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
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
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The book cover is dark with a fine, repeating diagonal ribbed texture. It features an embossed floral design consisting of two symmetrical branches of leaves and flowers, one in the upper half and one in the lower half, framing the central text.

CATECHETICAL HELP
TO
BUTLER'S ANALOGY.







A

CATECHETICAL HELP

TO

BISHOP BUTLER'S ANALOGY.

BY THE

REV. CAMPBELL GREY HULTON, M.A.,

BRAZENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD.

“No doubt *Butler's Analogy* is as fit to be put into the hands of men, whose minds are to be exercised, and who are to be taught the process of reasoning, as any book that can well be pointed out.”—*Lord John Russell's Speech on the University Commission*, 1854.

THIRD EDITION.

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

A *New Edition* having been called for, the Author would observe that he has still adhered to the resolution of not adding any notes or comments, &c. *Each student should do this for himself.* He has merely reprinted the former Edition, so that the present one may be available in the same Colleges and Schools where the work is used. In conclusion, the Author would express his sincere thanks for many notices of approval which the work has received, and which assure him that it has been, not in *name* only but really, a "Help" to the thorough understanding of the Analogy.

Emberton Rectory,
Newport Pagnel,
Buckinghamshire.

FEB. 10th, 1859.

INTRODUCTION.

CONTENTS.

PROBABLE Evidence—its Nature, Foundation, and Use. Reasoning from Probable Evidence or Analogical Reasoning Justified. Instances of Good and Bad Reasoning. What Data are assumed in the work. The Work itself—its Nature and Scope.

DEGREES OF PROBABLE EVIDENCE.

STATE the difference between Probable and Demonstrative evidence.—*A*. Probable evidence admits of degrees; Demonstrative evidence does not.

Of what degrees does Probable evidence admit?—*A*. Of every variety; from the slightest possible presumption, to the highest moral certainty.

Show that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability.—*A*. Because such low presumption, oft repeated, will amount to a probability.

To what may it at last amount?—*A*. To the highest moral certainty.

Illustrate this.—*A*. The first sight of the tide would afford some sort of *presumption*, though the lowest imaginable, that it would happen again, but the observation of this event for so many days and months and ages together, as has been observed by mankind, gives us a full *assurance* that it will.

FOUNDATION OF PROBABLE EVIDENCE.

What is the foundation of probable evidence?—*A.* Likeness.

When do we conceive a thing or event to be probably true?—

A. When it is *like* some other thing or event which we have *observed* to come to pass.

What regulates, then, our expectation as to the occurrence of an event?—*A.* Our *observation* that the *like* event has *sometimes, most commonly, or always* happened.

What three degrees of probability will accordingly be formed?—*A.* We shall have a *presumption, an opinion, or a moral certainty* that it will occur.

On what depend the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits?—*A.* On our having *observed the like*, either with respect to others or ourselves.

Why do we expect that others will act so-and-so in such circumstances?—*A.* Because we have *observed the like* with respect to others or ourselves.

And why do we judge that such actions proceed from such principles?—*A.* Because we have *observed that similar* actions have proceeded from such principles, either with respect to others or ourselves.

On what, then, does probability depend?—*A.* On the extent of our *observation*.

Illustrate this.—*A.* The Prince who had always lived in a warm climate concluded that there was no such thing as water becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from *analogy* conclude that it is *supposable* that there may be *frost* in England any given day in January next, *probable* that there will be on some day of the month, and a *moral certainty* that there will be in some part or other of the winter.

PROBABLE EVIDENCE—ITS USE.

What kind of information is obtained by probable evidence?—

A. Only an imperfect kind of information.

To what kind of beings does it relate?—*A.* To beings of a limited capacity.

Why cannot anything be probable to an Infinite Intelligence?—*A.* Because all things are discerned by an Infinite Intelligence as they are in themselves, certainly true or certainly false.

What influence, however, has probable evidence on ourselves?—*A.* It is the very guide of life.

What conclusion do you draw from this?—*A.* That in questions of difficulty, speculative or practical, we are under absolute and formal obligation to act upon probable evidence, where higher evidence cannot be obtained.

How *do* men act in their worldly affairs?—*A.* They not only do what, upon the whole, appears to be for their happiness, but remark lower probabilities and presumptions:—they not only act upon an even chance, but where the probability or chance is *greatly against* success.

THE LOGIC OF PROBABILITIES.

To what SCIENCE does a stricter investigation into the nature, foundation, and measure of Probable evidence belong?—*A.* To the science of Logic.

What does Butler say of the manner in which the subject of “Probability” had been treated before his time?—*A.* He says that it had not, in his time (A.D. 1736) been thoroughly treated.

What hint does he throw out respecting the extent to which it might be carried?—*A.* He seems to think that the extent, force, and compass of *analogical* or *probable* reasoning might be reduced to general heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a *system*.

What general conclusion can you draw respecting its use?—*A.* We may conclude that *analogy* is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our practice, notwithstanding the objections that may be raised against it.

Whence have these objections arisen?—*A.* From cases in which it was not easy to say, whether the argument was or was

not of any weight, and from instances of apparent but false *analogies*.

Yet how does Butler characterize the argument founded upon it?—*A.* As being natural, just, and conclusive.

How does he illustrate this general remark?—*A.* “No man,” he observes, “can make a question but that the sun will arise to-morrow and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle and not in that of a square.”

THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY, OR LIKENESS, APPLIED TO RELIGION.

What remark has Origen made, in applying the argument from analogy to the subject of religion?—*A.* “He who believes,” says Origen, “that the Holy Scriptures proceed from the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in them, as are found in the constitution and course of nature.”

What does Butler say of this remark?—*A.* That it is a singularly wise remark.

How does he enlarge upon it?—*A.* He observes that, “He who denies the Holy Scriptures to have come from God, because of these difficulties, may also deny the world to have been formed by Him; but that, on the other hand, if there be an *analogy* or *likeness* between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation or the Holy Scriptures informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which experience, together with reason, informs us of—this *analogy* or *likeness* between them is a presumption that both of them have the same Author and Cause.”

REASONING—BAD AND GOOD.

What *two* kinds of reasoning does Butler mention with disapprobation?—*A.* 1. Reasoning founded upon no Principles; 2. Reasoning founded upon misapplied Principles.

What instance is adduced of the former kind?—*A.* The Reasoning of *Descartes*—building a world upon hypothesis, without any foundation for the principles assumed.

Give an instance of Reasoning on misapplied principles.—*A.* When men explain the structure of the body and the nature of diseases and medicines by mere mathematics, without sufficient data.

Why is the second like the first mode of reasoning?—*A.* Because what is assumed to make the argument applicable is *hypothesis*.

What mode of reasoning, however, is allowed to be just?—

(*To be committed to Memory.*)

A. It is allowed to be just to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts: to argue from such facts as are known to others that are like them: from that part of God's government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government which is beyond it—and from what is present to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.

What kind of reasoning do you call this?—*A.* ANALOGICAL REASONING.

State the *three* reasons which induced Butler to apply the Argument from ANALOGY to Natural and Revealed Religion?—

A. Because it is a mode of reasoning which is 1st. Practical; 2nd. Conclusive; 3rd. And Sanctioned by Origen.

DATA ASSUMED IN THE WORK.

What fundamental truth is assumed throughout the work?—

A. That there is an Intelligent Author and Natural Governor of the world.

What reasons have justified Butler in assuming this truth?—

A. Because the existence of God has been proved:—1. By Analogy; 2. Final Causes; 3. By Abstract Reasonings; 4. By ancient Tradition and Testimony; 5. By the general consent of Mankind; and there is no presumption against it, prior to the proof of it, neither is it denied by the generality of those who are dissatisfied with the evidence of Religion.

SPECULATORS — HOW THE WORLD MIGHT AND SHOULD
HAVE BEEN BETTER MADE AND CARRIED ON THAN IT
IS AT PRESENT.

What other class of objectors to the present constitution of Nature, besides Descartes, does Butler mention?—*A.* Those who indulge in speculating how the world might and should have been better made and carried on than it is at present.

What *five* improvements would they probably suggest?—*A.* They would suggest:—1. That all creatures should be made, at first, as happy and as perfect as they were capable of ever being; 2. That nothing hazardous or dangerous should be put upon them to do; 3. That, perhaps, nothing at all should be put upon them to do; 4. That they should always do what was right, and most conducive to their happiness; 5. That all sorts of punishment should be abolished, as contrary to the idea of happiness.

Show the folly and extravagance of all such speculations.—*A.* They may be seen in the fact, that there could scarcely be found a man who could frame a model of a world which would meet with his own perfect satisfaction.

What general answer, therefore, can you give to all such reasoning?—*A.* That we have not faculties for it.

THE *END* OF GOD'S GOVERNMENT, DISCOVERABLE — THE
MEANS OF EFFECTING IT, NOT DISCOVERABLE.

But how far *are we able* to judge correctly of God's government?—*A.* We can judge that the *END* of his government must be the production of the greatest virtue and happiness in the world.

Why cannot we judge of the best *MEANS* of effecting both?—*A.* Because we are unable to judge what are the best means of raising even an *individual* to his highest state of perfection and happiness, much less of producing the greatest amount of virtue and happiness in a system so extensive as this world.

What may we conclude will be the *END* of God's government?

—*A.* We conclude that virtue must be the happiness and vice the misery of every creature of God; and that regularity, order, and right must *finally* triumph under His government.

How can we ascertain this?—*A.* From the Moral Character of God, which we can discover.

What enables us to judge of His Moral Character?—*A.* Our whole nature.

What does our whole nature instinctively require of us?—*A.* It leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God and to deny all moral imperfection of Him.

Why should this be a proof of His character?—*A.* Because it is the voice of God within us.

What do we, then, conclude His character to be?—*A.* *Perfect.*

Having ascertained that the END of God's government must correspond to the perfection of His character, will our nature instruct us in the necessary MEANS of accomplishing that end?—*A.* No.

ADVICE TO ALL MORAL SPECULATORS.

Seeing, then, that we cannot discover the MEANS of effecting the END which God has in view in the government of the world, what practical lesson may we draw from our ignorance on this point?—*A.* That, instead of framing imaginary models of worlds and schemes of governing them, we should turn our thoughts to what *we experience* to be the conduct of Nature with respect to intelligent creatures.

To what can such conduct of Nature be reduced?—*A.* To general laws.

In what way are these laws discoverable?—*A.* In the same way as many of the laws of matter are discovered:—by experiments.

Having ascertained what those general laws are, what should be our next step?—*A.* We should compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature—the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that

government which we find ourselves under, with that which religion teaches us to believe and expect;—and then see whether they are not ANALOGOUS and of a piece.

What will be the result of such comparison?—*A.* It will be found that the two systems are ANALOGOUS or *very like* each other; that both may be traced up to general laws and resolved into the same principles of Divine conduct.

THE ANALOGY—ITS PLAN, SCOPE, AND FORCE.

What plan, then, does Butler propose to himself?—*A.* To compare the known constitution of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature; *i.e.*, our experience with what religion teaches us to expect.

What is the *character* of the work?—*A.* Of considerable extent and consisting of several parts.

What will be the *force* of the argument used?—*A.* In some few instances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practical proof; in others, not so; yet in these, it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise:—It will show that the system of natural and revealed religion is not a subject of ridicule, unless the system of nature be so too; it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the *system* of natural and revealed religion; and, in a considerable degree, an answer to all objections against the *evidence* of both.

But why do you draw a distinction between objections urged against a system, and objections against its evidence?—*A.* Because objections against a proof (*i.e.* the evidence) and objections against what is said to be proved (*i.e.* the system), are different things; since the proofs advanced may be inconclusive, and the system may admit of other and stronger proofs.

State now the CONTENTS of the work.

(*To be committed to memory.*)

Now the Divine Government of the world, implied in the notion of Religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it

PART I.—1. That mankind is appointed to live in a *future* state ; 2. That there, every one shall be *rewarded* and *punished* ; 3. Rewarded and punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words *virtuous*, and *vicious*, *morally good* and *evil* ; 4. That our present life is a probation—a state of *trial* ; 5. And of *discipline* for a future one ; 6. Notwithstanding the objections which men fancy they have, from notions of NECESSITY, against there being any such moral plan as this at all ; and 7. Whatever objections may appear to lie against the *wisdom* and *goodness* of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present.

PART II.—That mankind being in a state of apostacy and wickedness and, consequently, of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men ; this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence 1. Of the utmost *importance* ; 2. Proved by *miracles* ; 3. Yet containing in it many things, appearing to us *strange* and *not to have been expected* ; 4. A dispensation of Providence, which is a *scheme* or *system* of things ; 5. Carried on by the *mediation* of a Divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world ; 6. and 7. Yet not revealed to all men, or proved with the greatest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but *only* to *such a part of mankind*, and with *such particular evidence*, as the wisdom of God thought fit : and, 8. That this argument from ANALOGY is, in general, unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it

What is the intention of the work?—(*Commit this also to memory.*)—*A.* The design of the following treatise will be, to show that the several parts principally objected against, in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth, are

ANALOGOUS to what is experienced in the constitution and course of NATURE :—that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former (Religion) are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter (Nature) where they are found to be, in fact, inconclusive.

Why does Butler give to the subject of *a future life* the first consideration?—*A.* Because it is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears.

A FUTURE LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.—A Future Life PROBABLE—from the Law of Progressive Change, and from the Law of *Continuance*; NOT IMPROBABLE either from *the reason of the thing*, or from the *Analogy of Nature*. The soul of man not compounded, and his powers of *reflection* so independent of his organic body, which is subject to death, that there is a presumptive proof that death will neither destroy the soul, or its present powers, or even suspend them; so that a *Future Life* may be a natural continuation of the present life—the Force of the Argument.

How did Butler, in his Introduction, describe the Importance of a *Future Life*?—*A.* As the foundation of all our hopes and fears.

On what point, bearing on this important subject, have strange difficulties been raised?—*A.* Concerning personal identity.

What do you mean by personal identity?—*A.* The sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing hereafter, or in any two successive moments.

Who raised these difficulties?—*A.* Locke.

Where does Butler consider them?—*A.* In the first dissertation at the end of the Analogy.

What does he now propose to consider?—*A.* What the ANALOGY OF NATURE and the several changes we have undergone and those which we may undergo without being destroyed suggest, as to the effect which death may or may not have upon

us ;—and whether it is not from thence probable, that we may survive those changes and exist in a Future State of life and perception.

LAW OF PROGRESSIVE CHANGE.

State a General Law of Nature observable in man and other creatures.—*A.* It is a General Law of Nature, that the same individuals should exist in very different degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them, in another period of it.

Give an instance of *this progressive change*.—*A.* The state of our infancy, helpless and imperfect as it is, when compared with our mature age.

Does this law hold good with respect to other creatures besides man?—*A.* Yes.

Give instances.—*A.* We see instances of this General Law of Nature in the change of worms into flies, and in the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: birds and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and thus entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them.

What inference with regard to a *Future Life* may you draw from this General *Law of Nature*?—*A.* That it would be but according to the ANALOGY OF NATURE, *i.e.*, according to a natural order and appointment, which we have already experienced, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different from our present, as our present state in mature age is from our state in infancy.

THE LAW OF CONTINUANCE.

What presumption, also, is there that we shall retain, through death, our present known powers of action and perception?—*A.* Our present possession of them.

On what *law* does this presumption depend?—*A.* On the LAW OF CONTINUANCE.

Describe this law.—*A.* There is in every case a probability that all things will continue, as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered.

What is the force of this *law*?—*A.* It becomes our only natural reason for believing that any one substance, now existing, will continue to exist a moment longer—or that the course of this world will continue to-morrow as it has done, so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back.

Is there any exception to this law?—*A.* It does not apply to the self-existent substance.

But how would our living powers be affected by this law?—*A.* This *law of continuance* makes it probable that they will continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death will be their destruction.

What will be the amount of this probability?—*A.* Very high—sufficient indeed to act upon.

And supposing we were assured that death would not destroy our living powers, how should we feel with respect to their continuance?—*A.* We should have no apprehension that any other event or power, unconnected with this of death, would destroy them.

NEITHER THE REASON OF THE THING, NOR THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, AFFORD ANY REASON TO THINK THAT DEATH WILL BE OUR DESTRUCTION.

But what naturally causes us to apprehend that death will destroy us?—*A.* The great shock and alteration which we undergo at death.

From what two causes must this apprehension arise?—*A.* 1. From the reason of the thing; 2. From the analogy of nature.

THE REASON OF THE THING.

Show why we are unable to judge, *from the reason of the thing*, that death will not destroy our living powers.—*A.* 1. We do not know what death is in itself—but only what some of

its effects are, as the dissolution of flesh, skin and bones; 2. We do not know on what the exercise of our living powers depends; 3. Neither do we know on what the powers themselves depend.

And from what *three* things may these powers be distinguished?—*A.* 1. From their actual exercise: 2. From their present capacity of exercising them; 3. From their destruction.

What things will show that they may exist where there is no present capacity of exercising them?—*A.* Sleep and a Swoon—as the passive power of motion in inanimate matter.

Show also that the *suspension* of our living powers does not imply their destruction.—*A.* In sleep and in a swoon they are suspended but not destroyed.

Why, then, does the REASON OF THE THING show us no connexion between death and the destruction of living agents?—*A.* Because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death—upon somewhat quite out of the reach of the king of terrors.

THE ANALOGY OF NATURE.

Again, why cannot we conclude, from *the Analogy of Nature*, that death will be the destruction of our living powers?—*A.* Because we have nothing on which to ground the slightest presumption that animals *ever* lose their living powers—much less that they lose them by *death*.

What effect has death upon them?—*A.* It removes them from our view and destroys the sensible proof, which we had, before their death, of their being possessed of living powers.

And what makes it probable that they will retain their living powers beyond death?—*A.* The fact that they possessed them up to the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them—or *the law of continuance*.

How is this probability confirmed?—*A.* By observing the great and astonishing changes we have undergone: so great that our existence in another state of life, of perception and

of action, will be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which has already been exercised even with regard to ourselves.

Yet there are PRESUMPTIONS THAT DEATH WILL DESTROY US, from what cause do they arise?—*A.* From our imagination—from early and lasting prejudices.

How does Butler describe our imagination?—*A.* He calls it that forward and delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere, of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all error.

State the *three* imaginary presumptions that death will be our destruction.—*A.* It is presumed 1. That we are compounded: 2. That our organized bodies are ourselves: 3. That our present powers depend on our organized bodies.

LIVING BEINGS NOT COMPOUNDED OR DISCERPTIBLE.

What is the *first* supposition on which it is presumed that death will destroy our living powers?—*A.* It is supposed that those living powers are *compounded and so discerptible*.

Show that they are not compounded.—*A.* This may be seen from the nature of consciousness.

What is its nature?—*A.* Single and indivisible.

What will follow from this fact?—*A.* That as consciousness is indivisible, the perceptive power or *the power of consciousness* must be also indivisible, and *the place* where it resides, *i.e.*, *the conscious being* must be indivisible likewise.

Supposing, then, that the conscious being is single and indivisible, what general conclusion may we draw respecting our own organized bodies?—*A.* THAT OUR ORGANIZED BODIES ARE NOT OURSELVES—or part of ourselves.

Show, in *five* points, our conceivable independence of our organized bodies?—*A.* 1. It is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner in which our present bodies are, as how we can receive impressions from and have power over any matter: 2. It is as

easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies as in them : 3. That we might have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us : 4. That we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously modified and organized : 5. That the destruction of all these several organized bodies, supposing we had successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy our living faculties, than the destruction of any foreign matter, from which we were capable of receiving impressions, and making use of for the common occasions of life.

What *three* observations show us that our gross organized bodies are no part of ourselves?—*A.* 1. We see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of their bodies and yet remain the same living agents : 2. We can trace up the existence of ourselves to a time when the bulk of our bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is in mature age ; and we cannot but think that we might then have lost a considerable part of that small body and yet have remained the same living agents : 3. We know that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them.

What should we learn from these experimental observations ?—*A.* We should learn to distinguish between these living agents, ourselves, and large quantities of matter in which we are very nearly interested, since these quantities of matter are alienated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners ; whilst we are assured that each living agent remains one and the same permanent being.

THE BULK OF THE LIVING BEING.

To what *three* remarks is Butler led by this general observation?—*A.* 1. Concerning the bulk of the living being ; 2. Concerning its relation to systems of matter ; 3. Concerning its relation to the organs of sense.

How large in bulk is the living Being?—*A.* There is no way of ascertaining by experience how large it is.

What conclusion may be drawn from our ignorance of its bulk?—*A.* That unless it is determined to be greater in size than those solid elementary particles of matter which *no natural power can dissolve*, there is no sort of reason to think that death will be its destruction.

ITS RELATION TO SYSTEMS OF MATTER.

Why have you concluded that certain systems of matter, to which we are so nearly related and interested in (suppose our flesh and bones) are, however, not ourselves?—*A.* Because, notwithstanding their alienation, the living agents, ourselves, remain all the while undestroyed.

What further inference may be drawn from this fact?—*A.* That we have no ground to conclude any other systems of matter (suppose internal systems) to be ourselves.

What will justify such an inference?—*A.* Because we have no reason to conclude, from our interest in and relation to, such systems of matter, that their destruction at death will prove our own destruction.

And what makes it probable that we shall remain the same living agents at death, notwithstanding the whole loss of the body?—*A.* The fact that we have already, several times over, lost a great part, or, perhaps, the whole of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature.

But the loss was gradual in the one case and sudden in the other.—*A.* This proves nothing to the contrary.

But that which is lost during life is no part of our original body, but adventitious matter only.—*A.* It must have been some part of our original body, because we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body.

What kind of relation, then, does a person bear to those

parts of his body to which he is most nearly related?—*A.* They mutually affect each other.

Of what other things may the same be said?—*A.* Of all foreign matter which gives us ideas, and over which we have any power.

Now what imaginary presumption do these observations remove?—*A.* That *the dissolution of any matter* is the destruction of the living agent, from the interest he once had in such matter.

ITS RELATION TO THE ORGANS OF SENSE—SIGHT.

What other consideration will show that the living agent is independent of these systems of matter?—*A.* Considering our body as made up of organs, and instruments of perception and motion.

What instances are adduced to show that our bodily organs are instruments only, as other foreign matter may be?—*A.* The use of levers, poles, glasses.

How do we see with our eyes?—*A.* Only as we see with glasses.

By what facts is it shown that our organs of sense are not percipients?—*A.* 1. By the loss of our external senses whilst the living Being remains unimpaired; 2. By the experience of dreams, by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent power of perceiving sensible objects in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them—so that *our powers of sight are not dependent on our organs of sight.*

HEARING—MOTION.

Show that our power of motion is not dependent on our organs of motion?—*A.* The limb by which we move may be destroyed, whilst the active power of motion remains unlesened.

How is this illustrated?—*A.* A man, having lost his natural leg, makes use of an artificial leg. He can also make use of a pole or lever to reach and move things beyond the length and power of his natural arm, and this he does in the same

manner as he reaches and moves, with the natural arm, things nearer and of less weight.

Where does the power of motion, then, reside?—*A.* Certainly not in the limbs.

Where does the power of hearing reside?—*A.* Not in the ear, any more than in an ear-trumpet.

Where does the power to see an object reside?—*A.* Not more in the eye than in the microscope.

What is the use, then, of our organs of sense and of our limbs?—*A.* They are instruments only, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with.

What relation do we bear to them?—*A.* The same in kind (though not in degree) which we bear to the microscope, lever, pole, and artificial leg.

What conclusion may you fairly draw from this relation?—*A.* That the alienation or dissolution of our organs of sense and motion would no more prove the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent, than the dissolution and alienation of other foreign matter, such as glasses, poles, and artificial legs.

What further conclusion may be drawn?—*A.* That there is no ground for thinking that the dissolution of any other matter, or the destruction of any other organs and instruments will be the destruction of living agents from the like kind of relation.

NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF BRUTES.

What objection is brought against this reasoning?—*A.* That it would prove as well the immortality of brutes, who are, to the same extent as man, independent of their organs of sense and perception.

How does Butler characterize this objection?—*A.* As invidious and weak.

OBJECTION—INVIDIOUS.

In what respect is it invidious?—*A.* Because it infers that none but rational and moral agents can become immortal.

If this were the fact, show that it would not necessarily prove that brutes were not immortal?—*A.* Even they may still be possessed of these latent powers and capacities.

How might you account, then, for their present state of incapacity and irrationality?—*A.* By the general law of nature “that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being in which they are altogether without the use of these capacities for a considerable length of time.”

Give instances.—*A.* Infants and children, many of whom die without coming to the exercise of these capacities at all, and yet, though they did not exercise them, no one would say that they did not possess them.

OBJECTION—WEAK.

In what respect is the objection, also, weak?—*A.* Because the immortality of brutes does not necessarily imply that they should become rational and moral agents, as the economy of nature might require that there should be living agents in a future state without any capacities of this kind.

But how may all difficulties respecting this question be disposed of?—*A.* By a reference to our ignorance of the whole economy of nature.

POWERS OF REFLECTION NOT DESTROYED BY DEATH.

But what would enable you most effectually to answer the objection against the natural immortality of man?—*A.* The consideration of our present powers of reason, memory and affection.

How do they furnish you with an answer?—*A.* Because they do not depend on our gross bodies as perception by the senses does, and they do not appear to depend upon it in such a manner as to give ground to think that the dissolution of the body will either *destroy* or *suspend* them.

In how many states of life and perception do human creatures exist?—*A.* In two.

Name them.—*A.* In a state of sensation and in a state of reflection.

When may we be said to live in a state of sensation?—*A.* When any of our senses are affected or appetites gratified with the objects of them.

When may we be said to live in a state of reflection?—*A.* When none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reason and act.

Of what use are our organs of sensation to us?—*A.* They are necessary for conveying ideas to our reflecting powers.

To what may they be compared?—*A.* To the use we make of carriages, levers, and scaffolds in architecture.

After ideas are thus gained by our organs of sensation, what relation do we assume towards them?—*A.* We become independent of them—we can reflect, enjoy the greatest pleasure and suffer the greatest pain without their assistance, and without any at all, which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death.

What conclusion, then, may be fairly drawn from this fact?—*A.* That this gross body is not necessary to the reflecting being—to our intellectual enjoyments and sufferings; and that the dissolution or alienation of the body, therefore, will not be the destruction of our present powers, or render us incapable of this state of reflection.

POWERS OF REFLECTION NOT DESTROYED BY DISEASE.

What further proof have you that death does not *destroy* our powers of reflection?—*A.* The fact, that some diseases, which are mortal, do not at all affect them.

But suppose they did affect those powers of reflection, would this prove that they would destroy them?—*A.* By no means; since we have already seen that there is no presumption from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body would prove the destruction of the living agent.

What things, moreover, show us that our living powers may be affected, and even suspended without being destroyed?—*A.* Swoons, fainting fits, and drowsiness increasing until it ends in sound sleep.

Give an instance to prove that diseases will not destroy the reflecting power.—*A.* Many persons, up to the moment before death, have discovered apprehension, memory, reason, all entire, with the utmost force of affection; sense of character, of shame and honour; and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp; and, therefore, there is no pretence for thinking that a progressive disease, when arrived to such a degree that it is mortal, will destroy those powers which were not impaired, nay, which were not even affected by it.

POWERS OF REFLECTION NOT SUSPENDED BY DEATH.

