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A
VINDICATION
OF
STRICTURES
ON THE
ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL;



CONTAINING
A RE-EXAMINATION OF DR. WILLIAMS'

Hypothesis,

AS REPORTED IN
THE REV. THOMAS HILL'S ANIMADVERSIONS
ON THE
STRICTURES;

WITH
A REPLY TO THOSE ANIMADVERSIONS.

—*—
BY WILLIAM PARRY.
—*—

Abyffus est, (i. e. Origo Mali) credite JUVENES, abyffus est, nullâ humani ingenii bolide exploranda. Quapropter ab hoc scrutinio (si quid me auditis) mentes vestras ad pietatis studia, et tremendæ Majestatis Divinæ reverentiam protinus convertite.

ARCHIEP. LEIGHTON.

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Hypothesis of the Rev. Dr. Williams is investigated.
Price 2s. 6d.

ERRATUM.

Page 60, line 10 from the bottom, *for* " peaceable " *read* peccable.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE design of the following Tract is not merely to answer Mr. T. Hill's "Animadversions," but to evince the FALLACY of those principles on the nature of MORALITY and MORAL OBLIGATION, by which he has attempted to support the *Hypothesis* of Dr. Williams. On this *new* ground, the subject becomes deeply interesting to the friends of TRUTH and HOLINESS.

WYMONDLEY-HOUSE, near *Stevenage*,
November 8, 1808.

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A VINDICATION

A
VINDICATION
OF
STRICTURES
ON THE
ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL, &c.

SECTION I.

Introduction—Importance of the Subject—Rules of Controversy—
Axioms respecting Truth.

THE IMPORTANCE of just ideas concerning the character of God, and the foundation of morals, is acknowledged by all the friends of pure and undefiled religion; and the necessity of guarding, with zealous vigilance, against principles subversive of *either*, will not be denied, by those who have observed the facility with which the human heart inclines to whatever may countenance, or excuse its sinful propensities. If principles *peculiarly liable* to this abuse are advanced, it becomes a duty, with those who view them in this light, to detect the fallacies on which they are founded, and evince, by fair and just reasoning, the pernicious consequences to which they tend. If such opinions are maintained, though with the *best* intentions, by any who have justly acquired esteem for their religious character, it becomes the more important, to bear a firm, clear, and convincing testimony against them. The love of truth and holiness ought to be superior to every other consideration.

B

Under

Under the influence of such motives, the " *Strictures on the Origin of Moral Evil*," in which the hypothesis of the Rev. Dr. WILLIAMS on that subject was examined, were submitted to the public eye. The fullest credit was given in them to the *purity* of motive in which the hypothesis originated, and a solicitude was expressed, to manifest great personal respect for its author, while its *nature* and *tendency* were brought to the test of a free and impartial examination. That personal respect was not feigned but *sincere*, and owed its rise to conversations held with Dr. Williams *thirty-four* years ago, which then impressed a high idea of his religious character, though it has not occurred in providence, that we have met since that period.

When the doctor published his hypothesis, in the notes annexed to his sermon on predestination, he *invited* those who might disapprove of his views to state their objections, and promised that due notice should be taken of them*. After such an intimation it might reasonably be expected, that he would consider himself bound in honour and justice, to meet the discussion, and to answer the arguments of his opponents in a fair and *explicit* manner. The novel form of replying by deputation has, however, been chosen, though the reason assigned for it, " ill health and other " engagements," cannot be deemed satisfactory. The PUBLIC is never in *haste*, and those who feel an interest in the subject, would have waited without murmuring, until Dr. Williams' returning health, of which every good man would rejoice to hear, might enable him to enter into the discussion which he had challenged.

It was undoubtedly a matter perfectly free for any person to notice the " *Strictures*," whether connected with

* " If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them." *Strictures* p. 9, or Notes to the Sermon on Predestination, p. 43.

Dr. W. or not; and accordingly "Animadversions" on them have appeared by the Rev. THOMAS HILL. Professions of personal respect for the author of the "Strictures" are made near the beginning of his performance; but as Mr. Hill is a gentleman who has but lately entered upon the stage of public life, and whom I have never seen, I am unable to make any other return, than that of acknowledging my obligations for the complimentary style of his second page. I shall ever be ready to pay all due respect to talent and character, where time has developed the one, and established the other. Considering Mr. H. however, though a stranger, as a respectable young minister, who would probably write with that amiable ingenuousness and piety, which are the brightest ornaments of early life in the ministerial character, I was disposed to receive his "Animadversions" without prejudice, and desirous to regard them with impartiality. From the important *professional* situation in which he is placed, it was reasonable to expect, if he entered into the controversy, that he would conduct it with the politeness of a gentleman, the liberality of a scholar, and the devotional spirit of a Christian. If with these dispositions he had *met* the *arguments* in the Strictures, had encountered them *fully*, and had endeavoured, by a just chain of *luminous reasoning*, to prove, that they were founded upon *false* principles, or that the conclusions were illogically deduced, and did not follow from the premises, his performance would have claimed my esteem, whatever degree of success might have attended such an attempt. If it had been *complete*, and he had *refuted* the "Strictures" by proving the truth of Dr. W's views *from reason*, and especially *from Scripture*, I should have been ready to congratulate his success.* With TRUTH *alone* for my object, I should have embraced the hypothesis, if I could have seen it supported by *solid arguments*, and *proved* to be conducive to the honour of the

DIVINE

DIVINE CHARACTER, and the best interests of mankind. Instead of producing *this* effect, Mr. H's performance has strengthened my deep conviction, that the hypothesis he wishes to support, is highly injurious to *both*. The same motives therefore, which produced the "Strictures," induce me now to notice a pamphlet, which, on account of a departure from the rules of *fair* and *honourable* debate, would otherwise have been passed by in silence and compassion for an author, whose period of life may *extenuate* indiscretion, though it cannot obliterate this memorial of it. A love of *controversy*, is not the vice of age. Far *other* feelings and views are suited to the period when men "descend into the vale of years;" and this tract would not now have appeared, did not Mr. H's production present a fresh opportunity of further evincing the **FALLACY**, and *dangerous tendency*, of an hypothesis, which is as contrary to *reason* and *Scripture*, as it is *discordant* from the usual views and sentiments of able and respectable divines.

On every subject, its real *importance* is an object of *primary* consideration, CUI BONO, and as Mr. H. has strongly asserted, the *practical importance* of discovering the *origin of moral evil*, *this topic* may be dispatched here. His assertions are, that "a consistent view" of it "would become a most powerful auxiliary to the comfort and holiness of the church of God*:" that "a satisfactory solution of the question, *Whence cometh moral evil*, must be regarded as highly conducive to the *comfort* of inquiring minds, and greatly advantageous to the cause of *practical religion*."† To bring the truth and justice of these *positions* to an *infallible test*, it must be recollected, that the **SACRED SCRIPTURES** are the perfect, and *only infallible* rule of faith, comfort, and holiness to the church of Christ. If, as Mr.

* Animadversions, p. 1. The numbers at the foot of the page without a prefix, will refer to Mr. H's Animadversions.

† P. 12.

H. affirms,

H. affirms, a knowledge of the true origin of moral evil be an object of *great* importance to the edification of Christians, and the *cause* of *practical* religion, such knowledge would have been communicated to us in the Scriptures; but, as no *distinct*, or *satisfactory* explanation, of the manner in which moral evil *originated*, is conveyed by the sacred volume, it follows, that such explanation is *not* requisite for the purposes *asserted* by Mr. H. The *just* and *inevitable* consequences, therefore, on this branch of the subject are, either, that a “solution of the question *Whence cometh moral evil*,” is not of “importance to the cause of *practical* religion,” or, that the Holy Scriptures are *not* a perfect rule of faith, “comfort, and holiness to the church of God.” On which *alternative* of this dilemma does Mr. H. chuse to lean? That the hypothesis he wishes to defend, is not to be supported by the Scriptures, is evident, from his not appealing to *them* in its vindication. If evidence in its *favour* could have been found in *Revelation*, he would undoubtedly have adduced it; and it must strike an attentive reader, as a most extraordinary circumstance, that a *christian divine* should write a treatise upon a subject which he declares to be of *great* importance to the cause of *practical* religion, without referring to *one* passage of Scripture, in support of his theory, from the beginning to the end of his performance.

To collect, however, in one point of view, what relates to the same object, it is proper here to advert to the chief *pleas* brought by Mr. H. for the importance of Dr. W's *supposed* discovery. These are, that it assists to “justify “the ways of God to man*,” and establishes the necessity “of divine influence in the recovery and sanctification of “our nature†.” If it had been the design of that great and righteous Being, who “giveth none account of his “matters,” to vindicate to his creatures, in the *present*

* P. 13.

† P. 68.

state of their existence, the wisdom and justice of his conduct, in the admission of moral evil, he would have done this in the revelation which he has given them. He did not need for this purpose the invention or assistance of mortals, nor will their *feeble* aid ever be found adequate to the explanation of those things, in the system of his moral government, which, for the present, he has in wisdom and mercy judged proper to conceal. The sentiment with which Elihu terminates the debate on "the ways of God," in the book of Job, is more just, reverential, and becoming than that of Mr. Hill. "Touching the ALMIGHTY we cannot find him out: he is excellent in power, and in judgment, and in plenty of justice*." "Secret things belong to God, but revealed to us and our children †;" and among things revealed, Mr. H. has shewn, by the omission of scriptural evidence, that the origin of moral evil is *not* to be found.

The sublime poet, whose words he adopted in the above *plea*, was too learned, wise, and pious, to attempt to explain the true *origin* of evil, in order to "justify the ways of God to man." On the contrary, MILTON has severely satirized those metaphysical divines, who attempt to carry their researches on subjects of this nature, beyond the discoveries of Revelation, by giving them to the *fallen angels*, to "charm awhile their sense of anguish," by the discussion.

Others apart sat on a HILL retired,
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high,
Of Providence, foreknowledge, *will* and fate,
Fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end in wandering mazes lost.
Of GOOD and EVIL much they argued then,
Of happiness and final misery,
Passion and apathy, and glory and shame:
Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy.

PARADISE LOST, B. II. l. 558.

* Job xxxvii. 23.

† Deut. xxix. 29.

The

The doctrine of divine influence, in the recovery and sanctification of our nature, which is Mr. H's second plea, shines with luminous evidence in the Sacred Scriptures. The promises respecting it are an invaluable source of encouragement and consolation to sincere Christians, under a sense of their weakness and imperfections, and the numerous temptations and difficulties to which they are exposed. But this important doctrine is much *better* supported by the clear, *direct*, and *positive* evidence of *Revelation*, than by any *inferential* statements arising from *metaphysical* principles. A person must be very defective in just reverence for the authority of GOD, and strangely in love with abstract and dubious principles, who can think, that upon *any* point of *pure revelation*, better evidence can be obtained *elsewhere*, than arises from the *infallible testimony* of God in his word*. With a *humble* and *consistent* believer in Revelation, "THUS SAITH THE LORD," must ever have unspeakably more weight, than *thus saith* any merely human writer, however learned, sage, or venerable. The plea, that a discovery of the *origin of moral evil* is important, to support the doctrine of divine influence, is therefore utterly nugatory and futile: it is already better established upon firmer ground. To call in the aid of Dr. W's hypothesis in its defence, resembles the attempt of a person, who would erect a buttress to support a rock, which has stood firmly on its basis from the creation.

But though the above considerations prove, that the knowledge of the *origin* of moral evil is *not* of practical importance, and would not be *beneficial* to the interests of

* The opinion here censured, though it be not likely to prevail, has of late been discovered on other subjects than that of the present controversy. Witness a very weak and impertinent review of Mr. Winter's Sermon on future punishments, in the Theological Magazine for March 1807. Its anonymous author proceeded on the *false* and *absurd* position above stated.

true religion, there is another view, in which a great and high degree of practical importance attaches to the present discussion. It is of the greatest moment to resist such representations, as involve principles or consequences derogatory to the Divine honour, and which might be eagerly seized by men of libertine dispositions, and urged by them in extenuation of their vicious practices, in a manner which the authors of such statements could not refute, and are very far from intending, or approving. In *this* light, the opponents of Dr. W. with all their just *esteem* and *respect* for him, view his hypothesis, on the *present* subject, the RE-EXAMINATION of which, as stated in Mr. H's "Animadversions," will therefore occupy the following pages.

Mr. H. has introduced them with "preliminary observations" containing rules of conduct in discussing the subject. "Axioms" to shew the importance of truth, and "Definitions of the principal terms in the controversy." On the two *former* it will be necessary to remark but briefly, while the *chief* attention shall be directed to the *latter*, as intended to convey a view of the whole hypothesis. The *first* rule of conduct, "a strict attention to the subject," was not necessary, for what subject can be properly investigated, without *strict attention*? The *second* rule, "accuracy in the use of terms" is just, and it will be seen in the discussion, how closely Mr. H. has adhered to it. Under this rule it is asserted, that "the arts and sciences have all their peculiar *assemblage* of language." The "*assemblage* of language," is an expression not remarkable for its *accuracy*. The use of technical terms is to *abridge* language, and when they do not answer *this* end, they are unphilosophical, and, at least, useless. Mr. H. under this particular affirms, that "a misapprehension, or gratuitous definition of the phrase PASSIVE POWER," used by Dr. W. "has proved a *fatal stumbling* block to his
"opponents,

“opponents, and rendered their conclusions *invalid**.” The phrase was not misunderstood, nor gratuitously defined by *them*. It is because they *do* understand his hypothesis, that they firmly oppose it, as founded upon a *radical mistake*, involving *false principles* in the “*science of morals*,” and fraught with dangerous consequences. *Proof* of these assertions shall be adduced in their due place. Whether “*PASSIVE POWER*” has proved a fatal stumbling-block to *them*, Mr. H. should have left the public to *determine*, or have produced his commission as their censor. It probably is not unknown to *him*, that the arguments of the doctor’s opponents have convinced some learned and respectable ministers, of the falsehood of his hypothesis, and that with a candour which reflects honour on their liberality and justice, they have *avowed* their convictions. In the above sentence, therefore, will not Mr. H. be thought to have imitated the policy of certain generals, who have been loud in proclaiming a *victory*, in the same proportion as they suffered a *defeat*?

Mr. H. thinks, “that on any subject, and especially “on subjects of moral science, it is difficult, if not impossible, to select, or even to *invent* by language, the exact “*images* of ideas.” Language does not select, nor *invent* the *images* of ideas, it *expresses* them. The terms employed on moral subjects, as they are chiefly borrowed from material objects, must necessarily be, in part, figurative. It is the more requisite, therefore, to use them in the *same sense* as other writers have done, and to avoid every needless departure from their common and established acceptance. The English language has such copiousness and precision, that those who have a proper *acquaintance* with it, if they possess *clear* ideas, need be at no loss to express them, with *perspicuity* and *accuracy*. Mr. H. is mistaken, in supposing his position is supported by his quotation from LUCRE-

* P. 4.

TIUS. That poet, who was the first that introduced the Grecian philosophy into Italy, and died about the 181st Olympiad, did not mean to assert, of language in general, that it was inadequate to express ideas, but that when he wrote, which was before the Latin tongue had been improved, by the genius of Cicero and others, it was *less copious* than the Greek, and that hence arose the difficulty of inventing new terms, to express the peculiar distinctions of the Greek philosophers. The "*egestas linguæ*," does not refer to language in *general*, but to the *poverty* of the Latin tongue at that period. This idea Mr. Good has retained in his translation of the passage.

More "rules of conduct" respecting the controversy, have not been mentioned by Mr. H. than the two which have been noticed. There are, nevertheless, some others, which *ought* to be regarded amongst Christians, especially, that charity which *vaunteth not itself*, doth not behave itself *unseemly*, is not easily *provoked*, and *thinketh no evil*. It will be proper to *preserve the exercise of it*, while it is applied, as a standard, by which, in some instances, to ascertain the justice and decorum of his "Animadversions."

On Mr. H's "Axioms" concerning truth, it is not necessary to dwell. What is *just* in them was well known before he proposed them. Some of them are inaccurately expressed. He tells us, "Truth is *immutably* consistent." Is there any thing *mutably consistent*? But, passing the implication, the general sentiment intended to be conveyed is just; truth, respecting many of its objects, is *eternal, immutable, consistent, and important*. The propriety of introducing and dilating on this sentiment in the animadversions is not however apparent, because, it is as tenaciously held by Dr. W's *opponents*, as it can be by *his advocates*. Mr. H. is *obscure*, when he says, "Truth must be resolved into the nature of God," and that the independence of truth consists in its "standing in
" its

“ its own nature, the nature of God, unconnected with foreign support.” Not more lucid or correct is the sentence, “ hence *demonstration* is not to be overturned by *erroneous* interpretations of Scripture.” Can DEMONSTRATION be overturned by interpretations of any kind? If *nominal demonstrations* have been overturned, by being compared with the *standard of moral and religious truth*, the *Scriptures*, it is because the professed demonstrations were *false*, and the interpretations *true*. Whether this has been the case with Dr. W’s professed “ demonstration” on the subject of moral evil, those who attentively survey *both sides* in this controversy, will be best qualified to judge. In the following section, it is proposed to shew, in the *plainest* manner, by calm disquisition, that this *nominal demonstration*, consists only of *positions* without *proof*, of controverted and refuted principles, which are adduced anew as “ DATA” to ascertain the justice of the arguments which refuted them.

SECTION II.

Definitions examined—Equity—Sovereignty—Tendency—Necessity—
Passive Power.

DEFINITIONS, when properly used, in philosophical or moral treatises, are designed either to abridge labour by avoiding circumlocution, or by their plainness, to prevent ambiguity, obscurity, and misapprehension. They cannot, with propriety, be employed as the vehicle to convey science, or establish propositions, unsupported by inductive reasoning, much less should they be assumed as *axioms*, or *postulata*, when the positions they affirm have been disputed, by the party whose arguments are to be opposed. Yet, this is the use Mr. H. has attempted to make of his “ Definitions ;” and by this application

cation of them, he has rendered his argument, so far as it has a claim to that name, completely *circular*. He lays down in his definitions the *very principles* for the refutation of which the "Strictures" were written; and to encounter the "Strictures," he *appeals* to his *definitions* as established "*data*" and medium of proof, to repel the *arguments* which had been urged *against them*. To support the *hypothesis*, he assumes as *true* the *radical principles* of the *hypothesis*; and to resist the *arguments* against the *disputed positions*, he assumes the *positions disputed*. This is both arguing in a circle, and taking for granted the things to be proved. The stress, however, of the present vindication will not be laid on the *illogical* construction of Mr. H's performance, though the fact will be established in the course of it, but the *subject shall be fully met*, and the "Definitions" as distinctly *examined*, as if the principles they contain had received no previous refutation.

The propriety of the proposed discussion is evinced, by the *great* dependence Mr. H. places on his definitions, in reference to which he says: "On the strength of these "*data* the *whole* argument is rested; and it behoves the "opponent to shew, either that they are falsely assumed, "or that they are too weak to support the conclusions*." On *this ground* issue is joined; and by an attentive examination of the definitions which Mr. H. as the reporter of Dr. W's sentiments, has given, it is proposed to demonstrate, that, those of them which are the *foundation* of the hypothesis, and on which the whole argument is rested, are *false* and insufficient to support the conclusions, which both these gentlemen draw from them.

I. "EQUITY is that perfection of the divine nature "which gives to every one his due; and mere equity allows "neither more nor less than his due†." That equity gives to all their due is the ground on which the argument stands

* P. 14.

† P. 7.

in the " *Strictures*," p. 57, to prove, that to deal with creatures, in their original and probationary state, in the manner to which Dr. W. applies this term, would not be *equity*, but great *injustice*. The phrase, "*mere equity*, which allows *neither more nor less* than is due," is inaccurate and unnecessary. To give *more* is *generosity*; to give *less* would be *injustice*. It must be observed, Mr. H. allows under this definition, that " every moral agent claims by the principles of equity the grounds of moral accountability." On this just position, the argument in the " *Strictures*" is founded to prove, that, according to the *hypothesis*, intelligent beings were created in circumstances, which would destroy their accountability. P. 61.

II. " SOVEREIGNTY is the authority of God over his creatures, to do whatever is not *inconsistent* with equity." The latter part of this definition is vague and incorrect. The divine authority is supreme and indisputable, but many things are supposable, which, though not contrary to equity, would be inconsistent with *wisdom*. Is the divine sovereignty a right to act unwisely? Mr. H's language, taken from Dr. W. is rather a definition of *justice*, than of sovereignty. Or it may be considered, as a definition of *innocent caprice*, or *arbitrariness*; but it very inadequately expresses the sovereignty of the infinitely supreme, wise, righteous, and holy Governor of the universe, who is " wise in council and excellent in working." The blessed God, undoubtedly, acts in a *sovereign* manner; but this is not the exercise of arbitrariness, which would be an *imperfection*, but the sovereignty of infinite wisdom, infinite rectitude, and infinite goodness, displayed in many instances, on a scale too vast and sublime, to be estimated, in the present state, by his creatures. From the *perfection* of his nature, it may, nevertheless, be inferred, *a priori*, that, if it were possible for us to have a comprehensive view of all his conduct towards the intelligent creation, and the motives

motives by which it is guided, we should see, that the exercise of his sovereignty, in every instance of it, is conformable to the infinite righteousness, wisdom, purity, and goodness of his nature. Its displays are not confined to intelligent existence, or the dispensations of his grace to men. They extend to many circumstances in nature, as well as providence, and in no instance are they more palpable, than in the impenetrable clouds which envelope the reasons of his conduct, in the permission of moral evil, lest vain mortals should presume to "break through to gaze" on the secrets of his throne. The next definition relates to the point, on which the *whole* controversy turns.

III "TENDENCY *implies* in general the idea of *causation*." A definition should state not what a thing *implies*, but what it is. Did Mr. H. feel it would shock some of his readers to say at once, "*tendency is causation*." The next sentence states this to be his meaning: "But in order to understand its precise import, the different species of *tendency* or *causation* must be considered*." Here *tendency* and *causation* are used as *synonymous*. Passing by the unauthorized use of a term, which is the same, in common acceptance, as bias or inclination, the word shall here be taken in Dr. W's sense, to mean *causation*. His adoption of it in *this* sense, has been well understood by his opponents, and upon this sense of the term stands the arguments in the "Strictures," to prove that a tendency to moral defection could not be of the kind which Dr. W. supposed, and could not *essentially* belong to the nature of holy creatures, at the moment they come out of the hands of their great and good Creator. P. 16 to 26. Under the present definition Mr. H. explains. "*Tendency to evil* in Dr. W's acceptance, is the *negative* or *metaphysical cause of evil*, and *excludes every idea of what is*

* P. 7.

