





THE

DISSERTATIONS

OF

MAXIMUS TYRIUS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY

THOMAS TAYLOR.

Truth would you teach, or save a sinking land,
All hear, *none* aid you, and FEW understand. POPE.

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DISSERTATION XXI.

WHETHER THE LIBERAL DISCIPLINES CONTRIBUTE ANY THING TO VIRTUE.

SOCRATES, in the Piræum, discoursing with political characters, fashions in words, as in a drama, an image of a good city and polity. He also establishes laws, educates children, and appoints guardians for the city, and delivers over both the bodies and souls of the citizens to music and gymnastic; for this purpose appointing good preceptors and select judges of both these disciplines, as being the leaders of the flock, and denominating these leaders guardians *; thus forming a city in a dream and not in reality, as it will appear to some one of a more rustic genius. This, however, was the manner of the ancient philosophy, which was similar to oracles. But, if you please, we will dismiss Socrates, and call on the Athenian guest to answer us: for I hear † him

* See the second book of the Republic of Plato.

† Maximus here alludes to Plato's Laws, to my translation of which I refer the reader.

discoursing in Crete, in the cavern of Dictæan Jupiter, to Megillus the Lacedæmonian, and Clinias the Cnossian, and establishing laws for a Doric city, in order that the Cretans might be persuaded to introduce music into the study of fortitude, and thus mitigate the ferocity of anger by melody, lest virtue among them should become mutilated or imperfect in consequence of preparing themselves to act valiantly, endure labours, and die without deserting their station in battle, but imparting no remedy against the sedition in the souls of their citizens.

What then do you say, O Attic guest? Is good so narrow, grovelling, difficult to be obtained, immanifest, and replete with molestation, that we cannot obtain it without singing, and drawing geometrical lines, and consuming our time in these, as if it were our intention to become something else, and not to be good men? Though divine virtue, indeed, according to its use, is sublime and great, and near to every one, but, according to its possession, is not difficult to him who but once wishes to be obedient to the beautiful in conduct, and to oppose whatever is base. The Athenian guest, however, will answer, that this, which is called the law of the city, without the obedience of those that use it, is promulgated in vain, and that it is necessary the people should submit to it voluntarily; but the people * in the soul are nu-

* The people in the soul consist, 1. Of multiform desires, which divide the soul about the body, and cause it to energize about externals. 2. Of the senses; for these are multiform,

merous and foolish, who, nevertheless, when they once yield their assent to the law, and follow where it commands, produce the most excellent polity in the soul, and which men denominate philosophy.

Come, then, let philosophy approach after the manner of a legislator, adorning the disorderly and wandering soul as if it were the people in a city. Let her also call as her coadjutors other arts; not such as are sordid by Jupiter, nor such as require manual operation, nor such as contribute to procure us things little and vile; but let one of these be that art which prepares the body to be subservient, as a prompt and robust vehicle, to the mandates of the soul, and which is denominated gymnastic. Let another art be that which is the angel of the conceptions of the soul, and which is called rhetoric; another, that which is the nurse and tutor of the juvenile mind, and which is denominated poetry; another that which is the leader of the nature of numbers, and which is called arithmetic; and another that which is the teacher of computation, and is called logistic. Let geometry, also, and music follow, who are the associates of philosophy and conscious of her arcana, and to each of which she distributes a portion of her labour.

and perceive nothing accurate or true. 3. Of imaginations, which draw down the soul to a passive intelligence. And 4. Of opinions, because these are various and infinite, tend to externals, and are mingled with phantasy and sense.

And of her labours, indeed, perhaps we may discourse hereafter; but let us now assert what is reasonable about music, the most ancient of all the studies in the soul; that it is a pursuit, beautiful indeed to a man, and again, that it is also beautiful to a city and to the whole human race, by which, through the destiny of the gods, it is studied. I do not speak of that music which proceeds into the soul through flutes and singing, through choirs and dancing, unaccompanied with words, and which is honoured for the delight it procures to the ears: for human error, it seems, embraced this in consequence of pursuing the apparently pleasant, and through this love adulterating the accuracy of music. Indeed this accuracy is now no longer to be found: but the music which we have at present, abandoning its sane and ancient beauty, deceives us like doves, by exhibiting a counterfeit and not a native flower; and thus, associating with nothing but an image of music, we ignorantly think that it is the true Heliconian muse, which was the friend of Homer, the preceptor of Hesiod, and the mother of Orpheus, neither possessing this, nor having any knowledge of it. The illegitimate usurpation, however, gradually insinuating itself into the soul, drew it into this misfortune both privately and publicly. For when the Dorians, who inhabit Sicily, leaving at home that mountain and simple music which they used among their herds and flocks, became enamoured of Sybaritic pipes, and studied such danc-

ing as the Ionian flute excites, then, to speak the most favourably, they became less wise, but, to speak most truly, they became more intemperate. But the ancient Athenian muse consisted of choirs of boys and men; and the husbandmen being collected in tribes, who had not yet wiped away the dust which they had collected in the field from the harvest and sowing, poured forth the extemporaneous song. This muse, however, gradually declining into the art of insatiable grace in the scene and in theatres, became the source to the Athenians of political error. But the true harmony which the choir of the muses sings, and of which Apollo Musagetes is the leader, saves the soul, saves a house, saves a city, saves a ship, saves an army.

If, indeed, we are persuaded by Pythagoras, as it is fit we should, the heavens themselves sing *

* It is well observed by Simplicius, in his Commentary on the second book of Aristotle de Cœlo, that all things are not mutually commensurate with each other, nor every thing sensible to every sensitive nature: for dogs scent animals at a distance, of which men have no smell. Much more, therefore, must it be true to say that the sound of divine bodies (and such are those in the heavens) is not audible by terrene ears, since celestial and earthly bodies differ in the same proportion from each other, as things incorruptible from such as are corruptible. He adds; but the sound of divine and immaterial bodies is neither percussive nor destructive, but excites the powers and energies of the sounds in the sublunary region, and perfects the kindred sense by which it is perceived. What Simplicius here observes accords with what Maximus says concerning the celestial harmony.

sweetly, not being struck like a lyre, nor inflated like a flute ; but the revolution of the elegant and harmonious bodies which they contain being commensurate and equally balanced, produces a certain divine sound. The beauty of this song is, indeed, known to the gods, but is not perceived by us, through its transcendency and our penury. This, also, Hesiod appears to me to have obscurely signified when he speaks of a certain Helicon, and the divine choirs of gods which it contains; the coryphæus, of which is the sun, or Apollo, or by whatever other name it may be proper to denominate that most splendid and harmonic fire. But with respect to human music, which proceeds about the soul, what else will it be than a method of instructing the passions, soothing them as it were by enchantment when they are too elevated and impetuous; and, on the contrary, exciting and exalting them when they are too remiss and dissipated ? This it is which is skilful in mitigating sorrow, repressing the emotions of anger and the ebullitions of rage, moderating desire, healing grief, consoling love, and alleviating calamity. This is a good assistant in sacrifices, a companion in banquets, a commander in war. This is skilled to give delight in festivals, to dance at the rites of Bacchus, and to impart inspiration in the mysteries. It is also skilled to mingle political manners with measure. Thus the study of the flute, accompanied with Pindar singing to its harmony, rendered the rustic Bœotians mild ; the

verses of Tyrtæus excited the Spartans; the numbers of Telesilla * the Argives; and the song of Alcæus the Lesbians. Thus, also, Anacreon, among the Samians, softened the manners of Polycrates, mingling with his tyranny the love of Smerdias, the locks of Cleobulus, the beauty of Bathyllus, and the Ionic song.

But why is it requisite to speak of things more ancient than these? Orpheus, indeed, was the son of Oeagrus and Calliope herself, and was born in Thrace, in the mountain Pangæus, which is inhabited by those Thracians who are called Odrysi, a rustic race, given to plunder, and void of hospitality. The Odrysi, however, willingly followed Orpheus as their leader, being charmed by the beauty of his song. This, therefore, is the meaning of the assertion, that he drew rocks and trees, assimilating the ignoble manners of those that were allured to inanimate bodies. There was also another noble harper † in Bœotia, who did not, as the fable says, draw stones by his art (for how could a wall be raised by song?) but by embaterion and tactic melody collecting the Bœotian young men into a phalanx, he surrounded Thebes

* Telesilla was a lyric poetess of Argos, who bravely defended her country against the Lacedæmonians, and obliged them to raise the siege. A statue was raised to her honour in the temple of Venus. Pausan. ii. c. 20. See also Plutarch on the virtues of women, vol. ii. p. 245. Polyænus viii. 33. and Suidas.

† Maximus here speaks of Amphion, who was fabled to have moved stones and raised the walls of Thebes by the harmony of his lyre.

with an invincible wall. This was such a wall as that which Lycurgus devised for the Spartans, who ordered the young men to march to battle with the flute for their leader, and they followed fighting to the law of the dance. Themistocles, possessing this flute, led the Athenians to their ships, when some rowed, and others fought, under the inspiring influence of the flute; but both were victorious. The Eleusinian goddesses applauded this choir. Hence monuments of victory were raised; hence Laconic and Attic, marine and continental trophies, accompanied with beautiful inscriptions. With this choir the Lacedæmonians conquered; this choir Leonidas taught.

What occasion is there, however, to say any thing further, or to be prolix in speaking of music? since it is an excellent governor in peace, a good leader in battle, a good associate in a polity, and an excellent nurse of children. For the hearing is the most rapid of the senses, swiftly sends what it apprehends to the soul, and compels her to sound and be excited in conjunction with its passions. Whence souls, foreign from the muses and destitute of elegance, having abandoned themselves to every thing apparently pleasant, never become partakers of right law, though they denominate their pleasure music, through a similitude, not of the end, but of the occupation about melodies; just as if any one should call the art medicinal which pays no attention to the salubrious, but is wholly busied in the search of remedies. Thus, too, with respect to geometry, which is a

most noble part of philosophy, it is considered by the multitude as a vile thing, and as conducive to a vile end, since they look only to its subserviency to the necessities of life; such as measuring the earth, raising a wall, and every thing else pertaining to manual operation, to which it contributes; and their views extend no further than this. It is, however, far otherwise. For the earth would not be worse inhabited though it should not be accurately measured by needy husbandmen. And this, indeed, is the vilest part of geometry; but its proper employment, like a certain remedy which sharpens the vision of the dianoëtic power, consists in imparting to this power a strength by no means ignoble in its contemplation of the universe. The multitude, however, do not perceive this its proper use; just as if an inhabitant of the continent, on seeing a ship in a port, and admiring the contrivance, should make use of it while it is in the port, moving all its instrumental parts, and conceiving this to be the end of the ship.

To such a man, Minerva (the inventress of this work) would, I think, say: "Do you see the broad and immense sea which is poured round the earth and connects its boundaries, of which before you had never heard, and of the sight of which you had no hope? Prior to this contrivance each man knew only the place of his abode, in the same manner as reptiles their dens; but friendship, the mingling with others, communion, and an exchange of commodities were unknown till I devised for you this invention, a ship. For this

elevated vehicle, like a bird, flies everywhere. If you doubt the truth of this, learn by experience that it is so." In like manner some one of the gods, or Minerva herself, may say, concerning geometry: "Look yonder! Do you see this spectacle above your head, beautiful, various, circularly spreading and revolving round the earth, carrying the sun, containing the moon? Of this you are ignorant, though you desire to see and know what it is. But I, O inhabitant of earth! will raise you thither. For, by the assistance of geometry, I will fashion for you a light vehicle, which will at first raise you into the port, that you may not be giddy and terrified at the prospect of the sea; but afterwards, leading you out of the port, it will bring you to the pure and tranquilly-flowing sea of real beings *,

> 'Where the gay morn resides in radiant bowers,
> And keeps her revels with the dancing hours;
> Where Phœbus, rising in th' etherial way,
> Through heav'n's bright portals pours the beamy day;†'

and where the moon and the other undecaying bodies diffuse their light. But as long as you are without the vision of these, you will remain without the participation, and without a portion, of true felicity ‡."

* In the original τῶν ὄντων but I read τῶν ὄντως ὄντων; and in so doing I am justified by the version of Paccius.

† Odyss. xii. ver. 3.

‡ The mathematical disciplines awaken the dormant knowledge of the soul. Hence Plato justly asserts of theoretic arith-

metic, that it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. Geometry, too, is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge of the ineffable principle of things, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, and contemplating, as in most splendid images, the ideal world and its immense cause. And, lastly, music, when properly studied, is subservient to our ascent; viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. It is beautifully, therefore, said by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul, through these disciplines, has an organ purified and enlightened, which is blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this alone."

DISSERTATION XXII.

WHETHER ANY ONE MAY BECOME A GOOD MAN THROUGH A DIVINE ALLOTMENT.

HOMER, speaking to Telemachus in the person of Mentor *, observes concerning him: "I do not think that you was born and educated with the gods averse to you." He also calls all good men *divine* †; because, as it appears to me, their goodness was not the effect of art but the work of *Jupiter*. I also suspect that his verses concerning Demodocus were composed by him respecting his own fortune, though he ascribes them to that bard. But the verses are as follow:

> "Dear to the muse! who gave his days to flow
> With mighty blessings mix'd with mighty woe:
> With clouds of darkness quench'd his visual ray,
> But gave him skill to raise the lofty lay ‡."

I agree with him, indeed, that he was dear to the

* In the original Νεστορος, *Nestor*; but this is evidently either an error of Maximus or of his transcriber. For it is Mentor who says this. See Odyss. iii. ver. 28.

† In order that the English reader may understand the meaning of Maximus in this place, it is necessary to observe, that the word used here for *divine* is in the original διους, *dious*, and that the genitive of *Jupiter* is διος, *dios*.

‡ Odyss. viii. ver. 63. The translation by Pope.

muse, but I do not accord with him respecting his calamity; for the gift is not harmonic. Demodocus, also, is not to be believed when he thus says of himself:

"Self-taught am I, the gods impart the song*."

But how, O best of poets! can you be self-taught, and at the same time receive your song from the gods, who are the most faultless of preceptors? Demodocus may answer that which the rich, who have received a paternal inheritance, may say to those who are busily employed in the acquisition of wealth, that their riches are spontaneous, and not acquired by the art and labour of others.

Can we, indeed, think that Hesiod, when he was feeding sheep about Helicon in Bœotia, met with the Muses singing †, who reprobated the shepherds' art; and that, receiving from them a branch of laurel, he began immediately to sing, becoming from a shepherd a poet; just as they say those who are inspired by the Corybantes,

* In the original,

"Αυτοδιδακτος δ'ειμι, θεοι δε μοι ωπασαν ομφην."

This line is not at present to be found in Homer. Phemius, indeed, says the same thing of himself in different words:

"Αυτοδιδακτος δ'ειμι, θεος δε μοι εν φρεσιν οιμας
Παντοιας ενεφυσεν." Odyss. xxii. ver. 347.

I am, however, inclined to think, that the line quoted by Maximus formerly existed in Homer.

† Maximus alludes to the Theogony of Hesiod, ver. 21, et seq.

when they hear the sound of the pipe, are agitated with divine fury, and are no longer in the same state of mind as before? By no means. But Hesiod, I think, obscurely signified the spontaneous nature of his art, ascribing the cause of it to the choir of the Muses; just as if some one, becoming a brazier without art, should refer to Vulcan the spontaneity of the workmanship. But what with respect to the Cretans? Does it not appear to you, that, being beautifully instructed by Minos, and delighted with virtue, they celebrated him as having Jupiter for his preceptor, and asserted, that for nine years he associated with Jupiter in Ida, in the cavern of the god, and was there disciplined by him in political concerns? For such are the assertions of the Cretans.

There was also among the Athenians an Eleusinian, whose name was Melesagoras *. This man, as the Athenians say, not by art, but from the inspiration of the nymphs, was, by a divine allotment, a wise man and a prophet. Another man, likewise, a Cretan, whose name was Epemenides, came to Athens, he too not being able to tell who was his preceptor; but he was skilful in divine concerns, so that by expiatory sacrifices he saved the republic of the Athenians from pestilence and sedition, with which it was at that time infested. He was skilful in these things, not from having learnt them, but a long sleep narrated them to

* There were formerly many historians of this name; but no ancient writer except Maximus makes any mention of Melesagoras the prophet.

him, and a dream was his preceptor. There was also in Proconnesus a philosopher, whose name was Aristeas *, in whose wisdom all men at first disbelieved, because he could not adduce any one as his preceptor in it. For this incredulity, therefore, he invented the following remedy: He said, that his soul having left the body, immediately winged its way to æther, wandered round the Grecian and barbarian lands, every island, river, and mountain; and that the land of the Hyperboreans became the boundary of his circuit. He added, that in his flight he surveyed all legal institutions, political manners, the nature of different regions, the mutations of the air, the flux and reflux of the sea, and the gates of rivers; and that his view of the heavens was much clearer than that of the realms beneath. Aristeas, too, in asserting these things, more readily gained assent than Anaxagoras or Xenophanes, or any other who has unfolded the manner in which things subsist: for men did not clearly understand this circuitous wandering of his soul, nor with what eyes he saw all these particulars; but they thought that the soul must in reality travel in order to give a true account of every thing.

Are you willing, therefore, that, dismissing Aristeas, Melesagoras, and Epemenides, and leaving the enigmas of poets to fables, we turn our attention to the philosophers from the Lyceum

* This Aristeas was also a poet. He wrote an epic poem on the Arimaspi, in three books; and some of his verses are quoted by Longinus.

and the elegant academy: for these neither mythologize, nor speak in enigmas, nor embrace the portentous, but employ a popular diction and popular conceptions? But, if you please, we will thus address the leader of these: "That you honour, O Socrates! science more than every thing, I hear you frequently asserting, when you recommend different young men to different preceptors; as when you exhort Callias to send his son * to Aspasia the Milesian, a male to a female. You, too, though you was so great a man, went to her, nor was this preceptress sufficient for you; but you collected knowledge in amatory affairs from Diotima, in music from Connus, in poetry from Evenus, in agriculture from Ischomachus, and in geometry from Theodorus. And these things, indeed, I praise, whether they are to be taken ironically, or seriously, or in whatever way they are to be considered. But when I hear you discoursing with Phædrus, or Charmides, or Theætetus, or Alcibiades, I suspect that you do not attribute every thing to science, but that you think there is a more ancient preceptress to men, nature herself; and that it is this which in so careless a manner you insinuate in your conferences when you say, my association with Alcibiades † is from a divine allotment; and again, when you call Phædrus ‡ a divine head, and prophesy concerning

* Viz. Philebus. See the Philebus of Plato.

† See the first Alcibiades of Plato.

‡ Phædrus is thus called by Socrates in the dialogue by Plato of that name.

Isocrates *, when he was a very young man. What do you mean by these things, O Socrates? If you please I will dismiss you, and betake myself to the author of these assertions, that friend from the academy; and let him answer us, very earnestly enquiring if men become good by a divine allotment. My question, however, is confined to good men; for I do not speak of poets, lest you should adduce Hesiod, nor diviners, lest you should speak of Melesagoras, nor of expiators, lest you should narrate Epimenides; but dismissing the name of art from each, add virtue, by which they were good men with respect to the works of men, dextrous in the government of a family, and skilled in political concerns; about this inform me, whether it is imparted by divinity to any one without art. Or let me also dismiss you; and let reason answer itself for itself, as one man to another, boldly, in the following manner:

O miserable man! why do you thus trifle, by thinking that what is most excellent in human goods is rapidly derived from human art, but with the utmost difficulty from divine virtue? And yet you will not say that the divining, telestic †, and poetic arts, expiations, and the uttering of oracles, and in short every thing of this kind, are of equal worth with virtue. Add to this, you think these are mingled in human souls by a certain divine inspiration; but that which is more

* See the Phædrus of Plato.

† Viz. The art pertaining to sacred mysteries.

rare than these, virtue, you conceive to be the work of mortal art. Divinity is, indeed, according to you, a very exalted nature, since he conducts himself towards things that are vile in a beautiful and munificent manner, but is parsimonious towards things of a more excellent condition. I omit to mention, that if each of these receives its completion, this must necessarily be the case with that which is of a superior nature. For divinity is not circumscribed by one art, in the same manner as a brazier cannot teach a carpenter, or in the same manner as the husbandman is unskilled in the pilot's art, the pilot in the medical art, and so on in the other arts and their professors; but if any thing is derived to us from him, with respect to the power of the human soul, it will be the measure of art; but with respect to the preparation of divine science it will be a part of the whole. See then, whether divinity, if he is able to allot and distribute to you things of this kind, will not, by a much greater priority, be both able and willing to distribute virtue.

But consider this as follows: You will certainly admit that divinity is most perfect, most sufficient to himself, and most powerful; so that if you take away any one of these you will injure the whole. For if he is not perfect neither will he be sufficient to himself; if he is not sufficient to himself he will not yet be perfect; and if he is neither sufficient to himself nor perfect how will he be powerful? But being sufficient to himself, perfect, and strong, according to perfection indeed, he must will that

which is good, according to self-sufficiency possess, and according to power be able to effect it. And being willing, possessing, and able to impart good, why should he not impart it? For he who possesses and does not bestow good is not willing to bestow it: he who is willing, but does not possess it, is not able to impart it: but how is it possible that he should be deprived of power who both possesses and is able to bestow it? If, therefore, he possesses good he will possess the most perfect; but virtue is the most perfect good: and hence he will give that which he possesses. So that there is no occasion to fear lest any other good should be imparted to men which does not originate from divinity; for, indeed, there is not any thing good to men which is not derived from the gods. But it may be said, after what manner is virtue imparted by divinity? The whole of the human nature receives from the beginning a twofold division, into an aptitude to virtue and an aptitude to depravity; of which two, depravity indeed, requires punishment, but virtue preservation. For a depraved nature when it obtains a good ruler, law, or custom, derives this advantage, that it does not injure its neighbour; and makes a proficiency, not by the accession of good but by the diminution of evil. Souls, however, of the most excellent nature, being established as in a port in the confines of the most exalted virtue and extreme depravity, require the co-operating aid of divinity in their strenuous tendency to the better part. For the lapse to things base is the work of

spontaneous imbecility, which, flattering worthy souls through pleasures and desires, draws them into the same paths with the depraved. Hear, therefore, Jupiter himself, who says *,

" O strange that mortals should the gods accuse!
On us their ills they charge, though them
Fate for their crimes precipitates in woe."

But you will not hear him asserting any thing of this kind about good men, nor denying the cause of their worth, nor abandoning the care of them, but the very contrary :

" Divine Ulysses how can I forget,
Whose soul in ev'ry toil is prompt and bold,
And whom the power of wisdom deigns to love †?"

Who, therefore, will not acknowledge that Ulysses was a good man through a divine allotment, of whom Jupiter was mindful, Minerva solicitous, and Mercury the leader ; and who was beloved by Calypso, and saved by Leucöthea? But if he was a good man (as he was) because he,

" Wand'ring from clime to clime, observant stray'd,
Men's manners noted, and their states survey'd ‡;"

And because

" He greatly suffer'd on the stormy main,"

How is it possible these exercises should not have

* Odyss. i. ver. 32.

† The first only of these verses is ascribed to Jupiter by Homer, in Odyss. i. ver. 65 ; but the three are to be found conjointly in Iliad x. ver. 243, seq. The memory, therefore, of Maximus here failed him, as Stephens well observes.

‡ Odyss. i. ver. 3.

been assigned to him by a divine allotment, through which he both was and appeared to be a worthy man? On this account a divine power surrounded him with so many antagonists; among the barbarians, with the Trojans; among the Greeks, with those illustrious chiefs Palamedes and Ajax; in his own palace, with robust and most intemperate suitors; among the Cyclops, with one the most savage; among the Thracians, with the most inhospitable; among enchantresses, with one the most dreadful; and among wild beasts, with one possessing the most numerous heads *. And, besides all these, he sailed over a great length of sea, encountered dreadful storms and frequent shipwrecks; was compelled to wander and become a mendicant, to be clothed with rags, to ask for fragments of bread, to wrestle with a beggar, be kicked and derided by the intoxicated; all which divinity exposed him to with benevolent intentions; neither Neptune being enraged because he had

"————blinded his much-lov'd son †,"

nor the sun on account of his herds. For neither has Neptune so much friendship for a savage man ‡ and inhospitable son, nor is the sun so

* Meaning the rock Scylla.

† Odyss. i. ver. 102.

‡ See my explanation of the wanderings of Ulysses in the History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, at the end of vol. ii. of Proclus on Euclid.

needy and parsimonious of oxen; but these were the mandates of Jupiter. For is it not this divinity, also, who did not suffer his own son Hercules to live in indolence and luxury, but drew him from the midst of pleasures, into which he hurled Eurystheus, and surrounded Hercules with wild boars and lions, potentates and tyrants, robbers and long journies, desert lands, and impervious rivers? Or can you suppose that Jupiter was able to beget three sons in one night, but that he was not able to liberate from these labours of life him whom he had begotten in this night? But he was unwilling to do so. For it is not lawful that Jupiter should will any thing else than that which is most beautiful. Thus, then, Hercules, Bacchus *, and Ulysses were worthy men. And, that I may not lead you far from things before your feet, do you think that Socrates himself became a good man from art, and not from a divine allotment? According to art, indeed, he was a statuary, receiving this allotment from his father; but, ac-

* Every deity, according to the ancient theology, beginning from on high, produces his own proper series to the last of things; and this series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other. Thus, for instance, the sun produces *angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, panical,* and such-like powers, each of which subsists according to a solar characteristic: and the same reasoning must be applied to every other divinity. Hence the most exalted characters among men, in consequence of knowing the divine series, of which they formed a part, called themselves by the names of the leaders of those series.

cording to the election of divinity, he abandoned his art and embraced virtue *.

* In order thoroughly to understand the subject of this dissertation, it is necessary to refer the reader to the Meno of Plato, which is a dialogue concerning virtue. At present, therefore, I shall only observe from that dialogue, that not every soul is capable of virtue ; that a certain predisposition is requisite ; and that the parts of the soul must be well-proportioned to each other in their natural frame. In the next place, it must be observed, that virtue is not acquired by mere practice or habit ; that it consists not merely in a good disposition, without being well-cultivated, and, consequently, comes not by nature, nor in any particular science or sciences ; and, therefore, is not acquired by learning, and is not to be taught in the ordinary method of instruction or discipline. Hence it may be collected, that it consists in true wisdom, not only derived originally from Divinity by participation, but inspired immediately by him through continual communication ; presupposing, as a fit subject for the reception of this wisdom, a soul well disposed by nature, cultivated by right discipline, and strengthened by constant care and attention. But as the two first requisites, a good natural disposition and right institution, depend on the Divine Providence ; and, as the last, the constant practice of virtue depends on the divine assistance ; all these co-operating causes of virtue are called by Plato θεια μοιρα, *the divine allotment.*

DISSERTATION XXIII.

IF GOOD IS GREATER THAN GOOD *. IN WHICH IT IS SHOWN THAT IT IS NOT.

I DO not assent to Homer when he blames the Lycian Glaucus for changing † his golden arms for those of Diomed, which were brazen, and giv-

* In order to solve the question which is discussed in this and the next Dissertation, it is necessary to observe, that all things are not synonymous which subsist according to one form, nor do they after the same manner participate of their common cause; but some things participate of it *primarily* and others *ultimately*. For every form is the leader of a certain series, which begins from on high, and gradually descends as far as to the last of things. It is by no means, therefore, wonderful that the same form of good should presubsist as the cause both of divine and mortal goods; of such as are true and real, and of such as are false and delusive. To which we may add, that as the characteristics of true good are, as Plato observes in the Philebus, *the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect*, the first and most excellent beings participate of all these, but the last of things of *the desirable* only; and on this account, as they do not participate of the whole of good, they are good homonymously, and not synonymously. Let the reader also observe, that *good*, considered as a *form* or *idea*, is different from *good* considered as the ineffable principle of things: for, according to Plato, the former ranks among *beings* but the latter is superessential: and the former is simply called *good*, but the latter *the good*.

* See Iliad. vi. ver. 234, seq.

ing the value of a hecatomb for the worth of nine oxen. For this is properly the accusation of a merchant:

> " Some mean sea-farer in pursuit of gain;
> Studious of freight, in naval trade well skill'd *:"

and not of a poet, who was thought worthy to be the disciple of Calliope, and to whom it was neither lawful to praise any thing base, nor to blame any thing beautiful. It was fit, indeed, that Glaucus, since he was descended from Hippolochus, Bellerophon, Sisyphus, and Æolus, all of whom were excellent characters, when he met with a man who appeared to be an enemy according to the fortune of war, but who was a friend according to paternal hospitality,—it became him, on recognising ancient friendship, and the familiarity of their ancestors, to measure the exchange of arms by the occasion and not by their worth; nor to compare gold with brass, in the same manner as those who buy wine from Lemnos:

> " Each in exchange proportion'd treasures gave:
> Some brass or iron; oxen some, or hides †."

For compensation consists in the necessity of things before our feet, and the more is opposed to the less in things which are dissimilar with respect to honour. He, therefore, who is blindfold may know that a talent is worth more than ten minæ,

* Odyss. viii. ver. 162. The translation by Pope.

† Iliad. vii. ver. 473.

and that a drachma is more valuable than an obolus; and in the possession of land, according to Herodotus *, poor husbandmen measure it by paces, the more wealthy by stadia; and those who are much more agricultural than these, such as the Egyptians, by ropes. In the possession of cattle, also, Dardanus was much more opulent than Polyphemus:

"Three thousand mares about his pastures fed †."

But he who, not removing things necessary to life, compares them with good, will find that these, in opportunity and law, pleasures, manners, and fortunes, are, by a continual flux, changed into honour and infamy; but that good is firm, stable, undeviating, equiponderant, common, impartible, copious, unindigent, neither admitting increase nor being subject to defect ‡. For that which is increased is increased by addition; but if good accedes to good, you must not conceive that good becomes more good by this accession, for it was good before. But if that which acceded to the increase was not good you speak of a dire thing, since thus there will be a certain good which will become greater by the addition of evil. For that which is indigent is indigent by deficiency; and if the good is indigent by the absence of good, it was not good, since it is indigent; but if it is indigent by the absence of something else, and not by

* Lib. ii. cap. 6. † Iliad. xx. ver. 221.

‡ It must be carefully observed, that these are the characteristics of *true* good, and not of that good which is only *equivocally* so called.

the absence of good, this deficiency does not injure the good.

But what! do you not thus consider what is said? Do you call health of body any thing? Certainly, you will say. And do you not also call disease something? Answer, then, respecting each of these: is not health a certain measure of the congruity of bodies, when contraries accord with each other in the most excellent temperament; fire with water, earth with air, and again, both with both, and all with all? Does, therefore, health appear to you to be a diversified and all-various thing, and not that which is simple and consentaneous*? For when you speak of measure you speak of stability; since in things commensurate there is no transition from one to the other, but their boundaries are accurate. On the other hand, what else is disease than the dissolution and perturbation of the corporeal league, when the parts, which were hitherto harmonized, hastily fall on each other, and are tumultuously moved, and the body through these is corrupted, dilacerated, and violently agitated? Can you, therefore, think that this war is simple and one? If it was, indeed, the medicinal science would be but of little worth. But now the abundant distribution and garrulity of this war of bodies, which we call disease, generates an all-various art, and which is full of various instruments, many medicines, and a great diver-

* Health, accurately defined, is symmetry, and a subsistence according to nature.

sity of aliments and modes of living. If, also, you proceed to music, here, indeed, that which is harmonized is one, neither becoming superior nor subordinate to itself; but that which is discordant is abundant, all-various, and distributed. Thus, too, an according choir is one; but when it does not accord it is divulsed, diffused, and dissipated, and becomes a multitude. In like manner a three-ranked galley, which is rowed to the sound of the flute, conjoins the numerous hands by which it is impelled along through the similitude of the rowing; but if you take away the flute you dissolve the labour of the hands. Thus, also, a chariot is driven by the charioteer in a right and common course, and with one impetus; but if you take away the charioteer you disperse the chariot. Thus, likewise, an army is arranged under one standard; but if you take away the standard you dissolve the phalanx into a crowd.

What, then, is the good of bodies? health. What is the evil of bodies? disease. And health, indeed, is one thing, but diseases are many. What is the good in music? harmony: and that which is harmonised is one thing, but the discordant is manifold. In a choir, too, the consent is one, but the dissonance all-various. In a three-ranked galley the flute is one, but disobedience many: and in a chariot the art of the charioteer is one, but unskilfulness all various. But what is the good in a phalanx? the defence of the standard. And this, indeed, is one thing, but anarchy all-various.

And in the nature of *the one*, indeed I see neither excess nor defect: for it is stable, and can endure no transition, neither into flight nor pursuit; but when I fall into *multitude* and number then am I able to measure their natures. For of a long road the boundary is one, but the distances are many. If you should go to Babylon, the Assyrian is nearer to it than the Armenian, the Armenian than the Lydian, the Lydian than the Ionian, and the Ionian than an islander. No one of these, however, is yet in Babylon; neither the Assyrian, nor the Armenian, neither the Lydian nor the Ionian, nor the islander. If, also, you should go to Eleusis, Peloponnesus here * is next to it, after this Megara, and after Megara the Isthmus. But are you uninitiated? For if so, though you should be in Megara, you will be similarly uninitiated with the Peloponnesian, while you do not yet enter into the temple. I think, also, that life is a certain long road leading to Eleusis or Babylon; but that the boundary of this road are palaces and temples, and *the greatest* † *of the mysteries.* Con-

* Markland justly observes, it may hence be conjectured that this Dissertation was composed in some city of Peloponnesus.

† In the original τελετην, which I have translated "the greatest of the mysteries;" because Suidas informs us that τελετη signifies "a mysterious sacrifice, the *greatest* and *most honourable.*" Proclus, too, in speaking of the Eleusinian, which he calls *the most holy of the mysteries,* always denominates them τελεται. Maximus, likewise, in calling the end of life *the greatest of the mysteries,* admirably accords with the

ceive, likewise, that this road, through the multitude of travellers, is full of men running, pushing each other, labouring, resting, lying down, turning out of the path, and wandering. For the impediments and fallacies are many, some of which lead to precipices and profundities, others to the Sirens, others to the Lotophagi, and others to the Cimmerians. There is one path, however, which

remark contained in the following extraordinary passage from Themistius, preserved in the Sentences of Stobœus:

"Το δε πασχειν παθος, οιον οι τελεταις μεγαλαις κατοργιαζομενοι· διο και το ρημα τῳ ρηματι, και το εργον τῳ εργῳ του τελευταν και τελεισθαι προσεοικε. πλαναι τα πρωτα και περιδρομαι κοπωδεις, και δια σκοτους τινος υποπλοι πορειαι και ατελεστοι· ειτα προ του τελους αυτου τα δεινα παντα, φρικη, και τρομος, και ιδρως, και θαμβος· εκ δε τουτου, φως τι θαυμασιον απηντησεν, και τοποι καθαροι, και λειμωνες εδεξαντο, φωνας και χορειας και σεμνοτητας ακουσματων ιερων, και φαντασμαλαν αγιων εχοντες. εν αις ο παντελης ηδη και μεμυημενος ελευθερος γεγονως, και αφετος περιιων εστεφανωμενος οργιαζει· και συνεστιν οσιοις και καθαροις ανδρασι." Sermo cxix.; *i. e.* "The soul is affected in death just as it is in the initiation into the great mysteries, and word answers to word as well as thing to thing: for *teleutan* is, to die, and *teleisthai* to be initiated. The first stage consists of wanderings and laborious circuits, and of a suspicious and rude march through a certain darkness. In the next place, before this darkness is dispersed every thing dreadful presents itself to the view, accompanied with horror, trembling, sweating, and astonishment. But after this a certain admirable light discloses itself, and pure places and flowery meadows receive them, replete with mystic sounds and dances, the doctrines of sacred knowledge, and reverend and holy visions. And now, become perfect and initiated, they are free, and no longer under restraints; but, crowned, they walk about celebrating divine orgies, and converse with pure and holy men."

is narrow, and straight, and rough, and is not much frequented, but which leads to the end of the journey. Weary and laborious souls, who aspire after the region to which this road conducts, who love the mysteries and predict their beauty, scarcely, and with much molestation, labour, and sweat, arrive through this path at the desired end. But when they have arrived thither they rest from their labour and cease to desire. For what other initiation is more mystic than this, and what other place is more worthy than this of strenuous exertion? But what Eleusis is to the uninitiated that is this region *the good* to men. Come, then, be initiated, ascend to this region, embrace the good, and you will not desire any thing greater than this.

If, however, you denominate the good by the nature of things which are not good, such as the health and elegant form of bodies, the ornaments of gold and silver, the renown of ancestors and political honour, things which are naturally adapted to be measured by pleasure rather than by good, you divulge the mysteries, you sin against divinity. You desire to partake of such kind of goods as were the mysteries of Alcibiades *, who, when intoxicated, was the *torch-bearer*, from a banquet was the *hierophant* †, and in jest the *perfector*.

* Alcibiades was accused by Androcles for imitating the mysteries in his own house. See Plutarch, tom. i. p. 200 D.; and Cornelius Nepos in his Life of Alcibiades, cap. 3.

† In the mysteries the initiating priest was called the *hierophant*, which signifies *a revealer of holy things*. The

But you will not find that good is more arcane than good, as neither is beauty more graceful than beauty; for, if you take away any thing from these, that which is not yet beautiful will no longer be beautiful, and that which is not yet good will no longer be good. Do you not see this heaven which is above our head, and the stars which it contains, æther which is under it, air which is under this, the sea which is under air, and earth which is under the sea? Measure the natures of these. Earth is a part of the whole, broad, abundantly nourishing, bearing trees, and being the nurse of animals; but if you compare it with the sea it is less than the sea, the sea is less than the air, the air than æther, and æther than heaven. Thus far the parts proceed, surpassing and surpassed. But, when you have arrived thither, beauty together with magnitude proceeds no farther. For what can be more beautiful than the heavens; what more splendid than the stars; what more vigorous than the sun; what more abundantly nourishing * than the moon; what more elegantly arranged than the choir of the other stars; what more venerable than the gods themselves?

torch-bearer was one of the assistants of the hierophant; but in what the office of the perfector (τέλεστης) consisted, it is, perhaps, at present in vain to inquire.

* According to ancient theologists the moon is *the self-visive image of nature;* (αυτοπτον της φυσεως αγαλμα) and hence she is celebrated by Apuleius, as "nourishing with moist fires the joyful seeds of plants."

Men, however, try to weigh honours for the gods as they do for things that are good. Who is he? Jupiter. It is his province to govern. Who is he? Saturn. It is his province to be bound. To Vulcan it belongs to operate in brass, to Hermes to announce, to Minerva to weave. For, in my opinion, men are ignorant that to all the gods there is one law, one life, and one mode of subsistence, without separation and without sedition; all of them being rulers, all of the same age, all saviours, and living together through the whole of time with equal honours and with equal authority, and of whom there is one nature * but many names. For, through our ignorance of the divinities, we denominate them from the benefits which they impart, different men giving a different name to deity: just as with respect to the parts of the sea; this is the Ægean, that the Ionian, this the Myrtoan †, and that the Crissæan ‡; while, in the meantime, the sea is one, homogeneous, co-passive, and co-mingled. Thus,

* According to the arcana of ancient theology the union of the divinities with each other is so profound, in consequence of each being characterized by *unity*, that all are in all: for it is a union of unities. At the same time, however, as they are the causes of all the diversities of being, their distinction from each other is no less transcendent than their union..

† The Myrtoum Mare is a part of the Ægean sea, which lies between Eubœa, Peloponnesus, and Attica.

