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THE TRUE
INTEREST
OF THE
Princes of *Europe*, &c.

The Interest of the EMPEROR, *N. S.*

Vienna, February 1, 1739.

S I R,



THE new System of Politicks, of which your *Modern and wise Ministers* can justly claim the Honour of having been the first Inventors, and which all *Europe* thought calculated for their Meridian only, as intirely contrary to the true Interest of a Prince, or of his Subjects, have been lately, by an unexpected Event (which

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our ancient Politicians are pleased to call Fatality) received amongst us; and are likely to create as much Disorder and Confusion in our Councils, as they do in yours.

It is true, Sir, that our *German* Politicks have never been looked upon by other Nations as a most refined one, especially ever since the Abdication of *Charles* the Fifth; or our *German* Ministry thought incorruptible: but however, we had till this present unhappy Juncture, retained so good an Opinion of our selves, to which the vast Success of *Charles's* glorious Enterprizes had given Birth; that we thought we had still Sense and Discernment enough left, to make a just Difference betwixt the publick Good, and a Shadow of Glory, attended with Affliction and ill Success.

Sensible that it is not the Interest of the *illustrious Germanic Body*, in General, or of the Emperor in Particular, to leave a full Carrier to the unlimited Ambition of the *Muscovites*, reckoned dangerous by the Impoliticks of *Charles* the Fifth's Successors, we have been surprized at the strict Alliance, lately contracted between the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Petersbourg*; neither have we been capable yet, to understand, upon what Foundation it is establish'd, with what View cemented, and what great Advantages can accrue from it to the *Roman Empire*. The

The *Muscovites*, till their late Legillator *Peter the Great*, had made little or no Figure in *Europe*, and were scarcely known but by their Ferocity, Ignorance, and the vast Extent of their Empire, more formidable for its unpassable Mountains, unpenetrable Forests, and unpracticable Deserts, than by the Number, Courage, or warlike Disposition of its Inhabitants. Their ambitious Neighbours, especially the *Poles* and the *Swedes*, had wrested from them the most beautiful and fertile Provinces they were possess'd of in that Part of the World, which some of their Czars had attempted to defend, but always in vain, till *Peter*, after his Victory at *Pultowa*, began to draw both the Attention and Respect of all *Europe*. Little satisfy'd with having re-conquer'd what had been dismember'd from *Russia* by the *Swedes*, he had form'd the vast Design of rendering his Empire, in Process of Time, as unlimited as was his Ambition. He wanted above all, a Footing in *Germany*; but our late Emperor *Joseph*, thinking the Neighbourhood of such a warlike enterprizing and ambitious Prince, too dangerous, who in Process of Time could have oppress'd the whole *Germanic* Body and made himself Emperor, oppos'd it.

Were the Suspicions and Jealousies of those Times vain and groundless? Or is it less our Interest to confine the *Russian* Empire within its na-

tural Limits, or have we less to fear at present, from the Ambition of the Court of *Petersbourg*, than we had then? And if we are in the same Danger, why don't we endeavour to crush the over-growing Power of the *Muscovites*, rather than render it more formidable to us, by lending a helping Hand toward the Extent of their Conquests? We do it, perhaps, by a Principle of Gratitude for the signal Services they have done us in the late Election of a King of *Poland*? But those very pretended Services should have been Suspect to us; since it is the Opinion of the most impartial amongst us, that the *Czarina* consulted rather her Ambition at that Juncture, than the true Interest of the House of *Austria*, and was glad of the Opportunity of forcing the *Poles* to accept a King from her Hands, against their own Inclination, and contrary to the fundamental Laws of the Republick; in Hopes, perhaps, to pave the Way to further Incroachments on their Priveledges and Liberties, and to make some Time or other, their Kingdom a Province of the *Russian* Empire; which, if it should happen, would be a perpetual Thorn in our Sides.

You'll say, perhaps, Sir, that my Suspicions are nothing else but Panick Fears; and that I suppose Things which will never be brought to bear, since it will always be in the Power of the Emperor, and of the Empire, to hinder the Execution of those
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supposed dangerous Projects of the *Muscovites*; that their Marching their Troops in *Poland* to support *Augustus*, can never be attended with such fatal Consequences for us, as to have their King in the *French* Interest, that the *Poles* have always been thought capable to cope with the *Muscovites*, to oppose any Invasion on their Sides, or to expel them if once enter'd into *Poland*.

If my Fears are Panicks, they are, however, grounded upon incontestable Precedents, easily to be found even in this Century; since we have all the Reason imaginable to believe that *Peter the First*, would have seiz'd on *Poland*, instead of restoring *Augustus*, if he had dealt with a less war-like Prince, and had not been afraid of bringing upon him the Arms of the Empire, render'd at that Time, formidable, by its vast and uninterrupted Success against *France*; what could we expect less, was the Kingdom of *Poland* divided in so many Parts at present as it was then? I cannot agree with you, that it will be always in the Emperor's Power to hinder the *Muscovites* from executing their Projects, especially, if they were assisted by a powerful Ally, which none of their Neighbours will refuse, for the Sake of their Share in the Spoils. As for the Dangers we run by having a King of *Poland* in the *French* Interests, you'll give me Leave to say, that they are chimerical; since we have seen a King of *Poland* in the
French

French Interest, and indebted to *France* for his Election, such was the late *John Sobieski*; but we don't know that *France* has ever reap'd any Benefits by it, or the Empire been the worse for it. I confess, that if a King of *Poland* was as absolute as the King of *France*, and could assemble as easily the *Pospolite* as his *Most Christian* Majesty does his Armies, one could make a powerful Diversion, while the other, is engaged in a War against the Emperor; but every Body that is acquainted with the *Polish* Government, knows that is a Thing impossible. The *Pospolites* are certainly a formidable Body, which, if once on Horseback, and inspired with an unanimous Spirit of Fidelity to their Prince, and of Sincerity to the true Interest of their Country, could not only cope with the *Muscovites*, but even make the whole *Russian* Empire tremble; but which is very difficult to be effected, amongst People so easy to be bribed by their Neighbours, and always ready to preserve their own private Interest to the Publick Good. Therefore what Influence could the Emperor promise himself to have over them, in Case he wanted their Assistance to oppose the Enterprizes of the *Russians* against him, especially when his *Imperial* Majesty is always in want of the most persuasive Argument, *Money*?

