiphon had done what was *wrong*, or, rather, had failed to do what was right. Here, again, the logical consistency of μή is equally certain and conspicuous.

The next combination of μή—that with a relative—is now to be considered.

Though this combination is different from the two preceding ones—μή with a finite verb, and μή with a participle—the peculiar force of that particle remains the same. When μή is found with a relative, something either to be deplored as unfortunate or denounced as wrong, is found at the same time. But there is not the slightest trace of a "supposed case," or a "conception," as the Germans say, to be found. Nor is there the slightest warrant for Dr Donaldson having written,—

"Μή follows the relative when the antecedent is indefinite, because in this case there is an hypothesis." —*Complete Greek Grammar*, p. 214.

Four passages were cited from Sophocles where μή followed the relative, but neither "indefinite antecedent" nor "hypothesis" could be found, so that a "hypothesis" could not by any possibility have been the cause of the employment of μή. They now are cited again to show that they contain the

concomitant common to all the combinations of μή. There is, either a person or his condition to be deplored. Since all the passages contain this common characteristic, there is no need of separate comment on each. When placed together they tell their own tale themselves:—

τίς τοῦδε γ' ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερος;
ὃν μὴ ἔξεστι μήτ' ἀστῶν τινὰ
δόμοις δέχεσθαι, μηδὲ προσφωνεῖν τινά,
ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων.—Œd., *Rex*, 815.

ἐδεξάμην
δῶρον, ὃ μήποτ' ἐγὼ ταλακάρδιος
ἐπωφέλησα πόλεος ἐξελέσθαι.—Œd., *Col.* 540.

ὅτῳ μήτ' Ἄρης
μήτε πόντος ἀντέκυρσεν,
ἄσκοποι δὲ πλάκες ἔμαρψαν
ἐν ἀφανεῖ τινι μόρῳ φερόμεναι.—*Id.* 1679.
πόθος καὶ κακῶν ἄρ' ἦν τις,
καὶ γὰρ ὃ μηδαμὰ δὴ φίλον, ἦν φίλον.—*Id.* 1697.

In the following additional illustrative instances of μή combined with the relative, there is something to be denounced as well as deplored,—certain practices which are positively evil. Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plato, who are certainly competent witnesses where Greek is concerned, contribute their testimony to the truth. Had these three philosophers combined in common concert to illustrate and demonstrate what is involved in μή, they could not have done so more conclusively and decisively than in the passages to be cited below. In the case of this common con-

tribution there is, of course, no collusion, but only an undesigned coincidence, which is the best of all conceivable evidence. Xenophon is the first cited:—

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσι, καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις, καὶ ποιήσειν, ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσι, ὑπισχνουμένοις.

i. e., For, indeed, the braggart seems, to me at least, to be given as a name to those who affect to be both richer and braver than they really are, and who promise to perform what they are *not* able.—*Cyr.* ii. 2, 12.

The clause which is here principally concerned is, *ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσι.* The explanation which has hitherto been given of such a clause as this, is, "the contingency is obvious, *it means, not particular things which*, but such things as." The doctrine of "contingency" can soon be disposed of. It is impossible that the presence of these so-called "contingent" things can produce *μή*, because case after case has been cited above where their absence did not prevent the presence of *μή*. Of course, "contingency" or certainty, definiteness or "indefiniteness," is a mere accident of *μή*. The essential condition of *μή*, the uniform and universal concomitant of *μή*, is the presence of something to be deplored or denounced. And here this is found. In *ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσι*, certain persons are described as *not* being able to do what they *ought* to be able to do, otherwise they *ought not* to have promised at all. It would be impossible to conceive a case where *μή* could be employed with greater fitness and force.

The character of an ἀλαζών—one who illustrates the difference between professing and possessing, who is not really what he represents himself to be—is photographed by Aristotle, as well as Xenophon. Truth holds her torch while they draw the portrait to life, in lines of light. They reach the same result by the same route, because each was guided by the laws of reason. Each wrote according to rule, and not at random; and the coincidence in the form of expression proves that it was as common in practice as it was correct in principle. The one censures a pretender because he cannot perform what he promises; the other censures him because he aims at the unattainable—the *nimis alta* of Sallust; and both convey their common censure by the employment of μή.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων.—*Nic. Ethic.* iv. 7, 2.

The evidence of these two competent witnesses is confirmed and crowned by the evidence of a third witness equally competent, in the shape of Plato, who defines ἀλαζονεία in almost the same words as his compatriots,—

ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων.