" *physical*

“ *physical and positive.*” He afterwards asserts that “ it is
 “ the *opposite* of *physical* and *active*, is neither *moral* nor im-
 “ *moral* * :” that “ nothing according to its definition can
 “ be less *corrupt*, nothing more *simple*, nothing more *inno-*
 “ *cent* †. Mr. H. as the interpreter of Dr. W. affirms, it
 “ has been uniformly, and is most *strenuously maintained*,
 “ that the tendency to moral evil neither is, nor can be a
 “ *physical*, but merely a *metaphysical*, a *negative*, *privative*,
 “ or *deficient principle* ‡.” These quotations shew that
 “ the defectiveness of nature,” which Mr. H. affirms to
 be the *metaphysical cause of evil*, is in his opinion neither
physical nor *moral*, and this he allows to be the *point* on
 which the *whole controversy* turns §. If, therefore, it can
 be proved, that this supposed metaphysical cause, neither
moral nor *immoral*, but *opposed to both*, neither *does*, nor *can*
possibly exist, then the whole hypothesis, according to Mr.
 H’s concession, must fall; and here may it not be asked,
 What can Mr. H. and Dr. W. mean by speaking of a
metaphysical cause or tendency which is neither *physical* nor
moral, but opposed to both? What *possible* idea can remain
 under the *term*, when it is put in contrast to every thing
physical, and every thing *moral*? Can there be any possible
 object of metaphysical inquiry, in *created* existence, whe-
 ther *defective* or *effective*, but what relates to *existent* beings,
 either in a *physical*, or in a *moral* view? On the *supposed*
existence of this *metaphysical* cause, which is neither *phy-*
sical nor *moral*, and has no *physical* or *moral character*
 belonging to it, Mr. H. places his *chief* reliance in op-
 posing the arguments in the “ *Strictures*,” against an
essential tendency to evil; but it may very *easily*, and *shall*
now be very *clearly proved*, that the supposition is ALTOGE-
 THER A MISTAKE, which has misled both his mind, and
 that of Dr. Williams. For this purpose it will be proper
 to enter into a more *distinct* and *plain statement* of causes in

* P. 23.

† P. 29.

‡ P. 20.

§ P. 19.

general,

general, so far as the consideration of them is concerned in the present subject.

I. The proposition *affirmed*, and to be *proved*, is, that separate from the *immediate influence*, or operation of *Deity*, all *possible* causes respecting his creatures, may *justly* be arranged, and *must necessarily be included*, under the terms *physical* and *moral*. In contemplating the nature and properties of *existent beings*, they may be called *metaphysical*, as all the objects of that science, excepting the nature and perfections of the Deity, are creatures which *do exist*, either as to their essential nature, or their properties, relations, or actions. But, causes cannot *justly* be called *metaphysical*, in *opposition* to every idea of what is *physical* or *moral*, because this would imply the contradiction, that there are some things belonging to created beings, which do not belong to them, *either* as creatures *physically existing*, or as *moral agents* possessing moral *habitudes* and *ideas*. The application of the term *metaphysical*, to something which is asserted to be, in *no sense*, either *physical* or *moral*, only shews that the term *itself* is *not understood* by the person who thus applies it. To make this matter yet plainer.

ARISTOTLE, when he had written his treatise on *physics*, wrote another treatise, on things omitted in the former. Hence arose the term *metaphysics* (*μετα τα Φυσικα*) which has been since applied to the *science of being in general*, and is sometimes restricted to the science of immaterial beings. But there can be no *possible* object of metaphysical disquisition, or *contemplation*, but what is either created or uncreated, God or his creatures, matter or spirit, body or mind, or some of their actions, properties, or relations. Whether, therefore, respecting *created existence*, *causes* or *tendencies* are called *positive* or *privative*, *active* or *passive*, *efficient* or *deficient*, they must still be the tendencies, either of matter or spirit, of body or mind, or of both united. It follows, therefore, that they must be,
either

either *physical* or *moral*; either they must belong to the *essential nature* of the creature, and then they are *physical*; or they must belong to his dispositions or habitudes, as a subject of moral government, and then they are of a *moral* kind. Every *metaphysical cause*, must therefore class under one of these two descriptions, because the terms include the whole range of created existence; and to talk of a metaphysical cause *essential* to *all created existence*, which appertains to *neither* of these classes, but is opposed to them *both*, is to use the words without the *possibility* of having *any* idea attached to them. For if the cause or tendency be said to be merely *negative* or *privative*, still it is a negation or privation, to which the creature of whom it is predicated, must be supposed subject, *either* as an *existing being*, or as a *moral agent*. In the former case it would be a privation of a *physical*, and in the latter of a *moral* kind. The former would be a *privation* with respect to *physical existence*, the latter would be a privation of the *MORAL PRINCIPLE*. Subjection to the *former* by no means therefore implies the existence of the *latter*; and if the *latter* be said to arise from a cause or tendency of the *former description*, or from what *essentially* belongs to the *nature* of a creature, then *moral effects* are attributed to *physical causes*. This was the *radical error* charged upon Dr. W's hypothesis, in the "Strictures." If therefore that gentleman will reconsider the subject, and the reasons *now* assigned, his candour perhaps will admit, that the error here pointed out, lies at the foundation of his hypothesis. If he does not admit this, he ought explicitly to shew where is the *mistake* in what has been above mentioned, which he is here publicly called upon to do, if he thinks the attempt practicable.

The above *plain statement*, in my view, overturns the whole hypothesis, and Mr. H's attempt to defend it, because it is *all* founded upon, and attempted to be upheld,

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by the *mistaken supposition* of a *metaphysical* cause, which is neither *moral* nor *physical*, but expressly declared to be *opposed to both*. This statement also proves that the distinction in the " *Strictures*," between *moral* and *physical* causes is just; that *this* distinction has been *confounded* by Dr. W.; and that to *abandon* it, and "*strenuously* to maintain" as Mr. H. does, that there exists a *metaphysical* cause, which has neither a *physical* nor *moral character*, is to lose sight of a most obvious principle, not only of sound philosophy, but even of common sense. The above statement likewise establishes the position, that if, as Dr. W. supposes, a tendency to defection in a moral view, be coexistent with created and dependent existence, it is not a *metaphysical*, but a *physical* tendency, as attaching to the *nature* of all creatures. Even Dr. W's own language shews, that *he* considered it to be so, for he says it is a "*natural evil* *," which is but another term for a *physical* evil. The terms *natural* and *physical*, in such connection are perfectly synonymous. The only difference between them is, that the one is derived from the Latin, and the other from the Greek language, but the idea is precisely the same, and means what *essentially* belongs to *creatures*, and whatever does *essentially* belong to their *nature*, must be *natural*, or *physical*. May it not *now* therefore be considered as established, that an *essential* tendency, whether negative or positive, so far from being opposed to *every thing physical*, is, and *can be* nothing else than a PHYSICAL TENDENCY? Mr. H's distinction of a metaphysical tendency, which is "*opposed to every idea of what is physical*," is therefore proved to be *unfounded*, and *all* that he has built upon it, of course falls. Whether created and *dependent* existence necessarily implies an *essential* tendency of any kind to *moral evil*, will be considered under the definition of "*Passive Power*," which is but another term in the hypothesis, for the supposed *tendency* to, or *causation* of sin.

* Sermon on Predestination, p. 42.

In the above quotations, the intelligent reader has doubtless remarked the striking contrast respecting the nature of this "*tendency*," between the language of Dr. W. and that of his *advocate*. Dr. W. says it is a "*natural evil*." Mr. H. "*strenuously maintains*" it is not "*physical*," but "*opposite to every thing*" of that kind. The adjustment of this *difference in opinion* between persons so nearly connected on the very *turning point* of the controversy, must be left to the parties themselves. But which ever way this difference may be settled *between them*, the *decision* will be *equally fatal* to the hypothesis. If Mr. H's assertion be admitted, that the cause of sin is not *moral* nor *physical*, Dr. W. must have been *mistaken* in the ground of his own hypothesis, when he stated the "*tendency*" which is the causation of sin, to be "*a natural evil*;" and if this statement of Dr. W's be *correct*, Mr. H's "*metaphysical cause*," opposed to *every thing physical*, is *gone for ever*, unless he will have the goodness, when he writes again, to *explain* to his readers, how a cause, which is "*the opposite of every thing physical*," is, at the same time, "*natural*."

2. As the argument urged above proves, that the radical supposition of a metaphysical cause contrasted to every thing of a *physical and moral character*, is absolutely *absurd*, and that, if such *essential tendency to evil* did at all exist, it must be *physical*, so the *consequences* of its supposed existence, as stated in the hypothesis, by *whatever name* it may be called, prove the hypothesis both *false* and dangerous. This "*tendency*" is said to be the *privative cause* of "*evil both natural and moral*. An *unity of cause* is assigned to *both**, and admitted by Mr. H.†; and the consequence of stating such a tendency as *this* definition asserts, to be the *cause* of sin, is, that it *virtually denies* the *existence* of *moral evil*, and will make it only the *natural effect* of a cause, which has been now proved to be *physical*, and

* P. 9.

† P. 25.

which

which Dr. W. himself calls a "*natural evil*." *Identity* and *uniformity* of *cause*, must ever produce an *identity* and *uniformity* of *effect*. If the cause be physical, the effect is physical; if the cause be moral, the effect is moral; if the cause be called "*metaphysical*," the effect ought only to be called *metaphysical*; and if the cause be "*innocent*," as asserted by Mr. H. the effect must also be "*innocent*." If, therefore, this essential *defectibility* of created nature, called "*tendency*," or "*passive power*," be the "*privative*" cause of sin (whether physical or metaphysical) then it follows, that *all sin*, however *heinous*, is nothing more than a mere "*privation*," a *negative* effect, from a *negative* cause, which is asserted to attach by "*absolute necessity*," to all-created existence: for the effect can in *no* case *exceed* the *cause*; nor can the *production* ever possess a nature or properties *specifically different* from the *producing principle*. And if, as Mr. H. "*strenuously maintains*," the tendency be neither "*moral nor immoral*;" or if, as Dr. W. affirms, it be a "*natural evil*," then sin can only be a *natural evil* also. It may be a *calamity*, but upon *this hypothesis*, it cannot be a *crime*. This will be further proved hereafter. That sin is a *mere privation*, Dr. W. would indeed allow*; and the sentiment agrees with some old statements of the schoolmen and Aristotelians; but the practical consequences which arise from such a view awfully evince its dangerous moral tendency.

The above general reasoning from the nature and identity of the *cause*, to the nature and *identity* of the *effect*, will probably be allowed correct. There must, therefore, be a deep and *radical defect* in a scheme, which, when fairly and impartially examined, leads, by just inferential argument, to the *horrible* conclusion, that sin has no moral *turpitude* or *pravity* in it: a conclusion not to be refuted by those who assert it to be the certain effect of an inherent

* Notes on Doddridge, Vol. V. p. 163.

cause which has no *moral quality* or *character*; for the effect cannot possess a character or quality, *essentially* and *specifically* different from the cause which produced it. It is evident, therefore, that the *radical defect* of the hypothesis lies, as stated in the "Strictures," and re-established above, in *identifying "moral and physical causes."* An essential principle of defectability in a physical view, does not imply the existence of an *essential* principle of *defectability* with respect to *moral conduct*, because, there is not a common relation or analogy between things so specifically different, as *physical* existence, and actions of a *moral kind*, which depend on the dispositions and volitions of moral and accountable agents, who in their original and *probationary* state, must have been endowed with an *adequate moral principle*. An *essential privative* tendency might expose to *annihilation*, but a "privative tendency," that would be the cause of *sin*, must be a *privation* or *depravation* of the *moral principle*, a thing totally distinct, and which, though in various *unknown* ways it might arise, and did really take place in intelligent agents, could not have been the original and *essential constitution* of their nature, without destroying their *accountability*. This will be further evinced under Mr. H's subsequent definitions. The source of the confusion in the hypothesis, and of all the absurd, and most of the dangerous consequences with which it is justly chargeable, lies, therefore, in *identifying physical and moral causes*, and representing the "*same*" species of tendency to be the cause of effects so diametrically opposite as annihilation and sin, non-existence, and wicked conduct. From the arguments alleged under this definition, the reader may now judge, whether the supposed "causation" of sin, which is the *chief* of the "*data*" on which Mr. H. rests the "whole argument," be not "*falsely assumed*," and "insufficient to support the conclusions" drawn from it

it by Dr. W. It may further assist to form a just view of his hypothesis, to consider

3. The *real origin* of this opinion, that sin is the effect of a "privative" cause, essentially attaching to created existence. Another of Dr. W's advocates, with that attachment which a pupil might naturally feel towards a pious and worthy tutor, has, in a manner more zealous than discreet, represented the hypothesis as a discovery for which "the esteem and gratitude of all the lovers of truth" are due to Dr. Williams.* The excellence of *his* motives in its publication is fully admitted; but the merit of its being a *discovery* must be disputed. The principle is as old as the Persian philosophy, from which the chief errors and absurdities of the Manicheans were borrowed. There is a passage in Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, which clearly proves, that the principle of defection or privation, was anciently supposed to be the *cause of evil*. He assigns it as his opinion, that the supposed existence of such a principle, gave rise to the Persian doctrine, of a *good* and *evil* genius, and, according to Plutarch's account, the authors of *that* system appear to have argued in a manner similar to that which Dr. W. has pursued, to assign a *cause for the origin* of evil. Here is the proof of these assertions. "For if nothing can come into being *without* " *cause*; and if that which is perfectly good cannot be the " *cause of evil*, then must there needs be a *distinct principle* " *in nature*, as well for the *production of evil*, as of that " *which is good* *." After stating that Zoroaster, long before the Trojan war, compared the good principle to *light*, and the evil to *darkness*; and, after giving the different appellations applied to these two principles, by the

* εἰ γὰρ ἐθὲν ἀναίτιος πέφυκε γένεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τὰγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν παράχοι, δεῖ γένεσθαι ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.

Plutarchi Opera, Tom. II. p. 369. Fol. ed. 1624.

Magi,

Magi, Chaldeans, Pythagoreans, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, Plutarch adds, " Aristotle describes them by the " names of FORM and PRIVATION*." The true origin of a " privative" hypothesis is not, therefore, the Sacred Scriptures, the unerring and perfect rule of religious truth, but the heathen philosophy. Dr. W. seeks a *cause* for the existence of evil, so did Aristotle, and both place it in *privation*. The ancient notion seems to have arisen in the same manner as the modern hypothesis, by seeking *in nature* some metaphysical cause of evil, distinct from the will of a voluntary agent. It may now be judged, whether the question in the " Strictures" was not well-founded. Wherein does Dr. W's hypothesis " differ in " *effect* from the old Manichean doctrine of an *evil principle* essentially existing?"

IV. After distinguishing NECESSITY into *absolute* and *hypothetical*, Mr. H. as the reporter of Dr. W's sentiments, says, that when the term " is applied by Dr. W. to the " subject of moral evil, it is designed to express the *infallible connection between the creatures being left to his NEGATIVE TENDENCIES, and the existence of sin* †." According to this definition, therefore, when, as Dr. W. asserts, creatures were in " EQUITY" left to their " negative " tendencies," the " connection" between their circumstances and the " existence of sin, became *necessary* and " *infallible*," consequently they could not be accountable for it. The consequence now asserted from the " definition," is thus established. If in the first commission of transgression, it did not arise from circumstances over which the volitions of the intelligent creature *had*, or *could have any control*, but from his being left, by an act of sovereignty, to his " negative tendencies," (which Mr. H. asserts to be the

* *Αριστοτέλης δὲ, τὸ μὲν Εἶδος, τὸ δὲ Στερήσειν.*

Plutarchi Opera, Tom. II, p. 370. Fol. ed. 1624.

† P. 9.

cause of moral evil, and *infallibly* connected with it) then he could be, in no proper or just sense *accountable* for the effect. The position is clearly supported by the following reasons: the "privative tendency," according to the hypothesis, flows neither from his *own will*, nor from the *will* of his *Creator*, but is said to "attach by absolute necessity," and the act of sovereignty which *leaves* him to it, is not his *own act*, but an effect (on this scheme) of the Divine will, for Mr. H. will not, and cannot deny, that Divine *volition* is concerned in the exercise of Divine *sovereignty*. If, therefore, under *these* circumstances, sin, as the definition *asserts*, became "*infallible*," where could be the *criminality* or *accountability* of the agent? As to any *moral* purpose, he might as well have been a mere machine. Volition in this case was, and could be, of no avail; for whatever might be the state of volition, or however inclined, if the creature were left to his *negative tendency*, the definition affirms, the connection between him and sin was certain and "*infallible*." Under these circumstances he was *unable* to avoid it. His fall, therefore, was *inevitable* and *unavoidable*. According to the hypothesis, his transgression resulted, *in part*, from a circumstance which did *not depend* on his *own will*, and which his will could *not prevent*, but *principally* from a cause, the lamentable effects of which, it is acknowledged, when he was left to its operation, his *will* could not possibly counteract. He could not, therefore, in reason or justice, be *amenable* for the *effect* which took place. If he acted at all, he was under an *inevitable necessity* of sinning, and his accountability must, therefore, have been entirely superseded, according to this definition. It pronounces the "*necessity*" which *secured* the connection between his circumstances and *sin*, to be both certain and "*infallible*." Thus it appears that the *consequence* above deduced from this definition follows with the strictest force of inferential reasoning;

oning; and its establishment proves the hypothesis from which it so evidently flows, to be *really* an *absurdity*, involving this contradictory proposition, that the Divine Being originally created, and left *accountable* creatures, in circumstances which *destroyed* their *accountability*. This will be further evinced under the definition of *liberty*, where a reference to this of *necessity*, will be again requisite. What has now been advanced proves, that Dr. W's scheme was accurately understood, when it was argued in the "Strictures" that it took away the accountability of rational creatures. Mr. H's next definitions respect,

V. VI. POWER and PASSIVE POWER *. "Power" in the abstract is *force*, influence cause as adapted to *produce* effects." Abstract power then, according to *this* definition, is a *producing* principle. Its nature is consequently *active*. This is just, and agrees with the assertion in the "Strictures," that whenever the term power is properly used, *activity* of some kind is intended. It agrees also with the definition of power given by acute metaphysicians. But when Mr. H. defines *passive power*, he asserts it to be "the want of *ulterior perfection* contrasted with self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency;" it is called also a deficient, a negative principle. Under this definition we shall meet again with the *principal point* of the hypothesis, which occurred before under "tendency," another name for the same supposition, which is here called *Passive Power*. It is now proposed distinctly to consider the phrase, and what is intended to be maintained by it.

1. The phrase, as to its propriety. Mr. H. as a logician, must know, that the rule to form a good definition is, in technical language, to unite the "*proximate genus*" with the *specific difference*." Let his definition be tried by this rule of logic. The proximate genus is "*power*

* P. 9.

“ in the abstract,” or *force, influence, producing cause*. But, in his definition of *passive power*, he drops the *proximate genus*, and introduces what is the *reverse* of every correct idea of *power* or *force*, and substitutes for it, what ought to be arranged under a different and opposite genus, *IMPO- TENCE*, for he says it is “ the want of ulterior perfection,” a “ negation,” a “ privation.” Thus absolute *weakness* is called *power*. Every idea of *power*, properly so called, is relinquished, and something of a different, and even an *opposite* nature, is called by that name, which is not *power*, but only a *want*, a *defect*, or “ no power at all.” Does not this logical *test* prove, that the argument in the “ Strictures” was correct to shew, that the terms “ passive power,” are self-contradictory, and their union *absurd*, as, in that connection, they reciprocally destroy each other, agreeably to the opinion long before given of the *phrase* by Dr. Reid? In that argument Dr. Campbell’s rule was followed, that the best way to detect *absurdity* is to *analyze* it. And what can be more absurd, than to call by the name of *power*, what is confessed by the party who uses it, to be the want of all power, a mere *defect* and *privation*. But to put this matter in plainer language.

If there be any propriety in this favourite phrase, or if it be descriptive of what is intended by it, some idea of *power*, in its genuine and abstract sense, must still be retained under the term, when coupled with the epithet *passive*. We may then, instead of *power*, substitute either of the terms by which Mr. H. has defined *abstract power*. But what clear idea can be formed of a *passive force*, a *passive influence*, a *passive cause*? *Passive force*, must be a *force* that does *nothing*, or has *no force*, or is not *exerted*. *Passive influence*, must be an *inactive* influence, or what has *no influence*: and a *passive cause* must be an *inoperative* cause, which produces *nothing*, or at the most can produce only a *passive effect*. Yet, sin, which is asserted to flow from *this* cause,

cause, is an awfully active, and dreadfully destructive principle. Will Mr. H. pertinaciously adopt this unmeaning phrase, "passive power" in future? If he should, he is welcome to the retention of it, but he must permit me, and others who have examined it, to regard it as *absurd* in itself, and most *inappropriate*, when adopted to express *absolute weakness*. Dismissing the phrase, the idea designed to be expressed by it, must now be distinctly *re-examined*. This is,

2. The defectiveness of created existence, called the "want of ulterior perfection," and asserted, under the present definition, to be "the *metaphysical cause of evil*" "*natural and moral*." Under "*tendency*" it was shewn, that this statement confounds *physical* and *moral* causes; and that if a tendency to sin did originally and essentially attach to the nature of created intelligencies, it could not be *physical*, but must be a *privation* of the *moral principle*. Throwing controverted terms out of the discussion, it is now to be deliberately examined, whether such defectability necessarily belonged to the nature of created agents, as would *infallibly* connect them with sin, if they were left to its influence, without such superadded support and assistance, as Dr. W. thinks, the Creator might in "equity" withhold. The quotations given at large in the "Strictures," as well as Mr. H's assertion under this definition, shew, that Dr. W. apprehends, the affirmation of the inquiry now mentioned, to be implied, in the *necessary dependence* of all creatures on the Divine Being. The infinitely great and ever-blessed God is, undoubtedly, the source and origin of *all* good, of all that is, or ever will be morally good and holy, in his intelligent creatures. They are ever *dependent* upon him, both for their being and well-being, for "of him, and through him, and to him are all things*." In the *present* condition of our nature, the

* Rom. xi. 36.

best of men need the continued and daily support of his grace, to enable them to discharge the duties of the Christian life, and advance in a holy conformity to himself. But the admission of these truths in the extensive sense in which they are taught in the Scriptures, and deeply interesting to the peace, consolation, and religious improvement of the humble and sincere Christian, does *not imply* that there was, in the *original constitution* of our nature, and before the *fall*, such an *essential principle of defectability*, as had an “*infallible connection with sin*,” if the rational being were *left* to it without further communications than had been given him in his creation as a *holy creature*, a subject of God’s moral government, placed in a state of probation. Neither does the denial of *such a supposed tendency to moral evil*, imply any *independence* in the creature. All that he possessed he had *received*; and to *support him*, as a *subject of moral government in a probationary state*, included the *support* of an *adequate moral principle* in his mind, unless, by a subsequent act of the Creator, he had been *deprived* of that holy image of God, in which he was created. In the statements of Dr. W. and Mr. H. *no medium is admitted* between the ideas of *absolute independence*, and a certain and “*infallible*” *tendency to sin*; and they appear to think, that unless *such a tendency* be believed to exist by absolute necessity, the proper *contrast* between a *created* and *derived* nature, and that which is *independent* and *self-existent*, would not be maintained. But the *exclusion* of such a *medium* as is now mentioned, would be the *exclusion* of all *moral agency* in the original state of man, and the contrary sentiment, affirmed in the hypothesis, would make both matter and spirit to be *evil, per se*. *Such a medium* has been generally *admitted*, in the statements of most reputable divines, who have usually represented man, according to the scriptural account, as originally created *holy*, but *mutable*; and without the admission of such a *medium*,

medium, the proper accountable agency of the creature, in his primitive state, could not be affirmed or proved, nor the Divine holiness and righteousness vindicated from the imputation of having originally formed, and placed rational creatures, in circumstances which would, if they were left to them, “*infallibly*” lead them into sin. In supposing, therefore, a principle of moral defeclability to attach, by “*absolute necessity*,” to all created intelligent existence; and in asserting *this* to be the *proper contrast* to self-existence and independence, Dr. W. and Mr. H. have *failed to distinguish* between the *voluntary mutability of an accountable agent* and *independence*, as shall now be further evinced.

