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A
REPLY

TO A

Vindication

OF A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Unreasonableness of a New Separation, &c.

By Samuel Grascome

L O N D O N,

Printed in the Year MDCXCI.



AMONG all the Reformed Churches, none departed from *Rome* with greater Advantage than the Church of *England*. The certain Succession of Authority, as well as purity of Doctrine, and both maintained by Men as famous for the Integrity of their Lives, as Profoundness of their Learning, made her for a long time the Glory of the Reformation, and both the Envy and Terror of her Adversaries. For this Reason she became the principal Mark, at which all Firebrands were darted; and no Arts were neglected, which might by any means raise up Enemies against her, till in the former Rebellion, overwhelmed with the Multitude, Malice, and Wickedness of her Foes, either her Priests, with others, were barbarously murdered, or shut out from the Temples, and debarr'd from the daily Sacrifice: And *Jerusalem* it self was made an heap of Stones. But though this did eclipse her Beauty, and (as some thought) well nigh defac'd her, yet such was the Sincerity of her Members, that those bloody Persecutions did indeed raise her Reputation; and made many, who admired their Constancy, enquire into those Principles, from whence sprang such wonderful Effects; whereby she gained no few Profelytes: And as, when the Heathens, accounting all false, erected Statues to *Dioclesian*, with this Inscription, *Superstitione Christi ubiq; deleta*, the Christian Church soon after broke forth with greater Splendor than ever; so when our Enemies thought they had raked up that long afflicted Church in Ashes, on a sudden, and beyond hopes, she rose with such a Lustre as struck Envy dumb, and her Enemies with Admiration, as seeing the Finger of God in

it. And thus it might have long continued, had there not been a falling away, and her own Members renounced her Principles. But, alas! now her Condition is worse and more desperate than ever, unless God be her Helper. *Rome* hugs herself, and laughs to see the Members of that Church debauched, and that effected by some few Vipers bred in her Bowels, which all their Craft and Industry could never bring to pass. The Dissenters smile and insult, to see the worst of their Principles taken up, and pretended to have been always Principles of the Church of *England*. And as for those few, whom no Plagues or Penalties can force to abdicate their Mother, and with Rancour vomit up that Divine Food they suckt from her Breasts; whilst even their Enemies commiserate them, those who call themselves their Brethren prosecute them with the utmost Malice, as if nothing would serve them but *Root and Branch*, and they were fully resolved to destroy that poor distressed Church, *both Name and Thing*: And unless God of his Infinite Mercy prevent their implacable Designs, to the eye of Sense it scarce seems avoydable.

Experience may have sufficiently taught us, That Schism not only breeds ill Blood, but worse Actions; and not only causeth Heats and Animosities, but often raiseth Men to that Madness of Zeal, that they think they do God good Service by the most unjustifiable Deeds, and barbarous Immanities; and I pray God that these times may not too much feel the Effects of it. Upon this account every good Man will not only Mourn over the Divisions of *Reuben*, but by all honest Means endeavour to allay them: And if I could be convinced, That the

Guilt of the present Schism lay at our Door, I should think it ought to be my first Work to Repent of it. And tho' the Author I have to do with writes at that rate, as if he intended not to convince any Man, but reproach all, who are not of his Party; yet I will pass that by, and do him the Justice to examine whatever may seem in the least material thorough his whole Discourse, and so leave the Judgment to the Impartial Reader.

For a taste, at first, what awkward doings we must expect all along, he answers my little Piece backwards, and begins at the end. And because I said I was unwilling to *judge severely of my Brethren*, he thinks he hath no small advantage in picking up three or four harsh Phrases, which dropt from my Pen: As if a Man could have no kindness for others, who sometimes speaks in sharp Language, when bitter Truth enforceth him to it, and the Nature of the Thing will not be otherwise expressed. But this Complaint very ill becomes him, who at every turn, on set purpose, calls me by all the scornful, despicable Names, a malicious Wit can invent; and sometimes gives me such ill-favoured Titles, with Threatning to boot, as if he had a mind to deal by me, as the Heathens with the Primitive Christians, who, when they would expose them to be torn in pieces, dress them in the Skins of Bears, or other Savage Beasts. But this I can neglect: For though it may recommend his Book to some kind of Wits, yet it will certainly disparage it with all Men of Sense.

My Answer contained only two Sheets, so that it could be neither difficult nor tedious to have answered it as it lay: But, as if he were lost in a Wood, or had to do with some Voluminous Author, he reduceth it to Heads; but as there I followed another Man's Steps, so here, to prevent all Complaints of foul play, seeing our Author will not allow

me my own Method, I will follow his. But first, I cannot forbear to tell him, That I do not think that he hath done like an ingenuous Man in these things. 1. That he hath quite omitted several Reasons of mine, which were material as to the Matter in Controversy. 2. That when he mentions Topicks, or hints at any of my Arguments, he never repeats those Words wherein the strength of the Argument lay. 3. That he rarely makes any direct Answer; but shifts and turns it off to another Matter, like some crafty Huntsmen, who being desirous to save the life of an old chac'd Hare, and yet to gull those who follow the Sport, and think the same Game is still on foot, start, and lay the Dogs into a fresh one. And in these three things consists both the Artifice and Strength (if it have any) of his whole Book.

The first Topick he makes to be of *Church-Communion and Schisme*; and here the first Offer he makes is a Side-blow, in styling us the *New Separatists*, (p. 3.) Now Schisme certainly goes along with the Cause; and those properly are the Schismatics who are the Criminals: Now let Matters be first adjusted, and the Cause examined, and let those be the new *Separatists* who shall be found Guilty upon Tryal; and if his new Titles of Honour be not found of Right to belong to himself and his Party, I will confess that I have been woefully mistaken.

That we *do not fall, but are forced into this Division*, I had alledged. This he saith he will answer in due place, and I must wait his Leisure. But when he calls it a *Spiteful Return*, when I desire that Author to *speak with more Reverence of a Case of Conscience*, if he had withal added my Reasons, it would have plainly appeared that nothing but frontless Impudence would have called that Spitefulness. But to divert the Discourse, he tells me, That I have *over-run the Point*. For (saith he) *the Word Only is not as if a Case of Conscience was not a matter*

matter of Consequence; but that the taking or not taking the Oaths, is only a Case of Conscience, not matter of Doctrine. But doth not the Strength of his Argument lye in this, That the taking or not taking the Oaths is only a Case of Conscience, about which wise and good Men may differ? And doth not he by this means endeavour to represent it as a Matter of small Moment or Importance? and I think this is not to make it a Matter of any great Consequence. Or do I there speak any thing of Doctrine, but strictly keep my self to the Plea of a Case of Conscience? Was not my principal Reason this, That there was not any Moral Action, and consequently not any Duty of a Christian, about which a Case of Conscience might not at one time or other arise? And if these may be determined either way, because wise and good Men may differ, this will either destroy the very nature of Good & Evil, or make the Bounds so moveable, that we shall never know certainly where to find them. But because these and other Reasons deserve no Answer, let us see whether he hath made the matter better or worse by what he will vouchsafe us. It is only a *Case of Conscience*, (he says) *not Matter of Doctrine.* What is the meaning of this? Doth he think practical Cases things indifferent, and that nothing is of moment but matter of Theory? Provided that a Man doth believe in general that Oaths are obligatory, is it lawful for him in practice to take contradictory Oaths, and be guilty of Perjury? I confess, That I should have a better Opinion of the Quaker, who denies the Lawfulness of all Oaths, than of that Man who maintains the Lawfulness of Breaking all Oaths: The one may prevent Perjury, the other encourageth it without end. But if Men put such a Sense upon promissory Oaths, as, contrary to their Nature and Design, makes them to be no Security, I leave it to indifferent Persons to judge, whether that Man doth not in effect invali-

date all promissory Oaths, and set up such a Doctrine as teacheth the Lawfulness to break them: And I think we need not go far to seek Men who do thus. But this Oath (he says) is a *Matter of a Civil Nature.* What then? Is not God appealed to in the taking it? Is not his holy Name profaned, and his Wrath and Vengeance provoked, if it be taken in Violation of former Oaths, *i. e.* in Perjury? What if its Meaning be to be learnt from the *Constitution and Laws of the Realm*? Has it not therefore a certain Sense and Meaning? And if there be Sin in it, is it not a sufficient ground to refuse to communicate in that Sin, or to joyn with perjured Persons in their Perjury? But here he shamelessly insinuates, That the Matter of our Difference is only Scruples; when I had told him, as plainly as a Man could speak, That we had no Scruples. If a Man should encourage me to murder my Father, or rob him of all he hath, should I make any Scruple to reject the Council of such a Villain? I think there is as little Reason for a Man to raise Scruples why he may not forswear himself, as why he may not commit Theft, Murder, or Adultery. He scarce deserves the Name of a Christian, who doth not, without any Scruple, condemn these Sins.

After this shift, he next puts two Pleas in our Mouths, and then makes two Answers for his learned Author. The First Plea is, *That when any Thing unlawful is made a condition of Communion it will justify a Separation.* As to which he tells us, his Author made Answer, *That taking the Oaths is no condition of Communion with us, and shewed that the Terms of our Communion are not altered.* This, indeed, he said, but he never shewed or proved, nor ever can. For will he say, That the matter of the Oaths is not made a condition of Communion to all Men? Are we not obliged to pray for the same thing in more ample, plain, and significant Terms, than we are to swear it?

Now.

Now whatever Objections we have against the Oath, our principal Objection is against the matter of it, as un-duely, and unjustly assigned; and if the Owing and Praying for this be made a part of the daily Office, it is made a condition of our Communion; and if so, then the terms of our Communion are altered. And thus he may see that a Man may sooner prove the Oaths to be made conditions of Communion, then tell of forty Things they are not: But this will be done more fully afterwards.

As to the Second Objection, he tells us his Author says, *That it is the Scruple about mix'd Communion, which hath been so long exploded among us*; and this he says, *I was very careful to pass over in silence*: And perhaps he did not very advisedly to be my remembrancer: For I will not pass it over so now: For should I suffer that to lye against us, I should expose both my self, and others to a severe Censure. But I have known Boys set up a *Daftin*, and then strangely laugh and triumph to see how bravely they knockt it down again; and when other Men make our Objections for us they may frame them on purpose so as to fasten on them some ridiculous Consequences, which they had before in their Head; and that indeed may make them Sport, but it doth not affect us: And I cannot think that this Author did believe himself, when he cast this Calumny upon us, as think us so very Weak and Silly to seperate upon the Terms of those Enthusiasts, who thought themselves Defiled in mix'd Communions. Had he stated the Objection fairly, there had been no colour for his Answer: But since he is resolved to cast all Slanders upon us, I shall briefly represent our Sense in this Case, which will be sufficient to wipe them off. We do not seperate from them upon the account of any particular Frailties, or any personal Infirmities, or Sins. We do not seperate from them for that they

have taken unlawful Oaths, though we think them bad Men for doing so; and worse for hardening themselves in their Sin by maintaining them, and encouraging others to be as bad as themselves; good Offices may be discharged by ill Persons, if lawfully authorized there-to; and where the Terms of the Communion are Sound, the particular personal Failings of a Man, in other matters, affects not the Communion; both *Judas* and *Demas* may execute their Office to the benefit of others, though it were to be wished, that scandalous Sins were less rife in the World; for a fulsome Cup is apt to turn the Stomack against the most wholesome Liqueur; and Devotion is apt to grow chill, when the Offices of the Communion are discharged by a Person, whose ordinary Actions are known to be Wicked, and disagreeable to his Official Prescriptions; but, yet this will not Warrant the violation of Communion. But the reason, why we Communicate not with you is, because we cannot do it without being guilty of Sin in so doing, which I have already in part proved from these two Heads; First, That we are unjustly discharged from the Exercise of our Office, which we ought not to submit to, but Exercise at our Peril, being we cannot do it otherwise. Secondly, That there is evil in the very Terms of your Communion; and therefore whether the Oaths be made conditions of Communion or not, we have sufficient Ground to refuse your Communion; and this I shall more fully prove hereafter, as our Author gives me Occasion; for I am bound to follow a kind of desultory Wit, which like a *Monkey*, in a drying Room, is always leaping from one Line to another, and though he never stays long on the same, yet he is never long from it.