‡ I have adopted the emendation of Markland here, who substitutes *Crissæan* for *Cretæan*. The Crissæus Sinus is a bay on the coasts of Peloponnesus, near Corinth.

also, the good is one, similar to itself, and on all sides equal; but, through our imbecility and ignorance of it, we distribute it in our opinions. Callicles is rich, and he is blessed in good; but Alcibiades is more beautiful than Callias. Let us oppose the goods, wealth to beauty. Which of them is worth an hecatomb; which of them is worth nine oxen; which of them shall we choose; for which of them shall we pray? The Phœnician, therefore, and the Egyptian will pray for the good of Callias; but the Elean and the Bœotian for that of Alcibiades. Pausanias was of noble birth, but Eurybiades was more renowned. Let us oppose birth to glory. Which will vanquish; to which shall we give the palm of victory? Socrates was poor, Socrates was deformed, Socrates was inglorious, Socrates was of ignoble birth, Socrates lived with ignominy. For how is it possible he should not be deformed, without honour, of ignoble birth, inglorious, and poor; who was the son of a statuary, flat-nosed, and paunch-bellied; who was reviled in comedies, and cast into prison; and who died there, where Timagoras * died? O what a solitude of good! for I am afraid to mention the multitude of evils. What shall we oppose to these; what shall we say? Compare Socrates with the antagonists in the

* Timagoras was an Athenian, who was capitally punished for paying homage to Darius, according to the Persian manner of kneeling on the ground, when he was sent to Persia as ambassador.

possession of good. Do you not see that he is vanquished in wealth by Callias, in body by Alcibiades, in honour by Pericles, in glory by Nicias, in the theatre by Aristophanes, in the court of justice by Melitus? In vain, therefore, did Apollo give him the palm of victory; in vain did he proclaim him the wisest of men.

DISSERTATION XXIV.

IF GOOD IS GREATER THAN GOOD: IN WHICH IT IS SHOWN THAT IT IS.

SINCE, however, you accuse Homer for blaming Glaucus for the exchange which he made; whether shall we apologize to you for Homer, or to Homer for Glaucus? To the latter by Jupiter; for Homer must be honoured by me before others, and even in preference to your judgment. Let Glaucus, therefore, speak as follows: "If in a certain respect, O Homer! good was less than good, or less than something greater, Jupiter would be justly accused by you for depriving me of intellect; but in the exchange of gold for brass, do not yet entirely accuse either Jupiter or me. For neither does he who receives gold possess more, nor he who receives brass in exchange for gold less; but both are well adapted to both, since the inequality of the matter is compensated by the equality of intention in the gift." Let Glaucus, however, depart; and let Ulysses, who was wiser than him, approach, and disclose to us his opinion concerning the possession of good. For is it not he who proclaimed the house of

Alcinous * blessed for its hilarity and singing, who wished that he might enter into according wedlock with Nausicaa †; and who proclaimed Calypso ‡ happy for her immortality? But I think that he, if he had come to some one whose felicity did not consist in the song and the banquet, and who was not blessed according to the harmony of wedlock but from the possession of goods still greater than these,—I think that he would have spoken pertinently concerning them. Since, however, you adduce beauty as having its subsistence in unity of measure, I will briefly answer you concerning this. For it appears to me, that if you had been in the place of the Trojan shepherd, and Mercury had come to you, sent from Jupiter, leading three goddesses to you as to a judge, that you might decide concerning their beauty, you would have admired Venus in the same manner as Paris did, and would have condemned Juno and Minerva as deformed. For if *the beautiful* is one in all beauty, and one from the three goddesses vanquishes the rest, it is necessary that those who are vanquished should be deformed.

O most happy of judges! do not act in this manner, but be sparing of base appellations, and gradually descend from the highest to the lowest, that I may not once more adduce Homer against you, who calls Juno white-armed, Aurora rosy-

* Odyss. ix. ver. 5. † Odyss. vi. ver. 180. seq.

‡ Odyss. v. ver. 215. seq.

fingered, Minerva azure-eyed, Thetis silver-footed; and Hebe fair-footed; from no one of which must you take away the beauty, though it should subsist in a part, if you wish to speak in a becoming manner of divine natures, and by no means to sin against them. Hear him, also, describing a rustic choir of nymphs sporting on the mountain, with Diana for their leader:

"The goddess treads with more majestic pace,
The nymphs surpassing in her head and face*,"

says Homer, and

"Distinguish'd beauty in the goddess shines."

Or will you deride Homer for preferring the beauty of Diana to that of the nymphs? But do you not, also, hear how he speaks about the beauty of Menelaus, when he says that, being wounded, the blood flowed down his thigh, the beauty of which he compares to the art of a woman, staining ivory with purple, for the trappings of a horse:

"So Menelaus show'd thy sacred blood,
As down thy snowy thigh distill'd the streaming flood. †"

And yet he also says that his legs and the inferior parts of his feet were beautiful. But again, when he praises the beauty of Agamemnon, he is not in want of a Lydian or Carian image, nor of ivory

* Odyss. vi. ver. 106.

† Iliad. iv. ver. 142. The translation from Pope.

dyed with purple by a barbarian woman, but he assimilates his head and his eyes * to those of Jupiter, by which it is evident that Agamemnon was more beautiful than Menelaus: for the beauty of the former consisted in his head and eyes, but of the latter in his thighs and the lower parts of his feet. But he who is beautiful in the superior parts is more beautiful, and he who is beautiful in the inferior is not yet deformed but is less beautiful. Again, in the Grecian army, does not Achilles surpass in beauty, while the beauty of Nireus only ranks in the second degree? And you being the judge, will it follow that because Nireus is less beautiful than Achilles he differs in no respect from Thersites? And, that I may not alone speak to you concerning beauty, Ajax will not contend with Achilles about valour, nor Diomed with Ajax, nor Sthenelus with Diomed, nor Menestheus with Sthenelus; and yet no one will deprive Menestheus of valour on account of Sthenelus, nor Sthenelus on account of Diomed, nor Diomed on account of Ajax, nor Ajax on account of Achilles; but there is here a path of virtue which does not leap over the natures situated in the middle, but descends gradually from the most excellent to the more inferior.

That we may, however, leave the consideration of bodies in which strength and beauty are mingled together, if you compare Andromache with Penelope, are not both of them chaste and affec-

* Iliad ii. ver. 477, 478.

tionate wives? And yet you will prefer Penelope, not as a Grecian to a barbarian woman, but as attributing greater excellence to that which surpasses in virtue. Nestor gives counsel to Agamemnon; was it, therefore, as a wise to a stupid man? You certainly will not speak so opprobriously of the king of all the Greeks, who was Jove-begotten and the shepherd of the people; and yet, though he was wise, he required the assistance of a wiser counsellor, Nestor. But you will not be in any respect more persuasive, if, in speaking concerning good, you are unwilling to compare similars with similars, according to inequality of participation, through which they receive the more and the less; since you admit that health is something simple. This, however, is less simple than any thing else. For the natures of bodies are much more abundant than those of the soul with respect to the measure of health. Hence, in a manner entirely contrary to that which you adduce, he who pursues the highest degree in health pursues a fugitive thing, and which in its flight can neither be captured by Esculapius nor Chiron; but he who, in the inequality of that which can be obtained, is contented with what he receives, is more equitable with respect to art, and is not without hope of attaining the summit. This, also, is the case with good. For since there are three things by which any one may form a judgment of the present speculation, the first of which pertains to truth, the second to the possible, and the third to the useful, let us consider each of these,

beginning in an inverse order from the useful: for it will not yet be possible to determine whether the assertion is true, that good is greater than good. Let us, however, consider its utility: for many things which are neither true nor possible are advantageous when they obtain credibility.

Does not, indeed, Socrates, when he circumscribes the essence of the good, in the most excellent alone, exclude the multitude from the road which leads to it? But he who permits certain steps and resting-places in the midst of the journey, together with many recesses, causes the multitude to wander very widely from the good, as thus obtaining the moderately excellent, and consoles them with the acquisition of it, as having now arrived at that which is best. He proclaims, him, however, who reaches the summit as the best among the good. But does not the other of the assertions crown the most strenuous combatant among the timid and the most robust among the imbecile? And, in short, is it not evident, that it does not give antagonists to the most brave, nor explore the virtues among similars? And thus much concerning utility; let us now consider the possible. An inferior kind of gold, and not lead, proves gold of the most excellent quality. Thus, also, silver is proved by silver, and brass by brass. And, in short, the examinations of all things are effected in the comparison of the similar according to essence, but of the dissimilar according to transcendency. But if, comparing good itself with evils, you thus investigate, how is it possible

that the least of goods should not appear to you in the place of the greatest. For as by night the light from a fire appears to be more vivid than that which beams from day, through the abundant darkness with which it is surrounded, but the same light in sun-shine is obscure and imbecile, in consequence of being opposed to a more robust antagonist; thus, also, good, though it should be merely casual, if compared with evils, is most excellent, most great, and most transcendent, like a small spark in profound darkness, like a little light in a starless night. If, however, you permit it to run and contend with its like, you will then perceive that which is truly the best; but now you confound and disturb the investigation. Do you not see that the moon, a star amphibious with respect to night and day, is splendid in the night but obscure in the radiance of the sun? By day, therefore, the sun, the best and most robust of the celestial bodies, is victorious; but the moon, the most imbecile of them all, vanquishes by night. In like manner good, if you compare it with the night, and darkness and obscurity of evil, vanquishes, though its light be most debile; but if you compare good with good it is necessary that the more splendid should be victorious.

I quit the possible, and pass on to the true. Is the life of man to be considered as any thing else than a vital transition mingled from soul and body and fortune? From the harmony of these, well-tempered, each at the same time having reached the summit of its strength, the aggregate is called

felicity; the soul commanding like a general, but the body obeying like a common soldier, and fortune co-operating like arms, from all which victory is obtained. But if you take away fortune you disarm the soldier, and if you take away the soldier you deprive the general of his authority. The common soldier, however, is more honourable than arms, and the general than the common soldier. But if, honouring the general, you despise the rest, what use will the general make of fortune? Or if, though introducing these, you should distribute to them equal honour, what use will fortune make of the general? The soul should command, the body should act the part of a soldier, and fortune should co-operate in the contest. I praise all, I admit all; but I deprive them of equality of honour. Do you not see a marine navigation, in which the pilot governs, in the same manner as the soul does the body; but the ship is governed in the same manner as the body by the soul, and the winds impel as fortune does the virtues? But if a storm arises, while the ship remains and the pilot remains, there is hope of safety; and though the ship should be driven in a wrong course by the impulse of the winds, yet, by the assistance of art, it may be prevented from sinking. But if you begin from the pilot, and take him away, the ship is useless though it remains, and the winds are useless, however prosperously they may blow. Hence in the sea, in a ship, and in navigation, the pilot is the most honourable, next to him the ship, and next to the ship external

aid; but in the race of the present life the soul is the most honourable, next to this the body, and the third is fortune*. The goods, however, of

* Fortune in this place appears to be considered by Maximus in the popular sense of the word, as a certain capricious cause of good and evil; but, philosophically considered, it is that divine power which disposes things differing from each other, and happening, contrary to expectation, to beneficent purposes. Or it may be defined to be that deific distribution which causes every thing to complete the allotment assigned to it by the condition of its being. Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics, lib. ii. p. 81, gives the following beautiful description of this divinity, the original of which the reader will find in vol. iii. p. 311, of my translation of Pausanias's Description of Greece: "The power of Fortune particularly disposes in an orderly manner the sublunary part of the universe, in which the nature of the contingent is contained, and which being essentially disordered, Fortune, in conjunction with other primary causes, directs, places in order, and governs. Hence she is represented guiding a rudder, because she governs things sailing on the sea of generation. Her rudder, too, is fixed on a globe, because she directs that which is unstable in generation. In her other hand she holds the horn of Amalthea, which is full of fruits, because she is the cause of obtaining all divine fruits. And on this account we venerate the fortunes of cities and houses and of each individual; because, being very remote from divine union, we are in danger of being deprived of its participation, and require, in order to obtain it, the assistance of the goddess Fortune, and of those natures superior to the human (*i. e.* dæmons and heroes) who possess the characteristic of this divinity. Indeed every fortune is good, for every attainment respects something good, nor does any thing evil subsist from divinity. But of goods some are precedaneous, and others are of a punishing or avenging characteristic, which we are accustomed to call evils. Hence we speak of two fortunes, one of which we denominate *good*, and which is the cause of our obtaining precedaneous goods, and the other *evil*, which prepares us to receive punishment or revenge."

that which is more honourable possess a greater degree of honour than those which are less so.

I, indeed, also take away equality of honour in the senses. Homer was blind, but he heard Calliope: Atys was deaf, but he saw the sun. Transpose the calamities: let Atys hear, but not see; let Homer see and not hear. Calliope, indeed, will not sing to Atys, but you will not deprive Homer of his preceptress. I, likewise, take away equality of honour in the gods: for I am persuaded by Homer, when he says,

> "Triply are all things ranked, but each his share
> Of honour is decreed *."

Not equal honour, for neither is the dominion equal; as neither is the division of heaven equal to that of the sea, nor the division of the sea to that of Hades. And yet Pluto, Neptune, and Jupiter are equally gods, and equally the sons of Saturn: just as Lysander is a Spartan, but Agesilaus, Heraclides, or one descended from Hercules. In the virtues, likewise, I prefer one genus to another: for does not a tamer of horses love horses that are well born?

> "The race of those which once the thundering god
> For ravish'd Ganymede on Tros † bestow'd."

Does not the huntsman, also, love whelps that are well-born; and will not he who is a lover of man, and who delights to educate this animal, explore

* Iliad. xv. ver. 189. These lines refer to the distribution of the universe among the three brother deities, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto.

† Iliad. v. ver. 265. The translation from Pope.

his race? Not, indeed, narrating that of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes (for you speak of a cowardly race) nor that of Crœsus, the son of Alyattis (for you speak of an imbecile race) nor that of Hippias the son of Pisistratus (for you speak of a base race;) but if you speak of Leonidas and Agesilaus, I know their virtue, I call to mind Hercules, and I praise the nobility of their birth. I wish that the race of Aristides, I wish that the race of Socrates was to be found in Athens; for I should honour these in the same manner as the Heraclidæ, as the Persidæ, as the Patricii. Or will you praise rivers if they flow pure from their fountains, and plants, though their bodies grow old, but their seeds remain; and will you not praise human nobility, if it originates from virtue as from a pure fountain, if it remains genuine, if it remains unmingled? And thus far you act in a manly manner, and your assertions are worthy of belief. But if I should ask you concerning wealth, what will you say; in what manner will you arrange the thing; in what place? Speak, with your head uncovered *, the language of the soul: say what you assert wealth to be. Is it a bad thing; why then do you love it? is it a good thing; why then do you avoid it?

"Though the tongue swears the mind unsworn remains †."

You should, however, consider it as a thing nei-

* Maximus here, doubtless, alludes to Socrates uncovering his head when discoursing about *divine* beauty, in the Phædrus of Plato.

† This is from Euripides in Hippolyto, ver. 612.

ther good nor bad, but situated in the confines and in the middle region between both. Rank it among things indifferent, and do not proceed any farther, lest you should pass beyond the boundaries. If, however, you change the name, you should not call it good, but you should call it that which leads the way to good; for thus you will change the appellation but honour the thing.

DISSERTATION XXV.

SINCE DIVINITY PRODUCES GOOD, WHENCE DO EVILS ORIGINATE?

THEY say that Alexander the Macedonian, when he came to the temple of Jupiter Ammon, and was called by Ammon his son, believed in the god conformably to the doctrine of Homer, who denominates Jupiter the father of gods and men; and that, having received the oracle, he did not think fit to interrogate his father about any thing else after this, neither about the flight of Darius, nor the impending battle, nor the calamities of Greece, nor the tumults of Asia; but, as if all his other concerns were in a prosperous condition, he enquired of the god, whence the Nile * originating descended into Egypt. Was this one thing, therefore, perfectly necessary to his felicity; and, having learnt this, would he be sufficiently blessed? He would not, by Jupiter,

* According to other writers, however, Alexander did not consult Jupiter Ammon about the source of the Nile, but enquired of the god, whether the empire of the whole earth was destined to him, and whether all his father Philip's murderers had been punished. See Quintus Curtius, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch.

though, together with the Nile, he had known the source of the Ister, and could tell whether the ocean itself is a certain river spreading round all the earth, or is the principle and fountain of our sea, or a lake which receives the setting sun and moon, or something else, such as the poets prophetically announce concerning it. At the same time, however, it was permitted him to suffer the rivers to flow whither Jupiter sends them; but he might have betaken himself to Ammon, or to the Threspotian land, and the oak which is there, or to Parnassus and the Pythian oracle, or to Ismenius *, and the divine voice which it contains, or to Delos and its choirs, or to any other prophetic place, either in Greece or the land of the barbarians, and might there have requested Jupiter or Apollo to deliver to him an oracle which should be common and public to the whole human race. For such a request would have been much more generally beneficial to mankind than when the Dorians consulted the oracle about Peloponnesus, or the Athenians about Ionia, or the Corinthians about Sicily.

Come, then, imitating those common ambassadors, who were sent to oracles on account of the human race, let us enquire of Jupiter, who is the father and supplier of human good, what are its principles, what its fountains, and whence originating it flows. Unless it is not proper to disturb

* Ismenius was a river of Bœotia, near to which there was an oracle of Apollo.

divinity about things of this kind, since the supply is apparent to our senses, and we perceive the cause, understand the fountain, and know the father and fabricator, the governor of heaven, the charioteer of the sun and moon, the coryphœus of the revolution and whirling motion, of the harmonic dance and course, of the stars, the dispensator of the seasons, the moderator of the winds, the maker of the sea, the fabricator of the earth, the supplier of rivers, the nurse of fruits, the generator of animals, the guardian of births, the source of rain, the giver of fruits, paternal and the progenitor, and whose intellect is entire and unwearied, and pervading to every nature with an inconceivable swiftness, like the projecting beams of the sight, adorns every thing with which it comes into contact; in the same manner as the rays of the sun, when they fall on the earth, give splendour to every thing which they supervene. What the mode, however, of this contact is I am unable to tell; but Homer obscurely indicates it, when he says,

"With his dark eyebrows Jove then nods assent *."

But, together with the nod of Jupiter, the earth subsists, and whatever the earth produces, the sea subsists, and all its progeny, the air subsists, and whatever it contains; and heaven subsists, with all its moving orbs: these are the works of the nods of Jupiter. Thus far I am not in want of an ora-

* Iliad i. ver. 528.

cle; I am persuaded by Homer, I believe in Plato, and I pity Epicurus.

But, if I betake myself to the conceptions of evils, I ask, whence came they hither; what are their fountains or generations; whence did they originate? Shall we say from Ethiopia, as pestilence; from Babylon, as Xerxes; from Macedonia, as Philip? For, by Jupiter, they did not originate from heaven, not from heaven; for envy is not admitted in the divine choir. Here, then, here, I have need of an oracle; let us, therefore, implore the gods: O Jupiter and Apollo, and whatever other god is prophetic, and the curator of the human race, declare to us, who are in want of your aid, what is the principle, what the cause of evils, how we may guard against, how we may escape them.

"The flight from evils none can reprehend *."

Or do you not see what dreadful circumstances, falling into the destiny of men, roll about the earth, and fill it with all-various sighs and lamentations? The body of man laments, perceiving itself surrounded by diseases as by a wall, and deplores the insecurity of its safety and the immanifest condition of its life. For when is it that the human body is not obnoxious to evil? As soon as man is born, and plucked from his mother's womb, his body is wet and miry, and full of lamentation and crying. In the course of time, when it puts forth

* Iliad xiv. ver. 80.

its flower, it is foolish and intemperate; and, if it should arrive at puberty, it cannot be restrained, through the ardour with which it is impelled. But, if it should reach old age, it gradually dies, and becomes extinguished, and is a useless habitation to the soul, morose, miserable, employed with difficulty, neither capable of enduring rain, nor wind, nor the sun, blaming the seasons of heaven, and rebelling against Jupiter. In winter it is invested with additional clothing, in summer it seeks refrigeration; when full desires to be empty, and when empty to be full. Like the alternately-ebbing and flowing Euripus, it never stops, it never rests, but is insatiable, unrestrained, voracious, indigent of garments, in want of shoes, of ointments, and medicines. Many hands and many arts minister to one body; though one equerry is sufficient to a thousand horses, one shepherd to as many sheep, and one herdsman to as many oxen. Nor yet is this multitude adequate to the wants of the human body. For what human artifice can avert the incursions of pestilence, or restrain showers descending from heaven, or stop earthquakes, or extinguish fire rising from the earth? You see the course and the succession of evils, and the continuity of dangers:

"Earth nothing nourishes more weak than man *."

And if you proceed to the soul, there, also, you will see a crowd of diseases pouring in upon it.

* Odyss. xviii. ver. 129.

If you repel sorrow, fear creeps in: if fear departs, anger is excited; and if anger ceases, envy accedes. Calamities are before our feet, evils are neighbours; and there is no accurate intermission of maladies.

What, then, will Jupiter, or Apollo, or any other prophetic god, answer to these things? Let us hear what their interpreter says *:

> " O strange, that mortals should the gods accuse!
> On us their ills they charge, tho' them
> Fate, for their crimes, precipitates in woe."

What, then, is the cause of this perverseness? Since heaven and earth are two habitations, the former must be considered as void of evil, but the latter as mingled from good and evil; so that good, indeed, descends from the one, but evils rise from spontaneous depravity. Improbity, also, is twofold, the one being the property of matter, the other the licence of the soul. Let us, therefore, first speak concerning the former of these. You see matter, then, about which the operations of a good artificer are employed, and which derives its ornament from art. But if any thing subsists with confusion (since things on the earth are full of disorder) do not accuse art as the cause: for that which is inartificial is by no means the wish of the artist, as neither is injustice the wish of the legislator. But a divine intellect attains its end in a much greater degree than human art.

* Odyss. i. ver. 32.

As, therefore, in the manual operations of the arts, some things are precedaneously performed by art regarding the end, but others are consequent to manual operation, not being the works of art but the properties of matter, as sparks from an anvil, ashes from a furnace, and the like, and which are, indeed, necessary to the operation, but are not the leading design of the artist;—in like manner, with respect to the calamities about the earth, which we call the invasions of human evils, art must not be accused as the cause; but it must be admitted that these things are, as it were, certain necessary natures consequent to the fabrication of the universe. For the things which we call evils and corruptions, and which are the subjects of our lamentations, these the artist calls the salvation of the whole; for his attention is directed to the whole, for the sake of which it is necessary the part should be connected with evil. The Athenians are afflicted with pestilence, the Lacedæmonians with an earthquake, the Thessalians with an inundation, and Ætna is subject to eruptions of fire. But when did Jupiter promise the Athenians immortality? For, if there had not been a pestilence, would not Alcibiades have led the people to Sicily? When did Jupiter promise the Lacedæmonians a land free from earthquakes; when the Thessalians, a land free from inundation; when the Scilians, a land exempt from fiery eruptions? These things are the destiny of bodies. You see, therefore, the participated properties, which you, indeed, call *corruption*, in consequence

of regarding the departure of things; but which I call *salvation*, in consequence of looking to the succession of things in futurity. You see the mutation of bodies, and the transition of generation, a path upwards and downwards according to Heraclitus; and again, as he says, one thing living the death, but dying the life of another. Thus fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, and earth lives the death of water. You see a succession of life, and a mutation of bodies, both which are the renovation of the whole.

Let us now direct our attention to the other principle, spontaneous, which the licentious power of the soul conceives and brings to perfection, and the name of which is depravity. Of this, the fault is in him that chooses it, but divinity is without blame *. For since it was necessary that earth should be produced, the bearer of fruits, the nurse of animals, and abounding with cattle, but inwardly containing evils confined in herself; these, being expelled from heaven, were mingled in this terrene abode. But divinity produced many and all-various allotments of animals, and gave a twofold division to their nature, so that the one might be diversified in their lives and bodies, might be irrational, void of prudence, mutually destructive of each other, without any intellectual conception of deity, destitute of virtue, fed, and popularly allured by diurnal sense, and

* See the tenth book of the Republic of Plato.

strong in body, but perfectly imbecile in the reasoning power. On the contrary, the other nature, which is the human, he made to be homogeneous, obedient to law, and one; infirm, indeed, in body, but victorious in reason, having an intellectual knowledge of divinity, being a partaker of political government, a lover of communion, and having a taste of justice, law, and friendship. It was necessary, therefore, that this genus should be superior to every herd of animals on the earth, but inferior to divinity. Death*, however, is not the cause of this inferiority: for this very thing, which the multitude call death, is the beginning of immortality, and the birth of a future life; bodies, indeed, being corrupted by the very law and time of their existence, but the soul being recalled to her proper place and life. But God devised the following mode of rendering the human condition inferior to the divine: He placed the soul in a terrestrial body, as a charioteer in a chariot†, and, delivering the reins to the charioteer, dismissed it to the race; the soul possessing, indeed, from divinity the strength of art, but possessing also the liberty of acting without art. When the happy and

* The true cause of the inferiority of the human to the divine nature is, not from corporeal death, or the separation of the body from the soul, but from the death of the soul, arising from its union with the body. For the soul, by animating the body, enkindles, indeed, a light in her dark receptacle, but becomes herself situated in obscurity, and dies in proportion as she converts herself to the body.

† See the Phædrus of Plato, from which Maximus derived this simile.

blessed soul, therefore, ascends into the chariot, being mindful of divinity, who placed it in this vehicle, and gave it this ruling power, it seizes the reins, governs the chariot, and corrects the impulses of the horses. But these in reality are all-various, and are impelled to run in different directions; one of them being intemperate, voracious, and insolent, but another irascible, impetuous, and stupified; one being sluggish and effeminate, but another illiberal, pusillanimous, and humble. Hence the chariot, being driven in different directions, disturbs the charioteer. And if, indeed, he is vanquished by the horses, the axis is hurried away according to the impetus of the domineering horse; the whole chariot at one time, together with the charioteer, being dragged along by the intemperate horse to insolence, intoxication, and venery, and to other pleasures, which are neither elegant nor sincere; but at another time by the irascible horse to all-various calamities *.

* The true answer to this most important question, which is but imperfectly solved by Maximus, is as follows: The habitude or relation which divinity has to things differs from that of ours; and again, things are related to divinity in a manner different from their relation to us: for there is one kind of relation of wholes to parts and another of parts towards each other. With reference to divinity, therefore, nothing is evil, not even among things which are called evils, for these he employs to beneficent purposes. But, on the other hand, with respect to partial natures, there is a certain evil with which they are naturally connected; and the same thing is evil to a part, but to the universe and to wholes good. For so far as a thing has being, and so far as it participates of order, it is good.

In short, there is no evil which is not, in a certain respect good, because the beneficent illuminations of Providence extend to all things, and even irradiate the dark and formless nature of matter. Evil, therefore, neither subsists in intellectual natures, for the whole intellectual order is void of evil, nor in souls or bodies which rank in the universe as *wholes;* for all *wholes* are free from evil on account of their *perpetually* subsisting according to nature. Hence evil must either subsist in partial souls, or in partial bodies, but yet not in the essences of these, because all their essences are of divine origin; nor in their powers, for these subsist according to nature. It remains, therefore, that evil must subsist in their energies. But among souls it cannot be in the energies of such as are rational, for all these aspire after good; nor in the energies of such as are irrational, for these energize according to nature; but it must take place *in the privation of symmetry between the two.* And with respect to bodies, evil can neither subsist in their form, for it desires to rule over matter, nor in matter, for it aspires after the supervening irradiations of form; but in the *asymmetry of form with respect to matter.* From hence, likewise, it is evident that every thing evil has nothing more than a shadowy kind of being; that at the same time it is coloured by good; that, consequently, all things are good through the will of divinity; and that even evil is necessary to the perfection of the universe, as without its shadowy nature generation could not subsist. See more on this very interesting subject in the introduction to my translation of five books of Plotinus. The above observations are extracted from that introduction, and are derived from the very adytum of Platonic philosophy.

DISSERTATION XXVI.

WHAT THE DÆMON * OF SOCRATES WAS.

DO you wonder that a dæmoniacal power associated with Socrates, a power which was a friend to him, prophetic, always attendant on him, and all but mingled with his mind; with Socrates, I say, a man pure in body, good in soul, accurate in diet, skilful in wisdom, musical in speech, pious towards divinity, and holy in human affairs? Why, then, do you not wonder that a Delphic † woman in Pytho, or a Threspotian man

* In the original το δαιμονιον; by which word Maximus signifies indiscriminately both a dæmon, properly so called, and a god. For, according to the theology of Plato, divine dæmons, though essentially different from the gods, may be called gods from their contact with the divinities; just as good men are sometimes called by Plato gods, according to similitude, or from their resemblance to a divine nature.

† The following beautiful explanation of divination by oracles is given by Jamblichus, which satisfactorily shows how prophecy is communicated by divinity to mankind:

"It is acknowledged by all men that the oracle in Colophon gives its answers through the medium of water: for there is a fountain, in a subterranean dwelling, from which the prophetess drinks; and, on certain established nights, after many sacred rites have been previously performed, and she has drank of the fountain, she delivers oracles, but is not visible to those that are present. That this water, therefore, is prophetic is from hence manifest; but how it becomes so, this (according to the proverb) is not for every man to know. For it appears

in Dodona, or a Libyan in the temple of Ammon, or an Ionian in Claros, or a Lycian in Xanthus, or a Bœotian in Ismenus; why do you not wonder that all these daily associate with a divine power, and not only have a knowledge of their own affairs,

as if a certain prophetic spirit pervaded the water. This is not, however, in reality the case: for a divine nature does not pervade through its participants in this manner, according to interval and division, but comprehends as it were externally, and illuminates the fountain, and fills it from itself with a prophetic power. For the inspiration which the water affords is not the whole of that which proceeds from a divine power, but the water itself only prepares us, and purifies our luciform spirit, so that we may be able to receive the divinity; while, in the meantime, there is a presence of divinity prior to this, and illuminating from on high. And this, indeed, is not absent from any one, who through aptitude is capable of being conjoined with it. But this divine illumination is immediately present, and uses the prophetess as an instrument; she neither being any longer mistress of herself, nor capable of attending to what she says, nor perceiving where she is. Hence, after prediction, she is scarcely able to recover herself: and before she drinks the water she abstains from food for a whole day and night; and retiring to certain sacred places, inaccessible to the multitude, begins to receive in them the divinely inspired energy. Through her departure, therefore, and separation from human concerns, she renders herself pure, and by this means adapted to the reception of divinity: and hence she possesses the inspiration of the god shining into the pure seat of her soul, becomes full of an unrestrained afflatus, and receives the divine presence in a perfect manner, and without any impediment.

"But the prophetess in Delphi, whether she gives oracles to mankind through an attenuated and fiery spirit, bursting from the mouth of the cavern; or whether, being seated in the adytum upon a brazen tripod, or on a stool with four feet, she becomes sacred to the god; whichsoever of these is the case she entirely gives herself up to a divine spirit, and is illumi-

but deliver oracles to others both privately and publicly? Or why do you not wonder that the prophetess sitting on the tripod, and being filled with a divine spirit, sings oracles; but that the prophet in Ionia, having drawn and drank fontal water, possesses a divining power; and that those

nated with a ray of divine fire. And when, indeed, fire ascending from the mouth of the cavern circularly invests her in collected abundance, she becomes filled from it with a divine splendour. But when she places herself on the seat of the god she becomes accommodated to his stable prophetic power; and from both these preparatory operations she becomes wholly possessed by the god. And then, indeed, he is present with and illuminates her in a separate manner, and is different from the fire, the spirit, the proper seat; and, in short, from all the apparent apparatus of the place, whether physical or sacred.

"The prophetic woman, too, in Branchidæ, whether holding in her hand a wand, which was at first received from some god, she becomes filled with a divine splendour; or whether, seated on an axis, she predicts future wants; or dips her feet, or the border of her garment in the water; or receives the god by imbibing the vapour of the water,—by all these she becomes adapted to partake externally * of the god.

"But the multitude of sacrifices, the institution of the whole of sanctimony, and such other things as are performed in a divine manner, prior to the prophetic inspiration; viz. the baths of the prophetess, her fasting for three whole days, her retiring into the adyta, and there receiving a divine light, and rejoicing for a considerable time—all these evince that the god is entreated by prayer to approach, that he becomes externally present; and that the prophetess before she comes to her accustomed place is inspired in a wonderful manner; and that in the spirit which rises from the fountain another more ancient god, who is separate from the place, appears, and who is the cause of the place, of the country, and of the whole of divination." Jamblic. de Myst. p. 72, &c.

* That is, of an illumination which has no σχεσις, or *habitude* to any thing material.

worshippers of the oak in Dodona *, who lie on the ground, and whose feet are unbathed, deliver oracles according to the report of the Thesprotians, in consequence of the prophetic skill which they derive from the oak ?

* The oracle of Jupiter at Dodona was the most ancient of all the oracles of Greece prior to the flood, and was restored by Deucalion after it. The Scholiast on the 16th Iliad. ver. 233, &c. informs us from a very ancient author, Thrasybulus, that Deucalion after the flood, which happened in his time, having got safe upon the firm land of Epirus, prophesied in an oak; and by the admonition of a miraculous dove having gathered together such as were saved from the flood, caused them to dwell together in a certain place or country, which from Jupiter, and *Dodona*, one of the *Oceanides*, they called *Dodona*.

Hermias the philosopher, in his manuscript commentary on the Phædrus of Plato, gives us the following satisfactory information concerning this oracle: "Different accounts are given of the Dodonæan oracle; for it is the most ancient of the Grecian oracles. According to some an oak prophesied in Dodona; but according to others, doves. The truth however is, that priestesses, whose heads were crowned with oak, prophesied; and these women were called by some *peleiades* or *doves*. Perhaps, therefore, certain persons, being deceived by the name, suspected that doves prophesied in Dodona; and as the heads of these women were crowned with oak, perhaps from this circumstance they said that an oak prophesied. But this oracle belongs to Jupiter, and that in Delphi to Apollo. With great propriety, therefore, are these oracles considered as allied to each other. For Apollo is said to be the assistant of Jupiter in the administration of things: and often when the Dodonæan oracle appeared to be obscure, the oracle in Delphi has been consulted, in order to know the meaning of that of Jupiter. Often too, Apollo has interpreted many of the Dodonæan oracles. Priestesses, therefore, when in an enthusiastic and prophetic condition, have greatly benefited mankind, by predicting, and previously correcting, future events; but when

In the cavern of Trophonius too, (for there is an oracle of the hero Trophonius †, in Bœotia, about the city Lebadia,) he who wishes to consult the divine power, being invested with a purple robe, which reaches to his feet, and having cakes in his hand, enters supine through the narrow mouth of the cavern, and seeing some things, and hearing others, again emerges into light, a prophetic enunciator of these to others. There was, also, in Italy, about Magna Græcia, near Aornos, a lake so called, a prophetic cavern, and evocators of souls presiding over it, who were thus denominated from the work which was there effected. Here he

in a prudent state, they were similar to other women." For the original of this passage, see p. 11. of the collection of Oracles by Opsopœus. See also p. 333 of my Notes on Pausanies (from which this note is extracted) for further particulars concerning this oracle of Jupiter at Dodona.

I only add, that the circumstance mentioned by Maximus, of the worshippers of the oak in Dodona lying on the ground, and having their feet unbathed, is also mentioned by Homer in the following lines, forming part of the prayer of Achilles, just before the departure of Patroclus to assist the Greeks. Iliad xvi. ver. 233:

"Oh thou Supreme! high thron'd all height above;
Oh great Pelasgic, Dodonæan Jove!
Who, midst surrounding frosts, and vapours chill,
Presid'st on bleak Dodona's vocal hill:
Whose groves the Selli, race austere, surround,
Their feet unwash'd, their slumbers on the ground;
Who hear from rustling oaks thy dark decrees,
And catch the fates, low-whisper'd in the breeze."

POPE.

† See the additional notes to this volume.

who came for the purpose of consulting the oracle, having prayed, slain the victims, and poured forth the sacrifice, recalled the soul of any one, either of his ancestors or friends. After this, an image presented itself to his view, obscure, indeed, and dubious, but vocal and prophetic, and which, after answering the questions that were asked, disappeared. Homer * seems to me to have known this oracle, and to have conducted Ulysses to it, though he very poetically places it beyond our sea.

If these things, then, are true, as they are (for even now † some of these oracles are preserved such as they formerly were, and of the religious cultivation of the others vestiges still remain;) if these things are wonderful, yet *no one thinks them absurd and unusual, no one is dubious concerning them; but, giving credibility to time, every one who is desirous of interrogating an oracle enters the place whence it is delivered, hearing, believes, believing, consults, and consulting, venerates it.* But if a man, who by nature is most generous, who employs the most temperate discipline, the most true philosophy, and the most auspicious fortune, should be thought worthy by divinity to associate

* See Odyss. x. ver, 511. seq.; and xvii. ver. 13. seq.

† Vulgo quidam oracula, Christo nascente, prorsus siluisse jactitant; sed hanc opinionem redarguunt et hicce locus, et alii veterum plurimi. Davis. *i. e.* "It is commonly boasted, that on the birth of Christ oracles were entirely silent; but both this place, and many others of the ancients, confute this opinion."

with a dæmoniacal power, shall it appear wonderful and incredible that this man, so far as was sufficient for him, should deliver oracles; not to the Athenians, by Jupiter, consulting about the Grecian evils; nor to the Lacedæmonians interrogating about military expeditions; nor to some one, who being about to contend in the Olympic games, should ask concerning victory; nor to one enquiring in a court of justice if he should gain his cause; nor to the lover of wealth, asking if he shall be rich; nor to any other busily employed in enquiring about things of no worth, and for which men daily disturb the gods? For, perhaps, indeed, the dæmon of Socrates was capable of knowing these things, since he possessed a prophetic power. For he is the best physician who is sufficient for himself and others; and this, also, is the case with a carpenter and a shoemaker, and in the other arts and professions. But in this Socrates surpassed others, that being present with his intellect to the language of the gods, through this association with a dæmoniacal power, he disposed his own affairs in a becoming manner, and exhibited himself to others without envy, and as far as necessity required.

Be it so, some one may say, I am persuaded that Socrates, from the virtue of his manners, and the nobility of his disposition, was thought worthy of a dæmoniacal association; but I am desirous of knowing what this dæmon was. First, however, inform me, my friend, whether you think there is a dæmoniacal genus in the nature of things, as

there is of gods, as there is of men, and as there is of wild beasts, or whether you are of a contrary opinion. For it will be ridiculous to enquire what the dæmon of Socrates was, at the same time being ignorant whether dæmons have any subsistence. This, indeed, would be just as if an inhabitant of an island, who had never seen, and had no knowledge of horses, on hearing that the king of Macedonia had a thing in his possession called Bucephalus, on which he could ride, but no other person, should immediately ask what kind of a thing Bucephalus was. For the narrator must be dubious what he should say to a man who had never seen a horse, in consequence of wanting a conspicuous image.

But those, indeed, who now doubt about the dæmon of Socrates have never read what Homer * relates concerning Achilles, that, when in a military assembly, he was so enraged with Agamemnon, that, having drawn his sword, he was on the point of assaulting him, he was prevented by a divine power, which Homer calls Minerva. For he says that she was present with Achilles enraged:

> " Behind she stood, and by the yellow hair
> Achilles seiz'd †."

* See my introduction to the second book of the Republic, in the first volume of my translation of the works of Plato, in which what Maximus now mentions from Homer is satisfactorily explained.

† Iliad i. ver. 197.

He also calls this same power Minerva, when he says of Diomed,

" From mortal mists thine eyes are purg'd by me,
That god and man thou may'st distinctly see *."

Again, to Telemachus, when approaching a king more advanced in years, and being bashful and dubious how he should address him, his companion, Mentor says:

" Some thoughts thy mind will in itself conceive,
The dæmon others will suggest †."

And, afterwards, he adds the cause of this expectation from a dæmoniacal power:

" Nor born wert thou, nor nurtur'd, I conceive,
With gods averse."

Again, of another, he says,

" The white-arm'd goddess Juno in his mind
This thought inspir'd ‡."

And of another,

" Pallas, Minerva, strength and boldness gave
To Diomed, from Tydeus sprung §."

And again, of Diomed, he says,

" His hands and feet the goddess render'd light,
And ev'ry limb, with vigour from on high ||."

You see the multitude of those who associated with a divine power.

* Iliad v. ver. 127.
† Odyss. iii. ver. 26.
‡ Iliad i. ver. 55.
§ Iliad v. ver. 1.
|| Iliad v. ver. 122.

Are you willing, therefore, that, dismissing Socrates, we enquire of Homer, What do these things mean, O most noble of poets? For the dæmoniacal power which attended Socrates, was one, and simple, private, and not public; which recalled him either when he was passing over a river *, or when he deferred the love of Alcibiades †; and which impeded him when he wished to make an apology, but did not impede him when he deliberately intended to die. But in Homer a dæmoniacal power is present, neither to one person, nor for one purpose; nor is this power one, nor is it present on trifling occasions; but it is all-various, and frequently exhibits itself in many names, and many appearances, and in a variety of voices. Do you, therefore, admit any of these things, and do you think that Minerva is any thing, or Juno, or Apollo, or Strife, or any other Homeric dæmon? Do not, however, think that I ask whether you conceive Minerva to be such as Phidias has fashioned her, in no respect inferior to the description of Homer, a virgin beautiful, azure-eyed, tall, begirt with the ægis, and having a helmet, spear, and shield; nor whether you conceive Juno to be such as the Argive Polycletus has exhibited, with white arms, ivory elbows, beautiful eyes, her garments elegantly disposed, royal, and sitting on a throne of gold; nor, again, whether you conceive Apollo to be such as he is repre-

* See the Phædrus of Plato.

