



HINTS

TO

MEDICAL STUDENTS

UPON

THE SUBJECT OF A FUTURE LIFE:

EXTRACTED FROM THE CELEBRATED

WORK, ENTITLED, THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED,

BY DR. JOSEPH BUTLER, LATE BISHOP OF DURHAM:

WITH

Corresponding Notices

FROM OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF HIGH AUTHORITY,

AND WITH

A PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.

"I wonder why that, which made Galen a believer, should make any of his sons an atheist."—*Sermon preached before the Company of Apothecaries, London, by W. Reeves*, M.A. *Rector of Cranford*, 1704, p. 16.

"The man, who will coldly and laboriously teach the lessons of infidelity, will not scruple to excuse, if not to inculcate, the practice of immorality."—*Remarks on Scepticism*, &c. *by T. Rennell*, M.A. *Vicar of Kensington*, 1819, p. 51.

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1823.


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TO

SIR HENRY HALFORD, BARONET,

PHYSICIAN IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY AND

PRESIDENT

OF THE

ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS;

WHOSE SKILL IN SCIENCE AND LOVE OF RELIGION

HAVE EVER LED HIM TO PROMOTE

WHATEVER DULY ILLUSTRATES

THE CONNEXION OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE;

THIS LITTLE COMPILATION,

FROM THE WORKS OF MEN

EMINENTLY WISE AND ELOQUENT IN THEIR

INSTRUCTION UPON THE SUBJECT,

IS WITH SINCERE RESPECT AND

GRATITUDE INSCRIBED BY HIS

OBLIGED FRIEND,

THE EDITOR.

PREFACE.

"THE (a) *analogical* method of proof," says a popular writer of the present day, "has been very lately *resuscitated* for the purpose of destroying the immortality of the soul. A bold and fresh attempt has been made to convert *analogy* into the Δος πω στω of materialism; by the help of which, as by a lever, the Archimedes of scepticism may be enabled to overturn, not earth indeed, but heaven! *Analogy* has in fact supplied the *first* stone of the foundation, and that alone; but infidelity has reared the superstructure with an industry as fertile of resource, (and we might add of *invention*,) as that of the children of Israel, who continued to deliver in the tale of bricks after the materials were denied."

(a) Lacon, by the Rev. C. Colton, vol. 2. p. 32. et seq. Lond. 1822.

Now if *analogy* has been thus employed, specially in a course of lectures for the alleged improvement of medical science; it is imagined that to medical students it might be particularly useful, if they were made acquainted with what learned men have written on *analogy as serving the cause of religion, both natural and revealed; as exposing the pretences of materialism, and shewing how reason confirms the probability of a future state.* From the valuable work, therefore, of Dr. Joseph Butler, formerly bishop of Durham, entitled THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE, I have drawn, to this purpose, the first chapter; which treats, as the author expresses it, of "the foundation of all our hopes and all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration; I mean a FUTURE STATE." I may observe that this learned and ingenious work has never ceased to be the admiration of every sound scholar, and has always been recommended among books of education to those

who are directed to mark, and to profit by, the alliance between faith and philosophy. From other distinguished writers notes are also subjoined to this important extract.

This method of arguing *analogically* is indeed by Butler particularly recommended to (b) *such as profess to follow nature.* To no one, then, can it be more fitly addressed than to the medical student. Yet this part of his publication is also calculated to assist readers in general, who regard the natural history of man; because opinions have been published upon this subject, that is, upon pursuits professedly anatomical and surgical only, in which disgraceful observations have been mixed up, and have been made as it were *a general guide-post to infidelity*, in the cheapest circulation of them which the art of printing affords; because physiology has levelled its deadly aim

(b) See the introductory sentence to the chapter, which is taken from Part II. chap. 8. of the Analogy of Religion, &c.

against the faith of *all*, in pronouncing man to be the creature of nature, and not of God; because Christianity has been scornfully bid to yield to scientific research, and no longer to teach the everlasting truth, *Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God!*

Our present concern is with the belief of a future state. (c) "*Are we to live after death?*" as the author already cited asks; "and if we are, in what state? The second question evidently depends upon the first; for he, that feels no conviction as to the *certainty* of a future life, will not be oversolicitous as to the *condition* of it: for to common minds the greatest things are diminished by *distance*, and they become evanescent if to that distance be added *doubt*. But should the doubt of futurity introduce the denial of it, what must then be the result? all that endears us to our fellow-

(c) Lacon, ut suprà.

men, and all that exalts us above them, will be swallowed up and lost in the paltriness of the present and the nothingness of now. The interests of society demand that a belief in a future state should be general; the probability of such a state is confirmed by reason, and its certainty is affirmed by revelation."

A very able writer on the *Moral Evidence of a Life to come* has so finely illustrated the point thus urged, that I am sure the sensible reader will be gratified with the following citation; for in it he will find force as well as elegance of language, and strength as well as justness of argumentation; and it squares especially with the object of this little publication. The denial of a future life, he observes, infers in the reasoning and consequence of it, (d) "first, that

(d) Some Discourses, Sermons, and Remains, of the Rev. Mr. Jos. Glanvil, late Rector of Bath, and Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty. 1681. p. 294, et seq.

man is but a better beast. And those wits speak agreeably to this principle, who, whether in earnest or in jest, satyrize human nature, and represent us only as somewhat a more cunning herd of cattle. For if this life be all, we have the same end and happiness with the brutes; and they are the happier of the two, in that they have less cares and fewer disappointments than we. Our reason and religion, upon which we so much value ourselves, according to this doctrine, are but chains of imaginations; and these but refined sense: and so the soul and principle of action is no other in *us*, than it is in *them;* and we differ but little more than one sort of beasts doth from another; namely, than the more stupid doth from those that are more sprightly and sagacious. And then farewell the prerogatives and dignity of human nature. Man is but a beast of prey; and his use of, and dominion over, the other creatures, is but a proud usurpation over his equals. So that this opinion degrades our nature, and affronts the whole race of mankind together.

"2. In the direct tendency of it, it destroys human societies. For those cannot subsist without laws; nor laws without some conscience of good and evil; nor would this signify to any great purpose, without the belief of another world. Take away this, and every thing will be *good* that is *profitable*, and honest that conduces to a man's designs. That would be *mine* which I could get by *force*; and I had no *right* to any thing longer than I had *strength* to defend it: and thus the world would be *ipso facto* in a state of war, and fall into endless confusions and disorders. So that the whole earth would quickly be a hell intolerable; every man would be a devil to another, yea and every man to himself.