Whereas the Author against a New Separation had put this Case, *That supposing the Swearers to blame, yet if they acted according to their Consciences, there could*

could be no reason for a Separation, unless it be lawful to separate from all, who follow the dictates of an erroneous Conscience, and so there will be no end of Separation; to which I did reply to this effect, That though we may be bound to separate from some erroneous Consciences, yet it doth not follow, That we may lawfully separate from all. This he calls another of my Blunders. But to prove that we may separate from some erroneous Consciences, (and, I think, we ought to separate from no other) and yet Schism not be endless: I gave this Reason, *That all erroneous Consciences had not an equal influence on Communion and good Manners, so that it is not the erroneous Conscience, but the nature of the Thing wherein Conscience errs, which according as it affects Communions, either requires a Separation, or allows a continuance of Communion; and particular instances I there proposed.* But as if he were afraid he should burn his Fingers, he never saith one Word to his Blunderers Reasons and Instances; and yet to give him his due, he here endeavours to split the Hair. For he calls me back, and tells me that his Friends supposition was this, *That though the Swearers were to blame, yet if the Oaths were not made a condition of Communion, there could be no cause assigned for a Separation on that account.* But if I give him this, yet it is plain Force on his part, and to make me agree to his Authors Supposal whether I will or no. For it was my Business to shew, That the Supposition did not lye in our Case; and I there not only asserted but proved, That the erroneous Conscience, concerning which we Discoursed, was such as did affect Communion. Now if a Man will always say the same thing, and constantly hold and repeat his Conclusion, without any regard to any Arguments offered against it, I must allow that Man to have this peculiar advantage of all others, That he can never be Confuted.

I confess I did charge his Author, *That he had not fairly stated the Case;* and, I think still, that it ought not only to have been considered, whether the Penalties bore any proportion to the pretended Crime, but whether the Power it self had any lawful Authority either to impose the Oaths, or inflict the Penalties? For if that was wanting, than it is certain, That greater Iniquity and Injustice could scarce be committed, then such unlawful Impositions, and such mercylefs Usage. But here, to be even with me, he tells me, *That it was my Mistake; for if there be no reason for the Scruples about the Oath, there can be no reason for their sake to separate.* (p. 6.) Still he is at his Scruples, though in effect I had before told him, That if there be such a thing as Perjury, the Oaths must without Scruple be unlawful. But to admit his Reasoning at present, yet if there be Reasons for Scruple, and the Oaths be unlawful, than the Penalties are Unjust as well as Mercylefs, and there may be Reason to separate on their account; and, I think, this ought to have been considered as well as the other, and not such an easie state of the Case, only propounded, as if there were no more to do, but get up and ride. And yet, after all, as triumphant as he is, his Consequence is not universally Good; for though it is not our Case, yet there may be Cases, wherein an Oath may be either lawfully taken, or lawfully refused; and though there be no Scruple in such Case, yet a Man's Actions may be Warrantable, so far as tending to the Just and Honest Defence of his Liberty, when such Oaths are imposed with Unjust and Mercylefs Penalties.

But it seems I am guilty of another mistake; for he tells me, *That if the Oaths are Lawful, the Penalties how Unjust and Rigorous soever, cannot make them Unlawful.* But he ought to have considered, That I called those Penalties Mercylefs, in respect of the Dispro-

Disproportion; and such they might be, though the Oaths were Lawful: But then I said they were *Unjust*, in respect of the Unlawfulness of the Oaths themselves. Now to answer this by saying, *if the Oaths are Lawful*, is meerly to beg the Question, and to argue upon the Supposition of that, as granted, which is the Matter in dispute.

He will needs reduce my Arguments to three Heads, of which the first he makes this, *That the Penalties to be inflicted upon us, want nothing of being a condition of Communion to us, quatenus Ministers*. Now I thought they had been inflicted already, but if they are to be inflicted, then it seems there are more to come, and I was more in the Right than I was aware, when I called them *Merciless*, for so they were with a Witness; of which we shall know no end, nor from time to time what they shall be. To secure Usurpation what in them lies, by endless Punishments, is to put the Usurper into the place of God Almighty: For none but he can in Justice punish without end. I now begin to think, that instead of pitying our unjust Sufferings, they will inflame what they can, and get those Barbarities put in Execution, which some have threatned, for the Warning against which we are more beholden to their Anger than their Honesty.

But before he takes notice wherein my Argument pincheth him, he pretends to answer what I urged as the *fatal Consequence* of such Penalties. And here, with a great deal of wit, (as he thinks) he tells me, *That there may be Forty things which may have the same fatal Consequence*. And if what he says be true, is it any Answer to my Argument? But let us however examine his Instances; and he tells us it would have been of the *same fatal Consequence, if the Clergy had not subscribed, &c. if they had not declared their Assent and Consent, &c. if they had not taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy in former Kings Reigns; and*

he might have added, if People should Renounce Christianity, which I fear many are strongly tempted to, whilst they hear the Ministers of it Preach away God's Commandments, and those who ought to be the severest Enemies of all Wickedness, to Canonize Perjury and Injustice for Christian Virtues. But to answer his particular Instances; Will he say, That either the things commanded, or the Authority commanding, then was unlawful? If not, how comes it up to our Case; or how could they justly be made a ground of Separation? But he would not see wherein the *Fatality of the Consequence* I urged lay; which if he had pleased to do, he might have spared all his Instances, though he had had Forty more. Suppose the Case thus; a Government requires something to be done, which is sinful and unlawful, with which if the Clergy will not comply, they shall be discharged from the Exercise of their Function and Duty. Now in such a case, God forbids Compliance; and if they are bound to submit to the Government, and cease from the Exercise of their Ministry, upon Non-compliance; then it will lye in the Power of the Civil Government, whether God shall be worshipped in the Land or not. For sin we must not; and yet if we must acquiesce under the Penalty, for not complying, then it is in their Power to discharge every Man from his Duty: And therefore in such a Case I say we must do our Duty at our Peril; we must do well, and be content to suffer Ill; we have no Remedy in such Case, but to bear our Cross. And to avoid or explode the Doctrine of the Cross here, were in the consequence to thrust Christianity out of the World. Of this not a word; and indeed our Author's great Skill lyes in avoiding, not answering, Arguments.

He farther adds, *That the Penalties, though great, are neither unjust or merciless, if the Government is not otherwise to be secured*. What! not though the thing

thing commanded be Sinful? May a Government then enjoy Wickedness under the severest Penalties, if it be thought for its Security, and yet be blameless? There are a sort of Men are strangely careful for some Governments, and what a small ado is required to establish a Throne in Unrighteousness, and after all, it will never be done; but either this will not secure the Government according to your Principles, or it may be without it. For I must intreat you to remember a common Distinction amongst your selves, I mean that *between Government and Governours*; and then be pleased to call to mind who it is, that expressly says, *That the Oath is to the Government, not to the Person*. Now suppose a Man should take the Oaths with a design, at the same time, to secure the Government, by putting it into other Hands: I cannot see but that a Man may lawfully do thus upon your Principles; and yet this were to make an Oath the most detestable Cheat that ever was known, or heard of. Sure the Eyes of Governours will one time or other be opened to see, that these Men really strip them of all Security.

All our Churches (saith he) *are open*, (p. 8.) and every one furnished with a bold Swearer; But what's this to the purpose? Or how does it answer the Case I put? For may they not on that account be shut at any time, and for a longer time, than they were in the Reign of King *John*? And let me desire you, Sir, to remember, though you have shut us out, That the Church is not tyed to the Walls, but follows the Authority; of which we shall Discourse anon. What he means by his Proportions of 12000. to 16000. and 2000. to 10000. I cannot imagine, unless it be to expose the Apostacy and Iniquity of these Times, which none before can parallel: If he mean to upbraid us with the fewness of our Number, it is only to encrease their own Shame and

Reproach; for Argument in this Case, it is none, or of no Force; for it might as well have been pleaded against the Church in *Elijah's* time, and he might for the same Reason have condemned all Christians in general, because Christ calls them his *Little Flock*.

Whereas I alledged and proved, *That the Oaths were made a condition of Communion to us, quatenus Ministers*. He could not deny this, only it seems we must be like Pelicans in the Wilderness, and none must come near us; *For if we will separate we may, but then we must separate alone: For the People cannot joyn with us without being guilty of a notorious Schism.* (p. 8.) But if Ministers fall under a Deprivation, which hath neither Cause for the Ground, nor Authority for the Act, and consequently is null and void in it self; May not a Minister's own Flock joyn with him without being guilty of notorious Schism? And if other Ministers will not only justifie such unjust Proceedings, but greedily rob them of their Livelihoods, and enter upon their Charges; May not those, who receive the Wrong, separately do their Duties? But here he objects, *That this is nothing to the People, of whom, as Church Members, this is not required.* And this (he says) *is a tender Point, and what I durst not touch upon.* The Point indeed is tender; and though I had not Courage enough to swear, *i. e.* to be Perjured, yet my noble Hector shall find, that I dare do any thing that is Honest. It is not the Oaths in themselves, nor their taking, or our refusing, upon which we merely justifie the Separation, but it is the influence those Oaths have upon Communion, and that is such as will not only justifie, but oblige the People, as well as the Papists to separate: And if this be so, then it is your selves must *Separate alone*, because the People ought not to joyn with you. For though the Oaths themselves are not imposed on the People as condition of Communion, yet the

Matter and Substance of those Oaths is put into the Prayers of the Church; and so far it becomes a condition of Communion to all Persons. For to every Prayer the People are required to say *Amen*; and they are not left at their Liberty to joyn in what Prayers they will, and not in others, but are required not only to joyn, but to testify their joyning in all; their *Amen* supposes their joynt consent, concurrence, and approbation. What People are enjoyned in the solemn Worship to pray for, is made a condition of Communion to them; and if it be Sinful, will not only justify, but require a Separation: For what I may not swear, though but once, I may much less pray for daily; nor can there be a greater affront offered to the Divine Goodness, than by solemn Prayer to endeavour to engage it for that, which, at the same time, I condemn as Unjust and Wicked. How can I joyn with those, in every time of whose solemn Worship, I am required more then once to pray to God, that he would approve and prosper the breach of his Commandments, and most signally and notoriously the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth? To pray not only for that which is highly unjust, but also for the Prosperity and Continuance of it, is that which no Christian ought to do; and where he is enjoyned to do it, he not only may, but ought to separate from such; and so I leave others to judge, whether there be any Reason for *the Peoples non Communion*, (as he Styles it.) Other Reasons I could add, but because the Author of *The Caution against Inconsistency* has clearly proved, That those who think the Oaths unlawful ought, for the same Reason, to condemn the Prayers, which relate the Matter of the Oath, and consequently ought not to joyn, where they, by being inserted in the daily Office, are made a condition of Communion; I refer to that for more full Satisfaction in that particu-

lar. Only this I shall add, that in conclusion of the Church Prayers we return Thanks to God, *Who hath given us Grace with one accord to make our Prayers and Supplications*. Now let Men pretend what they will, in repeating this Prayer either they say true or false; if they say true, then they joyn in those Prayers which contain the Matter of the Oath; but if they do not joyn in those Prayers, then this Prayer is a lye in their Mouths.

Yet there is one thing more I shall propound, That though personal Failings of any Man are not a good Warrant to others to abstain from Communion, whether nevertheless the Teaching, Preaching, and Maintaining Immoralities, and Opinions destructive of Christian Practice, may not as well justify a Separation from such, as Errors in the Faith? For though our Adversaries do not say, That Perjury is lawful, yet they argue upon such Principles, as if there could hardly be any such thing: They make Oaths to be no Security to any Governours, which is enough to make all Governours hate and root out that Religion which teacheth so. The effect of their Discourse tends to the destroying of all Faith, Truth, and Justice, amongst Mankind; than which nothing can be more scandalous or dangerous to that Religion, which prescribes and requires the highest Simplicity and Sincerity. And this thing alone, I think, may go a great way towards justifying a Separation from such Persons.

From what hath been said, the Answer is easie to what follows: For it is apparent, That it is not barely a Political Security required of us; *nor do we* (and God forbid either we or any others should) *Revenge our Wrongs upon the Church*, as he maliciously insinuates: But we preserve our own Innocency, and, what in us lyes, by lawful and honest Means, the Churches Purity and just Authority; though we heartily mourn, That the Wickedness of others hath unavoidably put

put us upon the necessity of taking the Course we now do.