But we have not only suffered the *Muscovites* to give Law to *Poland*, but are likewise entered jointly

jointly, with them into a War against the *Turk*; in a Time, and at a Juncture, when we were the less able to pursue it with Vigor, and with some Hopes of Success. Where most of our Electors, jealous, or either dissatisfied at the Steps lately taken by our Court for to procure the Empire to the Duke of *Lorraine*, were so little inclinable to furnish their Contingent; and when the Imperial Treasure had been exhausted, by a late and unsuccessful War against *France*. We expected, perhaps, that our Arms would have been attended with the same Success as they had been when we made the advantageous Treaty of *Pas-sarowitz*; but Prince *Eugene* is no more, and we want Money, so justly called the Nerve of War. No doubt but we have flattered our selves from the Beginning, that we should have raised Contributions enough, in the Enemy's Country, to subsist our Troops, but have been unhappily disappointed: We depended, also, for Troops and Money, on our faithful Ally the *Czarina*, in whose Behalf we have imprudently undertaken this destructive War; but we have not seen yet that her Forces have been able to join ours, though she had found Means to send them against *France* upon the *Rhine*; perhaps, because at that Time she wanted to make her Troops acquainted with the Roads of *Germany*, when at present she finds it is enough for her to make what Conquests she can on the Side of *Turky*, which is more to her

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Conveniency, which she can the easier keep and defend, and to which the Emperor could or would not lay any Claim, and leave him to do the same on his Side, in Hopes, perhaps, he would meet with more Difficulties; for her *Czarian* Majesty knows but too well, that it is not her Interest that the *Turks* should be crushed by the Emperor. As for Money, I have never heard yet, that the Philosopher's Stone has been found in *Russia*; and it is surprizing to me, considering the Revenue of the *Russian* Empire, the *Czarina* should find enough to supply her vast Expences, far from being capable to assist her Allies that Way: Therefore every Thing rightly considered, it is his Imperial Majesty's Interest, to make as soon as possible, if not an advantageous, at least an honourable Peace with the *Turks*; least by another unfortunate Campaigne, he should be forced to make a very dishonourable one; and leave the *Czarina* to pursue a War, which her Ambition has made her undertake so scandalously, and in which we have had the Imprudence to assist her. Her Succours in the Affairs of *Poland*, in which she minded more her own Interest, as I have proved heretofore, than ours, will never be worth the Shift we are daily put to, by taking her Part against the *Turks*; or ever answer the considerable Losses we have met with in our several Campaigns of both Men and Places. We should have stayed till our Finances had been repaired, before we
had

had ventured to have any Difference with the *Turks*; laid hold of the pacifick Dispositions in which his sublime Highness seemed to be towards us, to have prevented an open Rupture. The *Porte*, little Politick as she is, must nevertheless have been astonished to see us espouse with so much Warmth, the Interest of a Nation, contrary to our natural one; what will our natural Allies say, when they see us forced to mortgage to *France*, *Luxembourg* and Part of the *Netherlands*, which had always served as a Barrier to the exorbitant Power, and unlimited Ambition of that Crown; for a Sum of Money, to enable us to pursue this expensive War? And what will become then of the Ballance of *Europe*? And of what Signification is it to be for the future, the Alliance of the *Dutch* kept in Awe by so formidable a Neighbour, who, thereby, will be Master of the Keys of their Country?

If it is objected that we have no Need to Care for their future State, since by the last Treaty of *Vienna*, all the Jealousies and Differences between us and *France* being settled, we are not likely to want so soon the Assistance of the *Dutch*, or any other of those Allies, by whom we have been so shamefully abandon'd in our late War with that Crown; I'll answer, that there is very little Foundation to be made upon Treaties so extraordinary in their Nature. That the different Pretensions,

of the two Houses of *Austrich* and *France*, have always been thought, even by the most skilful and experienced Ministers, of such Kind, as never to be amicably accommodated. That it is not surprizing that the *French*, seem at present so tractable, and so prone to enter into our Measures, when they are likely to gain, *sans Coups ferir*, as they call it, a free Passage into the very Bowels of *Germany*; where they have wanted so long to gain the upper Hand. That rendering them intirely Masters of the *Rhine* on their Side under their bare Promise, they will not attempt further, is a very feeble Bar toward their crossing that River whenever they please, and have a Mind to give Law in the Empire in Gratitude, for that extraordinary Piece of Condescension, or rather Generosity. They are Guarantees of the *Pragmatick Sanction*; but how could they have refused it upon such advantageous Terms? and who knows but they may make Use of what we grant them at present, to be nearer at Hand to hinder the Execution thereof? and who can blame them, were we even to render them Masters of the whole Empire? Since, *volenti non fit injuria*; I should rather think them very unwise to refuse any Advantages offered to them on any Condition, or Consideration whatsoever. Our Ministers at present, are so well persuaded that the *French* would make a Scruple of Conscience to break the most insignificant Articles of a Treaty, that they seem disposed

disposed to yield to them, without the least Jealousy, what has cost us, for many Ages past, so many Millions of Men and Money to defend against them. Some pretend that the *French Louis d'or*, have a very great Influence over our Councils, and that all these *miraculous Variations* are owing to the *extraordinary Qualities*, of that *Magnet*, in which they are followed by some other Ministers in *Christendom*, who, like them, sell their Country, and pocket the Price thereof. Others say, on the contrary, that our Ministers are actuated by no other Motives than of being revenged of our antient Allies, for their Inaction in our late War with *France*, when it was so much their own Interest to preserve to us the Possession of those two Kingdoms we have lost in *Italy*; but rather than to take upon me to decide that Controversy, I chuse to finish my Letter, by assuring you that I am,

S I R,

Yours, &c.



The INTEREST *of the* ELECTORS *of the* *Empire.*

The INTEREST of the Elector of *Bavaria.*

S I R,

Munich Feb. 22, 1739.