"3. It suppresses man's private happiness; and even the rioters of the world have stings and torments from it. If a man live in sensuality and fulness of pleasure, what a cutting thought it is to consider, that in a little time he must bid adieu to this and to all felicity for ever! And if his life

be in trouble and discomfort, how terrible is it to reflect, that he must go from being *miserable* to be *nothing!* How can those think of parting with their possessions and enjoyments, who have *nothing* else to expect! Or how can *they* bear up under the burdens and vexations of *this* state, who cannot relieve themselves by the hopes of a *better!* With what sad pangs of sorrow should we lay our friends into the grave, if we had cause to be assured that they were *lost eternally!* And how could we reflect upon our own *mortality*, if we were to look for no *further being!*"

Such is the judicious reasoning, and such the impressive words, of one who has earnestly and amply inculcated the belief of a future state; for in his days, he has told us, they were "fallen into an age, wherein among some, and those not a few, it was a piece of gallantry to be an infidel; and who could not have *lived* so much like *beasts*, had they not thought also that they should *die* as *such!*" The reflection is severe; but similar censures were applied

in abundance, (as this had been,) to the (e) licentious times of Charles the second:

(e) There had been published, during the Gre Rebellion, a work, which probably encouraged tl licentiousness of the times in question. It was pr tended to be printed in Amsterdam, (for the autho was afraid of his work,) and is dated in 1644. Bu in reality it was printed in London; and was entitled, "Man's Mortalitie, or a Treatise wherein 'tis proved, both theologically and philosophically, that whole man, as a rationall creature, is a compound wholly mortall, contrary to that common distinction of soul and body, &c. By R. O. (that is, R. Overton,) &c." Fabricius has noticed this work, and also an answer to it, entitled, "The Prerogative of man, or his soul's immortality, and high perfection, defended and explained against the rash and rude conceptions of a late authour, who hath inconsiderately ventured to impugne it." 1645. Incorrectly dated by Fabricius, 1643. See his Delectus Argument. et Syllabus Scriptorum qui Verit. Relig. Chr. asseruerunt. 1725. p. 433. The anonymous author of the answer, in his Preface, informs us that his labours (which indeed are most important) are directed as well against those "who have nothing but mere surmises or suspicions to oppose to the belief of immortality, as those whose depraved appetite, or unbridled and untamed sensuality, solicits perpetually to be satisfied, without fear of future reckonings in another world."

and were even then levelled against the men of that science which is the most friendly to the sufferings of human life. This was so notorious, that a distinguished physician seized the opportunity, in illustrating the sacred portraiture of Old Age, finely to defend *the profession to which he belonged*; and in a manner, for ever worthy the notice and imitation of his brethren in the science of medicine. To the (f) " scandals, which impudent and malevolent persons had been apt to cast upon this profession," he accordingly replies: " As though *the studies we addicted ourselves unto* did, like the sin of Adam, naturally make us run from God, and hide ourselves from Him, and patch up some perishing remnants to cover our naked-

(f) " King Solomon's Portraiture of Old Age; wherein is contained a sacred anatomy both of soul and body, &c. expressed in the six former verses of the 12th chapter of Ecclesiastes, and here paraphrased upon and made plain and easy to a mean capacity. By John Smith, M.D. è Coll. Med. Lond. Cand. et è Coll. Æn. Nas. Oxon. quondam Com. 1666." p. 253, et seq.

ness after our own contrivances! Whereas, in truth, there is nothing in all the world that man can be busied about, which will sooner bring him to God, than the earnest beholding Him in the book of creatures. There is not the most contemptible being, which by virtue of the Almighty *Fiat*, at first started out of nothing, that will not, if it be thoroughly searched and followed, at length bring us home to its Eternal Father; as *of Him, and from Him, and through Him*, so *to Him also are all things; to Whom be glory for ever.* But how much more shall we be instructed in this divine lesson, by contemplating that heavenly (g) work of works, the sum and

(g) Addison, with the same feeling, has observed, that "those, who were skilful in anatomy amongst the ancients, concluded, *from the outward and inward make of a human body*, that it was the work of a Being transcendently wise and powerful. As the world grew more enlightened in this art, their discoveries gave them fresh opportunities of admiring the conduct of Providence *in the formation of a human body.* Galen was converted by his dissections, and could

height of the visible creation, that honourable piece, *tantùm non* angelical, in which the Creator himself rested in time, delighted from eternity, being the true pattern of His own divine image, Man! And God in his providence having so ordered, that the Holy Writings should begin with the history of the Creation of all things, and lastly and chiefly of Man, plainly teaches us this lesson, that none are so idoneous hearers or so meet receivers of the words of His mouth, as those who have first well understood and abundantly admired the works of His hand. *All which fall under our consideration, as the proper subject of our*

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not but own a Supreme Being *upon a survey of this his handywork.*" Spectator, No. 543. Thus the author of an excellent Sermon, concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul, preached before the Company of Apothecaries in London in 1704, pointedly remarks upon a wretched physician of that time, who had been writing against the soul, that however little he was to be dreaded as to argument, yet, says the preacher, "*I wonder why that, which made Galen a believer, should make any of his sons an atheist.*" Serm. by W. Reeves, M.A. &c. p. 16.

knowledge; but chiefly the chiefest; which cannot but in the end bring us to Him, who made and knows all things; as the saying of the woman did the Samaritans. And *being hereby brought unto Him,* we afterwards hear Him ourselves, and believe now for His own word's sake, *that he is God, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world.* We are so far from slighting or contemning the Scriptures, that *we are the great admirers of it, and endeavour to advance it above all other writings whatsoever; and* THAT *even in natural things, though never so accidentally or cursorily handled: And we had rather that all our books, though very curious and greatly valuable, should be burnt, than that one line, nay one letter, one jot, or tittle of it should in anywise pass away.*—I hope also I have persuaded and prevailed with *all my own brethren* to be more wise for themselves, and more wary in respect to others, than some severe and jealous-headed censurers *have judged them to be;* that we may none of us give the

least occasion for any one to speak evil of the things they understand not, but BY TAKING HEED TO A SURE RULE WE MAY BRING PERPETUAL HONOUR TO OUR OWN FACULTY, and shame to the loose professors of a better. A light and superficial knowledge of natural things may indeed consist with atheism; but a deep and profound search into them brings men back again to God, and necessarily binds them over to religion. Solomon's wisdom stayed not in the creatures, though he perfectly knew so great a variety; but did from them only, as it were, take its rise, and mount higher than the cedars, even into heaven itself; and there only could find its rest, from whence it had its first beginning; like the spirit of man, *returning to God that gave it*. Let no man think he has sufficient knowledge in natural things, who has not by them been directed to divine; or that he has viewed the creatures enough, who has not been led through them to the Creator. Nor shall ever any man have my consent to pass for a philosopher, who keeps himself so ignorant of the Scripture,

as with devotion to admire that academical inscription, ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ. Knowledge natural, and spiritual, are not so contrary to one another, but that they may very well agree together, and cohabit in the same mansion; nay, they are greatly conducive to the growth and promotion of each other."