As to that, which he calls my second Argument, he tells me in the First place, That I *proceed upon a gross Mistake, by confounding Deprivation with Degradation*; and yet, with his leave, the Mistake was not mine; for I called it Deprivation, as he doth, I never mentioned Degradation. But if the Civil Power inflict a Penalty under the name of Deprivation, which tantamounts to a Degradation, I could only argue against it as it was. Now, to take away a Character, and make it eternally useless, is in effect the same thing; and this is the Case; we are not only deprived of our Livelihoods, and shut out from our proper Cures, but perpetually discharged from the Exercise of the Ministerial Function, unless we will sin against the known Laws of God and the Land, and the Dictates of our own Consciences; which we ought not, upon any account, to do: And I think this wants very little of being equivalent to a Degradation, let them call it by what Name they will. But what if the Civil Power never so much as thought of your Distinction; as I am apt to think they little regard it? When the High-Priest and Rulers of the Jews first consulted and resolved amongst themselves, *straitly to threaten the Apostles, That they speak henceforth to no Man in this (i. e. Christ's) Name, (Act. 4 17.)* and after put their Resolves in Execution, expressly commanding them, *not to Speak at all, nor Teach in the Name of Jesus, (vers. 18.)* do you think they troubled their heads with your Distinction of *Deprivation* and *Degradation*? And how much is our Case different? For we are obliged, what in them lies, either not to speak in that Name, or to act contrary to it; and therefore I think we may very justly take up the Apostles Answer, *Whether it be right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you, more than unto God, judge ye. (vers. 19.)* When the Heathen

Emperors, who set themselves against Christianity it self, Banish'd the Bishops, and Martyr'd others, they did but deprive them; they would not for all the World sure have thought of degrading them. And after all, what if your new Masters do assert that Power in themselves? You know many of them are *Eraſtians*; and how much such Men set by your Distinction, you can scarce be ignorant. But to go a little farther with you, those Men who pretend to make Laws, are commonly presumed best to understand their Meaning. Now it is not long since, that a haughty Member of the Convention plainly told me, That it was in their power to take away our Orders, and Unpriest and Unbishop us; for which he gave this worshipful Reason, That the Legislative Power ought not to be stinted: And thus neither the Authority nor Establishment of God himself, or his Christ, nor the Bounds of Good and Evil, must be suffered to set any Limits to a proud pragmatistical Conventioneer. By this you may see, That the Saviours you adore, reckon, That our being at any time *in Statu quo*, lies wholly at their Mercy; and that even your selves, if you do not absolutely please your new Masters, and go through Stitch, Right or Wrong, with their Commands, can pretend to little Benefit from your Character or Orders. Besides, I have lately heard of a Man, who hath accepted a Commission to visit all the Exempts in the City of London, and within Ten Miles of it; by Vertue of which, for any thing I know, a busie Chego-pated Priest, may insolently attempt to Visit his Metropolitan: And whether this may not be improved in time to grant by Commission the Exercise of Episcopal Jurisdiction to any Persons, whom they please, without regard to Orders, I cannot say, but I think it is a pretty Step, and fair Advance towards it.

But be the Mistake whose it will, I shall now try what he answers to the Argument;

Argument; for it is that, which is the Concern: And here he deals most disin-
geniously by me. For, First, in reciting
my Argument, he leaves out those
Words, which would have cleared my
Meaning; and others, wherein the
Strength of my Argument lay. Next,
he Sums up my Argument falsely, and
not in my Sense: And after this, he
gives no direct Answer to it, but raiseth
three Questions, and those too for the
sake of some Answers he had found in
Archdeacon *Mason*; and those Answers
come not up to the Case. Such mighty
pains are some Men at to say nothing to
the purpose. But however we must
wait his Motions.

My Argument he Sums up thus, *That
being they (i. e. the Clergy,) receive
their Authority from God, no Civil Power
can disable them from the Exercise of
their Duty: And if it doth, they are bound
to quit the Communion of the Church,
where so disabled.* Now I was so far from
simply asserting, That the Civil Power
cannot disable them from exercising their
Function, that I there instanced in Ca-
ses where they lawfully might. But as
he has worded it, he confutes himself.
For if they exercise only (as he calls it)
their Duty, it is certain no Civil Power
lawfully can disable them from the
Exercise of it. And if he grant it
their Duty in that Case, he justifies them:
For no Man ought to be hindred from
discharging his Duty. Nor did I say, *That
they are bound to quit the Communion of
the Church, where so disabled:* For the
Church might own them, when the
State disallowed them. I said, in such
Case of unjust Deprivation, they might
exercise their Office at their Peril; which
either might be done in the Church, or
in Separation from that particular
Church, according as the Doctrines
there taught, and the Terms of Com-
munion in it stood.

The Argument being thus falsely re-
presented, he answers it with Questions.
The method, I suppose, is new, and he

a Man in fashion. The first is this,
*Whether a Bishop duly Consecrated, or a
Minister duly Ordained, may not be law-
fully Suspended and Deprived from the
Execution of his Office, by the Secular
Power, where there is sufficient Reason for
it?* Now this Question plainly answers
it self. For I think any thing may be
done, for which there is a *sufficient Rea-
son*; and he is a very hard hearted Man,
who will not allow him this. But then
there are other Questions to be asked,
viz. What is, in such Case, a sufficient
Reason? Whether there be sufficient
Reason in this particular Case? And
lastly, (if he please,) Whether no Au-
thority in the Deprivers, and no Crime,
as to them, in the Deprived, be a suf-
ficient Reason for Suspension or Depriva-
tion? It is an odd way of answering
a Man in a particular Case, to float in
generals, and keep as far from the Que-
stion as may be; but perhaps he will
mend that anon; at present we must
attend to the Solution of his Question,
which in his Singular way he performs
by reciting two Objections, and as many
Answers to them, from Mr. *Mason*. And,
to make short work, I will grant him
all that *Mason* says, where there is, as our
Author calls it, a *sufficient Reason for so
doing*; and I hope he would not have it
done without or against Reason. And
so, passing by the Act of Parliament,
which he hath left me to peruse at lei-
sure, till I have more spare time, I will
directly come to his second Question,
and try whether he hath any better For-
tune there.

He is not agreed with himself, how
he shall word his second Question; and
therefore I will set down that, where
he expresseth himself most at large, and
maintains the affirmative; *Whether it
may not be lawful for the Secular Power
to deprive Persons in Orders, for Crimes
committed against the State, and parti-
cularly, upon Refusal to give Security to
the Government for their Peaceable Be-
haviour and Allegiance, by Oath?* This
he

he affirms, and he says *I expressly deny*; which is expressly false, as may appear from those very Words of mine, which he hath cited to prove his Assertion: For there I did allow a Deprivation by the Secular Power, where either *the just Censure of the Church had passed on any, or they did merit Deposition*; and that I think they may do, though a Censure be not actually passed upon them. But if you will have the Deprivation valid even to their acquiescence, where the Secular Power, or that which calls it self a Secular Power says, that a Crime is committed against it, you must not only justify Queen *Mary* in Depriving *Edward* the Sixth's Bishops, but you must condemn those deprived Bishops for making a Schism, and not joyning in Communion as Laymen, *i. e.* that they did not turn Papists.

But let us examine his Defence. *I answer* (saith he) *with Mason, Where was the Act of the Church, in the Deposition of Abiathar? And where was the Ecclesiastical Crime he was charged with? Did Mason then use thus to answer with Questions? But your Questions shall have Answers however; And, First, I think it not very clear whether the Jewish Church did afford so sufficient an Ecclesiastical Remedy against their Criminal High Priest, as the Christian Church doth against Criminal Bishops; and if so, then it was altogether necessary both for Church and State, that their King, who was of God's own appointment, and something more than a mere Secular Person, should interpose his Authority without any deference to Ecclesiastical Censure. Secondly, You may enquire, but I am apt to believe that neither you nor I can certainly tell, whether *Abiathar* was Censured by the Sanhedrim or not; for if it be not Recorded that he was; so neither is it that he was not. Thirdly, Though it be very convenient in it self, agreeable to the Rules of the Church, and makes much for the Peace both of Church and State,*

That Christian Kings in Punishing Ecclesiasticks would take the Censures of the Church along with them, which would make the Condemnation of such Persons more terrible and notorious; yet if the Clergy should refuse, as it would be their Fault, so it doth not hinder the Secular Power to punish Offenders according to Justice. But all this is nothing to the purpose, and will do him no service, because there are Cases, wherein Ecclesiasticks, Deprived by even a lawful Secular Power, may yet remain obliged to execute their Commission from Christ, though at their Peril; or else the Apostles and Primitive Bishops must be Condemned; and if so, it is much more Lawful, when for adhering to right they are deprived only by a pretended Power. But I suppose this *Virtuoso* will say, That *Jehojada* had been bound to leave of all care of discharging his Duty of High Priest, if *Athaliah* had Deprived him. As to his Second Question, (*Where was the Ecclesiastical Crime Abiathar was charged with?*) I answer, That though I spake of Ecclesiastical Censures, yet I did never limit the matter to pure Ecclesiastical Crimes, nor have I (that I can remember) so much as used that Phrase; for the Church may censure whatsoever is *Contra bonos mores*, though, at the same time, the Secular Power punish it as an Offence against the State: The one is Spiritual, and tends to their Repentance and Amendment, and consequently is for their Good: The other respects their Deserts, and the ill effects it had on the State, and repays and punisheth their Misdeeds. But if he would know *Abiathar's* Crime, it was *High Treason*, which is a thing of so scandalous and dangerous a Nature, that he becomes unfit to discharge so sacred an Office, who is guilty of it; nor can the Censures of the Church be too severe against such Wickedness; when the Sons of Peace, and those which should teach and pay the strictest Obedience,

though they meet even with the greatest Discouragements, shall turn Masters of Misrule, the Church ought to spew them out. As for *Abiathar*, he had forfeited his Life by his Treasonable Actions, (I do not say by joyning with the Son against the Father) and in such a case he who only restrained his Actions, but granted him both Life and an honourable Subsistence, was very kind. But whether this come nearest to our Case or theirs, I leave succeeding Time, and more impartial Posterity to judge.

He farther answers with the same learned Author to this effect, *That a Law was made, That all Magistrates, whether Sacerdotal or Civil, should take an Oath that the Queen, (i. e. Elizabeth) was Supream. &c. under the Pain of Deposition: For refusing this, the Popish Bishops were deprived, as presumed to be for the Pope's Supremacy.* But then he adds, *The same Parity of Reason may hold for administering and taking the Oath of Allegiance to, &c. i. e.* Because Bishops might be deprived for refusing an Oath to a lawful Power, against an unlawful; therefore they may be deprived for refusing to take an Oath to an unlawful Power, against that which is lawful and rightful. And this he calls Parity of Reason, though an indifferent Person would say it were directly contrary to it; and that the Legality and Rightfulness of Power, being the Reason of the Oath to one, was a just Reason of denying it the other.

The same Author, he says, tells us, That when *those Bishops* would not take the Oath, *Episcopis suis tandem aliquando juxta Legem Parliamentariam sunt abdicati.* And now he thinks he hath undone me: For he tells me *he leaves me this to English.* If I cannot, I will come to him for help; though I think I shall be very ill employed, if I do. But after all, I believe this Sentence was particularly pitched upon for the sake of some Words in it. And first, he had an Eye to the Word *abdicati*, as

a fine clinch on the Times, and grateful to his new Masters. What a lucky hit was this, to find such a Word in a venerable Clergy-man? Well! let them make their best on't: It is not to be doubted, but they will never stick at Abdicating Bishops, who make no Scruple of Abdicating Kings. His next Respect was to the *Legem Parliamentariam*, which seemed to be a pretty Offering to his Goddess *Diana*, the *House of Commons*; for which they can do no less than nominate him to Preach before them the next Sessions, and then he will forfeit his Conscience, rather than miss *the Thanks of the House.* And yet I must tell him, That it is an Impropriety of Speech in his Author: For though the Parliament contrive, compose, and propound, yet they are the King's Laws, whose *Fiat* it is which makes them so. But the subtillest Fetch of all is in the Word *Episcopis*; which may signify their Temporalities, and the Exercise of Episcopal Jurisdiction in their proper Diocesses, as it doth in this place; or else may signify the Function and Order it self. Now, he durst not English it in this latter Sense, for fear of giving up the whole Order, and being charged with down right *Erastianism*: And yet he was willing to leave it with an *Inuendo*, as if it ought to be taken in that sense that so he might gratify the Secular Power with a boundless Authority: For thence are his Hopes; and some Men care not to betray their whole Order, so they can enrich themselves. Thus, Sir, I have Englished your Latin by Piecemeal, and, to requite your Favour, I leave it to you to put together again.