What *two* things, lastly, show us that death may not *even suspend* our present power of reflection?—*A.* 1. Our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised without any assistance that we know of from these bodies, which will be dissolved by death: 2. Our finding that the exercise of these powers is so lively even to the last.

OUR FUTURE LIFE.

What, then, may be the character of our posthumous life?—*A.* Not an entirely new life, but a continuance of our present one.

And to what may our death correspond?—*A.* Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb, but a continuation of both, with such and such alterations.

Into what state may death, then, usher us?—*A.* Death may, immediately in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does—a state in which our capacities and sphere of perception and action may be much greater than at present.

What would lead to such a supposition?—*A.* The fact that as our relation to our external organs of sense renders us capable of a life of sensation, so it may be the only hindrance to our existing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of reflection.

Show now that there is no analogy or similarity between the destruction of a vegetable and a living agent.—*A.* The vegetable is wholly void of that which is the principal and chief thing in the other, the power of perception and action—and this is the only thing, about whose continuance we are enquiring.

OUR FUTURE LIFE—NATURAL AND SOCIAL.

Explain, then, what is meant by the assertion, that our entrance into another life will be *natural*.—*A.* When we go out of the world, we may pass into new scenes and a new state of action, just *as naturally as* we came into the present.

What may be the character of this new state?—*A.* It may be naturally a *social* one.

How may its advantages be bestowed?—*A.* As *naturally as* they are here—not indeed by the will of the Society, but by HIS will, on WHOM the whole frame of nature depends.

What things may be called natural?—*A.* Those things which we see at present.

What is the distinct meaning of the word?—*A.* Stated, fixed, settled, uniform.

On what do men's notions of what is natural depend?—*A.* On their knowledge of the works of God, and the dispensations of HIS providence.

How far may this knowledge extend?—*A.* So far, that there may be some beings in the universe, whose capacities and knowledge and views may be so extensive, that the whole Christian dispensation may appear to them *natural*, *i.e.*, conformable to God's dealings with other parts of HIS creation—as natural as the visible known course of things appears to us.

THE FORCE OF THE ARGUMENT USED IN THIS CHAPTER.

To what degree of evidence does the foregoing reasoning amount?—*A.* To a *presumptive* proof in favour of a future life.

What purpose will it answer?—*A.* It will answer all the purposes of religion in like manner as a *demonstrative* proof would.

Why would not even a demonstrative proof be a proof of religion?—*A.* Because a future life is as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, as our present life is.

Of what use, then, is the argument?—*A.* It will remove all presumption against a future life; and, as religion implies a future life, it proves, to a very considerable degree of probability, the truth of this doctrine; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whole.

What is the nature of this doctrine?—*A.* It is one of the fundamental doctrines of religion.

CHAPTER II.

CONTENTS.—The question of a Future Life important; 1. Because of our capacity of happiness and misery; 2. Because our happiness and misery are made to depend, in a great measure, on our own conduct, and are, therefore, in our own power. General method of the Divine Administration defined—What it leads us, by ANALOGY, to anticipate. *Three* objections stated and answered.—The practical use of the Chapter.

What makes the question of a Future Life so important to us?—*A.* Our capacity of happiness and misery.

What makes its consideration also so important?—*A.* The supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter depending upon our actions here.

What might lead to such a supposition?—*A.* Analogy and experience. We find our present happiness and misery depend, in a great measure, upon our present conduct, and that they are placed in our own power.

Show that our pleasures and sufferings are, for the most part, put in our own power and depend upon our own conduct.—*A.* Pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions, which consequences God has given us capacities to foresee—By prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet, or by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, we may make ourselves as miserable as ever we please.

State the *five* reasons why the Author of our nature has not given us promiscuously such and such perceptions of pleasure and pain, *i.e.*, why He has not made us happy without respect to our own behaviour, or independently of our own actions, and why He does not prevent us bringing any sufferings upon ourselves.—*A.* 1. It may be impossible, in the nature of things, to act otherwise ; 2. Less happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct than by the present ; 3. Divine goodness, perhaps, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful and honest man happy ; 4. An infinitely *perfect mind* may, perhaps, be pleased with seeing His creatures behave suitably to the nature which He has given them—to the relations which He has placed them in to each other and to that relation which they stand in to Himself.—Perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents in and for itself as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of His creation ; 5. Or, lastly, the whole end for which God made and thus governs the world may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties. There may be somewhat in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colours.

What is universally found, then, to be the general method of the *divine* administration? (*To be committed to memory.*)—*A.* Forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have such en-

joyments ; if so and so, such sufferings ; and giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our actions.

OBJECTION I.

“ *This system of government is to be ascribed to the general course of nature.*”

But it is objected that “ all this may be ascribed to the general course of nature ”—answer this objection.—*A.* This system, certainly, is natural, but must be ascribed to *an agent who appointed and maintains it, and that agent is God.*

How do you infer this?—*A.* From the fact that every abstract implies a concrete, and, consequently, that every system of operation implies an operating agent.

Why, then, is the course or system of things called natural?—*A.* Because it is uniform, fixed, and constant.

Show, also, that the good and bad consequences of our actions are His appointment.—*A.* *He* has appointed the course of things by which such good and bad consequences follow our good and bad actions, and He has, moreover, given us present faculties of foreseeing these consequences.

And with what view does He enable us to foresee the consequences of our actions?—*A.* To advise us how we should act.

OBJECTION II.

“ *Man may, then, enjoy everything which he knows is attended with pleasure.*”

State another objection to the theory “ that our foresight of the pleasure and pain accompanying our actions is an intimation and warning, afforded us by the Author of nature, how He would have us act.”—*A.* It is asked, by way of objection, “ whether the pleasure naturally accompanying *every* particular gratification of passion, as revenge, &c., is intended to put us on gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and whether it may be considered as a *reward* to us for so doing.

Answer this objection.—*A.* The foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the passions were intended *in general* to induce us to act in such a manner, but there are particular exceptions.

How is this mode of answering the objection illustrated?—*A.* By a reference to the *general* intention of the eye, which was given us, doubtless, to look at objects, but not at *all* objects.

How can we ascertain, then, that we are actually, at present, under *God's Government*?—*A.* Because He has given us to understand that He has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequences of our acting in one way, and pain and uneasiness, of our acting in another manner or of our not acting at all, and we find these consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow.

Show in a word, therefore, that we are under His government.—*A.* He rewards and punishes us for our actions.

In what sense are we thus under His government?—*A.* In the same sense as we are under the government of civil magistrates.

Define the proper notion of *government*. (*To be committed to memory.*)—*A.* “Annexing pleasure to some actions and pain to others in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government.”

Show, by an illustration, that we should equally be under God's government, whether the pleasure or pain which thus accompany our actions be owing to His *acting upon us every moment*, or to His having *at once* contrived and executed His own part in the plan of the world.—*A.* This may be shown by a reference to civil governments—for we should be just in the same sense under the government of civil magistrates, if they were able to make the sanctions of their laws take place without interposing at all, after they had passed them,—without a trial and the formalities of an execution.

What would, in fact, be the perfection of civil government?—

A. If civil magistrates could make their laws execute themselves or every offender execute them upon himself.

Show, now, that it is not ridiculous to suppose the lesser pains accompanying and following certain actions, instances of divine punishment.—*A.* If final causes be admitted, then *all* pleasures and *all* pains must be admitted as instances of them—and if they are so (*i.e.*, if God annexes delight to some actions and uneasiness to others with an apparent design to induce us to act so and so) then he not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also *rewards and punishes actions*.

Give an example.—*A.* The pain we receive from a burn or upon wounding ourselves (be it more or less) is appointed by God to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction. This pain is as great an instance of His punishing our actions and, consequently, of our being under His government, as declaring, by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, He would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it, whether it were greater or less.

What, then, is the notion we have of God prior to the consideration of His moral attributes?—*A.* The notion of a master or governor.

What kind of government does He exercise over us?—*A.* The government of rewards and punishments.

In what sense?—*A.* In as strict and proper a sense of these words and even in the same sense as children, servants, and subjects are rewarded and punished by those who govern them.

If, then, the whole course of nature shows that we are, at present, under God's Government, and that He does reward and punish us for our actions here, what *conclusion* may fairly be drawn?—*A.* We may fairly conclude that there is *nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter*.

OBJECTION III.

It is incredible men should be punished hereafter.

What circumstance in connexion with this subject, are men most unwilling to admit?—*A.* The doctrine of Divine Punishments.

What things, however, render them not incredible?—*A.* Circumstances in the natural course of punishments here in this world, ANALOGOUS to what religion teaches us concerning a Future State of Punishment.

Mention some (nine) of these circumstances.—*A.* 1. Natural punishments often follow actions which procure many present advantages.

Give an instance.—*A.* Sickness and untimely death follow the present pleasure of intemperance.

2. The punishments are often greater than the pleasures and advantages, of which they are the punishments or consequences ; 3. Delay of punishment is, in no sort or degree, a presumption of final impunity ; 4. The punishment often comes violently and suddenly after such delay ; 5. The punishment, though not foreseen at the time or expected to follow, yet inevitably follows at its appointed time, in many cases.

Illustrate this.—*A.* Intemperance brings after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil punishments—and thus, also, though *youth* is often alleged as an excuse for folly and rashness, as being naturally thoughtless and not foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, yet it is followed by these consequences, which are grievously felt throughout the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age are often utter ruin ; and men's success in the world depends, in a great degree and in various ways, upon the manner in which they pass their youth, which consequences they for the most part neglect to consider and, perhaps, seldom can properly be said to believe beforehand.

6. Opportunities neglected are, in numberless cases, irreclaimable.

Give me an example.—*A.* If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life, for want of those acquirements which they neglected the natural season of attaining.

Can you illustrate this?—*A.* If the husbandman lets his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery.

7. Extravagancies, beyond a certain point, are irreparable, *i.e.*, not to be repaired by reformation—for there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things. 8. Neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention, not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any active misbehaviour from the most extravagant passion. 9. The punishments of civil government are natural and some of the punishments are capital, as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal.

From what two reasons are they inflicted?—*A.* Either to remove the offender out of the way of being further mischievous or as an example to those who are left behind.

Now, how do all these punishments arise?—*A.* They proceed from general laws by which God governs the world in the natural course of His providence.

To what are they ANALOGOUS?—*A.* They are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked.

How may they both be described?—*A.* They would naturally be expressed in the very same words and manner of expression.

Where are they both thus described?—*A.* In the Book of Proverbs, Chap. i.

Repeat the passage verbatim. (*To be committed to memory.*)

—*A.* “How long,” says Wisdom, “how long, ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity, and the scorers delight in their scorning and fools hate knowledge? Turn you at my reproof: Behold! I will pour out my Spirit upon you: I will make known my words unto you.” But she is rejected. She therefore adds, “Because I have called, and ye refused: I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh: when your fear cometh as desolation and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish cometh upon you, then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer: they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me.”

Give the obvious meaning of the passage in the words of Solomon. (*To be committed to memory.*)—“They hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord—*Therefore* shall they eat of the fruit of their own way and be filled with their own devices, for the security of the simple shall slay them and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them.”

To what two ANALOGOUS circumstances is the whole passage applicable?—*A.* 1. It is applicable to what we experience in the present world concerning the consequence of men’s actions; 2. To what religion teaches us is to be expected in another world; *i.e.*, to our present experience and to our religious expectations.

What circumstances afford us the most sensible apprehension of a future state of punishment?—*A.* The irresistible, irremediable, and inevitable consequences of a life spent in sin and in opposition to the warnings of Providence.

What *four* kinds of warnings are mentioned?—*A.* 1. Warnings from their very nature; 2. From the examples of others; 3. From the lesser inconveniences which men bring upon themselves; 4. From the instruction of wise and virtuous men.

With what mitigating or qualifying circumstances, however, are these remarks made?—*A.* It is not meant by them that

men are always (according to what appears at present of the natural course of things) uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehaviour.

What, then, is the force of the above remarks?—*A.* They show, that there are very many instances of misbehaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too; they are sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient to answer *all objections* against the credibility of a Future State of Punishment.

Mention *four* objections to this doctrine of Future Punishment.—*A.* 1. The frailty of our nature and the strength of external temptations, it is said, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices; 2. Man is not a free agent: cannot avoid falling into sin, and, therefore, is not properly or justly exposed to punishment; 3. The will of an Infinite Being cannot be contradicted, and, therefore, man, whatever is his conduct, should not be punished; and lastly, 4. God is incapable of offence and provocation and, therefore, will not punish.

THE PRACTICAL USE OF THE CHAPTER.

What practical good, then, will arise from this Chapter?—*A.* It may raise a salutary apprehension of God's Future Punishment in the minds of the serious and sober-minded: it will show that a spirit of fearlessness and recklessness with regard to what may be hereafter is altogether unjustifiable, inasmuch as we find, by experience, that in this world an ungodly man may bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death, so that it had been better for him that he had never been born—it will show that there can be no reasonable pretence for people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing **ANALOGOUS** to this extremity of woe, with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same God.

CHAPTER III.

CONTENTS.—God's Government—Its moral character—Definition of Moral Government—V. Proofs of its Morality.

What *two* things prove the world to be the work of an intelligent mind?—*A.* Appearances of design and of final causes in its constitution.

And what things show that we are under God's government?—*A.* Particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst us.

What may this government be called?—*A.* His natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason.

But what kind of government does it imply?—*A.* The same kind of government which a master exercises over his servants or a civil magistrate over his subjects.

And what conclusion may be drawn from these particular final causes of pleasure and pain?—*A.* They as really prove an Intelligent *Governor* of the world, as any instances of final causes prove an Intelligent *Maker* of it.

THE QUALITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

Why, however, will not this account of His government enable us to pronounce upon its morality?—*A.* Because the most tyrannical governor may simply reward and punish his men for their actions.

How then must you DEFINE moral government?—(*To be committed to memory.*)—*A.* "Moral government consists not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do; but in rewarding the righteous and in punishing the wicked, *i.e.*, in rendering to men according to their actions considered as good or evil."

And what would constitute the perfection of moral government?—*A.* "In doing this with regard to all intelligent creatures, in exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits."

GOD A RIGHTEOUS GOVERNOR.

What wrong idea has been entertained of God's character?—

A. That it is one of simple absolute benevolence.

And how is it said that such a character should develop itself?—*A.* In producing the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it.

Now, if this were God's character, what would the attributes of justice and veracity become?—*A.* They would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom.

Why, however, should not such an assertion be made?—*A.* Because it cannot be proved, and we should always speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject, and moreover it is not the question before us.

What, then, is the question?—*A.* Whether in the constitution and conduct of the world a *righteous government* be not discernibly planned out.

And what would such righteous government imply?—*A.* It would imply a righteous Governor (an abstract always implying a concrete).

How *may* He manifest Himself to others?—*A.* As a Being of infinite absolute benevolence.

But how *does* He manifest Himself to *us*?—*A.* As a **RIGHT-EOUS GOVERNOR.**

May this simple and absolute benevolence be consistent with His justice?—*A.* Assuredly.

But of what character does the constitution of the world prove Him to be?—*A.* A righteous Governor over servants, as He rewards and punishes us for our actions.

What three proofs has He given us of the righteousness of His government?—*A.* 1. The reason of the thing; 2. The natural presages of conscience; 3. Clear and distinct intimations of its morality.

To whom are these intimations clear?—*A.* To such as think

the nature of His government deserving of their attention, but not to every careless person who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.

CONCESSION.

What concession is here made?—*A.* That the government of the world, if taken alone, is not the perfection of moral government.

What position, however, is maintained?—*A.* That there is somewhat truly moral in it.

In what degree?—*A.* Enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be carried on to that degree of perfection that religion teaches us to expect.

THE DESIGN OF THE CHAPTER.

What, then, is the design of the chapter?—*A.* Its design is to enquire how far the government of God is moral—how far, (over and above the moral nature which God has given us and our natural notion of Him as the righteous governor of His creatures,) *the principles or beginnings of a moral government* over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it.

VIRTUE IN THIS WORLD HAPPIER THAN VICE.

What proof of the establishment of a moral government has been often forcibly urged?—*A.* That, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction are the natural consequences of a virtuous rather than of a vicious course of life.

How is this proof obtained?—*A.* From experience.

What two circumstances, however, make it difficult to prove this?—*A.* 1. The difficulty of weighing and balancing pleasures and uneasiness against each other, so as to make an estimate, with any degree of exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue; 2. It is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue.

What two exceptions are supposed possible?—*A.* 1. With regard even to those persons whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless, and 2. Much more with regard to a reformed profligate.

What renders the latter exception probable?—*A.* The difficulties, shame, self-denial and uneasiness which must attend his change of life.

To what account, however, should uneasiness of this kind be put?—*A.* To the account of his former bad life.

What is Butler's opinion, however, on the point?—*A.* He is far from allowing it doubtful whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice, in the present world.

But supposing the matter were doubtful, what and how many *principles* or *elements* of a righteous administration may *unquestionably* be found in *nature*?—*A.* Five.

Name them.—*A.* 1. A moral government of the world falls in with our natural sense of things; 2. Prudence and Imprudence (*quasi virtues and vices*) are rewarded and punished; 3. Vice is punished as mischievous to society; 4. Virtue and vice are rewarded and punished *per se*, and, 5. They have an essential tendency to be much more rewarded and punished than they are, but such tendency is prevented from becoming effect only by artificial hindrances.

A MORAL GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD FALLS IN WITH OUR NATURAL SENSE OF THINGS.

What renders the question of God's moral government important?—*A.* The fact that God at present manifests Himself to us under the character of a Governor, *i.e.*, He punishes and rewards us for our actions.

What then will be the nature of the enquiry?—*A.* Whether there is any reason to apprehend that He is a righteous or *moral* governor.

What would render Him a moral governor?—*A.* If He re-

warded or punished His creatures according to this particular RULE, *viz.*, as they act virtuously or viciously.

What makes this rule probable?—*A.* It is much more NATURAL than any other rule.

How is it more natural?—*A.* Because rewarding and punishing actions by *any other* rule would appear much harder to be accounted for by minds formed as He has formed ours.

Now religion teaches us to expect that the righteous shall upon the whole be happy, and the wicked miserable—why then is such an expectation neither absurd or chimerical?—*A.* Because it is no more than an expectation that a method of government already begun (the method of rewarding and punishing actions) shall be carried on by a particular rule, which rule unavoidably appears to us at first sight MORE NATURAL than any other rule.

What would you call the rule?—*A.* THE RULE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

THE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS OF PRUDENCE AND IMPRUDENCE.

What is the second intimation of the establishment of a moral government?—*A.* The rewards and punishments of prudence and imprudence.

What are the natural consequences of prudence?—*A.* Tranquillity, satisfaction, and many external advantages.

What, on the other hand, are the natural consequences of imprudence?—*A.* Many inconveniences and sufferings.

Of what are these consequences of imprudence instances?—*A.* They are instances of a right constitution of nature.

To what may they be compared?—*A.* To the correction of children for their own sakes and by way of example, when they run into danger, and hurt themselves.

And of what is this correction of children an instance?—*A.* It is an instance of a right education.

But how are these instances of a *right constitution of nature*

any proofs of the *morality* of God's government?—*A.* Because prudence is a kind of virtue and imprudence is a kind of vice; and, inasmuch as these *natural consequences* of prudence and imprudence are regulated by fixed laws, and God has given us capacities to reflect upon and foresee them, these things plainly imply some sort of *moral* government.

VICE PUNISHED AS MISCHIEVOUS TO SOCIETY.

What is the third intimation of the establishment of a moral government?—*A.* The punishment of vice considered as being mischievous to society.

In what three ways is vice thus punished?—*A.* 1. In the actual infliction of punishment on the criminal when detected; 2. In the fear of punishment felt by the criminal in case of detection; 3. In the fear of punishment which restrains men from committing such crimes as are mischievous to society.

What would you call these three kinds of punishments?—*A.* Declarations of nature or of society (which is natural) against vice.

What vices would be thus naturally punished?—*A.* The vices of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty.

Why would society instinctively punish men for these vices?—*A.* For the sake of self-preservation—as these vices would otherwise prove the destruction of society.

If society, then, be natural, how would you characterize the punishment of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty?—*A.* As natural too.

But who has rendered *society* natural and made it natural to punish those vices of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty?—*A.* God—the natural course of things being His appointment.

What, then, proves the morality of His government?—*A.* The unavoidable necessity imposed on Society (which is His appointment) to punish such vices, as the vices of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty, in the view of their being destructive of it, and sometimes rewarding good actions in the view of their being beneficial to it.

OBJECTION.

But, it is objected, “good actions are sometimes punished, as in the case of persecution, and bad and mischievous actions are sometimes rewarded:”—give two distinct answers to this objection.—*A.* 1. It is not natural or necessary to the existence of society that good actions should be punished, as we have seen that it is natural and necessary to the very existence of society that falsehood, injustice and cruelty should be punished; 2. Good actions are never punished, considered as being beneficial to society, nor are ill actions rewarded under the view of their being hurtful to it—but these rewards and punishments are dispensed under the influence of mistaken judgment or excited passion—both are mistakes.

What conclusion, then, will stand good?—*A.* We may conclude that God has made it as natural and necessary that society should punish certain vices as He has made it natural and necessary for us to preserve our lives with food.

THE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS OF VIRTUE AND VICE
AS SUCH.

State the fourth proof of the establishment of a moral government in nature.—*A.* In the natural course of things virtue *as such* is rewarded and vice *as such* is punished.

Of what is this an instance?—*A.* It is an instance of a moral government begun and established.

In what sense and to what degree is the government *moral*?—*A.* In the strictest sense indeed—but not in that perfection of degree which religion teaches us to expect.

What will help us more clearly to see its morality?—*A.* If we distinguish between actions themselves and their qualities.

What distinction, then, may we here draw?—*A.* Between an action *per se* and its morality.

Show the propriety of drawing this distinction?—*A.* An action, by which any natural passion is gratified or fortune

acquired must be attended with delight, and it is thus accompanied with delight and advantage, abstracted from all consideration of its *morality*. Here, then, the pleasure or advantage is gained by the action itself and not by its morality.

Show this more fully?—*A.* To say such an action or course of behaviour procured such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different thing from saying that such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In the one case, the action abstracted from all moral consideration (or the action *per se*) produced its effect;—in the other case, the morality of the action produced the effect.

What do you infer from this distinction?—*A.* We may infer that the morality of an action, *i.e.*, its virtuousness or viciousness, is attended with its *own proper effects*.

What, then, *are the proper effects of virtue and vice* as such?—*A.* Virtue as such naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such naturally occasions great inconvenience and misery to the vicious in very many instances.

How many instances are adduced?—*A.* Six.

What is the first instance?

THE NATURAL EFFECTS OF VIRTUE AND VICE, AS SUCH, UPON THE TEMPER.

Mention some of the bad effects of vice upon the temper?—*A.* Vice is naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and, not uncommonly, with great disturbance and apprehension— inward vexation in lesser matters and bitter remorse in matters of importance, together with fears of future punishment.

What, on the other hand, are the natural effects of virtue?—*A.* It produces inward security and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life.

Name some other good effects of innocency and virtue?—*A.* We may add the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of

heart which accompany the real exercise of gratitude, friendship, and benevolence—and lastly, the peaceful hopes of a better life in those who fully believe in its reality.

THE VIRTUOUS, AS SUCH, BEFRIENDED, AND THE VICIOUS
DISCOURAGED.

Mention another instance to show the natural advantages of virtue, and the natural disadvantages of vice?—*A.* The assistance which good and honest men are inclined to render to the good and honest as such—while the vicious are discountenanced by the good and honest—from which favour and discouragement considerable advantage and inconvenience must arise.

PUBLIC HONOURS TO THE VIRTUOUS.

What are the natural and sometimes actual consequences of virtue?—*A.* Public honours and advantages.

What are the consequences of vice?—*A.* Sometimes death; often infamy and external inconveniences.

Show that infamy is the public punishment of vice as such.—*A.* The sense which men have of tyranny, injustice, and oppression additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has been instrumental in bringing about revolutions which make a figure even in the history of the world.

Under what notion do men resist injuries?—*A.* Not merely under the notion of having received harm, but of having received wrong.

Under what view do men return good offices?—*A.* Not merely because such good offices were of advantage to themselves, but because they implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.

State two other instances to show that a moral institution of government is visibly begun and established—

DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT.

A. Domestic government (which is natural) is an instance of the establishment of a moral government in the world, inasmuch as

we punish children for falsehood, injustice, and ill behaviour, and reward them for the contrary—and these are instances, where veracity, justice, and right behaviour, as such, are naturally enforced by rewards and punishments—and

CIVIL GOVERNMENT

is another instance of the establishment of a moral government. For, although it takes cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of their immorality greatly contributes to bring the offenders to justice—and as, on the one hand, entire absence of crime and guilt in a moral sense, when plainly appearing, will, almost of course, procure a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, so, on the contrary, circumstances of aggravated guilt will prevent, in very many cases, a remission of such penalties.

SUMMARY.

Sum up, then, the instances you have enumerated of the establishment of a moral government.—*A.* 1. The good and bad effects of virtue and vice on the temper and disposition; 2. The virtuous are generally befriended and the vicious naturally discountenanced; 3. Virtue publicly honoured and vice rendered infamous; 4. Injustice as such resented and virtue as such kindly approved; 5. In domestic government children are punished for immorality—for falsehood, injustice and ill behaviour; and 6. In civil government the amount of punishment is modified by the moral character of the offender.

What do these facts show?—*A.* They show that virtue (*per se*) is naturally favoured, and vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human life.

Give now the two general proofs of God's moral government.—*A.* 1. Our moral nature which He has given us is a proof that we are under His moral government; and 2. The condition in which He has placed us, giving this nature scope to operate,

i.e., influencing us thus to favour and reward virtue and discountenance and punish vice.

Why is this latter a further proof of God's moral government ?

—*A.* Because it is an instance of it.

Of what is the first a proof?—*A.* It shows that God will finally favour and support virtue effectually.

What is the force of the second?—*A.* It shows that He does support and favour virtue at present in some degree.

WHY THIS RULE OF MORALITY IS NEVER INVERTED.

From what two causes does it arise that virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such punished, and that this rule is never inverted?—*A.* It arises 1. From the moral nature which God has given us; 2. From His having given us so much power over each other's happiness and misery.

What are the natural effects of virtuous practice?—*A.* Peace and delight.

How do they arise?—*A.* They arise from the constitution of our nature.

What again must follow from our moral nature and from God's having put our happiness and misery in many respects in each others' power?—*A.* It must follow that vice as such (*e.g.*, injustice, cruelty, and falsehood) will be infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as detestable—and the villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him under the notion of his deserving it.

But why have you nothing to say against this on the side of vice?—*A.* Because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory to virtue.

In what does virtue consist?—*A.* In a regard to what is right and reasonable as being so; in a regard to veracity, justice, and charity in themselves.

Is there no regard to vice as such?—*A.* No—there is no natural regard to falsehood, injustice and cruelty.

But have there not been persons who have approved of vice in itself and for its own sake?—*A.* If there have been any (which is very questionable), such an approbation of vice is evidently monstrous, as much so as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever.

What does Butler call such instances of perversion?—*A.* Imaginary, unnatural, and monstrous.

What moral effect, then, must follow from our *nature* and our *condition*?—*A.* It must follow that virtue cannot but be, and vice cannot at all be, favoured as such by others, and that the virtuous must be happy in some degree.

And what is the only point here insisted upon?—*A.* It is not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in *some degree*.