† See the first Alcibiades of Plato.

sented by painters and statuaries, a youth partly naked, from the manner in which his robe is disposed, with a bow and arrows, and with his feet in the attitude of one running. I do not ask you this, for neither do I think you so vile with respect to the assimilation of truth as that you cannot change an enigma into its genuine meaning; but I ask you, whether you think in reality that these names and these representations obscurely signify certain divine powers, which associate with men of the most fortunate destiny, both when awake and when asleep. But if you are of opinion that there are no such powers, you will be at war with Homer, you will subvert oracles, disbelieve in the answers of the gods, reject dreams, and bid farewell to Socrates. If, again, you neither think these things incredible nor impossible, but are dubious concerning Socrates, changing the question, I ask you whether you think Socrates was not worthy to have a dæmon allotted to him, or that what is possible elsewhere is here destitute of power. If you admit, however, the possibility of this, you must also admit it here, and you will not take away the worthiness of Socrates. If, therefore, the thing is possible, and Socrates was worthy, it remains that you must no longer be dubious concerning Socrates, but consider universally what is the nature of a dæmoniacal power.

And this, indeed, will be discussed by me again; but now purify yourself from this opinion, that these things may become to you the *proteleia* of the future discourse; viz. that the gods have distri-

buted virtue and vice to men as to the champions in the stadium, the latter as the reward of a depraved nature and base mind, but the former of a worthy mind and robust nature, when it is victorious in probity. With these divinity is willing to be present, to be the defender of their life, and to protect them with his hand. Hence he saves one of these by oracles, another by auguries, another by dreams, another by a voice, and another by sacrifices. For the human soul is imbecile with respect to the rational investigation of every thing, as being surrounded in this second life with profound darkness, conversant with loud noise and abundant tumult from terrestrial evils, and suffering perturbation from them. For what traveller is so swift and secure as not, in the course of his journey to meet with obscure profundities, or an immanifest trench, or a precipice? What pilot is so skilful and sagacious as to sail over the sea without experiencing storms and tempest, the impetus of the winds, and the turbulency of the air? What physician is so conversant with his art as not to be disturbed by some obscure and unexpected disease, since different diseases have a different origin, and thus subvert all the rules of art? And what man is so worthy as to pass through life securely and without blame, since life is like a diseased body, an uncertain voyage, or a road full of profundities: what man, this being the case, is so good as not to require the piloting, and medical skill, and helping hand of divinity? For virtue is, indeed, a beautiful thing, her paths are easy, and

her power is most efficacious; but she is mingled with a base and obscure matter, which is full of the immanifest, and which men call fortune, a thing blind and unstable. It is this which ambitiously opposes, rises against, and contends with virtue, and which by this opposition frequently disturbs her; just as ætherial clouds, which, running under the rays of the sun, conceal its light; for then, indeed, the sun is beautiful, but is to us immanifest. In like manner the incursions of fortune cut off* virtue from the view; and virtue, indeed, is then in itself no less beautiful, but, falling into an obscure cloud, it is overshadowed and obstructed. Here, then, there is need of divinity, as the coadjutant, as the joint combatant, and as the guardian in the contest.

Divinity, therefore, being established in his proper region, governs the heavens, and the order which they contain. But there are secondary immortal natures proceeding from him, which are called secondary gods, arranged in the confines of

* Plotinus, in his book on Felicity, to my translation of which I refer the reader, beautifully observes concerning the truly worthy man, "That he is never oppressed with evil through ignorance of his own concerns, nor changed by the fortunes of others, whether prosperous or adverse; but when his pains are vehement, as far as it is possible to bear he bears them, and, when they are excessive, they may cause him to be delirious; yet he will not be miserable in the midst of the greatest pains. For his intellectual splendor will assiduously shine in the penetralia of his soul, like a bright light secured in a watch-tower, which shines with unremitted splendor, though surrounded by stormy winds and raging seas."

earth and heaven. These are, indeed, less powerful than divinity, but more powerful than man. They are, also, the ministers of the gods, but the governors of men; and they are very near to the gods, but the curators of mankind. For the mortal with respect to the immortal would be separated by too great an interval from the survey of celestial beings and an association with them, unless this dæmoniacal nature, through its alliance to each of these, harmoniously bound human imbecility to divine strength. For as the Barbarians are separated from the Grecians by the ignorance of language, but the race of interpreters, receiving the language of each, and associating with both, conjoins and comingles their converse; in like manner it appears to me the race of dæmons must be conceived to be mingled with gods and men: for it is this race which appears to and converses with men, is rolled in the midst of the mortal nature, and extends from the gods those things of which mortals must necessarily be in want. But the herd of dæmons is numerous:

> "For thrice ten thousand are th' immortal powers,
> On Jove attendant in the foodful earth *."

Of these, some are the physicians of diseases, others counsellors in things dubious, others the messengers of things unapparent, others the co-operators in art, and others the companions of the way. Others, again, are conversant in cities,

* Hesiod. Op. et Dier. ver. 252.

others in the country, others in the sea, and others in the continent. Different dæmons, too, are allotted the habitation of different bodies, this Socrates, but that Plato, this Pythagoras, but another Zeno, and another Diogenes. One of these, likewise, is terrible, another philanthropic, another political, and another military. For as numerous as are the dispositions of men, so numerous, also, are the natures of dæmons:

> " Gods, to the view resembling stranger guests,
> Wander thro' cities in all-various forms *."

But if you point out to me a depraved soul, this is untenanted, and destitute of an inspective guardian.

* Odyss. xvii. ver. 485. See this explained in my introduction to the second book of the Republic of Plato.

DISSERTATION XXVII.

AGAIN, CONCERNING THE DÆMON * OF SOCRATES.

COME, then, let us interrogate this dæmoniacal power itself (for it is philanthropic, and is accustomed to answer through the human mouth, just as the art of Ismenias through the pipe) let us interrogate him as follows with the Homeric Ulysses:

> " A god art thou, or of the mortal race †?
> For if some god, th' inhabitant of heav'n,"

an answer is not necessary, since we know what you are:

> " But if some mortal, habitant of earth,"

Are you subject to the like passions that we are? do you speak in the same manner that we do?

* As Maximus is not accurate in what he says of dæmons in general, and does not inform us what were the characteristic properties of the dæmon of Socrates in particular, the reader is referred to the additional Notes on this volume, in which he will find a copious and accurate account, derived from ancient sources, of both these.

† Odyss. vi. ver. 149.

and is your birth and the extent of your duration the same as that of ours? or, are you, indeed, according to your mode of living, a domestic of the earth, but according to your essence superior to it? For dæmons are not of a fleshly nature, (since they order me to answer for them) nor do they consist of bones, or blood, or any thing else which is of a dissipated nature, and which may be dissolved, or liquified, or glide away. What then does a dæmon consist of? Let us, in the first place, survey the necessity with which the existence of a dæmoniacal essence is attended. The impassive is contrary to the passive, the mortal to the immortal, the irrational to the rational, the insensible to the sensible, and the animated to the inanimate. Every thing, therefore, which possesses a soul is composed from both these: for it is either impassive and immortal, or immortal and passive, or passive and mortal, or rational and sensitive, or animated and impassive; and through these nature gradually proceeds, descending successively from the most honourable to the vilest animals. But if you take away any one of these you mutilate nature; just as, in the harmony of sounds, the middle produces the concord of the extremes; since it causes the mutation by adhering to the intermediate sounds, from the sharpest to the flattest note, to become consonant both to the hearing and the hand of the musician.

Conceive that this, which takes place in the most perfect harmony, is also effected in nature: and establish divinity, indeed, according to the

impassive and immortal, but a dæmon according to the immortal and passive *; man according to the passive and mortal; a beast according to the irrational and sensitive; and a plant according to the animated and impassive. And the consideration of the others, indeed, we shall now omit: but since we speculate the nature of dæmons, which we say is a medium between man and divinity, let us see whether it is possible to take this away and yet preserve the extremes. Is, therefore, divinity immortal, indeed, but passive? by no means: for he is immortal but impassive. And what is man; is he mortal and impassive? Neither must this be admitted: for he is mortal, indeed, but not impassive. Where, therefore, shall we place that which is immortal and at the same time passive? For it is necessary that a common essence should be composed from both these, which is more excellent than man, but inferior to divinity, in order that the extremes may be in proportion to each other. For there can be no mixture of two things which are naturally separated, unless a certain common boundary is the recipient of both.

Thus, for instance, we say that fire is dry and hot; but the contrary to the hot is the cold, and to the dry the moist. It is, however, impossible for fire to be changed into water and water into fire: for neither can cold be changed into heat nor moisture into dryness. But nature managed

* This, however, is true only of the lowest orders of dæmons; for the highest, or divine dæmons, are impassive. See the additional notes.

the war of these as follows: she gave to them air as a conciliator, which receiving heat from fire, and moisture from water, mingled and conjoined them in amicable league. Hence a mutation and transition is effected from fire into air through heat, and from air into water through moisture. Again, air is hot and moist, but earth cold and dry; and dryness is contrary to moisture, but coldness to heat. Air, therefore, would never be changed into earth unless nature had given to them the essence of water as an associate and conciliator, and which receives, indeed, from air moisture, but from earth coldness. Thus, then, summarily consider the whole: since each of these consists from two contrary natures, of which always taking away one part, you add the remainder to the other; according to one half separating each from the other, but co-arranging them according to the other half. After this manner things which are contrary to, in consequence of being unmingled with each other, communicate and are at the same time mingled together, fire with air, indeed, according to heat, air with water according to moisture, water with earth according to coldness, and earth with fire according to dryness. In like manner, here also, a god communicates with a dæmon according to the immortal, a dæmon with man according to the passive, man with beast according to the sensitive, and beast with plant according to the animated.

If you are willing, also, to survey the œconomy of the body, you will see that neither does nature

here leap immediately from one extreme to the other, but that she requires certain media in managing the temperament of bodies. For the hair and nails are softer than the bones, more slender than the nerves, more dry than the blood, and rougher than the flesh. And, in short, in every thing in which there is harmony and arrangement a medium is necessary, in voices, in colours, in the subjects of taste and smell, in rhythms, in figures, in passions, and in discourses. Be it so: for these things being admitted, if divinity is impassive and immortal, but man mortal and passive, it is necessary that the medium of these should be either impassive and mortal or immortal and passive; of which the former is impossible, since the impassive cannot at any time associate or accord with the mortal. It remains, therefore, that the nature of dæmons must be passive and immortal, that through the immortal it may communicate with divinity, but through the passive with man.

It is now, therefore, time to show how the dæmoniacal genus is passive and immortal: and, in the first place, let us speak concerning the immortal. Every thing, then, which is corrupted is either dissolved, or melted, or is cut, or broken, or changes and is converted. It is dissolved, as clay by water; or it is broken as the earth by the plough; or it is melted, as wax by the sun; or it is cut, as a plant by iron; or it changes and is converted, as water into air, and air into fire. But it is necessary to the immortality of a dæmoniacal nature, that it should neither be dissolved, nor dis-

sipated, nor converted, nor broken, nor changed, nor cut. For if it suffered any one of these it would cease to be immortal. But how can it be subject to passivity, since a dæmon is a soul divested of body? For if the soul imparts to the body incorruptibility as long as it is present with it, the soul cannot be itself corrupted. In the composition, therefore, the body is contained, but the soul contains. But if something else contains the soul, and itself does not contain itself, what will this be, and who can conceive a soul of soul? For when one thing being contained by another is preserved by it, it is necessary that this containing should cease when it arrives at a thing which contains, indeed, something else, but is contained by itself. For, if this were not the case, where would reasoning, proceeding to infinity, stop? Just as if you conceive a ship in a tempest fixed to a rock by many ropes, which being fastened to each other end in the rock, a thing stable and firm.

Such a thing as this is the soul, which connects, establishes as in a port, and gives stability to the body, which is always swimming, vibrating, and agitated in billows and tempest. But when these nerves, the spirit, and other particulars, from which as ropes the body has hitherto been stationed in the soul, begin to fail, the body perishes, and is merged in the abyss; but the soul, swimming over the stormy deeps by herself, connectedly contains herself, and is firmly established. Such a soul, too, is then called a dæmon, an etherial being, transmigrated from earth thither; re-

sembling the condition of one who is transferred from the Barbarians to the Greeks, and from a city lawless, tyrannical, and seditious, to one governed by equitable laws, royal, and peaceful. For this thing appears to me to be very near to the Homeric image: as, for instance, when Homer says that Vulcan fashioned in a golden shield two cities,

"In one were marriages and splendid feasts *,"

and dancing, and singing, and numerous torches; but in the other wars and seditions, rapine and contest, howling, and lamentations, and groans. The same may be said of earth when compared to heaven: for the latter is a peaceful thing, replete with joyful songs and divine choirs; but the former is full of noise, and labour, and discord. For when the soul is liberated from hence thither, having divested herself of the body, and left it to be corrupted in the earth, in its own time, and according to its own law, she becomes a dæmon † instead of a man, and with pure eyes surveys her proper spectacles, being neither darkened by flesh, nor disturbed by colour, nor confounded by all-various figures, nor confined, as with a wall, by tur-

* Iliad xviii. ver. 491.

† The human soul, however, after death, becomes a dæmon only κατα χεσιν, *according to habitude, proximity, or alliance;* but never becomes a dæmon essentially. Maximus, from not accurately understanding the ancient theology, confounds dæmons, *according to habitude,* with *essential* dæmons; or, in other words, souls that are *sometimes* with those that are *always* the attendants of the gods.

bid air; but she beholds beauty itself with her own eyes, and rejoices in the vision. Then, too, she bewails her former life, but proclaims the present blessed. Then she bewails the condition of her kindred souls, who still revolve about the earth; and, through philanthropy, she is willing to associate with them, and correct them when they are deviating from rectitude. But she is ordered by divinity to descend to earth, and become mingled with every kind of men, with every human fortune, disposition, and art; so as to give assistance to the worthy, avenge those that are injured, and punish those that injure.

Every dæmon, however, does not effect all things; but there, also, different works are assigned to different dæmons. And this, indeed, is the passivity by which a dæmon is inferior to a god. For they are not entirely willing to be liberated from the propensities which they possessed while on earth; but Æsculapius now exercises the healing art, Hercules engages in strenuous exertions, Dionysius is agitated with Bacchic fury, Amphilochus prophesies, the Dioscuri sail, Minos judges, and Achilles is armed. Achilles, indeed, inhabits an island * about the Pontic sea, in a direct line with the Ister. In this island there are a temple and altars of Achilles; and no one of his own accord approaches it without having first sacrificed; but when he has sacrificed, he ascends

* This island is called Achillea, or Leuce. See the Andromache of Euripides, ver. 1260.

into the island. In this place sailors frequently see a young man with yellow hair, leaping in golden arms. Others by no means see him, but hear him singing the song of triumph; and others both see and hear him. Some one, too, who unwillingly slept in the island, was roused from his sleep by Achilles, who also led him to a banquet in his tent. There Patroclus poured out the wine, and Achilles played on the harp. Thetis, likewise, he said, was present, and a choir of other dæmons. But Hector, as the Ilienses relate, inhabits the Trojan land, and is seen leaping in the plains in glittering armour. I, indeed, have neither seen Achilles nor Hector, but I have seen the Dioscuri * in a ship, those splendid stars, who directed the vessel through the storm. I have also seen Esculapius, but not in a dream: I have seen Hercules, but when awake.

* In magna tempestate apparent quasi stellæ velo insidentes. Adjuvari se tunc periclitantes existimant Pollucis et Castoris numine. Senec. Nat. Quæst. lib. i. cap. i.; viz. "In a great tempest stars, as it were, appear seated on the sail of the ship. Those that are in danger then think that they are assisted by the divinity of Castor and Pollux." Thus, also, Arrian, in Periplo Ponti Euxini, p. 23,: "Οι μεν Διοσκυροι τοις πανλαχου πλωϊζομενοις εναργεις φαινονται, και φανεντες σωτηρες γινονλαι:" *i. e.* "The Dioscuri are clearly seen by those that sail to all parts of the earth, and become saviours when they are seen."

DISSERTATION XXVIII.

IF DISCIPLINES ARE REMINISCENCES.

A CRETAN once came to Athens, whose name was Epimenides, bringing with him a narration, which, according to its literal meaning, it was difficult to believe. For he said, that, lying in the cavern of Dictæan Jupiter, in a profound sleep for many years, he saw the gods, and the offspring of the gods, together with Truth and Justice. Epimenides in mythologically delivering certain particulars of this kind, obscurely signified, as it appears to me, that the life of the human soul on the earth resembles a long-extended dream. His narration, however, would have been more persuasive if he had added to it the verses of Homer concerning dreams. For Homer * says that there are two gates of evanescent dreams, one of which is of ivory and the other of horn ; and that the dreams which pass through the gate of horn are true and worthy of belief, but those which pass through the other gate are vain and fallacious, and bring nothing to the soul, pertaining to vigilant perception. Referable to this, also, is what Epimenides

* Odyss. xix. ver. 562.

related, whether it be a fable or a true narration. For the life here is in reality a dream, according to which the soul being buried in body through satiety and repletion, has scarcely a dreaming perception of beings, but the visions of sleep arrive to the souls of the multitude through the ivory gate. If, however, there is anywhere a soul pure and sober, and but little disturbed by the satiety and repletion which are here, it is likely that such a soul will meet with dreams that pass through the other gate clear and distinct, and approximating very nearly to the truth. This was the dream of Epimenides.

But Pythagoras, the Samian, was the first among the Greeks who had the boldness to say that his body would die, but that his soul, taking her flight, would depart deathless and unconscious of old age, for she existed before she came hither. Men believed him asserting these things, and also when he said that he formerly lived on the earth in another body, and was then Euphorbus the Trojan. But they believed him from the following circumstance: He once entered the temple of Minerva *, where he saw many and all-various gifts, and among them a shield, the form of which was Phrygian, but greatly impaired by time. He said, therefore, that he knew the shield, and that it was

* Ovid, however, Metam. xv. ver. 164. Porphyrius, Vit. Pyth. sec. 27. Jamblichus, sec. 63, and Pausanias in Corinth, lib. ii. cap. 17. assert that this shield of Euphorbus was in the temple of Juno; and Diogenes Laertius, viii. 5. relates that it was dedicated to Apollo.

taken from him in the Trojan war by him by whom he was slain. The inhabitants, wondering at the relation, took down the shield, in which there was this inscription: "TO PALLAS MINERVA MENELAUS FROM EUPHORBUS." If you are willing I will also give you another narration: There was a Proconnesian*, whose body lay on the ground, breathing, indeed, but obscurely and very near to death. His soul, however, leaving the body, wandered in æther, like a bird, surveying every thing which could be beheld from on high, the earth and the sea, rivers and cities, the manners of men, their calamities, and all-various dispositions: and, again entering the body, exciting it from its death-like state, and using it as an instrument, she related whatever in different places she had seen and heard.

What then did Epimenides, Pythagoras, and Aristeas wish obscurely to signify by these narrations? Is it any thing else than the leisure of the soul of a worthy man from the pleasures and passions of the body, when, being liberated from its tumult, and converting herself to intellect, she again meets with truth itself, dismissing the images of reality? This, indeed, resembles a beautiful sleep, and which is replete with clear dreams. It also resembles a sublime flight of the soul, not, indeed, above the summits of mountains, in dark and turbid air, but far beyond these, in stable æther, where it gradually and quietly passes, unattended

* Aristeas. See the 22d Dissertation.

by pain, to the vision of true and real being. But what is the mode of conducting it thither, and what may it most fitly be denominated? Shall we call it discipline, or, according with Plato, reminiscence*; or shall we assign two names, dis-

* The soul having existed in all the infinite periods of past time, in consequence of her natural immortality, the knowledge which she acquires in the present life is very properly called by Plato *reminiscence*, since it is nothing more than a recovery of what she formerly possessed. As *reminiscence*, therefore, necessarily implies *pre-existence*, the following arguments in defence of that doctrine, extracted from my Introduction to five books of Plotinus, are recommended to the most serious attention of the reader.

Unless the soul, then, had a being prior to her connection with the present body, she never would be led to search after knowledge; for if the objects of her investigation were things which she had never before been acquainted with, how could she ever be certain that she detected them? Indeed it would be as impossible on this hypothesis for the soul to know any thing about them, even when she perceived them, as it would be to understand the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripatetics, in order to subvert this consequence, have recourse to an intellect in capacity, which is the passive recipient of all forms. But the doubt still remains. For how does this intellect understand? since it must either understand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics assert that natural conceptions are the causes of our investigating and discovering truth. If, therefore, these conceptions are in capacity, we ask the same question as before; but if they are in energy, why do we investigate what we know? But the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the causes of our investigations. If, then, they say that these anticipations subsist in an expanded condition, investigation must be in vain; but if they are in an involved state, why do we seek after any thing besides these anticipations; or, in other words, why do we seek after distinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

cipline and reminiscence, to one thing? This one thing, indeed, resembles that which happens to the eye: for though sight is always inherent in it,

Again, there are numberless instances of persons that are terrified at certain animals, such as cats, lizards, and tortoises, without knowing the cause of their terror. The nephews of Berius, says Olympiodorus, (in MS. Comment. in Phædonem) that were accustomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the sight of a cock. The same author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undisturbed at asps and dragons, but was so exceedingly frightened at a wasp that he would run from it crying aloud, and quite stupified with terror. Thus too, says he: Themison the physician could apply himself to the cure of every disease except the hydrophobia; but if any person only mentioned this disease he would be immediately agitated, and suffer in a manner similar to those afflicted with this malady. Now it is impossible to assign any other satisfactory cause of all this than a reminiscence of having suffered through these animals in a prior state of existence.

Farther still: infants are not seen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but pass the greatest part of this time in sleep; however, in their sleep they are often seen both to laugh and cry. But how is it possible that this can any otherwise happen than through the soul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the passions which it had experienced in another life? Besides, our looking into ourselves when we are endeavouring to discover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkness of oblivion. The delight, too, which attends our discovery of truth sufficiently proves that this discovery is nothing more than a recognition of something most eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, lost in the middle space of time between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature would produce terror instead of delight; and things are pleasing only in proportion as they possess something known and domestic to the natures by which they are known.

yet, through calamity, darkness pouring in upon, and investing its instrument, excludes its association with the objects of sight. Art, therefore, approaches, which does not, indeed, give sight to the eye, but, removing the impediment, affords a free egress to its rays. Conceive that the soul also is a certain sight, naturally capable of perceiving, and scientifically knowing real beings. From the calamity of bodies, however, much darkness pours in upon it, confounds its vision, takes away its accuracy, and extinguishes its proper light. But artificial reason, approaching like a physician, does not, indeed, impart to it science, as a thing which it has not, but excites that which it already possesses, though obscure and bound, and oppressed with darkening vertigo.

In the same manner, therefore, as the obstetric art, introducing to the parturient hands together with art, receives the offspring, gives ease to the pangs of labour, leads the mature fœtus into light, and liberates the parturient female from her pains; —thus, also, reason obstetricates * the soul when big with conceptions and full of pregnant pains; though many become abortive, either through the unskilfulness of the midwives, or the vehemence of the parturient pangs, or the dulness of the seed; while, on the contrary, but few souls, and those rare, receive a perfect conception, the offspring of which are clear and distinct, and the genuine productions of their primary parents. And the

* See my translation of the Theætetus of Plato.

name, indeed, of the pregnancy is intellect, but of the pangs of parturition sense, and of the delivery reminiscence. All souls, too, are naturally pregnant, but they suffer the pains of parturition from sense, and bring forth from reason. As it is impossible, therefore, for any thing to be born without seed, or to be of a nature different from the seed; for a man is born from a man, an ox from an ox, an olive from an olive, and a vine from a vine; so if the soul emits into light any thing true, it is necessary that these seeds which are implanted in the soul, should also be true. But if they are, they always were implanted; and if they always were they are immortal. Indeed, that which takes place about the sciences is nothing more than the flower and mature perfection of the seeds of the soul. But with respect to that which men call ignorance, what else will it be than a sluggishness of the seeds?

If, then, the soul, like the body, were mortal and corruptible, if it were subject to dissolution and putrefaction, I should have nothing venerable to say about it; for the body is a thing diurnal, exposed to danger, uncertain, obscure, and foolish. If the soul were a thing of this kind it would neither know, nor remember, nor learn any thing. For wax, when melted by the sun, would more easily preserve the impression of the seal than the soul discipline, if it were body; since every body flows, and is rapidly borne along, like Euripus, upwards and downwards, at one time swelling from infancy to puberty, and at another sinking

and gliding from puberty to old age. Neither, however, Pythagoras nor Plato prophesy that the soul is a thing of this kind; nor, prior to these, Homer, with whom souls, even in Hades, discourse, and are then prophetic. For a bard says in one of his poems,

"Self-taught am I, the gods impart the song *."

And what he says is true: for the soul is in reality a self-taught thing, and naturally possesses knowledge from the gods, according to an excellent mode of subsistence. Or shall we say that other animals are indeed self-taught with respect to their proper works, and acknowledge no masters, neither the lion in the exertion of strength, nor the stag in flying from his pursuers, nor the horse in the race; and likewise that the tribe of birds is self-taught, who with self-operating art build nests in the summits of trees; that spiders with spontaneous thread suspend their webs in air, serpents spontaneously form for themselves dens, and fishes caverns, and that the arts of other animals are connate to the safety of the several kinds; but that man, the most intellectual of animals, possesses knowledge by external aid? But if this be admitted, whence is it derived? For it must necessarily be obtained either from invention or discipline, each of which is imbecile, if science is not naturally inherent in the soul. For how can he

* See what we have said on this verse in the twenty-second Dissertation.

who discovers any thing, use that which he discovers, if he is ignorant of the use of it? If, indeed, some inhabitant of the continent should, according to Homer, meet with a man carrying an oar, he would say,

"On his strong shoulders he a corn-van bears *."

But whence did he learn this? Not from one who was ignorant. And if he learnt it from one possessing knowledge, I should ask his preceptor how he also learnt it. For, again, he must either have discovered or learnt it: and if he discovered it, I should ask the same thing, how he could use what he had discovered, if he had no knowledge of it. But if he learnt it from another, it will again be necessary to interrogate that other in a similar manner. Where, then, shall we stop in interrogating different preceptors? For inquiry must, at length, arrive at him who derived his knowledge not from learning, but invention; to whom also the same things may be said.

Reason, therefore, brings us to the object of investigation. For the invention of the soul being something self-begotten, spontaneous, and connate, what else is it than true opinions wakened into energy, the name of the excitation and coordination of which is science? But, if you will, assimilate invention to a soldier widely-wandering: or, rather, according to Homer, let there be night and abundant quiet in the camp, and let all the

* Odyss. xii. ver. 127. See p. 53 of my Introduction to five books of Plotinus.

other soldiers, in order, lie sunk in profound sleep:

" But not Atrides, shepherd of the troops * ,"

For he is awake, and he rouses every soldier, and places him in his rank:

" The horse and chariots to the front assign'd,
The foot (the strength of war) he rang'd behind;
The middle space suspected troops supply,
Inclos'd by both, nor left the power to fly †."

Conceive that a thing of this kind takes place about the soul; viz. a profound night and sleep of her conceptions; but that reason, like a general or a king, or whatever else you may be willing to denominate it, approaches to each of these, and excites and places them in their rank. Call, then, the sleep of these conceptions oblivion, the excitation of them reminiscence, and the guardian, defence, and safety of the things co-ordinated, memory. But reminiscence is gradually produced from the soul investigating one thing from another, and being as it were led by the hand from the present to the future; just, indeed, as reminiscence is produced about the affairs of the present life.

Demodocus, at a banquet of the Phæacians, sings the strife

" That made Ulysses and Achilles foes ‡."

Ulysses being present hears the song, and, recognizing the strife, weeps. Is it not, therefore, probable that his soul from this, as a principle, pro-

* Iliad x. ver. 3.

† Iliad iv. ver. 297. The translation by Pope.

‡ Odyss. viii. ver. 75. See my translation of the Phædo of Plato.

ceeded to the deeds which he had there performed; and that his body, indeed, abiding in the same place with the Phæacians, drank with them; but his soul was in Ilion, memory recalling her to what he there saw, and proceeding from a small beginning to the multitude of her spectacles at that time? We also find, that some one, on seeing a lyre, recollects the beloved person by whom it was used: for reminiscence is a thing light and prompt. And as bodies which are easily moved require the previous impulse of the hand, from which receiving a beginning they preserve their motion for a long time; in like manner intellect, receiving from memory a small beginning, which sense extends to it, proceeds, according to reminiscence, to a multitude of particulars. For every thing, whether present or past, which occurs to the soul, has a certain consequent order, either according to time, as night after day, age after youth, and summer after winter; or according to passion, as love succeeds beauty, anger contumely, pleasure prosperity, and pain calamity; or according to place, as

"Pharis and Sparta, Thisbe, nurse of doves *."

Or according to distribution; as,

"The hardy warriors whom Bœotia bred,
Penelius, Leitus, Prothoënor, led:
With these Arcesilaus and Clonius stand †."

Or according to power; as,

"O father Jove! this task let Ajax prove,
Or Tydeus' son, or rich Mycene's king ‡."

* Iliad ii. ver. 502 and 582.
† Iliad ii. ver. 494. The translation by Pope.
‡ Iliad vii. ver. 179.

The senses, therefore, as being established in the vestibules of the soul, when they come into contact with a certain beginning, and deliver it to intellect; then intellect, adhering to this, perceives what remains, and proceeds to things consequent either by time or by nature, by distribution or by place, by honour or by power. For, as in long and thin spears, he who moves their extremities sends the motion through the whole spear as far as to the other end; and as he who shakes the beginning of long and stretched ropes diffuses the motion which proceeds to the end through the whole; in like manner a small beginning only is necessary to intellect, in order to its conception of the whole of things. A man, therefore, of a naturally good disposition, and who rapidly runs to virtue, receiving the beginning from himself, eagerly proceeds in his journey, and apprehends and remits to memory the spectacles of intellect. But he who is less skilful has need of Socrates, who, indeed, teaches him nothing, but by interrogation and enquiry causes him to answer * the truth itself. Who then can answer that which he does not yet know? Unless some one should say, that he who walks when another leads him by the hand does not himself walk. What then is the difference between him who leads another by the hand and him who interrogates, and between him who walks and him who answers? For the one possesses energy from himself, but the other imparts security to that energy. But neither does he who

* See this beautifully illustrated in the Meno of Plato.

is led by the hand learn to walk, nor he who is interrogated learn to answer; but the one walks, for he is able, and the other answers, for he knows how; and both receive security, one from him who leads, and the other from him who interrogates.

The body, indeed, naturally possesses the ability of walking, and the soul is naturally ratiocinative: and if it is immortal, as it is, the intellectual conceptions and sciences of things must necessarily be eternally inherent in it. But the soul being connected with a twofold life, the one pure and refulgent, and disturbed by no calamity, but the other turbulent and agitated, and mingled with all-various fortunes; while an inhabitant of the earth she is filled with obscurity and dark vertigo, being affected in the same manner as those that are intoxicated. For in these the soul being inflamed through immoderate drinking, approaches very near to insanity. She partially, however, recalls herself, and neither entirely errs, nor reasons without ambiguity, but remains in the confines of ignorance and knowledge. But when the soul is liberated from hence thither, emerging as it were from the land of the Cimmerians into splendid æther, becoming free from flesh, free from desires, free from diseases, free from calamities, then she perceives and reasons about perfect realities, associating with gods, and the sons of gods, above the supreme arch * of the heavens, revolving and

* See the Phædrus of Plato; for Maximus here alludes to the *subcelestial arch,* which is celebrated in that dialogue.

being co-ordinated with the army of gods, of which Jupiter is the leader and commander. And then, indeed, she possesses *memory* in reality, but now she *remembers* what she then saw. Then she possesses confidence, but now she errs. The robust soul, however, and which is allotted a good dæmon, even in the present life, liberates herself from the loud tumult, and abandoning as much as possible an association with the body, excites in herself the memory of what she there saw and heard. This, then, is what poets obscurely signify, when they say that Mnemosyne is the mother of the Muses, calling the sciences the Muses, a divine choir, the work of Jupiter, begotten by and co-ordinated with Mnemosyne. Let us, therefore, cultivate the Muses, let us cultivate Mnemosyne.

The heaven, however, there mentioned is not, as Maximus supposes, the *sensible heaven*, but that divine order which is called by the Chaldæan theologists νοητος και νοερος, *intelligible and at the same time intellectual.* See my notes on the Phædrus.

DISSERTATION XXIX.

WHETHER POETS HAVE ENTERTAINED BETTER CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GODS THAN PHILOSOPHERS.

MEN very much oppose each other, not only about a polity or dominion, or the common evils of life, but their contention extends to the most peaceful of things, poetry and philosophy; a thing twofold, indeed, according to name, but simple according to essence, and possessing no difference in itself. Just as if some one should conceive that day is any thing else than the light of the sun falling on the earth, or that the sun running above the earth is any thing else than day: for thus poetry subsists with respect to philosophy. For what else is poetry than philosophy, ancient by time, metrical from harmony, and mythological from design? And what else is philosophy than poetry, more recent in time, more strenuous in harmony, and more clear in its intention? Since these two things, therefore, differ from each other in time only and form, how shall any one judge what is the difference between them in those things in which both poets and philosophers assert something about divinity?

Or may we not say that this enquiry is just as if some one, comparing the most ancient medicine with the new, and which is now applied to bodies, should consider the better and the worse in each of these? For Esculapius would say in answer to him, "That times do not change other arts (for of things of which there is the same use, of these the works, likewise, are always similar) but that medicine, following the temperament of the body, a thing neither stable nor definite, but easily changed by ordinary aliment, necessarily invented different modes of diet accommodated to the present nutriment. Do not think, therefore, that those my sons, Machaon and Podalirius, were less dexterous in the healing art than their successors who discovered these sage and all-various methods of eure. But then, indeed, the art being conversant with bodies, which were neither easily changed, nor various, nor perfectly dissolute, managed them without difficulty, and its employment was something simple,

"To cut out arrows, and by med'cines bland
The wound to heal *."

But now, at length, bodies falling from this art into a more various diet and a depraved temperament, the art itself became diversified, and passed from its former simplicity into an all-various form."

Come, then, let one, who is a poet, and at the same time a philosopher, judge of the pursuits of

* Iliad, lib. xi. ver. 515.

the two in the same manner as Esculapius has judged of medicine. This man, therefore, will be very indignant, if any one should think that Homer and Hesiod, or by Jupiter Orpheus, or any other of the poets of that time, was less wise than Aristotle the Stagirite, or Chrysippus the Cilician, or Clitomachus the Libyan, or than others who were the authors of these many wise inventions; and that these poets were not in like manner, if not even more, skilful in the same things. But, as in bodies, the more ancient were more easily managed by art, through an excellent diet, but in process of time required more various medical aid; in like manner the soul formerly, through its simplicity, and what is called the rudeness of its manners, required a certain musical and milder philosophy, which might popularly allure and manage it, in the same manner as nurses charm through fabulous narrations the children committed to their care; but when, in the course of time, it became skilful and strenuous, and full of incredulity and craft, investigating fables, and not enduring enigmas, then it unveiled and divested philosophy of her ornament, and employed naked words. The latter mode, however, differed in nothing from the former, except in the scheme of harmony; but the opinions concerning the gods originating supernally proceeded through every philosophy.

I expel, however, Epicurus from the number both of poets and philosophers, but the business with the rest is equal and the same; unless you

think that Homer met with gods discharging arrows *, or discoursing, or drinking, or doing any thing else, such as he sings concerning them. For neither must it be supposed that Plato met with Jupiter acting the part of a charioteer †, and riding in a winged chariot, nor with an army of gods distributed into eleven ranks, nor with divinities feasting in the palace of Jupiter, in celebration of the birth of Venus ‡, when Plenty and Poverty were secretly connected together, and Love was the offspring of their conjunction. Nor must we imagine that he was a spectator of Pyriphlegethon, Acheron, and Cocytus §, and of rivers flowing upwards and downwards with water and fire, nor that he saw Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos ‖, nor met with them turning seven different revolu-

* Maximus here alludes to what Homer asserts of Apollo, in the first book of the Iliad. But this god must be considered as a divine power rooted in the first cause, through which all things participate of undefiled light and intelligible harmony, together with efficacious power, vigour, and fabricative perfection. The rays of this god are assimilated to arrows, and signify that *power* of Apollo which subverts every thing inordinate in the universe, and gives dominion to that which is orderly and gentle. *Discourse* signifies the *distributive* energy of a divine nature, and *drinking* that *vivific* energy which diffuses itself to all things, and supplies them with good. See more on this interesting subject in the introduction to the second and third books of Plato's Republic, vol. i. of my translation of Plato's works.

† See my translation of the Phædrus of Plato.

‡ See the Banquet of Plato.

§ See the Phædo of Plato.

‖ See the tenth book of Plato's Republic.

tions on a spindle. Survey, also, the poetry of the Syrian*, Jupiter and Cthonia, and the love which he there celebrates, together with the generation of Ophion, the battle of the gods, the tree, and the veil. Survey, too, Heraclitus, his mortal gods, and immortal men †.

All things, indeed, are full of enigmas, both among poets and philosophers, whose reverence of the truth I much more admire than the liberty of speech adopted by the moderns. For a fable is a more elegant interpreter of things which are not clearly seen through the imbecility of human nature. I, indeed, if those of a more recent saw farther in any thing than those of a former age, proclaim the men blessed for the vision; but if they did not in any thing surpass them in knowledge, and yet changed their enigmas into perspicuous language, I am afraid lest some one should reprove them for having divulged arcane narrations. For what else is a fable than a discourse invested with a foreign ornament? Just as the initiators into the mysteries cover statues with gold and silver and veils, by this mean magnificently celebrating the expectation which they raise. For the human soul being of a daring nature less honours that which is before its feet, but conceives that to be very admirable which is absent, predicting, indeed, respecting things which are not seen, and investigating these by a reason-

* *i. e.* Pherecydes.

† Heraclitus called men mortal gods, and gods immortal men.

ing process, hastening to discover what it has not yet obtained, but when it has obtained it delighting in it as its own work.

Poets, therefore, understanding this to be the case, as a remedy for it in divine dogmas devised fables, which are more obscure than direct narration, but more clear than enigmas, subsisting as a medium between science and ignorance; being credible, indeed, according to the pleasant, but incredible according to the paradoxical; leading the soul as it were by the hand to the investigation of things, and to explore something beyond what is apparent. Hence the meaning of these men was for a long time concealed, through the charm with which they captivated our ears; they being, indeed, philosophers in reality, but poets by name, and exchanging a thing attended with envy for a popularly alluring art. For to the hearing of the multitude the word philosopher is painful and oppressive, just as a rich man is an oppressive spectacle among the poor, a temperate man among the intemperate, and a strenuous combatant among the timid: for the depraved cannot endure that in their presence the virtues should be exalted. But the word poet is delicate to the hearing, and dear to the people, and is beloved for the pleasure which it affords, but unknown according to the virtue which it possesses. And as physicians mingle bitter medicines with sweet nutriment for the sick when they loathe food, and thus conceal the unpleasantness of the remedy; in like manner, ancient philosophy, inserting its meaning in fables,

and in the measures and form of verse, concealed by the vestment of delight the unpleasantness of its precepts.

Do not, therefore, ask whether the conceptions of poets concerning the gods are superior to those of philosophers; but, making a truce and league with the pursuits of each, consider them as conversant with one according art. For when you speak of a poet you also speak of a philosopher, and when of a philosopher you likewise speak of a poet. For you will similarly call Achilles a most brave man, fighting with a golden and varigeated shield, and Ajax, though he carries a shield composed of the hides of bulls; but virtue made both alike strenuous and terrible in battle, nor is gold here to be compared with the hide of a bull. Assimilate then measure and verse to gold, but prose to popular matter; and consider neither the gold, nor the skin, but the virtue of him by whom they are employed. The poet speaks the truth, though he speaks in enigmas, though he speaks in fables, though he speaks in verse. I follow the enigmas, I investigate the fables, nor shall I be seduced by his song. The philosopher also speaks the truth, though he speaks in prose, and I embrace the facility of this mode of writing; but if you take away truth both from the poet and the philosopher, you will make the verse inelegant, and the plain narration a fable. For without truth you will neither entirely believe in the fable of the poet, nor in the discourse of the philosopher.