Every *intelligent and created agent* must, from the nature of the case, be *mutable*; for all laws, human or divine, which require *obedience*, imply the possibility of *disobedience*. When therefore intelligent creatures were formed *holy*, and in the image of God, as their accountability rendered it necessary that they should have an *adequate moral principle*, or possess sufficient physical and moral power to *obey*, so also it implied, that their obedience must be *voluntary*, and consequently, that there was a possibility of their *disobedience*. But there could be neither *merit* in the one, nor *demerit* in the other, during their probationary state, if *either* were the result of an inevitable and “*infallible*” necessity, arising from the circumstances in which they were placed, and over which their option or choice had no control. The difference between the holiness of God and that of his creatures, in their original state of probation, (to which alone the inquiry concerning the *origin* of evil refers) lies in this, that the *former* is necessary, self-existent, *independent* and *immutable*, the attribute of *uncreated perfection*; the latter is derived, *dependent*, and *mutable*. Though, therefore, in *that* state, they were created *holy*, and upheld in the possession of an *adequate moral principle*, they must, as the subjects of moral government, be still *mutable*.

mutable. The due *improvement* and *exertion* of *that principle*, must depend upon their voluntary choice; and it must have been sufficient, if duly exerted, to have preserved them from falling into sin; so that if they *did* fall, it should, as Ridgley said, not be “by a necessity of nature*,” which plunged them “into inevitable misery,” or through the *inadequacy* of the *derived moral principle* for their preservation, but solely by *voluntary transgression*. Calvin says, that, “in his integrity man had *free will*, “whereby, if he would, he might have attained eternal “life;” that “Adam might have stood if he *would*, “because he fell *not* but by *his own will*†.” The *nature* of the moral principle will be more distinctly considered under the definition of morality; what is now affirmed is its *adequacy*, that it was such as placed the creature’s continuance in his original integrity and purity, (according to the opinion of the writers now mentioned) within the control of his intelligence and volitions, or rendered his obedience or disobedience *optional*, and not the effect of “infallible” necessity, for then the true ground of his accountability would not remain.

The proper contrast, therefore, to independence and self-existence, in a *moral view*, does not lie, in an *inherent* and essential principle of *moral defectibility* in creatures, which the Creator could not prevent, and to which he might in equity leave them, but in the *voluntary mutability* of the creature, though created and supported by *him*, in the possession of an adequate moral principle, adapted to the circumstances in which he was placed, and sufficient, if properly used, to have secured him from transgression.

* See *Strictures*, p. 87.

† In hac integritate libero arbitrio pollebat homo, quo si vellet, adipisci posset æternam vitam.—Potuit igitur Adam stare si vellet, quando non nisi propria voluntate cecidit.

Calvini Instit. Lib. I. c. xv. § 8.

But,

But, if creatures *were left* to such an essential tendency to moral defection, as the hypothesis supposes to exist, and asserts to be the consequence of *created existence*, they would not have been possessed of an *adequate* moral principle, but would have been subjected to an *inevitable* necessity, which had an “*infallible* connection with sin.” They might possess understanding, *will*, and moral means, but still, according to the hypothesis, these physical powers and means in a *moral view*, were *not adequate* to their preservation in obedience, or their security from *inevitable* transgression and misery. For Mr. H. as the interpreter of Dr. W. asserts, that when creatures were so left, the connection between their “*negative tendencies and sin*” would be “*infallible*,” consequently there could be *no accountability*. This required, as Calvin argued, that they should be “*able*” to stand if they *would*, but *ability to stand*, which left their continuance in a holy and happy state, to their own *choice* or *option*, is utterly *incompatible* with the relinquishment of them to a principle of defection, which should infallibly connect them with sin. Their connection with it would *then* be no longer *optional*, but the effect of a certain and “*infallible necessity*,” which must therefore supersede both their *moral agency* and *accountability*. Do not these plain arguments afford a clear and satisfactory DEMONSTRATION, that the *dependence* of creatures does not involve an *essential* and *necessary* “*tendency to moral defection*,” and, that the assertion of such a tendency, which is the very *foundation* of the whole hypothesis, not only identifies physical and moral causes, as before proved, but is, in *any view* of it, a principle “*falsely assumed*, and “*insufficient to support the conclusions*” drawn from it? Its supposed *existence*, and its “*infallible connection with sin*,” in the case stated by the definitions, involves a *denial* of the *adequacy* of the moral principle in intelligent creatures, at their original creation, and thereby altogether
supersedes

supercedes *responsible* agency, *accountability*, and *criminality*. This will be further proved under the definition of "li-
" berty."

3. The above view of the necessity and *adequacy* of the moral principle in intelligent creatures, placed originally in a state of probation, accords with the usual representations of *protestant* divines on the subject. In proof of this assertion, quotations to a very large number might easily be collected; but the two following from Dr. WATTS, and Dr. JOHN OWEN, will probably be deemed sufficient. On the state of Adam before the fall, the latter says, " With respect unto his *moral condition*, and *principle*
" of obedience unto God, it is expressed, Gen. i. 26, 27.
" *And God said let us make man in our image after our like-*
" *ness, and let him have dominion; so God created man in his*
" *own image, in the image of God created he him. He made*
" *him upright. Eccles. vii. 29. perfect in his condition;*
" *every way complete, fit, disposed, and able to and for the*
" *obedience required of him. Without weakness, distem-*
" *per, disease, contrariety of principles, inclinations or rea-*
" *sonings. An universal rectitude of nature, consisting in*
" *light, power, and order in his understanding, mind, and*
" *affections, was the principal part of this image of God*
" *wherein he was created.—Although this rectitude of his*
" *nature be distinguishable and separable from the faculties*
" *of the soul of man, yet in his first creation they were*
" *not actually distinguished from them, nor superadded or*
" *infused into them when created, but were concreated*
" *with them; that is, his soul was made meet and ABLE*
" *to live to God, as his sovereign Lord, chiefest good, and*
" *last end.*" OWEN on the Spirit, p. 75, 76. Dr. WATTS infers, " from the justice and goodness of God," that it was necessary man in his original state, " should
" not only have a superior propensity to what was good,"
but also " a full-sufficiency of power to *preserve himself in*
this

“ this state of obedience and love to his Creator, and to
 “ guard himself from every temptation and sin, if his
 “ faculties were rightly employed.—Surely he must be
 “ furnished with power of self-preservation in his state of
 “ innocency, and sufficient to guard him from offending
 “ his Creator, and losing his happiness. This the *justice*
 “ and the *goodness* of God seem to require. His natural
 “ powers in themselves must have a full sufficiency for his
 “ own security from sin, if he used those natural powers
 “ in the best manner he was capable of; otherwise he
 “ would be exposed to *unavoidable* sin and misery, and
 “ certainly fall into it, if he were not able to preserve his
 “ innocence and virtue: he would as it were be made for
 “ his maker’s anger, if he were not *able* to preserve himself
 “ in his *love*.” WATTS’S Works, quarto, vol. vi. p. 189,
 190. In vol. ii. p. 545, the same sentiments are expressed.

The above quotations indubitably prove, that, in the
 judgment of both these divines, an adequate moral princi-
 ple, sufficient to enable him to avoid sin, was *essential* to
 the “ moral condition of *man*,” as a rational being origi-
 nally placed in a probationary state: that he would not
 have possessed the Divine image, unless he had been fit
 and *able* to obey the will of God, and been free from all
contrariety of *bias*, *tendency*, or *propensity*: and that he
 would not have been dealt with in righteousness and *justice*,
 nor have been placed on the proper *ground of accountability*,
 unless his continuance in integrity had been *put within his*
own power, as a pure and perfect creature formed in
 “ knowledge and holiness, after the image of him that
 “ created him *.” The hypothesis, therefore, which as-
 serts the existence of such “ tendencies” attaching to his
 nature, as would *infallibly* connect him with sin, if he
 were left to them, is diametrically opposite to the opinion
 on the original state of man, entertained by the above

* Col. ii. 10.

respectable writers, to whom a host of others might easily be added ; nor is it possible to conceive of the existence of such original “ tendencies,” by whatever name they may be called, and of the creature’s *relinquishment to them*, without admitting, that he must first be *deprived* of the *adequate* moral principle with which he was endowed, or of the Divine image in which he was created. The *actual possession* of an *adequate* moral principle, sufficient to enable the moral agent to continue in integrity, and his *subjection* or *relinquishment* to “ tendencies” which had an “ *infallible connection with sin*,” are *contradictory* propositions, which no powers of genius, learning, or reason, can ever reconcile, or prove to have *coexisted* respecting creatures in their original state of probation. The *former* is the *Scriptural view* of the primary and moral state of man, as created in the image of God ; the *latter* is utterly subversive of it, and therefore *false*, and *groundless*.

The intelligent reader has doubtless observed, that the hypothesis stands chiefly on the two definitions of “ tendency,” and “ passive power,” which are but different appellations for the same imaginary position. Under the former, it has been evinced, that a *metaphysical tendency* in creatures when put, *as it is by Mr. H.* in opposition to *all* that is *physical*, and all that is *moral*, is a phrase not *only without an idea*, but which cannot *possibly have any idea attached to it*, because the terms *physical* and *moral* are inclusive of *all created existence*. Under the present definition it has been shewn, that the supposed “ passive power” involves the *absolute denial* of an adequate moral principle, in the original and probationary state of intelligent beings. Here then on the *turning points* of the controversy the argument draws to a clear and indubitable conclusion. In the former view the supposed tendency on which the *hypothesis stands* is an *absolute absurdity*, and in the latter it is a gross reflection on the wisdom, justice, righteousness, and goodness

ness of God, by representing it as equity to create rational and accountable beings in circumstances under which their fall and misery would be "*infallible*," and *unavoidable*. "But," to adopt the words of Dr. Watts, as Mr. H. is fond of referring to *him*, "our reason can never suppose, "that God, the *wise*, *just*, and *good*, would have placed "a new made creature in such an original situation*." Either, therefore, the whole hypothesis must be given up as false, and founded on a *radical* error, or the Divine character must be grievously dishonoured and scandalized. Consequences not less reproachful to the Divine honour will arise from the subsequent definitions to be considered in the next section.

SECTION III.

Motive—Morality—Moral Obligation—Moral Power—Moral Means—
Liberty.

VII. "A MOTIVE is that which excites or determines "the will. It consists of two parts, the "external representation, and the internal state of the mind, "each of which is essential to its formation†." Much might be said against this definition, as according rather with a mechanical view of the human mind, than with a more just estimate of its nature and operations. It is incorrect and unphilosophical to represent "A motive," as half internal and half external. A *motive*, more properly, is that which in the contemplation of a *rational* being, induces him to form a volition respecting an object, as worthy of choice or rejection. The habitual views, *state*, and dispositions of the mind, in the present condition of human beings, have a *great* and *important* influence in deter-

* Works, vol. vi. p. 189.

† P. 9.

mining the choice, or giving effect to the motive. A bad or *vicious* mind is determined in its choice by motives, which a good and *holy* mind could not even contemplate without abhorrence. But to represent a *motive* as in part internal, and in part external, is to confound the *agent*, or the *state* of the *agent*, with the *exciting cause* of action. But passing this to what more immediately relates to the present subject, Mr. H. adds, " This distinction must be carefully observed, or the merits of the present controversy can never be ascertained*." In considering the circumstances of intelligent creatures, at *the moment* of their creation, it was not necessary to make or to regard the above distinction, for this most obvious and indubitable reason, that the mind could *then be in no state but that which the Creator gave it, and in which he placed it*; and if it had then any tendency to moral evil, that tendency could not be the result of any *physical* defectability, but must have been a *defect, privation, or depravation* of the moral principle as before shewn. This *self-evident truth*, that intelligent minds, at the *moment of creation*, could, in a *moral* view, be in *no state but that which a good and holy Creator gave them*, must, indeed, be kept carefully in view, or the merits of the controversy cannot be ascertained. If it had always been regarded, neither the controversy, nor the hypothesis which occasioned it, would ever have existed. This *plain and important truth was* observed in the argument stated in the " *Strictures*." In speaking of the original condition of intelligent beings, p. 18, the *state of the mind was* taken into the account, and the argument goes upon the plain obvious principle, which no man would deny, unless he had a favourite hypothesis to support, that when God created intelligent creatures, they were *at the moment of their creation*, nothing else than what the Creator made them, had no properties but those with which he

* P. 9.

endowed them, and that their minds *then were*, and *could be* in no *possible state*, and had no "tendencies," dispositions, or inclinations, but such as he thought proper in justice, wisdom, and goodness, to attach to them. It was there stated, in perspicuous and unequivocal language, which Mr. H. ought to answer, that "creatures could not *be* without his *will*, and that when he willed them to *be*, they could, at *that moment*, be nothing but what he *willed*." Does not this most obvious and indubitable truth, prove that "the data" on which the hypothesis is founded, were "falsely assumed," and are insufficient to support the conclusions? Mr. H's next definition is more extraordinary. To form it, recourse seems to have been had to the aid of etymology, a most uncertain rule in determining the modern meaning of terms. As the English word *morality*, is derived from the Latin term, *mos moris*, we are informed,

VIII. "MORALITY is the MANNER of an action, with respect to the rule of rectitude. It includes, radically, both virtue and vice*." To refute this assertion, nothing more is necessary than to ask a very plain question, which Mr. H. cannot answer without demolishing his own position. If morality include both virtue and vice, what then is IMMORALITY? Mr. H. has answered the question, and completed the demolition, by saying, in the close of the sentence, that morality "is commonly applied to *virtue*, and placed as the *contrast* to *immorality* or vice." Either then Mr. H's representation is *false*, or a thing may be a *contrast* to itself.

The most exceptionable thing, however, in the above definition, is, that it *limits morality* to the *actions* of the moral agent, and loses sight of what is the most material part, and *essential principle* of all real goodness in the agency of human beings, the *conformity of mental disposition to the*

* P. 10.

eternal rule of rectitude, Mr. H. here distinguishes between "the natural *act* and its *sinfulness*;" and asserts that the obliquity or deviation" of the *act* "from the line of rectitude constitutes the WHOLE of its sinfulness*." In this, and other parts of his performance, as well as in Dr. W's statement of his hypothesis, some very false principles on the subject of morals in general, and the proper ground of accountability are assumed. Here, therefore, it will be necessary to inquire briefly, what constitutes the *morality* of human actions, and what must have been the *nature* of an *adequate* moral principle, in the original and *probationary* state of man.

I. As to the nature of morality in general. Mr. H. places it in "the *manner* of an action," and uses the terms "moral" and "morality" as of the same import with *acts of the will*. He thinks the agent could not be "*virtuous* or *sinful* antecedently to the exercise of freedom †, and in a very unauthorized manner uses the phrase "moral evil ‡" to denote only *action* in consequence of *volition*, without adverting to the *conformity* or *non-conformity* of the mind with the rule of rectitude. Both he and Dr. W. represent the ground of accountability to lie only in the possession of "intellect, will, moral means, with freedom "from impulsive influence §." But it may easily be made to appear that their positions involve false and dangerous mistakes in the science of morals, especially when applied as they are by the hypothesis, to the condition of rational beings in their original state of probation ||.

The immutable rule of rectitude is the *divine law*, which ever has an invariable consistency with the truth, nature, reason, and fitness of things. From the highest authority we know, that "the commandment is exceeding broad ¶," and that the law extends to the thoughts and inclinations of

* P. 10.

† P. 11.

‡ P. 28.

§ P. 13.

|| Notes on Doddridge, vol. v. p. 209.

¶ Psalm cxix. 96.

the heart*. An *action*, therefore, cannot be *morally good* according to that law, unless it bear not only an *external* conformity to the *precept*, but proceed from that *rectitude* or *purity* of *principle* which has an *antecedent meetness* and conformity to the *nature* and requisitions of the law itself. From the manner in which Mr. H. has spoken of morality, it may be concluded, that he thought no other power or exertion of the mind than the *will* was concerned in the morality of actions, for he thinks an agent could not be “virtuous or sinful antecedently to the exercise of freedom.” But *mere volition*, considered as a natural exertion of the mind, is only the *physical instrument* of moral action, and even its *proper* exertion, under the apprehension of truth and right motives, should only be regarded as a *subordinate* part of real moral excellence and goodness. *This*, in the *chief* and primary view of it, consists in the *rectitude*, or proper *disposition* of the *mind itself*, in all its exertions; whether considered with reference to the *reception* of divine truth, or an *inclination* to regard, obey, and follow it as good and important. Christians, therefore, are said by the apostle to be “renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him †.” This sentiment implies that Adam was *created in it*; and if he was created in the *image* of God, the God of *truth* and *purity*, then he must have been *holy* “previous to the exercise of freedom,” and must have come to the exercise of it, with that *antecedent* meetness, and conformity of nature and disposition to the Divine image, which enabled him to exercise his freedom *agreeably to the Divine will*.

To constitute actions in a proper sense *morally good*, there must still be this *suitableness* of *disposition* to the nature and demands of the Divine law. It requires “truth in the inward parts ‡,” purity of heart as well as external conformity in the “*manner*” of the action to the letter of

* Matt. v. 28.

† Col. ii. 10.

‡ Psalm li. 6.

the commandment. All the powers and exertions of the mind are capable of a moral direction, and not the will only. The divine law takes cognizance of both their *habitual frame* and *direction*, and their *actual exertions*. They may, therefore, justly be said to be morally *good* or *bad*, according as they are, or are not in a state of *conformity* with the nature, purity, and requisitions of the law. The real principle of morality in human actions consequently, does not lie merely in their external agreement with the rule of rectitude, but in the internal coincidence, *harmony*, and *conformity* of the *views*, *dispositions*, and *inclinations* of the *mind*, with the *nature*, *purity*, and *requisitions* of that law, *antecedently disposing* it to regulate its *desires*, *thoughts*, *pursuits*, and *actions*, in sacred conformity and obedience to its *extensive* demands. This is that renewal of the mind in knowledge and holiness, of which the apostle speaks in the above passage, and in the Ephesians*. The manner, therefore, in which Mr. H. speaks of “morals” and “morality,” as terms *convertible* with mere *acts* of the *will* or the *effects* of volition, confounds *physical acts* with the *morality* of them, or with their nature in a moral view, and disregards also that internal conformity of *mental disposition* with the rectitude of the divine law, which is the primary and *radical* part of all moral goodness. It is evidently that which the law of God as delineated in the Scriptures, requires, and which, we are there assured, is chiefly regarded in the Divine estimation, “for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart†.” These considerations, which must approve themselves to those who are well acquainted with the Scriptures, may assist us in judging.

2. What must have been the *nature* and *adequacy* of the moral principle, in the primary state of man, for an infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator, when he formed him

* Eph. iv. 24.

† 1 Sam. xvi. 7.

a moral agent, and placed him in a probationary state, did not require of him more than he was *then* "able" to perform. On this most obvious dictate of natural reason and *justice*, in connection with the light of Revelation, Dr. Watts and Dr. Owen argued in the passages before quoted, as divines in general have done who have written on the original state of man*. Their common and general sentiment has been, that in the moral condition of man as a creature in a state of probation, his *ability* for *obedience*, was *adequate* to the *obedience required*; and that if this *had not been the case*, he would not have possessed the proper and equitable grounds of accountability. But Dr. Williams has stated, that "what God *owes* to an accountable being as "such, is *intellect*, *will*, *freedom* from impulse to sin, and "objects *suitable* to his wants, exhibited to his choice†." Mr. H. intimates the same opinion‡." Both these gentlemen place accountability in the *above particulars*, but it is evident, that, upon their hypothesis there could be no *just ground of accountability*, nor any *adequate moral principle*, in the probationary state of man. If he were placed in *these* circumstances with nothing more "superadded," then, according to the hypothesis, (definition the third) the "connection with sin" was certain and "infallible," and therefore, no rational ground of *accountability* would remain. Mere "understanding," *will*, and objects of choice, could never render him *accountable*, if, as soon as they were exercised, the exercise of them must infallibly be *sinful*. No principle of natural justice, or equity, of reason or Scripture will permit us to think, that any *accountability* could attach in such a case. And as to *moral principle*, the very statement supposes that there was *none*. The definition which asserts, that if he were left in these circumstances,

* See the quotations and references at the end of the *Strictures*.

† Notes on Doddridge, vol. v. p. 209, or *Strictures*, p. 47.