And why must they be distinguished even in some degree?—*A.* Because it is a matter of fact, of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human affairs.

THE VOICE OF NATURE IN FAVOUR OF VIRTUE HEARD AMIDST THE CONFUSION OF THE WORLD.

What concession may be made with respect to the distribution of happiness and misery in the world?—*A.* That they are distributed by other rules besides the personal merit and demerit of character.

For what purpose may they thus be so unequally distributed?—*A.* For the purpose of mere discipline.

What is the cause of this unequal distribution of happiness and misery?—*A.* The general laws by which the world is governed.

What also is the cause of our happiness and misery being placed so much in each other's power?—*A.* The same general laws of nature.

What is the *general* effect of such laws?—*A.* They contribute to the rewarding virtue as such and punishing vice as such.

Are these laws ever inverted?—*A.* Never—such an inversion is impossible.

What exceptions may there be?—*A.* These general laws *sometimes* render the wicked prosperous and the righteous afflicted.

But how do these exceptions affect the general argument?—*A.* They cannot drown the voice of nature, declaring itself in favour of virtue and against vice.

Give an intuitive proof of the intention of nature.—*A.* Our being so constituted as that virtue as such is naturally favoured and vice as such is naturally discountenanced.

Why is this to be looked upon as a proof?—*A.* Because otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which such favour and disfavour arise, would be absurd.

But why cannot the exceptions (*i.e.*, virtuous actions sometimes being punished and vicious actions sometimes being rewarded) also prove the intention of nature?—*A.* Because they are produced, not by natural passion implanted in us for good purposes, but by the perversion of some natural passion.

CONCLUSION.

What is the result of all this reasoning?—*A.* It shows that the God of nature, even in this world, favours virtue and discountenances vice.

What may the virtuous man (the truthful, and just, the equitable and charitable man) discover from this?—*A.* He may see that he is on the side of the Divine administration and co-operates with it (*συνεργος τῷ Θεῷ*).

What will be the effect of such a discovery?—*A.* To such a man there will naturally arise a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further.

How is this hope confirmed?—*A.* By the necessary *tendencies of virtue*.

THE TENDENCIES OF VIRTUE WITH REGARD TO
INDIVIDUALS.

What will these tendencies prove?—*A.* They will show that there is somewhat moral in the essential constitution of nature.

What are the natural tendencies of virtue and vice?—*A.* They have a natural tendency to produce better and worse effects than they do at present.

Give an instance to show this.—*A.* Good and bad men would be naturally much more rewarded and punished, than they are at present, but for accidental causes.

How are these natural tendencies prevented?—*A.* By justice being artificially eluded and by ignorance of characters, so that many who would thus favour virtue and discourage vice are prevented from doing so.

THE NATURAL TENDENCIES OF POLITICAL VIRTUE.

What now is the natural tendency of political power under the direction of virtue?—*A.* It has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under its direction.

To what may this tendency of political power under the direction of virtue be compared?—*A.* To the tendency which power under the direction of *reason* has to prevail over brute force.

CONCURRING HELPS NECESSARY.

Now what is the relative power possessed by rational and irrational creatures?—*A.* Several brute creatures are equal and several are superior to man in point of strength, and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes is greater than that of mankind.

What, then, gives man the superiority over brutes?—*A.* Reason.

And what is man acknowledged to be?—*A.* The governing animal upon the earth.

Is this superiority of man over irrational creatures accidental

or natural?—*A.* Natural ; it is what reason has, in the nature of the thing, a tendency to obtain for man.

Are there exceptions to this rule?—*A.* Yes ; many men have been overcome by irrational creatures.

What *concurring circumstances* are needed, then, to render reason superior to brute force?—*A.* Four ; 1. There must be some *proportion* between the power under the direction of reason and the merely brutal force ; for what would a handful of men, though ever so wise, do in a contest, in an open plain, with a number of wild beasts ? 2. There must be *union* among the rational creatures ; for without it brute force might more than maintain its ground against reason ; 3. There must be sufficient *time and scope* for the development of the rational power—for irrational animals might, by a sudden attack, at once overpower and even extirpate the whole species of rational ones ; 4. Reason must not become, as it may be, a hindrance to its own superiority.

How may reason prove such an hindrance?—*A.* By dissuading us from making the attempt from its anticipated danger ; by preventing our undertaking what, it has subsequently appeared, we might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness, for there are certain conjunctures where ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, have their advantages.

Supposing the absence of any one of these four concurring circumstances, what would be the result?—*A.* Irrational power might prevail.

What possible fact is mentioned?—*A.* That in some globes brute force may prevail over reason.

What would produce such an inverted order of things?—*A.* If men were wholly at variance and disunited by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the irrational creatures were firmly united among themselves by instinct.

But why do you call this order of things “ inverted ”?—

A. Because reason has, in the nature of things, a tendency to prevail over brute force, notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity which there is of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent.

With what view has this instance of the natural superiority of reason over brute force been adduced?—*A.* To show that virtue in a society has a similar tendency to procure power.

In what twofold view may this power be considered?—*A.* Either as defensive or as acquisitive.

How has social virtue this tendency?—*A.* It has this tendency: 1. By rendering public good an object and end to every member of the society; 2. By putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, in order to see what is the most effectual method of obtaining and preserving it; 3. By uniting a society within itself and so increasing its strength; 4. By uniting it by means of veracity and justice.

Show that virtue must have this natural tendency.—*A.* Because there must be the same natural tendency in the derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction, as there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force.

But what concurring circumstances are necessary for the triumph of virtue?—*A.* The same as were necessary for the prevalence of reason.

Name them again.—*A.* 1. There must be some PROPORTION between the natural power which is and that which is not under the direction of virtue; 2. There must be time and opportunity given “for godly UNION;” 3 and 4. There must be fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough for the virtuous to exert themselves and reap the fruit of their united labours.

What, in the first place, is the PROPORTION between the virtuous and vicious?—*A.* The disproportion between the good

and bad, even here on earth, is not so great, but that the good have natural power sufficient to prevail over the bad, if circumstances permitted this power to be *united*.

What prevents this godly UNION?—*A.* Good men cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters.

What circumstances also deny to virtue its full SCOPE?—*A.* The known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through, and, particularly, the shortness of life.

What is the character, however, of these hindrances?—*A.* Accidental only.

Where may these hindrances be removed?—*A.* In a future state.

What is the condition of virtue here in this earth?—*A.* It is militant here, and is frequently overborne.

What may its condition be hereafter?—*A.* It may combat with greater advantage, and prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards.

What makes this probable?—*A.* Because in a future state there may be scenes *lasting enough* and in every other way adapted to afford virtue a sufficient *sphere* of action and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in fact.

And what may the condition of the virtuous be *then*?—*A.* They may naturally unite not only among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures in that future state.

What renders such a supposition probable?—*A.* The very nature of virtue, which is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, amongst *all* who are endued with it and known to each other, so as that by it a good man cannot but recommend himself to the favour and protection of all virtuous beings throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his character and can anyway interpose in his behalf.

What effect may such an union among the various orders of virtuous beings in a future life have on any orders of vicious creatures throughout the universal kingdom of God?—*A.* It may

have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other ways, of amending those who are capable of amendment.

Under what circumstances would representations of this kind cease to appear absurd or extravagant?—*A.* If our discoveries in the moral world were proportionable to our discoveries in the material world.

Are these suppositions, however, to be considered as real or imaginary only?—*A.* They are imaginary only.

Why are they, then, adduced at all?—*A.* They are mentioned to show that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and advantages is no objection against its having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them.

How do the suppositions now made show this?—*A.* They show that the hindrances to the natural tendencies of virtue to procure superiority and obtain higher rewards than it does at present are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may be removed in a future state and full scope be granted to virtue.

And what are these advantageous tendencies of virtue to be considered?—*A.* As declarations of God in its favour.

How does Butler characterize the view he has taken?—*A.* As taking in a pretty large compass.

How does he justify the speculation?—*A.* By the immensity and boundless character of the scheme of Providence.

What makes it credible that the moral government of God is so immense and boundless?—*A.* The boundlessness and immensity of the material world.

THE TENDENCY OF A VIRTUOUS STATE TO PROCURE SUPERIORITY.

What case is now supposed to show this happy tendency of virtue?—*A.* The case of a virtuous kingdom.

Describe one.—*A.* Suppose a kingdom perfectly virtuous for a

succession of many ages ; to which may be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy.

In such a state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of the greatest capacity would have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them ; and they would share it among themselves without envy.

Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his genius was peculiarly adapted : and others, who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe and think themselves very happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had.

Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would be faithfully executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute, to the public prosperity, and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbours—for cunning, false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight and accompanied with intestine treachery, would be found mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other side.

What would soon be its position?—*A*. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire. The Head of it would be an universal Monarch, in another sense than any mortal has been, and the eastern style would be literally applicable to him, “ that all people, nations, and languages should serve him.”

How do these happy tendencies of virtue affect the general system of religion?—*A*. They make it appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connexion in its several parts, and a tendency towards its completion, arising out of the very nature of virtue—which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of things.

What two things should be borne in mind by any one who thinks such tendencies of virtue unimportant?—*A.* 1. He should consider what he would think, if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies; and 2. If virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones.

OBJECTION.

But it is objected, that notwithstanding all these natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter in the same mixed way as here at present upon earth—virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed; vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful;—How do you answer this objection?—*A.* It may be answered, that it is not the object of the analogy, or of this chapter, to prove God's perfect moral government over the world or the truth of religion.

What, then, is the object of this treatise?—*A.* To observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known.

And in what four ways do the preceding arguments tend to confirm it?—*A.* 1. They show that the Author of nature is in favour of virtue, and is against vice, and this furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obligations of religion; 2. They show that future rewards and punishments will not be a thing different in *kind* but only in *degree* from what we experience in God's present government; 3. They show that since virtue and vice are actually rewarded and punished in a certain degree at present, we have just ground to hope and to fear that they *may be* rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter; 4. That there is sufficient ground for thinking so from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice, for that these tendencies are essential and founded in the nature of things, whereas the hindrances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only.

Give now a summary of the whole argument?—*A.* 1. There is a kind of moral government implied in God's natural government; 2. Virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society; 3. They are rewarded and punished *per se*; 4. They have a tendency to be rewarded and punished much more than they are at present.

Show, then, that the notion of a scheme of government *much more moral* and perfect is not a fictitious but a natural notion.—*A.* It is suggested to our thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice.

And in what light are these tendencies to be considered?—*A.* They are to be considered as intimations from the Author of nature of much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do respectively follow them at present.

And why do you presume that these tendencies will become effect?—*A.* Because they are prevented from becoming effect only by *accidental* causes.

How is this presumption proportionably increased?—*A.* Proportionably to the length of time through which such tendencies will continue.

What inference do you draw from this?—*A.* That the moral scheme of government, established in nature, shall be absolutely completed.

What *practical proof* have you that it will be completed?—*A.* That arising from the above arguments joined with the moral nature which God has given us.

Why is it a practical proof?—*A.* Because it is a proof from *fact*.

And from what is this practical proof to be distinguished?—*A.* From that which is deduced from eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTENTS.—How this Chapter differs from the last—Our natural trials—*Definition* of the natural government of God—The causes of our natural and moral trials analogous—Man's behaviour under both analogous—Both increased by analogous causes—Our present state of trial no just ground of complaint—Credible—and Consistent with the fore-knowledge of God.

HOW THIS CHAPTER DIFFERS FROM THE LAST.

What doctrine of religion is discussed in this chapter?—

A. “That our present life is a state of *trial* for a future one.”

What is most commonly meant by the doctrine?—*A.* That our future life is now depending, and depending on ourselves:—that we have scope and opportunities here for that good and bad behaviour which God will reward and punish hereafter, together with temptations to the one as well as inducements of reason to the other.

How is this *the same* as the subject of the last chapter?—

A. Because the future judgment, which the last chapter leads us to anticipate, must imply some sort of temptations to what is wrong.

Why?—*A.* Because 1. There would otherwise be no moral possibility of doing wrong, and 2ndly, There would otherwise be no ground for judgment or discrimination.

How, then, will this chapter *differ* from the last?—*A.* In distinctly considering our state as one of TRIAL, danger, and difficulties—the term *trial* expressing, more than the words MORAL GOVERNMENT, allurements to what is wrong, difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and danger of miscarrying through such temptations.

OUR NATURAL TRIALS.

What does the moral government of God imply?—*A.* That we are in a state of trial or probation with respect to a future world.

What does His natural government imply?—*A.* That we are in a state of trial or *probation* with respect to the present life.

What is meant by the NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD? (*To be committed to memory,*)—*A.* “It consists in annexing pleasure to some actions and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such appointment beforehand.”

What is implied in such a kind of government?—*A.* That God has made our happiness and misery (or our interest) to depend in part upon ourselves.

What would endanger this interest?—*A.* Temptations to any course of action which would probably occasion greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness than satisfaction.

What is the conduct of the generality with respect to their worldly interests?—*A.* They are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that natural happiness which they might have obtained in this present life:—perhaps every one does in some degree; whilst many run themselves into great inconvenience and extreme distress and misery.

What do these facts imply?—*A.* They necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest and happiness.

What general inference, therefore, may you draw from them?—*A.* We may conclude that we are, in our NATURAL OR TEMPORAL CAPACITY, in a state of TRIAL, *i.e.*, of difficulty and danger ANALOGOUS or like to our moral and religious trial.

THE CAUSES OF OUR NATURAL AND MORAL TRIALS ANALOGOUS.

Whence arise our trials?—*A.* They arise either from our external circumstances or in our nature—either from without or within.

If a person were betrayed into wrong behaviour by some sudden surprise, or by any singular external circumstance, to what

would you attribute his fault?—*A.* We should impute it to such *external* circumstance.

But suppose he had contracted habits of folly and vice, and sought out for himself opportunities for sinful gratification, what would you then say caused his trial and temptation?—*A.* Nothing external—but rather his own *internal* habits and passions.

And what account might you give of these habits and passions?—*A.* We might say that they were no more coincident with prudence or with that reasonable self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle of virtue and religion; and that such particular passions were as much temptations to act imprudently with regard to our worldly interests, as to act viciously with respect to our future happiness.

When men, however, are misled by *external* circumstances of temptation, what must be understood to have rendered these circumstances temptations?—*A.* Something *within* themselves.

And when men are misled by *internal* passions, what things must enter into the supposition?—*A.* We must conclude that there were *external* circumstances and objects, exciting those passions and affording means of gratifying them.

What relation, then, have these two sources of TRIAL to each other?—*A.* They coincide and mutually imply each other.

What, then, would endanger at once our present and future interest?—*A.* The presence of such external objects of the appetites, passions and affections, exciting emotions which admit of imprudent and vicious gratification.

And what conclusion would you draw from this?—*A.* That we are in a like state of TRIAL with respect to our present and future interests, by the very same passions excited by the very same means.

Describe at large our state of TRIAL in our TEMPORAL capacity?—*A.* Mankind having a *temporal* interest depending upon themselves, and a *prudent* course of behaviour being necessary to secure it; passions inordinately excited (whether by

means of example, or by any other external circumstance towards such objects, at such times or in such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly prudence), are temptations to forego what is upon the whole their temporal interest for the sake of a present gratification.

By the substitution of what words could you describe our state of TRIAL in our RELIGIOUS capacity?—*A.* We could do it by substituting the word “future” for “temporal” and “virtue” for “prudence.”

Now describe it?—*A.* Mankind having a future interest depending upon themselves, and a virtuous course of behaviour being necessary to secure it—passions inordinately excited (whether by means of example or by any other external circumstance towards such objects at such times or in such degrees as that they cannot be gratified consistently with virtue), are temptations to forego what is upon the whole their future interest for the sake of a present gratification.

What do you conclude respecting both states of TRIAL?—*A.* They are very ANALOGOUS or *similar to each other.*

MAN'S BEHAVIOUR UNDER BOTH KINDS OF TRIAL ANALOGOUS.

Describe the manner in which men behave under the trials of life?—*A.* 1. Some have so little sense of them that they scarce look beyond the passing day :—they are so taken up with present gratifications as to have, in a manner no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another ; 2. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as much as in religion ; 3. Others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by inordinate passions against their better judgment and feeble resolutions of acting better ; 4. Many there are who shamelessly avow not their interest but their mere will and pleasure to be their law of life, and who, in

open defiance of everything that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will be their *temporal* ruin, and some of them under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in *another* state. In a word, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, with regard to their *temporal* interests as well as with respect to religion.

What general conclusion can you draw from these different characters of men?—*A.* We may conclude that our TRIALS in our temporal and our religious capacity, as they have the same effect upon men's behaviour, are evidently ANALOGOUS and of the same kind.

MEANS OF INCREASING OUR TRIALS IN BOTH CAPACITIES ANALOGOUS.

In what way are our religious trials caused and increased?—*A.* 1. By the ill behaviour of others; 2. By a wrong and vicious education; 3. By the dishonest artifices which have got into business of all kinds; 4. By religion being corrupted into superstitions which indulge men in their vices.

In what ANALOGOUS or similar way are our natural trials increased?—*A.* 1. By a foolish education; 2. By the extravagance and carelessness of others with whom we have intercourse; 3. By mistaken notions respecting temporal happiness; 4. By negligence, folly and vice, by which men bring themselves into difficulties, which, from habits of indulgence, they become less qualified to sustain; 5. By repeated irregularities, involving them in embarrassments, and making the path of duty so intricate and perplexed, that it becomes difficult to determine what is the prudent or the moral part to perform.

Give an illustration.—*A.* Wrong behaviour in youth increases the difficulties of right behaviour in mature age, *i.e.*, puts us in a more disadvantageous state of TRIAL in our temporal capacity.

OUR PRESENT CONDITION NO JUST GROUND OF
COMPLAINT.

What points must be conceded respecting our present condition?—*A.* 1. That we are an inferior part of the creation of God; 2. That we are in a state of degradation; 3. That we are in a condition which *does not seem* to be the most advantageous for securing either our present or our future interest.

How does Bulter describe our state?—*A.* As being “low, careful, and uncertain.”

Yet why may we not justly complain of it, as respects our temporal condition?—*A.* Because we may pass our days, here on earth, with tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care and prudence.

Or with regard to our religious condition?—*A.* Because there is no more required of us than what we are able to do, and what we must be greatly wanting to ourselves if we neglect.

Show also the equitable character of our rule of life.—*A.* It is a rule which we may observe, and it is imposed upon us by proper authority.

Show, then, the unreasonableness of all complaints about it.—*A.* We have no more reason to complain of it, with regard to the Author of NATURE, than of His not having given us other advantages belonging to other orders of creatures.

TRIALS WITH RESPECT TO OUR FUTURE INTERESTS—WHY
CREDIBLE.

What, then, renders the state of TRIAL, which religion speaks of, credible?—*A.* Its being uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of Providence towards us in all other respects within the compass of our knowledge.

What objection would naturally be raised against the truth of religion, if our present worldly interest was not under TRIAL, and was not made to depend upon our present behaviour?—*A.* It would be said that our religious interests (not being secured

to us, but requiring recollection and self-government), were not ANALOGOUS to our present condition.

But what, on the contrary, is necessary to secure our worldly happiness?—*A.* Care, self-denial, and diligence.

What, then, removes all presumption against the necessity of self-denial and attention to secure our highest interests?—*A.* The absolute necessity of care, diligence and self-denial, to secure our worldly interests.

OUR STATE OF TRIAL COMPATIBLE WITH THE FORE-KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

What would prove a sufficient answer to the argument, “that it is improbable anything of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an Infinite Being, when everything that appears like hazard and danger to us is now already certain in His foreknowledge?”—*A.* Our experience to the contrary.

What is our experience?—*A.* We find that our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct and made to depend upon it.

Give instances of this.—*A.* All the various miseries of life (which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, but which might have been avoided by proper care) are instances of it.

On what do these miseries depend?—*A.* On their conduct.

OBJECT OF THE CHAPTER.

What objections do these remarks answer?—*A.* They are an answer to the objections against the credibility of a state of TRIAL, as implying temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest under the moral government of God.

What do they show?—*A.* They show that the GENERAL ANALOGY OF PROVIDENCE leads us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity.

How do they prove this?—*A.* By showing that we have a present

interest under the government of God which we experience here upon earth—that this interest as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance but to our acquisition—that, therefore, we are in danger of missing it by means of temptation to neglect, and that without attention and self-denial we must and do miss of it—so that it becomes perfectly credible that this may be our case with regard to that chief and final good which religion proposes to us.

CHAPTER V.

CONTENTS.—Man's business in this life—The law of habits—Habits of virtue necessary—This world peculiarly fitted to form habits of virtue—Objections answered.

THIS LIFE A DISCIPLINE FOR A FUTURE ONE.

What Question arises out of the last chapter?—*A.* The Question, “How we came to be placed in a probation state of so much difficulty and hazard.”

What difficulties would arise from such an enquiry?—*A.* Insuperable difficulties.

How might such difficulties be partially met?—*A.* By observing that all wickedness is voluntary, and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects.

What, however, shows us the folly and presumption of pretending to answer them entirely?—*A.* The consideration of the awful consequences of vice in a life to come.

What account does Religion give of this matter?—*A.* Religion teaches us that “*we were placed in this world in order to qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it.*”

How far does this answer the original question?—*A.* Very partially.

What other enquiry would it more satisfactorily answer?—*A.* The enquiry, “What is our business here?”

What, then, is our business in this world?—*A.* “ *Our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness.*”

State the ANALOGY here attempted to be proved.—*A.* As the beginning of life is an education for mature age in the present world, so our present life is an education for a future one.

What five observations will show *the extent and force of the analogy*?—*A.* 1. Man’s capacities and character must correspond to his particular mode of life; 2. By the formation of habits he becomes qualified for that mode of life; 3. He must acquire these habits; 4. Virtue is necessary for a future life; 5. This world is peculiarly adapted to discipline, and train us in virtue.

MODES OF LIFE.

What is the first point to be here observed?—*A.* “ *That every species of creatures is designed and fitted for a particular mode of life.*”

What things are necessary for this mode of life?—*A.* That there should be a harmony between the *nature* and *condition* of each species.

Show this to be the case.—*A.* Change a Human Being’s character and capacities, he would be incapable of a Human course of life and of human happiness: or let his character and capacities remain unchanged, but change his *condition*, that is, put him in a world where he had no sphere of action or any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections, and still he would be unhappy.

What use does Butler make of the passage out of Ecclesiasticus, “One thing is set over against another?”—*A.* To show the harmony subsisting between our NATURE and CONDITION.

From what two things do life and happiness proceed?—*A.* From our nature and external condition conjointly.

What INFERENCE is drawn from this fact?—*A.* That as there must be some special capacities and character to enable us to

enjoy this present life, so “ *There must be some determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifications, without which we must be utterly incapable of enjoying a future life.*”

MAN IS CAPABLE OF ACQUIRING HABITS, AND THUS OF FITTING HIMSELF FOR CERTAIN MODES OF LIFE.

What is the second consideration?—*A.* “That human creatures are so constituted as to be capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified.”

Is this capacity peculiar to man?—*A.* No! It is possessed by every species of creatures known to us.

By what process are we capable of such enlargement of our faculties?—*A.* By the power of HABITS.

With what threefold capacity are we particularly endued?—*A.* 1. With the power of perceiving truth and storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory; 2. With the power of action and acquiring a new facility in any kind of action; 3. With the power of being differently impressed in our minds and of settled alterations in our temper and character.

By what power are we capable of these two last capacities?—*A.* By the power of HABITS.

What does Butler exclude from the nature of HABITS?—*A.* The perception of ideas and knowledge of any sort.

Of what use, then, are they?—*A.* They are absolutely necessary to the formation of habits.

What is the exact place assigned them in the moral world?—*A.* They are *like habits*.

How many kinds, then, of habits are there?—*A.* Two.

Name them.—*A.* Habits of *perception* and habits of *action*.

Give me an instance of THE HABIT OF PERCEPTION.—*A.* Correcting our impressions concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation.

What might you call all association of ideas not naturally

connected?—*A.* PASSIVE HABITS, as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight or hearing of words.

Give me now an instance of ACTIVE HABITS.—*A.* Our readiness in speaking and writing languages.

In what two points of view does Butler consider habits?—

A. He considers them either as MENTAL OR BODILY.

How may we explain the habits belonging to the mind?—

A. By those habits which belong to the body.

What is meant by BODILY HABITS?—*A.* All bodily activities or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use.

What is meant by MENTAL HABITS?—*A.* General habits of life and conduct—such as obedience and submission to authority—veracity—justice—charity—the habit of attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge.

How are these habits produced?—*A.* BY REPEATED ACTS.

How are bodily habits produced?—*A.* BY REPEATED ACTS.

What difference is there between the two?—*A.* Bodily habits are produced by *external* acts :—mental habits by the exertion of the *inward principle*.

Why cannot mental habits be formed in some other way?—

A. Because those only are acts of obedience, veracity, justice, envy, revenge, which proceed from the exercise of the inward principle.

What does Butler call “an intention?”—*A.* “AN INWARD ACT.”

What does he call resolutions to do well?—*A.* ACTS.

What does he call all endeavours to enforce on our own minds and those of others a *practical* sense of virtue?—*A.* Virtuous acts.

What will be the effect of such acts?—*A.* They will tend to form GOOD HABITS.

PASSIVE IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIVE HABITS.

What will be the effect of theorizing on virtue—talking well and drawing fine pictures of it, without carrying it out into action?—*A.* It will tend to produce quite *the contrary habit*—a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations.

What is the cause of this effect?—*A.* The fact—that **PASSIVE IMPRESSIONS** *by being repeated become weaker.*

Show this really to be the case?—*A.* Being accustomed to danger, fear is lessened: being accustomed to distress, pity is lessened: being accustomed to the deaths of others, the sensible apprehension of our own is lessened.

What follows from this fact—that **PASSIVE IMPRESSIONS** become weaker, whilst **ACTIVE HABITS** become stronger by repetition?—*A.* It follows that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening by a course of acting upon such motives and excitements, whilst these motives and excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, becoming less and less sensibly felt.

How is this confirmed by experience?—*A.* We find that active principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character and become more effectual in influencing our practice.

What three instances are adduced to illustrate this fact?—*A.* 1. Perception of **DANGER** excites fear—passively—which gradually decreases by habit; excites caution—actively—which gradually increases. 2. **DISTRESS** excites pity—passively—which gradually decreases; excites benevolence—actively—which gradually increases. 3. **DEATH** excites an apprehension of our own—passively—which gradually decreases; excites caution and due preparation for eternity, which increases.

What further point is shown by this law of our nature?—*A.* That passive impressions, made upon our minds by admo-

tion, experience, example, are useful in the formation of active habits only as they induce us to *act* upon them; since habits are the result not of passive impressions but of active habits.

Is the attempt, then, to enforce good impressions on our minds useless?—*A.* By no means—it is a species of virtuous action.

What does Butler admit to be possible?—*A.* That effects, equivalent to habits, may be wrought in us at once.

But what is the question before us?—*A.* Not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature.

And what is the law of nature respecting active habits?—*A.* The law of nature respecting them is, *that active habits are formed by exercise.*

What points respecting the laws of habit are confessedly difficult?—*A.* To trace their progress; to explain the faculty, by which we are capable of them; to trace it up to its original throughout its several parts; to define its contrary effects.