His Third Question is this, *Whether if a Person be lawfully Deprived of the Exercise of his Ministry, he is notwithstanding bound, as a private Member, to communicate in that Church? &c.* This he says, I deny, which is a false and impudent Slander; for nothing can be more plain, than that he, who is lawfully Deprived ought to acquiesce; the only Remedy

Remedy left him in that case, is by all lawful means to get it off again as soon as he can. But he knows we deny the lawfulness of the Deprivation, upon which account we think it lawful for us to continue the Exercise of our Ministry, and would do it in conjunction with them, were it not that they both unjustly approve our pretended Deprivation, and refuse to suffer us the Exercise of our Ministry, either in our own or their Churches, and also further clog their Communion with such Terms, as is not lawful for us to comply with; and upon this score we think we both may, and ought to maintain a *separate Communion*. You should have proved the Deprivation lawful, which you knew we denied; but instead of that, you all a long run away begging the Question.

This should have been the Last, but being a fruitful She Question, it hath foaled Two more, and how many it may bring forth in time, Who knows? Like Twins he has put them together, and so let them go. *Whether Ordination oblige such a one to the actual Exercise of his Office, when forbid by the Magistrate? And then, Whether for the Exercise of his Ministry, he may and is obliged to set up and maintain a separate Communion?* And that I may comply with his way as far as I can, I will answer them with two more. First, Whether the Apostles, having received their Commission and Authority from Christ, were obliged to leave off the actual Exercise of their Office, when forbid by the Magistrate? Secondly, Whether if a Separation be made, those who depart from others, or those who give just Cause for it are the Schismatics? But these I must leave to him, that we may examine how he solves his own. If (saith he) *the Magistrate may lawfully Deprive, then the Clerk may be lawfully Deprived, and if so, he is bound to submit.* Still this is begging the Question; for we complain not of what

is lawfully, but what is unlawfully done. But he gives a Reason, which either proves too much, or manifestly shews, That he thinks either that the Magistrates Deprivation is always lawful, or though it should be unlawful, yet must be submitted to. For (saith he p. 13, 14.) *to officiate notwithstanding such a Prohibition, is in our way to take up Arms against him; and in a lower, to do what the Pope doth in a higher Station, and to controul his Jurisdiction.* Now this is a Knavish malicious Trick, to compare our Actions to the Popes; the Pope directly challengeth a Supremacy over Kings, indeed over all Men; we only lay claim to a Christian Liberty, not to comply with Sin and Wickedness, though the Magistrate command it; and a Power not to desert our Station, wherein Christ hath fixed us, for every humourfom or unjust Prohibition of the State, but at our Peril, and without Resistance; and what Agreement hath this with the Popes Actions? But if his Civil Magistrate may not any ways be controuled, but must be complied with in all things, then I leave any indifferent Persons to judge, whether these two things be not the direct Consequences of his Arguments. First, This makes the Proceedings of the Apostles, and all the Primitive Christians, in propagating the Gospel for about Three hundred Years, to be altogether unjustifiable. For they were actually prohibited first by the Jews, after by the Emperours; so that if his Doctrine had taken place, Christianity had never entered into the World. Secondly, This shuts out the Doctrine of the Cross, not only as Foolishness, but as Wickedness and Disobedience, and puts it in the Power of the Civil Magistrate at his Pleasure to extirpate Christianity out of the World; for if prohibited, they must cease and comply; because to do otherwise *Were in their way to take up Arms against him, and controul his Jurisdiction.* And thus, if the Grand

Signior should Silence all the *Christian Ministers* in his Dominions, they must hold their Peace, and no more speak in the Name of Jesus; for if they do our Author will tell them, they are Rebels. I perceive this Author makes use of his Religion only for his Convenience, and will put no more on than he can at any time put off again; he is here a sort of a *Christian*, and at *Japan* would be a *Hollander*.

But to make good his Argument, he accuseth me of Ignorance as to the Primitive Times, and instanceth in *Eustathius* of *Antioch*, *Athanasius* of *Alexandria*, and *Paulus* of *Constantinople*, put out by the Imperial Power; and this he says, *Was never questioned by the Orthodox, though they complained of the Injustice of it, &c.* Now I confess, that I have not had those Advantages which some have been happy in; and am content to be accounted Ignorant, provided he will suffer me to be Honest: But, yet as Ignorant as I am, I think, no Man that had consulted his Cause, or his own Reputation would have produced this instance in this case. For it will either justify our Proceedings, or force him to condemn these Persons; and in so good Company we shall the less value hard Censures: For were they thrust out of their Diocesses? What great difference is here? Are not our Livelihoods and Cures taken from us? Are not our Bishops Deprived of their Profits and the exercise of their Jurisdictions? This we suffer, and do not so much as compare the Power then and now, whether lawful or unlawful: If the Civil Authority wrongfully spoil us of our Goods, and restrain our Persons, we know no Resistance any more than those good Men did. But did they forbear to exercise their Office and Ministry where they had opportunity? No such thing. Was there no Schism upon this account? It is plain, That the Orthodox refused to Communicate with the Bishops put over

them; the whole Christian World was concerned on one side or other in the Case of *Athanasius*; at *Constantinople* the People were so troublesome, that the Emperor was forced to recal *Paulus*, though he was after again Banished; and upon the Expulsion of *Eustathius* from *Antioch*, the suspected Bishops, set over them, were disgusted by many, and *Theodoret* says, That *plurimi Studiosi pietatis, cum Sacerdotes tum Plebs, desertis Ecclesiasticis caribus, privatim Conveniebant* (lib. 1. cap. 21.) And this they continued to do, though all the Churches were taken away from the Adherents to *Eustathius*, in order to force them to Communion with those put in his place, as may appear from that request of *Athanasius* to the Emperor, for one Church to be granted to the Orthodox at *Antioch*, when he desired the like of *Athanasius* for the Arrians at *Alexandria* (*Theod. lib. 2. cap. 12.*) I think a Man so Skilful in Antiquity might have made choise of some more lucky instance; but that he may not be at too much trouble, if he can have a little Patience, it shall not be long ere I furnish him.

Next in order to an Answer to his Second Question, he supposeth the Clergy-man not bound by the Deprivation; but then (saith he) *What is this to a Separation? For is he so obliged, that rather then not officiate, he may and ought to break of from Communion with the Church?* If you will make that supposal (which in our particular Case is a great Truth) you of all Men were most unfit to put these Questions. For when you joyn with those, who make this unjust Deprivation, when you take our Churches, our Flocks, our Livelihoods, and suffer us not to exercise our Ministry, where you have the Profit of it, unless we will do it to the dissatisfaction of our Consciences, Do you complain that we do not maintain Communion with you? If we were in fault in this Case, yet Modesty (if any be

be left you) and the ill Usage we have from your Party, might make you hold your Peace. I freely grant, *That we ought to continue in the Communion of the Church we are of as long as we can, and that Separation is like a Divorce, which is the last Extremity, &c.* But then I say, That we still are of the same Church we were of; for the Schism goes along with the Cause; and there it is you, not we, are the Schismaticks; the Separation I grant to be Unhappy and Mischievous, but let them look to that who made the Divorce by justifying unlawful Proceedings, and setting up sinful Terms of Communion, as I have already proved; and therefore will say no more of it here. And this is sufficient for an Answer to that Slander, as if we proceeded upon the same Grounds with the Dissenters, which is manifestly false; only I am bold to tell him, That they have now put a Plea into the Mouth of the Dissenters, which will justify their Separation from them; and were it not, that they cannot justify their Separation from us, your Perfidiousness and other ill Acts had given up the Cause to them.

When he thought he had lost my Second Argument with multitudes of Questions, he attacks that which he calls the Third. And, he says, *I argue from the Subjection the People and Clergy owe to the Bishops, and the Bishops owe to their Metropolitan;* and I grant, That I do so, and the Argument must be good, unless he can Dispute away all the Government and Orders of the Christian Church. But to this he returns with all imaginable Scorn. *Our Author that undertakes to give us an account of the Sense, Judgment, and Practice of the Primitive Times, would have done well to have given us a touch or two of his Skill that way, by some credible Authorities; and particularly of such a Subjection of the Bishop to the Metropolitan, to the Confutation of some of St. Cyprian's Epistles.* It being very likely, that in a

small time the whole Controversie may turn upon this hinge, and it being most becoming Church Men to direct Ecclesiastical Proceedings by Ecclesiastical Authority, I shall take a little more pains in this place to answer, not only what he now objects, but to take in what he hath at any time dispersedly spoken as to this Matter. If this scornful Gentleman will so give up all to the Civil Power, that their Commands, and Orders must be actually obeyed and complied with in every thing, he in effect grants two things (which done by any Clergy-man, to have his Gown pulled over his Ears were too mean a Punishment.) First, That it is in their Power to destroy Christianity, and in the room of it to plant any other, or none at all. Secondly, That Religion is only an Artifice or Sham to be made use of, so far as it is serviceable to the Civil Power, and no otherwise. By this you may perceive, what a Friend the Erastian is to the Atheist; and though our Author doth not speak out, yet he hath many Expressions that look earnestly that way. But he will allow, That the blessed Jesus, who instituted the Christian Church, did by a published Gospel and Succession of authorized Pastors provide for the Directing, Ordering, and Governing of that Church, which they are to stand by in all Ages and Difficulties; then he must grant, That there are some Duties of a Christian, which no Civil Power can supercede; and though we are not allowed to resist the lawful Civil Power, how hardly so ever it use us, yet we must practice our Duty at our peril; and if the Civil Power would obstruct it, we must then take up our Cross and follow Christ. And if this be not our Case, we are mistaken Sufferers; but if it be, it will very much call in question their Sincerity.

To fear God, and honour the King, and not meddle with those, who are given to change, I think, was not only

Only laid down as a wise Man's Advice, but designed as a Duty and Obligation upon every particular Person. But not to urge here matters of Justice, Fidelity, and common Honesty, (which yet by the way, I think, are never to be slighted) we are here to consider what Obligations we may lie under with respect to the Government, and Orders in the Church. And if he will allow me to reason either from the Practice of the Church, or the Canons of the Church, or the Writings of those who best understood both, particularly St. Cyprians, whom he himself Magnifies; and than whom no Man better understood this Cause; then I doubt not but we may go a considerable way in it.

That Episcopacy is the highest Order in the Christian Church, and that there is nothing, which one Bishop as a Bishop may do, but another may do the same, I readily grant; and consequently, That there can be no such thing as *Episcopus Episcoporum*: But then that there are withal certain Rights, Priviledges, and Prerogatives belonging to the Metropolitan, which have been always thought to have been inseparably annexed to him, and from the exercise of which other Bishops have been ever ordinarily debarr'd; and that upon this account, that the Peace and Unity of the Church cannot be otherwise preserved, nor the Government managed; this (I say) I think to be as plain as the High way.

Whatever the Rights or Priviledges of Metropolitans may be, I shall only Discourse of some, which were universally allowed by the Ancient Church, and confirmed by Canons, or Practice universally received, and which may at least, in some measure, affect our Case; of which one is this, That no one was to be Ordained a Bishop without the concurrence or consent of the Metropolitan. In the 19th. Canon of the 1st. Council of Antioch, it is thus determined,

Ἐπίσκοπον μὴ χειροτονῶνται δίχα συνόδου

καὶ παρούσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει τ' ἐπιτελεῖται.
 That a Bishop shall not be Ordained without a Synod and the Presence of the Metropolitan. And when in the same Canon they had made the actual Presence of the Metropolitan, as necessary as such a case could permit, they add, εἰ δ' ἄλλως ᾧδε τι ὤκεισθαι γίνοιτο, μηδὲν ἰσχύειν τὴν χειροτονίαν. That if any thing be done otherwise, then as was then determined, the Ordination shall be invalid. Now this very Canon was only pursuant to a Canon of the Council of Nice; and because most Men, especially those with whom we have now to do, have, at least formerly, pretended a great Veneration for that Ancient Council, we will see what was their Judgment, which in the 6th. Can. you may find expressed thus.--
 Καθόλου δ' ἐπεδύλον ἐμῆνο, ὅτι εἰ τις χειρὶς γνώμης τῆς μετροπολίτου γένοιτο Ἐπίσκοπος, ἢ τοιούτων ἢ μεγάλῃ συνόδῳ ὡεῖται μὴ δεῖν εἶναι ἐπίσκοπον. Let this be universally known, that if any one be Ordained a Bishop without the consent of the Metropolitan, This great Council doth determine, that such a one ought to be no Bishop. Perhaps it was for this Reason, That Eusebius (as far as I remember) in reckoning up the Ecclesiastical Succession, except Jerusalem (for which there might be particular Reasons) mentions only Metropolitan Sees. For whilst the Rights of the Metropolitan were preserved, and his Succession undoubted, it was scarce possible, that the other Bishops of the Province should come in any other way, but at the right Door; for he was either to be actually at, or consent their to Ordination by Bishops summoned by him for that purpose; so that as the being sure concerning him, removed away all doubt of the rest; so the being uncertain concerning him, of course makes all the Ordinations in his time uncertain. This I say, that you may consider what will be the effect of Setting up a Metropolitan against a Metropolitan, and how it is a fair way to render the validity

of the Ministerial Function called in question. But of what force such an Act would be, if done, I shall consider presently.