Epicurus, indeed, writes in prose, but his assertions are more absurd than fables; so that I should rather believe Homer, when he says, speaking of Jupiter, that he weighed the souls of two most valiant men with a golden balance,

"Of slaught'ring Hector, and Achilles fierce*;"

raising the beams with his right-hand: for I see the fate of the men nodding together with the right-hand of Jupiter:

"The nod that ratifies the will divine,
The faithful, fix'd, irrevocable sign†."

I understand the nod of Jupiter, through which the earth remains fixed, the sea is poured forth, the air flows, fire runs upwards, the heavens revolve, animals are generated, and trees grow. Human virtue and felicity, also, are the works of the nods of Jupiter. I understand Minerva, likewise, at one time being present with Achilles, leading the man from anger, and standing behind him, but at another associating with Ulysses

"In all his toils‡."

I understand Apollo, likewise, a god who is both an archer and a musician; and I love his harmony, but am terrified at his arrows. Neptune also shakes the earth with his trident, Mars marshals

* Iliad xxii. ver. 211. † Iliad i. ver. 526.
‡ Odyss. xiii. ver. 299.

armies, and Vulcan fabricates in brass; but all his arrangements and operations through fire are not for Achilles alone. These things poets assert, and these things are also asserted by philosophers; of which, if you change the names, you will find the similitude, and recognize the narration. Call Jupiter, then, the most ancient * and original intellect, which all things follow and obey, but call Minerva wisdom, Apollo the sun, and Neptune † a spirit pervading through the earth and sea, and governing their contention and harmony.

If, too, you proceed to other particulars, you will find in the poets all things full of names, but in the philosophers of arguments. To what fable, however, shall I compare the assertions of Epicurus? For what poet is so indolent, so dissolute, and so ignorant of the gods? *That which is immortal is neither busily employed itself, nor is the cause of molestation to another* ‡. Who can show me a fable resembling this assertion? How shall I represent Jupiter; what is he doing; about what does he deliberate; and in what pleasures is he engaged? Jupiter, indeed, in Homer drinks, but he

* Say, rather, conformably to the ancient theology, that Jupiter is a divine power rooted in the first cause; that he is the artificer of the universe; that he subsists at the extremity of the *intellectual* order of gods; and that he gives life to all things *through* himself.

† Conceive, also, that Neptune is a divine power rooted in the first cause, and that he is the inspective guardian of all the middle elements, of which his trident is a symbol.

‡ This was the doctrine of Epicurus. See the additional notes on this volume.

also speaks in assemblies, and deliberates, just as the administration of the affairs about Asia flows from the Persian king, and that of the Grecian affairs flows from the assembly of the Athenians. For the great king consults for Asia and the Athenian people for Greece: the pilot also consults for the ship, the general for the army, the legislator for the city, the husbandman for the earth, and the steward for the house. And, that the ship, the army, the city, the earth, and the house, may be preserved, the pilot, the general, the legislator, the husbandman, and the steward, are busily employed. But for the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the other parts of the universe, who, O Epicurus, consults? Who is the pilot; who the general; who the legislator; who the husbandman, who the steward? But neither was Sardanapalus without employment; who, though he was shut up within doors, lying on a carved bed, amidst a choir of women, yet at the same time consulted how Ninus* might be saved, and how the Assyrians might be happy. With you, however, O Epicurus, the pleasure of Jupiter is more indolent than that of Sardanapalus. O incredible fables! and adapted to no poetic harmony.

* Ninus was the son of Belus, who built a city, to which he gave his own name; and founded the Assyrian monarchy, of which he was the first sovereign. B. C. 2059.

DISSERTATION XXX.

WHETHER IT BE NECESSARY TO PRAY.

A PHRYGIAN *, whose life was rustic, and who was a lover of money, infected, according to the fable, the water of a fountain with wine; to which fountain a dæmoniacal satyr, who was a lover of wine, being thirsty, came to drink. The stupid Phrygian formed such a prayer to the captive dæmon as it was likely the former would make and the latter accomplish: that the land might become golden, together with the trees, the fruits, the meadows, and the flowers they contain. The satyr granted his request. When the land, however, became golden, a famine invaded the Phrygians; and Midas deplored his wealth, made a recantation of his wish, and no longer prayed to the satyr, but to the gods and goddesses, that his ancient poverty, fertile, all-producing, and abounding with fruits, might return to him, and that gold might be transferred to the heads of his enemies. Such was the prayer which he offered, weeping; but he

* Midas.

prayed in vain. I praise the fable for its grace, and for the path which it affords to the truth: for what else does it obscurely signify, than the worthless prayer of a stupid man, asking to obtain that, of which, when obtained, he repents? But the fable, by the hunting after the satyr, his bonds, and his wine, signifies, that some by fraud, and others by violence, obtaining that which they desire, and that for which they pray, ascribe the gift to the gods, though it is not from them they receive it. For divinity gives nothing which is not good; but these are the gifts of fortune*, the irrational bestowing of an irrational nature, resembling the benevolence of the intoxicated.

But what of the Lydian? Was he not more stupid than the Phrygian? Did he not pray to Apollo that he might possess the kingdom of the Persians, and worship the god with abundance of gold, as if he had been a magistrate who is to be corrupted by gifts? and though he had frequently received this oracle from Delphi, *If Cræsus passes over the Halys, he will destroy a mighty empire*; yet he interpreted the meaning of the oracle to his own advantage, passed over the Halys, and destroyed

* Fortune, considered according to its first subsistence, is that divine power which congregates all sublunary causes, and enables them to confer on sublunary effects that particular good which their nature and merits eminently deserve. She is by no means, therefore, an irrational nature; but as she governs the fluctuating empire of the sublunary region, which is full of the irrational and inordinate, her gifts are also received disorderly and irrationally.

the mighty kingdom of the Lydians. I also hear, in Homer, a certain Grecian praying:

"O father Jove! may this be Ajax' lot,
Or Tydeus' son, or rich Mycene's king *."

And Jupiter accomplished the prayer:

"Then from the helm leap'd forth the lot desir'd
Of Ajax."

And of Priam, indeed, when praying for his own land, and daily sacrificing to Jupiter oxen and sheep, he rendered the prayer ineffectual; but to Agamemnon, when invading a foreign land, he promised and fulfilled his promise:

"A safe return, Troy's well-built walls o'erthrown †."

And Apollo, who before gave no assistance to the injured Chryses, when he freely addressed him, and reminded him of the savour of the thighs which he had sacrificed, then he discharged his arrows on the Greeks, pouring them for nine continued days on mules, and sheep, and dogs ‡.

What is the meaning of these things, O best of poets? Is divinity a helluo, one who may be corrupted by gifts, and in no respect differing from the multitude of mankind? And must we also admit this verse of thine:

"The gods themselves are flexible §?"

Or, on the contrary, is the divine nature incapable of being changed, firm, and inexorable? For

* Iliad vii. ver. 179. † Iliad ii. ver. 113.

‡ See Iliad i. ver. 50, &c.

§ Iliad ix. ver. 493. The illuminations of divinity, though in themselves immutable, are received mutably by mortal na-

it is not only unbecoming in a god to be changed and to repent, but is even unworthy a good man. For a man who can be changed from his purpose and repent, if he is changed to better from worse, has consulted badly, but if to worse from better he is basely changed. Divinity, however, is free from depravity: for either he who prays deserves or does not deserve to obtain the things for which he prays. If, therefore, he deserves, he will obtain them, even though he should not pray for them; but if he does not deserve, he will not obtain them, though they should be the objects of his prayer. For neither is he who is worthy, but omits to pray, on this account unworthy because he has not prayed; nor is he who deserves to obtain, but who obtains praying, on this account worthy because he has prayed; but, on the contrary, he who deserves to obtain, and does not disturb divinity, is, in consequence of omitting to pray, more worthy to obtain. But he who is unworthy and disturbs divinity is also unworthy because he disturbs him: and to the former, indeed, we ascribe modesty and confidence; for through confidence he believes that he shall obtain, but through modesty

tures. Hence, according to our aptitude or inaptitude to become partakers of the divine energy, which is always and uniformly exerted, we either do not at all receive these illuminations, or they are received by us fully or imperfectly. When, therefore, from being unadapted we become adapted to receive them, by exercises of piety and a conversion to a divine nature, then also the mind of divinity is said, by the authors of fables, to be changed; fables ascribing to causes that which happens to effects.

he is quiet, though he should not obtain; but to the latter we ascribe ignorance and depravity, ignorance from his praying, and depravity from his being unworthy to obtain. But what? If divinity were a general, and if a man, who alone deserved to carry the implements of war, should request of the general the place of an armed soldier, but one who is adapted to bear arms should remain quiet, would not the general, as the necessity of the army required, dismiss the man who is qualified to carry burthens, but rank the other among the armed troops? And yet a general may be ignorant, may be corrupted by gifts, or may be deceived; but nothing of this kind can happen to divinity. Neither, therefore, will he give contrary to desert to those that pray, nor will he withhold his gifts from the worthy though they do not invoke him by prayer.

Besides, with respect to the things which men pray to obtain, some of these providence inspects, others fate supplies, others fortune changes, and others art dispenses. And providence, indeed, is the work of divinity, fate of necessity, art of man, and fortune of that which is casual. The conditions, too, of human life are allotted each of these. Hence what we pray for either pertains to the providence of divinity, or the necessity of fate, or the art of man, or the course of fortune. And if, indeed, it pertains to providence, what necessity is there for prayer? For if divinity provides, he either provides for the whole, but neglects particulars (just as kings preserve cities by law and jus-

tice, but do not extend their concern to individuals) or providence is also exerted in particulars. What then shall we say? Are you willing that divinity should provide for the whole? He must not, therefore, be molested: for he will not be persuaded if you ask any thing contrary to the salvation of the whole. For what, if the parts of the body becoming vocal, as often as any one of them being diseased was amputated for the safety of the whole, should pray that they might not be corrupted by the medical art, would not Esculapius answer them: "O miserable members! it is not fit that the whole body should be destroyed for your sake, but that you should perish that it may be preserved." The same thing takes place in this universe: the Athenians are afflicted with pestilence, the Lacedæmonians are shaken with earthquakes, Thessaly is inundated, and Ætna burns. The dissolution of these things you call corruption; but the physician knows the cause and neglects the prayer of the parts. Hence he preserves the universe, for he cares for the whole. But although divinity should provide for particulars, neither in this case is it proper to pray to him: for this is just as if some one who is diseased should ask a physician for medicine or food, since the physician will give him this, if it would be attended with efficacy, though he should not request it; but he will not give it to him, though he should ask for it, when it would prove inefficacious. Nothing, therefore, is to be requested, nothing to be prayed for, that it belongs to providence to accomplish.

But what shall we say of the particulars which subsist according to fate? Indeed, here also prayer is most ridiculous: for any one might more easily persuade a king or a tyrant; since fate is tyrannic, without a master, and inflexible. She throws a bridle, too, as it were, on the herds of men, draws them by violence, and compels them to follow where she leads, in the same manner as Dionysius compelled the Syracusians, Pisistratus the Athenians, Periander the Corinthians, and Thrasibulus the Milesians. For in a democracy persuasion and prayer, obsequious attention, and supplications, are capable of effecting something; but in a tyranny, as in war, violence has dominion:

"Oh! spare my life, and mighty gifts demand *."

What rewards, therefore, can we bestow on fate, so that we may liberate ourselves from necessity and bonds? what gold can we offer; what obsequious attendance; what sacrifice; what prayer? But neither has Jupiter himself been able to discover any means of escaping her power; but thus laments:

"Ah me! Patroclus, most belov'd of men,
Is fated by Menœtius' son to die †!"

* Iliad vi. ver. 46.

† Iliad xvi. ver. 433. Lamentations are symbols of the providence of the gods about mortal concerns, which are continually subject to renovation and decay. Jupiter, therefore, does not say this as being unable to escape the power of fate; for as he is the artificer of the universe he is superior to the control

To which of the gods does Jupiter pray for his son? And Thetis also exclaims,

> " Ah, wretched me! unhappily I bore
> A son most brave *."

Such is Fate, Atropos, Clotho, and Lachesis, immutable and definite, and allotted the care of human lives. How, therefore, can any one pray to inexorable Fate?

Neither must we pray for things which subsist according to fortune; and much more, indeed, in these must we abstain from prayer. For neither ought we to converse with a stupid potentate, with whom there is neither counsel nor judgment, and whose kingdom is not governed by temperate impulse, but by anger, inordinate motion, irrational appetites, insane tendencies, and successions of desires. Such a thing as this is fortune, irrational, furious, improvident, deaf, unprophetic, alternately ebbing and flowing like the Euripus, circularly rolling, and not admitting the pilot's art. Why, then, should any one pray to a thing unstable, stupid, unequal, and solitary? After fortune art remains. But what artist would pray concerning the beauty of a plough when he possesses art? or what weaver possessing art would pray concerning the beauty of a robe? What smith en-

of fate: but as one divine power does not counteract the operations of another, nothing more is indicated by these verses than the concurrence of the providential energies of Jupiter with the will of fate.

* Iliad xviii. ver. 54.

dued with art would pray concerning the beauty of a shield? or what valiant man would pray for courage, when he possesses fortitude? or what good man possessing virtue would pray concerning felicity?

What then is that for which any one can pray which does not pertain either to providence, or fate, or art, or fortune? Do you ask for riches? do not disturb the gods, you request nothing beautiful: do not disturb fate, you request nothing necessary: do not disturb fortune, for she does not give to those that are in want: do not disturb art, for you hear Menander saying,

> "Unless the arts to avarice are slaves
> They are not wholly subject to old age*."

Is not this the case? Are you a good man? Change your manners, and you will obtain depravity: make this the object of your study, and you will be a merchant of bawds, or the keeper of a tavern, or a robber, or full of craft, or a false witness, or a sycophant, or one corrupted by gifts. Do you ask for victory? this may be obtained in war from a mercenary, in a court of justice from a sycophant. Do you ask for merchandize? a ship, the sea, and the impulse of the winds may give this: the market is before you, the thing is venal. Why do you disturb the gods? be not afraid of acting basely and you will become rich: for in this case, though you should be Hippo-

* Vid. Stob. Serm. lix.

nicus *, you will conquer; though you should be Cleon or Melitus you will obtain what you desire. But if you betake yourself to prayer to the gods you will come before an accurate and inexorable court of justice; nor will any god endure that you should pray for things which are not to be prayed for, nor will he bestow upon you things which ought not to be given. For divinity severely enquires into and estimates the prayers of every one, and directs your affairs by the measure of what is conducive to your advantage; nor will your desires, however mournfully they may be expressed, and with whatever lamentations they may be accompanied, as if you were pleading in a court of justice, bend him from his intention; not even though you should spread an abundance of dust on your head. And if it should so happen that you reproach divinity,

"If e'er with wreaths I hung thy sacred fane †,"

He will say: "If you ask for what is good for a good purpose, receive it, if you ask being a worthy man. For in this case there is no occasion for prayer; take it, and be silent."

But Socrates, you will say, went into the Piræus that he might pray ‡ to the goddess Minerva, and exhorted others to do the same. The life,

* Hipponicus was the son of Callias, and was very rich.

† Iliad i. ver. 39.

‡ Maximus here alludes to the first book of the Republic of Plato.

however, of Socrates was full of prayer: for Pythagoras also prayed, and Plato, and every other who was familiar with the gods. But you, indeed, think that the prayer of a philosopher is a supplication for things that are not present. I, however, think that it is a conference with the gods about existing circumstances, and an exhibition of virtue. Or do you think Socrates prayed that he might be rich, or that he might govern the Athenians? very far from it. But he requested of the gods, and received from himself, with their consent, virtue of soul, tranquillity of life, blameless manners, and death attended with good hope, gifts of an admirable nature, and which are imparted by the gods. But if any one should request a prosperous navigation from the earth, and abundant fruits from the sea; a plough from a weaver, and a military robe from a carpenter, his prayer would be ineffectual, and he would depart ungifted, and without obtaining the object of his wish. O Jupiter, Minerva, and Apollo, inspectors of the manners of men, it is necessary that philosophers should be your disciples, who receiving your art with robust souls gather a beautiful and happy harvest of life. This kind of agriculture is, however, rare, is exercised with difficulty, and at a late period of life, and assumes a different appearance in different bodies. But this rare and little fuel is as necessary to life as a little light in profound night. For the beautiful in human nature is not abundant, and yet every thing belonging to man is by this little preserved. If, however, you exterminate

philosophy from life you exterminate that which is its vivid spark, that which is breathing in it and vital, and that which alone knows how to pray *. Just as, if you take away the soul from the body,

* The wise man, indeed, as Demophilus says in his Pythagoric sentences, is alone a priest, is alone the friend of divinity, and alone knows how to pray. The prayer of the philosopher, however, is not merely a conference with the gods about existing circumstances, as Maximus a little before asserts it to be; but it is a conversion and elevation of the divine part of the soul to a divine nature, and an ardent supplication for that good which it is in the power of divinity at all times to bestow, because that providential energy which is the characteristic of deity is superior to the decrees of fate.

Providence, indeed, as the name implies, is an *energy prior to intellect*, and consequently, from its transcending all intellectual and sensible natures, is superior to fate, which, according to the arcana of ancient theology, is a beneficent exertion of divinity resulting from and subsisting in bodies. Hence whatever is under the dominion of fate is likewise under the dominion of Providence, deriving its connection from fate, but the good which it possesses from Providence. On the contrary, all things which are under the government of Providence are not indigent of fate; for intellectual beings are exempt from its dominion. Providence, too, differs from fate in the same manner as a god differs from that which is divine, indeed, but which is so by participation, and not according to a primary subsistence. Just as with respect to light, that which subsists in the sun is primary, but that which is in the air secondary, and life is primarily in the soul but secondarily in the body. Providence, therefore, is a god essentially, but fate is something divine, and not a god; for it depends on Providence, and has the same relation to it as an image to its exemplar.

Again, Providence extends itself to all things, to wholes and parts, to eternal and corruptible natures; for nothing can escape its all-comprehending power, whether you regard the essence of a thing or its subsistence as an object of knowledge.

you render the body fixed; if you take away fruits from the earth, you cut off its fertility; if you take away the sun from the air, you extinguish the day.

It is said, indeed, and with great propriety, that the whole circle has a central subsistence in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but the circle the thing caused; and on the same account every number subsists monadically in unity. But in *the one* of Providence all things are contained in a much more exalted manner, since it is far more transcendently one than a centre, and an arithmetical monad.

Such, then, being the absolute dominion of Providence, and its superiority to fate, the efficacy of prayer is at once apparent, since aptitude in him who prays is alone requisite to the participation of that good which he implores. And thus much on this subject at present; for in the additional notes we shall unfold the divine conceptions of Plato's most legitimate disciples concerning the nature and efficacy of prayer.

DISSERTATION XXXI.

CONCERNING PLEASURE, THAT ALTHOUGH IT BE GOOD, YET IT IS NOT STABLE.

IT is difficult to be good *, according to the ancient verse. Whether, also, is it difficult for a horse to be good, according to the virtue of a horse, and for a dog according to the virtue of a dog? Or may we not say that proper good is not difficult either to a horse or a dog; but that to each of these the possession of appropriate virtue is easy, if the horse is well tamed from a colt, and the dog is dexterously trained to hunting from a whelp: and that to man alone *good* is difficult to investigate and apprehend, and that the art is dubious and has not yet been discovered, by which the human race may be properly educated? For with sophists there will be no end to the pretext of words, of disputation and contention. No one deprives himself of the hope of the end, nor abandons safety through the instability of arguments, but buoyed up by expectation, he does not neglect to learn. Neither, likewise, does he suffer that which unfortunate sailors, or those who make their first sea-voyage experience: for these, if a

* This was a saying of Pittacus.

little storm arises, being terrified by the novelty of the circumstance, leaving the ship, and neglecting the saving art, give themselves to the waves, and perish prior to the ship. It appears to me that they act in a similar manner, who, betaking themselves to philosophy, and falling into the loud clamour of its votaries, cannot endure this tempest of the soul, but despair that reason will ever firmly secure them in stable ports.

Or are you ignorant that the opinions and passions of men, together with the causes and generations, correction and salvation of these, concerning which philosophers are daily busied, and daily discourse—are you ignorant that this is a thing neither narrow nor simple, nor resembling rivers that flow in a direct course, and to which if you deliver a ship you are carried with the stream, and conducted through well-known paths? Here, also, there is a broad and ample sea, much more intricate than any in Sicily and Egypt. But art knows the way, looks to the heavens, and recognizes the ports. The very same thing, therefore, takes place as that which happens to the greater part of pilots: for each desires to know, but most are deficient in accurate knowledge. Hence they wander from the port, and are driven, some on craggy rocks, others on muddy shores, others on the coast of the Sirens, and others on the land of the Lotophagi; or to other men, who are either inhospitable through depravity, or impious through ignorance, or corrupted through pleasure. But if there is

any good and sagacious pilot he directly sails into the most secure port,

" Where ships may rest unanchor'd and unty'd *."

Who, therefore, is this pilot, and to whom shall we commit ourselves? Do not yet ask me this till you have seen and examined others. And, in the first place, let us give a ship to this delicate and most pleasant pilot; a ship, which, when seen from the land, is delightful to the view, but in navigation is most useless, and always unfit for ministrant offices, is deprived of instruments, and is most imbecile and inefficacious against the incursions of tempest. Since our discourse, however, I know not how, has employed an image of the sea, let us not suffer this to depart from us till it has fabricated for us a clear description, assimilating the philosophy of Epicurus to the royal ship of Æetes †. I say this, not devising a fable; but, not very long since, a certain king of those barbarians who dwell beyond Phœnicia sailed from Egypt to Troy, the men he governed being so ignorant that they knew not the sea ‡, nor revered ægis-bearing Jupiter, nor the other blessed gods. This impious king, and unacquainted with the sea, pre-

* Odyss. ix. ver. 136.

† No vestiges of the history which Maximus here relates are, as Davis well observes, to be found elsewhere.

‡ An Homeric phrase. See Odyss. xi. ver. 121.; and xxiii. ver. 269.

pared a large and broad ship, in which every pleasure might sail with him: for one part of it was a most beautiful palace, in which there were bed-chambers, couches, and thrones:

" Close to the gates a spacious garden lay *."

In this trees flourished, pomegranates, pears, apples, and vines. In other parts of it there were a bath and gymnasium, a place for cooks, bed-chambers for harlots, a banquetting-room, and every thing else belonging to a luxurious city. The ship, too, was invested with a variety of colours most beautiful to the view, and abounded with silver and gold; nor was it in any respect different from a coward adorned with golden arms. The Egyptians admired this spectacle, and proclaimed the master of it blessed; nor was there wanting one who prayed to become a sailor in this most delightful ship. But when the time came to weigh anchor, this mighty and opulent ship sailed, and was tossed about in the very port like a floating island. At the same time, too, other common ships sailed out of the harbour compact and fitted for use. As long, therefore, as the winds were gentle the royal ship was victorious in pleasure, and all was full of exhalation,

* Of the pipe's melody, and noise of men †."

But when, instead of that serenity, a sudden tempest disturbed the air, and an impetuous wind

* Odyss. vii. ver. 112. † Iliad x. ver. 13.

descended with a loud crashing noise, then it was known what is the use of pleasure and what the use of art. For the other ships, striking their sails, contended with the storm, braved the wind, and vanquished the force of the evil; but this miserable ship was tossed about like the body of a large man oppressed with vertigo, or staggering from intoxication. The pilot, too, could no longer use his art, and that effeminate crowd lay astonished and groaning. In the mean-time the storm dissipated all these admirable contrivances,

> " Forests of lofty trees uprooted fell *."

It dispersed also the palaces, the bed-chambers, and the baths, and the shipwreck of a city was driven to the land:

> " Like fowl that haunt the floods, they sink, they rise
> Round the black ship †."

This was the end of the stupid master of the useless ship, and of unseasonable luxury.

Let us, however, return to the discourse, for the sake of which we have introduced this similitude: for it appears to promulgate pleasures to us in our course, not during a short navigation, or for the space of a few days, but for the whole time of life, though the pleasures which it commends are in no respect more secure than those marine circumstances which we have just related; since, as yet, no reasoning has persuaded us that pleasure is not good.

* Iliad ix. ver. 537. † Odyss. xii. ver. 418.

Let it, therefore, contend, if it is able to convince us, that pleasure is stable. If, indeed, I should find that pleasure is incapable of being changed, I will endure to be delighted for ever; and I will neglect virtue if you can show me pleasure secure and unmingled with pain, pleasure unattended with repentance, and pleasure worthy to be praised. But how will you show this? certainly not more than you can show this of pain. For nature has not given to man any one of these sane and sincere, but has everywhere mingled pains with pleasures, and intimately united the one with the other: hence he who makes one of these the object of his choice immediately participates of the other: for, since they are connascent with each other, the one supervenes the other, and they reciprocally change their generations and mutual associations. The soul being mingled with this flux and reflux, how can it ever be void of pain, since it associates with goods of which it will be, at some time or other, deprived? I, indeed, should not trust the sea, though it were undisturbed by the winds, though it were tranquil; for I should suspect its quietness. But if you wish me to confide in its serenity lead me to a secure sea,

> "Where rain and raging tempest are unknown,
> But a white splendor spreads its radiance round *."

The soul, also, is allotted a condition of this kind; and as long as the pilot is absent from her, and as

* Odyss. iv. ver. 566.; and vi. ver. 43.

long as art is absent, though she should see serenity, she will dread the storm, and when she meets with the storm she will desire serenity. For the life of a man given to pleasure and astonished with pain is light, terrified at every noise, unfaithful, and more immanifest than every sea.

Do you not see the suitors engaged in juvenile pleasures, feasting on fat goats, satiated with tender kids, listening to the sound of flutes, mingling wine, delighting in the quoit, and discharging arrows from the bow? who would not proclaim them blessed for this pleasure? But a prophet, who was well acquainted with futurity, says,

> " O race to death devote! with Stygian shade
> Each destin'd peer impending fates invade *."

Evil was before their feet and near them. It was also before the feet of Paris when he stole that admirable pleasure from Peloponnesus. For a Grecian fleet swiftly sailed on the occasion, bringing myriads of sorrows to this lover of pleasure, and myriads of calamities to a whole city. I omit the Assyrian pleasures †, which, together with gold and harlots, fire immediately invaded: nor will I speak of the Ionic pleasures of Polycrates ‡,

* Thus Theoclymenus speaks to the suitors of Penelope in Odyss. xx. ver. 351.

† Maximus here alludes to the history of Sardanapalus. See Ctesias in Athenæus, lib. xii. p. 529. and Justin, i. 3.

‡ Polycrates was crucified by Oroetes, a governor of Sardis. See Athenæus, lib. xii. p. 540.

which were overwhelmed with a disgraceful death. Sybaris was full of pleasures, but they perished together with their votaries. Pleasures also were celebrated by the Syracusians; but, through the calamities with which they were followed, they at length became wise. Nor did the Corinthians become wise through misfortune.

DISSERTATION XXXII.

CONCERNING PLEASURE, THAT, ALTHOUGH IT BE GOOD, YET IT IS NOT STABLE.

SOME hostile arguments which were lately adduced, endeavoured to persuade us that pleasure would be eligible if it could subsist in conjunction with security. The arguments, however, were sophistical and skilled to deceive: for their intention being to consider with respect to pleasure, whether, so far as pleasure, it should be ranked among things good or among such as are evil; taking it for granted that pleasure is good, they enquired if this good is stable: for how can any one conceive that to be good which is unstable and agitated? Just, I think, as if some one should deprive the earth of its stability and permanency, he would also take away its very being: and if any one should deprive the sun of his motion and course he would at the same time take away his essence. In like manner, if any one takes away from the good its accuracy and its permanency, he at the same time takes away its nature. For the good does not flourish for a time like the beauty of body. How then can any one speculate concern-

ing pleasure if he adds good to it, but deprives it of stability? For if it is necessary that, being good, it should also be stable, together with the absence of stability, the good of pleasure will likewise depart. Which, however, of these assertions will be more calculated to persuade; that which says pleasure is good, though it should not be stable, or that which says it is not good, unless it is stable? I think the latter of these: for it is better to take away pleasure from good, at the same time adding stability to it, than to add good to pleasure, and deprive it of security.

Since, therefore, good is not entirely pleasant, but is entirely stable, and the pleasant is not entirely good, but is entirely unstable, one of two things remains; either that, in pursuing pleasure, good should be neglected, or in choosing good that pleasure should not be pursued. Nothing, however, I think is an object of pursuit which is not good; but that which is not good is pursued as such from the appearance of good. Just as to money-changers counterfeit money is not eligible because it is counterfeited, but from its similitude to the true, which conceals the nature of the false coin. And as here silversmiths distinguish by art the genuine from the counterfeit, so in the distribution of good does not reason distinguish apparent from real good? Shall we, therefore, be ignorant of this in the same manner as depraved money-changers, and collect for ourselves treasures of fraudulent goods?

How then shall we consider this affair, and what is the mode of trial which we should adopt? If some one, then, should attempt to loosen an ox from the plough and a horse from the chariot, and, changing the employment of each, should yoke the ox to the chariot and the horse to the plough, would he not act illegally towards nature, insolently towards the animals themselves, ignorantly with respect to the arts, without gain with respect to use, and ridiculously with respect to ministrant operation? And what if we suppose things still more absurd than these; that, depriving birds of their wings, you are desirous that they should become gradient; and, giving wings to man, you expect that he should move in air like a bird, would you not be ridiculous for the change? For neither does the fable endure that Dædalus should be busied in such absurd arts, but hurls his son, together with his wings, from æther to the earth. They say, also, that a Carthaginian * youth took a lion from his milk, rendered him mild by unlawful aliment, and by a spurious diet deprived him of his irascible disposition; so that at length, placing burthens on his back, he drove him through the city like an ass. The Carthaginians, however, hating the illegal conduct of the man, put him to death, as being a tyrant by nature, but a private man by his infelicity.

* This circumstance is related of Hanno, one of the most illustrious of the Carthaginians, by Ælian, Pliny, and Plutarch.

As horses, therefore, for their safety are allotted the race, oxen labour, birds wings, lions strength, and other animals something else; in like manner a connate power which preserves the race is present with man. With respect to this power, it is necessary that it should be different from that of other animals; if, being man, he is to be saved, not by strength as lions, nor by the race as horses, and is not to carry burthens like an ass, nor to plough like an ox, nor to fly with birds, nor swim with fishes. But there is also a certain work peculiar to this animal, which preserves his life, if powers are distributed to animals according to the use of life, works according to powers, and instruments according to works, and the good they effect.

In short, the good of every thing consists in its peculiar work, its work in the necessity of use, use in the facility of power, power in the aptitude of instruments, and instruments in the variety of nature. For nature is all-various, and on this account she has imparted to, and adorned with different arms, the several species of animals; some with the force of nails, and others with the sharpness of teeth; some with the strength of horns, and others with the swiftness of feet; some with anger, and others with poison. But to man she denied these vestments, and delivered him into light, naked, imbecile, and without art; most slow in running, incapable of flying, and most feeble in swimming. She implanted in him, however, a certain unapparent vital spark for the safety of his

life, which men call intellect: through this he conducts himself with safety, finds a remedy for the wants of life, heals the indigence of body, employs art as an equivalent to the prerogatives of other animals, and to the law and authority of this subdues and subjects all things.

Ask me, also, concerning man: where, and after what manner is his good to be investigated? I shall answer you just as I answered concerning the lion, concerning a bird, and concerning all other animals. Seek the good of man, *there, where* the work * of man is to be found. But where shall I find this work? where the instrument exists. But where shall I find the instrument? where that subsists by which man is preserved. Here,

* That the good of man consists in his *proper work* as man, is thus beautifully demonstrated by Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, lib i. cap. vi.: "As the good and the well-condition of a piper, of a statuary, of every artist, and, in short, of all those who have a certain work and action, appears to consist in that work, this also will appear to be the case with man, if he has a certain work. Whether, therefore, shall we say, that there are certain works and actions of the carpenter and the shoemaker, but that man has no work, and that he is naturally indolent? Or shall we say, that as there appears to be a certain work of the eye, the hand, and the foot, and, in short, of each of the members of the body; so, also, there is a certain work of man different from all these? What then will this work be? For to live appears to be common also to plants; but that which is now investigated is the peculiar. The life, therefore, which consists in nutrition and increase must be removed from the enquiry. But the sensitive life is consequent to this. It appears, however, that this life is common to a horse and an ox, and to every animal. Hence the practic life of that which possesses reason remains. But of this,

then, begin. What is that which preserves man? pleasure. You speak of a thing common, which extends to every nature, and on this account I cannot endure that it should have the preference: for an ox and an ass, a swine and an ape, are susceptible of the delight which pleasure affords. See, now, where you will place man, what partakers of good you will assign him. For if pleasure is that which saves him, explore, in the next place, what is the instrument of pleasure: you will find many and all-various instruments. And as far, indeed, as to the eyes and ears honour the instruments; but if you proceed farther in the paths of pleasure, see to what instruments you ascribe the

one part is obedient to reason, but the other possesses reason and energizes dianoëtically. Since this life, also, is predicated in a twofold respect, that must be adopted which subsists in energy; for this appears to be predicated as the more *peculiar* life. But if the work of man is the energy of the soul according to reason, or not without reason, and we say that the work of man, and of a worthy man, are the same in kind: just as the work of a harper, and of a good harper, and, in short, if transcendency according to virtue, is added to the work in all things, for it is the work of a harper to play, but of a good harper to play well, on the harp. If this be the case, and we admit that the work of man is a certain life, and that this life is the energy and actions of the soul in conjunction with reason; but in a worthy man these are in a good and beautiful condition, and the good of every thing is effected according to appropriate virtue.;—if this be the case, human good will be the energy of the soul according to virtue. If, also, there are many virtues, it will consist in the best and most perfect of these; and besides this in a perfect life. For as neither one swallow, nor one day makes spring, so neither does one day, nor a short time, make a man blessed and happy."

salvation of man. You have found the instruments, investigate the works. The tongue is gluttonized, the eyes waste away, the hearing is dissolved, the belly is crammed, the parts become insolent which are naturally adapted to be so. You have found the works, you have met with the good of man. Is this salvation? is this felicity?

DISSERTATION XXXIII.

AGAIN, CONCERNING PLEASURE.

ÆSOP the Phrygian composed fables through the conversation of brutes; and with him trees and fishes are mingled with each other and with men. In these fables, too, a concise intellect is introduced, which obscurely signifies some particular truth. The following fable, also, is celebrated by him: A lion pursued a stag, who escaped by flight, and penetrated into a thick wood. But the lion, who is as much inferior to the stag in swiftness as he surpasses him in strength, came to the wood, and asked a shepherd, if he had anywhere seen a terrified stag. The shepherd said he had not; but at the same time, extending his hand, pointed to the place, and the lion rushed on the miserable stag. A fox, however, for in Æsop this is a crafty animal, said to the shepherd, What a cowardly and base fellow you are: cowardly towards lions, but base towards stags.

It appears to me that Epicurus might use this Phrygian ænigma against the accuser of pleasure, who is virile in speech, but in his mind extended by pleasure, as it were by the hand. For who is so

hostile to himself as willingly to abandon that which is the most alluring of all things? For with respect to other things which are pursued by men, either experience affords the means of knowing them, or the industry of art approves them, or they are believed from the investigation of reason, or they are embraced in consequence of having been tried by time. But pleasure has no need of reason, is more ancient than art, outstrips experience, and does not stay for time, but the love of it is supernatural, and coëval with bodies, and subsists as a foundation of the safety of animals; so that if any one takes this away, a generated nature must, from necessity, immediately vanish. For man collects science and reason, and even this, which is so much celebrated, intellect itself, in the progression of time, by the gradual occurrence of the senses, and the aid of experience. But he immediately receives, from the very beginning, pleasure self-taught *, from nature herself: and this, indeed, he embraces, but hostilely opposes the painful. By pleasure also he is preserved, but is corrupted by pain.

Is pleasure, therefore, a vile thing? If this be the case, it would not be connascent with us, nor the most ancient of the things by which we are preserved. But the particulars which are celebrated by the sophists as belonging to pleasure, such as the luxury of Sardanapalus, the Median

* The Epicureans employ this argument to demonstrate that pleasure is the sovereign good. See Sext. Empiric. Hypot. lib. iii. cap. xxiv.; and Cic. de Fin. i. 9.

delicacies, the Ionic softness, Sicilian tables, Sybaritic dances, and Corinthian harlots;—all these, and such as are more various than these, are not the works of pleasure, but of art and reason, after a long time, illegally leading men to pleasures through the fecundity of the arts. As, therefore, no one reviles reason as not naturally beautiful, though some one should employ its use to that which is not beautiful by nature, so neither is pleasure to be reviled, but those that use it badly. And as there are two things in the soul of man, pleasure and reason, the former being mingled with the latter, does not take away any thing of the necessary, but imparts to reason an alluring power. But reason, when it associates with pleasures, by increasing that which is moderate in them through its fecundity, takes away the necessity of that which is naturally delightful.

You will, however, say that pleasure is not the peculiarity of man, but is also common to other animals. But in saying this do you accuse that which is nearest in pleasure to saving power? and does that which preserves every thing, and is common to all animated beings, disturb you? O vindicator of unjust prerogative! you appear to me not to love the light of the sun because it is common to all eyes, and to be of opinion that man only ought to behold it, and that on this account the solar light is not good. Nor will you be delighted with the air, which inspires and governs all bodies by its pervading power, nor with the waters of rivers, nor the fruits of the earth. For if you

proceed beyond necessaries, all things are *common*, and nothing is *peculiar* to any thing. Here, therefore, rank pleasure in the communion of that good which preserves every sensitive nature.

Since, however, our business at present is to compare virtue with pleasure, I shall not revile virtue (for the discourse about pleasure is neither virulent nor blasphemous;) but thus much I shall say: that he who takes away the pleasant from virtue takes away also its power; since nothing beautiful is eligible if pleasure is absent. For he who voluntarily engages in virtuous labours engages in them through the love of pleasure either present or expected. For as, in the exchange of money, no one willingly changes a talent for a drachma, nor gold for brass, unless

"Of intellect him Jove deprives *."

But in retributions, though they should be equal, it is necessary that the advantage of him who changes should be regarded, according to the indigence of the receiver: thus, also, though in the endurance of labour no one labours through a love of it, (for this would be a most unhappy love,) yet he exchanges his present labours, as some one more rustic would say, for the beautiful, but, as those would assert, who judge more truly, for pleasure. For though you speak of the beautiful you speak of pleasure, since beauty will scarcely be beautiful unless it is also most pleasant.

* Iliad, lib. vi. ver. 234.

I, however, think that the very contrary will thus be rendered apparent; I mean that pleasure is the most eligible of all things, for the sake of which death is sometimes exchanged for life, and wounds and labours, and ten thousand other difficulties are endured. For though you assign different names to the different causes of these things; as, for instance, you may ascribe friendship to Achilles, when, for the sake of avenging the death of Patroclus, he was willing to die; but the love of dominion to Agamemnon, when surpassing others in vigilance and deliberation, and fighting at the head of his army; and the safety of his country to Hector, when leading his troops, and strenuously contending in battle; yet all these that you have adduced will be so many names of pleasures. For as in the diseases of the body the sick man rejoices when he is cut or burnt, and willingly endures thirst and hunger, and things which are by nature difficult to bear, through the expectation of health; but if you take away the hope of future good, you will also take away the endurance of the present evils; thus, also, in actions a retribution of labours is effected through pleasures, which you call virtue; but I, admitting virtue, ask you if the soul would choose virtue without possessing a love for it? For if you admit love you also admit pleasure.