What point, however, is most clear, and a matter of most certain experience?—*A.* That our nature is formed to yield
TO USE AND EXERCISE.

How, then, do we acquire an aptitude and even pleasure in any course of action?—*A.* By accustoming ourselves to it.

In what two ways do practical principles grow strong?—*A.* Absolutely in themselves, by exercise; and relatively with regard to contrary principles.

What EFFECT follows from the acquisition of habits?—*A.* A new character, in many respects, may be formed, and many habitudes of life not given by nature, but which nature inculcates, may be acquired.

THE FORMATION OF HABITS NECESSARY.

What shows us the NECESSITY and DUTY of acquiring HABITS?—*A.* Our capacity of improving by them.

Show that they are necessary.—*A.* Without them we should

be utterly incapable of the employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life.

How are we qualified for mature life?—*A.* Not by nature, but by HABITS.

How do we attain our maturity of understanding and bodily strength?—*A.* By the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind.

Suppose a person were brought into the world in full possession of all his bodily and mental powers, what sad deficiencies would he display?—*A.* It would be some time before he would be capable of doing anything; his sight would deceive, his hearing mislead him; he would, in all probability, be self-willed and headstrong, and insupportable to society.

How are these natural deficiencies supplied?—*A.* BY HABITS.

What TWOFOLD provision has the Author of our nature made for the supply of these deficiencies?—*A.* 1. He has not only given us a capacity to acquire these habits; 2. He has also put us in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, most fitted for their acquisition.

Show this more fully.—*A.* Children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects around them. The discipline of home teaches them self-government in common behaviour abroad, and obedience and subjection to civil authority; they are daily becoming alive to the treachery and deceit of the world, and daily learning customs and numberless little rules of action and conduct which they could not live without.

What conclusion may be drawn from these facts?—*A.* That the beginning of our days is adapted to be a state of education in the theory and practice of mature life.

What assistance, in the beginning of our days, do we derive from others?—*A.* Much assistance from their example, instruction and care.

Are we wholly dependent on others?—*A.* No; a great deal is left to ourselves to do.

What is the character of the work that is thus left us to per-

form?—*A.* Part of it is easy—but part requires diligence, care and self-denial.

Of what use are these last?—*A.* They fit us for our duties in mature life.

What influence have they on our character?—*A.* They serve to develop it, according as we behave ourselves under the difficulties and hardships of youth.

What conclusion may you draw from this fact?—*A.* We may conclude that “the former part of life is an important opportunity which nature puts into our hands, and which, when lost, is not to be recovered.”

What ANALOGOUS condition of life is there?—*A.* The discipline of this life for another world.

How do you mean that it is “Analogous?”—*A.* It is uniform, and of a piece, with it.

State the analogy.—*A.* The discipline of this life to prepare us for another world is LIKE (uniform and of a piece with) the discipline of childhood preparing us for mature life.

OBJECTION.

“But we cannot see how this present life can be a preparation for a future life.”—Answer this objection.—*A.* We cannot see many natural things, which nevertheless are facts. We cannot see how food and sleep can contribute to the growth of the body. Children do not think that their sports and exercises contribute to their health and growth:—they do not imagine there is a necessity to be restrained in them—nor do they understand many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age.

What, then, would at once lead you to suppose that the present life could form you for a future one?—*A.* The general analogy of Providence.

What would especially confirm this supposition?—*A.* The moral character of God’s government.

If we take in this consideration, how may we distinctly see that the present life may be a preparation for a future?—*A.* We shall see that, if the government of the world be moral, then the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for the future state.

VIRTUE NECESSARY FOR A FUTURE LIFE.

How will this show that the present life may be a preparation for a future?—*A.* In two ways. 1. We want and are capable of improvement in virtue and piety by moral and religious habits; 2. This present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement.

In what way is this present life fit to be a state of discipline for a future?—*A.* In the same way (ANALOGICALLY) as infancy, childhood and youth are a necessary preparation and a natural state of discipline for mature age.

PREPARATION FOR HEAVEN NECESSARY.

What kind of life may we suppose our future life will be?—*A.* An active life.

What will our state be?—*A.* A community.

What induces you to think so?—*A.* THE ANALOGY OF NATURE.

Under what kind of government may this society be placed?—*A.* Under God's more immediate and sensible government.

What may the employments of this society be?—*A.* They may consist in the exercise of benevolence, justice and veracity, amongst the members of it with regard to each other.

Supposing there is no sphere of exercise for these virtues, what would follow?—*A.* There might yet be occasion for a benevolent and just frame of mind and character.

How is such a character obtained?—*A.* By the daily practice of these virtues in this world.

What, however, must be owned in general?—*A.* All persons must allow that the character of virtue and piety *must* be the condition of our happiness and the qualification for it.

Why is this condition necessary?—*A.* *Because the government established in the universe is moral.*

MAN'S NEED OF MORAL IMPROVEMENT.

What point has now been satisfactorily proved?—*A.* It has been shown that we are **CAPABLE OF IMPROVEMENT**.

In what way?—*A.* By a natural power of acquiring **HABITS**.

What things show our **NEED** of improvement?—*A.* The great wickedness of mankind in general, and the acknowledged imperfections of the best men.

Why are all men in danger of running into indulgences and habits of vice?—*A.* Because we are all naturally *deficient*.

What only security is there against this danger?—*A.* The formation of virtuous habits.

MAN'S DANGER—WHENCE IT ARISES.

You said all men were deficient and in danger of going wrong, whence do these dangers and defects arise?—*A.* They arise from **OUR NATURAL CONSTITUTION**.

Of what parts does our natural constitution consist?—*A.* Of two parts: 1. The moral principle; and 2. Various affections towards particular external objects.

What relation should there be between these two component parts of man?—*A.* The affections should always be subject to the government of the moral principle.

What connection really subsists between them?—*A.* The moral principle can neither excite the affections nor prevent them from being excited.

What, then, excites the affections?—*A.* The external objects suited to them, and they will be excited and felt when these objects are before the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but even after it is found they cannot.

Whence, then, does man's **DANGER** clearly arise?—*A.* From these very affections inclining us to venture on unlawful means of gratifying them.

MAN'S SECURITY.

But what is **MAN'S SECURITY**?—*A.* As his danger is, so also must his security be—*from within*.

What would you call this *inward security*?—*A.* *Man's moral principle.*

How can this moral principle be improved?—*A.* By proper discipline and exercise.

Describe the character of this discipline.—*A.* “Recollecting the practical impressions which example and experience have made upon us, and, instead of following humour and mere inclination, continually attending to the equity and right of the case in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less matters, and accustoming ourselves always to act upon it as being itself the just and natural motive of action, and because this moral course of behaviour must necessarily, under the Divine government, be our final interest.”

What general conclusion do you, then, arrive at?—*A.* “That the principle of virtue, improved into a habit, of which improvement we are capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propensions or particular affections.”

What fact does this reasoning imply?—*A.* That particular affections remain in a future state.

Is it possible that they should remain?—*A.* It is scarce possible to avoid supposing so.

Should they, then, continue, what necessity would there be for acquired habits of virtue and self-government?—*A.* These would be necessary to regulate the affections.

Should they not continue, show that the thing really comes to the same.—*A.* Habits of virtue are improvement in virtue, and improvement in virtue must be advancement in happiness.

UPRIGHT CREATURES REQUIRE DISCIPLINE.

What two facts further show our need of improvement by DISCIPLINE?—*A.* The fall and improvement of upright and finitely perfect creatures.

Describe a finitely perfect creature.—*A.* A creature endued with such *propensions* as were necessary for his particular state of life, together with a *moral understanding*; and these several principles being in the most exact proportion possible, *i.e.*, in a proportion most exactly adapted to his intended mode of life.

What might occasion the fall of such an upright creature?—*A.* His *propensions* might occasion his fall.

What is the nature of these propensions?—*A.* Particular propensions must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.

How, then, are upright creatures in danger of falling?—*A.* From the possibility of gratifying these propensions without the allowance of the moral principle.

What is clearly the tendency of such propensions?—*A.* Their tendency is to induce us to forbidden gratifications.

What would increase this tendency?—*A.* The greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting such propensions.

How would such tendency become effect?—*A.* By the least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, till (peculiar circumstances perhaps conspiring) the tendency ends in an act.

What effect would such an irregularity have on the constitution of the upright?—*A.* It would disorder it: unsettle its adjustments, and alter the proportions which formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted.

How would his constitution be spoiled?—*A.* By a repetition of such irregularities.

Then upright creatures are in danger of falling from the very nature of their propensions; how is this, their danger, illustrated?—*A.* By supposing a straight path marked out for a person, in which such a degree of attention would keep him steady; but if he would not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand objects catching his eye might lead him out of it.

UPRIGHT CREATURES IMPROVED.

How might such upright creatures, instead of falling and corrupting their constitution, have still further improved themselves?—*A.* By a contrary behaviour.

Describe this contrary behaviour.—*A.* By steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be *one* part of their nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from *propension*, the *other* part.

In what two ways would their danger of falling be lessened?—*A.* 1. By the weakening of their propensions; 2. By the strengthening of the moral principle.

To what degree might their character be improved?—*A.* To such an extent that their danger of actually deviating from right might be almost infinitely lessened.

And to what would you, therefore, attribute this great security?—*A.* To habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline.

What conclusion, then, may you draw from the foregoing reasoning?—*A.* It is plainly conceivable that upright and finitely perfect creatures may be in danger, from their *propensions*, of going wrong, and so may stand in need of *virtuous habits*, additional to the *moral principle* wrought into their natures by their Creator; that their want of security is a deficiency of which virtuous habits are the natural supply; and that, as they are naturally *capable* of being raised and improved by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite that they should be placed *in circumstances* with an eye to it—in circumstances peculiarly fitted to be to *them a state of discipline* for their improvement in virtue.

WHY FALLEN MAN MUCH MORE REQUIRES DISCIPLINE.

If upright creatures thus require discipline, why has fallen man *greater need of discipline*?—*A.* Because man has corrupted his nature: fallen from his original rectitude, and his passions

have become excessive through repeated violations of his inward constitution.

Why, then, is discipline necessary for him?—*A.* To wear out vicious habits; to recover his primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence has weakened; to repair as well as raise into a habit the moral principle, in order to his arriving at a secure state of virtuous happiness.

THE WORLD AN EXCELLENT SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE.

What means has man of thus disciplining himself?—*A.* The present world is *peculiarly* FIT to be a state of discipline to him.

What makes it so?—*A.* The various temptations with which we are surrounded.

Mention some of these temptations.—*A.* Our experience of the deceits of wickedness:—having been in many instances led wrong ourselves:—the great viciousness of the world:—the infinite disorders consequent upon it: our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it or from the sight of it in others.

What effect should these things have on the mind?—*A.* They have a direct tendency to *discipline*, and *chasten* the mind, and bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper.

And what experience does the present state of things afford us?—*A.* It shows us the frailty of our nature—the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion—the power which an Infinite Being has over us, by the various capacities of misery which He has given us.

What will be the result of such experience?—*A.* It will practically convince us that *we are liable to vice and capable of misery*.

And of what probable use may this sense of things be in a future state?—*A.* Our security in the highest and most settled state of perfection may, in part, arise from it—and the moral at-

tention which was necessary to the acting a right part in the world may leave everlasting impressions upon our minds.

Mention, however, more distinctly some things which render this world peculiarly fit to be a SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE?—*A.* Allurements to what is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our duty; our not being able to act a uniform right part without some thought and care; the opportunities which we have or imagine we have of avoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what we desire by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones.

How are they useful to discipline us?—*A.* They render the exercise of caution, resolution, and the denial of our passions necessary in order to preserve our integrity.

What will be the tendency of such caution, resolution, and self-denial?—*A.* They will enable us to form habits of virtue.

What do they imply?—*A.* They imply not only a real but a *more continued* and a more *intense* exercise of the virtuous principle.

What case is supposed to prove this?—*A.* The case of a person who knows himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing anything wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do.

What will be necessary to make good his resolution?—*A.* Continued recollection and keeping upon his guard.

And what will be the result of this intense exercise of the virtuous principle?—*A.* A more confirmed habit of virtue will be the consequence.

Is, then, self-denial in every point essential to virtue and piety?—*A.* No.

Why is it not essential?—*A.* Because certain virtuous and pious actions may happen to be perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, and therefore may not be any exercise of the virtuous principle.

When do they become virtuous?—*A.* When they are done in circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty.

What then will be the result?—*A.* They will have the tendency, in proportion to the difficulties, dangers, and temptations under which they were performed, of forming and fixing the habit of virtue.

How far does this hold good?—*A.* Only to a certain length.

Why not to any extent?—*A.* Because our moral character may be overwrought.

What shows this to be possible?—*A.* The fact, that our intellectual powers and our bodily strength cannot be improved beyond a certain extent.

What do you infer from this fact?—*A.* The possibility of there being somewhat analogous to this with respect to the moral character.

Why does Butler allude to such a possibility?—*A.* Lest it should be considered, not as an exception to the foregoing observations, which it is; but as a refutation of them, which it is not.

How far do the foregoing observations hold good?—*A.* Not minutely and in every case—but only in general.

What is plainly intended by them?—*A.* to show that “*the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for improvement in virtue and piety.*”

To whom will it prove this EXCELLENT SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE?—*A.* It will prove so to such as will gird themselves to the task of improvement; just as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, are fit to form the mind to habits of attention.

THIS WORLD NOT PROVING A SCHOOL OF VIRTUOUS DISCIPLINE TO MOST MEN NO PROOF THAT GOD DID NOT INTEND IT TO BE SO.

Of what use, however, do most men make of the temptations and great wickedness of the world?—*A.* They become to the generality of men not a discipline of virtue but of vice.

Why, then, are these temptations allowed at all?—*A.* They

serve to improve the virtuous much further than a more perfect state of society would do.

What was the end and occasion why we were placed in such a condition?—*A.* We cannot pretend to account for either.

What point is evident amidst the general corruption of the world?—*A.* That there are some persons, who, having within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to and follow the dictates of virtue and religion, and that the present world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and degrees peculiarly apt to improve it—apt to improve it in some respects even beyond what would be by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves.

What would enable you to show, that, because the world does not become to most men a state of moral discipline, this is no proof that it was not intended to answer this end?—*A.* THE ANALOGY OF NATURE.

In what way?—*A.* Nature evidently intended the seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals to arrive at perfect maturity, yet not one seed in a million actually arrives at perfection, and far the greatest part of animals never reach to a state of maturity.

And what natural phenomena may be thought as unaccountable as the great wickedness, misery, and ruin of mankind by voluntary sinfulness?—*A.* The amazing waste of these seeds and bodies by foreign causes.

A RELIGIOUS COURSE OF BEHAVIOUR, THOUGH IT BE A DISCIPLINE OF SELF-LOVE, NOT TO BE CONDEMNED.

What other objection is raised against the notion of MORAL DISCIPLINE?—*A.* It is said that a course of behaviour, materially virtuous (as *e.g.*, regard to veracity, justice and charity, so far as it proceeds from hope of reward or fear of punishment) is only a DISCIPLINE AND STRENGTHENING OF SELF-LOVE.

What answer may be given to this objection?—*A.* It may be said that there is no foundation for this nice distinction of motives and actions, and that simple obedience to God's command, though prompted by the FEAR of offending Him, or from a HOPE of some benefit, is still *obedience*.

And what will follow a course of such obedience?—*A.* A HABIT of obedience.

And what will follow from a regard to veracity, justice and charity?—*A.* Distinct HABITS of these particular virtues—HABITS of *self-government* and *self-denial*, whenever truth, justice and charity required it, directly opposed to SELF-LOVE.

What three principles of action are allowed to be just and natural?—*A.* 1. Veracity, justice and charity (actions materially virtuous); 2. Regard to God's authority (from fear of His wrath); 3. Regard to our own chief interest (from hope of His favour).

And suppose a person began a good life from any one of these principles, what three blessed effects would follow?—*A.* 1. He could not fail to become more and more of that character which corresponds to the constitution of NATURE as *moral*; 2. He could not fail to become more and more of that character which corresponds to the relation which GOD stands in to us as the MORAL governor of the world; 3. And consequently he could not fail of obtaining that HAPPINESS which this *constitution* and this *relation* necessarily suppose connected with that character.

DISCIPLINE OF SUBMISSION, OR OF THE PASSIVE VIRTUES.

To what other part of a right character do these remarks on *active* virtue apply?—*A.* They apply also to *passive* submission or resignation to God's will.

How can such resignation be described?—*A.* As an essential part of a right character, connected with the active principle of virtue, and very much in our own power to form ourselves to.

What two wrong ideas do men entertain respecting it?—*A.* They imagine 1. That nothing but affliction can give occasion for or require this virtue; 2. That it can have no respect to a state of perfect happiness.

RESIGNATION IN PROSPERITY—WHY NECESSARY.

Name some other thing besides affliction which requires a spirit of resignation?—*A.* Prosperity needs such a spirit.

On what account?—*A.* Because it begets unbounded and extravagant thoughts, which will end in discontent, jealousy and misery, unless checked and disciplined by a spirit of resignation to the will of God.

“But in another world, where sorrow is no more, patience and resignation will not be necessary, and, therefore, there is no necessity to acquire these passive virtues in this world”—what answer can you give to this?—*A.* We answer that though there is no scope for patience in heaven, yet there may be need in heaven of that temper of mind which shall have been formed by patience and submission.

On what ground do you think so?—*A.* Because the will of man, as well as of all creatures, is not always coincident with the will of God—and as self-love (considered as a design to promote our own interest and happiness) like other affections, is liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution of things or the divine appointments—on this account habits of resignation *may be requisite for all creatures.*

And what do you mean by habits of resignation?—*A.* Resignation formed by use, and wrought into the character.

What will tend to moderate this self-love and these particular affections?—*A.* Denial of them in a course of active virtue, and obedience to God’s will.

What effect will such self-denial have on the mind?—*A.* It will accustom the mind to be easy and satisfied with that degree

of happiness which is allotted to us—*i.e.*, it will teach us RESIGNATION.

DISCIPLINE UNDER AFFLICTION.

But what is the proper discipline for resignation?—*A.* Affliction.

What will accustom the mind to a dutiful submission?—*A.* A right behaviour under trials and afflictions.

And in what does this consist?—*A.* In considering them, in the view in which religion teaches us to consider them, *as from the hand of God*:—receiving them as what He appoints or thinks proper to permit, in His world and under His government.

What effect will this spirit of resignation, united with the active principle of obedience, have on the mind?—*A.* They will form that temper and character which answers to His sovereignty, and absolutely belongs to the condition of our being as dependent creatures.

Why cannot it be said that such conduct is only bending the mind to a submission to mere power?—*A.* Because mere power may be accidental, irregular and usurped, but this is forming within ourselves the temper of resignation to His rightful authority WHO IS, BY NATURE, supreme over all.

SUMMARY.

Sum up, then, the general ANALOGY of the chapter.—*A.* AS a particular character and special qualifications are necessary for the mature state of life in the present world, which character and qualifications nature does not bestow upon us but puts it upon us, in a great part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from childhood to old age—giving us 1. Capacities to acquire that character and those qualifications; 2. Putting us in a condition to acquire them; SO are we, in this present life, in a state of *moral discipline* for another.

Show that it is vain to *object* that it is not credible that this life should be a discipline for another, as such discipline is un-

necessary, since God might have made us at once the creatures and the characters *which we were to be*.—*A*. Our experience shows us that *what we were to be* was to be the effect of *what we would do*.

What is the conduct of nature in general?—*A*. Not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of enduring both.

How does nature supply our deficiencies and secure us against the dangers of life?—*A*. By acquirements of our own—experience and habits.

Name a general law of nature.—*A*. The forming and cultivating practical principles within us, by attention, use and discipline, chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it.

What alternative is left to our choice?—*A*. Either to improve ourselves, and better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched.

What inference, then, may certainly be drawn from the ANALOGY OF NATURE?—*A*. That the same alternative may be left to our choice with respect to the happiness of a future life, and the qualifications necessary for it.

THE WORLD, A DISCIPLINE, AS BEING A THEATRE FOR THE MANIFESTATION OF CHARACTER.

It has now been shown, 1. That this world is a state of trial; 2. That it is a state of moral discipline; what *third* thing seems implied in its being a state of probation?—*A*. That this life is a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' characters with respect to a future one.

To whom?—*A*. Not to an omniscient God, but to His creation, or at least to a part of it.

What respect may the manifestation of character have to our future life?—*A*. It may be the means of our being disposed of at the judgment day, suitably to our characters; and of its being known to the CREATION that we are so disposed of.

What is its influence in this present life?—*A.* It contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that general course of nature respecting mankind, which comes under our observation at present.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTENTS.—The opinion of necessity does not disprove, 1. The existence of God; 2. His intelligence; 3. Man's religious state; 4. The character of God or man; 5. The internal evidence of religion; 6. Its external evidence.—The doctrine destructive of all religion.

What conclusion may be drawn from the foregoing treatise?—*A.* We may conclude that the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under that government of God which we experience, is greatly *analogous* to our condition as designed for another world, or to that further government which religion teaches.

If, then, the opinion of necessity be reconcilable with the government of God which we experience, what question will immediately arise?—*A.* Whether the opinion of necessity may not be equally reconcilable with religion itself and its proof.

What is the essence of the question?—*A.* Not absolute or categorical, but hypothetical.

State the question.—*A.* The question is, “Whether, supposing the opinion of fate be reconcilable with the constitution of *nature*, it be not reconcilable also with *religion*.”

What apology does Butler here make?—*A.* For the unavoidable obscurity of the chapter.

THE EXISTENCE AND INTELLIGENCE OF GOD NOT DIS- PROVED BY THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

What point has all along been taken for granted?—*A.* That there is an intelligent Author and Governor of the world.

Why is it requisite to consider this point?—*A.* Because an objection may be made against its proof.

What are the grounds of this objection?—*A.* It may be supposed that UNIVERSAL NECESSITY may itself account for the origin and preservation of all things.

What, then, is the object of this chapter?—*A.* To show that Fatality does not destroy the proof of an Intelligent Author and Governor of nature, or the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of religion.

When a fatalist, then, asserts that all things are by necessity, and could not be otherwise, what answer would you give?—*A.* That this necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles to certain ends.

How do you justify this answer?—*A.* By the undoubted experience of all. It is acknowledged by all, and is what every man may, every moment, be conscious of.

What follows from this fact?—*A.* That necessity, alone, and of itself, does not account for the existence and continuance of the world, but only for this circumstance in its existence and continuance, that it could not otherwise have been formed or maintained.

What must we understand when it is said that the world was made by necessity?—*A.* We *must* understand that it was made by *an agent acting necessarily.*

Why must we so understand the assertion?—*A.* Because abstract notions can do nothing.

Give an illustration.—*A.* If a fatalist and an advocate of man's free agency were speaking of a HOUSE, they would both agree that the house in question had been built by an ARCHITECT. The difference between them would be "whether the architect had been a necessary or a free agent."

Why is this account of the existence of a house not applicable to the existence of God?—*A.* Because He exists prior to all design contributing to his existence.

What induces us to ascribe such an existence to him?—*A.* We are obliged to do so by our own *innate ideas*.

What are these ideas?—*A.* Those of infinity and eternity.

What do these ideas imply?—*A.* The existence of something answering to them—or—their archetype.

What would this archetype be?—*A.* AN ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEING.

On what principle do you justify such a conclusion?—*A.* Because every abstract implies a concrete.

What conclusion do you draw from this axiom?—*A.* That there is and cannot but be AN INFINITE AND ETERNAL BEING existing, prior to all designs contributing to His existence, and exclusive of it.

But how is it, then, that we say, that necessity is the foundation, reason, and account of God's existence?—*A.* Such an expression is owing to the scantiness and imperfection of language.

Why cannot it be said that everything besides God exists by this law of necessity?—*A.* On several accounts; and because it is admitted that design in the actions of men contributes to *many alterations of nature*.

What TWO CONCLUSIONS follow from the above reasoning?—*A.* 1. That when a Fatalist asserts that everything is by necessity—he must mean “by an AGENT acting necessarily;” 2. That the necessity, by which such an AGENT is supposed to act, does not exclude *intelligence* and *design*.

What things prove His intelligence?—*A.* Evident appearances of design, and final causes.

What, then, is the one general summary of the argument?—*A.* *That*, even if the opinion of necessity were true, there would nevertheless be AN INTELLIGENT AUTHOR AND NATURAL GOVERNOR OF THE WORLD.

MAN'S RELIGIOUS STATE NOT AFFECTED BY THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

What question must next in order be considered?—*A.*

Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed possible, does or does not destroy all reasonable ground of belief that we are in a state of religion.

What case is supposed?—*A.* The education of a child in the principles of fatality.

What effect would such principles have on the mind of the child at school and in the world?—*A.* They would make him vain, conceited, and intolerable to himself and all about him, even to his own destruction.

What would he learn from the correction he would certainly experience?—*A.* He would find, that if the scheme of fatality were not false, yet that he had reasoned falsely and absurdly upon it.

What would be the practical working of the doctrine when applied to every day life?—*A.* Equally absurd and fallacious.

What was the absurd fallacy of the ancients respecting the doctrine of necessity?—*A.* It was called “Ignava Ratio” or “Ἄργος Λόγος.”

Give an example:—

A. Zeno, quando servum furem verberabat,
Furari sibi fatum esse dicenti,
Et “vapulare” respondit.

How are such practical absurdities avoided?—*A.* By supposing ourselves to be FREE.

How is this supposition confirmed?—*A.* By our whole experience.

Show that we are free.—*A.* The whole process of action is, as if we were free.

Describe the process of action.—*A.* Suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and, at last, doing as we determine.

What, however, is the point here insisted upon?—*A.* That, under the present natural government of the world, we find that we are treated *as if we were* FREE, prior to all consideration whether we are or not.

Show the danger of acting on fatalist principles.—*A.* Whenever we apply the doctrine to life and practice, we find ourselves dreadfully deceived with regard to our *present* interests.

What caution is here very properly inserted?—*A.* We should fear, lest the application of the same opinion to religion should mislead us, in some *analogous* manner, with respect to our *eternal* interests.

What reason have we for this fear?—*A.* Because religion is a practical thing, and the doctrine of necessity cannot be applied to practical subjects.

What must be the state of the fatalist's mind when he applies his principles to religion and boasts that he is free from its obligations?—*A.* Highly unsatisfactory and practically contradictory.

To what does Butler compare this unsatisfactoriness?—*A.* To the state of that man's mind who fancies that he can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of Infinity.

What general CONCLUSION may be drawn from this part of the subject?—*A.* That if religion be true upon supposition of *freedom*, it remains so upon supposition of *necessity*.

Why does not this conclusion reflect upon reason?—*A.* Because our reason would teach us to act on practical principles, and not to apply ourselves to subjects, which experience shows us are not to be depended upon.

GOD'S CHARACTER—MAN'S CHARACTER NOT AFFECTED BY
THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

If necessity does not prevent us from having a will and a character, what inference may be drawn, bearing on the character of God?—*A.* It will not prevent God having a will and a character.

What two things, moreover, especially manifest His character?—*A.* His natural government and final causes.

Why does not the doctrine of necessity interfere with His

character?—*A.* Because it no more hinders Him from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithless, just than unjust.

How do you infer this?—*A.* Because it no more hinders us from being benevolent than cruel, &c., &c.

But does not the doctrine of necessity at once destroy the proof that God is good, and, consequently, the proof of religion?—*A.* No! we find, by experience, that misery and happiness are not our fate in any other sense than as they are the consequences of our behaviour.