Another matter appropriated by the universal Church to the Metropolitan, was, that nothing of Moment, which might concern the Province, or be of general Concernment, should be done without his privity and consent; so that unjustly to set a Metropolitan aside, and for other Bishops to neglect him, is to make matters of greatest Moment, and nearest Concernment to the Church to become impracticable; and to draw a Scandal upon the Actions of all Bishops, as to any thing they shall do in such Cases; and when I have offered Authorities for the Proof of this, I leave others to judge whether they are Credible enough for such a Huff as our Author. Amongst those Ancient Canons, collected and received before the Council of Nice, which are vulgarly called the Apostles Canons, the 34th. runs thus, τὰς Ἐπισκόπους ἐκάστω ἔθνους εἶδέναι χρὴ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πρῶτον, καὶ ἠγεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς κεφαλὴν, καὶ μηδὲν τι περὶ τὴν πείτην ἀνευ τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης ἐκείνα ἢ μόνον περὶ τὴν ἐκείνου, ὅσα τῇ αὐτῷ περιεχία ἐπιβάλλει καὶ ταῖς ὑπὸ αὐτὴν χώραις. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐκείνῳ ἀνευ τῆς πάντων γνώμης ποιῆτω τι. ἔπειτα γὰρ ὁμονομία ἔσται, καὶ δοξασιῶσεται ὁ θεὸς διὰ κρείσσιν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ διὰ κρείσσιν ἐν ἀγίῳ πνεύματι. Ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα πατρὸς ἄγιον. i. e. The Bishops of every Country ought to observe him, who is their First (or Chief) and to esteem him as their Head, and to do nothing of Moment without his Consent. Every other Bishop to employ himself only about those things, which are business of his proper Diocess and the Villages (or Places) thereunto belonging. Neither let him (i. e. the Chief) do any thing without the Concurrence of the rest. And so Unity shall be preserved, and God shall be glorified, &c. To this very Canon the Council of Nice relates, and explains what is meant by the τὸν ἐν

αὐτοῖς πρῶτον, the first amongst them. For after a great deal of care taken about the Ordination of the Metropolitan, as a Matter of great moment for the Churches Security, they conclude the Canon thus, τὸ ἢ κρείσσιν ἑπινομένων ἀγέσθαι καὶ ἐκάστω ἐπαρχίᾳ τὸ μέτροπολίτη, (Can. 4.) i. e. Let the Authority (or Confirmation) of things done throughout every Province belong to the Metropolitan. Upon this very Canon did the African Fathers found their Authority for that saying in their Epistle to Cælestine, Bishop of Rome, Decreta Nicæana, sive inferioris gradus Clericus, sive ipse Episcopus, suis Metropolitanis aperitissime commiserunt. i. e. The Decrees of the Council of Nice have most plainly put, not only the Clergy of inferiour Rank, but even the Bishops themselves, under the Jurisdiction of their Metropolitans. And to both the foregoing Canons the Council of Antioch seems plainly to refer, in their 9th Can. τὰς καὶ ἐκάστω ἐπαρχίᾳ ἐπισκόπους εἶδέναι χρὴ τὸ ἐν τῇ μητροπολίτει πρεσβύται ἐπισκόπον καὶ τὴν φροντίδα ἀναδέχεσθαι πᾶσις τῆς ἐπαρχίας, &c. i. e. It behooves the Bishops in every Province, to know the Bishop of the Metropolitan See, and that he undertakes the Care and Management of the whole Province; and that by reason of the great Concurrence of People from all places to the Metropolis, upon account of Business, &c. And having thus confirmed the Jurisdiction of Metropolitans, they tell you, That they did it, κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον κειμήσιον ἡμῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν κείνον. i. e. According to an ancient Canon of our Fathers, binding, (or in force.) And that you may know what particular Canon in this they had an eye to, in the very next Words, speaking of the Duty of Bishops, they expressed it thus, ταῦτα μόνον ὅσα τῇ ἐκάστω ἐπιβάλλει περιεχία καὶ ταῖς ὑπὸ αὐτὴν χώραις; which are the very words used in the Apostles Canon for the same purpose, as any one may see, who will compare them together. From all this it is evident, That even Bishops themselves

themselves cannot regularly transact any thing, in Reference to their Churches in common, without their Metropolitan. And if a Metropolitan be set up against a lawful Metropolitan, the latter by the Laws of the Church being made null, and consequently he no Metropolitan, all their Actions in conjunction with him will be uncanonical and scandalous, and extremely to the trouble, confusion, and detriment of the Church: And how this agrees with the Publick Good he prates of afterwards, let any Christian judge.

To prevent being tedious, I shall mention only one more Right or Prerogative, belonging to the Metropolitan; and that is, either at the stated Times, or upon extraordinary Occasions, and the common concern of the Church, to call together or summon the other Bishops of the Province, to appear in Council, and there to debate and confirm Matters with them. The Council of *Antioch*, in their 20th Canon, appointing two Synods in the Year, for the determining Controversies, and other Ecclesiastical Uses, in the same Canon tell us, ἐπιτελείδαι τὴν συνέδον, ὑπομιμνήσκοντες τὰς ἐπαρχίας τὰ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει, i. e. *That is truly a Synod, when those of the Province are warned by the Bishop of the Metropolis*: And that a Synod is not lawfully congregated otherwise, they plainly thus tell us, in the same Canon, μὴ ἐξἄνω ἢ τινὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς συνέδους ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν πεπιστευμένων τὰς μητροπόλεις; i. e. *It is not lawful for any to make Synods of themselves, without those to whom the Metropoles are intrusted*. But when they are so called, it seems that, for their Proceeding Synodically, his Presence, if it can be had, is extremely necessary. For so much that in the 16th Canon of the same Council seems to import, τελείαν ἢ ἐνεῖνλω εἶναι συνέδον, ἢ συμπρέσει καὶ ὁ τῆ μητροπόλεως, i. e. *That is a compleat Synod, wherein the Metropolitan is present with the rest*. But this is a Matter so known and acknowledged, that I need not labour to

confirm it: But that which I use it for is this, That as Matters are now managed, and much more as suddenly to be expected, things will be brought to that pass, that we can have no Convocation; or if we should have, yet all their Acts would be invalid; I mean, as to any Ecclesiastical or Canonical Authority; for if that may be set aside, so may the Persons too, and the business done by other hands; and so farewell all Convocations for ever. Such glorious Advantages some blessed Revolutions may bring to pass.

Against this he objects the Authority of *St. Cyprian*, in *some of his Epistles*; but which those Epistles are, he doth not tell us; nor doth he afford us so much as one Word out of them. But I believe the Reason was, That he could find none to serve his Turn: For none of the Fathers better understood the Discipline and Government of the Church, than *St. Cyprian*; And that I have no Cause to confute all his Epistles, he shall presently understand. But sure he was either in great Haste, or in great Scarcity of Authorities, who mentions only *St. Cyprian* in this Case, who was himself a Metropolitan, and of how great Authority, may appear from the Case of *Rogatianus*, a Bishop of his Province, who would not so much as punish his refractory Deacon, (though a thing which properly belonged to his own Cognizance,) without first consulting *St. Cyprian*. Some daring Persons perhaps may look upon this as the weak Act of a timorous old Man; but if it be well examined, this very Act will prove *Rogatianus* to have been a Man of great Judgment, Prudence, and Foresight. For though it was in his Power to censure his Deacon, yet it was also in his Deacon's Power to appeal; and little less could be expected from so stubborn a Fellow as he is represented: And had he done so, the Case had been altered; *Rogatianus*, from a Judge, must have become a Party, and though his Cause had

had been never so just, yet it had prolonged time, and put him to a great deal of Expence and Trouble: But by proceeding according to the Advice of his Metropolitan, he did wisely forestall and prevent an Appeal; and thus did his business with Speed, and with as little pains and charge as might be. As for St. Cyprian, as his Age scarce afforded a Person of greater Authority; so, as to the Extent of his Jurisdiction, perhaps there was not a greater Metropolitan at that time in the Christian World. He himself saith of it, *Latius fusa est Provincia nostra; habet enim Numidiam, & Mauritanias duas sibi coherentes,* (*ad Cornel. Ep. 45.*) And though in dread and abhorrence of the *Typhus Seculi*, the African Fathers were such Enemies to the Titles of *Eparck* or *Patriarck*; that they decreed against the Name, yet if there were Metropolitans in *Numidia* and *Mauritania*, in St. Cyprian's time, as it is certain there was not long after, then he had the Thing, though not the Name; and if I mistake not, the peculiar Title of the Bishop of *Carthage* was *Primate*. For when the Council was determining the Order and Precedence of Bishops, and *Zantippus*, the Metropolitan of *Numidia*, asks what could be said against the present Determination, all the Bishops give their Consent, but with this Exception, *σὺζουμένε ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς δικαίης τῶν πρωτεύοντων ἢ Νουμίδας καὶ Μαυριτανίας.* i. e. *The Rights of the Primate of Numidia and Mauritania being preserved.* And that this was not intended as a Compliment, but a Reality, is apparent in the very next Decree, where though in favour of *Numidia* it is granted, That a Register shall be kept at *Constantina*, the Metropolis of that Country; yet in token of their Subjection to the Primate, it is ordered also, That the same shall be at *Carthage*; for that, if any thing, must be the meaning of *πρῶτον Κἀθηδρέα* in that place, (*Cod. Can. Ec. Afr. num. 96.*) But if these things reach not St. Cyprian, yet it is plain e-

nough that he was a Metropolitan of very great Authority, and so as our Author makes use of his Name, it is plainly to cite him against himself.

From the Case of Metropolitans I shall come to that of Bishops in general. I make no doubt, but that a lawful Secular Power may as well punish a Clergyman as a Layman, for any Crime committed against the State, proportionably to his Fault: But still I say, the Secular Power can neither make nor unmake a Clergyman. To make such, plainly requires an Authority from *Christ*; and if the Civil Power can unmake such, then he can vacate the Authority of *Christ*, and destroy all the Power he left in his Church. Deprivation I take to be no very proper Term, applied to the Secular Power with respect to the Clergy: But how far a lawful Secular Power may restrain a Bishop from the Exercise of his Episcopal Authority, I will not discourse; nor do I take it to be our Case. But this I say, That if the Secular Power, though never so undoubtedly lawful, shall so restrain a Bishop from the Exercise of his Episcopal Function and Authority, that in effect there shall be no Bishop of the place, or another is put in his room; then, beside the Justice of the Cause, it is requisite that the Church's Censure accompany such Fact; that so a due Ecclesiastical Provision may be made in such case, without which Christians cannot be satisfied as to Communion: But then if a lawful Secular Power, much more an unlawful Power, shall unjustly deprive a Bishop, whatever either he or his Flock may be bound quietly to suffer; yet the Flock cannot by such Act be bound to abandon and renounce their lawful Canonical Pastor, but may and ought to Communicate with him as well as [they can. All the Orthodox Christian World did look upon *Athanasius* as Bishop of *Alexandria*, when he was banished into *Gallia*; and when upon the Banishment of him *Liberius Felix* was substituted in his

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place at *Rome*, it made a Schism, and it had been a very Pernicious one, had not *Felix* opportunely died. I will not urge upon our Author, That his frequent loose way of expressing himself doth, in effect, basely give up, not only the Episcopal Order, but all the Orders in Christ's Church, and consequently the Church it self, to the Secular Power, be it what it will; if this was done designedly, (as it seems to be) it is so much the worse: But I will keep my self to regular Ecclesiastical Practices and Authorities; and if a Clergy-man will not abide by these, or return them a fair Answer, he is much more fit for a Censure than a Disputation.