‡ P. 13.

to his "negative tendencies," his "connection with sin" "would be infallible," is *itself* the strongest *proof*, that upon this scheme, there was in him *no principle adequate to his preservation*, no good moral *habitudes*, or dispositions at all, but the contrary. Mr. H. speaks of an *eventual* "efficacious adequacy to duty," through "*superadded favour* *," but this cannot be a proper or admissible *sense* of the term *adequacy* in morals, when applied to a creature in a *probationary* state. The nature of an *adequate* principle cannot mean its "eventual efficacy" through *superadded* and *unclaimable* assistance. The very supposition, that it owed its *efficacy* to such *assistance*, is an acknowledgment of its utter *inadequacy* without it. But an *adequate moral* principle must have consisted in its *antecedent meetness* and *competency* for those effects which the agent who possessed it, if he had properly employed it, might have accomplished. *Adequacy of principle* cannot relate to the *ultimate* or *eventual consequence*, but to the *previous adaptation* of the *principle itself* to the *end* required, if it were properly exercised. Such must have been the nature of the moral principle with which Adam was *endowed* as a *holy* creature during his probationary state, according to the sentiments of the divines before quoted, and many others. Calvin thought that Adam had *ability* to stand, and that his fall was *voluntary*, as before-mentioned.

The passage quoted from Ridgley at the end of the *Strictures*, proves, that in his opinion, Adam would not have possessed the true grounds of *accountability*, unless his moral power, in his probationary state, had been *commensurate* with the requisitions of duty. Speaking of Adam, he says, "and inasmuch as he was *indispensably* obliged to "yield obedience to this law, and the consequence of violating it would be his ruin, God, as a *just* and gracious sovereign, gave him *ABILITY* to fulfil it; so that he "might not, *without his own fault*, by a *necessity of nature*,

* P. 33.

"rebel

“ rebel against him, and so plunge himself into *inevitable* “ misery *.” This passage indubitably evinces, that in the opinion of this writer, God would not have been “ *just*,” if he had not given Adam “ *ability* to fulfil” the law; and that if he had been placed under obligation to obey it, without possessing *ability adequate* to that end, his fall would have been “ *without his own fault*,” as it would then have been by “ *an inevitable necessity of nature*.” But this, which Ridgley thought so *exceptionable*, is the very position which arises from Dr. W’s and Mr. H’s views; for, according to the hypothesis, though he had *intellect*, *will*, and moral means, with freedom from impulsive influence, yet so *inadequate* was the *moral principle* in him, or rather so entirely *destitute* was he of it, that if he were left to his “ *negative tendencies*,” the connection between him and sin was “ *infallible*.” According to this scheme he was, consequently, placed under a law that required obedience for which he possessed no *adequate ability* or *power*; and if the condition of his probationary state were, that he should yield that obedience for which *no adequate power was given* to him, then he must have been treated in a most *unjust* and *unrighteous* manner, as Ridgley shews he thought would have been the case, without the possession of an *adequate* moral principle. The *contrary*, however, is the statement which arises from the scriptural account of man, as created in the *image* of God, as well as from the opinions of divines in general on the subject. Dr. Guise states his opinion of the adequacy of the moral principle in Adam before the fall by saying, “ He was not created “ with any *proneness* to evil, nor with an *indifference* towards *good* or *evil*, but with an *aversion* to all *iniquity*, “ and approbation of all that was excellent: he had a “ *strong* and *holy bias* towards the great and blessed God to “ *admire*, *chuse*, and *adore* him. God’s law was written

* Ridgley, vol. i. p. 291. Edit. of 1731.

“ on

“ on his heart ; was *natural* to him ; it suited his *original frame* ; all his *propensities* were correspondent to holiness ; “ and he had *sufficient abilities* to will his own standing, and “ *to stand if he would* *.” In opposition to these *just* views, the *false* position, and *radical mistake* which runs through the whole hypothesis, and is *fatal* to every part of it, is, that it represents it as *EQUITY*, to place and continue creatures in an original state of probation, without the *possession* or *continuance* of an *adequate* moral principle : a most improbable and indefensible proposition, dishonourable to the Divine righteousness, and in its consequences subversive of the just distinction between *virtue* and *vice*, rendering the existence of the *latter* in effect impossible. For if, in the first instance, transgression were the certain and “ infallible” consequence of *created* existence, left to the powers with which it was *endowed*, then there could remain no just cause of blame or praise, of merit or demerit.

3. The above are not the only exceptionable things advanced by Mr. H. on the nature of “ *morality*,” and the actions of men in a *moral view*. In proceeding to distinguish, under the present definition, between a natural act and its sinfulness, his representations are *crude*, dishonourable to the Divine character, and dangerous in their moral tendency. One position he lays down is that, “ Every sinful act as an *effect* of providential *energy* is “ *good*†.” If this proposition be a *truth*, it will bear to be examined, and traced to the *fair* and just deductions which arise from it. Adhering to the *language* in which Mr. H. has expressed it, we may argue, that, if “ every “ *sinful act*,” be an “ *effect*” of “ *providential energy*,” then the *energy* of *providence* is the *producing cause*. If this energy be the *producing cause*, where is the *proper agency* of the *individual* who does the action ? Can he, on *this*

* Berry-Street Sermons, vol. i. p. 161.

† P. 10.

statement,

statement, be any thing more than the *instrumental cause* of that *good*, which providential energy *effects* by his means? Where then can be his *criminality*, or *accountability*? He has been but the *instrument* of doing that by his sinful act, which Mr. H. pronounces to be *good*, and to be the *effect* of *providential energy*. This reasoning is *fair* and *just* on Mr. H's *proposition*, and if he had followed his position, to its *inevitable* consequences, he must have seen that they are such as he would *abhor*, and which candour will not permit me to impute to *him*, though they are the just *deductions* which flow from it. They may, however, convince him, that in the above sentence he has published a sentiment which is very pernicious and reprehensible. The *conduct* of DIVINE PROVIDENCE is *good* in permitting the *sinful actions* of men, and in supporting them during the performance of such actions; but it is both *false* and *dangerous* to assert, that a *sinful act* is *good* in any sense whatever. In this crude and unguarded paragraph, Mr. H. has touched upon a subject which has exercised the mature reflections of grave and eminent divines, "The connection between divine sustentation and the sinful actions of men." The digression would be too long, to enter here into an explanation of more just sentiments on the subject. But such a statement might be given as would lead to this *general* conclusion, that in all the criminal indulgence of animal appetites and passions, or of corrupt and vicious thoughts and affections, Divine concurrence is so far concerned, as to support the *immediate* agent in those exertions of body or mind, or both, by which sinful actions are committed, but is not concerned in producing the sinful qualities of them. The *physical agency* is, in *this case*, the proper *object* of divine sustentation; the *criminality*, in a *moral* view, is clearly attributable to *other* causes.

In connection with the above assertion concerning a "*sinful act*" Mr. H. adds, "its *defectiveness*, *obliquity*, or
" *deviation*

“ *deviation from the line of rectitude, constitutes the whole*
 “ *of its sinfulness.* This must be evident, because the very
 “ *same act, considered naturally, may be morally good,*
 “ *evil, or indifferent, according to the manner of it, or*
 “ *the ends proposed by the moral agent*.*” What can be
 more inconsistent than these *two* sentences? The *former*
 asserts the *whole* turpitude of a sinful ACT to lie in *its*
 deviation from the line of rectitude, the latter affirms, that
 not only the *manner* of the *act*, but the “ *ends proposed*
 “ *by the agent,*” or his *intention* constitutes its *moral* qua-
 lity. It is strange Mr. H. should not see this inconsistency
 in two sentences immediately following each other. He
 was betrayed into it by making “ *morality*” consist in *the*
manner of an action, instead of attending to that *anterior rec-*
titude of mind which is essential to constitute true morality,
 as before argued. The whole of his views on *this* subject,
 appear to be very imperfect and incorrect. This is pecu-
 liarly evident under the next definition, that of *moral obli-*
gation. On this very *important subject* Mr. H’s sentiments
 are so extraordinary, that the entire paragraph shall be
 here quoted.

IX. “ *MORAL OBLIGATION, or to be morally*
 “ *obliged, is to be equitably bound by appropriate conse-*
 “ *quences of reward or punishment, to observe the will of*
 “ *the Creator, or to act according to the rule of rectitude.*
 “ Hence it is obvious, that moral obligation is *purely hypo-*
 “ *thetical.* The moral agent is not influenced in his choice
 “ by any external compulsion. It is *his* province to fix
 “ his own *ends*, which stand immutably connected with
 “ their proper *consequences.* If his actions be *good*, they
 “ are consequently rewarded; if *evil*, they are punished.
 “ The *ONLY binding force* in *moral obligation* springs from
 “ *rewards and punishments* †.” It probably has not escaped
 the observation of the judicious reader, that in *this defini-*

* P. 10.

† P. 10, 11.

tion, no other ground of moral obligation is mentioned, or supposed to exist, than what arises from the declaration of equitable rewards and punishments; and that in the close of the paragraph it is emphatically asserted, that "the ONLY binding force in moral obligation springs from rewards and punishments." Is it possible that Mr. H. can have considered maturely, the principles involved in *his positions* on this very important subject, which, whatever becomes of the question concerning the origin of evil, is worthy the diligent study of every man, and especially of every one entering on the ministerial office? The inaccuracy, and dangerous tendency of Mr. H's *positions* ought therefore to be stated, and will be clearly evinced by the consequences they involve.

1. If "the ONLY binding force in moral obligation, "springs from rewards and punishments," then there can be *no other cause, motive, or reason* whatever, that can *oblige* or *bind* the rational agent to the observance of moral duties. If these are the *only* things which bind him, then there can be *no other* ground of obligation. But, rewards and punishments can themselves have no *force*, or influence, except as they affect the *interest* of the individuals concerned. If, therefore, none but *interested motives*, or considerations *bind* them to *moral duty*, then it follows, according to Mr. H's assertion, that the *only foundation of morals* is *self-love*.

2. If the *only* binding force in moral obligation springs from "rewards and punishments," then the *infinite* perfections of the Deity, would not be proper objects of devout admiration and homage, any further than we may have reason to dread his anger, or hope for his favour. Neither on Mr. H's position would the wonderful displays of his love and grace in the gospel be worthy of our admiration and gratitude, separate from the degree in which our self-interest is affected by them. Yet reason may convince every

every man, that *infinite, natural, and moral perfection*, is the most *suitable and excellent object*, to which the contemplation of created intelligences can be directed. The light of Revelation also teaches us, that the "sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow," are things which "the angels desire to look into*," and that the *repentance of sinners*, affords joy to those pure and benevolent beings †, though it does not appear that, in *either* case, they are influenced by the *fear* of punishment, or the *hope* of reward.

3. If "the *only* binding force in moral obligation springs from "rewards and punishments," then separate from their influence, the rational creature would be under *no obligation* to any moral duty whatever. Actions, on this position, can have no *certain and essential character* in a *moral* view, and would be neither *right* nor *wrong*, except as they might afford the hope of reward, or excite an apprehension of punishment. Thus obedience would be reduced to a matter of *cool calculation*, like arithmetical or geometrical quantities, and the agent, if, as Mr. H. asserts, moral obligation be *purely hypothetical*, would only have to "fix his own ends," and calculate the sum total of the account. Thus the conscience would be *absolved* by a *stroke* from all sense of moral obligation, any further than the final result may affect his interest, or operate on the principle of self-love. Hence it appears, that Mr. Hill's definition, and position on *moral obligation*, symbolize with those of Mr. Hume, and other writers, who have placed the foundation of morals in *utility*, whose dangerous sentiments have been often refuted, and were recently exposed by one of the most acute reasoners and brilliant writers of the present day ‡. The above consequences follow by *fair* deductive argument, from Mr. H's positions on *moral obligation*; but is it possible that he

* 1 Pet. i. 11, 12. † Luke xv. 10. ‡ The Rev. ROBERT HALL.

can hold principles which involve such consequences, and lead to effects so highly pernicious and dangerous in a moral view? In candour, I am unwilling to impute them to *him*, though they are evidently included in his assertions, and clearly flow from them. Far different, however, were the opinions taught on the important subject of moral obligation, in that seminary where Mr. H. holds an official station, when my reverend and highly respectable Coadjutor in this controversy, and myself, had the honour to receive together, our moral and theological instructions, from the excellent and venerable divines who then filled those departments in the work of tuition*. With them it was an object of great importance to elucidate the fallacy and danger of such principles, as had any tendency to destroy the essential difference of moral actions, to reduce moral duty to a matter *purely hypothetical*, or to impress rational and immortal creatures with *no other* sense of moral obligation, than what arises *only* from rewards and punishments.

* The Rev. Dr. JOHN CONDER, and the Rev. Dr. THOMAS GIBBONS. The *former*, who was strictly a Calvinist, but not a *Supralapsarian*, was distinguished by his powers of discrimination, and an extensive knowledge of theology, and those branches of literature which have an immediate connection with it. His condescension, candour, and affability, endeared him to his pupils, several of whom still recollect his instructions and virtues, with affectionate esteem and veneration. The *latter*, whose talents have sometimes been *under-rated* by common report, to a good acquaintance with the classics, and polite literature, added fervent piety, and *diffusive* benevolence. The milk of human kindness never flowed with a warmer stream in any breast than in that of Dr. Gibbons. This tribute of respect is due to the memory of these excellent men, who, many years ago, have been removed to a better world. Prov. x. 7. Psalm cxii. 6. To the memory of Dr. Fisher, who, at the period above alluded to, was classical tutor, just respect has been recently paid, in the discourse published on occasion of his death, by the Rev. S. PALMER.

4. To correct, in some degree, the misapprehension which Mr. H's statements might occasion to some readers, it may be observed, that the true and immutable ground of moral obligation, lies in the infinite perfection, righteousness, and authority of the Creator, and the *indissoluble relation* which the intelligent creature stands in to him, as the author of his existence, on whom he is ever dependent for his being with all his rational and moral capacities. This relation is such as to bind the intelligent agent, by the highest and strongest reasons of *justice, equity, and propriety*, to an entire compliance with all the discoveries of his Creator's will, which ever accord with the nature and fitness of things, so long as the relation continues, that is, so long as the creature is continued in existence. On this ground *alone*, can the *immutable nature* of divine law, and the *immutable obligation* of conformity to it, be properly placed, and most securely defended against every attack that would *impair the force of moral obligation*. Rewards and punishments have, undoubtedly, a *great* and highly *important use* in the moral system, but *antecedently* to all consideration of *them*, such are the *infinite excellencies* and supremacy of the *Divine nature*, as to be the *proper object* of most devout admiration, fervent love, and cheerful obedience, to every intelligent being capable of contemplating them. And such is the *indissoluble relation* between dependent creatures, and their infinitely holy, perfect, and adorable Creator, as to lay them under *unalienable obligation* to this devout, reverential, and obedient regard to him. Neither can any circumstances of guilt and moral impotence into which they may come, in consequence of transgression, absolve them from the obligation of compliance with all the intimations of the Divine will which may be given to them, because those circumstances do not dissolve the relation in which, as creatures, they stand

stand to God, and which is the foundation of *all duty*, obedience, and moral obligation. The use of rewards and punishments, is to operate as motives to excite the rational and accountable agent, to that obedience to which he is *antecedently* obliged in reason, truth, and justice, by the relation in which he stands to his Creator. They are addressed to the principle of *self-love*; and this principle, inseparable from our nature, is allowed to have its *proper* and *limited* influence in exciting to obedience, because infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness, have ever connected our true interest with our duty. *Self-love*, however, ought not to be made the *sole principle*, or *only basis* of obedience, because this would destroy the *indelible character* of moral actions, would imply that there could be no virtue, or obligation, where hope and fear did not operate, and would involve the absurd position, that infinite purity, perfection, and goodness, were not in *themselves*, and *without all consideration* of reward or punishment, the *proper object* of love, reverence, and obedience to intelligent beings. The *great importance* of the subject must excuse the length of these remarks on it.

X. Mr. H's tenth particular is not a definition, but a censure on the phrase "MORAL POWER," which he says, "though frequently used by writers on morals, is "not strictly correct*." Its sense is *strictly* correct; it has been, as Mr. H. acknowledges, commonly used by theological writers, and was used in the *Strictures*, as an abridged form of expressing the power in a moral view, with which the giver of every good gift endowed a rational and moral agent in a probationary state. The phrase expresses "ability" to understand and obey the will of God, and refers not merely to the *natural* capacities, but to the *state of the mind*, in a *moral view*, which Mr. H. has strangely omitted in his *theory* of "morality," and "moral

* P. 11.

"obligation."

“ obligation.” In the above sense, it was asserted in the *Strictures* *, and still is maintained, without fear of refutation, that Adam, in his *original state*, had sufficient power or ability *given him* to obey the will of God, and that to suppose the contrary destroys his accountability, as has been now further evinced. It is not easy to assign a reason why Mr. H. should wish to depart from the common and well understood language of moral writers, unless it be to provide himself an asylum from a very plain and obvious argument. His observation, that natural powers have not “ a moral character,” is altogether irrelevant, because Dr. W’s opponents have not asserted that they had. But they are capable of a *moral direction*, and there could be nothing in the original constitution of man, which, if he were left to it, would “ *infallibly*” prevent the *right* direction of them in a moral view ; for if this had been the case, he could not have been a *moral agent*, in any proper sense of the term, but would have been the mere subject of an “ infallible necessity,” over which, according to the hypothesis, he had, and *could have*, no control, and for the effects of which he consequently could not be accountable. In the sense above defined, the terms *moral power* were used on a former occasion ; and having no design to prefer a claim to superior wisdom, by affecting to depart from the common acceptation of words, that phrase, and the term “ morality,” will be used by me in the same sense as before. Mr. H. under this particular, has given notice, that if at any time the phrase moral power is used by *him*, “ it is in a lax sense to represent “ the *natural powers* of the moral agent employed in producing *moral effects*.” The reader, therefore, has only to bear in mind, that when Mr. H. says *moral*, he means *natural* or *physical* powers.

XI. “ MORAL MEANS†,” as defined by Mr. H.

* *Strictures*, p. 24, 25.

† P. 11.

need

need not detain the reader ; for though his definition be not philosophically correct, there is no material difference on this head, between him and his opponents.

XII. " LIBERTY, in its most radical acceptation, signifies freedom from external impulse. Thus the moral agent is always free, at liberty, or unconstrained in his choice by any outward agency. But liberty is frequently used for the free act of the will *." In which of these senses does Mr. H. use the term? If the latter, he should have explained what he means by a free act of the will, otherwise *liberty* remains as undefined as before. But without examining the philosophic precision of this definition, it is evident, that *liberty*, in any true sense of the word, could not have existed at all on Dr. W's hypothesis, at the introduction of moral evil. Whether the constraint arose from " any outward agency," or from an inward inherent and essential principle of defectability, the *effect* must be the same, and must *equally* destroy accountability. If, as the third definition asserted, there be an " infallible" connection between being left to " negative tendencies, and the existence of sin ;" and if, as Dr. W. asserts, it be " equity" to leave the rational creature in these circumstances, then he could possess *no liberty* in a moral view. He was not

Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. MILTON.

He was *only* able to *transgress*, and had *no power to avoid transgression*, or, as asserted in the " *Strictures*," he possessed only such powers as enabled him to sin, but had none which enabled him to avoid it. When left to his negative tendencies, his mind, upon the first volition, would, according to Dr. W. " instantly become the seat of moral evil †." His fall would be *instantaneous, inevitable, and*

* P. 11.

† Notes on Doddridge, vol. v. p. 210, or *Strictures*, p. 48.

" *infallible.*"

“ *infallible*.” His circumstances, therefore, must have equally absolved him from accountability, as if he were compelled by “ *external constraint*.” A short statement will further establish the position.

In all cases, effects should be attributed to their *true causes*, whenever these can be known and assigned. If, therefore, that defectability which is said to exist by “ *absolute necessity*,” really has an “ *infallible connection with sin*,” when the creature is left to its influence, the effect must, in the judgment of every impartial person, be attributed to its *true cause*, and not to the agent, who possessed *no strength* to counteract its influence, and who, it is acknowledged, in this case, could not act otherwise. That he could not act *otherwise*, Mr. H. must allow; for if he could, the “ *connection of negative tendency with sin*” would not be “ *infallible*,” which he maintains it to be. Freedom from external constraint, in the original state of man, was not sufficient to render him a *moral and accountable agent*, if, at the same time, he was connected by absolute necessity, with an inherent principle which had an “ *infallible*” connection with sin, whenever he were left to its operation. For, in this case, he must be destitute of an adequate moral principle, on which alone his accountability was founded, and must have been resigned to a *contrary tendency*, which had an “ *unavoidable connection with sin*.” His situation, therefore, destroyed his *liberty* by rendering it useless, and superseded his accountability, by removing him from that *state of moral freedom, on which alone it could justly stand*.

It could make no difference as to the result whether an “ *infallible connection with sin*, arose from impulsive “ *decretive necessity*, external constraint, or “ *negative tendency*.” If under the *latter* the effect was *equally certain*, as under either of the *former*, accountability would be *equally* destroyed. According to the *third* definition, the
intelligent

intelligent creature, when "left to his negative tendency," would be *impelled* to sin in a manner so irresistible, that the event in Mr. H's language would be necessary and "*infallible*," consequently, he could no more be *justly* amenable for the issue, than in a case of the most violent external constraint or force. The influence of external restraint must be partial, confined, and limited in its operation to particular actions. It could only therefore *suspend* accountability with respect to those actions in which the agent was subjected to it. But the operation of an inherent and *essential* principle of defectability, attaching by "absolute necessity" to all created existence, must be uniform, constant, and invariable, extending to all the actions in which the agent is relinquished to its influence. If, therefore, in the *original* and *probationary* state of intelligent beings, this influence "infallibly" led some of them to sin, then the blame could not attach to *them*, but to that principle which Mr. H. asserts to be the *true cause of sin*, or rather, (dreadful as the consequence is) to *that* Being who relinquished *them* to its *inevitable* operation. And if, as Mr. H. further observes, the immediate producing cause of sin be not "*immoral*" but "*innocent*," the effect must also be *innocent*, and free from all *immorality* or turpitude in a *moral* view. Thus the hypothesis, in the *former* view, imputes the criminality of sin to the Divine Being himself, and in the *latter*, *virtually* denies the *existence*, and even the *possibility* of MORAL EVIL in any proper sense of the phrase; for if *sin* be the *result* of a *natural defectability*, or *unavoidable necessity* of *created existence*, then it can, according to *this view* of its *origin*, be nothing more than a *natural* or *physical infirmity*. Do not the above considerations indubitably prove, that Dr. W's hypothesis involves not only a denial of *moral liberty*, but of all accountability; that it would not have been *equity*, but gross *injustice*, to leave creatures in these circumstances at their creation;

and

and consequently that the arguments advanced on these points in the *Strictures*, page 57 to 64, are fully vindicated?