There is another passage in Xenophon which, being cognate with the one last quoted from him, ought here to be considered. In the foregoing passage, the truthful historian censured the pretender; in the following one, he draws a sharp and severe distinction between those who speak the truth and

those who do *not*. The latter are afflicted with a mendacious fancy, which, if confined to their own concerns, would only have to be deplored; but, since it misleads others, requires to be denounced. The passage is to the following effect:—

Ἐντεῦθεν ἔπεμψαν τῆς νυκτὸς Δημοκράτην Τεμενίτην, ἄνδρας δόντες, ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη ἔνθα ἔφασαν οἱ ἀποσκεδαννύμενοι καθορᾶν τὰ πυρά. οὗτος γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ πρότερον πολλὰ ἤδη ἀληθεῦσαι, τὰ ὄντα τε ὡς ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ὄντα. πορευθεὶς δὲ τὰ μὲν πυρὰ οὐκ ἔφη ἰδεῖν.—*Anab.* iv. 4, 15.

The conduct of two parties is here contrasted; that of the first mentioned is commended, while that of the latter is condemned. Democrates saw no fires of the enemy, and said so,—*ὡς οὐκ ὄντα*. The stragglers (*οἱ ἀποσκεδαννύμενοι*), on the contrary, said they saw fires, but did *not*, which was at once a false report and a wrong one. Surely *μή* is well employed in Greek in condemning what is bad.

There remains yet to be considered the last of the four combinations of *μή* introducing the statement of a fact—*μή* with the infinitive used as a substantive. A long array of passages was cited to prove the fact that *μή*, in this last combination, introduced the statement of a fact without limitation or qualification, exception or restriction. It is now to be proved that *μή* is so used, as in all other combinations, because it introduces something either to be deplored as unfortunate or denounced as wrong.

Hitherto, it has been believed that *μή*, in combination with the infinitive as a substantive, introduced

" abstract and general propositions." This misconception is as great as any that has been disposed of above.

Μή in this combination introduces a particular or general proposition indifferently, so be it that there is something to be deplored or denounced. In the three following illustrative instances from Xenophon, μή introduces something to be deplored in connexion with a particular subject:—

Κλέαρχος δὲ τότε μὲν μικρὸν ἐξέφυγε τοῦ μὴ καταπετρωθῆναι. —*An.* i. 3, 2.

In the following instance, Xenophon does not, as in the foregoing one, name the individual, for this was not necessary; but he knew him, and describes the circumstances of his case with great minuteness of detail. The fact that a soldier was so weak that he could not walk, was one to be deplored:—

Ἀνὴρ κατελείπετο διὰ τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι πορεύεσθαι.— *Id.* V. 8, 8.

The third instance is:—

φημὶ αὐτόν, διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν σπουδαῖον ἐπιμελητήν, προσπεσεῖσθαί τινι αισχρᾷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ προβήσεσθαι πόρρω μοχθηρίας.

i. e., I say that he, on account of his having *no* virtuous guardian, will fall into some base lust, and will advance far in wickedness.—*Apol.* 30.

That the fact of a young man *not* having a virtuous guardian is a circumstance to be deplored, the reader is not left to infer indirectly, but Xenophon himself directly intimates it by specifying the results that follow such a condition.

In the three following additional instances, the clauses preceding μή specify so clearly the idea inherent in that particle that no separate comment is required:—

ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι
νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναι.

i.e., For somehow or other this *infirmity* is inherent in despotic power,—*not* to trust friends.—*Æschyl. Prom.* 224.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνεῖλε, τῷ παντὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι, τοτ' ἀπέδωκεν, οὐ μόνον ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνόσιον θείς, τὸ πυθοχρήστοις νόμοις μὴ πείθεσθαι.

i.e., But when the oracle replied that it was preferable in every respect, then he delivered the laws to the Spartans, having ordained that it was not only *contrary to human law, but also to divine, not* to obey laws sanctioned by the oracle of Apollo.—Xen., *Resp. Lac.* 8, 5.

Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν (τῶν ἀσώτων) εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί. εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἶσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.

i.e., Wherefore, also, the majority of them (*i.e.*, spendthrifts) are incapable of restraint: for spending their money freely, they are both lavish on their excesses, and because of *not* living according to virtue, they turn aside to pleasures.—Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* iv. 1, 36.

But μή is not only found with the infinitive as a substantive, but also with a substantive itself, and,

as might be expected, retaining all its peculiar force. Aristophanes says,—

Δεινόν ἐστιν ἡ μὴ 'μπειρία.—*Eccl.* 115.

On this line Liddell and Scott remark, "this is an abstract substantive, a general expression of opinion." Since this treatise is filled with passages from the classic writers of Greece, containing case after case of μή introducing the statement of facts in connexion with particular subjects, it is scarcely necessary to say that the explanation of the Oxford lexicographers is entirely erroneous. According to Aristophanes, μή imputes blame to those who, knowing *not*, yet ought to know. Ἐμπειρία is a good thing, μὴ 'μπειρία is a bad thing. While this explanation, of course, harmonizes with all that has hitherto been advanced relative to μή, it acquires special confirmation when the case of οὐ with a substantive is considered in contrast. Thucydides says,—

(γράψας τὴν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος παράγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δὲ αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν).—Lib. i. 137.