It is a Rule so well known to be universally received by the Ancient Church, *That there shall be but one Bishop in a City*, that I need not spend time to prove it. That of the *Chorepiscopi* doth not alter the case, and particularly is nothing to our case, for these two Reasons. First, That though they were a sort of Rural Bishops, yet they were only as Assistants, and acted in Subordination to, and by the Direction of the City Bishop. Secondly, That we have none such now; and as for those, who are so hasty to get into the places of our pretently deprived Bishops, they would never own themselves to be *Chorepiscopi*, but challenge the whole entire Jurisdiction, and absolutely thrust out the lawful Canonical Bishops, contrary to all the Rules of the Church. The reason why this Rule hath been held so Sacred, is partly, because to do otherwise would be to make the Church a Monster; for in St. Cyprian's Sense a Church is a People united to their Bishop; where by the way observe, That the Word *Plebs*, or People, is taken in a larger Sense, as well for the Clergy as Layety under the Jurisdiction of one Bishop: And here the Bishop supplying the place of the Head, and the People of the Body; to set up two Bishops were to make two Heads; partly because if two

Powers, independent upon each other, command and direct in the same Church, it would breed such Disorders and Confusions as usually end in Schism; and indeed it might make the Obedience of the People impossible, whilst they might command different things at the same time; and for this reason both so great Power was given to Metropolitans in Provincial Churches, and all Bishops were Prohibited any Acts of Jurisdiction out of their own Precincts, which might be any ways prejudicial to the Canonical Bishop of the Place. And therefore where there is a lawful Bishop, another ought not to be placed there; if it be otherwise, the whole Act is void; and this, Sir, your good Friend St. Cyprian will tell you, *Episcopo semel Facto, & Collegarum ac Plebis testimonio & iudicio comprobato, alium constitui nullo modo posse.* (Ep. 41. ad Cornel.) This, I think, is plain enough; but because our Author is for abundance of Words, if he please to read St. Cyprian's Epistle to *Antofoianus*, who favoured *Novatianus* in such a case as is daily expected will be ours, he may there find Reasons, as well as bare Assertions, of which take this taste; *Cum nemo ante se* (he speaks of *Cornelius* Bishop of *Rome*) *factus esset, cum Fabiani locus, i. e. cum locus Petri & gradus Cathedrae Sacerdotalis vacaret, quo occupato de dei voluntate, atque omnium nostrum confessione firmato; quisquis jam Episcopus fieri voluit, foris fiat necesse est, nec habeat Ecclesiasticam Ordinationem, qui Ecclesiae non tenet Unitatem; quisquis ille fuerit, multum de se jactans, & sibi plurimum vindicans, profanus est, alienus est, foris est. Et cum post primum secundus esse non possit, quisquis post unum, qui solus esse debeat, factus est, non jam secundus ille, sed nullus est.* (Ep. 52.) Thus it is plain, That the grand Reason why St. Cyprian gives the Cause against *Novatian*, was, because *Cornelius* in the Vacancy of the See was Canonically placed there before him. If therefore a Bishop be thrust into
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the place of another, who is lawfully Bishop of the Place, all such transactions are void and null in themselves; and all that forsake their true Bishop, and joyn with him who is thrust in, are Schismaticks; and though there should be any Penalty or Deprivation befall the Bishop; yet if it be such, which in its own Nature doth only amount to a Suspension, it cannot make the Place capable of another Bishop; because, notwithstanding the present restraint, he remains Bishop still, though under a kind of an arrest; and in such Case the return of the use and exercise of that Authority, which all this while is really lodg'd in him, is to be waited and endeavoured.

From hence, I think, it doth appear, that it was a ruled Case in the Church, That if any Person did come into any other than a vacant See, and claim there as direct and proper Bishop, (as *Novatianus* did against *Cornelius*,) both he and all his adherents were adjudged Schismaticks. As to a Vacancy I am still of the same Mind, and if our Author would have me change it, he would sooner have prevailed with me by Arguments than Threatnings; I have seriously thought on it, and cannot yet imagine how a Vacancy can be, but one of these three ways; either God must make the See void by his Death, or a lawful Authority makes it voyd by a lawful Deposition, or he himself makes it void by his Renunciation. For the last of these, I perceive, our Author has a present kindness, but how long it may hold I know not. For when others have taken away their Estates, he in a pretty sly way perswades them to mend the Matter, by renouncing their Order, and, I believe, with much the same design, that the Fox praised the Cock for an excellent Singer, that while he shut his Eyes as he crow'd, Reynard might have the opportunity to run in upon him, and make a prey of him; as to the second way, which is Depo-

sition, I do not see that there is the least room for any Plea for it in this Case. For be the Authority of the Secular Power what it will, as to the taking away their Estates, the confinement or punishment of their Persons, or the temporary restraint of the exercise of their Authority; yet, that the Secular Power can unmake a Bishop, (which is the only thing can, as to them, come up to our Case,) I still peremptorily deny: And let our Author clap his Hands and cry S'too, let him set all he can on my Back, all the threatnings in the World, nay all the things that can be threatned shall never fright me from it; indeed if he can fairly convince me by Argument, I will yield, and give up my Religion, when they please to demand it: But he had best have a care what he does; for, in the end, he himself would be no Gainer by the Bargain. In the next place, if he fly to an Ecclesiastical Deposition, there several things must be enquired into. As, First, A sufficient Cause, without which the Act would be manifest Injustice, if not void. To enquire after all the Causes, for which a Bishop may lawfully be Deposed, would be too tedious; *Photius* in the 14th. Ch. of his *Nomocanon* refers us to very many, I will not say all; our Author may search them at his leisure, and see if he can pick up a new Charge; as for the present Accusation it is a thing of that Nature, that the contrary may rather justify the doing the same by others. In the next place there must be competent Judges; and the 12th. Canon of the Council of *Carthage* will not allow less than Twelve Bishops to depose a Bishop. But lay all Circumstances together as our present Case is, and I am apt to think that there will not be found any competent Authority to sit in Judgment upon our Bishops. But be that as it will, When hath any such Authority made any offer that way? Lastly, There must be a full and fair Hearing. And in the close of the 97th. Canon of the Council

of *Carthage* you may see what Horreur the Bishops expressed in the Case of *Quodvultdeus* of Deposing a Bishop, before his Cause had a full and final Hearing. Indeed in some Cases the Canons censure *ipso facto*, and then such solemn Proceedings are not necessary; but even then there must be a notoriety of the Fact the Canon relates to, and there must be a Declaration, that the Canon takes Place. But I do not see that any of these things can be so much as pretended in this Case, and therefore deposed they are not: The last way of Vacancy is Death; but of that I need not Discourse, there are (thanks be to God) if not a great, yet a venerable Number of them living; and, I hope, God will long continue their Lives for his Honour, their own Renown, and the Good of this distressed Church.

From the foregoing Discourse, these Consequences may be fairly drawn; First, That whosoever shall be put into the Place of the pretended Deprived Bishops, are not to be esteemed Bishops, nor ought either Clergy or People to regard them, but to adhere firmly to their former true Bishops. Secondly, That whosoever shall Ordain such, or endeavour to Place them there, make themselves Criminals, and liable to an Ecclesiastical Censure. Thirdly, That they and all their adherents are Schismatics. I am accustomed to speak my Mind plainly; if this do not please you, I cannot help it; you were pleased to call for Authorities, I have given you some, and when you are at leisure, I hope I shall hear of your Epistles.

Having thus dispatched the Argument, I think, I need not put in any Answer to his impertinent Questions; but whereas he says, *My Argument will serve either way*, as well for the Bishops and Metropolitans that have, as those that have not taken the Oaths, he is much mistaken; for if my Allegation be good, they will be liable to censure; and if he consider, he will yield that that alters the

Case. And by this he may perceive, That whatever matters of State have occasioned, yet it is not bare matters of State we proceed upon, nor do we think it unlawful to swear Allegiance to the Sovereign Power; and therefore both his Questions in that respect are Impertinent. But I desire to know what Primitive Christians ever thought it lawful to take an Oath of Allegiance, to that which is no Sovereign, against that which really is, or to take a later Oath directly contrary to a former lawful Oath? But if he can find none such, if he please, I can furnish him with a sort of Christians in the Primitive Times, who made so little Conscience of Oaths, that *Jura, Perjura; Sacretum prodere noli*, is said to be a received Axiome amongst them; and if these are for his turn, I do not envy him their Company. But one great Artifice of our Author, is to take the out skirts, or some little snips of the Cause, and then put Questions as if we were concerned about nothing else, which is pitiful Sophistry; if he please to deal fairly, and take the whole Case together, he may take the liberty to ask as many Questions as he please, and I doubt not but he may be furnished with Answers. In the mean time I shall leave this matter here; and as for what follows, it coming not up so fairly to the Merits of the Cause, I shall be very short.

The next thing that comes upon the Stage, is, *Publick Good*, which, like the *Phoenix*, is born to destroy it self; for it is rarely used, but when all other Reasons fail; and commonly then most strongly pretended, when the Intention and Design is to destroy it. Much Fairer and Honefter it would be, if Men would plead the Justice and Righteousness of their Cause, and not thus justify the most shameless Treachery and prodigious Villany under the Disguises and false Pretences of Publick Good; but I must follow our Author, and it shall be as close as I can, that I may the sooner have

have done with him, and get into better Company. I did say, that the task his Author undertook would better become a *Committee-man or Sequestrator than a Divine of the Church of England*; and he grants that this had been true, provided it had been true that he undertook what I charge him with, *That the Publick Good will Warrant us to destroy a lawful King*. As to which I shall only ask this Question, Whether *K. J.* was our lawful *K.* or not? If he was, I think they have destroyed him as far as they can; that it is not done more effectually, is not for want of good Will, but of Power: And if I be not strangely mistaken, this is the thing which is defended, or which at least ought to be defended; for otherwise all the rest fails. Next he taxeth me, as having *either a bad Memory, or a very bad Conscience*, for saying, That his Author had not proved the matter in *Hypothesi, &c. in our particular Case*; now a bad Memory is no good thing, but a very bad Conscience is a very ill thing; but, I think, I have no great cause to accuse either in this Matter. For let them pretend what they will, particular Persons and Actions, and the thing as it really is, they will never be brought to; but here they always suppose Cases, which they would have People to believe is ours, or like ours, but never come home to the point. If they would give me leave, I would propound some Cases of Conscience, and name Persons and Actions; so that a direct Answer must unavoidably be given, or the trifling appear; but I would advise these Men not to talk too much of Conscience, least they should awaken her, and she should sing a Song in their Ears, and make their Hearts ache. But before he can come to the Matter, this learned Author in Romances, not being able to find out any thing more contemptible, compares me to *Don Quixot*; but he should have remembred, that he was a kind of a desperate Fellow, and there may be some hazard in undertaking such an Adversary; however, I believe, I shall never mistake him for an Enchanted Castle, or a Wind-mill, though, for any thing I know, he may have one in his Head.

Three Heads he propounds from my Discourse, of which the last is the Notion of Publick Good, and after his Landable Crab-

fashion, of going backward, he will needs begin with that; but at last I find we are agreed, That Publick Good is good for Somebody, but who that Somebody is, it seems we are not yet agreed; for, he says, it is not a *Personal Good*, and yet if it be not good for Persons, I am afraid it will prove good for no Body. If he had pleased, he might have observed, That I called the Publick Good a *Personal Good*, not with reference to Mens private separate Interest in detriment of the rest, but with respect to them as Persons in Society; and doubtless Publick Good is in its highest Exaltation, when it's Diffusive to all; but yet in some Cases particular Persons, or Parties may, and must suffer for the Preservation of the Community, and this I fairly owned, and if he would not see it, I cannot help it; but to argue as if I disowned any such thing, is very Disingenuous. But if there may be some Cases, wherein it may be the Glory of some to suffer; Yet will this prove it to be the Publick Good, for some Men to raise their Fortunes upon the Ruins of their Country? I think he might as well say, That a Man ought to set his House on fire on purpose, that three or four Thieves might have the opportunity to run away with the best of his Goods. I know not better how to compare the Publick Good of a Community, than to the safety of a human body, when every Part and Member is right, sound, and well disposed, and out of danger, it is certainly then best with it; but if a blow be made at me, I shall rather take it on my Arm than on my Head, though it was intended at my Head, and not at my Arm; and yet, I think, herein the Arm had no injustice from the Head or Body, though it had from the external Enemy, because the use of it in such case is to defend the Head, and it would have suffered more, if the blow had been taken there; and as to internal Distempers, some are removed by Cure, and every part preserved; but in case the whole be indangered by the disaffection of a part, then we come to Amputation, and spare not a Leg or Arm, or any Member, whereby the Body may be preserved sound, though not entire; but then this is a remedy which brings an irrecoverable loss, leaves a Maim for ever, and is never to be used but in

cases of absolute Necessity ; but then if the Distemper affect the Head or Heart, as all lawful Means ought to be used, so all Hazards must be run : For nothing can Warrant the cutting off the Head, or pulling out the Heart. Here the whole unavoidably must follow the fate of the part, and so the Remedy is worse than the Disease, and therefore under no pretence whatsoever to be practised. If it be objected, That the Head hath not the same Connexion with the Civil and with the Natural Body, and that the Civil Body may be preserved by a new Head, though not the Natural ; I Answer, First, That it is the safest Course for the Preservation of the Society to pay the same deference to the Civil Head as to the Natural ; and this, I think, our Constitutions do, by making the legal Succession of Kings to be the same Head, according to that known Axiome *Rex non moritur*. Secondly, That in any Body whatsoever it is most unnatural for the Body to conspire against, and destroy the Head. Thirdly, That in this respect the Civil Head hath a closer Connexion with the Body, than the Natural ; that the Ligaments between it and the Body are the Constitutions, so that let him be driven where he will, whilst he is alive and in Being, he will bear the Relation of the Head to the Body, while those Constitutions last. To alter these at pleasure, and Mens Rights with them, is the highest Injustice ; and the setting any other Head on than the Constitutions bear, most certainly puts the Body into strange Convulsions, and often ere long brings Ruin upon it. Beware a Common-wealth, my Masters ! Methinks I hear the Magpies, Daws, Crows and Rooks about the Town, begin to set their Notes that way.