Hence this excellent writer takes occasion to introduce into his work another ornament of the medical profession, whose name to this hour preserves the respect and honour, which his admiring countrymen, a century and a half ago, first gave it. He is speaking of "the true doctrine of the excellency and motion of the blood, and of the use of the heart and the parts adjoining thereunto; all which," he says, "were perfectly (h) known to Solomon, Eccles. xii.

(h) Hence he repeats, "that the expressions of Solomon, Eccles. xii. 6. symbolise unto us *the circulation of the blood*, and the use and action of the heart and the parts belonging thereto; and that the doctrine, which is now justly called *Harvæan*, was at first *Solomonian*." p. 245.

6." So bishop Horsley has argued, in our own time, that (i) " the images of this text are not easy to be explained on any other supposition, than that the writer, or the Spirit which guided the writer, *meant to allude to the circulation of the blood*, and the structure of the principal part by which it is carried. And upon the supposition that such allusions were intended, no obscurity, I believe, will remain for the anatomist in the whole passage." The learned prelate might have been highly gratified by the illustrations of Dr. Smith. But to proceed with Dr. Smith's commendation of Harvey. After alluding to the explication which he proposed to give, in his subsequent pages, of what he has ascribed to Solomon; he says that it pleased God, (k) " that this knowledge should with the possessor of it, sink into dust and darkness; where it lay buried for the space of 2500 years at the least,

(i) Bishop Horsley's Sermons, vol. 3. pp. 189, 190. 2d. edit.

(k) Dr. Smith, on Old Age, ut supr. p. 233.

till it was retrieved thence by the wisdom and industry of that incomparable and for ever to be renowned Dr. WILLIAM HARVEY, the greatest honour of our nation, and of all societies of which he was a member; who stands, and ever will do, *with the highest note of honour in the calendars both of physicians and philosophers*; and it were but justice to put him with the same eminence into that of the church, since he hath contributed more to the understanding of this and many other places of Scripture, than all that ever undertook that charge."

Bishop Sprat, however, in his elegant history of the Royal Society, published almost immediately after the work from which the preceding extracts have been made, has admitted that some followers of *experimental* philosophy might then "be inclinable to irreligion:" And he adds, "I cannot deny that some philosophers, *by their carelessness of a future state*, have brought a discredit on knowledge itself." This charge henceforward continued for many years to

be brought against persons of learning; and a leader amongst them was attacked as (l) "interpreting all the works of God [only] according to the brute laws of mechanism, and allowing *no other operations in vital nature than what he found paralleled in German clockwork.*"

Yet scepticism and infidelity were still defeated in their endeavours, as often as they were made, to weaken the belief of a future state; by arguments taken from philosophical heights, and remote speculations; from moral considerations; and more especially from the (m) Sacred Scriptures. In main-

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(l) Bishop Mannyngham's Two Discourses, &c. 1681. p. 96.

(m) "The strongest proofs are those from the Scripture; and all the arguments that demonstrate the truth of Christianity, prove also *the certainty of a life after this.* For one of the great designs of the Holy Jesus was to bring immortality to light; and he gave visible evidence of a *future existence* by his own resurrection. So that those who could not reason, and dispute, and see truth at distance in principles, might however be

taining the immortality of the soul, men of eminence too in the medical profession were found abundant; so just is the remark of a modern writer, who has refuted the pretences of scepticism, (n) " that

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convinced by a demonstration to the sense; and those who could not be fully assured by the reasonings of philosophers, many of which were very deep, and many uncertain, and many unsound and false, might yet be persuaded by the miracles which were wrought by Christ and his Apostles to confirm those doctrines, which they taught, *of rewards and punishments in another life:* And that there are such, every thing in the whole Gospel either supposes or proves. These, I say, are the clearest and best evidence; but they are such as are obvious to every understanding, and cannot receive more light than what they have at first sight in themselves. I therefore omit that sort of proof, as not needed by those who embrace the Scripture; and for others who believe it not, the reasons taken thence will be of no force with such men." Glanvil's Moral Evidence of a Life to come, (already cited,) p. 288.

(n) Remarks on Scepticism, especially as it is connected with the subjects of Organization and Life. Being an Answer to the Views of M. Bichat, Sir T. C. Morgan, and Mr. Lawrence, upon those points. By the Rev. T. Rennell, M. A. Vicar of Kensington, &c.

in other countries, *as well as in our own*, the men who have united the most consummate skill in this profession with the most enlarged and cultivated understandings, *have ever been, and still continue to be, among the first to acknowledge themselves sincere and humble Christians.*"

The medical student may accordingly call to mind the celebrated BOERHAAVE, who had never doubted of *the spiritual and immaterial nature of the soul;* (o) "but who, in his last illness took occasion to tell his intimate friend, the Rev. Mr. Schultens, that he had lately had a kind of experimental certainty of the distinction between corporeal and thinking substances, which mere

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Lond. 1819. p. 47. It is with the greatest pleasure I have lately seen announced to the public, not only the *fifth* edition of this valuable publication, but an edition also in a cheap form; which will occasion what has been long desired, the *general circulation* of a work so beneficial to society at large, as well serviceable to medical students in particular.

(o) Dr. Johnson's Life of Boerhaave.

reason and philosophy cannot afford, and opportunities of contemplating the wonderful and inexplicable union of soul and body, which nothing but a long sickness can give. This he illustrated by a description of the effects which the infirmities of his body had upon his faculties, which yet they did not so oppress, or vanquish, but his soul was always master of itself, and always resigned to the pleasure of its Maker."