Themistocles, in his letter to Artaxerxes recounting his services to that monarch and his father, makes special reference to τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν οὐ διάλυσιν. The non-destruction of the bridge proved the safety of Xerxes. That, therefore, in the opinion of Themistocles, was a signal service to the Persian king. If Thucydides had written μὴ διάλυσιν, instead of οὐ διάλυσιν, he would have implied that the bridge was not broken down, but ought to have been. But

such an expression could never have been used by Themistocles to one who had thereby made good his retreat, and whose favour and friendship he sought to secure.

There remain other combinations of μή, which, though not needed to confirm the opinions advanced above, serve to illustrate the logical consistency of the Greek language. The first of these additional combinations is that of μή in a conditional clause. Before looking at the practice of the ancient Greeks on this point, it will be instructive to look at the theory of the modern Germans:—

"If the protasis of an hypothetical sentence contains a negative, it is *invariably* μή."—Schmitz, *Gr. Gram.*, p. 156.

This sweeping assertion can only be considered true "subjectively," *i.e.*, in the opinion of the writer. As a matter of fact, it is contradicted by Xenophon, for instance, in one of the first treatises put into the hands of boys:—

Κῦρος δ' εἶπεν οὐκ ἄρα ἔτι μαχεῖται, εἰ ἐν ταύταις οὐ μαχεῖται ταῖς ἡμέραις.—*An.* i. 7, 18.

And Xenophon, in writing οὐ rather than μή here, only adapted the syntax to the sense of the passage. If Xenophon, instead of writing, "the king, then, will not fight at all, if he does not do so within ten days," had written, "if the king does not fight in ten days, he shall surely die," he would have used εἰ μή. When a *duty neglected* is made the subject of supposition in a conditional clause, and some result to

be dreaded or deplored follows in the consequent clause, then μή, not οὐ, is appropriately used:—

ἔφη εἶναι ἄκρον ὃ εἰ μή τις προκαταλήψοιτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσεσθαι παρελθεῖν.—*Id.* iv. 1, 25.

A few chapters further on, in the same book, another instance is found exhibiting the same syntax with the same sentiment; for the Greeks, like the Latins, adopted the principle of making the syntax subordinate to the sense. In the conditional clause, the non-performance of a duty, which is manifestly a wrong thing, being made the subject of a supposition, μή, the stronger negative, is used:—

Τῇ γὰρ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, εἰ μὴ λησόμεθα τὸ χωρίον.—*Id.* 7, 3.

Homer, even though the Greek language in his hands had not been logically developed, wrote in this respect like Xenophon,—

Εἰ δέ τοι οὐ δώσει ἓν ἄγγελον εὐρύοπα Ζεύς,
Οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ σ' ἔπειτα ἐποτρύνουσα κελοίμην
Νῆας ἐπ' Ἀργείων ἰέναι, μάλα περ μεμαῶτα.

—*Il.* xxiv. 298.

Since Jove, in the exercise of his supreme will, might withhold his messenger without failing to fulfil an obligation, οὐ, and not μή, is used in the conditional clause. And as the protasis, so is the apodosis. If the condition were not fulfilled, Hecuba mildly says "that she would not advise her husband to go to the ships of the Greeks."

The contrast of this passage in the last book of the Iliad with one in the first, is very striking,—

Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι
Ἢ τεόν, ἢ Αἴαντος, ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος.—*Ib.* 1, 137.

Here, in the protasis, the non-fulfilment of the obligation of the Greeks, as Agamemnon thought, —to grant to him a prize equal to what was taken away,—is aptly expressed by εἰ μή. And the apodosis contains, as might have been expected, a consequence to be dreaded and deplored.

In the three following examples, the contemplation of a non-performance of duty is so clearly expressed that no separate comment is needed.

κἢ μὴ θέλοι, πυρωπὸν ἐκ Διὸς μολεῖν
κεραυνόν, ὃς πᾶν ἐξαϊστώσοι γένος.

i.e., If Inachus did *not* obey, a fiery bolt from Jove would come, which should blot out his whole race.—Æschyl., *Pr.* 667.

Again, the same poet, in the same play, says,—

σκέψαι δ', ἐὰν μὴ τοῖς ἐμοῖς πεισθῇς λόγοις,
οἵός σε χειμὼν καὶ κακῶν τρικυμία
ἕπεισ' ἄφυκτος.

i.e., But mark, if you be *not* won by words, what a tempest, and threefold surge of ills, will come upon you, from which there is no escape!—*Id.* 1014.

The third is from the logical Sophocles, whose plays throw so much light on the usages of μή:—

εἰ δὲ μὴ
λέγω γ' ἐγὼ τἀληθές, ἀξιῶ θανεῖν.

i.e., But if I do *not* speak the truth, I claim death as my due.—Œd., *Tyr.* 944.