That the view here contended for respecting the necessity of *moral liberty*, and an adequate moral principle in the original constitution and probationary state of rational beings, accords with the general statements of *protestant* writers, has been before proved, by the quotations from Watts, Owen, Calvin, Ridgley, and Guise, to which it cannot now be necessary to add any thing further. But it may be remarked, that though the real *origin of moral evil* be *in-scrutable*, no views or conjectures concerning it will comport with the righteousness, purity, and goodness of the Divine character, and the real *guilt* and *demerit* of sin, but those which attribute it, not to any *essential tendencies*, but solely to the *voluntary* transgression of moral agents in a *probationary* state, though endowed with a moral principle *adequate*, if duly exerted, to their preservation. This sentiment accords with the usual statements of divines on the subject; and, what is more important, it agrees with the short and decisive evidence of Revelation respecting it. There we are assured, that “ God made man *upright*, “ but they have sought out many inventions *.” Of the wisdom and propriety of such a moral constitution, as left a continuance in integrity to the voluntary determination of the agent in his probationary state, Dr. Guise has expressed his opinion in the following sentences concerning Adam : “ His will was entirely free to act according to his original “ light, and *holy inclinations*, or to turn aside to evil. It “ did not become the wise and holy God, *absolutely to* “ *secure him against an abuse of this freedom of his will* ; for “ he was to be for some time in a state of *probation* ; but “ that would have made it a state of *confirmation*, before “ the time of trial was over †.”

* Ecclef. vii. 29.

† Berry-Street Sermons, vol. i. p. 161.

The whole of Mr. H's "*definitions*," or "*data*," have now been considered, except his explication of the phrase, "*terminating upon*," which, not to break the thread of a grave and important subject, shall be reserved for another place. If, instead of these definitions, Mr. H. had descended from the clouds of obscure and *incorrect* metaphysics, and, in *plain* language, had given a *clear* and connected view of Dr. W's hypothesis, supported by rational and *scriptural* arguments, if *such could* have been produced, the attempt would have been more satisfactory, to most readers, than the plan he has adopted. By his definitions and explications, he has thrown no *additional light* on the hypothesis, and the *original quotations* from Dr. W. given *at large* in the "*Strictures*," p. 7 to 12, and p. 47 to 49, afford a better view of what the Doctor intends, than the definitions of his advocate. Why Mr. H. did not attempt what has been now mentioned, is not my province to explain; but the omission is not a favourable *symptom* as to the *defensibility* of the cause he undertook. Whatever in the "*science of morals*" is true, important, rational, and *scriptural*, may be expressed in plain, clear, and common language; and if, in any case, the language of common sense will not furnish a medium of communication, this circumstance affords a strong presumption, that the thing intended to be communicated, is not, in some respects, consistent with it.

The detached arrangement which Mr. H. has given to his definitions, on which he says "*the whole argument is rested*," has unavoidably rendered their discussion desultory, and the *identity* of the *ideas* intended by several of them, has occasioned too much similarity in some of the statements requisite to evince, *distinctly*, their *fallacious* nature, and the *absurdities* involved in them. The *great importance* of the *subject* in a *moral* view, must apologize for the approximation of illustration, and the length of the

discussion. The same reason may render it not improper here, to unite in a collected point of view, the substance of the *Definitions*, and of the *arguments* adduced in the preceding pages, to refute the *hypothesis* they contain.

The idea of a metaphysical cause, which is *opposed* to what is *physical* and what is *moral*, has been proved, under Definition III. to be in itself an *absurdity*, because all created objects of metaphysical contemplation must be considered either as possessing *physical existence*, or as being *moral agents*; and no *negative* tendencies are *supposable*, but what must respect them in *one* of *those* views. That, for which Dr. W. contends as belonging to all created existence, can only be physical. Attributing sin to a *privative* tendency, reduces it to a mere *privation*, and makes it only a *natural* evil, as the effect of a *physical* cause, which Dr. W. has himself called a *natural evil*. The notion of *privation* is derived from the philosophy of Aristotle, and has a common origin with the Persian *hypothesis*, which arose from a desire to find in nature some *adequate cause* of evil. Under the definition of *Necessity*, it has been shewn, that the relinquishment of creatures to what is asserted to be the “ infallible connection between their negative tendencies “ and sin,” would destroy their accountability, by rendering their transgression certain and *unavoidable*. “ Passive “ Power,” which is the same as “ negative tendency” under a more improper appellation, involves the radical error of confounding the ideas of *voluntary mutability* and *independence*; and when closely examined, implies a denial of the *adequacy* of the moral principle in a *probationary* state, and thereby would altogether *superfede* accountability. The definition of morality, thought necessary for the defence of this scheme, omits the *most essential* and *primary* part of *moral* goodness, *conformity of mental disposition* to the Divine law. By making the *only* binding force in *moral* obligation to spring from rewards and punishments, the *foundation* of
morals

morals is placed in *self-love*, the right of the infinite Creator to the worship and obedience of his creatures, separate from the influence of interested motives in their minds, is *virtually denied*; and the representation, by symbolizing with the view of morals given by infidel writers, tends to absolve the conscience from the unalienable sense of duty, arising out of the relation in which rational beings stand to their Creator, and would render virtue a matter of *cool calculation* on the principles of self-interest. Under the defective definition of liberty, it has also been shewn, that, according to the hypothesis, intelligent creatures were not *originally* in a state of *moral liberty*, and possessed only such powers as would, if they were left in circumstances which the hypothesis calls "*equity*," lead them by an "*infallible necessity*," into *sin*, *ruin*, and *misery*.

For these reasons, therefore, it appears, that this hypothesis to explain "the origin of moral evil," is worthy not only of rejection, but of determined opposition, as being, in a high degree, dishonourable to the Divine character, injurious to the interests of pure morality, and too likely, if it were embraced by men of libertine principles, to countenance their vicious practices. Far, very far am I, from imputing the above exceptionable and dangerous consequences to Dr. W. or his advocate, though it has been shewn that they are such as arise, by fair and impartial reasoning, from the definitions which Mr. H. has given of the doctor's principles on this subject, and the language in which he has reported them. The consequences ought, in candour, to be attributed to the *fallacious* nature of the hypothesis itself, which, without any personal reflection being intended respecting its author or defenders, appears, in a philosophical view, to be absurd, as founded upon the *radical mistakes* before evinced, and, in a theological view, to be *inconsistent* with the *scriptural account* of man in his original state, and *contrary* to the *usual*
views

views of able and respectable divines, as is fully evident from the quotations before given.

To the judgment of the attentive reader it is now left to determine, whether it *has not been clearly demonstrated*, in the preceding pages, that the "data" on which "the whole argument is rested," by Dr. W. and Mr. H. are "*falsely assumed, and too weak to support the conclusions.*" The challenge has been accepted, the evidence adduced, and to the impartial decision of the intelligent and serious part of the public, the judgment is *referred*, with no hesitation or doubt on which side the sentence will be pronounced, by those who are excited to examine the evidence, with a degree of attention adequate to the real importance of the subject, respecting the interests of truth and holiness.

In the view of the writer, to allude to the closing paragraph of Mr. H's first part, it is most "obvious," that upon the hypothesis of Dr. W. and according to the definitions by which Mr. H. attempts to support it, neither "the Governor," nor "his laws," would be "equitable," because in the original constitution of his government, the "subjects" would be not merely "peaceable" by being free from "impulsive necessity," and furnished with "intellect and will," but might be left to circumstances which would "infallibly" and *inevitably* lead them into sin, and must therefore in the sober estimate of righteousness and justice, *absolve* them from all *accountability*. A view of the moral system, equally false, dangerous, and *indefensible*. It has, nevertheless, found a confident and adventurous advocate, whose "animadversions" are now further to be considered.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

MR. HILL'S ANIMADVERSIONS REVIEWED.

1. **W**HEN a gentleman voluntarily enters into a controversy in which he was not originally concerned, the law of equity, as well as the unalienable right of self-defence, will vindicate the party whom he attacks, in examining his performance with freedom, impartiality, and justice, and in pointing out whatever improprieties really exist in his statements, and attempts at argument. In reviewing, therefore, Mr. H's "Animadversions," which present themselves under the predicament now mentioned, while I shall not transgress the boundaries of that candour which is due to all men, I esteem myself authorized to make *fair* and *just* remarks of any kind on his pamphlet, whether they may be literary, moral, or theological; nor do I despair of their being in some respects useful to my opponent himself.

Fungar vice cotis, acutum

Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exfors ipsa secandi.

Ars Poetica, l. 304.

In a literary view, Mr. H's *first* sentence is not unexceptionable.—"To a lover of truth, nothing is more
 "pleasing than to observe *its* gradual developement, and
 "to mark *its* progress, not only while *emerging from the*
 "*darkness of ignorance*, but also in dispelling the smaller
 "*shades of sophistry and misconception.*" An uninformed
 mind may emerge from "*the darkness of ignorance*," by
 acquiring the *knowledge of truth*, but *truth itself* cannot
 emerge from *that* darkness, for it *was never in it*. Its
 nature is eternal and immutable. Of "*sophistry and*
 "*misconception*," an idea may be formed, but what is
 intended by the *shade* of misconception? Mr. H. pro-
 ceeds: "*I have been gratified in observing the attention*
 "which

“ which of late has been paid to the investigation of the
 “ origin of moral evil.” This gratification may have been
 very *real*; but was the communication of this circumstance
 an object of such prominent importance to the *public*, that
 it must be announced in the *first* paragraph of the “ Ani-
 “ madversions?” It is added, “ a subject of acknow-
 “ lodged *depth* and *obscurity*, but of which a *consistent view*,
 “ as might be expected from its *radical nature* would be-
 “ come,” &c. What is the *radical nature* of a subject of
 acknowledged *depth* and *obscurity*? What also is a *consistent*
view of such a subject? If it *consist* with its *obscurity*, must
 not the *view itself* be *obscure* and *dark*? Whether this *spe-*
cies of *consistency* attaches to Mr. H’s view of the present
 subject, his readers must judge. These remarks, how-
 ever, evince, that nearly the whole of his *first page* is
 occupied by *confused* and *discordant* metaphors.

2. In commencing his “ Animadversions” on the
 “ Strictures,” Mr. H. places the definitions before dis-
 cussed as “ adequate data” on the question *professedly* de-
 rived from Divine Revelation, and the first principles of
 “ common sense*.” What will it avail that they are
 “ *professedly* derived from Revelation,” when *no evidence* is
 attempted to be brought from the Scriptures to support this
profession? That they are *thence* derived is altogether an
unsupported assertion, and therefore, to adopt, in one in-
 stance, the style of Mr. H. “ An author has no stronger
 “ claims to the credit of his reader when he makes the
 “ assertions, than his opponent when he denies them†.”
 Of the adequacy of these “ definitions” as “ data” to
 determine the question, a judgment may be formed from
 the discussion in the preceding sections. If there be any
 truth and justice in the *arguments* there advanced, it has
 been *proved already*, that those of them on which the hypo-
 thesis is “ *rested*,” are not only “ false,” inconclusive,

* P. 14.

† P. 16.

and

and destitute of support from Revelation, but that when fairly examined and traced to their just consequences, they are inconsistent with "the first principles of common sense." This is plainly the case with that on which Mr. H. chiefly relies, the notion of a metaphysical cause neither *physical* nor *moral*, but opposed to both. See the argument under definition the third*. Mr. H. however, appears confident, that with the dim lamp of his obscure metaphysics, he shall be able to explore his path, in a region on which the light of Revelation never shone. The first step in his progress is thus marked. "To plead—that limitations are placed to our knowledge of the *divine conduct*—that on some subjects the word of God is 'wisely silent'—that the origin of moral evil is justly considered among the subjects of unprofitable speculation which the word of Revelation has left *undecided* and *unexplained*, is *altogether inapplicable*." Thus Mr. H. has *confidently decided*. But is not my young brother rather too hasty, and too *confident here* in his conclusions? Will he take the *converse* of the propositions which he has peremptorily *asserted* to be *inapplicable*? Will he *dare* to affirm, that there are *no limitations* to our knowledge of the DIVINE CONDUCT?—That there are *no subjects* on which the word of God is *wisely silent*? The fact, that it is *silent* on *some* is *indisputable*; and if he should assert, that the silence is *not wise*, he would "charge God foolishly†." Will he assert, that the word of Revelation has not left the *origin of evil* "undecided and unexplained?" If it has not, why does not Mr. H. or Dr. W. favour us with the *explanations*, and *produce* the *decisions* of Revelation on *this* subject? But if he dare not affirm the *converse* of the positions which he has pronounced to be "*altogether inapplicable*," where is the *justice* or *propriety* of *his sentence*? The positions prematurely condemned, stand acquitted

* P. 14 of this Vindication.

† Job i. 22.

from

from the charge ; and their *applicability* and propriety, as they occur in the *Strictures*, remain unshaken and unimpaired by his unsupported decision. Instances were adduced of the “ limitation ” of our knowledge, p. 2. and Mr. H. should have replied to them, before he *ventured* to make the above assertion, which cannot but recoil upon his own statement.

3. The assertion in the *Strictures*, that metaphysics will not decide those questions in morals and religion, on which Revelation is wisely silent, Mr. H. allows “ demands “ attention.” What is his reply ? that “ the total silence “ of Revelation cannot be allowed on the present controversy.” Why then did he not produce its language, and terminate the controversy by its authority, to which the opponents of the hypothesis are ever disposed to bow with entire deference ? But this he has not attempted. He adds, “ Nor will it be admitted that metaphysical inquiry “ is useless where Revelation is silent *.” It *must* be admitted as to any new discoveries in morals and religion, or Revelation must be acknowledged to be an *incomplete* rule of faith and duty, as before argued †. “ There are some “ principles of morality known by *intuitive* perception ‡.” Not any concerning which Revelation is *silent*, or which are not *implied, declared, or confirmed* by it. “ Principles “ which ought to stand as *data* of argument, from which “ the most certain conclusions may be deduced by the exercise of reason §.” If Mr. H. means his “ *data*,” the *definitions*, it has been seen in the preceding sections, what are “ *the most certain conclusions*” which may be deduced “ from them, by the exercise of reason.”—“ The heathen “ may infer the Being of God from the works of creation ; “ and their consciences testify to the morality, or immorality of their actions ||.” Can they thence *infer* any

* P. 15.

† P. 5 of this Vindication.

‡ P. 15.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

truth on which Revelation is *silent*? If *not*, what is this to the purpose; this observation is “altogether inapplicable.”

4. In reply to the observation that Revelation was not intended to gratify curiosity on questions of a *speculative* nature, Mr. H. observes, that “it strongly urges and demands an attentive examination of the subjects of “religion*.” This is true; but this does not refute the above assertion in the *Strictures*, nor prove that the *Scriptures* were intended to *gratify curiosity* on *speculative* points, or where evidence is *not* attainable. “We are required to “prove all things †.” On *this* principle the author of the *Strictures* proceeded to *prove* Dr. W’s hypothesis, and upon *proving* it, found that it was not “good,” but false and injurious, though well-intended by its worthy author. “The Holy Scriptures do not *discourage*, but invite inquiry ‡.” So does the author of the *Strictures*, and ever has done respecting *all* subjects that are proper objects of *free* and impartial inquiry; and the first page in the *Strictures* strongly asserts its utility. It has often been observed that distance and ignorance are sources of prejudice. The intimation here conveyed, that the author of the *Strictures* is unfriendly to *free* inquiry, ought, in candour, to be imputed to this cause; for to ascribe it to another, would impeach Mr. H’s purity of motive, which I am willing fully to admit. To convince him, however, that he was mistaken in this intimation, and to acquaint him with my sentiments on *free* inquiry, a passage shall here be recited from a publication which appeared when my brother H. must have been in his early “boyish days.” The ideas which it expresses are not less applicable to the present controversy, than they were to the ephemeral debate on public worship which occasioned them. It was then observed, that from the ordeal of

* P. 16.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

discussion, " no general, or permanent evil is to be apprehended by the friends of religion, to any thing truly valuable or important to its interests. By submitting every thing to the test of *impartial* examination, the latent powers of the human mind are roused to exertion, the dormant evidences of truth are called forth to public view, what is *false* or *spurious* is separated from what is *true* and *genuine*, and what rests upon the *immovable basis* of *Revelation*, distinguished from that which stands on the weak foundation of custom, or the *precarious* ground of *hypothesis*. Thus in the wise arrangements of Providence, the cause of truth and genuine Christianity acquires additional strength from *fair* discussion, whether excited by the desire of improvement, the doubts of scepticism, or *the affectation of novelty* *."

5. The statement in the *Strictures*, p. 19, that the origin of moral evil is " among the *arcana* of heaven," Mr. H. deems " not satisfactory †." But if he has really penetrated into those *arcana*, and can inform us " what constituted the first sin of the angels which fell," to which case the word was applied, he doubtless will not long withhold the intelligence. As yet, however, it has not been communicated; and the rebuke of the Almighty in the book of Job, respecting other subjects, in which the parties had attempted to determine what his wisdom had concealed, is but too applicable to Mr. H's opinion on this topic. " Knowest thou it because thou wast then born, or because the number of thy days is great ‡."

6. To his suppositions, that the origin of moral evil is " not so inscrutable nor so unprofitable §" as the " *Strictures*" assert, Archbishop Leighton, and John Calvin, shall reply. The former says, " The great difficulty in all this dispute is that with regard to the *origin* of

* Vindication of Public Worship, p. 2.

† P. 16.

‡ Job xxxviii. 21.

§ P. 16.

" evil.

" evil. Believe me, it is an *abyss* never to be per-
 " fectly *founded* by any plummet of human understanding.
 " Wherefore, if you will take my advice, withdraw your
 " minds from a *curious search* into *this* mystery, and turn
 " them directly to the study of piety, and a due reverence
 " for the awful majesty of God. Concerning God, and
 " his *secrets*, think and speak with *fear* and *trembling*:
 " and if you would not *ruin* yourselves, beware of dis-
 " puting with *him**." Calvin, after stating the short
 hints in the Scriptures concerning the fall of angels, adds,
 " But because these things do *nothing pertain to us*, it was
 " better if not to be *suppressed wholly*, yet to be but *lightly*
 " *touched*, and that partly because it was not befitting for
 " the Holy Ghost, to *feed curiosity* with *vain histories* with-
 " out any *fruit*: and we see it was the Lord's purpose
 " to put nothing in his holy oracles, but that which we
 " should learn to *edification*. Therefore, lest we ourselves
 " should tarry long upon things *superfluous*, let us be con-
 " tent shortly to know thus much concerning the nature
 " of devils, that at the first creation, they were the angels
 " of God, but by swerving out of kind, they both de-
 " stroyed themselves, and are become instruments of de-
 " struction to others†." Gordon's Translation, p. 39.

7. Referring to the statement in the Strictures, that
 attempts to discover the origin of moral evil are " nuga-
 " tory and unprofitable," Mr. H. says, " some argu-
 " ment, however, might have been expected on a point
 " so strongly affecting the controversy. But no *proof* is

* Sed magnus totius hujus disputationis nodus est, *De origine mali*.
 Abyssus est, credite JUVENES, abyssus est, nullâ humani ingenii bolide
 exploranda, &c. Prælect. Theol. p. 69, 70. Ed. 1701.

† Sed quia hæc *nihil ad nos*, melius fuit, si non subteriri in totum, at
 certè leviter attingi: quia nec Spiritu sancto dignum fuit, *inanibus historiis*
sine fructu curiositatem pascere: et videmus hoc fuisse Domino propositum,
 nihil in sacris suis oraculis tradere quod *non ad edificationem* disceremus.
 Ergo non *supervacuis*, &c. Calvini Instit. Lib. I. cap. xiv. § 16.

“ *even attempted* *.” It is not pleasant flatly to contradict any man as to a *matter of fact*, but *argument was produced*, and the *proof stands in one of the pages to which Mr. H. here refers*, p. 67. To prove the *inscrutable* nature of the subject, and the *vanity* of all human hypothesis concerning it, the argument there adduced was, “ that it was not the *design* of Providence to explain this subject in the present state: and that as an *explanation* of it is *not given* in the word of Revelation, it *cannot be derived from any other source*.” Mr. H. should have answered *this argument*, before he ventured to deny the *inscrutable* and *unprofitable* nature of the subject, and he ought especially, for his own sake, to have been careful not to make an *assertion* contradicted by the *fact*.

The above quotations from Leighton and Calvin, to which others might easily be added, vindicate the opinion given in the “ *Strictures*,” p. 67. that great and good men have thought it a vain thing, to attempt to explain the origin of moral evil. They also counterbalance that of Dr. WATTS which Mr. H. has quoted. Had he consulted other parts of his writings, he would have found that excellent man gave up the point as inexplicable †, and rested in the scriptural account of the fall of Adam, though Mr. H. pronounces it to be “ quite irrelevant ‡.” If also he had followed the advice of Dr. Watts in the piece which he has quoted, it would have led him to renounce the cause he is zealous to defend. “ Take heed lest some “ *darling notion, some favourite hypothesis, be made a test “ of the truth or falsehood of all other propositions about “ the same subject, &c. §.*”

8. In proceeding to what he calls “ the immediate grounds of the present controversy,” Mr. H. says, “ the “ *first objection* in these *Strictures* is advanced against that

* P. 16.

† Ruin and Recovery *passim*.

‡ P. 25.

§ Improvement of the Mind, Part I. ch. xxviii. § 13.

“ part of the hypothesis which supposes the existence of
 “ passive power, sometimes called the tendency to nihili-
 “ lity physically considered, and to sin morally considered,
 “ as attaching by *unavoidable necessity* to all created exist-
 “ ence *.” It must be observed, Mr. H. here concedes,
 that the tendency to sin attaches by *unavoidable necessity*
 to all created existence. This is the sentiment contro-
 verted in the *Strictures*, whether the arguments there ad-
 vanced against it deserve only the soft name of *objections*,
 or whether there be more of truth, or of design, in apply-
 ing this gentle appellative to them, may be left to the
 determination of such as will take the trouble to compare
 those arguments with these “ *Animadversions*.”

9. In his next paragraph, and in a subsequent page,
 Mr. H. endeavours to make use of a concession in the
 “ *Strictures*,” that “ physical existence tends to nihility,”
 “ p. 14. This was conceded to preclude cavelling, a con-
 duct which every fair controversialist would wish to adopt.
 It shall now be proved, that the concession affords an ad-
 vocate for the hypothesis *no advantage*. The admission of
 a tendency to nihility with respect to all material existence,
 would not prove, that a tendency to sin attaches by “ una-
 “ voidable necessity” to all *rational beings* as such : or that
 they were created, or left in a probationary state, without
 an *adequate* moral principle, which are the positions falsely
 assumed by the hypothesis. The utmost that can be fairly
 inferred from the *concession* is, that such beings tend also to
 non-existence. But not to rest in this general answer, it
 must be observed, that the clear and just distinction before
 established between physical and moral causes†, furnishes,
 and has, by anticipation, given a full reply to the use Mr.
 H. would make of the concession. Physical *privation*
 would be annihilation ; privation, in a *moral view*, would
 be the *annihilation* of the *moral principle*, which would have

* P. 18.