And what kind of government does God exercise over us?—*A.* That which a *father* exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects.

And give a reason why truth and justice *must* be the natural rule and measure of His government?—*A.* Because he has no competitors or interfering of interests with His creatures or subjects.

THE INTERNAL EVIDENCES OF RELIGION NOT AFFECTED
BY THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

What two reasons are assigned for the fuller consideration of this subject?—*A.* 1. Because the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be so easily perplexed with the most abstruse difficulties; 2. Because the doctrine of *fatality* is the very basis of infidelity.

Mention three important subjects which the doctrine of necessity does not affect.—*A.* It does not affect 1. The existence of an intelligent Author of nature; 2. His government by rewards and punishments; 3. Our moral faculty of distinguishing between actions, and approving some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapproving others of a vicious and of ill desert.

What is the proof of the first of these two points?—*A.* That which is derived from final causes.

What proves the second and third points?—*A.* They require no proof, being matters of fact.

What does our moral faculty of discerning between actions imply?—*A.* A rule of action and a rule of a very peculiar kind.

What kind of rule?—*A.* An authoritative and directing rule.

Of what authority?—*A.* Such, that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.

What, too, may its dictates be called?—*A.* The laws of God—laws including sanctions.

Show that they are so.—*A.* Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures capable of considering such rule as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following it and of danger in deviating from it.

What may the directing influence of our moral faculty be called?—*A.* A command from God.

What does such command imply?—*A.* An implicit promise in case of obedience or threatening in case of disobedience.

But what enables us to judge of the quality of actions?—*A.* Our moral faculty.

What effect has this on the sanctions of God's laws?—*A.* It renders them explicit and expressed.

What do you mean by explicit sanctions?—*A.* Plain declarations as to the persons on whom His punishments shall be inflicted and His rewards be bestowed.

Why has God given us this moral faculty?—*A.* To inform us beforehand what we are finally to expect in this world.

What conclusion do you draw from this?—*A.* That there is most evident ground to think that the government of God will be found to correspond with the nature He has given us, and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall in fact and event be made to follow virtue and vice respectively.

What are the grounds of this conclusion?—*A.* Because God has associated the ideas of happiness with virtue, and of misery with vice.

From what might you easily deduce the obligations of reli-

gious worship?—*A.* By considering it as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obedience to it.

Show that the proposition reasoned upon—that we have a moral faculty and discernment—is unobjectionable.—*A.* It is a matter of fact that we have this moral faculty.

Show also the fairness of the conclusion.—*A.* It arises immediately from the premises.

What is the conclusion?—*A.* That God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked.

How is this conclusion drawn?—*A.* From God's own declaration that He will reward the virtuous and punish the wicked.

Where has He told us this?—*A.* In the promise and threatening which the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert more distinctly expresses.

How is this reasoning confirmed and verified?—*A.* By the natural tendencies of virtue and vice, and also by this—that God, in the natural course of His providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to society, and vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.

What general conclusion do you, then, draw concerning the point we are discussing?—*A.* We may CONCLUDE that the opinion of NECESSITY does not affect the general proof of RELIGION.

THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCES OF RELIGION NOT AFFECTED BY THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

What further evidence has religion besides that which we have been considering?—*A.* External evidence.

What three points in its external evidence would tend to confirm the faith of one who was convinced of the truth of religion by its internal evidence?—*A.* He would find 1. That at all times and places some part of this natural religion had been received; 2. That it was received in the earliest ages; 3. That it was said to be directly revealed by God to man.

What would be the force of the first-named evidence, *general consent*?—*A.* It would show that it was conformable to the general sense of mankind.

What alternative would its reception in the earliest ages prove?—*A.* Either that it was revealed expressly by God, or that it was natural, obvious, and such as to command assent.

Which alternative do learned men think true?—*A.* The former one, *viz.*, that natural religion was expressly revealed by God.

What would incline you to receive this opinion?—*A.* The inaptitude of rude and uncultivated minds to speculate on such subjects.

And what probable account can be given of early pretences to revelation?—*A.* The fact, that there was some real original one from which they were copied.

What would be the force of the third evidence, from tradition?—*A.* The tradition itself must be admitted as *some degree of real proof* that it was so taught.

What is the ground of this proof?—*A.* There is no presumption against it, and there is the most ancient tradition in its favour.

Why is this proof mentioned here?—*A.* To show that religion came into the world by revelation prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book (*i.e.*, the Bible) supposed to contain it.

What CONCLUSION, then, may legitimately be drawn?—*A.* That the historical account of the origin of *religion*, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, *no way affected by the opinion of NECESSITY.*

CAUTION AGAINST THE ABUSE OF SPECULATIVE REASON AND OF OUR MORAL UNDERSTANDING.

What caution does Butler here incidentally insert?—*A.* To see that we do not allow our *speculative* reason to be neglected,

prejudiced, and deceived, or our *moral* understanding to be impaired and perverted and its dictates not impartially attended to.

What is the natural intention of these faculties?—*A.* They were intended by nature to inform us in the theory of things, and thus to instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our behaviour.

Why does Butler so seriously caution us?—*A.* Because of our great liability to prejudice and perversion.

On what two points then does he here advise us?—*A.* 1. To be on our guard as to our determinations concerning virtue and religion; 2. And particularly not to take custom, or fashion, or any slight notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule.

From what two sources are the foregoing remarks drawn?—*A.* 1. From the nature of the thing; 2nd. From the history of religion.

To what do they amount?—*A.* To a real practical proof of religion not to be confuted—sufficient to influence the actions of men who act upon thought and reflection.

OBJECTION.

But it is thus argued:—“No necessary agents are the subjects of blame or praise, reward or punishment; we are necessary agents, and therefore we are not the subjects of blame and praise, reward and punishment;”—What proves the falsity of this conclusion?—*A.* The whole constitution and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence.

Where does the fallacy lie?—*A.* In the minor premiss, which says that we are necessary agents, when in fact we are *free* agents.

But supposing the doctrine of necessity were true, where then would be the fallacy?—*A.* In the major premiss—in taking for granted that necessary agents could not be blamed or praised, rewarded or punished.

What, however, most plainly proves the conclusion to be false?
—*A.* The fact that God *does* govern both brutes and men by rewards and punishments.

What two things are mentioned as affording a contradiction to the above conclusion?—*A.* The natural rewards and punishments following from the affection of gratitude and the passion of resentment, and naturally annexed to actions considered as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert.

If, then, the major premiss be true, what must we infer?
—*A.* We must infer that men are not necessary but free agents.

If the minor be insisted upon?—*A.* We must then contradict the major, and say that it is not incredible that necessary agents should be punished and rewarded, since we are in fact thus dealt with.

What CONCLUSION may now be drawn from the whole argument?—*A.* It must follow that a necessity, supposed possible and reconcileable with the constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the Author of nature will not render His creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they behave well or ill.

Express this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter.—*A.* The opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false.

THE DESTRUCTIVE RESULTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

In what two senses would the doctrine of fatality prove destructive of all religion?—*A.* 1. In a practical; 2. In the strictest sense.

How in a practical sense?—*A.* Because men, by this notion, pretend to satisfy themselves and others in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion.

2. How in the strictest sense?—*A.* Because it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to all our experience, and so overturns everything.

But even suppose that it were reconcileable with the course of nature, and with our experience, how would it affect religion?—*A.* It would be reconcileable with religion also.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTENTS.—The argument of *analogy*—its direct and indirect use—The moral government of God a scheme incomprehensible—Our ignorance of the best means for accomplishing ends—The general laws of the natural and moral world—Special interpositions undesirable—Objections against the argument from analogy answered.

THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY—ITS DIRECT AND INDIRECT USES.

State, now, the use of this argument from analogy.—*A.* It gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; it likewise shows this incredibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity.

Now, *objections* have been raised against the wisdom and equity of the Divine government of the world; what kind of answer can analogy furnish to these objections?—*A.* An *indirect* answer only.

But if the argument from analogy proves the credibility of religion, why will it not *directly* show its wisdom and equity?—*A.* Because a fact may be credible without being an instance of either wisdom or equity.

To what, then, is the DIRECT argument from analogy limited?—*A.* To matters of fact.

How may it INDIRECTLY and REMOTELY be useful?—*A.* By

showing that the moral government of God must be a scheme, and not a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice : that this scheme must be an incomprehensible scheme, and that, consequently, the points objected against may be but very imperfectly understood.

How, then, will the argument from analogy provide us with a *direct* general answer to these objections?—*A.* By suggesting the answer and showing it to be a credible one.

In what two ways is this done?—*A.* 1. By showing that God's moral government is to us an incomprehensible scheme, and thus furnishing a general answer to all objections against its wisdom and equity ; 2. By the production of several particular points, all showing how little weight is to be attached to these objections.

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD A SCHEME.

Supposing God exercises a moral government over the world, what kind of government would it be?—*A.* It would be a scheme.

Why would it be a scheme?—*A.* Because His natural government is a scheme.

What is the nature of this scheme?—*A.* Incomprehensible.

What do you mean by a scheme?—(*To be committed to memory.*)—*A.* “ A plan, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any model of civil government—a scheme in which individuals and species have various relations to other individuals and species, and in which every action and event has relation to other actions and events much beyond the compass of this present world.”

Show that this scheme of natural government is incomprehensible.—*A.* We cannot give the whole account of any one thing whatever, of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts.

What inference do you draw from this?—*A.* We infer that

the moral government of God is also a SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

What connection is there, in fact, between God's natural and moral government?—*A.* They make up but *one* scheme together.

What relation may the one bear to the other?—*A.* The natural government of God may be formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral government.

In what two ways does Butler illustrate this subserviency?—*A.* The natural system of the universe is subservient to the moral, as the vegetable world is subservient to the animal world, and as our organized bodies are to our minds.

What is intended, however, by showing that the moral government of God is a scheme, and an incomprehensible one?—*A.* It is thus intended to show that every act of Divine justice and goodness (complained of) may be supposed to look much beyond itself and its immediate object, and, therefore, may not really be a just subject of complaint; that every part of this Divine system may have reference to other parts of God's moral administration and to a general moral plan, and that every circumstance of this His moral government may be adjusted beforehand, with a view to the whole of it.

Mention some of these circumstances.—*A.* 1. The determined length of time, and the degrees and ways in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline; 2. The time in which wickedness is permitted to have its progress; 3. The time appointed for the execution of justice; 4. The appointed instruments of it; 5. The kinds of rewards and punishments and the mode of their distribution.

Why are these instances adduced?—*A.* To show that we should think and speak of each of these circumstances as of a part of a scheme, connected and related in all its parts, a scheme or system which is as properly one as the natural world is, and of the like kind.

And should they prove to be parts of such a scheme, what is the evident conclusion that would arise?—*A*. It would be most evident that we cannot judge of it from those small parts of it which come within our view in the present life, and, consequently, cannot tell whether such parts are really instances of injustice and cruelty.

On what two accounts is it useful still further to show that our ignorance is a just answer to all objections against the wisdom and goodness of the divine government?—*A*. Because we universally forget our ignorance and the legitimate conclusion drawn from it whenever we argue against religion; And, 2. It is not easy, even for reasonable men, to remember the degree of our ignorance, and make due allowance for it.

How would you answer these two following objections:—“The origin and continuance of evil might have been prevented by repeated interpositions;” and “A scheme of government is itself an imperfection?”—*A*. We might answer; 1. The origin and continuance of evil may be parts only of an incomprehensible scheme, and, therefore, we cannot be competent judges of the justice and goodness of such parts; 2. The objections only imply imperfection and that the world might have been better made; 3. They are mere arbitrary assertions.

How do you show, then, that our ignorance is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of God?—*A*. We know not but that the parts objected against may be relative to other parts unknown to us, which relation would clear them of all reasonable objections, and would render them instances of justice and goodness.

THE SURPRISING CONNECTION AND RELATION BETWEEN
THE MEANS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS IN THE
SCHEME OF THE NATURAL WORLD.

How does Butler further show that these objections have little

weight?—*A.* By a more distinct observation of some particular things in the natural government of the world.

What does he take for granted?—*A.* That similar things are contained in God's moral government.

What enables him to take this for granted?—*A.* *Analogy.*

What is the first phenomenon in the natural world which he notices?—*A.* The marvellous connection and relation between the means and the end in the system of nature.

What two remarkable facts in *nature* are noticed?—*A.* As in the scheme in the natural world no ends appear to be accomplished without means, so very *undesirable means* often conduce to bring about ends, in such a measure desirable as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means; 2. Experience shows that many means are necessary and conducive to accomplish ends, which *means we should have thought*, before experience, *would have had even a contrary tendency?*

Why are these facts adduced?—*A.* To show that there may be a similar connection and relation between the means and the end in the *moral world*.

How are they brought to bear on the moral world?—*A.* They are adduced to answer objections against apparent irregularities in the moral world.

What instances of apparent irregularities are adduced?—*A.* The putting our misery in each other's power;—men's liability to vice;—in a word, all objections against the moral scheme of Providence.

How are they vindicated?—*A.* On the ground that they may be the very best and the only means for accomplishing the wisest and the most benevolent ends; although the same means, in themselves, may be most undesirable, and, before experience, might have been thought to have a contrary tendency.

What are the grounds of this supposition?—*A.* The supposed analogy and similarity that exists between the *natural* and *moral* world.

CAUTION.

What absurd and wicked conclusion is obviated?—*A.* The conclusion that vice and misery are blessings to the world—as they are thus represented as being the means of man's perfection and happiness.

What answer may be given?—*A.* That, though they are conducive to the perfection and happiness of man, yet it would have been much better for the world if the evil had never been done; for, although the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, by way of warning and example, yet it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from wickedness altogether.

How is this answer illustrated?—*A.* By reference to a fact in the natural world. Many disorders bring their own cures—many diseases are themselves remedies; many a man would have died had it not been for the gout or fever; yet no one would say that disorders, diseases, the gout, or the fever, argued a better or more perfect state of health.

GENERAL LAWS.

What is the second consideration?—*A.* That the world is carried on by general laws.

Why is the world carried on thus?—*A.* For the wisest and best reasons.

What induces you to think so?—*A.* The analogy of nature, since we experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all the good we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, viz., that the laws by which the world is governed are general.

Show this to be the case.—*A.* We procure our own enjoyments by acting in a manner, by which we know beforehand we can procure them.

How do we acquire this knowledge?—*A.* Through the permanency of the laws of nature.

If the laws were not fixed and permanent, how should we be

affected?—*A.* We could exercise no foresight at all in procuring our happiness.

Can you give me one or two illustrations?—*A.* Husbandry could not be carried on, if the seasons were not regular, and to be depended upon beforehand; the navigation of the sea could not be managed if the tides were not constant.

IRREGULARITIES CANNOT BE PREVENTED AND REMEDIED BY 1. GENERAL LAWS; 2. SPECIAL INTERPOSITIONS.

But why might not all irregularities be prevented and remedied by general laws?—*A.* It may be impossible, in the nature of things, thus to prevent and remedy them.

What may lead you to suppose so?—*A.* By seeing that it is absolutely impossible in civil government to prevent all irregularities by general laws.

But why might not the Author of nature *specially interpose*, if these irregularities could not be prevented or remedied by *general* laws?—*A.* Because special interpositions would have very bad effects.

On what condition would special interpositions be desirable?—*A.* If their effect was merely to prevent the irregularities complained of.

What other effects (3) would they have?—*A.* 1. They would encourage idleness and negligence; 2. They would render doubtful the natural rule of life; 3. They would have far distant, and very great and bad, effects on other systems with which our present system is connected.

But, supposing that it was urged that these bad effects of special interpositions might be prevented by further interpositions, what answer might we give?—*A.* We might say that this was talking quite at random and in the dark.

Show, then, in a word, that the not-interposing to prevent irregularities is not a legitimate subject of complaint.—*A.* We

find 1. That they would produce evil and prevent good ; 2. They would produce greater evil than they would prevent ; 3. They would prevent greater good than they would produce. That God does NOT INTERPOSE to prevent irregularities is, therefore, AN INSTANCE OF GOODNESS.

OBJECTION.

But it may be said, that “ after all, these supposed impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted with ; and we must judge of religion, as of other things, by what we know, and look upon the rest as nothing : or, however, that the answers here given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it, since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.”

How would you answer this objection?—*A.* By dividing it into four distinct parts.

THIS ARGUMENT FOUNDED NOT UPON TOTAL IGNORANCE.

State the first part.—*A.* It is said that these supposed impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted with.

Answer, then, this part of the objection.—*A.* We have not founded our arguments on total ignorance.

On what certain proof has the argument been built?—*A.* On the proof of the moral character of God.

And what is the inference that has been drawn from His moral character?—*A.* It is inferred that His government of the world must be moral, and that the designed end of His government is to reward every man according to his work. Thus much we *know*.

Of what, then, are we ignorant?—*A.* We are ignorant of the means of accomplishing this end.

But these means may be objectionable?—*A.* It is not likely they would be so. If the character of God be perfect, and the end He designs be perfect also, the means He uses for accomplishing His ends must be the best and the wisest, and our

ignorance respecting them is a legitimate answer to every objection.

Illustrate this.—*A.* We may be convinced that a person is of such a character, and consequently will pursue such ends, though we may be greatly ignorant of the way of obtaining those ends.

Suppose a person were to object against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain those ends, how might he be answered?—*A.* By our ignorance. We are certain, indeed, and may rest assured, that he will pursue the proposed end, and will adopt the best means for accomplishing that end. *The means*, therefore, which he will adopt should be free from *all objections*.

Apply this illustration to religion.—*A.* We are certain of God's character, and of the end of His government. Our ignorance of the best means of effecting this proposed end is a proper answer to all objections against apparent irregularities, as being contradictory to this end.

OBLIGATIONS TO HOLY LIVING WOULD REMAIN, THOUGH OBJECTIONS INVALIDATED THE PROOF OF RELIGION.

State the second part of the objection.—*A.* "These supposed impossibilities and relations invalidate the proof of religion, and leave it doubtful."

Answer it.—*A.* Granting the truth of this supposition, yet moral obligations would still remain certain.

On what two grounds would they remain certain?—*A.* 1. Because they arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, which we cannot violate without being self-condemned; 2. They would remain certain from considerations of interest.

Prove this.—*A.* We are bound to act upon doubtful evidence, and on lower evidence, if necessary, in matters of such importance as our eternal interests; and as it is credible that virtue will be

rewarded and vice punished in a future world, this credibility is a distinct and certain obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious practice of all that is good.

THESE OBJECTIONS DO NOT INVALIDATE THE PROOF OF
RELIGION.

Show, thirdly, that these answers to objections (grounded on supposed impossibilities and relations) do not invalidate the proof of religion.—*A.* It has been shown already that the moral government of God is a scheme incomprehensible. We know that parts of this scheme accomplish ends, which, before experience, we should have thought they had no tendency to accomplish, but that they rather tended to prevent.

What may we, therefore, justly conclude respecting *other means* used by the Author of nature—as, *e.g.*, His permission of the irregularities and disorders objected against—the permission of evil—our capabilities of vice and misery?—*A.* We may conclude, that if we could comprehend the whole scheme of the things objected against, they may be both consistent with justice and goodness, and even may be instances of both.

OUR ARGUMENTS NOT DRAWN FROM OUR IGNORANCE.

What is the fourth and last point in this objection?—*A.* “That the stress of the answers to objections against religion lie so very much upon our ignorance.”

Answer this.—*A.* They are not taken from our ignorance, but from somewhat which *analogy* shows us concerning it.

What does analogy show us?—*A.* It shows us that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions in cases similar to this in which we pretend to judge and object.

On what, then, are the answers we have given founded?—*A.* On what we do know.

How are they suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon our observation and rendered credible too?—*A. By the ANALOGY of nature.*

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART.

Repeat now, *from memory*, the summary of the first part of the Analogy.—*A.* The Divine government of the world contains in it, that mankind is appointed to live in a future state (Chap. I.); That there every one shall be rewarded and punished (Chap. II.); Rewarded and punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous and vicious, morally good and evil (Chap. III.); That our present life is a probation, a state of trial (Chap. IV.), And of discipline (Chap. V.) for that future one; notwithstanding the objections which men may fancy they have, from notions of necessity (Chap. VI.), against there being any such moral plan as this at all; and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present (Chap. VII.)

END OF THE FIRST PART.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.—A revelation not unnecessary or unimportant—Christianity an authoritative republication of *natural* religion with new light and information, in consequence of which new duties are revealed to us, the observance of which positive duties has a moral character—Positive and moral precepts defined and compared.

A REVELATION NOT UNNECESSARY OR UNIMPORTANT.

WHAT reason do some persons give for rejecting all revelation ?

—*A.* They say that the light of nature is sufficient.

How do they describe the very notion of a revelation ?—

A. As incredible and fictitious.

Under what circumstances, indeed, would a revelation be incredible ?—*A.* If the light of nature had been sufficient in such a sense as to render one not wanting or useless.

Give proofs, however, to show the insufficiency of the light of nature.—*A.* 1. The state of religion in the heathen world before revelation ; 2. Its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it ; 3. The doubtfulness of some of the greatest men among the heathen concerning things of the utmost importance ; 4. The natural inattention and ignorance of men in general ; 5. That it is impossible to say who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition ; 6. There is no ground to think that the generality could ; 7. If they could, there is no sort of probability that they would ; 8. Even then, they would highly want a standing admonition to remind them of it and inculcate it upon them ; and, 9. If the

generality were as much disposed to attend to religion as the better sort of men are, yet, even then, there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and many advantages would result from them.

What reasons do other persons assign for undervaluing revelation?—*A.* They say that revelation is a matter of small importance, provided natural religion be kept to.

What, then, are the two classes of objectors?—*A.* The one denies the necessity of revelation, the other undervalues it—the one thinks it uncalled for and of no use; the other of little importance provided natural religion be retained.

Show, on the contrary, that it is not an indifferent matter whether we obey or disobey the commands of the New Testament.—*A.* Because we cannot possibly be assured that the reasons of the commands have ceased, or that they are not binding upon us.

DIVISION OF THE CHAPTER.

What are the *two* views that must be taken of Christianity to enable us to understand its importance?—*A.* We must consider it, 1. As a republication and external institution of natural religion, intended to promote natural piety and virtue; 2. As containing an account of a dispensation of things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us.

What relation, then, does natural religion bear to Christianity?—*A.* It is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, but is not, in any sense, the whole of it.

CHRISTIANITY A REPUBLICATION OF NATURAL RELIGION.

In what respects is Christianity a republication of natural religion?—*A.* It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world; that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under His government; that virtue is His law, and that He will

finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render to every man according to his works in a future state.

What material point have you to observe respecting such instruction?—*A.* It teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity, free from those superstitions with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost.

CHRISTIANITY AN AUTHORITATIVE REPUBLICATION OF
NATURAL RELIGION.

How is Christianity an authoritative publication of natural religion?—*A.* It affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of it.

What evidence of testimony?—*A.* That arising from miracles and prophecies.

What, however, was the immediate intention of miracles and prophecies?—*A.* To prove a particular dispensation of Providence, viz., the redemption of the world by the Messiah.

Have they any other use?—*A.* They prove also God's general providence over the world, as our moral Governor and Judge.

How do they prove it?—*A.* Because this character of the Author of nature is necessarily connected with, and implied in, that particular revealed dispensation of things; it is likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies, so that natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it.

How does Butler characterize the evidence which miracles and prophecy afford to natural religion?—*A.* As being the strongest which human creatures are capable of having given them.

Can objections be raised against it?—*A.* Notable objections may be urged against it as a matter of speculation, but considered as a practical thing, there can be none.

What conclusion, then, may be fairly drawn?—*A.* That the Law of Moses and the Gospels of Christ are authoritative publications of the religion of nature.

What supposed case would show the importance of such a revelation?—*A.* The case of a man, well convinced of the truth of natural religion, yet, from the disorders of the world and the general bad example around him, in danger of running into infidelity, then hearing for the first time that the system in which he believed had been revealed to mankind, and that the publishers of the revelation had proved their Divine commission by the power they possessed of suspending and changing the general laws of nature.

Show the importance of Christianity in some other points.—*A.* Life and immortality have been eminently brought to light by the gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only confirmed in the gospel, but are taught with a degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness.

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH—A TEACHER OF NATURAL RELIGION.

Take another view of the importance of Christianity.—*A.* Christianity is intended to establish and confirm natural religion permanently by means of a visible Church.

How would the Christian Church confirm natural religion?—*A.* By an instituted method of instruction, and by an instituted form of external religion.

Define what you mean by a Church.—*A.* *A society distinguished from common ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious institutions.*

What are the advantages of a visible Church?—*A.* 1. It hands down to posterity the blessings of religious knowledge; 2. It is, like a city on a hill, a standing memorial to the world of the duty we owe to our Maker; 3. It calls men continually,

both by example and instruction, to attend to religion ; and, by the form of religion ever before their eyes, reminds them of the reality ; 4. It is the repository of the oracles of God ; 5. It holds up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature ; and, 6. It propagates it through all generations to the end of the world.

What does Butler say of the instruction given by the Church in his day ?—*A.* That it was originally designed to be of more peculiar advantage to those who conform to it.

What was its original design ?—*A.* By admonition and reproof as well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public exercises of religion “ to edify the body of Christ,” *i.e.*, train it up in piety and virtue for a higher and better state.

How, then, can you show the advantages of positive institutions ?—*A.* They are necessary to maintain this beneficial settlement of the Church ; for the visibility of the Church consists in them.

OBJECTIONS.

What two objections have been raised against Christianity ?—*A.* It has been said, 1. “ That it has been perverted ;” and, 2. “ That it has had very little good influence.”

Why cannot these objections be insisted upon ?—*A.* Because they would lead to downright Atheism.

How would they lead to Atheism ?—*A.* Because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason (which, upon all principles of Theism, must have been from God) has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner.

But can the objections be answered ?—*A.* It may be said that, 1. The good effects of Christianity have not been small ; 2. Nor its supposed ill effects any effects of it, properly speaking ; 3. The things themselves have been, perhaps, exaggerated ; 4. If not, Christianity has been often only a pretence ; and the same evils, in the main, would have been done upon some other pretence.

Now, what principle must be laid down in all our arguments on natural and revealed religion?—*A.* It must be laid down, as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies; not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect, if mankind did their part, that part which is justly put and left upon them.

What is the rule of God's government?—*A.* The light of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences of each; and, after this, leave them at full liberty to act just as they please till the appointed time of judgment.

What shows that this is God's general rule of government?—*A.* Every day's experience.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSION.

What things, then, fully show us the importance of Christianity?—*A.* 1. Its being a republication of natural religion; 2. Its being an authoritative promulgation of it, with new light and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of mankind.

What, in a *practical* sense, shows us its importance?—*A.* The command given to all men publicly to profess and openly to practise it.

Why is such a command given?—*A.* In order to continue the benefits of Christianity to the world, and transmit them down to future times; and, moreover, such a command follows from the very scheme of the gospel.

What is the scheme of the gospel?—*A.* The gospel requires that each Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards its continuance.

What shows, then, the danger of undervaluing and neglecting

it?—*A.* The fact, that such conduct is opposed to the genius and express commands of the gospel.

Now, under what restricted view has the importance of Christianity been proved?—*A.* Only in the view of its subserviency to natural religion.