One or two illustrations of εἰ μή introducing

something to be *deplored* as *unfortunate*, may be given:—

Τίς δ' ἂν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καὶ δριμέων καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνειργάσθη.

i.e., What perception could there have been of sweet and bitter things, and every thing that enters the mouth, if the tongue had *not* been constituted judge of them?—*Mem.* i. 4, 5.

Πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.

i.e., How, then, could such a man corrupt the young, *unless*, as a matter of course, devotion to virtue were corruption?—*Id.* i. 2, 8.

Such a state of morals in a community would certainly be a deplorable one.

The last regularly recurring usage of μή to be considered is μή used interrogatively.

Every one knows, who knows anything about Greek, that when μή is so used, the answer *No*, as in the case of the Latin *num*, is expected. The reason why it is so is to be found in the fact, that μή here, as in the numerous combinations already considered, retains its own peculiar force. Μή introduces an interrogative to which a negative answer is anticipated, because something wrong is thereby condemned. This usage is found even so early as in the time of Homer:—

Ἦ μή που τινὰ δυσμενέων φάσθ' ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν;

i.e., You don't perchance suppose him to be one of unfriendly men, do ye?—Od., 6, 200.

Nausicaa, by employing here μή, clearly implies that her maidens did *wrong* in supposing that the individual referred to was an enemy. So far from treating him as a foe, they were bound to receive and regard him as a friend; for, being a stranger, he was under the special protection of Jove himself:—

Τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομέειν. πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσὶν ἅπαντες
Ξεῖνοι.

Æschylus, who followed Homer in other respects, resembles him also here:—

τί οὖν; ὁ ναύτης ἆρα μὴ 'ς πρῷραν φυγὼν
πρύμνηθεν εὗρε μηχανὴν σωτηρίας,
νεὼς καμούσης ποντίῳ πρὸς κύματι;

i.e., What, then? The sailor finds *not* means of preservation (does he?) by fleeing from stern to prow, while the ship labours against the ocean-billow.—*Theb.*, 208.

The distinction between οὐ and μή, in questions, is brought out with great beauty by Sophocles, who employs them repeatedly in the same line:—

οὐ θᾶσσον οἴσεις, μηδ' ἀπιστήσεις ἐμοί;

i.e., You will present quickly your right hand, won't you? you will *not* disobey me, will you?—*Trach.* 1185.

The answer *No* is anticipated by μή, because an act of *non*-conformity is conceived, and is to be condemned.

Another line, precisely parallel, is to be found in the Ajax:—

οὐ σῖγ' ἀνέξει, μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρεῖς;

i.e., You will hold your tongue, won't you? you will *not* be cowardly, will you?—75.

Elmsley, a critic who deserves to be mentioned with respect, but having no conception of the essential property of *μή*, erroneously explained this passage by saying that *οὐ* extended to the second clause—*οὐ μὴ ἀρεῖς*—will you *not not* be cowardly?

There is a formula occurring in Plato occasionally, not only consistent with, but confirmatory of all these combinations:—

Μάλιστα μέν . . . εἰ δὲ μή . . .

i.e., What is most desirable is to be looked to; but failing that, the next best, which, however, is *worse*. This is what *μή* here implies, the degree of inferiority being exactly equivalent to the Latin *deterior*, which is *worse* than something *good*,—*bonus*.

It has hitherto been commonly, though not correctly, supposed that Plutarch, Lucian, Arrian, etc., do not use *μή* as the older Greek writers did. The Germans, with characteristic audacity, have censured these later writers accordingly. Oliver Cromwell would have told them, "I pray you, consider it possible that you yourselves may be mistaken." It never has occurred to the modern Germans that the ancient Greeks knew how to use their own tongue. Professor Madvig, of Copenhagen, a Dane, not venturing to censure the Greeks for not knowing how to write Greek, has endeavoured to explain the supposed anomaly in consistency with the law of logical development, but not with

more success than he has attempted to explain the Latin subjunctive. The difference, he alleges, is due to the *usus ethicus*. If he had said no more on the subject, it would have been difficult to confute him; for the learned phrase, *usus ethicus*, may mean anything, or rather, when it is so applied here, it means nothing at all. He, however, goes on to say "that μή is a milder form of negation." This distinction between οὐ and μή is not only not correct, but exactly contrary to what is correct. The Greeks, by means of μή, intimated that a thing was *not*, and thereby expressed their regret that it was so, inasmuch as it was to be deplored either as wrong or unfortunate. On the other hand, they employed οὐ when they did not desire or require to express any such feeling:—

Οὗτος δ' ἦν καλὸς μέν μέγας δ οὐ.—Xen., *An.* iv. 4, 3.

There was nothing in the fact that the river was *not* big which required to be described as wrong or unfortunate. Had either the subject required it or the historian desired it, he would have employed μή. Very often, where peculiar emphasis requires to be expressed, οὐ and μή are combined together:—

οὔ τοι μήποτέ σ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἑδράνων,
ὦ γέρον, ἄκοντά τις ἄξει.—Soph. Œd., *Col.* 176.