Turning *again to our own countrymen*, (for SMITH and HARVEY in the preceding pages he will always bear in mind,) the student may be further instructed by that distinguished physician, who has rightly said, that (p) "it is the heaviest stone which melancholy can throw at a man, to tell him he is at the end of his nature, or that there is no further state to come, unto which this seems progressional, and otherwise made in vain." Of this learned person,

(p) Cited by Dr. Johnson, in his Life of Sir T. Browne, p. xxii.

Sir THOMAS BROWNE, the patience is said to have been founded upon the *Christian* philosophy. (q) "I visited him," says a friend, "near his end;" when he said, "he had oft triumphed over the king of terrors in others, and given many repulses in the defence of patients;" and this observing friend adds, "when his own turn came, he submitted with a meek, rational, and religious courage." Nor let the student forget the remarkable avowal, which Sir Thomas Browne had long before made; "that he was of the Reformed Religion; of the same belief our Saviour taught, the Apostles disseminated, the Fathers authorized, and the Martyrs confirmed."

Let the medical student next take the best of lessons from RADCLIFFE, of whose skill in his profession astonishing circumstances have been related, and of whose attachment to learning the University of Oxford bears the noblest testimony in the Library of his

(q) See Dr. Johnson's Life of Sir T. Browne.

name. The lesson is contained in a letter from this great physician addressed to the Earl of Denbigh, dated Oct. 15, 1714. (r) " Your Lordship knows how far an air of jollity has obtained amongst you and your acquaintance, and how many of them in a few years have died martyrs to excess: let me conjure you, therefore, *for the good of your own soul*, for the preservation of your health, and the benefit of the publick, to deny yourself the destructive liberties you have hitherto taken, and which I must confess, with a heart full of sorrow, I have been too great a partaker of in your company. You are to consider (O, that I had done so,) that men, especially those of your exalted rank, are born to nobler purposes than those of eating and drinking; and that by how much the more eminent your station is, by so much the more accountable will you be for the discharge of it. Nor will your duty to God, your Country, or yourself, permit

(r) Memoirs of the Life of John Radcliffe, M. D. &c. 1715.

you to anger the *first*, in robbing the second of a patriot and defender, by not taking due care of the third; which will be accounted downright murder in the eyes of that incensed Deity that will most assuredly avenge it. The pain that affects my nerves, interrupts me from making any other request to you, than that your Lordship would give credit to the words of a dying man, who is fearful that he has been, in a great measure, an abettor and encourager of your intemperance, and would therefore, in these his last moments, when he is most to be credited, dehort you from the pursuit of it; and that in these days of your youth, (for you have yet many years to live if you do not hasten your own death,) you would give ear to the voice of the preacher, whom you and I, with the rest of our company, have, in the midst of our debauches, made light of for saying, *Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thy heart, and in the sight of thine eyes; but know thou, that for all these things God*

will bring thee to judgement! On which day, when the hearts of all men shall be laid open, may you and I, *and all that sincerely repent of having acted contrary to the revealed will in this life,* reap the fruits of our sorrows for our misdeeds, in a blessed resurrection; which is the hearty prayer of, my very good Lord, your Lordship's most obedient and most obliged servant, JOHN RADCLIFFE."

After this, (and though I might cite many other examples deserving his strictest attention, I will conclude with the following,) let the student listen to the confession of CHEYNE: (s) "Having had a liberal and regular education, with the instruction and example of pious parents, I preserved a firm persuasion of the great and fundamental principles of all virtue and morality, viz.

(s) The English Malady, &c. By G. Cheyne, M. D. Fellow of the College of Physicians at Edinburgh, &c. 1733. p. 330. He had before published Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Revealed; a work, which passed through many editions.

the existence of a supreme and infinitely perfect Being, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the spirits of all intelligent beings, and the certainty of future rewards and punishments. These doctrines I had examined carefully, and had been confirmed in, from abstract reasonings, as well as from the best natural philosophy, and some clearer knowledge of the material system of the world in general, and the wisdom, fitness, and beautiful contrivance of particular things animated and inanimate."

With these preliminary observations I invite the medical student to the perusal of the *analogical* discussion of a future state: the analysis of which is this. (t) "Neither the reason of the thing, nor the *Analogy* of nature, gives ground for imagining, that the unknown event, death, will be our destruction. The states in which we have formerly existed, in the womb and in infancy, are not more different from each other than

(t) From the preface to the edition of bishop Butler's Analogy by bishop Halifax.

from that of mature age in which we now exist: therefore that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present as the present is from those through which we have passed already, is a presumption favoured by the *Analogy* of nature. All that we know from reason concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies: and the frequent instances among men of the intellectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point of putting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on the human soul, not even so much as to suspend the exercise of its faculties: though if it have, the suspension of a power by no means implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us."

Hence he may be led, if hitherto he has doubted or questioned it, to grant the probability of a future state; and hence he may consider, how best to secure his own interest in that state; yes, and how in the day of

affliction, and on the bed of death, he may to his patient speak the words of comfort, by expressing his unshaken belief that "this mortal will put on immortality, and this corruptible will put on incorruption." Thus adding piety to his knowledge, and intent upon doing good (when in his power) to the soul as well as the body, the man of medical science may be considered (u) as a guardian angel to all around him.

Then, lastly, courteous reader, if this little work (w) "may be of any use to thee as a man, as a scholar, as a philosopher, as a physician, as a Christian, follow the intimation that is here given thee; and I will follow thee with a good wish, which I am sure shall be accomplished for thee, and for all those that honestly labour in God's word and work; I mean, I bid thee God-speed."

THE EDITOR.

(u) See Arnold's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus, chap. xxxviii. 14.

(w) Dr. Smith's Pref. to his Work on Old Age, before cited in this Introduction.

Of a Future Life.

RELIGION, *both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts;* ANALOGY, *being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly on the side of religion, both natural and revealed: and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as* PROFESS TO FOLLOW NATURE, *and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.*

WE are here to consider what the Analogy of Nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest as to the effect which death may, or may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and perception.

I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception with capacities of action, of enjoyment, and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change; and birds and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; *these are instances of this general law of nature.* Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here. But the states of life, in which we ourselves existed formerly in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. *Therefore that we are to exist*

hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the Analogy of Nature; according to a natural order, or appointment, of the very same kind with what we have already experienced.