 UR Prince Elector looks with as much Indifference upon what's transacting at the Courts of *Vienna, Versailles,* and *Madrid,* (in all Appearance contrary to his Interest) as if it no Way concerned his Electoral Highness. All Europe thought that the illustrious House of *Bavaria,* stood very fair for the Empire at this Emperor's Demise, who is very likely to dye without Issue Male; especially when there are already two other Princes of the same House in the College of the Electors; and could have expected to see his Election supported by *France,* and the other Princes of the Empire, whom that Crown could have brought into her Measures; but all our Elector,
Hopes

Hopes on that Side seemed entirely vanished, by the Conclusion of the late Treaty of *Vienna*. Though, perhaps, his *Electoral Highness* may think otherwise, and look upon that Treaty as a mere Farce, occasioned by the Necessity of the Times, and which might be succeeded by a bloody Tragedy, in Case *France* was called upon at the *Emperor's* Death to fulfill her Engagements with the House of *Lorain*. Therefore the Duke of *Bavaria* must think within himself, that he stands still the same Chance he did, before the Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, by his *most Christian Majesty*; which I am the more apt to believe, because the Court of *Munich* seem as much as ever inflamed by that of *Versailles*, and animated by the Spirit of the old Cardinal; which could not be, if his *Electoral Highness* thought his Interest entirely abandoned by his Eminence, since every Body knows that his chief Dependance, for his Election for the Imperial Throne, is on that Side. His Backwardness to send his Contingent to the *Emperor's* Assistance into *Hungary*, is a certain Proof, that he entertains yet the same Hopes which hindered him from sending his Troops upon the *Rhine*, and engaged him to protest against our late War with *France*. Time alone will shew if my Conjectures are just, and convince you of the Sincerity with which I am,

S I R,

Entirely yours, &c.

The

*The INTEREST of the King
of Prussia, Elector of Bran-
denbourg.*

S I R,

Berlin, March 1, 1739.

IT seems as if our King had no other Interest than to assemble from all Parts of the World an Army of Gyants, as if he would renew one time or other the old Quarrel, of those unfizable Gentlemen against the Gods. For I don't see what any other View he can have for keeping so long on Foot, and in Time of Peace, so formidable an Army: Unless it was to cause some Jealousy to his Neighbours, especially the *Dutch*, who do not seem overfond of his Majesty's Neighbourhood; and would be better pleased to see him keep at some Distance from them, than to have him so near a Neighbour; though the King of *Prussia* is of a contrary Opinion, and thinks it his Interest to be within the Call of their High Mightinesses; rather, perhaps, to oppress when the Occasion serves, than to assist them, if oppressed by some Body else; for then in all Likelihood, his *Prussian* Majesty would endeavour to get his Share of the Spoils; of which the States General are so conscious, that they find always some Subterfuge to evade, on all Occasions, espou-
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sing his Interest, as it plainly appears in the Affair of *Bergue* and *Juliers*.

It has been for a long While rumour'd amongst us, that his *Prussian Majesty* has entertain'd some Thoughts of the Empire, which might prove vain without the Help of so formidable an Army; and even with it, I cannot but think them very ridiculous; but let it be how it will, I am, nevertheless,

SIR,

Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of *Holland*.

SIR,

Hague, March 12, 1739.

THE *Dutch* themselves had always thought, till lately, that their true and real Interest consisted in defending themselves against the Ambition of *France*, and, by siding with *England*, help that Crown to keep in her own Hands the Ballance of *Europe*; but their late Conduct seems very contrary to those Principles, and leave us Room to think, that their High Mightinesses, having consulted their *Ephemerides*, have found that
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their Government was come to its last Period. The wrong Measures they have enter'd into; their false Politicks in trusting too far, or depending too blindly on the Sincerity and repeated Assurances of Friendship of a Court, from which they have all to fear; their Imprudence in deserting their natural Allies, are the Fore-runners of a Revolution in their State. They find that a too long Series of Prosperity grows, at last, as burthenfome as a too long one of Adversity. The *Dutch* have been too long happy; *like some of their Neighbours*, they are surfeited with that Liberty, which their Ancestors had purchased at the Price of their Blood, and thought an inestimable Jewel. They are looking for their old Chains in *Spain*, and hope that *France* will be so complaisant to order that they might fit them to a T, and *a la mode*.—Tho' there are amongst us, some old *stiff-necked Butter-Boxes*, whotoo much begotted to the Fashion of their Country, would not like such gay Equipage.

All *Europe* thought that the Marriage of the Prince of *Orange* with the *Princess Royal* of *England*, would have restored the mutual Confidence which had so long subsisted between the two Nations, and which seem'd to have turn'd into a Sort of Jealousy ever since the Accession of the illustrious House of *Hanover* to the Throne of *Great Britain*. The Prince of *Orange* himself thought
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his Interest in the States strengthen'd by that Alliance; and the *English* Ministry expected thereby to gain a greater Influence over their Councils; but it has happen'd otherwise, since the Coldness between them at present seems rather greater than ever; and they have shewn so great an Aversion even to the very Name of a *Stadt holder*, ever since King *William's* Death, that tho' his Most Serene Highness the present Prince of *Orange* is a Prince of a rare and distinguish'd Merit, he has nevertheless lost more Ground in *Holland*, and appeared more suspected to their High Mightinesses since his Marriage, than heretofore; and the *English* Ministry has made so poor a Figure for these twenty Years past, and has acquired so little Reputation in *Europe*, that the States, rather than have the Scandal of being thought influenced by it, or enter into its blundering Measures, have preferr'd to throw themselves, at all Events, into the Arms of their natural Enemies. Every Body else would have follow'd their Example in such a Case; for none but *Mules* would — with *Asses*; but very few would refuse to subscribe themselves,

Dear *SIR*,

Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of *France*.

S I R, *Versailles, March 18, 1739.*

OUR Interest is to render ourselves formidable by our Arms, or by our Politicks ; the one extends the Limits of our Frontiers, and the other, weakens our Enemies by sowing Diffidence and Jealousy amongst them, and setting them often together by the Ears. The first has been conducted with an incredible Success, and in all Ages, ever since the Establishment of the *French* Monarchy, by the most warlike of our Princes, and the second managed with great Dexterity, by our most wise and skilful Ministers ; tho' we have not the ridiculous Vanity, like some of our Neighbours, to think ourselves the bravest Nation in the World, or either invincible, tho' we are not the most witty People ; our vast Conquests, and the many Victories gain'd over our Enemies, even when all join'd against us, is a convincing Proof that we have Courage enough, if not to beat two of equal Strength with us, at least to cope with the Bravest amongst them ; and our Treaties and Negotiations so successfully conducted, shew we have Wit enough to consult our own Interest, and often to outwit them all.