But it is time to illustrate the practice of Plutarch:—

Περικλῆς μέλλων ἀποθνήσκειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐμακάριζεν ὅτι μηδεὶς Ἀθηναίων μέλαν ἱμάτιον δι' αὐτὸν ἐνεδύσατο.—P. 186.

The Germans here would say that, an actual fact

having been stated, Plutarch should have used *οὐδείς*. Professor Madvig would say, "that the milder form of *μηδείς* is due to the *usus ethicus*." The simple truth is, Plutarch used *μηδείς*, just as Sophocles, Xenophon, or Thucydides would have done, because, in this form of the negative, there is a *strong* protest against that policy which compelled one citizen to go into mourning for the acts of another. And as Plutarch wrote, so did the old Greek Father, Clement of Alexandria (who knew Greek better than the modern Germans), interpret him. Plutarch (*Alcib.* 3.) uses the word *ἄσωτος*. The aforesaid Father rightly explains the word as = *ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος σώζεσθαι*,—*i. e.*, one who could not be saved, was in a *deplorable* condition.

Whatever opinions the modern Germans, and those who have faithfully followed them, may have had regarding *μή*, all the Greek writers, early and late, grave and gay, had but one and the same. Æsop wrote as Sophocles and Demosthenes wrote. It has been seen what sad work the application of the German theory to their masterpieces has made. Nor is it otherwise with the lighter efforts of Æsop:—

Ὁ δὲ *μηδέπω πιών, κυνηγοῦ καταλαβόντος, ἔφευγεν.*

According to the Germans and Dr Donaldson, *ὁ μηδέπω πιών* is = siquis non potat. The merest tyro will perceive, at first sight, that this interpretation is here not intelligible, and therefore intolerable. From what has been already said about *μή*, the force and point of *μηδέπω* will be obvious at once. It implies, of course, that the stag did *not* drink, and

also implies censure for his not doing so, but looking at his horns instead, and allowing himself to be overtaken by the hounds. Æsop knew nothing about the *usus ethicus* of Professor Madvig, but he knew how to write Greek. The *μηδέπω πιών* of Æsop is precisely parallel to the *μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται* of Sophocles.

Professor Madvig, along with Dr Donaldson and the Germans, has supposed that an hypothesis is an essential of *μή*, whereas it is only a circumstantial. Its proper and peculiar function is to introduce what is to be deplored as evil or unfortunate, and accordingly is as appropriate to specific matters of fact as to hypothetical cases. All the error and confusion incident to *μή* have arisen from the failure to see that it retains the same force when negative as prohibitive.

Its chief usages may thus be exhibited:—

I. Μὴ *ψευδομαρτύρει.*

II. Ὁ *νόμος ἡμᾶς κελεύει μὴ ψευδομαρτυρεῖν.*

III. Ὁ *ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ δείδει μὴ ὁ παῖς ψευδομαρτυρῇ.*

IV. Περικλῆς *ἑαυτὸν ἐμακάριζεν, ὅτι μηδεὶς Ἀθηναίων μέλαν ἱμάτιον δι' αὐτὸν ἐνεδύσατο.*—Plutarch, p. 186.

V. Πάλαι *δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.*

—Soph., *Œd. Tyr.* 289.

VI. *ᾧ μὴ ξένων ἐξεστι μήτ' ἀστῶν τινὰ*
δόμοις δέχεσθαι.—*Id.* 817.

VII. Ἡ Ἑλλὰς *ἔτι μετανίστατο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασα αὐξηθῆναι.*—Thuc., 1, 12.

VIII. Ἀνὴρ *κατελείπετο διὰ τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι πορεύεσθαι.* —Xen., *An.* v. 8, 8.

IX. Δεινόν *ἐστιν ἡ μὴ ἐμπειρία.*

—Aristoph., *Eccl.* 115.

X. Ἦ μή που τινὰ δυσμενέων φάσθ' ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν.—Hom., *Od.* vi. 200.

XI. εἰ δὲ μὴ
λέγω γ' ἐγὼ τἀληθές, ἀξιῶ θανεῖν.
—Œd., *Tyr.* 944.

XII. Μάλιστα μέν . . . εἰ δὲ μή . . .—Plato.

XIII. Οὔ τοι μήποτέ σ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἑδράνων,
ὦ γέρον, ἄκοντά τις ἄξει.—Œd., *Col.* 176.