And though you should change the name, and call pleasure joy *, I shall not envy the diversity of

* Maximus says this conformably to the doctrine of the stoics.

names, but I see the thing, and I recognize pleasure. For it was this which made Hercules himself willingly endure and contend with so many and such admirable labours, which enabled him to attack wild beasts, to invade tyrants in every land, to purify the earth from savage monsters, to betake himself to Mount Œta, and be consumed by fire, being led as it were by the hand to all these, by nothing else than mighty, and admirable, and unmingled pleasures, some of which were present with, and others were the consequences of his labours. And you, indeed, look at the labours which he then endured, but you do not see the pleasures with which he was delighted. For Hercules rejoiced in thus acting, and through this accomplished these deeds: he would not, however, have accomplished them if in doing them he had not been delighted. For the pleasures of Bacchus, which rank in the place of the greatest of the mysteries, those nocturnal banquets and dances, pipes and singing, —all these forms of Bacchic pleasures are celebrated in the mysteries.

Why, however, do I speak of Bacchus and Hercules? these are fables, these are heroics. I will speak of Socrates. You love Alcibiades, O Socrates! after him Phædrus, and after Phædrus Charmides. You love, O Socrates! and Attic beauty is not concealed from you: confess, then, the cause of it, and do not be afraid of ignominy. It is possible to love temperately, in conjunction with pleasure, just as it is possible to love intemperately in conjunction with pain. But if you are a

lover of soul alone, without pleasure, and are not a lover of body, love Theætetus: you do not, however, love him, for he was flat-nosed *. Love, therefore, Chærephon; but you do not love him, for he was pale. Love, then, Aristodemus; but you do not love him, for he was deformed. Whom, therefore, do you love? any one who has graceful hair, any one who is elegant, any one who is delicate, any one who is beautiful. And from your virtue, indeed, I believe that you love justly, but I cannot doubt that you love through pleasure. For I cannot doubt that the body is heated by fire, or that the eyes are illuminated by the sun, or that the ears are delighted with the sound of flutes, or that Hesiod was taught by the Muses, or that Homer derived his melody from Calliope, or Plato his magnificent diction from Homer. All these, the eyes, the ears, prose and verse, are attracted by pleasure.

Pleasure, also, led Diogenes himself to his tub: and if virtue, likewise, attended him thither why should you exclude pleasure? Diogenes was delighted with his tub as Xerxes with Babylon; Diogenes was delighted with his hard bread as Smindyrides † with his sauce. He was delighted with fountains which abound in all places as much as Cambyses with the Choaspes ‡ alone. He was

* See my translation of the Theætetus of Plato.

† A native of Sybaris, famous for his luxury.

‡ The kings of the Persians were accustomed to drink the waters of this river alone.

delighted with the sun as much as Sardanapalus with his purple. He was pleased with his staff as much as Alexander with his spear; he was delighted with his sack as much as Crœsus with his treasures. And if you compare pleasures with pleasures, those of Diogenes will vanquish, for those of the others were everywhere mingled with pain *. Xerxes when conquered lamented, Cambyses when wounded groaned, Sardanapalus when burnt howled, Smindyrides when banished was inconsolable, Crœsus when taken captive wept; and Alexander when he was not fighting was afflicted. But the pleasures of Diogenes were without lamentations, without groans, without tears, and without pains. And you, indeed, call his pleasures labours; for you measure things pertaining to Diogenes by a base measure, that of your own nature. To you, indeed, it would be painful to act as he acted; but to Diogenes such deeds were delightful. I will also venture to say, that no one was a more accurate lover of pleasure than Diogenes: he kept no house, for the management of a family is troublesome: he did not engage in politics, for the thing is accompanied with sorrow: he did not connect himself with a wife, for he had heard of Xantippe: he did not busy himself with the education of children, for he saw that it was

* The characteristic of true pleasures, and such are the intellectual, is this; that they are not *necessarily* either preceded by or accompanied with pain. See the Philebus of Plato.

attended with dreadful circumstances *. But being unconnected with every thing terrible, free, without care, without dread, and without pain, he inhabited the whole earth as if it had been one house, and was the only man who associated with pleasures which are unattended by a guard, and which are open and abundant.

Let us dismiss Diogenes, pass on to legislators, and consider polities. Do not, however, think that I shall betake myself to Sybaris, or that I shall call your attention to Syracusian delicacies, or Corinthian pleasures, or the wealth of the Chians, or the abundant wine of the Lesbians, or the splendid garments of the Milesians; but I shall proceed to the leaders of armies, I shall proceed to the Athenians, and I shall examine the Lacedæmonians. Here, then, in the Laconic whips, and blows, and huntings, and races, and slender suppers, and vile bed-clothes, I see the pleasures which they contain. It is well, O Lycurgus! you introduce mighty pleasures instead of small pains. You give a few and receive great things: you give diurnal labours and receive in return perpetual pleasures. What do you say the Spartan pleasures

* Why τα δεινα in the original ought to be τον του κλεινιου, as Markland conjectures it should, I am not able to comprehend. Maximus here speaks generally, in consequence of being convinced that the education of children is a thing of the most arduous nature, and which has frequently a most calamitous issue. Hence Plato, in his Laws, justly observes, "That a boy is the most difficult to manage of all wild beasts." Markland is generally right in his emendations where philosophy is not concerned; but where it is, though he is the first of verbal critics, he is like a man oppressed with darkening vertigo.

are? a city without walls, without fear, which was not a spectator of enemies and foreign shields, and which heard no groans nor threats? For what can be more painful than fear; what more severe than slavery; what more laborious than necessity? But when you liberate a city from these you introduce many pleasures in their place. Leonidas, Othryades, Callicratides, were the pupils of this pleasure. These, however, you will say, were slain: but they died well. And what were the things for which they died? pleasure. For in bodies the parts are cut off for the preservation of the whole. Leonidas, also, was a part of Sparta, but he died for the whole. Othryades, likewise, and Callicratides were parts. Small parts, therefore, being taken away, the pleasures of the whole were saved. And why is it necessary to speak of the Athenian affairs? All the Attic concerns are full of festivity and hilarity, and their pleasures are distributed with the seasons. The sacred rites of Bacchus are celebrated in the spring, the mysteries in autumn; and the other seasons are consecrated to other gods. Hence the Panathenæa*, Scirrophoria†, Haloa‡, Apaturia§. They engage, too,

* An Athenian festival in honour of Minerva, the protectress of Athens.

† An anniversary solemnity at Athens in honour of Minerva, or, according to some, of Ceres and Proserpine.

‡ A festival in honour of Ceres and Bacchus.

§ An Athenian festival, which derived its name from απατη, DECEIT, because it was first instituted in memory of a stratagem, by which Melanthius, the Athenian king, overcame Xanthus, king of Bœotia.

in naval contests in the sea; they celebrate festivals at home; they fight on the land; they laugh in the rites of Bacchus. Neither is war, though the most dreadful of things, destitute of pleasure; but with this the Tyrrhene trumpet, the trieric * pipe, and the martial song are co-arranged. You see the abundance of pleasures.

* That is, the pipe belonging to three-ranked gallies.

DISSERTATION XXXIV.

WHAT THE END OF PHILOSOPHY IS.

IT is difficult to find a true assertion: for the soul of man, through the fecundity of its intellect, is in danger of being defective in judgment. And other arts, indeed, in their progress become more sagacious in invention respecting their peculiar work; but philosophy, when it has made the greatest proficiency, is then especially filled with arguments of an opposing nature * and of equal strength. Hence it resembles a husbandman who has an abundance of instruments but an unprolific soil. Suffrage, therefore, the number of judges, the harangues of rhetoricians, and the hands of the people, direct political decrees. But here who will be the judge for us; and by what suffrage shall we form a judgment of the truth? By reason? But you cannot assign any reason to which you may

* This is true of every philosophy but the *intellectual*, or that which was propagated by Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle: for this is scientific in all its parts. For intellect is suspended from deity, the characteristic of which is *unity*; science is an illumination from intellect, and concord is an illumination from unity, since it is the union of things which differ from each other.

not find a contrary. By passion? but the judge is not to be credited. By the multitude? but the greater the number the more unlearned. By opinion? but the worse the subjects are the more are they conversant with opinion.

Thus in this present speculation, in which pleasure contends with virtue, and the one is compared with the other, does not pleasure attack virtue, vanquish it in opinion, surpass it in the multitude of witnesses, and obtain dominion according to passion? Hence reason, which alone remains as a joint combatant with virtue, is cut and divided. A certain defence also of pleasure may be obtained from virtue herself, and some one * speaks plausibly when speaking in support of pleasure. He likewise degrades virtue, and transfers dominion from the male to the female †. And the form, indeed, of philosophy he rejects, but thinks fit to retain the name. Lay aside, O man! the name, together with your assertions. You act illegally towards those who admit that there is nothing common in philosophy and pleasure: for the lover of pleasure is one person, but the philosopher another. The names and the works are separated from each other: the genera also are divided, in the same manner as the Laconic from the Attic affairs, in the same manner as those of the Barbarians from the Greeks. But if, asserting that you are a Spartan, or a Grecian, a Dorian, or an inhabitant of Heraclea, you admire the Median tiara,

* *i. e.* Epicurus. † A proverbial mode of expression.

the Barbaric table, or the Persian chariot, you act the part of a Persian; you barbarize; you have abandoned Pausanias; you are a Mede; you are a Mardonian. Lay aside the name together with the genus.

I can endure the multitude, therefore, when they celebrate pleasure; for their soul is illiberal and exiled from reason. Hence their calamity is to be pitied, and their ignorance to be pardoned; but I cannot bear the name of Epicurus, nor can I endure philosophy acting wantonly. For neither can I endure a general who deserts his rank and becomes the leader of flight, nor a husbandman who burns his corn, nor a pilot who is afraid of the sea. It is necessary that you should sail, it is necessary that you should lead an army, it is necessary that you should cultivate the earth. These things are full of labours; but nothing beautiful is effected by indolence. If, indeed, you say that pleasure is the attendant of worthy conduct, this I admit; let it follow, but let the beautiful everywhere take the lead:

'One sov'reign ruler let there be, one king, *"

to whom Jupiter has given dominion. But if you transpose the order, so that pleasure governs, and reason is in subjection, you give to the soul a bitter and inexorable tyrant, to which she must necessarily be subservient, even though pleasure should enjoin a servitude disgraceful and all-vari-

* Iliad ii. ver. 204.

ous, base and unjust. For what will be the measure of pleasure when it receives authority from desires? For this tyrant is insatiable, despises things present, desires such as are absent, is inflamed through opulence, elevated by hope, and rendered insolent by power. This tyrant causes the base to rise in opposition to the beautiful, this arms injustice against justice, and excess against moderation. At the same time the indigence of the body may without difficulty satisfy the desires of the body. Is any one thirsty? there are fountains everywhere. Is any one hungry? there are beech-trees everywhere. This sun is hotter than a military cloak; these meadows are the most variegated of all spectacles; these flowers are natural fragrancies. And thus far we may fix the boundary of pleasures; viz. indigence itself: but if you pass beyond this, and proceed farther, you give to pleasures an unceasing course, and inclose virtue as with a wall.

This it is which produces an immoderate desire of possessing, this is the source of tyrannies. For the region Pasargidæ was not sufficient to the king of the Persians, nor the water-cresses of Cyrus; but all Asia was destined to supply the pleasures of one man. For him Media nourished the Nisæan horse, Ionia sent Grecian harlots, Babylon nurtured barbarous eunuchs, Egypt furnished all-various arts, India ivory, and Arabia fragrance. Rivers also administered to the pleasures of the king; Pactolus supplying him with gold, the Nile with wheat, and Choaspes with water. These things, however, were not sufficient for him; but

he desired foreign pleasures, and through this marched to Europe, pursued the Scythians, subverted the Pæonians, captured Eretria, sailed to Marathon, and wandered everywhere. O most unfortunate poverty! For what can be more poor than a man who incessantly desires? For when once the soul has tasted of pleasures beyond what its wants require, it becomes satiated with former, and aspires after novel, delight. This, therefore, is the ænigma of Tantalus *, the perpetual thirst of a lover of pleasure, the streams of which accede and again depart, a reflux of desires with which bitter pains are mingled, together with tumult and fear. For pleasure when present is attended with the dread of its departure, and sorrow lest it should not arrive is occasioned by its absence. Hence it is necessary that he who pursues pleasure should be incessantly pained, and perceive no delight; but live a confused life, involved in abundant obscurity.

You see what a tyrant you give to the soul; just as if, rejecting Solon, you should give Critias to the Athenians, or Pausanias to the Lacedæmonians, rejecting Lycurgus. But I, who am desirous of liberty, have need of law, have need of reason: these will preserve for me felicity, erect, unshaken, unattended with fear, and self-sufficient; and which is not groveling and subject to servile arts;

* The ænigma of Tantalus rather signifies the condition of a man who lives under the dominion of the phantasy; but his hanging over the lake, and in vain attempting to drink, indicates the elusive and rapidly-gliding condition of such a life.

through which, being impoverished, I collect the mighty emolument pleasure. Not by Jupiter, asking, like the Homeric beggar, swords and kettles*, but things still more absurd than these; food from Mithæcus, wine from Sarambus, a harp from Connus, a song from Melesias. And what will be the measure of these things? what the boundary of the felicity of pleasures? where shall we stop? to whom shall we give the palm of victory? what man is so blessed, so vigilant, and laborious that no pleasure is concealed from or escapes him, either by night or by day; but whose soul extends all its senses, in the same manner as the marine polypus its many hairs, that through these it may attract to itself on all sides every pleasure at once?

Let us devise, if possible, the following image of a man who is happy from the felicity of pleasure: Let him be a spectator of the most pleasant colours, an auditor of the most delightful sounds; let him also inhale the most agreeable odours, taste the most varied juices, be warmed with a bland heat, and at the same time engage in venereal pleasures. For if you give time and interval you separate pleasures and the senses, and thus mutilate felicity. For every thing which delights by its presence gives pain by its absence: and what soul can endure the influx of such a crowd of pleasures, which afford no intermission, nor any respiration? Is it not likely that the man would lead a most mi-

* Odyss. xvii. ver. 222.

serable life, be desirous of some remission, and aspire after repose? For pleasure, long continued, produces pain: what then can be more incredible than a felicity which deserves to be pitied? O Jupiter, and ye gods, the fathers and makers of the earth and sea, and of the progeny which they support! what is this animal to which you have assigned this secondary place and life? An animal so daring, rash, and loquacious, poor in good, destitute of operation, and who is fed and popularly allured by pleasures:

> "O had it died before it saw the light,
> Or died at least before the nuptial rite, *"

we may exclaim respecting this whole genus, if it has derived nothing from you better than pleasure.

But how can it be made to appear that it does not possess something better? Let us answer for Jupiter with Homer: for it has indeed, intellect and reason, and its life is mingled from things immortal and mortal. Hence it is an animal situated in the confines of both these, possessing a body from mortal inundation, but receiving intellect from the effluxion of the immortal nature. Pleasures, too, are the peculiarity of the flesh, but reason is the property of intellect. And flesh, indeed, is common to this genus with brutes, but its peculiarity is intellect. Here, therefore, seek the good of man where the work of man subsists: but where

* Iliad iii. ver. 40.

the instrument is, there is the work; and where that is which saves, there is the instrument. Begin, therefore, from that which saves. Which is the saviour of the other, the body of the soul, or the soul of the body? the soul of the body. You have found that which saves. What is the instrument of the soul? intellect. Seek its work. What is the work of intellect? prudence *. You have found the good of man. But if any one despises this part of man which prudentially energizes, and is a lover of divinity, to what shall I assimilate that disgraceful animal, I mean the flesh, intemperate, voracious, the friend of pleasures, and which wishes to be feasted? to the following fable, by Jupiter:

Poets say that in Pelion there was a Thetalic race of men with monstrous bodies, which, from the navel downwards, consisted of the nature of a horse. In the inelegance of this arrangement there was every necessity that the beastly nature should be fed in conjunction with the human, that it should speak as a man, but be nourished as a beast, and love as a man, but copulate as a brute. It is well, O poets, and sons of poets, fathers of the ancient and generous muse! you have clearly exposed to our view the bond which unites us to

* This word frequently means, in Plato and Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual perception: it must be considered as implying both these in the present instance. For a further account of this virtue see the explanation of Platonic terms, in the first volume of my translation of Plato's works.

pleasures. For when beastly desires have dominion in the soul, they preserve, indeed, the human appearance, but, through subserviency to their works, they cause him who uses them to appear a beast instead of a man. This the Centaurs, this the Gorgons, this Chimæra, Geryon, and Cecrops signify. Take away the desire of the belly, and you take away the beastly part of man: take away the desire of the genital parts, and you cut off the beast. But as long as these are preserved and nourished in conjunction with the other part, and this part assents to their will by its obsequious attendance, their appetites must necessarily have dominion, and the soul must vociferate their words.

DISSERTATION XXXV.

THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

IT would be a dreadful thing if the gods had separated for men good from the association of evil, so that each might be unmingled with the other, distinguishing their natures in the same manner as night from day, light from darkness, and fire from water, each of which, if you are willing to bring to its contrary, and to mingle their difference in one common nature, you will corrupt the peculiarity of each. But men who willingly pursue a happy life of their own accord mingle with it misfortune. Hence, if some one of the gods should permit them to live in splendid and perpetual light, without sleep, and without the want of rest by night, they would be indignant with the sun for never departing, nor again giving place to darkness. Stop, however, lest, if you proceed any farther, variety should produce confusion. If it were possible that the eye of man could endure perpetual light, and if by any contrivance the sun should stop his circular course, so as al-

ways to be suspended above the earth, like a torch from a lofty summit, sending down upon us his light; if this were the case, and the sun should stand still, and our eyes could endure to survey him incessantly, who would be so stupid, insane, and miserable in his love as to desire night and darkness, and indolence of the eyes, and throw away the body as if it were a corpse? If, however, our eyes could endure perpetual wakefulness, or the sun should stand still, the love of light would not be the subject of prayer, but an association with night would be necessary.

In the same manner, also, does the love of good subsist: for the soul aspires after it: and why should it not? and is hostile to evil: for why should it not? But it is not possible for the soul to obtain with purity that which it desires, nor to avoid necessarily falling upon things to which it is hostile. I do not now speak of a depraved soul, (for this is replete with every vice, is destitute of good, is incredulous in hope, and insecure in prosperity,) but of one that is worthy and a partaker of prudence. Come, then, let us see whether we may say that this soul, when it is in possession of virtue, will be able to be always conversant with a certain well-flowing of life and acme of prosperity*. Or is not this impossible to hu-

* The human soul, from the middle condition of its being, is adapted alternately to ascend to divine and descend to mortal natures. Hence it circulates infinitely, and is at one time an inhabitant of the intelligible and at another of the sensible world.

man nature? For there are many things before our feet; just as to a man running rapidly there are ditches and precipices, profundities and walls, into which he who is ignorant of the road, effeminate in the race, imbecile in leaping, and insecure in running, may, through terror, fall. But the brave man, who is strenuous in running, and skilled in the way, through strength runs rapidly, through skill without error, and through art with security. For he knows which road is smooth and safe and which is rough, and which it is necessary, indeed, to pass through, but is not the object of choice to the runner.

This, also, is what Homer obscurely signifies concerning life:

"Two tubs have ever in Jove's threshold stood *,"

says he, one of which is full of evil unmingled with good, but the other is mingled from both: for he nowhere says that there is a third tub in the abode of Jupiter consisting of pure good. But Jupiter drawing from these tubs, according to the verses of Homer, distributes from the one a strong and violent stream of unmingled evil, full of strife and contention, of tumult and fear, and of ten thousand other noxious and genuine evils. From the other, however, as Homer would say, he distributes a stream mingled from good and evil. But I, indeed, see the mixture, and am persuaded by what

* Iliad xxiv. ver. 527.

he says; but I wish to give a more auspicious name to the distribution of Jupiter: for it is as follows:

The virtue and the depravity of the soul are the fountains of Jupiter's tubs. Of these depravity, emitting a voracious and stupid stream, confuses and disturbs life, in the same manner as the impetuous efflux of a winter torrent rushing on the corn and plants, which is hostile to husbandmen, hostile to shepherds, and hostile to travellers, and is unfruitful, unprolific, useless, and insecure. But the fountains of virtue make the whole life of the soul, in which they shine forth to the view, prolific, cultivated, and abounding with perfect fruit. Sweat, however, labour, and molestation, are necessary to the husbandman. For neither does the Egyptian confide in the Nile alone, nor does he deliver to it seeds till he has yoked the ox to the plough, till he has cut furrows in the soil, till he has abundantly laboured. After this he calls the river to his works. This is the mixture of the river with agriculture, of hopes with labours, and of fruits with molestation. Thus evil is mingled with good. If you please, dismiss the inauspicious, and know that the essence of good is not spontaneous to those who labour. If you would sail into the port you must take a pilot; not one unskilled in tempest, nor one who has never seen a storm, but one who has collected his art from many errors and an experience of evils. I, likewise, should not confide in a general who was always fortunate in his undertakings; but I should trust such a general as Nicias would

have been to the Athenians if he had returned safe from Sicily; or such a modest demagogue as Cleon would have been if he had returned from Amphipolis. But when I see the pilot and the general, the private man and the magistrate, an individual and a city prosperous, I distrust their prosperity, as Solon did Crœsus, as Amasis did Polycrates.

For Crœsus possessed a land abounding in horses, and Polycrates a sea well-furnished with ships; but none of these was stable, neither the land to Crœsus nor the sea to Polycrates. For Orœtes * took Polycrates captive, and Cyrus Crœsus. Hence, after long prosperity, there was a succession of collected evils. On this account Solon did not proclaim Crœsus happy; for he was a wise man. Hence, too, Amasis left Polycrates, for he was secure. On this account, I also praise the life which has tasted of evils, but which has *only* tasted them:

"But the lips touching, leaves the palate dry †,"

and which possesses, indeed, virtue, but uses it in involuntary fortunes. For the most splendid of colours is dear to the eyes, but unless you conjoin with it a dark colour you mingle pain with the pleasure which it affords. But if you mingle adverse with prosperous circumstances you will in a greater degree perceive virtue and prosperity.

Thirst, indeed, prepares for the body the pleasure of drinking, hunger prepares for the body the

* A satrap of king Darius. † Iliad xxii. ver. 596.

pleasure of eating, and night prepares for the eyes the pleasure of the sun: man desires night after the sun, hunger after satiety, and thirst after intoxication: and if you take away this mutation you make pleasure to be pain. Thus, also, Artaxerxes, the Persian king, is said, through long peace and continual pleasure, not to have been conscious of his prosperity; though Asia prepared for him food, the most beautiful rivers sent him drink, and ten thousand arts devised for him a proper diet. When, however, war came to him from the sea, myriads of Greeks and skilful generals, being vanquished, he fled to a little hill, on which having rested for the night, the miserable man was, for the first time, thirsty, where there was no Choaspes, nor Tigris, nor Nile, nor cups, nor cup-bearers. Hence he rejoiced to receive from a Mardonian putrid water in a bladder, and then the miserable man knew what is the use of thirst, and what the pleasure of drinking.

Is there then a satiety of pleasure, and is there no satiety of prosperity? There is, I think, and it is more troublesome than that of food and intoxication. For neither could leisure be endured by Achilles, nor silence by Nestor, nor freedom from dangers by Ulysses. For Achilles might have lived in peace, reigned over the Myrmidons, cultivated the Thessalian land, and cherished Peleus in his old age. Nestor, also, might have peaceably reigned in Pylus, and have grown old in quiet; and Ulysses might have staid at home in leafy Ne-

ritus, in a land the nurse of youth *, or might have remained with Calypso in her irriguous and shady cavern, with nymphs to wait on him, and without experiencing old age and death; but he did not choose to be immortal, and indolent, and without exerting his virtue. For it is necessary that he who engages in virtuous energies should fall into human calamities, and frequently exclaim,

"Endure, my heart, thou mightier ills hast borne †."

What memory, however, would remain of Ulysses, if you take away from him calamities? what of Achilles, if you take away from him Hector and Scamander, and

"Twelve ample cities captur'd by his ships ‡,"

and eleven taken by him on the continent? For men celebrate Hercules as the son of Jupiter for no other reason than his association with evil, the antagonist of good. But if you take from him wild beasts and potentates, upward and downward journies, and all those dreadful circumstances, you mutilate the virtue of Hercules. In the Olympic, indeed, and Pythian games, it is not possible for a man to receive the olive crown, or obtain the apple, who contends by himself in the dust, but antagonists are necessary to the cryer. But in the stadium of life, and the contest which is here, what

* See Odyss. ix. ver. 22, 27. † Odyss. xx. ver. 18.

‡ See Iliad i. ver. 328.

can be the antagonist to a worthy man except the experience of calamity?

Come then, let us call our champions to the stadium. Who then shall we call from the Athenians? Socrates, who contended with Melitus, and bonds, and poison. Who from the academy? Plato, contending with the anger of a tyrant *, a great length of sea, and mighty dangers. Let, also, another Attic † champion approach, who contended with the perjury of Tissaphernes, the stratagems of Ariæus, the treason of Meno, and the assaults of a king ‡. It is also necessary for me that a champion from Pontus § should engage in a strenuous contest against bitter antagonists, poverty and infamy, hunger and cold. But I praise his exercises:

> " Himself he tames with ignominious blows,
> And rags o'er both his shoulders careless throws ||."

He did not, however, on this account, vanquish with difficulty. I crown the men, therefore, and proclaim them conquerors in the cause of virtue. But if you take away their contest with evil you deprive the men of their crowns, you stop the voice of the cryer. Take away from the Athenians the course to Marathon, the death which hap-

* *Viz.* Dionysius. See the seventh epistle of Plato, in the fifth volume of my translation of Plato's works.

† Xenophon.

‡ *i. e.* Of Artaxerxes Mnemon, the elder brother of the younger Cyrus. See the whole history in Xenophon's books on the expedition of Cyrus.

§ *i. e.* Diogenes. || Odyss. iv. ver. 244.

pened there, the hand of Cynægirus, the calamity of Polyzelus *, and the wounds of Callimachus, and you leave nothing venerable to the Athenians, except the incredible fables of Erichthonius and Cecrops. Through this Sparta was for the most part free, because, even in peace, she did not give herself up to leisure. Those Laconic whips and blows, and a nation of evils † were mingled with the virtues.

* He became suddenly blind from seeing a spectre too luminous for the eyes to endure. See his memorable history in Herodotus vi. 117.

† This appears to have been a proverbial expression among the Greeks, in the same manner as an *Iliad of evils*.

DISSERTATION XXXVII.

THAT THE DISCOURSE OF A PHILOSOPHER IS ADAPTED TO EVERY SUBJECT.

WHY is it that actors, in the festivals of Bacchus, at one time speaking in the character of Agamemnon, at another in that of Achilles, and again, at one time assuming the person of Telephus, or Palamedes, or some other which the drama requires, think that they do nothing erroneously or absurdly by thus appearing at different times to be different, though they are the same persons? But if some one, leaving the festivals of Bacchus to sport and the theatre, should think that he is concerned in a certain political drama, not composed, by Jupiter, from Iambics, by poetical art for one festive season, nor arranged by a choir into the harmony of verse, but consisting of the business of life, which will be a drama to the philosopher, more true in its subject, perpetual in time, and composed by divinity as the poet: if some one, engaging in this drama, and arranging himself as the first champion of the choir, should preserve, indeed, the dignity of the poem, but conform the manner of his speaking to the nature of the things which divinity has dramatically composed, would

not some one think that this man acted in a disorderly and clamorous manner, and that he was such a one as Homer narrates Proteus to have been, a marine hero, naturally multiform and all-various? Or shall we say that, just as if the musical art and power were necessary to the felicity of man, no attention would be paid to a man who was well harmonized according to the Dorian mode; but who, if it were requisite to be harmonized according to the flat Œolian mode, should become silent amidst the variety of voices with which the art abounds?

Since, however, there is but little need to mankind of the song and the allurement from melodies, and another more virile muse is necessary, which Homer delights to call Calliope, but Pythagoras philosophy, and others, perhaps, something else; is it fit that the man who is possessed by this muse and this pursuit should be less harmonized with respect to abundance of sounds and modes than those songsters; a man who always preserves the beauty of the poem, and is never embarrassed by silence? For if there were any period of life in this long and continued duration, in which there was no need of the arguments of philosophy; or if human affairs, being co-arranged into one form, should proceed in a similar manner, neither passing to pain from pleasure nor to pleasure from pain, nor changing one calamity for another, the mind of every man varying and being rolled upwards and downwards; there would be no oc-

casion for this muse and harmony, the parts and the modes of which are so numerous. For

> " Such is the mind of all terrestrial men,
> As parent Jove diurnally imparts *."

For the divine power consults for the conversion of human affairs, and the nature of them is diurnal. As, therefore, of the rivers which everflowing fountains emit, one name is Sperchius, or Alpheus, or something else; but the change produced by the accession of a new to the departing stream deceives the sight by the continuity of the motion, so that it appears to be one continued and united river; in like manner the generation and supply of human affairs flow, as from a perpetual fountain, vehemently indeed, and with immense swiftness, but the motion is not perceived by sense, and the reasoning power is deceived in the same manner as the sight in beholding a river, and calls life one and the same. It is, however, a thing multiform and all-various, changed by many fortunes, many things, and many occasions. But reason presides over life, which is always fashioned by present circumstances, in the same manner as the art of the physician, when exercised on the body, (which is not stable, but borne upwards and downwards, and agitated by evacuation and repletion) and governing its indigence and satiety. This also the discourse of philosophers is capable of effecting in

* Odyss. xviii. ver. 135.

human life, being co-adapted to the passions, mitigating sorrowful circumstances, and joining in the celebration of such as are more illustrious.

If, indeed, there was one order and one form through life there would be need of one reason and one method: but now there is one time for the harper to sing to the harp when the tables are full,

> " The plenteous board high-heap'd with cates divine,
> And o'er the foaming bowl the laughing wine *."

There is also one time for the orator, when the courts of justice are crowded, and one time for the poet, in the festivals of Bacchus, when he stands in need of a choir; but no peculiar time is appropriated to the discourse of the philosopher, since it is in reality connascent and mingled with life, in the same manner as light with the eye. For what can you conceive the work of the eye to be if you take away light? And yet the sight assumes confidence in the night, though its vision is dull, and resembles manuduction in obscurity. But if you take away reason from the life of man he will be hurled down certain precipices, through noxious, immanifest, and rough paths, paths such as are trodden by those barbarians who are destitute of reason, some of whom live by plunder, others by acting as hirelings, and others by wandering. But, as if you separate a shepherd from his flock, and take away his pipe, you dissolve the flock; so if from the

* Odyss. ix. ver. 9. The translation by Pope.

herd of men you take away this leader and collector reason, what else will you do than injure and dissolve the herd? This herd, indeed, is naturally mild, but, from depraved nutriment, is persuaded with difficulty, and requires a musical shepherd, who does not punish its disobedience with the whip and the spur. For he who thinks that the philosopher should omit any opportunity of philosophising appears to me to resemble him who should assign one certain time to a man skilled in war, and well adapted to fight in armour, and to hurl the javelin from afar, both on horseback and in a chariot; thus depriving him of all the use and fortune of war, a thing unstable and ambiguous.

A champion, indeed, in the Olympian may be permitted to neglect the Isthmian games, though, even here, indolence is disgraceful; for the ambitious soul cannot easily endure to be prevented through idleness from engaging in every contest, and from partaking not only of the Olympian olive, but also of the Isthmian pine, the Argolic parsley, and the Pythian apple; though she does not engage in these contests for her own sake, but, through dwelling and associating with the body, she also enjoys its victory and the proclamation of its triumphs. But where the labour and the contest and victory are of the soul alone, will she here neglect the season of contending, and be voluntarily indolent where neither apples nor olives are the reward, but, instead of these, that which is more beautiful with respect to ambition, more useful

with respect to the advantage of the beholders, and more efficacious to the speaker with respect to the fidelity of life? The times, too, and the places of this contest, which are various and suddenly proclaimed, spontaneously collect together all Greece, which assembles not for the pleasure of the eyes, but with the hope of virtue, which, in my opinion, is more allied to the soul of man than pleasure. In other spectacles, therefore, where strength or art of body are displayed, we may see that no one of the spectators comes with an intention of emulating or imitating the spectacle; but there, indeed, we collect pleasure for the eyes from the labours of others, and no one, from among ten thousand spectators, would pray to be one of those who are defiled with dust, or who run, or strangle, or are strangled, or struck in the middle of the stadium, except some degenerate and servile soul. But here I think this contest is more liberal than that, these labours more useful than those, and this theatre * more sympathetic than that; so that there is no one who is present, and endued with intellect, that would not rather pray to become a champion than a spectator.

What then is the cause of this? that not every fleshly nature can endure the arts and labours of the body; nor is this a voluntary thing, but spontaneous and casual, and which arrives but to a few from among the many. For it is necessary either

* That is, the philosophic school in which this discourse was delivered.

to be born with magnitude of body, like Titormus *, or with the power of endurance, like Milo, or with strength, like Polydamas, or with swiftness, like Lasthenes. But he who is less strong than Epeus, more deformed than Thersites, shorter than Tydeus, and heavier than Ajax, and who possesses all the defects of the body in the aggregate, and yet is emulous of this contest, indulges a vain and imperfect desire. The contests of the soul, however, subsist in a manner directly contrary to these; for those among the human race who are not naturally adapted to this are but few and rare. Not, indeed, that the virtues of the soul are spontaneous and casual, but something is previously effected by nature, which, with respect to virtue, has the relation of a small foundation to a great wall, or a little keel to a lofty ship. Divinity, too, has associated with the reasonings of the human soul love and hope, the former as a certain light and sublime wing raising and giving levity to the soul, and enabling her appetites to obtain the objects of their pursuit; and this wing is called by philosophers human impulse. But hopes, associating with the soul, impart consolation to her impulses; and these are not, according to the Attic poet, blind, but, perceiving most acutely, they do not suffer her to be wearied in labouring, as if she had entirely obtained the objects of her love. For if hope had no subsistence, the man intent upon

* A shepherd of Ætolia, called another Hercules, on account of his prodigious strength.

gain would long since have desisted from accumulating wealth, the mercenary would long since have ceased to engage in war, the merchant to sail, the robber to plunder, and the man of lust to commit adultery. Hopes, however, do not suffer this, which command men to labour in things impossible, and which can never be completed: for they order the man intent on gain to labour as one who will accumulate wealth, the warrior to fight as one who will conquer, the merchant to sail as one who will escape the perils of the sea, the robber to plunder as one who will be enriched, and the adulterer to commit adultery as one who will elude detection: and this though a sudden calamity overwhelms each of these, which deprives the man intent on gain of his wealth, slays the mercenary, drowns the merchant, apprehends the robber, and detects the adulterer, and though appetites destroy them together with their hopes. For divinity did not comprehend in measure, or assign a boundary to any one of these, neither to wealth nor pleasures, nor any other of human desires; but the essence of them is infinite; so that he who pursues these becomes more thirsty from being filled with them, in consequence of that which is obtained being less than what was expected. But when the soul arrives at a thing, stable, unambiguous, and definite, which is beautiful, indeed, by nature, but acquired by labour, apprehended by reasoning, pursued by love, and anticipated by hope, then the contest of the soul is fortunate, obtains its end, and is victorious:

and this is nothing else than that for the sake of which those who philosophize fill with auditors these theatres.

Again, however, I am in want of the image of champions: for there each prays that no other combatant may enter the stadium, but that he may obtain the victory without dust; for it is necessary that one from among the many should conquer; but here, he among the champions is especially victorious who calls many to the contest. For if, O ye gods! some one of my spectators should become a champion together with me, and should be a partaker with me in this seat of dust and labour, then should I be renowned, then should I be crowned, then should I be celebrated by the voice of the cryer in the presence of all Greece: since hitherto I acknowledge myself to have been uncrowned and uncelebrated by the cryer though you vociferate. For what advantage have I derived from a multitude of arguments and this continued contest? praise? I have enough of this. Glory? I am satiated with the thing. In short, is there any one who praises arguments, and does not use them, though he possesses speech, though he possesses the sense of hearing? Is there any one who praises philosophy and does not embrace it, though he has a soul, though he has a master? The thing, indeed, is just as it is with flutes or harps, or any other instruments which are employed in tragedies or comedies at the festival of Bacchus; for they are praised by all, but imitated by none.

Or here, also, there is a mighty difference between praise and pleasure. For all that hear are delighted; but he who praises in reality will also imitate, though while he does not emulate he will not praise. Now, indeed, some one unskilled in music, on hearing the harmony of the flute, becomes musically disposed, and having the flute still sounding in his ears, he remembers the song and sings to himself. Some one of you, also, may emulate the manner in which this man is affected; for perhaps he may be enamoured of the song. A man, who was a lover of animals, was in possession of birds, who sang, indeed, sweetly the morning song, but indistinctly, and in such a manner as might be expected from birds. A player on the flute was the neighbour of this man, and the birds daily hearing him practising on the flute, and their hearing being fashioned to its harmony, answered him with their song; and, at length, when he began to play on the flute, they at the same time warbled like a musical band. Will not men, therefore, in imitation of birds, join us in the song, when they frequently hear, not rude melody produced from the flute, but intellectual words, distinct, prolific, and naturally well adapted to imitation? So that I, who hitherto have been silent to all men with respect to our concerns, and have said nothing venerable nor boastful either in private or in public, now appear to myself, for your sake, to speak most superbly and boastfully. You are supplied, O young men! with an apparatus of words, diffuse, manifold, and all-prolific, which pervades to

all ears and to every nature, and which emulates all the forms of diction and disciplines, not recondite, gratuitous, not divulged, unenvying, and situated in the very middle, to those who are able to apprehend it. Whether, therefore, some one is a lover of rhetoric, this course of words is at hand, is abundantly sufficient, easy and elevated, admirable and infrangible, strong and unwearied; or whether he is a lover of poetry, let him come hither, procuring elsewhere measures alone, but receiving here whatever else pertains to poetry, the magnificent, the conspicuous, the splendid, the prolific, the divinely inspired, the disposition of the argument, the composition of the fable, the exuberant in diction, and the irreprehensible in harmony. But are you a lover of the political science, and do you come indigent of the apparatus pertaining to the people and the senate-house? You, indeed, have detected the work, you see the people, you see the senate-house, the speaker, the persuasion, and the strength which it possesses. If, however, any one despises these things, and embraces philosophy, and honours truth, here I withdraw my boasting, I yield, I am not the same with myself. The thing is great, and requires a patron; not from among the vulgar, by Jupiter, nor one of a groveling soul, or which is mingled with the manners of the multitude.

If, therefore, any one asserts that philosophy consists in nouns and verbs, or in the arts of diction, or in confutations, contentions, and sophisms, and the converse with these, it is not difficult to

find a preceptor. Every place is full of such like sophists; the thing is obvious, and rapidly presents itself to the view. I will also be bold to say, that there are more teachers than disciples of this philosophy. But if these things are indeed small parts of philosophising, and of such a nature that it is disgraceful not to know them, and yet the knowledge of them is not venerable; by knowing these we shall avoid disgrace, but we shall derive no glory from their possession: for if this were the case, those who teach the rudiments of literature, who are busily employed about syllables, and who stammer with the most stupid of boys, would be worthy of great regard. That, however, which is the principal thing in philosophy, and the path which leads to it, require a preceptor who can elevate the souls of youth, govern their ambition like a pedagogue, and who does nothing else than measure their appetites in conjunction with pleasures and pains; just as those who tame horses neither extinguish the ardour of the colts, nor suffer them to exert their generous impulse without restraint. And as the bridle and the whip, together with the art of the horseman and charioteer, govern the ardour of a colt; in like manner discourse, not indolent, nor sordid, nor negligent, but mingled with the manners and passions, governs the soul of man; not affording leisure to its auditors to investigate words, and the pleasure they contain, but compelling them to be elevated, and to energize enthusiastically, as if excited by a trumpet at one time

calling to battle, and at another sounding a retreat.