CHRISTIANITY—CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF A DISPENSATION OF THINGS NOT DISCOVERABLE BY REASON.

In what further view, however, are we to consider it?—*A.* As containing an account of things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us.

What is the nature of this new dispensation?—*A.* It contains a revelation of a particular dispensation of God, carrying on by His Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented, in Scripture, to be in a state of ruin.

What command is given to us in consequence of this new dispensation?—*A.* To be baptized, not only in the name of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost—and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost are revealed.

Whence arises the importance of these duties?—*A.* From the fact, that they proceed, not from positive command only, but from the offices belonging to the divine persons and from the relations they bear to us.

How is the relation in which we stand to God, the Father, revealed?—*A.* By reason.

How are the relations in which we stand to the Son and the Holy Spirit made known to us?—*A.* By revelation.

Supposing these three relations equally true, what conclusion may you draw?—*A.* That our duties to the second and third persons of the Trinity are as plain and obligatory as those we owe to the first person, and that, therefore, there is as much reason why we should be baptized in the name of the Son and

of the Holy Spirit, as that we should be baptized in the name of the Father.

Now, under what twofold consideration may religion be viewed?—*A.* As internal or external.

When it is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, what is the essence of natural religion?—*A.* In religious regards to God, the Father Almighty.

What is the essence of revealed religion?—*A.* In religious regards to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

How do these regards arise?—*A.* From their respective relations to us.

Why is it immaterial whether those relations are made known to us by reason or by revelation?—*A.* Because our regards towards them arise out of the relations themselves, and not out of the manner in which we are informed of them.

What are the inward religious regards due to the Son and the Holy Spirit?—*A.* The religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear and hope.

How are we instructed to express externally this inward worship?—*A.* By pure revealed command.

To what extent?—*A.* Just as far as the relations in which they stand unto us are matters of pure revelation.

When the relations in which they stand to us are made known, what is the character of the obligations by which we are bound to worship and love them?—*A.* Obligations of reason, arising out of the relations themselves.

Show, then, that Christianity has something important even of a moral nature.—*A.* The office of our Lord and the relation He stands unto us being known, the obligation of religious regards to Him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is.

How does this obligation arise?—*A.* Immediately out of His office and relation.

What seems, then, to escape the attention of such persons as

speak lightly of revelation, provided natural religion be kept to?—*A.* That revelation is to be considered as acquainting us with somewhat new in the state of mankind and in the government of the world, and as informing us of new relations we stand in, which could not otherwise be known.

What consequences may follow the neglect and disregard of these relations, which have been revealed to us by Christianity?—*A.* The same consequences as follow from the neglect and disregard of our relative duties in life.

What serious consequences, then, may result from a neglect of our duty to the Son and the Holy Spirit?—*A.* If the assistance of the Holy Spirit be necessary to render us fit for the place which Jesus has gone to prepare for us, most serious consequences may follow from neglecting the means expressly commanded by God for obtaining such assistance.

Why may such serious consequences be apprehended?—*A.* Because the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the appointed means of obtaining them.

How do we ascertain the means of obtaining temporal or spiritual benefits?—*A.* Either by experience or revelation.

To which of these two must we have recourse in the matter under consideration?—*A.* To revelation.

CONCLUSION.

What conclusion may be drawn from the foregoing reasoning?—*A.* That if Christianity be either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence to treat it as a light matter.

When only might it be treated as a light matter?—*A.* When it was positively supposed to be false.

What high and important obligation rests upon us?—*A.* That of examining most seriously into its evidence, supposing its credibility; and of heartily embracing it, upon supposition of its truth.

POSITIVE AND MORAL PRECEPTS AND DUTIES COMPARED.

What two deductions are added to illustrate this chapter?—

A. 1. As to the difference between what is positive and what is moral in religion; and, 2. As to the preference which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the latter.

State the *difference* between positive and moral precepts:—

A. Moral precepts are precepts the reasons of which we see; positive precepts are precepts the reasons of which we do not see.

State the *difference* between moral and positive duties.—*A.* Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case, prior to external command:—positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command.

How are these duties affected by the manner in which they are revealed?—*A.* They are independent of it.

Illustrate this.—*A.* It is as much a positive duty to be baptized in the name of the Father, as that we should be baptized in the name of the Son, although the relation which we stand in to God, the Father, is made known to us by reason, whilst the relation we stand in to Christ, is made known by revelation only.

Give another illustration.—*A.* If the gospel be true, gratitude as immediately becomes due to Christ, as the Saviour of the world, as it is due to the Father, from His being the fountain of all good; although the first is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason.

On what twofold basis, then, are positive institutions founded?—*A.* They are founded either on natural religion, as baptism in the name of the Father, or they are founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

Why does Holy Scripture give the *preference* to moral duties?—*A.* Because moral duties arise out of the nature of the case, and positive duties only from external command.

Show, however, that positive institutions, in general, have the

nature of a moral command.—*A.* Because the reasons of them appear.

What caution must be observed?—*A.* That moral and positive duties be compared no further than as they are different.

Explain this more fully.—*A.* They are to be compared no further than as the former are moral and arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without any external command; and as the latter are positive and arise out of mere external command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with.

Give *three* reasons why a moral precept is to be preferred to a positive.—*A.* Because, 1. There is an apparent reason for this preference, and none against it; 2. Positive institutions are means to a moral end, and the end is more excellent than the means; 3. The observance of religious institutions is no religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it arises from a moral principle.

Give, now, another reason why the moral law is superior to a positive command.—*A.* Because the moral law is not only as much a matter of revealed command as positive institutions are, but it is, moreover, written upon our hearts and interwoven into our very nature, and, consequently, is plainly declared by the Author of our nature to be preferred.

What three things also show the inefficacy of positive institutions unaccompanied by moral duties?—*A.* 1. The reason of the thing; 2. The general tenor of Christianity; 3. Particular declarations of Scripture.

What does Holy Scripture say on the point?—*A.* It says that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue.

On what does Holy Scripture, therefore, lay the greater stress?—*A.* On moral virtue.

How does our Lord decide the question?—*A.* In favour of moral duties.

When did He give His opinion?—*A.* 1. When He was cen-

sured for eating with publicans and sinners ; 2. When His disciples were blamed for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day.

How did He give His opinion ?—*A.* By using a proverb.

What advantage resulted from the use of a proverb ?—*A.* He has made the case general.

State the remarkable circumstance of the quotation.—*A.* That though drawn from the Old Testament and so intelligible, yet, it is said, the Pharisees did not understand it.

What was it that the Pharisees had not learnt ?—*A.* In what the general spirit of religion consists.

In what does it consist ?—*A.* True religion consists in moral piety and virtue, and not in forms and ritual observances.

What caution, however, does Butler give us ?—*A.* Not to neglect ritual observances because moral duties have greater claims upon us.

Why should we not neglect them ?—*A.* Because they are appointed by God, and, consequently, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them.

What obligation follows from the foregoing remarks ?—*A.* To search the Holy Scriptures to see what the scheme of revelation is, without determining beforehand, from reason, what it must be.

And what two general rules for the interpretation of Scripture does Butler give us ?—*A.* If any thing in the Scripture, he says, appears contrary to natural religion, it only appears so, and really is not ; and, 2. That interpretation of Scripture must not be considered to be false, because it contains a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover, or a precept which the law of nature does not enjoin.

CHAPTER II.

CONTENTS.—No presumption, from *analogy*, against the scheme of Christianity, because not discoverable by reason, or because unlike the known course of nature ; and, in general, no presumption against a revelation considered as miraculous, at or after the settlement of the course of nature.

ON THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION,
AS MIRACULOUS.

How far has Butler proceeded?—*A.* He has shown the *importance* of the Christian revelation, and the obligation we are under seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or credibility.

What is the next thing he proposes to do?—*A.* To consider the supposed presumptions against a revelation in general.

What reason does he give for adopting this plan?—*A.* It seems, he observes, the most natural method to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before proceeding to the consideration of its proper evidence and the objections against that evidence.

What part of the Christian scheme is particularly objected against?—*A.* Miracles.

What amount of evidence is commonly demanded to prove their reality?—*A.* Far more than is sufficient to convince us of other events or matters of fact.

NO PRESUMPTION, FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE,
AGAINST THE GENERAL SCHEME OF CHRISTIANITY.

What is meant by the general scheme of Christianity?—*A.* That God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ ; 2. That by Him He will judge it hereafter in righteousness, rendering to every man according to his works ; and 3. That good men are under the secret influence of the Holy Spirit.

✓ If the analogy of nature raises a presumption against this scheme, on what *two* grounds must the presumption rest?—*A.*

1. Either because it is not discoverable by reason, or 2. Because it is unlike the known course of nature.

Show that the analogy of nature raises no presumption against the Christian scheme because it is not discoverable by reason.—

A. Many things are confessedly true in nature which are not discoverable by reason or experience.

But it is objected that “the scheme of Christianity is unlike the known course of nature;” give *three* answers to this.—

1. We cannot presume, from analogy, that the *whole* course of things, naturally unknown to us, and *everything* in it, is like to anything that is known, and, therefore, there is no peculiar presumption against anything in the former, upon account of its being unlike to anything in the latter; 2. Many things that we do know and see in the natural and moral government of the world, are unlike one another, and, therefore, we ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible; 3. The scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature.

What things may be called invisible miracles?—*A.* Things done contrary to the established course of nature, but requiring visible miracles to confirm them.

Give instances of invisible miracles.—*A.* The incarnation of our Lord, and a Divine revelation.

NO PRESUMPTION, FROM ANALOGY, AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS, AT OR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD.

Show that there is no presumption against a revelation, considered as miraculous, *at the beginning of the world.*—*A.* A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of *nature*, and implies something different from it. Now, since there was, at that time, no established course of nature, there could be no miracle.

How must we, therefore, treat the question, whether a revela-

tion was or was not then miraculously given?—*A.* Not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a common question of fact.

And what evidence is admissible?—*A.* The same which is admitted to substantiate any common matters of fact of the same antiquity, *e.g.*, what part of the earth was first peopled.

State another way of answering the objection.—*A.* At the beginning of the world there was a power exerted totally different from the present course of nature. Now, whether this power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went on and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is only a question about the *degree* in which such power exerted itself.

What *two* things confirm the idea that religion was miraculously revealed?—*A.* History and tradition.

What also would imply the same?—*A.* The state of religion in the first ages.

What do these facts prove?—*A.* That there was a revelation at the beginning of the world.

And if so, what two important points would be gained?—*A.* 1. The confirmation of natural religion; and 2. The removal of prejudices against a subsequent revelation.

But it is objected “that there is some peculiar presumption against a revelation *after the settlement of a course of nature* ;” give a general answer to this objection.—*A.* Before we can raise an argument from analogy for or against a revelation, we must be acquainted with a similar and parallel case.

What would be a parallel case?—*A.* Some other world, in like circumstances with our own.

And suppose we knew the history of another world and that no revelation had been vouchsafed to it, what would be the character of evidence afforded by this discovery?—*A.* Highly unsatisfactory, as being drawn from one single instance only.

Give now a more *particular* answer to the objection.—*A.* 1. No objection can be fairly urged against a revelation because of a peculiar presumption against it, because such presumption exists

against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of them ; which presumption, however, is overcome by almost any proof.

Give an illustration.—*A.* There is a presumption of millions to one against the story of Cæsar, or of any other man.

What then should be the question in the matter before us?—

A. Not whether there be *any* peculiar presumption *at all* against a revelation, but whether it is so great as to render one wholly incredible ; and 2. Leaving out the consideration of religion, we are so ignorant of the circumstances on which the course of nature depends, that we can see no presumption for or against a revelation—but yet there will be a greater presumption against any *particular* common facts, than against miracles *in general*, before any evidence of either ; 3. Taking in the consideration of religion, we can then see distinct reasons for a revelation proved by miracles, in order to afford mankind instruction, additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth of it ; and 4. and lastly, Miraculous interpositions must be compared not to the ordinary but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature, as comets, the powers of magnetism, electricity and steam—and would there be no presumption against such phenomena, in the minds of those who were acquainted only with the common powers of matter ?

What conclusion, then, may be fairly drawn?—*A.* 1. That there is no such peculiar presumption against a revelation, considered as miraculous, as to render it incredible ; 2. That on the contrary there is a presumption in its favour, from our ability to see reasons for it ; and 3. That there is no more peculiar presumption against a revelation, considered as miraculous, than there would be against the extraordinary phenomena of nature.

CHAPTER III.

CONTENTS.—Objections against the scheme of Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, frivolous; from our incompetency to judge beforehand of a scheme of revelation. This incompetency to judge beforehand of the Christian scheme probable from our incompetency to judge, before experience, of the scheme of nature, which contains many things different from what we might have expected, and open to many apparent objections.

THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.

Name some of the objections raised against the scheme of Christianity.—*A.* Objections have been alleged against the whole manner in which it has been left with the world; 2. Against several particular relations of Scripture; 3. From the deficiencies of revelation; 4. From things in it appearing to men “foolishness;” 5. From its containing matters of offence, which have led, and, it must have been seen would lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness; 6. From its not being universal; 7. From its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been.

What importance has been attached to this last objection?—*A.* It has been turned into a positive argument against Christianity.

Have any other objections been raised against the Christian scheme?—*A.* Yes, as many and as various as the different fancies of men.

On what grounds has objection been taken against the authority of Holy Scripture?—*A.* Because it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon by critics for polite and correct writing.

Why have great objections been raised against the prophetic parts of Holy Scripture?—*A.* 1. Because of the rashness of interpreters; 2. Because of the hieroglyphical and figurative language in which they have been left to us.

State the object of the chapter.—*A.* The object of the chapter is to show, that, on supposition of a revelation, it is credible beforehand that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree, and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to objections, in case we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature.

What difference does Butler draw between objections against the scheme of Christianity and objections against its proper evidences?—*A.* Objections against the scheme of Christianity are frivolous, whilst objections against its evidences are most seriously to be considered.

What two things would prove a supposed revelation false?—*A.* If it were to contain clear immoralities or contradictions.

What is the specific office of reason?—*A.* To judge of the meaning, the morality, and evidences of revelation.

State the hypothetical position now laid down.—*A.* If the natural and revealed dispensation of things are both from God, and, if they coincide with each other, and make up ONE scheme of providence, our being incompetent judges of one must render it credible that we may be incompetent judges also of the other.

Now, what is the character of the course of nature?—*A.* Very different from what, before experience, we should have expected.

What inference may be drawn from this fact?—*A.* That it is highly credible that the revealed dispensation of things would be very different from our expectations, and apparently liable to great objections—objections against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on.

How does Butler illustrate his position?—*A.* If a subject of a king be an incompetent judge of the manner in which the ordinary administration of the kingdom should be carried on, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary; and if he thought he had objections against

the former, he would most probably think he had objections against the latter.

What is the only safe way of judging of the course of nature?—*A.* From experience and analogy.

How likewise must we judge of revelation?—*A.* From experience and analogy.

To what points are these remarks particularly applicable?—*A.* To inspiration.

NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL INSTRUCTION.

Show how they are applicable.—*A.* As we are not proper judges, *a priori*, of the mode of natural instruction, neither are we proper judges respecting the mode of supernatural instruction.

Show, by analogy, in five particulars, that our *a priori* objections against the mode in which the Christian Church was instructed by supernatural inspiration are unfounded.—*A.* 1. As we know not beforehand what kind or degree of instruction God would naturally afford us, so are we wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by a revelation, upon supposition of His affording one; 2. As we are wholly ignorant how far God would enable and effectually dispose men to communicate the natural information given them, so are we wholly ignorant how far He would interpose miraculously to qualify those, to whom He originally made the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to secure their doing it to the age, in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity; 3. As we are incompetent to judge beforehand whether the evidence of natural instruction would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; so are we equally ignorant, beforehand, whether the evidence of revelation would be certain, highly credible, or probable; 4. As we are incompetent, *a priori*, to judge whether natural instruction would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all;

so are we equally ignorant beforehand whether all, who had a knowledge of revelation, should possess the same knowledge and the same evidence of it; 5. And as we are incompetent to judge beforehand whether natural knowledge or REASON had better be communicated at once or gradually, so are we alike unable to judge whether the scheme of revelation would be most properly revealed at once or left to be unfolded gradually; and we are unable to judge, whether it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted to act as they will.

“ But if the Christian revelation had not been committed to writing, and thus secured against the danger of corruption, it would not have fulfilled its purpose ”—answer this objection.—*A.* It would not certainly have answered all the purposes it has now answered, but it would have answered other purposes or the same purposes in different degrees, and which of these purposes best fell in with God’s general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.

Objections, therefore, against the scheme of Christianity, because different from our expectations, having been shown to be frivolous, what is the only question concerning the truth of Christianity?—*A.* Whether the Christian revelation is a real one, not whether it has been attended with every circumstance which we should have anticipated.

And what is the question concerning the authority of Holy Scripture?—*A.* Whether the Bible comes from God, and not whether it is just what we might have fancied a book containing a Divine revelation should have been.

What points do not affect the authority of Holy Scripture?—*A.* Its obscurity, seeming inaccuracy of style, various readings, early disputes about the authors of particular parts.

Under what circumstances would they have even overthrown

the authority of Holy Scripture?—*A.* If the prophets, apostles, or our Lord Himself had promised that the Book, containing the revelation, should be free from obscurity, seeming inaccuracies, and various readings.

And when would Christianity be overturned?—*A.* When it was shown that there was absolutely no proof at all for miracles or prophecies.

How would its authority be affected by showing that the proof of miracles and prophecies was lower than is allowed?—*A.* It would still rest upon the same foot it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence upon our practice.

Why, also, are we not competent judges of the manner in which a doctrine or prophecy of Holy Scripture should have been stated?—*A.* Because we are not fit judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were to have been expected the true sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured.

What is the only question?—*A.* What appearance there is, that this is the sense, not how much more definitely or accurately it might have been expressed or figured.

“ But internal improbabilities, of all kinds, weaken external probable proof ”—give two distinct answers to this objection.—*A.* 1. Internal improbabilities, rising even to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony ; 2. We scarcely know what are improbabilities in the matter before us.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTENTS.—Christianity a scheme incomprehensible—2. In which means are used to accomplish ends—3. Carried on by general laws—Vindicated from objections against its wisdom, justice, and goodness, on these three grounds—Its gradual development no real objection.

What fact has now been proved?—*A.* It has been shown that the analogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand that, supposing a revelation to be made, it would contain many surprising things, and such as appear open to great objections.

What is the value of this position?—*A.* It takes off the force of those objections, or rather precludes them.

But it is said that “this is a very unsatisfactory way of meeting the objections, as it in no respect proves the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity;” What step does Butler take now?—*A.* He applies the same remarks which he has made in the last chapter of the 1st Part, in answer to objections against the wisdom, goodness, and justice of the scheme of nature.

What were the three general heads under which he comprised his remarks in that chapter?—*A.* 1. That the scheme of nature is an incomprehensible scheme. 2. That in it means are used to accomplish ends. 3. That it is carried on by general laws.

What was proved from the remarks on the constitution of nature?—*A.* That it was not only possible, but credible, that those things that are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; and that, in a word, the constitution of nature may be perfect.

How would this affect Christianity?—*A.* It may show that if Christianity be a scheme of the like kind, that similar objections would admit of the like answers.

CHRISTIANITY AN INCOMPREHENSIBLE SCHEME.

What *is* the character of the Christian scheme?—*A.* One quite beyond our comprehension.

Under what general plan of Providence is the Christian scheme?—*A.* Under the general moral plan of Divine Government.

Describe this general plan of Divine Government.—*A.* The moral government of God is exercised by gradually conducting things so in the course of His Providence, that every one shall receive according to his deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail.

What relation does Christianity hold to this general plan?—*A.* It is a particular scheme under it, and a part of it conducive to its completion, consisting of various parts and a mysterious economy carrying on from the beginning of the world for the recovery of man.

Give an outline of this scheme.—*A.* Man's fall and mode of recovery by the Messiah, who is to "gather together the children of God that are scattered abroad," and "establish an everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness." After various dispensations, and in the fulness of time, He took our nature upon Him, was crucified, and afterwards exalted above every creature. Parts of the scheme are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and His ordinary assistances given to good men; the invisible government which Christ exercises over His Church; His preparation of heaven for His followers; His future return to judge the world, and establish His kingdom; and lastly, His subjection to the everlasting Father.

What would you call this Christian scheme?—*A.* Confessedly mysterious, as mysterious as the constitution and scheme of nature.

What does the Scripture call it?—*A.* "The mystery of godliness."

What inference does Butler draw from this fact?—*A.* That our ignorance is as much an answer to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as against the perfection of nature.

MEANS ARE MADE USE OF TO ACCOMPLISH ENDS.

What is the second noticeable thing respecting the Christian scheme?—*A.* That means are used to accomplish ends, as in the course of nature.

What fact does this render credible?—*A.* That the things objected against, how foolish soever they may appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing the very best ends.

But the means used appear “foolish.”—*A.* You can raise no presumption against Christianity on this account, as the scheme is so much beyond our comprehension.

CHRISTIANITY CARRIED ON BY GENERAL LAWS.

What is the third point?—*A.* That it is credible that the Christian dispensation, no less than the course of nature, may have been all along carried on by general laws.

On what data do we say that the whole course of nature is carried on by general laws?—*A.* Because we find that the course of nature in *some* respects, and *so far as we do understand it*, is reducible to general laws.

To what extent can we trace it up to general laws?—*A.* We know several of the general laws of matter; and a great part of the natural behaviour of living agents is reducible to general laws.

How far are we unacquainted with the laws of nature?—*A.* To a very great extent.

Mention some of the phenomena in nature with which we are unacquainted.—*A.* The laws by which storms, tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction to mankind; the laws by which thoughts come into our mind; how it is that one person dies at his birth, whilst another lives

to an extreme old age; how one is born an idiot, whilst another is possessed of immense natural powers.

How can you conclude that all the events of the natural world are reducible to general laws?—*A.* By analogy—from finding that some are so reducible.

Is this a sound inference?—*A.* Yes, there is just ground for such a conclusion.

What circumstance affecting miraculous powers may be apprehended from this?—*A.* That miraculous interpositions may have been, all along and in like manner, conducted by *general* laws of wisdom.

Explain yourself more fully.—*A.* That miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons rather than others; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should then have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions; and that these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general laws.

“But,” it is objected, “these laws are unknown to us.”—*A.* They are no more unknown to us than those regulating storms, tempests, earthquakes, famine and pestilence, which, we have taken for granted, may be reducible to general laws.

What inference may be drawn from this?—*A.* That there is no more reason to expect that every exigency, as it arises, should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous interpositions, than that every exigence in nature should be provided for by the general laws of nature; yet that there might be good reasons why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws, and that these laws should not be broken in upon or deviated from by other miracles.

To what, then, do you attribute the appearance of irregularities and deficiencies in nature?—*A.* To its being a scheme but in part known to us.

What conclusion may you draw respecting Christianity?—

A. That as it is a scheme, like nature (1), but partly known, (2), in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, (3), carried on by general laws; so it is credible beforehand, and probable, that there would be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in it, as in nature, *i.e.*, that Christianity would be liable to the same objections as the frame of nature.

How are these objections answered?—*A.* By the preceding observations concerning Christianity, as the objections against the frame of nature were answered, in the 1st Part, by the like observations concerning the frame of nature.

What objections were obviated in the last chapter?—*A.* Objections against Christianity as a matter of fact.

What objections have been obviated in this?—*A.* Objections against the wisdom and goodness of it.

What is the next thing to be done?—*A.* To show that the principal objections against Christianity may be answered by particular and full analogies in nature.

THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY VINDICATED.

Mention one objection against the whole scheme of Christianity.—*A.* That the scheme is a tedious one, and that God was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means to accomplish the recovery and salvation of the world.

What shows the folly of such an objection?—*A.* Everything that we see. God makes use of a variety of means, which we call tedious ones, to bring about the accomplishment of all His ends.

Name some of these means which may be called tedious means.—*A.* The change of the seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, vegetable and animal life, the intellect of man. Our existence is not only successive, but one state of our life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation for another, and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one—infancy to childhood, childhood to youth, youth to mature age.

What marked difference is there between human and divine operations?—*A.* Men are impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout His operations: accomplishing His natural ends by slow, successive steps; and there is a plan of things laid out by Him which requires various systems of means as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution.

What, then, is the inference you draw?—*A.* That God operates in the daily course of Natural Providence in the very same manner as in the dispensation of Christianity, making one thing subservient to another, through a progressive series of means, and that therefore no more objection can be urged against Christianity on this head than against the scheme of Nature.

Show, from analogy, that it is highly probable that we should, *a priori*, have objected to the scheme of revelation.—*A.* Because it is highly credible we should beforehand have objected to the scheme of Nature.

Mention four things in Nature which, before experience to the contrary, we should have thought highly improbable.—*A.* 1. It would have been thought highly improbable that men should have been so much more capable of discovering the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes and revolutions of the heavenly bodies, than the occasions and cures of diseases, in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned than in astronomy; 2. That invention should be so irregular and capricious, that a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is thinking of something else; 3. It would be thought incredible beforehand that language should be so imperfect, and liable to such manifold abuse from negligence and design; 4. That brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight, vastly greater than what men have in those respects.

What conclusion do you draw from these facts?—*A.* That it is highly credible, that, if God gave us additional instruction by

revelation, we should be apt to fancy that we had great objections against it.

To what objections are these remarks applicable?—*A.* They are applicable to almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence.

To what particular objection are they applied?—*A.* To that drawn from the abuse of miracles, as, *e. g.*, the gift of tongues.

Answer this objection. “The gift of tongues was abused; they could not, therefore, be miraculous.”—*A.* The ordinary power of language is abused; and a man who abused his miraculous power of language would abuse also his ordinary powers of speech.

What power had the first converts to Christianity over their miraculous gift of tongues?—*A.* The same power over it, as if it had been the effect of habit, of study, and of use; the same power over it, as they had over any natural endowment; and, consequently, they would use it, either regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly and upon improper ones, according to their sense of decency and prudence.

But “if this miraculous power was given to the world to propagate Christianity, we might have expected that only prudent persons would have been invested with it, and that they would have been continually restrained and directed in the exercise of it.” Give three answers to this supposition.—*A.* 1. We are in no sort judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been expected God would miraculously interpose, supposing that He did so in some degree and manner; 2. In the natural course of Providence, superior gifts of memory, eloquence, and knowledge are not conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them; 3. Neither is our education for our conduct in this life commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it, but often by persons and under circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction.

Give some other points of resemblance between natural and revealed instruction.—*A.* 1. As practical Christianity is a plain and obvious thing, so also are the common rules of conduct in ordinary life; 2. As many branches of religious knowledge are most difficult, so many parts of natural and even civil knowledge require very exact thought and careful consideration; 3. Again, the hindrances of natural and supernatural knowledge are of the same kind; 4. Lastly, the perfection of natural and supernatural knowledge is to be attained in the same way.

How is the perfection of natural knowledge to be attained?—*A.* By the continuance and progress of learning and liberty and by particular persons attending to, comparing and tracing on, obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance.

Why is it credible that the Bible should contain many truths as yet undiscovered?—*A.* Because the book of Nature is yet but partially understood.

Show that a gradual development of the Word of God is probable.—*A.* Because the works of Nature have been only gradually developed; for, although the same phenomena and the same faculties of investigation have been equally in possession of mankind, several thousands of years before, yet what great and wonderful discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in this present age! And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.