The close connexion between all these combinations of μή is equally certain and conspicuous. These combinations are certainly different, but not diverse. The logical consistency of the Greek language is manifest throughout. The relationship between these different usages of μή is as close as in those of the Latin subjunctive, though its ramifications do not extend so wide, as in the case of that marvellous form of expression. Cosmos, and not chaos, reigns throughout the ramifications of the Greek μή, while chaos, and not cosmos, reigns throughout the ramifications of the German *mή*. The introduction of "subjective and objective" into the domain of Greek syntax, so far from being worthy of the designation of a discovery, deserves only to be described as a "nostrum." It is not at all wonderful that such strange notions relative to μή should have sprung up so fast and spread so wide in Germany, since German scholars often believe before they reason. It is somewhat strange, however, that such opinions should have found a footing in Britain, where theories usually are taken on trial before they are

taken on trust, and should have been adopted by scholars whose repute is as well deserved as it is widely diffused—the Oxford lexicographers, and the late lamented J. W. Donaldson, of Cambridge.

Sed nos immensum spatiis confecimus aequor
Et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.

APPENDIX.

THE SUBJUNCTIVE AS KNOWN TO THE ROMANS.

It is neither desired nor designed here to exhibit a complete view of all the combinations with which the subjunctive is found. Upwards of thirty of these are enumerated in the author's treatise, "The True Theory of the Subjunctive." Only a few are given here, which have suggested themselves since the publication of that work.

In the Latin grammars hitherto published it is stated that the Romans use the subjunctive,—

at one time,	because	"the clause is dependent;"
at another time,	,,	"the clause is indirect;"
,,	,,	"the clause is indefinite;"
,,	,,	"the clause is potential;"
,,	,,	"the predicate is in the relative clause;"
,,	,,	"the clause is an essential part of the entire statement;"
,,	,,	"the clause contains a supposition, and not the statement of a fact;"

at another time, because "the supposition carries with it some intimation that, in the speaker's judgment, it is probable."

Any one accustomed to reason before believing, would, *à priori*, pronounce such a multifarious and heterogeneous character of the subjunctive to be "marvellously improbable," and, after close and constant observation of Roman usage, to be absolutely impossible; for although the form of the subjunctive is in every case the same, the descriptions of its nature, as given above, are so diverse that they bear no more relation to each other than to the angle of incidence or polarization. Here, as elsewhere, error is manifold, while truth is one, uniform and consistent.

Of these multifarious descriptions of the subjunctive, the most respectable is that which represents it as the mood of conception. If, however, consideration had been given to the fact, that *ut*, in almost every sentence of every Latin writer, introduces an actual result, neither any grammarian would ever have conceived nor any other have ever believed that the subjunctive was the mood of conception. It is, of course, the character of a fact or a conception which alone determines its mood. A fact of an extraordinary or exceptional character, or one to which they wished to give especial prominence, the Romans expressed by the subjunctive; on the other hand, a conception, if of an ordinary, feasible, or probable kind, they expressed by the indicative.

As *ut* of itself is sufficient to prove that "conception" is not the true theory of the subjunctive, so also of itself, though there were no other proof, it is sufficient to prove what is the true theory. There is, no doubt, a great difference between a consequence and a purpose; but between an extraordinary consequence and an extraordinary purpose, there is a common bond. Hence, nothing is more natural than that, in the case of a language so logical as Latin, *ut* should introduce, now the one, now the other, with the subjunctive. The following are instances of an extraordinary purpose introduced by *ut* with the subjunctive. And what makes the circumstance more striking is the fact that, in ordinary cases, the same introductory verb is not followed by the subjunctive:—

Itaque, quod plerumque in atroci negotio solet, senatus edixit, *ut darent* operam consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet.

Dico and *edico* are naturally and commonly followed by the infinitive; but when employed to convey an official command in an extraordinary emergency, as here, they are followed by the subjunctive. The syntax is adapted to the sense and situation.

Deliberantibus Pythia *respondit*, *ut* moenibus se ligneis *munirent*.—Nep. Them., ii.

Of course the natural and normal mood following *respondeo* is the infinitive; but the extraordinary syntax of the subjunctive aptly represents the extraordinary emergency of the Athenian state.

Senatus P. Lentulum, *ut* se *abdicaret* praetura *coegit*. —Cic., *Cat.* 4, 8.

Had there been nothing extraordinary or exceptional here, *coegit* would have been followed by the infinitive.

In like manner, when any extraordinary commission is given, the syntax is, Mandatum est legato, ut *diceret*, etc.; and while *refert*, *volo*, and *mos est*, are, in ordinary cases, followed by the infinitive, when anything extraordinary is to be indicated, they are followed by *ut* and the subjunctive. When the Romans wished to give less prominence to the expression of a purpose, they used *causa* or *ad* with the gerund, and sometimes the supine, or future participle by itself.

Whoever first taught that the clause with *ut* required the subjunctive, because it was "logically subordinate" to the preceding one, was certainly not a great Latin scholar, still less a great logician; but he was certainly a somewhat clever fellow, to make the whole academic world believe in "logical subordination."