If a discourse of this kind is necessary to those who are desirous of philosophy, we should explore and embrace the man who possesses it, whether he be old or young, poor or rich, without glory or renowned. For old-age is, I think, more imbecile than youth, poverty than wealth, and the privation of than the possession of renown. But men who have these defects easily associate with philosophy, to which the calamities of fortune are ministrant as viatica. And because, indeed, Socrates was poor, the poor man will immediately imitate Socrates, so that we shall derive advantage from the flat-nosed and big-bellied *, not being the champions of philosophy. But that Socrates betook himself only to the poor, and not also to the rich, is related by no one. For Socrates thought, as it appears to me, that the city of the Athenians would derive but little advantage from Æschines and Antisthenes philosophising, or rather, that no one of those who then existed would be benefitted, but posterity alone, from the memory of their discourses. If, however, Alcibiades, or Critias, or Critobulus, or Callias had philosophised, nothing dreadful would have befallen the Athenians of that time. For philosophy is not emulous of Diogenes with his scrip and staff, since he who is furnished

* Such was Socrates, whence he was said to resemble Silenus. See the Banquet of Xenophon, and my translation of the speech of Alcibiades in the Banquet of Plato.

with these may be more unhappy than Sardanapalus. Aristippus, indeed, who was clothed in purple, and perfumed with ointments, was not less temperate than Diogenes. For just as if some one should have acquired a power of body, by which he would sustain no injury from fire, he would, in my opinion, be confident of safety, even though his body was committed to the flames of Ætna; in like manner, he who is well furnished against pleasures will not, when engaged in them, either be heated, or burnt, or dissolved.

A philosopher, however, is to be investigated, not from his habit, nor his age, nor from fortune, but from his sentiments, his discourse, and the furniture of his soul, by which alone he is elected; but all these other decorations, which are derived from fortune, resemble the vestments in the festivals of Bacchus. For the beauty of the poems is one and the same, whether he who recites them is a potentate or a servant; but the necessity of the drama changes the garb of the actors. Agamemnon wields a sceptre, a herdsman wears a hide, Achilles bears arms, and Telephus * is clothed in rags, and carries a scrip. The spectators, however, no less regard Telephus than Agamemnon: for the soul is extended to the poem itself, and not to the fortunes of those who recite it. Thus, also, conceive respecting the discourses of philosophers, that their beauty is not all-various, nor distributed

* Telephus was a king of Mysia, son of Hercules and Auge, the daughter of Aleus.

into a multitude of parts, but is one and similar to itself; and that the champions themselves are sent into the scene of life clothed by fortune in different garbs; Pythagoras, indeed, in purple; Socrates in a lacerated garment; Xenophon with a corselet and shield; and the champion from Sinope, after the manner of Telephus, with a staff and scrip. The garbs themselves, however, contribute to the dramatical performance of the actors; and on this account Pythagoras astonished, Socrates confuted, Xenophon conquered, and Diogenes reprobated: blessed were the actors of the dramas, and blessed the spectators that saw them act. Where now shall we find a poet and champion, neither inelegant nor dumb, but worthy to enter on the Grecian theatres? Let us seek the man, for perhaps he may appear, and, when appearing, may not be disgraced.

DISSERTATION XXXVII. [36]

HOW A MAN OUGHT TO PREPARE HIMSELF WITH RESPECT TO A FRIEND.

CAN you tell me who those are whom Homer delights to call men resembling the gods, divine, and equal in wisdom to Jupiter? What others than those most excellent men, Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ulysses, and any other who supplies him with a portion of praise? But what, if he had not compared them to Jupiter, but either to Machaon the physician, or Calchas the prophet, or Nestor skilled in horsemanship, or Menestheus skilled in tactics, or Epeus the carpenter, or the beautiful Nireus? Would you not be able to inform me what was the cause of this comparison? Or do you there, indeed, know the similitude, but here know that they resembled Jupiter; and do you praise the assimilator for his image, but are ignorant of the assimilation? Come, then, I will narrate the affair to you, for Homer, in prose; for I am not a poet. Homer, therefore, calls Jupiter the father of gods and men*, not because descend-

* Jupiter is called by Homer the father of gods and men, because, according to the Grecian theology, he is the demiurgus or fabricator of the universe.

ing from heaven, and at one time resembling a bird, at another time gold, and at another something else, he had connexion with mortal women:

"First the seeds scatt'ring of illustrious kings."

For thus Jupiter would have been the parent of very few, but ascribing to him the being and preservation of these genera, he calls him father, a name the most ancient of those which belong to friendship.

Be it so: and let these particulars respecting Jupiter be admitted. Do you think, however, that the circumstances which pertain to those that resembled Jupiter subsist otherwise? or do you not see that neither do poets compare Salmoneus to Jupiter, though he hurled thunder, as he thought, and imitated its sound, and the blaze of lightning? But Salmoneus in thus acting resembled Thersites imitating Nestor. How then do men become similar to Jupiter? By imitating his saving power, his love, and paternal regard. This is the similitude of mortal to divine virtue, which by the gods is denominated Themis and Justice, and is called by other mystical and divine appellations, but is denominated by men friendship and benevolence, and certain other benignant and human names. The nature of man, indeed, is indigent of divine virtue in other respects, and also in the extension of friendship. For the mortal nature does not pervade to every thing similar, but, like the herds of cattle, becomes familiar alone with those of the same flock: and we must be content if it is familiar

even with the whole of this. But now you will see in one flock, and under one shepherd, many seditions and discords, some pushing with their horns, and some biting each other, so that scarcely any sparks of genuine friendship remain. And food, indeed, drink and clothing, and such other things as are necessary to the body, men procure by exchange and retribution from brass and iron, and those venerable metals gold and silver; though they have it in their power to bid farewell to the metallic art, and receive these things from each other without labour, by employing a measure the most equitable of all things. For he who is indigent may receive that of which he is in want from him who possesses it, and he who is in affluence may impart what is wanted, receiving in exchange that of which the retribution is blameless.

Homer, indeed, blames the Lycian Glaucus for giving gold and receiving brass, and for exchanging the worth of a hecatomb for the worth of nine oxen. If, however, neglecting the value of these, we judiciously measure the reciprocal gifts, the thing will be equivalent. But now all things are full of traffic, merchandize, and bitter compacts; in the forum, at sea, and on shore, foreign and in the city, provincial and transmarine. Hence the sea and the land are turned upwards and downwards, things uninvestigable are investigated, such as are unapparent are explored, such as are remote pursued, and such as are rare imported; treasures buried in the earth are dug up, and chests are filled with riches. This, however, is owing to

distrust of friendship, the love of avarice, the fear of want, the custom of depravity, and the desire of pleasure; through which friendship being expelled, and profoundly merged in the earth, scarcely preserves an obscure and imbecile vestige of itself. Hence if, either among the Greeks or Barbarians, things existed in common, unguarded, and most abundant, through the rarity of possessions, this circumstance is celebrated by poets, is considered as fabulous, and its veracity is doubted; and, indeed, very reasonably.

Thus a Grecian fleet, consisting of a thousand ships, and a multitude of men, the flower of Greece, who dwelt in the same habitation and used the same food, came to Asia, and lived for ten years opposite to barbarian enemies. But the fame of these deeds falling into the verse of Homer, he could only relate one instance of accurate friendship in such a numerous army and such a length of time, that of a Thessalian youth with a Locrian man *; than which there is nothing in the narrations of Homer more delightful with respect to pleasure, more alluring to virtue, or more renowned with respect to memory. Every thing else in Homer, if you attentively consider it, consists of war and rage, of threats and anger; and the end of these things is lamentations and groans, death, slaughter, and destruction. An Attic narration, also, is celebrated, which becomes illustrious from friendship. Among the numerous

* *Viz.* Of Achilles with Patroclus.

writings of the Athenians, this one thing is worthy of Minerva and worthy of Theseus, the beautiful and just friendship of worthy men, which armed both with a common sword against a tyrant *, and gave to both a common standard and a common death. Besides this, no advantage is to be derived from Attic friendship, but every thing else is fraudulent and futile, incredible and corrupt, accompanied with envy and anger, illiberality, avarice, and ambition.

If, also, you peruse the rest of the Grecian history, you will perceive an abundance of lamentable narrations, man contending with man, city with city, and family with family; not only the Doric with the Ionic, and the Bœotian with the Attic, but also the Ionians attacking the Ionians, and the Dorians, Bœotians, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, respectively contending with each other; enemies allied to each other and companions, all rising against all, though living under the same sun, in the same air, and under the same law, speaking the same language, inhabiting the same lands, eating the same fruits, and initiated into the same mysteries, and whom one wall and one city incloses: all these you will see engaging in war, and forming leagues; swearing, and violating their oaths; making and dissolving compacts, and, for small pretexts, becoming the causes of the greatest evils. For when friendship abandons the

* This tyrant was Hipparchus, and the friends were Aristogiton and Harmodius.

mind, every thing becomes the occasion of exciting anger and introducing perturbation; just as a ship when deprived of its ballast is agitated and overturned by a small preponderance.

By what mean then can a man who is a lover of friendship obtain this possession? It is difficult indeed to say, but at the same time it must be told:

> " As men with lions form no faithful leagues,
> Nor lambs with wolves possess according souls *."

So neither is there any attraction of friendship between man and man as long as their eyes are dazzled with silver and gold. And if they withdraw their sight from these, this forbearance is not sufficient to the acquisition of friendship, but the beauty of some male or female form again disturbs. And even though you should shut your eyes to these, yet *the people of the magnanimous Erectheus is comely to the view* †, and the proclamations in public assemblies, together with the renown resulting from them, is a light thing, and rapidly wings its way through every land. Should you likewise despise this, yet you will not despise a prison; and though you should endure fetters, yet you will not despise approaching death. But it is necessary to pass by many pleasures, and to look stedfastly at many labours, in order to obtain a possession which is equivalent to all pleasures, and equipon-

* Iliad xxii. ver. 262.

† These are the words of Socrates in the first Alcibiades of Plato.

derant with all labours; a possession more honourable than gold, more stable than the flower of beauty, more secure than glory, more true than honour; a possession voluntary and self-announced; a possession which is justly praised; a possession which, though it should bring with it pain and employment, yet delights the sufferer from the memory of the cause.

This possession, however, is most rare, but the image of it is at hand and is all various; swarms of flatterers and dissemblers, possessing friendship on the tip of their tongue, not conducted by benevolence, but compelled by indigence, and who are hirelings and not friends. From this evil you will never be liberated as long as men think that friendship *consists* in remuneration. Friendship, indeed, is *attended* with remuneration, though the multitude do not perceive it either privately or in public; for if they did they would lay aside their arms, and bid farewel to the arts of military commanders, to the fabrication of arms, the crowd of mercenaries, the delivery of standards, fortifications, and camps, but they would willingly receive leagues from Jupiter himself, though he should not proclaim the truce in Olympia nor from the Isthmus, but should vociferate from heaven,

> " Ah! stop my friends, and suffer me to go
> Where sorrow calls *,"

to save you, and not to behold you injured by each other. But now engaging in diurnal leagues for a

* Iliad xxii. ver. 416.

period of thirty years they obtain a repose from evils obscure and not entirely safe, till, another pretext occurring, all things are again turbulently agitated upwards and downwards. And even though they should lay aside their arms and act peaceably, another war falling on the soul, which is not public but private, and which brings with it neither fire nor sword, nor a fleet of ships, nor horses, but is destitute of all these; this war injures the soul, and besieging, fills it with envy, anger, rage, contumely, and ten thousand other evils.

Where then shall any one turn himself, and what truce shall he find? what Olympian, what Nemean league? The Athenian Dionysia and Panathenæa are indeed beautiful; but they celebrate these festivals hating and being hated. You speak of a war and not of a festival. The Gymnopædiæ * also, the Hyacinthea †, and the choirs among the Lacedæmonians, are beautiful; but Agesilaus envied Lysander, Agesipolis hated Agis, Cinadon formed stratagems against the kings, Phalanthus against the Ephori, and the Partheniæ ‡

* This was a Spartan festival, in which those who celebrated it were entirely naked.

† An annual solemnity at Amiclæ, in Laconia, in honour of Hyacinthus and Apollo.

‡ A certain number of young men under age, during the Messenian war, were permitted to have promiscuous intercourse with all the unmarried women of Sparta, in order to raise a future generation. The children who sprang from this union were called *Partheniæ*, or *sons of virgins*.

against the Spartans. I cannot believe in the festival till I see that those are friends by whom it is celebrated. This is the law and manner of a true league, arranged by the legislator divinity, without the possession of which friendship cannot be seen, not even though a man should frequently make libations, not though he should frequently be enrolled among the Olympian, Isthmian, and Nemean conquerors. It is necessary that the proclamation and the league should proceed into the soul: but as long as the war in the soul is without a truce and without a public cryer, the soul remains without friendship, hostile and sorrowful. These are avenging dæmons, these are the furies, dramas, and tragedies. Let us pursue the league, let us call Philosophy: she will come, she will bring with her the reconciling league, she will proclaim peace.

DISSERTATION XXXVIII.

WHETHER STATUES SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO THE GODS.

THE gods are the helpers of mankind, all indeed of all; but different gods are considered as giving assistance to different men, according to the rumour of names; and men distribute honours and statues to them according to the private benefits which they have individually received. Thus sailors dedicate, on a rock undisturbed by the sea, a helm to the marine deities. Thus, also, some shepherd dedicates in honour of Pan a tall fir tree or a profound cavern. Husbandmen, likewise, honour Bacchus, fixing in their gardens a spontaneous trunk as a rustic statue. Fountains of water, too, hollow thickets, and flowery meadows, are sacred to Diana: and the first men consecrated as statues to Jupiter the summits of mountains, such as Olympus and Ida, or any other mountain proximate to the heavens. Honour also is paid to rivers, either for the sake of the benefit which they impart, as by the Egyptians to the Nile; or on account of their beauty, as by the Thessalians to Peneus; or on account of their magnitude, as by the Scythians to the Ister; or on account of fabu-

lous tradition, as by the Ætolians to Achelous; or according to law, as the Spartans to Eurotas; or in conformity to the mysteries, as the Athenians to Ilissus. Shall, therefore, rivers be allotted honours, according to the indigence of those whom they benefit, and shall every art honour its patron deity, dedicating a different statue to a different god? but if there is a certain race of men, not marine, nor rustic, but inhabitants of cities, and mingled with the political communion of law and reason, will divinity be ungifted, and unhonoured by these? or will they honour him, indeed, but with words alone, and think that the gods have no need of statues and altars? For the gods are not more in want of these than good men are of images.

Indeed, it appears to me as external discourse has no need, in order to its composition, of certain Phœnician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian characters, but human imbecility devised these marks, in which inserting its dullness, it recovers from them its memory; in like manner a divine nature has no need of statues or altars; but human nature being very imbecile, and as much distant from divinity as earth from heaven, devised these symbols, in which it inserted the names and the renown of the gods. Those, therefore, whose memory is robust, and who are able, by directly extending their soul to heaven, to meet with divinity, have, *perhaps*, no need of statues. This race is, however, rare among men, and in a whole nation you will not find one who recollects divinity, and who is not in want of this kind of assistance,

which resembles that devised by writing-masters for boys, who give them obscure marks as copies; by writing over which, their hand being guided by that of the master, they become, through memory, accustomed to the art. It appears to me, therefore, that legislators devised these statues for men, as if for a certain kind of boys, as tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, and a certain manuduction as it were and path to reminiscence.

Of statues, however, there is neither one law, nor one mode, nor one art, nor one matter. For the Greeks think it fit to honour the gods from things the most beautiful in the earth, from a pure matter, the human form, and accurate art: and their opinion is not irrational who fashion statues in the human resemblance. For if the human soul is most near and most similar to divinity it is not reasonable to suppose that divinity would invest that which is most similar to himself with a most deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy vehicle to immortal souls, light, and adapted to motion. For this alone, of all the bodies on the earth, raises its summit on high, is magnificent, superb, and full of symmetry, neither astonishing through its magnitude, nor terrible through its strength, nor moved with difficulty through its weight, nor slippery through its smoothness, nor repercussive through its hardness, nor groveling through its coldness, nor precipitate through its heat, nor inclined to swim through its laxity, nor feeding on raw flesh through its fero-

city, nor on grass through its imbecility; but is harmonically composed for its proper works, and is dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as are brave; it is also adapted to walk by nature, but winged by reason, capable of swimming by art, feeds on corn and fruits, and cultivates the earth, is of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a graceful beard. In the resemblance of such a body the Greeks think fit to honour the gods.

With respect to the Barbarians, all of them in like manner admit the subsistence of divinity, but different nations among these adopt different symbols. Hence the Persians adopt fire, a diurnal statue, insatiable and voracious; and to this they sacrifice, supplying it with the aliment of fire, and at the same time exclaiming, *O sovereign ruler fire, eat.* To the Persians, however, we may properly say: "O most stupid of all nations, who, neglecting so many and such mighty statues, the mild earth, the splendid sun, the navigable sea, prolific rivers, the nourishing air, and the heavens themselves, are especially devoted to one thing, and that most savage and most rapid, not only supplying it with the aliment of wood, with victims, and aromatic fumigations, but by this statue and by this god giving Eretria to be consumed, together with Athens itself, the temples of the Ionians, and the statues of the Greeks."

I also blame the law of the Egyptians. They honour an ox and a bird, a goat and the progeny of the river Nile, whose bodies indeed are mortal,

their lives abject, their sight groveling, the cultivation of which is ignoble, and the honour which is paid to them disgraceful. A deity among the Egyptians dies, a deity is lamented*, and they show the temple and the sepulchre of a god. And the Greeks, indeed, sacrifice† to good men, whose virtues they honour, but are unmindful of their calamities; but among the Egyptians, divinity is equally a partaker of honour and tears. An Egyptian woman nursed a young crocodile, and the Egyptians proclaimed the woman blessed, as being the nurse of a god: some of them also adored both her and the young crocodile. This woman had a son, who was now a lad, and of an equal age with the god, his playfellow, and with whom he had been nursed. And the god, indeed, as long as he was imbecile, was mild, but when he grew large he manifested his nature and devoured the boy. The miserable woman, however, proclaimed her son blessed in his death, as having become a gift to a domestic god. And thus much for the affairs of the Egyptians.

But Alexander the Great, having captured Persia,

* Maximus here alludes to the image of Osiris.

† The Greeks sacrificed to good men in conformity to the Pythagoric precept, in the golden verses, which commands honour to be paid to the *terrestrial heroes; i. e.* to men who by their transcendent virtues are proximately allied to *essential* heroes, the perpetual attendants of the gods. To such men as these *appropriate* honour is to be paid, as well during their abode on the earth as after their death. Markland, from not attending to this, erroneously conceived the meaning of Maximus in this place to be uncertain and ambiguous.

vanquished the Babylonians, and made Darius his prisoner, marched to the land of the Indians, which had till then been inaccessible to a foreign army, as the Indians said, except to that of Bacchus. The Indian kings Porus and Taxiles were at that time hostile to each other: and Alexander, indeed, made Porus his captive, but gave friendly assistance to Taxiles. Hence Taxiles showed to Alexander all that was wonderful in the land of the Indians, its greatest rivers, various birds, fragrant plants, and whatever else was novel to Grecian eyes. Among these also he shewed him a prodigious animal, a statue of Bacchus, to which the Indians sacrificed. This animal was a dragon, five hundred feet * in length, and was nourished in the hollow recess of a profound precipice, surrounded by a lofty wall which reached above its summits. This dragon devoured the herds of the Indians, who supplied him with oxen and sheep for food, as if he had been a tyrant rather than a god.

The Hesperian Lybians inhabit a land narrow and long, and on all sides surrounded by the sea: for the external sea being divided about the summit of this neck embraces the land with numerous and marine billows. To these men Atlas is a temple and a statue. But Atlas is a hollow mountain, of a great altitude, open to the sea like theatres to the air; and in the middle region of the mountain

* According to Ælian, however, in his History of Animals, xv, 21. the length of this dragon was seventy cubits.

and the sea there is a deep valley, fertile and well planted with trees. In this valley you may see fruits hanging on the trees, which, when surveyed from the summit, appear to be as it were at the bottom of a well; but it is neither possible to descend into it, for it is precipitous, nor lawful. The prodigy in this place is the ocean, which inundates the shore, and not only pours on the plains but crowns Atlas itself with its waves. You may also see the water rising by itself like a wall, and neither flowing into the hollow places nor supported by the land; but between the mountain and the water there is much air and a hollow grove. This is the temple and deity, the oath and statue of the Lybians.

The Celta, indeed, venerate Jupiter, but the Celtic statue of Jupiter is a lofty oak. The Pæonians venerate the sun, but the Pæonic statue of the sun is a short discus fixed on the top of a long pole. The Arabians, indeed, venerate a god whom I do not know; but the statue of him which I have seen is a quadrangular stone. By the Paphians Venus is honoured; but you cannot compare her statue to any thing else than a white pyramid, the matter of which is unknown. Among the Lycians the mountain Olympus eructates fire, not like that of Ætna, but peaceful and possessing symmetry: and this fire is to them a temple and a statue. The Phrygians who dwell about Celæna venerate two rivers, Marsyas and Mæander, which rivers I have seen. One fountain is the source of these, which proceeding as far

as to the mountain disappears at the back of the city, and again emerges from the city, separating both the water and the names of the rivers. And Mæander, indeed, flows to Lydia, but the waters of Marsyas are consumed about the plains. The Phrygians sacrifice to these rivers, some indeed to both, but others to Mæander, and others to Marsyas alone. They also throw the thighs of the victims into the fountains, invoking by name the river to which they sacrifice; and these thighs are carried as far as to the mountain and merged under the water. The things too which are sacrificed to one of these rivers are never carried by the stream into the other; but if the sacrifice is to both these they divide the gift. A mountain is to the Cappadocians a god, an oath, and a statue; a lake to the Mæotæ; the Tanaïs to the Massagetæ.

O many and all-various statues! of which some are fashioned by art, and others are embraced through indigence; some are honoured through utility, and others are venerated through the astonishment which they excite; some are considered as divine through their magnitude, and others are celebrated for their beauty! There is not, indeed, any race of men, neither Barbarian nor Grecian, neither maritime nor continental, neither living a pastoral life, nor dwelling in cities, which can endure to be without some symbols of the honour of the gods. How, therefore, shall any one discuss the question whether it is proper that statues of the gods should be fabricated or not? for if we

were to give laws to other men recently sprung from the earth, and dwelling beyond our boundaries and our air, or who were fashioned by a certain Prometheus, ignorant of life, and law, and reason, it might, perhaps, demand consideration whether this race should be permitted to adore these spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or gold, and which are neither oaks nor cedars, nor rivers nor birds, but the rising sun, the splendid moon, the variegated heaven, the earth itself and the air, all fire and all water; or shall we constrain these also to the necessity of honouring wood, or stones, or images? But if this is the common law of all men, let us make no innovations, let us admit the conceptions concerning the gods, and preserve their symbols as well as their names.

For divinity *, indeed, the father and fabricator of all things, is more ancient than the sun and the heavens, more excellent than time and eternity, and every flowing nature, and is a legislator with-

* The intellectual philosophers of antiquity by the word θεος, *God*, either denoted the highest god, or all the gods; because, according to the ancient theology, all the divine powers which proceed from the first God are concentred and rooted in him, so as to form as it were one divine orb in which the union of these divinities with each other and their ineffable principle is most transcendent, and at the same time their separation from each other surpasses every conceivable mode of distinct subsistence. Let it be observed, however, that Jupiter is properly the fabricator and father of all things; and that, according to Plato, the highest god is superior to a *fabricative* energy.

out law, ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes. Not being able, however, to comprehend his essence, we apply for assistance to words and names, to animals and figures of gold, and ivory and silver, to plants and rivers, to the summits of mountains, and to streams of water; desiring, indeed, to understand his nature, but through imbecility calling him by the names of such things as appear to us to be beautiful. And in thus acting we are affected in the same manner as lovers, who are delighted with surveying the images of the objects of their love, and with recollecting the lyre, the dart, and the seat of these, the circus in which they ran, and every thing, in short, which excites the memory of the beloved object. What then remains for me to investigate and determine respecting statues? only to admit the subsistence of deity. But if the art of Phidias excites the Greeks to the recollection * of divinity, honour to animals

* From this passage, as well as from many others which might be adduced from ancient authors, it is evident that the ancients in general considered statues merely as symbols of a divine nature, to the recollection of which they might be excited through these as media. That the reader, however, may more fully see the reasons which induced the ancients to venerate statues, I shall present him with the following admirable observations on this subject, by the philosopher Sallust, in his golden treatise on the gods and the world. See p. 73 of my translation.

" A divine nature is not indigent of any thing; but the honours which we pay to the gods are performed for the sake of our advantage. And since the providence of the gods is everywhere extended, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and similitude;

the Egyptians, a river others, and fire others, I do not condemn the dissonance: let them only know, let them only love, let them only be mindful of the object they adore.

and hence temples imitate the heavens but altars the earth; *statues resemble life, and on this account they are similar to animals.* Prayers imitate that which is intellectual, but characters superior ineffable powers. Herbs and stones resemble matter, and animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of our souls. But from all these nothing happens to the gods beyond what they already possess; for what accession can be made to a divine nature? but a conjunction of our souls with the gods is by these means produced."

DISSERTATION XXXIX.

IF SOCRATES DID WELL IN NOT DEFENDING HIMSELF BEFORE HIS JUDGES*.

IT would be a dreadful thing that each of the other arts should be liberated from the tribunal of the multitude, and that neither the pilot who gives assistance to the ship, and properly employs his art, should be corrected by the unskilful, nor the physician endure that his prescriptions, his methods of cure, and his precepts respecting diet should be surveyed and scrutinized by the diseased, and that neither the potter, nor the shoemaker, nor those who exercise arts still more ignoble than these, should have any other judge of their works except art; but that Socrates, who was not accused of ignorance even by Apollo himself, to whom the number of the sands and the measures of the sea are known, should not yet be freed from calumnies and accusations, but that he should be

* Many of the ancients, however, composed apologies for Socrates, two of which are still extant, those of Plato and Xenophon; the former of which philosophers was present at the condemnation of Socrates, and has, doubtless, preserved the substance of what he then said.

perpetually attacked by more bitter sycophants than Anytus and Melitus, and the Athenian judges of that period. And yet, if he had been a painter or a fabricator of statues, such as Zeuxis, or Polycletus, or Phidias, the opinion of art would have transmitted his works to posterity with renown. For men, on surveying the productions of these artists, are so far from defaming, that they do not even dare to examine them, but are the voluntary encomiasts of renowned spectacles. Should there, however, be a man who is not a good manual artist in painting, or in the fabrication of statues, but who well harmonizes his life, and according to the most accurate standard, by reason and law, custom and frugality, endurance and temperance, and the other virtues; shall this man neither obtain stable renown, nor indisputable praise, nor according judges, but be subject to the various decisions of different persons?

Such, however, was Socrates, the subject of our present discourse, whom Melitus accused, Anytus led to judgment, Lycon pursued, the Athenians condemned, the eleven magistrates bound, and the executioner put to death. Socrates, however, looked down upon Melitus accusing him, despised Anytus leading him to judgment, derided Lycon when declaiming against him, decreed contrary to the decree of the Athenians, passed sentence on himself in opposition to their sentence; and when the eleven magistrates bound him he resigned his body, for it was more imbecile than many bodies;

but he did not resign his soul, for it was superior to all the Athenians: nor was he indignant with the executioner, nor did he hesitate to take the poison; but though the Athenians unwillingly condemned him he willingly died. That he voluntarily died, indeed, this is a sufficient argument, that though he had the power of redeeming himself by a fine, and of privately escaping, yet he preferred to die; and that the Athenians were unwilling he should die is proved from their repentance immediately after, than which what circumstance more ridiculous could have happened to the judges?

Do you, therefore, desire to consider still further whether Socrates was right in thus acting or not? What then will you say if some one should narrate to you, that there was an Athenian very much advanced in age, in his pursuits a philosopher, from fortune poor, naturally skilful, eloquent, acute in his conceptions, vigilant and sober, one who neither did nor said any thing rashly, and one who had for the encomiasts of his manners not the most naturally depraved among the Greeks, but among the gods, Apollo himself; if some one should narrate to you that this man, through the envy and hatred of those that rose against him, and their rage towards things truly beautiful; of Aristophanes, indeed, from the theatre, of Anytus from among the sophists, of Melitus from among the sycophants, of Lyco from among the rhetoricians, and of the Athenians among the

Greeks, the first of whom reviled him in comedies, the second composed a written accusation against him, the third brought him to a court of justice, the fourth spoke against him, and the fifth judged him; that this man was in the first place indignant with Aristophanes, and in the midst of the Athenians reviled him in the festivals of Bacchus, while the judges were intoxicated; and, in the next place, when he came into the court of justice, that he contended with his accusers, and delivered a long speech in defence of himself, in order that his apology might avert the minds of the judges from the calumnies of his adversaries, exciting the court to benevolence by his prefatory harangues, persuading by his narrations, demonstrating by arguments, by credibility, and by conjecture, and producing as witnesses certain wealthy persons, and who were approved by the Athenian judges themselves; in the conclusion, likewise, of his speech, supplicating, imploring, and beseeching, and accompanying all this with seasonable tears; and that, in the last place, he exhibited to the view of the court Xantippe lamenting, and his children crying; by all which circumstances he so influenced the judges that they commiserated, acquitted, and dismissed him?

O illustrious victor! he would, doubtless, have betaken himself from the court of justice to the Lyceum, and from thence again to the academy and to other places of disputation, full of hilarity, like those who have been saved from a winter tem-

pest at sea. But how could Philosophy endure such a man as this returning to her? not more than the master of the bodily exercises of boys could endure a champion returning from the stadium, perfumed with ointment, crowned without sweat, without dust, without blows, and without a wound, and possessing no vestige of virtue. Besides, on what account should Socrates have apologized to those Athenians? As to just men? but they were unjust. As to intelligent men? but they were stupid. As to good men? but they were depraved. As to benevolent men? but they were enraged. As to men like himself? but they were most unlike. As to better men? but they were worse. And what better man will apologize to a worse man? what, likewise, could he say in apologizing? that he did not philosophize? But he would have spoken falsely. Or that he did philosophize? But this was the thing for which they were enraged.

Let us, however, by Jupiter suppose that he said none of these things, but that it was requisite he should free himself from the accusation, and prove that he neither corrupted the youth nor introduced novel divinities. But what artist can persuade one unskilled in art respecting things which pertain to art? and whence could the Athenians understand in what the corruption of youth consists, and what virtue is? what divinity is, and how he is to be honoured? For the thousand judges, who are elected by a bean, do not inves-

tigate these things, nor has Solon written any thing concerning them, nor the venerable laws of Draco; but citations and accusations, examinations, and oaths respecting calumny, and every thing of this kind are discussed in the Heliæa *; just as among the herds of boys there are battles and verbal contentions about their dice, which they take from each other, and mutually injure and are injured. Truth, however, virtue, and an upright life require other judges, other laws, and other orators, in which Socrates vanquishes, and is crowned and celebrated.

Would not, therefore, an old man and a philosopher contending with boys about dice be ridiculous? Or what physician could ever persuade a man in a fever that hunger and thirst are good? or who can persuade an intemperate man that pleasure is a base thing? or a man addicted to gain that he aspires after nothing good? For if this were possible it would not have been difficult for Socrates to have persuaded the Athenians that the study of virtue is not the corruption of youth, nor the knowledge of the gods illegality about divine natures. For either they knew these things together with Socrates, or he knew, but they were ignorant of them. And if, indeed, they knew them, what occasion was there of arguments to those that possessed this knowledge? but if they were igno-

* This was the greatest and most celebrated tribunal of the Athenians, the judges of which were called *Heliastæ*.

rant of them they were not in want of an apology but of science. For witnesses, credibility, arguments, conjectures, examinations, and other such-like particulars confirm other apologies, in order that what had till then been unapparent in the court of judicature may become manifest. Of virtue and probity, however, there is but one defence,—the reverence of these, which being at that time expelled from Athens, what need had Socrates of an apology?

By Jupiter, that he might not die. But if this is the thing which is principally to be avoided by a good man, Socrates should have been careful not only not to make an apology to the judges of the Athenians, but also not to incur the hatred of Melitus, nor to confute Anytus, nor to be hostile to the errors of the Athenians, nor to wander round the city, mixing with all the fortunes, and arts, and pursuits, and desires of men, being a common, bitter, and inexorable censor, uttering nothing humble, nothing fawning, nothing servile, nothing abject to any one. If, indeed, a soldier despises death in battle, and a pilot in the sea, and every artist desires to die well in the exercise of his art, shall it be proper for a philosopher to desert his station, and abandon his labours, and through the love of life to throw away virtue like a shield in battle? But thus acting what judge would praise him; or who could endure Socrates standing in the court of justice humble and dejected, and begging the hope of life from others? for this would have been

the form of his apology. Or was it requisite that he should say nothing humiliating, nothing submissive, nothing abject, but that he should speak freely and in a manner worthy of a philosopher? But in this case you do not tell me of an apology but of the suscitation and inflammation of anger. For how could a depraved court of justice, democratic, intemperate through power, unacquainted with freedom of speech, and conversant with perpetual flattery, endure such an apology? Not more than a banquet of the intemperate can endure a man who removes the bowls, leads away the female players on the pipe, takes off the crowns, and causes intoxication to cease. Socrates, therefore, was securely silent when he was not permitted to speak in a becoming manner; by this mean preserving virtue, repressing anger, and procuring bitter disgrace for those who condemned him, he being silent.

An apology, therefore, was certainly very necessary to the Athenian judges of that time. For Socrates was seventy years of age, and in him philosophy and virtue flourished continually: his life also was blameless and sane, his mode of conduct sincere, his conferences useful, and his daily associations beneficial. These, however, did not exempt him from a court of justice, a prison, and death. But would the permission to speak for a little time, and that measured by the dial, have acquitted Socrates? This, however, was not possible, nor, if it had been possible, would Socrates have acceded to

it. O Jupiter, and ye gods forbid it! for this would be just as if some armed flatterer, from among a number of military associates, should attempt to persuade the Spartan Leonidas to withdraw himself immediately from battle and not expose himself to the attack of Xerxes. For he would not follow the advice of this man, but would rather choose to die with virtue and his arms, than living to show his back to a barbarous king. What else then would the apology of Socrates have been, than the turning his back, flying from blows, and a specious timidity? He stood firm, therefore, received the attack, and acted the part of a strenuous combatant. The Athenians, however, fancied they had condemned him, just as Xerxes fancied he had vanquished Leonidas. But Leonidas, indeed, died, and Xerxes was conquered: and Socrates died, but the Athenians were condemned; and their judge was divinity and truth. But the accusation of the Athenians by Socrates was this: The Athenian people act unjustly in not believing in those gods in which Socrates believes, but introducing certain other novel divine powers. For Socrates believes that Jupiter is Olympian, but the Athenians Pericles*; Socrates believes in Apollo, but the Athenians decreed contrary to the decision of the god. The people also act unjustly in corrupting the youth: for these corrupted Alcibiades, Hipponicus, and

* Maximus thus speaks because the Athenians gave the surname of Olympius to Pericles.

Critias, and ten thousand others. O true accusation, just court of judicature, and bitter sentence! Pestilence and war from Peloponnesus were the consequence of impiety towards Jupiter. Decelia, the ill-fortune in Sicily, and the calamities in the Hellespont, were the consequences of the corruption of the youth. Thus divinity judges, thus does he condemn.

DISSERTATION XL.

WHAT SCIENCE IS *.

WHAT is this by which man differs from brute? and what is it by which divinity differs from man? I, indeed, think that men are superior to brutes through science but inferior to the gods through folly: for divinity is wiser than man, and man is more scientific than brute. Do you therefore think that science is any thing else than wisdom †? by Jupiter I do not, no more than life differs from life, which is common to the mortal and immortal nature, and which is equal in qua-

* Science, considered according to its first subsistence, which is in intellect, is *the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal entities;* but in partial souls, such as ours, it is *a perception of eternal beings by the dianoëtic power of the soul,* or that power which reasons truly, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. Hence science in the human soul is a perception neither eternal nor uniform, because it is transitive, and accompanied with the intervention of oblivion. See my translation of the Theætetus of Plato, in which this subject is most accurately discussed.

† Wisdom is the intellectual perception of the principles of things, and those incorporeal natures or ideas resident in deity, which are the luminous paradigms of the sensible world. Hence science is not properly the same as wisdom, for the latter subsists as the vertex of the former, and has the same relation to it as intellect to the reasoning power.

lity, but differs in length and shortness of duration. For the life of divinity is eternal *, but of man diurnal. As, therefore, if there was a certain power in the eyes of always seeing, of continually extending the sight, and receiving the impulse of light, and the sight had no need of the covering of the eyelids, nor of sleep for repose, nor of the night for quiet; to such eyes vision would be common with this sight of the multitude but would differ in perpetuity; in like manner science being something common, divine science at the same time differs from that which is human. And divine science, indeed, we shall perhaps hereafter discuss; but let us now proceed to that which is more known, and consider what it is for man to possess scientific knowledge, to know, to learn, and what other such like particulars are, which when we adduce we attribute a certain habit of contemplation to the soul.

Shall we, therefore, say, that every thing which sense, collecting by a gradual survey (this being denominated by us experience) introduces to the soul, ratiocination after this being impressed by experience as by a seal, shall we say that this is science? My meaning is this: the first men not having yet seen a ship, but being desirous of associating with others of their own species, being

* The life, however, of divinity, as being *eternal*, has nothing in common with temporal duration, though infinitely extended; for *eternity*, as it is beautifully and profoundly defined by Plotinus, is *infinite life, at once total and full*, in which there is nothing either of the past or the future.

likewise led by necessity, but restrained by the sea, saw a bird that had descended from the air swim, or some heavy substance rapidly carried on the top of the waves, or a tree borne along from a river into a tempestuous sea. Perhaps, also, some one being unwillingly driven into the water, and moving his limbs, escaped drowning; and perhaps, also, some one tried this in sport. But experience, collecting together the conceptions of sailing, at first constructed a certain vile raft, men binding together light materials, and thus forming a rude ship. Sense, however, gradually proceeding in conjunction with reason, devised and invented a hollow vehicle which might be impelled by oars, swim through sails, be driven by the winds, and directed by a rudder, and committed the safety of this vehicle to the piloting science alone. They say, also, that medicine was at first discovered as follows: The domestics of a sick man carried him into the public road and there left him; but the passengers enquiring of him the nature of his malady, if any of them had found benefit from certain food, from cauterization, or incisions, or the endurance of thirst, they severally applied these to the sick man; and the similitude of disease collecting the memory of that which gave relief, in a short time produced science from the aggregate. Thus, also, the art of the builder, the brazier, the weaver, and the painter originated, each deriving its subsistence from the manuduction of experience.

Be it so: let us say that science is this, the cus-

tom of the soul with respect to any human works or pursuits. Or does not this also extend to brutes? for sense and experience do not constitute the peculiarity of man; but brutes also perceive and learn something from experience, and thus become partakers of a portion of wisdom. For cranes departing from Egypt in the summer season, in consequence of not being able to endure the heat, extend their wings as if they were sails, and are borne through the air directly to the Scythian lands. As the body of this animal, however, is not adapted to orderly motion, but the middle parts have a gravitating tendency, those about the neck are long, those about the tail light, about the wings slender, and about the feet divided, it fluctuates in flying like a ship in a tempest. The crane, however, knowing this, either from sense or experience, does not begin to fly till she has put a stone into her mouth which may serve her instead of ballast in flying. Stags, too, in the summer season, swim from Sicily into Calabria*, about Rhegium, through the desire of food. As the stag, however, from holding its head above water through such a length of sea must lose its strength, they relieve their weariness as follows: they swim arranged under one as their leader, following each other like an army drawn up in order, each resting his head on the side of the stag that precedes him. But when the leader of the

* I have supplied the word *Calabria* from the version of Paccius.

band is weary he is transferred to the place of the last, and another takes the lead, and another brings up the rear; just as in armies Xenophon brings up the rear, and Chirisophus * is the leader, so that these animals are studious of military arrangement.

May we not, therefore, say, that not sense and experience are the characteristics of man, but that his *peculiarity* is reason? and that science is nothing else than a stability of reason uniformly proceeding to the same object, investigating things allied, distinguishing things dissimilar, comparing such as are similar, conjoining such as are appropriate, dividing such as are confused, separating such as are foreign, co-arranging such as are without arrangement, and harmonizing such as are unharmonized. Such, indeed, are arithmetic, geometry, and music, and other disciplines, which being unindigent of manual operation, have acceded to human conceptions, and received their completion through the force of reason. Homer, indeed, who is a man both ancient and worthy of belief, does not call these the most ancient of the sciences, but admires those alone as wise men,

> " Who public structures raise, or who design;
> Those to whose eyes the gods their ways reveal,
> Or bless with salutary arts to heal;
> But chief to poets such respect belongs †."

* Maximus here alludes to the third book of Xenophon's Expedition of Cyrus, cap. ii. 25. 26.