† P. 16, &c. of this *Vindication*.

been

been utterly inconsistent with moral agency and responsibility in a probationary state, and cannot be admitted for the reasons before assigned*. This may also be made further evident, by considering the nature of Divine sustentation as to physical existence.

It would be highly improper, respecting the physical sustentation of existing beings, to suppose, that it requires any *new* exertions of "positive" or active power, or renewed efforts, momentarily repeated, on the part of Deity to perpetuate their existence. His sustaining energy should rather be considered as his *operative will*, that their existence should be continued. It is an idea unworthy of the majesty and infinity of God, to suppose, that there is any thing in *him* resembling what we call active exertions or effort when applied to creatures. We know not the *mode* by which Divine power operates in any case; but we may know, both from reason and Revelation, that his will is sufficient, without what we call *effort*, to give *being* and *permanence* to whatever effects his wisdom thinks proper should exist. "He spake, and it was done: he commanded, and it stood fast†." The physical preservation of created beings does not therefore require any renewed efforts, or exertions of active and "positive" power on the part of the Divine Being. Though they are altogether incapable of continuing themselves in existence, yet their existence is permanent, while it is the *will* of him on whom they *are ever dependent*, that they should continue in being. In like manner, when he placed creatures in a probationary state, who were endowed with an *adequate* moral principle, (that should render their continuance in integrity optional) their *dependence* on him did not require renewed, momentary, and positive efforts of Divine power to support in them the *adequacy* of that principle. Neither did their possession of it imply any degree of *independence* in

* P. 17, 27 to 32 of this Vindication.

† Psalm xxxiii. 9.

them,

them, for they possessed only what had been communicated to them in their formation, by him who was the author of their being and preservation. As created perfect and holy, and upheld by him in existence, they must have possessed *such a principle* until they *either* lost it by their own *voluntary* conduct, or were *deprived of it* by the act of God. The *former* is what the hypothesis opposes, the latter is a most dishonourable reflection on the Divine character; yet it must inevitably be admitted if the hypothesis is received. From this statement it follows, that a tendency to annihilation, cannot involve an original and necessary tendency to sin in rational agents. The former is only a physical tendency, or a consequence of physical dependent existence; the latter, in the primitive state of moral agents, could arise only from a cause of a different nature, the want of a suitable moral principle, the supposition of which is not compatible with the Divine righteousness and goodness, as was evinced under the definition of *passive power* *.

10. It had been stated in the *Strictures*, p. 19. as a probable inference, that the nature of angels, as created by God, would tend to a continuance in holiness: and p. 26, it had been concluded from the whole of the first argument, that there was not in the mind of Adam, at his entrance into Paradise, any tendency to sin, by whatever name it might be called. These ideas, detached from their original connection, and the reasons on which they were founded, Mr. H. previous to his taking up one argument in the *Strictures*, has coupled together in his nineteenth page, and then adds: "Thus the moral agent is made
 " dependent on God for his *being*, but not for his *well-being*;
 " *being*; for his physical existence, but not for his moral
 " purity, a position which few Christians, it is presumed,
 " would allow †." By whom is the moral agent thus made *independent*? Not by the author of the *Strictures*, he has

* P. 25, &c. of this *Vindication*.

† P. 19.

uniformly

uniformly testified the *contrary* from a period anterior to that in which Mr. H. first drew the breath of life ; and the *contrary was testified* even in the *very paragraph* from which Mr. H. took the former part of his quotation. It was there stated, p. 18, that “ intelligent and holy creatures are *ever dependent* on the author of all good, for the *continuance both* of their physical and MORAL POWERS.” In p. 62, it was also stated, that “ every creature through *every moment of its duration*, is *dependent on Divine sustentation*, for the continuance of its physical existence, with all the intellectual and MORAL POWERS attached to it.” Could language be more clear and decisive ? Why did not Mr. H. quote *these* passages, before he adduced the above charge ? The *former* must have been beneath his eye when he made it. Was it *omitted* because he *felt* it would contradict the assertion he wished to establish ? Here then the *fact of gross misrepresentation* is brought home to Mr. Hill. Was it wilful ? Was it done to excite a prejudice against the author of the *Strictures* before his arguments were mentioned ; or did it arise from the distress of an antagonist, eager to seize on any thing that might be a subterfuge from the force of a plain argument ? Candour will attribute it to the *latter* motive. But does the cause of truth require, or would the “ love of truth ” lead to the adoption of such methods ? The love of truth is candid, frank, ingenuous, unsuspicious, like that character which thinketh no evil, believeth all things, hopeth all things ; and when my brother Hill has learnt to distinguish between the love of *truth* and the love of *hypothesis*, he will avoid the *indiscretion* into which, by his attachment to the *latter*, he has been betrayed in this instance. His honourable profession, however, ought to render him superior to every thing that might be thought to resemble the maxim of Machiavel, the Florentine secretary.

Calumniare fortiter et aliquid adhærebit.

11. In

11. In proceeding to the arguments in the *Strictures* against an *essential* tendency to "defection morally considered," Mr. H. admits that "the controversy turns upon the question, whether such a tendency *really exists* or *not* *." Of its existence, a judgment may be formed from the arguments before alleged under definitions the third and sixth †. Under the former it was proved, that an essential tendency could be only *physical*; and under the latter it was established, that, an *original* tendency of *any kind* to moral defection would involve a denial of the *adequacy* of the moral principle in the *original* state of man, and is utterly inconsistent with the Divine righteousness. By these two considerations it is apprehended the controversy is decided.

Mr. H. however opposes in the first place, the assertion in the *Strictures*, that the radical fallacy in Dr. W's hypothesis, lies in identifying physical and moral tendency. This he encounters, by saying, "It may with *confidence* be asserted, that Dr. W. does not identify physical and moral tendency in the case of moral evil ‡." After the arguments urged by the Dr's opponents, many will think, that prior to their refutation, this assertion could not be made *without confidence*. Mr. H. should have quoted and have answered the conclusion of the sentence in the *Strictures*, which was, p. 16, that the hypothesis supposes "the *same species* of tendency which in the one case would terminate in *nihil*ity, must in the other terminate in *depravity*." The charge of radical error was founded upon the *identity* and *unity* of *cause* which Dr. W. assigns for effects so widely different as *annihilation* and *moral evil*: and for the *truth* and *justice* of the *charge*, the reader may now be referred to the demonstration given under the third definition, that this error does *really lie* at the foundation

* P. 19. † Page 14 and 27 of this Vindication.

‡ P. 20.

of the hypothesis*. Some proof, however, might be expected for the above confident assertion; and Mr. H. adds, "for proof of this I might appeal to various passages in his works; and for *convenience* I may also refer to the definition in the first part of these Animadversions†." The passages referred to in the notes on Doddridge, are those quoted and refuted in the *Strictures*, p. 7 to 12. Mr. H's definition of tendency, before amply considered, is therefore the *only proof* he adduces; and though it might be *convenient* to refer to it for want of any thing better to produce, the reader may judge what proof it affords, that the Doctor has not identified *physical* and *moral* tendency, from the *plain statement* given under that definition, which clearly establishes that identity‡.

12. Here Mr. H. begins to appeal to his *definitions*, without seeming to suspect that the principles in them might be wrong, or to advert to the fact, that they contain the very positions attacked in the *Strictures*. To this practice of appealing to refuted principles as established "data," he often has recourse, and covered with his twelve definitions as with the shield of Achilles, he seems to think himself secure from attack. But whether his definitions be not composed of more vulnerable materials, than the compartments of the shield which the Grecian Bard attributes to the Grecian hero, and whether those of them on which Mr. H. relies for defence, have not been already pierced through with many wounds by the discussion in the former sections, may be left to the judgment of my readers. To abridge both their labour and my own, it will often be requisite for me also, in future, to refer, not to *definitions* or *principles assumed* without *proof*, but to *arguments* by which the *fallacy* of those definitions and principles on which the hypothesis is rested, has been demonstrated.

* Page 16, &c. of this Vindication.

† P. 20.

‡ P. 16, &c. of this Vindication.

Mr. H. proceeds, " it is most strenuously maintained " that the tendency to moral evil neither is, nor can be " *physical*, but merely a *metaphysical*, a *negative*, *privative*, " or *deficient* principle *."—" It is the *opposite* of *physical* and " active. It is in truth neither *moral* nor *immoral* †." Mr. H's whole dependence both to prove that the Doctor had not confounded physical and moral causes, and to encounter the just, clear, and obvious distinction between them as asserted in the *Strictures*, is placed on this *imaginary existence* of a *metaphysical* cause or tendency, which is neither *physical* nor *moral*, and has no *moral* character, which he " strenuously maintains," but has brought, and *can* bring no *possible* evidence to support. This point has been so fully examined and refuted by the *statement* under definition the third, that nothing further can now be requisite than to refer to it ‡. That *plain* demonstration indubitably establishes the position, that all *possible* causes respecting creatures, except Divine agency, must be included in one of these classes; and thus Mr. H's *main* resource, the notion of a metaphysical cause opposed to both, is " dissolved,

" And like the baseless fabric of a vision,
" Leaves not a wreck behind !"

It may nevertheless be proper to make some remarks on his attempts to support this " baseless fabric," in his subsequent pages.

13. On the clear and evident nature of a physical tendency stand the assertions in the *Strictures*, that the term when applied to *physical existence*, and when applied to *moral agents*, must express two different ideas; and that tendency morally considered, must be something specifically different from what is *physical*. To prove this position, it was there argued, that tendency, in a moral view, must result from ideas, as nothing except Divine operation

* P. 20, 21.

† P. 23.

‡ P. 16, &c. of this *Vindication*.

could

could influence the mind but what it apprehends: that at the moment of creation, as rational agents could then have no ideas, and could be in no state but what they received from God, they could then have *no* tendency to moral defection: that in Adam there could originally be no such tendency without involving the position, that it must be also in that Being in whose moral image he was created: that the supposition of its existence denied the adequacy of the moral principle or power in him, to answer the ends and duties of his creation; and would imply, that he was placed under obligations of duty as an accountable creature with which he was utterly unable to comply. This is the substance of the *first* argument in the *Strictures*, p. 16 to 28. Mr. H. ought to have met it in its full force and bearings, and should have endeavoured to prove, either that the principles are false, or the reasoning inconclusive. He should have proved, that there is no difference between *physical* and *moral* tendency, that an *infallible* tendency to sin might co-exist with a *perfect* possession of the Divine image; that accountable creatures possessed an adequate moral principle *sufficient* to enable them to *avoid* sin, and *keep* the law of God, even while they were at the same time left to such "negative tendencies," as "infallibly" connected them with *transgression* and *ruin*. If he could have established these *contradictory propositions*, he would have accomplished something towards repelling the first argument. But instead of ever meeting the argument in its true force, or even *stating* it, all he has attempted is, to break to pieces a connected chain of reasoning, and then to remark on such an incorrect assortment of *some* of the links as he might choose to notice. By such methods, and especially by using principal terms in different and *arbitrary* senses, an antagonist, though he has not refuted a plain argument, may please himself for a time, with the hope of having *escaped* from
its

its force, and may create such confusion and darkness, as may perplex himself, and bewilder some of his readers. His composition will then be an assemblage of words, where

Chaos umpire sits,
And by decision more embroils the fray. MILTON.

Whether this be not the real character of Mr. H's animadversions, will quickly appear, as it must be in part already evident, from his dark notion of a metaphysical cause, which is neither physical nor moral, and on which his decisions are founded.

14. Having divided the argument in the *Strictures* into what he calls *principles assumed* and *arguments employed*, Mr. H. states the first of the former to be "a difference between physical and moral existence*." This phrase he has formed from the following elliptical sentence in the *Strictures*, which is very plain to him who is willing to understand. "The TERM tendency, when applied to physical existence, and when applied to moral, must stand for two different ideas," p. 16. In quoting this sentence †, Mr. H. has dropped the word "term," and has said "the tendency." Upon consulting the page, the reader may see, that this little word is *there* important to my argument, and that the sentence was not intended to express, that any thing moral has distinct existence separate from the exercise of the natural powers of the mind, but was designed to assert, that the word tendency could not mean the same idea, when used concerning things that exist merely *physically*, as it must mean when used concerning *moral agents*, considered as *rational* and *accountable* beings. By the omission of the word *term*, Mr. H's readers might think the sentence related to *tendency* in Dr. W's sense, whereas its object was to shew that *his* sense of the word was wrong. In this *false quotation* and misapplication of

* P. 24.

† Ibid.

the sentence, Mr. H. is chargeable, if not with misrepresentation, at least with inattention and misconception. In remarking on a supposed distinction of moral existence, as subsisting separate from the natural powers of the mind, he only encounters a phantom, which, at best, owes its existence to his misconception, and is therefore worthy of no further notice.

15. "From the preceding assumed position," Mr. H. asserts, "is derived the distinction between physical and "moral tendency*." This distinction was not inferred from any assumed principle, it was *proved*, from the nature and operations of the human mind, p. 17. and has been now further evinced by the *plain* statement on causes and tendencies, in the former part of this vindication. What has Mr. H. to reply to this distinction? That "the terms physical and moral do not form an accurate "contrast†," because of what he had advanced on the nature of "morality," as arising "from the exercise of "natural or physical powers." The incorrectness and danger of Mr. H's views of morality have been before proved. The accuracy of the contrast which he opposes, is established by the same statement which proves that all possible tendencies in created beings must relate to them, either as physically existing, or as moral agents. Mr. H. adds, "a tendency to moral *results* distinct from physical tendencies, is readily allowed‡." This is the very hinge on which the argument turns in the *Strictures*, to prove that a tendency to "moral results" could not be such as Dr. W. asserted, which has been proved to be a physical or natural tendency, and was called by him "a natural "evil." All effects must partake of the nature of their causes; and a merely *physical* cause as such, can have no tendency to produce "moral results." These must arise from the *state* of the *mind*, and the ideas and views which

* P. 22.

† Ibid.

‡ P. 23.

it possesses, neither of which, at the first moment of existence, could be any other than the all-wise and good Creator constituted them. Mr. H. retreats to his former distinction of a *metaphysical* tendency different from what is *physical* or *moral*, and says, "it is the *opposite* of *physical* and active, " a *metaphysical* and passive tendency, neither *moral* nor *immoral* *." This has been before proved to be

" Neither sea,
" Nor good dry land,"

but a mere mistake, a phrase which in this contrast adopted by Mr. H. has, and can have *no idea*; yet my good brother, in this crisis of the subject, rests his *attempt* at argument upon

—— " the *crude confistence*,"

and tells us, " this " *metaphysical* cause, which he had just asserted to be the *opposite* of *physical*, and neither *moral* nor *immoral* " is the defectiveness of derived existence denominated by Dr. W. passive power †." But the *defectiveness* of created existence *itself* must be either *physical* or *moral*. The former would be a defect relative to *existence*, the latter a defect of the *moral principle*, and could not be the original state of man for the reasons before assigned ‡. A defectiveness or tendency included in *neither* of *these* distinctions, which is what Mr. H. affirms, is an *absolute impossibility*. Nevertheless on this ground he decides, that the distinction between *physical* and *moral* tendency, so obvious and just from the consideration of all created existence, " is *inadmissible* and *inapplicable* to the controversy §." The reader will observe, that the *only reason* assigned for this decision is, that the distinction in the *Strictures* does *not agree* with Dr. W's notion of " defectiveness " which it was brought to oppose; and that to support this decision, Mr. H. asserts, *that defectiveness* to be a *metaphysical* cause

* P. 23.

† Ibid.

‡ P. 21 of this *Vindication*.

§ Ibid.

neither

neither *physical* nor *moral*, though it be evident, as above stated, and before largely proved*, that there can be *no possible defect* respecting rational beings, which does not range under one or the other of these classes. Thus to resist an argument against a *disputed* position, Mr. H. assumes, as his datum, the *position* disputed; and has so totally failed in this attempt to disprove the propriety of the distinction he controverts, that he is driven to the predicament of using the phrase *metaphysical cause*, not only *without an idea*, but without even the *possibility* of an idea attaching to it. It may readily be supposed, that this attempt to assert a *cause* neither “physical nor moral,” but opposed to both, was not submitted to the revival of Dr. W. and that here, at least, Mr. H. must have neglected Horace’s rule :

Si quid tamen olim
Scripseris, in Meti descendat iudicis aures,
Et Patris.

Nescit vox missa reverti.

Ars Poetica, l. 386.

The *attempt* and its *issue* both resemble rather the adventurous flight and disaster of one of old, whose desertion of paternal guidance and its consequences, are thus described by the poet ;

Cum puer audaci coepit gaudere volatu,
Deferuitque ducem : coelique cupidine tactus
Altius egit iter. Rapidi vicina solis
Mollit odoratas, pennarum vincula, ceras.
Tabuerant ceræ : nudos quatit ille lacertos :
Remigioque carens non ullas percipit auras.
Oraque cœruleâ, patrium clamantia nomen,
Excipiuntur aquâ.

Ovidii Metamorph. L. VIII. l. 223.

* P. 14 to 19 of this Vindication.

It must be further observed, that in the above quotations, Mr. H. uses the word *physical* in *different* senses within two sentences of each other. In its *proper* sense, when he speaks of the “ *physical* or *natural* powers” of the mind, but in a *misplaced* and totally unauthorized sense, when in the next sentence but one, he makes *physical* synonymous with *active*, and places *passive* as its proper *contrast*. It cannot be suspected, that a good man would use a word designedly in a wrong sense to perplex his readers, or answer a particular purpose, and therefore this error must arise from some wrong association in education, which has led Mr. H. to suppose that *physical* means *active*.

Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu.

Hor. Ep. Lib. I. Ep. ii. 69.

I must here therefore entreat the patience of my reader, while I adduce, for Mr. H's conviction, that evidence which would otherwise be redundant, to prove that *physical* does not mean *active*; and that its proper contrast is the word *moral*, and not the word *passive*. The latter term cannot be the contrast to *physical*, because some things are both *physical* and *passive*. The *vis inertiae* of matter is a *physical* property, and, according to some philosophers, the only one essential to it, Mr. H. will not say that *this* is *active*. Inanimate substances have *physical* existence, yet they are the *passive* subjects of manual operation. *Physical* and *passive* therefore, cannot be *contrasts*, because they frequently coincide in the *same subjects*. But this matter need not rest on argument, authority may be produced. The first is that of Mr. Hill himself, who, when it served his purpose, could recognize and adopt the *distinction* and *contrast* which he here labours to oppose, as when he charged the author of the *Strictures*, with making the creature *dependent* “ for his *physical* existence, but not for his *moral* “ purity*.” Other and indubitable authority is at hand.

* P. 19.

M

“ PHYSICAL,

" PHYSICAL, relating to *nature* or to natural philosophy, not MORAL."
 JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY.

" PHYSICAL, something belonging to or really existing in *nature*."
 " CYCLOPÆDIA.

The same words are given as the explanation of the term in the Encyclopædia Britannica. The other senses relate to the art of medicine.

Dr. Watts, in his Ontology, contrasts "*physical* or "*natural* good with *moral* good," and "*physical* or *natural* truth" with "*ethical* or *moral* truth." Chap. viii.

The above is evidence which no man can resist; and if Mr. H. should attempt to dispute it,

Melius non tangere clamo. HORACE.

It is remarkable this is not the *first* mistake which has been published in the use of this very word "*physical*;" and though a mistake may be excusable in conversation, or in a letter hastily printed, yet the case is very different when an author, in writing a *metaphysical* pamphlet, which was *not hurried* through the press, makes a *mistake* in the use of a *principal* word, especially, after laying down as a rule, the "*necessity*" of "*accuracy* in the use of *terms*."

16. After quoting some passages from the *Strictures*, p. 16, 17. relative to the connection of moral tendency with "*ideas*" and knowledge, Mr. H. decides "*in these passages ideas are identified which ought carefully to be distinguished: the cause and the occasion of its operation, the principle and that which calls it into action* *." As he has not here done the *Strictures* the honour of considering the reasons which support the positions on which he has decided, nor made it *plain* to his readers what he means by the phrases in which his decision is expressed, this double omission supercedes the necessity of reply. To make the above assertions, however, was easy, and what is

* P. 23.

substituted for a proof of their truth? The simile of a ball dropped from a given distance above the earth, which tends "*propria natura*" to its surface *. This is not a fortunate allusion for Mr. H. The ball falls by the law of gravitation. But who subjected it to that law, or gave it a gravitating tendency? Will Mr. H. as a christian philosopher, affirm, that the law of gravitation exists by an "absolute necessity," or *independent* of the will of God? His allusion, instead of answering his purpose, will better vindicate the argument in the *Strictures*, that all real tendencies, or essential properties, were originally given by the Creator, among which there could not be any to moral defection without making him the author of sin. If the ball in its descent should demolish the glazed roof of a green-house, or deprive an innocent child of life, would the ball be criminal? Must not the fault attach to the agent who abandoned it, in such a case, to its "infallible" tendency? Is not this the very argument which, under another form, is urged in the *Strictures*, p. 59, &c. to prove, that on the principles of the hypothesis no criminality or accountability could attach to the moral agent? He would be no more accountable for the consequences of that necessity, which abandoned him to the "infallible connection" between "negative tendency and sin," than the ball was accountable for the destruction of property, or of human life in the case supposed.

17. Feeling the inadequacy of this allusion to his purpose, Mr. H. labours to infer that the argument in the *Strictures*, p. 17, 18, would prove too much, even that "moral evil could have no existence."—"If then the mind tends, or is biased simply by what it *apprehends* or receives *ab extra*, and it cannot be supposed that any improper views should be impressed upon it by God at the moment of creation, (and for the same reason I presume at

* P. 23, 24.