II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers: because there is in every case a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This is that *kind* * of presumption or probability from analogy expressed in the very word *continuance*,

* I say *kind* of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same *degree* of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay it seems our only reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would be no apprehension that any other power, or event, unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each creature's death; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain after it: which shews the high probability that our living powers will continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death is their destruction.* For, if it would be

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* *Destruction of living powers,* is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either *the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; or, the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action.* It is here used in the former sense. When it is used

in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.

Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, that is, our living powers, might be wholly destroyed; yet even prior to these proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from *the reason of the thing*, or from *the Analogy of Nature*.

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in the latter, the epithet *present* is added. The loss of a man's eye, is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being, endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

But we cannot argue from *the reason of the thing*, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. And these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves as distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their destruction: for [A] sleep, or however a swoon, shews us not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter; but shews also that they exist, when there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, this shews further, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their destruction: because their ex-

istence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that *the reason of the thing* shews us no connection between death and the destruction of living agents. Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole *Analogy of Nature*, to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their living powers; much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death; for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys the *sensible* proof, which we had before their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are then, or by that event, deprived of them.

And our knowing, that they were possessed of these powers up to the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our existence

in another state of life, of perception, and of action, will be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through.

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all error: as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of; it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices; and to shew how little they can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And,

I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded; and so, dis-

cerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, that is, part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest; then its power of motion would be indivisible; and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. In like manner it has been argued,* and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the other there; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is indivisible too: and consequently the subject in which it resides; that is, the conscious Being. Now upon supposition that living agent each man

* See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the Defences of it.

calls himself is thus a single being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned; it follows, that our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may exist out of bodies, as in them: that we might have animated bodies, of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously modified and organized; as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of for the common occasions of life.

II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental observations. But as these *fall in* with the supposition of its unity, so they plainly lead us to *conclude* certainly, that our gross organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore shew us, that we have no reason to believe [B] their destruction to be ours; even without determining whether our living substances be material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may [C] lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, that they might then have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose great part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now things of this kind unavoidably

teach us to distinguish between these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter in which we are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of succession and changing their owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same permanent [D] being. And this general observation leads us on to the following ones:

First, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.

Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents ourselves remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being

ourselves; it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any other, suppose *internal systems* of matter, to be the living agents ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this but from our relation to, and interest in, such other systems of matter: and therefore we can have no reason to conclude, what befals those systems of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have already several times over lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature; yet we remain the same living agents: When we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death; why may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves; why should we imagine death will be [E] so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus alienated, or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter; because we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body;

or, if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though, by the way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our solid body. But after all; the relation a person bears to those parts of his body, to which he is the most nearly related; what does it appear to amount to but this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect each other? And the same thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, may be said of *all foreign* matter, which gives us ideas, and which we have any power over. From these observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter is the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in such matter.

Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments shew, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses shews, that we see with our eyes in the same

sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in any other sense; any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing: And our feeling distant solid matter by means of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar or like to the manner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author of Nature appointed those external objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances of this; namely, of matter which is no part of our body, preparing objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from Analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or

of perception by any other of our senses, can be traced through all its steps quite up to the living power of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of appearance that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons [F] losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of [G] dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and; what would otherwise be, an unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them.

So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will and choice: Upon the destruction of a limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems, unlessened; so as that the living being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as before,

if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg; just as it can make use of a pole, or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things beyond the length and the power of its natural arm: and this last it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb to be instruments of motion to other parts of it.

Thus a man determines that he will look at such an object through a microscope; or, being lame suppose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole then, our organs of sense and our limbs are cer-

tainly instruments, which the living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently, that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we may have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it;) nor consequently is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.

And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction; shews demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind

of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death.

But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to brutes: and it is thought an insuperable difficulty that [H] they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For *first*, suppose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least in the natural immortality of brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty: since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, *that creatures, endued with capacities of virtue and*

religion, should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy aud childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, *secondly*, the natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all difficulties, as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any but [I] such *as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things.* There is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds: I say the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind.

III. That as it is evident our *present* powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affec-

tion, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our *present* powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.

Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reason and act; we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing, which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For though, from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of

sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages and levers and scaffolds are in architecture; yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure and feeling the greatest pain by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings; nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of the former by death will be the destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. Further, there are [K] instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed, from the observations before made, it appears that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. And, by the same reasoning, it must appear too that there is no pre-

sumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: but instances of their not affecting each other afford a presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them; as for instance drowsiness, encreasing till it ends in sound sleep: and from hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But, in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of probability to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at present. For, in those diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affection; sense of a character, of shame and honour; and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp: and these surely prove even greater vigour of life than bodily strength does. Now

what pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that degree? *And if death, by diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is.*

It is obvious, that this general observation may be carried on further: and there appears so little connection between our bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt our [L] *continuing* to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion of it. And our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be dissolved by death; and our finding often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last;

these things afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies. * So that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present, yet may not be entirely beginning anew; but going on. Death may in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth; which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a continuation of both, with such and such great alterations.

Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life, and of death; death may imme-

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* There are three distinct questions relating to a future life here considered: *Whether death be the destruction of living agents;* if not, *Whether it be the destruction of their* PRESENT *powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation;* and if not, *Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exersise, of these present reflecting powers.* Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

diately, in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does;* a state in which our capacities, and sphere of perception and of action, may be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external organs of sense renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation; so it may be the only natural hindrance to our existing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all shew us in what state death naturally leaves us. But were we sure that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers; yet the suspension of a power, and the destruction of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the other; or conclude, even to the

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* This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, *νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι·* Lib. XV. p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, *ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σε ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι τὴν ὥραν ἐν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριον σε τὸ ἕλυτρε τοῦτο ἐκπεσεῖται.* Lib. IX. c. 3.

lowest degree of probability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.

These observations together, may be sufficient to shew, how little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures. However there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is; the supposed likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables, and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But, in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the present question: because one of the two subjects compared, is wholly void of THAT, which is the principal and chief thing in the other, *the power of* [M] *perception and of action;* and which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable is an event not similar, or analagous, to the destruction of a living agent.