† Odyss. xvii. ver. 385. The translation by Pope,

O equality of honour! A prophet, therefore, is wise, and an architect is wise, and a physician is wise; and Apollo, Esculapius, and Phemius * are similarly to be honoured. Does not Homer, therefore, ascribe honour to the sciences rather from the invention than the use of them? We must not, however, investigate in this manner, but we should speak as follows: The soul of man is the most easily moved, and the most acute of all things, and being mingled from the mortal and immortal nature, according to its mortal part is coordinated with the brutal nature; for it nourishes † and increases, moves and perceives according to sense. But according to its immortal part it is conjoined with divinity; for it energizes intellectually, reasons and learns, and possesses scientific knowledge. As much, too, of the mortal nature as is conjoined with the immortal, so much of it is called prudence, subsisting as a medium between science and sense. Hence the employment of the soul, so far as it is irrational, is sense; but so far as it

* I have followed the version of Paccius here in preference to the conjectures of Davis and Markland; as it did not appear to me to be *necessary* that Maximus, because he had cited some lines from Homer, in which four artists are mentioned, should immediately after mention all the four. Such conjectures as these are surely nothing more than *hypercriticisms.*

† Markland conjectures that for τρεφει and κινει *it nourishes* and *moves,* we should read in the passive sense τρεφεται και κινειται, *it is nourished* and *moved.* But what need is there, O first of verbalists! of this alteration? for is it not the irrational part of the soul which nourishes and moves the body?

is divine, intellect; and so far as it is human, prudence. And sense, indeed, collects experience, prudence reason, and intellect stable certainty; but the harmony resulting from all these I call science. If, however, what we have said requires an image, let sense subsist according to the manual operation in the tectonic art *, intellect according to geometry, and prudence according to the architectural art, which subsisting as a medium between geometry and the tectonic art, ranks as a certain science with respect to manual operation, but in stable certainty is inferior to geometry.

Science, too, prudence, and experience, are allotted among themselves the powers of man. And experience, indeed, being busily employed about fire and iron, and other all-various material subjects, collects for the necessities of life the opulence of the arts. But prudence, which possesses authority in the passions of the soul, and governs these by the energy of reason, has, indeed, with respect to experience, the relation of science; so far as experience being conversant with a thing which is neither stable nor definite, is fashioned by its dubious nature. Intellect, however, being that which is most honourable and most ruling in the soul, is like law in a city; not, indeed, that law which is written in tables, or engraved in pillars, or established by decrees, or constituted by an assembly, or celebrated by the people, or approved by a court of justice, or ordained by Solon

* *i. e.* The art pertaining to operations in wood.

or Lycurgus; but that law of which divinity is the legislator, a law unwritten, the honour of which does not subsist from suffrage, and the authority of which is innoxious: this alone will be law; but other things which are called laws are false opinions, erroneous and fallacious. By those laws Aristides was exiled, Pericles was fined, and Socrates died; but through this divine law Aristides was just, Pericles good, and Socrates a philosopher. The work of those laws is democracy, courts of justice, assemblies, the fury of the people, the corruption of demagogues by gifts, all-various fortunes, and calamities; but the work of this law is liberty and virtue, a life without pain, and secure felicity. Through the mandates of those laws courts of justice are collected, three-ranked gallies are filled, fleets are equipped, the land is laid waste, the sea is infested with war, Ægina is subverted, Decelia begirt with a wall, Melus * is destroyed, Plateæ is captured, Sicyon enslaved, and Delos obliterated; but through these laws virtue is collected, the soul is filled with disciplines, a house is well inhabited, a city is governed by equitable laws, the land and sea enjoy peace, nothing is sinister, nothing inhuman, nothing barbaric; all things are full of peace and amicable leagues, of science and philosophy, and harmonic reasons.

O laws more ancient than laws! O legislators

* Melus, according to Stephanus, is one of the islands of the Cyclades, and has a city of the same name.

more mild than legislators! to which he who willingly submits himself is free and opulent, and fearless of diurnal laws and stupid judges. If, however, there are some men who act illegally and insolently towards these laws, they suffer punishment, not in consequence of being condemned by the Athenians, or led to prison by the eleven magistrates, or of receiving poison from the executioner, but they are immediately punished from spontaneous and voluntary depravity:

"They to destruction for their crimes are doom'd *."

Alcibiades for transgressing this law was unfortunate, not when the Athenians called him from Sicily, nor when he was devoted by the public cryers and the Eumolpidæ, nor when he fled beyond Attica. These are trifles, these punishments may be easily despised, (for Alcibiades flying was superior to those who stayed at home, since, when exiled, he lived among the Lacedæmonians with renown, surrounded Decelia with a wall, was the friend of Tisaphernes, and the general of the Peloponnesians) but the true punishment of Alcibiades was far more ancient, originating from a more ancient law and more ancient judges. When he left the Lyceum, was condemned by Socrates, and proscribed by philosophy, then Alcibiades was exiled, then he was taken prisoner. O bitter condemnation, implacable execration, and lamentable wandering! The Athenians, indeed, afterwards

* Odyss. i. ver. 7.

entreating received him ; but philosophy, science, and virtue remain inaccessible and irreconcileable to those whom they have once exiled. Such, then, is science, and such is ignorance.

But I also call the laws of Minos science, which Jupiter taught for the space of nine years, which Minos learnt, and which made the race of the Cretans happy. I also call the virtue of Cyrus royal science, which Cyrus, indeed, taught, but neither Cambyses, nor Xerxes learnt. For Cyrus was the leader of the Persians in the same manner as a shepherd of his sheep, preserving and nourishing the flock, warring on the Medes, capturing Babylon, and permitting no barbarous and rapacious wolf to be mingled with the flock. But Cambyses, and afterwards Xerxes, from good shepherds became base wolves, fleecing the flock and expelled from science. I also call the laws of Lycurgus harmonic science.

DISSERTATION XLI.

WHICH ARE THE MORE NOXIOUS DISEASES, THOSE OF THE BODY OR THOSE OF THE SOUL.

A CERTAIN ancient verse is sung in the form of a prayer:

> " Oldest of th' immortal pow'rs!
> Grant, for what remains of life,
> That I, O Health! may dwell with thee *."

But I would ask the maker of the verse, what this health is which he invokes in prayer to come and dwell with him; for I, indeed, suspect that it is a certain divine thing and worthy of prayer; since it would not rashly and casually have been celebrated in song, and still continue to be sung. If, then, it be a thing of this kind, such as I suspect it to be, let reason itself answer us for the poet. For as there are two things in the harmonious composition of man; *viz.* soul and body, if disease was not natural to the soul, this verse would cer-

* This is the beginning of that Pæan which the Sicyonian Ariphron composed in praise of health. The whole of it is extant in Athenæus, lib. xv. p. 702.

tainly be the prayer of the body, which is naturally adapted both to be diseased and to be in a healthy condition. But if both are similarly mingled together by nature for the most beautiful purpose, and at the same time are disturbed through the insolence of the members, when something in them vindicates to itself unjust prerogative, like the people or a tyrant in a city, so that other things are impeded, and the symmetry of both is injured; and if also we denominate both of them avarice, the one of the soul, the other of the body, each with respect to itself being similarly indigent of health; but with respect to its neighbour not being arranged according to equality of appellation; if this be the case, to the symmetry and salvation of which of these two shall we give the name of the most ancient of the blessed immortals? But that we may survey the disease of each from its contrary, and see which is the greater evil to man, let us discuss the whole affair as follows:

Man consists of soul and body, the former of which governs and the latter is governed, in the same manner as in a city. The governor, also, and the governed are similarly parts of the city. This being the case, which of these parts by acting ill injures the city? In a democracy the people is diseased, but Pericles is in an healthy condition, and a good ruler remedies the disease of the people. The Syracusian Dionysius is diseased with a tyrannic distemper, but the people, though healthy, are imbecile with respect to salvation. Are you willing, therefore, to consider the body

as analogous to the people, but the soul as analogous to a potentate? behold, therefore, and compare the resemblance. Is the people to be more esteemed than the governor, and the soul than the body *? The people, however, is stupid, and this is likewise the case with the body. The people is manifold, loquacious, and abundantly passive, and this is also the case with the body. The people is composed from many and all-various dissimilars, and such likewise is the body. The people is a thing rapid in impulse, strong in desires, dissolute in pleasures, sorrowful in pains, severe in anger: and these also are the passions of the body; for it is agitated by desire, is rash, aspires after pleasure, and is impetuous. Let us also compare ruler with ruler: the ruler in a city is most authoritative, most honourable, and most powerful, and the same also may be said of the soul in man. The ruler is naturally most thoughtful and ratiocinative, and this also is true of the soul. The ruler acts from his own authority, and this is likewise the case with the soul. These things, therefore, thus subsisting, which shall we say is the more noxious disease both in man and in a city?

Is not the more excellent part, when diseased, more noxious to the whole? for though the people is sick, yet if the ruler is well the city still preserves its liberty, but if the ruler is sick the city

* I have made this sentence interrogative, the sense, as it appears to me, requiring it.

is enslaved. In short, the soul is more honourable than the body, and the good of that which is more honourable is a greater good. But the contrary to a greater good is a greater evil, and the health of the soul is a greater good than the health of the body. The disease of the soul, therefore, is a greater evil than the disease of the body. The health of the body, indeed, is the work of art, but the health of the soul is the work of virtue. The disease of the soul is depravity, the disease of the body is calamity: depravity is voluntary, calamity involuntary. Things involuntary are the subjects of pity, such as are voluntary of hatred. Assistance too is given to the subjects of pity, but the subjects of hatred are punished: and things to which assistance is afforded are more excellent than those that are punished.

Again, consider health in each of these. The one is unindigent, the other indigent of all things. The one supplies felicity, the other imparts infelicity. The one is without any portion of evil, the other falls into depravity. The one is perpetual, the other diurnal health. The one is stable, the other unstable. The one is immortal, the other mortal. Consider also the diseases. The disease of the body is easily removed by art, the disease of the soul is with difficulty cured by law. The one, through the sorrow which it brings, renders its possessor more obedient to the remedy, but the other, entirely dissolving its possessor, prepares him to despise the laws. The gods afford assistance to the one, but they hate the other.

There are no wars through the disease of the body, but there are many through the disease of the soul. No one through bodily disease acts the part of a sycophant, or plunders sepulchres, or is a robber, or perpetrates any other mighty evil. The disease of the body is noxious only to its possessor, the disease of the soul is noxious also to its neighbour.

Survey, however, what is said more clearly as follows, from a political image. A pestilence invaded Athens under the magistracy of Pericles, a democratic city, flourishing from the multitude of its inhabitants, the magnitude of its dominion, the power of its riches, and the great number of its generals. This pestilence, originating from Æthiopia, descending through the land of *the king*, ended in Athens, where also being established, it destroyed the city. A war from Peloponnesus, also, was combined with the accession of this evil. However, though the land was laid waste, the city destroyed, the bodies of its inhabitants consumed, its power wasted, and the whole country become desperate, yet there was one man, Pericles himself, who was as it were the soul of the city, and who, remaining free from disease and in a healthy condition, raised and renovated the city, and opposed himself both to the pestilence and the war. Survey, likewise, the second image. When the pestilence ceased, the people were restored to health, and power regained its vigour, then the ruling part of the city laboured under a dreadful disease, and which bordered on

insanity: this disease invaded the multitude, and compelled the people to partake of the malady. For did not this people partake of the insanity of Cleon, the disease of Hyperbolus, and the ardour of Alcibiades; and did they not at length waste away, become involved in error, and perish, together with their demagogues? Different persons calling on the miserable city, from different places,

"Approach, dear nymph! and deeds divine survey *."

And Alcibiades, indeed, pointed out to them Sicily, Cleon Sphacteria, and some other a different land or sea, just as if they were showing fountains and wells to a man in a fever. These, O base men! are your divine works, destruction, and subversion, the acme of evils, and the inflammation of disease. This also the disease of the soul is capable of effecting when compared with the disease of the body. The body is diseased, disturbed, and corrupted, but if you place over it as a ruler a robust soul it will pay no attention to the disease and will despise the evil †. In this manner

* Iliad iii. ver. 130.

† The greatest discipline, says Plotinus, in his book on Felicity, always resides with the good man, and is perpetually at hand, and this more so, though he should be placed in the bull of Phalaris, which is ridiculously called pleasant, when twice or frequently pronounced. For what is there pronounced in agony is pronounced by that which is placed in torment, the external and shadowy man, which is far different from the true man (the rational part of the soul) who dwelling by himself, so far as he necessarily resides with himself, never ceases from the contemplation of universal good." See p. 45 of my translation of five books of Plotinus.

Pherecydes despised it when lying in Syrus, his flesh, indeed, being in a corrupt state, but his soul standing erect, and expecting the liberation from this cumbersome vestment.

I, indeed, should say, that neither is the corruption of the body unpleasing to the generous soul. Just as if you conceive a man in chains, who, while he sees the wall of his prison decaying and crumbling in pieces, waits for the egression and liberation from his bonds, that, from the abundant and profound darkness in which he has hitherto been buried, he may survey the ætherial regions and be filled with splendid light. Or do you think that a man who has been well exercised, and who has strenuously laboured with his body, would be disturbed in consequence of his garments being torn; and that he would not willingly throw them away, and deliver his body to the air, the naked to the naked, the friend to the friend, and the free to the free? what else, then, do you think this skin, these bones, and this flesh are to the soul than a diurnal robe and slender and effeminate rags? these the sword cuts, fire liquifies, and ulcers consume. Hence the worthy soul, that has been inured to labour and exercise, desires to be divested of these with the utmost celerity; so that some one, on surveying a generous man diseased in body, may exclaim, in the language of the suitors to Ulysses,

"See what a hip the old-man's rags disclose *!"

* Odyss. xviii. ver. 73.

But the degenerate soul being buried in body, as some sluggish reptile in its place of retreat, loves its den, and is never willing to be liberated from, nor to creep out of it; but when the body is burnt it burns with it, is dilacerated when it is torn in pieces, is pained when it is in pain, and when it bellows exclaims.

"Must I, O foot! then leave thee *?"

says Philoctetes. Leave it, O man! and do not bellow, nor revile your dearest friends, nor disturb the land of the Lemnians:

"O death! of evils the physician †."

If you thus speak, being about to exchange evil for evil, I do not accept the prayer: but if you think in reality that death is the physician of, and liberator from, this evil, insatiable, and diseased thing the body, you think well: pray and invoke the physician.

My discourse, however, brings me to a more manifest example, which I have for some time been desirous of exhibiting to you. For among the Greeks, during the Trojan war, there were myriads of bodies, as numerous

"As leaves and flowers, the progeny of spring ‡,"

all healthy, without disease, strong, and entire,

* From the Philoctetes of Æschylus.

† This, too, is from the Philoctetes of Æschylus. See also the Hippolytus of Euripides.

‡ Iliad ii. ver. 468.

and spreading round the wall of the enemy; yet for nearly the space of ten years they accomplished nothing, neither Achilles by pursuing, nor Ajax by standing firm, nor Diomed by slaughtering, nor Teucer by discharging his arrows, nor Agamemnon by counselling, nor Nestor by speaking, nor Calchas by prophesying, nor Ulysses by his crafty harangues. But divinity said to them: "O beautiful and generous progeny of the Grecian land! ye labour in vain, and in vain pursue, discharge your arrows, and consult; for you will never capture this wall till a man comes as your helper, whose soul is, indeed, robust, but his body diseased, offensive to the smell, lame, and emaciated." The Greeks were obedient to the god, and led from Lemnos a man *, as their associate in battle, whose soul was healthy, but his body diseased.

If you are willing, also, consider the affair by transferring a diseased soul into a healthy body. The soul is distempered with the disease of pleasure, dissolves, and wastes away. What will you do with this diseased man? of what advantage is the body to such a soul? Sardanapalus laboured under this disease. Do you not see that the evil proceeded to the body itself? Hence the miserable man is rubbed and made smooth, wastes away through his eyes, and at length, being no longer

* Philoctetes. See Homer's Iliad, ii. ver. 721. and Hygin. fab. 102.

able to endure the disease, he destroys himself by fire. Alcibiades, also, was diseased: a fire abundant and fierce consumed him, disturbed his reason, so as to render him nearly insane, and impelled him everywhere, from the Lyceum to the assembly of the people, from the assembly to the sea, from the sea to Sicily, from thence to Lacedæmon, afterwards to Persia, from Persia to Samos, from Samos to Athens, from Athens again to the Hellespont, and everywhere. Critias was distempered with a bitter and all-various disease, which could not be cured, and which the whole city could not endure. The bodies, however, of these men were healthy and entire: for Sardanapalus was robust, Alcibiades beautiful, and Critias strong: but I hate the health of these men. Let Critias be so diseased that he may not tyrannize; let Alcibiades be so diseased that he may not lead the Athenians to Sicily; let Sardanapalus be diseased, for it is better that he should die through disease than through pleasure; or, rather, let every one perish into whom depravity flows with a perpetual stream. For as ulcers of a creeping kind, when they attack the body, make continual advances, always corrupt some sound part, and are hostile to remedies, till art cuts away the foundation and seat of the disease; in like manner an ulcerated, corroded, and putrid soul continually infects whatever is proximate to it with its malady. Hence the powers of the body must be cut off and taken away from it, in the same manner as hands from a

robber, eyes from the lascivious, and the belly from the glutton. For, though you should appoint judges, prisons, and executioners for this disease, yet the evil prevails, and creeps, and mocks all such attempts. For the acrimony of depravity is incurable, when it has once occupied the soul, and obtained for its subject-matter fearless licence and unpunished audacity.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

VOL. II.

P. 63. l. 1.—*In the cavern of Trophonius, too.* The following remarkable account of this cavern is given by Pausanias. The narration is peculiarly interesting and valuable, because Pausanias was himself a spectator of what he relates.

" When any one desires to descend into the cave of Trophonius, he must first take up his residence, for a certain number of days, in a building destined to this purpose. This building is a temple of *the Good Dæmon*, and of *Good Fortune*. While he stays here he purifies himself in other respects, and abstains from hot-baths. The river Hercyna is used by him for a bath: and he is well supplied with animal food from the victims which are sacrificed. For he who descends hither sacrifices to Trophonius and his sons; to Apollo, Saturn, and Jupiter the king; to Juno *the chariot-driver*, and to Ceres, whom they call Europa, and who, they say, was the nurse of Trophonius. A diviner is present to each of the sacrifices, who inspects the entrails of the victims, and, while he beholds them, prophesies whether or not Trophonius will propitiously receive the person who consults him. The other victims do not in a similar manner disclose the mind of Trophonius; but each person who descends to him sacrifices, on the night in which he descends, a ram in a ditch, invoking at the same time Agamedes. They pay no regard to the former entrails, even though they should be favourable, unless the entrails of this ram are likewise auspicious. And when it happens that the entrails thus correspond in signification, then the person who wishes to consult Trophonius descends with good hope, and in the following manner:

The sacrificers bring him by night to the river Hercyna, there they anoint him with oil; and two boys belonging to the city, each about thirteen years old, and whom they call Mercuries, wash him, and supply him with every thing necessary.

" He is not immediately after this led by the sacrificers to the oracle, but is first brought to the fountains of the river, which are very near to each other. Here he is obliged to drink of that which is called the water of Lethe, that he may become oblivious of all the former objects of his pursuit. Afterwards he must drink of another water, which is called the water of *Mnemosyne*, that he may remember the objects which will present themselves to his view on descending into the grove. Having, therefore, beheld the statue, which, they say, was made by Dædalus, (and which the priests never show to any but those who desire to consult Trophonius) performed certain religious ceremonies, and prayed, he proceeds to the oracle, clothed in white linen, begirt with fillets, and having on his feet such slippers as are worn by the natives of this place. The oracle is above the grove, in a mountain, and is inclosed with a wall of white stone, whose circumference is very small, and whose altitude is not more than two cubits. Two obelisks are raised on this wall, which, as well as the zones that hold them together, are of brass. Between these there are doors, and within the inclosure there is a chasm of the earth, which was not formed by nature, but was made by art, and is excavated in according proportion with consummate accuracy and skill. The shape of this chasm resembles that of an oven. Its breadth, measured diametrically, may be conjectured to be about four cubits: its depth does not appear to me more than eight cubits. There are no steps to its bottom; but when any one designs to descend to Trophonius they give him a ladder, which is both narrow and light. On descending into this chasm, between its bottom and summit there is a small cavern, the breadth of which is about two spans, and its altitude appears to be about one span.

" He, therefore, who descends to the bottom of this chasm lays himself down on the ground, and holding in his hand sops mingled with honey, first of all places his feet in the small cavern, then hastens to join his knees to his feet; and immediately after the rest of his body, contracted to his knees, is

drawn within the cavern, just as if he was hurried away by the vortex of the largest and most rapid river. But those that have descended to the adytum of this place are not all instructed in the secrets of futurity in the same manner: for one obtains this knowledge by his sight, and another by his hearing; but all return through the same opening, and walk backwards as they return. They say that no one who descended here ever died in the chasm, except one of the spear-bearers of Demetrius, who would not perform any of the established religious ceremonies, and who did not come hither for the purpose of consulting divinity, but that he might enrich himself by carrying away the gold and silver from the adytum. It is also said that his dead body was thrown up by a different avenue, and not through the sacred opening. Other reports are circulated about this man, but those which I have mentioned appear to me to be the most remarkable. When the person that descended to Trophonius returns, the sacrificers immediately place him on a throne, which they call the throne of Mnemosyne, and which stands not far from the adytum. Then they ask him what he has either seen or heard, and afterwards deliver him to certain persons appointed for this purpose, who bring him to the temple of Good Fortune, and the Good Dæmon, while he is yet full of terror, and without any knowledge either of himself, or of those that are near him. Afterwards, however, he recovers the use of his reason, and laughs just the same as before. *I write this, not from hearsay, but from what I have seen happen to others, and from what I experienced myself, when I consulted the oracle of Trophonius.* All too that return from Trophonius are obliged to write in a table whatever they have either heard or seen: and even, at present, the shield of Aristomenes remains in this place." Vol. 3, p. 92, of my translation of Pausanias.

Concerning the dæmon of Socrates, p. 74. Agreeably to our promise, we here present the reader with a copious account of dæmons in general, and of the dæmon of Socrates in particular. The whole of it is derived from ancient sources, and is extracted from vol. 1, of my translation of the works of Plato.

As there is no vacuum in corporeal, so neither in incorporeal natures. Between divine essences therefore, which are the first

of things, and partial essences such as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according to a two-fold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. Hence whatever is ineffable and occult in the gods, dæmons and heroes express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing common with the subjects of their providential energies; and these characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power, and energy. On the other hand the characteristics of partial souls are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itself, and through itself; and these characteristics they also possess acording to essence, power, and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we shall find that those of dæmons are, to contain in themselves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the gods, but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize and absorb, as it were, by their powerful light, whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence they are multiplied indeed, but unitedly, mingled but yet so that the unmingled predominates, and are moved but with stability. On the contrary, heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence under the condition of multitude, motion and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of subordinate predominate in these, over the characteristics of superior natures. In short, dæmons and heroes are composed from the properties of the two extremes—gods and

partial souls; but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.

Having premised thus much, the Platonic reader will, I doubt not, gratefully accept the following admirable account of dæmons in general, and also of the dæmon of Socrates, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus, on the first Alcibiades of Plato.

" Let us now speak, in the first place, concerning dæmons in general; in the next place, concerning those that are allotted us in common; and in the third place concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons, therefore, deriving their first subsistence from the vivific goddess*, and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is more intellectual and more perfect according to hyparxis†; in those of a middle order, it is more rational; and in those which rank in the third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the demoniacal order, it is various, more irrational and more material. Possessing therefore an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction with the gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence they are in one way subservient to the liberated gods* (απολυλοι θεοι) who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there is one division of dæmons, according to the twelve supercelestial gods, and another according to all the idioms of the mundane gods. For every mundane god is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic god, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable an undefiled power; if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities, there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified with the same appellations as their leading gods.

* i. e. Juno. † i. e. The summit of essence.

‡ i. e. Gods who immediately subsist above the mundane deities, and are therefore called supercelestial.

Hence they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expressing the idiom, or peculiarity of their proper deities: and from these, mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different gods; dæmons proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. But the gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons; and through this, last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of things last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle genera too of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the gods, but participated by mortal natures. He therefore will not err who asserts that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of the universe, in dæmons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing supernal streams, elevating all secondary natures to the gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium. We must not therefore assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are the souls of men, that have changed the present life. For it is not proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature *according to habitude* (κατὰ σχεσιν) as the same with a nature *essentially* dæmoniacal, nor to assert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the same, connecting the mundane wholes; but soul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at different times, it chuses different lives. Nor do we praise those, who make certain of the gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic gods, according to Amelius; but we are persuaded by Plato, who calls the gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the herds of dæmons; and we shall every where preserve the doctrine of Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.

In the next place, let us speak concerning the dæmons which are allotted mankind. For of these dæmons which, as we have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine

dæmons, and who often appear as gods, through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For in short, that which is first in every order, preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. Thus the first intellect is a god, and the most ancient of souls is intellectual: and hence of dæmons the highest genus, as being proximate to the gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order, are those dæmons who participate of an intellectual idiom, and preside over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the gods. The third are those who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, and complete the bond of those that receive defluxions from thence. The fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations, which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through this medium? For it is this ultimate middle nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth in order, are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it contains.

Dæmons therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father, to their leading gods: for every god as we have said, is the leader in the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the Demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon, and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons therefore, are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders: and every soul though it revolves together with its leading deity requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. For the most perfect souls who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they chuse a life conformable to their presiding god, so they live according to a di-

vine dæmon, who conjoined them to their proper deity, when they dwelt on high. Hence the Egyptian priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To souls, therefore who live as those that will shortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the dæmon which attends them here; but to more imperfect souls the essential is different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.

If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between gods and men, and as Socrates also evinces, when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the human nature: for, says he, not a human, but a dæmoniacal obstacle detains me. But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.

This also is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he says that intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence, is different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter in Orpheus, calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon, and Plato in the Timæus, calls those gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute the realms of generation, dæmons: "for," says he, "to speak concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature." But a dæmon according to analogy is that which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a god, or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the gods. And the soul, that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα σχεσιν, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those, dæmons, who have lived well, and who, in consequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon, is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor

through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain summit, or flower of essence (hyparxis) by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In short, the rational soul is called in the Timæus the dæmon of the animal. But we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of the animal, as Socrates says in the Phædo. For when the animal is no more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For if the soul possesses that dæmon while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high it governs the whole of our composition.

Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live according to desire, the desiderative part. Nor must it be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as for instance, that reason is the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to desire. For in the first place to assert that dæmons are parts of our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after gods and dæmons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to similar passions. By this accusation therefore it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons who are of a sublimer order than heroes are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things more excellent according to essence give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, and this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life.

The dæmon, therefore, will vary according to these changes: for the energizing part will be different at different times. If therefore, either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the mutation of human life; and the same person will have many dæmons in one life, which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo.

Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual idiom, with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine souls; but the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.

Farther still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding care of a dæmoniacal nature, through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body, we require the aid of a dæmon. Hence Plato, in the Phædrus, calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoetic part. And farther still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he

gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And thus much concerning our allotted dæmons.

In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a dæmon, but also as a god: for in the course of this dialogue he clearly says, "I have long been of opinion that *the god* did not as yet permit me to hold any conversation with you."

He calls the same power, therefore, a dæmon and a god. And in the Apology, he more clearly evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered as ranking in a dæmoniacal nature. And this is what we before said, that the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and anagogic life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal genus, and being the first participitants of the gods. For as is a dæmon among gods, such also is a god among dæmons. But among the divinities the essence is divine; but in dæmons, on the contrary the idiom of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons, they frequently appear as gods. With great propriety, therefore, does Socrates call his dæmon a god: for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the Theætetus and in the Phædrus. And this voice is the signal from the dæmon, which he speaks of in the Theages; and again in the Phædrus, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the dæmon. What then does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice, through which he says the dæmon signified to him his will?

In the first place, we must say, that Socrates through his dia-

noetic power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls; and according to the energy of his dæmon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoetic part alone, nor in his doxastic* powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon, suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident, that reason, imagination, and sense enjoy the same energy differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice, therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal inspiration proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness, (συναισθησις) than by sense: for such are illuminations of good dæmons, and the gods.

In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of Socrates: for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must again be referred to the Socratic life: for it is not a property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say, therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting dæmon.

* i. e. The powers belonging to *opinion*, or that part of the soul which knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.

For the unaptitude of auditors which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity requires a dæmoniacal discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities, can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.

But farther still, it may be said that of dæmons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power; others a generative; others a perfective; and others a demiurgic power: and in short they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each, likewise, according to his essence incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns, and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures: and hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For what else is to recall than to withdraw from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed it appears to me that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titannic multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus: for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity.

P. 101.—*For a fable is a more elegant interpreter of things, &c.* The following account of divine fables, by Proclus, is extracted from the Introduction to the second book of my translation of the Republic of Plato.

Since Socrates accuses the mode of fables, according to which Homer and Hesiod have delivered doctrines concerning the

gods, and prior to these Orpheus, and any other poet who with a divine mouth ενθεω στοματι have interpreted things which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence, it is necessary that we should in the first place show that the disposition of the Homeric fables is adapted to the things which it indicates. For it may be said how can things which are remote from the good and the beautiful, and which deviate from order, how can base and illegal names ever be adapted to those natures whose essence is characterized by the good, and is consubsistent with the beautiful, in whom there is the first order, and from whom all things are unfolded into light, in conjunction with beauty and undefiled power? How then can things which are full of tragical portents, and phantasms which subsist with material natures, and are deprived of the whole of justice, and the whole of divinity, be adapted to such natures as these? For is it not unlawful to ascribe to the nature of the gods, who are exempt from all things through transcendent excellence, adulteries, and thefts, precipitations from heaven, injurious conduct towards parents, bonds, and castrations, and such other particulars as are celebrated by Homer and other ancient poets? But as the gods are separated from other things, are united with *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, and have nothing of the imperfection of inferior natures belonging to them, but are unmingled and undefiled with respect to all things, presubsisting uniformly according to one bound and order; in like manner it is requisite to employ the most excellent language in speaking of them, and such appellations as are full of intellect; and which are able to assimilate us according to their proper order, to their ineffable transcendency. It is also necessary to purify the notions of the soul from material phantasms in the mystic intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, and rejecting every thing foreign and all false opinions, to conceive every thing as small with respect to the undefiled transcendency of the gods, and believe in right opinion alone, and the more excellent spectacles of intellect in the truth concerning the first of essences.

Let no one, therefore, say to us, that such things harmonize with the gods as are adapted to men, nor endeavour to introduce the passions of material irrationality to natures expanded above intellect, and an intellectual essence and life: for these symbols

do not appear similar to the hyparxis* of the gods. It is, therefore, requisite that fables, if they do not entirely wander from the truth inherent in things, should be in a certain respect assimilated to the particulars, the occult theory of which they endeavour to conceal by apparent veils. Indeed, as Plato himself often mystically teaches us divine concerns through certain images, and neither any thing base, nor any representation of disorder, nor material and turbulent phantasm is inserted in his fables, but the intellectual conceptions concerning the gods are concealed with purity, before which the fables are placed like conspicuous statues, and most similar representations of the inward arcane theory; in like manner it is requisite that poets, and Homer himself, if they devise fables adapted to the gods, should reject these multiform compositions, and which are at the same time replete with names most contrary to things, but employing such as regard the beautiful and the good, should through these exclude the multitude from a knowledge concerning the gods, which does not pertain to them, and at the same time employ in a pious manner fabulous devices respecting divine natures.

These are the things, which as it appears to me, Socrates objects to the fables of Homer, and for which, perhaps, some one besides may accuse other poets, in consequence of not admitting the apparently monstrous signification of names. In answer then to these objections we reply that fables fabricate all that apparatus pertaining to them which first presents itself to our view, instead of the truth which is established in the arcana, and employ apparent veils of conceptions invisible and unknown to the multitude. This, indeed, is their distinguishing excellence, that they narrate nothing belonging to natures truly good to the profane, but only extend certain vestiges of the whole mystic discipline, to such as are naturally adapted to be led from these to a theory inaccessible to the vulgar. For these, instead of investigating the truth which they contain, use only the pretext of fabulous devices, and instead of the purification of intellect, follow phantastic and figured conceptions. Is it not,

* Hyparxis signifies the summit of essence; and in all the divinities, except the first god is *the one* considered as participated by essence. See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

therefore, absurd in these men to accuse fables of their own illegitimate conduct, and not themselves for the erroneous manner in which they consider them?

In the next place, do we not see that the multitude are injured by such things as are remarkably venerable and honourable, from among all other things, and which are established in and produced by the gods themselves? For who will not acknowledge that the mysteries and perfective rites lead souls upwards from a material and mortal life, and conjoin them with the gods, and that they suppress all that tumult which insinuates itself from the irrational part, into intellectual illuminations, and expel whatever is indefinite and dark, from those that are initiated, through the light proceeding from the gods? Yet, at the same time nothing can restrain the multitude from sustaining from these all-various distortions, and in consequence of using the good and the powers proceeding from these, according to their perverted habit, departing from the gods, and truly sacred ceremonies, and falling into a passive and irrational life. Those indeed that accuse the mysteries for producing these effects in the multitude, may also accuse the fabrication of the universe, the order of wholes, and the providence of all things, because those that receive the gifts of these, use them badly; but neither is such an accusation holy, nor is it fit that fables should be calumniated on account of the perverted conceptions of the multitude. For the virtue and vice of things are not to be determined from those that use them perversely; but it is fit that every thing should be estimated from its own proper nature, and the rectitude which it contains. Hence the Athenian guest, in the Laws of Plato, is of opinion, that even intoxication ought not to be expelled from a well-instituted city, on account of the views of the multitude, and its corrupt use; for he says it greatly contributes to education, if it is properly and prudently employed. And yet it may be said, that intoxication corrupts both the bodies and souls of those that are subject to it, but the legislator does not, on this account detract from its proper worth, and the aid it affords to virtue.

But if any one accuses fables on account of their apparent depravity, and the base names which they employ, since things of this kind are by no means similar to the divine exemplars of which fables are the images; we reply, in the first place, that

there are two kinds of fables, those adapted to the education of youth, and those full of a divine fury; and which rather regard the universe itself than the habit of those that hear them. In the next place we must distinguish the lives of those that use fables; and we must consider that some are juvenile, and conversant with simple habits, but that others are able to be excited to intellect, to the whole genera of the gods, to their progressions through all things, their series, and their terminations which hasten to be extended as far as to the last of things. This being premised, we must say that the fables of Homer and Hesiod, are not adapted to the education of youth, but that they follow the nature of wholes, and the order of things, and conjoin with true beings, such as are capable of being led to the elevated survey of divine concerns. For the fathers of fables perceiving that nature fabricating images of immaterial and intelligible forms, and diversifying the sensible world with the imitations of these, adumbrated things impartible partibly, but expressed things eternal, through such as proceed according to time, things intelligible through sensibles, that which is immaterial materially, that which is without interval, with interval, and through mutation that which is firmly established, they also, conformably to the nature, and the progression of the phænomena, devising the resemblances and images of things divine in their verses, imitated the transcendent power of exemplars, by contrary and most remote adumbrations. Hence they indicated that which is supernatural in things divine, by things contrary to nature, that which is more divine than all reason, by that which is contrary to reason, and that which is expanded above all partial beauty, by things apparently base. And thus, by an assimilative method, they recalled to our memory the exempt supremacy of divine natures.

Besides this, according to every order of the gods, which beginning from on high, gradually proceeds as far as to the last of things, and penetrates through all the genera of being, we may perceive the terminations of their series exhibiting such idioms as fables attribute to the gods themselves, and that they give subsistence to and are connective of such things as those, through which fables conceal the arcane theory of first essences. For the last of the dæmoniacal genera, and which revolve about matter, preside over the perversion of natural powers, the

baseness of material natures, the lapse into vice, and a disorderly and confused motion. For it is necessary that these things should take place in the universe, and should contribute to fill the variety of the whole order of things, and that the cause of their shadowy subsistence and of their duration should be comprehended in perpetual genera. The leaders of sacred rites perceiving these things, ordered that laughter and lamentations should be consecrated to such-like genera in certain definite periods of time, and that they should be allotted a convenient portion of the whole of the sacred ceremonies pertaining to a divine nature. As, therefore, the art of sacred rites distributing in a becoming manner the whole of piety to the gods and the attendants of the gods, that no part of worship might be omitted, adapted to such attendants, conciliated the divinities by the most holy mysteries and mystic symbols, but called down the gifts of dæmons by apparent passions, through a certain arcane sympathy: in like manner the fathers of these fables, looking, as I may say, to all the progressions of divine natures, and hastening to refer fables to the whole series proceeding from each, established the imagery in their fables, and which first presents itself to the view, analogous to the last genera, and to those that preside over ultimate and material passions; but to the contemplators of true being they delivered the concealed meaning, and which is unknown to the multitude, as declarative of the exempt and inaccessible essence of the gods. Thus every fable is dæmoniacal according to that which is apparent in it, but is divine according to its recondite theory. If these things, then, are rightly asserted, neither is it proper to deprive the fables of Homer of an alliance to things which have a true subsistence, because they are not serviceable to the education of youth; for the end of such fables is not juvenile tuition, nor did the authors of fables devise them looking to this, nor are those written by Plato to be referred to the same idea with those of a more divinely inspired nature, but each is to be considered separately; and the latter are to be established as more philosophic, but the former as adapted to sacred ceremonies and institutions. The latter, likewise, are fit to be heard by youth, but the former by those who have been properly conducted through all the other parts of learning.

Socrates, indeed, sufficiently indicates this to those who are

able to perceive his meaning, and also that he only blames the fables of Homer so far as they are neither adapted to education, nor accord with the restless and simple manners of youth. He, likewise, signifies that the recondite and occult good of fables requires a certain mystic and entheastic (*i. e.* divinely inspired) intelligence. But the multitude not perceiving the meaning of the Socratic assertions, and widely deviating from the conceptions of the philosopher, accuse every such like kind of fables. But it is worth while to hear the words of Socrates, and through what cause he rejects such a mythology: "The young person (says he) is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immoveable. On these accounts care should be taken, above all things, that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue." With great propriety, therefore, do we say that the Homeric fables do not well imitate a divine nature; for they are not useful to legislators for the purposes of virtue and education, nor for the proper tuition of youth, but in this respect, indeed, they do not appear at all similar to things themselves, nor adapted to those that preside over the politic science; but after another manner they harmonize with the gods, and lead those who possess a naturally good disposition to the contemplation of divine natures; and the good which they contain is not disciplinative but mystic, nor does it regard a juvenile but an aged habit of soul. This, also, Socrates himself testifies when he says, "That such fables should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible, after they had sacrificed, not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice." Socrates, therefore, is very far from despising this kind of fables, according to the opinion of the multitude; for he evinces that the hearing of them is co-ordinated with the most holy initiations *, and the most subtle mysteries. For to assert that such fables ought to be used in secret with a sacrifice the *greatest and most perfect*, manifests that the contemplation of them is

* The Eleusinian, which Proclus calls the most holy of the mysteries, are, likewise, always denominated by him τελεῖαι: and Suidas informs us that τελετη signifies a mysterious sacrifice, the *greatest and most honourable*. So that Socrates in the above passage clearly indicates that such fables belong to the most sacred of the mysteries.

mystic, and that they elevate the souls of the hearers to sublime speculations. Whoever, therefore, has divested himself of every puerile and juvenile habit of the soul, and of the indefinite impulses of the phantasy, and who has established intellect as the leader of his life, such a one will most opportunely participate of the spectacles concealed in such-like fables; but he who still requires instruction and symmetry of manners cannot with safety engage in their speculation.

It follows, therefore, according to Socrates himself, that there is a twofold species of fables, one of which is adapted to the instruction of youth, but the other is mystic; one is preparatory to moral virtue, but the other imparts a conjunction with a divine nature; one is capable of benefitting the many, the other is adapted to the few; the one is common, and known to most men, but the other is recondite, and unadapted to those who do not hasten to become perfectly established in a divine nature; and the one is co-ordinate with juvenile habits, but the other scarcely unfolds itself with sacrifices and mystic tradition. If, therefore, Socrates teaches us these things, must we not say that he harmonizes with Homer respecting fables? But he only rejects and reprobates them so far as they appear unadapted to the hypothesis of his discourse, and the narration of the education of youth.