Our late King *Louis XIV.* did make Use of those two Expedients to strengthen his Interest,
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and until the latter End of his Reign, when unhappily wrapt up in an old weak Woman's Petticoat, carry'd both with incredible Success. Brave in his Person he preferr'd no Body in those fortunate Days to the Command of his Armies, but *Heroes* like himself, and uncommonly wise; he trusted no other Ministers but those he had known, by a long Experience capable to manage under him the Affairs of his Kingdom: On that firm Foundation he had establish'd all his Interest and Glory; and the prodigious great Design he had form'd of extending his Empire as far as its antient Limits under the *second Race* of our Kings; for tho', Jealousy had represented that Project, glorious in itself, as the Effect of our Ambition out of Measure, and even of the greatest Injustice, *Louis XIV.* had, however, no other View, than to conquer what had been dismember'd, from the *French Monarchy*.

His illustrious Successor our present King *Louis XV.* whom we can justly call the Father of his People, and *francorum Deliciae*, sensible that a War, let it be ever so prosperous, always gives a very dangerous Wound to the State, which nothing else but Length of Time can heal, struck with Admiration, at the courageous Intrepidity and warlike Humour of his Great Grandfather and Predecessor, has thought it more agreeable to his own private Happiness, and his Subjects Felicity, to

assert his, and their Interest, by pacifick than violent Means, and his Majesty has not been frustrated in his Expectation; for without Blows, and without exposing the Lives of his most faithful Subjects, (as dear to him, as his own) assisted therein by the most dexterous, most wise, most impartial, and most disinterested Minister, that has ever set at the Helm of the French Affairs; he has accomplish'd, by Treaty, what all the Strength of a powerful Nation had left imperfect.

The *Cardinal Fleury*, whose Memory will be blest'd among us, as long as the *French Monarchy* shall subsist, and as long as there will be a true *Frenchman* left upon Earth, has by an assiduous and indefatigable Labour, found the Secret to reconcile all *Spaniards* to dissipate those rank Jealousies which had so long subsisted between us and other Nations, and to make the most inveterate Enemies of the *French Name* enter into his Measures, and finding Means at the same Time, to render them as jealous of each other, as they had ever been of us.

Persuaded that the Execution of our best concerted Measures, would always meet with some Difficulty, as long as the *Ballance of Europe* should be in other Hands, his *Eminence*, has cajoled them out of it, who for a considerable Time had claim'd an undoubted Right to it; and when
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once in Possession of it, has made all the good Use which could be expected from it. Since at present the *Cardinal's* Will, or Command, is of a greater Efficacy amongst our Neighbours, than was the most formidable of our Armies, under *Conde, Turenne, Luxembourg, Vandome, Catinat, &c. &c.* in the late Reign.

The House of *Austrich*, which had always been our Rival in Glory, and had always thought her Interests incompatible with ours, believes them at present, by the *Cardinal's* Dexterity, to be equally the same; tho', perhaps, our Minister is of a contrary Opinion, at least, some of our Politicians think so; for say They, if his *Eminence* is sincere in his Alliance with the *Emperor*, why does he defer so long the Conclusion of the Peace, between his *Imperial* Majesty and the *Turks*? Since it is in his Power to put a finishing Hand to it whenever he pleases. To which I could answer, that it is rather an Effect of the Desire that his *Eminence* has of being revenged of the *Czarina's* Conduct in *Poland*, than of his Want of Sincerity for the *Emperor*, since, had his *Imperial* Majesty abandon'd that Prince's Interest (which in no Ways square with his own) as so often solicited to it by our Court, the Peace had been a long While ago concluded between him and the *Turks*, even to his Advantage and Satisfaction.

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Tis true that the Cardinal has divested the Emperor of two Kingdoms in *Italy*; but without retaining the least Part of it, he has invested with it a Prince of *Spain*, from which those Dominions had been dismember'd. Besides, it was against the Interest of most of the Princes of *Europe*, and of *France* in Particular, that the Emperor should be so powerful in those Parts; even his natural Allies, by their Inaction, while they could have hinder'd that Conquest, seem'd to be jealous of it. His Eminence had put his Imperial Majesty's Dominions in his Ballance, and had found them too weighty: Nay, even at present, the Cardinal does not think them within their just Limits, and would not be sorry, perhaps, that one or two more Campaigns in *Hungary* should force the Emperor to mortgage to *France* Part of the *Netherlands* for a Sum of Money. I am sure that it is much the Interest of our Court, as the only Means to keep the *Dutch* in Awe, at which they are so much alarmed, that his Eminence wanted all his Skill to calm their Fears; he has even enchanted them so far, as to render them indifferent toward the Admission of *French* Troops into *Bergues* and *Juliers*, to secure the Possession of that State to the House of *Sultzbach*, and to render them deaf to the repeated Instances of the King of *Prussia*, who claims a Right to it. I say to secure the Possession, because that Restriction of few Years, till all Difference might be amicably

cably accomodated, is only an Evasion, of no Weight among our more refined Politicians.

His Eminence, by making our King Guarantee of the Pragmatick Sanction, seems, in that Point, to have deviated from our true Interest, since it is intirely against it, that a Prince of the House of *Lorain* should be Emperor, who, at that Time, would be very apt to revoke what he had been obliged to yield to the Necessity of the Times; and endeavour to regain by his Arms, what he had lost by a few Strokes of his Pen. Yes, but who shall be Guarantee of the Execution of that Guarantee of the Pragmatick Sanction on the Part of *France*, especially if we find in Time, that it might prove contrary to our Interest? What his Eminence has done, for the Acquisition of *Lorain*, and perhaps of some other State contiguous to it, we might be apt to undo, for the Preservation of it, unless we find Means to guard ourselves on that Side against all Attempts whatsoever, so that we could have nothing to fear from the Emperor; since no Prince have ever thought themselves bound by Treaties any longer than it suited their own Interest.

His Eminence's Conduct towards our Court is represented here in a various Light; for some of us believe, that the great Harmony and strict Union which seemingly subsist between the two Crowns,

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is owing to the ancient Friendship which has so long subsisted between the two illustrious Houses of *France* and *Hanover*; and that none of our Kings will ever undertake any Thing which could prejudice that Friendship, as long as a Prince of that House shall sit on the Throne of *Great Britain*, unless his *Britannick* Majesty break the Union first, and be the first Aggressor.