But after all, let all, that can, be allowed to Publick Good ; yet it ought to be considered whether it be the particular Case, and whether the Publick Good be Secured or Advanced. And here it would be enquired, Whether Religion be better Secured to us ? Whether Mens Lives and Properties are more Safe ? How we encrease in Strength, in Trade, in Riches, and the like ? And though I do not admire our Gain, yet many of these Things are out of my way ; but there is a certain Tract, called the *DEAR BARGAIN*,

which speaks of these Things ; and if the Government would encourage that Author to write, I am perswaded he would quickly set that Controversie in the true Light ; and to him as the fittest Man I leave it.

The next thing is the Practicability of this Principle of Publick Good. Now whatever the Publick Good is, or whatever it may Warrant, yet if People are to make that their Rule, they will judge of it, and then every one will judge of Publick Good according to his own Interest and Persuasion ; and this by several Arguments I did prove would fill the World with Violence and Confusion. But he is so far from answering any of my Arguments, that he never mentioneth one of 'em as sensible that it would spoil all that he intended to sham on me afterwards. But very honestly he Sums up my Argument, as I neither laid nor meant it, and tells me, That the *Publick Good's being liable to be abused*, is an inconcluding Argument, not only because of the Inconsequence, but because *this is a way of Arguing, that may serve against any thing ; and if we put Publick Justice, or Laws, or Religion, or Reformation, into the place of Publick Good, it will hold in any of them as well as the other* : Grant this to be true, though it is of his own making ; yet will this conclude, that whoever pleads Publick Good, Religion, or Reformation, is necessarily in the Right ? And if it be so liable to be abused, Doth it not nearly concern us to examine well whether it be not abused ? When so many have been imposed upon by it, and even we ourselves so very lately almost to our utter Ruin, must we still be such Fools as to believe without more ado every bawling, or self-interested Fellow, who cries *Publick Good* ? For this Reason I did then fairly intimate, That *Publick Good* as a common Noise, or solitary Plea, is never to be admitted without such *Creations*, and other Evidences accompanying it, as may make it appear, that what is pleaded is real. And thus it will be in any of the Cases he supposeth ; if he please he may set up the cry of *Reformation*, and then the Church of England is for Reforming the Church of Rome ; yea, at this time perhaps one part of it is for Reforming another ; the Presbyterial would Reform them both, and the Independen

dent outdoeth him; and still the Anabaptist hath a Knack of Reforming further, and the Quaker he is for Reforming them all. Now let all these on Work, and encourage them by telling them, That the Plea of Reformation being liable to be abused is no Argument, but it is Inconsequent, and would reach to Publick Good, or any thing else; and if they were suffered to go on in this mad Humour, I am apt to think, that in a short time, they would reform away all Religion. And if therefore Reformation be required, we must not presently fall to altering or pulling down, but first enquire whether there be any thing that stands in need of Reformation. For if things be either well or near well, change is rarely for the better: But if there be discovered either such gross Errors, or intolerable Abuses as need Reformation, yet it must be done in a regular Course; for though there should be never so much need of Reformation, if you will allow all to be Publick Reformers, you will mend Religion worse than those Tinkers do Kettles, who, instead of stopping one hole, make two. And thus as to Publick Good, the bare Name of it is not enough, especially when such great Actions are pretended for the sake of it, as for any thing we know may prove fatal; and therefore when such a Pretence is set up, I think, there is a double Test whereby it ought to be tryed; for as a Civil Society we ought to examine such Pretences with their agreeableness to our Constitutions; for if they be contrary to them, they portend a Civil Destruction. But then as we are a Christian Society, this Pretence of Publick Good must be examined by the Rules of Righteousness, and the Gospel of the Blessed Jesus; and if Men will pretend for Publick Good, to disannul indispensable Duties, to destroy all Faith and Truth amongst Men, and to overthrow the very Nature of Good and Evil, by making it Changeable and Subservient to every present Turn and Occasion; this is the ready way to destroy not only the Civil Society, but the Christian Church. And if that which makes void Promises and Oaths, which evacuates God's Commandments, which transforms Treachery into Vertue, and either makes it lawful to do Evil that Good may come of it, or flatly says it is no Evil, if Good may happen

to come of it, (for I think there is not much Good come of it yet.) I say if this be not Destructive of the Evangelical Rule, I know not what can. And if disinterested Persons were to judge of Particulars in the present Case, I dread to think on which Side even a Moral Heathen would give the Verdict, to the Shame of such numbers of Christians.

The third thing proposed, is, *who shall be Judge?* i. e. either of the Mischiefe, or the Remedy. As to the former, he says, *The Case before us is supposed to be notorious*: It is indeed supposed, but it was never proved. Must we destroy a King and Government for the Shams and Slanders that malicious Men suppose in defence of their Wickedness? Two things indeed he mentions, which have a Tendency (as he saith) to *the Destruction of a Government, Desertion and Lunacy*. Now, if K. J. was Lunatick, this is the first time I have heard of it; but if he was, that is not a sufficient ground to depose him: Indeed it may warrant the setting up a Protector, or Regent, to act in his Name; but the Honour and Title still remain with him. This seems to be the Case of Edward III. who at the latter end of his Reign, being sensible of his Indisposition for Government, made Lionel, Duke of Clarence, Regent of the Realm. But this bereaved neither Edward III. his Father, nor Richard II. his Nephew, of their Right. As for Desertion, I think they ought not for shame to have named it, unless they had returned some better Answer to the Paper called *Desertion Discuss'd*, than imprisoning the Author. But he saith, I might as well have asked, *who shall be the Judge, whether the Banks are broken down in an Inundation, &c.* I hope he doth not mean an Inundation of Foreigners, Poverty, and Cruelty. But who is it hath broke the Banks, or made the Breaches? Or how are they repaired and amended? No doubt, but that now all is well, and we are out of danger, and as safe as Thieves in a Mill. But after all, he might have considered, That there is a great difference between judging in Naturals and Politicks. As to the Objects of my Senses, Nature hath made me the Judge, so that if I see the Water break in, or the Wall thrown down, I need not ask another, whether it be

to or no; but I am not so proper a Judge of the Tendency of my Superiours Actions, they being often moved by such Springs as I cannot see, and therefore can make no certain Judgment of them: And it is no strange thing for People to mistake these Actions when done, and not to know what is good for themselves. Thus the Earl of *Strafford* was accused for advancing Trade in *Ireland*, and for urging the necessity of the Interposition of the King's Authority, where the Letter of the Law was too severe upon his Subjects. And I could name the Person, who in Vindication of the Barbarity of the Kentish Men to a certain Person in Distress, urged his putting an Act in execution in those parts, than which, scarce any thing more tended to the Advancement of our Trade, as even he, who urged it, had formerly acknowledged. Thus some people will make even Health it self to be a Disease.

Now, if we are not well qualified to judge of the Evil, we are still more unfit to be judges of the Remedy. For it is a Madness to prate of applying a Cure to we know not what. But to put a stop here; he supposes Cases wherein the Supreme Governour may be a Party, and therefore not to be allowed to be judge in his own Case; But then will not his Subjects be a Party too? And if they in this Case must be allowed to be Judge over the Supreme Governour, What is this but to set a Supreme above a Supreme, whilst he himself grants, *That the Supreme Governour has no Supreme?* But it is an idle if not a wicked Thing to suppose such Cases without proving them, when such Supposals are made the Reason of their Actions: For at this rate no Government can be long-liv'd. When that is proved to be the Case, it is then time enough to discourse of what may be done by the Intreaties and Petitions of the People, and the Mediation of co-ordinate Powers, in order to set things to Rights. But let his Author say never so plainly, *That he doth not set up the Power of the People over Kings*, yet his Principles do; and Men act by those, whatever they may pretend or say to the contrary.

As to what concerns a *Body of Men*, he puts these two Questions from his Author. *Whether the Law of our Nation doth not bind us to Allegiance to a King and Queen in actual Posses-*

tion of the Throne by consent of the three Estates of the Realm? And whether such an Oath may not lawfully be taken, notwithstanding any former Oath? The affirmative he proves from *the Consent of the People, whose true Representatives*, (as he says) *they are*, I need not here examine of what Force is the Consent of the People, because the Foundation whereon he Grounds it, as to our present Case, is false: For the three Estates of the Realm are the King's three Estates, and they can neither be legal Estates, nor legal Representatives without the King's Authority, Writs, and Summons, and other Requisites. But, it seems, the Inquirer here put an unlucky Question. *Where or how can all the People meet?* Which he scornfully thus Answers. *As if the Author he opposes thought of no less than the numbering of the People from Dan to Beersheba.* But if he did not think of numbering them from *Dan to Beersheba*, he ought to have thought of numbering them from *Barwick to Dover*. For if the Government was not dissolved, Why goes it not according to the Constitution? If it was dissolved, than all Men were as free as it is possible for Men to be; and then no Man could represent another without his express Consent; and every ones Consent ought to be taken *Virum*; for whosoever did not give his Consent, did not come into your new Body, and his natural Freedom could not without Injustice be taken from him by Force.

When I thought we had been near an end, he is got again to the beginning; and when he was *thinking of closing*, in the very next Words, he propounds no less than three Heads of Discourse, which, he says, his *Author treated of towards the beginning*; but all amount to no more, but the old Cuckoo Note of Publick Good, and that it ought to over-rule every thing; as to which I might briefly Answer, That Publick Good is to be promoted in the way of Duty, not out of it; and this is very ill taken up for a Plea, where there is neither Publick Good nor Duty in the Matter they plead for. But he undertakes to prove the Matter by Instances, only they are Instances which have been already Answered, and he doth not handle them so dexterously as his Author. He begins with Parents and Children, an unlucky Omen: *If (saith he) a Vow*

to God (which is as solemn a Thing as an Oath) binds that good, which Children are bound to do to Parents, it ceaseth to oblige, as our Saviour declares: Very good. But the reason is, because that Vow never obliged at all, as being unlawful, and contrary to that which God and Nature had made a Duty of Childeren to Parents, though Wicked or Froward. I thought the Duty of Children to Parents had been Abdicated; at least, Sir, you ought to have overlook'd it. But I desire it may be observed, That, to make amends for this oversight, this very Author, who here makes the Duty of Childeren to Parents so Sacred that it makes void a Vow to God himself, within 3 Pages next following teacheth you a trick to vacate the Obligation of the Fifth Commandment.

But it seems I had said, That this was nothing to the purpose, and I think I there proved it: But he says, *it is to the purpose*, because *if the procuring and preserving the Publick Good be a Duty, and what a Person hath vowed or sworn be destructive of it, then the Oath cannot oblige, no more than a Vow, &c. (p. 28.)* But I say this also is nothing to the Purpose. For though the procuring and preserving the publick Good be a Duty, yet it doth not make every thing a Duty, which may tend towards it; and it must be procured and preserved only by means lawful and honest. If Children might murder their Parents for the Publick Good, such Parents as have large Estates and wicked Children, had need look out sharp; for Pretences, even of Publick Good, would not long be wanting to send them of an Errand to another World.