But if it be requisite that legislators should in one way be conversant with mythical fictions, and those who endeavour to cultivate more imperfect habits, but in another way those who indicate by the divinely-inspired intuitive perceptions of intellect the ineffable essence of the gods to those who are able to follow the most elevated contemplations, we shall not hesitate to refer the precipitations of Vulcan to the irreprehensible science concerning the gods, nor the Saturnian bonds, nor the castrations of heaven, which Socrates says are unadapted to the ears of youth, and by no means harmonize with those habits which require juvenile tuition. For, in short, the mystic knowledge of divine natures can never subsist in foreign receptacles. To those, therefore, that are capable of such sublime speculations we must say, that the precipitation of Vulcan indicates the progression of a divine nature from on high, as far as to the last fabrications in sensibles, and this so as to be moved and perfected, and directed by the demiurgus and father of all things. But the Sa-

turnian bonds manifest the union of the whole fabrication of the universe * with the intellectual and paternal supremacy of Saturn. The castrations of heaven obscurely signify the separation of the Titannic † series from the connective ‡ order. By thus speaking we shall, perhaps, assert things that are known, and refer that which is tragical and fictitious in fables to the intellectual theory of the divine genera. For whatever among us appears to be of a worse condition, and to belong to the inferior co-ordination of things, fables assume according to a better nature and power. Thus, for instance, a bond with us impedes and restrains energy, but there it is a contact and ineffable union with causes. A precipitation here is a violent motion from another, but with the gods it indicates a prolific progression and an unrestrained and free presence to all things, without departing from its proper principle, but in an orderly manner proceeding from it through all things. And castrations in things partial and material, cause a diminution of power, but in primary causes they obscurely signify the progression of secondary natures into a subject order from their proper causes; things first at the same time remaining established in themselves undiminished, neither moved from themselves through the progression of these, nor mutilated by their separation, nor divided by their distribution in things subordinate. These things, which Socrates justly says are not fit to be heard by youth, are not on that account to be entirely rejected. For the same thing takes place with respect to these fables which Plato somewhere says happens to divine and all-holy dogmas: for these are ridiculous to the multitude, but to the few who are excited to intellectual energy they unfold their sympathy with things, and through sacred operations themselves procure credibility of their possessing a power connate with all that is divine. For the gods hearing these symbols rejoice, and readily obey those that invoke them, and proclaim the characteristic of their natures through these, as signs domestic and especially known to them. The mysteries, likewise, and the greatest and most perfect of

* Hence, according to the fable, Saturn was bound by Jupiter, who is the demiurgus or artificer of the universe

† The Titans are the ultimate artificers of things.

‡ See the notes to the Cratylus.

sacrifices (τελεταὶ) possess their efficacy in these, and enable the mystics to perceive through these, entire, stable, and simple visions, which a youth by his age, and much more his manners, is incapable of receiving. We must not, therefore, say, that such-like fables do not instruct in virtue; but those that object to them should show that they do not in the highest degree accord with the laws pertaining to sacred rites. Nor must it be said that they dissimilarly imitate divine natures, through obscure symbols; but it it must be shown that they do not prepare for us an ineffable sympathy towards the participation of the gods. For fables which are composed with a view to juvenile discipline should possess much of the probable, and much of that which is decorous in the fabulous, in their apparent forms, but should be entirely pure from contrary appellations, and be conjoined with divine natures through a similitude of symbols. But those fables which regard a more divinely inspired habit, which co-harmonize things last with such as are first through analogy alone, and which are composed with a view to the sympathy in the universe between effects and their generative causes; such fables, despising the multitude, employ names in an all-various manner for the purpose of indicating divine concerns. Since, also, with respect to harmony, we say that one kind is poetic, and which, through melodies exciting to virtue, cultivates the souls of youth, but another divine, which moves the hearers and produces a divine mania, and which we denominate better than temperance: and we admit the former as completing the whole of education, but we reject the latter as not adapted to political administration. Or does not Socrates expel the Phrygian harmony from his Republic, as producing ecstasy in the soul, and on this account separate it from other harmonies which are subservient to education?

As, therefore, harmony is twofold, and one kind is adapted to erudition, but the other is foreign from it; in a similar manner, likewise, is mythology divided, into that which contributes to the proper tuition of youth, and into that which is subservient to the sacred and symbolic invocation of a divine nature. And the one, viz. the method through images, is adapted to those that philosophize in a genuine manner; but the other, which indicates a divine essence through recondite signs, to the leaders of a more mystically-perfective operation; from which Plato

himself also renders many of his peculiar dogmas more credible and clear. Thus in the Phædo he venerates with a becoming silence that recondite assertion, that we are confined in body as in a prison secured by a guard, and testifies according to mysteries the different allotments of the soul when in a pure or impure condition, on its departure to Hades, and again, its habitudes, and the triple paths arising from its essence, and this according to paternal sacred institutions; all which are full of a symbolic theory, and of the ascent and descent of souls celebrated by poets, of dionysiacal signs, what are called Titannic errors, the triviæ and wandering in Hades, and every thing else of this kind. So that Plato does not entirely despise this mode of mythologizing, but considers it as foreign from juvenile tuition, and on this account delivers types of theology commensurate with the manners of those that are instructed.

It likewise appears to me that whatever is tragical, monstrous, and unnatural in poetical fictions, excites the hearers in an all-various manner to the investigation of the truth, attracts us to recondite knowledge, and does not suffer us through apparent probability to rest satisfied with superficial conceptions, but compels us to penetrate into the interior parts of fables, to explore the obscure intention of their authors, and survey what natures and powers they intended to signify to posterity by such mystical symbols *.

Since, therefore, fables of this kind excite those of a naturally more excellent disposition to a desire of the concealed theory which they contain, and to an investigation of the truth established in the adyta †, through their apparent absurdity, but prevent the prophane from busying themselves about things which it is not lawful for them to touch, are they not eminently adapted to the gods themselves, of whose nature they are the interpreters? For many genera are hurled forth before the gods, some of a dæmoniacal and others of an angelic order, who terrify those that are excited to a participation of divinity, who are

* Such fables also call forth our unperverted conceptions of divine natures, in which they efficaciously establish us by untaught sacred disciplines; and, in short, they give perfection to the vital powers of the soul.

† Αδυνατοις is erroneously printed in the original for αδυτοις.

exercised for the reception of divine light, and are sublimely elevated to the union of the gods. But we may especially perceive the alliance of these fables with the tribe of dæmons, whose energies manifest many things symbolically, as those know who have met with dæmons when awake *, or have enjoyed their inspiration in dreams, unfolding many past or future events. For in all such phantasies, after the manner of the authors of fables, some things are indicated by others. Nor of the things which take place through this are some images, but others paradigms, but some are symbols, and others sympathize with these from analogy. If, therefore, this mode of composing fables is dæmoniacal, must we not say that it is exempt from every other variety of fables, as well that which regards nature and interprets natural powers, as that which presides over the instruction of the forms of the soul.

P. 107.—*Whether it be necessary to pray.*—Agreeably to my promise, I shall now present the reader with the conceptions of the most eminent philosophers of the Platonic sect on prayer. The whole is extracted from my Introduction to the translation of the second Alcibiades of Plato. No apology will, I trust, be requisite for the length of these observations, when it is considered that they are not to be equalled in any other writers for their profundity and sublimity, and that, prior to the publication of my translation of Plato, they never appeared in any modern language.

In the first place, then, Porphyry observes †, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it is a conjunction with a divine nature. But the similar loves to be united to the similar; and a worthy man is most similar to the gods. Since those also that cultivate virtue are inclosed in body as in a prison, they ought to pray to the gods that they may depart from hence. Besides, as we are like children torn from our parents, it is proper to pray that we may return to the gods as to our true parents: and because those that do not think it requisite to pray and convert themselves to more excellent natures are like those that are deprived of their fathers and mothers. To which

* For υπερ, as in the original, read υπω.

† Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 64.

we may add, that, as we are a part of the universe, it is fit that we should be in want of it: for a conversion to the whole imparts safety to every thing. Whether, therefore, you possess virtue, it is proper that you should invoke that which causally comprehends * the whole of virtue. For that which is all-good will also be the cause to you of that good which it is proper for you to possess. Or whether you explore some corporeal good there is a power in the world which connectedly contains every body. It is necessary, therefore, that the perfect should thence be derived to the parts of the universe. Thus far Porphyry, who was not without reason celebrated by posterior philosophers for his ἱεροπρεπη νοημαλα, or conceptions adapted to sacred concerns.

Let us now attend to Iamblichus †, whom every genuine Platonist will acknowledge to have been justly surnamed *the divine*.

As prayers, through which sacred rites receive their perfect consummation and vigour, constitute a great part of sacrifice, and as they are of general utility to religion, and produce an indissoluble communion between the divinities and their priests, it is necessary that we should mention a few things concerning their various species and wonderful effects. For prayer is of itself a thing worthy to be known, and gives greater perfection to the science concerning the gods. I say, therefore, that the *first* species of prayer is *collective*, producing a contact with divinity, and subsisting as the leader and light of knowledge. But the *second* is the *bond of consent and communion with the gods*, exciting them to a copious communication of their benefits prior to the energy of speech, and perfecting the whole of our operations previous to our intellectual conceptions. But the *third*, and most perfect species of prayer, is *the seal of ineffable union with the divinities*, in whom it establishes all the power and authority of prayer: and thus causes the soul to repose in the gods, as in a divine and never-failing port. But

* The word used by Porphyry here is προειληφος, which always signifies in Platonic writings *causal comprehension;* or the occult and indistinct prior to the actual and separate subsistence of things. After this manner numbers subsist causally in the monad.

† De Myst. sect. v. cap. 26.

from these three terms, in which all the divine measures are contained, suppliant adoration not only conciliates to us the friendship of the gods, but supernally extends to us three fruits, being as it were three Hesperian apples of gold *. The *first* pertains to *illumination*, the second to *a communion of operation*; but through the energy of the *third* we receive *a perfect plenitude of divine fire*. And sometimes, indeed, supplication *precedes;* like a forerunner preparing the way before the sacrifice appears. But sometimes it *intercedes as a mediator*, and sometimes *accomplishes the end of sacrificing*. No operation, however, in sacred concerns, can succeed without the intervention of prayer. Lastly, the continual exercise of prayer nourishes the vigour of our intellect, and renders the receptacles of the soul far more capacious for the communications of the gods. It likewise is the *divine key*, which unfolds to men the penetralia of the gods, accustoms us to the splendid rivers of supernal light, in a short time perfects our inmost recesses, and disposes them for the ineffable embrace and contact of the gods, and does not desist till it raises us to the summit of all. It likewise gradually and silently draws upwards the manners of our soul, by divesting them of every thing foreign from a divine nature, and clothes us with the perfections of the gods. Besides this, it produces an indissoluble communion and friendship with divinity, nourishes a divine love, and inflames the divine part of the soul. Whatever is of an opposing and contrary nature in the soul it expiates and purifies, expels whatever is prone to generation, and retains any thing of the dregs of mortality in its ætherial and splendid spirit, perfects a good hope and faith concerning the reception of divine light; and, in one word, renders those by whom it is employed the familiars and domestics of the gods. If such, then, are the advantages of prayer, and such its connection with sacrifice, does it not appear from hence that the end of sacrifice is a conjunction with the demiurgus of the world? And the benefit of prayer is of the same extent with the good which is conferred by the demiurgic causes on the race of mortals. Again, from hence the

* This particular respecting the *apples of gold* is added from the version of Scutellius, who appears to have made his translation of Iamblichus from a more perfect manuscript than that which was used by Gale.

anagogic, *perfective, and replenishing* power of prayer appears; likewise how it becomes efficacious and unific, and how it possesses a common bond imparted by the gods. And, in the third and last place, it may easily be conceived from hence how prayer and sacrifice mutually corroborate and confer on each other a sacred and perfect power in divine concerns.

The following translation from p. 64 of Proclus on the Timæus, containing the doctrine of Iamblichus on Prayer, with the elucidations of Proclus, may be considered as an excellent commentary on the preceding observations.

All beings are the progeny of the gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist, and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from the gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the divinities: and this is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself. For a divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all things. Hence, though you consider the last of beings, in these also you will find divinity: for *the one* is everywhere; and in consequence of its absolute dominion every thing receives its nature and coherence from the gods. But as all things proceed, so, likewise, they are not separated from the gods, but radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence: for where can they recede, since the gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace? for whatever is placed as separate from the gods has not any kind of subsistence. But all beings are contained by the gods, and reside in their natures, after the manner of a circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor, indeed, can be separated from the gods; (for all generated natures, when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the wide-spreading immensity of non-being,) but they are after a manner established in the divine natures: and, in fine, they proceed in themselves, but abide in the gods. But since, in consequence of their progression, it is requisite that they should be converted, and return, and imitate the egress and conversion of the gods to their ineffable cause, that the natures thus disposed may again be contained by the gods, and the first

unities, according to a *telesiurgic*, or perfective triad, they receive from hence a certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to the goodness of the gods; that after they have rooted their principle in the divinities, they may again by conversion abide in them, and form as it were a circle, which originates from and terminates in the gods. All things, therefore, both abide in and convert themselves to the gods, receiving this power from the divinities, together with twofold symbols according to essence: the one that they may abide there, but the other that, having proceeded, they may convert themselves: and this we may easily contemplate, not only in souls but also in inanimate natures. For what else ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the symbols which they are allotted by nature, some of which contract a familiarity with *this*, and some with *that* series of gods? For nature supernally depending from the gods, and being distributed from their orders, impresses also in bodies the symbols of her familiarity with the divinities. In some, indeed, inserting solar symbols, but in others lunar, and in others again the occult characters of some other god. And these, indeed, convert themselves to the divinities: some, as it were, to the gods simply, but others as to particular gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of the gods. The Demiurgus of the universe, therefore, by a much greater priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of their being: through the symbol of unity conferring on them stability, but through intellect affording them the power of conversion.

And to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility: for it conciliates the beneficence of the gods through those ineffable symbols which the Father of the Universe has disseminated in souls. It likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is addressed; copulates the intellect of the gods, with the discourses of those who pray; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend good, and produces in us a firm persuasion, that they will abundantly impart to us the beneficence which they contain: and, lastly, it establishes in the gods whatever we possess.

But to a perfect and true prayer there is required, first, a

knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches: for neither will any one accede in a proper manner unless he intimately beholds their distinguishing properties: and hence it is that the oracle * admonishes, *that a fiery intellection obtains the first order in sacred veneration.* But afterwards there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine: and this accompanied with all *purity, chastity, discipline, and order.* For thus while we present ourselves to the gods, they will be provoked to beneficence, and our souls will be subjected to theirs, and will participate the excellencies of a divine nature. In the third place, a certain contact is necessary, from whence, with the more exalted part of the soul, we touch the divine essence, and verge to a union with its ineffable nature. But there is yet farther required an accession and inhesion, (for thus the oracle calls it, while it says, *the mortal adhering to fire will possess a divine light,)* from whence we receive a greater and more illustrious part of the light proceeding from the gods. In the last place, a union succeeds with the unity of the gods, restoring and establishing unity to the soul, and causing our energy to become one with divine energy: so that in this case we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed as it were in the nature of the gods; and, residing in divine light, are entirely surrounded with its splendor. And this is, indeed, the best end of prayer, the conjunction of the soul's conversion, with its permanency: establishing in unity whatever proceeds from the divine unities, and surrounding our light with the light of the gods.

Prayer, therefore, is of no small assistance to our souls in ascending to their native region: nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of that good which proceeds from prayer, but the very contrary takes place; since prayer is not only the cause of our ascent and reversion, but with it is connected piety to the gods, that is, the very summit of virtue. Nor, indeed, ought any other to pray than he who excels in goodness: (as the Athenian guest in Plato admonishes us) for to such a one, while enjoying by the exercise of prayer familiarity with the gods, an efficacious and easy way is prepared for the enjoyment of a blessed life. But the contrary succeeds to the vicious:

* Viz. One of the Chaldean Oracles.

since it is not lawful for purity to be touched by impurity. It is necessary, therefore, that he who generously enters on the exercise of prayer should render the gods propitious to him, and should excite in himself divine conceptions, full of intellectual light: for the favour and benignity of more exalted beings is the most effectual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requisite, without intermission, to dwell in the veneration of divinity: for, according to the poet, *the gods are accustomed to be present with the mortal constantly employed in prayer.* It is, likewise, necessary to preserve a stable order of divine works, and to produce those virtues which purify the soul from the stains of generation, and elevate her to the regions of intellect, together with *faith, truth, and love:* to preserve this triad, and hope of good, this immutable perception of divine light, and seggregation from every other pursuit; that thus solitary, and free from material concerns, we may become united with the solitary unities of the gods: since he who attempts by multitude to unite himself with unity acts preposterously, and dissociates himself from divinity. For as it is not lawful for any one to conjoin himself by that which is not with that which is; so neither is it possible with multitude to be conjoined with unity. Such, then, are the consequences primarily apparent in prayer; viz. that its essence is the cause of associating our souls with the gods; and that on this account it unites and copulates all inferior with all superior beings. For, as the great *Theodorus* * says, *all things pray, except the FIRST.*

But the perfection of prayer, beginning from more common goods, ends in divine conjunction, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine light. And its efficacious and vigorous energy both replenishes us with good, and causes our concerns to be common with those of the gods. We may also rationally suppose that the causes of prayer, so far as they are *effective,* are the vigorous and efficacious powers of the gods, converting and calling upwards the soul to the gods themselves. But that, so far as they are *perfective,* they are the immaculate goods of the soul, from the reception of which souls are established in the gods. And again, that, so far as they are *paradigmatical,* they are the primary fabricating causes of beings; proceeding from

* Viz. Theodorus Asinœus, a disciple of Porphyry.

the good, and conjoined with it by an ineffable union. But that, so far as they are *formal*, or possess the proportion of forms, they render souls similar to the gods, and give perfection to the whole life of the soul. Lastly, so far as they are *material*, or retain the proportion of matter, they are the marks, or symbols, conferred by the Demiurgus on the essences of souls, that they may be wakened to a reminiscence of the gods, who produced both them and whatever else exists.

But we may also describe the modes of prayer, which are various, according to the genera and species of the gods. For of prayers, some are *operative*, others *of a purifying nature;* and others, lastly, are vivific. I call those *operative* which are offered for the sake of showers and winds. For the operative gods (δημιουργοὶ) are also the causes of these: on which account it is customary with the Athenians to pray to such divinities, for the sake of obtaining winds, procuring serenity of weather. But I call those prayers, of a *purifying nature*, which are instituted for the purpose of averting diseases, originating from pestilence and other contagious distempers: such as are written in our temples. And, lastly, those prayers are *vivific*, with which we venerate the gods, who are the causes of vivification, on account of the origin and maturity of fruits. Hence it is that prayers are of a perfective nature, because they elevate us to these divine orders: and those who consider such prayers in a different manner do not properly apprehend in what their nature and efficacy consists. But, again, with respect to the things for which we pray; those which regard the *safety of the soul* obtain the first place: those which pertain to *the proper disposition and strength of body* the second: and those claim the last which pertain to external concerns. And, lastly, with respect to the distribution of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the seasons of the year, or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish multiform prayers according to other such-like conceptions.

With the above admirable passage the following extract from Iamblichus de Myst. sect. i. cap. 12. may be very properly conjoined. Its design is to shew that the gods are not agitated by passions, though they appear to be moved through the influence of prayer.

Prayers are not to be directed to the gods as if they were

passive, and could be moved by supplications: for the divine irradiation, which takes place through the exercise of prayer, operates spontaneously, and is far remote from all material attraction; since it becomes apparent through divine energy and perfection, and as much excels the voluntary motion of our nature as the divine will of *the good* surpasses our election. Through this volition, the gods, who are perfectly benevolent and merciful, pour their light without any parsimony on the supplicating priests, whose souls they call upwards to their own divine natures, impart to them a union with themselves, and accustom their souls, even while bound in body, to separate themselves from its dark embrace, and to be led back by an ineffable energy to their eternal and intelligible original. Indeed it is evident that the safety of the soul depends on such divine operations. For while the soul contemplates divine visions it acquires another life, employs a different energy, and may be considered with the greatest propriety as no longer ranking in the order of man. For it often lays aside its own proper life, and changes it for the most blessed energy of the gods. But if an ascent to the gods, through the ministry of prayer, confers on the priests, purity from passion, freedom from the bonds of generation, and a union with a divine principle, how can there be any thing passive in the efficacy of prayer? For invocation does not draw down the pure and impassive gods to us, who are passive and impure; but, on the contrary, renders us, who are become through generation impure and passive, immutable and pure.

But neither do invocations conjoin through passion the priests with the divinities, but afford an indissoluble communion of connection, through that friendship which binds all things in union and consent. Nor do invocations incline the intellect of the gods towards men, as the term seems to imply; but, according to the decisions of truth, they render the will of men properly disposed to receive the participations of the gods; leading it upwards, and connecting it with the divinities by the sweetest and most alluring persuasion. And on this account the sacred names of the gods, and other divine symbols, from their anagogic nature, are able to connect invocations with the gods themselves.

And in chap. 15, of the same section, he again admirably discourses on the same subject as follows:

That which in our nature is divine, intellectual, and one, or (as you may be willing to call it) intelligible, is perfectly excited by prayer from its dormant state; and when excited vehemently seeks that which is similar to itself, and becomes copulated to perfection itself. But if it should seem incredible that incorporeal natures can be capable of hearing sounds, and it is urged, that for this purpose the sense of hearing is requisite, that they may understand our supplications; such objectors are unacquainted with the excellency of primary causes, which consists in both knowing, and comprehending in themselves at once, the universality of things. The gods, therefore, do not receive prayers in themselves through any corporeal powers or organs, but rather contain in themselves the energies of pious invocations; and especially of such as through sacred cultivation are consecrated and united to the gods: for in this case a divine nature is evidently present with itself, and does not apprehend the conceptions of prayers as different from its own. Nor are supplications to be considered as foreign from the purity of intellect: but since the gods excel us both in power, purity, and all other advantages, we shall act in the most opportune manner by invoking them with the most vehement supplications. For a consciousness of our own nothingness, when we compare ourselves with the gods, naturally leads us to the exercise of prayer. But, through the benefits resulting from supplication, we are in a short time brought back to the object of supplication, acquire its similitude from intimate converse; and gradually obtain divine perfection instead of our own imbecility and imperfection.

Indeed, he who considers that sacred prayers are sent to men from the gods themselves, that they are certain symbols of the divine natures; and that they are only known to the gods, with whom, in a certain respect, they possess an equal power: I say, he who considers all this cannot any longer believe that supplications are of a sensible nature, and that they are not very justly esteemed intellectual and divine, and must acknowledge it to be impossible that any passion should belong to things, the purity of which the most worthy manners of men cannot easily equal.

Nor ought we to be disturbed by the objection, which urges, that material things are frequently offered in supplications; and

this as if the gods possessed a sensitive and animal nature. For, indeed, if the offerings consisted solely of corporeal and composite powers, and such as are only accommodated to organical purposes, the objection would have some weight: but since they participate of incorporeal forms, certain proportions, and more simple measures; in this alone the correspondence and connection of offerings with the gods ought to be regarded. For whenever any affinity and similitude is present, whether greater or less, it is sufficient to the connection of which we are now discoursing: since there is nothing which approaches to a kindred alliance with the gods, though in the smallest degree, to which the gods are not immediately present and united. A connection, therefore, as much as is possible subsists between prayers and the gods: at the same time prayers do not regard the divinities as if they were of a sensitive or animal nature; but they consider them as they are in reality, and according to the divine forms which their essences contain.

In the third place, let us attend to the admirable observations on prayer of Hierocles, who, though inferior in accuracy and sublimity of conception to Iamblichus and Proclus; yet, as Damascius well observes, (in his life of Isidorus apud Phot.) he uncommonly excelled in his dianoëtic part, and in a venerable and magnificent fluency of diction. The following is a translation of his comment on the Pythagoric verse:

——— Αλλ' ερχευ επ' εργον
Θεοίσεν επευξαμενος τελεσαι.

i. e. "Betake yourself to the work, having implored the gods to bring it to perfection."

The verse briefly describes all that contributes to the acquisition of good; viz. the self-moved nature of the soul, and the co-operation of divinity. For though the election of things beautiful * is in our power, yet as we possess our freedom of the will from divinity, we are perfectly indigent of his co-operating with and perfecting the things which we have chosen. For our endeavour appears to be similar to a hand extended to the reception of things beautiful; but that which is imparted by divi-

* By things beautiful, with Platonic writers, every thing excellent and good is included.

nity is the supplier and the fountain of the gift of good. And the former, indeed, is naturally adapted to discover things beautiful, but the latter to unfold them to him by whom they are rightly explored. But prayer is the medium between two boundaries; viz. between investigation by us and that which is imparted by divinity, properly adhering to the cause which leads us into existence and perfects us in well-being. For how can any one receive well-being unless divinity imparts it: and how can divinity, who is naturally adapted to give, give to him who does not ask, though his impulses arise from the freedom of his will? That we may not, therefore, pray only in words, but may also corroborate this by deeds; and that we may not confide only in our own energy, but may also beseech divinity to co-operate with our deeds, and may conjoin prayer to action, as form to matter; and, in short, that we may pray for what we do, and do that for which we pray, the verse conjoining these two says, "Betake yourself to the work, having implored the gods to bring it to perfection." For neither is it proper alone to engage with alacrity in beautiful actions, as if it were in our power to perform them with rectitude, without the co-operation of divinity; nor yet should we be satisfied with the words of mere prayer, while we contribute nothing to the acquisition of the things which we request. For thus, we shall either pursue atheistical virtue (if I may be allowed so to speak) or unenergetic prayer; of which the former, being deprived of divinity, takes away the essence of virtue, and the latter, being sluggish, dissolves the efficacy of prayer. For how can any thing be beautiful which is not performed according to the divine rule? and how is it possible that what is done according to this should not entirely require the co-operation of divinity to its subsistence? For virtue is the image of divinity in the rational soul; but every image requires its paradigm in order to its generation, nor is that which it possesses sufficient unless it looks to that from the similitude to which it possesses the beautiful. It is proper, therefore, that those should pray who hasten to energetic virtue, and, having prayed, that they should endeavour to possess it. It is, likewise, requisite that they should do this, looking to that which is divine and splendid, and should extend themselves to philosophy, adhering at the same time, in a becoming manner, to the first cause of good. For that te-

tractys *, the fountain of perennial nature, is not only the eternal cause of being to all things, but likewise of well-being, expanding proper good through the whole world, like undecaying and intellectual light. But the soul, when she properly adheres to this light, and purifies herself like an eye to acuteness of vision, by an attention to things beautiful is excited to prayer; and, again, from the plenitude of prayer she extends her endeavours, conjoining actions to words, and by divine conferences giving stability to worthy deeds. And discovering some things, and being illuminated in others, she endeavours to effect what she prays for, and prays for that which she endeavours to effect. And such, indeed, is the union of endeavour and prayer.

In the last place, the pseudo Dionysius has decorated his book on the Divine Names with the following admirable observations on prayer, stolen † from writers incomparably more sublime than any of the age in which he pretended to have lived:

Divinity is present to all things, but all things are not present to him; but when we invoke him with all-sacred prayers, an unclouded intellect, and an aptitude to divine union, then we also are present to him. For he is neither in place, that he may absent from any thing, nor does he pass from one thing to another. But, indeed, to assert that he is in all things, falls far short of that infinity which is above, and which comprehends all things. Let us, therefore, extend ourselves by prayer to the more sublime intuition of his divine and beneficent rays. Just as if a chain, consisting of numerous lamps, were suspended

* This *tetractys*, which is the same as the *Phanes* of Orpheus, and the αυτοζωον, or *animal itself*, of Plato, first subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order, and is thence participated by Jupiter the fabricator of the universe. See my introduction to the Timæus.

† Fabricius, in the fourth volume of his Bibliotheca Græca, has incontestably proved that this Dionysius lived several hundred years after the time of St. Paul; and observes, that his works are, doubtless, composed from Platonic writings. In confirmation of this remark, it is necessary to inform the learned reader, that the long discourse on Evil, in the treatise of Dionysius, περι θειων ονοματων, appears to have been taken almost verbatim from one of the lost writings of Proclus on the subsistence of Evil, as will be at once evident by comparing it with the Excerpta from that work, preserved by Fabricius in Biblioth. Græc. tom. viii. p. 502.

from the summit of heaven, and extended to the earth. For if we ascended this chain, by always alternately stretching forth our hands, we should appear, indeed, to ourselves to draw down the chain, though we should not in reality, it being present upwards and downwards, but we should elevate ourselves to the more sublime splendors of the abundantly luminous rays. Or as if we ascended into a ship, and held by the ropes * extended from a certain rock to us, and which were given to us for our assistance; we should not in this case draw the rock to us, but we in reality should move both ourselves and the ship to the rock. Just as, on the contrary, if any one standing in a ship pushes against a rock fixed in the sea, he, indeed, effects nothing in the firm and immoveable rock, but causes himself to recede from it: and by how much the more he pushes against, by so much the more is he repelled from the rock. Hence, prior to every undertaking, and especially that which is theological, it is necessary to begin from prayer, not as if drawing down that power which is everywhere present, and is at the same time nowhere, but as committing and uniting ourselves to it by divine recollections and invocations.

P. 144.—*The sacred rites of Bacchus are celebrated in the spring*, &c. The following account of the festivals of the ancients, from the Descriptions of Libanius, represents to us the liberal, philanthropic, and hospitable spirit of Paganism in the most amiable point of view, and naturally leads the truly benevolent mind to regret that such philanthropy has been for so long

* This part is evidently stolen from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Epictetus, as is evident from the following extract: Ταυτην την ημων επιστροφην προς αυτον (Θεον) ως αυτου προς ημας λεγομεν· τοιουτον τι παχοντες, οιον οι πειρας τινος παραλιας καλων εξαψαντες, και τω εκεινον επισπασθαι εαυτους τε και το ακατιον τη πειρα προσαγοντες. και δι' απειριαν του γινομενου δοκουντες ουκ αυτοι προσιεναι τη πειρα, αλλα την πειραν καθ' ολιγον επ' αυτους ιεναι. μεταμελειαι δε, και ικετειαι, και ευχαι, και τα τοιαυτα, αναλογουσι τω καλω, p. 223, octavo. *i. e.* "We speak of this our conversion to divinity, as if it was a conversion of him to us; being affected in somewhat the same manner as those, who, fastening a rope to a certain rock in the sea, and drawing both themselves and the boat to the rock by pulling it, appear, through their ignorance of this circumstance, not to approach themselves to the rock, but think that the rock gradually approaches to them. For repentance, supplication, prayer, and things of this kind, are analogous to the rope."

a period banished from the earth; that the essence of divinity is no longer considered as essentially necessary to the splendor of festivity; and that a festival at present is every thing but a solemnity.

"Solemn festivals when approaching produce desire in the human race, when present they are attended with pleasure, and when past with recollection: for remembrance places men very near the transactions themselves. The recollection also possesses a certain advantage. For in speaking of solemn festivals it is also necessary to speak concerning the gods in whose honour they are instituted. Men prepare themselves for these festivals when they approach with joy. The multitude, indeed, procure such things as may furnish them with a splendid entertainment, but the worthy those things by which they may reverence the gods. Cattle and wine, and whatever else is the produce of the fields, are brought from the country. Garments also are purified; and every one is anxious to celebrate the festival in perfection. Those that are in want of garments are permitted to borrow such as are requisite to adorn themselves on this occasion from those that have abundance. When the appointed day arrives the priests open the temples, pay diligent attention to the statues; and nothing is neglected which contributes to the public convenience. The cities too are crowded with a conflux of the neighbouring inhabitants, assembled to celebrate the festival; some coming on foot, and others in ships.

"At sun-rise they enter the temples in splendid garments, worshipping that divinity to whom the festival is sacred. Every master of a house, therefore, precedes bearing frankincense: a servant follows him carrying a victim; and children walk by the side of their parents, some very young, and others of a more advanced age, already perceiving the strong influence of the gods. One having performed his sacrifice departs; another approaches to perform it. Numerous prayers are everywhere poured forth, and words of good omen are mutually spoken. With respect to the women, some offer sacrifices in the temples, and others are satisfied with beholding the crowd of those that sacrifice. When such things as pertain to the divinities are properly accomplished, the tables follow, at which hymns are sung in praise of the god who is honoured in the festival. So-

cial drinking suceeeds, with songs, which are partly serious and partly jocose, according to the different dispositions of the company. Some, likewise, feast in the temples, and others at home; and citizens request strangers to partake with them of the banquet. In the course of drinking, ancient friendships are rendered more firm, and others receive their commencement. After they have feasted, rising from table, some take the strangers, and show them whatever is worthy to be seen in the city, and others sitting in the forum gaily converse. No one is sorrowful, but every countenance is relaxed with joy. The exaction of debts gives place to festivity, and whatever might cause affliction is deferred to another time. Accusations are silent, and the judge does not pass sentence; but such things as produce pleasure alone flourish. The slave is not afraid of blows from his master, and pedagogues are mild to youth.

" In the evening they sup splendidly, at which time there are so many torches that the city is full of light. There are also many revellers, and various flutes, and the sound of pipes is heard in the narrow streets, accompanied with sometimes the same, and sometimes different songs. Then to drink even to intoxication is not perfectly disgraceful; for the occasion in a certain respect appears to take away the opprobrium. On the following day the divinity is not neglected; but many of those that worshipped on the preceding day do not again come to the shows. Those that contend in the composition of verses attend on this, but those with whom the contest is in the scenes on the preceding day. The third day also is not far short of these; and pleasure and hilarity are extended with the time of the festival. When the solemnity ends, prayers are offered for futurity, that they, their children, and families, may again be spectators of it; after which the strangers depart, and the citizens accompany them."

The same author, likewise, in his account of the Calends observes as follows: " This festival is extended as far as the dominion of the Romans; and such is the joy it occasions, that if it were possible time could be hastened for mortals, which, according to Homer, was effected by Juno respecting the sun, this festival also would be hastened by every nation, city, house, and individual of mankind. The festival flourishes on every

hill and mountain, and in every lake and navigable river. It also flourishes in the sea, if at that time it happens to be undisturbed by tempest: for then both ships and merchants cut through its waves and celebrate the festival. Joy and feasting everywhere abound. The earth is then full of honours, in consequence of men honouring each other by gifts and hospitality. The foot-paths and the public roads are crowded with men, and four-footed animals bearing burdens subservient to the occasion; and the ways in the city are covered, and the narrow streets are full. Some are equally delighted with giving and receiving; but others, though they do not receive any thing, are pleased with giving, merely because they are to give. And the spring by its flowers, indeed, renders the earth beautiful, but the festival by its gifts, which, pouring in from every place, are everywhere diffused. He, therefore, who asserts that this is the most pleasant part of the year will not err; so that if the whole time of life could be passed in the same manner, the islands of the blest would not be so much celebrated by mankind as they are at present. The first appearance of the swallow is, indeed, pleasant, yet does not prevent labour; but this festival thinks proper to remove from the days of its celebration every thing laborious, and permits us to enjoy minds free from molestation. These days free the youth from twofold fears, one arising from their preceptors, the other from their pedagogues. They also make slaves as much as possible free, and exhibit their power even in those in chains, removing sorrow from their countenances, and exciting some of them to mirth. They can also persuade a father who expects the death of his son, and through sorrow is wasting away, and averse to nourishment, to be reconciled to his condition, to abandon darkness, lay aside his squalid appearance, and betake himself to the bath: and what the most skilful in persuasion are unable to accomplish, that the power of the festival effects. It also conciliates citizen with citizen, stranger with stranger, one boy with another, and woman with woman. It likewise instructs men not to be avaricious, but to bring forth their gold, and deposit it in the right-hands of others." He concludes with observing, that the altars of the gods in his time did not possess all that they did formerly, this being forbidden by the law of the Christians; but that before this prohibition much fire, blood, and fume of sacrifice ascended to heaven

from every region, so that the banquets in honour of the gods were then splendid during the festival."

The most remarkable circumstance in these festivals was the cause of this universal joy, which was no other than the firm persuasion that divinity was then present and propitious, as is evident from the following beautiful passage from Plutarch, in the treatise in which he shows that pleasure is not attainable according to Epicurus: "Neither the discourses (says he) of those that wait in the temples, nor the seasons of solemn festivals, nor any other actions or spectacles, delight us more than those things which we ourselves do concerning the gods, when we celebrate orgies, or join in the dance, or are present at sacrifices, or the greatest of the mysteries. For then the soul is not sorrowful, abject, and languid, as if conversing with certain tyrants, or dire avengers, which it is reasonable to suppose she then would be; but where she especially thinks and rationally conceives divinity is present, there she especially banishes sorrow and fear, and care, and lets herself loose even to intoxication, frolic, and laughter. In amorous concerns, indeed, as the poet once said,

> 'Remembrance of the joys that Venus gave
> Will fire the bosom of the aged pair.'

But in public processions and sacrifices not only the old man and the old woman, not only the poor and the plebeian, but also

> 'The dusty thick-legg'd drab that turns the mill,'

and household slaves and hirelings are elevated with joy and gladness. Banquets and public entertainments are given both by the wealthy and kings; but those which take place at sacrifices and solemnities, *when, through inspiration, we appear to approach very near to a divine nature,* are attended with much greater joy and pleasure, in conjunction with honour and veneration. Of this the man who denies a providence has no portion. For it is not the abundance of wine, nor the roasting of meat, which gives delight in solemn festivals; but *the good hope and belief that divinity is propitiously present, and gratefully receives what is done.* From some of our festivals we exclude the flute and the crown; but *when*

divinity is not present at the sacrifice, as the solemnity of the banquet, the rest is impious, is void of festivity, and possesses nothing of divine fury."

Ουτε διατριβαι των εν ιεροις, ουτε καιροι των εορτασμων, ουτε πραξεις, ουτε οψεις ευφραινουσιν ἑτεραι μαλλον ὠν ορωμεν ἢ δρωμεν αυτοι περι θεων, οργιαζοντες, ἢ χορευοντες, ἢ θυσιαις παροντες, ἢ τελεταις. ὁ γαρ ὡς τυραννοις τισιν ἢ θειοις κολαξαις ομιλουσα τηνικαυτα ἢ ψυχη περιλυπος εστι και ταπεινη και δυσθυμος, ὁπερ εικος ην· αλλ' ὁπου μαλιστα δοξαζει και διανοειται παρειναι τον θεον, εκει μαλιστα λυπας και φοβους, και το φροντιζειν απωσαμενη τῳ ηδομενῳ μεχρι μεθης και παιδιας και γελωτος, αφιησιν ἑαυτην. Εν τοις ερωτικοις ὡς ὁ ποιητης ειρηκε,

> "Και τε γερων και γρηυς, επην χρυσης Αφροδιτης
> Μνησωνται, και τισιν επηρδη φιλον ητορ."

Εν δε πομπαις και θυσιαις ου μονον γερων και γρηϋς, ουδε, πενης, και ιδιωτης, αλλα και παχυσκελης αλειρις προς μυλην κινουμενη, και οικοτριβες και θητες ὑπο γηθους και χαρμοσυνης αναφερονται· πλουσιοις τε και βασιλευσιν εστιασεις και παιδαισιαι λιτες παρεισιν. αι δ ἐφ ἱεροις και θυηπολιαις, και οταν εγκυρσα του θειου τῃ επινοιᾳ φαυειν δοκωσι, μετα τιμης και σεβασμου πολυ διαφερουσαν ηδονην και χαριν εχουσιν. παυλης ουδεν ανδρι μετεστιν απεγνωκοτι της προνοιας. ου γαρ οινου πληθος, ουδε οπλησις κρεων το ευφραινον εστιν εν ταις εορταις, αλλα και ελπις αγαθη και δοξα του παρειναι τον θεον ευμενη, και δεχεσθαι τα γινομενα κεχαρισμενως· αυλον μεν γαρ ετερων εορτων και στεφανον αφαιρουμεν, θεου δε θυσιᾳ μη παροντος, ὡσπερ ἱερον δοχης, αθεον εστι και ανεορταστον και ανενθουσιαστον το λειπομενον, μαλλον δε ὁλον ατερπες αυλῳ και λυπηρον. The same author also observes, in his Treatise on Superstition, "that holydays, temple-feasts, the being initiated in mysteries, processions, with public prayers and solemn devotions, were considered as the most agreeable things in human life."

FINIS.

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