In such a sentence as *juvenis dat operam, ut doctissimus evadat*, so far is it from being true that the latter clause is subordinate to the first that the reverse is the case. *To become a great scholar is the final aim* of the youth, and his *previous exertion* is subordinate to that end. Surely the *means* is *subordinate* to the *end*. The same idea is equally certain and conspicuous in the case of *antequam* and *dum*, with the subjunctive:—

Tragoedi quotidie, *antequam pronuncient*, vocem *sensim excitant.—Cic. de Or.* i. 59.

Here the *gradual elevation* of the voice was sub-

ordinate to the *final aim*—the *full pitch of utterance*—to which especial prominence is given by the employment of the subjunctive.

Another passage from Cicero makes this still more clear:—

In omnibus negotiis *priusquam aggrediare*, adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.—*De Off.* i. 21.

Here the *careful preliminary training*, or means, is subordinate to *entrance on duty* — the end. So Nepos:—

Neque prius inde decessit, quam totam insulam bello *devinceret.*—*Chab.* ii.

Everything the general did was secondary and subordinate to the *final aim*, the crowning act—the subjugation of the island. Two illustrative instances from Virgil are equally clear and convincing:—

Multa quoque et bello passus, *dum conderet* urbem.
—*Æn.* i. 5.

The foundation of a city was the crowning act in the extraordinary career of Æneas, and due prominence is given to it by the subjunctive accordingly.

The same sentiment, in connexion with the same subject, is found a little further on in the poem, and, of course, the same syntax:—

Ante et Trinacria tentandus remus in unda,
Et salis Ausonii lustrandum navibus aequor,
Infernique lacus, Aeaeaeque insula Circae,
Quam tuta *possis* urbem componere terra.
—iii. 380.

It is impossible that the preceding clause can be the

cause of the subjunctive in the succeeding one, for the subjunctive is found when there is no preceding clause:—

Eloquar an sileam?—*Vir.*

Here is the subjunctive; but where is the "logical subordination" or "dependence"? Nowhere. These ideas never had any existence, as applied to Latin, save in the imagination of their German inventor. The composition of the Latin language was independent of them, and so is its exposition. The essential idea of the so-called subjunctive lies in the mood itself, and is independent, not only of any preceding clause, but even of any appended word whatever, as in *eloquar*, and hundreds of instances besides.

Eloquar of course implies that the speaker is in some extraordinary position, and that he is at a loss whether to speak or not. In like manner, the phrase, in Cicero, independent of any preceding clause, is constantly occurring, *Prope dixerim*, —*i.e.*, I had almost said something extraordinary or exceptional. Akin to this is the formula, *ut ita dicam*, which the writer or speaker introduces to soften the effect of some strong or striking statement. On the other hand, when *ut* is joined with the indicative, the meaning is very different,—*e.g.*, *ut aiunt*, as the *common* saying is. And these forms of expression would neither be correctly nor completely illustrated without the addition of one more, *Sunt qui ferant*,—which has hitherto puzzled grammarians so sadly. The explanation of the subjunctive here was, that "the predicate

was in the relative clause." Now, there might have been some meaning in this explanation if there had been no "predicate" in the preceding clause. But there is a predicate in that clause, as well as in the relative clause. Of course, the true explanation is that, in the indicative clause, there is an *ordinary* predication; in the subjunctive, an *extraordinary* one.

Fuere, qui *dicerent*, Catilinam humani corporis sanguinem in pateris circumtulisse.—*Sal. Cat.* 22.

The statement, that the blood of a human victim was circulated among the conspirators, constitutes certainly a very extraordinary predicate. That, consequently, accounts for the subjunctive. There is a passage in Livy precisely parallel in point of sentiment and syntax:—

Sunt, qui patrem auctorem ejus supplicii *ferant.*—ii. 41.

The statement, that a father caused his own son to be put to death, constitutes also a very *extraordinary* predicate; and due prominence is given thereby to it by the employment of the subjunctive.

Of all the doctrines relative to the subjunctive, that of "indefiniteness" has probably been most widely circulated, and yet it rests on a basis as narrow as any,—*i.e.*, no basis at all. Two facts alone are sufficient to dispose of this doctrine. (1.) The imperfect indicative is constantly used to describe a repeated act indefinitely,—*i.e.*, without a precise specification of time and place. (2.) It is notorious that *quisquis* and *quicunque*, the most indefinite of all words, are used

with the indicative; on the other hand, specifications the most precise, in point of time and place, are made by the subjunctive:—

Postridie ejus diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, *quum* exercitui frumentum metiri *oporteret.*—Cæs., *Bel. Gall.* lib. i. 23.

The subjunctive, here, is utterly inconsistent with "indefiniteness," but it is completely consistent with the subjunctive as known to the Romans. Cæsar thereby desires and designs to show with what intense interest he and his men anticipated the approach of the day, on which the most important issues were suspended—the preservation or destruction of the army. Again, in Livy, the day is definitely fixed, yet the subjunctive is used:—

Ante tamen, quam *prædicta dies veniret*, morbo moritur.—II. 61.