" any

“ any other succeeding moment) the volition would always “ be virtuous, and sin would be for ever excluded*.” The syllogism, if syllogism it may be called, involved in this extraordinary sentence is this, that because God did not make voluntary agents sinful, therefore they could not make themselves so, or become sinful by any other means. This is Mr. H’s reasoning! That mind, in its present state, is *influenced* by nothing but what it receives *ab extra*, is no where asserted in the *Strictures*, nor deducible from any position they contain. If my brother H. could or would reason calmly and distinctly, he might see, that the assertion in the *Strictures* (with the exception of one case expressly mentioned, but here kept out of view by him, that of Divine influence) was, that mind as such could only be influenced by what it *apprehends*; but nothing is there said which can imply, that the apprehensions of the mind in the present state of human beings, may not be influenced by internal, physical, constitutional, and habitual causes, as well as by information *ab extra*. The assertion in the *Strictures*, p. 18, was restrained to the moment when God first made rational beings, and affirmed, that at that moment they could have no tendency or ideas but what God gave them; and because it cannot be supposed he would ever impress wrong ideas upon them, Mr. H. would therefore infer “ volition must be always virtuous.” Thus he attempts to draw an *unlimited and universal conclusion* from a *partial and expressly restricted instance*, contrary to the well-known *rules* of logic, and every *just* principle of reasoning. Though minds were at first holy and free from all contrariety of bias or tendency, yet, as spontaneous, mutable, and voluntary agents, many different ways are supposable by which they might deviate from rectitude, although it does not *become us to determine*, how the first deviation took place, because it occurred long before

our existence, and we have no distinct information concerning it in Revelation. If this does not satisfy Mr. H. let him read that section of Calvin's Institutions on the *fall* of angels, which has been before quoted. Whether Mr. H. felt more than usual self-gratulation at the discovery, that an *universal consequence* may be drawn from a *restricted* instance, or to what other cause it was owing, that he dropped the following sentence, may be left to his own determination; but thus he proceeds: "If Mr. P. had conceived
 " of motives as complex, embracing *the state of the mind*
 " *in union with the object presented,*" (very luminous) " he
 " might have preserved himself from the *absurd consequence*
 " which I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXPOSE*." If my young brother had attended to the self-evident truth, that intelligent minds, *at the moment* of their creation, could be in *no state*, but that in which their wise and good Creator placed them, he would not have written *this* sentence. It may be left to the reader, therefore, to determine what is EXPOSED, in this ATTEMPT at EXPOSURE. The party against whom it was aimed, having no wish to diminish the sum total of human happiness, will push this matter no further, though it might easily be done.

18. " From the preceding *unfounded* PRESUMPTIONS,
 " it is *boldly* inferred, if inclination, bias, or tendency exists
 " in intelligent minds, previous to the existence of per-
 " ceptions and ideas, it can only be a physical tendency†." Strictures, p. 17. The position was established by fair inductive reasoning, which, by comparing this part of the Animadversions with the Strictures, p. 16 to 20, the reader may see Mr. H. has neither refuted nor met. To call arguments by opprobrious names, is, however, more easy than to answer them. How often will it be requisite to remind my good brother of these important *general* truths, that positivity is not proof, that arrogance is a poor sub-

* P. 26.

† Ibid.

stitute for argument ; and that nothing can refute calm and distinct reasoning, except reasoning equally calm and distinct, but more forcible. Young writers are usually *liberal* in the use of *epithets*. Some years hence Mr. H. will understand, that the words “ bold, unfounded, pre-
“ sumptuous, &c.” when they are adopted without reasons to evince the propriety of their application, mean no more than they do in the isolated form under which they appear in a dictionary : and he will then see the necessity, if he writes, of producing convincing arguments in the room of confident assertions. In reply, however, to the above positions in the *Strictures*, he has nothing to urge but the repetition of his visionary, and now often refuted notion.

Chordâ semper oberrat eâdem;

Ars Poetica, l. 356.

He asks, “ Why may not such a tendency be metaphysical?” Because, as Mr. H. uses it, the phrase is *vox et præterea nihil*, and has no meaning, as was proved under the third definition, by the arguments which demonstrate, that all possible causes in creatures must be physical or moral*. “ Why not negative?” For the reasons assigned under the same demonstration, and often referred to before.

19. Mr. H. here again adverts to the concession in the *Strictures*, respecting physical tendency, which has been amply vindicated above, and says, “ it is this *same* defectiveness which Dr. W. maintains to be the metaphysical cause of moral evil;†” then it can only produce the *same* effect, *nibility*, and not sin, as before proved. “ A tendency which stands directly opposed to the natural perfections of God‡.”—No ; a tendency to *moral* evil, if it had existed originally in the constitution of intelligent beings, would not have been opposed to the *natural*, but to the *moral* perfections of God, his wisdom, righteousness,

* P. 15, &c. of this Vindication.

† P. 26.

‡ Ibid.
justice,

justice, and purity, and to the existence of that adequate moral principle, with which these perfections led him to endow accountable creatures, in their state of probation, as before established *. This assertion of an uniformity of cause for non-existence and for sin, is but the repetition of the *radical* error, and the repetition of error, however frequent, cannot give it the stamp of truth. “ The existence
 “ of such a tendency, when once understood, the Doctor
 “ seems with propriety to have supposed that no reason-
 “ able being would ever controvert †.” Why then did he invite the controversy in the passage before quoted? The supposition here stated was improper, as the Doctor’s hypothesis must, and ever will be, controverted, by every one who understands its utter inconsistency with Divine justice, and the adequacy of the moral principle in the primary state of man. Whether those who have controverted it, are *reasonable* beings or not, may be judged of by their arguments.

20. We have now gone through the whole of Mr. Hill’s attempt to disprove the justice of the distinction in the *Strictures*, between *physical* and *moral* causes; and it is deemed altogether unnecessary to detain the attention of the reader, in reviewing the evidence of his total failure in *this* attempt, after the abundant proof of it, arising from the above remarks, as well as from the *plain* statement given under definition the third. And as Mr. H. rested his *chief hope* of success, in disproving the *propriety* of the *distinction* in the *Strictures*, it may, after the above discussion, be left entirely to the decision of my readers, whether his attempt to establish a metaphysical cause, *distinct* from what is *physical* and what is *moral*, instead of being a lamp to guide him into truth and certainty, has not proved rather to be an *ignis fatuus*, by following which, his argument terminates in confusion and darkness.

* P. 27, &c. of this Vindication.

† P. 26.

21. He next proceeds to consider what he calls the arguments urged in the *Strictures*, against an essential tendency to moral evil. Mr. H. asserts, "to insist, that moral defection, when it took place, must be supposed to arise from causes subsequent to their creation, will avail nothing*." What he has advanced to support this strange assertion, discovers either such a disposition to cavil, or such confusion of mind, as renders it unworthy of distinct notice. It has been previously answered, by the statement on the nature and necessity of the moral principle in a probationary state, and the ground of moral obligation†. His whole paragraph is only an enlargement of his former syllogism, that because God did not make voluntary agents sinful, they could not make themselves so. "Time cannot change the true ground of accountability," which is the rational creature's relation to God, but time and transgression might bring him into fallen circumstances, in which his original moral power is lost by sin. Does Mr. H. seriously mean to deny that such is the present situation of human beings? Inattention to the nature of the constitution with Adam, and the consequences of its violation, is the source of that palpable confusion of idea, which appears in his statement on this subject. The distinctions in the *Strictures*, concerning a state of *probation*, and the consequences of the voluntary transgression and fall of Adam, must *avail much*, or the criminality would be detached from the creature, and attached to the Creator.

22. In his next paragraph Mr. H. affirms, that "to maintain a tendency to moral evil is an *immoral tendency*, "is to identify cause and effect‡." The argument in the *Strictures* was, that a tendency to moral defection, could not have existed in the *original* state of man, because it would be a tendency to *depart from God*, to forsake him, &c. The reasons on which the assertions were founded,

* P. 27. † P. 28, 40, &c. of this Vindication. ‡ P. 28.

Mr. H. carefully keeps out of view, and calls the argument “ a *sophism*,” but it only implied, that *moral* effects must proceed from *moral* causes ; a position often recognized in the sacred volume. Would this gentleman’s modesty charge a *sophism* for the same reason on the following sentences, from the mouth of him who spake as never man spake ? “ A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit : “ neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. An “ evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth “ forth that which is evil *.” Or will his ingenuity solve the problem which arises from his own language in the next page, that the greatest moral turpitude arises from a cause which is most innocent ? For he says of that tendency which he maintains to be the *causation* of sin, that “ nothing “ can be less corrupt, nothing more simple, more innocent †.” If he would seriously reflect on the contrast between *his* language, and that of our Lord in the above passages, it might lead him to pay more respect and deference to the authority of Revelation, and less regard to dark metaphysical notions, which he can neither *explain*, nor defend. Mr. H. asserts, that the argument in the *Strictures* “ supposes the existence of sin antecedently to “ the exercise of liberty ‡.” It is the hypothesis rather, that involves this position ; the argument in the *Strictures* asserted a freedom from that *tendency*, which would render liberty *nugatory*, as before proved under Mr. H’s definition of liberty. “ Equally assumed and erroneous is the assertion, that if the moral agent had such a tendency at the “ moment of creation, it must have been given him §.” Liberal of *epithet*, and *barren* of proof as before. Mr. H. here takes the word *tendency* in different senses. The assertion in the *Strictures* was not that the tendency in Dr. Williams’s sense was *given*, which is the phantom Mr. H. encounters, but that *such a tendency did not exist at all*, for

* Matt. vii. 18. Luke vi. 45. † P. 29. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

this plain reason, that if *any real tendency* to sin, belonged to the original state of intelligent beings, it must have been of a *different* nature from that which Dr. W. supposes, and therefore must have been given them.

23. Mr. H. proceeds to decide, that what was said in the *Strictures*, of man's being created in the moral image of God, "is totally irrelevant*." Is not this rather a *bold* assertion? It was easy to make it, and what is adduced for proof? That man, at his creation, did not "strictly resemble his Creator." Mr. H. labours to establish a difference between *image* and *resemblance*, or likeness. Popish writers have often attempted to establish such a difference. Here, for the third time, John Calvin shall answer Mr. Hill. "Some interpreters make a great difference about image and likeness, while they make a difference between these two words, where is no difference at all.—They are to be laughed at, who do so subtly argue about the words†." Gordon's Translation, p. 42. Man, when created, possessed the perfect image of God in a *moral* view. He was holy, and exempt from all tendency or bias to sin, though free and mutable, as stated in the quotations from Owen, Watts, and Guise. In proceeding to shew, that a creature could not possess the incommunicable attributes of the Creator, Mr. H. again encounters a phantom, which probably never existed in any imagination except his own. His next particular denies that "Dr. W's statement" is affected by "the Mosaic account‡" of the original state and the fall of man, as given in the *Strictures*, p. 20. But the Mosaic

* P. 30.

† Disputatio etiam non parva est de imagine, et similitudine, dum interpretes differentiam quæ nulla est, inter duas istas voces quærunt.—Unde ridiculos esse apparet qui subtilius philosophantur in nominibus illis.

Calvini Instit. Lib. I. c. xv. § 3.

‡ P. 31.

account does so *materially* affect Dr. W's hypothesis as to be *incompatible* with it. An infallible tendency to sin, and a possession at the same time of the *moral* image of God, are contradictory propositions. Mr. H. acknowledges, that Adam must have retained the image of God when he was placed in Paradise ; and, *since the publication* of the *Strictures*, Dr. W. has stated, that he believes the image of God in man to have been concreated with him *. This statement of *his opinion* is to be credited ; but neither Dr. W. nor Mr. H. has *explained*, nor it is presumed, ever *can consistently explain*, the simultaneous co-existence of the Divine image, and an adequate moral principle in man, with an "*infallible tendency*" to sin. What Mr. H. has added under this particular, is founded on a misapprehension of the peculiar dispensation to Adam, and the effects of its violation. At the close, he says, " God has a right to " require perpetual and *inflexible* obedience to his will, as " well from those who possess his image, and those who " have lost it †." Its *loss* supposes the original *possession* of it ; and that the loss was not the consequence of an inevitable or infallible necessity in the first transgression, but of voluntary and criminal disobedience. The dispensation to Adam would not have been a blessing, unless, as Dr. Owen argues, he had been *fit, disposed, and able*, to and for the obedience required of him, and had possessed an universal rectitude of nature, without *weakness* or *contrariety* of principles. If Dr. Williams' hypothesis were true, and Adam had been acquainted with it, when the question was put to him, What hast thou done ? his answer, according to Mr. Hill's definition, might justly have been, " Nothing but what I was under an unavoidable and ' infallible ' necessity of doing, when *left* to my negative tendencies."

* Letter in the Theological Review for April 1808.

† P. 32.

Mr. H's next particular is founded upon the same mistake concerning the constitution under which Adam was placed, and his language evinces his want of acquaintance with the controversies on that subject, especially between the Protestant and Popish divines. He says, in the present connection, " it cannot surely by any one be allowed, and " especially by a consistent Calvinist," (this comes very gracefully from Mr. H. after the instances before adduced, of the opposition in his sentiments on this subject to those of the venerable reformer) " that Adam had such power by " natural constitution*." Calvin says, he was able to stand as possessing the image of God; and he must have had such power by the constitution of nature which God gave him, or Mr. H. must take the converse of the proposition, and say, that a creature in the *perfect moral* image of God, was *not able* to obey him. " And independently of the " superadded favour of his Maker†." If Mr. H. had not been very negligent, he would not have adopted here the very word which was the distinguishing *badge* of the popish positions on the subject. If he had attended to the quotations at the end of the *Strictures*, or even to the mottos in the title page, he might have known, that the position tenaciously maintained by the Papists, and strenuously opposed by the Protestants, was, that original righteousness in man, was the effect of " superadded favour." That the nature of an adequate moral principle did not consist in its *eventual* efficacy through *superadded* favour, as Mr. H. here very incorrectly states, has been before established under the definition of *morality*, and the discordance of his statement with the views of respectable theological writers fully evinced.

24. " By what argument it can be established, that " the creature's *moral power* should be ' *the measure of his* " *duty*,' while in a state of perfection, rather than after

* P. 33.

† Ibid.

" he

“ he had ‘ *voluntarily sinned*,’ I am at a loss to conceive*.” Mr. H. would have been at no loss to conceive the truth and propriety of the assertions to which he alludes, if he had been well read in the controversies concerning the original state of man, or had understood the true grounds of accountability in that state, which furnish a full answer to what he here aims to assert. In the above sentence, however, he is chargeable with misrepresentation, the effect perhaps of misconception or inattention. The phrase, that “ the creature’s *moral power* should be “ the *measure* of his duty,” does *not* occur in the *Strictures*, though Mr. H. has printed *those words* as a quotation. The assertion in the *Strictures* was, that the creature’s moral power in his probationary state, must have been *commensurate with his duty*, p. 25, a form of expression common with theological writers, and which evidently implied, that the creature’s *duty* was to be measured by *another standard*, even the immutable rule of rectitude, and that the *ability* originally *given* him was adequate to, or co-extensive with its demands. To the assertions in the *Strictures*, that according to the hypothesis, God must have originally formed and placed an accountable creature, under obligations of duty with which it was impossible for him to comply, Mr. H. under his last particular, replies, “ justice requires it to be stated, that the *impossibility* is not “ supposed to arise, as the author of the *Strictures* maintains, from any extraneous cause, but simply from the “ defectiveness of his nature†.” My readers will here doubtless observe, that Mr. H. explicitly recognizes and allows, the impossibility above asserted *to exist*, and only affirms, that it does not arise from an *extraneous* cause. The assertion in the *Strictures* respecting the *existence* of this *impossibility* is thus established, by Mr. Hill’s concession. The author of the *Strictures* in the page referred

* P. 33.

† P. 34.

to, p. 25, did not assert, that it arose from an extraneous cause, but that it was a consequence of Dr. Williams' hypothesis, and Mr. H. here acknowledges that the consequence was justly drawn. Whether the cause be extraneous or inherent, still, according to the definition, its operation would be certain and "infallible," and therefore the argument against the hypothesis derived from this impossibility of complying with the obligations under which the creature was placed, is fully vindicated. Mr. H. adds, "it is an impossibility purely hypothetical*." It can be of no avail, whether it were *purely hypothetical*, or really *potential*, when its effects are asserted, by the definition, to be certain and "infallible."—"And strictly consistent with the greatest freedom†." It has been proved under the definition of liberty, that there could have been no *moral freedom* at all. "This," adds my animadverter, "is the simple proposition: if moral agents, *under certain given circumstances*, perform moral actions, it is impossible that they should be *morally good*‡." Mr. H's proposition is not only simple, but *identical*; for, connected with his third definition, which expresses the circumstances given, all it affirms is, that if agents perform moral actions in circumstances under which they will "infallibly" be impelled to sin, their actions will be *sinful*. Is not this a *simple* proposition?

Thus terminates Mr. Hill's attempt to encounter the *first* argument in the *Strictures*, in which his chief dependence was placed on establishing the existence of a *metaphysical cause*, destitute of a *physical* or *moral* character. Of his entire failure in *this* attempt, the attentive reader may judge from the preceding remarks, and the arguments urged under the definitions: or if he will compare the *Strictures* from page 14 to 28, with what Mr. Hill has advanced in reply to the whole of the first argument, it

* P. 34.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

may be seen, that notwithstanding the garbled form under which he has introduced many of the ideas, he is so far from refuting, that he has neither appreciated, nor met the force of *that* argument. The remainder of his "animadversions" may be released from the ordeal of so minute an examination, as those already reviewed have passed through, and shall therefore receive but cursory notice.

SECTION V.

Animadversions further reviewed—Consequences of the Hypothesis—
Conclusion.

ON Mr. Hill's second section, little more appears to be necessary, than to prove, that the supposition in the *Strictures*, respecting the formation of holy creatures, whose nature should have *no* tendency to sin, involves neither "absurdity" nor "independence." It had been argued, that the formation of *such* creatures was not inconsistent with the *natural* or *moral* perfections of God; nor has Mr. H. attempted to prove, that it would have been inconsistent with either. The original argument stands therefore in all its force, but Mr. H. asserts that it involves "two prominent absurdities, that a creature (at least as *it* regards *holiness*) might be independent, and that such independence might have been created*." In labouring to establish this charge, he speaks flippantly of created "divinities," and "independent creatures," as if such ideas were familiar to his mind. But, with the author of the *Strictures*, the phrase an "independent creature," both in language and idea, is classed with "passive power," and with "a metaphysical cause" neither "physical" nor "moral." He will leave the three absurdities to be embraced together, by those whose minds are incapable of

* P. 37.

discerning

discerning the relations of ideas. If Mr. Hill had reasoned either in a *clear, fair, or correct* manner, he must have seen, that the argument in the *Strictures* implies the *reverse* of what he labours confusedly to infer from it, as well as have known, that the author had most *explicitly* asserted the constant dependence of creatures in every view, *moral* and *physical*, on God, p. 18 and 62. To be produced by Almighty power, to be *created*, or to be a *creature*, must ever carry in it the idea of *entire* dependence, on that Being, to whose will existence of whatever nature and its *continuance* is ever owing. When the *Strictures* were written, it was not thought necessary to prove, that the formation of *holy creatures* did *not* imply *independence*, because it was not then supposed, that any mind, capable of reasoning at all, would ever attempt to prove, that what was expressly stated to be a *created nature*, could be supposed independent of God, because it had not an *inherent tendency* to sin. *This* inference, however, which Mr. H. attempts to draw, is not perhaps *more wonderful* than the radical error of the whole hypothesis, that the infinitely great, holy, and blessed God, cannot prevent the *best* and *holiest* of his works, from tending by “an absolute necessity” to moral evil!! It shall now therefore be distinctly evinced, that the statement in the *Strictures*, neither implies “independence in creatures”, or that independence could be created.

The supposition, that God could make a creature whose nature should be holy, and tend only to a continuance in holiness, as it is not inconsistent with any of his natural or moral perfections, so it would not imply, that such a creature could be in *any respect* independent of him. All that would be implied in it is, that the Divine Being *willed* the *continuance* of those properties which he originally *communicated*. The creature, with all its properties, would still be *derived*, and the continuance of its existence, and of its properties,

properties, would still *depend* on *his will*, which is immutable. If, therefore, the original purpose of his will was, that the *permanence* of the created *holiness* should run *parallel* with the created *existence*, the *effect* would be certain and *infallible*. And it implies no contradiction to suppose, that he should will the *communicated* properties should *remain* as long as the being *remained*. He could as easily give *permanence* to the effects of his communicative goodness, grace, and love, in rendering a creature *holy*, and free from all contrary tendency, if that were his sovereign and holy pleasure, as he could to any other effects of his will; for who, in these things, shall “ limit the holy one of “ Israel * ! ” It implies therefore no more independence in the creature to suppose that God should will the continuance of its derived *purity*, while its *derived nature* was preserved, than that he should will the sun should give light while he preserves its course in the heavens. Is not what is now stated, in *effect* the *same* as divines have generally meant by the grace of confirmation to the holy angels, which secured them in their heavenly state? There was, therefore, nothing improper in the above conjecture; for who can tell, that amidst the immensity of the Divine works, there may not be myriads of worlds occupied by such perfectly pure and glorious intelligencies, continually filled with devout admiration of that infinite purity, goodness, and power, to which they are ever indebted for their existence, and for all the holy and happy circumstances that attend it? The thought is at least delightful, and its indulgence in our minds, amidst the infirmities and miseries of this fallen world, can be productive of no injurious effects, but may rather stimulate us, in humble dependence on Divine aid, to seek and pursue that exalted purity, and conformity to God, which must ever be essential to the happiness of conscious and intelligent existence.

* Psalm lxxviii. 41.

Of Mr. H's strange and wild attempt in this connection, to charge the author of the *Strictures* with holding "the Manichean doctrine of an evil principle *ETERNALLY existing* *," no other notice shall be taken, than to state the *fact*, that in making it, Mr. H. has *falsified* the passage which he has given as a quotation in an important word, and has printed "*eternally existing*," instead of "*essentially existing*." For the credit of religion, it is to be wished, that this was an error of the press; but in a pamphlet so remarkably well printed as Mr. Hill's, this is not probable. Reader, let us quit this part of his conduct without remark. The question in the *Strictures* has been fully vindicated by the extract from Plutarch, p. 22 of this Vindication.

In reply to Mr. H's observations concerning fate, it is sufficient to observe, that, according to the hypothesis, and to his animadversions, the essential tendency to moral defection does not arise from the will of the Creator, or the will of the creature. To what then can it be owing but to an irresistible fate which controls both?

The argument against the hypothesis from the human nature of Christ, Mr. H. calls a hackneyed argument, because it has occurred to others as well as to the author of the *Strictures*. Is Mr. H. incapable of discerning that truth is not weakened by repetition? What arguments have been more hackneyed than those which establish the truth of Christianity? Are they the less true, because they have been hackneyed, or often repeated? What reply would he make to a Deist who should call the evidences of Christianity hackneyed? The same reply he may take to himself in this instance. What he has alleged against this argument does not prove that, according to the hypothesis, the human nature of our Lord had not an infallible tendency to sin, but only that it is *counter-acted*. The argument is strong and unanswerable, and has

* P. 39.

not yet been urged half so far as it might be. For if Dr. W's hypothesis be true, then the human nature of Christ, as the production of Divine power *, must have, by "absolute necessity," a tendency to *moral* evil, and will continue to have it to all eternity! Dr. W's proposition is, that such a tendency is *essential* to *all* created existence; and if that proposition *be true*, this tendency *must for ever* remain inseparable from the human nature of our blessed Lord, however it may be counteracted!!! What can Mr. H. or Dr. W. reply to *this plain consequence* of their hypothesis? In reply to Mr. H's observations from page 40 to 44, it is only necessary to refer to the statement on *privative tendency* in this Vindication, p. 15 to 19.