“But this analogy,” it is said, “fails in a material point, for natural knowledge is of little or no consequence:” Give three answers to this objection.—*A.* 1. Butler has been speaking of the general instruction which Nature does or does not afford us; 2. Some parts of natural knowledge are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of life; 3. God does not dispense His gifts according to our notions of the advantage and consequence they would be of to us; so that this general fact,

together with His method of dispensing knowledge in particular, will together make out an analogy full to the point before us.

But if Christianity be the great remedy for human misery and the means of rescuing and saving a lost world, "why," it is objected, "why has the knowledge of it been so long withholden, and so little known?"—*A.* An answer may be given to both objections from the analogy of nature. Remedies for natural diseases have been unknown to mankind for many ages, and known but to few now:—probably many valuable ones are not known yet.

What is the character of those remedies which Nature does provide for diseases?—*A.* Neither certain, perfect, nor universal.

If we were to object and say, that the remedies for such diseases should be certain, perfect, and universal, what would such reasoning lead to?—*A.* It would lead us to conclude that there could be no occasion for them, *i. e.*, that there could be no diseases at all—for if remedies were certain and universal, there would be no disease.

What does our experience to the contrary show us?—*A.* That the remedies for diseases are not certain, perfect, or universal; and, thus no objection, by analogy, can be urged against Christianity, although the only remedy for spiritual diseases, because it is not universally known and received as such.

What conclusion can you draw from the whole argument?—*A.* Not that reason is no judge of anything relating to a revelation (for it is the judge of the meaning, morality, and evidence of what is offered to us as being such), but the just conclusion is, that the truth of Christianity is not affected by objections against its scheme, because such objections, as distinguished from those against its evidence, are frivolous.

What has been said to be the threefold office of reason?—*A.* To judge of the meaning, morality and evidence of a revelation.

In judging of the morality of Scripture, what caution must be observed?—*A.* We must be careful to see whether or not it

contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, and goodness; and not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; for objections from our preconceived expectations have already been obviated.

What objections have been raised against the morality of Scripture?—*A.* Only such as are formed upon suppositions which would equally conclude that the constitution of Nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, and goodness;—which most certainly it is not.

How may the character of an action, otherwise immoral, be changed?—*A.* By the precept enjoining it.

How might an act of treachery, for instance, be justified?—*A.* When the act did not proceed from principle, but was the result of a special command.

How would the case stand, if we were enjoined to cultivate the principles of treachery, ingratitude, and cruelty?—*A.* Then the command would not alter the nature of the case, or of the action.

Show that the precept is totally different, requiring us to do an external action, as, *e.g.*, to take away the property of another?—*A.* Men have no right to either life or property, but what arises from the grant of God: when this grant is revoked, men cease to have any right to either, and when this revocation is made known, as surely it possibly may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either.

Why has Butler thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts which require not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts?—*A.* Because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight has been laid upon objections drawn from them.

What difficulty presented itself to Butler's mind arising from these precepts?—*A.* The difficulty arising from their being offences; *i.e.*, from their being liable to be perverted, so as to serve the most horrid purposes and mislead the weak and enthusiastic.

Against what are objections, founded on such perversion, levelled?—*A.* Against the whole notion of religion, as a trial, and against the general constitution of Nature.

How may these objections be shown to be still more unreasonable?—*A.* By showing that the chief things, thus objected against, are justified by distinct, particular, and full analogies in the constitution and course of Nature.

What presumptive proof have you that a supposed revelation did not proceed from enthusiasm or political views?—*A.* When it is more consistent with itself and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from such principles.

Why can we insist on this proof?—*A.* Because we are able to judge what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views.

CHAPTER V.

CONTENTS.—1. The mediation of Christ in accordance with God's natural government of the world—2. Future punishment would naturally attend sin—3. Natural remedies and relief for punishment—4. Repentance not an adequate remedy for sin—5. Hence the interposition of Christ—6. The mode of his interposition.

Against what Christian doctrine has the greatest exception been taken?—*A.* The mediation of Christ.

What is Butler's opinion respecting it?—*A.* That there is nothing less open to objection.

Show that there can be no objection, from analogy, against the general notion of a Mediator.—*A.* The visible government of God is carried on by the mediation of others. Human life is preserved and its satisfactions bestowed by the mediation of others. God appoints mediators to be the instruments of good and evil to us, the instruments of His justice and mercy.

How does this fact bear upon His invisible government?—*A.*

It makes it credible that part of it should be carried on in this way, or at least it makes it as credible as the contrary.

But against what is the objection urged?—*A.* Not merely against the doctrine of Christianity, but against the whole notion itself of a Mediator at all.

FUTURE PUNISHMENT WOULD NATURALLY ATTEND SIN.

2. What supposition is here to be distinctly noticed?—*A.* That the world is under the proper moral government of God.

What is implied in this supposition?—*A.* That the consequence of vice shall be misery in some future state by the righteous judgment of God.

How may such future punishment follow sin?—*A.* In a manner analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present.

What illustration does Butler introduce to point out the natural consequence of sin?—*A.* “Future punishment,” he observes, “may follow sin as naturally, as a person, rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural consequence fractures his limbs, and, in the way of natural consequence of this, perishes.

But it is objected that such a supposition takes the execution of justice out of God’s hands, and gives it to Nature:—answer this objection.—*A.* We may answer, that when things come to pass according to the course of nature, they are really brought to pass by Him who is the God of Nature.

To what do the Holy Scriptures ascribe natural punishments?—*A.* To the justice of God.

Why, then, are they called natural punishments?—*A.* To distinguish them from such as are miraculous.

NATURAL REMEDIES FOR PUNISHMENT.

3. But what providential arrangement may be observed relative to the punishment of sin?—*A.* God has provided, in many instances, remedies for its otherwise inevitable consequences.

What are we apt presumptuously to imagine on this head?—

A. That there should be neither misery nor evil.

What, however, is the fact?—*A.* We find that God permits both.

With what alleviations?—*A.* With reliefs and remedies for both.

What instance then of severity and indulgence in the course of Nature does Butler adduce?—*A.* The permission of sin and misery is an instance of severity: the allowance of alleviations and remedies is an instance of mercy.

How, for instance, might the bad consequences of the man's trifling upon the precipice have been prevented?—*A.* By proper interposition—by another's coming to the rash man's relief, and with his own laying hold of that relief.

Describe the indulgence afforded by Nature.—*A.* God has provided remedies to prevent the natural consequences of sin from following in this life.

What may this indulgence be called?—*A.* Compassion, as distinguished from goodness.

Describe, now, the unprevented consequences of sin.—*A.* Sad effects result from negligence, rashness, and wilfulness: sadder effects still from a dissolute disregard of all religion: extreme misery, irretrievable ruin and death are often the unprevented consequences of vice in this world.

What ground, however, would there still be to hope for pardon and the prevention of the penal consequences of vice?—*A.* That arising from the general economy of the world, which affords instances of merciful remedies and preventives of the natural consequences of sin.

REPENTANCE NOT AN ADEQUATE REMEDY FOR SIN.

4. What four things show us that nothing that we could do, alone and of ourselves, would prevent the natural consequences of

sin?—*A.* 1. Our ignorance of the relations between sin and its punishment; 2. The analogy of nature; 3. Our notions of government; 4. The general consent of mankind.

How in the first place does our ignorance prove this?—*A.* Because we know nothing of the reasons which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted, and, therefore, we cannot know whether anything we could do would render it fit that such punishment should be remitted.

What light does the analogy of nature throw on the subject?—*A.* It shows that sorrow for past follies and behaving well for the future will not prevent the natural consequences of men's actions, and that, therefore, it is credible that behaving well for the time to come may be (not useless indeed, but) wholly insufficient to prevent the future punishment which naturally follows on vice.

Show, in the third place, that our notions of government are against the idea that doing well for the future would prevent the punishment annexed to disobedience.—*A.* Because our ideas of punishment are necessarily connected with our ideas of government.

How, lastly, does the common consent of mankind show that repentance alone is not sufficient to expiate guilt?—*A.* By the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.

What, conclusion, then, may be drawn from this branch of the argument?—*A.* That, had the laws of God's government been permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment of our sins must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it.

THE INTERPOSITION OF CHRIST.

5. In what six points does Revelation confirm the foregoing conclusion?—*A.* 1. It confirms our fears concerning the unprevented consequences of sin; 2. It supposes the world to be in a state of ruin; 3. It teaches that pardon does not immediately

follow on repentance ; 4. That an interposition was not improbable ; 5. That the laws of God are compassionate ; and 6. That He mercifully provided that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of mankind.

How is this interposition described in Holy Scripture?—*A.* “ God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life.”

To what other act of divine goodness may this gift of His Son be compared?—*A.* To that, by which he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow creatures.

How did the Son of God interpose?—*A.* As one friend interposes for another, and in such a manner as was necessary to prevent the otherwise inevitable punishment of sin ; “ He loved us and gave himself for us.”

How does He describe His love?—*A.* He compares it to that of human friendship.

Show that these statements are not inconsistent with Divine Goodness.—*A.* If the constitution of things had been such that the whole creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat which God had appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness.

What answer would you give to one who objected “ that mankind are thus supposed to be in a very strange state ? ”—*A.* We should confess very readily that men were in a very strange state, but that it was not Christianity which put them into it.

What appearances are there of the fall of man?—*A.* In the manifold miseries and extreme wickedness of the world : that the best have great wrongnesses which they complain of and endeavour to amend, and that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age.

What opinion had moralists of the present state?—*A.* That it was a state of punishment.

What appearance does the world assume?—*A.* It has the appearance of being in a state of ruin.

What inference may be justly drawn from these facts?—*A.* That there is very little reason to object against the Scripture account of man's degradation, however difficult it may be to account for the occasions and circumstances of it.

But what may be said of the sad effects of Adam's disobedience upon ourselves?—*A.* That it is a thing analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence.

And what may be said of the effects of Christ's interposition?—*A.* That it is also a thing analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence.

Describe, now, the particular way in which Christ interposed.—*A.* 1. As the light of the world; 2. As a propitiatory sacrifice; 3. As our High Priest.

Why is He called our High Priest?—*A.* Because He voluntarily offered Himself up.

What important fact, on this point, should be observed?—*A.* That He is described, beforehand, in the Old Testament, under the characters of a Priest and Victim.

“But all this,” it is objected, “was mere allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law.”—*A.* The apostle Paul, on the contrary, asserts that “the law was the shadow” and Christ was the substance—and that the Levitical priesthood was a shadow only of the priesthood of Christ.

What, in a word, is the doctrine of his epistle to the Hebrews?—*A.* That the legal sacrifices alluded to the great atonement to be made by the blood of Christ, and not that the blood of the Redeemer alluded to the sacrifices.

Under what three heads is His office, as Mediator between God and man, usually treated?—*A.* As our Prophet, Priest, and King.

CHRIST, OUR PROPHET, KING, AND PRIEST.

State the way in which Christ is eminently the Prophet?—*A.*

1. He published anew the law of nature which men had corrupted; 2. He taught us authoritatively to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this world, in expectation of the righteous judgment of God; 3. He confirmed the truth of this moral system by miracles; 4. He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be worshipped; 5. He taught us the efficacy of repentance; 6. He taught us the rewards and punishments of a future life; 7. He set us a perfect example, that we should follow His steps.

Describe the nature of His kingdom.—*A.* It is not of this world; was founded by His death; was intended to be a standing memorial of religion, and to continue for ever.

What kind of government does He exercise over His kingdom or Church?—*A.* An invisible government.

By whom does He exercise it?—*A.* By His Spirit.

Who are the members of His Church?—*A.* All persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to His laws.

What is Christ preparing for them?—*A.* A place where they may reign with Him for ever and ever.

What, lastly, was the nature of Christ's sacrifice?—*A.* Propitiatory and atoning.

What does Butler say of sacrifices of expiation?—*A.* That they prevailed among the Jews and obtained amongst most other nations.

What was the origin of heathen sacrifices?—*A.* Tradition; whose original, probably, was revelation.

Contrast the sacrifice of Christ with them.—*A.* They were continually repeated, and made up a great part of the external religion of mankind; but now "once, in the end of the world, hath Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself."

What was the nature of His sacrifice?—*A.* In the highest degree efficacious, for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens thought their sacrifices to be, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree and with regard to some persons.

Why must all conjecture about the way in which His death was efficacious remain uncertain?—*A.* Because the Scripture has left it a mystery, by leaving something unrevealed.

State two extreme views which have been taken of the sacrifice of Christ.—*A.* Some have explained it beyond what the Scriptures have authorized. Others have denied its efficacy because unable to explain it; and have confined His office, as Redeemer, to His instruction, example, and government of His Church.

What, however, is the doctrine of the gospel?—*A.* That our Lord not only taught us the efficacy of repentance, but made our repentance available; and not only taught us that we were capable of salvation and how to obtain it, but put us into a capacity to obtain it.

What, then, is our duty and wisdom?—*A.* Thankfully to accept the benefit by performing the conditions upon which it is offered on our part, without disputing how it was procured on His part.

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST NEITHER UNNECESSARY NOR UNJUST.

Answer the objection “The sacrifice of Christ was unnecessary.”—*A.* No one can say so, unless acquainted with the whole of the case, which is impossible.

When might such an objection be reasonable?—*A.* When we could prove that any part of Christ’s mediatorial office was not requisite or conducive to the end proposed, or was in itself unreasonable.

“But,” it is objected again, “the sacrifice of Christ represents God as indifferent whether He punishes the innocent or the guilty,” answer this objection.—*A.* Such an objection is equally valid against the existing course of nature, which demands vicarious sufferings.

Why is the objection against Christ’s sacrifice less valid than against natural mediatorship?—*A.* Because the laws of

nature oblige us to suffer for others, whilst Christ's sufferings were voluntary.

Give two reasons why men object to the satisfaction of Christ's death.—*A.* 1. Because they do not consider God's fixed and settled appointments as His appointments at all; or, 2. They forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience.

To what cause do they trace it up?—*A.* To arbitrary and tyrannical will.

By what two tendencies, however, has the doctrine of Christ's atonement been justified?—*A.* 1. By its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws; and 2. to deter his creatures from sin.

What is the force of such a justification?—*A.* Plainly unanswerable.

Against what, however, is the objection to the doctrine levelled?—*A.* Not against Christianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature.

To what does the objection really amount?—*A.* To a denial of the necessity and expediency of a divine appointment, because the objector does not see it to be necessary or expedient.

What further heightens the absurdity of this reasoning?—*A.* 1. Because it is urged against a doctrine in Christianity analogous to a natural dispensation of providence, which is a matter of experience; and 2. It is not about a matter in which we are actively concerned.

What general rule is now laid down concerning the degree of information we may expect, concerning our own duty and the Divine conduct respectively?—*A.* That we should not expect the same degree of information concerning the Divine conduct as concerning our own duty.

How is this general rule proved?—*A.* By analogy:—We know but little of the natural constitution of the world, yet enough for the common purposes of life:—we know little of the

mystery of redemption, but enough respecting the common precepts of Christianity:—under His natural government He has given us all things pertaining to life, whilst under the Christian dispensation He has given us all things pertaining unto Godliness.

What, in fact, is the character of the common precepts of Christianity?—*A.* Intelligible and easy to be accounted for.

And what is the manifest use of positive institutions in Christianity?—*A.* To keep up and to propagate religion amongst mankind.

And, lastly, what reasons have we for internal regards to Christ, for our external and internal worship of him?—*A.* They manifestly arise out of what He has done and suffered, His authority and dominion, and the relation which He is revealed to stand in to us.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTENTS.—The evidence of Christianity and its want of universality vindicated by a reference 1. to a similar want of evidence and universality observable in the natural government of the world; and 2. To God's righteousness in judging all men according to what they had, and not according to what they had not—The evidence of religion constitutes a religious probation—The lowest evidence puts men into a general state of probation—Difficulties as to the evidence of religion may afford an opportunity for a virtuous exercise of the understanding—The evidence of Christianity lies level to common men.

What two objections against Christianity are mentioned in this chapter?—*A.* 1. That its evidence appears doubtful; 2. That it is not universal.

On what suppositions are these objections founded?—*A.* 1. That God would not bestow a favour upon any of us, except in the degree which, we think, He might, and which we imagine would be most to our particular advantage; and 2. That He would not bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all.

How are these suppositions contradicted?—*A.* By the general analogy of nature.

NO OBJECTION AGAINST CHRISTIANITY FROM ITS DOUBTFULNESS OR WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.

What should be taken into consideration by such as think Christianity false, because its evidence is doubtful?—*A.* They should consider what the evidence is, on which they act with regard to their temporal interests.

Mention some things which show how doubtful this evidence is.—*A.* 1. It is impossible, in many cases, to balance pleasure and pain, so as to be able to say, on which side the overplus is; 2. It is impossible to make due allowances for change of temper and taste, satiety, disgust, ill health, all of which render men incapable of enjoying the objects they have desired; 3. Numberless accidents, besides untimely death, may probably disappoint the best concerted schemes; 4. Strong objections against these schemes overbalanced only by probable reasons on the other side; 5. Our liability to be deceived by men and things, especially if there be a strong bias from within, from indulged passion, to favour the deceit; 6. Our engagement in pursuits where the probability is greatly against success, and making provision for ourselves, which we suppose we may have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, we never shall.

What answer do you give to those who object against Christianity because it is not universal?—*A.* An analogical one. The Author of Nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some which He does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it.

How does this uncertain evidence and variety in God's natural government of the world affect the question of His government on the one hand and our own duty on the other hand?—*A.* Notwithstanding both, God does exercise a natural government over the world, and there is such a thing as a prudent and im-

prudent institution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that His natural government.

Answer the two main objections from God's dealings with His Church.—*A.* Neither the Jewish nor the Christian revelation have been universal, and both revelations have had different degrees of evidence.

Show this more particularly.—*A.* The Jews who lived during the prophets, from Moses to Malachi, had higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those who lived after the cessation of prophecy. The first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than what we now have.

What presumptive proof had they, which we do not enjoy in the same degree?—*A.* That arising from the influence which religion had upon the generality of its professors.

What proof may we have which they could not enjoy?—*A.* That resulting from the conformity between the prophetic history and the state of the world and of Christianity.

How does Butler illustrate the variety in the degrees of religious light and evidence conferred on mankind?—*A.* By a reference to the spiritual condition of the heathen, of Mahomedans, Papists, and Protestants.

How does he describe the religious state of the heathen?—*A.* As having received no light at all from the Scriptures of truth.

How may the religious condition of the Mahomedans be described?—*A.* As having had natural or essential religion enforced upon their consciences, yet having never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to their consideration.

How does he describe the religious state of Papists?—*A.* Though they have had the Scripture laid before them as of Divine revelation, yet they have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted,

the evidence so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole.

How, lastly, does he describe the religious condition of Protestants?—*A.* As having Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence.

Why are these cases adduced?—*A.* To show that the different degrees of light, which they severally enjoy, might be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensations of Providence.

What will reconcile us to these inequalities?—*A.* The fact that every one will be dealt with equitably at the Judgment-day, and accepted according to what he hath, and not according to what he hath not.

If all men shall be thus equitably dealt with in the Judgment-day, is their condition equally advantageous with respect to futurity?—*A.* By no means.

What obligation, then, rests upon the heathen and others to get out of their religious darkness, and on others to bring them out of it?—*A.* The same obligation as would rest upon them in matters of other knowledge, to endeavour to learn, and on others to endeavour to teach.

To what principle do you refer these different situations of men?—*A.* To the same principle which disposed the Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures.

To what principle do you refer the different religious situations of persons who have like moral capacities?—*A.* To the same principle which disposed Him to make creatures of different moral capacities.

Why must we be in the dark respecting the particular reasons of these things —*A.* Because we know so very little of our own case, much less of that of others.

Supposing, however, revelation were universal and offered to all alike, from what causes would almost the same differences

arise in their religious situations, and the same disadvantages happen to some in comparison to others?—*A.* 1. From men's different capacities ; 2. From the different lengths of their lives ; 3. From their different educations ; 4. From their difference of temper and bodily constitution.

What, also, must be supposed to be the true account why some men are placed in a state of ignorance?—*A.* The same account why we ourselves should be ignorant of the reasons of their ignorance.

Admitting, then, that the evidence of revelation is doubtful, there are four practical reflections which will tend to remove all causes of complaint. Name them.—*A.* 1. Want of evidence may constitute some men's religious trials ; 2. Doubtful evidence puts us into a general state of probation ; 3. Difficulties in evidence are no more a ground of complaint than external temptations ; 4. The general proofs of religion lie level to common men.

DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE, A RELIGIOUS TRIAL.

How does the apparent want of evidence constitute some men's trial?—*A.* It gives scope for a virtuous exercise or a vicious neglect of their understandings, in examining or not examining into that evidence.

Why is it reasonable to suppose that we are on our trial with respect to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion?—*A.* Because the exercise of our understanding is as much within our power and choice as our behaviour in common affairs.

What two states of mind are distinctly described and compared?—*A.* The state of mind and conduct before and after conviction of the truth of religion.

How would the principle of obedience after conviction of religious truth develop itself before such conviction?—*A.* In impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude.

What, after conviction, would render the student of religious truth obedient to its precepts?—*A.* The same principle which would, before conviction, set him about an examination of it.

How would you describe inattention, negligence, and want of all serious concern before conviction?—*A.* As immoral, as neglect of religious practice after conviction.

How would you describe active solicitude before conviction?—*A.* As being as much an exercise of a morally right temper, as religious practice after conviction.

How, then, does the manner, in which the evidence of religion is left, constitute religious probation?—*A.* By affording an opportunity for right and wrong behaviour.

THE PROPER FORCE OF DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE.

How does the lowest evidence of religion act as a test of character?—*A.* It puts us into a general state of probation in a religious sense.

What case does Butler suppose, to illustrate this?—*A.* The case of a person doubting whether another had or had not done him the greatest favour.

How would such a doubt affect his mind?—*A.* It would render him at least not indifferent to that person.

How, then, should the lowest evidence of religion affect us?—*A.* It should beget a serious, practical apprehension, that it may be true.

And why should such an apprehension produce a spirit of religious suspense and moral resolution and self-government?—*A.* Because the apprehension that religion may be true, as really lays men under obligation as a full conviction that it is true.

What are the duties, then, of such as complain of the doubtfulness of religion?—*A.* 1. To consider further the important subject; 2. To maintain a sense of being under the government of God; 3. To maintain an awful solicitude about religion; 4. To attend to any fresh evidence; 5. To refrain from all

immoralities, and cultivate every virtue; 6. To refrain from all profane company; and, 7. To treat with highest reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest and being and the fate of Nature depend.

What does Butler say of the rule of life laid down for the doubting and those who are convinced of the truth of religion?—*A.* That there is not near so great a difference between them as is generally supposed; because, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same in kind, so the subject-matter of their obligations (what they are bound to do and refrain from) is not so very unlike.

What renders the higher classes so responsible for their religious behaviour?—*A.* The power which they have of doing so much more harm or good, by their example, in religious matters (either by setting an example of profaneness, or of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of the truth of religion), than the harm or good they can do by acting well or ill in all their common intercourses with mankind.

What constitutes the force of these remarks?—*A.* The fact, that doubting implies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt.

Prove this.—*A.* No one would be in doubt concerning the truth of any number of facts that should accidentally come into his mind, and of which he had no evidence at all.

In a case, however, where we were in doubt, as in an even chance, what is this equivalent to?—*A.* It is equivalent to all other cases, where there is such evidence on both sides of a question, as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth.

What conclusion may be fairly drawn from this?—*A.* That doubting presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still.

What comparison may then be instituted between the degrees of evidence?—*A.* There are as many intermediate steps between no evidence and that which affords ground of doubt, as

between that degree which affords ground of doubt and demonstration.

How ought these degrees of evidence to influence our conduct?—*A.* In proportion as they are discerned.

What comparison, on the subject of evidence, may be fairly drawn between the moral and intellectual character?—*A.* 1. As it is an imperfection in the moral character not to be influenced by lower degrees of evidence when discerned, so it is an imperfection in the understanding not to discern them; 2. The understanding, proportionably to its capacity, discovers the lower as well as the higher degrees of evidence; so the moral character, proportionably to its fairness and honesty, is influenced by the lower as well as the higher degrees of evidence; 3. The understanding, in proportion to its defects, is unable to discover lower degrees of evidence; so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, men seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing.

What conclusion follows from these things?—*A.* It follows that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under serious obligations to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour.

SPECULATIVE DIFFICULTIES AND EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TEMPTATION.

With what other difficulties may you compare the difficulties of religious evidence of which some complain?—*A.* With the external circumstances of temptation in which others are placed.

How do temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline?—*A.* By giving occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle.

In what way are difficulties as to the evidence of religion temptations?—*A.* 1. They tempt us to reject religion without any consideration at all; 2. To explain it away after some

degree of consideration ; and 3. To encourage ourselves in vice, from hopes of impunity.

How do these difficulties tend to our improvement in virtue ?—*A.* They call forth our virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanted.

What account can you give of the evidence of religion being left in such a way as to require, in some, an attentive, solicitous and painful exercise of the understanding about it ?—*A.* The same account why others are placed in such circumstances as that the practice of the common duties of religion should require great attention and solicitude.

What account can you give of the temptations to some, caused by the apparent doubtfulness of religion ?—*A.* The same account why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others.

And what account may be given why some persons should be exercised with both kinds of temptations, *i.e.*, with external temptations and with speculative difficulties ?—*A.* The same account why others should be exercised with external trials in such very high degrees, as some have been.

Whom does Butler mention as having been thus greatly tempted ?—*A.* The early Christians.

To what class of persons may the speculative difficulties of religious evidence become the principal part of their trials in life ?—*A.* To such as have small temptations to behave ill in the common course of life.

Why should such persons be exposed to these difficulties ?—*A.* 1. Because they stand in need of moral discipline ; 2. That they may give some manifestation to the creation of God with respect to their moral character.

Mention some circumstances in men's temporal capacity analogous to this respecting religion.—*A.* The case of persons whose difficulty in life is not so much doing their duty, when discovered, as in discovering it.

On what supposition has Butler, however, been hitherto proceeding?—*A.* That men's dissatisfaction with the evidences of religion is not owing to their own neglect and prejudices.

What remark, then, must be further added?—*A.* That such dissatisfaction may possibly be owing to their own neglects and prejudices.

State some courses of conduct which prevent men from receiving evidence in religious matters.—*A.* Carelessness, profaneness, prejudices, mockery, ridicule.

What effect has a like turn of mind with respect to matters of common speculation and practice?—*A.* It hinders men from attaining knowledge and a right understanding in such common matters.

What effect has the indulgence of ridicule on the mind?—*A.* Men may indulge it so far as to lose all sense of good conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even impair their faculties of reason.

What account does Holy Scripture give of the reception of religious evidence?—*A.* It says that "every one shall not understand."

How may this ignorance arise?—*A.* It may arise from the evidence of religion being originally and designedly left doubtful; so that they who were desirous of evading moral obligation might not see it; and that honest-minded persons should.

What, however, is Butler's opinion respecting the general proof of natural religion and of Christianity?—*A.* That it lies level to common men. If they are as much in earnest, he adds, about religion as about their temporal affairs, they are capable of being convinced, upon real evidence, concerning the chief points of religion.

Under what circumstances, however, must such persons remain in doubt, ignorance, and error?—*A.* If they attend to the objections to which revelation is open, and will not give the necessary time and attention to sift them to the bottom.