But if, as was before intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we would argue only from *That*, and from *That* form our expectations; it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be so can be concluded from the reason of the thing; so none can be collected from the Analogy of Nature; because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons; what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be likely to destroy us; *which death does in no wise appear to be.*

And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into [N] new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the present. And this new state may naturally be a social one. And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in

proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advantages of that future natural state should not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely by His more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature depends: yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their being distributed here by the instrumentality of men. And indeed, though one were to allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to put upon the word *natural*, it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible, to imagine that no system or course of things can be so but only what we see at [O] present; especially whilst the probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because this is really both admitting, and denying at once, a state of being different from the present to be natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, *stated, fixed, or settled:* since what is natural, as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it continually or at stated times; as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. And from hence it must follow, that persons' notions of what is natural will

be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God and the dispensations of his Providence. Nor is there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, that is, analogous or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of his creation; as natural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.

This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as, that we are now alive, is: and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there

can be no future state. *But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a state, is a presumption against religion.* AND THE FOREGOING OBSERVATIONS REMOVE ALL PRESUMPTIONS OF THAT SORT, AND PROVE, TO A VERY CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF PROBABILITY, ONE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE OF RELIGION, WHICH, IF BELIEVED, WOULD GREATLY OPEN AND DISPOSE THE MIND SERIOUSLY TO ATTEND TO THE GENERAL EVIDENCE OF THE WHOLE.

NOTES.

P. 6. [A] *Sleep, or however a swoon, shews us,* &c.] Wollaston thus argues *analogically,* from the same circumstances, upon the suspension of mental faculty: "A man when he *wakes,* or *comes to himself,* knows himself to be the same soul that he was before his *sleep,* or *fainting away.* I will suppose, that he is also conscious to himself, that in those intervals he *thought not at all;* that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldered to dust, he could not have thought *less;* for there is no thinking less than thinking *not at all.* From hence I gather, that the soul preserves a capacity of thinking, &c. under those circumstances and indispositions of the body, in which it thinks *no more* than if the body was *destroyed;* and THAT THEREFORE IT MAY AND WILL PRESERVE IT WHEN THE BODY IS DESTROYED." *The Religion of Nature Delineated,* Sect. IX. §. 8. 3.

P. 11. [B] *We have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours.*] And yet the propagators of scepticism and infidelity have been eager to avow, in modern times, that death, which destroys the bodily structure, destroys the whole of us; that soul and

body decay together, and perish together. Yet, as an admirable writer has observed, "the insinuation of the soul's wearing away and decaying with the body is a *wilful mistake;* since there are such instances of the contrary, as cannot leave a man ignorant that *the decay is all on one side:*" And he refers to authorities which have never been disputed. See *Baxter's Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,* 3d. edit. 1745. §. 8. p. 379. "People," he adds, "of sober and temperate lives preserve a clearness of judgement, and vigour of mind, to the last: though this cannot be said indeed of luxury and constant debauches, which first attack the springs of mechanical motion, *and disguise the activity of the soul,* long before it leaves the body." And see what Mr. Rennell has stated in his *Remarks on Scepticism,* chap. viii. "We know upon what our external life depends; and we know when the organization of certain parts of our body is disturbed, that the life which depends upon it will cease. But we do not know upon what our intellectual life depends; we only know that it does not depend upon the same. We have no reason therefore to suppose, that when organization is disturbed, our intellectual life will be annihilated. All that we can conclude from the destruction of the external organ is, that the thinking principle will then be separated from all communication with the external world, when the link of its connection is thus dissolved. *But it does not follow because a being is incapable of its thoughts, that therefore it ceases to think.*"

See also the note E. in the following pages. And the preceding note A. from Wollaston.

P. 11. [C] *Men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense,* &c.] Compare Wollaston, *Religion of Nature delineated,* sect. IX. §. 3. "When a limb is lost, the soul, it is true, loses an opportunity of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of using it, *but perceives no loss in itself.* And though the body, many parts of it, at least, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the substance, which thinks within me now, or rather which is I, *is, notwithstanding all the changes my body has undergone, the very same which thought above fifty years ago, and ever since;* when I played in such a field, went to such a school, was of such a university, performed such and such exercises, &c. If you would permit me to use a school term, I would say the *egoity* remains."

P. 12. [D] *Each living agent remains one and the same permanent being.*] Take bishop Butler's own illustration of this position in his *Dissertation on Personal Identity,* subjoined to his *Analogy of Religion.* "All imagination of a daily change of that living agent, which each man calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion that though he should live to-morrow,

he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act, *with respect to a future life,* upon this notion that personality is transient; it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present. *Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to our temporal concerns;* and every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case: if therefore any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.

"*Secondly,* It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive: this living being must have done, and suffered, and enjoyed what it has done, and suffered, and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another,) as really as it does, and suffers, and enjoys what it does, and suffers, and enjoys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of

knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know, or remember, or forget any thing else.

" *Thirdly,* Every person is conscious, that he is now the same person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance; then consciousness that he is the same person, is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a substance; still consciousness that he is the same property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would be: since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another."

P. 13. [E] *Why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us?*] " In all the observations, which our experience will enable us to make upon the phænomena of death, we find nothing that will at all invalidate

the independency of the thinking principle within us. On the contrary, the strongest cases which the adversaries of this doctrine can adduce, prove nothing against it; while the innumerable instances which may be cited on the other side of the question, afford the highest possible presumption in its favour." *Rennell, Remarks on Scepticism,* &c. chap. viii.

P. 16. [F] *Instances of persons losing some of them,* &c.] "Upon amputation of a limb, that which in man is the subject of self-consciousness and has the faculties of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, &c. *is not found to be diminished, nor any of its faculties lost.* Its sphere of acting, while it is confined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its *instrument* lost. It cannot make use of that which is not, or which it has not. If the eyes be shut, or the ears stopt, it cannot then see or hear; but remove the obstruction, and it instantly appears that the faculty, by which it apprehends the impressions made upon the organs of sensation, *remained all that while entire; and that so it might have done, if the eyes or ears had never been opened again, or if the eyes had been out or the ears quite disabled.* This shews in general, that when any sense or faculty seems to be impaired or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever or through age, this doth not come to pass because it is *the body* that perceives and has these faculties in itself, but because the body loses its *instrumentality,* and gives that which is the *true subject* of these faculties no opportunity of exerting them, or

of exerting them well; though it retains them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut. Thus distinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it *the soul.*" Wollaston, *Religion of Nature,* &c. sect. IX. §. 6. "The consideration of the indefeasibleness or unweariedness of the principle of thought in us, should practically satisfy us of *the immateriality of the soul.* We feel our bodies every now and then sinking down under their own infirmities: but the thing that thinks in us would never give over, if the body could keep up with it. It is busy all day with the body, and all the night without the body, and all the day with the body again; and thus in a constant circle, without respite or intermission that we can perceive by our strictest enquiry. For the body no sooner sinks down in weariness and slumber, than this thing within enters fresh upon other scenes of action, and hears and sees things worth enquiring into; *and this without the subserviency of its organs, which are then disabled from their function.* That which lives and perceives in us, lives and perceives at all times; if its vital and perceptive faculty could be duly applied to by fit objects; as from this particular it appears; and from which also it appears, that it can be otherwise applied to them by external objects through the senses." *Baxter, Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul,* sect. V. §. 23.