Others, on the contrary, pretend, that there is no Sincerity in that Friendship; and that our Cardinal has only made Use of it to render *England* suspected to its natural Allies, that his Eminence might the easier *dividere, & Imperare*; which once accomplish'd, he will put in Execution some Projects very disadvantageous to the *English* Nation: For, say they, if this was not our Cardinal's Design, why should he have taken so much Pains to deter *England*, in Part by Promises, and in Part by Menaces, from assisting the Emperor, during the late War in *Italy*, when she had guaranteed, by the most solemn Treaties, the Possession of the Dominions ravish'd, at that Time, from his Imperial Majesty, since he knew perfectly well, that such Breach of Faith on the Part of *Great Britain*, would cause a Jealousy, and set the Courts of *London* and *Vienna* at Variance? And consequently render it the easier for him to gain the Emperor on his Side; which we know has succeeded to his Wishes. A very difficult Task, if
ever

ever there was one, which no *French* Minister had ever dared to attempt before; and which none but the Cardinal *Fleury* could ever have managed with such *Dexterity*; and so happily perfected. Tho' we all know very well, that if once we could break what is call'd the *Grand Alliance*, we might be able to crush every one of the *Grand Allies*, in their Turn; yet none of the most skilful of our Ministers had ever entertain'd the Hope of bringing into our Measures the *Principal* of that *Grand Alliance*, and in whose Defence chiefly it had been concluded; such *Coup de Maître*, was reserved for his Eminence,

Another Tract of consummate Politicks in our Cardinal, is, his having laid the Foundation for *France* to ingross, together with *Spain*, and, in Process of Time, the whole Commerce of the *Lévant*, by rendering themselves Masters of the best Ports in the *Mediterranean*. Therefore, if his Eminence's preferring his Royal Master's Interest to all other Considerations whatsoever, is a convincing Proof of the Sincerity of his Friendship for you, we are certainly in the Wrong to call it in Question; but, if, on the contrary, all I have heretofore alledged, join'd to the great Care he has taken ever since he has been declared first Minister of *France*, to have continued, at the Head of your Affairs, a Person, who, by a long Series of Blunders and Miscarriages, had already

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incurred

incurred the publick Hatred, and has since found the Secret to revive amongst you the Spirit of Party, which seem'd almost dormant; and if, agreeable to his Predecessors Politicks, by blowing the Fire, it appears, that the Cardinal has no other Design than to make that Friendship subservient to his Designs, I do not see what great Advantages the *English* Nation might expect to reap from it; unless it be the Honour of becoming, one Time or other, a Province to *France*; which would procure me that of calling you Friends, Countrymen, and Fellow-Citizens; and myself then, more than ever,

S I R,

Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of *England*.

S I R,

Versailles, March 25, 1739.

AS you have been pleased to inform me lately, that you are afraid at this critical Juncture, to declare too openly your Sentiments, on the present Situation of your foreign or domestic Affairs, lest you should be chaced by a *Pack*
of

of Greyhounds, which the *Ministerial Huntsman* P——— n, is always putting upon the *Scent*; I am sure that you will not be sorry, to know, what we think of it on this Side of the Water.

You must be inform'd, then, Sir, that I belong to a Society, which, from the first of its Establishment, till of late Years, had entertain'd a most advantageous Opinion of the Wisdom, Prudence, Sagacity, and Politicks of an *English* Ministry; but which your late Transactions have changed into the greatest Contempt; the most devoted amongst us, to the *English* Interest, for we are call'd here, *francois Englisies*, or *Englisies*, are struck dumb when we mention the Present Posture of Affairs, and when ever we are urged to declare our Sentiments upon it, with both our Hands and Eyes, lifted up to Heaven, we answer no otherwise than by this Exclamation, *Ob les Grands Asnes! Ob les Grandes Bestes!* and then, fall again into our former *Reverie* without proceeding any farther.

Others less bigotted to the *English* Interest, take the Cudgel and endeavour to make a Recapitulation (intermix'd now and then with a scornful Smile) of all your M——rs Miscarriages and Blunders (as they are pleas'd to call them) ever since they have been at the Helm of your Affairs; they enlarge especially upon that Affair of *Sicily*,

in 1718, when Sir *George Bing*, your Admiral, attack'd the *Spaniards*, while your Ambassador at *Madrid*, was making the most solemn Protestations, that you was to appear there, at that Juncture, only as Mediators; which Affair, they call Perfidy and a scandalous Breach of the Publick Faith given; and which has (as they pretend) occasion'd that Inveteracy, and implacable Animosity subsisting at present between the two Nations, thinking it impossible ever to bring the *Spaniards* to a sincere Reconciliation, till they have been thoroughly revenged of it; which they have attempted ever since, and which they will effect at any Rate; for (continue our Politicians) have not the *Spaniards*, ever since, endeavour'd to render their Commerce precarious, both in the *Mediterranean* and on the *Atlantick* Ocean, by plundering or seizing their Merchants Ships? Have they not since by their frequent Alarms, put the *English* Nation, to the vast Expences of equipping large Squadrons, and all to no Purpose? Have they not ever since been employ'd in finding Ways and Means to transport the Commerce the *English* used to drive with them to the *French* Nation? And have they not at last accomplish'd it? Where was the Wisdom of the *English* M——y, while those Projects, so opposite to the Interest of their Country, were transacting? Was it asleep? And, if not, why did they not exert all their Might to defeat them? But no; they have acted as if they

they had been resolved to consult any other Interest but their own, (I mean that of their Nation,) or rather, as if they would sacrifice the Interest of *England* to all others: For, in 1718, they thought the Preservation of the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy* of so great Consequence to them, that they even set then their Nation's Honour and Reputation at a Venture, and laid one of the best Branches of their Commerce at Stake, for to run to his Assistance; and, in 1734, those very same Estates appear'd as insignificant to the *English* Ministers as their *Honour* and *Reputation*.