Here prominence is given by the subjunctive to the pre-appointed day of trial, on which so important issues were suspended, and to which the people looked forward with such intense interest. So, in Virgil:—

Quum jam *diffideret* armis,
Dardaniae, cingique urbem obsidione *videret.*
—*Æn.* iii. 87.

Here, again, the subjunctive gives due prominence to the critical time which was to close the long siege of ten years. Nepos, too, specifies the time precisely, but he leaves not the reader to infer the extraordinary or exceptional character of the occasion from the

subjunctive, for he expressly adds the word, *praesertim*:—

Erat enim ea sagacitate, ut decipi non posset, *praesertim quum* animum ad cavendum *attendisset.*—*Alcib.* v.

Within the brief compass of a single line, Livy, who, it may be presumed, knew how to write his own language, disposes of the modern doctrine of "indefiniteness" and "dependence" together, with merciless severity:—

Quicquid erat Patrum, reos *diceres*, precibus plebem exposcentes.—II. 35.

In the first clause, there is the most "indefinite" of all words with the indicative, *erat.* In the second clause, which is independent, the subjunctive *diceres* is found; and though Livy wrote thus, in opposition to all modern Latin grammarians, he wrote with that strict logical consistency which is so characteristic of the Latin language. For there is nothing to be described as extraordinary in *quicquid erat Patrum.* But there is, in the case of *diceres reos.* The former is simply = Omnes Patres. In the latter, however, there is an *extraordinary* description of the Patres, as the suppliants of their inferiors, the Plebs. The common explanation of *diceres* is, that it is "indefinite,"—*i.e.*, one would have said. Not to speak of what has been said above, that is rather an awkward explanation, in face of the fact, that Livy, in the preceding clause, used an indefinite with the indicative; and Cicero, speaking of himself, constantly writes, *prope dixerim, ut ita dicam.*

And by the addition of *sunt qui dicant*, there is the coincidence of all the three persons expressing something extraordinary, in a manner entirely independent either of "dependence" or "indefiniteness."

Two other illustrative instances of the second person of the subjunctive introducing an extraordinary comparison may be cited from Horace:—

Nam quae pervincere voces
Evaluere sonum, referunt quem nostra theatra?
Garganum mugire *putes* nemus, aut mare Tuscum.
—*Epist.* ii. 1, 200.

Quod si
Judicium subtile videndis artibus illud
Ad libros, et ad haec musarum dona, vocares;
Boeotum in crasso *jurares* aëre natum.—*Id.* 244.

But a complete, as well as correct, conception of the subjunctive is best formed by representing what is *extraordinary* or *exceptional*, as the expression of an *extreme* on *either* side,—*e.g.*, something either to be greatly *desired* or *deprecated*. Examples of the former extreme, something to be *greatly desired*, expressed by the subjunctive, are found in almost every page of every Latin writer. Let the three following, quoted from memory, suffice:—

O mihi praeteritos *referat* si Jupiter annos.—*Virgil.*
Te *teneam* moriens deficiente manu.—*Tibullus.*
Utinamque oculos in pectora *posses*
Inserere, et patrias intus *deprehendere* curas.—*Ovid.*

The opposite extreme, something to be *greatly deprecated*, is expressed by *ne* with the subjunctive.

This usage is notoriously as common as the preceding one, and shows infallibly what was the essential idea associated by the Romans with the subjunctive. Let one example, as a representative of the others, suffice:—

Ne se sanguine nefando soceri generique *resperge-rent.—Livy.*

These two extremes are unquestionably expressed as *conceptions* in the preceding example; but in the succeeding ones they are expressed as *results*, proving that *fact* belongs to the subjunctive as well as to the indicative.

Quod nunquam opinatus fui, id contigit, ut salvi *potiremur* domum.—Plaut., *Am.* i. 1, 32. (A result greatly to be desired.)

Accidit ut una nocte omnes Hermae statuae *dejice-rentur.*—Nep., *Alc.* 3. (A result greatly to be *deplored.*)

Such is the subjunctive as known to the Romans. Its usages at first sight appearing to be most remote from each other, but bound by a real affinity, converge to a common centre. An essential unity, with a logical consistency peculiar to the Latin language, is found to underlie all its usages. Certain anonymous critics may account for the subjunctive being used at one time, because it is "dependent," at another time, because it is "indirect;" at one time, because it is "indefinite," at another time, because it is "potential;" at one time, because "it expresses an *essential part* of the entire statement," at another time, because "it expresses a supposition, not a fact;" and

sometimes, because "the supposition carries with it some intimation that, in the speaker's opinion, it is probable." When these critics append their names to their opinions, they will be believed to be sincere in their opinions; but, then, they will find that neither booksellers nor boys believe them to be sound in their opinions.

FINIS.

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