P. 16. [G] *It is confirmed by the existence of dreams,* &c.] Read the excellent Essay of Addison in the

Spectator, No. 487, wherein he treats of dreams as giving some idea of the great excellency of the soul, and some intimations of its independency on matter. And observe especially the following reasoning of Baxter: "The phænomenon of sleep and dreaming, which has been made use of to exalt the nature of matter and depress the perfection of the soul, *rightly considered shews the very contrary.* It is upon the account of the body that the activity of the soul is restrained, that the region of memory is covered up, and by the means of the body that the soul is liable to be imposed upon. The opposition of appearances observable in this state, (of fatigue and activity, of insensibility and life, at the same time,) cannot fail to shew us the opposite natures of *the two constituent parts of our constitution.* If this opposition of appearances had been less, or our constitution more perfect, perhaps we could not have observed *these different natures* with so much ease and certainty. If all had been a blank of thought and consciousness in sleep, the soul would have seemed to be of the same nature with the body: if there had been no difference of thought and consciousness then and at other times, the body would have appeared to be of the same nature with the soul; nor could the *thinking principle* have been so distinguished." *Enquiry into the Soul,* vol. 2. sect. I. §. 46. To this reasoning add the perspicuous and elegant observations of Mr. Rennell: "If there be a circumstance, which to any philosophic mind will clearly intimate *the independency of thought on matter,* it is the

phænomenon of dreaming. Perception, that faculty of the soul which unites it with the external world, is then suspended, and the avenues of sense are closed. All communication with outward objects being thus removed, the soul is transported, as it were, into a world of its own creation. There appears to be an activity in the motions, and a perfection in the faculties of the mind, when disengaged from the body, and disencumbered of its material organs. The slumber of its external perception seems to be but the awakening of every other power. The memory is far more keen, the fancy far more vivid, in the dreaming than in the waking man. Ideas rise in rapid succession, and are varied in endless combination: so that the judgment, which, next to the perception, depends most upon external objects, is unable to follow the imagination in all its wild and unwearied flights. *A better notion of the separate and independent existence of the soul cannot be formed, than that which we derive from our observations on the phænomena of dreaming.*" Remarks on Scepticism, &c. p. 93.

P. 19. [H] *it is thought an insuperable difficulty that they should be immortal,* &c.] Baxter thus finely reasons upon this point: "The immateriality of the human soul doth not fall, though the souls of brutes are at the same time immaterial; nor doth *the rational soul's being such* depend upon *the brute's soul being not such.* But further: though both are immaterial, it doth not follow that both are therefore equal, or of the same kind of immaterial beings; which the objection tacitly supposes; or that there are the same reasons why the souls of brutes should subsist after they are separated from

their material systems, as that the human soul should. The one's being *rational*, and the other *irrational*, is certainly a *specific difference*, which argues *a difference of design* in the Author of these two kinds of immaterial beings; unless we would say that a Being infinitely wise made specifically different beings, and not for different purposes. The same reasons do not conclude a soul immortal, which conclude it immaterial; and though the immateriality of it is not against its immortality, but rather a strong symptom of it; yet, without better reasons, the conclusion would be precarious and ill supported. We are to conclude nothing certain about the immortality of the souls of brutes, because we have not evident reasons to support such a conclusion; and *we are to conclude something certain about the immortality of the human soul, because we have evident reasons to justify our so doing.* This is surely a right method of philosophizing." *Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul*, vol. 1. sect. II. § 37. Again: "They who run the parallel between the human soul, and that of brutes, suppose still the same powers in both: but surely rationality must be founded in some power, which the brute soul, as such, has not." *Ibid.* sect. IV. §. 27.

P. 20. [I] *such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things.*] "Though a presentiment of immortality be deeply interwoven in the human constitution, and most clearly revealed in the New Testament, yet this Testament affords not a hint that the animating principles of plants and animals are to be dissolved along with their bodies. As to animals particularly, several visions of St. John in the Apocalypse would imply the contrary. But if reserved

for a future state, and destined, like man, in a new heaven or a new earth to animate new bodies, and of different materials, *who will presume to say to the Omniscient and the Almighty, that after fulfilling his purposes here, they can answer no other purpose hereafter?*" Barclay on Life and Organization, 1822. p. 398.

P. 22. [K] *there are instances of mortal diseases,* &c.] See what Boerhaave has related of himself in the Preface to this compilation, p. xxiv. "There are diseases," Mr. Rennel also observes, "many in number, and different in species, which even in their utmost violence will cause no disorder in the intellectual faculties. Even under the acutest agonies, of which our frame is capable, the mind is often tranquil and undisturbed. *If we pursue the progress of disease to the very hour of death, we shall see this in a still stronger point of view.* Cases daily occur, where the strength is gone, the vital powers are rapidly retreating, and the patient is lying helpless, waiting for the very moment of impending dissolution: yet his mind shall be as vigorous, his judgment as sound, his imagination as ardent, as in the days of his health and strength. Even in the very convulsion of bodily death, the life of his understanding and his affections shall be unimpaired. *Here then we have the strongest possible presumption, that the thinking principle shall survive the frail and perishable system of organs with which it was connected.*" Remarks on Scepticism, &c. p. 105. See also the preceding Notes A, E, & F. Dr. Burrows in his recent *Inquiry into certain Errors relative to Insanity*, has observed, that "there is no part within the cranium supposed to exercise an intellectual function,

that has not been læsed or even destroyed, and yet the understanding has remained clear and undisturbed." But I refer the reader to various cases, noticed in the Quarterly Review of July 1819, "in which it has been found that every part of the structure of the brain has been deeply injured if not destroyed, without impeding or destroying any of the faculties of the mind, or any part of the process of thought."