I could not help siding with those ill-natured Gentlemen, in that Particular; for in Fact it was the Interest of the *English* to secure, by their Arms, as well as they had done by Treaties, the Possession of those States to the Emperor, unless the Ministry was resolved to render *France* and *Spain* still more formidable in those Parts, and to throw intirely into the Hands of those two Nations their own Commerce to the *Levant*, and in the *Mediterranean* Sea; which Inconvenience could not have been met with, while his Imperial Majesty had been Master of the two *Sicilies*; since *England* had nothing to fear from his Power at Sea which cannot be said of *France*, *Spain*, and the King of *Naples* join'd together; neither could the Emperor have ever been suspected to have the least Inclination (considering the Jealousy which must have unavoidably subsisted between him,

France,

France, and *Spain*,) to join with those two Powers, or either of them, to interrupt our Commerce in those Seas; which, as Matters stand at present, through the Indolence, Imprudence, ill Politicks (not to say worse) of your Minister, must be, in Process of Time, intirely destroy'd. For what can protect it, your Acquisitions, or Conquests in those Parts? But alas! how feeble are the Succours you can draw from thence, when compared to the united Strength of *France* and *Spain*, who can have always a formidable Fleet, which they can equip on the *Mediterranean*, and supply with Men and Provisions, when you must be forced to fetch your Ships and Ammunition of all Kind from *England*. Besides, how long will you be Masters of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, when once all *Europe*, at least the most formidable Powers in it, will be bent to depose you of them? I know the *English* are brave, that they are very powerful by Sea; but they are not invincible: And they are to encounter with Foes not inferior to them in Courage; and they must agree with me, that Fortune decides as often the Fate of Battles, as Undauntedness and Bravery; and if once they have a Check in the Streights, they must return to *England* to refit; while their Enemies can do it upon the Spot, and appear in two or three Weeks as formidable as ever.

It was then your Interest, Sir, to prevent the growing of those dangerous Evils, by timely assisting

sisting the Emperor, when attack'd in *Italy* by the *French* and *Spaniards*; but, instead of that, you have not only seen, unconcern'd, *Naples* and *Sicily* wrested from him, but, with the same Indifference, seen him likewise throw himself into the Arms of *France*, and conclude with it and *Spain* a Treaty which should alarm all *Europe*.

Is it not through the Confidence of that Treaty that *Spain* has, at present, the presumptuous Temerity to insult your Flag, and lord it over you, as if you were obliged to receive Laws from it; you, says the brave *Englishman*, whom, twenty Years ago, a *Spaniard* had not dared to look in the Face? But how can you help it? The Ignorance, or ——— of your M——r has render'd the Wound incurable. For if even you was to attempt, at present, to change Foils, and enter into a War with *Spain*, as the whole Nation seems inclinable, how could you do it with the least Hopes of Success? Your M——r himself confesses, that you have no Allies to be depended upon; for it cannot be reasonably supposed, that *France* would desert the *Emperor* and *Spain*, with whom she has lately contracted so strict and advantageous an Alliance, to take your Part; especially when it is so much against her own Interest. Besides, who knows but that Treaty might be concluded to your entire Destruction; for you have not yet forgot that for ever memorable one of
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Partition, made under your late King *William*; and Heaven forbid, for your own Sake, that the one should be attended with better Success than was the other.

The *Dutch* are so well hook'd in, and so much kept in Awe by their Neighbours, that they dare not stir, if even they had the greatest Inclination to assist you, lest, by a wrong Step, they should run the Risque of being swallow'd up: And who knows but the King of *Spain* waits for so favourable an Opportunity, to seize on those Provinces, which have revolted from the *Spanish* Monarchy.

Money is the Sinews of the War; but, if I am rightly inform'd, you have spent so much, for these late Years, in secret Services, that you have little or none left; and you have been so backward in paying your Debts, that I don't believe you'll find any Body very forward to lend you more. You have a vast Number of Ships, it is true, and perhaps Men enough to arm a formidable Fleet; but will those Ships go upon the dry Land; or are your Enemies obliged to man another, on Purpose to have the Honour of being beaten by you? Or to oppose an Invasion of their Country, while, on the contrary, the Fate of yours depends on that of a Sea Fight, since there is always a considerable Party amongst you, ready to side with the Invader.

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No Doubt but your Men have Courage enough; but they have languish'd so long in the Indolency of an uninterrupted Peace, that they must want that Experience, so absolutely requisite to fight with Success; which the *French* and *Spaniards* have acquired by frequent Skirmishes with their Enemies: Therefore it would be almost Presumptuous in you to flatter yourselves with the Hopes of a successful War, unless, by a Change in your Ministry, you regain the Confidence of your ancient and natural Allies; set your Finances on a better Footing, by restoring the publick Credit; and calm the intestine Divisions, which weaken the State.

I am,

S I R, Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of *Spain*.

S I R,

Madrid, April 1, 1739

IF you follow exactly, Step by Step, all the Measures of the Court of *Madrid*, ever since the first Time the famous *Cardinal Alberoni* was set at the Helm of the *Spanish* Administration, you'll find that his *Catholick* Majesty has had no other View, than to regain, by his Arms,

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or by Treaty, what had been dismember'd, from Time to Time, from the *Spanish* Monarchy, in order to form out of it separate Dominions for the Princes his Children, for fear (as he expected to be bless'd with a numerous Posterity) the Ambition, so natural to Princes of living independant, should force them to form some Projects contrary to each others Interests.

The Fleet which you destroy'd, on the Coast of *Sicily*, was design'd to dislodge the *Emperor* out of that Kingdom; and the Miscarriage of that Enterprize, at that Time, did not discourage the Court of *Madrid* so far, as to make her lay it entirely aside. Mean while, the whole *Spanish* Nation was so enraged at the unexpected Conduct of your Ministry, which they call'd perfidious, that they had proposed to themselves several Expedients, as well to be revenged, as to put you entirely out of Power to make use, at any other Time, of such *violent Mediation*; and finding, after many frivolous Attempts, they could not accomplish their Designs, they had Recourse to crafty political Means.

Their first Project of that Kind, was to alarm you for several Years, with the intended Introduction of *Don Carlos* in *Italy*; which, at first, was thought so contrary to your Interest, by your Ministers and the ministerial Emissaries, that
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the *British* Nation was as much terrify'd by their Clamours on that Subject, as if the Fate of the three Kingdoms had been at Stake. The Parliament was teized by long and repeated Speeches, and the Nation lull'd asleep by their——political Essays, till those amongst you (who, on all Occasions, have appear'd the most zealous for the Interest of their Country, and had appear'd unconcern'd as long as they had seen no Danger, finding that the Court of *Spain* was in earnest, and entirely bent upon that Expedition) began to chime with the Ministry, and find as many Inconveniences in the Introduction of *Don Carlos* into *Italy*: For though your Ministers, by a Spirit of Contradiction, or inflamed by something else—, began to alter their Tone; and, far from finding that Introduction contrary to the *English* Interest, or to that of their Allies, they left no Stone unturn'd till they had brought the *Emperor* (contrary to his Interest) to consent to it; and we have seen at last, those same Squadrons, fitted out before to oppose it, bring *Don Carlos* in Triumph into *Italy*, under the bare, or rather frivolous Promises, that he should attempt no farther than the Succession of *Parma*, *Placentia*, and the *Great Dukedom of Tuscany*; though your Ministers must have been conscious, that such Promises extorted by them from his *Catholic Majesty*, to plaister their treacherous, or impolitical Conduct, should be no longer sacred to him, than he could find