“ But,” it is objected, “ if a prince wishes to be obeyed, his commands and directions will be plain and evident ; should not God’s commands, therefore, be also plain ? ” Answer this objection.—*A.* 1. We cannot argue thus with respect to Him Who is the governor of the world ; 2. He does not give us such positive information with respect to our temporal interests ; 3. He does not regard so much the act as the motive in doing it ; and if the prince wished to test the loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in a plain manner.

In what two points of view may the will of God be considered ? —*A.* As either absolute or conditional.

If His will be considered as absolute, what is the character of His requirements ?—*A.* That we should act virtuously in such given circumstances.

What weighty consideration will follow from this ?—*A.* That we have it in our power to contradict His will.

What is the language of His conditional will ?—*A.* That if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished.

What instances have we of this His conditional will ?—*A.* The whole constitution of nature affords most certain instances.

What, now, is necessarily implied in our being in a state of religion ?—*A.* That we are in a state of probation.

How may this probation be effected ?—*A.* By an apparent lack of evidence, and by thus requiring care and consideration on our part.

In what may it consist ?—*A.* In taking due care to inform ourselves about it, and, afterwards, in acting as the case requires, however doubtful the evidence may be.

Show, *from the reason of the thing*, and *from experience*, that it may arise from the doubtfulness of evidence.—*A.* 1. Ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty ; 2. Our temporal probation makes us think so.

What is the character of the evidence on which we are bound to act in our temporal concerns ?—*A.* Very doubtful.

What are often the consequences of inconsiderateness?—*A.* They are often as fatal as misconduct occasioned by wilfulness and overbearing passion.

What three points should be forced on the consideration of those who complain of want of evidence in religion?—*A.* They should be made to see that, in the daily concerns of life, they have to act upon doubtful evidence; 2. That they have to guard against not only what they fully believe will happen, but also against what they think it supposable may happen; 3. That they have to engage in pursuits, when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible that possibly they may succeed in them.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTENTS.—The direct evidences of Christianity—Miracles and Prophecy—The Argument drawn from the direct and collateral evidence united.

How far has Butler advanced?—*A.* He has removed presumptions against revelation and objections against the general scheme of Christianity and particular things relating to it.

What now remains to be considered?—*A.* The positive evidence we have for its truth.

With what object?—*A.* To see what the Analogy of Nature suggests with regard to that evidence and the objections against it; or to see what is the plain natural rule of judgment and of action in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before us.

How may the evidences of Christianity be divided?—*A.* Into the direct and collateral.

What are the direct and fundamental proofs of Christianity?—*A.* Miracles and the completion of Prophecy.

How should the collateral proofs be adduced?—*A.* They should never be urged apart from the direct proofs, but always joined with them.

Of what, then, will the evidence of Christianity consist?—*A.* Of a long series of things reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up one argument.

To what may the conviction arising from this kind of proof be compared?—*A.* To what is called “the effect” in architecture and other works of art.

How is this effect produced?—*A.* It results from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view.

What plan of argument does Butler propose to himself?—*A.* 1. To treat of miracles and prophecy; 2. To treat of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument.

Why does he adopt this plan?—*A.* Because it is the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning common facts, and especially questions relating to conduct.

MIRACLES.

What evidence is there in the Old Testament of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets?—*A.* The same evidence of them, as of the common, civil, history of Moses and the kings of Israel.

What evidence do the gospels and the acts of the apostles afford of the miracles of Christ and His apostles?—*A.* The same historical evidence as of the common matters related in them.

What remark may be made upon this?—*A.* It shows that the authors of these books did not make an entertaining manner of writing their aim.

What account would have been given of the miracles, had this been the case?—*A.* The same account as of their speeches

and descriptions ; the same account as is given why Poets make use of wonders and prodigies.

But how are the facts, both natural and miraculous, recorded in Scripture ?—*A.* In plain, unadorned narratives.

And upon what kind of evidence do they respectively rest ?—*A.* Upon the same foot of historical evidence.

State another proof of miracles.—*A.* Some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles, have been quoted as genuine from the age in which they are said to be written.

By what events, too, are they confirmed ?—*A.* By the contemporaneous establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions.

And how can you account for their establishment ?—*A.* By the performance of miracles.

And what also is the most obvious reason why the history of miracles was written and received as a true history ?—*A.* Because it was a true history, and no other account of it would be so easy and direct.

But is the most obvious reason always the true one ?—*A.* No—a very far-fetched and indirect account of a matter is often the true account.

What thing alone do mere guess, supposition and possibility prove, when opposed to historical evidence ?—*A.* They prove nothing but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.

What just conclusion can be drawn from these remarks ?—*A.* That the Scripture history of miracles is to be received as an authentic history until something positive be alleged against it, sufficient to invalidate it.

In what three ways may it be invalidated ?—*A.* 1. By direct historical evidence on the other side ; 2. By general incredibility in the things related ; 3. By inconsistencies in the general turn of the history.

II. Why is a peculiar weight of evidence to be attached to St. Paul's epistles ?—*A.* From the nature of epistolary writing, and

because several of his letters were written, not to individuals but, to churches.

What is the effect of this particular evidence, joined with what they have in common with the rest of the New Testament?—*A.* It seems not to leave so much as any *particular* pretence for defying their genuineness.

Why do you say “particular pretence?”—*A.* Because any single fact of such a kind and such antiquity, may have *general* doubts raised concerning it.

On what grounds?—*A.* From the very nature of human affairs and human testimony.

Of what epistle of St. Paul is there special evidence?—*A.* Of the first epistle to the Corinthians.

Why of this epistle?—*A.* From the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle to the same Church.

And why is St. Paul’s evidence detached from that of the other Apostles?—*A.* Because he received the gospel in general, and the institution of the communion in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ Himself, Whom he declares that he saw after His ascension.

How, then, does St. Paul allude to miracles?—*A.* He declares that he was endued with the power of working miracles; that the Corinthians knew he was endued with this power; and speaks of great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in the Church.

What gives to this assertion an air of credibility?—*A.* He reproveth them for several irregularities, and he had amongst them several personal opposers.

How also does he allude to these gifts?—*A.* Incidentally only, in the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to several for their indecent use of them, and by way of depreciating them in comparison with moral virtues.

III. Again, on what allegation did Christianity offer itself to the world?—*A.* On the allegation of miracles.

On what grounds was it received?—*A.* On a professed belief in their reality.

In what, then, does it differ from all other religions?—*A.* In thus resting its claims on public miracles.

How was Mahomedanism propagated?—*A.* Not by public miracles, but by other means.

Were not particular institutions, however, in Paganism and Popery, confirmed by miracles?—*A.* By no well attested miracles.

How, then, do you account for the reports of miracles having been performed on their establishment?—*A.* They are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed and have power in their hands, and the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude, and political interests are blended with religious claims and religious distinctions.

What is there, on the subject of miracles, peculiar to the Christian religion?—*A.* That a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, brought over such numbers to the new religion, and got it to be received on the evidence of miracles.

What reason would the first converts have alleged for embracing Christianity?—*A.* Their belief in the miracles.

What things proved that they were satisfied of the truth of the miracles?—*A.* 1. Their abandonment of the religion in which they had been educated; 2. Separation from former friends and from their festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are so greatly addicted; 3. The adoption of a faith, which exposed them to many inconveniences, losses, persecutions, and death.

In what only way can you account for their conduct?—*A.* They were really convinced of the truth of those miracles on the belief of which they had changed their religion.

To what is this kind of evidence equivalent?—*A.* It is as if their testimony had been put in writing, and these writings had come down to us.

Show, too, that it is real evidence.—*A.* It was the evidence of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves of.

How is it distinct from express and direct evidence?—*A.* Because it is an additional evidence—the evidence of conduct, resulting from the belief of the fact.

Show that their conduct is a distinct testimony from direct historical evidence.—*A.* Because in all cases, if a fact, recorded by an historian, were called in question, it would be an additional proof of such fact, that it was believed in by numbers of the age in which the historian said it was done.

If it is argued that men are credulous, what should be put in the opposite scale?—*A.* Their suspicions and backwardness even to believe, and much more to practise, what makes against their interest.

What, therefore, affords a presumption of something more than human in Christianity?—*A.* The immediate conversion of such great numbers in the face of persecution and death.

Why is it called only a presumption?—*A.* Because it is not alleged as a proof, alone and of itself.

What view must we also take of all the other arguments separately?—*A.* We need not consider each, by itself, as a proof.

What, however, will be the force of the combined evidence?—*A.* The strongest proof.

What, therefore, are unbelievers called on, by the rules of argument, to show?—*A.* That this evidence for miracles is not to be credited.

What objections have they raised against them?—*A.* Such objections as, in their judgment, to destroy the credit of miracles.

What is the FIRST objection?—*A.* “Enthusiastic people,” they say, “have given up their lives for the most idle follies.”

What distinction, however, must be drawn between testimony

of opinions and testimony of facts?—*A.* Testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, yet it is allowed, in all cases, to be a proof of facts.

What is the greatest proof a man can give of his belief in opinions or facts?—*A.* That he should lay down his life in attestation of either.

How did the apostles express their belief in the miraculous facts of Christianity?—*A.* By laying down their lives in attestation of them.

What kind of facts were they?—*A.* Such as came under the observation of their senses.

And what additional evidence may be derived from the martyrs of the next age?—*A.* They gave equal proof of their believing the miracles to be true, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of the facts.

2. “But enthusiasm,” it is said, “weakens the evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion.” Answer this second objection.—*A.* Those who bear witness to the Christian miracles do not appear, in any peculiar degree, weak or under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, and they affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and ears. This certainly is evidence of the strongest kind.

By what two things, however, might even this evidence be overcome?—*A.* Either by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by contrary testimony.

To what influence is religion peculiarly exposed?—*A.* To enthusiasm.

To what influences is human testimony in common things exposed?—*A.* To innumerable prejudices—romance, affectation, humour, a desire to engage attention, or surprise, party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings.

Is human testimony rejected on this account?—*A.* By no means.

What is the *third* objection against the Christian miracles?

It is said that “the early Christians were partly deceivers and partly deceived:—were partly enthusiasts and partly knaves.” Answer this.—*A.* We do not disbelieve human testimony, although it is exposed to the same admixture of enthusiasm and knavery: it still remains a natural ground of assent, and this assent a natural principle of action.

What is the *fourth* objection? It is said “that mankind has been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders.” Answer this objection.—*A.* They have not been deceived by these oftener than by other things; neither are they more liable to be deceived by these pretences than by other pretences.

Mention the *fifth* objection. It is said “that there is very considerable historical evidence for spurious miracles and, therefore, the Christian miracles are fabulous also.” Answer this.—*A.* The consequence is illogical—for evidence confuted by contrary evidence or overbalanced by it does not surely destroy the credibility of evidence neither confuted nor overbalanced.

What would such a course of argument be akin to?—*A.* It would be the same as saying, that if two men, of equally good reputation, had given evidence in different cases, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other.

What effect must the general observation of the weakness, negligence, and dishonesty of men have on the evidence of testimony?—*A.* It weakens it in all cases, but destroys it in none.

In what different degrees will such things weaken the evidence of testimony?—*A.* In degrees proportionable to the observations made of men’s weakness and dishonesty, or of the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it.

What could destroy the evidence of testimony?—*A.* Incompetency to give evidence: acknowledged prejudice: incredibility in the facts: contrary testimony.

Till such things be proved, what do the natural laws of

human actions require?—*A.* They require that human testimony be admitted.

What do some men indolently say, in order to overthrow direct historical evidence?—*A.* They say that there are so many principles, from which men are liable to be deceived and are disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe.

What is supposed by this very manner of speaking?—*A.* That they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which they thus speak, which on such a subject is a very material point.

What *two* points would render it less likely that the early Christians should be deceived from carelessness?—*A.* 1. The importance of Christianity; and 2. The obligations to veracity which their religion laid them under.

What obvious presumption may be drawn from this?—*A.* That they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others.

To what extent, then, must the external evidence for Christianity (*i.e.*, the proof of miracles) be admitted?—*A.* It must be admitted to be of real weight, although not sufficient, perhaps, to convince the mind of the reality of those miracles.

State a similar case.—*A.* The case of such persons as see that there is strong evidence for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true.

What cases of this character could occur?—*A.* Cases in which there was contrary testimony, or where the things supposed were incredible.

But can such reasons occur in Christianity?—*A.* No—there is no testimony contrary to that which has been considered: and it has been proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general or in any part of it.

PROPHECY.

What kind of remarks does Butler make on the prophetic evidence?—*A.* He makes some few observations, suggested by the Analogy of Nature.

What, in this case, does he mean by the Analogy of Nature?—*A.* Judging of the evidence of prophecy by the same rules which you apply to common matters.

How, then, would the obscurity of one part of a prophecy affect that which is plain and intelligible?—*A.* It would not invalidate, in any degree, the proof of foresight arising from the completion of such parts as are not obscure or unintelligible.

What must be thought of such parts as are not understood?—*A.* They must be looked upon as if they were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue.

Can you exemplify this remark?—*A.* Suppose a writing partly in cypher and partly in plain words; and that, in the part we understood, mention was made of several known facts; it would never be thought, that, if we understood the whole, we should find that those facts were not in reality known to the writer.

For the same reason, how may most men gain a general idea of the fulfilment of prophecy?—*A.* They may see that particular prophecies have been fulfilled to such a degree as to be convinced of foresight more than human in such prophecies, although they may be incapable, from want of learning and opportunities of inquiry, to see how they have been fulfilled throughout.

How may the most learned also gain a general idea of the same?—*A.* From that general completion of them which is made out—although they also may not be able to make out to their own satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled.

II. What shows the intention of prophecy?—*A.* Its applicability.

In answer to what common objection is this remark made?—*A.* That “considering each prophecy by itself, it does not appear that they were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by Christians.”

To what two kinds of writing does Butler compare prophecy?—*A.* To the mythological and satirical, where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed.

When might a person be sure of the intention of a fable or parable?—*A.* When he saw that it was easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it.

And when might he be sure that such and such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing?—*A.* When it was applicable to such persons and events.

If he were acquainted with the meaning of only half the satire, how would his views be influenced?—*A.* He would still, in a great measure, be satisfied about its intention.

On what would his satisfaction depend?—*A.* On the degree in which he saw the general applicability of the satire.

What, then, proves the intention of prophecy as regards Christ and the present state of the Church and the political situation of the kingdoms of the world?—*A.* The long series of prophecy which is applicable to each.

III. Supposing the prophecies were capable of a two-fold application, and that the prophets thought they were speaking of other events besides those to which Christians apply them, why would not this circumstance invalidate the proof of prophecy?—*A.* Because the prophets must not necessarily be understood as knowing the whole meaning of their predictions.

And why is it not unlikely that the prophecies should contain more than the prophets themselves intended?—*A.* Because they were not the authors of their own works.

In what relation did they stand to their works?—*A.* They were the compilers only, not the authors.

What conclusion, then, would be drawn from the assertion that the Holy Spirit could have no other meaning than those persons had who wrote them?—*A.* It would follow that those persons must have been the authors and not the compilers, and, consequently, that their works were not inspired.

Why would such an assertion be absurd?—*A.* Because the authority of the books is yet under consideration, and they are not yet proved to be of no divine authority.

Till this be determined, what must be supposed?—*A.* That the prophecies may have some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood, and that this further meaning may be fulfilled.

What general rule, then, may be laid down on this point?—*A.* That events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different way from that in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them, afford the same proof that this different sense was originally intended, as would have been afforded, if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did, because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense, and apparent completions of prophecy are allowed to be explanatory of its meaning.

What, then, will be the real question?—*A.* Whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled in a natural or proper sense.

What example does Butler introduce to illustrate his remarks?—*A.* The prophecies of Daniel, which are capable of a twofold application, the second application being on that account not the less intended.

What, then, must be the simple matter of inquiry?—*A.* Whether the prophecies are applicable to Christ and to the present state of the Church and of the world, applicable in such a degree as to imply foresight, and not whether they are capable of any other application.

THE DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES.

Of what does the general argument for the truth of Christianity consist?—*A.* Of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered as making up one argument.

How are most questions of difficulty in common matters determined?—*A.* By evidence arising from various coincidences, supporting and confirming one another, and thus proving, with more or less certainty, the point under consideration.

For what two reasons does Butler adduce this kind of evidence?—*A.* 1. Because the proof of Revelation is not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and, 2. Because unbelievers must acknowledge them, as they are brought singly and then collectedly before them, to contain a great weight of evidence.

But where lies the proper force of the evidence?—*A.* It consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other and then united in one view.

What are the three great subjects on which Butler founds the circumstantial evidence of Christianity?—*A.* 1. The Bible; 2. The Messiah; 3. The Jews.

N.B. The remarks on these three subjects should be attentively considered.

What recommendation does Butler give on a review of them all?—*A.* That serious persons should set down every proof of Christianity, and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy.

What will be the result of such a process?—*A.* They will find that they will amount to a much higher degree of proof upon a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately at different times.

In what ratio does each additional evidence increase a probability?—*A.* It multiplies it.

What other recommendation does he give?—*A.* To set down what, they might imagine, would overturn Christianity.

What caution, however, does he add?—*A.* Against making a mistake rather on the one side than on the other.

Why does he introduce such a caution?—*A.* Because the consequences of a mistake on one side would be far more serious than a mistake on the other.

By what, however, is the truth of Christianity to be judged?—*A.* By the whole evidence, direct and collateral.

And what would prove Christianity true?—*A.* If it should be found impossible to show that all the series of things, alleged in its favour, were by accident only.

What advantage does circumstantial evidence give to the enemies of Christianity?—*A.* They can easily show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to objection and of little weight.

What, however, would they find impossible to show?—*A.* That the united force of the whole argument was liable to objection or of little weight.

What conclusion may now be drawn?—*A.* That there is no presumption against a revelation considered as miraculous: that the general scheme of Christianity and the principal parts of it are conformable to the experienced constitution of things, and that the whole is perfectly credible: and that the account now given of the positive evidence for it shows that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONTENTS.—Five objections against the argument used throughout the treatise—Its vindication and force.

How might the necessity of this chapter, in some degree, be superseded?—*A.* If every one would consider what they judge and give characters of.

Why is this not to be expected?—*A.* Because some persons do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against.

What induces Butler to consider the objections to which the treatise might be exposed?—*A.* Because they might appear very material to some thoughtful men; and if not considered, the treatise would become peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking and censure without judging.

How many objections does he mention?—*A.* Five.

The **FIRST** objection. “It is a poor thing,” it is said, “to solve difficulties in religion by saying that there are the same difficulties in the scheme of nature, since what is required is to clear both of all difficulties.”

To what would this be almost tantamount?—*A.* To a desire to comprehend the Divine nature and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting.

Show, in *three* ways, that it is not a poor thing to argue from natural and revealed religion.—*A.* 1. It is a just mode of argument to reason from what is acknowledged to what is disputed; 2. In matters of conduct we are constantly obliged to do so; 3. It is a valuable mode of argument to such as admit the truth of natural religion.

How do you answer the objections which are equally applicable to nature and religion?—*A.* By showing that they are equally applicable, provided the former be admitted to be true.

What is taken for granted in the second part of this treatise?—*A.* The same thing only as in the first, “that there is an Author of nature and natural Governor of the world.”

And how is Christianity vindicated?—*A.* Not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.

What is the **SECOND** objection?—*A.* “That it is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations of religion, by showing them that they have as little reason for their temporal affairs.”

Show that such reasoning is by no means strange, but most natural.—*A.* Religion is a practical thing; and if men can be convinced that there is the like reason for believing that the practice of religion will be for their happiness, as for believing that worldly prudence will, such conviction cannot but be an argument for the practice of religion.

Enlarge on the argument.—*A.* If there be any reason for believing that attention and care are requisite for obtaining and preserving the necessaries and conveniences of life, then there will be the same reason for believing that attention and care are necessary for obtaining and preserving our higher interests.

And why is there a greater reason for endeavouring to secure our future than our present interest?—*A.* Because the interest which religion proposes to us is infinitely greater than our present interest.

How does Butler characterize this reasoning?—*A.* As plainly unanswerable.

Whom will such a consideration influence?—*A.* It will have a tendency to influence fair minds.

How does Butler describe “a fair mind?”—*A.* A mind that considers what our condition really is, and upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and following and attending to that practical instruction, whatever it is, which is afforded us.

Where, however, lies the force of the objection that has been mentioned?—*A.* It lies in the doubtfulness of religion.

State the form of the objection.—*A.* If religion were true, it would not be doubtful and open to objections as it is—but it is doubtful and open to great objections; it is, therefore, false.

Answer this objection?—*A.* We may answer it, by observing that in our temporal concerns, we must act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion.

What is the *third* objection?—*A.* “Many doctrines and pre-

cepts of religion," it is said, "are inconsistent with justice and mercy."

What, however, is the design of this treatise?—*A.* Not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; not to justify His providence, but exhibit man's duty.

How should these two subjects be viewed?—*A.* As perfectly distinct, and not to be confounded.

How far is it necessary to justify the dispensations of Providence?—*A.* Only so far as to show that the things objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent with justice and goodness.

Suppose, then, that there were some things which, taken alone, would be unjust, how would you vindicate them?—*A.* By showing that, if we could understand them in connection with the whole scheme, of which they were parts, they would be found not consistent only with justice, but instances of it.

How may this be done?—*A.* By the analogy of what we see, proving not only that it is possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is so.

And how, in the second place, are the objections dealt with?—*A.* They are proved to be groundless and inconclusive; and, then, that, as matters of fact, they are credible from their conformity to the constitution of Nature.

If the objections against God's goodness and justice were not shown to be inconclusive, how would you then deal with them?—*A.* They might be shown, nevertheless, to be credible, as matters of fact—as, *e.g.*, the fact of God's future government is rendered credible from his present moral government, although it be objected against as unjust and improbable.

How can objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion be answered?—*A.* Only by entering into a consideration of its reasonableness.

Show, however, that you may answer objections against its truth without considering its reasonableness.—*A.* The system

of religion is reducible into matters of fact; and the probable truth of facts may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness.

Why is it not necessary to prove the reasonableness of every part of the system of religion?—*A.* Because the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the reasonableness of its practice.

How would the practice of religion be shown to be reasonable?—*A.* By proving that the system of it may be so, for ought we know to the contrary.

Of what use, also, is the analogy of nature in answering objections against the wisdom or goodness of any precept or doctrine of religion?—*A.* It is an immediate answer to what is really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the things objected against are incredible.

What, now, is the *fourth* objection?—*A.* It is said that this treatise is not satisfactory.

What answer would you give to such an objection?—*A.* That no natural institution of life, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence, would be satisfactory.

What is the character of the evidence on which we must act in ordinary life?—*A.* Most doubtful.

What effect, however, has this doubtfulness on our minds?—*A.* We do not throw away life, or disregard its interests on that account.

What two things do they seem to forget who object to the evidence of religion, as being not satisfactory?—*A.* They forget the very nature of our being, and also the very nature of religion.

What does religion pre-suppose?—*A.* A certain degree of integrity and honesty in those who will embrace it.

Of what is it a test?—*A.* It was intended to try whether men have or have not this integrity and honesty, and to exercise it in such as have it, in order to its improvement.

What, then, is the real question?—*A.* Not whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory or not, but whether it is sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes.

What is the nature of the evidence afforded us?—*A.* Fully sufficient for all the purposes of our probation.

If it were overbearing, what imperfection would follow?—*A.* It would not answer these purposes of probation.

What, in common matters of life, is the important question?—*A.* Whether the evidence for a course of action be such, as that our judgment determines it to be prudent.

By what evidence is our judgment thus determined?—*A.* By evidence infinitely lower than that which satisfies us.

What is the *last* objection?—*A.* That this treatise will prove uninfluential.

What is the object of the treatise?—*A.* Not to inquire what men are, but what the light and knowledge, afforded them, requires them to be—to show how, in reason, they should behave, not how, in fact, they will behave.

What, indeed, was the intention of religion?—*A.* For the trial and exercise of the morality of every man's character.

And on what does their character depend?—*A.* Upon themselves.

What, too, is the end of religion?—*A.* To place men in a state of probation.

And what, on this point, are we taught by Reason and Revelation?—*A.* That, by the evidence of Religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who will not be influenced by it.

What, however, does the objection allow?—*A.* That the things insisted upon in the Analogy are of some weight.

What two things follow from this?—*A.* That it is to be hoped the treatise will have some weight; and if so, there

would be the same reason, in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men.

How has Butler conducted his argument?—*A.* Upon the principles of others, and not his own.

What important argument has he omitted?—*A.* That founded on the moral fitness and unfitness of actions prior to all will whatever.

Why did he omit this argument?—*A.* Because it would have been thought unintelligible or not true.

What, in Butler's opinion, determines the Divine conduct?—*A.* Moral fitness and unfitness.

What determines the Divine judgment?—*A.* Speculative truth and falsehood.

Upon what have Moralists, ancient and modern, formed their language?—*A.* Upon the principles of liberty and moral fitness.

How do you account for the strange manner in which Butler has expressed himself?—*A.* From his wish to avoid the language formed upon these two principles.

Now, if you omit these two abstract principles, in what only view can religion be regarded?—*A.* As a matter of fact.

How, then, is it here regarded?—*A.* As a matter of fact.

In contrast with what other view?—*A.* As an abstract truth.

Explain this.—*A.* That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract truth; but that they appear so to our mind, is a matter of fact.

Which of these two must have been admitted even by the ancient sceptics?—*A.* The latter.

Make an assertion involving both an abstract truth and a matter of fact.—*A.* "That there is an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent of all will, but which unalterably determines the will of God to exercise that moral government over the world which religion teaches, *i.e.*, finally and upon the whole to punish and reward men respectively, as they act right and wrong."

How could Butler have proved this future fact more forcibly ?
—*A.* From the principles of liberty and moral fitness.

What is the force of the argument, as it now stands ?—
A. Not a demonstrative proof indeed, but one impossible to be evaded or disproved.

THE FORCE OF THE TREATISE.

Of what value will this treatise be to those who are convinced of the truth of religion from the principles of liberty and moral fitness ?—*A.* It will be an additional proof.

Of what use will it be to such as do not admit these principles ?—*A.* It will be an original proof.

Of what use will the TREATISE be to believers ?—*A.* They will find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and its evidence peculiarly strengthened.

Of what use will it prove to those who do not believe ?—
A. They will see the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, and the plain, undoubted credibility of it.

And what conclusion may be drawn respecting the argument from analogy ?—*A.* That it is a real argument and of weight on the side of religion, natural and revealed, and should be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.

Repeat, from memory, the contents of the Second Part of the Analogy.—*A.* “ The Divine Government of the world, implied in Christianity, contains in it—That this world, being in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and, consequently, of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, that this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence chap. I., of the utmost importance ; chap. II., proved by miracles ; but, chap. III., containing in it many things appearing to us strange and not to have been expected ; chap. IV., a dispensation which is a scheme or system

of things ; chap. V., carried on by the mediation of a Divine Person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world ; chap. VI., VII., yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the greatest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed, but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit. The design of the Treatise has been to show, that the several parts, principally objected against in the Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth, are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of nature or providence ; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against Christianity are no other than what may equally be alleged against the course of nature, where they are found, in fact, to be inconclusive ; and it is proved (chap. VIII.) that this argument from analogy is, in general, unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it.

THE END.