His third section, on passive power, &c. has been largely refuted by anticipation in the arguments on that subject, and on the nature of morality in the present Vindication, page 25 to 35, and page 37 to 44.

Mr. Hill's attempt in his 47th page, to justify those allusions of Dr. Williams which, it had been hinted in the *Strictures* by the use of a single word, were not sufficiently *delicate*, cannot stand, except on the supposition, that every allusion in the Sacred Scriptures may with propriety be admitted into modern discourse. But this is a position which no person acquainted with the difference between the Hebrew and English idiom, and between ancient and modern manners, will affirm. Of Mr. H's reflection on *character*, conveyed by the intimation, that the hint in the *Strictures* was not consistent with purity of mind †, no further notice shall be taken, than to refer him to the grave and dignified rebuke of the apostle, Rom. xiv. 9.

The present is the proper connection for considering his explanation of the phrase, "LIBERTY TERMINATING UPON." This is said to be, "*the free act of the will*

* Luke i. 53.

† P. 48.

"forming

“ forming a junction with the state of the mind. The allusion is mathematical, and represents the free act of the will, connecting itself with the state of the mind, so as to form a union; as one line terminating upon another forms an angle *.” In the science of geometry, when a line terminates upon another right line, it ends where it terminates. The question therefore in the *Strictures* still returns, What is meant by the termination of liberty, its action, or its extinction? What advantage is gained, or what clear idea conveyed by comparing the state of the mind to one right line, and volition to another right line descending upon it, in a certain direction? Is the perpendicular the line of rectitude in Mr. H’s moral geometry? And as the sum of the two angles, made by one line meeting another line, is always equal to two right angles, or to the sum of the angles made by the perpendicular, does this gentleman mean to tell us, that the quantity of virtue and vice in every human character, taken together, is equal to rectitude, or to perfect virtue? This is sufficient to evince the weakness and absurdity of attempting to describe the operations of mind, by allusions that are inapplicable, and altogether incapable of conveying just or distinct ideas on the subject.

It would be a mere waste of the reader’s time and my own, to enter on a distinct consideration of Mr. H’s feeble efforts, through his fourth section, to refute the demonstration of the Divine injustice on Dr. W’s scheme given in the *Strictures*, p. 57 to 64. That demonstration has been further established, by the proof adduced in the former part of this vindication, that on the principles of the hypothesis, no accountability could have attached to the moral agent. One passage, however, must not be omitted. Mr. H. says, “ The position, that moral power must, at their first creation, have been commensurate with the obliga-

* P. 12.

tions of the subjects, is in *truth* merely a repetition of " the *Arminian* doctrine *." Dr. Owen, as above quoted, asserted the *moral* condition of Adam to be " perfect ;" and that he was " every way complete, *fit, disposed, and able,* " to, and for the obedience required of him." A comparison of Mr. H's *affirmation*, with Dr. Owen's sentiment, inevitably leads to one of these conclusions, either that Dr. Owen was an *Arminian*, or that Mr. H. knows very little of controversies. Which of these is the true conclusion, will probably not be doubted by any person.

To the observation in the *Strictures*, that the Doctor's scheme affords no relief, Mr. H. says, " that to assign the " reasons of the Divine conduct in the *permission* of sin, " does not belong to the person who professes to explain " merely the *origin* of its existence †." But if he does not enter into those reasons, how then will he " justify the " ways of God to man," which was the object he professed? Until this question is answered, nothing more need be said on this head.

Brief notice only shall be taken of Mr. H's animadversions on the " regret" expressed in the *Strictures*, respecting some of Dr. W's notes on Doddridge, which convey " singularities of opinion." It may be *seen* in the *Strictures*, p. 70. what those " singularities" are, whose appearance has been regretted, and the enumeration (which Mr. H. has prudently omitted) evinces the *propriety* of the appellation, as the reader may see, by turning to the page. Often, in conversation, has the author of the *Strictures* heard a regret expressed, that Dr. W. should annex them to the works of Doddridge. In one instance, he distinctly recollects to have heard a gentleman, in no respect inferior to Mr. H. in knowledge, learning, or piety, observe, that the annexation of those notes to Doddridge's works, looked like a cunning attempt to give these " singularities

* P. 56.

† P. 60

“ of opinion” wider circulation than they would otherwise have attained. These were the words used, and the anecdote sufficiently vindicates the opinion in the *Strictures*, which, with a studied carefulness, was expressed in language the *most respectful* to Dr. Williams. If my brother H. could, or would distinguish between *things* that *differ*, he would not have dishonoured himself by saying, that this part of the *Strictures* is, “ a severe reflection on the conduct of that numerous body of Expositors, Commentators, and Paraphrasts, who have, with deserved praise, employed their ingenuity and learning, not only on works of literature and science, but even on the infallible oracles of God*!!!!” Mr. H’s observations, part the third, to p. 70. are refuted by the proofs before adduced, that the whole hypothesis is useless, and utterly incompatible with the Divine equity and justice; see sections second and third of this *Vindication*. To apply, as Mr. H. thinks may be done, the dark and inconsistent metaphysical “ principles of this hypothesis,” to explain “ obscurities in the Holy Scriptures,” or to “ establish” its “ important truths †,” is to attempt, with the unhallowed touch of a vain philosophy, to support the ark of God.

I have now gone through Mr. H’s animadversions. His appendix, which relates to the Rev. W. Bennet’s “ Remarks,” is left entirely to the very able animadversions of my worthy and highly respectable Co-adjutor in the controversy, whose just, scriptural, and forcible arguments, against Dr. W’s hypothesis, have not yet been, and probably never will be refuted. The same spirit, however, runs through Mr. H’s appendix, as prevails in his animadversions, a spirit which shews, that the blow given to the hypothesis, both by the “ Remarks” and the “ *Strictures*,” has been deeply felt. Mr. H. it must candidly be allowed, might wish to support what had been strongly

* P. 62.

† P. 70.

attacked ;

attacked ; but in doing this, he should have avoided all the disreputable arts of controversy, and he ought, especially, to have abstained from personal aspersions, on men who had an honourable introduction into the ministry, and who were well respected in the situations where Divine Providence had placed them, some years before he was introduced into being. On this topic nothing more is requisite, than to state the fact. The justice of public opinion never flows, and seldom erring, will supersede the necessity of further observation. It has been my object to render this review of the animadversions as little personal as possible ; and the candid reader will observe, that the only thing of this description imputed to Mr. H. is, a want of discretion : an imputation from which, probably, the partiality of his kindest friends cannot in this instance altogether exculpate him. Wishing him, therefore, more discretion in future, and much personal comfort and success in his important and sacred engagements, I here take leave of the Rev. Thomas Hill's animadversions.

A brief statement of the consequences of Dr. W's hypothesis, and of the principles on which it has been attacked, shall close this tract, which has already extended far beyond what was at first designed. To an impartial mind, attentive to the evidence of Revelation, it is apprehended that the following principles, on which the arguments both in the *Strictures*, and the present *Vindication*, have been conducted, must appear evident. 1. That the ever blessed God, the source of all excellence, perfection, truth, and purity, is the author of all good, of all that is, or that ever will be *morally* good or *holy* in his creatures. 2. That intelligent and moral agents are spontaneous agents. Actions may *originate* with them, otherwise there would be but *one agency* in the universe. 3. That all laws, human or divine, which take cognizance of the actions of moral agents, suppose, or imply, that criminal actions might have

have been otherwise than they are. If this were not the case, they would be most notoriously unjust. 4. That moral and accountable agents were not, in their original formation, under circumstances which rendered transgression *inevitable* or *unavoidable*, for this would have destroyed their accountability. 5. That moral evil, or sin, though the precise mode of its origination, must remain *unknown* to us, could not have had its origin in the agency of God, or in the uncontrollable circumstances of his creatures. To suppose the former, would be blasphemous; to admit the latter, would supersede criminality. These positions are too obvious to be liable to misconception, and too self-evident to admit refutation. The hypothesis of Dr. W. by involving the *reverse* of most of them, has been shewn to be false and inadmissible; and in arguing on these principles, nothing more has been done than was acknowledged and urged, by the able and respectable divines whose sentiments have been before quoted. The precise point of difference between Dr. W. and his opponents, respects the adequacy of the moral principle in the original and probationary state of man. His opponents, with divines in general, affirm, that principle to have been sufficient, if duly improved, to have enabled man, in his original state, to preserve his integrity; while the Doctor's hypothesis asserts, that though created in the image of God, his connection with sin was *inevitable* and "*unavoidable*," unless prevented by such *superadded* positive communications, as the Creator was not in equity bound to grant. In addition to the arguments urged under the former sections, it is apprehended that such view of the moral system does,

1. Make God the author of sin. The whole scheme is clearly this: that moral agents were originally placed in a situation in which they would inevitably fall, in consequence of an essential imperfection of their nature, unless
this

this effect were prevented by the immediate interposition of Divine energy. But Dr. W. does not seem properly to have considered, that the great and holy God, who was the author of their existence, must have foreseen, and therefore intended the inevitable consequences of those imperfections, though he were able to prevent them, and consequently, that he is, according to the hypothesis, the original cause of the evil result. Dr. W's distinction between *decretive* and *hypothetical* necessity, is altogether *futile*, and cannot relieve his hypothesis from the above consequence, because, according to his statements, the hypothetical necessity arises from the creature's being left by an act of sovereignty, to his negative tendencies; and this act of sovereignty must have been an effect of Divine *volition*. That volition on *this* hypothesis must then be considered as the productive and effective cause of all the consequences.

2. The hypothesis altogether supercedes the criminality of sin in the *first instance*. The assertion is thus established. Supposing, without granting, that an essential tendency to moral defection originally belonged to the rational creature, this must have been his misfortune, but was not his *fault*. Dr. W. allows it was not *immoral*: supposing also, that the *positive* influence necessary to prevent sin was withheld from him; this withholdment must have been his calamity, but could not have been his *fault*. Upon the principles of the hypothesis, it was not a consequence of his *own act*, but of an act of Divine sovereignty, in which he had no concern. Supposing, further, that upon being left by sovereignty in these circumstances, he must, as Dr. W. asserts, fall into sin, or become the seat of moral evil, *this* also might be his *calamity*, but could not be *his fault*. No criminality could attach to it; for, on the principles of the hypothesis, the event was *certain* and *inevitable*, and could not have been avoided, by any powers which the

creature possessed, or which were originally communicated to him. It would be a solecism in language, under these circumstances, to call his transgression *moral* evil. The inevitable and unavoidable necessity of his acting contrary to God, as soon as he began to act at all, would supersede all criminality in the action. He might be *miserable*, but he was not in the first instance *criminal*. He was an *object* which benevolence might view with compassion, but he was not a *subject* which justice could pronounce to blame. This statement shews that the hypothesis takes away all accountability. And if this consequence be denied, let the argument be *fairly met* and *refuted*.

3. The principles of this hypothesis are, in a moral view, peculiarly liable to abuse. If sin be the mere effect of the infirmity of nature, which was not to be prevented in the first instance, but by superadded influence, beyond what the moral agent was originally endowed with as a holy creature, it is easy to see how such sentiments concerning the *essential infirmity* of nature, may be pleaded by men of corrupt minds, in extenuation of their most vicious propensities, and wicked practices. It is sufficient to suggest *this hint* as a *just* consequence arising from the hypothesis. The argument deducible from it, shall not here be drawn out at length, because this would be

Sacro digna silentio
dicere.

Hor. Od. Lib. II. od. 13.

If, therefore, after the perusal of this tract, Dr. W. should think, that the controversy respecting his theory on the origin of moral evil, remains undecided, he is now respectfully called upon to appear in its defence, and to meet the arguments urged against his views on this subject, in a manner worthy his respectable character and talents. He will ever find me disposed to treat a *fair* and *explicit* reply with all due candour and impartiality. In making
this

this requisition, I am far from being influenced by a love of controversy, a desire to carry it on, or a wish to hurt the feelings of those whom I respect and esteem.

Hic stylus haud petet ultrò
Quemquam animantem, et me veluti custodiet ensis
Vaginâ tectus. Quem cur distringere conor
Tutus ?

With respect to its further use in this controversy, my wish rather is,

Ut pereat positum rubigine telum.

If, however, attempts at reply should be made by any other person than the author of the Hypothesis, I must reserve to myself the right of noticing them or not, as their merits or demerits may in my judgment render proper. Every attempt to explain the origin of moral evil, is, in my view, vain and unprofitable ; and few perhaps will be of a different opinion, who will look over the long list of writers on the subject through fifteen centuries, given in the books mentioned in the note below*. Those views, however, of the DIVINE CHARACTER, of the nature of MORALITY, and the ground of MORAL OBLIGATION contained in this Vindication, appear to me infinitely important, and should *these* be attacked, though altogether averse from controversy, I would say in the words of the Roman poet,

Seu me tranquilla senectus
Expectat, seu mors atris circumvolat alis,
Dives, inops, Romæ, seu fors ita jusserit, exsul,
Quisquis erit vitæ, scribam, color.

Sat. Lib. II. i. 57.

On the whole, the design of the present tract coincides with that of the Strictures, and is intended to evince the

* Fabricii delectus argumentorum et syllabus Scriptorum qui veritatem religionis Christianæ asseruerunt, p. 378. *de origine mali*. Quarto. Hamburg, 1725. Fabricii Bibliothecæ Græcæ. Vol. V. p. 290. seq. [Edit. 1712.

inutility

inutility of hypotheses on the origin of moral evil, by
 demonstrating the fallacy and injurious tendency of that
 which has been recently presented to public attention.
 From such vain speculations the friends of Zion may
 with propriety retreat, to those more important objects
 which concern the promotion, defence, extension, and
 influence of their common Christianity, and that *Scriptural*
 and zealous exhibition of it, which the latter part of the
 Strictures was designed to recommend. The present tract
 may close therefore with an extract from the former, of
 a passage to which no reply has been made, but which
 expresses in brief my entire view of the subject. “ It
 “ is a matter of infinitely greater moment, to embrace,
 “ and act under the influence of those gracious discoveries
 “ of Revelation, which were intended to be the means of
 “ delivering us from the pollution and bondage, and, ulti-
 “ mately, from all the consequences of moral evil, than to
 “ perplex ourselves, or others, concerning the mode of its
 “ introduction. That a large portion of moral evil exists
 “ in the universe, and that it could not take place in a
 “ system which is the work of a Being of infinite power,
 “ equity, and goodness, without, in some sense, the per-
 “ mission of its author, are facts indubitable. And, pro-
 “ bably those who, in a proper spirit, may reflect most
 “ deeply on the subject, and view it attentively, in all its
 “ bearings and consequences, will be disposed to acquiesce
 “ in the general statement, that a being of infinite power,
 “ holiness, and goodness, ever acts worthy of himself, or
 “ consistently with his adorable moral perfections : but that
 “ we are not at present competent to explain all the parts
 “ of the moral system, or to judge, in many cases, of the
 “ reasons and motives which influenced the Divine con-
 “ duct, as we, certainly, are not in a situation to compre-
 “ hend the *whole* of it. Such a view of this solemn and
 “ profound subject, may satisfy a humble and believing
 “ mind,

“ mind, and the most sceptical cannot go further. He
“ doeth great things and unsearchable, marvellous things
“ without number *: he giveth not account of any of his
“ matters †. How unsearchable are his judgments, and his
“ ways past finding out ‡.”

To this shall only be added the language of a good and
eminent man lately removed to a better world. “ Many
“ have puzzled themselves about the origin of evil. I
“ observe there *is* evil, and that there is a way to escape
“ it, and with this I begin and end.”

CECIL'S Life of NEWTON, p. 246.

* Job v. 9.

† Chap. xxxiii. 13.

‡ Rom. xi. 33.



APPENDIX.

THE extracts annexed to the Strictures, evinced the zealous manner in which the reformed divines opposed the popish doctrine, that original righteousness was *superadded*, to counteract the *essential* infirmity of nature. Some of my readers may perhaps be pleased to see the following extracts from Bellarmine, which contain the passages controverted by Turretine and Spanheim, in the former quotations.

“ Quarta igitur propositio hæc esse potest : *Reſtitutio illa,*
 “ *cum qua Adam creatus fuit, et ſine qua, poſt ejus lapſum,*
 “ *homines omnes naſcuntur, donum ſupernaturale fuit. Hæc*
 “ *eſt adverſus hæreticos hujus temporis: ſed antequam*
 “ *probetur, explicanda eſt. Sciendum igitur primo, ho-*
 “ *minem naturaliter conſtare ex carne et ſpiritu, et ideo*
 “ *partim cum beſtiis, partim cum Angelis communicare*
 “ *naturam; et quidem ratione carnis, et communione cum*
 “ *beſtiis, habere propenſionem quandam ad bonum corporale*
 “ *et ſenſibile, in quod fertur per ſenſum et appetitum;*
 “ *ratione ſpiritus et communione cum Angelis, habere pro-*
 “ *penſionem ad bonum ſpirituale, et intelligibile, in quod fer-*
 “ *tur per intelligentiam et voluntatem. Ex autem diverſis,*
 “ *vel contrariis propenſionibus, exiſtere in uno eodemque*
 “ *homine pugnam quandam, et ex ea pugna ingentem bene*
 “ *agendi difficultatem, dum una propenſio alteram impedit.*
 “ Sciendum ſecundo, divinam providentiam initio crea-
 “ tionis, ut remedium adhiberet *huic morbo, ſeu languori*
 “ *naturæ humanæ, qui ex conditione materiæ oriebatur, ad-*
 “ *didiffe homini donum quoddam inſigne, juſtitiam vide-*
 “ *licet originalem; qua, veluti aureo quodam fræno, pars*
 “ *inferior parti ſuperiori, et pars ſuperior Deo, facile ſub-*
 “ *jecta contineretur. Sic autem ſubjectam fuiſſe carnem*
 “ *ſpiritu,*

“ spiritui, ut non possit eo invito moveri, neque ei rebel-
 “ lis fieri, nisi ipse fieret rebellis Deo ; in potestate tamen
 “ spiritus fuisse rebellem Deo fieri, et non fieri.

“ Sciendum tertio, multis modis dici aliquid *naturale* :
 “ primum enim naturale dicitur id omne, quod habetur a
 “ *nativitate*, &c. 2do. Naturale dici potest id, quod est
 “ *naturæ consentaneum*, quodque eam non destruit, sed
 “ ornat ac perficit, &c. 3tio. Dicitur naturale, quod,
 “ tametsi donum sit gratuitum, tamen naturam *juvat* ac
 “ *perficit in operibus naturalibus*, neque eam elevat ad opera
 “ ulla supernaturalia, &c. Et hoc modo Justitia originalis,
 “ si distincta esse intelligatur *a gratia gratum faciente*, donum
 “ naturale dici non potest. 4to. Naturale vocatur, quod
 “ aut est *pars naturæ*, aut *fluit a principiis naturæ*. Qua
 “ significatione corpus et animus, facultates quoque tum
 “ sentiendi, tum intelligendi, et operationes quæ ab eisdem
 “ facultatibus exercentur, naturalia esse dicuntur. Atque
 “ *hæc est significatio* de qua hoc loco disputamus ; et natu-
 “ rali, hoc modo considerato, valde proprie opponitur
 “ *supernaturale*. Potest autem duobus modis dici aliquid
 “ supernaturale, per se, et per accidens. Per se dicitur
 “ supernaturale, quod ex genere suo *non est aptum fluere ex*
 “ *principiis naturæ*, qualis fuit ascensio Helix igneo curru
 “ in cœlum, robur Sampsonis, et alia id genus : Per ac-
 “ *cidens* supernaturale vocatur, quod *interdum obtinetur*
 “ *divino miraculo*, licet alioqui ex naturæ principiis fluere
 “ soleat. Talis fuit sensus videndi, quem Dominus *cæco*
 “ *nato* restituit—sapientia divinitus *Salomoni* tributa, et alia
 “ non pauca, quæ in Scripturis leguntur.

“ Jam igitur *Adversarii* consent, rectitudinem illam, in
 “ qua creatus est Adam, fuisse illi naturalem *hoc ultimo*
 “ *modo* ; nimirum, quod fuerit veluti *quædam sanitas debita*
 “ *naturæ*, aptaque, *nasci ex ipsa natura bene constituta*, id est
 “ non corrupta : Et nunc hominibus, qui eam rectitudinem
 “ amiserunt in Adamo, deesse *bonum aliquod naturale*,
 “ quale

“ quale deesset pecudi si cæca, vel claudicans, vel febri-
 “ citans nasceretur. Et si nunc alicui homini originalis illa
 “ Justitia divinitus redderetur, dicerent eam esse donum
 “ supernaturale *per accidens*, non *per se*; ut diximus de
 “ oculis redditis cæco nato. Nos vero existimamus, rec-
 “ titudinem illam, etiam partis inferioris, fuisse *donum*
 “ *supernaturale*, et quidem *per se*, non per accidens; ita
 “ ut neque ex *naturæ principii* fluxerit, neque *potuerit*
 “ fluere. Et quia donum illud *supernaturale* erat, *eo remoto*,
 “ natura humana sibi relicta, pugnam illam experiri cæpit
 “ partis inferioris cum superiore, quæ *naturalis futura erat*,
 “ id est, *ex conditione materiæ* sequutura, nisi Deus justitiæ
 “ donum homini *addidisset*. Quare non *magis differt* status
 “ hominis *post lapsum Adæ*, a statu ejusdem in *puris natu-*
 “ *ralibus*, quam differat *spoliatus a nudo*; neque *deterior est*
 “ humana natura (si culpam originalem detrahas) neque
 “ *magis ignorantia et infirmitate laborat*, quam esset, et labo-
 “ raret, in *puris naturalibus* condita. Proinde, *Corruptio*
 “ *naturæ*, non ex alicujus *doni naturalis carentia*, neque ex
 “ alicujus *malæ qualitatis* accessu, sed ex *sola doni superna-*
 “ *turalis*, ob Adæ peccatum, *amissione* profluxit.”

Bellarmin. de Gratia primi hominis, et de Amissione
 gratiæ et statu peccati. Cap. V. p. 19, 20, 21.
 Edit. Ingolstadt. 8vo. 1593.

F I N I S.