the Opportunity to break it. The Death of the late King of *Poland* happening soon after, offer'd him a very favourable one ; for the King of *Spain* joining with *France*, who stood for King *Stanislaus*, and the *Emperor* favouring the Election of the Elector of *Saxony*; *Don Carlos*, powerfully assisted by the *French* and the King of *Sardinia*, and the *Emperor* deserted by *England* and *Holland*, reconquer'd, in few Weeks, the two flourishing Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, whose Conquest had cost so much Blood to the *Grand Alliance*.

A less ambitious Princess than the Queen of *Spain* could have been satisfy'd, by having so well provided for the present, for her Darling. But no; she carried her Pretensions still further, and carried an underhand Intrigue at the Court of *Vienna*, in the Time of the War, to patch up a secret Peace with the *Emperor*, on Condition, that *Don Carlos* should marry the eldest Archduchess, that, at his *Imperial Majesty's* Death, he might be elected *Emperor*; but that Princess being, at that Time, betroathed to the Duke of *Lorain*, and the Queen of *Spain's* Mine sprung up by her Allies, she was forced, at last, to act in Concert with them, and expect from a Treaty, Part of which she had endeavour'd to gain by Finess, and which will be the Consequence of the last concluded at *Vienna*, between the *Emperor*, *France*, *Spain*, and the King of *Sardinia*; for *Don Philip* will be likewise introduced

duced into *Italy*, even in Spight of all your Armaments; if, contrary to your modern Politicks, you would venture to oppose it (unless you prefer to it the Honour of lending a helping Hand to that Prince, as you have already done to his *Sicilian* Majesty) the Grand Duke of *Tuscany* shall be obliged to buy the Interest of *France* and *Spain* at the dear Rate of his Dominions in *Italy*, out of which, and some other States which might be guess'd at, shall be erected a Kingdom of *Lombardy* for *Don Philip*. If the Island of *Corfica* is to be made a Province of it; or if *France* designs to keep it in her own Hands, Time alone will determine; though I am apt to believe that *Corfica* will be made Part of the Portion of *Madame de France*.

No Doubt but his *Catholick* Majesty will likewise renew his Pretensions (and that very soon on *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, which 'tis neither his Interest, or that of the Princes of *Italy*, it should remain in your Hands; since, in Time of War, you could keep there a powerful Fleet, to alarm continually their Coasts.

The *Dutch* seem apprehensive (and well they may) that their Turn will come next; as being the Interest of the King of *Spain* to recall those Rebels to their former Obedience; and it is with the greater Reluctance I am obliged to tell them, that I see their Government expiring. It

It is likewise, with as little Pleasure, that I find myself obliged in Honour to forewarn you, that, in spite of your late Convention, his *Catholic* Majesty will never renounce the pretended Right he claims to search your Ships in the *West Indies*; that his seeming present Condescension is only to gain Time; and that your intended Treaty will never be brought to a happy Conclusion; and all through the *ill Management, Blunders, and Miscarriages* of your too wise M-----rs: For had the Conclusion of the late Treaty of *Vienna* preceded the Signature of the Conventions, you had never been put to the Trouble of voting *pro* and *con* in your Parliament, and never been tantalized with the Hopes of a speedy Satisfaction for the *Spanish* Depredations, to which the Court of *Madrid* had never any the least Propensity. I wish, for your Sake, she had as much as I have to declare myself,

S I R,

Entirely Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of Sweden.

S I R,

Stockholm, April 15, 1739.

THE chief Interest of *Sweden*, at present, is to endeavour to regain the Provinces dismember'd from it by the *Muscovites*, in the unfortunate Days of *Charles XIIth's* Reign; and as
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the *Swedes* find *France* ready, by a Spirit of Revenge, to assist them in that glorious Enterprize, they are not to be blamed for laying hold of so favourable an Opportunity. 'Tis not at all surprizing they have preferr'd the advantageous Offers of the *French* Court to yours, since they know you so peaceably inclined, that nothing with your Help could ever be transacted, but by *Mediation*, *Plenipoes*, *grand Plot*, *Conventions*, *Treaties*, and I don't know what else, which after many Conferences, and an Army of Messengers, and Couriers dispatch'd on each Side, would at last take their ordinary Course, *i. e.* vanish into Smoak, and have no Effect, as all your Negotiations have done for these twenty Years past. They think *Bellona's* Voice, and *Mars's* Thunder a far more persuasive Argument. I wish I could as easily convince you, that I am,

S I R,

Your's, &c.

P. S. Our King has been, of late, in such a precarious State of Health, that his Majesty is, at present, seldom seen in Publick. He has been subject (as pretended) to very violent Fits of the Gravel, which oblige him to keep his Chamber, and often his Bed; but I am of Opinion, that his greatest Distemper lies at his Heart, and affects his Mind; and that he is more chagrin at the visible Decay of his Interest in *Sweden*, than at that of
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his Constitution; for in Fact, who can his Majesty bear with Patience, that the single Suspicion of being in the Interest of the House of *Hesse*, is sufficient to give the Exclusion from the Senate; and to see his Favourites in that Assembly supplanted by the Duke of Holstein's Partizans, supported by *France*, whose Ministers govern at present with as absolute a Power at *Stockholm*, as they do at most of the principal Courts of *Europe*, in spite of all the Oppositions of *Russia*, *Denmark*, and *England*, who would be better pleased to see our present King succeeded by a Prince of his House, than by the Duke, who has so many Claims upon each of those three Nations, and could make them good, in case he had once the Power in his Hands, which is his unquestionable Right, as being Son of the eldest Sister of *Charles* the XIIth? Besides, his Royal Highness could then, perhaps, defeat all the Measures concerted by the present *Czarina* to preserve the Succession to the Throne of *Russia* to the House of *Courland*; for every Body knows that he married the eldest Daughter of *Peter the Great*, and has a Prince by her. Since the same Will that call'd the Princess of *Courland* to that Throne, declares the Dutches of *Holstein-Gottorp*, and her Heirs, her Successors; and it is certainly the Interest of *France* to support the Interest of that injured Prince, as the most efficacious Means to clip the ambitious Wings of
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the *Russians*, and to set just Limits to their overgrowing Empire.