Whereas I had said, with respect to such Oath or Vow, That *the Sin was in making, &c.* he says this is true, *where the Matter is unlawful in it self*, but not where *the Obligation comes to cease*. And this I grant also to be true; but then a Man ought to be very well assured that the Obligation doth cease, for otherwise all the Arts and Shifts in the world will not absolve him from Perjury. And I insisted on the first, as being our Case; and therefore his Instance of the *Shew-bread* is beside the Matter: For though, as dedicated to God, it belonged to the Priests, yet it was never unlawful in it self for a Man to eat Bread; nor did such Dedication hinder the Priests from

being Charitable, and in case of necessity, relieving a good Man from being starved. And though it be the fashion of our days, not only to make Men poor, but by all means possible to hinder them from any Relief, that they may starve; yet he needed not to have gone to the *Jews* for an Instance, but might have told us of Christian Bishops, who in times of Famine have sold the Riches of their Churches, to buy Food for the Poor; and Posterity hath honoured their Memory for it. As for his Story of *Jaddus*, I will not trouble my self to call it in question; it will be somewhat to the Purpose when he can prove these three things, 1. That *Jaddus* and the *Jews* took an Oath to *Alexander*: I find no such thing in the Story; and he knows that we do not deny all manner of Submission to Force. 2. That *Darius* was living when *Jaddus* made the Submission. 3. That we have the same Authority, Warrant, and Directions, which *Jaddus* and the *Jews* had; as to which last, he may do very well to address himself to a certain Person, whom he very well knows, and try if he can find it in the *Revelations*.

The next Instance is of *the Parents Part to Children*, as to which he cites these words from his Author; *If Parents, instead of regarding the Good of their Children, do openly design their Ruine, none will say but that they are bound to take Care of their own Wellfare*. They are so; but yet even then there is a Duty owing from those Children to those Parents. But in order to take off my Answer there given, as if he had received a double Portion of *Hugh Peters's* Spirit, he falls to his blackening Arts, and with the help of *Flam-Supposals* and notorious *Falshoods*, represents as indulgent a Father as perhaps lived, as if he were another *Saturn*, who devoured his own Issue; and then he thinks the Child *may enter upon the Estate, and keep Possession against his Parent, &c.* and then triumphantly asks this question, *May not all this be done, and the Fifth Commandment stand in its full Force?* Yes, Sir! the Fifth Commandment will be in force, and you and others, some time or other, will find so; but as you order the Matter here, you make it either of no Force, or of Force to very ill purpose; for so I take it to be, when it lays no other Obligation upon the Child, but

but to dispossess the Father of his Estate, or to knock out his Brains. Do not you think you have done an Heroick Act, thus to dispute away the fifth Commandment? But at this rate, I am afraid you will paint *White-Chapel* black, and make People doubtful, how he is a Preacher of Righteousness, who devises Tricks to take away the Obligation of God's Commandments.

The third Instance is of *Masters and Servants, Vassals and Captives; and in these* (his Author says) *there is a Regard had to the Benefit of those, who are in Subjection.* This I did grant, but withall deny, That any Consequence could be drawn thence, which would be for his turn. But here he accuseth me of Ignorance, Nonsense, Blunders, and what not, and all along after speaks in such insolent language, as I think is only fit to be despised; and therefore I will not do him the Pleasure to take any farther notice of it: Only I think it disingenuous to cite my Words by the halves, and then cry out of *Nonsense and Inconsistencies.* But it was impudence, as soon as this was done, to repeat the following Words, which both make them Sense, and take away all Inconsistency. But to my Argument he answers, *That being under Government (rightly so called,) doth not Metamorphose us into Beasts; yet mere absolute Power comes very near it.* I know not what he means by his *Government (rightly so called;)* I hope it is not Usurpation. That Parenthesis would better have become another, than him. But his Answer is neither to the purpose, nor true: For there neither is nor can be any Government, but somewhere there is lodg'd in it that, which he calls *an absolute Power;* and thus in his way of Arguing, he hath near *Metamorphos'd* all Mankind into Beasts, unless there be any such as are under no Government at all. I as heartily wish, as he or any other Man can, That Power may be well used; and yet I think I ought to be content to allow my Governours their Failings, without mutinying against them, and displacing them: This would be, not only endless, but to condemn our selves; for if it were said to us, *he that is without Sin, let him cast the first stone,* I doubt you would scarce find one to begin the Work. His Distinction of a *private Injury* from that

wherein the Publick is concerned, is not practicable upon his Principle: For let it be made lawful on any account to depose the supreme Governour, and the least and most private Injury imaginable shall be interpreted a Breach of the Subjects Privilege in general, and consequently against the Publick Good. But there will be no need for this, according to his Principle. For if the *antecedent Good* (as he calls it) be so the *Measure of the Obligation, as to dissolve it,* when that is wanting, every Man will be prone to think his own particular Good to be as much that antecedent Good, as any thing he can call publick; and consequently if he be wronged, will take himself to be absolved from his Allegiance. This is an admirable way to make Government firm and stable.

The last Relation he mentions is between Princes and their Subjects, as to which, the only material thing he says, is, *That the Nature of Political Oaths is such, that they are reciprocal.* Now though I do not think this will hold, yet to what purpose should I enter into a Discourse about Oaths, when our Business is with the Duties, which were antecedent to the Oaths, and to the Performance of which we are more strongly bound by those Oaths! These undoubtedly are not reciprocal: For if the Subject will not do his Duty, or absolutely deny it, doth this deprive the King of his Right to Sovereignty? At this rate indeed we may depose Kings, and transfer Allegiance at pleasure. It were a very happy thing, if the Duties of Relations were always justly and mutually paid; but if there be (as too often there is) a Failure on the one part, it doth not discharge the Obligations of the other. Children owe a Duty to wicked Parents, Servants to hard Masters, Subjects to severe Kings; though it were much better, if they had more Encouragement to perform their Obligations.

Every Cur will be snarling at the dead Lyon, whom otherwise he durst not look in the Face. The Actions, Writings, and Reputation of Dr. *Hammond* and Bishop *Sanderjot* were enough to blast these Proceedings; and therefore almost every Scribler for the last Treachery doth all he can to lessen the Esteem in the World. I had particular occa-

tion to vindicate Bishop Sanderson; but he tells me I mistake between *what the Consent of the absent Prince is founded upon, and upon what the Casuists found their Opinion of the Obligation that lies on Mankind to do what tends to the Publick Good under a Ujurpation*; and this he calls teaching me *A. B. C.* and indeed I think he is much fitter to teach *A. B. C.* than so great a Congregation, unless he had more Conscience and Honesty. However, I will not learn my *A. B. C.* of him, if it were only for this Reason, that I have no mind to learn it backward. But if he please to look into his Author again, with a more impartial Eye, he will find that he invidiously and maliciously endeavours to charge and undervalue Bishop Sanderson, as founding the Actions of Subjects under a Ujurpation on such a Reason as other Casuists did not; and as if he made the presumptive Will of the Prince the sole Reason: And in this Case, I think I had Reason to urge, That he founded the presumptive Consent of the Prince upon the Publick Good; and I shall not willingly suffer so great a Person to be scandalized, let him put his *B's* and *C's* how he will.

The last Head he propounds is *of Obedience to Authority*, which if it had been more thought of, and better observed, there had been no occasion to dispute about it now: And I wonder with what face those Men can name *Obedience to Authority*, who make it their whole Business to justify Disobedience to Authority. Here, after some little Wit, and much trifling, and the Charge of some Mistakes upon me, which I think might be easily returned, but I will not spend time about it, because they come not up to the Case; at last he replies to my Answer concerning the Case of the *Jews*: And this is the only thing material he offers under this Head. My first Answer, *That the Jews being governed by one of their own Brethren was designed as a Blessing, the contrary was a Judgment*, he doth not deny: But he would thence infer this Consequence, *That therefore they might not lawfully transfer their Allegiance from their own Blood to a Foreigner*. And this he thinks he can prove false. But I do not know how that consequence follows from my Words. The

Jews spontaneously, wantonly, and by their own Authority, could not transfer their Allegiance; but when God, for their Sins, deprived them of a particular Privilege and Blessing, and put them under the Power of others, and they knew it was his Will it should be so; they were then bound to obey. And thus *Nehemiah* might serve as *Governour under Artaxerxes*, and *Jaddus* take an Oath of Fidelity to *Darius*. And hence you see on *what Right the Oath was founded*.

Next I urged, that they were under a state of Conquest, this he doth neither deny, nor own it to be our Case; and unless he doth this latter, whatever he infers thence, whether true or false, cannot affect us. And therefore I am not further concerned to answer a Man, who labours to make acts of Violence to be standing Rules for all Seasons.

In the third place I did (as he says) urge, *That the Question to our Saviour was not concerning Oaths, but Tribute, which he grants all Casuists do allow may be paid, even to an Usurper*. But then he says, *I know what Use, and what Gain too, my Adversary made of this*. But if he made an ill Use of it, how can I help it? Must I Answer for that? As for his Gain, if he mean a Bishoprick, it is something; but as to the Merits of the Cause I cannot see, that he hath Gained any thing. But after all, both the Use and Gain, is an Argument borrowed from *Dr. Burnet*, which runs to this purpose; if Submission may be testified one way, why not another? If Tribute may be paid, why not promised? If promised, why not sworn? And then he asks, *Is it not as a Token of Allegiance?* The Answer is plain. I may submit wherein it may be done lawfully, but not wherein it is unlawful. I may pay Money to a Thief, I may promise it, yea such may be my Streights and Dangers, that I may swear to do it; and yet this is not as a Token of Allegiance, which all that time is due to my King, and ought not to be made over to a Thief; it is the Redemption of my Life, or Goods, and the choosing a less Evil rather than a greater in a case, wherein I may do it without Sin. For in such case, I think, I may lawfully part with my own, though it is unlawful for the other to take it. And if this Answer will not please him, he may still call me Fool, as he here

here doth; I like the Title much better than Knave, though I am fond of neither.

Lastly, With respect to *Tiberius* it was urged, that no Man had *jus potius*, and that there was no prior Oaths, in bar against him; as to which he Answers, That *Agrippa Posthumus* was then living, one much nearer to *Augustus*, and that seem'd designed by him to succeed him. What he means by *seem'd designed* I cannot tell. Was he really designed, or not? It is a common thing for Relations to waver in their Thoughts, which way they shall bestow their Favours, and sometimes it is a piece of Art; but if *Tiberius* was designed (as he calls it) at last, the Cause is so far cast. But because this will not do, he says, That there was a *jus potius* in the Senate, from whom even *Augustus* was willing to receive it. But if *Augustus*, who was before *Tiberius*, did receive the Senates Right, then their Right was gone before *Tiberius's* time, and so the *jus potius* is good on his side still. Beside by their own Laws they might make a Dictator, and they had actually made *Julius Caesar* perpetual Dictator, who was before them both, and in that very act gave away their Power; so that their giving up to *Augustus*, was but Selling their Estate twice. And after all, his Author confesses they swore Allegiance to *Tiberius*; and where was then their *jus potius*? As to the prior Oaths he asks me, *What I think of the Oath of Jaddus to Darius, &c.*? And in requital I ask him again, What is that in bar to the Title of *Tiberius*? So that if *Tiberius* was as bad a Man as he represents him, (and indeed I never thought him a Saint, though for his Art in Dissimulation he might have been qualified for one in these times) yet in spite of our Author his Title will prove the best he can set up.

As to the better Title, which he saith he will adventure to set before me, he may keep it to himself; he hath offered his Ware to a wrong Chapman: But for his Kindness I will leave him this Remark, That when the Children of *Israel* forsook the living God to worship Graven Images, the greater part were always more zealous for their Idols than for the true God.

In the Conclusion I find, that our Author is suppositious of the force of his Arguments; for he will not lead me to the Tribunal of Heaven, but threatens me with being called to account here, and I do not question but that he will do his endeavour, nor do I crave any Favour at his Hands: He that calls me to Sufferings, I hope will enable me to bear them; and in such case I have no other Remedy, but to appeal to the just God, before whom one Day we shall have a Rehearing. And when it comes to my Thoughts how a Turk at *Buda*, laying his Hand on his Brest, promised not to yield up the Town but with his Life, and in pursuance of his Word so Manfully defended it, that it cost a victorious Army dear, and took up almost two Summers Work, and when the Place was Untenable any longer might have made honourable Conditions, yet rather than break his Promise, chose to stand in the Breach, in his Drawers, and tempt and defie Death; it amazeth me to think, who shall rise up in Judgment against this Treacherous and Perfidious Generation. O God of Goodness and Compassion! in the midst of Judgment think on Mercy, have Pity upon this poor distressed Church, and give Men a Sense of that Simplicity, Sincerity, and Integrity, which thy Law so highly extols and strictly requires of all who call themselves Christians.

F I N I S.