P. 24. [L] *or interrupt our continuing to exist,* &c.] "Among other excellent arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one drawn from the perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without a possibility of ever arriving at it; which is a hint that I do not remember to have seen opened and improved by others who have written on this subject, though it seems to me to carry great weight with it." *Addison, Spectator,* No. 111. This is indeed an argument of great weight, and had certainly before been urged by a distinguished author, some of whose remarks have already been cited in the Preface to this compilation. And the present especially agree with what Bishop Butler has here argued throughout the paragraph. "The faculty of reason is a noble power, and exercised not only about the matters of the body, but upon the highest and noblest objects, in a way that is raised and spiritual; and shews a capacity of far greater heights and improvements: *which exercises and perfections prove, that it is designed for more than this poor mortal condition.* For if this be *all* the life of man, his *end* and happiness would then be only to provide for the body, and the gratification of its senses. And if we were made for *no more* than this, our reasons are a superfluous provision in nature. It is

not agreeing with the Divine Wisdom, as it is discovered in the whole *analogy* of things, to make such noble faculties for so low and mean services. All things have their proportion in the economy of God, and are in number, weight, and measure: Every thing is suited to its design and end: *And hence we may conclude, that our reason was intended for more than the little business of this inferior life, and that* THERE IS ANOTHER IN WHICH IT SHALL BE BECOMINGLY EMPLOYED AND GLORIOUSLY IMPROVED.—As from the obscure discoveries of sense, in an infant in the womb, we may argue there is another state wherein the sensitive faculties, that have begun to shew themselves, shall act with more advantage and perfection; in like manner the essays of the soul towards a better life in the virtuous, is *an argument that indeed there is one; and that this present state is but the womb of the future.*" Glanvil, Serm. 1681. p. 278, 281. So Addison: "Would an infinitely wise Being give us talents that are not to be exerted? capacities that are not to be gratified? How can we find that wisdom, which shines through all His works, in the formation of man, without looking on this world only as a nursery for the next, and believing that the several generations of rational creatures, which rise up and disappear in such quick successions, are only to receive their first rudiments of existence here, and afterwards to be transplanted into a more friendly climate, where they may spread and flourish to all eternity?" Wollaston has also finely pursued this subject.

P. 27. [M] *the power of perception and of action,* &c.] "In the inherent activity, or life, of the vege-

table, the animal, and the human creation, there are three degrees distinct in themselves. In the vegetable we observe the faculty of involuntary motion; in the animal, we see this involuntary motion combined with a power of volition; in man, we recognise both these faculties crowned with the predominant principle of the understanding." *Rennell, Remarks on Scepticism,* &c. p. 78. The whole of the chapter, whence this extract is made, is of very great merit as well as interest.

P. 28. [N] *we may pass into new scenes,* &c.] "The soul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat or state, agreeable to the nature of it. Every species of beings must belong to *some* region or state. Because nothing can be, but it must be *some where,* and *some how.*" Wollaston, Religion of Nature, sect. IX. §. 9. See the whole of this paragraph, and what follows to the conclusion of Wollaston's book upon this important point.

P. 29. [O] *but only what we see at present,* &c.] The author here refers us to the second part of his admirable work, chap. 2. and chap. 4. in which he more fully illustrates the position, that things lying beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them. To the whole of bishop Butler's work the reader may be directed, as to a sure guide, for finding, by considerations from *analogy,* the proofs of the truth both of natural and revealed religion confirmed.

And with the writings of Wollaston and Baxter, from which so many extracts have been made in the preceding notes, I would also earnestly recommend a

close acquaintance; abounding as they do with scientific research, with arguments which subdue the sceptic, and with philosophy which both delights and convinces the sincere inquirer after truth. Of WOLLASTON'S book I may add that Pope, denominated it "a book wherein all human virtue is reduced to one test, that of truth; and branched out in every instance of our duty to God and man:" And the poet, in his *Essay on Man*, has certainly been often indebted to the philosopher's *Religion of Nature delineated*. Of BAXTER'S work Warburton has pronounced this character: "a few pages of his reasoning have not only more sense and substance than all the elegant discourses of bishop Berkeley, but infinitely better entitle him to the character of a great genius. *He was truly such:* and a time will come, if learning ever revive amongst us, when the present inattention to his admirable metaphysics, established on the physics of Newton, will be deemed as great a dishonour to the wisdom of this age, as the neglect of Milton's poetry was to the wit of the past." The complaint of neglect, made by Warburton in this eulogium, was soon silenced by at least three editions of Baxter's work within a few years, in two octavo volumes; to which in 1750 was added "An Appendix to the First Part of the Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, wherein the principles, laid down there, are cleared from some objections; and the government of the Deity in the material world is vindicated, or shewn not to be carried on by *mechanism* and *second causes*."

These are books, which the student in every science may safely and advantageously consult; and by them be led to "trace the origin of their species to the First

of causes, to feel and acknowledge that they are under the protection of an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent Being, self-existent, benevolent, and just; and to be therewith content, and congratulate themselves *that they are not reduced to that low and degraded state of some modern physiologists, who with all their efforts have never been able to trace their origin beyond some gross collections of matter, some occult qualities, or some unknown chemical affinities of mud or atoms; and who, as to religion, have only to console themselves with the thought, that they are at least as far advanced as the Caffres, the Hottentots, and the untutored savages of Brazil.*" Barclay on Life and Organization, p. 531.

These are books, which will specially lead the medical student to consider the position of the immortality of the human soul, as an eminent physician long since considered it, "*to be the grand base of religion, and like the key or middle stone in an arch which bears the weight of all others in the building.*" Dr. Walter Charleton on the Immortality of the Human Soul, 1657. p. 58.

Lastly, the editor of this compilation ventures to assert, that little will the man of medical or any other science be regarded, who slights, or derides, or in any way affects to weaken, the force and value of religious principles; and that society, instead of trusting the boast of honour, or the profession of liberality, which disowns the fear of God and the hopes of hereafter, justly excludes from confidence and credit all those, *who deny that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good, and that every one of us shall give account of himself to God.*

INDEX.

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