The INTEREST of *Russia*.

S I R, *Petersbourg, May 1, 1739.*

WE are much afraid here, that the easy Conquest of *Asoph* will cost a great deal more than we expected at first, or that really it is worth. I do not know what Business we had to break with the *Turks*, for a Place which we know very well we could not keep long; and which, if it could not be wrested from us by Force, we should be obliged to surrender by a Treaty. Our *Empress*, flush'd with her Success in *Poland*, had, perhaps, flatter'd herself with the Hopes of extending her Conquests on that Side as far as *Adrianople*, if not farther; but she has found that Enterprize not so easy in the Execution, as she had expected. The Incursions of General *Lasey* into *Tartary* have been [very chargeable to *Russia*, both for Men and Money, and of no Profit. General *Munich* gain'd *Oczakow*, which we have been forced to abandon; but has never dared to

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attempt *Pender*: And the Truth is, that from all our Skirmishes with the *Turks*, we always came out like *Trivelin*, *avec les Estivierres*. We would be glad at present, perhaps, to slip our Necks out of the Collar; but how, and which Way to do it with Honour, is what's unknown to us. Our Ministers pretend that it was our Interest to begin this War with the *Turks*; and I wish they could make good their Assertion by the Success of our Arms. I chuse rather to think it was our Ambition, puffed up by some Advantages, which have gain'd us a Number of powerful Enemies, and caused some Outrages to our Friends and Allies; therefore we had acted a great deal wiser, if we had not so scrupulously consulted that pretended Interest, which has put our Neighbours in Mind, that it was theirs to undertake something very opposite to our natural and real one: for had we sat still, or contented ourselves with palming a King upon the *Polanders* (since we were resolved to do it) we had not given Occasion to the *Swedes* (by the Disappointments we have met with on the Side of *Turky*) to meditate the Recovery of the Provinces they lost to us after the Battle of *Pultowa*. Likely enough but we depend upon powerful Succours from *England*; but will *France* consent to it? And if not, as they never will, what will become of us, when assaulted at once by the *Turks* and *Swedes* by Land, and block'd up by Sea by the confederate

federate Fleets of *France* and *Sweden*? Shall not we be forced to confess then, that it had been more our Interest to content ourselves with what we had got, than to be exposed to lose all, by extending our ambitious Views farther. I wish our Ministers had had, at that Time, a small Share of the pacifick Disposition of *Yours*; and would be convinced, that I am,

S I R,

Entirely yours, &c,

The INTEREST of the Court of *Rome*.

S I R,

May 10, 1739.

WHEN I consider that *Christ*, when conversing amongst us, often declared, that his Kingdom was not of this World; and that denying here that the *Pope* is his Vicar upon Earth, is an Heresy of the first Class, a high Road to the Inquisition, and smells much of the Faggot: Methinks his Holiness should have no Interest but that of his Divine Master, which is

a spiritual one; or any other Ambition, like *S Paul, Gloriari in cruce Domini*; but when I see the *Sovereign Pontiff* surrounded with *Satellites*, raising Armies, intriguing at all the Courts of *Europe*, endeavouring to enlarge his Dominions by Policy, or open Force (tho his Divine Master had not always so much as a Place to rest his sacred Head upon) and claiming a Supremacy over the Temporality of Kings and Sovereign Princes, I am entirely at a Loss, and leave you to think what you please, provided you do not question the Sincerity with which I am,

S I R,

Your very humble,

and obedient Servant, &c.

The INTEREST of the Republic of *Venice*.

S I R,

Venice, April 12, 1739.

THE extraordinary Events which happen'd in *Europe* by the unexpected Death of the late King of *Poland*, and which have served as a Pre-text

text for *France* and *Spain's* invading *Italy*, had a little disconcerted the noble and majestick Gravity of our *Senators*; and our ancient Politicks so much admired by all other States of *Europe*, which are the Basis of ours at present, and without which it seems almost impossible our Republick should long subsist in its flourishing Condition, were thought to be embarrassed, at that Time, with some very difficult Problems. We were a little perplex'd to see ourselves environed, all on a sudden, with the Armies of two Powers, who make little or no Scruple of seizing, if possible, on every Thing they find to their Purpose; and have always shew'd themselves deaf to all Intreaties or Arguments, let them be ever so artfully concerted, when they can retort with their more persuasive Cannon. The *Adriatick*, and her dear Spouse, were alarmed at that impending Storm, which was so likely to disturb their conjugal Union, if not to divorce them for ever. The Peace which succeeded afterwards, and that apparant Reconciliation betwixt the contending Parties, has not been capable yet to restore our former domestick Tranquility; for tho' the Tempest did make but very little Havock on our Land, yet it broke very near us. The Alliance concluded between the *Emperor* and the *Czarina*, threw us into a new Dilemma, worse than the first. His *Imperial Majesty* claims from us the Performance of our former Engagements with him; the

the *Porte* assured us of the Continuation of her Friendship, in case we were to continue Neuter; threatening us, at the same Time, with an immediate Invasion, if we were so imprudent as to espouse the Quarrel of the Aggressors. The *Pope* pressed us earnestly to join our Arms to those of those two *Christian* Princes, against the common Enemy of the *Christian* Name; but we knew perfectly well that *France* and *Spain* were of a contrary Opinion; and, though it was not our Interest to disoblige either of those Powers, much less to enter into a War against the *Turks*, in which we know by Experience we must be always Losers, we have chose to keep them all in Suspence, till we can see what Part *France* (who has always had a great Influence over the *Turkish* Ministers ever since Cardinal *Richelieu*) should act in that Affair; for fear, by running too rashly to the *Emperor's* Assistance, we should have chanced to provoke her to patch up a Treaty between his *Imperial* Majesty and his sublime Highness, and leave us in the Lurch; and then we must have been forced to purchase a Peace at the dear Rate of Part of our Dominions, or of some immense Sums of Money, which it is not in our Power to pay at present; for it will never be our Interest to attack the *Turks*, or to provoke them to attack us, were we even sure of a powerful Assistance, which we cannot expect but from the *Emperor*, and which, at that unhappy Juncture of his Affairs, it must have